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-The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Mystical Element of Religion, as
-studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa , by Baron Friedrich von Hügel
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: The Mystical Element of Religion, as studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her friends, Volume 2 (of 2)
-
-Author: Baron Friedrich von Hügel
-
-Release Date: October 14, 2015 [EBook #50206]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MYSTICAL ELEMENT OF RELIGION, VOL 2 ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Julie Barkley and the Online Distributed
-Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
-
-
-
-
-
-TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE: Volume I is available as Project Gutenberg ebook
-number 50205.
-
-
-
-
-
- THE MYSTICAL ELEMENT
- OF RELIGION
-
- _All rights reserved._
-
- [Illustration: _The Venerable Battista Vernazza
- (Tommasina Vernazza)
- 1497-1587._]
-
- THE MYSTICAL ELEMENT
- OF RELIGION AS STUDIED
- IN SAINT CATHERINE OF
- GENOA AND HER FRIENDS
-
- BY BARON FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL
- MEMBER OF THE CAMBRIDGE PHILOLOGICAL SOCIETY
-
- [Illustration]
-
- VOLUME SECOND
- CRITICAL STUDIES
-
- LONDON: J. M. DENT & CO.
- NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO.
- MCMVIII
-
- RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED,
- BREAD STREET HILL, E.C., AND
- BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.
-
-
-
-
-CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME
-
-
-The frontispiece consists of a reduced facsimile, in photogravure, of
-a lithograph by F. Scotto, entitled “Ven. Batta. Vernazza,” which
-was printed and owned by the firm of Gervasoni, and which appeared
-in the large 4to volume, _Ritratti, ed Elogi di Liguri Illustri_,
-with the text printed by Ponthenier, all in Genoa. This book was
-published there, in monthly parts, from 1823 to 1830. Scotto’s highly
-characteristic lithograph no doubt reproduces an authentic likeness;
-and probably the original portrait was, in the first instance, owned
-by the Canonesses of S. Maria delle Grazie, Battista’s own convent
-in Genoa. The picture now in the possession of the Nuns of S. Maria
-in Passione, the successors of those Canonesses, is of a quite
-conventional, secondary type.
-
- PAGE
-
- PART III.--CRITICAL
-
- CHAPTER IX.--PSYCHO-PHYSICAL AND TEMPERAMENTAL QUESTIONS 3-61
-
- Introductory 3-9
-
- I. Catherine’s Third Period, 1497-1510 9-13
-
- II. Conclusions concerning Catherine’s Psycho-physical
- Condition during this Last Period 14-21
-
- III. Catherine’s Psycho-physical Condition, its Likeness and
- Unlikeness to Hysteria 22-27
-
- IV. First Period of Catherine’s Life, 1447-1477, in its Three
- Stages 28-32
-
- V. The Second, Great Middle Period of Catherine’s Life,
- 1477-1499 32-40
-
- VI. Three Rules which seem to govern the Relations between
- Psycho-physical Peculiarities and Sanctity in general 40-47
-
- VII. Perennial Freshness of the Great Mystics’ Main Spiritual
- Test, in Contradistinction to their Secondary, Psychological
- Contention. Two Special Difficulties 47-61
-
- CHAPTER X.--THE MAIN LITERARY SOURCES OF CATHERINE’S
- CONCEPTIONS 62-110
-
- Introductory 62, 63
-
- I. The Pauline Writings: the Two Sources of their
- Pre-Conversion Assumptions; Catherine’s Preponderant
- Attitude towards each Position 63-79
-
- II. The Joannine Writings 79-90
-
- III. The Areopagite Writings 90-101
-
- IV. Jacopone da Todi’s “Lode” 102-110
-
- V. Points common to all Five Minds; and Catherine’s Main
- Difference from her Four Predecessors 110
-
- CHAPTER XI.--CATHERINE’S LESS ULTIMATE THIS-WORLD DOCTRINES 111-181
-
- Introductory 111, 112
-
- I. Interpretative Religion 112-121
-
- II. Dualistic Attitude towards the Body 121-129
-
- III. Quietude and Passivity. Points in this Tendency to be
- considered here 129-152
-
- IV. Pure Love, or Disinterested Religion: its Distinction
- from Quietism 152-181
-
- CHAPTER XII.--THE AFTER-LIFE PROBLEMS AND DOCTRINES 182-258
-
- I. The Chief Present-day Problems, Perplexities, and
- Requirements with Regard to the After-Life in General 182-199
-
- II. Catherine’s General After-Life Conceptions 199-218
-
- III. Catherine and Eternal Punishment 218-230
-
- IV. Catherine and Purgatory 230-246
-
- V. Catherine and Heaven--Three Perplexities to be considered 246-258
-
- CHAPTER XIII.--THE FIRST THREE ULTIMATE QUESTIONS 259-308
-
- I. The Relations between Morality and Mysticism, Philosophy
- and Religion 259-275
-
- II. Mysticism and the Limits of Human Knowledge and Experience 275-290
-
- III. Mysticism and the Question of Evil 290-308
-
- CHAPTER XIV.--THE TWO FINAL PROBLEMS: MYSTICISM AND PANTHEISM,
- THE IMMANENCE OF GOD, AND SPIRITUAL PERSONALITY, HUMAN AND
- DIVINE 309-340
-
- Introductory 309, 310
-
- I. Relations between the General and the Particular, God and
- Individual Things, according to Aristotle, the Neo-Platonists,
- and the Medieval Strict Realists 310-319
-
- II. Relations between God and the Human Soul 319-325
-
- III. Mysticism and Pantheism: their Differences and Points of
- Likeness 325-335
-
- IV. The Divine Immanence; Spiritual Personality 336-340
-
- CHAPTER XV.--SUMMING-UP OF THE WHOLE BOOK. BACK THROUGH
- ASCETICISM, SOCIAL RELIGION, AND THE SCIENTIFIC HABIT OF MIND,
- TO THE MYSTICAL ELEMENT OF RELIGION 341-396
-
- I. Asceticism and Mysticism 341-351
-
- II. Social Religion and Mysticism 351-366
-
- III. The Scientific Habit and Mysticism 367-386
-
- IV. Final Summary and Return to the Starting-point of the Whole
- Inquiry: the Necessity, and yet the Almost Inevitable Mutual
- Hostility, of the Three Great Forces of the Soul and of the
- Three Corresponding Elements of Religion 387-396
-
- INDEX 397
-
-
-
-
-THE MYSTICAL ELEMENT OF RELIGION
-
-
-
-
-PART III
-
-CRITICAL
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER IX
-
-PSYCHO-PHYSICAL AND TEMPERAMENTAL QUESTIONS
-
-
-INTRODUCTORY.
-
-
-1. _Plan of Part Three._
-
-The picture of Catherine’s life and teaching which was attempted in the
-previous volume will, I hope, have been sufficiently vivid to stimulate
-in the reader a desire to try and go deeper, and to get as near as may
-be to the driving forces, the metaphysical depths of her life. And
-yet it is obvious that, if we would understand something of these, we
-must proceed slowly and thoroughly, and must begin with comparatively
-superficial questions. Or rather, we must begin by studying her
-temperamental and psycho-physical endowment and condition, and then the
-literary influences that stimulated and helped to mould these things,
-as though all this were not secondary and but the material and occasion
-of the forces and self-determinations to be considered later on.
-
-
-2. _Defects of ancient psycho-physical theory._
-
-Now as to those temperamental and neural matters, to which this chapter
-shall be devoted, the reader will, no doubt long ago, have discovered
-that it is precisely here that not a little of the _Vita e Dottrina_
-is faded and withered beyond recall, or has even become positively
-repulsive to us. The constant assumption, and frequent explicit
-insistence, on the part of more or less all the contributors, upon the
-immediate and separate significance, indeed the directly miraculous
-character, of certain psycho-physical states--states which, taken
-thus separately, would now be inevitably classed as most explicable
-neural abnormalities,--all this atmosphere of nervous high-pitch and
-tremulousness has now become a matter demanding a difficult historical
-imagination and magnanimity, if we would be just to those who held such
-views, and would thus benefit to the full from these past positions and
-misconceptions.
-
-Thus when we read the views of perhaps all her educated attendants:
-“this condition, in which her body remained alive without food or
-medicine, was a supernatural thing”; “her state was clearly understood
-to be supernatural when, in so short a time, so great a change was
-seen”; and “she became yellow all over,--a manifest sign that her
-humanity was being entirely consumed in the fire of divine love”:[1]
-we feel indeed that we can no more follow. And when we read, as part
-of one of the late additions, the worthless legends gathered from, or
-occasioned by, the uneducated Argentina: “in proof that she bore the
-stigmata within her,--on putting her hands in a cup of cold water, the
-latter became so boiling hot that it greatly heated the very saucer
-beneath it”:[2] we are necessarily disgusted. And when, worst of all,
-she is made, by a demonstrable, probably double misinterpretation of an
-externally similar action, to burn her bare arm with a live charcoal
-or lighted candle, with intent to see which fire, this external one or
-that interior one of the divine love, were the greater:[3] we can, even
-if we have the good fortune of being able, by means of the critical
-analysis of the sources, to put this absurd story to the discredit of
-her eulogists, but feel the pathos of such well-meant perversity, which
-took so sure a way for rendering ridiculous one who, take her all in
-all, is so truly great.[4]
-
-
-3. _Slow growth of Neurology._
-
-We should, of course, be very patient in such matters: for
-psycho-physical knowledge was, as yet, in its very infancy, witness
-the all-important fact that the nerves were, in our modern sense of
-the term, still as unknown as they were to the whole of Graeco-Roman
-antiquity, with which “neuron” and “nervus” ever meant “muscle” or
-“ligament” and, derivatively, “energy,” but never consciously what
-they now mean in the strict medical sense. Thus the _Vita_ (1551)
-writes: “There remained no member or muscle (nervo) of her body that
-was not tormented by fire within it”; “one rib was separated from
-the others, with great pains in the ligaments (_nervi_) and bones”;
-and “all her body was excruciated and her muscles (_nervi_) were
-tormented”:[5] where, in the first and last case, visible muscular
-convulsive movements are clearly meant. St. Teresa, in her own _Life_
-(1561 or 1562), writes: “Nervous pains, according to the physicians,
-are intolerable; and all my nerves were shrunk”; and “if the rapture
-lasts, all the nerves are made to feel it.”[6] Even Fénelon (died
-1715) can still write of the human body: “The bones sustain the flesh
-which envelops them; the nerves” (ligaments, minor muscles) “which
-are stretched along them, constitute all their strength; and the
-muscles, by inflation and elongation at the points where the nerves
-are intertwined with them, produce the most precise and regular
-movements.”[7] Here the soul acts directly upon the muscles, and,
-through these and their dependent ligaments, upon the bones and the
-flesh.
-
-
-4. _Permanent values of the ancient theory._
-
-And yet that old position with regard to the rarer psycho-physical
-states has a right to our respectful and sympathetic study.
-
-For one thing, we are now coming again to recognize, more and more,
-how real and remarkable are certain psycho-physical states and facts,
-whether simply morbid or fruitfully utilized states, so long derided,
-by the bulk of Scientists, as mere childish legend or deliberate
-imposture; and to see how natural, indeed inevitable it was, that
-these, at that time quite inexplicable, things should have been
-attributed to a direct and discontinuous kind of Divine intervention.
-We, on our part, have then to guard against the Philistinism both
-of the Rationalists and of the older Supernaturalists, and will
-neither measure our assent to facts by our ability to explain them,
-nor postulate the unmediated action of God wherever our powers of
-explanation fail us. On this point we have admirable models of
-sympathetic docility towards facts, in the works of Prof. Pierre Janet,
-in his medico-psychological investigations of present-day morbid
-cases; of Hermann Gunkel and Heinrich Weinel, in their examination of
-mostly healthy psycho-physical phenomena in early Christian times and
-writings; and of William James, in his study of instances of various
-kinds, both past and present.[8]
-
-And next, these (at first sight physical) phenomena are turning out,
-more and more, to be the direct or indirect consequence of the action
-of mind: no doubt, in the first instance, of the human mind, but still
-of mind, both free-willing and automatically operative. And at the same
-time this action is, more and more, seen to be limited and variously
-occasioned by the physical organism, and to be accompanied or followed,
-in a determinist fashion, by certain changes in that organism. Yet if
-we have now immeasurably more knowledge than men had, even fifty years
-ago, of this latter ceaselessly active, limiting, occasioning influence
-of the body upon the mind, we have also immeasurably more precise and
-numerous facts and knowledge in testimony of the all but boundless
-effect of mind over body. Here, again, Prof. Janet’s writings, those
-of Alfred Binet, and the Dominican Père Coconnier’s very sensible book
-register a mass of material, although of the morbid type.[9]
-
-And further, such remarkable peripheral states and phenomena are
-getting again to be rightly looked for in at least some types of
-unusual spiritual insight and power (although such states are found to
-be indicative, in exact proportion to the spiritual greatness of their
-subject, of a substantially different mental and moral condition of
-soul). Witness again the Unitarian Prof. James’s _Varieties_, and the
-Church-Historical works of the Broad Lutheran German scholars Weinel,
-Bernoulli, and Duhm.[10]
-
-And lastly, the very closeness with which modern experimental and
-analytical psychology is exploring the phenomena of our consciousness
-is once more bringing into ever-clearer relief the irrepressible
-metaphysical apprehensions and affirmations involved and implied by
-the experience of every human mind, from its first dim apprehension
-in infancy of a “something,” as yet undifferentiated by it into
-subjective and objective, up to its mature and reflective affirmation
-of the trans-subjective validity of its “positions,” or at least of its
-negations--pure scepticism turning out to be practically impossible.
-Here we have, with respect to that apprehension, such admirable workers
-as Henri Bergson in France, and Professors Henry Jones and James
-Ward in England; and, for this affirmation, such striking thinkers
-as the French Maurice Blondel, and the Germans Johannes Volkelt and
-Hugo Münsterberg. And Mgr. Mercier of Louvain, now Cardinal Mercier,
-has contributed some valuable criticism of certain points in these
-positions.[11]
-
-
-5. _Difficulties of this inquiry._
-
-Now here I am met at once by two special difficulties, the one
-personal to myself and to Catherine, and the other one of method.
-For, with regard to those three first sets of recent explorations of
-a psycho-physical kind, I am no physician at all, and not primarily
-a psychologist. And again, in Catherine’s instance, the evidence as
-to her psycho-physical states is not, as with St. Teresa and some few
-other cases, furnished by writings from the pen of the very person who
-experienced them, and it is at all copious and precise only for the
-period when she was admittedly ill and physically incapacitated.--And
-yet these last thirteen years of her life occupy a most prominent
-place in her biography; it is during, and on occasion of, those
-psycho-physical states, and largely with the materials furnished by
-them, that, precisely in those years, she built up her noblest legacy,
-her great Purgatorial teaching; the illness was (quite evidently) of a
-predominantly psychical type, and concerns more the psychologist than
-the physician, being closely connected with her particular temperament
-and type of spirituality, a temperament and type to be found again and
-again among the Saints. All this and more makes it simply impossible
-for me to shrink from some study of the matter, and permits me to hope
-for some success in attempting, slowly and cautiously, to arrive at
-certain general conclusions of a spiritually important kind.
-
-But then there is also the difficulty of method. For if we begin
-the study of these psycho-physical peculiarities and states by
-judging them from the temperamental and psychological standpoint,
-we can hardly escape from treating them, at least for the moment,
-as self-explanatory, and hence from using these our preliminary
-conclusions about such neural phenomena as the measure, type, and
-explanation of and for all such other facts and apprehensions as our
-further study of the religious mind and experience may bring before
-us. In this wise, these our psychological conclusions would furnish
-not only a negative test and positive material, but also the exclusive
-standard for all further study. And such a procedure, until and unless
-it were justified in its method, would evidently be nothing but a
-surreptitious begging of the question.--Yet to begin with the fullest
-analysis of the elementary and normal phenomena of consciousness and
-of its implications and inviolable prerequisites, would too readily
-land us in metaphysics which have themselves to operate in and with
-those immediate and continuous experiences; and hence these latter
-experiences, whether normal and healthy, or, as here, unusual and in
-part _maladif_, must be carefully studied first. We have, however,
-to guard most cautiously against our allowing this, our preliminary,
-analysis and description of psycho-physical states from imperceptibly
-blocking the way to, or occupying the ground of, our ultimate analysis
-and metaphysical synthesis and explanation. Only this latter will be
-able, by a final movement from within-outwards, to show the true place
-and worth of the more or less phenomenal series, passed by us in review
-on our previous movement from outside-inwards.
-
-6. _Threefold division._
-
-I propose, then, in this chapter, to take, as separately as is
-compatible with such a method, the temperamental, psycho-physical side
-of Catherine’s life. I shall first take those last thirteen years
-of admitted illness, as those which are alone at all fully known to
-us by contemporary evidence.--I shall then make a jump back to her
-first period,--to the first sixteen years up to her marriage, with
-the next ten years of relaxation, and the following four years of
-her conversion and active penitence. I take these next, because,
-of these thirty years, we have her own late memories, as registered
-for us by her disciples, at the time of her narration of the facts
-concerned.--And only then, with these materials and instruments thus
-gathered from after and before, shall I try to master the (for us
-very obscure) middle period, and to arrive at some estimate of her
-temperamental peripheral condition during these twenty years of her
-fullest expansion.--I shall conclude the chapter by taking Catherine
-in her general, lifelong temperament, and by comparing and contrasting
-this type and modality of spiritual character and apprehension with the
-other rival forms of, and approaches to, religious truth and goodness
-as these are furnished for us by history.
-
-The ultimate metaphysical questions and valuation are reserved for the
-penultimate chapter of my book.
-
-
-I. CATHERINE’S THIRD PERIOD, 1497 TO 1510.
-
-
-1. _Increasing illness of Catherine’s last years._
-
-Beginning with her third and last period (1497-1510), there can be no
-doubt that throughout it she was ill and increasingly so. Her closest
-friends and observers attest it. It is presumably Ettore Vernazza who
-tells us, for 1497, “when she was about fifty years of age, she ceased
-to be able to attend either to the Hospital or to her own house, owing
-to her great bodily weakness. Even on Fast-days she was obliged, after
-Holy Communion, to take some food to sustain her strength.” Probably
-Marabotto it is who tells us that, in 1499, “after twenty-five years
-she could no further bear her spiritual loneliness, either because of
-old age or because of her great bodily weakness.” We hear from a later
-Redactor that, “about nine years before her death (_i.e._ about 1501),
-there came to her an infirmity.” And then, especially from November
-1509, May 1510, and August 1510 onwards, she is declared and described
-as more and more ill.[12] Indeed she herself, both by her acts and by
-her words, emphatically admits her incapacitation. For it is clearly
-ill-health which drives her to abandon the Matronship and even all
-minor continuous work for the Hospital. In her Wills we find indeed
-that, as late as May 21, 1506, she was able to get to the neighbouring
-Hospital for Incurables; and that even on November 27, 1508 she was
-“healthy in mind and body.” But her Codicil of January 5, 1503, was
-drawn up in the presence of nine witnesses at midnight,--a sure sign of
-some acute ill-health. Indeed already on July 23, 1484, she is lying
-“infirm in bed, in her room in the Women’s quarter of the Hospital,
-oppressed with bodily infirmity.”[13]
-
-
-2. _Abnormal sensations, impressions and moods._
-
-Her attendants are all puzzled by the multitude and intensity, the
-mobility and the self-contradictory character of the psycho-physical
-manifestations. Perhaps already before 1497 “she would press thorny
-rose-twigs in both her hands, and this without any pain”; and so
-late as about three weeks before her death “she remained paralyzed
-(_manca_),” and no doubt anaesthetic “in one (the right) hand and in
-one finger of the other hand.”--Probably again before 1497 “her body
-could not,” at times, “be moved from the sitting posture without the
-application of force.” In February or March 1510 “she could not move
-out of her bed”; in August, “on some occasions she could not move
-the lips or the tongue, or the arms or legs, unless helped to do
-so,--especially on the left side,--and this would, at times, last three
-or four hours.”--In December 1509 “she suffered from great cold,” as
-part of her peculiar condition; on September 4, 1510, “she suffered
-from great cold in the right arm.”[14]
-
-On other occasions she is, on the contrary, intensely hyper-aesthetic.
-Some time in February or March 1510, “for a day and a night, her flesh
-could not be touched, because of the great pain that such touching
-caused her.” At the end of August “she was so sensitive, that it was
-impossible to touch her very bedclothes or the bedstead, or a single
-hair on her head, because in such case she would cry out as though she
-had been grievously wounded.”--These states seem to have been usually
-accompanied by sensations of great heat: for on the former occasion
-“she seemed like a creature placed in a great flame of fire”; whilst on
-the latter “she had her tongue and lips so inflamed, that they seemed
-as though actual fire.”
-
-And movement appears to have been more often increased than diminished.
-In the last case indeed “she did not move nor speak nor see; but, when
-thus immovable, she suffered more than when she could cry out and
-turn about in her bed.” But in the former instance “she could not be
-kept in bed”; and in April 1510 “she cried aloud, and could not keep
-herself from moving about, on her bed, on hands and feet.”--There
-are curious localizations of apparently automatic movements. During
-an attack somewhere in March 1510 “her flesh was all in a tremble,
-particularly the right shoulder”; on later occasions “an arm, a leg, a
-hand would tremble, and she would seem to have a spasm within her, with
-all-but-unbroken acute pains in the flanks, the shoulders, the abdomen,
-the feet and the brain.” On an earlier occasion “her body writhed in
-great distress.” On another day “she seemed all on fire and lost her
-power of speech, and made signs with her head and hands.” On one day
-in February or March 1510 “she lost both speech and sight, though not
-her intelligence”; and on September 12 “her sight was so weak, that she
-could hardly any further distinguish or recognize her attendants.”--The
-heat is liable to be curiously localized. Early in September 1510 “she
-had a great heat situated in and on her left ear, which lasted for
-three hours; the ear was red and felt very hot to the touch of others.”
-
-Various kinds of haemorrhage are not uncommon. On the last-mentioned
-occasion bloody urine is passed; bleeding of the nose, with loss of
-bile, occurs in December 1509; very black blood is lost by the mouth,
-whilst black spots appear all over her person, on September 12, 1510;
-and more blood is evacuated on the following day. In February or March
-1510 “there were in her flesh certain places which had become concave,
-like as paste looks where a finger has been put into it.” At the end of
-August 1510 “her skin became saffron-yellow all over.”
-
-Troubles of breathing and of heart-action are frequently acute.
-Somewhere about March 1510 “she had such a spasm in her throat and
-mouth as to be unable, for about an hour, to speak or to open her
-eyes, and that she could hardly regain her breath.” “Cupping-glasses
-were applied to her side, to ease her heart, and lung-action, but with
-little effect.” On one occasion “she made signs indicative of feeling
-as though burning pincers were seizing her heart”; and on a day soon
-after “she felt like a hard nail at her heart.”[15]
-
-Disturbances of the power of swallowing and of nutrition are often
-grave and sudden, and in curious contradiction to her abnormally acute
-and shifting longing for and revulsion from certain specific kinds of
-food. On August 22, 1510, “she was so thirsty that she felt as though
-she could drink up the very ocean”; “yet she could not,” in fact,
-“manage to swallow even one little drop of water.” On September 10
-“her attendants continuously gave her drinking water; but she would
-straightway return it from her mouth.” And on September 12, “whilst
-her mouth was being bathed, she exclaimed, ‘I am suffocating,’--and
-this because a drop of water had trickled down her throat--a drop which
-she was unable to gulp down.” And on a day in August “she saw a melon
-and had a great desire to eat it; but hardly did she have some of it
-in her mouth, when she rejected it with intense disgust.” So too with
-odours. A little later, “on one day the smell of wine would please
-her, and she would bathe her hands and face in it with great relish;
-and next day she would so much dislike it, that she could not bear to
-see or smell it in her room.”--And so too with colours. On September
-2 “a physician-friend came to visit her in his scarlet robes; and she
-bore the sight a little, so as not to pain him.” But she then declared
-that she could no longer bear it; and he went, and returned to her in
-his ordinary black habit. And yet we have seen, from the Inventory of
-her effects, that she loved to have vermilion colour upon her bed and
-person.[16]
-
-And her emotional moods are analogously intense and rapidly shifting.
-In the spring of 1510 “she cried aloud because of the great pain: this
-attack lasted a day and a night”; in the night of August 10 “she tossed
-about with many exclamations”; and at the beginning of September “she
-cried out with a loud voice.” At other times, she laughs for joy. So at
-the end of April “she would laugh without speaking”; on August 11 “she
-fixed her eyes steadily on the ceiling; and for about an hour she abode
-all but immovable, and spoke not, but kept laughing in a very joyous
-fashion”; on August 17 great interior jubilation “expressed itself in
-merry laughter”; and on the evening of September 7 “her joy appeared
-exteriorly in laughter which lasted, with but small interruptions,
-for some two hours.”--And her entire apparent condition would shift
-from one such extreme to the other with extraordinary swiftness. In
-the autumn of 1509 “she many times remained as though dead; and at
-other times she would appear as healthy,--as though she had never had
-anything the matter with her.” Already in December 1509 she herself,
-after much vomiting and loss of blood, had sent for her Confessor and
-had declared that “she felt as though she must die in consequence of
-these many accidents.” Yet even on September 10, 1510, “when she was
-not being oppressed and tormented by her accidents (attacks), she
-seemed to be in good health; but when she was being suffocated by them,
-she seemed as one dead.”[17]
-
-
-II. CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING CATHERINE’S PSYCHO-PHYSICAL CONDITION DURING
-THIS LAST PERIOD.
-
-
-1. _Her illness not primarily physical. Her self-diagnosis._
-
-Now we saw, at the beginning of this chapter, how readily her
-attendants concluded, from all these extreme, multiple, swift-changing
-and self-contradictory states, to their directly and separately
-supernatural origin.--And indeed the diagnosis and treatment of her
-case showed clearly that it was not primarily physical. So in the
-case, probably in November 1509, of the cupping-glasses, when “she got
-medically treated for a bodily infirmity, whilst her real trouble was
-fire of the spirit”; so with a medicine given to her by the resident
-Hospital physician, some time in April 1510, “from taking which she
-nearly died”; so with Giovanni Boerio’s three-weeks’ treatment of her,
-in May 1510, a treatment which led to no other results than momentary
-additional distress; and so with the declaration of the ten Physicians
-who, even on September 10, four days before her death, “could find no
-trace of disease in her pulse, secretions, or any other symptom,” and
-who consequently abstained from prescribing anything. And hence, more
-or less throughout her last nine years, “there was confusion in the
-management of her, not on her own part, but on that of those who served
-her.”[18]
-
-For--and these two further points are of primary importance--the
-tending of her, as distinct from physic, was throughout held by herself
-to be of great importance; and yet this care was declared by her to
-be often useless or harmful, owing to the powers of discrimination
-possessed by her attendants being as much below their good-will, as her
-own knowledge as to the differences between her healthy and _maladif_
-states exceeded her power of herself acting upon this knowledge against
-these sickly conditions. “She would often appear to be asleep; and
-would awake from such a state, at one time, quite refreshed, and, at
-another time, so limp and broken down as to be unable to move. Those
-that served her knew not how to distinguish one state from the other;
-and on recovering from an attack of the latter sort, she would say to
-them: ‘Why did you let me continue in that state of quiet, from which
-I have all but died?’” So, on September 5, “she cried aloud on waking
-from a state of quiet, which had appeared to be (healthy) quietude, but
-had not been so.” And indeed, already on January 10 previous, she had
-shut herself off from her Confessor, “because it seemed to her that he
-bore with her too much in her sayings and doings.”
-
-Yet, at least after this time, Marabotto does oppose her sometimes.
-Thus on two, somewhat later, occasions she respectively makes signs,
-and asks, that Extreme Unction be given her; but only some four months
-later did she actually receive it. In these cases, then, she either
-had not, even at bottom, a correct physical self-knowledge; or her
-requests had been prompted, at the time, by her secondary, _maladif_
-consciousness alone.--When first visited by Boerio, she takes pleasure
-in the thought of getting possibly cured by him; but “in the following
-night, when great pain came upon her, she reproved herself, saying,
-‘You are suffering this, because you allowed yourself to rejoice
-without cause.’” But this declaration distinctly falls short of
-any necessary implication of a directly supernatural origin of her
-malady, as the _Vita_ here will have it, and but refers, either to the
-continuance of earthly existence not deserving such joy, or to her
-persistent fundamental consciousness that the phenomena were partly
-the fruitful, profitable occasions, and partly the price paid, for the
-mind’s close intercourse with things divine.
-
-Indeed her (otherwise unbroken) attitude is one, both of quiet
-conviction that physic cannot help her, and of gentle readiness to let
-the physicians try whatever they may think worth the trying: so with
-the cupping-glasses, and the various examinations and physickings.
-Especially is this disposition clear in her short dialogue with Boerio,
-where, in answer to his assertion that she ought to beware of giving
-scandal to all the world by saying that her infirmity had no need of
-remedies, and that she ought to look upon such an attitude as “a kind
-of hypocrisy,” she declares: “I am sorry if any one is scandalized
-because of me; and I am ready to use any remedy for infirmity,
-supposing that it can be found.”[19]
-
-
-2. _Her preoccupation with the spiritual suggestions afforded by the
-phenomena._
-
-It would, indeed, be a grave misreading of her whole character
-and habits of mind to think of her as at all engrossed in her
-psycho-physical states as such, and as having ever formally considered
-and decided that they must either come directly from God or be
-amenable to medicine. On the contrary, she is too habitually absorbed
-in the consideration and contemplation of certain great spiritual
-doctrines and realities, to have the leisure or inclination for any
-such questions.--Indeed it is this very absorption in those spiritual
-realities which has ended by suggesting, with an extraordinary
-readiness, frequency and vividness, through her mind to her senses,
-and by these back to her mind, certain psycho-physical images and
-illustrations for those very doctrines, until her whole psycho-physical
-organism has been, all but entirely, modified and moulded into an apt
-instrument and manifestation for and of that world unseen.
-
-Thus, after her greatest psycho-physical and spiritual experience
-in November 1509, she declares to Vernazza, when he urges her to
-let him write down the graces she has received from God, that “it
-would, strictly speaking, be impossible to narrate those interior
-things; whilst, of exterior ones, few or none have happened to
-me.” And she never entirely loses her mental consciousness in any
-state not recognized by herself as _maladif_. So, on a day of great
-psycho-physical trouble in February or March 1510, “they thought she
-must expire; but, though she lost both sight and speech, she never
-lost her intelligence.” And even on September 11 and 12, amidst
-foodlessness and suffocations, her intelligence still persists.--In
-the March previous “her mind appeared to grow daily in contentment.”
-Some days later, her attendants “saw how, after an hour of spasm and
-breathlessness, and then a great restriction of all her being, she
-returned to her normal condition, and addressed many beautiful words
-to them.” And later on, “her attendants were amazed at seeing a body,
-which seemed to be healthy, in such a tormented condition.” But “soon
-after she laughed and spoke as one in health, and told them not to
-distress themselves about her, since she was very contented; but that
-they should see to it that they did much good, since the way of God is
-very narrow.”[20]
-
-
-3. _Interaction and mutual suggestion of her spiritual and physical
-states._
-
-As to the extraordinary closeness and readiness for mutual response
-between her sensible impressions and her thoughts and emotions--her
-sensations turning, all but automatically, into religious emotions,
-and her thoughts and feelings translating themselves into appropriate
-psycho-physical states--we have a mass of interesting evidence.
-
-Thus when, about the end of November 1509, in response to her seeing,
-on some wall of the Hospital, a picture of Our Lord at the Well of
-Samaria, and to her asking Him for one drop of that Divine water,
-“instantly a drop was given to her which refreshed her within and
-without.” The spiritual idea and emotion is here accompanied and
-further stimulated by the keenest psycho-physical impression of
-drinking. And such an impression can even become painful through
-its excessive suggestiveness. Thus she herself explains to Maestro
-Boerio, on September 2, 1510, that she cannot long bear the sight
-of his scarlet robe “because of what it suggests (represents) to my
-memory,”--no doubt the fire of divine love. Three days later, on the
-contrary, “she mentally saw herself lying upon a bier, surrounded by
-many Religious robed in black,” and greatly rejoiced at the sight. Here
-the very impression of black, the colour of death, will have conveyed,
-during this special mood of hers, a downright psycho-physical pleasure,
-somewhat as Boerio’s reappearance, on the former occasion, in a black
-gown, had been a sensible relief to her.
-
-So also with scents. When, certainly after 1499, “she perceived, on
-the (right) hand of her Confessor, an odour which penetrated her very
-heart,” and “which abode with her and restored both mind and body for
-many days,” we have again a primarily mental act and state which she
-herself knows well to be untransferable, even to Don Marabotto himself.
-Here the association of ideas was, no doubt, the right hand of the
-Priest and her daily reception, by means of it, of the Holy Eucharist.
-For the latter, “the Bread from heaven, having within it all manner
-of delight,” is already connected in her mind with an impression of
-sweet odour. “One day, on receiving Communion, so much odour and
-sweetness came to her, that she seemed to herself to be in Paradise.”
-Probably the love for, and then the disgust at, the smell of wine, was
-also connected with her Eucharistic experiences. Certainly “one day,
-having received Holy Communion, she was granted so great a consolation
-as to fall into an ecstasy, so that when the Priest wanted to give
-her to drink from the Chalice (with unconsecrated wine) she had to be
-brought back by force to her ordinary consciousness.” Vivid memories
-of both sets of psycho-physical impressions are, I think, at work
-when she says: “If a consecrated Host were to be given to me amongst
-unconsecrated ones, I should be able to distinguish it by the very
-taste, as I do wine from water.” And as the sight of red rapidly became
-painful from the very excess of its mental suggestiveness, so will the
-smell of wine have been both specially dear and specially painful to
-her.[21]
-
-Indeed her psycho-physical troubles possess, for the most part, a
-still traceable, most delicate selectiveness as to date, range, form,
-combination, and other peculiarities. Thus some of the most acute
-attacks coincide, in their date of occurrence and general character, as
-the biographers point out, with special saint’s and holy days: so in
-the night leading into St. Lawrence’s day, August 9 and 10, 1510; so
-on the Vigil of St. Bartholomew’s day, August 24; and so in the night
-previous to and on the Feast (August 28) of St. Augustine, special
-Patron of her only sister’s Order and of the Convent in which her own
-Conversion had taken place thirty-seven years before. Yet we have also
-seen how that these synchronisms did not rise to the heights which
-were soon desired by her biographers, for we know that she died, not
-(as they would have it) on the Feast of the Exaltation of the Cross,
-September 14, but early on the day following.
-
-Thus too as to her incapacity to swallow and retain food, we find that,
-up to the end, with the rarest exceptions of a directly physical kind,
-she retained the most complete facility in receiving Holy Communion:
-so on September 2, 1510, when “all ordinary food was returned, but
-the Holy Eucharist she retained without any difficulty”; and so too
-on September 4, when, after “lying for close upon twelve hours with
-closed eyes, speechless and all but immovable,” Marabotto himself
-feared to communicate her, but “she made a sign to him, with a joyous
-countenance, to have no fear, and she communicated with ease, and
-soon after began to speak, owing to the vigour given to her by the
-Sacrament.” Yet here too the abnormality is not complete: some ordinary
-food is retained, now and then; so, minced chicken, specially mentioned
-for December 1509, and on September 3, 1510.
-
-As to her heat-attacks and the corresponding extreme--the sense of
-intense cold,--it is clear how close is their connection with her
-profound concentration upon the conception of God as Love, and upon the
-image of Love as fire. It is these sudden and intense psycho-physical,
-spiritually suggestive because spiritually suggested, heat-attacks
-which are, I think, always meant by the terms “assault” (_assalto_),
-“stroke” (_ferita_), and “arrow” (_saetta_): terms which already
-indicate the mental quality of these attacks. And these heats are
-mostly localized in a doctrinally suggestive manner: they centre in and
-around the heart, or on the tongue and lips, or they envelop the whole
-person “as though it were placed in a great flame of fire,” or “in a
-glowing furnace.” Indeed these heats are often so described, by her
-attendants or herself, as to imply their predominantly psycho-physical
-nature: “it was necessary, with a view to prolonging her life, to
-use many means for lightening the strain of that interior fire upon
-her mind”; and “I feel,” she says herself, on occasion of such an
-attack, “so great a contentment on the part of the spirit, as to be
-unutterable; whilst, on the part of my humanity, all the pains are, so
-to say, no pains.”
-
-As to her boundless thirst, her inability to drink, and her sense of
-strangulation, their doctrinal suggestions are largely clear. Thus
-when “she was so thirsty as to feel able to drink up all the waters
-of the sea,” and when she calls out “I am suffocating” (drowning, _io
-affogo_), we are at once reminded of her great saying: “If the sea
-were all so much love, there would not live man or woman who would
-not go to drown himself in it (_si affogasse_).” And when, at the end
-of August 1510, unable to drink, she herself declares “all the water
-that is on earth could not give me the least refreshment,” there is,
-perhaps, an implied contrast to that “little drop of divine water”
-which had so much refreshed her a year before.
-
-And finally, the various paralyses and death-like swoons seem, at least
-in part, to follow from, and to represent, the death of the spirit
-to the life of the senses, and to mirror the intensity with which
-perfection has been conceived and practised as “Love going forth out
-of self, and abiding all in God and separated from man.” Thus when, on
-August 22, 1510, “she had a day of great heat, and abode paralyzed in
-one hand and in one finger of the other hand for about sixteen hours,
-and she was so greatly occupied (absorbed), that she neither spoke, nor
-opened her eyes, nor could take any food.”[22]
-
-
-4. _Only two cases of spiritually unsuggestive impressions._
-
-It is indeed profoundly instructive to note how that, in exact
-proportion as a human-mental mediation and suggestion of a religious
-kind is directly traceable or at least probable in any or all of
-these things, is that thing also worthy of being considered as having
-ultimately the Divine Spirit Itself for its first cause as well as last
-end; and that, in exact proportion as this kind of human mediation
-and suggestion is impossible or unlikely, the thing turns out to be
-unworthy of being attributed, in any special sense, to the spirit of
-God Himself.
-
-Of such spiritually opaque, religiously unused and apparently
-unuseable, hysteriform impressions, I can, even during the last
-days of these nine years of admitted infirmity, find but two clear
-instances,--instances which, by their very unlikeness to the mass of
-her spiritually transparent, readily used impressions, strongly confirm
-our high estimate of the all but totality of her psycho-physical
-states, as experienced and understood and used by herself. On September
-7, 1510, after having seen and wisely utilized the spiritually
-suggestive image of “a great ladder of fire,” she ends by having so
-vivid an hallucination of the whole world being on fire “that she asked
-whether it were not so, and caused her windows to be opened that the
-facts might be ascertained;” and “she abode the whole night, possessed
-by that imagination,” as the _Vita_ itself calls this impression. At
-night, on September 11, she complained of a very great heat, and cast
-forth from her mouth very black blood; and black spots came out all
-over her body. And on the 13th, “she was seen with her eyes fixed upon
-the ceiling, and with much movement of the lips and hands; and she
-answered her attendants’ queries as to what she was seeing with ‘Drive
-away that beast.…’ the remaining words being inaudible.”[23]
-
-Here we have, I think, the only two merely factual, unsuggestive, and
-hence simply delusive, impressions really experienced by herself and
-recorded in the _Vita_, a book whose very eagerness to discover things
-of this kind and readiness to take them as directly supernatural is a
-guarantee that no other marked instances of the kind have been omitted
-or suppressed. And these two impressions both take place within a week
-of her death, and respectively four days before, and two days after,
-the first clear case of organic disease or lesion to be found anywhere
-in the life.
-
-
-III. CATHERINE’S PSYCHO-PHYSICAL CONDITION, ITS LIKENESS AND UNLIKENESS
-TO HYSTERIA.
-
-Only by a quite unfair magnifying or multiplying of the two incidents
-just described could we come to hold, with Mr. Baring-Gould, that
-Catherine was simply a sufferer from hysteria, and that the Roman
-Church did well to canonize her on the ground of her having, in spite
-of this malady, managed to achieve much useful work amongst the sick
-and poor.[24] Here we shall do well to consider three groups of facts.
-
-
-1. _Misapprehensions as to hysteria._
-
-The first group gives the reasons why we should try and get rid of the
-terror and horror still so often felt in connection with the very name
-of this malady. This now quite demonstrably excessive, indeed largely
-mythical, connotation of the term springs from four causes.
-
-First, the very name still tends to suggest, as the causes or
-conditions of the malady, things fit only for discussion in medical
-reviews. But then, ever since 1855, all limitation to, or special
-connection with, anything peculiarly female, or indeed generally
-sexual, has been increasingly shown to be false, until now no serious
-authority on the matter can be found to espouse the old view. The
-malady is now well known to attack men as well as women, and to have no
-special relation to things of sex at all.[25]
-
-Next, probably as a consequence from the initial error, this disorder
-was supposed to predominantly come from, or to lead to, moral impurity,
-or at least to be ordinarily accompanied by strong erotic propensions.
-But here the now carefully observed facts are imperatively hostile:
-of the 120 living cases most carefully studied by Prof. Janet, only
-four showed the predominance of any such tendencies, a proportion
-undoubtedly not above the percentage to be found amongst non-hysterical
-persons.[26]
-
-And again, the term was long synonymous with untruthfulness and deceit.
-But here again Prof. Janet shows how unfounded is this prejudice, since
-it but springs from the misplaced promptitude with which the earlier
-observers refused to believe what they had not as yet sufficiently
-examined and could not at all explain, and from the malady being itself
-equivalent to a more or less extensive breaking-up of the normal
-inter-connection between the several, successive or simultaneous
-states, and, as it were, layers of the one personality. He is convinced
-that real untruthfulness is no commoner among such patients than it is
-among healthy persons.[27]
-
-And, finally, it is no doubt felt that, apart from all such
-specifically moral suspicions, the malady involves all kinds of fancies
-and inaccuracies of feeling and of perception, and that it frequently
-passes into downright insanity. And this is no doubt the one objection
-which does retain some of its old cogency. Still, it is well to note
-that, as has now been fully established, the elements of the human mind
-are and remain the same throughout the whole range of its conditions,
-from the sanest to the maddest, whilst only their proportion and
-admixture, and the presence or absence and the kind of synthesis
-necessary to hold them together differentiate these various states of
-mind. In true insanity there is no such synthesis; in hysteria the
-synthesis, however slight and peculiar, is always still traceable
-throughout the widespread disgregation of the elements and states.[28]
-And it is this very persistence of the fundamental unity, together with
-the strikingly different combination and considerable disaggregation
-of its elements, that makes the study of hysteria so fruitful for
-the knowledge of the fully healthy mind and of its unity; whilst the
-continuance of all the elements of the normal intelligence, even in
-insanity, readily explains why it is apparently so easy to see insanity
-everywhere, and to treat genius and sanctity as but so much degeneracy.
-
-
-2. _Hysteriform phenomena observable in Catherine’s case._
-
-The second group of facts consists in the phenomena which, in
-Catherine’s case, are like or identical to what is observable in cases
-of hysteria.
-
-There is, perhaps above all else, the anaesthetic condition, which was
-presumably co-extensive with her paralytic states. “Anaesthesia,” says
-Prof. Janet, “can be considered as the type of the other symptoms of
-hysteria; it exists in the great majority of cases, it is thoroughly
-characteristic of the malady. In its most frequent localization
-(semi-anaesthesia) it affects one of the lateral halves of the body,
-and this half is usually the left side.” Or, “a finger or hand will be
-affected.” Such “insensibility can be very frequent and very profound”;
-but “it disappears suddenly” and even “varies from one moment to
-another.”[29]
-
-Then there is the corresponding counter-phenomenon of hyper-aesthesia.
-“The slightest contact provokes great pains, exclamations, and spasms.
-The painful zones have their seat mostly on the abdomen or on the
-hips.” And “sensation in these states is not painful in itself, by its
-own intensity, but by its quality, its characteristics; it has become
-the signal, by association of ideas, for the production of a set of
-extremely painful phenomena.” So, with the colour-sense: “one patient
-adores the colour red, and sees in its dullest shade ‘sparkling rays
-which penetrate to her very heart and warm her through and through.’”
-But “another one finds this ‘a repulsive colour and one capable
-of producing nausea.’” And similarly with the senses of taste and
-odour.[30]
-
-Then, too, the inability to stand or walk, with the conservation,
-at times, of the power to crawl; the acceptance, followed by the
-rejection, of food, because of certain spasms in the throat or stomach,
-and the curious, mentally explicable, exceptions to this incapacity;
-the sense, even at other times, of strangulation; heart palpitations,
-fever heats, strange haemorrhages from the stomach or even from the
-lung; red patches on the skin and emotional jaundice all over it, and
-one or two other peculiarities.[31]
-
-Then, as to a particular kind of quietude, from which Catherine warns
-her attendants to rouse her, we find a patient who “ceases her reading,
-without showing any sign of doing so. She gets taken to be profoundly
-attentive; it is, however, but one of her attacks of ‘fixity.’ And she
-has promptly to be shaken out of this state, or, in a few minutes,
-there will be no getting her out of it.”
-
-As to Catherine’s consciousness of possessing an extraordinary fineness
-of discrimination between sensibly identical objects, we see that
-“if one points out, to some of these patients, an imaginary portrait
-upon a plain white card, and mixes this card with other similar ones,
-they will almost always find again the portrait on the same card.” And
-similarly as to her attaching a particular quasi-sensible perception
-to Marabotto’s hand alone, we find that, if M. Janet touches Léonie’s
-hand, he having suggested a nosegay to her, she will henceforth, when
-he touches the hand, see that nosegay; whereas, if another person
-touches that same hand, Léonie will see nothing special.
-
-As to Catherine’s feelings of criminality and of being already dead, M.
-Janet quotes M., who says, “I am like a criminal about to be punished”;
-and R., who declares, “It seems to me that I am dead.” As to the
-hallucination of a Beast, Marcelle suffers from the same impression.[32]
-
-And,--perhaps the most important of all these
-surface-resemblances,--there is Catherine’s apparent freedom from all
-emotion at the deaths of her brothers and sister, and her extraordinary
-dependence upon, and claimfulness towards, her Confessor alone. “These
-patients rapidly lose the social feelings: Berthe, who for some time
-preserved some affection for her brother, ends by losing all interest
-in him; Marcelle, at the very beginning of her illness, separates
-herself from every one.” “It is always their own personality which
-dominates their thoughts.” Yet these patients have “an extraordinary
-attachment to their physician. For him they are resolved to do all
-things. In return, they are extremely exacting,--he is to occupy
-himself entirely with each one alone. Only a very superficial observer
-would ascribe this feeling to a vulgar source.”[33]
-
-
-3. _Catherine’s personality not disintegrated._
-
-But a third group of facts clearly differentiates Catherine’s case,
-even in these years of avowed ill-health, from such patients; and these
-facts become clearer and more numerous in precise proportion as we move
-away from peripheral, psycho-physical phenomena and mechanisms, and
-dwell upon her practically unbroken mental and moral characteristics,
-and upon the use and meaning, the place and context of these things
-within her ample life.
-
-For as to her relations with her attendants, even now it is still she
-who leads, who suggests, who influences; a strong and self-consistent
-will shows itself still, under all this shifting psycho-physical
-surface. Thus Don Marabotto now administers, it is true, all her money
-and charitable affairs for her. But it is she who insists, alone and
-unaided, upon the true spiritual function of that impression of odour
-on his hand.--Vernazza, no doubt, has now to help her in the fight
-against subtle scruples, on occasion of her deepest depressions. But
-her far more frequent times of light and joy are in nowise occasions
-of a simply subjective self-engrossment or of a purely psycho-physical
-interest, for her mind is absorbed if in but a few, yet in
-inexhaustibly fruitful and universally applicable ideas and experiences
-of a spiritual kind, such as helped to urge this friend on to his
-world-renewing impulses and determinations.--Her closest relations and
-friends, one must admit, succeed by their action, taken eighteen months
-and then again two days before her death, in getting her to desist
-from ordering her burial by the side of her husband. But we have seen,
-in the one case, how indirectly, and, in the other case, how suddenly
-and even then quite informally, they had to gain their point.--Her
-attendants in general, and Marabotto in particular, certainly paid her
-an engrossed attention, and the all but endlessness of her superficial
-fancies and requirements have been chronicled by them with a naïve and
-wearisome fulness. But then she herself is well aware that, had they
-but the requisite knowledge as to how and when to apply them, some
-sturdy opposition and a greater roughness of handling would, on their
-part, be of the greatest use to her, in this her psychical infirmity;
-indeed her shutting herself away from Marabotto, as late as January
-1510, is directly caused by her sense and fear of being spoilt by him.
-
-It is true again that, already in 1502, we hear, in a probably
-exaggerated but still possibly semi-authentic account, of her
-indifference of feeling with regard to the deaths of two brothers and
-of her only sister; and that, from January 1510 onwards, she gradually
-excludes all her attendants from her sick-room, with, eventually, the
-sole exceptions of Marabotto or Carenzio and Argentina. But her Wills
-show conclusively how persistent were her detailed interest in, and
-dispositions for, the requirements of her surviving brother, nephews,
-and nieces; of poor Thobia and the girl’s hidden mother; of her
-priest-attendants, and of each and all of her humblest domestics; of
-the natives in the far-away Greek Island of Scios; and, above all, of
-the Hospital and its great work which she had ever loved so well.
-
-We have indeed found two cases, both from within the last week of her
-life, of mentally opaque and spiritually unsuggestive and unutilized
-impressions which are truly analogous to those characteristic of
-hysteria. But we have also seen how forcibly these two solitary cases
-bring out, by contrast, the spiritual transparency and fruitfulness of
-her usual, finely reflective picturings of these last years. For here
-it is her own deliberate and spiritual mind which joyously greets, and
-straightway utilizes and transcends, the psycho-physical occurrences;
-and it does so, not because these occurrences are, or are taken to be,
-the causes or requisites or objects of her faith and spiritual insight,
-but because, on the contrary, they meet and clothe an already exuberant
-faith and insight--spiritual certainties derived from quite another
-source.
-
-And finally, if the monotony and superficial pettiness of the sick-room
-can easily pall upon us, especially when presented with the credulities
-and hectic exaggerations which disfigure so much of the _Vita’s_
-description of it; we must, in justice, as I have attempted to do in my
-seventh and eighth chapters, count in, as part of her biography, her
-deep affection for and persistent influence with Ettore and Battista
-Vernazza, and the exemplification of her doctrine by these virile
-souls, makers of history in the wide, varied world of men.[34]
-
-In a word, it is plain at once that, given the necessarily limited
-number of ways in which the psycho-physical organism reacts under
-mental stimulations, certain neural phenomena may, in any two cases,
-be, in themselves, perfectly similar, although their respective mental
-causes or occasions may be as different, each from the other, as
-the Moonlight Sonata of Beethoven, or the working out of the Law of
-Gravitation by Newton, or the elaboration of the implications of the
-Categorical Imperative by Kant, are different from the sudden jumping
-of a live mouse in the face of an hysterically-disposed young woman, or
-as the various causes of tears and laughter throughout the whole world.
-
-
-IV. FIRST PERIOD OF CATHERINE’S LIFE, 1447 TO 1477, IN ITS THREE STAGES.
-
-If we next go back to the first period of her life, in its three stages
-of the sixteen years of her girlhood, 1447-1463, the first ten years
-of her married life, 1463-1473, and the four years of her Conversion
-and active Penitence, 1473-1477, we shall find, I think, in the matter
-of temperament and psycho-physical conditions, little or nothing
-but a rare degree of spiritual sensitiveness, and an extraordinary
-close-knittedness of body and mind.
-
-
-1. _From her childhood to her conversion._
-
-Thus, already in her early childhood, that picture of the Pietà seems
-to have suggested religious ideas and feelings with the suddenness
-and emotional solidity of a physical seizure--an impression still
-undimmed when she herself recounted it, some fifty years later, to her
-two intimates.--It is true that during those first, deeply unhappy
-ten years of marriage, we cannot readily find more than indications
-of a most profound and brooding melancholy, the apparent result of
-but two factors,--a naturally sad disposition and acutely painful
-domestic circumstances. Yet it is clear, from the sequel, that more
-and other things lay behind. It is indeed evident that she possessed
-a congenitally melancholy temperament; that nothing but the rarest
-combination of conditions could have brought out, into something like
-elastic play and varied exercise, her great but few and naturally
-excessive qualities of mind and heart; that these conditions were not
-only absent, but were replaced by circumstances of the most painful
-kind; and that she will hardly, at this time, have had even a moment’s
-clear consciousness of any other sources than just those conditions for
-her deep, keen, and ever-increasing dissatisfaction with all things,
-her own self included: all peace and joy, the very capacity for either
-seemed gone, and gone for ever. But it is only the third stage, with
-its sudden-seeming conversion on March 20, 1473, and the then following
-four years of strenuously active self-immolation and dedication to the
-humblest service of others, which lets us see deep into those previous
-years of sullen gloom and apparently hopeless drift and dreary wastage.
-
-The two stages really belong to one another, and the depth of the
-former gloom and dreariness stood in direct proportion and relation to
-the capacities of that nature and to the height of their satisfaction
-in the later light and vigour brought to and assimilated by them. It
-was the sense, at that previous time still inarticulate, but none the
-less mightily operative, of the insufficiency of all things merely
-contingent, of all things taken as such and inevitably found to be
-such, that had been adding, and was now discovered to have added, a
-quite determining weight and poignancy to the natural pressure of her
-temperament and external lot. And this temperament and lot, which had
-not alone produced that sadness, could still less of themselves remove
-it, whatever might be its cause. Her sense of emptiness and impotence
-could indeed add to her sense of fulness and of power, once these
-latter had come; but of themselves the former could no more give her
-the latter, than hunger, which indeed makes bread to taste delicious,
-can give us real bread and, with it, that delight.
-
-And it was such real bread of life and real power which now came to
-her. For if the tests of reality in such things are their persistence
-and large and rich spiritual applicability and fruitfulness,
-then something profoundly real and important took place in the
-soul of that sad and weary woman of six-and-twenty, within that
-Convent-chapel, at that Annunciation-tide. Her four years of heroic
-persistence; her unbroken Hospital service of a quarter of a century;
-her lofty magnanimity towards her husband, Thobia and Thobia’s
-mother; her profound influence upon Vernazza, in urging him on to
-his splendid labours throughout Italy, and to his grand death in
-plague-stricken Genoa; her daringly original, yet immensely persuasive,
-doctrine,--nearly all this dates back, completely for her consciousness
-and very largely in reality, to those few moments on that memorable day.
-
-
-2. _Her conversion not sudden nor visionary._
-
-But two points, concerning the manner and form of this experience,
-are, though of but secondary spiritual interest, far more difficult
-to decide. There is, for one thing, the indubitable impression, for
-her own mind and for ours, of complete suddenness and newness in her
-change. Was this suddenness and newness merely apparent, or real as
-well? And should this suddenness, if real, be taken as in itself and
-directly supernatural?
-
-Now it is certain that Catherine, up to ten years before, had been
-full of definitely religious acts and dispositions. Had she not,
-already at thirteen, wanted to be a Nun, and, at eight or so, been
-deeply moved by a picture of the dead Christ in His Mother’s lap?
-Hence, ideas and feelings of self-dedication and of the Christ-God’s
-hatred of sin and love for her had, in earlier and during longer times
-than those of her comparative carelessness, soaked into and formed her
-mental and emotional bent, and will have in so far shaped her will,
-as to make the later determination along those earlier lines of its
-operation, comparatively easy, even after those years of relaxation and
-deviation. Yet it is clear that there was not here, as indeed there
-is nowhere, any mere repetition of the past. New combinations and an
-indefinitely deeper apprehension of the great religious ideas and facts
-of God’s holiness and man’s weakness, of the necessity for the soul to
-reach its own true depth or to suffer fruitlessly, and of God having
-Himself to meet and feed this movement and hunger which He has Himself
-implanted; new combinations and depths of emotion, and an indefinite
-expansion and heroic determination of the will: were all certainly
-here, and were new as compared with even the most religious moments in
-the past.
-
-As to the suddenness, we cannot but take it as, in large part, simply
-apparent,--a dim apprehension of what then became clear having been
-previously quite oppressively with her. And, in any case, this
-suddenness seems to belong rather to the temperamental peculiarities
-and necessary forms of her particular experiences than to the essence
-and content of her spiritual life. For, whatever she thinks, feels,
-says or does throughout her life, she does and experiences with actual
-suddenness, or at least with a sense of suddenness; and there is
-clearly no more necessary connection between such suddenness and grace
-and true self-renouncement, than there is between gradualness and mere
-nature; both suddenness and gradualness being but simple modes, more or
-less fixed for each individual, yet differing from each to each, modes
-in which God’s grace and man’s will interact and manifest themselves in
-different souls.[35]
-
-And then there is the question as to whether or not this
-conversion-experience took the form of a vision. We have seen, in
-the Appendix, how considerable are the difficulties which beset the
-account of the Bleeding Christ Vision in the Palace; and how the story
-of the previous visionless experience in the Chapel is free from all
-such objections. But, even supposing the two accounts to be equally
-reliable, it is the first, the visionless experience, which was
-demonstrably the more important and the more abidingly operative of the
-two. More important, for it is during those visionless moments that
-her conversion is first effected; and more abiding, for, according to
-all the ancient accounts, the impression of the Bleeding Christ Vision
-disappeared utterly at the end of at longest four years, whereas the
-memory of the visionless conversion moments remained with her, as an
-operative force, up to the very last. Witness the free self-casting of
-the soul into painful-joyous Purgation, into Love, into God (without
-any picturing of the historic Christ), which forms one of the two
-constituents of her great latter-day teaching; and how entirely free
-from directly historic elements all her recorded visions of the middle
-period turn out to be.[36]
-
-
-3. _Peculiarities of her Active Penitence._
-
-As to the four years of Active Penitence, we must beware of losing
-the sense of the dependence, the simple, spontaneous instrumentality,
-in which the negative and restrictive side of of her action stood
-towards the positive and expansive one. An immense affirmation, an
-anticipating, creative buoyancy and resourcefulness, had come full
-flood into her life; and had shifted her centre of deliberate interest
-and willing away from the disordered, pleasure-seeking, sore and
-sulky lesser self in which her true personality had for so long been
-enmeshed. Thus all this strenuous work of transforming and raising her
-lower levels of inclinations and of habit to the likeness and heights
-of her now deliberate loftiest standard was not taking place for the
-sake of something which actually was, or which even seemed to be, less
-than what she had possessed or had, even dimly, sought before, nor with
-a view to her true self’s contraction. But, on the contrary, the work
-was for the end of that indefinite More, of that great pushing upwards
-of her soul’s centre and widening out of its circumference, which she
-could herself confirm and increase only by such ever-renewed warfare
-against what she now recognized as her false and crippling self.
-
-And it is noticeable how soon and how largely, even still within this
-stage, her attitude became “passive.” She pretty early came to do these
-numerous definite acts of penance without any deliberate selection
-or full attention to them. As in her third period her absorption in
-large spiritual ideas spontaneously suggests certain corresponding
-psycho-physical phenomena, which then, in return, stimulate anew the
-apprehensions of the mind; so here, towards the end of the first
-period, penitential love ends by quite spontaneously suggesting
-divers external acts of penitence, which readily become so much fresh
-stimulation for love.
-
-I take this time to have been as yet free from visions or ecstasies--at
-least of the later lengthy and specific type. For the Bleeding Christ
-experience, even if fully historical, occurred within the first
-conversion-days, and only its vivid memory prolonged itself throughout
-those penitential years; whilst all such other visions, as have been
-handed down to us, do not treat of conversion and penance, at least in
-any active and personal sense. And only towards the end of these years
-do the psycho-physical phenomena as to the abstention from food begin
-to show themselves. The consideration of both the Visions and the Fasts
-had, then, better be reserved for the great central period.
-
-
-V. THE SECOND, GREAT MIDDLE PERIOD OF CATHERINE’S LIFE, 1477 TO 1499.
-
-It is most natural yet very regrettable that we should know so little
-as to Catherine’s spiritual life, or even as to her psycho-physical
-condition, during these central twenty-two years of her life. It is
-natural, for she had, at this time, neither Physician nor Confessor
-busy with her, and the very richness and balanced fulness of this epoch
-of her life may well have helped to produce but little that could have
-been specially seized and registered by either. Yet it is regrettable,
-since here we have what, at least for us human observers, constitutes
-the culmination and the true measure of her life, the first period
-looking but like the preparation, and the third period, like the price
-paid for such a rich expansion.--Yet we know something about three
-matters of considerable psycho-physical and temperamental interest,
-which are specially characteristic of this time: her attitude towards
-food; her ecstasies and visions; and certain peculiarities in her
-conception and practice of the spiritual warfare.
-
-
-1. _Her extraordinary fasts._
-
-As to food, it is clear that, however much we may be able or bound to
-deduct from the accounts, there remains a solid nucleus of remarkable
-fact. During some twenty years she evidently went, for a fairly equal
-number of days,--some thirty in Advent and some forty in Lent, seventy
-in all annually,--with all but no food; and was, during these fasts,
-at least as vigorous and active as when her nutrition was normal.
-For it is not fairly possible to make these great fasts end much
-before 1496, when she ceased to be Matron of the Hospital; and they
-cannot have begun much after 1475 or 1476: so that practically the
-whole of her devoted service and administration in and of that great
-institution fell within these years, of which well-nigh one-fifth was
-covered by these all but total abstentions from food. Yet here again
-we are compelled to take these things, not separately, and as directly
-supernatural, but in connection with everything else; and to consider
-the resultant whole as the effect and evidence of a strong mind and
-will operating upon and through an immensely responsive psycho-physical
-organism.
-
-For here again we easily find a significant system and delicate
-selectiveness both in the constant approximate synchronisms--these
-incapacities occurring about Advent and Lent; and in the foods
-exempted--since there is no difficulty in connection with the daily
-Holy Eucharist, with the unconsecrated wine given to her, as to all
-Communicants in that age at Genoa, immediately after Communion, or with
-water when seasoned penitentially with salt or vinegar. And if the
-actual heightening of nervous energy and balance, recorded as having
-generally accompanied these two fasts, is indeed a striking testimony
-to the extraordinary powers of her mind and will, we must not forget
-that these fruitful fasts were accompanied, and no doubt rendered
-possible, by the second great psychical peculiarity of these middle
-years, her ecstasies.
-
-
-2. _Her ecstasies and visions._
-
-It is indeed remarkable how these two conditions and functions, her
-fasts and her ecstasies of a definite, lengthy and strength-bringing
-kind, arise, persist and then fade out of her life together. And since,
-in ecstasy, the respiration, the circulation, and the other physical
-functions are all slackened and simplified; the mind is occupied with
-fewer, simpler, larger ideas, harmonious amongst themselves; and
-the emotions and the will are, for the time, saved the conflict and
-confusion, the stress and strain, of the fully waking moments; and
-considering that Catherine was peculiarly sensitive to all this flux
-and friction, and that she was now often in a more or less ecstatic
-trance from two up to eight hours: it follows that the amount of food
-required to heal the breach made by life’s wear and tear would, by
-these ecstasies, be considerably reduced. And indeed it will have been
-these contemplative absorptions which directly mediated for her those
-accessions of vigour: and that they did so, in such a soul and for the
-uses to which she put this strength, is their fullest justification as
-thoroughly wholesome, at least in their ultimate outcome, in and for
-this particular life.
-
-And the visions recorded have these two characteristics, that they all
-deal with metaphysical realities and relations--God as source and end
-of all things, as Light and food of the soul, and similar conceptions,
-and never directly with historical persons, scenes, or institutions;
-and that, whereas the non-ecstatic picturings of her last period
-are grandly original, and demonstrably based upon her own spiritual
-experience, these second-period ecstatic visions are readily traceable
-to New Testament, Neo-Platonist, and Franciscan precursors, and have
-little more originality than this special selection from amongst other
-possible literary sources.
-
-
-3. _Special character of her spiritual warfare._
-
-Catherine’s ecstasies lead us easily on to the special method of her
-spiritual warfare, which can, I think, be summed up in three maxims:
-“One thing, and only one at a time”; “Ever fight self, and you
-need not trouble about any other foe”; and “Fight self by an heroic
-indirectness and by love, for love,--through a continuous self-donation
-to Pure Love alone.”
-
-Studying here these great convictions simply in their temperamental
-occasions, colouring, and limitations, we can readily discover how the
-“one thing at a time” maxim springs from the same disposition as that
-which found such refreshment in ecstasy. For here too, partly from a
-congenital incapacity to take things lightly, partly from an equally
-characteristic sensitiveness to the conflict and confusion incident
-to the introduction of any fresh multiplicity into the consciousness,
-she requires, even in her non-ecstatic moments, to have her attention
-specially concentrated upon one all-important idea, one point in the
-field of consciousness. And, by a faithful wholeness of attention to
-the successive spiritually significant circumstances and obligations,
-interior impressions and lights, which her praying, thinking,
-suffering, actively bring round to her notice, she manages, by such
-single steps, gradually to go a very long way, and, by such severe
-successiveness, to build up a rich simultaneity. For each of these
-faithfully accepted and fully willed and utilized acts and states,
-received into her one ever-growing and deepening personality, leave
-memories and stimulations behind them, and mingle, as subconscious
-elements, with the conscious acts which follow later on.
-
-
-4. _Two remarkable consequences of this kind of warfare._
-
-There were two specially remarkable consequences of this constant
-watchful fixation of the one spiritually significant point in each
-congeries of circumstances, and of the manner in which (partly perhaps
-as the occasion, but probably in great part as the effect of this
-attention) one interior condition of apparent fixity would suddenly
-shift to another condition of a different kind but of a similar
-apparent stability. There was the manner in which, during these years,
-she appears to have escaped the committing of any at all definite
-offences against the better and best lights of that particular moment;
-and there was the way in which she would realize the faultiness and
-subtle self-seeking of any one state, only at the moment of its
-disappearing to make room for another.
-
-I take the accounts of both these remarkable peculiarities to be
-substantially accurate, since, if the first condition had not obtained,
-we should have found her practising more or less frequent Confession,
-as we find her doing in the first and third, but not in this period;
-and if the second condition had not existed, we should have had, for
-this period also, some such vivid account of painful scruples arising
-from the impression of actually present unfaithfulnesses, such as has
-been preserved for her last years. And indeed, as soon as we have
-vividly conceived a state in which a soul (by a wise utilization of the
-quite exceptional successiveness and simplification to which it has
-been, in great part, driven by its temperamental requirements, and by
-a constant heroic watchfulness) has managed to exclude from its life,
-during a long series of years, all fully deliberate resistances to, or
-lapses from, its contemporaneous better insight: one sees at once that
-a consciousness of faultiness could come to her only at those moments
-when, one state and level giving place to another, she could, for the
-moment, see the former habits and their implicit defects in the clear
-light of their contrast to her new, deeper insights and dispositions.
-
-Now it is evident that here again we have in part (in the curious
-quasi-fixity of each state, and then the sudden replacement of it
-by another) something which, taken alone, is simply psychically
-peculiar and spiritually indifferent. The persistent sense of gradual
-or of rapid change in the midst of a certain continuity and indeed
-abidingness, characteristic of the average moments of the average soul,
-is, taken in itself, more true to life and to the normal reaction of
-the human mind, and not less capable of spiritual utilization, than is
-Catherine’s peculiarity. Her heroic utilization of her special psychic
-life for purposes of self-fighting, and the degree in which, as we
-shall find in a later chapter, she succeeded in moulding this life into
-a shape representative of certain great spiritual truths: these things
-it is which constitute here the spiritually significant element.
-
-And her second peculiarity of religious practice was her great
-simplification and intensification of the spiritual combat.
-Simplification: for she does not fight directly either the Devil or the
-World; she directly fights the “Flesh” alone, and recognizes but one
-immediate opponent, her own lower self. Hence the references to the
-world are always simply as to an extension or indefinite repetition
-of that same self, or of similar lower selves; and those to the devil
-are, except where she declares her own lower self “a very devil,”
-extraordinarily rare, and, in their authentic forms, never directly and
-formally connected with her own spiritual interests and struggles.
-And Intensification: for she conceives this lower self, against which
-all her fighting is turned, as capable of any enormity, as actually
-cloaking itself successively in every kind of disguise, and as more or
-less vitiating even the most spiritual-seeming of her states and acts.
-
-And here again we can, I think, clearly trace the influence of her
-special temperament and psycho-physical functioning, yet in a direction
-opposite to that in which we would naturally expect it. For it is not
-so much that this temperament led her to exaggerate the badness of her
-false self, or to elaborate a myth concerning its (all but completely
-separate) existence, as that, owing in large part to that temperament
-and functioning, her false self _was_ both unusually distinct from her
-true self and particularly clamorous and claimful. It would indeed be
-well for hagiography if, in all cases, at least an attempt were made to
-discover and present the precise and particular good and bad selves,
-worked for and fought by the particular saint: for it is just this
-double particularization of the common warfare in every individual soul
-that gives the poignant interest and instructiveness, and a bracing
-sense of reality to these lonely yet typical, unique yet universal
-struggles, defeats, and victories.
-
-And in Catherine’s case her special temperament; her particular
-attitude during the ten years’ laxity, and again during the last years’
-times of obscurity and scruple; even some of her sayings probably
-still belonging to this middle period; but above all the precise point
-and edge of her counter-ideal and _attrait_: all indicate clearly
-enough what was her congenital defect. A great self-engrossment of
-a downrightly selfish kind; a grouping of all things round such a
-self-adoring _Ego_; a noiseless but determined elimination from
-her life and memory of all that would not or could not, then and
-there, be drawn and woven into the organism and functioning of this
-immensely self-seeking, infinitely woundable and wounded, endlessly
-self-doctoring “I” and “Me”: a self intensely, although not sexually,
-jealous, envious and exacting, incapable of easy accommodation, of
-pleasure in half successes, of humour and brightness, of joyous
-“once-born” creatureliness: all this was certainly to be found, in
-strong tendency at least, in the untrained parts and periods of her
-character and life.
-
-And then the same peculiarity and sensitiveness of her psycho-physical
-organism which, in her last period, ended by mirroring her mental
-spiritual apprehensions and picturings in her very body, and which,
-even at this time, has been traced by us in the curious long fixities
-and rapid changes of her fields of consciousness, clearly operates
-also and already here, in separating off this false self from the good
-one and in heightening the apprehension of that false self to almost a
-perception in space, or to an all but physical sensation.
-
-We thus get something of which the interesting cases of “doubleness
-of personality,” so much studied of late years, are, as it were,
-purely psychical, definitely _maladif_ caricatures; the great
-difference consisting in Catherine herself possessing, at all times,
-the consciousness and memory of both sides, of both “selves,” and of
-each as both actual and potential, within the range of her one great
-personality. Indeed it is this very multiplicity thus englobed and
-utilized by that higher unity, which gives depth to her sanity and
-sanctity.[37]
-
-
-5. _Precise object and end of her striving._
-
-And all this is confirmed and completed, as already hinted, by the
-precise object of her ideal, the particular means and special end of
-the struggle. Here, at the very culmination of her inner life and
-aim, we find the deepest traces of her temperamental requirements;
-and here, in what she seeks, there is again an immense concentration
-and a significant choice. The distinctions between obligation and
-supererogation, between merit and grace, are not utilized but
-transcended; the conception of God having anger as well as love arouses
-as keen a sense of intolerableness as that of God’s envy aroused in
-Plato, and God appears to her as, in Himself, continuously loving.
-
-This love of God, again, is seen to be present everywhere, and, of
-Itself, everywhere to effect happiness. The dispositions of souls are
-indeed held to vary within each soul and between soul and soul, and to
-determine the differences in their reception, and consequently in the
-effect upon them, of God’s one universal love: but the soul’s reward
-and punishment are not something distinct from its state, they are but
-that very state prolonged and articulated, since man can indeed go
-against his deepest requirements but can never finally suppress them.
-Heaven, Purgatory, Hell are thus not places as well as states, nor do
-they begin only in the beyond: they are states alone, and begin already
-here. And Grace and Love, and Love and Christ, and Christ and Spirit,
-and hence Grace and Love and Christ and Spirit are, at bottom, one, and
-this One is God. Hence God, loving Himself in and through us, is alone
-our full true self. Here, in this constant stretching out and forward
-of her whole being into and towards the ocean of light and love, of
-God the All in All, it is not hard to recognize a soul which finds
-happiness only when looking out and away from self, and turning, in
-more or less ecstatic contemplation and action, towards that Infinite
-Country, that great Over-Againstness, God.
-
-And, in her sensitive shrinking from the idea of an angry God, we
-find the instinctive reaction of a nature too naturally prone itself
-to angry claimfulness, and which had been too much driven out of
-its self-occupation by the painful sense of interior self-division
-consequent upon that jealousy, not to find it intolerable to get out
-of that little Scylla of her own hungry self only to fall into a great
-Charybdis, an apparent mere enlargement and canonization of that same
-self, in the angry God Himself.
-
-And if her second peculiarity, the concentration of the fight upon an
-unusually isolated and intense false self, had introduced an element of
-at least relative Rigorism and contraction into her spirituality, this
-third peculiarity brings a compensating movement of quasi-Pantheism,
-of immense expansion. Here the crushed plant expands in boundless
-air, light and warmth; the parched seaweed floats and unfolds itself
-in an immense ocean of pure waters--the soul, as it were, breathes
-and bathes in God’s peace and love. And it is evident that the great
-super-sensible realities and relations adumbrated by such figures, did
-not, with her, lead to mere dry or vague apprehensions. Even in this
-period, although here with a peaceful, bracing orderliness and harmony,
-the reality thus long and closely dwelt on and lived with was, as it
-were, physically seen and felt in these its images by a ready response
-of her immensely docile psycho-physical organism.
-
-
-6. _Catherine possessed two out of the three conditions apparently
-necessary for stigmatization._
-
-And in this connection we should note how largely reasonable was
-the expectation of some of her disciples of finding some permanent
-physical effects upon her body; and yet why she not only had not the
-stigmata of the Passion, but why she could not have them. For, of the
-three apparently necessary conditions for such stigmatization, she had
-indeed two--a long and intense absorption in religious ideas, and a
-specially sensitive psycho-physical temperament and organization of
-the ecstatic type; but the third condition, the concentration of that
-absorption upon Our Lord’s Passion and wounds, was wholly wanting--at
-least after those four actively penitential and during those twenty-two
-ecstatic years. We can, however, say most truly that although, since
-at all events 1477, her visions and contemplations were all concerning
-purely metaphysical, eternal realities, or certain ceaselessly
-repeated experiences of the human soul, or laws and types derived from
-the greatest of Christian institutions, her daily solace, the Holy
-Eucharist: yet that these verities ended by producing definite images
-in her senses, and certain observable though passing impressions upon
-her body, so that we can here talk of sensible shadows or “stigmata” of
-things purely spiritual and eternal.
-
-And if, in the cases of some ecstatic saints, mental pathologists of
-a more or less materialistic type have, at times, shown excessive
-suspicion as to some of the causes and effects of these saints’
-devotion to Our Lord’s Humanity under the imagery and categories of
-the Canticle of Canticles--all such suspicions, fair or unfair, have
-absolutely no foothold in Catherine’s life, since not only is there
-here no devotion to God or to Our Lord as Bridegroom of the Bridal
-soul: there is no direct contemplative occupation with the historic
-Christ and no figuring of Him or of God under human attributes
-or relations at all. I think that her temperament and health had
-something to do with her habitual dwelling upon Thing-symbols of God:
-Ocean--Air--Fire--picturings which, conceived with her psycho-physical
-vividness, must, in their expanse, have rested and purified her in a
-way that historical contingencies and details would not have done. The
-doctrinal and metaphysical side of the matter will be considered later
-on.
-
-
-VI. THREE RULES WHICH SEEM TO GOVERN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
-PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PECULIARITIES AND SANCTITY IN GENERAL.
-
-If we next inquire how matters stand historically with regard to the
-relations between ecstatic states and psycho-physical peculiarities
-on the one hand, and sanctity in general on the other hand, we shall
-find, I think, that the following three rules or laws really cover, in
-a necessarily general, somewhat schematic way, all the chief points,
-at all certain or practically important, in this complex and delicate
-matter.
-
-
-1. _Intense spiritual energising is accompanied by auto-suggestion and
-mono-ideism._
-
-It is clear, for one thing, that as simply all and every mental,
-emotional, and volitional energizing is necessarily and always
-accompanied by corresponding nerve-states, and that if we had
-not some neural sensitiveness and neural adaptability, we could
-not--whilst living our earthly life--think, or feel, or will in
-regard to anything whatsoever: a certain special degree of at least
-potential psycho-physical sensitiveness and adaptability must be
-taken to be, not the productive cause, but a necessary condition for
-the exercise, of any considerable range and depth of mind and will,
-and hence of sanctity in general; and that the actual aiming at,
-and gradual achievement of, sanctity in these, thus merely possible
-cases, spiritualizes and further defines this sensitiveness, as the
-instrument, material, and expression of the soul’s work.[38] And this
-work of the heroic soul will necessarily consist, in great part, in
-attending to, calling up, and, as far as may be, both fixing and ever
-renovating certain few great dominant ideas, and in attempting by every
-means to saturate the imagination with images and figures, historical
-and symbolic, as so many incarnations of these great verities.
-
-We get thus what, taken simply phenomenally and without as yet any
-inquiry as to an ultimate reality pressing in upon the soul,--a divine
-stimulation underlying all its sincere and fruitful action,--is a
-spiritual mono-ideism and auto-suggestion, of a more or less general
-kind. But, at this stage, these activities and their psycho-physical
-concomitants and results will, though different in kind, be no
-more abnormal than is the mono-ideism and auto-suggestion of the
-mathematician, the tactician, and the constructive statesman. Newton,
-Napoleon, and Richelieu: they were all dominated by some great
-central idea, and they all for long years dwelt upon it and worked
-for it within themselves, till it became alive and aflame in their
-imaginations and their outward-moving wills, before, yet as the means
-of, its taking external and visible shape. And, in all the cases
-that we can test in detail, the psycho-physical accompaniments of
-all this profound mental-volitional energy were most marked. In the
-cases of Newton and Napoleon, for instance, a classification of their
-energizings solely according to their neural accompaniments would
-force us to class these great discoverers and organizers amongst
-psycho-physical eccentrics. Yet the truth and value of their work and
-character has, of course, to be measured, not by this its neural fringe
-and cost, but by its central spiritual truth and fruitfulness.
-
-
-2. _Such mechanisms specially marked in Philosophers, Musicians, Poets,
-and Mystical Religionists._
-
-The mystical and contemplative element in the religious life, and the
-group of saints amongst whom this element is predominant, no doubt give
-us a still larger amount of what, again taking the matter phenomenally
-and not ultimately, is once more mono-ideism and auto-suggestion,
-and entails a correspondingly larger amount of psycho-physical
-impressionableness and reaction utilized by the mind. But here also,
-from the simplest forms of the “prayer of quiet” to absorptions of an
-approximately ecstatic type, we have something which, though different
-in kind and value, is yet no more abnormal than are the highest flights
-and absorptions of the Philosopher, the Musician, and the Poet. And
-yet, in such cases as Kant and Beethoven, a classifier of humanity
-according to its psycho-physical phenomena alone would put these great
-discoverers and creators, without hesitation, amongst hopeless and
-useless hypochondriacs. Yet here again the truth of their ideas and the
-work of their lives have to be measured by quite other things than by
-this their neural concomitance and cost.
-
-
-3. _Ecstatics possess a peculiar psycho-physical organization._
-
-The downright ecstatics and hearers of voices and seers of visions
-have all, wherever we are able to trace their temperamental and neural
-constitution and history, possessed and developed a definitely peculiar
-psycho-physical organization. We have traced it in Catherine and
-indicated it in St. Teresa. We find it again in St. Maria Magdalena
-dei Pazzi and in St. Marguerite Marie Alacocque, in modern times,
-and in St. Catherine of Siena and St. Francis of Assisi in mediaeval
-times. For early Christian times we are too ignorant as regards the
-psycho-physical organization of St. Ignatius of Antioch, Hermas,
-and St. Cyprian, to be able to establish a connection between their
-temperamental endowments and their hearing of voices and seeing of
-visions--in the last two cases we get much that looks like more or less
-of a mere conventional literary device.[39]
-
-We are, however, in a fair position for judging, in the typical and
-thoroughly original case of St. Paul. In 2 Cor. xiii, 7, 8, after
-speaking of the abundant revelations accorded to him, he adds that
-“lest I be lifted up, a thorn” (literally, a stake) “in the flesh was
-given to me, an Angel of Satan to buffet me.” And though “I thrice
-besought the Lord that it might depart from me, the Lord answered
-me, ‘My grace is sufficient for thee; for grace is perfected in
-infirmity.’” And he was consequently determined “rather” to “glory in
-his infirmities, so that the power of Christ may dwell within” him.
-And in Gal. iv, 14, 15, written about the same time, he reminds his
-readers how he had “preached to them through the infirmity of the
-flesh,” commending them because they “did not despise nor loathe their
-temptation in his flesh” (this is no doubt the correct reading), “but
-had received him as an Angel of God, as Christ Jesus.”
-
-Now the most ancient interpretation of this “thorn” or “stake” is some
-kind of bodily complaint,--violent headache or earache is mentioned by
-Tertullian de Pudicitia, 13, and by St. Jerome, Comm. in Gal. _loc.
-cit._ Indeed St. Paul’s own description of his “bodily presence” as
-“weak,” and his “spoken word” as “contemptible” (2 Cor. x, 10), points
-this way. It seems plain that it cannot have been carnal temptations
-(only in the sixth century did this interpretation become firmly
-established), for he could not have gloried in these, nor could they,
-hidden as they would be within his heart, have exposed him to the
-contempt of others. Indeed he expressly excludes such troubles from his
-life, where, in advising those who were thus oppressed to marry, he
-gives the preference to the single life, and declares, “I would that
-all men were even as myself” (1 Cor. vii, 7).
-
-The attacks of this trouble were evidently acutely painful: note the
-metaphor of a stake driven into the live flesh and the Angel of Satan
-who buffeted him. (And compare St. Teresa’s account: “An Angel of God
-appeared to me to be thrusting at times a long spear into my heart and
-to pierce my very entrails”; “the pain was so great that it made me
-moan”; “it really seems to the soul as if an arrow were thrust through
-the heart or through itself; the suffering is not one of sense, neither
-is the wound physical”; and how, on another occasion, she heard Our
-Lord answer her: “Serve thou Me, and meddle not with this.”)[40]
-
-These attacks would come suddenly, even in the course of his public
-ministry, rendering him, in so far, an object of derision and of
-loathing. (Compare here St. Teresa’s declaration: “During the rapture,
-the body is very often perfectly powerless; it continues in the
-position it was in when the rapture came upon it: if sitting, sitting;
-if the hands were open, or if they were shut, they will remain open or
-shut”; “if the body” was “standing or kneeling, it remains so.”)[41]
-
-Yet these attacks were evidently somehow connected, both in fact and
-in his consciousness, with his Visions; and they were recurrent. The
-vision of the Third Heaven and his apparently first attack seem to have
-been practically coincident,--about A.D. 44. We find a second attack
-hanging about him for some time, on his first preaching in Galatia,
-about A.D. 51 or 52 (see 1 Thess. ii, 18; 1 Cor. ii, 3). And a third
-attack appears to have come in A.D. 57 or 58, when the Second Epistle
-to the Corinthians and that to the Galatians were written; note the
-words (2 Cor. i, 9), “But” (in addition to his share in the public
-persecution) “we ourselves had the sentence of death within ourselves,
-in order that we might not trust in ourselves but in God who raiseth
-the dead to life.” (And compare here St. Teresa: in July 1547 “for
-about four days I remained insensible. They must have regarded me as
-dead more than once. For a day and a half the grave was open in my
-monastery, waiting for my body. But it pleased Our Lord I should come
-to myself.”)[42] Dr. Lightfoot gives as a parallel the epileptiform
-seizures of King Alfred, which, sudden, acutely painful, at times
-death-like, and protracted, tended to render the royal power despicable
-in the eyes of the world.[43] Yet, except for the difference of sex and
-of relative privacy, St. Teresa’s states, which I have given here, are
-more closely similar, in so much as they are intimately connected with
-religious visions and voices.
-
-And, amongst Old Testament figures, we can find a similar connection,
-on a still larger scale, in the case of Ezekiel, the most definitely
-ecstatic, though (upon the whole) the least original, of the literary
-Prophets. For, as to the visionary element, we have his own records
-of three visions of the glory of Jahve; of five other ecstasies,
-three of which are accompanied by remarkable telepathic, second-sight
-activities; and of twelve symbolic (better: representative) prophetic
-actions, which are now all rightly coming to be considered as having
-been externally carried out by him.[44] And we get psycho-physical
-states, as marked as in any other ecstatic saint. For we hear how Jahve
-on one occasion says to him: “But thou, son of man, lay thyself on
-thy left side” (_i.e._ according to Jewish orientation, towards the
-North) “and I shall lay the guilt of the house of Israel” (the Northern
-Kingdom) “upon thee; the number of days that thou shalt lie upon it,
-shalt thou bear their guilt. But I appoint unto thee the years of their
-guilt, as a (corresponding) number of days, (namely) one hundred and
-fifty days.… And, when thou hast done with them, thou shalt lay thyself
-on thy right side” (_i.e._ towards the South), “and thou shalt bear the
-guilt of the house of Judah” (the Southern Kingdom); “one day for each
-year shall I appoint unto thee. And behold I shall lay cords upon thee,
-that thou shalt be unable to turn from one side to the other, till thou
-hast ended the days of thy boundness” (iv, 4-8). Krätzschmar, no doubt
-rightly, finds here a case of hemiplegia and anaesthesia, functional
-cataleptic paralysis lasting during five months on the left side, and
-then shifting for about six weeks to the right side. And the _alalia_
-(speechlessness), which no doubt accompanied this state, is referred
-to on three other occasions: xxiv, 27; xxix, 31; xxxiii, 22. And note
-how Jahve’s address to Ezekiel, “son of man,” which occurs in this book
-over ninety times, and but once in the whole of the rest of the Old
-Testament (Dan. viii, 17), evidently stands here for the sense of his
-creaturely nothingness, so characteristic of the true ecstatic.[45]
-
-Now, at this last stage, the analogy of the other non-religious
-activities of the healthy mind and of their psycho-physical conditions
-and effects forsakes us; but not the principle which has guided us
-all along. For here, as from the very first, some such conditions
-and effects are inevitable; and the simple fact of this occurrence,
-apart from the question of their particular character, is something
-thoroughly normal. And here again, and more than ever, the emphasis
-and decision have to lie with, and to depend upon, the mental and
-volitional work and the spiritual truth and reality achieved in and for
-the recipient, and, through him, in and for others.
-
-Even at the earlier stages, to cling to the form, as distinct from
-the content and end, of these things was to be thoroughly unfair
-to this their content and end, within the spacious economy of the
-spirit’s life; at this stage such clinging becomes destructive of all
-true religion. For if the mere psycho-physical forms and phenomena of
-ecstasy, of vision, of hearing of voices is, in proportion to their
-psycho-physical intensity and seeming automatism and quasi-physical
-objectivity, to be taken as necessarily a means and mark of sanctity or
-of insight, or, at least, as something presumably sent direct by God
-or else as diabolical, something necessarily super- or preter-natural:
-then the lunatic asylums contain more miracles, saints, and sages, or
-their direct, strangely similar antipodes, than all the most fervent or
-perverted churches, monasteries, and families upon God’s earth. For in
-asylums we find ecstasies, visions, voices, all more, not less marked,
-all more, not less irresistibly objective-seeming to the recipient,
-than anything to be found outside.
-
-Yet apply impartially to both sets the test, not of form, but of
-content, of spiritual fruitfulness and of many-sided applicability--and
-this surface-similarity yields at once to a fundamental difference.
-Indeed all the great mystics, and this in precise proportion to their
-greatness, have ever taught that, the mystical capacities and habits
-being but means and not ends, only such ecstasies are valuable as
-leave the soul, and the very body as its instrument, strengthened and
-improved; and that visions and voices are to be accepted by the mind
-only in proportion as they convey some spiritual truth of importance to
-it or to others, and as they actually help it to become more humble,
-true, and loving.
-
-And there can be no doubt that these things worked thus with such
-great ecstatic mystics as Ezekiel, the man of the great prophetic
-schemes and the permanently fruitful picturing of the Good Shepherd;
-as St. Paul, the greatest missionary and organizer ever given to the
-Christian Church; as St. Francis of Assisi, the salt and leaven and
-light of the Church and of society, in his day and more or less ever
-since; as St. Catherine of Siena, the free-spoken, docile reinspirer
-of the Papacy; as Jeanne d’Arc, the maiden deliverer of a Nation; as
-St. Teresa, reformer of a great Order. All these, and countless others,
-would, quite evidently, have achieved less, not more, of interior
-light and of far-reaching helpfulness of a kind readily recognized by
-all specifically religious souls, had they been without the rest, the
-bracing, the experience furnished to them by their ecstasies and allied
-states and apprehensions.
-
-
-
-
-VII. PERENNIAL FRESHNESS OF THE GREAT MYSTICS’ MAIN SPIRITUAL TEST, IN
-CONTRADISTINCTION TO THEIR SECONDARY, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTENTION. TWO
-SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES.
-
-
-1. _A false and a true test of mystical experience._
-
-Now it is deeply interesting to note how entirely unweakened, indeed
-how impressively strengthened, by the intervening severe test of
-whole centuries of further experience and of thought, has remained
-the main and direct, the spiritual test of the great Mystics, in
-contradistinction to their secondary psychological contention with
-respect to such experiences. The secondary, psychological contention
-is well reproduced by St. Teresa where she says: “When I speak, I go
-on with my understanding arranging what I am saying; but, if I am
-spoken to by others, I do nothing else but listen without any labour.”
-In the former case, “the soul,” if it be in good faith, “cannot
-possibly fail to see clearly that itself arranges the words and utters
-them to itself. How then can the understanding have time enough to
-arrange these locutions? They require time.”[46] Now this particular
-argument for their supernaturalness derived from the psychological
-form--from the suddenness, clearness, and apparent automatism of these
-locutions--has ceased to carry weight, owing to our present, curiously
-recent, knowledge concerning the subconscious region of the mind, and
-the occasionally sudden irruption of that region’s contents into the
-field of that same mind’s ordinary, full consciousness. In the Ven.
-Battista Vernazza’s case we have a particularly clear instance of such
-a long accumulation,--by means of much, in great part full, attention
-to certain spiritual ideas, words, and images,--in the subconscious
-regions of a particularly strong and deeply sincere and saintly mind;
-and the sudden irruption from those regions of certain clear and
-apparently quite spontaneous words and images into the field of her
-mind’s full consciousness.[47]
-
-But the reference to the great Mystics’ chief and direct test, upon
-which they dwell with an assurance and self-consistency far surpassing
-that which accompanies their psychological argument,--the spiritual
-content and effects of such experiences,--this, retains all its
-cogency. St. Teresa tells us: “When Our Lord speaks, it is both word
-and work: His words are deeds.” “I found myself, through these words
-alone, tranquil and strong, courageous and confident, at rest and
-enlightened: I felt I could maintain against all the world that my
-prayer was the work of God.” “I could not believe that Satan, if he
-wished to deceive me, could have recourse to means so adverse to his
-purpose as this, of rooting out my faults, and implanting virtues and
-spiritual strength: for I saw clearly that I had become another person,
-by means of these visions.” “So efficacious was the vision, and such
-was the nature of the words spoken to me, that I could not possibly
-doubt that they came from Him.” “I was in a trance; and the effects of
-it were such, that I could have no doubt it came from God.” On another
-occasion she writes less positively even of the great test: “She never
-undertook anything merely because it came to her in prayer. For all
-that her Confessors told her that these things came from God, she never
-so thoroughly believed them that she could swear to it herself, though
-it did seem to her that they were spiritually safe, because of the
-effects thereof.”[48] This doctrine is still the last word of wisdom in
-these matters.
-
-
-2. _First special difficulty in testing ecstasies._
-
-Yet it is only at this last stage that two special difficulties occur,
-the one philosophical, the other moral. The philosophical difficulty
-is as follows. As long as the earlier stages are in progress, it is
-not difficult to understand that the soul may be gradually building up
-for herself a world of spiritual apprehensions, and a corresponding
-spiritual and moral character, by a process which, looked at merely
-phenomenally and separately, appears as a simple case of mono-ideism
-and auto-suggestion, but which can and should be conceived, when
-studied in its ultimate cause and end, as due to the pressure and
-influence of God’s spirit working in and through the spirit of
-man,--the Creator causing His own little human creature freely to
-create for itself some copy of and approach to its own eternally
-subsisting, substantial Cause and Crown. There the operation of such an
-underlying Supreme Cause, and a consequent relation between the world
-thus conceived and built up by the human soul and the real world of the
-Divine Spirit, appears possible, because the things which the soul is
-thus made to suggest to itself are ideas, and because even these ideas
-are clearly recognized by the soul as only instruments and approaches
-to the realities for which they stand. But here, in this last stage, we
-get the suggestion, not of ideas, but of psycho-physical impressions,
-and these impressions are, apparently, not taken as but distantly
-illustrative, but as somehow one with the spiritual realities for which
-they stand. Is not, _e.g._, Catherine’s joy at this stage centred
-precisely in the downright feeling, smelling, seeing, of ocean waters,
-penetrating odours, all-enveloping light; and in the identification of
-those waters, odours, lights, with God Himself, so that God becomes at
-last an object of direct, passive, sensible perception? Have we not
-then here at last reached pure delusion?
-
-Not so, in proportion as the mystic is great and spiritual, and as
-he here still clings to the principles common to all true religion.
-For, in proportion as he is and does this, will he find and regard the
-mind as deeper and more operative than sense, and God’s Spirit as
-penetrating and transcending both the one and the other. And hence he
-will (at least implicitly) regard those psycho-physical impressions
-as but sense-like and really mental; and he will consider this mental
-impression and projection as indeed produced by the presence and
-action of the Spirit within his mind or of the pressure of spiritual
-realities upon it, but will hold that this whole mental process, with
-these its spacial- and temporal-seeming embodiments, these sights and
-sounds, has only a relation and analogical likeness to, and is not
-and cannot be identical with, those realities of an intrinsically
-super-spacial, super-temporal order.--And thus here as everywhere,
-although here necessarily more than ever, we find again the conception
-of the Transcendent yet also Immanent Spirit, effecting in the human
-spirit the ever-increasing apprehension of Himself, accompanied in
-this spirit by an ever keener sense of His incomprehensibility for all
-but Himself. And here again the truth, and more especially the divine
-origin of these apprehensions, is tested and guaranteed on and on by
-the consequent deepening of that spiritual and ethical fruitfulness and
-death to self, which are the common aspirations of every deepest moment
-and every sincerest movement within the universal heart of man.
-
-Thus, as regards the mentality of these experiences, Catherine
-constantly speaks of seeing “as though with the eyes of the body.” And
-St. Teresa tells us of her visions with “the eyes of the soul”; of
-how at first she “did not know that it was possible to see anything
-otherwise than with the eyes of the body”; of how, in reality “she
-never,” in her true visions and locutions, “saw anything with her
-bodily eyes, nor heard anything with her bodily ears”; and of how
-indeed she later on, on one occasion, “saw nothing with the eyes of
-the body, nothing with the eyes of the soul,”--she “simply felt Christ
-close by her,”--evidently again with the soul. Thus, too, Catherine
-tells us, that “as the intellect exceeds language, so does love exceed
-intellection”; and how vividly she feels that “all that can be said of
-God,” compared to the great Reality, “is but tiny crumbs from the great
-Master’s table.”[49]
-
-And, as to the inadequacy of these impressions, the classical authority
-on such things, St. John of the Cross, declares: “He that will rely on
-the letter of the divine locutions or on the intelligible form of the
-vision, will of necessity fall into delusion; for he does not yield to
-the Spirit in detachment from sense.” “He who shall give attention to
-these motes of the Spirit alone will, in the end, have no spirituality
-at all.” “All visions, revelations, and heavenly feelings, and whatever
-is greater than these, are not worth the least act of humility, bearing
-the fruits of that charity which neither values nor seeks itself,
-which thinketh well not of self but of all others.” Indeed “virtue
-does not consist in these apprehensions. Let men then cease to regard,
-and labour to forget them, that they may be free.” For “spiritual
-supernatural knowledge is of two kinds, one distinct and special,”
-which comprises “visions, revelations, locutions, and spiritual
-impressions”; “the other confused, obscure, and general,” which “has
-but one form, that of contemplation which is the work of faith. The
-soul is to be led into this, by directing it thereto through all the
-rest, beginning with the first, and detaching it from them.”
-
-Hence “many souls, to whom visions have never come, are incomparably
-more advanced in the way of perfection than others to whom many
-have been given”; and “they who are already perfect, receive these
-visitations of the Spirit of God in peace; ecstasies cease, for they
-were only graces to prepare them for this greater grace.” Hence, too,
-“one desire only doth God allow and suffer in His Presence: that of
-perfectly observing His law and of carrying the Cross of Christ. In
-the Ark of the Covenant there was but the Book of the Law, the Rod of
-Aaron, and the Pot of Manna. Even so that soul, which has no other aim
-than the perfect observance of the Law of God and the carrying of the
-Cross of Christ, will be a true Ark containing the true Manna, which
-is God.” And this perfected soul’s intellectual apprehensions will,
-in their very mixture of light and conscious obscurity, more and more
-approach and forestall the eternal condition of the beatified soul.
-“One of the greatest favours, bestowed transiently on the soul in this
-life, is to enable it to see so distinctly and to feel so profoundly,
-that it cannot comprehend Him at all. These souls are herein, in
-some degree, like the Saints in Heaven, where they who know Him most
-perfectly perceive most clearly that He is infinitely incomprehensible;
-for those who have the less clear vision do not perceive so distinctly
-as the others how greatly He transcends their vision.”[50]
-
-
-3. _Second special difficulty in testing ecstasies._
-
-The second special difficulty is this. Have not at least some of the
-saints of this definitely ecstatic type shown more psycho-physical
-abnormality than spiritually fruitful origination or utilization of
-such things, so that their whole life seems penetrated by a fantastic
-spirit? And have not many others, who, at their best, may not have been
-amenable to this charge, ended with shattered nerve- and will-power,
-with an organism apparently incapable of any further growth or use,
-even if we restrict our survey exclusively to strength-bringing ecstasy
-and to a contemplative prayer of some traceable significance?
-
-(1) As a good instance of the apparent predominance of psycho-physical
-and even spiritual strangeness, we can take the Venerable Sister
-Lukardis, Cistercian Nun of Ober-Weimar, born probably in 1276.
-Her life is published from a unique Latin MS. by the Bollandists
-(_Analecta_, Vol. XVIII, pp. 305-367, Bruxelles, 1899), and presents us
-with a mediaevally naïve and strangely unanalytic, yet extraordinarily
-vivid picture of things actually seen by the writer. “Although,” say
-the most competent editors, “we know not the name nor profession of
-the Author, whether he belonged to the Friars or to the Monks,[51] it
-is certain that he was a contemporary of Lukardis, that he knew her
-intimately, and that he learnt many details from her fellow-nuns. And
-though we shall be slow to agree with him when he ascribes all the
-strange things which she experienced in her soul and body to divine
-influence, yet we should beware of considering him to be in bad faith.
-For, though he erred perchance in ascribing to a divine operation
-things which are simply the work of nature, such a vice is common
-amongst those who transmit such things.”[52] I take the chief points in
-the order of their narration by the _Vita_.
-
-“Soon after Lukardis had, at twelve years of age, taken the Cistercian
-habit, her mother died,” over twelve English miles away, at Erfurt, yet
-Lukardis “saw the scene” in such detail “in the spirit,” that, when
-her sister came to tell her, she, Lukardis, “anticipated her with an
-account of the day, the place and hour of the death, of the clothes
-then being worn by their mother, of the precise position of the bed and
-of the hospital, and of the persons present at the time.”
-
-She soon suffered from “stone” in the bladder; “quartan, tertian, and
-continuous fevers,” and from fainting fits; also from contraction of
-the muscles (_nervi_) of the hands, so that the latter were all but
-useless and could not even hold the staff on which she had to lean in
-walking, till they had been “tightly wrapped round in certain clothes.”
-Yet “she would, at times, strike her hands so vehemently against each
-other, that they resounded as though they had been wooden boards.”
-“When lying in bed she would sometimes, as it were, plant her feet
-beneath her, hang her head down” backwards, “and raise her abdomen and
-chest, making thus, as it were, a highly curved arch of her person.”
-Indeed sometimes “she would for a long while stand upon her head and
-shoulders, with her feet up in air, but with her garments adhering to
-her limbs, as though they had been sewn on to them.” “Often, too, by
-day or night, she was wont to run with a most impetuous course;--she
-understood that, by this her course, she was compensating Christ for
-His earthly course of thirty-three years.”[53]
-
-“On one occasion she had a vision of Christ, in which He said to her:
-‘Join thy hands to My hands, and thy feet to My feet, and thy breast
-to My breast, and thus shall I be aided by thee to suffer less.’ And
-instantly she felt a most keen pain of wounds,” in all three regions,
-“although wounds did not as yet appear to sight.” But “as she bore
-the memory of the hammering of the nails into Christ upon the Cross
-within her heart, so did she exercise herself in outward deed. For she
-was frequently wont, with the middle finger of one hand, impetuously
-to wound the other in the place appropriate to the stigmata; then to
-withdraw her finger to the distance of a cubit, and straightway again
-impetuously to wound herself. Those middle fingers felt hard like
-metal. And about the sixth and ninth hour she would impetuously wound
-herself with her finger in the breast, at the appropriate place for the
-wound.”--After about two years “Christ appeared to her in the night of
-Blessed Gregory, Pope” (St. Gregory VII, May 26?), “pressed her right
-hand firmly in His, and declared, ‘I desire thee to suffer with Me.’
-On her consenting, a wound instantly appeared in her right hand; about
-ten days later a wound in the left hand; and thus successively the five
-wounds were found in her body.” “The wounds of the scourging were also
-found upon her, of a finger’s length, and having a certain hard skin
-around them.”[54]
-
-“At whiles she would lie like one dead throughout the day; yet her
-countenance was very attractive, owing to a wondrous flushed look. And
-even if a needle was pressed into her flesh, she felt no pain.”--“On
-one occasion she was carried upon her couch by two sisters into the
-Lady Chapel, to the very spot where her body now reposes. After having
-been left there alone for about an hour, the Blessed Virgin appeared
-to her, with her beloved Infant, Jesus, in her arms, and suckling Him.
-And Lukardis, contrary to the law of her strength”--she had, by now,
-been long confined to a reclining posture--“arose from her couch and
-began to stand upright. And at this juncture one of the Sisters opened
-the Chapel door a little, and, on looking in, marvelled at Lukardis
-being able to stand, but withdrew and forbade the other Sisters from
-approaching thither, since she feared that, if they saw her standing
-thus, they might declare her to be quite able, if she but chose, to
-arise and stand at any time. Upon the Blessed Virgin twice insisting
-upon being asked for some special favour, and Lukardis declaring, ‘I
-desire that thou slake my thirst with that same milk with which I now
-see thee suckling thy beloved Son,’ the Blessed Virgin came up to her,
-and gave her to drink of her milk.” And when later on Lukardis was
-fetched by the Sisters, she was “found reclining on her couch. And for
-three days and nights she took neither food nor drink, and could not
-see the light of day. And as a precaution, since her death was feared,
-Extreme Unction was administered to her. And, later on, the Sister who
-had seen her standing in the Chapel, gradually drew the whole story
-from her.”[55]
-
-“After she had lain, very weak, and, as it were, in a state of
-contracture, for eleven years, it happened that, about the ninth hour
-of one Good Friday, the natural bodily heat and colour forsook her;
-she seemed nowise to breathe; her wounds bled more than usual; she
-appeared to be dead. And her fellow-Sisters wept greatly. Yet about
-Vesper-time she opened her eyes and began to move; and her companions
-were wondrously consoled. And then in the Easter night, about the hour
-of Christ’s Resurrection, as, with the other sick Sisters, she lay in
-her bed placed so as to be able to hear the Divine Office, she felt
-all her limbs to be as it were suffused with a most refreshing dew.
-And straightway she saw stretched down to her from Heaven a hand, as
-it were of the Blessed Virgin, which stroked her wounds and all the
-painful places, the ligaments and joints of her members, gently and
-compassionately. After which she straightway felt how that all her
-members, which before had for so long been severely contracted, and how
-the knots, formed by the ligaments (_nervi_), were being efficaciously
-resolved and equally distended, so that she considered herself freed
-from her hard bondage. She arose unaided from her couch, proceeded to
-the near-by entrance to the Choir, and prostrated herself there, in
-fervent orison, with her arms outstretched in cross-form, for a very
-long hour. And then, commanded by the Abbess to rise, she readily arose
-without help, stood with pleasure, and walked whithersoever she would.”
-“At all times she ever suffered more from the cold than any of her
-companions.”[56]
-
-“As, during those eleven years that she lay like one paralyzed, she was
-wont, on every Friday, to lie with her arms expanded as though on the
-Cross, and her feet one on the top of the other; so, after the Lord had
-so wonderfully raised her on that Paschal day, she, on every Friday
-and every Lenten day, would stand erect with her arms outstretched,
-crosswise, and, without any support, on one foot only, with the
-other foot planted upon its fellow, from the hour of noon to that of
-Vespers.”--“Whilst she was still uncured, and required some delicate
-refection which the Convent could not afford, there came to her,” one
-day, “the most loving Infant, bearing in His Hand the leg of a chicken,
-newly roasted, and begging her to eat it for His sake.” She did so,
-and was wonderfully strengthened. Apparently late on in her life “they
-procured, with much labour and diligence, all kinds of drinkables from
-different and even from distant places for her. But she, having tasted
-any one of them, would straightway shake her head, close her lips, and
-then declare that she could not drink it up.” “However delicious in
-itself, it seemed to be so much gall and wormwood when applied to her
-mouth.”[57]
-
-And if we look, not at seemingly childish fantasticalness in certain
-mystical lives, but at the later state of shattered health and
-apparently weakened nerve- and will-power which appears so frequently
-to be the price paid for the definitely ecstatic type of religion, even
-where it has been spiritually fruitful, our anxiety is readily renewed.
-Look at the nine, possibly thirteen, last years of Catherine’s, or at
-the last period of St. Margaret Mary’s life; note the similar cases
-of SS. Maria Magdalena de Pazzi and Juliana Falconieri. And we have
-a figure of all but pure suffering and passivity in St. Lidwina of
-Schiedam (1380-1433), over which M. Huysmans has managed to be so
-thoroughly morbid.
-
-(2) And if such lives strike us as too exceptional to be taken, with
-whatever deductions, as a case in point, we can find a thoroughly fair
-instance in the life of Father Isaac Hecker. Here we have a man of
-extraordinary breadth, solidity, and activity of mind and character,
-and whose mysticism is of the most sober and harmonious kind. Yet his
-close companion and most faithful chronicler, Father Walter Elliott,
-tells us: “From severe colds, acute headaches, and weakness of the
-digestive organs, Father Hecker was at all times a frequent sufferer.
-But, towards the end of the year 1871, his headaches became much more
-painful, his appetite forsook him, and sleeplessness and excitability
-of the nervous system were added to his other ailments. Remedies of
-every kind were tried, but without permanent relief. By the summer
-of 1872 he was wholly incapacitated.” “The physical sufferings of
-those last sixteen” (out of the sixty-nine) “years of his life were
-never such as to impair his mental soundness … though his organs of
-speech were sometimes too slow for his thoughts.” His digestion and
-nervous system had been impaired by excessive abstinence in early
-manhood, and by excessive work in later life, “till at last the body
-struck work altogether. During the sixteen years of his illness every
-symptom of bodily illness was aggravated by the least attention to
-community affairs or business matters, and also by interior trials,”
-although he still managed, by heroic efforts, at times directly to
-serve his congregation and to write some remarkable papers. Yet this
-state continued, practically unbroken, up to the end, on December 22,
-1888.[58] And although the various proximate causes, indicated by
-Father Elliott, had no doubt been operative here, there can, in view of
-the numerous similar cases, be no question that the most fundamental
-of the reasons of this general condition of health was his strongly
-mystical type and habit of mind and his corresponding psycho-physical
-organization.
-
-(3) In view of those fantasticalnesses and of these exhaustions, we
-cannot but ask whether these things are not a terrible price to pay
-for such states? whether such states should not be disallowed by
-all solid morality, and should not prompt men of sense to try and
-stamp them out? And, above all, we seem placed once more, with added
-anxiety, before the question whether what is liable to end in such sad
-general incapacitation was not, from the first, directly productive
-of, and indeed simply produced by, some merely subjective, simply
-psycho-physical abnormality and morbidness?
-
-(4) Three points here call for consideration. Let us, for one thing,
-never forget that physical health is not the true end of human life,
-but only one of its most important means and conditions. The ideal man
-is not, primarily and directly, a physical machine, perfect as such
-in its development and function, to which would be tacked on, as a
-sort of concomitant or means, the mental, moral, and spiritual life
-and character. But the ideal man is precisely this latter life and
-character, with the psycho-physical organism sustained and developed in
-such, and only such, a degree, direction, and combination, as may make
-it the best possible substratum, stimulus, instrument, material, and
-expression for and of that spiritual personality.[59] Hence, the true
-question here is not whether such a type of life as we are considering
-exacts a serious physical tribute or not, but whether the specifically
-human effects and fruits of that life are worth that cost.
-
-No one denies that mining, or warfare, or hospital work, both spiritual
-and medical, involve grave risks to life, nor that the preparation
-of many chemicals is directly and inevitably injurious to health.
-Yet no one thinks of abolishing such occupations or of blaming those
-who follow them, and rightly so; for instant death may and should be
-risked, the slow but certain undermining of the physical health may be
-laudably embarked on, if only the mind and character are not damaged,
-and if the end to be attained is found to be necessary or seriously
-helpful, and unattainable by other means.
-
-The simple fact, then, of frequent and subsequent, or even of universal
-and concomitant ill-health in such mystical cases, or even the proof
-of this ill-health being a direct consequence or necessary condition
-of that mystical life, can but push back the debate, and simply raises
-the question as to the serious value of that habit and activity. Only
-a decision adverse to that serious value would constitute those facts
-into a condemnation of that activity itself.
-
-And, next, it must be plain to any one endowed with an appreciable dose
-of the mystical sense, and with a sufficiently large knowledge of human
-nature and of religious apprehension in the past and present,--that, if
-it is doubtless possible quite erroneously to treat all men as having
-a considerable element of mysticism in them, and hence to strain and
-spoil souls belonging to one of the other types: it is equally possible
-to starve those that possess this element in an operative degree.
-Atrophy is as truly a malady as plethora.
-
-And here the question is an individual one: would that particular
-temperament and psycho-physical organism congenial to Sister Lukardis,
-to Catherine Fiesca Adorna, to Marguerite Marie Alacocque, and to Isaac
-Hecker, have--taking the whole existence and output together--produced
-more useful work, and have apprehended and presented more of abiding
-truth, had their ecstatic states or tendencies been, if possible,
-absent or suppressed? Does not this type of apprehension, this, as
-it were, incubation, harmonization, and vivifying of their otherwise
-painfully fragmentary and heavy impressions, stand out,--in their
-central, creative periods,--as the one thoroughly appropriate means and
-form of their true self-development and self-expression, and of such
-an apprehension and showing forth of spiritual truth as to them,--to
-them and not to you and me,--was possible? And if we are bound to admit
-that, even in such cases, ecstasy appears, psycho-physically, as a kind
-of second state, and that these personalities find or regain their
-fullest joy and deepest strength only in and from such a state; yet we
-know too that such ecstasy is not, as in the trances of hysteria and
-of other functional disorders, simply discontinuous from the ordinary,
-primary state of such souls; and that,--again contrary to those
-_maladif_ trances,--whenever the ecstasy answers to the tests insisted
-upon by the great mystics, viz. a true and valuable ethico-spiritual
-content and effect, it also, in the long run, leaves the very body
-strengthened and improved.
-
-And if, after this, their productive period, some of these persons end
-by losing their psycho-physical health, it is far from unreasonable
-to suppose that the actual alternative to those ecstasies and this
-break-up, would, _for them_, have been a lifelong dreary languor and
-melancholy self-absorption, somewhat after the pattern of Catherine’s
-last ten pre-conversion years. Thus for her, and doubtless for most of
-the spiritually considerable ecstatics, life was, taken all in all,
-indefinitely happier, richer, and more fruitful in religious truth and
-holiness, with the help of those ecstatic states, than it would have
-been if these states had been absent or could have been suppressed.
-
-And thirdly, here again, even from the point of view of psycho-physical
-health and its protection, it is precisely the actual practice and,
-as interpreted by it, the deepest sayings of the standard Christian
-mystics which are being most powerfully confirmed,--although
-necessarily by largely new reasons and with important modifications
-in the analysis and application of their doctrine,--by all that we
-have gained, during the last forty years, in definite knowledge of
-the psycho-physical regions and functions of human nature, and,
-during two centuries and more, in enlargement and precision of our
-religious-historical outlook.
-
-If we consider the specific health-dangers of this way, we shall find,
-I think, that their roots are ever two. These dangers, and with them
-the probability of delusion or at least of spiritual barrenness, always
-become actual, and often acute, the minute that we allow ourselves to
-attach a primary and independent importance to the psycho-physical
-form and means of these things, as against their spiritual-ethical
-content, suggestions, and end; or that we take the whole man, or at
-least the whole of the religious man, to consist of the specifically
-mystical habits and life alone. Now the first of these dangers has
-been ceaselessly exposed and fought by all the great ethical and
-Christian mystics of the past, _e.g._ St. John of the Cross and St.
-Teresa; and the latter has been ever enforced by the actual practice,
-as social religionists, of these same mystics, even if and when some
-of their sayings, or the logical drift of their speculative system,
-left insufficient room or no intrinsic necessity and function for such
-things.
-
-(5) And everything that has happened and is happening in the world
-of psychological and philosophical research, in the world of
-historico-critical investigation into the past history and modalities
-of religion, and in the world of our own present religious experience
-and requirements, has but brought to light fresh facts, forces,
-and connections, in proof both of the right and irreplaceableness
-of the Mystical element in life and religion, and of the reality
-and constant presence of these its two dangers. For, as to these
-dangers, we now know, with extraordinary clearness and certainty, how
-necessary, constant and far-reaching is, on its phenomenal surface,
-the auto-suggestive, mono-ideistic power and mechanism of the mind;
-yet how easily, in some states, too much can be made of such vivid
-apprehensions and quasi-sensible imagings of invisible reality,--things
-admirable as means, ruinous as ends. And we also know, with an
-astonishing universality of application, how great a multiplicity in
-unity is necessarily presented by every concrete object and by every
-mental act and emotional state of every sane human being throughout
-every moment of his waking life; and how this unity is actually
-constituted and measured by the multiplicity of the materials and
-by the degree of their harmonization.--Hence, not the absence of
-the Mystical element, but the presence both of it and of the other
-constituents of religion, will turn out to be the safeguard of our
-deepest life and of its sanity, a sanity which demands a balanced
-fulness of the soul’s three fundamental pairs of activities: sensible
-perception and picturing memory; reflection, speculative and analytic;
-and emotion and volition, all issuing in interior and exterior acts,
-and these latter, again, providing so much fresh material and occasions
-for renewed action and for a growing unification in an increasing
-variety, on and on.
-
-The metaphysical and faith questions, necessarily raised by the
-phenomenal facts and mechanisms here considered, but which cannot
-be answered at this level, will be discussed in a later chapter.
-Here we can but once more point out, in conclusion, that no amount
-of admitted or demonstrated auto-suggestion or mono-ideism in the
-phenomenal reaches and mechanism of the mind decides, of itself,
-anything whatsoever about, and still less against, the objective truth
-and spiritual value of the ultimate causes, dominant ideas, and final
-results of the process; nor as to whether and how far the whole great
-movement is, at bottom, occasioned and directed by the Supreme Spirit,
-God, working, in and through man, towards man’s apprehension and
-manifestation of Himself.[60]
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER X
-
-THE MAIN LITERARY SOURCES OF CATHERINE’S CONCEPTIONS
-
-
-INTRODUCTORY.
-
-
-1. _The main literary sources of Catherine’s teaching are four._
-
-The main literary sources of Catherine’s conceptions can be grouped
-under four heads: the New Testament, Pauline and Joannine writings;
-the Christian Neo-Platonist, Areopagite books; and the Franciscan,
-Jacopone da Todi’s teachings. And here, as in all cases of such
-partial dependence, we have to distinguish between the apparently
-accidental occasions (her seemingly fortuitous acquaintance with these
-particular writings), and the certainly necessary causes (the intrinsic
-requirements of her own mind and soul, and its special reactions under,
-and transformations of, these materials and stimulations). And during
-this latter process this mind’s original trend itself undergoes, in its
-turn, not only much development, but even some modification. She would
-no doubt owe her close knowledge of the first two sets of writings to
-the Augustinian Canonesses, (her sister Limbania amongst them,) and to
-their Augustinian-Pauline tradition; her acquaintance with the third
-set, to her Dominican cousin; and her intimacy with the fourth, to the
-Franciscans of the Hospital. Yet only her own spiritual affinity for
-similar religious states and ideals, and her already at least partial
-experience of them, could ever have made these writings to her what
-they actually became: direct stimulations, indeed considerable elements
-and often curiously vivid expressions, of her own immediate interior
-life.
-
-
-2. _Plan of the following study of these sources._
-
-I shall, in this chapter, first try to draw out those characteristics
-of each group, which were either specially accepted or transformed,
-neglected or supplanted by her, and carefully to note the particular
-nature of these her reactions and refashionings. And I shall end up
-by a short account of what she and all four sets have got in common,
-and of what she has brought, as a gift of her own, to that common
-stock which had given her so much. And since her distinct and direct
-use of the Pauline and Joannine writings is quite certain, whereas
-all her knowledge of Neo-Platonism seems to have been mediated by
-pseudo-Dionysius alone, and all her Franciscanism appears, as far as
-literary sources go, to take its rise from Jacopone, I shall give four
-divisions to her chief literary sources, and a fifth section to the
-stream common to them all.[61]
-
-
-I. THE PAULINE WRITINGS: THE TWO SOURCES OF THEIR PRE-CONVERSION
-ASSUMPTIONS; CATHERINE’S PREPONDERANT ATTITUDE TOWARDS EACH POSITION.
-
-It is well that the chronological order requires us to begin with
-St. Paul, for he is probably, if not the most extensive, yet the
-most intense of all these influences upon Catherine’s mind. I here
-take the points of his experience and teaching which thus concern
-us in the probable order of their development in the Apostle’s own
-consciousness,--his pre-conversion assumptions and positions, first
-and the convictions gained at and after his conversion or clarified
-last;[62] and under each heading I shall group together, once for all,
-the chief reactions of Catherine’s religious consciousness.
-
-Now those Pauline pre-conversion assumptions and positions come from
-two chief sources--Palestinian, Rabbinical Judaism, (for he was the
-disciple of the Pharisee, Gamaliel, at Jerusalem), and a Hellenistic
-religiousness closely akin to, though not derived from, Philo, (for he
-had been born in the intensely Hellenistic Cilician city Tarsus, at
-that time a most important seat of Greek learning in general and of
-the Stoic philosophy in particular). And we shall find that Catherine
-appropriates especially this, his Hellenistic element; indeed, that at
-times she sympathizes rather with the still more intensely Hellenistic
-attitude exemplified by Philo, than with the limitations introduced by
-St. Paul.
-
-
-1. _St. Paul’s Anthropology in general._
-
-If we take the Pauline Anthropology first, we at once come upon a
-profoundly dualistic attitude.
-
-(1) There is, in general, “the outer” and “the inner” man, 2 Cor. iv,
-16; and the latter is not the exclusive privilege of the redeemed,--the
-contrast is that between the merely natural individual and the moral
-personality. And this contrast, foreign to the ancient Hebrews, is
-first worked out, with clear consciousness, by Plato, who, _e.g._,
-in his _Banquet_, causes one of the characters to say: “Socrates has
-thrown this Silenus-like form around himself externally, as in the case
-of those Silenus-statues which enclose a statuette of Apollo; but, when
-he is opened, how full is he found to be of temperance within”; and who
-treats this contrast as typical of the dualism inherent to all human
-life here on earth.[63]--This contrast exists throughout Catherine’s
-teaching as regards the thing itself, although her terms are different.
-She has, for reasons which will appear presently, no one constant term
-for “the inner man,” but “the outer man” is continuously styled “la
-umanità.”
-
-(2) The “outer man” consists for St. Paul of the body’s earthly
-material, “the flesh”; and of the animating principle of the flesh,
-“the psyche,” which is inseparably connected with that flesh, and
-which dies for good and all at the death of the latter; whereas the
-form of “the body” is capable of resuscitation, and is then filled out
-by a finer material, “glory.”[64]--Here Catherine has no precise or
-constant word for the “psyche”; her “umanità” generally stands for the
-“psyche” _plus_ body and flesh, all in one; and her “anima” practically
-always means part or the whole of “the inner man,” and mostly stands
-for “mind.” And there is no occasion for her to reflect upon any
-distinction between the form and the matter of the body, since she
-nowhere directly busies herself with the resurrection.
-
-The “inner man” consists for St. Paul in the Mind, the Heart, and the
-Conscience. The Mind (_noûs_), corresponding roughly to our theoretical
-and practical Reason, has a certain tendency towards God: “The
-invisible things of God are seen by the mind in the works of creation,”
-Rom. i, 20; and there is “a law of the mind” which is fought by “the
-law of sin,” Rom. vii, 23; and this, although there is also a “mind
-of the flesh,” Col. ii, 18; “a reprobate mind,” Rom. i, 28; and a
-“renovation of the mind,” Rom. xii, 2.--Catherine clings throughout
-most closely to the Pauline use of the term, as far as that use is
-favourable: note how she perceives invisible things “colla mente mia.”
-
-The Heart is even more accessible to the divine influence,--at least,
-it is to it that God gives “the first fruits of the Spirit” and “the
-Spirit of His Son, crying Abba, Father,” Gal. iv, 6; 2 Cor. i, 22. As
-an organ of immediate perception it is so parallel to the Mind, that we
-can hear of “eyes of the heart”; yet it is also the seat of feeling,
-of will, and of moral consciousness, Eph. i, 18; 2 Cor. ii, 4; 1 Cor.
-iv, 5; Rom. ii, 15. It can stand for the inner life generally; or,
-like the Mind, it can become darkened and impenitent; whilst again,
-over the heart God’s love is poured out, God’s peace keeps guard, and
-we believe with the heart, 1 Cor. xiv, 25; Rom. i, 21; ii, 5; v, 5;
-Phil. iv, 7; Rom. x, 9.--All this again, as far as it is favourable, is
-closely followed by Catherine; indeed the persistence with which she
-comes back to certain effects wrought upon her heart by the Spirit,
-Christ,--effects which some of her followers readily interpreted as so
-many physical miracles,--was no doubt occasioned or stimulated by 2
-Cor. iii, 3, “Be ye an epistle of Christ, written by the Spirit of the
-living God … upon the fleshly tables of the heart.”
-
-And Conscience, “Syneidēsis”--that late Greek word introduced
-by St. Paul as a technical term into the Christian
-vocabulary--includes our “conscience,” but is as comprehensive as
-our “consciousness.”--Catherine practically never uses the term: no
-doubt because, in the narrower of the two senses which had become
-the ordinary one, it was too predominantly ethical to satisfy her
-overwhelmingly religious preoccupations.
-
-(3) Now, with regard to this whole dualism of the “outer” and the
-“inner man,” its application to the resurrection of the body in
-St. Paul and in St. Catherine shall occupy us in connection with
-her Eschatology; here I would but indicate the two Pauline moods
-or attitudes towards the earthly body, and Catherine’s continuous
-reproduction of but one of these. For his magnificent conception of the
-Christian society, in which each person, by a different specific gift
-and duty, co-operates towards the production of an organic whole, a
-whole which in return develops and dignifies those its constituents,
-is worked out by means of the image of the human earthly body, in
-which each member is a necessary part and constituent of the complete
-organism, which is greater than, and which gives full dignity to,
-each and all these its factors (1 Cor. xii). And he thus, in his most
-deliberate and systematic mood, shows very clearly how deeply he has
-realized the dignity of the human body, as the instrument both for the
-development of the soul itself and for the work of that soul in and
-upon the visible world.
-
-But in his other mood, which remains secondary and sporadic throughout
-his writings, his attitude is acutely dualistic. His one direct
-expression of it occurs in 2 Cor. v, 1-4: “For we know that, if our
-earthly house of this tent be dissolved, we have a building of God, a
-house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this also we
-groan, desiring to be clothed upon with our habitation that is from
-heaven. We who are in this tabernacle do groan, being burthened.” Now
-this passage is undoubtedly modelled by St. Paul upon the Book of
-Wisdom, ix, 15: “For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and
-the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many
-things.” And this latter saying again is as certainly formed upon Plato
-(_Phaedo_, 81 _c_): “It behoves us to think of the body as oppressive
-and heavy and earthlike and visible. And hence the soul, being of
-such a nature as we have seen, when possessing such a body, is both
-burthened and dragged down again into the visible world.”[65] And it is
-this conception of the Hellenic Athenian Plato (about 380 B.C.) which,
-passing through the Hellenistic Alexandrian Jewish Wisdom-writer (80
-B.C.?) and then through the Hellenistically tinctured ex-Rabbi, Paul
-of Tarsus (52 A.D.), still powerfully, indeed all but continuously,
-influences the mind of the Genoese Christian Catherine, especially
-during the years from A.D. 1496 to 1510.
