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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57420e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #50141 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50141) diff --git a/old/50141-0.txt b/old/50141-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 4e0fe36..0000000 --- a/old/50141-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10547 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Philosophical Studies, by George Edward Moore - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Philosophical Studies - -Author: George Edward Moore - -Release Date: October 6, 2015 [EBook #50141] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Hathi Trust.) - - - - - -PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES - -By - -G. E. MOORE, Litt.D. - -_Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews), F.B.A._ - -_Lecturer in Moral Science in the University of Cambridge -Author of "Principia Ethica"_ - -LONDON - -ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD - -BROADWAY HOUSE: 68-74 CARTER LANE, E.C.4 - -1922 - - - -CONTENTS - - I. THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM - II. THE NATURE AND REALITY OF OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION - III. WILLIAM JAMES' "PRAGMATISM" - IV. HUME'S PHILOSOPHY - V. THE STATUS OF SENSE-DATA - VI. THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY - VII. SOME JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION - VIII. THE CONCEPTION OF INTRINSIC VALUE - IX. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS - X. THE NATURE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY - - -_Those of the papers in this volume, which have been previously -published, originally appeared as follows_:-- - -I. "The Refutation of Idealism" in _Mind,_ N.S. Vol. xii, 1903. - -II. "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception" in _Proceedings -of the Aristotelian Society,_ 1905-6. - -III. "Professor James' 'Pragmatism'" in _Proceedings of the -Aristotelian Society,_ 1907-8. - -IV. "Hume's Philosophy" in _The New Quarterly,_ November, 1909. - -V. "The Status of Sense-Data" in _Proceedings of the Aristotelian -Society,_ 1913-14. - -VI. "The Conception of Reality" in _Proceedings of the Aristotelian -Society,_ 1917-18. - -VII. "Some Judgments of Perception" in _Proceedings of the Aristotelian -Society,_ 1918-19. - -IX. "External and Internal Relations" in _Proceedings of the -Aristotelian Society,_ 1919-20. - - - - -PREFACE - - -All the papers contained in this volume, except the two ethical ones -(VIII and X), have been previously published; and of those which have -been previously published all, except that on "External and Internal -Relations" (IX), are here re-printed without change. They were written -at various dates between 1903 and 1921, and all are here printed in the -order in which they were written, except that VIII on "The Conception -of Intrinsic Value," which was written earlier than VI and VII, has -been moved out of its proper place in order to bring it nearer to IX -and X, to both of which it is closely related in subject. - -All, except IV and X, were primarily intended for an audience -familiar with the writings of philosophers; but I hope that they may -nevertheless prove intelligible even to those who have read little or -no philosophy, since I make little use of technical terms, and, where I -have done so, have done my best to explain in ordinary language exactly -what I mean by them. The tone of X is somewhat different from that -of the rest, because it was written as a lecture for the _Leicester -Philosophical Society_, with regard to which I was informed that I must -not assume any previous acquaintance with philosophy in most of the -audience. It accordingly bears marks throughout of the kind of audience -for which it was intended. - -An attentive reader will easily discover that some of the views -expressed in some of the papers are inconsistent with views expressed -in others. The fact is that some of the views expressed in some of the -earlier ones are views with which I no longer agree; and I feel that -some apology is needed for nevertheless republishing them exactly as -they stood. In all cases, except one, my excuse is that the mistaken -views in question are so embedded in the form and substance of the -papers in which they occur, that it would have been impossible to -correct them without practically substituting new papers for the old -ones; and that, in spite of these mistakes, the old papers, as they -stand, still seem to me, on the whole, to say things which are worth -saying in a form which, however defective it may be, I doubt my -own ability to improve upon. The only case in which I doubt whether -this excuse applies is that of the first paper--"The Refutation of -Idealism." This paper now appears to me to be very confused, as well -as to embody a good many down-right mistakes; so I am doubtful whether -I ought to have included it. But in this case I have another excuse: -namely that it is a paper to which a good many allusions have been made -by contemporary writers on philosophy; and I was told that, for some -readers at all events, it would be a convenience that it should be -re-printed along with the rest, if only for the sake of reference. - -I said above that the only one of the previously published papers, -in which changes have been made, is IX on "External and Internal -Relations." In this case the changes are not due to any change in my -views, but to the fact that, in that part of the paper in which symbols -are used, I tried, when it was first published in the _Proceedings of -the Aristotelian Society,_ to use the symbols adopted by Whitehead and -Russell in _Principia Mathematica,_ and used them also without giving -an explanation of their meaning which would be sufficient for readers -not acquainted with that work. The symbols in question are symbols -which it is difficult for printers to reproduce; and I have, therefore, -thought it better, on this occasion, to use another set of symbols, -which seem to me to be adequate for the limited purpose I had in view. -I have tried to give an explanation of their meaning, which will -enable anyone to understand them; and I have taken the opportunity of -rewriting some of the parts of the paper in which they occur in a way -which will, I hope, make some points clearer than they originally were. - -I have to thank the Committee of the Aristotelian Society for -permission to reprint the large number of papers (viz., II, III, V, -VI, VII and IX), which originally appeared in the _Proceedings_ of -that Society; and the Editor of the _New Quarterly_ for permission to -reprint the article on Hume's Philosophy (IV), which appeared in that -Journal in November, 1909. - -G. E. MOORE. - -CAMBRIDGE, - -_January_, 1922. - - - - - -Philosophical Studies - - - - -THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM - - -Modern Idealism, if it asserts any general conclusion about the -universe at all, asserts that it is _spiritual._ There are two points -about this assertion to which I wish to call attention. These points -are that, whatever be its exact meaning, it is certainly meant to -assert (1) that the universe is very different indeed from what it -seems, and (2) that it has quite a large number of properties which it -does not seem to have. Chairs and tables and mountains _seem_ to be -very different from us; but, when the whole universe is declared to -be spiritual, it is certainly meant to assert that they are far more -like us than we think. The idealist means to assert that they are _in -some sense_ neither lifeless nor unconscious, as they certainly seem -to be; and I do not think his language is so grossly deceptive, but -that we may assume him to believe that they really are very different -indeed from what they seem. And secondly when he declares that they -are _spiritual,_ he means to include in that term quite a large number -of different properties. When the whole universe is declared to be -spiritual, it is meant not only that it is in some sense _conscious,_ -but that it has what we recognise in ourselves as the _higher_ forms of -consciousness. That it is intelligent; that it is purposeful; that it -is not mechanical; all these different things are commonly asserted -of it. In general, it may be said, this phrase 'reality is spiritual' -excites and expresses the belief that the _whole_ universe possesses -_all the qualities_ the possession of which is held to make us so -superior to things which seem to be inanimate: at least, if it does not -possess exactly those which we possess, it possesses not one only, but -several others, which, by the same ethical standard, would be judged -equal to or better than our own. When we say it is _spiritual_ we mean -to say that it has quite a number of excellent qualities, different -from any which we commonly attribute either to stars or planets or to -cups and saucers. - -Now why I mention these two points is that when engaged in the -intricacies of philosophic discussion, we are apt to overlook the -vastness of the difference between this idealistic view and the -ordinary view of the world, and to overlook the number of _different_ -propositions which the idealist must prove. It is, I think, owing to -the vastness of this difference and owing to the number of different -excellences which Idealists attribute to the universe, that it seems -such an interesting and important question whether Idealism be true or -not. But, when we begin to argue about it, I think we are apt to forget -what a vast number of arguments this interesting question must involve: -we are apt to assume, that if one or two points be made on either side, -the whole case is won. I say this lest it should be thought that any of -the arguments which will be advanced in this paper would be sufficient -to disprove, or any refutation of them sufficient to prove, the truly -interesting and important proposition that reality is spiritual. For my -own part I wish it to be clearly understood that I do not suppose that -anything I shall say has the smallest tendency to prove that reality -is not spiritual: I do not believe it possible to refute a single one -of the many important propositions contained in the assertion that it -is so. Reality may be spiritual, for all I know; and I devoutly hope -it is. But I take 'Idealism' to be a wide term and to include not -only this interesting conclusion but a number of arguments which are -supposed to be, if not sufficient, at least _necessary,_ to prove it. -Indeed I take it that modern Idealists are chiefly distinguished by -certain arguments which they have in common. That reality is spiritual -has, I believe, been the tenet of many theologians; and yet, for -believing that alone, they should hardly be called Idealists. There -are besides, I believe, many persons, not improperly called Idealists, -who hold certain characteristic propositions, without venturing to -think them quite sufficient to prove so grand a conclusion. It is, -therefore, only with Idealistic _arguments_ that I am concerned; and -if any Idealist holds that _no_ argument is necessary to prove that -reality is spiritual, I shall certainly not have refuted him. I shall, -however, attack at least one argument, which, to the best of my belief, -is considered necessary to their position by _all_ Idealists. And -I wish to point out a certain advantage which this procedure gives -me--an advantage which justifies the assertion that, if my arguments -are sound, they will have refuted Idealism. If I can refute a single -proposition which is a necessary and essential step in all Idealistic -arguments, then, no matter how good the rest of these arguments may be, -I shall have proved that Idealists have _no reason whatever_ for their -conclusion. - -Suppose we have a chain of argument which takes the form: Since A is -B, and B is C, and C is D, it follows A is D. In such an argument, -though 'B is C' and 'C is D' may both be perfectly true, yet if 'A -is B' be false, we have no more reason for asserting A is D than if -all three were false. It does not, indeed, follow that A is D is -false; nor does it follow that no other arguments would prove it to -be true. But it does follow that, so far as this argument goes, it is -the barest supposition, without the least bit of evidence. I propose -to attack a proposition which seems to me to stand in this relation -to the conclusion 'Reality is spiritual.' I do not propose to dispute -that 'Reality is spiritual;' I do not deny that there may be reasons -for thinking that it is: but I do propose to show that one reason upon -which, to the best of my judgment, all other arguments ever used by -Idealists depend is _false._ These other arguments may, for all I shall -say, be eminently ingenious and true; they are very many and various, -and different Idealists use the most different arguments to prove the -same most important conclusions. Some of these _may_ be sufficient to -prove that B is C and C is D; but if, as I shall try to show, their 'A -is B' is false the conclusion A is D remains a pleasant supposition. -I do not deny that to suggest pleasant and plausible suppositions may -be the proper function of philosophy: but I am assuming that the name -Idealism can only be properly applied where there is a certain amount -of argument, intended to be cogent. - -The subject of this paper is, therefore, quite uninteresting. Even -if I prove my point, I shall have proved nothing about the Universe -in general. Upon the important question whether Reality is or is not -spiritual my argument will not have the remotest bearing. I shall only -attempt to arrive at the truth about a matter, which is in itself quite -trivial and insignificant, and from which, so far as I can see and -certainly so far as I shall say, no conclusions can be drawn about any -of the subjects about which we most want to know. The only importance -I can claim for the subject I shall investigate is that it seems to me -to be a matter upon which not Idealists only, but all philosophers and -psychologists also, have been in error, and from their erroneous view -of which they have inferred (validly or invalidly) their most striking -and interesting conclusions. And that it has even this importance I -cannot hope to prove. If it has this importance, it will indeed follow -that all the most striking results of philosophy--Sensationalism. -Agnosticism and Idealism alike--have, for all that has hitherto been -urged in their favour, no more foundation than the supposition that -a chimera lives in the moon. It will follow that, unless new reasons -never urged hitherto can be found, all the most important philosophic -doctrines have as little claim to assent as the most superstitious -beliefs of the lowest savages. Upon the question what we have _reason_ -to believe in the most interesting matters, I do therefore think that -my results will have an important bearing; but I cannot too clearly -insist that upon the question whether these beliefs are true they will -have none whatever. - -The trivial proposition which I propose to dispute is this: that _esse_ -is _percipi._ This is a very ambiguous proposition, but, in some sense -or other, it has been very widely held. That it is, in some sense, -essential to Idealism, I must for the present merely assume. What I -propose to show is that, in all the senses ever given to it, it is -false. - -But, first of all, it may be useful to point out briefly in what -relation I conceive it to stand to Idealistic arguments. That wherever -you can truly predicate _esse_ you can truly predicate _percipi_, in -some sense or other, is, I take it, a necessary step In all arguments, -properly to be called Idealistic, and, what is more, in all arguments -hitherto offered for the Idealistic conclusion. If _esse_ is -_percipi,_ this is at once equivalent to saying that whatever is, is -experienced; and this, again, is equivalent, in a sense, to saying that -whatever is, is something mental. But this is not the sense in which -the Idealist _conclusion_ must maintain that Reality is _mental._ The -Idealist _conclusion_ is that _esse_ is _percipere_; and hence, whether -_esse_ be _percipi_ or not, a further and different discussion is -needed to show whether or not it is also _percipere._ And again, even -if _esse_ be _percipere_, we need a vast quantity of further argument -to show that what has _esse_ has also those higher mental qualities -which are denoted by spiritual. This is why I said that the question -I should discuss, namely, whether or not _esse is percipi_, must be -utterly insufficient either to prove or to disprove that reality is -spiritual. But, on the other hand, I believe that every argument ever -used to show that reality is spiritual has inferred this (validly or -invalidly) from '_esse_ is _percipere'_ as one of its premisses; and -that this again has never been pretended to be proved except by use of -the premiss that _esse_ is _percipi._ The type of argument used for the -latter purpose is familiar enough. It is said that since whatever is, -is experienced, and since some things are which are not experienced by -the individual, these must at least form part of some experience. Or -again that, since an object necessarily implies a subject, and since -the whole world must be an object, we must conceive it to belong to -some subject or subjects, in the same sense in which whatever is the -object of our experience belongs to us. Or again, that, since thought -enters into the essence of all reality, we must conceive behind it, in -it, or as its essence, a spirit akin to ours, who think: that 'spirit -greets spirit' in its object. Into the validity of these inferences -I do not propose to enter: they obviously require a great deal of -discussion. I only desire to point out that, however correct they may -be, yet if _esse_ is not _percipi,_ they leave us as far from a proof -that reality is spiritual, as if they were all false too. - -But now: Is _esse percipi?_ There are three very ambiguous terms in -this proposition, and I must begin by distinguishing the different -things that may be meant by some of them. - -And first with regard to _percipi._ This term need not trouble us -long at present. It was, perhaps, originally used to mean 'sensation' -only; but I am not going to be so unfair to modern Idealists--the -only Idealists to whom the term should now be applied without -qualification--as to hold that, if they say _esse_ is _percipi_, they -mean by _percipi_ sensation only. On the contrary I quite agree with -them that, if _esse_ be _percipi_ at all, _percipi_ must be understood -to include not sensation only, but that other type of mental fact, -which is called 'thought '; and, whether _esse_ be _percipi_ or not, I -consider it to be the main service of the philosophic school, to which -modern Idealists belong, that they have insisted on distinguishing -'sensation' and 'thought' and on emphasising the importance of the -latter. Against Sensationalism and Empiricism they have maintained the -true view. But the distinction between sensation and thought need not -detain us here. For, in whatever respects they differ, they have at -least this in common, that they are both forms of consciousness or, to -use a term that seems to be more in fashion just now, they are both -ways of experiencing. Accordingly, whatever _esse_ is _percipi_ may -mean, it does _at least_ assert that whatever is, is _experienced._ -And since what I wish to maintain is, that even this is untrue, the -question whether it be experienced by way of sensation or thought or -both is for my purpose quite irrelevant. If it be not experienced at -all, it cannot be either an object of thought or an object of sense. -It is only if being involves 'experience' that the question, whether -it involves sensation or thought or both, becomes important. I beg, -therefore, that _percipi_ may be understood, in what follows, to refer -merely to what is _common_ to sensation and thought. A very recent -article states the meaning of _esse_ is _percipi_ with all desirable -clearness in so far as _percipi_ is concerned. - -'I will undertake to show,' says Mr. Taylor,[1] 'that what makes [any -piece of fact] real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable -aspect of _a sentient experience_.' I am glad to think that Mr. Taylor -has been in time to supply me with so definite a statement that this -is the ultimate premiss of Idealism. My paper will at least refute -Mr. Taylor's Idealism, if it refutes anything at all: for I _shall_ -undertake to show that what makes a thing real cannot possibly be its -presence as an inseparable aspect of a senient experience. - -But Mr. Taylor's statement though clear, I think, with regard to -the meaning of _percipi_ is highly ambiguous in other respects. I -will leave it for the present to consider the next ambiguity in the -statement: _Esse_ is _percipi._ What does the copula mean? What can be -meant by saying that Esse _is_ percipi? There are just three meanings, -one or other of which such a statement _must_ have, if it is to be -true; and of these there is only one which it can have, if it is to -be important. (1) The statement may be meant to assert that the word -'esse' is used to signify nothing either more or less than the word -'percipi': that the two words are precise synonyms: that they are -merely different names for one and the same thing: that what is meant -by _esse_ is absolutely identical with what is meant by _percipi._ -I think I need not prove that the principle _esse_ is _percipi_ is -_not_ thus intended merely to define a word; nor yet that, if it were, -it would be an extremely bad definition. But if it does _not_ mean -this, only two alternatives remain. The second is (2) that what is -meant by _esse,_ though not absolutely identical with what is meant by -_percipi_, yet _includes_ the latter as a _part_ of its meaning. If -this were the meaning of 'esse is percipi,' then to say that a thing -was real would not be the same thing as to say that it was experienced. -That it was _real_ would mean that it was experienced and _something -else besides_: 'being experienced' would be _analytically essential_ -to reality, but would not be the whole meaning of the term. From the -fact that a thing was real we should be able to infer, by the law of -contradiction, that it was experienced; since the latter would be -_part_ of what is meant by the former. But, on the other hand, from the -fact a thing was experienced we should _not_ be able to infer that it -was real; since it would not follow from the fact that it had one of -the attributes essential to reality, that it _also_ had the other or -others. Now, if we understand _esse_ is _percipi_ in this second sense, -we must distinguish _three_ different things which it asserts. First of -all, it gives a definition of the word 'reality,' asserting that word -stands for a complex whole, of which what is meant by 'percipi' forms -a part. And secondly it asserts that 'being experienced' forms a part -of a certain whole. Both these propositions may be true, and at all -events I do not wish to dispute them. I do not, indeed, think that the -word 'reality' is commonly used to include 'percipi': but I do not wish -to argue about the meaning of words. And that many things which are -experienced are also something else--that to be experienced forms part -of certain wholes, is, of course, indisputable. But what I wish to -point out is, that neither of these propositions is of any importance, -unless we add to them a _third._ That 'real' is a convenient name for a -union of attributes which _sometimes_ occurs, it could not be worth any -one's while to assert: no inferences of any importance could be drawn -from such an assertion. Our principle could only mean that when a thing -happens to have _percipi_ as well as the other qualities included under -_esse,_ it has _percipi_: and we should never be able to _infer_ that -it was experienced, except from a proposition which already asserted -that it was both experienced and something else. Accordingly, if the -assertion that _percipi_ forms part of the whole meant by reality is -to have any importance, it must mean that the whole is organic, at -least in this sense, that the other constituent or constituents of it -_cannot_ occur without percipi, even if percipi can occur without them. -Let us call these other constituents _x._ The proposition that _esse_ -includes _percipi,_ and that therefore from _esse percipi_ can be -inferred, can only be important if it is meant to assert that _percipi_ -can be inferred from _x._ The only importance of the question whether -the whole _esse_ includes the part _percipi_ rests therefore on the -question whether the part _x_ is necessarily connected with the part -_percipi._ And this is (3) the third possible meaning of the assertion -_esse is percipi:_ and, as we now see, the only important one. _Esse_ -is _percipi_ asserts that wherever you have _x_ you also have _percipi_ -that whatever has the property _x_ also has the property that it is -_experienced._ And this being so, it will be convenient if, for the -future, I may be allowed to use the term '_esse_' to denote _x alone._ -I do not wish thereby to beg the question whether what we commonly mean -by the word 'real' does or does not include _percipi_ as well as _x._ I -am quite content that my definition of 'esse' to denote _x_, should be -regarded merely as an arbitrary verbal definition. Whether it is so or -not, the only question of interest is whether from _x percipi_ can be -inferred, and I should prefer to be able to express this in the form: -can _percipi_ be inferred from _esse?_ Only let it be understood that -when I say _esse,_ that term will not for the future _include percipi_: -it denotes only that _x,_ which Idealists, perhaps rightly, include -_along with percipi_ under _their_ term _esse._ That there is such an -_x_ they must admit on pain of making the proposition an _absolute_ -tautology; and that from this _x percipi_ can be inferred they must -admit, on pain of making it a perfectly barren analytic proposition. -Whether _x_ done should or should not be called _esse_ is not worth -a dispute: what is worth dispute is whether _percipi_ is necessarily -connected with _x._ - -We have therefore discovered the ambiguity of the copula in _esse_ is -_percipi,_ so far as to see that this principle asserts two distinct -terms to be so related, that whatever has the _one,_ which I call -_esse,_ has _also_ the property that it is experienced. It asserts a -necessary connexion between _esse_ on the one hand and _percipi_ on -the other; these two words denoting each a distinct term, and _esse_ -denoting a term in which that denoted by _percipi_ is not included. We -have, then in _esse_ is _percipi,_ a _necessary synthetic_ proposition -which I have undertaken to refute. And I may say at once that, -understood as such, it cannot be refuted. If the Idealist chooses to -assert that it is merely a self-evident truth, I have only to say that -it does not appear to me to be so. But I believe that no Idealist ever -has maintained it to be so. Although this--that two distinct terms are -necessarily related--is the only sense which 'esse is percipi' can have -if it is to be true and important, it _can_ have another sense, if it -is to be an important falsehood. I believe that Idealists all hold this -important falsehood. They do not perceive that _Esse_ is _percipi_ -must, if true, be _merely_ a self-evident synthetic truth: they either -identify with it or give as a reason for it another proposition which -must be false because it is self-contradictory. Unless they did so, -they would have to admit that it was a perfectly unfounded assumption; -and if they recognised that it was _unfounded,_ I do not think they -would maintain its truth to be evident. _Esse_ is _percipi,_ in the -sense I have found for it, _may_ indeed be true; I cannot, refute it: -but if this sense were clearly apprehended, no one, I think, would -_believe_ that it was true. - -Idealists, we have seen, must assert that whatever is experienced, -is _necessarily_ so. And this doctrine they commonly express by -saying that 'the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the -subject.' I have hitherto been concerned with pointing out what meaning -this assertion must have, if it is to be an important truth. I now -propose to show that it may have an important meaning, which must be -false, because it is self-contradictory. - -It is a well-known fact in the history of philosophy that _necessary_ -truths in general, but especially those of which it is said that -the opposite is inconceivable, have been commonly supposed to be -_analytic,_ in the sense that the proposition denying them was -self-contradictory. It was in this way, commonly supposed, before Kant, -that many truths could be proved by the law of contradiction alone. -This is, therefore, a mistake which it is plainly easy for the best -philosophers to make. Even since Kant many have continued to assert -it; but I am aware that among those Idealists, who most properly -deserve the name, it has become more fashionable to assert that truths -are _both_ analytic and synthetic. Now with many of their reasons -for asserting this I am not concerned: it is possible that in some -connexions the assertion may bear a useful and true sense. But if we -understand 'analytic' in the sense just defined, namely, what is proved -by the law of contradiction _alone_, it is plain that, if 'synthetic' -means what is _not_ proved by this alone, no truth can be both analytic -and synthetic. Now it seems to me that those who do maintain truths to -be both, do nevertheless maintain that they are so in this as well as -in other senses. It is, indeed, extremely unlikely that so essential -a part of the historical meaning of 'analytic' and 'synthetic' should -have been entirely discarded, especially since we find no express -recognition that it is discarded. In that case it is fair to suppose -that modern Idealists have been influenced by the view that certain -truths can be proved by the law of contradiction alone. I admit they -also expressly declare that they can _not:_ but this is by no means -sufficient to prove that they do not also think they are; since it is -very easy to hold two mutually contradictory opinions. What I suggest -then is that Idealists hold the particular doctrine in question, -concerning the relation of subject and object in experience, because -they think it is an analytic truth in this restricted sense that it is -proved by the law of contradiction alone. - -I am suggesting that the Idealist maintains that object and subject are -necessarily connected, mainly because he fails to see that they are -_distinct_, that they are _two,_ at all. When he thinks of 'yellow' -and when he thinks of the 'sensation of yellow,' he fails to see that -there is anything whatever in the latter which is not in the former. -This being so, to deny that yellow can ever _be_ apart from the -sensation of yellow is merely to deny that yellow can ever be other -than it is; since yellow and the sensation of yellow are absolutely -identical. To assert that yellow is necessarily an object of experience -is to assert that yellow is necessarily yellow--a purely identical -proposition, and therefore proved by the law of contradiction alone. -Of course, the proposition also implies that experience is, after all, -something distinct from yellow--else there would be no reason for -insisting that yellow is a sensation: and that the argument thus both -affirms and denies that yellow and sensation of yellow are distinct, -is what sufficiently refutes it. But this contradiction can easily -be overlooked, because though we are convinced, in other connexions, -that 'experience' does mean something and something most important, -yet we are never distinctly aware _what_ it means, and thus in every -particular case we do not notice its presence. The facts present -themselves as a kind of antinomy: - -(1) Experience _is_ something unique and different from anything else; -(2) Experience of green is entirely indistinguishable from green; two -propositions which cannot both be true. Idealists, holding both, can -only take refuge in arguing from the one in some connexions and from -the other in others. - -But I am well aware that there are many Idealists who would repel it -as an utterly unfounded charge that they fail to distinguish between -a sensation or idea and what I will call its object. And there are, I -admit, many who not only imply, as we all do, that green is distinct -from the sensation of green, but expressly insist upon the distinction -as an important part of their system. They would perhaps only assert -that the two form an inseparable unity. But I wish to point out that -many, who use this phrase, and who do admit the distinction, are not -thereby absolved from the charge that they deny it. For there is a -certain doctrine, very prevalent among philosophers nowadays, which by -a very simple reduction may be seen to assert that two distinct things -both are and are not distinct. A distinction is asserted; but it is -_also_ asserted that the things distinguished form an 'organic unity,' -But, forming such a unity, it is held, each would not be what it is -_apart from its relation to the other._ Hence to consider either by -itself is to make an _illegitimate abstraction._ The recognition that -there are 'organic unities' and 'illegitimate abstractions' in this -sense is regarded as one of the chief conquests of modern philosophy. -But what is the sense attached to these terms? An abstraction is -illegitimate, when and only when we attempt to assert of _a part_--of -something abstracted--that which is true only of the _whole_ to which -it belongs: and it may perhaps be useful to point out that this should -not be done. But the application actually made of this principle, -and what perhaps would be expressly acknowledged as its meaning, is -something much the reverse of useful. The principle is used to assert -that certain abstractions are _in all cases_ illegitimate; that -whenever you try to assert _anything whatever_ of that which is _part_ -of an organic whole, what you assert can only be true of the whole. -And this principle, so far from being a useful truth, is necessarily -false. For if the whole can, nay _must,_ be substituted for the part -in all propositions and for all purposes, this can only be because the -whole is absolutely identical with the part. When, therefore, we are -told that green and the sensation of green are certainly distinct but -yet are not separable, or that it is an illegitimate abstraction to -consider the one apart from the other, what these provisos are used -to assert is, that though the two things are distinct yet you not -only can but must treat them as if they were not. Many philosophers, -therefore, when they admit a distinction, yet (following the lead -of Hegel) boldly assert their right, in a slightly more obscure form -of words, _also_ to deny it. The principle of organic unities, like -that of combined analysis and synthesis, is mainly used to defend the -practice of holding _both_ of two contradictory propositions, wherever -this may seem convenient. In this, as in other matters, Hegel's main -service to philosophy has consisted in giving a name to and erecting -into a principle, a type of fallacy to which experience had shown -philosophers, along with the rest of mankind, to be addicted. No wonder -that he has followers and admirers. - -I have shown then, so far, that when the Idealist asserts the important -principle 'Esse is _percipi'_ he must, if it is to be true, mean by -this that: Whatever is experienced also _must_ be experienced. And -I have also shown that he _may_ identify with, or give as a reason -for, this proposition, one which must be false, because it is self -contradictory. But at this point I propose to make a complete break -in my argument. '_Esse_ is _percipi_,' we have seen, asserts of two -terms, as distinct from one another as 'green' and 'sweet,' that -whatever has the one has also the other: it asserts that 'being' and -'being experienced' are necessarily connected: that whatever _is_ is -_also_ experienced. And this, I admit, cannot be directly refuted. -But I believe it to be false; and I have asserted that anybody who -saw that '_esse_ and _percipi_' _were_ as distinct as 'green' and -'sweet' would be no more ready to believe that whatever _is_ is _also_ -experienced, than to believe that whatever is green is also sweet. I -have asserted that no one would believe that '_esse_ is _percipi_' -if they saw how different _esse_ is from _percipi:_ but _this_ I -shall not try to prove. I have asserted that all who do believe that -'_esse_ is _percipi_' identify with it or take as a reason for it a -self-contradictory proposition: but this I shall not try to prove. I -shall only try to show that certain propositions which I assert to be -believed, are false. That they are believed, and that without this -belief '_esse_ is _percipi'_ would not be believed either, I must leave -without a proof. - -I pass, then, from the uninteresting question 'Is _'esse percipi?'_ to -the still more uninteresting and apparently irrelevant question 'What -is a sensation or idea?' - -We all know that the sensation of blue differs from that of green. But -it is plain that if both are _sensations_ they also have some point in -common. What is it that they have in common? And how is this common -element related to the points in which they differ? - -I will call the common element 'consciousness' without yet attempting -to say what the thing I so call _is._ We have then in every sensation -two distinct terms, (1) 'consciousness,' in respect of which all -sensations are alike; and (2) something else, in respect of which one -sensation differs from another. It will be convenient if I may be -allowed to call this second term the 'object' of a sensation: this also -without yet attempting to say what I mean by the word. - -We have then in every sensation two distinct elements, one which I call -consciousness, and another which I call the object of consciousness. -This must be so if the sensation of blue and the sensation of green, -though different in one respect, are alike in another: blue is one -object of sensation and green is another, and consciousness, which both -sensations have in common, is different from either. - -But, further, sometimes the sensation of blue exists in my mind and -sometimes it does not; and knowing, as we now do, that the sensation of -blue includes two different elements, namely consciousness and blue, -the question arises whether, when the sensation of blue exists, it is -the consciousness which exists, or the blue which exists, or both. -And one point at least is plain: namely that these three alternatives -are all different from one another. So that, if any one tells us that -to say 'Blue exists' is the _same_ thing as to say that 'Both blue -and consciousness exist,' he makes a mistake and a self-contradictory -mistake. - -But another point is also plain, namely, that when the sensation -exists, the consciousness, at least, certainly does exist; for when I -say that the sensations of blue and of green both exist, I certainly -mean that what is common to both and in virtue of which both are -called sensations, exists in each case. The only alternative left, -then, is that _either_ both exist or the consciousness exists alone. -If, therefore, any one tells us that the existence of blue is the same -thing as the existence of the sensation of blue he makes a mistake and -a self-contradictory mistake, for he asserts _either_ that blue is the -same thing as blue together with consciousness, _or_ that it is the -same thing as consciousness alone. - -Accordingly to identify either "blue" or any other of what I have -called "_objects_" of sensation, with the corresponding sensation is -in every case, a self-contradictory error. It is to identify a part -either with the whole of which it is a part or else with the other part -of the same whole. If we are told that the assertion "Blue exists" is -_meaningless_ unless we mean by it that "The sensation of blue exists," -we are told what is certainly false and self-contradictory. If we -are told that the existence of blue is inconceivable apart from the -existence of the sensation, the speaker _probably_ means to convey to -us, by this ambiguous expression, what is a self-contradictory error. -For we can and must conceive the existence of blue as something quite -distinct from the existence of the sensation. We can and must conceive -that blue might exist and yet the sensation of blue not exist. For my -own part I not only conceive this, but conceive it to be true. Either -therefore this terrific assertion of inconceivability means what is -false and self-contradictory or else it means only that _as a matter of -fact_ blue never can exist unless the sensation of it exists also. - -And at this point I need not conceal my opinion that no philosopher -has ever yet succeeded in avoiding this self-contradictory error: that -the most striking results both of Idealism and of Agnosticism are only -obtained by identifying blue with the sensation of blue: that _esse_ -is held to be _percipi,_ solely because _what is experienced_ is held -to be identical with _the experience of it._ That Berkeley and Mill -committed this error will, perhaps, be granted: that modern Idealists -make it will, I hope, appear more probable later. But that my opinion -is plausible, I will now offer two pieces of evidence. The first is -that language offers us no means of referring to such objects as "blue" -and "green" and "sweet," except by calling them sensations: it is an -obvious violation of language to call them "things" or "objects" or -"terms." And similarly we have no natural means of referring to such -objects as "causality" or "likeness" or "identity," except by calling -them "ideas" or "notions" or "conceptions." But it is hardly likely -that if philosophers had clearly distinguished in the past between a -sensation or idea and what I have called its object, there should have -been no separate name for the latter. They have always used the same -name for these two different "things" (if I may call them so): and -hence there is some probability that they have supposed these "things" -_not_ to be two and different, but one and the same. And, secondly, -there is a very good reason why they should have supposed so, in the -fact that when we refer to introspection and try to discover what the -sensation of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before -us only a single term. The term "blue" is easy enough to distinguish, -but the other element which I have called "consciousness"--that which -sensation of blue has in common with sensation of green--is extremely -difficult to fix. That many people fail to distinguish it at all is -sufficiently shown by the fact that there are materialists. And, in -general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to -escape us: it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent--we -look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that -there _is something_ but _what_ it is no philosopher, I think, has yet -clearly recognised. - -But this was a digression. The point I had established so far was -that in every sensation or idea we must distinguish two elements, -(1) the "object," or that in which one differs from another; and (2) -"consciousness," or that which all have in common--that which makes -them sensations or mental facts. This being so, it followed that when -a sensation or idea exists, we have to choose between the alternatives -that either object alone, or consciousness alone, or both, exist; -and I showed that of these alternatives one, namely that the object -only exists, is excluded by the fact that what we mean to assert is -certainly the existence of a mental fact. There remains the question: -Do both exist? Or does the consciousness alone? And to this question -one answer has hitherto been given universally: That both exist. - -This answer follows from the analysis hitherto accepted of the relation -of what I have called "object" to "consciousness" in any sensation or -idea. It is held that what I call the object is merely the "content" of -a sensation or idea. It is held that in each case we can distinguish -two elements and two only, (1) the fact that there is feeling or -experience, and (2) _what_ is felt or experienced; the sensation or -idea, it is said, forms a whole, in which we must distinguish two -"inseparable aspects," "content" and "existence." I shall try to show -that this analysis is false; and for that purpose I must ask what may -seem an extraordinary question: namely what is meant by saying that one -thing is "content" of another? It is not usual to ask this question; -the term is used as if everybody must understand it. But since I am -going to maintain that "blue" is _not_ the content of the sensation of -blue, and what is more important, that, even if it were this analysis -would leave out the most important element in the sensation of blue, it -is necessary that I should try to explain precisely what it is that I -shall deny. - -What then is meant by saying that one thing is the "content" of -another? First of all I wish to point out that "blue" is rightly -and properly said to be part of the content of a blue flower. If, -therefore, we also assert that it is part of the content of the -sensation of blue, we assert that it has to the other parts (if any) -of this whole the same relation which it has to the other parts of -a blue flower--and we assert only this: we cannot mean to assert -that it has to the sensation of blue any relation which it does not -have to the blue flower. And we have seen that the sensation of blue -contains at least one other element beside blue--namely, what I call -"consciousness," which makes it a sensation. So far then as we assert -that blue is the content of the sensation, we assert that it has to -this "consciousness" the same relation which it has to the other parts -of a blue flower: we do assert this, and we assert no more than this. -Into the question what exactly the relation is between blue and a blue -flower in virtue of which we call the former part of its "content" I -do not propose to enter. It is sufficient for my purpose to point out -that it is the general relation most commonly meant when we talk of a -thing and its qualities; and that this relation is such that to say the -thing exists implies that the qualities also exist. The _content_ of -the thing is _what_ we assert to exist, when we assert _that_ the thing -exists. - -When, therefore, blue is said to be part of the content of the -"sensation of blue," the latter is treated as if it were a whole -constituted in exactly the same way as any other "thing." The -"sensation of blue," on this view, differs from a blue bead or a blue -beard, in exactly the same way in which the two latter differ from one -another: the blue bead differs from the blue beard, in that while the -former contains glass, the latter contains hair; and the "sensation -of blue" differs from both in that, instead of glass or hair, it -contains consciousness. The relation of the blue to the consciousness -is conceived to be exactly the same as that of the blue to the glass or -hair: it is in all three cases the _quality_ of a _thing._ - -But I said just now that the sensation of blue was analysed into -"content" and "existence," and that blue was said to be _the_ content -of the idea of blue. There is an ambiguity in this and a possible -error, which I must note in passing. The term "content" may be used -in two senses. If we use "content" as equivalent to what Mr. Bradley -calls the "_what_"--if we mean by it the _whole_ of what is said to -exist, when the thing is said to exist, then blue is certainly not -_the_ content of the sensation of blue: part of the _content_ of the -sensation is, in this sense of the term, that other element which I -have called consciousness. The analysis of this sensation into the -"content" "blue," on the one hand, and mere existence on the other, is -therefore certainly false; in it we have again the self-contradictory -identification of "Blue exists" with "The sensation of blue exists," -But there is another sense in which "blue" might properly be said to be -_the_ content of the sensation--namely, the sense in which "content," -like _εἴδος_ is opposed to "substance" or "matter." For the element -"consciousness," being common to all sensations, may be and certainly -is regarded as in some sense their "substance," and by the "content" -of each is only meant that in respect of which one differs from -another. In this sense then "blue" might be said to be _the_ content -of the sensation; but, in that case, the analysis into "content" and -"existence" is, at least, misleading, since under "existence" must be -included "_what_ exists" in the sensation other than blue. - -We have it, then, as a universally received opinion that blue is -related to the sensation or idea of blue, as its _content_, and -that this view, if it is to be true, must mean that blue is part of -_what_ is said to exist when we say that the sensation exists. To say -that the sensation exists is to say both that blue exists and that -"consciousness," whether we call it the substance of which blue is -_the_ content or call it another part of the content, exists too. Any -sensation or idea is a "_thing,_" and what I have called its object is -the quality of this thing. Such a "thing" is what we think of when we -think of a _mental image._ A mental image is conceived as if it were -related to that of which it is the image (if there be any such thing) -in exactly the same way as the image in a looking-glass is related to -that of which it is the reflection; in both cases there is identity -of content, and the image in the looking-glass differs from that -in the mind solely in respect of the fact that in the one case the -other constituent of the image is "glass" and in the other case it is -consciousness. If the image is of blue, it is not conceived that this -"content" has any relation to the consciousness but what it has to the -glass: it Is conceived _merely_ to be its _content._ And owing to the -fact that sensations and ideas are all considered to be _wholes_ of -this description--things in the mind--the question: What do we know? -is considered to be identical with the question: What reason have we -for supposing that there are things outside the mind _corresponding_ to -these that are inside it? - -What I wish to point out is (1) that we have no reason for supposing -that there are such things as mental images at all--for supposing that -blue _is_ part of the content of the sensation of blue, and (2) that -even if there are mental images, no mental image and no sensation or -idea is _merely_ a thing of this kind: that 'blue,' even if it is -part of the content of the image or sensation or idea of blue, is -always _also_ related to it in quite another way, and that this other -relation, omitted in the traditional analysis, is the _only_ one which -makes the sensation of blue a mental fact at all. - -The true analysis of a sensation or idea is as follows. The element -that is common to them all, and which I have called "consciousness," -really _is_ consciousness. A sensation is, in reality, a case of -'knowing' or 'being aware of' or 'experiencing' something. When we -know that the sensation of blue exists, the fact we know is that -there exists an awareness of blue. And this awareness is not merely, -as we have hitherto seen it must be, itself something distinct and -unique, utterly different from blue: it also has a perfectly distinct -and unique relation to blue, a relation which is _not_ that of thing -or substance to content, nor of one part of content to another part -of content. This relation is just that which we mean in every case -by 'knowing.' To have in your mind 'knowledge' of blue, is _not_ to -have in your mind a 'thing' or 'image' of which blue is the content. -To be aware of the sensation of blue is _not_ to be aware of a -mental image--of a "thing," of which 'blue' and some other element -are constituent parts in the same sense in which blue and glass are -constituents of a blue bead. It is to be aware of an awareness of -blue; awareness being used, in both cases, in exactly the same sense. -This element, we have seen, is certainly neglected by the 'content' -theory: that theory entirely fails to express the fact that there is, -in the sensation of blue, this unique relation between blue and the -other constituent. And what I contend is that this omission is _not_ -mere negligence of expression, but is due to the fact that though -philosophers have recognised that _something_ distinct is meant by -consciousness, they have never yet had a clear conception of _what_ -that something is. They have not been able to hold _it_ and _blue_ -before their minds and to compare them, in the same way in which they -can compare _blue_ and _green._ And this for the reason I gave above: -namely that the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness -and to see _what_, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as -if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the -sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is -as if it were diaphanous. Yet it _can_ be distinguished if we look -attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for. -My main object in this paragraph has been to try to make the reader -_see_ it; but I fear I shall have succeeded very ill. - -It being the case, then, that the sensation of blue includes in its -analysis, beside blue, _both_ a unique element 'awareness' _and_ a -unique relation of this element to blue, I can make plain what I meant -by asserting, as two distinct propositions, (1) that blue is probably -not part of the content of the sensation at all, and (2) that, even it -were, the sensation would nevertheless not be the sensation _of_ blue, -if blue had only this relation to it. The first hypothesis may now be -expressed by saying that, if it were true, then, when the sensation of -blue exists, there exists a _blue awareness_: offence may be taken at -the expression, but yet it expresses just what should be and is meant -by saying that blue is, in this case, a _content_ of consciousness -or experience. Whether or not, when I have the sensation of blue, my -consciousness or awareness is thus blue, my introspection does not -enable me to decide with certainty: I only see no reason for thinking -that it is. But whether it is or not, the point is unimportant, for -introspection _does_ enable me to decide that something else is also -true: namely that I am aware _of_ blue, and by this I mean, that my -awareness has to blue a quite different and distinct relation. It is -possible, I admit, that my awareness is blue _as well_ as being _of_ -blue: but what I am quite sure of is that it is _of_ blue; that it has -to blue the simple and unique relation the existence of which alone -justifies us in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the thing -known, indeed in distinguishing mind from matter. And this result I may -express by saying that what is called the _content_ of a sensation is -in very truth what I originally called it--the sensation's _object._ - -But, if all this be true, what follows? - -Idealists admit that some things really exist of which they are not -aware: there are some things, they hold, which are not inseparable -aspects of _their_ experience, even if they be inseparable aspects of -some experience. They further hold that some of the things of which -they are sometimes aware do really exist, even when they are not aware -of them: they hold for instance that they are sometimes aware of other -minds, which continue to exist even when they are not aware of them. -They are, therefore, sometimes aware of something which is _not_ an -inseparable aspect of their own experience. They do _know some_ things -which are _not_ a mere part or content of their experience. And what -my analysis of sensation has been designed to show is, that whenever -I have a mere sensation or idea, the fact is that I am then aware of -something which is equally and in the same sense _not_ an inseparable -aspect of my experience. The awareness which I have maintained to be -included in sensation is the very same unique fact which constitutes -every kind of knowledge: "blue" is as much an object, and as little -a mere content, of my experience, when I experience it, as the most -exalted and independent real thing of which I am ever aware. There is, -therefore, no question of how we are to "get outside the circle of our -own ideas and sensations." Merely to have a sensation is already to -_be_ outside that circle. It is to know something which is as truly and -really _not_ a part of _my_ experience, as anything which I can ever -know. - -Now I think I am not mistaken in asserting that the reason why -Idealists suppose that everything which _is_ must be an inseparable -aspect of some experience, is that they suppose some things, at least, -to be inseparable aspects of _their_ experience. And there is certainly -nothing which they are so firmly convinced to be an inseparable aspect -of their experience as what they call the _content_ of their ideas and -sensations. If, therefore, _this_ turns out in every case, whether it -be also the content or not, to be at least _not_ an inseparable aspect -of the experience of it, it will be readily admitted that nothing else -which _we_ experience ever is such an inseparable aspect. But if we -never experience anything but what is _not_ an inseparable aspect of -_that_ experience, how can we infer that anything whatever, let alone -_everything,_ is an inseparable aspect of _any_ experience? How utterly -unfounded is the assumption that "_esse_ is _percipi"_ appears in the -clearest light. - -But further I think it may be seen that if the object of an Idealist's -sensation were, as he supposes, _not_ the object but merely the content -of that sensation, if, that is to say, it really were an inseparable -aspect of his experience, each Idealist could never be aware either of -himself or of any other real thing. For the relation of a sensation -to its object is certainly the same as that of any other instance of -experience to its object; and this, I think, is generally admitted even -by Idealists: they state as readily that _what_ is judged or thought or -perceived is the _content_ of that judgment or thought or perception, -as that blue Is the content of the sensation of blue. But, if so, then -when any Idealist thinks he is _aware_ of himself or of any one else, -this cannot really be the case. The fact Is, on his own theory, that -himself and that other person are in reality mere _contents_ of an -awareness, which is aware _of_ nothing whatever. All that can be said -is that there is an awareness in him, _with_ a certain content: it can -never be true that there is in him a consciousness _of_ anything. And -similarly he is never aware either of the fact that he exists or that -reality is spiritual. The real fact, which he describes in those terms, -is that his existence and the spirituality of reality are _contents_ of -an awareness, which is aware of nothing--certainly not, then, of it own -content. - -And further if everything, of which he thinks he is aware, is in -reality merely a content of his own experience he has certainly no -_reason_ for holding that anything does exist except himself: it will, -of course, be possible that other persons do exist; solipsism will not -be necessarily true; but he cannot possibly infer from anything he -holds that it is not true. That he himself exists will of course follow -from his premiss that many things are contents of _his_ experience. -But since everything, of which he thinks himself aware, is in reality -merely an inseparable aspect of that awareness; this premiss allows no -inference that any of these contents, far less any other consciousness, -exists at all except as an inseparable aspect of his awareness, that -is, as part of himself. - -Such, and not those which he takes to follow from it, are the -consequences which _do_ follow from the Idealist's supposition that the -object of an experience is in reality merely a content or inseparable -aspect of that experience. If, on the other hand, we clearly recognise -the nature of that peculiar relation which I have called "awareness of -anything"; if we see that _this_ is involved equally in the analysis -of _every_ experience--from the merest sensation to the most developed -perception or reflexion, and that _this_ is in fact the only essential -element in an experience--the only thing that is both common and -peculiar to all experiences--the only thing which gives us reason to -call any fact mental; if, further, we recognise that this awareness is -and must be in all cases of such a nature that its object, when we are -aware of it, is precisely what it would be, if we were not aware: then -it becomes plain that the existence of a table in space is related to -my experience of _it_ in precisely the same way as the existence of -my own experience is related to my experience of _that._ Of both we -are merely aware: if we are aware that the one exists, we are aware -in precisely the same sense that the other exists; and if it is true -that my experience can exist, even when I do not happen to be aware of -its existence, we have exactly the same reason for supposing that the -table can do so also. When, therefore, Berkeley, supposed that the only -thing of which I am directly aware is my own sensations and ideas, he -supposed what was false; and when Kant supposed that the objectivity of -things in space _consisted_ in the fact that they were "Vorstellungen" -having to one another different relations from those which the -same "Vorstellungen" have to one another in subjective experience, -he supposed what was equally false. I am as directly aware of the -existence of material things in space as of my own sensations; and -_what_ I am aware of with regard to each is exactly the same--namely -that in one case the material thing, and in the other case my sensation -does really exist. The question requiring to be asked about material -things is thus not: What reason have we for supposing that anything -exists _corresponding_ to our sensations? but: What reason have we for -supposing that material things do _not_ exist, since _their_ existence -has precisely the same evidence as that of our sensations? That either -exist _may_ be false; but if it is a reason for doubting the existence -of matter, that it is an inseparable aspect of our experience, the same -reasoning will prove conclusively that our experience does not exist -either, since that must also be an inseparable aspect of our experience -of _it._ The only _reasonable_ alternative to the admission that matter -exists _as well as_ spirit, is absolute Scepticism--that, as likely as -not _nothing_ exists at all. All other suppositions--the Agnostic's, -that something, at all events, does exist, as much as the Idealist's, -that spirit does--are, if we have no reason for believing in matter, as -baseless as the grossest superstitions. - - -[1] _International Journal of Ethics,_ October, 1902. - - - - -THE NATURE AND REALITY OF OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION - - -There are two beliefs in which almost all philosophers, and almost all -ordinary people are agreed. Almost everyone believes that he himself -and what he directly perceives do not constitute the whole of reality: -he believes that _something_ other than himself and what he directly -perceives _exists_ or is _real._ I do not mean to say that almost -everyone believes that what he directly perceives is real: I only mean -that he does believe that, whether what he directly perceives is real -or not, something other than it and other than himself certainly is so. -And not only does each of us thus agree in believing that _something_ -other than himself and what he directly perceives is real: almost -everyone also believes that _among_ the real things, other than himself -and what he directly perceives, are other persons who have thoughts -and perceptions in some respects similar to his own. That most people -believe this I think I need scarcely try to show. But since a good many -philosophers may appear to have held views contradictory of this one, I -will briefly point out my reason for asserting that most philosophers, -even among those (if any) who have believed the contradictory of this, -have yet held this as well. Almost all philosophers tell us something -about the nature of _human_ knowledge and _human_ perception. They tell -us that _we_ perceive so and so; that the nature or origin of _our_ -perceptions is such and such; or (as I have just been telling you) that -men in general have such and such beliefs. It might, indeed, be said -that we are not to interpret such language too strictly: that, though -a philosopher talks about _human_ knowledge and _our_ perceptions, -he only means to talk about his own. But in many cases a philosopher -will leave no doubt upon this point, by expressly assuming that there -are other perceptions, which differ in some respects from his own: -such, for instance, is the case when (as is so common nowadays) a -philosopher introduces psycho-genetic considerations into his arguments ---considerations concerning the nature of the perceptions of men who -existed before and at a much lower stage of culture than himself. -Any philosopher, who uses such arguments, obviously assumes that -perceptions other than his own have existed or been real. And even -those philosophers who think themselves justified in the conclusion -that neither their own perceptions nor any perceptions like theirs are -_ultimately_ real, would, I think admit, that _phenomenally_, at least, -they _are_ real, and are certainly _more_ real than some other things. - -Almost everyone, then, does believe that some perceptions other than -his own, and which he himself does not directly perceive, are real; and -believing this, he believes that something other than himself and what -he directly perceives is real. But how do we know that anything exists -except our own perceptions, and what we directly perceive? How do we -know that there are any other people, who have perceptions in some -respects similar to our own? - -I believe that these two questions express very exactly the nature of -the problem which it is my chief object, in this paper, to discuss. -When I say these words to you, they will at once suggest to your minds -the very question, to which I desire to find an answer; they will -convey to you the very same meaning which I have before my mind, when I -use the words. You will understand at once what question it is that I -mean to ask. But, for all that, the words which I have used are highly -ambiguous. If you begin to ask yourselves what I do mean by them, you -will find that there are several quite different things which I might -mean. And there is, I think, great danger of confusing these different -meanings with one another. I think that philosophers, when they have -asked this question in one sense, have often answered it in quite a -different sense; and yet have supposed that the answer which they have -given is an answer to the very same question which they originally -asked. It is precisely because there is this ambiguity--this danger of -confusion, in the words which I have used, that I have chosen to use -them. I wish to point out as clearly as I can, not only what I do mean -by them, but also some things which I do _not_ mean; and I wish to make -it clear that the questions which I do _not_ mean to ask, are different -questions from that which I do mean to ask. - -I will take the second of my two questions, since there is in the other -an additional ambiguity to which I do not now wish to call attention. -My second question was: How do we know that there exist any other -people who have perceptions in some respects similar to our own? What -does this question mean? - -Now I think you may have noticed that when you make a statement to -another person, and he answers "How do you know that that is so?" he -very often means to suggest that you do _not_ know it. And yet, though -he means to suggest that you do not _know_ it, he may not for a moment -wish to suggest that you do not _believe_ it, nor even that you have -not that degree or kind of conviction, which goes beyond mere belief, -and which may be taken to be essential to anything which can properly -be called knowledge. He does not mean to suggest for a moment that you -are saying something which you do not believe to be true, or even that -you are not thoroughly convinced of its truth. What he does mean to -suggest is that what you asserted was not _true_, even though you may -not only have believed it but felt sure that it was true. He suggests -that you don't _know_ it, in the sense that what you believe or feel -sure of is not true. - -Now I point this out, not because I myself mean to suggest that we -don't know the existence of other persons, but merely in order to show -that the word "know" is sometimes used in a sense in which it is not -merely equivalent to "believe" or "feel sure of." When the question -"How do you _know_ that?" is asked, the questioner does not merely -mean to ask "how do you come to believe that, or to be convinced of -it?" He sometimes, and I think generally, means to ask a question with -regard to the _truth_, and not with regard to the _existence_ of your -belief. And similarly when I ask the question "How do we know that -other people exist?" I do _not_ mean to ask "How do we come to believe -in or be convinced of their existence?" I do not intend to discuss this -question _at all._ I shall not ask what _suggests_ to us our belief in -the existence of other persons or of an external world; I shall not -ask whether we arrive at it by inference or by "instinct" or in any -other manner, which ever has been or may be suggested: I shall discuss -no question of any kind whatever with regard to its origin, or cause, -or the way in which it arises. These psychological questions are _not_ -what I propose to discuss. When I ask the question "How do we know that -other people exist?" I do _not_ mean: - -"How does our belief in their existence arise?" - -But if I do not mean this what do I mean P I have said that I mean -to ask a question with regard to the _truth_ of that belief; and the -particular question which I mean to ask might be expressed in the -words: _What reason have_ we for our belief in the existence of other -persons? But these are words which themselves need some explanation, -and I will try to give it. - -In the first place, then, when I talk of "a reason," I mean _only_ -a good reason and _not_ a bad one. A bad reason is, no doubt, a -reason, in one sense of the word; but I mean to use the word "reason" -exclusively in the sense in which it is equivalent to "good reason." -But what, then, is meant by a good reason for a belief? I think I can -express sufficiently accurately what I mean by it in this connection, -as follows:--A good reason for a belief is a proposition which is -true, and which would not be true unless the belief were also true. We -should, I think, commonly say that when a man knows such a proposition, -he has a good reason for his belief; and, when he knows no such -proposition, we should say that he has no reason for it. When he knows -such a proposition, we should say he knows something which is a reason -for thinking his belief to be true--something from which it _could_ be -validly inferred. And if, in answer to the question "How do you know -so and so?" he were to state such a proposition, we should, I think, -feel that he had answered the question which we meant to ask. Suppose, -for instance, in answer to the question "How do you know that?" he were -to say "I saw it in the _Times."_ Then, if we believed that he had -seen it in the _Times_, and also believed that it would not have been -in the _Times_, unless it had been true, we should admit that he had -answered our question. We should no longer doubt that he did _know_ -what he asserted, we should no longer doubt that his belief was true. -But if, on the other hand, we believed that he had not seen it in the -_Times_--if, for instance, we had reason to believe that what he saw -was not the statement which he made, but some other statement which -he mistook for it; or if we believed that the kind of statement in -question was one with regard to which there was no presumption that, -being in the _Times_, it would be true: in _either_ of these cases -we should, I think, feel that he had _not_ answered our question. We -should still doubt whether what he had said was true. We should still -doubt whether he _knew_ what he asserted; and since a man cannot tell -you how he _knows_ a thing unless he does know that thing, we should -think that, though he might have told us truly how he _came to believe -it,_ he had certainly not told us how he _knew_ it. But though we -should thus hold that he had _not_ told us _how he knew_ what he had -asserted, and that he had given us no reason for believing it to be -true; we must yet admit that he had given us a reason in a sense--a -_bad_ reason, a reason which was no reason because it had no tendency -to show that what he believed was true; and we might also be perfectly -convinced that he had given us _the reason_ why he believed it--the -proposition by believing which he was induced also to believe his -original assertion. - -I mean, then, by my question, "How do we know that other people -exist?" what, I believe, is ordinarily meant, namely, "What reason -have we for believing that they exist?" and by this again I mean, what -I also believe is ordinarily meant, namely, "What proposition do we -believe, which is both true itself and is also such that it would not -be true, unless other people existed?" And I hope it is plain that -this question, thus explained, is quite a different question from the -psychological question, which I said I did _not_ mean to ask--from the -question, "How does our belief in the existence of other people arise?" -My illustration, I hope, has made this plain. For I have pointed out -that we may quite well hold that a man has told us how a belief of -his arises, and even what was the reason which made him adopt that -belief, and yet may have failed to give us any _good reason_ for his -belief--any proposition which is both true itself, and also such that -the truth of his belief follows from it. And, indeed, it is plain that -if any one ever believes what is false, he is believing something for -which there _is_ no good reason, in the sense which I have explained, -and for which, therefore, he cannot possibly have a good reason; and -yet it plainly does not follow that his belief did not arise in anyway -whatever, nor even that he had no reason for it--no bad reason. It -is plain that false beliefs do arise in some way or other--they have -origins and causes: and many people who hold them _have_ bad reasons -for holding them--their belief does arise (by inference or otherwise) -from their belief in some other proposition, which is not itself true, -or else is not a _good_ reason for holding that, which they infer -from it, or which, in some other way, it induces them to believe. I -submit, therefore, that the question, "What good reason have we for -believing in the existence of other people?" is different from the -question, "How does that belief arise?" But when I say this, I must -not be misunderstood; I must not be understood to affirm that the -answer to both questions _may_ not, in a sense, be the same. I fully -admit that the very same fact, which suggests to us the belief in the -existence of other people, _may_ also be a good reason for believing -that they do exist. All that I maintain is that the question whether -it is a good reason for that belief is a different question from the -question whether it suggests that belief: if we assert that a certain -fact _both_ suggests our belief in the existence of other persons and -is _also_ a good reason for holding that belief, we are asserting two -different things and not one only. And hence, when I assert, as I shall -assert, that we _have_ a good reason for our belief in the existence -of other persons, I must not be understood also to assert either that -we infer the existence of other persons from this good reason, or that -our belief in that good reason suggests our belief in the existence -of other persons in any other way. It is plain, I think, that a man -may believe two true propositions, of which the one would not be true, -unless the other were true too, without, in any sense whatever, having -arrived at his belief in the one _from_ his belief in the other; and it -is plain, at all events, that the question whether his belief in the -one _did_ arise from his belief in the other, is a different question -from the question whether the truth of the one belief follows from the -truth of the other. - -I hope, then, that I have made it a little clearer what I mean by the -question: "What reason have we for believing in the existence of other -people?" and that what I mean by it is at all events different from -what is meant by the question: "How does our belief in the existence of -other people arise?" - -But I am sorry to say that I have not yet reached the end of my -explanations as to what my meaning is. I am afraid that the subject may -seem very tedious. I can assure you that I have found it excessively -tedious to try to make my meaning clear to myself. I have constantly -found that I was confusing one question with another, and that, where -I had thought I had a good reason for some assertion, I had in reality -no good reason. But I may perhaps remind you that this question, "How -do we know so and so?" "What reason have we for believing it?" is one -of which philosophy is full; and one to which the most various answers -have been given. Philosophy largely consists in giving reasons; and the -question what are good reasons for a particular conclusion and what are -bad, is one upon which philosophers have disagreed as much as on any -other question. For one and the same conclusion different philosophers -have given not only different, but incompatible, reasons; and -conversely different philosophers have maintained that one and the same -fact is a reason for incompatible conclusions. We are apt, I think, -sometimes to pay too little attention to this fact. When we have taken, -perhaps, no little pains to assure ourselves that our own reasoning -is correct, and especially when we know that a great many other -philosophers agree with us, we are apt to assume that the arguments -of those philosophers, who have come to a contradictory conclusion, -are scarcely worthy of serious consideration. And yet, I think, there -is scarcely a single reasoned conclusion in philosophy, as to which -we shall not find that some other philosopher, who has, so far as we -know, bestowed equal pains on his reasoning, and with equal ability, -has reached a conclusion incompatible with ours. We may be satisfied -that we are right, and we may, in fact, be so; but it is certain that -_both_ cannot be right: either our opponent or we must have mistaken -bad reasons for good. And this being so, however satisfied we may be -that it is not we who have done so, I think we should at least draw the -conclusion that it is by no means easy to avoid mistaking bad reasons -for good; and that no process, however laborious, which is in the least -likely to help us in avoiding this should be evaded. But it is at least -possible that one source of error lies in mistaking one kind of reason -for another--in supposing that, because there is, in one sense, a -reason for a given conclusion, there is also a reason in another, or -that because there is, in one sense, no reason for a given conclusion, -there is, therefore, no reason at all. I believe myself that this _is_ -a very frequent source of error: but it is at least a possible one. -And where, as disagreements show, there certainly is error on one -side or the other, and reason, too, to suppose that the error is not -easy to detect, I think we should spare no pains in investigating any -source, from which it is even possible that the error may arise. For -these reasons I think I am perhaps doing right in trying to explain as -clearly as possible not only what reasons we have for believing in an -external world, but also in what sense I take them to be reasons. - -I proceed, then with my explanation. And there is one thing, which, I -think my illustration has shown that I do _not_ mean. I have defined -a reason for a belief as a true proposition, which would not be true -unless the belief itself--what is believed--were also true; and I -have used, as synonymous with this form of words, the expressions: A -reason for a belief is a true proposition from which the truth of the -belief _follows_ from which it _could_ be _validly inferred._ Now these -expressions might suggest the idea that I mean to restrict the word -"reason," to what, in the strictest sense, might be called a _logical_ -reason--to propositions from which the belief in question _follows,_ -according to the rules of inference accepted by Formal Logic. But I -am _not_ using the words "follow," "validly inferred," in this narrow -sense; I do _not_ mean to restrict the words "reason for a belief" -to propositions from which the laws of Formal Logic state that the -belief could be deduced. The illustration which I gave is inconsistent -with this restricted meaning. I said that the fact that a statement -appeared in the _Times_ might be a good reason for believing that -that statement was true. And I am using the word "reason" in the wide -and popular sense, in which it really might be. If, for instance, -the _Times_ stated that the King was dead, we should think that was -a good reason for believing that the King was dead; we should think -that the _Times_ would not have made such a statement as that unless -the King really were dead. We should, indeed, not think that the -statement in the _Times_ rendered it absolutely _certain_ that the -King was dead. But it _is_ extremely unlikely that the _Times_ would -make a statement of this kind unless it were true; and, in that sense, -the fact of the statement appearing in the _Times_ would render it -_highly probable_--much more likely than not--that the King was dead. -And I wish it to be understood that I am using the words "reason for -a belief" in this extremely wide sense. When I look for a good reason -for our belief in the existence of other people, I shall not reject any -proposition merely on the ground that it only renders their existence -probable--only shows it to be more likely than not that they exist. -Provided that the proposition in question does render it _positively -probable_ that they exist, then, if it also conforms to the conditions -which I am about to mention, I shall call it a "good reason." - -But it is not every proposition which renders it probable that -other people exist, which I shall consider to be a good answer to -my question. I have just explained that my meaning is wide in one -direction--in admitting _some_ propositions which render a belief -merely probable; but I have now to explain that it is restricted in -two other directions. I do mean to exclude certain propositions which -do render that belief probable. When I ask: What reason have _we_ for -believing in the existence of other people? a certain ambiguity is -introduced by the use of the plural "we." If each of several different -persons has a reason for believing that he himself exists, then it is -not merely probable, but certain, according to the rules of Formal -Logic, that, in a sense, _they_ "have a reason for believing" that -several people exist; each has a reason for believing that he himself -exists; and, therefore, all of them, taken together, have reasons for -supposing that several persons exist. If, therefore, I were asking -the question: What reason have _we_ for believing in the existence -of other persons? in this sense, it would follow that if each of us -has a reason for believing in his own existence, these reasons, taken -together, would be a reason for believing in the existence of all of -us. But I am not asking the question in this sense: it is plain that -this is not its natural sense. What I do mean to ask is: Does _each -single one_ of us know any proposition, which is a reason for believing -that _others_ exist? I am using "we," that is to say, in the sense -of "each of us." But again I do mean _each_ of us: I am not merely -asking whether some _one_ man knows a proposition which is a reason -for believing that other men exist. It would be possible that some -one man, or some few men, should know such a proposition, and yet the -rest know no such proposition. But I am not asking whether this is the -case. I am asking whether among propositions of the kind which (as we -commonly suppose) all or almost all men know, there is any which is a -reason for supposing that other men exist. And in asking this question -I am not begging the question by supposing that all men do exist. My -question might, I think, be put quite accurately as follows. There are -certain kinds of belief which, as we commonly suppose, all or almost -all men share. I describe this kind of belief as "our" beliefs, simply -as an easy way of pointing out which kind of belief I mean, but without -assuming that all men do share them. And I then ask: Supposing a -single man to have beliefs of this kind, which among them would be a -good reason for supposing that other men existed having like beliefs? - -This, then, is the first restriction which I put upon the meaning -of my question. And it is, I think, a restriction which, in their -natural meaning, the words suggest. When we ask: What reason have -we for believing that other people exist? we naturally understand -that question to be equivalent to: What reason has _each_ of us for -that belief? And this question again is naturally equivalent to the -question: Which among the propositions that a single man believes, but -which are of the kind which (rightly or wrongly) we assume all men to -believe, are such that they would not be true unless some other person -than that man existed? But there is another restriction which, I think, -the words of my question also naturally suggest. If we were to ask -anyone the question: How do you know that you did see that statement -in the _Times_? and he were to answer "Because I did see it in the -_Times_ and in the _Standard_ too," we should not think that he had -given us a _reason_ for the belief that he saw it in the _Times._ We -should not think his answer a _reason_, because it asserts the very -thing for which we require a reason. And similarly when I ask: How -do we know that any thing or person exists, other than ourselves and -what we directly perceive? What reason have we for believing this? I -must naturally be understood to mean: What proposition, _other_ than -one which itself asserts or presupposes the existence of something -beyond ourselves and our own perceptions, is a reason for supposing -that such a thing exists? And this restriction obviously excludes an -immense number of propositions of a kind which all of us do believe. We -all of us believe an immense number of different propositions about -the existence of things which we do not directly perceive, and many -of these propositions are, in my sense, good reasons for believing in -the existence of still other things. The belief in the existence of a -statement in the _Times,_ when we have not seen that statement, may, -as I implied, be a good reason for believing that someone is dead. But -no such proposition can be a good answer to my question, because it -asserts the very kind of thing for which I require a reason: it asserts -the existence of something other than myself and what I directly -perceive. When I am asking: What reason have I for believing in the -existence of anything but myself, my own perceptions, and what I do -directly perceive? you would naturally understand me to mean: What -reason, _other than_ the existence of such a thing, have I for this -belief? - -Each of us, then, we commonly assume, believes some true propositions, -which do not themselves assert the existence of anything other than -himself, his own perceptions, or what he directly perceives. Each of -us, for instance, believes that he himself has and has had certain -particular perceptions: and these propositions are propositions of -the kind I mean--propositions which do not themselves assert the -existence of anything _other than_ himself, his own perceptions, -and what he directly perceives: they are, I think, by no means the -only propositions of this kind, which most of us believe: but they -_are_ propositions of this kind. But, as I say, I am not assuming -that each of us--each of several different people--does believe -propositions of this kind. All that I assume is that at least one man -does believe some such propositions. And then I ask: Which among those -true propositions, which one man believes, are such that they would -probably not be true, unless some other man existed and had certain -particular perceptions? Which among them are such that it _follows_ -(in the wide sense, which I have explained) from their truth, that it -is more likely than not that some other man has perceptions? This is -the meaning of my question, so far as I have hitherto explained it: -and I hope this meaning is quite clear. It is in this sense that I am -asking: What reason have we for believing that other people exist? How -do we know that they exist? This, indeed, is not _all_ that I mean by -that question: there is one other point--the most important one--which -remains to be explained. But this is _part_ of what I mean to ask; and -before I go on to explain what else I mean, I wish first to stop and -enquire what is the answer to this part of my question. What is the -answer to the question: Which among the true propositions, of a kind -which (as we commonly assume) each of us believes, and which do not -themselves assert the existence of anything other than that person -himself, his own perceptions, or what he directly perceives, are such -that they would probably not be true unless some other person existed, -who had perceptions in some respects similar to his own? - -Now to this question the answer is very obvious. It is very obvious -that in this sense we have reasons for believing in the existence of -other persons, and also what some of those reasons are. But I wish -to make it quite plain that this is so: that in this sense one man -_has_ a reason for believing that another has certain perceptions. All -that I am asking you to grant, is, you see, that some of you would -not be having just those perceptions which you now have, unless I, -as I read this paper, were perceiving more or less black marks on a -more or less white ground; or that I on the other hand, should not -be having just those perceptions which I now have, unless some other -persons than myself were hearing the sounds of my voice. And I am -not asking you even to grant that this is certain--only that it is -positively probable--more likely than not. Surely it is very obvious -that this proposition is true. But I wish to make it quite clear -what would be the consequences of denying that any such propositions -are true--propositions which assert that the existence of certain -perceptions in one man are a reason for believing in the existence of -certain perceptions in another man--which assert that one man would -probably not have had just those perceptions which he did have, unless -some other man had had certain particular perceptions. It is plain, I -think, that, unless some such propositions are true, we have no more -reason for supposing that Alexander the Great ever saw an elephant, -than for supposing that Sindbad the Sailor saw a Roc; we have no more -reason for supposing that anybody saw Julius Caesar murdered in the -Senate House at Rome, than for supposing that somebody saw him carried -up to Heaven in a fiery chariot. It is plain, I think, that if we have -any reason at all for supposing that in all probability Alexander the -Great did see an elephant, and that in all probability no such person -as Sindbad the Sailor ever saw a Roc, part of that reason consists -in the assumption that some other person would probably not have had -just those perceptions which he did have, unless Alexander the Great -had seen an elephant, and unless Sindbad the Sailor had not seen a -Roc. And most philosophers, I think, are willing to admit that we have -some reason, in some sense or other, for such propositions as these. -They are willing to admit not only that some persons probably did see -Julius Caesar murdered in the Senate House; but also that some persons, -other than those who saw it, had and have _some reason_ for supposing -that some one else probably saw it. Some sceptical philosophers might, -indeed, deny both propositions; and to refute their views, I admit, -other arguments are needed than any which I shall bring forward in this -paper. But most philosophers will, I think, admit not only that facts, -for which there is, as we say, good historical evidence, are probably -true; but also that what we call good historical evidence really is -in some sense a good reason for thinking them true. Accordingly I am -going to assume that many propositions of the following kind are true. -Propositions, namely, which assert that one man would probably not -have certain perceptions which he does have, unless some other man had -certain particular perceptions. That some of you, for instance, would -probably not be having precisely the perceptions which you are having, -unless I were having the perception of more or less black marks on a -more or less white ground. And, in this sense, I say, we certainly have -reasons for supposing that other people have perceptions similar, in -some respects, to those which we sometimes have. - -But when I said I was going to ask the question: What reason have we -for supposing that other people exist? you will certainly not have -thought that I merely meant to ask the question which I have just -answered. My words will have suggested to you something much more -important than merely this. When, for instance, I said that to the -question "How do you know that?" the answer "I saw it in the _Times"_ -would be a satisfactory answer, you may have felt, as I felt, that it -would not in all circumstances be regarded as such. The person who -asked the question might, in some cases, fairly reply: "That is no -answer: how do you know that, because you saw a thing in the _Times_, -it is therefore true?" In other words he might ask fora _reason_ for -supposing that the occurrence of a particular statement in the _Times_ -was a reason for supposing that statement true. And this is a question -to which we all believe that there may be an answer. We believe that, -with some kinds of statements which the _Times_ makes--some kinds of -statements with regard to Fiscal Policy for example--the fact that -the _Times_ makes them is no reason for supposing them to be true: -whereas with regard to other kinds of statements, which it makes, such -a statement, for instance, as that the King was dead, the fact that it -makes them _is_ a reason for supposing them true. We believe that there -are some kinds of statements, which it is very unlikely the _Times_ -would make, unless they were true; and others which it is not at all -unlikely that the _Times_ might make, although they were not true. And -we believe that a reason might be given for distinguishing, in this -way, between the two different kinds of statement: for thinking that, -in some cases (on points, for instance, which, as we should say, are -not simple questions of fact) the _Times_ is fallible, whereas in other -cases, it is, though not absolutely infallible, very unlikely to state -what is not true. - -Now it is precisely in this further sense that I wish to consider: what -reason have we for believing that certain particular things, other -than ourselves, our own perceptions, and what we directly perceive, -are real? I have asserted that I do have certain perceptions, which it -is very unlikely I should have, unless some other person had certain -particular perceptions; that, for instance, it is very unlikely I -should be having precisely those perceptions which I am now having -unless someone else were hearing the sound of my voice. And I now -wish to ask: What reason have I for supposing that this is unlikely? -What reason has any of us for supposing that any such proposition is -true? And I mean by "having a reason" precisely what I formerly meant. -I mean: What other proposition do I know, which would not be true, -unless my perception were connected with someone else's perception, in -the manner in which I asserted them to be connected? Here again I am -asking for _a good reason_; and am not asking a psychological question -with regard to origin. Here again I am not asking for a reason, in the -strict sense of Formal Logic; I am merely asking for a proposition -which would probably not be true, unless what I asserted were true. -Here again I am asking for some proposition of a kind which _each_ of -us believes; I am asking: What reason has _each_ of us for believing -that some of his perceptions are connected with particular perceptions -of other people in the manner I asserted?--for believing that he would -not have certain perceptions that he does have, unless some other -person had certain particular perceptions? And here again I am asking -for a _reason_--I am asking for some proposition _other_ than one -which itself asserts: When one man has a perception of such and such a -particular kind, it _is_ probable that another man has a perception or -thought of this or that other kind. - -But what kind of reason can be given for believing a proposition of -this sort? For believing a proposition which asserts that, since one -particular thing exists, it is probable that another particular thing -also exists? One thing I think is plain, namely that we can have no -good reason for believing such a proposition, unless we have good -reason for believing some _generalisation._ It is commonly believed, -for instance, that certain so-called flint arrow-heads, which have been -discovered, were probably made by prehistoric men; and I think it is -plain that we have no reason for believing this unless we have reason -to suppose that objects which resemble these in certain particular -respects are _generally_ made by men--are _more often_ made by men -than by any other agency. Unless certain particular characteristics -which those arrow-heads have were characteristics which belonged at -least more frequently to articles of human manufacture than to any -articles not made by men, it would surely be just as likely as not -that these arrowheads were _not_ made by men--that they were, in fact -not arrow-heads. That is to say, unless we have reason to assert a -_generalisation_--the generalisation that objects of a certain kind -are _generally_ made by men, we have no reason to suppose that these -particular objects, which are of the kind in question, _were_ made -by men. And the same, so far as I can see, is true universally. If -we ever have any reason for asserting that, since one particular -thing exists, another probably exists or existed or will exist also -part of our reason, at least, must consist in reasons for asserting -some generalisation--for asserting that the existence of things of -a particular kind is, more often than not, accompanied or preceded -or followed by the existence of things of another particular kind. -It is, I think, sometimes assumed that an alternative to this theory -may be found in the theory that the existence of one kind of thing -"intrinsically points to," or is "intrinsically a sign or symbol of" -the existence of another thing. It is suggested that when a thing -which thus points to the existence of another thing exists, then it is -at least probable that the thing "pointed to" exists also. But this -theory, I think, offers no real alternative. For, in the first place, -when we say that the existence of one thing A is a "sign of" or "points -to" the existence of another thing B, we very commonly actually mean to -say that when a thing like A exists, a thing like B _generally_ exists -too. We may, no doubt, mean something else _too_; but this we do mean. -We say, for instance, that certain particular words, which we hear or -read, are a "sign" that somebody has thought of the particular things -which we call the meaning of those words. But we should certainly -hesitate to admit that the hearing or reading of certain words could be -called a "sign" of the existence of certain thoughts, unless it were -true that when those words are heard or read, the thoughts in question -_generally_ have existed. If when those words were heard or read, the -thoughts had generally _not_ existed, we should say that, in one sense -of the word at all events, the hearing of the words was _not_ a sign of -the existence of the thoughts. In this sense, therefore, to say that -the existence of A "points to" or "is a sign of" the existence of B is -actually to say that when A exists, B _generally_ exists also. But, -no doubt, the words "points to" "is a sign of" may be used in some -other sense: they may, for instance, mean only that the existence of A -_suggests_ in some way the belief that B exists. And in such a case we -certainly might know that the existence of A pointed to the existence -of B, without knowing that when A existed B generally existed also. -Let us suppose, then, that in some such sense A does "point to" the -existence of B; can this fact give us a reason for supposing it even -probable that B existed. Certainly it can, _provided_ it is true that -when A _does_ point to the existence of B, B _generally_ exists. But -surely it can do so, only on this condition. If when A _points_ to -the existence of B, B, nevertheless, does _not_ generally exist, then -surely the fact that A points to the existence of B can constitute no -probability that B does not exist: on the contrary it will then be -probable that, even though A "points to" the existence of B, B does -_not_ exist. We have, in fact, only substituted the generalisation that -A's _pointing to_ B is generally accompanied by the existence of B, for -the generalisation that A's _existence_ is generally accompanied by the -existence of B. If we are to have any reason for asserting that, when -A _points to_ or is a sign of the existence of B, B probably exists, we -must still have a reason for some generalisation--for a generalisation -which asserts that when one thing points to the existence of another, -that other _generally_ exists. - -It is plain, then, I think, that if we are to find a reason for the -assertion that some particular perception of mine would probably not -exist, unless someone else were having or had had a perception of a -kind which I can name, we must find a reason for _some_ generalisation. -And it is also plain, I think, that in many cases of this kind the -generalisation must consist in an assertion that when one man has a -certain kind of perception, some other man generally has had some -other perception or belief. We assume, for instance, that when we hear -or read certain words, somebody besides ourselves has thought the -thoughts, which constitute the meaning of those words; and it is plain, -I think, that we have no reason for this assumption except one which -is also a reason for the assumption that when certain words are heard -or read, somebody generally has had certain thoughts. And my enquiry, -therefore, at least includes the enquiry: What reasons have we for such -generalisations as these? for generalisations which assert a connection -between the existence of a certain kind of perception in one man, and -that of a certain kind of perception or belief in another man? - -And to this question, I think, but one answer can be given. If we -have any reason for such generalisations at all, some reason must -be given, in one way or another, by observation--by observation, -understood in the wide sense in which it includes "experiment." No -philosopher, I think, has ever failed to assume that observation does -give a reason for _some_ generalisations--for some propositions -which assert that when one kind of thing exists, another generally -exists or has existed in a certain relation to it. Even those who, -like Hume, imply that observation cannot give a _reason_ for anything, -yet constantly appeal to observation in support of generalisations of -their own. And even those who hold that observation can give no reason -for any generalisation about the relation of one man's perceptions to -another's, yet hold that it _can_ give a reason for generalisations -about the relation of some to others among a man's own perceptions. -It is, indeed, by no means agreed _how_ observation can give a reason -for any generalisation. Nobody knows what reason we have, if we have -any, for supposing that it can. But _that_ it can, everyone, I think, -assumes. I think, therefore, most philosophers will agree, that if we -can find any reason at all for generalisations of the kind in which -I am interested, a reason for _some_ of them at all events must be -found in observation. And what I propose to ask is: What reason can be -found in observation for even a single proposition of the kind I have -described? for a proposition which asserts that when one man has one -kind of perception, another man generally has or has had another. - -But, when it is said that observation gives us a reason for -generalisations, two things may be meant neither of which I mean. In -the first place, we popularly use "observation" in a sense in which -we can be said to _observe_ the perceptions, feelings and thoughts -of other people: in which, therefore, we can be said to observe the -very things with regard to which I am asking what reason we have for -believing in their existence. But it is universally[1] agreed that -there is a sense in which no man can observe the perceptions, feelings -or thoughts of any other man. And it is to this strict sense that -I propose to confine the word. I shall use it in a sense, in which -we can certainly be said to observe nothing but ourselves, our own -perceptions, thoughts and feelings, and what we directly perceive. And -in the second place, it may be said that observations made by another -person may give _me_ a reason for believing some generalisation. And -it is certainly the case that for many of the generalisations in which -we all believe, if we have a reason in observation at all, it is not -in _our own_ observation that we have it: part of our reason, at all -events, lies in things which _other_ people have observed but which we -ourselves have not observed. But in asking this particular question, -I am not asking for reasons of this sort. The very question that I am -asking is: What reason has any one of us for supposing that any other -person whatever has ever made any observations? And just as, in the -first meaning which I gave to this question, it meant: What thing, -that any single man observes is such that it would probably not have -existed, unless some other man had made a particular observation? -So now I am asking: Which among the things, which _one single man -observes_, are such that they would probably not have existed, unless -it were true that some of them generally stood in certain relations to -observations of some other person? I am asking: Which among _my own_ -observations give me a reason for supposing that some of them are of -a kind which are generally preceded or accompanied by observations -of other people? Which, for instance, among my own observations give -a good reason for the generalisation that when I hear certain words, -somebody else has generally had certain particular thoughts, or that -whenever anyone hears certain words, somebody else has generally had -the thoughts which constitute what we call the meaning of those words? -I am asking: Which among the vast series of observations, which any -one individual makes during his lifetime, give a good reason for -any generalisation _whatever_ of this kind--a generalisation which -asserts that some of them are generally preceded by certain thoughts, -perceptions or feelings in other persons? I quite admit that there -are some generalisations of this kind for which the observations of -_some_ particular men will _not_ give a reason. All that I ask is: -Is there even _one_ generalisation of this kind, for which the kind -of observations, which (as we commonly assume) each man, or nearly -every man does make, do give a reason? Among observations of the kind -which (as we commonly assume) are common to you and to me, do yours, -by themselves, give any reason for even _one_ such generalisation? -And do mine, by themselves, give any reason for even _one_ such -generalisation? And if they do, which, among these observations, is it -which do so? - -My question is, then: What reason do my own observations give me, for -supposing that any perception whatever, which I have, would probably -not occur, unless some other person had a certain kind of perception? -What reason do my own observations give me for supposing, for instance, -that I should not be perceiving what I do now perceive, unless -someone were hearing the sound of my voice? What reason do your own -observations give you for supposing that you would not be perceiving -just what you are perceiving, unless I were perceiving more or less -black marks on a more or less white ground? The question does, I -think, appear to be a reasonable one; and most philosophers, I think, -have assumed that there is an answer to it. Yet it may be said that -there is no answer to it: that my own observations give me no reason -whatever for any single proposition of this kind. There are certain -philosophers (even apart from thorough sceptics, with whom, as I have -said, I am not now arguing) who have denied that they do. There are -certain philosophers who hold that nothing which any single one of -us observes or can observe, gives the slightest reason for supposing -that any of his own perceptions are generally connected with certain -perceptions in other people. There are philosophers who hold that the -only generalisations for which our own observations do give any warrant -are generalisations concerning the manner in which our own perceptions, -thoughts and feelings do and probably will succeed one another; and who -conclude that, this being so, we have no reason whatever for believing -in the existence of any other people. And these philosophers are, I -think, right in drawing this conclusion from this premiss. It does -not, indeed, follow from their premiss that we have not a reason in -the sense which I first explained, and in which, I insisted, it must -be admitted that we have a reason. It does not follow that some of our -perceptions _are_ not such as would probably not exist, unless some -other person had certain perceptions. But, as I have urged, when we -say that we have a reason for asserting the existence of something not -perceived, we commonly mean something more than this. We mean not only -that, since what we perceive does exist, the unperceived thing probably -exists too; we mean also that we have some reason for asserting this -connection between the perceived and the unperceived. And holding, as -we do, that no reason can be given for asserting such a connection, -except observation, we should say that, if observation gives no reason -for asserting it, we have _no_ reason for asserting it; and having no -reason for asserting this connection between the perceived and the -unperceived, we should say that we have none either for asserting the -even probable existence of the unperceived. This, I think, is what -we commonly mean by saying that we have no reason to believe in the -existence of a particular thing which we do not perceive. And hence, -I think, those philosophers who hold that our own observations give -us no reason whatever for any generalisation whatever concerning -the connection of any of them with those of other people, are quite -right in concluding that we have no reason to assert that any other -person ever did have any particular thought or perception whatever. I -think that the words of this conclusion, understood in their natural -meaning, express precisely what the premiss asserts. We need not, -indeed, conclude, as many of these philosophers are inclined to do, -that, because we have no reason for believing in the existence of other -people, it is therefore highly doubtful whether they do exist. The -philosophers who advocate this opinion commonly refute themselves by -assigning the existence of other people as part of their reason for -believing that it is very doubtful whether any other people exist. That -for which we have no reason may, nevertheless, be certainly true. And, -indeed, one of the philosophers who hold most clearly and expressly -that we do know not only the existence of other people but also that -of material objects, is also one of those who deny most emphatically -that our own observations can give any reason for believing either -in the one or in the other. I refer to Thomas Reid. Reid, indeed, -allows himself to use not only the word "observe," but even the word -"perceive," in that wide sense in which it might be said that we -observe or perceive the thoughts and feelings of others: and I think -that the fact that he uses the words in this sense, has misled him into -thinking that his view is more plausible and more in accordance with -Common Sense than it really is: by using the words in this sense he is -able to plead that "observation" really does give a reason for some of -those generalisations, for which Common Sense holds that "observation" -(in a narrower sense) does give a reason. But with regard to what we -observe or perceive, in the strict sense to which 1 am confining those -words, he asserts quite explicitly that it gives us no reason either -for believing in the existence of material objects or for believing -in the existence of other minds. Berkeley, he says, has proved -incontrovertibly that it gives us no reason for the one, and Hume that -it gives us no reason for the other. - -Now these philosophers may be right in holding this. It may, perhaps, -be true that, in this sense, my own observations give me no reason -whatever for believing that any other person ever has or will perceive -anything like or unlike what I perceive. But I think it is desirable -we should realise how paradoxical are the consequences which must be -admitted, if this is true. It must then be admitted that the very -large part of our knowledge, which we suppose to have some basis in -experience, is by no means based upon experience, in the sense, and -to the extent, which we suppose. We do for instance, commonly suppose -that there is some basis in experience for the assertion that some -people, whom we call Germans, use one set of words to express much the -same meaning which we express by using a different set of words. But, -if this view be correct, we must admit that no person's experience -gives him any reason whatever for supposing that, when he hears certain -words, any one else has ever heard or thought of the same words, or -meant anything by them. The view admits, indeed, that I do know that -when I hear certain words, somebody else has generally had thoughts -more or less similar to those which I suppose him to have had: but it -denies that my own observations could ever give me the least reason -for supposing that this is so. It admits that my own observations may -give me reason for supposing that _if_ anyone has ever had perceptions -like mine in some respects, he will also have had other perceptions -like others of mine: but it denies that they give me any reason for -supposing that any one else has had a perception like one of mine. It -admits that my own observations may give me reason for supposing that -certain perceptions and thoughts in _one_ person (_if_ they exist) will -be followed or preceded by certain other perceptions and thoughts in -that person: but it denies that they give me any reason whatever for -_any_ similar generalisation concerning the connection of a certain -kind of perception in one person with a certain kind of perception in -another. It admits that I should not have certain perceptions, which -I do have, unless someone else had had certain other perceptions; but -it denies that my own observations can give me any reason for saying -so--for saying that I should not have had this perception, unless -someone else had had that. No observations of mine, it holds, can ever -render it probable that such a generalisation is true; no observation -of mine can ever confirm or verify such a generalisation. If we are to -say that any such generalisation whatever is based upon observation, -we can only mean, what Reid means, that it is based on a series of -assumptions. When I observe this particular thing, I assume that _that_ -particular thing, which I do not observe, exists; when I observe -another particular thing, I again assume that a second particular -thing, which I do not observe, exists; when I observe a third -particular thing, I again assume that a third particular thing, which I -do not observe, exists. These assumed facts--the assumed fact that one -observation of mine is accompanied by the existence of one particular -kind of thing, and that another observation of mine is accompanied by -the existence of a different particular kind of thing, will then give -me a reason for different generalisations concerning the connection of -different perceptions of mine with different external objects--objects -which I do not perceive. But (it is maintained) nothing but a mass of -such assumptions will give me a reason for any such generalisation. - -Now I think it must be admitted that there is something paradoxical -in such a view. I think it may be admitted that, in holding it, the -philosopher of Common Sense departs from Common Sense at least as far -in one direction as his opponents had done in another. But I think -that there is some excuse for those who hold it: I think that, in one -respect, they are more in the right than those who do not hold it--than -those who hold that my own observations do give me a reason for -believing in the existence of other people. For those who hold that my -observations do give me a reason, have, I believe, universally supposed -that the reason lies in a part of my observations, in which no such -reason is to be found. This is why I have chosen to ask the question: -_What_ reason do my observations give me for believing that any other -person has any particular perceptions or beliefs? I wish to consider -_which_ among the things which I observe will give such a reason. For -this is a question to which no answer, that I have ever seen, appears -to me to be correct. Those who have asked it have, so far as I know, -answered it _either_ by denying that my observations give me any reason -_or_ by pointing to a part of my observations, which, as it seems to -me, really do give none. Those who deny are, it seems to me, right in -holding that the reason given by those who affirm is no reason. And -their correct opinion on this point will, I think, partly serve to -explain their denial. They have supposed that if our observations give -us any reason at all for asserting the existence of other people, that -reason must lie where it has been supposed to lie by those who hold -that they do give a reason. And then, finding that this assigned reason -is no reason, they have assumed that there is no other. - -I am proposing then to ask: Which among the observations, which I make, -and which (as we commonly suppose) are similar in kind to those which -all or almost all men make, will give a reason for supposing that the -existence of any of them is generally connected with the existence of -certain kinds of perception or belief in other people? And in order to -answer this question, it is obvious we must first consider two others. -We must consider, in the first place: Of what nature must observations -be, if they are to give a reason for any generalisation asserting that -the existence of one kind of thing is generally connected with that of -another? And we must consider in the second place: What kinds of things -do we observe? - -Now to the first of these questions I am not going to attempt to give -a complete answer. The question concerning the rules of Inductive -Logic, which is the question at issue, is an immensely difficult and -intricate question. And I am not going to attempt to say, what kind of -observations are _sufficient_ to justify a generalisation. But it is -comparatively easy to point out that a certain kind of observations are -_necessary_ to justify a generalisation: and this is all that I propose -to do. I wish to point out certain conditions which observations must -satisfy, if they are to justify a generalisation; without in any way -implying that all observations which do satisfy these conditions, -_will_ justify a generalisation. The conditions, I shall mention, are -ones which are certainly _not_ sufficient to justify a generalisation; -but they are, I think, conditions, without which no generalisation can -be justified. If a particular kind of observations do _not_ satisfy -these conditions, we can say with certainty that those observations -give us _no_ reason for believing in the existence of other people; -though, with regard to observations which _do_ satisfy them, we shall -only be able to say that they _may_ give a reason. - -What conditions, then, must observations satisfy, if they are to -justify a generalisation? Let us suppose that the generalisation to -be justified is one which asserts that the existence of a kind of -object, which we will call A, is generally preceded, accompanied, or -followed by the existence of a kind of object, which we call B. A, for -instance, might be the hearing of a certain word by one person, and B -the thought of that which we call the meaning of the word, in another -person; and the generalisation to be justified might be that when one -person hears a word, not spoken by himself, someone else has generally -thought of the meaning of that word. What must I have observed, if the -generalisation that the existence of A is generally preceded by the -existence of B, is to be justified by my observations? One first point, -I think, is plain. I must have observed both some object, which is in -some respects like A, and which I will call _α_, and also some object -in some respects like B which I will call _β_: I must have observed -both _α_ and _β_, and also I must have observed _β_ preceding _α._ -This, at least, I must have observed. But I do not pretend to say _how_ -like _α_ and _β_ must be to A and B; nor do I pretend to say how often -I must have observed _β_ preceding _α_, although it is generally held -that I must have observed this more than once. These are questions, -which would have to be discussed if we were trying to discover what -observations were _sufficient_ to justify the generalisation that the -existence of A is generally preceded by that of B. But I am only -trying to lay down the minimum which is _necessary_ to justify this -generalisation; and therefore I am content to say that we must have -observed something more or less like B preceding something more or less -like A, at least once. - -But there is yet another minimum condition. If my observation of _β_ -preceding _α_ is to justify the generalisation that the _existence_ of -A is generally preceded by the _existence_ of B, it is plain, I think, -that both the _β_ and the _α,_ which I observed, must have _existed_ -or been _real_; and that also the existence of _β_ must _really_ have -preceded that of _α_. It is plain that if, when I observed _α_ and -_β_, _α_ existed but _β_ did not, this observation could give me no -reason to suppose that on another occasion when A existed, _β_ _would_ -exist. Or again, if, when I observed _β_ preceding _α_, both _β_ and -_α_ existed, but the existence of _β_ did not _really_ precede that of -α, but, on the contrary, followed it, this observation could certainly -give me no reason to suppose that, in general, the existence of A was -_preceded_ by the existence of B. Indeed this condition that what is -observed must have been _real_ might be said to be included in the very -meaning of the word "observation." We should, in this connection, say -that we had _not_ observed _β_ preceding _α,_ unless _β_ and _α_ were -both real, and _β_ had really preceded _α._ If I say "I have _observed_ -that, on one occasion, my hearing of the word 'moon' was followed by -my imagining a luminous silvery disc," I commonly mean to include in -my statement the assertion that I did, on that occasion, really hear -the word "moon," and really did have a visual image of a luminous -disc, and that my perception was really followed by my imagination. -If it were proved to me that this had not really happened, I should -admit that I had not really observed it. But though this condition -that, if observation is to give reason for a generalisation, what is -observed must be real, may thus be said to be implied in the very -word "observation," it was necessary for me to mention the condition -explicitly. It was necessary, because, as I shall presently show, -we do and must also use the word "observation" in a sense in which -the assertion "I observe A" by no means includes the assertion "A -exists"--in a sense in which it _may_ be true that though I did observe -A, yet A did _not_ exist. - -But there is also, I think, a third necessary condition which is very -apt to be overlooked. It may, perhaps, be allowed that observation -gives some reason for the proposition that hens' eggs are generally -laid by hens. I do not mean to say that any one man's observation can -give a reason for this proposition: I do not assume either that it can -or that it cannot. Nor do I mean to make any assumption as to what -must be meant by the words "hens" and "eggs," if this proposition is -to be true. I am quite willing to allow for the moment that if it is -true at all, we must understand by "hens" and "eggs," objects very -unlike that which we directly observe, when we see a hen in a yard, or -an egg on the breakfast-table. I am willing to allow the possibility -that, as some Idealists would say, the proposition "Hens lay eggs" is -false, unless we mean by it: A certain kind of collection of spirits or -monads sometimes has a certain intelligible relation to another kind of -collection of spirits or monads. I am willing to allow the possibility -that, as Reid and some scientists would say, the proposition "Hens -lay eggs" is false, if we mean by it anything more than that: Certain -configurations of invisible material particles sometimes have a certain -spatio-temporal relation to another kind of configuration of invisible -material particles. Or again I am willing to allow, with certain -other philosophers, that we must, if it is to be true, interpret -this proposition as meaning that certain kinds of sensations have to -certain other kinds a relation which may be expressed by saying that -the one kind of sensations "lay" the other kind. Or again, as other -philosophers say, the proposition "Hens lay eggs" may possibly mean: -Certain sensations of mine _would_, under certain conditions, have to -certain other sensations of mine a relation which may be expressed by -saying that the one set would "lay" the other set. But whatever the -proposition "Hens' eggs are generally laid by hens" may _mean_, most -philosophers would, I think, allow that, in some sense or other, this -proposition was true. And they would also I think allow that we have -_some_ reason for it; and that _part_ of this reason at all events lies -in observation: they would allow that we should have no reason for it -unless certain things had been observed, which have been observed. -Few, I think, would say that the existence of an egg "intrinsically -points" to that of a hen, in such a sense that, even if we had had no -experience of any kind concerning the manner in which objects like eggs -are connected with animals like hens, the mere inspection of an egg -would justify the assertion: A hen has probably existed. - -I assume, then, that objects having all the characteristics which -hens' eggs have (whatever these may be) are generally laid by hens -(whatever hens may be); and I assume that, if we have any reason -for this generalisation at all, observation gives us some reason -for it. But now, let us suppose that the only observations we had -made were those which we should commonly describe by saying that we -had seen a hen laying an egg. I do not say that any number of such -observations, by themselves, would be _sufficient_ to justify our -generalisation: I think it is plain that they would not. But let us -suppose, for the moment, that we had observed nothing else which bore -upon the connection between hens and eggs; and that, if therefore -our generalisation was justified by any observations at all, it was -justified by these. We are supposing, then, that the observations -which we describe as "seeing hens lay eggs" give some reason for the -generalisation that eggs of that kind are generally laid by hens. And -if these observations give reason for this, obviously _in a sense_ -they give reason for the generalisation that the existence of such an -egg is generally preceded by that of a hen; and hence also, they give -us reason to suppose that if such an egg exists, a hen has probably -existed also--that unless a hen had existed, the egg would not have -existed. But the point to which I wish to call attention is that it -is _only_ in a limited sense that they do give reason for this. They -only give us reason to suppose that, for each egg, there has existed a -hen, which was at some time _near_ the place where the egg in question -then was, and which existed at a time _near_ to that at which the egg -began to exist. The only kind of hens, whose existence they do give us -reason to suppose, are hens, of which each was at some time in spatial -and temporal proximity (or, if Idealists prefer, in the relations which -are the "intelligible counterparts" of these) to an egg. They give us -no information at all about the existence of hens (if there are any) -which never came within a thousand miles of an egg, or which were dead -a thousand years before any egg existed. That is to say, they _do_ -give us reason to suppose that, if a particular egg exists, there has -probably existed a hen which was at some time _near_ that egg; but -they give us no reason to suppose that, if a particular egg exists, -there must have existed a hen which never came near that egg. They -_do_ give us reason to suppose that, for each egg, there has probably -existed a hen which at some time stood to the egg in question in that -relation which we have observed to hold between an egg and a hen, when -we observed the hen laying an egg. But they give us no reason to infer -from the existence of an egg any other kind of hen: any hen which -_never_ stood to the egg in the relation in which we have observed that -some hens do stand to eggs. - -What I wish to suggest is that this condition is a universal condition -for sound inductions. If the observation of β preceding _α_ can ever -give us any reason at all for supposing that the existence of A is -generally preceded by that of B, it can at most only give us reason -to suppose that the existence of an A is generally preceded by that -of a B _which stands to our A in the same relation in which β_ has -been observed to stand to _α._ It cannot give the least reason for -supposing that the existence of an A must have been preceded by that -of a B, which did _not_ stand to A in the observed relation, but in -some quite different one. If we are to have any reason to infer from -the existence of an A the existence of such a B, the reason must lie in -some different observations. That this is so, in the case of hens' eggs -and hens, is, I think, obvious: and, if the rule is _not_ universal, -some reason should at least be given for supposing that it does apply -in one case and not in another. - -Having thus attempted to point out some conditions which seem to be -necessary, though not _sufficient_, where observation is to give any -reason for a generalisation, I may now proceed to my second preliminary -question. What kinds of things do we observe? - -In order to illustrate how much and how little I mean by "observation" -or "direct perception," I will take as an instance a very common -visual perception. Most of us are familiar with the experience which -we should describe by saying that we had seen a red book and a blue -book side by side upon a shelf. What exactly can we be said to observe -or directly perceive when we have such an experience? We certainly -observe one colour, which we call blue, and a different colour, which -we call red; each of these we observe as having a particular size and -shape; and we observe also these two coloured patches as having to one -another the spatial relation which we express by saying they are side -by side. All this we certainly see or directly perceive _now,_ whatever -may have been the process by which we have come to perceive so much. -But when we say, as in ordinary talk we should, that the objects we -perceive are _books,_ we certainly mean to ascribe to them properties, -which, in a sense which we all understand, are not actually seen by -us, at the moment when we are merely looking at two books on a shelf -two yards off. And all such properties I mean to exclude as not being -then _observed_ or _directly perceived_ by us. When I speak of what -we _observe,_ when we see two books on a shelf, I mean to limit the -expression to that which is _actually seen._ And, thus understood, the -expression does include colours, and the size and shape of colours, and -spatial relations in three dimensions between these patches of colour, -but it includes nothing else. - -But I am also using observation in a sense in which we can be said -actually to observe a movement. We commonly say that we can sometimes -_see_ a red billiard ball moving towards a white one on a green table. -And, here again, I do not mean to include in what is directly perceived -or observed, all that we mean by saying that the two objects perceived -are billiard-balls. But I do mean to include what (we should say) we -_actually see._ We actually see a more or less round red patch moving -towards a more or less round white patch; we _see_ the stretch of green -between them diminishing in size. And this perception is not merely the -same as a series of perceptions--first a perception of a red patch with -a green stretch of one size between it and the white; then a perception -of a red patch with a green stretch of a different size between it and -the white; and so on. In order to perceive a movement we must have a -different perception from any one of these or from the sum of them. We -must _actually see_ the green stretch diminishing in size. - -Now it is undoubtedly difficult, in some instances, to decide precisely -what is perceived in this sense and what is not. But I hope I have -said enough to show that I am using "perceive" and "observe" in a -sense