-
-Catherine’s still more pessimistic figure of the body as a prison-house
-and furnace of purification for the soul, is no doubt the resultant of
-suggestions received, probably in part through intermediary literature,
-from the following three passages:--(1) Plato, in his _Cratylus_
-(400 B.C.), makes Socrates say: “Some declare that the body (_sōma_)
-is the grave (_sēma_) of the soul, as she finds herself at present.
-The Orphite poets seem to have invented the appellation: they held
-that the soul is thus paying the penalty of sin, and that the body is
-an enclosure which may be likened to a prison, in which the soul is
-enclosed until the penalty is paid.” (2) St. Matt. v, 25, 26, gives
-Our Lord’s words: “Be thou reconciled with thine adversary whilst he
-is still with thee on the way … lest the Judge hand thee over to the
-prison-warder, and thou be cast into prison.… Thou shalt not go forth
-thence, until thou hast paid the uttermost farthing.” And (3) St.
-Paul declares, 1 Cor. iii, 15: “Every man’s work shall be tested by
-fire. If a man’s work be burnt, he shall suffer loss; yet he himself
-shall be saved, yet so as by fire.” These three passages combined will
-readily suggest, to a soul thirsting for purification and possessed of
-an extremely sensitive psycho-physical organization with its attendant
-liability to fever heats, the picture of the body as a flame-full
-prison-house,--a purgatory of the soul.
-
-
-2. _St. Paul’s conception of “Spirit.”_
-
-A very difficult complication and varying element is introduced into
-St. Paul’s Anthropology by the term into which he has poured all
-that is most original, deepest, most deliberate and abiding in his
-teaching,--the Spirit, “Pneuma.” For somewhat as he uses the term
-“Sarx,” the flesh, both in its loose popular signification of “mankind
-in general”; and in a precise, technical sense of “the matter which
-composes the earthly body”; so also he has, occasionally, a loose
-popular use of the term “spirit,” when it figures as but a fourth
-parallel to “mind,” “heart,” and “conscience”; and, usually, a very
-strict and technical use of it, when it designates the Spirit, God
-Himself.
-
-(1) Now it is precisely in the latter case that his doctrine attains
-its fullest depth and its greatest difficulty. For here the Spirit,
-the Pneuma, is, strictly speaking, only one--the Spirit of God, God
-Himself, in His action either outside or inside the human mind, Noûs.
-And in such passages of St. Paul, where man seems to possess a distinct
-pneuma of his own, by far the greater number only apparently contradict
-this doctrine. For in some, so in 1 Cor. ii, the context is dominated
-by a comparison between the divine and the human consciousness, so
-that, in v. 11, man’s Noûs is designated Pneuma, and in v. 16, and
-Rom. xi, 34, the Lord’s Pneuma is called His Noûs. And the “spirit of
-the world” contrasted here, in v. 11, with the “Spirit of God,” is
-a still further deliberate laxity of expression, similar to that of
-Satan as “the God of this world,” 2 Cor. iv, 4. In other passages,--so
-Rom. viii, 16; i, 9; viii, 10, and even in 1 Cor. v, 5 (the “spirit”
-of the incestuous Corinthian which is to be saved),--we seem to have
-“spirit” either as the mind in so far as the object of the Spirit’s
-communications, or as the mind transformed by the Spirit’s influence.
-And if we can hear of a “defilement of the spirit,” 2 Cor. vii, 1, we
-are also told that we can forget the fact of the body being the temple
-of the holy Spirit, 1 Cor. vi, 19; and that this temple’s profanation
-“grieves the holy Spirit,” Eph. iv, 30. Very few, sporadic, and short
-passages remain in which “the spirit of man” cannot clearly be shown to
-have a deliberately derivative sense.
-
-Catherine, in this great matter, completely follows St. Paul. For she
-too has loosely-knit moods and passages, in which “spirito” appears
-as a natural endowment of her own, parallel to, or identical with,
-the “mente.” But when speaking strictly, and in her intense moods,
-she means by “spirito,” the Spirit, Christ, Love, God, a Power which,
-though in its nature profoundly distinct and different from her entire
-self-seeking self, can and does come to dwell within, and to supplant,
-this self. Indeed her highly characteristic saying, “my Me is God,”
-with her own explanations of it, expresses, if pressed, even more than
-this. In these moods, the term “mente” is usually absent, just as in
-St. Paul.
-
-Now in his formally doctrinal _Loci_, St. Paul defines the Divine
-Pneuma and the human sarx, not merely as ontologically contrary
-substances, but as keenly conflicting, ethically contradictory
-principles. An anti-spiritual power, lust, possesses the flesh and the
-whole outer man, whilst, in an indefinitely higher degree and manner,
-the Spirit, which finds an echo in the mind, the inner man, is a
-spontaneous, counter-working force; and these two energies fight out
-the battle in man, and for his complete domination, Rom. vi, 12-14;
-vii, 22, 23; viii, 4-13. And this dualistic conception is in close
-affinity to all that was noblest in the Hellenistic world of St. Paul’s
-own day; but is in marked contrast to the pre-exilic, specifically
-Jewish Old Testament view, where we have but the contrast between
-the visible and transitory, and the Invisible and Eternal; and the
-consciousness of the weakness and fallibility of “flesh and blood.” And
-this latter is the temper of mind that dominates the Synoptic Gospels:
-“The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak”; and “Father,
-forgive them, for they know not what they do,” are here the divinely
-serene and infinitely fruitful leading notes.--And Catherine, on this
-point, is habitually on the Synoptist side: man is, for her, far more
-weak and ignorant than forcibly and deliberately wicked. Yet her
-detailed intensity towards the successive cloaks of self-love is still,
-as it were, a shadow and echo of the fierce, and far more massive,
-flesh-and-spirit struggle in St. Paul.
-
-
-3. _The Angry and the Loving God._
-
-And, as against the intense wickedness of man, we find in St. Paul an
-emphatic insistence--although this is directly derived from the Old
-Testament and Rabbinical tradition--upon the anger and indignation
-of God, Rom. ii, 8, and frequently.--Here Catherine is in explicit
-contrast with him, in so far as the anger would be held to stand for
-an emotion not proceeding from love and not ameliorative in its aim
-and operation. This attitude sprang no doubt, in part, from the strong
-influence upon her of the Dionysian teaching concerning the negative
-character of evil; possibly still more from her continuous pondering
-of the text, “As a father hath compassion upon his children, so hath
-the Lord compassion on them that fear Him; for He knoweth our frame, He
-remembereth that we are dust,” Ps. ciii, 13, 14,--where she dwells upon
-the fact that we are all His children rather than upon the fact that
-we do not all fear Him; but certainly, most of all, from her habitual
-dwelling upon the other side of St. Paul’s teaching, that concerning
-the Love of God.
-
-Now the depth and glow of Paul’s faith and love goes clearly back to
-his conversion, an event which colours and influences all his feeling
-and teaching for some thirty-four years, up to the end. And similarly
-Catherine’s conversion-experience has been found by us to determine the
-sequence and all the chief points of her Purgatorial teaching, some
-thirty-seven years after that supreme event.
-
-Already Philo had, under Platonic influence, believed in an Ideal
-Man, a Heavenly Man; had identified him with the Logos, the Word
-or Wisdom of God; and had held him to be in some way ethereal and
-luminous,--never arriving at either a definitely personal or a simply
-impersonal conception of this at one time intermediate Being, at
-another time this supreme attribute of God. St. Paul, under the
-profound impression of the Historic Christ and the great experience
-on the road to Damascus, perceives the Risen, Heavenly Jesus as
-possessed of a luminous, ethereal body, a body of “glory,” Acts xxii,
-11. And this Christ is, for St. Paul, identical with “the Spirit”:
-“the Lord is the Spirit,” 2 Cor. iii, 17; and “to be in Christ” and
-“Christ is in us” are parallel terms to those of “to be in the Spirit”
-and “the Spirit is within us” respectively. In all four cases we get
-Christ or the Spirit conceived as an element, as it were an ocean of
-ethereal light, in which souls are plunged and which penetrates them.
-In Catherine we have, at her conversion, this same perception and
-conception of Spirit as an ethereal light, and of Christ as Spirit;
-and up to the end she more and more appears to herself to bathe, to be
-submerged in, an ocean of light, which, at the same time, fills her
-within and penetrates her through and through.
-
-But again, and specially since his conversion, St. Paul thinks of God
-as loving, as Love, and this conception henceforth largely supplants
-the Old Testament conception of the angry God. This loving God is
-chiefly manifested through the loving Christ: indeed the love of Christ
-and the love of God are the same thing. And this Christ-Love dwells
-within us.[66] And Catherine, since her mind has perceived Love to be
-the central character of God, and has adopted fire as love’s fullest
-image, cannot but hold,--God and Love and Christ and Spirit being all
-one and the same thing,--that Christ-Spirit-Fire is in her and she
-in It. The yellow light-image, which all but alone typifies God’s
-friendliness in the Bible, is thus turned into a red fire-image. And
-yet this latter in so far retains with Catherine something of its older
-connotation of anger, that the Fire and Heat appear in her teaching
-more as symbols of the suffering caused by the opposition of man’s
-at least partial impurity to the Spirit, Christ, Love, God, and of
-the pain attendant upon that Spirit’s action, even where it can still
-purify; whereas the Light and Illumination mostly express the peaceful
-penetration of man’s spirit by God’s Spirit, and the blissful gain
-accruing from such penetration.
-
-
-4. _The Risen Christ and the Heavenly Adam._
-
-St. Paul dwells continuously upon the post-earthly, the Risen Christ,
-and upon Him in His identity with the pre-earthly, the Heavenly Man:
-so that the historical Jesus tends to become, all but for the final
-acts in the Supper-room and upon the Cross, a transitory episode;--a
-super-earthly biography all but supplants the earthly one, since His
-death and resurrection and their immediate contexts are all but the
-only two events dwelt upon, and form but the two constituents of one
-inseparable whole.--Here Catherine is deeply Pauline in her striking
-non-occupation with the details of the earthly life (the scene
-with the Woman at the Well being the single exception), and in her
-continuous insistence upon Christ as the life-giving Spirit. Indeed,
-even the death is strangely absent. There is but the one doubtful
-contrary instance, in any case a quite early and sporadic one, of the
-Vision of the Bleeding Christ. The fact is that, in her teaching,
-the self-donation of God in general, in His mysterious love for each
-individual soul, and of Christ in particular, in His Eucharistic
-presence as our daily food, take all their special depth of tenderness
-from her vivid realization of the whole teaching, temper, life, and
-death of Jesus Christ; and that teaching derives its profundity of
-feeling only from all this latter complexus of facts and convictions.
-
-
-5. _Reconciliation, Justification, Sanctification._
-
-(1) St. Paul has two lines of thought concerning Reconciliation. In
-the objective, juridical, more Judaic conception, the attention is
-concentrated on the one moment of Christ’s death, and the consequences
-appear as though instantaneous and automatic; in the other, the
-subjective, ethical, more Hellenistic conception, the attention
-is spread over the whole action of the Christ’s incarnational
-self-humiliation, and the consequences are realized only if and when we
-strive to imitate Him,--they are a voluntary and continuous process.
-Catherine’s fundamental conversion-experience and all her later
-teachings attach her Reconciliation to the entire act of ceaseless
-Divine “ecstasy,” self-humiliation, and redemptive immanence in Man,
-of which the whole earthly life and death of Christ are the centre
-and culmination; but though the human soul’s corresponding action is
-conceived as continuous, once it has begun, she loves to dwell upon
-this whole action as itself the gift of God and the consequence of His
-prevenient act.
-
-(2) As to Justification, we have again, in St. Paul, a preponderatingly
-Jewish juridical conception of adoption, in which a purely vicarious
-justice and imputed righteousness seem to be taught; and an ethical
-conception of immanent justice, based on his own experience and
-expressed by means of Hellenistic forms, according to which “the
-love of God is poured out in our hearts,” Rom. v, 5. And he often
-insists strenuously upon excluding every human merit from the moment
-and act of justification, insisting upon its being a “free gift” of
-God.--Catherine absorbs herself in the second, ethical conception,
-and certainly understands this love of God as primarily God’s, the
-Spirit’s, Christ’s love, as Love Itself poured out in our hearts; and
-she often breaks out into angry protests against the very suggestion of
-any act, or part of an act, dear to God, proceeding from her natural or
-separate self, indeed, if we press her expressions, from herself at all.
-
-(3) As to Sanctification, St. Paul has three couples of contrasted
-conceptions. The first couple conceives the Spirit, either Old
-Testament-wise, as manifesting and accrediting Itself in extraordinary,
-sudden, sporadic, miraculous gifts and doings--_e.g._ in ecstatic
-speaking with tongues; or,--and this is the more frequent and the
-decisive conception,--as an abiding, equable penetration and spiritual
-reformation of its recipient. Here the faithful “live and walk in the
-spirit,” are “driven by the spirit,” “serve God in the spirit,” are
-“temples of the Spirit,” Gal. v, 25; Rom. viii, 14; vii, 6; 1 Cor.
-vi, 19: the Spirit has become the creative source of a supernatural
-character-building.[67]--Here Catherine, in contrast to most of her
-friends, who are wedded to the first view, is strongly attached to the
-second view, perhaps the deepest of St. Paul’s conceptions.
-
-The second couple conceives Sanctification either juridically, and
-moves dramatically from act to act,--the Sacrifice on the Cross and
-the Resurrection of the Son of God, the sentence of Justification and
-the Adoption as sons of God; or ethically, and presupposes everywhere
-continuous processes,--beginning with the reception of the Spirit, and
-ending with “the Lord of the Spirit.”--Here Catherine has curiously
-little of the dramatic and prominently personal conception: only in
-the imperfect soul’s acutely painful moment, of standing before and
-seeing God immediately after death, do we get one link in this chain,
-in a somewhat modified form. For the rest, the ethical and continuous
-conception is present practically throughout her teaching, but in a
-curious, apparently paradoxical form, to be noticed in a minute.
-
-And the third couple either treats Sanctification as, at each moment of
-its actual presence, practically infallible and complete: “We who have
-died to sin, how shall we further live in it?” “Freed from sin, ye have
-become the servants of Justice”; “now we are loosed from the law of
-death, so as to serve in newness of spirit”; “those who are according
-to the flesh, mind the things of the flesh; but they that are according
-to the Spirit, mind the things of the Spirit,” Rom. vi, 2, 18; vii, 6;
-viii, 5. Or it considers Sanctification as only approximately complete,
-so long as man has to live here below, not only in the Spirit, Rom.
-viii, 9, but also in the flesh, Gal. ii, 20. The faithful have indeed
-crucified the flesh once for all, Gal. v, 24: yet they have continually
-to mortify their members anew, Col. iii, 5, and by the Spirit to
-destroy the works of the flesh, Rom. viii, 13. The “fear of the Lord,”
-“of God,” does not cease to be a motive for the sanctified, 2 Cor. v,
-11; vii, 1. To “walk in the Spirit,” “in the light,” has to be insisted
-on (1 Thess. v, 4-8; Rom. xiii, 11-14; 2 Cor. vi, 14), as long as the
-eternal day has not yet arisen for us. And even in Romans, chapter
-vi, we find admonitions, vv. 12, 13, 19, which, if we press the other
-conception, are quite superfluous.[68]
-
-And here Catherine, in her intense sympathy with each of these
-contrasted conceptions, offers us a combination of both in a state
-of unstable equilibrium and delicate tension. I take it that it is
-not her immensely impulsive and impatient temperament, nor survivals
-of the Old Testament idea as to instantaneousness being the special
-characteristic of divine action, but her deep and noble sense of the
-givenness and pure grace of religion, and of God’s omnipotence being,
-if possible, exceeded only by His overflowing, self-communicative
-love, which chiefly determine her curious presentation and emotional
-experience of spiritual growth and life as a movement composed of
-sudden shiftings upwards, with long, apparently complete pauses in
-between. For here this form (of so many instants, of which each is
-complete in itself) stands for her as the least inadequate symbol, as a
-kind of shattered mirror, not of time at all, but of eternity; whilst
-the succession and difference between these instants indicates a growth
-in the apprehending soul, which has, in reality, been proceeding also
-in between these instants and not only during them. And this remarkable
-scheme presents her conviction that, in principle, the work of the
-all-powerful, all-loving Spirit cannot, of itself, be other than final
-and complete, and yet that, as a matter of fact, it never is so, in
-weak, self-deceptive, and variously resisting man, but ever turns
-out to require a fresh and deeper application. And this succession
-of sudden jerks onwards and upwards, after long, apparently complete
-pauses between them, gives to her fundamentally ethical and continuous
-conception something of the look of the forensic, dramatic series,
-with its separate acts,--a series which would otherwise be all but
-unrepresented in her picture of the soul’s life on this side of death
-and of its life (immediately after its vivid sight of God and itself,
-and its act of free-election) in the Beyond.
-
-
-6. _Pauline Social Ethics._
-
-As to Social Ethics, St. Paul’s worldward movement is strongly
-represented in Catherine’s teaching. Her great sayings as to God being
-servable not only in the married state, but in a camp of (mercenary)
-soldiers; and as to her determination violently to appropriate the
-monk’s cowl, should this his state be necessary to the attainment of
-the highest love of God, are full of the tone of Rom. xiv, 14, 20,
-“nothing is common in itself, but to him who considereth anything to be
-common, to him it is common,”--“all things are clean”; and of 1 Cor.
-x, 26, 28, “the earth is the Lord’s, and the fulness thereof.” And her
-sense of her soul’s positive relation to nature, _e.g._ trees, was no
-doubt in part awakened by that striking passage, Rom. viii, 19, “the
-expectation of the creature awaiteth the revelation of the sons of God;
-for the creature was made subject to vanity not willingly.”
-
-On the other hand, it would be impossible confidently to identify
-her own attitude concerning marriage with that of St. Paul, since,
-as we know, her peculiar health and her unhappiness with Giuliano
-make it impossible to speak here with any certainty of the mature
-woman’s deliberate judgment concerning continence and marriage. Yet
-her impulsive protestation, in the scene with the monk, against any
-idea of being debarred by her state from as perfect a love of God as
-his,--whilst, of course, not in contradiction with the Pauline and
-generally Catholic positions in the matter, seems to imply an emotional
-attitude somewhat different from that of some of the Apostle’s
-sayings. Indeed, in her whole general and unconscious position as to
-how a woman should hold herself in religious things it is interesting
-to note the absence of all influence from those Pauline sayings which,
-herein like Philo (and indeed the whole ancient world) treat man alone
-as “the (direct) image and glory (reflex) of God,” and the woman as but
-“the glory (reflex) of the man,” 1 Cor. xi, 7. Everywhere she appears
-full, on the contrary, of St. Paul’s other (more characteristic and
-deliberate) strain, according to which, as there is “neither Jew nor
-Gentile, bond nor free” before God, so “neither is the man without the
-woman, nor the woman without the man, in the Lord,” 1 Cor. xi, 11.--And
-in social matters generally, Catherine’s convert life and practice
-shows, in the active mortifications of its first penitential part, in
-her persistent great aloofness from all things of sense as regards
-her own gratification, and in the ecstasies and love of solitude
-which marked the zenith of her power, a close sympathy with, and no
-doubt in part a direct imitation of, St. Paul’s Arabian retirement,
-chastisement of his body, and lonely concentration upon rapt communion
-with God. Yet she as strongly exemplifies St. Paul’s other, the
-outward movement, the love-impelled, whole-hearted service of the
-poorest, world-forgotten, sick and sorrowing brethren. And the whole
-resultant rhythmic life has got such fine spontaneity, emotional and
-efficacious fulness, and expansive joy about it, as to suggest at once
-those unfading teachings of St. Paul which had so largely occasioned
-it,--those hymns in praise of that love “which minds not high things
-but consenteth to the humble,” Rom. xii, 16; “becomes all things to
-all men,” 1 Cor. ix, 22; “weeps with those that weep and rejoices with
-those that rejoice,” _ibid._ xii, 26; and which, as the twin love of
-God and man, is not only the chief member of the central ethical triad,
-but, already here below, itself becomes the subject which exercises the
-other two virtues, for it is “love” that “believeth all things, hopeth
-all things,” even before that eternity in which love alone will never
-vanish away, _ibid._ xiii, 7, 8. Here Catherine with Paul triumphs
-completely over time: their actions and teaching are as completely
-fresh now, after well-nigh nineteen and four centuries, as when they
-first experienced, willed, and uttered them.
-
-
-7. _Sacramental Teachings._
-
-In Sacramental matters it is interesting to note St. Paul’s close
-correlation of Baptism and the Holy Eucharist: “All (our fathers) were
-baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea; and all ate the same
-spiritual food and all drank the same spiritual drink,” 1 Cor. x, 3;
-“in one Spirit we have all been baptized into one body, and we have all
-been made to drink one Spirit,” Christ, His blood, _ibid._ xii, 13.
-And Catherine is influenced by these passages, when she represents the
-soul as hungering for, and drowning itself in, the ocean of spiritual
-sustenance which is Love, Christ, God: but she attaches the similes,
-which are distributed by St. Paul among the two Rites, to the Holy
-Eucharist alone. Baptism had been a grown man’s deliberate act in
-Paul’s case,--an act immediately subsequent to, and directly expressive
-of, his conversion, the culminating experience of his life; and, as a
-great Church organizer, he could not but dwell with an equal insistence
-upon the two chief Sacraments.
-
-Catherine had received baptism as an unconscious infant, and the event
-lay far back in that pre-conversion time, which was all but completely
-ousted from her memory by the great experience of some twenty-five
-years later. And in the latter experience it was (more or less from the
-first and soon all but exclusively) the sense of a divine encirclement
-and sustenance, of an addition of love, rather than a consciousness of
-the subtraction of sins or of a divine purification, that possessed
-her. In her late, though profoundly characteristic Purgatorial
-teaching, the soul again plunges into an ocean; but now, since the soul
-is rather defiled than hungry, and wills rather to be purified than
-to be fed, this plunge is indeed a kind of Baptism by Immersion. Yet
-we have no more the symbol of water, for the long state and effects
-to which that swift act leads, but we have, instead, fire and light,
-and, in one place, once again bread and the hunger for bread. And
-this is no doubt because, in these Purgatorial picturings, it is her
-conversion-experience of love under the symbols of light and of fire,
-and her forty years of daily hungering for the Holy Eucharist and Love
-Incarnate, which furnish the emotional colours and the intellectual
-outlines.
-
-
-8. _Eschatological matters._
-
-In Eschatological matters the main points of contact and of contrast
-appear to be four; and three of the differences are occasioned by St.
-Paul’s preoccupation with Christ’s Second Coming, with the Resurrection
-of the body, and with the General Judgment, mostly as three events in
-close temporal correlation, and likely to occur soon; whilst Catherine
-abstracts entirely from all three.
-
-(1) Thus St. Paul is naturally busy with the question as to the Time
-when he shall be with Christ. In 1 Thess. iv, 15, he speaks of “we
-who are now living, who have been left for the coming of the Lord,”
-_i.e._ he expects this event during his own lifetime; whilst in Phil.
-i, 23, he “desires to be dissolved and to be with Christ,” _i.e._ he
-has ceased confidently to expect this coming before his own death.
-But Catherine dwells exclusively, with this latter conception, upon
-the moment of death, as that when the soul shall see, and be finally
-confirmed in its union with, Love, Christ, God; for into her earthly
-lifetime Love, Christ, God, can and do come, but invisibly, and she may
-still lose full union with them for ever.
-
-(2) As to the Place, it is notoriously obscure whether St. Paul thinks
-of it, as do the Old Testament and the Apocalypse, as the renovated
-earth, or as the sky, or as the intervening space. The risen faithful
-who “shall be caught in the clouds to meet Christ,” 1 Thess. iv, 16,
-seem clearly to be meeting Him, in mid-air, as He descends upon earth;
-and “Jerusalem above,” Gal. iv, 26, may well, as in Apoc. iii, 12; xxi,
-2, be conceived as destined to come down upon earth. But Catherine,
-though she constantly talks of Heaven, Purgatory, Hell as “places,”
-makes it plain that such “places” are for her but vivid symbols for
-states of soul. God Himself repeatedly appears in her sayings as “the
-soul’s place”; and it is this “place,” the soul’s true spiritual
-birthplace and home, which, ever identical and bliss-conferring in
-itself, is variously experienced by the soul, in exact accordance
-with its dispositions,--as that profoundly painful, or that joyfully
-distressing, or that supremely blissful “place” which respectively we
-call Hell, and Purgatory, and Heaven.
-
-(3) As to the Body, we have already noted St. Paul’s doctrine,
-intermediate between the Palestinian and Alexandrian Jewish teaching,
-that it will rise indeed, but composed henceforth of “glory” and
-no more of “flesh.” It is this his requirement of a body, however
-spiritual, which underlies his anxiety to be “found clothed, not
-naked,” at and after death, 2 Cor. v, 3. Indeed, in this whole passage,
-v, 1-4, “our earthly house of this habitation,” and “a building of God
-not made with hands,” no doubt mean, respectively, the present body
-of flesh and the future body of glory; just as the various, highly
-complex, conceptions of “clothed,” “unclothed,” “clothed upon,” refer
-to the different conditions of the soul with a body of flesh, without a
-body at all, and with a body of glory.--Now this passage, owing to its
-extreme complication and abstruseness of doctrine, has come down to us
-in texts and versions of every conceivable form; and this uncertainty
-has helped Catherine towards her very free utilization of it. For she
-not only, as ever, simply ignores all questions of a risen body, and
-transfers the concept of a luminous ethereal substance from the body to
-the soul itself, and refers the “nakedness,” “unclothing,” “clothing,”
-and “clothing upon” to conditions obtaining, not between the soul and
-the body, but between the soul and God; but she also, in most cases,
-takes the nakedness as the desirable state, since typical of the soul’s
-faithful self-exposure to the all-purifying rays of God’s light and
-fire, and interprets the “unclothing” as the penitential stripping from
-off itself of those pretences and corrupt incrustations which prevent
-God’s blissful action upon it.
-
-(4) And, finally, as to the Judgment, we have in St. Paul a double
-current,--the inherited Judaistic conception of a forensic retribution;
-Christ, the divine Judge, externally applying such and such statutory
-rewards and punishments to such and such good and evil deeds,--so
-in Rom. ii, 6-10; and the experimental conception, helped on to
-articulation by Hellenistic influences, of the bodily resurrection and
-man’s whole final destiny as the necessary resultant and manifestation
-of an internal process, the presence of the Spirit and of the power
-of God,--so in the later parts of Romans, in Gal. vi, 8, and in 1
-Cor. vi, 14; 2 Cor. xiii, 4.--Among Catherine’s sayings also we
-find some passages--but these the less characteristic and mostly
-of doubtful authenticity,--where reward and punishment, indeed the
-three “places” themselves, appear as so many separate institutions
-of God, which get externally applied to certain good and evil deeds.
-But these are completely overshadowed in number, sure authenticity,
-emotional intensity, and organic connection with her other teachings,
-by sayings of the second type, where the soul’s fate is but the
-necessary consequence of its own deliberate choice and gradually
-formed dispositions, the result, inseparable since the first from
-its self-identification with this or that of the various possible
-will-attitudes towards God.
-
-(5) We can then sum up the main points of contact and of difference
-between Paul and Catherine, by saying that, in both cases, everything
-leads up to, or looks back upon, a great culminating, directly
-personal experience of shortest clock-time duration, whence all
-their doctrine, wherever emphatic, is but an attempt to articulate
-and universalize this original experience; and that if in Paul there
-remains more of explicit occupation with the last great events of
-the earthly life of Jesus, yet in both there is the same insistence
-upon the life-giving Spirit, the eternal Christ, manifesting His
-inexhaustible power in the transformation of souls, on and on, here and
-now, into the likeness of Himself.
-
-
-II. THE JOANNINE WRITINGS.
-
-On moving now from the Pauline to the Joannine writings, we shall
-find that Catherine’s obligations to these latter are but rarely as
-deep, yet that they cover a wider reach of ideas and images. I take
-this fresh source of influence under the double heading of the general
-relations of the Joannine teaching to other, previous or contemporary,
-conceptions; and of this same teaching considered in itself.[69]
-
-
-1. _Joannine teaching contrasted with other systems._
-
-(1) As to the general relations towards other positions, we get here,
-towards Judaism and Paganism, an emphatic insistence upon the novelty
-and independence of Christianity as regards not only Paganism, but even
-the previous Judaism, “The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth
-came by Jesus Christ,” i, 17; and upon the Logos, Christ, as “the Light
-that enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world,” “unto his
-own,” _i.e._ men in general; for this Light “was in the world, and the
-world was made by Him,” i, 9-11. There is thus a divinely-implanted,
-innate tendency towards this light, extant in man prior to the explicit
-act of faith, and operative outside of the Christian body: “Every
-man who is from the truth, heareth my voice,” xviii, 37: “he who
-doeth the truth, cometh to the light,” in, 21: “begotten,” as he is,
-not of man but “of God,” i, 13; 1 John iii, 9. And thus Samaritans,
-Greeks, and Heathens act and speak in the best dispositions, iv, 42;
-xii, 20-24; x, 16; whilst such terms and sayings as “the Saviour of
-the World,” “God so loved the world,” iv, 42, iii, 16, are the most
-universalistic declarations to be found in the New Testament.--And
-this current dominates the whole of Catherine’s temper and teaching:
-this certainty as to the innate affinity of every human soul to the
-Light, Love, Christ, God, gives a tone of exultation to the musings
-of this otherwise melancholy woman. Whereas the Joannine passages of
-a contrasting exclusiveness and even fierceness of tone, such as “all
-they that came before Me, were thieves and robbers,” x, 8; “ye are
-from your father, the devil,” viii, 44; “ye shall die in your sins,”
-viii, 21; “your sin remains,” ix, 41, are without any parallel among
-Catherine’s sayings. Indeed it is plain that Catherine, whilst as sure
-as the Evangelist that all man’s goodness comes from God, nowhere,
-except in her own case, finds man’s evil to be diabolic in character.
-
-(2) With regard to Paulinism, the Joannine writings give us a
-continuation and extension of the representation of the soul’s mystical
-union with Christ, as a local abiding in the element Christ. Indeed
-it is in these writings that we find the terms “to abide in” the
-light, 1 John ii, 10, in God, 1 John iv, 13, in Christ, 1 John ii, 6,
-24, 27, iii, 6, 24, and in His love, John xv, 9, 1 John iv, 16; the
-corresponding expressions, “God abideth in us,” 1 John iv, 12, 16,
-“Christ abideth in us,” 1 John iii, 24, and “love abideth in us,” 1
-John iv, 16; the two immanences coupled together, where the communicant
-“abideth in Me and I in him,” vi, 56, and where the members of His
-mystical body are bidden to “abide in Me and I in you,” xv, 4; and the
-supreme pattern of all these interpenetrations, “I am in the Father,
-and the Father is in Me,” xiv, 10.--And it is from here that Catherine
-primarily gets the literary suggestions for her images of the soul
-plunged into, and filled by, an ocean of Light, Love, Christ, God; and
-again from here, more than from St. Paul, she gets her favourite term
-μένειν (It. _restare_), around which are grouped, in her mind, most of
-the quietistic-sounding elements of her teaching.
-
-(3) As to the points of contact between the Joannine teaching and
-Alexandrianism, we find that three are vividly renewed by Catherine.
-
-Philo had taught: “God ceases not from acting: as to burn is the
-property of fire, so to act is the property of God,” _Legg. Alleg._ I,
-3. And in John we find: “God is a Spirit,” and “My Father worketh ever
-and I work ever,” iv, 24; v, 17. And God as pure Spiritual Energy, as
-the _Actus Purus_, is a truth and experience that penetrates the whole
-life of Catherine.
-
-The work of Christ is not dwelt on in its earthly beginnings; but it is
-traced up and back, in the form of a spiritual “Genesis,” to His life
-and work as the Logos in Heaven, where He abides “in the bosom of the
-Father,” and whence He learns what He “hath declared” to us, i, 18;
-just as, in his turn, the disciple whom Jesus loved “was reclining” at
-the Last Supper “on the bosom of Jesus,” and later on “beareth witness
-concerning the things” which he had learnt there, xiii, 23; xxi, 24. So
-also Catherine transcends the early earthly life of Christ altogether,
-and habitually dwells upon Him as the Light and as Love, as God in His
-own Self-Manifestation; and upon the ever-abiding sustenance afforded
-by this Light and Life and Love to the faithful soul reclining and
-resting upon it.
-
-And the contrast between the Spiritual and the Material, the Abiding
-and the Transitory, is symbolized throughout John, in exact accord
-with Philo, under the spacial categories of upper and lower, and of
-extension: “Ye are from below, I am from above,” viii, 23; “He that
-cometh from above, is above all,” iv, 31; and “in my Father’s house,”
-that upper world, “there are many mansions,” abiding-places, xiv,
-2. Hence all things divine here below have descended from above:
-regeneration, iii, 3; the Spirit, i, 32; Angels, i, 51; the Son of God
-Himself, iii, 13: and they mount once more up above, so especially
-Christ Himself, iii, 13; vi, 62. And the things of that upper world
-are the true things: “the true light,” “ the true adorers,” “the
-true vine,” “the true bread from Heaven,” i, ix; iv, 23; xv, 1; vi,
-32: all this in contrast to the shadowy semi-realities of the lower
-world.--Catherine is here in fullest accord with the spacial imagery
-generally; she even talks of God Himself, not only as in a place, but
-as Himself a place, as the soul’s “loco.” But she has, for reasons
-explained elsewhere, generally to abandon the upper-and-lower category
-when picturing the soul’s self-dedication to purification, since, for
-this act, she mostly figures a downward plunge into suffering; and
-she gives us a number of striking sayings, in which she explicitly
-re-translates all this quantitative spacial imagery into its underlying
-meaning of qualitative spiritual states.
-
-(4) As to the Joannine approximations and antagonisms to Gnosticism,
-Catherine’s position is as follows. In the Synoptic accounts, Our Lord
-makes the acquisition of eternal life depend upon the keeping of the
-two great commandments of the love of God and of one’s neighbour, Luke
-x, 26-28, and parallels. In John Our Lord says: “this is eternal life,
-that they may know Thee, the only true God and Jesus Christ whom Thou
-hast sent,” xvii, 3. To “know,” γινώσκειν, occurs twenty-five times in
-1 John alone. Here the final object of every soul is to believe and to
-know: “they received and knew truly and believed,” xvii, 8; “we have
-believed and have known,” vi, 69; or “we have known and have believed,”
-1 John iv, 16. And Catherine also lays much stress upon faith ending,
-even here below, in a certain vivid knowledge; but this knowledge is,
-with her, less doctrinally articulated, no doubt in part because there
-was no Gnosticism fronting her, to force on such articulation.
-
-And the Joannine writings compare this higher mental knowledge to the
-lower, sensible perception: “He who cometh from heaven, witnesseth to
-what he hath seen and heard,” iii, 31; “when He shall become manifest,
-we shall see Him as He is,” 1 John iii, 2. And they have three special
-terms, in common with Gnosticism, for the object of such knowledge:
-Life, Light, and Fulness (_Plerōma_),--the latter, as a technical term,
-appearing in the New Testament only in John i, 16, and in the Epistles
-to the Colossians and Ephesians. Catherine, also, is ever experiencing
-and conceiving the mental apprehensions of faith, as so many
-quasi-sensible, ocular, perceptions; and Life and Light are constantly
-mentioned, and Fulness is, at least, implied in the psycho-physical
-concomitants or consequences of her thinkings.
-
-On the other hand, she does not follow John in the intensely dualistic
-elements of his teaching,--the sort of determinist, all but innate,
-distinction between “the darkness,” “the men who loved the darkness
-rather than the light,” and the Light itself and those who loved it, i,
-4, 5; iii, 19,--children of God and children of the devil--the latter
-all but incapable of being saved, viii, 38-47; x, 26; xi, 52; xiv,
-17. Rather is she like him in his all but complete silence as to “the
-anger of God,”--a term which he uses once only, iii, 36, as against the
-twenty-two instances of it in St. Paul.
-
-And she is full to overflowing of the great central, profoundly un- and
-anti-Gnostic, sensitively Christian teachings of St. John: as to the
-Light, the only-begotten Son, having been given by God, because God so
-loved the world; as to Jesus having loved his own even to the end; as
-to the object of Christ’s manifestation of His Father’s name to men,
-being that God’s love for Christ, and indeed Christ Himself, might
-be within them; and as to how, if they love Him, they will keep His
-commandments,--His commandment to love each other as He has loved them,
-iii, 21; iii, 16; xiii, 1; xvii, 26; xiv, 15; xv, 17. In this last
-great declaration especially do we find the very epitome of Catherine’s
-life and spirit, of her who can never think of Him as Light and
-Knowledge only, but ever insists on His being Fire and Love as well;
-and who has but one commandment, that of Love-impelled, Love-seeking
-loving.
-
-(5) And lastly, in relation to organized, Ecclesiastical Christianity,
-the Joannine writings dwell, as regards the more general principles, on
-points which, where positive, are simply presupposed by Catherine; and,
-where negative, find no echo within her.
-
-The Joannine writings insist continually upon the unity and
-inter-communion of the faithful: “There shall be one fold, one
-shepherd”; Christ’s death was in order “that He might gather the
-scattered children of God into one”; He prays to the Father that
-believers “may be one, as we are one”; and He leaves as His legacy
-His seamless robe, x, 16; xi, 52; xvii, 21; xix, 24. And these same
-writings have a painfully absolute condemnation for all outside of
-this visible fold: “The whole world lies in evil”; its “Prince is the
-Devil”; “the blood of Jesus cleanseth us from all sin,” within the
-community alone; false prophets, those who have gone forth from the
-community, are not to be prayed for, are not even to be saluted, 1
-John, v, 19; John xii, 31; John i, 7; v, 16; 2 John, 10. For the great
-and necessary fight with Gnosticism has already begun in these writings.
-
-But Catherine dies before the unity of Christendom is again in jeopardy
-through the Protestant Reformation, and she never dwells--this is
-doubtless a limit--upon the Christian community, as such. And her
-enthusiastic sympathy with the spiritual teachings of Jacopone da
-Todi, who, some two centuries before, had, as one of the prophetic
-opposition, vehemently attacked the intensely theocratic policy of
-Pope Boniface VIII, and had suffered a long imprisonment at his hands;
-her tender care for the schismatic population of the far-away Greek
-island of Chios; and her intimacy with Dre. Tommaso Moro, who, later
-on, became for a while a Calvinist; all indicate how free from all
-suspiciousness towards individual Catholics, or of fierceness against
-other religious bodies and persons, was her deeply filial attachment to
-the Church.
-
-In the Synoptists Our Lord declares, as to the exorcist who worked
-cures in His name, although not a follower of His, that “he that is
-not against us, is for us,” and refuses to accede to His disciples’
-proposal to interfere with his activity, Mark ix, 38-41; and He points,
-as to the means of inheriting eternal life, to the keeping of the
-two great commandments, as these are already formulated in the Old
-Testament, and insists that this neighbour, whom here we are bidden
-to love, is any and every man, Luke x, 25-37. The Joannine writings
-insist strongly upon the strict necessity of full, explicit adhesion:
-the commandment of love which Our Lord gives is here “My commandment,”
-“a new commandment,” one held “from the beginning”--in the Christian
-community; and the command to “love one another” is here addressed to
-the brethren in their relations to their fellow-believers only, xiii,
-34; xiii, 35; xv, 12, 17. Catherine’s feeling, in this matter, is
-clearly with the Synoptists.
-
-
-2. _Joannine teaching considered in itself._
-
-If we next take the Joannine teachings in themselves, we shall find the
-following interesting points of contact or contrast to exist between
-John and Catherine.
-
-(1) In matters of Theology proper, she is completely penetrated by
-the great doctrine, more explicit in St. John even than in St. Paul,
-that “God is Love,” 1 John iv, 8; and by the conceptions of God and of
-Christ “working always” as Life, Light, and Love.--But whereas, in the
-first Epistle of John, God Himself is “eternal life” and “light,” v,
-20; i, 5; and, in the Gospel, it is Christ Who, in the first instance,
-appears as Life and as Light, xi, 25; viii, 12: Catherine nowhere
-distinguishes at all between Christ and God. And similarly, whereas in
-St. John “God doth not give” unto Christ “the Spirit by measure”; and
-Christ promises to the disciples “another Paraclete,” _i.e._ the Holy
-Spirit, iii, 34; xiv, 16; and indeed the Son and the Spirit appear,
-throughout, as distinct from one another as do the Son and the Father:
-in Catherine we get, practically everywhere, an exclusive concentration
-upon the fact, so often implied or declared by St. Paul, of Love,
-Christ, being Himself Spirit.
-
-(2) The Joannine Soteriology has, I think, influenced Catherine as
-follows. Christ’s redemptive work appears, in the more original current
-of that teaching, under the symbols of the Word, Light, Bread, as
-the self-revelation of God. For in proportion that this Logos-Light
-and Bread enlightens and nourishes, does He drive away darkness and
-weakness, and, with them, sin, and this previously to any historic
-acts of His earthly life. And, in this connection, there is but little
-stress laid upon penance and the forgiveness of sins as compared
-with the Synoptic accounts, and the term of turning back, στρέφειν,
-is absent here.--But that same redemptive work appears, in the more
-Pauline of the two Joannine currents, as the direct result of so many
-vicarious, atoning deeds, the historic Passion and Death of Our Lord.
-Here there is indeed sin, a “sin of the world,” and specially for this
-sin is Christ the propitiation: “God so loved the world, as to give His
-only-begotten Son”--Him “the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sins of
-the world,” i, 29; 1 John ii, 2; John ii, 16; i, 29, 36.
-
-Catherine, with the probably incomplete exception of her Conversion
-and Penance-period, concentrates her attention, with a striking degree
-of exclusiveness, upon the former group of conceptions. With her too
-the God-Christ is--all but solely--conceived as Light which, in so far
-as it is not hindered, operates the healing and the growth of souls.
-And in her great picture of all souls inevitably hungering for the
-sight of the One Bread, God, she has operated a fusion between two of
-the Joannine images, the Light which is seen and the Bread which is
-eaten: here the bare sight (in reality, a satiating sight) of the Bread
-suffices. If, for the self-manifesting God-Christ, she has, besides the
-Joannine Light-image, a Fire-symbol, which has its literary antecedents
-rather in the Old Testament than in the New, this comes from the fact
-that she is largely occupied with the pain of the impressions and
-processes undergone by already God-loving yet still imperfectly pure
-souls, and that fierce fire is as appropriate a symbol for such pain as
-is peaceful light for joy.
-
-Now this painfulness is, in Catherine’s teaching, the direct result
-of whatever may be incomplete and piecemeal in the soul’s state and
-process of purification. And this her conception, of Perfect Love being
-mostly attained only through a series of apparently sudden shifts,
-each seemingly final, is no doubt in part moulded upon the practically
-identical Joannine teaching as to Faith.
-
-True, we have already seen that her conception of the nature of God’s
-action upon the soul, and of the soul’s reaction under this His
-touch, is more akin to the rich Synoptic idea of a disposition and
-determination of the soul’s whole being, (a cordial trust at least as
-much as an intellectual apprehension and clear assent), than to the
-Joannine view, which lays a predominant stress upon mental apprehension
-and assent. And again, she nowhere presents anything analogous to the
-Joannine, already scholastic, formulations of the object of this Faith
-and Trust,--all of them explicitly concerned with the nature of Christ.
-
-But, everywhere in the Joannine writings, the living Person and Spirit
-aimed at by these definitions is considered as experienced by the
-soul in a succession of ever-deepening intuitions and acts of Faith.
-Already at the Jordan, Andrew and Nathaniel have declared Jesus to be
-the Christ, the Son of God, i, 41, 49; yet they, His disciples, are
-said to have believed in Him at Cana, in consequence of His miracle
-there, ii, 11. Already at Capernaum Peter asserts for the twelve, “We
-have believed and known that Thou art the Holy One of God,” vi, 69;
-yet still, at the Last Supper, Christ exhorts them to believe in Him,
-xiv, 10, 11, and predicts future events to them, in order that, when
-these predictions come true, their faith may still further increase,
-xiii, 19; xiv, 29. And, as far on as after the Resurrection we hear
-that the Beloved Disciple “saw” (the empty tomb) “and believed,” xx,
-8, 29. We thus get in John precisely the same logically paradoxical,
-but psychologically and spiritually most accurate and profound,
-combination of an apparent completeness of Faith at each point of
-special illumination, with a sudden re-beginning and impulsive upward
-shifting of the soul’s Light and Believing, which is so characteristic
-of Catherine’s experience and teaching as to the successive levels of
-the soul’s Fire, Light and Love. And the opposite movement--of the
-fading away of the Light and the Faith--can be traced in John, as the
-corresponding doctrine of the going out of the Fire, Light and Love
-within the Soul can be found in Catherine.
-
-Again, both John and Catherine are penetrated with the sense that this
-Faith and Love is somehow waked up in souls by a true touch of God, a
-touch to which they spontaneously respond, because they already possess
-a substantial affinity to Him. “His,” the Good Shepherd’s, “sheep hear
-His voice,” x, 16; they hear it, because they are already His: the
-Light solicits and is accepted by the soul, because the soul itself
-is light-like and light-requiring, and because it proceeds originally
-from this very Light which would now reinforce the soul’s own deepest
-requirements. This great truth appears also in those profound Joannine
-passages: “No man can come to Me, unless the Father Who sent Me draw
-him”; and “I have manifested Thy name, to those men whom Thou didst
-give Me from out of the world,” vi, 44; xvii, 6.
-
-And this attractive force is also a faculty of Christ: “I shall draw
-all men unto Myself,” xii, 32. And note how Catherine, ever completely
-identifying God, Christ, Light, Love, and, where these work in
-imperfectly pure souls, Fire, is stimulated by the last-quoted text
-to extend God’s, Christ’s, Love’s drawing, attraction, to all men;
-to limit only, in various degrees, these various men’s response to
-it; and to realize so intensely that a generous yielding to this our
-ineradicable deepest _attrait_ is our fullest joy, and the resisting it
-is our one final misery, as to picture the soul, penitent for this its
-mad resistance, plunging itself, now eagerly responsive to that intense
-attraction, into God and a growing conformity with Him.
-
-(3) As to points concerning the Sacraments where Catherine is
-influenced by John, we find that here again Baptismal conceptions are
-passed over by her. She does not allude to the water in the discourse
-to Nicodemus, iii, 5, although she is full of other ideas suggested
-there; but she dwells upon the water in the address to the Woman at
-the Well, iv, 10-15, that “living water,” which is, for her, the
-spirit’s spiritual sustenance, Love, Christ, God, and insensibly glides
-over into the images and experiences attaching, for her, to the Holy
-Eucharist.
-
-But, as to this the greatest of the Sacraments and the all-absorbing
-devotion of her life, her symbols and concepts are all suggested by
-the Fourth Gospel, in contrast to the Synoptists and St. Paul. For the
-Holy Eucharist is, with her, ever detached from any direct memory of
-the Last Supper, Passion, and Death, the original, historical, unique
-occasions which still form its setting in the pre-Joannine writings,
-although those greatest proofs of a divinely boundless self-immolation
-undoubtedly give to her devotion to the Blessed Sacrament its beautiful
-enthusiasm and tenderness. The Holy Eucharist ever appears with her,
-as with St. John, attached to the scene of the multiplication of the
-breads,--a feast of joy and of life, with Christ at the zenith of His
-earthly hope and power. For not “a shewing of the death” in “the
-eating of this bread,” 1 Cor. xi, 26, is dwelt on by John; but we have:
-“I am the Bread of Life; he that eateth this bread, shall live for
-ever,” John vi, 51, 52.
-
-And Catherine follows John in thinking predominantly of the single
-soul, when dwelling upon the Holy Eucharist. For if John presents
-a great open-air Love-Feast in lieu of Paul’s Upper Chamber and
-Supper with the twelve, he, as over against Paul’s profoundly social
-standpoint, has, throughout this his Eucharistic chapter, but three
-indications of the plural as against some fourteen singulars.
-
-And, finally, John’s change from the future tense, with its reference
-to a coming historic institution, “the food which … the Son of Man
-will give you,” vi, 27, to the present tense, with its declaration
-of an eternal fact and relation, “I am” (now and always) “the living
-bread which hath come down from heaven,” vi, 51, will have helped
-Catherine towards the conception of the eternal Christ-God offering
-Himself as their ceaseless spiritual food to His creatures, possessed
-as they are by an indestructible spiritual hunger for Himself. For if
-the Eucharistic food, Bread, Body, has already been declared by St.
-Paul to be “spiritual,” 2 Cor. iii, 17, in St. John also it has to be
-spiritual, for it is here “the true bread from heaven” and “the bread
-of life”; and Christ declares here “it is the Spirit that giveth life,
-the flesh (alone) profiteth nothing,” vi, 61, 69. Hence Catherine is,
-again through the Holy Eucharist and St. John, brought back to her
-favourite Pauline conception of the Lord as Himself “Spirit,” “the
-Life-giving Spirit,” 2 Cor. iii, 17; 1 Cor. xv, 45.
-
-(4) And if we conclude with the Joannine Eschatology, we shall find
-that Catherine has penetrated deep into the following conceptions,
-which undoubtedly, even in their union, present us with a less rich
-outlook than that furnished by the Synoptists, but which may be said to
-constitute the central spirit of Our Lord’s teaching.
-
-Like John, who has but two mentions of “the Kingdom of God,” iii, 3,
-5, and who elsewhere ever speaks of “Life,” Catherine has nowhere “the
-Kingdom,” but everywhere “Life.” Like him she conceives the process of
-Conversion as a “making alive” of the moribund, darkened, cold soul, by
-the Light, Love, Christ, God, v, 21-29, when He, Who is Himself “the
-Life,” xi, 25, and “the Spirit,” iv, 24, speaks to the soul “words”
-that are “spirit and life,” vi, 63; for then the soul that gives ear
-to His words “hath eternal life,” v, 24.
-
-Again Catherine, for the most part, appropriates and develops that one
-out of the two Joannine currents of doctrine concerning the Judgment,
-which treats the latter as already determined and forestalled by Man’s
-present personal attitude towards the Light. The judgment is thus
-simply a discrimination, according to the original meaning of the noun
-κρίσις--like when God in the beginning “discriminated the light from
-the darkness,” Gen. i, 5; a discrimination substantially effected
-already here and now, “he that believeth in Him, is not judged; he
-that believeth not, is already judged,” iii, 18. But the other current
-of doctrine, so prominent in the Synoptists, is not absent from St.
-John,--the teaching as to a later, external and visible, forensic
-judgment. And Catherine has a similar intermixture of two currents, yet
-with a strong predominance of the immanental, present conception of the
-matter.
-
-And even for that one volitional act in the beyond, which, according
-to her doctrine, has a certain constitutive importance for the whole
-eternity of all still partially impure souls--for that voluntary
-plunge--we can find an analogue in the Joannine writings, although here
-there is no reference to the after life. For throughout the greater
-part of his teaching--from iii, 15, 16, apparently up to the end of the
-Gospel,--the possession of spiritual Life is consequent upon the soul’s
-own acts of Faith, and not, as one would expect from his other, more
-characteristic teaching, upon its Regeneration from above, iii, 3. And
-the result of such acts of Faith is a “Metabasis,” a “passing over from
-death to life,” v, 24; 1 John iii, 14. Catherine will have conceived
-such an act of Faith as predominantly an act of Love, and the act as
-itself already that Metabasis; and will, most characteristically,
-have quickened the movement, and have altered its direction from the
-horizontal to the vertical, so that the “passing, going over,” becomes
-a “plunge down into” Life. For indeed the Fire she plunges into is, in
-her doctrine, Life Itself; since it is Light, Love, Christ, and God.
-
-Catherine, once more, is John’s most faithful disciple, where he
-declares that Life to stream out immediately from the life-giving
-object of Faith into the life-seeking subject of that Faith, from the
-believed God into the believing soul: “I am the Bread of Life; he who
-cometh to Me, shall not hunger”; “he who abideth in Me, and I in him,
-beareth much fruit”; vi, 35; xv, 5.
-
-And finally, she follows John closely where he insists upon
-Simultaneity and Eternity as contrasted with Succession and
-Immortality, so as even to abstract from the bodily resurrection. He
-who “hath passed over from death to life” (already) “possesses eternal
-life”; “every one who liveth and believeth in Me, shall not die for
-ever (at any time)”; “this,” already and of itself, “is eternal life,
-to know Thee, the one true God and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent”;
-and the soul’s abiding in such an experience is Christ’s own joy,
-transplanted into it, and a joy which is full, v, 24; xi, 26; xvii, 3;
-xv, 11. And there is here such an insistence upon an unbroken spiritual
-life, in spite of and right through physical death, that, to Martha’s
-declaration that her brother will arise at the last day, xi, 24, Jesus
-answers, “I am the Resurrection and the Life: he who believeth in Me,
-even if he die” the bodily death, “shall live” on in his soul; indeed
-“every man who liveth” the life of the body, “and who believeth in Me,
-shall not die for ever (at any time)” in his soul, xi, 25, 26. John’s
-other line of thought, in which the bodily resurrection is prominent,
-remains without any definite or systematic response in Catherine’s
-teaching.
-
-(5) We can then summarize the influence exercised by John upon
-Catherine by saying that he encouraged her to conceive religion as
-an experience of eternity; as a true, living knowledge of things
-spiritual; indeed as a direct touch of man’s soul by God Himself,
-culminating in man’s certainty that God is Love.
-
-
-III. THE AREOPAGITE WRITINGS.
-
-Catherine’s close relations to the Areopagite, the Pseudo-Dionysius,
-are of peculiar interest, in their manifold agreement, difference, or
-non-responsiveness; and this although the ideas thus assimilated are
-mostly of lesser depth and importance than those derived from the New
-Testament writings just considered. They can be grouped conveniently
-under the subject-matters of God’s creative, providential, and
-restorative, outgoing, His action upon souls and all things extant,
-and of the reasons for the different results of this action; of
-certain symbols used to characterize that essential action of God
-upon His creatures; of the states and energizings of the soul, in so
-far as it is responsive to that action; of certain terms concerning
-these reactions of the soul; and of the final result of the whole
-process. I shall try and get back, in most cases, to the Areopagite’s
-Neo-Platonist sources, the dry, intensely scholastic Proclus, and that
-great soul, the prince of the non-Christian Mystics, Plotinus.[70]
-
-
-1. _God’s general action._
-
-As to God’s action, we have in Dionysius the Circle with the
-three stages of its movement,--a conception so dear to Catherine.
-“Theologians call Him the Esteemed and the Loved, and again Love and
-Loving-kindness, as being a Power at once propulsive and leading up”
-and back “to Himself; a loving movement self-moved, which pre-exists in
-the Good, and bubbles forth from the Good to things existing, and which
-again returns to the Good--as it were a sort of everlasting circle
-whirling round, because of the Good, from the Good, in the Good, and
-to the Good,--ever advancing and remaining and returning in the same
-and throughout the same.” This is “the power of the divine similitude”
-present throughout creation, “which turns all created things to their
-cause.”[71] The doctrine is derived from Proclus: “Everything caused
-both abides in its cause and proceeds from it and returns to it”;
-and “everything that proceeds from something returns, by a natural
-instinct, to that from which it proceeds.”[72] And Plotinus had led
-the way: “there” in the super-sensible world, experienced in moments
-of ecstasy, “in touch and union with the One, the soul begets Beauty,
-Justice, and Virtue: and that place and life is, for it, its principle
-and end: principle, since it springs from thence; end, because the Good
-is there, and because, once arrived there, the soul becomes what it was
-at first.”[73]
-
-And Dionysius has the doctrine, so dear to Catherine, that “the Source
-of Good is indeed present to all, but all are not,” by their intention,
-“present to It; yet, by our aptitude for Divine union, we all,” in a
-sense, “are present to It.” “It shines, on Its own part, equally upon
-all things capable of participation in It.”[74] Already Plotinus had
-finely said: “The One is not far away from any one, and yet is liable
-to be far away from one and all, since, present though It be, It is”
-efficaciously “present only to such as are capable of receiving It, and
-are so disposed as to adapt themselves to It and, as it were, to seize
-and touch It by their likeness to It, … when, in a word, the soul is in
-the state in which it was when it came from It.”[75]
-
-We have again in Dionysius the combination, so characteristic of
-Catherine, of a tender respect for the substance of human nature, as
-good and ever respected by God, and of a keen sense of the pathetic
-weakness of man’s sense-clogged spirit here below. “Providence, as
-befits its goodness, provides for each being suitably: for to destroy
-nature is not a function of Providence.” “All those who cavil at the
-Divine Justice, unconsciously commit a manifest injustice. For they
-say that immortality ought to be in mortals, and perfection in the
-imperfect … and perfect power in the weak, and that the temporal should
-be eternal … in a word, they assign the properties of one thing to
-another.”[76]
-
-
-2. _Symbols of God’s action._
-
-(1) As to the symbols of God’s action, we have first the Chain or Rope,
-Catherine’s “fune,” that “rope of His pure Love,” of which “an end was
-thrown to her from heaven.”[77] This symbol was no doubt suggested by
-Dionysius: “Let us then elevate our very selves by our prayers to the
-higher ascent of the Divine … rays; as though a luminous chain (rope,
-σειρά) were suspended from the celestial heights and reached down
-hither, and we, by ever stretching out to it up and up … were thus
-carried upwards.”[78] And this passage again goes back to Proclus,
-who describes the “chain (rope) of love” as “having its entirely
-simple and hidden highest point fixed amongst the very first ranks of
-the Gods”; its middle effluence “amongst the Gods higher than the
-(sensible) world”; and its third, lowest, part, as “divided multiformly
-throughout the (sensible) world.” “The divine Love implants one common
-bond (chain) and one indissoluble friendship in and between each soul
-(that participates in its power), and between all and the Beautiful
-Itself.”[79] And this simile of a chain from heaven, which in Dionysius
-is luminous, and in Catherine and Proclus is loving, goes back, across
-Plato (_Theaetetus_ 153_c_ and _Republic_, X, 61_b_, 99_c_) to Homer,
-where it again is luminous (golden). For, in the _Iliad_, viii, 17-20,
-Zeus says to the Gods in Olympus, “So as to see all things, do you, O
-Gods and Goddesses all, hang a golden chain from heaven, and do you all
-seize hold of it”--so as thus to descend to earth.
-
-(2) We have next the symbol of the Sun and its purifying, healing
-Light, under which God and His action are rapturously proclaimed by
-Dionysius. “Even as our sun, by its very being, enlightens all things
-able to partake of its light in their various degrees, so also the
-Good, by its very existence, sends unto all things that be, the rays
-of its entire goodness, according to their capacity for them. By means
-of these rays they are purified from all corruption and death … and
-are separated from instability.” “The Divine Goodness, this our great
-sun, enlightens … nourishes, perfects, renews.” Even the pure can
-thus be made purer still. “He, the Good, is called spiritual light
-… he cleanses the mental vision of the very angels: they taste, as
-it were, the light.”[80] All this imagery goes back, in the first
-instance, to Proclus. For Proclus puts in parallel “sun” and “God,” and
-“to be enlightened” and “to be deified”; makes all purifying forces
-to coalesce in the activity of the Sun-God, Apollo Katharsios, the
-Purifier, who “everywhere unifies multiplicity … purifying the entire
-heaven and all living things throughout the world”; and describes how
-“from above, from his super-heavenly post, Apollo scatters the arrows
-of Zeus,--his rays upon all the world.”[81] The Sun’s rays, here as
-powerful as the bolts of Zeus, thus begin to play the part still
-assigned to them in Catherine’s imagery of the “Saëtte” and “Radii” of
-the divine Light and Love. And the substance of the whole symbol goes
-back, through fine sayings of Plotinus and through Philo, to Plato, who
-calls the Sun “the offspring of the Good and analogous to it,” and who
-(doubtless rightly) takes Homer’s “golden chain” to be nothing but the
-Sun-rays,--thus identifying the two symbols.[82]
-
-(3) Fire, as a symbol for God and His action, is thus praised by
-Dionysius: “The sacred theologians often describe the super-essential
-Essence in terms of Fire.… For sensible fire is, so to say, present
-in all things, and pervades them all without mingling with them, and
-is received by all things; … it is intolerable yet invisible; it
-masters all things by its own might, and yet it but brings the things
-in which it resides to (the development of) their own energy; it has
-a transforming power; it communicates itself to all who approach it
-in any degree; … it has the power of dividing (what it seizes); it
-bears upwards; it is penetrating; … it increases its own self in a
-hidden manner; it suddenly shines forth.”[83]--All these qualities,
-and the delicate transitions from fire to light and from light back to
-fire, and from heat immanent to heat applied from without, we can find
-again, vividly assimilated and experienced, in Catherine’s teaching
-and emotional life. But the Sun-light predominates in Dionysius, the
-Fire-heat in Catherine; and whereas the former explicitly attaches
-purification only to the Sun-light, the latter connects the cleansing
-chiefly with Fire-heat, no doubt because the Greek man is busy chiefly
-with the intellectually cognitive, and the Italian woman with the
-morally ameliorative, activities and interests of the mind and soul.
-
-
-3. _The soul’s reaction._
-
-(1) As to the soul’s reaction under God’s action, and its return to
-Him, we first get, in Dionysius, the insistence upon Mystical Quietude
-and Silence, which, according to him, are strictly necessary, since
-only like can know and become one with like, and God is “Peace and
-Repose” and, “as compared with every known progression, Immobility,”
-and “the one all-perfect source and cause of the Peace of all”; and
-He is Silence, “the Angels are, as it were, the heralds of the Divine
-Silence,”--teaching not unlike that of St. Ignatius of Antioch,
-“Jesus Christ … the Word which proceeds from Silence.”[84] Hence “in
-proportion as we ascend to the higher designations of God, do our
-expressions become more and more circumscribed”; and at last “we shall
-find, not a little speaking, but a complete absence of speech and
-of conception.”[85] As Proclus has it: “Let this Fountain of Godhead
-be honoured on our part by silence and by the union which is above
-silence.”[86] And Plotinus says: “This,” the Divine, “Light comes not
-from anywhere nor disappears any whither, but simply shines or shines
-not: hence we must not pursue after it, but must abide in quietness
-till it appears.” And when it does appear, “the contemplative, as one
-rapt and divinely inspired, abides here with quietude in a motionless
-condition, … being entirely stable, and becoming, as it were, stability
-itself.”[87]--All this still finds its echo in Catherine.--But the
-treble (cognitive) movement of the Angelic and human mind,--the
-circular, the straight-line, and the spiral,--which Dionysius, in
-direct imitation of Proclus, carefully develops throughout three
-sections, is quite absent from Catherine’s mind.[88]
-
-(2) We next get, in Dionysius, the following teachings as to Mystical
-Vision and Union. “The Unity-above-Mind is placed above the minds;
-and the Good-above-word is unutterable by word.” “There is, further,
-the most divine knowledge of Almighty God, which is known through
-not knowing … when the mind, having stood apart from all existing
-things, and having then also dismissed itself, has been made one with
-the super-luminous rays.” “We must contemplate things divine by our
-whole selves standing out of our whole selves, and becoming wholly
-of God.” “By the resistless and absolute ecstasy, in all purity,
-from out of thyself and all things, thou wilt be carried on high, to
-the super-essential ray of the divine darkness.” “It is during the
-cessation of every mental energizing, that such a union of the deified
-minds and of the super-divine light takes place.”[89] And the original
-cause and final effect of such a going forth from self, are indicated
-in words which were worked out in a vivid fulness by Catherine’s whole
-convert life: “Divine Love is ecstatic, not permitting any lovers to
-belong to themselves, but only to those beloved by them. And this
-love, the superior beings show by being full of forethought for their
-inferiors; those equal in rank, by their mutual coherence; and the
-inferior by a looking back and up to the superior ones.”[90]
-
-Dionysius here everywhere follows Proclus. Yet the noblest
-Neo-Platonist sayings are again furnished by Plotinus: “We are not cut
-off or severed from the Light, but we breathe and consist in It, since
-It ever enlightens and bears us, as long as It is what It is.” In the
-moments of Union, “we are able to see both Him and ourself,--ourself
-in dazzling splendour, full of spiritual light, or rather one with the
-pure Light Itself … our life’s flame is then enkindled.” “There the
-soul rests, after it has fled up, away from evil, to the place which
-is free from evils … and the true life is there.” “Arrived there,
-the soul becomes that which she was at first.”[91] And if Plotinus
-has thus already got the symbolism of place, he is as fully aware as
-Catherine herself that, for purposes of vivid presentation, he is
-spacializing spiritual, that is, unextended, qualitative states and
-realities. “Things incorporeal do not get excluded by bodies; they are
-severed only by otherness and difference: hence, when such otherness is
-absent, they, not differing, are near each other.” And already, as with
-Catherine, there is the apparent finality, and yet also the renewed
-search for more. “The seer and the seen have become one, as though it
-were a case not of vision but of union.” “When he shall have crossed
-over as the image to its Archetype, then he will have reached his
-journey’s end.” And yet this “ecstasy, simplification, and donation of
-one’s self,” this “quiet,” is still also “a striving after contact,” “a
-musing to achieve union.”[92]
-
-
-4. _Terminology of the soul’s reaction._
-
-(1) Certain terms and conceptions in connection with the soul’s return
-to God, which are specially dear to Catherine, already appear, fully
-developed, in Dionysius, Proclus, and Plotinus; in part, even in Plato.
-Her “suddenly “ (_subito_) appears but rarely in Dionysius, _e.g._ in
-_Heavenly Hierarchy_ xv, 2; but it is carefully explained by him in
-his Third Epistle, specially devoted to the subject.[93] It is common
-in Plotinus: “Suddenly the soul saw, without seeing how it saw”;
-“suddenly thou shalt receive light,” “suddenly shining.”[94] And in
-Plato we find: “He who has learnt to see the Beautiful in due order
-and succession, when he comes towards the end, will suddenly perceive
-a Nature of wondrous beauty--Beauty alone, absolute, separate, simple
-and everlasting”: a passage which derives its imagery from the Epopteia
-of the Eleusynian Mysteries,--the sudden appearance, the curtain being
-withdrawn, upon the stage whereon the Heathen Mystery-play was being
-performed, under a peculiar fairy-illumination, of the figures of
-Demeter, Kore, and Iacchus, as the culmination of a long succession of
-purifications and initiations.[95]
-
-Catherine’s “wound,” or “wounding stroke,” (_ferita_), is, in part, the
-necessary consequence of the “arrow” conception already considered;
-in part, the echo of that group of terms which, in Dionysius and
-Proclus even more than in Plotinus, express the painfully sudden
-and overwhelming, free-grace character of God’s action upon the
-soul,--especially of ἐπιβολή, “immissio,” a “coming-upon,” a “hitting,”
-a very common word in the Areopagite; μετοχή, “communication,” and
-παραδοχή, “reception,” being the corresponding terms for God’s and the
-soul’s share in this encounter respectively. Thus: “Unions, whether we
-call them immissions or receptions from God.”[96]
-
-“Presence,” “presenza,” παρουσιά, is another favourite term, as with
-Catherine so also with Dionysius and Proclus. Thus the Areopagite:
-“The presence of the spiritual light causes recollection and unity in
-those that are being enlightened with it,” “His wholly inconceivable
-presence.”[97] And Proclus: “Every perfect spiritual contact and
-communion is owing to the presence of God.”[98] And the conception of a
-sudden presence goes back, among the Neo-Platonists, to Plato and the
-Greek Mysteries, in which the God was held suddenly to arrive and to
-take part in the sacred dance. Such rings of sacred dancers, “choirs,”
-are still characteristic of Dionysius--_e.g._ _Heavenly Hierarchy_,
-vii, 4--but they are quite wanting in Catherine.--But “contact,”
-“touch,” ἐπαφή,--said of God’s direct action upon the soul,--a
-conception so intensely active in Catherine’s mind and life, is again
-a favourite term with Dionysius and Proclus. The former declares this
-“touch” to be neither “sensible” nor “intelligible” and that “we are
-brought into contact with things unutterable”; the latter talks of
-“perfect spiritual contact.”[99]
-
-The symbols of “Nakedness” and “Garments,” as indicative respectively
-of the soul’s purity and impurity or self-delusion, are, though most
-prominent in Catherine, rare in Dionysius. But his declaration:
-“The nakedness of the (Angels’) feet indicates purification from
-the addition of all things external and assimilation to the divine
-simplicity” exactly expresses her idea.[100] And Proclus has it more
-fully: The soul, on descending into the body, forsakes unity, “and
-around her, from all sides, there grow multiform kinds of existence
-and manifold garments”; “love of honour is the last garment of souls”;
-and “when,” in mounting up, “we lay aside our passions and garments
-which, in coming down, we had put on, we must also strip off that
-last garment, in order that, having become (entirely) naked, we may
-establish ourselves before God, having made ourselves like to the
-divine life.”[101]
-
-(2) Again, as to Triads, it is interesting to note that Catherine has
-nothing about the three stages or ways of the inner life,--purgative,
-illuminative, unitive,--of which Dionysius is full, and which are
-already indicated in Proclus; for we can find but two in her life, the
-purgative and unitive, and in her teaching these two alone appear,
-mostly in close combination, sometimes in strong contrast. Nor has
-she anything about the three degrees or kinds of prayer,--Meditation,
-Contemplation, Union,--as indicated in Dionysius: “It behoves us, by
-our prayers, to be lifted into proximity with the Divine Trinity; and
-then, by still further approaching it, to be initiated…; and (lastly)
-to make ourselves one with it”; and as taught by Proclus: “Knowledge
-leads, then follows proximity, and then union.”[102] With her we
-only get Contemplation and Union.--Nor do we get in her anything
-about thrice three choirs of Angels, or three orders of Christian
-Ministrants, or three classes of Christian people, or thrice three
-groups of Sacraments and Sacramental acts. For she is too intensely
-bent upon immediate intercourse with God, and too much absorbed in the
-sense of profound unity and again of innumerable multiplicity, to be
-attracted by Dionysius’s Neo-Platonist ladder of carefully graduated
-intermediaries, or by his continuous interest in triads of every kind.
-Catherine thus follows the current in Dionysius which insists upon
-direct contact between the soul and the transcendent God, and ignores
-the other, which bridges over the abyss between the two by carefully
-graduated intermediaries: these intermediaries having become, with her,
-successive stages of purification and of ever more penetrating union of
-the one soul with the one God.
-
-
-5. _Deification, especially through the Eucharist._
-
-As to the end of the whole process, we find that Deification, so
-frequently implied or suggested by Catherine, is formally taught by
-Dionysius: “A union of the deified minds” (ἐκθεουμένων); the heavenly
-and the earthly Hierarchy have the power and task “to communicate
-to their subjects, according to the dignity of each, the sacred
-deification” (ἐκθέωσις); “we are led up, by means of the multiform of
-sensible symbols, to the uniform Deification.”[103] “The One is the
-very God,” says Proclus, “but the Mind (the Noûs) is the divinest of
-beings, and the soul is divine, and the body is godlike.… And every
-body that is God-like is so through the soul having become divine; and
-every soul that is divine, is so through the Mind being very divine;
-and every Mind that is thus very divine, is so through participation
-in the Divine One.”[104] There are preformations of this doctrine in
-Plotinus and echoes of it throughout Catherine’s sayings.
-
-And the Areopagite’s teaching that the chief means and the culmination
-of this deification are found and reached in the reception of the
-Holy Eucharist will no doubt also have stimulated Catherine’s mind:
-“The Communicant is led to the summit of deiformation, as far as this
-is possible for him.”[105] And her soul responds completely to the
-beautiful Dionysian-Proclian teaching concerning God’s presence in all
-things, as the cause of the profound sympathy which binds them all
-together. “They say,” declares Dionysius, “that He is in minds … and
-in bodies, and in heaven and in earth; (indeed that He is) sun, fire,
-water, spirit … all things existing, and yet again not one of all
-things existing.” “The distribution of boundless power passes from
-Almighty God all things, and no single being but has intellectual,
-or rational, or sensible, or vital, or essential power.” “The gifts
-of the unfailing Power pass on to men and (lesser) living creatures,
-to plants, and to the entire nature of the Universe.”[106] This
-latter passage was suggested by Proclus: “One would say that, through
-participation in the One, all things are deified, each according to
-its rank, inclusive of the very lowest of beings.” “The image of the
-One and the inter-communion existing through it,--this it is that
-produces the extant sympathy” which permeates all things.[107]--But
-Catherine has nowhere the term “echo,” which is so dear to Dionysius:
-“His all-surpassing power holds together and preserves even the
-remotest of its echoes”; “the sun and plants are or hold most distant
-echoes of the Good and of Life”; indeed even the licentious man still
-possesses, in his very passion, “as it were a faint echo of Union and
-of Friendship.”[108]
-
-
-6. _Dionysius and Catherine; three agreements and differences._
-
-I conclude with three important points of difference and similarity
-between Catherine and Dionysius.
-
-(1) Catherine abstains from the use of those repulsive, impossibly
-hyperbolic epithets such as “the Super-Good,” “the Above-Mind,” which
-Dionysius is never weary of applying to God, and is content with ever
-feeling and declaring how high above the very best conception which
-she can form of mind and of goodness He undoubtedly is; thus wisely
-moderated, I take it, by her constant experience and faith as to
-God’s immediate presence within the human soul, which soul cannot,
-consequently, be presented as entirely remote from the nature of God.
-
-(2) Catherine transforms over-intense and impoverishing insistence upon
-the pure Oneness of God, such as we find it even in Dionysius and still
-more in Proclus, into a, sometimes equally over-intense, conception as
-to the oneness of our union with Him, leaving Him to be still conceived
-as an overflowing richness of all kinds.
-
-(3) And Catherine keeps, in an interesting manner, Hellenic, and
-specifically Platonic, formulation for the deepest of her experiences
-and teachings, since her standing designation of God and of Our
-Lord is never personal, “My Lover” or “My Friend”; but, as it were,
-elemental, “Love” or “My Love.” Her keen self-purifying instinct
-and reverence for God will have spontaneously inclined her thus to
-consider Him first as an Ocean of Being in which to quench and drown
-her small, clamorous individuality, and this as a necessary step
-towards reconstituting that true personality, which, itself spirit,
-would be penetrated and sustained by the Spirit, Christ, God. And then
-the Pauline-Joannine picturings of God as a quasi-place and extended
-substance (“from Him and in Him and to Him,” “in the Spirit,” “in
-Christ,” “God is Charity and he that abideth in Charity, abideth in
-Him”) will have strongly confirmed this trend. Yet Dionysius too must
-have greatly helped on this movement of her mind. For in Dionysius
-the standing appellations for God are, in true Neo-Platonist fashion,
-derived from extended or diffusive material substances or conditions,
-Light, Fire, Fountain, Ocean; and from that pervasive emotion, Love,
-strictly speaking Desire, Eros.
-
-Now this, for our modern and Christian feeling, curiously impersonal,
-general and abstract method goes back, through Proclus and Plotinus,
-to Plato, who, above all in his _Symposium_, is dominated by the two
-tendencies and requirements, of identifying the First and Perfect
-with the most General and the most Abstract; and of making the very
-prerequisites and instruments of the search for It,--even the earthly
-Eros, still so far from the Heavenly Eros and from the Christian
-Agapē,--into occasions, effects or instalments of and for the great
-Reality sought by them. And since it is thus the love, the desire, the
-eros, of things beautiful, and true, and good,--a love first sensible,
-then intellectual, and at last spiritual, which makes us seek and find
-It, the Beauty, Truth, and Goodness which is First Cause and Final End
-of the whole series, this Cause and End will be considered not as a
-Lover but as Love Itself. It is plain, I think, that it is specially
-this second motive, this requirement of a pervading organization and
-circle of and within the life of spirits and of the Spirit, which has
-also determined Catherine to retain Plato’s terminology.
-
-
-IV. JACOPONE DA TODI’S “LODE.”
-
-In the case of Jacopone, the suddenly wife-bereft and converted lawyer,
-an ardent poet doubled by a soaring, daring mystic, with an astonishing
-richness of simultaneous symbols and conceptions and rapidity of
-successive complements and contrasts, it will really be simplest if
-I take the chief touches which have characteristically stimulated
-Catherine or have left her unaffected, in the order and grouping in
-which they appear in his chief “Lode,” as these latter are given in the
-first printed edition, probably the very one used by Catherine.[109]
-
-
-1. _Lode XIII, XXIII, XXXV, XLV._
-
-In Loda XIII “the vicious soul is likened unto Hell,” vv. 1-7; and “the
-soul that yesterday was Hell, to-day has turned into Heaven,” v. 8. We
-thus get here, precisely as in Catherine, the spaceless conditions of
-the soul and their modifications treated under the symbols of places
-and of the spacial change from one place to the other.
-
-In Loda XXIII we first have five successive purifications and purities
-of Love, “carnal, counterfeit, self-seeking, natural, spiritual,
-transformed,” vv. 1-6; and then the symbols of spacial location
-and movement reappear, “if height does not abase itself, it cannot
-participate with, nor communicate itself to, the lowest grade”; all
-which is frequent with Catherine. But she nowhere echoes the teaching
-reproduced here, v. 10, as to the Divine Trinity being figured in man’s
-three faculties of soul.
-
-Loda XXXV gives us a sort of Christian Stoicism very dear dear to
-Catherine: “Thou, my soul, hast been created in great elevation; thy
-nature is grounded in great nobility (_gentilezza_),” v. 7; “thou hast
-not thy life in created things; it is necessary for thee to breathe in
-other countries, to mount up to God thine inheritance, Who (alone) can
-satisfy thy poverty,” v. 10; “great is the honour which thou doest to
-God, when thou abidest (stare) in Him, in thy (true) nobility,” v. 11.
-
-Loda XLV gives “the Five Modes in which God appears in the Soul”--“the
-state of fear”; mercenary, “beggar-love”; “the way of love”; “the
-paternal mode”; “the mode of espousals.” Catherine leaves the last two,
-anthropomorphic and familial, conceptions quite unused, and passes in
-her life, at one bound, from the first to the third mode.
-
-
-2. _Lode LVIIIa, LVIIIb._
-
-The fine Loda LVIII_a_, “Of Holy Poverty, Mistress of all Things,” has
-evidently suggested much to Catherine. “Waters, rivers, lakes, and
-ocean, fish within them and their swimming; airs, winds, birds, and all
-their flying: all these turn to jewels for me,” v. 10. How readily the
-sense of water, and of rapid movement within it, passes here into that
-of air, and of swift locomotion within _it_! And both these movements,
-are felt to represent, in vivid fashion, certain very different
-experiences of the soul.--“Moon, Sun, Sky, and Stars,--even these are
-_not_ amongst my treasures; above the very sky those things abide,
-which are the object of my song,” v. 11. The positive, “analogic”
-method has here turned suddenly into the negative, “apophatic” one;
-and yet, even here, we still have the spacial symbolism, for the best
-is the highest up,--indeed it is this very symbolism which is made to
-add point to the negative declaration, a declaration which nevertheless
-clearly implies the mere symbolism of that spacialization. All this is
-fully absorbed by Catherine.--“Since God has my will, … my wings have
-such feathers that from earth to heaven there is no distance for me,”
-v. 12. Here we see how Plato filters through, complete, to Jacopone;
-but only in his central idea to Catherine. For the _Phaedrus_, 246_b_,
-_c_, teaches: “The perfect soul then, having become winged, soars
-upwards, and is the ruler of the universe; whilst the imperfect soul
-sheds her feathers and is borne downwards, till it settles on the solid
-ground.” Catherine never mentions wings nor feathers, but often dwells
-upon flying.
-
-The great Loda LVIII_b_, “Of Holy Poverty and its Treble Heaven,”
-(one passage of which is formally quoted and carefully expounded
-by Catherine), is a combination of Platonism, Paulinism, and
-Franciscanism, and has specially influenced her through its Platonist
-element. Verses 1-9 contain a fine apostrophe to Poverty. “O Love of
-Poverty, Reign of tranquillity! Poverty, high Wisdom! to be subject
-to nothing; through despising to possess all things created!” v. 1:
-all this is echoed by Catherine. But the ex-lawyer’s declaration that
-such a soul “has neither judge nor notary,” v. 3, did certainly not
-determine her literally, for we have had before us some fifteen cases
-in which she had recourse to lawyers. “God makes not His abode in a
-narrow heart; thou art, oh man, precisely as great as thine affection
-may be. The spirit of poverty possesses so ample a bosom, that Deity
-Itself takes up its dwelling there,” v. 8. Catherine’s deepest self
-seems to breathe from out of this profound saying.
-
-Verses 10 to 30 describe the three heavens of successive
-self-despoilments. The firmamental heaven, which typifies the four-fold
-renouncement,--of honour, riches, science, reputation of sanctity,
-has left no echo in Catherine. The stellar heaven is “composed of
-solidified clear waters (_aque solidate_)”; here “the four winds”
-cease “that move the sea,--that perturb the mind: fear and hope, grief
-and joy,” 11-14. Here Plato again touches Catherine through Jacopone.
-For the _Symposium_, 197_a_, declares: “Love it is that produces
-peace among men and calm on the sea, a cessation of the winds, and
-repose and sleep even in trouble”; and Jacopone identifies the middle
-“crystalline” heaven, (“the waters above” of Genesis, chap, i,) with
-Plato’s “sea”; takes Plato’s (four) winds as the soul’s chief passions;
-and considers Plato’s “peace” and “windlessness” as equivalent to the
-“much silence,” which, says the Apocalypse, “arose in heaven,” viii, 1,
-interpreted here as “in mid-heaven.” “Not to fear Hell, nor to hope for
-Heaven, to rejoice in no good, to grieve over no adversity,” v. 16, is
-a formulation unlike Catherine, although single sayings of hers stand
-for sentiments analogous to the first and last.--“If the virtues are
-naked, and the vices are not garmented,--mortal wounds get given to the
-soul,” v. 19, has a symbolism exactly opposite to Catherine’s, who, we
-know, loves to glorify “nakedness” as the soul’s purity.--“The highest
-heaven” is “beyond even the imagings of the mortified fancy”; “of every
-good it has despoiled thee, and has expropriated thee from all virtue:
-lay up as a treasure this thy gain,--the sense of thine own vileness.”
-“O purified Love! it alone lives in the truth!” These verses, 20-22,
-have left a deep impress upon Catherine, although she wisely does
-not press that “expropriation from virtue,” which goes back at least
-to Plotinus, for whom the true Ecstatic is “beyond the choir of the
-virtues.”[110]
-
-“That which appears to thee (as extant), is not truly, existent:
-so high (above) is that which truly is. True elevation of soul
-(_la superbia_) dwells in heaven above, and baseness of mind
-(_humilitade_) leads to damnation,” v. 24, is a saying to which we
-still have Catherine’s detailed commentary. In its markedly Platonic
-distinction between an upper true and a lower seeming world, and in its
-characteristically mystical love of paradox and a play upon words, it
-is more curious than abidingly important; but in its deeply Christian
-consciousness of “pride” and “humility,” in their ordinary ethical
-sense, being respectively the subtlest vice and the noblest virtue, it
-rises sheer above all Platonist and Neo-Platonist apprehension.
-
-“Love abides in prison, in that darksome light! All light there is
-darkness, and all darkness there is as the day,” vv. 26, 27. Here
-Catherine no doubt found aids towards her prison-conception,--of the
-loving soul imprisoned in the earthly body, and of the imperfect,
-yet loving, disembodied souls imprisoned in Purgatory; and towards
-articulating her strong sense of the change in the meaning and value of
-the same symbols, as the soul grows in depth and experience. But her
-symbolization of God, and of our apprehension of Him as Light and Fire,
-is too solidly established in her mind, to allow her to emphasize the
-darkness-symbol with any reference to Him.
-
-“There where Christ is enclosed (in the soul), all the old is changed
-by Him,--the one is transformed into the Other, in a marvellous union.
-To live as I and yet not I; and my very being to be not mine: this is
-so great a cross-purpose (_traversio_), that I know not how to define
-it,” vv. 28-30. This vivid description, based of course upon St. Paul,
-of the apparent shifting of the very centre of the soul’s personality,
-has left clear echoes in Catherine’s sayings; but the explicit
-reference to Christ is here as characteristically Franciscan as it is
-unlike Catherine’s special habits.--And the great poem ends with a
-_refrain_ of its opening apostrophe.
-
-
-3. _Lode LXXIV, LXXIX, LXXXI, LXXXIII._
-
-In the dramatically vivid Dialogue between the Old and the Young Friar
-“Concerning the divers manners of contemplating the Cross,” Loda
-LXXIV, the elder says to the younger man: “And I find the Cross full
-of arrows, which issue from its side: they get fixed in my heart. The
-Archer has aimed them at me; He causes me to be pierced,” v. 6. The
-Cross is here a bow; and yet the arrows evidently issue not from it,
-but, as so many rays, from the Sun, the Light-Christ, Who is laid upon
-it,--from the heart of the Crucified. Catherine maintains the rays and
-arrows, and the Sun and Fire from which they issue; but the Cross and
-the Crucified, presupposed here throughout, appear not, even to this
-extent, in her post-conversion picturings.--“You abide by the warmth,
-but I abide within the fire; to you it is delight, but I am burning
-through and through, I cannot find a place of refuge in this furnace,”
-v. 13. All this has been echoed throughout by Catherine.
-
-Loda LXXIX, “Of the Divine Love and its Praises,” has evidently much
-influenced her. “O joyous wound, delightful wound, gladsome wound, for
-him who is wounded by Thee, O Love!” “O Love, divine Fire! Love full
-of laughter and playfulness!” “O Love, sweet and suave; O Love, Thou
-art the key of heaven! Ship that Thou art, bring me to port and calm
-the tempest,” vv. 3, 6, 16. All this we have found reproduced in her
-similes and experiences. “Love, bounteous in spending Thyself; Love
-with widespread tables!” “Love, Thou art the One that loves, and the
-Means wherewith the heart loves Thee!” vv. 24, 26. These verses give us
-the wide, wide world outlook, the connection between Love and the Holy
-Eucharist, and the identity of the Subject, Means, and Object of Love,
-which are all so much dwelt upon by Catherine.
-
-Loda LXXXI is interesting by the way in which, although treating of
-“the love of Christ upon the Cross,” it everywhere apostrophizes Love
-and not the Lover, and treats the former, again like Catherine, as a
-kind of boundless living substance; indeed v. 17 must have helped to
-suggest one of her favourite conceptions: “O great Love, greater than
-the great sea! Oh! the man who is drowned within it, under it, and with
-it all around him, whilst he knows not where he is!”
-
-Loda LXXXIII has two touches dear to Catherine. “O Love, whose name is
-‘I love’--the plural is never found,” v. 5,--a saying which evidently
-is directed, not against a social conception of religion, but against
-a denial of the Divine Love being Source as well as Object of our
-love; and “I did not love Thee with any gain to myself, until I loved
-Thee for Thine own sake,” v. 15,--a declaration of wondrous depth and
-simplicity.
-
-
-4. _Lode LXXXVIII, LXXXIX, LXXXX, LXXXXVIII, LXXXXIX._
-
-The great Loda LXXXVIII, “How the soul complains to God concerning
-the excessive ardours of the love infused into it,” contains numerous
-touches which have been interestingly responded to or ignored by
-Catherine. “All my will is on fire with Love, is united, transformed
-(into It); who can bear such Love? Nor fire nor sword can part the
-loving soul and her Love; a thing so united cannot be divided; neither
-suffering nor death can henceforth mount up to that height where the
-soul abides in ecstasy,” vv. 5, 6: a combination of St. Paul and
-Plotinus, quite after Catherine’s heart. But “the light of the sun
-appears to me obscure, now that I see that resplendent Countenance,”
-v. 7, has an anthropomorphic touch to which she does not respond;
-and “I have given all my heart, that it may possess that Lover who
-renews me so,--O Beauty ancient and ever new!” v. 10, has the personal
-designation “Lover,” which, again, is alien to her vocabulary.
-
-“Seeing such Beauty, I have been drawn out of myself … and the heart
-now gets undone, melted as though it were wax, and finds itself again,
-with the likeness of Christ upon it,” v. 11, must have stimulated, by
-its first part, some of her own experiences, and will, by its second
-part, taken literally, have helped on the fantastic expectations of
-her attendants. “Love rises to such ardour, that the heart seems to
-be transfixed as with a knife,” v. 14, no doubt both expressed an
-experience of Jacopone and helped to constitute the form of a similar
-experience on the part of Catherine. “As iron, which is all on fire,
-as dawn, made resplendent by the sun, lose their own form (nature) and
-exist in another, so is it with the pure mind, when clothed by Thee, O
-Love,” v. 21, contains ideas, (all but the symbol of clothing,) very
-dear to Catherine. But the astonishingly daring words: “Since my soul
-has been transformed into Truth, into Thee, O Christ alone, into Thee
-Who art tender Loving,--not to myself but to Thee can be imputed what I
-do. Hence, if I please Thee not, Thou dost not please Thine Own Self,
-O Love!” v. 22, remain unechoed by her, no doubt because her states
-shift from one to another, and she wisely abstains from pushing the
-articulation of any one of them to its own separate logical limit.
-
-“Thou wast born into the world by love and not by flesh, O Love
-become Man (_humanato Amore_),” v. 27, is like her in its interesting
-persistence in the “Love” (not “Lover”) designation, but is unlike her
-in its definite reference to the historic Incarnation. “Love, O Love,
-Jesus, I have reached the haven,” v. 32, is closely like her, all but
-the explicit mention of the historic name; and “Love, O Love, Thou art
-the full-orbed circle,” “Thou art both warp and woof,” beginning and
-end, material and transforming agency, v. 33, is Catherine’s central
-idea, expressed in a form much calculated to impress it upon her.
-
-The daring and profound Loda LXXXIX, “How the soul, by holy
-self-annihilation and love, reaches an unknowable and indescribable
-state,” contains again numerous touches which have been assimilated by
-Catherine. So with: “Drawn forth, out of her natural state, into that
-unmeasurable condition whither love goes to drown itself, the soul,
-having plunged into the abyss of this ocean, henceforth cannot find,
-on any side, any means of issuing forth from it,” vv. 12, 13. So also
-with: “Since thou dost no longer love thyself, but alone that Goodness
-… it has become necessary for thee again to love thyself, but with
-His Love,--into so great an unity hast thou been drawn by Him,” vv.
-52-54. So too with: “All Faith ceases for the soul to whom it has been
-given to see; and all Hope, since it now actually holds what it used
-to seek,” v. 70, although this is more absolute than are her similar
-utterances.--But especially are the startling words interesting: “In
-this transformation, thou drinkest Another, and that Other drinketh
-thee (_tu bevi e sei bevuto, in transformazione_),” v. 98, which, in
-their second part, are identical with R. Browning’s “My end, to slake
-Thy thirst”:[111] for they will have helped to support or to encourage
-Catherine’s corresponding inversion--the teaching of an eating, an
-assimilation, not of God by man, but of man by God. Both sets of images
-go back, of course, to the Eucharistic reception by the soul of the
-God-man Christ, under the forms of Bread eaten and of Wine drunk.
-
-The striking Loda LXXXX, “How the soul arrives at a treble state of
-annihilation,” has doubtless suggested much to Catherine. “He who
-has become the very Cause of all things” (_chi è cosa d’ogni cosa_)
-“can never more desire anything,” v. 4, is, it is true, more daring,
-because more quietly explicit, than any saying of hers. But v. 13 has
-been echoed by her throughout: “The heavens have grown stagnant; their
-silence constrains me to cry aloud: ‘O profound Ocean, the very depth
-of Thine Abyss has constrained me to attempt and drown myself within
-it,’”--where note the interestingly antique presupposition of the music
-of the spheres, which has now stopped, and of the watery constitution
-of the crystalline heaven, which allows of stagnation; and the rapidity
-of the change in the impressions,--from immobility to silence, and from
-air to water. Indeed that Ocean is one as much of air as of water, and
-as little the one as the other; and its attractive force is still that
-innate affinity between the river-soul and its living Source and Home,
-the Ocean God, which we have so constantly found in Plotinus, Proclus,
-and Dionysius. “The land of promise is, for such a soul, no longer one
-of promise only: for the perfect soul already reigns within that land.
-Men can thus transform themselves, in any and every place,” v. 18, has,
-in its touching and lofty Stoic-Christian teaching, found the noblest
-response and re-utterance in and by Catherine’s words and life.
-
-Loda LXXXXVIII, “Of the Incarnation of the Divine Word,” full though
-it is of beautiful Franciscanism, has left her uninfluenced. But the
-fine Loda LXXXXIX, “How true Love is not idle,” contains touches which
-have sunk deep into her mind. “Splendour that givest to all the world
-its light, O Love Jesus … heaven and earth are by Thee; Thine action
-resplends in all things and all things turn to Thee. Only the sinner
-despises Thy Love and severs himself from Thee, his Creator,” v. 6,
-is, in its substance, taken over by her. “O ye cold sinners!” v. 12,
-is her favourite epithet. And vv. 13, 14, with their rapid ringing of
-the changes on the different sense-perceptions, will, by their shifting
-vividness, have helped on a similar iridescence in her own imagery: “O
-Odour, that transcendest every sweetness! O living river of Delight …
-that causest the very dead to return to their vigour! In heaven Thy
-lovers possess Thine immense Sweetness, tasting there those savoury
-morsels.”
-
-And finally Loda LXXXVII, “Of true and false discretion,” which, in vv.
-12-20, consists of a dialogue between “the Flesh” and “the Reason,”
-will have helped to suggest the slight beginnings of this form of
-apprehension to Catherine which we have found amongst her authentic
-sayings and experiences, and which were, later on, developed on so
-large a scale, by Battista Vernazza, throughout her long _Dialogo della
-Beata Caterina_.
-
-5. Jacopone it is, then, who furnished Catherine with much help towards
-that rare combination of deep feeling with severely abstract thinking
-which, if at times it somewhat strains and wearies us moderns who would
-ever end with the concrete, gives a nobly virile, bracing note to even
-the most effective of her sayings.
-
-
-V. POINTS COMMON TO ALL FIVE MINDS; AND CATHERINE’S MAIN DIFFERENCE
-FROM HER FOUR PREDECESSORS.
-
-If we now consider for a moment the general points common to the four
-writers just considered and to Catherine, we readily note that all
-five are profoundly reflective and interpretative in their attitude
-towards the given contingencies of traditional religion; that they
-all tend to find the Then and There of History still at work, in
-various degrees, Here and Now, throughout Time and Space, and in the
-last resort, above and behind both these categories, in a spaceless,
-timeless Present. And if only three, Paul, Jacopone, and Catherine,
-bear marks, throughout all they think and feel and do and are, of the
-cataclysmic conversion-crisis through which they had passed,--the
-temporally intermediate two, John and Dionysius, have also got, but in
-a more indirect form, much of a similar Dualism. All five are, in these
-and other respects, indefinitely closer to each other than any one of
-them is to the still richer, more complete, and more entirely balanced
-though less articulated, Synoptic teaching, which enfolds all that
-is abiding in those other five, whilst they, even if united, do not
-approximately exhaust the substance of that teaching.
-
-And if we would briefly define the main point on which Catherine holds
-views additional to, or other than, those other four, we must point to
-her Purgatorial teaching, which has received but little or no direct
-suggestion from any one of them, and which, whatever may have been its
-literary precursors and occasions, gives, perhaps more than anything
-else, a peculiarly human and personal, original and yet still modern,
-touch to what would otherwise be, to our feeling, too abstract and
-antique a spiritual physiognomy.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XI
-
-CATHERINE’S LESS ULTIMATE THIS-WORLD DOCTRINES
-
-
-INTRODUCTORY: CATHERINE’S LESS ULTIMATE POSITIONS, CONCERNING OUR LIFE
-HERE, ARE FOUR.
-
-We have now attempted, (by means of a doubtless more or less artificial
-distinction between things that, in real life, constitute parts of one
-whole in a state of hardly separable inter-penetration,) a presentation
-of Catherine’s special, mental and psycho-physical, character and
-temperament, and of the principal literary stimulations and materials
-which acted upon, and in return were refashioned by, that character;
-and we have also given, in sufficient detail, the resultant doctrines
-and world-view acquired and developed by that deep soul and noble mind.
-The most important and difficult part of our task remains, however,
-still to be accomplished,--the attempt to get an (at least approximate)
-estimate of the abiding meaning, place, and worth of this whole, highly
-synthesized position, for and within the religious life generally and
-our present-day requirements in particular. For the general outline of
-the Introduction, (intended there more as an instrument of research
-and classification for the literature and history then about to be
-examined, than as this history’s final religious appraisement,) cannot
-dispense us from now attempting something more precise and ultimate.--I
-propose, then, to give the next four chapters to an examination
-of Catherine’s principal positions and practices, the first two,
-respectively, to “the less ultimate This-World Doctrines”; and “the
-Other-World Doctrines,” or “the Eschatology”; and the last two to “the
-Ultimate Implications and Problems” underlying both. The last chapter
-shall then sum up the whole book, and consider the abiding place and
-function of Mysticism, in its contrast to, and supplementation of,
-Asceticism, Institutionalism, and the Scientific Habit and Activity of
-the Mind.
-
-Now I think the less ultimate spiritual positions, as far as they
-concern our life here below, which are specially represented, or at
-least forcibly suggested by, Catherine, can reasonably be accounted as
-four: Interpretative Religion; a strongly Dualistic attitude towards
-the body; Quietude and Passivity; and Pure Love. I shall devote a
-section to each position.
-
-
-I. INTERPRETATIVE RELIGION.
-
-
-1. _Difficulties of the Subjective element of Religion._
-
-Now, by Interpretative Religion, I do not mean to imply that there
-is anywhere, in _rerum natura_, such a thing as a religion which is
-not interpretative, which does not consist as truly of a reaction on
-the part of the believing soul to certain stimulations of and within
-it, as of these latter stimulations and actions. As every (even
-but semi-conscious) act and state of the human mind, ever embraces
-both such action of the object and such reaction of the subject,--a
-relatively crude fact of sensation or of feeling born in upon it, and
-an interpretation, an incorporation of this fact by, and into, the
-living tissue and organism of this mind: so is it also, necessarily
-and above all, with the deepest and most richly complex of all human
-acts and states,--the specifically religious ones. But if this
-interpretative activity of the mind was present from the very dawn of
-human reason, and exists in each individual in the precise proportion
-as mind can be predicated as operative within him at all: this mental
-activity is yet the last element in the compound process and result
-which is, or can be, perceived as such by the mind itself. The process
-is too near to the observer, even when he is once awake to its
-existence; he is too much occupied with the materials brought before
-his mind and with moulding and sorting them out; and this moulding and
-sorting activity is itself too rapid and too deeply independent of
-those materials as to its form, and too closely dependent upon them as
-to its content, for the observation by the mind of this same mind’s
-contributions towards its own affirmations of reality and of the nature
-of this reality, not ever to appear late in the history of the human
-race or in the life of any human individual, or not to be, even when it
-appears difficult, a fitful and an imperfect mental exercise.
-
-And when the discovery of this constant contribution of the mind to
-its own affirmations of reality is first made, it can hardly fail,
-for the time being, to occasion misgivings and anxieties of a more or
-less sceptical kind. Is not the whole of what I have hitherto taken
-to be a solid world of sense outside me, and the whole of the world
-of necessary truth and of obligatory goodness within me,--is it not,
-perhaps, all a merely individual creation of my single mind--a mind cut
-off from all effective intercourse with reality,--my neighbour’s mind
-included? For all having, so far, been held to be objective, the mind
-readily flies to the other extreme, and suspects all to be subjective.
-Or if all my apprehensions and certainties are the resultants from the
-interaction between impressions received by my senses and mind and
-reactions and elaborations on the part of this mind with regard to
-those impressions, how can I be sure of apprehending rightly, unless
-I can divide each constituent off from the other? And yet, how can I
-effect such a continuous discounting of my mind’s action by means of my
-own mind itself?
-
-And this objection is felt most keenly in religion, when the religious
-soul first wakes up to the fact that itself, of necessity and
-continuously, contributes, by its own action, to the constitution of
-those affirmations and certainties, which, until then, seemed, without
-a doubt, to be directly borne in upon a purely receptive, automatically
-registering mind, from that extra-, super-human world which it thus
-affirmed. Here also, all having for so long been assumed to be purely
-objective, the temptation now arises to consider it all as purely
-subjective. Or again, if we insist upon holding that, here too, there
-are both objective and subjective elements, we readily experience keen
-distress at our inability clearly to divide off the objective, which is
-surely the reality, from the subjective, which can hardly fail to be
-its travesty.
-
-And finally, this doubt and trouble would seem to find specially ready
-material in the mystical element and form of religion. For here, as we
-have already seen, psycho-physical and auto-suggestive phenomena and
-mechanisms abound; here especially does the mind cling to an immediate
-access to Reality; and here the ordinary checks and complements
-afforded by the Historical and Institutional, the Analytically
-Rational, and the Volitional, Practical elements of Religion are at
-a minimum. Little but the Emotional and the Speculatively Rational
-elements seems to remain; and these, more than any others, appear
-incapable of admitting that they are anything other than the pure and
-direct effects and expressions of spiritual Reality.
-
-What, then, shall we think of all this?
-
-
-2. _Answers to the above difficulties._
-
-We evidently must, in the first instance, guard against any attempt
-at doing a doctrinaire violence to the undeniable facts of our
-consciousness or of its docile analysis, by explaining all our
-knowledge, or only even all our knowledge of any single thing, as
-either of purely subjective or of purely objective provenance; for
-everywhere and always these two elements co-exist in all human
-apprehension, reason, feeling, will, and faith. We find, throughout, an
-organization, an indissoluble organism, of subjective and objective,
-hence a unity in diversity, which is indeed so great that (for our
-own experience and with respect to our own minds at all events), the
-Subjective does not and cannot exist without the Objective, nor the
-Objective without the Subjective.
-
-In the next place, we must beware against exalting the Objective
-against the Subjective, or the Subjective against the Objective, as
-if Life, Reality, and Truth consisted in the one rather than the
-other. Because the subjective element is, on the first showing, a work
-of our own minds, it does not follow (as we shall see more clearly
-when studying the ultimate problems) that its operations are bereft
-of correspondence with reality, or, at least, that they are further
-from reality than are our sense-perceptions. For just as the degree
-of worth represented by these sense-perceptions can range from the
-crudest delusion to a stimulation of primary importance and exquisite
-precision, so also our mental and emotional reaction and penetration
-represent almost any and every degree of accuracy and value.
-
-And, above all, as already implied, the true priority and superiority
-lies, not with one of these constituents against the other, but with
-the total subjective-objective interaction and resultant, which is
-superior, and indeed gives their place and worth to, those ever
-interdependent parts.
-
-Now, in the general human experience, the Objective element is
-constituted, in the first instance and for clear and ready analysis,
-by the sense-stimulations; and, after some mental response to and
-elaboration of these, by the larger psychic moods; and later still, by
-the examples of great spiritual attitudes and of great personalities
-offered by other souls to the soul that keeps itself open to such
-impressions. And though the sense of Reality (as contrasted with
-Appearance), of the Abiding and Infinite (as different from the
-Passing and the Finite), are doubtless awakened, however faintly and
-inarticulately, in the human soul from the first, as the background and
-presupposition of the foreground and the middle-distances of its total
-world of perceptions and aspirations: yet all these middle-distances,
-as well as that great background and groundwork, would remain
-unawakened but for those humble little sense-perceptions on the one
-hand, and intercourse with human fellow-creatures on the other. And in
-such intercourse with the minds and souls, or with the literary remains
-and other monuments of souls, either still living here or gone hence
-some two thousand years or more, a mass of mental and moral impressions
-and stimulations, which, in those souls, were largely their own
-elaborations, offer themselves to any one human mind, or to the minds
-of a whole generation or country, with the apparent homogeneity of a
-purely objective, as it were a sense-impression.
-
-Especially in Religion the Historical and Institutional (as Religion’s
-manifestation in space and time), come down to us thus from the past
-and surround us in the present, and either press in upon us with a
-painful weight, or support us with a comforting solidity, thus giving
-them many of the qualities of things physically seen and touched,
-say, a mystery play or a vast cathedral. And, on the other hand,
-the Rational, (whether Analytic or Synthetic,) and the Emotional
-and Volitional Elements, whenever they are at all preponderant or
-relatively independent of the other, more objective ones, are liable,
-in Religion, to look quite exceptionally subjective,--and this in
-the unfavourable sense of the word, as though either superfluous and
-fantastic, or as dangerous and destructive.--And yet both that look of
-the objective elements being, in Religion, more self-sufficing than
-they appear to be in the ordinary psychic, or the artistic, or social,
-or scientific life; and that impression conveyed by the subjective
-elements in Religion, as being there less necessary or more dangerous
-than elsewhere, are doubtless deceptive. These impressions are simply
-caused by two very certain facts. Religion is the deepest and most
-inclusive of all the soul’s energizings and experiences, and hence
-all its constituents reveal a difference, at least in amount and
-degree, when compared with the corresponding constituents of the more
-superficial and more partial activities of the soul; and Religion,
-just because of this, requires the fullest action and co-operation, the
-most perfect unity, in and through diversity, of all the soul’s powers,
-and all mere non-use of any of these forces, even any restriction to
-the use of but one or two, is here, more readily and extensively than
-elsewhere, detrimental both to the non-exercised and to the exercised
-forces, and, above all, is impoverishing to the soul itself and to its
-religion.
-
-Hence, here as elsewhere, but more than anywhere, our ideal standard
-will be the greatest possible development of, and inter-stimulation
-between, each and all of the religious elements, with the greatest
-possible unity in the resulting organism. And yet,--in view of the
-very greatness of the result aimed at, and of the fact that its even
-approximate attainment can, even for any one age of the world, be
-reasonably expected only from the co-operation of the differently
-endowed and attracted races and nations, social and moral grades,
-sexes, ages and individuals that make up mankind,--we shall not
-only be very tolerant of, we shall positively encourage, largely
-one-sided developments, provided that each keeps some touch with the
-elements which itself knows not how to develop in abundance, and that
-it considers its own self, and works out its own special gift and
-_attrait_, as but one out of many variously gifted and apportioned
-fellow-servants in the Kingdom,--as only one of the countless, mutually
-complementary, individually ever imperfect, part-expressions of the
-manifold greatness, of the rich unity of spiritual humanity as willed
-by God, and of God Himself.
-
-
-3. _Partial developments of the full Gospel Ideal._
-
-Now in the New Testament we have a most instructive, at first sight
-puzzling phenomenon, illustrative of the positions just taken up.
-For here it is clear that, with regard to the distinction between
-richly many-sided but as yet unarticulated religion, and comparatively
-one-sided and limited but profoundly developed religion, we have two
-considerably contrasted types of spiritual tone and teaching. We get
-the predominantly “Objective” strand of life and doctrine, in the
-pre-Pauline parts and in their non-Pauline echoes, _i.e._ in the
-substance of the Synoptic tradition, and in the Epistles of St. James
-and of St. Peter; and we find the predominantly “Subjective” strain
-in the “Pauline” parts, St. Paul’s Epistles and the Joannine Gospel
-and Letters.--And it has become more and more clear that it is the
-pre-Pauline parts which give us the most immediately and literally
-faithful, and especially the most complete and many-sided, picture of
-Our Lord’s precise words and actions; whereas the Pauline parts give
-us rather what some of these great creative forces were and became for
-the first generations of Christians and for the most penetrating of
-Christ’s early disciples and lovers. And yet it is the latter documents
-which, at first sight, appear to be the deeper, the wider, and the more
-profoundly spiritual; whereas the former look more superficial, more
-temporal and local, and more simply popular and material.
-
-And yet,--though this first impression has been held to be finally
-true by large masses of Christians; although the Greek Fathers
-predominantly, and, in the West, the great soul of an Augustine, and
-the powerful but one-sided personalities of a Luther and a Calvin
-have, in various degrees and ways, helped to articulate and all but
-finally fix it for the general Christian consciousness: this view is
-yielding, somewhat slowly but none the less surely, to the sense that
-it is the Synoptic, the pre-Pauline tradition which contains the fuller
-arsenal of the spiritual forces which have transfigured and which still
-inspire the world of souls. This, of course, does not mean that the
-Pauline-Joannine developments were not necessary, or are not abiding
-elements towards the understanding of the Christian spirit.
-
-And, to come to the true answer to our objection, such a judgment
-does not mean that the reflective penetration and reapplication of
-the original more spontaneous message was, from the very nature of
-the case, inferior to the first less articulated announcement of the
-Good Tidings. But it merely signifies that this necessary process of
-reflection could only be applied to parts of the original, immensely
-rich and varied, because utterly living, divinely spiritual, whole; and
-that, thus, the special balance and tension which characterized the
-original, complete spirit and temper, could, however profoundly, be
-reproduced only in part. For the time being this later penetration and
-resetting of some elements from among the whole of Our Lord’s divinely
-rich and simple life and teaching, necessarily and rightly, yet none
-the less most really, ignored, or put for the time into some other
-context, certain other sides and aspects of that primitive treasure
-of inexhaustible experience. Only the full, equable, and simultaneous
-unfolding of all the petals could have realized the promise and
-content of the bud; whereas the bud, holding enfolded within itself
-such various elements and combinations of truth, could not expand its
-petals otherwise than successively, hence, at any one moment only
-somewhat one-sidedly and partially. Each and all of these unfoldings
-bring some further insight into, and articulation of, the original
-spiritual organism; and that they are not more, but less, than the
-totality of that primitive experience and revelation, does not prove
-that such reflective work is wrong or even simply dispensable,--for, on
-the contrary, in some degree or form it was and ever is necessary to
-the soul’s apprehension of that life and truth,--but simply implies the
-immensity of the spiritual light and impulsion given by Our Lord, and
-the relative smallness of even the greatest of His followers.
-
-Thus only if it could be shown that those parts of the New Testament
-which doubtless give us the nearest approach to the actual words and
-deeds of Our Lord require us to conceive them as having been without
-the reflective and emotional element; or again that, in the case of the
-more derivative parts of the New Testament, it is their reflectiveness,
-and not their relative incompleteness and one-sidedness, that cause
-them to be more readily englobed in the former world, than that former
-world in the latter: could the facts here found be used as an argument
-against the importance and strict necessity for religion of the
-reflective and emotional, the “Subjective” elements, alongside of the
-“Objective,” the Historical and Institutional ones.
-
-It is a most legitimate ground for consolation to a Catholic when
-he finds the necessities of life and those of learned research both
-driving us more and more to this conclusion; for it is not deniable
-that Catholicism has ever refused to do more than include the Pauline
-and Joannine theologies amongst its earliest and most normative
-stimulations and expressions; and that it has ever retained, far
-more than Protestantism, the sense, which (upon the whole) is most
-unbrokenly preserved by the Synoptists, of, if I may so phrase it, the
-Christianity of certain true elements in the pre- and extra-Christian
-religions. For it is in the Synoptists that we get the clear
-presentation of Our Lord’s attitude towards the Jewish Church of His
-time, as one, even at its keenest, analogous to that of Savonarola, and
-not to that of a Luther, still less of a Calvin, towards the Christian
-Church of their day.--Indeed in these documents all idea of limiting
-Christianity to what He brought of new, appears as foreign to His mind
-as it ever has been to that of the Catholic Church. Here we get the
-most spontaneous and many-sided expression of that divinely human,
-widely traditional and social, all-welcoming and all-transforming
-spirit, which embraces both grace _and_ nature, eternity _and_ time,
-soul _and_ body, attachment _and_ detachment. The Pauline strain stands
-for the stress necessary to the full spiritualization of all those
-occasions and materials, as against all, mere unregenerate or static,
-retention of the simple rudiments or empty names of those things;
-and predominantly insists upon grace, _not_ nature; eternity, _not_
-time; soul, _not_ body; the cross and death here, the Crown and Life
-hereafter. No wonder it is this latter strain that gets repeated,
-with varying truth and success, in times of acute transition, and by
-characters more antithetic than synthetic, more great at developing a
-part of the truth than the whole.
-
-Thinkers, of such wide historical outlook and unimpeachable detachment
-from immediate controversial interest as Prof. Wilhelm Dilthey and
-Dr. Edward Caird, have brought out, with admirable force, this
-greater fulness of content offered by the Synoptists, and how the
-Pauline-Joannine writings give us the first and most important of
-those concentrations upon, and in part philosophic and mystical
-reinterpretations of, certain constituents of the original happenings,
-actions and message, as apprehended and transmitted by the first
-eye-witnesses and believers.[112]--Here I would but try and drive
-home the apparently vague, but in reality ever pressing and concrete,
-lesson afforded by the clear and dominant fact of these two groups
-within the New Testament itself:--of how no mere accumulation of
-external happenings, or of external testimony as to their having
-happened,--no amount of history or of institutionalism, taken as sheer,
-purely positive givennesses,--can anywhere be found, or can anywhere
-suffice for the human mind and conscience, in the apprehension and
-embodiment of the truth. For although, in Our Lord’s most literally
-transmitted sayings and doings, this continuous and inalienable element
-of the apprehending, organizing, vitalizing mind and heart,--on
-His part above all, but also on the part of His several hearers and
-chroniclers,--can mostly still be traced and must everywhere be
-assumed: yet it is in the Pauline-Joannine literature that the ever
-important, the rightly and fruitfully “subjective,” the speculative and
-emotional, the mystical and the volitional strain can best be studied,
-both as to its necessity and as to its special character and dangers,
-because here it is developed to the relative exclusion of the other
-factors of complete religion.
-
-
-4. _The exclusive emotionalism of Dionysius and Jacopone._
-
-Now if even in St. Paul and St. John there is a strong predominance of
-these reflective-emotional elements, in Dionysius and Jacopone they
-threaten to become exclusive of everything else. Especially is this
-the case with the Pseudo-Areopagite, steeped as he is in reflection
-upon reflections and in emotion upon emotions, often of the most
-subtle kind: a Christian echo, with curiously slight modifications,
-of Neo-Platonism in its last stage,--hence, unfortunately, of the
-over-systematic and largely artificial Proclus, instead of the
-predominantly experimental and often truly sublime Plotinus. And even
-Jacopone, although he has distinctly more of the historic element, is
-still predominantly reflective-emotional, and presents us with many a
-hardly modified Platonic or Stoic doctrine, derived no doubt from late
-Graeco-Roman writers and their mediaeval Christian echoes.
-
-
-5. _Catherine’s interpretation of the Gospel Ideal._
-
-Catherine herself, although delightfully free from the long scale of
-mediations between the soul and God which forms one of the predominant
-doctrines of the Areopagite, continues and emphasizes most of what is
-common, and much of what is special to, all and each of these four
-writers; she is a reflective saint, if ever there was one. And of her
-too we shall have to say that she is great by what she possesses, and
-not by what she is without: great because of her noble embodiment of
-the reflective and emotional, the mystical and volitional elements
-of Christianity and Religion generally. Religion is here, at first
-sight at least, all but entirely a thought and an emotion; yet all
-this thought and emotion is directed to, and occasioned by, an
-abiding Reality which originates, sustains, regulates, and fulfils
-it. And although this Reality is in large part conceived, in Greek
-and specially in Neo-Platonist fashion, rather under its timeless and
-spaceless, or at least under its cosmic aspect, rather as Law and
-Substance, than as Personality and Spirit: yet, already because of the
-strong influence upon her of the noblest Platonic doctrine, it is loved
-as overflowing Love and Goodness, as cause and end of all lesser love
-and goodness; and the real, though but rarely articulated, acceptance
-and influence of History and Institutions, above all the enthusiastic
-devotion to the Holy Eucharist with all its great implications, gives
-to the whole a profoundly Christian tone and temper.
-
-True, the Church at large, indeed the single soul (if we would take
-such a soul as our standard of completeness) requires a larger
-proportion of those crisp, definite outlines, of those factual,
-historical, and institutional elements; a very little less than what
-remains in Catherine of these elements, and her religion would be
-a simple, even though deep religiosity, a general aspiration, not
-a definite finding, an explicit religion. Yet it remains certain,
-although ever readily forgotten by religious souls, especially by
-theological apologists, that without some degree and kind of those
-outgoing, apprehending, interpreting activities, no religion is
-possible. Only the question as to what these activities should be, and
-what is their true place and function within the whole religious life,
-remains an open one. And this question we can study with profit in
-connection with such a life and teaching as Catherine’s, which brings
-out, with a spontaneous, childlike profundity and daring, the elemental
-religious passion, the spiritual hunger and thirst of man when he is
-once fully awake; the depths within him anticipating the heights above
-him; the affinity to and contact with the Infinite implied and required
-by that nobly incurable restlessness of his heart, which finds its rest
-in Him alone Who made it.
-
-
-II. DUALISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE BODY.
-
-And if Catherine is profoundly reflective, that reflection is, in its
-general drift, deeply dualistic,--at least in the matter of body and
-spirit. Their difference and incompatibility; the spirit’s fleeing of
-the body; the spirit’s getting outside of it,--by ecstasy, for a little
-while, even in this earthly life, and by this earthly body’s death, for
-good and all; the body a prison-house, a true purgatory to the soul:
-all this hangs well together, and is largely, in its very form, of
-ultimately Neo-Platonist or Platonic origin.
-
-
-1. _New Testament valuations of the body._
-
-Now here is one of the promised instances of a double type--if not of
-doctrine, yet at least of emotional valuation in the New Testament.
-
-(1) In the Synoptist documents, (with the but apparent, or at least
-solitary, exceptions, of Jesus’ Fasting in the Desert and of His
-commendation of those who have made themselves eunuchs for the Kingdom
-of Heaven),[113] we find no direct or acute antagonism to the body,
-even to the average earthly human body, in the teaching and practice
-of Our Lord. The Second Coming and its proximity do indeed, here
-also, dwarf all earthly concerns, in so far as earthly.[114] This
-background to the teaching and its tradition was, in course of time,
-in part abstracted from, in part restated.--The entrance into life is
-through the narrow gate and the steep way; only if a man turn, can he
-enter into the Kingdom of God; only if he lose his soul, can he find
-it:[115] this great teaching and example, as to life and joy being ever
-reached through death to self and by the whole-hearted turning of the
-soul from its false self to its true source, God: remains, in the very
-form of its promulgation as given by the Synoptists, the fundamental
-test and standard of all truly spiritual life and progress. But as to
-the body in particular, Jesus here knows indeed that “the flesh is
-weak,” and that we must pray for strength against its weakness:[116]
-but He nowhere declares it evil--an inevitable prison-house or a
-natural antagonist to the spirit. The beautiful balance of an unbroken,
-unstrained nature, and a corresponding doctrine as full of sober
-earnestness as it is free from all concentrated or systematic dualism,
-are here everywhere apparent.
-
-(2) It is St. Paul, the man of the strongest bodily passions
-and temptations, he who became suddenly free from them by the
-all-transforming lightning-flash of his conversion, who, on and on,
-remained vividly conscious of what he had been and, but for that
-grace, still would be, and of what, through that grace, he had become.
-The deepest shadows are thus ever kept in closest contrast to the
-highest lights; and the line of demarcation between them runs here
-along the division between body and soul. “Unhappy man that I am, who
-can liberate me from this body of sin?” “In my flesh dwelleth no good
-thing”:[117] are sayings which are both keener in their tone and more
-limited in their range than are Our Lord’s. And we have seen how, in
-one of his most depressed moods, he transiently adopts and carries
-on a specifically Platonist attitude towards the body’s relation to
-the soul, as he finds it in that beautiful, profoundly Hellenistic
-treatise, the Book of Wisdom.[118] This attitude evidently represents,
-in his strenuous and deeply Christian character, only a passing
-feeling; for, if we pressed it home, we could hardly reconcile it with
-his doctrine as to the reality and nature of the body’s resurrection.
-It is indeed clear how the Platonist, and especially the Neo-Platonist,
-mode of conceiving that relation excludes any and every kind of body
-from the soul’s final stage of purification and happiness; and how
-the Synoptic, and indeed the generally Christian conception of it,
-necessarily eliminates that keen and abiding dualism characteristic of
-the late Greek attitude.
-
-
-2. _Platonic, Synoptic, and Pauline elements in Catherine’s view._
-
-Now in Catherine we generally find an interesting combination of the
-Platonic form with the Synoptic substance and spirit: and this can, of
-course, be achieved only because that abiding form itself is made to
-signify a changed set and connection of ideas.
-
-(1) We have seen how she dwells much, Plotinus-like, upon the soul’s
-stripping itself of all its numerous garments, and exposing itself
-naked to the rays of God’s healing light. Yet in the original Platonic
-scheme these garments are put on by the soul in its descent from
-spirit into matter, and are stripped off again in its ascent back out
-of matter into spirit; in both cases, they stand for the body and its
-effects. In Catherine, even more than in Plotinus, the garments stand
-for various evil self-attachments and self-delusions of the soul;
-and against these evils and dangers the Synoptists furnish endless
-warnings. And yet she insists upon purity, clear separation, complete
-abstraction of the soul, in such terms as still to show plainly enough
-the originally Neo-Platonist provenance of much of her form; for
-in the Neo-Platonists we get, even more markedly than here, a like
-insistence upon the natural dissimilarity of the body and the soul,
-and a cognate longing to get away from it in ecstasy and death. But
-whilst in the Neo-Platonists there is, at the bottom of all this, a
-predominant belief that the senses are the primary source and occasion
-of all sin, so that sin is essentially the contamination of spirit
-by matter: in Catherine, (although she shares to the full Plotinus’s
-thirst for ecstasy, as the escape from division and trouble into unity
-and peace), impurity stands primarily for self-complacency,--belief in,
-and love of, our imaginary independence of even God Himself; and purity
-means, in the first instance, the loving Him and His whole system of
-souls and of life, and one’s own self only in and as part of that
-system.
-
-It is very instructive to note, in this connection, how, after her four
-years of directly penitential and ascetical practice, (an activity
-which, even then, extended quite as much to matters of decentralization
-of the self as of bodily mortification), her warfare is, in the first
-instance, all but exclusively directed against the successive refuges
-and ambushes of self-complacency and self-centredness. Thus there is
-significance in the secondary place occupied, (even in the _Vita_, and
-doubtless still more in her own mind), by the question of continence;
-indeed her great declaration to the Friar indicates plainly her
-profound concentration upon the continuous practice of, and growth in,
-Love Divine, and her comparative indifference to the question of the
-systematic renunciation of anything but sin and selfish attachments and
-self-centrednesses of any kind. Her conception of sinners as “cold,”
-even more than as dark or stained; of God as Fire, even more than
-as Light; and of purity as indefinitely increasable, since Love can
-grow on and on: all similarly point to this finely positive, flame-,
-not snow-conception, in which purity has ceased to be primarily, as
-with the Greeks, a simple absence of soiledness, even if it be moral
-soiledness, and has become, as with the Synoptic teaching, something
-primarily positive, love itself.
-
-In her occasionally intense insistence upon herself as being all evil,
-a very Devil, and in some of her picturings of her interior combat,
-we get, on the other hand, echoes, not of Plato, nor again of the
-Synoptist teaching, but of St. Paul’s “in my flesh there dwelleth no
-good thing,” and of his combat between flesh and spirit.--Yet the evil
-which she is thus conscious of, is not sensual nor even sensible evil
-and temptation, but consists in her unbounded natural claimfulness and
-intense inclination to sensitive self-absorption.--And this gives,
-indeed, to these feminine echoes of St. Paul a certain thin shrillness
-which the original tones have not got, standing there for the massive
-experiences of a man violently solicitated by both sense and spirit.
-But it leaves her free to note, as regards the flesh, the whole bodily
-organism, (and this in beautiful sympathy with Our Lord’s own genially
-fervent, homely heroic spirit), not its wickedness, but its weakness,
-its short-livedness, and its appeal for merciful allowance to God,
-“Who knows that we are dust.” Instead of a direct and pointed dualism
-of two distinct substances informed by all but incurably antagonistic
-principles, we thus get a direct conflict between two dispositions of
-the soul, and a but imperfect correspondence between the body and that
-soul.
-
-(2) There is, indeed, no doubt that the very ancient association of the
-ideas of Fire and of spiritual Purification goes back, in the first
-instance, to the conception of the soul being necessarily stained by
-the very fact of its connection with the body, and of those stains
-being finally removed by the body’s death and cremation. We find
-this severely self-consistent view scattered up and down Hellenic
-religion and literature.[119] And even in Catherine the fire, a sense
-of fever-heat, still seizes the body, and this body wastes away,
-and leaves the soul more and more pure, during those last years of
-illness.--Yet the striking identity, between that old cluster of ideas
-and her own forms of thought, brings out, all the more clearly, the
-immense road traversed by spirituality between the substance of those
-ideas and the essence of this thought. For in her teaching, which
-is but symbolized or at most occasioned by those physico-psychical
-fever-heats, the Fire is, at bottom, so spiritual and so directly
-busy with the soul alone, that it is ever identical with itself in
-Heaven, Hell, Purgatory, and on earth, and stands for God Himself; and
-that its effects are not the destruction of a foreign substance, but
-the bringing back, wherever and as far as possible, of the fire-like
-soul’s disposition and quality to full harmony with its Fire-source and
-Parent, God Himself.
-
-(3) Only the Prison-house simile for the body, as essentially an
-earthly purgatory for the soul, must be admitted, I think, to remain
-a primarily Platonic, not fully Christianizable conception; just as
-the absence of all reference by her to the resurrection of the body
-will have been, in part, occasioned by the strong element of Platonism
-in her general selection and combination of ideas. Yet it would
-obviously be unfair to press these two points too much, since, as to
-the resurrection, her long illness and evidently constant physical
-discomfort must, even of themselves, have disinclined her to all
-picturing of an abiding, even though highly spiritualized, bodily
-organization; and as to the likeness of her body to a prison and
-purgatory of the soul, we are expressly told that it began only with
-the specially suffering last part of her life.
-
-
-3. _Dualism pragmatic, not final. Its limits._
-
-Now, for this whole matter of the right conception as to the relations
-of body and soul, it is clear that any more than partial and
-increasingly superable antagonism between body and spirit cannot be
-accepted.
-
-(1) A final Dualism is unsound in Psychology, since all the first
-materials, stimulations, and instruments for even our most abstract
-thinking are supplied to us by our sense-perceptions, hence also
-through the body. It is narrow in Cosmology, for we do not want to
-isolate man in this great universe of visible things; and his link
-with animal- and plant-life, and even with the mineral creation, is,
-increasingly as we descend in the scale of beings, his body. It is
-ruinous for Ethics, because purity, in such a physical-spiritual being
-as is man, consists precisely in spiritual standards and laws extending
-to and transforming his merely physical inclinations. It is directly
-contradictory of the central truth and temper of Christianity, since
-these require a full acceptance of the substantial goodness and the
-thorough sanctifiableness of man’s body; of God’s condescension to
-man’s whole physico-spiritual organism; and of the persistence or
-reanimation of all that is essential to man’s true personality across
-and after death. And it is, at bottom, profoundly un-Catholic; the
-whole Sacramental system, the entire deep and noble conception of the
-normal relations between the Invisible and the Visible being throughout
-of the Incarnational type,--an action of the one in the other, which
-develops the agent and subject at the same time that it spiritualizes
-the patient, the object, is in direct conflict with it. Neo-Platonism
-came more and more to treat the body and the entire visible creation
-as an intrinsic obstacle to spirit, to be eliminated by the latter as
-completely as possible; at least this very prominent strain within it
-was undoubtedly pushed on to this extreme by the Gnostic sects. But
-Christianity has ever to come back to its central presupposition--the
-substantial goodness and spiritual utility and transfigurableness of
-body and matter; and to its final end,--the actual transformation of
-them by the spirit into ever more adequate instruments, materials, and
-expressions of abiding ethical and religious values and realities.
-
-(2) The fact is that here, as practically at every chief turning-point
-in ethical and religious philosophy, the movement of the specifically
-Christian life and conviction is not a circle round a single
-centre,--detachment; but an ellipse round two centres,--detachment and
-attachment. And precisely in this difficult, but immensely fruitful,
-oscillation and rhythm between, as it were, the two poles of the
-spiritual life; in this fleeing and seeking, in the recollection back
-and away from the visible (so as to allay the dust and fever of growing
-distraction, and to reharmonize the soul and its new gains according
-to the intrinsic requirements and ideals of the spirit), and in the
-subsequent, renewed immersion in the visible, (in view both of gaining
-fresh concrete stimulation and content for the spiritual life, and of
-gradually shaping and permeating the visible according to and with
-spiritual ends and forces): in this combination, and not in either
-of these two movements taken alone, consists the completeness and
-culmination of Christianity.[120]
-
-(3) It no doubt looks, at first sight, as though the Church, by her
-canonization of the Monastic Ideal, gave us, for the ultimate pattern
-and measure of all Christian perfection, as pure and simple a flight of
-the soul from the body and the world, as (short of insanity or suicide)
-can be made in this life. But here we have to remember three things.
-
-In the first place, the Church not only forbids all attacks upon
-the legitimacy, indeed sanctity of marriage, or upon its necessity,
-indeed duty, for mankind at large; but St. Augustine and St. Thomas
-only articulate her ordinary, strenuously anti-Manichean teaching,
-in declaring that man was originally created by God, in body and in
-soul, not for celibacy but for marriage; and that only owing to the
-accidental event of the Fall and of its effects,--the introduction of
-disorder and excess into human nature, but not any corruption of its
-substance and foundations,--does any inferiority,--the dispositions,
-motives, and circumstances being equal,--attach to marriage as compared
-with virginity.[121] Hence, still, the absolute ideal would be that man
-could and did use marriage as all other legitimate functions and things
-of sense, as a necessary, and ever more and more perfected, means and
-expression of truly human spirituality, a spirituality which ever
-requires some non-spiritual material in which to work, and by working
-in which the soul itself, not only spiritualizes it, but increasingly
-develops its own self.
-
-And secondly, detachment, unification, spiritual recollection is the
-more difficult, and the less obviously necessary, of the two movements,
-and yet is precisely the one which (by coming upon the extant or
-inchoate attachments, and by suppressing or purifying them according
-as they are bad or good) first stamps any and every life as definitely
-religious at all. No wonder, then, that it is this sacred detachment
-and love of the Cross that we notice, first of all, in the life and
-doctrine of Our Lord and of all His followers, indeed in all truly
-religious souls throughout the world; and that the Church should, by
-her teaching and selection of striking examples, ever preach and uphold
-this most necessary test and ingredient, this very salt of all virile
-and fruitful spirituality.
-
-But, in the third place, a man need only directly attack the family,
-society, the state; or art, literature, science,--as intrinsically
-evil or even as, in practice, true hindrances to moral and religious
-perfection,--and the Church,--both the learning and experimenting,
-and the official and formulating Church,--will at once disavow him:
-so strong is, at bottom, the instinct that attachment and variety
-of interests,--variety both in kind and in degree--that materials,
-occasions, and objects for spirituality to leaven and to raise, and to
-work on in order to be itself deepened and developed,--are as truly
-essential to the spiritual life as are detachment, and unity, and
-transcendence of ultimate motive and aim; these latter furnishing to
-the soul the power gradually to penetrate all that material, and, in
-and through this labour, more and more to articulate its own spiritual
-character.
-
-(4) No man can become, or is proclaimed to have become, a Christian
-saint, who has not thus achieved a profound spiritualization and
-unification of a more or less recalcitrant material and multiplicity.
-In some cases, it is the unity and detachment that greatly predominate
-over the multiplicity and attachment,--as, say, in the Fathers of the
-Desert. In other cases, it is the variety and attachment that strikes
-us first of all,--as, for instance, in Sir Thomas More and Edmund
-Campion. And, in a third set of cases, it is the depth of the unity and
-detachment, in the breath of the variety and attachment, which is the
-dominant characteristic, so with St. Paul and St. Augustine. Catherine
-herself belongs, for her great middle period, rather to the third
-group than to either of the other two; only during her penitential
-period and her last long illness does she clearly belong to the group
-of intensely detached and unified saints.--It is evidently impossible
-in such a matter to do more than insist upon the necessity of both
-movements; upon the immensely fruitful friction and tension which
-their well-ordered alternation introduces into the soul’s inner life;
-and upon the full ideal and ultimate measure for the complete and
-perfected man, humanity at large, being a maximum of multiplicity and
-attachment permeated and purified by a maximum of unity and detachment.
-The life which can englobe and organize both these movements, with
-their manifold interaction, will have a multitude of warm attachments,
-without fever or distraction, and a great unity of pure detachment,
-without coldness or emptiness: it will have the, winning because rich,
-simplicity and wondrous combination of apparent inevitableness and of
-seeming paradox furnished by all true life, hence exhibited in its
-greatest fulness by the religious life which, at its deepest, is deeper
-any other kind of life.
-
-
-III. QUIETUDE AND PASSIVITY. POINTS IN THIS TENDENCY TO BE CONSIDERED
-HERE.
-
-We have inevitably somewhat anticipated another matter, in which
-Catherine shows all the true Mystic’s affinities: the craving for
-simplification and permanence of the soul’s states,--her practice
-and teaching as to Quietude and Passivity. Pushed fully home, this
-tendency involves four closely related, increasingly profound,
-convictions and experiences. Utter unification of the soul’s functions,
-indeed utter unity of its substance: _i.e._ the soul does one single
-thing, and seems to do it by one single act; itself is simply one, and
-expresses itself by one sole act. Passivity of the soul: _i.e._ the
-soul does not apparently act at all, it simply _is_ and receives--it
-is now nothing but one pure immense recipiency. Immediacy of contact
-between the soul and God: _i.e._ there seems to be nothing separating,
-or indeed in any way between, the soul and God. And, finally, an
-apparent coalescence of the soul and God: _i.e._ the soul _is_ God, and
-God _is_ the soul.--Only the first two points, and then the closely
-related question of Pure Love, shall occupy us here; the last two
-points must stand over for our penultimate chapter.
-
-
-1. _Distinction between experiences, their expression, and their
-analysis._
-
-We have already studied the psycho-physical occasions, concomitants,
-and embodiments of Catherine’s keen desire for, and profound experience
-of, spiritual unification and passivity; and we can have no kind of
-doubt as to the factual reality and the practical fruitfulness of the
-state so vividly described by her. Here we have only to inquire into
-the accuracy of the analysis and terminology effected and employed by
-her, in so far as they seem to claim more than simply to describe the
-soul’s own feeling and impression as to these states thus experienced
-by itself. We have then to consider the nature and truth of what can
-roughly be styled Quietism and Passivity.
-
-Now here especially will it be necessary for us carefully to
-distinguish between the direct experiences, impressions, and
-instinctive requirements of the soul,--here all souls, in precise
-proportion to their depth and delicacy of holiness and of
-self-knowledge are our masters, and furnish us with our only materials
-and tests; and, on the other hand, the implications and analysis of
-these states, as, in the first instance, psychological, and then as
-requiring elucidation with regard to their ontological cause and
-reality by means of a religious philosophy,--here, psychology, and
-religious philosophy, especially also the discriminations and decisions
-of theologians and Church authorities as expressive of these ultimate
-questions, will be our guides.[122]
-
-(1) If we start from the history of the nomenclature which, (though
-present only partially in Catherine’s sayings, for she nowhere uses the
-term “passivity”), runs, with however varying a completeness, right
-through the Christian Mystics more or less from the first, we shall
-find that it consists, roughly, of three stages, and, throughout,
-of two currents. There is the Pre-Pauline and Pre-Philonian stage;
-the stage of Paul, Philo, and John, through Clement and Origen,
-on to Gregory of Nyssa and St. Augustine; and the stage from the
-Pseudo-Dionysius onward, down to Nicolas of Coes inclusive, and which,
-to this hour, still largely influences us all.--And there are the two
-currents. The one tends so to emphasize the sense and reality of the
-soul’s simple receptivity, and of what the soul receives at such,
-apparently, purely receptive times, as to ignore, or even practically
-deny, the undeniable fact that this very receptivity is, inevitably,
-an act of its own. Its decisive terms are Passivity, Fixedness,
-Oneness. The other current realizes that Grace does not destroy,
-violate, or supplant Nature, either entirely or in part, but that it
-awakens, purifies, and completes it, so that every divine influx is
-also ever a stimulation of all the good and true energy already, even
-though latently, present in the soul. And its characteristic terms are
-“Action” (as distinguished from “Activity”), Growth, Harmony.
-
-(2) And we should note with care that these two currents are not simply
-Heathen and Christian respectively. For if that great, indeed all but
-central, term and conception of “Action” has been wisely generalized
-by most Christian Mystics, as the truly Christian substitute for the
-strongly Neo-Platonist term “Passivity”: that term and conception of
-“Action” was first fixed and elucidated by Aristotle, who, as Mr.
-Schiller well puts it, “has packed into his technical term ‘Energeia,’
-and especially into the combination ‘Unmoving Energy,’ all that
-was most distinctive, most original, most fundamental, and most
-profound in his philosophy”;[123] whilst the second term, “Passivity,”
-goes on figuring in Christian Mystics and Mystical Theologies--(in
-spite of its demonstrably dangerous suggestions and frequently
-scandalous history)--because the religious, especially the Christian,
-consciousness requires a term for the expression of one element of all
-its deepest experiences, that character of “giveness” and of grace, of
-merciful anticipation by God, which marks all such states, in exact
-proportion to their depth and to the soul’s awakeness.
-
-(3) Now Aristotle’s conception of God’s Unmoving Energy, is taken over
-by St. Thomas in the form of God being One Actus Purus,--sheer Energy,
-His very peace and stillness coming from the brimming fulness of His
-infinite life. And even finite spirit, whilst fully retaining, indeed
-deepening, its own character, can and does penetrate finite spirit
-through and through,--the law of Physics, which does not admit more
-than one body in any one place, having here no kind of application,--so
-that the Infinite Spirit is at once conceived unspiritually, if He
-is conceived as supplanting, and not as penetrating, stimulating,
-and transforming the finite spirits whom He made into an increasing
-likeness to Him, their Maker. And hence according to the unanimous
-teaching of the most experienced and explicit of the specifically
-Theistic and Christian Mystics, the appearance, the soul’s own
-impression, of a cessation of life and energy of the soul in periods
-of special union with God or of great advance in spirituality, is an
-appearance only. Indeed this, at such times strong, impression of rest
-springs most certainly from an unusually large amount of actualized
-energy, an energy which is now penetrating, and finding expression
-by, every pore and fibre of the soul. The whole moral and spiritual
-creature expands and rests, yes; but this very rest is produced by
-Action “unperceived because so fleet,” so near, so all fulfilling; or
-rather by a tissue of single acts, mental, emotional, volitional, so
-finely interwoven, so exceptionally stimulative and expressive of the
-soul’s deepest aspirations, that these acts are not perceived as so
-many single acts, indeed that their very collective presence is apt to
-remain unnoticed by the soul itself.
-
-(4) Close parallels to such a state are abundant in all phases and
-directions of the soul’s life. The happiest and most fruitful moments
-for our aesthetic sense, those in which our mind expands most and
-grows most, hence is most active in aesthetic “action” (though not
-“activity”) are those in which we are unforcedly and massively absorbed
-in drinking in, with a quiet intentness, the contrasts and harmonies,
-the grand unity in variety, the very presence and spirit of an alpine
-upland, or of a river’s flowing, or of the ocean’s outspread, or of
-the Parthenon sculptures or of Rafael’s madonnas. At such moments
-we altogether cease to be directly conscious of ourselves, of time
-or of the body’s whereabouts; and when we return to our ordinary
-psychical and mental condition, we do so with an undeniable sense
-of added strength and youthfulness,--somewhat as though our face,
-old and haggard, were, after gazing in utter self-oblivion upon some
-resplendent youthfulness, to feel, beyond all doubt, all its many
-wrinkles to have gone. And so too with the mind’s absorption in some
-great poem or philosophy or character.--In all these cases, the mind or
-soul energizes and develops, in precise proportion as it is so absorbed
-in the contemplation of these various over-againstnesses, these
-“countries” of the spirit, as to cease to notice its own overflowing
-action. It is only when the mind but partially attends that a part of
-it remains at leisure to note the attention of the other part; when
-the mind is fully engrossed, and hence most keenly active, there is no
-part of it sufficiently disengaged to note the fact of the engrossment
-and action of, now, the whole mind. And, with the direct consciousness
-of our mind’s action, we lose, for the time being, all clear
-consciousness of the mind’s very existence. And let it be carefully
-noted, this absence of the direct consciousness of the self is as
-truly characteristic of the deepest, most creative, moments of full
-external action: the degree of mind and will-force operating in Nelson
-at Trafalgar and in Napoleon at Waterloo, or again in St. Ignatius
-of Antioch in the Amphitheatre, and in Savonarola at the stake, was
-evidently in the precisely contrary ratio to their direct consciousness
-of it or of themselves at all.
-
-
-(5) Now if such “Passivity,” or Action, is in reality the condition
-in which the soul attains to its fullest energizing, we can argue
-back, from this universal principle, to the nature of the various
-stages and kinds of the Prayer and States of Quiet. In each case, that
-is, we shall combat the still very common conception that,--though
-orthodoxy, it is admitted, requires _some_ human action to remain
-throughout,--such Prayer and States consist (not only as to the
-immediate feeling of their subjects, but in reality and in their
-ultimate analysis) in an ever-increasing preponderance of divine action
-within the soul, and an ever-decreasing remnant of acts of the soul
-itself. For such a view assumes that God supplants man, and that, so
-to speak, His Hand appears unclothed alongside of the tissue woven by
-man’s own mind; whereas God everywhere but stimulates and supports man
-whom He has made, and His Hand moves ever underneath and behind the
-tissue,--a tissue which, at best, can become as it were a glove, and
-suggest the latent hand. The Divine Action will thus stimulate and
-inform the human action somewhat like the force that drives the blood
-within the stag’s young antlers, or like the energy that pushes the
-tender sap-full fern-buds up through the hard, heavy ground.
-
-Thus a special intensity of divine help and presence, and an unusual
-degree of holiness and of union, have nothing to do with the fewness
-of the soul’s own acts at such times, but with their quality,--with
-the preponderance amongst them of divinely informed acts as against
-merely natural, or wrongly self-seeking, or downrightly sinful acts.
-And since it is certain that living simplicity is but the harmony and
-unification, the synthesis, of an organism, and hence is great in
-precise proportion to the greater perfection of that synthesis, it
-follows that the living, utterly one-seeming Action or State will,
-at such times, contain a maximum number of interpenetrating acts and
-energies, all worked up into this harmonious whole.
-
-
-2. _Four causes of inadequate analysis._
-
-It is plain, I think, that one thoroughly normal, one accidental, and
-two mischievous, causes have all conspired to arrest or to deflect the
-analysis of most of the Mystics themselves concerning Simplicity.
-
-For one thing, the soul, as has just been shown, at such moments of
-harmonious concentration and of willing and thinking in union with
-God’s Light and Will, necessarily ceases, more or less, to be conscious
-of its own operations, and, in looking back, braced and rested as it
-now is, it cannot but think that it either did not act at all, or that
-its action was reduced to a minimum. For how otherwise could it now
-feel so rested, when, after its ordinary activity, it feels so tired
-and dissatisfied? and how otherwise could it be so unable to give
-any clear account of what happened in those minutes of union? Yet it
-is, on the contrary, the very fulness of the action which has rested,
-by expanding, the soul; and which has made the soul, returned to its
-ordinary distractedness, incapable of clearly explaining that, now
-past, concentration.
-
-The accidental cause has been the fairly frequent, though not
-necessary, connection of the more pronounced instances of such habits
-of mind with more or less of the psycho-physical phenomena of ecstasy,
-in the technical sense of the word. For, in such trances, the breathing
-and circulation are retarded, and the operation of the senses is in
-part suspended. And it was easy to reason, from such visible, literal
-simplification of the physical life, to a similar modification of
-the soul’s action at such times; and, from the assumed desirableness
-of that psycho-physical condition, to the advantage of the supposed
-corresponding state of the soul itself. Any tendency to an extreme
-dualism, as to the relations between body and soul, would thus
-directly help on an inclination to downright Quietism.--Here it is,
-on the contrary, certain that only in so far as those psycho-physical
-simplifications are the results of, or conditions for, a deepening
-multiplicity in unity, a fuller synthetic action of the soul, or,
-at least, of a fuller penetration by the soul of even one limited
-experience or idea--an operation which entails not less, but more,
-energizing of the soul,--are such psycho-physical simplifications of
-any spiritual advantage or significance. And in such cases they could
-not be indications of the cessation or diminution of the deepest and
-most docile energizing of the soul.
-
-And the mischievous causes were a mistake in Psychology and a mistake
-in Theology. For, as to Psychology, not only was simplicity assumed,
-(through a mistaken acceptance of the soul’s own feeling, as furnishing
-the ultimate analysis of its state), to consist, at any one moment,
-of an act materially and literally one, instead of a great organism
-of various simultaneous energizings; but this one act was often
-held to require no kind of repetition. Since the act was one as
-against any simultaneous multiplicity, so was it one as against any
-successive multiplicity, even if this latter were taken as a repetition
-differentiated by number alone. And yet here again energizing _is_
-energizing; and though the soul’s acts overlap and interpenetrate
-each other, and though when, by their number and harmony, they
-completely fill and pacify the soul, many of them are simultaneously
-or successively present to the soul in their effects alone: it is
-nevertheless the renewal, however peaceful and unperceived, of these
-acts, which keeps the state of soul in existence. For these acts are
-not simply unowned acts that happen to be present within the soul; they
-are the soul’s own acts, whether, in addition, the soul is directly
-conscious of them or not.
-
-And, theologically, the idea was often at work that it was more
-worthy of God to operate alone and, as it were, _in vacuo_; and more
-creaturely of man to make, or try to make, such a void for Him. Yet
-this is in direct conflict with the fundamental Christian doctrine,
-of the Condescension, the Incarnation of God to and in human nature,
-and of the persistence, and elevation of this humanity, even in the
-case of Christ Himself. God’s action does not keep outside of, nor
-does it replace, man’s action; but it is,--Our Lord Himself has told
-us,--that of yeast working in meal, which manifests its hidden power in
-proportion to the mass of meal which it penetrates and transforms.
-
-
-3. _Four Quietistic aberrations._
-
-Now it is certain that the error of Quietism has, in no doubt many
-cases, not remained confined to such mistakes in psychological analysis
-and theological doctrine, but that these have joined hands with, and
-have furnished a defence to, sloth and love of dreamy ease, or to some
-impatience of the necessary details of life, or to fanatical attachment
-to some one mood and form of experience; and that they have, thus
-reinforced, ravaged not a few wills and souls.
-
-Four chief Quietistic aberrations can be studied in history.
-
-(1) The neglect or even contempt of vocal prayer, and of the historical
-and institutional elements of religion, at least in the case of
-more advanced souls, is one of these abuses.--Now it is true, and
-Catherine has been a striking instance, that the proportion of all
-these different elements towards one another vary, and should vary,
-considerably between soul and soul, according to the _attrait_ and
-degree of advance of each; that the soul’s most solid advance is in the
-direction of an ever-deepened spiritual devotedness, and not in that of
-a multiplication of particular devotions; that the use of even the more
-central of those elements and means may, for souls called to the prayer
-of Quiet, become remarkably elastic and largely unmethodized; and that,
-for such souls (and, in various degrees and ways, sooner or latter, for
-perhaps most other souls), a prayer of peacefully humble expectation
-and of all but inarticulate, practically indescribable, brooding of
-love, and of dim, expansive trust and conformity is possible, sometimes
-alone possible, and is proved right and useful, if it leaves them
-strengthened to act and to suffer, to help and to devote themselves to
-their fellows, to Christ, and to God.
-
-But it remains equally true, even for these as for all other souls,
-that the historical and institutional elements must ever remain
-represented, and sufficiently represented; indeed the persistence in
-these elements of religion will be one of the chief means for avoiding
-delusion. We have St. Teresa’s experience and teaching here, as a truly
-classical instance. And if the prayer of Quiet will give a special
-colour, depth, and unity to those more contingent-seeming practices,
-these practices will, in return, give a particular definiteness,
-content, and creaturely quality to that prayer. And thus too the
-universally and profoundly important union and interchange with souls
-of other, equally legitimate, kinds and degrees of spirituality will
-be kept up. Only the sum-total of all these souls, only the complete
-invisible Church, is the full Bride of Christ; and though the souls
-composing her may and should each contribute a varying predominance of
-different elements, no soul should be entirely without a certain amount
-of each of these constituents.
-
-(2) Another abuse is the neglect, contempt, or misapplied fear
-of not directly religious occupations and labours which, however
-otherwise appropriate or even necessary to this soul’s growth and
-destination, tend to disturb its quiet and to absorb a part of its
-time and attention. Here it is doubtless true that the other elements
-of religion are also all more or less apprehensive and jealous with
-regard to actual, or even only possible, non-religious rival interests.
-And it is certain that they are all right in so far as that a certain
-interior leisureliness and recollection, a certain ultimate preference
-for the spiritualizing religious force of the soul as against the
-materials, non-religious and other, which that force is to penetrate,
-are necessary to the soul that would advance.
-
-But the fear that characterizes the Historical and Institutional
-elements is rather a fear, respectively, of error and of disobedience
-and singularity, whereas on the part of the Mystical element it is a
-fear of distraction and absorption away from the _Unum Necessarium_ of
-the soul. Perhaps even among the Canonized Mystics there is none that
-has more impressively warned us, both by word and example, against
-this insidious danger, than the distinguished Platonist scholar and
-deep spiritual writer, Père Jean Nicolas Grou, who, right through the
-long mystical period of his life, alternated his prayer of Quiet with
-extensive and vigorous critical work on the Graeco-Latin classics,
-and whose practice only wants further expansion and application,
-(according to the largely increased or changed conditions of such not
-directly religious work), in order to bear much fruit, not only for
-criticism and science, but, (by the return-effect of such occupations
-upon the soul’s general temper and particular devotional habits), for
-spirituality itself. But we must return to this point more fully in our
-last chapter.
-
-(3) The third abuse is the neglect or contempt of morality, especially
-on its social, visible, and physical sides. Particular Mystics, and
-even whole Mystical schools and movements, have undoubtedly in some
-instances, and have, possibly, in many more cases, been maligned on
-this point, since even such a spotless life as Fénelon’s, and that of
-such a profoundly well-intentioned woman as Madame Guyon, did not,
-for a time, escape the most unjust suspicions. It is also true that,
-as a man advances in spirituality, he lays increasing stress upon the
-intention and general attitude of the agent, and increasingly requires
-to be judged by the same interior standard, if he is to be rightly
-understood at all. God may and does, to humble and purify him, allow
-painful temptations and trials from within to combine, apparently,
-against him, with persecutions and much isolation from without. And
-the difference, rather than the similarity, between Religion and
-Morality,--the sense of pure grace, of free pardon, of the strange
-profound “givenness” of even our fullest willings and of our most
-emphatically personal achievements,--can and should grow in him more
-and more.
-
-And yet it is clear that there must have been some fire to account
-for all that smoke of accusation; that the material and the effect
-outwards, the _body_ of an action, do matter, as well as does that
-action’s _spirit_; that this body does not only act thus outwards,
-but also inwards, back upon the spirit of the act and of the agent;
-and that temptations and trials are purifying, not by their simple
-presence but in proportion as they are resisted, or, if they have been
-yielded to, in proportion as such defeats are sincerely deplored and
-renounced. Thus everywhere the full development of any one part of
-life, and the true unity of the whole, have to be achieved through the
-gradual assimilation of at first largely recalcitrant other elements,
-and within an ever-abiding multiplicity--a maximum number of parts and
-functions interacting within one great organism. And hence not the
-outrage, neglect, or supersession of morality, but, on the contrary,
-its deeper development, by more precise differentiation from, and more
-organic integration into, religion proper, must, here again and here
-above all, be the final aim. Once more again it is the Incarnational
-type which is the only fully true, the only genuinely Christian one.
-
-(4) And, finally, there are certain hardly classifiable fanaticisms,
-which are nevertheless a strictly logical consequence from a wrongly
-understood Quiet and Passivity,--from Quietism in its unfavourable,
-condemned sense. I am thinking of such a case as that of Margarethe
-Peters, a young Quietist, who caused herself to be crucified by her
-girl-companions, at Wildenspuch, near Schaffhausen, in 1823,--in order
-to carry out, in full literalness and separateness, the utmost and
-most painful passivity and dependence and resistless self-donation, in
-direct imitation of the culminating act of Christ’s life on earth and
-of His truest followers.[124] Here, in the deliberate suicide of this
-undoubtedly noble Lutheran girl, we get an act which but brings out
-the strength and weakness of Quietism wherever found. For the greatest
-constituents of the Christian spirit are undoubtedly there: free
-self-sacrifice, impelled by love of God, of Christ, and of all men,
-and by hatred of self.--Yet, because they here suppress other, equally
-necessary, constituents, and are out of their proper context and bereft
-of their proper checks, they but render possible and actual a deed of
-piteous self-delusion. How terrible is false simplification, the short
-cut taken by pure logic, operating without a sufficient induction from
-facts, and within an ardent, self-immolating temperament!
-
-
-4. _Rome’s condemnation of Quietism._
-
-All this is abundantly sufficient to explain and justify Rome’s
-condemnation of Quietism. The term “Quietists” appears, I think, for
-the first time,--at least in an invidious sense,--in the Letter which
-Cardinal Caraccioli, Archbishop of Naples, addressed to Pope Innocent
-XI (Odescalchi) on June 30, 1682, and in which he graphically describes
-the abuses which, (under pretext or through the misapplication of
-spiritual Quiet and Passivity), had now appeared in his Diocese: souls
-apparently incapable of using their beads or making the sign of the
-Cross; or which will neither say a vocal prayer nor go to Confession;
-or which, when in this prayer of Quiet, even when at Holy Communion,
-will strive to drive away any image, even of Our Lord Himself, that may
-present itself to their imagination; or which tear down a Crucifix, as
-a hindrance to union with God; or which look upon all the thoughts that
-come to them in the quietude of prayer, as so many rays and effluences
-from God Himself, exempting them henceforth from every law.[125]
-
-Yet it is important to bear well in mind, the special circumstances,
-the admitted limits, and the probable signification of Rome’s
-condemnations.
-
-(1) As to the circumstances of the time, it appears certain that it was
-the ready circulation of the doctrines of the Spanish priest, Miguel de
-Molinos in the _Guida Spirituale_, 1675, and the abuses of the kind we
-have just now detailed, and that sprang from this circulation, which
-formed the primary reason and motive for the otherwise excessively
-severe treatment of a man and a book, which had both received the very
-highest and the most deliberate ecclesiastical approbations. That these
-two circumstances were the determining causes of at least the severity
-of his condemnation is well brought out by the circumstance that,
-during his two years’ trial (1685-1687), not only the short _Guida_ but
-his whole obtainable correspondence (some twenty thousand letters) were
-examined, and that it is at least as much on such occasional manuscript
-material, and on Molinos’s own oral admissions,--in prison and
-doubtless, in part at least, under torture,--that the condemnation was
-based, containing, as it does, certain revoltingly immoral propositions
-and confessions, admittedly absent from his published writings.
-
-But if at least some shadow of doubt rests upon the moral character
-of Molinos, not a shadow of such suspicion or of doubt concerning his
-perfectly Catholic intentions can, in justice, be allowed to rest
-upon his chief follower and the most distinguished apologist for his
-doctrine, the saintly Oratorian and Bishop, the much-tried Cardinal
-Petrucci; any more than Fénelon’s moral and spiritual character, or
-deeply Catholic spirit and intentions, can, (in spite of the painfully
-fierce and unjust attack upon both by Bossuet in his formally classic
-invective, _Relation sur le Quiétisme_), for one moment be called
-in question.[126] Other admittedly deeply spiritual and entirely
-well-intentioned Catholics, whose writings were also condemned during
-this time when devotional expressions having an at all quietistic tinge
-or drift were very severely judged, are Mère Marie de l’Incarnation
-(Marie Guyard), a French Ursuline Religious, who died in Canada in
-1672, and the process of whose Beatification has been introduced; the
-saintly French layman, Jean de Bernières-Louvigny, much admired by
-Fénelon, who died in 1659; the very interior, though at times somewhat
-fantastic, Secular Priest, Henri Marie Boudon, who died in 1702; and
-the very austere but highly experienced ascetical writer, the Jesuit
-Père Joseph Surin, whom Bossuet had formally approved, and who died in
-1668.[127] But Madame Guyon herself, that much-tried and vehemently
-opposed woman, was held, by many an undoubtedly Catholic-minded,
-experienced and close observer, to be (in spite of the largely
-misleading and indeed incorrect character of many of her analyses and
-expressions) a truly saintly, entirely filial Catholic.[128]
-
-(2) As to the limits of these condemnations, we must remember that only
-two of them,--those of Molinos and of Fénelon,--claim to be directly
-doctrinal at all; and that Fénelon was never really compromised in
-the question of Quietism proper, but was condemned on questions of
-Pure Love alone. Bossuet himself was far less sound as against the
-central Quietist doctrine of the One Act, which, unless formally
-revoked, lasts on throughout life, and hence need never be repeated;
-Fénelon’s early criticism of the Molinos propositions remains one of
-the clearest extant refutations of that error. Again in the matter of
-the Passivity of advanced souls, Bossuet was distinctly less normal and
-sober than Fénelon: for whilst Fénelon taught that in no state does
-the soul lose all capacity, although the facility may greatly vary,
-to produce distinct acts of the virtues or vocal prayers and other
-partially external exercises, Bossuet taught that, in some cases, all
-capacity of this kind is abolished.[129] “I take,” says Fénelon, “the
-terms ‘Passive’ and ‘Passivity’ as they actually appear everywhere
-in the language of the (sound) Mystics, as something opposed to the
-terms ‘active’ and ‘activity’: ‘Passivity,’ taken in the sense of an
-entire inaction of the will, would be a heresy.” And he then opposes
-“Passivity,” not to “Action,” but to that “Activity,” which is a merely
-natural, restless, and hurried excitation.[130]
-
-(3) And as to the abiding significance of the whole anti-quietist
-decisions and measures, we shall do well to consider the following
-large facts. From St. Paul and St. John to Clement of Alexandria and
-Origen; from these to Dionysius the Areopagite; from the Areopagite to
-St. Bernard of Clairvaux and then the Franciscan and Dominican Mystics;
-from these, again, on to the great Renaissance and Counter-Reformation
-saints and writers of this type,--the German Cardinal Nicolas of Coes
-and the Italian St. Catherine of Genoa, the Spaniards St. Teresa and
-St. John of the Cross, and the French Saint Francis de Sales and
-Saint Jane Frances de Chantal, we get a particular type of religious
-experience and doctrine, which but unfolds and concentrates, with an
-unusual articulation, breadth, and depth, what is to be found, on
-some sides of their spiritual character and teaching, among Saints
-and religious souls of the more mixed type, such as St. Augustine,
-St. Anselm, St. Thomas of Aquin, and St. Ignatius Loyola. And this
-mixed type, bearing within it a considerable amount of that mystical
-quiet and emotional-speculative element, is again but a deepening, a
-purification and a realization of one of the profoundest affinities and
-constituents of every human heart and will.
-
-Hence, even in the thickest of the quietist controversy, when that
-mystical element must have seemed, to many, to be discredited once for
-all, those best acquainted with the rich history of the Church, and
-with the manifold requirements of the abiding religious consciousness,
-could not and did not doubt that all that was good, deep, and true
-in that element would continue to be upheld by, and represented in,
-the Church.--And it is not difficult to point to the more or less
-Mystical souls furnished by the Monks, the Friars; the Clerks-Regular,
-specially the Jesuits; the Secular Clergy; and the Laity, down to
-the present day. Such writers and Saints as Père de Caussade (_d._
-about 1770) on the one hand, and Père Jean N. Grou (_d._ 1803) and
-the Curé d’Ars (_d._ 1859) on the other hand, carry on the two
-streams of the predominantly mystical and of the mixed type,--streams
-so clearly observable before 1687 and 1699. Quietism, the doctrine
-of the One Act; Passivity in a literal sense, as the absence or
-imperfection of the power and use of initiative on the soul’s part in
-any and every state: these doctrines were finally condemned, and most
-rightly and necessarily condemned; the Prayer of Quiet, and various
-states and degrees of an ever-increasing predominance of Action over
-Activity,--an Action which is all the more the soul’s very own,
-because the more occasioned, directed, and informed by God’s action
-and stimulation,--these, and the other chief lines of the ancient
-experience and practice, remain as true, correct, and necessary as ever.
-
-
-5. _Rome’s alleged change of front._
-
-And yet it is undeniable that the Roman events between 1675 and 1688 do
-seem, at first sight, to justify the strongly Protestant Dr. Heppe’s
-contention that those twelve years,--not to speak of the later troubles
-of Madame Guyon and of Fénelon--witnessed a complete _volte face_, a
-formal self-stultification, of the Roman teaching and authority, on
-these difficult but immediately important matters.
-
-(1) Let us put aside the many passages in Molinos’s _Guida_ which
-were but (more or less) literal reproductions of the teachings
-of such solemnly approved authorities as Saints Teresa, Peter of
-Alcantara, John of the Cross, Francis de Sales and Jane Frances de
-Chantal,--passages which, of course, remained uncondemned even in
-Molinos’s pages, but which it would often be difficult to distinguish
-from the parts of his book that were censured. Yet there still remain
-such facts as the following.
-
-Juan Falconi’s _Alfabeto_ and _Lettera_ were at their Fifth Italian
-edition, 1680, and all five editions had been approved by the Master
-of the Apostolic Palace; but only in 1688 were these writings
-forbidden. Yet the _Lettera_ contains, with unsurpassed directness and
-clearness, the central doctrine of Quietism: an exhortation to the
-production of one single lively Act of Faith, which will then continue
-uninterruptedly through the whole earthly life into eternity, and
-which, consequently, is not to be repeated.[131]
-
-Molinos’s _Guida_ and _Breve Trattato_ appeared in Rome, respectively
-in 1675 and 1681, with the approbations of five theologians, four of
-whom were Consultors of the Holy Office,--the Archbishop of Reggio;
-the Minister-General of the Franciscans; the late General of the
-Carmelites; Father Martin Esparza, the same Jesuit Theologian-Professor
-of the Roman College who, some years before, had been one of those who
-had examined and approved St. Catherine’s _Vita ed Opere_; and the
-actual General of the Carmelites.[132]
-
-Even after these two writings of Molinos had been criticised by the
-Jesuits Bell Huomo and Segneri and the Clerk Regular Regio, (Segneri
-enjoying a deservedly immense reputation, and showing in this affair
-much moderation and a strong sense of the legitimate claims of
-Mysticism), the Inquisition examined these criticisms, and forbade, not
-the incriminated writings of Molinos and Petrucci, but the critique of
-Bell Huomo _donec corrigatur_, and those of Regio and of Segneri (in
-his _Lettera_ of 1681) absolutely. Segneri’s subsequent _Concordia_
-almost cost him his life, so strong was the popular veneration of
-Molinos.
-
-Molinos indeed was the guest of Pope Innocent XI himself, and the
-friend and confidant, amongst countless other spiritually-minded souls,
-of various Cardinals, especially of the deeply devout Petrucci, Bishop
-of Jesi, who was raised to the Cardinalate eighteen months after the
-beginning of Molinos’s trial. The imprisonment of Molinos began in May
-1685, but the trial did not end till August 1687, when (after nineteen
-“Principal Errors of the New Contemplation” had been censured by the
-Holy Office in February 1687) sixty-eight propositions, out of the
-two hundred and sixty-three which had been urged against him, were
-solemnly condemned: of these the clearly and directly immoral ones
-being admittedly not derived from any printed book, or indeed any ever
-published letter of his Molinos.[133]
-
-(2) To estimate Rome’s attitude (as far as it concerns the ultimate
-truth and completeness of these doctrines, taken in their most
-characteristic and explicit forms) fairly, we shall have to put aside
-all questions as to the motives that impelled, and the methods that
-were employed, by either side against the other. Molinos may have been
-even worse than the condemned propositions represent, and yet Petrucci
-would remain a saintly soul; and we certainly are driven to ask with
-Leibniz: “Si Molinos a caché du venin sous ce miel, est-il juste que
-Petrucci et autres personnes de mérite en soient responsables?”[134]
-But neither the wickedness of the one nor the sanctity of the other
-would make the doctrines propounded by them, objectively, any less
-solid or more spiritual than they are in themselves. The acutely
-anti-Roman Anglican Bishop Burnet may not have invented or exaggerated
-when he wrote from Rome, during those critical years, that one of the
-chief motives which actuated the opponents of the Quietists was the
-fact that, though the latter “were observed to become more strict in
-their lives, more retired and serious in their mental devotions, yet …
-they were not so assiduous at Mass, nor so earnest to procure Masses to
-be said for their friends: nor … so frequently either at Confession or
-in processions”: and so “the trade of those that live by these things
-was sensibly sunk.”[135] And the cruel injustice of many details and
-processes of the movement against the Quietists,--a movement which soon
-had much of the character of a popular scare and panic, in reaction
-against a previous, in part, heedless enthusiasm,--are beyond dispute
-or justification. Yet mercenary and ruthless as part of the motives and
-much of the action of the anti-quietists doubtlessly were, the question
-as to the worth and wisdom of Quietism, (taken objectively, and not as
-an excusable counter-excess but as a true synthesis of the spiritual
-life), remains precisely where it was before.
-
-(3) Now I think that two peculiarities, most difficult to notice at
-the time, seriously differentiate the Molinist movement from the great
-current of fully Catholic Mysticism, even in those points and elements
-where the two are materially alike or even identical; and yet that
-these peculiarities are but the caricature (through further emphasis
-and systematization) of certain elements present, in a more latent
-and sporadic manner, in the formulae and philosophic assumptions
-or explanations of the older Mysticism,--elements which had been
-borrowed too largely from a, at bottom, profoundly anti-incarnational
-philosophy, not to be of far less value and of much greater danger than
-the profoundly true experiences, nobly spiritual maxims, and exquisite
-psychological descriptions which that predominantly Neo-Platonist
-framework handed on.
-
-The first peculiarity is that the older Mystics, especially those of
-the type of St. Catherine of Genoa and St. John of the Cross, but
-even also those of the more “mixed” type of Mysticism, such as St.
-Teresa, had indeed quite freely used terms which are vividly true
-as descriptions of the prima facie aspect and emotional impression
-of certain states and experiences of the soul: “empty,” “fixed,”
-“motionless,” “the reason and the will have ceased to act,” “doing
-nothing,” “incapable of doing anything,” “moved by irresistible grace,”
-“but one act,” “one single desire”: these and equivalent expressions
-occur again and again. But these sayings do not here lead up to such a
-deliberate and exclusive rule as is that given by Falconi, and repeated
-by Molinos in his _Guida_, Nos. 103-106.[136]
-
-This doctrine of the One Act, in this its negative form,--for it
-is not to be repeated,--and in its application to the whole waking
-and sleeping life, is first an exclusive concentration upon, and
-then a wholesale extension of, one out of the several trends of the
-older teaching, a doctrine which, compared with that teaching in its
-completeness, is thin and doctrinaire, and as untrue to the full
-psychological explanation and working requirements of the soul as it
-is readily abusable in practice and contrary to the Incarnational type
-of religion. It is impossible not to feel that the manifold great
-ocean-waters of life, that the diversely blowing winds of God’s Spirit
-are here, somehow, expected to flow and breathe in a little shortcut,
-single channel, through a tiny pipe; one more infallible recipe or
-prescription is here offered to us, hardly more adequate than the many
-similar “sure” roads to salvation, declared by this or that body of
-devout religionists to attach to the practice or possession of this or
-that particular prayer or particular religious object.
-
-And the second difference is that the older Catholic Mystics leave
-less the impression that the external side of religion, its _body_,
-is of little or no importance, and indeed very readily an obstacle to
-its interior side, its _soul_. And this, again, for the simple reason
-that their teaching is, in general, less systematic and pointed, more
-incidental, and careless of much self-consistency.
-
-(4) Yet these two differences have largely sprung from the simple
-pressing and further extension of precisely the least satisfactory, the
-explanatory and systematic side,--the form as against the content,--of
-the older Mystics. For once the more specifically Neo-Platonist
-constituent, in those Mystics’ explanation and systematization, was
-isolated from the elements of other provenance which there had kept it
-in check, and now became, as it were, hypostasized and self-sufficient,
-this constituent could not but reveal, more clearly than before, its
-inadequacy as a form for the intensely organic and “incarnational”
-spiritual realities and processes which it attempted to show forth.
-That Neo-Platonist constituent, always present in those ancient
-Mystics, had ever tended to conceive the soul’s unity, at any one
-moment, as a something outside of all multiplicity whatsoever. Hence
-this character of the simultaneous unity had only to be extended to
-the successive unity,--and the literally One Act, as in the present so
-throughout the future, became a necessary postulate.
-
-And that same constituent had, even in those great teachers of
-profound maxims, exquisite religious psychology, and noblest living,
-tended, (however efficaciously checked by all this their Christian
-experience and by certain specifically Platonist and Aristotelian
-elements of their philosophy), towards depreciating the necessity,
-importance, indeed even the preponderant utility, of the External,
-Contingent, Historical and Institutional, and of the interchange, the
-inter-stimulation between these sides and expressions of religion and
-its internal centre and spirit.
-
-Perhaps, amongst all the great ecclesiastically authorized Mystics of
-that past, the then most recent of them all, St. John of the Cross,
-comes, by his (theoretically continuous though in his practice by no
-means exclusive) insistence upon the abstractive and universal, the
-obscure and invisible, the self-despoiling and simplifying element and
-movement, nearest to an exclusion of the other element and movement.
-Indeed the Quietists’ generally strong insistence upon the necessity
-of a Director and upon Frequent Communion gives their teaching, when
-taken in its completeness, a prima facie greater Institutionalism than
-is offered by the spiritual theory of the great Spaniard. Yet if, even
-in him, one misses, in his theoretical system, a sufficiently organic
-necessity for the outgoing movement, a movement begun by God Himself,
-and which cannot but be of fundamental importance and influence for
-believers in the Incarnation, there is as complete an absence of the
-doctrinaire One-Act recipe for perfection as in the most Historical and
-Institutional of Christian teachers. But more about this hereafter.
-
-
-6. _Four needs recognised by Quietism._
-
-Quietism, then, has undoubtedly isolated and further exaggerated
-certain explanatory elements of the older Mysticism which, even there,
-were largely a weakness and not a strength; has thus underrated and
-starved the Particular, Visible, Historical, Institutional constituents
-of Religion; and has, indeed, misunderstood the nature of true Unity
-everywhere. Yet the very eagerness with which it was welcomed at
-the time,--in France and Italy especially,--and this, not only as a
-fashion by the _Quidnuncs_, but as so much spiritual food and life by
-many a deeply religious soul; and the difficulty, and not infrequent
-ruthlessness of its suppression, indicate plainly enough that, with
-all its faults and dangers, it was divining and attempting to supply
-certain profound and abiding needs of the soul. I take these needs to
-be the following four.
-
-(1) Man has an ineradicable, and, when rightly assuaged, profoundly
-fruitful thirst for Unity,--for Unification, Synthesis, Harmonization;
-for a living System, an Organization both within and without himself,
-in which each constituent gains its full expansion and significance
-through being, and more and more becoming, just _that_ part and
-function of a great, dynamic whole; a sense of the essential and
-ultimate organic connection of all things, in so far as, in any degree
-or form, they are fair and true and good. And this sense and inevitable
-requirement alone explain the surprise and pain caused, at first, to
-us all, by the actual condition of mutual aloofness and hostility,
-characteristic of most of the constituents of the world within us, as
-of the world around us, towards their fellow-constituents. A truly
-atomistic world,--even an atomistic conception of the world,--of life,
-as a collection of things one alongside of another, on and on, is
-utterly repulsive to any deeply religious spirit whose self-knowledge
-is at all equal to its aspirations.--No wonder, then, if the Quietists,
-haunted by the false alternative of one such impenetrable atom-act or
-of an indefinite number of them, chose the One Act, and not a multitude
-of them.
-
-(2) Man has a deep-seated necessity to purify himself by detachment,
-not only from things that are illicit but even from those that are
-essential and towards which he is bound to practise a deep and warm
-attachment. There is no shadow of theoretical or ultimate contradiction
-here: to love one’s country deeply, yet not to be a _Chauvinist_; to
-love one’s wife tenderly, yet not to be uxorious; to care profoundly
-for one’s children, yet to train, rebuke, and ever brace them, when
-necessary, up to suffering and even death itself: these things so
-little exclude each the other, that each attachment can only rightly
-grow in and through the corresponding detachment. The imperfection
-in all these cases, and in all the analogous, specifically religious
-ones, lies not in the objects to be loved, nor in these objects being
-many and of various degrees and kinds of lovableness, nor in the right
-(both effective and affective, appropriately varied) love of them:
-but simply in our actual manner of loving them.--No wonder then that
-Quietism, face to face with the false alternative of either Attachment
-or Detachment, chose Detachment, (the salt and the leaven of life) and
-not attachment (life’s meat and meal).
-
-(3) Man has a profound, though ever largely latent, capacity and need
-for admiration, trust, faith; and does not by any means improve solely
-by direct efforts at self-improvement, and by explicit examinations
-of his efforts and failures; but, (a little from the first, and very
-soon as much, and later on far more), he progresses by means of a
-happy absorption in anything clean and fruitful that can and does
-lift him out of and above his smaller self altogether.--And such an
-absorption will necessarily be unaccompanied, at the time, by any
-direct consciousness on the part of the mind as to this its absorption.
-And, religiously, such quiet concentrations will, in so far as they are
-at all analyzable after the event, consist in a quite inarticulate,
-and yet profound and spiritually renovating, sense of God; and they
-will have to be tested, not by their describable content, but by their
-ethical and religious effects. “Psychology and religion,” says that
-great psychological authority, Prof. William James, “both admit that
-there are forces, seemingly outside of the conscious individual, that
-bring redemption to his life.” “A man’s conscious wit and will, so far
-as they strain after the ideal, are aiming at something only dimly and
-inaccurately imagined, whilst the deeper forces of organic ripening
-within him tend towards a rearrangement that is pretty surely definite,
-and definitely different from what he consciously conceives and
-determines. It may consequently be actually interfered with by efforts
-of too direct and energetic a kind on our part.”[137]--No wonder
-then that Quietism, finding this element of quiet incubation much
-ignored and starved in the lives of most religious souls, flew to the
-other extreme, of making this inarticulateness and wise indirectness
-of striving into the one test and measure of the perfection of all
-the constituents of the religious life, instead of insisting upon
-various degrees and combination of full and direct consciousness and
-articulation, and of much dimness and indirect alertness, as each
-requiring the other, and as both required by the complete and normal
-life of the soul.
-
-(4) And Man has a deep-seated sense of shame, in precise proportion
-as he becomes spiritually awake, about appropriating to himself his
-virtues and spiritual insight, even in so much as he perceives and
-admits his possession of them. Not all his consciousness and conviction
-of the reality of his own efforts and initiative, can or does prevent
-a growing sense that this very giving of his is (in a true sense)
-God’s gift,--that his very seeking of God ever implies that he had, in
-some degree, already found God,--that God had already sought him out,
-in order that he might seek and find God.--No wonder then that, once
-more shrinking from a Unity constituted in a Multiplicity, Quietism
-should, (with the apparently sole choice before it, of God Himself
-operating literally all, or of man subtracting something from that
-exclusive action and honour of God), have chosen God alone and entire,
-rather than, as it were, a fragmentary, limited, baffled influence
-and efficiency of the Almighty within His Own creature. Yet here
-again the greater does not supplant, but informs, the lesser; and the
-Incarnational action of God is, in this supreme question also, the
-central truth and secret of Christianity.
-
-
-7. _Multiplicity and unity, in different proportions, needful for all
-spiritual life._
-
-We find, then, that it is essential for even the most advanced souls,
-that they should keep and increase the sense and the practice of a
-right multiplicity, as ever a constituent and essential condition
-of every concrete, living unity; of a right attachment, as ever the
-necessary material and content for a fruitful and enriching detachment;
-of a right consciousness and articulation of images, thoughts,
-feelings, volitions, and external acts, as ever stimulations, restful
-alternations, and food for a wise and strengthening prayer or states
-of Quiet and inarticulation; and of a right personal initiative
-and responsibility, as the most precious means and element for the
-operations of God.
-
-We find, too, that it is equally important, for even the most imperfect
-souls, to be helped towards some, (though but ever semi-conscious and
-intermittent), sense of the unity which alone can give much worth
-or meaning to their multiplicity; of the detachment which alone can
-purify and spiritualize their attachments; of the self-oblivion, in
-rapt and peaceful admiration, which alone can save even their right
-self-watchings and self-improvements from still further centring them
-in themselves; and of the true self-abandonment to pure grace and the
-breathing of God’s Spirit, which alone can give a touch of winning
-freedom and of joyful spaciousness to all the prudence and right fear
-and conscious responsibility which, left alone, will hip, darken and
-weigh down the religious soul.
-
-And thus we shall find that there is no degree of perfection for any
-one set of souls which is not, in some form and amount, prefigured and
-required by all other souls of good-will; and again, that there is
-no one constituent, to which any one soul is specially drawn, which
-does not require the supplementation and corrective of some other
-constituents, more fully represented in other souls of possibly lower
-sanctity.
-
-Thus each soul and grade requires all the others; and thus the measure
-of a soul’s greatness is not its possessing things which cannot, in
-any degree or way, be found in, or expected of, all human souls, in
-proportion as they are fully and characteristically human, but, on the
-contrary, its being full of a spirit and a force which, in different
-degrees and forms, are the very salt and yeast, the very light and
-life, of all men in every place and time.
-
-The following weighty declaration, long ascribed to St. Thomas Aquinas,
-fully covers, I think, the doctrine and ideal aimed at throughout this
-section: “Already in this life we ought continuously to enjoy God, as
-a thing most fully our own, in all our works.… Great is the blindness
-and exceeding the folly of many souls that are ever seeking God,
-continuously sighing after God, and frequently desiring God: whilst,
-all the time, they are themselves the tabernacles of the living God …
-since their soul is the seat of God, in which He continuously reposes.
-Now who but a fool deliberately seeks a tool which he possesses under
-lock and key? or who can use and profit by an instrument which he is
-seeking? or who can draw comfort from food for which he hungers, but
-which he does not relish at leisure? Like unto all this is the life
-of many a just soul, which ever seeks God and never tarries to enjoy
-Him; and all the works of such an one are, on this account, less
-perfect.”[138]
-
-
-IV. PURE LOVE, OR DISINTERESTED RELIGION: ITS DISTINCTION FROM QUIETISM.
-
-The problem of Pure Love, of Disinterested Religion, can hardly, in
-practice, be distinguished from that of Quiet and Passivity, if only
-because Quietists, (those who have considered perfection to diminish
-more and more the number of the soul’s acts, or at least to eliminate
-more and more the need of distinctness or difference between them),
-have, quite inevitably, ever given a special prominence to the question
-as to what should be the character of those few acts, of that one
-unbroken act. For once allow this their main question we should all
-have to answer in the Quietist’s way,--viz. that this single act must,
-for a perfect soul, to be the most perfect of the acts possible to
-man, and hence must be an act of Pure Love.--Yet it is well to realize
-clearly that, if Quietism necessitates an even excessive and unreal
-doctrine of Pure Love, a moderate and solid Pure-Love teaching has
-no kind of necessary connection with Quietism. For even though my
-interior life be necessarily one continuous stream and tissue of acts,
-countless in their number, variety, and degrees of inter-penetration,
-it in nowise follows that acts of Pure Love are not the best, or are
-impossible; nor that, in proportion as Pure Love informs the soul’s
-multiform acts, such acts must lose in depth and delicacy of variety
-and articulation. Indeed here, with regard to the very culmination
-of the interior life, we shall again find and must again test the two
-conceptions: the finally abstractive and materially simplifying one,
-which must ever have any one real thing outside of another; and the
-incarnational and synthetic one, which finds spiritual realities and
-forces working the one inside and through the other. And the latter
-view will appear the true one.
-
-
-1. _New Testament teaching as to Pure Love._
-
-Now we must first try and get some clear ideas as to how this difficult
-matter stands in the New Testament,--in the Synoptic tradition and in
-the Pauline-Joannine teaching respectively. Here again it is the former
-which, (though on its surface it appears as the more ordinary and the
-more locally coloured teaching), is the richer, in its grandly elastic
-and manifold simplicity; and it is the latter which has most profoundly
-penetrated and articulated the ultimate meaning and genius of a part
-of Our Lord’s doctrine, yet at the cost of a certain narrowing of the
-variety and breadth of that outlook. In both cases I shall move, from
-the easier and more popular teaching, to the deepest and most original
-enunciations and explanations.[139]
-
-(1) The Synoptic teaching starts throughout from the ordinary
-post-exilic Jewish feeling and teaching, which indeed recognizes the
-ceremonial obligations and the more tangible amongst the ethical
-demands as standing under the categorical imperative of the Legal
-“Thou Shalt,” but places the large territory of the finer moral
-precepts outside of the Law. So with the “Zedakah,” the “Justice” of
-almsdeeds, and with the “Gemiluth Chasadim,” the “works of mercy,”
-such as visiting the sick, burying the dead, and rejoicing with the
-joyful and sorrowing with the sorrowful. Thus Rabbi Simon the Just
-tells us: “The world rests on three things: on the Law (_Thorah_),
-on Worship (_Abodah_), and on Works of Mercy (_Gemiluth Chasadim_)”;
-and Rabbi Eleazar declared the “Gemiluth Chasadim” to be above the
-“Zedakah.”[140] And it is especially in view of these works of
-supererogation that rewards, and indeed a strict scale of rewards,
-are conceived. Thus already in the Book of Tobit, (written somewhere
-between 175 and 25 B.C.), we have Tobit instructing his son Tobias that
-“Prayer is good with Fasting and Alms, more than to buy up treasures
-of gold. For Alms delivereth from death … they that practise Mercy and
-Justice shall live long.”[141] And one of the sayings of the Jewish
-Fathers declares: “So much trouble, so much reward.”[142]
-
-Now this whole scheme and its spirit seems, at first to be taken over
-quite unchanged by Our Lord. The very Beatitudes end with: “Rejoice
-… because your reward is great in heaven.” And, in the following
-Sermon, his hearers are bidden to beware of doing their “Zedakah,”--the
-“Justice” of Prayer, Fasting, Almsdeeds in order to be seen by men;
-since, in that case, “ye shall not have reward from your Father Who is
-in heaven.” And this is driven home in detail: these three kinds of
-Justice are to be done “in secret,” and “thy Father will repay thee.”
-Even Prayer itself thus appears as a meritorious good work, one of the
-means to “treasure up treasures in heaven.” Similarly, the rich man
-is bid “Go sell all that thou hast and give it to the poor; and thou
-shalt have a treasure in heaven.” Even “he that shall give you a cup of
-cold water in My name, shall not lose his reward.” Indeed we have the
-general principle, “the labourer is worthy of his hire.”[143]
-
-And yet we can follow the delicate indications of the presence, and the
-transitions to the expression, of the deeper apprehension and truth.
-For, on the part of God, the reward appears, in the first instance, as
-in intrinsic relation to the deed. The reward is the deed’s congenital
-equivalent: “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy”;
-“if ye forgive men their trespasses, your Father … will likewise
-forgive you your trespasses”; and “everyone who shall confess Me before
-men, him will I also confess before My Father Who is in heaven.”[144]
-Or the reward appears as a just inversion of the ordinary results of
-the action thus rewarded: “Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit
-the land”; take the highest seat at a banquet, and you will be forced
-down to the lowest, take the lowest, and you will be moved up to the
-highest; and, generally, “he who findeth his soul, shall lose it;
-and that loseth his soul, for My sake, shall find it.”[145] Or the
-reward appears as an effect organically connected with the deed, as its
-cause or condition: “Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see
-God.”[146] And then the reward comes to vary, although the deed remains
-quantitatively identical, solely because of that deed’s qualitative
-difference,--_i.e._ according to the variation in its motive: “He that
-receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet, shall receive the reward
-of a prophet; and he who receiveth a just man in the name of a just
-man, shall receive the reward of a just man.”[147] And then the reward
-moves up and up and becomes a grace, through being so far in excess
-of the work done: “Every one who hath forsaken house … or father or
-children or fields for My name, shall receive manifold,” indeed “an
-hundredfold”--“a full … and overflowing measure shall they pour into
-your lap”; and “whosoever shall humble himself, shall be exalted,”--not
-simply back to his original level, but into the Kingdom of Heaven. So,
-too, “Thou wast faithful over a few things, I shall place thee over
-many things”; indeed this faithful servant’s master “shall place him
-over all his possessions;” or rather, “blessed are those servants whom
-the Lord, when He cometh, shall find watching. Amen, I say unto you,
-that he shall approach … and shall minister unto them.”[148]
-
-This immense disproportion between the work and its reward, and the
-consequent grace-character of the latter, is driven home with a
-purposely paradoxical, provocative pointedness, in the two Parables of
-the Wedding Garment and of the Equal Payment of the Unequal Labourers,
-both of which are in St. Matthew alone. The former concerns the soul’s
-call to the kingdom, and that soul’s response. The King here, after
-having formally invited a certain select number of previously warned
-relatives and nobles, who all, as such, had a _claim_ upon him, Matt,
-xxii, 3, sends out invitations with absolute indiscrimination,--to men
-with no claims or with less than none; to “bad” as well as “good.” And
-it is the King, again, who gratuitously supplies them each with the
-appropriate white wedding-feast garment. He has thus a double right to
-expect all his guests to be thus clothed, and to punish instantly,
-not the mere negligence, but the active rejection implied on the part
-of the man clothed in his ordinary clothing (vv. 11, 12). Both call
-and investiture have been here throughout pure graces, which rendered
-possible, and which invited but did not force, an acceptance.[149]
-
-The second Parable describes the “Householder” who hired labourers
-for his vineyard at the first, third, sixth, ninth, and even eleventh
-hour,--each and all of them for a penny a day; who actually pays out
-to them, at the end of the day, this one identical pay; and who,
-to the labourer of the first shift who complains, “These last have
-wrought but one hour, and thou hast made them equal unto us who have
-borne the burden and heat of the day,” declares, “Friend, I do thee
-no wrong: didst thou not agree with me for a penny? Take thine own
-and go thy way: I will give to this last even as unto thee. Is it not
-lawful for me to do what I will with mine own? Is thine eye evil (art
-thou envious) because I am good” (because I choose to be bountiful)?
-Matt. xx, 1-15. Here again the overflowing generosity of God’s grace
-is brought home to us, as operating according to other standards
-than those of ordinary daily life: nor is this operation unjust, for
-the Householder paid their due to the first set of workers, whilst
-rewarding, far above their worth, those poor labourers of the last
-hour. But, as Jülicher well points out, “we should not pedantically
-insist upon finding here a doctrine of the strict equality of souls in
-the Beyond--a doctrine contradicted by other declarations of Jesus.
-Only the _claim_ of single groups of souls to preferential treatment is
-combated here …: a certain fundamental religious disposition is to be
-awakened.” And, as Bugge rightly notes, “the great supreme conception
-which lies at the bottom of the parable has, parablewise, remained here
-unnamed: Paul has found the expressive term for it,--‘Grace.’”[150]
-
-And we get corresponding, increasingly spiritual interpretations with
-regard to man’s action and man’s merit. First, all ostentation in the
-doing of the deed cancels all reward in the Beyond; so, in the case
-of each of the three branches of “Justice.”[151] And then the worker
-is to be satisfied, day by day, with that day’s pay and sustenance:
-“Give us this day our daily bread,” every soul is to pray; the divine
-Householder will say, “Didst thou not agree with me for a penny a day?
-Take thine own and go thy way.” And even “when ye have done all that
-has been commanded you, say ‘we are unprofitable servants, we have but
-done what we were bound to do.’” They are invited to look away from
-self, to “seek first the Kingdom and His Justice,” and then “all these
-things,” their very necessaries for earthly life, “shall be added unto
-you.” Indeed it is the boundlessly generous self-communicativeness of
-God Himself which is to be His disciples’ deliberate ideal, “be ye
-perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect”; and the production of
-this likeness within themselves is to be the ultimate end and crown
-of their most heroic, most costly acts: “love your enemies, and pray
-for those that persecute you: that you may become the sons of your
-Father who is in Heaven, who maketh His sun to rise upon the evil and
-the good, and who raineth upon the just and the unjust.” And the more
-there is of such self-oblivious love, the more will even the gravest
-sins be entirely blotted out, and the more rapid will be the full
-sanctification of the soul, as Our Lord solemnly declares concerning
-the sinful woman in St. Luke, “her many sins are forgiven her, because
-she hath loved much.”[152]
-
-In all this matter it is St. Luke’s Gospel which is specially
-interesting as showing, so to speak, side by side, an increased
-Rabbinical-like preciseness of balance between work and reward, and
-yet the adoption, doubtlessly under Pauline influence, of St. Paul’s
-central term in lieu of the old Jewish terminology. For, in one of its
-curious so-called “Ebjonite” passages, this Gospel works up the Parable
-of the Talents, with its only approximate relation between the deeds
-and their rewards (Matt. xxv, 14-30), into the Parable of the Pounds
-(Luke xix, 12-27), with its mathematically symmetrical interdependence
-between the quantities of the merit and those of this merit’s reward:
-the man who makes ten pounds is placed over ten cities, and he who
-makes five, over five. And, on the other hand, in a Lukan equivalent
-for part of the Sermon on the Mount, St. Matthew’s “reward” is replaced
-by “grace”: “If ye love them that love you, what grace (χάρις) have
-you? and if ye do good to those that do you good, what grace have
-you?”[153]
-
-(2) St. Paul indeed it is who, in the specially characteristic portions
-of his teaching, unfolds, by means of a partly original terminology,
-the deepest motives and implications of Our Lord’s own divinely
-deep sayings and doings, and never wearies of insisting upon the
-Grace-character of the soul’s call and salvation,--the Free Mercy, the
-Pure Love which God shows to us, and the sheer dependence and complete
-self-donation, the pure love which we owe to Him, and which, at the
-soul’s best, it can and does give Him.
-
-It is true that in the contrasting, the traditional layer of his
-teaching, we find the old Jewish terminology still intact: “God will
-render unto every man according to his works”; “it behoves us to
-appear before the Judgment-seat of Christ, that everyone … may receive
-according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad.”[154]
-Indeed it is precisely in St. Paul’s pages that we find the two most
-difficult and, at first sight, least spiritual sayings concerning this
-matter to be discovered in the whole New Testament: “If in this life
-only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men the most miserable.”
-And: “If the dead do not rise … let us eat and drink, for to-morrow
-we die.”[155] But these two passages must doubtless be taken partly
-as arguments adapted to the dispositions of his hearers,--the “Let us
-eat and drink” conclusion is given in the words of a current Heathen
-Greek proverb,--and, still more, as expressions not so much of a
-formal doctrine as of a mood, of one out of the many intense, mutually
-supplementary and corrective moods of that rich nature.
-
-According to his own deepest, most deliberate, and most systematic
-teaching, it is the life of Christ, the living Christ, energizing even
-now within the faithful soul, that constitutes both the primary source
-and the ultimate motive of Christian sanctity. “I am crucified with
-Christ; nevertheless I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.” And
-through this divine-human life within us “we faint not; but though our
-outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day.” Indeed
-the Lord Himself said to him: “My grace is sufficient for thee; for
-power is made perfect in infirmity”; and hence he, Paul, could declare:
-“Gladly therefore will I glory in my infirmities, that the power of
-Christ may dwell in me.” And thus, with Christ living within him, he
-can exclaim: “If God be for us, who shall be against us?… Who shall
-separate us from the love of Christ? shall tribulation, or peril, or
-the sword?… In all these things we are more than conquerors, through
-him that loved us. For I am persuaded that neither death nor life,
-nor things present nor things to come … shall be able to separate us
-from the love of God.” “Whether we live, or whether we die, we are
-the Lord’s.”[156] We thus get here a reinsistence upon, and a further
-deepening of, perhaps the profoundest utterance of the whole Old
-Testament: “What have I in Heaven besides Thee? and besides Thee I seek
-nothing upon earth. Even though my flesh and my heart faint, Thou art
-my rock and my portion for ever.”[157]
-
-And then that deathless hymn to Pure Love, the thirteenth chapter of
-the First Epistle to the Corinthians, not only culminates with the
-proclamation that, of all man can hope and wish and will and do, of
-all his doings and his graces, “there remain these three, Faith, Hope,
-Love, (Charity): but the greatest of these is Love (Charity).” But
-the Love that has this primacy is Pure Love, for “it seeketh not its
-own.” And though of this Love alone it is said that “it never passeth
-away,” ever persists in the Beyond: yet even here already it can and
-does get exercised,--and this, not only without any suppression of
-parallel acts of the other virtues, but with these other virtues and
-their specific motives now taken over and deepened, each in its special
-characteristic, by the supreme virtue and motive of Pure Love: “Love
-believeth all things, hopeth all things, beareth all things.”[158] Thus
-Faith, Hope, Patience, and all the other virtues, they all remain,
-but it is Love that is now the ultimate motive of all their specific
-motives. These, his culminating teachings, indicate clearly enough that
-virtue’s rewards are regarded by him, ultimately and substantially, as
-“the wages of going on and not to die”; or rather that they are, in
-their essence, manifestations of that Eternal Life which is already
-energizing, within souls that earnestly seek God, even here and now.
-This Life, then, however great may be its further expansion and the
-soul’s consciousness of possessing it, already holds within itself
-sufficient, indeed abundant motives, (in the fulfilment of its own
-deepest nature and of its now awakened requirements of harmony,
-strength, and peace through self-donation), for giving itself ever more
-and more to God.
-
-(3) And with regard to the Joannine teaching, it will be enough for
-us to refer back to the texts discussed in the preceding chapter, and
-to note how large and specially characteristic is here the current
-which insists upon the reward being already, at least inchoatively,
-enclosed in the deed itself, and upon this deed being the result and
-expression of Eternal Life operating within the faithful soul, even
-already, Here and Now. Only the declaration that “perfect love casteth
-out fear,” that it does not tolerate fear alongside of itself, 1 John
-iv, 18, appears to be contrary to the Pauline doctrine that Perfect
-Love, “Love” itself “beareth all things, believeth, hopeth, endureth
-all things,” 1 Cor. xiii, 7. Love then can animate other virtues: why
-not then a holy fear? But this Joannine saying seems in fact modelled
-upon St. Paul’s quotation and use of a passage from the Septuagint:
-“Cast out the bondwoman (the slave-servant) and her son, for the son
-of the bondwoman shall not be heir together with the son of the free,”
-Gal. iv, 30; and hence this saying will not exclude “children of the
-free-woman,”--a holy fear as well as faith, hope, patience,--but
-only “children of the slave-woman,” superstition, presumption,
-weakmindedness, and slavish fear.
-
-
-2. _The “Pure Love” controversy._
-
-In turning now to the controversy as to, Pure Love (1694-1699) and its
-assured results, we shall have again to distinguish carefully between
-the lives and intentions of the writers who were censured, and the
-doctrines, analytic or systematic, taught or implied by them, which
-were condemned. This distinction is easier in this case than in that of
-Quietism, for the chief writer concerned here is Fénelon, as to whose
-pure and spiritual character and deeply Catholic intentions there never
-has been any serious doubt.
-
-But in this instance we have to make a further distinction--viz.
-between the objective drift of at least part of his _Explication des
-Maximes des Saints sur la Vie Interieure_, published in 1697, and
-especially the twenty-three propositions extracted from it which
-were condemned by Pope Innocent XII in 1699; and the teaching which
-he increasingly clarified and improved in his numerous apologetic
-writings against Bossuet and other opponents in this memorable
-controversy--especially in his Latin writings, intended for
-transmission to the Pope, and written as late as 1710 and 1712.[159]
-It is certain that Bishops and theologians who opposed his _Maximes_
-were found warmly endorsing such pieces as his wonderfully clear and
-sober _Première Réponse aux Difficultés de M. l’Evêque de Chartres_.
-It is these pieces, comprising also his remarkably rich _Instruction
-Pastorale_, his admirably penetrating _Lettre sur l’Oraison Passive_
-and _Lettre sur la Charité_, and his extraordinarily compact and
-balanced Second Epistle to Pope Clement XI, 1712 (where all the
-censured ambiguities and expressions are carefully avoided), and which
-alone among Fénelon’s writings shall be accepted in what follows.[160]
-Indeed even the earlier of these writings fail in but one thing--in
-justifying the actual text of the condemned book, as distinguished
-from the intentions of its writer. Bishop Hedley sums up the real
-position with the treble authority of a spiritually trained Monk,
-of a practised theological writer, and of a Catholic Bishop of long
-experience: “The doctrine intended by Fénelon, in his _Maximes des
-Saints_, and as explained by him during his controversy with Bossuet,
-has never been censured, although the opposite party laboured hard for
-its condemnation. Fifteen years after the condemnation of his book, we
-find him re-stating to Pope Clement XI (who, as Cardinal, had drawn up
-the Brief of his condemnations), in careful scholastic language the
-doctrine intended by himself, but which he himself had misstated in his
-popular treatise. As there were errors, the other side, whatever the
-crudity or novelty of some of its contentions, whatever its motives or
-methods--and some of them were far from creditable--was sure in the end
-to succeed. And it is well that it should have succeeded as far as it
-did succeed.”[161]
-
-In any case, we shall have to beware of considering Bossuet’s
-contentions as to the specific character of Charity, Love, and as to
-the possibility, for man here below, of single acts of pure love, to
-be representative of the ordinary Catholic teaching either before or
-since the condemnation. On both these fundamental points Fénelon’s
-positions are demonstrably, and indeed have been generally admitted to
-be, a mere restatement of that teaching, as is shown, for instance, in
-the Jesuit Father Deharbe’s solid and sober, thoroughly traditional and
-highly authorized essay: _Die vollkommene Liebe Gottes … dargestellt
-nach der Lehre des h. Thomas von Aquin_, Regensburg, 1856. It is
-this most useful treatise and the admirable _Analyse Raisonnée de la
-Controverse du Quiétisme_ of the Abbé Gosselin,[162] (which has already
-much helped me in the preceding section), that have been my chief aids
-in my careful study, back through Bossuet and Fénelon, to St. Thomas
-and his chief commentators, Sylvius, who died in 1649, and Cardinal
-Cajetan, who died in 1534, and to the other chief authorities beyond
-them.--I group the main points, which alone need concern us here, under
-three heads: the specific Nature of Pure Love; single Acts of Pure
-Love; a State of Pure Love.
-
-(1) Now as to the specific Nature of Charity, or Pure, Perfect Love,
-St. Thomas tells us: “One Kind of Love is perfect, the other kind is
-imperfect. Perfect Love is that wherewith a man is loved for his own
-sake: as, for instance, when some one wishes well to another person,
-for that other person’s sake, in the manner in which a man loves his
-friend. Imperfect love is the love wherewith a man loves something,
-not for its own sake, but in order that this good thing may accrue to
-himself,--in the manner in which a man loves a thing that he covets.
-Now the former kind of love pertains to Charity, which clings to God
-for His own sake, whereas it is Hope that pertains to the second
-kind of love, since he who hopes aims at obtaining something for
-himself.”[163] And Cardinal Cajetan explains that this wishing well to
-God, “this good that we can will God to have, is double. The good that
-is in Him, that (strictly speaking) is God Himself,--we can, by Love,
-will Him to have it, when we find our delight in God being what He is.
-And the good that is but referred to God,--His honour and Kingdom and
-the Obedience we owe him,--this we can will, not only by finding our
-pleasure in it, but by labouring at its maintenance and increase with
-all our might.”[164]
-
-And, says St. Thomas, such Perfect Love alone is Love in its strict
-sense and “the most excellent of all the virtues”: for “ever that which
-exists for its own sake is greater than that which exists in view of
-something else. Now Faith and Hope attain indeed to God, yet as the
-source from which there accrue to us the knowledge of the Truth and
-the acquisition of the Good; whilst Love attains to God Himself, with
-a view to abide in Him, and not that some advantage may accrue to us
-from Him.” And perhaps still more clearly: “ When a man loves something
-so as to covet it, he apprehends it as something pertaining to his
-own well-being. The lover here stands towards the object beloved, as
-towards something which is his property.”[165] And note how, although
-he teaches that whereas “the beatitude of man, as regards its cause
-and its object, is something increate,” _i.e._ God Himself, “the
-essence of the beatitude itself is something created,” for “men are
-rendered blessed by participation, and this participation in beatitude
-is something created”: yet he is careful to explain some of his more
-incidental passages, in which he speaks of this essence of beatitude
-as itself man’s end, by the _ex professo_ declaration: “God” alone “is
-man’s ultimate end, and beatitude is only as it were an end before the
-very end, an end in immediate proximity to the ultimate end.”[166]
-
-(2) And next, as to the possibility, actual occurrence and
-desirableness of single Acts of such Pure Love, even here below:
-all this is assumed as a matter of course throughout St. Thomas’s
-_ex professo_ teaching on the matter. For throughout the passages
-concerning the Nature of Pure Love he is not exclusively, indeed not
-even primarily, busy with man’s acts in the future life, but with the
-respective characteristics of man’s various acts as executed and as
-analyzable, more or less perfectly, already here below. And nowhere
-does he warn us against concluding, from his reiterated insistence upon
-the essential characteristics of Pure Love, that such love cannot, as
-a matter of fact, be practised, at least in single acts, here below at
-all. Hence it is clear that, according to him, the soul as it advances
-in perfection will--alongside of acts of supernatural Faith, Hope,
-Fear, etc. (and the production of such acts will never cease), produce
-more and more acts of Pure Love: not necessarily more, as compared
-with the other kinds of contemporary acts, but certainly more as
-compared with its former acts of the same character.
-
-But there is a further, profoundly and delicately experienced
-doctrine. Not only can Pure Love be exercised in single and simple
-acts, alongside of single and simple acts of other kinds of virtues,
-supernatural or otherwise: but Pure Love can itself come to command
-or to inform acts which in themselves bear, and will now bear in
-increased degree, the characteristics of the other kinds of acts. St.
-Thomas tells us, with admirable clearness: “An act can be derived from
-Charity in one of two ways. In the first way, the act is elicited
-by Charity itself, and such a virtuous act requires no other virtue
-beside Charity,--as in the case of loving the Good, rejoicing in it,
-and mourning over its opposite. In the second way, an act proceeds
-from Charity in the sense of being commanded by it: and in this
-manner,--since Charity” has the full range of and “commands all the
-virtues, as ordering them (each and all) to their (ultimate) end,--an
-act can proceed from Charity whilst nevertheless belonging to any other
-special virtue.” And he assures us that: “The merit of eternal life,”
-“the fountain-head of meriting,” “pertains primarily to, consists in
-Charity, and pertains to and consists in other kinds of supernatural
-acts in only a secondary manner,--that is, only in so far as these acts
-are commanded or informed by Charity” or Pure Love.[167]
-
-Let us take some instances of such two-fold manifestations of identical
-motives and virtues, according as these motives and virtues operate
-in simple co-ordination, or within a compound and organic system. In
-the scholar’s life, Greek and Latin and Hebrew may be acquired, each
-simply for its own sake and each alongside of the other; or they can be
-acquired, from the immediate motive indeed of knowing each in its own
-specific nature as thoroughly as possible, yet with the ultimate, ever
-more and more conscious and all-penetrating, motive of thus acquiring
-means and materials for the science of language, or for the study of
-philosophy, or for research into early phases of the Jewish-Christian
-religion. In the family life, a man, woman, or child can live for
-himself or herself, and then for his or her other immediate relatives,
-each taken as separate alongside of the other, or he or she may get
-more and more dominated by the conception and claims of the family as
-an organic whole, and may end by working largely, even with respect
-to himself, as but for so many constituents of that larger organism
-in which alone each part can attain its fullest significance. And
-especially a young mother can live for her own health and joys, and
-then, alongside of these, for those of her child, or she can get to the
-point of sustaining her own physical health and her mental hopes and
-will to live as so many means and conditions for feeding and fostering
-the claimful body and soul of her child.
-
-So again, in the creatively artistic life, we can have a Dante writing
-prose and poetry and painting a picture, and a Rafael painting
-pictures and writing sonnets; or we can have Wagner bringing all his
-activities of scholar, poet, painter, musician, stage-manager,--each
-retaining, and indeed indefinitely increasing, its specific character
-and capabilities,--to contribute, by endless mutual stimulation and
-interaction, to something other and greater than any one of them
-individually or even than the simple addition of them all,--to a great
-Music-Drama and multiform yet intensely unified image of life itself.
-And an organist can draw out, as he plays, the _Vox Humana_ stop, and
-then another and another limitedly efficacious organ-stop, whilst each
-new-comer takes the place of its predecessor or a place beside it; or
-he can draw out the _Grand Jeu_ stop, which sets all the other stops
-to work in endless interaction, with itself permeating and organizing
-the whole. We thus, in these and countless other cases, and in every
-variety of degree within each case, get two kinds of variety, what we
-may call the simple and the compound diversification. And everywhere
-we can find that the richest variety not only can co-exist with, but
-that it requires and is required by, indeed that it is a necessary
-constituent and occasion of, the deepest and most delicate unity.[168]
-
-(3) And finally, as to a State of Pure Love. Only here do we reach the
-class of questions to which the condemnations of Fénelon really apply.
-
-We shall do well to begin by bearing in mind the very ancient,
-practically unbroken, very orthodox Christian discrimination of
-faithful souls,--sometimes into the two classes of Mercenaries (or
-Slaves) and Friends or Children, the latter of whom the great Clement
-of Alexandria, who died about A.D. 215, called “Gnostics,” “Gnosis”
-being his term for perfection (this scheme is the one to which
-Catherine’s life and teaching conform); or into the three classes
-of Servants (Slaves); Mercenaries; and Friends (or Children), as is
-already worked out with full explicitness by Saints Basil, Gregory
-of Nazianzum, and Gregory of Nyssa, who died in the years 379, 389,
-and 395 (?) respectively. Now Clement places the Mercenary on the
-left of the Sanctuary, but the “Gnostic” on the right; and, whilst
-declaring that the former “are those who, by means of renouncing things
-perishable, hope to receive the goods of incorruption in exchange,”
-he demands of the “Gnostic” that “he approach the saving word neither
-from the fear of punishment, nor from the motive of reward, but simply
-because He is good.”[169] And St. Basil, echoed in this by his two
-contemporaries, teaches that, “We obey God and avoid vices, from the
-fear of punishment, and in that case we take on the resemblance of
-Slaves. Or we keep the precepts, because of the utility that we derive
-from the recompense, thus resembling Mercenaries. Or finally, from
-love of Him who has given us the law, we obey with joy at having been
-judged worthy of serving so great and good a God, and thus we imitate
-the affection of Children towards their parents.”[170] And, in the case
-of all these Fathers, it is clear that, not only single acts, but whole
-states of soul and life are meant.
-
-But the increased fineness in the analysis of interior experiences
-and dispositions has since then required, and the Church formulations
-have most wisely demanded, that these three classes be not so sharply
-distinguished as to make any one soul seem exclusively and unchangeably
-to pertain to any one of them; and, still more, that these three
-divisions be taken to represent, even where and whilst they are most
-completely realized, only the predominant character of the majority of
-the acts constituting the respective state of soul. For it is clear
-that not only is there, and can there be, no such thing, on earth at
-least, as a state composed of one unrepeated act; but there is no such
-thing as a condition of soul made up solely of acts of “simple” Pure
-Love, or even of supernatural acts of all sorts commanded throughout
-by Charity, or indeed solely of supernatural acts, both simple and
-commanded. The “One-act” state is a chimera; the state of “simple”
-acts of Pure Love alone would, if possible, involve the neglect of
-numberless other virtues and duties; and the last two states indeed
-highly desirable, but it would be fanaticism to think we could
-completely attain to them here below.
-
-Yet there is nothing in any Church-censure to prevent, and there is
-much in the teaching and life of countless saints to invite, our
-holding the possibility, hence the working ideal and standard, for even
-here below, of a state in which two kinds of acts, which are still
-good in their degree, would be in a considerable minority: acts of
-merely natural, unspiritualized hope, fear, desire, etc.; and acts of
-supernatural hope, fear, desire, etc., in so far as not commanded by
-Charity. For even in this state not fully deliberate venial sins would
-occasionally be committed, far more would a certain number of acts
-of an unspiritualized, unsupernatural kind occur. And the necessary
-variety among the supernatural acts would in nowise be impaired,--it
-would indeed be greatly stimulated, by Pure Love being now, for the
-most part, the ultimate motive of their exercise.
-
-Sylvius, in his highly authoritative commentary on St. Thomas, puts the
-matter admirably: “We may not love God in view of reward in suchwise
-as to make eternal life the true and ultimate end of our love, or to
-love God because of it, so that without the reward we would not love
-Him … We must love God with reference to the eternal reward in suchwise
-that we put forth indeed both love and good works in view of such
-beatitude,--in so far as the latter is the end proposed to these works
-by God Himself; yet that we subordinate this our beatitude to the love
-of God as the true and ultimate end,” so that “if we had no beatitude
-to expect at all, we should nevertheless still love Him and execute
-good works for His own sake alone. In this manner we shall first love
-God above all things and for His own sake; and we shall next keep the
-eternal reward before us, for the sake of God and of His honour.”[171]
-A man in these dispositions would still hope, and desire, and fear,
-and regret, and strive for, and aspire to conditions, things, persons
-both of earth and of the beyond, both for himself and for others,
-both for time and for eternity: but all this, for the most part, from
-the ultimate motive, penetrating, deepening, unifying all the other
-motives,--of the love of Love, Christ, Spirit, God.
-
-Any hesitation to accept the reality or possibility of such a state
-cannot, then, be based upon such acceptance involving any kind of
-Quietism, but simply on the admittedly great elevation of such a
-condition. Yet this latter objection seems to be sufficiently met if
-we continuously insist that even such a state neither exempts souls
-from the commission of (more or less deliberate) venial sin; nor is
-ever entirely equable; nor is incapable of being completely lost; nor,
-as we have just contended, is ever without more or less numerous acts
-of an unsupernaturalized kind, and still less without acts of the
-supernatural virtues other than Love and unprompted by Love.
-
-And all fear of fanaticism will be finally removed by a further most
-necessary and grandly enlarging insistence upon the Mercenaries and
-even the Servants having passing moments, and producing varyingly
-numerous single acts of, Pure Love and of the other supernatural
-virtues prompted by Pure Love. All souls in a state of Grace throughout
-God’s wide wide world,--every constituent, however slight and recent,
-of the great soul of the Church throughout every sex, age, race, clime,
-and external organization, would thus have some touches, some at least
-incidental beginnings of Pure Love, and of the other supernatural
-virtues prompted by Pure Love. All souls would thus, in proportion to
-their degree of grace and of fidelity, have some of those touches; and
-the progress of all would consist in the degree to which that variety
-of acts would become informed and commanded by the supreme motive of
-all motives, Pure and Perfect Love.[172]
-
-And with such an Ideal, required by fundamental Catholic positions,
-ever increasingly actuating the soul and binding it to all souls
-beneath, around, above it, what there is of truth in the savage
-attacks of Spinoza and of Kant and of such recent writers as A.
-E. Taylor,[173] upon the supposed hypocritical self-seeking in the
-practice and temper of average Christians, would lose all its force.
-
-
-3. _Cognate Problems._
-
-Three much-discussed cognate matters require some elucidation here.
-They answer to the questions: Does reference to the self, as for
-instance in acts of gratitude and thanksgiving, prevent an act from
-being one of Pure Love? Is the pleasurableness, normally ever attached
-and subsequent to all virtuous acts, to be regarded as part of the
-reward from which Pure Love abstracts? And finally are, I will not say
-any technically ecstatic or other in part psycho-physical peculiarities
-and manifestations, but even active Contemplation or the simple Prayer
-of Quiet, necessary conditions or expressions of a state of Pure
-Love,--understood in the sense explained above?
-
-(1) As to reference to the self, it is highly important to distinguish
-between acts of Pure Love, and attempts, by means of the maximum
-possible degree of abstraction, to apprehend the absolute character
-and being of God. For these two things have no necessary connection,
-and yet they have been frequently confounded. St. Teresa’s noble
-confession of past error, and consequent doubly valuable, amended
-teaching is perhaps the most classical pronouncement extant upon this
-profoundly important point.[174] The contingent, spacial and temporal,
-manifestations and communications of God, above all as we have them in
-the life of Our Lord and in those who have come nearest to Him, but
-also, in their several degrees and forms, in the lives of each one of
-us: all these, in their sacred, awakening and healing, particularity
-and closeness of contact, can and should be occasions and materials for
-the most perfect, for the purest Love.
-
-Indeed it is well never to forget that nothing, and least of all God,
-the deepest of all the realities, is known to us at all, except in and
-by means of its relation to our own self or to our fellow-creatures.
-Hence if Love were Pure only in proportion as it could be based upon
-our apprehension of God as independent of all relation to ourselves,
-Pure Love would be simply impossible for us.--But, in truth, such a
-conception would, in addition, be false in itself: it would imply that
-the whole great Incarnation-fact and -doctrine,--the whole of that
-great root of all religion, the certainty that it is because God has
-first loved us that we can love Him, that He is a self-revealing God,
-and One whom we can know and reach because “in Him we live and move
-and have our being”--was taking us, not towards, but away from, our
-true goal. There are, surely, few sadder and, at bottom, more deeply
-uncreaturely, unchristian attitudes, than that which would seek or
-measure perfection in and by the greatest possible abstraction from all
-those touching contingencies which God Himself has vouchsafed to our
-nature,--a nature formed by Himself to require such plentiful contact
-with the historical and visible.--And if God’s pure love for us can
-and does manifest itself in such contingent acts, then our love can
-and should become and manifest itself purer and purer by means, not
-only of the prayer of formless abstraction and expectation, but also
-by the contemplation of these contingencies and by the production of
-analogously contingent acts. And if so, then certainly gratitude, in so
-far as it truly deserves the name, can and does belong to Pure Love,
-for the very characteristic of such gratitude consists in a desire to
-give and not to receive.[175]
-
-Not, then, the degree of disoccupation with the Contingent, even
-of the contingent of our own life, but the degree of freedom from
-self-seeking, and of the harmonization and subordination of all these
-contingencies in and under the supreme motive of the Pure Love and
-service of God in man and of man in God, is the standard and test of
-Christian perfection.
-
-(2) As to the pleasurableness which, in normal psychic conditions, more
-or less immediately accompanies or follows the virtuous acts of the
-soul, the realizations of its own deeper and deepest ideals, we should
-note that, in its earthly degree and form, it is not included in what
-theologians mean by the “rewards” of virtuous action. And in this they
-are thoroughly self-consistent, for they adhere, I think with practical
-unanimity, to Catherine’s doctrine that these immediate consequences
-of virtuous acts are not to be considered a matter of positive and,
-as it were, separate divine institution,--as something which, given
-the fundamental character of man’s spiritual nature, might have been
-otherwise; but as what,--given the immutable nature of God and of the
-image at nature in His creature, man,--follows from an intrinsic,
-quite spontaneous necessity.--Hence, at this point especially, would
-it be foolish and fanatical, because contrary to the immanental nature
-of things, and to the right interplay of the elemental forces of all
-life, to attempt the suppression even of the several actual irruptions
-of such pleasure, and still more of the source and recurrence of this
-delectation. Fortunately success is here as impossible as it would be
-undesirable,--as much so as, on a lower plane, would be the suppression
-of the pleasure concomitant with the necessary kinds and degrees of
-eating. Indeed, it is clear, upon reflection that unless a man (at
-least implicitly) accepts and (indirectly) wills that spiritual or
-physical pleasure, he cannot profitably eat his food or love his God.
-
-But from this in nowise follows what Bossuet tried so hard to
-prove,--that what is thus necessarily present in man, as a psychical or
-physical prompting and satisfaction, must also of necessity be willed
-by him, directly and as his determining reason and justification. In
-turning to eat, man cannot help feeling a psychic pleasure of an all
-but purely physical kind; and, if he is wise, he will make no attempt
-to meddle with this feeling. But he can either deliberately will, as
-his action’s object, that pleasure which is thus inevitably incident
-to the act, and the more he does so, the more simply greedy and
-sensual he will become; or he can directly will, as his determining
-end, that sustenance of life and strength for his work and spiritual
-growth, which is the justification and ultimate reason of eating (the
-_rationale_ of that very pleasure so wisely attached by nature, as a
-stimulus, to a process so necessary to the very highest objects), and
-the more he does so, the more manly and spiritual he will grow.
-
-And so with every one of man’s wondrously manifold and different
-physical, psychical, spiritual requirements and actions, within
-the wide range of his right nature and ideals. There is not one of
-them,--not the most purely physical-seeming of these acts,--which he
-cannot ennoble and spiritualize by, as it were, meeting it,--by willing
-it, more and more, because of its rational end and justification.
-And there is not one of them,--not an act which, judged simply by
-its direct subject-matter and by the soul’s faculties immediately
-engaged, would be the most purely mental and religious of acts,--which
-man cannot degrade and de-spiritualize, by, as it were, following
-it, by willing it more and more because of its psychical attraction
-and pleasurable concomitance alone. For, in the former case, the
-act, however gross may seem its material, is made the occasion and
-instrument of spiritual character-building and of the constitution
-of liberty; in the latter case, the act, however ethereal its body,
-is but the occasion and means of the soul’s dispersion in the mere
-phenomenal flux of the surface of existence, and of its subjection to
-the determinism which obtains here.[176]
-
-Catherine’s whole convert life is one long series of the most striking
-examples of an heroic delicacy in self-knowledge and self-fighting in
-this matter: a delicacy which, as to the degree of its possibility and
-desirableness in any particular soul, is, however, peculiarly dependent
-upon that soul’s special circumstances, temperament, _attrait_, and
-degree of perfection reached and to be reached.
-
-(3) And, finally, as to the relations between the Contemplative forms
-of Prayer, and Acts and variously complete States of Pure Love; and,
-again, of such Prayer and Love, and Abnormal or Miraculous conditions:
-it is clear that, if there is no true Contemplation without much Pure
-Love, there can be much Pure Love without Contemplation.
-
-Abbé Gosselin well sums up the ordinary Catholic teaching. “Meditation
-consists of discursive acts which are easily distinguished from each
-other, both because of the kind of strain and shock with which they
-are produced, and because of the diversity of their objects. It is
-the ordinary foundation of the interior life and the ordinary prayer
-of beginners, whose imperfect love requires to be thus excited and
-sustained by distinct and reflective acts. Contemplation consists,
-strictly speaking, in direct ‘non-reflex’ acts,--acts so simple and
-peaceful as to have nothing salient by which the soul could distinguish
-one from the other. It is called by the Mystical Saints ‘a simple and
-loving look,’ as discriminating it from meditation and the latter’s
-many methodic and discursive acts, and as limiting it to a simple and
-loving consideration and view of God and of divine things, certified
-and rendered present to the soul by faith. It is the ordinary prayer
-of perfect souls, or at least of those that have already made much
-progress in the divine love. For the more purely a soul loves
-God, the less it requires to be sustained by distinct, reflective
-acts; reasoning becomes a fatigue and an embarrassment to it in its
-prayer--it longs but to love and to contemplate the object of its love.”
-
-Or as Fénelon puts it: “‘Passivity,’ ‘Action,’ is not precisely itself
-Pure Love, but is the mode in which Pure Love operates.… ‘Passivity,’
-‘Action,’ is not precisely the purity of Love, but is the effect of
-that purity.”[177] Yet, as M. Gosselin adds, “It must be admitted that
-without Contemplation the soul can arrive at a very high perfection;
-and that the most discursive meditation, and hence still more all
-prayer as it becomes effective, often includes certain direct acts
-which form an admixture and beginning of contemplation.”[178]
-
-And as to any supposed necessary relations between the very highest
-contemplation and the most complete state of Pure Love on the one hand,
-and anything abnormal or miraculous on the other hand, Fénelon, in
-this point remarkably more sober than Bossuet, well sums up the most
-authoritative and classical Church-teaching on the matter: “‘Passive’
-Contemplation is but Pure Contemplation: ‘Active’ Contemplation
-being one which is still mixed with hurried and discursive acts.
-When Contemplation has ceased to have any remnant of this hurry, of
-this ‘activity,’ it is entirely ‘Passive,’ that is, peaceful, in
-its acts.” “This free and loving look of the soul means acts of the
-understanding,--for it is a look; and acts of the will, for the look
-is a loving one; and acts produced by free-will, without any strict
-necessity, for the look is a free look.” “We should not compare
-Passive Contemplation,” as did Bossuet, “to prophecy, or to the gift
-of tongues or of miracles; nor may we say that this mystical state
-consists principally in something wrought by God within us without
-our co-operation, and where, consequently, there neither is nor can
-be any merit. We must, on the contrary, to speak correctly, say that
-the substance of such Passive Prayer, taken in its specific acts,
-is free, meritorious, and operated within us by a grace that acts
-together with us.” “It is the attraction to the acts which the soul
-now produces which, as by a secondary and counter-effect, occasions
-a quasi-incapacity for those acts which it does not produce. Now
-this attraction is not of a kind to deprive the soul of the use of
-its free-will: we see this from the nature of the acts which this
-attraction causes the soul to produce. Whence I conclude that this
-same attraction does not, again, deprive it of its liberty with regard
-to the acts which it prevents. The attraction but prevents the latter
-in the way it produces the other,--by an efficacious influence that
-involves no sheer necessity.” “‘Passivity,’ if it comes from God, ever
-leaves the soul fully free for the exercise of the distinct virtues
-demanded by God in the Gospel; the _attrait_ is truly divine only
-in so far as it draws the soul on to the perfect fulfilment of the
-evangelical counsels and promises concerning all the virtues.” “The
-inspiration of the Passive state is but an habitual inspiration for
-the interior acts of evangelical piety. It renders the Passive soul
-neither infallible nor impeccable, nor independent of the Church even
-for its interior direction, nor exempt from the obligation of meriting
-and growing in virtue.… The inspiration of the passive soul differs
-from that of actively just souls only in being purer; that is, more
-exempt from all natural self-seeking, more full, more simple, more
-continuous, and more developed at each moment. We have, throughout,
-ever one and the same inspiration, which but grows in perfection and
-purity in proportion as the soul renounces itself more, and becomes
-more sensitive to the divine impressions.”[179]
-
-Thus we get an impressive, simple and yet varied, conception of
-spirituality, in which a real continuity, and a power and obligation of
-mutual understanding and aid underlies all the changes of degree and
-form, from first to last. For from first to last there are different
-degrees, but of the same supernatural grace acting in and upon the same
-human nature responsive in different degrees and ways. From first to
-last there is, necessarily and at every step, the Supernatural: at no
-point is there any necessary presence of, or essential connection with,
-the Miraculous or the Abnormal.
-
-
-4. _Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant._
-
-Theology and Philosophy have not ceased to occupy themselves, at least
-indirectly, with the substance of these great questions, since they
-furnished the subject-matter to Bossuet and Fénelon in their memorable
-controversy; somewhat over-subtle although some of it was in its
-earlier phases, owing to Fénelon’s chivalrous anxiety to defend, as far
-as possible, the very expressions, often so nebulous and shifting, of
-his cousin, Madame Guyon.
-
-(1) Indeed about twenty years before that controversy, Spinoza had,
-in his _Theologico-Political Treatise_, and then, more impressively
-still, in his _Ethics_, made a brilliant assault upon all, especially
-all religious, self-seeking. Also on this point these writings showed
-that strange, pathetic combination of grandly religious intuitions
-and instincts with a Naturalistic system which, logically, leaves no
-room for those deepest requirements of that great soul; and here they
-revealed, in addition, considerable injustice towards the, doubtless
-very mixed and imperfect, motives of average humanity.
-
-True intuition speaks in his _Treatise_ (published in 1670) in the
-words: “Since the love of God is man’s supreme beatitude and the final
-end and scope of all human actions: it follows that only that man
-conforms to the divine law, who strives to love God, not from fear of
-punishment, nor from the love of some other thing, such as delights,
-fame, and so forth, but from this motive alone, that he knows God, or
-that he knows the knowledge and love of God, to be his supreme end.”
-But a little further back we learn that “the more we know the things
-of Nature, the greater and the more perfect knowledge of God do we
-acquire”; a frank application of the pure Pantheism of his reasoned
-system.
-
-In his _Ethics_, again, a noble intuition finds voice where he says:
-“Even if we did not know our Mind,” our individual soul, “to be
-eternal, we should still put Piety and Religion and, in a word, all
-those virtues that are to be referred to magnanimity and generosity,
-first in our esteem.” But he is doubtless excessive in his picturing of
-the downright, systematic immorality of attitude of ordinary men--the
-“slaves” and “mercenaries.” “Unless this hope of laying aside the
-burdens of Piety and Religion after death and of receiving the price
-of their service, and this fear of being punished by dire punishments
-after death were in men, and if they, contrariwise, believed that
-their minds would perish with their bodies: they would let themselves
-go to their natural inclination and would decide to rule all their
-actions according to their lust.” And he is doubtlessly, though nobly,
-excessive in his contrary ideal: “He who loves God cannot strive that
-God shall love him in return,”--an ideal which is, however, certainly
-in part determined by his philosophy, which knows no ultimate abiding
-personality or consciousness either in God or man.
-
-Yet, once again, we have him at his inspiring best when,
-Catherine-like, he tells us: “The supreme Good of those who pursue
-virtue is common to them all, and all are equally able to rejoice in
-it”; and “this love towards God is incapable of being stained by the
-passions of envy and bitterness, but is increased in proportion as we
-figure to ourselves a larger number of men joined to God by the same
-bonds of love”; when he declares: “we do not enjoy beatitude because we
-master our passions; rather, contrariwise, do we master our passions
-because we enjoy beatitude”; and when he insists, with no doubt too
-indiscriminating, too Jacopone-like, a simplification, upon what,
-in its substance, is a profound truth: “the intellectual,” the pure
-“love of the soul for God is the very love of God, wherewith God loves
-Himself.”[180]
-
-(2) It was, however, the astonishingly circumspect and many-sided
-Leibniz who, indefinitely smaller soul though he was, succeeded,
-perhaps better than any other modern philosopher, in successfully
-combining the divers constitutive elements of the act and state of
-Pure Love, when he wrote in 1714: “Since true Pure Love consists in a
-state of soul which makes me find pleasure in the perfections and the
-felicity of the object loved by me, this love cannot but give us the
-greatest pleasure of which we are capable, when God is that object.
-And, though this love be disinterested, it already constitutes, even
-thus simply by itself, our greatest-good and deepest interest.”
-
-Or, as he wrote in 1698: “Our love of others cannot be separated
-from our true good, nor our love of God from our felicity. But it is
-equally certain that the consideration of our own particular good, as
-distinguished from the pleasure which we taste in seeing the felicity
-of another, does not enter into Pure Love.” And earlier still he
-had defined the act of loving as “the finding one’s pleasure in the
-felicity of another”; and had concluded thence that Love is for man
-essentially an enjoyment, although the specific motive of love is not
-the pleasure or the particular good of him who loves, but the good or
-the felicity of the beloved object.[181]
-
-(3) Yet it is especially Kant who, with his predominant hostility to
-all Eudaemonism in Morality and Religion, has, more than all others,
-renewed the controversy as to the relations between virtue and piety
-on the one hand, and self-seeking motives on the other, and who is
-popularly credited with an entirely self-consistent antagonism to even
-such a wise and necessary attitude as are the amended positions of
-Fénelon and those of Leibniz. And yet I sincerely doubt whether (if
-we put aside the question as to the strictly logical consequences of
-his Critical Idealism, such as that Idealism appears in its greatest
-purity in the _Critique of Pure Reason_, 1781; and if we neglect the
-numerous, often grossly unjust, Spinoza-like sallies against the
-supposed undiluted mercenariness of ordinary piety, which abound in his
-_Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason_, 1793), we could readily
-find any explicit pronouncement hopelessly antagonistic to the Catholic
-Pure-Love doctrine.
-
-Certainly the position taken up towards this point in that very
-pregnant and curious, largely-overlooked little treatise, _The Canon
-of Pure Reason_, which (evidently an earlier and complete sketch), has
-been inserted by him into his later, larger, but materially altered
-scheme of the _Critique_ of 1781, (where it now forms the _Zweite
-Hauptstück_ of the _Transcendentale Methodenlehre_, ed. Kehrbach,
-Reclam, pp. 603-628), appears to be substantially acceptable.[182]
-“Happiness consists in the satisfaction of all our inclinations,
-according to their various character, intensity, and duration. The
-law of practical action, in so far as it is derived from the motive
-of happiness, I call Pragmatic, a Rule of Good Sense; the same law,
-in so far as it has for its motive only the becoming worthy of such
-happiness, I call Moral, the Moral Law. Now Morality already by itself
-constitutes a system, but Happiness does not do so, except in so far as
-Happiness is distributed in exact accordance with Morality. But such a
-distribution is only possible in the intelligible world,”--the world
-beyond phenomena which can be reached by our reason alone--“and under
-a wise Originator and Ruler. Such an One, together with life in such a
-world--a world which we are obliged to consider as a future one--reason
-finds itself forced to assume, or else to look upon the moral laws as
-empty phantoms, since the necessary result of these laws,--a result
-which that same reason connects with their very idea,--would have to
-fall away, if that assumption were to go. Hence every one looks upon
-the moral laws as _commandments_, a thing which they could not be,
-if they did not conjoin with their rule consequences of _a priori_
-appropriateness, and hence if they did not carry with them _promises_
-and _threats_. But this too they can do only if they lie within the
-compass of a Single Necessary Being, Itself the Supreme Good, Which
-alone can render possible such a unity embracing both means and
-end.--Happiness alone is, for our reason, far from being the Complete
-Good, for reason does not approve of Happiness unless it be united with
-the being worthy of Happiness, _i.e._ Moral Rectitude. But Morality
-alone, and with it the simple being worthy of happiness, is also far
-from the Complete Good. Even if reason, free from any consideration of
-any interest of its own, were to put itself in the position of a being
-that had to distribute all happiness to others alone, it could not
-judge otherwise: for, in the complete idea of practical action, both
-points are in essential conjunction, yet in suchwise that it is the
-moral disposition which, as condition, first renders possible a sharing
-in happiness, and not the prospect of happiness which first gives
-an opening to the moral disposition. For, in this latter case, the
-disposition would not be moral, and, consequently, would not deserve
-that complete happiness to which reason can assign no other limitation
-than such as springs from our own immoral attitude of will.”[183]
-
-In his _Foundation of the Metaphysic of Morals_, 1785, the noble
-apostrophe to the Good Will no doubt appears formally to proclaim
-as possible and desirable a complete human disposition, in which no
-considerations of Happiness play any part: “The good will is good,
-not through what it effects or produces, not through its utility for
-the attainment of any intention or end, but it is good through the
-quality of the volition alone; that is, it is good in itself.…” “If,
-with its greatest efforts, nothing were to be effected by it, and only
-the good will itself were to remain, this bare will would yet shine in
-lonely splendour as a jewel,--as something which has its full value in
-itself.” But further on he shows us how, after all, “this good will
-cannot, then, be the only and the whole good, but still it is the
-highest good and the condition for all the rest, even for our desire of
-happiness.”[184] Certain exaggerations, which are next developed by
-him here, shall be considered in a later chapter.
-
-
-5. _Four important points._
-
-Here I will but put together, in conclusion, four positions which I
-have rejoiced to find in two such utterly, indeed at times recklessly,
-independent writers as Professor Georg Simmel of Berlin and Professor
-A. E. Taylor.
-
-(1) Dr. Simmel declares, with admirable cogency: “The concept of
-religion completely loses in Kant, owing to his rationalistic manner
-of discovering in it a mere compound of the moral interest and the
-striving after happiness, its most specific and deepest character.
-No doubt these two apprehensions are also essential to religion, but
-precisely the direction in which Kant conjoins them,--that duty issues
-in happiness, is the least characteristic of religion, and is only
-determined by his Moralism, which refuses to recognize the striving
-after happiness as a valuable motive. The opposite direction appears to
-me as far more decisively a part of religion and of its incomparable
-force: for we thus find in religion precisely that ideal power, which
-makes it the duty of man to win his own salvation. According to the
-Kantian Moralism, it is every man’s private affair how he shall meet
-his requirement of happiness; and to turn such a private aspiration
-into an objective, ideal claim, would be for Kant a contradiction and
-abomination. In reality, however, religion itself _requires_ that man
-should have a care for his own welfare and beatitude, and in this
-consists its incomparable force of attraction.”[185] Let the reader
-note how entirely this agrees with, whilst properly safeguarding, the
-doctrine of Pure Love: it is the precise position of the best critics
-of the unamended Fénelon.
-
-(2) Professor Taylor insists that “it is possible to desire directly
-and immediately pleasant experiences which are not my own.… Because
-it is _I_ who in every case have the pleasure of the anticipation, it
-is assumed that it must be I who am to experience the realization of
-the anticipation.” Yet “it is really no more paradoxical that I should
-anticipate with pleasure some event which is not to form part of my own
-direct sensible experience, than it is that I should find pleasure in
-the anticipation at twenty of myself at eighty.” “The austerest saints
-will and can mortify themselves as a thing well-pleasing to God.”[186]
-In this way the joy of each constituent of the Kingdom of God in the
-joys of all the rest, and in the all-pervading joy of God, is seen to
-be as possible as it is undoubtedly actual: the problem of the relation
-between pleasure and egoism is solved.
-
-(3) And Professor Taylor again insists upon how pleasant experiences,
-which do not owe their pleasantness to their relation to a previous
-anticipation, are not, properly speaking, good or worthy. It is by
-“satisfactions” and not by mere “pleasures” that “even the most
-confirmed Hedonist must compute the goodness of a life.… Only when
-the pleasant experience includes in itself the realization of an idea
-is it truly good.”[187] But, if so, then the experience will be good,
-not in proportion as it is unpleasant, as Kant was so prone to imply;
-nor directly in proportion as it is pleasant, although pleasantness
-will accompany or succeed it, of a finer quality if not of a greater
-intensity, according as the idea which it embodies is good: but
-directly in proportion to the goodness of that idea. Thus all things
-licit, from sense to spirit, will find their place and function in such
-acts, and in a life composed of such acts, spirit expressing itself
-in terms of sense. And the purification, continuously necessary for
-the ever more adequate expression of the one in and by the other, will
-be something different from any attempt at suppressing this means of
-expression. Thus here again the great Christian Incarnation-Doctrine
-appears as the deepest truth, and as the solution of the problem as to
-the relations of pleasure and duty.[188]
-
-(4) And finally, as to the ever-present need and importance of a theory
-concerning these matters, Professor Taylor points out, not only that
-some such theory is necessary to the full human life, but that it must
-place an infinite ideal before us: paradox though it may sound, nothing
-less is truly practical, for “any end that is to be permanently felt
-as worth striving for, must be infinite,” and therefore “in a sense
-infinitely remote”; and hence “if indifference to the demand for a
-practicable ideal be the mark of a dreamer or a fanatic, contentment
-with a finite and practicable ideal is no less undeniably the mark of
-an _esprit borné_.”[189]
-
-Here Fénelon has adequately interpreted the permanent and complete
-requirements of the religious life and spirit. “You tell me,” he
-says to his adversaries, “that ‘Christianity is not a school of
-Metaphysicians.’ All Christians cannot, it is true, be Metaphysicians;
-but the principal Theologians have great need to be such. It was by a
-sublime Metaphysic that St. Augustine soared above the majority of the
-other Fathers, who were, for the rest, as fully versed in Scripture
-and Tradition. It was by his lofty Metaphysic that St. Gregory of
-Nazianzum has merited the distinguishing title of _Theologian_.
-It is by Metaphysic that St. Anselm and St. Thomas have been such
-great luminaries of the Church. True, the Church is not ‘a school of
-Metaphysicians,’ who dispute without docility, as did the ancient sects
-of philosophers. Yet she is a school in which St. Paul teaches that
-Charity is more perfect than Hope, and in which the holiest Doctors
-declare, in accordance with the principles of the Fathers, that Love
-is more perfect, precisely because it ‘abides in God, not in view of
-any benefit that may accrue to us from so doing.’” “I know well,” he
-writes to a friend, “that men misuse the doctrines of Pure Love and
-Resignation; I know that there are hypocrites who, under cover of
-such noble terms, overthrow the Gospel. Yet it is the worst of all
-procedures to attempt the destruction of perfect things, from a fear
-that men will make a wrong use of them.” Notwithstanding all misuse of
-the doctrine--“the very perfection of Christianity is Pure Love.”[190]
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XII
-
-THE AFTER-LIFE PROBLEMS AND DOCTRINES
-
-
-Moving on now to the questions concerning the After-Life, it
-will be convenient to consider them under five heads: the chief
-present-day positions and perplexities with regard to belief in
-the After-Life in General; the main implications and convictions
-inherent to an Eschatology such as Catherine’s; and then the principal
-characteristics, difficulties, and helps of her tendencies and
-teachings concerning Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven. And throughout the
-Chapter we shall busy ourselves directly only with the After-Life in
-the sense of a heightened, or at least an equal, consciousness after
-death, as compared to that which existed before death: the belief in
-a shrunken state of survival, in non-annihilation, appearing to be as
-certainly the universal minimum of belief as such a minimum is not
-Immortality.
-
-
-I. THE CHIEF PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS, PERPLEXITIES, AND REQUIREMENTS WITH
-REGARD TO THE AFTER-LIFE IN GENERAL.
-
-Now I take our chief present-day problems, perplexities, and resultant
-requirements with regard to the After-Life in general, to fall into
-three groups, according as those problems are predominantly Historical,
-or Philosophical, or directly Practical and Ethical.
-
-
-1. _Three Historical Difficulties._
-
-The Historical group now brings very clearly and certainly before
-us the striking non-universality, the startling lateness, and
-the generally strange fitfulness and apparent unreasonableness
-characterizing the earliest stage of belief in the soul’s heightened,
-or at least equivalent, consciousness after death.
-
-(1) Now with respect to the Non-Universality of the doctrine, it
-is true that, in China, Confucianism is full of care for the dead.
-“Throughout the Empire, the authorities are obliged to hold three
-annual sacrifices for the refreshment and rest of the souls of the dead
-in general.” “It is hardly doubtful that the cultus of Ancestors formed
-the chief institution in classical Confucianism, and constituted the
-very centre of religion for the people. Even now ancestor-worship is
-the only form of religion for which rules, applicable to the various
-classes among the Emperor’s subjects, are laid down in the Dynastic
-Statutes.” And Professor De Groot, from whom I am quoting, gives an
-interesting conspectus of the numberless ways in which the religious
-service of the dead penetrates Chinese life.[191]--Yet we hear of
-Kong-Tse (Confucius) himself (551-478 B.C.), that, though he insisted
-upon the most scrupulous execution of the three hundred rules of the
-then extant temple-ceremonial, which were no doubt largely busy with
-the dead, and though he said that one should sacrifice to the spirits
-as if they were present, he designated, in several of his sayings,
-occupation with theological problems as useless: “as long as we do not
-know men, how shall we know spirits? As long as we do not understand
-life, how should we fathom death?” And to questions relative to the
-spirits and the dead, he would give evasive answers.[192] Thus the
-founder of the most characteristic of the Chinese religions was without
-any clear and consistent conviction on the point in question.
-
-In India we find, for Brahmanic religion, certain unmistakable
-Immortality-Doctrines (in the sense of the survival of the soul’s
-self-consciousness), expressed in the hymns of the _Rig-Veda_.--But
-already, in the philosophizings of the _Upanishads_, we get a
-world-soul, and this soul’s exclusive permanence: “to attain to true
-unity, the very duality of subject and object is to disappear. The
-terms Atman and Brahman here express the true Being which vivifies all
-beings and appearances, and with which cognizing man reunites himself
-whilst losing his individual existence.”[193]
-
-And if we move on to Buddhism, with its hundreds of millions of
-adherents in Burmah, Tibet, China, and Japan, we can learn, from the
-classical work of Oldenberg, how interestingly deep down lies the
-reason for the long conflict between scholars as to whether Nirvana
-is or is not to be taken for the complete extinction of the individual
-soul. “Everything, in the Buddhist dogmatic system, is part and parcel
-of a circle of Becoming and of Dissolution: all things are but a
-Dhamma, a Sankhara; and all Dhamma, all Sankhara are but temporary.…
-The Mutable, Conditioned is here thinkable only as conditioned by
-another Mutable and Conditioned. If we follow the dialectic consequence
-alone, there is no seeing how, according to this system, there can
-remain over, when a succession and mutual destruction of things
-conditioning and of things conditioned has run its course, anything
-but a pure vacuum.” And we have also such a saying of the Buddha as
-the following. “Now if, O disciples, the Ego (_atta_) and anything
-appertaining to the Ego (_attaniya_) cannot be comprehended with
-accuracy and certainty, is not then the faith which declares: ‘This is
-the world, and this is the Ego; this shall I become at death,--firm,
-constant, eternal, unchangeable,--thus shall I be there, throughout
-eternity,’--is not this sheer empty folly?” “How should it not, O
-Lord, be sheer empty folly?” answer the disciples. “One who spoke
-thus,” is Oldenberg’s weighty comment, “cannot have been far from the
-conviction that Nirvana is annihilation. Yet it is understandable how
-the very thinkers, who were capable of bearing this consequence, should
-have hesitated to raise it to the rank of an official dogma of the
-community.… Hence the official doctrine of the Buddhist Church attained
-the form, that, on the question of the real existence of the Ego, of
-whether or not the perfected saint lives on after death, the exalted
-Buddha has taught nothing. Indeed the legally obligatory doctrine of
-the old community required of its votaries an explicit renunciation of
-all knowledge concerning the existence or non-existence of completely
-redeemed souls.”
-
-“Buddhism,” so Oldenberg sums up the matter, with, I think, the
-substantial adhesion of all present-day competent authorities, “teaches
-that there is a way out of the world of created things, out into the
-dark Infinite. Does this way lead to new being? or does it lead to
-nothingness? Buddhist belief maintains itself on the knife’s edge
-of these alternatives. The desire of the heart, as it longs for the
-Eternal, is not left without something, and yet the thinking mind is
-not given a something that it could grasp and retain. The thought
-of the Infinite, the Eternal, could not be present at all, and yet
-vanish further away than here, where, a mere breath and on the
-point of sinking into sheer nothingness, it threatens to disappear
-altogether.”[194] This vast Buddhist community, numbering, perhaps, a
-third of the human race, should not, then, be forgotten, when we urge
-the contrary instances of the religions of Assyria and Babylonia; of
-Egypt; of Greece and Rome; and, above all, of the Jews and Christianity.
-
-Yet it is well to remember that such non-universality of belief is at
-least as real, to this very hour, for such a fundamental religious
-truth and practice as Monotheism and Monolatry; such purely Ethical
-convictions as Monogamy and the Illicitness of Slavery; such a plain
-dictate of the universal humanitarian ideal as the illegitimacy
-of the application of physical compulsion in matters of religious
-conviction; and such directly demonstrable psychical and natural facts
-as subconsciousness in the human soul, the sexual character of plants,
-and the earth’s rotundity and rotation around the sun. In none of these
-cases can we claim more than that the higher, truer doctrine,--that is,
-the one which explains and transcends the element of truth contained in
-its predecessor and opposite,--is explicitly reached by a part only of
-humanity, and is but implied and required by other men, at their best.
-Yet this is clearly enough for leaving us free to decide,--reasonably
-conclusive evidence for their truth being forthcoming,--in favour of
-the views of the minority: since the assumption of an equality of
-spiritual and moral insight and advance throughout mankind is as little
-based upon fact, as would be the supposition of men’s equal physical
-strength or height, or of any other quality or circumstance of their
-nature and environment.
-
-(2) The lateness of the doctrine’s appearance, precisely in the cases
-where there can be no doubt of its standing for a conviction of an
-endless persistence of a heightened consciousness after death,--that
-is, amongst the Greeks (and Romans) and the Jews (and Christians),--has
-now been well established by critical historical research.
-
-With regard to the Greeks,[195] the matter is particularly plain,
-since we can still trace even in Plato, (427 to 347 B.C.), who, next
-to Our Lord Himself and to St. Paul, is doubtless the greatest and
-most influential teacher of full individual Immortality that the world
-has seen, two periods of thought in this matter, and can show that
-the first was without any such certain conviction. In his _Apology of
-Socrates_, written soon after the execution in 399 B.C., he makes his
-great master, close to his end, declare that death would bring to man
-either a complete unconsciousness, like to a dreamless sleep, or a
-transition into another life,--a life here pictured like to the Homeric
-Hades. Both possibilities Socrates made to accept resignedly, in full
-reliance on the justice of the Gods, and to look no further; how should
-he know what is known to no man?--And this is Plato’s own earlier
-teaching. For in the very _Republic_ which, in its chronologically
-later constituents, (especially in Book V, 471_c_, to the end of
-Book VIII, Book IX, 560_d_ to 588_a_, and Book X up to 608_b_), so
-insists upon and develops the truth and importance of Immortality in
-the strictest, indeed the sublimest sense: we get, in its earlier
-portions, (especially in Book II, 10_c_, to Book V, 460_c_), no trace
-of any such conviction. For, in these earlier passages, the Guardians
-in the Ideal State are not to consider what may come after death: the
-central theme is the manner in which Justice carries with it its own
-recompense; and the rewards, that are popularly wont to be placed
-before the soul, are referred to ironically,--Socrates is determined to
-do without such hopes. In those later portions, on the contrary, there
-is the greatest insistence upon the importance of caring, not for this
-short life alone, but for the soul’s “whole time” and for what awaits
-it after death. And in the still later parts, (as in Books VI and VII),
-the sublimest form of Immortality is presupposed as true and actual
-throughout. Thus in Greece it is not till about 390-380 B.C., and in
-Plato himself not till his middle life, that we get a quite definite
-and final doctrine of the Immortality of all souls, and of a blessed
-after-existence for every just and holy life here below.
-
-For the survival after the body’s death, indubitably attributed to
-the Psyche in the Homeric Poems, is conceived there, throughout,
-as a miserably shrunken consciousness, and one which is dependent
-for its continuance upon the good offices bestowed by the survivors
-upon the corpse and grave. And the translation of the still living
-Menelaus to Elysium (Od. IV, 560-568) is probably a later insertion;
-belongs to a small class of exceptional cases; implies the writer’s
-inability to conceive a heightened consciousness for the soul, after
-the soul’s separation from the body; and is based, not upon any virtue
-or reward, but upon Menelaus’s family-relationship to Zeus. Ganymede
-gets similarly translated because of his physical beauty (II. XX, 232
-_seq._).
-
-Hesiod, though later than Homer as a writer, gives us, in his account
-of the Five Ages of the World (_Works and Days_, ll. 109-201), some
-traces of an Animistic conception of a heightened life of the bodiless
-soul beyond the grave,--a conception which had been neglected or
-suppressed by Homer, but which had evidently been preserved alive in
-the popular religion of, at least, Central Greece. Yet Hesiod knows of
-such a life only for the Golden and for the Silver Ages, and for some
-miraculous, exceptional cases of the fourth, the Heroic Age: already
-in the third, the Bronze Age, and still more emphatically in his own
-fifth, the Iron Age, there are no such consolations: nothing but the
-shrunken consciousness of the Homeric after-death Psyche is, quite
-evidently, felt by him to be the lot of all souls in the hard, iron
-present.
-
-The Cultus of the Heroes is already registered in Draco’s Athenian
-Laws, in about 620 B.C., as a traditional custom. And these Heroes have
-certainly lived at one time as men upon earth, and have become heroes
-only after death; their souls, though severed from the body, live a
-heightened imperishable life, indeed one that can mightily help men
-here below and now,--so at Delphi and at Salamis against the Persians.
-Yet here again each case of such an elevation was felt to be a miracle,
-an exception incapable of becoming a universal law: not even the germ
-of a belief in the Immortality of the soul as such seems to be here.
-
-The Cultus of the Nether-World Deities, of the Departed generally, and,
-as the culmination of all this movement, the Eleusinian Mysteries,
-must not be conceived as involving or as leading to, any belief in the
-ecstatic elevation of the soul, or consciousness of its God-likeness;
-and such unending bliss as is secured, is gained by men, not because
-they are virtuous and devout, but through their initiation into the
-Mysteries. Rhode assures us, rightly I think, that “it remains unproved
-that, during the classical period of Greek culture, the belief in
-Judges and a Judgment to be held in Hades over the deeds done by men on
-earth, had struck root among the people”; Professor Percy Gardner adds
-his great authority to the same conclusion.[196] Here again it is Plato
-who is the first to take up a clearly and consistently spiritual and
-universalistic position.
-
-Indeed it is only in the predominantly neuropathic, indeed largely
-immoral and repulsive, forms of the Dionysiac sect and movement, (at
-work, perhaps, already in the eighth century B.C. and which leads
-on to the formation of the more aristocratic and priestly Orphic
-communities) that a demonstrable and direct belief arose in the soul’s
-intrinsic God-likeness, or even divinity, and in its immortality,
-or even eternity; and that stimulations, materials, and conceptions
-were furnished to Greek thought, which are traceable wheresoever it
-henceforth inclines to belief in the soul’s intrinsic Immortality.
-
-Yet the leaven spread but slowly into philosophy. For the Ionian
-philosophers, and among them Heraclitus, the impressive teacher of
-the flux of all things, flourish from about 600 to 430 B.C.; but,
-_naïve_ Materialists and Pantheists as they are, they frankly exclude
-all survival of individual consciousness after death. The Eleatic
-philosophers live between 550 and 450 B.C., and are all busy with _a
-priori_ logical constructions of the physical world, conceived as sole
-and self-explanatory; and amongst them is Parmenides, the powerful
-propounder of the complete identity and immutability of all reality.
-Those transcendent spiritual beliefs appear first as part, indeed as
-the very foundation, although still rather of a mode of life than of
-a formal philosophy, in the teaching and community of Pythagoras, who
-seems to have lived about 580 to 490 B.C., and who certainly emigrated
-from Asia Minor to Croton in Southern Italy. The soul appears here
-as intrinsically immortal, indeed without beginning and without end.
-And then Immortality forms one (the mystical) of the two thoroughly
-heterogeneous elements of the, otherwise predominantly Ionic and
-Materialistic, philosophy of Empedocles of Agrigentum in Sicily, about
-490 to 435 B.C. In both these cases the Dionysiac-Orphic provenance of
-the “Immortality”-doctrines is clearly apparent.