in which, on a given occasion, it is easy to decide that _some_ -things certainly are perceived, and other things, as certainly, are -not perceived. I am using it in a sense in which we do perceive such -a complex object as a white patch moving towards a red one on a green -field; but I am not using it in any sense in which we could be said to -"perceive" or "observe" that what we saw moving was a billiard-ball. -And in the same way I think we can distinguish roughly between what, -on any given occasion, we perceive, as we say, "by any one of the -other senses," and what we do not perceive by it. We can say with -certainty that, on any given occasion, there are certain kinds of -"content" which we are actually hearing, and others which we are _not_ -actually hearing; though with regard to some again it is difficult to -say whether we are actually hearing them or not. And similarly we can -distinguish with certainty in some instances, between what we are on -a given occasion, actually smelling or feeling, and what we are not -actually smelling or feeling. - -But now, besides these kinds of "things," "objects," or "contents," -which we perceive, as we say, "by the senses," there is also another -kind which we can be said to observe. Not only can I observe a red and -blue book side by side; I can also observe myself observing them. I can -perceive a red patch moving towards a white, and I can also perceive my -perception of this movement. And what I wish to make as plain as I can -is that my perception of the movement of a coloured patch can at least -be distinguished from that movement itself. I wish to make it plain -that to observe a coloured patch moving is to observe one thing; and -to observe myself observing a coloured patch moving is another. When -I observe my own perception of a movement, I observe something _more_ -than when I merely observe the movement, and something very different -from the movement. I may perceive a red and a blue book side by side on -a shelf; and at another time I may perceive a red ball moving towards a -white. The red and blue patch, of one shape, at rest side by side, are -different from the red, of another shape, moving towards the white; and -yet, when I say that both are "perceived," I mean by "perceived" one -and the same thing. And since, thus, two different things may both be -perceived, there must also be some difference between each of them and -what is meant by saying that it is perceived. Indeed, in precisely the -same way In which I may observe a spatial relation between a red patch -and a blue (when I observe them "side by side") I do, when I observe my -own perception of them, observe a spatial relation between it and them. -I observe a distance between my perception and the red and blue books -which I perceive, comparable in magnitude with the breadth or height -of the blue book, just as these are comparable in magnitude with one -another. And when I say I observe a distance between my perception -of a red book and that red book itself, I do not mean that I observe -a distance between my eyes, or any other part of what I call my body, -and the red patch in question. I am talking not of my eyes, but of my -actual perception. I observe my perception of a book to be near the -book and further from the table, in exactly the same sense in which I -observe the book to be near the shelf on which it stands, and further -from the table. And just as, if the distance between a red patch and -a white is to be perceived, the red patch must be different from the -white, so, if I perceive a certain distance between my perception and -the red patch, my perception must be different from the red patch which -I perceive. - -I assume, then, that we observe, on the one hand, coloured patches of -certain shapes and sizes, and their spatial relations to one another, -together with all the other kinds of "contents," which we should -usually be said to perceive "through the senses." And, on the other -hand, we also sometimes observe our own perceptions of such "contents" -and our thoughts. And these two kinds of "content" are different from -one another: my perception of a red patch with gold letters on it, -is not itself a red patch with gold letters on it; and hence, when I -observe my perception of this patch, I observe something different from -that which I observe when I merely perceive the patch. Either of these -two kinds of "content"--either colours, moving or at rest, sounds, -smells, and all the rest--or, on the other hand, my perceptions of -these--either of these two kinds, or both, might conceivably, since -both are observed, give grounds for a generalisation concerning what -exists. But, as I have said, if observations are to give any ground -for such a generalisation, it must be assumed that what Is observed -_exists_ or is _real._ And since, as I have insisted, when I observe -my _perception_ of a red patch with gold letters on it, I observe -something different from what I observed when I merely observed a red -patch with gold letters on it, it follows that to assume the existence -of my perception of this red and gold is _not_ the same thing as to -assume the existence of the red and gold itself. - -But what, it may be asked, do I mean by this property of "existence" or -"reality," which may, it would seem, belong to every content, which I -observe, or may again belong to none, or which may belong to some and -not to others? What is this property which may belong to my perception -of a movement, and yet not belong to the movement perceived, or which -may again belong to the movement perceived and not to my perception of -it, or which may again belong to both or to neither? - -It is necessary, I think, to ask this question at this point, because -there are some philosophers who hold that, in the case of some kinds -of "content," at all events, to say that they "exist" is to say that -they are "perceived." Some hold that to say "A exists" is to say -neither more nor less than "A is perceived"--that the two expressions -are perfect synonyms; and others again would say that by "A exists -or is real" we may mean _more_ than that "A is perceived," but that -we must at least mean this. Now, I have hitherto used the word -"existence" pretty freely, and I think that, when I used it, I used -it in its ordinary sense. I think it will generally have suggested to -you precisely what I meant to convey, and I think that, in some cases -at all events, it will not even have occurred to you to doubt whether -you did understand what I meant by it. But, if these philosophers are -right, then, if you _have_ understood what I meant by it, I have all -along been using it in a sense, which renders the end of my last -paragraph perfect nonsense. If these philosophers are right, then, when -I assert that what _is_ perceived may yet _not_ exist, I am really -asserting that what _is_ perceived may yet _not_ be perceived--I am -contradicting myself. I am, of course, quite unaware that I am doing -so. But these philosophers would say _either_ you are contradicting -yourself, _or_ you are not using the word "exists" in its ordinary -sense. And either of these alternatives would be fatal to my purpose. -If I am not using the word in its ordinary sense, then I shall not be -understood by anyone; and, if I am contradicting myself, then what I -say will not be worth understanding. - -Now, with one class of these philosophers--the class to which, I -think, Berkeley belongs--I think I can put myself right comparatively -easily. The philosophers I mean are those who say that it is only in -the case of one particular class of "contents" (the kind of "content" -which Berkeley calls "ideas") that to say "the 'content' A exists" -is to say "A is perceived," and who admit that in the case of other -contents--myself and my perceptions and thoughts, for example--to say -that _these_ exist or are real, is to say of them something different -from this. These philosophers admit, that is to say, that the word -"exists" has two different senses: and that in only one of these senses -is it synonymous with the words "is perceived." When (they hold) I -say of such a content as a red patch with gold letters on it that -it "exists" I _do_ mean that it is perceived; but when I say of my -_perception_ of such a patch that _it_ exists, I do _not_ mean that -my perception is perceived but something different from this. Now, it -would be nothing strange that one and the same word should be used in -two different senses; many words are used in many different senses. -But it would, I think, be something very strange indeed, if in the -case of a word which we constantly apply to all sorts of different -objects, we should uniformly apply it to one large class of object in -the one sense and the one sense only and the other large class in the -other sense and the other sense only. Usually, in the case of such -ambiguous words, it happens that, in different contexts, we apply it -to one and the same object in _both_ senses. We sometimes wish to -say of a given object that it has the one property, and sometimes we -wish to say of the same object that it has the other property; and -hence we apply the same word to the same object, at one time in one -sense, and at another in the other. I think, therefore, that, even -if there were these two different senses of the word "existence," it -would be very unlikely that we should not commonly, in some contexts, -apply it in the sense, in which (as is alleged) it does apply to -perceptions, to "contents" which are not perceptions. Indeed, I think, -it is quite plain that we constantly do ask, with regard to what is -not a perception, whether _it_ exists, in precisely the same sense, -in which we ask, with regard to a perception, whether _it_ exists. We -ask in precisely the same sense: Was the Roc a real bird, or merely an -imaginary one? and, did Sindbad's perception of the Roc really exist, -or is it a fiction that he perceived a Roc? I think, therefore, that -the sense in which these philosophers admit that we do apply the word -"existence" to perceptions, is one in which we also commonly apply it -to "contents" other than perceptions. But, even if this is not the -case, I can set myself right with them by a simple explanation. I -need merely explain that the sense in which I am proposing to enquire -whether a red patch exists, is precisely the sense in which they admit -that my perception of a red patch does exist. And in this sense, it is -plain that to suppose that a thing may exist, which is not perceived, -or that it may _not_ exist, although it is perceived, is at least not -self-contradictory. - -But there may be other philosophers who will say that, in the case of -a perception also, to say that it exists or is real is to say that -it is perceived--either that alone or something more as well. And to -these philosophers I would first point out that they are admitting -that the proposition "This perception is real" is significant. There -is some sense or other in which we may say: "Alexander's perception of -an elephant was real or did exist, but Sindbad's perception of a Roc -was _not_ real--never did exist": the latter proposition is, in some -sense or other, not self-contradictory. And then I would ask of them: -When they say, that to call a perception "real" is to assert that it -is perceived, do they mean by this that to call it real is to assert -that it is _really_ perceived, or not? If they say "No," then they are -asserting that to call a perception "real" is merely to say that it was -perceived in the sense in which Sindbad _did_ perceive a Roc: they are -asserting that to call it "real" is not to say, in any sense, that it -was _really_ perceived: they are asserting that to call a perception -"real" is to say that it was perceived, in some sense quite other than -that in which we ordinarily use the word: for we certainly commonly -mean, when we say "A was perceived," that a perception of A was "real": -we should commonly say that Sindbad did _not_ perceive a Roc--meaning -that no such perception ever did exist. I do not think they do mean -this; and, in any case, if they do, I think it is plain that they -are wrong. When we say that a perception is "real," we certainly do -not mean merely that it is the object of another perception, which -may itself be quite unreal--purely Imaginary. I assume, therefore, -that when they say: To call a perception "real" is to say that it is -perceived; they mean, what we should naturally understand, namely, -that: To call it "real" is to say that it is _really_ perceived--to say -that it is the object of another perception, which is also _real_ in -the same sense. And, if they mean this, then what they say is certainly -untrue. Their definition of reality is circular. It cannot be the case -that the _only_ sense in which a perception may be said to be real, is -one in which to call it so is to assert that not it alone, but another -perception is real also. It cannot be the case that the assertion "A is -real" is _identical_ with the assertion "A and B are both real," where -A and B are different, and "real" is used in the same sense as applied -to both. If it is to be true that the assertion "A is real" _ever_, in -any sense, includes the assertion "A is _really_ perceived," there must -be another sense of the word "real," in which to assert "A is real" is -to assert _less_ than "A is _really_ perceived"--the sense, namely, in -which we here assert that the _perception_ of A is real. - -We find, therefore, that the other class of philosophers were at least -right in this: they were right in allowing that the sense in which -we commonly say that our perceptions exist is one in which "exist" -does not include, even as a part of its meaning, "is perceived." We -find that there is a common sense of the word "existence," in which -to say "A exists" must mean _less_ than "A is _really_ perceived": -since, otherwise, the only possible definition of the word "existence" -would be a circular definition. And I may point out that two other -definitions, which have been sometimes suggested by philosophers as -giving what we commonly mean by "reality" or "existence" are vitiated -by the same fault--they also are circular. Some philosophers have -sometimes suggested that when we call a thing "real," we mean that it -is "systematically connected" in some way with other things. But, -when we look into their meaning, we find that what they mean is (what, -indeed, is alone plausible)--systematically connected with other -_real_ things. And it may possibly be the case that we sometimes use -the word "real" in this sense: but, at least, it must be certainly -the case, that, if we do, we _also_ use it in another and simpler -sense--the sense in which it is employed in the proposed definition. -And other philosophers have suggested that what we mean by "real" -is--"connected in some way with a purpose--helping or hindering, -or the object of a purpose." But if we look into their meaning, we -find they mean--connected with a _real_ purpose. And hence, even if -we do sometimes mean by "real," "connected with a _real_ purpose," -it is plain we also sometimes mean by "real" something simpler than -this--that namely, which is meant by "real" in the proposed definition. - -It is certain, therefore, that we do commonly use the word "existence" -in a sense, in which to say "A exists" is _not_ to say "A is -perceived," or "A is systematically connected with other real things," -or "A is purposive." There is a simpler sense than any of these--the -sense in which we say that our own perceptions do exist, and that -Sindbad's perceptions did not exist. But when I say this, I am by no -means denying that what exists, in this simple sense, may not always -_also_ exist in all the others; and that what exists in any of them -may not _also_ always exist in this. It is quite possible that what -exists is always _also_ perceived, and that what is perceived always -_also_ exists. All that I am saying is that, even if this is so, this -proposition is significant--is not merely a proposition about the -meaning of a word. It is not self-contradictory to suppose that some -things which exist are not perceived, and that some things which are -perceived do not exist. - -But, it may be asked: What is this common simple sense of the word -"exists"? For my own part, it seems to me to be so simple that it -cannot be expressed in other words, except those which are recognised -as its synonyms. I think we are all perfectly familiar with its -meaning: it is the meaning which you understood me to have throughout -this paper, until I began this discussion. I think we can perceive at -once what is meant by asserting that my perception of black marks on a -white ground is "real," and that no such perception as Sindbad's of a -Roc was ever "real": we are perfectly familiar with the property which -the one perception is affirmed to possess, and the other to be without. -And I think, as I have said, that this property is a simple one. But, -whatever it is, this, which we ordinarily mean, is what I mean by -"existence" or "reality." And this property, we have seen, is certainly -neither identical with nor inclusive of that complex one which we mean -by the words "is perceived." - -I may now, then, at last approach the main question of my paper. -Which among the "contents" which I observe will give me reason to -suppose that my observation of some of them is generally preceded -or accompanied or followed by the existence of certain particular -perceptions, thoughts or feelings in another person? I have explained -that the "contents" which I actually observe may be divided into two -classes: on the one hand, those which, as we commonly say, we perceive -"through the senses"; and, on the other hand, my perceptions of these -last, my thoughts, and my feelings. I have explained that if any -of these observed contents are to give reason for a generalisation -about what exists, _they_ must exist. And I have explained that with -regard to both classes of "contents" I am using the word "exist" in -precisely the same sense--a sense, in which it is certainly not -self-contradictory to suppose that what _is_ perceived, does not exist, -and that what is _not_ perceived, does exist; and, in which, therefore, -the assumption that a red patch with gold letters on it exists, is a -_different_ assumption from the assumption that my _perception_ of -a red patch with gold letters on it exists; and the assumption that -my _perception_ of a red patch with gold letters on it exists, is a -_different_ assumption from the assumption that a red patch with gold -letters on it exists. - -What, then, that we observe, can give us any reason for believing that -anyone else has certain particular perceptions, thoughts or feelings? -It has, I think, been very commonly assumed that the observation of -my own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, can, by itself, give me -such a reason. And I propose, therefore, to examine this assumption. -If, as I hope to show, it is false; it will then follow, that if our -own observation gives us any reason whatever, for believing in the -existence of other persons, we must assume the existence, not only -of our own perceptions, thoughts and feelings, but also of some, at -least, among that other class of data, which I may now, for the sake of -brevity, call "sense-contents"; we must assume that some of them exist, -in precisely the same sense in which we assume that our perceptions, -thoughts, and feelings exist. - -The theory which I propose to examine is, then, the following. My -observation of my own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions may, it -asserts, give me some reason to suppose that another person has -thoughts, feelings, and perceptions similar to some of mine. Let us -assume, accordingly, that my own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions -do exist; but that none of the "sense-contents," which I also observe, -do so. Where among my perceptions am I to look for any which might -conceivably give me a reason for supposing the existence of other -perceptions similar to my own? It is obvious where I must look. I have -perceptions which I call perceptions of other people's bodies; and -these are certainly similar in many respects to other perceptions of -my own body. But I also observe that certain kinds of perceptions of -my own body are preceded by certain other perceptions, thoughts, or -feelings of mine. I may, for instance, observe that when I perceive -my hand suddenly catch hold of my foot in a particular way, this -perception was preceded by a particular kind of feeling of pain. I -may, perhaps, observe this often enough to justify the generalisation -that the perception of that particular motion of my body is generally -preceded by that particular feeling of pain. And in this way I may -perhaps have reason for quite a number of generalisations which assert -that particular kinds of perceptions of my own body are generally -preceded by other particular kinds of perceptions, thoughts, or -feelings of my own. - -But I may also, no doubt, have the perception, which I call the -perception of another person's hand catching hold of his foot, in a -manner similar to that in which I have perceived my own hand catch -hold of my own foot. And my perception of another person's hand -catching hold of his foot may undoubtedly be similar in many respects -to my perception of my own hand catching hold of my own foot. But -I shall not observe the same kind of feeling of pain preceding my -perception of _his_ hand catching hold of his foot, which I have -observed preceding my perception of _my_ hand catching hold of my -foot. Will my generalisation, then, give me any reason to suppose -that nevertheless my perception of his hand catching hold of his foot -_is_ preceded by a similar feeling of pain, not in me but in him? -We undoubtedly do assume that when I perceive another person's body -making movements similar to those which I have observed my own body -making, this perception has generally been preceded by some feeling or -perception of his similar to that which I have observed to precede my -perception of similar movements in my own body. We do assume this; and -it is precisely the kind of generalisation, which, I have insisted, -must be admitted to be true. But my present question is: Will such -observations as I have described give any reason for thinking any -such generalisation true? I think it is plain that they will not give -the slightest reason for thinking so. In the first place, all the -perceptions which I call perceptions of another person's body differ -very considerably from any of those which I call perceptions of my -own. But I am willing to waive this objection. I am not offering any -theory as to what degree of likeness is _sufficient_ to justify a -generalisation: and therefore I will allow that the degree of likeness -_may_ be sufficient. But there remains an objection which is, I think, -quite fatal to the proposed inference. This objection is that the -inference in question plainly does not satisfy the third condition -which I suggested above as _necessary_, wherever any generalisation -is to be justified by observation. I am willing to allow that my -observations of the fact that my perception of a certain movement in -my own body is preceded by a certain feeling of pain, _will_ justify -the generalisation that my perception of any such movement, whether in -my own body _or_ in that of another person, is generally preceded by a -similar feeling of pain. And I allow, therefore, that when I perceive a -certain movement in another's body, it _is_ probable that the feeling -of pain exists, though I do not perceive it. But, if it _is_ probable -that such a feeling of pain exists, such a feeling must stand _in the -same relation_ to my perception of the movement in another person's -body, in which a similar feeling of pain has been observed by me to -stand to my perception of such a movement in my own body. That is to -say the only kind of feeling of pain, which my observations do justify -me in inferring, if (as I admit they may) they justify me in inferring -any at all, is a feeling of pain of _my own._ They cannot possibly -justify the belief in the existence of any such feeling _except_ one -which stands to my perception in the same relation in which my feelings -do stand to _my_ perceptions--one, that is to say, which is my own. I -have no more reason to believe that the feeling of pain which probably -precedes my perception of a movement in another person's body can be -the feeling _of another person_, than, in my former example, I had -reason to suppose that the hen, whose existence probably preceded that -of a given egg, could be a hen, which had never been near the egg in -question. The two cases are exactly analogous. I observe a feeling of -pain _of my own_ preceding a perception _of my own._ I observe the -two, that is to say, as standing to one another, in those relations -(whatever they may be) in which any perception of mine stands to any -other thought, perception or feeling of mine, and which are, at all -events, different from any relation in which a perception or feeling of -another person can stand to one of mine. I never perceive the feeling -and the perception as standing in any other relation. In any case, -therefore, where I do observe something like the perception, but do -not observe the feeling, I can only be justified (_if_ justified in -inferring any feeling at all), in inferring an unperceived feeling _of -my own._ - -For this reason I think that no observations of my own perceptions, -feelings or thoughts can give me the slightest reason for supposing a -connection between any of them and any feeling, perception, or thought -in another person. The argument is perfectly general, since _all_ -my perceptions, feelings and thoughts do have to one another those -relations in virtue of which I call them mine; and which, when I talk -of a perception, feeling or thought as being _another persons_, I mean -to say that it has _not_ got to any of mine. I can, therefore, merely -from observation of _this_ class of data never obtain the slightest -reason for belief in the existence of a feeling, perception, or thought -which does _not_ stand in these relations to one of mine--which _is,_ -that is to say, the feeling, perception or thought, of another person. -But how different is the case, if we adopt the hypothesis, which I wish -to recommend--if we assume the existence of that other class of data -which I have called "sense-contents!" On this hypothesis, that which I -perceive, when I perceive a movement of my own body, is _real_; that -which I perceive when I perceive a movement of another's body is _real_ -also. I can now observe not merely the relation between my _perception_ -of a movement of my body and my own feelings, but also a relation -between a _real_ movement of my body and my own feelings. And there -is no reason why I should not be justified in inferring that another -person's feelings stand _in the same relation_ to the real movements of -his body, in which I observe my own feelings to stand to similar real -movements of mine. - -But there is another argument which may still be urged by those who -hold that my own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, by themselves, -may be sufficient to justify a belief in the existence of other -persons. It may be said: "Our observation of our own perceptions may be -sufficient to _verify_ or _confirm_ the hypothesis that other persons -exist. This hypothesis is one which "works." The assumption that other -persons have particular thoughts, feelings and perceptions enables us -to predict that they will have others and that our own perceptions will -be modified accordingly: it enables us to predict future perceptions of -our own; and we find that these predictions are constantly verified. -We observe that we do have the perceptions, which the hypothesis leads -us to expect we should have. In short, our perceptions occur just as -they would do, _if_ the hypothesis were true; our perceptions behave -_as if_ other persons had the perceptions, thoughts and feelings which -we suppose them to have. Surely, then, they confirm the truth of the -hypothesis--they give some reason to think it probably true?" - -All this, which I have supposed an opponent to urge, I admit to be -true. I admit that the fact that an hypothesis works may give some -reason to suppose it true. I admit that my perceptions occur just as -they would do, if other people had the perceptions which I suppose them -to have. I admit that that assumption enables me to make predictions as -to future perceptions of my own, and that I observe these predictions -to come true. I admit all this. But I admit it only in a sense in -which it in no way conflicts with the position which I am maintaining. -The words, which I have put into the mouth of a supposed opponent, -may, in fact, mean three different things, which it is worth while to -distinguish. In two of those meanings, which I shall admit to be true -and which are what make them seem plausible, they do not deny what I -assert. Only in the third sense are they an objection to my position: -and in that sense they are false. - -One of the meanings which I admit to be true is as follows:--I have not -only admitted but insisted that some of my perceptions are just such -as would occur if another person had certain particular feelings: I -have insisted that I should not have just those perceptions which I do -have, unless some other person had certain feelings and perceptions -which I suppose him to have. And I admit further that the fact that I -have one of the perceptions in question--for instance, that of another -person's hand catching hold of his foot--this fact, _together with_ -the true assumption that I should not have this perception, unless -some other person felt pain, will justify the assertion that another -person has felt pain. In this sense, I admit, the fact that I perceive -what I do perceive will give me reason to suppose that another person -has felt pain. And, on the other hand, I also admit that the fact -that I have this perception, _together with_ the true assumption that -when I have it another person has felt pain, may help to justify the -assumption that the perception in question is one which I should not -have had unless another person had felt pain--it helps to justify the -generalisation that certain of my perceptions are just what would -occur, _if_ another person had felt pain. In general terms, that is to -say, I admit that the occurrence of B, _together with_ the assumption -that B is just the sort of thing which would occur if A existed, will -justify the assertion that A exists in that particular instance. And -I also admit that the occurrence of B, _together with_ the assumption -that A exists in that particular instance, may help to justify the -assumption that B is just the sort of thing which would exist, if A -existed. In other words: When it is said that the observation of B's -existence confirms or verifies the assumption that A exists, either of -two things may be meant. It may be meant that, assuming B to be the -sort of thing which would exist if A existed, the observation of B -confirms the assumption that A exists _in this particular instance._ -Or, on the other hand, it may be meant that, assuming A to exist -in this particular instance, the observation of B may confirm the -generalisation, that B is just the sort of thing which would exist, -if A existed. _Either_ the one _or_ the other of these two things is, -I think, what is generally assumed, when it is assumed that what we -do observe confirms or verifies the assumption that there exists some -particular thing which we don't observe. And I am admitting that both -these assumptions are true. - -But neither of them conflicts in any way with the position I am -maintaining. What I am maintaining is that no observation of my own -perceptions, _by itself,_ can confirm the generalisation that any one -of them _is_ just what would occur if another person had a particular -feeling. I admit this generalisation to be true; and I admit that my -observation of my own perceptions and feelings may give me _reason_ to -suppose that _if_ another person has certain perceptions or feelings -_he_ will also have certain others. What I deny is that they give -me the slightest reason to suppose that the existence of any such -feeling or perception in another has any connection with the existence -of any perception _of my own_--to suppose that any perception of my -own is the sort of thing which would occur _if_ another person had a -particular feeling. What therefore, my opponent must affirm is that the -observation of a perception of my own _without_ the assumption (which -Reid makes) that in that particular instance any feeling or perception -of another person, of any kind whatever, has preceded it, may give me -reason to suppose that that perception of my own is of a kind which is -generally preceded by a particular kind of feeling in another person. -And this, I think, is plainly false. - -But there is yet a third thing which may be meant, and which I -am willing to admit may be true. It may be said: "I believe many -generalisations of the following kind. I believe that when I have -a perception A, some other person has generally had a feeling X; I -believe that the existence of the feeling X is generally followed, in -the same person, by that of the feeling Y; and I believe also that -when another person has the feeling Y, I generally have the perception -B. I believe all this." And it must, I think, be admitted that we do -believe generalisations of this kind, and generalisations in which -there are not merely two steps between A and B, but a great number of -steps. "But then," it may be said, "my belief in this generalisation -causes me, when I observe my perception A, to expect that I shall have -the perception B; and such expectations, I observe, are constantly -realised." And this also, I think, must be admitted to be true. "But, -finally," it may be said, "beliefs which produce expectations which -are constantly realised are generally true. And hence the fact that -these beliefs of mine about the connection of feelings in other persons -with perceptions of my own do lead to expectations which are realised, -gives me reason to suppose that these generalisations are true and -hence that other persons do have particular kinds of feelings." -And I am willing to admit that this also is true. I am willing to -admit that true predictions can, as a rule, only be produced by true -beliefs. The generalisation that this is so, is, indeed, one which -can only be justified by the observations of beliefs, which are, in -some way, independently proved to be true; and hence, if it is to be -justified, without assuming the existence of anything other than my -own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, it can only be justified by -my observation that beliefs with regard to the manner in which _these_ -succeed one another generally lead to true predictions. Whether the -observation of such beliefs _alone_ could give sufficient reason for -it, is, I think, doubtful; but I am willing to admit that it may be -so. One thing, however, is, I think, quite plain: namely, that this -generalisation "Beliefs which lead to true predictions are generally -true" cannot be true, _unless_ some other of the "contents" which I -observe, beside my own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, do exist. -That is to say, in giving a reason for supposing the existence of -other people, this generalisation also gives a reason for the very -theory which I am advocating, namely, that some of those data which -I have called "sense-contents" do exist. It does this, because it is -quite certain that beliefs in generalisations about the existence of -sense-contents _can_ (and do) constantly lead to true predictions. The -belief that when I have observed a fire of a certain size in my grate, -something similar to what I have observed will continue to exist for -a certain time, can, and constantly does, lead to the true prediction -that, when I come back to my room in half an hour's time, I shall -observe a fire of a certain size still burning. We make predictions -on such grounds, I think, every day and all day long. And hence -unless such beliefs as that what I observe when I see a fire burning -_does_ exist, _are_ true, we certainly have no reason to suppose that -beliefs which lead to true predictions are generally true. And hence -on this hypothesis also it remains true: that, unless some of the -contents which I observe _other_ than my own perceptions, thoughts, and -feelings, do exist, I cannot have the slightest reason for supposing -that the existence of certain perceptions of my own is generally -connected with that of certain perceptions, thoughts, or feelings in -any other person. - -I conclude therefore that, unless some of the observed data which I -have called sense-contents _do_ exist, my own observations cannot give -me the slightest reason for believing that anybody else has ever had -any particular perception, thought, or feeling. And, having arrived -so far towards an answer to my first question: How do we know that -any other persons exist? I may now point out that precisely the same -answer must be given to my second question: How do we know that _any_ -particular kind of thing exists, other than ourselves, our perceptions, -thoughts, and feelings, and what we directly perceive? There is a view -concerning what exists, which deserves, I think, much more respect than -it generally receives from philosophers nowadays. The view I mean is -the view that material objects, such as they are conceived by physical -science, do really exist. It is held by some persons (and Reid is among -them) that we _do_ know of the existence, not only of other persons, -but also of the movements of matter in space. It is held that we do -know, with considerable precision, what kinds of movements of matter -generally precede my perception, when I have a particular perception. -It is held, for instance, that when I perceive a red and blue book side -by side on a shelf, at a certain distance from me, there have existed, -between two material objects, which may be called books, and another -kind of material object, which may be called my eyes, certain wave-like -motions of a material medium; that there have existed two different -sets of waves, of which the one is connected with my perception of red -and the other with my perception of blue; and that the relative heights -and breadths of the two different sets of waves, and the relative -velocity of their movements are very exactly known. It is held that -some men have a vast amount of very precise information about the -existence of objects of this kind; and I think the view that this is -so deserves a great deal of respect. But what I wish now to point out -is that no one's observation of his own perceptions, thoughts and -feelings, can, by itself, give him the slightest reason for believing -in the existence of any such material objects. All the arguments by -which I have tried to show that this kind of observation alone can give -me no reason to believe in the existence of any kind of perception -or feeling in another person, apply, with at least equal force, to -show that it can give me no reason to believe in the existence of any -kind of material object. On the other hand, if we are to admit the -principle that "Beliefs which lead to true predictions, are generally -true," this principle will give us at least as much reason to believe -in the existence of certain kinds of material objects as to believe -in the existence of other persons; since one of the most remarkable -facts about beliefs in the existence of such objects is that they do so -often lead to true predictions. But it must be remembered that we can -have no reason for believing this principle itself, _unless_ our own -perceptions, thoughts and feelings are _not_ the only kind of observed -"content" which really does exist: we can have no reason for it, unless -some such things as what I perceive, when I see a red and blue book -side by side, do really exist. - -It would seem, therefore, that if my own observations do give me any -reason whatever for believing in the existence either of any perception -in any other person or of any material object, it must be true that -not only my own perceptions, thoughts and feelings, but also _some_ of -the other kinds of things which I directly perceive--colours, sounds, -smells, etc.--do really exist: it must be true that some objects of -this kind _exist_ or are _real_ in precisely the same simple sense -in which my perceptions of them exist or are real. Is there then any -reason to think that this is not true? Is there any reason to think, -for instance, that _none_ of the colours which I perceive as occupying -areas of certain shapes and sizes really exist in the areas which -they appear to occupy? This is a question which I wished to discuss -at length, because I think that it is one in which there are real -difficulties. But I have given so much space to other questions, that I -can only deal with it very briefly here. - -Some philosophers are very fond of asserting that a colour cannot exist -except when it is perceived; and it might possibly be thought that -when I suggest that colours do really exist, I am suggesting that they -do exist when they are not perceived. I wish, therefore, briefly to -point out that the question whether anything does exist, when it is -not perceived, is one which I have not argued and shall not attempt -to argue in this paper. I have, indeed, tried to show that since -"exists" does not _mean_ "is perceived," it is, at least, conceivable -that things should exist, when they are not perceived. But I have -admitted that it is quite possible none _do_ so: it _may_ be the case -that whenever a thing exists, it is _also_ at the same time perceived, -for anything that I have said or shall say to the contrary. I think, -indeed, that, if such things as colours _do_ exist, my observation of -their behaviour will justify me in concluding that they also exist when -I myself am, at least, not aware of perceiving them: but since I have -not attempted to determine what kinds of observation are sufficient to -justify a generalisation, I do not pretend to say whether this is so -or not: and still less do I pretend to say whether, _if_ they exist -when _I_ do not perceive them, we are justified in supposing that -someone else must be perceiving them. The question whether anything -exists, when it is not perceived, and, if so, what things, seems to -me to be one which can only be settled by observation; and thus, I -conceive, observation might justify us in concluding that certain kinds -of things--pains, for example, do _not_ exist, when they are not -perceived and that other kinds of things--colours, for example, _do_ -exist, when they are not perceived. The only way, in which, so far as -I am aware, the theory I am advocating does conflict with ordinary -Idealistic conclusions, is that it does suggest that things, which are -_not_ "spiritual," do _sometimes_ exist, as really and as truly, as -things which are. - -The theory, therefore, that nothing exists, except when it is -perceived, is no objection (even if it be true) to the supposition that -colours do exist. What objections are there to this supposition? All -serious objections to it are, I think, of one type. They all rest upon -the assumption that, if a certain kind of thing exists at a certain -time in a certain place, certain other kinds of things cannot exist at -the same time in the same place. They are all, that is to say, of the -same type as Berkeley's argument: that, though the same body of water -may _appear_ to be simultaneously both hot and cold (if one of the -hands we plunge into it is warm and the other cold), yet the heat and -the cold cannot both _really_ be in the same body at the same time. And -it is worth noticing that anyone who uses this argument must admit that -he understands what is meant by "really existing in a given place," and -that he means by it something _other_ than "being perceived as in a -given place." For the argument itself admits that _both_ the heat _and_ -the cold _are_ really _perceived_ as being in the same place, and that -there is no difficulty in supposing that they are so; whereas It urges -that there _is_ a difficulty in supposing that they both _really exist_ -in it. - -Now there is one obvious defect in this type of argument, if designed -to prove that _no_ sensible quality exists at any place where it -is perceived as being--a defect, which Berkeley himself admits in -his "Principles," though he omits to notice it where he repeats the -argument in his "Hylas." Even if we assume that the heat and the -cold cannot _both_ exist in the same place (and I admit that, in this -case, the contrary assumption does seem repugnant to Common Sense), -it does not follow that _neither_ exists there. That is to say this -type of argument, even if we grant its initial assumption, will only -entitle us to conclude that _some_ sensible qualities which we perceive -as being in a certain place at a certain time, do not exist in that -place at that time. And this conclusion, I am inclined to think, is -true. In the case, for instance, of the so-called "images" which -we perceive in a looking-glass, we may very readily admit that the -colours and shapes which we perceive do _not_ exist at the places where -they appear to be--namely at various distances behind the glass. But -yet, so far as I can see, we have no reason whatever for supposing -that they do not, _except_ the assumption that our observations give -us reason to believe that _other_ sensible qualities _do_ exist in -those positions behind the glass; and the assumption that _where_ -these _other_ sensible qualities do exist, those which we see in the -glass do _not_ exist. I should, therefore, admit that _some_ sensible -qualities which we perceive as being in certain places, do _not_ exist -in those places, while still retaining my belief that others do. And -_perhaps_ this explanation is the one which should also be adopted in -the case of sensible qualities which appear to be at a great distance -from us. When, for instance, (as we say), "we see the moon," _what_ -we perceive (if the moon be full) is a round bright silver disc, of -a small size, at a place very distant from us. Does that silver disc -exist at that place? With what suppositions does the assumption that -it _does_ conflict? Only, so far as I can see, with the supposition -that the place in question is _really_ occupied by a body such as -science has taught us to suppose that the moon _really_ is--a spherical -body immensely larger than objects, in comparison with which the -silver disc which we perceive is small; _or else_ with the supposition -that the place in question is really occupied by some part of our -atmosphere, or some part of the medium which science supposes to exist -between our atmosphere and the moon; _or else_ with the supposition -that the place in question is really occupied by what we might see, -if the moon were nearer to us by many thousands of miles. Unless we -suppose that some other object _is_ in the place, in which the silver -disc appears to be, and that this object is of a kind which cannot -occupy the _same_ place which is occupied by a silver disc, we have -no reason to suppose that the silver disc does _not_ really exist in -the place where it appears to be. And, in this case, we _perhaps_ have -reason for both suppositions and should therefore conclude that the -silver disc, which we perceive, does not exist in any real place. - -Part, therefore, of these objections to our theory may, I think, be -met by admitting that _some_ of the ... sensible qualities which we -perceive do not exist at the places where they appear to exist, though -ethers do. But there is, I think, another class of cases, in which we -may be justified in denying that two things which (it is asserted) -cannot occupy the same space, really cannot. I will take an instance -which is, I think, typical. When we look at a drop of blood with the -naked eye, we perceive a small red spot, uniformly red all over. But -when (as we say) we look at the _same_ object under a microscope of -a certain power, I am informed that we see a much larger spot, of -similar shape, indeed, but _not_ uniformly red--having, in fact, small -red spots at different positions in a yellowish field. And if we were -again to look at the _same_ object through a microscope of much higher -power still, we might perceive yet a third different arrangement of -colours. Is there any fatal objection to supposing that all _three_ -appearances--the uniform red spot, the yellowish field with reddish -spots in it, and the third, whatever that may be--do all really occupy -the same real spatial area? I cannot see that there is. We are familiar -with the idea that a given spatial area may contain parts which are -invisible to us. And hence, I think it is quite conceivable that parts -of a given area may be _really_ occupied by one colour, while the whole -is _really_ occupied by another. And this, I think, is what we actually -_do_ believe in many cases. At all events, we certainly believe that -the area which appears to be occupied by one colour really is _the same -area_ as that which appears to be occupied by another. And, unless -we assume that the area, in both cases, really is the same, we can -certainly have no reason to deny that each colour does really occupy -the area which it appears to occupy. - -For these reasons I think that the difficulties in the way of supposing -that _some_ of the sensible qualities which we perceive as being in -certain places, really exist in the places in which we perceive them -to be, are not insuperable. I have indeed not done justice to these -difficulties; but then, neither have I done justice to what is to be -said on the other side. At all events, I think it is plain that we have -no reason to assert, in any case whatever, that a perceived colour -does _not_ really exist in the place where it is perceived as being, -_unless_ we assume that that very same place really is occupied by -something else_--either_ by some different sensible qualities _or_ by -material objects such as physical science supposes to exist. But what -reason can we give for such an assumption? I have tried to show that -our own observations can give us none, _unless_ we assume that some of -the sensible qualities, which we observe as occupying certain places, -do really exist in those places. And, if this is so, then we must -admit that neither he who believes (with Reid) in the existence of -other minds and of matter also, nor he who believes in the existence -of other minds and denies that of matter, can have, in his own -observations, the slightest reason either for his assertion or for his -denial: we must admit that he can have no reason for either assertion -or denial, except one which consists in the assumption of the existence -or nonexistence of something which he does _not_ observe--something, -therefore, of the very same kind as that for which he gives it as a -reason. I am very unwilling to suppose that this is the case: I am -very unwilling to suppose that he who believes that Sindbad the Sailor -really saw what the "Arabian Nights" represent him as seeing, has just -as good reason (so far as his own observation goes) for believing this -as he who denies it has for denying it. Still this may be the case. -We _must_, perhaps, be content to assume as certain that for which -our observation gives no reason: to assume such propositions as that -Sindbad did _not_ see a Roc, and that you _do_ hear my voice. But if it -is said that these things are certain; then it also appears to me to -be certain that the colours which I perceive do exist (_some_ of them) -where I perceive them. The more I look at objects round me, the more I -am unable to resist the conviction that what I see does exist, as truly -and as really, as my perception of it The conviction is overwhelming. - -This being, then, the state of the case, I think I may at least plead -that we have grounds for suspense of judgment as to whether what I -see does _not_ really exist; grounds, too, for renewed enquiry, more -careful than such enquiry has sometimes been in the past. - - -[1] Not now in 1921. - - - - -WILLIAM JAMES - - -My object in this paper is to discuss some of the things which Prof. -William James says about truth in the recent book, to which he has -given the above name.[1] In Lecture VI he professes to give an account -of a theory, which he calls "the pragmatist theory of truth;" and he -professes to give a briefer preliminary account of the same theory in -Lecture II. Moreover, in Lecture VII, he goes on to make some further -remarks about truth. In all these Lectures he seems to me to make -statements to which there are very obvious objections; and my main -object is to point out, as clearly and simply as I can, what seem to me -to be the principal objections to some of these statements. - -We may, I think, distinguish three different things which he seems -particularly anxious to assert about truth. - -(I) In the first place, he is plainly anxious to assert some connection -between truth and "verification" or "utility." Our true ideas, he seems -to say, are those that "work," in the sense that they are or can be -"verified," or are "useful." - -(II) In the second place, he seems to object to the view that truth is -something "static" or "immutable." He is anxious to assert that truths -are in some sense "mutable." - -(III) In the third place, he asserts that "to an unascertainable -extent our truths are man-made products" (p. 242). - -To what he asserts under each of these three heads there are, I think, -serious objections; and I now propose to point out what seem to me to -be the principal ones, under each head separately. - - -(I) - -Professor James is plainly anxious to assert _some_ connection between -truth and "verification" or "utility." And that there is _some_ -connection between them everybody will admit. That _many_ of our true -ideas are verified; that _many_ of them can be verified; and that -_many_ of them are useful, is, I take it, quite indisputable. But -Professor James seems plainly to wish to assert something more than -this. And one more thing which he wishes to assert is, I think, pretty -plain. He suggests, at the beginning of Lecture VI, that he is going to -tell us in what sense it is that our true ideas "agree with reality." -Truth, he says, certainly _means_ their agreement with reality; -the only question is as to what we are to understand by the words -"agreement" and "reality" in this proposition. And he first briefly -considers the theory, that the sense in which our true ideas agree with -reality, is that they "copy" some reality. And he affirms that some -of our true ideas really do do this. But he rejects the theory, as a -theory of what truth means, on the ground that they do not _all_ do so. -Plainly, therefore, he implies that no theory of what truth _means_ -will be correct, unless it tells us of some property which belongs to -_all_ our true ideas without exception. But his own theory is a theory -of what truth means. Apparently, therefore, he wishes to assert that -not only many but _all_ our true ideas are or can be verified; that -_all_ of them are useful. And it is, I think, pretty plain that this is -_one_ of the things which he wishes to assert. - -Apparently, therefore, Professor James wishes to assert that _all_ -our true ideas are or can be verified--that _all_ are useful. And -certainly this is not a truism like the proposition that _many_ of -them are so. Even if this were all that he meant, it would be worth -discussing. But even this, I think, is not all. The very first -proposition in which he expresses his theory is the following. "True -ideas," he says (p. 201) "are those that we can assimilate, validate, -corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot." And -what does this mean? Let us, for brevity's sake, substitute the word -"verify" alone for the four words which Professor James uses, as he -himself subsequently seems to do. He asserts, then, that true ideas -are _those which_ we can verify. And plainly he does not mean by this -merely that _some_ of the ideas which we can verify are true, while -plenty of others, which we can verify, are not true. The plain meaning -of his words is that _all_ the ideas which we can verify are true. -No one would use them who did not mean this. Apparently, therefore, -Professor James means to assert not merely that we can verify all our -true ideas; but also that all the ideas, which we can verify, are true. -And so, too, with utility or usefulness. He seems to mean not merely -that all our true ideas are useful; but that all those which are useful -are true. This would follow, for one thing, from the fact that he seems -to use the words "verification" or "verifiability" and "usefulness" as -if they came to the same thing. But, in this case too, he asserts it -in words that have but one plain meaning. "The true" he says (p. 222) -"is only the expedient in the way of our thinking." "The true" is _the_ -expedient: that is, _all_ expedient thinking is true. Or again: "An -idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives" (p. -75). That is to say, _every_ idea, which is profitable to our lives, -is, while it is so, true. These words certainly have a plain enough -meaning. Apparently, therefore, Professor James means to assert not -merely that all true ideas are useful, but also that all useful ideas -are true. - -Professor James' words, then, do at least suggest that he wishes to -assert all four of the following propositions. He wishes to assert, it -would seem-- - -(1) That we can verify all those of our ideas, which are true. - -(2) That all those among our ideas, which we can verify, are true. - -(3) That all our true ideas are useful. - -(4) That all those of our ideas, which are useful, are true. - -These four propositions are what I propose first to consider. He -does mean to assert them, at least. Very likely he wishes to assert -something more even than these. He does, in fact, suggest that he means -to assert, in addition, that these properties of "verifiability" and -"utility" are the _only_ properties (beside that of being properly -_called_ "true") which belong to all our true ideas and to none but -true ideas. But this obviously cannot be true, unless all these four -propositions are true. And therefore we may as well consider them first. - -First, then, can we verify all our true ideas? - -I wish only to point out the plainest and most obvious reasons why I -think it is doubtful whether we can. - -We are very often in doubt as to whether we did or did not do a certain -thing in the past. We may have the idea that we did, and also the idea -that we did not; and we may wish to find out which idea is the true -one. Very often, indeed, I may believe very strongly, that I did do a -certain thing; and somebody else, who has equally good reason to know, -may believe equally strongly that I did not. For instance, I may have -written a letter, and may believe that I used certain words in it. -But my correspondent may believe that I did not. Can we always verify -either of these ideas? Certainly sometimes we can. The letter may be -produced, and prove that I did use the words in question. And I shall -then have verified my idea. Or it may prove that I did not use them. -And then we shall have verified my correspondent's idea. But, suppose -the letter has been destroyed; suppose there is no copy of it, nor any -trustworthy record of what was said in it; suppose there is no other -witness as to what I said in it, beside myself and my correspondent? -Can we then always verify which of our ideas is the true one? I think -it is very doubtful whether we can _nearly_ always. Certainly we may -often try to discover any possible means of verification, and be quite -unable, for a time at least, to discover any. Such cases, in which we -are unable, for a time at least, to verify either of two contradictory -ideas, occur very commonly indeed. Let us take an even more trivial -instance than the last. Bad whist-players often do not notice at all -carefully which cards they have among the lower cards in a suit. At -the end of a hand they cannot be certain whether they had or had not -the seven of diamonds, or the five of spades. And, after the cards -have been shuffled, a dispute will sometimes arise as to whether a -particular player had the seven of diamonds or not. His partner may -think that he had, and he himself may think that he had not. Both may -be uncertain, and the memory of both, on such a point, may be well -known to be untrustworthy. And, moreover, neither of the other players -may be able to remember any better. Is it always possible to verify -which of these ideas is the true one? Either the player did or did not -have the seven of diamonds. This much is certain. One person thinks -that he did, and another thinks he did not; and both, so soon as the -question is raised, have before their minds both of these ideas--the -idea that he did, and the idea that he did not. This also is certain. -And it is certain that one or other of these two ideas is true. But can -they always verify either of them? Sometimes, no doubt, they can, even -after the cards have been shuffled. There may have been a fifth person -present, overlooking the play, whose memory is perfectly trustworthy, -and whose word may be taken as settling the point. Or the players may -themselves be able, by recalling other incidents of play, to arrive at -such a certainty as may be said to verify the one hypothesis or the -other. But very often neither of these two things will occur. And, in -such a case, is it always possible to verify the true idea? Perhaps, -theoretically, it may be still possible. Theoretically, I suppose, the -fact that one player, and not any of the other three, had the card in -his hand, may have made some difference to the card, which _might_ -be discovered by some possible method of scientific investigation. -Perhaps some such difference may remain even after the same card has -been repeatedly used in many subsequent games. But suppose the same -question arises again, a week after the original game was played. Did -you, or did you not, last week have the seven of diamonds in that -particular hand? The question has not been settled in the meantime; -and now, perhaps, the original pack of cards has been destroyed. Is it -still possible to verify either idea? Theoretically, I suppose, it may -be still possible. But even this, I think, is very doubtful. And surely -it is plain that, humanly and practically speaking, it will often have -become quite impossible to verify either idea. In all probability it -never will be possible for any man to verify whether I had the card -or not on this particular occasion. No doubt we are here speaking of -an idea, which some man _could have_ verified at one time. But the -hypothesis I am considering is the hypothesis that we never have a true -idea, which we _can_ not verify; that is to say, which we cannot verify -_after_ the idea has occurred. And with regard to this hypothesis, it -seems to me quite plain that _very often indeed_ we have two ideas, one -or other of which is certainly true; and yet that, in all probability, -it is no longer possible and never will be possible for any man to -verify either. - -It seems to me, then, that we very often have true ideas which we -cannot verify; true ideas, which, in all probability, no man ever will -be able to verify. And, so far, I have given only comparatively trivial -instances. But it is plain that, in the same sense, historians are very -frequently occupied with true ideas, which it is doubtful whether they -can verify. One historian thinks that a certain event took place, and -another that it did not; and both may admit that they cannot verify -their idea. Subsequent historians may, no doubt, sometimes be able to -verify one or the other. New evidence may be discovered or men may -learn to make a better use of evidence already in existence. But is -it certain that this will _always_ happen? Is it certain that _every_ -question, about which historians have doubted, will some day be able to -be settled by verification of one or the other hypothesis? Surely the -probability is that in the case of an immense number of events, with -regard to which we should like to know whether they happened or not, it -never will be possible for any man to verify either the one hypothesis -or the other. Yet it may be certain that either the events in question -did happen or did not. Here, therefore, again, we have a large number -of ideas--cases where many men doubt whether a thing did happen or -did not, and have therefore the idea both of its having happened and -of its not having happened--with regard to which it is certain that -half of them are true, but where it seems highly doubtful whether -any single one of them will ever be able to be verified. No doubt it -is just possible that men will some day be able to verify every one -of them. But surely it is very doubtful whether they will. And the -theory against which I am protesting is the positive assertion that -we _can_ verify all our true ideas--that some one some day certainly -will be able to verify every one of them. This theory, I urge, has all -probability against it. - -And so far I have been dealing only with ideas with regard to what -happened in the past. These seem to me to be the cases which offer -the most numerous and most certain exceptions to the rule that we can -verify our true ideas. With regard to particular past events, either -in their own lives or in those of other people, men very frequently -have ideas, which it seems highly improbable that any man will ever be -able to verify. And yet it is certain that a great many of these ideas -are true, because in a great many cases we have both the idea that the -event did happen and also the idea that it did not, when it is certain -that one or other of these ideas is true. And these ideas with regard -to past events would by themselves be sufficient for my purpose. If, as -seems certain, there are many true ideas with regard to the past, which -it is highly improbable that anyone will ever be able to verify, then, -obviously, there is nothing in a true idea which makes it certain that -we can verify it. But it is, I think, certainly not only in the case -of ideas, with regard to the past, that it is doubtful whether we can -verify all the true ideas we have. In the case of many generalisations -dealing not only with the past but with the future, it is, I think, -obviously doubtful whether we shall ever be able to verify all those -which are true; although here, perhaps, in most cases, the probability -that we shall not is not so great. But is it quite certain, that in all -cases where scientific men have considered hypotheses, one or other -of which must be true, either will ever be verified? It seems to be -obviously doubtful. Take, for instance, the question whether our actual -space is Euclidean or not. This is a case where the alternative has -been considered; and where it is certain that, whatever be meant by -"our actual space," it either is Euclidean or is not. It has been held, -too, that the hypothesis that it is not Euclidean might, conceivably, -be verified by observations. But it is doubtful whether it ever will -be. And though it would be rash to say that no man ever will be able -to verify either hypothesis; it is also rash to assert positively that -we shall--that we certainly can verify the true hypotheses. There are, -I believe, ever so many similar cases, where alternative hypotheses, -one or other of which must be true, have occurred to men of science, -and where yet it is very doubtful whether either ever will be verified. -Or take, again, such ideas as the idea that there is a God, or the -idea that we are immortal. Many men have had not only contradictory -ideas, but contradictory beliefs, about these matters. And here we -have cases where it is disputed whether these ideas have not actually -been verified. But it seems to me doubtful whether they have been. And -there is a view, which seems to me to deserve respect, that, in these -matters, we never shall be able to verify the true hypothesis. Is it -perfectly certain that this view is a false one? I do not say that it -is true. I think it is quite possible that we shall some day be able to -verify either the belief that we are immortal or the belief that we are -not. But it seems to me doubtful whether we shall. And for this reason -alone I should refuse to assent to the positive assertion that we -certainly can verify all our true ideas. - -When, therefore, Professor James tells us that "True ideas are those -that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas -are those that we cannot," there seems to be a serious objection to -part of what these words imply. They imply that no idea of ours is -true, unless we can verify it. They imply, therefore, that whenever a -man wonders whether or not he had the seven of diamonds in the third -hand at whist last night, neither of these ideas is true unless he can -verify it. But it seems certain that in this, and an immense number of -similar cases, one or other of the two ideas is true. Either, he did -have the card in his hand or he did not. If anything is a fact, this -is one. Either, therefore, Professor James' words imply the denial of -this obvious fact, or else he implies that in _all_ such cases we _can_ -verify one or other of the two ideas. But to this the objection is -that, in any obvious sense of the words, it seems very doubtful whether -we can. On the contrary it seems extremely probable that in a _very -large_ number of such cases no man ever will be able to verify either -of the two ideas. There is, therefore, a serious objection to what -Professor James' words imply. Whether he himself really means to assert -these things which his words imply I do not know. Perhaps he would -admit that, in this sense, we probably cannot verify nearly all our -true ideas. All that I have wished to make plain is that there is, at -least, an objection to what he says, whether to what he means or not. -There is ample reason why we should refuse assent to the statement that -none of our ideas are true, except those which we can verify. - -But to another part of what he implies by the words quoted above, there -is, I think, no serious objection. There is reason to object to the -statement that we can verify all our true ideas; but to the statement -that all ideas, which we can "assimilate, validate, corroborate and -verify," are true, I see no serious objection. Here, I think, we might -say simply that all ideas which we can verify are true. To this, which -is the second of the four propositions, which I distinguished above -(p. 35) as what Professor James seems to wish to assert, there is, I -think, no serious objection, if we understand the word "verify" in -its proper and natural sense. We may, no doubt, sometimes say that we -have verified an idea or an hypothesis, when we have only obtained -evidence which proves it to be probable, and does not prove it to be -certain. And, if we use the word in this loose sense for incomplete -verification, it is obviously the case that we may verify an idea -which is not true. But it seems scarcely necessary to point this out. -And where we really can _completely_ verify an idea or an hypothesis, -there, undoubtedly, the idea which we can verify is always true. The -very meaning of the word "verify" is to find evidence which does really -prove an idea to be true; and where an idea can be really proved to be -true, it is of course, always true. - -This is all I wish to say about Professor James' first two -propositions, namely:-- - -(1) That no ideas of ours are true, except those which we can verify. - -(2) That all those ideas, which we can verify, are true. - -The first seems to me extremely doubtful--in fact, almost certainly -untrue; the second on the other hand, certainly true, in its most -obvious meaning. And I shall say no more about them. The fact is, I -doubt whether either of them expresses anything which Professor James -is really anxious to assert. I have mentioned them, only because his -words do, in fact, imply them and because he gives those words a very -prominent place. But I have already had occasion to notice that he -seems to speak as if to say that we can verify an idea came to the same -thing as saying it is useful to us. And it is the connection of truth -with usefulness, not its connection with "verification," that he is, I -think, really anxious to assert. He talks about "verification" only, -I believe, because he thinks that what he says about it will support -his main view that truth is what "works," is "useful," is "expedient," -"pays." It is this main view we have now to consider. We have to -consider the two propositions:-- - -(3) That all our true ideas are useful. - -(4) That all ideas, which are useful, are true. - -First, then: is it the case that all our true ideas are useful? Is it -the case that none of our ideas are true, except those which are useful? - -I wish to introduce my discussion of this question by quoting a -passage in which Professor James seems to me to say something which is -indisputably true. Towards the end of Lecture VI, he attacks the view -that truths "have an unconditional claim to be recognised." And in the -course of his attack the following passage occurs:-- - -"Must I," he says, "constantly be repeating the truth 'twice two are -four' because of its eternal claim on recognition? or is it sometimes -irrelevant? Must my thoughts dwell night and day on my personal sins -and blemishes, because I truly have them?--or may I sink and ignore -them in order to be a decent social unit, and not a mass of morbid -melancholy and apology?" - -"It is quite evident," he goes on, "that our obligation to acknowledge -truth, so far from being unconditional, is tremendously conditional. -Truth with a big T, and in the singular, claims abstractly to be -recognised, of course; but concrete truths in the plural need be -recognised only when their recognition is expedient." (pp. 231-232). - -What Professor James says in this passage seems to me so indisputably -true as fully to justify the vigour of his language. It is as clear -as anything can be that it would not be useful for any man's mind to -be _always_ occupied with the true idea that he had certain faults -and blemishes; or to be _always_ occupied with the idea that twice -two are four. It is clear, that is, that, if there are times at which -a particular true idea is useful, there certainly are other times -at which it would _not_ be useful, but positively in the way. This -is plainly true of nearly all, if not quite all, our true ideas. It -is plainly true with regard to nearly all of them that, even if the -occasions on which their occurrence is useful are many, the occasions -on which their occurrence would _not_ be useful are many more. With -regard to most of them it is true that on most occasions they will, as -Professor James says elsewhere, "be practically irrelevant, and had -better remain latent." - -It is, then, quite clear that almost any particular true idea _would_ -not be useful at all times and that the times at which it would _not_ -be useful, are many more than the times at which it would. And what -we have to consider is whether, in just this sense in which it is so -clear that most true ideas would _not_ be useful at most times, it is -nevertheless true that all our true ideas _are_ useful. Is this so? Are -all our true ideas useful? - -Professor James, we see, has just told us that there are ever so many -occasions upon which a particular true idea, such as that 2 + 2= 4, -_would_ not be useful--when, on the contrary, it would be positively in -the way. And this seems to be indisputably clear. But is not something -else almost equally clear? Is it not almost equally clear that cases, -such as he says _would_ not be useful, do sometimes actually happen? Is -it not clear that we do actually sometimes have true ideas, at times -when they are not useful, but are positively in the way? It seems -to me to be perfectly clear that this does sometimes occur; and not -sometimes only, but very commonly. The cases in which true ideas occur -at times when they are useful, are, perhaps, far _more_ numerous; but, -if we look at men in general, the cases in which true ideas occur, at -times when they are not useful, do surely make up positively a very -large number. Is it not the case that men do sometimes dwell on their -faults and blemishes, when it is _not_ useful for them to do so? when -they would much better be thinking of something else? Is it not the -case that they are often unable to get their minds away from a true -idea, when it is harmful for them to dwell on it? Still more commonly, -does it not happen that they waste their time in acquiring pieces of -information which are no use to them, though perhaps very useful to -other people? All this seems to me to be undeniable--just as undeniable -as what Professor James himself has said; and, if this is so, then, in -one sense of the words, it is plainly not true that all, or nearly all, -our true ideas are useful. _In one sense of the words._ For if I have -the idea that 2+2=4 on one day, and then have it again the next, I may -certainly, in a sense, call the idea I have on one day _one_ idea, and -the idea I have on the next _another._ I have had two ideas that 2+2=4, -and not one only. Or if two different persons both think that I have -faults, there have been two ideas of this truth and not one only. And -in asking whether _all_ our true ideas are useful, we might mean to ask -whether _both_ of these ideas were useful and not merely whether one of -them was. In this sense, then, it is plainly not true that _all_ our -true ideas are useful. It is not true, that is, that every true idea is -useful, _whenever it occurs._ - -In one sense, then, it is plainly not true that all our true ideas -are useful. But there still remains a perfectly legitimate sense in -which it might be true. It might be meant, that is, not that every -_occurrence_ of a true idea is useful, but that every true idea is -useful on at least one of the occasions when it occurs. But is this, -in fact, the case? It seems to me almost as plain that it is not, as -that the other was not. We have seen that true ideas are not by any -means always useful on every occasion when they occur; though most -that do occur many times over and to many different people are, no -doubt, useful on some of these occasions. But there seems to be an -immense number of true ideas, which occur but once and to one person, -and never again either to him or to anyone else. I may, for instance, -idly count the number of dots on the back of a card, and arrive at a -true idea of their number; and yet, perhaps, I may never think of their -number again, nor anybody else ever know it. We are all, it seems to -me, constantly noticing trivial details, and getting true ideas about -them, of which we never think again, and which nobody else ever gets. -And is it quite certain that all these true ideas are useful? It seems -to me perfectly clear, on the contrary, that many of them are not. Just -as it is clear that many men sometimes waste their time in acquiring -information which is useful to others but not to them, surely it is -clear that they sometimes waste their time in acquiring information, -which is useful to nobody at all, because nobody else ever acquires -it. I do not say that it is never useful idly to count the number -of dots on the back of a card. Plainly it is sometimes useful to be -idle, and one idle employment may often be as good as another. But -surely it is true that men _sometimes_ do these things when their time -would have been better employed otherwise? Surely they sometimes get -into the habit of attending to trivial truths, which it is as great a -disadvantage that they should attend to as that they should constantly -be thinking of their own thoughts and blemishes? I cannot see my way -to deny that this is so; and therefore I cannot see my way to assert -positively that all our true ideas are useful, even so much as on _one -occasion._ It seems to me that there are many true ideas which occur -but once, and which are not useful when they do occur. And if this be -so, then it is plainly not true that _all_ our true ideas are useful in -any sense at all. - -These seem to me to be the most obvious objections to the assertion -that all our true ideas are useful. It is clear, we saw to begin with, -that true ideas, which are sometimes useful, _would_ not be useful at -all times. And it seemed almost equally clear that they do sometimes -occur at times when they are not useful. Our true ideas, therefore -are not useful at every time when they actually occur. But in just -this sense in which it is so clear that true ideas which are sometimes -useful, nevertheless sometimes occur at times when they are not, it -seems pretty plain that true ideas, which occur but once, are, some of -them, not useful. If an idea, which is sometimes useful, does sometimes -occur to a man at a time when it is irrelevant and in the way, why -should not an idea, which occurs but once, occur at a time when it is -irrelevant and in the way? It seems hardly possible to doubt that this -does sometimes happen. But, if this be so, then it is not true that all -our true ideas are useful, even so much as on one occasion. It is not -true that none of our ideas are true, except those which are useful. - -But now, what are we to say of the converse proposition--the -proposition that all those among our ideas, which are useful, are true? -That we never have a useful idea, which is not true? - -I confess the matter seems to me equally clear here. The assertion -should mean that every idea, which is at any time useful, is true; -that no idea, which is not true, is ever useful. And it seems hardly -possible to doubt that this assertion is false. It Is, in the first -place, commonly held that it is sometimes right positively to deceive -another person. In war, for instance it is held that one army is -justified in trying to give the enemy a false idea as to where it -will be at a given time. Such a false idea is sometimes given, and it -seems to me quite clear that it is sometimes useful. In such a case, -no doubt, it may be said that the false idea is useful to the party -who have given it, but not useful to those who actually believe in it. -And the question whether it is useful on the whole will depend upon -the question which side it is desirable should win. But it seems to me -unquestionable that the false idea is sometimes useful on the whole. -Take, for instance, the case of a party of savages, who wish to make a -night attack and massacre a party of Europeans but are deceived as to -the position in which the Europeans are encamped. It is surely plain -that such a false idea is sometimes useful on the whole. But quite -apart from the question whether deception is ever justifiable, it is -not very difficult to think of cases where a false idea, not produced -by deception, is plainly useful--and useful, not merely on the whole, -but to the person who has it as well. A man often thinks that his watch -is right, when, in fact, it is slow, and his false idea may cause -him to miss his train. And in such cases, no doubt, his false idea -is _generally_ disadvantageous. But, in a particular case, the train -which he would have caught but for his false idea may be destroyed -in a railway accident, or something may suddenly occur at home, which -renders it much more useful that he should be there, than it would -have been for him to catch his train. Do such cases never occur? And -is not the false idea sometimes useful in some of them? It seems to me -perfectly clear that it is _sometimes_ useful for a man to think his -watch is right when it is wrong. And such instances would be sufficient -to show that it is not the case that every idea of ours, which is ever -useful, is a true idea. But let us take cases, not, like these, of an -idea, which occurs but a few times or to one man, but of ideas which -have occurred to many men at many times. It seems to me very difficult -to be sure that the belief in an eternal hell has not been often useful -to many men, and yet it may be doubted whether this idea is true. And -so, too, with the belief in a happy life after death, or the belief in -the existence of a God; it is, I think, very difficult to be sure that -these beliefs have not been, and are not still, often useful, and yet -it may be doubted whether they are true. These beliefs, of course, are -matters of controversy. Some men believe that they are both useful and -true; and others, again, that they are neither. And I do not think we -are justified in giving them as certain instances of beliefs, which -are not true, but, nevertheless, have often been useful. But there is -a view that these beliefs, though not true, have, nevertheless, been -often useful; and this view seems to me to deserve respect, especially -since, as we have seen, some beliefs, which are not true, certainly -are sometimes useful. Are we justified in asserting positively that it -is false? Is it perfectly certain that beliefs, which have often been -useful to many men, may not, nevertheless, be untrue? Is it perfectly -certain that beliefs, which are not true, have not often been useful -to many men? The certainty may at least be doubted, and in any case it -seems certain that some beliefs, which are not true, are, nevertheless, -sometimes useful. - -For these reasons, it seems to me almost certain that _both_ the -assertions which I have been considering are false. It is almost -certainly false that all our true ideas are useful, and almost -certainly false that all our useful ideas are true. But I have only -urged what seem to me to be the most obvious objections to these two -statements; I have not tried to sustain these objections by elaborate -arguments, and I have omitted elaborate argument, partly because of a -reason which I now wish to state. The fact is, I am not at all sure -that Professor James would not himself admit that both these statements -are false. I think it is quite possible he would admit that they are, -and would say that he never meant either to assert or to imply the -contrary. He complains that some of the critics of Pragmatism are -unwilling to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into the -statements of Pragmatism; and, perhaps, he would say that this is the -case here. I certainly hope that he would. I certainly hope he would -say that these statements, to which I have objected, are silly. For -it does seem to me intensely silly to say that we can verify all our -true ideas; intensely silly to say that every one of our true ideas -is at some time useful; intensely silly to say that every idea which -is ever useful is true. I hope Professor James would admit all these -things to be silly, for if he and other Pragmatists would admit even -as much as this, I think a good deal would be gained. But it by no -means follows that because a philosopher would admit a view to be -silly, when it is definitely put before him, he has not himself been -constantly holding and implying that very view. He may quite sincerely -protest that he never has either held or implied it, and yet he may -all the time have been not only implying it but holding it--vaguely, -perhaps, but really. A man may assure us, quite sincerely that he is -not angry; he may really think that he is not, and yet we may be able -to judge quite certainly from what he says that he really is angry. -He may assure us quite sincerely that he never meant anything to our -discredit by what he said--that he was not thinking of anything in the -least discreditable to us, and yet it may be plain from his words that -he was actually condemning us very severely. And so with a philosopher. -He may protest, quite angrily, when a view is put before him in other -words than his own, that he never either meant or implied any such -thing, and yet it may be possible to judge, from what he says, that -this very view, wrapped up in other words, was not only held by him but -was precisely what made his thoughts seem to him to be interesting and -important. Certainly he may quite often imply a given thing which, at -another time, he denies. Unless it were possible for a philosopher to -do this, there would be very little inconsistency in philosophy, and -surely everyone will admit that _other_ philosophers are very often -inconsistent. And so in this case, even if Professor James would say -that he never meant to imply the things to which I have been objecting, -yet in the case of two of these things, I cannot help thinking that -he does actually imply them--nay more, that he is frequently actually -vaguely thinking of them, and that his theory of truth owes its -interest, in very great part, to the fact that he is implying them. -In the case of the two views that all our true ideas are useful, and -that all our useful ideas are true, I think this is so, and I do not -mean merely that his _words_ imply them. A man's _words_ may often -imply a thing, when he himself is in no way, however vaguely, thinking -either of that thing or of anything which implies it; he may simply -have expressed himself unfortunately. But in the case of the two views -that all our true ideas are useful, and all our useful ideas true, I do -not think this is so with Professor James. I think that his thoughts -seem interesting to him and others, largely because he is thinking, -not merely of words, but of things which imply these two views, in the -very form in which I have objected to them. And I wish now to give some -reasons for thinking this. - -Professor James certainly wishes to assert that there is _some_ -connection between truth and utility. And the connection which I have -suggested that he has vaguely before his mind is this: that every true -idea is, at some time or other, useful, and conversely that every idea, -which is ever useful, is true. And I have urged that-there are obvious -objections to both these views. But now, supposing Professor James does -not mean to assert either of these two things, what else can he mean to -assert? What else can he mean, that would account for the interest and -importance he seems to attach to his assertion of connection between -truth and utility? Let us consider the alternatives. - -And, first of all, he might mean that _most_ of our true ideas are -useful, and _most_ of our useful ideas true. He might mean that most -of our true ideas are useful at some time or other; and even that most -of them are useful, whenever they actually occur. And he might mean, -moreover, that if we consider the whole range of ideas, which are -useful to us, we shall find that by far the greater number of them are -true ones; that true ideas are far more often useful to us, than those -which are not true. And all this, I think, may be readily admitted to -be true. If this were all that he meant, I do not think that anyone -would be very anxious to dispute it. But is it conceivable that this -is _all_ that he means? Is it conceivable that he should have been so -anxious to insist upon this admitted commonplace? Is it conceivable -that he should have been offering us this, and nothing more, as a -theory of what truth means, and a theory worth making a fuss about, and -being proud of? It seems to me quite inconceivable that this should -have been _all_ that he meant. He must have had something more than -this in his mind. But, if so, what more? - -In the passage which I quoted at the beginning, as showing that he does -mean to assert that _all_ useful ideas are true, he immediately goes on -to assert a qualification, which must now be noticed. "The true," he -says, "is only the expedient in the way of our thinking" (p. 222). But -he immediately adds: "Expedient in the long run, and on the whole, of -course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight won't -necessarily meet all further experiences equally satisfactorily." -Here, therefore, we have something else that he might mean. What is -expedient _in the long run_, he means to say, is true. And what exactly -does this mean? It seems to mean that an idea, which is not true, may -be expedient _for some time_. That is to say, it may occur _once,_ -and be expedient then; and again, and be expedient then; and so on, -over a considerable period. But (Professor James seems to prophesy) -if it is not true, there will come a time, when it will cease to be -expedient. If it occurs again and again over a long _enough_ period, -there will at last, if it is not true, come a time when it will (for -once at least) fail to be useful, and will (perhaps he means) _never_ -be useful again. This is, 1 think, what Professor James means in this -passage. He means, I think, that though an idea, which is not true, -may for some time be repeatedly expedient, there will at last come a -time when its occurrence will, perhaps, _never_ be expedient again, -certainly will, for a time, not be _generally_ expedient. And this -a view which, it seems to me, may possibly be true. It is certainly -possible that a time may come, in the far future, when ideas, which -are not true, will hardly ever, if ever, be expedient. And this is all -that Professor James seems here positively to mean. He seems to mean -that, if you take time _enough_, false ideas will some day cease to be -expedient. And it is very difficult to be sure that this is not true; -since it is very difficult to prophesy as to what may happen in the far -future. I am sure I hope that this prophesy will come true. But in the -meantime (Professor James seems to admit) ideas, which are not true, -may, for an indefinitely long time, again and again be expedient. And -is it conceivable that a theory, which admits this, is _all_ that he -has meant to assert? Is it conceivable that what interests him, in his -theory of truth, is merely the belief that, some day or other, false -ideas will cease to be expedient? "In the long run, _of course_," he -says, as if this were what he had meant all along. But I think it is -quite plain that this is _not_ all that he has meant. This may be one -thing which he is anxious to assert, but it certainly does not explain -the whole of his interest in his theory of truth. - -And, in fact, there is quite a different theory which he seems plainly -to have in his mind in other places. When Professor James says, "in -the long run, _of course_," he implies that ideas which are expedient -only for a _short_ run, are very often not true. But in what he says -elsewhere he asserts the very opposite of this. He says elsewhere that -a belief is true "_so long as_ to believe it is profitable to our -lives" (p. 75). That is to say, a belief will be true, _so long as_ -it is useful, even if it is _not_ useful in the long run! This is -certainly quite a different theory; and, strictly speaking, it implies -that an idea, which is useful even _on one occasion,_ will be true. But -perhaps this is only a verbal implication. I think very likely that -here Professor James was only thinking of ideas, which can be said _to -have a run,_ though only a comparatively short one--of ideas, that is, -which are expedient, not merely on one occasion, but _for some time._ -That is to say, the theory which he now suggests, is that ideas, which -occur again and again, perhaps to one man only, perhaps to several -different people, over some space of time are, if they are expedient on -most occasions within that space of time, true. This is a view which he -is, I think, really anxious to assert; and if it were true, it would, I -think, be important. And it is difficult to find instances which show, -with certainty, that it is false. I believe that it is false; but it -is difficult to prove it, because, in the case of some ideas it is so -difficult to be certain that they ever were useful, and in the case of -others so difficult to be certain that they are not true. A belief such -as I spoke of before--the belief in eternal hell--is an instance. I -think this belief has been, for a long time, useful, and that yet it is -false. But it is, perhaps, arguable that it never has been useful; and -many people on the other hand, would still assert that it is true. It -cannot, therefore, perhaps, fairly be used as an instance of a belief, -which is certainly not true, and yet has for some time been useful. But -whether this view that all beliefs, which are expedient for some time, -are true, be true or false; can it be all that Professor James means to -assert? Can it constitute the whole of what interests him in his theory -of truth? - -I do not think it can. I think it is plain that he has in his mind -something more than _any_ of these alternatives, or than all -of them taken together. And I think so partly for the following -reason. He speaks from the outset as if he intended to tell us what -_distinguishes_ true ideas from those which are not true; to tell us, -that is to say, not merely of some property which belongs to all our -true ideas; nor yet merely of some property, which belongs to none -but true ideas; but of some property which satisfies _both_ these -requirements at once--which both belongs to all our true ideas, and -_also_ belongs to none but true ones. Truth, he says to begin with, -means the agreement of our ideas with reality; and he adds "as falsity -their disagreement." And he explains that he is going to tell us what -property it is that is meant by these words "agreement with reality." -So again in the next passage which I quoted: "True ideas," he says "are -those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify." But, -he also adds, "False ideas are those that we cannot." And no one, I -think, could possibly speak in this way, who had not in his head the -intention of telling us what property it is which _distinguishes_ true -ideas from those which are not true, and which, therefore, not only -belongs to all ideas which are true, but also to none that are not. -And that he has this idea in his head and thinks that the property of -being "useful" or "paying" is such a property, is again clearly shown -by a later passage. "Our account of truth," he says (p. 218) "is an -account of truths in the plural, of processes of leading, realised _in -rebus_, and having only this quality in common, that they _pay." Only_ -this quality in common! If this be so, the quality must obviously be -one, which is _not_ shared by any ideas which are _not_ true; for, -if true ideas have any quality in common at all, they must have at -least one such quality, which is _not_ shared by those which are _not_ -true. Plainly, therefore, Professor James is intending to tell us of -a property which belongs both to _all_ true ideas and _only_ to true -ideas. And this property, he says, is that of "paying." But now let us -suppose that he means by "paying," not "paying _once_ at least," but, -according to the alternative he suggests, "paying in the long run" or -"paying for some time." Can he possibly have supposed that these were -properties which belonged _both_ to all true ideas _and also_ to none -but true ones? They may, perhaps, be properties which belong to _none -but_ true ones. I doubt, as I have said, whether the latter does; but -still it is difficult to prove the opposite. But even if we granted -that they belong to _none but_ true ones, surely it is only too obvious -that they do _not_ fulfil the other requirement--that they do _not_ -belong to nearly all true ones. Can anyone suppose that _all_ our true -ideas pay "in the long run" or repeatedly for some time? Surely it is -plain that an enormous number do not for the simple reason that an -enormous number of them _have no run at all,_ either long or short, -but occur but once, and never recur. I believe truly that a certain -book is on a particular shelf about 10.15 p.m. on December 21st, 1907; -and this true belief serves me well and helps me to find it But the -belief that that book is there at that particular time occurs to no one -else, and never again to me. Surely there are thousands of useful true -beliefs which, like this, are useful but once, and never occur again; -and it would, therefore, be preposterous to say that every true idea is -useful "in the long run" or repeatedly for some time. If, therefore, -we supposed Professor James to mean that "paying in the long run" or -"paying repeatedly over a considerable period" were properties which -belonged to all true ideas and to none but true ones, we should be -supposing him to mean something still more monstrous than if we suppose -him to mean that "paying at least once" was such a property. - -To sum up then: - -I think there is no doubt that Professor James' interest in "the -pragmatist theory of truth" is largely due to the fact that he thinks -it tells us what distinguishes true ideas from those which are not -true. And he thinks the distinction is that true ideas "pay," and false -ones don't. The most natural interpretation of this view is: That every -true idea pays at least once; and that every idea, which pays at least -once, is true. These were the propositions I considered first, and I -gave reasons for thinking that _both_ are false. But Professor James -suggested elsewhere that what he means by "paying" is "paying in the -long run." And here it seems possibly true that all ideas which "pay -in the long run" are true; but it is certainly false that all our true -ideas "pay in the long run," if by this be meant anything more than -"pay at least once." Again, he suggested that what he meant by paying -was "paying for some time." And here, again, even if it is true (and it -seems very doubtful) that all ideas which pay for some time are true, -it is certainly false that all our true ideas pay for some time, if by -this be meant anything more than that they pay "at least once." - -This, I think, is the simplest and most obvious objection to Professor -James' "instrumental" view of truth--the view that truth is what -"works," "pays," is "useful." He seems certainly to have in his mind -the idea that this theory tells us what distinguishes true ideas from -false ones, and to be interested in it mainly for this reason. He has -vaguely in his mind that he has told us of some property which belongs -to all true ideas and to none but true ones; and that this property is -that of "paying." And the objection is, that, whatever we understand -by "paying," whether "paying at least once," or "paying in the long -run," or "paying for some time," it seems certain that none of these -properties will satisfy _both_ requirements. As regards the first, that -of "paying at least once," it seems almost certain that it satisfies -_neither:_ it is neither true that all our true ideas "pay at least -once," nor yet that every idea which pays at least once, is true. -On the contrary, many true ideas never pay at all; and many ideas, -which are not true, do pay on at least one occasion. And as regards -the others, "paying in the long run" and "paying for some time," -even if these do belong to none but true ideas (and even this seems -very doubtful), they certainly neither of them satisfy the _other_ -requirement--neither of them belong to _all_ our true ideas. For, in -order that either of them may belong to an idea, that idea must pay at -least once; and, as we have seen, many true ideas do not pay even once, -and cannot, therefore, pay either in the long run or for some time. -And, moreover, many true ideas, which do pay on one occasion, seem to -pay on one occasion and one only. - -And, if Professor James does not mean to assert any of these things, -what is there left for him to mean? There is left in the first place, -the theory that _most_ of our true ideas do pay; and that _most_ of the -ideas which pay are true. This seems to me to be true, and, indeed, to -be all that is certainly true in what he says. But is it conceivable -that this is all he has meant? Obviously, these assertions tell us -of no property at all which belongs to all true ideas, and to none -but true ones; and, moreover, it seems impossible that he should have -been so anxious to assert this generally admitted commonplace. What a -very different complexion his whole discussion would have worn, had he -merely asserted this--this quite clearly, and nothing but this, while -admitting openly that many true ideas do not pay, and that many, which -do pay, are not true! - -And, besides this commonplace, there is only left for him to mean two -one-sided and doubtful assertions to the effect that certain properties -belong to none but true ideas. There is the assertion that all ideas -which pay in the long run are true, and the assertion that all ideas -which pay for some considerable time are true. And as to the first, it -_may_ be true; but it may also be doubted, and Professor James gives us -no reason at all for thinking that it is true. Assuming that religious -ideas have been useful in the past, is it quite certain that they may -not permanently continue to be useful, even though they are false? -That, in short, even though they are not true, they nevertheless will -be useful, not only for a time, but in the long run? And as for the -assertion that all ideas, which pay for a considerable time, are true, -this is obviously more doubtful still. Whether certain religious ideas -will or will not be useful in the long run, it seems difficult to doubt -that many of them have been useful for a considerable time. And why -should we be told dogmatically that all of these are true? This, it -seems to me, is by far the most interesting assertion, which is left -for Professor James to make, when we have rejected the theory that the -property of being useful belongs to _all_ true ideas, as well as to -none but true ones. But he has given no reason for asserting it. He -seems, in fact, to base it merely upon the general untenable theory, -that utility belongs to _all_ true ideas, and to none but true ones; -that this is what truth means. - -These, then, seem to me the plainest and most obvious objections to -what Professor James says about the connection between truth and -utility. And there are only two further points, in what he says under -this head, that I wish to notice. - -In the first place, we have hitherto been considering only whether it -is true, as a matter of empirical fact, that all our true ideas are -useful, and those which are not true, never. Professor James seems, -at least, to mean that, _as a matter of fact,_ this is so; and I have -only urged hitherto that _as a matter of fact_, it is not so. But as we -have seen, he also asserts something more than this--he also asserts -that this property of utility is the _only_ one which belongs to all -our true ideas. And this further assertion cannot possibly be true, if, -as I have urged, there are many true ideas which do not possess this -property; or if, as I have urged, many ideas, which do possess it, are -nevertheless not true. The objections already considered are, then, -sufficient to overthrow this further assertion also. If there are any -true ideas, which are not useful, or if any, which are useful, are not -true, it cannot be the case that utility is the _only_ property which -true ideas have in common. There must be some property, other than -utility, which is common to all true ideas; and a correct theory as to -what property it is that does belong to all true ideas, and to none but -true ones, is still to seek. The empirical objections, hitherto given, -are then sufficient objections to this further assertion also; but they -are not the only objections to it. There is another and still more -serious objection to the assertion that utility is the _only_ property -which all true ideas have in common. For this assertion does not -_merely_ imply that, as a matter of fact, all our true ideas and none -but true ideas are useful. It does, indeed, imply this; and therefore -the fact that these empirical assertions are not true is sufficient -to refute it. But it also implies something more. If utility were the -_only_ property which all true ideas had in common, it would follow -not merely that all true ideas are useful, but also that any idea, -which was useful, _would_ be true _no matter what other properties -it might have or might fail to have._ There can, I think, be no doubt -that Professor James does frequently speak as if this were the case; -and there is an independent and still more serious objection to this -implication. Even if it were true (as it is not) that all our true -ideas and none but true ideas are, as a matter of fact, useful, we -should still have a strong reason to object to the statement that any -idea, which was useful, _would_ be true. For it implies that if such an -idea as mine, that Professor James exists, and has certain thoughts, -_were_ useful, this idea would be true, _even if_ no such person as -Professor James ever did exist. It implies that, if the idea that I had -the seven of diamonds in my hand at cards last night, _were_ useful, -this idea would be true, even if, in fact, I did not have that card -in my hand. And we can, I think, see quite plainly that this is not -the case. With regard to some kinds of ideas, at all events--ideas -with regard to the existence of other people, or with regard to past -experiences of our own--it seems quite plain that they would not be -true, unless they "agreed with reality" in some other sense than that -which Professor James declares to be the only one in which true ideas -must agree with it. Even if my idea that Professor James exists were to -"agree with reality," in the sense that, owing to it, I handled _other_ -realities better than I should have done without it, it would, I think, -plainly not be true, unless Professor James really did exist--unless -_he_ were a reality. And this, I think, is one of the two most serious -objections to what he seems to hold about the connection of truth with -utility. He seems to hold that any idea, which was useful, _would_ be -true, _no matter what other properties it might fail to have._ And with -regard to some ideas, at all events, it seems plain that they cannot be -true, _unless_ they have the property that what they believe to exist, -really does or did exist. Beliefs in the existence of other people -might be useful to me, even if I alone existed; but, nevertheless, in -such a case, they would not be true. - -And there is only one other point, in what Professor James says in -connection with the "instrumental" view of truth, upon which I wish -to remark. We have seen that he seems sometimes to hold that beliefs -are true, _so long as_ they are "profitable to our lives." And this -implies, as we have seen, the doubtful proposition than any belief -which is useful for some length of time, is true. But this is not -all that it implies. It also implies that beliefs are true _only_ so -long as they are profitable. Nor does Professor James appear to mean -by this that they _occur_, only so long as they are profitable. He -seems to hold, on the contrary, that beliefs, which are profitable -for some time, do sometimes finally occur at a time when they are not -profitable. He implies, therefore, that a belief, which occurs at -several different times, may be true at some of the times at which it -occurs, and yet untrue at others. I think there is no doubt that this -view is what he is sometimes thinking of. And this, we see, constitutes -a quite new view as to the connection between truth and utility--a view -quite different from any that we have hitherto considered. This view -asserts not that every true idea is useful at some time, or in the long -run, or for a considerable period; but that the truth of an idea may -come and go, as its utility comes and goes. It admits that one and the -same idea sometimes occurs at times when it is useful, and sometimes -at times when it is not; but it maintains that this same idea is true, -at those times when it is useful, and not true, at those when it is -not. And the fact that Professor James seems to suggest this view, -constitutes, I think, a second most serious objection to what he says -about the connection of truth and utility. It seems so obvious that -utility is a property which comes and goes--which belongs to a given -idea at one time, and does not belong to it at another, that anyone who -says that the true is the useful naturally seems not to be overlooking -this obvious fact, but to be suggesting that truth is a property which -comes and goes in the same way. It is, in this way I think, that the -"instrumental" view of truth is connected with the view that truth is -"mutable." Professor James does, I think, imply that truth is mutable -in just this sense--namely, that one and the same idea may be true at -some of the times at which it occurs, and not true at others, and this -is the view which I have next to consider. - - -(II) - -Professor James seems to hold, generally, that "truth" is mutable. And -by this he seems sometimes to mean that an idea which, when it occurs -at one time, is true, _may,_ when it occurs at another time, not be -true. He seems to hold that one and the same idea _may_ be true at -one time and false at another. That it _may_ be, for I do not suppose -he means that all ideas do actually undergo this change from true to -false. Many true ideas seem to occur but once, and, if so, they, at -least, will not actually be true at one time and false at another, -though, even with regard to these, perhaps Professor James means to -maintain that they _might_ be false at another time, if they were to -occur at it. But I am not sure that he even means to maintain this -with regard to _all_ our true ideas. Perhaps he does not mean to say, -with regard to _all_ of them, even that they _can_ change from true to -false. He speaks, generally, indeed, as if truth were mutable; but, -in one passage, he seems to insist that there is a certain class of -true ideas, none of which are mutable in this respect. "_Relations -among purely mental ideas,"_ he says (p. 209), "form another sphere -where true and false beliefs obtain, and here the beliefs are absolute -or unconditional. When they are true they bear the name either of -definitions or of principles. It is either a principle or a definition -that 1 and 1 make 2, that 2 and 1 make 3, and so on; that white differs -less from grey than it does from black; that when the cause begins to -act the effect also commences. Such propositions hold of all possible -'ones,' of all conceivable 'whites,' 'greys,' and 'causes.' The objects -here are mental objects. Their relations are perceptually obvious -at a glance, and no sense-verification is necessary. Moreover, once -true, always true, of those same mental objects. Truth here has an -'eternal' character. If you can find a concrete thing anywhere that is -'one' or 'white' or 'grey' or an 'effect,' then your principles will -everlastingly apply to it." Professor James does seem here to hold -that there are true ideas, which once true, are always true. Perhaps, -then, he does not hold that _all_ true ideas are mutable. Perhaps he -does not even hold that all true ideas, _except_ ideas of this kind, -are so. But he does seem to hold at least that _many_ of our true ideas -are mutable. And even this proposition seems to me to be disputable. -It seems to me that there is a sense in which it is the case with -_every_ true idea that, if once true, it is always true. That is to -say, that every idea, which is true once, _would_ be true at any other -time at which it were to occur; and that every idea which does occur -more than once, if true once, _is_ true at every time at which it does -occur. There seems to me, I say, to be _a sense_ in which this is so. -And this seems to me to be the sense in which it is most commonly and -most naturally maintained that all truths are "immutable." Professor -James seems to mean to deny it, even in this sense. He seems to me -constantly to speak as if there were _no_ sense in which _all_ truths -are immutable. And I only wish to point out what seems to me to be the -plainest and most obvious objection to such language. - -And, first of all, there is one doctrine, which he seems to connect -with this of his that "truths are mutable," with regard to which I -fully agree with him. He seems very anxious to insist that reality is -mutable: that it does change, and that it is not irrational to hope -that in the future it will be different from and much better than it -is now. And this seems to me to be quite undeniable. It seems to me -quite certain that I do have ideas at one time which I did not have -at another; that change, therefore, does really occur. It seems to me -quite certain that in the future many things will be different from -what they are now; and I see no reason to think that they may not be -much better. There is much misery in the world now; and I think it is -quite possible that some day there will really be much less. This view -that _reality_ is mutable, that _facts_ do change, that some things -have properties at one time which they do not have at other times, -seems to me certainly true. And so far, therefore, as Professor James -merely means to assert this obvious fact, I have no objection to his -view. Some philosophers, I think, have really implied the denial of -this fact. All those who deny the reality of time do seem to me to -imply that nothing really changes or can change--that, in fact, reality -is wholly immutable. And so far as Professor James is merely protesting -against this view, I should, therefore, agree with him. - -But I think it is quite plain that he does not mean _merely_ this, -when he says that truth is mutable. No one would choose this way of -expressing himself if he merely meant to say that _some_ things are -mutable. Truth, Professor James has told us, is a property of certain -of our ideas. And those of our ideas, which are true or false, are -certainly only a part of the Universe. Other things in the Universe -might, therefore, change, even if our ideas never changed in respect -of this property. And our ideas themselves do undoubtedly change in -some respects. A given idea exists in my mind at one moment and does -not exist in it at another. At one moment it is in my mind and not in -somebody else's, and at another in somebody else's and not in mine. -I sometimes think of the truth that twice two are four when I am in -one mood, and sometimes when I am in another. I sometimes think of it -in connection with one set of ideas and sometimes in connection with -another set. Ideas, then, are constantly changing in some respects. -They come and go; and at one time they stand in a given relation to -other things or ideas, to which at another time they do not stand in -that relation. In this sense, any given idea may certainly have a -property at one time which it has not got at another time. All this -seems obvious; and all this cannot be admitted, without admitting that -reality is mutable--that _some_ things change. But obviously it does -not seem to follow from this that there is _no_ respect in which ideas -are immutable. It does not seem to follow that because ideas, and other -things, change some of their properties, they necessarily change that -one which we are considering--namely, "truth." It does not follow that -a given idea, which has the property of truth at one time, ever exists -at any other time without having that property. And yet that this -_does_ happen seems to be part of what is meant by saying that truth -is mutable. Plainly, therefore, to say this is to say something quite -different from saying that _some_ things are mutable. Even, therefore, -if we admit that _some_ things are mutable, it is still open to -consider whether truth is so. And this is what I want now to consider. -Is it the case that an idea which exists at one time, and is true then, -ever exists at any other time, without being true? Is it the case that -any idea ever changes from true to false? That it has the property of -being true on one of the occasions when it exists, and that it has -_not_ this property, but that of being false instead, on some other -occasion when it exists? - -In order to answer this question clearly, it is, I think, necessary to -make still another distinction. It does certainly seem to be true, _in -a sense_, that a given idea may be true on one occasion and false on -another. We constantly speak as if there were cases in which a given -thing was true on one occasion and false on another; and I think it -cannot be denied that, when we so speak, we are often expressing in a -perfectly proper and legitimate manner something which is undeniably -true. It is true now, I might say, that I am in this room; but -to-morrow this will not be true. It is true now that men are often -very miserable; but perhaps in some future state of society this will -not be true. These are perfectly natural forms of expression, and what -they express is something which certainly may be true. And yet what -they do apparently assert is that something or other, which is true -at one time, will not, or _perhaps_ will not, be true at another. We -constantly use such expressions, which imply that what is true at one -time is not true at another; and it is certainly legitimate to use -them. And hence, I think, we must admit that, _in a sense_, it is true -that a thing may be true at one time which is not true at another; in -that sense, namely, in which we use these expressions. And it is, I -think, also plain that these things, which may be true at one time and -false at another, may, _in a sense,_ be ideas. We might even say: The -idea that I am in this room, is true now; but to-morrow it will not be -true. We might say this without any strain on language. In any ordinary -book--indeed, in any philosophical book, where the subject we are at -present discussing was not being expressly discussed--such expressions -do, I think, constantly occur. And we should pass them, without any -objection. We should at once understand what they meant, and treat them -as perfectly natural expressions of things undeniably true. We must, -then, I think, admit that, _in a sense_, an idea may be true at one -time, and false at another. The question is: In what sense? What is the -truth for which these perfectly legitimate expressions stand? - -It seems to me that in all these cases, so far as we are not merely -talking of _facts_, but of true _ideas_, that the "idea" which we truly -say to be true at one time and false at another, is merely the idea -of a _sentence_--that is, of certain _words._ And we do undoubtedly -call _words_ "true." The words "I am at a meeting of the Aristotelian -Society" are true, if I use them now; but if I use the same words -to-morrow, they would not be true. The words "George III is king of -England" were true in 1800, but they are not true now. That is to say, -a given set of words may undoubtedly be true at one time, and false -at another; and since we may have ideas of words as well as of other -things, we may, in this sense, say the same of certain of our "ideas." -We may say that some of our "ideas" (namely those of words) are true at -one time and not true at another. - -But is it conceivable that Professor James _merely_ meant to assert -that the same _words_ are sometimes true at one time and false at -another? Can this be _all_ he means by saying that truth is mutable? -I do not think it can possibly be so. No one, I think, in definitely -discussing the mutability of truth, could say that true ideas were -mutable, and yet mean (although he did not say so) that this -proposition applied _solely_ to ideas of words. Professor James must, I -think, have been sometimes thinking that _other_ ideas, and not merely -ideas of words, do sometimes change from true to false. And this is the -proposition which I am concerned to dispute. It seems to me that if we -mean by an idea, not merely the idea of certain words, but the kind of -idea which words express, it is very doubtful whether such an idea ever -changes from true to false--whether any such idea is ever true at one -time and false at another. - -And plainly, in the first place, the mere fact that the same set of -words, as in the instances I have given, really are true at one time -and false at another, does not afford any presumption that anything -which they stand for is true at one time and false at another. For -the same words may obviously be used in different senses at different -times; and hence though the same words, which formerly expressed a -truth, may cease to express one, that may be because they now express -a _different_ idea, and not because the idea which they formerly -expressed has ceased to be true. And that, in instances such as I have -given, the words _do_ change their meaning according to the time at -which they are uttered or thought of, is I think, evident. If I use now -the words "I am in this room," these words certainly express (among -other things) the idea that my being in this room is contemporary -with my present use of the words; and if I were to use the same words -to-morrow, they would express the idea that my being in this room -to-morrow, was contemporary with the use of them _then._ And since my -use of them then would not be the same fact as my use of them now, -they would certainly then express a different idea from that which -they express now. And in general, whenever we use the present tense -in its primary sense, it seems to me plain that we do mean something -different by it each time we use it. We always mean (among other -things) to express the idea that a given event is contemporary with -our actual use of it; and since our actual use of it on one occasion -is always a different fact from our actual use of it on another, we -express by it a different idea each time we use it. And similarly with -the past and future tenses. If anybody had said in 1807 "Napoleon is -dead," he would certainly have meant by these words something different -from what I mean by them when I use them now. He would have meant that -Napoleon's death occurred at a time previous to _his_ use of those -words; and this would not have been true. But in this fact there is -nothing to show that if he _had_ meant by them what I mean now, his -idea would not have been as true then as mine is now. And so, if I say -"It will rain to-morrow," these words have a different meaning to-day -from what they would have if I used them to-morrow. What we mean by -"to-morrow" is obviously a different day, when we use the word on one -day, from what we mean by it when we use it on another. But in this -there is nothing to show that if the idea, which I _now_ mean by "It -will rain to-morrow," _were_ to occur again to-morrow, it would not be -true then, if it is true now. All this is surely very obvious. But, -if we take account of it, and if we concentrate our attention not on -the words but on what is meant by them, is it so certain that what we -mean by them on any one occasion ever changes from true to false? If -there were to occur to me to-morrow the very same idea which I now -express by the words "I am in this room," is it certain that this idea -would not be as true then as it is now? It is perhaps true that the -_whale_ of what I mean by such a phrase as this never does recur. But -part of it does, and that a part which is true. Part of what I mean -is Certainly identical with part of what I should mean to-morrow by -saying "I _was_ in that room last night." And this part would be as -true then, as it is now. And is there _any_ part, which, if it were to -recur at any time, would _not_ then be true, though it Is true now? In -the case of all ideas or parts of ideas, which ever do actually recur, -can we find a single instance of one, which is plainly true at one of -the times when it occurs, and yet not true at another? I cannot think -of any such instance. And on the other hand this very proposition that -any idea (other than mere words) which is true once, would be true at -any time, seems to me to be one of those truths of which Professor -James has spoken as having an "eternal," "absolute," "unconditional" -character--as being "perceptually obvious at a glance" and needing -"no sense-verification." Just as we know that, if a particular colour -differs more from black than from grey at one time, the same colour -would differ more from black than from grey at any time, so, it seems -to me, we can see that, if a particular idea is true at one time, the -same idea would be true at any time. - -It seems to me, then, that if we mean by an idea, not mere words, but -the kind of idea which words express, any idea, which is true at one -time when it occurs, _would_ be true at any time when it were to occur; -and that this is so, even though it is an idea, which refers to facts -which are mutable. My being in this room is a fact which is now, but -which certainly has not been at every time and will not be at every -time. And the words "I _am_ in this room," though they express a truth -now, would not have expressed one if I had used them yesterday, and -will not if I use them to-morrow. But if we consider the idea which -these words _now_ express--namely, the idea of the connection of my -being in this room with this particular time--it seems to me evident -that anybody who had thought of that connection at any time in the -past, would have been thinking truly, and that anybody who were to -think of it at any time in the future would be thinking truly. This -seems to me to be the sense in which truths are immutable--in which -no idea can change from true to false. And I think Professor James -means to deny of truths generally, if not of all truths, that they are -immutable even in this sense. If he does not mean this there seems -nothing left for him to mean, when he says that truths are mutable, -except (1) that some _facts_ are mutable, and (2) that the same _words_ -may be true at one time and false at another. And it seems to me -impossible that he could speak as he does, if he meant _nothing more_ -than these two things. I believe, therefore, that he is really thinking -that ideas which have been once true (_ideas,_ and not merely words) -do sometimes afterwards become false: that the very same idea is at -one time true and at another false. But he certainly gives no instance -which shows that this does ever occur. And how far does he mean his -principle to carry him? Does he hold that this idea that Julius Caesar -was murdered in the Senate-House, though true now, may, at some future -time cease to be true, if it should be more profitable to the lives of -future generations to believe that he died in his bed? Things like this -are what his words seem to imply; and, even if he does hold that truths -like this are _not_ mutable, he never tries to tell us to what kinds of -truths he would limit mutability, nor how they differ from such as this. - - -(III) - -Finally, there remains the view that "to an unascertainable extent our -truths are man-made products." And the only point I want to make about -this view may be put very briefly. - -It is noticeable that all the instances which Professor James gives -of the ways in which, according to him, "our truths" are "made" are -instances of ways in which our _beliefs_ come into existence. In -many of these ways, it would seem, false beliefs sometimes come into -existence as well as true ones; and I take it Professor James does -not always wish to deny this. False beliefs, I think he would say, -are just as much "man-made products" as true ones: it is sufficient -for his purpose if true beliefs do come into existence in the ways he -mentions. And the only point which seems to be illustrated by all these -instances, is that in all of them the existence of a true belief does -depend in some way or other upon the previous existence of something -in some man's mind. They are all of them cases in which we may truly -say: This man would not have had just that belief, had not some man -previously had such and such experiences, or interests, or purposes. -In some cases they are instances of ways in which the existence of a -particular belief in a man depends upon _his own_ previous experiences -or interests or volitions. But this does not seem to be the case -in all. Professor James seems also anxious to illustrate the point -that one man's beliefs often depend upon the previous experiences or -interests or volitions of _other_ men. And, as I say, the only point -which seems to be definitely illustrated in all cases is that the -existence of a true belief does depend, _in some way or other,_ upon -something which has previously existed in some man's mind. Almost -any kind of dependence, it would seem, is sufficient to illustrate -Professor James' point. - -And as regards this general thesis that almost all our beliefs, true as -well as false, depend, in some way or other, upon what has previously -been in some human mind, it will, I think, be readily admitted. It -is a commonplace, which, so far as I know, hardly anyone would deny. -If this is all that is to be meant by saying that our true beliefs -are "man-made," it must, I think, be admitted that almost all, If not -quite all, really are man-made. And this is all that Professor James' -instances seem to me, in fact, to show. - -But is this all that Professor James means, when he says that _our -truths_ are man-made? Is it conceivable that he only means to insist -upon this undeniable, and generally admitted, commonplace? It seems to -me quite plain that this is not all that he means. I think he certainly -means to suggest that, from the fact that we "make" our true beliefs, -something _else_ follows. And I think it is not hard to see one thing -more which he does mean. I think he certainly means to suggest that we -not only make our true beliefs, but also that we _make them true._ At -least as much as this is certainly naturally suggested by his words. -No one would persistently say that we make _our truths_, unless he -meant, at least, not merely that we make our true beliefs, but also -that we make them true--unless he meant not merely that the existence -of our true beliefs, but also that their _truth_, depended upon human -conditions. This, it seems to me, is one consequence which Professor -James means us to draw from the commonplace that the _existence_ of our -true beliefs depends upon human conditions. But does this consequence, -in fact, follow from that commonplace? From the fact that we make our -true beliefs, does it follow that we _make them true?_ - -_In one sense,_ undoubtedly, even this does follow. If we say (as we -may say) that no belief can be true, unless it exists, then it follows -that, in a sense, the truth of a belief must always depend upon any -conditions upon which its existence depends. If, therefore, the -occurrence of a belief depends upon human conditions, so, too, must its -truth. If the belief had never existed, it would never have been true; -and therefore its truth must, in a sense, depend upon human conditions -in exactly the same degree in which its existence depends upon them. -This is obvious. But is this all that is meant? Is this all that would -be suggested to us by telling us that we make our beliefs true? - -It is easy to see that it is not. I may have the belief that it will -rain to-morrow. And I may have "made" myself have this belief. It may -be the case that I should not have had it, but for peculiarities in my -past experiences, in my interests and my volitions. It may be the case -that I should not have had it, but for a deliberate attempt to consider -the question whether it will rain or not. This may easily happen. And -certainly this particular belief of mine would not have been true, -unless it existed. Its truth, therefore, depends, in a sense, upon any -conditions upon which its existence depends. And this belief may be -true. It will be true, if It does rain to-morrow. But, in spite of all -these reasons, would anyone think of saying that, in case it is true, I -had _made_ it true? Would anyone say that I had had any hand _at all_ -in making it true? Plainly no one would. We should say that I had a -hand in making it true, if and only If I had a hand in _making the rain -fall._ In every case in which we believe in the existence of anything, -past or future, we should say that we had helped to make the belief -true, if and only if we had helped to cause the existence of the fact -which, in that belief, we believed did exist or would exist. Surely -this is plain. I may believe that the sun will rise to-morrow. And I -may have had a hand in "making" this belief; certainly it often depends -for its existence upon what has been previously in my mind. And if the -sun does rise, my belief will have been true. I have, therefore, had -a hand in making a true belief. But would anyone say that, therefore, -I had a hand in _making this belief true_? Certainly no one would. No -one would say that anything had contributed to make this belief true, -except those conditions (whatever they may be) which contributed to -making the sun actually rise. - -It is plain, then, that by "making a belief true," we mean something -quite different from what Professor James means by "making" that -belief. Conditions which have a hand in making a given true belief, -may (it appears) have no hand at all in making it true; and conditions -which have a hand in making it true may have no hand at all in making -_it._ Certainly this is how we use the words. We should never say that -we had made a belief true, merely because we had made the belief. But -now, which of these two things does Professor James mean? Does he mean -_merely_ the accepted commonplace that we make our true beliefs, in the -sense that almost all of them depend for their existence on what has -been previously in some human mind? Or does he mean also that we _make -them true_--that their truth also depends on what has been previously -in some human mind? - -I cannot help thinking that he has the latter, and not only the former -in his mind. But, then, what does this involve? If his instances of -"truth-making" are to be anything to the purpose, it should mean that, -whenever I have a hand in causing one of my own beliefs, I always -have to that extent a hand in making it true. That, therefore, I have -a hand in actually making the sun rise, the wind blow, and the rain -fall, whenever I cause my beliefs in these things. Nay, more, it -should mean that, whenever I "make" a true belief about the past, I -must have had a hand in making this true. And if so, then certainly I -must have had a hand in causing the French Revolution, in causing my -father's birth, in making Professor James write this book. Certainly -he implies that some man or other must have helped in causing almost -every event, in which any man ever truly believed. That it was we who -made the planets revolve round the sun, who made the Alps rise, and -the floor of the Pacific sink--all these things, and others like them, -seem to be involved. And it is these consequences which seem to me to -justify a doubt whether, in fact "our truths are to an unascertainable -extent man-made." That some of our truths are man-made--indeed, a great -many--I fully admit. We certainly do make some of our beliefs true. -The Secretary probably had a belief that I should write this paper, -and I have made his belief true by writing it. Men certainly have the -power to alter the world to a certain extent; and, so far as they do -this, they certainly "make true" any beliefs, which are beliefs in the -occurrence of these alterations. But I can see no reason for supposing -that they "make true" _nearly_ all those of their beliefs which are -true. And certainly the only reason which Professor James seems to -give for believing this--namely, that the _existence_ of almost all -their beliefs depends on them--seems to be no reason for it at all. For -unquestionably a man does not "make true" nearly every belief whose -_existence_ depends on him; and if so, the question which of their -beliefs and how many, men do "make true" must be settled by quite other -considerations. - -In conclusion, I wish to sum up what seems to me to be the most -important points about this "pragmatist theory of truth," as Professor -James represents it. It seems to me that, in what he says about it, he -has in his mind some things which are true and others which are false; -and I wish to tabulate separately the principal ones which I take to be -true, and the principal ones which I take to be false. The true ones -seem to me to be these:-- - -That _most_ of our true beliefs are useful to us; and that _most_ of -the beliefs that are useful to us are true. - -That the world really does change in some respects; that facts exist at -one time, which didn't and won't exist at others; and that hence the -world may be better at some future time than it is now or has been in -the past. - - -That the very same words may be true at one time and false at -another--that they may express a truth at one time and a falsehood at -another. - -That the existence of most, if not all, of our beliefs, true as well as -false, does depend upon previous events in our mental history; that we -should never have had the particular beliefs we do have, had not our -previous mental history been such as it was. - -That the truth, and not merely the existence, of _some_ of our beliefs, -does depend upon us. That we really do make some alterations in the -world, and that hence we do help to "make true" all those of our -beliefs which are beliefs in the existence of these alterations. - - -To all of these propositions I have no objection to offer. And they -seem to me to be generally admitted commonplaces. A certain class of -philosophers do, indeed, imply the denial of every one of them--namely, -those philosophers who deny the reality of time. And I think that -part of Professor James' object is to protest against the views of -these philosophers. All of these propositions do constitute a protest -against such views; and so far they might be all that Professor James -meant to assert. But I do not think that anyone, fairly reading through -what he says, could get the impression that these things, and nothing -more, were what he had in his mind. What gives colour and interest to -what he says, seems to be obviously something quite different. And, if -we try to find out what exactly the chief things are which give his -discussion its colour and interest, it seems to me we may distinguish -that what he has in his mind, wrapped up in more or less ambiguous -language, are the following propositions, to all of which I have tried -to urge what seem to me the most obvious objections:-- - - -That utility is a property which distinguishes true beliefs from those -which are not true; that, therefore, _all_ true beliefs are useful, and -_all_ beliefs, which are useful, are true--by "utility" being sometimes -meant "utility on at least one occasion," sometimes "utility in the -long run," sometimes "utility for some length of time." - -That all beliefs which are useful for some length of time are true. - -That utility is the _only_ property which all true beliefs have in -common: that, therefore, _if_ it were useful to me to believe in -Professor James' existence, this belief _would_ be true, even if he -didn't exist; and that, _if_ it were not useful to me to believe this, -the belief _would_ be false, even if he did. - -That the beliefs, which we express by words, and not merely the words -themselves, may be true at one time and _not_ true at another; and that -this is a general rule, though perhaps there may be some exceptions. - -That whenever the _existence_ of a belief depends to some extent on -us, then also the _truth_ of that belief depends to some extent on us; -in the sense in which this implies, that, when the existence of my -belief that a shower will fall depends upon me, then, if this belief -is true, I must have had a hand in making the shower fall: that, -therefore, men must have had a hand in making to exist almost every -fact which they ever believe to exist. - - -[1] _Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking: Popular -Lectures on Philosophy._ By William James. Longmans, Green, and Co., -1907 - - - - -HUME'S PHILOSOPHY - - -In both of his two books on the Human Understanding, Hume had, I think, -one main general object. He tells us that it was his object to discover -"the extent and force of human understanding," to give us "an exact -analysis of its powers and capacity." And we may, I think, express -what he meant by this in the following way. He plainly held (as we -all do) that some men sometimes entertain opinions which they cannot -know to be true. And he wished to point out what characteristics are -possessed by those of our opinions which we _can_ know to be true, with -a view of persuading us that any opinion which does _not_ possess any -of these characteristics is of a kind which we _cannot_ know to be so. -He thus tries to lay down certain rules to the effect that the _only_ -propositions which we can, any of us, know to be true are of certain -definite kinds. It is in this sense, I think, that he tries to define -the limits of human understanding. - -With this object he, first of all, divides all the propositions, -which we can even so much as conceive, into two classes. They are -all, he says, either propositions about "relations of ideas" or else -about "matters of fact." By propositions about "relations of ideas" -he means such propositions as that twice two are four, or that black -differs from white; and it is, I think, easy enough to see, though -by no means easy to define, what kind of propositions it is that -he means to include in this division. They are, he says, the only -kind of propositions with regard to which we can have "intuitive" or -"demonstrative" certainty. But the vast majority of the propositions -in which we believe and which interest us most, belong to the other -division: they are propositions about "matters of fact." And these -again he divides into two classes. So far as his words go, this latter -division is between "matters of fact, beyond the present testimony of -our senses, or the records of our memory," on the one hand, and matters -of fact for which we _have_ the evidence of our memory or senses, on -the other. But it is, I think, quite plain that these words do not -represent quite accurately the division which he really means to make. -He plainly intends to reckon along with facts for which we have the -evidence of our _senses_ all facts for which we have the evidence -of _direct observation_--such facts, for instance, as those which I -observe when I observe that I am angry or afraid, and which cannot be -strictly said to be apprehended by my _senses._ The division, then, -which he really intends to make is (to put it quite strictly) into the -two classes--(1) propositions which assert some matter of fact which I -am (in the strictest sense) _observing_ at the moment, or which I have -so observed in the past and now remember; and (2) propositions which -assert any matter of fact which I am not now observing and never have -observed, or, if I have, have quite forgotten. - -We have, then, the three classes--(1) propositions which assert -"relations of ideas"; (2) propositions which assert "matters of fact" -for which we have the evidence of direct observation or personal -memory; (3) propositions which assert "matters of fact_"_ for which -we have _not_ this evidence. And as regards propositions of the first -two classes, Hume does not seem to doubt our capacity for knowledge. -He does not doubt that we can know _some_ (though, of course, not -_all)_ propositions about "relations of ideas" to be true; he never -doubts, for instance, that we can know that twice two are four. And -he generally assumes also that each of us can know the truth of -_all_ propositions which merely assert some matter of fact which we -ourselves are, in the strictest sense, directly observing, or which -we have so observed and now remember. He does, indeed, in one place, -suggest a doubt whether our memory is _ever_ to be implicitly trusted, -but he generally assumes that it _always_ can. It is with regard to -propositions of the third class that he is chiefly anxious to determine -which of them (if any) we can know to be true and which not. In what -cases can any man know any matter of fact which he himself has not -directly observed? It is Hume's views on this question which form, I -think, the main interest of his philosophy. - -He proposes, first of all, by way of answer to it, a rule, which may, -I think, be expressed as follows: No man, he says, can ever know any -matter of fact, which he has not himself observed, unless he can know -that it is connected by "the relation of cause and effect," with some -fact which he _has_ observed. And no man can ever know that any two -facts are connected by this relation, except by the help of his own -past _experience._ In other words, if I am to know any fact, A, which -I have not myself observed, my past experience must give me some -foundation for the belief that A is causally connected with some fact, -B, which I have observed. And the only kind of past experience which -can give me any foundation for such a belief is, Hume seems to say, -as follows: I must, he says, have found _facts like_ A "constantly -conjoined" in the past with _facts like_ B. This is what he _says;_ -but we must not, I think, press his words too strictly. I may, for -instance, know that A is _probably_ a fact, even where the conjunction -of facts like it with facts like B has not been quite constant. Or -instead of observing facts like A conjoined with facts like B, I may -have observed a whole series of conjunctions--for instance, between A -and C, C and D, D and E, and E and B; and such a series, however long, -will do quite as well to establish a causal connection between A and B, -as if I had directly observed conjunctions between A and B themselves. -Such modifications as this, Hume would, I think, certainly allow. But, -allowing for them, his principle is, I think, quite clear. I can, he -holds, never know any fact whatever, which I have not myself observed, -unless I have observed similar facts in the past and have observed that -they were "conjoined" (directly or indirectly) with facts similar to -some fact which I do now observe or remember. In this sense, he holds, -_all_ our knowledge of facts, beyond the reach of our own observation, -is founded on _experience._ - -This is Hume's primary principle. But what consequences does he -think will follow from it, as to the kind of facts, beyond our own -observation, which we can know? We may, I think, distinguish three -entirely different views as to its consequences, which he suggests in -different parts of his work. - -In the first place, where he is specially engaged in explaining this -primary principle, he certainly seems to suppose that all propositions -of the kind, which we assume most universally in everyday life, may be -founded on experience in the sense required. He supposes that we have -this foundation in experience for such beliefs as that "a stone will -fall, or fire burn"; that Julius Caesar was murdered; that the sun will -rise to-morrow; that all men are mortal He speaks as if experience did -not merely render such beliefs probable, but actually _proved_ them -to be true. The "arguments from experience" in their favour are, he -says, such as "leave no room for doubt or opposition." The only kinds -of belief, which he definitely mentions as _not_ founded on experience, -are "popular superstitions" on the one hand, and certain religious and -philosophical beliefs, on the other. He seems to suppose that a few (a -very few) religious beliefs may, perhaps, be founded on experience. -But as regards most of the specific doctrines of Christianity, for -example, he seems to be clear that they are not so founded. The belief -in miracles is not founded on experience; nor is the philosophical -belief that every event is caused by the direct volition of the Deity. -In short, it would seem, that in this doctrine that our knowledge of -unobserved facts is confined to such as are "founded on experience," -he means to draw the line very much where it is drawn by the familiar -doctrine which is called "Agnosticism." We can know such facts as -are asserted in books on "history, geography or astronomy," or on -"politics, physics and chemistry," because such assertions may be -"founded on experience"; but we cannot know the greater part of the -facts asserted in books "of divinity or school metaphysics," because -such assertions have no foundation in experience. - -This, I think, was clearly one of Hume's views. He meant to fix the -limits of our knowledge at a point which would _exclude_ most religious -propositions and a great many philosophical ones, as incapable of being -known; but which would _include_ all the other kinds of propositions, -which are most universally accepted by common-sense, as capable of -being known. And he thought that, so far as matters of fact beyond the -reach of our personal observation are concerned, this point coincided -with that at which the possibility of "foundation on experience" -ceases. - -But, if we turn to another part of his work, we find a very different -view suggested. In a quite distinct section of both his books, he -investigates the beliefs which we entertain concerning the existence -of "external objects." And he distinguishes two different kinds of -belief which may be held on this subject. "Almost all mankind, and -philosophers themselves, for the greatest part of their lives," -believe, he says, that "the very things they feel and see" _are_ -external objects, in the sense that they continue to exist, even when -we cease to feel or see them. Philosophers, on the other hand, have -been led to reject this opinion and to suppose (when they reflect) -that what we actually perceive by the senses never exists except when -we perceive it, but that there are other external objects, which do -exist independently of us, and which _cause_ us to perceive what we do -perceive. Hume investigates both of these opinions, at great length in -the _Treatise_, and much more briefly in the _Enquiry_, and comes to -the conclusion, in both books, that neither of them can be "founded -on experience," in the sense he has defined. As regards the first of -them, the vulgar opinion, he does seem to admit in the _Treatise_ that -it is, in a sense, founded on experience; but not, he insists, in -the sense defined. And he seems also to think that, apart from this -fact, there are conclusive reasons for holding that the opinion cannot -be true. And as regards the philosophical opinion, he says that any -belief in external objects, which we never perceive but which cause our -perceptions, cannot possibly be founded on experience, for the simple -reason that if it were, we should need to have directly observed some -of these objects and their "conjunction" with what we do perceive, -which _ex hypothesi,_ we cannot have done, since we never do directly -observe any external object. - -Hume, therefore, concludes, in this part of his work, that we cannot -know of the existence of any "external object" whatever. And though -in all that he says upon this subject, he is plainly thinking only of -_material_ objects, the principles by which he tries to prove that we -cannot know these must, I think, prove equally well that we cannot -know any "external object" whatever--not even the existence of any -other human mind. His argument is: We cannot directly observe any -object whatever, except such as exist only when we observe them; we -cannot, therefore, observe any "constant conjunctions" except between -objects of this kind: and hence we can have no foundation in experience -for any proposition which asserts the existence of any other kind of -object, and cannot, therefore, know any such proposition to be true. -And this argument must plainly apply to all the feelings, thoughts and -perceptions of other men just as much as to material objects. I can -never know that any perception of mine, or anything which I do observe, -must have been caused by any other man, because I can never directly -observe a "constant conjunction" between any other man's thoughts -or feelings or intentions and anything which I directly observe: I -cannot, therefore, know that any other man ever had any thoughts or -feelings--or, in short, that any man beside myself ever existed. The -view, therefore, which Hume suggests in this part of his work, flatly -contradicts the view which he at first seemed to hold. He now says we -_cannot_ know that a stone will fall, that fire will burn, or the sun -will rise to-morrow. All that I can possibly know, according to his -present principles, is that _I shall see_ a stone fall, shall feel the -fire burn, shall see the sun rise to-morrow. I cannot even know that -any other men will see these things; for I cannot know that any other -men exist. For the same reason, I cannot know that Julius Caesar -was murdered, or that all men are mortal. For these are propositions -asserting "external" facts--facts which don't exist only at the moment -when I observe them; and, according to his present doctrine, I cannot -possibly know any such proposition to be true. No man, in short, can -know any proposition about "matters of fact" to be true, except such -as merely assert something about _his own_ states of mind, past, -present or future--about these or about what _he himself_ has directly -observed, is observing, or will observe. - -Here, therefore, we have a very different view suggested, as to the -limits of human knowledge. And even this is not all. There is yet a -third view, inconsistent with both of these, which Hume suggests in -some parts of his work. - -So far as we have yet seen, he has not in any way contradicted his -original supposition that we can know _some_ matters of fact, which we -have never ourselves observed. In the second theory, which I have just -stated, he does not call in question the view that I can know all such -matters of fact as I know to be causally connected with facts which -I have observed, nor the view that I can know some facts to be thus -causally connected. All that he has done is to question whether I can -know any _external_ fact to be causally connected with anything which -I observe; he would still allow that I may be able to know that future -states of my own, or past states, which I have forgotten, are causally -connected with those which I now observe or remember; and that I may -know therefore, in some cases, what I shall experience in the future, -or have experienced in the past but have now forgotten. But in some -parts of his work he does seem to question whether any man can know -even as much as this: he seems to question whether we can ever know any -fact whatever to be causally connected with any other fact. For, after -laying it down, as we saw above, that we cannot know any fact, A, to be -causally connected with another, B, unless we have experienced in the -past a constant conjunction between facts like A and facts like B, he -goes on to ask what foundation we have for the conclusion that A and B -_are_ causally connected, even when we _have_ in the past experienced -a constant conjunction between them. He points out that from the fact -that A has been constantly conjoined with B in the past, it does not -follow that it ever will be so again. It does not follow, therefore, -that the two really are causally connected in the sense that, when the -one occurs, the other _always_ will occur also. And he concludes, for -this and other reasons, that _no argument_ can assure us that, because -they have been constantly conjoined in the past, therefore they really -are causally connected. What, then, he asks, is the foundation for such -an inference? _Custom,_ he concludes, is the only foundation. It is -nothing but custom which induces us to believe that, because two facts -have been constantly conjoined on many occasions, therefore they will -be so on _all_ occasions. We have, therefore, no better foundation -than custom for any conclusion whatever as to facts which we have not -observed. And can we be said really to _know_ any fact, for which we -have no better foundation than this? Hume himself, it must be observed, -never says that we can't. But he has been constantly interpreted as if -the conclusion that we can't really know any one fact to be causally -connected with any other, did follow from this doctrine of his. And -there is, I think, certainly much excuse for this interpretation in the -tone in which he speaks. He does seem to suggest that a belief which is -_merely_ founded on custom, can scarcely be one which we _know_ to be -true. And, indeed, he owns himself that, when he considers that this -is our only foundation for any such belief, he is sometimes tempted -to doubt whether we do know any fact whatever, except those which we -directly observe. He does, therefore, at least suggest the view that -every man's knowledge is entirely confined to those facts, which he is -directly observing at the moment, or which he has observed in the past, -and now remembers. - -We see, then, that Hume suggests, at least, three entirely different -views as to the consequences of his original doctrine. His original -doctrine was that, as regards matters of fact beyond the reach of our -own actual observation, the knowledge of each of us is strictly limited -to those for which we have a basis in our own experience. And his first -view as to the consequences of this doctrine was that it does show us -to be incapable of knowing a good many religious and philosophical -propositions, which many men have claimed that they knew; but that it -by no means denies our capacity of knowing the vast majority of facts -beyond our own observation, which we all commonly suppose that we know. -His second view, on the other hand, is that it cuts off at once all -possibility of our knowing the vast majority of these facts; since he -implies that we cannot have any basis in experience for asserting any -_external_ fact whatever--any fact, that is, except facts relating to -our own actual past and future observations. And his third view is more -sceptical still, since it suggests that we cannot really know any fact -whatever, beyond the reach of our present observation or memory, even -where we _have_ a basis in experience for such a fact: it suggests that -experience cannot ever let us _know_ that any two things are causally -connected, and therefore that it cannot give us _knowledge_ of any fact -based on this relation. - -What are we to think of these three views, and of the original -doctrine from which Hume seems to infer them? - -As regards the last two views, it may perhaps be thought that they -are too absurd to deserve any serious consideration. It is, in fact, -absurd to suggest that I do not know any external facts whatever; -that I do not know, for instance, even that there are any men beside -myself. And Hume himself, it might seem, does not seriously expect or -wish us to accept these views. He points out, with regard to all such -excessively sceptical opinions that we cannot continue to believe them -for long together--that, at least, we cannot, for long together, avoid -believing things flatly inconsistent with them. The philosopher may -believe, when he is philosophising, that no man knows of the existence -of any other man or of any material object; but at other times he -will inevitably believe, as we all do, that he does know of the -existence of this man and of that, and even of this and that material -object. There can, therefore, be no question of making all our beliefs -consistent with such views as this of never believing anything that is -inconsistent with them. And it may, therefore, seem useless to discuss -them. But in fact, it by no means follows that, because we are not able -to adhere consistently to a given view, therefore that view is false; -nor does it follow that we may not sincerely believe it, whenever we -are philosophising, even though the moment we cease to philosophise, or -even before, we may be forced to contradict it. And philosophers do, -in fact, sincerely believe such things as this--things which flatly -contradict the vast majority of the things which they believe at other -times. Even Hume, I think, does sincerely wish to persuade us that -we cannot know of the existence of external material objects--that -this is a philosophic truth, which we ought, if we can, so long as we -are philosophising, to believe. Many people, I think, are certainly -tempted, in their philosophic moments, to believe such things; and, -since this is so, it is, I think, worth while to consider seriously -what arguments can be brought against such views. It is worth while to -consider whether they are views which we ought to hold as philosophical -opinions, even if it be quite certain that we shall never be able to -make the views which we entertain at other times consistent with them. -And it is the more worth while, because the question how we can prove -or disprove such extreme views as these, has a bearing on the question -how we can, in any case whatever, prove or disprove that we do really -_know,_ what we suppose ourselves to know. - -What arguments, then, are there for or against the extreme view that -no man can know any external fact whatever; and the still more extreme -view that no man can know any matter of fact whatever, except those -which he is directly observing at the moment, or has observed in the -past and now remembers? - -It may be pointed out, in the first place, that, if these views are -true, then at least no man can possibly know them to be so. What -these views assert is that I cannot know any external fact whatever. -It follows, therefore, that I cannot know that there are any other -men, beside myself, and that they are like me in this respect. Any -philosopher who asserts positively that other men, equally with -himself, are incapable of knowing any external facts, is, in that very -assertion, contradicting himself, since he implies that he _does_ know -a great many facts about the knowledge of other men. No one, therefore, -can be entitled to assert positively that human knowledge is limited -in this way, since, in asserting it positively, he is implying that -his own knowledge is not so limited. It cannot be proper, even in our -philosophic moments, to take up such an attitude as this. - -No one, therefore, can know positively that men in general, are -incapable of knowing external facts. But still, although we cannot -_know_ it, it remains possible that the view should be a true one. Nay, -more, it remains possible that a man should know that _he himself_ -is incapable of knowing any external facts, and that, _if_ there are -any other men whose faculties are only similar to his own, they also -must be incapable of knowing any. The argument just used obviously -does not apply against such a position as this. It only applies -against the position that men in general positively are incapable -of knowing external facts: it does not apply against the position -that the philosopher himself is incapable of knowing any, or against -the position that there are _possibly_ other men in the same case, -and that, if their faculties are similar to the philosopher's, they -certainly would be in it. I do not contradict myself by maintaining -positively that _I_ know no external facts, though I do contradict -myself if I maintain that I am only one among other men, and that no -man knows any external facts. So far, then, as Hume merely maintains -that _he_ is incapable of knowing any external facts, and that there -_may_ be other men like him in this respect, the argument just used is -not valid against his position. Can any conclusive arguments be found -against it? - -It seems to me that such a position must, in a certain sense, be quite -incapable of disproof. So much must be granted to any sceptic who feels -inclined to hold it. Any valid argument which can be brought against -it must be of the nature of a _petitio principii:_ it must beg the -question at issue. How is the sceptic to prove to himself that he does -know any external facts? He can only do it by bringing forward some -instance of an external fact, which he does know; and, in assuming -that he does know this one, he is, of course, begging the question. It -is therefore quite impossible for any one to _prove,_ in one strict -sense of the term, that he does know any external facts. I can only -prove that I do, by assuming that in some particular instance, I -actually do know one. That is to say, the so-called proof must assume -the very thing which it pretends to prove. The only proof that we do -know external facts lies in the simple fact that we do know them. And -the sceptic can, with perfect internal consistency, deny that he does -know any. But it can, I think, be shown that he has no reason for -denying it. And in particular it may, I think, be easily seen that the -arguments which Hume uses in favour of this position have no conclusive -force. - -To begin with, his arguments, in both cases, depend upon the two -original assumptions, (1) that we cannot know any fact, which we -have not observed, unless we know it to be causally connected with -some fact which we have observed, and (2) that we have no reason for -assuming any causal connection, except where we have experienced some -instances of conjunction between the two facts connected. And both of -these assumptions may, of course, be denied. It is just as easy to deny -them, as to deny that I do know any external facts. And, if these two -assumptions did really lead to the conclusion that I cannot know any, -it would, I think, be proper to deny them: we might fairly regard the -fact that they led to this absurd conclusion as disproving them. But, -in fact, I think it may be easily seen that they do not lead to it. - -Let us consider, first of all, Hume's most sceptical argument (the -argument which he merely suggests). This argument suggests that, since -our only reason for supposing two facts to be causally connected is -that we have found them constantly conjoined in the past, and since -it does not follow from the fact that they have been conjoined ever -so many times, that they _always_ will be so, therefore we cannot -_know_ that they always will be so, and hence cannot know that they are -causally connected. But obviously the conclusion does not follow. We -must, I think, grant the premiss that, from the fact that two things -have been conjoined, no matter how often, it does not strictly _follow_ -that they _always_ are conjoined. But it by no means follows from this -that we may not _know_ that, as a matter of fact, when two things are -conjoined sufficiently often, they are also _always_ conjoined. We -may quite well _know_ many things which do not logically follow from -anything else which we know. And so, in this case, we may _know_ that -two things are causally connected, although this does not logically -follow from our past experience, nor yet from anything else that we -know. And, as for the contention that our belief in causal connections -is merely based on _custom,_ we may, indeed, admit that custom would -not be a sufficient _reason_ for concluding the belief to be true. -But the mere fact (if it be a fact) that the belief is only caused by -custom, is also no sufficient reason for concluding that we can _not_ -know it to be true. Custom _may_ produce beliefs, which we do know to -be true, even though it be admitted that it does not _necessarily_ -produce them. - -And as for Hume's argument to prove that we can never know any -_external_ object to be causally connected with anything which we -actually observe, it is, I think, obviously fallacious. In order -to prove this, he has, as he recognises, to disprove both of two -theories. He has, first of all, to disprove what he calls the vulgar -theory--the theory that we can know the very things which we see or -feel to be external objects; that is to say, can know that these very -things exist at times when we do not observe them. And even here, I -think, his arguments are obviously inconclusive. But we need not stay -to consider them, because, in order to prove that we cannot know any -external objects, he has also to disprove what he calls the philosophic -theory--the theory that we can know things which we do observe, to be -caused by external objects which we never observe. If, therefore, his -attempt to disprove this theory fails, his proof that we cannot know -any external objects also fails; and I think it is easy to see that -his disproof does fail. It amounts merely to this: That we cannot, _ex -hypothesi,_ ever observe these supposed external objects, and therefore -cannot observe them to be constantly conjoined with any objects which -we do observe. But what follows from this? His own theory about the -knowledge of causal connection is not that in order to know A to be the -cause of B, we must have observed A _itself_ to be conjoined with B; -but only that we must have observed objects _like_ A to be constantly -conjoined with objects _like_ B. And what is to prevent an external -object from being _like_ some object which we have formerly observed? -Suppose I have frequently observed a fact _like A_ to be conjoined with -a fact _like_ B: and suppose I now observe B, on an occasion when I do -not observe anything like A. There is no reason, on Hume's principles, -why I should not conclude that A does exist on this occasion, even -though I do not observe it; and that it is, therefore, an external -object. It will, of course, differ from any object which I have ever -observed, in respect of the simple fact that it is _not_ observed by -me, whereas they were. There is, therefore, this one respect in which -it must be _unlike_ anything which I have ever observed. But Hume has -never said anything to show that unlikeness in this single respect is -sufficient to invalidate the inference. It may quite well be like -objects which I have observed in all other respects; and this degree -of likeness may, according to his principles, be quite sufficient to -justify us in concluding its existence. In short, when Hume argues that -we cannot possibly learn by experience of the existence of any external -objects, he is, I think, plainly committing the fallacy of supposing -that, because we cannot, _ex hypothesis_ have ever observed any object -which actually is "external," therefore we can never have observed -any object _like_ an external one. But plainly we may have observed -objects like them in all respects except the single one that these -have been observed whereas the others have not. And even a less degree -of likeness than this would, according to his principles, be quite -sufficient to justify an inference of causal connection. - -Hume does not, therefore, bring forward any arguments at all sufficient -to prove either that he cannot know any one object to be causally -connected with any other or that he cannot know any external fact. And, -indeed, I think it is plain that no conclusive argument could possibly -be advanced in favour of these positions. It would always be at least -as easy to deny the argument as to deny that we do know external facts. -We may, therefore, each one of us, safely conclude that we do know -external facts; and, if we do, then there is no reason why we should -not also know that other men do the same. There is no reason why we -should not, in this respect, make our philosophical opinions agree with -what we necessarily believe at other times. There is no reason why I -should not confidently assert that I do really _know_ some external -facts, although I cannot prove the assertion except by simply assuming -that I do. I am, in fact, as certain of this as of anything; and as -reasonably certain of it. But just as I am certain that I do know -_some_ external facts, so I am also certain that there are others which -I do not know. And the question remains: Does the line between the -two fall, where Hume says it falls? Is it true that the only external -facts I know are facts for which I have a basis in my own experience? -And that I cannot know any facts whatever, beyond the reach of my own -observation and memory, except those for which I have such a basis? - -This, it seems to me, is the most serious question which Hume raises. -And it should be observed that his own attitude towards it is very -different from his attitude towards the sceptical views which we -have just been considering. These sceptical views he did not expect -or wish us to accept, except in philosophic moments. He declares -that we cannot, in ordinary life, avoid believing things which are -inconsistent with them; and, in so declaring, he, of course, implies -incidentally that they are false: since he implies that he himself -has a great deal of knowledge as to what we can and cannot believe in -ordinary life. But, as regards the view that our knowledge of matters -of fact beyond our own observation is entirely confined to such as are -founded on experience, he never suggests that it is impossible that -all our beliefs should be consistent with this view, and he does seem -to think it eminently desirable that they should be. He declares that -any assertion with regard to such matters, which is not founded on -experience, can be nothing but "sophistry and illusion"; and that all -books which are composed of such assertions should be "committed to the -flames." He seems, therefore, to think that here we really have a test -by which we may determine what we should or should not believe, on all -occasions: any view on such matters, for which we have no foundation in -experience, is a view which we cannot know to be even probably true, -and which we should _never_ accept, if we can help it. Is there any -justification for this strong view? - -It is, of course, abstractly possible that we do really know, _without_ -the help of experience, some matters of fact, which we never have -observed. Just as we know matters of fact, which we _have_ observed, -without the need of any further evidence, and just as we know, for -instance, that 2+2=4, without the need of any proof, it is possible -that we may know, directly and immediately, without the need of any -basis in experience, some facts which we never have observed. This -is certainly possible, in the same sense in which it is possible -that I do not really know any external facts: no conclusive disproof -can be brought against either position. We must make assumptions as -to what facts we do know and do not know, before we can proceed to -discuss whether or not all of the former are based on experience; and -none of these assumptions can, in the last resort, be conclusively -proved. We may offer one of them in proof of another; but it will -always be possible to dispute the one which we offer in proof. But -there are, in fact, certain kinds of things which we universally -assume that we do know or do not know, just as we assume that we do -know some external facts; and if among all the things which we know -as certainly as this, there should turn out to be none for which we -have no basis in experience, Hume's view would I think, be as fully -proved as it is capable of being. The question is: Can it be proved -in this sense? Among all the facts beyond our own observation, which -we know most certainly, are there any which are certainly not based -upon experience? For my part, I confess, I cannot feel certain what -is the right answer to this question: I cannot tell whether Hume was -right or wrong. But if he was wrong--if there are any matters of fact, -beyond our own observation, which we know for certain, and which yet -we know directly and immediately, without any basis in experience, we -are, I think, faced with an eminently interesting problem. For it is, -I think, as certain as anything can be that there are _some_ kinds of -facts with regard to which Hume was right--that there are _some_ kinds -of facts which we cannot know without the evidence of experience. -I could not know, for instance, without some such evidence, such a -fact as that Julius Caesar was murdered. For such a fact I must, in -the first instance, have the evidence of other persons; and if I am -to know that their evidence is trustworthy, I must have some ground -in experience for supposing it to be so. There are, therefore, some -kinds of facts which we cannot know without the evidence of experience -and observation. And if it is to be maintained that there are others, -which we can know without any such evidence, it ought to be pointed out -exactly what kind of facts these are, and in what respects they differ -from those which we cannot know without the help of experience. Hume -gives us a very clear division of the kinds of propositions which we -can know to be true. There are, first of all, some propositions which -assert "relations of ideas "; there are, secondly, propositions which -assert "matters of fact" which we ourselves are actually observing, or -have observed and now remember; and there are, thirdly, propositions -which assert "matters of fact" which we have never actually observed, -but for believing in which we have some foundation in our past -observations. And it is, I think, certain that some propositions, which -we know as certainly as we know anything, do belong to each of these -three classes. I know, for instance, that twice two are four; I know -by direct observation that I am now seeing these words, that I am -writing, and by memory that this afternoon I saw St. Paul's; and I know -also that Julius Caesar was murdered, and I have some foundation in -experience for this belief, though I did not myself witness the murder. -Do any of those propositions, which we know as certainly as we know -these and their like, _not_ belong to either of these three classes? -Must we add a fourth class consisting of propositions which resemble -the two last, in respect of the fact that they do assert "matters of -fact," but which differ from them, in that we know them neither by -direct observation nor by memory, nor yet as a result of previous -observations? There may, perhaps, be such a fourth class; but, if there -is, it is, I think, eminently desirable that it should be pointed out -exactly what propositions they are which we do know in this way; and -this, so far as I know, has never yet been done, at all clearly, by any -philosopher. - - - - -THE STATUS OF SENSE-DATA - - -The term "sense-data" is ambiguous; and therefore I think I had better -begin by trying to explain what the class of entities is whose status I -propose to discuss. - -There are several different classes of mental events, all of which, -owing to their intrinsic resemblance to one another in certain -respects, may, in a wide sense, be called "sensory experiences," -although only some among them would usually be called "sensations." -There are (1) those events, happening in our minds while we are -awake, which consist in the experiencing of one of those entities, -which are usually called "images," in the narrowest sense of the -term. Everybody distinguishes these events from sensations proper; -and yet everybody admits that "images" intrinsically resemble the -entities which are experienced in sensations proper in some very -important respect. There are (2) the sensory experiences we have in -dreams, some of which would certainly be said to be experiences of -images, while others might be said to be sensations. There are (3) -hallucinations, and certain classes of illusory sensory experiences. -There are (4) those experiences, which used to be called the having -of "after-images," but which psychologists now say ought rather to -be called "after-sensations." And there are, finally, (5) that class -of sensory experiences, which are immensely commoner than any of the -above, and which may be called _sensations proper_, if we agree to use -this term in such a way as to exclude experiences of my first four -sorts. - -Every event, of any one of these five classes, consists in the fact -that an entity, of some kind or other, _is experienced._ The entity -which is experienced may be of many different kinds; it may, for -instance, be a patch of colour, or a sound, or a smell, or a taste, -etc; or it may be an image of a patch of colour, an image of a -sound, an image of a smell, an image of a taste, etc. But, whatever -be its nature, the entity which _is_ experienced must in all cases -be distinguished from the fact or event which consists in its being -experienced; since by saying that it is experienced we mean that it -has a relation of a certain kind to something else. We can, therefore, -speak not only of _experiences_ of these five kinds, but also of the -entities which _are experienced in_ experiences of these kinds; and -the entity which is experienced _in_ such an experience is never -identical with the experience which consists in its being experienced. -But we can speak not only of the entities which _are_ experienced in -experiences of this kind, but also of _the sort_ of entities which are -experienced in experiences of this kind; and these two classes may -again be different. For a patch of colour, even if it were not actually -experienced, would be an entity _of the same sort_ as some which are -experienced in experiences of this kind: and there is no contradiction -in supposing that there are patches of colour, which yet are not -experienced; since by calling a thing a patch of colour we merely make -a statement about its intrinsic quality, and in no way assert that -it has to anything else any of the relations which may be meant by -saying that it is experienced. In speaking, therefore, of _the sort -of_ entities which are experienced in experiences of the five kinds I -have mentioned, we do not necessarily confine ourselves to those which -actually _are_ experienced in some such experience: we leave it an open -question whether the two classes are identical or not. And the class -of entities, whose status I wish to discuss, consists precisely of all -those, whether experienced or not, which are _of the same sort_ as -those which are experienced in experiences of these five kinds. - -I intend to call this class of entities the class of _sensibles_; so -that the question I am to discuss can be expressed in the form: What -is the status of sensibles? And it must be remembered that images and -after-images are just as much "sensibles," in my sense of the term, as -the entities which are experienced in sensations proper; and so, too, -are any patches of colour, or sounds, or smells, etc, (if such there -be), which are not experienced at all. - -In speaking of sensibles as _the sort of_ entities which are -experienced in sensory experiences I seem to imply that all the -entities which are experienced in sensory experiences have some -common characteristic other than that which consists in their being -so experienced. And I cannot help thinking that this is the case, -in spite of the fact that it is difficult to see what intrinsic -character can be shared in common by entities so different from one -another as are patches of colour, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. For, -so far as I can see, some non-sensory experiences may be exactly -similar to sensory ones in all intrinsic respects, except that what -is experienced in them is different in kind from what is experienced -in any sensory experience: the relation meant by saying that in them -something _is experienced_ may be exactly the same in kind, and so may -the experient. And, if this be so, it seems to compel us to admit that -the distinction between sensory and non-sensory experiences is derived -from that between sensibles, and non-sensibles and not _vice versâ._ I -am inclined, therefore, to think that all sensibles, in spite of the -great differences between them, have some common intrinsic property, -which we recognise, but which is unanalysable; and that, when we call -an experience sensory, what we mean is not only that in it something -is experienced in a particular way, but also that this something has -this unanalysable property. If this be so, the ultimate definition of -"sensibles" would be merely all entities which have this unanalysable -property. - -It seems to me that the term "sense-data" is often used, and may be -correctly used, simply as a synonym for "sensibles"; and everybody, -I think, would expect me, in discussing the status of sense-data, -to discuss, among other things, the question whether there are any -sensibles which are not "given." It is true that the etymology of the -term "sense-data" suggests that nothing should be called a sense-datum, -but what _is_ given; so that to talk of a non-given sense-datum would -be a contradiction in terms. But, of course, etymology is no safe guide -either as to the actual or the correct use of terms; and it seems to me -that the term "sense-data" is often, and quite properly, used merely -for _the sort of_ entities that are given in sense, and not in any way -limited to those which are actually given. But though I think I might -thus have used "sense-data" quite correctly instead of "sensibles," -I think the latter term is perhaps more convenient; because though -nobody ought to be misled by etymologies, so many people in fact are -so. Moreover the term "sense-data" is sometimes limited in yet another -way, viz, to the sort of sensibles which are experienced in _sensations -proper_; so that in this sense "images" would not be "sense-data." -For both these reasons, I think it is perhaps better to drop the term -"sense-data" altogether, and to speak only of "sensibles." - -My discussion of the status of sensibles will be divided into two -parts. I shall first consider how, in certain respects, they are -related to our minds; and then I shall consider how, in certain -respects, they are related to physical objects. - - -(I) - - -(1) We can, I think, distinguish pretty clearly at least one kind -of relation which sensibles, of all the kinds I have mentioned, do -undoubtedly sometimes have to our minds. - -I do now see certain blackish marks on a whitish ground, and I hear -certain sounds which I attribute to the ticking of my clock. In both -cases I have to certain sensibles--certain blackish marks, in the one -case, and certain sounds, in the other--a kind of relation with which -we are all perfectly familiar, and which may be expressed, in the one -case, by saying that I actually _see_ the marks, and in the other, by -saying that I actually _hear_ the sounds. It seems to me quite evident -that the relation to the marks which I express by saying that I _see_ -them, is not different in kind from the relation to the sounds which -I express by saying that I _hear_ them. "Seeing" and "hearing," when -thus used as names for a relation which we may have to sensibles, are -not names for different relations, but merely express the fact that, -in the one case, the kind of sensible to which I have a certain kind -of relation is a patch of colour, while, in the other case, the kind -of sensible to which I have the same kind of relation is a sound. And -similarly when I say that I feel warm or smell a smell these different -verbs do not express the fact that I have a different kind of relation -to the sensibles concerned, but only that I have the _same_ kind of -relation to a different kind of sensible. Even when I call up a visual -image of a sensible I saw yesterday, or an auditory image of a sound -I heard yesterday, I have to those images exactly the same kind of -relation which I have to the patches of colour I now see and which I -had yesterday to those I saw then. - -But this kind of relation, which I sometimes have to sensibles of -all sorts of different kinds, images as well as others, is evidently -quite different in kind from another relation which I may also have -to sensibles. After looking at this black mark, I may turn away my -head or close my eyes, and then I no longer _actually see_ the mark I -saw just now. I may, indeed, have (I myself actually do have at this -moment) a visual _image_ of the mark before my mind; and to this image -I do now have exactly the same kind of relation which I had just now -to the mark itself. But the image is not identical with the mark of -which it is an image; and to the mark itself it is quite certain that -I have _not_ now got the same kind of relation as I had just now, when -I was actually seeing it. And yet I certainly may _now_ have to that -mark itself a kind of relation, which may be expressed by saying that -I am _thinking of_ it or remembering it. I can _now_ make judgments -about _it itself_--the very sensible which I did see just now and am no -longer seeing: as, for instance, that I did then see it and that it was -different from the image of it which I am now seeing. It is, therefore, -quite certain that there is a most important difference between the -relation I have to a sensible when I am actually seeing or hearing it, -and any relation (for there may be several) which I may have to the -same sensible when I am only thinking or or remembering it. And I want -to express this difference by using a particular term for the former -relation. I shall express this relation, which I certainly do have to -a sensible when I actually see or hear it, and most certainly do not -have to it, when I only think of or remember it, by saying that there -is in my mind a _direct apprehension_ of it. I have expressly chosen -this term because, so far as I know, it has not been used hitherto as -a technical term; whereas all the terms which have been so used, such -as "presented," "given," "perceived," seem to me to have been spoilt -by ambiguity. People sometimes, no doubt, use these terms as names for -the kind of relation I am concerned with. But you can never be sure, -when an entity is said to be "given" or "presented" or "perceived," -that what is meant is simply and solely that it has to someone that -relation which sensibles do undoubtedly have to me when I actually see -or hear them, and which they do _not_ have to me when I only think of -or remember them. - -I have used the rather awkward expression "There is in my mind a -direct apprehension of this black mark," because I want to insist that -though, when I see the mark, the mark certainly has to _something_ -the fundamental relation which I wish to express by saying that it is -directly apprehended, and though the event which consists in its being -directly apprehended by that something is certainly a mental act of -_mine_ or which occurs in my mind, yet the something which directly -apprehends it may quite possibly not be anything which deserves to be -called "I" or "me." It is quite possible, I think, that there is _no_ -entity whatever which deserves to be called "I" or "me" or "my mind"; -and hence that nothing whatever is ever directly apprehended by _me._ -Whether this is so or not, depends on the nature of that relation which -certainly does hold between all those mental acts which are _mine_, and -does not hold between any of mine and any of yours; and which holds -again between all those mental acts which are yours, but does not hold -between any of yours and any of mine. And I do not feel at all sure -what the correct analysis of this relation is. It may be the case -that the relation which unites all those acts of direct apprehension -which are mine, and which is what we mean to say that they have to one -another when we say they are all mine, really does consist in the fact -that one and the same entity is _what_ directly apprehends in each of -them: in which case this entity could properly be called "me," and it -_would_ be true to say that, when I see this black mark, _I_ directly -apprehend it. But it is also quite possible (and this seems to me to -be the view which is commonest amongst psychologists) that the entity -which directly apprehends, in those acts of direct apprehension which -are mine, is numerically different in every different act; and that -what I mean by calling all these different acts _mine_ is either merely -that they have some kind of relation to _one another_ or that they -all have a common relation to some other entity, external to them, -which may or may not be something which deserves to be called "me." -On any such view, what I assert to be true of this black mark, when -I say that it is seen by me, would not be simply that it is directly -apprehended by me, but something more complex in which, besides -direct apprehension, some other quite different relation was also -involved. I should be asserting _both_ (1) that the black mark is being -directly apprehended by _something_, _and_ (2) that this act of direct -apprehension has to something else, external to it, a quite different -relation, which is what makes it an act of _mine._ I do not know how to -decide between these views, and that is why I wished to explain that -the fundamental relation which I wish to call direct apprehension, is -one which quite possibly never holds between _me_ and any sensible. -But, once this has been explained, I think no harm can result from -using the expression "I directly apprehend A" as a synonym for "A -direct apprehension of A occurs in my mind." And in future I shall so -speak, because it is much more convenient. - -The only other point, which seems to me to need explanation, in order -to make it quite clear what the relation I call "direct apprehension" -is, concerns its relation to _attention_; and as to this I must confess -I don't feel clear. In every case where it is quite clear to me that -I am directly apprehending a given entity, it seems also clear to me -that I am, more or less, attending to it; and it seems to me possible -that what I mean by "direct apprehension" may be simply identical with -what is meant by "attention," in _one_ of the senses in which that word -can be used. That it can, at most, only be identical with _one_ of the -relations meant by attention seems to me clear, because I certainly -can be said to attend, in some sense or other, to entities, which I am -not directly apprehending: I may, for instance, think, with attention, -of a sensible, which I saw yesterday, and am certainly not seeing now. -It is, therefore, clear that to say I am attending to a thing and yet -am _not_ directly apprehending it, is not a contradiction in terms: -and this fact alone is sufficient to justify the use of the special -term "direct apprehension." But whether to say that I am directly -apprehending a given thing and yet am _not_ attending to it, in any -degree at all, is or is not a contradiction in terms, I admit I don't -feel clear. - -However that may be, one relation, in which sensibles of all sorts do -sometimes stand to our minds, is the relation constituted by the fact -that we directly apprehend them: or, to speak more accurately, by the -fact that events which consist in their being directly apprehended are -_in_ our minds, in the sense in which to say that an event is _in_ our -minds means merely that it is a mental act of _ours_--that it has to -our other mental acts that relation (whatever it may be) which we mean -by saying that they are all mental acts _of the same individual._ And -it is clear that to say of a sensible that it is directly apprehended -by me, is to say of it something quite different from what I say of a -mental act of mine, when I say that this _mental act is in my mind_: -for nothing is more certain than that an act of direct apprehension or -belief may be in my mind, without being itself directly apprehended -by me. If, therefore, by saying that a sensible is _in our minds_ -or is _ours,_ we mean merely that it is directly apprehended by us, -we must recognise that we are here using the phrases "in our minds" -or "ours" in quite a different sense from that in which we use them -when we talk of our mental acts being "in our minds" or "ours." And -why I say this is because I think that these two relations are very -apt to be confused. When, for instance, we say of a given entity that -it is "experienced," or when the Germans say that it is "erlebt," it -is sometimes meant, I think, merely that it is directly apprehended, -but sometimes that it is in my mind, in the sense in which, when I -entertain a belief, this act of belief is in my mind. - -But (2) it seems to me to be commonly held that sensibles are often -in our minds in some sense quite other than that of being directly -apprehended by us or that of being thought of by us. This seems to me -to be often what is meant when people say that they are "immediately -experienced" or are "subjective modifications"; though, of course, -both expressions are so ambiguous, that when people say that a given -entity is immediately experienced or is a subjective modification, they -_may_ mean merely that it is directly apprehended. And since I think -this view is held, I want to explain that I see no reason whatever for -thinking that sensibles ever are experienced by us in any other sense -than that of being directly apprehended by us. Two kinds of argument, -I think, are sometimes used to show that they are. - -(_a_) It is a familiar fact that, when, for instance, we are in a room -with a ticking clock, we may seem suddenly to become aware of the -ticks, whereas, so far as we can tell, we had previously not heard -them at all. And it may be urged that in these cases, since the same -kind of stimulus was acting on our ears all the time, we must have -_experienced_ the same kind of sensible sounds, although we did not -directly apprehend them. - -But I think most psychologists are now agreed that this argument is -quite worthless. There seem to me to be two possible alternatives to -the conclusion drawn. It may, I think, possibly be the case that we -did directly apprehend the ticks all the time, but that we cannot -afterwards remember that we did, because the degree of attention (if -any) with which we heard them was so small, that in ordinary life we -should say that we did not attend to them at all. But, what, I think, -is much more likely is that, though the same stimulus was acting on -our ears, it failed to produce any mental effect whatever, because our -attention was otherwise engaged. - -(_b_) It is said that sometimes when we suddenly become aware, say, -of the eighth stroke of a striking clock, we can _remember_ earlier -strokes, although we seem to ourselves _not_ to have directly -apprehended them. I cannot say that I have ever noticed this experience -in myself, but I have no doubt that it is possible. And people seem -inclined to argue that, since we can remember the earlier strokes, we -must have experienced them, though we did not directly apprehend them. - -But here again, the argument does not seem to me at all conclusive. I -should say, again, that it is possible that we did directly apprehend -them, but only with a very slight degree of attention (if any). And, -as an alternative, I should urge that there is no reason why we should -not be able to remember a thing, which we never experienced at all. - -I do not know what other arguments can be used to show that we -sometimes _experience_ sensibles in a sense quite other than that of -directly apprehending them. But I do not know how to show that we do -not; and since people whose judgment I respect, seem to hold that we -do, I think it is worth while to say something as to what this sense of -"experience" can be, in case it does occur. - -I have said that sometimes when people say that a given entity is -"experienced" they seem to mean that it belongs to some individual, -in the sense in which my acts of belief belong to me. To say that -sensibles were experienced by me in this sense would, therefore, be to -say that they sometimes have to my acts of belief and acts of direct -apprehension the same relation which these have to one another--the -relation which constitutes them _mine._ But that sensibles ever have -this kind of relation to my mental acts, is a thing which I cannot -believe. Those who hold that they are ever experienced at all, in some -sense other than that of being directly apprehended, always hold, I -think, that, whenever they are directly apprehended by us, they also, -at the same time, have to us this other relation as well. And it seems -to me pretty clear that when I do directly apprehend a sensible, it -does _not_ have to me the same relation which my direct apprehension of -it has. - -If, therefore, sensibles are ever experienced by us at all, in any -sense other than that of being directly apprehended by us, we must, I -think, hold that they are so in an entirely new sense, quite different -both from that in which to be experienced means to be directly -apprehended, and from that in which to be experienced means to occur -in some individual's mind. And I can only say that I see no reason to -think that they ever are experienced in any such sense. If they are, -the fact that they are so is presumably open to the inspection of us -all; but I cannot distinguish any such fact as occurring in myself, as -I can distinguish the fact that they are directly apprehended. On the -other hand, I see no way of showing that they are _not_ experienced in -some such sense; and perhaps somebody will be able to point it out to -me. I do not wish to assume, therefore, that there _is_ no such sense; -and hence, though I am inclined to think that the _only_ sense in which -they are experienced is that of being directly apprehended, I shall, in -what follows, use the phrase "experienced" to mean _either_ directly -apprehended _or_ having to something this supposed different relation, -if such a relation there be. - -(3) We may now, therefore, raise the question: Do sensibles ever exist -at times when they are not being experienced at all? - -To this question it is usual to give a negative answer, and two -different _a priori_ reasons may be urged in favour of that answer. - -The first is what should be meant by Berkeley's dictum that the _esse_ -of sensibles is _percipi._ This should mean, whatever else it may mean, -at least this: that to suppose a sensible to exist and yet _not_ to -be experienced in self-contradictory. And this at least seems to me -to be clearly false. Anything which was a patch of colour would be a -sensible; and to suppose that there are patches of colour which are not -being experienced is clearly not self-contradictory, however false it -may be. - -It may, however, be urged (and this is the second argument) that, -though to suppose a thing to be a sensible and _yet_ not experienced is -not self-contradictory, yet we can clearly see that nothing can have -the one property without having the other. And I do not see my way to -deny that we may be able to know, _a priori_ that such a connection -holds between two such properties. In the present case, however, I -cannot see that it does hold, and therefore, so far as _a priori_ -reasons go, I conclude that there is no reason why sensibles should not -exist at times when they are not experienced. - -It may, however, be asked: Is there any reason to suppose that they -ever do? And the reason, which weighs with me most, is one which -applies, I think, to a certain class of sensibles _only_; a class -which I will try to define by saying that it consists of those which -_would_ (under certain conditions which actually exist) be experienced -in a _sensation proper, if only_ a living body, having a certain -constitution, existed under those conditions in a position in which no -such body does actually exist. I think it is very probable that this -definition does not define at all accurately the kind of sensibles I -mean; but I think that what the definition aims at will become clearer -when I proceed to give my reasons for supposing that sensibles, of a -kind to be defined in _some_ such way, do exist unexperienced. The -reason is simply that, in Hume's phrase, I have "a strong propensity -to believe" that, _e.g.,_ the visual sensibles which I directly -apprehend in looking at this paper, still exist unchanged when I merely -alter the position of my body by turning away my head or closing my -eyes, _provided_ that the physical conditions outside my body remain -unchanged. In such a case it is certainly true in some sense that I -_should_ see sensibles like what I saw the moment before, _if only_ -my head were still in the position it was at that moment or my eyes -unclosed. But if, in such a case, there is reason to think that -sensibles which I should see, if the position of my body were altered, -exist in spite of the fact that I do not experience them, there is, -I think, an equal reason to suppose it in other cases. We must, for -instance, suppose that the sensibles which I should see now, if I were -at the other end of the room, or if I were looking under the table, -exist at this moment, though they are not being experienced. And -similarly we must suppose that the sensibles which _you_ would see, if -you were in the position in which I am now, exist at this moment, in -spite of the fact that they may be more or less different from those -which I see, owing to the different constitution of our bodies. All -this implies of course, that a vast number of sensibles exist at any -moment, which are not being experienced at all. But still it implies -this only with regard to sensibles of a strictly limited class, namely -sensibles which would be experienced _in a sensation proper,_ if a -body, having a certain constitution, were in a position in which it is -not, under the given physical conditions. It does not, for instance, -imply that any _images,_ of which it may be true that I _should_ -have them, under present physical conditions, if the position of my -body were altered, exist now; nor does it imply that sensibles which -_would_ be experienced by me now in a sensation proper, if the physical -conditions external to my body were different from what they are, exist -now. - -I feel, of course, that I have only succeeded in defining miserably -vaguely the kind of sensibles I mean; and I do not know whether the -fact that I have a strong propensity to believe that sensibles of a -kind to be defined in some such way, do exist unexperienced, is any -good reason for supposing that they actually do. The belief may, of -course, be a mere prejudice. But I do not know of any certain test by -which prejudices can be distinguished from reasonable beliefs. And I -cannot help thinking that there may be a class of sensibles, capable -of definition in _some_ such way, which there really is reason to -think exist unexperienced. - -But, if I am not mistaken, there is an empirical argument which, -though, even if it were sound, it would have no tendency whatever to -show that _no_ sensibles exist unexperienced, would, if it were sound, -show that this very class of sensibles, to which alone my argument for -unexperienced existence applies, certainly do not so exist. This, it -seems to me, is the most weighty argument which can be used upon the -subject; and I want, therefore, to give my reasons for thinking that it -is fallacious. - -The argument is one which asserts that there is abundant empirical -evidence in favour of the view that the existence of the sensibles -which we experience at any time, always depends upon the condition of -our nervous system: so that, even where it also depends upon external -physical conditions, we can safely say that sensibles, which we should -have experienced, if only our nervous system had been in a different -condition, certainly do not exist, when it is not in that condition. -And the fallacy of this argument seems to me to lie in the fact that -it does not distinguish between the existence of the sensibles _which_ -we experience and _the fact that we experience them._ What there _is_ -evidence for is that _our experience_ of sensibles always depends upon -the condition of our nervous system; that, according as the condition -of the nervous system changes, different sensibles are _experienced_, -even where other conditions are the same. But obviously the fact that -our experience of a given sensible depends upon the condition of our -nervous system does not directly show that the existence of _the -sensible experienced_ always also so depends. The fact that I am now -experiencing this black mark is certainly a different fact from the -fact that this black mark now exists. And hence the evidence which -does tend to show that the former fact would not have existed if my -nervous system had been in a different condition, has no tendency to -show that the latter would not have done so either. I am sure that this -distinction ought to be made; and hence, though I think there may be -other reasons for thinking that the very existence of the sensibles, -which we experience, and not merely the fact that we experience them -_does_ always depend upon the condition of our nervous systems, it -seems to me certain that this particular argument constitutes no such -reason. - -And I think that those who suppose that it does are apt to be -influenced by an assumption, for which also, so far as I can see, -there is no reason. I have admitted that the only reason I can see for -supposing that sensibles which we experience ever exist unexperienced, -seems to lead to the conclusion that the sensibles which would be seen -by a colour-blind man, if he occupied exactly the position which I, who -am not colour-blind, now occupy, exist now, just as much as those which -I now see. And it may be thought that this implies that the sensibles, -which he would see, and which would certainly be very different from -those which I see, are nevertheless at this moment in exactly the same -place as those which I see. Now, for my part, I am not prepared to -admit that it is impossible they should be in the same place. But the -assumption against which I wish to protest, is the assumption that, -if they exist at all, they _must_ be in the same place. I can see no -reason whatever for this assumption. And hence any difficulties there -may be in the way of supposing that they could be in the same place at -the same time as the sensibles which I see, do not at all apply to my -hypothesis, which is only that they exist _now, not_ that they exist -_in the same place_ in which mine do. - -On this question, therefore, as to whether sensibles ever exist at -times when they are not experienced, I have only to say (1) that I -think there is certainly no good reason whatever for asserting that -_no_ sensibles do; and (2) that I think perhaps a certain amount of -weight ought to be attached to our instinctive belief that certain -kinds of sensibles do; and that here again any special arguments which -may be brought forward to show that, whether some sensibles exist -unexperienced or not, _this_ kind certainly do not, are, so far as I -can see, wholly inconclusive. - - - -(II) - - -I now pass to the question how sensibles are related to physical -objects. And here I want to say, to begin with, that I feel extremely -puzzled about the whole subject. I find it extremely difficult to -distinguish clearly from one another the different considerations which -ought to be distinguished; and all I can do is to raise, more or less -vaguely, certain questions as to how certain _particular_ sensibles -are related to certain _particular_ physical objects, and to give -the reasons which seem to me to have most weight for answering these -questions in one way rather than another. I feel that all that I can -say is very tentative. - -To begin with, I do not know how "physical object" is to be defined, -and I shall not try to define it. I shall, instead, consider certain -propositions, which everybody will admit to be propositions _about_ -physical objects, and which I shall assume that I know to be true. -And the question I shall raise is as to how these propositions are to -be interpreted_--in what sense_ they are true; in considering which, -we shall at the same time consider how they are related to certain -sensibles. - -I am looking at two coins, one of which is a half-crown, the other a -florin. Both are lying on the ground; and they are situated obliquely -to my line of sight, so that the visual sensibles which I directly -apprehend in looking at them are visibly elliptical, and not even -approximately circular. Moreover, the half-crown is so much farther -from me than the florin that _its_ visual sensible is visibly smaller -than that of the florin. - -In these circumstances I am going to assume that I know the following -propositions to be true; and no one, I think, will deny that we can -know such propositions to be true, though, as we shall see, extremely -different views may be taken as to what they mean. I know (_a_) that, -in the ordinary sense of the word "see" I am _really seeing two coins;_ -an assertion which includes, if it is not identical with, the assertion -that the visual experiences, which consist in my direct apprehension -of those two elliptical patches of colour, _are_ sensations proper, -and are not either hallucinations nor mere experiences of "images"; -(_b_) that the upper sides of the coins are _really_ approximately -circular, and not merely elliptical like the visual sensibles; (_c_) -that the coins _have_ another side, and an inside, though I don't see -it; (_d_) that the upper side of the half-crown is really _larger_ -than that of the florin, though its visual sensible is _smaller_ than -the visual sensible of the upper side of the florin: (_e_) that both -coins continue to exist, even when I turn away my head or shut my eyes; -but in saying this, I do not, of course, mean to say that there is -absolutely _no_ change in them; I daresay there must be _some_ change, -and I do not know how to define exactly what I do mean. But we can, I -think, say at least this: viz., that propositions (_h_), (_c_), and -(_d_) will still be true, although proposition (_a_) has ceased to be -true. - -Now all these propositions are, I think, typical propositions of the -sort which we call propositions about physical objects; and the two -coins themselves _are_ physical objects, if anything is. My question -is: _In what sense_ are these propositions true? - -And in considering this question, there are, I think, two principles -which we can lay down as certain to begin with; though they do not -carry us very far. - -The one is (_a_) that the upper side of the coin, which I am said -to _see,_ is not simply identical with the visual sensible which I -_directly apprehend_ in seeing it. That this is so might be thought to -follow absolutely from each of the two facts which I have called (_b_) -and (_d_); but I am not quite sure that it does follow from either of -these or from both together: for it seems to me just possible that the -two sensibles in question, though _not_ circular _in my private space,_ -may yet be circular in _physical_ space; and similarly that though the -sensible of the half-crown is smaller than that of the florin _in my -private space,_ it may be larger _in physical space._ But what I think -it does follow from is the fact that another person may be seeing the -upper side of the coin in exactly the same sense in which I am seeing -it, and yet his sensible be certainly different from mine. From this it -follows absolutely that the upper side of the coin cannot be identical -with _both_ sensibles, since they are _not_ identical with one another. -And though it does not follow absolutely that it may not be identical -with _one_ of the two, yet it does follow that we _can_ get a case in -which it is not identical with _mine_ and I need only assume that the -case I am taking is such a case. - -From this it follows that we must distinguish that sense of the word -"see" in which we can be said to "see" a physical object, from that -sense of the word in which "see" means merely to directly apprehend -a visual sensible. In a proposition of the form "I see A," where A -is a name or description of some physical object, though, if this -proposition is to be true, there must be some visual sensible, B, -which I am directly apprehending, yet the proposition "I see A" is -certainly not always, and probably never, identical in meaning with the -proposition "I directly apprehend B." In asserting "I see A" we are -asserting not only that we directly apprehend some sensible but also -something else about this sensible--it may be only some proposition of -the form, "and this sensible has certain other properties," or it may -be some proposition of the form "and _I know_ this sensible to have -certain other properties." Indeed we have not only to distinguish that -sense of the word "perceive" in which it is equivalent to "directly -apprehend," from _one_ sense in which we can be said to perceive a -physical object; we have also to distinguish at least two different -senses in which we can be said to perceive physical objects, different -both from one another and from "directly apprehend." For it is obvious -that though I should be said to be now seeing _the half-crown_, there -is a narrower, and more proper, sense, in which I can only be said -to _see_ one side of it_--not_ its lower side or its inside, and not -therefore the whole half-crown. - -The other principle, which we can lay down to start with is (_β_) that -my knowledge of all the five propositions (_a_) to (_e_), is based, -in the last resort, on experiences of mine consisting in the direct -apprehension of sensibles and in the perception of relations between -directly apprehended sensibles. It is _based_ on these, in at least -this sense, that I should never have known any of these propositions -if I had never directly apprehended any sensibles nor perceived any -relations between them. - -What, in view of these two principles, can be the sense in which my -five propositions are true? - -(1) It seems to me possible that the only _true_ interpretation which -can be given to any of them is an interpretation of a kind which I -can only indicate rather vaguely as follows: Namely, that all of them -express only a kind of fact which we should naturally express by saying -that, _if_ certain conditions were fulfilled, I or some other person, -_should_ directly apprehend certain other sensibles. For instance -the only _true_ thing that can be meant by saying that I really see -_coins_ may be some such thing as that, _if_ I were to move my body in -certain ways, I should directly apprehend _other_ sensibles, _e.g._ -tactual ones, which I should not directly apprehend as a consequence -of these movements, if these present visual experiences of mine were -mere hallucinations or experiences of "images." Again, the only true -thing that can be meant by saying that the upper sides of the coins -are _really_ approximately circular may be some such thing as that, -_if_ I were looking straight at them, I should directly apprehend -circular sensibles. And similarly, the only true interpretation of -(_c_) may be some such fact as that, _if_ I were to turn the coins -over, or break them up, I _should_ have certain sensations, of a sort I -can imagine very well; of (_d_) that _if_ I were at an equal distance -from the half-crown and the florin, the sensible, I should then see -corresponding to the half-crown would be bigger than that corresponding -to the florin, whereas it is now smaller; of (_e_) that, _if,_ when -my eyes were closed, they had been open instead, I should have seen -certain sensibles. - -It is obvious, indeed, that if any interpretation on these lines _is_ -the only true interpretation of our five propositions, none of those -which I have vaguely suggested comes anywhere near to expressing it in -its ultimate form. They cannot do so for the simple reason that, in -them, the conditions under which I _should_ experience certain other -sensibles are themselves expressed in terms of _physical objects,_ and -not in terms of sensibles and our experience of them. The conditions -are expressed in such terms as "if I were to move my body," "if I -were to look straight at the coins," "if I were to turn the coins -over," etc.; and all these are obviously propositions, which must -themselves again be interpreted in terms of sensibles, if our original -five propositions need to be so. It is obvious, therefore, that any -_ultimate_ interpretation of our five propositions, on these lines, -would be immensely complicated; and I cannot come anywhere near to -stating exactly what it would be. But it seems to me possible that -_some_ such interpretation could be found, and that it is the _only_ -true one. - -The great recommendation of this view seems to me to be that it enables -us to see, more clearly than any other view can, how our knowledge of -physical propositions can be based on our experience of sensibles, in -the way in which principle (_β_) asserts it to be. If, when I know -that the coins are round, all that I know is some such thing as that -if, after experiencing the sensibles I do now experience, I were to -experience still others, I should finally experience a third set, we -can understand, as clearly as we can understand how any knowledge can -be obtained by induction at all, how such a knowledge could be based on -our previous experience of sensibles, and how it could be verified by -our subsequent experience. - -On the other hand, apart from the difficulty of actually giving any -interpretation on these lines, which will meet the requirements, -the great objection to it seems to me to be this. It is obvious -that, on this view, though we shall still be allowed to say that the -coins _existed_ before I saw them, are _circular_ etc., all these -expressions, if they are to be true, will have to be understood in a -Pickwickian sense. When I know that the coins existed before I saw -them, what I know will not be that anything whatever existed at that -time, in the sense in which those elliptical patches of colour exist -now. _All_ that I know will be simply that, since the elliptical -patches exist now, it is true, that, _if_ certain unrealised conditions -had been realised, I should have had certain sensations that I have -not had; or, _if_ certain conditions, which may or may not be realised -in the future, were to be so, I _should_ have certain experiences. -Something like this will actually be the _only true_ thing that can -be meant by saying that the coins existed before I saw them. In -other words, to say of a _physical object_ that it _existed_ at a -given time will always consist merely in saying of some sensible, -_not_ that _it_ existed at the time in question, but something quite -different and immensely complicated. And thus, though, when I know that -the coins exist, what I know will be merely some proposition about -these sensibles which I am directly apprehending, yet this view will -not contradict principle (_a_) by _identifying_ the coins with the -sensibles. For it will say that to assert a given thing of the _coins_ -is not equivalent to asserting the _same thing_ of the sensibles, but -only to asserting of them something quite different. - -The fact that these assertions that the coins exist, are round, etc., -will, on this view, only be true in this outrageously Pickwickian -sense, seems to me to constitute the great objection to it. But it -seems to me to be an objection only, so far as I can see, because I -have a "strong propensity to believe" that, when I know that the coins -existed before I saw them, _what_ I know is that something existed at -that time, in the very same sense in which those elliptical patches now -exist. And, of course, this belief _may_ be a mere prejudice. It _may_ -be that when I believe that I _now_ have, in my body, blood and nerves -and brain, _what_ I believe is only true, if it does _not_ assert, in -the proper sense of the word "existence," the _present_ existence of -anything whatever, other than sensibles which I directly apprehend, but -only makes assertions as to the kind of experiences a doctor _would_ -have, if he dissected me. But I cannot feel at all sure that my belief, -that, when I know of the present Existence of these things (as I think -I do), I am knowing of the present existence (in the proper sense) of -things other than any sensibles which I or any one else am now directly -apprehending, is a mere prejudice. And therefore I think it is worth -while to consider what, if it is not, these things, of whose existence -I know, can be. - -(2) It is certain that if, when I know that that half-crown existed -before I saw it, I am knowing that something existed at that time -in other than a Pickwickian sense, I only know this something _by -description_; and it seems pretty clear that the description by -which I know it is as _the_ thing which has a certain connection -with this sensible which I am now directly apprehending. But _what_ -connection? We cannot simply say, as many people have said, that by -"that half-crown" I mean _the_ thing which _caused_ my experience of -this sensible; because events which happen between the half-crown and -my eyes, and events in my eyes, and optic nerves, and brains are just -as much _causes_ of my experiences as the half-crown itself. But it -may perhaps be the case that the half-crown has some particular _kind_ -of causal relation to my experience, which these other events have not -got--a kind which may be expressed, perhaps, by saying that it is its -"source." And hence, when I know that that half-crown is circular, I -may perhaps be knowing that the _source_ of this experience is circular. - -But what sort of a thing can this "source" be? - -One kind of view, which I think is very commonly held, is that it is -something "spiritual" in its nature, or something whose nature is -utterly unknown to us. And those who hold this view are apt to add, -that it is not really "circular," in any sense at all; nor is the -"source" of my half-crown experience, in any sense at all, "bigger" -than that of my florin experience. But if this addition were seriously -meant, it would, of course, amount to saying that propositions (_b_) -and (_d_) are not true, in any sense at all; and I do not think -that those who make it, really mean to say this. I think that what -they mean is only that the only sense in which those "sources" are -circular, and one bigger than the other, is one in which to say this -merely amounts to saying that the sensibles, which they _would_ cause -us to experience, under certain conditions, _would_ be circular, and -one bigger than the other. In other words, in order to give a true -interpretation to the propositions that the coins are circular and one -bigger than the other, they say that we must interpret them in the same -kind of way in which view (1) interpreted them; and the only difference -between their view and view (1), is that, whereas _that_ said that you -must give a Pickwickian interpretation _both_ to the assertion that the -coins _exist, and_ to the assertion that they are _circular_, they say -that you must _not_ give it to the former assertion, and must to the -latter. - -To this view my objection is only that any reason there may be for -saying that the "sources" exist in other than a Pickwickian sense, -seems to me to be also a reason for saying that they are "circular" in -a sense that is not Pickwickian. I have just as strong a propensity to -believe that they are really circular, in a simple and natural sense, -as that they exist in such a sense: and I know of no better reason for -believing either. - -(3) It may be suggested, next, that these "sources," instead of being -something spiritual in their nature or something of a nature utterly -unknown, consist simply of sensibles, of a kind which I have previously -tried to define; namely of all those sensibles, which anybody _would,_ -under the actual physical conditions, experience in _sensations proper_ -of which the half-crown and the florin were the source, _if_ their -bodies were in any of the positions relatively to those coins, in which -they would get sensations from them at all. We saw before that it seems -_possible_ that all these sensibles do really exist at times when they -are not experienced, and that some people, at all events, seem to have -a strong propensity to believe that they do. And in favour of the view -that some such huge collection of sensibles _is_ the upper side of the -half-crown, is the fact that we do seem to have a strong propensity -to believe that any particular sensible, which we directly apprehend -in looking at the upper side of the half-crown, and of our direct -apprehension of which the upper side is the source, is _in the place_ -in which the upper side is. And that _some_ sense might be given to -the expression "in the same place as," in which it could be true that -sensibles of all sorts of different shapes and sizes, and of all sorts -of different colours, were in the same place at the same time, seems to -me to be possible. But the objection to this view seems to me to be the -same as to the last; namely that if the upper side of the half-crown -were identical with such a collection of sensibles, then the only sense -in which it could be said to be "circular," or bigger than that of the -florin, would certainly be very Pickwickian, though not the same as on -that view. - -(4) If, for the reasons given, we reject both (1), (2), and (3) as -interpretations of our five propositions, the only alternative I -can think of that remains, is one which is roughly identical, so far -as I can see, with Locke's view. It is a view which asserts that the -half-crown and the florin really did exist (in the natural sense) -before I saw them; that they really are approximately circular (again -in the natural sense); that, therefore, they are not composed of -sensibles which I or others should directly apprehend under other -conditions; and that therefore also neither these sensibles (even if -such do now exist) nor those which I am now directly apprehending are -in the place in which the coins are. It holds, therefore, that the -coins do really _resemble_ some sensibles, in respect of the "primary" -qualities which these have; that they really are round, and one larger -than the other, in much the same sense in which some sensibles are -round and some larger than others. But it holds also that no sensibles -which we ever do directly apprehend, or should directly apprehend, if -at a given time we were in other positions, are _parts_ of those coins; -and that, therefore, there is no reason to suppose that any parts of -the coins have any of the "secondary qualities"--colour, etc.--which -any of these sensibles have. - -On this view, it is plain, there is nothing to prevent us from holding -that, as suggested in I (3), all sorts of unexperienced sensibles do -exist. We are only prevented from holding that, if they do, those which -have the same source all exist in the _same place_ as their source. -And the natural view to take as to the status of sensibles generally, -relatively to physical objects, would be that none of them, whether -experienced or not, were ever in the same place as any physical object. -That none, therefore, exist "anywhere" in physical space; while, at the -same time, we can also say, as argued in I (2), that none exist "in the -mind," except in the sense that some are directly apprehended by some -minds. And the only thing that would need to be added, is that some, -and some only, _resemble_ the physical objects which are their source, -in respect of their shape. - -To this view I can see no objection except the serious one that it -is difficult to answer the questions: How can I ever come to know -that these sensibles have a "source" at all? And how do I know that -these "sources" are circular? It would seem that, if I do know these -things at all, I must know _immediately_, in the case of _some_ -sensibles, both that they have a source and what the shape of this -source is. And to this it may be objected that this is a kind of thing -which I certainly cannot know immediately. The argument in favour -of an interpretation of type (i) seems to me to rest wholly on the -assumption that there are only certain kinds of facts which I can know -immediately; and hence that if I believe I know a fact, which is not of -this kind, and which also I cannot have learnt immediately, my belief -must be a mere prejudice. But I do not know how it can be shown that an -assertion of the form: Facts of certain kinds are the only ones you can -know immediately; is itself not a prejudice. I do not think, therefore, -that the fact that, if this last view were true, we should have to -admit that we know immediately facts of a kind which many people think -we cannot know immediately, is a conclusive objection to it. - - - - -THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY - - -The fourth chapter of Mr. Bradley's _Appearance and Reality_ is a -chapter headed "Space and Time," and he begins the chapter as follows:-- - -"The object of this chapter is far from being an attempt to discuss -fully the nature of space or of time. It will content itself with -stating our main justification for regarding them as appearances. It -will explain why we deny that, _in the character which they exhibit_, -they either _have_ or _belong_ to reality."[1] - -Here, it will be seen, Mr. Bradley states that, in his opinion, Time, -_in a certain character_, neither has nor belongs to reality; this is -the conclusion he wishes to maintain. And to say that Time _has not_ -reality would seem to be plainly equivalent to saying that Time _is -not_ real. However, if anybody should doubt whether the two phrases -are meant to be equivalent, the doubt may be easily set at rest by -a reference to the concluding words of the same chapter, where Mr. -Bradley uses the following very emphatic expression: "Time," he says, -"like space, has most evidently proved _not to be real,_ but to be a -contradictory appearance" (p. 43). Mr. Bradley does, then, say here, -in so many words, that Time _is not_ real. But there is one other -difference between this statement at the end of the chapter, and the -statement at the beginning of it, which we must not forget to notice. -In the statement at the beginning he carefully qualifies the assertion -"Time neither has nor belongs to reality" by saying "Time, _in the -character which it exhibits,_ neither has nor belongs to reality," -whereas in the final statement this qualification is not inserted; -here he says simply "Time is not real." This qualification, which is -inserted in the one place and omitted in the other, might, of course, -be meant to imply that, in some _other_ character--some character which -it does _not_ exhibit--Time _has_ reality and does belong to it. And I -shall presently have something to say about this distinction between -Time in one character and Time in another, because it might be thought -that this distinction is the explanation of the difficulty as to Mr. -Bradley's meaning, which I am going to point out. - -However, so far it is clear that Mr. Bradley holds that _in some -sense,_ at all events, the whole proposition "Time is not real" can be -truly asserted. And, now, I want to quote a passage in which he says -things which, at first sight, seem difficult to reconcile with this -view. This new passage is a passage in which he is not talking of Time -in particular, but of "appearances" in general. But, as we have seen, -he does regard Time as one among appearances, and I think there is no -doubt that what he here declares to be true of all appearances is meant -to be true of Time, among the rest. This new passage is as follows:-- - -"For the present," he says,[2] "we may keep a fast hold upon this, -that appearances _exist._ That is absolutely certain, and to deny it -is nonsense. And whatever exists must _belong to reality._ This is -also quite certain, and its denial once more is self-contradictory. -Our appearances, no doubt, may be a beggarly show, and their nature to -an unknown extent may be something which, _as it is,_ is _not_ true -of reality. That is one thing, and it is quite another thing to speak -as if these facts had no actual existence, or as if there could be -anything but reality to which they might belong. And I must venture to -repeat that such an idea would be sheer nonsense. What appears, for -that sole reason, most indubitably _is;_ and there is no possibility of -conjuring its being away from it." - -That is the passage which seems to me to raise a difficulty as to his -meaning when contrasted with the former passage. And the reason why it -seems to me to raise one is this. In the former passage Mr. Bradley -declared most emphatically that Time is not real; he said: "Time has -_most evidently_ proved not to be real." Whereas in this one he seems -to declare equally emphatically that Time _does_ exist, and _is._ And -his language here again is as strong as possible. He says it is sheer -nonsense to suppose that Time does _not_ exist, is _not_ a fact, does -_not_ belong to reality. It looks, therefore, as if he meant to make -a distinction between "being real" on the one hand, and "existing," -"being a fact," and "being" on the other hand--as if he meant to say -that a thing may exist, and be, and be a fact, and yet _not_ be real. -And I think there is, at all events, some superficial difficulty in -understanding this distinction. We might naturally think that to say -"Time exists, is a fact, and is," is equivalent to saying that it is -real. What more, we might ask, can a man who says that Time _is_ real -mean to maintain about it than that it exists, is a fact, and is? All -that most people would mean by saying that time is real could, it would -seem, be expressed by saying "There is such a thing as Time." And it -might, therefore, appear from this new passage as if Mr. Bradley fully -agreed with the view that most people would express by saying "Time is -real"--as if he did not at all mean to contradict anything that most -people believe about Time. But, if so, then what are we to make of his -former assertion that, nevertheless, Time is _not_ real? He evidently -thinks that, in asserting this, he is asserting something which is -_not_ mere nonsense; and he certainly would not have chosen this way of -expressing what he means, unless he had supposed that what he is here -asserting about Time is incompatible with what people _often_ mean when -they say "Time is real." Yet, we have seen that he thinks that what he -is asserting is _not_ incompatible with the assertions that Time is, -and is a fact, and exists. He must, therefore, think that when people -say "Time is real" they often, at least, mean something _more_ than -merely that there _is_ such a thing as Time, something therefore, which -may be denied, without denying this. All the same, there is, I think, a -real difficulty in seeing that they ever _do_ mean anything more, and, -_if_ they do, what more it is that they can mean. - -The two expressions "There _is_ such a thing as so and so" and "So -and so is real" are certainly sometimes and quite naturally used as -equivalents, even if they are not always so used. And Mr. Bradley's own -language implies that this is so. For, as we have seen, in the first -passage, he seems to identify belonging to reality with being real. -The conclusion which he expresses in one place by saying that Time -does not belong to reality he expresses in another by saying that it -is not real; whereas in the second passage he seems to identify the -meaning of the same phrase "belonging to reality" with _existing;_ -he says that whatever exists must belong to reality, and that it is -self-contradictory to deny this. But if both being real and existing -are identical with belonging to reality, it would seem they must be -identical with one another. And, indeed, in another passage in the -Appendix to the 2nd Edition (p. 555) we find Mr. Bradley actually using -the following words: "Anything," he says, "that in any sense _is,_ -qualifies the absolute reality and so is real." Moreover, as we have -seen, he declares it to be nonsense to deny that Time _is_; he must, -therefore, allow that, _in a sense,_ at all events, it is nonsense to -deny that Time is real. And yet this denial is the very one he has -made. Mr. Bradley, therefore, does seem himself to allow that the word -"real" may, _sometimes_ at all events, be properly used as equivalent -to the words "exists," "is a fact," "is." And yet his two assertions -cannot both be true, unless there is _some_ sense in which the whole -proposition "Time is real" is _not_ equivalent to and cannot be -inferred from "Time is," or "Time exists," or "Time is a fact." - -It seems, then, pretty clear that Mr. Bradley must be holding that the -statement "Time is real" is in _one_ sense, _not_ equivalent to "Time -exists"; though he admits that, in _another_ sense, it is. And I will -only quote one other passage which seems to make this plain. - -"If," he says later on (p. 206) "Time is not unreal, I admit that our -Absolute is a delusion; but, on the other side, it will be urged that -time cannot be mere appearance. The change in the finite subject, we -are told, is a matter of direct experience; it is a fact, and hence it -cannot be explained away. And so much of course is indubitable. Change -is a fact and, further, _this fact, as such,_ is _not_ reconcilable -with the Absolute. And, if we could not in any way perceive how _the -fact_ can be _unreal,_ we should be placed, I admit, in a hopeless -dilemma.... But our real position is very different from this. For time -has been shown to contradict itself, and so to be appearance. With -this, its discord, we see at once, may pass as an element into a wider -harmony. And with this, the _appeal to fact_ at once becomes worthless." - -"It is mere superstition to suppose that an appeal to experience can -prove _reality._ That I find something in existence in the world or in -my self, shows that this something _exists_, and it cannot show _more._ -Any deliverance of consciousness--whether original or acquired--is -but a deliverance of consciousness. It is in no case an oracle and a -revelation which we have to accept as it is a fact, like other facts, -to be dealt with; and there is no presumption anywhere that any _fact_ -is better than appearance." - -Here Mr. Bradley seems plainly to imply that to be "real" is something -_more_ and other than to be a fact or to exist. This is the distinction -which I think he means to make, and which, I think, is the real -explanation of his puzzling language, and this is the distinction which -I am going presently to discuss. But I want first to say something -as to that other distinction, which I said might be supposed to be -the explanation of the whole difficulty--the distinction implied by -the qualification "Time, _in the character which it exhibits_"; the -suggestion that, when we talk of "Time," we may sometimes mean Time in -one character, sometimes in another, and that what is true of it in the -one character may not be true of it in the other. It might, I think, be -suggested that this is the explanation of the whole difficulty. And I -want briefly to point out why I think it cannot be the only explanation. - -Stated very badly and crudely, the difficulty which requires -explanation is this: Mr. Bradley says, "It is sheer nonsense to say -Time is not real." But this thing which he says it is sheer nonsense -to say is the very thing which he himself had formerly said. He had -said, "Time has most evidently proved not to be real." Now, Mr. Bradley -certainly does not mean to say that this proposition of his own is -sheer nonsense; and yet he says, in words, that it _is_ sheer nonsense. -This is the difficulty. What is the explanation? Quite obviously, -the explanation can only take one possible form. Mr. Bradley must be -holding that the words "Time is real" may have two different _senses._ -In one sense, the denial of them is sheer nonsense; in the other sense, -so far from being sheer nonsense, denial of them is, according to him, -evidently true. Now, what are these two different senses, between -which the difference is so enormous? It is here that the two different -explanations come in. - -The first and, as I think, the wrong explanation (though I think Mr. -Bradley's words do give some colour to it) is this. It might be said: -"The whole business is perfectly easy to explain. When Mr. Bradley -says that Time is _not_ real, what he means is that Time, _in the -character which it exhibits,_ is not real. Whereas, when he says, Time -does exist, is a fact, and is, and that it is nonsense to deny this, -what he means is that Time does exist, _in some other character_--some -character _other_ than that which it exhibits. He does _not_ mean to -make any distinction, such as you suppose, between two meanings of -the word I real '--the one of them merely equivalent to 'exists,' -'is,' 'is a fact,' and the other meaning something very different from -this. The only distinction he means to make is a distinction between -_two_ meanings of 'Time' or of the whole sentence 'Time is real.' He -distinguishes between the meaning of this sentence, when it means, -'Time in the character which it exhibits, is real,' which meaning, he -says, is evidently false; and its meaning when it means, 'Time in _some -other_ character, is real,' and this meaning, he says, is evidently -true. This is the complete explanation of your supposed puzzle, which -is, in fact, therefore, very easy to solve." - -This, I think, might be offered as an explanation of Mr. Bradley's -meaning. And it must be admitted that it _would_ furnish a complete -explanation of the particular puzzle I have just stated, it would -completely absolve Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency; and -would show that where he appears to contradict himself about the -reality of Time, the contradiction is verbal only and not real. We -might, indeed, object to this distinction between Time in one character -and Time in another; on the ground that anything which has not got the -character which Time exhibits, but only some _other_ character, ought -not to be called Time at all. We are, indeed, perfectly familiar with -the conception that one and the same thing may _at one time_ possess a -character which it does _not_ possess at another, so that what is true -of it at one time may not be true of it at another. We are, that is, -familiar with the idea of a thing _changing_ its character. But Time -itself as a whole obviously cannot change its character in this sense. -Mr. Bradley cannot mean to say that it possesses the character "which -it exhibits" and in which it is unreal _at one time,_ and possesses -some other character, in which it is real, at _some other time._ And -hence we might say it is certainly wrong to speak as if Time itself -could have two incompatible characters; since nothing can have two -incompatible characters, unless it has them _at different times._ And -this is an objection which does seem to apply to Mr. Bradley's doctrine -in any case, since he does in any case seem to imply this distinction -between Time in one character and Time in another, whether this -distinction is the complete explanation of our particular puzzle or -not. Yet this objection would not necessarily be more than an objection -to Mr. Bradley's words; it would not necessarily be an objection to -his meaning. Where he seems to imply that Time, in some character -other than that which it exhibits, may be fully real, he may only mean -that something completely different from Time, but which does in some -sense correspond to it, is fully real; and if he does mean this, our -objection would only amount to an objection to his giving the name of -"Time" to this supposed counterpart of Time; we might say, and I think -justly, that it is misleading to speak of this counterpart of Time as -if it were Time itself in some other character; but this would go no -way at all to show that there may not really be such a counterpart of -Time, which _is_ real, while Time itself is unreal. We might ask, too, -what this supposed counterpart of Time is like, or (to put it in Mr. -Bradley's way) what the precise character is, in which Time Areal? And -I think Mr. Bradley would admit that he cannot tell us. But this, you -see, would also be no objection to his actual doctrine. He might quite -well know, and be right in saying, that there is and must be a real -_counterpart_ of Time, completely different in character from Time, as -we know it, even though he has not the least idea what this counterpart -is like. - -We must, therefore, admit that this proposed explanation of our puzzle -would be a complete explanation of it. It would completely vindicate -Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency, and would give us, as -his doctrine, a doctrine to which we have hitherto found no objection -except verbal ones. - -But, nevertheless, I think it is a wrong explanation, and I want to -explain why. If we were to suppose that this distinction between Time -in one character and Time in another were the only one on which Mr. -Bradley meant to rely, we should have as his doctrine this: We should -have to suppose him to affirm most emphatically that Time, in the -character which it exhibits, neither is real, _nor_ exists, _nor_ is -a fact, _nor_ is. We should have to suppose him to be using all these -four expressions always as strict equivalents, and to mean that it -is _only_ in its other character that Time either exists, or is a -fact, or is. And if he did mean this, there would, of course, be no -doubt whatever that he does mean to contradict the common view with -regard to Time; since, of course, what most people mean by "Time" is -what he chooses to call "Time in the character which it exhibits." -Yet, his language, even in the passages that I quoted, seems to me -to indicate that he does not mean this. I think, on the contrary, -he means to affirm emphatically that Time _even_ in the character -which it exhibits, does exist, _is_ a fact, and indubitably _is,_ -though it is _not_ real in that character. In the second passage, for -instance, where he insists so emphatically that appearances do exist, -are facts, and indubitably _are,_ he is, I think, plainly talking of -appearances, in the character which they exhibit--or, as he there puts -it, their nature, _as it is_--he does, I think, mean that appearances, -even in this character, are facts, exist, and are, though, in this -character, they are not "true of reality." And, so again in the third -passage, where he says, Change _is_ a fact, and this fact, _as such,_ -is not reconcilable with the Absolute; this language is surely quite -inexcusable, unless he means that Change, as such--change, in the -_character which it exhibits_--change, _as it is, is_ a fact: though, -of course, he holds that _in_ this character it certainly is not real. -I think, therefore, we have to assume that Mr. Bradley means to make -a distinction not merely between Time, in one character, and Time in -another, but also between "real," in one sense, and "real" in another. -His meaning is not so simple as it would be, if he were merely making -a distinction between Time in one character and Time in another, and -it is not, after all, at all plain whether he means to contradict what -ordinary people hold about Time or not. He does not mean to assert that -Time, _as such, neither_ is real, _nor_ exists, _nor_ is a fact, _nor_ -is; but, on the contrary, that Time, even _as such,_ does exist, _is_ -a fact, and _is_; _but,_ nevertheless, is not real. This, at least, -is what I am going to assume him to mean. And on this assumption, we -are brought face to face with the question as to the meaning of the -word "real," and also as to the meaning of these other words "exists," -"is a fact," and "is." Mr. Bradley seems to admit, we have seen, that -"real" may _sometimes_ be properly used as _merely_ equivalent to -these other phrases. We are, however, now supposing that he also holds -that in another sense they are not equivalent, but that "real" means -something more than the others, so that it is quite consistent to -maintain that Time is _not_ "real," and yet _does_ exist, is a fact, -and is. In holding this I think he is mistaken; and what I want to do -is to explain, as clearly as I can, what sort of a mistake I take him -to be making, and what seems to me to be the source of this mistake. I -may, perhaps, be quite wrong in thinking that Mr Bradley has made this -mistake, and that it is in any degree the source of the distinction he -seems to draw between "reality" and "existence." To maintain that it is -so is no part of my main object. My main object is simply to make clear -the nature of this particular mistake, whether committed by Mr. Bradley -or not, and that it is a mistake; because it seems to me that it is a -mistake which it is very easy to make, and very important to avoid. I -am, of course, not concerned at all to discuss the question whether -Time _is_ real or not, but only to discuss the question what sort of -things would have to be true, if it were unreal, and whether if those -things were true it could still be true that Time either exists, or is, -or is a fact. - -Now, to begin with, I think I know pretty well, in part at least, what -Mr. Bradley means when he says that it is unreal. I think that part -at least of what he means is just what he _ought_ to mean--just what -anyone else would mean if he said that Time was unreal, and what any -ordinary person would understand to be meant, if he heard those words. -But I can conceive that, when I have explained as well as I can what -this is that he _ought_ to mean, some people may be inclined to dispute -whether he means any such thing at all. They may say that he is using -the word "real" exclusively in some highly unusual and special sense, -so that in asserting that "Time is unreal" he is by no means denying -any part of what ordinary people would mean by saying that "Time is -real." And that some special sense may _come in_ to his meaning I -am prepared to admit. I do think it is possible that _part_ of what -Mr. Bradley is asserting may be something which no unsophisticated -person would think of expressing in the same way, and I will admit, -therefore, that he does not, very likely, mean by "Time is unreal" -_merely_ what other people would mean by this phrase, but something -else _as well._ What, however, I cannot help thinking is that, even -if he means something more, he _does_ mean what ordinary people would -mean _as well_: that what they would mean is at least a _part_ of his -meaning. And if even this is disputed, if it is maintained that he is -using the words _exclusively_ in some special sense, I own I do not -know how to argue the question. If anybody really does take the view -that, when he says "Time is unreal," absolutely all that he means is -something which is in no way incompatible with what most people would -mean by saying "Time is real," I do not know how to show that this view -is wrong. I can only say that if this _had_ been all that he meant, -I cannot believe that he would have expressed his view in the form -"Time is unreal." The only further argument I shall bring in favour -of my view that he does mean what he ought to mean will take the form -of an answer to one possible argument which might be brought against -it. When I nave explained what he _ought_ to mean by saying that "Time -is unreal," it will be quite clear that this is something which is in -fact incompatible with the truth of the propositions that Time _is,_ -or _exists,_ or _is a fact._ And it might be urged that the fact that -it is thus incompatible is a strong argument against the view that -Mr. Bradley does mean what he _ought_ to mean, since, if he had meant -it, he could hardly have failed to perceive that what he meant _was_ -inconsistent with these propositions, whereas, as we have seen, he -certainly does not perceive this. I have an answer to that argument, -which consists in giving an explanation, which I think a plausible -one, as to how he could come to think that the propositions are _not_ -inconsistent, when in fact they are. - -What, then, _ought_ Mr. Bradley to mean by "Time is unreal"? What -would most people mean by this proposition? I do not think there is -much difficulty in discovering what sort of thing they would mean by -it. Of course, Time, with a big T, seems to be a highly abstract kind -of entity, and to define _exactly_ what can be meant by saying of an -entity of that sort that it is unreal does seem to offer difficulties. -But if you try to translate the proposition into the concrete, and to -ask what it _implies,_ there is, I think, very little doubt as to the -sort of thing it implies. The moment you try to do this, and think what -it really comes to, you at once begin thinking of a number of different -_kinds_ of propositions, all of which plainly must be untrue, if Time -is unreal. If Time is unreal, then plainly nothing ever happens before -or after anything else; nothing is ever simultaneous with anything -else; it is never true that anything is past; never true that anything -will happen in the future; never true that anything is happening now; -and so on. You can at once think of a considerable number of kinds of -propositions (and you could easily add to the list), the falsehood of -all of which is plainly implied by saying that Time is unreal. And it -is clear, also, that to say that the falsehood of all propositions of -these kinds is implied is equivalent to saying that there are no facts -of certain corresponding kinds--no facts which consist in one event -happening before another; none which consist in an event being past or -future, and so on. That is to say, what "Time is unreal" implies is -that, in the case of a large number of different _properties_ which -are such that, if they _did_ belong to anything, what they belonged -to would be facts having some common characteristic, which we might -express by calling them "temporal facts," the properties in question -do, in fact, belong to nothing. It implies that the property of being a -fact which consists in one event following another belongs to nothing; -that that of being a past event belongs to nothing, and so on. And -why it implies that all those different special properties belong to -nothing is, I think we may say, because what it _means_ is that the -general property which I have called that of being a "temporal fact" -belongs to nothing. To say that the property of being a temporal fact -belongs to nothing _does imply_ that such special properties as that -of being a fact which consists in one event following another, or that -of being a fact which consists in something being past, also belong to -nothing; in exactly the same way as to say that the property of being -"coloured" belongs to nothing _implies_ with regard to the special -properties "being red," "being blue," etc., that they also belong to -nothing. We may, then, I think, say that what "Time is unreal" _means_ -is simply "The property of being a temporal fact belongs to nothing," -or, to express this in the way in which it would be expressed in -ordinary life, "There _are_ no temporal facts." And this being so, we -have explained the usage of "unreal," where it is predicated of Time -with a capital T, by reference to a much more common and perfectly -familiar usage of the term. The use of "is unreal" in the phrase "Time -is unreal" has been defined by reference to its use in the phrase -"Temporal facts are unreal." And its use in this phrase is, so far as -I can see, exactly the same as in hosts of phrases with which we are -perfectly familiar; it is, I think, _the_ commonest and by far the most -important use of the term "unreal." The use is that in which we use it -when we say, "Unicorns are unreal," "Griffins are unreal," "Chimæras -are unreal," and so on. It is the usage in which unreal is equivalent -to "imaginary"; and in which to say "Unicorns are unreal" means the -same as "There are no unicorns" or "Unicorns do not exist." In just -the same way the proposition "Temporal facts are unreal," into which -we have translated "Time is unreal," means the same as "There are no -temporal facts," or "Temporal facts do not exist," or "Temporal facts -are imaginary." - -I think, then, that what Mr. Bradley _ought_ to mean by "Time is -unreal" can be defined by reference to one particular usage of the word -"real" --or, if you like to put it that way, to one particular one -among the conceptions for which the term "reality" may stand. And this -particular conception seems to me to be by far the commonest and most -important of those for which the term does stand. I want, therefore, -before going on, to dwell a little upon its nature; although I daresay -that all that I have to say is perfectly familiar and perfectly well -understood by every one here. Of course, it has often been said before, -but I think it is still very far from being generally understood. - -I think, perhaps, the point I want to insist on can be brought out in -this way. I have just said that we have pointed out one particular -one, and that the most important, among the conceptions for which the -term "reality" may stand; and that is an excusable way of saying what -we have done. But it would, I think, be more correct to say that we -have pointed out one particular, and that the most important, usage -of the terms "real" and "unreal," and that one of the peculiarities -of this usage is that it is such that the terms "real" and "unreal" -cannot, when used in this way, be properly said to stand for any -conception whatever. I will try to explain what I mean. We have said -that what "Lions are real" _means_ is that some particular property or -other--I will say, for the sake of brevity, _the_ property of being -a lion, though that is not strictly accurate, does In fact _belong -to_ some-thing--that there are things which have it, or, to put it -in another way, that the conception of being a lion is a conception -which does apply to some things--that there are things which _fall -under_ it. And similarly what "Unicorns are _unreal"_ means is that the -property of being a unicorn belongs to _nothing_. Now, if this is so, -then it seems to me, in a very important sense, "real" and "unreal" -do _not_ in this usage stand for any conceptions at all. The only -_conceptions_ which occur in the proposition "Lions are real" are, on -this interpretation, plainly, (1) the conception of being a lion, and -(2) the conception of belonging to something, and perfectly obviously -"real" does not stand for either of these. In the case of the first -that is obvious; but it is worth while pointing out that it is also -true of the second. - -For if "is real" did stand for "belongs to something," then the -proposition "Lions are real" would stand, not for the assertion -that the property of "being a lion" belongs to something, but for -the assertion that lions themselves _are properties which belong to -something_; and it is quite obvious that what we mean to assert is -not any such nonsense as this. "Real," therefore, does not, in this -proposition, stand for the conception of "belonging to something" nor -yet, quite plainly, does it stand for the conception of "being a lion." -And hence, since these are the only two conceptions which do occur in -the proposition, we may, I think, say that "real," in this usage, does -not stand for any conception at all. To say that it did would be to -imply that it stood for some property of which we are asserting that -everything which has the property of "being a lion" _also_ has this -other property. But we are not, in fact, asserting any such thing. We -are not asserting of any property called "reality" that it belongs to -lions, as in the proposition "Lions are mammalian" we _are_ asserting -of the property of "being a mammal" that _it_ belongs to lions. The -two propositions "Lions are real" and "Lions are mammalian," though -grammatically similar, are in reality of wholly different forms; and -one difference between them may be expressed by saying that whereas -"mammalian" does stand for a property or conception, the very point of -this usage of "real" is that it does not. - -To return to Mr. Bradley. "Time is unreal" _ought_ to mean, according -to me, "Temporal facts are unreal," in the sense I have tried to -explain. And I cannot help thinking that this which he _ought_ to mean -is, in part at least, what Mr. Bradley _does_ mean when he says "Time -is unreal," though possibly be also means something else as well. But -if so, it is quite clear, I think, that what he means is inconsistent -with its being true that Time exists or that there is such a thing as -Time. To say that Time exists or that there is such a thing, is to -assert at least, that there are some temporal facts: it may assert more -than this, but it does assert this, at least. And this, we have seen, -is exactly what is denied when it is said that Time is unreal. "Time -is unreal" just means "Temporal facts are unreal," _or_ "there are no -temporal facts," _or_ "Temporal facts do not exist." And just this is -also what is meant by "Time does not exist" or "There is no such thing -as Time." There is, in fact, nothing, else for these expressions to -mean. What, therefore, Mr. Bradley _ought_ to mean and (according to -me) does mean by "Time is unreal" is, in fact, inconsistent with what -he ought to mean by "Time exists" or by "Time is." And yet plainly he -does not think that it is so. Is it possible to explain why he should -have failed to perceive the inconsistency? - -I think his failure can be explained as follows. It may have been -noticed that, in the passages I quoted from him, he insists in one -place, that to deny that appearances exist is not merely false but -_self-contradictory,_ and in another appeals to the principle that "any -deliverance of consciousness is but a deliverance of consciousness" in -support of his contention that what _is_ a fact need, nevertheless, -_not_ be real. And the fact that he does these two things does, I -think, give colour to the suggestion that the reason why he thinks that -what is unreal may yet exist, and be a fact, and be, is the following. -It is undoubtedly the case that, even if temporal facts are unreal, -_i.e.,_ there _are_ no such things, we can and do _think of them,_ just -as it is undoubtedly the case that, though unicorns are unreal, we can -and do imagine them. In other words, "temporal facts" and "unicorns" -are both quite certainly "deliverances of consciousness," at least -in the sense that they are "objects of thought"; being "objects of -thought" they are, in a wide sense, "appearances" also, and I cannot -help thinking that Mr. Bradley supposes that, merely because they are -so, they _must_ at least BE. "How" (I imagine he would ask) "can a -thing 'appear' or even 'be thought of' unless it is there to appear and -to be thought of? To say that it appears or is thought of, and that yet -there is no such thing, is plainly self-contradictory. A thing cannot -have a property, unless it is there to have it, and, since unicorns -and temporal facts _do_ have the property of being thought of, there -certainly must be such things. When I think of a unicorn, what I am -thinking of is certainly not nothing; if it were nothing, then, when -I think of a