-
-And then, among the poets who bridge over the period up to Plato, we
-find Pindar, who, alongside of reproductions of the ordinary, popular
-conceptions, gives us at times lofty, Orphic-like teachings as to
-the eternity, the migration, and the eventual persistent rest and
-happiness of the just Soul, and as to the suffering of the unjust one;
-Aeschylus, who primarily dwells upon the Gods’ judgment in this life,
-and who makes occasional allusions to the after-life which are partly
-still of the Homeric type; Sophocles, who indeed refers to the special
-privileges which, in the after-life, attend upon the souls that have
-here been initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries, and who causes
-Oedipus to be translated, whilst still alive, to Other-World happiness,
-but who knows nothing of an unceasing heightened consciousness
-for all men after death; and Euripides, who, showing plainly the
-influence of the Sophists, gives expression, alongside of Pantheistic
-identifications of the soul and of the aether, to every kind of
-misgiving and doubt as to any survival after death.
-
-And as to the appearance of the doctrine among the Jews, we again find
-a surprising lateness. I follow here, with but minor contributions
-and modifications from other writers and myself, the main conclusions
-of Dr. Charles’s standard _Critical History of the Doctrine of a
-Future Life_, London, 1899, whose close knowledge of the subject is
-unsurpassed, and who finds as many and as early attestations as are
-well-nigh findable by serious workers.[197]
-
-“The primitive beliefs of the individual Israelite regarding the future
-life, being derived from Ancestor-worship, were implicitly antagonistic
-to Yahwism, from its first proclamation by Moses.… This antagonism
-becomes explicit and results in the final triumph of Yahwism.” And
-to the early Israelite, even under Yahwism, “the religious unit was”
-not the individual but “the family or tribe.” Thus, even fully six
-centuries after Moses, “the message of the prophets of the eighth
-century,” Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, “is still directed to the
-nation, and the judgments they proclaim are collective punishment for
-collective guilt. It is not till late in the seventh century B.C. that
-the problem of individual retribution really emerged, and received
-its first solution in the teaching of Jeremiah.” And “the further
-development of these ideas,” by the teaching of Ezekiel and of some
-of the Psalms and Proverbs, as regards individual responsibility
-and retribution in this life, and by the deep misgivings and keen
-questionings of Job and Ecclesiastes, as to the adequacy of this
-teaching, “led inevitably to the conception of a blessed life beyond
-the grave.”
-
-Yet throughout the Hebrew Old Testament the Eschatology of the Nation
-greatly predominates over that of the Individual. Indeed in pre-Exilic
-times “the day of Yahwe,” with its national judgments, constitutes
-the all but exclusive subject of the prophetic teaching as to the
-future. Only from the Exile, (597 to 538 B.C.), onwards, does the
-eschatological development begin to grow in complexity, for now the
-individualism first preached by Jeremiah begins to maintain its claim
-also. But not till the close of the fourth century, or the beginning of
-the third century B.C., do the separate eschatologies of the individual
-and of the nation issue finally in their synthesis: the righteous
-individual will participate in the Messianic Kingdom, the righteous
-dead of Israel will arise to share therein,--thus in Isaiah xxvi, 1-19,
-a passage which it is difficult to place earlier than about 334 B.C.
-The resurrection is here limited to the just. In Daniel xii, 2, which
-is probably not earlier than 165 B.C., the resurrection is extended,
-not indeed to all members of Israel, but, with respective good and evil
-effects, to its martyrs and apostates.
-
-And the slowness and incompleteness of the development throughout the
-Hebrew Old Testament is strikingly illustrated by the great paucity
-of texts which yield, without the application of undue pressure, any
-clear conviction or hope of a heightened, or even a sheer, maintenance
-of the soul’s this-life consciousness and force after death. Besides
-the passages just indicated, Dr. Charles can only find Psalms xlix and
-lxxiii, and Job xix, 25-27, all three, according to him, later than
-Ezekiel, who died in 571 B.C.[198] The textually uncertain and obscure
-Job-passage (xix, 25, 26) must be discounted, since it evidently
-demands interpretation according to the plain presupposition and point
-of the great poem as a whole.--And the same result is reached by the
-numerous, entirely unambiguous, passages which maintain the negative
-persuasion. In the hymn put into the mouth of the sick king Hezekiah,
-for about 713 B.C., (a composition which seems to be very late,
-perhaps only of the second century B.C.), we hear: “The grave cannot
-praise Thee … they that go down into the pit cannot hope for truth.
-The living, the living, he shall praise Thee, as I do this day.” And
-the Psalter contains numerous similar declarations. Thus vi, 5: “In
-death there is no remembrance of Thee: in the grave who shall give Thee
-thanks?” and cxv, 17: “The dead praise not the Lord, neither any that
-go down into silence; but _we_ praise the Lord.” See also Psalms xxx,
-19; lxxxviii, 11.
-
-Indeed the name for the Departed is Rephaim, “the limp, the powerless
-ones.” Stade well says: “According to the ancient Israelitish
-conception the entire human being, body and soul, outlasts death,
-whilst losing all that makes life worth living. That which persists
-in Sheol for all eternity is the form of man, emptied of all content.
-Antique thought ignores as yet that there exists no such thing as a
-form without substance. The conception has as little in common with
-the conviction of the Immortality of the Soul, which found its chief
-support in Greek ideas, as with the expectation of the Resurrection,
-which grew out of the Jewish Messianic hope, or with the Christian
-anticipation of Eternal Life, which is also based upon religious
-motives.”[199]
-
-Yet, with respect to this objection from the lateness of the doctrine,
-we must not forget that fully consistent Monotheism and Monogamy are
-also late, but not, on that account, less true or less precious; and
-indeed that, as a universal rule, the human mind has acquired at all
-adequate convictions as to most certain and precious truths but slowly
-and haltingly. This process is manifest even in Astronomy, Geology,
-Botany, Human Anatomy. It could not fail to be, not less but more
-the case in a matter like this which, if it concerns us most deeply,
-is yet both too close to us to be readily appreciated in its true
-proportions, and too little a matter of mathematical demonstration
-or of direct experience not to take much time to develop, and not to
-demand an ever-renewed acquisition and purification, being, as it is,
-the postulate and completion of man’s ethical and spiritual faiths, at
-their deepest and fullest.
-
-(3) And with regard to the unsatisfactory character of some of the
-earliest manifestations of the belief, this point is brought home to
-us, with startling vividness, in the beginnings of the doctrine in
-ancient Greece. For Rhode’s very careful and competent examination of
-precisely this side of the whole question shows conclusively (even
-though I think, with Crusius, that he has overlooked certain rudiments
-of analogous but healthy experiences and beliefs in pre-Dionysiac
-Greece) how new and permanently effective a contribution to the full
-doctrine was made, for the Hellenic world and hence indirectly for
-all Western humanity, by the self-knowledge gained in that wildly
-orgiastic upheaval, those dervish-like dances and ecstatic fits during
-the Dionysian night-celebrations on the Thracian mountain-sides.
-Indeed Rhode traces how from these experiences, partly from the
-continuation of them, partly from the reaction against them, on the
-part of the intensely dualistic and ascetic teaching and training of
-the Orphic sect, there arose, and filtered through to Pythagoras, to
-Plato, and to the whole Neo-Platonist school, the clear conception
-and precise terminology concerning ecstatic, enthusiastic states,
-the divinity and eternity of the human soul, its punitive lapse
-into and imprisonment within the body, and its need of purification
-throughout the earthly life and of liberation through death from this
-its incurably accidental and impeding companion.--Thus we get here,
-concerning one of the chief sources of at least the formulation of our
-belief in Immortality, what looks a very nest of suspicious, repulsive
-circumstances:--psycho-physical phenomena, which, quite explicable to,
-and indeed explained by, us now as in nowise supernatural, could not
-fail to appear portentous to those men who first experienced them;
-unmoral or immoral attitudes and activities of mind and will; and
-demonstrable excesses of feeling and conception as regards both the
-static goodness, the downright divinity, eternity, and increateness
-of the soul, and the unmixed evil of the body with its entirely
-disconnected alongsideness to the soul. Does not all this spell a mass
-of wild hallucination, impurity, fanaticism, and superstition?
-
-Yet here again it behoves us, if not to accept, yet also not to reject,
-in wholesale fashion and in haste. For the profoundly experienced
-Professor Pierre Janet shows[200] us, what is now assumed as an axiom,
-and as the ultimate justification of the present widespread interest
-in the study of Hysteria, that “we must admit for the moral world the
-great principle universally admitted for the physical world since
-Claude Bernard,--viz. that the laws of illness are, at bottom, the
-same as those of health, and that, in the former, there is but the
-exaggeration or the diminution of phenomena which existed already in
-the latter.”
-
-And if thus our recent studies of morbid mentalities have been able
-to throw a flood of light upon the mechanism and character of the
-healthy mind, a mind more difficult to analyze precisely because
-of the harmonious interaction of its forces, there is nothing very
-surprising if man, in the past, learnt to know his own fundamental
-nature better in and through periods of abnormal excitation than in
-those of normal balance. And the resultant doctrines in the case in
-question only required, and demand again and again, a careful pruning
-and harmonizing to show forth an extraordinary volume of abiding
-truth. The insuppressible difference between mind and matter, and the
-distinction between the fully recollected soul (intuitive reason), and
-explicit reasoning; the immeasurable superiority of mind over matter,
-and the superiority of that full reason over this “thin” reasoning;
-the certainty, involved in all our inevitable mental categories and
-assumptions and in all our motives for action, of this mind and
-intuition being more like the cause of all things than are those
-other inferior realities and activities; the indestructibleness of
-the postulates and standards of objective and infinite Beauty, Truth,
-Goodness, of our consciousness of being intrinsically bound to them,
-and of our inmost humanity and its relative greatness being measurable
-by just this our consciousness of this our obligation, and hence
-by the keenness of our sense of failure, and by our striving after
-purification and the realization of our immanental possibilities: all
-this remains deeply fruitful and true.
-
-And those crude early experiences and analyses certainly point to
-what, even now, are our most solid reasons for belief in Immortality:
-for if man’s mind and soul can thus keenly suffer from the sense
-of the contingency and mutability of all things directly observed
-by it without and within, it must itself be, at least in part or
-potentially, outside of this flux which it so vividly apprehends
-as _not_ Permanence, _not_ Rest, _not_ true Life. Let us overlook,
-then, and forgive the first tumultuous, childishly rude and clumsy,
-mentally and emotionally hyper-aesthetic forms of apprehension of
-these great spiritual facts and laws, forms which are not, after all,
-more misleading than is the ordinary anaesthetic condition of our
-apprehending faculties towards these fundamental forces and testimonies
-of our lot and nature. Not the wholesale rejection, then, of even those
-crude Dionysian witnessings, still less of the already more clarified
-Orphic teaching, and least of all of Plato’s great utilizations and
-spiritualizations can be required of us, but only a reinterpretation
-of those first impressions and of mankind’s analogous experiences, and
-a sifting and testing of the latter by the light of all that has been
-deeply lived through, and seriously thought out, by spiritually awake
-humanity ever since.--And we should remember that the history of the
-doctrine among the Jews is, as has already been intimated, grandly free
-from any such suspicious occasions and concomitances.
-
-
-2. _Two Philosophical Difficulties._
-
-Yet it is precisely this latter, social, body-and-soul-survival
-doctrine which brings the second group of objections, the philosophical
-difficulties, to clear articulation. For thus we are unavoidably driven
-to one or other of the equally difficult alternatives, of a bodiless
-life of the soul, and of a survival or resurrection of the body.
-
-(1) Christianity, by its explicit teachings, and even more by its whole
-drift and interior affinities, requires the survival of all that is
-essential to the whole man, and conceives this whole as constituted,
-not by thought alone but also by feeling and will and the power of
-effectuation; so that the body, or some unpicturable equivalent to
-it, seems necessary to this physico-spiritual, ultimately organic
-conception of what man is and must continue to be, if he is to remain
-man at all.--And Psychology, on its part, is showing us, more and more,
-how astonishingly wide and deep is the dependence, at least for their
-actuation, of the various functions and expressions of man’s character
-and spirit upon his bodily frame. For not only is the reasoning
-faculty seen, ever since Aristotle, to depend, for its material and
-stimulation, upon the impressions of the senses, nor can we represent
-it to ourselves otherwise than as seated in the brain or in some
-such physical organism, but the interesting Lange-James observations
-and theory make it likely that also the emotions,--the feelings as
-distinct from sensations,--ever result, as a matter of fact, from
-certain foregoing, physico-neural impressions and modifications, which
-latter follow upon this or that perception of the mind, a perception
-which would otherwise, as is the case in certain neural lesions and
-anaesthesias, remain entirely dry and unemotional.[201]--And the
-sense of the Infinite, which we have had such reason to take as the
-very centre of religion, arises ever, within man’s life here below,
-in contrast to, and as a concomitant and supplementation of, his
-perception of the Finite and Contingent, and hence not without his
-senses being alive and active.
-
-Now all this fits in admirably with the whole Jewish-Christian respect
-for, high claims upon, and constant training of the body, the senses,
-the emotions, and with the importance attached to the Visible and
-Audible,--History, Institutions, Society.--Yet our difficulties are
-clear. For however spiritually we may conceive a bodily survival or
-resurrection; however completely we may place the identity of the
-various stages of the body in this life, and the sameness between
-the body before death and after the resurrection, in the identity of
-its quasi-creator, the body-weaving soul, we can in nowise picture
-to ourselves such a new, indefinitely more spiritual, incorporation,
-and we bring upon ourselves acute difficulties, for both before and
-after this unpicturable event. Before the resurrection there would
-have to be unconsciousness between death and that event; but thus
-the future life is broken up, and for no spiritual reason. Or there
-would be consciousness; but then the substitute for the body, that
-occasions this consciousness, would, apparently, render all further
-revivification of the body unnecessary. And if we take the resurrection
-as effected, we promptly feel how mixed and clumsy, how inadequate,
-how less, and not more, than the best and noblest elements of our
-experience and aspirations even here and now, is such a, still
-essentially temporal and spacial, mode of existence.
-
-I take it that, against all this, we can but continue to maintain
-two points. The soul’s life after bodily death is not a matter of
-experience or of logical demonstration, but a postulate of faith and a
-consequence from our realization of the human spirit’s worth; and hence
-is as little capable of being satisfactorily pictured, as are all the
-other great spiritual realities which can nevertheless be shown to be
-presupposed and implicitly affirmed by every act of faith in the final
-truth and abiding importance of anything whatsoever.--And again, it is
-not worth while to attempt to rescue, Aristotle-wise, just that single,
-and doubtless not the highest, function of man’s spirit and character,
-his dialectic faculty, or even his intellectual intuitive power, for
-the purpose of thus escaping, or at least minimizing, the difficulties
-attendant upon the belief in Immortality. If we postulate, as we do,
-man’s survival, we must postulate, without being able to fill in or to
-justify any details of the scheme, the survival of all that may and
-does constitute man’s true and ultimate personality. How much or how
-little this may precisely mean, we evidently know but very imperfectly:
-but we know enough to be confident that it means more than the
-abstractive, increasingly dualistic school of Plato, Philo, Plotinus,
-Proclus would allow.
-
-(2) But speculative reason seems also to raise a quite general
-objection, based upon man’s littleness within the immense Universe, and
-upon the arbitrariness of excepting those tiny points, those centres of
-human consciousness, men’s souls, from the flux, the ceaseless becoming
-and undoing, of all the other parts of that mighty whole, immortal,
-surely, only _as_ a whole.
-
-Here we can safely say that, at least in this precise form, the
-difficulty springs predominantly not from reason or experience, but
-from an untutored imagination. For all our knowledge of that great
-external world, which this objection supposes to englobe our small
-internal world, as a part inferior, or at most but equal, to the other
-parts of that whole, is dependent upon this interior world of ours; and
-however truly inherent in that external world we may hold that world’s
-laws to be, those laws can, after all, be shown to be as truly the
-result of our own mind’s spontaneous work,--an architectonic building
-up by this mind of the sense-impressions conveyed to it from without.
-And that whole Universe, in so far as it is material, cannot be
-compared, either in kind or in dignity, to Mind: only the indications
-there, parallel in this to our experiences within our own mind, of a
-Mind and Spirit infinitely greater and nobler than, yet with a certain
-affinity to, our own,--only these constitute that outer world as great
-as this our inner world. Indeed it is plain that Materialism is so
-far from constituting the solution to the problem of existence, that
-even Psycho-Physical Parallelism, even the attribution of any ultimate
-reality to Matter, are on their trial. It is anyhow already clear that,
-of the two, it is easier and nearer to the truth to maintain that
-Matter and its categories are simply modes in the manifestation of Mind
-to minds and in the apprehension of Mind by minds, than to declare Mind
-to be but a function or resultant of Matter.[202]
-
-But if all this is so, then no simply sensible predominance of the
-sensible Universe, nor even any ascertainment of the mere flux and
-interchange of and between all things material and their elements,
-can reasonably affect the question as to the superiority and
-permanence of Mind. But we shall return, in the next chapter, to the
-difficulties special to the Immortality of individual human spirits or
-personalities,--for this is, I think, the point at which the problem is
-still acute.
-
-
-3. _Three Ethico-Practical Difficulties._
-
-The last group of objections is directly practical and ethical, and
-raises three points: the small space and influence occupied and
-exercised, apparently, by such a belief, in the spiritual life of even
-serious persons; the seemingly selfish, ungenerous type of religion and
-of moral tone fostered by definite belief in, or at least occupation
-with, the thought of an individual future life, as contrasted with the
-nobility of tone engendered by such denials or abstractions from all
-such beliefs as we find in Spinoza and Schleiermacher; and, finally,
-the plausibility of the teaching, on the part of some distinguished
-thinkers and poets, that a positive conviction of this our short
-earthly life being the sole span of our individual consciousness
-is directly productive of a certain deep tenderness, an heroic
-concentration of attention, and a virile truthfulness, which are
-unattainable, which indeed are weakened or rendered impossible by,
-the necessarily vague anticipation of an unending future life; a hope
-which, where operative at all, can but dwarf and deaden all earthly
-aspiration and endeavour.
-
-(1) As to the first point, which has perhaps never been more
-brilliantly affirmed than by Mr. Schiller,[203] I altogether doubt
-whether the numerous appearances, which admittedly seem to point that
-way, are rightly interpreted by such a conclusion. For it is, for one
-thing, most certainly possible to be deeply convinced of the reality
-and importance of the soul’s heightened after-life, and to have no
-kind of belief or interest in Psychical Research, at least in such
-Research as an intrinsically valuable aid to any specifically religious
-convictions. No aloofness from such attempts to find spiritual
-realities at the phenomenal level can, (unless it is clear that the
-majority of educated Western Europeans share the naïve assumptions of
-this position), indicate negation of, or indifference to, the belief in
-Immortality.--And next, it is equally certain that precisely the most
-fruitful form of the belief is that which conceives the After-life as
-already involved in this one, and which, therefore, dwells specially,
-not upon the posteriority in time, but upon the difference in kind
-of that spiritual life of the soul which, even _hic et nunc_, can be
-sought after and experienced, in ever imperfect degrees no doubt, yet
-really and more and more. Here we ever get an approach to Simultaneity
-and Eternity, instead of sheer succession and clock-time: and here
-the fundamental attitude of the believer would appear only if pressed
-to deny or exclude the deathlessness of the spirit and its life,--the
-usual latency and simple implication of the positive conviction, in
-nowise diminishing this conviction’s reality.--And, finally, it would
-have to be seen whether those who are indifferent or sceptical as to
-Immortal or Eternal Life, are appreciably fewer and largely other
-than those who are careless as to the other deep implications and
-requirements of spiritual experience. We may well doubt whether they
-would turn out to be so.
-
-(2) As to the second point, we have already found how utterly
-insuppressible is the pleasure, normally concomitant upon every act of
-noble self-conquest; and how, though we can and should perform such
-and all other acts, as far as possible, from the ultimate, determining
-motive of thereby furthering the realization of the Kingdom of God,
-there can be no solid truthfulness or sane nobility in insisting upon
-attempts at thinking away and denying the fact and utility of that
-concomitant pleasure. But if so, then a further, other-world extension
-of that realization and of this concomitant happiness, and a belief
-here below in such an eventual extension, cannot of themselves be
-ignoble or debasing. Occasions for every degree and kind of purely
-selfish and faultily natural acts, of acts inchoatively supernatural
-but still predominantly slavish, reappear here, in close parallel to
-the variety of disposition displayed by men towards every kind of
-reality and ideal, towards the Family, Science, the State, Humanity,
-where the same concomitances and the same high uses and mean abuses are
-ever possible and actual. Neither here nor there should we attempt to
-impoverish truth and life, in order to exclude the possibility of their
-abuse.--And it would, of course, be profoundly unfair to contrast such
-a rarely noble spirit as Spinoza among the deniers with the average
-mind from among the affirmers. The average or the majority of the
-deniers would not, I think, appear as more generous and devoted than
-the corresponding average or majority on the other side.
-
-(3) And as to the supposed directly beneficial effects of a positive
-denial of Immortality, such as have been sung for us by George
-Eliot and Giovanni Pascoli, we can safely affirm that the special
-tendernesses and quiet heroisms, deduced by them from such a negation,
-are too obviously dependent upon spiritual implications and instincts,
-for us to be able to put them directly to the credit of that denial.
-Only in so far as Immortality were not a postulate intrinsically
-connected with belief in objective and obligatory Beauty, Truth, and
-Goodness,--in God as our origin and end,--could its persistent and
-deliberate denial not be injurious to these fundamental convictions
-and to the ultimate health of the soul’s life: and of this intrinsic
-non-connection there is no sufficient evidence.--Certainly, in such
-a case as Spinoza’s, the same strain of reasoning which makes him
-abandon individual Immortality Ought, in logic, to prevent him, a
-mere hopelessly determined link in the _Natura Naturata_, from ever
-attaining to the free self-dedication of himself, as now a fully
-responsible member of the _Natura Naturans_. And if not all the grand
-depth of his spiritual instinct and moral nobility, and its persistence
-in spite of its having no logical room in the fixedly naturalistic
-element of his teaching, can be urged as an argument in favour of the
-ultimate truth and ethical helpfulness of that whole element, neither
-can it be urged with respect to what is presumably one part of that
-element, his denial of personal Immortality.
-
-
-II. CATHERINE’S GENERAL AFTER-LIFE CONCEPTIONS.
-
-Now Catherine’s general After-Life Conceptions in part bring into
-interesting prominence, in part really meet and overcome, the
-perplexities and mutually destructive alternatives which we have just
-considered. I shall here again leave over to the next chapter the
-simply ultimate questions, such as that of the pure Eternity _versus_
-the Unendingness of the soul; but shall allow myself, as to one set
-of her general ideas, a little digression as to the probability of
-their ultimate literary suggestion by Plato.--These Platonic passages
-probably reached her too indirectly, and by means and in forms which I
-have too entirely failed to discover, for me to be able to discuss them
-in my chapter devoted to her assured and demonstrably direct literary
-sources. But these sayings of Plato greatly help to illustrate the
-meaning of her doctrine.--I shall group these, her general, positions
-and implications under four heads, and shall consider three of these
-as, in substance, profoundly satisfactory, but one of them, the second,
-as acceptable only with many limitations, although this second has
-obviously much influenced the form given by her to several of those
-other conceptions.
-
-
-1. _Forecasts of the Hereafter, based upon present experience._
-
-First, then, we get, as the fundamental presupposition of the
-whole Eschatology, a grandly sane, simple, and profound doctrine
-formulated over and over again and applied throughout, with a splendid
-consistency, as the key and limit to all her anticipations and
-picturings. Only because of the fact, and of our conviction of the
-fact, of the unbroken continuity and identity of God with Himself,
-of the human soul with itself, and of the deepest of the relations
-subsisting between that God and the soul, across the chasm formed by
-our body’s death, and only in proportion as we can and do experience
-and achieve, during this our earthly life, certain spiritual laws and
-realities of a sufficiently elemental, universal, and fruitful, more or
-less time- and space-less character, can we (whilst ever remembering
-the analogical nature of such picturings even as to the soul’s life
-here) safely and profitably forecast certain general features of the
-future which is thus already so largely a present. But, given these
-conditions in the present, we can and should forecast the future,
-to the extent implied. And as Plato’s great imaginative projection,
-his life-work, the _Republic_, achieves its original end, (of making
-more readily understandable, by objectivizing on a large scale, the
-life of the inner city of our own soul), in so far as he has rightly
-understood the human soul and has found appropriate representations
-of its powers, laws, and ideals in his future commonwealth, even
-if we cannot accept this picture for political purposes and in all
-its details: so is it also with Catherine’s projection, which, if
-bolder in its subject-matter, is, most rightly, indefinitely more
-general in its indications than is Plato’s great diagram of the soul.
-Man’s spiritual personality, being held by her to survive death,--to
-retain its identity and an at least equivalent consciousness, of that
-identity,--the deepest experiences of that personality before the
-body’s death are conceived as re-experienced by it, in a heightened
-degree and form, after death itself. Hence these great pictures, of
-what the soul will experience then, would remain profoundly true of
-what the soul seeks and requires now, even if there were no _then_ at
-all.
-
-And note particularly how only with regard to one stage and condition
-of the spirit’s future life,--that of the purification of the imperfect
-soul,--does she indulge in any at all direct doctrine or detailed
-picturing; and this, doubtless, not only because she has experienced
-much concerning this matter in her own life here, but also because
-the projection of these experiences would still give us, not the
-ultimate state, but more or less only a prolongation of our mixed,
-joy-in-suffering life upon earth. As to the two ultimate states, we get
-only quite incidental glimpses, although even these are strongly marked
-by her general position and method.
-
-
-2. _Catherine’s forecasts and present experience correspondingly
-limited._
-
-And next, coming to the projection itself, we naturally find it
-to present all the strength and limitations of her own spiritual
-experiences which are thus projected: her attitude towards the body
-and towards human fellowship, (two subjects which are shown to be
-closely inter-related by the continuous manner in which they stand
-and fall together throughout the history of philosophy and religion,)
-thus constitute the second general peculiarity of her Eschatology. We
-have already noted, in her life, her strongly ecstatic, body-ignoring,
-body-escaping type of religion; and how, even in her case, it tended to
-starve the corporate, institutional conceptions and affections. Here,
-in the projection, we find both the cause and the effect again, and on
-a larger scale. Her continuous psycho-physical discomforts and keen
-thirst for a unity and simplicity as rapid and complete as possible,
-the joy and strength derived from ecstatic habits and affinities, would
-all make her, without even herself being aware of it, drop all further
-thought as to the future fate of that oppressive “prison-house” from
-which her spirit had at last got free.
-
-Now such non-occupation with the fate of the body and of her
-fellow-souls may appear quite appropriate in her Purgatorial
-Eschatology, yet we cannot but find that, even here, it already
-possesses grave disadvantages, and that it persists throughout all her
-After-life conceptions. For in all the states and stages of the soul we
-get a markedly unsocial, a _sola cum solo_ picture. And yet there is,
-perhaps, no more striking difference, amongst their many affinities,
-between Platonism and Christianity than the intense Individualism
-which marks the great Greek’s doctrine, and the profoundly social
-conception which pervades Our Lord’s own teaching,--in each case as
-regards the next life as well as this one. Plotinus’s great culminating
-commendation of “the flight of the alone to the Alone” continues
-Plato’s tradition; whereas, if even St. Paul and the Joannine writings
-speak at times as though the individual soul attained to its full
-personality in and by direct intercourse with God alone, the Synoptic
-Gospels, and at bottom also those two great lovers of Our Lord’s
-spirit, never cease to emphasize the social constituent of the soul’s
-life both here and hereafter. The Kingdom of Heaven, the Soul of
-the Church, as truly constitutes the different personalities, their
-spirituality and their joy, as they constitute it,--that great Organism
-which, as such, is both first and last in the Divine thought and love.
-
-Here, in the at least partial ignoring of these great social facts,
-we touch the main defect of most mystical outlooks; yet this defect
-does not arise from what they possess, but from what they lack. For
-solitude, and the abstractive, unifying, intuitive, emotional, mystical
-element is also wanted, and this element and movement Catherine
-exemplifies in rare perfection. Indeed, in the great classical,
-central period of her life she had, as we know, combined all this
-with much of the outward movement, society, detailed observation,
-attachment, the morally _en-static_, the immanental type. Unfortunately
-the same ill-health and ever-increasing predominance of the former
-element, which turned her, quite naturally, to these eschatological
-contemplations, and which indeed helped to give them their touching
-tone of first-hand experience, also tended, of necessity, to make her
-drop even such slight and lingering social elements as had formerly
-coloured her thought. It is, then, only towards the understanding and
-deepening of the former of these two necessary movements of religion,
-that these, her latter-day enlargements of some of her deepest
-experiences and convictions will be found true helps.
-
-Yet if the usual _ad extra_ disadvantages of such an abstractive
-position towards the body are thus exemplified by her, in this her
-unsocial, individualistic attitude, it is most interesting to note
-how entirely she avoids the usual _ad intra_ drawbacks of this same
-position. For if her whole attention, and, increasingly, even her
-consciousness are, in true ecstatic guise, absorbed away from her
-fellows and concentrated exclusively upon God in herself and herself
-in God, yet this consciousness consists not only of _Noûs_, that dry
-theoretic reason which, already by Plato, but still more by Aristotle,
-is alone conceived as surviving the body, but contains also the upper
-range of _Thumos_,--all those passions of the noblest kind,--love,
-admiration, gratitude, utter self-donation, joy in purifying suffering
-and in an ever-growing self-realization as part of the great plan of
-God,--all the highest notes in that wondrous scale of deep feeling and
-of emotionally coloured willing which Plato made dependent, not for its
-character but for the possibility of its operation, upon the body’s
-union with the soul.--And thus we see how, in her conception of the
-soul’s own self within itself and of its relation to God, the Christian
-idea of Personality, as of a many-sided organism in which Love and
-Will are the very flower of the whole, has triumphed over the Platonic
-presentation of the Spirit, in so far as this is taken to require and
-achieve an ultimate sublimation free from all emotive elements. Thus
-in her doctrine the whole Personality survives death, although this
-Personality energizes only, as it were upwards, to God alone, and
-not also sideways and downwards, towards its fellows and the lesser
-children of God.
-
-
-3. _Catherine’s forecast influenced by Plato._
-
-Catherine’s third peculiarity consists in a rich and profound
-organization of two doctrines, the one libertarian, the other
-determinist; and requires considerable quotation from Plato, whose
-teachings, bereft of all transmigration-fancies, seem clearly to
-reappear here, (however complex may have been the mediation,) in
-Catherine’s great conception.
-
-The determinist doctrine maintains that virtue and vice, in proportion
-as they are allowed their full development, spontaneously and
-necessarily attain to their own congenital consummation, a consummation
-which consists, respectively, in the bliss inseparable from the final
-and complete identity between the inevitable results upon itself of
-the soul’s deliberate endeavours, and the indestructible requirements
-of this same soul’s fundamental nature; and in the misery of the, now
-fully felt but only gradually superable, or even, in other cases,
-insuperable, antagonism between the inevitable consequences within its
-own self of the soul’s more or less deliberate choosings, and those
-same, here also ineradicable, demands of its own truest nature.
-
-As Marsilio Ficino says, in his _Theologia Platonica_, published in
-Florence in 1482: “Virtue is reward in its first budding, reward is
-virtue full-grown. Vice is punishment at the moment of its birth;
-punishment is vice at its consummation. For, in each of these cases,
-one and the same thing is first the simple seed and then the full ear
-of corn; and one and the same thing is the full ear of corn and then
-the food of man. Precisely the very things then that we sow in this our
-(earthly) autumn, shall we reap in that (other-world) summer-day.”[204]
-It is true that forensic terms and images are also not wanting in
-Catherine’s sayings; but these, in part, run simply parallel to the
-immanental conception without modifying it; in part, they are in
-its service; and, in part, they are the work of the theologians’
-arrangements and glosses discussed in my Appendix.
-
-And the libertarian doctrine declares that it is the soul itself which,
-in the beyond and immediately after death, chooses the least painful,
-because the most expressive of her then actual desires, from among the
-states which the natural effects upon her own self of her own earthly
-choosings have left her interiorly free to choose.
-
-Now it is in this second doctrine especially that we find so detailed
-an anticipation by Plato of a whole number of highly original and
-characteristic points and combinations of points, as to render a
-fortuitous concurrence between Catherine and Plato practically
-impossible. Yet I have sought in vain, among Catherine’s authentic
-sayings, actions, possessions, or friends, for any trace of direct
-acquaintance with any of Plato’s writings. But Ficino’s Latin
-translation of Plato, published, with immense applause, in Florence in
-1483, 1484, must have been known, in those intensely Platonizing times,
-to even non-professed Humanists in Genoa, long before Catherine’s death
-in 1510, so that one or other of her intimates may have communicated
-the substance of these Platonic doctrines to her.[205] Plotinus, of
-whom Ficino published a Latin translation in 1492, contains but a
-feeble echo of Plato on this point. Proclus, directly known only very
-little till much after Catherine’s time, is in even worse case. The
-Areopagite, who has so continuously taken over whole passages from
-all three writers, although directly almost exclusively from Proclus,
-contains nothing more immediately to the purpose than his impressive
-sayings concerning Providence’s continuous non-forcing of the human
-personality in its fundamental constitution and its free elections with
-their inevitable consequences; hence Catherine cannot have derived her
-ideas, in the crisp definiteness which they retain in her sayings, from
-her cousin the Dominican nun and the Areopagite. And it is certain, as
-we have seen, how scattered and inchoate are the hints which she may
-have found in St. Paul, the Joannine writings, and Jacopone da Todi.
-St. Augustine contains nothing that would be directly available,--an
-otherwise likely source considering Catherine’s close connection with
-the Augustinian Canonesses of S. Maria delle Grazie.
-
-In Plato, then, we get five conceptions and symbolic pictures that are
-practically identical with those of Catherine.
-
-(1) First we get the conception of souls having each, in exact
-accordance with the respective differences of their moral and spiritual
-disposition and character, as these have been constituted by them here
-below, a “place” or environment, expressive of that character, ready
-for their occupation after the body’s death. “The soul that is pure
-departs at death, herself invisible, to the invisible world,--to the
-divine, immortal and rational: thither arriving, she lives in bliss.
-But the soul that is impure at the time of her departure and is …
-engrossed by the corporeal …, is weighed down and drawn back again into
-the visible place (world).”
-
-And this scheme, of like disposition seeking a like place, is then
-carried out, by the help of the theory of transmigration, as a
-re-incarnation of these various characters into environments, bodies,
-exactly corresponding to them: gluttonous souls are assigned to asses’
-bodies, tyrannous souls to those of wolves, and so on: in a word,
-“there is no difficulty in assigning to all ‘a whither’ (a place)
-answering to their general natures and propensities.”[206] For this
-corresponds to a law which runs throughout all things,--a determinism
-of consequences which does not prevent the liberty of causes. “The King
-of the universe contrived a general plan, by which a thing of a certain
-nature found a seat and place of a certain kind. But the formation of
-this nature, he left to the wills of individuals.”
-
-Or, with the further spacial imagery of movements up, level, or down,
-we get: “All things that have a soul change … and, in changing, move
-according to law and the order of destiny. Lesser changes of nature
-move on level ground, but great crimes sink … into the so-called lower
-places …; and, when the soul becomes greatly different and divine, she
-also greatly changes her place, which is now altogether holy.”[207] The
-original, divinely intended “places” of souls are all high and good,
-and similar to each other though not identical, each soul having its
-own special “place”; and for this congenital “place” each soul has a
-resistible yet ineradicable home-sickness. “The first incarnation” of
-human souls which “distributes each soul to a star,” is ordained to
-be similar for all.… “And when they have been of necessity implanted
-in bodily forms, should they master their passions … they live in
-righteousness; if otherwise, in unrighteousness. And he who lived well
-through his allotted time shall be conveyed once more to a habitation
-in his kindred star, and there shall enjoy a blissful and congenial
-life; but failing this he shall pass into … such a form of (further)
-incarnation as fits his disposition … until he shall overcome, by
-reason, all that burthen that afterwards clung around him.”[208]
-
-If from all this we exclude the soul’s existence before any
-beginning of its body, its transmigration into other bodies, and the
-self-sufficiency of reason; and if we make it all to be penetrated
-by God’s presence, grace, and love, and by our corresponding or
-conflicting emotional and volitional as well as intellectual attitude:
-we shall get Catherine’s position exactly.
-
-(2) But again, in at least one phase of his thinking, Plato pictures
-the purification of the imperfect soul as effected, of at least as
-begun, not in a succession of “places” of an extensionally small but
-organic kind, bodies, but in a “place” of an extensionally larger but
-inorganic sort,--the shore of a lake, where the soul has to wait.
-“The Acherusian lake is the lake to the shores of which the many go
-when they are dead; and, after waiting an appointed time, which to
-some is longer and to others shorter, they are sent back to be born
-as animals.” Here we evidently get a survival of the conception,
-predominant in Homer, of a pain-and-joyless Hades, but limited here to
-the middle, the imperfect class of souls, and followed, in their case,
-by transmigration, to which alone, apparently, purification is directly
-attached.
-
-In the same Dialogue we read later on: “Those who appear to have lived
-neither well nor ill … go to the river Acheron, and are carried to the
-lake; and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds … and
-are absolved and receive the rewards of their good deeds according to
-their deserts.” Here we have, evidently, still the same “many” and the
-same place, the shores of the Acherusian lake, but also an explicit
-affirmation of purification effected there, for this purification is
-now followed directly, not by re-incarnation, but by the ultimate
-happiness in the soul’s original and fundamentally congenial “place.”
-And this scheme is far more conformable to Plato’s fundamental
-position: for how can bodies, even lower than the human, help to purify
-the soul which has become impure precisely on occasion of its human
-body?--We can see how the Christian Purgatorial doctrine derives some
-of its pictures from the second of these parallel passages; yet that
-the “longer or shorter waiting” of the first passage also enters into
-that teaching,--especially in its more ordinary modern form, according
-to which there is, in this state, no intrinsic purification.
-
-And lower down we find: “Those who have committed crimes which,
-although great, are not unpardonable,--for these it is necessary to
-plunge (ἐμπεσεῖν) into Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled
-to undergo for a year; but at the end of the year they are borne to
-the Acherusian lake. But those who appear incurable by reason of the
-greatness of their crimes … such their appropriate destiny hurls
-(ῤίπτει) into Tartarus, whence they never come forth.” Here we get a
-Purgatory, pictured as a watery substance in which the more gravely
-impure of the curable souls are immersed before arriving at the easier
-purification, the waiting on the dry land alongside the lake; this
-Purgatory is, as a “place” and, in intensity, identical with Hell; and
-into this place the curable souls “plunge” and the incurable ones are
-“hurled.”--Of this third passage Catherine retains the identification
-of the pains of Purgatory and those of Hell; the “plunge,” or
-“hurling,” of two distinct classes of souls into these pains; and
-the mitigation, after a time, previous to complete cessation, of the
-suffering in the case of the curable class. But the “plunge,” with her,
-is common to all degrees of imperfectly pure souls; there is, for all
-these souls, no change of “place” during their purgation, but only a
-mitigation of suffering; and this mitigation is at work gradually and
-from the first. And the ordinary modern Purgatorial teaching is like
-this passage, in that it keeps the curable souls in Tartarus, say, for
-one year, and lets them suffer there, apparently without mitigation,
-throughout that time: and that, in the case of both classes of souls,
-it conceives the punishment as extrinsic, vindictive, and inoperative.
-
-And a fourth _Phaedo_ passage tells us: “Those who are remarkable for
-having led holy lives are released from this earthly prison, and go
-to their pure home, which is above, and dwell in the purer earth,”
-the Isles of the Just, in Oceanus. “And those, again, amongst these
-who have duly purified themselves with philosophy, live henceforth
-altogether without the body, in mansions fairer far than these.” Here
-we get, alongside of the two Purgatories and the one Hell, two Heavens,
-of which the first is but taken over from Homer and Pindar, but of
-which the second is Plato’s own conception. Catherine, in entire accord
-with the ordinary teaching, has got but one “place” of each kind; and
-her Heaven corresponds, apart from his formal and final exclusion of
-every sort of body, to the second of these Platonic Heavens; whilst,
-here again, the all-encompassing presence of God’s love for souls as
-of the soul’s love for God, which, in her teaching, is the beginning,
-means, and end of the whole movement, effects an indefinite difference
-between the two positions.[209]
-
-(3) Yet Plato, in his most characteristic moods, explicitly anticipates
-Catherine as to the intrinsic, ameliorative nature and work of
-Purgatory: “The proper office of punishment is two-fold: he who
-is rightly punished ought either to become better … by it, or he
-ought to be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what
-he suffers and … become better. Those who are punished by Gods and
-men and improved, are those whose sins are curable … by pain and
-suffering:--for there is no other way in which they can be delivered
-from evil, as in this world so also in the other. But the others are
-incurable--the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit
-themselves.… Rhadamanthus,” the chief of the three nether-world judges,
-“looks with admiration on the soul of some just one, who has lived in
-holiness and truth … and sends him” without any intervening suffering
-“to the Isles of the Blessed.… I consider how I shall present my soul
-whole and undefiled before the Judge, in that day.”[210] Here the last
-sentence is strikingly like in form as well as in spirit to many a
-saying of St. Paul and Catherine.
-
-(4) But the following most original passages give us a sentiment and an
-image which, in their special drift, are as opposed to St. Paul, and
-indeed to the ordinary Christian consciousness, as they are dear to
-Catherine, in this matter so strongly, although probably unconsciously,
-Platonist, indeed Neo-Platonist, in her affinities. “In the time of
-Kronos, indeed down to that of Zeus, the Judgment was given on the day
-on which men were to die,” _i.e._ immediately _before_ their death;
-“and the consequence was, that the judgments were not well given,--the
-souls found their way to the wrong places. Zeus said: ‘The reason is,
-that the judged have their clothes on, for they are alive.… There are
-many, having evil souls, who are apparelled in fair bodies or wrapt
-round in wealth and rank.… The Judges are awed by them; and they
-themselves too have their clothes on when judging: their eyes and
-ears and their whole bodies are interposed, as a veil, before their
-own souls. What is to be done? … Men shall be entirely stript before
-they are judged, for they shall be judged when dead; the Judge too
-shall be naked, that is, dead: he, with his naked soul, shall pierce
-into the other naked soul immediately _after_ each man dies … and is
-bereft of all his kith and kin, and has left behind him all his brave
-attire upon earth, and thus the Judgment will be just.’”[211]--If we
-compare this with St. Paul’s precisely contrary instinct and desire to
-be “clothed upon” at death, “lest we be found naked,” i.e. without the
-protection of any kind of body; and then realize Catherine’s intense
-longing for “nudità,”--to strip herself here, as far as possible, from
-all imperfection and self-delusion before the final stripping off of
-the body in death, and to appear, utterly naked, before the utterly
-naked eye of God, so that no “clothes” should remain requiring to
-be burnt away by the purifying fires,[212] the profound affinity of
-sentiment and imagery between Catherine and Plato--and this on a point
-essentially Platonic,--is very striking.
-
-(5) But, above all, in his deep doctrine as to the soul’s spontaneous
-choice after death of that condition, “place,” which, owing to the
-natural effects within her of her earthly willings and self-formation,
-she cannot but now find the most congenial to herself, Plato appears as
-the ultimate source of a literary kind for Catherine’s most original
-view, which otherwise is, I think, without predecessors. “The souls,”
-he tells us in the _Republic_, “immediately on their arrival in the
-other world, were required to go to Lachesis,” one of the three Fates.
-And “an interpreter, having taken from her lap a number of lots and
-plans of life, spoke as follows: ‘Thus saith Lachesis, the daughter of
-Necessity.… “Your destiny shall not be allotted to you, but you shall
-choose it for yourselves. Let him who draws the first lot, be the first
-to choose a life which shall be his irrevocably.… The responsibility
-lies with the chooser, Heaven is guiltless.”’” “No settled character
-of soul was included in the plans of life, because, with the change
-of life, the soul inevitably became changed itself.” “It was a truly
-wonderful sight, to watch how each soul selected its life.… When all
-the souls had chosen their lives, Lachesis dispatched with each of
-them the Destiny he had selected, to guard his life and satisfy his
-choice.”[213] And in the _Phaedrus_ Plato tells us that “at the end of
-the first thousand years” (of the first incarnation) “the good souls
-and also the evil souls both come to cast lots and to choose their
-second life; and they may take any that they like.”[214]
-
-In both the dialogues the lots are evidently taken over from popular
-mythology, but are here made merely to introduce a certain orderly
-succession among the spontaneous choosings of the souls themselves,
-whilst the lap of the daughter of Necessity, spread out before all
-the choosers previous to their choice, and the separate, specially
-appropriate Destiny that accompanies each soul after its choice,
-indicate plainly that, although the choice itself is the free act
-and pure self-expression of each soul’s then present disposition,
-yet that this disposition is the necessary result of its earthly
-volitions and self-development or self-deformation, and that the
-choice now made becomes, in its turn, the cause of certain inevitable
-consequences,--of a special environment which itself is then productive
-of special effects upon, and of special occasions for, the final
-working out of this soul’s character.--Plotinus retains the doctrine:
-“the soul chooses there” in the Other world,--“its Daemon and its kind
-of life.”[215] But neither Proclus nor Dionysius has the doctrine,
-whilst Catherine, on the contrary, reproduces it with a penetrating
-completeness.
-
-
-4. _Simplifications characteristic of Catherine’s Eschatology._
-
-And under our last, fourth head, we can group the simplifications
-characteristic of Catherine’s Eschatology.
-
-(1) One simplification has, of course, for now some fifteen hundred
-years, been the ordinary Christian conception: I mean the elimination
-of the time-element between the moment of death and the beginning of
-the three states. Yet it is interesting to note how by far the greatest
-of the Latin Fathers, St. Augustine, who died in A.D. 430, still clings
-predominantly to the older Christian and Jewish conception of the soul
-abiding in a state of shrunken, joy-and-painless consciousness from
-the moment of the body’s death up to that of the general resurrection
-and judgment. “After this short life, thou wilt not yet be where the
-saints will be,” _i.e._ in Heaven. “Thou wilt not yet be there: who
-is ignorant of this? But thou canst straightway be where the rich
-man descried the ulcerous beggar to be a-resting, far away,” _i.e._
-in Limbo. “Placed in that rest, thou canst await the day of judgment
-with security, when thou shalt receive thy body also, when thou shalt
-be changed so as to be equal to an Angel.”[216] Only with regard to
-Purgatory, a state held by him, in writings of his last years, 410-430
-A.D., to be possible, indeed probable, does he make an exception to
-his general rule: for such purification would have to take place” in
-the interval of time between the death of the body and the last day of
-condemnation and reward.”[217]
-
-It is doubtless the still further fading away of the expectation, so
-vivid and universal in early Christian times, of the proximity of Our
-Lord’s Second Advent, and the tacit prevalence of Greek affinities and
-conceptions concerning the bodiless soul, that helped to eliminate,
-at last universally, this interval of waiting, in the case of souls
-too good or too bad for purgation, from the general consciousness
-of at least Western Christendom. The gain in this was the great
-simplification and concentration of the immediate outlook and interest;
-the loss was the diminished apprehension of the essentially complex,
-concrete, synthetic character of man’s nature, and of the necessity for
-our assuming that this characteristic will be somehow preserved in this
-nature’s ultimate perfection.
-
-(2) There is a second simplification in Catherine which, though here
-St. Augustine leads the way, is less common among Christians: her three
-other-world “places” are not, according to her ultimate thought, three
-distinct spacial extensions and localities, filled, respectively, with
-ceaselessly suffering, temporarily suffering, and ceaselessly blessed
-souls; but they are, (notwithstanding all the terms necessitated by
-such spacial picturings as “entering,” “coming out,” “plunging into”),
-so many distinct states and conditions of the soul, of a painful,
-mixed, or joyful character. We shall have these her ultimate ideas very
-fully before us presently. But here I would only remark that this her
-union of a picturing faculty, as vivid as the keenest sense-perception,
-and of a complete non-enslavement to, a vigorous utilization of,
-these life-like spacial projections, by a religious instinct and
-experience which never forgets that God and souls are spirits, to whom
-our ordinary categories of space and extension, time and motion, do
-not and cannot in strictness apply, is as rare as it is admirable;
-and that, though her intensely anti-corporeal and non-social attitude
-made such a position more immediately easy for her than it can be for
-those who remain keenly aware of the great truths involved in the
-doctrines of the Resurrection of the Body and the Communion of Saints,
-this her trend of thought brings into full articulation precisely the
-deepest of our spiritual apprehensions and requirements, whilst it is
-not her fault if it but further accentuates some of our intellectual
-perplexities.
-
-We get much in St. Augustine, which he himself declares to have
-derived, in the first instance, from “the writings of the Platonists,”
-which doubtless means above all Plotinus, (that keen spiritual thinker
-who can so readily be traced throughout this part of the great
-Convert’s teaching), as to this profound incommensurableness between
-spiritual presence, energizing, and affectedness on the one hand, and
-spacial position, extension, and movement on the other. “What place is
-there within me, to which my God can come? … I would not exist at all,
-unless Thou already wert within me.” “Thou wast never a place, and yet
-we have receded from Thee; and we have drawn near to Thee, yet Thou
-art never a place.” “ Are we submerged and do we emerge? Yet it is not
-places into which we are plunged and out of which we rise. What can be
-more like to places and yet more unlike? For here the affections are in
-case,--the impurity of our spirit, which flows downwards, oppressed by
-the love of earthly cares; and the holiness of Thy Spirit, which lifts
-us upwards with the love of security.”[218] For, as he teaches “the
-spiritual creature can only be changed by times,”--a succession within
-a duration: “by remembering what it had forgotten, or by learning
-what it did not know, or by willing what it did not will. The bodily
-creature can be changed by times and places,” by spacial motion, “from
-earth to heaven, from heaven to earth, from east to west.” “That thing
-is not moved through space which is not extended in space … the soul is
-not considered to move in space, unless it be held to be a body.”[219]
-
-In applying the doctrine just expressed to eschatological matters, St.
-Augustine concludes: “If it be asked whether the soul, when it goes
-forth from the body, is borne to some corporeal places, or to such as,
-though incorporeal, are like to bodies, or to what is more excellent
-than either: I readily answer that, unless it have some kind of body,
-it is not borne to bodily places at all, or, at least, that it is not
-borne to them by bodily motion.… But I myself do not think that it
-possesses any body, when it goes forth from this earthly body.… It gets
-borne, according to its deserts, to spiritual conditions, or to penal
-places having a similitude to bodies.”[220]
-
-The reader will readily note a curiously uncertain frame of mind
-in this last utterance. I take it that Plotinian influences are
-here being checked by the Jewish conception of certain, definitely
-located, provision-chambers (_promptuaria_), in which all souls are
-placed for safe keeping, between the time of the body’s death and its
-resurrection. So in the Fourth Book of Esra (of about 90 A.D.), “the
-souls of the just in their chambers said: ‘How long are we to remain
-here?’”; and in the Apocalypse of Baruch (of about 150-250 A.D.), “at
-the coming of the Messiah, the provision-chambers will open, in which
-the” whole, precise “number of the souls of the just have been kept,
-and they will come forth.”[221]
-
-But it is St. Thomas Aquinas who, by the explicit and consistent
-adoption and classification of these _promptuaria receptacula_, reveals
-to us more clearly the perplexities and fancifulnesses involved in
-the strictly spacial conception. “Although bodies are not assigned
-to souls (immediately) after death, yet certain bodily places are
-congruously assigned to these souls in accordance with the degree of
-their dignity, in which places they are, as it were, locally, in the
-manner in which bodiless things can be in space: each soul having a
-higher place assigned to it, according as it approaches more or less
-to the first substance, God, whose seat, according to Scripture, is
-Heaven.” “In the Scriptures God is called the Sun, since He is the
-principle of spiritual life, as the physical sun is of bodily life;
-and, according to this convention, … souls spiritually illuminated have
-a greater fitness for luminous bodies, and sin-darkened souls for dark
-places.” “It is probable that, as to local position, Hell and the Limbo
-of the Fathers constitute one and the same place, or are more or less
-continuous.” “The place of Purgatory adjoins (that of) Hell.” “There
-are altogether five places ready to receive (_receptanda_) souls bereft
-of their bodies: Paradise, the Limbo of the Fathers, Purgatory, Hell,
-and the Limbo of Infants.”[222]
-
-No doubt all these positions became the common scholastic teaching. But
-then, as Cardinal Bellarmine cogently points out: “no ancient, as far
-as I know, has written that the Earthly Paradise was destroyed … and I
-have read a large number who affirm its existence. This is the doctrine
-of all the Scholastics, beginning with St. Thomas, and of the Fathers.
-… St. Augustine indeed appears to rank this truth amongst the dogmas
-of faith.”[223] We shall do well, then, not to press these literal
-localization-schemes, especially since, according to St. Augustine’s
-penetrating analysis, our spiritual experiences, already in this our
-earthly existence, have a distinctly non-spacial character. Catherine’s
-position, if applied to the central life of man here, and hence
-presumptively hereafter, remains as true and fresh and unassailable as
-ever.
-
-(3) And her last simplification consists in taking the Fire of Hell,
-the Fire of Purgatory, and the Fire and Light of Heaven as profoundly
-appropriate symbols or descriptions of the variously painful or joyous
-impressions produced, through the differing volitional attitudes of
-souls towards Him, by the one God’s intrinsically identical presence
-in each and all. In all three cases, throughout their several grades,
-there are ever but two realities, the Spirit-God and the spirit-soul,
-in various states of inter-relation.
-
-Here again it is Catherine’s complete abstraction from the body which
-renders such a view easy and, in a manner, necessary for her mind. But
-here I would only emphasize the impressive simplicity and spirituality
-of view which thus, as in the material world it finds the one sun-light
-and the one fire-heat, which, in themselves everywhere the same, vary
-indefinitely in their effects, owing to the varying condition of the
-different bodies which meet the rays and flames; so, in the Spiritual
-World it discovers One supreme spiritual Energy and Influence which,
-whilst ever self-identical, is assimilated, deflected, or resisted by
-the lesser spirits, with inevitably joyous, mixed, or painful states
-of soul, since they can each and all resist, but cannot eradicate that
-Energy’s impression within their deepest selves. And though, even with
-her, the Sun-light image remains quasi-Hellenic and Intellectual, and
-the Fire-heat picture is more immediately Christian and Moral: yet
-she also frequently takes the sunlight as the symbol of the achieved
-Harmony and Peace, and the Fire-heat as that of more or less persisting
-Conflict and Pain. She is doubtless right in keeping both symbols, and
-in ever thinking of each as ultimately implying the other, for God is
-Beauty and Truth, as well as Goodness and Love, and man is made with
-the indestructible aspiration after Him in His living completeness.
-
-And here again Catherine has a complicated doctrinal history behind her.
-
-We have already considered the numerous Scriptural passages where
-God and His effects upon the soul are symbolized as light and fire;
-and those again where joy or, contrariwise, trial and suffering are
-respectively pictured by the same physical properties. And Catherine
-takes the latter passages as directly explanatory of the first, in
-so far as these joys and sufferings are spiritual in their causes or
-effects.
-
-Among the Greek Fathers, Clement of Alexandria tells us that “the Fire”
-of Purgatory,--for he has no Eternal Damnation,--“is a rational,”
-spiritual, “fire that penetrates the soul”; and Origen teaches that
-“each sinner himself lights the flame of his own fire, and is not
-thrown into a fire that has been lit before that moment and that exists
-in front of him.… His conscience is agitated and pierced by its own
-pricks.” Saints Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzum are more or
-less influenced by Origen on this point. And St. John Damascene, who
-died in about 750 A.D., says explicitly that the fire of Hell is not a
-material fire, that it is very different from our ordinary fire, and
-that men hardly know what it is.[224]
-
-Among the Latins, St. Ambrose declares: “neither is the gnashing, a
-gnashing of bodily teeth; nor is the everlasting fire, a fire of bodily
-flames; nor is the worm, a bodily one.”--St. Jerome, in one passage,
-counts the theory of the non-physical fire as one of Origen’s errors;
-but elsewhere he mentions it without any unfavourable note, and even
-enumerates several Scripture-texts which favour it, and admits that
-“‘the worm which dieth not and the fire which is not quenched,’ is
-understood, by the majority of interpreters (_a plerisque_), of the
-conscience of sinners which tortures them.”[225]--St. Augustine, in
-413 A.D., declares: “In the matter of the pains of the wicked, both
-the unquenchable fire and the intensely living worm are interpreted
-differently by different commentators. Some interpreters refer both
-to the body, others refer both to the soul; and some take the fire
-literally, in application to the body, and the worm figuratively,
-in application to the soul, which latter opinion appears the more
-credible.” Yet when, during the last years of his life, he came,
-somewhat tentatively, to hold an other-world Purgatory as well, he
-throughout assimilated this Purgatory’s fire to the fire of this-world
-sufferings. Thus in 422 A.D.: “Souls which renounce the wood, hay,
-straw, built upon that foundation (I Cor. iii, 11-15), not without pain
-indeed (since they loved these things with a carnal affection), but
-with faith in the foundation, a faith operative through love … arrive
-at salvation, through a certain fire of pain.… Whether men suffer these
-things in this life only, or such-like judgments follow even after
-this life--in either case, this interpretation of that text is not
-discordant with the truth.” “‘He shall be saved yet so as by fire,’
-because the pain, over the loss of the things he loved, burns him. It
-is not incredible that some such thing takes place even after this life
-… that some of the faithful are saved by a certain purgatorial fire,
-more quickly or more slowly, according as they have less or more loved
-perishable things.”[226]
-
-St. Thomas, voicing and leading Scholastic opinion, teaches that the
-fire of Purgatory is the same as that of Hell; and Cardinal Bellarmine,
-who died in 1621, tells us: “The common opinion of theologians is that
-the fire of Purgatory is a real and true fire, of the same kind as an
-earthly fire. This opinion, it is true, is not of faith, but it is very
-probable,”--because of the “consent of the scholastics, who cannot be
-despised without temerity,” and also because of “the eruptions of Mount
-Etna.”[227] Yet the Council of Florence had, in 1439, restricted itself
-to the quite general proposition that “if men die truly penitent,
-in the love of God, before they have satisfied … for their sins …
-their souls are purified by purgatorial pains after death”; thus
-very deliberately avoiding all commitment as to the nature of these
-pains.[228] Cardinal Gousset, who died in 1866, tells us: “The more
-common opinion amongst theologians makes the sufferings of Purgatory
-to consist in the pain of fire, or at least in a pain analogous to
-that of fire.”[229] This latter position is practically identical with
-Catherine’s.
-
-As to the fire of Hell, although here especially the Scholastics, old
-and new, are unanimous, it is certain that there is no definition or
-solemn judgment of the Church declaring it to be material. On this
-point again we find St. Thomas and those who follow him involved in
-practically endless difficulties and in, for us now, increasingly
-intolerable subtleties, where they try to show how a material fire
-can affect an immaterial spirit. Bossuet, so severely orthodox in all
-such matters, preaching, before the Court, about sin becoming in Hell
-the chastisement of the sinner, does not hesitate to finish thus: “We
-bear within our hearts the instrument of our punishment. ‘I shall
-produce fire from thy midst, which shall devour thee’ (Ezek. xxviii,
-18). I shall not send it against thee from afar, it will ignite in
-thy conscience, its flames will arise from thy midst, and it will be
-thy sins which will produce it.”[230]--And the Abbé F. Dubois, in a
-careful article in the Ecclesiastical _Revue du Clergé Français_ of
-Paris, has recently expressed the conviction that “the best minds of
-our time, which are above being suspected of yielding to mere passing
-fashions, feel the necessity of abandoning the literal interpretation,
-judged to be insufficient, of the ancient symbols; and of returning
-to a freer exegesis, of which some of the Ancients have given us the
-example.”[231] Among these helpful “Ancients” we cannot but count
-Catherine, with her One God Who is the Fire of Pain and the Light of
-Joy to souls, according as they resist Him or will Him, either here or
-hereafter.
-
-
-III. CATHERINE AND ETERNAL PUNISHMENT.
-
-
-_Introductory: four doctrines and difficulties to be considered._
-
-Taking now the three great after-life conditions separately, in the
-order of Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven, I would first of all note that
-some readers may be disappointed that Catherine did not, like our
-own English Mystic, the entirely orthodox optimist, Mother Juliana
-of Norwich--her _Revelations_ belong to the year 1373 A.D.--simply
-proclaim that, whilst the teaching and meaning of Christ and His
-Church would come true, all, in ways known to God alone, would yet
-be well.[232] In this manner, without any weakening of traditional
-teaching, the whole dread secret as to the future of evil-doers is
-left in the hands of God, and a beautifully boundless trust and hope
-glows throughout those contemplations.
-
-Yet, as I hope to show as we go along, certain assumptions and
-conceptions, involved in the doctrine of Eternal Punishment, cannot
-be systematically excluded, or even simply ignored, without a grave
-weakening of the specifically Christian earnestness; and that,
-grand as is, in certain respects, the idea of the Apocatastasis,
-the Final Restitution of all Things and Souls--as taught by Clement
-and Origen--it is not, at bottom, compatible with the whole drift,
-philosophy, and tone, (even apart from specific sayings) of Our Lord.
-And this latter teaching--of the simply abiding significance and effect
-of our deliberate elections during this our one testing-time,--and
-not that of an indefinite series of chances and purifications with
-an ultimate disappearance of all difference between the results of
-the worst life and the best, answers to the deepest postulates and
-aspirations of the most complete and delicate ethical and spiritual
-sense. For minds that can discriminate between shifting fashions and
-solid growth in abiding truth, that will patiently seek out the deepest
-instinct and simplest implications underlying the popular presentations
-of the Doctrine of Abiding Consequences, and that take these
-implications as but part of a larger whole: this doctrine still, and
-now again, presents itself as a permanent element of the full religious
-consciousness.
-
-It would certainly be unfair to press Catherine’s rare and incidental
-sayings on Hell into a formal system. Yet those remarks are deep and
-suggestive, and help too much to interpret, supplement, and balance
-her central, Purgatorial teaching, and indeed to elucidate her general
-religious principles, for us to be able to pass them over. We have
-already sufficiently considered the question as to the nature of the
-Fire; and that as to Evil Spirits is reserved for the next Chapter.
-Here I shall consider four doctrines and difficulties, together with
-Catherine’s attitude towards them: the soul’s final fate, dependent
-upon the character of the will’s act or active disposition at the
-moment of the body’s death; the total moral perversion of the lost; the
-mitigation of their pains; and the eternity of their punishment.
-
-
-1. _Eternity dependent on the earthly life’s last moment._
-
-Now as to the soul’s final fate being made dependent upon the
-character of that soul’s particular act or disposition at the last
-moment previous to death, this teaching, prominent in parts of the
-_Trattato and Vita_, goes back ultimately to Ezekiel, who, as Prof.
-Charles interestingly shows, introduces a double individualism into
-the older, Social and Organic, Eschatology of the Hebrew Prophets.
-For Man is seen, by him, as responsible for his own acts alone, and
-as himself working out separately his own salvation or his own doom;
-and this individual man again is looked at, not in his organic unity,
-but as repeating himself in a succession of separate religious acts.
-The individual act is taken to be a true expression of the whole man
-at the moment of its occurrence: and hence, if this act is wicked at
-the moment of the advent of the Kingdom, the agent will rightfully be
-destroyed; but if it be righteous, he will be preserved.[233]--Now
-the profound truth and genuine advance thus proclaimed, who can doubt
-them? And yet it is clear that the doctrine here is solidly true, only
-if taken as the explicitation and supplement, and even in part as the
-corrective, of the previously predominant teaching. Take the Ezekielian
-doctrine as complete, even for its own time, or as final over against
-the later, the Gospel depth of teaching, (with its union of the social
-body and of individual souls, and of the soul’s single acts and of the
-general disposition produced by and reacting upon these acts), and you
-get an all but solipsistic Individualism and an atomistic Psychology,
-and you offend Christianity and Science equally.
-
-It is evident that Catherine, if she can fairly be taxed with what,
-if pressed, would, in her doctrine rather than in her life, be an
-excessive Individualism, is, in her general teaching and practice,
-admirably free from Psychological Atomism; indeed did any soul ever
-understand better the profound reality of habits, general dispositions,
-tones of mind and feeling and will, as distinct from the single acts
-that gradually build them up and that, in return, are encircled and
-coloured by them all? Her whole Purgatorial doctrine stands and falls
-by this distinction, and this although, with a profound self-knowledge,
-she does not hesitate to make the soul express, in one particular act
-after death,--that of the Plunge,--an even deeper level of its true
-attitude of will and of its moral character than is constituted by
-those imperfect habits of the will, habits which it will take so much
-suffering and acceptance of suffering gradually to rectify.
-
-Thus the passages in which Catherine seems to teach that God can and
-does, as it were, catch souls unawares, calling them away, and finally
-deciding their fate on occasion of any and every _de facto_ volitional
-condition at the instant of death, however little expressive of the
-radical determination of that soul such an act or surface-state may be,
-will have, (even if they be genuine, and most of them have doubtlessly
-grown, perhaps have completely sprung up, under the pen of sermonizing
-scribes), to be taken as hortatory, hence as partly hyperbolical.
-And such an admission will in nowise deny the possibility for the
-soul to express its deliberate and full disposition and determination
-in a single act or combination of acts; nor that the other-world
-effects will follow according to such deep, deliberate orientations
-of the character: it will only deny that, at any and every moment,
-any and every act of the soul sufficiently expresses its deliberate
-disposition. Certainly it is comparatively rarely that the soul exerts
-its full liberty, in an act of true, spiritual self-realization; and
-an analogous rarity cannot but be postulated by religious philosophy
-for contrary acts, of an approximately equal fulness of deliberation
-and accuracy of representation, with regard to the soul’s volitional
-state. And yet the operative influence towards such rare, fully
-self-expressive acts of the right kind, and the aid towards similar,
-massive, and truly representative volitions of the wrong kind, afforded
-by even quite ordinary half-awake acts and habits of respectively good
-or evil quality are so undeniable, and it is so impossible to draw
-a general line as to where such wishes pass into full willings and
-deliberate states: that the prevalence of a hortatory attitude towards
-the whole subject is right and indeed inevitable.
-
-
-2. _The reprobate will of the lost._
-
-As to Moral Perversion, the reprobate will of the lost, we find that
-Catherine approaches the question from two different, and at bottom,
-on this point, incompatible, systems; but some incidental and short
-sayings of hers give us suggestive hints towards a consistent position
-in this difficult matter.
-
-Catherine has a double approach. For, consistently with the strong
-Neo-Platonist, Dionysian strain in her mind, she frequently teaches and
-implies that Evil is the absence of Good, of Love, and nothing positive
-at all. In this case Evil would not only be less strong than good--only
-Manichaeans would maintain that they were equal--but, as against the
-constructive force of good, it would have no kind even of destructive
-strength. Varying amounts, degrees, and kinds of good, but good and
-only good, everywhere, would render all, even transitory, pollution of
-the soul, and all, even passing, purification of it, so much actual
-impossibility and theoretical superstition. All that survived at all,
-could but be good; and at most some good might be added, but no evil
-could be removed, since none would exist.--Yet all this is, of course,
-strongly denied and supplanted by the, at first sight, less beautiful,
-but far deeper and alone fully Christian, position of her specifically
-Purgatorial teaching. Here Evil is something positive, an active
-disposition, orientation, and attachment of the will; it is not without
-destructive force; and its cure is a positive change in that will and
-its habits, and not a mere addition of good. Yet it is plain that, even
-exclusively within the implications of this deeper conviction, there
-is no necessity to postulate unmixed evil in the disposition of any
-soul. In some the evil would be triumphing over the good; in others
-good would be triumphing over evil,--each over the other, in every
-degree of good or of evil, up to the all but complete extinction of all
-inclinations to evil or to good respectively.
-
-And Catherine has suggestive sayings. For one or two of them go, at
-least in their implications, beyond a declaration as to the presence
-of God’s extrinsic mercy in Hell, a presence indicated by a mitigation
-of the souls’ sufferings to below what these souls deserve; and even
-beyond the Areopagite’s insistence upon the presence of some real good
-in these souls, since he hardly gets beyond their continuous possession
-of those non-moral goods, existence, intelligence, and will-power.[234]
-For when she says, “The ray of God’s mercy shines even in Hell,” she
-need not, indeed, mean more than that extrinsic mercy, and its effect,
-that mitigation. But when she declares: “if a creature could be found
-that did not participate in the divine Goodness,--that creature would,
-as it were, be as malignant as God is good,” we cannot, I think, avoid
-applying this to the moral dispositions of such souls.[235]
-
-Now I know that St. Thomas had already taught, in at first sight
-identical terms: “Evil cannot exist (quite) pure without the admixture
-of good, as the Supreme Good exists free from all admixture of evil.…
-Those who are detained in Hell, are not bereft of all good”;[236] and
-yet he undoubtedly maintained the complete depravation of the will’s
-dispositions in these souls. And, again, after Catherine’s first
-declaration there follow, (at least in the text handed down in the
-_Vita_), words which explain that extrinsic mercy, not as mitigating
-the finite amount of suffering due to the sinner, but as turning the
-infinite suffering due to the sinner’s infinite malice, into a finite,
-though indefinite amount; and hence, in the second declaration, a
-corresponding interior mercy may be signified--God’s grace preventing
-the sinner from being infinitely wicked.
-
-But Catherine, unlike St. Thomas, expressly speaks not only of Good and
-Evil, but of Good and Malignancy; and Malignancy undoubtedly refers
-to dispositions of the will. And even if the words, now found as the
-sequel to the first saying, be authentic, they belong to a different
-occasion, and cannot be allowed to force the meaning of words spoken
-at another time. In this latter saying the words “as it were” show
-plainly that she is not thinking of a possible infiniteness of human
-wickedness which has been changed, through God’s mercy, to an actual
-finitude of evil; but is simply asking herself whether a man could be,
-not infinitely but wholly, malignant. For she answers that, were this
-possible, a man would “as it were” be as malignant as God is good, and
-thus shows that the malignancy, which she denies, would only in a sense
-form a counterpart to God’s benevolence: since, though the man would be
-as entirely malignant as God is entirely good, God would still remain
-infinite in His goodness as against the finitude of Man’s wickedness.
-
-The difficulties of such a combination of convictions are, of course,
-numerous and great. Psychologically it seems hard to understand why
-this remnant of good disposition should be unable to germinate further
-and further good, so that, at last, good would leaven the whole
-soul. From the point of view of any Theodicy, it appears difficult
-to justify the unending exclusion of such a soul from growth in, and
-the acquirement of, a predominantly good will and the happiness that
-accompanies such a will. And the testimony of Our Lord Himself and of
-the general doctrine of the Church appear definitely opposed: for does
-not His solemn declaration: “Hell, where their worm dieth not” (Mark
-ix, 48), find its authoritative interpretation in the common Church
-teaching as to the utterly reprobate will of the lost? And indeed
-Catherine herself, in her great saying that if but one little drop of
-Love could fall into Hell (that is, surely, if but the least beginning
-of a right disposition towards God could enter those souls) Hell would
-be turned into Heaven, seems clearly to endorse this position.
-
-And yet, we have full experience in this life of genuinely good
-dispositions being present, and yet not triumphing or even spreading
-within the soul; of such conditions being, in various degrees, our own
-fault; and of such defeat bringing necessarily with it more or less of
-keen suffering.--There would be no injustice if, after a full, good
-chance and sufficient aid had been given to the soul to actualize its
-capabilities of spiritual self-constitution, such a soul’s deliberately
-sporadic, culpably non-predominant, good did not, even eventually, lead
-to the full satisfaction of that soul’s essential cravings.--The saying
-attributed to Our Lord, which appears in St. Mark alone, is a pure
-quotation from Isaiah lxvi, 24 and Ecclesiasticus vii, 17, and does not
-seem to require more than an abiding distress of conscience, an eternal
-keenness of remorse.
-
-Again, the common Church-teaching is undoubtedly voiced by St. Thomas
-in the words, “Since these souls are completely averse to the final end
-of right reason, they must be declared to be without any good will.”
-Yet St. Thomas himself (partly in explanation of the Areopagite’s
-words, “the evil spirits desire the good and the best, namely, to
-be, to live, and to understand”), is obliged to distinguish between
-such souls’ deliberate will and their “natural will and inclination,”
-and to proclaim that this latter, “which is not from themselves but
-from the Author of nature, who put this inclination into nature … can
-indeed be good.”[237] And, if we would not construct a scheme flatly
-contradictory of all earthly experience, we can hardly restrict the
-soul, even in the beyond, to entirely indeliberate, good inclinations,
-and to fully deliberate, bad volitions, but cannot help interposing
-an indefinite variety of inchoative energizings, half-wishes, and
-the like, and thinking of these as mixed with good and evil. Indeed
-this conclusion seems also required by the common teaching that the
-suffering there differs from soul to soul, and this because of the
-different degrees of the guilt: for such degrees depend undoubtedly
-even more upon the degree of deliberation and massiveness of the will
-than upon the degree of objective badness in the deed, and hence can
-hardly fail to leave variously small or large fragments of more or less
-good and imperfectly deliberate wishings and energizings present in the
-soul.
-
-And finally Catherine’s “little drop of Love” would, she says, “at
-once” turn Hell into Heaven, and hence cannot mean some ordinary good
-moral disposition or even such supernatural virtues as theological
-Faith and Hope, but Pure Love alone, which latter queen of all the
-virtues she is explicitly discussing there. Thus she in nowise requires
-the absence from these souls of a certain remnant of semi-deliberate
-virtue of a less exalted, and not necessarily regenerative kind.
-
-
-3. _Mitigation of the sufferings of the lost._
-
-As to the Mitigation of the Suffering, it is remarkable that Catherine,
-who has been so bold concerning the source of the pains, and the
-dispositions, of the lost souls, does not more explicitly teach such
-an alleviation. I say “remarkable,” because important Fathers and
-Churches, that were quite uninfected by Origenism, have held and have
-acted upon such a doctrine. St. Augustine, in his _Enchiridion_ (A.D.
-423 (?)) tells us that “in so far as” the Offering of the Sacrifice of
-the Altar and Alms “profit” souls in the beyond, “they profit them by
-procuring a full remission (of the punishment), or at least that their
-damnation may become more tolerable.” And after warning men against
-believing in an end to the sufferings of the lost, he adds: “But let
-them consider, if they like, that the sufferings of the damned are
-somewhat mitigated during certain intervals of time.”[238]--Saints
-John Chrysostom and John Damascene, thoroughly orthodox Greek Fathers,
-and the deeply devout hymn-writer Prudentius among the Latins, teach
-similar doctrine; and in many ancient Latin missals, ranging from the
-eleventh to the fourteenth century, prayers for the Mitigation of the
-Sufferings of the Damned are to be found.[239]
-
-Hence the great Jesuit Theologian Petau, though not himself
-sharing this view, can declare: “Concerning such a breathing-time
-(_respiratio_) of lost souls, nothing certain has as yet been decreed
-by the Catholic Church, so that this opinion of most holy Fathers
-should not temerariously be rejected as absurd, even though it be
-foreign to the common opinion of Catholics in our time.”[240] And the
-Abbé Emery, that great Catholic Christian, the second founder of St.
-Sulpice, who died in 1811, showed, in a treatise _On the Mitigation
-of the Pains of the Damned_, that this view had also been held by
-certain Scholastic Theologians, and had been defended, without any
-opposition, by Mark of Ephesus, in the Sessions of the Council of
-Florence (A.D. 1439); and concluded that this doctrine was not contrary
-to the Catholic Faith and did not deserve any censure. The most learned
-Theologians in Rome found nothing reprehensible in this treatise, and
-Pope Pius VII caused his Theologian, the Barnabite General, Padre
-Fontana, to thank M. Emery for the copy sent by him to the Holy
-Father.[241]
-
-Catherine herself cannot well have been thinking of anything but some
-such Mitigation when she so emphatically teaches that God’s mercy
-extends even into Hell. Indeed, even the continuation of this great
-saying in the present _Vita_-text formally teaches such Mitigation, yet
-practically withdraws it, by making it consist in a rebate and change,
-from an infinitude in degree and duration into a finitude in degree
-though not in duration.[242] But, as we have already found, this highly
-schematic statement is doubtless one of the later glosses, in which
-case her true meaning must have been substantially that of the Fathers
-referred to, viz. that the suffering, taken as anyhow finite in its
-degree, gets mercifully mitigated for these souls.--And, if she was
-here also faithful to her general principles, she will have conceived
-the mitigation, not as simply sporadic and arbitrary, but as more or
-less progressive, and connected with the presence in these souls of
-those various degrees of semi-voluntary good inclinations and wishes,
-required by her other saying. Even if these wishings could slowly and
-slightly increase, and the sufferings could similarly decrease, this
-would in nowise imply or require a final full rectification of the
-deliberate will itself, and hence not a complete extinction of the
-resultant suffering. Hell would still remain essentially distinct
-from Purgatory; for in Purgatory the deliberate, active will is good
-from the first, and only the various semi-volitions and old habits are
-imperfect, but are being gradually brought into full harmony with that
-will, by the now complete willing of the soul; and hence this state
-has an end; whereas in Hell the deliberate, active will is bad from
-the first, and only various partially deliberate wishes and tendencies
-are good, but cannot be brought to fruition in a full virtuous
-determination of the dominant character of the soul, and hence _this_
-state has no end.
-
-
-4. _The Endlessness of Hell._
-
-And lastly, as to the Endlessness of this condition of the Lost, it is,
-of course, plain that Catherine held this defined doctrine; and again,
-that “the chief weight, in the Church-teaching as to Hell, rests upon
-Hell’s Eternity.”[243]
-
-Here I would suggest five groups of considerations:
-
-(1) Precisely this Eternity appears to be the feature of all others
-which is ever increasingly decried by contemporary philosophy and
-liberal theology as impossible and revolting. Thus it is frequently
-argued as though, not the indiscriminateness nor the materiality nor
-the forensic externality nor the complete fixity of the sufferings, nor
-again the complete malignity of the lost were incredible, and hence
-the unendingness of such conditions were impossible of acceptance;
-but, on the contrary, as though,--be the degree and nature of those
-sufferings conceived as ever so discriminated, spiritual, interior, and
-relatively mobile, and as occasioned and accompanied by a disposition
-in which semi-voluntary good is present,--the simple assumption of
-anything unending or final about them, at once renders the whole
-doctrine impossible to believe. It is true that Tennyson and Browning
-take the doctrine simply in its popular Calvinistic form, and then
-reject it; and even John Stuart Mill and Frederick Denison Maurice
-hardly consider the eternity separately. But certainly that thoughtful
-and religious-minded writer, Mr. W. R. Greg, brings forward the
-eternity-doctrine as, already in itself, “a _curiosa infelicitas_ which
-is almost stupidity on the part of the Church.”[244]
-
-(2) Yet it is plain how strongly, even in Mr. Greg’s case, the supposed
-(local, physical, indiscriminate, etc.) nature of the state affects
-the writer’s judgment as to the possibility of its unendingness,--as
-indeed is inevitable. And it is even clearer, I think, that precisely
-this eternity-doctrine stands for a truth which is but an ever-present
-mysterious corollary to every deeply ethical or spiritual, and,
-above all, every specifically Christian view of life. For every such
-view comes, surely, into hopeless collision with its own inalienable
-requirements if it _will_ hold that the deepest ethical and spiritual
-acts and conditions are,--avowedly performed though they be in time
-and space--simply temporary in their inmost nature and effects;
-whereas every vigorously ethical religion, in so far as it has reached
-a definite personal-immortality doctrine at all, cannot admit that
-the soul’s deliberate character remains without any strictly final
-and permanent results. The fact is that we get here to a profound
-ethical and spiritual postulate, which cannot be adequately set aside
-on the ground that it is the product of barbarous ages and vindictive
-minds, since this objection applies only to the physical picturings,
-the indiscriminateness, non-mitigation, and utter reprobation; or on
-the ground that a long, keen purification, hence a temporally finite
-suffering, would do as well, since, when all this has completely
-passed away, there would be an entire obliteration of all difference
-in the consequences of right and wrong; or that acts and dispositions
-built up in time cannot have other than finite consequences, since
-this is to naturalize radically the deepest things of life; or finally
-that “Evil,” as the Areopagite would have it, “is not,”[245] since
-thus the very existence of the conviction as to free-will and sin
-becomes more inexplicable than the theoretical difficulties against
-Libertarianism are insoluble.--Against this deep requirement of the
-most alert and complete ethical and spiritual life the wave of any
-Apocatastasis-doctrine or -emotion will, in the long run, ever break
-itself in vain.
-
-(3) The doctrine of Conditional Immortality has, I think, many
-undeniable advantages over every kind of Origenism. This view does not,
-as is often imputed to it, believe in the annihilation by Omnipotence
-of the naturally immortal souls of impenitent grave sinners; but simply
-holds that human souls begin with the capacity of acquiring, with the
-help of God’s Spirit, a spiritual personality, built up out of the mere
-possibilities and partial tendencies of their highly mixed natures,
-which, if left uncultivated and untranscended, become definitely fixed
-at the first, phenomenal, merely individual level,--so that spiritual
-personality alone deserves to live on and does so, whilst this animal
-individuality does not deserve and does not do so. The soul is thus
-not simply born as, but can become more and more, that “inner man” who
-alone persists, indeed who “is renewed day by day, even though our
-outward man perish.”[246]
-
-This conception thus fully retains, indeed increases, the profound
-ultimate difference between the results of spiritual and personal, and
-of animal and simply individual life respectively,--standing, as it
-does, at the antipodes to Origenism; it eliminates all unmoralized,
-unspiritualized elements from the ultimate world, without keeping souls
-in an apparently fruitless suffering; and it gives full emphasis to a
-supremely important, though continually forgotten fact,--the profoundly
-expensive, creative, positive process and nature of spiritual
-character. No wonder, then, that great thinkers and scholars, such
-as Goethe, Richard Rothe, Heinrich Holtzmann, and some Frenchmen and
-Englishmen have held this view.[247]
-
-Yet the objections against this view, taken in its strictness, are
-surely conclusive. For how can an originally simply mortal substance,
-force, or entity become immortal, and a phenomenal nature be leavened
-by a spiritual principle which, _ex hypothesi_, is not present within
-it? And how misleadingly hyperbolical, according to this, would be
-the greatest spiritual exhortations, beginning with those of Our Lord
-Himself!
-
-(4) And yet the conception of Conditional Immortality cannot be
-far from the truth, since everything, surely, points to a lowered
-consciousness in the souls in question, or at least to one lower
-than that in the ultimate state of the saved. This conception of the
-shrunken condition of these souls was certainly held by Catherine,
-even if the other, the view of a heightened, consciousness, appears
-in hortatory passages which just _may_ be authentic; and indeed only
-that conception is conformable with her fundamental position that
-love alone is fully positive and alone gives vital strength, and that
-all fully deliberate love is absent from the lost souls. And if we
-consider how predominantly hortatory in tone and object the ordinary
-teaching on this point cannot fail to be; and, on the other hand, how
-close to Manichaeism, any serious equating of the force and intensity
-of life and consciousness between the Saved and the Lost would be, we
-can hardly fail to find ourselves free, indeed compelled, to hold a
-lesser consciousness for the Lost than for the Saved. Whilst the joyful
-life of the Saved would range, in harmonious intensity, beyond all that
-we can experience here, the painful consciousness of the Lost would
-be, in various degrees, indefinitely less. The Saved would thus not be
-only _other_ than the Lost, they would actually be _more_: for God is
-Life supreme, and, where there is more affinity with God, there is more
-life, and more consciousness.
-
-(5) But, if the view just stated is the more likely one, then we
-cannot soften the sufferings of those souls, by giving them a sense of
-Eternity, of one unending momentary Now, instead of our earthly sense
-of Succession, as Cardinal Newman and Father Tyrrell have attempted to
-do, in a very instructive and obviously orthodox manner.[248] I shall
-presently argue strongly in favour of some consciousness of Eternity
-being traceable in our best moments here, and of this consciousness
-being doubtless more extended in the future blessed life. But here I
-have only to consider whether for one who, like Catherine, follows the
-analogy of earthly experience, the Lost should be considered nearer to,
-or farther from, such a _Totum-Simul_ consciousness than we possess
-now, here below, at our best? And to this the answer must, surely, be
-that they are further away from it. Yet God in His mercy may allow
-this greater successiveness, if unaccompanied by any keen memory or
-prevision, to help in effecting that mitigation of the suffering which
-we have already allowed.
-
-
-IV. CATHERINE AND PURGATORY.
-
-
-1. _Introductory._
-
-
-(1) _Changed feeling concerning Purgatory._
-
-In the matter of a Purgatory, a very striking return of religious
-feeling towards its normal equilibrium has been occurring in the most
-unexpected, entirely unprejudiced quarters, within the last century
-and a half. In Germany we have Lessing, who, in the wake of Leibniz,
-encourages the acceptance of “that middle state which the greater part
-of our fellow-Christians have adopted”: Schleiermacher, who calls the
-overpassing of a middle state by a violent leap at death “a magical
-proceeding”; David F. Strauss, who entirely agrees; Carl von Hase, who,
-in his very Manual of Anti-Roman Polemics admits that “most men when
-they die are probably too good for Hell, but they are certainly too bad
-for Heaven”; the delicately thoughtful philosopher Fechner who, in the
-most sober-minded of his religious works, insists upon our “conceiving
-the life beyond according to the analogy of this-life conditions,” and
-refers wistfully to “the belief which is found amongst all peoples
-and is quite shrunken only among Protestants--that the living can
-still do something to aid the dead”; and Prof. Anrich, probably the
-greatest contemporary authority on the Hellenic elements incorporated
-in Christian doctrine, declares, all definite Protestant though he
-is, that “legitimate religious postulates underlie the doctrine of
-Purgatory.”[249] And in England that sensitively religious Unitarian,
-W. R. Greg, tells us “Purgatory, ranging from a single day to a century
-of ages, offers that borderland of discriminating retribution for which
-justice and humanity cry out”; and the Positivist, John Stuart Mill,
-declares at the end of his life: “All the probabilities in case of a
-future life are that such as we have been made or have made ourselves
-before the change, such we shall enter into the life hereafter.… To
-imagine that a miracle will be wrought at death … making perfect every
-one whom it is His will to include among His elect … is utterly opposed
-to every presumption that can be adduced from the light of nature.”[250]
-
-
-(2) _Causes of the previous prejudice._
-
-Indeed the general principle of ameliorative suffering is so obviously
-true and inexhaustibly profound that only many, long-lived abuses
-in the practice, and a frequent obscuration in the teaching, of the
-doctrine, can explain and excuse the sad neglect, indeed discredit,
-into which the very principle and root-doctrine has fallen among
-well-nigh one-half of Western Christendom. As to the deplorably
-widespread existence, at the time of the Protestant Reformation, of
-both these causes, which largely occasioned or strengthened each other,
-we have the unimpeachable authority of the Council of Trent itself: for
-it orders the Bishops “not to permit that uncertain doctrines, or such
-as labour under the presumption of falsity, be propagated and taught,”
-and “to prohibit, as so many scandals and stones of stumbling for the
-faithful, whatever belongs to a certain curiosity or superstition or
-savours of filthy lucre.”[251] The cautious admissions of the strictly
-Catholic scholar-theologian, Dr. N. Paulus, and the precise documentary
-additions and corrections to Paulus furnished, directly from the
-contemporary documents, by the fair-minded Protestant worker at
-Reformation History, Prof. T. Brieger, now furnish us, conjointly, with
-the most vivid and detailed picture of the sad subtleties and abuses
-which gave occasion to that Decree.[252]
-
-
-(3) _Catherine’s purgatorial conceptions avoid those causes. Her
-conceptions harbour two currents of thought._
-
-It is surely not a small recommendation of Catherine’s mode of
-conceiving Purgatory, that it cuts, as we shall see, at the very root
-of those abuses. Yet we must first face certain opposite dangers and
-ambiguities which are closely intertwined with the group of terms
-and images taken over, for the purpose of describing an immanental
-Purgation, by her and her great Alexandrian Christian predecessors,
-from the Greek Heathen world. And only after the delimitation of the
-defect in the suggestions which still so readily operate from out of
-these originally Hellenic ideas, can we consider the difficulties and
-imperfections peculiar to the other, in modern times the predominant,
-element in the complete teaching as to the Middle State, an element
-mostly of Jewish and Roman provenance, and aiming at an extrinsically
-punitive conception. Both currents can be properly elucidated only if
-we first take them historically.
-
-
-1. _Jewish prayers for the dead._
-
-It is admitted on all hands that, in the practical form of Prayers for
-the Dead, the general doctrine of a Middle State can be traced back, in
-Judaism, up to the important passage in the Second Book of Maccabees,
-c. ii, vv. 43-45, where Judas Maccabaeus sends about two thousand
-drachms of silver to Jerusalem, in order that a Sin-Offering may be
-offered up for the Jews fallen in battle against Gorgias, upon whose
-bodies heathen amulets had been found. “He did excellently in this …
-it is a holy and devout thought. Hence he instituted the Sin-Offering
-for the dead, that they might be loosed from their sins.” That battle
-occurred in B.C. 166, and this book appears to have been written in
-B.C. 124, in Egypt, by a Jew of the school of the Pharisees.
-
-Now it is difficult not to recognize, in the doctrinal comment upon the
-facts here given, rather as yet the opinions of a Judaeo-Alexandrian
-circle, which was small even at the time of the composition of the
-comment, than the general opinion of Judaism at the date of Judas’s
-act. For if this act had been prompted by a clear and generally
-accepted conviction as to the resurrection, and the efficacy of prayers
-for the dead, the writer would have had no occasion or inclination to
-make an induction of his own as to the meaning and worth of that act;
-and we should find some indications of such a doctrine and practice in
-the voluminous works of Philo and Josephus, some century and a half
-later on. But all such indications are wanting in these writers.
-
-And in the New Testament there is, with regard to helping the dead,
-only that curious passage: “If the dead do not arise, what shall they
-do who are baptized for the dead?”[253] where St. Paul refers, without
-either acceptance or blame, to a contemporary custom among Christian
-Proselytes from Paganism, who offered up that bath of initiation for
-the benefit of the souls of deceased relatives who had died without any
-such purification. Perhaps not till Rabbi Akiba’s time, about 130 A.D.,
-had prayers for the dead become part of the regular Synagogue ritual.
-By 200 A.D. Tertullian speaks of the practice as of an established
-usage among the Christian communities: “we make oblations for the Dead,
-on their anniversary, every year”; although “if you ask where is the
-law concerning this custom in Scripture, you cannot read of any such
-there. Tradition will appear before you as its initiator, custom as its
-confirmer, and faith as its observer.”[254]
-
-It is interesting to note how considerably subsequent to the practice
-is, in this instance also, its clear doctrinal justification. Indeed
-the Jews are, to this hour, extraordinarily deficient in explicit,
-harmonious conceptions on the matter. Certainly throughout Prof. W.
-Bacher’s five volumes of Sayings of the Jewish Rabbis from 30 B.C.
-to 400 A.D., I can only find the following saying, by Jochanan the
-Amoraean, who died 279 A.D.: “There are three books before God, in
-which men are inscribed according to their merit and their guilt: that
-of the perfectly devout, that of the perfect evil-doers, and that of
-the middle, the uncertain souls. The devout and the evil-doers receive
-their sentence on New Year’s day … the first, unto life; the second,
-unto death. As to middle souls, their sentence remains in suspense
-till the day of Atonement: if by then they have done penance, they get
-written down alongside of the devout; if not, they are written down
-alongside of the evil-doers.”[255]
-
-
-2. _Alexandrine Fathers on Purgatory._
-
-Yet it is the Platonizing Alexandrian Fathers Clement and Origen,
-(they died, respectively, in about 215 and in 254 A.D.), who are the
-first, and to this hour the most important, Christian spokesmen for
-a state of true intrinsic purgation. We have already deliberately
-rejected their Universalism; but this error in no way weakens the
-profound truth of their teaching as to the immanental, necessary
-inter-connection between suffering and morally imperfect habits, and
-as to the ameliorative effects of suffering where, as in Purgatory, it
-is willed by a right moral determination. Thus Clement: “As children
-at the hands of their teacher or father, so also are we punished by
-Providence. God does not avenge Himself, for vengeance is to repay
-evil by evil, but His punishment aims at our good.” “Although a
-punishment, it is an emendation of the soul.” “The training which
-men call punishments.”[256] And Origen: “The fury of God’s vengeance
-profits unto the purification of souls; the punishment is unto
-purgation.” “These souls receive, in the prison, not the retribution
-of their folly, but a benefaction in the purification from the evils
-contracted in that folly,--a purification effected by means of salutary
-troubles.”[257]
-
-Now Clement is fully aware of the chief source for his formulation of
-these deeply spiritual and Christian instincts and convictions. “Plato
-speaks well when he teaches that ‘men who are punished, experience in
-truth a benefit: for those who get justly punished, profit through
-their souls becoming better.’”[258] But Plato, in contradistinction
-from Clement, holds that this applies only to such imperfect souls as
-“have sinned curable sins”; he has a Hell as well as a Purgatory: yet
-his Purgatory, as Clement’s, truly purges: the souls are there because
-they are partially impure, and they cease to be there when they are
-completely purified.
-
-And Plato, in his turn, makes no secret as to whence he got his
-suggestions and raw materials, _viz._ the Orphic priesthood and
-its literature, which, ever since the sixth century B.C., had been
-succeeding to and supplanting the previous Orgiastic Dionysianism.[259]
-Plato gives us vivid pictures of their doings in Athens, at the time
-of his writing, in about 380 B.C. “Mendicant prophets go to rich men’s
-doors, and persuade these men that they have a power committed to them
-of making an atonement for their sins, or for those of their fathers,
-by sacrifices and incantations … and they persuade whole cities that
-expiations and purifications of sin may be made by sacrifices and
-amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the service of
-the living and the dead.”[260]--Yet from these men, thus scorned as
-well-nigh sheer impostors, Plato takes over certain conceptions and
-formulations which contribute one of the profoundest, still unexhausted
-elements to his teaching,--although this element is, at bottom, in
-conflict with that beautiful but inadequate, quite anti-Orphic,
-conception of his--the purely negative character of Evil. For the
-Orphic literary remains, fragmentary and late though they be, plainly
-teach that moral or ritual transgressions are a defilement of the soul,
-an infliction of positive stains upon it; that these single offences
-and “spots” produce a generally sinful and “spotted” condition;
-and that this condition is amenable to and requires purification by
-suffering,--water, or more frequently fire, which wash or burn out
-these stains of sin. So Plutarch (who died about 120 A.D.) still
-declares that the souls in Hades have stains of different colours
-according to the different passions; and the object of the purificatory
-punishment is “that, these stains having been worn away, the soul may
-become altogether resplendent.” And Virgil, when he declares “the
-guilt which infects the soul is washed out or burnt out … until a
-long time-span has effaced the clotted stain, and leaves the heavenly
-conscience pure”: is utilizing an Orphic-Pythagorean Hades-book.[261]
-
-This conception of positive stains is carefully taken over by the
-Alexandrian Fathers: Clement speaks of “removing, by continuous prayer,
-the stains (κηλίδας) contracted through former sins,” and declares
-that “the Gnostic,” the perfect Christian, “fears not death, having
-purified himself from all the spots (σπίλους) on his soul.” And Origen
-describes “the pure soul that is not weighed down by leaden weights of
-wickedness,” where the spots have turned to leaden pellets such as were
-fastened to fishing-nets. Hence, says Clement, “post-baptismal sins
-have to be purified out” of the soul; and, says Origen, “these rivers
-of fire are declared to be of God, who causes the evil that is mixed up
-with the whole soul to disappear from out of it.”[262]
-
-In Pseudo-Dionysius the non-Orphic, purely negative, view prevails:
-“Evil is neither in demons nor in us as an existent evil, but as a
-failure and dearth in the perfection of our own proper goods.” And St.
-Thomas similarly declares that “different souls have correspondingly
-different stains, like shadows differ in accordance with the difference
-of the bodies which interpose themselves between the light.”[263]
-
-But Catherine, in this inconsistent with her own general
-Privation-doctrine, again conceives the stain, the “macchia del
-peccato,” as Cardinal Manning has acutely observed, not simply as a
-deprivation of the light of glory, but “as the cause, not the effect,
-of God’s not shining into the soul”: it includes in it the idea of
-an imperfection, weakness with regard to virtue, bad (secondary)
-dispositions, and unheavenly tastes.[264]
-
-
-3. _The true and the false in the Orphic conception._
-
-Now precisely in this profoundly true conception of Positive Stain
-there lurk certain dangers, which all proceed from the original Orphic
-diagnosis concerning the source of these stains, and these dangers will
-have to be carefully guarded against.
-
-(1) The conviction as to the purificatory power of fire was no doubt,
-originally, the direct consequence from the Orphic belief as to the
-intrinsically staining and imprisoning effect of the body upon the
-soul. “The soul, as the Orphics say, is enclosed in the body, in
-punishment for the punishable acts”; “liberations” from the body,
-and “purifications” of the living and the dead, ever, with them,
-proceed together. And hence to burn the dead body was considered
-to purify the soul that had been stained by that prison-house: the
-slain Clytemnestra, says Euripides, “is purified, as to her body, by
-fire,” for, as the Scholiast explains, “fire purifies all things,
-and burnt bodies are considered holy.”[265] And such an intensely
-anti-body attitude we find, not only fully developed later on into a
-deliberate anti-Incarnational doctrine, among the Gnostics, but, as we
-have already seen, slighter traces of this same tone may be found in
-the (doubtless Alexandrian) Book of Wisdom, and in one, not formally
-doctrinal passage, a momentary echo of it, in St. Paul himself.
-And Catherine’s attitude is generally, and often strongly, in this
-direction.
-
-(2) A careful distinction is evidently necessary here. The doctrine
-that sin defiles,--affects the quality of the soul’s moral and
-spiritual dispositions, and that this defilement and perversion, ever
-occasioned by the search after facile pleasure or the flight from
-fruitful pain, can normally be removed and corrected only by a long
-discipline of fully accepted, gradually restorative pain, either here,
-or hereafter, or both: are profound anticipations, and have been most
-rightly made integral parts, of the Christian life and conception. The
-doctrine that the body is essentially a mere accident or superaddition
-or necessary defilement to the soul, is profoundly untrue, in its
-exaggeration and one-sidedness: for if the body is the occasion of
-the least spiritual of our sins, it can and should become the chief
-servant of the spirit; the slow and difficult training of this servant
-is one of the most important means of development for the soul itself;
-and many faults and vices are not occasioned by the body at all, whilst
-none are directly and necessarily caused by it. Without the body, we
-should not have impurity, but neither should we have specifically
-human purity of soul; and without it, given the persistence and
-activity of the soul, there could be as great, perhaps greater, pride
-and _solipsism_, the most anti-Christian of all the vices. Hence if,
-in Our Lord’s teaching, we find no trace of a Gnostic desire for
-purification from all things bodily as essentially soul-staining, we do
-find a profound insistence upon purity of heart, and upon the soul’s
-real, active “turning,” conversion, (an interior change from an un- or
-anti-moral attitude to an ethical and spiritual dependence upon God),
-as a _sine qua non_ condition for entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven.
-And the Joannine teachings re-affirm this great truth for us as a
-_Metabasis_, a moving from Death over to Life.
-
-
-4. _Catherine’s conceptions as to the character of the stains and of
-their purgation._
-
-And this idea, as to an intrinsic purgation through suffering of
-impurities contracted by the soul, can be kept thoroughly Christian,
-if we ever insist, with Catherine in her most emphatic and deepest
-teachings, that Purgation can and should be effected in this life,
-hence in the body,--in and through all the right uses of the body,
-as well as in and through all the legitimate and will-strengthening
-abstentions from such uses; that the subject-matter of such purgation
-are the habits and inclinations contrary to our best spiritual lights,
-and which we have largely ourselves built up by our variously perverse
-or slothful acts, but which in no case are directly caused by the body,
-and in many cases are not even occasioned by it; and, finally, that
-holiness consists primarily, not in the absence of faults, but in the
-presence of spiritual force, in Love creative, Love triumphant,--the
-soul becoming flame rather than snow, and dwelling upon what to do,
-give and be, rather than upon what to shun.--Catherine’s predominant,
-ultimate tone possesses this profound positiveness, and corrects all
-but entirely whatever, if taken alone, would appear to render the
-soul’s substantial purity impossible in this life; to constitute the
-body a direct and necessary cause of impurity to the soul; and to find
-the ideal of perfection in the negative condition of being free from
-stain. In her greatest sayings, and in her actual life, Purity is
-found to be Love, and this Love is exercised, not only in the inward,
-home-coming, recollective movement,--in the purifying of the soul’s
-dispositions, but also in the outgoing, world-visiting, dispersive
-movement,--in action towards fellow-souls.
-
-
-5. _Judaeo-Roman conception of Purgatory._
-
-And this social side and movement brings us to the second element and
-current in the complete doctrine of a Middle State,--a constituent
-which possesses affinities and advantages, and produces excesses
-and abuses, directly contrary to those proper to the element of an
-intrinsic purgation.
-
-(1) Here we get early Christian utilizations, for purposes of a
-doctrine concerning the Intermediate State, of sayings and images which
-dwell directly only upon certain extrinsic consequences of evil-doing,
-or which, again, describe a future historical and social event,--the
-Last Day. For already Origen interprets, in his beautiful _Treatise on
-Prayer_, XXIX, 16, Our Lord’s words as to the debtor: “Thou shalt be
-cast into prison, thou shalt not come forth from thence, until thou
-hast paid the uttermost farthing,” Matt, v, 25, 26, as applying to
-Purgatory. And in his _Contra Celsum_, VII, 13, he already takes, as
-the Biblical _locus classicus_ for a Purgatory, St. Paul’s words as to
-how men build, upon the one foundation Christ, either gold, silver,
-gems, or wood, hay, stubble; and how fire will test each man’s work;
-and, if the work remain, he shall receive a reward, but if it be burnt,
-he shall suffer loss and yet he himself shall be saved yet so as by
-fire, 1 Cor. iii, 10-15. It appears certain, however, that St. Paul
-is, in this passage, thinking directly of the Last Day, the End of the
-World, with its accompaniment of physical fire, and as to how far the
-various human beings, then on earth, will be able to endure the dread
-stress and testing of that crisis; and he holds that some will be fit
-to bear it and some will not.
-
-Such a destruction of the world by fire appears elsewhere in
-Palestinian Jewish literature,--in the Book of Enoch and the Testament
-of Levi; and in the New Testament, in 2 Peter iii, 12: “The heavens
-being on fire shall be dissolved, the elements shall melt with fervent
-heat.” Josephus, _Antiquities_, XI, ii, 3, teaches a destruction by
-fire and another by water. And the Stoics, to whom also Clement and
-Origen appeal, had gradually modified their first doctrine of a simply
-cosmological Ekpyrōsis, a renovation of the physical universe by fire,
-into a moral purification of the earth, occasioned by, and applied
-to, the sinfulness of man. Thus Seneca has the double, water-and-fire,
-instrument: “At that time the tide” of the sea “will be borne along
-free from all measure, for the same reason which will cause the future
-conflagration. Both occur when it seems fit to God to initiate a better
-order of things and to have done with the old.… The judgment of mankind
-being concluded, the primitive order of things will be recalled, and to
-the earth will be re-given man innocent of crimes.”[266]
-
-(2) It is interesting to note how--largely under the influence of the
-forensic temper and growth of the Canonical Penitential system, and
-of its successive relaxations in the form of substituted lighter good
-works, Indulgences,--the Latin half of Christendom, ever more social
-and immediately practical than the Greek portion, came, in general,
-more and more to dwell upon two ideas suggested to their minds by
-those two, Gospel and Pauline, passages. The one idea was that souls
-which, whilst fundamentally well-disposed, are not fit for Heaven at
-the body’s death, can receive instant purification by the momentary
-fire of the Particular Judgment; and the other held that, thus already
-entirely purified and interiorly fit for Heaven, they are but detained
-(in what we ought, properly, to term a _Satisfactorium_), to suffer
-the now completely non-ameliorative, simply vindictive, infliction of
-punishment,--a punishment still, in strict justice, due to them for
-past sins, of which the guilt and the deteriorating effects upon their
-own souls have been fully remitted and cured.
-
-In this way it was felt that the complete unchangeableness of the
-condition of every kind of soul after death, or at least after the
-Particular Judgment (a Judgment held practically to synchronize with
-death), was assured. And indeed how could there be any interior growth
-in Purgatory, seeing that there is no meriting there? Again it was
-thought that thus the vision of God at the moment of Judgment was given
-an operative value for the spiritual amelioration of souls which,
-already in substantially good dispositions, could hardly be held to
-pass through so profound an experience without intrinsic improvement,
-as the other view seemed to hold.--And, above all, this form of the
-doctrine was found greatly to favour the multiplication among the
-people of prayers, Masses and good-works for the dead; since the _modus
-operandi_ of such acts seemed thus to become entirely clear, simple,
-immediate, and, as it were, measurable and mechanical. For these souls
-in their “Satisfactorium,” being, from its very beginning, already
-completely purged and fit for Heaven,--God is, as it were, free to
-relax at any instant, in favour of sufficiently fervent or numerous
-intercessions, the exigencies of his entirely extrinsic justice.
-
-(3) The position of a purely extrinsic punishment is emphasized, with
-even unusual vehemence, in the theological glosses inserted, in about
-1512 to 1529, in Catherine’s _Dicchiarazione_. Yet it is probably
-the very influential Jesuit theologian Francesco Suarez, who died
-in 1617, who has done most towards formulating and theologically
-popularizing this view. All the guilt of sin, he teaches, is remitted
-(in these Middle souls) at the first moment of the soul’s separation
-from the body, by means of a single act of contrition, whereby the
-will is wholly converted to God, and turned away from every venial
-sin. “And in this way sin may be remitted, as to its guilt, in
-Purgatory, because the soul’s purification dates from this moment”;--in
-strictness, from before the first moment of what should be here termed
-the “Satisfactorium.” As to bad habits and vicious inclinations,
-“we ought not to imagine that the soul is detained for these”: but
-“they are either taken away at the moment of death, or expelled by an
-infusion of the contrary virtues when the soul enters into glory.”[267]
-This highly artificial, inorganic view is adopted, amongst other
-of our contemporary theologians, by Atzberger, the continuator of
-Scheeben.[268]
-
-
-6. _The Judaeo-Roman conception must be taken in synthesis with the
-Alexandrine._
-
-Now it is plain that the long-enduring Penitential system of the Latin
-Church, and the doctrine and practice of Indulgences stand for certain
-important truths liable to being insufficiently emphasized by the Greek
-teachings concerning an intrinsically ameliorative _Purgatorium_, and
-that there can be no question of simply eliminating these truths.
-But neither are they capable of simple co-ordination with, still
-less of super-ordination to, those most profound and spiritually
-central immanental positions. As between the primarily forensic and
-governmental, and the directly ethical and spiritual, it will be the
-former that will have to be conceived and practised as, somehow, an
-expression and amplification of, and a practical corrective and means
-to, the latter.[269]
-
-(1) The ordinary, indeed the strictly obligatory, Church teaching
-clearly marks the suggested relation as the right one, at three, simply
-cardinal points. We are bound, by the Confession of Faith of Michael
-Palaeologus, 1267 A.D., and by the Decree of the Council of Florence,
-1429 A.D., to hold that these Middle souls “are purged after death by
-purgatorial or cathartic pains”; and by that of Trent “that there is
-a Purgatory.”[270] Yet we have here a true _lucus a non lucendo_, if
-this place or state does not involve purgation: for no theologian dares
-explicitly to transfer and restrict the name “Purgatory” to the instant
-of the soul’s Particular Judgment; even Suarez, as we have seen, has to
-extend the name somehow.
-
-Next we are bound, by the same three great Decrees, to hold indeed that
-“the Masses, Prayers, Alms, and other pious offices of the Faithful
-Living are profitable towards the relief of these pains,” yet this by
-mode of “suffrage,” since, as the severely orthodox Jesuit, Father H.
-Hurter, explains in his standard _Theologiae Dogmaticae Compendium_,
-“the fruit of this impetration and satisfaction is not infallible, for
-it depends upon the merciful acceptance of God.”[271] Hence in no case
-can we, short of superstition, conceive such good works as operating
-automatically: so that the _a priori_ simplest view concerning the
-mode of operation of these prayers is declared to be mistaken. We can
-and ought, then, to choose among the conceptions, not in proportion to
-their mechanical simplicity, but according to their spiritual richness
-and to their analogy with our deepest this-life experiences.
-
-And we are all bound, by the Decree of Trent and the Condemnation of
-Baius, 1567 A.D., to hold that Contrition springing from Perfect Love
-reconciles man with God, even before Confession, and this also outside
-of cases of necessity or of martyrdom.[272] Indeed, it is the common
-doctrine that one single act of Pure Love abolishes, not only Hell,
-but Purgatory, so that, if the soul were to die whilst that act was
-in operation, it would forthwith be in Heaven. If then, in case of
-perfect purity, the soul is at once in heaven, the soul cannot be quite
-pure and yet continue in Purgatory.
-
-(2) It is thus plain that, as regards Sin in its relation to the
-Sinner, there are, in strictness, ever three points to consider: the
-guilty act, the reflex effect of the act upon the disposition the
-agent, and the punishment; for all theologians admit that the more or
-less bad disposition, contracted through the sinful act, remains in
-the soul, except in the case of Perfect Contrition, after the guilt
-of the act has been remitted. But whilst the holders of an Extrinsic,
-Vindictive Purgatory, work for a punishment as independent as possible
-of these moral effects of sin still present in the pardoned soul, the
-advocates of an Intrinsic, Ameliorative Purgatory find the punishment
-centre in the pain and difficulty attendant upon “getting slowly
-back to fully virtuous dispositions, through retracing the steps we
-have taken in departing from it.”[273] And the system of Indulgences
-appears, in this latter view, to find its chief justification in that
-it keeps up a link with the past Penitential system of the Church; that
-it vividly recalls and applies the profound truth of the interaction,
-for good even more than for evil, between all human souls, alive and
-dead; and that it insists upon the readily forgotten truth of even the
-forgiven sinner, the man with the good determination, having ordinarily
-still much to do and to suffer before he is quit of the effects of his
-sin.
-
-(3) And the difficulties and motives special to those who supplant
-the Intrinsic, Ameliorating Purgatory by an Extrinsic, Vindicative
-_Satisfactorium_, can indeed be met by those who would preserve that
-beautifully dynamic, ethical, and spiritual conception. For we can
-hold that the fundamental condition,--the particular determination
-of the active will,--remains quite unchanged, from Death to Heaven,
-in these souls; that this determination of the active will requires
-more or less of time and suffering fully to permeate and assimilate to
-itself all the semi-voluntary wishes and habits of the soul; and that
-this permeation takes place among conditions in which the soul’s acts
-are too little resisted and too certain of success to be constituted
-meritorious. We can take Catherine’s beautiful Plunge-conception as
-indicating the kind of operation effected in and by the soul, at and
-through the momentary vision of God. And we can feel convinced that
-it is ever, in the long run, profoundly dangerous to try to clarify
-and simplify doctrines beyond or against the scope and direction of
-the analogies of Nature and of Grace, which are ever so dynamic and
-organic in type: for the poor and simple, as truly as the rich and
-learned, ever require, not to be merely taken and left as they are, but
-to be raised and trained to the most adequate conceptions possible to
-each.--It is, in any case, very certain that the marked and widespread
-movement of return to belief in a Middle State is distinctly towards a
-truly Purgative Purgatory, although few of these sincere truth-seekers
-are aware, as is Dr. Anrich, that they are groping after a doctrine
-all but quite explained away by a large body of late Scholastic and
-Neo-Scholastic theologians.[274]
-
-(4) Yet it is very satisfactory to note how numerous, and especially
-how important are, after all is said, the theologians who have
-continued to walk, in this matter, in the footsteps of the great
-Alexandrines. St. Gregory of Nyssa teaches a healing of the soul in the
-beyond and a purification by fire.[275] St. Augustine says that “fire
-burns up the work of him who thinketh of the things of this world,
-since possessions, that are loved, do not perish without pain on the
-part of their possessor. It is not incredible that something of this
-sort takes place after this life.”[276]
-
-St. Thomas declares most plainly: “Venial guilt, in a soul which
-dies in a state of grace, is remitted after this life by the purging
-fire, because that pain, which is in some manner accepted by the
-will, has, in virtue of grace, the power of expiating all such guilt
-as can co-exist with a state of grace.” “After this life … there can
-be merit with respect to some accidental reward, so long as a man
-remains in some manner in a state of probation: and hence there can be
-meritorious acts in Purgatory, with respect to the remission of venial
-sin.”[277]--Dante (_d._ 1321) also appears, as Father Faber finely
-notes, to hold such a voluntary, immanental Purgatory, where the poet
-sees an Angel impelling, across the sea at dawn, a bark filled with
-souls bent for Purgatory: for the boat is described as driving towards
-the shore so lightly as to draw no wake upon the water.[278]
-
-Cardinal Bellarmine, perhaps the greatest of all anti-Protestant
-theologians (_d._ 1621) teaches that “venial sin is remitted in
-Purgatory _quoad culpam_,” and that “this guilt, as St. Thomas rightly
-insists, is remitted in Purgatory by an act of love and patient
-endurance.”[279] St. Francis of Sales, that high ascetical authority
-(_d._ 1622), declares: “By Purgatory we understand a place where souls
-undergo purgation, for a while, from the stains and imperfections which
-they have carried away with them from this mortal life.”[280]
-
-And recently and in England we have had Father Faber, Cardinal Manning,
-and Cardinal Newman, although differing from each other on many other
-points, fully united in holding and propagating this finely life-like,
-purgative conception of purgatory.[281]
-
-
-7. _A final difficulty._
-
-One final point concerning a Middle State. In the Synoptic tradition
-there is a recurrent insistence upon the forgiveness of particular
-sins, at particular moments, by particular human and divine acts of
-contrition and pardon. In the Purgatorial teaching the stress lies
-upon entire states and habits, stains and perversities of soul, and
-upon God’s general grace working, in and through immanently necessary,
-freely accepted sufferings, on to a slow purification of the complete
-personality. As Origen says: “The soul’s single acts, good or bad, go
-by; but, according to their quality, they give form and figure to to
-the mind of the agent, and leave it either good or bad, and destined
-for pains or for rewards.”[282]
-
-The antagonism here is but apparent. For the fact that a certain
-condition of soul precedes, and that another condition succeed, each
-act of the same soul, in proportion as this act is full and deliberate,
-does not prevent the corresponding, complimentary fact that such acts
-take the preceding condition as their occasion, and make the succeeding
-condition into a further expression of themselves. Single acts which
-fully express the character, whether good or bad, are doubtless rarer
-than is mostly thought. Yet Catherine, in union with the Gospels and
-the Church, is deeply convinced of the power of one single act of Pure
-Love to abolish, not of course the effects outward, but the reflex
-spiritual consequences upon the soul itself, of sinful acts or states.
-
-Catherine’s picture again, of the deliberate Plunge into Purgatory,
-gives us a similar heroic act which, summing up the whole soul’s active
-volitions, initiates and encloses the whole subsequent purification,
-but which itself involves a prevenient act of Divine Love and mercy, to
-which this act of human love is but the return and response. Indeed,
-as we know, this plunge-conception was but the direct projection,
-on to the other-world-picture, of her own personal experience at
-her conversion, when a short span of clock-time held acts of love
-received and acts of love returned, which transformed all her previous
-condition, and initiated a whole series of states ever more expressive
-of her truest self.--Act and state and state and act, each presupposes
-and requires the other: and both are present in the Synoptic pictures,
-and both are operative in the Purgatorial teaching; although in the
-former the accounts are so brief as to make states and acts alike look
-as though one single act; and, in the latter, the descriptions are so
-large as to make the single acts almost disappear behind the states.
-
-
-V. CATHERINE AND HEAVEN--THREE PERPLEXITIES TO BE CONSIDERED.
-
-We have found a truly Purgational Middle state, with its sense of
-succession, its mixture of joy and suffering, and its growth and
-fruitfulness, to be profoundly consonant with all our deepest spiritual
-experiences and requirements. But what about Heaven, which we must,
-apparently, hold to consist of a sense of simultaneity, a condition
-of mere reproductiveness and utterly uneventful finality, and a state
-of unmixed, unchanging joy?--Here again, even if in a lesser degree,
-certain experiences of the human soul can help us to a few general
-positions of great spiritual fruitfulness, which can reasonably
-claim an analogical applicability to the Beyond, and which, thus
-taken as our ultimate ideals, cannot fail to stimulate the growth of
-our personality, and, with it, of further insight into these great
-realities. I shall here consider three main questions, which will
-roughly correspond to the three perplexities just indicated.
-
-
-1. _Time and Heaven._
-
-Our first question, then, is as to the probable character of man’s
-happiest ultimate consciousness,--whether it is one of succession or
-of simultaneity: in other words, whether, besides the disappearance of
-the category of space (a point already discussed), there is likely to
-be the lapse of the category of time also.--And let it be noted that
-the retention of the latter sense for Hell, and even for Purgatory,
-does not prejudge the question as to its presence or absence in Heaven,
-since those two states are admittedly non-normative, whereas the latter
-represents the very ideal and measure of man’s full destination and
-perfection.
-
-(1) Now it is still usual, amongst those who abandon the ultimacy
-of the space-category, simultaneously to drop, as necessarily
-concomitant, the time-category also. Tennyson, among the poets, does
-so, in his beautiful “Crossing the Bar”: “From out our bourne of Time
-and Place, the flood may bear me far”; and Prof. H. J. Holtzmann,
-among speculative theologians, in criticising Rothe’s conception of
-man as a quite ultimately spacial-temporal being, treats these two
-questions as standing and falling together.[283]--Yet a careful study
-of Kant’s critique of the two categories of Space and Time suffices
-to convince us of the indefinitely richer content, and more ultimate
-reality, of the latter. Indeed, I shall attempt to show more fully in
-the next Chapter, with the aid of M. Henri Bergson, that mathematical,
-uniform clock-time is indeed an artificial compound, which is made up
-of our profound experience of a duration in which the constituents
-(sensations, imaginations, thoughts, feelings, willings) of the
-succession ever, in varying degrees, overlap, interpenetrate, and
-modify each other, and the quite automatic and necessary simplification
-and misrepresentation of this experience by its imaginary projection on
-to space,--its restatement, by our picturing faculty, as a perfectly
-equable succession of mutually exclusive moments. It is in that
-interpenetrative duration, not in this atomistic clock-time, that our
-deeper human experiences take place.
-
-(2) But that sense of duration, is it indeed our deepest apprehension?
-Dr. Holtzmann points out finely how that we are well aware, in our
-profoundest experiences, of “that permanently incomprehensible
-fact,--the existence of, as it were, a prism, through which the
-unitary ray of light, which fills our consciousness with a real
-content, is spread out into a colour-spectrum, so that what, in itself,
-exists in pure unitedness” and simultaneity, “becomes intelligible to
-us only as a juxtaposition in space and a succession in time. Beyond
-the prism, there are no such two things.” And he shows how keenly
-conscious we are, at times, of that deepest mode of apprehension and
-of being which is a Simultaneity, an eternal Here and Now; and how
-ruinous to our spiritual life would be a full triumph of the category
-of time.[284]
-
-But it is St. Augustine who has, so far, found the noblest expression
-for the deepest human experiences in this whole matter of Duration and
-Simultaneity, as against mere Clock-Time, although, here as with regard
-to Space, he is deeply indebted to Plotinus. “In thee, O my soul, I
-measure time,--I measure the impression which passing events make
-upon thee, who remainest when those events have passed: this present
-impression then, and not those events which had to pass in order to
-produce it, do I measure, when I measure time.” “The three times,”
-tenses, “past, present, and future … are certain three affections in
-the soul, I find them there and nowhere else. There is the present
-memory of past events, the present perception of present ones, and the
-present expectation of future ones.” God possesses “the splendour of
-ever-tarrying Eternity,” which is “incomparable with never-tarrying
-times,” since in it “nothing passes, but the content of everything
-abides simply present.” And in the next life “perhaps our own thoughts
-also will not be flowing, going from one thing to another, but we shall
-see all we know simultaneously, in one intuition.” St. Thomas indeed is
-more positive: “All things will,” in Heaven, “be seen simultaneously
-and not successively.”[285]
-
-(3) If then, even here below, we can so clearly demonstrate the
-conventionality of mere Clock-Time, and can even conceive a perfect
-Simultaneity as the sole form of the consciousness of God, we cannot
-well avoid holding that, in the other life, the clock-time convention
-will completely cease, and that, though the sense of Duration is
-not likely completely to disappear, (since, in this life at least,
-this sense is certainly not merely phenomenal for man, and its
-entire absence would apparently make man into God), the category of
-Simultaneity will, as a sort of strong background-consciousness,
-englobe and profoundly unify the sense of Duration. And, the more
-God-like the soul, the more would this sense of Simultaneity
-predominate over the sense of Duration.
-
-
-2. _The Ultimate Good, concrete, not abstract._
-
-Our second question concerns the kind and degree of variety in unity
-which we should conceive to characterize the life of God, and of the
-soul in its God-likeness. Is this type and measure of all life to be
-conceived as a maximum of abstraction or as a maximum of concretion;
-as pure thought alone, or as also emotion and will; as solitary and
-self-centred, or as social and outgoing; and as simply reproductive, or
-also as operative?
-
-(1) Now it is certain that nothing is easier, and nothing has been
-more common, than to take the limitations of our earthly conditions,
-and especially those attendant upon the strictly contemplative, and,
-still more, those connected with the technically ecstatic states, as so
-many advantages, or even as furnishing a complete scheme of the soul’s
-ultimate life.
-
-As we have already repeatedly seen in less final matters, so here once
-more, at the end, we can trace the sad impoverishment to the spiritual
-outlook produced by the esteem in which the antique world generally
-held the psycho-physical peculiarities of trances, as directly
-valuable or even as prophetic of the soul’s ultimate condition; the
-contraposition and exaltation, already on the part of Plato and
-Aristotle, of a supposed non-actively contemplative, above a supposed
-non-contemplatively active life; the largely excessive, not fully
-Christianizable, doctrines of the Neo-Platonists as to the Negative,
-Abstractive way, when taken as self-sufficient, and as to Quiet,
-Passivity, and Emptiness of Soul, when understood literally; and the
-conception, rarely far away from the ancient thinkers, of the soul as a
-substance which, full-grown, fixed and stainless at the first, requires
-but to be kept free from stain up to the end.
-
-And yet the diminution of vitality in the trance, and even the
-inattention to more than one thing at a time in Contemplation, are,
-in themselves, defects, at best the price paid for certain gains; the
-active and the contemplative life are, ultimately, but two mutually
-complementary sides of life, so that no life ever quite succeeds in
-eliminating either element, and life, _caeteris paribus_, is complete
-and perfect, in proportion as it embraces both elements, each at
-its fullest, and the two in a perfect interaction; the Negative,
-Abstractive way peremptorily requires also the other, the Affirmative,
-Concrete way; the Quiet, Passivity, Emptiness are really, when
-wholesome, an incubation for, or a rest from, Action, indeed they are
-themselves a profound action and peace, and the soul is primarily a
-Force and an Energy, and Holiness is a growth of that Energy in Love,
-in full Being, and in creative, spiritual Personality.
-
-(2) Now on this whole matter the European Christian Mystics, strongly
-influenced by, yet also largely developing, certain doctrines of the
-Greeks, have, I think, made two most profound contributions to the
-truths of the spirit, and have seriously fallen short of reality in
-three respects.
-
-The first contribution can, indeed, be credited to Aristotle, whose
-luminous formulations concerning Energeia, Action, (as excluding
-Motion, or Activity), we have already referred to. Here to _be_ is
-to _act_, and Energeia, a being’s perfect functioning and fullest
-self-expression in action, is not some kind of movement or process;
-but, on the contrary, all movement and process is only an imperfect
-kind of Energeia. Man, in his life here, only catches brief glimpses of
-such an Action; but God is not so hampered,--He is ever completely all
-that He can be, His Action is kept up inexhaustibly and ever generates
-supreme bliss; it is an unchanging, unmoving Energeia.[286]--And St.
-Thomas echoes this great doctrine, for all the Christian schoolmen: “A
-thing is declared to be perfect, in proportion as it is in act,”--as
-all its potentialities are expressed in action; and hence “the First
-Principle must be supremely in act,” “God’s Actuality is identical with
-His Potentiality,” “God is Pure Action (_Actus Purus_).”[287]--Yet it
-is doubtless the Christian Mystics who have most fully experienced, and
-emotionally vivified, this great truth, and who cease not, in all their
-more characteristic teachings, from insisting upon the ever-increasing
-acquisition of “Action,” the fully fruitful, peaceful functioning of
-the whole soul, at the expense of “activity,” the restless, sterile
-distraction and internecine conflict of its powers. And Heaven, for
-them, ever consists in an unbroken Action, devoid of all “activity,”
-rendering the soul, in its degree, like to that Purest Action, God,
-who, Himself “Life,” is, as our Lord declared, “not the God of the dead
-but of the living.”[288]
-
-And the second contribution can, in part, be traced back to Plato,
-who does not weary, in the great middle period of his writings, from
-insisting upon the greatness of the nobler passions, and who already
-apprehends a Heavenly Eros which in part conflicts with, in part
-transcends, the Earthly one. But here especially it is Christianity,
-and in particular Christian Mysticism, which have fully experienced
-and proclaimed that “God” is “Love,” and that the greatest of all the
-soul’s acts and virtues is Charity, Pure Love. And hence the Pure
-Act of God, and the Action of the God-like soul, are conceived not,
-Aristotle-like, as acts of pure intelligence alone, but as tinged
-through and through with a noble emotion.