griffin, I should also be thinking of nothing, and there -would be no difference between thinking of a griffin and thinking -of a unicorn. But there certainly is a difference; and what can the -difference be except that in the one case what I am thinking of is a -unicorn, and in the other a griffin? And if the unicorn is what I am -thinking of, then there certainly must _be_ a unicorn, in spite of the -fact that unicorns are unreal. In other words, though in one sense of -the words there certainly _are_ no unicorns--that sense, namely, in -which to assert that there are would be equivalent to asserting that -unicorns are real--yet there _must_ be _some_ other sense in which -there _are_ such things; since, _if_ there were not, we could not think -of them." - -Perhaps, it may be thought that the fallacy involved in this argument -is too gross for it to be possible that Mr. Bradley should have -been guilty of it. But there are other passages in _Appearance and -Reality_--particularly what he says about Error --which look to me as -if he certainly was guilty of it. I suppose it will be quite obvious to -everyone here that it is a fallacy; that the fact that we can think of -unicorns is not sufficient to prove that, in any sense at all, there -_are_ any unicorns. Yet, I am not sure that I know myself what is _the_ -mistake involved in thinking that it _is_ sufficient, and I am going, -therefore, to try to put as clearly as I can, what I think it is, in -the hope that somebody may be able, if I am wrong, to correct me. - -The main mistake, I suppose, is the mistake of thinking that the -proposition "Unicorns are thought of" is a proposition of the same form -as "Lions are hunted"; or the proposition "I am thinking of a unicorn" -of the same form as "I am hunting a lion"; or the proposition "Unicorns -are objects of thought" of the same form as "Lions are objects of the -chase." Of the second proposition in each of these three pairs, it is -in fact the case that it could not be true unless there were lions--at -least one. Each of them does, in fact, assert both with regard to a -certain property--which we will call that of "being a lion"--that there -_are_ things which possess it, and also with regard to another--that of -being hunted--that some of the things which possess the former possess -this property too. But it is obvious enough to common sense that the -same is by no means true of the _first_ proposition in each pair, in -spite of the fact that their grammatical expression shows no trace of -the difference. It is perfectly obvious that if I say "I am thinking of -a unicorn," - -I am not saying both that there is a unicorn and that I am thinking of -it, although, if I say "I am hunting a lion," I am saying both that -there is a lion, and that I am hunting it. In the former case, - -I am _not_ asserting that the two properties of being a unicorn and of -being thought of by me both belong to one and the same thing; whereas, -in the latter case, I am asserting that the two properties of being a -lion and of being hunted by me _do_ belong to one and the same thing. -It is quite clear that there is _in fact_, this difference between -the two propositions; although no trace of it appears in their verbal -expression. And why we should use the same form of verbal expression -to convey such different meanings is more than I can say. It seems to -me very curious that language, in this, as in the other instance which -we have just considered of "Lions are real" and "Lions are mammalian," -should have grown up just as if it were expressly designed to mislead -philosophers; and I do not know why it should have. Yet, it seems to -me there is no doubt that in ever so many instances it has. Moreover, -_exactly_ what _is_ meant by saying "I am thinking of a unicorn" is -not by any means clear to me. I think we can assert at least this: -In order that this proposition should be true, it is necessary (1) -that I should be conceiving, with regard to a certain property, the -hypothesis that there Is something which possesses it, and (2) that the -property in question should be such that, if anything did possess it -there would be a unicorn. Although this is plainly true, it does not -give us completely what is _meant_ by the statement, "I am thinking -of a unicorn"; and I do not know what the complete meaning is. It is -certainly _not_ that I am conceiving with regard to the property of -"being a unicorn," that there is something which possesses it; since -I may be thinking of a unicorn, without ever having conceived the -property of "being a unicorn" at all. Whatever it does mean, the point -which concerns us is that it is certainly _not_ necessary for its -truth, that the property of being a unicorn should, in fact, belong -to anything whatever, or, therefore, that there should in any sense -whatever _be_ a unicorn. And the fallacy I am attributing to Mr. -Bradley is that of supposing that, _in some sense,_ it must imply this -latter. - -This, then, is what I imagine to be at least one of the reasons -which have led Mr. Bradley to suppose that the proposition "Time is -unreal," _must_ be consistent with the proposition "There _is_ such -a thing as Time." Put shortly, it is that he sees (what is perfectly -true) that "Time is unreal" _must_ be consistent with "We do think of -Time;" he thinks (falsely) that "We _do_ think of Time" must imply, -in some sense, "There _is_ such a thing as Time;" and finally, infers -(correctly) from this true and this false premiss, that there _must_ be -some sense of the proposition "There is such a thing as Time" which is -consistent with "Time is unreal." - -It follows, then, that if Mr. Bradley means what he ought mean _both_ -by "Time is unreal" _and_ by "Time exists," he is contradicting himself -when he combines these two propositions. And I have said I feel -convinced that he _does_ mean what he ought to mean by the former. -But I feel a good deal of doubt as to whether, all the same, he is -contradicting himself, because it does seem to me doubtful whether he -means what he ought to mean by the latter. The kind of thing which I -imagine may be happening to him when he insists so strongly that Time -_does_ exist, _is a fact,_ and _is,_ is that, properly speaking, he is -not attaching to these phrases any meaning whatever--_not,_ therefore, -that which they properly bear. It seems to me very possible that he -has so strongly convinced himself of the false proposition that there -_must_ be _some_ sense in which, if I think of a unicorn, there must -_be_ a unicorn, that wherever he knows the former proposition holds, -he allows himself to use the latter _form of words,_ without attaching -any meaning to them. What he is really asserting so emphatically may, -I think, be not anything which his words stand for, but simply this -verbal proposition that there _must_ be _some_ sense in which they are -true. - - -[1] _Appearance and Reality_ (2nd edn.), p. 35. The Italics are mine. - -[2] _Op. cit._ pp. 131-2. - - - - -SOME JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION - - -I want to raise some childishly simple questions as to what we are -doing when we make judgments of a certain kind, which we all do in fact -exceedingly commonly make. The kind of judgments I mean are those which -we make when, with regard to something which we are seeing, we judge -such things as '"That is an inkstand," "That is a tablecloth," "That -is a door," etc., etc.; or when, with regard to something which we are -feeling with our hands, we judge such things as "This is cloth," "This -is a finger," "This is a coin," etc., etc. - -It is scarcely possible, I think, to exaggerate the frequency with -which we make such judgments as these, nor yet the certainty with -which we are able to make vast numbers of them. Any man, who is not -blind, can, at almost any moment of his waking life, except when he -is in the dark, make a large number of judgments of the first kind, -with the greatest certainty. He has only to look about him, if he is -indoors, to judge with regard to various things which he is seeing, -such things as "That is a window," "That is a chair," "This is a book"; -or, if he is out-of-doors, such things as "That is a house," "That -is a motor-car," "That is a man," or "That is a stone," "That is a -tree," "That is a cloud." And all of us, who are not blind, do in fact -constantly make such judgments, even if, as a rule, we only make them -as parts of more complicated judgments. What I mean is that, when -we make such judgments as "Hullo! that clock has stopped," or "This -chair is more comfortable than that one," or "That man looks like a -foreigner," judgments of the simpler kind with which I am concerned -are, so far as I can see, actually a part of what we are judging. In -judging "That clock has stopped," part of what I am actually judging -is, so far as I can see, "That is a clock;" and similarly if I judge -"That tree is taller than this one," my judgment actually contains the -two simpler judgments "That is a tree," and "This is a tree." Perhaps -most judgments which we make, of the kind I mean, are, in this way, -only parts of more complicated judgments: I do not know whether this -is so or not. But in any case there can be no doubt that we make them -exceedingly commonly. And even a blind man, or a man in the dark, can -and does, very frequently, make judgments of the second kind--judgments -about things which he is feeling with his hands. All of us, for -instance, at almost any moment of our waking life, whether we are in -the dark or not, have only to feel certain parts of our own bodies or -of our clothes, in order to make, with great certainty, such judgments -as "This is a finger," "This is a nose," "This is cloth." And similarly -I have only to feel in my pockets to judge, with regard to objects -which I meet with there, such things as "This is a coin," "This is a -pencil," "This is a pipe." - -Judgments of this kind would, I think, commonly, and rightly, be taken -to be judgments, the truth of which involves the existence of material -things or physical objects. If I am right in judging that this is -an inkstand, it follows that there is at least one inkstand in the -Universe; and if there is an inkstand in the Universe, it follows that -there is in it at least one material thing or physical object. This -may, of course, be disputed. Berkeley, if I understand him rightly, -was clearly of opinion that there was no inconsistency in maintaining -that there were in the Universe thousands of inkstands and trees and -stones and stars, and that yet there was in it no such thing as matter. -And perhaps the definition of matter, which he adopted, was such -that there really was no inconsistency in maintaining this. Perhaps, -similarly, other philosophers have sometimes adopted definitions of -the expressions "material things" and "physical objects," which were -such that all the judgments of this kind that we make might quite -well be true, without its being true that there are in the Universe -any material things whatever. Perhaps, even, there may be some -justification for adopting definitions of those terms which would yield -the surprising result that we may, with perfect consistency, maintain -that the world is full of minerals and vegetables and animals, of all -sorts of different kinds, and that yet there is not to be found in -it a single material thing. I do not know whether there is or is not -any utility in using the terms "material thing" or "physical object" -in such a sense as this. But, whether there is or not, I cannot help -thinking that there is ample justification for using them in another -sense--a sense in which from the proposition that there are in the -Universe such things as inkstands or fingers or clouds, it strictly -follows that there are in it at least as many material things, and in -which, therefore, we can _not_ consistently maintain the existence of -inkstands, fingers, and clouds, while denying that of material things. -The kinds of judgment which I have mentioned, and thousands of others -which might easily be mentioned, are obviously all of the same sort -in one very important respect--a respect in which, for instance, such -judgments as "This is an emotion," "This is a judgment," "This is a -colour," are _not_ of the same sort as they are. And it seems to me -that we are certainly using the term "material thing" in _a_ correct -and useful way, if we express this important common property which they -have, by saying that of each of them the same can truly be said as was -said of the judgment "That is an inkstand": that, just as from the -proposition "There is an inkstand" it follows that there is at least -one material thing, so from the proposition "There is a tablecloth," -it follows that there is at least one material thing; and similarly -in all the other cases. We can certainly use the expression "Things -_such as_ inkstands, tablecloths, fingers, clouds, stars, etc.," to -mean things such as these in a certain very important respect, which -we all understand, though we may not be able to define it. And the -term "material thing" certainly is and can be correctly used to mean -simply things such as these in that respect--whatever it may be. Some -term is certainly required to mean merely things such as these in that -important respect; and, so far as I can see, there is no term which can -be naturally used in this sense except the term "material things" and -its equivalents. Thus understood, the term "material thing" certainly -does stand for an important notion, which requires a name. - -And, if we agree to use the term in this sense, then it is obvious that -no more can be necessary for the truth of the assertion that there are -material things, than is necessary for the truth of judgments of the -kind with which I propose to deal. But no more can be necessary for -the truth of these judgments than is actually asserted in or logically -implied by them. And if we approach the question what is necessary for -the truth of the assertion that there are material things, by asking -what it is that we actually assert when we make such judgments as -these, certain reasons for doubting how much is necessary are, I think, -brought out much more clearly, than if we approach the question in -any other way. Many philosophers have told us a very great deal as to -what they suppose to be involved in the existence of material things; -and some, at least, among them seem to have meant by "material things" -such things as inkstands, fingers and clouds. But I can think of only -one type of view as to the constitution of material things, which is -such that it is tolerably clear what answer those who hold it would -give to the simple question; What is it that I am judging, when I -judge, as I now do, that that is an inkstand? The type of view I mean -is that to which the view that Mill suggests, when he explains what he -means by saying that Matter is a Permanent Possibility of Sensation, -and also the view or views which Mr. Russell seems to suggest in his -"Our Knowledge of the External World," seem to belong. In the case of -views of this kind, it is, I think, tolerably clear what answer those -who hold them would give to _all_ the questions I want to raise about -judgments of the kind I have described. But it does not seem to me at -all certain that any view of this type is true; and certainly many -philosophers have held and do hold that all views of this type are -false. But in the case of those who do hold them to be false, I do -not know, in any single case, what answer would be given to _all_ the -questions which I want to raise. In the case of philosophers, who do -not accept any view of the Mill-Russell type, none, so far as I know, -has made it clear what answer he would give to _all_ my questions: some -have made it clear what answer they would give to _some_ of them; but -many, I think, have not even made it clear what answer they would give -to any. Perhaps there is some simple and satisfactory answer, which has -escaped me, that such philosophers could give to all my questions; but -I cannot help thinking that assumptions as to the nature of material -things have too often been made, without its even occurring to those -who made them to ask, what, if they were true, we could be judging when -we make such judgments as these; and that, if this question had been -asked, it would have become evident that those assumptions were far -less certain than they appeared to be. - -I do not know that there is any excuse whatever for calling _all_ -judgments of the kind I mean "judgments of perception." All of them -are, of course, judgments _about_ things which we are at the moment -perceiving, since, by definition, they are judgments about things -which we are seeing or feeling with our hands; and all of them are, no -doubt, also _based upon_ something which we perceive about the thing -in question. But the mere fact that a judgment is both about a thing -which I am perceiving, and also based upon something which I perceive -about that thing, does not seem to be a sufficient reason for calling -it a judgment of perception; and I do not know that there is any -other reason than this for calling _all_ judgments of the kind I mean -judgments of perception. I do not want therefore, to assert that _all_ -of them are so. But it seems to me quite plain that enormous numbers -of them are so, in a perfectly legitimate sense. This judgment, which -I now make, to the effect that _that_ is a door, seems to me quite -plainly to be a judgment of perception, in the simple sense that I -make it because I do, in fact, see that that _is_ a door, and assert -in it no more than what I see; and what I see I, of course, perceive. -In every case in which I judge, with regard to something which I am -seeing or feeling with my hands, that it is a so-and-so, simply because -I do perceive, by sight or touch, that it is in fact a thing of that -kind, we can, I think, fairly say that the judgment in question is a -judgment of perception. And enormous numbers of judgments of the kind -I mean are, quite plainly, judgments of perception in this sense. They -are not _all,_ for the simple reason that some of them are mistaken. -I may, for instance, judge, with regard to an animal which I see at -a distance, that it is a sheep, when in fact it is a pig. And here -my judgment is certainly not due to the fact that I see it to be a -sheep; since I cannot possibly see a thing to be a sheep, unless it is -one. It, therefore, is _not_ a judgment of perception in this sense. -And moreover, even where such a judgment is true, it may not always -be a judgment of perception, for the reason that, whereas I only see -the thing in question, the kind of thing which I judge it to be is of -such a nature, that it is impossible for any one, by sight alone, to -perceive anything to be of that kind. How to draw the line between -judgments of this kind, which are judgments of perception, and those -which are not, I do not know. That is to say, I do not know what -conditions must be fulfilled in order that I may be truly said to be -_perceiving,_ by sight or touch, such things as that that is a door, -this is a finger, and not _merely_ inferring them. Some people may no -doubt think that it is very unphilosophical in me to say that we _ever_ -can perceive such things as these. But it seems to me that we do, in -ordinary life, constantly talk of _seeing_ such things, and that, when -we do so, we are neither using language incorrectly, nor making any -mistake about the facts--supposing something to occur which never does -in fact occur. The truth seems to me to be that we are using the term -"perceive" in a way which is both perfectly correct and expresses a -kind of thing which constantly does occur, only that some philosophers -have not recognised that this is a correct usage of the term and have -not been able to define it. I am not, therefore, afraid to say that I -do now perceive that that is a door, and that that is a finger. Only, -of course, when I say that I do, I do not mean to assert that part of -what I "perceive," when I "perceive" these things, may not be something -which, in an important sense, is known to me only by inference. It -would be very rash to assert that "perception," in this sense of the -word, entirely excludes inference. All that seems to me certain is that -there is an important and useful sense of the word "perception," which -is such that the amount and kind of inference, if inference there be, -which is involved in my present perception that that is a door, is no -bar to the truth of the assertion that I do perceive that it is one. -Vast numbers, then, of the kind of judgments with which I propose to -deal seem to me to be, in an important and legitimate sense, judgments -of perception; although I am not prepared to define, any further than I -have done, what that sense is. And though it is true that the questions -which I shall raise apply just as much to those of them which are not -judgments of perception as to those which are, it is, of course, also -true that they apply just as much to those which are as to those which -are not; so that I shall be really dealing with a large and important -class among judgments of perception. - -It is true that, if certain views which, if I understand them rightly, -some Philosophers have seriously entertained, were true ones, it would -be quite impossible that any of them should be judgments of perception. -For some philosophers seem to me to have denied that we ever do in fact -know such things as these, and others not only that we ever know them -but also that they are ever true. And, if, in fact, I never do know -such a thing, or if it is never true, it will of course, follow that I -never perceive such a thing; since I certainly cannot, in this sense, -perceive anything whatever, unless I both know it and it is true. But -it seems to me a sufficient refutation of such views as these, simply -to point to cases in which we do know such things. This, after all, you -know, really is a finger: there is no doubt about it: I know it, and -you all know it. And I think we may safely challenge any philosopher to -bring forward any argument in favour either of the proposition that we -do not know it, or of the proposition that it is not true, which does -not at some point, rest upon some premiss which is, beyond comparison, -less certain than is the proposition which it is designed to attack. -The questions whether we do ever know such things as these, and whether -there are any material things, seem to me, therefore, to be questions -which there is no need to take seriously: they are questions which it -is quite easy to answer, with certainty, in the affirmative. What does, -I think, need to be taken seriously, and what is really dubious, is not -the question, whether this is a finger, or whether I know that it is, -but the question _what,_ in certain respects, I am knowing, when I know -that it is. And this is the question to which I will now address myself. - -To begin with there is one thing which seems to me to be very certain -indeed about such judgments. It is unfortunately a thing which I do -not know how properly to express. There seem to me to be objections -to every way of expressing it which I can think of. But I hope I -may be able to make my meaning clear, in spite of the inadequacy of -my expression. The thing I mean is a thing which may to some people -seem so obvious as to be scarcely worth saying. But I cannot help -thinking that it is not always clearly recognised, and even that some -philosophers, to judge from what they say, might perhaps dispute it. -It seems to me to be an assumption which is silently made in many -treatments of the subject, and, as I say, it seems to me to be very -certain indeed. But I think it is at all events worth while to try to -make the assumption explicit, in case it should be disputed. If it -really is not true, then the other questions to which I shall go on, -and which seem to me really dubious and difficult, do not, I think, -arise at all. - -I will try to express this fundamental assumption, which seems to me -so very certain, by saying it is the assumption that, in all cases in -which I make a judgment of this sort, I have no difficulty whatever -in picking out a thing, which is, quite plainly, in a sense in which -nothing else is, _the_ thing about which I am making my judgment; and -that yet, though this thing is _the_ thing about which I am judging, I -am, quite certainly, _not_, in general, judging with regard to it, that -_it_ is a thing of that kind for which the term, which seems to express -the predicate of my judgment, is a name. Thus, when I judge, as now, -that That is an inkstand, I have no difficulty whatever in picking out, -from what, if you like, you can call my total field of presentation -at the moment, an object, which is undoubtedly, in a sense in which -nothing else is, _the_ object about which I am making this judgment; -and yet it seems to me quite certain that of _this_ object I am not -judging that it is a whole inkstand. And similarly when I judge, with -regard to something which I am feeling in my pocket, "This is a coin," -I have no difficulty in picking out, from my field of presentation, -an object, which is undoubtedly _the_ object with which my judgment -is concerned; and yet I am certainly not judging with regard to this -object that it is a whole coin. I say that _always__t_ when I make -such a judgment, I can pick out _the_ one, among the objects presented -to me at the time, about which I am making it; but I have only said -that _in general_ I am not judging with regard to this object that -it is a thing of the kind, for which the term, which seems to express -the predicate of my judgment, is a name. And I have limited my second -proposition in this way, because there are cases, in which it does -not, at first sight, seem quite so certain that I am not doing this, -as in the two instances I have just given. When, for instance, I judge -with regard to something, which I am seeing, "This is a soap-bubble," -or "This is a drop of water," or even when I judge "This is a spot -of ink," it may not seem quite so plain, that I may not be judging, -with regard to the very object presented to me, that it is, itself, a -whole soap-bubble, a whole drop of water, or a whole spot of ink, as -it always is, in the case of an inkstand, or a coin, that I never take -the presented object, about which I am judging, to be a whole inkstand, -or a whole coin. The sort of reason why I say this will, of course, -be obvious to any one, and it is obviously of a childish order. But I -cannot say that it seems to me quite obvious that in such a case I am -not judging of the presented object that it is a whole drop of water, -in the way in which it does seem to be obvious that I am not judging -of _this_ presented object that it is an inkstand. That is why I limit -myself to saying that, _in general_, when I judge "That is a so-and-so" -I am not judging with regard to the presented object, about which my -judgment is that _it_ is a thing of the kind in question. As much as -this seems to me to be a thing which any child can see. Nobody will -suppose, for a moment, that when he judges such things as "This is a -sofa," or "This is a tree," he is judging, with regard to the presented -object about which his judgment plainly is, that it is a whole sofa or -a whole tree: he can, at most, suppose that he is judging it to be a -part of the surface of a sofa or a part of the surface of a tree. And -certainly in the case of most judgments of this kind which we make, -whether in the case of all or not, this is plainly the case: we are not -judging, with regard to the presented object about which our judgment -plainly is, that it is a thing of the kind, for which the term which -appears to express the predicate of our judgment, is a name. And that -this should be true of _most_ judgments of this kind, whether of all or -not, is quite sufficient for my purpose. - -This much, then, seems to me to be very certain indeed. But I will try -to make clearer exactly what I mean by it, by mentioning a ground on -which I imagine it might perhaps be disputed. - -The object of which I have spoken as _the_ object, about which, in -each particular case, such a judgment as this always is a judgment, -is, of course, always an object of the kind which some philosophers -would call a sensation, and others would call a sense-datum. Whether -all philosophers, when they talk of sensations, mean to include among -them such objects as these, I do not know. Some, who have given a great -deal of attention to the subject, and for whom I have a great respect, -talk of sensations in such a way, that I cannot be sure what they are -talking about at all or whether there are such things. But many, I -think, undoubtedly do mean to include such subjects as these. No doubt, -in general, when they call them sensations, they mean to attribute to -them properties, which it seems to me extremely doubtful whether they -possess. And perhaps even those who call them sense-data, may, in part, -be attributing to them properties which it may be doubtful whether -they possess. If we want to define a sensation or a sense-datum, in a -manner which will leave it not open to doubt what sort of things we are -talking of, and that there are such things, I do not know that we can -do it better than by saying that sense-data are the sort of things, -_about_ which such judgments as these always seem to be made--the sort -of things which seem to be the real or ultimate subjects of all such -judgments. Such a way of defining how the term "sense-datum" is used, -may not seem very satisfactory; but I am inclined to think it may be as -satisfactory as any which can be found. And it is certainly calculated -to obviate some misunderstandings which may arise; since everybody can -see, I think, what the thing is which I am describing as _the_ thing -about which he is making his judgment, when he judges "That is an -inkstand," and that there is such a thing, even if he does not agree -that this description applies to it. - -I can, in fact, imagine that some of those who would call this thing a -sensation would deny that my judgment is _about_ it at all. It would -sometimes be spoken of as the sensation which mediates my perception -of this inkstand in this instance. And I can imagine that some of -those who would so speak of it might be inclined to say that when -I judge "This is an inkstand," my judgment is about this inkstand -which I perceive, and not, in any sense at all, about the sensation -which mediates my perception of it. They may perhaps imagine that the -sensation mediates my perception of the inkstand only in the sense -that it brings the inkstand before my mind in such a way that, once it -is before my mind, I can make a judgment about it, which is _not_ a -judgment about the mediating sensation at all; and that such a judgment -is the one I am actually expressing when I say "This is an inkstand." -Such a view, if it is held, seems to me to be quite certainly false, -and is what I have intended to deny. And perhaps I can put most clearly -the reason why it seems to me false, by saying that, if (which may -be doubted) there is anything which is this inkstand, that thing is -certainly not given to me independently of this sense-datum, in such -a sense that I can possibly make a judgment about it which is _not_ -a judgment about this sense-datum. I am not, of course, denying that -I do perceive this inkstand, and that my judgment is, in a sense, a -judgment about it. Both these things seem to me to be quite obviously -true. I am only maintaining that my judgment is _also,_ in another -sense, a judgment about this sense-datum which mediates my perception -of the inkstand. Those who say that this sense-datum does mediate my -perception of the inkstand, would, of course, admit that my perception -of the inkstand is, in a sense, dependent upon the sense-datum; that -it is dependent is implied in the mere statement that it is mediated -by it. But it might be maintained that it is dependent on it only in -the sense in which, when the idea of one object is called up in my -mind, through association, by the idea of another, the idea which is -called up is dependent on the idea which calls it up. What I wish to -maintain, and what seems to me to be quite certainly true, is that my -perception of this inkstand is dependent on this sense-datum, in a -quite different and far more intimate sense than this. It is dependent -on it in the sense that, if there is anything which is this inkstand, -then, in perceiving that thing, I am knowing it _only_ as _the_ thing -which stands in a certain relation to this sense-datum. When the idea -of one object is called up in my mind by the idea of another, I do -not know the second object _only_ as _the_ thing which has a certain -relation to the first: on the contrary, I can make a judgment about the -second object, which is not a judgment about the first. And similarly -in the case of two sense-data which are presented to me simultaneously, -I do not know the one _only_ as a thing which has a certain relation to -the other. But in the case of this sense-datum and this inkstand the -case seems to me to be plainly quite different. If there be a thing -which is this inkstand at all, it is certainly _only_ known to me as -_the_ thing which stands in a certain relation to this sense-datum. It -is not given to me, in the sense in which this sense-datum is given. -If there be such a thing at all, it is quite certainly only known to -me by description, in the sense in which Mr. Russell uses that phrase; -and the description by which it is known is that of being _the_ thing -which stands to this sense-datum in a certain relation. That is to -say, when I make such a judgment as "This inkstand is a good big one"; -what I am really judging is: "There is a thing which stands to _this_ -in a certain relation, and which is an inkstand, and that thing is -a good big one"--where "_this_" stands for this presented object. I -am referring to or identifying the thing which is this inkstand, if -there be such a thing at all, only as the thing which stands to this -sense-datum in a certain relation; and hence my judgment, though in -one sense it may be said to be a judgment about the inkstand, is quite -certainly also, in another sense, a judgment about this sense-datum. -This seems to me so clear, that I wonder how anyone can deny it; and -perhaps nobody would. But I cannot help thinking that it is not clear -to everybody; partly because, so far as I can make out, nobody before -Mr. Russell had pointed out the extreme difference there is between a -judgment about a thing known only by description to the individual who -makes the judgment, and a judgment about a thing not known to him only -in this way; and partly because so many people seem still utterly to -have failed to understand what the distinction is which he expresses in -this way. I will try to make the point clear, in a slightly different -way. Suppose I am seeing two coins, lying side by side, and am not -perceiving them in any other way except by sight. It will be plain to -everybody, I think, that, when I identify the one as "This one" and -the other as "That one," I identify them only by reference to the two -visual presented objects, which correspond respectively to the one and -to the other. But what may not, I think, be realised, is that the sense -in which I identify them by reference to the corresponding sense-data, -is one which involves that every judgment which I make about the one -is a judgment about the sense-datum which corresponds to it, and every -judgment I make about the other, a judgment about the sense-datum which -corresponds to _it_: I simply cannot make a judgment about either, -which is not a judgment about the corresponding sense-datum. But if the -two coins were given to me, in the sense in which the two sense-data -are, this would certainly not be the case. I can identify and -distinguish the two sense-data _directly,_ this as this one, and that -as that one: I do not need to identify either as _the_ thing which has -this relation to this other thing. But I certainly cannot thus directly -identify the two coins. I have not four things presented to me (1) -_this_ sense-datum, (2) _that_ sense-datum, (3) _this_ coin, and (4) -_that_ coin, but two only_--this_ sense-datum and _that_ sense-datum. -When, therefore, I judge "_This_ is a coin," my judgment is certainly -a judgment about the one sense-datum, and when I judge "And _that_ -is also a coin," it is certainly a judgment about the other. Only, -in spite of what my language might seem to imply, I am certainly not -judging either of the one sense-datum that it is a whole coin, nor yet -of the other that it is one. - -This, then, seems to me fundamentally certain about judgments of this -kind. Whenever we make such a judgment we can easily pick out an object -(whether we call it a sensation or a sense-datum, or not), which is, -in an easily intelligible sense, _the_ object which is the real or -ultimate subject of our judgment; and yet, in many cases at all events, -what we are judging with regard to this object is certainly not that it -is an object of the kind, for which the term which appears to express -the predicate of our judgment is a name. - -But if this be so, what is it that I am judging, in all such cases, -about the presented object, which is the real or ultimate subject of my -judgment? It is at this point that we come to questions which seem to -me to be really uncertain and difficult to answer. - -To begin with, there is one answer which is naturally suggested by the -reason I have given for saying that, in this case, it is quite obvious -that I am not judging, with regard to this presented object, that -_it_ is an inkstand, whereas it is not in the same way, quite obvious -that, in making such a judgment as "This is a soap-bubble" or "This is -a drop of water," I may not be judging, of the object about which my -judgment is, that that very object really is a soap-bubble or a drop -of water. The reason I gave is that it is quite obvious that I do not -take this presented object to be a _whole_ inkstand: that, at most, I -only take it to be part of the surface of an inkstand. And this reason -naturally suggests that the true answer to our question may be that -what I am judging of the presented object is just that it is a part of -the surface of an inkstand. This answer seems to me to be obviously on -quite a different level from the suggestion that I am judging it really -to be an inkstand. It is not childishly obvious that I am not judging -it to be part of the surface of an inkstand, as it is that I am not -judging it to be an inkstand--a whole one. - -On this view, when I say such things as "That is an inkstand," "That -is a door," "This is a coin," these expressions would really only be -a loose way of saying "That is part of the surface of an inkstand," -"That is part of the surface of a door," "This is part of the surface -of a coin." And there would, I think, plainly be nothing surprising -in the fact that we should use language thus loosely. What, at first -sight, appears to be a paradox, namely that, whereas I appear to be -asserting of a given thing that it is of a certain kind, I am not -really asserting of the thing in question that it is of that kind at -all, would be susceptible of an easy explanation. And moreover, if -this view were true, it would offer an excellent illustration of the -difference between a thing known only by description and a thing not so -known, and would show how entirely free from mystery that distinction -is. On this view, when I judge "That inkstand is a good big one" I -shall in effect be judging: "There is one and only one inkstand of -which _this_ is part of the surface, and the inkstand of which this is -true is a good big one." It would be quite clear that the part of the -surface of the inkstand was given to me in a sense in which the whole -was not, just as it is in fact clear that I do now _"see"_ this part -of the surface of this inkstand, in a sense in which I do _not_ "see" -the whole; and that my judgment, while it is, in fact, _about_ both the -whole inkstand, and also _about_ one particular part of its surface, is -_about_ them in two entirely different senses. - -This view is one, which it is at first sight, I think, very natural to -suppose to be true. But before giving the reasons, why, nevertheless, -it seems to me extremely doubtful, I think it is desirable to try -to explain more precisely what I mean by it. The word "part" is one -which is often used extremely vaguely in philosophy; and I can imagine -that some people would be willing to assent to the proposition that -this sense-datum really is, in some sense or other, a "part" of this -inkstand, and that what I am judging with regard to it, when I -judge "This is an inkstand," is, in effect, "There is an inkstand, -of which _this_ is a part," who would be far from allowing that this -can possibly be what I am judging, when once they understand what the -sense is in which I am here using the word "part." What this sense -is, I am quite unable to define; but I hope I may be able to make my -meaning sufficiently clear, by giving instances of things which are -undoubtedly "parts" of other things in the sense in question. There is, -it seems to me, a sense of the word "part," in which we all constantly -use the word with perfect precision, and, which, therefore, we all -understand very well, however little we may be able to define it. It is -the sense in which the trunk of any tree is undoubtedly a part of that -tree; in which this finger of mine is undoubtedly a part of my hand, -and my hand a part of my body. This is a sense in which every part -of a material thing or physical object is itself a material thing or -physical object; and it is, so far as I can see, the only proper sense -in which a material thing can be said to have parts. The view which I -wish to discuss is the view that I am judging this presented object to -be a part of an inkstand, in this sense. And the nature of the view -can perhaps be brought out more clearly, by mentioning one important -corollary which would follow from it. I am, of course, at this moment, -seeing many parts of the surface of this inkstand. But all these -parts, except one, are, in fact, themselves parts of that one. That -one is the one of which we should naturally speak as "_the_ part of -the surface that I am now seeing" or as "_this_ part of the surface of -this inkstand." There is only one part of the surface of this inkstand, -which does thus contain, as parts, all the other parts that I am now -seeing. And, if it were true that I am judging this presented object to -be a part of the surface of an inkstand at all, in the sense I mean, -it would follow that this presented object must, if my judgment "This -is an inkstand" be true (as it certainly is), be identical with this -part, which contains all the other parts which I am seeing; since there -is plainly no other part with which it could possibly be identified. -That is to say, if I am really judging of this presented object that it -is part of the surface of an inkstand, in the sense I mean, it must be -the case that everything which is true of what I should call "this part -of the surface of this inkstand" is, in fact, true of this presented -object. - -This view, therefore, that what we are judging of the ultimate subject -of our judgment, when we judge "This is a so-and-so," is, in general, -merely that the subject in question is a _part_ of a thing of the -kind in question, can, I think, be most clearly discussed, by asking -whether, in this case, this presented object can really be identical -with this part of the surface of this inkstand. If it can't, then most -certainly I am not judging of it that it is a part of the surface of an -inkstand at all. For my judgment, whatever it is, is true. And yet, if -this presented object is not identical with this part of the surface of -this inkstand, it certainly is not a part of an inkstand at all; since -there is no other part, either of this inkstand or of any other, with -which it could possibly be supposed to be identical. - -Can we, then, hold that this sense-datum really is identical with this -part of the surface of this inkstand? That everything which is true of -the one is true of the other? - -An enormous number of very familiar arguments have been used by various -philosophers, which, if they were sound, would show that we can not. -Some of these arguments seem to me to be quite clearly not sound--all, -for instance, which rest either on the assumption that this sense-datum -can only exist so long as it is perceived, or on the assumption that -it can only exist so long as it is perceived _by me._ Of others I -suspect that they may have some force, though I am quite unable to see -that they have any. Such, for instance, are all those which assume -either that this sense-datum is a sensation or feeling of mine, in a -sense which includes the assertion that it is dependent on my mind -in the very same sense in which my perception of it obviously is so; -or that it is causally dependent on my body in the sense in which my -perception of it admittedly is so. But others do seem to me to have -great force. I will, however, confine myself to trying to state one, -which seems to me to have as much as any. It will be found that this -one involves an assumption, which does seem to me to have great force, -but which yet seems to me to be doubtful. So far as I know, all good -arguments against the view that this sense-datum really is identical -with this part of the surface of the inkstand, do involve this same -assumption, and have no more force than it has. But in this, of course, -I may be wrong. Perhaps some one will be able to point out an argument, -which is obviously quite independent of it, and which yet has force. - -The argument I mean involves considerations which are exceedingly -familiar, so familiar that I am afraid every one may be sick of -hearing them alluded to. But, in spite of this fact, it seems to -me not quite easy to put it quite precisely, in a way which will -distinguish it clearly from other arguments involving the same familiar -considerations, but which do not seem to me to be equally cogent. I -want, therefore, to try to put it with a degree of precision, which -will prevent irrelevant objections from being made to it--objections -which would, I think, be relevant against some of these other -arguments, but are not, I think, relevant against it. - -The fact is that we all, exceedingly commonly, when, at each of two -times, separated by a longer or shorter interval, we see a part of the -surface of a material thing, in the sense in which I am now seeing -this part of the surface of this inkstand, or when at one time we see -such a surface and at another perceive one by touch, make, on the -second occasion, the judgment "_This_ part of a surface is the _same_ -part of the surface of the same thing, as that which I was seeing -(or perceiving by touch) just now." How commonly we all do this can -scarcely be exaggerated. I look at this inkstand, and then I look -again, and on the second occasion I judge "This part of the surface -of this inkstand is the same as, or at least contains a part which is -the same as a part of, the part of its surface which I was seeing just -now." Or I look at this finger and then I touch it, and I judge, on the -second occasion, "This part of the surface of this finger is the same -as one of those I was seeing just now." We all thus constantly identify -a part of a surface of a material thing which we are perceiving at one -time with a part which we _were_ perceiving at another. - -Now, when we do this--when we judge "This is the _same_ part of the -same thing as I was seeing or touching just now," we, of course, do -not mean to exclude the possibility that the part in question may -have changed during the interval; that it is really different, on the -second occasion, either in shape or size or quality, or in all three, -from what it was on the first. That is to say, the sense of sameness -which we are here concerned with is one which clearly does not exclude -change. We may even be prepared to assert, on general grounds, in all -such cases, that the surface in question certainly must have changed. -But nevertheless there is a great difference in one respect, between -two kinds of such cases, both of which occur exceedingly commonly. -If I watch somebody blowing air into a child's balloon, it constantly -happens, at certain stages in the process, that I judge with regard -to the part of the surface which I am seeing at that stage, not only -that it _is_ larger than it was at an earlier stage, but that it is -_perceptibly_ larger. Or, if I pull the face of an india-rubber doll, -I may judge at a certain stage in the process that the patch of red -colour on its cheek not only is different in shape from what it was -at the beginning, but is _perceptibly_ so; it may, for instance, be a -perceptibly flatter ellipse than it was to start with. Or, if I watch -a person blushing, I may judge at a certain stage that a certain part -of the surface of his face not only is different in colour from what -it was, when I saw it before he began to blush, but is _perceptibly_ -so--perceptibly redder. In enormous numbers of cases we do thus judge -of a surface seen at a given time that it is thus _perceptibly_ -different in size, or in shape, or in colour, from what it was when we -saw it before. But cases are at least equally numerous in which, though -we might, on general grounds be prepared to assert that it _must_ have -changed in some respect, we should not be prepared to assert that it -had, in any respect whatever, changed _perceptibly._ Of this part -of this surface of this inkstand, for instance, I am certainly not -prepared to assert that it is now perceptibly different in any respect -from what it was when I saw it just now. And similar cases are so -numerous that I need not give further instances. We can, therefore, -divide cases, in which we judge, of a part of a surface which we are -seeing, "This is the same part of the surface of the same material -thing as the one I saw just now," into cases where we should also judge -"But it is perceptibly different from what it was then," and cases in -which, even though we might assert "It _must_ be different," we are -certainly not prepared to assert that it is _perceptibly_ so. - -But now let us consider the cases in which we are not prepared to -assert that the surface in question has changed perceptibly. The -strange fact, from which the argument I mean is drawn, is that, in a -very large number of such cases, it seems as if it were unmistakably -true that the presented object, about which we are making our judgment -when we talk of "This surface" at the later time, _is_ perceptibly -different, from that about which we are making it when we talk of the -surface I saw just now. If, at the later time, I am at a sufficiently -greater distance from the surface, the presented object which -corresponds to it at the time seems to be perceptibly smaller, than -the one which corresponded to it before. If I am looking at it from -a sufficiently oblique angle, the later presented object often seems -to be perceptibly different in shape--a perceptibly flatter ellipse, -for instance. If I am looking at it, with blue spectacles on, when -formerly I had none, the later presented object seems to be perceptibly -different in colour from the earlier one. If I am perceiving it by -touch alone, whereas formerly I was perceiving it by sight alone, -the later presented object seems to be perceptibly different from -the earlier, in respect of the fact that it is not coloured at all, -whereas the earlier was, and that, on the other hand, it has certain -tactual qualities, which the earlier had not got. All this seems to -be as plain as it can be, and yet it makes absolutely no difference -to the fact that of the surface in question we are _not_ prepared to -judge that it is perceptibly different from what it was. Sometimes, -of course, where there seems to be no doubt that the later presented -object is perceptibly different from the earlier, we may not notice -that it is so. But even where we do notice the apparent difference, we -do still continue to judge of the surface in question: This surface -is not, so far as I can tell with certainty by perception, in any way -different from what it was when I saw it or touched it just now; I am -_not_ prepared to assert that it has changed perceptibly. It seems, -therefore, to be absolutely impossible that the surface seen at the -later time should be identical with the object presented then, and the -surface seen at the earlier identical with the object presented then, -for the simple reason that, whereas with regard to the later seen -surface I am not prepared to judge that it is in any way perceptibly -different from that seen earlier, it seems that with regard to the -later sense-datum I cannot fail to judge that it _is_ perceptibly -different from the earlier one: the fact that they are perceptibly -different simply stares me in the face. It seems, in short, that when, -in such a case, I judge: "This surface is not, so far as I can tell, -perceptibly different from the one I saw just now," I cannot possibly -be judging of the presented object "_This_ is not, so far as I can -tell, perceptibly different from that object which was presented to -me just now," for the simple reason that I _can_ tell, as certainly, -almost, as I can tell anything, that it is perceptibly different. - -That is the argument, as well as I can put it, for saying that this -presented object, is _not_ identical with this part of the surface of -this inkstand; and that, therefore, when I judge "This is part of the -surface of an inkstand," I am not judging of this presented object, -which nevertheless is the ultimate subject of my judgment, that _it_ is -part of the surface of an inkstand. And this argument does seem to me -to be a very powerful one. - -But nevertheless it does not seem to me to be quite conclusive, because -it rests on an assumption, which, though it seems to me to have great -force, does not seem to me quite certain. The assumption I mean is the -assumption that, in such cases as those I have spoken of, the later -presented object really is perceptibly different from the earlier. This -assumption has, if I am not mistaken, seemed to many philosophers to -be quite unquestionable; they have never even thought of questioning -it; and I own that it used to be so with me. And I am still not sure -that I may not be talking sheer nonsense in suggesting that it can -be questioned. But, if I am, I am no longer able to see that I am. -What now seems to me to be possible is that the sense-datum which -corresponds to a tree, which I am seeing, when I am a mile off, may not -really be perceived to _be_ smaller than the one, which corresponds -to the same tree, when I see it from a distance of only a hundred -yards, but that it is only perceived to _seem_ smaller; that the -sense-datum which corresponds to a penny, which I am seeing obliquely, -is not really perceived to _be_ different in shape from that which -corresponded to the penny, when I was straight in front of it, but is -only perceived to _seem_ different--that all that is perceived is that -the one _seems_ elliptical and the other circular; that the sense-datum -presented to me when I have the blue spectacles on is not perceived -to _be_ different in colour from the one presented to me when I have -not, but only to _seem_ so; and finally that the sense-datum presented -when I touch this finger is not perceived to _be_ different in any way -from that presented to me when I see it, but only to _seem_ so that -I do not perceive the one to be coloured and the other not to be so, -but only that the one _seems_ coloured and the other not. If such a -view is to be possible, we shall have, of course, to maintain that -the kind of experience which I have expressed by saying one _seems_ -different from the other_--"seems_ circular," _"seems_ blue," _"seems_ -coloured," and so on--involves an ultimate, not further analysable, -kind of psychological relation, not to be identified either with that -involved in being "perceived" to be so and so, or with that involved -in being "judged" to be so and so; since a presented object might, in -this sense, _seem_ to be elliptical, _seem_ to be blue, etc., when it -is neither perceived to be so, nor judged to be so. But there seems to -me to be no reason why there should not be such an ultimate relation. -The great objection to such a view seems to me to be the difficulty of -believing that I don't actually perceive this sense-datum to _be_ red, -for instance, and that other to _be_ elliptical; that I only perceive, -in many cases, that it _seems_ so. I cannot, however, now persuade -myself that it is quite clear that I do perceive it to _be_ so. And, -if I don't, then it seems really possible that this presented object -really is identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand; -since, when I judge, as in the cases supposed, that the surface in -question is _not_, so far as I can tell, perceptibly different from -what it was, I might really be judging of the two sense-data that they -also were not, so far as I can tell, perceptibly different, the only -difference between the two that _is_ perceptible, being that the one -_seems_ to be of a certain size, shape or colour, and the other to -be of a different and incompatible size, shape or colour. Of course, -in those cases, as in that of the balloon being blown up, where I -"perceive" that the surface has changed, _e.g._ in size, it would have -to be admitted that I do perceive of the two sense-data not merely that -they _seem_ different in size, but that they _are_ so. But I think it -would be possible to maintain that the sense in which, in these cases, -I "perceive" them to _be_ different, is a different one from that in -which, both in these and in the others, I perceive them to _seem_ so. - -Possibly in making this suggestion that sense-data, in cases where most -philosophers have assumed unhesitatingly that they are _perceived_ to -be different, are only really perceived to _seem_ different, I am, as I -said, talking sheer nonsense, though I cannot, at the moment, see that -I am. And possibly, even if this suggestion itself is not nonsense, -even if it is true, there may be other fatal objections to the view -that this presented object really is identical with this part of the -surface of this inkstand. But what seems to me certain is that, unless -this suggestion is true, then this presented object is certainly _not_ -identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand. And since it -is doubtful whether it is not nonsense, and still more doubtful whether -it is true, it must, I think, be admitted to be highly doubtful whether -the two _are_ identical. But, if they are not identical, then what I am -judging with regard to this presented object, when I judge "This is an -inkstand," is certainly _not_ that it is itself part of the surface of -an inkstand; and hence, it is worth while to inquire further, what, if -I am not judging this, I _can_ be judging with regard to it. - -And here, I think, the first natural suggestion to make is that just -as, when I talk of "this inkstand," what I seem really to mean is -"_the_ inkstand of which _this_ is part of the surface," so that the -inkstand is only known to me by description as the inkstand of which -this material surface is part of the surface, so again when I talk of -"this material surface," what I really mean is "_the_ material surface -to which _this_ (presented object) has a certain relation," so that -this surface is, in its turn, only known to me by description as _the_ -surface which has a certain relation to this presented object. If that -were so, then what I should be judging of this presented object, when I -judge "This is part of the surface of an inkstand," would be not that -it is itself such a part, but that _the_ thing which stands to it in -a certain relation is such a part: in short, what I should be judging -with regard to _it,_ would be "There's one thing and one only which -stands to _this_ in _this_ relation, and the thing which does so is -part of the surface of an inkstand." - -But if we are to adopt the view that something of this sort is what we -are judging, there occurs at once the pressing question: What on earth -can the relation be with regard to which we are judging, that one and -only one thing stands in it to this presented object? And this is a -question to which, so far as I know, none of those philosophers, who -_both_ hold (as many do) that this presented object is _not_ identical -with this part of the surface of this inkstand, _and_ also that there -really is something of which it could be truly predicated that it is -this part of the surface of this inkstand (that is to say, who reject -all views of the Mill-Russell type), have given anything like a clear -answer. It does not seem to have occurred to them that it requires an -answer, chiefly, I think, because it has not occurred to them to ask -what we can be judging when we make judgments of this sort. There are -only two answers, that I can think of, which might be suggested with -any plausibility. - -Many philosophers, who take the view that the presented objects about -which we make these judgments are sensations of ours, and some even who -do not, are in the habit of talking of _"the_ causes" of these objects -as if we knew, in the case of each, that it had one and only one cause; -and many of them seem to think that this part of the surface of this -inkstand could be correctly described as _the_ cause of this presented -object. They suggest, therefore, the view that what I am judging in -this case might be: "This presented object has one and only one cause, -and that cause is part of the surface of an inkstand." It seems to me -quite obvious that _this_ view, at all events, is utterly untenable. I -do not believe for a moment, nor does any one, and certainly therefore -do not judge, that this presented object has _only_ one cause: I -believe that it has a whole series of different causes. I do, in fact, -believe that this part of the surface of this inkstand is _one_ among -the causes of my perception of this presented object: that seems to -me to be a very well established scientific proposition. And I am -prepared to admit that there _may_ be good reasons for thinking that -it is one among the causes of this presented object itself, though I -cannot myself see that there are any. But that it is the _only_ cause -of this presented object I certainly do not believe, nor, I think, -does anybody, and hence my judgment certainly cannot be "_The_ cause -of this is part of the surface of an inkstand." It might no doubt, be -possible to define some _kind_ of causal relation, such that it might -be plausibly held that it and it alone causes this presented object _in -that particular way._ But any such definition would, so far as I can -see, be necessarily very complicated. And, even when we have got it, -it seems to me it would be highly improbable we could truly say that -what we are judging in these cases is: "This presented object has one -and only one cause, of this special kind." Still, I do not wish to deny -that some such view may _possibly_ be true. - -The only other suggestion I can make is that there may be some -ultimate, not further definable relation, which we might for instance, -call the relation of "being a manifestation of," such that we might -conceivably be judging: "There is one and only one thing of which this -presented object is a manifestation, and _that_ thing is part of the -surface of an inkstand." And here again, it seems to me just possible -that this _may_ be a true account of what we are judging; only I cannot -find the slightest sign that I am in fact aware of any such relation. - -Possibly other suggestions could be made as to what the relation is, -with regard to which it could be plausibly supposed that in all cases, -where we make these judgments we are in fact judging of the presented -object "There is one and only one thing which stands to this object in -_this_ relation." But it seems to me at least very doubtful whether -there is any such relation at all; whether, therefore, our judgment -really is of this form, and whether therefore, this part of the surface -of this inkstand really is known to me by description as _the_ thing -which stands in a certain relation to this presented object. But if it -isn't, and if, also, we cannot take the view that what I am judging -is that this presented object _itself_ is a part of the surface of an -inkstand, there would seem to be no possible alternative but that we -must take some view of what I have called the Mill-Russell type. Views -of this type, if I understand them rightly, are distinguished from -those which I have hitherto considered, by the fact that, according to -them, there is nothing whatever in the Universe of which it could truly -be predicated that it is this part of the surface of this inkstand, -or indeed that it is _a_ part of the surface of an inkstand, or an -inkstand, at all. They hold, in short, that though there are plenty of -material things in the Universe, there is nothing in it of which it -could truly be asserted that _it_ is a material thing: that, though, -when I assert "This is an inkstand," my assertion is true, and is such -that it follows from it that there is in the Universe at least one -inkstand, and, therefore, at least one material thing, yet it does not -follow from it that there is anything which is a material thing. When -I judge "This is an inkstand," I am judging this presented object to -possess a certain property, which is such that, if there are things, -which possess that property, there are inkstands and material things, -but which is such that nothing which possesses it is itself a material -thing; so that in judging that there are material things, we are really -always judging of some _other_ property, which is not that of being a -material thing, that there are things which possess _it._ It seems to -me quite possible, of course, that some view of this type is the true -one. Indeed, this paper may be regarded, if you like, as an argument in -favour of the proposition that some such view _must_ be true. Certainly -one of my main objects in writing it was to put as plainly as I can -some grave difficulties which seem to me to stand in the way of any -other view; in the hope that some of those, who reject all views of -the Mill-Russell type, may explain clearly which of the alternatives -I have suggested they would adopt, or whether, perhaps, some other -which has not occurred to me. It does not seem to me to be always -sufficiently realised how difficult it is to find _any_ answer to my -question "What are we judging in these cases?" to which there are not -very grave objections, unless we adopt an answer of the Mill-Russell -type. That an answer of this type _is_ the true one, I am not myself, -in spite of these objections, by any means convinced. The truth is I am -completely puzzled as to what the true answer can be. At the present -moment, I am rather inclined to favour the view that what I am judging -of this presented object is that it is itself a part of the surface of -an inkstand--that, therefore, it really is identical with this part of -the surface of this inkstand, in spite of the fact that this involves -the view that, where, hitherto, I have always supposed myself to be -perceiving of two presented objects that they really were different, I -was, in fact, only perceiving that they _seemed_ to be different. But, -as I have said, it seems to me quite possible that this view is, as I -have hitherto supposed, sheer nonsense; and, in any case, there are, no -doubt, other serious objections to the view that this presented object -is this part of the surface of this inkstand. - - - - -THE CONCEPTION OF INTRINSIC VALUE - - -My main object in this paper is to try to define more precisely the -most important question, which, so far as I can see, is really at issue -when it is disputed with regard to any predicate of value, whether it -is or is not a "subjective" predicate. There are three chief cases in -which this controversy is apt to arise. It arises, first, with regard -to the conceptions of "right" and "wrong," and the closely allied -conception of "duty" or "what _ought_ to be done." It arises, secondly, -with regard to "good" and "evil," in some sense of those words in which -the conceptions for which they stand are certainly quite distinct from -the conceptions of "right" and "wrong," but in which nevertheless it is -undeniable that ethics has to deal with them. And it arises, lastly, -with regard to certain aesthetic conceptions, such as "beautiful" and -"ugly;" or "good" and "bad," in the sense in which these words are -applied to works of art, and in which, therefore, the question what is -good and bad is a question not for ethics but for aesthetics. - -In all three cases there are people who maintain that the predicates -in question are purely "subjective," in a sense which can, I think, -be fairly easily defined. I am not here going to attempt a perfectly -accurate definition of the sense in question; but, as the term -"subjective" is so desperately ambiguous, I had better try to indicate -roughly the sense I am thinking of. Take the word "beautiful" for -example. There is a sense of the term "subjective," such that to say -that "beautiful" stands for a subjective predicate, means, roughly, -that any statement of the form "This is beautiful" merely expresses a -psychological assertion to the effect that some particular individual -or class of individuals either actually has, or would, under certain -circumstances, have, a certain kind of mental attitude towards the -thing in question. And what I mean by "having a mental attitude" -towards a thing, can be best explained by saying that to desire a thing -is to have one kind of mental attitude towards it, to be pleased with -it is to have another, to will it is to have another; and in short -that to have any kind of feeling or emotion _towards_ it is to have a -certain mental attitude towards it--a different one in each case. Thus -anyone who holds that when we say that a thing is beautiful, what we -_mean_ is merely that we ourselves or some particular class of people -actually do, or would under certain circumstances, have, or permanently -have, a certain feeling towards the thing in question, is taking a -"subjective" view of beauty. - -But in all three cases there are also a good many people who hold that -the predicates in question are not, in this sense "subjective"; and I -think that those who hold this are apt to speak as if the view which -they wish to maintain in opposition to it consisted simply and solely -in holding its contradictory--in holding, that is, that the predicates -in question are "objective," where "objective" simply means the same as -"not subjective." But in fact I think this is hardly ever really the -case. In the case of goodness and beauty, what such people are really -anxious to maintain is by no means merely that these conceptions are -"objective," but that, besides being "objective," they are also, in -a sense which I shall try to explain, "intrinsic" kinds of value. -It is this conviction--the conviction that goodness and beauty are -_intrinsic_ kinds of value, which is, I think, the strongest ground of -their objection to any subjective view. And indeed, when they speak -of the "objectivity" of these conceptions, what they have in mind is, -I believe, always a conception which has no proper right to be called -"objectivity," since it includes as an essential part this other -characteristic which I propose to call that of being an "intrinsic" -kind of value. - -The truth is, I believe, that though, from the proposition that a -particular kind of value is "intrinsic" it does follow that it must -be "objective," the converse implication by no means holds, but on -the contrary it is perfectly easy to conceive theories of _e.g._ -"goodness," according to which goodness would, in the strictest sense, -be "objective," and yet would not be "intrinsic." There is, therefore, -a very important difference between the conception of "objectivity," -and that which I will call "internality" but yet, if I am not mistaken, -when people talk about the "objectivity" of any kind of value, they -almost always confuse the two, owing to the fact that most of those -who deny the "internality" of a given kind of value, also assert its -"subjectivity." How great the difference is, and that it is a fact that -those who maintain the "objectivity" of goodness do, as a rule, mean by -this not mere "objectivity," but "internality," as well, can, I think, -be best brought out by considering an instance of a theory, according -to which goodness would be objective but would not be intrinsic. - -Let us suppose it to be held, for instance, that what is meant by -saying that one type of human being A is "better" than another type B, -is merely that the course of evolution tends to increase the numbers of -type A and to decrease those of type B. Such a view has, in fact, been -often suggested, even if it has not been held in this exact form; it -amounts merely to the familiar suggestion that "better" means "better -fitted to survive." Obviously "better," on this interpretation of its -meaning, is in no sense a "subjective" conception: the conception of -belonging to a type which tends to be favoured by the struggle for -existence more than another is as "objective" as any conception can be. -But yet, if I am not mistaken, all those who object to a subjective -view of "goodness," and insist upon its "objectivity," would object -just as strongly to this interpretation of its meaning as to any -"subjective" interpretation. Obviously, therefore, what they are really -anxious to contend for is not merely that goodness is "objective," -since they are here objecting to a theory which is "objective;" but -something else. And this something else is, I think, certainly just -that it is "intrinsic"--a character which is just as incompatible -with this objective evolutionary interpretation as with any and every -subjective interpretation. For if you say that to call type A "better" -than type B means merely that it is more favoured in the struggle for -existence, it follows that the being "better" is a predicate which does -_not depend merely on the intrinsic nature of A and B respectively._ -On the contrary, although here and now A may be more favoured than B, -it is obvious that under other circumstances or with different natural -laws the very same type B might be more favoured than A, so that the -very same type which, under one set of circumstances, is better than -B, would, under another set, be worse. Here, then, we have a case -where an interpretation of "goodness," which does make it "objective," -is incompatible with its being "intrinsic." And it is just this same -fact--the fact that, on any "subjective" interpretation, the very same -kind of thing which, under some circumstances, is better than another, -would, under others, be worse--which constitutes, so far as I can -see, the fundamental objection to all "subjective" interpretations. -Obviously, therefore, to express this objection by saying that goodness -is "objective" is very incorrect; since goodness might quite well be -"objective" and yet _not_ possess the very characteristic which it is -mainly wished to assert that it has. - -In the case, therefore, of ethical and aesthetic "goodness," I think -that what those who contend for the "objectivity" of these conceptions -really wish to contend for is not mere "objectivity" at all, but -principally and essentially that they are _intrinsic_ kinds of value. -But in the case of "right" and "wrong" and "duty," the same cannot -be said, because many of those who object to the view that these -conceptions are "subjective," nevertheless do not hold that they are -"intrinsic." We cannot, therefore, say that what those who contend for -the "objectivity" of right and wrong really mean is always chiefly -that those conceptions are intrinsic, but we can, I think, say that -what they do mean is certainly _not_ "objectivity" in this case any -more than the other; since here, just as there, it would be possible -to find certain views, which are in every sense "objective," to -which they would object just as strongly as to any subjective view. -And though what is meant by "objectivity" in this case, is not that -"right" and "wrong" are _themselves_ "intrinsic," what is, I think, -meant here too is that they have a fixed relation to a kind of value -which _is_ "intrinsic." It is this fixed relation to an intrinsic -kind of value, so far as I can see, which gives to right and wrong -that kind and degree of fixity and impartiality which they actually -are felt to possess, and which is what people are thinking of when -they talk of their "objectivity." Here, too, therefore, to talk of -the characteristic meant as "objectivity" is just as great a misnomer -as in the other cases; since though it is a characteristic which is -incompatible with any kind of "subjectivity," it is also incompatible, -for the same reason, with many kinds of "objectivity." - -For these reasons I think that what those who contend for the -"objectivity" of certain kinds of value, or for the "objectivity" of -judgments of value, commonly have in mind is not really "objectivity" -at all, but either that the kinds of value in question are themselves -"intrinsic," or else that they have a fixed relation to some kind that -is so. The conception upon which they really wish to lay stress is not -that of "objective value," but that of "intrinsic value," though they -confuse the two. And I think this is the case to a considerable extent -not only with the defenders of so-called "objectivity," but also with -its opponents. Many of those who hold strongly (as many do) that _all_ -kinds of value are "subjective" certainly object to the so-called -"objective" view, not so much because it is _objective_, as because it -is not _naturalistic ox positivistic_--a characteristic which does -naturally follow from the contention that value is "intrinsic," but -does not follow from the mere contention that it is "objective." To a -view which is at the same time both "naturalistic" or "positivistic" -and also "objective," such as the Evolutionary view which I sketched -just now, they do not feel at all the same kind or degree of objection -as to any so-called "objective" view. With regard to so-called -"objective" views they are apt to feel not only that they are false, -but that they involve a particularly poisonous kind of falsehood--the -erecting into a "metaphysical" entity of what is really susceptible of -a simple naturalistic explanation. They feel that to hold such a view -is not merely to make a mistake, but to make a superstitious mistake. -They feel the same kind of contempt for those who hold it, which we -are apt to feel towards those whom we regard as grossly superstitious, -and which is felt by certain persons for what they call "metaphysics." -Obviously, therefore, what they really object to is not simply the view -that these predicates are "objective," but something else--something -which does not at all follow from the contention that they are -"objective," but which does follow from the contention that they are -"intrinsic." - -In disputes, therefore, as to whether particular kinds of value are -or are not "subjective," I think that the issue which is really felt -to be important, almost always by one side, and often by both, is not -really the issue between "subjective" and "non-subjective," but between -"intrinsic" and "non-intrinsic." And not only is this felt to be the -more important issue; I think it really is so. For the difference that -must be made to our view of the Universe, according as we hold that -some kinds of value are "intrinsic" or that none are, is much greater -than any which follows from a mere difference of opinion as to whether -some are "non-subjective," or all without exception "subjective." To -hold that any kinds of value are "intrinsic" entails the recognition of -a kind of predicate extremely different from any we should otherwise -have to recognise and perhaps unique; whereas it is in any case certain -that there are "objective" predicates as well as "subjective." - -But now what is this "internality" of which I have been speaking? -What is meant by saying with regard to a kind of value that it is -"intrinsic?" To express roughly what is meant is, I think, simple -enough; and everybody will recognise it at once, as a notion which -is constantly in people's heads; but I want to dwell upon it at some -length, because I know of no place where it is expressly explained and -defined, and because, though it seems very simple and fundamental, the -task of defining it precisely is by no moans easy and involves some -difficulties which I must confess that I do not know how to solve. - -I have already given incidentally the main idea in speaking of that -evolutionary interpretation of "goodness," according to which, as I -said, goodness would be "objective" but would not be "intrinsic." -I there used as equivalent to the assertion that 'better,' on -that definition, would not be 'intrinsic,' the assertion that the -question whether one type of being A was better than another B would -_not_ depend _solely on the intrinsic natures of A and B,_ but on -circumstances and the laws of nature. And I think that this phrase will -in fact suggest to everybody just what I do mean by "intrinsic" value. -We can, in fact, set up the following definition. _To say that a kind -of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the question whether a thing -possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the -intrinsic nature of the thing in question._ - -But though this definition does, I think, convey exactly what I mean, -I want to dwell upon its meaning, partly because the conception of -'differing in intrinsic nature which I believe to be of fundamental -importance, is liable to be confused with other conceptions, and partly -because the definition involves notions, which I do not know how to -define exactly. - -When I say, with regard to any particular kind of value, that the -question whether and in what degree anything possesses it _depends -solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question_, I mean to say -two different things at the same time. I mean to say (1) that it is -_impossible_ for what is strictly _one and the same_ thing to possess -that kind of value at one time, or in one set of circumstances, and -_not_ to possess it at another; and equally _impossible_ for it to -possess it in one degree at one time, or in one set of circumstances, -and to possess it in a different degree at another, or in a different -set. This, I think, is obviously part of what is naturally conveyed by -saying that the question whether and in what degree a thing possesses -the kind of value in question always depends _solely_ on the intrinsic -nature of the thing. For if _x_ and _y_ have different intrinsic -natures, it follows that _x_ cannot be quite strictly one and the same -thing as _y_; and hence if _x_ and _y_ can have a different intrinsic -value, only where their intrinsic natures are different, it follows -that one and the same thing must always have the same intrinsic value. -This, then, is part of what is meant; and about this part I think I -need say no more, except to call attention to the fact that it involves -a conception, which as we shall see is also involved in the other part, -and which involves the same difficulty in both cases--I mean, the -conception which is expressed by the word 'impossible.' (2) The second -part of what is meant is that if a given thing possesses any kind of -intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not only must that same thing -possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but also -anything _exactly like_ it, must, under all circumstances, possess it -in exactly the same degree. Or to put it in the corresponding negative -form: It is _impossible_ that of two exactly similar things one should -possess it and the other not, or that one should possess it in one -degree, and the other in a different one. - -I think this second proposition also is naturally conveyed by saying -that the kind of value in question depends solely on the intrinsic -nature of what possesses it. For we should naturally say of two -things which were _exactly alike_ intrinsically, in spite of their -being _two,_ that they possessed the _same_ intrinsic nature. But -it is important to call attention expressly to the fact that what -I mean by the expression 'having a different intrinsic nature' is -equivalent to 'not exactly alike' because here there is real risk of -confusion between this conception and a different one. This comes -about as follows. It is natural to suppose that the phrase 'having a -different intrinsic nature' is equivalent to the phrase 'intrinsically -different' or 'having different intrinsic properties.' But, if we do -make this identification, there is a risk of confusion. For it is -obvious that there is a sense in which, when things are exactly like, -they must be 'intrinsically different' and have different intrinsic -properties, merely because they are two. For instance, two patches of -colour may be exactly alike, in spite of the fact that each possesses a -constituent which the other does not possess, provided only that their -two constituents are exactly alike. And yet, in a certain sense, it -is obvious that the fact that each has a constituent, which the other -has not got, does constitute an intrinsic difference between them, and -implies that each has an intrinsic property which the other has not -got. And even where the two things are simple the mere fact that they -are _numerically_ different does in a sense constitute an intrinsic -difference between them, and each will have at least one intrinsic -property which the other has not got--namely that of being identical -with itself. It is obvious therefore that the phrases 'intrinsically -different' and 'having different intrinsic properties' are ambiguous. -They may be used in such a sense that to say of two things that they -are intrinsically different or have different intrinsic properties does -_not_ imply that they are not exactly alike, but only that they are -_numerically_ different. Or they may be used in a sense in which two -things can be said to be intrinsically different, and to have different -intrinsic properties _only_ when they are not exactly alike. It is, -therefore, extremely important to insist that when I say: Two things -can differ in intrinsic value, only when they have different intrinsic -natures, I am using the expression 'having different intrinsic natures' -in the latter sense and not the former:--in a sense in which the mere -fact that two things are two, or differ numerically, does _not_ imply -that they have different intrinsic natures, but in which they can -be said to have different intrinsic natures, _only_ where, besides -differing numerically, they are also _not_ exactly alike. - -But as soon as this is explained, another risk of confusion arises -owing to the fact that when people contrast mere numerical difference -with a kind of intrinsic difference, which is _not_ merely numerical, -they are apt to identify the latter with _qualitative_ difference. It -might, therefore, easily be thought that by 'difference in intrinsic -nature' I mean 'difference in quality.' But this identification of -difference in quality with difference in intrinsic nature would also -be a mistake. It is true that what is commonly meant by difference -of quality, in the strict sense, always is a difference of intrinsic -nature: two things cannot differ in quality without differing in -intrinsic nature; and that fact is one of the most important facts -about qualitative difference. But the converse is by no means also -true: although two things cannot differ in quality without differing in -intrinsic nature, they can differ in intrinsic nature without differing -in quality; or, in other words, difference in quality is only _one_ -species of difference in intrinsic nature. That this is so follows -from the fact that, as I explained, I am using the phrase 'different -in intrinsic nature' as equivalent to 'not exactly like for it is -quite plain that two things may not be exactly alike, in spite of the -fact that they don't differ in quality, _e.g._ if the only difference -between them were in respect of the _degree_ in which they possess -some quality they do possess. Nobody would say that a very loud sound -was exactly like a very soft one, even if they were exactly like in -quality; and yet it is plain there is a sense in which their intrinsic -nature is different For this reason alone qualitative difference cannot -be identified with difference in intrinsic nature. And there are still -other reasons. Difference in size, for instance may be a difference -in intrinsic nature, in the sense I mean, but it can hardly be called -a difference in quality. Or take such a difference as the difference -between two patterns consisting in the fact that the one is a yellow -circle with a red spot in the middle, and the other a yellow circle -with a blue spot in the middle. This difference would perhaps be -loosely called a difference of quality; but obviously it would be more -accurate to call it a difference which consists in the fact that the -one pattern has a _constituent_ which is qualitatively different from -any which the other has; and the difference between being qualitatively -different and having qualitatively different constituents is important -both because the latter can only be defined in terms of the former, and -because it is possible for simple things to differ from one another -in the former way, whereas it is only possible for complex things to -differ in the latter. - -I hope this is sufficient to make clear exactly what the conception is -which I am expressing by the phrase "different in intrinsic nature." -The important points are (1) that it is a kind of difference which -does _not_ hold between two things, when they are _merely_ numerically -different, but only when, besides being numerically different, they -are also _not_ exactly alike and (2) that it is _not_ identical -with qualitative difference; although qualitative difference is one -particular species of it. The conception seems to me to be an extremely -important and fundamental one, although, so far as I can see, it has no -quite simple and unambiguous name: and this is the reason why I have -dwelt on it at such length. "Not exactly like" is the least ambiguous -way of expressing it; but this has the disadvantage that it looks as -if the idea of exact likeness were the fundamental one from which this -was derived, whereas I believe the contrary to be the case. For this -reason it is perhaps better to stick to the cumbrous phrase "different -in intrinsic nature." - -So much for the question what is meant by saying of two things that -they "differ in intrinsic nature." We have now to turn to the more -difficult question as to what is meant by the words "impossible" and -"necessary" in the statement: A kind of value is intrinsic if and only -if, it is _impossible_ that _x_ and _y_ should have different values of -the kind, unless they differ in intrinsic nature; and in the equivalent -statement: A kind of value is intrinsic if and only if, when anything -possesses it, that same thing or anything exactly like it would -_necessarily_ or _must_ always, under all circumstances, possess it in -exactly the same degree. - -As regards the meaning of this necessity and impossibility, we may -begin by making two points clear. - -(1) It is sometimes contended, and with some plausibility, that what -we mean by saying that it is _possible_ for a thing which possesses -one predicate F to possess another G, is, sometimes at least, merely -that some things which possess F do in fact also possess G. And if -we give this meaning to "possible," the corresponding meaning of the -statement it is _impossible_ for a thing which possesses F to possess -G will be merely: Things which possess F never do in fact possess G. -If, then, we understood "impossible" in this sense, the condition for -the "internality" of a kind of value, which I have stated by saying -that if a kind of value is to be "intrinsic" it must be _impossible_ -for two things to possess it in different degrees, if they are exactly -like one another, will amount merely to saying that no two things -which are exactly like one another ever do, in fact, possess it in -different degrees. It follows, that, if this were all that were meant, -this condition would be satisfied, if only it were true (as for all -I know it may be) that, in the case of all things which possess any -particular kind of intrinsic value, there happens to be nothing else -in the Universe exactly like any one of them; for if this were so, it -would, of course, follow that no two things which are exactly alike did -in fact possess the kind of value in question in different degrees, -for the simple reason that everything which possessed it at all would -be unique in the sense that there was nothing else exactly like it. If -this were all that were meant, therefore, we could prove any particular -kind of value to satisfy this condition, by merely proving that there -never has in fact and never will be anything exactly like any one of -the things which possess it: and our assertion that it satisfied this -condition would merely be an empirical generalisation. Moreover if -this were all that was meant it would obviously be by no means certain -that purely subjective predicates could not satisfy the condition in -question; since it would be satisfied by any subjective predicate of -which it happened to be true that everything which possessed it was, -in fact, unique--that there was nothing exactly like it; and for all -I know there may be many subjective predicates of which this is true. -It is, therefore, scarcely necessary to say that I am not using -"impossible" in this sense. When I say that a kind of value, to be -intrinsic, must satisfy the condition that it must be _impossible_ for -two things exactly alike to possess it in different degrees, I do not -mean by this condition anything which a kind of value could be proved -to satisfy, by the mere empirical fact that there was nothing else -exactly like any of the things which possessed it. It is, of course, -an essential part of my meaning that we must be able to say not merely -that no two exactly similar things do _in fact_ possess it in different -degrees, but that, _if_ there had been or were going to be anything -exactly similar to a thing which does possess it, even though, in -fact, there has not and won't be any such thing, that thing would have -possessed or would possess the kind of value in question in exactly the -same degree. It is essential to this meaning of "impossibility" that -it should entitle us to assert what _would_ have been the case, under -conditions which never have been and never will be realised; and it -seems obvious that no mere empirical generalisation can entitle us to -do this. - -But (2) to say that I am not using 'necessity' in this first sense, -is by no means sufficient to explain what I do mean. For it certainly -seems as if causal laws (though this is disputed) do entitle us to make -assertions of the very kind that mere empirical generalisations do not -entitle us to make. In virtue of a causal law we do seem to be entitled -to assert such things as that, if a given thing had had a property -or were to have a property F which it didn't have or won't have, it -_would_ have had or _would_ have some other property G. And it might, -therefore, be thought that the kind of 'necessity' and 'impossibility' -I am talking of is this kind of causal 'necessity' and 'impossibility.' -It is, therefore, important to insist that I do _not_ mean this kind -either. If this were all I meant, it would again be by no means -obvious, that purely subjective predicates might not satisfy our second -condition. It may, for instance, for all I know, be true that there -are causal laws which insure that in the case of everything that is -'beautiful,' anything exactly like any of these things would, in this -Universe, excite a particular kind of feeling in everybody to whom it -were presented in a particular way: and if that were so, we should have -a subjective predicate which satisfied the condition that, when a given -thing possesses that predicate, it is impossible (in the causal sense) -that any exactly similar thing should not also possess it. The kind -of necessity I am talking of is not, therefore, mere causal necessity -either. When I say that if a given thing possesses a certain degree of -intrinsic value, anything precisely similar to it _would_ necessarily -_have_ possessed that value in exactly the same degree, I mean that it -_would_ have done so, even if it had existed in a Universe in which -the causal laws were quite different from what they are in this one. I -mean, in short, that it is _impossible_ for any precisely similar thing -to possess a different value, in precisely such a sense as that, in -which it is, I think, generally admitted that it is _not_ impossible -that causal laws should have been different from what they are--a sense -of impossibility, therefore, which certainly does not depend merely on -causal laws. - -That there is such a sense of necessity--a sense which entitles us to -say that what has F _would have_ G, even if causal laws were quite -different from what they are--is, I think, quite clear from such -instances as the following. Suppose you take a particular patch of -colour, which is yellow. We can, I think, say with certainty that any -patch exactly like that one, _would_ be yellow, even if it existed in -a Universe in which causal laws were quite different from what they -are in this one. We can say that any such patch _must_ be yellow, -quite unconditionally, whatever the circumstances, and whatever -the causal laws. And it is in a sense similar to this, in respect -of the fact that it is neither empirical nor causal, that I mean -the 'must' to be understood, when I say that if a kind of value is -to be 'intrinsic,' then, supposing a given-thing possesses it in a -certain degree, anything exactly like that thing _must_ possess it in -exactly the same degree. To say, of 'beauty' or 'goodness' that they -are 'intrinsic' is only, therefore, to say that this thing which is -obviously true of 'yellowness' and 'blueness' and 'redness' is true -of them. And if we give this sense to 'must' in our definition, then -I think it is obvious that to say of a given kind of value that it is -intrinsic _is_ inconsistent with its being 'subjective.' For there -is, I think, pretty clearly no subjective predicate of which we can -say thus unconditionally, that, _if_ a given thing possesses it, then -anything exactly like that thing, _would,_ under any circumstances, and -under any causal laws, also possess it. For instance, whatever kind of -feeling you take, it is plainly not true that supposing I have that -feeling towards a given thing A, then _I_ should necessarily under any -circumstances have that feeling towards anything precisely similar to -A: for the simple reason that a thing precisely similar to A _might_ -exist in a Universe in which I did not exist at all. And similarly -it is not true of any feeling whatever, that if _somebody_ has that -feeling towards a given thing A, then, in arty Universe, in which -a thing precisely similar to A existed, _somebody_ would have that -feeling towards it. Nor finally is it even true, that if it is true of -a given thing A, that, under actual causal laws, any one to whom A were -presented in a certain way _would_ have a certain feeling towards it, -then the same hypothetical predicate would, in any Universe, belong to -anything precisely similar to A: in every case it seems to be possible -that there _might_ be a Universe, in which the causal laws were such -that the proposition would not be true. - -It is, then, because in my definition of 'intrinsic' value the 'must' -is to be understood in this unconditional sense, that I think that the -proposition that a kind of value is 'intrinsic' is inconsistent with -its being subjective. But it should be observed that in holding that -there is this inconsistency, I am contradicting a doctrine which seems -to be held by many philosophers. There are, as you probably know, some -philosophers who insist strongly on a doctrine which they express by -saying that no relations are purely external. And so far as I can make -out one thing which they mean by this is just that, whenever r has any -relation whatever which _y_ has not got, _x_ and _y cannot_ be exactly -alike: That any difference in relation necessarily entails a difference -in intrinsic nature. There is, I think, no doubt that when these -philosophers say this, they mean by their 'cannot' and 'necessarily' -an unconditional 'cannot' and 'must.' And hence it follows they are -holding that, if, for instance, a thing A pleases me now, then any -other thing, B, precisely similar to A, must, under any circumstances, -and in any Universe, please me also: since, if B did not please me, it -would _not_ possess a relation which A does possess, and therefore, by -their principle, _could_ not be precisely similar to A_--must_ differ -from it in intrinsic nature. But it seems to me to be obvious that this -principle is false. If it were true, it would follow that I can know _a -priori_ such things as that no patch of colour which is seen by you and -is not seen by me is ever exactly like any patch which is seen by me -and is not seen by you; or that no patch of colour which is surrounded -by a red ring is ever exactly like one which is not so surrounded. But -it is surely obvious, that, whether these things are true or not they -are things which I cannot know _a priori._ It is simply _not_ evident -_a priori_ that no patch of colour which is seen by A and not by B is -ever exactly like one which is seen by B and not by A, and that no -patch of colour which is surrounded by a red ring is ever exactly like -one which is not. And this illustration serves to bring out very well -both what is meant by saying of such a predicate as 'beautiful 'that -it is intrinsic,' and why, if it is, it cannot be subjective. What is -meant is just that if A is beautiful and B is not, you could know _a -priori_ that A and B are _not_ exactly alike; whereas, with any such -subjective predicate, as that of exciting a particular feeling in me, -or that of being a thing which would excite such a feeling in any -spectator, you cannot tell _a priori_ that a thing A which did possess -such a predicate and a thing B which did not, could not be exactly -alike. - -It seems to me, therefore, quite certain, in spite of the dogma that no -relations are purely external, that there are many predicates, such for -instance as most (if not all) subjective predicates or the objective -one of being surrounded by a red ring, which do _not_ depend solely -on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them: or, in other words, -of which it is _not_ true that if _x_ possesses them and _y_ does -not, _x_ and _y must_ differ in intrinsic nature. But what precisely -is meant by this unconditional 'must,' I must confess I don't know. -The obvious thing to suggest is that it is the logical 'must,' which -certainly is unconditional in just this sense: the kind of necessity, -which we assert to hold, for instance, when we say that whatever is a -right-angled triangle _must_ be a triangle, or that whatever is yellow -_must_ be either yellow or blue. But I must say I cannot see that -all unconditional necessity is of this nature. I do not see how it -can be deduced from any logical law that, if a given patch of colour -be yellow, then any patch which were exactly like the first would be -yellow too. And similarly in our case of 'intrinsic' value, though I -think it is true that beauty, for instance, is 'intrinsic,' I do not -see how it can be deduced from any logical law, that if A is beautiful, -anything that were exactly like A would be beautiful too, in exactly -the same degree. - -Moreover, though I do believe that both "yellow" (in the sense in -which it applies to sense-data) and "beautiful" are predicates which, -in this unconditional sense, depend only on the intrinsic nature of -what possesses them, there seems to me to be an extremely important -difference between them which constitutes a further difficulty in the -way of getting quite clear as to what this unconditional sense of -"must" is. The difference I mean is one which I am inclined to express -by saying that though both yellowness and beauty are predicates which -_depend_ only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them, yet -while yellowness is itself an _intrinsic_ predicate, _beauty_ is not. -Indeed it seems to me to be one of the most important truths about -predicates of value, that though many of them _are_ intrinsic kinds of -value, in the sense I have defined, yet _none_ of them are intrinsic -properties, in the sense in which such properties as "yellow" or the -property of "being a state of pleasure" or "being a state of things -which contains a balance of pleasure" are intrinsic properties. It is -obvious, for instance, that, if we are to reject _all_ naturalistic -theories of value, we must not only reject those theories, according to -which no kind of value would be intrinsic, but must also reject such -theories as those which assert, for instance, that to say that a state -of mind is good is to say that it is a state of being pleased; or -that to say that a state of things is good is to say that it contains -a balance of pleasure over pain. There are, in short, two entirely -different types of naturalistic theory, the difference between which -may be illustrated by the difference between the assertion, "A is good" -_means_ "A is pleasant" and the assertion "A is good" _means_ "A is a -state of pleasure." Theories of the former type imply that goodness is -_not_ an intrinsic kind of value, whereas theories of the latter type -imply equally emphatically that it is: since obviously such predicates -as that "of being a state of pleasure," or "containing a balance of -pleasure," _are_ predicates like "yellow" in respect of the fact that -if a given thing possesses them, anything exactly like the thing in -question must possess them. It seems to me equally obvious that _both_ -types of theory are false: but I do not know how to exclude them both -except by saying that two different propositions are both true of -_goodness_, namely: (1) that it does depend _only_ on the intrinsic -nature of what possesses it--which excludes theories of the first type -and (2) that, _though_ this is so, it is yet not itself an intrinsic -property--which excludes those of the second. It was for this reason -that I said above that, if there are any intrinsic kinds of value, -they would constitute a class of predicates which is, perhaps, unique; -for I cannot think of any other predicate which resembles them in -respect of the fact, that though _not_ itself intrinsic, it yet shares -with intrinsic properties the characteristics of depending solely on -the intrinsic nature of what possesses it. So far as I know, certain -predicates of value are the only non-intrinsic properties which share -with intrinsic properties this characteristic of depending only on the -intrinsic nature of what possesses them. - -If, however, we are thus to say that predicates of value, though -_dependent_ solely on intrinsic properties, are not themselves -intrinsic properties, there must be some characteristic belonging to -intrinsic properties which predicates of value never possess. And -it seems to me quite obvious that there is; only I can't see _what_ -it is. It seems to me quite obvious that if you assert of a given -state of things that it contains a balance of pleasure over pain, you -are asserting of it not only a _different_ predicate, from what you -would be asserting of it if you said it was "good"--but a predicate -which is of quite a different _kind_; and in the same way that when -you assert of a patch of colour that it is "yellow," the predicate -you assert is not only _different_ from "beautiful," but of quite a -different _kind,_ in the same way as before. And of course the mere -fact that many people have thought that goodness and beauty were -subjective is evidence that there is _some_ great difference of kind -between them and such predicates as being yellow or containing a -balance of pleasure. But _what_ the difference is, if we suppose, as I -suppose, that goodness and beauty are _not_ subjective, and that they -do share with "yellowness" and "containing pleasure," the property -of depending _solely_ on the intrinsic nature of what possesses -them, I confess I cannot say. I can only vaguely express the kind of -difference I feel there to be by saying that intrinsic properties seem -to _describe_ the intrinsic nature of what possesses them in a sense -in which predicates of value never do. If you could enumerate _all_ -the intrinsic properties a given thing possessed, you would have given -a _complete_ description of it, and would not need to mention any -predicates of value it possessed; whereas no description of a given -thing could be _complete_ which omitted any intrinsic property. But, -in any case, owing to the fact that predicates of intrinsic value are -not themselves intrinsic properties, you cannot define "intrinsic -property," in the way which at first sight seems obviously the right -one. You cannot say that an intrinsic property is a property such that, -if one thing possesses it and another does not, the intrinsic nature of -the two things _must_ be different. For this is the very thing which we -are maintaining to be true of predicates of intrinsic value, while at -the same time we say that they are _not_ intrinsic properties. Such a -definition of "intrinsic property" would therefore only be possible if, -we could say that the necessity there is that, if _x_ and _y_ possess -different intrinsic properties, their nature must be different, is a -necessity of a _different kind_ from the necessity there is that, if -_x_ and _y_ are of different intrinsic values, their nature must be -different, although both necessities are unconditional. And it seems to -me possible that this is the true explanation. But, if so, it obviously -adds to the difficulty of explaining the meaning of the unconditional -"must," since, in this case, there would be two different meanings of -"must," both unconditional, and yet neither, apparently, identical with -the logical "must." - - - - -EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS - - -[Propositions and terms surrounded by "°" are "over-ligned" in original.] - -In the index to _Appearance and Reality_ (First Edition) Mr. Bradley -declares that _all_ relations are "intrinsical"; and the following are -some of the phrases by means of which he tries to explain what he means -by this assertion. "A relation must at both ends _affect,_ and pass -into, the being of its terms" (p. 364). "Every relation essentially -penetrates the being of its terms, and is, in this sense, intrinsical" -(p. 392). "To stand in a relation and not to be relative, to support -it and yet not to be infected and undermined by it, seems out of the -question" (p. 142). And a good many other philosophers seem inclined to -take the same view about relations which Mr. Bradley is here trying to -express. Other phrases which seem to be sometimes used to express it, -or a part of it, are these: "No relations are purely external"; "All -relations qualify or modify or make a difference to the terms between -which they hold"; "No terms are independent of any of the relations in -which they stand to other terms." (See _e.g.,_ Joachim, _The Nature of -Truth,_ pp. 11, 12, 46). - -It is, I think, by no means easy to make out exactly what these -philosophers mean by these assertions. And the main object of this -paper is to try to define clearly one proposition, which, even if it -does not give the whole of what they mean, seems to me to be always -implied by what they mean, and to be certainly false. I shall try to -make clear the exact meaning of this proposition, to point out some -of its most important consequences, and to distinguish it clearly -from certain other propositions which are, I think, more or less -liable to be confused with it. And I shall maintain that, if we give -to the assertion that a relation is "internal" the meaning which this -proposition would give to it, then, though, in that sense, _some_ -relations are "internal," others, no less certainly, are not, but are -"purely external." - -To begin with, we may, I think, clear the ground, by putting on -one side two propositions about relations, which, though they seem -sometimes to be confused with the view we are discussing, do, I think, -quite certainly not give the whole meaning of that view. - -The first is a proposition which is quite certainly and obviously true -of all relations, without exception, and which, though it raises points -of great difficulty, can, I think, be clearly enough stated for its -truth to be obvious. It is the proposition that, in the case of any -relation whatever, the kind of fact which we express by saying that -a given term A has that relation to another term B, or to a pair of -terms B and C, or to three terms B, C, and D, and so on, in no case -simply consists in the terms in question _together with_ the relation. -Thus the fact which we express by saying that Edward VII was father -of George V, obviously does not simply consist in Edward, George, -_and_ the relation of fatherhood. In order that the fact may be, it -is obviously not sufficient that there should merely be George and -Edward and the relation of fatherhood; it is further necessary that the -relation should _relate_ Edward to George, and not only so, but also -that it should relate them in the particular way which we express by -saying that Edward was father of George, and not merely in the way -which we should express by saying that George was father of Edward. -This proposition is, I think, obviously true of all relations without -exception: and the only reason why I have mentioned it is because, -in an article in which Mr. Bradley criticises Mr. Russell (_Mind,_ -1910, p. 179), he seems to suggest that it is inconsistent with the -proposition that any relations are merely external, and because, so far -as I can make out, some other people who maintain that all relations -are internal seem sometimes to think that their contention follows -from this proposition. The way in which Mr. Bradley puts it is that -such facts are unities which are not _completely analysable_; and this -is, of course, true, if it means merely that in the case of no such -fact is there any set of constituents of which we can truly say: This -fact is _identical with_ these constituents. But whether from this it -follows that all relations are internal must of course depend upon -what is meant by the latter statement. If it be merely used to express -this proposition itself, or anything which follows from it, then, of -course, there can be no doubt that all relations are internal. But I -think there is no doubt that those who say this do not mean by their -words _merely_ this obvious proposition itself; and I am going to point -out something which I think they always imply, and which certainly does -_not_ follow from it. - -The second proposition which, I think, may be put aside at once as -certainly not giving the whole of what is meant, is the proposition -which is, I think, the natural meaning of the phrases "All relations -modify or affect their terms" or "All relations make a difference to -their terms." There is one perfectly natural and intelligible sense in -which a given relation may be said to modify a term which stands in -that relation, namely, the sense in which we should say that, if, by -putting a stick of sealing-wax into a flame, we make the sealing-wax -melt, its relationship to the flame has modified the sealing-wax. -This is a sense of the word "modify" in which part of what is meant -by saying of any term that it is modified, is that it has actually -undergone a change: and I think it is clear that a sense in which this -is part of its meaning is the only one in which the word "modify" can -properly be used. If, however, those who say that all relations modify -their terms were using the word in this, its proper, sense, part of -what would be meant by this assertion would be that all terms which -have relations at all actually undergo changes. Such an assertion would -be obviously false, for the simple reason that there are terms which -have relation? and which yet never change at all. And I think it is -quite clear that those who assert that all relations are internal, in -the sense we are concerned with, mean by this something which could be -consistently asserted to be true of all relations without exception, -even if it were admitted that some terms which have relations do -not change. When, therefore, they use the phrase that all relations -"modify" their terms as equivalent to "all relations are internal," -they must be using "modify" in some metaphorical sense other than its -natural one. I think, indeed, that most of them would be inclined to -assert that in every case in which a term A comes to have to another -term B a relation, which it did not have to B in some immediately -preceding interval, its having of that relation to that term causes -it to undergo some change, which it would not have undergone if it -had not stood in precisely that relation to B and I think perhaps -they would think that this proposition follows from some proposition -which is true of all relations, without exception, and which is what -they mean by saying that all relations are internal. The question -whether the coming into a new relation does thus always cause some -modification in the term which comes into it is one which is often -discussed, as if it had something to do with the question whether all -relations are internal as when, for instance, it is discussed whether -knowledge of a thing alters the thing known. And for my part I should -maintain that this proposition is certainly not true. But what I am -concerned with now is not the question whether it is true, but simply -to point out that, so far as I can see, it can have nothing to do -with the question whether all relations are internal, for the simple -reason that it cannot possibly follow from any proposition with regard -to _all_ relations without exception. It asserts with regard to all -relational properties of a certain kind, that they have a certain kind -of _effect_; and no proposition of this sort can, I think follow from -any universal proposition with regard to _all_ relations. - -We have, therefore, rejected as certainly not giving the whole meaning -of the dogma that all relations are internal: (1) the obviously true -proposition that no relational facts are _completely_ analysable, -in the precise sense which I gave to that assertion; and (2) the -obviously false proposition that all relations modify their terms, -in the natural sense of the term "modify," in which it always has as -part of its meaning "cause to undergo a change." And we have also seen -that this false proposition that any relation which a term comes to -have always causes it to undergo a change is wholly irrelevant to the -question whether _all_ relations are internal or not. We have seen -finally that if the assertion that all relations modify their terms is -to be understood as equivalent to the assertion that all are internal, -"modify" must be understood in some metaphorical sense. The question -is: What is this metaphorical sense? - -And one point is, I think, pretty clear to begin with. It is obvious -that, in the case of some relations, a given term A may have the -relation in question, not only to one other term, but to several -different terms. If, for instance, we consider the relation of -fatherhood, it is obvious that a man may be father, not only of -one, but of several different children. And those who say that all -relations modify their terms always mean, I think, not merely that -every different relation which a term has modifies it; but also that, -where the relation is one which the term has to several different other -terms, then, in the case of _each_ of these terms, it is modified by -the fact that it has the relation in question to that particular term. -If, for instance, A is father of three children, B, C, and D, they -mean to assert that he is modified, not merely by being a father, but -by being the father of B, also by being the father of C, and also by -being the father of D. The mere assertion that all _relations_ modify -their terms does not, of course, make it quite clear that this is what -is meant; but I think there is no doubt that it is always meant; and -I think we can express it more clearly by using a term, which I have -already introduced, and saying the doctrine is that all _relational -properties_ modify their terms, in a sense which remains to be -defined. I think there is no difficulty in understanding what I mean -by a _relational property._ If A is father of B, then what you assert -of A when you say that he is so is a _relational property_--namely -the property of being father of B; and it is quite clear that this -property is not itself a _relation_, in the same fundamental sense -in which the relation of fatherhood is so; and also that, if C is a -different child from B, then the property of being father of C is a -different relational property from that of being father of B, although -there is only _one_ relation, that of fatherhood, from which both are -derived. So far as I can make out, those philosophers who talk of -all _relations_ being internal, often actually mean by "relations" -"relational properties"; when they talk of all the "relations" of a -given term, they mean all its relational properties, and not merely -all the different relations, of each of which it is true that the term -has that relation to something. It will, I think, conduce to clearness -to use a different word for these two entirely different uses of the -term "relation" to call "fatherhood" a relation, and "fatherhood of -B" a "relational property." And the fundamental proposition, which is -meant by the assertion that all relations are internal, is, I think, a -proposition with regard to relational properties, and not with regard -to relations properly so-called. There is no doubt that those who -maintain this dogma mean to maintain that all relational properties are -related in a peculiar way to the terms which possess them--that they -modify or are internal to them, in some metaphorical sense. And once we -have defined what this sense is in which a _relational property_ can be -said to be internal to a term which possesses it, we can easily derive -from it a corresponding sense in which the _relations_, strictly so -called, from which relational properties are derived, can be said to be -internal. - -Our question is then: What is the metaphorical sense of "modify" in -which the proposition that all relations are internal is equivalent to -the proposition that all relational properties "modify" the terms which -possess them? I think it is clear that the term "modify" would never -have been used at all to express the relation meant, unless there had -been some analogy between this relation and that which we have seen is -the proper sense of "modify," namely, _causes_ to change. And I think -we can see where the analogy comes in by considering the statement, -with regard to any particular term A and any relational property P -which belongs to it, that A _would have been different from what it -is if it had not had_ P: the statement, for instance, that Edward VII -would have been different if he had not been father of George V. This -is a thing which we can obviously truly say of A and P, in some sense, -whenever it is true of P that it _modified_ A in the proper sense of -the word: if the being held in the flame causes the sealing-wax to -melt, we can truly say (in some sense) that the sealing-wax would not -have been in a melted state if it had not been in the flame. But it -seems as if it were a thing which might also be true of A and P, where -it is _not_ true that the possession of P _caused_ A to change; since -the mere assertion that A would have been different, if it had not -had P, does not necessarily imply that the possession of P _caused -A_ to have any property which it would not have had otherwise. And -those who say that all relations are internal do sometimes tend to -speak as if what they meant could be put in the form: In the case of -every relational property which a thing has, it is always true that -the thing which has it would have been different if it had not had -that property; they sometimes say even: If P be a relational property -and A a term which has it, then it is always true that A _would not -have been A_ if it had not had P. This is, I think, obviously a clumsy -way of expressing anything which could possibly be true, since, taken -strictly, it implies the self-contradictory proposition that if A had -not had P, it would not have been true that A did not have P. But it -is nevertheless a more or less natural way of expressing a proposition -which might quite well be true, namely, that, supposing A has P, then -anything which had not had P would necessarily have been different -from A. This is the proposition which I wish to suggest as giving the -metaphorical meaning of "P _modifies_ A," of which we are in search. -It is a proposition to which I think a perfectly precise meaning can -be given, and one which does not at all imply that the possession of P -_caused_ any change in A, but which might conceivably be true of all -terms and all the relational properties they have, without exception. -And it seems to me that it is not unnatural that the proposition that -this is true of P and A, should have been expressed in the form, "P -modifies A," since it can be more or less naturally expressed in the -perverted form, "If A had not had P it would have been different,"--a -form of words, which, as we saw, can also be used whenever P does, in -the proper sense, modify A. - -I want to suggest, then, that one thing which is always implied by -the dogma that, "All relations are internal," is that, in the case of -every relational property, it can always be truly asserted of any term -A which has that property, that any term which had not had it would -necessarily have been different from A. - -This is the proposition to which I want to direct attention. And there -are two phrases in it, which require some further explanation. - -The first is the phrase "would necessarily have been." And the meaning -of this can be explained, in a preliminary way, as follows:--To say -of a pair of properties P and Q, that any term which had had P would -necessarily have had Q, is equivalent to saying that, in every case, -from the proposition with regard to any given term that it has P, it -_follows_ that that term has Q: _follows_ being understood in the sense -in which from the proposition with regard to any term, that it is a -right angle, it _follows_ that it is an angle, and in which from the -proposition with regard to any term that it is red it _follows_ that -it is coloured. There is obviously some very important sense in which -from the proposition that a thing is a right angle, it does follow -that it is an angle, and from the proposition that a thing is red it -does follow that it is coloured. And what I am maintaining is that the -metaphorical sense of "modify," in which it is maintained that all -relational properties modify the subjects which possess them, can be -defined by reference to this sense of "follows." The definition is: To -say of a given relational property P that it modifies or is internal to -a given term A which possesses it, is to say that from the proposition -that a thing has not got P it follows that that thing is different -from A. In other words, it is to say that the property of _not_ -possessing P, and the property of being different from A are related -to one another in the peculiar way in which the property of being a -right-angled triangle is related to that of being a triangle, or that -of being red to that of being coloured. - -To complete the definition it is necessary, however, to define the -sense in which "different from A" is to be understood. There are two -different senses which the statement that A is different from B may -bear. It may be meant merely that A is _numerically_ different from -B, _other_ than B, not identical with B. Or it may be meant that not -only is this the case, but also that A is related to B in a way which -can be roughly expressed by saying that A is _qualitatively_ different -from B. And of these two meanings, those who say "All relations make -a _difference_ to their terms," always, I think, mean difference -in the latter sense and not merely in the former. That is to say, -they mean, that if P be a relational property which belongs to A, -then the absence of P entails not only numerical difference from A, -but qualitative difference. But, in fact, from the proposition that -a thing is qualitatively different from A, it does follow that it -is also numerically different. And hence they are maintaining that -every relational property is "internal to" its terms in both of two -different senses at the same time. They are maintaining that, if P be a -relational property which belongs to A, then P is internal to A both in -the sense (1) that the absence of P entails qualitative difference from -A; and (2) that the absence of P entails numerical difference from A. -It seems to me that neither of these propositions is true; and I will -say something about each in turn. - -As for the first, I said before that I think some relational properties -really are "internal to" their terms, though by no means all are. -But, if we understand "internal to" in this first sense, I am not -really sure that any are. In order to get an example of one which -was, we should have, I think, to say that any two different qualities -are always _qualitatively_ different from one another: that, for -instance, it is not only the case that anything which is pure red is -qualitatively different from anything which is pure blue, but that -the quality "pure red" itself is qualitatively different from the -quality "pure blue." I am not quite sure that we can say this, but I -think we can; and if so, it is easy to get an example of a relational -property which is internal in our first sense. The quality "orange" is -intermediate in shade between the qualities yellow and red. This is a -relational property, and it is quite clear that, on our assumption, -it is an internal one. Since it is quite clear that any quality which -were _not_ intermediate between yellow and red, would necessarily -be _other_ than orange; and if any quality _other_ than orange must -be _qualitatively_ different from orange, then it follows that -"intermediate between yellow and red" is internal to "orange." That is -to say, the absence of the relational property "intermediate between -yellow and red," _entails_ the property "different in quality from -orange." - -There is then, I think, a difficulty in being sure that _any_ -relational properties are internal in this first sense. But, if what we -want to do is to show that some are _not,_ and that therefore the dogma -that all relations are internal is false, I think the most conclusive -reason for saying this is that if _all_ were internal in this first -sense, all would necessarily be internal in the second, and that this -is plainly false. I think, in fact, the most important consequence of -the dogma that all relations are internal, is that it follows from it -that all relational properties are internal in this second sense. I -propose, therefore, at once to consider this proposition, with a view -to bringing out quite clearly what it means and involves, and what are -the main reasons for saying that it is false. - -The proposition in question is that, if P be a relational property -and A a term to which it does in fact belong, then, no matter what -P and A may be, it may always be truly asserted of them, that any -term which had _not_ possessed P would necessarily have been other -than--numerically different from--A: or in other words, that A would -necessarily, in all conceivable circumstances, have possessed P. -And with this sense of "internal," as distinguished from that which -says _qualitatively different,_ it is quite easy to point out some -relational properties which certainly are internal in this sense. -Let us take as an example the relational property which we assert to -belong to a visual sense-datum when we say of it that it has another -visual sense-datum as a spatial part: the assertion, for instance, -with regard to a coloured patch half of which is red and half yellow. -"This whole patch contains this patch" (where "this patch" is a proper -name for the red half). It is here, I think, quite plain that, in a -perfectly clear and intelligible sense, we can say that any whole, -which had not contained that red patch, could not have been identical -with the whole in question: that from the proposition with regard to -any term whatever that it does not contain _that_ particular patch it -_follows_ that that term is _other_ than the whole in question--though -_not_ necessarily that it is qualitatively different from it. _That_ -particular whole could not have existed without having that particular -patch for a part. But it seems no less clear, at first sight, that -there are many other relational properties of which this is not true. -In order to get an example, we have only to consider the relation which -the red patch has to the whole patch, instead of considering as before -that which the whole has to it. It seems quite clear that, though the -whole could not have existed without having the red patch for a part, -the red patch might perfectly well have existed without being part -of that particular whole. In other words, though every relational -property of the form "having _this_ for a spatial part" is "internal" -in our sense, it seems equally clear that every property of the form -"is a spatial part of this whole" is _not_ internal, but purely -external. Yet this last, according to me, is one of the things which -the dogma of internal relations denies. It implies that it is just -as necessary that anything, which is in fact a part of a particular -whole, should be a part of that whole, as that any whole, which has -a particular thing for a part, should have that thing for a part. It -implies, in fact, quite generally, that any term which does in fact -have a particular relational property, could not have existed without -having that property. And in saying this it obviously flies in the -face of common sense. It seems quite obvious that in the case of many -relational properties which things have, the fact that they have them -is _a mere matter of fact:_ that the things in question _might_ have -existed without having them. That this, which seems obvious, is true, -seems to me to be the most important thing that can be meant by saying -that some relations are purely external. And the difficulty is to see -how any philosopher could have supposed that it was not true: that, for -instance, the relation of part to whole is no more external than that -of whole to part. I will give at once one main reason which seems to me -to have led to the view, that _all_ relational properties are internal -in this sense. - -What I am maintaining is the common-sense view, which seems obviously -true, that it may be true that A has in fact got P and yet also true -that A might have existed without having P. And I say that this -is equivalent to saying that it may be true that A has P, and yet -_not_ true that from the proposition that a thing has _not_ got P it -_follows_ that that thing is _other_ than A--numerically different from -it. And one reason why this is disputed is, I think, simply because it -is in fact true that if A has P, and _x_ has _not_, it _does_ follow -that _x_ is other than A. These two propositions, the one which I admit -to be true (1) that if A has P, and _x_ has not, it _does_ follow that -_x_ is other than A, and the one which I maintain to be false (2) that -if A has P, then from the proposition with regard to any term _x_ -that it has not got P, it _follows_ that _x_ is other than A, are, I -think, easily confused with one another. And it is in fact the case -that if they are not different, or if (2) follows from (1), then no -relational properties are external. For (1) is certainly true, and (2) -is certainly equivalent to asserting that none are. It is therefore -absolutely essential, if we are to maintain external relations, to -maintain that (2) does _not_ follow from (1). These two propositions -(1) and (2), with regard to which I maintain that (1) is true, and (2) -is false, can be put in another way, as follows: (1) asserts that if A -has P, then any term which has not, _must_ be other than A. (2) asserts -that if A has P, then any term which had not, _would necessarily be_ -other than A. And when they are put in this form, it is, I think, easy -to see why they should be confused: you have only to confuse "must" -or "is necessarily" with "would necessarily be." And their connexion -with the question of external relations can be brought out as follows: -To maintain external relations you have to maintain such things as -that, though Edward VII was in fact father of George V, he _might_ -have existed without being father of George V. But to maintain this, -you have to maintain that it is _not_ true that a person who was _not_ -father of George would necessarily have been other than Edward. Yet -it is, in fact, the case, that any person who was not the father of -George, _must_ have been other than Edward. Unless, therefore, you can -maintain that from this true proposition it does _not_ follow that any -person who was _not_ father of George _would necessarily_ have been -other than Edward, you will have to give up the view that Edward might -have existed without being father of George. - -By far the most important point in connexion with the dogma of internal -relations seems to me to be simply to see clearly the difference -between these two propositions (1) and (2), and that (2) does _not_ -follow from (1). If this is not understood, nothing in connexion with -the dogma, can, I think, be understood. And perhaps the difference may -seem so clear, that no more need be said about it. But I cannot help -thinking it is not clear to everybody, and that it does involve the -rejection of certain views, which are sometimes held as to the meaning -of "follows." So I will try to put the point again in a perfectly -strict form. - -Let P be a relational property, and A a term to which it does in fact -belong. I propose to define what is meant by saying that P is internal -to A (in the sense we are now concerned with) as meaning that from the -proposition that a thing has not got P, it "follows" that it is _other_ -than A. - -That is to say, this proposition asserts that between the two -properties "not having P" and "other than A," there holds that relation -which holds between the property "being a right angle" and the property -"being an angle," or between the property "red" and the property -"coloured," and which we express by saying that, in the case of any -thing whatever, from the proposition that that thing is a right angle -it follows, or is deducible, that it is an angle. - -Let us now adopt certain conventions for expressing this proposition. - -We require, first of all, some term to express the _converse_ of that -relation which we assert to hold between a particular proposition _q_ -and a particular proposition _p_, when we assert that _q follows from_ -or _is deducible from p._ Let us use the term "entails" to express the -converse of this relation. We shall then be able to say truly that "_p_ -entails _q_," when and only when we are able to say truly that "_q_ -follows from _p_" or "is deducible from _p_," in the sense in which the -conclusion of a syllogism in Barbara follows from the two premisses, -taken as one conjunctive proposition; or in which the proposition -"This is coloured" follows from "This is red." "_p_ entails _q_" will -be related to "_q_ follows from, _p_" in the same way in which "A is -greater than B" is related to "B is less than A." - -We require, next, some short and clear method of expressing the -proposition, with regard to two properties P and Q, that _any_ -proposition which asserts of a given thing that it has the property -P _entails_ the proposition that the thing in question also has the -property Q. Let us express this proposition in the form - -_x_P entails _x_Q - -That is to say "_x_P entails _x_Q" is to mean the same as "Each one of -all the various propositions, which are alike in respect of the fact -that each asserts with regard to some given thing that that thing has -P, entails _that one_ among the various propositions, alike in respect -of the fact that each asserts with regard to some given thing that -that thing has Q, which makes this assertion with regard to the _same -thing_, with regard to which the proposition of the first class asserts -that it has P." In other words "_x_P entails _x_Q" is to be true, if -and only if the proposition "AP entails AQ" is true, and if also all -propositions which resemble this, in the way in which "BP entails BQ" -resembles it, are true also; where "AP" means the same as "A has P," -"AQ" the same as "A has Q" etc., etc. - -We require, next, some way of expressing the proposition, with regard -to two properties P and Q, that any proposition which _denies_ of a -given thing that it has P _entails_ the proposition, with regard to the -thing in question, that it has Q. - -Let us, in the case of any proposition, _p_, express the contradictory -of that proposition by _p_. The proposition "It is not the case that A -has P" will then be expressed by °AP°; and it will then be natural, in -accordance with the last convention to express the proposition that any -proposition which _denies_ of a given thing that it has P _entails_ the -proposition, with regard to the thing in question, - -that it has Q, by - -°_xP_° entails _xQ._ - -And we require, finally, some short way of expressing the proposition, -with regard to two things B and A, that B is _other_ than (or not -identical with) A. Let us express "B is identical with A" by "B = A"; -and it will then be natural, according to the last convention, to -express "B is not identical with A" by - -°B = A.