-
-(3) But in three matters the Mystics, as such and as a whole, have,
-here especially under the predominant influence of Greek thought,
-remained inadequate to the great spiritual realities, as most fully
-revealed to us by Christianity. The three points are so closely
-interconnected that it will be best first to illustrate, and then to
-criticise them, together.
-
-(i) Aristotle here introduces the mischief. For it is he who in his
-great, simply immeasurably influential, theological tractate, Chapters
-VI to X of the Twelfth Book of his _Metaphysic_, has presented to us
-God as “the one first unmoved Mover” of the Universe, but Who moves it
-as desired by it, not as desiring it, as outside of it, not as also
-inside it. God here is sheer Pure Thought, Noēsis, for “contemplation
-is the most joyful and the best” of actions. And “Thought” here
-“thinks the divinest and worthiest, without change,” hence “It thinks
-Itself, and the Thinking is a Thinking of Thought.”[289] We have here,
-as Dr. Caird strikingly puts it, a God necessarily shut up within
-Himself, “of purer eyes than to behold, not only iniquity but even
-contingency and finitude, and His whole activity is one act of pure
-self-contemplation.” “The ideal activity which connects God with the
-world, appears thus as in the world and not in God.”[290]
-
-(ii) Now we have already allowed that the Mystics avoid Aristotle’s
-elimination of emotion from man’s deepest action, and of emotion’s
-equivalent from the life of God. But they are, for the most part, much
-influenced in their speculations by this intensely Greek, aristocratic,
-intellectualist conception, in the three points of a disdain of the
-Contingent and Historical; of a superiority to volitional, productive
-energizing; and of a presentation of God as unsocial, and as occupied
-directly with Himself alone. We have already studied numerous examples
-of the first two, deeply un-Christian, errors as they have more or
-less influenced Christian Mysticism; the third mistake, of a purely
-Transcendental, Deistic God, is indeed never consistently maintained
-by any Christian, and Catherine, in particular, is ever dominated by
-the contrary great doctrine, adumbrated by Plato and fully revealed by
-Our Lord, of the impulse to give Itself intrinsic to Goodness, so that
-God, as Supreme Goodness, becomes the Supreme Self-giver, and thus the
-direct example and motive for our own self-donation to Him. Yet even
-so deeply religious a non-Christian as Plotinus, and such speculative
-thinkers as Eriugena and Eckhart (who certainly intended to remain
-Christians) continue all three mistakes, and especially insist upon a
-Supreme Being, Whose true centre, His Godhead, is out of all relation
-to anything but Himself. And even the orthodox Scholastics, and St.
-Thomas himself, attempt at times to combine, with the noblest Platonic
-and the deepest Christian teachings, certain elements, which, in
-strictness, have no place in an Incarnational Religion.
-
-(iii) For, at times, the fullest, deepest Action is still not
-conceived, even by St. Thomas, as a Harmony, an Organization of all
-Man’s essential powers, the more the better. “In the active life,
-which is occupied with many things, there is less of beatitude than
-in the contemplative life, which is busy with one thing alone,--the
-contemplation of Truth”; “beatitude must consist essentially in the
-action of the intellect; and only accidentally in the action of the
-will.”[291] God is still primarily intelligence: “God’s intelligence
-is His substance”; whereas “volition must be in God, since there is
-intelligence in Him,” and “Love must of necessity be declared to be
-in God, since there is volition in Him.”[292] God is still, in a
-certain sense, shut up in Himself: “As He understands things other
-than Himself, by understanding His own essence, so He wills things
-other than Himself, by willing His own goodness.” “God enjoys not
-anything beside Himself, but enjoys Himself alone.”[293]--And we get,
-in correspondence to this absorption of God in Himself, an absorption
-of man in God, of so direct and exclusive a kind, as, if pressed, to
-eliminate all serious, permanent value, for our soul, in God’s actual
-creation of our fellow-creatures. “He who knoweth Thee and creatures,
-is not, on this account, happier than if he knows them not; but he is
-happy because of Thee alone.” And “the perfection of Love is essential
-to beatitude, with respect to the Love of God, not with respect to
-the Love of one’s neighbour. If there were but one soul alone to
-enjoy God, it would be blessèd, even though it were without a single
-fellow-creature whom it could love.”[294]
-
-(iv) And yet St. Thomas’s own deeply Christian sense, explicit sayings
-of Our Lord or of St. Paul, and even, in part, certain of the fuller
-apprehensions of the Greeks, can make the great Dominican again
-uncertain, or can bring him to entirely satisfactory declarations,
-on each of these points. For we get the declaration that direct
-knowledge of individual things, and quasi-creative operativeness are
-essential to all true perfection. “To understand something merely
-in general and not in particular, is to know it imperfectly”; Our
-Lord Himself has taught us that “the very hairs of your head are all
-numbered”; hence God must “know all other individual things with
-a distinct and proper knowledge.”--And “a thing is most perfect,
-when it can make another like unto itself. But by tending to its
-own perfection, each thing tends to become more and more like God.
-Hence everything tends to be like God, in so far as it tends to be
-the cause of other things.”[295]--We get a full insistence, with St.
-Paul, (in I Cor. xiii), upon our love of God, an act of the will,
-as nobler than our cognition of Him; and with Plato and St. John,
-upon God’s forthgoing Love for His creatures, as the very crown and
-measure of His perfection. “Everything in nature has, as regards its
-own good, a certain inclination to diffuse itself amongst others, as
-far as possible. And this applies, in a supreme degree, to the Divine
-Goodness, from which all perfection is derived.” “Love, Joy, Delight
-can be predicated of God”; Love which, of its very essence “causes
-the lover to bear himself to the beloved as to his own self”: so that
-we must say with Dionysius that “He, the very Cause of all things,
-becomes ecstatic, moves out of Himself, by the abundance of His loving
-goodness, in the providence exercised by Him towards all things
-extant.”[296]
-
-(v) And we get in St. Thomas, when he is too much dominated by the
-abstractive trend, a most interesting, because logically necessitated
-and quite unconscious, collision with certain sayings of Our Lord. For
-he then explains Matt. xviii, 10, “their,” the children’s, “Angels
-see without ceasing the face of their Father who is in Heaven” as
-teaching that “the action (_operatio_), by which Angels are conjoined
-to the increate Good, is, in them, unique and sempiternal”; whereas his
-commentators are driven to admit that the text, contrariwise, implies
-that these Angels have two simultaneous “operations,” and that their
-succouring action in nowise disturbs their intellectual contemplation.
-Hence, even if we press Matt. xxii, 30, that we “shall be as the Angels
-of God,” we still have an organism of peaceful Action, composed of
-intellectual, affective, volitional, productive acts operating between
-the soul and God, and the soul and other souls, each constituent and
-object working and attained in and through all the others.
-
-(vi) Indeed all Our Lord’s Synoptic teachings, as to man’s ultimate
-standard and destiny, belong to this God-in-man and man-in-God type
-of doctrine: for there the two great commandments are strictly
-inseparable; God’s interest in the world is direct and detailed,--it
-is part of His supreme greatness that He cares for every sparrow that
-falls to the ground; and man, in the Kingdom of God, will sit down
-at a banquet, the unmistakable type of social joys.--And even the
-Apocalypse, which has, upon the whole, helped on so much the conception
-of an exclusive, unproductive entrancement of each soul singly in
-God alone, shows the deepest emotion when picturing all the souls,
-from countless tribes and nations, standing before the throne,--an
-emotion which can, surely, not be taken as foreign to those souls
-themselves.[297] But, indeed, Our Lord’s whole life and message become
-unintelligible, and the Church loses its deepest roots, unless the
-Kingdom of God is, for us human souls, as truly a part of our ultimate
-destiny as is God Himself, that God who fully reveals to us His own
-deepest nature as the Good Shepherd, the lover of each single sheep and
-of the flock as a whole.[298]
-
-(4) We shall, then, do well to hold that the soul’s ultimate beatitude
-will consist in its own greatest possible self-realization in its
-God-likeness,--an Action free from all Activity, but full of a knowing,
-feeling, willing, receiving, giving, effectuating, all which will
-energize between God and the soul, and the soul and other souls,--each
-force and element functioning in its proper place, but each stimulated
-to its fullest expansion, and hence to its deepest delight, by the
-corresponding vitalization of the other powers and ends, and of other
-similar centres of rich action.
-
-
-3. _The pain-element of Bliss._
-
-And our third, last question is whether our deepest this-life
-apprehensions and experiences give us any reason for holding that a
-certain equivalent for what is noblest in devoted suffering, heroic
-self-oblivion, patient persistence in lonely willing, will be present
-in the life of the Blessed. It would certainly be a gain could we
-discover such an equivalent, for a pure glut of happiness, an unbroken
-state of sheer enjoyment, can as little be made attractive to our most
-spiritual requirements, as the ideal of an action containing an element
-of, or equivalent for, devoted and fruitful effort and renunciation can
-lose its perennial fascination for what is most Christian within us.
-
-(1) It is not difficult, I take it, to find such an element, which we
-cannot think away from any future condition of the soul without making
-that soul into God Himself. The ultimate cause of this element shall
-be considered, as Personality, in our next Chapter: here I can but
-indicate this element at work in our relations to our fellow-men and
-to God.--Already St. Thomas, throughout one current of his teaching,
-is full of the dignity of right individuality. “The Multitude and
-Diversity of natures in the Universe proceed directly from the
-intention of God, who brought them into being, in order to communicate
-His goodness to them, and to have It represented by them. And since
-It could not be sufficiently represented by one creature alone, He
-produced many and diverse ones, so that what is wanting to the one
-towards this office, should be supplied by the other.”[299] Hence the
-multiplication of the Angels, who differ specifically each from all
-the rest, adds more of nobility and perfection to the Universe, than
-does the multiplication of men, who differ only individually.[300] And
-Cardinal Nicolas of Coes writes, in 1457 A.D., “Every man is, as it
-were, a separate species, because of his perfectibility.”[301] As Prof.
-Josiah Royce tells us in 1901, “What is real, is not only a content of
-experience and the embodiment of a type; but an individual content of
-experience, and the unique embodiment of a type.”[302]
-
-(2) Now in the future beatitude, where the full development of this
-uniqueness in personality cannot, as so often here, be stunted or
-misapplied, all this will evidently reach its zenith. But, if so,
-then it follows that, although one of the two greatest of the joys of
-those souls will be their love and understanding of each other,--this
-love and trust, given as it will be to the other souls, in their full,
-unique personality, will, of necessity, exceed the comprehension of
-the giving personalities. Hence there will still be an equivalent for
-that trust and venture, that creative faith in the love and devotion
-given by us to our fellows, and found by us in them, which are, here
-below, the noblest concomitants and conditions of the pain and the
-cost and the joy in every virile love and self-dedication.--There
-is then an element of truth in Lessing’s words of 1773: “The human
-soul is incapable of even one unmixed emotion,--one that, down to its
-minutest constituent, would be nothing but pleasurable or nothing but
-painful: let alone of a condition in which it would experience nothing
-but such unmixed emotions.”--For, as Prof. Troeltsch says finely in
-1903, “Everything historical retains, in spite of all its relation to
-absolute values, something of irrationality,”--of impenetrableness to
-finite minds, “and of individuality. Indeed just this mixture is the
-special characteristic of the lot and dignity of man; nor is a Beyond
-for him conceivable in which it would altogether cease. Doubt and
-unrest can indeed give way to clear sight and certitude: yet this very
-clarity and assurance will, in each human soul, still bear a certain
-individual character,” fully comprehensible to the other souls by love
-land trust alone.[303]
-
-(3) And this same element we find, of course, in a still greater
-degree,--although, as I shall argue later on, our experimental
-knowledge of God is greater than is our knowledge of our
-fellow-creatures,--in the relations between our love of God and our
-knowledge of Him. St. Thomas tells us most solidly: “Individual
-Being applies to God, in so far as it implies Incommunicableness.”
-Indeed, “_Person_ signifies the most perfect thing in nature,”--“the
-subsistence of an individual in a rational nature.” “And since the
-dignity of the divine nature exceeds every other dignity, this name
-of Person is applicable, in a supreme degree, to God.” And again:
-“God, as infinite, cannot be held infinitely by anything finite “;
-and hence “only in the sense in which comprehension is opposed to
-a seeking after Him, is God comprehended, _i.e._ possessed, by the
-Blessed.” And hence the texts: “I follow, if that I may apprehend,
-seeing that I also am apprehended” (Phil. iii, 12); “then shall I
-know even as I am known” (1 Cor. xiii, 12); and “we shall see Him as
-He is” (1 John iii, 2): all refer to such a possession of God. In the
-last text “the adverb ‘as’ only signifies ‘we shall see His essence’
-and not ‘we shall have as perfect a mode of vision as God has a mode
-of being.’”[304]--Here again, then, we find that souls loving God in
-His Infinite Individuality, will necessarily love Him beyond their
-intellectual comprehension of Him; the element of devoted trust, of
-free self-donation to One fully known only through and in such an act,
-will thus remain to man for ever. St. John of the Cross proclaimed this
-great truth: “One of the greatest favours of God, bestowed transiently
-upon the soul in this life, is its ability to see so distinctly, and
-to feel so profoundly, that … it cannot comprehend Him at all. These
-souls are herein, in some degree, like to the souls in heaven, where
-they who know Him most perfectly perceive most clearly that He is
-infinitely incomprehensible; for those that have the less clear vision,
-do not perceive so distinctly as the others how greatly He transcends
-their vision.”[305] With this teaching, so consonant with Catherine’s
-experimental method, and her continuous trust in the persistence of the
-deepest relations of the soul to God, of the self-identical soul to the
-unchanging God, we can conclude this study of her Eschatology.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XIII
-
-THE FIRST THREE ULTIMATE QUESTIONS. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MORALITY,
-MYSTICISM, PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGION. MYSTICISM AND THE LIMITS OF HUMAN
-EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE. MYSTICISM AND THE NATURE OF EVIL
-
-
-I take the ultimate questions involved in the religious positions
-which are taken up by Catherine, and indeed by the Christian Mystics
-generally, and which we have studied in the preceding two chapters,
-to be four. In the order of their increasing difficulty they are: the
-question as to the relations between Morality, Mysticism, Philosophy,
-and Religion; that as to the Limits of Human Knowledge, and as to the
-special character and worth of the Mystics’ claim to Trans-subjective
-Cognition; that as to the Nature of Evil and the Goodness or Badness
-of Human Nature; and that as to Personality,--the character of, and
-the relations between, the human spirit and the Divine Spirit. The
-consideration of these deepest matters in the next two chapters will, I
-hope, in spite of its inevitable element of dimness and of repetition,
-do much towards binding together and clarifying the convictions which
-we have been slowly acquiring,--ever, in part, with a reference to
-these coming ultimate alternatives and choices.
-
-
-I. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MORALITY AND MYSTICISM PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.
-
-Now the first of these questions has not, for most of the more
-strenuous of our educated contemporaries, become, so far again, a
-living question at all. A morally good and pure, a socially useful and
-active life,--all this in the sense and with the range attributed to
-these terms by ordinary parlance: this and this alone is, for doubtless
-the predominant public present-day consciousness, the true object,
-end, and measure of all healthy religion; whatever is alongside of,
-or beyond, or other than, or anything but a direct and exclusive
-incentive to this, is so much superstition and fanaticism. According to
-this view, at least one half of Catherine’s activity at all times, and
-well-nigh the whole of it during her last period, would be practically
-worthless. Thus only certain elements of such a life would be retained
-even for and in religion, and even these would be bereft of all that
-has hitherto been held to be their specifically religious sense and
-setting.
-
-
-1. _Kant’s non-mystical religion._
-
-It is doubtless Kant who, among the philosophers, has been the most
-consistent and influential in inculcating such non-Mystical Religion.
-“Religion,” he says in 1793, “is, on its subjective side, the cognition
-of all our duties as so many Divine Commandments.” “The delusion that
-we can effect something, in view of our justification before God, by
-means of acts of religious worship, is religious superstition; and
-the delusion that we can effect something by attempts at a supposed
-intercourse with God, is religious fanaticism.… Such a feeling of the
-immediate presence of the Supreme Being, and such a discrimination
-between this feeling and every other, even moral, feeling, would
-imply a capacity for an intuition, which is without any corresponding
-organ in human nature.… If then a Church doctrine is to abolish or
-to prevent all religious delusion, it must,--over and above its
-statutory teachings, with which it cannot, for the present, entirely
-dispense,--contain within itself a principle which shall enable it to
-bring about the religion of a pure life, as the true end of the whole
-movement, and then to dispense with those temporary doctrines.”[306]
-
-It is deeply instructive to note how thoroughly this, at first sight,
-solid and triumphant view, has not only continued to be refuted by the
-actual practice and experience of specifically religious souls, but how
-explicitly it is being discredited by precisely the more delicately
-perceptive, the more truly detached and comprehensive, students and
-philosophers of religion of the present day,--heirs, let us not forget
-in justice to Kant, of the intervening profound development of the
-historical sense, and of the history and psychology of religion.--Thus
-that most vigorous, independent thinker, Prof. Simmel of Berlin,
-writes in 1904: “Kant has, I think, simply passed by the essentials
-of religion,--that is to say, of that reality which historically bears
-the name of religion. Only the reflection, that the harmony of complete
-happiness with complete morality is producible by a Divine Being
-alone, is here supposed to lead us to believe in such a Being. There
-is here a complete absence of that direct laying hold of the Divine
-by our souls, because of our intrinsic needs, which characterizes
-all genuine piety. And the religious sense is not recognized as an
-organism with a unity of its own, as a growth springing from its own
-root. The entirely specific character of religion, which is resolvable
-neither into morality nor into a thirst after happiness: the direct
-self-surrender of the soul to a higher reality, the giving and taking,
-the unification and differentiation,--that quite organic unity of the
-religious experience, which we can but most imperfectly indicate by
-a multiplicity of some such, simultaneously valid, antitheses: this,
-there is no evidence to show, was ever really known to Kant. What
-was religion for Augustine and Francis of Assisi, he was unable to
-reproduce in himself; indeed religion, of this type, he readily rejects
-as fanaticism. Here lay the limit both of his own nature and of his own
-times.”[307]
-
-The rich mind of Prof. Troeltsch is, perhaps, more entirely just: “As
-Kant’s theory of knowledge is throughout dependent upon the state of
-contemporary psychology, so also is his theory of religious knowledge
-dependent upon the psychology of religion predominant in his day.
-Locke, Leibniz, Pascal had already recognized the essentially practical
-character of all religion; and since their psychology was unable to
-conceive the ‘practical’ otherwise than as the moral, it had looked
-upon Religion as Morality furnished forth with its metaphysical
-concomitants. And as soon as this psychology had become the very
-backbone of his conception of Religion, Morality gained an entirely
-one-sided predominance over Kant’s mind,--considerably, indeed, beyond
-his own personal feelings and perceptions.” For he remains deeply
-penetrated by “the conceptions of Regeneration and Redemption; the idea
-of divine Grace and Wisdom, which accepts the totality of a soul’s
-good disposition in lieu of that soul’s ever defective single good
-works; the belief in a Providence which strengthens the Good throughout
-the world against Evil; adoring awe in face of the majesty of the
-Supersensible”: and “all these” conceptions “are no more simply moral,
-they are specifically religious thoughts.”[308]
-
-Such a fuller conception of religion is admirably insisted on by that
-penetrating philosopher and historian of philosophy, Prof. Windelband:
-“Actual Religion, in its complete reality, belongs to all the spheres
-of life, and yet transcends them all, as something new and _sui
-generis_. It is first an interior life--an apprehending, cognizing,
-feeling, willing, accomplishing. But this accomplishing leads it on to
-being also an exterior life: an acting out, according to their various
-standards, of such feeling and willing; and an outward expression of
-that inner life in general, in ritual acts and divine worship. Yet
-this worship takes it beyond the little circle of the individual, and
-constitutes the corporate acts of a community, a social, external
-organization with visible institutions. And yet Religion ever claims to
-be more than the whole series of such empirical facts and doings, it
-ever transcends mere earthly experience, and is an intercourse with the
-inmost nature and foundation of all reality; it is a life in and with
-God, a metaphysical life. All these elements belong to the complete
-concept of actual religion.”[309] I would add, that they each stimulate
-the other, the external, _e.g._ being not only the expression of the
-awakened internal, but also the occasion of that awakening.
-
-And the great Dutch scholar, Prof. C. P. Tiele, unexcelled in the
-knowledge of the actual course taken by the great religions of the
-world, declares: “All progress, not only in Morality, but also in
-Science, Philosophy, Art, necessarily exerts an influence upon that
-of Religion. But … Religion is not, on that account, identical with
-Ethics any more than with Philosophy or Art. All these manifestations
-of the human spirit respond to certain needs of man; but none of them,
-not even Morality, is capable of supplying the want which Religion
-alone can satisfy.… Religion differs from the other manifestations
-of the human mind” in this, that whereas “in the domain of Art, the
-feelings and the imagination predominate; in that of Philosophy,
-abstract thought is paramount”; and “the main object of Science is to
-know accurately, whilst Ethics are chiefly concerned with the emotions
-and with the fruit they yield: in Religion all these factors operate
-alike, and if their equilibrium be disturbed, a morbid religious
-condition is the result.”[310]
-
-
-2. _Ritschlian modification of Kant’s view._
-
-It is deeply interesting to note the particular manner in which Kant’s
-impoverishment of the concept of religion has been in part retained, in
-part modified, by the Ritschlian school,--I am thinking especially of
-that vigorous writer, Prof. Wilhelm Hermann.
-
-(1) If in Kant we get the belief in God derived from reflection
-upon Goodness and Happiness, and as the only possible means of
-their ultimate coalescence: in Hermann we still get the Categorical
-Imperative, but the thirst for Happiness has been replaced by the
-historic figure of Jesus Christ. “Two forces of different kinds,”
-he says, “ever produce the certainty of Faith: the impression of an
-Historic Figure which approaches us in Time; and the Moral Law which,
-when we have heard it, we can understand in its Eternal Truth. Faith
-arises, when a man recognizes, in the appearance of Jesus, that symbol
-of his own existence which gives him the courage to recognize in the
-Eternal, which claims him in the Moral Imperative, the source of true
-life for his own self.”[311]--And these two sole co-efficients of
-all entirely living religion are made to exclude, as we have already
-seen, especially all Mysticism from the life of Faith. “True, outside
-of Christianity, Mysticism will everywhere arise, as the very flower
-of the religious development. But a Christian is bound to declare the
-mystical experience of God to be a delusion. Once he has experienced
-his elevation, by Christ alone, above his own previous nature, he
-cannot believe that another man can attain the same result, simply by
-means of recollection within his own self.… We are Christians precisely
-because we have struck, in the person of Jesus, upon a fact which is
-incomparably richer in content than the feelings that arise within
-ourselves.” “Only because Christ is present for us can we possess
-God with complete clearness and certainty.” And, with Luther,--who
-remained, however, thoroughly faithful to the Primitive and Mediaeval
-high esteem for the Mystical element of religion;--“right prayer is
-a work of faith, and only a Christian can perform it.” And, more
-moderately: “We have no desire to penetrate through Christ on to
-God: for we consider that in God Himself we still find nothing but
-Christ.”[312]
-
-(2) Now it is surely plain that we have here a most understandable,
-indeed respectable, reaction against all empty, sentimental
-Subjectivism, and a virile affirmation of the essential importance
-of the Concrete and Historical. And, in particular, the insistence
-upon the supreme value and irreplaceable character and function of
-Christ is profoundly true.--Yet three counter-considerations have
-ever to be borne in mind.
-
-(i) It remains certain that we do not know, or experience anything,
-to which we can attribute any fuller reality, which is either purely
-objective or purely subjective; and that there exists no process of
-knowing or experiencing such a reality which would exclude either the
-objective or the subjective factor. “Whatever claims to be fully real,”
-either as apprehending subject or as apprehended object, “must be an
-individual … an organic whole, which has its principle of unity in
-itself.” The truly real, then, is a thing that has an inside; and the
-sharp antithesis drawn, although in contrary directions, by Aristotle
-and by Kant, between the Phenomenal and the Intelligible worlds, does
-not exist in the reality either of our apprehending selves, or of our
-apprehended fellow-men, or God.[313]--But Hermann is so haunted by the
-bogey-fear of the subjective resonance within us being necessarily
-useless towards, indeed obstructive of, the right apprehension
-of the object thus responded to, that he is driven to follow the
-will-o’-the-wisp ideal of a pure, entirely exclusive objectivity.
-
-(ii) Bent on this will-o’-the-wisp quest of an exclusive objectivity,
-he has to define all Mysticism in terms of Exclusive Mysticism, and
-then to reject such an aberration. “Wherever the influence of God upon
-the soul is sought and found solely in an interior experience of the
-individual soul, in an excitation of the feelings which is supposed
-directly to reveal the true nature of this experience, _viz._ in a
-state of possession by God, and this without anything exterior being
-apprehended and held fast with a clear consciousness, without the
-positive content of some mental contemplation setting thoughts in
-motion and raising the spiritual level of the soul’s life; _there_ is
-Mystical Piety.”[314]
-
-Now it is, of course, true that false Mysticism does attempt such an
-impossible feat as the thing at which Hermann is thus aiming. But, even
-here, the facts and problems are again misstated. Just now the object
-presented was everything, and the apprehending subject was nothing.
-Here, on the contrary, the apprehension by the subject is pressed to
-the degree of requiring the soul to remain throughout reflexly aware of
-its own processes.
-
-Already in 1798 Kant had, in full acceptance of the great distinction
-worked out by Leibniz in the years 1701-1709, but not published till
-1765, declared: “We can be mediately conscious of an apprehension as to
-which we have no direct consciousness”; and “the field of our obscure
-apprehensions,--that is, apprehensions and impressions of which we are
-not directly conscious, although we can conclude without doubt that we
-have them,--is immeasurable, whereas clear apprehensions constitute but
-a very few points within the complete extent of our mental life.”[315]
-This great fact psychologists can now describe with greater knowledge
-and precision: yet the observations and analyses of Pierre Janet,
-William James, James Ward and others, concerning Subconsciousness,
-have but confirmed and deepened the Leibnizian-Kantian apprehensions.
-Without much dim apprehension, no clear perception; nothing is more
-certain than this.
-
-And it is certain, also, that this absence of reflex consciousness, of
-perceiving that we are apprehending, applies not only to impressions
-of sensible objects, or to apprehensions of realities inferior
-in richness, in interiority, to our own nature, but also, indeed
-especially, to apprehensions of realities superior, in dignity and
-profundity of organization, to our own constitution. When engrossed
-in a great landscape of Turner, the Parthenon sculptures, a sonata of
-Beethoven, Dante’s _Paradiso_; or when lost in the contemplation of the
-seemingly endless spaces of the heavens, or of the apparently boundless
-times of geology; or when absorbed in the mysterious greatness of
-Mind, so incommensurable with matter, and of Personality, so truly
-presupposed in all these appreciations yet so transcendent of even
-their collectivity--we are as little occupied with the facts of our
-engrossment, our self-oblivion, our absorption, or with the aim and
-use of such immensely beneficial self-oblivion, as we are, in our
-ordinary, loosely-knit states, occupied with the impression which,
-nevertheless, is being produced upon our senses and mind by some small
-insect or slight ray of light to which we are not giving our attention,
-or which may be incapable of impressing us sufficiently to be thus
-attended to and clearly perceived.[316] And, as in the case of these
-under-impressions, so in that of those over-impressions, we can often
-judge, as to their actual occurrence and fruitfulness, only from their
-after-effects, although this indirect proof will, in each case, be of
-quite peculiar cogency.--All this leaves ample room for that prayer
-of simple quiet, so largely practised by the Saints, and indeed for
-all such states of recollection which, though the soul, on coming
-from them, cannot discover definite ideas or picturings to have been
-contained in them, leave the soul braced to love, work, and suffer
-for God and man, beyond its previous level. Prof. William James is
-too deeply versed a Psychologist not fully to understand the complete
-normality of such conditions, and the entire satisfactoriness of such
-tests.[317]
-
-(iii) And finally, it is indeed true that God reveals Himself to us,
-at all fully, in Human History alone, and within this history, more
-fully still, in the lives and experiences of the Saints of all the
-stages of religion, and, in a supreme and normative manner, in the life
-and teaching of Jesus Christ; that we have thus a true immanence of
-the Divine in the Human; and that it is folly to attempt the finding
-or the making of any shorter way to God than that of the closest
-contact with His own condescensions. Yet such a wisely Historical and
-fully Christian attitude would be imperilled, not secured, by such an
-excessive Christocentrism, indeed such _Panchristism_, as that of Prof.
-Hermann.
-
-We shall indeed beware of all indifferentist levelling-down of the
-various religions of the world. For, as Prof. Robertson Smith, who
-knew so well the chief great religions, most wisely said, “To say
-that God speaks to all men alike, and gives the same communication
-directly to all without the use of a revealing agency, reduces religion
-to Pure Mysticism. In point of fact it is not true of any man that
-what he believes and knows of God, has come to him directly through
-the voice of nature and conscience.” And he adds: “History has not
-taught us anything in true religion to add to the New Testament. Jesus
-Christ still stands as high above us as He did above His disciples,
-the perfect Master, the supreme head of the fellowship of all true
-religion.”[318]
-
-Yet we must equally guard against making even Our Lord into so
-exclusive a centre and home of all that is divine, as to cause Him
-to come into an entirely God-forsaken, completely God-forgetting
-world, a world which did not and could not, in any degree or manner
-whatsoever, rightly know, love, or serve God at all; and against so
-conceiving the religion, taught and practised by Him, as to deprive it
-of all affinity with, or room for, such admittedly universal forces
-and resultants of the human soul and the religious sense as are dim
-apprehension, formless recollection, pictureless emotion, and the
-sense of the Hiddenness and Transcendence of the very God, Who is also
-Immanent and Self-Revealing, in various degrees and ways, in every
-place and time. Indeed, these two forces: the diffused Religiosity and
-more or less inchoate religion, readily discoverable, by a generous
-docility, more or less throughout the world of human souls, and the
-concentrated spirituality and concrete, thoroughly characteristic
-Religion, which has its culmination, after its ample preludings in the
-Hebrew Prophets, in the Divine-Human figure and spirit of Jesus Christ:
-are interdependent, in somewhat the way in which vague, widely spread
-Subconsciousness requires, and is required by, definite, narrowly
-localized Consciousness in each human mind. Precisely because there
-have been and are previous and simultaneous lesser communications
-of, and correspondences with, the one “Light that enlighteneth every
-man that cometh into the world”; because men can and do believe
-according to various, relatively preliminary, degrees and ways, in God
-and a Providence, in Sin and Contrition, without a knowledge of the
-Historic Christ (although never without the stimulation of some, often
-world-forgotten, historic personality, and ever with some real, though
-unconscious approximation to His type of life and teaching), therefore
-can Christ be the very centre, and sole supreme manifestation and
-measure of all this light. Not only can Christ remain supreme, even
-though Moses and Elijah, Amos and Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel; and
-indeed, in their own other degrees and ways, Plato and Plotinus,
-Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, Gautama Buddha and Rabbi Akiba be all
-revered as God-loved and God-loving, as, in various amounts, truly,
-spiritually great: but only thus can His central importance be fully
-realized.
-
-There is certainly much in Our Lord’s own attitude, as we have already
-found, to demand such a view; and Clement of Alexandria, Origen and St.
-Justin Martyr have emphasized it continually. And there is no necessary
-Naturalism here--for the position is entirely compatible with the
-profoundest belief in the great truth that it is Grace which everywhere
-produces the various degrees of God-pleasing religion to be found
-scattered throughout the world. Father Tyrrell has admirably said:
-“God’s salutary workings in man’s heart have always been directed,
-however remotely, to the life of Grace and Glory; of ‘the Order of mere
-nature,’ and its exigencies, we have no experimental knowledge … In the
-present order, Theism is but embryonic Christianity, and Christianity
-is but developed Theism: ‘purely natural’ religion is what might have
-been, but never was.”[319]
-
-(3) Now this must suffice as a sketch of the relations between
-(Historical) Religion and Mysticism, and will have shown why I cannot
-but regret that so accomplished a scholar as Prof. Morice Jastrow
-should class all and every Mysticism, whether Pure or Mixed, as
-so far forth a religious malady; why I rejoice that so admirably
-circumspect an investigator as Prof. C. P. Tiele should, (in the
-form of a strenuous insistence upon the apprehension, indeed the
-ontological action of, the Infinite, by and within the human spirit,
-as the very soul and mainspring of Religion), so admirably reinforce
-the fundamental importance of the Mystical apprehensions; why I most
-warmly endorse Prof. Rauwenhoff’s presentment of Mysticism as, with
-Intellectualism and Moralism, one of the three psychological forms
-of religion, which are each legitimate and necessary, and which each
-require the check of the other two, if they are not to degenerate each
-into some corruption special to the exclusive development of that
-particular form; and why I cordially applaud the unequalled analysis
-and description by Prof. Eucken of the manner in which “Universal
-Religion” is at work, as an often obscure yet (in the long run) most
-powerful leaven, throughout all specifically human life,--Sciences,
-Art, Philosophy, and Ethics, calling for, and alone satisfied with, the
-answering force and articulation of “Characteristic Religion,” each
-requiring and required by the other, each already containing the other
-in embryo, and both ever operating together, in proportion as Man and
-Religion attain to their fulness.[320]
-
-
-3. _Hermann’s impossible simplification concerning philosophy._
-
-But what shall we say as to the relations between Religion and
-Philosophy? Here again Hermann is the vigorous champion of a very
-prevalent and plausible simplification. “There exists no Theory of
-Knowledge for such things as we hold to be real in the strength of
-faith. In such religious affirmations, the believer demolishes every
-bridge between his conviction and that which Science can recognize as
-real.” Indeed Hermann’s attitude is here throughout identical with that
-of his master, Albrecht Ritschl: Metaphysics of any and every kind
-appear everywhere, to both writers, as essentially unnecessary, unreal,
-misleading, as so much inflation and delusion of soul.--Yet this again
-is quite demonstrably excessive, and can indeed be explained only as an
-all but inevitable recoil from the contrary metaphysical excesses of
-the Hegelian school.
-
-(1) Since the culmination of that reaction, “it has,” as Prof. H.
-J. Holtzmann, himself so profoundly historical and so free from
-all extreme metaphysical bent, tells us, “become quite impossible
-any further to deny the metaphysical factors which had a share in
-constituting such types of New Testament doctrine as the Pauline and
-Joannine. Indeed, not even if we were to reduce the New Testament to
-the Synoptic Gospels and the Acts on the one hand, and to the Pastoral
-Epistles, the Epistle of James and the Apocalypse on the other hand,
-would the elements which spring from speculative sources be entirely
-eliminated. And since, again, the Old Testament religion, in its last
-stage, assimilated similarly metaphysical materials from the East
-and from the West; since Mohammedanism, in its Persian and Indian
-branches, did the same with regard to the older civilized religions of
-Middle and Eastern Asia; since also these latter religions received
-a speculative articulation in even the most ancient times, so that
-they are both Philosophy and Religion simultaneously: we are forced
-to ask ourselves, whether so frequent a concomitant of religion is
-satisfactorily explicable as a mere symptom of falsification or decay.”
-And whilst answering that the primary organ for religion is Feeling
-and Conscience, he points out how large an amount of Speculation was,
-nevertheless, required and exercised by a St. Augustine, even after his
-unforgettable experiences of the sufferings attendant upon Sin, and of
-their cure by Grace alone.[321]
-
-(2) The fact is that, if man cannot apprehend the objects,--the
-historic and other facts,--of Religion, without certain subjective
-organs, dispositions, and effects, any more than can all these
-subjective capacities, without those objects, produce religious
-convictions and acts, or be waked up into becoming efficient forces:
-neither can man thus experience and effect the deepest foundations and
-developments of his own true personality in and through contact with
-the divine Spirit, without being more or less stimulated into some
-kind of, at least rudimentary, Philosophy as to these his profoundest
-experiences of reality, and as to their rights and duties towards the
-rest of what he is and knows.
-
-(3) Indeed his very Religion is already, in itself, the profoundest
-Metaphysical Affirmation. As the deeply historical-minded Prof. Tiele
-admits: “Every man in his sound senses, who does not lead the life of
-a half-dormant animal, philosophizes in his own way”; and “religious
-doctrine rests on a metaphysical foundation; unless convinced of the
-reality of a supersensual world, it builds upon sand.”[322] Or as Prof.
-Eucken, the most eloquent champion of this central characteristic
-of all vital religion, exclaims: “If we never, as a matter of fact,
-get beyond merely subjective psychological processes, and we can
-nowhere trace within us the action of cosmic forces; if we in no case
-experience through them an enlargement, elevation, and transformation
-of our nature: then not all the endeavours of its well-meaning friends
-can preserve religion from sinking to the level of a mere illusion.
-Without a universal and real principle, without hyper-empirical
-processes, there can be no permanence for religion.”[323]
-
-(4) Some kind of philosophy, then, will inevitably accompany, follow,
-and stimulate religion, were it only as the, necessarily ever
-inadequate, attempt at giving a fitting expression to the essentially
-metaphysical character of belief in a super-sensible world, in God, in
-man’s spiritual capacities and in God’s redemption of man. Not because
-the patient analysis of the completer human personalities, (as these
-are to be found throughout the length and breadth of history), requires
-the elimination of a wholesome Mysticism and a sober Metaphysic from
-among the elements and effects of the fullest Manhood and Religion; but
-because of the ever serious difficulties and the liability to grave
-abuses attendant upon both these forces, the inevitably excessive
-reactions against these abuses, and the recurrent necessity of
-remodelling much of the theory and practice of both, in accordance with
-the growth of our knowledge of the human mind, (a necessity which, at
-first sight, seems to stultify all the hyper-empirical claims of both
-these forces): only because of this have many men of sense and goodness
-come to speak as though religion, even at its fullest, could and should
-get on without either, contenting itself to be a somewhat sentimental,
-Immanental Ethics.
-
-(5) Yet, against such misgivings, perhaps the most immediately
-impressive counter-argument is the procession, so largely made up
-of men and of movements not usually reckoned as exclusively or
-directly religious, whose very greatness,--one which humanity will
-not let die,--is closely interwoven with Mystical and Metaphysical
-affirmations. There are, among philosophers, a Spinoza and a Leibniz,
-a Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, a Trendelenburg and a Lotze, with the
-later stages of a John Mill, a Littré, and a Herbert Spencer; among
-poets, a Pindar and Aeschylus, a Lucretius and Vergil, a Lessing and a
-Goethe, a Wordsworth and a Browning; among historians, a Thucydides and
-a Tacitus, a St. Simon and de Tocqueville, a Carlyle, a Jacob Grimm,
-a Droysen and a Ranke; among scientists, a Copernicus and a Kepler, a
-Newton, a Lyell, indeed, largely still, also a Darwin; and among men of
-action, a Moltke and a Gordon, a Burke and a von Stein. Shear any of
-these men of their Mystical and Metaphysical elements, and you will
-have shorn Samson of his locks.
-
-And if we can frame a contrary list of men of force and distinction,
-who have represented an un- or even an anti-Mystical and
-anti-Metaphysical type: Caesar and Hannibal, Napoleon and Bismarck,
-Voltaire and Laplace, Hume and Bentham, Huxley and Mommsen, we must
-ever remember the complex truth as to the Polarity of Life,--the strict
-necessity of the movement towards an intensely close contact with
-empirical reality, as well as of the movement back to recollection;
-the frequent sickliness of the recollective movement, as found in the
-average practice of life, which cannot but produce a reaction and
-contrary excess; and hence the legitimacy of what this second type
-has got of positiveness and of corrective criticism. Yet here too the
-greatness will consist directly in what these men are and have, not
-in what they are not; and wherever this their brutal-seeming sense of
-the apparent brutalities of life is combined with an apprehension of a
-higher world and of a deeper reality, _there_ something fuller and more
-true has been attained than is reached by such strong but incomplete
-humanity alone.
-
-
-4. _Religion and Morality, their kinship and difference._
-
-And, finally, as to Religion and Morality, we should note how that the
-men, who deny all essential connection between Religion and Mysticism
-and Religion and Philosophy, ever, when they do retain Religion at
-all, tend to identify it with Morality, if not as to the motives, yet
-as to the contents of the two forces. And yet it is not difficult to
-show that, if the relation between Religion and Morality is closer than
-that between Religion and Philosophy, though not as intimate as is that
-between Historical-Institutional Religion and Mysticism: Religion and
-Morality are nevertheless not identical.
-
-(1) This non-identity is indicated by the broad historical fact that,
-though the development of Religion tells upon that of Morality, and
-_vice versa_: yet that the rate of development of these two forces is
-practically never the same, even in one and the same soul, still less
-in any one country or race. In each case we get various inequalities
-between the two developments, which would be impossible, were the two
-forces different only in name.
-
-We reach again the same conclusion, if we note, what Dr. Edward Caird
-has so well pointed out, “the imperfection of the subjective religion
-of the prophets and psalmists of Israel,”--who nevertheless already
-possessed a very advanced type of profoundly ethical religion,--“shown
-by its inability to overcome the legal and ceremonial system of
-worship to which it was opposed”; as, “in like manner, Protestantism
-… has never been able decisively to conquer the system of Rome.”[324]
-For this, as indeed the failure of Buddhism to absorb and supersede
-Hindooism, evidently implies that Religion cannot find its full
-development and equilibrium in an exclusive concentration upon Morality
-Proper, as alone essential; and hence that complete Religion embraces
-other things besides Morality.
-
-Once more we find non-identity between the very Ethics directly
-postulated by Religion at its deepest, and the Ethics immediately
-required by the Family, Society, the State, Art, Science, and
-Philosophy. As Prof. Troeltsch admirably puts it, “the special
-characteristic of our modern consciousness resides in the insistence
-both upon the Religious, the That-world Ends, _and_ upon the Cultural,
-This-World Ends, which latter are taken as Ends-in-themselves: it
-is precisely in this combination that this consciousness finds its
-richness, power, and freedom, but also its painful interior tension
-and its difficult problems.” “As in Christian Ethics we must recognize
-the predominance of an Objective Religious End,--for here certain
-relations of the soul to God are the chief commandments and the supreme
-good,--so in the Cultural Ends we should frankly recognize objective
-Moral Ends of an Immanental kind.” And in seeking after the right
-relations between the two, we shall have to conclude that “Ethics, for
-us, are not, at first, a unity but a multiplicity: man grows up amongst
-a number of moral ends, the unification of which is his life’s task and
-problem, and not its starting-point.” And this multiplicity “is” more
-precisely “a polarity in human nature, for it contains two poles--that
-of Religious and that of Humane Ethics, neither of which can be ignored
-without moral damage, but which, nevertheless, cannot be brought under
-a common formula.” “We can but keep a sufficient space open for the
-action of both forms, so that from their interaction there may ever
-result, with the least possible difficulty, the deepening of the Humane
-Ends by the Christian Ethics, and the humanizing of the Christian End
-by the Humane Ethics, so that life may become a service of God within
-the Cultural Ends, and that the service of God may transfigure the
-world.”[325]
-
-We can perceive the difference between the two forces most clearly
-in Our Lord’s life and teaching--say, the Sermon on the Mount; in
-the intolerableness of every exegesis which attempts to reduce the
-ultimate meaning and worth of this world-renewing religious document to
-what it has of literal applicability in the field of morality proper.
-Schopenhauer expressed a profound intuition in the words: “It would be
-a most unworthy manner of speech to declare the sublime Founder of the
-Christian Religion, whose life is proposed to us as the model of all
-virtue, to have been the most reasonable of men, and that his maxims
-contained but the best instruction towards an entirely reasonable
-life.”[326]
-
-(2) The fact is that Religion ever insists, even where it but seems
-to be teaching certain moral rules and motives as appropriate to this
-visible world of ours, upon presenting them in the setting of a fuller,
-deeper world than that immediately required as the field of action and
-as the justification of ordinary morality. Thus whilst, in Morality
-Proper, the concepts of Responsibility, Prudence, Merit, Reward,
-Irretrievableness, are necessarily primary; in Religious Ethics the
-ideas of Trust, Grace, Heroism, Love, Free Pardon, Spiritual Renovation
-are, as necessarily, supreme. And hence it is not accidental, although
-of course not necessary, that we often find men with a keen religious
-sense but with a defective moral practice or even conception, and men
-with a strong moral sense and a want of religious perception; that
-Mystics, with their keen sense for one element of religion, so often
-seem, and sometimes are, careless of morality proper; and that, in such
-recent cases (deeply instructive in their very aberrations) as that of
-Nietzsche, we get a fierce anti-Moralism combined with a thirst for
-a higher and deeper world than this visible one, which not all its
-fantastic form, nor even all Nietzsche’s later rant against concrete
-religion, can prevent from being essentially religious.[327]
-
-(3) We have then, here, the deepest instance of the law and
-necessity which we have, so often, found at the shallower levels of
-the spirit’s life. For here, once more, there is one apprehension,
-force, life,--This-world Morality,--which requires penetration and
-development, in nowise destruction, by another, a deeper power,
-That-world Ethics and Religion. Let the one weaken or blunt the edge
-and impact of the other, and it has, at the same time, weakened itself.
-For here again we have, not a Thing which simply exists, by persistence
-in its dull unpenetratingness and dead impenetrability, but a Life,
-growing by the incorporation and organization, within its ampler range,
-of lesser lives, each with its own legitimate autonomy.
-
-
-II. MYSTICISM AND THE LIMITS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE.
-
-But have not even the most sober-minded of the Partial Mystics greatly
-exceeded the limits of human knowledge, more or less continuously,
-throughout their conclusions? Is Kant completely in the wrong? And are
-not the Positivists right in restricting all certain cognition to the
-experiences of the senses and to the Mathematico-Physical Sciences
-built upon those experiences? And, again, is there such a thing at all
-as specifically Mystical Experience or Knowledge? And, if so, what is
-its worth?--I must keep the elaboration of the (ultimately connected)
-question, as to the nature of the realities experienced or known--as
-to the human spirit and the Divine Spirit, and their inter-relations,
-hence as to Pantheism and Personality--for the next chapter, and can
-here but prepare the ground for it, by the elucidation of certain
-important points in general Epistemology, and of the more obvious
-characteristics of Mystical apprehension.
-
-
-1. _Positivist Epistemology an error._
-
-As regards general Epistemology, we may well take up the following
-positions.
-
-(1) We cannot but reject, with Prof. Volkelt, as a mere vulgar error,
-the Positivist limitation of trans-subjectively valid knowledge to
-direct sense-perception and to the laws of the so-called Empirical
-Sciences. For, as he shows conclusively, the only fact which is
-absolutely indubitable, is that of the bare occurrence of our (possibly
-utterly misleading) sensations and impressions. Some of these are, it
-is true, accompanied by a certain pressure upon our minds to credit
-them with trans-subjective validity; and the fact of this (possibly
-quite misleading) pressure is itself part of our undeniable experience.
-Yet we can, if we will, treat this pressure also as no more than a
-meaningless occurrence, and not as evidencing the trans-subjective
-reality which it seems to indicate. No man, it is true, has ever
-succeeded in consistently carrying out such a refusal of assent,--since
-no scepticism is so thorough but that it derives its very power,
-against the trans-subjective validity of some of the impressions
-furnished with trans-subjective pressure, from an utterly inconsistent
-acceptance, as trans-subjectively valid, of other impressions furnished
-with a precisely similar trans-subjective intimation. Yet the fact
-remains that, in all such cases of trans-subjective pressure, the
-mind has “an immediate experience of which the content is precisely
-this, that we are justified in proceeding with these concepts into
-what is absolutely beyond the possibility of being experienced by
-us.” “Positivistic Cognition,” to which no man, Positivist included,
-can systematically restrict himself, “abides absolutely within the
-immediately experienced. Logical Cognition,” which every man practises
-surreptitiously if not avowedly, “exceeds experience at every step,
-and conceptually determines what is absolutely incapable of being
-experienced, yet the justification for this kind of cognition is, here
-also, an immediately experienced certitude.”[328]
-
-We have, “then, immediately experienced presentations which of
-themselves already constitute a knowledge,--our first knowledge,
-and the only one possessed of absolute indubitableness.” And some
-of these presentations “are accompanied by a kind of immediate
-certainty or revelation that, in some way, they reach right into the
-Thing-in-Itself, that they directly express something objectively
-valid, present in that Thing-in-Itself”; and “this pressure ever
-involves, should the contradictory of what it enunciates be admitted as
-objectively existent, the self-destruction of objective reality.”--“And
-this pressure can, in any one case, be resisted by the mind; an act of
-endorsement, of a kind of faith, is necessary on the part of the mind:
-for these presentations, furnished with such pressure, do not transform
-themselves into the Things-in-Themselves directly,--we do not come to
-see objective reality simply face to face.”[329] And we find thus that
-“_in principle_ the entire range of reality, right down to its last
-depths, lies open to cognition, proceeding according to the principle
-of the necessities of thought. For he who recognizes this principle,
-thereby admits that the necessities of thought have trans-subjective
-significance, so that, if any affirmation concerning the ultimate
-reasons and depths of Reality can be shown to be necessary in thought,
-this affirmation possesses as rightful a claim to trans-subjective
-validity, as any determination, necessary in thought, which concern
-only such parts of the Thing-in-Itself as are the nearest neighbours to
-our sense-impressions concerning it. Everywhere our principle leaves us
-only the question whether thought, as a matter of fact, does or does
-not react, under the given problems, with the said logical constraint
-and pressure.”[330]
-
-(2) We can next insist upon how we have thus already found that the
-acquisition of even so rudimentary an outline of Reality, as to be
-ever in part presupposed in the attacks of the most radical sceptics,
-necessarily involves a certain emotive disposition and volitional
-action. And, over and above this partially withholdable assent, such
-quite elementary thinking will also ever require the concomitant
-energizing of the picturing faculty. And again, the more interior and
-spiritual are this thinking’s subject-matters, the more will it be
-permeated by, and be inseparable from, deep feeling. It is then all
-man’s faculties conjoined, it is the whole man, who normally thus
-gives, without reflecting on it, his all, to gain even this elementary
-nucleus of certainty as to Reality. “Even receptivity,” as Prof. Ward
-well says, “is activity”; for even where non-voluntary, it is never
-indifferent. “Not mere receptivity, but conative or selective activity,
-is the essence of subjective reality.” Or, with Prof. Volkelt: “Purely
-isolated thought,”--which, in actual life ever more or less of a
-fiction, is not rarely set up by individuals as an ideal,--“is, however
-intensified and interiorized, something ever only formal, something, in
-the final resort, insignificant and shadowy.”--And, concurrently with
-the recognition of this fact, man will come to find that “the ultimate
-Substance or Power of and in the world,”--that objective reality which
-is the essential counterpart to his own subjective reality,--“is
-something possessed of a true, deep content and of a positive aim,
-and alive according to the analogy of a willing individual. The
-world would thus be a Logical Process only in the sense that this
-concrete fundamental Power is bound by the ideal necessity of its own
-nature.”[331]
-
-(3) And again, I would note with Volkelt how Kant, owing to his
-notoriously intense natural tendency to universal Dualism, never
-admits, even as a point for preliminary settlement, the possibility
-that our subjective conceptions of Objective Reality may have some true
-relation to that Reality. His professed ignorance as to the nature
-of that Reality changes instantaneously, quite unbeknown to himself,
-into an absolutely unvarying, negative knowledge concerning that
-Reality,--he simply _knows_ that it is _utterly heterogeneous_ to our
-conception of it. Thus he finds the view that “God has implanted into
-the human mind certain categories and concepts of a kind spontaneously
-to harmonize with things,” to be “the most preposterous solution that
-we could possibly choose.”[332] Thus the epistemological difference
-between Presentation and Thing-in-Itself becomes a metaphysical
-exclusion of each by the other. And yet we know of no fact, whether
-of experience or of thought, to prevent something which is _my_
-presentation existing also, in so far as it is the content of that
-presentation, outside of this presentment. Indeed Psychology and
-Epistemology have, driven by every reason and stopped by none, more and
-more denied and refuted this excessive, indeed gratuitous, Dualism.
-
-As Prof. Henry Jones well puts it: “The hypothesis that knowledge
-consists of two elements which are so radically different as to be
-capable of description only by defining each negatively in terms of
-the other, the pure manifold or differences of sense, and a purely
-universal or relative thought,” breaks down under the fact that “pure
-thought and the manifold of sense pass into each other, the one proving
-meaningless and the other helpless in its isolation.” These elements
-“are only aspects of one fact, co-relates mutually penetrating each
-other, distinguishable in thought, but not separable as existences.”
-Hence we must not “make logical remnants do the work of an intelligence
-which is never purely formal, upon a material which is nowhere a pure
-manifold”: for “the difference between the primary data of thought
-on the one hand, and the highest kinds of systematized knowledge on
-the other, is no difference … between a mere particular and a mere
-universal, or a mere content and a mere form; but it is a difference
-in comprehensiveness of articulation.” However primary may be the
-distinction of subjective and objective, “we are not entitled to
-forget the unity of the reality in which the distinction takes place.”
-If we begin with the purely subjective, we must doubtless end there;
-but then, in spite of certain, never self-consistent, philosophical
-hypotheses, “the purely subjective is as completely beyond our reach as
-the purely objective.”[333]
-
-Prof. Ward indeed pushes the matter, I think rightly, even a step
-further. He points out how readily, owing to the ambiguous term
-“consciousness,” “we confound experience with knowledge”; but holds
-that experience is the wider term. “Knowledge must fall within
-experience, and experience extend beyond knowledge. Thus I am not
-left to infer my own being from my knowing.… Objective reality is
-immediately ‘given,’ or immediately ‘there,’ not inferred.” But the
-subjective reality is not immediately given, immediately there.
-“There is no such parallelism between the two.… The subjective factor
-in experience is not _datum_ but _recipiens_: it is not ‘there’ but
-‘here’; a ‘here’ relative to that ‘there.’”[334] Nothing of this,
-I think, really conflicts with the positions we have adopted from
-Volkelt, since “experience” is evidently used here in a sense inclusive
-of the presentations, the trans-subjective pressure and the endorsement
-of the latter’s estimations,--the three elements which, according also
-to Volkelt, form an organism which even the most daring subjectivism
-can never consistently reject. At most, the term “experience” is more
-extended in Prof. Ward, since it includes all three elements, than in
-Prof. Volkelt, who restricts it to the two first.
-
-(4) And further, we must take care to find room for the only unforced
-explanation of the wondrous fact that “although,” as Dr. Volkelt
-strikingly says, “the various schools of philosophy “--this is largely
-true of those of theology also,--are “in part essentially determined
-by historical currents, forces which follow other standards than
-those of logical necessity”: yet “these points of view and modes
-of thought, thus determined by” apparently non-logical “history,
-subserve nevertheless logical necessity, indeed represent its” slow,
-intermittent, yet real “progressive realization.” The explanation is
-that “the forces of history are, unbeknown to themselves, planned,
-in their depths, for agreement with the necessities and ends of
-thought and of truth.” “And thus the different spheres” and levels
-“of spiritual life and endeavour appear as originally intended for
-each other, so that each sphere, whilst consciously striving only
-after its own particular laws and standards, in reality furthers
-the objects of the rest.” For “only the operative presence of such
-an original, teleological inter-relation can explain how historic
-forces, by their influence upon, and determination of, philosophical
-thinking, can, instead of staining and spoiling it by the introduction
-of religious, artistic, political, and other motives, actually
-advance it most essentially.”[335]--Here then we get a still further
-enlargement of the already wide range of interaction, within the human
-mind, between forces which, at first sight, appear simply external
-to, indeed destructive of, each other; and a corresponding increase
-in the indications of the immense breadth, depth, and closeness
-of inter-penetration characterizing the operative ground-plan,
-the pre-existing Harmony and Teleology of the fundamental forces
-of Reality. Thus once more man’s spirit appears as possessed of a
-large interiority; and as met, supported and penetrated, by a Spirit
-stupendously rich in spiritual energy.
-
-(5) And finally, let us never forget that “the only experience
-immediately accessible to us” men, “is our own; this, in spite of
-its complexity, is the first we know.”[336] And this means that we
-have direct experience and anything like adequate knowledge, (because
-knowledge from within,) not of things, but of mind and will, of
-spiritual life struggling within an animal life; and that in face,
-say, of plant-life, and still more of a pebble or of a star, we have a
-difficulty as to an at all appropriate and penetrative apprehension,
-which, if opposite to, is also in a sense greater than, the difficulty
-inherent to our apprehension of God Himself. For towards this latter
-apprehension we have got the convergent testimony of certain great,
-never quite obliterable facts without us and within ourselves.
-
-There is the upward trend, the ever-increased complexity of
-organization, the growing depth and interiority in the animate
-world,--Plant-Life itself being already, very probably, possessed of a
-vague consciousness, and Man, at the other end of the scale, summing up
-the tendency of the whole series in a deep self-consciousness which, at
-the same time, makes him alone keenly aware of the great difference,
-in the midst of the true kinship, between himself and the humbler
-members of that one world. For Natural Selection can but describe the
-results and explain part of the method of this upward trend, but cannot
-penetrate to its ultimate cause and end.
-
-There is, again, the great, deep fact of the mutually necessary,
-mutually stimulating presence and interaction, within our own mental
-and spiritual life, of sense-impressions, imaginative picturings,
-rational categories, emotional activities, and volitional acts;
-and, again, of subject and object; and, once more, of general,
-philosophic Thought and the contingencies of History. For the
-immanental inter-adaptation and Teleology, that mysteriously link
-together all these, profoundly disparate-seeming, realms and forces
-is far too deep-down, it too much surprises, and exacts too much of
-us, it too much reveals itself, precisely at the end of much labour
-of our own and in our truest and most balanced moods, as the mostly
-unarticulated presupposition and explanation of both the great cost
-and the rich fruitfulness of every approximately complete actuation of
-all our faculties, each with and in the others, and in and with their
-appropriate objects, to be permanently ruled out of court as mere
-sentimentalism or baseless apologetic.
-
-And there is the deepest fact of all, the one which precisely
-constitutes the specific characteristic of all true humanity, the sense
-of mental oppression, of intolerable imprisonment inflicted by the
-very idea of the merely contingent, the simply phenomenal and Finite,
-and the accompanying noble restlessness and ready dwarfing of all
-man’s best achievements by the agent’s own Ideal of Perfection. For
-this latter sense is, precisely in the greater souls, so spontaneous
-and so keen, so immensely operative in never leaving our, otherwise
-indolent and readily self-delusive, self-complacent race fully and
-long satisfied with anything that passes entirely away, or that
-is admittedly merely a subjective fancy, even though this fancy be
-shared by every member of the human race; and this sense operates so
-explosively within Sceptics as well as Dogmatists, within would-be
-Agnostic Scientists as well as in the most Intellectualist Theologians;
-it so humbles, startles, and alone so braces, sweetens, widens, indeed
-constitutes our humanity: as to be unforcedly explicable only by
-admitting that man’s spirit’s experience is not shut up within man’s
-own clear analysis or picturing of it; that it is indefinitely wider,
-and somehow, in its deepest reaches, is directly touched, affected, in
-part determined, by the Infinite Spirit Itself. “Man never knows how
-anthropomorphic he is,” says Goethe. Yes, but it was a man, Goethe,
-it is at bottom all men, in proportion as they are fully, sensitively
-such, who have somehow discovered this truth; who suffer from its
-continuous evidences, as spontaneously as from the toothache or from
-insomnia; and whose deepest moments give them a vivid sense of how
-immensely the Spirit, thus directly experienced by their spirit,
-transcends, and yet also is required by and is immanent in, their keen
-sense of the Finitude and Contingency present throughout the world of
-sense-perception and of clear intellectual formulation.
-
-(6) With Plato and Plotinus, Clement of Alexandria and St. Augustine,
-St. Bernard, Cardinal Nicolas of Coes and Leibniz in the past; with
-Cardinal Newman, Professors Maurice Blondel and Henri Bergson,
-Siegwart, Eucken, Troeltsch and Tiele, Igino Petrone and Edward Caird,
-in the present; with the explicit assent of practically all the great
-Mystics of all ages and countries, and the implicit instinct, and at
-least partial, practical admission, of all sane and developed human
-souls; we will then have to postulate here, not merely an intellectual
-reasoning upon finite data, which would somehow result in so operative
-a sense of the Infinite; nor even simply a mental category of
-Infinitude which, evoked in man by and together with the apprehension
-of things finite, would, somehow, have so massive, so explosive an
-effect against our finding satisfaction in the other categories,
-categories which, after all, would not be more subjective, than itself:
-but the ontological presence of, and the operative penetration by
-the Infinite Spirit, within the human spirit. This Spirit’s presence
-would produce, on occasion of man’s apprehension or volition of things
-contingent and finite, the keen sense of disappointment, of contrast
-with the Simultaneous, Abiding, and Infinite.--And let the reader note
-that this is not Ontologism, for we here neither deduce our other ideas
-from the idea of God, nor do we argue from ideas and their clarity, but
-from living forces and their operativeness.
-
-We thus get man’s spirit placed within a world of varying degrees of
-depth and interiority, the different levels and kinds of which are
-necessary, as so many materials, stimulants, obstacles, and objects,
-for the development of that spirit’s various capacities, which
-themselves again interact the one upon the other, and react upon
-and within that world. For if man’s experience of God is not a mere
-discursively reasoned conclusion from the data of sense, yet man’s
-spirit experiences the Divine Spirit and the spirits of his fellow-men
-on occasion of, and as a kind of contrast, background, and support
-to, the actuation of his senses, imagination, reason, feeling, and
-volition, and, at least at first and in the long run, not otherwise.
-
-
-2. _No distinct faculty of Mystical apprehension._
-
-Is there, then, strictly speaking, such a thing as a specifically
-distinct, self-sufficing, purely Mystical mode of apprehending Reality?
-I take it, _distinctly not_; and that all the errors of the Exclusive
-Mystic proceed precisely from the contention that Mysticism does
-constitute such an entirely separate, completely self-supported kind of
-human experience.--This denial does not, of course, mean that soul does
-not differ quite indefinitely from soul, in the amount and kind of the
-recollective, intuitive, deeply emotive element possessed and exercised
-by it concurrently or alternately with other elements,--the sense of
-the Infinite within and without the Finite springing up in the soul on
-occasion of its contact with the Contingent; nor, again, that these
-more or less congenital differences and vocations amongst souls cannot
-and are not still further developed by grace and heroism into types of
-religious apprehension and life, so strikingly divergent, as, at first
-sight, to seem hardly even supplementary the one to the other. But it
-means that, in even the most purely contingent-seeming soul, and in its
-apparently but Institutional and Historical assents and acts, there
-ever is, there never can fail to be, _some_, however implicit, however
-slight, however intermittent, sense and experience of the Infinite,
-evidenced by at least some dissatisfaction with the Finite, except as
-this Finitude is an occasion for growth in, and a part-expression of,
-that Infinite, our true home. And, again, it means, that even the most
-exclusively mystical-seeming soul ever depends, for the fulness and
-healthiness of even the most purely mystical of its acts and states,
-as really upon its past and present contacts with the Contingent,
-Temporal, and Spacial, and with social facts and elements, as upon its
-movement of concentration, and the sense and experience, evoked on
-occasion of those contacts or of their memories, of the Infinite within
-and around those finitudes and itself.
-
-Only thus does Mysticism attain to its true, full dignity, which
-consists precisely in being, not everything in any one soul, but
-something in every soul of man; and in presenting, at its fullest, the
-amplest development, among certain special natures with the help of
-certain special graces and heroisms, of what, in some degree and form,
-is present in every truly human soul, and in such a soul’s every, at
-all genuine and complete, grace-stimulated religious act and state.
-And only thus does it, as Partial Mysticism, retain all the strength
-and escape the weaknesses and dangers of would-be Pure Mysticism, as
-regards the mode and character of Religious Experience, Knowledge, and
-Life.
-
-
-3. _The first four pairs of weaknesses and strengths special to the
-Mystics._
-
-I take the Mystic’s weaknesses and strengths to go together in pairs,
-and that there are seven such pairs. Only the first four shall be
-considered here; the fifth and the last two couples are reserved
-respectively for the following, and for the last section, of this
-chapter.
-
-(1) The Mystic finds his joy in the recollective movement and moments
-of the soul; and hence ever tends, _qua_ Mystic, to ignore and neglect,
-or to over-minimize, the absolutely necessary contact of the mind and
-will with the things of sense. He will often write as though, could he
-but completely shut off his mind from all sense-perceptions,--even of
-grand scenery, or noble works of art, or scenes of human devotedness,
-suffering, and peace,--it would be proportionately fuller of God.--Yet
-this drift is ever more or less contradicted by his practice, often
-at the very moment of such argument: for no religious writers are
-more prolific in vivid imagery derived from noble sensible objects
-and scenes than are the Mystics,--whose characteristic mood is an
-intuition, a resting in a kind of vision of things invisible.--And
-this contradiction is satisfactory, since it is quite certain that
-if the mind, heart, and will could be completely absorbed, (from the
-first or for any length of time), in the flight from the sensible,
-it would become as dangerously empty and languid concerning things
-invisible themselves as, with nothing but an outgoing occupation
-with the sensible, it would become distracted and feverish. It is
-this aversion from Outgoing and from the world of sense, of the
-contemporaneous contingencies environing the soul, that gives to
-Mysticism, as such, its shadowy character, its floating above, rather
-than penetrating into, reality,--in contradiction, where this tendency
-becomes too exclusive, to the Incarnational philosophy and practice of
-Christianity, and indeed of every complete and sound psychology.
-
-And yet the Incoming, what the deep religious thinker
-Kierkegaard has so profoundly analyzed in his doctrine of
-“Repetition,”[337]--recollection and peaceful browsing among the
-materials brought in by the soul’s Outgoing,--is most essential. Indeed
-it is the more difficult, and, though never alone sufficient, yet ever
-the more centrally religious, of the two movements necessary for the
-acquisition of spiritual experience and life.
-
-(2) Again, the Mystic finds his full delight in all that approximates
-most nearly to Simultaneity, and Eternity; and consequently turns
-away, _qua_ Mystic, from the Successive and Temporal presented by
-History.--Yet here also there are two movements, both necessary for
-man. He will, by the one, once more in fullest sympathy with the grand
-Christian love of lowliness, strive hard to get into close, and ever
-closer, touch with the successivenesses of History, especially those
-of Our Lord’s earthly life and of His closest followers. Without this
-touch he will become empty, inflated, as St. Teresa found to be the
-case with herself, when following the false principle of deliberate and
-systematic abstraction from Christ’s temporal words and acts: for man’s
-soul, though it does not energize in mere Clock-Time, cannot grow if
-we attempt to eliminate Duration, that interpenetrative, overlapping
-kind of Succession, which is already, as it were, halfway to the
-Simultaneity of God. It is this aversion from Clock-Time Succession and
-even from Duration which gives to Mysticism, as such, its remarkable
-preference for Spacial images, and its strong bent towards concepts of
-a Static and Determinist type, profoundly antagonistic though these
-are to the Dynamic and Libertarian character which ever marks the
-occasions and conditions for the acquiring of religious experience.
-
-And yet, here again, the Mystic is clinging, even one-sidedly, to the
-more central, more specifically religious, of the two movements. For
-it is certain that God is indeed Simultaneous and Eternal; that it
-is right thus to try and apprehend, what appears to us stretched out
-successively in time, as simultaneously present in the one great Now
-of God; and that our deepest experiences testify to History itself
-being ever more than mere process, and to have within it a certain
-contribution from, a certain approximation to and expression of,
-Eternity.
-
-(3) And again, the Mystic finds his joy in the sense of a Pure
-Reception of the Purely Objective; that God should do all and should
-receive the credit of all, is here a primary requirement.--And yet
-all penetrating Psychology, Epistemology, and Ethics find this very
-receptivity, however seemingly only such, to be, where healthy and
-fruitful, ever an action, a conation of the soul,--an energizing and
-volition which, as we have seen, are present in its very cognition of
-anything affirmed by it as trans-subjective, from a grain of sand up to
-the great God Himself. This antipathy to even a relative, God-willed
-independence and power of self-excitation, gives Mysticism, as such,
-its constant bent towards Quietism; and hence, with regard to the
-means and nature of knowledge, its tendency to speak of such a purely
-spiritual effect as Grace, and such purely spiritual beings as the
-Soul and God, as though they were literally sensible objects sensibly
-impressing themselves upon the Mystic’s purely passive senses. This
-tendency reinforces the Mystic’s thirst for pictorial, simultaneous
-presentation and intuition of the verities apprehended by him, but is
-in curious contradiction to his even excessive conceptions concerning
-the utter separateness and difference from all things material of all
-such spiritual realities.--And yet, here too, it is doubtless deeply
-important ever to remember, and to act in accordance with, the great
-truth that God Himself is apprehended by us only if there be action
-of our own, and that, from elementary moral dispositions right up to
-consummate sanctity, the whole man has ever to act and will more and
-more manysidedly, fully, and persistently.
-
-But the corresponding, indeed the anterior and more centrally
-religious, truth here is, that all this range of our activity could
-never begin, and, if it could, would lose itself _in vacuo_, unless
-there already were Reality around it and within it, as the stimulus
-and object for all this energizing,--a Reality which, as Prof. Ward
-has told us with respect to Epistemology, must, for a certain dim but
-most true experience of ours, be simply given, not sought and found.
-And indeed the operations of Grace are ever more or less penetrating
-and soliciting, though nowhere forcing, the free assent of the natural
-soul: we should be unable to seek God unless He had already found
-us and had thus, deep down within ourselves, caused us to seek and
-find Him. And hence thus again the most indispensable, the truest
-form of experience underlies reasoning, and is a kind of not directly
-analyzable, but indirectly most operative, intuition or instinct of the
-soul.
-
-(4) And yet the Mystic, in one of his moods (the corresponding,
-contradictory mood of a Pantheistic identification of his true self
-with God shall be considered in our next chapter), finds his joy in
-so exalting the difference of nature between himself and God, and the
-incomprehensibility of God for every finite intelligence, as,--were
-we to press his words,--to cut away all ground for any experience or
-knowledge sufficient to justify him in even a guess as to what God is
-like or is not like, and for any attempt at intercourse with, and at
-becoming like unto, One who is so utterly unlike himself.
-
-
-4. _Criticism of the fourth pair, mystical “Agnosticism.”_
-
-Now this acutely paradoxical position, of an entire certainty as to
-God’s complete difference from ourselves, has been maintained and
-articulated, with a consistency and vividness beyond that of any
-Mystic known to me, by that most stimulating, profound, tragically
-non-mystical, religious ascetic and thinker, the Lutheran Dane, Sören
-Kierkegaard (1813-1855). His early friend, but philosophical opponent,
-Prof. Höffding, describes him as insisting that “the suffering incident
-to the religious life is necessarily involved in the very nature of the
-religious relation. For the relation of the soul to God is a relation
-to a Being utterly different from man, a Being which cannot confront
-man as his Superlative and Ideal, and which nevertheless is to rule
-within him.” “What, wonder, then,” as Kierkegaard says, “if the Jew
-held that the vision of God meant death, and if the Heathen believed
-that to enter upon relations with God was the beginning of insanity?”
-For the man who lives for God “is a fish out of water.”[338]--We have
-here what, if an error, is yet possible only to profoundly religious
-souls; indeed it would be easy to point out very similar passages in
-St. Catherine and St. John of the Cross. Yet Höffding is clearly in
-the right in maintaining that “Qualitative or Absolute difference
-abolishes all possibility of any positive relation.… If religious zeal,
-in its eagerness to push the Object of religion to the highest height,
-establishes a yawning abyss between this Object and the life whose
-ideal It is still to remain,--such zeal contradicts itself. For a God
-who is not Ideal and Exemplar, is no God.”[339]
-
-Berkeley raised similar objections against analogous positions of the
-Pseudo-Dionysius, in his Alciphron in 1732.[340] Indeed the Belgian
-Jesuit, Balthazar Corderius, has a very satisfactory note on this
-matter in his edition, in 1634, of the Areopagite,[341] in which
-he shows how all the negative propositions of Mystical Theology,
-_e.g._ “God is not Being, not Life,” presuppose a certain affirmative
-position, _e.g._ “God is Being and Life, in a manner infinitely more
-sublime and perfect than we are able to comprehend”; and gives reasons
-and authorities, from St. Jerome to St. Thomas inclusive, for holding
-that some kind and degree of direct confused knowledge (I should
-prefer, with modern writers, to call it experience) of God’s existence
-and nature is possessed by the human soul, independently of its
-reasoning from the data of sense.
-
-St. Thomas’s admissions are especially striking, as he usually
-elaborates a position which ignores, and would logically exclude,
-such “confused knowledge.” In his _Exposition and Questions on the
-Book of Boetius on the Trinity_, after arguments to show that we know
-indeed _that_ God is, but not _what_ He is,--at most only what He is
-not, he says: “We should recognize, however, that it is impossible,
-with regard to anything, to know whether it exists, unless, in some
-way or other, we know _what_ it is, either with a perfect or with a
-confused knowledge.… Hence also with regard to God,--we could not
-know whether He exists, unless we somehow knew _what_ He is, even
-though in a confused manner.” And this knowledge of _what_ He is, is
-interestingly, because unconsciously, admitted in one of the passages
-directed to proving that we can but know _that_ He is. “In our earthly
-state we cannot attain to a knowledge of Himself beyond the fact that
-He exists. And yet, among those who know _that_ He is, the one knows
-this more perfectly than the other.”[342] For it is plain that, even
-if the knowledge of the existence of something were possible without
-any knowledge of that thing’s nature, no difference or increase in
-such knowledge of the thing’s bare existence would be possible. The
-different degrees in the knowledge, which is here declared to be one
-concerning the bare existence of God, can, as a matter of fact, exist
-only in knowledge concerning His nature. I shall have to return to this
-great question further on.
-
-Here I would only point out how well Battista Vernazza has, in her
-_Dialogo_, realized the importance of a modification in such acutely
-dualistic statements as those occasionally met with in the _Vita_. For,
-in the _Dialogo_, the utter qualitative difference between God and the
-Soul, and the Soul and the Body, which find so striking an utterance
-in one of Catherine’s moods, is ever carefully limited to the soul’s
-sinful acts and habits, and to the body’s unspiritualized condition; so
-that the soul, when generous and faithful to God’s grace, can and does
-grow less and less unlike God, and the body can, in its turn, become
-more and more an instrument and expression of the soul. A pity only
-that Battista has continued Catherine’s occasional over-emphasis in the
-parallel matter of the knowledge of God: since, even in the _Dialogo_,
-we get statements which, if pressed, would imply that even the crudest,
-indeed the most immoral conception of God is, objectively, no farther
-removed from the reality than is the most spiritual idea that man can
-attain of Him.
-
-It would indeed be well if the Christian Mystics who, since about
-500 A.D., are more and more dependent for their formulations upon
-the Areopagite, had followed, in this matter, not his more usual
-and more paradoxical, but his exceptional, thoroughly sober vein
-of teaching,--that contained in the third chapter of his _Mystical
-Theology_, where he finds degrees of worth and approximation among the
-affirmative attributions, and degrees of unfitness and distance among
-the negative ones. “Are not life and goodness more cognate to Him than
-air and stone? And is He not further removed from debauchery and wrath,
-than from ineffableness and incomprehensibility”?[343] But such a scale
-of approximations would be utterly impossible did we not somehow, at
-least dimly, experience or know _what_ He is.
-
-We shall then have to amend the Mystic’s apparent Agnosticism on three
-points. We shall have to drop any hard and fast distinction between
-knowledge of God’s Existence and knowledge of His Nature, since both
-necessarily more or less stand and fall together. We shall have to
-replace the terms as to our utter ignorance as to what He is, by terms
-expressive of an experience which, if not directly and independently
-clear and analyzable to the reflex, critical reason, can yet be shown
-to be profoundly real and indefinitely potent in the life of man’s
-whole rational and volitional being. It is this dim, deep experience
-which ever causes our reflex knowledge of God to appear no knowledge at
-all. And we shall reject any absolute qualitative difference between
-the soul’s deepest possibilities and ideals, and God; and shall, in
-its stead, maintain an absolute difference between God and all our
-downward inclinations, acts, and habits, and an indefinite difference,
-in worth and dignity, between God and the very best that, with His
-help, we can aim at and become. With regard to every truly existent
-subject-matter, we can trace the indefinitely wider range and the more
-delicate penetration possessed by our dim yet true direct contact and
-experience, as contrasted with our reflex analysis concerning all
-such contacts and experiences; and this surplusage is at its highest
-in connection with God, Who is not simply a Thing alongside of other
-things, but the Spirit, our spirit’s Origin, Sustainer, and End, “in
-whom we live and move and have our being.”
-
-
-III. MYSTICISM AND THE QUESTION OF EVIL.
-
-
-_Introductory: Exclusive and Inclusive Mysticism in Relation to
-Optimism._
-
-The four couples of weaknesses and corresponding strong points
-characteristic of Mysticism that we have just considered, and the fact
-that, in each case, they ever spring respectively from an attempt to
-make Mysticism be the all of religion, and from a readiness to keep
-it as but one of the elements more or less present in, and necessary
-for, every degree and form of the full life of the human soul: make
-one wish for two English terms, as useful as are the German names
-“Mystik” and “Mystizismus,” for briefly indicating respectively “the
-legitimate share of Feeling in the constitution of the religious life,
-and the one-sidedness of a religion in which the Understanding and the
-Will,” and indeed also the Memory and the Senses, with their respective
-variously external occasions, vehicles, and objects, “do not come to
-their rights,” as Prof. Rauwenhoff well defines the matter.[344] I
-somehow shrink from the term “Mysticality” for his “Mystizismus”; and
-must rest content with the three terms--of “Mysticism,” as covering
-both the right and the wrong use of feeling in religion; and of “True”
-or “Inclusive Mysticism,” and of “Pseudo-” or “Exclusive Mysticism,”
-as denoting respectively the legitimate, and the (quantitatively or
-qualitatively) mistaken, share of emotion in the religious life.
-
-Now the four matters, which we have just considered, have allowed us
-to reach an answer not all unlike that of Nicolas of Coes, Leibniz,
-and Hegel,--one which, if it remained alone or quite final, would, in
-face of the fulness of real life, strike us all, nowadays, as somewhat
-superficial, because too Optimistic and Panlogistic in its trend. The
-fifth set of difficulties and problems now to be faced will seem almost
-to justify Schopenhauer at his gloomiest. Yet we must bear in mind that
-our direct business here is not with the problem of Evil in general,
-but only with the special helps and hindrances, afforded by Inclusive
-and by Exclusive Mysticism respectively, towards apprehending the true
-nature of Evil and turning even it into an occasion for a deeper good.
-In this case the special helps and hindrances fall under three heads.
-
-
-1. _Mysticism, too optimistic. Evil positive, but not supreme._
-
-(1) First of all, I would strongly insist upon the following great
-fact to which human life and history bear witness, if we but take and
-test these latter on a large scale and with a patient persistency.
-It is, that not the smoother, easier times and circumstances in the
-lives of individuals and of peoples, but, on the contrary, the harder
-and hardest trials of every conceivable kind, and the unshrinking,
-full acceptance of these, as part of the price of conscience and of
-its growing light, have ever been the occasions of the deepest trust
-in and love of God to which man has attained. In Jewish History, the
-Exile called forth a Jeremiah and Ezekiel, and the profound ideal of
-the Suffering Servant; the persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes raised
-up a Judas Maccabaeus; and the troubles under the Emperor Hadrian, a
-Rabbi Akiba. And in Christian History, the persecutions from Nero to
-Robespierre have each occasioned the formation of heroic lovers of
-Love Crucified. And such great figures do not simply manage to live,
-apart from all the turmoil, in some Mystic upper region of their own;
-but they face and plunge into the very heart of the strife, and get
-and give spiritual strength on occasion of this closest contact with
-loneliness, outrage, pain, and death. And this fact can be traced
-throughout history.
-
-Not as though suffering automatically deepens and widens man into
-a true spiritual personality,--of itself it does not even tend to
-this; nor as though there were not souls grown hard or low, or
-frivolous or bitter, under suffering,--to leave madness and suicide
-unconsidered,--souls in which it would be difficult to find any
-avoidable grave fault. But that, wherever there is the fullest,
-deepest, interiority of human character and influence, _there_ can
-ever be found profound trials and sufferings which have been thus
-utilized and transfigured. It is doubtless Our Lord’s uniquely full
-and clear proclamation of this mysterious efficacity of all suffering
-nobly borne; above all it is the supreme exemplification and fecundity
-of this deepest law of life, afforded and imparted by His own
-self-immolation, that has given its special power to Christianity,
-and, in so doing, has, more profoundly than ever before or elsewhere,
-brought home to us a certain Teleology here also,--the deepest ever
-discovered to man. For though we fail in our attempts at explaining
-how or why, with an All-knowing, All-powerful, and All-loving God,
-there can be Evil at all, we can but recognize the law, which is ever
-being brought home to us, of a mysterious capacity for purification and
-development of man’s spiritual character, on occasion and with the help
-of trouble, pain, and death itself.
-
-(2) Now all this, we must admit, is practised and noted, directly and
-in detail, only by the Ascetical and the Outward-going elements in
-Religion; whereas Mysticism, as such, is optimistic, not only as is
-Christianity, with respect to the end, but, in practice, with regard
-to the actual state of things already encircling it as well. For so
-careful a selection and so rigorous an abstraction is practised by
-Mysticism, as such, towards the welter of contingencies around it, that
-the rough shocks, the bitter tonics, the expansive birth-pangs of the
-spirit’s deeper life, in and by means of the flux of time and sense,
-of the conflict with hostile fellow-creatures, and of the claimfulness
-of the lower self, are known by it only in their result, not in their
-process, or rather only as this process ebbs and fades away, in such
-recollective moments, into the distance.
-
-No wonder, then, that Mysticism, as such, has ever tended to deny
-all positive character to Evil. We have already found how strongly
-this is the case with the prince of Mystic philosophers, Plotinus.
-But even St. Augustine, with his massive experience, and (in his
-other mood) even excessive realization, of the destructive force of
-Evil and of the corrupt inclinations of man’s heart, has one whole
-large current of teaching expressive of the purely negative character
-of Evil. The two currents, the hot and concrete, and the cold and
-abstract one, appear alternately in the very _Confessions_, of 397
-A.D. There, ten years after his conversion, he can write: “All things
-that are corrupted, are deprived of good. But, if they are deprived
-of all good, they will cease to exist.… In so far, then, as they
-exist, they are good.… Evil is no substance.” Notwithstanding such
-Neo-Platonist interpretations, he had found Evil a terribly powerful
-force; the directly autobiographical chapters of this same great book
-proclaim this truth with unsurpassable vividness,--he is here fully
-Christian.[345] And in his unfinished work against the Pelagianizing
-Monk Julianus, in 429 A.D., he even declares--characteristically,
-whilst discussing the Origin of Sin: “Such and so great was Adam’s sin,
-that it was able to turn (human) nature itself into this evil.” Indeed,
-already in 418, he had maintained that “this wound” (of Original Sin)
-“forces all that is born of that human race to be under the Devil, so
-that the latter, so to speak, plucks the fruit from the fruit-tree of
-his own planting.”[346]
-
-Pseudo-Dionysius, writing about 500 A.D., has evidently no such
-massive personal experience to oppose to the Neo-Platonic influence,
-an influence which, in the writings of Proclus (who died 485 A.D.), is
-now at its height. “Evil,” he says, “is neither in Demons nor in us,
-as an existent (positive) evil, but (only) as a failure and dearth of
-the perfection of our own proper goods.”[347] He says this and more of
-the same kind, but nothing as to the dread power of Evil. St. Thomas
-Aquinas (who died in 1271 A.D.) is, as we know, largely under the
-influence of the Negative conception: thus “the stain of sin is not
-something positive, existent in the soul.… It is like a shadow, which
-is the privation of light.”[348]
-
-Catherine, though otherwise much influenced by the Negative conception,
-as _e.g._ in her definition of a soul possessed by the Evil Spirit
-as one suffering from a “privation of love,” finds the stain of sin,
-doubtless from her own experience, to be something distinctly positive,
-with considerable power of resistance and propagation.[349]--Mother
-Juliana of Norwich had, in 1373, also formulated both conceptions. “I
-saw not Sin, for I believe it hath no manner of substance, nor no part
-of being”: Neo-Platonist theory. “Sin is so vile and so mickle for to
-hate, that it may be likened to no pain.… All is good but Sin, and
-naught is evil but Sin”: Christian experience.[350]
-
-Eckhart had, still further back (he died in 1327 A.D.), insisted much
-that “Evil is nothing but privation, or falling away from Being; not
-an effect, but a defect”:[351] yet he also finds much work to do in
-combating this somehow very powerful “defect.”--Not till we get to
-Spinoza (who died in 1677) do we get the Negative conception pushed
-home to its only logical conclusion: “By Reality and Perfection, I mean
-the same thing.… All knowledge of Evil is inadequate knowledge.… If the
-human mind had nothing but adequate ideas, it would not form any notion
-of Evil.”[352]
-
-(3) As regards the Christian Mystics, their negative conception
-of evil, all but completely restricted as it was to cosmological
-theory, did those Mystics themselves little or no harm; since their
-tone of feeling and their volitional life, indeed a large part of
-their very speculation, were determined, not by such Neo-Platonist
-theories, but by the concrete experiences of Sin, Conscience, and
-Grace, and by the great Christian historical manifestation of the
-powers of all three.--It is clear too that our modern alternative:
-“positive-negative,” is not simply identical with the scholastic
-alternative: “substantial-accidental,” which latter alternative is
-sometimes predominant in the minds of these ancient theorizers; and
-that, once the question was formulated in the latter way, they were
-profoundly right in refusing to hypostatize Evil, in denying that there
-exists any distinct thing or being wholly bad.--Yet it is equally
-clear how very Greek and how little Christian is such a preoccupation
-(in face of the question of the nature of Evil) with the concepts
-of Substance and Accident, rather than with that of Will; and how
-strangely insufficient, in view of the tragic conflicts and ruins of
-real life, is all, even sporadic, denial, of a certain obstructive
-and destructive efficacy in the bad will, and of a mysterious, direct
-perversity and formal, intentional malignity in that will at its worst.
-
-(4) On these two points it is undeniable that Kant, (with all
-his self-contradictions, insufficiencies, and positive errors on
-other important matters), has adequately formulated the practical
-dispositions and teachings of the fully awakened Christian
-consciousness, and hence, pre-eminently, of the great Saints in the
-past, although, in the matter of the perverse will, the Partial Mystics
-have, even in their theory, (though usually only as part of the
-doctrine of Original Sin), largely forestalled his analysis. “Nowhere
-in this our world, nowhere even outside it, is anything thinkable as
-good without any reservation, but the good will alone.” “That a corrupt
-inclination to evil is rooted in man, does not require any formal
-proof, in view of the clamorous examples furnished to all men by the
-experience of human behaviour. If you would have such cases from the
-so-called state of nature, where some philosophers have looked for the
-chief home of man’s natural goodness, you need only compare, with such
-an hypothesis, the unprovoked cruelties enacted in Tofoa, New Zealand
-… and the ceaseless scenes of murder in the North-Western American
-deserts, where no human being derives the slightest advantage from
-them,--and you will quickly have more than sufficient evidence before
-you to induce the abandonment of such a view. But if you consider that
-human nature is better studied in a state of civilization, since there
-its gifts have a better chance of development,--you will have to listen
-to a long melancholy string of accusations: of secret falseness, even
-among friends; of an inclination to hate him to whom we owe much; of
-a cordiality which yet leaves the observation true that ‘there is
-something in the misfortune of even our best friend which does not
-altogether displease us’: so that you will quickly have enough of the
-vices of culture, the most offensive of all, and will prefer to turn
-away your look from human nature altogether, lest you fall yourself
-into another vice,--that of hatred of mankind.”[353]
-
-It is sad to think how completely this virile, poignant sense of the
-dread realities of human life again disappeared from the teachings of
-such post-Kantians as Hegel and Schleiermacher,--in other important
-respects so much more satisfactory than Kant. As Mr. Tennant has well
-said, in a stimulating book which, on this point at least, voices
-the unsophisticated, fully awakened conscience and Christian sense
-with refreshing directness, “for Jesus Christ and for the Christian
-consciousness, sin means something infinitely deeper and more real than
-what it can have meant for Spinoza or the followers of Hegel.”[354]
-Here again we have now in Prof. Eucken, a philosopher who, free from
-ultimate Pessimism, lets us hear once more those tones which are alone
-adequate to the painful reality. “In great things and in small, there
-exists an evil disposition beyond all simple selfishness: hatred and
-envy, even where the hater’s self-interest is not touched; an antipathy
-to things great and divine; a pleasure found in the disfigurement or
-destruction of the Good.… Indeed the mysterious fact of Evil, as a
-positive opposition to Good, has never ceased to occupy the deepest
-minds.… The concept of moral guilt cannot be got rid of, try as we
-may.”[355]
-
-(5) And yet even with regard to this matter, Mysticism represents a
-profound compensating truth and movement, which we cannot, without
-grave detriment, lose out of the complete religious life. For in life
-at large, and in human life and history in particular, it would be
-sheer perversity to deny that there is much immediate, delightful,
-noble Beauty, Truth, and Goodness; and these also have a right to
-the soul’s careful, ruminating attention. And it is the Mystical
-element that furnishes this rumination.--Again, “it is part of the
-essential character of human consciousness, as a Synthesis and an
-organizing Unity, that, as long as the life of that consciousness
-lasts at all, not only contrast and tension, but also concentration
-and equilibrium must manifest themselves. Taking life’s standard from
-life itself, we cannot admit its decisive constituent to lie in tension
-alone.”[356] And it is the Mystical mood that helps to establish this
-equilibrium.--And finally, deep peace, an overflowing possession and
-attainment, and a noble joy, are immensely, irreplaceably powerful
-towards growth in personality and spiritual fruitfulness. Nothing,
-then, would be more shortsighted than to try and keep the soul from a
-deep, ample, recollective movement, from feeding upon and relishing,
-from as it were stretching itself out and bathing in, spiritual air and
-sunshine, in a rapt admiration, in a deep experience of the greatness,
-the beauty, the truth, and the goodness of the World, of Life, of God.
-
-
-2. _Mysticism and the Origin of Evil._
-
-The second hindrance and help, afforded respectively by Exclusive and
-by Inclusive Mysticism in the matter of Evil, concerns the question of
-its Origin.
-
-(1) Now it appears strange at first sight that, instead of first
-directly realizing and picturing the undeniable, profoundly important
-facts of man’s interior conflict, his continuous lapses from his own
-deepest standard, and his need of a help not his own to become what
-he cannot but wish to be, and of leaving the theory as to how man
-came by this condition to the second place; the Mystics should so
-largely,--witness Catherine--directly express only this theory, and
-should face what is happening _hic et nunc_ all but exclusively under
-the picture of the prehistoric beginnings of these happenings, in the
-state of innocence and the lapse of the first man. For men of other
-religious modalities have held this doctrine as firmly as the Mystics,
-yet have mostly dwelt directly upon the central core of goodness and
-the weakness and sinfulness to be found in man; whilst the Mystics
-had even less scruple than other kinds of devout souls in embodying
-experimental truths in concepts and symbols other than the common ones.
-
-(2) I think that, here again, it was the Neo-Platonist literary
-influence, so strong also on other points with the Mystics of the
-past, and a psychological trend characteristic of the Mystical habit
-of mind, which conjoined thus to concentrate the Mystics’ attention
-upon the doctrines of Original Justice and of a First Lapse, and
-to give to these doctrines the peculiar form and tone taken on by
-them here. We have noted, for instance, in the case of Catherine
-herself, how powerfully her thought and feeling, as to the first
-human soul’s first lapse into sin, is influenced by the idea of each
-human soul’s lapse into a body; and we have found this latter idea
-to be, notwithstanding its echoes in the Deutero-Canonical Book of
-Wisdom and in one non-doctrinal passage in St. Paul, not Christian
-but Neo-Platonist. Yet it is this strongly anti-body idea that could
-not fail to attract Mysticism, as such.--And the conception as to the
-plenary righteousness of that first soul before its lapse, which she
-gets from Christian theology, is similarly influenced, in her theorized
-emotion and thought, by the Neo-Platonist idea of every soul having
-already existed, perfectly spotless, previous to its incarnation:
-a view which could not but immensely attract such a high-strung
-temperament, with its immense requirement of something fixed and
-picturable on which to rest. Thus here the ideal for each soul’s future
-would have been already real in each soul’s past. In this past the soul
-would have been, as it were, a mirror of a particular fixed size and
-fixed intensity of lustre; its business here below consists in removing
-the impurities adhering to this mirror’s surface, and in guarding it
-against fresh stains.
-
-(3) Now it is well known how it was St. Augustine, that mighty and
-daring, yet at times ponderous, intellect, who, (so long a mental
-captive of the Manichees and then so profoundly influenced by
-Plotinus,) was impelled, by the experiences of his own disordered
-earlier life and by his ardent African nature, to formulate by far the
-most explicit and influential of the doctrines upon these difficult
-matters. And if, with the aid of the Abbé Turmel’s admirable articles
-on the subject, we can, with a fairly open mind, study his successive,
-profoundly varying, speculations and conclusions concerning the Nature
-and Origin of Sin,[357] we shall not fail to be deeply impressed with
-the largely impassable maze of opposite extremes, contradictions and
-difficulties of every kind, in which that adventurous mind involved
-itself.--And to these difficulties immanent to the doctrine,--at
-least, in the form it takes in St. Augustine’s hands,--has, of course,
-to be added the serious moral danger that would at once result,
-were we, by too emphatic or literal an insistence upon the true
-guiltiness of Original sin, to weaken the chief axiom of all true
-morality--that the concurrence of the personality, in a freely-willed
-assent, is necessarily involved in the idea of sin and guilt.--And
-now the ever-accumulating number and weight of even the most certain
-facts and most moderate inductions of Anthropology and Ethnology are
-abolishing all evidential grounds for holding a primitive high level
-of human knowledge and innocence, and a single sudden plunge into a
-fallen estate, as above, apparently against, all our physiological,
-psychological, historical evidences and analogies, (which all point
-to a gradual rise from lowly beginnings), and are reducing such a
-conception to a pure postulate of Theology.
-
-Yet Anthropology and Ethnology leave in undisturbed possession the
-great truths of Faith that “man’s condition denotes a fall from the
-Divine intention, a parody of God’s purpose in human history,” and that
-“sin is exceedingly sinful for us in whom it is a deliberate grieving
-of the Holy Spirit”; and they actually reinforce the profound verities
-that “the realization of our better self is a stupendously difficult
-task,” and as to “Man’s crying need of grace, and his capacity for
-a gospel of Redemption.”[358] But they point, with a force great in
-proportion to the highly various, cumulatively operative, immensely
-interpretative character of the evidence,--to the conclusion that
-“Sin,” as the Anglican Archdeacon Wilson strikingly puts it, “is …
-the survival or misuse of habits and tendencies that were incidental
-to an earlier stage of development.… Their sinfulness would thus lie
-in their anachronism, in their resistance to the … Divine force that
-makes for moral development and righteousness.” Certainly “the human
-infant” appears to careful observers, as Mr. Tennant notes, “as simply
-a non-moral animal,” with corresponding impulses and propensities.
-According to this view “morality consists in the formation of the
-non-moral material of nature into character …”; so that “if goodness
-consists essentially in man’s steady moralization of the raw material
-of morality, its opposite, sin, cannot consist in the material awaiting
-moralization, but in the will’s failure to completely moralize it.”
-“Evil” would thus be “not the result of a transition from the good, but
-good and evil would” both alike “be voluntary developments from what
-is ethically neutral.”[359] Dr. Wilson finds, accordingly, that “this
-conflict of freedom and conscience is precisely what is related as
-‘the Fall’ _sub specie historiae_.” Scripture “tells of the fall of a
-creature from unconscious innocence to conscious guilt. But this fall
-from innocence” would thus be, “in another sense, a rise to a higher
-grade of being.”[360]
-
-(4) It is, in any case, highly satisfactory for a Catholic to remember
-that the acute form, given to the doctrine of Original Sin by St.
-Augustine, has never been finally accepted by the Catholic Roman
-Church; indeed, that the Tridentine Definition expressly declares that
-Concupiscence does not, in strictness, possess the nature of Sin, but
-arises naturally, on the withdrawal of the _donum superadditum_,--so
-that Mr. Tennant can admit, in strictest accuracy, that “in this
-respect, the Roman theology is more philosophical than that of
-the Symbols of Protestant Christendom.”[361] It is true that the
-insistence upon “Original Sin” possessing somehow “the true and proper
-nature of Sin” remains a grave difficulty, even in this Tridentine
-formulation of the doctrine; whilst the objections, already referred
-to as accumulating against the theory in general, retain some of
-their cogency against other parts of this decree.--Yet we have here
-an impressive proclamation of the profoundest truths: the spiritual
-greatness of God’s plan for us, the substantial goodness of the
-material still ready to our hand for the execution of that plan, and
-His necessary help ever ready from the first; the reality of our lapse,
-away from all these, into sin, and of the effects of such lapse upon
-the soul; the abiding conflict between sense and spirit, the old man
-and the new, within each one of us; and the close solidarity of our
-poor, upward-aspiring, downward-plunging race, in evil as well as in
-good.
-
-(5) And as to the Christian Mystics, their one particular danger
-here,--that of a Static Conception of man’s spirit as somehow
-constituted, from the first, a substance of a definite, final size and
-dignity, which but demands the removal of disfiguring impurities, is
-largely eliminated, even in theory, and all but completely overcome
-in practice, by the doctrine and the practice of Pure Love. For
-in “Charity” we get a directly dynamic, expansive conception and
-experience: man’s spirit is, at first, potential rather than actual,
-and has to be conquered and brought, as it were, to such and such
-a size and close-knitness of organization, by much fight with, and
-by the slow transformation of, the animal and selfish nature. Thus
-Pure Love, Charity, Agape, has to fight it out, inch by inch, with
-another, still positive force, impure love, concupiscence, Eros,
-in all the latter’s multiform disguises. Here Purity has become
-something intensely positive and of boundless capacities for growth;
-as St. Thomas says, “Pure Love has no limit to its increase, for it
-is a certain participation in the Infinite Love, which is the Holy
-Spirit.”[362]--In this utterly real, deeply Christian way do these
-Mystics overcome Neo-Platonist static abstractions, and simultaneously
-regain, in their practical theory and emotional perception, the great
-truth of the deep, subtle force of Evil, against which Pure Love has to
-stand, in virile guard, as long as earth’s vigil lasts. And the longest
-and most difficult of these conflicts is found,--here again in utterly
-Christian fashion,--not in the sensual tendencies proceeding from the
-body, but in the self-adoration, the solipsism of the spirit. We have
-found this in Catherine: at her best she ever has something of the
-large Stoic joy at being but a citizen in a divine Cosmopolis; yet but
-Love and Humility, those profoundest of the Christian affections, have
-indefinitely deepened the truth of the outlook, and the range of the
-work to be done, in and for herself and others.
-
-(6) Yet even apart from Pure Love, Mysticism can accurately be said to
-apprehend an important truth when, along its static line of thought
-and feeling, it sees each soul as, from the first, a substance of a
-particular, final size. For each soul is doubtless intended, from the
-first, to express a particular thought and wish of God, to form one,
-never simply replaceable member in His Kingdom, to attain to a unique
-kind and degree of personality: and though it can refuse to endorse and
-carry out this plan, the plan remains within it, in the form of never
-entirely suppressible longings. The Mystic, then, sees much here also.
-
-
-3. _The warfare against Evil. Pseudo-Mysticism._
-
-The third of the relations between Mysticism and the conception and
-experience of Evil requires a further elucidation of an important
-distinction, which we have already found at work all along, more or
-less consciously, between the higher and the lower Mysticism, and their
-respective, profoundly divergent, tempers, objects, and range.
-
-(1) Prof. Münsterberg discriminates between these two Mysticisms with
-a brilliant excessiveness, and ends by reserving the word “Mysticism”
-for the rejected kind alone. “As soon as we speak of psychical
-objects,--of ideas, feelings, and volitions,--as subject-matters of our
-direct consciousness and experience, we have put before ourselves an
-artificial product, a transformation, to which the categories of real
-life no longer apply.” In this artificial product causal connections
-have taken the place of final ends. But “History, Practical Life,
-… Morality, Religion have nothing to do with these psychological
-constructions; the categories of Psychology,” treated by Münsterberg
-himself as a Natural, Determinist Science, “must not intrude into their
-teleological domains. But if,” on the other hand, “the categories
-belonging to Reality,” which is Spiritual and Libertarian, “are forced
-on to the psychological system, a system which was framed” by our
-mind “in the interest of causal explanation, we get a cheap mixture,
-which satisfies neither the one aim nor the other. Just this is the
-effect of Mysticism. It is the personal, emotional view applied,
-not to the world of Reality, where it fits, but to the Physical and
-Psychological worlds, which are constructed by the human logical will,
-with a view to gaining an impersonal, unemotional causal system.…
-The ideals of Ethics and Religion … have now been projected into the
-atomistic structure” (of the Causal System), “and have thus become
-dependent upon this system’s nature; they find their right of existence
-limited to the regions where ignorance of Nature leaves blanks in the
-Causal System, and have to tremble at every advance which Science
-makes.” It is to this projection alone that Münsterberg would apply
-the term “Mysticism,” which thus becomes exclusively “the doctrine
-that the processes in the world of physical and psychical objects
-are not always subject to natural laws, but are influenced, at times,
-in a manner fundamentally inexplicable from the standpoint of the
-causal conception of Nature.… Yet, the special interest of the Mystic
-stands and falls here with his conviction that, in these extra-causal
-combinations,” thus operative right within and at the level of this
-causal system, “we have a” direct, demonstrable “manifestation of a
-positive system of quite another kind, a System of Values, a system
-dominated, not by Mechanism, but by Significance.”[363]
-
-(2) Now we have been given here a doubtless excessively antithetic and
-dualistic picture of what, in actual life, is a close-knit variety in
-unity,--that interaction between, and anticipation of the whole in, the
-parts, and that indication of the later stages in the earlier,--which
-is so strikingly operative in the order and organization of the various
-constituents and stages of the processes and growth of the human mind
-and character, and which appears again in the Reality apprehended,
-reproduced, and enriched by man’s powers.
-
-Even in the humblest of our Sense-perceptions, there is already a
-mind perceiving and a Mind perceived; and, in the most abstract
-and artificial of our intellectual constructions, there is not
-only a logical requirement, but also, underlying this requirement
-as this cause’s deepest cause, an ever-growing if unarticulated
-experience and sense that only by the closest contact with the most
-impersonal-seeming, impersonally conceived forces of life and nature,
-and by the deepest recollection within its own interior world of
-mind and will, can man’s soul adequately develop and keep alive,
-within itself, a solid degree and consciousness of Spirit, Free-will,
-Personality, Eternity, and God. Thus, in proportion as he comes more
-deeply to advance in the true occasions of his spirit’s growth, does
-man still further emphasize and differentiate these two levels: the
-shallower, spacial-temporal, mathematico-physical, quantitative and
-determinist aspect of reality and level of apprehension; and the
-deeper, alone at all adequate, experience of all the fuller degrees
-of Reality and effectuations of the spirit’s life, with their
-overlapping, interpenetrating Succession, (their Duration), and their
-Libertarianism, Interiority, and Sense of the Infinite. He thus
-emphasizes both levels, because the determinist level is found to be,
-though never the source or direct cause, yet ever a necessary awakener
-and purifier of the Libertarian level.
-
-Strictly within the temporal-spacial, quantitative method and level,
-indeed, we can nowhere find Teleology; but if we look back upon these
-quantitative superficialities from the qualitative, durational and
-personal, spiritual level and standpoint, (which alone constitute
-our direct experience), we find that the quantitative, causal level
-and method is everywhere inadequate to exhaust or rightly to picture
-Reality, in exact proportion to this reality’s degree of fulness and of
-worth. From the simplest Vegetable-Cell up to Orchids and Insectivorous
-Plants; from these on to Protozoans and up, through Insects, Reptiles,
-and Birds, to the most intelligent of Domestic Animals; from these on
-to Man, the Savage, and up to the most cultured or saintly of human
-personalities: we have everywhere, and increasingly, an inside, an
-organism, a subject as well as object,--a series which is, probably
-from the first, endowed with some kind of dim consciousness, and which
-increasingly possessed of a more and more definite consciousness,
-culminates in the full self-consciousness of the most fully human man.
-And everywhere here, though in indefinitely increasing measure, it is
-the individualizing and historical, the organic and soul-conceptions
-and experiences which constitute the most characteristic and important
-truths and reality about and in these beings. For the higher up we
-get in this scale of Reality, the more does the Interior determine
-and express itself in the Exterior, and the more does not only kind
-differ from kind of being, but even the single individual from the
-other individuals within each several kind. And yet nowhere, not even
-in free-willing, most individualized, personal Man do we find the
-quantitative, determinist envelope simply torn asunder and revealing
-the qualitative, libertarian spirit perfectly naked and directly
-testable by chronometer, measuring-rod, or crucible. The spirit is thus
-ever like unto a gloved hand, which, let it move ever so spontaneously,
-will ever, in the first instance, present the five senses with a glove
-which, to their exclusive tests, appears as but dead and motionless
-leather.
-
-(3) Now we have already in Chapter IX studied the contrasting
-attitudes of Catherine and her attendants towards one class of such
-effects,--those attributed to the Divine Spirit,--and hence, in
-principle, towards this whole question. Yet it is in the matter of
-phenomena, taken to be directly Diabolic or Preternatural, that a
-Pseudo-Mysticism has been specially fruitful in strangely materialistic
-fantasies. As late as 1774 the _Institutiones Theologiae Mysticae_
-of Dom Schram, O.S.B., a book which even yet enjoys considerable
-authority, still solemnly described, as so many facts, cases of
-Diabolical _Incubi_ and _Succubae_. Even in 1836-1842 the layman
-Joseph Görres could still devote a full half of his widely influential
-_Mystik_ to “Diabolical Mysticism,”--witchcraft, etc.; a large space
-to “Natural Mysticism,”--divination, lycanthropy, vampires, etc.; and
-a considerable part of the “Divine Mysticism,” to various directly
-miraculous phenomenalisms. The Abbé Ribet could still, in his _La
-Mystique Divine, distinguée de ses Contrefaçons Diaboliques_, of 1895,
-give us a similarly uncritical mixture and transposition of tests
-and levels. But the terrible ravages of the belief in witchcraft in
-the later Middle Ages, and, only a few years back, the humiliating
-fraud and craze concerning “Diana Vaughan,” are alone abundantly
-sufficient to warn believers in the positive character of Evil away
-from all, solidly avoidable, approaches to such dangerous forms of this
-belief.[364]
-
-(4) Yet the higher and highest Mystical attitude has never ceased
-to find its fullest, most penetrating expression in the life and
-teaching of devoted children of the Roman Church,--several of whom
-have been proclaimed Doctors and Models by that Church herself. And by
-a conjunction of four characteristics these great normative lives and
-teachers still point the way, out of and beyond all false or sickly
-Mysticism, on to the wholesome and the true.
-
-(i) There is, first, the grand trust in and love of God’s beautiful,
-wide world, and in and of the manifold truth and goodness present
-throughout life,--realities which we have already found rightly to
-be dwelt on, in certain recollective movements and moments, to the
-momentary exclusion of their positively operative, yet ever weaker,
-opposites. “Well I wote,” says Mother Juliana, “that heaven and earth,
-and all that is made, is great, large, fair and good”; “the full-head
-of joy is to behold God in all,” and “truly to enjoy in Our Lord, is a
-full lovely thanking in His sight.”[365] This completely un-Manichaean
-attitude,--so Christian when held as the ultimate among the divers,
-sad and joyful, strenuous and contemplative moods of the soul,--is
-as strongly present in Clement of Alexandria, in the Sts. Catherine
-of Siena and of Genoa, in St. John of the Cross, and indeed in the
-recollective moments of all the great Mystics.
-
-(ii) There is, next, a strong insistence upon the soul having to
-transcend all particular lights and impressions, in precise proportion
-to their apparently extraordinary character, if it would become strong
-and truly spiritual. “He that will rely on the letter of the divine
-locution, or on the intellectual form of the vision, will necessarily
-fall into delusion. ‘The letter killeth, the spirit quickeneth’; we
-must therefore reject the literal sense, and abide in the obscurity
-of faith.” “One desire only doth God allow in His presence, that of
-perfectly observing His law and carrying the Cross of Christ.… That
-soul, which has no other aim, will be a true ark containing the true
-Manna, which is God.” “One act of the will, wrought in charity, is
-more precious in the eyes of God, than that which all the visions
-and revelations of heaven might effect.” “Let men cease to regard
-these supernatural apprehensions … that they may be free.”[366] Here
-the essence of the doctrine lies in the importance attached to this
-transcendence, and not in the particular views of the Saint concerning
-the character of this or that miraculous-seeming phenomenon to be
-transcended.
-
-(iii) And this essential doctrine retains all its cogency, even though
-we hold the strict necessity of a contrary, alternating movement
-of definite occupation with the Concrete, Contingent, Historical,
-Institutional, in thought and action. For this occupation will be with
-the normal, typical means, duties, and facts of human and religious
-life; and, whilst fully conscious of the Supernatural working in and
-with these seemingly but natural materials, will, with St. Augustine,
-pray God to “grant men to perceive in little things the common-seeming
-indications of things both small and great,” and, with him, will see a
-greater miracle in the yearly transformation of the vine’s watery sap
-into wine, and in the germination of any single seed, than even in that
-of Cana.[367]
-
-(iv) And then there is, upon the whole, a tendency to concentrate, at
-these recollective stages, the soul’s attention upon Christ and God
-alone. “I believe I understand,” says Mother Juliana, “the ministration
-of holy Angels, as Clerks tell; but it was not shewed to me. For
-Himself is nearest and meekest, highest and lowest, and doeth all.
-God alone took our nature, and none but He; Christ alone worked our
-salvation, and none but He.”[368] And thus we get a wholesome check
-upon the Neo-Platonist countless mediations, of which the reflex is
-still to be found in the Areopagite. God indeed is alone held, with
-all Catholic theologians, to be capable of penetrating to the soul’s
-centre, and the fight against Evil is simplified to a watch and war
-against Self, in the form of an ever-increasing engrossment in the
-thought of God, and in the interests of His Kingdom. “Only a soul
-in union with God,” says St. John of the Cross, “is capable of this
-profound loving knowledge: for this knowledge is itself that union.…
-The Devil has no power to simulate anything so great.” “Self-love,”
-says Père Grou, “is the sole source of all the illusions of the
-spiritual life.… Jesus Christ on one occasion said to St. Catherine
-of Siena: ‘My daughter, think of Me, and I will think of thee’: a
-short epitome of all perfection. ‘Wheresoever thou findest self,’ says
-the _Imitation_, ‘drop that self’: the soul’s degree of fidelity to
-this precept is the true measure of its advancement.”[369] The highly
-authorized _Manuel de Théologie Mystique_ of the Abbé Lejeune, 1897,
-gives but one-sixth of its three-hundred pages to the discussion of
-all quasi-miraculous phenomena, puts them all apart from the substance
-of Contemplation and of the Mystical Life, and dwells much upon
-the manifold dangers of such, never essential, things. The French
-Oratorian, Abbé L. Laberthonnière, represents, in the _Annales de
-Philosophie Chrétienne_, a spirituality as full of a delicate Mysticism
-as it is free from any attachment to extraordinary phenomena. The same
-can be said of the Rev. George Tyrrell’s _Hard Sayings_ and _External
-Religion_. And the Abbé Sandreau has furnished us with two books of the
-most solid tradition and discrimination in all these matters.[370]
-
-(5) And we should, in justice, remember that the Phenomenalist
-Mysticism, objected to by Prof. Münsterberg and so sternly transcended
-by St. John of the Cross, is precisely what is still hankered after,
-and treated as of spiritual worth, by present-day Spiritualism. Indeed,
-even Prof. James’s in many respects valuable _Varieties of Religious
-Experience_ is seriously damaged by a cognate tendency to treat
-Religion, or at least Mysticism, as an abnormal faculty for perceiving
-phenomena inexplicable by physical and psychical science.
-
-(6) And finally, with respect to the personality of Evil, we must not
-forget that “there are drawings to evil as to good, which are not mere
-self-temptations, … but which derive from other wills than our own;
-strictly, it is only persons that can tempt us.”[371]
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XIV
-
-THE TWO FINAL PROBLEMS: MYSTICISM AND PANTHEISM. THE IMMANENCE OF GOD,
-AND SPIRITUAL PERSONALITY, HUMAN AND DIVINE
-
-
-INTRODUCTORY.
-
-_Impossibility of completely abstracting from the theoretical form in
-the study of the experimental matter._
-
-We now come to the last two of our final difficulties and problems--the
-supposed or real relations between Inclusive or Exclusive Mysticism
-and Pantheism; and the question concerning the Immanence of God and
-Spiritual Personality, Human and Divine.
-
-(1) A preliminary difficulty in this, our deepest, task arises from
-the fact that, whereas the evidences of a predominantly individual,
-personal, directly experimental kind, furnished by every at all deeply
-religious soul, have hitherto been all but completely overlooked
-by trained historical investigators, in favour of the study of the
-theological concepts and formulations accepted and transmitted by
-such souls, now the opposite extreme is tending to predominate, as in
-Prof. William James’s _Varieties of Religious Experience_, 1902, or
-in Prof. Weinel’s interesting study, _The Effects of the Spirit and
-of the Spirits in the Sub-Apostolic Age_, 1899. For here, as Prof.
-Bousset points out in connection with the latter book, we get an all
-but complete overlooking of the fact that, even in the most individual
-experience, there is always some intellectual framework or conception,
-some more or less traditional form, which had previously found lodgment
-in, and had been more or less accepted by, that soul; so that, though
-the experience itself, where at all deep, is never the mere precipitate
-of a conventionally accepted traditional intellectual form, it is
-nevertheless, even when more or less in conflict with this form, never
-completely independent of it.[372]--Yet though we cannot discriminate
-in full detail, we can show certain peculiarities in the traditional
-Jewish, Mohammedan, Christian Mysticism to be not intrinsic to the
-Mystical apprehensions as such, but to come from the then prevalent
-philosophies which deflected those apprehensions in those particular
-ways.
-
-(2) In view then of this inevitable inter-relation between the
-experimental, personal matter and the theoretical, traditional form,
-I shall first consider the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonist conceptions
-concerning the relations between the General and the Particular,
-between God and Individual Things, as being the two, partly rival yet
-largely similar, systems that, between them, have most profoundly
-influenced the intellectual starting-point, analysis, and formulation
-of those experiences; and shall try to show the special attraction and
-danger of these conceptions for the mystically religious temperament.
-I shall next discuss the conceptions as to the relations between
-God and the individual personality,--the Noûs, the Spirit, and the
-Soul,--which, still largely Aristotelian and Neo-Platonist, have even
-more profoundly commended themselves to those Mystics, since these
-conceptions so largely met some of those Mystics’ requirements, and
-indeed remain still, in part, the best analysis procurable. I shall,
-thirdly, face the question as to any intrinsic tendency to Pantheism in
-Mysticism as such, and as to the significance and the possible utility
-of any such tendency, keeping all fuller description of the right
-check upon it for my last chapter. And finally, I shall consider what
-degree and form of the Divine Immanence in the human soul, of direct
-Experience or Knowledge of God on the part of man, and of “Personality”
-in God, appear to result from the most careful analysis of the deepest
-religious consciousness, and from the requirements of the Sciences and
-of Life.
-
-
-I. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GENERAL AND THE PARTICULAR, GOD AND INDIVIDUAL
-THINGS, ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE, THE NEO-PLATONISTS, AND THE MEDIEVAL
-STRICT REALISTS.
-
-
-1. _Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus, Proclus._
-
-(1) With regard to the relations between the General and Particular,
-we should note Aristotle’s final perplexities and contradictions,
-arising from his failure to harmonize or to transcend, by means of
-a new and self-consistent conception, the two currents, the Platonic
-and the specifically Aristotelian, which make up his thought. For,
-with him as with Plato, all Knowledge has to do with Reality: hence
-Reality alone, in the highest, primary sense of the word, can form
-the highest, primary object of Knowledge; Knowledge will be busy,
-primarily, with the Essence, the Substance of things. But with him, as
-against Plato, every substance is unique, whence it would follow that
-all knowledge refers, at bottom, to the Individual,--individual beings
-would form, not only the starting-point, but also the content and
-object of knowledge.--Yet this is what Aristotle, once more at one with
-Plato, stoutly denies: Science, even where it penetrates most deeply
-into the Particular, is never directed to individual things as such,
-but always to General Concepts; and this, not because of our human
-incapacity completely to know the Individual, as such, but because the
-General, in spite of the Particular being better known to us, is more
-primitive and more knowable, as alone possessing that Immutability
-which must characterize all objects of true knowledge.[373] The true
-Essence of things consists only in what is thought in their Concept,
-which concept is always some Universal; yet this Universal exists only
-in Individual Beings, which are thus declared true Substances: here
-are two contentions, the possibility of whose co-existence he fails
-to explain. Indeed at one time it is the Form, at another it is the
-Individual Being, composed of Form and Matter, which appears as real;
-and Matter, again, appears both as the Indefinite General and as the
-Cause of Individual Particularity.[374]
-
-(2) Now Plato had indeed insisted upon ascending to even greater
-abstraction, unity, and generality, as the sure process for attaining
-to the truth of things; and had retained what is, for us, a strangely
-unpersonal, abstract element, precisely in his highest concept, since
-God here is hardly personal, but the Idea of Good, a Substance distinct
-from all other things, yet not, on this account, an Individual. Yet
-Plato’s profoundly aesthetic, social, ethical, above all religious,
-consciousness forced him to the inconsistency of proclaiming that, as
-the Sun is higher than the light and the eye, so the Good is higher
-than (mere) Being and Knowledge; and this Supreme Idea of the Good
-gives to things their Being, and to the understanding its power of
-Cognition, and is the Cause of all Rightness and Beauty, the Source
-of all Reality and Reason, and hence, not only a final, but also an
-efficient Cause,--indeed _the_ Cause, pure and simple.[375] In the
-_Philebus_ he tells us explicitly that the Good and the Divine Reason
-are identical; and in the _Timaeus_ the Demiurge, the World-Former,
-looks indeed to the Image of the World, in order to copy it: yet the
-Demiurge is also himself this image which he copies.[376] We thus
-still have a supreme Multiplicity in Unity as the characteristic of
-the deepest Reality; and its chief attribute, Goodness, is not the
-most abstract and aloof, but the most rich in qualities and the most
-boundlessly self-communicative: “He was good, so he desired that all
-things should be as like unto himself as possible.”[377] And Aristotle,
-(although he places God altogether outside the visible world, and
-attributes to Him there one sole action, the thinking of his own
-thought, and one quasi-emotion, intellectual joy at this thinking),
-still maintains, in this shrunken form, the identity of the Good and of
-the Supreme Reason, Noûs, and a certain Multiplicity in Unity, and a
-true self-consciousness, within Him.
-
-(3) It is Plotinus who is the first expressly to put the Godhead,--in
-strict obedience to the Abstractive scheme,--beyond all Multiplicity,
-hence above the highest Reason itself, for reason ever contains at
-least the duality of Subject thinking and of Object thought; above
-Being, for all being has ever a multitude of determinations; and above
-every part and the totality of All Things, for it is the cause of them
-all. The Cause is here ever outside the effect, the Unity outside the
-Multiplicity, what is thought outside of what thinks. The First is
-thus purely transcendent,--with one characteristic exception: although
-above Being, Energy, Thought, and Thinking, Beauty, Virtue, Life, It
-is still the Good; and because of this, though utterly self-sufficing
-and without action of any kind, It, “as it were,” overflows, and
-this overflow produces a Second.[378] And only this Second is here
-the Noûs, possessed of what Aristotle attributes to the First: it is
-no sheer Unity, “all things are together there, yet are they there
-discriminated”: it is contemplative Thinking of itself; it is pure and
-perfect Action.[379]
-
-(4) And Proclus who, through the Pseudo-Dionysius, is the chief
-mediator between Plato and Plotinus on the one hand, and the Medieval
-Mystics and Scholastics on the other, is, with his immense thirst for
-Unity, necessarily absorbed by the question as to the Law according
-to which all things are conjoined to a whole. And this Law is for him
-the process of the Many out of the One, and their inclination back to
-the One; for this process and inclination determine the connection
-of all things, and the precise place occupied by each thing in that
-connection. All things move in the circle of procession from their
-cause, and of return to it; the simplest beings are the most perfect;
-the most complex are the most imperfect.[380]
-
-
-2. _The Anti-Proclian current, in the Areopagite’s view._
-
-Now in the Pseudo-Dionysius we find an interesting oscillation between
-genuine Neo-Platonism, which finds Beings perfect in proportion to the
-fewness and universality of their attributes, although, with it, he
-inconsistently holds Goodness,--the deepest but not the most general
-attribute,--to be the most perfect of all; and Aristotelianism at its
-richest, when it finds Beings perfect according to the multiplicity
-and depth of their attributes. Dionysius himself becomes aware of the
-dead-lock thence ensuing. “The Divine name of the Good is extended
-to things being and to things not being,”--a statement forced upon
-him by his keeping, with Plato and Plotinus, Goodness as the supreme
-attribute, and yet driving home, more completely than they, their first
-principle that Generality and Perfection rise and sink together. “The
-Name of Being is extended to all things being” and stretches further
-than Life. “The name of Life is extended to all things living” and
-stretches further than Wisdom. “The Name of Wisdom is extended,” only,
-“to all the intellectual, and rational, and sensible.”
-
-But if so, “for what reason do we affirm,” (as he has been doing in
-the previous sections), “that Life,” the less extended, “is superior
-to (mere) Being,” the more extended? “and that Wisdom,” though less
-extended, “is superior to mere Life,” the more extended? And he answers
-in favour of depth and richness of attributes. “If any one assumed
-the intellectual to be without being or life, the objection might hold
-good. But if the Divine Minds,” the Angels, “both are above all other
-beings, and live above all other living creatures, and think and know
-above sensible perception and reasoning, and aspire beyond all other
-existent and aspiring beings, to … the Beautiful and Good: then they
-encircle the Good more closely.” For “the things that participate more
-in the one and boundless-giving God, are more … divine, than those that
-come behind them in gifts.”[381] And with abiding truth he says: “Those
-who place attributes on That which is above every attribute, should
-derive the affirmation from what is more cognate to It; but those who
-abstract, with regard to That which is above every abstraction, should
-derive the negation from what is further removed from It. Are not,
-_e.g._, Life and Goodness more cognate to It than air and stone? And is
-It not further removed from debauch and anger than from ineffableness
-and incomprehensibility?”[382]
-
-But more usually Dionysius shows little or no preference for any
-particular attribution or denegation; all are taken to fall short so
-infinitely as to eliminate any question as to degrees of failure. “The
-Deity-Above-All … is neither Soul nor Mind, neither One nor Oneness,
-neither Deity nor Goodness.”[383] God is thus purely transcendent.
-
-
-3. _Continuators of the Proclian current._
-
-The influence of the Areopagite was notoriously immense throughout
-the Middle Ages,--indeed unchecked,--along its Proclian, Emanational,
-Ultra-Unitive current,--among the Pantheists from the Christian,
-Mohammedan and Jewish camps.
-
-(1) Thus Scotus Eriugena (who died in about 877 A.D.) insists: “In
-strict parlance, the Divine Nature Itself exists alone in all things,
-and nothing exists which is not that Nature. The Lord and the Creature
-are one and the same thing.” “It is its own Self that the Holy Trinity
-loves, sees, moves within us.” One of his fundamental ideas is the
-equivalence of the degrees of abstraction and those of existence; he
-simply hypostatizes the logical table.[384] Eriugena was condemned.
-
-(2) But the Pseudo-Aristotelian, really Proclian, _Liber de Causis_,
-written by a Mohammedan in about 850 A.D., became, from its
-translation into Latin in about 1180 A.D. onwards, an authority among
-the orthodox Scholastics. It takes, as “an example of the (_true_)
-doctrine as to Causes, Being, Living-Being, and Man. Here it is
-necessary that the thing Being should exist first of all, and next
-Living-Being, and last Man. Living-Being is the proximate, Being is
-the remote cause of Man; hence Being is in a higher degree the cause
-of Man than is Living-Being, since Being is the cause of Living-Being,
-which latter again is the cause of Man.” … “Being, (of the kind)
-which is before Eternity, is the first cause.… Being is more general
-than Eternity.… Being of the kind which is with and after Eternity,
-is the first of created things.… It is above Sense, and Soul, and
-Intelligence.”[385]
-
-(3) The Mohammedan Avicenna, who died in 1037 A.D., is mostly
-Aristotelian in philosophy and Orthodox in religious intention, and,
-translated into Latin, was much used by St. Thomas. Yet he has lapses
-into pure Pantheism, such as: “The true Being that belongs to God,
-is not His only, but is the Being of all things, and comes forth
-abundantly from His Being. That which all things desire is Being:
-Being is Goodness; the perfection of Being is the perfection of
-Goodness.”[386]
-
-(4) And the Spanish Jew, Ibn Gebirol (Avicebron), who died about 1070
-A.D., is predominantly Proclian, but with a form of Pantheism which, in
-parts, strikingly foreshadows Spinoza. His masterly _Fons Vitae_, as
-translated into Latin, exercised a profound influence upon Duns Scotus.