° - -We have now got everything which is required for expressing, in a short -symbolic form, the proposition, with regard to a given thing A and -a given relational property P, which A in fact possesses, that P is -_internal_ to A. The required expression is - -_xP_ entails (°_x_ = A°) - -which is to mean the same as "Every proposition which asserts of any -given thing that it has not got P _entails_ the proposition, with -regard to the thing in question, that it is other than A." And this -proposition is, of course, logically equivalent to - -(_x_ = A) entails _x_ P - -where we are using "logically equivalent," in such a sense that to -say of any proposition _p_ that it is logically equivalent to another -proposition _q_ is to say that both _p_ entails _q_ and _q_ entails -_p._ This last proposition again, is, so far as I can see, either -identical with or logically equivalent to the propositions expressed -by "anything which were identical with A would, in any conceivable -universe, necessarily have P" or by "A could not have existed in any -possible world without having P"; just as the proposition expressed by -"In any possible world a right angle must be an angle" is, I take it, -either identical with or logically equivalent to the proposition "(_x_ -is a right angle) entails (r is an angle)." - -We have now, therefore, got a short means of symbolising, with -regard to any particular thing A and any particular property P, the -proposition that P is _internal_ to A in the second of the two senses -distinguished on p. 286. But we still require a means of symbolising -the general proposition that _every_ relational property is internal -to any term which possesses it--the proposition, namely, which was -referred to on p. 287, as the most important consequence of the dogma -of internal relations, and which was called (2) on p. 289. - -In order to get this, let us first get a means of expressing with -regard to some one particular relational property P, the proposition -that P is internal to _any_ term which possesses it. This is a -proposition which takes the form of asserting with regard to one -particular property, namely P, that any term which possesses that -property also possesses another--namely the one expressed by saying -that P is internal to it. It is, that is to say, an ordinary universal -proposition, like "All men are mortal." But such a form of words is, -as has often been pointed out, ambiguous. It may stand for either of -two different propositions. It may stand merely for the proposition -"There is nothing, which both is a man, and is not mortal"--a -proposition which may also be expressed by "If anything is a man, -that thing is mortal," and which is distinguished by the fact that -it makes no assertion as to whether there are any men or not; or it -may stand for the conjunctive proposition "If anything is a man, that -thing is mortal, _and there are men."_ It will be sufficient for our -purposes to deal with propositions of the first kind--those namely, -which assert with regard to some two properties, say Q and R, that -there is nothing which both does possess Q and does not possess R, -without asserting that anything does possess Q. Such a proposition is -obviously equivalent to the assertion that _any_ pair of propositions -which resembles the pair "AQ" and "AR," in respect of the fact that -one of them asserts of some particular thing that it has Q and the -other, of the same thing, that it has R, stand to one another in a -certain relation: the relation, namely, which, in the case of "AQ" -and "AR," can be expressed by saying that "It is not the case both -that A has Q and that A has not got R." When we say "There is nothing -which does possess Q and does not possess R" we are obviously saying -something which is either identical with or logically equivalent to the -proposition "In the case of every such pair of propositions it is not -the case both that the one which asserts a particular thing to have -Q is true, and that the one which asserts it to have R is false." We -require, therefore, a short way of expressing the relation between two -propositions _p_ and _q,_ which can be expressed by "It is not the case -that _p_ is true and _q_ false." And I am going, quite arbitrarily to -express this relation by writing - -_p_ * _q_ - -for "It is not the case that _p_ is true and _q_ false." - -The relation in question is one which logicians have sometimes -expressed by "_p_ implies _q_." It is, for instance, the one which -Mr. Russell in the _'Principles of Mathematics_ calls "material -implication," and which he and Dr. Whitehead in _Principia Mathematica_ -call simply "implication." And if we do use "implication" to stand for -this relation, we, of course, got the apparently paradoxical results -that every false proposition implies every other proposition, both -true and false, and that every true proposition implies every other -true proposition: since it is quite clear that if _p_ is false then, -whatever _q_ may be, "it is not the case that _p_ is true and _q_ -false," and quite clear also, that if _p_ and _q_ are both true, then -also "it is not the case that _p_ is true and _q_ false." And these -results, it seems to me, appear to be paradoxical, solely because, -if we use "implies" in any ordinary sense, they are quite certainly -false. Why logicians should have thus chosen to use the word "implies" -as a name for a relation, for which it never is used by any one else, -I do not know. It is partly, no doubt, because the relation for which -they do use it--that expressed by saying "It is not the case that _p_ -is true and _q_ false"--is one for which it is very important that -they should have a short name, because it is a relation which is very -fundamental and about which they need constantly to talk, while (so far -as I can discover) it simply has no short name in ordinary life. And -it is partly, perhaps, for a reason which leads us back to our present -reason for giving some name to this relation. It is, in fact, natural -to use "_p_ implies _q_" to mean the same as "If _p,_ then _q."_ And -though "If _p_ then _q_" is hardly ever, if ever, used to mean the -same as "It is not the case that _p_ is true and _q_ false"; yet the -expression "If _anything_ has Q, _it_ has R" may, I think, be naturally -used to express the proposition that, in the case of _every_ pair of -propositions which resembles the pair A Q and A R in respect of the -fact that the first of the pair asserts of some particular thing that -it has Q and the second, of the same thing, that it has R, it is not -the case that the first is true and the second false. That is to say, -if (as I propose to do) we express "It is not the case both that AQ is -true and AR false" by - -AQ * AR, - -and if, further (on the analogy of the similar case with regard -to "entails)," we express the proposition that of _every_ pair of -propositions which resemble A Q and A R in the respect just mentioned, -it is true that the first has the relation * to the second by - -_x_Q * _x_R - -then, it _is_ natural to express _x_Q * _x_R, by "If _anything_ has -Q, then _that thing_ has R." And logicians may, I think, have falsely -inferred that _since_ it is natural to express "_x_Q * _x_R" by "If -_anything_ has Q, then _that thing_ has R," it _must_ be natural to -express "AQ * AR" by "If AQ, then AR," and therefore also by "AQ -implies AR." If this has been their reason for expressing "_p * q_" -by "_p_ implies _q_" then obviously their reason is a fallacy. And, -whatever the reason may have been, it seems to me quite certain that -"AQ * AR" cannot be properly expressed either by "AQ implies AR" or by -"If AQ, then AR," although "_r_Q * _x_R" can be properly expressed by -"If anything has Q, then that thing has R." - -I am going, then, to express the universal proposition, with regard to -two particular properties Q and R, which asserts that "Whatever has -Q, has R" or "If anything has Q, it has R," without asserting that -anything has Q, by - -_x_Q * _x_R - ---a means of expressing it, which since we have adopted the convention -that "_p_ * _q_" is to mean the same as "It is not the case that -_p_ is true and _q_ false," brings out the important fact that this -proposition is either identical with or logically equivalent to the -proposition that of _every_ such pair of propositions as AQ and AR, -it is true that it is not the case that the first is true and the -second false. And having adopted this convention, we can now see how, -in accordance with it, the proposition, with regard to a particular -property P, that P is _internal_ to _everything_ which possesses it, is -to be expressed. We saw that P is _internal_ to A is to be expressed by - -°_xP_° entails (°_x_ = A°) - -or by the logically equivalent proposition - -(_x =_ A) entails _xP_ - -And we have now only to express the proposition that _anything_ that -has P, has also the property that P is _internal_ to it. The required -expression is obviously as follows. Just as "Anything that has Q, has -R" is to be expressed by - -_x_Q * _x_R - -so "Anything that has P, has also the property that P is internal to -it" will be expressed by - -_x_P * {°_y_P° entails (°_y x_°)} - -or by - -_x_P * {(_v x_) entails _y_P}. - -We have thus got, in the case of any particular property P, a means -of expressing the proposition that it is _internal_ to _every_ term -that possesses it, which is both short and brings out clearly the -notions that are involved in it. And we do not need, I think, any -further special convention for symbolising the proposition that _every_ -relational property is internal to any term which possesses it--the -proposition, namely, which I called (2) above (pp. 289, 290), and which -on p. 287, I called the most important consequence of the dogma of -internal relations. We can express it simply enough as follows:-- - -(2) = "What we assert of P when we say _xP_ * {°_y_P° entails (°_y = -x_°)} can be truly asserted of every relational property." - -And now, for the purpose of comparing (2) with (1), and seeing exactly -what is involved in my assertion that (2) does not follow from (1), let -us try to express (1) by means of the same conventions. - -Let us first take the assertion with regard to a particular thing A -and a particular relational property P that, from the proposition that -A has P it _follows_ that nothing which has not got P is identical -with A. This is an assertion which is quite certainly true; since, if -anything which had not got P were identical with A, it would follow -that °AP°; and from the proposition AP, it certainly _follows_ that -°AP° is false, and therefore also that "Something which has not got P -is identical with A" is false, or that "Nothing which has not got P is -identical with A" is true. And this assertion, in accordance with the -conventions we have adopted, will be expressed - -by - -AP entails {°_x_P° * (°_x_ = A°)} - -We want, next, in order to express (1), a means of expressing with -regard to a particular relational property P, the assertion that, from -the proposition, with regard to _anything_ whatever, that that thing -has got P, it _follows_ that nothing which has not got P is identical -with the thing in question. This also is an assertion which is quite -certainly true; since it merely asserts (what is obviously true) that -what - -AP entails {°_x_P° * (°_x_ = A°)} - -asserts of A, can be truly asserted of anything whatever. And this -assertion, in accordance with the conventions we have adopted, will be -expressed by - -_x_P entails {°_y_P° * (°_y_ = x°)}. - -The proposition, which I meant to call (1), but which I expressed -before rather clumsily, can now be expressed by - -(1) = "What we assert of P, when we say, - -_x_P entails {°_y_P° * (°y = _x_°)} - -can be truly asserted of every relational property." This is a -proposition which is again quite certainly true; and, in order to -compare it with (2), there is, I think, no need to adopt any further -convention for expressing it, since the questions whether it is or is -not different from (2), and whether (2) does or does not follow from -it, will obviously depend on the same questions with regard to the two -propositions, with regard to the particular relational property, P, - -_x_P entails {°_y_P° * (°_y = x_°)} - -and - -_x_P * {_y_P entails (_y = x_)} - -Now what I maintain with regard to (1) and (2) is that, whereas (1) is -true, (2) is false. I maintain, that is to say, that the proposition -"What we assert of P, when we say - -_x_P * {°_y_P° entails (°_y = x_°)}. - -is true of _every_ relational property" is false, though I admit that -what we here assert of P is true of _some_ relational properties. -Those of which it is true, I propose to call _internal_ relational -properties, those of which it is false _external_ relational -properties. The dogma of internal relations, on the other hand, implies -that (2) is true; that is to say, that _every_ relational property is -_internal_ and that there are no _external_ relational properties. And -what I suggest is that the dogma of internal relations has been held -only because (2) has been falsely thought to follow from (1). - -And that (2) does not follow from (1), can, I think, be easily seen as -follows. It can follow from (1) only if from any proposition of the form - -_p_ entails (_q_ * _r_) - -there follows the corresponding proposition of the form - -_p_ * (_q_ entails _r_), - -And that this is not the case can, I think, be easily seen by -considering the following three propositions. Let _p_ = "All the books -on this shelf are blue," let _q_ = "My copy of the _Principles of -Mathematics_ is a book on this shelf," and let _r_ = "My copy of the -_Principles of Mathematics_ is blue." Now _p_ here does absolutely -_entail_ (_q * r_). That is to say, it absolutely follows from _p_ -that "My copy of the _Principles_ is on this shelf," and "My copy of -the _Principles_ is _not_ blue," are not, as a matter of fact, both -true. But it by no means follows from this that _p_ * (_q_ entails -_r_). For what this latter proposition means is "It is not the case -both that _p_ is true and that (_q_ entails _r_) is false." And, as a -matter of fact, (_q_ entails _r_) is quite certainly false; for from -the proposition "My copy of the _Principles_ is on this shelf" the -proposition "My copy of the _Principles_ is blue" does _not_ follow. It -is simply not the case that the second of these two propositions can be -deduced from the first _by itself:_ it is simply not the case that it -stands to it in the relation in which it does stand to the conjunctive -proposition "All the books on this shelf are blue _and,_ my copy of the -_Principles_ is on this shelf." This conjunctive proposition really -does _entail_ "My copy of the _Principles_ is blue." But "My copy of -the _Principles_ is on this shelf," _by itself_ quite certainly does -not entail "My copy of the Principles is blue." It is simply not the -case that my copy of the Principles _couldn't_ have been on this shelf -without being blue, (_q_ entails _r_) is, therefore, false. And hence -"_p_ * (_q_ entails _r_)," can only follow from "_p_ entails (_q_ * -_r_)," if from this latter proposition °_p_° follows. But _p_ quite -certainly does not follow from this proposition: from the fact that (_q -* r_) is deducible from _p_, it does not in the least follow that °_p_° -is true. It is, therefore, clearly not the case that every proposition -of the form - -_p_ entails (_q * r_) - -entails the corresponding proposition of the form - -_p_ * {_q_ entails _r_}, - -since we have found one particular proposition of the first form which -does _not_ entail the corresponding proposition of the second. - -To maintain, therefore, that (2) follows from (1) is mere confusion. -And one source of the confusion is, I think, pretty plain. (1) does -allow you to assert that, if AP is true, then the proposition "°_y_P° -* {°(_y_ = A°)}" _must_ be true. What the "must" here expresses is -merely that this proposition follows from AP, not that it is in itself -a necessary proposition. But it is supposed, through confusion, that -what is asserted is that it is not the case both that AP is true -and that "°_y_P° * (°_y_ = A°)" is not, _in itself,_ a necessary -proposition; that is to say, it is supposed that what is asserted is -"AP + {°_y_P° entails (°_y_ = A°)}"; since to say that "°_y_P° * (°_y_ -= A°)" is, _in itself_, a necessary proposition is the same thing as to -say that "°_y_P° entails (°_y_ = A°)" is also true. In fact it seems -to me pretty plain that what is meant by saying of propositions of -the form "_x_P * _x_Q" that they are _necessary_ (or "apodeictic") -propositions, is merely that the corresponding proposition of the -form "_x_P entails _x_Q" is also true, "_x_P _entails_ _x_Q" is not -_itself_ a necessary proposition; but, if "_x_P entails _x_Q" is -_true,_ then "_x_P * _x_Q" is a necessary proposition--and a necessary -truth, since no false propositions are necessary in themselves. Thus -what is meant by saying that "Whatever is a right angle, is also an -angle" is a necessary truth, is, so far as I can see, simply that the -proposition "(_x_ is a right angle) entails (_x_ is an angle)" is -also true. This seems to me to give what has, in fact, been generally -meant in philosophy by "necessary truths," _e.g._ by Leibniz; and -to point out the distinction between them and those true universal -propositions which are "mere matters of fact." And if we want to extend -the meaning of the name "necessary truth" in such a way that some -singular propositions may also be said to be "necessary truths," we -can, I think, easily do it as follows. We can say that AP is itself -a necessary truth, if and only if the universal proposition "(_x_ = -A) * _x_P" (which, as we have seen, follows from AP) is a necessary -truth: that is to say, if and only if (_x_ = A) entails _x_P. With -this definition, what the dogma of internal relations asserts is that -in every case in which a given thing actually has a given relational -property, the fact that it has that property is a necessary truth; -whereas what I am asserting is that, if the property in question is -an "internal" property, then the fact in question will be a necessary -truth, whereas if the property in question is "external," then the fact -in question will be a mere "matter of fact." - -So much for the distinction between (1) which is true, and (2), or -the dogma of internal relations, which I hold to be false. But I said -above, in passing, that my contention that (2) does not follow from -(1), involves the rejection of certain views that have sometimes been -held as to the meaning of "follows"; and I think it is worth while to -say something about this. - -It is obvious that the possibility of maintaining that (2) does not -follow from (1), depends upon its being true that from "_x_P * _x_Q" -the proposition "_x_P entails _x_Q" does not follow. And this has -sometimes been disputed, and is, I think, often not clearly seen. - -To begin with, Mr. Russell, in the _Principles of Mathematics_ (p. 34), -treats the phrase "_q_ can be deduced from _p_" as if it meant exactly -the same thing as "_p * q_" or "_p_ materially implies _q_"; and has -repeated the same error elsewhere, _e.g._ in _Philosophical Essays_ -(p. 166), where he is discussing what _he_ calls the axiom of internal -relations. And I am afraid a good many people have been led to suppose -that, since Mr. Russell has said this, it must be true. If it were -true, then, of course, it would be impossible to distinguish between -(1) and (2), and it would follow that, since (1) certainly is true, -what I am calling the dogma of internal relations is true too. But I -imagine that Mr. Russell himself would now be willing to admit that, so -far from being true, the statement that "_q_ can be deduced from _p_" -means the same as "_p_ * _q_" is simply an enormous "howler"; and I do -not think I need spend any time in trying to show that it is so. - -But it may be held that, though "_p_ entails _q_" does not mean the -same as "_p * q_," yet nevertheless from "_x_P * _x_Q" the proposition -"_x_P entails _x_Q" does follow, for a somewhat more subtle reason; -and, if this were so, it would again follow that what I am calling the -dogma of internal relations must be true. It may be held, namely, that -though "AP entails AQ" does not mean simply "AP * AQ" yet what it does -mean is simply the conjunction "AP * AQ _and_ this proposition is an -instance of a true formal implication" (the phrase "formal implication" -being understood in Mr. Russell's sense, in which "_x_P * _x_Q" asserts -a formal implication). This view as to what "AP entails AQ" means, -has, for instance, if I understand him rightly, been asserted by Mr. -O. Strachey in _Mind,_ N.S., 93. And the same view has been frequently -suggested (though I do not know that he has actually asserted it) by -Mr. Russell himself (_e.g., Principia Mathematica,_ p. 21). If this -view were true, then, though "_x_P entails _x_Q" would not be identical -in meaning with "_x_P * _x_Q," yet it would follow from it; since, if - -_x_P * _x_Q - -were true, then every particular assertion of the form AP * AQ, would -not only be true, but would be an instance of a true formal implication -(namely "_x_P * _x_Q") and this, according to the proposed definition, -is all that "_x_P entails _x_Q" asserts. If, therefore, it were true, -it would again follow that all relational properties must be internal. -But that this view also is untrue appears to me perfectly obvious. The -proposition that I am in this room does "materially imply" that I am -more than five years old, since both are true; and the assertion that -it does is also an instance of a true formal implication, since it is -in fact true that all the persons in this room are more than five years -old; but nothing appears to me more obvious than that the second of -these two propositions can _not_ be deduced from the first--that the -kind of relation which holds between the premisses and conclusion of -a syllogism in _Barbara_ does _not_ hold between them. To put it in -another way: it seems to me quite obvious that the properties "being -a person in this room" and "being more than five years old" are not -related in the kind of way in which "being a right angle" _is_ related -to "being an angle," and which we express by saying that, in the case -of every term, the proposition that that term is an angle can be -deduced from the proposition that it is a right angle. - -These are the only two suggestions as to the meaning of "_p_ entails -_q_" known to me, which, if true, would yield the result that (2) -does follow from (1), and that therefore all relational properties -are internal; and both of these, it seems to me, are obviously -false. All other suggested meanings, so far as I know, would leave -it true that (2) does not follow from (1), and therefore that I may -possibly be right in maintaining that some relational properties are -external. It might, for instance, be suggested that the last proposed -definition should be amended as follows--that we should say: "_p_ -entails _q_" means "_p * q and_ this proposition is an instance of a -formal implication, which is not merely true but _self-evident,_ like -the laws of Formal Logic." This proposed definition would avoid the -paradoxes involved in Mr. Strachey's definition, since such true formal -implications as "all the persons in this room are more than five years -old" are certainly not self-evident; and, so far as I. can see, it may -state something which is in fact true of _p_ and _q,_ whenever and only -when _p_ entails _q._ I do not myself think that it gives the _meaning_ -of "_p_ entails _q,_" since the kind of relation which I see to hold -between the premisses and conclusion of a syllogism seems to me to be -one which is purely "objective" in the sense that no psychological -term, such as is involved in the meaning of "self-evident," is involved -in its definition (if it has one). I am not, however, concerned to -dispute that some such definition of "_p_ entails _q_" as this may be -true. Since it is evident that, even if it were, my proposition that -"_x_P entails _x_Q" does _not_ follow from "_x_P * _x_Q," would still -be true; and hence also my contention that (2) does not follow from (1). - -So much by way of arguing that we are not bound to hold that all -relational properties are internal in the particular sense, with which -we are now concerned, in which to say that they are means that in every -case in which a thing A has a relational property, it follows from the -proposition that a term has _not_ got that property that the term in -question is _other_ than A. But I have gone further and asserted that -some relational properties certainly are _not_ internal. And in defence -of this proposition I do not know that I have anything to say but that -it seems to me evident in many cases that a term which _has_ a certain -relational property _might_ quite well not have had it: that, for -instance, from the mere proposition that this is this, it by no means -follows that this has to other things all the relations which it in -fact has. Everybody, of course, must admit that if all the propositions -which assert of it that it has these properties, do in fact follow from -the proposition that this is this, we cannot see that they do. And so -far as I can see, there is no reason of any kind for asserting that -they do, except the confusion which I have exposed. But it seems to me -further that we can see in many cases that the proposition that this -has that relation does _not_ follow from the fact that it is this: -that, for instance, the proposition that Edward VII was father of -George V _is_ a _mere_ matter of fact. - -I want now to return for a moment to that other meaning of "internal," -(p. 286) in which to say that P is internal to A means not merely that -anything which had not P would necessarily be _other_ than A, but that -it would necessarily be _qualitatively_ different. I said that this -was the meaning of "internal" in which the dogma of internal relations -holds that all relational properties are "internal"; and that one of -the most important consequences which followed from it, was that all -relational properties are "internal" in the less extreme sense that -we have just been considering. But, if I am not mistaken, there is -another important consequence which also follows from it, namely, the -Identity of Indiscernibles. For if it be true, in the case of every -relational property, that any term which had net that property would -necessarily be qualitatively different from any which had, it follows -of course that, in the case of two terms one of which has a relational -property, which the other has not the two are qualitatively different. -But, from the proposition that _x_ is other than _y,_ it _does_ follow -that _x_ has some relational property which _y_ has not; and hence, -if the dogma of internal relations be true, it will follow that if -_x_ is other than _y, x_ is always also qualitatively different from -_y,_ which is the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. This is, of -course, a further objection to the dogma of internal relations, since I -think it is obvious that the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is -not true. Indeed, so far as I can see, the dogma of internal relations -essentially consists in the joint assertion of two indefensible -propositions: (1) the proposition that in the case of no relational -property is it true of any term which has got that property, that it -_might_ not have had it and (2) the Identity of Indiscernibles. - -I want, finally, to say something about the phrase which Mr. Russell -uses in the _Philosophical Essays_ to express the dogma of internal -relations. He says it may be expressed in the form "Every relation is -grounded in the natures of the related terms" (p. 160). And it can be -easily seen, if the account which I have given be true, in what precise -sense it does hold this. Mr. Russell is uncertain as to whether by "the -nature" of a term is to be understood the term itself or something -else. For my part it seems to me that by a term's nature is meant, not -the term itself, but what may roughly be called all its qualities as -distinguished from its relational properties. But whichever meaning -we take, it will follow from what I have said, that the dogma of -internal relations does imply that every relational property which a -term has is, in a perfectly precise sense, _grounded_ in its nature. -It will follow that every such property is _grounded_ in _the term,_ -in the sense that, in the case of every such property, it _follows_ -from the mere proposition that that term is that term that it has the -property in question. And it will also follow that any such property -is grounded in the qualities which the term has, in the sense, that if -you take _all_ the qualities which the term has, it will again follow -in the case of each relational property, from the proposition that the -term has _all_ those qualities that it has the relational property in -question; since this is implied by the proposition that in the case of -any such property, any term which had not had it would necessarily have -been different in quality from the term in question. In both of these -two senses, then, the dogma of internal relations does, I think, imply -that every relational property is grounded in the nature of every term -which possesses it; and in this sense that proposition is false. Yet -it is worth noting, I think, that there is another sense of "grounded" -in which it may quite well be true that every relational property _is_ -grounded in the nature of any term which possesses it. Namely that, in -the case of every such property, the term in question has some quality -_without_ which it could not have had the property. In other words that -the relational property _entails_ some quality in the term, though no -quality in the term _entails_ the relational property. - - - - -THE NATURE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY - - -I should like, if I can, to interest you to-night in one particular -question about Moral Philosophy. It is a question which resembles most -philosophical questions, in respect of the fact that philosophers are -by no means agreed as to what is the right answer to it: some seem to -be very strongly convinced that one answer is correct, while others are -equally strongly convinced of the opposite. For my own part I do feel -some doubt as to which answer is the right one, although, as you will -see, I incline rather strongly to one of the two alternatives. I should -like very much, if I could, to find some considerations which seemed to -me absolutely convincing on the one side or the other; for the question -seems to me in itself to be an exceedingly interesting one. - -I have said that the question is a question _about_ Moral Philosophy; -and it seems to me in fact to be a very large and general question -which affects the whole of Moral Philosophy. In asking it, we are doing -no less than asking what it is that people are doing when they study -Moral Philosophy at all: we are asking what sort of questions it is -which it is the business of Moral Philosophy to discuss and try to -find the right answer to. But I intend, for the sake of simplicity, -to confine myself to asking it in two particular instances. Moral -Philosophy has, in fact, to discuss a good many different ideas; -and though I think this same question may be raised with regard to -them all, I intend to pick out two, which seem to me particularly -fundamental, and to ask it with regard to them only. - -My first business must be to explain what these two ideas are. - -The name Moral Philosophy naturally suggests that what is meant is a -department of philosophy which has something to do with morality. And -we all understand roughly what is meant by morality. We are accustomed -to the distinction between moral good and evil, on the one hand, and -what is sometimes called physical good and evil on the other. We all -make the distinction between a man's moral character, on the one hand, -and his agreeableness or intellectual endowments, on the other. We feel -that to accuse a man of immoral conduct is quite a different thing from -accusing him merely of bad taste or bad manners, or from accusing him -merely of stupidity or ignorance. And no less clearly we distinguish -between the idea of being under a moral obligation to do a thing, and -the idea of being merely under a legal obligation to do it. It is a -commonplace that the sphere of morality is much wider than the sphere -of law: that we are morally bound to do and avoid many things, which -are not enjoined or forbidden by the laws of our country; and it is -also sometimes held that, if a particular law is unjust or immoral, it -may even be a moral duty to disobey it--that is to say that there may -be a positive conflict between moral and legal obligation; and the mere -fact that this is held, whether truly or falsely, shows, at all events, -that the one idea is quite distinct from the other. - -The name Moral Philosophy, then, naturally suggests that it is a -department of philosophy concerned with morality in this common sense. -And it is, in fact, true that one large department of Moral Philosophy -is so concerned. But it would be a mistake to think that the whole -subject is _only_ concerned with morality. Another important department -of it is, as I shall try to show, concerned with ideas which are _not_ -moral ideas, in this ordinary sense, though, no doubt, they may have -something to do with them. And of the two ideas which I propose to -pick out for discussion, while one of them is a moral idea, the other -belongs to that department of Moral Philosophy, which is not concerned -solely with morality, and is not, I think, properly speaking, a moral -idea at all. - -Let us begin with the one of the two, which is a moral idea. - -The particular moral idea which I propose to pick out for discussion -is the one which I have called above the idea of moral obligation--the -idea of being morally bound to act in a particular way on a particular -occasion. But what is, so far as I can see, precisely the same idea -is also called by several other names. To say that I am under a moral -obligation to do a certain thing is, I think, clearly to say the same -thing as what we commonly express by saying that I ought to do it, -or that it is my duty to do it. That is to say, the idea of moral -obligation is identical with the idea of the moral "ought" and with the -idea of duty. And it also seems at first sight as if we might make yet -another identification. - -The assertion that I ought to do a certain thing seems as if it meant -much the same as the assertion that it would be wrong of me _not_ to do -the thing in question: at all events it is quite clear that, whenever -it is my duty to do anything, it would be wrong of me not to do it, -and that whenever it would be wrong of me to do anything, then it is -my duty to refrain from doing it. In the case of these two ideas, the -idea of what is wrong, and the idea of what is my duty or what I ought -to do, different views may be taken as to whether the one is more -fundamental than the other, or whether both are equally so; and on -the question: _If_ one of the two is more fundamental than the other, -which of the two is so? Thus some people would say, that the idea of -"wrong" is the more fundamental, and that the idea of "duty" is to be -defined in terms of it: that, in fact, the statement "It is my duty to -keep that promise" merely means "It would be wrong of me not to keep -it"; and the statement "It is my duty not to tell a lie" merely means -"It would be wrong of me to tell one." Others again would apparently -say just the opposite: that duty is the more fundamental notion, and -"wrong" is to be defined in terms of it. While others perhaps would -hold that neither is more fundamental than the other; that both are -equally fundamental, and that the statement "it would be wrong to do so -and so" is only equivalent to, not identical in meaning with, "I ought -not to do it." But whichever of these three views be the true one, -there is, I think, no doubt whatever about the equivalence notion of -the two ideas; and no doubt, therefore, that whatever answer be given -to the question I am going to raise about the one, the same answer must -be given to the corresponding question about the other. - -The moral idea, then, which I propose to discuss, is the idea of duty -or moral obligation, or, what comes to the same thing, the idea of what -is wrong--morally wrong. Everybody would agree that this idea--or, to -speak more accurately, one or both of these two ideas--is among the -most fundamental of our moral ideas, whether or not they would admit -that all others, for example the ideas of moral goodness, involve a -reference to this one in their definition, or would hold that we have -some others which are independent of it, and equally fundamental with -it. - -But there is a good deal of difficulty in getting clear as to what this -idea of moral obligation itself is. Is there in fact only one idea -which we call by this name? Or is it possible that on some occasions -when we say that so and so is a duty, we mean something different by -this expression from what we do on others? And that similarly when -we say that so and so is morally wrong, we sometimes use this name -"morally wrong" for one idea and sometimes for another; so that one -and the same thing may be "morally wrong" in one sense of the word, -and yet _not_ morally wrong in another? I think, in fact, there are -two different senses in which we use these terms; and to point out the -difference between them, will help to bring out clearly more the nature -of each. And I think perhaps the difference can be brought out most -clearly by considering the sort of moral rules with which we are all of -us familiar. - -Everybody knows that moral teachers are largely concerned in laying -down moral rules, and in disputing the truth of rules which have been -previously accepted. And moral rules seem to consist, to a very large -extent, in assertions to the effect that it is always wrong to do -certain actions or to refrain from doing certain others; or (what comes -to the same thing) that it is always your duty to refrain from certain -actions, and positively to do certain others. The Ten Commandments for -example, are instances of moral rules; and most of them are examples -of what are called negative rules--that is to say rules which assert -merely that it is wrong to do certain positive actions, and therefore -our duty to refrain from these actions; instead of rules which assert -of certain positive actions, that it is our duty to do them and -therefore wrong to refrain from doing them. The fifth commandment, -which tells us to honour our father and mother, is apparently an -exception; it seems to be a positive rule. It is not, like the others, -expressed in the negative form "Thou shalt _not_ do so and so," and -it is apparently really meant to assert that we ought to do certain -positive actions, not merely that there are some positive action from -which we ought to refrain. The difference between this one and the -rest will thus serve as an example of the difference between positive -and negative moral rules, a difference which is sometimes treated as -if it were of great importance. And I do not wish to deny that there -may be some important difference between seeing only that certain -positive actions are wrong, and seeing also that, in certain cases, to -refrain from doing certain actions is just as wrong as positively to -do certain others. But this distinction between positive and negative -rules is certainly of much less importance than another which is, I -think, liable to be confused with it. So far as this distinction goes -it is only a distinction between an assertion that it is wrong to do a -positive action and an assertion that it is wrong to refrain from doing -one: and each of these assertions is equivalent to one which asserts -a duty--the first with an assertion that it is a duty to refrain, the -second with an assertion that a positive action is a duty. But there is -another distinction between some moral rules and others, which is of -much greater importance than this one, and which does, I think, give a -reason for thinking that the term "moral obligation" is actually used -in different senses on different occasions. - -I have said that moral rules seem to consist, _to a large extent_, -in assertions to the effect that it is always wrong to do certain -_actions_ or to refrain from doing certain others, or the equivalent -assertions in terms of duty. But there is a large class of moral -rules, with which we are all of us very familiar, which do not come -under this definition. They are rules which are concerned not with our -_actions_, in the natural sense of the word, but with our feelings, -thoughts and desires. An illustration of this kind of rule can again -be given from the Ten Commandments. Most of the ten, as we all know, -are concerned merely with actions; but the tenth at least is clearly -an exception. The tenth says "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's -house, nor his wife, nor his servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor -anything that is his," and, unless "covet" is merely a mistranslation -of a word which stands for some kind of action, we plainly have here a -rule which is concerned with our _feelings_ and not with our actions. -And one reason which makes the distinction between rules of this kind -and rules concerned with actions important, is that our feelings are -not, as a rule, directly within the control of our will in the sense in -which many of our actions are. I cannot, for instance, by any single -act of will directly prevent from arising in my mind a desire for -something that belongs to some one else, even if, when once the desire -has arrived, I can by my will prevent its continuance; and even this -last I can hardly do _directly_ but only by forcing myself to attend -to other considerations which may extinguish the desire. But though -I thus cannot prevent myself altogether from coveting my neighbour's -possessions, I can altogether prevent myself from stealing them. The -action of stealing, and the feeling of covetousness, are clearly on a -very different level in this respect. The action is _directly_ within -the control of my will, whereas the feeling is not. _If_ I will not -to take the thing (though of course some people may find a great -difficulty in willing this) it does in general follow directly that I -do not take it; whereas, it I will not to desire it, it emphatically -does not, even in general, follow directly that no desire for it will -be there. This distinction between the way in which our feelings and -our actions are under the control of our wills is, I think, a very -real one indeed; we cannot help constantly recognising that it exists. -And it has an important bearing on the distinction between those moral -rules which deal with actions and those which deal with feelings, for -the following reason. The philosopher Kant laid down a well-known -proposition to the effect that "ought" implies "can": that is to say, -that it cannot be true that you "ought" to do a thing, unless it is -true that you _could_ do it, _if_ you chose. And as regards one of -the senses in which we commonly use the words "ought" and "duty," I -think this rule is plainly true. When we say absolutely of ourselves -or others, "I ought to do so and so" or "you ought to," we imply, -I think, very often that the thing in question is a thing which we -_could_ do, _if_ we chose; though of course it may often be a thing -which it is very difficult to choose to do. Thus it is clear that I -cannot truly say of anyone that he ought to do a certain thing, if it -is a thing which it is physically impossible for him to do, however -desirable it may be that the thing should be done. And in this sense it -is clear that it cannot be truly said of me that I ought not to have a -certain feeling, or that I ought not to have had it, if it is a feeling -which I could not, by any effort of my will, prevent myself from -having. The having or the prevention of a certain feeling is not, of -course, strictly ever a _physical_ impossibility, but it is very often -impossible, in exactly the same sense, in which actions are physically -impossible--that is to say that I could not possibly get it or prevent -it, even if I would. But this being so, it is plain that such a -moral rule as that I ought not to covet my neighbour's possessions -is, if it means to assert that I ought not, in that sense in which -"ought" implies "can," a rule which cannot possibly be true. What it -appears to assert is, absolutely universally, of _every_ feeling of -covetousness, that the feeling in question is one which the person who -felt it _ought_ not to have felt. But in fact a very large proportion -of such feelings (I am inclined to say the vast majority) are feelings -which the person who felt them could not have prevented feeling, if he -would: they were beyond the control of his will. And hence it is quite -emphatically _not_ true that none of these feelings _ought_ to have -been felt, if we are using "ought" in the sense which implies that the -person who felt them _could_ have avoided them. So far from its being -true that absolutely _none_ of them ought to have been felt, this is -only true of those among them, probably a small minority, which the -person who felt them _could_ have avoided feeling. If, therefore, moral -rules with regard to feelings are to have a chance of being _nearly_ -true, we must understand the "ought" which occurs in them in some -other sense. But with moral rules that refer to actions the case is -very different. Take stealing for example. Here again what the Eighth -Commandment appears to imply is that absolutely every theft which has -ever occurred was an act which the agent ought not to have done; and, -if the "ought" is the one which implies "can," it implies, therefore, -that every theft was an act which the agent, if he had chosen, could -have avoided. And this statement that every theft which has been -committed was an act which the thief, _if_ he had so willed, could -have avoided, though it may be doubted if it is absolutely universally -true, is not a statement which is clearly absurd, like the statement -that every covetous desire could have been avoided by the will of the -person who felt it. It is probable that the vast majority of acts of -theft have been acts which it was in the power of the thief to avoid, -if he had willed to do so; whereas this is clearly not true of the vast -majority of covetous desires. It is, therefore, quite possible that -those who believe we ought never to steal are using "ought" in a sense -which implies that stealing always _could_ have been avoided; whereas -it is I think quite certain that many of those who believe that we -ought to avoid all covetous desires, do not believe for a moment that -every covetous desire that has ever been felt was a desire which the -person who felt it could have avoided feeling, if he had chosen. And -yet they certainly do believe, in some sense or other, that no covetous -desire _ought_ ever to have been felt. The conclusion is, therefore, -it seems to me, unavoidable that we do use "ought," the moral "ought," -in two different senses; the one a sense in which to say that I ought -to have done so and so does really imply that I could have done it, -if I had chosen, and the other a sense in which it carries with it no -such implication. I think perhaps the difference between the two can be -expressed in this way. If we express the meaning of the first "ought," -the one which does imply "can," by saying that "I ought to have done -so and so" means "It actually _was_ my duty to do it"; we can express -the meaning of the second by saying that _e.g._ "I ought not to have -felt so and so" means _not_ "it _was_ my duty to avoid that feeling," -but "it _would_ have been my duty to avoid it, _if_ I had been able." -And corresponding to these two meanings of "ought" we should, I think, -probably distinguish two different sorts of moral rules, which though -expressed in the same language, do in fact mean very different things. -The one is a set of rules which assert (whether truly or falsely) -that it always actually _is_ a duty to do or to refrain from certain -actions, and assert therefore that it always is in the power of the -agent's will to do or to refrain from them; whereas the other sort only -assert that so and so _would_ be a duty, if it _were_ within our power, -without at all asserting that it always is within our power. - -We may, perhaps, give a name to the distinction I mean, by calling the -first kind of rules--those which do assert that something actually is -a duty--"rules of duty," and by calling the second kind--those which -recommend or condemn something not in the control of our wills--"ideal -rules": choosing this latter name because they can be said to inculcate -a moral "ideal"--something the attainment of which is not directly -within the power of our wills. As a further example of the difference -between ideal rules and rules of duty we may take the famous passage -from the New Testament (Luke 6, 27) "Love your enemies, do good to -them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that -despitefully use you." Of these four rules, the three last may be -rules of duty, because they refer to things which are plainly, as a -rule, at least, in the power of your will; but the first, if "love" -be understood in its natural sense as referring to your feelings, is -plainly only an "ideal" rule, since such feelings are obviously not -directly under our own control, in the same way in which such actions -as doing good to, blessing or praying for a person are so. To love -certain people, or to feel no anger against them, is a thing which -it is quite impossible to attain directly by will, or perhaps ever -to attain completely at all. Whereas your behaviour towards them is -a matter within your own control: even if you hate a person, or feel -angry with him, you can so control yourself as not to do him harm, and -even to confer benefits upon him. To do good to your enemies may, then, -really be your duty; but it cannot, in the strict sense, be your duty -not to have evil feelings towards them: all that can possibly be true -is that it would be your duty if you were able. Yet I think there can -be no doubt that what Christ meant to condemn was the occurrence of -such feelings altogether; and since, if what he meant to assert about -them in condemning them, would have been certainly false, if he had -meant to say that you _could_ avoid ever feeling them, I think it is -clear that what he meant to assert was _not_ this, or not this only, -but something else, which may quite possibly be true. That is to say, -he was asserting an ideal rule, not merely a rule of duty. - -It will be seen that this distinction which I am making coincides, -roughly at all events, with the distinction which is often expressed -as the distinction between rules which tell you what you ought to -_be_ and rules which tell you merely what you ought to _do_; or as -the distinction between rules which are concerned with your inner -life--with your thoughts and feelings--and those which are concerned -only with your external actions. The rules which are concerned with -what you ought to _be_ or with your inner life are, for the most part -at all events, "ideal" rules; while those which are concerned with what -you ought to do or your external actions are very often, at least, -rules of duty. And it is often said that one great difference between -the New Testament and the Old is its comparatively greater insistence -on "ideal" rules--upon a change of heart--as opposed to mere rules of -duty. And that there is a comparatively greater insistence on ideal -rules I do not wish to deny. But that there are plenty of ideal rules -in the Old Testament too must not be forgotten. I have already given an -example from the Ten Commandments: namely the rule which says you ought -not to covet anything which belongs to your neighbour. And another -is supplied by the Old Testament commandment, "Love thy neighbour as -thyself," if by "love" is here meant a feeling which is not within our -own control, and not merely that the Jew is to _help_ other Jews by his -external actions. Indeed, however great may be the difference between -the Old Testament and the New in respect of comparative insistence on -ideal rules rather than rules of duty, I am inclined to think that -there is at least as great a difference, illustrated by this very rule, -in another, quite different, respect--namely in the kind of rules, -_both ideal and of duty,_ which are insisted on. For whereas by "thy -neighbour" in the Old Testament there is plainly meant only other Jews, -and it is not conceived either that it is the duty of a Jew to help -foreigners in general, or an ideal for him to love them; in the New -Testament, where the same words are used, "my neighbour" plainly is -meant to include all mankind. And this distinction between the view -that beneficent action and benevolent feelings should be confined to -those of our own nation, and the view that both should be extended -equally to all mankind,--a distinction which has nothing to do with -the distinction between being and doing, between inner and outer, but -affects both equally--is, I am inclined to think, at least as important -a difference between New Testament and Old, as the comparatively -greater insistence on "ideal" rules. However, the point upon which I -want at present to insist is the distinction between ideal rules and -rules of duty. Both kinds are commonly included among moral rules, -and, as my examples have shown, are often mentioned together as if no -great difference were seen between them. What I want to insist on is -that there is a great difference between them: that whereas rules of -duty do directly assert of the idea of duty, in the sense in which to -say that something is your duty implies that you _can_ do it, that -certain things are duties, the "ideal" rules do _not_ assert this, but -something different. Yet the "ideal" rules certainly do, in a sense, -assert a "moral obligation." And hence we have to recognise that the -phrase "moral obligation" is not merely a name for one idea only, but -for two very different ideas; and the same will, of course, be true of -the corresponding phrase "morally wrong." - -When, therefore, I say that the idea of "moral obligation" is one of -the fundamental ideas with which Moral Philosophy is concerned, I think -we must admit that this one name really stands for two different ideas. -But it does not matter for my purpose which of the two you take. Each -of them is undoubtedly a moral idea, and whatever answer be given to -the question we are going to raise about the one, will also certainly -apply to the other. - -But it is now time to turn to the other idea, with which I said that -Moral Philosophy has been largely concerned, though it is not, strictly -speaking, a moral idea, at all. - -And I think, perhaps, a good way of bringing out what this idea is, -is to refer to the Ethics of Aristotle. Everybody would admit that -the fundamental idea, with which Aristotle's Ethics is concerned, is -an idea which it is the business of Moral Philosophy to discuss; and -yet I think it is quite plain that this idea is not a moral idea at -all. Aristotle does not set out from' the idea of moral obligation -or duty (indeed throughout his treatise he only mentions this idea -quite incidentally); nor even from the idea of moral goodness or moral -excellence, though he has a good deal more to say about that; but -from the idea of what he calls "the human good," or "good for man." -He starts by raising the question what the good for man _is,_ and his -whole book is arranged in the form of giving a detailed answer to that -question. And I think we can gather pretty well what the idea is, which -he calls by this name, by considering what he says about it. There -are two points, in particular, which he insists upon from the outset: -first, that nothing can be good, in the sense he means, unless it is -something which is worth having for its own sake, and not merely for -the sake of something else; it must be good _in itself_; it must not, -like wealth (to use one example which he gives) be worth having merely -for the sake of what you can do with it; it must be a thing which is -worth having even if nothing further comes of it. And secondly (what -partly covers the former, but also, I think, says something more) it -must, he says, be something that is "self-sufficient": something which, -even if you had nothing else would make your life worth having. And -further light is thrown upon his meaning when he comes to tell you -what he thinks the good for man is: the good, he says, is "mental, -activity--where such activity is of an excellent kind, or, if there -are several different kinds of excellent mental activity, that which -has the best and most perfect kind of excellence; and also" (he -significantly adds) "mental activity which lasts through a sufficiently -long life." The word which I have here translated "excellence" is what -is commonly translated "virtue"; but it does not mean quite the same -as we mean by "virtue," and that in a very important respect. "Virtue" -has come to mean exclusively _moral_ excellence; and if that were all -Aristotle meant, you might think that what he means by "good" came -very near being a moral idea. But it turns out that he includes among -"excellences," intellectual excellence, and even that he thinks that -the best and most perfect excellence of which he speaks is a particular -kind of intellectual excellence, which no one would think of calling a -moral quality, namely, the sort of excellence which makes a man a good -philosopher. And as for the word which I have translated "activity," -the meaning of this can be best brought out by mentioning the reason -which Aristotle himself gives for saying that mere excellence itself is -not (as some of the Greeks had said) the good for man. He says, truly -enough, that a man may possess the greatest excellence--he may be a -very excellent man--even when he is asleep, or is doing nothing; and -he points out that the possession of excellence when you are asleep -is not a thing that is desirable _for its own sake_--obviously only -for the sake of the effects it may produce when you wake up. It is not -therefore, he thinks, mere mental excellence, but the _active exercise_ -of mental excellence--the state of a man's mind, when he not only -possesses excellent faculties, moral or intellectual, but is actively -engaged in using them, which really constitutes the human good. - -Now, when Aristotle talks of "the good for man," there is, I think, as -my quotation is sufficient to show, a certain confusion in his mind -between what is _good_ for man and what is _best_ for man. What he -really holds is that _any_ mental activity which exhibits excellence -and is pleasurable is _a_ good; and when he adds that, if there are -many excellences, _the_ good must be mental activity which exhibits -the _best_ of them, and that it must last through a sufficiently long -life, he only means that this is necessary if a man is to get the -_best_ he can get, not that this is the _only_ good he can get. And -the idea which I wish to insist on is not, therefore, the idea of -"_the_ human good," but the more fundamental idea of "good "; the idea, -with regard to which he holds that the working of our minds in some -excellent fashion is the only good thing that any of us can possess; -and the idea of which "better" is the comparative, when he says that -mental activity which exhibits some sorts of excellence is _better_ -than mental activity which exhibits others, though both are good, and -that excellent mental activity continued over a longer time is _better_ -than the same continued for a shorter. This idea of what is "good," in -the sense in which Aristotle uses it in these cases, is an idea which -we all of us constantly use, and which is certainly an idea which it -is the business of Moral Philosophy to discuss, though it is not a -moral idea. The main difficulty with regard to it is to distinguish it -clearly from other senses in which we use the same word. For, when we -say that a thing is "good," or one thing "better" than another, we by -no means always mean that it is better in this sense. Often, when we -call a thing good we are not attributing to it any characteristic which -it would possess _if it existed quite alone,_ and if nothing further -were to come of it; but are merely saying of it that it is a sort of -thing from which other good things do in fact come, or which is such -that, when accompanied by other things, the whole thus formed is "good" -in Aristotle's sense, although, by itself, it is not. Thus a man may -be "good," and his character may be "good," and yet neither are "good" -in this fundamental sense, in which goodness is a characteristic which -a thing would possess, if it existed quite alone. For, as Aristotle -says, a good man may exist, and may have a good character, even when -he is fast asleep; and yet if there were nothing in the Universe but -good men, with good characters, all fast asleep, there would be nothing -in it which was "good" in the fundamental sense with which we are -concerned. Thus "moral goodness," in the sense of good character, as -distinguished from the actual working of a good character in various -forms of mental activity, is certainly not "good" in the sense in which -good means "good for its own sake." And even with regard to the actual -exercise of certain forms of moral excellence, it seems to me that in -estimating the value of such exercise relatively to other things, we -are apt to take into account, not merely its intrinsic value--the sort -of value which it would possess, if it existed quite alone--but also -its effects: we rate it higher than we should do if we were considering -only its intrinsic value, because we take into account the other good -things which we know are apt to flow from it. Certain things which -have intrinsic value are distinguished from others, by the fact that -more good consequences are apt to flow from them; and where this is -the case, we are apt, I think, quite unjustly, to think that their -intrinsic value must be higher too. One thing, I think, is clear about -intrinsic value--goodness in Aristotle's sense--namely that it is only -actual occurrences, actual states of things over a certain period of -time--not such things as men, or characters, or material things, that -can have any intrinsic value at all. But even this is not sufficient to -distinguish intrinsic value clearly from other sorts of goodness: since -even in the case of actual occurrences, we often call them good or bad -for the sake of their effects or their promise of effects. Thus we -all hope that the state of things in England, as a whole, will really -be better some day than it has been in the past--that there will be -progress and improvement: we hope, for instance, that, if we consider -the whole of the lives lived in England during some year in the next -century, it may turn out that the state of things, as a whole, during -that year will be really better than it ever has been in any past year. -And when we use "better" in this way--in the sense in which progress -or improvement means a change to a _better_ state of things--we are -certainly thinking partly of a state of things which has a greater -intrinsic value. And we certainly do not mean by improvement merely -_moral_ improvement. An improvement in moral conditions, other things -being equal, may no doubt be a gain in intrinsic value; but we should -certainly hold that, moral conditions being equal, there is yet room -for improvement in other ways--in the diminution of misery and purely -physical evils, for example. But in considering the degree of a real -change for the better in intrinsic value, there is certainly danger of -confusion between the degree in which the actual lives lived are really -intrinsically better, and the degree in which there is improvement -merely in the _means_ for living a good life. If we want to estimate -rightly what would constitute an intrinsic improvement in the state -of things in our imagined year next century, and whether it would on -the whole be really "good" at all, we have to consider what value it -would have if it were to be the last year of life upon this planet; -if the world were going to come to an end, as soon as it was over; -and therefore to discount entirely all the promises it might contain -of future goods. This criterion for distinguishing whether the kind -of goodness which we are attributing to anything is really intrinsic -value or not, the criterion which consists in considering whether it -is a characteristic which the thing would possess, if it were to have -absolutely no further consequences or accompaniments, seems to me to -be one which it is very necessary to apply if we wish to distinguish -clearly between different meanings of the word "good." And it is only -the idea of what is good, where by "good" is meant a characteristic -which has this mark, that I want now to consider. - -The two ideas, then, with regard to which I want to raise a question, -are first the moral idea of "moral obligation" or "duty," and secondly -the non-moral idea of "good" in this special sense. - -And the question with regard to them, which I want to raise, is this. -With regard to both ideas many philosophers have thought and still -think--not only _think_, but seem to be absolutely convinced, that when -we apply them to anything--when we assert of any action that it ought -not to have been done, or of any state of things that it was or would -be good or better than another, then it _must_ be the case that _all_ -that we are asserting of the thing or things in question is simply -and solely that some person or set of persons actually does have, or -has a tendency to have a certain sort of feeling towards the thing or -things in question: that there is absolutely no more in it than this. -While others seem to be convinced, no less strongly, that there _is_ -more in it than this: that when we judge that an action is a duty or -is really wrong, we are _not_ merely making a judgment to the effect -that some person or set of persons, have, or tend to have a certain -sort of feeling, when they witness or think of such actions, and that -similarly when we judge that a certain state of things was or would be -better than another, we are _not_ merely making a judgment about the -feelings which some person or set of persons would have, in witnessing -or thinking of the two states of things, or in comparing them together. -The question at issue between these two views is often expressed in -other less clear forms. It is often expressed as the question whether -the ideas of duty and of good or value, are or are not, "objective" -ideas: as the problem as to the "objectivity" of duty and intrinsic -value. The first set of philosophers would maintain that the notion of -the "objectivity" of duty and of value is a mere chimera; while the -second would maintain that these ideas really are "objective." And -others express it as the question whether the ideas of duty and of good -are "absolute" or purely "relative": whether there is any such thing -as an absolute duty or an absolute good, or whether good and duty are -purely relative to human feelings and desires. But both these ways -of expressing it are, I think, apt to lead to confusion. And another -even less clear way in which it is put is by asking the question: Is -the assertion that such and such a thing is a duty, or has intrinsic -value, ever _a dictate of reason?_ But so far as I can gather, the -question really at issue, and expressed in these obscure ways, is the -one which I have tried to state. It is the question whether when we -judge (whether truly or falsely) that an action is a duty or a state -of things good, _all_ that we are thinking about the action or the -state of things in question, is simply and solely that we ourselves -or others have or tend to have a certain feeling towards it when we -contemplate or think of it. And the question seems to me to be of great -interest, because, if this is all, then it is evident that all the -ideas with which Moral Philosophy is concerned are merely psychological -ideas; and all moral rules, and statements as to what is intrinsically -valuable, merely true or false psychological statements; so that -the whole of Moral Philosophy and Ethics will be merely departments -of Psychology. Whereas, if the contrary is the case, then these two -ideas of moral obligation and intrinsic value, will be no more purely -psychological ideas than are the ideas of shape or size or number; and -Moral Philosophy will be concerned with characteristics of actions -and feelings and states of affairs, which these actions and feelings -and states of affairs would or might have possessed, even if human -psychology had been quite different from what it is. - -Which, then, of these two views is the true one? Are these two ideas -merely psychological ideas in the sense which I have tried to explain, -or are they not? - -As I have said, I feel some doubts myself whether they are or not: it -does not seem to me to be a matter to dogmatize upon. But I am strongly -inclined to think that they are not merely psychological; that Moral -Philosophy and Ethics are not mere departments of Psychology. In favour -of the view that the two ideas in question are merely psychological, -there is, so far as I am aware, nothing whatever to be said, except -that so many philosophers have been absolutely convinced that they are. -None of them seem to me to have succeeded in bringing forward a single -argument in favour of their view. And against the view that they are, -there seem to me to be some quite definite arguments, though I am not -satisfied that any of these arguments are absolutely conclusive. I will -try to state briefly and clearly what seem to me the main arguments -against the view that these are merely psychological ideas; although, -in doing so, I am faced with a certain difficulty. For though, as I -have said, many philosophers are absolutely convinced, that "duty" -and "good" do merely stand for psychological ideas, they are by no -means agreed _what_ the psychological ideas are for which they stand. -Different philosophers have hit on very different ideas as being the -ideas for which they stand; and this very fact that, if they _are_ -psychological ideas at all, it is so difficult to agree as to _what_ -ideas they are, seems to me in itself to be an argument against the -view that they are so. - -Let me take each of the two ideas separately, and try to exhibit the -sort of objection there seems to be to the view that it is merely a -psychological idea. - -Take first the idea of moral obligation. What purely psychological -assertion can I be making about an action, when I assert that it was -"wrong," that it ought not to have been done? - -In this case, one view, which is in some ways the most plausible that -can be taken, is that in every case I am merely making an assertion -about my own psychology. But what assertion about my own psychology can -I be making? Let us take as an example, the view of Prof. Westermarck, -which is as plausible a view of this type as any that I know of. He -holds that what I am judging when I judge an action to be wrong, is -merely that it is of a sort which _tends_ to excite in me a peculiar -kind of feeling--the feeling of moral indignation or disapproval. He -does not say that what I am judging is that the action in question _is -actually_ exciting this feeling in me. For it is obviously not true -that, when I judge an action to be much more wrong than another, I am -always actually feeling much indignation at the thought of either, or -much more indignation at the thought of the one than at that of the -other; and it is inconceivable that I should constantly be making so -great a mistake as to my own psychology, as to think that I am actually -feeling great indignation when I am not. But he thinks it is plausible -to say that I am making a judgment as to the _tendency_ of such actions -to excite indignation in me; that, for instance, when I judge that one -is much more wrong than the other, I am merely asserting the fact, -taught me by my past experience, that, if I were to witness the two -actions, under similar circumstances, I should feel a much more intense -indignation at the one than at the other.[1] - -But there is one very serious objection to such a view, which I think -that those who take it are apt not fully to realise. If this view be -true, then when I judge an action to be wrong, I am merely making a -judgment about my own feelings towards it; and when you judge it to -be wrong, you are merely making a judgment about yours. And hence the -word "wrong" in my mouth, means something entirely different from -what it does in yours; just as the word "I" in my mouth stands for an -entirely different person from what it does in yours--in mine it stands -for me, in yours it stands for you. That is to say when I judge of a -given action that it was wrong, and you perhaps of the very same action -that it was not, we are not in fact differing in opinion about it at -all; any more than we are differing in opinion if I make the judgment -"I came from Cambridge to-day" and you make the judgment "_I_ did not -come from Cambridge to-day." When _I_ say "That was wrong" I am merely -saying "That sort of action excites indignation in me, when I see it"; -and when you say "No; it was not wrong" you are merely saying "It -does not excite indignation in _me,_ when _I_ see it." And obviously -both judgments may perfectly well be true together; just as my judgment -that I did come from Cambridge to-day and yours that you did not, may -perfectly well be true together. In other words, and this is what I -want to insist on, if this view be true, then there is absolutely -no such thing as a difference of opinion upon moral questions. If -two persons think they differ in opinion on a moral question (and it -certainly seems as if they sometimes _think_ so), they are always, -on this view, making a mistake, and a mistake so gross that it seems -hardly possible that they should make it: a mistake as gross as that -which would be involved in thinking that when you say "I did not come -from Cambridge to-day" you are denying what I say when I say "I did." -And this seems to me to be a very serious objection to the view. -Don't people, in fact, sometimes really differ in opinion on a moral -question? Certainly all appearances are in favour of the view that they -do: and yet, if they do, that can only be if when I think a thing to -be wrong, and you think it not to be wrong, I mean by "wrong" the very -_same_ characteristic which you mean, and am thinking that the action -possesses this characteristic while you are thinking it does not. It -must be the very _same_ characteristic which we both mean; it cannot -be, as this view says it is, merely that I am thinking that it has to -my feelings the very same relation, which you are thinking that it -has not got to yours; since, if this were all, then there would be no -difference of opinion between us. - -And this view that when we talk of wrong or duty, we are not -merely, each of us, making a statement about the relation of the -thing in question to our own feelings, may be reinforced by another -consideration. It is commonly believed that some moral rules exhibit a -_higher_ morality than others: that, for instance a person who believes -that it is our duty to do good to our enemies, has a higher moral -belief, than one who believes that he has no such duty, but only a duty -to do good to his friends or fellow-countrymen. And Westermarck himself -believes that, some moral beliefs, "mark a stage of higher refinement -in the evolution of the moral consciousness."[2] But what, on his view -can be meant by saying that one moral belief is higher than another? If -A believes that it is his duty to do good to his enemies and B believes -that it is not, in what sense can A's belief be higher than B's? Not, -on this view, in the sense that what A believes is true, and what B -believes is not; for what A is believing is merely that the idea of not -doing good to your enemies tends to excite in him a feeling of moral -indignation, and what B believes is merely that it does not tend to -excite this feeling in _him_: and both beliefs may perfectly well be -true; it may really be true that the same actions do excite the feeling -in A, and that they don't in B. What then, could Westermarck mean by -saying that A's morality is higher than B's? So far as I can see, what, -on his own views, he would have to mean is merely that he himself, -Westermarck, shares A's morality and does not share B's: that it is -true of him, as of A, that neglecting to do good to enemies excites -his feelings of moral indignation and not true of him as it is of B, -that it does _not_ excite such feelings in him. In short he would have -to say that what he means by calling A's morality the higher is merely -"A's morality is _my_ morality, and B's is not." But it seems to me -quite clear that when we say one morality is higher than another, we do -not merely mean that it is our own. We are not merely asserting that it -has a certain relation to our own feelings, but are asserting, if I may -say so, that the person who has it has a better moral taste than the -person who has not. And whether or not this means merely, as I think, -that what the one believes is true, and what the other believes is -false, it is at all events inconsistent with the view that in all cases -we are merely making a statement about our own feelings. - -For these reasons it seems to me extremely difficult to believe that -when we judge things to be wrong, each of us is merely making a -judgment about _his own_ psychology. But if not about our own, then -about whose? I have already said that the view that, if the judgment -is merely a psychological one at all, it is a judgment about our -own psychology, is in some ways more plausible than any other view. -And I think we can now see that any other view is _not_ plausible. -The alternatives are that I should be making a judgment about the -psychology of all mankind, or about that of some particular section -of it. And that the first alternative is not true, is, I think, -evident from the fact that, when I judge an action to be wrong, I -may emphatically _not_ believe that it is true of all mankind that -they would regard it with feelings of moral disapproval. I may know -perfectly well that some would not. Most philosophers, therefore, have -not ventured to say that this is the judgment I am making; they say, -for instance, that I am making a judgment about the feelings of the -particular society to which I belong--about, for instance, the feelings -of an impartial spectator in that society. But, if this view be taken, -it is open to the same objections as the view that I am merely making a -judgment about my own feelings. If we could say that every man, when he -judges a thing to be wrong, was making a statement about the feelings -of all mankind, then when A says "This is wrong" and B says "No, it -isn't," they would really be differing in opinion, since A would be -saying that all mankind feel in a certain way towards the action, and -B would be saying that they don't. But if A is referring merely to his -society and B to his, and their societies are different, then obviously -they are not differing in opinion at all: it may perfectly well be true -both that an impartial spectator in A's society does have a certain -sort of feeling towards actions of the sort in question, and that an -impartial spectator in B's does not. This view, therefore, implies that -it is impossible for two men belonging to different societies ever to -differ in opinion on a moral question. And this is a view which I find -it almost as hard to accept as the view that _no_ two men ever differ -in opinion on one. - -For these reasons I think there are serious objections to the view -that the idea of moral obligation is merely a psychological idea. - -But now let us briefly consider the idea of "good," in Aristotle's -sense, or intrinsic value. - -As regards this idea, there is again a difference of opinion among -those who hold that it is a psychological idea, as to _what_ idea it -is. The majority seem to hold that it is to be defined, somehow, in -terms of desire; while others have held that what we are judging when -we judge that one state of things is or would be intrinsically better -than another, is rather that the belief that the one was going to be -realized would, under certain circumstances, give more pleasure to some -man or set of men, than the belief that the other was. But the same -objections seem to me to apply whichever of these two views be taken. - -Let us take desire. About whose desires am I making a judgment, when I -judge that one state of things would be better than another? - -Here again, it may be said, first of all, that I am merely making a -judgment about my own. But in this case the view that my judgment is -merely about my own psychology is, I think, exposed to an obvious -objection to which Westermarck's view that my judgments of moral -obligation are about my own psychology was not exposed. The obvious -objection is that it is evidently not true that I do in fact always -desire more, what I judge to be better: I may judge one state of things -to be better than another, even when I know perfectly well not only -that I don't desire it more, but that I have no tendency to do so. It -is a notorious fact that men's strongest desires are, as a rule, for -things in which they themselves have some personal concern; and yet -the fact that this is so, and that they know it to be so, does not -prevent them from judging that changes, which would not affect them -personally, would constitute a very much greater improvement in the -world's condition, than changes which would. For this reason alone the -view that when I judge one state of things to be better than another I -am merely making a judgment about my own psychology, must, I think, be -given up: it is incredible that we should all be making such mistakes -about our feelings, as, on this view, we should constantly be doing. -And there is, of course, besides, the same objection, as applied in -the case of moral obligation: namely that, if this view were true, no -two men could ever differ in opinion as to which of two states was the -better, whereas it appears that they certainly sometimes do differ in -opinion on such an issue. - -My judgment, then, is not merely a judgment about my own psychology: -but, if so, about whose psychology is it a judgment? It cannot be a -judgment that all men desire the one state more than the other; because -that would include the judgment that I myself do so, which, as we have -seen, I often know to be false, even while I judge that the one state -really is better. And it cannot, I think, be a judgment merely about -the feelings or desires of an impartial spectator in my own society; -since that would involve the paradox that men belonging to different -societies could never differ in opinion as to what was better. But we -have here to consider an alternative, which did not arise in the case -of moral obligation. It is a notorious fact that the satisfaction of -some of our desires is incompatible with the satisfaction of others, -and the satisfaction of those of some men with the satisfaction of -those of others. And this fact has suggested to some philosophers that -what we mean by saying that one state of things would be better than -another, is merely that it is a state in which more of the desires, of -those who were in it, would be satisfied at once, than would be the -case with the other. But to this view the fundamental objection seems -to me to be that whether the one state was better than the other would -depend not merely upon the number of desires that were simultaneously -satisfied in it, but upon what the desires were desires for. I can -imagine a state of things in which all desires were satisfied, and yet -can judge of it that it would not be so good as another in which some -were left unsatisfied. And for this reason I cannot assent to the view -that my judgment, that one state of things is better than another is -merely a judgment about the psychology of the people concerned in it. - -This is why I find it hard to believe that either the idea of moral -obligation or the idea of intrinsic value is merely a psychological -idea. It seems to me that Moral Philosophy cannot be merely a -department of Psychology. But no doubt there may be arguments on the -other side to which I have not done justice. - - -[1] E Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas_, Vol. I, -pp. 4, 13, 17-18, 100-101. On p. 105, however, Westermarck suggests a -view inconsistent with this one; namely that, when I judge an action to -be wrong, I am not _merely_ asserting that it has a tendency to excite -moral indignation in me, but am also asserting that other people _would -be_ convinced that it has a tendency to excite moral indignation in -them, if they "knew the act and all its attendant circumstances as well -as [I do], and if, at the same time their emotions were as refined as -[mine]." - -[2] Ibid. p. 89. - - -THE END - - - - - INDEX - - - Abstractions, "illegitimate" - Agnosticism - "Analytic" truths - Apprehension, direct - Aristotle's Ethics - Attention - Awareness - - "Being" and "Reality" - Berkeley - Bradley - Causal connection - necessity - Consciousness - "Content" - - Deduction - Difference, - numerical and qualitative - intrinsic - Direct apprehension - observation - perception - Duty and Wrong - "objectivity" of - - Entails - and "implies" - _Esse_ and _percipi,_ - Existence - and "reality" - of physical objects - "Experience," ambiguity of - External objects and facts - relations - - Fact, matters of - "Follows" - - "Given," ambiguity of - "Good," ambiguity of - objectivity of - "for man" - - Hegel - Hume - - "I." - Idealism - Ideas - Identity of Indiscernibles - "Implication," - Indiscernibles, Identity of - Induction, - conditions necessary for - Internal relations, - dogma of - two senses of - Intrinsic difference - nature - predicates - value - - James, William - Joachim, H. H. - - Kant - Knowledge - and belief - by description - - Leibniz - - "Manifestation of" - Material objects or things - Mill. J. S. - Minds, "in our" - "Modify" - Moral rules, two kinds of - - Necessary truths - Necessity, three senses of - logical - unconditional - - "Objectivity," ambiguity of - of kinds of value - - Objects, - external - material - physical, and sensibles - - Observation - Organic unities - "Ought," two meanings of - objectivity of - and "wrong" - - Part, physical - and whole - - "Perception," ambiguity of - direct - _Percipi_ and _esse_ - Physical objects and sensibles - Pickwickian senses - "Possible," three senses of - Pragmatist theory of truth - "Presented," ambiguity of - - Reality - Reason, "dictates of" - Reasons - Reid, T. - Relational properties - Relations, - dogma of internal - external - internal - Right, objectivity of - Russell, B. - - "See," ambiguity of - "Seems" - Sensations - proper - Sense-data - Sensibles - Solipsism - Spiritual - Strachey, O. - "Subjective" - "Synthetic" truths - - Taylor, A. E., 8 - "Time" - Truth, - and mutability - pragmatist theory of - and utility - and verification - of words - Truths, "analytic" and "synthetic" - "man-made" - necessary - - Value, intrinsic - objectivity of - - Westermarck, E. - "Wrong," objectivity of - and "ought" - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's Philosophical Studies, by George Edward Moore - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES *** - -***** This file should be named 50141-0.txt or 50141-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/1/4/50141/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Hathi Trust.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Philosophical Studies - -Author: George Edward Moore - -Release Date: October 6, 2015 [EBook #50141] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Hathi Trust.) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="" /> -</div> - -<h1>PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES</h1> - -<h3>By</h3> - -<h2>G. E. MOORE, Litt.D.</h2> - -<h4><i>Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews), F.B.A.</i></h4> - -<h4><i>Lecturer in Moral Science in the University of Cambridge<br /> -Author of "Principia Ethica"</i></h4> - -<h5>LONDON</h5> - -<h5>ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD</h5> - -<h5>BROADWAY HOUSE: 68-74 CARTER LANE, E.C.4</h5> - -<h5>1922</h5> - -<hr class="full" /> - - -<p class="caption" style="margin-left: 15%; font-size: 0.8em;">CONTENTS</p> - -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="" style="font-size: 0.8em;"> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">I.</td><td align="left">THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM</td> <td align="right"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">II.</td><td align="left">THE NATURE AND REALITY OF OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION </td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_31">31</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">III.</td><td align="left">WILLIAM JAMES' "PRAGMATISM"</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_97">97</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">IV.</td><td align="left">HUME'S PHILOSOPHY</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_147">147</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">V.</td><td align="left">THE STATUS OF SENSE-DATA</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_168">168</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">VI.</td><td align="left">THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_197">197</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">VII.</td><td align="left">SOME JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_220">220</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">VIII.</td><td align="left">THE CONCEPTION OF INTRINSIC VALUE</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_253">253</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">IX.</td><td align="left">EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_276">276</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">X.</td><td align="left">THE NATURE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_310">310</a></td></tr> -</table> -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><i>Those of the papers in this volume, which have been previously -published, originally appeared as follows</i>:—</p> - -<p>I. "The Refutation of Idealism" in <i>Mind,</i> N.S. Vol. xii, 1903.</p> - -<p>II. "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception" in <i>Proceedings -of the Aristotelian Society,</i> 1905-6.</p> - -<p>III. "Professor James' 'Pragmatism'" in <i>Proceedings of the -Aristotelian Society,</i> 1907-8.</p> - -<p>IV. "Hume's Philosophy" in <i>The New Quarterly,</i> November, 1909.</p> - -<p>V. "The Status of Sense-Data" in <i>Proceedings of the Aristotelian -Society,</i> 1913-14.</p> - -<p>VI. "The Conception of Reality" in <i>Proceedings of the Aristotelian -Society,</i> 1917-18.</p> - -<p>VII. "Some Judgments of Perception" in <i>Proceedings of the Aristotelian -Society,</i> 1918-19.</p> - -<p>IX. "External and Internal Relations" in <i>Proceedings of the -Aristotelian Society,</i> 1919-20.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> - - -<h4>PREFACE</h4> - - -<p>All the papers contained in this volume, except the two ethical ones -(VIII and X), have been previously published; and of those which have -been previously published all, except that on "External and Internal -Relations" (IX), are here re-printed without change. They were written -at various dates between 1903 and 1921, and all are here printed in the -order in which they were written, except that VIII on "The Conception -of Intrinsic Value," which was written earlier than VI and VII, has -been moved out of its proper place in order to bring it nearer to IX -and X, to both of which it is closely related in subject.</p> - -<p>All, except IV and X, were primarily intended for an audience -familiar with the writings of philosophers; but I hope that they may -nevertheless prove intelligible even to those who have read little or -no philosophy, since I make little use of technical terms, and, where I -have done so, have done my best to explain in ordinary language exactly -what I mean by them. The tone of X is somewhat different from that -of the rest, because it was written as a lecture for the <i>Leicester -Philosophical Society</i>, with regard to which I was informed that I must -not assume any previous acquaintance with philosophy in most of the -audience. It accordingly bears marks throughout of the kind of audience -for which it was intended.</p> - -<p>An attentive reader will easily discover that some of the views -expressed in some of the papers are inconsistent with views expressed -in others. The fact is that some of the views expressed in some of the -earlier ones are views with which I no longer agree; and I feel that -some apology is needed for nevertheless republishing them exactly as -they stood. In all cases, except one, my excuse is that the mistaken -views in question are so embedded in the form and substance of the -papers in which they occur, that it would have been impossible to -correct them without practically substituting new papers for the old -ones; and that, in spite of these mistakes, the old papers, as they -stand, still seem to me, on the whole, to say things which are worth -saying in a form which, however defective it may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span> be, I doubt my -own ability to improve upon. The only case in which I doubt whether -this excuse applies is that of the first paper—"The Refutation of -Idealism." This paper now appears to me to be very confused, as well -as to embody a good many down-right mistakes; so I am doubtful whether -I ought to have included it. But in this case I have another excuse: -namely that it is a paper to which a good many allusions have been made -by contemporary writers on philosophy; and I was told that, for some -readers at all events, it would be a convenience that it should be -re-printed along with the rest, if only for the sake of reference.</p> - -<p>I said above that the only one of the previously published papers, -in which changes have been made, is IX on "External and Internal -Relations." In this case the changes are not due to any change in my -views, but to the fact that, in that part of the paper in which symbols -are used, I tried, when it was first published in the <i>Proceedings of -the Aristotelian Society,</i> to use the symbols adopted by Whitehead and -Russell in <i>Principia Mathematica,</i> and used them also without giving -an explanation of their meaning which would be sufficient for readers -not acquainted with that work. The symbols in question are symbols -which it is difficult for printers to reproduce; and I have, therefore, -thought it better, on this occasion, to use another set of symbols, -which seem to me to be adequate for the limited purpose I had in view. -I have tried to give an explanation of their meaning, which will -enable anyone to understand them; and I have taken the opportunity of -rewriting some of the parts of the paper in which they occur in a way -which will, I hope, make some points clearer than they originally were.</p> - -<p>I have to thank the Committee of the Aristotelian Society for -permission to reprint the large number of papers (viz., II, III, V, -VI, VII and IX), which originally appeared in the <i>Proceedings</i> of -that Society; and the Editor of the <i>New Quarterly</i> for permission to -reprint the article on Hume's Philosophy (IV), which appeared in that -Journal in November, 1909.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 70%; font-size: 0.8em;">G. E. MOORE.</p> - -<p><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">CAMBRIDGE</span>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 10%;"><i>January</i>, 1922.</span></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> - - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h3>Philosophical Studies</h3> - - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<h4><a name="THE_REFUTATION_OF_IDEALISM" id="THE_REFUTATION_OF_IDEALISM">THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM</a></h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>Modern Idealism, if it asserts any general conclusion about the -universe at all, asserts that it is <i>spiritual.</i> There are two points -about this assertion to which I wish to call attention. These points -are that, whatever be its exact meaning, it is certainly meant to -assert (1) that the universe is very different indeed from what it -seems, and (2) that it has quite a large number of properties which it -does not seem to have. Chairs and tables and mountains <i>seem</i> to be -very different from us; but, when the whole universe is declared to -be spiritual, it is certainly meant to assert that they are far more -like us than we think. The idealist means to assert that they are <i>in -some sense</i> neither lifeless nor unconscious, as they certainly seem -to be; and I do not think his language is so grossly deceptive, but -that we may assume him to believe that they really are very different -indeed from what they seem. And secondly when he declares that they -are <i>spiritual,</i> he means to include in that term quite a large number -of different properties. When the whole universe is declared to be -spiritual, it is meant not only that it is in some sense <i>conscious,</i> -but that it has what we recognise in ourselves as the <i>higher</i> forms of -consciousness. That it is intelligent; that it is purposeful; that it -is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> mechanical; all these different things are commonly asserted -of it. In general, it may be said, this phrase 'reality is spiritual' -excites and expresses the belief that the <i>whole</i> universe possesses -<i>all the qualities</i> the possession of which is held to make us so -superior to things which seem to be inanimate: at least, if it does not -possess exactly those which we possess, it possesses not one only, but -several others, which, by the same ethical standard, would be judged -equal to or better than our own. When we say it is <i>spiritual</i> we mean -to say that it has quite a number of excellent qualities, different -from any which we commonly attribute either to stars or planets or to -cups and saucers.</p> - -<p>Now why I mention these two points is that when engaged in the -intricacies of philosophic discussion, we are apt to overlook the -vastness of the difference between this idealistic view and the -ordinary view of the world, and to overlook the number of <i>different</i> -propositions which the idealist must prove. It is, I think, owing to -the vastness of this difference and owing to the number of different -excellences which Idealists attribute to the universe, that it seems -such an interesting and important question whether Idealism be true or -not. But, when we begin to argue about it, I think we are apt to forget -what a vast number of arguments this interesting question must involve: -we are apt to assume, that if one or two points be made on either side, -the whole case is won. I say this lest it should be thought that any of -the arguments which will be advanced in this paper would be sufficient -to disprove, or any refutation of them sufficient to prove, the truly -interesting and important proposition that reality is spiritual. For my -own part I wish it to be clearly understood that I do not suppose that -anything I shall say has the smallest tendency to prove that reality -is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> spiritual: I do not believe it possible to refute a single one -of the many important propositions contained in the assertion that it -is so. Reality may be spiritual, for all I know; and I devoutly hope -it is. But I take 'Idealism' to be a wide term and to include not -only this interesting conclusion but a number of arguments which are -supposed to be, if not sufficient, at least <i>necessary,</i> to prove it. -Indeed I take it that modern Idealists are chiefly distinguished by -certain arguments which they have in common. That reality is spiritual -has, I believe, been the tenet of many theologians; and yet, for -believing that alone, they should hardly be called Idealists. There -are besides, I believe, many persons, not improperly called Idealists, -who hold certain characteristic propositions, without venturing to -think them quite sufficient to prove so grand a conclusion. It is, -therefore, only with Idealistic <i>arguments</i> that I am concerned; and -if any Idealist holds that <i>no</i> argument is necessary to prove that -reality is spiritual, I shall certainly not have refuted him. I shall, -however, attack at least one argument, which, to the best of my belief, -is considered necessary to their position by <i>all</i> Idealists. And -I wish to point out a certain advantage which this procedure gives -me—an advantage which justifies the assertion that, if my arguments -are sound, they will have refuted Idealism. If I can refute a single -proposition which is a necessary and essential step in all Idealistic -arguments, then, no matter how good the rest of these arguments may be, -I shall have proved that Idealists have <i>no reason whatever</i> for their -conclusion.</p> - -<p>Suppose we have a chain of argument which takes the form: Since A is -B, and B is C, and C is D, it follows A is D. In such an argument, -though 'B is C' and 'C is D' may both be perfectly true,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> yet if 'A -is B' be false, we have no more reason for asserting A is D than if -all three were false. It does not, indeed, follow that A is D is -false; nor does it follow that no other arguments would prove it to -be true. But it does follow that, so far as this argument goes, it is -the barest supposition, without the least bit of evidence. I propose -to attack a proposition which seems to me to stand in this relation -to the conclusion 'Reality is spiritual.' I do not propose to dispute -that 'Reality is spiritual;' I do not deny that there may be reasons -for thinking that it is: but I do propose to show that one reason upon -which, to the best of my judgment, all other arguments ever used by -Idealists depend is <i>false.</i> These other arguments may, for all I shall -say, be eminently ingenious and true; they are very many and various, -and different Idealists use the most different arguments to prove the -same most important conclusions. Some of these <i>may</i> be sufficient to -prove that B is C and C is D; but if, as I shall try to show, their 'A -is B' is false the conclusion A is D remains a pleasant supposition. -I do not deny that to suggest pleasant and plausible suppositions may -be the proper function of philosophy: but I am assuming that the name -Idealism can only be properly applied where there is a certain amount -of argument, intended to be cogent.</p> - -<p>The subject of this paper is, therefore, quite uninteresting. Even -if I prove my point, I shall have proved nothing about the Universe -in general. Upon the important question whether Reality is or is not -spiritual my argument will not have the remotest bearing. I shall only -attempt to arrive at the truth about a matter, which is in itself quite -trivial and insignificant, and from which, so far as I can see and -certainly so far as I shall say, no conclusions can be drawn about any -of the subjects<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> about which we most want to know. The only importance -I can claim for the subject I shall investigate is that it seems to me -to be a matter upon which not Idealists only, but all philosophers and -psychologists also, have been in error, and from their erroneous view -of which they have inferred (validly or invalidly) their most striking -and interesting conclusions. And that it has even this importance I -cannot hope to prove. If it has this importance, it will indeed follow -that all the most striking results of philosophy—Sensationalism. -Agnosticism and Idealism alike—have, for all that has hitherto been -urged in their favour, no more foundation than the supposition that -a chimera lives in the moon. It will follow that, unless new reasons -never urged hitherto can be found, all the most important philosophic -doctrines have as little claim to assent as the most superstitious -beliefs of the lowest savages. Upon the question what we have <i>reason</i> -to believe in the most interesting matters, I do therefore think that -my results will have an important bearing; but I cannot too clearly -insist that upon the question whether these beliefs are true they will -have none whatever.</p> - -<p>The trivial proposition which I propose to dispute is this: that <i>esse</i> -is <i>percipi.</i> This is a very ambiguous proposition, but, in some sense -or other, it has been very widely held. That it is, in some sense, -essential to Idealism, I must for the present merely assume. What I -propose to show is that, in all the senses ever given to it, it is -false.</p> - -<p>But, first of all, it may be useful to point out briefly in what -relation I conceive it to stand to Idealistic arguments. That wherever -you can truly predicate <i>esse</i> you can truly predicate <i>percipi</i>, in -some sense or other, is, I take it, a necessary step In all arguments, -properly to be called Idealistic, and, what is more, in all arguments -hitherto offered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> for the Idealistic conclusion. If <i>esse</i> is -<i>percipi,</i> this is at once equivalent to saying that whatever is, is -experienced; and this, again, is equivalent, in a sense, to saying that -whatever is, is something mental. But this is not the sense in which -the Idealist <i>conclusion</i> must maintain that Reality is <i>mental.</i> The -Idealist <i>conclusion</i> is that <i>esse</i> is <i>percipere</i>; and hence, whether -<i>esse</i> be <i>percipi</i> or not, a further and different discussion is -needed to show whether or not it is also <i>percipere.</i> And again, even -if <i>esse</i> be <i>percipere</i>, we need a vast quantity of further argument -to show that what has <i>esse</i> has also those higher mental qualities -which are denoted by spiritual. This is why I said that the question -I should discuss, namely, whether or not <i>esse is percipi</i>, must be -utterly insufficient either to prove or to disprove that reality is -spiritual. But, on the other hand, I believe that every argument ever -used to show that reality is spiritual has inferred this (validly or -invalidly) from '<i>esse</i> is <i>percipere'</i> as one of its premisses; and -that this again has never been pretended to be proved except by use of -the premiss that <i>esse</i> is <i>percipi.</i> The type of argument used for the -latter purpose is familiar enough. It is said that since whatever is, -is experienced, and since some things are which are not experienced by -the individual, these must at least form part of some experience. Or -again that, since an object necessarily implies a subject, and since -the whole world must be an object, we must conceive it to belong to -some subject or subjects, in the same sense in which whatever is the -object of our experience belongs to us. Or again, that, since thought -enters into the essence of all reality, we must conceive behind it, in -it, or as its essence, a spirit akin to ours, who think: that 'spirit -greets spirit' in its object. Into the validity of these inferences -I do not propose to enter: they obviously require a great deal of -discussion. I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> only desire to point out that, however correct they may -be, yet if <i>esse</i> is not <i>percipi,</i> they leave us as far from a proof -that reality is spiritual, as if they were all false too.</p> - -<p>But now: Is <i>esse percipi?</i> There are three very ambiguous terms in -this proposition, and I must begin by distinguishing the different -things that may be meant by some of them.</p> - -<p>And first with regard to <i>percipi.</i> This term need not trouble us -long at present. It was, perhaps, originally used to mean 'sensation' -only; but I am not going to be so unfair to modern Idealists—the -only Idealists to whom the term should now be applied without -qualification—as to hold that, if they say <i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i>, they -mean by <i>percipi</i> sensation only. On the contrary I quite agree with -them that, if <i>esse</i> be <i>percipi</i> at all, <i>percipi</i> must be understood -to include not sensation only, but that other type of mental fact, -which is called 'thought '; and, whether <i>esse</i> be <i>percipi</i> or not, I -consider it to be the main service of the philosophic school, to which -modern Idealists belong, that they have insisted on distinguishing -'sensation' and 'thought' and on emphasising the importance of the -latter. Against Sensationalism and Empiricism they have maintained the -true view. But the distinction between sensation and thought need not -detain us here. For, in whatever respects they differ, they have at -least this in common, that they are both forms of consciousness or, to -use a term that seems to be more in fashion just now, they are both -ways of experiencing. Accordingly, whatever <i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i> may -mean, it does <i>at least</i> assert that whatever is, is <i>experienced.</i> -And since what I wish to maintain is, that even this is untrue, the -question whether it be experienced by way of sensation or thought or -both is for my purpose quite irrelevant. If it be not experienced at -all, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> cannot be either an object of thought or an object of sense. -It is only if being involves 'experience' that the question, whether -it involves sensation or thought or both, becomes important. I beg, -therefore, that <i>percipi</i> may be understood, in what follows, to refer -merely to what is <i>common</i> to sensation and thought. A very recent -article states the meaning of <i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i> with all desirable -clearness in so far as <i>percipi</i> is concerned.</p> - -<p>'I will undertake to show,' says Mr. Taylor,<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> 'that what makes [any -piece of fact] real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable -aspect of <i>a sentient experience</i>.' I am glad to think that Mr. Taylor -has been in time to supply me with so definite a statement that this -is the ultimate premiss of Idealism. My paper will at least refute -Mr. Taylor's Idealism, if it refutes anything at all: for I <i>shall</i> -undertake to show that what makes a thing real cannot possibly be its -presence as an inseparable aspect of a senient experience.</p> - -<p>But Mr. Taylor's statement though clear, I think, with regard to -the meaning of <i>percipi</i> is highly ambiguous in other respects. I -will leave it for the present to consider the next ambiguity in the -statement: <i>Esse</i> is <i>percipi.</i> What does the copula mean? What can be -meant by saying that Esse <i>is</i> percipi? There are just three meanings, -one or other of which such a statement <i>must</i> have, if it is to be -true; and of these there is only one which it can have, if it is to -be important. (1) The statement may be meant to assert that the word -'esse' is used to signify nothing either more or less than the word -'percipi': that the two words are precise synonyms: that they are -merely different names for one and the same thing: that what is meant -by <i>esse</i> is absolutely identical with what is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> meant by <i>percipi.</i> -I think I need not prove that the principle <i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i> is -<i>not</i> thus intended merely to define a word; nor yet that, if it were, -it would be an extremely bad definition. But if it does <i>not</i> mean -this, only two alternatives remain. The second is (2) that what is -meant by <i>esse,</i> though not absolutely identical with what is meant by -<i>percipi</i>, yet <i>includes</i> the latter as a <i>part</i> of its meaning. If -this were the meaning of 'esse is percipi,' then to say that a thing -was real would not be the same thing as to say that it was experienced. -That it was <i>real</i> would mean that it was experienced and <i>something -else besides</i>: 'being experienced' would be <i>analytically essential</i> -to reality, but would not be the whole meaning of the term. From the -fact that a thing was real we should be able to infer, by the law of -contradiction, that it was experienced; since the latter would be -<i>part</i> of what is meant by the former. But, on the other hand, from the -fact a thing was experienced we should <i>not</i> be able to infer that it -was real; since it would not follow from the fact that it had one of -the attributes essential to reality, that it <i>also</i> had the other or -others. Now, if we understand <i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i> in this second sense, -we must distinguish <i>three</i> different things which it asserts. First of -all, it gives a definition of the word 'reality,' asserting that word -stands for a complex whole, of which what is meant by 'percipi' forms -a part. And secondly it asserts that 'being experienced' forms a part -of a certain whole. Both these propositions may be true, and at all -events I do not wish to dispute them. I do not, indeed, think that the -word 'reality' is commonly used to include 'percipi': but I do not wish -to argue about the meaning of words. And that many things which are -experienced are also something else—that to be experienced forms part -of certain wholes, is, of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> course, indisputable. But what I wish to -point out is, that neither of these propositions is of any importance, -unless we add to them a <i>third.</i> That 'real' is a convenient name for a -union of attributes which <i>sometimes</i> occurs, it could not be worth any -one's while to assert: no inferences of any importance could be drawn -from such an assertion. Our principle could only mean that when a thing -happens to have <i>percipi</i> as well as the other qualities included under -<i>esse,</i> it has <i>percipi</i>: and we should never be able to <i>infer</i> that -it was experienced, except from a proposition which already asserted -that it was both experienced and something else. Accordingly, if the -assertion that <i>percipi</i> forms part of the whole meant by reality is -to have any importance, it must mean that the whole is organic, at -least in this sense, that the other constituent or constituents of it -<i>cannot</i> occur without percipi, even if percipi can occur without them. -Let us call these other constituents <i>x.</i> The proposition that <i>esse</i> -includes <i>percipi,</i> and that therefore from <i>esse percipi</i> can be -inferred, can only be important if it is meant to assert that <i>percipi</i> -can be inferred from <i>x.</i> The only importance of the question whether -the whole <i>esse</i> includes the part <i>percipi</i> rests therefore on the -question whether the part <i>x</i> is necessarily connected with the part -<i>percipi.</i> And this is (3) the third possible meaning of the assertion -<i>esse is percipi:</i> and, as we now see, the only important one. <i>Esse</i> -is <i>percipi</i> asserts that wherever you have <i>x</i> you also have <i>percipi</i> -that whatever has the property <i>x</i> also has the property that it is -<i>experienced.</i> And this being so, it will be convenient if, for the -future, I may be allowed to use the term '<i>esse</i>' to denote <i>x alone.</i> -I do not wish thereby to beg the question whether what we commonly mean -by the word 'real' does or does not include <i>percipi</i> as well as <i>x.</i> I -am quite content<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> that my definition of 'esse' to denote <i>x</i>, should be -regarded merely as an arbitrary verbal definition. Whether it is so or -not, the only question of interest is whether from <i>x percipi</i> can be -inferred, and I should prefer to be able to express this in the form: -can <i>percipi</i> be inferred from <i>esse?</i> Only let it be understood that -when I say <i>esse,</i> that term will not for the future <i>include percipi</i>: -it denotes only that <i>x,</i> which Idealists, perhaps rightly, include -<i>along with percipi</i> under <i>their</i> term <i>esse.</i> That there is such an -<i>x</i> they must admit on pain of making the proposition an <i>absolute</i> -tautology; and that from this <i>x percipi</i> can be inferred they must -admit, on pain of making it a perfectly barren analytic proposition. -Whether <i>x</i> done should or should not be called <i>esse</i> is not worth -a dispute: what is worth dispute is whether <i>percipi</i> is necessarily -connected with <i>x.</i></p> - -<p>We have therefore discovered the ambiguity of the copula in <i>esse</i> is -<i>percipi,</i> so far as to see that this principle asserts two distinct -terms to be so related, that whatever has the <i>one,</i> which I call -<i>esse,</i> has <i>also</i> the property that it is experienced. It asserts a -necessary connexion between <i>esse</i> on the one hand and <i>percipi</i> on -the other; these two words denoting each a distinct term, and <i>esse</i> -denoting a term in which that denoted by <i>percipi</i> is not included. We -have, then in <i>esse</i> is <i>percipi,</i> a <i>necessary synthetic</i> proposition -which I have undertaken to refute. And I may say at once that, -understood as such, it cannot be refuted. If the Idealist chooses to -assert that it is merely a self-evident truth, I have only to say that -it does not appear to me to be so. But I believe that no Idealist ever -has maintained it to be so. Although this—that two distinct terms are -necessarily related—is the only sense which 'esse is percipi' can have -if it is to be true and important, it <i>can</i> have another sense, if it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> -is to be an important falsehood. I believe that Idealists all hold this -important falsehood. They do not perceive that <i>Esse</i> is <i>percipi</i> -must, if true, be <i>merely</i> a self-evident synthetic truth: they either -identify with it or give as a reason for it another proposition which -must be false because it is self-contradictory. Unless they did so, -they would have to admit that it was a perfectly unfounded assumption; -and if they recognised that it was <i>unfounded,</i> I do not think they -would maintain its truth to be evident. <i>Esse</i> is <i>percipi,</i> in the -sense I have found for it, <i>may</i> indeed be true; I cannot, refute it: -but if this sense were clearly apprehended, no one, I think, would -<i>believe</i> that it was true.</p> - -<p>Idealists, we have seen, must assert that whatever is experienced, -is <i>necessarily</i> so. And this doctrine they commonly express by -saying that 'the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the -subject.' I have hitherto been concerned with pointing out what meaning -this assertion must have, if it is to be an important truth. I now -propose to show that it may have an important meaning, which must be -false, because it is self-contradictory.</p> - -<p>It is a well-known fact in the history of philosophy that <i>necessary</i> -truths in general, but especially those of which it is said that -the opposite is inconceivable, have been commonly supposed to be -<i>analytic,</i> in the sense that the proposition denying them was -self-contradictory. It was in this way, commonly supposed, before Kant, -that many truths could be proved by the law of contradiction alone. -This is, therefore, a mistake which it is plainly easy for the best -philosophers to make. Even since Kant many have continued to assert -it; but I am aware that among those Idealists, who most properly -deserve the name, it has become more fashionable to assert that truths -are <i>both</i> analytic and synthetic. Now<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> with many of their reasons -for asserting this I am not concerned: it is possible that in some -connexions the assertion may bear a useful and true sense. But if we -understand 'analytic' in the sense just defined, namely, what is proved -by the law of contradiction <i>alone</i>, it is plain that, if 'synthetic' -means what is <i>not</i> proved by this alone, no truth can be both analytic -and synthetic. Now it seems to me that those who do maintain truths to -be both, do nevertheless maintain that they are so in this as well as -in other senses. It is, indeed, extremely unlikely that so essential -a part of the historical meaning of 'analytic' and 'synthetic' should -have been entirely discarded, especially since we find no express -recognition that it is discarded. In that case it is fair to suppose -that modern Idealists have been influenced by the view that certain -truths can be proved by the law of contradiction alone. I admit they -also expressly declare that they can <i>not:</i> but this is by no means -sufficient to prove that they do not also think they are; since it is -very easy to hold two mutually contradictory opinions. What I suggest -then is that Idealists hold the particular doctrine in question, -concerning the relation of subject and object in experience, because -they think it is an analytic truth in this restricted sense that it is -proved by the law of contradiction alone.</p> - -<p>I am suggesting that the Idealist maintains that object and subject are -necessarily connected, mainly because he fails to see that they are -<i>distinct</i>, that they are <i>two,</i> at all. When he thinks of 'yellow' -and when he thinks of the 'sensation of yellow,' he fails to see that -there is anything whatever in the latter which is not in the former. -This being so, to deny that yellow can ever <i>be</i> apart from the -sensation of yellow is merely to deny that yellow can ever be other -than it is; since yellow and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> sensation of yellow are absolutely -identical. To assert that yellow is necessarily an object of experience -is to assert that yellow is necessarily yellow—a purely identical -proposition, and therefore proved by the law of contradiction alone. -Of course, the proposition also implies that experience is, after all, -something distinct from yellow—else there would be no reason for -insisting that yellow is a sensation: and that the argument thus both -affirms and denies that yellow and sensation of yellow are distinct, -is what sufficiently refutes it. But this contradiction can easily -be overlooked, because though we are convinced, in other connexions, -that 'experience' does mean something and something most important, -yet we are never distinctly aware <i>what</i> it means, and thus in every -particular case we do not notice its presence. The facts present -themselves as a kind of antinomy:</p> - -<p>(1) Experience <i>is</i> something unique and different from anything else; -(2) Experience of green is entirely indistinguishable from green; two -propositions which cannot both be true. Idealists, holding both, can -only take refuge in arguing from the one in some connexions and from -the other in others.</p> - -<p>But I am well aware that there are many Idealists who would repel it -as an utterly unfounded charge that they fail to distinguish between -a sensation or idea and what I will call its object. And there are, I -admit, many who not only imply, as we all do, that green is distinct -from the sensation of green, but expressly insist upon the distinction -as an important part of their system. They would perhaps only assert -that the two form an inseparable unity. But I wish to point out that -many, who use this phrase, and who do admit the distinction, are not -thereby absolved from the charge that they deny it. For there is a -certain doctrine, very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> prevalent among philosophers nowadays, which by -a very simple reduction may be seen to assert that two distinct things -both are and are not distinct. A distinction is asserted; but it is -<i>also</i> asserted that the things distinguished form an 'organic unity,' -But, forming such a unity, it is held, each would not be what it is -<i>apart from its relation to the other.</i> Hence to consider either by -itself is to make an <i>illegitimate abstraction.</i> The recognition that -there are 'organic unities' and 'illegitimate abstractions' in this -sense is regarded as one of the chief conquests of modern philosophy. -But what is the sense attached to these terms? An abstraction is -illegitimate, when and only when we attempt to assert of <i>a part</i>—of -something abstracted—that which is true only of the <i>whole</i> to which -it belongs: and it may perhaps be useful to point out that this should -not be done. But the application actually made of this principle, -and what perhaps would be expressly acknowledged as its meaning, is -something much the reverse of useful. The principle is used to assert -that certain abstractions are <i>in all cases</i> illegitimate; that -whenever you try to assert <i>anything whatever</i> of that which is <i>part</i> -of an organic whole, what you assert can only be true of the whole. -And this principle, so far from being a useful truth, is necessarily -false. For if the whole can, nay <i>must,</i> be substituted for the part -in all propositions and for all purposes, this can only be because the -whole is absolutely identical with the part. When, therefore, we are -told that green and the sensation of green are certainly distinct but -yet are not separable, or that it is an illegitimate abstraction to -consider the one apart from the other, what these provisos are used -to assert is, that though the two things are distinct yet you not -only can but must treat them as if they were not. Many philosophers, -therefore, when they admit a distinction,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> yet (following the lead -of Hegel) boldly assert their right, in a slightly more obscure form -of words, <i>also</i> to deny it. The principle of organic unities, like -that of combined analysis and synthesis, is mainly used to defend the -practice of holding <i>both</i> of two contradictory propositions, wherever -this may seem convenient. In this, as in other matters, Hegel's main -service to philosophy has consisted in giving a name to and erecting -into a principle, a type of fallacy to which experience had shown -philosophers, along with the rest of mankind, to be addicted. No wonder -that he has followers and admirers.