-“Below the first Maker there is nothing but what is both matter and
-form.” “All things are resolvable into Matter and Form. If all things
-were resolvable into a single root,” (that is, into Form alone), “there
-would be no difference between that one root and the one Maker.” There
-exists a universal Matter and a universal Form. The first, or universal
-Matter, is a substance existing by itself, which sustains diversity,
-and is one in number: it is capable of receiving all the different
-kinds of forms. The universal Form is a substance which constitutes the
-essence of all the different kinds of forms.… By means of the knowledge
-of this universal Form, the knowledge of every (less general) form is
-acquired,--is deduced from it and resolved into it.” “Being falls under
-four categories, answering to: whether it is, what it is, what is its
-quality, and why it is: but, of these, the first in order of dignity
-is the category which inquires whether it is at all.”[387] We thus
-get again the degree of worth strictly identical with the degree of
-generality.
-
-
-4. _Inconsistencies of Aquinas and Scotus._
-
-(1) St. Thomas, the chief of the orthodox Scholastics, has embodied
-the entire Dionysian writings in his own works, but labours
-assiduously--and successfully, as far as his own statements are
-concerned--to guard against the Pantheistic tendencies special to
-strict Realism. Yet it is clear, from his frequent warnings and
-difficult distinctions regarding the double sense of the proposition,
-“God is sheer Being,” and from the ease with which we find Eckhart,
-an entirely consistent Realist, lapse into the Pantheistic sense, how
-immanent is the danger to any severe form of the system.[388] And he
-fails to give us a thoroughly understandable and consistent account
-as to the relations between the General and the Particular, between
-Form and Matter, and between these two pairs of conceptions. Thus
-“Materia signata,” matter, as bearing certain dimensions, “is the
-principle of individuation”:[389] yet this _quantum_ is already an
-individually determined quantity, and _this_ determination remains
-unexplained. And certain forms exist separately, without matter, in
-which case each single form is a separate species; as with the Angels
-and, pre-eminently, with God.--Yet, as already Duns Scotus insisted,
-Aquinas’ general principle seems to require the non-existence of pure
-forms as distinct beings, and the partial materiality of all individual
-beings.[390]
-
-(2) And Duns Scotus teaches, in explicit return to Avicebron, that
-every created substance consists of matter as well as of form, and that
-there is but one, First Matter, which is identical in every particular
-and derivative kind of matter. The world appears to him as a gigantic
-tree, whose root is this indeterminate matter; whose branches are
-the transitory substances; whose leaves the changeable accidents;
-whose flowers, the rational souls; whose fruit are the Angels: and
-which God has planted and which He tends. Here again the order of
-Efficacity,--with the tell-tale exception of God,--is identical with
-that of Generality.[391]
-
-
-5. _Eckhart’s Pantheistic trend._
-
-But it is Eckhart who consistently develops the Pantheistic trend of
-a rigorous Intellectualism. The very competent and strongly Thomistic
-Father Denifle shows how Eckhart strictly followed the general
-scholastic doctrine, as enunciated by Avicenna: “In every creature
-its Being is one thing, and is from another, its Essence is another
-thing, and is not from another”; whereas in God, Being and Essence are
-identical. And Denifle adds: “Eckhart will have been unable to answer
-for himself the question as to what, in strictness, the ‘Esse’ is, in
-distinction from the ‘Essentia’; indeed no one could have told him,
-with precision.… Eckhart leaves intact the distinction between the
-Essence of God and that of the creature; but, doubtless in part because
-of this, he feels himself free,--in starting from an ambiguous text
-of Boetius,--to break down the careful discriminations established by
-St. Thomas, in view of this same text, between Universal Being, Common
-to all things extant, and Divine Being, reserved by Aquinas for God
-alone.”[392] “What things are nearer to each other, than anything that
-_is_ and Being? There is nothing between them.” “Very Being,” the Being
-of God, “is the actualizing Form of every form, everywhere.” “In one
-word,” adds Denifle, “the Being of God constitutes the formal Being of
-all things.”[393] The degrees of Generality and Abstract Thinkableness
-are again also the degrees of Reality and Worth: “the Eternal Word
-assumed to Itself, not this or that human being, but a human nature
-which existed bare, unparticularized.” “Being and Knowableness are
-identical.”
-
-When speaking systematically Eckhart is strictly Plotinian: “God
-and Godhead are as distinct as earth is from heaven.” “The Godhead
-has left all things to God: It owns nought, wills nought, requires
-nought, effects nought, produces nought.” “Thou shalt love the Godhead
-as It truly is: a non-God, non-Spirit, non-Person … a sheer, pure,
-clear One, severed from all duality: let us sink down into that One,
-throughout eternity, from Nothing unto Nothing, so help us God.” “The
-Godhead Itself remains unknown to Itself.” “It is God who energizes and
-speaks one single thing,--His Son, the Holy Ghost, and all creatures.…
-Where God speaks it, there it is all God; here, where man understands
-it, it is God and creature.”[394] No wonder that the following are
-among the propositions condemned by Pope John XXII in 1329: “God
-produces me as His own Being, a Being identical, not merely similar”;
-and, “I speak as falsely when I call God (the Godhead) good, as if I
-call white, black.”[395]
-
-
-6. _The logical goal of strict Realism._
-
-This series of facts, which could be indefinitely extended, well
-illustrates the persistence of “the fundamental doctrine common to all
-forms of Realism,--of the species as an entity in the individuals,
-common to all and _identical_ in each, an entity to which individual
-differences adhere as accidents,” as Prof. Seth-Pattison accurately
-defines the matter. “Yet when existence is in question, it is the
-individual, not the universal, that is real; and the real individual
-is not a compound of species and accidents, but is individual to the
-inmost fibre of his being.” Not as though Nominalism were in the right.
-For “each finite individual has its” special “place in the one real
-universe, with all the parts of which it is inseparably connected. But
-the universe is itself an individual or real whole, containing all
-its parts within itself, and not a universal of the logical order,
-containing its exemplifications under it.”[396] And, above all, minds,
-spirits, persons,--however truly they may approximate more and more
-to certain great types of rationality, virtue, and religion, which
-types are thus increasingly expressive of God’s self-revealing purpose
-and nature,--are ever, not merely numerically different, as between
-one individual and the other, but, both in its potentialities and
-especially in its spiritual actualization, no one soul can or does take
-the place of any other.
-
-And if we ask what there is in any strict Realism to attract the
-Mystical sense, we shall find it, I think, in the insistence of
-such Realism upon Unity, Universality, and Stability. Yet in so
-far as Mysticism, in such a case Exclusive Mysticism, tends to oust
-the Outgoing movement of the soul, it empties these forms of their
-Multiple, Individual, and Energizing content. Inclusive Mysticism may
-be truly said alone to attain to the true Mystic’s desires; for only
-by the interaction of both movements, and of all the powers of the
-soul, will the said soul escape the ever-increasing poverty of content
-characteristic of the strict Realist’s pyramid of conceptions; a
-poverty undoubtedly antagonistic to the secret aspiration of Mysticism,
-which is essentially an apprehension, admiration, and love of the
-infinite depths and riches of Reality--of this Reality no doubt present
-everywhere, yet in indefinitely various, and mutually complementary and
-stimulative forms and degrees. And the readiness with which Mysticism
-expressed itself in the Nominalist Categories,--distinctly less
-adequate to a healthy, Partial Mysticism than the more moderate forms
-of Realism,--shows how little intrinsic was the link which seemed to
-bind it to a Realism of the most rigorous kind.
-
-
-II. RELATIONS BETWEEN GOD AND THE HUMAN SOUL.
-
-In taking next the question as to the relations between God and the
-Human Soul, we shall find our difficulties increased, because, here
-especially, the Philosophers and even the Biblical Writers have,
-with regard to religious experience, used expressions and furnished
-stimulations of a generally complex and unclarified, intermittent,
-and unharmonized kind; and especially because certain specifically
-religious experiences and requirements have operated here with a unique
-intensity, at one time in a Pantheistic, at another in a more or less
-Deistic direction. The reader will specially note the points in the
-following doctrines which helped on the conception that a certain
-centre or highest part of the soul is God, or a part of God, Himself.
-
-
-1. _Plato and Aristotle. “The Noûs.”_
-
-(1) Plato teaches the pre-existence and the post-existence
-(immortality) of the soul, as two interdependent truths. In his
-earlier stage, _e.g._ the _Phaedrus_, he so little discriminates, in
-his argument for immortality, between the individual soul and the
-World-Soul, as to argue that “the Self-Moving” Soul generally “is the
-beginning of motion, and this motion,” (specially here in connection
-with the human soul), “can neither be destroyed nor begotten, since,
-in that case, the heavens and all generation would collapse.” Yet
-individual souls are not, according to him, emanations of the
-World-Soul; but, as the particular ideas stand beside the Supreme Idea,
-so do the particular souls stand beside the Soul of the Whole, in a
-distinct peculiarity of their own.[397]--And again, since the soul
-has lapsed from a purer, its appropriate, life into the body, and has
-thus no original, intrinsic relation to this body, the activity of the
-senses, indeed in strictness even that of the emotions, cannot form
-part of its essential nature. Only the highest part of the soul, the
-Reason, _Noûs_, which, as “sun-like, God-like,” can apprehend the sun,
-God, is one and simple, as are all the ideas, immortal; whereas the
-soul’s lower part consists of two elements,--the nobler, the irascible,
-and the ignobler, the concupiscible passions. But how the unity of the
-soul’s life can co-exist with this psychical tritomy, is a question
-no doubt never formulated even to himself by Plato: we certainly have
-only three beings bound together, not one being active in different
-directions.[398]
-
-(2) Aristotle, if more sober in his general doctrine, brings some
-special obscurities and contradictions. For whilst the pre-existence
-of the soul, taken as a whole, is formally denied, and indeed its very
-origin is linked to that of the body, its rational part, the Noûs,
-comes into the physical organism from outside of the matter altogether,
-and an impersonal pre-existence is distinctly predicated of it,--in
-strict conformity with his doctrine that the Supreme Noûs does not
-directly act upon, or produce things in, the world.[399]
-
-
-2. _St. Paul. The “Spirit.”_
-
-But it is St. Paul who, in his Mystical outbursts and in the systematic
-parts of his doctrine, as against the simply hortatory level of
-his teaching, gives us the earliest, one of the deepest, and to
-this hour by far the most influential, among the at all detailed
-experiences and schemes, accepted by and operative among Christians,
-as to the relations of the human soul to God. And here again, and
-with characteristic intensity, certain overlapping double meanings
-and conceptions, and some vivid descriptions of experiences readily
-suggestive of the divinity of the soul’s highest part, repeatedly
-appear.
-
-(1) In the systematic passages we not only find the terms _Psyche_,
-“Soul,” for the vital force of the body; and _Noûs_, (“Mind,”)
-“Heart,” and “Conscience,” for various aspects and functions of
-man’s rational and volitional nature: but a special insistence upon
-_Pneuma_, “Spirit,” mostly in a quite special sense of the word.
-Thus in 1 Cor. ii, 14, 15, we get an absolute contrast between the
-psychic or sarkic, the simply natural man, and the Pneumatic, the
-Spiritual one, all capacity for understanding the Spirit of God being
-denied to the former. The Spiritual thus appears as itself already
-the Divine, and the Spirit as the exclusive, characteristic property
-of God, something which is foreign to man, apart from his Christian
-renovation and elevation to a higher form of existence. Only with the
-entrance of faith and its consequences into the mind and will of man,
-does this transcendent Spirit become an immanent principle: “through
-His Spirit dwelling in you.”[400]--Hence, in the more systematic
-Pauline Anthropology, _Pneuma_ cannot be taken as belonging to man’s
-original endowment. Certainly in 1 Cor. ii, 11, the term “the spirit
-of a man” appears simply because the whole passage is dominated by a
-comparison between the Divine and the human consciousness, which allows
-simultaneously of the use of the conversely incorrect term, “the mind
-of God,”--here, v. 16, and in Rom. xi, 34. And the term “the spirit
-of the world,” 1 Cor. ii, 12, is used in contrast with “the Spirit of
-God,” and as loosely as the term “the God of this world,” is applied,
-in 2 Cor. iv, 4, to Satan.--Only some four passages are difficult to
-interpret thus: _e.g._ “Every defilement of flesh and of spirit” (2
-Cor. vii, 1); for how can God, Spirit, be defiled? Yet we can “forget
-that our body is a temple of the Holy Spirit,” 1 Cor. vi, 19; and its
-defilement can “grieve the Holy Spirit” (Eph. iv, 30).[401]
-
-And note how parallel to his conception of this immanence of the
-transcendent Spirit is St. Paul’s conception, based upon his personal,
-mystical experience, of the indwelling of Christ in the regenerate
-human soul. Saul had indeed been won to Jesus Christ, not by the
-history of Jesus’ earthly life, but by the direct manifestation of
-the heavenly Spirit-Christ, on the way to Damascus: whence he teaches
-that only those who know Him as Spirit, can truly “be in Christ,”--an
-expression formed on the model of “to be in the Spirit,” as in Mark
-xii, 36, and Apoc. 1, 10.
-
-(2) And then these terms take on, in specifically Pauline Mystical
-passages, a suggestion of a local extension and environment, and
-express, like the corresponding formulae “in God,” “in the Spirit,” the
-conception of an abiding within as it were an element,--that of the
-exalted Christ and His Divine glory. Or Christ is within us, as the
-Spirit also is said to be, so that the regenerate personality, by its
-closeness of intercourse with the personality of Christ, can become
-one single Spirit with Him, 1 Cor. vi, 17. “As the air is the element
-in which man moves, and yet again the element of life which is present
-within the man: so the Pneuma-Christ is for St. Paul both the Ocean
-of the Divine Being, into which the Christian, since his reception
-of the Spirit, is plunged,” and in which he disports himself, “and a
-stream which, derived from that Ocean, is specially introduced within
-his individual life.”[402] Catherine’s profound indebtedness to this
-Mystical Pauline doctrine has already been studied; here we are but
-considering this doctrine in so far as suggestive, to the Mystics,
-of the identity between the true self and God,--an identity readily
-reached, if we press such passages as “Christ, our life”; “to live is
-Christ”; “I live, not I, but Christ liveth in me.”[403]
-
-
-3. _Plotinus._
-
-Some two centuries later, Plotinus brings his profound influence to
-bear in the direction of such identification. For as the First, the
-One, which, as we saw, possesses, for him, no Self-consciousness,
-Life, or Being, produces the Second, the Noûs, which, possessed of
-all these attributes, exercises them directly in self-contemplation
-alone; and yet this Second is so closely like that First as to be
-“light from light”: so does the Second produce the Third, the Human
-Psyche, which, though “a thing by itself,” is a “godlike (divine)
-thing,” since it possesses “a more divine part, the part which is
-neighbour to what is above, the Noûs, with which and from which Noûs
-the Psyche exists.”--The Psyche is “an image of the Noûs”: “as outward
-speech expresses inward thought, so is the Psyche a concept of the
-Noûs,--a certain energy of the Noûs, as the Noûs itself is an energy
-of the First Cause.” “As with fire, where we distinguish the heat that
-abides within the fire and the heat that is emitted by it … so must we
-conceive the Psyche not as wholly flowing forth from, but as in part
-abiding in, in part proceeding from the Noûs.”[404]
-
-And towards the end of the great Ninth Book of the Sixth Ennead, he
-tells how in Ecstasy “the soul sees the Source of Life … the Ground of
-Goodness, the Root of the Soul.… For we are not cut off from or outside
-of It … but we breathe and consist in It: since It does not give and
-then retire, but ever lifts and bears us, so long as It is what It is.”
-“We must stand alone in It and must become It alone, after stripping
-off all the rest that hangs about us.… There we can behold both Him and
-our own selves,--ourselves, full of intellectual light, or rather as
-Pure Light Itself, having become God, or rather as being simply He …
-abiding altogether unmoved, having become as it were Stability Itself.”
-“When man has moved out of himself away to God, like the image to its
-Prototype, he has reached his journey’s end.” “And this is the life of
-the Gods and of divine and blessed men … a flight of the alone to the
-Alone.”[405]
-
-
-4. _Eckhart’s position. Ruysbroek._
-
-(1) Eckhart gives us both Plotinian positions--the God-likeness and
-the downright Divinity of the soul. “The Spark (_das Fünkelein_)
-of the Soul … is a light impressed upon its uppermost part, and an
-image of the Divine Nature, which is ever at war with all that is not
-divine. It is not one of the several powers of the soul.… Its name
-is Synteresis,”--_i.e._ conscience. “The nine powers of the soul are
-all servants of that man of the soul, and help him on to the soul’s
-Source.”[406]--But in one of the condemned propositions he says: “There
-is something in the soul which is Increate and Uncreatable; if the
-whole soul were such, it would be (entirely) Increate and Uncreatable.
-And this is the Intellect,”--standing here exactly for Plotinus’s
-Noûs.[407]
-
-(2) Ruysbroek (who died in 1381) combines a considerable fundamental
-sobriety with much of St. Paul’s daring and many echoes of Plotinus.
-“The unity of our spirit with God is of two kinds,--essential and
-actual. According to its essence, our spirit receives, in its
-innermost highest part, the visit of Christ, without means and without
-intermission; for the life which we are in God, in our Eternal Image,
-and that which we have and are in ourselves, according to the essence
-of our being … are without distinction.--But this essential unity of
-our spirit with God has no consistency in itself, but abides in God and
-flows out from and depends on Him.” The actual unity of our spirit with
-God, caused by Grace, confers upon us not His Image, but His Likeness,
-“and though we cannot lose the Image of God, nor our natural unity with
-Him,--if we lose His Likeness, His Grace, Christ, who, in this case,
-comes to us with mediations and intermissions, we shall be damned.”[408]
-
-
-5. _St. Teresa’s mediating view._
-
-St. Teresa’s teachings contain interesting faint echoes of the old
-perplexities and daring doctrines concerning the nature of the Spirit;
-but articulate a strikingly persistent conviction that the soul holds
-God Himself as distinct from His graces, possessing thus some direct
-experience of this His presence. “I cannot understand what the mind
-is, nor how it differs from the soul or the spirit either: all three
-seem to me to be but one, though the soul sometimes leaps forth out
-of itself, like a fire which has become a flame: the flame ascends
-high above the fire, but it is still the same flame of the same fire.”
-“Something subtle and swift seems to issue from the soul, to ascend
-to its highest part and to go whither Our Lord will … it seems a
-flight. This little bird of the spirit seems to have escaped out of
-the prison of the body.” Indeed “the soul is then not in itself … it
-seems to me to have its dwelling higher than even the highest part of
-itself.”[409]--“In the beginning I did not know that God is present in
-all things.… Unlearned men used to tell me that He was present only by
-His grace. I could not believe that.… A most learned Dominican told me
-He was present Himself … this was a great comfort to me.” “To look upon
-Our Lord as being in the innermost parts of the soul … is a much more
-profitable method, than that of looking upon Him as external to us.”
-“The living God was in my soul.” And even, “hitherto” up to 1555, “my
-life was my own; my life, since then, is the life which God lived in
-me.”[410]
-
-
-6. _Immanence, not Pantheism._
-
-St. Teresa’s teaching as to God’s own presence in the soul points
-plainly, I think, to the truth insisted on by the Catholic theologian
-Schwab, in his admirable monograph on Gerson. “Neither speculation nor
-feeling are satisfied with a Pure Transcendence of God; and hence the
-whole effort of true Mysticism is directed, whilst not abolishing His
-Transcendence, to embrace and experience God, His living presence,
-in the innermost soul,--that is, to insist, in some way or other,
-upon the Immanence of God. Reject all such endeavours as Pantheistic,
-insist sharply upon the specific eternal difference between God and
-the Creature: and the Speculative, Mystical depths fade away, with
-all their fascination.”[411] Not in finding Pantheism already here,
-with the imminent risk of falling into a cold Deism, but in a rigorous
-insistence, with all the great Inclusive Mystics, upon the spiritual
-and moral effects, as the tests of the reality and worth of such
-experiences, and, with the Ascetical and Historical souls, upon also
-the other movement--an outgoing in some kind of contact with, and
-labour at, the contingencies and particularities of life and mind--will
-the true safeguard for this element of the soul’s life be found.[412]
-
-
-III. MYSTICISM AND PANTHEISM: THEIR DIFFERENCES AND POINTS OF LIKENESS.
-
-But does not Mysticism, not only find God in the soul, but the soul
-to be God? Is it not, as such, already Pantheism? Or, if not, what is
-their difference?
-
-
-1. _Plotinus and Spinoza compared._
-
-Now Dr. Edward Caird, in his fine book, _The Evolution of Theology in
-the Greek Philosophers_, 1904, tells us that “Mysticism is religion in
-its most concentrated and exclusive form; it is that attitude of mind
-in which all other relations are swallowed up in the relation of the
-soul to God”; and that “Plotinus is the Mystic _par excellence_.”[413]
-And he then proceeds to contrast Plotinus, the typical Mystic, with
-Spinoza, the true Pantheist.
-
-“Whether” or not “Spinoza, in his negation of the limits of the finite,
-still leaves it open to himself to admit a reality in finite things
-which is _not_ negated,” and “to conceive of the absolute substance
-as manifesting itself in attributes and modes”: “it is very clear
-that he does so conceive it, and that, for all those finite things
-which he treats as negative and illusory in themselves, he finds in
-God a ground of reality … which can be as little destroyed as the
-divine substance itself.” “God, _Deus sive Natura_, is conceived as
-the immanent principle of the universe, or perhaps rather the universe
-is conceived as immanent in God.”--Thus to him “the movement by which
-he dissolves the finite in the infinite, and the movement by which he
-finds the finite again in the infinite, are equally essential. If for
-him the world is nothing apart from God, God is nothing apart from His
-realization in the world.” This is true Pantheism.[414]
-
-But in Plotinus the _via negativa_ involves a negation of the finite
-and determinate in all its forms; hence here it is impossible to find
-the finite again in the infinite. The Absolute One is here not immanent
-but transcendent.[415] “While the lower always has need of the higher,
-the higher is regarded as having no need” for any purpose “of the
-lower”; and “the Highest has no need of anything but Itself.” “Such
-a process cannot be reversed”: “in ascending, Plotinus has drawn the
-ladder after him, and left himself no possibility of descending again.
-The movement, in which he is guided by definite and explicit thought,
-is always upwards; while, in describing the movement downwards, he
-has to take refuge in metaphors and analogies,” for the purpose of
-indicating a purely self-occupied activity which only accidentally
-produces an external effect, _e.g._, “the One as it were overflows, and
-produces another than itself.”[416] “Thus we have the strange paradox
-that the Being who is absolute, is yet conceived as in a sense external
-to the relative and finite, and that He leaves the relative and finite
-in a kind of unreal independence.” “On the one side, we have a life
-which is nothing apart from God, and which, nevertheless, can never be
-united to him, except as it loses itself altogether; and, on the other
-side, an Absolute, which yet is not immanent in the life it originates,
-but abides in transcendent isolation from it.… It is this contradiction
-which … makes the writings of Plotinus the supreme expression of
-Mysticism.”[417]
-
-Now I think, with this admirable critic, that we cannot but take
-Spinoza as the classical representative of that parallelistic
-Pantheism to which most of our contemporary systems of psycho-physical
-parallelism belong. As Prof. Troeltsch well puts it, “we have here a
-complete parallelism between every single event in the physical world,
-which event is already entirely explicable from its own antecedents
-within that physical world, and every event of a psychical kind,
-which, nevertheless, is itself also entirely explicable from its own
-psychical antecedents alone.” And “this parallelism again is but two
-sides of the one World-Substance, Which is neither Nature nor Spirit,
-and Whose law is neither natural nor spiritual law, but Which is Being
-in general and Law in general.” In this one World-Substance, with its
-parallel self-manifestations as extension and as thought, Spinoza
-finds the ultimate truth of Religion, as against the Indeterminist,
-Anthropomorphic elements of all the popular religions,--errors which
-have sprung, the Anthropomorphic from man’s natural inclination to
-interpret Ultimate Reality, with its complete neutrality towards
-the distinctions of Psychical and Physical, by the Psychic side, as
-the one nearest to our own selves; and the Indeterminist from the
-attribution of that indetermination to the World-Substance which, even
-in Psychology, is already a simple illusion and analytical blunder.
-
-“It is in the combination,” concludes Professor Troeltsch, “of such a
-recognition of the strict determination of all natural causation, and
-of such a rejection of materialism (with its denial of the independence
-of the psychic world), that rests the immense power of Pantheism at
-the present time.”[418] On the other hand, the supposed Pantheistic
-positions of the later Lessing, of Herder, Goethe and many another
-predominantly aesthetic thinker, must, although far richer and more
-nearly adequate conceptions of full reality, be assigned, _qua_
-Pantheism, a secondary place, as inconsistent, because already largely
-Teleological, indeed Theistic Philosophies.
-
-
-2. _Complete Pantheism non-religious; why approached by Mysticism._
-
-Now the former, the full Pantheism, must, I think, be declared, with
-Rauwenhoff, to be only in name a religious position at all. “In its
-essence it is simply a complete Monism, a recognition of the _Pan_ in
-its unity and indivisibility, and hence a simple view of the world, not
-a religious conception.”[419]--Yet deeply religious souls can be more
-or less, indeed profoundly, influenced by such a Monism, so that we can
-get Mystics with an outlook considerably more Spinozist than Plotinian.
-There can, _e.g._, be no doubt as to both the deeply religious temper
-and the strongly Pantheistic conceptions of Eckhart in the Middle Ages,
-and of Schleiermacher in modern times; and indeed Spinoza himself is,
-apart from all questions as to the logical implications and results
-of his intellectual system, and as to the justice of his attacks upon
-the historical religions, a soul of massive religious intuition and
-aspiration.
-
-But further: Mystically tempered souls,--and the typical and
-complete religious soul will ever possess a mystical element in its
-composition,--have three special _attraits_ which necessarily bring
-them into an at least apparent proximity to Pantheism.
-
-(1) For one thing Mysticism, like Pantheism, has a great, indeed (if
-left unchecked by the out-going-movement) an excessive, thirst for
-Unity, for a Unity less and less possessed of Multiplicity; and the
-transition from holding the Pure Transcendence of this Unity to a
-conviction of its Exclusive Immanence becomes easy and insignificant,
-in proportion to the emptiness of content increasingly characterizing
-this Oneness.
-
-(2) Then again, like Pantheists, Mystics dwell much upon the strict
-call to abandon all self-centredness, upon the death to self, the loss
-of self; and in proportion as they dwell upon this self to be thus
-rejected, and as they enlarge the range of this petty self, do they
-approach each other more and more.
-
-(3) And lastly, there is a peculiarity about the Mystical habit of
-mind, which inevitably approximates it to the Pantheistic mode of
-thought, and which, if not continuously taken by the Mystic soul
-itself as an inevitable, but most demonstrable, inadequacy, will
-react upon the substance of this soul’s thought in a truly Pantheistic
-sense. This peculiarity results from the Mystic’s ever-present double
-tendency of absorbing himself, away from the Successive and Temporal,
-in the Simultaneity and Eternity of God, conceiving thus all reality
-as partaking, in proportion to its depth and greater likeness to
-Him, in this _Totum Simul_ character of its ultimate Author and
-End; and of clinging to such vivid picturings of this reality as
-are within his, this Mystic’s reach. Now such a Simultaneity can be
-pictorially represented to the mind only by the Spacial imagery of
-co-existent Extensions,--say of air, water, light, or fire: and these
-representations, if dwelt on as at all adequate, will necessarily
-suggest a Determinism of a Mathematico-Physical, Extensional type,
-_i.e._ one, and the dominant, side of Spinozistic Pantheism.--It is
-here, I think, that we get the double cause for the Pantheistic-seeming
-trend of almost all the Mystical imagery. For even the marked
-Emanationism of much in Plotinus, and of still more in Proclus,--the
-latter still showing through many a phrase in Dionysius,--appears in
-their images as operating upon a fixed Extensional foundation: and
-indeed these very overflowings, owing to the self-centredness and
-emptiness of content of their Source, the One, and to their accidental
-yet automatic character, help still further to give to the whole
-outlook a strikingly materialistic, mechanical, in so far Pantheistic,
-character.
-
-
-3. _Points on which Mysticism has usefully approximated to Pantheism._
-
-And yet we must not overlook the profound, irreplaceable services that
-are rendered by Mysticism,--provided always it remains but one of two
-great movements of the living soul,--even on the points in which it
-thus approximates to Pantheism. These services, I think, are three.
-
-(1) The first of these services has been interestingly illustrated by
-Prof. A. S. Pringle Pattison, from the case of Dr. James Martineau’s
-writings, and the largely unmediated co-existence there of two
-different modes of conceiving God. “The first mode represents God
-simply as another, higher Person; the second represents Him as
-the soul of souls. The former, Deistic and Hebraic, rests upon an
-inferential knowledge of God, derived either from the experience of
-His resistance to our will through the forces of Nature, or from that
-of His restraint upon us in the voice of Conscience,--God, in both
-cases, being regarded as completely separated from the human soul, and
-His existence and character apprehended and demonstrated by a process
-of reasoning.--The second mode is distinctly and intensely Christian,
-and consists in the apprehension of God as the Infinite including
-all finite existences, as the immanent Absolute who progressively
-manifests His character in the Ideals of Truth, Beauty, Righteousness,
-and Love.” And Professor Pattison points out, with Professor Upton,
-that it was Dr. Martineau’s almost morbid dread of Pantheism which was
-responsible for the inadequate expression given to this Mystical, or
-“Speculative” element in his religious philosophy. For only if we do
-not resist such Mysticism, do we gain and retain a vivid experience of
-how “Consciousness of imperfection and the pursuit of perfection are
-alike possible to man only through the universal life of thought and
-goodness in which he shares, and which, at once an indwelling presence
-and an unattainable ideal, draws him on and always on.” “Personality
-is” thus “not ‘unitary’ in Martineau’s sense, as occupying one side
-of a relation, and unable to be also on the other. The very capacity
-of knowledge and morality implies that the person … is capable of
-regarding himself and all other beings from what Martineau well names
-‘the station of the Father of Spirits.’”[420]
-
-I would, however, guard here against any exclusion of a seeking
-or finding of God in Nature and in Conscience: only the contrary
-exclusion of the finding of God within the soul, and the insistence
-upon a complete separation of Him from that soul, are inacceptable in
-the “Hebraic” mood. For a coming and a going, a movement inwards and
-outwards, checks and counter-checks, friction, contrast, battle and
-storm, are necessary conditions and ingredients of the soul’s growth in
-its sense of appurtenance to Spirit and to Peace.
-
-(2) A further service rendered by this Pantheistic-seeming
-Mysticism,--though always only so long as it remains not the only or
-last word of Religion,--is that it alone discovers the truly spiritual
-function and fruitfulness of Deterministic Science. For only if Man
-deeply requires a profound desubjectivizing, a great shifting of the
-centre of his interest, away from the petty, claimful, animal self,
-with its “I against all the world,” to a great kingdom of souls, in
-which Man gains his larger, spiritual, unique personality, with its
-“I as part of, and for all the world,” by accepting to be but one
-amongst thousands of similar constituents in a system expressive of the
-thoughts of God; and only if Mathematico-Physical Science is specially
-fitted to provide such a bath, and hence is so taken, with all its
-apparently ruinous Determinism and seeming Godlessness: is such Science
-really safe from apologetic emasculation; or from running, a mere
-unrelated dilettantism, alongside of the deepest interests of the soul;
-or from, in its turn, crushing or at least hampering the deepest, the
-spiritual life of man. Hence all the greater Partial Mystics have got
-a something about them which indicates that they have indeed passed
-through fire and water, that their poor selfishness has been purified
-in a bath of painfully-bracing spiritual air and light, through which
-they have emerged into a larger, fuller life. And Nicolas of Coes,
-Pascal, Malebranche are but three men out of many whose Mysticism and
-whose Mathematico-Physical Science thus interstimulated each other and
-jointly deepened their souls.
-
-We shall find, further on, that this purificatory power of such Science
-has been distinctly heightened for us now. Yet, both then and now,
-there could and can be such purification only for those who realize
-and practise religion as sufficiently ultimate and wide and deep to
-englobe, (as one of religion’s necessary stimulants), an unweakened,
-utterly alien-seeming Determinism in the middle regions of the
-soul’s experience and outlook. Such an englobement can most justly
-be declared to be Christianity driven fully home. For thus is Man
-purified and saved,--if he already possesses the dominant religious
-motive and conviction,--by a close contact with Matter; and the Cross
-is plunged into the very centre of his soul’s life, operating there a
-sure division between the perishing animal Individual and the abiding
-spiritual Personality: the deathless Incarnational and Redemptive
-religion becomes thus truly operative there.
-
-(3) And the last service, rendered by such Mysticism, is to keep
-alive in the soul the profoundly important consciousness of the
-prerequisites, elements and affinities of a Universally Human kind,
-which are necessary to, and present in, all Religion, however
-definitely Concrete, Historical and Institutional it may have become.
-Such special, characteristic Revelations, Doctrines and Institutions,
-as we find them in all the great Historical Religions, and in their
-full normative substance and form in Christianity and Catholicism, can
-indeed alone completely develop, preserve and spread Religion in its
-depth and truth; yet they ever presuppose a general, usually dim but
-most real, religious sense and experience, indeed a real presence and
-operation of the Infinite and of God in all men.
-
-It is, then, not an indifferentist blindness to the profound
-differences, in their degree of truth, between the religions of
-the world, nor an insufficient realization of man’s strict need of
-historical and institutional lights and aids for the development and
-direction of that general religious sense and experience, which make
-the mind revolt from sayings such as those we have already quoted from
-the strongly Protestant Prof. Wilhelm Hermann, and to which we can
-add the following. “Everywhere, outside of Christianity, Mysticism
-will arise, as the very flower of the religious development. But
-the Christian must declare such Mystical experience of God to be a
-delusion.” For “what is truly Christian is _ipso facto_ not Mystical.”
-“We are Christians because, in the Humanity of Jesus, we have struck
-upon a fact which is of incomparably richer content, than are the
-feelings that arise within our own selves.” Indeed, “I should have
-failed to recognize the hand of God even in what my own dead father
-did for me, had not, by means of my Christian education, God appeared
-to me, in the Historic Christ.”[421]--As if it were possible to
-consider Plato and Plotinus, in those religious intuitions and feelings
-of theirs which helped to win an Augustine from crass Manichaeism
-to a deep Spiritualism, and which continue to breathe and burn as
-part-elements in countless sayings of Christian philosophers and
-saints, to have been simply deluded, or mere idle subjectivists! As if
-we could apprehend even Christ, without some most real, however dim and
-general, sense of religion and presence of God within us to which He
-could appeal! And as if Jeremiah, Ezekiel and the Maccabaean Martyrs,
-and many a devoted soul within Mohammedanism or in Brahmanic India,
-could not and did not apprehend something of God’s providence in their
-earthly father’s love towards them!
-
-No wonder that, after all this, Hermann can,--as against Richard Rothe
-who, in spite of more than one fantastic if not fanatical aberration,
-had, on some of the deepest religious matters, a rarely penetrating
-perception,--write in a thoroughly patronizing manner concerning
-Catholic Mysticism. For this Mysticism necessarily appears to him not
-as, at its best, the most massive and profound development of one type
-of the ultimate religion,--a type in which one necessary element of all
-balanced religious life is at the fullest expansion compatible with a
-still sufficient amount and healthiness of the other necessary elements
-of such a life,--but only as “a form of religion which has brought out
-and rendered visible such a content of interior life as is capable of
-being produced within the limits of Catholic piety.”[422] The true,
-pure Protestant possesses, according to Hermann, apparently much less,
-in reality much more,--the Categorical Imperative of Conscience and the
-Jesus of History, as the double one-and-all of his, the only spiritual
-religion.--Yet if Christianity is indeed the religion of the Divine
-Founder, Who declared that he that is not against Him is for Him; or
-of Paul, who could appeal to the heathen Athenians and to all men for
-the truth and experience that in God “we live and move and have our
-being”; or of the great Fourth Gospel, which tells us that Christ,
-the True Light, enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world, a
-light which to this hour cannot, for the great majority, be through
-historic knowledge of the Historic Christ at all; or of Clement of
-Alexandria and of Justin Martyr, who loved to find deep apprehensions
-and operations of God scattered about among the Heathen; or of Aquinas,
-who, in the wake of the Areopagite and others, so warmly dwells upon
-how Grace does not destroy, but presupposes and perfects Nature: then
-such an exclusive amalgam of Moralism and History, though doubtless a
-most honest and intelligible reaction against opposite excesses, is
-a sad impoverishment of Christianity, in its essential, world-wide,
-Catholic character.
-
-Indeed, to be fair, there have never been wanting richer and more
-balanced Protestant thinkers strongly to emphasize this profound
-many-sidedness and universality of Christianity: so, at present,
-in Germany, Profs. Eucken, Troeltsch, Class, Siebeck and others;
-and, in England, Prof. A. S. P. Pattison and Mr. J. R. Illingworth.
-In all these cases there is ever a strong sympathy with Mysticism
-properly understood, as the surest safeguard against such distressing
-contractions as is this of Hermann, and that of Albrecht Ritschl before
-him.
-
-
-4._ Christianity excludes complete and final Pantheism._
-
-And yet, as we have repeatedly found, Christianity has, in its
-fundamental Revelation and Experience, ever implied and affirmed such a
-conception of Unity, of Self-Surrender, and of the Divine Action, as to
-render any Pantheistic interpretation of these things ever incomplete
-and transitional.
-
-(1) The Unity here is nowhere, even ultimately, the sheer Oneness
-of a simply identical Substance, but a Unity deriving its very
-close-knitness from its perfect organization of not simply identical
-elements or relations.
-
-The Self-Surrender here is not a simply final resolution, of
-laboriously constituted centres of human spiritual consciousness and
-personality, back into a morally indifferent All, but a means and
-passage, for the soul, from a spiritually worthless self-entrenchment
-within a merely psycho-physical apartness and lust to live, on to a
-spiritual devotedness, an incorporation, as one necessary subject, into
-the Kingdom of souls,--the abiding, living expression of the abiding,
-living God.
-
-And, above all, God’s Action is not a mechanico-physical, determinist,
-simultaneous Extension, nor even an automatic, accidental, unconscious
-Emanation, but, as already Plato divined,--an intuition lost again by
-Aristotle, and, in his logic, denied by Plotinus,--a voluntary outgoing
-and self-communication of the supreme self-conscious Spirit, God. For
-Plato tells us that “the reason why Nature and this Universe of things
-was framed by Him Who framed it, is that God is good … and desired
-that all things should be as like Himself as it was possible for them
-to be.”[423] Yet this pregnant apprehension never attains here to its
-full significance, because the Divine Intelligence is conceived only as
-manifesting itself in relation to something given from without,--the
-pre-existing, chaotic Matter. And for Aristotle God does not love this
-Givenness; for “the first Mover moves” (all things) only “as desired”
-by them: He Himself desires, loves, wills nothing whatsoever, and
-thinks and knows nothing but His own self alone.[424] And in Plotinus
-this same transcendence is still further emphasized, for the Absolute
-One here transcends even all thought and self-consciousness.
-
-(2) It is in Christianity, after noble preludings in Judaism, that we
-get the full deliberate proclamation, in the great Life and Teaching,
-of the profound fact,--the Self-Manifestation of the Loving God, the
-Spirit-God moving out to the spirit-man, and spirit-man only thus
-capable of a return movement to the Spirit-God. As Schelling said, “God
-can only give Himself to His creatures as He gives a self to them,”
-and, with it, the capacity of participating in His life. We thus get
-a relation begun and rendered possible by God’s utterly prevenient,
-pure, _ecstatic_ love of Man, a relation which, in its essence
-spiritual, personal and libertarian, leaves behind it, as but vain
-travesties of such ultimate Realities, all Emanational or Parallelistic
-Pantheism, useful though these latter systems are as symbols of the
-Mathematico-Physical level and kind of reality and apprehension.
-Yet this spiritual relation is here, unlike Plotinus’s more or less
-Emanational conception of it, not indeed simply invertible, as Spinoza
-would have it, (for Man is ontologically dependent upon God, whereas
-God is not thus dependent upon Man), but nevertheless largely one of
-true mutuality. And this mutuality of the relation is not simply a
-positive enactment of God, but is expressive, in its degree and mode,
-of God’s intrinsic moral nature. For God is here the Source as well
-as the Object of all love; hence He Himself possesses the supreme
-equivalent for this our noblest emotion, and is moved to free acts of
-outgoing, in the creation and preservation, the revelation to, and
-the redemption of finite spirits, as so many successive, mutually
-supplementary, and increasingly fuller expressions and objects of this
-His nature. “God is Love”; “God so loved the world, as to give His
-only-begotten Son”; “Let us love God, for God hath first loved us”; “if
-any man will do the will of God, he shall know of the doctrine if it be
-from God”: God’s Infinity is here, not the negation of the relatively
-independent life of His creatures, but the very reason and source of
-their freedom.[425]
-
-In the concluding chapter I hope to give a sketch of the actual
-operation of the true correctives to any excessive, Plotinian or
-Spinozistic, tendencies in the Mystical trend, especially when
-utilizing Mathematico-Physical Science at the soul’s middle level; and
-of History at the ultimate reaches of the soul’s life.
-
-
-IV. THE DIVINE IMMANENCE; SPIRITUAL PERSONALITY.
-
-
-1. _Panentheism._
-
-As to our fourth question, the Divine Immanence and Personality,
-our last quotations from St. Teresa give us, I think, our true
-starting-point. For it is evident that, between affirming the simple
-Divinity of the innermost centre of the soul, and declaring that the
-soul ever experiences only the Grace of God, _i.e._ certain created
-effects, sent by Him from the far-away seat of His own full presence,
-there is room for a middle position which, whilst ever holding the
-definite creatureliness of the soul, in all its reaches, puts God
-Himself into the soul and the soul into God, in degrees and with
-results which vary indeed indefinitely according to its good-will
-and its call, yet which all involve and constitute a presence ever
-profoundly real, ever operative before and beyond all the soul’s own
-operations. These latter operations are, indeed, even possible only
-through all this Divine anticipation, origination, preservation,
-stimulation, and, at bottom,--in so far as man is enabled and required
-by God to reach a certain real self-constitution,--through a mysterious
-Self-Limitation of God’s own Action,--a Divine Self-Restraint.
-
-There can be little doubt that such a _Panentheism_ is all that
-many a daring, in strictness Pantheistic, saying of the Christian,
-perhaps also of the Jewish and Mohammedan, Mystics aimed at. Only the
-soul’s ineradicable capacity, need and desire for its Divine Lodger
-and Sustainer would constitute, in this conception, the intrinsic
-characteristic of human nature; and it is rather the too close
-identification, in feeling and emotional expression, of the desire
-and the Desired, of the hunger and the Food, and the too exclusive
-realization of the deep truth that this desire and hunger do not cause,
-but are themselves preceded and caused by, their Object,--it is the
-over-vivid perception of this real dynamism, rather than any _a priori_
-theory of static substances and identities--which, certainly in many
-cases, has produced the appearance of Pantheism.
-
-And again it is certain that we have to beware of taking the apparent
-irruption or ingrafting,--in the case of the operations of Grace,--of
-an entirely heterogeneous Force and Reality into what seems the already
-completely closed circle of our natural functions and aspirations,
-as the complete and ultimate truth of the situation. However utterly
-different that Force may feel to all else that we are aware of within
-ourselves, however entirely unmeditated may seem its manifestations:
-it is clear that we should be unable to recognize even this Its
-difference, to welcome or resist It, above all to find It a response to
-our deepest cravings, unless we had some natural true affinity to It,
-and some dim but most real experience of It from the first. Only with
-such a general religiosity and vague sense, from a certain contact,
-of the Infinite, is the recognition of definite, historical Religious
-Facts and Figures as true, significant, binding upon my will and
-conscience, explicable at all.
-
-
-2. _Aquinas on our direct semi-consciousness of God’s indwelling._
-
-St. Thomas, along one line of doctrine, has some excellent teachings
-about all this group of questions. For though he tells us that “the
-names which we give to God and creatures, are predicated of God”
-only “according to a certain relation of the creature to God, as its
-Principle and Cause, in which latter the perfections of all things
-pre-exist in an excellent manner”: yet he explicitly admits, in one
-place, that we necessarily have some real, immediate experience of the
-Nature of God, for that “it is impossible, with regard to anything,
-to know whether it exists,”--and he has admitted that natural reason
-can attain to a knowledge of God’s bare existence,--“unless we somehow
-know what is its nature,” at least “with a confused knowledge”; whence
-“also with regard to God, we could not know whether He exists, unless
-we somehow knew, even though confusedly, what He is.”[426]--God, though
-transcendent, is also truly immanent in the human soul: “God is in all
-things, as the agent is present in that wherein it acts. Created Being
-is as true an effect of God’s Being, as to burn is the true effect of
-fire. God is above all things,--by the excellence of His nature, and
-yet He is intimately present within all things, as the cause of the
-Being of all.”--And man has a natural exigency of the face-to-face
-Vision of God, hence of the Order of Grace, however entirely its
-attainment may be beyond his natural powers: “There is in man a natural
-longing to know the cause, when he sees an effect: whence if the
-intellect of the rational creature could not attain to the First Cause
-of things,”--here in the highest form, that of the Beatific vision of
-God--“the longing of its nature would remain void and vain.”[427]
-
-But it is the great Mystical Saints and writers who continuously have,
-in the very forefront of their consciousness and assumptions, not a
-simply moral and aspirational, but an Ontological and Pre-established
-relation between the soul and God; and not a simply discursive
-apprehension, but a direct though dim Experience of the Infinite
-and of God. And these positions really underlie even their most
-complete-seeming negations, as we have already seen in the case of the
-Areopagite.
-
-
-3. _Gradual recognition of the function of subconsciousness._
-
-Indeed, we can safely affirm that the last four centuries, and even
-the last four decades, have more and more confirmed the reality and
-indirect demonstrableness of such a presence and sense of the Infinite;
-ever more or less obscurely, but none the less profoundly, operative
-in the innermost normal consciousness of mankind: a presence and sense
-which, though they can be starved and verbally denied, cannot be
-completely suppressed; and which, though they do not, if unendorsed,
-constitute even the most elementary faith, far less a developed
-Historical or Mystical Religion, are simply necessary prerequisites to
-all these latter stimulations and consolidations.
-
-(1) As we have already found, it is only since Leibniz that we
-know, systematically, how great is the range of every man’s Obscure
-Presentations, his dim Experience as against his Clear or distinct
-Presentations, his explicit Knowledge; and how the Clear depends even
-more upon the Dim, than the Dim upon the Clear. And further discoveries
-and proofs in this direction are no older than 1888.[428]
-
-(2) Again, it is the growing experience of the difficulties and
-complexities of Psychology, History, Epistemology, and of the apparent
-unescapableness and yet pain of man’s mere anthropomorphisms, that
-makes the persistence of his search for, and sense of, Objective Truth
-and Reality, and the keenness of his suffering when he appears to
-himself as imprisoned in mere subjectivity, deeply impressive. For the
-more man feels, and suffers from feeling himself purely subjective,
-the more is it clear that he is not merely subjective: he could never
-be conscious of the fact, if he were. “Suppose that all your objects
-in life were realized … would this be a great joy and happiness
-to you?” John Stuart Mill asked himself; and “an irrepressible
-self-consciousness distinctly answered ‘No.’”[429] Whether in bad
-health just then or not, Mill was here touching the very depths of
-the characteristically human sense. In all such cases only a certain
-profound apprehension of Abiding Reality, the Infinite, adequately
-explains the keen, operative sense of contrast and disappointment.
-
-(3) And further, we have before us, with a fulness and delicate
-discrimination undreamed of in other ages, the immense variety,
-within a certain general psychological unity, of the great and small
-Historical Religions, past and present, of the world. Facing all this
-mass of evidence, Prof. Troeltsch can ask, more confidently than
-ever: “Are not our religious requirements, requirements of Something
-that one must have somehow first experienced in order to require It?
-Are they not founded upon some kind of Experience as to the Object,
-Which Itself first awakens the thought of an ultimate infinite meaning
-attaching to existence, and Which, in the conflict with selfishness,
-sensuality and self-will, draws the nobler part of the human will,
-with ever new force, to Itself?” “All deep and energetic religion is
-in a certain state of tension towards Culture, for the simple reason
-that it is seeking something else and something higher.”[430] And
-Prof. C. P. Tiele, so massively learned in all the great religions,
-concludes: “‘Religion,’ says Feuerbach, ‘proceeds from man’s wishes’ …;
-according to others, it is the outcome of man’s dissatisfaction with
-the external world.… But why should man torment himself with wishes
-which he never sees fulfilled around him, and which the rationalistic
-philosopher declares to be illusions? Why? surely, because he cannot
-help it.… The Infinite, very Being as opposed to continual becoming
-and perishing,--or call It what you will,--_that_ is the Principle
-which gives him constant unrest, because It dwells within him.” And
-against Prof. Max Müller,--who had, however, on this point, arrived at
-a position very like Tiele’s own,--he impressively insists that “the
-origin of religion consists,” not in a “perception of the Infinite,”
-but “in the fact that Man _has_ the Infinite within him.”--I would
-only contend further that the instinct of the Infinite awakens
-simultaneously with our sense-perceptions and categories of thinking,
-and passes, together with them and with the deeper, more volitional
-experiences, through every degree and stage of obscurity and relative
-clearness. “Whatever name we give it,--instinct; innate, original,
-or unconscious form of thought; or form of conception,--it is the
-specifically human element in man.”[431] But if all this be true, then
-the Mystics are amongst the great benefactors of our race: for it is
-especially this presence of the Infinite in Man, and man’s universal
-subjection to an operative consciousness of it, which are the deepest
-cause and the constant object of the adoring awe of all truly spiritual
-Mystics, in all times and places.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XV
-
-SUMMING UP OF THE WHOLE BOOK. BACK THROUGH ASCETICISM, SOCIAL RELIGION,
-AND THE SCIENTIFIC HABIT OF MIND, TO THE MYSTICAL ELEMENT OF RELIGION.
-
-
-I now propose to conclude, by getting, through three successively
-easier matters, back to the starting-point of this whole book,
-and, in doing so, to sum up and delimitate, more and more clearly,
-the practical lessons learnt during its long course. These three
-last matters and points of observation shall be Asceticism,
-Institutionalism, and Mental Activity and Discipline, or the Scientific
-Habit--all three in their relation to the Mystical Element of Religion.
-
-
-I. ASCETICISM AND MYSTICISM.
-
-Now in the matter of Asceticism, we can again conveniently consider
-three points.
-
-
-1. _Ordinary Asceticism practised by Mystics._
-
-There is, first, the (generally severe) Asceticism which is ever
-connected with at least some one phase, an early one, of every genuine
-Mystic’s history, yet which does not differ essentially from the direct
-training in self-conquest to which practically all pre-Protestant, and
-most of the old Protestant earnest Christians considered themselves
-obliged.
-
-(1) Now it is deeply interesting to note how marked has been, off
-and on throughout the last century and now again quite recently,
-the renewal of comprehension and respect for the general principle
-of Asceticism, in quarters certainly free from all preliminary bias
-in favour of Medieval Christianity. Schopenhauer wrote in 1843:
-“Not only the religions of the East but also genuine Christianity
-shows, throughout its systems, that fundamental characteristic of
-Asceticism which my philosophy elucidates.… Precisely in its doctrines
-of renunciation, self-denial, complete chastity, in a word, of
-general mortification of the will, lie the deepest truth, the high
-value, the sublime character of Christianity. It thus belongs to the
-old, true, and lofty ideal of mankind, in opposition to the false,
-shallow, and ruinous optimism of Greek Paganism, Judaism and Islam.”
-“Protestantism, by eliminating Asceticism and its central point, the
-meritoriousness of celibacy, has, by this alone, already abandoned the
-innermost kernel of Christianity.… For Christianity is the doctrine
-of the deep guilt of the human race … and of the heart’s thirst after
-redemption from it, a redemption which can be acquired only through the
-abnegation of self,--that is, through a complete conversion of human
-nature.”[432]--And the optimistically tempered American Unitarian,
-the deeply versed Psychologist, Prof. William James, tells us in
-1902: “In its spiritual meaning, Asceticism stands for nothing less
-than for the essence of the twice-born philosophy.” “The Metaphysical
-mystery, that he who feeds on death, that feeds on men, possesses life
-supereminently, and meets best the secret demands of the Universe,
-is the truth of which Asceticism has been the faithful champion. The
-folly of the cross, so inexplicable by the intellect, has, yet, its
-indestructible, vital meaning.… Naturalistic optimism is mere syllabub
-and sponge-cake in comparison.”[433]
-
-(2) Indeed, the only thing at all special to Mysticism, in its attitude
-towards this general principle and practice of Asceticism, is that
-it ever practises Asceticism as a means towards, or at least as the
-make-weight and safeguard of, Contemplation, which latter is as
-essentially Synthetic, and, in so far, peaceful and delightful, as the
-former is Analytic, polemical and painful; whereas non-Mystical souls
-will practise Asceticism directly with a view to greater aloofness
-from sin, and greater readiness and strength to perform the various
-calls of duty. And hence, if we but grant the legitimacy of the general
-principle of ordinary Asceticism, we shall find the Mystical form of
-this Asceticism to be the more easily comprehensible variety of that
-principle. For the Mystic’s practice, as concerns this point, is more
-varied and inclusive than that of others, since he does not even tend
-to make the whole of his inner life into a system of checks and of
-tension. The expansive, reconciling movement operates in him most
-strongly also, and, where of the right kind, this expansive movement
-helps, even more than the restrictive one, to purify, humble, and
-deepen his heart and soul.
-
-
-2. _God’s Transcendence a source of suffering._
-
-There is, however, a second, essentially different source and kind of
-suffering in some sorts and degrees of Mysticism, and indeed in other
-_attraits_ of the spiritual life, which is deeply interesting, because
-based upon a profound Metaphysical apprehension. Although, at bottom,
-the opposite extreme to Pantheism, it readily expresses itself, for
-reasons that will presently appear, in terms that have a curiously
-Pantheistic colour.
-
-(1) St. John of the Cross writes in 1578: “It is a principle of
-philosophy, that all means must … have a certain resemblance to the
-end, such as shall be sufficient for the object in view. If therefore
-the understanding is to be united to God, … it must make use of
-those means which can effect that union, that is, means which are
-most like unto God.… But there is no essential likeness or communion
-between creatures and Him, the distance between His divine nature and
-their nature is infinite. No creature therefore … nothing that the
-imagination may conceive or the understanding comprehend … in this life
-… can be a proximate means of union with God,” for “it is all most
-unlike God, and most disproportionate to Him.” “The understanding …
-must be pure and empty of all sensible objects, all clear intellectual
-perceptions, resting on faith: for faith is the sole proximate and
-proportionate means of the soul’s union with God.”[434]
-
-Now it is certain, as we have already found, that the awakened human
-soul ever possesses a dim but real experience of the Infinite, and
-that, in proportion as it is called to the Mystical way, this sense
-will be deepened into various degrees of the Prayer of Quiet and of
-Union, and that here, more plainly than elsewhere, will appear the
-universal necessity of the soul’s own response, by acts and the habit
-of Faith, to all and every experience which otherwise remains but
-so much unused material for the soul’s advance. And it is equally
-certain that St. John of the Cross is one of the greatest of such
-contemplatives, and that neither his intuition and actual practice,
-nor even his sayings, (so long as any one saying belonging to one
-trend is set off against another belonging to the other trend),
-contravenes the Christian and Catholic positions.--Yet it cannot be
-denied that, were we to press his “negative way” into becoming the only
-one; and especially were we to take, without discount, such a virtual
-repudiation, as is furnished by any insistence upon the above words,
-of any essential, objective difference in value between our various
-apprehensions of Him and approaches to Him: the whole system and
-_rationale_ of External, Sacramental and Historical Religion, indeed of
-the Incarnation, in any degree and form, would have to go, as so many
-stumbling-blocks to the soul’s advance. For the whole principle of all
-such Religion implies the profound importance of the Here and the Now,
-the Contingent and the Finite, and of the Immanence of God, in various
-degrees and ways, within them.
-
-Indications of this incompatibility, as little systematically realized
-here as in the Areopagite, are afforded by various remarks of his,
-belonging in reality to another trend. Thus, immediately before his
-denial of any essential likeness or communion between any creature and
-God, he says: “It is true that all creatures bear a certain relation to
-God and are tokens of His being, some more, some less, according to the
-greater perfection of their nature.” And of Our Lord’s sacred Humanity
-he says: “What a perfect living image was Our Saviour upon earth: yet
-those who had no faith, though they were constantly about Him, and saw
-His wonderful works, were not benefited by His presence.”[435] But even
-here the immense importance, indeed downright necessity for Faith,
-of such external and historical stimuli, objects and materials,--in
-the latter instance all this at its very deepest,--remains
-unemphasized, through his engrossment in the necessity of Faith for the
-fructification of all these things.
-
-In other places this Faith appears as though working so outside of all
-things imageable, as to have to turn rapidly away from all picturings,
-as, at best, only momentary starting-points for the advanced soul.
-“Let the faithful soul take care that, whilst contemplating an
-image, the senses be not absorbed in it, whether it be material or
-in the imagination, and whether the devotion it excites be spiritual
-or sensible. Let him … venerate the image as the Church commands
-and lift up his mind at once from the material image to those whom
-it represents. He who shall do this, will never be deluded.”[436]
-Here, again, along the line of argument absorbing the saint in this
-book, there is no fully logical ground left for the Incarnational,
-Historical, Sacramental scheme of the Infinite immanent in the finite,
-and of spirit stimulated in contact with matter, with everywhere the
-need of the condescensions of God and of our ascensions by means of
-careful attention to them.
-
-Sören Kierkegaard, that deep solitary Dane, with so much about him
-like to Pascal the Frenchman, and Hurrell Froude the Englishman, and
-who, though Lutheran in all his bringing up, was so deeply attracted
-by Catholic Asceticism, has, in recent times (he died in 1855), pushed
-the doctrine of the qualitative, absolute difference between God and
-all that we ourselves can think, feel, will or be, to lengths beyond
-even the transcendental element,--we must admit this to be the greatly
-preponderant one,--in the great Spaniard’s formal teaching. And it
-is especially in this non-Mystical Ascetic that we get an impressive
-picture of the peculiar kind of suffering and asceticism, which results
-from such a conviction to a profoundly sensitive, absorbedly religious
-soul; and here too we can, I think, discover the precise excess and
-one-sidedness involved in this whole tendency. Professor Höffding,
-in his most interesting monograph on his friend, tells us how “for
-Kierkegaard, … the will gets monopolized by religious Ethics from the
-very first; there is no time for Contemplation or Mysticism.” “To tear
-the will away,” Kierkegaard himself says, “from all finite aims and
-conditions … requires a painful effort and this effort’s ceaseless
-repetition. And if, in addition to this, the soul has, in spite of all
-its striving, to be as though it simply were not, it becomes clear
-that the religious life signifies a dedication to suffering and to
-self-destruction. What wonder, then, that, for the Jew, death was the
-price of seeing God; or that, for the Gentile, the soul’s entering
-into closer relations with the Deity meant the beginning of madness?”
-For “the soul’s relation to God is a relation to a Being absolutely
-different from Man, who cannot confront him as his Superlative or
-Ideal, and who, nevertheless, is to rule in his inmost soul. Hence a
-necessary division, ever productive of new pains, is operative within
-man, as long as he perseveres in this spiritual endeavour.… A finite
-being, he is to live in the Infinite and Absolute: he is there like a
-fish upon dry land.”[437]
-
-Now Prof. Höffding applies a double, most cogent criticism to this
-position.--The one is religious, and has already been quoted. “A
-God Who is not Ideal and Pattern is no God. Hence the contention
-that the Nature of the Godhead is, of necessity, qualitatively
-different from that of Man, has ever occasioned ethical and religious
-misgivings.”--And the other is psychological. “Tension can indeed be
-necessary for the truth and the force of life. But tension, taken
-by itself, cannot furnish the true measure of life. For the general
-nature of consciousness is a synthesis, a comprehensive unity: not only
-contrast, but also concentration, must make itself felt, as long as the
-life of consciousness endures.”[438]
-
-It is deeply interesting to note how Catherine, and at bottom St. John
-of the Cross and the Exclusive Mystics generally, escape, through
-their practice and in some of their most emphatic teachings, from
-Kierkegaard’s excess, no doubt in part precisely because they _are_
-Mystics, since the exclusive Mystic’s contemplative habit is, at
-bottom, a Synthetic one. Yet we should realize the deep truth which
-underlies the very exaggerations of this one-sidedly Analytic and
-Ascetical view. For if God is the deepest ideal, the ultimate driving
-force and the true congenital element and environment of Man, such as
-Man cannot but secretly wish to will deliberately, and which, at his
-best, Man truly wills to hold and serve: yet God remains ever simply
-incompatible with that part of each man’s condition and volition which
-does not correspond to the best and deepest which that Man himself sees
-or could see to be the better, _hic et nunc_; and, again, He is ever,
-even as compared with any man’s potential best, infinitely more and
-nobler, and, though here not in simple contradiction, yet at a degree
-of perfection which enables Him, the Supreme Spirit, to penetrate, as
-Immanent Sustainer or Stimulator, and to confront, as Transcendent
-Ideal and End, the little human spirit, so great in precisely this its
-keen sense of experienced contrast.
-
-Catherine exhibits well this double relation, of true contradiction,
-and of contrast, both based upon a certain genuine affinity between
-the human soul and God. On one side of herself she is indeed a
-veritable fish out of water; but, on the other side of her, she is a
-fish happily disporting itself in its very element, in the boundless
-ocean of God. On the one side, snapping after air, in that seemingly
-over-rarified atmosphere in which the animal man, the mere selfish
-individual, cannot live; on the other side, expanding her soul’s
-lungs and drinking in light, life, and love, in that same truly rich
-atmosphere, which, Itself Spirit, feeds and sustains her growing
-spiritual personality. And the _Dialogo_, in spite of its frequently
-painful abstractness and empty unity, has, upon the whole, a profound
-hold upon this great doctrine.
-
-Yet it is in Catherine’s own culminating intuition,--of the soul’s
-free choice of Purgatory, as a joyful relief from the piercing pain of
-what otherwise would last for ever,--the vividly perceived contrast
-between God’s purity and her soul’s impurity, that we get, in the
-closest combination, indeed mutual causation, this double sense of
-Man’s nearness to and distance from, of his likeness and unlikeness to
-God. For only if man is, in the deepest instincts of his soul, truly
-related to God, and is capable of feeling, (indeed he ever actually,
-though mostly dimly, experiences,) God’s presence and this, man’s
-own, in great part but potential, affinity to Him: can suffering be
-conceived to arise from the keen realization of the contrast between
-God and man’s own actual condition at any one moment; and can any
-expectation, indeed a swift vivid instinct, arise within man’s soul
-that the painful, directly contradictory, discrepancy can and will,
-gradually though never simply automatically, be removed. And though,
-even eventually, the creature cannot, doubtless, ever become simply
-God, yet it can attain, in an indefinitely higher degree, to that
-affinity and union of will with God, which, in its highest reaches and
-moments, it already now substantially possesses; and hence to that
-full creaturely self-constitution and joy in which, utterly trusting,
-giving itself to, and willing God, it will, through and in Him, form
-an abidingly specific, unique constituent and link of His invisible
-kingdom of souls, on and on.
-
-
-3. _Discipline of fleeing and of facing the Multiple and Contingent._
-
-But there is a third attitude, peculiar (because of its preponderance)
-to the Mystics as such, an attitude in a manner intermediate between
-that of ordinary Asceticism, and that of the Suffering just described.
-The implications and effects of, and the correctives for, this third
-attitude will occupy us up to the end of this book. I refer to the
-careful turning-away from all Multiplicity and Contingency, from
-the Visible and Successive, from all that does or can distract and
-dissipate, which is so essential and prevailing a feature in all
-Mysticism, which indeed, in Exclusive Mysticism, is frankly made into
-the one sole movement towards, and measure of, the soul’s perfection.
-
-(1) It is true that to this tendency, when and in so far as it has
-come so deeply to permeate the habits of a soul as to form a kind of
-second nature, the name Asceticism cannot, in strictness, be any more
-applied; since now the pain will lie, not in this turning away from all
-that dust and friction, but, on the contrary, in any forcing of the
-soul back into that turmoil. And doubtless many, perhaps most, souls
-with a pronouncedly mystical _attrait_, are particularly sensitive to
-all, even partial and momentary, conflict. Yet we can nevertheless
-appropriately discuss the matter under the general heading of
-Asceticism, since, as a rule, much practice and sacrifice go to build
-up this habit; since, in every case, this Abstractive Habit shares
-with Ordinary Asceticism a pronounced hostility to many influences and
-forces ever actually operative within and around the undisciplined
-natural man; and since, above all, the very complements and correctives
-for this Abstractiveness will have to come from a further, deeper and
-wider Asceticism, to be described presently.
-
-(2) As to Ordinary Asceticism and this Abstractiveness, the former
-fights the world and the self directly, and then only in so far as they
-are discovered to be positively evil or definitely to hinder positive
-good; it is directly attracted by the clash and friction involved in
-such fighting; and it has no special desire for even a transitory
-intense unification of the soul’s life: whereas the Abstractiveness
-turns away from, and rises above, the world and the phenomenal self;
-their very existence, their contingency, the struggles alive within
-them, and their (as it seems) inevitably disturbing effect upon the
-soul,--are all felt as purely dissatisfying; and an innermost longing
-for a perfect and continuous unification and overflowing harmony of its
-inner life here possess the spirit.
-
-(3) Now we have just seen how a movement of integration, of
-synthesizing all the soul’s piecemeal, inter-jostling acquisitions,
-of restful healing of its wounds and rents, of sinking back, (from
-the glare and glitter of clear, and then ever fragmentary perception,
-and from the hurry, strain and rapidly ensuing distraction involved
-in all lengthy external action), into a peaceful, dim rumination and
-unification, is absolutely necessary, though in very various degrees
-and forms, for all in any way complete and mature souls.--And we have,
-further back, realized that a certain, obscure but profoundly powerful,
-direct instinct and impression of God in the soul is doubtless at work
-here, and, indeed, throughout all the deeper and nobler movements of
-our wondrously various inner life. But what concerns us here, is the
-question whether the _complete_ action of the soul, (if man would
-grow in accordance with his ineradicable nature, environment, and
-specific grace and call), does not as truly involve a corresponding
-counter-movement to this intensely unitive and intuitive movement
-which, with most men, and in most moments of even the minority of men,
-forms but an indirectly willed condition and spontaneous background of
-the soul.
-
-(4) We have been finding, further, that all the Contingencies,
-Multiplicities and Mediations which, one and all, tend to appear to the
-Mystic as so many resistances and distractions, can roughly be grouped
-under two ultimate heads. These intruders are fellow-souls, or groups
-of fellow-souls,--some social organism, the Family, Society, the State,
-the Church, who provoke, in numberless degrees and ways, individual
-affection, devotion, distraction, jealousy, as from person towards
-person. Or else the intruders are Things and Mechanical Laws, and these
-usually leave the Mystic indifferent or irritate or distract him; but
-they can become for him great opportunities of rest, and occasions for
-self-discipline.
-
-Yet this distinction between Persons and Things, (although vital for
-the true apprehension of all deeper, above all of the deepest Reality,
-and for the delicate discrimination between what are but the means and
-what are the ends in a truly spiritual life), does not prevent various
-gradations within, and continuous interaction between, each of these
-two great groups. For in proportion as, in the Personal group, the
-Individual appears as but parcel and expression of one of the social
-organisms, does the impression of determinist Law, of an impersonal
-Thing or blind Force, begin to mix with, and gradually to prevail
-over, that of Personality. And in proportion as, in the Impersonal
-group, Science comes to include all careful and methodical study,
-according to the most appropriate methods, of any and every kind of
-truth and reality; and as it moves away from the conceptions of purely
-quantitative matter, and of the merely numerically different, entirely
-interchangeable, physical happenings, (all so many mere automatic
-illustrations of mechanical Law), on, through the lowly organisms of
-plant-life, and the ever higher interiority and richer consciousness of
-animal life, up to Man, with his ever qualitative Mind, and his ever
-non-interchangeable, ever “effortful,” achievements and elaborations
-of types of beauty, truth and goodness in Human History,--does Science
-itself come back, in its very method and subject-matter, ever more
-nearly, to the great personal starting-point, standard and ultimate
-motive of all our specifically human activity and worth.
-
-(5) Indeed, the two great continuous facts of man’s life, first that
-he thinks, feels, wills, and acts, in and with the help or hindrance
-of that profoundly material Thing, his physical body, and on occasion
-of, and with regard to, the materials furnished by the stimulations and
-impressions of his senses; and again, that these latter awaken within
-him those, in themselves, highly abstract and Thing-like categories of
-his mind which penetrate and give form to these materials; are enough
-to show how close is the pressure, and how continuous the effect, of
-Things upon the slow upbuilding of Personality.
-
-(6) Fair approximations to these two kinds of Things, with their quite
-irreplaceable specific functions within the economy of the human mental
-life,--the intensely concrete and particular Sense-Impressions, and
-the intensely abstract and general Mental Categories,--reappear within
-the economy of Characteristic Religion, in its Sacraments and its
-Doctrine. And conversely, there exists, _in rerum natura_, no Science
-worth having which is not, ultimately, the resultant of, and which does
-not require and call forth, on and on, certain special qualities, and
-combinations of qualities, of the truly ethical, spiritual Personality.
-Courage, patience, perseverance, candour, simplicity, self-oblivion,
-continuous generosity towards others and willing correction of even
-one’s own most cherished views,--these things and their like are
-not the quantitative determinations of Matter, but the qualitative
-characteristics of Mind.
-
-(7) I shall now, therefore, successively take Mysticism in its attitude
-towards these two great groups of claimants upon its attention,
-the Personal and the Impersonal, even though any strictly separate
-discussion of elements which, in practice, ever appear together, cannot
-but have some artificiality. And an apparent further complication will
-be caused by our having, in each case, to contrast what Mysticism would
-do, if it became Exclusive, with what it must be restricted to doing,
-if it is to remain Inclusive, _i.e._ if it is to be but one element
-in the constitution of that multiplicity in unity, the deep spiritual
-Personality. The larger Asceticism will thus turn out to be a wider and
-deeper means towards perfection than even genuine Mysticism itself,
-since this Asceticism will have to include both this Mysticism and the
-counter movement within the one single, disciplined and purified life
-of the soul.
-
-
-II. SOCIAL RELIGION AND MYSTICISM.
-
-
-_Introductory: the ruinousness of Exclusive Mysticism._
-
-Prof. Harnack says in his _Dogmengeschichte_: “An old fairy tale tells
-of a man who lived in ignorance, dirt and wretchedness; and whom God
-invited, on a certain day, to wish whatsoever he might fancy, and it
-should be given him. And the man began to wish things, and ever more
-things, and ever higher things, and all these things were given him.
-At last he became presumptuous, and desired to become as the great God
-Himself: when lo, instantly he was sitting there again, in his dirt and
-misery. Now the history of Religion,--especially amongst the Greeks
-and Orientals,--closely resembles this fairy tale. For they began by
-wishing for themselves certain sensible goods, and then political,
-aesthetic, moral and intellectual goods: and they were given them all.
-And then they became Christians and desired perfect knowledge and a
-super-moral life: they even wished to become, already here below, as
-God Himself, in insight, beatitude and life. And behold, they fell,
-not at once indeed, but with a fall that could not be arrested, down
-to the lowest level, back into ignorance, dirt and barbarism.… Like
-unto their near spiritual relations, the Neo-Platonists, they were at
-first over-stimulated, and soon became jaded, and hence required ever
-stronger stimulants. And in the end, all these exquisite aspirations
-and enjoyments turned into their opposite extreme.”[439]
-
-However much may want discounting or supplementing here, there is,
-surely, a formidable amount of truth in this picture. And, if so, is
-Mysticism, at least in its Dionysian type, not deeply to blame? And
-where is the safeguard against such terrible abuses?
-
-Now Prof. Harnack has himself shown us elsewhere that there is a sense
-in which Monasticism should be considered eternal, even among and for
-Protestants. “Monasticism,” he says plaintively, in his account of the
-first three centuries of Protestantism, “even as it is conceivable
-and necessary among Evangelical Christians, disappeared altogether.
-And yet every community requires persons, who live _exclusively_ for
-its purposes; hence the Church too requires volunteers who shall
-renounce ‘the world’ and shall dedicate themselves entirely to the
-service of their neighbour.”[440]--And again, scholars of such breadth
-of knowledge and independence of judgement as Professor Tiele and
-his school, insist strongly upon the necessity of Ecclesiastical
-Institutions and Doctrines. The day of belief in the normality,
-indeed in the possibility for mankind in general, of a would-be quite
-individual, entirely spiritual, quite “pure” religion, is certainly
-over and gone, presumably for good and all, amongst all competent
-workers.--Nor, once more, can the general Mystical sense of the
-unsatisfying character of all things finite, and of the Immanence of
-the Infinite in our poor lives, be, in itself, to blame: for we have
-found these experiences to mingle with, and to characterize, all the
-noblest, most fully human acts and personalities.--But, if so, what
-are the peculiarities in the religion of those times and races, which
-helped to produce the result pictured in the _Dogmengeschichte?_
-
-Now here, to get a fairly final answer, we must throw together
-the question of the ordinary Christian Asceticism and that of the
-Abstraction peculiar to the Mystics; and we must ask whether the
-general emotive-volitional attitude towards Man and Life,--the
-theory and practice as to Transcendence and Immanence, Detachment
-and Attachment, which, from about 500 A.D. to, say, 1450 _A.D._,
-predominantly preceded, accompanied, and both expanded and deflected
-the specific ally Christian and normally human experience in Eastern
-Christendom, were not (however natural, indeed inevitable, and in
-part useful for those times and races), the chief of the causes
-which turned so much of the good of Mysticism into downright harm. At
-bottom this is once more the question as to the one-sided character of
-Neo-Platonism,--its incapacity to find any descending movement of the
-Divine into Human life.
-
-
-1. _True relation of the soul to its fellows. God’s “jealousy.”_
-
-Let us take first the relation of the single human soul to its
-fellow-souls.
-
-(1) Now Kierkegaard tells us: “the Absolute is cruel, for it demands
-_all_, whilst the Relative ever continues to demand _some_ attention
-from us.”[441] And the Reverend George Tyrrell, in his stimulating
-paper, _Poet and Mystic_, shows us that, as regards the relations
-between man’s love for man and man’s love for God, there are two
-conceptions and answers in reply to the question as to the precise
-sense in which God is “a jealous God,” and demands to be loved alone.
-In the first, easier, more popular conception, He is practically
-thought of as the First of Creatures, competing with the rest for Man’s
-love, and is here placed alongside of them. Hence the inference that
-whatever love they win from us by reason of their inherent goodness,
-is taken from Him: He is not loved perfectly, till He is loved alone.
-But in the second, more difficult and rarer conception, God is placed,
-not alongside of creatures but behind them, as the light which shines
-through a crystal and lends it whatever lustre it may have. He is
-loved here, not apart from, but through and in them. Hence if only
-the affection be of the right kind as to mode and object, the more
-the better. The love of Him is the “form,” the principle of order and
-harmony; our natural affections are the “matter” harmonized and set in
-order; it is the soul, they are the body, of that one Divine Love whose
-adequate object is God in, and not apart from, His creatures.[442] Thus
-we have already found that even the immensely abstractive and austere
-St. John of the Cross tells us: “No one desires to be loved except
-for his goodness; and when we love in this way, our love is pleasing
-unto God and in great liberty; and if there be attachment in it, there
-is greater attachment to God.” And this doctrine he continuously,
-deliberately practises, half-a-century after his Profession, for he
-writes to his penitent, Donna Juana de Pedrazas in 1589: “All that is
-wanting now, is that I should forget you; but consider how that is to
-be forgotten which is ever present to the soul.”[443]
-
-But Father Tyrrell rightly observes: “To square this view with the
-general ascetic tradition of the faithful at large is exceedingly
-difficult.”[444] Yet I cannot help thinking that a somewhat different
-reconciliation, than the one attempted by him,[445] really meets all
-the substantial requirements of the case.
-
-(2) I take it, then, that an all-important double law or twin fact, or
-rather a single law and fact whose unity is composed of two elements,
-is, to some extent, present throughout all characteristically human
-life, although its full and balanced realization, even in theory
-and still more in practice, is ever, necessarily, a more or less
-unfulfilled ideal: viz. that not only there exist certain objects,
-acts, and affections that are simply wrong, and others that are simply
-right or perfect, either for all men or for some men: but that there
-exist simply no acts and affections which, however right, however
-obligatory, however essential to the perfection of us all or of some
-of us, that do not require, on our own part, a certain alternation
-of interior reserve and detachment away from, and of familiarity and
-attachment to, them and their objects. This general law applies as
-truly to Contemplation as it does to Marriage.
-
-And next, the element of detachment which has to penetrate and purify
-simply all attachments,--even the attachment to detachment itself,--is
-the more difficult, the less obvious, the more profoundly spiritual
-and human element and movement, although only on condition that ever
-some amount of the other, of the outgoing element and movement, and
-of attachment, remains. For here, as everywhere, there is no good and
-operative yeast except with and in flour; there can be no purification
-and unity without a material and a multiplicity to purify and to unite.
-
-And again, given the very limited power of attention and articulation
-possessed by individual man, and the importance to the human community
-of having impressive embodiments and examples of this, in various
-degrees and ways, universally ever all-but-forgotten, universally
-difficult, universally necessary, universally ennobling renunciation:
-we get the reason and justification for the setting apart of men
-specially drawn and devoted to a maximum, or to the most difficult
-kinds, of this renunciation. As the practically universal instinct,
-or rudimentary capacity, for Art, Science, and Philanthropy finds its
-full expression in artists, scientists, philanthropists, whose specific
-glory and ever necessary corrective it is that they but articulate
-clearly, embody massively and, as it were, precipitate what is dimly
-and intermittingly present, as it were in solution, throughout the
-consciousness and requirements of Mankind; and neither the inarticulate
-instinct, diffused among all, would completely suffice for any one of
-the majority, without the full articulation by a few, nor the full
-articulation by this minority could thrive, even for this minority
-itself, were it not environed by, and did it not voice, that dumb
-yearning of the race at large: so, and far more, does the general
-religiosity and sense of the Infinite, and even its ever-present
-element and requirement of Transcendence and Detachment, seek and call
-forth some typical, wholesomely provocative incorporation,--yet, here,
-with an even subtler and stronger interdependence, between the general
-demand and the particular supply.
-
-And note that, if the minority will thus represent a maximum of
-“form,” with a minimum of “matter,” and the majority a maximum of
-“matter,” with a minimum of “form”: yet some form as well as some
-matter must be held by each; and the ideal to which, by their mutual
-supplementations, antagonisms, and corrections, they will have more
-and more to approximate our corporate humanity will be a maximum of
-“matter,” permeated and spiritualized by a maximum of “form.” If it
-is easy for the soul to let itself be invaded and choked by the wrong
-kind of “matter,” or even simply by an excess of the right kind, so
-that it will be unable to stamp the “matter” with spiritual “form”; the
-opposite extreme also, where the spiritual forces have not left to them
-a sufficiency of material to penetrate or of life-giving friction to
-overcome, is ever a most real abuse.
-
-
-2. _Ordinary Ascesis corrected by Social Christianity._
-
-Now it is very certain that Ordinary Asceticism and Social Christianity
-are, in their conjunction, far less open to this latter danger than is
-the Mystical and Contemplative Detachment. For the former combination
-possesses the priceless conception of the soul’s personality being
-constituted in and through the organism of the religious society,--the
-visible and invisible Church. This Society is no mere congeries of
-severally self-sufficing units, each exclusively and directly dependent
-upon God alone; but, as in St. Paul’s grand figure of the body, an
-organism, giving their place and dignity to each several organ, each
-different, each necessary, and each influencing and influenced by all
-the others. We have here, as it were, a great living Cloth of Gold,
-with, not only the woof going from God to Man and from Man to God,
-but also the warp going from Man to Man,--the greatest to the least,
-and the least back to the greatest. And thus here the primary and
-full Bride of Christ never is, nor can be, any individual soul, but
-only this complete organism of all faithful souls throughout time and
-space; and the single soul is such a Bride only in so far as it forms
-an operative constituent of this larger whole.--And hence the soul of a
-Mystical habit will escape the danger of emptiness and inflation if it
-keeps up some,--as much indeed as it can, without permanent distraction
-or real violation of its special helps and call,--of that outgoing,
-social, co-operative action and spirit, which, in the more ordinary
-Christian life, has to form the all but exclusive occupation of the
-soul, and which here, indeed, runs the risk of degenerating into mere
-feverish, distracted “activity.”
-
-I take the right scheme for this complex matter to have been all but
-completely outlined by Plato, in the first plan of his _Republic_, and
-indeed to have been largely derived by Christian thinkers from this
-source; and the excessive and one-sided conception to have been largely
-determined by his later additions and changes in that great book,
-especially as these have been all but exclusively enforced, and still
-further exaggerated, by Plotinus and Proclus. As Erwin Rhode finely
-says of this later teaching of Plato: “It was at the zenith of his
-life and thinking that Plato completed his ideal picture of the State,
-according to the requirements of his wisdom. Over the broad foundation
-of a population discriminated according to classes, (a foundation
-which, in its totality and organization, was to embody the virtue of
-justice in a form visible even from afar, and which formerly had seemed
-to him to fulfil the whole function of the perfect State), there now
-soars, pointing up into the super-mundane ether, a highest crown and
-pinnacle, to which all the lower serves but as a substructure to render
-possible this life in the highest air. A small handful of citizens,
-the Philosophers, form this final point of the pyramid of the State.
-In this State, ordered throughout according to the ends of ethics,
-these Philosophers will, it is true, take part in the Government, not
-joyously, but for duty’s sake; as soon, however, as duty permits,
-they will eagerly return to that super-mundane contemplation, which
-is the end and true content of their life’s activity. Indeed, in
-reality, the Ideal State is now built up, step by step, for the ‘one
-ultimate’ purpose of preparing an abode for these Contemplatives, of
-training them in their vocation, the highest extant, and of providing
-a means for the insertion of Dialectic, as a special form of life and
-the highest aim of human endeavour, into the general organism of the
-earthly, civilized life. ‘The so-called virtues’ all here sink into the
-shade before the highest force of the soul, the mystic Contemplation
-of the Eternal.… To bring his own life to ripeness for its own
-redemption, _that_ is now the perfect sage’s true, his immediate duty.
-If, nevertheless, he has still to bethink himself of acting upon and of
-moulding the world the virtues will spontaneously present themselves to
-him: for he now possesses Virtue itself; it has become his essential
-condition.”[446]
-
-It is truly impressive to find here, in its most perfect and most
-influential form, that ruinously untrue doctrine of the separation of
-any one set of men from the mass of their fellows, and of Contemplation
-from interest in other souls, taking the place, (in the same great
-mind, in the same great book), of the beautifully humble, rich, and
-true view of a constant, necessary interchange of gifts and duties
-between the various constituents of a highly articulated organism, a
-whole which is indefinitely greater than, and is alone the full means,
-end and measure of, all its several, even its noblest, parts.--Yet the
-Christian, indeed every at all specifically religious, reader, will
-have strongly felt that the second scheme possesses, nevertheless, at
-least one point of advantage over the earlier one. For it alone brings
-out clearly that element of Transcendence, that sense and thirst of the
-Infinite, which we have agreed upon as the deepest characteristic of
-man. And if this point be thus true and important, then another,--the
-making of Contemplation into a special vocation,--can hardly be
-altogether incorrect.
-
-But if this is our judgment, how are we to harmonize these two points
-of Plato’s later scheme with the general positions of the earlier
-one. Or, rather, how are we to actuate and to synthesize our complex
-present-day requirements and duties, Christian and yet also Modern,
-Transcendental and yet Immanental too? For if we have any delicately
-vivid sense of, and sympathy with, the original, very simple, intensely
-transcendental, form and emphasis of the Christian teaching, and any
-substantial share in the present complex sense of obligation to various
-laws and conceptions immanent in different this-world organizations and
-systems: we shall readily feel how indefinitely more difficult and deep
-the question has become since Plato’s, and indeed since the Schoolmen’s
-time.
-
-
-3. _Preliminary Pessimism and ultimate Optimism of Christianity._
-
-Now I think it is Prof. Ernst Troeltsch who has most fully explicitated
-the precise centre of this difficulty, which, in its acuteness, is a
-distinctly modern one, and the direction in which alone the problem’s
-true solution should be sought.
-
-(1) “The chief problem of Christian Ethics,” he says, “is busy,” not
-with the relation between certain subjective means and dispositions,
-but “with the relation between certain objective ends, which have, in
-some way, to be thought together by the same mind as so many several
-objects, and to be brought by it and within it to the greatest possible
-unity. And the difficulty here lies in the fact, that the sublunar
-among these ends are none the less moral ends, bearing the full
-specific character of moral values,--that they are ends-in-themselves,
-and necessary for their own sakes, even at the cost of man’s natural
-happiness; and yet that they operate in the visible world, and adhere
-to historical formations which proceed from man’s natural constitution,
-and dominate his earthly horizon; whilst the Super-worldly End cannot
-share its rule with any other end. Yet the special characteristic
-of modern civilization resides precisely in such a simultaneous
-insistence upon the Inner-worldly Ends, as possessing the nature of
-ends-in-themselves, and upon the Religious, Super-worldly End: it is
-indeed from just this combination that this civilization derives its
-peculiar richness, power, and freedom, but also its painful, interior
-tension and its difficult problems.”
-
-(2) The true solution of the difficulty surely is that “Ethical life is
-not, in its beginnings, a unity but a multiplicity: man grows up amidst
-a number of moral ends, whose unification is not his starting-point
-but his problem. And this multiplicity can be still further defined
-as the polarity of two poles, inherent in man’s nature, of which the
-two chief types proceed respectively from the religious and from
-the inner-worldly self-determination of the soul,--the polarity of
-Religious, and that of Humane Ethics, neither of which can be dispensed
-with without moral damage, yet which cannot be brought completely under
-a common formula. On this polarity depends the richness, but also the
-difficulty, of our life, since the sublunar ends remain, to a large
-extent, conditioned by the necessities and prerequisites of their own
-special subject-matters, and since only on condition of being thus
-recognized as ends in themselves, can they attain to their morally
-educative power.”[447]
-
-(3) Or, to put the same matter from the point of view of definitely
-Christian experience and conviction: “The formula, for the specific
-nature of Christianity, can only be a complex conception,--the special
-Christian form,” articulation and correction, “of the fundamental
-thoughts concerning God, World, Man and Redemption which,” with
-indefinite variations of fulness and worth, “are found existing
-together in all the religions. And the tension present in this
-multiplicity of elements thus brought together is of an importance
-equal to that of the multiplicity itself; indeed in this tension
-resides the main driving-force of Religion. Christianity” in particular
-“embraces a polarity within itself, and its formula must be dualistic;
-it resembles, not a circle with one centre, but an ellipse with two
-focuses. For Christianity is,” unchangeably, “an Ethics of Redemption,
-with a conception of the world both optimistic and pessimistic, both
-transcendental and immanental, and an apprehension both of a severe
-antagonism and of a close interior union between the world and God. It
-is, in principle, a Dualism, and yet a Dualism which is ever in process
-of abolition by Faith and Action. It is a purely Religious Ethic, which
-concentrates man’s soul, with abrupt exclusiveness, upon the values of
-the interior life; and yet, again, it is a Humane Ethic, busy with the
-moulding and transforming of nature, and through love bringing about
-an eventual reconciliation with it. At one time the one, at another
-time the other, of these poles is prominent: but neither of them may be
-completely absent, if the Christian outlook is to be maintained.--And
-yet the original germ of the whole vast growth and movement ever
-remains an intensely, abruptly Transcendent Ethic, and can never simply
-pass over into a purely Immanental Ethic. The Gospel ever remains,
-with all possible clearness and keenness, a Promise of Redemption,
-leading us, away from the world, from nature and from sin, from earthly
-sorrow and earthly error, on and on to God; and which cannot allow
-the last word to be spoken in this life. Great as are its incentives
-to Reconciliation, it is never entirely resolvable into them. And the
-importance of that classical beginning ever consists in continuously
-calling back the human heart, away from all Culture and Immanence, to
-that which lies above both.”[448]
-
-(4) We thus get at last a conception which really covers, I think,
-all the chief elements of this complex matter. But the reader will
-have noted that it does so by treating the whole problem as one of
-Spiritual Dynamics, and not of Intellectual Statics. For the conception
-holds and requires the existence and cultivation of three kinds of
-action and movement in the soul. There are, first, the various centres
-of human energy and duty of a primarily This-world character, each
-of which possesses its own kind and degree of autonomy, laws, and
-obligations. There is, next, the attempt at organizing an increasing
-interaction between, and at harmonizing, (whilst never emasculating
-or eliminating), these various, severally characteristic, systems of
-life and production into an ever larger ultimate unity. And, lastly,
-there is as strong a turning away from all this occupation with the
-Contingent and Finite, to the sense and apprehension of the Infinite
-and Abiding. And this dynamic system is so rich, even in the amount of
-it which can claim the practice of the majority of souls, as to require
-definite alternations in the occupations of such souls, ranging thus,
-in more or less rhythmic succession, from earth to Heaven and from
-Heaven back again to earth.
-
-(5) And so great and so inexhaustible is this living system, even by
-mankind at large, that it has to be more or less parcelled out amongst
-various groups of men, each group possessing its own predominant
-_attrait_,--either to work out one of those immanental interests, say
-Art, Natural Science, Politics; or to fructify one or more of these
-relatively independent interests, by crossing it with one or more of
-the others; or to attempt to embrace the whole of these intra-mundane
-interests in one preliminary final system; or to turn away from this
-whole system and its contents to the Transcendent and Infinite; or
-finally to strive to combine, as far as possible, this latter Fleeing
-to the Infinite with all that former Seeking of the Finite.--We shall
-thus get specialists within one single domain; and more many-sided
-workers who fertilize one Science by another; and philosophers of
-Science or of History, or of both, who strive to reach the _rationale_
-of all knowledge of the Finite and Contingent; and Ascetics and
-Contemplatives who, respectively, call forth and dwell upon the sense
-and presence of the Infinite and Abiding, underlying and accompanying
-all the definite apprehensions of things contingent; and finally, the
-minds and wills that feel called to attempt as complete a development
-and organization as possible of all these movements.
-
-
-4. _Subdivision of spiritual labour: its necessity and its dangers._
-
-And yet all the subdivision of labour we have just required can avoid
-doing harm, directly or indirectly, (by leading to Materialism,
-Rationalism, or Fanaticism, to one or other of the frequent but ever
-mischievous “Atomisms”), only on condition that it is felt and worked
-_as_ such a subdivision. In other words, every soul must retain and
-cultivate some sense of, and respect for, the other chief human
-activities not primarily its own. For, as a matter of fact, even the
-least rich or developed individual requires and practises a certain
-amount, in an inchoate form, of each and all of these energizings; and
-he can, fruitfully for himself and others, exercise a maximum amount
-of any one of them, only if he does not altogether and deliberately
-neglect and exclude the others; and, above all, if, in imagination and
-in actual practice, he habitually turns to his fellow-men, of the other
-types and centres, to supplement, and to be supplemented by, them.
-
-It will be found, I think, that the quite undeniable abuses that have
-been special to the Ascetic and Contemplative methods and states,
-have all primarily sprung from that most plausible error that, if
-these energizings are, in a sense, the highest in and for man, then
-they can, at least in man’s ideal action and condition, dispense with
-other and lower energizings and objects altogether. Yet both for man’s
-practice here and even for his ideal state in the hereafter, this is
-not so. There is no such thing,--either in human experience or in the
-human ideal, when both are adequately analyzed and formulated,--as
-discursive reasoning, without intuitive reason; or clear analysis and
-sense of contrast, without dim synthesis and a deep consciousness of
-similarity or continuity; or detachment of the will from evil, without
-attachment of the higher feelings to things good; or the apprehension
-and requirements of Multiplicity, without those of Unity; or the vivid
-experience of Contingency, Mutation, and the Worthlessly Subjective,
-without the, if obscure yet most powerful, instinct of the Infinite
-and Abiding, of the true Objective and Valuable Subjective. Thus, for
-humanity at large entirely, and for each human individual more or less,
-each member of these couples requires, and is occasioned by, the other,
-and _vice versa_.
-
-The maxims that follow from this great fact are as plain in reason,
-and as immensely fruitful in practice, as they are difficult, though
-ever freshly interesting, to carry out, at all consistently, even in
-theory and still more in act. For the object of a wise living will now
-consist in introducing an ever greater unity into the multiplicity of
-our lives,--up to the point where this unity’s constituents would,
-like the opposing metals in an electric battery, become too much alike
-still to produce a fruitful interaction, and where the unity would,
-thus and otherwise, become empty and mechanical; and an ever greater
-multiplicity into the unity,--up to the point where that multiplicity
-would, seriously and permanently, break up or weaken true recollection;
-and in more and more expanding this whole individual organism, by its
-insertion, as a constituent part, into larger groups and systems of
-interests. The Family, the Nation, Human Society, the Church,--these
-are the chief of the larger organizations into which the inchoate,
-largely only potential, organism of the individual man is at first
-simply passively born, yet which, if he would grow, (not in spite of
-them, a hopeless task, but by them), he will have deliberately to
-endorse and will, as though they were his own creations.
-
-
-5. _Mystics and Spiritual Direction._
-
-It is interesting to note the special characteristics attaching to the
-one social relation emphasized by the medieval and modern varieties of
-Western Catholic Mysticism; and the effect which a larger development
-of the other chief forces and modalities of the Catholic spiritual life
-necessarily has upon this relation. I am thinking of the part played
-by the Director, the soul’s leader and adviser, in the lives of these
-Mystics,--a part which differs, in three respects, from that of the
-ordinary Confessor in the life of the more active or “mixed” type of
-Catholic.
-
-(1) For one thing, there is here a striking variety and range, in the
-ecclesiastical and social position of the persons thus providentially
-given and deliberately chosen. The early German Franciscan Preacher,
-Berthold of Regensburg, owes his initiation into the Interior Life to
-his Franciscan Novice-Master, the Partial Mystic, David of Augsburg,
-whose writings still give forth for us their steady light and genial
-warmth; the French widowed noblewoman and Religious Foundress, St.
-Jane Frances de Chantal, is helped on her course to high contemplation
-by the Secular Priest and Bishop, St. Francis de Sales; the French
-Jesuit, Jean Nicolas Grou, is initiated, after twenty-four years’
-life and training in his Order, by the Visitation Nun, Soeur Pélagie,
-into that more Mystical spirituality, which constitutes the special
-characteristic of his chief spiritual books; the great Spaniard, St.
-Teresa herself, tells us how “a saintly nobleman … a married layman,
-who had spent nearly forty years in prayer, seems to me to have been,
-by the pains he took, the beginning of salvation to my soul”--“his
-power was great”; and the English Anchorite, Mother Juliana of Norwich,
-“a simple, unlettered creature,” seems to have found no special leader
-on to her rarely deep, wide, and tender teachings, but to have been
-led and stimulated, beyond and after her first general Benedictine
-training, by God’s Providence alone, working through the few and quite
-ordinary surroundings and influences of her Anchorage at Norwich.[449]
-It would be difficult to find anything to improve in this noble liberty
-of these great children of God; nor would a larger influence of the
-other modalities necessarily restrict this ample range.
-
-(2) Again, the souls of this type seem, for the most part, to realize
-more fully and continuously than those of the ordinary, simply active
-and ascetical kind, that the “blind obedience” towards such leaders, so
-often praised in their disciples and penitents, is, where wholesome
-and strengthening, essentially a simple, tenacious adherence, during
-the inevitable times of darkness and perplexity, to the encouragements
-given by the guide to persevere along the course and towards the truths
-which this soul itself saw clearly, often through the instrumentality
-of this leader, when it was in light and capable of a peaceful,
-deliberate decision. For however much the light may have been given it
-through this human mediation, (and the most numerous, and generally
-the most important, of our lights, have been acquired thus through
-the spoken, written, or acted instrumentality of fellow-souls),--yet
-the light was seen, and had (in the first instance), to be seen, by
-the disciple’s own spiritual eye; and it is but to help it in keeping
-faithful to this light (which, in the first and last instance, is God’s
-light and its own) that the leader stands by and helps. But, given
-this important condition, there remains the simple, experimental fact
-that, not only can and do others often see our spiritual whereabouts
-and God’s _attrait_ for us more clearly than we do ourselves, but such
-unselfseeking transmission and such humbly simple reception of light
-between man and man adds a moral and spiritual security and beauty to
-the illumination, (all other conditions being equal and appropriate),
-not to be found otherwise. It is interesting to note the courageous,
-balanced, and certainly quite unprejudiced, testimony borne to these
-important points, by so widely read, and yet upon the whole strongly
-Protestant, a pair of scholars, as Miss Alice Gardner and her very
-distinguished brother, Professor Percy Gardner.[450]
-
-(3) And finally, the souls of this type have, (at least for the two
-purposes of the suscitation of actual insight, and for bearing witness
-to this, now past, experience during the soul’s periods of gloom),
-often tended,--in Western Christendom and during Medieval and still
-more in Modern times,--to exalt the office and power of the Director,
-in the life of the soul of the Mystical type, very markedly beyond the
-functions, rights and duties of the ordinary Confessor in the spiritual
-life of the ordinary Catholic.
-
-Indeed they and their interpreters have, in those times and places,
-often insisted upon the guarantee of safety thus afforded, and upon the
-necessity of such formal and systematic mediation, with an absoluteness
-and vehemence impossible to conciliate with any full and balanced,
-especially with any at all orthodox, reading of Church History. For
-this feature is as marked in the condemned book of Molinos and of most
-of the other Quietists, as it is in such thoroughly approved Partial
-Mysticism as that of Père Lallemant and Père Grou: hence it alone
-cannot, surely, render a soul completely safe against excesses and
-delusions. And this feature was markedly in abeyance, often indeed,
-for aught we know, completely wanting, at least in any frequent and
-methodic form, in the numerous cases of the Egyptian and other Fathers
-of the Desert: hence it cannot be strictly essential to all genuine
-Contemplation in all times and places.
-
-(4) The dominant and quite certain fact here seems to be that, in
-proportion as the Abstractive movement of the soul is taken as
-self-sufficient, and a Contemplative life is attempted as something
-substantially independent of any concrete, social, and devotional helps
-and duties, the soul gets into a state of danger, which no amount
-of predominance of the Director can really render safe; whereas, in
-proportion as the soul takes care to practise, in its own special
-degree and manner, the outgoing movement towards Multiplicity and
-Contingency, (particular attention to particular religious facts and
-particular service of particular persons), does such right, quite
-ordinary-seeming, active subordination to, and incorporation within,
-the great sacred organisms of the Family, Society, and the Church,
-or of any wise and helpful subdivision of these, furnish material,
-purgation and check for the other movement, and render superfluous any
-great or universal predominance of Direction. St. Teresa is, here also,
-wonderfully many-sided and balanced. Just as she comes to regret having
-ever turned aside from Christ’s Sacred Humanity, so too she possesses,
-indeed she never loses, the sense of the profoundly social character of
-Christianity: she dies as she had lived, full of an explicit and deep
-love for the Kingdom of God and the Church.
-
-
-6. _Mysticism predominantly Individualistic._
-
-Yet it is clear that the strong point of the Mystics, as such, does not
-lie in the direction of the great social spirituality which finds God
-in our neighbour and in the great human organizations, through and in
-which, after all, man in great part becomes and is truly man. They are,
-as such, Individualistic; the relation between God and the individual
-soul here ever tends to appear as constituted by these two forces
-alone. A fresh proof, if one were still wanting, that Mysticism is but
-one of the elements of Religion,--for Religion requires both the Social
-and the Individual, the Corporate and the Lonely movement and life.
-
-It is truly inspiring to note how emphatic is the concurrence of
-all the deepest and most circumspect contemporary Psychology,
-Epistemology, Ethics, and History and Philosophy of the Sciences and
-of Religion, in these general conclusions, which find, within the slow
-and many-sided growth and upbuilding of the spiritual personality, a
-true and necessary place and function for all the great and permanent
-capabilities, aspirations and energizings of the human soul. Thus no
-system of religion can be complete and deeply fruitful which does not
-embrace, (in every possible kind of healthy development, proportion
-and combination), the several souls and the several types of souls
-who, between them, will afford a maximum of clear apprehension and
-precise reasoning, _and_ of dim experience and intuitive reason; of
-particular attention to the Contingent (Historical Events and Persons,
-and Institutional Acts and Means) _and_ of General Recollection and
-Contemplation and Hungering after the Infinite; and of reproductive
-Admiration and Loving Intellection, _and_ of quasi-creative, truly
-productive Action upon and within Nature and other souls, attaining, by
-such Action, most nearly to the supreme attribute, the Pure Energizing
-of God.
-
-Thus Pseudo-Dionysius and St. John of the Cross will, even in their
-most Negative doctrines, remain right and necessary in all stages of
-the Church’s life,--on condition, however, of being taken as but one
-of two great movements, of which the other, the Positive movement,
-must also ever receive careful attention: since only between them is
-attained that all-important oscillation of the religious pendulum,
-that interaction between the soul’s meal and the soul’s yeast, that
-furnishing of friction for force to overcome, and of force to overcome
-the friction, that material for the soul to mould, and in moulding
-which to develop itself, that alternate expiration and inspiration,
-upon which the soul’s mysterious death-in-life and life-in-death so
-continuously depends.
-
-
-III. THE SCIENTIFIC HABIT AND MYSTICISM.
-
-
-_Introductory. Difficulty yet Necessity of finding a True Place and
-Function for Science in the Spiritual Life._
-
-Now it is certain that such an oscillatory movement, such a
-give-and-take, such a larger Asceticism, built up out of the alternate
-engrossment in and abstraction from variously, yet in each case
-really, attractive levels, functions and objects of human life and
-experience, is still comparatively easy, as long as we restrict it
-to two out of the three great groups of energizings which are ever,
-at least potentially, present in the soul, and which ever inevitably
-help to make or mar, to develop or to stunt, the totality of the
-soul’s life, and hence also of the strictly spiritual life. The
-Historical-Institutional, and the Mystical-Volitional groups and
-forces, the High-Church and the Low-Church trend, the Memory- and
-the Will-energies, do indeed coalesce, in times of peace, with the
-Reason-energy, though, even then, with some difficulty. But in times
-of war,--on occasion of any special or excessive action on the part of
-this third group, the Critical-Speculative, the Broad-Church trend,
-and the energizing of the Understanding,--they readily combine against
-every degree of the latter. It is as though the fundamental vowels A
-and U could not but combine to oust the fundamental vowel I; or as if
-the primary colours Red and Blue _must_ join to crush out the primary
-colour Yellow.
-
-Indeed, it is undoubtedly just this matter of the full and continuous
-recognition of, and allocation of a special function to, this third
-element within the same great spiritual organism which englobes the
-other two, which is now the great central difficulty and pressing
-problem of more or less every degree and kind of religious life. For
-the admission of this third element appears frequently to be ruinous to
-the other two; yet the other two, when kept away from it, seem to lose
-their vigour and persuasive power.--And yet it is, I think, exactly
-at this crucial point that the conception of the spiritual life as
-essentially a Dynamism, a slow constitution of an ever fuller, deeper,
-more close-knit unity in, and by means of, the soul’s ineradicable
-trinity of forces, shows all its fruitfulness, if we but work down to a
-sufficiently large apprehension of the capacities and requirements of
-human nature, moved and aided by divine grace, and to a very precise
-delimitation of the special object and function of Mysticism.
-
-
-1. _Science and Religion: each autonomous at its own level; and, thus,
-each helpful to the other._
-
-Erwin Rhode has well described Plato’s attitude towards Science
-and Mysticism respectively, and towards the question of their
-inter-relation. “The flight from the things of this World is, for
-Plato, already in itself an acquisition of those of the Beyond, and
-an assimilation to the Divine. For this poor world, that solicits our
-senses, the philosopher has, at bottom, nothing but negation. Incapable
-as it is of furnishing a material that can be truly known, the whole
-domain of the Transitory and Becoming has no intrinsic significance
-for Science as understood by him. The perception of things which are
-ever merely relative, and which simultaneously manifest contradictory
-qualities, has its sole use in stimulating and inviting the soul to
-press on to the Absolute.”[451]
-
-Here we should frankly admit that the soul’s hunger for the Infinite
-is, as the great Athenian so deeply realized, the very mainspring of
-Religion; and yet we must maintain that it is precisely this single
-bound away, instead of the ever-repeated double movement of a coming
-and a going, which not only helped to suppress, or at least gravely
-to stunt, the growth of the sciences of external observation and
-experiment, but (and this is the special point,--the demonstrable
-other side of the medal,) also, in its degree, prevented religion from
-attaining to its true depth, by thus cutting off, as far as Plato’s
-conviction prevailed, the very material, stimulation, and in part the
-instruments, for the soul’s outgoing, spiritualizing work, together
-with this work’s profound reflex effect upon the worker, as a unique
-occasion for the growth and self-detachment of the soul.
-
-Now the necessity for such a first stage and movement, which, as far
-as possible both immanental and phenomenalist, shall be applied and
-restricted to the special methods, direct objects, and precise range
-of each particular Science, and the importance of the safeguarding of
-this scientific liberty, are now clearly perceived, by the leading men
-of Religion, Philosophy, Psychology and Physics, in connection with
-the maintenance and acquisition of sincere and fruitful Science.--It
-is also increasingly seen that, even short of Religion, a second,
-an interpretative, an at least Philosophical stage and movement is
-necessary for the full explicitation of Science’s own assumptions and
-affinities. And the keeping of these two movements clearly distinct or
-even strongly contrasted, is felt, by some far-sighted Theologians,
-to be a help towards securing, not only a candid attitude of Science
-towards its own subject matters, but also a right independence of
-Philosophy and Theology towards the other Sciences. Thus Cardinal
-Newman has brought out, with startling force, the necessarily
-non-moral, non-religious character of Physico-Mathematical Science,
-taken simply within its direct subject-matter and method. “Physical
-science never travels beyond the examination of cause and effect.
-Its object is to resolve the complexity of phenomena into simple
-elements and principles; but when it has reached those first elements,
-principles and laws, its mission is at an end; it keeps within that
-material system with which it began, and never ventures beyond the
-‘flammantia moenia mundi.’ The physicist as such will never ask himself
-by what influence, external to the universe, the universe is sustained;
-simply because he is a physicist. If, indeed, he be a religious man,
-he will, of course, have a very different view of the subject; … and
-this, not because physical science says anything different, but simply
-because it says nothing at all on the subject, nor can do by the very
-undertaking with which it set out.” Or, as he elsewhere sympathetically
-sums up Bacon’s method of proceeding: “The inquiry into physical causes
-passes over for the moment the existence of God. In other words,
-physical science is, in a certain sense, atheistic, for the very reason
-that it is not theology.”[452]
-
-
-2. _Science builds up a preliminary world that has to be corrected by
-Philosophy and Religion, at and for their deeper levels._
-
-The additional experience and analysis of the last half-century
-apparently forces us, however, to maintain not only that
-Physico-Mathematical Science, and all knowledge brought strictly to
-the type of that Science, does not itself pronounce on the Ultimate
-Questions; but that this Science, as such, actually presents us with a
-picture of reality which, at the deeper level even of Epistemology and
-of the more ultimate Psychology, and still more at that of Religion,
-requires to be taken as more or less artificial, and as demanding, not
-simply completion, but, except for its own special purposes, correction
-as well. Thus we have seen how M. Bergson finds Clock-Time to be an
-artificial, compound concept, which seriously travesties Duration, the
-reality actually experienced by us; and Space appears as in even a
-worse predicament. M. Emil Boutroux in France, Dottore Igino Petrone
-in Italy, Profs. Eucken and Troeltsch in Germany, Profs. James Ward
-and Pringle Pattison in Great Britain, and Profs. William James, Hugo
-Münsterberg and Josiah Royce in America are, in spite of differences
-on other points, united in insistence upon, or have even worked out
-in much detail, such a distinction between the first stage and level
-of Determinist, Atomistic, Inorganic Nature and our concepts of it,
-and the second stage and level of Libertarian, Synthetic, and Organic
-Spiritual Reality, and our experience of it. And the penetrating
-labours of Profs. Windelband, Rickert, and others, towards building up
-a veritable _Organon_ of the Historical Sciences, are bringing into
-the clearest relief these two several degrees of Reality and types
-of Knowledge, the Historical being the indefinitely deeper and more
-adequate, and the one which ultimately englobes the other.[453]
-
-A profoundly significant current in modern philosophy will thus be
-brought, in part at least, to articulate expression and application.
-This current is well described by Prof. Volkelt. “German philosophy
-since Kant reveals, in manifold forms and under various disguises, the
-attempt to recognize, in Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Ethics, such
-kinds of Certainty, such domains of Being, such human Volitions and
-Values, as lie beyond reason, constitute a something that it cannot
-grasp, and are rooted in some other kind of foundation. In variously
-struggling, indeed stammering utterances, expression is given to the
-assurance that not everything in the world is resolvable into Logic
-and Thought, but that mighty resisting remainders are extant, which
-perhaps even constitute the most important thing in the world.… Such a
-longing after such a Reality can be traced in Hamann, Jacobi, Herder,
-in Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, the youthful Schleiermacher, and Jean
-Paul. Indeed, even in Hegel, the adorer of Reason, the movement of
-Negation, which is the very soul of his philosophy, is, at bottom,
-nothing but the Irrational,” the Super-Rational, “element violently
-pressed into the form of Reason; and again the single Thing, the This,
-the Here and the Now, are felt by him as … a something beyond Reason.
-And has not the Irrational found expression in Kant, in his doctrines
-of the unconditional Liberty of the Will and of Radical Evil? In the
-later Schelling and his spiritual relatives the Irrational has found
-far more explicit recognition; whilst Schopenhauer brings the point
-to its fullest expression. Yet even Nietzsche still possesses such an
-element, in his doctrine of the ‘Over-Man.’”[454] And in England we
-find this same element, in various degrees and in two chief divergent
-forms, in the Cambridge Platonists, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Thomas
-Hill Green on the one hand; and in Bishop Butler and Cardinal Newman on
-the other hand.
-
-We can thus point to much clear recognition, or at least to a
-considerable influence, of the profound truth that Science and Wisdom
-can each prosper and help and supplement the other, only if each
-possesses a certain real autonomy, a power fully to become and to
-remain itself, and, in various degrees and ways, to stimulate, check
-and thwart the other. And this truth ever presupposes, what human
-experience, in the long run, proves to be a fact,--that the different
-kinds, spheres, and levels of man’s apprehension, and of the total
-reality thus apprehended by him, are already immanently planned each
-for the other, within a great, largely dormant system of the world.
-Thus Man can and should call this congenital inter-relatedness into
-ever more vigorous and more fruitful play; whereas, if it were not
-already present deep within the very nature of things, no amount of
-human effort or ingenuity could ever evoke or insert it. Prof. Volkelt
-has, as we have seen, illustrated this great fact very strikingly,
-with regard to the relation extant between the apparently sheer
-contingencies of human History and the requirements of Philosophy, of
-normative thought and ideal truth. Yet a similar inter-connection can
-be traced elsewhere, between any other two or more levels and spheres
-of wholesome and permanent human apprehension and action, in their
-relation to various degrees and kinds of reality, as this environs man
-or inheres in him.
-
-
-3. _Necessity of the “Thing-element” in Religion._
-
-But let us note that the recognition, of an at all emphatic, systematic
-kind, of such inter-relatedness is, so far, almost limited to the
-moods and persons preoccupied with the right claims of Science or of
-Philosophy upon each other or upon the remainder of Life; and is, as
-yet, all but wanting, when Life is approached from the side of the
-specifically Religious requirements and of the Spiritual consolidation
-of man’s soul. Yet here especially, at by far the most important point
-of the whole matter, the unique place and significance of Science can
-now be very clearly grasped.
-
-Indeed it is deeply interesting to note how largely the fundamental
-characteristics of Catholicism really meet, or rather how they strictly
-require, some such vivid conception and vigorous use of the Determinist
-Thing and of its level for the full constitution of our true depth,
-our Spiritual Personality itself. If we take, _e.g._, the criticisms
-addressed, by so earnest and acute a mind as the intensely Protestant
-Emile Sulze, to the whole Thing-Element and -Concept, as these are at
-work in the Catholic practice and position, we shall find his sense of
-the difference between Thing and Spirit to be as enviably keen, and his
-idea of the end and ultimate measure of Religion to be as sound and
-deep, as his conception of the means towards developing Religion and
-the Spirit is curiously inadequate.
-
-(1) “Personality,” says Sulze, “is, for Religion and Morality, the
-supreme Good, of which the source is in God, and the end, the fruit,
-and the manifestation is in Man.”[455] This I take to be profoundly
-true, especially if we insist upon Perfect Personality being Supreme
-and Perfect Spirit; and, again, upon our imperfect personality
-and spirit as possessed of certain profound affinities to, and as
-penetrable and actually moved by, that Perfect Spirit.
-
-(2) “The value of Personality nowhere finds a full recognition in
-Catholicism; Catholicism indeed is Pantheism.” Now this harsh judgment
-is based upon two sets of allegations, which, though treated by Sulze
-as of the same nature, are, I would submit, essentially different, and
-this because of their definitely different places and functions in the
-Catholic system.
-
-“The Impersonal Godhead, the bond which unites the three Persons,
-stands above the Persons. Hence those who took religion seriously had
-to lose themselves, pantheistically, in the abyss of the Divinity.
-And in Christ the Person was even looked upon as the product of
-two Natures, the Divine and the Human, hence of two Impersonal
-Forces.”[456] Here two peculiarities in the early Conciliar Definitions
-are emphasized, which were doubtless as helpful, indeed necessary,
-for the apprehension of the great abiding truths thus conveyed to the
-Graeco-Roman mind, as they are now in need of reinterpretation in the
-light of our greater sensitiveness to the difference, in character and
-in value, which obtains between the concept of Spirit and Personality
-and that of Substances and Things.
-
-But Sulze continues, without any change in the kind or degree of his
-criticism: “Impersonal miraculous means, created by the Hierarchy, are
-put by it in the place of the sanctifying mutual intercourse of the
-children of God.” “Christianity, torn away from the religious and moral
-life, became thus a special, technical apparatus, without any religious
-or spiritual worth. Ecclesiastical Christianity has become a Pantheism,
-Materialism, indeed Atheism.”[457] We have so continuously ourselves
-insisted upon the profound danger, and frequently operative abuse, of
-any and all complete apartness between any one means, function, or
-_attrait_ of the spiritual life and the others, that we can, without
-any unfairness, restrict ourselves here to the attack upon the general
-acceptation of Impersonal means as helps towards the constitution of
-Personality. Now Sulze’s principle here,--that only directly personal
-means can help to achieve the end of Personality,--is most undoubtedly
-false, unless Mathematico-Physical Science is also to be ruled out
-of life, as necessarily destructive of, or at least as necessarily
-non-conductive to, Personality.
-
-(3) Indeed Sulze himself tells us, most truly, that, “for Religion
-also, Science is a bath of purification”; and that “Doctrine and the
-Sacraments are aids, in the hands of Christ and of the Community,
-towards representing the riches of their interior life and offering
-these to believing hearts.”[458] This latter pronouncement is, however,
-still clearly insufficient. For if there is a double truth which,
-at the end of well-nigh five centuries, ought to have burnt itself
-indelibly into the mind and conscience of us all, it is, surely,
-the following. On the one hand, Man, unless he develops a vigorous
-alternating counter-movement, ever grows like to the instruments of
-his labour and self-development, and hence, whilst busy with Things,
-(whether these be Natural Happenings and their Sciences, or Religious
-Institutions and Doctrines), he inclines to become, quite unawares,
-limited and assimilated to them,--himself thus a Thing among Things,
-instead of, through such various Things, winning an ever fuller
-apprehension of and growth in Spiritual Personality. Yet, on the
-other hand, without such a movement of close contact with the Thing,
-(both the intensely concrete, the Here and Now Contingency, and the
-profoundly Abstract, the stringent Universal Law) and without the
-pleasure and pain derived from the accompanying sense of contraction
-and of expansion, of contrast, conflict, supplementation and
-renovation,--there is no fullest discipline or most solid growth of the
-true spiritual Personality.
-
-(4) Thus Science, as Sulze himself clearly sees, not merely aids us
-to represent and to communicate our personality acquired elsewhere,
-but the shock, friction, contrast, the slow, continuous discipline,
-far more, beyond doubt, than any positive content furnished by such
-science, can and should constitute an essential part of the soul’s
-spiritual fertilization. And similarly, if we move on into the directly
-religious life, the Sacramental contacts and Doctrinal systems (the
-former so intensely concrete, the latter often so abstract,) are
-not simply means towards representing and transmitting spirituality
-acquired elsewhere: but they are amongst the means, and, in some form
-and degree, the necessary, indeed actually universal means, towards
-the awakening and developing and fulfilling of this our spiritual
-personality.
-
-
-4. _Three possible relations between Thing and Thought, Determinism and
-Spirit._
-
-It remains no doubt profoundly true that, with the awakening of the
-Mystical sense, will come a more or less acute consciousness of an at
-least superficial and preliminary, difference between this sense, with
-its specific habits and informations, and those means and forms, in
-part so contingent and external, in part so intensely abstract and yet
-so precise. But it is equally certain that such a soul, and at such a
-stage, even as it continues to require, in some respects more than
-ever, for its general balanced development, some of the irreplaceable
-discipline and manly, bracing humiliation of the close external
-observation and severe abstract generalization of Science: so also
-does it continue to require, for the deepening of the spirit and for
-the growth of creatureliness, the contact with religious Things,--the
-profoundly concrete Sacraments and the intensely abstract Doctrines of
-the religious community.
-
-(1) In one of Trendelenburg’s most penetrating essays, he shows us
-how, between blind Force and conscious Thought,--if we presuppose
-any tendency towards unity to exist between them,--there can be but
-three possible relations. “Either Force stands before Thought, so that
-Thought is not the primitive reality, but the result and accident of
-blind Force; or Thought stands before Force, so that blind Force is not
-itself the primitive reality, but the effluence of Thought; or finally,
-Thought and Force are, at bottom, only one and the same thing, and
-differ only in our mind’s conception of them.” And only one of these
-three positions can, by any possibility, be the true one: hence their
-internecine conflict.[459]
-
-(2) Now Religion, in its normal, central stream, stands most
-undoubtedly for Thought before Force, the second, the Theistic view.
-And yet it would be profoundly impoverishing for our outlook and
-practice, and would but prepare a dangerous reaction in ourselves or
-others, were we ever to ignore the immense influence, in the history,
-not only of philosophical speculation, but even of religious feeling
-and aspiration, not indeed of the first, the Materialist, view, (which
-owes all its strength to non-religious causes or to a rebound against
-religious excesses), but of the third, the Pantheistic, Monistic, view,
-whose classical exponent Spinoza will probably remain unto all time.
-
-(3) If we examine into what constitutes the religious plausibility and
-power of this view, we shall find, I think, that it proceeds, above
-all, from the fact that, only too often, the second, the Theistic view
-and practice, leaves almost or quite out of sight the purification
-and slow constitution of the Individual into a Person, by means of
-the Thing-element, the apparently blind Determinism of Natural Law
-and Natural Happenings. Yet nothing can be more certain than that we
-must admit and place this undeniable, increasingly obtrusive, element
-and power _somewhere_ in our lives: if we will not own it as a means,
-it will grip us as our end. The unpurified, all but merely natural,
-animal, lustful and selfish individual man, is far too like to the
-brutes and plants, indeed even to the inorganic substances that so
-palpably surround him, for it not to be a fantastic thought to such
-thinkers as Spinoza, (and indeed it would be an excessive effort to
-himself,) to believe that he is likely, taken simply in this condition,
-to outlast, and is capable of dominating, the huge framework of the
-visible world, into which his whole bodily and psychical mechanism
-is placed, and to which it is bound by a thousand ties and closest
-similarities: his little selfish thinkings cannot but seem mere bubbles
-on a boundless expanse of mere matter; all creation cannot, surely,
-originate in, depend from, and move up to, a Mind and Spirit in any way
-like unto this trivial ingenuity.
-
-(4) It is true, of course, that Spinoza ended,--as far as the logic
-of his system went,--by “purifying” away not only this animal
-Individualism, but Spiritual Personality as well, and this because he
-takes Mathematico-Physical concepts to be as directly applicable and as
-adequate to Ultimate Reality as are the Ethico-Spiritual categories.
-We have then to admit that even so rich and rare, so deeply religious
-a spirit as Spinoza could insist upon purification by the “preliminary
-Pantheism,” and yet could remain, in theory, the eager exponent of
-an ultimate Pantheism. Like the Greeks, he not only passes through
-a middle distance, a range of experience which appears dominated
-by austere Fate and blind Fortune, but finds Fate even in ultimate
-Reality. Whilst, however, the Greeks often thought of Fate as superior
-even to the Gods, Spinoza finds Ultimate Reality to be neither Nature
-nor Spirit, but simply Being in General, with a Law which is neither
-Natural nor Spiritual Law, but Law in general. This General Being and
-General Law then bifurcate, with the most rigorous determinism and
-complete impartiality, step by step, into parallel and ever co-present
-manifestations of Nature and of Spirit, and of their respective laws,
-which, though different, are also each strictly determined within their
-own series.[460]
-
-(5) But Spinoza’s error here undoubtedly lies in his _de facto_
-violent bending (in spite of this theoretical Parallelism) of all
-Knowledge, Reality, and Life, under the sole Mathematico-Physical
-categories and method; and in the insistence upon attaining to ultimate
-Truth by one single bound and with complete adequacy and clearness.
-And the greatness here consists in the keen and massive sense of three
-profound truths. He never forgets that Mathematico-Physical Science
-is rigidly determinist, and that it stands for a certain important
-truth and penetrates to a certain depth of reality. He never ceases
-to feel how impure, selfish, petty is the natural man, and how pure,
-disinterested, noble, can and should be the spiritual personality. And
-he never lets go the sense that, somehow, that science must be able to
-help towards this purification.
-
-(6) Now these three truths must be preserved, whilst the
-Mathematico-Physical one-sidedness and the “one-step” error must
-be carefully eliminated. And indeed it is plain that only by such
-elimination can those truths operate within a fully congenial
-system. For only thus, with a dissimilarity between the Ultimate,
-Libertarian, Spiritual Reality, and the Intermediate, Determinist,
-Physico-Mathematical Range, can we explain and maintain the pain, not
-only of the selfish but also of the true self, in face the Mere Thing;
-and only thus is all such pain and trouble worth having, since only
-thus it leads to the fuller development and the solid constitution of
-an abiding, interior, mental and volitional Personality.
-
-
-5. _Purification of the Personality by the impersonal._
-
-Prof. H. J. Holtzmann has got an eloquent page concerning the kind of
-Dualism which is more than ever desirable for souls, if they would
-achieve a full and virile personality in this our day. “It would appear
-to be the wiser course for us to recognize the incompatibility between
-merely natural existence and truly personal life, just as it is, in
-its whole acute non-reconciliation; to insert this conflict into our
-complete outlook on to Life in its full breadth and depth, and to find
-the harmonization in God the Infinite, in whom alone such parallels can
-meet, and not deliberately to blind our right eye or our left, in order
-to force that outlook into one single aspect,--a degree of unification
-which, when achieved in this violent manner, would mean for us, at the
-same time, a point of absolute inertia, of eternal stagnation.” And
-he then shows how it is precisely the interaction within our minds,
-feelings, and volitions, of, on the one hand, the boundless world
-of nature, with its majestic impersonality, and on the other hand,
-the inexhaustible, indefinitely deeper realm of personal life, as it
-appears within the stream of human history, which is best adapted
-to give us some fuller glimpses of the greatness of God and of the
-specific character of religion.[461]
-
-The religious imagination, mind, heart, and will,--that is to say,
-the complete, fully normal human being at his deepest,--has thus been
-more and more forced, by an increasingly articulated experience of
-the forces and requirements of actual life, to hold and to practise,
-with ever-renewed attempts at their most perfect inter-stimulation and
-mutual supplementation, a profoundly costing, yet immensely fruitful,
-trinity in unity of convictions on this point.
-
-In every time, place, and race, man will continue to be or to become
-religious, in proportion to his efficacious faith in, and love of,
-the overflowing reality and worth of the great direct objects of
-religion,--God and the soul, and their inter-relation in and through
-the Kingdom of God, the Church, and its Divine-Human Head,--the whole
-constituting God’s condescension towards and immanence in man, and
-man’s response and orientation towards the transcendent God.
-
-And again, in every age, place, and race, man will be or will become
-deeply religious, in proportion to the keenness with which he realizes
-the immense need of spiritual growth and purification for his, at best,
-but inchoate personality.
-
-But,--and this third point we must admit, in the precise extension and
-application given to it here, to be characteristically modern,--man
-will, (if he belongs to our time and to our Western races, and is
-determined fully to utilize our special circumstances, lights and
-trials, as so many means towards his own spiritualization), have
-carefully to keep in living touch with that secondary and preliminary
-reality, the Thing-world, the Impersonal Element, Physical Science and
-Determinist Law. He will have to pass and repass beneath these Caudine
-forks; to plunge and to replunge into and through this fiery torrent;
-and, almost a merely animal individual at the beginning and on this
-side of such docile bendings and such courageous plungings, he will,
-(if he combines them with, and effects them through, those two other,
-abiding and ultimate, directly religious convictions), straighten
-himself up again to greater heights, and will come forth from the
-torrent each time a somewhat purer and more developed spiritual person
-than he was before such contraction and purgation.
-
-
-6. _This position new for Science, not for Religion._
-
-Yet even this third point has, if we will but look to its substantial
-significance and religious function, been equivalently held and
-practised ever since the Twice-Born life, the deeper religion, has been
-lived at all.
-
-(1) The Ascetic’s self-thwarting, and the Mystic’s self-oblivion and
-seeking after Pure Love, what are they but the expressions of the very
-same necessities and motives which we would wish to see fully operative
-here? For we are not, of course, here thinking of anything simply
-intellectual, and fit only for the educated few. Any poor laundry-girl,
-who carefully studies and carries out the laws of successful washing,
-who moves, in alternation, away from this concentration on the Thing,
-to recollection and increasingly affective prayer and rudimentary
-contemplation, and who seeks the fuller growth of her spirit and of
-its union with God, in this coming and going, to and from the Visible
-and Contingent, to and from the Spiritual and Infinite, and in what
-these several levels have of contrast and of conflict; or any lowly
-farm-labourer or blacksmith or miner, who would proceed similarly with
-his external determinist mechanical work, and with his deeply internal
-requirements and spiritual growth and consolidation: would all be
-carrying out precisely what is here intended.
-
-(2) As a matter of fact, the source of such novelty, as may be
-found here, is not on the side of religion, but on that of science.
-For the conception of Nature of the ancient Greek Physicists, and
-indeed that of Aristotle, required to be profoundly de-humanized,
-de-sentimentalized: a rigorous mathematical Determinism and soulless
-Mechanism became the right and necessary ideal of Physical Science.
-But, long before the elaboration of this concept of the ruthless Thing,
-and of its blind Force, Our Lord had, by His Life and Teaching, brought
-to man, with abidingly unforgettable, divine depth and vividness, the
-sense of Spirit and Personality, with its liberty and interiority, its
-far-looking wisdom and its regenerating, creative power of love. And
-for some thirteen centuries after this supreme spiritual revelation
-and discovery, that old anthropomorphic and anthropocentric conception
-of the Physical Universe continued, well-nigh unchanged, even among
-the earlier and middle schoolmen, and was readily harmonized with
-that Spiritual world. Yet they were harmonized, upon the whole, by a
-juxtaposition which, in proportion as the conception of Nature became
-Determinist and Mechanical, has turned out more and more untenable;
-and which, like all simple juxtapositions, could not, as such, have
-any spiritually educative force. But Spiritual Reality has now,--for
-those who have become thoroughly awake to the great changes operated,
-for good and all, in man’s conception of the Physical Universe during
-now three centuries,--to be found under, behind, across these Physical
-Phenomena and Laws, which both check and beckon on the mind and soul of
-man, in quest of their ultimate mainstay and motivation.
-
-(3) And let us note how much some such discipline and asceticism is
-required by the whole Christian temper and tradition, and the weakening
-of some older forms of it.
-
-During the first three generations Christians were profoundly sobered
-by the keen expectation of Our Lord’s proximate Second Coming, and
-of the end of the entire earthly order of things, to which all their
-natural affections spontaneously clung; and again and again, up to
-well-nigh the Crusading Age, this poignant and yet exultant expectation
-seized upon the hearts of Christians. And then, especially from St.
-Augustine’s teaching onwards, an all-pervading, frequently very severe,
-conviction as to the profound effects of Original Sin, a pessimistic
-turning away from the future of this sublunar world, as leading up
-to the great Apostacy, and a concentration upon Man’s prehistoric
-beginnings, as incomparably eclipsing all that mankind would ever
-achieve here below, came and largely took the place, as the sobering,
-detaching element in Christianity, of the vivid expectation of the
-Parousia which had characterized the earlier Christian times.
-
-Clearly, the Parousia and the Original Sin conception have ceased to
-exercise their old, poignantly detaching power upon us. Yet we much
-require some such special channel and instrument for the preservation
-and acquisition of the absolutely essential temper of Detachment
-and Other-Worldiness. I think that this instrument and channel of
-purification and detachment--if we have that thirst for the More and
-the Other than all things visible can give to our souls, (a thirst
-which the religious sense alone can supply and without which we are
-religiously but half-awake)--is offered to us now by Science, in the
-sense and for the reasons already described.
-
-
-7. _Three kinds of occupation with Science._
-
-Let the reader note that thus, and, I submit, thus only, we can and
-do enlist the religious passion itself on the side of disinterested,
-rightly autonomous science. For thus the harmony between the different
-aspects and levels of life is not, (except for our general faith in
-its already present latent reality, and in its capacity for ultimate
-full realization and manifestation), the static starting-point or
-automatically persisting fact in man’s life; but it is, on the
-contrary, his ever difficult, never completely realized goal,--a goal
-which can be reached only by an even greater transformation within the
-worker than within the materials worked upon by him,--a transformation
-in great part effected by the enlargement and purification, incidental
-to the inclusion of that large range of Determinist Thing-laws and
-experiences within the Spirit’s Libertarian, Personal life.
-
-It is plain that there are three kinds and degrees of occupation with
-Things and Science, and with their special level of truth and reality;
-and that in proportion as their practice within, and in aid of, the
-spiritual life is difficult, in the same proportion, (given the soul’s
-adequacy to this particular amount of differentiation and pressure)--is
-this practice purifying. And though but few souls will be called to
-any appreciable amount of activity within the third degree, all souls
-can be proved, I think, to require a considerable amount of the first
-two kinds, whilst mankind at large most undoubtedly demands careful,
-thorough work of all three sorts.
-
-The first kind is that of the man with a hobby. His directly religious
-acts and his toilsome bread-winning will thus get relieved and
-alternated by, say, a little Botany or a little Numismatics, or by any
-other “safe” science, taken in a “safe” dose, in an easy, _dilettante_
-fashion, for purposes of such recreation. This kind is already in
-fairly general operation, and is clearly useful in its degree and way,
-but it has, of course, no purificatory force at all.
-
-The second kind is that of the man whose profession is some kind
-of science which has, by now, achieved a more or less secure place
-alongside of, or even within, religious doctrines and feelings,--such
-as Astronomy or Greek Archaeology. Here the purification will be in
-proportion to the loyal thoroughness with which he fully maintains,
-indeed develops, the special characteristics and autonomy both of
-these Sciences, as the foreground, part-material and stimulation, and
-of Religion, as the groundwork, background and ultimate interpreter
-and moulder of his complete and organized life; and with which he
-makes each contribute to the development of the other and of the
-entire personality, its apprehensions and its work. This second kind
-is still comparatively rare, doubtless, in great part, because of the
-considerable cost and the lifelong practice and training involved in
-what readily looks like a deliberate complicating and endangering of
-things, otherwise, each severally, simple and safe.
-
-And the third kind is that of him whose systematic mental activity
-is devoted to some science or research, which is still in process of
-winning full and peaceful recognition by official Theology,--say,
-Biological Evolution or Biblical Criticism. Here the purification will,
-for a soul capable of such a strain, be at its fullest, provided such a
-soul is deeply moved by, and keeps devotedly faithful to, the love of
-God and of man, of humble labour and of self-renouncing purification,
-and, within this great ideal and determination, maintains and
-ameliorates with care the methods, categories and tests special both to
-these sciences and investigations, and to their ultimate interpretation
-and utilization in the philosophy and life of religion. For here there
-will, as yet, be no possibility of so shunting the scientific activity
-on to one side, or of limiting it to a carefully pegged-out region,
-as to let Religion and Science energize as forces of the same kind
-and same level, the same clearness and same finality; but the Science
-will here have to be passed through, as the surface-level, on the way
-to Religion as underlying all. What would otherwise readily tend to
-become, as it were, a mental Geography, would thus here give way to
-what might be pictured as a spiritual Geology.
-
-
-8. _Historical Science, Religion’s present, but not ultimate, problem._
-
-The reader will have noted that, for each of these three stages, I have
-taken an Historico-Cultural as well as a Mathematico-Physical Science,
-though I am well aware of the profound difference between them, both as
-to their prerequisites and method, and their aim and depth. And, again,
-I know well that, for the present, the chief intellectual difficulty
-of Religion, or at least the main conflict or friction between the
-Sciences and Theology, seems to proceed, not from Physical Science but
-from Historical Criticism, especially as applied to the New Testament,
-so that, on this ground also, I ought, apparently, to keep these two
-types of Science separate.--Yet it is clear, I think, that, however
-distinct, indeed different, should be the methods of these two sorts of
-Science, they are in so far alike, if taken as a means of purification
-for the soul bent upon its own deepening, that both require a slow,
-orderly, disinterested procedure, capable of fruitfulness only by
-the recurring sacrifice of endless petty self-seekings and obstinate
-fancies, and this in face of that natural eagerness and absoluteness
-of mind which strong religious emotions will, unless they too be
-disciplined and purified, only tend to increase and stereotype.
-
-The matters brought up by Historical Criticism for the study and
-readjustment of Theology, and for utilization by Religion, are indeed
-numerous and in part difficult. Yet the still more general and
-fundamental alternatives lie not here, but with the questions as to the
-nature and range of Science taken in its narrower sense,--as concerned
-with Quantity, Mechanism, and Determinism alone.
-
-If Science of this Thing-type be all that, in any manner or degree, we
-can apprehend in conformity with reality or can live by fruitfully:
-then History and Religion of every kind must be capable of a strict
-assimilation to it, or they must go. But if such Science constitute
-only one kind, and, though the clearest and most easily transferable,
-yet the least deep, and the least adequate to the ultimate and
-spiritual reality, among the chief levels of apprehension and of life
-which can be truly experienced and fruitfully lived by man; and if the
-Historical and Spiritual level can be shown to find room for, indeed to
-require, the Natural and Mechanical level, whilst this latter, taken
-as ultimate, cannot accommodate, but is forced to crush or to deny,
-the former: then a refusal to accept more than can be expressed and
-analyzed by such Physico-Mathematical Science would be an uprooting and
-a discrowning of the fuller life, and would ignore the complete human
-personality, from one of whose wants the entire impulse to such Science
-took its rise.
-
-As a matter of fact, we find the following three alternatives.
-
-Level all down to Mathematico-Physical Science, and you deny the
-specific constituents of Spirituality, and you render impossible the
-growth of the Person out of, and at the expense of, the Individual.
-Proclaim the Person and its Religion, as though they were static
-substances adequately present from the first, and ignore, evade or
-thwart that Thing-level and method as far as ever you can, and you
-will, in so far, keep back the all but simply animal Individual from
-attaining to his full spiritual Personality. But let grace wake up,
-in such an Individual, the sense of the specific characteristics of
-Spirituality and the thirst to become a full and ever fuller Person,
-and this in contact and conflict with, as well as in recollective
-abstraction from, the apparently chance contingencies of History and
-Criticism, and the seemingly fatalistic mechanisms of Physics and
-Mathematics: and you will be able, by humility, generosity, and an
-ever-renewed alternation of such outgoing, dispersive efforts and of
-such incoming recollection and affective prayer, gradually to push out
-and to fill in the outlines of your better nature, and to reorganize it
-all according to the Spirit and to Grace, becoming thus a deep man, a
-true personality.
-
-Once again: take the intermediate, the Thing-level as final, and you
-yourself sink down more and more into a casual Thing, a soulless Law;
-Materialism, or, at best, some kind of Pantheism, must become your
-practice and your creed.--Take the anterior, the Individual-level as
-final, and you will remain something all but stationary, and if not
-merely a Thing yet not fully a Person; and if brought face to face
-with many an Agnostic or Pantheist of the nobler sort, who is in
-process of purification from such childish self-centredness by means
-of the persistently frank and vivid apprehension of the Mechanical,
-Determinist, Thing-and-Fate level of experience and degree of truth,
-you will, even if you have acquired certain fragmentary convictions and
-practices of religion, appear strangely less, instead of more, than
-your adversary, to any one capable of equitably comparing that Agnostic
-and yourself--you who, if Faith be right, ought surely to be not less
-but more of a personality than that non-believing soul.
-
-But take the last, the Spiritual, Personal level as alone ultimate,
-and yet as necessarily requiring, to be truly reached and maintained,
-that the little, selfish, predominantly animal-minded, human being
-should ever pass and repass from this, his Individualistic plane
-and attitude, through the Thing-and-Fate region, out and on to the
-“shining table-land, whereof our God Himself is sun and moon”: and
-you will, in time, gain a depth and an expansion, a persuasive force,
-an harmoniousness and intelligibleness with which, everything else
-being equal, the Pantheistic or Agnostic self-renunciation cannot
-truly compare. For, in these circumstances, the latter type will, at
-best, but prophesy and prepare the consummation actually reached by
-the integrational, dynamic religiousness, the Individual transformed
-more and more into Spirit and Person, by the help of the Thing and of
-Determinist Law. Freedom, Interiority, Intelligence, Will, Grace, and
-Love, the profoundest Personality, a reality out of all proportion
-more worthy and more ultimate than the most utterly unbounded universe
-of a simply material kind could ever be, thus appear here, in full
-contradiction of Pantheism, as ultimate and abiding; and yet all
-that is great and legitimate in Pantheism has been retained, as an
-intermediate element and stage, of a deeply purifying kind.
-
-
-9. _Return to Saints John of the Cross and Catherine of Genoa._
-
-And thus we come back to the old, sublime wisdom of St. John of the
-Cross, in all that it has of continuous thirst after the soul’s
-purification and expansion, and of a longing to lose itself, its
-every pettiness and egoistic separateness, in an abstract, universal,
-quasi-impersonal disposition and reality, such as God here seems
-to require and to offer as the means to Himself. Only that now we
-have been furnished, by the ever-clearer self-differentiation of
-Mathematico-Physical Science, with a zone of pure, sheer Thing, mere
-soulless Law, a zone capable of absorbing all those elements from out
-of our thought and feeling which, if left freely to mingle with the
-deeper level of the growing Spiritual Personality, would give to this
-an unmistakably Pantheistic tinge and trend. Hence, now the soul will
-have, in one of its two latter movements, to give a close attention to
-contingent facts and happenings and to abstract laws, possessed of no
-direct religious significance or interpretableness which, precisely
-because of this, will, if practised as part of the larger whole of
-the purificatory, spiritual upbuilding of the soul, in no way weaken,
-but stimulate and furnish materials for the other movement, the one
-specially propounded by the great Spaniard, in which the soul turns
-away, from all this particularity, to a general recollection and
-contemplative prayer.
-
-And we are thus, perhaps, in even closer touch with Catherine’s
-central idea,--the soul’s voluntary plunge into a painful yet joyous
-purgation, into a state, and as it were an element, which purges away,
-(since the soul itself freely accepts the process), all that deflects,
-stunts, or weakens the realization of the soul’s deepest longings,--the
-hard self-centredness, petty self-mirrorings, and jealous claimfulness,
-above all. For though, in Catherine’s conception, this at first both
-painful and joyful, and then more and more, and at last entirely,
-joyful, ocean of light and fire is directly God and His effects upon
-the increasingly responsive and unresisting soul: yet the apparent
-Thing-quality here, the seemingly ruthless Determinism of Law, in
-which the little individual is lost for good and all, and which only
-the spiritual personality can survive, are impressively prominent
-throughout this great scheme. And though we cannot, of course, take the
-element and zone of the sheer Thing and of Determinist Law as God, or
-as directly expressive of His nature, yet we can and must hold it, (in
-what it is in itself, in what it is as a construction of our minds,
-and in its purificatory function and influence upon our unpurified but
-purifiable souls), to come from God and to lead to Him. And thus here
-also we escape any touch of ultimate Pantheism, without falling into
-any cold Deism or shallow Optimism. For just because we retain, at the
-shallower level, the ruthlessly impersonal element, can we, by freely
-willed, repeated passing through such fatalistic-seeming law, become,
-from individuals, persons; from semi-things, spirits,--spirits more and
-more penetrated by and apprehensive of the Spirit, God, the source and
-sustainer of all this growth and reality.
-
-And yet, let us remember once more, the foreground and preliminary
-stage to even the sublimest of such lives will never, here below at
-least, be abidingly transcended, or completely harmonized with the
-groundwork and ultimate stage, by the human personality. Indeed our
-whole contention has been that, with every conceivable variation of
-degree, of kind, and of mutual relation, these two stages, and some
-sort of friction between them, are necessary, throughout this life,
-for the full development, the self-discipline, and the adequate
-consolidation, at the expense of the childish, sophistic individual, of
-the true spiritual Personality.
-
-
-
-
-IV. FINAL SUMMARY AND RETURN TO THE STARTING-POINT OF THE WHOLE
-INQUIRY: THE NECESSITY, AND YET THE ALMOST INEVITABLE MUTUAL HOSTILITY,
-OF THE THREE GREAT FORCES OF THE SOUL AND OF THE THREE CORRESPONDING
-ELEMENTS OF RELIGION.
-
-
-Our introductory position as to the three great forces of the soul,
-with the corresponding three great elements of religion, appears, then,
-to have stood the test of our detailed investigation. For each of these
-forces and corresponding elements has turned out to be necessary to
-religion, and yet to become destructive of itself and of religion in
-general where this soul-force and religious element is allowed gravely
-to cripple, or all but to exclude, the other forces and elements, and
-their vigorous and normal action and influence.
-
-
-1. _Each of these three forces and elements is indeed necessary, but
-ruinously destructive where it more or less ousts the other two._
-
-(1) The psychic force or faculty by which we remember and picture
-things and scenes; the law of our being which requires that
-sense-impressions should stimulate our thinking and feeling into
-action, and that symbols, woven by the picturing faculty out of these
-impressions, should then express these our thoughts and feelings; and
-the need we have, for the due awakening, discipline and supplementation
-of every kind and degree of experience and action, that social
-tradition, social environment, social succession should ever be before
-and around and after our single lives: correspond to and demand the
-Institutional and Historical Element of Religion. This element is as
-strictly necessary as are that force and that law.
-
-Yet if this force and need of the soul, and this religious element
-are allowed to emasculate the other two primary soul-forces and needs
-and the religious elements corresponding to them, it will inevitably
-degenerate into more or less of a Superstition,--an oppressive
-materialization and dangerous would-be absolute fixation of even quite
-secondary and temporary expressions and analyses of religion; a ruinous
-belief in the direct transferableness of religious conviction; and a
-predominance of political, legal, physically coercive concepts and
-practices with regard to those most interior, strong yet delicate,
-readily thwarted or weakened, springs of all moral and religious
-character,--spiritual sincerity and spontaneity and the liberty of
-the children of God. We thus get too great a preponderance of the
-“Objective,” of Law and Thing, as against Conviction and Person; of
-Priest as against Prophet; of the movement from without inwards, as
-against the movements from within outwards.
-
-The Spanish Inquisition we found to be probably the most striking
-example and warning here. Yet the Eastern Christian Churches have
-doubtless exhibited these symptoms, if less acutely, yet more
-extensively and persistently. And the Protestant Reformation-Movement,
-(even in the later lives of its protagonists, Luther, Zwingli, and
-Calvin), much of orthodox Lutheranism and Calvinism, and some forms and
-phases of Anglican Highchurchism and of Scotch Presbyterianism, show
-various degrees and forms of a similar one-sidedness. In Judaism the
-excesses in the Priestly type of Old Testament religion, especially
-as traceable after the Exile, and their partial continuation in
-Rabbinism, furnish other, instructive instances of such more or less
-partial growth,--the Pharisees and the Jerusalem Sanhedrin being here
-the fullest representatives of the spirit in question. The classical
-Heathen Roman religion was, throughout, too Naturalistic for its,
-all but exclusive, externalism and legalism to be felt as seriously
-oppressive of any other, considerable element of that religion. And
-much the same could doubtless be said of Indian Brahmanism to this
-day. But in orthodox Mohammedanism we get the truly classical instance
-of such a predominance, in all its imposing strength and terrible,
-because all but irremediable, weakness--with its utterly unanalytic,
-unspeculative, unmystical, thing-like, rock-solid faith; its detailed
-rigidity and exhaustive fixity; its stringent unity of organization
-and military spirit of entirely blind obedience; its direct, quite
-unambiguous intolerance, and ever ready appeal to the sword, as the
-normal and chief instrument for the propagation of the spirit; and its
-entirely inadequate apprehension of man’s need of purification and
-regeneration in all his untutored loves, fears, hopes and hates.
-
-(2) Then there is the soul-force by which we analyze and synthesize,
-and the law of our being which requires us to weigh, compare, combine,
-transfer, or ignore the details and the evidential worth of what has
-been brought home to us through the stimulation of our senses, by our
-picturing faculty and memory, and by means of our Social, Historical,
-and Institutional environment, and which orders us to harmonize all
-these findings into as much as may be of an intelligible whole of
-religion, and to integrate this religious whole within some kind of,
-at least rough, general conception as to our entire life’s experience.
-And this force and law are answered by the Critical-Historical and
-Synthetic-Philosophical element of religion. We thus get Positive
-and Dogmatic Theology. And this element is as humanly inevitable and
-religiously necessary as is that soul-force and law.
-
-Yet here again, if this force, law, and element are allowed
-superciliously to ignore, or violently to explain away, the other kinds
-of approaches and contributions to religious truth and experience,
-special to the other two soul-forces and religious elements, we shall
-get another destructive one-sidedness, a Rationalistic Fanaticism,
-only too often followed by a lengthy Agnosticism and Indifference.
-Whilst the Rationalist Fanaticism lasts, everything will doubtless
-appear clear and simple to the soul, but then this “everything” will
-but represent the merest skimmings upon the face of the mighty deep
-of living, complete religion,--a petty, artificial arrangement by the
-human mind of the little which, there and then, it can easily harmonize
-into a whole, or even simply a direct hypostatizing of the mind’s own
-bare categories.
-
-The worship of the Goddess of Reason at Notre-Dame of Paris we found to
-be here, perhaps, the most striking instance. Yet Rationalist excesses,
-varying from a cold Deism down to an ever short-lived formal Atheism,
-and the lassitude of a worldly-wise Indifferentism, are traceable
-within all the great religions. Thus a large proportion of the educated
-members of the ancient Graeco-Roman world were, from the Sophists and
-the Second Punic War onward, stricken with such a blight. The Sadducees
-are typical of this tendency among the Jews for some two centuries.
-The tough persistence of a mostly obscure current of destructive
-free-thought throughout Western Europe in the Middle Ages shows well
-the difficulty and importance of a mental and spiritual victory over
-these forces of radical negation, and of not simply driving them
-beneath the surface of society. And the ready lapse of the most daring
-and intense of the Medieval, Jewish and Christian, Scholastics into a
-thoroughly Pantheistic Panlogism, points to the prevalence, among these
-circles, of a certain tyranny of the abstractive and logical faculty
-over the other powers and intimations of the soul.--Unitarianism again
-is, in its origins and older form, notwithstanding its even excessive
-anti-Pantheism, strongly Scholastic in its whole temper and method, and
-this without the important correctives and supplementations brought
-to that method by the largely Mystical and Immanental Angel of the
-Schools. The greater part of the “Aufklärung”-Movement was vitiated
-by an often even severer, impoverishment of the whole conception of
-religion. And, in our day, the Liberal movements within the various
-Christian bodies, and again among Brahmanic religionists in India,
-rarely escape altogether from ignoring or explaining away the dark
-and toilsome aspects of life, and the inevitable excess of all deep
-reality, and indeed of our very experience of it, above our clear,
-methodical, intellectual analysis and synthesis of it. Too often and
-for too long all such groups have inclined to assimilate all Experience
-to clear Knowledge, all clear Knowledge to Physico-Mathematical
-Science, all Religion to Ethics, and all Ethics to a simple belief
-in the ultimacy of Determinist, Atomistic Science. The situation is
-decidedly improving now; History and Culture are being found to have
-other, more ultimate categories, than are those of Mathematics and
-Physics, and to bring us a larger amount of reality, and Ethics and
-Religion are discovered to be as truly distinct as they are closely
-allied and necessary, each to the deepest development of the other.
-
-(3) The faculty and action of the soul, finally, by which we have an
-however dim yet direct and (in its general effects) immensely potent,
-sense and feeling, an immediate experience of Objective Reality, of
-the Infinite and Abiding, of a Spirit not all unlike yet distinct from
-our own, Which penetrates and works within these our finite spirits
-and in the world at large, especially in human history; and by which
-we will, and give a definite result and expression to, our various
-memories, thinkings, feelings, and intuitions, as waked up by their
-various special stimulants and by the influence of each upon all the
-others: is met by the Mystical and the directly Operative element of
-Religion. And here again we have a force and law of the human spirit,
-and a corresponding element of religion, which can indeed be starved
-or driven into a most dangerous isolation and revolt, but which are
-simply indestructible.
-
-The Apocalyptic Orgies of the Münster Anabaptists we found to be
-perhaps the most striking illustration of the dire mischief that can
-spring from this third group of elemental soul-forces, when they ignore
-or dominate the other two. Yet some such Emotional Fanaticism can be
-traced, in various degrees and forms, throughout all such religious
-groups, schools, and individuals as seriously attempt to practise Pure
-Mysticism,--that is, religious Intuition and Emotion unchecked by the
-other two soul-forces and religious elements, or by the alternation of
-external action and careful contact with human Society and its needs
-and helps, Art and Science, and the rest.
-
-Thus we find that, after the immense, luxuriant prevalence of an
-intensely intuitive, emotional, tumultuously various apprehension
-and manifestation of religion during the first two generations
-of Christians, and even after the deep, wise supplementation and
-spiritualization of this element by St. Paul, who in his own person so
-strikingly combined the Institutional, Rational and Intuitive-Emotional
-forces and elements, this whole force and element rapidly all but
-disappeared for long from Western Christian orthodoxy. And Montanism
-in still early times, and, during the very height of the Middle
-Ages, the Waldensian and Albigensian movements--all predominantly
-intuitive, enthusiastic, individualist--appear as so many revolutionary
-explosions, threatening the whole fabric of Christendom with
-dissolution. The “Eternal Gospel” movement of Abbot Joachim, on
-the other hand, gives us the intuitional-emotive element in a more
-purified, institutionally and rationally supplemented form.
-
-Again we find that, for a while, in reaction from an all but hopelessly
-corrupt civilization, the Fathers of the Desert attained in many cases,
-by means of an all but Exclusive Mysticism, to a type of sanctity
-and to the inculcation of a lesson which the Church has gratefully
-recognized. We have to admit that many of the Italian, French and
-Spanish Quietists of the Seventeenth Century were no doubt excessively,
-or even quite unjustly, suspected or pursued, as far at least as their
-own personal motives and the effect of their doctrines upon their own
-characters were concerned; and that the general reaction against even
-the proved, grave excesses of some of these men and women, went often
-dangerously far in the contrary direction. Indeed even the fierce
-fanaticism of the Dutch-Westphalian Apocalyptic Intuitionists can but
-excuse, not justify, the policy of quite indiscriminately ruthless
-extermination pursued by Luther, Zwingli and Calvin, and by their
-official churches after their deaths, towards any and all Illuminism,
-however ethically pure and socially operative. The “Society of Friends”
-which, measured by the smallness of its numbers, has given to the world
-an astonishingly large band of devoted lovers of humankind, is a living
-witness to the possibility of such an Illuminism.
-
-And we can note how the sane and solid, deep and delicate constituents,
-which had existed, mixed up with all kinds of fantastic, often
-hysterical and anti-moral exaltations, within most of those all but
-purely Intuitionist circles, gradually found their escape away into all
-sorts of unlikely quarters, helping to give much of their interiority
-and religious warmth, not only to various, now fairly sober-minded,
-Nonconformist Protestant bodies on the Continent, in England and
-America, but also to the more religious-tempered and more spiritually
-perceptive among modern philosophers--such as Spinoza, Kant, Fichte,
-Schleiermacher, Schelling and Fechner.
-
-Within the Jewish world, we get much of this element at its noblest
-and at its worst, in the true and false Prophets respectively; then
-among the Essenes, for the times between the Maccabean resistance and
-the revolt of Bar Cochba; and later on in the Kabbala. The Mohammedans
-still furnish the example of the Sufi-movement. The Classical Heathen
-world produced the Neo-Platonist and the Mithraic movements; and we can
-still study, as a living thing, the Buddhist Mysticism of Thibet.
-
-We have then, here too, something thoroughly elemental, which requires
-both persistent operative recognition and a continuous and profound
-purification and supplementation by becoming incorporated within a
-large living system of all the fundamental forces of the soul, each
-operating and operated upon according to the intrinsic nature and
-legitimate range of each.
-
-
-2. _Each element double; endless combinations and conflicts._
-
-We have also found that these three forces and elements are each
-double, and that collisions, but also most fruitful interactions, can
-and do obtain between even these yoke-fellows: between Institutionalise
-and History,--the Present and the Past, a direct Sense-Impression and
-Picture and a Memory; between Criticism and Construction,--Analysis
-and acuteness of mind, and Synthesis and richness and balance of
-imagination, head, heart, and will; and between Mysticism and Action,
-as respectively Intuitive and quiescent and Volitional and effortful.
-
-And both the three forces and elements as a whole, and the single
-members of each pair, can and do appear in every possible variety of
-combination with, and of opposition against, the others, although
-there is a special affinity between the Critical-Speculative and the
-Intuitive-Volitional pairs (in combination against the Sense-and-Memory
-pair); between the Sense-and-Memory pair and the single member of
-Action; and between the single members of Speculation and of Intuition.
-Yet, ultimately, not any one pair or member can bear its fullest fruit,
-without the aid of all the others; and there is not one that, in actual
-human nature, does not tend to emasculate, or to oust as much as
-possible from the soul, the other pairs or single members.
-
-
-3. _Our entire religious activity but one element of our complete
-spirit-life._
-
-And we have noted further, how even the fullest development in
-any one soul of all these three couples of specifically religious
-activities--even supposing that they could be developed to their
-fullest, without any participation in and conflict with other degrees
-and kinds of life and reality--do not, by any means, exhaust the range
-of even the simplest soul’s actual energizings.
-
-(1) For over and beyond the specifically religious life--though this,
-where genuine, is ever the deepest, the central life--every soul lives,
-and has to live, various other lives. And indeed--and this is the
-point which specially concerns religion--the soul cannot attain to its
-fullest possible spiritual development, without the vigorous specific
-action and differentiation of forces and functions of a not directly
-religious character, which will have to energize, each according
-to its own intrinsic nature, within the ever ampler, and ever more
-closely-knit, organization of the complete life of the soul.
-
-(2) And within this complete life, the three pairs of religious forces
-and elements each possess their own special affinities and antipathies
-for certain of the forces and elements which constitute the other,
-less central organizations of man’s marvellously rich activity.
-The Historical-Institutional element of Religion has necessarily
-a special affinity for, and borrows much of its form from, social,
-legal, political history and institutions of a general kind. The
-Critical-Speculative element of religion is necessarily cognate to, and
-in a state of interchange with, the general historical criticism and
-philosophical insight attained during the ages and amongst the races in
-which any particular religion is intellectually systematized. And the
-Mystical-Operative element is necessarily influenced by, and largely
-utilizes the general emotive and volitional gifts and habits, peculiar
-to the various ages and peoples within which this double religious
-element is in operation.
-
-(3) It is thus abundantly clear how greatly a work so manifold in its
-means, and so harmonious in its end, requires, if it is to come to
-a considerable degree of realization, that single souls, and single
-classes and types of souls, should have around them a large and varied
-Historical and Institutional, a Social life both of a specifically
-religious and of a general kind, and that, within this large ambit of
-the actualized religion of others and of the still largely potential
-religion of their own souls, they shall develop and be helped to
-realize their own deepest spiritual capacities and _attrait_. They
-will have to develop these special capabilities to the utmost degree
-compatible with some practice of the other chief elements of religion,
-with a continuous respect for and belief in the necessity of the other
-types of soul, and with a profound belief in, and love of, the full,
-organized community of all devoted souls, which builds up, and is built
-up by, all this variety in unity. The Kingdom of God, the Church, will
-thus be more and more found and made to be the means of an ever more
-distinct articulation, within an ever more fruitful interaction, of
-the various _attraits_, gifts, vocations, and types of souls which
-constitute its society. And these souls in return will, precisely
-by this their articulation within this ampler system, bring to this
-society an ever richer content of variety in harmony, of action and
-warfare within an ever deeper fruitfulness and peace.
-
-
-4. _Two conditions of the fruitfulness of the entire process._
-
-Yet even the simplest effort, within this innumerable sequence and
-simultaneity of activities, will lack the fullest truth and religious
-depth and fruitfulness, unless two experiences, convictions and motives
-are in operation throughout the whole, and penetrate its every part,
-as salt and yeast, atmosphere and light penetrate, and purify and
-preserve our physical food and bodily senses.
-
-The vivid, continuous sense that God, the Spirit upholding our poor
-little spirits, is the true originator and the true end of the whole
-movement, in all it may have of spiritual beauty, truth, goodness
-and vitality; that all the various levels and kinds of reality and
-action are, in whatever they have of worth, already immanently
-fitted to stimulate, supplement and purify each other by Him Who, an
-Infinite Spiritual Interiority Himself, gives thus to each one of us
-indefinite opportunities for actualizing our own degree and kind of
-spiritual possibility and ideal; and that He it is Who, however dimly
-yet directly, touches our souls and awakens them, in and through all
-those minor stimulations and apprehensions, to that noblest, incurable
-discontent with our own petty self and to that sense of and thirst for
-the Infinite and Abiding, which articulates man’s deepest requirement
-and characteristic: this is the first experience and conviction,
-without which all life, and life’s centre, religion, are flat and
-dreary, vain and philistine.
-
-And the second conviction is the continuous sense of the ever
-necessary, ever fruitful, ever bliss-producing Cross of Christ--the
-great law and fact that only through self-renunciation and suffering
-can the soul win its true self, its abiding joy in union with the
-Source of Life, with God Who has left to us, human souls, the choice
-between two things alone: the noble pangs of spiritual child-birth, of
-painful-joyous expansion and growth; and the shameful ache of spiritual
-death, of dreary contraction and decay.
-
-Now it is especially these two, ever primary and supreme, ever deepest
-and simplest yet most easily forgotten, bracing yet costing, supremely
-virile truths and experiences--facts which increasingly can and
-ever should waken up, and themselves be vivified by, all the other
-activities and gifts of God which we have studied--these two eyes
-of religion and twin pulse-beats of its very heart, that have been
-realized, with magnificent persistence and intensity, by the greatest
-of the Inclusive Mystics.
-
-And amongst these Mystics, Caterinetta Fiesca Adorna, the Saint
-of Genoa, has appeared to us as one who, in spite of not a little
-obscurity and uncertainty and vagueness in the historical evidences for
-her life and teaching, of not a few limitations of natural character
-and of opportunity, and of several peculiarities which, wonderful to
-her _entourage_, can but perplex or repel us now, shines forth, in
-precisely these two central matters, with a penetrating attractiveness,
-rarely matched, hardly surpassed, by Saints and Heroes of far more
-varied, humorous, readily understandable, massive gifts and actions.
-And these very limits and defects of her natural character and
-opportunities, of her contemporary disciples and later panegyrists,
-and of our means for studying and ascertaining the facts and precise
-value of the life she lived, and of the legend which it occasioned,
-may, we can hope, but help to give a richer articulation and wider
-applicability to our study of the character and necessity, the limits,
-dangers and helpfulness of the Mystic Element of Religion.
-
-
-
-
-INDEX
-
-
-(_Some corrections of mistakes in names and references, as given in the
-foregoing work, have been silently effected in the following Index_)
-
-
-I. OF SUBJECT-MATTERS
-
- Abelard, I. 61
-
- Absorptions of St. Catherine, I. 226-229
-
- Acarie, Madame, I. 89
-
- Acquasola, Genoa, I. 144, 145 _n._ 1, 168
-
- Action (reflex), its three elements, I. 57-58
-
- Adorni Family, I. 96, =101=, 102
- various, I. 102, 145 _n._ 1, 151, 153-155, 173, 300, 327, 377
-
- Adorno, Giuliano, I. =101=, =102=, 103, 138, 145 _n._ 1, =149=, 153,
- 173, 187, 225, 296, 297 _n._ 1, 300, 307, 308, 309, 311, 313,
- 325 _n._ 1, 377, 378, 379, 382, 386, 388, 394, 454, 455; II. 29, 74
- he becomes a Tertiary of the Order of St. Francis, I. 130
- his bankruptcy, I. 128-129
- character, I. 102
- conversion, I. 129
- his death, I. 149-156, 379
- his illness, I. 149 _n._ 1.
- his life in the little house within the Hospital, I. 129-131
- his monument, I. 297 _n._ 1
- his natural daughter, I. 129
- his will, I. =151-152=, 378-379
- moves into the Hospital, I. 141, 142
- sells his palace, I. 148 _n._ 1
-
- Adorno Palazzo, I. 108, 128, 148, 327, 377, 379, 403
-
- Aeschylus, II. 189, 271
-
- Afer, Victorinus, I. 266 _n._ 3
-
- Affinities, human, furthered by Mysticism, II. 331-335
-
- After-life beliefs, in Asiatic countries, II. 183-185
- in Greece, II. 185-189
- of the Jews, II. 189-191
- problems, ethico-practical difficulties of, II. 197-199
- historical difficulties of, II. 182-194
- philosophical difficulties of, II. 194-197
-
- After-life, its forecasts in St. Catherine, II. 200-203
- Plato’s influence on them, II. 203-211
-
- Agnosticism (Mystical), criticism of, II. 287-296
-
- Agrigentum, II. 188
-
- Aix, Cathedral of, and triptych, I. 96
-
- Akiba, Rabbi, II. 233, 268, 292
-
- Alacoque, St. Marie Marguerite, II. 42, 56, 58
-
- Albigensian movement, II. 391
-
- Alcantara, St. Peter of, II. 143
-
- Alexander VI, Pope (Borgia), I. 95
- VII, Pope (Chigi), II. 168 _n._ 1
-
- Alexandrian School, I. 61
-
- Alfred, King, II. 44
-
- Aloysius, St. Gonzaga, I. 88
-
- Alvarez, Venerable Balthazar, S.J., I. 64
-
- Ambrosian Library, Milan, I. 411 _n._ 1, 466
-
- America, II. 370, 392
-
- Amos, II. 189, 268
-
- Anabaptists, I. 9, 63; II. 391
- their orgies, I. 10, 340; II. 391
-
- Anaxagoras, I. 12
-
- Andrew, Monastery of St., Genoa, I. 325 _n._ 2
-
- Andrewes, Anglican Bp. Lancelot, I. 63
-
- Angelica Library, Rome, I. 411 _n._ 1
-
- Angelo, Castel S., Rome, I. 327
- of Chiavasso, Blessed, O.S.F., I. 116
-
- Anglican Highchurchism, II. 63, 388
-
- Anglicanism, its three elements, I. 8, 9, 63
-
- Anguisola, Donna Andronica, I. 359, 361, 363, 364, 403, 413, 416
-
- Animal-life, St. Catherine’s sympathy with, I. 163, 164
-
- Anjou, Charles I. of, I. 96
- Margaret of, I. 96
- René of, King of Naples, I. 96
-
- Annunciation, Church of the, Sturla, I. 451
-
- Annunziata in Portorio, Church of Sma., Genoa, I. 98 _n._ 1 (99), 130,
- 201 _n._ 3, 297 _n._ 1, 313, 325 _n._ 1
- Monastery of, I. 319, 325
-
- Annunziata, Piazza della Sma., Genoa, I. 102
-
- Anselm, St., Archbishop, I. 78; II. 142, 181
-
- Anthony, St., I. 373
-
- Antiochene School, I. 61
-
- Antiochus Epiphanes, II. 292
-
- Antonietta (servant), I. 149, 153, 226
-
- Apocalypse, II. 269
-
- Apollo Katharsios, II. 93
-
- Apostles, I. 27, 389
-
- Apprehension, Mystical, no distinct faculty of, II. =283-284=
-
- Arc, Jeanne d’, Ven., II. 47
-
- Archives, Archiepiscopal, of Genoa, I. 411 _n._ 1
- of the Cathedral Chapter, Genoa, I. 384
-
- Archivio di Stato in Genoa, I. 153 _n._ 1, 172, 176 _n._ 1, 2,
- 378 _n._ 1, 379 _n._ 1, 381 _n._ 1, 203 _n._ 1, 213; II. 10 _n._ 1.
-
- Argentina, del Sale (de Ripalta), I. 149, 151, 162 _n._ 2 (163),
- =169-171=, 173, 175, 197 _n._ 4 (198), 210 _n._ 1, 213 _n._ 1,
- =215-219=, 223, 226, 297 _n._ 1, 298, 299, 367, 310-312, =313=,
- =314=, 387-389, 402, =452=, =453=, 464; II. 4, 26
- adopted by St. Catherine, I. 170, 171
- her fate, I. 313, 314
- much alone with St. Catherine in 1510, she helps on growth of
- legends, I. 203; II. 4, 26, 197 _n._ 4 (198), 203, 209, 210 _n._ 1,
- 219, 452, 453
- wills of, I. 313, 381
-
- Arias, Francisco, S.J., I. 89
-
- Aristotle, I. 7, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 41, 42; II. 131, 132, 194, 203, 249,
- 250, 252, 264, 310, 311, 312, 320, 324, 379
- his conception of “Unmoving Energy,” II. =131=, =132=, 250
- of the Noûs, II. 32
- of God as sheer abstract Thought, II. 251
- his general doctrine, I. 19-23
-
- Arnold, Dr. Thomas, of Rugby, I. 63
-
- Ars, Curé d’, the Bl. J. B. Vianney, II. 143
-
- Arvenza, on the Riviera, I. 318
-
- Asceticism and Mystical abstractiveness, II. 348-349
- ordinary and social Christianity, II. 355-358
- ordinary, as practised by Mystics, II. 341-343
-
- Asia Minor, II. 188
-
- Assyria, II. 185
-
- Atman, II. 183
-
- Augsburg, David of, O. S. F., II. 363
-
- Augustine, St., I. 61, 100; II. 117, 129, 131, 142, 205, 211, 212, 213,
- 214, 215, 261, 266 _n._ 3, 270, 282, 298, 380
- on Evil as negative, II. 293
- on fire of Hell, II. 216
- on mitigation of sufferings of the Lost, II. 225
- on Purgatory, II. 216, 217
- on soul’s Rest between death and resurrection, II. 211, 212
- on Original Sin, II. 298-301
- on God and the soul as out of Space, II. =212=, =213=
- on Time and Eternity, II. 165 _n._, =248=
-
- Augustinian Canonesses, I. 103 _n._ 1; II. 62
- Canons, I. 103 _n._ 1
-
- Augustinianesses, Chapel of the, Genoa, I. 109, 170
-
- Avicebron, _see_ Gebirol Ibn
-
- Avicenna, II. 317
-
- Avignon exile, I. 94
-
- Azzolini, Cardinal, I. 305
- dei Manfredi, cavaliere, I. 99 _n._
-
-
- Babylonia, II. 185
-
- Bacon, Francis, II. 369
-
- Baius, condemnation of, II. 242
-
- Balilla, via, Genoa, I. 129
-
- Ballerini, Father Antonio, S. J., I. 121
-
- Bar Cochba, revolt of, II. 392
-
- Barnabites, I. 340
-
- Baronius, Cardinal, I. 318
-
- Basil, St., II. 166
-
- Beethoven, L. von, II. 27, 42, 265
-
- Beguards, II. 131 _n._ 1
-
- Bellarmine, Cardinal, S.J., I. 88
-
- Bell’Huomo, G., S.J., II. 144
-
- Benedetta Lombarda, servant, I. 130, 149, 153, 172, 176, 226,
- =311=, =312=, 317, 379
-
- Benedict XIV, Pope (Lambertini), I. 136, 253
- St., I. 104, 127, 240, 460
-
- Benedictines, I. =63=, =64=, 103 _n._ 1, 373; II. 161,
- 363
-
- Bentham, Jeremy, II. 272
-
- Bergson, Henri, Professor, II. 247, 282, 370
-
- Bernard, St., of Clairvaux, I. 7, 61, 69; II. 242, 182
- Claude, II. 192
-
- Bernières-Louvigny, Jean de, II. 141
-
- Bernouilli, Dr. C. A., I. 373
-
- Berulle, Venerable Cardinal de, I. 88, 317
-
- Bible, Catherine’s love of the, I. 258
-
- Biographies, religious, the three attitudes possible concerning,
- I. =374-375=
-
- Biography, religious, laws regulating its growth, I. =371=
-
- Bismarck, Otto von, II. 272
-
- Bliss, its “pain”-element, II. =255=
-
- Blondel, Prof. Maurice, II. 282
-
- Body, Catherine’s view concerning it, and the elements of this view,
- II. 123-126
- dualistic view concerning it, ever only pragmatic, II. =126-129=
- dualistic view, un-Catholic, II. 126, 127
- its valuation in the N. T., II. 122-123
-
- Boerio, Maestro G. B., I. 200, 201 _n._ 3, 202, 208, 217, 218, 389, 451,
- 464; II. 14, 15, 17
- Don Giovanni, I. 201 _n._ 3 (202), 208, 451
-
- Boetius, II. 317
-
- Bollandists, I. 372
-
- Bona, Cardinal, Cistercian, I. 88
-
- Boniface VIII, Pope (Gaetani), II. 83
- his Bull “Unam Sanctam,” I. 94
-
- Bosco Bartolomeo, I. 130
-
- Bossuet, Bishop J. B., I. 64, 89; II. 141, 161, 162, 171, 173
-
- Boudon, Archdeacon H. M., II. 141
-
- Bousset, Prof. W., on individual experience and traditional form, II. 309
-
- Brahman, II. 183
-
- Brahmanism, II. 388
- its three elements, I. 60
-
- Brescia, Hospital in, I. 322
- Vincenzo da, painter, I. 99
-
- Bridgettines, Convent of the, Genoa, I. 312
-
- Browning, Robert, II. 57, 108, 223, 227, 271
-
- Buddha, Gautama, I. 71; II. 184, 268
-
- Buddhism, II. 183, 184, 273
- its three elements, I. 60
-
- Buddhist Mysticism, II. 392
-
- Bunyan, John, his works, I. 63
-
- Burke, Edmund, II. 271
-
- Burmah, II. 183
-
- Burnet, Anglican Bishop Gilbert, II. 145
-
- Busenbaum, Hermann, S. J., I. 121
-
- Butler, Anglican Bishop Joseph, II. 371
-
-
- Caesar, II. 272
-
- Caird, Professor Edward, II. 91 _n._ 1, 282
-
- Cajetanus, Thomas de Vio, Cardinal, O.P., II. 162
-
- Callisto da Piacenza, Padre, I. 323, 324
-
- Calvin, I. 341, 414, 415; II. 117, 118, 388, 392
- _Institutio Religionis Christianæ_ I. 340
- Calvinism, I. 9, 63
- early stages of, I. 339-341
-
- Cambridge Platonists, the, II. 371
-
- Camillus of Lellis, St., I. 129 _n._ 2
-
- Campanaro Family, of Genoa, I. 101
-
- Campion, Blessed Edmund, S.J., I. 64; II. 129
-
- Campofregoso, Paolo, of Genoa, I. 101
-
- Canada, II. 141
-
- _Canticle of Canticles_, I. 258, 356
- its imagery dear to V. Battista Vernazza, I. 111, 356, 432
- remote from St. Catherine’s mind, I. 229, 258, 432;
- II. 100, 101, 107
-
- Capuchins, I. 311, 340, 341
-
- Caraccioli, Cardinal, Archbishop of Naples, II. 139
-
- Caraffa, Cardinal, _see_ also Paul IV. (Pope), I. 327, 340
-
- Carenzio, Don Jacobo, 155 _n._ 1, 175, 202, 204 _n._ 1, 213, 216, 217,
- 295, 299, 301, =307-309=, 310 _n._ 1, 384, 464; II. 26
- his fate, I. 307-309
-
- Carenzio, Don Jacobo, his funeral, I. 381
-
- Carlyle, Thomas, II. 271
-
- Cassian, I. 78
-
- Cassino, Monte, I. 103 _n._ 1
-
- Castagneto, Brigidina, I. 175
-
- Catherine, of Alexandria, St., I. 97, 348
-
- Catherine of Genoa, St. (Caterinetta Fieschi Adorno), I. 86, 95, 97,
- 98 _n._ 1, 100, 101, 102, 103, 103 _n._ 1, 104, 105, 111, 112,
- 113, 123, 151, 168, 169, 170, 171, 338, 339, 376, 382, 387, 388,
- 389; II. 42, 50, 56, 58, 63, 64, 96, 97, 98, 109, 131, 136, 142,
- 146, 170, 172, 206, 208, 209, 218, 288, 289, 297, 298, 304, 306,
- 395, 396
-
- Catherine, St., her AFTER-LIFE CONCEPTIONS, II. 199-218
- her apparitions after death, I. 216, 218
- her external appearance, I. 97
- ecclesiastical approbation of her doctrine, I. 255, 256, 413,
- =448=, =449=, 464
- and Argentina del Sale, I. 170, 171, 203, 209, 210, 213, 217, 298
- her BAPTISM, I. 97
- and Baptism, I. 436; II. 76
- her birth, I. 93, 97
- her breadth of sympathy and unsuspiciousness, II. 83, 84
- her brothers, I. 97, 167, 172, 176
- her burial, I. 296, 297
- her burial-place, shifting of, I. 152, =185-187=, 213
- and business, I. 154, 186
- the three CATEGORIES of her teaching, ‘In,’ ‘Out,’ ‘Over,’
- I. 273-276
- her codicils of 1503, I. 168, 169, 380
- of 1508, I. 175, 176, 380
- of 1510, I. 212-214, 380
- colours, her sensitiveness to, I. 208, 210, 298; II. 17, 24
- compared with St. Augustine, II. 211-214, 216, 225, 248, 293, 294
- with Clement and Origen of Alexandria, II. 219, 234-236
- with Pseudo-Dionysius, II. 90-101, 205, 236
- with the Joannine writings, II. 79-90
- with St. John of the Cross, II. 257, 258, 346, 347, 385, 386
- with the Pauline writings, I. 140; II. 63-79, 322
- with Plato, II. 66, 201-211, 235, 251
- with Plotinus, II. 204, 322, 323
- with Proclus, II. 204, 205, 294, 313
- with the Synoptic Gospels, II. 122-124, 153-158
- with St. Teresa, II. 288, 289, 324, 325
- with St. Thomas Aquinas, I. 120; II. 162-164, 222-224, 301,
- 337, 338
- with Ven. Battista Vernazza, I. =332-366=, 408, 409, 423,
- 429-433
- with Ettore Vernazza, I. 317-323, 328, 329, 331-335
- and Confession, I. 109, =117-121=, 158, 159, =424-427=
- and her Confessor (Don Marabotto), I. 155-158, 184, 185, 193-196,
- 455-457
- her Conversion, I. 104-109, 403-406, 458-462; II. 29-31
- Cross and Passion, her attitude towards, I. 108, 109, 205, 209, 210,
- =403-406=, 409, =411-413=, 452, 453
- Cultus, her popular, I. 301-303, 332, 335, 394
- her DEATH, I. 215, 216
- her Deed of Cession, 1456, I. 376, 377
- her _Deposito_, I. 98 _n._
- her desire for death, I. 183, 184, 192, 210
- for life, I. 200-202
- for human sympathy, I. 195
- and the Devil, I. 124, 125, 205, 206, 264; II. 36, 37
- men devoted to her spirit, I. 89, 90
- her DIALOGO, _see_ Vita (D) in Index II
- her _Dicchiarazione, see_ Vita (T) in Index II
- her doctrine presented in theological order, I. 257, 260-294
- dualistic tendencies in, considered, II. 121-129
- her ECSTATIC states, I. 161, 162, 226, 229; II. 34
- and the H. Eucharist, I. 113, 114, 116, 204, 208, 214, 240, 241,
- 288, 289, 263; II. =87=, =88=
- her attitude towards Evil, I. 266-270; II. 294
- her FASTS, I. 135-139, 155; II. 34
- her Father, I. 96, 97, 101
- and Tommasa Fiesca, I. 131, 132, 168, 169, 174
- GROWTH, her spiritual, I. 112, 113, =236-239=
- and HEAVEN, I. 159-161; II. =246-258=
- and Hell, I. 281-288; II. =218-230=
- her attitude towards historical and institutional religion, I. 190,
- 204, 206, =239-241=
- and the Hospital _Chronici_, I. 173, 174
- and the Hospital _Pammatone_, I. 129-131, 141-143, 175, 202
- and her husband, I. 102-104, 129, 152, 153
- hysteriform appearances in her health, II. 20, 21, 23-25
- her fundamental difference from hysteria-patients, II. =25-27=
- her ILLNESS, during last days, I. 207, 214; II. 13
- during last months, I. 193; II. 9, 10
- and Indulgences, I. 123-126, 202
- and intercessory prayer, I. 127
- and invocation of saints, I. 104, 127
- LESSONS of her life, I. 244-246
- Life, conceptions of, in, II. 88-90
- her literary obligations, I. 234-238; II. 62-110, 203-211
- Pure Love, her doctrine of, I, 108, =139-141=, =159-161=, 262, 263,
- 265, 266
- her practice of, I. 116, 144, 170, 184, 185, 187, 197
- and MARRIAGE, I. 101, 223-225, 246, 248, 249
- her Marriage-settlement, I. 377
- materialization of her experiences and ideas, I. 218, 219
- matron of Hospital, I. 143, 147, 148
- and her NEPHEWS, I. 154, 167, 171, 176, 213
- and her Nieces, I. 154, 167, 172, 173
- ORIGINALITY of her doctrine, I. =246-250=, 347
- and PAIN, physical and psycho-physical, 196-198, 198-200; II. 10, 11
- her penitence, I. 109-112, 131-134
- the periods of her convert life, I. 111, 112, 112 _n._ 1, 118, 119,
- 138, 390-393
- first period, I. 128-131
- second period, I. 128-140
- third period, I. 157-159, 175, 176
- and physicians, I. 200, 201, 208, 211, 212
- pictures, her care for religious, I. 99, =168=, =169=, 188, 189,
- 191; II. 29, 30
- portraits of, I. 98 _n._ i, 301
- her possessions at time of her death, I. 297-299
- her psycho-physical peculiarities, in themselves, I. 176-181, 193,
- 196-200; II. 10-13, 17-21
- her attitude towards them, I. 164, 165, 211, 212; II. 16, =35-39=
- and Purgatory, I. 283-294; II. =230-246=
- and prayer of QUIET, I. 227
- her quietistic-sounding sayings, I. =236=, =237=, 265, 266, 271, 279
- causes of her apparent quietism, II. =34-36=
- her RELICS, I. 98, _n._ 1, 300-304
- her Rigoristic trend, I. 342
- her “SCINTILLA”-experience, I. 187-191, 451
- and Holy Scripture, I. 258
- her self-knowledge, I. 164, 165, =206=, =207=, 247; II. 14, 15
- her extreme sensitiveness, I. 176-181, 207-209
- “Serafina,” I. 161, 262
- and her servants, I. 148, 149, 161, 162, 169, 171, 172, 175, 176,
- 217; II. 26
- and her sister, I. 100, 105, 167
- social interests in 1506, I. 172-174
- in 1506-1510, I. 175-176
- Spirit, the, her conception of, II. =67-69=, =84=, 320-322
- symbols used by,: air and flying, I. 189; II. 103
- arrow and wounding, I. 97; II. 105, 106
- bread and eating or being devoured, I. 288, 289, =270=
- cork under water, I. 275
- dog and his master, I. 263
- drops, liquid, I. 159, 160, 189; II. 52
- fountain, I. 189, 260, 261
- fragments and table, I. 277
- heat and cold, I. 194, 197; II. 109
- light, rays of the sun, and fire, sparks of, I. 178-180, 187,
- 188, 269, 276, =290-292=; II. 94, 95, 323
- motes, spots, stains, rust, I. 189, 267; II. 236, =238=, =239=
- nakedness and garments, I. =275=, =276=, 290-292, 428, 432;
- II. 77, 78, 98, 123, =209=, =210=
- places and abiding in them, I. =277=, =278=; II. =69=, =70=,
- 77, =80=, =81=, 212, 213, 322
- the plunge, I. 268, =284=, =285=, 332; II. 70, 89, =207=,
- =208=, 385
- prison, exile, I. 273, 274; II. 105, 126, 239
- the (golden) rope, I. 432; II. 92, 93
- water (the sea) and drowning, I. =274=, =275=; II. 103, 106,
- =108=, =109=, 322
- symbols used by her, why material and extensional, not personal
- and successive, I. 237-239, =245-247=; II. =39=, =40=, =100=, =101=,
- 285, 286, 330, 331, 349, 350
- her TEACHING, general character of, I. 229-234
- fortunate circumstances of, I. 255, 256
- her special temperament, I. 220-223
- and Thobia, I. 129, 153, 169
- her times, I. 94, 95
- and Transcendence, I. 274-277; II. =100=
- and UNCTION, Extreme, I. 195, 197, 204, 206
- Union, her thirst for absolute, I. 116, 159-161, 263, =265=,
- =266=, 269-271, 280
- and Battista VERNAZZA, I. 149, 337
- and Ettore Vernazza, I. 145-147, 191-193, 203, 204, 226, 331-335,
- =453-455=
- veracity of her mind, I. 119
- her VISION of the Bleeding Christ, I. =107-109=, 181, 209, 239,
- 403, 405, 418, =460-462=, 466 _n._ 2; II. 31, 32, 71
- WARFARE, method of her spiritual, II. =34-39=
- and the two ways, negative and positive, I. 276-280
- words, her last, I. 216, 465
- her Wills, i, I. 152, 153, 377-378
- ii, I. 152-154, 380
- iii, I. 172-174, 380
- iv, I. 172-173, 174, 176, 185-187, 202, 203, 308, 380
- her wills in general, I. 297-299; II. 26
- her “writings” not her composition, I. 87, 407, 433, 447, 448, =466=
- her YOUTH, I. 99-101
- of Siena, I. 87, 94, 306, 341, 382; II. 42, 47, 306, 307
-
- Catholicism, its three elements, I. 63-64
-
- Catholic mind, its characteristics, I. =122-123=
-
- Caussade, Père de, S.J., II. 143
-
- Censor, Dominican, the, of the _Vita_, I. 372, =413=, 464
-
- Centurione, Adam, Lord, I. 385
- Ginetta, Lady, I. 385
- Orientina, Donna, I. 385, 391
-
- Cesarini, Cardinal, I. 305
-
- Chantal, St. Jane Frances de, II. 142, 143, 363
-
- Child, the, its apprehension of religion, I. 51
-
- China, II. 182, 183
-
- Chios, Isle of, I. 101, 151; II. 27, 83
-
- Christian conception of life, I. 48-49
- doctrine (survey of), I. =25-28=
- its three N. T. presentations, I. =28-39=
-
- Christianity, conflicts between its Intuitive-Emotional and its other
- elements, I. =70-77=
- excludes Pantheism, II. 334-335
- its preliminary Pessimism and ultimate Optimism, II. 358-361
- its three elements, II. 61
- in the Humanist Renaissance, I. 62
- the Middle Ages, I. 61-62
- the Protestant Reformation, I. 62-63
-
- Christina, Queen of Sweden, I. 305, 305 _n._ 1
-
- Christofero of Chiavari, I. 168, 298
-
- _Chronici_, Spedale dei, Genoa, I. =173=, =174=, 317, 319, 326, 327, 333;
- II. 10
- Protectors of, I. 318, 326
- Sindaco of, I. 319
-
- Chroniclers of St. Catherine, rivalry between them, I. 216
-
- Chronicles, Books of, David in, I. 373
-
- Church, the, her life and spirit, I. 123
-
- Cibo Donna Maddalena (born Vernazza), I. 322
-
- Cicero, Don Blasio, I. 152
-
- Clement of Alexandria, I. 61, 78; II. 131, 142, =166=, =219=, =235=, 239,
- 268, 282, 306, 333
-
- Clement XI, Pope (Albani), II. 131, 161
- Fénelon’s letter to, I. 69
- X, Pope (Altieri), I. 305
- XII, Pope (Orsini), I. 306
- his Bull of Catherine’s Canonization, I. 466
-
- Cogoleto, on Riviera, I. 318
-
- Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, II. 371
-
- Collino, Padre Serafino, C.R.L., I. 364, 366
-
- Colonna, Vittoria, I. 341, 342 _n._ 2
-
- Chrysostom, St. John, II. 225
-
- Columbus, Christopher, I. 94, 146
-
- Confucianism, II. 182, 183
-
- Confucius, II. 183
-
- Constance, Council of, I. 94, 342
-
- Constantinople, I. 94
-
- Contarini, Gaspar, Cardinal, I. 342 _n._ 2
-
- Contemplation and Social Christianity, II. =355-358=
-
- _Conversione_-booklet, I. 449, 464
-
- _Convertite_ the, Genoa, I. 327
-
- Corsica, I. 156
-
- Counter-reformation, I. 62
-
- Covenant, Book of the, I. 373
-
- Criticism, of the writings of Saints, how far allowed, I. 254 and foll.
-
- Croton, II. 188
-
- Crusading Age, the, II. 380
-
- Cynic school, I. 23
-
- Cyprian, St., II. 43
-
- Cyrenaic school, I. 23
-
-
- Dante, II. 165, 265
-
- Darwin, Charles, II. 271
-
- David, three stages of his biography, I. 373
-
- Delphi, II. 187
-
- Demeter, II. 97
-
- Democritus, II. 12
-
- Descartes, René, I. 7, 40, 317
- his apprehension of law, I. 40
-
- Determinism, its place in the spiritual life, II. 330, 331, =369-379=,
- 385, 386
-
- Deuteronomy, Book of, Moses in, I. 373
-
- Developments, partial, of the Gospel-Ideal, II. 116-120
-
- de Vere, Aubrey, paraphrases the _Trattato_, I. 89
-
- _Dialogo_ of St. Catherine, see _Vita e Dottrina_
-
- Diano, Castello of, on Riviera, I. 308, 309
-
- _Dicchiarazione_-booklet, I. 464, and see _Vita_ (T)
-
- Dionysiac sect, II. 188
-
- Dionysius (Pseudo-) Areopagite, I. 163 _n._, 177, 256, 259, 266 _n._ 3;
- II. 63, 109, 131, 142, 205, 211, 288, 307, 313, 329, 333, 344, 366
- and Catherine, II. =90-101=
- Catherine’s direct knowledge of, II. 258, 259
- his conception of God’s general action, II. 91-94
- Deification, II. 99, 100
- the soul’s reaction, II. 94-99
- his influence in Middle Ages, II. 314-317
- Neo-Platonism in, II. 91-99, 294, 312, 313
- Platonism, in, II. 93, 94, 96, 97, 101
-
- Diotima, in Plato’s _Symposium_, St. Catherine compared to, I. 257
-
- Direction, spiritual, its advantages, II. 364
-
- Disciple, the Beloved, symbol of, I. 111
-
- Domenico, Monastero Nuovo di S., Genoa, I. 132, 168, 174, 451
- de Ponzo, Padre, O.S.F., I. 140 _n._ 4
-
- Dominicans, I. =63=, =64=, 253, 413, 464; II. 52, 53 _n._ 1, 316,
- 317, 324
-
- Doria, Andrea, Admiral, I. 93, 104-146
- other members of family, I. 96, 376
-
- Draco, laws of, II. 87
-
- Drexel, Jeremias, S.J., I. 89
-
- Droysen, J. G., II. 271
-
- Dualism, as regards body, II. 121-129, 289, 298
- and question of Evil, II. =290-308=
- unconscious, in Kant’s Epistemology, II. 278
-
-
- Eberhard, Father, O.P., II. 52
-
- Ecclesiastes, II. 189
-
- Eckhart, Meister, his Deistic tendencies, II. 252
- on Evil as purely negative, II. 294
- on Godhead as distinct from God, II. 317, 318
- Father Denifle, on, II. 317
-
- Ecstasies, difficulty in testing them, I. 161, 162; II. 49-51
- of St. Catherine, I, 139-140, 226-229; II. 34
-
- Ecstasy, in Dionysius, II. 95, 96
- in Plotinus and Proclus, I. 24; II. 95, 96
-
- Ecstatics, their psycho-physical organisation, II. =40-47=
-
- Egypt, II. 185, 233
-
- Eleatic philosophers, II. 188
-
- Eleazar, Rabbi, II. 153
-
- Eleusinian Mysteries, II. 185, 187, 189
-
- Elijah, II. 268
-
- Eliot, George, II. 199
-
- Elohist, the, writer, and figure of Moses, I. 373
-
- Embriaco, Guilielmo, I. 100
-
- Emmerich, Anne Catherine, I. 334, 335
-
- Emotional-intuitive element in Religion, I. 8-10
- in the various Churches, I. 8-10
- in Christian Religion, its exclusiveness, I. =73-79=
- its danger and yet necessity, I. 6, 59, 60; II. =260-263=, =387-393=
-
- Emotional-intuitive personalities, movements and races, I. 6-7
-
- Empedocles, I. 11; II. 188
-
- _Energeia_, Aristotle’s great contribution, II. 250-251
-
- England, I. 62, 63, 65, 200; II. 371, 392
-
- Epictetus, II. 268
-
- Epicurean school, I. 23
-
- Epistles, Pastoral, II. 269
-
- Epopteia, the Eleusinian, II. 97
-
- Erasmus of Rotterdam, I. 311, 340; II. 119 _n._ 1
-
- Eschatology, Catherine’s simplifications of it, II. =211-218=
-
- Esparta, Father Martin, S.J., II. 144
-
- _Essays and Reviews_, I. 63
-
- Essenes, I. 61; II. 392
-
- Este, Eleonora d’, I. 341
-
- Estius, William, II. 63 _n._ 2
-
- Eucken, Prof. R., II. 63 _n._ 2, 282, 333, 370
- on Evil as positive, II. 296
- hyper-empirical processes as a _sine qua non_ for religion,
- II. 270, 271
- “universal” religion and “characteristic” religion, II. 296
-
- Euripides, II. 189
-
- Evangelicalism, I. 8-10; II. 392
-
- Evil denied by extreme Mysticism, II. 292-293
- its origin and Mysticism, II. =279-302=
- Mysticism and the warfare against, II. 302-308
- positive but not supreme, II. =291-297=
- positive conceptions of, II. 304, 305
-
- Experience not directly transmissible, I. 4-5
- of the human race, I. 6-7
- personal, its influence upon our convictions, I. 4
-
- Experiences, distinguished from their expression, and their analysis,
- II. =130-134=
-
- Experimental matter and theoretical form, II. 308-309
-
- Ezekiel, II. 189, 220, 268, 292, 332
- his ecstasies and psycho-physical peculiarities, II. =45-46=
- his individualistic trend, II. 189, 220
-
-
- Faber, Frederick, Father, I. 65
-
- Falconi, Juan, II. 146
- his _Alfabeto_ and _Lettera_ II. 143, 144
-
- Falconieri, St. Juliana, I. 306; II. 56
-
- Fasts, Catherine’s, II. 33
- end of, II. 148
-
- Fechner, G. T., II. 392
-
- Felicitas, St., I. 361
-
- Fénelon, I. 64, 68, 89; II. 138, 141, 142, 143, =160-162=, 174, 177
- his condemnation, the questions to which it applies, II. =165-169=
- on need of Metaphysics in Theology, II. 181
- on “Passivity,” II. 141, 142
- works of, distinction between them, II. 160, 161
-
- Ferrara, Duchess of (Renée de Valois), I. 340, 341
-
- Ferretto, Dottore Augusto, I. 125 _n._ 1, 152 _n._ 1, 155 _n._ 1,
- 172 _n._ 2, 176 _n._ 1, 2; 203 _n._ 1, 213 _n._ 1, 378 _n._ 1,
- 381 _n._ 1
-
- Feuerbach, Ludwig, II. 332
-
- Fichte, J. G., II. 271, 392
-
- Ficino Marsilio, his translation of Dionysius’ works, I. 259
-
- Fiesca, Adorna Caterinetta, _see_ Catherine, St.
-
- Fiesca, Francesca, I. 376, 377
- Maria, B., I. 176, 302
- Tommasa Suor, I. =131=, =132=, 143, 217, 259, 384, 387, 457, 464;
- II. 62, 175
- possible contributions to the _Vita_, by, I. 457
- death of, I. 381
- life and works (upon the Areopagite and the Apocalypse), I. 132
-
- Fieschi, Battista, I. 153, 154, 172
- Family, I. 95-97, 101, 157, 303
- Francesco, I. 125, 213, 315
- Giorgio, Cardinal, I. 102
- Giovanni, I. 97, 153, 154, 377, 378
- death of, I. 167 _n._ 3 (168), 172
- sons of, I. 167
- Cardinal, I. 125, 126
- Jacobo, I. 149 _n._ 1; 153, 167 _n._ 3 (168), 376, 384
- death of, I. 172
- his daughters, I. 167, 379
- Limbania, I. 97, 100, 105, 153, 167, 172, 186, 321, 379; II. 62
- Lorenzo, I. 97, 153, 154, 167 _n._ 3 (168), 172, 187, 215, 299,
- 370, 377
- Cardinal, I. 302
- Luca, Cardinal, I. 96
- Maria, I. 153, 154, 167, 172
- Marietta, I. 146
- Napoleone, Cardinal, I. 102
- Nicolò, Cardinal, I. 96
- Roberto dei, I. 95
-
- Fieschi, Sinibaldo de, _see_ Innocent IV, Pope
-
- Fiesco, Emmanuele, I. 175
-
- Fisher, Bishop John, Blessed, I. 340
-
- Florence, Council of, II. 226
- decisions concerning Purgatory, II. 217, 242
-
- Fontana, Padre, Barnabite, II. 226
-
- France, I. 64, 94; II. 148
-
- Franchi, de’, Archbishop, I. 306
- Tobia dei, I. 102
-
- Francis, St., of Assisi, I. 8, 65, 389; II. 42, 47, 261
- his life and legend, I. 372
-
- Franciscans, I. =61=, =64=, 130, 140 _n._ 4, 385, 386, 389, 390;
- II. 105, 106, 109, 143, 144, 316, 317, 363
-
- Francis, St., de Sales, I. 88; II. 142, 143, 363
-
- Frank, Sebastian, I. 63
-
- Fregosi Family, Genoa, I. 96, 101
-
- Ottaviano, Doge, I. 327, 329, 330
-
- Friendship, St. Catherine’s attitude concerning, I. 225, 226
-
- Fust, Printer, I. 94
-
-
- Galilei, Galileo, I. 7
-
- Gamaliel, II. 63
-
- Ganymede, II. 187
-
- Gardner, Prof. P. and Miss A. on Confession and Direction,
- II. 364 _n._ 1
-
- Gemiluth Chasadim, II. 153
-
- General, its relation to Particular according to Greek philosophy,
- I. 10-25; II. =310-319=
-
- Geneva, I. 9
-
- Genoa, I. 96, 100-102, and _passim_
- position and climate, I. 93
- Republic of, I. 303, 305, 306, 449
-
- Genoese Republic, I. 203
- the people, their character, I. 93-94
-
- George, Bank of Saint, I. 125, 152, 153, 169, 172, 318, 326 _n._ 1,
- 330, 365, 376, 379
- cartulary of the, I. 149 _n._ 1, 365, 379
-
- Germano, Borgo San, Genoa, I. 145 _n._ 1
-
- Germany, I. 62, 94; II. 370
-
- Geronimo of Genoa, Fra, O.P., I. 253, 413, 464
-
- Gerson, John, Chancellor of Paris, I. 62, 94, 342
-
- Gertrude, Saint, I. 64
-
- Giovo, Angelo L., Prot. Ap., I. 93, 172 _n._ 1, 208 _n._ 2, 297 _n._ 1,
- 395, 396
-
- _Giuseppine_, Genoa, I. 327
-
- Giustiniano, Agostino, Bishop, his account of St. Catherine’s life,
- remains and biography, I. 382-384
-
- Gnosticism, approximations and antagonisms to, in Fourth Gospel, II. 81,
- 82
-
- God as supremely concrete, II. 249, 255
- natural conformity between, and all rational creatures, I. 261
- hunger after, I. 263
- His illumination of souls, I. 270-271
- His way of winning souls, I. 271-272
- co-operation of the living, and the living soul, I. 73
- ever apprehended in His relation to ourselves, II. =169-170=
- as the _Actus Purus_, II. 80, 81, 131, 132
- the essence of things, I. 256, 266
- Unity and Trinity of, I. 66-67
- various conceptions concerning His relations with the human soul,
- II. 319-325
- God’s “anger” and offendedness, I. 292; II. 69, 70
- “ecstasy,” I. 260, 262, 352; II. 95, 96, =254=
- immanence, I. 276, 280; II. 280-284, =287-290=, 324, 325, 330,
- =336-340=
- “jealousy,” II. 353, 355
- transcendence, I. 276, 280
-
- Goethe, II. 229, 271, 327
-
- Gordon, Charles, General, I. 89; II. 271
-
- Görres, Joseph von, and question of true Mysticism, II. 315
-
- Gospels, pre-Pauline and Pauline, apprehensions in the, II. 117-118
-
- Gospels, the, _see_ John, St., Evangelist, and Synoptic Gospels
-
- Grace and Free Will, I. =69=, =70=; II. 141, 142, =174=
-
- Graces, Interior, I. 263, 265
-
- Grasso, Don Giacomo C., I. 299 _n._ 1
-
- Greece, II. 185, 191, 192
-
- Greeks, I. =10-25=, 151, 155, 246, 259; II. 83, 90-101, 131, 132,
- 185-189, 205-211, 294, 310-314, 319, 320, 325-327, 333, 356-358,
- 389
-
- Green, Thomas Hill, II. 371
-
- Gregory I, the Great, Pope, Saint, I. 64
- VII, Pope (Hildebrand), I. 64
- St., of Nazianzum, II. 166, 181
- of Nyssa, I. 61; II. 31, 166
-
- Grimm, Jacob, II. 271
-
- Grisell, Hartwell, I. 98 _n._ 1 (99)
-
- Grou, Père J. N., S.J., I. 64; II. 143, 363, 365
- combines deep mystical life and critical labours, II. =138=
-
- Gutenberg (John Gensfleisch), I. 94
-
- Guyon, Madame la Mothe, II. 138, 143, 175
-
-
- Hadrian, Emperor, II. 292
- V, Pope (Fieschi), I. 95
- VI, Pope (Dedel), I. 340
-
- Hamann, J. C., II. 371
-
- Hannibal, II. 272
-
- Heaven and Pure Love according to St. Catherine’s conception,
- I. =159-160=
- and Time; concreteness; and pain, II. =247-258=
-
- Hecker, Father Isaac, I. 89; II. 58
-
- Hedley, Bishop J. C., O.S.B., on the condemnation of Fènelon, II. 161
-
- Hegel, G. W. F., II. 271, 291, 296, 371
-
- Hegelian school, II. 269
-
- Hell, St. Catherine and, II. =218-230=
- disposition of souls in, II. 221-225
- endlessness of, II. 227-230
- fire of, II. 215-218
- mitigation of its pains, II. 225-227
- St. Catherine’s doctrine concerning, I. =281-283=
-
- Hellenism, I. =11-25=
- its qualities, I. 48
- its three religious elements, I. 60
-
- Henry VI, of England, I. 96
- VII, of England, I. 200, 201, and _n._ 2
- VIII, of England, I. 311
-
- Hensel, Luise, I. 334
-
- Heraclitus, I. 11, 12; II. 188
- his doctrine, I. 4, 11
-
- Herder, J. G., II. 327, 371
-
- Hermann, Prof. Wilhelm, II. 263, 264, 265
- impossible simplification of religion, II. =269-272=
- Panchristism of, II. 266
-
- Heroes, Cultus of, II. 187
-
- Hezekiah, II. 190
-
- Hildegard of Bingen, St., I. 64
-
- Hindooism, II. 273
-
- Historical element of Religion, its division, I. 85
- science, _see_ Science
-
- Hobbes, Thomas, I. 7
-
- Höffding, Prof. Harald, on religious “Agnosticism,” II. =287=, =288=
-
- Holtzmann, Prof. H., on retaining vivid sense both of determinist
- physical law and of libertarian spiritual life, II. =377=, =378=
- on Conditional Immortality, II. 229
- on Metaphysical factors in N. T. writings, II. =269=, =270=
-
- Holtzmann, Prof. H., on category of time, as secondary in man’s spiritual
- life, II. =247=, =248=
-
- Hume, David, II. 272
-
- Hus, John, I. 94
-
- Huxley, Prof. Thomas, II. 272
-
- Huysmans, J. K., II. 56
-
- Hylozoism, I. 12
-
- Hysteria, St. Catherine’s condition only superficially like, II. =22-27=
- three popular errors concerning, II. 22, 23
-
-
- Ignatius, of Antioch, St., I. 219 _n._ 2; II. 43, 133 _n._
- of Loyola, St., I. =68, 80=; II. 142
-
- Illingworth, Rev. J. B., II. 333
-
- Illuminists, I. 9
-
- Imagery, Battista Vernazza’s, I. 409, 432
- St. Catherine dominates her own imagery, I. 237, 238
- St. Catherine’s imagery, I. 266-268, 270, 277, 284-285, 287-293
- compared to B. Vernazzas, I. 409, 432
-
- Immanence, Divine, II. 287-290, =336-340=
- facts indicative of the, II. =280-284=
- in V. Battista Vernazza, I. 352; II. 289
- St. Catherine, I. 261-263; II. 347
- St. Paul, II. 70
- Plotinus, II. 92, 96
- St. Teresa, II. =324=, =325=
- St. Thomas, II. 288, 289, =337=, =338=
- recent thinkers, I. 270, 271, =339-340=
-
- Immortality, belief in, among great Eastern religions, II. 181-185
- its beginnings amongst Greeks and Jews, II. 185-191
- morbid, character of the Greek beginnings, II. 191-194
- philosophical and ethical difficulties of, II. =194-199=
-
- Imperiali, Cardinal, I. 305
-
- Incarnational doctrine, I. 369; II. 136, 139, 194, 195, 237, 238,
- =253-255=, 343, 344, =355-357=, 395, 396
-
- Incorruption of St. Catherine’s body, I. 302 and _n._ 2
-
- India, II. 183, 332
-
- Individual, the, its apparent power over the emotions and the will,
- I. 3-6;
- its power derived from expressing the Abiding and Personal,
- =I. 367-370=
-
- Individuality, right, of every soul, II. =255=, =256=
-
- Indulgences, St. Catherine’s assertions about them, I. 123-124
- authenticity of, I. 124
- St. Catherine’s attitude towards them, I. 124-125
- the Congregation of Rites on St. Catherine’s attitude towards
- indulgences, I. 125-126
-
- Innocent IV, Pope (Fieschi), I. 95
- XI. Pope (Odescalchi), I, 253, 305; II. 140, 144, 168 _n._ 1
-
- Inquisition, Roman, I. 341
- Spanish, I. 72; II. 380
-
- Intellectual element of Religion, its division, I. 85-86
- personalities, movements and races, I. 6-7
- gaps in, stopped by the Emotional-volitional element, I. 7
-
- Intercommunication, will-moving, between men, its conditions, I. 367-370
-
- Interiorization, the soul’s, of God, I. 263
-
- Intuitionists, Dutch-Westphalian Apocalyptic, I. 63; II. 392
-
- Invocation of Saints, by St. Catherine, I. 240
- her attitude concerning it, I. 126-127
-
- Isolation, moral and spiritual, I. 5-6
-
- Isaiah, I. 258; II. 189, 268
-
- Italy, I. 65, 94, 259, 311, 315, 341; II. 29, 270, 370
- Quietism in, II. 148
-
-
- Jacobi, F. H., II. 371
-
- Jacopone, da Todi, I. 130, 163 _n._, 177, 234, 235, 255, 258, 259, 275,
- 386; II. 62, 63, 83, 205
- his _Lode_, their influence upon Catherine’s conceptions,
- II. =102-110=
- Neo-Platonism in, II. 104, 109
- Platonism in, II. 103-105, 109
-
- Jahvist and Elohist writings, Moses in, I. 373
-
- Jamblichus, I. 6
-
- James, Saint, _Epistle of_, II. 116, 269
- Prof. William, II. 6, 265
- on psychical normality and fruitfulness of formless recollection,
- II. =266=
- on pace of conversion, as primarily a temperamental matter, II. 30
-
- Janet, Pierre, Professor, II. 265
- on three popular errors concerning Hysteria, II. 22, 23
- hysterical peculiarities registered by him, II. 23-25
-
- Japan, II. 183
-
- Jean Baptiste de la Salle, St., I. 78
-
- Jean, François St. Regis, S.J., I. 306
-
- Jean Paul Friedrich Richter, II. 371
-
- Jeremiah, II. 189, 190, 268, 292, 332
-
- Jerome, St., I. 78
-
- Jesuits, I. =63=, =64=, 121; II. 129, 142, 144, 162, 170 _n._, 225, 226,
- 241, 242, 245, 288, 307
-
- Jesus Christ, compared with Buddha and Mohamed, I. 71
- His Cross, its necessity for the soul’s fullest life, I. 82;
- II. 331, =360=, =361=, 395
- multiplicity within unity of His action and interests, I. =25-28=
- His place in teaching of V. Battista Vernazzo, I. 359, 360, 405,
- 406, 413
- St. Catherine, I. 108, 109, 209, =239-241=, 360, 412, 413;
- II. 70-74, 77, 79-83, 85
- Joannine writings, II. 80, 81
- St. Paul, II. 71, 72, 76-79, 158, 159
- in conception of Prof. W. Hermann, II. 263-268, 332
- His teaching, primarily not moral, but religious, II. =274=
- on Pure Love, II. 153-158
- its Petrine, Pauline, Joannine presentations, II. 28-39
-
- Jews, II. =189-191=, 194, 213, 214, 220, 224, 233, 234, 239, 315, 316
-
- Joachim, Abbot, II. 391
-
- Job, II. 189
-
- John, St. Damascene, II. 225
- St., Evangelist; the Joannine writings, I. 223, 234, 235, 258, 353,
- 374; II. 62, 63, 116, 202, 205, 253
- and organized Ecclesiastical Christianity, II. 83, 84
- and St. Paul, II. 80, 82, 85, 87, 88
- and the Synoptic Gospels, II. =81-86=, =116=, =117=
- and other systems, II. 79, 80, 81-83
- on God, Salvation, Sacraments, Last Things, compared with St.
- Catherine’s teachings, II. =84-90=
-
- John, St., on Pure Love, II. 160
- the Baptist, St., I. 65, 97
- chapel of, Cathedral, Genoa, I. 77, 161
- the Beheaded, Company of, I. 327, 328, 430
- XXII, Pope (Duèse), II. 318
- St., of the Cross, I. 67, 87, 180, 247; II. 50, 59, 142, 143, 146,
- 147, 288, 306-308, 346, 366
- on right attachment, II. =353=
- on faith, as sole proportionate means of union with God, II. 343,
- 348
- on a loving knowledge producible by God’s aid alone, II. 307
- on perception of God’s incomprehensibleness, II. =257=, =258=
- on the true test of perfection, II. =51=
- his helpfulness towards finding place for temper of determinist
- science within the spiritual life, II. 385
- his predominant theory requires continuous remembrance of his
- practice and occasional description of the soul’s other movement,
- II. =343-345=
-
- Josephus, II. 233
-
- Jowett, Benjamin, I. 63
-
- Judaism, II. 79
- its three elements, I. =61=; II. 388, 389, 392
-
- Judas Maccabaeus, II. 233, 292
-
- Juliana, Mother, of Norwich, on Eternal Punishment, II. 218, 219
- on negative character of Evil, II. 394
- and Direction, II. 363
- her Christian optimism, II. =305=, =306=
-
- Julianus, Monk, Pelagianizer, II. 293
-
- Julius II, Pope (Rovere), I. 94, 146, 155
-
- Justina, Benedictine, Congregation of St., Padua, I. 103 _n._ 1
-
- Justin, St., Martyr, II. 268, 333
-
-
- Kabbala, II. 392
-
- Kant, Immanuel, I. 43; II. 27, 42, 168, 179, 247, 261, 264, 275, 295, 370,
- 371, 392
- deepens contrast between quantitative science and qualitative
- spiritual life, I. 43
- his defective religious sense, II. =260-262=
- on disinterested religion, II. 177-179
- his dualistic assumption in epistemology, II. 278
- on Evil as positive and radical, II. =295=, =296=
- on obscure apprehensions, II. 265
-
- Keble, Rev. John, I. 63
-
- Kempen, Thomas of, I. 62
-
- Kepler, Johann, I. 7; II. 27
-
- Kierkegaard Sören, his radical Asceticism, II. 345, 346, 353
- on God’s utter difference from Man, II. =287=, =288=
- on “Repetition,” II. 285
-
- Knowledge, its three constituents, I. 54-57
-
-
- Laberthonnière, Abbé L., _Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne_, 1905, 1906,
- II. 307
-
- Lallemant, Louis, Pére, S.J., I. 64; II. 365
-
- Lancisius, Nicolas, S.J., I. 89
-
- Laplace, P. S. de, II. 272
-
- Lateran, Fourth Council of, I. 120, 121
-
- Laud, William, Anglican Archbishop, I. 63
-
- Laurence, St., quarter of, Genoa, I. 377
-
- Lavagna, on Riviera, I. 95
-
- Lazaretto, Genoa, I. 332
-
- Lazzaro, S., Genoa, I. 406
- poor of, I. 145 _n._ 1
-
- Leibniz, I. 42, 113; II. 145, 177, 231, 261, 271, 282, 291
- on dim Presentations, II. =338=
- on Pure Love, II. =176=
- his share in development of modern scientific spirit, I. =42=, =43=
-
- Leo X (Medici), Pope, I. 259, 311, 321, 322
- _Bull “Exurge Domine,”_ I. 340, 448
-
- Lessing, G. E., II. 271, 327
- on soul’s incapacity for any unmixed emotion, II. =256=
- on Purgatory, II. 231
-
- Leucippus, I. 11
-
- Library, University, of Genoa, I. 171 _n._ 1, 172 _n._ 1
-
- Life, Spiritual, three stages of, I. =241-244=
-
- Liguria, I. 96
-
- Ligurians, I. 96
-
- Limbania, Beata, of Genoa, I. 97, 100
-
- Littré, Emil, II. 271
-
- Locke, John, II. 261
-
- Loisy, Alfred, Abbé, II. 360 _n._ 1
-
- Lombard, Peter, I. 120; II. 325 _n._ 3
-
- Lomellini family, Genoa, I. 327
-
- Lorenzo, Cathedral of S., Genoa, I. 97, 101, 320
- Piazza S., I. 97
-
- Lost, mitigation of sufferings of the, II. 225-227
- perversion, their total moral, II. =221-225=
-
- Lotze, Hermann, II. 271
-
- Louis XII, King of France, I. 340
- XIV, King of France, I. 305
- St., King of France, I. 361
-
- Love, of God and of oneself, I. 262-263
- Pure, I. 261
- according to St. Catherine’s conception, I. 159-160
- according to the New Testament, I. =153-159=
- acts, single, of, II. =163-164=
- pleasurableness that follows them, II. =170-172=
- relation of, to Contemplative Prayer, II. 172
- and its cognate problems, II. =169-174=
- Catherine’s, I. 140-141
- controversy concerning, II. =160-169=
- distinction from Quietism, II. 151-181
- exactingness of, I. 268-269
- Fénelon on, II. 161, 165
- the Joannine writings on, II. 160
- Kant on, II. 177
- Leibniz on, II. 176
- Our Lord’s teaching concerning, II. =153-158=
- St. Paul on, II. =158-160=
- three rules of, according to St. Catherine, I. 138-139
- Spinoza’s view concerning, II. 175, 176
- state of, II. =165-169=
- St. Thomas Aquinas on, II. =162-165=, 301
-
- Loyola, St. Ignatius of, I. 68, 80; II. 142
-
- Lucretius, II. 271
-
- Lugo, John Cardinal de, S.J., I. 121
-
- Lukardis, Venerable Sister, Cistercian, II. 52, 53, 54, 55, 58
-
- Luke, St., I. 351, 374
- _Acts of the Apostles_, I. 162, 374; II. 269
- _Gospel according to_, I. 223
- and St. Paul, II. 157, 158
-
- Lunga, Signora, I. 329
-
- Luther, I. 9, 62, 63, 95, 340, 412, 448; II. =117-119=, 263, 388, 392
- Theses of, I. 252, 311, =448=
-
- Lutheranism, I. 9; II. 388
- early stages of, I. 339-341
-
- Lyell, Sir Charles, II. 271
-
-
- Maccabean Heroes, I. 373
- resistance, I. 392
-
- Maccabees, First and Second Books of, the, the Maccabean heroes in,
- I. 373
-
- “Maestà” (triptych), I. =168=, 172, 181, 239, 298
-
- Magdalen, Mary, St., I. 110, 170
-
- Maldonatus, Juan, S.J., I. 64
-
- Malebranche, Nicholas, Père, I. 63; II. 331
-
- _Mandiletto_, Compagnia del, I. 154, 332
-
- Manichaeans, II. 221, 289
-
- Manichaeism, II. 230
-
- Manning, H. E., Cardinal, I. 89
-
- Manuscripts, Genoese, of the _Vita_, I. 93
-
- Manuscript “A” (University Library), I. 112 _n._ 1, 159 _n._ 1,
- 162 _n._ 3 (163), 166, 188 _n._ 1, 197 _n._ 2, 214, 304, 434,
- 435, 442, 451
- additions and variations of, as compared with Printed _Vita_,
- I. =384-394=
- and Argentina del Sale, I. 387
- characteristics of, I. 396
- authentic contributions of, I. =387-388=
- date and scribe of, I. 385
- modification from a tripartite to a quadripartite scheme,
- I. =390-394=
-
- Manuscript “B” (Archives of the Cathedral-chapter), I. 162 _n._ 3 (163),
- 166, 188, 197 _n._ 2, 214, 396, 412, 415, 442
- dependence from MS. “A”, I. 394
- its divisions, I. 394-395
- its very primitive heading, I. =394=
-
- Manuscript “C” (University Library), differences from MSS. A and B,
- origin and attribution, I. 395-396
-
- “Maona” Company, Genoa, I. 151
-
- Marabotti, various, I. 156, 157
-
- Marabotto Cattaneo, Don, I. 90, 98 _n._ 1, 110, 117 _n._ 2, 118, 119,
- 120, 121 _n._ 3, 135 _n._ 1, 140 _n._ 4, 147 _n._ 1, =156-159=,
- 162 _n._ 3 (163), 166, 172, 173, 175, 176, =185=, =186=, 187, 191,
- 193, 204 _n._ 1, 207, 213, 216, 217, 218, 225, 252, 256, 264, 296,
- 299, 300, 301, 308, 309, 313, 314, 356, 371, 384, 390, 393, =415=,
- =416=, =419=, =421=, 431, 432, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 454, 455,
- =463=, =464=; II. 9, =15=, =17=, =25=, =26=
- attitude concerning Catherine, I. 218
- character of, I. =157=
- Catherine’s confessor, I. =157-158=
- contributions to _Vita_-proper, I. 392-394, =455-457=
- contributions to _Dicchiarazione_ (_Trattato_), I. 447-448
- death of, I. 381
- family, I. 156-157
- fate of, I. 310-311
- first relations with Catherine, I. 155-156
- influence and work concerning Catherine, I. 193-196
- misunderstandings, I. 120 _n._ 1
- scruples, I. 194-195
- scent-impression from his hand, I. 184-185
- will of, I. 381
-
- Marco del Sale, I. 127, 203, 388, 402
- story of his death, I. =169-171=
-
- Marcus Aurelius, Emperor, II. 268
-
- Maria delle Grazie, Santa, Genoa, church and convent of, I. =99-101=,
- 132, 143, 170, 186, 319, 321, 325, 339, 365, 366 n. 2, =395=, 460;
- II. 205
-
- Maria delle Grazie Vecchia, S., church of, Genoa, I. 170
-
- Maria di Castello, church of S., Genoa, I. 100, 101, 366 _n._ 1
-
- Marie de l’Incarnation, the Ven., Ursuline, II. 141
-
- Mariola Bastarda, servant, I. 149, 153, 161, 162 _n._ 3 (163), 172, 175,
- 176, 216, 217, 226, =310-313=, 379, 381, 384, 457
-
- Mark, Bishop of Ephesus, II. 225
-
- Mark, St., Gospel according to, I. 67, 257, 374
-
- Marriage, Catherine’s attitude concerning, I, 223-225; II. 124
- settlement, Catherine’s, I. 337
- Church teaching concerning, II. =128-129=
-
- Martineau, Dr. James, II. 329, 330
-
- Martin St., of Tours, I. 373
-
- Mary, Blessed Virgin, I. 99, 127, 168, 338, 426, 432
- (Tudor), Queen of England, I. 95
- (Stuart), Queen of Scots, I. 366
-
- Matthew, St., Gospel according to, I. 374
- Levi, Apostle, I. 374
-
- Maurice, Frederic Denison, II. 227
-
- Mazone, Giovanni, painter, I. 98 _n._ 1 (99)
-
- Mazzini, Giuseppe, I. 97
-
- Megaric School, I. 23
-
- Melanchthon, and his _Loci_, I. 341
-
- Menelaus, II. 186
-
- Mercier, D. Cardinal, _Critériologie Générale_, II. 7 _n._ 1
-
- Merovingian Saints, I. 373
-
- Metaphysics and Religion, II. 181, 262, =269-272=
-
- Micah, Prophet, II. 189
-
- Michael Angelo Buonarotti, I. 94
-
- Milan, Dukes of, I. 96
-
- Milano, Carlo da, painter, I. 98 _n._ 1 (99)
-
- Mill, John Stuart, I. 51; II. 227, 271
-
- Misericordia, Donne della, Genoa, I. 130, 131, 401, 402
- Office of, Genoa, I. 152, 154, 319
-
- Missione Urbana, Biblioteca della, Genoa, I. 98 _n._ 1, 125 _n._ 1,
- 167 _n._ 3 (168), 171 _n._ 1 (172), 202 _n._ 2, 203 _n._ 1,
- 208 _n._ 2, 3; 296 _n._ 1, 297 _n._ 1, 299 _n._ 1, 301 _n._ 1,
- 308 _n._ 1, 309 _n._ 1, 312 _n._ 1, 313 _n._ 1, 381 _n._ 1, 2
-
- Mithraic movement, II. 392
-
- Mohamed, compared with Christ, I. 71
-
- Mohammedanism, II. 270, 388
- its three elements, I. =60-61=
-
- Mohammedans, II. 392
-
- Molinos, Miguel de, I. 253; II. 131 _n._ 1, 141, 145, 365
- his condemnation, its history, motives, limits, II. =136-148=
- _Guida Spirituale_, II. 140, 143, 144
- _Breve Trattato_, II. 144
-
- Moltke, Field-Marshal von, II. 271
-
- Mommsen, Theodor, II. 272
-
- Monasticism, the abiding needs met by, II. =352-355=
-
- Monica, St., I. 361
-
- Monism, I. 40; II. 294, 314, 326, =377-379=
-
- Montanism, II. 391
-
- Morality, relations to Mysticism, Philosophy and Religion, II. =259-275=
-
- More, Sir Thomas, Blessed, I. 62, 340; II. 129
-
- Moro, Dottore Tommaso, I. 149, 252, 337, 341, 358, 364, 414, 415; II. 83
- becomes a Calvinist, I. 341-342
-
- Moro, Dottore Tommaso, his letter to Battista Vernazza; and her letter
- to him, I. 341-342, =342-344=
- his return to the Catholic Church, I. 344
- Morone, Giovanni, Cardinal, I. 327, 342 _n._ 2
-
- Moses, I. =373=; II. 189, 268
-
- Mühlhausen, Father Henry of, O.P., II. 52
-
- Multiplicity, within every living Unity, I. =66-70=
- difficulty of its maintenance, I. 65, =70-77=; II. 264, =273-275=
- needful for all spiritual life, II. =150-152=, 283, 284, 343, 344
-
- Münsterberg, Prof. Hugo, II. 308, 370
-
- Mysteries, Eleusynian, I. 60; II. 97
-
- Mystical Element, its apparent worthlessness but essential importance,
- I. 6-10, 48, 49, 50-53, 58-65; II. =260-269=
-
- Mysticism and Pantheism, II. 325-340
- and the limits of human knowledge, II. 275-290
- and the question of Evil, II. 290-308
- and historical religion, II. 263-269
- Christian, II. 251, 252
- “exclusive” or pseudo-mysticism and “inclusive” or true mysticism,
- II. 283, =290-291=, 319
- ruinousness of exclusive, II. 304-308, =351-353=
- its place in complete Religion, II. =272-275=
- and the scientific habit of mind, II. =367-372=
- points on which it approaches Pantheism, II. =329-334=
- predominantly individualistic, II. 365-366
- tends to neglect the sensible, the successive, and spiritual
- self-excitation, II. =284-287=
-
- Mystic Saints, II. 142-143
-
- Mystics, I. 61, 247
- and spiritual Direction, II. 362-363
- their special weaknesses and strengths, II. =284-289=, =289-295=,
- 297, 298, 301, 302, =343-346=, 385, 386
-
-
- Naples, I. 97
- Hospital in, I. 323, 329
- Kingdom of, I. 96
- Society for escorting culprits to death, I. 323-324
-
- Napoleon, II. 41-42, 133, 272
-
- Negri Family, Genoa, various members of, I. 97, 100, 377
-
- Nelson, Admiral Lord, II. 133
-
- Neo-Platonism, in general, I. =23-25=, 61
- its direct influence with St. Augustine, II. =212=, =213=, =248=,
- =293=
- Pseudo-Dionysius, II. =91-99=, 294, =312=, =313=
- Its influence, through Dionysius, with V. Battista Vernazza,
- I. =352-354=, 356, 358, 428
- St. Catherine, II. =91-99=, =123-126=, =234-239=, 294
- Jacopone da Todi, II. 104, 108, 109
- Medieval Mystics and Pantheists, II. 131, 147, 314, 315, 317,
- 318, 323, 324
- St. Thomas Aquinas, II. =249-252=, 254, 294, 316, 317
- its truth, II. =92=, =248=
- its weaknesses and errors, II. 252, =287=, =288=, =293=, =294=,
- =351-353=
-
- Neri, St. Philip, I. 318
- Church of, Genoa, I. 102
-
- Nero, Emperor, II. 292
-
- Nervous system, late realization of, II. 4, 5
-
- “Nettezza,” I. 266 _n._ 3
-
- Newman, John Henry, Cardinal, I. 65, 78; II. 371
- _Dream of Gerontius_, I. 89; II. 245
- on Eternal Punishment, II. 230
- on Physical Science, its limited scope and its autonomy, II. =369=
-
- Newton, John, I. 63
- Sir Isaac, II. 27, 41, 42, 271
-
- Nicolas of Coes (Cusanus), Cardinal, I. 62, 78, 96; II. 131, 142, 282,
- 291, 331
-
- Nicolas V, Pope (Parentucelli), I. 103 _n._ 1
-
- Nicolo in Boschelto, S., near Genoa, church and monastery of, I. 103,
- 189, 213, 313, 319, 321, 325; II. 274
-
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, II. 274
-
- Nominalism, I. 61, 62
-
- Nonconformists, I. 63; II. 392
-
- Nonconformity, I. 8, 9
-
- Novara, Luca da, painter, I. 98 _n._ 1 (99)
-
-
- Occam, William of, O.S.F., I. 64
-
- Occhino, Bernardino, I. 341, 342
-
- Oldenberg, H., on _Nirvana_, II. 183-185
-
- Oratory (French), I. 63
-
- Orders, Catholic, religious, their three tendencies, I. 64
-
- Organic life, the successive stages of, II. 281, 304
-
- Origen, I. 6; II. 131, 142, 219, 239, 268
- his _Apocatastasis_--doctrine, II. 225, 228
- on fire of Hell, II. 216
- on an ameliorative Purgatory, II. 234-237
-
- Originality, treble, of St. Catherine, I. 246-249
-
- Orphic belief, II. 193
- influence, through Plato, upon Christian thought, II. 123, 124,
- =235-238=
- literature, II. 235
- mysteries, II. 188
- sect, II. 192
-
-
- Palaeologus, Michael, his confession of faith, II. 242
-
- Palladius, _Historia Monachorum_, I. 373
-
- Pammatone, Hospital of, I. =129-132=, 142, 145 _n._ 1, 148-153, 169,
- 170, 213, 226, 300, 303, 310 _n._ 1, 311, 317, 325-327, 377, 380,
- 395, 401, 407; II. 9, 10, 17, 27, 33, 62
- Books, of the, I. 143 _n._ 2, 208
- Cartulary, of, I. 202 _n._ 2, 313
- Church, of the, I. 98 _n._ 1, 152, 202 and _n._ 3, 296, 297 _n._ 1,
- 300, 302, 309, 321, 332, 382
- House surgeon, of the, I. 200; II. 14
- Protectors, of the, I. 175, 187, 216, 297, 299, 307
- Book of the Acts of the, I. 172 _n._ 1, 175 _n._ 1
-
- Pantheism in Middle Ages, II. 314-318
- useful preliminary, of Inclusive Mystics, II. =329-334=
- escaped by full development of scientific habit within shallower
- level of a deep spiritual life, II. =374-386=
- in Spinoza, secret of its power, II. =326-329=
- ultimate, not Christian, nor generally religious, II. =334=, =335=
-
- Paracelsus, I. 7
-
- Paris, II. 389
- University of, I. 62
-
- Parker, Rev. James, I. 250, 266 _n._ 3
-
- Parmenides, I. 11; II. 188
- his doctrine, I. 11
-
- _Parousia_, the, II. 380
-
- Parpera, Giacinto, P., Oratorian, I. 92, 390
-
- Pascal, I. 78; II. 261, 331
-
- Pascoli, Giovanni, II. 199
-
- Passivity, _see_ Quietism
-
- Pattison, A. S. Pringle, II. 329, 330, 333, 370
-
- Paul, Saint, I. 111, 256, 265, 320, 363, 361, 373, 453; II. 43, 44, 47,
- 80, 82, 87, 122, 124, 125, 129, 131, 142, 181, 186, 209, 237, 253,
- 298, 324, 333, 356
- and Joannine writings, II. 84-88
- and Synoptic Gospels, II. 65, =122-125=, =157=, =158=
- anthropology of, II. =64-67=
- his conceptions of God, II. =69-71=
- of Spirit, II. =67-69=, =320-322=
- of reconciliation, justification and sanctification, II. 71-74
- ecstasies and psycho-physical peculiarities of, II. 43-44
- Epistles of, I. 162, 234, 235, 258, 353, 374; II. 62, 63, 116,
- 202, 205
- Eschatology of, II. 76-79, =209=, =210=
- Judaic conceptions of, II. 69, 71, 72
- Platonic influences in, II. 64, =66=, =67=, 69, 122, 123
- and the Risen Christ, II. 71
- Sacramental teachings of, II. 75-76
- Social ethics of, II. =74-75=
- IV, Pope (Caraffa), I. 322, 327
-
- Pazzi, Maria Magdalena dei, St., II. 42, 56
-
- Peasants’ War, I. 10, 311, 340
-
- Personality, its purification, II. =377-387=
- Spiritual, II. =336-340=
-
- Petau, Denys, S.J., II. 225
-
- Peter, St., I. 67, 374
- Epistles of, II. 116
-
- Peters, Margarethe, Lutheran Quietist, II. 139
-
- Petrone, Igino, Prof., II. 282, 370
-
- Petrucci, Pietro M., Cardinal, II. 140, 141
- his writings, II. 144, 145
-
- Pharisees, I. 61, 68; II. 388
-
- Philo, I. 61; II. 63, 69, 93, 131, 196, 233
- and the Joannine writings, II. 80, 81
- and St. Paul, II. 69, 70
-
- Physicians, and St. Catherine, I. 200, 201, 208, 211, 212
-
- Physicists, the ancient Greek, II. 379
-
- Pico della Mirandoia, I. 7
-
- “Pietà,” picture, I. 181, 209, 239, 460; II. 28
-
- Pietism, Protestant, I. 10
-
- Pindar, II. 188, 189, 271
-
- Pius IV, Pope (Medici), I. 123
- VII, Pope (Chiaramonti), II. 226
-
- Plague, in Genoa, 1493, I. 143
- St. Catherine and the, I. 143-145
- Ettore Vernazza and the, I. 330-332
-
- Plant-life, Catherine’s sympathy for, I. 163, 164
- probably dimly conscious, II. 281, 304
-
- Plato, I. 12, 14, 19, 20, 21, 23, 28, 234, 257, 266 _n._ 3, 353;
- II. =66=, =124=, 185 _n._ 2, 186, 188, 192, 193, 196, 199, =202=,
- =203=, =204=, 249, 252, 253, 268, 282, 311, 357
- on amelioration by suffering, II. 208, 209
- his earlier and later beliefs as to place of contemplation in
- complete life, II. =306-309=
- Immortality, II. 186
- his abidingly fruitful combination of four characteristics,
- I. =17-19=
- on the Heavenly Eros, I. 17; II. 101, 203, 251
- God, how far concrete and ethical in, II. 311, 312
- on God’s goodness as cause of His framing this universe, I. 24;
- II. =334=
- on the Noûs, II. 319-320
- the Orphic strain in, II. 66, 67, =123-126=, 235, 236
- his five preformations of St. Catherine’s _Trattato_ teachings,
- II. =205-211=
- his _Republic_, Catherine’s purgatorial picturings compared with,
- II. 200, 201
- on the soul’s determinedness and liberty, II. 210, 211
- the soul’s nakedness, II. 209, 210
- the soul’s “places,” II. 205-207
- the soul’s plunge, II. 207, 208
- on Science and Mysticism, respectively, II. 368
- on _Thumos_, II. 203
-
- Plotinus, I. 6, 234, 257, 266 _n._ 3; II. 93, 97, 98, 99, 101, 109, 120,
- 196, 202, 204, 212, 213, 248, 268, 282, 298, 324, 326, 327, 329, 356
- his doctrine generally, I. =23-25=
- on Ecstasy, II. 322, 323
- places Godhead above all multiplicity, II. 312, 313
- on the Henad, the Noûs and the Soul, II. 322, 323
- and Spinoza, II. 325-328
-
- Plunge, voluntary of the Soul, I. 249, 250, =284=, =285=; II. 89, =207=,
- =208=, =385-386=
-
- Plutarch, II. 236
-
- Poor, Catherine’s love for the, I. 225-226
-
- Positivist, Epistemology, II. =275-283=
-
- Possession, Persons in state of, I. 161, 162 _n._ 3
-
- Possessions, Catherine’s, at her death, I. 297-299
-
- Poveri, Albergo dei, Genoa, I. 332
-
- Prà, near Genoa, I. 102, 103, 128, 129, 186, 313
-
- Prayers for the Dead, Jewish, II. 233-234
-
- Presbyterianism, II. 388
-
- Pre-Socratics, their doctrines, I. 11-12
-
- Priestly code, Moses in, I. 373
-
- Proclus, I. 234, 257; II. 91, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 109, 120, 196, 204,
- 205, 211, 294, 356
- doctrine of, I. =23-25=; II. 313, 329, 356
- the Areopagite reproduces directly, not Plotinus but, II. 91,
- 96-101, 205
-
- Prophets, Hebrew, I. 353
-
- Protestantism, II. 273
- continental, I. 8, =62=, =63=
- English, I. =8-9=
- German, I. 9
-
- Proverbs, Book of, Individual retribution in, II. 189
-
- Psalms, Book of, St. Catherine and, I. 258
- Future life in, II. 189-191
- David in, I. 373
-
- Psycho-physical and temperamental characteristics of St. Catherine during
- 1447-1477, II. 28-32
- 1477-1499, II. 32-40
- 1497-1510, II. 9-21
- Aug. 10-27, 1510, I. 204-209
- occasions or expressions, not causes, of Catherine’s doctrine,
- I. 211, 212, 260; II. =14-20=
-
- Psycho-physical and temperamental characteristics of St. Catherine,
- inquiry into, difficulty of, II. 7-9
- organism, of St. Catherine, I. 176-181
- peculiarities of great men, II. 41, 42
- peculiarities of ecstatic saints, II. =42-47=, =52-56=
- abidingly sure spiritual tests of, applied by great mystical
- saints, II. =48-51=
- theory, defects and value of ancient, II. 3-6, 47, 48
-
- Purgatory, I. 190, 249, 382
- Alexandrine Fathers on, II. 234-236
- Catherine’s conceptions of, harbour two currents of thought, II. 232
- Catherine’s doctrine concerning, I. 179. 189, =283-294=;
- II. =230-246=
- the three sets of theological “corrections” of, traceable in
- Trattato’s text, I. =434-449=
- and the New Testament, II. 233, 239, 240
- initial experience and act of the soul in, I. 283-285
- subsequent state of the soul in, I. 285-294
- change of feeling among Protestant thinkers concerning, II. 230-232
- fire of, II. 215-218
- Judaeo-Roman conceptions of, II. 239-245
- Luther’s theses concerning, I. 311, 448
- Orphic conception and, II. 237, 238
- Platonic conception of, II. =206-211=
- a truly purging, and Suarez’ simple _Satisfactorium_, II. =240-245=
-
- “Purità,” I. 266 _n._ 3
-
- Puritan excesses, I. 10
-
- Pusey, Dr. Edward B., I. 63
-
- Pythagoras, II. 188, 192
-
-
- Quietism, II. 130, 131, 133, 135, 138, 139, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148,
- 160, 168
- four aberrations of, II. =136-139=
- Rome’s condemnation of, II. 139-143
- distinct from Pure Love question, II. 152, 193
- four needs recognized by, II. =148-150=
- Rome’s alleged change of front concerning, II. 143-148
-
-
- Rabbinism, II. 63, 213, 214, 233, 234, 268, 388
-
- Rafael Sanzio, the painter, II. 132, 165
-
- Ranke, Leopold von, II. 271
-
- Rationalism, I. 8, 9; II. =260-263=, 275, 276, =382-387=, 389, 390
-
- Rauwenhoff, Prof. L. W. E., on Mysticism as a necessary form of
- religion, II. 268, 269
-
- Realism, I. 61, 62
- advantages of, II. =318-319=
- Pantheistic trend of strict, II. =314-319=
-
- Reason, goddess of, II. 389
-
- Redactor of _Conversione_-booklet, I. 464
- of _Dicchiarazione_-booklet, I. 464
- 1 of _Vita_-proper, I. 162 _n._ 3, 188 _n._ 1, 372, 414
- 2 of _Vita_-proper, I. 159, 162 _n._ 3, 372
- of _Vita-Dicchiarazione-Dialogo_, I. 464
-
- Reformation, Protestant, I. 62, 282, 339-341, 448; II. 232, 388
-
- Reform, Franciscan, I. 341
-
- Regio, Clerk Regular, criticizes Molinos, II. 144
-
- Reinach Salomon, on beginnings of Jewish prayers for the dead, II. 233,
- 234
-
- Religion and morality, II. =272-275=
- apprehension by man of, I. =50-55=
- through sense and memory, I. 51
- through Mysticism, I. 53
- through speculation, I. 51-52
- apprehension by St. Catherine of, I. 247
- conflicts between its elements, I. =70-77=; II. 392-393
- difficulties of the subjective element of, II. 112-114
- disinterested, _see_ Love, Pure
- emotional-volitional element, its exclusiveness, I. 73-77
- historical, relations with Mysticism, II. 266-268
- institutional element, its exclusiveness, I. 71-73
- relation to Science of, I. 45-48; II. =367-386=
- Social, and Mysticism, II. 351-366
- Subjective and Objective elements of, II. 118-120, =263-266=, 270
- the three elements of, I. 50-55; II. =387-396=
- and their due proportions, II. 387-388
- continuous concomitance of, I. 53-55
- distribution among men of, I. 58-59
- distribution among religions of, I. 60-65
- multiplicity of each of them, I. 85, 86
- succession in history of, I. 59-60
-
- Religious temper, its longing for simplification, I. 65-66
-
- Renaissance, humanist, I. 62
-
- Renté, Baron de, I. 89
-
- Rhode, Erwin, on the Dionysian and Orphic movements, II. 191, 192
- on Plato’s later teaching as to contemplation, II. 356, 357
-
- Ribet, Abbé, and question as to true Mysticism, II. 305
-
- Riccordo, Padre, da Lucca, I. 136
-
- Richelieu, Cardinal, II. 41
-
- Rickert, H., his building up an Organon of the Historical Sciences,
- II. 370
-
- Rig-Veda, II. 183
-
- Rigorism among pre-Reformation devoted Catholics, I. 339-342
- touches of, in V. Battista Vernazza, I. 400-407, 422, 431
- St. Catherine, I. 342
-
- Rites, Sacred Congregation of, Rome, I. 126, 253, 305, 306
-
- Ritschl, Albrecht, and his school; their excessive reaction against
- Hegel, II. 263, 269
-
- Ritschlian school, II. 263
-
- Robespierre, II. 292
-
- Rodriguez, Alfonso, Fr., S.J., I. 89
-
- Romans, the ancient, I. 93; II. 185, 239, 240
-
- Rome, I. 98, 99 _n._ ; 156, 203, 305, 322; II. 185
- Arch-Hospital in, I. 322
- Church of, I. 8, 9, 10, 63; II. 273
- condemns some propositions of Fénelon, II. 160, 162
- condemns Quietism, II. =139-143=
- sack of, I. 311
-
- Rosmini, Antonio, I. 65, 78
-
- Rothe, Richard, II. 229, 332, 333
-
- Royce, Josiah, Professor, II. 370
-
- Ruysbroek, Johannes, Augustinian Canon-Regular, on the two-fold unity
- of our spirit with God, II. 323
-
-
- Sabatier, Paul, his critical labours in early Franciscan history, I. 372
-
- Saccheri, Notary, Genoa, I. 213
-
- Sacraments and St. Catherine:
- Baptism, I. 436; II. 76, 87
- Holy Eucharist, I. 113-116, 204, 208, 240, 241; II. 19, 87, 88
- Penance, I. 117-123
- Extreme Unction, I. 195, 197, 204, 206
-
- Sadducees, I. 61; II. 389
-
- Saint-Jure, de, S.J., I. 89
-
- Saint-Simon, Duc de, II. 271
-
- Saints, canonized, Catholic principles concerning the teaching of,
- I. 253-255
- invocation of, Catherine’s, I. 240
-
- Samaria, Woman of, I. 188, 189, 406; II. 17
-
- Samaritans, I. 27, 38
-
- Samuel, Books of, David in, I. 373
-
- Sandreau, Abbé A., his sober Mystical doctrine, II. 307
-
- Sauli, Cardinal, of Genoa, I. 322, 327
-
- Savonarola, Fra Girolamo, contrasted with Luther and Calvin, II. 118
-
- Sceptical schools, the, of ancient Greece, I. 23
-
- Schelling, W. S. von, II. 335, 371, 392
-
- Schiller, Friedrich, his “Fiesco,” I. 96
-
- Schism, Papal, I. 95
-
- Schlegel, Friedrich von, I. 89, 424; II. 371
-
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich, II. 231, 296, 371, 392
-
- Scholastics, the, I. 61, 62; II. 162-168, 214, 215, 217, 222-225, 236,
- 242, 244, 245, =252-254=, 294, 301, =316=, =317=
-
- Schopenhauer, Arthur, II. 271, 291, 371
- his appreciation of Asceticism, II. 341, 342
-
- Schram, Dom, _Institutiones Theologiae Mysticae_, the Preternatural in,
- II. 305
-
- Schwab, J. B., on Mysticism requiring the Immanence of God, II. 325
-
- Science, character and motives of spirit’s occupation with, I. 40-43
- historical and physical sciences have each their specific method
- and level, II. 370, 382, 384
- historical, Religion’s present, but not ultimate, problem,
- II. =382-385=
- occupation with, three kinds, II. 381-382
- its place and function in man’s spiritual life, I. 43-45, 369, 370;
- II. =330=, =331=, =376=, =377=
- and Religion, each autonomous at its own level, I. 45-48; II. 368,
- 369
- Religion and Metaphysics, I. 39-40
- Religion, and Philosophy, their respective functions, II. 369-372
- to be taken throughout life in a double sense and way, I. 45-47;
- II. =374-379=
- and Things, and Religious Doctrine and Sacraments, as variously
- deep, parallel helps and necessities in man’s spiritual life,
- II. =372-379=
- novelty of this position very limited, II. =379-381=, 385, 386
-
- “Scintilla,” experience of St Catherine, I. 187-190, 451; II. 19
-
- Scotland, I. 72
-
- Scott, Thomas, the Evangelical, I. 63
- Walter, Sir, his _Anne of Geierstein_, I. 96
-
- Scotus, John Duns, I. 64, 78
- Proclus’ indirect influence upon, II. 315, 316
-
- Scotus, John, Eriugena, II. 252
- Proclus’ influence upon, II. 314, 315
-
- Segneri, Paolo, S.J., I. 89; II. 144
- his critiques of Molinos, II. 144
-
- Self-knowledge, persistent in St. Catherine, I. 206-207; II. 14, 15
-
- Semeria, --, _Secoli Cristiani della Liguria_, I. 337
-
- Sensitiveness, extreme, of Catherine, I. 176-181
-
- Sensuousness, lack of, in Catherine, I. 246
-
- Shakespeare, _Romeo and Juliet_, I. 101
-
- Siegwart, Professor Christian, II. 282
-
- Sight, Catherine’s impressions connected with, I. 181
-
- Silvestro, Convent of S., Genoa, I. 457
-
- Simmel, Georg, Dr., on the specifically religious sense, II. 260, 261
- on religion as _requiring_ that man should seek his own beatitude,
- II. 179
-
- Simon, the Just, Rabbi, II. 153
-
- Simon, Richard, I. 63, 64
-
- Simplicity, causes of, Quietists’ inadequate analysis of, II. 134-136
- longing of religious temper for, I. 65-66
- all living, ever constituted in multiplicity, I. =66-70=
-
- Sin, and the body, according to St. Catherine, I. 230, 235, 236, 264,
- 265, 298; II. =123-125=
- the Orphics, II. 192, 237
- St. Paul, II. 66, =68=, =69=, 122, 123
- Proclus, II. 98
- the Synoptists, II. 69, =122=
- as purely negative, in Ps.-Dionysius, Eckhart, Spinoza, II. 294
- as positive in Kant, Eucken, II. 294-296
- as positive and negative in St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Mother
- Juliana, II. 293, 294
- in St. Catherine, II. 235, 294
- original, according to Neo-Platonists, II. =298=
- St. Augustine, II. 298, 299
- Tridentine definition concerning, II. 300, 301
- difficulty in doctrine of, and Tennant’s interpretation,
- II. =298-300=
- value of Mystics’ attitude towards, II. =301=, =302=
-
- Sixtus IV. (Della Rovere), Pope, I. 94
-
- Sixtus V. (Peretti), Pope, I. 366
-
- Smell, Catherine’s impressions connected with, I. 180-181
-
- Socinianism, I. 9, 342; II. 390
-
- Socino, Fausto and Lelio, I. 63, 342
-
- Socrates, I. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 41, 60; II. 64, 186
- doctrine of, I. =12-13=
-
- Socratic school, I. 23
-
- Sophists, I. 12
-
- Sophocles, II. 189
-
- Sorbonne, the, Paris, II. 325 _n._ 3
-
- Soul, according to Aristotle, I. 20, 22
- Plato, I. 16, 17
- Plotinus, I. 24
- and the _Noûs_ in Eckhart, II. 323
- St. Paul, II. 64, 65
- Plotinus, II. 322, 323
- and the spirit in V. Battista, I. 353, 354, 399, 431
- St. Catherine, I. 189; II. 68
- St. Paul, II. =67-69=, =320-322=
- St. Teresa, II. 324
- the three forces of, I. 50-53; II. 387-396
- Immanence of God in the, II. 324-325, =336-338=
- life of, according to St. Catherine, I. 266-270
- usual succession in, I. 50-55
- its relation to its fellows, II. =353-355=
-
- Soul, its unity in multiplicity, I. 66
-
- Sources, literary of Catherine’s conceptions I. 254, 255, 258-260;
- II. =62-110=
- difficulties in their utilization, I. 251-253
-
- Space, and the soul and spirit, in St. Augustine, II. =212=, =213=
- St. Catherine. I. =277=, =278=; II. 69, 70, 77-81, =212=, =213=
- Plato, II. 205-207
- Plotinus, II. 248
- St. Thomas, II. 214
- recent writers, II. 247
-
- Spain, I. 62, 64, 72, 95, 96, 305; II. 388
-
- Spencer, Herbert, II. 271
-
- Speyer, Diet of, I. 340
-
- Spinola, Archbishop of Genoa, I. 305
- family, and members of, I. 96, 146, 175
-
- Spinoza, I. 7, 40-42; II. 169, 197, 198, 271, 296, 315, 326, 327, 375,
- 376, 392
- compared with Plotinus, II. 325-328
- on disinterested Religion, II. 175, 176
- doctrine of, I. 41-43
- errors of his speculation, greatness of his intuitions, II. =376=,
- =377=
- greatest Pure Pantheist, II. 325-327
- Reality and Perfection identical for, II. 294
-
- Spirit, Christ as, II. 70, 84, =320=, =321=
- God as, II. 84, 322
- the soul as, _see_ under Soul
- visitations of the, their suddenness and vehemence, I. 105, 107;
- II. 30, 96, 97
- and Space, II. 212, 213
- and Time and Duration, II. =247-249=
-
- Stanley, Arthur P., Dean, I. 63
-
- Stein, Freiherr von, II. 271
-
- Stigmata “Spiritual,” legend of St. Catherine’s, the, I. 209 _n._ 1,
- 210 _n._ 1, =452=, =453=
-
- Stoics, I. 23
-
- Strata, Battista, Notary, I. 155, 308, 379
-
- Strauss, David F., on Purgatory, II. 231
-
- Suarez, Francis, Father, S.J., I. 121; II. =241=
-
- Subconsciousness, late full recognition of, II. 47, 48, 265, =338-340=
- often described by Plotinus and St. Augustine, II. 91, 92, 248
- its deepest equivalent in St. Thomas’s “confused knowledge,”
- II. =288-289=, 337
-
- Sulze, Emile, fails to recognize necessity of Thing-element in religion,
- II. =372-374=
-
- Surin, Jean Joseph, S.J., I. 64, 89; II. 141
-
- Suso, Henry, Blessed, Dominican, I. 64, 94
-
- Sylvius, Francis, II. 162
-
- Synoptic Gospels and St. Catherine, II. 69, 84, 87, 89, =122-126=,
- 153-158
- and Joannine writings, II. 84-88
- and St. Paul, II. 65, 122-125, =157-158=
- on forgiveness as of single acts, II. 245, 246
- God’s direct interest in world, II. =254=, =255=
- Pure Love, II. =153-158=
- present most manifold picture of Jesus’ life and teaching,
- II. =116-120=
-
-
- Tacitus, II. 271
-
- Taigi, Anna Maria, Venerable, I. 78
-
- Tarsus, II. 63, 66
-
- Tasso, Torquato, I. 341
-
- Taste, Catherine’s impressions connected with, I. 180
-
- Tauler, John, Dominican, I. 64, 94
-
- Taylor, Prof. A. E., his criticism of Kant’s doctrine of Pure Love,
- II. 179-180
-
- Tennant, Rev. F. R., on Original Sin, II. 299, 300
-
- Tennyson, Alfred, I. 112; II. 227, 247
-
- Teresa, St., I. 64, 68, 87, 247; II. 5, 27 _n._ 1, 42, 45, 47, 48, 59,
- 137, 142, 143, 336, 363, 365
- and Direction, II. 363
- on occupation with our Lord’s Humanity, II. 169, =365=
- God’s immanence in the soul, II. =324=, =325=
- nerves and muscles, II. 5
- her psycho-physical peculiarities, II. notes to pp. 14-18, 20, 21,
- 27, 43, 44
- on soul and spirit, II. 324
- her tests for locutions and visions, =II. 47=, =50=
- and social Religion, II. 365
-
- Tertullian, on St. Paul’s “thorn,” “stake” in the flesh, II. 43
- prayer for the dead, II. 233, 234
-
- Thales, I. 12
-
- Theatines, I. 322, 340
-
- Thibet, II. 392
-
- Thing-element, its necessity in Religion, I. 245-247; II. =372-374=,
- =377-381=, 385, 386
-
- Thing, three relations of, with thought. II. =374-377=
-
- Thobia, I. 129, 151, 153, 154, 223, 225, 378, 380; II. 26, 29, 169, 172
-
- Thobia’s Mother, I. 151, 153, 154, 172, 176, 225; II. 29
-
- Thomas, St., Aquinas, I. 7, 61, 78, 120, 121; II. 142, 162, 181, 217,
- 218, 245, 253, 288, 315, 317, 325, 333
- on God as _Actus Purus_, II. 132, 250
- on God’s Being as distinct from His Essence, II. 316, 317
- on the soul’s direct dim knowledge of God, II. =288=, =289=, 337
- on obligation of Confession, I. 120
- on the dispositions of the Lost, II. 222, 223
- on the fire of Purgatory and Hell, II. 217
- on God’s _ecstacy_ and creative acts, as His supreme
- self-expression, II. =252-254=
- on every soul’s individuality, II. =255=, =256=
- on Pure Love, II. =162-168=
- on man’s natural exigency of the vision of God, II. =337=, =338=
- on term “person” as applicable to God, II. 257, 258
- on the other-world “places,” II. 214
- on Purgatory as truly purgative, II. 244, 245
- on simultaneity of soul’s vision of all things in future life,
- II. 248
- St., of Canterbury, I. 372
-
- Thomassin, Louis, Oratorian, I. 64
-
- Thucydides, II. 271
-
- Tiele, C. P., Professor, on the Infinite as present within man, II. 268,
- =339=, =340=
- necessity for Ecclesiastical Institutions, II. 352
- for metaphysical convictions in Religion, II. 270
-
- Tobit, Book of, the Eminent Good Works in, II. 154
-
- Toleto, Gaspare, Father, Inquisitor, I. 464
-
- Toqueville, Alexis de, II. 271
-
- Touch, St. Catherine’s impressions connected with, I. 178-180
-
- _Tracts for the Times_, I. 63
-
- Transcendence of God, attitude towards, of V. Battista Vennazza, II. 289
- St. Catherine, I. 276, 280; II. =346=, =347=
-
- Transcendence of God, attitude towards, of St. John of the Cross,
- II. =257=, =258=, 343-345
- Sören Kierkegaard, II. 287, 288, =345=, =346=
- St. Thomas, II. =257=
- recent thinkers, II. 270, 271, 339, 340, =358=, =359=
-
- Translations of St. Catherine’s relics, I. 300-302, 381 _n._
-
- _Trattato_, see _Vita_ (_Dic._ or _T._).