</p> - -<p>I have shown then, so far, that when the Idealist asserts the important -principle 'Esse is <i>percipi'</i> he must, if it is to be true, mean by -this that: Whatever is experienced also <i>must</i> be experienced. And -I have also shown that he <i>may</i> identify with, or give as a reason -for, this proposition, one which must be false, because it is self -contradictory. But at this point I propose to make a complete break -in my argument. '<i>Esse</i> is <i>percipi</i>,' we have seen, asserts of two -terms, as distinct from one another as 'green' and 'sweet,' that -whatever has the one has also the other: it asserts that 'being' and -'being experienced' are necessarily connected: that whatever <i>is</i> is -<i>also</i> experienced. And this, I admit, cannot be directly refuted. -But I believe it to be false; and I have asserted that anybody who -saw that '<i>esse</i> and <i>percipi</i>' <i>were</i> as distinct as 'green' and -'sweet' would be no more ready to believe that whatever <i>is</i> is <i>also</i> -experienced, than to believe that whatever is green is also sweet. I -have asserted that no one would believe that '<i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i>' -if they saw how different <i>esse</i> is from <i>percipi:</i> but <i>this</i> I -shall not try to prove. I have asserted that all who do believe that -'<i>esse</i> is <i>percipi</i>' identify with it or take as a reason for it a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> -self-contradictory proposition: but this I shall not try to prove. I -shall only try to show that certain propositions which I assert to be -believed, are false. That they are believed, and that without this -belief '<i>esse</i> is <i>percipi'</i> would not be believed either, I must leave -without a proof.</p> - -<p>I pass, then, from the uninteresting question 'Is <i>'esse percipi?'</i> to -the still more uninteresting and apparently irrelevant question 'What -is a sensation or idea?'</p> - -<p>We all know that the sensation of blue differs from that of green. But -it is plain that if both are <i>sensations</i> they also have some point in -common. What is it that they have in common? And how is this common -element related to the points in which they differ?</p> - -<p>I will call the common element 'consciousness' without yet attempting -to say what the thing I so call <i>is.</i> We have then in every sensation -two distinct terms, (1) 'consciousness,' in respect of which all -sensations are alike; and (2) something else, in respect of which one -sensation differs from another. It will be convenient if I may be -allowed to call this second term the 'object' of a sensation: this also -without yet attempting to say what I mean by the word.</p> - -<p>We have then in every sensation two distinct elements, one which I call -consciousness, and another which I call the object of consciousness. -This must be so if the sensation of blue and the sensation of green, -though different in one respect, are alike in another: blue is one -object of sensation and green is another, and consciousness, which both -sensations have in common, is different from either.</p> - -<p>But, further, sometimes the sensation of blue exists in my mind and -sometimes it does not; and knowing, as we now do, that the sensation of -blue includes two different elements, namely consciousness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> and blue, -the question arises whether, when the sensation of blue exists, it is -the consciousness which exists, or the blue which exists, or both. -And one point at least is plain: namely that these three alternatives -are all different from one another. So that, if any one tells us that -to say 'Blue exists' is the <i>same</i> thing as to say that 'Both blue -and consciousness exist,' he makes a mistake and a self-contradictory -mistake.</p> - -<p>But another point is also plain, namely, that when the sensation -exists, the consciousness, at least, certainly does exist; for when I -say that the sensations of blue and of green both exist, I certainly -mean that what is common to both and in virtue of which both are -called sensations, exists in each case. The only alternative left, -then, is that <i>either</i> both exist or the consciousness exists alone. -If, therefore, any one tells us that the existence of blue is the same -thing as the existence of the sensation of blue he makes a mistake and -a self-contradictory mistake, for he asserts <i>either</i> that blue is the -same thing as blue together with consciousness, <i>or</i> that it is the -same thing as consciousness alone.</p> - -<p>Accordingly to identify either "blue" or any other of what I have -called "<i>objects</i>" of sensation, with the corresponding sensation is -in every case, a self-contradictory error. It is to identify a part -either with the whole of which it is a part or else with the other part -of the same whole. If we are told that the assertion "Blue exists" is -<i>meaningless</i> unless we mean by it that "The sensation of blue exists," -we are told what is certainly false and self-contradictory. If we -are told that the existence of blue is inconceivable apart from the -existence of the sensation, the speaker <i>probably</i> means to convey to -us, by this ambiguous expression, what is a self-contradictory error. -For we can and must conceive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> the existence of blue as something quite -distinct from the existence of the sensation. We can and must conceive -that blue might exist and yet the sensation of blue not exist. For my -own part I not only conceive this, but conceive it to be true. Either -therefore this terrific assertion of inconceivability means what is -false and self-contradictory or else it means only that <i>as a matter of -fact</i> blue never can exist unless the sensation of it exists also.</p> - -<p>And at this point I need not conceal my opinion that no philosopher -has ever yet succeeded in avoiding this self-contradictory error: that -the most striking results both of Idealism and of Agnosticism are only -obtained by identifying blue with the sensation of blue: that <i>esse</i> -is held to be <i>percipi,</i> solely because <i>what is experienced</i> is held -to be identical with <i>the experience of it.</i> That Berkeley and Mill -committed this error will, perhaps, be granted: that modern Idealists -make it will, I hope, appear more probable later. But that my opinion -is plausible, I will now offer two pieces of evidence. The first is -that language offers us no means of referring to such objects as "blue" -and "green" and "sweet," except by calling them sensations: it is an -obvious violation of language to call them "things" or "objects" or -"terms." And similarly we have no natural means of referring to such -objects as "causality" or "likeness" or "identity," except by calling -them "ideas" or "notions" or "conceptions." But it is hardly likely -that if philosophers had clearly distinguished in the past between a -sensation or idea and what I have called its object, there should have -been no separate name for the latter. They have always used the same -name for these two different "things" (if I may call them so): and -hence there is some probability that they have supposed these "things"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> -<i>not</i> to be two and different, but one and the same. And, secondly, -there is a very good reason why they should have supposed so, in the -fact that when we refer to introspection and try to discover what the -sensation of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before -us only a single term. The term "blue" is easy enough to distinguish, -but the other element which I have called "consciousness"—that which -sensation of blue has in common with sensation of green—is extremely -difficult to fix. That many people fail to distinguish it at all is -sufficiently shown by the fact that there are materialists. And, in -general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to -escape us: it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent—we -look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that -there <i>is something</i> but <i>what</i> it is no philosopher, I think, has yet -clearly recognised.</p> - -<p>But this was a digression. The point I had established so far was -that in every sensation or idea we must distinguish two elements, -(1) the "object," or that in which one differs from another; and (2) -"consciousness," or that which all have in common—that which makes -them sensations or mental facts. This being so, it followed that when -a sensation or idea exists, we have to choose between the alternatives -that either object alone, or consciousness alone, or both, exist; -and I showed that of these alternatives one, namely that the object -only exists, is excluded by the fact that what we mean to assert is -certainly the existence of a mental fact. There remains the question: -Do both exist? Or does the consciousness alone? And to this question -one answer has hitherto been given universally: That both exist.</p> - -<p>This answer follows from the analysis hitherto accepted of the relation -of what I have called<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> "object" to "consciousness" in any sensation or -idea. It is held that what I call the object is merely the "content" of -a sensation or idea. It is held that in each case we can distinguish -two elements and two only, (1) the fact that there is feeling or -experience, and (2) <i>what</i> is felt or experienced; the sensation or -idea, it is said, forms a whole, in which we must distinguish two -"inseparable aspects," "content" and "existence." I shall try to show -that this analysis is false; and for that purpose I must ask what may -seem an extraordinary question: namely what is meant by saying that one -thing is "content" of another? It is not usual to ask this question; -the term is used as if everybody must understand it. But since I am -going to maintain that "blue" is <i>not</i> the content of the sensation of -blue, and what is more important, that, even if it were this analysis -would leave out the most important element in the sensation of blue, it -is necessary that I should try to explain precisely what it is that I -shall deny.</p> - -<p>What then is meant by saying that one thing is the "content" of -another? First of all I wish to point out that "blue" is rightly -and properly said to be part of the content of a blue flower. If, -therefore, we also assert that it is part of the content of the -sensation of blue, we assert that it has to the other parts (if any) -of this whole the same relation which it has to the other parts of -a blue flower—and we assert only this: we cannot mean to assert -that it has to the sensation of blue any relation which it does not -have to the blue flower. And we have seen that the sensation of blue -contains at least one other element beside blue—namely, what I call -"consciousness," which makes it a sensation. So far then as we assert -that blue is the content of the sensation, we assert that it has to -this "consciousness" the same relation which it has to the other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> parts -of a blue flower: we do assert this, and we assert no more than this. -Into the question what exactly the relation is between blue and a blue -flower in virtue of which we call the former part of its "content" I -do not propose to enter. It is sufficient for my purpose to point out -that it is the general relation most commonly meant when we talk of a -thing and its qualities; and that this relation is such that to say the -thing exists implies that the qualities also exist. The <i>content</i> of -the thing is <i>what</i> we assert to exist, when we assert <i>that</i> the thing -exists.</p> - -<p>When, therefore, blue is said to be part of the content of the -"sensation of blue," the latter is treated as if it were a whole -constituted in exactly the same way as any other "thing." The -"sensation of blue," on this view, differs from a blue bead or a blue -beard, in exactly the same way in which the two latter differ from one -another: the blue bead differs from the blue beard, in that while the -former contains glass, the latter contains hair; and the "sensation -of blue" differs from both in that, instead of glass or hair, it -contains consciousness. The relation of the blue to the consciousness -is conceived to be exactly the same as that of the blue to the glass or -hair: it is in all three cases the <i>quality</i> of a <i>thing.</i></p> - -<p>But I said just now that the sensation of blue was analysed into -"content" and "existence," and that blue was said to be <i>the</i> content -of the idea of blue. There is an ambiguity in this and a possible -error, which I must note in passing. The term "content" may be used -in two senses. If we use "content" as equivalent to what Mr. Bradley -calls the "<i>what</i>"—if we mean by it the <i>whole</i> of what is said to -exist, when the thing is said to exist, then blue is certainly not -<i>the</i> content of the sensation of blue: part of the <i>content</i> of the -sensation is, in this sense<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> of the term, that other element which I -have called consciousness. The analysis of this sensation into the -"content" "blue," on the one hand, and mere existence on the other, is -therefore certainly false; in it we have again the self-contradictory -identification of "Blue exists" with "The sensation of blue exists," -But there is another sense in which "blue" might properly be said to be -<i>the</i> content of the sensation—namely, the sense in which "content," -like <i>εἴδος</i> is opposed to "substance" or "matter." For the element -"consciousness," being common to all sensations, may be and certainly -is regarded as in some sense their "substance," and by the "content" -of each is only meant that in respect of which one differs from -another. In this sense then "blue" might be said to be <i>the</i> content -of the sensation; but, in that case, the analysis into "content" and -"existence" is, at least, misleading, since under "existence" must be -included "<i>what</i> exists" in the sensation other than blue.</p> - -<p>We have it, then, as a universally received opinion that blue is -related to the sensation or idea of blue, as its <i>content</i>, and -that this view, if it is to be true, must mean that blue is part of -<i>what</i> is said to exist when we say that the sensation exists. To say -that the sensation exists is to say both that blue exists and that -"consciousness," whether we call it the substance of which blue is -<i>the</i> content or call it another part of the content, exists too. Any -sensation or idea is a "<i>thing,</i>" and what I have called its object is -the quality of this thing. Such a "thing" is what we think of when we -think of a <i>mental image.</i> A mental image is conceived as if it were -related to that of which it is the image (if there be any such thing) -in exactly the same way as the image in a looking-glass is related to -that of which it is the reflection; in both cases there is identity -of content, and the image in the looking-glass differs<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> from that -in the mind solely in respect of the fact that in the one case the -other constituent of the image is "glass" and in the other case it is -consciousness. If the image is of blue, it is not conceived that this -"content" has any relation to the consciousness but what it has to the -glass: it Is conceived <i>merely</i> to be its <i>content.</i> And owing to the -fact that sensations and ideas are all considered to be <i>wholes</i> of -this description—things in the mind—the question: What do we know? -is considered to be identical with the question: What reason have we -for supposing that there are things outside the mind <i>corresponding</i> to -these that are inside it?</p> - -<p>What I wish to point out is (1) that we have no reason for supposing -that there are such things as mental images at all—for supposing that -blue <i>is</i> part of the content of the sensation of blue, and (2) that -even if there are mental images, no mental image and no sensation or -idea is <i>merely</i> a thing of this kind: that 'blue,' even if it is -part of the content of the image or sensation or idea of blue, is -always <i>also</i> related to it in quite another way, and that this other -relation, omitted in the traditional analysis, is the <i>only</i> one which -makes the sensation of blue a mental fact at all.</p> - -<p>The true analysis of a sensation or idea is as follows. The element -that is common to them all, and which I have called "consciousness," -really <i>is</i> consciousness. A sensation is, in reality, a case of -'knowing' or 'being aware of' or 'experiencing' something. When we -know that the sensation of blue exists, the fact we know is that -there exists an awareness of blue. And this awareness is not merely, -as we have hitherto seen it must be, itself something distinct and -unique, utterly different from blue: it also has a perfectly distinct -and unique relation to blue, a relation which is <i>not</i> that of thing -or substance to content, nor of one part of content<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> to another part -of content. This relation is just that which we mean in every case -by 'knowing.' To have in your mind 'knowledge' of blue, is <i>not</i> to -have in your mind a 'thing' or 'image' of which blue is the content. -To be aware of the sensation of blue is <i>not</i> to be aware of a -mental image—of a "thing," of which 'blue' and some other element -are constituent parts in the same sense in which blue and glass are -constituents of a blue bead. It is to be aware of an awareness of -blue; awareness being used, in both cases, in exactly the same sense. -This element, we have seen, is certainly neglected by the 'content' -theory: that theory entirely fails to express the fact that there is, -in the sensation of blue, this unique relation between blue and the -other constituent. And what I contend is that this omission is <i>not</i> -mere negligence of expression, but is due to the fact that though -philosophers have recognised that <i>something</i> distinct is meant by -consciousness, they have never yet had a clear conception of <i>what</i> -that something is. They have not been able to hold <i>it</i> and <i>blue</i> -before their minds and to compare them, in the same way in which they -can compare <i>blue</i> and <i>green.</i> And this for the reason I gave above: -namely that the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness -and to see <i>what</i>, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as -if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the -sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is -as if it were diaphanous. Yet it <i>can</i> be distinguished if we look -attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for. -My main object in this paragraph has been to try to make the reader -<i>see</i> it; but I fear I shall have succeeded very ill.</p> - -<p>It being the case, then, that the sensation of blue includes in its -analysis, beside blue, <i>both</i> a unique element 'awareness' <i>and</i> a -unique relation of this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> element to blue, I can make plain what I meant -by asserting, as two distinct propositions, (1) that blue is probably -not part of the content of the sensation at all, and (2) that, even it -were, the sensation would nevertheless not be the sensation <i>of</i> blue, -if blue had only this relation to it. The first hypothesis may now be -expressed by saying that, if it were true, then, when the sensation of -blue exists, there exists a <i>blue awareness</i>: offence may be taken at -the expression, but yet it expresses just what should be and is meant -by saying that blue is, in this case, a <i>content</i> of consciousness -or experience. Whether or not, when I have the sensation of blue, my -consciousness or awareness is thus blue, my introspection does not -enable me to decide with certainty: I only see no reason for thinking -that it is. But whether it is or not, the point is unimportant, for -introspection <i>does</i> enable me to decide that something else is also -true: namely that I am aware <i>of</i> blue, and by this I mean, that my -awareness has to blue a quite different and distinct relation. It is -possible, I admit, that my awareness is blue <i>as well</i> as being <i>of</i> -blue: but what I am quite sure of is that it is <i>of</i> blue; that it has -to blue the simple and unique relation the existence of which alone -justifies us in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the thing -known, indeed in distinguishing mind from matter. And this result I may -express by saying that what is called the <i>content</i> of a sensation is -in very truth what I originally called it—the sensation's <i>object.</i></p> - -<p>But, if all this be true, what follows?</p> - -<p>Idealists admit that some things really exist of which they are not -aware: there are some things, they hold, which are not inseparable -aspects of <i>their</i> experience, even if they be inseparable aspects of -some experience. They further hold that some of the things of which -they are sometimes aware do<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> really exist, even when they are not aware -of them: they hold for instance that they are sometimes aware of other -minds, which continue to exist even when they are not aware of them. -They are, therefore, sometimes aware of something which is <i>not</i> an -inseparable aspect of their own experience. They do <i>know some</i> things -which are <i>not</i> a mere part or content of their experience. And what -my analysis of sensation has been designed to show is, that whenever -I have a mere sensation or idea, the fact is that I am then aware of -something which is equally and in the same sense <i>not</i> an inseparable -aspect of my experience. The awareness which I have maintained to be -included in sensation is the very same unique fact which constitutes -every kind of knowledge: "blue" is as much an object, and as little -a mere content, of my experience, when I experience it, as the most -exalted and independent real thing of which I am ever aware. There is, -therefore, no question of how we are to "get outside the circle of our -own ideas and sensations." Merely to have a sensation is already to -<i>be</i> outside that circle. It is to know something which is as truly and -really <i>not</i> a part of <i>my</i> experience, as anything which I can ever -know.</p> - -<p>Now I think I am not mistaken in asserting that the reason why -Idealists suppose that everything which <i>is</i> must be an inseparable -aspect of some experience, is that they suppose some things, at least, -to be inseparable aspects of <i>their</i> experience. And there is certainly -nothing which they are so firmly convinced to be an inseparable aspect -of their experience as what they call the <i>content</i> of their ideas and -sensations. If, therefore, <i>this</i> turns out in every case, whether it -be also the content or not, to be at least <i>not</i> an inseparable aspect -of the experience of it, it will be readily admitted that nothing else -which <i>we</i> experience ever is such an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> inseparable aspect. But if we -never experience anything but what is <i>not</i> an inseparable aspect of -<i>that</i> experience, how can we infer that anything whatever, let alone -<i>everything,</i> is an inseparable aspect of <i>any</i> experience? How utterly -unfounded is the assumption that "<i>esse</i> is <i>percipi"</i> appears in the -clearest light.</p> - -<p>But further I think it may be seen that if the object of an Idealist's -sensation were, as he supposes, <i>not</i> the object but merely the content -of that sensation, if, that is to say, it really were an inseparable -aspect of his experience, each Idealist could never be aware either of -himself or of any other real thing. For the relation of a sensation -to its object is certainly the same as that of any other instance of -experience to its object; and this, I think, is generally admitted even -by Idealists: they state as readily that <i>what</i> is judged or thought or -perceived is the <i>content</i> of that judgment or thought or perception, -as that blue Is the content of the sensation of blue. But, if so, then -when any Idealist thinks he is <i>aware</i> of himself or of any one else, -this cannot really be the case. The fact Is, on his own theory, that -himself and that other person are in reality mere <i>contents</i> of an -awareness, which is aware <i>of</i> nothing whatever. All that can be said -is that there is an awareness in him, <i>with</i> a certain content: it can -never be true that there is in him a consciousness <i>of</i> anything. And -similarly he is never aware either of the fact that he exists or that -reality is spiritual. The real fact, which he describes in those terms, -is that his existence and the spirituality of reality are <i>contents</i> of -an awareness, which is aware of nothing—certainly not, then, of it own -content.</p> - -<p>And further if everything, of which he thinks he is aware, is in -reality merely a content of his own experience he has certainly no -<i>reason</i> for holding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> that anything does exist except himself: it will, -of course, be possible that other persons do exist; solipsism will not -be necessarily true; but he cannot possibly infer from anything he -holds that it is not true. That he himself exists will of course follow -from his premiss that many things are contents of <i>his</i> experience. -But since everything, of which he thinks himself aware, is in reality -merely an inseparable aspect of that awareness; this premiss allows no -inference that any of these contents, far less any other consciousness, -exists at all except as an inseparable aspect of his awareness, that -is, as part of himself.</p> - -<p>Such, and not those which he takes to follow from it, are the -consequences which <i>do</i> follow from the Idealist's supposition that the -object of an experience is in reality merely a content or inseparable -aspect of that experience. If, on the other hand, we clearly recognise -the nature of that peculiar relation which I have called "awareness of -anything"; if we see that <i>this</i> is involved equally in the analysis -of <i>every</i> experience—from the merest sensation to the most developed -perception or reflexion, and that <i>this</i> is in fact the only essential -element in an experience—the only thing that is both common and -peculiar to all experiences—the only thing which gives us reason to -call any fact mental; if, further, we recognise that this awareness is -and must be in all cases of such a nature that its object, when we are -aware of it, is precisely what it would be, if we were not aware: then -it becomes plain that the existence of a table in space is related to -my experience of <i>it</i> in precisely the same way as the existence of -my own experience is related to my experience of <i>that.</i> Of both we -are merely aware: if we are aware that the one exists, we are aware -in precisely the same sense that the other exists; and if it is true -that my<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> experience can exist, even when I do not happen to be aware of -its existence, we have exactly the same reason for supposing that the -table can do so also. When, therefore, Berkeley, supposed that the only -thing of which I am directly aware is my own sensations and ideas, he -supposed what was false; and when Kant supposed that the objectivity of -things in space <i>consisted</i> in the fact that they were "Vorstellungen" -having to one another different relations from those which the -same "Vorstellungen" have to one another in subjective experience, -he supposed what was equally false. I am as directly aware of the -existence of material things in space as of my own sensations; and -<i>what</i> I am aware of with regard to each is exactly the same—namely -that in one case the material thing, and in the other case my sensation -does really exist. The question requiring to be asked about material -things is thus not: What reason have we for supposing that anything -exists <i>corresponding</i> to our sensations? but: What reason have we for -supposing that material things do <i>not</i> exist, since <i>their</i> existence -has precisely the same evidence as that of our sensations? That either -exist <i>may</i> be false; but if it is a reason for doubting the existence -of matter, that it is an inseparable aspect of our experience, the same -reasoning will prove conclusively that our experience does not exist -either, since that must also be an inseparable aspect of our experience -of <i>it.</i> The only <i>reasonable</i> alternative to the admission that matter -exists <i>as well as</i> spirit, is absolute Scepticism—that, as likely as -not <i>nothing</i> exists at all. All other suppositions—the Agnostic's, -that something, at all events, does exist, as much as the Idealist's, -that spirit does—are, if we have no reason for believing in matter, as -baseless as the grossest superstitions.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>International Journal of Ethics,</i> October, 1902.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="THE_NATURE_AND_REALITY_OF_OBJECTS_OF_PERCEPTION" id="THE_NATURE_AND_REALITY_OF_OBJECTS_OF_PERCEPTION">THE NATURE AND REALITY OF OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION</a></h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>There are two beliefs in which almost all philosophers, and almost all -ordinary people are agreed. Almost everyone believes that he himself -and what he directly perceives do not constitute the whole of reality: -he believes that <i>something</i> other than himself and what he directly -perceives <i>exists</i> or is <i>real.</i> I do not mean to say that almost -everyone believes that what he directly perceives is real: I only mean -that he does believe that, whether what he directly perceives is real -or not, something other than it and other than himself certainly is so. -And not only does each of us thus agree in believing that <i>something</i> -other than himself and what he directly perceives is real: almost -everyone also believes that <i>among</i> the real things, other than himself -and what he directly perceives, are other persons who have thoughts -and perceptions in some respects similar to his own. That most people -believe this I think I need scarcely try to show. But since a good many -philosophers may appear to have held views contradictory of this one, I -will briefly point out my reason for asserting that most philosophers, -even among those (if any) who have believed the contradictory of this, -have yet held this as well. Almost all philosophers tell us something -about the nature of <i>human</i> knowledge and <i>human</i> perception. They tell -us that <i>we</i> perceive so and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> so; that the nature or origin of <i>our</i> -perceptions is such and such; or (as I have just been telling you) that -men in general have such and such beliefs. It might, indeed, be said -that we are not to interpret such language too strictly: that, though -a philosopher talks about <i>human</i> knowledge and <i>our</i> perceptions, -he only means to talk about his own. But in many cases a philosopher -will leave no doubt upon this point, by expressly assuming that there -are other perceptions, which differ in some respects from his own: -such, for instance, is the case when (as is so common nowadays) a -philosopher introduces psycho-genetic considerations into his arguments -—considerations concerning the nature of the perceptions of men who -existed before and at a much lower stage of culture than himself. -Any philosopher, who uses such arguments, obviously assumes that -perceptions other than his own have existed or been real. And even -those philosophers who think themselves justified in the conclusion -that neither their own perceptions nor any perceptions like theirs are -<i>ultimately</i> real, would, I think admit, that <i>phenomenally</i>, at least, -they <i>are</i> real, and are certainly <i>more</i> real than some other things.</p> - -<p>Almost everyone, then, does believe that some perceptions other than -his own, and which he himself does not directly perceive, are real; and -believing this, he believes that something other than himself and what -he directly perceives is real. But how do we know that anything exists -except our own perceptions, and what we directly perceive? How do we -know that there are any other people, who have perceptions in some -respects similar to our own?</p> - -<p>I believe that these two questions express very exactly the nature of -the problem which it is my chief object, in this paper, to discuss. -When I say these words to you, they will at once suggest to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> your minds -the very question, to which I desire to find an answer; they will -convey to you the very same meaning which I have before my mind, when I -use the words. You will understand at once what question it is that I -mean to ask. But, for all that, the words which I have used are highly -ambiguous. If you begin to ask yourselves what I do mean by them, you -will find that there are several quite different things which I might -mean. And there is, I think, great danger of confusing these different -meanings with one another. I think that philosophers, when they have -asked this question in one sense, have often answered it in quite a -different sense; and yet have supposed that the answer which they have -given is an answer to the very same question which they originally -asked. It is precisely because there is this ambiguity—this danger of -confusion, in the words which I have used, that I have chosen to use -them. I wish to point out as clearly as I can, not only what I do mean -by them, but also some things which I do <i>not</i> mean; and I wish to make -it clear that the questions which I do <i>not</i> mean to ask, are different -questions from that which I do mean to ask.</p> - -<p>I will take the second of my two questions, since there is in the other -an additional ambiguity to which I do not now wish to call attention. -My second question was: How do we know that there exist any other -people who have perceptions in some respects similar to our own? What -does this question mean?</p> - -<p>Now I think you may have noticed that when you make a statement to -another person, and he answers "How do you know that that is so?" he -very often means to suggest that you do <i>not</i> know it. And yet, though -he means to suggest that you do not <i>know</i> it, he may not for a moment -wish to suggest that you do not <i>believe</i> it, nor even that you<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> have -not that degree or kind of conviction, which goes beyond mere belief, -and which may be taken to be essential to anything which can properly -be called knowledge. He does not mean to suggest for a moment that you -are saying something which you do not believe to be true, or even that -you are not thoroughly convinced of its truth. What he does mean to -suggest is that what you asserted was not <i>true</i>, even though you may -not only have believed it but felt sure that it was true. He suggests -that you don't <i>know</i> it, in the sense that what you believe or feel -sure of is not true.</p> - -<p>Now I point this out, not because I myself mean to suggest that we -don't know the existence of other persons, but merely in order to show -that the word "know" is sometimes used in a sense in which it is not -merely equivalent to "believe" or "feel sure of." When the question -"How do you <i>know</i> that?" is asked, the questioner does not merely -mean to ask "how do you come to believe that, or to be convinced of -it?" He sometimes, and I think generally, means to ask a question with -regard to the <i>truth</i>, and not with regard to the <i>existence</i> of your -belief. And similarly when I ask the question "How do we know that -other people exist?" I do <i>not</i> mean to ask "How do we come to believe -in or be convinced of their existence?" I do not intend to discuss this -question <i>at all.</i> I shall not ask what <i>suggests</i> to us our belief in -the existence of other persons or of an external world; I shall not -ask whether we arrive at it by inference or by "instinct" or in any -other manner, which ever has been or may be suggested: I shall discuss -no question of any kind whatever with regard to its origin, or cause, -or the way in which it arises. These psychological questions are <i>not</i> -what I propose to discuss. When I ask the question "How do we know that -other people exist?" I do <i>not</i> mean:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span></p> - -<p>"How does our belief in their existence arise?"</p> - -<p>But if I do not mean this what do I mean P I have said that I mean -to ask a question with regard to the <i>truth</i> of that belief; and the -particular question which I mean to ask might be expressed in the -words: <i>What reason have</i> we for our belief in the existence of other -persons? But these are words which themselves need some explanation, -and I will try to give it.</p> - -<p>In the first place, then, when I talk of "a reason," I mean <i>only</i> -a good reason and <i>not</i> a bad one. A bad reason is, no doubt, a -reason, in one sense of the word; but I mean to use the word "reason" -exclusively in the sense in which it is equivalent to "good reason." -But what, then, is meant by a good reason for a belief? I think I can -express sufficiently accurately what I mean by it in this connection, -as follows:—A good reason for a belief is a proposition which is -true, and which would not be true unless the belief were also true. We -should, I think, commonly say that when a man knows such a proposition, -he has a good reason for his belief; and, when he knows no such -proposition, we should say that he has no reason for it. When he knows -such a proposition, we should say he knows something which is a reason -for thinking his belief to be true—something from which it <i>could</i> be -validly inferred. And if, in answer to the question "How do you know -so and so?" he were to state such a proposition, we should, I think, -feel that he had answered the question which we meant to ask. Suppose, -for instance, in answer to the question "How do you know that?" he were -to say "I saw it in the <i>Times."</i> Then, if we believed that he had -seen it in the <i>Times</i>, and also believed that it would not have been -in the <i>Times</i>, unless it had been true, we should admit that he had -answered our question.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> We should no longer doubt that he did <i>know</i> -what he asserted, we should no longer doubt that his belief was true. -But if, on the other hand, we believed that he had not seen it in the -<i>Times</i>—if, for instance, we had reason to believe that what he saw -was not the statement which he made, but some other statement which -he mistook for it; or if we believed that the kind of statement in -question was one with regard to which there was no presumption that, -being in the <i>Times</i>, it would be true: in <i>either</i> of these cases -we should, I think, feel that he had <i>not</i> answered our question. We -should still doubt whether what he had said was true. We should still -doubt whether he <i>knew</i> what he asserted; and since a man cannot tell -you how he <i>knows</i> a thing unless he does know that thing, we should -think that, though he might have told us truly how he <i>came to believe -it,</i> he had certainly not told us how he <i>knew</i> it. But though we -should thus hold that he had <i>not</i> told us <i>how he knew</i> what he had -asserted, and that he had given us no reason for believing it to be -true; we must yet admit that he had given us a reason in a sense—a -<i>bad</i> reason, a reason which was no reason because it had no tendency -to show that what he believed was true; and we might also be perfectly -convinced that he had given us <i>the reason</i> why he believed it—the -proposition by believing which he was induced also to believe his -original assertion.</p> - -<p>I mean, then, by my question, "How do we know that other people -exist?" what, I believe, is ordinarily meant, namely, "What reason -have we for believing that they exist?" and by this again I mean, what -I also believe is ordinarily meant, namely, "What proposition do we -believe, which is both true itself and is also such that it would not -be true, unless other people existed?" And I hope it is plain that -this question, thus explained, is quite a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> different question from the -psychological question, which I said I did <i>not</i> mean to ask—from the -question, "How does our belief in the existence of other people arise?" -My illustration, I hope, has made this plain. For I have pointed out -that we may quite well hold that a man has told us how a belief of -his arises, and even what was the reason which made him adopt that -belief, and yet may have failed to give us any <i>good reason</i> for his -belief—any proposition which is both true itself, and also such that -the truth of his belief follows from it. And, indeed, it is plain that -if any one ever believes what is false, he is believing something for -which there <i>is</i> no good reason, in the sense which I have explained, -and for which, therefore, he cannot possibly have a good reason; and -yet it plainly does not follow that his belief did not arise in anyway -whatever, nor even that he had no reason for it—no bad reason. It -is plain that false beliefs do arise in some way or other—they have -origins and causes: and many people who hold them <i>have</i> bad reasons -for holding them—their belief does arise (by inference or otherwise) -from their belief in some other proposition, which is not itself true, -or else is not a <i>good</i> reason for holding that, which they infer -from it, or which, in some other way, it induces them to believe. I -submit, therefore, that the question, "What good reason have we for -believing in the existence of other people?" is different from the -question, "How does that belief arise?" But when I say this, I must -not be misunderstood; I must not be understood to affirm that the -answer to both questions <i>may</i> not, in a sense, be the same. I fully -admit that the very same fact, which suggests to us the belief in the -existence of other people, <i>may</i> also be a good reason for believing -that they do exist. All that I maintain is that the question whether -it is a good reason for that belief is a different question<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> from the -question whether it suggests that belief: if we assert that a certain -fact <i>both</i> suggests our belief in the existence of other persons and -is <i>also</i> a good reason for holding that belief, we are asserting two -different things and not one only. And hence, when I assert, as I shall -assert, that we <i>have</i> a good reason for our belief in the existence -of other persons, I must not be understood also to assert either that -we infer the existence of other persons from this good reason, or that -our belief in that good reason suggests our belief in the existence -of other persons in any other way. It is plain, I think, that a man -may believe two true propositions, of which the one would not be true, -unless the other were true too, without, in any sense whatever, having -arrived at his belief in the one <i>from</i> his belief in the other; and it -is plain, at all events, that the question whether his belief in the -one <i>did</i> arise from his belief in the other, is a different question -from the question whether the truth of the one belief follows from the -truth of the other.</p> - -<p>I hope, then, that I have made it a little clearer what I mean by the -question: "What reason have we for believing in the existence of other -people?" and that what I mean by it is at all events different from -what is meant by the question: "How does our belief in the existence of -other people arise?"</p> - -<p>But I am sorry to say that I have not yet reached the end of my -explanations as to what my meaning is. I am afraid that the subject may -seem very tedious. I can assure you that I have found it excessively -tedious to try to make my meaning clear to myself. I have constantly -found that I was confusing one question with another, and that, where -I had thought I had a good reason for some assertion, I had in reality -no good reason. But I may perhaps remind you that this question, "How -do we know so and so?" "What reason have we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> for believing it?" is one -of which philosophy is full; and one to which the most various answers -have been given. Philosophy largely consists in giving reasons; and the -question what are good reasons for a particular conclusion and what are -bad, is one upon which philosophers have disagreed as much as on any -other question. For one and the same conclusion different philosophers -have given not only different, but incompatible, reasons; and -conversely different philosophers have maintained that one and the same -fact is a reason for incompatible conclusions. We are apt, I think, -sometimes to pay too little attention to this fact. When we have taken, -perhaps, no little pains to assure ourselves that our own reasoning -is correct, and especially when we know that a great many other -philosophers agree with us, we are apt to assume that the arguments -of those philosophers, who have come to a contradictory conclusion, -are scarcely worthy of serious consideration. And yet, I think, there -is scarcely a single reasoned conclusion in philosophy, as to which -we shall not find that some other philosopher, who has, so far as we -know, bestowed equal pains on his reasoning, and with equal ability, -has reached a conclusion incompatible with ours. We may be satisfied -that we are right, and we may, in fact, be so; but it is certain that -<i>both</i> cannot be right: either our opponent or we must have mistaken -bad reasons for good. And this being so, however satisfied we may be -that it is not we who have done so, I think we should at least draw the -conclusion that it is by no means easy to avoid mistaking bad reasons -for good; and that no process, however laborious, which is in the least -likely to help us in avoiding this should be evaded. But it is at least -possible that one source of error lies in mistaking one kind of reason -for another—in supposing that, because there is, in one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> sense, a -reason for a given conclusion, there is also a reason in another, or -that because there is, in one sense, no reason for a given conclusion, -there is, therefore, no reason at all. I believe myself that this <i>is</i> -a very frequent source of error: but it is at least a possible one. -And where, as disagreements show, there certainly is error on one -side or the other, and reason, too, to suppose that the error is not -easy to detect, I think we should spare no pains in investigating any -source, from which it is even possible that the error may arise. For -these reasons I think I am perhaps doing right in trying to explain as -clearly as possible not only what reasons we have for believing in an -external world, but also in what sense I take them to be reasons.</p> - -<p>I proceed, then with my explanation. And there is one thing, which, I -think my illustration has shown that I do <i>not</i> mean. I have defined -a reason for a belief as a true proposition, which would not be true -unless the belief itself—what is believed—were also true; and I -have used, as synonymous with this form of words, the expressions: A -reason for a belief is a true proposition from which the truth of the -belief <i>follows</i> from which it <i>could</i> be <i>validly inferred.</i> Now these -expressions might suggest the idea that I mean to restrict the word -"reason," to what, in the strictest sense, might be called a <i>logical</i> -reason—to propositions from which the belief in question <i>follows,</i> -according to the rules of inference accepted by Formal Logic. But I -am <i>not</i> using the words "follow," "validly inferred," in this narrow -sense; I do <i>not</i> mean to restrict the words "reason for a belief" -to propositions from which the laws of Formal Logic state that the -belief could be deduced. The illustration which I gave is inconsistent -with this restricted meaning. I said that the fact that a statement -appeared in the <i>Times</i> might be a good reason for believing that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> -that statement was true. And I am using the word "reason" in the wide -and popular sense, in which it really might be. If, for instance, -the <i>Times</i> stated that the King was dead, we should think that was -a good reason for believing that the King was dead; we should think -that the <i>Times</i> would not have made such a statement as that unless -the King really were dead. We should, indeed, not think that the -statement in the <i>Times</i> rendered it absolutely <i>certain</i> that the -King was dead. But it <i>is</i> extremely unlikely that the <i>Times</i> would -make a statement of this kind unless it were true; and, in that sense, -the fact of the statement appearing in the <i>Times</i> would render it -<i>highly probable</i>—much more likely than not—that the King was dead. -And I wish it to be understood that I am using the words "reason for -a belief" in this extremely wide sense. When I look for a good reason -for our belief in the existence of other people, I shall not reject any -proposition merely on the ground that it only renders their existence -probable—only shows it to be more likely than not that they exist. -Provided that the proposition in question does render it <i>positively -probable</i> that they exist, then, if it also conforms to the conditions -which I am about to mention, I shall call it a "good reason."</p> - -<p>But it is not every proposition which renders it probable that -other people exist, which I shall consider to be a good answer to -my question. I have just explained that my meaning is wide in one -direction—in admitting <i>some</i> propositions which render a belief -merely probable; but I have now to explain that it is restricted in -two other directions. I do mean to exclude certain propositions which -do render that belief probable. When I ask: What reason have <i>we</i> for -believing in the existence of other people? a certain ambiguity is -introduced by the use of the plural "we." If each of several<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> different -persons has a reason for believing that he himself exists, then it is -not merely probable, but certain, according to the rules of Formal -Logic, that, in a sense, <i>they</i> "have a reason for believing" that -several people exist; each has a reason for believing that he himself -exists; and, therefore, all of them, taken together, have reasons for -supposing that several persons exist. If, therefore, I were asking -the question: What reason have <i>we</i> for believing in the existence -of other persons? in this sense, it would follow that if each of us -has a reason for believing in his own existence, these reasons, taken -together, would be a reason for believing in the existence of all of -us. But I am not asking the question in this sense: it is plain that -this is not its natural sense. What I do mean to ask is: Does <i>each -single one</i> of us know any proposition, which is a reason for believing -that <i>others</i> exist? I am using "we," that is to say, in the sense -of "each of us." But again I do mean <i>each</i> of us: I am not merely -asking whether some <i>one</i> man knows a proposition which is a reason -for believing that other men exist. It would be possible that some -one man, or some few men, should know such a proposition, and yet the -rest know no such proposition. But I am not asking whether this is the -case. I am asking whether among propositions of the kind which (as we -commonly suppose) all or almost all men know, there is any which is a -reason for supposing that other men exist. And in asking this question -I am not begging the question by supposing that all men do exist. My -question might, I think, be put quite accurately as follows. There are -certain kinds of belief which, as we commonly suppose, all or almost -all men share. I describe this kind of belief as "our" beliefs, simply -as an easy way of pointing out which kind of belief I mean, but without -assuming that all men do share<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> them. And I then ask: Supposing a -single man to have beliefs of this kind, which among them would be a -good reason for supposing that other men existed having like beliefs?</p> - -<p>This, then, is the first restriction which I put upon the meaning -of my question. And it is, I think, a restriction which, in their -natural meaning, the words suggest. When we ask: What reason have -we for believing that other people exist? we naturally understand -that question to be equivalent to: What reason has <i>each</i> of us for -that belief? And this question again is naturally equivalent to the -question: Which among the propositions that a single man believes, but -which are of the kind which (rightly or wrongly) we assume all men to -believe, are such that they would not be true unless some other person -than that man existed? But there is another restriction which, I think, -the words of my question also naturally suggest. If we were to ask -anyone the question: How do you know that you did see that statement -in the <i>Times</i>? and he were to answer "Because I did see it in the -<i>Times</i> and in the <i>Standard</i> too," we should not think that he had -given us a <i>reason</i> for the belief that he saw it in the <i>Times.</i> We -should not think his answer a <i>reason</i>, because it asserts the very -thing for which we require a reason. And similarly when I ask: How -do we know that any thing or person exists, other than ourselves and -what we directly perceive? What reason have we for believing this? I -must naturally be understood to mean: What proposition, <i>other</i> than -one which itself asserts or presupposes the existence of something -beyond ourselves and our own perceptions, is a reason for supposing -that such a thing exists? And this restriction obviously excludes an -immense number of propositions of a kind which all of us do believe. We -all of us believe an immense number of different propositions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> about -the existence of things which we do not directly perceive, and many -of these propositions are, in my sense, good reasons for believing in -the existence of still other things. The belief in the existence of a -statement in the <i>Times,</i> when we have not seen that statement, may, -as I implied, be a good reason for believing that someone is dead. But -no such proposition can be a good answer to my question, because it -asserts the very kind of thing for which I require a reason: it asserts -the existence of something other than myself and what I directly -perceive. When I am asking: What reason have I for believing in the -existence of anything but myself, my own perceptions, and what I do -directly perceive? you would naturally understand me to mean: What -reason, <i>other than</i> the existence of such a thing, have I for this -belief?</p> - -<p>Each of us, then, we commonly assume, believes some true propositions, -which do not themselves assert the existence of anything other than -himself, his own perceptions, or what he directly perceives. Each of -us, for instance, believes that he himself has and has had certain -particular perceptions: and these propositions are propositions of -the kind I mean—propositions which do not themselves assert the -existence of anything <i>other than</i> himself, his own perceptions, -and what he directly perceives: they are, I think, by no means the -only propositions of this kind, which most of us believe: but they -<i>are</i> propositions of this kind. But, as I say, I am not assuming -that each of us—each of several different people—does believe -propositions of this kind. All that I assume is that at least one man -does believe some such propositions. And then I ask: Which among those -true propositions, which one man believes, are such that they would -probably not be true, unless some other man existed and had certain -particular perceptions? Which among them are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> such that it <i>follows</i> -(in the wide sense, which I have explained) from their truth, that it -is more likely than not that some other man has perceptions? This is -the meaning of my question, so far as I have hitherto explained it: -and I hope this meaning is quite clear. It is in this sense that I am -asking: What reason have we for believing that other people exist? How -do we know that they exist? This, indeed, is not <i>all</i> that I mean by -that question: there is one other point—the most important one—which -remains to be explained. But this is <i>part</i> of what I mean to ask; and -before I go on to explain what else I mean, I wish first to stop and -enquire what is the answer to this part of my question. What is the -answer to the question: Which among the true propositions, of a kind -which (as we commonly assume) each of us believes, and which do not -themselves assert the existence of anything other than that person -himself, his own perceptions, or what he directly perceives, are such -that they would probably not be true unless some other person existed, -who had perceptions in some respects similar to his own?</p> - -<p>Now to this question the answer is very obvious. It is very obvious -that in this sense we have reasons for believing in the existence of -other persons, and also what some of those reasons are. But I wish -to make it quite plain that this is so: that in this sense one man -<i>has</i> a reason for believing that another has certain perceptions. All -that I am asking you to grant, is, you see, that some of you would -not be having just those perceptions which you now have, unless I, -as I read this paper, were perceiving more or less black marks on a -more or less white ground; or that I on the other hand, should not -be having just those perceptions which I now have, unless some other -persons than myself were hearing the sounds of my voice. And I am -not asking you<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> even to grant that this is certain—only that it is -positively probable—more likely than not. Surely it is very obvious -that this proposition is true. But I wish to make it quite clear -what would be the consequences of denying that any such propositions -are true—propositions which assert that the existence of certain -perceptions in one man are a reason for believing in the existence of -certain perceptions in another man—which assert that one man would -probably not have had just those perceptions which he did have, unless -some other man had had certain particular perceptions. It is plain, I -think, that, unless some such propositions are true, we have no more -reason for supposing that Alexander the Great ever saw an elephant, -than for supposing that Sindbad the Sailor saw a Roc; we have no more -reason for supposing that anybody saw Julius Caesar murdered in the -Senate House at Rome, than for supposing that somebody saw him carried -up to Heaven in a fiery chariot. It is plain, I think, that if we have -any reason at all for supposing that in all probability Alexander the -Great did see an elephant, and that in all probability no such person -as Sindbad the Sailor ever saw a Roc, part of that reason consists -in the assumption that some other person would probably not have had -just those perceptions which he did have, unless Alexander the Great -had seen an elephant, and unless Sindbad the Sailor had not seen a -Roc. And most philosophers, I think, are willing to admit that we have -some reason, in some sense or other, for such propositions as these. -They are willing to admit not only that some persons probably did see -Julius Caesar murdered in the Senate House; but also that some persons, -other than those who saw it, had and have <i>some reason</i> for supposing -that some one else probably saw it. Some sceptical philosophers might, -indeed, deny both propositions; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> to refute their views, I admit, -other arguments are needed than any which I shall bring forward in this -paper. But most philosophers will, I think, admit not only that facts, -for which there is, as we say, good historical evidence, are probably -true; but also that what we call good historical evidence really is -in some sense a good reason for thinking them true. Accordingly I am -going to assume that many propositions of the following kind are true. -Propositions, namely, which assert that one man would probably not -have certain perceptions which he does have, unless some other man had -certain particular perceptions. That some of you, for instance, would -probably not be having precisely the perceptions which you are having, -unless I were having the perception of more or less black marks on a -more or less white ground. And, in this sense, I say, we certainly have -reasons for supposing that other people have perceptions similar, in -some respects, to those which we sometimes have.</p> - -<p>But when I said I was going to ask the question: What reason have we -for supposing that other people exist? you will certainly not have -thought that I merely meant to ask the question which I have just -answered. My words will have suggested to you something much more -important than merely this. When, for instance, I said that to the -question "How do you know that?" the answer "I saw it in the <i>Times"</i> -would be a satisfactory answer, you may have felt, as I felt, that it -would not in all circumstances be regarded as such. The person who -asked the question might, in some cases, fairly reply: "That is no -answer: how do you know that, because you saw a thing in the <i>Times</i>, -it is therefore true?" In other words he might ask fora <i>reason</i> for -supposing that the occurrence of a particular statement in the <i>Times</i> -was a reason for supposing that statement true. And this is a question -to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> which we all believe that there may be an answer. We believe that, -with some kinds of statements which the <i>Times</i> makes—some kinds of -statements with regard to Fiscal Policy for example—the fact that -the <i>Times</i> makes them is no reason for supposing them to be true: -whereas with regard to other kinds of statements, which it makes, such -a statement, for instance, as that the King was dead, the fact that it -makes them <i>is</i> a reason for supposing them true. We believe that there -are some kinds of statements, which it is very unlikely the <i>Times</i> -would make, unless they were true; and others which it is not at all -unlikely that the <i>Times</i> might make, although they were not true. And -we believe that a reason might be given for distinguishing, in this -way, between the two different kinds of statement: for thinking that, -in some cases (on points, for instance, which, as we should say, are -not simple questions of fact) the <i>Times</i> is fallible, whereas in other -cases, it is, though not absolutely infallible, very unlikely to state -what is not true.</p> - -<p>Now it is precisely in this further sense that I wish to consider: what -reason have we for believing that certain particular things, other -than ourselves, our own perceptions, and what we directly perceive, -are real? I have asserted that I do have certain perceptions, which it -is very unlikely I should have, unless some other person had certain -particular perceptions; that, for instance, it is very unlikely I -should be having precisely those perceptions which I am now having -unless someone else were hearing the sound of my voice. And I now -wish to ask: What reason have I for supposing that this is unlikely? -What reason has any of us for supposing that any such proposition is -true? And I mean by "having a reason" precisely what I formerly meant. -I mean: What other proposition do I know, which would not be true, -unless my perception were connected with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> someone else's perception, in -the manner in which I asserted them to be connected? Here again I am -asking for <i>a good reason</i>; and am not asking a psychological question -with regard to origin. Here again I am not asking for a reason, in the -strict sense of Formal Logic; I am merely asking for a proposition -which would probably not be true, unless what I asserted were true. -Here again I am asking for some proposition of a kind which <i>each</i> of -us believes; I am asking: What reason has <i>each</i> of us for believing -that some of his perceptions are connected with particular perceptions -of other people in the manner I asserted?—for believing that he would -not have certain perceptions that he does have, unless some other -person had certain particular perceptions? And here again I am asking -for a <i>reason</i>—I am asking for some proposition <i>other</i> than one -which itself asserts: When one man has a perception of such and such a -particular kind, it <i>is</i> probable that another man has a perception or -thought of this or that other kind.</p> - -<p>But what kind of reason can be given for believing a proposition of -this sort? For believing a proposition which asserts that, since one -particular thing exists, it is probable that another particular thing -also exists? One thing I think is plain, namely that we can have no -good reason for believing such a proposition, unless we have good -reason for believing some <i>generalisation.</i> It is commonly believed, -for instance, that certain so-called flint arrow-heads, which have been -discovered, were probably made by prehistoric men; and I think it is -plain that we have no reason for believing this unless we have reason -to suppose that objects which resemble these in certain particular -respects are <i>generally</i> made by men—are <i>more often</i> made by men -than by any other agency. Unless certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> particular characteristics -which those arrow-heads have were characteristics which belonged at -least more frequently to articles of human manufacture than to any -articles not made by men, it would surely be just as likely as not -that these arrowheads were <i>not</i> made by men—that they were, in fact -not arrow-heads. That is to say, unless we have reason to assert a -<i>generalisation</i>—the generalisation that objects of a certain kind -are <i>generally</i> made by men, we have no reason to suppose that these -particular objects, which are of the kind in question, <i>were</i> made -by men. And the same, so far as I can see, is true universally. If -we ever have any reason for asserting that, since one particular -thing exists, another probably exists or existed or will exist also -part of our reason, at least, must consist in reasons for asserting -some generalisation—for asserting that the existence of things of -a particular kind is, more often than not, accompanied or preceded -or followed by the existence of things of another particular kind. -It is, I think, sometimes assumed that an alternative to this theory -may be found in the theory that the existence of one kind of thing -"intrinsically points to," or is "intrinsically a sign or symbol of" -the existence of another thing. It is suggested that when a thing -which thus points to the existence of another thing exists, then it is -at least probable that the thing "pointed to" exists also. But this -theory, I think, offers no real alternative. For, in the first place, -when we say that the existence of one thing A is a "sign of" or "points -to" the existence of another thing B, we very commonly actually mean to -say that when a thing like A exists, a thing like B <i>generally</i> exists -too. We may, no doubt, mean something else <i>too</i>; but this we do mean. -We say, for instance, that certain particular words, which we hear or -read, are a "sign" that somebody has thought of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> particular things -which we call the meaning of those words. But we should certainly -hesitate to admit that the hearing or reading of certain words could be -called a "sign" of the existence of certain thoughts, unless it were -true that when those words are heard or read, the thoughts in question -<i>generally</i> have existed. If when those words were heard or read, the -thoughts had generally <i>not</i> existed, we should say that, in one sense -of the word at all events, the hearing of the words was <i>not</i> a sign of -the existence of the thoughts. In this sense, therefore, to say that -the existence of A "points to" or "is a sign of" the existence of B is -actually to say that when A exists, B <i>generally</i> exists also. But, -no doubt, the words "points to" "is a sign of" may be used in some -other sense: they may, for instance, mean only that the existence of A -<i>suggests</i> in some way the belief that B exists. And in such a case we -certainly might know that the existence of A pointed to the existence -of B, without knowing that when A existed B generally existed also. -Let us suppose, then, that in some such sense A does "point to" the -existence of B; can this fact give us a reason for supposing it even -probable that B existed. Certainly it can, <i>provided</i> it is true that -when A <i>does</i> point to the existence of B, B <i>generally</i> exists. But -surely it can do so, only on this condition. If when A <i>points</i> to -the existence of B, B, nevertheless, does <i>not</i> generally exist, then -surely the fact that A points to the existence of B can constitute no -probability that B does not exist: on the contrary it will then be -probable that, even though A "points to" the existence of B, B does -<i>not</i> exist. We have, in fact, only substituted the generalisation that -A's <i>pointing to</i> B is generally accompanied by the existence of B, for -the generalisation that A's <i>existence</i> is generally accompanied by the -existence of B. If<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> we are to have any reason for asserting that, when -A <i>points to</i> or is a sign of the existence of B, B probably exists, we -must still have a reason for some generalisation—for a generalisation -which asserts that when one thing points to the existence of another, -that other <i>generally</i> exists.</p> - -<p>It is plain, then, I think, that if we are to find a reason for the -assertion that some particular perception of mine would probably not -exist, unless someone else were having or had had a perception of a -kind which I can name, we must find a reason for <i>some</i> generalisation. -And it is also plain, I think, that in many cases of this kind the -generalisation must consist in an assertion that when one man has a -certain kind of perception, some other man generally has had some -other perception or belief. We assume, for instance, that when we hear -or read certain words, somebody besides ourselves has thought the -thoughts, which constitute the meaning of those words; and it is plain, -I think, that we have no reason for this assumption except one which -is also a reason for the assumption that when certain words are heard -or read, somebody generally has had certain thoughts. And my enquiry, -therefore, at least includes the enquiry: What reasons have we for such -generalisations as these? for generalisations which assert a connection -between the existence of a certain kind of perception in one man, and -that of a certain kind of perception or belief in another man?</p> - -<p>And to this question, I think, but one answer can be given. If we -have any reason for such generalisations at all, some reason must -be given, in one way or another, by observation—by observation, -understood in the wide sense in which it includes "experiment." No -philosopher, I think, has ever failed to assume that observation does -give a reason for <i>some</i> generalisations—for some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> propositions -which assert that when one kind of thing exists, another generally -exists or has existed in a certain relation to it. Even those who, -like Hume, imply that observation cannot give a <i>reason</i> for anything, -yet constantly appeal to observation in support of generalisations of -their own. And even those who hold that observation can give no reason -for any generalisation about the relation of one man's perceptions to -another's, yet hold that it <i>can</i> give a reason for generalisations -about the relation of some to others among a man's own perceptions. -It is, indeed, by no means agreed <i>how</i> observation can give a reason -for any generalisation. Nobody knows what reason we have, if we have -any, for supposing that it can. But <i>that</i> it can, everyone, I think, -assumes. I think, therefore, most philosophers will agree, that if we -can find any reason at all for generalisations of the kind in which -I am interested, a reason for <i>some</i> of them at all events must be -found in observation. And what I propose to ask is: What reason can be -found in observation for even a single proposition of the kind I have -described? for a proposition which asserts that when one man has one -kind of perception, another man generally has or has had another.</p> - -<p>But, when it is said that observation gives us a reason for -generalisations, two things may be meant neither of which I mean. In -the first place, we popularly use "observation" in a sense in which -we can be said to <i>observe</i> the perceptions, feelings and thoughts -of other people: in which, therefore, we can be said to observe the -very things with regard to which I am asking what reason we have for -believing in their existence. But it is universally<a name="FNanchor_1_2" id="FNanchor_1_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_2" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> agreed that -there is a sense in which no man can observe the perceptions, feelings -or thoughts of any other man. And it is to this strict sense that -I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> propose to confine the word. I shall use it in a sense, in which -we can certainly be said to observe nothing but ourselves, our own -perceptions, thoughts and feelings, and what we directly perceive. And -in the second place, it may be said that observations made by another -person may give <i>me</i> a reason for believing some generalisation. And -it is certainly the case that for many of the generalisations in which -we all believe, if we have a reason in observation at all, it is not -in <i>our own</i> observation that we have it: part of our reason, at all -events, lies in things which <i>other</i> people have observed but which we -ourselves have not observed. But in asking this particular question, -I am not asking for reasons of this sort. The very question that I am -asking is: What reason has any one of us for supposing that any other -person whatever has ever made any observations? And just as, in the -first meaning which I gave to this question, it meant: What thing, -that any single man observes is such that it would probably not have -existed, unless some other man had made a particular observation? -So now I am asking: Which among the things, which <i>one single man -observes</i>, are such that they would probably not have existed, unless -it were true that some of them generally stood in certain relations to -observations of some other person? I am asking: Which among <i>my own</i> -observations give me a reason for supposing that some of them are of -a kind which are generally preceded or accompanied by observations -of other people? Which, for instance, among my own observations give -a good reason for the generalisation that when I hear certain words, -somebody else has generally had certain particular thoughts, or that -whenever anyone hears certain words, somebody else has generally had -the thoughts which constitute what we call the meaning of those words? -I am asking: Which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> among the vast series of observations, which any -one individual makes during his lifetime, give a good reason for -any generalisation <i>whatever</i> of this kind—a generalisation which -asserts that some of them are generally preceded by certain thoughts, -perceptions or feelings in other persons? I quite admit that there -are some generalisations of this kind for which the observations of -<i>some</i> particular men will <i>not</i> give a reason. All that I ask is: -Is there even <i>one</i> generalisation of this kind, for which the kind -of observations, which (as we commonly assume) each man, or nearly -every man does make, do give a reason? Among observations of the kind -which (as we commonly assume) are common to you and to me, do yours, -by themselves, give any reason for even <i>one</i> such generalisation? -And do mine, by themselves, give any reason for even <i>one</i> such -generalisation? And if they do, which, among these observations, is it -which do so?</p> - -<p>My question is, then: What reason do my own observations give me, for -supposing that any perception whatever, which I have, would probably -not occur, unless some other person had a certain kind of perception? -What reason do my own observations give me for supposing, for instance, -that I should not be perceiving what I do now perceive, unless -someone were hearing the sound of my voice? What reason do your own -observations give you for supposing that you would not be perceiving -just what you are perceiving, unless I were perceiving more or less -black marks on a more or less white ground? The question does, I -think, appear to be a reasonable one; and most philosophers, I think, -have assumed that there is an answer to it. Yet it may be said that -there is no answer to it: that my own observations give me no reason -whatever for any single proposition of this kind. There are certain -philosophers (even apart from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> thorough sceptics, with whom, as I have -said, I am not now arguing) who have denied that they do. There are -certain philosophers who hold that nothing which any single one of -us observes or can observe, gives the slightest reason for supposing -that any of his own perceptions are generally connected with certain -perceptions in other people. There are philosophers who hold that the -only generalisations for which our own observations do give any warrant -are generalisations concerning the manner in which our own perceptions, -thoughts and feelings do and probably will succeed one another; and who -conclude that, this being so, we have no reason whatever for believing -in the existence of any other people. And these philosophers are, I -think, right in drawing this conclusion from this premiss. It does -not, indeed, follow from their premiss that we have not a reason in -the sense which I first explained, and in which, I insisted, it must -be admitted that we have a reason. It does not follow that some of our -perceptions <i>are</i> not such as would probably not exist, unless some -other person had certain perceptions. But, as I have urged, when we -say that we have a reason for asserting the existence of something not -perceived, we commonly mean something more than this. We mean not only -that, since what we perceive does exist, the unperceived thing probably -exists too; we mean also that we have some reason for asserting this -connection between the perceived and the unperceived. And holding, as -we do, that no reason can be given for asserting such a connection, -except observation, we should say that, if observation gives no reason -for asserting it, we have <i>no</i> reason for asserting it; and having no -reason for asserting this connection between the perceived and the -unperceived, we should say that we have none either for asserting the -even probable existence of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> unperceived. This, I think, is what -we commonly mean by saying that we have no reason to believe in the -existence of a particular thing which we do not perceive. And hence, -I think, those philosophers who hold that our own observations give -us no reason whatever for any generalisation whatever concerning -the connection of any of them with those of other people, are quite -right in concluding that we have no reason to assert that any other -person ever did have any particular thought or perception whatever. I -think that the words of this conclusion, understood in their natural -meaning, express precisely what the premiss asserts. We need not, -indeed, conclude, as many of these philosophers are inclined to do, -that, because we have no reason for believing in the existence of other -people, it is therefore highly doubtful whether they do exist. The -philosophers who advocate this opinion commonly refute themselves by -assigning the existence of other people as part of their reason for -believing that it is very doubtful whether any other people exist. That -for which we have no reason may, nevertheless, be certainly true. And, -indeed, one of the philosophers who hold most clearly and expressly -that we do know not only the existence of other people but also that -of material objects, is also one of those who deny most emphatically -that our own observations can give any reason for believing either -in the one or in the other. I refer to Thomas Reid. Reid, indeed, -allows himself to use not only the word "observe," but even the word -"perceive," in that wide sense in which it might be said that we -observe or perceive the thoughts and feelings of others: and I think -that the fact that he uses the words in this sense, has misled him into -thinking that his view is more plausible and more in accordance with -Common Sense than it really is: by using the words in this sense he is -able to plead<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> that "observation" really does give a reason for some of -those generalisations, for which Common Sense holds that "observation" -(in a narrower sense) does give a reason. But with regard to what we -observe or perceive, in the strict sense to which 1 am confining those -words, he asserts quite explicitly that it gives us no reason either -for believing in the existence of material objects or for believing -in the existence of other minds. Berkeley, he says, has proved -incontrovertibly that it gives us no reason for the one, and Hume that -it gives us no reason for the other.</p> - -<p>Now these philosophers may be right in holding this. It may, perhaps, -be true that, in this sense, my own observations give me no reason -whatever for believing that any other person ever has or will perceive -anything like or unlike what I perceive. But I think it is desirable -we should realise how paradoxical are the consequences which must be -admitted, if this is true. It must then be admitted that the very -large part of our knowledge, which we suppose to have some basis in -experience, is by no means based upon experience, in the sense, and -to the extent, which we suppose. We do for instance, commonly suppose -that there is some basis in experience for the assertion that some -people, whom we call Germans, use one set of words to express much the -same meaning which we express by using a different set of words. But, -if this view be correct, we must admit that no person's experience -gives him any reason whatever for supposing that, when he hears certain -words, any one else has ever heard or thought of the same words, or -meant anything by them. The view admits, indeed, that I do know that -when I hear certain words, somebody else has generally had thoughts -more or less similar to those which I suppose him to have had: but it -denies that my own observations could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> ever give me the least reason -for supposing that this is so. It admits that my own observations may -give me reason for supposing that <i>if</i> anyone has ever had perceptions -like mine in some respects, he will also have had other perceptions -like others of mine: but it denies that they give me any reason for -supposing that any one else has had a perception like one of mine. It -admits that my own observations may give me reason for supposing that -certain perceptions and thoughts in <i>one</i> person (<i>if</i> they exist) will -be followed or preceded by certain other perceptions and thoughts in -that person: but it denies that they give me any reason whatever for -<i>any</i> similar generalisation concerning the connection of a certain -kind of perception in one person with a certain kind of perception in -another. It admits that I should not have certain perceptions, which -I do have, unless someone else had had certain other perceptions; but -it denies that my own observations can give me any reason for saying -so—for saying that I should not have had this perception, unless -someone else had had that. No observations of mine, it holds, can ever -render it probable that such a generalisation is true; no observation -of mine can ever confirm or verify such a generalisation. If we are to -say that any such generalisation whatever is based upon observation, -we can only mean, what Reid means, that it is based on a series of -assumptions. When I observe this particular thing, I assume that <i>that</i> -particular thing, which I do not observe, exists; when I observe -another particular thing, I again assume that a second particular -thing, which I do not observe, exists; when I observe a third -particular thing, I again assume that a third particular thing, which I -do not observe, exists. These assumed facts—the assumed fact that one -observation of mine is accompanied by the existence of one particular -kind<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> of thing, and that another observation of mine is accompanied by -the existence of a different particular kind of thing, will then give -me a reason for different generalisations concerning the connection of -different perceptions of mine with different external objects—objects -which I do not perceive. But (it is maintained) nothing but a mass of -such assumptions will give me a reason for any such generalisation.</p> - -<p>Now I think it must be admitted that there is something paradoxical -in such a view. I think it may be admitted that, in holding it, the -philosopher of Common Sense departs from Common Sense at least as far -in one direction as his opponents had done in another. But I think -that there is some excuse for those who hold it: I think that, in one -respect, they are more in the right than those who do not hold it—than -those who hold that my own observations do give me a reason for -believing in the existence of other people. For those who hold that my -observations do give me a reason, have, I believe, universally supposed -that the reason lies in a part of my observations, in which no such -reason is to be found. This is why I have chosen to ask the question: -<i>What</i> reason do my observations give me for believing that any other -person has any particular perceptions or beliefs? I wish to consider -<i>which</i> among the things which I observe will give such a reason. For -this is a question to which no answer, that I have ever seen, appears -to me to be correct. Those who have asked it have, so far as I know, -answered it <i>either</i> by denying that my observations give me any reason -<i>or</i> by pointing to a part of my observations, which, as it seems to -me, really do give none. Those who deny are, it seems to me, right in -holding that the reason given by those who affirm is no reason. And -their correct opinion on this point will, I think, partly serve to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> -explain their denial. They have supposed that if our observations give -us any reason at all for asserting the existence of other people, that -reason must lie where it has been supposed to lie by those who hold -that they do give a reason. And then, finding that this assigned reason -is no reason, they have assumed that there is no other.</p> - -<p>I am proposing then to ask: Which among the observations, which I make, -and which (as we commonly suppose) are similar in kind to those which -all or almost all men make, will give a reason for supposing that the -existence of any of them is generally connected with the existence of -certain kinds of perception or belief in other people? And in order to -answer this question, it is obvious we must first consider two others. -We must consider, in the first place: Of what nature must observations -be, if they are to give a reason for any generalisation asserting that -the existence of one kind of thing is generally connected with that of -another? And we must consider in the second place: What kinds of things -do we observe?</p> - -<p>Now to the first of these questions I am not going to attempt to give -a complete answer. The question concerning the rules of Inductive -Logic, which is the question at issue, is an immensely difficult and -intricate question. And I am not going to attempt to say, what kind of -observations are <i>sufficient</i> to justify a generalisation. But it is -comparatively easy to point out that a certain kind of observations are -<i>necessary</i> to justify a generalisation: and this is all that I propose -to do. I wish to point out certain conditions which observations must -satisfy, if they are to justify a generalisation; without in any way -implying that all observations which do satisfy these conditions, -<i>will</i> justify a generalisation. The conditions, I shall mention, are -ones which are certainly <i>not</i> sufficient to justify<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> a generalisation; -but they are, I think, conditions, without which no generalisation can -be justified. If a particular kind of observations do <i>not</i> satisfy -these conditions, we can say with certainty that those observations -give us <i>no</i> reason for believing in the existence of other people; -though, with regard to observations which <i>do</i> satisfy them, we shall -only be able to say that they <i>may</i> give a reason.</p> - -<p>What conditions, then, must observations satisfy, if they are to -justify a generalisation? Let us suppose that the generalisation to -be justified is one which asserts that the existence of a kind of -object, which we will call A, is generally preceded, accompanied, or -followed by the existence of a kind of object, which we call B. A, for -instance, might be the hearing of a certain word by one person, and B -the thought of that which we call the meaning of the word, in another -person; and the generalisation to be justified might be that when one -person hears a word, not spoken by himself, someone else has generally -thought of the meaning of that word. What must I have observed, if the -generalisation that the existence of A is generally preceded by the -existence of B, is to be justified by my observations? One first point, -I think, is plain. I must have observed both some object, which is in -some respects like A, and which I will call <i>α</i>, and also some object -in some respects like B which I will call <i>β</i>: I must have observed -both <i>α</i> and <i>β</i>, and also I must have observed <i>β</i> preceding <i>α.</i> -This, at least, I must have observed. But I do not pretend to say <i>how</i> -like <i>α</i> and <i>β</i> must be to A and B; nor do I pretend to say how often -I must have observed <i>β</i> preceding <i>α</i>, although it is generally held -that I must have observed this more than once. These are questions, -which would have to be discussed if we were trying to discover what -observations were <i>sufficient</i> to justify the generalisation that the -existence of A is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> generally preceded by that of B. But I am only -trying to lay down the minimum which is <i>necessary</i> to justify this -generalisation; and therefore I am content to say that we must have -observed something more or less like B preceding something more or less -like A, at least once.</p> - -<p>But there is yet another minimum condition. If my observation of <i>β</i> -preceding <i>α</i> is to justify the generalisation that the <i>existence</i> of -A is generally preceded by the <i>existence</i> of B, it is plain, I think, -that both the <i>β</i> and the <i>α,</i> which I observed, must have <i>existed</i> -or been <i>real</i>; and that also the existence of <i>β</i> must <i>really</i> have -preceded that of <i>α</i>. It is plain that if, when I observed <i>α</i> and -<i>β</i>, <i>α</i> existed but <i>β</i> did not, this observation could give me no -reason to suppose that on another occasion when A existed, <i>β</i> <i>would</i> -exist. Or again, if, when I observed <i>β</i> preceding <i>α</i>, both <i>β</i> and -<i>α</i> existed, but the existence of <i>β</i> did not <i>really</i> precede that of -α, but, on the contrary, followed it, this observation could certainly -give me no reason to suppose that, in general, the existence of A was -<i>preceded</i> by the existence of B. Indeed this condition that what is -observed must have been <i>real</i> might be said to be included in the very -meaning of the word "observation." We should, in this connection, say -that we had <i>not</i> observed <i>β</i> preceding <i>α,</i> unless <i>β</i> and <i>α</i> were -both real, and <i>β</i> had really preceded <i>α.</i> If I say "I have <i>observed</i> -that, on one occasion, my hearing of the word 'moon' was followed by -my imagining a luminous silvery disc," I commonly mean to include in -my statement the assertion that I did, on that occasion, really hear -the word "moon," and really did have a visual image of a luminous -disc, and that my perception was really followed by my imagination. -If it were proved to me that this had not really happened, I should -admit that I had not really observed it. But though this condition<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> -that, if observation is to give reason for a generalisation, what is -observed must be real, may thus be said to be implied in the very -word "observation," it was necessary for me to mention the condition -explicitly. It was necessary, because, as I shall presently show, -we do and must also use the word "observation" in a sense in which -the assertion "I observe A" by no means includes the assertion "A -exists"—in a sense in which it <i>may</i> be true that though I did observe -A, yet A did <i>not</i> exist.</p> - -<p>But there is also, I think, a third necessary condition which is very -apt to be overlooked. It may, perhaps, be allowed that observation -gives some reason for the proposition that hens' eggs are generally -laid by hens. I do not mean to say that any one man's observation can -give a reason for this proposition: I do not assume either that it can -or that it cannot. Nor do I mean to make any assumption as to what -must be meant by the words "hens" and "eggs," if this proposition is -to be true. I am quite willing to allow for the moment that if it is -true at all, we must understand by "hens" and "eggs," objects very -unlike that which we directly observe, when we see a hen in a yard, or -an egg on the breakfast-table. I am willing to allow the possibility -that, as some Idealists would say, the proposition "Hens lay eggs" is -false, unless we mean by it: A certain kind of collection of spirits or -monads sometimes has a certain intelligible relation to another kind of -collection of spirits or monads. I am willing to allow the possibility -that, as Reid and some scientists would say, the proposition "Hens -lay eggs" is false, if we mean by it anything more than that: Certain -configurations of invisible material particles sometimes have a certain -spatio-temporal relation to another kind of configuration of invisible -material particles. Or again I am willing to allow, with certain -other philosophers,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> that we must, if it is to be true, interpret -this proposition as meaning that certain kinds of sensations have to -certain other kinds a relation which may be expressed by saying that -the one kind of sensations "lay" the other kind. Or again, as other -philosophers say, the proposition "Hens lay eggs" may possibly mean: -Certain sensations of mine <i>would</i>, under certain conditions, have to -certain other sensations of mine a relation which may be expressed by -saying that the one set would "lay" the other set. But whatever the -proposition "Hens' eggs are generally laid by hens" may <i>mean</i>, most -philosophers would, I think, allow that, in some sense or other, this -proposition was true. And they would also I think allow that we have -<i>some</i> reason for it; and that <i>part</i> of this reason at all events lies -in observation: they would allow that we should have no reason for it -unless certain things had been observed, which have been observed. -Few, I think, would say that the existence of an egg "intrinsically -points" to that of a hen, in such a sense that, even if we had had no -experience of any kind concerning the manner in which objects like eggs -are connected with animals like hens, the mere inspection of an egg -would justify the assertion: A hen has probably existed.</p> - -<p>I assume, then, that objects having all the characteristics which -hens' eggs have (whatever these may be) are generally laid by hens -(whatever hens may be); and I assume that, if we have any reason -for this generalisation at all, observation gives us some reason -for it. But now, let us suppose that the only observations we had -made were those which we should commonly describe by saying that we -had seen a hen laying an egg. I do not say that any number of such -observations, by themselves, would be <i>sufficient</i> to justify our -generalisation: I think it is plain that they would not. But let us -suppose,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> for the moment, that we had observed nothing else which bore -upon the connection between hens and eggs; and that, if therefore -our generalisation was justified by any observations at all, it was -justified by these. We are supposing, then, that the observations -which we describe as "seeing hens lay eggs" give some reason for the -generalisation that eggs of that kind are generally laid by hens. And -if these observations give reason for this, obviously <i>in a sense</i> -they give reason for the generalisation that the existence of such an -egg is generally preceded by that of a hen; and hence also, they give -us reason to suppose that if such an egg exists, a hen has probably -existed also—that unless a hen had existed, the egg would not have -existed. But the point to which I wish to call attention is that it -is <i>only</i> in a limited sense that they do give reason for this. They -only give us reason to suppose that, for each egg, there has existed a -hen, which was at some time <i>near</i> the place where the egg in question -then was, and which existed at a time <i>near</i> to that at which the egg -began to exist. The only kind of hens, whose existence they do give us -reason to suppose, are hens, of which each was at some time in spatial -and temporal proximity (or, if Idealists prefer, in the relations which -are the "intelligible counterparts" of these) to an egg. They give us -no information at all about the existence of hens (if there are any) -which never came within a thousand miles of an egg, or which were dead -a thousand years before any egg existed. That is to say, they <i>do</i> -give us reason to suppose that, if a particular egg exists, there has -probably existed a hen which was at some time <i>near</i> that egg; but -they give us no reason to suppose that, if a particular egg exists, -there must have existed a hen which never came near that egg. They -<i>do</i> give us reason to suppose that, for each egg, there has probably -existed a hen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> which at some time stood to the egg in question in that -relation which we have observed to hold between an egg and a hen, when -we observed the hen laying an egg. But they give us no reason to infer -from the existence of an egg any other kind of hen: any hen which -<i>never</i> stood to the egg in the relation in which we have observed that -some hens do stand to eggs.</p> - -<p>What I wish to suggest is that this condition is a universal condition -for sound inductions. If the observation of β preceding <i>α</i> can ever -give us any reason at all for supposing that the existence of A is -generally preceded by that of B, it can at most only give us reason -to suppose that the existence of an A is generally preceded by that -of a B <i>which stands to our A in the same relation in which</i>β <i>has -been observed to stand to</i> α. It cannot give the least reason for -supposing that the existence of an A must have been preceded by that -of a B, which did <i>not</i> stand to A in the observed relation, but in -some quite different one. If we are to have any reason to infer from -the existence of an A the existence of such a B, the reason must lie in -some different observations. That this is so, in the case of hens' eggs -and hens, is, I think, obvious: and, if the rule is <i>not</i> universal, -some reason should at least be given for supposing that it does apply -in one case and not in another.</p> - -<p>Having thus attempted to point out some conditions which seem to be -necessary, though not <i>sufficient</i>, where observation is to give any -reason for a generalisation, I may now proceed to my second preliminary -question. What kinds of things do we observe?</p> - -<p>In order to illustrate how much and how little I mean by "observation" -or "direct perception," I will take as an instance a very common -visual perception. Most of us are familiar with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> experience which -we should describe by saying that we had seen a red book and a blue -book side by side upon a shelf. What exactly can we be said to observe -or directly perceive when we have such an experience? We certainly -observe one colour, which we call blue, and a different colour, which -we call red; each of these we observe as having a particular size and -shape; and we observe also these two coloured patches as having to one -another the spatial relation which we express by saying they are side -by side. All this we certainly see or directly perceive <i>now,</i> whatever -may have been the process by which we have come to perceive so much. -But when we say, as in ordinary talk we should, that the objects we -perceive are <i>books,</i> we certainly mean to ascribe to them properties, -which, in a sense which we all understand, are not actually seen by -us, at the moment when we are merely looking at two books on a shelf -two yards off. And all such properties I mean to exclude as not being -then <i>observed</i> or <i>directly perceived</i> by us. When I speak of what -we <i>observe,</i> when we see two books on a shelf, I mean to limit the -expression to that which is <i>actually seen.</i> And, thus understood, the -expression does include colours, and the size and shape of colours, and -spatial relations in three dimensions between these patches of colour, -but it includes nothing else.</p> - -<p>But I am also using observation in a sense in which we can be said -actually to observe a movement. We commonly say that we can sometimes -<i>see</i> a red billiard ball moving towards a white one on a green table. -And, here again, I do not mean to include in what is directly perceived -or observed, all that we mean by saying that the two objects perceived -are billiard-balls. But I do mean to include what (we should say) we -<i>actually see.</i> We actually see a more or less round red patch moving<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> -towards a more or less round white patch; we <i>see</i> the stretch of green -between them diminishing in size. And this perception is not merely the -same as a series of perceptions—first a perception of a red patch with -a green stretch of one size between it and the white; then a perception -of a red patch with a green stretch of a different size between it and -the white; and so on. In order to perceive a movement we must have a -different perception from any one of these or from the sum of them. We -must <i>actually see</i> the green stretch diminishing in size.</p> - -<p>Now it is undoubtedly difficult, in some instances, to decide precisely -what is perceived in this sense and what is not. But I hope I have -said enough to show that I am using "perceive" and "observe" in a -sense in which, on a given occasion, it is easy to decide that <i>some</i> -things certainly are perceived, and other things, as certainly, are -not perceived. I am using it in a sense in which we do perceive such -a complex object as a white patch moving towards a red one on a green -field; but I am not using it in any sense in which we could be said to -"perceive" or "observe" that what we saw moving was a billiard-ball. -And in the same way I think we can distinguish roughly between what, -on any given occasion, we perceive, as we say, "by any one of the -other senses," and what we do not perceive by it. We can say with -certainty that, on any given occasion, there are certain kinds of -"content" which we are actually hearing, and others which we are <i>not</i> -actually hearing; though with regard to some again it is difficult to -say whether we are actually hearing them or not. And similarly we can -distinguish with certainty in some instances, between what we are on -a given occasion, actually smelling or feeling, and what we are not -actually smelling or feeling.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span></p> - -<p>But now, besides these kinds of "things," "objects," or "contents," -which we perceive, as we say, "by the senses," there is also another -kind which we can be said to observe. Not only can I observe a red and -blue book side by side; I can also observe myself observing them. I can -perceive a red patch moving towards a white, and I can also perceive my -perception of this movement. And what I wish to make as plain as I can -is that my perception of the movement of a coloured patch can at least -be distinguished from that movement itself. I wish to make it plain -that to observe a coloured patch moving is to observe one thing; and -to observe myself observing a coloured patch moving is another. When -I observe my own perception of a movement, I observe something <i>more</i> -than when I merely observe the movement, and something very different -from the movement. I may perceive a red and a blue book side by side on -a shelf; and at another time I may perceive a red ball moving towards a -white. The red and blue patch, of one shape, at rest side by side, are -different from the red, of another shape, moving towards the white; and -yet, when I say that both are "perceived," I mean by "perceived" one -and the same thing. And since, thus, two different things may both be -perceived, there must also be some difference between each of them and -what is meant by saying that it is perceived. Indeed, in precisely the -same way In which I may observe a spatial relation between a red patch -and a blue (when I observe them "side by side") I do, when I observe my -own perception of them, observe a spatial relation between it and them. -I observe a distance between my perception and the red and blue books -which I perceive, comparable in magnitude with the breadth or height -of the blue book, just as these are comparable in magnitude with one -another. And<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> when I say I observe a distance between my perception -of a red book and that red book itself, I do not mean that I observe -a distance between my eyes, or any other part of what I call my body, -and the red patch in question. I am talking not of my eyes, but of my -actual perception. I observe my perception of a book to be near the -book and further from the table, in exactly the same sense in which I -observe the book to be near the shelf on which it stands, and further -from the table. And just as, if the distance between a red patch and -a white is to be perceived, the red patch must be different from the -white, so, if I perceive a certain distance between my perception and -the red patch, my perception must be different from the red patch which -I perceive.</p> - -<p>I assume, then, that we observe, on the one hand, coloured patches of -certain shapes and sizes, and their spatial relations to one another, -together with all the other kinds of "contents," which we should -usually be said to perceive "through the senses." And, on the other -hand, we also sometimes observe our own perceptions of such "contents" -and our thoughts. And these two kinds of "content" are different from -one another: my perception of a red patch with gold letters on it, -is not itself a red patch with gold letters on it; and hence, when I -observe my perception of this patch, I observe something different from -that which I observe when I merely perceive the patch. Either of these -two kinds of "content"—either colours, moving or at rest, sounds, -smells, and all the rest—or, on the other hand, my perceptions of -these—either of these two kinds, or both, might conceivably, since -both are observed, give grounds for a generalisation concerning what -exists. But, as I have said, if observations are to give any ground -for such a generalisation, it must be assumed that what Is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> observed -<i>exists</i> or is <i>real.</i> And since, as I have insisted, when I observe -my <i>perception</i> of a red patch with gold letters on it, I observe -something different from what I observed when I merely observed a red -patch with gold letters on it, it follows that to assume the existence -of my perception of this red and gold is <i>not</i> the same thing as to -assume the existence of the red and gold itself.</p> - -<p>But what, it may be asked, do I mean by this property of "existence" or -"reality," which may, it would seem, belong to every content, which I -observe, or may again belong to none, or which may belong to some and -not to others? What is this property which may belong to my perception -of a movement, and yet not belong to the movement perceived, or which -may again belong to the movement perceived and not to my perception of -it, or which may again belong to both or to neither?</p> - -<p>It is necessary, I think, to ask this question at this point, because -there are some philosophers who hold that, in the case of some kinds -of "content," at all events, to say that they "exist" is to say that -they are "perceived." Some hold that to say "A exists" is to say -neither more nor less than "A is perceived"—that the two expressions -are perfect synonyms; and others again would say that by "A exists -or is real" we may mean <i>more</i> than that "A is perceived," but that -we must at least mean this. Now, I have hitherto used the word -"existence" pretty freely, and I think that, when I used it, I used -it in its ordinary sense. I think it will generally have suggested to -you precisely what I meant to convey, and I think that, in some cases -at all events, it will not even have occurred to you to doubt whether -you did understand what I meant by it. But, if these philosophers are -right, then, if you <i>have</i> understood what I meant by it, I have all -along been using it in a sense, which renders the end of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> my last -paragraph perfect nonsense. If these philosophers are right, then, when -I assert that what <i>is</i> perceived may yet <i>not</i> exist, I am really -asserting that what <i>is</i> perceived may yet <i>not</i> be perceived—I am -contradicting myself. I am, of course, quite unaware that I am doing -so. But these philosophers would say <i>either</i> you are contradicting -yourself, <i>or</i> you are not using the word "exists" in its ordinary -sense. And either of these alternatives would be fatal to my purpose. -If I am not using the word in its ordinary sense, then I shall not be -understood by anyone; and, if I am contradicting myself, then what I -say will not be worth understanding.</p> - -<p>Now, with one class of these philosophers—the class to which, I -think, Berkeley belongs—I think I can put myself right comparatively -easily. The philosophers I mean are those who say that it is only in -the case of one particular class of "contents" (the kind of "content" -which Berkeley calls "ideas") that to say "the 'content' A exists" -is to say "A is perceived," and who admit that in the case of other -contents—myself and my perceptions and thoughts, for example—to say -that <i>these</i> exist or are real, is to say of them something different -from this. These philosophers admit, that is to say, that the word -"exists" has two different senses: and that in only one of these senses -is it synonymous with the words "is perceived." When (they hold) I -say of such a content as a red patch with gold letters on it that -it "exists" I <i>do</i> mean that it is perceived; but when I say of my -<i>perception</i> of such a patch that <i>it</i> exists, I do <i>not</i> mean that -my perception is perceived but something different from this. Now, it -would be nothing strange that one and the same word should be used in -two different senses; many words are used in many different senses. -But it would, I think, be something very strange indeed, if in the -case of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> a word which we constantly apply to all sorts of different -objects, we should uniformly apply it to one large class of object in -the one sense and the one sense only and the other large class in the -other sense and the other sense only. Usually, in the case of such -ambiguous words, it happens that, in different contexts, we apply it -to one and the same object in <i>both</i> senses. We sometimes wish to -say of a given object that it has the one property, and sometimes we -wish to say of the same object that it has the other property; and -hence we apply the same word to the same object, at one time in one -sense, and at another in the other. I think, therefore, that, even -if there were these two different senses of the word "existence," it -would be very unlikely that we should not commonly, in some contexts, -apply it in the sense, in which (as is alleged) it does apply to -perceptions, to "contents" which are not perceptions. Indeed, I think, -it is quite plain that we constantly do ask, with regard to what is -not a perception, whether <i>it</i> exists, in precisely the same sense, -in which we ask, with regard to a perception, whether <i>it</i> exists. We -ask in precisely the same sense: Was the Roc a real bird, or merely an -imaginary one? and, did Sindbad's perception of the Roc really exist, -or is it a fiction that he perceived a Roc? I think, therefore, that -the sense in which these philosophers admit that we do apply the word -"existence" to perceptions, is one in which we also commonly apply it -to "contents" other than perceptions. But, even if this is not the -case, I can set myself right with them by a simple explanation. I -need merely explain that the sense in which I am proposing to enquire -whether a red patch exists, is precisely the sense in which they admit -that my perception of a red patch does exist. And in this sense, it is -plain that to suppose that a thing may exist, which is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> perceived, -or that it may <i>not</i> exist, although it is perceived, is at least not -self-contradictory.</p> - -<p>But there may be other philosophers who will say that, in the case of -a perception also, to say that it exists or is real is to say that -it is perceived—either that alone or something more as well. And to -these philosophers I would first point out that they are admitting -that the proposition "This perception is real" is significant. There -is some sense or other in which we may say: "Alexander's perception of -an elephant was real or did exist, but Sindbad's perception of a Roc -was <i>not</i> real—never did exist": the latter proposition is, in some -sense or other, not self-contradictory. And then I would ask of them: -When they say, that to call a perception "real" is to assert that it -is perceived, do they mean by this that to call it real is to assert -that it is <i>really</i> perceived, or not? If they say "No," then they are -asserting that to call a perception "real" is merely to say that it was -perceived in the sense in which Sindbad <i>did</i> perceive a Roc: they are -asserting that to call it "real" is not to say, in any sense, that it -was <i>really</i> perceived: they are asserting that to call a perception -"real" is to say that it was perceived, in some sense quite other than -that in which we ordinarily use the word: for we certainly commonly -mean, when we say "A was perceived," that a perception of A was "real": -we should commonly say that Sindbad did <i>not</i> perceive a Roc—meaning -that no such perception ever did exist. I do not think they do mean -this; and, in any case, if they do, I think it is plain that they -are wrong. When we say that a perception is "real," we certainly do -not mean merely that it is the object of another perception, which -may itself be quite unreal—purely Imaginary. I assume, therefore, -that when they say: To call a perception "real" is to say that it is -perceived; they mean, what we should naturally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> understand, namely, -that: To call it "real" is to say that it is <i>really</i> perceived—to say -that it is the object of another perception, which is also <i>real</i> in -the same sense. And, if they mean this, then what they say is certainly -untrue. Their definition of reality is circular. It cannot be the case -that the <i>only</i> sense in which a perception may be said to be real, is -one in which to call it so is to assert that not it alone, but another -perception is real also. It cannot be the case that the assertion "A is -real" is <i>identical</i> with the assertion "A and B are both real," where -A and B are different, and "real" is used in the same sense as applied -to both. If it is to be true that the assertion "A is real" <i>ever</i>, in -any sense, includes the assertion "A is <i>really</i> perceived," there must -be another sense of the word "real," in which to assert "A is real" is -to assert <i>less</i> than "A is <i>really</i> perceived"—the sense, namely, in -which we here assert that the <i>perception</i> of A is real.</p> - -<p>We find, therefore, that the other class of philosophers were at least -right in this: they were right in allowing that the sense in which -we commonly say that our perceptions exist is one in which "exist" -does not include, even as a part of its meaning, "is perceived." We -find that there is a common sense of the word "existence," in which -to say "A exists" must mean <i>less</i> than "A is <i>really</i> perceived": -since, otherwise, the only possible definition of the word "existence" -would be a circular definition. And I may point out that two other -definitions, which have been sometimes suggested by philosophers as -giving what we commonly mean by "reality" or "existence" are vitiated -by the same fault—they also are circular. Some philosophers have -sometimes suggested that when we call a thing "real," we mean that it -is "systematically connected" in some way with other things. But,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> -when we look into their meaning, we find that what they mean is (what, -indeed, is alone plausible)—systematically connected with other -<i>real</i> things. And it may possibly be the case that we sometimes use -the word "real" in this sense: but, at least, it must be certainly -the case, that, if we do, we <i>also</i> use it in another and simpler -sense—the sense in which it is employed in the proposed definition. -And other philosophers have suggested that what we mean by "real" -is—"connected in some way with a purpose—helping or hindering, -or the object of a purpose." But if we look into their meaning, we -find they mean—connected with a <i>real</i> purpose. And hence, even if -we do sometimes mean by "real," "connected with a <i>real</i> purpose," -it is plain we also sometimes mean by "real" something simpler than -this—that namely, which is meant by "real" in the proposed definition.</p> - -<p>It is certain, therefore, that we do commonly use the word "existence" -in a sense, in which to say "A exists" is <i>not</i> to say "A is -perceived," or "A is systematically connected with other real things," -or "A is purposive." There is a simpler sense than any of these—the -sense in which we say that our own perceptions do exist, and that -Sindbad's perceptions did not exist. But when I say this, I am by no -means denying that what exists, in this simple sense, may not always -<i>also</i> exist in all the others; and that what exists in any of them -may not <i>also</i> always exist in this. It is quite possible that what -exists is always <i>also</i> perceived, and that what is perceived always -<i>also</i> exists. All that I am saying is that, even if this is so, this -proposition is significant—is not merely a proposition about the -meaning of a word. It is not self-contradictory to suppose that some -things which exist are not perceived, and that some things which are -perceived do not exist.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span></p> - -<p>But, it may be asked: What is this common simple sense of the word -"exists"? For my own part, it seems to me to be so simple that it -cannot be expressed in other words, except those which are recognised -as its synonyms. I think we are all perfectly familiar with its -meaning: it is the meaning which you understood me to have throughout -this paper, until I began this discussion. I think we can perceive at -once what is meant by asserting that my perception of black marks on a -white ground is "real," and that no such perception as Sindbad's of a -Roc was ever "real": we are perfectly familiar with the property which -the one perception is affirmed to possess, and the other to be without. -And I think, as I have said, that this property is a simple one. But, -whatever it is, this, which we ordinarily mean, is what I mean by -"existence" or "reality." And this property, we have seen, is certainly -neither identical with nor inclusive of that complex one which we mean -by the words "is perceived."</p> - -<p>I may now, then, at last approach the main question of my paper. -Which among the "contents" which I observe will give me reason to -suppose that my observation of some of them is generally preceded -or accompanied or followed by the existence of certain particular -perceptions, thoughts or feelings in another person? I have explained -that the "contents" which I actually observe may be divided into two -classes: on the one hand, those which, as we commonly say, we perceive -"through the senses"; and, on the other hand, my perceptions of these -last, my thoughts, and my feelings. I have explained that if any -of these observed contents are to give reason for a generalisation -about what exists, <i>they</i> must exist. And I have explained that with -regard to both classes of "contents" I am using the word "exist" in -precisely the same sense—a sense,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> in which it is certainly not -self-contradictory to suppose that what <i>is</i> perceived, does not exist, -and that what is <i>not</i> perceived, does exist; and, in which, therefore, -the assumption that a red patch with gold letters on it exists, is a -<i>different</i> assumption from the assumption that my <i>perception</i> of -a red patch with gold letters on it exists; and the assumption that -my <i>perception</i> of a red patch with gold letters on it exists, is a -<i>different</i> assumption from the assumption that a red patch with gold -letters on it exists.</p> - -<p>What, then, that we observe, can give us any reason for believing that -anyone else has certain particular perceptions, thoughts or feelings? -It has, I think, been very commonly assumed that the observation of -my own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, can, by itself, give me -such a reason. And I propose, therefore, to examine this assumption. -If, as I hope to show, it is false; it will then follow, that if our -own observation gives us any reason whatever, for believing in the -existence of other persons, we must assume the existence, not only -of our own perceptions, thoughts and feelings, but also of some, at -least, among that other class of data, which I may now, for the sake of -brevity, call "sense-contents"; we must assume that some of them exist, -in precisely the same sense in which we assume that our perceptions, -thoughts, and feelings exist.</p> - -<p>The theory which I propose to examine is, then, the following. My -observation of my own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions may, it -asserts, give me some reason to suppose that another person has -thoughts, feelings, and perceptions similar to some of mine. Let us -assume, accordingly, that my own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions -do exist; but that none of the "sense-contents," which I also observe, -do so. Where among my perceptions am<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> I to look for any which might -conceivably give me a reason for supposing the existence of other -perceptions similar to my own? It is obvious where I must look. I have -perceptions which I call perceptions of other people's bodies; and -these are certainly similar in many respects to other perceptions of -my own body. But I also observe that certain kinds of perceptions of -my own body are preceded by certain other perceptions, thoughts, or -feelings of mine. I may, for instance, observe that when I perceive -my hand suddenly catch hold of my foot in a particular way, this -perception was preceded by a particular kind of feeling of pain. I -may, perhaps, observe this often enough to justify the generalisation -that the perception of that particular motion of my body is generally -preceded by that particular feeling of pain. And in this way I may -perhaps have reason for quite a number of generalisations which assert -that particular kinds of perceptions of my own body are generally -preceded by other particular kinds of perceptions, thoughts, or -feelings of my own.</p> - -<p>But I may also, no doubt, have the perception, which I call the -perception of another person's hand catching hold of his foot, in a -manner similar to that in which I have perceived my own hand catch -hold of my own foot. And my perception of another person's hand -catching hold of his foot may undoubtedly be similar in many respects -to my perception of my own hand catching hold of my own foot. But -I shall not observe the same kind of feeling of pain preceding my -perception of <i>his</i> hand catching hold of his foot, which I have -observed preceding my perception of <i>my</i> hand catching hold of my -foot. Will my generalisation, then, give me any reason to suppose -that nevertheless my perception of his hand catching hold of his foot -<i>is</i> preceded by a similar feeling of pain, not in me but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> in him? -We undoubtedly do assume that when I perceive another person's body -making movements similar to those which I have observed my own body -making, this perception has generally been preceded by some feeling or -perception of his similar to that which I have observed to precede my -perception of similar movements in my own body. We do assume this; and -it is precisely the kind of generalisation, which, I have insisted, -must be admitted to be true. But my present question is: Will such -observations as I have described give any reason for thinking any -such generalisation true? I think it is plain that they will not give -the slightest reason for thinking so. In the first place, all the -perceptions which I call perceptions of another person's body differ -very considerably from any of those which I call perceptions of my -own. But I am willing to waive this objection. I am not offering any -theory as to what degree of likeness is <i>sufficient</i> to justify a -generalisation: and therefore I will allow that the degree of likeness -<i>may</i> be sufficient. But there remains an objection which is, I think, -quite fatal to the proposed inference. This objection is that the -inference in question plainly does not satisfy the third condition -which I suggested above as <i>necessary</i>, wherever any generalisation -is to be justified by observation. I am willing to allow that my -observations of the fact that my perception of a certain movement in -my own body is preceded by a certain feeling of pain, <i>will</i> justify -the generalisation that my perception of any such movement, whether in -my own body <i>or</i> in that of another person, is generally preceded by a -similar feeling of pain. And I allow, therefore, that when I perceive a -certain movement in another's body, it <i>is</i> probable that the feeling -of pain exists, though I do not perceive it. But, if it <i>is</i> probable -that such a feeling of pain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> exists, such a feeling must stand <i>in the -same relation</i> to my perception of the movement in another person's -body, in which a similar feeling of pain has been observed by me to -stand to my perception of such a movement in my own body. That is to -say the only kind of feeling of pain, which my observations do justify -me in inferring, if (as I admit they may) they justify me in inferring -any at all, is a feeling of pain of <i>my own.</i> They cannot possibly -justify the belief in the existence of any such feeling <i>except</i> one -which stands to my perception in the same relation in which my feelings -do stand to <i>my</i> perceptions—one, that is to say, which is my own. I -have no more reason to believe that the feeling of pain which probably -precedes my perception of a movement in another person's body can be -the feeling <i>of another person</i>, than, in my former example, I had -reason to suppose that the hen, whose existence probably preceded that -of a given egg, could be a hen, which had never been near the egg in -question. The two cases are exactly analogous. I observe a feeling of -pain <i>of my own</i> preceding a perception <i>of my own.</i> I observe the -two, that is to say, as standing to one another, in those relations -(whatever they may be) in which any perception of mine stands to any -other thought, perception or feeling of mine, and which are, at all -events, different from any relation in which a perception or feeling of -another person can stand to one of mine. I never perceive the feeling -and the perception as standing in any other relation. In any case, -therefore, where I do observe something like the perception, but do -not observe the feeling, I can only be justified (<i>if</i> justified in -inferring any feeling at all), in inferring an unperceived feeling <i>of -my own.</i></p> - -<p>For this reason I think that no observations of my own perceptions, -feelings or thoughts can give me the slightest reason for supposing a -connection<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> between any of them and any feeling, perception, or thought -in another person. The argument is perfectly general, since <i>all</i> -my perceptions, feelings and thoughts do have to one another those -relations in virtue of which I call them mine; and which, when I talk -of a perception, feeling or thought as being <i>another persons</i>, I mean -to say that it has <i>not</i> got to any of mine. I can, therefore, merely -from observation of <i>this</i> class of data never obtain the slightest -reason for belief in the existence of a feeling, perception, or thought -which does <i>not</i> stand in these relations to one of mine—which <i>is,</i> -that is to say, the feeling, perception or thought, of another person. -But how different is the case, if we adopt the hypothesis, which I wish -to recommend—if we assume the existence of that other class of data -which I have called "sense-contents!" On this hypothesis, that which I -perceive, when I perceive a movement of my own body, is <i>real</i>; that -which I perceive when I perceive a movement of another's body is <i>real</i> -also. I can now observe not merely the relation between my <i>perception</i> -of a movement of my body and my own feelings, but also a relation -between a <i>real</i> movement of my body and my own feelings. And there -is no reason why I should not be justified in inferring that another -person's feelings stand <i>in the same relation</i> to the real movements of -his body, in which I observe my own feelings to stand to similar real -movements of mine.</p> - -<p>But there is another argument which may still be urged by those who -hold that my own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, by themselves, -may be sufficient to justify a belief in the existence of other -persons. It may be said: "Our observation of our own perceptions may be -sufficient to <i>verify</i> or <i>confirm</i> the hypothesis that other persons -exist. This hypothesis is one which "works." The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> assumption that other -persons have particular thoughts, feelings and perceptions enables us -to predict that they will have others and that our own perceptions will -be modified accordingly: it enables us to predict future perceptions of -our own; and we find that these predictions are constantly verified. -We observe that we do have the perceptions, which the hypothesis leads -us to expect we should have. In short, our perceptions occur just as -they would do, <i>if</i> the hypothesis were true; our perceptions behave -<i>as if</i> other persons had the perceptions, thoughts and feelings which -we suppose them to have. Surely, then, they confirm the truth of the -hypothesis—they give some reason to think it probably true?"</p> - -<p>All this, which I have supposed an opponent to urge, I admit to be -true. I admit that the fact that an hypothesis works may give some -reason to suppose it true. I admit that my perceptions occur just as -they would do, if other people had the perceptions which I suppose them -to have. I admit that that assumption enables me to make predictions as -to future perceptions of my own, and that I observe these predictions -to come true. I admit all this. But I admit it only in a sense in -which it in no way conflicts with the position which I am maintaining. -The words, which I have put into the mouth of a supposed opponent, -may, in fact, mean three different things, which it is worth while to -distinguish. In two of those meanings, which I shall admit to be true -and which are what make them seem plausible, they do not deny what I -assert. Only in the third sense are they an objection to my position: -and in that sense they are false.