-
- Trendelenburg, Adolf, on blind Force and conscious Thought, their only
- possible relations, II. =375=
-
- Trent, Council of, on abuses connected with purgatorial doctrines and
- practices, II. 232
- on Purgatory, II. =242=
- on Original Sin, II. 300
-
- Troeltsch, Prof. Ernst, II. 282, 333, 370
- on Christianity as Inner-worldly and Super-worldly, II. =358-360=
- abiding individuality of all things historical, II. 256, 257
- Kant’s actual conceptions as more religious than his theory of
- religion, II. 261, 262
- the testimony involved in our religious requirements, II. =339=
-
- Tyrrell, Rev. G., on the possibly _Totum-Simul_ consciousness of the
- Lost, II. 230
- the relations between love of God and love of creatures,
- II. 354, 355
- purely natural religion, what might have been but never was,
- II. =288=
-
-
- Unity, constituted by multiplicity, I. =66-70=
- needful for all spiritual life, II. 150
-
- Universe, conditions of its power upon human will, I. 3
-
- _Upanishads_, the, II. 183
-
- Upton, Prof., II. 330
-
- Urban VIII, Pope (Barberini), I. 98, 304
- Bull on Cultus of Saints, I. 98 _n._ i (99), 304, 305
-
-
- Varni, Santo, sculptor, I. 332
-
- Vaughan, Diana, II. 305
-
- Venice, I. 93, 203
- Hospital in, I. 322
-
- Vergil, II. 271
- on the burning out of the soul’s stains, II. 236
-
- Vernaccia (Vernazza) Family, I. 146
-
- Vernazza, Venerable Battista (Tommasa), I. 91, 117 _n._ 1, 146 _n._ 2,
- 217, 252, 253, 316, 321, 322, 325, 327 _n._ 1, 328, 329, 330, 331,
- 372, 381, 384, 395, 403, 407, 410, 413, 414, 429, 432, 447, 451,
- 453, 454, 457, 461, 462; II. 27, 38 _n._ 1, 48
- and Tommaso Moro, I. 339-344
- author of Dialogo I, I. =407-410=
- II, III, I. =429-433=
- _Preface_ (ancient) of _Vita_ (probably), I. 416
- birth of, I. 419
- character of, I. 365, 366
- death of, I. =366=, =367=, 366 _n._ 2, 381
- _Colloquies_, I. =344-358=, 416, 433
- compared with Catherine’s doctrine, I. 346-358
- the _Dialogo_, I. 399, 403, 408, 431
- compared to St. Catherine and E. Vernazza, I. 336, 337
- _Dialogo della Beata Caterina_ based practically throughout upon
- _Vita-Dicchiarazione_ yet shows everywhere thought, feeling, aims,
- information of, I. 397-410, =417-433=
- _Letters of_, I. 345
- to Donna Anguisola, I. 359-364
- to Padre Collino (1), I. 316-318, 321-324, 327-331 (2), I. 366
- to Tommaso Moro, I. 342-344
- portrait, I. 366 _n._ 2
- final redactor of _Vita_, _Dicchiarazione_, _Dialogo_, I. 464
- her youth, I. 337-339
- her writings, I. 344, 345
- Catetta (Daniela), I. 166, 321, 325, 339
- Ettore, I. 90, 91, 105 _n._ 1, 114 _n._ 2, 121 _n._ 3, 127,
- 140 _n._ 4, 145 _n._ 1, 147 _n._ 1, 150 _n._ 1, 154, 159, 166,
- 167, 169, 174, 175, 183 _n._ 1, 187, 191, 193, 202, 213, 216,
- 217, 246, 252, 256, 279, 299, 308, 337, 338, 339, 340, 371, 384,
- 415, 430, 444, 449, 450, 451, 456, 463, 464; II. 9, 16, 26, 27, 29
- his philanthropic work, its character, I. 319-321, 323, 327
- its effects, I. 364, 365
- in Genoa, _Chronici_, I. 173, 316, 317
- Lazaretto, I. 330, 331
- _Mandiletto_, I. 154, 332
- Prisons, I. 327-329
- his wills, ii, I. 318-321
- iii, I. 166, =324-327=
- Ven. Battista and, in general, I. 314-316, 336, 337
- in June 1524, I. =330-332=
- traces of their intercourse in _Dialogo_, I. =406=, =407=,
- =429-431=
- St. Catherine and his absence from her death-bed, I. 202-204, 226
- his authorization to write about her, I. =191-192=
- her influence with him, I. 314, 315, 320, 321, 331, 332
- his influence with her, I. 159-161, 191-193
- upon her memory, I. 145, 146, 453-457
- their mutual likeness and unlikeness, I. 314, 315
- his character, I. =146=, =147=
- his contributions to St. Catherine’s biography in _Vita_-proper,
- I. 166, =453-455=, 464
- in _Trattato_, I. 447, 448
- their general character, I. 147
- daughters of, I. 149, 166, 299, 300, 325, 326
- his death, I. =331=, 381
- his posthumous fame, its unlikeness to Catherine’s, I. 332, 333
- Leo X, Pope, and, I. 322
- Lunga, Señora, and, I. 329, 330
- Manuscript C wrongly attributed to, I. 395, 396
- married life of, I. 316-318, 330
- monuments to, I. 332, 333
- Ginevrina (Maria Archangela), I. 166, 325, 326, 339
- Tommasa, _see_ Vernazza Battista
- village, I. 318
-
- Vernazzi, clan of, I. 318, 320
-
- Vincent, St., de Paul, I. 306
-
- Vinci, Leonardo da, School of, I. 98 _n._ 1 (99)
-
- Visions of St. Catherine’s, I. 181
-
- _Vita e Dottrina di S. Caterina_, as in Thirteenth, Ninth Genoese, ed.,
- _Sordi Muti_, and its three parts, _Vita_-proper, _Dicchiarazione_
- or _Trattato_, _Dialogo_, I. 90, 91
- its additions to MSS. A and B in _Vita_-proper, I. 389, 390, 394,
- 451-453
- in _Trattato_, I. 442
- of entire _Dialogo_ I. 389, 395
- its additions to MS. C in _Vita_-proper, I. 396
- of _Dialogo_, Parts II, III, I. 396, 397
- to MSS. A, B, C of Title, Approbation, Preface, Subscription,
- I. 411-417
- its changes since first printed edition, 1551, I. 464-466
- final redaction for printing of entire corpus, I. 464
- booklets, evidence for _Conversione-_, _Dicchiarazione-_,
- _Passione-_, in about 1512, I. 394, 434, =447-449=, 450, 451, 464
- the _Dialogo_, Part I, I. 396, 397
- its author (Battista Vernazza), I. 407, 410
- compared with _Vita_-proper, I. =399-407=
- its authentic contributions, I. 406, 407
- the _Dialogo_, Parts II, III, their author and character,
- I. 418, 419, =427-433=
- compared with _Vita_-proper, I. 419-424, =424-427=
- the _Trattato_ (_Dicchiarazione_), earlier and later part
- of, I. 439, 440
- earlier part, its theological glosses, I. =440-442=
- later part, its secondary expansions, I. =435-440=
- upbuilding of whole, and authorship (predominantly Ettore
- Vernazza), I. 447-449
- the _Vita_-proper, original tripartite scheme of, become
- quadripartite, I. =390-394=
- its great divisions and secondary constituents, I. 453
- age and authorship of retained constituents, I. =453-463=
- three tests for discriminating authentic from secondary
- sayings, I. 462, 463
-
- Volkelt, Johannes, Prof., on immanental inter-relatedness of History and
- Philosophy, II. =279=, =280=
- dualism in Kant’s Epistemology, II. 278
- fallacy of Positivistic Epistemology, II. =275-278=
- ultimate Power in world, alive in analogy to a willing individual,
- II. 277, 278
-
-
- Wagner, Richard, II. 165
-
- Waldensian movement, II. 391
-
- Ward, James, Prof., II. 265, 287, 370
- on receptivity as activity; experience as wider than knowledge; and
- our own experience, the only one immediately accessible to us,
- II. =277-280=
-
- Weinel, Heinrich, on visions and psycho-physical peculiarities in
- sub-apostolic times, II. 42, 43, 308
-
- White, Edward, on Conditional Immortality, II. 229 _n._ 2
-
- Will, the things and conditions that move the human, I. 3, 367-370;
- II. 375-385
-
- Wilson, Archdeacon Andrew, on the Fall of Man, II. 299-300
-
- Windelband, W., Prof., on religion’s various elements including
- metaphysical life, II. 262
-
- Wisdom, Book of, I. 61
- attitude towards the body in, and St. Paul, I. 234; II. 227
-
- Wittenberg, I. 9, 95, 311
-
- Wordsworth, William, II. 271
-
- Wycliffe, I. 94
-
-
- Xenophon, I. 28
-
- Ximenes, Cardinal Francis, O.S.F., I. 62
-
-
- Youth, its apprehension of religion, I. 51-52
-
-
- Zaccaria, F. A., S.J., II. 225 _n._ 2
-
- Zedakah, II. 153
-
- Zeller, Edward, _Philosophie der Griechen_, I. 11 _n._ 1; II. 320
-
- Zeus, II. 93, 187
-
- Zwingli, I. 62, 63; II. 119 _n._ 1, 388, 392
-
- Zwinglianism, I. 9
-
-
-II. OF LITERARY REFERENCES
-
-(_The more general literary references given under names of authors in
-Part I_)
-
-
-HOLY SCRIPTURE--OLD TESTAMENT
-
- Daniel ix. 24; I. 408
- xii. 2; II. 190
-
- Ecclesiasticus vii. 17; II. 224
-
- Ezekiel i. 1-28, etc.; II. 45 _n._
- iv. 1-3, 7, etc.; II. 45 _n._
- iv. 4-8; II. 45, 46 _n._
- viii. i-ix. 11, etc.; II. 45 _n._
- viii. 16, xi. 13, xxiv. 1; II. 45 _n._
-
- Genesis i. 5, iii. 18; II. 89
- xv. 1; I. 348
-
- Isaiah vi. 3; I. 352
- xxvi. 1-19; II. 190
- xliii. 10, xliv. 1, xlviii. 10; I. 349
- xlix. 6; I. 351
-
- Job xix. 25, 26; II. 190
-
- Maccabees, Book of, ii. 43-45; II. 233
-
- Psalms lxxiii. (lxxii.) 25; II. 159
- ci. 13; I. 362
- ciii. 13, 14; II. 69
- cix. 31; I. 358
-
- Solomon, Cant. v. 10; I. 349
- Prov. viii. 31; I. 360
- Wisd. of., ix. 15; II. 66, 123
-
- Tobit, Book of, xii. 8, 9; II. 154
-
-
-NEW TESTAMENT
-
- Acts of the Apostles xxvi. 9-10; I. 33
-
- John, St., Apocalypse, v. 11; I. 349
- vii. 9; II. 254
- 1 Ep., i. 1; I. 36
- i. 2; I. 37
- iii. 2; II. 82, 257
- iii. 14; I. 39; II. 89
- v. 10; I. 37
- v. 20; I. 39; II. 84
- Gospel according to, i. 4, 5; II. 82
- i. 9-11; II. 79
- i. 14; I. 36
- i. 17; II. 79
- i. 18; I. 358; II. 81
- i. 29; II. 85
- ii. 11; I. 37; II. 86
- ii. 23, 24; I. 38
- iii. 2-5; I. 38
- iii. 16; II. 79-80, 83
- iii. 18; II. 89
- iii. 19; II. 82
- iii. 21; I. 37; II. 79-83, 82
- iii. 31; II. 82
- iii. 34; II. 84
- iii. 36; I. 39
- iv. 18; II. 160
- iv. 24; I. 37; II. 80, 88
- iv. 31; II. 81
- iv. 42; I. 38; II. 79-80
- v. 6; I. 38
- v. 24; II. 88-89, 90
- v. 28-29; I. 36
- vi. 27; II. 88
- vi. 35; I. 37; II. 90
- vi. 44; I. 37; II. 87
- vi. 61, 63; II. 88
- vi. 69; II. 86, 88
- viii. 21; II. 80
- viii. 23; II. 81
- viii. 44; II. 80
- ix. 41; II. 80
- x. 8; II. 80
- x. 38; I. 360
- xiii. 23; I. 358
- xiv. 6; I. 37
- xiv. 10; II. 80
- xiv. 11; I. 38
- xiv. 20-21; I. 39
- xiv. 23; I. 360
- xvii. 1-13; I. 210 _n._ 1
- xvii. 3; II. 82, 90
- xvii. 6; II. 90
- xvii. 8, etc.; II. 82
- xvii. 18; I. 37
- xvii. 21; II. 83
- xviii. 9; I. 362
- xviii. 37; II. 79
- xix. 24; II. 83
- xx. 8; II. 86
- xx. 29; I. 38; II. 86
-
- Luke, St., Gospel according to, ii. 32; I. 351
- vi. 33, 34; II. 158
- vi. 38; II. 155
- vii. 47; II. 157
- ix. 23-24; I. 31
- ix. 51-56; I. 27-28
- x. 7; II. 154
- xii. 6; II. 254
- xiv. 27; I. 31
- xvi. 23; I. 358
- xvii. 10; II. 157
- xvii. 33; I. 31
- xx. 34-38; I. 32
- xxii. 3-11; I. 33
- xxii. 15-19; I. 31
- xxvi. 9-18; I. 33
-
- Mark, St., Gospel according to, i. 13; II. 122
- iv. 27-28; I. 30
- vii. 14, 15; I. 31
- viii. 34; I. 31
- ix. 30-32; I. 27-28
- ix. 35-36; I. 32
- ix. 38-41 (& Par.); II. 84
- ix. 41; II. 154
- x. 13-16; I. 27-28
- x. 14, 15; I. 32
- x. 21; II. 154
- x. 23; II. 155
- xii. 28-34 (& Par.); II. 254
- xii. 36; II. 322
- xiv. 22-25; I. 31
- xiv. 25; II. 254
- xiv. 38 (& Par.); II. 122
-
- Matth., St., Gospel according to, iii. 13-19; I. 31
- v. 3; I. 31
- v. 5; II. 155
- v. 7; II. 154
- v. 8; I. 31; II. 154, 155
- v. 12; II. 154
- v. 17; I. 30
- v. 23; I. 30
- v. 44, 45, 48; II. 157
- vi. 4, 6; II. 154
- vi. 16; I. 30
- vi. 14, 18, 20; II. 154
- vi. 23, 26, 28; I. 30
- vi. 33; II. 157
- x. 29; II. 254
- xii. 24-27; I. 32
- xiii. 30-32; II. 122
- xvi. 24, 25; I. 31
- xvii. 12-14; II. 255
- xviii. 32; II. 154
- xxii. 3; II. 155
- xxii. 11; II. 156
- xxii. 12; II. 155-156
- xxii. 29-33; I. 32
- xxiv. 47; II. 155
- xxv. 10; II. 254
- xxv. 14-30; II. 157
- xxv. 21; II. 155
- xxvi. 26-29; I. 31
- xxxiv. 42; II. 122
- xxxvi. 51, 52; II. 27-28
-
- Paul, St., Ep. to Col. i. 15-17; I. 35
- i. 26; I. 34
- ii. 2; I. 34
- iii. 1; I. 35
- iii. 3-4; I. 34
- iii. 4; II. 322
- 1 Ep. to Cor. i. 18; I. 33
- i. 22-25; I. 33
- ii. 6; I. 34
- ii. 10; I. 34
- ii. 11; I. 34; II. 321
- ii. 14, 15; I. 33; II. 321
- iii. 1; I. 34
- iii. 10-15; II. 239
- v. 5; II. 68
- v. 11; II. 67
- vi. 19; II. 72, 321
- vii. 7; II. 43
- x. 3; II. 76
- x. 4; I. 35
- xi. 7; II. 75
- xi. 11; I. 32; II. 75
- xi. 23, 26; I. 32
- xii.; I. 33; II. 65-66
- xiii. 7; II. 160
- xiv.; I. 33
- xiv. 25; II. 65
- xv. 3-8; I. 32
- xv. 19, 32; II. 158
- xv. 35, 53; II. 64
- 2 Ep. to Cor. i. 22; II. 65
- ii. 4; II. 65
- iii. 17; II. 70, 88
- iii. 18; I. 35
- iv. 4; II. 68, 321
- iv. 16; II. 64, 159
- v. 1-4; II. 66, 77, 123
- v. 4; II. 66
- v. 11; II. 73
- vi. 14; II. 73, 77
- vii. 1; II. 68, 73, 321
- x. 10; II. 43
- xii. 9; II. 159
- xiii. 4; II. 78
- xviii. 7-8; II. 43
- Ep. to Eph. i. 10; I. 35
- i. 18; II. 65
- iii. 5; I. 35
- iv. 13; I. 35
- Ep. to Gal. ii. 20; I. 35; II. 322
- iv. 6; II. 65
- iv. 14-15; II. 43
- iv. 30; II. 160
- Ep. to Phil. i. 23; II. 77
- iii. 12; II. 257
- iv. 1; I. 361
- Ep. to Rom. ii. 5; II. 65
- ii. 6; II. 158
- iii.-xi.; I. 32
- v. 5; I. 360; II. 65, 72
- v. 15-19; I. 352
- vi. 6, 8; I. 35
- vi. 12-13; II. 68, 73
- vi. 14; II. 68-69
- vii. 18; II. 123
- vii. 23; II. 65, 68
- vii. 24; II. 123
- viii. 4-13; II. 68-69
- viii. 10; II. 68
- viii. 11; I. 35; II. 321
- viii. 16; II. 68
- viii. 19; II. 74
- viii. 31; II. 159
- viii. 35, 37-39; II. 159
- x. 9; II. 65
- xii. 2; II. 65
- xiii. 11-14; II. 73
- xiv. 14-20; II. 74
- 1 Ep. to Thess. iv. 15, 16; II. 77
- v. 4-8; II. 73
-
- Peter, St., 2 Ep. of, iii. 12; II. 239
-
-
- Abbott, Dr. E. A., _St. Thomas of Canterbury, his Death and Miracles_,
- 2 vols., 1898; I. 372
-
- Alizieri, Federico, “Vita di Suor Tommasa Fieschi,” in _Atti della Soc.
- di Storia Patria_, Vol. VIII., 1868; II. 381 _n._ 2
-
- Ambrose, St., _In Lucam_, VII. 205; II. 216
-
- Anrich, G., “Clemens und Origenes als Begründer, etc.,” in _Theol.
- Abhandlungen für H. J. Holtzmann_, 1892; II. 236, 244 _n._ 1
-
- Aristotle, _de Anima_, III. 5, 430_a_; II. 320
- _Gen. animal_, II. 3, 736_b_; II. 320
- _Metaph._ VII. 1072_b_, IX. 1074_b_; II. 334
- XII. 7-10; II. 320
- XII. 1072_b_-1074_b_; II. 251
-
- Pseudo-Aristotle, _Liber de Causis_, ed. Bardenhewer, 1882, §§ 2, 4;
- II. 315
-
- Arnold, Matthew, _Culture and Anarchy_, 1869; II. 57
-
- Atzberger, Dr. L., continuation of Dr. J. Scheeben’s _Dogmatik_,
- Vol. IV., 1903; II. 227
-
- Augustine, St., ed. Ben. Reprint Gaume, _Confessiones_, I. c. 2; II. 213
- VI. c. 15, VII. c. 12, VIII. cc. 5, 11; II. 293
- X. c. 26, XIII. c. 17; II. 213
- XI. cc. 11, 20; II. 248
- XI. c. 23 § 1; II. 306
- XI. c. 27 § 3; II. 248
- _De Civitate Dei_, lib. xxi. c. 26 _n._ 4; II. 211
- _Contra Julianum_, IV. 58 (Vol. X. col. 1073 _c_); II. 128
- _De Nuptiis et concupisc._, I. 8 (Vol. X. col. 613 _a_); II. 128
- I. 23; II. 293
- _De Octo Dulcitii quaest._, 12, 13; II. 217, 244
- _De Trinitate_, L. XV. c. 16; II. 248
- _Enarratio_ in Ps. xxxvi. § i _n._ 10; II. 211
- _Enchiridion_, CX. CXII; II. 225
- _Liber de Fide_, I. 27, 29; II. 317
- _Opus imperfectum_, III. 56; II. 293
- _De Peccato Orginali_, 40 (Vol. X. col. 590 _b_); II. 128
- _Tract in Joannis Ev._, VIII. 1; II. 306
- XXIV. 1; II. 306
-
- Avicenna, _Comm. in Arist. Metaph., Tract._ VIII. c. 6; II. 315
-
-
- Bacher, Prof. W., _Die Agada der Palästinensischen Amoräer_, Vol. I.
- 1892; II. 234
-
- Baring-Gould, Rev. S., _Lives of the Saints_, 1898, Vol. X., Sept.
- 15; I. 92; II. 22
-
- Baruch, _Apocalypse of_, XXX. 2; II. 214
-
- Basil, St., _Prooemium in Reg. Fus. Tract_, _n._ 3; II. 166
-
- Bellarmine, Cardinal, _De Gratia primi hominis_, XIV.; II. 214
- _De Purgat_, I. c. IV. 6, c. XIV. 22; II. 245
- Lib. II. c. 11; II. 217
-
- Benedicti XIV., _De Servorum Beatificatione et Beatorum
- Canonizatione_, 1743, Vol. II. p. 239 _a_; I. 126, 253, 254
-
- Bergson, H., _Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience_, ed. 1898;
- II. 7 _n._ 1, 165
-
- Berkeley, George, Bp., _Alciphron_, IV. _nos._ 17-21; II. 288
-
- Bernard, St., _Sermons on the Canticle of Cant._, ch. XXVI.; I. 385
- _Tract. de Gratia et Lib. Arbitrio_, ch. XIV. § 47; I. 69-70
-
- Blondel, Maurice, Prof., _L’Action_, 1893; I. 48 _n._ 1; II. 7 _n._ 1
-
- Bossuet, J. B., Bishop, Œuvres, ed. 1816, 1817, _Sermons_, Vol. XI.
- p. 376; II. 218
- _Instruction sur les Etats d’Oraison_, and Documents, Vol. XXVII.;
- II. 131 _n._
- _Relation sur le Quiétism_, Vol. XXIX.; II. 141
-
- Boudhinon, Abbé A., “Sur l’Histoire des Indulgences,” in _Revue d’Hist.
- et de Litt. Relig._, 1898; I. 121; II. 242
-
- Bousset, W., _Die Religion des Judenthums_, 1903; II. 153 _n._ 1
-
- Boutroux, Emile, Prof., “La Psychologie du Mysticisme,” _Bull. de l’Inst.
- Psych. Internat._, 1902; II. 61
-
- Brieger, T., Prof., “N. Paulus’ Johann Tetzel,” in _Theol.
- Literaturzeitung_, 1900; II. 232
-
- Bugge, _Die Hauptparabeln Jesu_, 1900; II. 156
-
- Butler, Abbot, E. Cuthbert, O.S.B., _The Lausiac History of Palladius_,
- 1898, 1904; II. 371
-
-
- Cadrès, Alphonse, S.J., _le Père Jean N. Grou_, 1866; II. 363 _n._
-
- Caird, Edward, _Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers_, Vol. I,
- Lecture XIII.; II. 264 _n._ 2
- Vol. II. L. XIV.; II. 251, 320
- LL. XXII. XXIII.; II. 325-327
- L. XXV.; II. 273
- L. XXVI.; II. 335
- “St. Paul and the Idea of Evolution,” _Hibbert Journal_, Vol. II.;
- II. 119
-
- Cajetanus, Card, _Comm. in Summam_, II., ii., qu. 23, art. 1.; II. 162
-
- Celesia, P., Vinc., _Storia dell’Ospedale di Pammatone_ (MS.); I.
- 155 _n._ 1, 308 _n._ 1
-
- Chantepie de la Saussaye, _Lehrbuch der Religions-Geschichte_, Vol. I.,
- ed. 1887; ed. 1905; II. 183
-
- Charles, Dr. R. H., _Critical Hist. of the doctrine of Future Life_,
- 1899; II. 189, 190, 220
-
- Class, Prof. G., _Phänomenologie u. Ontologie des menschl-Geistes_, 1896;
- II. 229 _n._ 2
-
- Clement, of Alexandria, _Paedagogus_, I. c. VIII.; II. 235
- _Stromata_, I. c. XXVI. 168, 2 (Stählin); II. 234
- IV. c. IV. 15, 6 (St.); II. 166
- IV. c. VI. 30, 1 (St.); II. 166
- IV. c. XXIV. 154, 3 (St.); II. 236
- V. c. III. 16, 7 (St.); II. 236
- VII. c. VI.; II. 216
- VII. c. XXVI.; II. 234
-
- Coconnier, Père, M.Th., _L’Hypnotisme Franc_, 1897; II. 6 _n._ 2
-
- Corderins, Bathazar, S.J., “Quaestio Mystica,” in _Dionysius Areop.,
- Migne._, Vol. I. pp. 1050-1058; II. 288
-
- Crusius, O., _Erwin Rhode_, 1902; II. 191, 192
-
-
- Dante, _Purgatorio_, II. 40-42; II. 244
-
- Deharbe, Joseph, S.J., _Die Volkommene Liebe Gottes_; II. 162,
- 170 _n._ 1
-
- Denifle, H. S., Father, “Meister Eckharts Lateinische Schriften,” in
- _Arch f. Litt. u. Kirchengesch. des M. A._, 1886; II. 294, 315, 317
-
- Denzinger, H., _Enchiridion Definitionum_, ed. 1888, No. 38;
- I. 448 _n._ 1
- No. 73; I. 217
- Nos. 387, 588, 859; II. 242
- No. 363; I. 120, 121
- No. 454; II. 323
- Nos. 437, 455; II. 318
-
- Dilthey, W., Prof., “Auffassung d. Menschen, i. 15 _u._ 16, Jahrh.,” in
- _Arch. f. Gesh. der Philosophie_, 1892; II. 119
-
- Dionysius, the Areopagite (tr. Parker, Oxford, 1897, 1899), _Divine
- Names_, I. i; II. 95, 98
- I. 5; II. 97, 99
- I. 6; II. 100
- III. i; II. 91, 98
- IV. 1; II. 93
- IV. 2; II. 94
- IV. 5; II. 93
- IV. 6; II. 97
- IV. 8-10; II. 95
- IV. 13; II. 96
- IV. 13, 4, 16; I. 353
- IV. 22; II. 222
- IV. 23; II. 224, 228
- IV. 24; II. 222, 228, 236, 294
- V. 1; II. 314
- VII. 1, 3; II. 95
- VIII. 3, 5; II. 100
- VIII. 7; II. 92
- IX. 4; II. 91, 92
- IX. 5; II. 99
- XI. 1; II. 94
- _Eccl. Hierarchy_, I. 2; II. 99
- III. 3, 7; II. 99
- _Heavenly Hierarchy_, XV. 2; II. 94
- XV. 3; II. 98
- _Mystic Theology_, I.; II. 95, 97
- III.; II. 95, 97, 289-290, 314
- IV.; II. 314
- V.; II. 98
-
- _Documenti su S. Caterina_ (Bibl-Univ. Genoa), I. 115 _n._ 1, 149 _n._ 1,
- 171 _n._ 1, 172 _n._ 1, 179 _n._ 1, 310 _n._ 2, 376-379
-
- Dubors, F., Abbé, “Le feu du Purgatoire, est-il un feu corporal?” _Revue
- du Clergé Français_, 1902, II. 218
-
- Duhm, B., Prof., _das Geheinniss in der Religion_, 1896; II. 6 _n._ 3,
- 159 _n._ 2
-
-
- Eckhart, Meister, _Werke_, ed. Pfeiffer, 1857; II. 318, 323
-
- Elliott, Walter, _The Life of Father Hecker_, 1894; II. 56
-
- Emery, Abbé J. A., _Sur la Mitigation des Peines des Damnés_; II. 226
-
- Enoch, Book of; II. 239
-
- Esra, IV. iv. 35; II. 213-214
-
- Eucken, R., Prof., _Der Kampf um einen geistig. Lebensinhalt_, 1896;
- II. 271
- _Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion_, 1901; II. 269, 296
- _Die Lebensanschaungen der grossen Denker_; I. 39 _n._ 3
-
- Euripides, _Orestes_, XXX.; II. 237
-
-
- Faber, Rev. F. W., _All for Jesus_, ed. 1889, ch. IX., § 3-5; I. 89;
- II. 244, 245
-
- Federici, F., _Famiglie Nobili di Genova_, MS., I. 157 _n._ 1;
- II. 231 _n._
-
- Fechner, G. T., _Die Drei Gründe u. Motive des Glaubens_, 1863;
- II. 231 _n._ 1
-
- Fénelon, Fr. de S., Archbishop; Œuvres, Versailles, 1817-1821, _Epistle
- II to Pope Clement XI_, Vol. IX; I. 68, 69; II. 161
- _Explication … des Propositions de Molinos_, Vol. IV.; II. 142
- _Existence de Dieu_, Vol. I; I. 1, 31; II. 5
- _Instruction pastorale_, 1697, Vol. IV; II. 131, 161
- _Lettre sur la Charité_, Vol. IX; II. 161
- _Lettre sur l’Oraison Passive_, Vol. VIII; II. 131, 161, 173, 174
- _Première Réponse aux Difficultés de M. l’Evêque de Chartres_, Vol.
- IV; II. 161
- _Seconde Lettre à M. de Paris_, Vol. V; II. 181
-
- Ficino Marsilio, _Theologia Platonica_, 1482; II. 203, 204
-
- Francis, St., de Sales, _Les Controverses_ in _Œuvres_, ed. 1892, Vol. I.
- pt. iii. ch. II.; II. 245
-
- Froude, R. E., “Scientific Speculation and the Unity of Truth,” _Dublin
- Review_, Oct. 1900; II. 369
-
-
- Gardner, Percy, Prof., _New Chapters in Greek History_, 1892, pp. 333-334;
- II. 188
- _Oxford at the Cross Roads_, 1903; II. 57
-
- Gebirol Ibn., _Fons Vitae_, ed. 1895; II. 316
-
- Giovo, Angelo, _Vita di S. Caterina_ (MS.); I. 172 _n._, 310 _n._ 2
-
- Giustiniano, Agostino, _Castigatissimi Annali della Rep. di Genova_,
- 1537; I. 382-384
-
- Görres, Joseph, _Die Christliche Mystik_, 1836, 1842; II. 305
-
- Gosselin, Abbé, _Analyse raisonnée de la Controverse du Quiétisme_
- (Fénelon, Œuvres, Vol. IV.); II. 162, 172, 173
- _Vie de M. Emery_, 1862, Vol. II.; II. 226
-
- Gousset, Cardinal, _Théologie Dogmatique_, 1856, Vol. II.; II. 217
-
- Grafe, E., “Verhältniss der paulinischen Schriften zur Sapientia
- Salomonis,” in _Theol. Abhandl. C. von. Weizsäcker Gewidmet_, 1892;
- II. 66
-
- Grandgeorge, M. L., _St. Augustin et le Neo-Platonisme_, 1896; I. 126,
- 127, 130, 131; II. 293
-
- Greg, W. E., _Enigmas of Life_; II. 227, 231
-
- Gregory, St., of Nazianzum, _Poema de Seipso_; I. 546; II. 216
- St., of Nyssa, _Catecheticus_, VIII. c. 35; II. 244
- _Orationes_, XL. 36; II. 216
-
- Grou, Jean N., S.J., _Méditations sur l’Amour de Dieu_; II. 307
-
- Gunkel, Prof. H., _die Wirkungen des H. Geistes_, ed. 1899; II. 6 _n._ 1
-
-
- Harnack, Prof. A., _Das Wesen des Christenthums_, 1902; II. 352
- _Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte_, ed. 1888, Vol. II.; II. 351
-
- Hase, Carl von, _Handbuch der protest. Polemik_, ed. 1864; II. 231 _n._ 1
-
- Hedley, Bishop J. C., _The Spiritual Letters of Fénelon_, 1892, Vol. I.
- Preface; II. 161
-
- Heppe, Heinrich, Prof., _Geschichte der Quietistischen Mystik_, 1875;
- II. 139-140
-
- Hermann, Wilhelm, Prof., _Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott_, 1892; II.
- 263-265, 332, 333
-
- Hesiod, _Works and Days_, II. 187
-
- Höffding, H., Prof., _Söron Kirkegaard_, 1896; II. 285, 288, 345, 346,
- 353
-
- Holtzmann, H. J., Prof., _Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen Theologie_,
- 1897; I. 30 _n._; II. 153 _n._
- Vol. II., ch. i.; II. 63 _n._ 2, 72, 73, 321, 322
- Vol. II., ch. iii.; II. 79 _n._, 190
- _Richard Rothe’s Speculative System_, 1899; II. 229, 247, 248,
- 269, 270, 377, 378
-
- Homer, _Iliad_, VIII. 17-20; II. 93
- XX. 232 _seq._; II. 186-187
- _Od._ IV. 560-568; II. 186-187
-
- Hurter, H., Father, S.J., _Theologiae Dogmaticae Compendium_, 1893,
- Vol. III.; II. 242
-
-
- Inge, W. R., Prof., _Christian Mysticism_, 1897; I. 30 _n._ 1;
- II. 305 _n._
-
-
- Jacopone da Todi, _Laudi Spirituali_, ed. Florence, 1490; I. 259-260
- _Lauda_, XIII. _v._ 1-7, 8; II. 102
- XXIII. _v._ 1-6, 10; _ibid._
- XXV. _v._ 7, 10, 11; _ibid._
- XLV.; II. 103
- LVIII. _a_, _v._ 10, 11, 12; _ibid._
- LVIII. _b_, 1-9; II. 204
- LVIII. _v._ 3, 8, 11-14, 16, 19, 20-22; II. 104
- LVIII. _v._ 23; II. 104, 259, 275
- LVIII. _v._ 24, 26, 27, 28-30; II. 105
- LXXIV. _v._ 6; _ibid._
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- Vol. VI. 192-248, _Letters_; I. 343-344, 359-364, 409 _n._ 1, 2
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- _Vita_-proper, Cap. I. 3; I. 104 _n._ 1
- 3_c_; I. 127
- Cap. II. 4_a_, _b_, _c_; I. 105
- 4_a_-5_b_; I. 404-406
- 4_a_-5_c_; I. 458-460
- 4_c_-5_a_; I. 107, 108
- 4_c_; I. 108 _n._ 1
- 5_a-c_; _ibid._
- 5_b_; I. 181-412
- 5_b-c_; I. 108 _n._ 2
- 5_c_-6; I. 112, 121 _n._ 3
- 6; I. 118-119
- 6_a_; I. 334 _n._ 1
- 6_b_; I. 118, 412
- 6_c_; I. 397
- Cap. III. 7_a_; I. 114 _n._ 2
- 7_b_; I. 116
- 8_a_; I. 280
- 8-9; I. 115
- 8_c_; I. 263, 273, 280
- 9_b_; I. 180 _n._ 3, 263, 265, 273
- Cap. IV. 10_a_; I. 135 _n._ 1, 136 _n._ 2
- 10_b_; I. 180 _n._ 1
- 11_b_; I. 273
- 11_b-c_; I. 264
- 11_c_; I. 137 _n._ 1
- Cap. V. 12_b_-13_b_; I. 121 _n._ 3
- 13_c_; I. 401
- 14_b_; I. 134 _n._ 2
- Cap. VI. 14_c_; I. 121 _n._ 3, 393
- 15_b_; I. 139, 267, 273, 280
- 15_c_-16_a_; I. 140, 265
- 16_b_; I. 118 _n._ 2, 139
- Cap. VII. 17_b_; I. 140
- 19_b_; I. 274
- Cap. VIII. 20_a_; I. 401
- 20_b_; I. 142 _n._ 2
- 20_c_; I. 143
- 21_a_; I. 407
- 21_a-b_; I. 401
- 21_b_; I. 144, 145 _n._ 1
- 21_c_; I. 143 _n._ 2
- 22_b_; I. 265
- Cap. IX. 22_c_; I. 267, 277
- 23_a_; I. 139, 279
- 23_b_; I. 267, 274
- 23_c_; I. 263, 277
- 24_a_; I. 277, 279
- 24_b_; I. 274
- Cap. X. 25_c_-26_a_; I. 265
- 26_b_; I. 266
- Cap. XI. 27_a_; I. 280
- 28_c_-29_b_; I. 269
- 29_c_; I. 262, 278
- 30_a_; I. 278
- Cap. XII. 30_b_; I. 262
- 31_b_; I. 271
- 31_c_-32_a_; I. 268
- Cap. XIII. 32_c_; I. 409 _n._ 1
- 33_c_-33_b_; I. 261
- 33_b_; I. 283; II. 222
- Cap. XIV. 34_c_; I. 277
- 36_b_; I. 263, 266
- 36_c_; I. 266
- 37; I. 259
- 38_b_-39_a_; I. 282
- 39_b_; I. 162 _n._ 3
- Cap. XV. 39_b_-116_b_; II. 294
- Cap. XVI. 42_a_; I. 270
- 42_b_; I. 269
- 43_c_; I. 269, 278
- Cap. XVII. 47_b_; I. 139, 161, 162
- 47_c_-48_a_; II. 92
- Cap. XVIII. 48_b_; I. 266
- 49_a_; I. 139, 267
- 50_a_; I. 161, 162
- 50_b_; I. 266
- Cap. XIX. 51-52; I. 140 _n._ 4, 141 _n._ 1
- 51_a_-53_b_; I. 390 _n._ 2, 451
- 51_b_; I. 279
- 52_a_; I. 279
- 52_c_-53_a_; I. 272
- 53_b_; I. 265, 276
- Cap. XX. 54_b-c_; I. 272
- 55_c_-56_a_; I. 262
- 56_b_, _c_; I. 123, 124 _n._ 1
- Cap. XXII. 59_c_; I. 274, 275
- Cap. XXIII. 60_c_; I. 280
- 61_a_; I. 262
- 61_c_; I. 277
- 62_a_; I. 259, 387
- Cap. XXIV. 64_b_; I. 287
- Cap. XXV. 66_a_; I. 268
- 66_b_; I. 268
- 67_c_; I. 265
- Cap. XXVI. 69_a_; I. 267
- Cap. XXVII. 71_c_; I. 198 _n._ 1
- 72_b_; I. 162, 163. 164
- Cap. XXIX. 74_b_; I. 263
- 75_b_; I. 268
- 76; I. 387
- 76_a_; I. 272
- 76_c_; I. 262, 275
- 77_a_; I. 275
- 77_b_; I. 277; II. 50
- Cap. XXX. 78_c_; I. 284
- Cap. XXXI. 79_c_; I. 262
- 80_b_; I. 265
- 80_c_-81_a_; I. 263
- 81_b-c_; I. 271
- 82_a_: I. 271
- 82_b_-83_a_; I. 394-395
- 83_a_; I. 259
- Cap. XXXII. 83_c_-84_a_; I. 270
- 86_b_; _ibid._
- 87_a_; _ibid._
- 87_c_; I. 268, 276; II. 50
- Cap. XXXIV. 91_c_; I. 262
- 92_a_; I. 259
- Cap. XXXVI. 94_b_-95_c_; I. 160
- 94_a_; I. 276
- 94_b_-95_c_; I. 455
- 94_c_; I. 159 _n._ 1, 279
- 95_b_; I. 279
- 95_c_; I. 127, 272
- 96_b_; I. 148 _n._ 1
- Cap. XXXVII. 97_b_; I. 140, 148 _n._ 1, 160, 161, 409 _n._ 2
- 97_c_; I. 388
- Cap. XXXVIII. 98-99; I. 166, 183 _n._ 1
- 98_a-b_; I. 183, 454
- 98_a_-99_b_; I. 454-455
- 98_c_; I. 192 _n._ 1
- 99_a_; I. 192 _n._ 1
- Cap. XXXIX. 100_c_-101_b_; I. 455
- 101_a-b_; I. 262
- 103_b_; I. 271
- Cap. XL. 105_c_; I. 147 _n._ 1, 265
- Cap. XLI. 106_a_, _c_; I. 268
- 107_a_; I. 268
- 107_b_; I. 274
- 108_b_; I. 270
- 109_b_; I. 276
- Cap. XLII. 113_b_; I. 164 _n._ 2; II. 10
- 113_c_; I. 274
- 114_a_; I. 269
- Cap. XLIII. 115_a_, _b_; I. 162 _n._ 3, 457
- 115_c_; I. 457
- Cap. XLIV. 116_c_; I. 117 _n._ 2, 118 _n._ 1
- 116_c_-121_b_; I. 390 _n._ 4, 455-456
- 117_b_; I. 118 _n._ 1
- 117_b_-121_b_; I. 451, 455-457
- 118_a_, _b_; I. 158 _n._ 1
- 119_b_; I. 185 _n._ 1
- 119_c_; I. 118, 195 _n._ 1, 391
- 120_a_, _b_; I. 195 _n._ 1
- Cap. XLV. 122_b_, _c_-123_a_; I. 150 _n._ 1
- 122_c_; I. 272, 388
- 123, 124; I. 132 _n._ 3
- 123_b_; I. 167, 402
- 123_b_-124_b_; I. 390 _n._ 3, 457
- 124_b_; I. 387
- Cap. XLVI. 124_b_-125; I. 169-171
- 124_c_; I. 388
- 125_a_; I. 272
- 125_b_; I. 402 _n._ 2
- Cap. XLVII. 127-132; I. 166
- 127_a_, _c_; I. 420
- 129_b_; I. 119 _n._ 2
- 129_c_; I. 164 _n._ 2; II. 4
- 130_a_; I. 164 _n._ 2
- 132_a_; I. 188 _n._ 1
- Cap. XLVIII. 132_b_; 188 _n._ 1
- 133_b_; I. 187 _n._ 1, 188, 450
- 134_a_; I. 164 _n._ 2
- 135_a_; I. 189 _n._ 1
- 135_c_-136_a_; I. 189 _n._ 2
- 136_b_; I. 274
- 138_b_; II. 10
- 138_c_; I. 193
- Cap. XLIX. 139_a_; I. 388 _n._ 1
- 139_a_-140_c_; I. 390 _n._ 4
- 139_c_-140_b_; I. 388 _n._ 1
- 140_a_; I. 194 _n._ 1
- 140_b_, _c_; I. 119-120
- 141_b_-145_b_; I. 204 _n._ 1
- 142_a_, _b_, _c_; I. 197 _n._ 2, 3
- 143_b_; I. 197 n, 4; II. 10
- 144_a_; I. 198 _n._ 2
- 144_b_; I. 281
- 144_c_; I. 434
- 145_c_-146_a_; I. 198 _n._ 3
- 146_c_-147_c_; I. 201 _n._ 3 (202), 390, 451
- Cap. L. 148_c_; I. 204 _n._ 2
- 149_b_; I. 205 _n._ 1; II. 10
- 149_c_; I. 205 _n._ 1
- 151_a_, _b_; I. 205 _n._ 4
- 152_b_-153_c_; I. 204 _n._ 1
- 152_c_; II. 10
- 153_a_; I. 209 _n._ 1
- 154_b_; I. 208 _n._ 3, 390, 451
- 155_a_; I. 209 _n._ 1, 273; II. 10
- 155_b_-156_a_; I. 210 _n._ 1, 389, 412, 452
- 156_b_, _c_; I. 210 _n._ 1
- 157_c_; I. 209 _n._ 1
- 158_a_; I. 209 _n._ 1
- 158_b_; I. 210 _n._ 3
- 158_c_-159_a_; I. 211
- 159_c_; I. 213 _n._ 1
- 160_a_, _b_; I. 214
- 160_c_; I. 215
- 161; I. 387
- 161_a_; I. 215
- Cap. LI. 161_c_-163_a_; I. 216-218
- 162_a_; I. 162 _n._ 3
- Cap. LII. 163_b_-164_a_; I. 218 _n._ 2
- 164_b_, _c_; I. 300
- 165_a_; I. 454-455
- 165_c_; I. 300, 454, 455
-
- _Vita-Trattato_, Cap. I. 169_b_; I. 281
- 169_b_-175_c_; I. 435
- 169_b_-184_c_; I. 435-438
- 169_c_-170_a_; I. 286
- 169_c_-170_b_; I. 417
- 169_c_-170_c_; I. 440-442
- 170_b_; I. 283
- Cap. II. 170_c_; I. 287, 291
- 170_c_-171_b_; I. 442-444
- 171_b_; I. 287
- Cap. III. 171_c_; I. 278
- 172_a_; I. 278, 288
- 172_b_; I. 287, 444-445
- Cap. IV. 172_c_; I. 282
- 173_a_; I. 445
- 173_a_, _b_; I. 283
- 173_b_; I. 226; II. 222
- Cap. V. 173_c_, 174_a_; I. 287, 446-447
- Cap. VI. 174_b_; I. 288, 289
- Cap. VII. 175_a_; I. 277, 285
- 175_b_; I. 284
- Cap. IX. 176_a_; I. 284, 285
- Cap. X. 177_b_; I. 284, 287
- Cap. XI. 178_a-b_; I. 438-439
- 178_b_; I. 292, 293
- Cap. XIII. 180_a_-181_c_; I. 437
- 180_b_-181_c_; I. 438-439
- Cap. XVI. 181_c_, 182_b_; I. 438-439
- 182_b_; I. 286, 290
- Cap. XVII. 183_c_; I. 274
-
- _Vita-Dialogo_, Part I. 185-225; I. 396-397
- 185_c_-190_c_, 191_a_-198_a_; I. 397 _n._ 1
- Cap. VI. 197_a_; I. 400
- 198_b_-206_b_; I. 398 _n._ 1
- Cap. VIII. 199_c_-202_c_; I. 404
- 201_b_; I. 409 _n._ 2
- 202_c_-208_b_; I. 404-406
- 203_a_; I. 124
- Cap. XI. 208_c_-209_b_; I. 404, 405
- Cap. XII. 209_c_-211_b_; I. 409 _n._ 1
- 207_c_-212_a_; I. 398 _n._ 4
- 211_a_; I. 404-406, 409 _n._ 2
- 211_b_; I. 400, 404-406, 409 _n._ 1, 412
- 211_c_; I. 409 _n._ 1
- Cap. XIII. 212_b_, _c_; I. 398 _n._ 5
- 212_c_; I. 146, 429
- 212_c_-213_a_; I. 406-407
- Cap. XIV. 213_c_-225_c_; I. 398 _n._ 6, 420-421
- Cap. XV. 215_c_-216_a_; I. 399 _n._ 2, 408 _n._ 5
- Cap. XVIII. 220_c_; I. 401, 406-407
- 221_b_; I. 431
- Cap. XIX. 221_c_; 400, 406-407
- 221, 222_a_; I. 402
- 222_b_; I. 406-407
- Cap. XX. 222_c_; I. 401
- 223_c_; I. 400
- Part II. 226_b_-242_b_; I. 419
- 226_c_-241_b_; I. 420
- 227_a_-241_b_; I. 420-421
- Cap. III. 231_a_; I. 430
- 232_b_-245_c_; I. 419
- 232_b_; I. 431
- Cap. V. 234_b_: I. 427
- Cap. IX. 241_b_; I. 427-428
- 241_c_-245_c_; I. 491
- Cap. X. 242_b_; I. 430, 431
- Cap. XI. 245_c_; I. 417
- Part III. Cap. I. 247_b_; I. 432
- 248_c_; I. 430, 432
- 249_a_; I. 430
- Cap. II. 250_a_, _b_; I. 160, 161
- 250_a_-263_c_; I. 422
- 250_b_; I. 430
- Cap. VI. 259_c_; I. 432
- 260_b_; I. 428
- 264_a_-271_a_; I. 423
- Cap. VIII. 264_b_; I. 412, 433
- Cap. IX. 266_a_, _c_; I. 425, 426
- 266_b_; I. 432
- Cap. X. 268_c_; I. 428
- Cap. XI. 269_c_; I. 428
- 270_b_; I. 428
- C. XII. XIII. 271_b_-275_a_; I. 424
- Cap. XIII. 273_a_; I. 429
- 275_a_; I. 429
-
- _Vita-Brevi Notizie_ (Maineri), _Traslazione_, 278-282;
- I. 306 _n._ 1
- 278_b_, _c_; I. 304
- _Miracoli_, 282_b_; I. 302
-
- _Vita Venerabilis Lukardis_, in “Analecta Bollandiana,” XVIII.
- 1899; II. 52-55
-
- Volkelt, J., Prof., _Erfahrung u. Denken_, 1886; II. 280
- _Kant’s Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1879; I. 56 _n._ 1; II. 276-278
- _Schopenhauer_, 1900; II. 370, 371
-
-
- Ward, James, Prof., _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, ed. 1905;
- II. 196 _n._ 1
- “Mechanism and Morals,” _Hibbert Journal_, Oct. 1905;
- II. 197 _n._ 1
- “On the Definition of Psychology,” _Journal of Psych._, Vol. I.,
- 1904; II. 280
- “Present Problems of Psychology,” (American) _Philosophical Review_,
- 1904; II. 277-278
-
- Weinel, Prof. H., _Die Wirkungen des Geistes u. der Geister_, 1899, 309;
- II. 43 _n._ 1
-
- Wesley, John, _Journal_, ed. Parker, 1903; II. 4 _n._ 4
-
- Windelband, Prof. W., “Das Heilige,” in _Präludien_, 1903; II. 262
-
-
- Zeller, Prof. Edward, _Philosophie der Griechen_, Part II. ed. 1879;
- I. 312
- Part III., Div. 2, ed. 1881; II. 313
-
-
-
-
-FOOTNOTES
-
-
-[1] _Vita_, pp. 143_b_; 149_b_, 159_b_; 153_a_.
-
-[2] _Ibid._ p. 153_c_.
-
-[3] _Ibid._ pp. 129_c_, 134_a_.
-
-[4] I have already traced the steps in the growth of this legend. It
-is no doubt this element in the biography which irritated John Wesley,
-the man of absolute judgments; although he himself, with shrewd good
-sense, indicates its possible secondary origin. “I am sure this was a
-fool of a Saint; that is, if it was not the folly of her historian, who
-has aggrandized her into a mere idiot” (_Journal_, ed. P. L. Parker,
-London, 1903).
-
-[5] _Vita_, pp. 127_c_, 143_b_, 144_b_.
-
-[6] _Life_, tr. by D. Lewis, London, ed. 1888, pp. 27, 420.
-
-[7] _Existence de Dieu_, I, 1, 31: _Œuvres_, ed. Versailles, 1820, Vol.
-I, p. 51.
-
-[8] Pierre Janet, _Automatisme Psychologique_, ed. 1903; _Etat Mental
-des Hysteriques_, 2 vols., 1892, 1893. Hermann Gunkel, _Die Wirkungen
-des heiligen Geistes_, Göttingen, 1899. Heinrich Weinel, _Die Wirkungen
-des Geistes und der Geister_, Freiburg, 1899. William James, _The
-Varieties of Religious Experience_, London, 1902.
-
-[9] Pierre Janet, _op. cit._ Alfred Binet, _Les Altérations de la
-Personnalité_, Paris, 1902. M. Th. Coconnier, _L’Hypnotisme Franc_,
-Paris, 1897.
-
-[10] W. James, _op. cit._, especially pp. 1-25. H. Weinel, _op.
-cit._, especially pp. 128-137; 161-208. Bernouilli, _Die Heiligen der
-Merowinger_, Tübingen, 1900, pp. 2-6. B. Duhm, _Das Geheimniss in der
-Religion_, Tübingen, 1896.
-
-[11] H. Bergson, _Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience_,
-ed. 1898. H. Jones, _The Philosophy of Lotze_, 1895. J. Ward,
-_Naturalism and Agnosticism_, 2 vols., 1899. M. Blondel, _l’Action_,
-1893. J. Volkelt, _Kant’s Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1879; _Erfahrung und
-Denken_, 1886. H. Münsterberg, _Psychology and Life_, 1899. D. Mercier
-_Critériologie Générale_, ed. 1900.
-
-[12] _Vita_, pp. 96_c_; 117_b_; 127_a_; 97_c_, 133_b_ (dated November
-11, 1509, in MSS.); 146_b_; 148_a_.
-
-[13] From my authenticated copies of the original wills in the Archivio
-di Stato, Genoa.
-
-[14] _Vita_, pp. 113_b_, 149_c_; 143_b_, 152_c_; 138_b_, 155_a_. Note
-the parallels in St. Teresa’s _Life_, written by herself, tr. D.
-Lewis, ed. 1888. P. 234: “When these (spiritual) impetuosities are
-not very violent, the soul seeks relief through certain penances; the
-painfulness of which, and even the shedding of blood, are no more felt
-than if the body were dead.” P. 30: “I was unable to move either arm or
-foot, or hand or head, unless others moved me. I could move, however,
-I think, one finger of my right hand.” P. 31: “I was paralytic, though
-getting better, for about three years.”
-
-[15] Hyper-aesthesia and sensation of heat: _Vita_, pp. 142_a_, 153_a_.
-Increase of movement: _ibid._, and pp. 145_b_, 143_a_, 153_c_, 141_a_.
-Loss of speech and sight: pp. 141_b_, 141_c_, 159_c_. Localization of
-heat: p. 157_b_. Haemorrhages: 138_c_, 159_c_, 160_a_. Concavities
-and jaundice: pp. 144_a_, 153_a_. Spasms: pp. 143_c_, 71_c_, 141_c_,
-142_b_. Cf. St. Teresa, _loc. cit._ p. 30: “As to touching me, that was
-impossible, for I was so bruised that I could not endure it. They used
-to move me in a sheet, one holding one end, and another the other.” P.
-31: “I began to crawl on my hands and feet.” P. 263: “I felt myself on
-fire: this inward fire and despair.…” P. 17: “The fainting fits began
-to be more frequent; and my heart was so seriously affected, that those
-who saw it were alarmed.” P. 27: “It seemed to me as if my heart had
-been seized by sharp teeth.” P. 235: “I saw, in the Angel’s hand, a
-long spear of gold, and at the iron’s point there seemed to be a little
-fire. He appeared to me to be thrusting it at times into my heart, and
-to pierce my very entrails.… The pain is not bodily, but spiritual.”
-
-[16] Swallow: _Vita_, pp. 149_c_, 150_a_; 159_b_; 159_c_; 150_a_.
-Odours and colours: 153_c_, 154_b_. Cf. St. Teresa, _loc. cit._ p. 27:
-“I could eat nothing whatever, only drink. I had a great loathing for
-food.” P. 43: “I have been suffering for twenty years from sickness
-every morning.” P. 30: “There was a choking in my throat … I could
-not swallow even a drop of water.” P. 263: “A sense of oppression, of
-stifling.”
-
-[17] Exclamations: _Vita_, pp. 144_a_, 148_b_, 155_a_. Laughter:
-_ibid._ 145_c_, 148_b_, 149_b_, 157_c_. Sudden changes of condition:
-135_b_, 138_c_, 159_b_. Cf. St. Teresa, _loc. cit._ pp. 28, 29: “That
-very night,” Feast of the Assumption, 1537, “my sickness became so
-acute that, for about four days, I remained insensible. For a day and a
-half the grave was open, waiting for my body. But it pleased Our Lord I
-should come to myself. I wished to go to confession at once. Though my
-sufferings were unendurable, and my perceptions dull, yet my confession
-was, I believe, complete. I communicated with many tears.”
-
-[18] _Vita_, pp. 71_c_; 145_c_; 147_b_; 159_c_, 159_a_; 127_a_. Cf.
-St. Teresa, _loc. cit._ p. 23: “I was in my sister’s house, for the
-purpose of undergoing medical treatment--they took the utmost care of
-my comfort.” P. 27: “In two months, so strong were the medicines, my
-life was nearly worn out.” “The physicians gave me up: they said I was
-consumptive.”
-
-[19] Self-knowledge as to “quietudes”: _Vita_, pp. 153_b_, 157_a_.
-Marabotto’s attitude: 139_b_; 141_c_, 143_c_, 149_a_. Relations with
-Boerio: 147_c_, 147_b_. Cf. St. Teresa, _loc. cit._ p. 86: “My health
-has been much better since I have ceased to look after my ease and
-comforts.”
-
-[20] Remark to Vernazza: _Vita_, pp. 98_c_, 99_a_. Persistence of
-intelligence: 141_c_; 159_b_, _c_; 143_a_; 143_c_; 145_b_. Cf. St.
-Teresa, _loc. cit._ p. 408: “She” (Teresa herself) “never saw anything
-with her bodily eyes, nor heard anything with her bodily ears.” P.
-189: “The words of the divine locutions are very distinctly formed;
-but by the bodily ear they are not heard.” P. 191: “In ecstasy, the
-memory can hardly do anything at all, and the imagination is, as it
-were, suspended.” P. 142: “You see and feel yourself carried away, you
-know not whither.” P. 187: “I fell into a trance; I was carried out of
-myself. It was most plain.”
-
-[21] Picture: _Vita_, p. 135_a_;. Red and black robes: 154_b_, 156_c_.
-Suggestions of odour: 118_c_, 119_a_; 9_c_, 8_a_, 9_b_. Cf. St. Teresa,
-_loc. cit_. pp. 57, 58: “One day, I saw a picture of Christ most
-grievously wounded: the very sight of it moved me.” P. 247: “I used to
-pray much to Our Lord for that living water of which He spoke to the
-Samaritan woman: I had always a picture of it with this inscription:
-‘Domine, da mihi aquam.’” P. 231: “Once when I was holding in my
-hand the cross of my rosary, He took it from me into His own hand.
-He returned it; but it was then four large stones incomparably more
-precious than diamonds: the five wounds were delineated on them with
-the most admirable art. He said to me that for the future that cross
-would appear so to me always, and so it did. The precious stones were
-seen, however, only by myself.”
-
-[22] Synchronisms: _Vita_, pp. 148_b_; 150_b_; 152_a_, 160_c_, 161_b_.
-Communion and ordinary food: 154_a_, 154_c_, 138_c_; 154_c_. Heats:
-“Assalto,” _e.g._ 138_b_, _c_; 143_a_, _c_; “ferita” and “saetta,”
-_e.g._ 141_a_, _c_; 145_a_. Their localization: 135_a_, 141_c_; 153_a_;
-142_a_, 158_a_. Their psycho-physical character: 135_b_, 144_b_. Thirst
-and its suggestion: 149_c_, 159_c_; 76_c_; 152_b_, 135_a_. Paralyses:
-134_b_; 149_c_. Cf. St. Teresa, _op. cit._ p. 28: her death-swoon
-occurs on evening of the Assumption. P. 235: Heat, piercing of the
-heart as by a spear, and a spiritual (not bodily) pain, are all united
-in the experience of the heart-piercing Angel. P. 423: “Another prayer
-very common is a certain kind of wounding; for it really seems to the
-soul as if an arrow were thrust through the heart or through itself.
-The suffering is not one of sense, nor is the wound physical; it is in
-the interior of the soul.”
-
-[23] _Vita_, pp. 158_a_; 160_a_. Cf. St. Teresa, _op. cit._ p. 41: “We
-saw something like a great toad crawling towards us.… The impression
-it made on me was such, that I think it must have had a meaning.”
-Contrast, with this naïvely sensible sight and the absence of all
-interior assurance, such a spiritual vision as “Christ stood before me,
-stern and grave. I saw Him with the eyes of the soul. The impression
-remained with me that the vision was from God, and not an imagination”
-(pp. 40, 41). Another quasi-sensible sight, with no interior assurance,
-or question as to its provenance and value, is given on pp. 248, 249:
-“Once Satan, in an abominable shape, appeared on my left hand. I looked
-at his mouth in particular, because he spoke, and it was horrible. A
-huge flame seemed to issue out of his body, perfectly bright without
-any shadow.” Another such impression is recorded on p. 252: “I thought
-the evil spirits would have suffocated me one night.… I saw a great
-troop of them rush away as if tumbling over a precipice.”
-
-[24] _Lives of the Saints_, ed. 1898, Vol. X, September 15.
-
-[25] Pierre Janet, _Etat Mental des Hysteriques_, 2 vols., Paris, 1892,
-1894: Vol. II, pp. 260, 261; 280; Vol. I, pp. 225, 63.
-
-[26] _Ibid._ Vol. I, pp. 63, 225, 226.
-
-[27] Pierre Janet, _Etat Mental_, Vol. I, pp. 226, 227.
-
-[28] _Ibid._ Vol. II, pp. 253, 257.
-
-[29] Pierre Janet, _Etat Mental_, Vol. I, pp. 7, 8, 11, 12, 57, 21.
-
-[30] _Ibid._ Vol. II, pp. 82, 91; 70, 71.
-
-[31] _Ibid._ Vol. II. Troubles of movement, pp. 105, 106; of nutrition,
-pp. 285, 70, 71; strangulation, heart palpitation, fever heats, p. 282;
-haemorrhages and red patches, p. 283; jaundice (_ictère emotionnel_),
-p. 287; and note the “ischurie,” p. 283, top, compared with _Vita_, p.
-12_a_.
-
-[32] Pierre Janet, _Etat Mental_, Vol I, p. 140; Vol. II, pp. 14, 72,
-165.
-
-[33] _Ibid._ Vol. I, pp. 218, 219; 158, 159.
-
-[34] The biographical chapters of Volume I give all the facts and
-references alluded to in this paragraph. It would be easy to find
-parallels for most of these peripheral disturbances and great central
-normalities in St. Teresa’s life.
-
-[35] Prof. W. James has got some very sensible considerations on the
-pace of a conversion (as distinct from its spiritual significance,
-depth, persistence, and fruitfulness) being primarily a matter of
-temperament: _Varieties of Religious Experience_, 1902, pp. 227-240.
-
-[36] By the term “visionless,” I do not mean to affirm anything as to
-the presence or absence of ideas or mental images during the times so
-described, but to register the simple fact, that, for her own memory
-after the event, she was, at the time, without any one persistent,
-external-seeming image.--Note how St. Ignatius Loyola in his
-_Testament_, ed. London, 1900, pp. 91, 92, considered the profoundest
-spiritual experience of his life to have been one unaccompanied or
-expressed by any vision: “On his way” to a Church near Manresa, “he sat
-down facing the stream, which was running deep. While he was sitting
-there, the eyes of his mind were opened,” not so as to see any kind of
-vision, but “so as to understand and comprehend spiritual things … with
-such clearness that for him all these things were made new. If all the
-enlightenment and help he had received from God in the whole course of
-his life … were gathered together in one heap, these all would appear
-less than he had been given at this one time.”
-
-[37] I would draw the reader’s attention to the very interesting
-parallels to many of the above-mentioned peculiarities furnished both
-by St. Teresa in her _Life_, _passim_, and by Battista Vernazza in the
-Autobiographical statements which I have given here in Chapter VIII.
-
-[38] The omnipresence of neural conditions and consequences for all and
-every mental and volitional activity has been admirably brought out by
-Prof. W. James, in his _Varieties of Religious Experience_, 1902, Vol.
-I, pp. 1-25.
-
-[39] H. Weinel’s _Die Wirkungen des Geistes und der Geister im
-nachapostolischen Zeitalter, bis auf Irenäus_, 1899, contains an
-admirably careful investigation of these things.
-
-[40] _Life_, written by herself, ed. cit. pp. 235, 423; 136.
-
-[41] _Ibid._ pp. 149, 420.
-
-[42] _Ibid._ pp. xxii, 28.
-
-[43] It is to Dr. Lightfoot’s fine _Excursus in St. Paul’s Epistle to
-the Galatians_, ed. 1881, pp. 186-191, that I owe all the Pauline texts
-and most of the considerations reproduced above.
-
-[44] Visions of Jahve’s glory: i, 1-28; iii, 22-27 xl, 1; xliv, 4. The
-five other Ecstasies and Visions: viii, 1 foll.; xi, 1 foll.; xxiv,
-1 foll.; xxxiii, 22; xxxvii, 1 foll. Second Sight: viii, 16; xi, 13;
-xxiv, 1. Representative Actions: iv, 1-3, 7; iv, 4-6, 8; iv, 10; ix,
-11-15; xii, 1-16; xii, 17-20; xxi, 11, 12; xxi, 23-32; xxiv, 1-14;
-xxiv, 15-27; xxxiii, 22; xxxvii, 15-28.
-
-[45] The above translation and interpretation is based upon
-Krätzschmar’s admirably psychological commentary, _Das Buch Ezechiel_,
-Göttingen, 1900, pp. v, vi; 45, 49. But I think he is wrong in taking
-that six months’ abnormal condition to have given rise, in Ezekiel’s
-mind, to a belief in a previous divine order and to an interpretation
-of this order. All the strictly analogical cases of religious ecstasy,
-not hysteria, point to a strong mental impression, such as that order
-and belief having preceded and occasioned the peculiar psycho-physical
-state.
-
-[46] _Op. cit._ pp. 190_c_; 192_c_, 193_a_.
-
-[47] See Prof. W. James’s admirable account of these irruptions in his
-_Varieties of Religious Experience_, 1902, pp. 231-237.
-
-[48] _Life_, written by Herself, pp. 190_b_; 196_b_; 224_c_; 295_c_;
-413_b_.
-
-[49] _Vita_, passim; _Life_, ed. cit. pp. 40, 41; 408; 206. _Vita_, pp.
-87_c_, 77_b_.
-
-[50] _Ascent of Mount Carmel_, ed. cit. pp. 159, 163; 264, 265, 102,
-195; _Spiritual Canticle_, ed. cit. p. 238; _Ascent_, pp. 26, 27;
-_Canticle_, pp. 206, 207.
-
-[51] Two Confessors of hers are mentioned by her, _Vita_, p. 352:
-Fathers Henry of Mühlhausen, and Eberhard of the Friars Preachers.
-
-[52] _Analecta_, _loc. cit._ p. 310.
-
-[53] _Analecta_, pp. 311-313.
-
-[54] _Analecta_, pp. 314, 315.
-
-[55] _Vita_, _loc. cit._ pp. 317, 319.
-
-[56] _Vita_, pp. 319, 320.
-
-[57] _Ibid._, _loc. cit._ pp. 327, 334, 352.
-
-[58] _The Life of Father Hecker_, by the Rev. Walter Elliott, New York,
-1894, pp. 371, 372, 418.
-
-[59] Robert Browning, in _Rabbi Ben Ezra_, viii; Matthew Arnold, in
-_Culture and Anarchy_, 21; Prof. James Seth, in _A Study of Ethical
-Principles_, 1894, pp. 260-262; and Prof. Percy Gardner, in _Oxford at
-the Cross Roads_, 1903, pp. 12-14, have all admirably insisted upon
-this most important point.
-
-[60] I owe much clearness of conception as to the function of
-auto-suggestion and mono-ideism to the very remarkable paper of Prof.
-Emil Boutroux, “La Psychologie du Mysticisme,” in the _Bulletin de
-l’Institut Psychologique International_, Paris, 1902, pp. 9-26: Engl.
-tr. in the _International Journal of Ethics_, Philadelphia, Jan. 1908.
-There are also many most useful facts and reflections in Prof. Henri
-Joly’s _Psychology of the Saints_, Engl. tr., 1898, pp. 64-117.
-
-[61] In Chapter XII, § iv, I shall show reason for strongly suspecting
-that Catherine possessed some knowledge, probably derived from
-an intermediate Christian source, of certain passages in Plato’s
-Dialogues. But the influence of these passages can, in any case, only
-be traced in her Purgatorial doctrine, and had better be discussed
-together with this doctrine itself.
-
-[62] My chief obligations are here to Prof. H. J. Holtzmann’s _Lehrbuch
-der Neutestamentlichen Theologie_, 1897, Vol. II, pp. 1-225: “Der
-Paulinismus”; but I have also learnt from Estius and Dr. Lightfoot, and
-from my own direct studies in St. Paul, Philo, and Plato.
-
-[63] _Symposium_, 216_e_.
-
-[64] 1 Cor. xv, 35-53.
-
-[65] E. Grafe, “Verhältniss der paulinischen Schriften zur Sapientia
-Salomonis,” in _Theol. Abhandlungen Carl von Weizsäcker Gewidmet_,
-1892, pp. 274-276.
-
-[66] “The love of Christ,” Rom. viii, 35, is identical with “the love
-of God which is in Christ Jesus,” Rom. viii, 39. “The Spirit of God
-dwelleth in you,” Rom. viii, 9; 1 Cor. iii, 16. “I live, not I: but
-Christ dwelleth in me,” Gal. ii, 20.
-
-[67] H. J. Holtzmann, _op. cit._ Vol. II, p. 145.
-
-[68] Holtzmann, _op. cit._ Vol. II, pp. 151, 152.
-
-[69] My chief obligations are here again to Dr. H. J. Holtzmann’s
-_Neutestamentliche Theologie_, 1897, Vol. II, pp. 354-390; 394-396;
-399-401; 426-430; 447-466; 466-521.
-
-[70] I am much indebted to the thorough and convincing monograph of
-the Catholic Priest and Professor Dr. Hugo Koch, _Pseudo-Dionysius
-Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen sum Neo-Platonismus und
-Mysterienwesen_, Mainz, 1900, for a fuller understanding of the
-relations between Dionysius, Proclus, and Plotinus. I have also
-found much help in H. F. Müller’s admirable German translation of
-Plotinus, a translation greatly superior to Thomas Taylor’s English
-or to Bouillet’s French translation. And I have greatly benefited by
-the admirable study of Plotinus in Dr. Edward Caird’s _Evolution of
-Theology in the Greek Philosophers_, 1904, Vol. II, pp. 210-346.
-
-[71] _The Divine Names_, iii, I; ix, 4: English translation by Parker,
-1897, pp. 49, 50; 106.
-
-[72] _Institutio Theologica_, c. 35; c. 31.
-
-[73] _Enneads_, vi, ch. ix, 9.
-
-[74] _Divine Names_, iii, 1; ix, 4: Parker, pp. 27, 104.
-
-[75] _Enneads_, vi, ch. ix, 4.
-
-[76] _Divine Names_, viii, 7: Parker, pp. 98, 99.
-
-[77] _Vita_, pp. 47_c_, 48_a_.
-
-[78] _Divine Names_, iii, 1: Parker, pp. 27, 28.
-
-[79] _In Platonis Alcibiadem_, ii, 78 _seq._
-
-[80] _Divine Names_, iv, 1; iv, 5: Parker, pp. 32, 33; 38.
-
-[81] _In Parmenidem_, iv, 34. _In Cratylum_, pp. 103; 107.
-
-[82] _Republic_, VI, 508_c_. _Theaetetus_, 153_c_.
-
-[83] _Heavenly Hierarchy_, xv, 2: Parker, pp. 56, 57.
-
-[84] _Divine Names_, xi, 1; iv, 2: Parker, pp. 113, 34. _Ad Magnesios_,
-viii, 2.
-
-[85] _Mystic Theology_, iii: Parker, p. 135.
-
-[86] _Platonic Theology_, III, p. 132.
-
-[87] _Enneads_, v, ch. v, 8; vi, ch. ix, 11.
-
-[88] _Divine Names_, iv, 8-10: Parker, pp. 42-45. _In Parmenidem_, vi,
-52 (see Koch, p. 152).
-
-[89] _Divine Names_, i, 1; vii, 3; vii, 1; Mystic Theology, 1; _Divine
-Names_, vii, 3: Parker, pp. 2; 91, 92; 87; 130; 91, 92.
-
-[90] _Divine Names_, iv, 13: Parker, p. 48.
-
-[91] _Enneads_ vi, ch. ix, 9.
-
-[92] _Ibid._ vi, ch. ix, 8; ch. vi, 11.
-
-[93] Parker, p. 142.
-
-[94] _Enneads_, vi, ch. vii, 36; v, ch. iii, 17; v, ch. v, 7.
-
-[95] _Symposium_, 210 E. See the admirable elucidations in Rhode’s
-_Psyche_, ed. 1898, Vol. I, p. 298; Vol. II, pp. 279; 283, 284.
-
-[96] _Divine Names_, i, 5: Parker, p. 8.
-
-[97] _Divine Names_, iv, 6; _Mystic Theology_, i, iii: Parker, pp. 39,
-132.
-
-[98] _In Alcibiadem_, ii, 302.
-
-[99] _Mystic Theology_, iv, v; _Divine Names_ i, 1: Parker, pp. 136,
-137; 1; _In Alcibiadem_, ii, 302.
-
-[100] _Heavenly Hierarchy_, ch. xv, s. 3: Parker, p. 60.
-
-[101] _In Alcibiadem_, iii, 75.
-
-[102] _Divine Names_, iii, 1: Parker, pp. 27, 28. _In Parmenidem_, iv,
-68.
-
-[103] _Divine Names_, i, 5; _Ecclesiastical Hierarchy_, i, 2; _Divine
-Names_, ix, 5: Parker, pp. 8, 69, 104.
-
-[104] _Institutio Theologica_, c. 129.
-
-[105] _Ecclesiastical Hierarchy_, iii, 3, 7: Parker, p. 97.
-
-[106] _Divine Names_, i, 6; viii, 3; 5: Parker, pp. 10, 95, 96.
-
-[107] _In Parmenidem_, iv, 34; v.
-
-[108] _Divine Names_ viii, 2; iv, 4; iv, 20: Parker, pp. 95, 84, 57.
-
-[109] _Laude de lo contemplativo et extatico B. F. Jacopone de lo
-Ordine de lo Seraphico S. Francesco.…_ In Firenze, per Ser Francesco
-Bonaccorsi, MCCCCLXXXX. Only the sheets are numbered; and two Lode
-have, by mistake, been both numbered LVIII: I have indicated them by
-LVIII_a_ and LVIII_b_ respectively. I have much felt the absence of any
-monograph on the sources and character of Jacopone’s doctrine.
-
-[110] _Enneads_, vi, ch. ix, II.
-
-[111] _Rabbi Ben Ezra_, XXXI.
-
-[112] E. Caird, “St. Paul and the Idea of Evolution,” _Hibbert
-Journal_, Vol. II, 1904, pp. 1-19. W. Dilthey has shown this by
-implication, in his studies of Erasmus, Luther, and Zwingli: _Archiv
-für Geschichte der Philosophie_, Vol. V, 1892, especially, pp. 381-385.
-
-[113] Mark i, 13, and parallels; Matt. xix, 10-12.
-
-[114] Mark vi, 8; Matt. x, 26-38; viii, 19-22; xiii, 30-32; xxxiv, 42,
-and parallels.
-
-[115] Matt. vii, 13, 14; xviii, 1-5; xvi, 24-28.
-
-[116] Mark xiv, 38, and parallels.
-
-[117] Rom. vii, 24, 18.
-
-[118] 2 Cor. v, 1-4 = Wisd. of Sol. ix, 15.
-
-[119] See Erwin Rhode’s _Psyche_, ed. 1898, Vol. II, p. 101, n. 2.
-
-[120] I owe much help towards acquiring this very important conception,
-and all the above similes, to Prof. Ernst Troeltsch’s admirable
-exposition in his “Grundprobleme der Ethik,” _Zeitschrift f. Theologie
-und Kirche_, 1902, pp. 163-178.
-
-[121] _St. Augustine_, ed. Ben., Vol. X, 590_b_, 613_a_, 1973_c_, etc.
-St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, suppl., qu. 62, art. 2.
-
-[122] My chief authorities throughout this section have been Bossuet’s
-_Instruction sur les Etats d’Oraison_ of 1687, with the important
-documents prefixed and appended to it (_Œuvres de Bossuet_, ed.
-Versailles, 1817, Vol. XXVII); Fénelon’s chief apologetic works,
-especially his _Instruction Pastorale_, his _Letteres en Réponse à
-Divers Ecrits ou Mémoires_, his _Lettre sur l’Etat Passif_, and his two
-Latin Letters to Pope Clement XI (_Œuvres de Fénelon_, ed. Versailles,
-1820, Vols. IV, VI, VIII, and IX); and Abbé Gosselin’s admirably clear,
-impartial, cautious, and authoritative _Analyse de la Controverse du
-Quiétisme_. I have studied these works, and the condemned propositions
-of the Beguards, of Molinos, and of Fénelon, very carefully, and
-believe myself to have, in my text, taken up a position identical with
-M. Gosselin’s.
-
-[123] F. C. S. Schiller, Essay “Activity and Substance,” pp.
-204-227,--an admirably thorough piece of work, in _Humanism_, 1903. See
-his p. 208.
-
-[124] See Heinrich Heppe, _Geschichte der Quietistischen Mystik_,
-Berlin, 1875, p. 521. The obviously strong partisan bias of the author
-against Rome,--of which more lower down,--does not destroy the great
-value of the large collection of now, in many cases, most rare and
-inaccessible documents given, often _in extenso_, in this interesting
-book.
-
-[125] Heppe, _op. cit._ pp. 130-133.
-
-[126] There is a good article on Petrucci in the Catholic Freiburg
-_Kirchenlexikon_, 2nd ed., 1895; and Heppe, in his _Geschichte_,
-pp. 135-144, gives extracts from his chief book. Bossuet’s attack,
-_Œuvres_, ed. 1817, Vol. XXIX.
-
-[127] Reusch, _Der Index der verbotenen Bücher_, 1885, Vol. II, pp.
-611; 622, 623; 625.
-
-[128] Gosselin’s _Analyse, Œuvres de Fénelon_, ed. cit. Vol. IV, pp.
-xci-xcv.
-
-[129] Fénelon, _Explication … des Propositions de Molinos_ (_Œuvres_,
-Vol. IV, pp. 25-86). Gosselin, _Analyse_ (_ibid._ pp. ccxvi-ccxxiii).
-
-[130] _Œuvres de Fénelon_, Vol. VIII, pp. 6, 7.
-
-[131] Heppe, _op. cit._ p. 62. Reusch, _op. cit._ Vol. II, pp. 619, 620.
-
-[132] I write with these approbations before me, as reprinted in the
-_Recueil de Diverses Pièces concernant le Quiétisme_, Amsterdam, 1688.
-
-[133] _Œuvres de Bossuet_, ed. 1817, Vol. XXVII, pp. 497-502. Heppe,
-_op. cit._ pp. 27_g_ n.; 273-281. Denzinger, _Encheiridion_, ed. 1888,
-pp. 266-274.
-
-[134] Reusch, _op. cit._ Vol. II, p. 618 _n._ 1.
-
-[135] See Heppe, p. 264, n.
-
-[136] _Recueil de Diverses Pièces_, pp. 61, 62.
-
-[137] _Varieties of Religious Experience_, 1902, pp. 209, 211.
-
-[138] _De Beatitudine_, c. 3, 3.
-
-[139] I have been much helped in my own direct studies of the sources
-by W. Bousset’s _Die Religion des Judenthums im Neutestamentlichen
-Zeitalter_, 1903; by H. J. Holtzmann’s _Neutestamentliche Theologie_,
-1897; and A. Jülicher’s _Gleichnissreden Jesu_, Theil 2, 1899.
-
-[140] Bousset, pp. 395, 396.
-
-[141] Ch. xii, 8, 9; see too ch. ii, 2, 7.
-
-[142] Pirke Aboth, v, 23.
-
-[143] Matt. v, 12; vi, 4, 6, 18, 20; Mark x, 21; ix, 41; Luke x, 7.
-
-[144] Matt. v, 7; vi, 14; xviii, 32.
-
-[145] Matt. v, 5; Luke xiv, 8-11; Matt. x, 39.
-
-[146] Matt. v, 8.
-
-[147] Matt. x, 41, 42.
-
-[148] Matt. xix, 29; Mark x, 23; Luke vi, 38; Matt, xxii, 12; xxv, 21;
-xxiv, 47; Luke xii, 37.
-
-[149] Interesting reasons and parallels for holding the Wedding Garment
-to have been the gift of the King, in Bugge’s _Die Haupt-Parabeln
-Jesu_, 1900, pp. 316, 317.
-
-[150] Jülicher, _op. cit._ p. 467. Bugge, _op. cit._ p. 277.
-
-[151] Matt. vi, 1, 2, 5, 16.
-
-[152] Matt. vi, 11; xx, 14; Luke xvii, 10; Matt. vi, 33; v, 48, 44, 45;
-Luke vii, 47. It seems plain that the Parable of the Two Debtors, which
-appears in this last passage, declares how pardon awakens love; and
-that the sinful woman’s act and Our Lord’s direct comment on it, which
-are now made to serve as that Parable’s frame, demonstrate how love
-produces pardon. In my text I have been busy only with the second of
-these twin truths.
-
-[153] Luke vi, 33, 34.
-
-[154] Rom. ii, 6; 2 Cor. v, 10.
-
-[155] 1 Cor. xv, 19, 32.
-
-[156] Gal. iii, 19; 2 Cor. iv, 16; xii, 9; Rom. viii, 31, 35, 37-39;
-xiv, 8.
-
-[157] Ps. lxxiii (lxii), v. 25. I follow Duhm’s restoration of the text.
-
-[158] 1 Cor. xiii, 13; 8, 7.
-
-[159] _Œuvres_, ed. Versailles, 1820, Vols. IV to IX.
-
-[160] _Réponse: Œuvres_, Vol. IV, pp. 119-132; _Instruction: ibid._ pp.
-181-308: _Lettre sur l’Oraison_, Vol. VIII, pp. 3-82; _Lettre sur la
-Charité_, Vol IX, pp. 3-56; _Epistola II, ibid._ pp. 617-677.
-
-[161] _The Spiritual Letters of Fénelon_, London, 1892, Vol. I, pp. xi,
-xii.
-
-[162] _Œuvres de Fénelon_, ed. 1820, Vol. IV, pp. lxxix-ccxxxiv.
-
-[163] _Summa Theologica_, II, ii, qu. 17, art. 8, in corp.
-
-[164] Comment in II, ii, qu. 23, art. 1.
-
-[165] _Summa_, II, ii, qu. 23, art. 6, concl., et in corp.; I, ii, qu.
-28, art. 1, in corp., et ad 2. See also II, ii, qu. 17, art. 6, in
-corp.; qu. 28, art. 1 ad 3; I, ii, qu. 28, art. 1, in corp., et ad 2.
-
-[166] In Libr. sent. II, dist. 30, qu. 1 ad 2.
-
-[167] _Summa Theol._, III, qu. 85, art. 2 ad 1; I, ii, qu. 114, art. 4,
-in corp. In Libr. sent. III, dist. 30, art. 5.
-
-[168] Some of the finest descriptions of these profoundly organized
-states common, in some degrees and forms, to all mankind, are to be
-found in the tenth and eleventh books of St. Augustine’s _Confessions_,
-A.D. 397, and in Henri Bergson’s _Essai sur les Données Immédiates de
-la Conscience_, 1898.
-
-[169] _Stromata_, Book IV, ch. vi, 30, 1; ch. iv, 15, 6.
-
-[170] Proemium in _Reg. Fus. Tract._ n. 3, Vol. II, pp. 329, 330.
-
-[171] _Summa Theol._, II, ii, qu. 27, art. 3.
-
-[172] The obligation for all of acts of Pure Love is clearly taught
-by the condemnations, passed by Popes Alexander VII and Innocent XI,
-upon the opposite contention, in 1665 and 1679: “Homo nullo unquam
-vitae suae tempore tenetur elicere actum Fidei, Spei et Charitatis,
-ex vi praeceptorum divinorum ad eas virtutes pertinentium.” Note here
-how “Charitas” necessarily means Pure Love, since Imperfect Love has
-already been mentioned in “Spes.”--“Probabile est, ne singulis quidem
-rigorose quinquenniis per se obligare praeceptum charitatis erga Deum.
-Tune solum obligat, quando tenemur justificari et non habemus aliam
-viam qua justificari possumus.” Here Pure Love is undoubtedly meant
-by “Charitas,” since, outside of the use of the sacraments, Pure Love
-alone justifies.
-
-[173] _The Problem of Conduct_, 1901, p. 329, n.
-
-[174] _Life, written by Herself_, ch. XXII, tr. by David Lewis, ed.
-1888, pp. 162-174.
-
-[175] Deharbe, _op. cit._ pp. 139-179, has an admirable exposition and
-proof of this point, backed up by conclusive experiences and analyses
-of Saints and Schoolmen.
-
-[176] See Deharbe’s excellent remarks, _op. cit._ pp. 109, 110, n.
-
-[177] _Analyse_, _loc. cit._ pp. cxxii, cxxiii, _Lettre sur l’Oraison
-Passive_, _Œuvres_, Vol. VIII, p. 47.
-
-[178] _Analyse_, p. cxxiii.
-
-[179] _Lettre sur l’Oraison Passive_, _Œuvres_, Vol. VIII, pp. 10; 18,
-11, 12; 14, 15; 74.
-
-[180] _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_, c. iv, opening of par. 4,
-ed. Van Vloten et Land, 1895, Vol. II, p. 4; _ibid._ middle of par.
-3, p. 3; _Ethica_, p. v, prop. xli, _ibid._ Vol. I, p. 264; _ibid._
-_Scholion_, p. 265; _ibid._ prop. xix, p. 251; _ibid._ prop. xx, p.
-251; _ibid._ prop. xlii, p. 265; _ibid._ prop. xxxvi, p. 261.
-
-[181] _Die Philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz_, ed. Gebhardt, Vol.
-VI, 1885, pp. 605, 606; and quotation in Gosselin’s _Analyse, Œuvres de
-Fénelon_, 1820, Vol. IV, pp. clxxviii, clxxvii.
-
-[182] It is to Schweizer’s admirable monograph, _Die
-Religions-Philosophie Kant’s_, 1899, pp. 4-70, that I owe my clear
-apprehension of this very interesting doubleness in Kant’s outlook.
-
-[183] _Loc. cit._ pp. 611, 614, 615, 616.
-
-[184] Kant’s _Werke_, ed. Berlin Academy, Vol. IV, 1903, pp. 393, 394;
-396.
-
-[185] Kant, 1904, p. 131.
-
-[186] _The Problem of Conduct_, pp. 336, 337; 329.
-
-[187] _Ibid._ p. 327.
-
-[188] See James Seth, _A Study of Ethical Principles_, 1894, pp.
-193-236, where this position, denominated there “Eudaemonism,” is
-contrasted with “Hedonism,” uniquely or at least predominantly occupied
-with the act’s sensational materials or concomitances, and “Rigorism,”
-with its one-sided insistence upon the rational form and end of action.
-
-[189] Taylor, _op. cit._ p. 901.
-
-[190] _Seconde Lettre à Monsieur de Paris, Œuvres_, Vol. V, pp. 268,
-269. _Lettres de M. de Cambrai à un de ses Amis, ibid._, Vol. IV, p.
-168.
-
-[191] Chantepie de la Saussaye, _Lehrbuch der Religions-Geschichte_,
-ed. 1905, Vol. I, pp. 69, 73-83.
-
-[192] Chantepie de la Saussaye, _Lehrbuch der Religions-Geschichte_,
-ed. 1887, Vol. I, pp. 248, 249.
-
-[193] _Ibid._ pp. 358, 373.
-
-[194] Oldenberg, _Buddha_, ed. 1897, pp. 310-328; especially 313, 314;
-316, 317; 327, 328.
-
-[195] My chief authority here has been that astonishingly living and
-many-sided book, Erwin Rhode’s _Psyche_, ed. 1898, especially Vol. II,
-pp. 263-295 (Plato); Vol. I, pp. 14-90 (Homer); 91-110 (Hesiod); pp.
-146-199 (the Heroes); pp. 279-319, and Vol. II, pp. 1-136 (Eleusinian
-Mysteries, Dionysian Religion, the Orphics). The culminating interest
-of this great work lies in this last treble section and in the Plato
-part.
-
-[196] _Psyche_, Vol. I, pp. 308, 312. _New Chapters in Greek History_,
-1892, pp. 333, 334.
-
-[197] See also the important study of the Abbé Touzard, _Le
-Développement de la Doctrine de l’Immortalité, Revue Biblique_, 1898,
-pp. 207-241.
-
-[198] Charles, _op. cit._ pp. 52, 53; 58; 61; 84; 124, 125; 126-132;
-68-77.
-
-[199] B. Stade, _Biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments_, Vol. I,
-1905, p. 184.
-
-[200] _L’Automatisme Psychologique_, ed. 1903, p. 5.
-
-[201] W. James, _The Principles of Psychology_, 1891, Vol. II, pp.
-442-467.
-
-[202] See Prof. James Ward’s closely knit proof in his _Naturalism and
-Agnosticism_, 2nd ed., 1905, and his striking address, “Mechanism and
-Morals,” _Hibbert Journal_, October, 1905.
-
-[203] “The Desire for Immortality,” in _Humanism_ 1903, pp. 228-249.
-
-[204] _Op. cit._ Lib. XVIII, c. x, ed. 1559, fol. 3413.
-
-[205] Neither she nor her friends can have derived these doctrines
-from Ficino’s _Theologia Platonica_, Florence, 1482, since precisely
-the points in question are quite curiously absent from, or barely
-recognizable in, that book. See its cc. x and xi, Book XVIII, on
-“the State of the Impure Soul” and “the State of the Imperfect Soul”
-respectively: ed. 1559, fol. 340, _v. seq._ See also foll. 318_r_,
-319_v_.
-
-[206] _Phaedo_, 81_a_-82_a_.
-
-[207] _Laws_, X, 904_a-e_.
-
-[208] _Timaeus_, 41_d_, _e_; 42_b_, _d_, I have, for clearness’ sake,
-turned Plato’s indirect sentences into direct ones; and have taken
-the _Timaeus_ after the _Laws_, although it is chronologically prior
-to them, because the full balance of his system, (which requires the
-originally lofty “place” of each individual soul),--is, I think,
-abandoned in the _Laws_: see 904_a_.
-
-[209] These four passages are all within pp. 110_b_-114_d_ of the
-_Phaedo_.
-
-[210] _Gorgias_, pp. 525_b_, _c_; 526_c_, _d_.
-
-[211] _Ibid._ p. 523_b-e_.
-
-[212] 2 Cor. v, 2, 3.--_Vita_, pp. 109_b_, 66_a_, 171_a_.
-
-[213] _Republic_, X, pp. 617_e_, 619_e_, 920_e_.
-
-[214] _Phaedrus_, p. 249_b_.
-
-[215] _Enneads_, III, 4, 5.
-
-[216] Enarr. in Ps. xxxvi, § 1, n. 10, ed. Ben., col. 375_b_. See also
-_Enchiridion_, CIX, _ibid._ col. 402_d_.
-
-[217] So in the _De Civitate Dei_, Lib. XXI, c. xxvi, n. 4, _ibid._
-col. 1037_d_.
-
-[218] _Confess._, Lib. I, c. 2, n. 1; X, c. 26; XIII, c. 7.
-
-[219] _De Genesi ad litt._, Lib. VIII, n. 39, ed. Ben. col. 387_b_; n.
-43, col. 389_a_.
-
-[220] _Ibid._ Lib. XII, n. 32, col. 507_c_. He soon after attempts
-to decide in favour of “incorporeal places,” as the other-world
-destination of all classes of human souls.
-
-[221] Esra IV, iv, 35. See also iv, 41; vii, 32, 80, 95, 101.
-Apocalypse of Baruch, xxx, 2.
-
-[222] _Summa Theol._ suppl., qu. 69, art. 1, in corp. et ad 3; art. 6,
-in corp.; Appendix de Purgat., art. 2, in corp.; suppl., qu. 69, art 7
-concl.
-
-[223] _De gratia primi hominis_, XIV.
-
-[224] Clemens, _Stromata_, VII, 6. Origen, _De Princ._, II, 10, 4. St.
-Greg. Nyss., _Orat._, XL, 36. St. Greg. Nazianz., _Poema de Seipso_, I,
-546. St. Joann. Damasc., _De Fide Orthod._, cap. ult.
-
-[225] St. Ambros., _In Lucam_, VII, 205. St. Hieron., Ep. 124, 7;
-_Apol. contra Ruf._, II; in Isa. lxv, 24.
-
-[226] _Liber de Fide_ (413 A.D.), 27, 29; ed. Ben., coll. 313_b_,
-314_c_. _De octo Dulcit. quaestm_ (422 A.D.) 12, 13; _ibid._ coll.
-219_d_, 220_a_. Repeated in _Enchiridion_ (423 A.D.?), LXIX; _ibid._
-col. 382_b_, _c_.
-
-[227] _De Purgatorio_, II, 11.
-
-[228] Denzinger, _Enchiridion_, ed. 1888, No. LXXIII.
-
-[229] _Theol. Dogm._, Vol. II, num. 206.
-
-[230] _Œuvres_, ed. Versailles, 1816, Vol. XI, p. 376.
-
-[231] _Le feu du Purgatoire est-il un feu corporel? op. cit._, 1902,
-pp. 263-282; 270. I owe most of my references on this point to this
-paper.
-
-[232] _Sixteen Revelations of Mother Juliana of Norwich_, 1373, ed.
-1902, pp. 73, 74, 78.
-
-[233] _Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life_, 1899, pp.
-63, 64.
-
-[234] _Divine Names_, ch. iv, secs, xxiii, xxiv: Parker, pp. 61-64.
-
-[235] _Vita_, pp. 173_b_; 33_b_.
-
-[236] _Summa Theol._, suppl., qu. 69, art. 7 ad 9.
-
-[237] Dionysius, _Divine Names_, ch. iv, sec. xxiii: Parker, p. 63. St.
-Thomas, _Summa Theol._, suppl., qu. 98, art. 1, in corp.
-
-[238] _Enchiridion_, CX, ed. Ben., col. 403_c_; CXII, col. 404_c_.
-
-[239] The passages here referred to will be found carefully quoted and
-discussed in Petavius’s great _Dogmata Theologica, De Angelis_, III,
-viii, 16, 17, with Zaccaria’s important note (ed. Fournials, 1866, Vol.
-IV, pp. 119-121).
-
-[240] _Dogmata Theologica_, Vol. IV, p. 120_b_. See also the
-interesting note in the Benedictine Edition of _St. Augustine_, Vol.
-VI, col. 403.
-
-[241] _Vie de M. Emery_, by M. Gosselin, Paris, 1862, Vol. II, pp.
-322-324.
-
-[242] _Vita_ (_Trattato_), p. 173_b_.
-
-[243] So Atzberger, in Scheeben’s _Dogmatik_, Vol. IV (1903), p. 826.
-
-[244] _Enigmas of Life_, ed. 1892, p. 255.
-
-[245] _Divine Names_, ch. iv, secs. 23, 24: Parker, pp, 70, 71.
-
-[246] 2 Cor. iv, 16.
-
-[247] See H. J. Holtzmann, Richard Rothe’s _Speculatives System_, 1899,
-pp. 110, 111; 123, 124;--Georg Class, _Phänomenologie und Ontologie des
-Menschlichen Geistes_, 1896, pp. 220, 221;--and that strange mixture of
-stimulating thought, deep earnestness, and fantastic prejudice, Edward
-White’s _Life of Christ_, ed. 1876.
-
-[248] _Grammar of Assent_, 1870, p. 417. _Hard Sayings_, 1898, p. 113.
-
-[249] G. E. Lessing, “Leibniz von den Ewigen Strafen,” in Lessing’s
-_Sämmtliche Werke_, ed. Lachmann-Muncker, 1895, Vol. XI, p. 486. D. F.
-Strauss, _Die christliche Glaubenslehre_, 1841, Vol. II, pp. 684, 685.
-Carl von Hase, _Handbuch der protestantischen Polemik_, ed. 1864, p.
-422. G. T. Fechner, _Die drei Gründe und Motive des Glaubens_, 1863,
-pp. 146, 147, 177. G. Anrich, “Clemens und Origenes, als Begründer
-der Lehre vom Fegfeuer,” in _Theologische Abhandlungen für H. J.
-Holtzmann_, 1902, p. 120.
-
-[250] W. R. Greg, _Enigmas of Life_, ed. 1892, pp. 256, 257, 259. J. S.
-Mill, _Three Essays on Religion_, ed. 1874, p. 211.
-
-[251] Sess. XXV, Decret. de Purgatorio, med.
-
-[252] N. Paulus, _Johann Tetzel_ 1899. Brieger’s review, _Theologische
-Literatur-Zeitung_, 1900, coll. 117, 118.
-
-[253] 1 Cor. xv, 29.
-
-[254] _De Corona_, III, IV. See M. Salomon Reinach’s interesting
-paper, “l’Origine des Prières pour les Morts,” in _Cultes, Mythes, et
-Religions_, 1905, pp. 316-331.
-
-[255] W. Bacher, _Die Agada der palästinensischen Amoräer_, Vol. I,
-1892, p. 331.
-
-[256] _Strom._, VII, 26 (Migne, _Ser. Graec_, Vol. IX, col. 541); I, 26
-(_ibid._ Vol. VIII, col. 916); VII, 26 (_ibid._ Vol. IX, col. 540).
-
-[257] _De Princ._, II, 10, 6. _De Orat._, XXIX, p. 263.
-
-[258] _Paedag._, I, 8, p. 51; and Plato, _Gorgias_, p. 477_a_.
-
-[259] I owe here almost everything to the truly classical account in
-Rhode’s _Psyche_, ed. 1898, Vol. II, pp. 1-136.
-
-[260] _Republic_ II, p. 364_b_, _c_, _e_.
-
-[261] I take these passages from Anrich’s _Clemens und Origenes, op.
-cit._ p. 102, n. 5.
-
-[262] Clemens, _Strom._, V, 3, p. 236. Origen, _Contra Cels._, VII, 13.
-Clemens, _Strom._, IV, 24. Origen, _Contra Cels._, IV, 13.
-
-[263] Dionysius, _Divine Names_, ch. iv, sec. 24: Parker, p. 64. St.
-Thomas, _Summa Theol._ I, ii, qu. 86, art. 1 ad 3 et concl.
-
-[264] _Treatise on Purgatory_, by St. Catherine of Genoa, ed. 1880, p.
-31.
-
-[265] Plato, _Cratylus_, p. 400_c_. _Republic_, II, p. 364_e_.
-Euripides, _Orestes_ XXX, _seq._, with Schol. Rhode, _op. cit._ Vol.
-II, p. 101, n. 2.
-
-[266] _Natur. quaest._ III, 28, 7; 30, 7, 8.
-
-[267] Disp. XI, Sec. iv, art. 2, §§ 13, 10; Disp. XLVII, Sec. i, art 6.
-
-[268] Scheeben’s _Dogmatik_ Vol. IV, 1903, pp. 856 (No. 93), 723.
-
-[269] See Abbé Boudhinon’s careful article, “Sur l’Histoire des
-Indulgences,” _Revue d’Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses_, 1898,
-pp. 435-455, for a vivid illustration of the necessity of explaining
-the details of this doctrine and practice by history of the most
-patient kind.
-
-[270] Denzinger, _Enchiridion_, ed. 1888, Nos. 387, 588, 859.
-
-[271] Denzinger, _ibid._, Hurter, _op. cit._ ed. 1893, Vol. III, p. 591.
-
-[272] Denzinger, Nos. 778, 951.
-
-[273] Cardinal Manning in _Treatise_, ed. cit. p. 31.
-
-[274] _Op. cit._ pp. 119, 120: “The Purgatory of the Catholic Church,
-in strictness, bears its name without warrant.”
-
-[275] _Cat._, cc. viii, 35.
-
-[276] _De octo Dulcitii quaest._ 12, 13.
-
-[277] _Summa Theol._, app., qu. 2, art. 4, in corp. et ad 4.
-
-[278] _Divina Commedia_, Purg. II, 40-42. See Faber, _All for Jesus_,
-ed. 1889, p. 361.
-
-[279] _De Purgatorio_, Lib. I, c. iv, 6; c. xiv, 22.
-
-[280] _Les Controverses_, Pt. III, ch. ii, art. 1 (end); _Œuvres_,
-Annecy, 1892 _seq._, Vol. I, p. 365.
-
-[281] Faber’s _All for Jesus_, 1853, ch. ix, sec. 4; Cardinal Manning’s
-Appendix (B) to Engl. tr. of St. Catherine’s _Treatise on Purgatory_,
-1858; Cardinal Newman’s _Dream of Gerontius_, 1865.
-
-[282] _In Rom._, Tom. II, i, p. 477.
-
-[283] _Richard Rothe’s Spekulatives System_, 1899, pp. 123, 124.
-
-[284] _Richard Rothe’s Spekulatives System_, 1899, pp. 69; 74, 75.
-
-[285] St. Augustine, _Confessions_, Lib. XI, ch. xxvii, 3; ch. xx; ch.
-xi. _De Trinit._, Lib. XV, ch. 16, ed. Ben., col. 1492 D.--St. Thomas,
-_Summa Theol._, I, qu. 12, art. 10, in corp.
-
-[286] I am here but giving an abstract of Mr. F. C. S. Schiller’s
-admirable essay, “Activity and Substance,” pp. 204-227 of his
-_Humanism_, 1903, where all the Aristotelian passages are carefully
-quoted and discussed. He is surely right in translating ἠρεμία by
-“constancy,” not by “rest.”
-
-[287] _Summa Theol._, I, qu. 4, art. 1, concl. qu. 25, art. 1 ad 2 et
-concl.
-
-[288] Matt. xxii, 32.
-
-[289] _Metaphysic_, xii, 1072_b_, 1074_b_.
-
-[290] E. Caird, _Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers_, 1904
-Vol. II, pp. 12, 16. See here, too, the fine discussion of the other,
-rightly immanental as well as transcendental, teaching of Aristotle,
-pp. 15, 21.
-
-[291] _Summa Theol._, I, ii, qu. 3, art. 2 ad 4; art. 4, concl.
-
-[292] _Ibid._ I, qu. 14, art. 4, in corp.; qu. 19, art. I, concl.; qu.
-20, art. I, concl.
-
-[293] _Summa Theol._, I, qu. 14, art. 11, 3; qu. 14, art. 2, ad 2; I,
-ii, qu. 3, art. 2 ad 4.
-
-[294] _Ibid._ I, qu. 12, art. 8 ad 4; I, ii, qu. 4, art. 8 ad 3.
-
-[295] _Ibid._ I, qu. 14, art. 8, in corp.; art. 11, contra et concl.;
-art. 8, concl.; art. 11, concl.--_Contra Gent._, Lib. III, c. xxi, in
-fine.
-
-[296] _Summa Theol._, II, ii, qu. 3, art. 4, 4; I, qu. 19, art. 2, in
-corp.; qu. 20, art. 1 ad 1; ad 3; art. 2 ad 1.
-
-[297] Mark xii, 28-34 and parallels; Matt, x, 29; Luke xii, 6; Matt,
-xxv, 10; Mark xiv, 25 and parallels, and elsewhere; Apoc. vii, 9.
-
-[298] Matt. xviii, 12-14; Luke xv, 1-10; John x, 11-16 (Ezekiel xxxiv,
-12-19).
-
-[299] _Summa Theol._, I, qu. 47, art. 1, in corp.
-
-[300] _Summa Theol._, I, qu. 29, art. 3 ad 4; ad 2; in corp. _Contra
-Gent._, Lib. II, c. xciv, init.; c. xciii.
-
-[301] _Excitationum_, Lib. VIII, 604.
-
-[302] _The World and the Individual_, Vol. II, p. 430.
-
-[303] G. E. Lessing: _Leibniz von den Ewigen Strafen, Werke_, ed.
-Lachmann-Muncker, Vol. XI, 1895, p. 482. E. Troeltsch, _Theologische
-Rundschau_, 1893, p. 72.
-
-[304] _Summa Theol._, I, qu. 12, art. 1, in corp.; art. 7, in corp.;
-art. 6 ad 1.
-
-[305] “A Spiritual Canticle,” stanza vii, 10, in _Works_, transl. by D.
-Lewis, ed. 1891, pp. 206, 207.
-
-[306] _Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft_, Werke, ed.
-Hartenstein, 1868, Vol. VI, pp. 252, 274.
-
-[307] _Kant_, 1904, pp. 129-132.
-
-[308] _Das Historische in Kant’s Religions-philosophie, Kant-Studien_,
-1904, pp. 43, 44.
-
-[309] “Das Heilige,” in _Präludien_, 1903, pp. 356, 357.
-
-[310] _Elements of the Science of Religion_, 1897, Vol. I, pp. 274,
-275; Vol. II, p. 23.
-
-[311] _Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott_, ed. 1892, p. 281.
-
-[312] _Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott_, ed. 1892, pp. 27, 28; 230,
-231; 262; 23.
-
-[313] E. Caird, _Development of Theology in the Greek Philosophers_,
-Vol. I, pp, 367, 362. The whole chapter, “Does the Primacy belong to
-Reason or to Will?” pp. 350-382, is admirable in its richness and
-balance.
-
-[314] _Verkehr des Christen_, pp. 15, 16.
-
-[315] I. Kant, “Anthropologie,” in _Werke_, ed. Berlin Academy,
-Vol. VII, 1907, pp. 135, 136. G. W. Leibniz, “Nouveaux Essais sur
-l’Entendement,” in _Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. L._,” ed.
-Gerhardt, Vol. V, 1882, pp. 8, 10; 45, 69, 100, 121, 122.
-
-[316] All this first clearly formulated by Leibniz, _op. cit._ pp. 121,
-122.
-
-[317] See his _Varieties of Religious Experience_, 1902, pp. 209-211;
-242, 243; and elsewhere.
-
-[318] _The Prophets of Israel_, 1882, pp. 11, 12; 10, 11.
-
-[319] _Lex Orandi_, 1903, pp. xxix, xxxi.
-
-[320] M. Jastrow, _The Study of Religion_, 1901, pp. 279-286. C. P.
-Tiele, _Elements of the Science of Religion_, 1897, Vol. II, pp.
-227-234; L. W. E. Rauwenhoff, _Religions-philosophie_, Germ. tr., ed.
-1894, pp. 109-124. R. Eucken, _Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion_, 1901,
-pp. 59-238; 303-399. There are important points in pp. 425-438, which I
-do not accept.
-
-[321] _Rothe’s Spekulatives System_, 1899, pp. 25, 26.
-
-[322] _Elements of the Science of Religion_, 1897, Vol. II, pp. 61, 62.
-
-[323] _Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt_, 1896, p. 309.
-
-[324] _The Evolution of Religion_, 1893, Vol. II, p. 313.
-
-[325] “Grundprobleme der Ethik,” in _Zeitschrift für Theologie und
-Kirche_, 1902, pp. 164; 166, 167; 172.
-
-[326] _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, I, Anhang, p. 653.
-
-[327] A. E. Taylor’s _The Problem of Conduct_, 1901, contains, pp.
-469-487, a very vigorous and suggestive study of the similarities and
-differences between Morality and Religion, marred though it is by
-paradox and impatience.
-
-[328] J. Volkelt, _Immanuel Kant’s Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1879, pp. 258,
-259.
-
-[329] _Ibid._ pp. 206, 208, 209.
-
-[330] J. Volkelt, _Immanuel Kant’s Erkenntnisstheorie_, 1879, p. 244.
-
-[331] James Ward, “Present Problems of Psychology,” in (American)
-_Philosophical Review_, 1904, p. 607. J. Volkelt, _Kant’s
-Erkenntnisstheorie_, p. 241.
-
-[332] In a Letter of 1772, _Briefe_, ed. Berlin Academy, Vol. I, 1900,
-p. 126.
-
-[333] H. Jones, _A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze_, 1895,
-pp. 102-104; 106, 107; 108, 111.
-
-[334] _The Present Problems_, pp. 606, 607.
-
-[335] J. Volkelt, _Erfahrung und Denken_, 1886, p. 485.
-
-[336] James Ward, “On the Definition of Psychology,” in _Journal of
-Psychology_, Vol. I, 1904, p. 25.
-
-[337] There is a good description of this doctrine in H. Höffding’s
-_Sören Kierkegaard_, Stuttgart, 1896, pp. 100-104.
-
-[338] Höffding’s _Kierkegaard_, pp. 119, 120.
-
-[339] _Ibid._ p. 123.
-
-[340] See _Works_, ed. London, 1898, Vol. II, pp. 299-306.
-
-[341] _Quaestio Mystica_, at the end of the notes to Chapter V of
-Dionysius’s _Mystical Theology_, ed. Migne, 1889, Vol. I, pp. 1050-1058.
-
-[342] _In Librum Boetii de Trinitate_, in D. Thomae Aquinatis _Opera_,
-ed. altera Veneta, Vol. VIII, 1776, pp. 341_b_, 342_a_; 291_a_.
-
-[343] _Mystical Theology_, Dr. Parker, pp. 135, 136. I have somewhat
-modified Parker’s rendering.
-
-[344] _Religions-philosophie_, German tr. ed. 1894, p. 116. His scheme
-finds three psychological forms and constituents in all religion,
-Intellectualism, Mysticism, Moralism, each with its own advantages and
-dangers.
-
-[345] _Confessions_: “Evil, Negative,” VII, 12, etc. “Evil, Positive,”
-VI, 15; VIII, 5, 11, etc.
-
-[346] _Opus Imperfectum_, III, 56, ed. Ben., Vol. X, col. 1750_b_.
-_De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia_, I, 23, _ibid._ col. 625_a_.--M. L.
-Grandgeorge, in his memoir _St. Augustin et le Neo-Platonisme_,
-1896, gives an interesting collection of such Negative and Positive
-declarations, and traces the former to their precise sources in
-Plotinus, pp. 126, 127; 130, 131.
-
-[347] _Divine Names_, ch. iv, sec. xxiv.
-
-[348] _Summa Theol._, I, ii, qu. 86, art. 1 ad 3.
-
-[349] _Vita_, pp. 39_b_, 116_b_.
-
-[350] _Sixteen Revelations_, ed. 1902, pp. 69, 70.
-
-[351] Meister Ekhart’s “Lateinische Schriften,” published by Denifle,
-_Archiv f. Litteratur u. Kirchengeschichte des M. A._, 1886, p. 662.
-
-[352] _Ethica_, II, def. vi; IV, prop. lxiv et coroll.; ed. Van Vloten
-et Land, 1895, Vol. I, pp. 73, 225.
-
-[353] _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, 1785, _Werke_, ed.
-Berlin Academy, Vol. IV, 1903, p. 393. _Religion innerhalb der Grenzen
-der reinen Vernunft_, 1793, _Werke_, ed. Hartenstein, Vol. VI, 1868,
-pp. 127, 128.
-
-[354] _The Origin and Propagation of Sin_, 1902, p. 125.
-
-[355] _Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion_, 1901, pp. 271, 272.
-
-[356] Prof. Höffding, in his _Sören Kierkegaard_, pp. 130, 131.
-
-[357] “Le Dogme du Pêché Originel dans S. Augustin,” _Revue d’Histoire
-et de Littérature Religieuses_, 1901, 1902. See too F. R. Tennant, _The
-Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin_, 1903, which,
-however, descends only to St. Ambrose inclusively.
-
-[358] So F. R. Tennant, _The Origin and Propagation of Sin_, 1902, pp.
-131, 110.
-
-[359] F. R. Tennant, _The Origin and Propagation of Sin_, 1902, pp. 82,
-95; 107, 108; 115.
-
-[360] _Ibid._ p. 83.
-
-[361] _Ibid._ p. 153.
-
-[362] _Summa Theol._, II, ii, qu. 24, art. 7, in corp.
-
-[363] _Psychology and Life_, 1899, pp. 267, 268. _Grundzüge der
-Psychologie_, Vol. I, 1900, pp. 170, 171.
-
-[364] Mr. W. R. Inge, in his useful _Christian Mysticism_, 1899, has
-some sharp expressions of disgust against these long-lived survivals
-within the Catholic Church. And though his own tone towards Rome in
-general belongs also, surely, to a more or less barbaric past, he has
-done good service in drawing forcible attention to the matter.
-
-[365] _Sixteen Revelations_, ed. 1902, pp. 23, 84, 101.
-
-[366] _Ascent of Mount Carmel_, tr. Lewis, 1891, pp. 159; 26, 27; 195,
-265.
-
-[367] _Confessions_, Bk. XI, ch. xxiii, 1. Tract in Joann. Ev., VIII,
-1; XXIV, 1: ed. Ben., Vol. III, 2, coll. 1770 _b_, 1958 _d_.
-
-[368] _Sixteen Revelations_, ed. cit. p. 210.
-
-[369] J. N. Grou, _Méditations sur l’Amour de Dieu_, Nouvelle ed.
-Perisse, pp. 268, 271.
-
-[370] L. Laberthonnière, _Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne_, 1905,
-1906. G. Tyrrell, _Hard Sayings_, 1898; _External Religion_, 1902. A.
-Sandreau, _La Vie d’Union à Dieu_, 1900; _L’Etat Mystique_, 1903.
-
-[371] M. D. Petre, _The Soul’s Orbit_, 1904, p. 113.
-
-[372] _Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeigen_, 1901, p. 757.
-
-[373] Zeller, _Philosophie der Griechen_, II, 2, ed. 1879, pp. 309, 312.
-
-[374] _Ibid._ p. 348.
-
-[375] Republic, VI, 508_e_; VII, 517_b_; and Zeller, _ibid._ II, 1, ed.
-1889, pp. 707-710.
-
-[376] _Philebus_, 22_c_; _Timaeus_, 28_a_, _c_; 29_e_, 92_c_ (with the
-reading ὅδε ὁ κόσμος … εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ).
-
-[377] _Timaeus_, 29_e_.
-
-[378] _Enneads_, I, vii, 1, 61_d_; I, viii, 2, 72_e_; VI, viii, 16,
-end. See, for all this, Zeller, _Philosophie der Griechen_, III, ii,
-ed. 1881, pp. 476-480; 483; 510-414.
-
-[379] _Enneads_, VIII. ix, 350_b_; VI, 2317, 610_d_; III, ix, 3, 358_a,
-b_.
-
-[380] Zeller, _op. cit._ III, ii, pp. 787-789.
-
-[381] _Divine Names_, ch. v, sec. 1: tr. Parker, pp. 73-75.
-
-[382] _Mystical Theology_, ch. iii: Parker, pp. 135, 136.
-
-[383] _Mystical Theology_, ch. iv, sec. 2: Parker, pp. 136, 137.
-
-[384] _De Divisione Naturae_, III, 17; I, 78. Ueberweg-Heinze,
-_Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_, Vol. II, ed. 1898, p. 159.
-
-[385] Secs. 2, 4, ed. Bardenhewer, 1882, pp. 163-166.
-
-[386] Commentarius, in _Aristotelis Metaphysica_, Tract. VIII, cap. 6,
-quoted by Denifle, _Archiv f. Litteratur-u-Kirchengeschichte_, 1886, p.
-520.
-
-[387] Ibn Gebirol, _Fons Vitae_, ed. Bäumker, 1895: IV, 6, pp. 225,
-224; V, 22, p. 298; II, 20, pp. 60-61; V, 24, p. 301.
-
-[388] _De Ente et Essentia_, c. vi. _Summa Theol._, I, qu. 3, art. 4 ad
-1; and elsewhere.
-
-[389] _De Ente et Essentia_, c. ii.
-
-[390] See Ueberweg-Heinze, _op. cit._ pp. 280, 281.
-
-[391] _De rerum Principio_, qu. viii. Ueberweg-Heinze, _op. cit._ pp.
-295, 296.
-
-[392] H. S. Denifle, _Meister Eckhart’s Lateinische Schriften_, _loc.
-cit._ pp. 489, 490; 540, n. 6.
-
-[393] _Ibid._ p. 519.
-
-[394] _Meister Eckhart_, ed. Pfeiffer, 1857, pp. 158, 1; 99, 8; 180,
-15; 532, 30; 320, 27; 288, 26; 207, 27.
-
-[395] Denzinger, _Enchiridion Symbolorum_, ed. 1888, Nos. 437, 455.
-
-[396] _Hegelianism and Personality_, ed. 1893, pp. 230, 231, and note.
-
-[397] _Phaedrus_, 245 d; Zeller, _op. cit._ II, 1, ed. 1889, p. 830.
-
-[398] _Ibid._ pp. 843, 844; 849, 850.
-
-[399] Pre-existence of the Noûs: _Gen. Anim._, II, 3, 736_b_; _de
-Anima_, III, 5, 430_a_; Zeller, _op. cit._ II, 2, ed. 1879, pp. 593,
-595. The Supreme Noûs, purely transcendent: _Metaph._, XII, 7-10. But
-see Dr. Edward Caird’s admirable pp. 1-30, Vol. II, of his _Evolution
-of Theology in the Greek Philosophers_, 1904.
-
-[400] Rom. viii, 11. See too Rom. viii, 9, 14; 1 Cor. iii, 16; vi, 11;
-vii, 40; xii, 3.
-
-[401] H. J. Holtzmann, _Lehrbuch der N. T. Theology_, 1897, Vol. II,
-pp. 9-12; 15-18.
-
-[402] H. J. Holtzmann, _op. cit._ Vol. II, pp. 79, 80. Johannes Weiss,
-_Dic Nachfolge Christi_, 1895, p. 95.
-
-[403] Col. iii, 4; Phil. i, 21; Gal. ii, 20.
-
-[404] _Enneads_, V, book 1, cc. 3 and 6.
-
-[405] _Ibid._ VI, book 9, 9 and 11.
-
-[406] _Eckhart_, ed. Pfeiffer, pp. 113, 33; 469, 40, 36.
-
-[407] Denzinger, _op. cit._ No. 454.
-
-[408] _Vier Schriften von Johannes Ruysbroek_, ed. Ullmann, 1848, pp.
-106, 107.
-
-[409] _Life, written by Herself_, tr. D. Lewis, ed. 1888, pp. 124, 421,
-146.
-
-[410] _Life, written by Herself_, tr. D. Lewis, ed. 1888, pp. 355, 130,
-430; 174.
-
-[411] J. B. Schwab, _Johannes Gerson_, 1858, pp. 361, 362.
-
-[412] I can find but one, secondary Ecclesiastical Censure of the
-doctrine of God’s substantial presence in the soul,--the censure passed
-by the Paris Sorbonne on Peter Lombard. The same Sorbonne repeatedly
-censured St. Thomas on other points.
-
-[413] Vol. II, pp. 210, 211.
-
-[414] _Ibid._ pp. 230, 231.
-
-[415] _Ibid._ p. 231.
-
-[416] _Ibid._ pp. 253-257. _Enneads_, V, book ii, i.
-
-[417] Vol. II, pp. 232, 233.
-
-[418] “Religions-philosophie,” in _Die Philosophie im Beginn des
-zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts_, 1904, Vol. I, pp. 115, 117.
-
-[419] _Religions-philosophie_, Germ. tr., ed. 1894, p. 140.
-
-[420] “Martineau’s Philosophy,” _Hibbert Journal_, Vol. I, 1902, pp.
-458, 457.
-
-[421] _Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott_, ed. 1892, pp. 27, 15, 28,
-231.
-
-[422] _Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott_, ed. 1892, pp. 20; 19-25.
-
-[423] _Timaeus_, 29_e_, _seq._
-
-[424] _Metaph._, VII, 1072_b_; IX, 1074_b_.
-
-[425] See Caird, _op. cit._ II, p. 337.
-
-[426] _Summa Theol._, I, qu. 13, art. 5, concl. et in corp. (See the
-interesting note, “The Meaning of Analogy,” in Fr. Tyrrell’s _Lex
-Orandi_, 1903, pp. 80-83.) _In Librum Boetii de Trinitate_: D. Thomae
-Aquinatis _Opera_, ed. Veneta Altera, 1776, p. 341_b_, 342_a_.
-
-[427] _Summa Theol._, I, qu. 8, art. 2; qu. 12, art. 1, in corp.
-
-[428] For Leibniz, see especially his _Nouveaux Essais_, written in
-1701-1709, but not published till 1765: _Die Philosophischen Schriften
-van G. W. Leibniz_, ed. Gebhardt, Vol. V, 1882, especially pp. 45; 67;
-69; 121, 122. For the date 1888, see W. James’s _Varieties of Religious
-Experience_, 1902, p. 233.
-
-[429] _Autobiography_, ed. 1875, pp. 133, 134.
-
-[430] “Die Selbständigkeit der Religion”: _Zeitschrift f. Theologie u.
-Kirche_, 1895, pp. 404, 405.
-
-[431] _Elements of the Science of Religion_, 1897, Vol. II, pp. 227-231.
-
-[432] _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, ed. Griesbach, Vol. II, pp.
-725, 734, 736.
-
-[433] _The Varieties of Religious Experience_, 1902, pp. 362, 364.
-
-[434] _Ascent of Mount Carmel_, tr. David Lewis, ed. 1889, pp. 94, 95,
-97.
-
-[435] _Ascent_, pp. 94; 350.
-
-[436] _Ascent_, p. 353.
-
-[437] _Sören Kierkegaard_, von Harald Höffding, Germ. tr. 1896, pp.
-116, 118, 120.
-
-[438] _Ibid._ pp. 122; 130, 131.
-
-[439] _Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte_, ed. 1888, Vol. II, pp. 413, 414;
-417.
-
-[440] _Das Wesen des Christenthums_, ed. 1902, pp. 180, 181.
-
-[441] Höffding’s _Kierkegaard_, p. 119.
-
-[442] _The Faith of the Million_, 1901, Vol. II, pp. 49, 50; 52, 53.
-
-[443] _Works_, tr. David Lewis, ed. 1889, 1891, Vol. I, p. 308; Vol.
-II, p. 541.
-
-[444] _Op. cit._ p. 53.
-
-[445] _Ibid._ pp. 55, 56.
-
-[446] _Psyche_, ed. 1898, Vol. II, pp. 292, 293.
-
-[447] “Grundprobleme der Ethik”: _Zeitschrift für Theologie und
-Kirche_, 1902, pp. 164, 167.
-
-[448] “Was heisst Wesen des Christenthums?” _Christliche Welt_,
-1903, I, coll. 583, 584. The Abbé Loisy has also dwelt, with rare
-impressiveness, upon the intensely Other-Worldly character of the first
-Christian teaching.
-
-[449] _Deutsche Mystiker des Mittelalters_, ed. Pfeiffer, Vol. I,
-1845, pp. xli, xlii. Any Life of St. Jane F. de Chantal. A. Cadrès,
-_Le P. Jean N. Grou_, 1866, pp. 13, 14. St. Teresa’s _Life, written by
-Herself_, tr. David Lewis, ed. 1888, pp. 176, 177; 186. _Revelations of
-Divine Love, showed to Mother Juliana of Norwich_, ed. 1902, p. 4.
-
-[450] A. Gardner, “Confession and Direction,” in _The Conflict of
-Duties_, 1903, pp. 223-229. P. Gardner, in _The Liberal Churchman_,
-1905, p. 266.
-
-[451] _Psyche_, ed. 1898, Vol. II, p. 289.
-
-[452] “Christianity and Physical Science” (1855), in _Idea of a
-University_, ed. 1873, pp. 432, 433. “University Teaching” (1852),
-_ibid._ p. 222. See Mr. R. E. Froude’s interesting paper, “Scientific
-Speculation and the Unity of Truth,” _Dublin Review_, Oct. 1900, pp.
-353-368.
-
-[453] W. Windelband, _Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft_, 1894. H.
-Rickert, _Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft_, 1899. And,
-above all, H. Rickert, _Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen
-Begriffsbildung_, 1902.
-
-[454] _Schopenhauer_, 1900, pp. 344, 345.
-
-[455] _Wie ist der Kampf um die Bedeutung … Jesu zu beendigen?_ 1901,
-p. 9.
-
-[456] _Wie ist der Kampf um die Bedeutung … Jesu zu beendigen?_ 1901,
-p. 10.
-
-[457] _Ibid._ pp. 10, 11.
-
-[458] _Ibid._ pp. 26, 27.
-
-[459] “Ueber den letzten Unterschied der philosophischen Systeme,”
-1847, in _Beiträge zur Philosophie_, 1855, Vol. II, p. 10.
-
-[460] See the admirably lucid analysis in Prof. Troeltsch’s
-“Religions-philosophie,” in _Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten
-Jahrhunderts_, 1904, Vol. I, p. 116, already referred to further back.
-
-[461] _Richard Rothe’s Spekulatives System_, 1899, pp. 205, 206.
-
-
-_Richard Clay & Sons, Limited, London and Bungay._
-
-
-
-
-
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