</p> - -<p>One of the meanings which I admit to be true is as follows:—I have not -only admitted but insisted that some of my perceptions are just such -as would occur if another person had certain particular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> feelings: I -have insisted that I should not have just those perceptions which I do -have, unless some other person had certain feelings and perceptions -which I suppose him to have. And I admit further that the fact that I -have one of the perceptions in question—for instance, that of another -person's hand catching hold of his foot—this fact, <i>together with</i> -the true assumption that I should not have this perception, unless -some other person felt pain, will justify the assertion that another -person has felt pain. In this sense, I admit, the fact that I perceive -what I do perceive will give me reason to suppose that another person -has felt pain. And, on the other hand, I also admit that the fact -that I have this perception, <i>together with</i> the true assumption that -when I have it another person has felt pain, may help to justify the -assumption that the perception in question is one which I should not -have had unless another person had felt pain—it helps to justify the -generalisation that certain of my perceptions are just what would -occur, <i>if</i> another person had felt pain. In general terms, that is to -say, I admit that the occurrence of B, <i>together with</i> the assumption -that B is just the sort of thing which would occur if A existed, will -justify the assertion that A exists in that particular instance. And -I also admit that the occurrence of B, <i>together with</i> the assumption -that A exists in that particular instance, may help to justify the -assumption that B is just the sort of thing which would exist, if A -existed. In other words: When it is said that the observation of B's -existence confirms or verifies the assumption that A exists, either of -two things may be meant. It may be meant that, assuming B to be the -sort of thing which would exist if A existed, the observation of B -confirms the assumption that A exists <i>in this particular instance.</i> -Or, on the other hand, it may be meant that, assuming<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> A to exist -in this particular instance, the observation of B may confirm the -generalisation, that B is just the sort of thing which would exist, -if A existed. <i>Either</i> the one <i>or</i> the other of these two things is, -I think, what is generally assumed, when it is assumed that what we -do observe confirms or verifies the assumption that there exists some -particular thing which we don't observe. And I am admitting that both -these assumptions are true.</p> - -<p>But neither of them conflicts in any way with the position I am -maintaining. What I am maintaining is that no observation of my own -perceptions, <i>by itself,</i> can confirm the generalisation that any one -of them <i>is</i> just what would occur if another person had a particular -feeling. I admit this generalisation to be true; and I admit that my -observation of my own perceptions and feelings may give me <i>reason</i> to -suppose that <i>if</i> another person has certain perceptions or feelings -<i>he</i> will also have certain others. What I deny is that they give -me the slightest reason to suppose that the existence of any such -feeling or perception in another has any connection with the existence -of any perception <i>of my own</i>—to suppose that any perception of my -own is the sort of thing which would occur <i>if</i> another person had a -particular feeling. What therefore, my opponent must affirm is that the -observation of a perception of my own <i>without</i> the assumption (which -Reid makes) that in that particular instance any feeling or perception -of another person, of any kind whatever, has preceded it, may give me -reason to suppose that that perception of my own is of a kind which is -generally preceded by a particular kind of feeling in another person. -And this, I think, is plainly false.</p> - -<p>But there is yet a third thing which may be meant, and which I -am willing to admit may be true. It may be said: "I believe many -generalisations of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> the following kind. I believe that when I have -a perception A, some other person has generally had a feeling X; I -believe that the existence of the feeling X is generally followed, in -the same person, by that of the feeling Y; and I believe also that -when another person has the feeling Y, I generally have the perception -B. I believe all this." And it must, I think, be admitted that we do -believe generalisations of this kind, and generalisations in which -there are not merely two steps between A and B, but a great number of -steps. "But then," it may be said, "my belief in this generalisation -causes me, when I observe my perception A, to expect that I shall have -the perception B; and such expectations, I observe, are constantly -realised." And this also, I think, must be admitted to be true. "But, -finally," it may be said, "beliefs which produce expectations which -are constantly realised are generally true. And hence the fact that -these beliefs of mine about the connection of feelings in other persons -with perceptions of my own do lead to expectations which are realised, -gives me reason to suppose that these generalisations are true and -hence that other persons do have particular kinds of feelings." -And I am willing to admit that this also is true. I am willing to -admit that true predictions can, as a rule, only be produced by true -beliefs. The generalisation that this is so, is, indeed, one which -can only be justified by the observations of beliefs, which are, in -some way, independently proved to be true; and hence, if it is to be -justified, without assuming the existence of anything other than my -own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, it can only be justified by -my observation that beliefs with regard to the manner in which <i>these</i> -succeed one another generally lead to true predictions. Whether the -observation of such beliefs <i>alone</i> could give sufficient reason for -it, is, I think, doubtful; but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> I am willing to admit that it may be -so. One thing, however, is, I think, quite plain: namely, that this -generalisation "Beliefs which lead to true predictions are generally -true" cannot be true, <i>unless</i> some other of the "contents" which I -observe, beside my own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, do exist. -That is to say, in giving a reason for supposing the existence of -other people, this generalisation also gives a reason for the very -theory which I am advocating, namely, that some of those data which -I have called "sense-contents" do exist. It does this, because it is -quite certain that beliefs in generalisations about the existence of -sense-contents <i>can</i> (and do) constantly lead to true predictions. The -belief that when I have observed a fire of a certain size in my grate, -something similar to what I have observed will continue to exist for -a certain time, can, and constantly does, lead to the true prediction -that, when I come back to my room in half an hour's time, I shall -observe a fire of a certain size still burning. We make predictions -on such grounds, I think, every day and all day long. And hence -unless such beliefs as that what I observe when I see a fire burning -<i>does</i> exist, <i>are</i> true, we certainly have no reason to suppose that -beliefs which lead to true predictions are generally true. And hence -on this hypothesis also it remains true: that, unless some of the -contents which I observe <i>other</i> than my own perceptions, thoughts, and -feelings, do exist, I cannot have the slightest reason for supposing -that the existence of certain perceptions of my own is generally -connected with that of certain perceptions, thoughts, or feelings in -any other person.</p> - -<p>I conclude therefore that, unless some of the observed data which I -have called sense-contents <i>do</i> exist, my own observations cannot give -me the slightest reason for believing that anybody else has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> ever had -any particular perception, thought, or feeling. And, having arrived -so far towards an answer to my first question: How do we know that -any other persons exist? I may now point out that precisely the same -answer must be given to my second question: How do we know that <i>any</i> -particular kind of thing exists, other than ourselves, our perceptions, -thoughts, and feelings, and what we directly perceive? There is a view -concerning what exists, which deserves, I think, much more respect than -it generally receives from philosophers nowadays. The view I mean is -the view that material objects, such as they are conceived by physical -science, do really exist. It is held by some persons (and Reid is among -them) that we <i>do</i> know of the existence, not only of other persons, -but also of the movements of matter in space. It is held that we do -know, with considerable precision, what kinds of movements of matter -generally precede my perception, when I have a particular perception. -It is held, for instance, that when I perceive a red and blue book side -by side on a shelf, at a certain distance from me, there have existed, -between two material objects, which may be called books, and another -kind of material object, which may be called my eyes, certain wave-like -motions of a material medium; that there have existed two different -sets of waves, of which the one is connected with my perception of red -and the other with my perception of blue; and that the relative heights -and breadths of the two different sets of waves, and the relative -velocity of their movements are very exactly known. It is held that -some men have a vast amount of very precise information about the -existence of objects of this kind; and I think the view that this is -so deserves a great deal of respect. But what I wish now to point out -is that no one's observation of his own perceptions, thoughts and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> -feelings, can, by itself, give him the slightest reason for believing -in the existence of any such material objects. All the arguments by -which I have tried to show that this kind of observation alone can give -me no reason to believe in the existence of any kind of perception -or feeling in another person, apply, with at least equal force, to -show that it can give me no reason to believe in the existence of any -kind of material object. On the other hand, if we are to admit the -principle that "Beliefs which lead to true predictions, are generally -true," this principle will give us at least as much reason to believe -in the existence of certain kinds of material objects as to believe -in the existence of other persons; since one of the most remarkable -facts about beliefs in the existence of such objects is that they do so -often lead to true predictions. But it must be remembered that we can -have no reason for believing this principle itself, <i>unless</i> our own -perceptions, thoughts and feelings are <i>not</i> the only kind of observed -"content" which really does exist: we can have no reason for it, unless -some such things as what I perceive, when I see a red and blue book -side by side, do really exist.</p> - -<p>It would seem, therefore, that if my own observations do give me any -reason whatever for believing in the existence either of any perception -in any other person or of any material object, it must be true that -not only my own perceptions, thoughts and feelings, but also <i>some</i> of -the other kinds of things which I directly perceive—colours, sounds, -smells, etc.—do really exist: it must be true that some objects of -this kind <i>exist</i> or are <i>real</i> in precisely the same simple sense -in which my perceptions of them exist or are real. Is there then any -reason to think that this is not true? Is there any reason to think, -for instance, that <i>none</i> of the colours which I perceive as occupying -areas of certain shapes and sizes really<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> exist in the areas which -they appear to occupy? This is a question which I wished to discuss -at length, because I think that it is one in which there are real -difficulties. But I have given so much space to other questions, that I -can only deal with it very briefly here.</p> - -<p>Some philosophers are very fond of asserting that a colour cannot exist -except when it is perceived; and it might possibly be thought that -when I suggest that colours do really exist, I am suggesting that they -do exist when they are not perceived. I wish, therefore, briefly to -point out that the question whether anything does exist, when it is -not perceived, is one which I have not argued and shall not attempt -to argue in this paper. I have, indeed, tried to show that since -"exists" does not <i>mean</i> "is perceived," it is, at least, conceivable -that things should exist, when they are not perceived. But I have -admitted that it is quite possible none <i>do</i> so: it <i>may</i> be the case -that whenever a thing exists, it is <i>also</i> at the same time perceived, -for anything that I have said or shall say to the contrary. I think, -indeed, that, if such things as colours <i>do</i> exist, my observation of -their behaviour will justify me in concluding that they also exist when -I myself am, at least, not aware of perceiving them: but since I have -not attempted to determine what kinds of observation are sufficient to -justify a generalisation, I do not pretend to say whether this is so -or not: and still less do I pretend to say whether, <i>if</i> they exist -when <i>I</i> do not perceive them, we are justified in supposing that -someone else must be perceiving them. The question whether anything -exists, when it is not perceived, and, if so, what things, seems to -me to be one which can only be settled by observation; and thus, I -conceive, observation might justify us in concluding that certain kinds -of things—pains, for example, do <i>not</i> exist, when they are not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> -perceived and that other kinds of things—colours, for example, <i>do</i> -exist, when they are not perceived. The only way, in which, so far as -I am aware, the theory I am advocating does conflict with ordinary -Idealistic conclusions, is that it does suggest that things, which are -<i>not</i> "spiritual," do <i>sometimes</i> exist, as really and as truly, as -things which are.</p> - -<p>The theory, therefore, that nothing exists, except when it is -perceived, is no objection (even if it be true) to the supposition that -colours do exist. What objections are there to this supposition? All -serious objections to it are, I think, of one type. They all rest upon -the assumption that, if a certain kind of thing exists at a certain -time in a certain place, certain other kinds of things cannot exist at -the same time in the same place. They are all, that is to say, of the -same type as Berkeley's argument: that, though the same body of water -may <i>appear</i> to be simultaneously both hot and cold (if one of the -hands we plunge into it is warm and the other cold), yet the heat and -the cold cannot both <i>really</i> be in the same body at the same time. And -it is worth noticing that anyone who uses this argument must admit that -he understands what is meant by "really existing in a given place," and -that he means by it something <i>other</i> than "being perceived as in a -given place." For the argument itself admits that <i>both</i> the heat <i>and</i> -the cold <i>are</i> really <i>perceived</i> as being in the same place, and that -there is no difficulty in supposing that they are so; whereas It urges -that there <i>is</i> a difficulty in supposing that they both <i>really exist</i> -in it.</p> - -<p>Now there is one obvious defect in this type of argument, if designed -to prove that <i>no</i> sensible quality exists at any place where it -is perceived as being—a defect, which Berkeley himself admits in -his "Principles," though he omits to notice it where he repeats the -argument in his "Hylas." Even if<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> we assume that the heat and the -cold cannot <i>both</i> exist in the same place (and I admit that, in this -case, the contrary assumption does seem repugnant to Common Sense), -it does not follow that <i>neither</i> exists there. That is to say this -type of argument, even if we grant its initial assumption, will only -entitle us to conclude that <i>some</i> sensible qualities which we perceive -as being in a certain place at a certain time, do not exist in that -place at that time. And this conclusion, I am inclined to think, is -true. In the case, for instance, of the so-called "images" which -we perceive in a looking-glass, we may very readily admit that the -colours and shapes which we perceive do <i>not</i> exist at the places where -they appear to be—namely at various distances behind the glass. But -yet, so far as I can see, we have no reason whatever for supposing -that they do not, <i>except</i> the assumption that our observations give -us reason to believe that <i>other</i> sensible qualities <i>do</i> exist in -those positions behind the glass; and the assumption that <i>where</i> -these <i>other</i> sensible qualities do exist, those which we see in the -glass do <i>not</i> exist. I should, therefore, admit that <i>some</i> sensible -qualities which we perceive as being in certain places, do <i>not</i> exist -in those places, while still retaining my belief that others do. And -<i>perhaps</i> this explanation is the one which should also be adopted in -the case of sensible qualities which appear to be at a great distance -from us. When, for instance, (as we say), "we see the moon," <i>what</i> -we perceive (if the moon be full) is a round bright silver disc, of -a small size, at a place very distant from us. Does that silver disc -exist at that place? With what suppositions does the assumption that -it <i>does</i> conflict? Only, so far as I can see, with the supposition -that the place in question is <i>really</i> occupied by a body such as -science has taught us to suppose that the moon <i>really</i> is—a spherical -body immensely larger than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> objects, in comparison with which the -silver disc which we perceive is small; <i>or else</i> with the supposition -that the place in question is really occupied by some part of our -atmosphere, or some part of the medium which science supposes to exist -between our atmosphere and the moon; <i>or else</i> with the supposition -that the place in question is really occupied by what we might see, -if the moon were nearer to us by many thousands of miles. Unless we -suppose that some other object <i>is</i> in the place, in which the silver -disc appears to be, and that this object is of a kind which cannot -occupy the <i>same</i> place which is occupied by a silver disc, we have -no reason to suppose that the silver disc does <i>not</i> really exist in -the place where it appears to be. And, in this case, we <i>perhaps</i> have -reason for both suppositions and should therefore conclude that the -silver disc, which we perceive, does not exist in any real place.</p> - -<p>Part, therefore, of these objections to our theory may, I think, be -met by admitting that <i>some</i> of the ... sensible qualities which we -perceive do not exist at the places where they appear to exist, though -ethers do. But there is, I think, another class of cases, in which we -may be justified in denying that two things which (it is asserted) -cannot occupy the same space, really cannot. I will take an instance -which is, I think, typical. When we look at a drop of blood with the -naked eye, we perceive a small red spot, uniformly red all over. But -when (as we say) we look at the <i>same</i> object under a microscope of -a certain power, I am informed that we see a much larger spot, of -similar shape, indeed, but <i>not</i> uniformly red—having, in fact, small -red spots at different positions in a yellowish field. And if we were -again to look at the <i>same</i> object through a microscope of much higher -power still, we might perceive yet a third different arrangement of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> -colours. Is there any fatal objection to supposing that all <i>three</i> -appearances—the uniform red spot, the yellowish field with reddish -spots in it, and the third, whatever that may be—do all really occupy -the same real spatial area? I cannot see that there is. We are familiar -with the idea that a given spatial area may contain parts which are -invisible to us. And hence, I think it is quite conceivable that parts -of a given area may be <i>really</i> occupied by one colour, while the whole -is <i>really</i> occupied by another. And this, I think, is what we actually -<i>do</i> believe in many cases. At all events, we certainly believe that -the area which appears to be occupied by one colour really is <i>the same -area</i> as that which appears to be occupied by another. And, unless -we assume that the area, in both cases, really is the same, we can -certainly have no reason to deny that each colour does really occupy -the area which it appears to occupy.</p> - -<p>For these reasons I think that the difficulties in the way of supposing -that <i>some</i> of the sensible qualities which we perceive as being in -certain places, really exist in the places in which we perceive them -to be, are not insuperable. I have indeed not done justice to these -difficulties; but then, neither have I done justice to what is to be -said on the other side. At all events, I think it is plain that we have -no reason to assert, in any case whatever, that a perceived colour -does <i>not</i> really exist in the place where it is perceived as being, -<i>unless</i> we assume that that very same place really is occupied by -something else<i>—either</i> by some different sensible qualities <i>or</i> by -material objects such as physical science supposes to exist. But what -reason can we give for such an assumption? I have tried to show that -our own observations can give us none, <i>unless</i> we assume that some of -the sensible qualities, which we observe as occupying certain places, -do really exist in those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> places. And, if this is so, then we must -admit that neither he who believes (with Reid) in the existence of -other minds and of matter also, nor he who believes in the existence -of other minds and denies that of matter, can have, in his own -observations, the slightest reason either for his assertion or for his -denial: we must admit that he can have no reason for either assertion -or denial, except one which consists in the assumption of the existence -or nonexistence of something which he does <i>not</i> observe—something, -therefore, of the very same kind as that for which he gives it as a -reason. I am very unwilling to suppose that this is the case: I am -very unwilling to suppose that he who believes that Sindbad the Sailor -really saw what the "Arabian Nights" represent him as seeing, has just -as good reason (so far as his own observation goes) for believing this -as he who denies it has for denying it. Still this may be the case. -We <i>must</i>, perhaps, be content to assume as certain that for which -our observation gives no reason: to assume such propositions as that -Sindbad did <i>not</i> see a Roc, and that you <i>do</i> hear my voice. But if it -is said that these things are certain; then it also appears to me to -be certain that the colours which I perceive do exist (<i>some</i> of them) -where I perceive them. The more I look at objects round me, the more I -am unable to resist the conviction that what I see does exist, as truly -and as really, as my perception of it The conviction is overwhelming.</p> - -<p>This being, then, the state of the case, I think I may at least plead -that we have grounds for suspense of judgment as to whether what I -see does <i>not</i> really exist; grounds, too, for renewed enquiry, more -careful than such enquiry has sometimes been in the past.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_2" id="Footnote_1_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_2"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Not now in 1921.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="WILLIAM_JAMES" id="WILLIAM_JAMES">WILLIAM JAMES</a></h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>My object in this paper is to discuss some of the things which Prof. -William James says about truth in the recent book, to which he has -given the above name.<a name="FNanchor_1_3" id="FNanchor_1_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_3" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> In Lecture VI he professes to give an account -of a theory, which he calls "the pragmatist theory of truth;" and he -professes to give a briefer preliminary account of the same theory in -Lecture II. Moreover, in Lecture VII, he goes on to make some further -remarks about truth. In all these Lectures he seems to me to make -statements to which there are very obvious objections; and my main -object is to point out, as clearly and simply as I can, what seem to me -to be the principal objections to some of these statements.</p> - -<p>We may, I think, distinguish three different things which he seems -particularly anxious to assert about truth.</p> - -<p>(I) In the first place, he is plainly anxious to assert some connection -between truth and "verification" or "utility." Our true ideas, he seems -to say, are those that "work," in the sense that they are or can be -"verified," or are "useful."</p> - -<p>(II) In the second place, he seems to object to the view that truth is -something "static" or "immutable." He is anxious to assert that truths -are in some sense "mutable."</p> - -<p>(III) In the third place, he asserts that "to an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> unascertainable -extent our truths are man-made products" (p. 242).</p> - -<p>To what he asserts under each of these three heads there are, I think, -serious objections; and I now propose to point out what seem to me to -be the principal ones, under each head separately.</p> - - -<p>(I)</p> - -<p>Professor James is plainly anxious to assert <i>some</i> connection between -truth and "verification" or "utility." And that there is <i>some</i> -connection between them everybody will admit. That <i>many</i> of our true -ideas are verified; that <i>many</i> of them can be verified; and that -<i>many</i> of them are useful, is, I take it, quite indisputable. But -Professor James seems plainly to wish to assert something more than -this. And one more thing which he wishes to assert is, I think, pretty -plain. He suggests, at the beginning of Lecture VI, that he is going to -tell us in what sense it is that our true ideas "agree with reality." -Truth, he says, certainly <i>means</i> their agreement with reality; -the only question is as to what we are to understand by the words -"agreement" and "reality" in this proposition. And he first briefly -considers the theory, that the sense in which our true ideas agree with -reality, is that they "copy" some reality. And he affirms that some -of our true ideas really do do this. But he rejects the theory, as a -theory of what truth means, on the ground that they do not <i>all</i> do so. -Plainly, therefore, he implies that no theory of what truth <i>means</i> -will be correct, unless it tells us of some property which belongs to -<i>all</i> our true ideas without exception. But his own theory is a theory -of what truth means. Apparently, therefore, he wishes to assert that -not only many but <i>all</i> our true ideas are or can be verified; that -<i>all</i> of them are useful. And it is, I think, pretty plain that this is -<i>one</i> of the things which he wishes to assert.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span></p> - -<p>Apparently, therefore, Professor James wishes to assert that <i>all</i> -our true ideas are or can be verified—that <i>all</i> are useful. And -certainly this is not a truism like the proposition that <i>many</i> of -them are so. Even if this were all that he meant, it would be worth -discussing. But even this, I think, is not all. The very first -proposition in which he expresses his theory is the following. "True -ideas," he says (p. 201) "are those that we can assimilate, validate, -corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot." And -what does this mean? Let us, for brevity's sake, substitute the word -"verify" alone for the four words which Professor James uses, as he -himself subsequently seems to do. He asserts, then, that true ideas -are <i>those which</i> we can verify. And plainly he does not mean by this -merely that <i>some</i> of the ideas which we can verify are true, while -plenty of others, which we can verify, are not true. The plain meaning -of his words is that <i>all</i> the ideas which we can verify are true. -No one would use them who did not mean this. Apparently, therefore, -Professor James means to assert not merely that we can verify all our -true ideas; but also that all the ideas, which we can verify, are true. -And so, too, with utility or usefulness. He seems to mean not merely -that all our true ideas are useful; but that all those which are useful -are true. This would follow, for one thing, from the fact that he seems -to use the words "verification" or "verifiability" and "usefulness" as -if they came to the same thing. But, in this case too, he asserts it -in words that have but one plain meaning. "The true" he says (p. 222) -"is only the expedient in the way of our thinking." "The true" is <i>the</i> -expedient: that is, <i>all</i> expedient thinking is true. Or again: "An -idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives" (p. -75). That is to say, <i>every</i> idea, which is profitable to our lives, -is, while<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> it is so, true. These words certainly have a plain enough -meaning. Apparently, therefore, Professor James means to assert not -merely that all true ideas are useful, but also that all useful ideas -are true.</p> - -<p>Professor James' words, then, do at least suggest that he wishes to -assert all four of the following propositions. He wishes to assert, it -would seem—</p> - -<p>(1) That we can verify all those of our ideas, which are true.</p> - -<p>(2) That all those among our ideas, which we can verify, are true.</p> - -<p>(3) That all our true ideas are useful.</p> - -<p>(4) That all those of our ideas, which are useful, are true.</p> - -<p>These four propositions are what I propose first to consider. He -does mean to assert them, at least. Very likely he wishes to assert -something more even than these. He does, in fact, suggest that he means -to assert, in addition, that these properties of "verifiability" and -"utility" are the <i>only</i> properties (beside that of being properly -<i>called</i> "true") which belong to all our true ideas and to none but -true ideas. But this obviously cannot be true, unless all these four -propositions are true. And therefore we may as well consider them first.</p> - -<p>First, then, can we verify all our true ideas?</p> - -<p>I wish only to point out the plainest and most obvious reasons why I -think it is doubtful whether we can.</p> - -<p>We are very often in doubt as to whether we did or did not do a certain -thing in the past. We may have the idea that we did, and also the idea -that we did not; and we may wish to find out which idea is the true -one. Very often, indeed, I may believe very strongly, that I did do a -certain thing; and somebody else, who has equally good reason to know, -may believe equally strongly that I did not.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> For instance, I may have -written a letter, and may believe that I used certain words in it. -But my correspondent may believe that I did not. Can we always verify -either of these ideas? Certainly sometimes we can. The letter may be -produced, and prove that I did use the words in question. And I shall -then have verified my idea. Or it may prove that I did not use them. -And then we shall have verified my correspondent's idea. But, suppose -the letter has been destroyed; suppose there is no copy of it, nor any -trustworthy record of what was said in it; suppose there is no other -witness as to what I said in it, beside myself and my correspondent? -Can we then always verify which of our ideas is the true one? I think -it is very doubtful whether we can <i>nearly</i> always. Certainly we may -often try to discover any possible means of verification, and be quite -unable, for a time at least, to discover any. Such cases, in which we -are unable, for a time at least, to verify either of two contradictory -ideas, occur very commonly indeed. Let us take an even more trivial -instance than the last. Bad whist-players often do not notice at all -carefully which cards they have among the lower cards in a suit. At -the end of a hand they cannot be certain whether they had or had not -the seven of diamonds, or the five of spades. And, after the cards -have been shuffled, a dispute will sometimes arise as to whether a -particular player had the seven of diamonds or not. His partner may -think that he had, and he himself may think that he had not. Both may -be uncertain, and the memory of both, on such a point, may be well -known to be untrustworthy. And, moreover, neither of the other players -may be able to remember any better. Is it always possible to verify -which of these ideas is the true one? Either the player did or did not -have the seven of diamonds. This much is certain. One person<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> thinks -that he did, and another thinks he did not; and both, so soon as the -question is raised, have before their minds both of these ideas—the -idea that he did, and the idea that he did not. This also is certain. -And it is certain that one or other of these two ideas is true. But can -they always verify either of them? Sometimes, no doubt, they can, even -after the cards have been shuffled. There may have been a fifth person -present, overlooking the play, whose memory is perfectly trustworthy, -and whose word may be taken as settling the point. Or the players may -themselves be able, by recalling other incidents of play, to arrive at -such a certainty as may be said to verify the one hypothesis or the -other. But very often neither of these two things will occur. And, in -such a case, is it always possible to verify the true idea? Perhaps, -theoretically, it may be still possible. Theoretically, I suppose, the -fact that one player, and not any of the other three, had the card in -his hand, may have made some difference to the card, which <i>might</i> -be discovered by some possible method of scientific investigation. -Perhaps some such difference may remain even after the same card has -been repeatedly used in many subsequent games. But suppose the same -question arises again, a week after the original game was played. Did -you, or did you not, last week have the seven of diamonds in that -particular hand? The question has not been settled in the meantime; -and now, perhaps, the original pack of cards has been destroyed. Is it -still possible to verify either idea? Theoretically, I suppose, it may -be still possible. But even this, I think, is very doubtful. And surely -it is plain that, humanly and practically speaking, it will often have -become quite impossible to verify either idea. In all probability it -never will be possible for any man to verify whether I had the card -or not on this particular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> occasion. No doubt we are here speaking of -an idea, which some man <i>could have</i> verified at one time. But the -hypothesis I am considering is the hypothesis that we never have a true -idea, which we <i>can</i> not verify; that is to say, which we cannot verify -<i>after</i> the idea has occurred. And with regard to this hypothesis, it -seems to me quite plain that <i>very often indeed</i> we have two ideas, one -or other of which is certainly true; and yet that, in all probability, -it is no longer possible and never will be possible for any man to -verify either.</p> - -<p>It seems to me, then, that we very often have true ideas which we -cannot verify; true ideas, which, in all probability, no man ever will -be able to verify. And, so far, I have given only comparatively trivial -instances. But it is plain that, in the same sense, historians are very -frequently occupied with true ideas, which it is doubtful whether they -can verify. One historian thinks that a certain event took place, and -another that it did not; and both may admit that they cannot verify -their idea. Subsequent historians may, no doubt, sometimes be able to -verify one or the other. New evidence may be discovered or men may -learn to make a better use of evidence already in existence. But is -it certain that this will <i>always</i> happen? Is it certain that <i>every</i> -question, about which historians have doubted, will some day be able to -be settled by verification of one or the other hypothesis? Surely the -probability is that in the case of an immense number of events, with -regard to which we should like to know whether they happened or not, it -never will be possible for any man to verify either the one hypothesis -or the other. Yet it may be certain that either the events in question -did happen or did not. Here, therefore, again, we have a large number -of ideas—cases where many men doubt whether a thing did happen or -did not, and have therefore the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> idea both of its having happened and -of its not having happened—with regard to which it is certain that -half of them are true, but where it seems highly doubtful whether -any single one of them will ever be able to be verified. No doubt it -is just possible that men will some day be able to verify every one -of them. But surely it is very doubtful whether they will. And the -theory against which I am protesting is the positive assertion that -we <i>can</i> verify all our true ideas—that some one some day certainly -will be able to verify every one of them. This theory, I urge, has all -probability against it.</p> - -<p>And so far I have been dealing only with ideas with regard to what -happened in the past. These seem to me to be the cases which offer -the most numerous and most certain exceptions to the rule that we can -verify our true ideas. With regard to particular past events, either -in their own lives or in those of other people, men very frequently -have ideas, which it seems highly improbable that any man will ever be -able to verify. And yet it is certain that a great many of these ideas -are true, because in a great many cases we have both the idea that the -event did happen and also the idea that it did not, when it is certain -that one or other of these ideas is true. And these ideas with regard -to past events would by themselves be sufficient for my purpose. If, as -seems certain, there are many true ideas with regard to the past, which -it is highly improbable that anyone will ever be able to verify, then, -obviously, there is nothing in a true idea which makes it certain that -we can verify it. But it is, I think, certainly not only in the case -of ideas, with regard to the past, that it is doubtful whether we can -verify all the true ideas we have. In the case of many generalisations -dealing not only with the past but with the future, it is, I think, -obviously doubtful whether we shall ever be able to verify all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> those -which are true; although here, perhaps, in most cases, the probability -that we shall not is not so great. But is it quite certain, that in all -cases where scientific men have considered hypotheses, one or other -of which must be true, either will ever be verified? It seems to be -obviously doubtful. Take, for instance, the question whether our actual -space is Euclidean or not. This is a case where the alternative has -been considered; and where it is certain that, whatever be meant by -"our actual space," it either is Euclidean or is not. It has been held, -too, that the hypothesis that it is not Euclidean might, conceivably, -be verified by observations. But it is doubtful whether it ever will -be. And though it would be rash to say that no man ever will be able -to verify either hypothesis; it is also rash to assert positively that -we shall—that we certainly can verify the true hypotheses. There are, -I believe, ever so many similar cases, where alternative hypotheses, -one or other of which must be true, have occurred to men of science, -and where yet it is very doubtful whether either ever will be verified. -Or take, again, such ideas as the idea that there is a God, or the -idea that we are immortal. Many men have had not only contradictory -ideas, but contradictory beliefs, about these matters. And here we -have cases where it is disputed whether these ideas have not actually -been verified. But it seems to me doubtful whether they have been. And -there is a view, which seems to me to deserve respect, that, in these -matters, we never shall be able to verify the true hypothesis. Is it -perfectly certain that this view is a false one? I do not say that it -is true. I think it is quite possible that we shall some day be able to -verify either the belief that we are immortal or the belief that we are -not. But it seems to me doubtful whether we shall. And for this reason -alone I should refuse to assent to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> positive assertion that we -certainly can verify all our true ideas.</p> - -<p>When, therefore, Professor James tells us that "True ideas are those -that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas -are those that we cannot," there seems to be a serious objection to -part of what these words imply. They imply that no idea of ours is -true, unless we can verify it. They imply, therefore, that whenever a -man wonders whether or not he had the seven of diamonds in the third -hand at whist last night, neither of these ideas is true unless he can -verify it. But it seems certain that in this, and an immense number of -similar cases, one or other of the two ideas is true. Either, he did -have the card in his hand or he did not. If anything is a fact, this -is one. Either, therefore, Professor James' words imply the denial of -this obvious fact, or else he implies that in <i>all</i> such cases we <i>can</i> -verify one or other of the two ideas. But to this the objection is -that, in any obvious sense of the words, it seems very doubtful whether -we can. On the contrary it seems extremely probable that in a <i>very -large</i> number of such cases no man ever will be able to verify either -of the two ideas. There is, therefore, a serious objection to what -Professor James' words imply. Whether he himself really means to assert -these things which his words imply I do not know. Perhaps he would -admit that, in this sense, we probably cannot verify nearly all our -true ideas. All that I have wished to make plain is that there is, at -least, an objection to what he says, whether to what he means or not. -There is ample reason why we should refuse assent to the statement that -none of our ideas are true, except those which we can verify.</p> - -<p>But to another part of what he implies by the words quoted above, there -is, I think, no serious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> objection. There is reason to object to the -statement that we can verify all our true ideas; but to the statement -that all ideas, which we can "assimilate, validate, corroborate and -verify," are true, I see no serious objection. Here, I think, we might -say simply that all ideas which we can verify are true. To this, which -is the second of the four propositions, which I distinguished above -(<a href="#Page_35">p. 35</a>) as what Professor James seems to wish to assert, there is, I -think, no serious objection, if we understand the word "verify" in -its proper and natural sense. We may, no doubt, sometimes say that we -have verified an idea or an hypothesis, when we have only obtained -evidence which proves it to be probable, and does not prove it to be -certain. And, if we use the word in this loose sense for incomplete -verification, it is obviously the case that we may verify an idea -which is not true. But it seems scarcely necessary to point this out. -And where we really can <i>completely</i> verify an idea or an hypothesis, -there, undoubtedly, the idea which we can verify is always true. The -very meaning of the word "verify" is to find evidence which does really -prove an idea to be true; and where an idea can be really proved to be -true, it is of course, always true.</p> - -<p>This is all I wish to say about Professor James' first two -propositions, namely:—</p> - -<p>(1) That no ideas of ours are true, except those which we can verify.</p> - -<p>(2) That all those ideas, which we can verify, are true.</p> - -<p>The first seems to me extremely doubtful—in fact, almost certainly -untrue; the second on the other hand, certainly true, in its most -obvious meaning. And I shall say no more about them. The fact is, I -doubt whether either of them expresses anything which Professor James -is really<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> anxious to assert. I have mentioned them, only because his -words do, in fact, imply them and because he gives those words a very -prominent place. But I have already had occasion to notice that he -seems to speak as if to say that we can verify an idea came to the same -thing as saying it is useful to us. And it is the connection of truth -with usefulness, not its connection with "verification," that he is, I -think, really anxious to assert. He talks about "verification" only, -I believe, because he thinks that what he says about it will support -his main view that truth is what "works," is "useful," is "expedient," -"pays." It is this main view we have now to consider. We have to -consider the two propositions:—</p> - -<p>(3) That all our true ideas are useful.</p> - -<p>(4) That all ideas, which are useful, are true.</p> - -<p>First, then: is it the case that all our true ideas are useful? Is it -the case that none of our ideas are true, except those which are useful?</p> - -<p>I wish to introduce my discussion of this question by quoting a -passage in which Professor James seems to me to say something which is -indisputably true. Towards the end of Lecture VI, he attacks the view -that truths "have an unconditional claim to be recognised." And in the -course of his attack the following passage occurs:—</p> - -<p>"Must I," he says, "constantly be repeating the truth 'twice two are -four' because of its eternal claim on recognition? or is it sometimes -irrelevant? Must my thoughts dwell night and day on my personal sins -and blemishes, because I truly have them?—or may I sink and ignore -them in order to be a decent social unit, and not a mass of morbid -melancholy and apology?"</p> - -<p>"It is quite evident," he goes on, "that our obligation to acknowledge -truth, so far from being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> unconditional, is tremendously conditional. -Truth with a big T, and in the singular, claims abstractly to be -recognised, of course; but concrete truths in the plural need be -recognised only when their recognition is expedient." (pp. 231-232).</p> - -<p>What Professor James says in this passage seems to me so indisputably -true as fully to justify the vigour of his language. It is as clear -as anything can be that it would not be useful for any man's mind to -be <i>always</i> occupied with the true idea that he had certain faults -and blemishes; or to be <i>always</i> occupied with the idea that twice -two are four. It is clear, that is, that, if there are times at which -a particular true idea is useful, there certainly are other times -at which it would <i>not</i> be useful, but positively in the way. This -is plainly true of nearly all, if not quite all, our true ideas. It -is plainly true with regard to nearly all of them that, even if the -occasions on which their occurrence is useful are many, the occasions -on which their occurrence would <i>not</i> be useful are many more. With -regard to most of them it is true that on most occasions they will, as -Professor James says elsewhere, "be practically irrelevant, and had -better remain latent."</p> - -<p>It is, then, quite clear that almost any particular true idea <i>would</i> -not be useful at all times and that the times at which it would <i>not</i> -be useful, are many more than the times at which it would. And what -we have to consider is whether, in just this sense in which it is so -clear that most true ideas would <i>not</i> be useful at most times, it is -nevertheless true that all our true ideas <i>are</i> useful. Is this so? Are -all our true ideas useful?</p> - -<p>Professor James, we see, has just told us that there are ever so many -occasions upon which a particular true idea, such as that 2 + 2= 4, -<i>would</i> not be useful—when, on the contrary, it would be positively in -the way. And this seems to be indisputably<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> clear. But is not something -else almost equally clear? Is it not almost equally clear that cases, -such as he says <i>would</i> not be useful, do sometimes actually happen? Is -it not clear that we do actually sometimes have true ideas, at times -when they are not useful, but are positively in the way? It seems -to me to be perfectly clear that this does sometimes occur; and not -sometimes only, but very commonly. The cases in which true ideas occur -at times when they are useful, are, perhaps, far <i>more</i> numerous; but, -if we look at men in general, the cases in which true ideas occur, at -times when they are not useful, do surely make up positively a very -large number. Is it not the case that men do sometimes dwell on their -faults and blemishes, when it is <i>not</i> useful for them to do so? when -they would much better be thinking of something else? Is it not the -case that they are often unable to get their minds away from a true -idea, when it is harmful for them to dwell on it? Still more commonly, -does it not happen that they waste their time in acquiring pieces of -information which are no use to them, though perhaps very useful to -other people? All this seems to me to be undeniable—just as undeniable -as what Professor James himself has said; and, if this is so, then, in -one sense of the words, it is plainly not true that all, or nearly all, -our true ideas are useful. <i>In one sense of the words.</i> For if I have -the idea that 2+2=4 on one day, and then have it again the next, I may -certainly, in a sense, call the idea I have on one day <i>one</i> idea, and -the idea I have on the next <i>another.</i> I have had two ideas that 2+2=4, -and not one only. Or if two different persons both think that I have -faults, there have been two ideas of this truth and not one only. And -in asking whether <i>all</i> our true ideas are useful, we might mean to ask -whether <i>both</i> of these ideas were useful and not merely whether one of -them was. In this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> sense, then, it is plainly not true that <i>all</i> our -true ideas are useful. It is not true, that is, that every true idea is -useful, <i>whenever it occurs.</i></p> - -<p>In one sense, then, it is plainly not true that all our true ideas -are useful. But there still remains a perfectly legitimate sense in -which it might be true. It might be meant, that is, not that every -<i>occurrence</i> of a true idea is useful, but that every true idea is -useful on at least one of the occasions when it occurs. But is this, -in fact, the case? It seems to me almost as plain that it is not, as -that the other was not. We have seen that true ideas are not by any -means always useful on every occasion when they occur; though most -that do occur many times over and to many different people are, no -doubt, useful on some of these occasions. But there seems to be an -immense number of true ideas, which occur but once and to one person, -and never again either to him or to anyone else. I may, for instance, -idly count the number of dots on the back of a card, and arrive at a -true idea of their number; and yet, perhaps, I may never think of their -number again, nor anybody else ever know it. We are all, it seems to -me, constantly noticing trivial details, and getting true ideas about -them, of which we never think again, and which nobody else ever gets. -And is it quite certain that all these true ideas are useful? It seems -to me perfectly clear, on the contrary, that many of them are not. Just -as it is clear that many men sometimes waste their time in acquiring -information which is useful to others but not to them, surely it is -clear that they sometimes waste their time in acquiring information, -which is useful to nobody at all, because nobody else ever acquires -it. I do not say that it is never useful idly to count the number -of dots on the back of a card. Plainly it is sometimes useful to be -idle, and one idle employment may often be as good as another. But<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> -surely it is true that men <i>sometimes</i> do these things when their time -would have been better employed otherwise? Surely they sometimes get -into the habit of attending to trivial truths, which it is as great a -disadvantage that they should attend to as that they should constantly -be thinking of their own thoughts and blemishes? I cannot see my way -to deny that this is so; and therefore I cannot see my way to assert -positively that all our true ideas are useful, even so much as on <i>one -occasion.</i> It seems to me that there are many true ideas which occur -but once, and which are not useful when they do occur. And if this be -so, then it is plainly not true that <i>all</i> our true ideas are useful in -any sense at all.</p> - -<p>These seem to me to be the most obvious objections to the assertion -that all our true ideas are useful. It is clear, we saw to begin with, -that true ideas, which are sometimes useful, <i>would</i> not be useful at -all times. And it seemed almost equally clear that they do sometimes -occur at times when they are not useful. Our true ideas, therefore -are not useful at every time when they actually occur. But in just -this sense in which it is so clear that true ideas which are sometimes -useful, nevertheless sometimes occur at times when they are not, it -seems pretty plain that true ideas, which occur but once, are, some of -them, not useful. If an idea, which is sometimes useful, does sometimes -occur to a man at a time when it is irrelevant and in the way, why -should not an idea, which occurs but once, occur at a time when it is -irrelevant and in the way? It seems hardly possible to doubt that this -does sometimes happen. But, if this be so, then it is not true that all -our true ideas are useful, even so much as on one occasion. It is not -true that none of our ideas are true, except those which are useful.</p> - -<p>But now, what are we to say of the converse<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> proposition—the -proposition that all those among our ideas, which are useful, are true? -That we never have a useful idea, which is not true?</p> - -<p>I confess the matter seems to me equally clear here. The assertion -should mean that every idea, which is at any time useful, is true; -that no idea, which is not true, is ever useful. And it seems hardly -possible to doubt that this assertion is false. It Is, in the first -place, commonly held that it is sometimes right positively to deceive -another person. In war, for instance it is held that one army is -justified in trying to give the enemy a false idea as to where it -will be at a given time. Such a false idea is sometimes given, and it -seems to me quite clear that it is sometimes useful. In such a case, -no doubt, it may be said that the false idea is useful to the party -who have given it, but not useful to those who actually believe in it. -And the question whether it is useful on the whole will depend upon -the question which side it is desirable should win. But it seems to me -unquestionable that the false idea is sometimes useful on the whole. -Take, for instance, the case of a party of savages, who wish to make a -night attack and massacre a party of Europeans but are deceived as to -the position in which the Europeans are encamped. It is surely plain -that such a false idea is sometimes useful on the whole. But quite -apart from the question whether deception is ever justifiable, it is -not very difficult to think of cases where a false idea, not produced -by deception, is plainly useful—and useful, not merely on the whole, -but to the person who has it as well. A man often thinks that his watch -is right, when, in fact, it is slow, and his false idea may cause -him to miss his train. And in such cases, no doubt, his false idea -is <i>generally</i> disadvantageous. But, in a particular case, the train -which he would have caught but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> for his false idea may be destroyed -in a railway accident, or something may suddenly occur at home, which -renders it much more useful that he should be there, than it would -have been for him to catch his train. Do such cases never occur? And -is not the false idea sometimes useful in some of them? It seems to me -perfectly clear that it is <i>sometimes</i> useful for a man to think his -watch is right when it is wrong. And such instances would be sufficient -to show that it is not the case that every idea of ours, which is ever -useful, is a true idea. But let us take cases, not, like these, of an -idea, which occurs but a few times or to one man, but of ideas which -have occurred to many men at many times. It seems to me very difficult -to be sure that the belief in an eternal hell has not been often useful -to many men, and yet it may be doubted whether this idea is true. And -so, too, with the belief in a happy life after death, or the belief in -the existence of a God; it is, I think, very difficult to be sure that -these beliefs have not been, and are not still, often useful, and yet -it may be doubted whether they are true. These beliefs, of course, are -matters of controversy. Some men believe that they are both useful and -true; and others, again, that they are neither. And I do not think we -are justified in giving them as certain instances of beliefs, which -are not true, but, nevertheless, have often been useful. But there is -a view that these beliefs, though not true, have, nevertheless, been -often useful; and this view seems to me to deserve respect, especially -since, as we have seen, some beliefs, which are not true, certainly -are sometimes useful. Are we justified in asserting positively that it -is false? Is it perfectly certain that beliefs, which have often been -useful to many men, may not, nevertheless, be untrue? Is it perfectly -certain that beliefs, which are not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> true, have not often been useful -to many men? The certainty may at least be doubted, and in any case it -seems certain that some beliefs, which are not true, are, nevertheless, -sometimes useful.</p> - -<p>For these reasons, it seems to me almost certain that <i>both</i> the -assertions which I have been considering are false. It is almost -certainly false that all our true ideas are useful, and almost -certainly false that all our useful ideas are true. But I have only -urged what seem to me to be the most obvious objections to these two -statements; I have not tried to sustain these objections by elaborate -arguments, and I have omitted elaborate argument, partly because of a -reason which I now wish to state. The fact is, I am not at all sure -that Professor James would not himself admit that both these statements -are false. I think it is quite possible he would admit that they are, -and would say that he never meant either to assert or to imply the -contrary. He complains that some of the critics of Pragmatism are -unwilling to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into the -statements of Pragmatism; and, perhaps, he would say that this is the -case here. I certainly hope that he would. I certainly hope he would -say that these statements, to which I have objected, are silly. For -it does seem to me intensely silly to say that we can verify all our -true ideas; intensely silly to say that every one of our true ideas -is at some time useful; intensely silly to say that every idea which -is ever useful is true. I hope Professor James would admit all these -things to be silly, for if he and other Pragmatists would admit even -as much as this, I think a good deal would be gained. But it by no -means follows that because a philosopher would admit a view to be -silly, when it is definitely put before him, he has not himself been -constantly holding and implying that very view. He may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> quite sincerely -protest that he never has either held or implied it, and yet he may -all the time have been not only implying it but holding it—vaguely, -perhaps, but really. A man may assure us, quite sincerely that he is -not angry; he may really think that he is not, and yet we may be able -to judge quite certainly from what he says that he really is angry. -He may assure us quite sincerely that he never meant anything to our -discredit by what he said—that he was not thinking of anything in the -least discreditable to us, and yet it may be plain from his words that -he was actually condemning us very severely. And so with a philosopher. -He may protest, quite angrily, when a view is put before him in other -words than his own, that he never either meant or implied any such -thing, and yet it may be possible to judge, from what he says, that -this very view, wrapped up in other words, was not only held by him but -was precisely what made his thoughts seem to him to be interesting and -important. Certainly he may quite often imply a given thing which, at -another time, he denies. Unless it were possible for a philosopher to -do this, there would be very little inconsistency in philosophy, and -surely everyone will admit that <i>other</i> philosophers are very often -inconsistent. And so in this case, even if Professor James would say -that he never meant to imply the things to which I have been objecting, -yet in the case of two of these things, I cannot help thinking that -he does actually imply them—nay more, that he is frequently actually -vaguely thinking of them, and that his theory of truth owes its -interest, in very great part, to the fact that he is implying them. -In the case of the two views that all our true ideas are useful, and -that all our useful ideas are true, I think this is so, and I do not -mean merely that his <i>words</i> imply them. A man's <i>words</i> may often -imply a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> thing, when he himself is in no way, however vaguely, thinking -either of that thing or of anything which implies it; he may simply -have expressed himself unfortunately. But in the case of the two views -that all our true ideas are useful, and all our useful ideas true, I do -not think this is so with Professor James. I think that his thoughts -seem interesting to him and others, largely because he is thinking, -not merely of words, but of things which imply these two views, in the -very form in which I have objected to them. And I wish now to give some -reasons for thinking this.</p> - -<p>Professor James certainly wishes to assert that there is <i>some</i> -connection between truth and utility. And the connection which I have -suggested that he has vaguely before his mind is this: that every true -idea is, at some time or other, useful, and conversely that every idea, -which is ever useful, is true. And I have urged that-there are obvious -objections to both these views. But now, supposing Professor James does -not mean to assert either of these two things, what else can he mean to -assert? What else can he mean, that would account for the interest and -importance he seems to attach to his assertion of connection between -truth and utility? Let us consider the alternatives.</p> - -<p>And, first of all, he might mean that <i>most</i> of our true ideas are -useful, and <i>most</i> of our useful ideas true. He might mean that most -of our true ideas are useful at some time or other; and even that most -of them are useful, whenever they actually occur. And he might mean, -moreover, that if we consider the whole range of ideas, which are -useful to us, we shall find that by far the greater number of them are -true ones; that true ideas are far more often useful to us, than those -which are not true. And all this, I think, may be readily admitted to -be true. If this were all that he meant, I do not think<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> that anyone -would be very anxious to dispute it. But is it conceivable that this -is <i>all</i> that he means? Is it conceivable that he should have been so -anxious to insist upon this admitted commonplace? Is it conceivable -that he should have been offering us this, and nothing more, as a -theory of what truth means, and a theory worth making a fuss about, and -being proud of? It seems to me quite inconceivable that this should -have been <i>all</i> that he meant. He must have had something more than -this in his mind. But, if so, what more?</p> - -<p>In the passage which I quoted at the beginning, as showing that he does -mean to assert that <i>all</i> useful ideas are true, he immediately goes on -to assert a qualification, which must now be noticed. "The true," he -says, "is only the expedient in the way of our thinking" (p. 222). But -he immediately adds: "Expedient in the long run, and on the whole, of -course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight won't -necessarily meet all further experiences equally satisfactorily." -Here, therefore, we have something else that he might mean. What is -expedient <i>in the long run</i>, he means to say, is true. And what exactly -does this mean? It seems to mean that an idea, which is not true, may -be expedient <i>for some time</i>. That is to say, it may occur <i>once,</i> -and be expedient then; and again, and be expedient then; and so on, -over a considerable period. But (Professor James seems to prophesy) -if it is not true, there will come a time, when it will cease to be -expedient. If it occurs again and again over a long <i>enough</i> period, -there will at last, if it is not true, come a time when it will (for -once at least) fail to be useful, and will (perhaps he means) <i>never</i> -be useful again. This is, 1 think, what Professor James means in this -passage. He means, I think, that though an idea, which is not true, -may for some time be repeatedly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> expedient, there will at last come a -time when its occurrence will, perhaps, <i>never</i> be expedient again, -certainly will, for a time, not be <i>generally</i> expedient. And this -a view which, it seems to me, may possibly be true. It is certainly -possible that a time may come, in the far future, when ideas, which -are not true, will hardly ever, if ever, be expedient. And this is all -that Professor James seems here positively to mean. He seems to mean -that, if you take time <i>enough</i>, false ideas will some day cease to be -expedient. And it is very difficult to be sure that this is not true; -since it is very difficult to prophesy as to what may happen in the far -future. I am sure I hope that this prophesy will come true. But in the -meantime (Professor James seems to admit) ideas, which are not true, -may, for an indefinitely long time, again and again be expedient. And -is it conceivable that a theory, which admits this, is <i>all</i> that he -has meant to assert? Is it conceivable that what interests him, in his -theory of truth, is merely the belief that, some day or other, false -ideas will cease to be expedient? "In the long run, <i>of course</i>," he -says, as if this were what he had meant all along. But I think it is -quite plain that this is <i>not</i> all that he has meant. This may be one -thing which he is anxious to assert, but it certainly does not explain -the whole of his interest in his theory of truth.</p> - -<p>And, in fact, there is quite a different theory which he seems plainly -to have in his mind in other places. When Professor James says, "in -the long run, <i>of course</i>," he implies that ideas which are expedient -only for a <i>short</i> run, are very often not true. But in what he says -elsewhere he asserts the very opposite of this. He says elsewhere that -a belief is true "<i>so long as</i> to believe it is profitable to our -lives" (p. 75). That is to say, a belief will be true, <i>so long as</i> -it is useful, even if it is <i>not</i> useful<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> in the long run! This is -certainly quite a different theory; and, strictly speaking, it implies -that an idea, which is useful even <i>on one occasion,</i> will be true. But -perhaps this is only a verbal implication. I think very likely that -here Professor James was only thinking of ideas, which can be said <i>to -have a run,</i> though only a comparatively short one—of ideas, that is, -which are expedient, not merely on one occasion, but <i>for some time.</i> -That is to say, the theory which he now suggests, is that ideas, which -occur again and again, perhaps to one man only, perhaps to several -different people, over some space of time are, if they are expedient on -most occasions within that space of time, true. This is a view which he -is, I think, really anxious to assert; and if it were true, it would, I -think, be important. And it is difficult to find instances which show, -with certainty, that it is false. I believe that it is false; but it -is difficult to prove it, because, in the case of some ideas it is so -difficult to be certain that they ever were useful, and in the case of -others so difficult to be certain that they are not true. A belief such -as I spoke of before—the belief in eternal hell—is an instance. I -think this belief has been, for a long time, useful, and that yet it is -false. But it is, perhaps, arguable that it never has been useful; and -many people on the other hand, would still assert that it is true. It -cannot, therefore, perhaps, fairly be used as an instance of a belief, -which is certainly not true, and yet has for some time been useful. But -whether this view that all beliefs, which are expedient for some time, -are true, be true or false; can it be all that Professor James means to -assert? Can it constitute the whole of what interests him in his theory -of truth?</p> - -<p>I do not think it can. I think it is plain that he has in his mind -something more than <i>any</i> of these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> alternatives, or than all -of them taken together. And I think so partly for the following -reason. He speaks from the outset as if he intended to tell us what -<i>distinguishes</i> true ideas from those which are not true; to tell us, -that is to say, not merely of some property which belongs to all our -true ideas; nor yet merely of some property, which belongs to none -but true ideas; but of some property which satisfies <i>both</i> these -requirements at once—which both belongs to all our true ideas, and -<i>also</i> belongs to none but true ones. Truth, he says to begin with, -means the agreement of our ideas with reality; and he adds "as falsity -their disagreement." And he explains that he is going to tell us what -property it is that is meant by these words "agreement with reality." -So again in the next passage which I quoted: "True ideas," he says "are -those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify." But, -he also adds, "False ideas are those that we cannot." And no one, I -think, could possibly speak in this way, who had not in his head the -intention of telling us what property it is which <i>distinguishes</i> true -ideas from those which are not true, and which, therefore, not only -belongs to all ideas which are true, but also to none that are not. -And that he has this idea in his head and thinks that the property of -being "useful" or "paying" is such a property, is again clearly shown -by a later passage. "Our account of truth," he says (p. 218) "is an -account of truths in the plural, of processes of leading, realised <i>in -rebus</i>, and having only this quality in common, that they <i>pay." Only</i> -this quality in common! If this be so, the quality must obviously be -one, which is <i>not</i> shared by any ideas which are <i>not</i> true; for, -if true ideas have any quality in common at all, they must have at -least one such quality, which is <i>not</i> shared by those which are <i>not</i> -true. Plainly, therefore, Professor James is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> intending to tell us of -a property which belongs both to <i>all</i> true ideas and <i>only</i> to true -ideas. And this property, he says, is that of "paying." But now let us -suppose that he means by "paying," not "paying <i>once</i> at least," but, -according to the alternative he suggests, "paying in the long run" or -"paying for some time." Can he possibly have supposed that these were -properties which belonged <i>both</i> to all true ideas <i>and also</i> to none -but true ones? They may, perhaps, be properties which belong to <i>none -but</i> true ones. I doubt, as I have said, whether the latter does; but -still it is difficult to prove the opposite. But even if we granted -that they belong to <i>none but</i> true ones, surely it is only too obvious -that they do <i>not</i> fulfil the other requirement—that they do <i>not</i> -belong to nearly all true ones. Can anyone suppose that <i>all</i> our true -ideas pay "in the long run" or repeatedly for some time? Surely it is -plain that an enormous number do not for the simple reason that an -enormous number of them <i>have no run at all,</i> either long or short, -but occur but once, and never recur. I believe truly that a certain -book is on a particular shelf about 10.15 p.m. on December 21st, 1907; -and this true belief serves me well and helps me to find it But the -belief that that book is there at that particular time occurs to no one -else, and never again to me. Surely there are thousands of useful true -beliefs which, like this, are useful but once, and never occur again; -and it would, therefore, be preposterous to say that every true idea is -useful "in the long run" or repeatedly for some time. If, therefore, -we supposed Professor James to mean that "paying in the long run" or -"paying repeatedly over a considerable period" were properties which -belonged to all true ideas and to none but true ones, we should be -supposing him to mean something still more monstrous than if we suppose -him to mean<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> that "paying at least once" was such a property.</p> - -<p>To sum up then:</p> - -<p>I think there is no doubt that Professor James' interest in "the -pragmatist theory of truth" is largely due to the fact that he thinks -it tells us what distinguishes true ideas from those which are not -true. And he thinks the distinction is that true ideas "pay," and false -ones don't. The most natural interpretation of this view is: That every -true idea pays at least once; and that every idea, which pays at least -once, is true. These were the propositions I considered first, and I -gave reasons for thinking that <i>both</i> are false. But Professor James -suggested elsewhere that what he means by "paying" is "paying in the -long run." And here it seems possibly true that all ideas which "pay -in the long run" are true; but it is certainly false that all our true -ideas "pay in the long run," if by this be meant anything more than -"pay at least once." Again, he suggested that what he meant by paying -was "paying for some time." And here, again, even if it is true (and it -seems very doubtful) that all ideas which pay for some time are true, -it is certainly false that all our true ideas pay for some time, if by -this be meant anything more than that they pay "at least once."</p> - -<p>This, I think, is the simplest and most obvious objection to Professor -James' "instrumental" view of truth—the view that truth is what -"works," "pays," is "useful." He seems certainly to have in his mind -the idea that this theory tells us what distinguishes true ideas from -false ones, and to be interested in it mainly for this reason. He has -vaguely in his mind that he has told us of some property which belongs -to all true ideas and to none but true ones; and that this property is -that of "paying." And the objection is, that, whatever<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> we understand -by "paying," whether "paying at least once," or "paying in the long -run," or "paying for some time," it seems certain that none of these -properties will satisfy <i>both</i> requirements. As regards the first, that -of "paying at least once," it seems almost certain that it satisfies -<i>neither:</i> it is neither true that all our true ideas "pay at least -once," nor yet that every idea which pays at least once, is true. -On the contrary, many true ideas never pay at all; and many ideas, -which are not true, do pay on at least one occasion. And as regards -the others, "paying in the long run" and "paying for some time," -even if these do belong to none but true ideas (and even this seems -very doubtful), they certainly neither of them satisfy the <i>other</i> -requirement—neither of them belong to <i>all</i> our true ideas. For, in -order that either of them may belong to an idea, that idea must pay at -least once; and, as we have seen, many true ideas do not pay even once, -and cannot, therefore, pay either in the long run or for some time. -And, moreover, many true ideas, which do pay on one occasion, seem to -pay on one occasion and one only.</p> - -<p>And, if Professor James does not mean to assert any of these things, -what is there left for him to mean? There is left in the first place, -the theory that <i>most</i> of our true ideas do pay; and that <i>most</i> of the -ideas which pay are true. This seems to me to be true, and, indeed, to -be all that is certainly true in what he says. But is it conceivable -that this is all he has meant? Obviously, these assertions tell us -of no property at all which belongs to all true ideas, and to none -but true ones; and, moreover, it seems impossible that he should have -been so anxious to assert this generally admitted commonplace. What a -very different complexion his whole discussion would have worn, had he -merely asserted this—this quite clearly, and nothing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> but this, while -admitting openly that many true ideas do not pay, and that many, which -do pay, are not true!</p> - -<p>And, besides this commonplace, there is only left for him to mean two -one-sided and doubtful assertions to the effect that certain properties -belong to none but true ideas. There is the assertion that all ideas -which pay in the long run are true, and the assertion that all ideas -which pay for some considerable time are true. And as to the first, it -<i>may</i> be true; but it may also be doubted, and Professor James gives us -no reason at all for thinking that it is true. Assuming that religious -ideas have been useful in the past, is it quite certain that they may -not permanently continue to be useful, even though they are false? -That, in short, even though they are not true, they nevertheless will -be useful, not only for a time, but in the long run? And as for the -assertion that all ideas, which pay for a considerable time, are true, -this is obviously more doubtful still. Whether certain religious ideas -will or will not be useful in the long run, it seems difficult to doubt -that many of them have been useful for a considerable time. And why -should we be told dogmatically that all of these are true? This, it -seems to me, is by far the most interesting assertion, which is left -for Professor James to make, when we have rejected the theory that the -property of being useful belongs to <i>all</i> true ideas, as well as to -none but true ones. But he has given no reason for asserting it. He -seems, in fact, to base it merely upon the general untenable theory, -that utility belongs to <i>all</i> true ideas, and to none but true ones; -that this is what truth means.</p> - -<p>These, then, seem to me the plainest and most obvious objections to -what Professor James says about the connection between truth and -utility. And there are only two further points, in what he says under -this head, that I wish to notice.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span></p> - -<p>In the first place, we have hitherto been considering only whether it -is true, as a matter of empirical fact, that all our true ideas are -useful, and those which are not true, never. Professor James seems, -at least, to mean that, <i>as a matter of fact,</i> this is so; and I have -only urged hitherto that <i>as a matter of fact</i>, it is not so. But as we -have seen, he also asserts something more than this—he also asserts -that this property of utility is the <i>only</i> one which belongs to all -our true ideas. And this further assertion cannot possibly be true, if, -as I have urged, there are many true ideas which do not possess this -property; or if, as I have urged, many ideas, which do possess it, are -nevertheless not true. The objections already considered are, then, -sufficient to overthrow this further assertion also. If there are any -true ideas, which are not useful, or if any, which are useful, are not -true, it cannot be the case that utility is the <i>only</i> property which -true ideas have in common. There must be some property, other than -utility, which is common to all true ideas; and a correct theory as to -what property it is that does belong to all true ideas, and to none but -true ones, is still to seek. The empirical objections, hitherto given, -are then sufficient objections to this further assertion also; but they -are not the only objections to it. There is another and still more -serious objection to the assertion that utility is the <i>only</i> property -which all true ideas have in common. For this assertion does not -<i>merely</i> imply that, as a matter of fact, all our true ideas and none -but true ideas are useful. It does, indeed, imply this; and therefore -the fact that these empirical assertions are not true is sufficient -to refute it. But it also implies something more. If utility were the -<i>only</i> property which all true ideas had in common, it would follow -not merely that all true ideas are useful, but also that any idea, -which was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> useful, <i>would</i> be true <i>no matter what other properties -it might have or might fail to have.</i> There can, I think, be no doubt -that Professor James does frequently speak as if this were the case; -and there is an independent and still more serious objection to this -implication. Even if it were true (as it is not) that all our true -ideas and none but true ideas are, as a matter of fact, useful, we -should still have a strong reason to object to the statement that any -idea, which was useful, <i>would</i> be true. For it implies that if such an -idea as mine, that Professor James exists, and has certain thoughts, -<i>were</i> useful, this idea would be true, <i>even if</i> no such person as -Professor James ever did exist. It implies that, if the idea that I had -the seven of diamonds in my hand at cards last night, <i>were</i> useful, -this idea would be true, even if, in fact, I did not have that card -in my hand. And we can, I think, see quite plainly that this is not -the case. With regard to some kinds of ideas, at all events—ideas -with regard to the existence of other people, or with regard to past -experiences of our own—it seems quite plain that they would not be -true, unless they "agreed with reality" in some other sense than that -which Professor James declares to be the only one in which true ideas -must agree with it. Even if my idea that Professor James exists were to -"agree with reality," in the sense that, owing to it, I handled <i>other</i> -realities better than I should have done without it, it would, I think, -plainly not be true, unless Professor James really did exist—unless -<i>he</i> were a reality. And this, I think, is one of the two most serious -objections to what he seems to hold about the connection of truth with -utility. He seems to hold that any idea, which was useful, <i>would</i> be -true, <i>no matter what other properties it might fail to have.</i> And with -regard to some ideas, at all events, it seems plain that they cannot be -true, <i>unless</i> they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> have the property that what they believe to exist, -really does or did exist. Beliefs in the existence of other people -might be useful to me, even if I alone existed; but, nevertheless, in -such a case, they would not be true.</p> - -<p>And there is only one other point, in what Professor James says in -connection with the "instrumental" view of truth, upon which I wish -to remark. We have seen that he seems sometimes to hold that beliefs -are true, <i>so long as</i> they are "profitable to our lives." And this -implies, as we have seen, the doubtful proposition than any belief -which is useful for some length of time, is true. But this is not -all that it implies. It also implies that beliefs are true <i>only</i> so -long as they are profitable. Nor does Professor James appear to mean -by this that they <i>occur</i>, only so long as they are profitable. He -seems to hold, on the contrary, that beliefs, which are profitable -for some time, do sometimes finally occur at a time when they are not -profitable. He implies, therefore, that a belief, which occurs at -several different times, may be true at some of the times at which it -occurs, and yet untrue at others. I think there is no doubt that this -view is what he is sometimes thinking of. And this, we see, constitutes -a quite new view as to the connection between truth and utility—a view -quite different from any that we have hitherto considered. This view -asserts not that every true idea is useful at some time, or in the long -run, or for a considerable period; but that the truth of an idea may -come and go, as its utility comes and goes. It admits that one and the -same idea sometimes occurs at times when it is useful, and sometimes -at times when it is not; but it maintains that this same idea is true, -at those times when it is useful, and not true, at those when it is -not. And the fact that Professor James seems to suggest this view, -constitutes, I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> think, a second most serious objection to what he says -about the connection of truth and utility. It seems so obvious that -utility is a property which comes and goes—which belongs to a given -idea at one time, and does not belong to it at another, that anyone who -says that the true is the useful naturally seems not to be overlooking -this obvious fact, but to be suggesting that truth is a property which -comes and goes in the same way. It is, in this way I think, that the -"instrumental" view of truth is connected with the view that truth is -"mutable." Professor James does, I think, imply that truth is mutable -in just this sense—namely, that one and the same idea may be true at -some of the times at which it occurs, and not true at others, and this -is the view which I have next to consider.</p> - - -<p>(II)</p> - -<p>Professor James seems to hold, generally, that "truth" is mutable. And -by this he seems sometimes to mean that an idea which, when it occurs -at one time, is true, <i>may,</i> when it occurs at another time, not be -true. He seems to hold that one and the same idea <i>may</i> be true at -one time and false at another. That it <i>may</i> be, for I do not suppose -he means that all ideas do actually undergo this change from true to -false. Many true ideas seem to occur but once, and, if so, they, at -least, will not actually be true at one time and false at another, -though, even with regard to these, perhaps Professor James means to -maintain that they <i>might</i> be false at another time, if they were to -occur at it. But I am not sure that he even means to maintain this -with regard to <i>all</i> our true ideas. Perhaps he does not mean to say, -with regard to <i>all</i> of them, even that they <i>can</i> change from true to -false. He speaks, generally, indeed, as if truth were mutable; but, -in one passage, he seems to insist that there is a certain class of -true ideas, none of which are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> mutable in this respect. "<i>Relations -among purely mental ideas,"</i> he says (p. 209), "form another sphere -where true and false beliefs obtain, and here the beliefs are absolute -or unconditional. When they are true they bear the name either of -definitions or of principles. It is either a principle or a definition -that 1 and 1 make 2, that 2 and 1 make 3, and so on; that white differs -less from grey than it does from black; that when the cause begins to -act the effect also commences. Such propositions hold of all possible -'ones,' of all conceivable 'whites,' 'greys,' and 'causes.' The objects -here are mental objects. Their relations are perceptually obvious -at a glance, and no sense-verification is necessary. Moreover, once -true, always true, of those same mental objects. Truth here has an -'eternal' character. If you can find a concrete thing anywhere that is -'one' or 'white' or 'grey' or an 'effect,' then your principles will -everlastingly apply to it." Professor James does seem here to hold -that there are true ideas, which once true, are always true. Perhaps, -then, he does not hold that <i>all</i> true ideas are mutable. Perhaps he -does not even hold that all true ideas, <i>except</i> ideas of this kind, -are so. But he does seem to hold at least that <i>many</i> of our true ideas -are mutable. And even this proposition seems to me to be disputable. -It seems to me that there is a sense in which it is the case with -<i>every</i> true idea that, if once true, it is always true. That is to -say, that every idea, which is true once, <i>would</i> be true at any other -time at which it were to occur; and that every idea which does occur -more than once, if true once, <i>is</i> true at every time at which it does -occur. There seems to me, I say, to be <i>a sense</i> in which this is so. -And this seems to me to be the sense in which it is most commonly and -most naturally maintained that all truths are "immutable." Professor -James seems to mean to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> deny it, even in this sense. He seems to me -constantly to speak as if there were <i>no</i> sense in which <i>all</i> truths -are immutable. And I only wish to point out what seems to me to be the -plainest and most obvious objection to such language.</p> - -<p>And, first of all, there is one doctrine, which he seems to connect -with this of his that "truths are mutable," with regard to which I -fully agree with him. He seems very anxious to insist that reality is -mutable: that it does change, and that it is not irrational to hope -that in the future it will be different from and much better than it -is now. And this seems to me to be quite undeniable. It seems to me -quite certain that I do have ideas at one time which I did not have -at another; that change, therefore, does really occur. It seems to me -quite certain that in the future many things will be different from -what they are now; and I see no reason to think that they may not be -much better. There is much misery in the world now; and I think it is -quite possible that some day there will really be much less. This view -that <i>reality</i> is mutable, that <i>facts</i> do change, that some things -have properties at one time which they do not have at other times, -seems to me certainly true. And so far, therefore, as Professor James -merely means to assert this obvious fact, I have no objection to his -view. Some philosophers, I think, have really implied the denial of -this fact. All those who deny the reality of time do seem to me to -imply that nothing really changes or can change—that, in fact, reality -is wholly immutable. And so far as Professor James is merely protesting -against this view, I should, therefore, agree with him.</p> - -<p>But I think it is quite plain that he does not mean <i>merely</i> this, -when he says that truth is mutable. No one would choose this way of -expressing himself if he merely meant to say that <i>some</i> things are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> -mutable. Truth, Professor James has told us, is a property of certain -of our ideas. And those of our ideas, which are true or false, are -certainly only a part of the Universe. Other things in the Universe -might, therefore, change, even if our ideas never changed in respect -of this property. And our ideas themselves do undoubtedly change in -some respects. A given idea exists in my mind at one moment and does -not exist in it at another. At one moment it is in my mind and not in -somebody else's, and at another in somebody else's and not in mine. -I sometimes think of the truth that twice two are four when I am in -one mood, and sometimes when I am in another. I sometimes think of it -in connection with one set of ideas and sometimes in connection with -another set. Ideas, then, are constantly changing in some respects. -They come and go; and at one time they stand in a given relation to -other things or ideas, to which at another time they do not stand in -that relation. In this sense, any given idea may certainly have a -property at one time which it has not got at another time. All this -seems obvious; and all this cannot be admitted, without admitting that -reality is mutable—that <i>some</i> things change. But obviously it does -not seem to follow from this that there is <i>no</i> respect in which ideas -are immutable. It does not seem to follow that because ideas, and other -things, change some of their properties, they necessarily change that -one which we are considering—namely, "truth." It does not follow that -a given idea, which has the property of truth at one time, ever exists -at any other time without having that property. And yet that this -<i>does</i> happen seems to be part of what is meant by saying that truth -is mutable. Plainly, therefore, to say this is to say something quite -different from saying that <i>some</i> things are mutable. Even, therefore, -if we admit that <i>some</i> things are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> mutable, it is still open to -consider whether truth is so. And this is what I want now to consider. -Is it the case that an idea which exists at one time, and is true then, -ever exists at any other time, without being true? Is it the case that -any idea ever changes from true to false? That it has the property of -being true on one of the occasions when it exists, and that it has -<i>not</i> this property, but that of being false instead, on some other -occasion when it exists?</p> - -<p>In order to answer this question clearly, it is, I think, necessary to -make still another distinction. It does certainly seem to be true, <i>in -a sense</i>, that a given idea may be true on one occasion and false on -another. We constantly speak as if there were cases in which a given -thing was true on one occasion and false on another; and I think it -cannot be denied that, when we so speak, we are often expressing in a -perfectly proper and legitimate manner something which is undeniably -true. It is true now, I might say, that I am in this room; but -to-morrow this will not be true. It is true now that men are often -very miserable; but perhaps in some future state of society this will -not be true. These are perfectly natural forms of expression, and what -they express is something which certainly may be true. And yet what -they do apparently assert is that something or other, which is true -at one time, will not, or <i>perhaps</i> will not, be true at another. We -constantly use such expressions, which imply that what is true at one -time is not true at another; and it is certainly legitimate to use -them. And hence, I think, we must admit that, <i>in a sense</i>, it is true -that a thing may be true at one time which is not true at another; in -that sense, namely, in which we use these expressions. And it is, I -think, also plain that these things, which may be true at one time and -false at another, may, <i>in a sense,</i> be ideas. We might even say: The -idea that I am in this room, is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> true now; but to-morrow it will not be -true. We might say this without any strain on language. In any ordinary -book—indeed, in any philosophical book, where the subject we are at -present discussing was not being expressly discussed—such expressions -do, I think, constantly occur. And we should pass them, without any -objection. We should at once understand what they meant, and treat them -as perfectly natural expressions of things undeniably true. We must, -then, I think, admit that, <i>in a sense</i>, an idea may be true at one -time, and false at another. The question is: In what sense? What is the -truth for which these perfectly legitimate expressions stand?</p> - -<p>It seems to me that in all these cases, so far as we are not merely -talking of <i>facts</i>, but of true <i>ideas</i>, that the "idea" which we truly -say to be true at one time and false at another, is merely the idea -of a <i>sentence</i>—that is, of certain <i>words.</i> And we do undoubtedly -call <i>words</i> "true." The words "I am at a meeting of the Aristotelian -Society" are true, if I use them now; but if I use the same words -to-morrow, they would not be true. The words "George III is king of -England" were true in 1800, but they are not true now. That is to say, -a given set of words may undoubtedly be true at one time, and false -at another; and since we may have ideas of words as well as of other -things, we may, in this sense, say the same of certain of our "ideas." -We may say that some of our "ideas" (namely those of words) are true at -one time and not true at another.</p> - -<p>But is it conceivable that Professor James <i>merely</i> meant to assert -that the same <i>words</i> are sometimes true at one time and false at -another? Can this be <i>all</i> he means by saying that truth is mutable? -I do not think it can possibly be so. No one, I think, in definitely -discussing the mutability of truth, could say that true ideas were -mutable, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> yet mean (although he did not say so) that this -proposition applied <i>solely</i> to ideas of words. Professor James must, I -think, have been sometimes thinking that <i>other</i> ideas, and not merely -ideas of words, do sometimes change from true to false. And this is the -proposition which I am concerned to dispute. It seems to me that if we -mean by an idea, not merely the idea of certain words, but the kind of -idea which words express, it is very doubtful whether such an idea ever -changes from true to false—whether any such idea is ever true at one -time and false at another.</p> - -<p>And plainly, in the first place, the mere fact that the same set of -words, as in the instances I have given, really are true at one time -and false at another, does not afford any presumption that anything -which they stand for is true at one time and false at another. For -the same words may obviously be used in different senses at different -times; and hence though the same words, which formerly expressed a -truth, may cease to express one, that may be because they now express -a <i>different</i> idea, and not because the idea which they formerly -expressed has ceased to be true. And that, in instances such as I have -given, the words <i>do</i> change their meaning according to the time at -which they are uttered or thought of, is I think, evident. If I use now -the words "I am in this room," these words certainly express (among -other things) the idea that my being in this room is contemporary -with my present use of the words; and if I were to use the same words -to-morrow, they would express the idea that my being in this room -to-morrow, was contemporary with the use of them <i>then.</i> And since my -use of them then would not be the same fact as my use of them now, -they would certainly then express a different idea from that which -they express now. And in general,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> whenever we use the present tense -in its primary sense, it seems to me plain that we do mean something -different by it each time we use it. We always mean (among other -things) to express the idea that a given event is contemporary with -our actual use of it; and since our actual use of it on one occasion -is always a different fact from our actual use of it on another, we -express by it a different idea each time we use it. And similarly with -the past and future tenses. If anybody had said in 1807 "Napoleon is -dead," he would certainly have meant by these words something different -from what I mean by them when I use them now. He would have meant that -Napoleon's death occurred at a time previous to <i>his</i> use of those -words; and this would not have been true. But in this fact there is -nothing to show that if he <i>had</i> meant by them what I mean now, his -idea would not have been as true then as mine is now. And so, if I say -"It will rain to-morrow," these words have a different meaning to-day -from what they would have if I used them to-morrow. What we mean by -"to-morrow" is obviously a different day, when we use the word on one -day, from what we mean by it when we use it on another. But in this -there is nothing to show that if the idea, which I <i>now</i> mean by "It -will rain to-morrow," <i>were</i> to occur again to-morrow, it would not be -true then, if it is true now. All this is surely very obvious. But, -if we take account of it, and if we concentrate our attention not on -the words but on what is meant by them, is it so certain that what we -mean by them on any one occasion ever changes from true to false? If -there were to occur to me to-morrow the very same idea which I now -express by the words "I am in this room," is it certain that this idea -would not be as true then as it is now? It is perhaps true that the -<i>whale</i> of what I mean by such a phrase as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> this never does recur. But -part of it does, and that a part which is true. Part of what I mean -is Certainly identical with part of what I should mean to-morrow by -saying "I <i>was</i> in that room last night." And this part would be as -true then, as it is now. And is there <i>any</i> part, which, if it were to -recur at any time, would <i>not</i> then be true, though it Is true now? In -the case of all ideas or parts of ideas, which ever do actually recur, -can we find a single instance of one, which is plainly true at one of -the times when it occurs, and yet not true at another? I cannot think -of any such instance. And on the other hand this very proposition that -any idea (other than mere words) which is true once, would be true at -any time, seems to me to be one of those truths of which Professor -James has spoken as having an "eternal," "absolute," "unconditional" -character—as being "perceptually obvious at a glance" and needing -"no sense-verification." Just as we know that, if a particular colour -differs more from black than from grey at one time, the same colour -would differ more from black than from grey at any time, so, it seems -to me, we can see that, if a particular idea is true at one time, the -same idea would be true at any time.</p> - -<p>It seems to me, then, that if we mean by an idea, not mere words, but -the kind of idea which words express, any idea, which is true at one -time when it occurs, <i>would</i> be true at any time when it were to occur; -and that this is so, even though it is an idea, which refers to facts -which are mutable. My being in this room is a fact which is now, but -which certainly has not been at every time and will not be at every -time. And the words "I <i>am</i> in this room," though they express a truth -now, would not have expressed one if I had used them yesterday, and -will not if I use them to-morrow. But if we consider the idea which -these words <i>now</i> express—<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span>namely, the idea of the connection of my -being in this room with this particular time—it seems to me evident -that anybody who had thought of that connection at any time in the -past, would have been thinking truly, and that anybody who were to -think of it at any time in the future would be thinking truly. This -seems to me to be the sense in which truths are immutable—in which -no idea can change from true to false. And I think Professor James -means to deny of truths generally, if not of all truths, that they are -immutable even in this sense. If he does not mean this there seems -nothing left for him to mean, when he says that truths are mutable, -except (1) that some <i>facts</i> are mutable, and (2) that the same <i>words</i> -may be true at one time and false at another. And it seems to me -impossible that he could speak as he does, if he meant <i>nothing more</i> -than these two things. I believe, therefore, that he is really thinking -that ideas which have been once true (<i>ideas,</i> and not merely words) -do sometimes afterwards become false: that the very same idea is at -one time true and at another false. But he certainly gives no instance -which shows that this does ever occur. And how far does he mean his -principle to carry him? Does he hold that this idea that Julius Caesar -was murdered in the Senate-House, though true now, may, at some future -time cease to be true, if it should be more profitable to the lives of -future generations to believe that he died in his bed? Things like this -are what his words seem to imply; and, even if he does hold that truths -like this are <i>not</i> mutable, he never tries to tell us to what kinds of -truths he would limit mutability, nor how they differ from such as this.</p> - - -<p>(III)</p> - -<p>Finally, there remains the view that "to an unascertainable extent our -truths are man-made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> products." And the only point I want to make about -this view may be put very briefly.</p> - -<p>It is noticeable that all the instances which Professor James gives -of the ways in which, according to him, "our truths" are "made" are -instances of ways in which our <i>beliefs</i> come into existence. In -many of these ways, it would seem, false beliefs sometimes come into -existence as well as true ones; and I take it Professor James does -not always wish to deny this. False beliefs, I think he would say, -are just as much "man-made products" as true ones: it is sufficient -for his purpose if true beliefs do come into existence in the ways he -mentions. And the only point which seems to be illustrated by all these -instances, is that in all of them the existence of a true belief does -depend in some way or other upon the previous existence of something -in some man's mind. They are all of them cases in which we may truly -say: This man would not have had just that belief, had not some man -previously had such and such experiences, or interests, or purposes. -In some cases they are instances of ways in which the existence of a -particular belief in a man depends upon <i>his own</i> previous experiences -or interests or volitions. But this does not seem to be the case -in all. Professor James seems also anxious to illustrate the point -that one man's beliefs often depend upon the previous experiences or -interests or volitions of <i>other</i> men. And, as I say, the only point -which seems to be definitely illustrated in all cases is that the -existence of a true belief does depend, <i>in some way or other,</i> upon -something which has previously existed in some man's mind. Almost -any kind of dependence, it would seem, is sufficient to illustrate -Professor James' point.</p> - -<p>And as regards this general thesis that almost all our beliefs, true as -well as false, depend, in some way or other, upon what has previously -been in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> some human mind, it will, I think, be readily admitted. It -is a commonplace, which, so far as I know, hardly anyone would deny. -If this is all that is to be meant by saying that our true beliefs -are "man-made," it must, I think, be admitted that almost all, If not -quite all, really are man-made. And this is all that Professor James' -instances seem to me, in fact, to show.</p> - -<p>But is this all that Professor James means, when he says that <i>our -truths</i> are man-made? Is it conceivable that he only means to insist -upon this undeniable, and generally admitted, commonplace? It seems to -me quite plain that this is not all that he means. I think he certainly -means to suggest that, from the fact that we "make" our true beliefs, -something <i>else</i> follows. And I think it is not hard to see one thing -more which he does mean. I think he certainly means to suggest that we -not only make our true beliefs, but also that we <i>make them true.</i> At -least as much as this is certainly naturally suggested by his words. -No one would persistently say that we make <i>our truths</i>, unless he -meant, at least, not merely that we make our true beliefs, but also -that we make them true—unless he meant not merely that the existence -of our true beliefs, but also that their <i>truth</i>, depended upon human -conditions. This, it seems to me, is one consequence which Professor -James means us to draw from the commonplace that the <i>existence</i> of our -true beliefs depends upon human conditions. But does this consequence, -in fact, follow from that commonplace? From the fact that we make our -true beliefs, does it follow that we <i>make them true?</i></p> - -<p><i>In one sense,</i> undoubtedly, even this does follow. If we say (as we -may say) that no belief can be true, unless it exists, then it follows -that, in a sense, the truth of a belief must always depend upon any -conditions upon which its existence depends. If,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> therefore, the -occurrence of a belief depends upon human conditions, so, too, must its -truth. If the belief had never existed, it would never have been true; -and therefore its truth must, in a sense, depend upon human conditions -in exactly the same degree in which its existence depends upon them. -This is obvious. But is this all that is meant? Is this all that would -be suggested to us by telling us that we make our beliefs true?</p> - -<p>It is easy to see that it is not. I may have the belief that it will -rain to-morrow. And I may have "made" myself have this belief. It may -be the case that I should not have had it, but for peculiarities in my -past experiences, in my interests and my volitions. It may be the case -that I should not have had it, but for a deliberate attempt to consider -the question whether it will rain or not. This may easily happen. And -certainly this particular belief of mine would not have been true, -unless it existed. Its truth, therefore, depends, in a sense, upon any -conditions upon which its existence depends. And this belief may be -true. It will be true, if It does rain to-morrow. But, in spite of all -these reasons, would anyone think of saying that, in case it is true, I -had <i>made</i> it true? Would anyone say that I had had any hand <i>at all</i> -in making it true? Plainly no one would. We should say that I had a -hand in making it true, if and only If I had a hand in <i>making the rain -fall.</i> In every case in which we believe in the existence of anything, -past or future, we should say that we had helped to make the belief -true, if and only if we had helped to cause the existence of the fact -which, in that belief, we believed did exist or would exist. Surely -this is plain. I may believe that the sun will rise to-morrow. And I -may have had a hand in "making" this belief; certainly it often depends -for its existence upon what has been previously in my mind. And<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> if the -sun does rise, my belief will have been true. I have, therefore, had -a hand in making a true belief. But would anyone say that, therefore, -I had a hand in <i>making this belief true</i>? Certainly no one would. No -one would say that anything had contributed to make this belief true, -except those conditions (whatever they may be) which contributed to -making the sun actually rise.</p> - -<p>It is plain, then, that by "making a belief true," we mean something -quite different from what Professor James means by "making" that -belief. Conditions which have a hand in making a given true belief, -may (it appears) have no hand at all in making it true; and conditions -which have a hand in making it true may have no hand at all in making -<i>it.</i> Certainly this is how we use the words. We should never say that -we had made a belief true, merely because we had made the belief. But -now, which of these two things does Professor James mean? Does he mean -<i>merely</i> the accepted commonplace that we make our true beliefs, in the -sense that almost all of them depend for their existence on what has -been previously in some human mind? Or does he mean also that we <i>make -them true</i>—that their truth also depends on what has been previously -in some human mind?</p> - -<p>I cannot help thinking that he has the latter, and not only the former -in his mind. But, then, what does this involve? If his instances of -"truth-making" are to be anything to the purpose, it should mean that, -whenever I have a hand in causing one of my own beliefs, I always -have to that extent a hand in making it true. That, therefore, I have -a hand in actually making the sun rise, the wind blow, and the rain -fall, whenever I cause my beliefs in these things. Nay, more, it -should mean that, whenever I "make" a true belief about the past, I -must have had a hand in making this true. And if<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> so, then certainly I -must have had a hand in causing the French Revolution, in causing my -father's birth, in making Professor James write this book. Certainly -he implies that some man or other must have helped in causing almost -every event, in which any man ever truly believed. That it was we who -made the planets revolve round the sun, who made the Alps rise, and -the floor of the Pacific sink—all these things, and others like them, -seem to be involved. And it is these consequences which seem to me to -justify a doubt whether, in fact "our truths are to an unascertainable -extent man-made." That some of our truths are man-made—indeed, a great -many—I fully admit. We certainly do make some of our beliefs true. -The Secretary probably had a belief that I should write this paper, -and I have made his belief true by writing it. Men certainly have the -power to alter the world to a certain extent; and, so far as they do -this, they certainly "make true" any beliefs, which are beliefs in the -occurrence of these alterations. But I can see no reason for supposing -that they "make true" <i>nearly</i> all those of their beliefs which are -true. And certainly the only reason which Professor James seems to -give for believing this—namely, that the <i>existence</i> of almost all -their beliefs depends on them—seems to be no reason for it at all. For -unquestionably a man does not "make true" nearly every belief whose -<i>existence</i> depends on him; and if so, the question which of their -beliefs and how many, men do "make true" must be settled by quite other -considerations.</p> - -<p>In conclusion, I wish to sum up what seems to me to be the most -important points about this "pragmatist theory of truth," as Professor -James represents it. It seems to me that, in what he says<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> about it, he -has in his mind some things which are true and others which are false; -and I wish to tabulate separately the principal ones which I take to be -true, and the principal ones which I take to be false. The true ones -seem to me to be these:—</p> - -<p>That <i>most</i> of our true beliefs are useful to us; and that <i>most</i> of -the beliefs that are useful to us are true.</p> - -<p>That the world really does change in some respects; that facts exist at -one time, which didn't and won't exist at others; and that hence the -world may be better at some future time than it is now or has been in -the past.</p> - - -<p>That the very same words may be true at one time and false at -another—that they may express a truth at one time and a falsehood at -another.</p> - -<p>That the existence of most, if not all, of our beliefs, true as well as -false, does depend upon previous events in our mental history; that we -should never have had the particular beliefs we do have, had not our -previous mental history been such as it was.</p> - -<p>That the truth, and not merely the existence, of <i>some</i> of our beliefs, -does depend upon us. That we really do make some alterations in the -world, and that hence we do help to "make true" all those of our -beliefs which are beliefs in the existence of these alterations.</p> - - -<p>To all of these propositions I have no objection to offer. And they -seem to me to be generally admitted commonplaces. A certain class of -philosophers do, indeed, imply the denial of every one of them—namely, -those philosophers who deny the reality of time. And I think that -part of Professor James' object is to protest against the views of -these philosophers. All of these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> propositions do constitute a protest -against such views; and so far they might be all that Professor James -meant to assert. But I do not think that anyone, fairly reading through -what he says, could get the impression that these things, and nothing -more, were what he had in his mind. What gives colour and interest to -what he says, seems to be obviously something quite different. And, if -we try to find out what exactly the chief things are which give his -discussion its colour and interest, it seems to me we may distinguish -that what he has in his mind, wrapped up in more or less ambiguous -language, are the following propositions, to all of which I have tried -to urge what seem to me the most obvious objections:—</p> - - -<p>That utility is a property which distinguishes true beliefs from those -which are not true; that, therefore, <i>all</i> true beliefs are useful, and -<i>all</i> beliefs, which are useful, are true—by "utility" being sometimes -meant "utility on at least one occasion," sometimes "utility in the -long run," sometimes "utility for some length of time."</p> - -<p>That all beliefs which are useful for some length of time are true.</p> - -<p>That utility is the <i>only</i> property which all true beliefs have in -common: that, therefore, <i>if</i> it were useful to me to believe in -Professor James' existence, this belief <i>would</i> be true, even if he -didn't exist; and that, <i>if</i> it were not useful to me to believe this, -the belief <i>would</i> be false, even if he did.</p> - -<p>That the beliefs, which we express by words, and not merely the words -themselves, may be true at one time and <i>not</i> true at another; and that -this is a general rule, though perhaps there may be some exceptions.</p> - -<p>That whenever the <i>existence</i> of a belief depends<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> to some extent on -us, then also the <i>truth</i> of that belief depends to some extent on us; -in the sense in which this implies, that, when the existence of my -belief that a shower will fall depends upon me, then, if this belief -is true, I must have had a hand in making the shower fall: that, -therefore, men must have had a hand in making to exist almost every -fact which they ever believe to exist.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_3" id="Footnote_1_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_3"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking: -Popular Lectures on Philosophy.</i> By William James. Longmans, Green, and -Co., 1907</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="HUMES_PHILOSOPHY" id="HUMES_PHILOSOPHY">HUME'S PHILOSOPHY</a></h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>In both of his two books on the Human Understanding, Hume had, I think, -one main general object. He tells us that it was his object to discover -"the extent and force of human understanding," to give us "an exact -analysis of its powers and capacity." And we may, I think, express -what he meant by this in the following way. He plainly held (as we -all do) that some men sometimes entertain opinions which they cannot -know to be true. And he wished to point out what characteristics are -possessed by those of our opinions which we <i>can</i> know to be true, with -a view of persuading us that any opinion which does <i>not</i> possess any -of these characteristics is of a kind which we <i>cannot</i> know to be so. -He thus tries to lay down certain rules to the effect that the <i>only</i> -propositions which we can, any of us, know to be true are of certain -definite kinds. It is in this sense, I think, that he tries to define -the limits of human understanding.</p> - -<p>With this object he, first of all, divides all the propositions, -which we can even so much as conceive, into two classes. They are -all, he says, either propositions about "relations of ideas" or else -about "matters of fact." By propositions about "relations of ideas" -he means such propositions as that twice two are four, or that black -differs from white; and it is, I think, easy enough to see, though -by no means easy to define, what<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> kind of propositions it is that -he means to include in this division. They are, he says, the only -kind of propositions with regard to which we can have "intuitive" or -"demonstrative" certainty. But the vast majority of the propositions -in which we believe and which interest us most, belong to the other -division: they are propositions about "matters of fact." And these -again he divides into two classes. So far as his words go, this latter -division is between "matters of fact, beyond the present testimony of -our senses, or the records of our memory," on the one hand, and matters -of fact for which we <i>have</i> the evidence of our memory or senses, on -the other. But it is, I think, quite plain that these words do not -represent quite accurately the division which he really means to make. -He plainly intends to reckon along with facts for which we have the -evidence of our <i>senses</i> all facts for which we have the evidence -of <i>direct observation</i>—such facts, for instance, as those which I -observe when I observe that I am angry or afraid, and which cannot be -strictly said to be apprehended by my <i>senses.</i> The division, then, -which he really intends to make is (to put it quite strictly) into the -two classes—(1) propositions which assert some matter of fact which I -am (in the strictest sense) <i>observing</i> at the moment, or which I have -so observed in the past and now remember; and (2) propositions which -assert any matter of fact which I am not now observing and never have -observed, or, if I have, have quite forgotten.</p> - -<p>We have, then, the three classes—(1) propositions which assert -"relations of ideas"; (2) propositions which assert "matters of fact" -for which we have the evidence of direct observation or personal -memory; (3) propositions which assert "matters of fact<i>"</i> for which -we have <i>not</i> this evidence. And as regards propositions of the first -two classes,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> Hume does not seem to doubt our capacity for knowledge. -He does not doubt that we can know <i>some</i> (though, of course, not -<i>all)</i> propositions about "relations of ideas" to be true; he never -doubts, for instance, that we can know that twice two are four. And -he generally assumes also that each of us can know the truth of -<i>all</i> propositions which merely assert some matter of fact which we -ourselves are, in the strictest sense, directly observing, or which -we have so observed and now remember. He does, indeed, in one place, -suggest a doubt whether our memory is <i>ever</i> to be implicitly trusted, -but he generally assumes that it <i>always</i> can. It is with regard to -propositions of the third class that he is chiefly anxious to determine -which of them (if any) we can know to be true and which not. In what -cases can any man know any matter of fact which he himself has not -directly observed? It is Hume's views on this question which form, I -think, the main interest of his philosophy.</p> - -<p>He proposes, first of all, by way of answer to it, a rule, which may, -I think, be expressed as follows: No man, he says, can ever know any -matter of fact, which he has not himself observed, unless he can know -that it is connected by "the relation of cause and effect," with some -fact which he <i>has</i> observed. And no man can ever know that any two -facts are connected by this relation, except by the help of his own -past <i>experience.</i> In other words, if I am to know any fact, A, which -I have not myself observed, my past experience must give me some -foundation for the belief that A is causally connected with some fact, -B, which I have observed. And the only kind of past experience which -can give me any foundation for such a belief is, Hume seems to say, -as follows: I must, he says, have found <i>facts like</i> A "constantly -conjoined" in the past with <i>facts like</i> B. This is what he <i>says;</i> -but we must not, I think,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> press his words too strictly. I may, for -instance, know that A is <i>probably</i> a fact, even where the conjunction -of facts like it with facts like B has not been quite constant. Or -instead of observing facts like A conjoined with facts like B, I may -have observed a whole series of conjunctions—for instance, between A -and C, C and D, D and E, and E and B; and such a series, however long, -will do quite as well to establish a causal connection between A and B, -as if I had directly observed conjunctions between A and B themselves. -Such modifications as this, Hume would, I think, certainly allow. But, -allowing for them, his principle is, I think, quite clear. I can, he -holds, never know any fact whatever, which I have not myself observed, -unless I have observed similar facts in the past and have observed that -they were "conjoined" (directly or indirectly) with facts similar to -some fact which I do now observe or remember. In this sense, he holds, -<i>all</i> our knowledge of facts, beyond the reach of our own observation, -is founded on <i>experience.</i></p> - -<p>This is Hume's primary principle. But what consequences does he -think will follow from it, as to the kind of facts, beyond our own -observation, which we can know? We may, I think, distinguish three -entirely different views as to its consequences, which he suggests in -different parts of his work.</p> - -<p>In the first place, where he is specially engaged in explaining this -primary principle, he certainly seems to suppose that all propositions -of the kind, which we assume most universally in everyday life, may be -founded on experience in the sense required. He supposes that we have -this foundation in experience for such beliefs as that "a stone will -fall, or fire burn"; that Julius Caesar was murdered; that the sun will -rise to-morrow; that all men are mortal He speaks as if experience did -not merely render such beliefs probable, but actually <i>proved</i> them -to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> be true. The "arguments from experience" in their favour are, he -says, such as "leave no room for doubt or opposition." The only kinds -of belief, which he definitely mentions as <i>not</i> founded on experience, -are "popular superstitions" on the one hand, and certain religious and -philosophical beliefs, on the other. He seems to suppose that a few (a -very few) religious beliefs may, perhaps, be founded on experience. -But as regards most of the specific doctrines of Christianity, for -example, he seems to be clear that they are not so founded. The belief -in miracles is not founded on experience; nor is the philosophical -belief that every event is caused by the direct volition of the Deity. -In short, it would seem, that in this doctrine that our knowledge of -unobserved facts is confined to such as are "founded on experience," -he means to draw the line very much where it is drawn by the familiar -doctrine which is called "Agnosticism." We can know such facts as -are asserted in books on "history, geography or astronomy," or on -"politics, physics and chemistry," because such assertions may be -"founded on experience"; but we cannot know the greater part of the -facts asserted in books "of divinity or school metaphysics," because -such assertions have no foundation in experience.</p> - -<p>This, I think, was clearly one of Hume's views. He meant to fix the -limits of our knowledge at a point which would <i>exclude</i> most religious -propositions and a great many philosophical ones, as incapable of being -known; but which would <i>include</i> all the other kinds of propositions, -which are most universally accepted by common-sense, as capable of -being known. And he thought that, so far as matters of fact beyond the -reach of our personal observation are concerned, this point coincided -with that at which the possibility of "foundation on experience" -ceases.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span></p> - -<p>But, if we turn to another part of his work, we find a very different -view suggested. In a quite distinct section of both his books, he -investigates the beliefs which we entertain concerning the existence -of "external objects." And he distinguishes two different kinds of -belief which may be held on this subject. "Almost all mankind, and -philosophers themselves, for the greatest part of their lives," -believe, he says, that "the very things they feel and see" <i>are</i> -external objects, in the sense that they continue to exist, even when -we cease to feel or see them. Philosophers, on the other hand, have -been led to reject this opinion and to suppose (when they reflect) -that what we actually perceive by the senses never exists except when -we perceive it, but that there are other external objects, which do -exist independently of us, and which <i>cause</i> us to perceive what we do -perceive. Hume investigates both of these opinions, at great length in -the <i>Treatise</i>, and much more briefly in the <i>Enquiry</i>, and comes to -the conclusion, in both books, that neither of them can be "founded -on experience," in the sense he has defined. As regards the first of -them, the vulgar opinion, he does seem to admit in the <i>Treatise</i> that -it is, in a sense, founded on experience; but not, he insists, in -the sense defined. And he seems also to think that, apart from this -fact, there are conclusive reasons for holding that the opinion cannot -be true. And as regards the philosophical opinion, he says that any -belief in external objects, which we never perceive but which cause our -perceptions, cannot possibly be founded on experience, for the simple -reason that if it were, we should need to have directly observed some -of these objects and their "conjunction" with what we do perceive, -which <i>ex hypothesi,</i> we cannot have done, since we never do directly -observe any external object.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span></p> - -<p>Hume, therefore, concludes, in this part of his work, that we cannot -know of the existence of any "external object" whatever. And though -in all that he says upon this subject, he is plainly thinking only of -<i>material</i> objects, the principles by which he tries to prove that we -cannot know these must, I think, prove equally well that we cannot -know any "external object" whatever—not even the existence of any -other human mind. His argument is: We cannot directly observe any -object whatever, except such as exist only when we observe them; we -cannot, therefore, observe any "constant conjunctions" except between -objects of this kind: and hence we can have no foundation in experience -for any proposition which asserts the existence of any other kind of -object, and cannot, therefore, know any such proposition to be true. -And this argument must plainly apply to all the feelings, thoughts and -perceptions of other men just as much as to material objects. I can -never know that any perception of mine, or anything which I do observe, -must have been caused by any other man, because I can never directly -observe a "constant conjunction" between any other man's thoughts -or feelings or intentions and anything which I directly observe: I -cannot, therefore, know that any other man ever had any thoughts or -feelings—or, in short, that any man beside myself ever existed. The -view, therefore, which Hume suggests in this part of his work, flatly -contradicts the view which he at first seemed to hold. He now says we -<i>cannot</i> know that a stone will fall, that fire will burn, or the sun -will rise to-morrow. All that I can possibly know, according to his -present principles, is that <i>I shall see</i> a stone fall, shall feel the -fire burn, shall see the sun rise to-morrow. I cannot even know that -any other men will see these things; for I cannot know that any other -men exist. For the same reason, I cannot<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> know that Julius Caesar -was murdered, or that all men are mortal. For these are propositions -asserting "external" facts—facts which don't exist only at the moment -when I observe them; and, according to his present doctrine, I cannot -possibly know any such proposition to be true. No man, in short, can -know any proposition about "matters of fact" to be true, except such -as merely assert something about <i>his own</i> states of mind, past, -present or future—about these or about what <i>he himself</i> has directly -observed, is observing, or will observe.</p> - -<p>Here, therefore, we have a very different view suggested, as to the -limits of human knowledge. And even this is not all. There is yet a -third view, inconsistent with both of these, which Hume suggests in -some parts of his work.</p> - -<p>So far as we have yet seen, he has not in any way contradicted his -original supposition that we can know <i>some</i> matters of fact, which we -have never ourselves observed. In the second theory, which I have just -stated, he does not call in question the view that I can know all such -matters of fact as I know to be causally connected with facts which -I have observed, nor the view that I can know some facts to be thus -causally connected. All that he has done is to question whether I can -know any <i>external</i> fact to be causally connected with anything which -I observe; he would still allow that I may be able to know that future -states of my own, or past states, which I have forgotten, are causally -connected with those which I now observe or remember; and that I may -know therefore, in some cases, what I shall experience in the future, -or have experienced in the past but have now forgotten. But in some -parts of his work he does seem to question whether any man can know -even as much as this: he seems to question whether we can ever know any -fact whatever to be causally connected<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> with any other fact. For, after -laying it down, as we saw above, that we cannot know any fact, A, to be -causally connected with another, B, unless we have experienced in the -past a constant conjunction between facts like A and facts like B, he -goes on to ask what foundation we have for the conclusion that A and B -<i>are</i> causally connected, even when we <i>have</i> in the past experienced -a constant conjunction between them. He points out that from the fact -that A has been constantly conjoined with B in the past, it does not -follow that it ever will be so again. It does not follow, therefore, -that the two really are causally connected in the sense that, when the -one occurs, the other <i>always</i> will occur also. And he concludes, for -this and other reasons, that <i>no argument</i> can assure us that, because -they have been constantly conjoined in the past, therefore they really -are causally connected. What, then, he asks, is the foundation for such -an inference? <i>Custom,</i> he concludes, is the only foundation. It is -nothing but custom which induces us to believe that, because two facts -have been constantly conjoined on many occasions, therefore they will -be so on <i>all</i> occasions. We have, therefore, no better foundation -than custom for any conclusion whatever as to facts which we have not -observed. And can we be said really to <i>know</i> any fact, for which we -have no better foundation than this? Hume himself, it must be observed, -never says that we can't. But he has been constantly interpreted as if -the conclusion that we can't really know any one fact to be causally -connected with any other, did follow from this doctrine of his. And -there is, I think, certainly much excuse for this interpretation in the -tone in which he speaks. He does seem to suggest that a belief which is -<i>merely</i> founded on custom, can scarcely be one which we <i>know</i> to be -true. And, indeed, he owns himself that, when he considers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> that this -is our only foundation for any such belief, he is sometimes tempted -to doubt whether we do know any fact whatever, except those which we -directly observe. He does, therefore, at least suggest the view that -every man's knowledge is entirely confined to those facts, which he is -directly observing at the moment, or which he has observed in the past, -and now remembers.</p> - -<p>We see, then, that Hume suggests, at least, three entirely different -views as to the consequences of his original doctrine. His original -doctrine was that, as regards matters of fact beyond the reach of our -own actual observation, the knowledge of each of us is strictly limited -to those for which we have a basis in our own experience. And his first -view as to the consequences of this doctrine was that it does show us -to be incapable of knowing a good many religious and philosophical -propositions, which many men have claimed that they knew; but that it -by no means denies our capacity of knowing the vast majority of facts -beyond our own observation, which we all commonly suppose that we know. -His second view, on the other hand, is that it cuts off at once all -possibility of our knowing the vast majority of these facts; since he -implies that we cannot have any basis in experience for asserting any -<i>external</i> fact whatever—any fact, that is, except facts relating to -our own actual past and future observations. And his third view is more -sceptical still, since it suggests that we cannot really know any fact -whatever, beyond the reach of our present observation or memory, even -where we <i>have</i> a basis in experience for such a fact: it suggests that -experience cannot ever let us <i>know</i> that any two things are causally -connected, and therefore that it cannot give us <i>knowledge</i> of any fact -based on this relation.</p> - -<p>What are we to think of these three views, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> of the original -doctrine from which Hume seems to infer them?</p> - -<p>As regards the last two views, it may perhaps be thought that they -are too absurd to deserve any serious consideration. It is, in fact, -absurd to suggest that I do not know any external facts whatever; -that I do not know, for instance, even that there are any men beside -myself. And Hume himself, it might seem, does not seriously expect or -wish us to accept these views. He points out, with regard to all such -excessively sceptical opinions that we cannot continue to believe them -for long together—that, at least, we cannot, for long together, avoid -believing things flatly inconsistent with them. The philosopher may -believe, when he is philosophising, that no man knows of the existence -of any other man or of any material object; but at other times he -will inevitably believe, as we all do, that he does know of the -existence of this man and of that, and even of this and that material -object. There can, therefore, be no question of making all our beliefs -consistent with such views as this of never believing anything that is -inconsistent with them. And it may, therefore, seem useless to discuss -them. But in fact, it by no means follows that, because we are not able -to adhere consistently to a given view, therefore that view is false; -nor does it follow that we may not sincerely believe it, whenever we -are philosophising, even though the moment we cease to philosophise, or -even before, we may be forced to contradict it. And philosophers do, -in fact, sincerely believe such things as this—things which flatly -contradict the vast majority of the things which they believe at other -times. Even Hume, I think, does sincerely wish to persuade us that -we cannot know of the existence of external material objects—that -this is a philosophic truth, which we ought, if we can, so long as we -are philosophising, to believe. Many<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> people, I think, are certainly -tempted, in their philosophic moments, to believe such things; and, -since this is so, it is, I think, worth while to consider seriously -what arguments can be brought against such views. It is worth while to -consider whether they are views which we ought to hold as philosophical -opinions, even if it be quite certain that we shall never be able to -make the views which we entertain at other times consistent with them. -And it is the more worth while, because the question how we can prove -or disprove such extreme views as these, has a bearing on the question -how we can, in any case whatever, prove or disprove that we do really -<i>know,</i> what we suppose ourselves to know.</p> - -<p>What arguments, then, are there for or against the extreme view that -no man can know any external fact whatever; and the still more extreme -view that no man can know any matter of fact whatever, except those -which he is directly observing at the moment, or has observed in the -past and now remembers?</p> - -<p>It may be pointed out, in the first place, that, if these views are -true, then at least no man can possibly know them to be so. What -these views assert is that I cannot know any external fact whatever. -It follows, therefore, that I cannot know that there are any other -men, beside myself, and that they are like me in this respect. Any -philosopher who asserts positively that other men, equally with -himself, are incapable of knowing any external facts, is, in that very -assertion, contradicting himself, since he implies that he <i>does</i> know -a great many facts about the knowledge of other men. No one, therefore, -can be entitled to assert positively that human knowledge is limited -in this way, since, in asserting it positively, he is implying that -his own knowledge is not so limited. It cannot be proper, even in our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> -philosophic moments, to take up such an attitude as this.</p> - -<p>No one, therefore, can know positively that men in general, are -incapable of knowing external facts. But still, although we cannot -<i>know</i> it, it remains possible that the view should be a true one. Nay, -more, it remains possible that a man should know that <i>he himself</i> -is incapable of knowing any external facts, and that, <i>if</i> there are -any other men whose faculties are only similar to his own, they also -must be incapable of knowing any. The argument just used obviously -does not apply against such a position as this. It only applies -against the position that men in general positively are incapable -of knowing external facts: it does not apply against the position -that the philosopher himself is incapable of knowing any, or against -the position that there are <i>possibly</i> other men in the same case, -and that, if their faculties are similar to the philosopher's, they -certainly would be in it. I do not contradict myself by maintaining -positively that <i>I</i> know no external facts, though I do contradict -myself if I maintain that I am only one among other men, and that no -man knows any external facts. So far, then, as Hume merely maintains -that <i>he</i> is incapable of knowing any external facts, and that there -<i>may</i> be other men like him in this respect, the argument just used is -not valid against his position. Can any conclusive arguments be found -against it?</p> - -<p>It seems to me that such a position must, in a certain sense, be quite -incapable of disproof. So much must be granted to any sceptic who feels -inclined to hold it. Any valid argument which can be brought against -it must be of the nature of a <i>petitio principii:</i> it must beg the -question at issue. How is the sceptic to prove to himself that he does -know any external facts? He can only do it by bringing forward some -instance of an external fact,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> which he does know; and, in assuming -that he does know this one, he is, of course, begging the question. It -is therefore quite impossible for any one to <i>prove,</i> in one strict -sense of the term, that he does know any external facts. I can only -prove that I do, by assuming that in some particular instance, I -actually do know one. That is to say, the so-called proof must assume -the very thing which it pretends to prove. The only proof that we do -know external facts lies in the simple fact that we do know them. And -the sceptic can, with perfect internal consistency, deny that he does -know any. But it can, I think, be shown that he has no reason for -denying it. And in particular it may, I think, be easily seen that the -arguments which Hume uses in favour of this position have no conclusive -force.</p> - -<p>To begin with, his arguments, in both cases, depend upon the two -original assumptions, (1) that we cannot know any fact, which we -have not observed, unless we know it to be causally connected with -some fact which we have observed, and (2) that we have no reason for -assuming any causal connection, except where we have experienced some -instances of conjunction between the two facts connected. And both of -these assumptions may, of course, be denied. It is just as easy to deny -them, as to deny that I do know any external facts. And, if these two -assumptions did really lead to the conclusion that I cannot know any, -it would, I think, be proper to deny them: we might fairly regard the -fact that they led to this absurd conclusion as disproving them. But, -in fact, I think it may be easily seen that they do not lead to it.</p> - -<p>Let us consider, first of all, Hume's most sceptical argument (the -argument which he merely suggests). This argument suggests that, since -our only reason for supposing two facts to be causally connected is -that we have found them constantly conjoined in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> the past, and since -it does not follow from the fact that they have been conjoined ever -so many times, that they <i>always</i> will be so, therefore we cannot -<i>know</i> that they always will be so, and hence cannot know that they are -causally connected. But obviously the conclusion does not follow. We -must, I think, grant the premiss that, from the fact that two things -have been conjoined, no matter how often, it does not strictly <i>follow</i> -that they <i>always</i> are conjoined. But it by no means follows from this -that we may not <i>know</i> that, as a matter of fact, when two things are -conjoined sufficiently often, they are also <i>always</i> conjoined. We -may quite well <i>know</i> many things which do not logically follow from -anything else which we know. And so, in this case, we may <i>know</i> that -two things are causally connected, although this does not logically -follow from our past experience, nor yet from anything else that we -know. And, as for the contention that our belief in causal connections -is merely based on <i>custom,</i> we may, indeed, admit that custom would -not be a sufficient <i>reason</i> for concluding the belief to be true. -But the mere fact (if it be a fact) that the belief is only caused by -custom, is also no sufficient reason for concluding that we can <i>not</i> -know it to be true. Custom <i>may</i> produce beliefs, which we do know to -be true, even though it be admitted that it does not <i>necessarily</i> -produce them.</p> - -<p>And as for Hume's argument to prove that we can never know any -<i>external</i> object to be causally connected with anything which we -actually observe, it is, I think, obviously fallacious. In order -to prove this, he has, as he recognises, to disprove both of two -theories. He has, first of all, to disprove what he calls the vulgar -theory—the theory that we can know the very things which we see or -feel to be external objects; that is to say, can know that these very -things exist at times when<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> we do not observe them. And even here, I -think, his arguments are obviously inconclusive. But we need not stay -to consider them, because, in order to prove that we cannot know any -external objects, he has also to disprove what he calls the philosophic -theory—the theory that we can know things which we do observe, to be -caused by external objects which we never observe. If, therefore, his -attempt to disprove this theory fails, his proof that we cannot know -any external objects also fails; and I think it is easy to see that -his disproof does fail. It amounts merely to this: That we cannot, <i>ex -hypothesi,</i> ever observe these supposed external objects, and therefore -cannot observe them to be constantly conjoined with any objects which -we do observe. But what follows from this? His own theory about the -knowledge of causal connection is not that in order to know A to be the -cause of B, we must have observed A <i>itself</i> to be conjoined with B; -but only that we must have observed objects <i>like</i> A to be constantly -conjoined with objects <i>like</i> B. And what is to prevent an external -object from being <i>like</i> some object which we have formerly observed? -Suppose I have frequently observed a fact <i>like A</i> to be conjoined with -a fact <i>like</i> B: and suppose I now observe B, on an occasion when I do -not observe anything like A. There is no reason, on Hume's principles, -why I should not conclude that A does exist on this occasion, even -though I do not observe it; and that it is, therefore, an external -object. It will, of course, differ from any object which I have ever -observed, in respect of the simple fact that it is <i>not</i> observed by -me, whereas they were. There is, therefore, this one respect in which -it must be <i>unlike</i> anything which I have ever observed. But Hume has -never said anything to show that unlikeness in this single respect is -sufficient to invalidate the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> inference. It may quite well be like -objects which I have observed in all other respects; and this degree -of likeness may, according to his principles, be quite sufficient to -justify us in concluding its existence. In short, when Hume argues that -we cannot possibly learn by experience of the existence of any external -objects, he is, I think, plainly committing the fallacy of supposing -that, because we cannot, <i>ex hypothesis</i> have ever observed any object -which actually is "external," therefore we can never have observed -any object <i>like</i> an external one. But plainly we may have observed -objects like them in all respects except the single one that these -have been observed whereas the others have not. And even a less degree -of likeness than this would, according to his principles, be quite -sufficient to justify an inference of causal connection.</p> - -<p>Hume does not, therefore, bring forward any arguments at all sufficient -to prove either that he cannot know any one object to be causally -connected with any other or that he cannot know any external fact. And, -indeed, I think it is plain that no conclusive argument could possibly -be advanced in favour of these positions. It would always be at least -as easy to deny the argument as to deny that we do know external facts. -We may, therefore, each one of us, safely conclude that we do know -external facts; and, if we do, then there is no reason why we should -not also know that other men do the same. There is no reason why we -should not, in this respect, make our philosophical opinions agree with -what we necessarily believe at other times. There is no reason why I -should not confidently assert that I do really <i>know</i> some external -facts, although I cannot prove the assertion except by simply assuming -that I do. I am, in fact, as certain of this as of anything; and as -reasonably certain of it. But just as I am certain that I do<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> know -<i>some</i> external facts, so I am also certain that there are others which -I do not know. And the question remains: Does the line between the -two fall, where Hume says it falls? Is it true that the only external -facts I know are facts for which I have a basis in my own experience? -And that I cannot know any facts whatever, beyond the reach of my own -observation and memory, except those for which I have such a basis?</p> - -<p>This, it seems to me, is the most serious question which Hume raises. -And it should be observed that his own attitude towards it is very -different from his attitude towards the sceptical views which we -have just been considering. These sceptical views he did not expect -or wish us to accept, except in philosophic moments. He declares -that we cannot, in ordinary life, avoid believing things which are -inconsistent with them; and, in so declaring, he, of course, implies -incidentally that they are false: since he implies that he himself -has a great deal of knowledge as to what we can and cannot believe in -ordinary life. But, as regards the view that our knowledge of matters -of fact beyond our own observation is entirely confined to such as are -founded on experience, he never suggests that it is impossible that -all our beliefs should be consistent with this view, and he does seem -to think it eminently desirable that they should be. He declares that -any assertion with regard to such matters, which is not founded on -experience, can be nothing but "sophistry and illusion"; and that all -books which are composed of such assertions should be "committed to the -flames." He seems, therefore, to think that here we really have a test -by which we may determine what we should or should not believe, on all -occasions: any view on such matters, for which we have no foundation in -experience, is a view which we cannot know to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> even probably true, -and which we should <i>never</i> accept, if we can help it. Is there any -justification for this strong view?</p> - -<p>It is, of course, abstractly possible that we do really know, <i>without</i> -the help of experience, some matters of fact, which we never have -observed. Just as we know matters of fact, which we <i>have</i> observed, -without the need of any further evidence, and just as we know, for -instance, that 2+2=4, without the need of any proof, it is possible -that we may know, directly and immediately, without the need of any -basis in experience, some facts which we never have observed. This -is certainly possible, in the same sense in which it is possible -that I do not really know any external facts: no conclusive disproof -can be brought against either position. We must make assumptions as -to what facts we do know and do not know, before we can proceed to -discuss whether or not all of the former are based on experience; and -none of these assumptions can, in the last resort, be conclusively -proved. We may offer one of them in proof of another; but it will -always be possible to dispute the one which we offer in proof. But -there are, in fact, certain kinds of things which we universally -assume that we do know or do not know, just as we assume that we do -know some external facts; and if among all the things which we know -as certainly as this, there should turn out to be none for which we -have no basis in experience, Hume's view would I think, be as fully -proved as it is capable of being. The question is: Can it be proved -in this sense? Among all the facts beyond our own observation, which -we know most certainly, are there any which are certainly not based -upon experience? For my part, I confess, I cannot feel certain what -is the right answer to this question: I cannot tell whether Hume was -right or wrong. But if he was wrong—if there are any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> matters of fact, -beyond our own observation, which we know for certain, and which yet -we know directly and immediately, without any basis in experience, we -are, I think, faced with an eminently interesting problem. For it is, -I think, as certain as anything can be that there are <i>some</i> kinds of -facts with regard to which Hume was right—that there are <i>some</i> kinds -of facts which we cannot know without the evidence of experience. -I could not know, for instance, without some such evidence, such a -fact as that Julius Caesar was murdered. For such a fact I must, in -the first instance, have the evidence of other persons; and if I am -to know that their evidence is trustworthy, I must have some ground -in experience for supposing it to be so. There are, therefore, some -kinds of facts which we cannot know without the evidence of experience -and observation. And if it is to be maintained that there are others, -which we can know without any such evidence, it ought to be pointed out -exactly what kind of facts these are, and in what respects they differ -from those which we cannot know without the help of experience. Hume -gives us a very clear division of the kinds of propositions which we -can know to be true. There are, first of all, some propositions which -assert "relations of ideas "; there are, secondly, propositions which -assert "matters of fact" which we ourselves are actually observing, or -have observed and now remember; and there are, thirdly, propositions -which assert "matters of fact" which we have never actually observed, -but for believing in which we have some foundation in our past -observations. And it is, I think, certain that some propositions, which -we know as certainly as we know anything, do belong to each of these -three classes. I know, for instance, that twice two are four; I know -by direct observation that I am now seeing these words,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> that I am -writing, and by memory that this afternoon I saw St. Paul's; and I know -also that Julius Caesar was murdered, and I have some foundation in -experience for this belief, though I did not myself witness the murder. -Do any of those propositions, which we know as certainly as we know -these and their like, <i>not</i> belong to either of these three classes? -Must we add a fourth class consisting of propositions which resemble -the two last, in respect of the fact that they do assert "matters of -fact," but which differ from them, in that we know them neither by -direct observation nor by memory, nor yet as a result of previous -observations? There may, perhaps, be such a fourth class; but, if there -is, it is, I think, eminently desirable that it should be pointed out -exactly what propositions they are which we do know in this way; and -this, so far as I know, has never yet been done, at all clearly, by any -philosopher.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="THE_STATUS_OF_SENSE-DATA" id="THE_STATUS_OF_SENSE-DATA">THE STATUS OF SENSE-DATA</a></h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>The term "sense-data" is ambiguous; and therefore I think I had better -begin by trying to explain what the class of entities is whose status I -propose to discuss.</p> - -<p>There are several different classes of mental events, all of which, -owing to their intrinsic resemblance to one another in certain -respects, may, in a wide sense, be called "sensory experiences," -although only some among them would usually be called "sensations." -There are (1) those events, happening in our minds while we are -awake, which consist in the experiencing of one of those entities, -which are usually called "images," in the narrowest sense of the -term. Everybody distinguishes these events from sensations proper; -and yet everybody admits that "images" intrinsically resemble the -entities which are experienced in sensations proper in some very -important respect. There are (2) the sensory experiences we have in -dreams, some of which would certainly be said to be experiences of -images, while others might be said to be sensations. There are (3) -hallucinations, and certain classes of illusory sensory experiences. -There are (4) those experiences, which used to be called the having -of "after-images," but which psychologists now say ought rather to -be called "after-sensations." And there are, finally, (5) that class -of sensory experiences, which are immensely commoner than any of the -above, and which may be called <i>sensations proper</i>, if we agree to use -this term in such a way as to exclude experiences of my first four -sorts.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span></p> - -<p>Every event, of any one of these five classes, consists in the fact -that an entity, of some kind or other, <i>is experienced.</i> The entity -which is experienced may be of many different kinds; it may, for -instance, be a patch of colour, or a sound, or a smell, or a taste, -etc; or it may be an image of a patch of colour, an image of a -sound, an image of a smell, an image of a taste, etc. But, whatever -be its nature, the entity which <i>is</i> experienced must in all cases -be distinguished from the fact or event which consists in its being -experienced; since by saying that it is experienced we mean that it -has a relation of a certain kind to something else. We can, therefore, -speak not only of <i>experiences</i> of these five kinds, but also of the -entities which <i>are experienced in</i> experiences of these kinds; and -the entity which is experienced <i>in</i> such an experience is never -identical with the experience which consists in its being experienced. -But we can speak not only of the entities which <i>are</i> experienced in -experiences of this kind, but also of <i>the sort</i> of entities which are -experienced in experiences of this kind; and these two classes may -again be different. For a patch of colour, even if it were not actually -experienced, would be an entity <i>of the same sort</i> as some which are -experienced in experiences of this kind: and there is no contradiction -in supposing that there are patches of colour, which yet are not -experienced; since by calling a thing a patch of colour we merely make -a statement about its intrinsic quality, and in no way assert that -it has to anything else any of the relations which may be meant by -saying that it is experienced. In speaking, therefore, of <i>the sort -of</i> entities which are experienced in experiences of the five kinds I -have mentioned, we do not necessarily confine ourselves to those which -actually <i>are</i> experienced in some such experience: we leave it an open -question<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> whether the two classes are identical or not. And the class -of entities, whose status I wish to discuss, consists precisely of all -those, whether experienced or not, which are <i>of the same sort</i> as -those which are experienced in experiences of these five kinds.</p> - -<p>I intend to call this class of entities the class of <i>sensibles</i>; so -that the question I am to discuss can be expressed in the form: What -is the status of sensibles? And it must be remembered that images and -after-images are just as much "sensibles," in my sense of the term, as -the entities which are experienced in sensations proper; and so, too, -are any patches of colour, or sounds, or smells, etc, (if such there -be), which are not experienced at all.</p> - -<p>In speaking of sensibles as <i>the sort of</i> entities which are -experienced in sensory experiences I seem to imply that all the -entities which are experienced in sensory experiences have some -common characteristic other than that which consists in their being -so experienced. And I cannot help thinking that this is the case, -in spite of the fact that it is difficult to see what intrinsic -character can be shared in common by entities so different from one -another as are patches of colour, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. For, -so far as I can see, some non-sensory experiences may be exactly -similar to sensory ones in all intrinsic respects, except that what -is experienced in them is different in kind from what is experienced -in any sensory experience: the relation meant by saying that in them -something <i>is experienced</i> may be exactly the same in kind, and so may -the experient. And, if this be so, it seems to compel us to admit that -the distinction between sensory and non-sensory experiences is derived -from that between sensibles, and non-sensibles and not <i>vice versâ.</i> I -am inclined, therefore, to think that all sensibles, in spite of the -great differences between them, have some common intrinsic property, -which we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> recognise, but which is unanalysable; and that, when we call -an experience sensory, what we mean is not only that in it something -is experienced in a particular way, but also that this something has -this unanalysable property. If this be so, the ultimate definition of -"sensibles" would be merely all entities which have this unanalysable -property.</p> - -<p>It seems to me that the term "sense-data" is often used, and may be -correctly used, simply as a synonym for "sensibles"; and everybody, -I think, would expect me, in discussing the status of sense-data, -to discuss, among other things, the question whether there are any -sensibles which are not "given." It is true that the etymology of the -term "sense-data" suggests that nothing should be called a sense-datum, -but what <i>is</i> given; so that to talk of a non-given sense-datum would -be a contradiction in terms. But, of course, etymology is no safe guide -either as to the actual or the correct use of terms; and it seems to me -that the term "sense-data" is often, and quite properly, used merely -for <i>the sort of</i> entities that are given in sense, and not in any way -limited to those which are actually given. But though I think I might -thus have used "sense-data" quite correctly instead of "sensibles," -I think the latter term is perhaps more convenient; because though -nobody ought to be misled by etymologies, so many people in fact are -so. Moreover the term "sense-data" is sometimes limited in yet another -way, viz, to the sort of sensibles which are experienced in <i>sensations -proper</i>; so that in this sense "images" would not be "sense-data." -For both these reasons, I think it is perhaps better to drop the term -"sense-data" altogether, and to speak only of "sensibles."</p> - -<p>My discussion of the status of sensibles will be divided into two -parts. I shall first consider how,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> in certain respects, they are -related to our minds; and then I shall consider how, in certain -respects, they are related to physical objects.</p> - - -<p>(I)</p> - - -<p>(1) We can, I think, distinguish pretty clearly at least one kind -of relation which sensibles, of all the kinds I have mentioned, do -undoubtedly sometimes have to our minds.</p> - -<p>I do now see certain blackish marks on a whitish ground, and I hear -certain sounds which I attribute to the ticking of my clock. In both -cases I have to certain sensibles—certain blackish marks, in the one -case, and certain sounds, in the other—a kind of relation with which -we are all perfectly familiar, and which may be expressed, in the one -case, by saying that I actually <i>see</i> the marks, and in the other, by -saying that I actually <i>hear</i> the sounds. It seems to me quite evident -that the relation to the marks which I express by saying that I <i>see</i> -them, is not different in kind from the relation to the sounds which -I express by saying that I <i>hear</i> them. "Seeing" and "hearing," when -thus used as names for a relation which we may have to sensibles, are -not names for different relations, but merely express the fact that, -in the one case, the kind of sensible to which I have a certain kind -of relation is a patch of colour, while, in the other case, the kind -of sensible to which I have the same kind of relation is a sound. And -similarly when I say that I feel warm or smell a smell these different -verbs do not express the fact that I have a different kind of relation -to the sensibles concerned, but only that I have the <i>same</i> kind of -relation to a different kind of sensible. Even when I call up a visual -image of a sensible I saw yesterday, or an auditory image of a sound -I heard yesterday, I have to those images exactly the same kind of -relation which I have to the patches of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> colour I now see and which I -had yesterday to those I saw then.</p> - -<p>But this kind of relation, which I sometimes have to sensibles of -all sorts of different kinds, images as well as others, is evidently -quite different in kind from another relation which I may also have -to sensibles. After looking at this black mark, I may turn away my -head or close my eyes, and then I no longer <i>actually see</i> the mark I -saw just now. I may, indeed, have (I myself actually do have at this -moment) a visual <i>image</i> of the mark before my mind; and to this image -I do now have exactly the same kind of relation which I had just now -to the mark itself. But the image is not identical with the mark of -which it is an image; and to the mark itself it is quite certain that -I have <i>not</i> now got the same kind of relation as I had just now, when -I was actually seeing it. And yet I certainly may <i>now</i> have to that -mark itself a kind of relation, which may be expressed by saying that -I am <i>thinking of</i> it or remembering it. I can <i>now</i> make judgments -about <i>it itself</i>—the very sensible which I did see just now and am no -longer seeing: as, for instance, that I did then see it and that it was -different from the image of it which I am now seeing. It is, therefore, -quite certain that there is a most important difference between the -relation I have to a sensible when I am actually seeing or hearing it, -and any relation (for there may be several) which I may have to the -same sensible when I am only thinking or or remembering it. And I want -to express this difference by using a particular term for the former -relation. I shall express this relation, which I certainly do have to -a sensible when I actually see or hear it, and most certainly do not -have to it, when I only think of or remember it, by saying that there -is in my mind a <i>direct apprehension</i> of it. I have expressly chosen -this term<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> because, so far as I know, it has not been used hitherto as -a technical term; whereas all the terms which have been so used, such -as "presented," "given," "perceived," seem to me to have been spoilt -by ambiguity. People sometimes, no doubt, use these terms as names for -the kind of relation I am concerned with. But you can never be sure, -when an entity is said to be "given" or "presented" or "perceived," -that what is meant is simply and solely that it has to someone that -relation which sensibles do undoubtedly have to me when I actually see -or hear them, and which they do <i>not</i> have to me when I only think of -or remember them.</p> - -<p>I have used the rather awkward expression "There is in my mind a -direct apprehension of this black mark," because I want to insist that -though, when I see the mark, the mark certainly has to <i>something</i> -the fundamental relation which I wish to express by saying that it is -directly apprehended, and though the event which consists in its being -directly apprehended by that something is certainly a mental act of -<i>mine</i> or which occurs in my mind, yet the something which directly -apprehends it may quite possibly not be anything which deserves to be -called "I" or "me." It is quite possible, I think, that there is <i>no</i> -entity whatever which deserves to be called "I" or "me" or "my mind"; -and hence that nothing whatever is ever directly apprehended by <i>me.</i> -Whether this is so or not, depends on the nature of that relation which -certainly does hold between all those mental acts which are <i>mine</i>, and -does not hold between any of mine and any of yours; and which holds -again between all those mental acts which are yours, but does not hold -between any of yours and any of mine. And I do not feel at all sure -what the correct analysis of this relation is. It may be the case -that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> relation which unites all those acts of direct apprehension -which are mine, and which is what we mean to say that they have to one -another when we say they are all mine, really does consist in the fact -that one and the same entity is <i>what</i> directly apprehends in each of -them: in which case this entity could properly be called "me," and it -<i>would</i> be true to say that, when I see this black mark, <i>I</i> directly -apprehend it. But it is also quite possible (and this seems to me to -be the view which is commonest amongst psychologists) that the entity -which directly apprehends, in those acts of direct apprehension which -are mine, is numerically different in every different act; and that -what I mean by calling all these different acts <i>mine</i> is either merely -that they have some kind of relation to <i>one another</i> or that they -all have a common relation to some other entity, external to them, -which may or may not be something which deserves to be called "me." -On any such view, what I assert to be true of this black mark, when -I say that it is seen by me, would not be simply that it is directly -apprehended by me, but something more complex in which, besides -direct apprehension, some other quite different relation was also -involved. I should be asserting <i>both</i> (1) that the black mark is being -directly apprehended by <i>something</i>, <i>and</i> (2) that this act of direct -apprehension has to something else, external to it, a quite different -relation, which is what makes it an act of <i>mine.</i> I do not know how to -decide between these views, and that is why I wished to explain that -the fundamental relation which I wish to call direct apprehension, is -one which quite possibly never holds between <i>me</i> and any sensible. -But, once this has been explained, I think no harm can result from -using the expression "I directly apprehend A" as a synonym for "A -direct apprehension of A occurs in my mind." And<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> in future I shall so -speak, because it is much more convenient.</p> - -<p>The only other point, which seems to me to need explanation, in order -to make it quite clear what the relation I call "direct apprehension" -is, concerns its relation to <i>attention</i>; and as to this I must confess -I don't feel clear. In every case where it is quite clear to me that -I am directly apprehending a given entity, it seems also clear to me -that I am, more or less, attending to it; and it seems to me possible -that what I mean by "direct apprehension" may be simply identical with -what is meant by "attention," in <i>one</i> of the senses in which that word -can be used. That it can, at most, only be identical with <i>one</i> of the -relations meant by attention seems to me clear, because I certainly -can be said to attend, in some sense or other, to entities, which I am -not directly apprehending: I may, for instance, think, with attention, -of a sensible, which I saw yesterday, and am certainly not seeing now. -It is, therefore, clear that to say I am attending to a thing and yet -am <i>not</i> directly apprehending it, is not a contradiction in terms: -and this fact alone is sufficient to justify the use of the special -term "direct apprehension." But whether to say that I am directly -apprehending a given thing and yet am <i>not</i> attending to it, in any -degree at all, is or is not a contradiction in terms, I admit I don't -feel clear.</p> - -<p>However that may be, one relation, in which sensibles of all sorts do -sometimes stand to our minds, is the relation constituted by the fact -that we directly apprehend them: or, to speak more accurately, by the -fact that events which consist in their being directly apprehended are -<i>in</i> our minds, in the sense in which to say that an event is <i>in</i> our -minds means merely that it is a mental act of <i>ours</i>—that it has to -our other mental acts that relation (whatever it may be) which we mean -by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> saying that they are all mental acts <i>of the same individual.</i> And -it is clear that to say of a sensible that it is directly apprehended -by me, is to say of it something quite different from what I say of a -mental act of mine, when I say that this <i>mental act is in my mind</i>: -for nothing is more certain than that an act of direct apprehension or -belief may be in my mind, without being itself directly apprehended -by me. If, therefore, by saying that a sensible is <i>in our minds</i> -or is <i>ours,</i> we mean merely that it is directly apprehended by us, -we must recognise that we are here using the phrases "in our minds" -or "ours" in quite a different sense from that in which we use them -when we talk of our mental acts being "in our minds" or "ours." And -why I say this is because I think that these two relations are very -apt to be confused. When, for instance, we say of a given entity that -it is "experienced," or when the Germans say that it is "erlebt," it -is sometimes meant, I think, merely that it is directly apprehended, -but sometimes that it is in my mind, in the sense in which, when I -entertain a belief, this act of belief is in my mind.</p> - -<p>But (2) it seems to me to be commonly held that sensibles are often -in our minds in some sense quite other than that of being directly -apprehended by us or that of being thought of by us. This seems to me -to be often what is meant when people say that they are "immediately -experienced" or are "subjective modifications"; though, of course, -both expressions are so ambiguous, that when people say that a given -entity is immediately experienced or is a subjective modification, they -<i>may</i> mean merely that it is directly apprehended. And since I think -this view is held, I want to explain that I see no reason whatever for -thinking that sensibles ever are experienced by us in any other sense -than that of being directly apprehended by us.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> Two kinds of argument, -I think, are sometimes used to show that they are.</p> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) It is a familiar fact that, when, for instance, we are in a room -with a ticking clock, we may seem suddenly to become aware of the -ticks, whereas, so far as we can tell, we had previously not heard -them at all. And it may be urged that in these cases, since the same -kind of stimulus was acting on our ears all the time, we must have -<i>experienced</i> the same kind of sensible sounds, although we did not -directly apprehend them.</p> - -<p>But I think most psychologists are now agreed that this argument is -quite worthless. There seem to me to be two possible alternatives to -the conclusion drawn. It may, I think, possibly be the case that we -did directly apprehend the ticks all the time, but that we cannot -afterwards remember that we did, because the degree of attention (if -any) with which we heard them was so small, that in ordinary life we -should say that we did not attend to them at all. But, what, I think, -is much more likely is that, though the same stimulus was acting on -our ears, it failed to produce any mental effect whatever, because our -attention was otherwise engaged.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) It is said that sometimes when we suddenly become aware, say, -of the eighth stroke of a striking clock, we can <i>remember</i> earlier -strokes, although we seem to ourselves <i>not</i> to have directly -apprehended them. I cannot say that I have ever noticed this experience -in myself, but I have no doubt that it is possible. And people seem -inclined to argue that, since we can remember the earlier strokes, we -must have experienced them, though we did not directly apprehend them.</p> - -<p>But here again, the argument does not seem to me at all conclusive. I -should say, again, that it is possible that we did directly apprehend -them, but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> only with a very slight degree of attention (if any). And, -as an alternative, I should urge that there is no reason why we should -not be able to remember a thing, which we never experienced at all.</p> - -<p>I do not know what other arguments can be used to show that we -sometimes <i>experience</i> sensibles in a sense quite other than that of -directly apprehending them. But I do not know how to show that we do -not; and since people whose judgment I respect, seem to hold that we -do, I think it is worth while to say something as to what this sense of -"experience" can be, in case it does occur.</p> - -<p>I have said that sometimes when people say that a given entity is -"experienced" they seem to mean that it belongs to some individual, -in the sense in which my acts of belief belong to me. To say that -sensibles were experienced by me in this sense would, therefore, be to -say that they sometimes have to my acts of belief and acts of direct -apprehension the same relation which these have to one another—the -relation which constitutes them <i>mine.</i> But that sensibles ever have -this kind of relation to my mental acts, is a thing which I cannot -believe. Those who hold that they are ever experienced at all, in some -sense other than that of being directly apprehended, always hold, I -think, that, whenever they are directly apprehended by us, they also, -at the same time, have to us this other relation as well. And it seems -to me pretty clear that when I do directly apprehend a sensible, it -does <i>not</i> have to me the same relation which my direct apprehension of -it has.</p> - -<p>If, therefore, sensibles are ever experienced by us at all, in any -sense other than that of being directly apprehended by us, we must, I -think, hold that they are so in an entirely new sense, quite different -both from that in which to be experienced means to be directly -apprehended, and from that in which to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> experienced means to occur -in some individual's mind. And I can only say that I see no reason to -think that they ever are experienced in any such sense. If they are, -the fact that they are so is presumably open to the inspection of us -all; but I cannot distinguish any such fact as occurring in myself, as -I can distinguish the fact that they are directly apprehended. On the -other hand, I see no way of showing that they are <i>not</i> experienced in -some such sense; and perhaps somebody will be able to point it out to -me. I do not wish to assume, therefore, that there <i>is</i> no such sense; -and hence, though I am inclined to think that the <i>only</i> sense in which -they are experienced is that of being directly apprehended, I shall, in -what follows, use the phrase "experienced" to mean <i>either</i> directly -apprehended <i>or</i> having to something this supposed different relation, -if such a relation there be.</p> - -<p>(3) We may now, therefore, raise the question: Do sensibles ever exist -at times when they are not being experienced at all?</p> - -<p>To this question it is usual to give a negative answer, and two -different <i>a priori</i> reasons may be urged in favour of that answer.</p> - -<p>The first is what should be meant by Berkeley's dictum that the <i>esse</i> -of sensibles is <i>percipi.</i> This should mean, whatever else it may mean, -at least this: that to suppose a sensible to exist and yet <i>not</i> to -be experienced in self-contradictory. And this at least seems to me -to be clearly false. Anything which was a patch of colour would be a -sensible; and to suppose that there are patches of colour which are not -being experienced is clearly not self-contradictory, however false it -may be.</p> - -<p>It may, however, be urged (and this is the second argument) that, -though to suppose a thing to be a sensible and <i>yet</i> not experienced is -not self-contradictory, yet we can clearly see that nothing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> can have -the one property without having the other. And I do not see my way to -deny that we may be able to know, <i>a priori</i> that such a connection -holds between two such properties. In the present case, however, I -cannot see that it does hold, and therefore, so far as <i>a priori</i> -reasons go, I conclude that there is no reason why sensibles should not -exist at times when they are not experienced.</p> - -<p>It may, however, be asked: Is there any reason to suppose that they -ever do? And the reason, which weighs with me most, is one which -applies, I think, to a certain class of sensibles <i>only</i>; a class -which I will try to define by saying that it consists of those which -<i>would</i> (under certain conditions which actually exist) be experienced -in a <i>sensation proper, if only</i> a living body, having a certain -constitution, existed under those conditions in a position in which no -such body does actually exist. I think it is very probable that this -definition does not define at all accurately the kind of sensibles I -mean; but I think that what the definition aims at will become clearer -when I proceed to give my reasons for supposing that sensibles, of a -kind to be defined in <i>some</i> such way, do exist unexperienced. The -reason is simply that, in Hume's phrase, I have "a strong propensity -to believe" that, <i>e.g.,</i> the visual sensibles which I directly -apprehend in looking at this paper, still exist unchanged when I merely -alter the position of my body by turning away my head or closing my -eyes, <i>provided</i> that the physical conditions outside my body remain -unchanged. In such a case it is certainly true in some sense that I -<i>should</i> see sensibles like what I saw the moment before, <i>if only</i> -my head were still in the position it was at that moment or my eyes -unclosed. But if, in such a case, there is reason to think that -sensibles which I should see, if the position of my body were altered, -exist in spite of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> the fact that I do not experience them, there is, -I think, an equal reason to suppose it in other cases. We must, for -instance, suppose that the sensibles which I should see now, if I were -at the other end of the room, or if I were looking under the table, -exist at this moment, though they are not being experienced. And -similarly we must suppose that the sensibles which <i>you</i> would see, if -you were in the position in which I am now, exist at this moment, in -spite of the fact that they may be more or less different from those -which I see, owing to the different constitution of our bodies. All -this implies of course, that a vast number of sensibles exist at any -moment, which are not being experienced at all. But still it implies -this only with regard to sensibles of a strictly limited class, namely -sensibles which would be experienced <i>in a sensation proper,</i> if a -body, having a certain constitution, were in a position in which it is -not, under the given physical conditions. It does not, for instance, -imply that any <i>images,</i> of which it may be true that I <i>should</i> -have them, under present physical conditions, if the position of my -body were altered, exist now; nor does it imply that sensibles which -<i>would</i> be experienced by me now in a sensation proper, if the physical -conditions external to my body were different from what they are, exist -now.</p> - -<p>I feel, of course, that I have only succeeded in defining miserably -vaguely the kind of sensibles I mean; and I do not know whether the -fact that I have a strong propensity to believe that sensibles of a -kind to be defined in some such way, do exist unexperienced, is any -good reason for supposing that they actually do. The belief may, of -course, be a mere prejudice. But I do not know of any certain test by -which prejudices can be distinguished from reasonable beliefs. And I -cannot help thinking that there may be a class of sensibles, capable -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> definition in <i>some</i> such way, which there really is reason to -think exist unexperienced.</p> - -<p>But, if I am not mistaken, there is an empirical argument which, -though, even if it were sound, it would have no tendency whatever to -show that <i>no</i> sensibles exist unexperienced, would, if it were sound, -show that this very class of sensibles, to which alone my argument for -unexperienced existence applies, certainly do not so exist. This, it -seems to me, is the most weighty argument which can be used upon the -subject; and I want, therefore, to give my reasons for thinking that it -is fallacious.</p> - -<p>The argument is one which asserts that there is abundant empirical -evidence in favour of the view that the existence of the sensibles -which we experience at any time, always depends upon the condition of -our nervous system: so that, even where it also depends upon external -physical conditions, we can safely say that sensibles, which we should -have experienced, if only our nervous system had been in a different -condition, certainly do not exist, when it is not in that condition. -And the fallacy of this argument seems to me to lie in the fact that -it does not distinguish between the existence of the sensibles <i>which</i> -we experience and <i>the fact that we experience them.</i> What there <i>is</i> -evidence for is that <i>our experience</i> of sensibles always depends upon -the condition of our nervous system; that, according as the condition -of the nervous system changes, different sensibles are <i>experienced</i>, -even where other conditions are the same. But obviously the fact that -our experience of a given sensible depends upon the condition of our -nervous system does not directly show that the existence of <i>the -sensible experienced</i> always also so depends. The fact that I am now -experiencing this black mark is certainly a different fact from the -fact that this black mark now exists. And hence the evidence which -does tend to show that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> the former fact would not have existed if my -nervous system had been in a different condition, has no tendency to -show that the latter would not have done so either. I am sure that this -distinction ought to be made; and hence, though I think there may be -other reasons for thinking that the very existence of the sensibles, -which we experience, and not merely the fact that we experience them -<i>does</i> always depend upon the condition of our nervous systems, it -seems to me certain that this particular argument constitutes no such -reason.</p> - -<p>And I think that those who suppose that it does are apt to be -influenced by an assumption, for which also, so far as I can see, -there is no reason. I have admitted that the only reason I can see for -supposing that sensibles which we experience ever exist unexperienced, -seems to lead to the conclusion that the sensibles which would be seen -by a colour-blind man, if he occupied exactly the position which I, who -am not colour-blind, now occupy, exist now, just as much as those which -I now see. And it may be thought that this implies that the sensibles, -which he would see, and which would certainly be very different from -those which I see, are nevertheless at this moment in exactly the same -place as those which I see. Now, for my part, I am not prepared to -admit that it is impossible they should be in the same place. But the -assumption against which I wish to protest, is the assumption that, -if they exist at all, they <i>must</i> be in the same place. I can see no -reason whatever for this assumption. And hence any difficulties there -may be in the way of supposing that they could be in the same place at -the same time as the sensibles which I see, do not at all apply to my -hypothesis, which is only that they exist <i>now, not</i> that they exist -<i>in the same place</i> in which mine do.</p> - -<p>On this question, therefore, as to whether sensibles ever exist at -times when they are not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> experienced, I have only to say (1) that I -think there is certainly no good reason whatever for asserting that -<i>no</i> sensibles do; and (2) that I think perhaps a certain amount of -weight ought to be attached to our instinctive belief that certain -kinds of sensibles do; and that here again any special arguments which -may be brought forward to show that, whether some sensibles exist -unexperienced or not, <i>this</i> kind certainly do not, are, so far as I -can see, wholly inconclusive.</p> - - - -<p>(II)</p> - - -<p>I now pass to the question how sensibles are related to physical -objects. And here I want to say, to begin with, that I feel extremely -puzzled about the whole subject. I find it extremely difficult to -distinguish clearly from one another the different considerations which -ought to be distinguished; and all I can do is to raise, more or less -vaguely, certain questions as to how certain <i>particular</i> sensibles -are related to certain <i>particular</i> physical objects, and to give -the reasons which seem to me to have most weight for answering these -questions in one way rather than another. I feel that all that I can -say is very tentative.</p> - -<p>To begin with, I do not know how "physical object" is to be defined, -and I shall not try to define it. I shall, instead, consider certain -propositions, which everybody will admit to be propositions <i>about</i> -physical objects, and which I shall assume that I know to be true. -And the question I shall raise is as to how these propositions are to -be interpreted<i>—in what sense</i> they are true; in considering which, -we shall at the same time consider how they are related to certain -sensibles.</p> - -<p>I am looking at two coins, one of which is a half-crown, the other a -florin. Both are lying on the ground; and they are situated obliquely -to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> my line of sight, so that the visual sensibles which I directly -apprehend in looking at them are visibly elliptical, and not even -approximately circular. Moreover, the half-crown is so much farther -from me than the florin that <i>its</i> visual sensible is visibly smaller -than that of the florin.</p> - -<p>In these circumstances I am going to assume that I know the following -propositions to be true; and no one, I think, will deny that we can -know such propositions to be true, though, as we shall see, extremely -different views may be taken as to what they mean. I know (<i>a</i>) that, -in the ordinary sense of the word "see" I am <i>really seeing two coins;</i> -an assertion which includes, if it is not identical with, the assertion -that the visual experiences, which consist in my direct apprehension -of those two elliptical patches of colour, <i>are</i> sensations proper, -and are not either hallucinations nor mere experiences of "images"; -(<i>b</i>) that the upper sides of the coins are <i>really</i> approximately -circular, and not merely elliptical like the visual sensibles; (<i>c</i>) -that the coins <i>have</i> another side, and an inside, though I don't see -it; (<i>d</i>) that the upper side of the half-crown is really <i>larger</i> -than that of the florin, though its visual sensible is <i>smaller</i> than -the visual sensible of the upper side of the florin: (<i>e</i>) that both -coins continue to exist, even when I turn away my head or shut my eyes; -but in saying this, I do not, of course, mean to say that there is -absolutely <i>no</i> change in them; I daresay there must be <i>some</i> change, -and I do not know how to define exactly what I do mean. But we can, I -think, say at least this: viz., that propositions (<i>h</i>), (<i>c</i>), and -(<i>d</i>) will still be true, although proposition (<i>a</i>) has ceased to be -true.</p> - -<p>Now all these propositions are, I think, typical propositions of the -sort which we call propositions about physical objects; and the two -coins themselves<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> <i>are</i> physical objects, if anything is. My question -is: <i>In what sense</i> are these propositions true?</p> - -<p>And in considering this question, there are, I think, two principles -which we can lay down as certain to begin with; though they do not -carry us very far.</p> - -<p>The one is (<i>a</i>) that the upper side of the coin, which I am said -to <i>see,</i> is not simply identical with the visual sensible which I -<i>directly apprehend</i> in seeing it. That this is so might be thought to -follow absolutely from each of the two facts which I have called (<i>b</i>) -and (<i>d</i>); but I am not quite sure that it does follow from either of -these or from both together: for it seems to me just possible that the -two sensibles in question, though <i>not</i> circular <i>in my private space,</i> -may yet be circular in <i>physical</i> space; and similarly that though the -sensible of the half-crown is smaller than that of the florin <i>in my -private space,</i> it may be larger <i>in physical space.</i> But what I think -it does follow from is the fact that another person may be seeing the -upper side of the coin in exactly the same sense in which I am seeing -it, and yet his sensible be certainly different from mine. From this it -follows absolutely that the upper side of the coin cannot be identical -with <i>both</i> sensibles, since they are <i>not</i> identical with one another. -And though it does not follow absolutely that it may not be identical -with <i>one</i> of the two, yet it does follow that we <i>can</i> get a case in -which it is not identical with <i>mine</i> and I need only assume that the -case I am taking is such a case.</p> - -<p>From this it follows that we must distinguish that sense of the word -"see" in which we can be said to "see" a physical object, from that -sense of the word in which "see" means merely to directly apprehend -a visual sensible. In a proposition of the form "I see A," where A -is a name or description of some physical object, though, if this -proposition<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> is to be true, there must be some visual sensible, B, -which I am directly apprehending, yet the proposition "I see A" is -certainly not always, and probably never, identical in meaning with the -proposition "I directly apprehend B." In asserting "I see A" we are -asserting not only that we directly apprehend some sensible but also -something else about this sensible—it may be only some proposition of -the form, "and this sensible has certain other properties," or it may -be some proposition of the form "and <i>I know</i> this sensible to have -certain other properties." Indeed we have not only to distinguish that -sense of the word "perceive" in which it is equivalent to "directly -apprehend," from <i>one</i> sense in which we can be said to perceive a -physical object; we have also to distinguish at least two different -senses in which we can be said to perceive physical objects, different -both from one another and from "directly apprehend." For it is obvious -that though I should be said to be now seeing <i>the half-crown</i>, there -is a narrower, and more proper, sense, in which I can only be said -to <i>see</i> one side of it<i>—not</i> its lower side or its inside, and not -therefore the whole half-crown.</p> - -<p>The other principle, which we can lay down to start with is (<i>β</i>) that -my knowledge of all the five propositions (<i>a</i>) to (<i>e</i>), is based, -in the last resort, on experiences of mine consisting in the direct -apprehension of sensibles and in the perception of relations between -directly apprehended sensibles. It is <i>based</i> on these, in at least -this sense, that I should never have known any of these propositions -if I had never directly apprehended any sensibles nor perceived any -relations between them.</p> - -<p>What, in view of these two principles, can be the sense in which my -five propositions are true?</p> - -<p>(1) It seems to me possible that the only <i>true</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> interpretation which -can be given to any of them is an interpretation of a kind which I -can only indicate rather vaguely as follows: Namely, that all of them -express only a kind of fact which we should naturally express by saying -that, <i>if</i> certain conditions were fulfilled, I or some other person, -<i>should</i> directly apprehend certain other sensibles. For instance -the only <i>true</i> thing that can be meant by saying that I really see -<i>coins</i> may be some such thing as that, <i>if</i> I were to move my body in -certain ways, I should directly apprehend <i>other</i> sensibles, <i>e.g.</i> -tactual ones, which I should not directly apprehend as a consequence -of these movements, if these present visual experiences of mine were -mere hallucinations or experiences of "images." Again, the only true -thing that can be meant by saying that the upper sides of the coins -are <i>really</i> approximately circular may be some such thing as that, -<i>if</i> I were looking straight at them, I should directly apprehend -circular sensibles. And similarly, the only true interpretation of -(<i>c</i>) may be some such fact as that, <i>if</i> I were to turn the coins -over, or break them up, I <i>should</i> have certain sensations, of a sort I -can imagine very well; of (<i>d</i>) that <i>if</i> I were at an equal distance -from the half-crown and the florin, the sensible, I should then see -corresponding to the half-crown would be bigger than that corresponding -to the florin, whereas it is now smaller; of (<i>e</i>) that, <i>if,</i> when -my eyes were closed, they had been open instead, I should have seen -certain sensibles.</p> - -<p>It is obvious, indeed, that if any interpretation on these lines <i>is</i> -the only true interpretation of our five propositions, none of those -which I have vaguely suggested comes anywhere near to expressing it in -its ultimate form. They cannot do so for the simple reason that, in -them, the conditions under which I <i>should</i> experience certain other -sensibles are themselves expressed in terms of <i>physical objects,</i> and -not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> in terms of sensibles and our experience of them. The conditions -are expressed in such terms as "if I were to move my body," "if I -were to look straight at the coins," "if I were to turn the coins -over," etc.; and all these are obviously propositions, which must -themselves again be interpreted in terms of sensibles, if our original -five propositions need to be so. It is obvious, therefore, that any -<i>ultimate</i> interpretation of our five propositions, on these lines, -would be immensely complicated; and I cannot come anywhere near to -stating exactly what it would be. But it seems to me possible that -<i>some</i> such interpretation could be found, and that it is the <i>only</i> -true one.</p> - -<p>The great recommendation of this view seems to me to be that it enables -us to see, more clearly than any other view can, how our knowledge of -physical propositions can be based on our experience of sensibles, in -the way in which principle (<i>β</i>) asserts it to be. If, when I know -that the coins are round, all that I know is some such thing as that -if, after experiencing the sensibles I do now experience, I were to -experience still others, I should finally experience a third set, we -can understand, as clearly as we can understand how any knowledge can -be obtained by induction at all, how such a knowledge could be based on -our previous experience of sensibles, and how it could be verified by -our subsequent experience.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, apart from the difficulty of actually giving any -interpretation on these lines, which will meet the requirements, -the great objection to it seems to me to be this. It is obvious -that, on this view, though we shall still be allowed to say that the -coins <i>existed</i> before I saw them, are <i>circular</i> etc., all these -expressions, if they are to be true, will have to be understood in a -Pickwickian sense. When I know that the coins existed before<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> I saw -them, what I know will not be that anything whatever existed at that -time, in the sense in which those elliptical patches of colour exist -now. <i>All</i> that I know will be simply that, since the elliptical -patches exist now, it is true, that, <i>if</i> certain unrealised conditions -had been realised, I should have had certain sensations that I have -not had; or, <i>if</i> certain conditions, which may or may not be realised -in the future, were to be so, I <i>should</i> have certain experiences. -Something like this will actually be the <i>only true</i> thing that can -be meant by saying that the coins existed before I saw them. In -other words, to say of a <i>physical object</i> that it <i>existed</i> at a -given time will always consist merely in saying of some sensible, -<i>not</i> that <i>it</i> existed at the time in question, but something quite -different and immensely complicated. And thus, though, when I know that -the coins exist, what I know will be merely some proposition about -these sensibles which I am directly apprehending, yet this view will -not contradict principle (<i>a</i>) by <i>identifying</i> the coins with the -sensibles. For it will say that to assert a given thing of the <i>coins</i> -is not equivalent to asserting the <i>same thing</i> of the sensibles, but -only to asserting of them something quite different.</p> - -<p>The fact that these assertions that the coins exist, are round, etc., -will, on this view, only be true in this outrageously Pickwickian -sense, seems to me to constitute the great objection to it. But it -seems to me to be an objection only, so far as I can see, because I -have a "strong propensity to believe" that, when I know that the coins -existed before I saw them, <i>what</i> I know is that something existed at -that time, in the very same sense in which those elliptical patches now -exist. And, of course, this belief <i>may</i> be a mere prejudice. It <i>may</i> -be that when I believe that I <i>now</i> have, in my body, blood and nerves -and brain, <i>what</i> I believe is only true, if<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> it does <i>not</i> assert, in -the proper sense of the word "existence," the <i>present</i> existence of -anything whatever, other than sensibles which I directly apprehend, but -only makes assertions as to the kind of experiences a doctor <i>would</i> -have, if he dissected me. But I cannot feel at all sure that my belief, -that, when I know of the present Existence of these things (as I think -I do), I am knowing of the present existence (in the proper sense) of -things other than any sensibles which I or any one else am now directly -apprehending, is a mere prejudice. And therefore I think it is worth -while to consider what, if it is not, these things, of whose existence -I know, can be.</p> - -<p>(2) It is certain that if, when I know that that half-crown existed -before I saw it, I am knowing that something existed at that time -in other than a Pickwickian sense, I only know this something <i>by -description</i>; and it seems pretty clear that the description by -which I know it is as <i>the</i> thing which has a certain connection -with this sensible which I am now directly apprehending. But <i>what</i> -connection? We cannot simply say, as many people have said, that by -"that half-crown" I mean <i>the</i> thing which <i>caused</i> my experience of -this sensible; because events which happen between the half-crown and -my eyes, and events in my eyes, and optic nerves, and brains are just -as much <i>causes</i> of my experiences as the half-crown itself. But it -may perhaps be the case that the half-crown has some particular <i>kind</i> -of causal relation to my experience, which these other events have not -got—a kind which may be expressed, perhaps, by saying that it is its -"source." And hence, when I know that that half-crown is circular, I -may perhaps be knowing that the <i>source</i> of this experience is circular.</p> - -<p>But what sort of a thing can this "source" be?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span></p> - -<p>One kind of view, which I think is very commonly held, is that it is -something "spiritual" in its nature, or something whose nature is -utterly unknown to us. And those who hold this view are apt to add, -that it is not really "circular," in any sense at all; nor is the -"source" of my half-crown experience, in any sense at all, "bigger" -than that of my florin experience. But if this addition were seriously -meant, it would, of course, amount to saying that propositions (<i>b</i>) -and (<i>d</i>) are not true, in any sense at all; and I do not think -that those who make it, really mean to say this. I think that what -they mean is only that the only sense in which those "sources" are -circular, and one bigger than the other, is one in which to say this -merely amounts to saying that the sensibles, which they <i>would</i> cause -us to experience, under certain conditions, <i>would</i> be circular, and -one bigger than the other. In other words, in order to give a true -interpretation to the propositions that the coins are circular and one -bigger than the other, they say that we must interpret them in the same -kind of way in which view (1) interpreted them; and the only difference -between their view and view (1), is that, whereas <i>that</i> said that you -must give a Pickwickian interpretation <i>both</i> to the assertion that the -coins <i>exist, and</i> to the assertion that they are <i>circular</i>, they say -that you must <i>not</i> give it to the former assertion, and must to the -latter.</p> - -<p>To this view my objection is only that any reason there may be for -saying that the "sources" exist in other than a Pickwickian sense, -seems to me to be also a reason for saying that they are "circular" in -a sense that is not Pickwickian. I have just as strong a propensity to -believe that they are really circular, in a simple and natural sense, -as that they exist in such a sense: and I know of no better reason for -believing either.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span></p> - -<p>(3) It may be suggested, next, that these "sources," instead of being -something spiritual in their nature or something of a nature utterly -unknown, consist simply of sensibles, of a kind which I have previously -tried to define; namely of all those sensibles, which anybody <i>would,</i> -under the actual physical conditions, experience in <i>sensations proper</i> -of which the half-crown and the florin were the source, <i>if</i> their -bodies were in any of the positions relatively to those coins, in which -they would get sensations from them at all. We saw before that it seems -<i>possible</i> that all these sensibles do really exist at times when they -are not experienced, and that some people, at all events, seem to have -a strong propensity to believe that they do. And in favour of the view -that some such huge collection of sensibles <i>is</i> the upper side of the -half-crown, is the fact that we do seem to have a strong propensity -to believe that any particular sensible, which we directly apprehend -in looking at the upper side of the half-crown, and of our direct -apprehension of which the upper side is the source, is <i>in the place</i> -in which the upper side is. And that <i>some</i> sense might be given to -the expression "in the same place as," in which it could be true that -sensibles of all sorts of different shapes and sizes, and of all sorts -of different colours, were in the same place at the same time, seems to -me to be possible. But the objection to this view seems to me to be the -same as to the last; namely that if the upper side of the half-crown -were identical with such a collection of sensibles, then the only sense -in which it could be said to be "circular," or bigger than that of the -florin, would certainly be very Pickwickian, though not the same as on -that view.</p> - -<p>(4) If, for the reasons given, we reject both (1), (2), and (3) as -interpretations of our five<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> propositions, the only alternative I -can think of that remains, is one which is roughly identical, so far -as I can see, with Locke's view. It is a view which asserts that the -half-crown and the florin really did exist (in the natural sense) -before I saw them; that they really are approximately circular (again -in the natural sense); that, therefore, they are not composed of -sensibles which I or others should directly apprehend under other -conditions; and that therefore also neither these sensibles (even if -such do now exist) nor those which I am now directly apprehending are -in the place in which the coins are. It holds, therefore, that the -coins do really <i>resemble</i> some sensibles, in respect of the "primary" -qualities which these have; that they really are round, and one larger -than the other, in much the same sense in which some sensibles are -round and some larger than others. But it holds also that no sensibles -which we ever do directly apprehend, or should directly apprehend, if -at a given time we were in other positions, are <i>parts</i> of those coins; -and that, therefore, there is no reason to suppose that any parts of -the coins have any of the "secondary qualities"—colour, etc.—which -any of these sensibles have.</p> - -<p>On this view, it is plain, there is nothing to prevent us from holding -that, as suggested in I (3), all sorts of unexperienced sensibles do -exist. We are only prevented from holding that, if they do, those which -have the same source all exist in the <i>same place</i> as their source. -And the natural view to take as to the status of sensibles generally, -relatively to physical objects, would be that none of them, whether -experienced or not, were ever in the same place as any physical object. -That none, therefore, exist "anywhere" in physical space; while, at the -same time, we can also say, as argued in I (2), that none exist "in the -mind," except in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> the sense that some are directly apprehended by some -minds. And the only thing that would need to be added, is that some, -and some only, <i>resemble</i> the physical objects which are their source, -in respect of their shape.</p> - -<p>To this view I can see no objection except the serious one that it -is difficult to answer the questions: How can I ever come to know -that these sensibles have a "source" at all? And how do I know that -these "sources" are circular? It would seem that, if I do know these -things at all, I must know <i>immediately</i>, in the case of <i>some</i> -sensibles, both that they have a source and what the shape of this -source is. And to this it may be objected that this is a kind of thing -which I certainly cannot know immediately. The argument in favour -of an interpretation of type (i) seems to me to rest wholly on the -assumption that there are only certain kinds of facts which I can know -immediately; and hence that if I believe I know a fact, which is not of -this kind, and which also I cannot have learnt immediately, my belief -must be a mere prejudice. But I do not know how it can be shown that an -assertion of the form: Facts of certain kinds are the only ones you can -know immediately; is itself not a prejudice. I do not think, therefore, -that the fact that, if this last view were true, we should have to -admit that we know immediately facts of a kind which many people think -we cannot know immediately, is a conclusive objection to it.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="THE_CONCEPTION_OF_REALITY" id="THE_CONCEPTION_OF_REALITY">THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY</a></h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>The fourth chapter of Mr. Bradley's <i>Appearance and Reality</i> is a -chapter headed "Space and Time," and he begins the chapter as follows:—</p> - -<p>"The object of this chapter is far from being an attempt to discuss -fully the nature of space or of time. It will content itself with -stating our main justification for regarding them as appearances. It -will explain why we deny that, <i>in the character which they exhibit</i>, -they either <i>have</i> or <i>belong</i> to reality."<a name="FNanchor_1_4" id="FNanchor_1_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_4" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>Here, it will be seen, Mr. Bradley states that, in his opinion, Time, -<i>in a certain character</i>, neither has nor belongs to reality; this is -the conclusion he wishes to maintain. And to say that Time <i>has not</i> -reality would seem to be plainly equivalent to saying that Time <i>is -not</i> real. However, if anybody should doubt whether the two phrases -are meant to be equivalent, the doubt may be easily set at rest by -a reference to the concluding words of the same chapter, where Mr. -Bradley uses the following very emphatic expression: "Time," he says, -"like space, has most evidently proved <i>not to be real,</i> but to be a -contradictory appearance" (p. 43). Mr. Bradley does, then, say here, -in so many words, that Time <i>is not</i> real. But there is one other -difference between this statement at the end of the chapter, and the -statement at the beginning of it,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> which we must not forget to notice. -In the statement at the beginning he carefully qualifies the assertion -"Time neither has nor belongs to reality" by saying "Time, <i>in the -character which it exhibits,</i> neither has nor belongs to reality," -whereas in the final statement this qualification is not inserted; -here he says simply "Time is not real." This qualification, which is -inserted in the one place and omitted in the other, might, of course, -be meant to imply that, in some <i>other</i> character—some character which -it does <i>not</i> exhibit—Time <i>has</i> reality and does belong to it. And I -shall presently have something to say about this distinction between -Time in one character and Time in another, because it might be thought -that this distinction is the explanation of the difficulty as to Mr. -Bradley's meaning, which I am going to point out.</p> - -<p>However, so far it is clear that Mr. Bradley holds that <i>in some -sense,</i> at all events, the whole proposition "Time is not real" can be -truly asserted. And, now, I want to quote a passage in which he says -things which, at first sight, seem difficult to reconcile with this -view. This new passage is a passage in which he is not talking of Time -in particular, but of "appearances" in general. But, as we have seen, -he does regard Time as one among appearances, and I think there is no -doubt that what he here declares to be true of all appearances is meant -to be true of Time, among the rest. This new passage is as follows:—</p> - -<p>"For the present," he says,<a name="FNanchor_2_5" id="FNanchor_2_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_5" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> "we may keep a fast hold upon this, -that appearances <i>exist.</i> That is absolutely certain, and to deny it -is nonsense. And whatever exists must <i>belong to reality.</i> This is -also quite certain, and its denial once more is self-contradictory. -Our appearances, no doubt, may be a beggarly show, and their nature to -an unknown<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> extent may be something which, <i>as it is,</i> is <i>not</i> true -of reality. That is one thing, and it is quite another thing to speak -as if these facts had no actual existence, or as if there could be -anything but reality to which they might belong. And I must venture to -repeat that such an idea would be sheer nonsense. What appears, for -that sole reason, most indubitably <i>is;</i> and there is no possibility of -conjuring its being away from it."</p> - -<p>That is the passage which seems to me to raise a difficulty as to his -meaning when contrasted with the former passage. And the reason why it -seems to me to raise one is this. In the former passage Mr. Bradley -declared most emphatically that Time is not real; he said: "Time has -<i>most evidently</i> proved not to be real." Whereas in this one he seems -to declare equally emphatically that Time <i>does</i> exist, and <i>is.</i> And -his language here again is as strong as possible. He says it is sheer -nonsense to suppose that Time does <i>not</i> exist, is <i>not</i> a fact, does -<i>not</i> belong to reality. It looks, therefore, as if he meant to make -a distinction between "being real" on the one hand, and "existing," -"being a fact," and "being" on the other hand—as if he meant to say -that a thing may exist, and be, and be a fact, and yet <i>not</i> be real. -And I think there is, at all events, some superficial difficulty in -understanding this distinction. We might naturally think that to say -"Time exists, is a fact, and is," is equivalent to saying that it is -real. What more, we might ask, can a man who says that Time <i>is</i> real -mean to maintain about it than that it exists, is a fact, and is? All -that most people would mean by saying that time is real could, it would -seem, be expressed by saying "There is such a thing as Time." And it -might, therefore, appear from this new passage as if Mr. Bradley fully -agreed with the view that most people would express by saying<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> "Time is -real"—as if he did not at all mean to contradict anything that most -people believe about Time. But, if so, then what are we to make of his -former assertion that, nevertheless, Time is <i>not</i> real? He evidently -thinks that, in asserting this, he is asserting something which is -<i>not</i> mere nonsense; and he certainly would not have chosen this way of -expressing what he means, unless he had supposed that what he is here -asserting about Time is incompatible with what people <i>often</i> mean when -they say "Time is real." Yet, we have seen that he thinks that what he -is asserting is <i>not</i> incompatible with the assertions that Time is, -and is a fact, and exists. He must, therefore, think that when people -say "Time is real" they often, at least, mean something <i>more</i> than -merely that there <i>is</i> such a thing as Time, something therefore, which -may be denied, without denying this. All the same, there is, I think, a -real difficulty in seeing that they ever <i>do</i> mean anything more, and, -<i>if</i> they do, what more it is that they can mean.</p> - -<p>The two expressions "There <i>is</i> such a thing as so and so" and "So -and so is real" are certainly sometimes and quite naturally used as -equivalents, even if they are not always so used. And Mr. Bradley's own -language implies that this is so. For, as we have seen, in the first -passage, he seems to identify belonging to reality with being real. -The conclusion which he expresses in one place by saying that Time -does not belong to reality he expresses in another by saying that it -is not real; whereas in the second passage he seems to identify the -meaning of the same phrase "belonging to reality" with <i>existing;</i> -he says that whatever exists must belong to reality, and that it is -self-contradictory to deny this. But if both being real and existing -are identical with belonging to reality, it would seem they must be -identical with one another.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> And, indeed, in another passage in the -Appendix to the 2nd Edition (p. 555) we find Mr. Bradley actually using -the following words: "Anything," he says, "that in any sense <i>is,</i> -qualifies the absolute reality and so is real." Moreover, as we have -seen, he declares it to be nonsense to deny that Time <i>is</i>; he must, -therefore, allow that, <i>in a sense,</i> at all events, it is nonsense to -deny that Time is real. And yet this denial is the very one he has -made. Mr. Bradley, therefore, does seem himself to allow that the word -"real" may, <i>sometimes</i> at all events, be properly used as equivalent -to the words "exists," "is a fact," "is." And yet his two assertions -cannot both be true, unless there is <i>some</i> sense in which the whole -proposition "Time is real" is <i>not</i> equivalent to and cannot be -inferred from "Time is," or "Time exists," or "Time is a fact."</p> - -<p>It seems, then, pretty clear that Mr. Bradley must be holding that the -statement "Time is real" is in <i>one</i> sense, <i>not</i> equivalent to "Time -exists"; though he admits that, in <i>another</i> sense, it is. And I will -only quote one other passage which seems to make this plain.</p> - -<p>"If," he says later on (p. 206) "Time is not unreal, I admit that our -Absolute is a delusion; but, on the other side, it will be urged that -time cannot be mere appearance. The change in the finite subject, we -are told, is a matter of direct experience; it is a fact, and hence it -cannot be explained away. And so much of course is indubitable. Change -is a fact and, further, <i>this fact, as such,</i> is <i>not</i> reconcilable -with the Absolute. And, if we could not in any way perceive how <i>the -fact</i> can be <i>unreal,</i> we should be placed, I admit, in a hopeless -dilemma.... But our real position is very different from this. For time -has been shown to contradict itself, and so to be appearance. With -this, its discord, we see at once, may pass as an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> element into a wider -harmony. And with this, the <i>appeal to fact</i> at once becomes worthless."</p> - -<p>"It is mere superstition to suppose that an appeal to experience can -prove <i>reality.</i> That I find something in existence in the world or in -my self, shows that this something <i>exists</i>, and it cannot show <i>more.</i> -Any deliverance of consciousness—whether original or acquired—is -but a deliverance of consciousness. It is in no case an oracle and a -revelation which we have to accept as it is a fact, like other facts, -to be dealt with; and there is no presumption anywhere that any <i>fact</i> -is better than appearance."</p> - -<p>Here Mr. Bradley seems plainly to imply that to be "real" is something -<i>more</i> and other than to be a fact or to exist. This is the distinction -which I think he means to make, and which, I think, is the real -explanation of his puzzling language, and this is the distinction which -I am going presently to discuss. But I want first to say something -as to that other distinction, which I said might be supposed to be -the explanation of the whole difficulty—the distinction implied by -the qualification "Time, <i>in the character which it exhibits</i>"; the -suggestion that, when we talk of "Time," we may sometimes mean Time in -one character, sometimes in another, and that what is true of it in the -one character may not be true of it in the other. It might, I think, be -suggested that this is the explanation of the whole difficulty. And I -want briefly to point out why I think it cannot be the only explanation.</p> - -<p>Stated very badly and crudely, the difficulty which requires -explanation is this: Mr. Bradley says, "It is sheer nonsense to say -Time is not real." But this thing which he says it is sheer nonsense -to say is the very thing which he himself had formerly said. He had -said, "Time has most evidently proved not to be real." Now, Mr. Bradley -certainly does not mean to say that this proposition of his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> own is -sheer nonsense; and yet he says, in words, that it <i>is</i> sheer nonsense. -This is the difficulty. What is the explanation? Quite obviously, -the explanation can only take one possible form. Mr. Bradley must be -holding that the words "Time is real" may have two different <i>senses.</i> -In one sense, the denial of them is sheer nonsense; in the other sense, -so far from being sheer nonsense, denial of them is, according to him, -evidently true. Now, what are these two different senses, between -which the difference is so enormous? It is here that the two different -explanations come in.</p> - -<p>The first and, as I think, the wrong explanation (though I think Mr. -Bradley's words do give some colour to it) is this. It might be said: -"The whole business is perfectly easy to explain. When Mr. Bradley -says that Time is <i>not</i> real, what he means is that Time, <i>in the -character which it exhibits,</i> is not real. Whereas, when he says, Time -does exist, is a fact, and is, and that it is nonsense to deny this, -what he means is that Time does exist, <i>in some other character</i>—some -character <i>other</i> than that which it exhibits. He does <i>not</i> mean to -make any distinction, such as you suppose, between two meanings of -the word I real '—the one of them merely equivalent to 'exists,' -'is,' 'is a fact,' and the other meaning something very different from -this. The only distinction he means to make is a distinction between -<i>two</i> meanings of 'Time' or of the whole sentence 'Time is real.' He -distinguishes between the meaning of this sentence, when it means, -'Time in the character which it exhibits, is real,' which meaning, he -says, is evidently false; and its meaning when it means, 'Time in <i>some -other</i> character, is real,' and this meaning, he says, is evidently -true. This is the complete explanation of your supposed puzzle, which -is, in fact, therefore, very easy to solve."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span></p> - -<p>This, I think, might be offered as an explanation of Mr. Bradley's -meaning. And it must be admitted that it <i>would</i> furnish a complete -explanation of the particular puzzle I have just stated, it would -completely absolve Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency; and -would show that where he appears to contradict himself about the -reality of Time, the contradiction is verbal only and not real. We -might, indeed, object to this distinction between Time in one character -and Time in another; on the ground that anything which has not got the -character which Time exhibits, but only some <i>other</i> character, ought -not to be called Time at all. We are, indeed, perfectly familiar with -the conception that one and the same thing may <i>at one time</i> possess a -character which it does <i>not</i> possess at another, so that what is true -of it at one time may not be true of it at another. We are, that is, -familiar with the idea of a thing <i>changing</i> its character. But Time -itself as a whole obviously cannot change its character in this sense. -Mr. Bradley cannot mean to say that it possesses the character "which -it exhibits" and in which it is unreal <i>at one time,</i> and possesses -some other character, in which it is real, at <i>some other time.</i> And -hence we might say it is certainly wrong to speak as if Time itself -could have two incompatible characters; since nothing can have two -incompatible characters, unless it has them <i>at different times.</i> And -this is an objection which does seem to apply to Mr. Bradley's doctrine -in any case, since he does in any case seem to imply this distinction -between Time in one character and Time in another, whether this -distinction is the complete explanation of our particular puzzle or -not. Yet this objection would not necessarily be more than an objection -to Mr. Bradley's words; it would not necessarily be an objection to -his meaning. Where he seems to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> imply that Time, in some character -other than that which it exhibits, may be fully real, he may only mean -that something completely different from Time, but which does in some -sense correspond to it, is fully real; and if he does mean this, our -objection would only amount to an objection to his giving the name of -"Time" to this supposed counterpart of Time; we might say, and I think -justly, that it is misleading to speak of this counterpart of Time as -if it were Time itself in some other character; but this would go no -way at all to show that there may not really be such a counterpart of -Time, which <i>is</i> real, while Time itself is unreal. We might ask, too, -what this supposed counterpart of Time is like, or (to put it in Mr. -Bradley's way) what the precise character is, in which Time Areal? And -I think Mr. Bradley would admit that he cannot tell us. But this, you -see, would also be no objection to his actual doctrine. He might quite -well know, and be right in saying, that there is and must be a real -<i>counterpart</i> of Time, completely different in character from Time, as -we know it, even though he has not the least idea what this counterpart -is like.</p> - -<p>We must, therefore, admit that this proposed explanation of our puzzle -would be a complete explanation of it. It would completely vindicate -Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency, and would give us, as -his doctrine, a doctrine to which we have hitherto found no objection -except verbal ones.</p> - -<p>But, nevertheless, I think it is a wrong explanation, and I want to -explain why. If we were to suppose that this distinction between Time -in one character and Time in another were the only one on which Mr. -Bradley meant to rely, we should have as his doctrine this: We should -have to suppose him to affirm most emphatically that Time, in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> the -character which it exhibits, neither is real, <i>nor</i> exists, <i>nor</i> is -a fact, <i>nor</i> is. We should have to suppose him to be using all these -four expressions always as strict equivalents, and to mean that it -is <i>only</i> in its other character that Time either exists, or is a -fact, or is. And if he did mean this, there would, of course, be no -doubt whatever that he does mean to contradict the common view with -regard to Time; since, of course, what most people mean by "Time" is -what he chooses to call "Time in the character which it exhibits." -Yet, his language, even in the passages that I quoted, seems to me -to indicate that he does not mean this. I think, on the contrary, -he means to affirm emphatically that Time <i>even</i> in the character -which it exhibits, does exist, <i>is</i> a fact, and indubitably <i>is,</i> -though it is <i>not</i> real in that character. In the second passage, for -instance, where he insists so emphatically that appearances do exist, -are facts, and indubitably <i>are,</i> he is, I think, plainly talking of -appearances, in the character which they exhibit—or, as he there puts -it, their nature, <i>as it is</i>—he does, I think, mean that appearances, -even in this character, are facts, exist, and are, though, in this -character, they are not "true of reality." And, so again in the third -passage, where he says, Change <i>is</i> a fact, and this fact, <i>as such,</i> -is not reconcilable with the Absolute; this language is surely quite -inexcusable, unless he means that Change, as such—change, in the -<i>character which it exhibits</i>—change, <i>as it is, is</i> a fact: though, -of course, he holds that <i>in</i> this character it certainly is not real. -I think, therefore, we have to assume that Mr. Bradley means to make -a distinction not merely between Time, in one character, and Time in -another, but also between "real," in one sense, and "real" in another. -His meaning is not so simple as it would be, if he were merely making -a distinction between Time in one character<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> and Time in another, and -it is not, after all, at all plain whether he means to contradict what -ordinary people hold about Time or not. He does not mean to assert that -Time, <i>as such, neither</i> is real, <i>nor</i> exists, <i>nor</i> is a fact, <i>nor</i> -is; but, on the contrary, that Time, even <i>as such,</i> does exist, <i>is</i> -a fact, and <i>is</i>; <i>but,</i> nevertheless, is not real. This, at least, -is what I am going to assume him to mean. And on this assumption, we -are brought face to face with the question as to the meaning of the -word "real," and also as to the meaning of these other words "exists," -"is a fact," and "is." Mr. Bradley seems to admit, we have seen, that -"real" may <i>sometimes</i> be properly used as <i>merely</i> equivalent to -these other phrases. We are, however, now supposing that he also holds -that in another sense they are not equivalent, but that "real" means -something more than the others, so that it is quite consistent to -maintain that Time is <i>not</i> "real," and yet <i>does</i> exist, is a fact, -and is. In holding this I think he is mistaken; and what I want to do -is to explain, as clearly as I can, what sort of a mistake I take him -to be making, and what seems to me to be the source of this mistake. I -may, perhaps, be quite wrong in thinking that Mr Bradley has made this -mistake, and that it is in any degree the source of the distinction he -seems to draw between "reality" and "existence." To maintain that it is -so is no part of my main object. My main object is simply to make clear -the nature of this particular mistake, whether committed by Mr. Bradley -or not, and that it is a mistake; because it seems to me that it is a -mistake which it is very easy to make, and very important to avoid. I -am, of course, not concerned at all to discuss the question whether -Time <i>is</i> real or not, but only to discuss the question what sort of -things would have to be true, if it were unreal, and whether<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> if those -things were true it could still be true that Time either exists, or is, -or is a fact.</p> - -<p>Now, to begin with, I think I know pretty well, in part at least, what -Mr. Bradley means when he says that it is unreal. I think that part -at least of what he means is just what he <i>ought</i> to mean—just what -anyone else would mean if he said that Time was unreal, and what any -ordinary person would understand to be meant, if he heard those words. -But I can conceive that, when I have explained as well as I can what -this is that he <i>ought</i> to mean, some people may be inclined to dispute -whether he means any such thing at all. They may say that he is using -the word "real" exclusively in some highly unusual and special sense, -so that in asserting that "Time is unreal" he is by no means denying -any part of what ordinary people would mean by saying that "Time is -real." And that some special sense may <i>come in</i> to his meaning I -am prepared to admit. I do think it is possible that <i>part</i> of what -Mr. Bradley is asserting may be something which no unsophisticated -person would think of expressing in the same way, and I will admit, -therefore, that he does not, very likely, mean by "Time is unreal" -<i>merely</i> what other people would mean by this phrase, but something -else <i>as well.</i> What, however, I cannot help thinking is that, even -if he means something more, he <i>does</i> mean what ordinary people would -mean <i>as well</i>: that what they would mean is at least a <i>part</i> of his -meaning. And if even this is disputed, if it is maintained that he is -using the words <i>exclusively</i> in some special sense, I own I do not -know how to argue the question. If anybody really does take the view -that, when he says "Time is unreal," absolutely all that he means is -something which is in no way incompatible with what most people would -mean by saying "Time is real," I do not know how to show that this view -is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> wrong. I can only say that if this <i>had</i> been all that he meant, -I cannot believe that he would have expressed his view in the form -"Time is unreal." The only further argument I shall bring in favour -of my view that he does mean what he ought to mean will take the form -of an answer to one possible argument which might be brought against -it. When I nave explained what he <i>ought</i> to mean by saying that "Time -is unreal," it will be quite clear that this is something which is in -fact incompatible with the truth of the propositions that Time <i>is,</i> -or <i>exists,</i> or <i>is a fact.</i> And it might be urged that the fact that -it is thus incompatible is a strong argument against the view that -Mr. Bradley does mean what he <i>ought</i> to mean, since, if he had meant -it, he could hardly have failed to perceive that what he meant <i>was</i> -inconsistent with these propositions, whereas, as we have seen, he -certainly does not perceive this. I have an answer to that argument, -which consists in giving an explanation, which I think a plausible -one, as to how he could come to think that the propositions are <i>not</i> -inconsistent, when in fact they are.</p> - -<p>What, then, <i>ought</i> Mr. Bradley to mean by "Time is unreal"? What -would most people mean by this proposition? I do not think there is -much difficulty in discovering what sort of thing they would mean by -it. Of course, Time, with a big T, seems to be a highly abstract kind -of entity, and to define <i>exactly</i> what can be meant by saying of an -entity of that sort that it is unreal does seem to offer difficulties. -But if you try to translate the proposition into the concrete, and to -ask what it <i>implies,</i> there is, I think, very little doubt as to the -sort of thing it implies. The moment you try to do this, and think what -it really comes to, you at once begin thinking of a number of different -<i>kinds</i> of propositions, all of which plainly must be untrue, if<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> Time -is unreal. If Time is unreal, then plainly nothing ever happens before -or after anything else; nothing is ever simultaneous with anything -else; it is never true that anything is past; never true that anything -will happen in the future; never true that anything is happening now; -and so on. You can at once think of a considerable number of kinds of -propositions (and you could easily add to the list), the falsehood of -all of which is plainly implied by saying that Time is unreal. And it -is clear, also, that to say that the falsehood of all propositions of -these kinds is implied is equivalent to saying that there are no facts -of certain corresponding kinds—no facts which consist in one event -happening before another; none which consist in an event being past or -future, and so on. That is to say, what "Time is unreal" implies is -that, in the case of a large number of different <i>properties</i> which -are such that, if they <i>did</i> belong to anything, what they belonged -to would be facts having some common characteristic, which we might -express by calling them "temporal facts," the properties in question -do, in fact, belong to nothing. It implies that the property of being a -fact which consists in one event following another belongs to nothing; -that that of being a past event belongs to nothing, and so on. And -why it implies that all those different special properties belong to -nothing is, I think we may say, because what it <i>means</i> is that the -general property which I have called that of being a "temporal fact" -belongs to nothing. To say that the property of being a temporal fact -belongs to nothing <i>does imply</i> that such special properties as that -of being a fact which consists in one event following another, or that -of being a fact which consists in something being past, also belong to -nothing; in exactly the same way as to say that the property of being -"coloured" belongs to nothing <i>implies</i> with regard<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> to the special -properties "being red," "being blue," etc., that they also belong to -nothing. We may, then, I think, say that what "Time is unreal" <i>means</i> -is simply "The property of being a temporal fact belongs to nothing," -or, to express this in the way in which it would be expressed in -ordinary life, "There <i>are</i> no temporal facts." And this being so, we -have explained the usage of "unreal," where it is predicated of Time -with a capital T, by reference to a much more common and perfectly -familiar usage of the term. The use of "is unreal" in the phrase "Time -is unreal" has been defined by reference to its use in the phrase -"Temporal facts are unreal." And its use in this phrase is, so far as -I can see, exactly the same as in hosts of phrases with which we are -perfectly familiar; it is, I think, <i>the</i> commonest and by far the most -important use of the term "unreal." The use is that in which we use it -when we say, "Unicorns are unreal," "Griffins are unreal," "Chimæras -are unreal," and so on. It is the usage in which unreal is equivalent -to "imaginary"; and in which to say "Unicorns are unreal" means the -same as "There are no unicorns" or "Unicorns do not exist." In just -the same way the proposition "Temporal facts are unreal," into which -we have translated "Time is unreal," means the same as "There are no -temporal facts," or "Temporal facts do not exist," or "Temporal facts -are imaginary."</p> - -<p>I think, then, that what Mr. Bradley <i>ought</i> to mean by "Time is -unreal" can be defined by reference to one particular usage of the word -"real" —or, if you like to put it that way, to one particular one -among the conceptions for which the term "reality" may stand. And this -particular conception seems to me to be by far the commonest and most -important of those for which the term does stand. I want, therefore, -before going on, to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> dwell a little upon its nature; although I daresay -that all that I have to say is perfectly familiar and perfectly well -understood by every one here. Of course, it has often been said before, -but I think it is still very far from being generally understood.</p> - -<p>I think, perhaps, the point I want to insist on can be brought out in -this way. I have just said that we have pointed out one particular -one, and that the most important, among the conceptions for which the -term "reality" may stand; and that is an excusable way of saying what -we have done. But it would, I think, be more correct to say that we -have pointed out one particular, and that the most important, usage -of the terms "real" and "unreal," and that one of the peculiarities -of this usage is that it is such that the terms "real" and "unreal" -cannot, when used in this way, be properly said to stand for any -conception whatever. I will try to explain what I mean. We have said -that what "Lions are real" <i>means</i> is that some particular property or -other—I will say, for the sake of brevity, <i>the</i> property of being -a lion, though that is not strictly accurate, does In fact <i>belong -to</i> some-thing—that there are things which have it, or, to put it -in another way, that the conception of being a lion is a conception -which does apply to some things—that there are things which <i>fall -under</i> it. And similarly what "Unicorns are <i>unreal"</i> means is that the -property of being a unicorn belongs to <i>nothing</i>. Now, if this is so, -then it seems to me, in a very important sense, "real" and "unreal" -do <i>not</i> in this usage stand for any conceptions at all. The only -<i>conceptions</i> which occur in the proposition "Lions are real" are, on -this interpretation, plainly, (1) the conception of being a lion, and -(2) the conception of belonging to something, and perfectly obviously -"real" does not stand for either of these. In the case of the first -that is obvious; but it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> worth while pointing out that it is also -true of the second.</p> - -<p>For if "is real" did stand for "belongs to something," then the -proposition "Lions are real" would stand, not for the assertion -that the property of "being a lion" belongs to something, but for -the assertion that lions themselves <i>are properties which belong to -something</i>; and it is quite obvious that what we mean to assert is -not any such nonsense as this. "Real," therefore, does not, in this -proposition, stand for the conception of "belonging to something" nor -yet, quite plainly, does it stand for the conception of "being a lion." -And hence, since these are the only two conceptions which do occur in -the proposition, we may, I think, say that "real," in this usage, does -not stand for any conception at all. To say that it did would be to -imply that it stood for some property of which we are asserting that -everything which has the property of "being a lion" <i>also</i> has this -other property. But we are not, in fact, asserting any such thing. We -are not asserting of any property called "reality" that it belongs to -lions, as in the proposition "Lions are mammalian" we <i>are</i> asserting -of the property of "being a mammal" that <i>it</i> belongs to lions. The -two propositions "Lions are real" and "Lions are mammalian," though -grammatically similar, are in reality of wholly different forms; and -one difference between them may be expressed by saying that whereas -"mammalian" does stand for a property or conception, the very point of -this usage of "real" is that it does not.</p> - -<p>To return to Mr. Bradley. "Time is unreal" <i>ought</i> to mean, according -to me, "Temporal facts are unreal," in the sense I have tried to -explain. And I cannot help thinking that this which he <i>ought</i> to mean -is, in part at least, what Mr. Bradley <i>does</i> mean when he says "Time -is unreal," though<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> possibly be also means something else as well. But -if so, it is quite clear, I think, that what he means is inconsistent -with its being true that Time exists or that there is such a thing as -Time. To say that Time exists or that there is such a thing, is to -assert at least, that there are some temporal facts: it may assert more -than this, but it does assert this, at least. And this, we have seen, -is exactly what is denied when it is said that Time is unreal. "Time -is unreal" just means "Temporal facts are unreal," <i>or</i> "there are no -temporal facts," <i>or</i> "Temporal facts do not exist." And just this is -also what is meant by "Time does not exist" or "There is no such thing -as Time." There is, in fact, nothing, else for these expressions to -mean. What, therefore, Mr. Bradley <i>ought</i> to mean and (according to -me) does mean by "Time is unreal" is, in fact, inconsistent with what -he ought to mean by "Time exists" or by "Time is." And yet plainly he -does not think that it is so. Is it possible to explain why he should -have failed to perceive the inconsistency?</p> - -<p>I think his failure can be explained as follows. It may have been -noticed that, in the passages I quoted from him, he insists in one -place, that to deny that appearances exist is not merely false but -<i>self-contradictory,</i> and in another appeals to the principle that "any -deliverance of consciousness is but a deliverance of consciousness" in -support of his contention that what <i>is</i> a fact need, nevertheless, -<i>not</i> be real. And the fact that he does these two things does, I -think, give colour to the suggestion that the reason why he thinks that -what is unreal may yet exist, and be a fact, and be, is the following. -It is undoubtedly the case that, even if temporal facts are unreal, -<i>i.e.,</i> there <i>are</i> no such things, we can and do <i>think of them,</i> just -as it is undoubtedly the case that, though unicorns are unreal, we can<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> -and do imagine them. In other words, "temporal facts" and "unicorns" -are both quite certainly "deliverances of consciousness," at least -in the sense that they are "objects of thought"; being "objects of -thought" they are, in a wide sense, "appearances" also, and I cannot -help thinking that Mr. Bradley supposes that, merely because they are -so, they <i>must</i> at least BE. "How" (I imagine he would ask) "can a -thing 'appear' or even 'be thought of' unless it is there to appear and -to be thought of? To say that it appears or is thought of, and that yet -there is no such thing, is plainly self-contradictory. A thing cannot -have a property, unless it is there to have it, and, since unicorns -and temporal facts <i>do</i> have the property of being thought of, there -certainly must be such things. When I think of a unicorn, what I am -thinking of is certainly not nothing; if it were nothing, then, when -I think of a griffin, I should also be thinking of nothing, and there -would be no difference between thinking of a griffin and thinking -of a unicorn. But there certainly is a difference; and what can the -difference be except that in the one case what I am thinking of is a -unicorn, and in the other a griffin? And if the unicorn is what I am -thinking of, then there certainly must <i>be</i> a unicorn, in spite of the -fact that unicorns are unreal. In other words, though in one sense of -the words there certainly <i>are</i> no unicorns—that sense, namely, in -which to assert that there are would be equivalent to asserting that -unicorns are real—yet there <i>must</i> be <i>some</i> other sense in which -there <i>are</i> such things; since, <i>if</i> there were not, we could not think -of them."</p> - -<p>Perhaps, it may be thought that the fallacy involved in this argument -is too gross for it to be possible that Mr. Bradley should have -been guilty of it. But there are other passages in <i>Appearance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> and -Reality</i>—particularly what he says about Error —which look to me as -if he certainly was guilty of it. I suppose it will be quite obvious to -everyone here that it is a fallacy; that the fact that we can think of -unicorns is not sufficient to prove that, in any sense at all, there -<i>are</i> any unicorns. Yet, I am not sure that I know myself what is <i>the</i> -mistake involved in thinking that it <i>is</i> sufficient, and I am going, -therefore, to try to put as clearly as I can, what I think it is, in -the hope that somebody may be able, if I am wrong, to correct me.</p> - -<p>The main mistake, I suppose, is the mistake of thinking that the -proposition "Unicorns are thought of" is a proposition of the same form -as "Lions are hunted"; or the proposition "I am thinking of a unicorn" -of the same form as "I am hunting a lion"; or the proposition "Unicorns -are objects of thought" of the same form as "Lions are objects of the -chase." Of the second proposition in each of these three pairs, it is -in fact the case that it could not be true unless there were lions—at -least one. Each of them does, in fact, assert both with regard to a -certain property—which we will call that of "being a lion"—that there -<i>are</i> things which possess it, and also with regard to another—that of -being hunted—that some of the things which possess the former possess -this property too. But it is obvious enough to common sense that the -same is by no means true of the <i>first</i> proposition in each pair, in -spite of the fact that their grammatical expression shows no trace of -the difference. It is perfectly obvious that if I say "I am thinking of -a unicorn,"</p> - -<p>I am not saying both that there is a unicorn and that I am thinking of -it, although, if I say "I am hunting a lion," I am saying both that -there is a lion, and that I am hunting it. In the former case,</p> - -<p>I am <i>not</i> asserting that the two properties of being a unicorn and of -being thought of by me both<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> belong to one and the same thing; whereas, -in the latter case, I am asserting that the two properties of being a -lion and of being hunted by me <i>do</i> belong to one and the same thing. -It is quite clear that there is <i>in fact</i>, this difference between -the two propositions; although no trace of it appears in their verbal -expression. And why we should use the same form of verbal expression -to convey such different meanings is more than I can say. It seems to -me very curious that language, in this, as in the other instance which -we have just considered of "Lions are real" and "Lions are mammalian," -should have grown up just as if it were expressly designed to mislead -philosophers; and I do not know why it should have. Yet, it seems to -me there is no doubt that in ever so many instances it has. Moreover, -<i>exactly</i> what <i>is</i> meant by saying "I am thinking of a unicorn" is -not by any means clear to me. I think we can assert at least this: -In order that this proposition should be true, it is necessary (1) -that I should be conceiving, with regard to a certain property, the -hypothesis that there Is something which possesses it, and (2) that the -property in question should be such that, if anything did possess it -there would be a unicorn. Although this is plainly true, it does not -give us completely what is <i>meant</i> by the statement, "I am thinking -of a unicorn"; and I do not know what the complete meaning is. It is -certainly <i>not</i> that I am conceiving with regard to the property of -"being a unicorn," that there is something which possesses it; since -I may be thinking of a unicorn, without ever having conceived the -property of "being a unicorn" at all. Whatever it does mean, the point -which concerns us is that it is certainly <i>not</i> necessary for its -truth, that the property of being a unicorn should, in fact, belong -to anything whatever, or, therefore, that there should in any sense<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> -whatever <i>be</i> a unicorn. And the fallacy I am attributing to Mr. -Bradley is that of supposing that, <i>in some sense,</i> it must imply this -latter.</p> - -<p>This, then, is what I imagine to be at least one of the reasons -which have led Mr. Bradley to suppose that the proposition "Time is -unreal," <i>must</i> be consistent with the proposition "There <i>is</i> such -a thing as Time." Put shortly, it is that he sees (what is perfectly -true) that "Time is unreal" <i>must</i> be consistent with "We do think of -Time;" he thinks (falsely) that "We <i>do</i> think of Time" must imply, -in some sense, "There <i>is</i> such a thing as Time;" and finally, infers -(correctly) from this true and this false premiss, that there <i>must</i> be -some sense of the proposition "There is such a thing as Time" which is -consistent with "Time is unreal."</p> - -<p>It follows, then, that if Mr. Bradley means what he ought mean <i>both</i> -by "Time is unreal" <i>and</i> by "Time exists," he is contradicting himself -when he combines these two propositions. And I have said I feel -convinced that he <i>does</i> mean what he ought to mean by the former. -But I feel a good deal of doubt as to whether, all the same, he is -contradicting himself, because it does seem to me doubtful whether he -means what he ought to mean by the latter. The kind of thing which I -imagine may be happening to him when he insists so strongly that Time -<i>does</i> exist, <i>is a fact,</i> and <i>is,</i> is that, properly speaking, he is -not attaching to these phrases any meaning whatever—<i>not,</i> therefore, -that which they properly bear. It seems to me very possible that he -has so strongly convinced himself of the false proposition that there -<i>must</i> be <i>some</i> sense in which, if I think of a unicorn, there must -<i>be</i> a unicorn, that wherever he knows the former proposition holds, -he allows himself to use the latter <i>form of words,</i> without attaching -any meaning to them. What he is really asserting so emphatically may, -I think, be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> not anything which his words stand for, but simply this -verbal proposition that there <i>must</i> be <i>some</i> sense in which they are -true.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_4" id="Footnote_1_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_4"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Appearance and Reality</i> (2nd edn.), p. 35. The Italics -are mine.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_5" id="Footnote_2_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_5"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 131-2.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4><a name="SOME_JUDGMENTS_OF_PERCEPTION" id="SOME_JUDGMENTS_OF_PERCEPTION">SOME JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION</a></h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>I want to raise some childishly simple questions as to what we are -doing when we make judgments of a certain kind, which we all do in fact -exceedingly commonly make. The kind of judgments I mean are those which -we make when, with regard to something which we are seeing, we judge -such things as '"That is an inkstand," "That is a tablecloth," "That -is a door," etc., etc.; or when, with regard to something which we are -feeling with our hands, we judge such things as "This is cloth," "This -is a finger," "This is a coin," etc., etc.</p> - -<p>It is scarcely possible, I think, to exaggerate the frequency with -which we make such judgments as these, nor yet the certainty with -which we are able to make vast numbers of them. Any man, who is not -blind, can, at almost any moment of his waking life, except when he -is in the dark, make a large number of judgments of the first kind, -with the greatest certainty. He has only to look about him, if he is -indoors, to judge with regard to various things which he is seeing, -such things as "That is a window," "That is a chair," "This is a book"; -or, if he is out-of-doors, such things as "That is a house," "That -is a motor-car," "That is a man," or "That is a stone," "That is a -tree," "That is a cloud." And all of us, who are not blind, do in fact -constantly make such judgments, even if, as a rule, we only make them -as parts of more complicated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> judgments. What I mean is that, when -we make such judgments as "Hullo! that clock has stopped," or "This -chair is more comfortable than that one," or "That man looks like a -foreigner," judgments of the simpler kind with which I am concerned -are, so far as I can see, actually a part of what we are judging. In -judging "That clock has stopped," part of what I am actually judging -is, so far as I can see, "That is a clock;" and similarly if I judge -"That tree is taller than this one," my judgment actually contains the -two simpler judgments "That is a tree," and "This is a tree." Perhaps -most judgments which we make, of the kind I mean, are, in this way, -only parts of more complicated judgments: I do not know whether this -is so or not. But in any case there can be no doubt that we make them -exceedingly commonly. And even a blind man, or a man in the dark, can -and does, very frequently, make judgments of the second kind—judgments -about things which he is feeling with his hands. All of us, for -instance, at almost any moment of our waking life, whether we are in -the dark or not, have only to feel certain parts of our own bodies or -of our clothes, in order to make, with great certainty, such judgments -as "This is a finger," "This is a nose," "This is cloth." And similarly -I have only to feel in my pockets to judge, with regard to objects -which I meet with there, such things as "This is a coin," "This is a -pencil," "This is a pipe."</p> - -<p>Judgments of this kind would, I think, commonly, and rightly, be taken -to be judgments, the truth of which involves the existence of material -things or physical objects. If I am right in judging that this is -an inkstand, it follows that there is at least one inkstand in the -Universe; and if there is an inkstand in the Universe, it follows that -there is in it at least one material thing or physical object. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> -may, of course, be disputed. Berkeley, if I understand him rightly, -was clearly of opinion that there was no inconsistency in maintaining -that there were in the Universe thousands of inkstands and trees and -stones and stars, and that yet there was in it no such thing as matter. -And perhaps the definition of matter, which he adopted, was such -that there really was no inconsistency in maintaining this. Perhaps, -similarly, other philosophers have sometimes adopted definitions of -the expressions "material things" and "physical objects," which were -such that all the judgments of this kind that we make might quite -well be true, without its being true that there are in the Universe -any material things whatever. Perhaps, even, there may be some -justification for adopting definitions of those terms which would yield -the surprising result that we may, with perfect consistency, maintain -that the world is full of minerals and vegetables and animals, of all -sorts of different kinds, and that yet there is not to be found in -it a single material thing. I do not know whether there is or is not -any utility in using the terms "material thing" or "physical object" -in such a sense as this. But, whether there is or not, I cannot help -thinking that there is ample justification for using them in another -sense—a sense in which from the proposition that there are in the -Universe such things as inkstands or fingers or clouds, it strictly -follows that there are in it at least as many material things, and in -which, therefore, we can <i>not</i> consistently maintain the existence of -inkstands, fingers, and clouds, while denying that of material things. -The kinds of judgment which I have mentioned, and thousands of others -which might easily be mentioned, are obviously all of the same sort -in one very important respect—a respect in which, for instance, such -judgments as "This is an emotion," "This is a judgment," "This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> is a -colour," are <i>not</i> of the same sort as they are. And it seems to me -that we are certainly using the term "material thing" in <i>a</i> correct -and useful way, if we express this important common property which they -have, by saying that of each of them the same can truly be said as was -said of the judgment "That is an inkstand": that, just as from the -proposition "There is an inkstand" it follows that there is at least -one material thing, so from the proposition "There is a tablecloth," -it follows that there is at least one material thing; and similarly -in all the other cases. We can certainly use the expression "Things -<i>such as</i> inkstands, tablecloths, fingers, clouds, stars, etc.," to -mean things such as these in a certain very important respect, which -we all understand, though we may not be able to define it. And the -term "material thing" certainly is and can be correctly used to mean -simply things such as these in that respect—whatever it may be. Some -term is certainly required to mean merely things such as these in that -important respect; and, so far as I can see, there is no term which can -be naturally used in this sense except the term "material things" and -its equivalents. Thus understood, the term "material thing" certainly -does stand for an important notion, which requires a name.</p> - -<p>And, if we agree to use the term in this sense, then it is obvious that -no more can be necessary for the truth of the assertion that there are -material things, than is necessary for the truth of judgments of the -kind with which I propose to deal. But no more can be necessary for -the truth of these judgments than is actually asserted in or logically -implied by them. And if we approach the question what is necessary for -the truth of the assertion that there are material things, by asking -what it is that we actually assert when we make<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> such judgments as -these, certain reasons for doubting how much is necessary are, I think, -brought out much more clearly, than if we approach the question in -any other way. Many philosophers have told us a very great deal as to -what they suppose to be involved in the existence of material things; -and some, at least, among them seem to have meant by "material things" -such things as inkstands, fingers and clouds. But I can think of only -one type of view as to the constitution of material things, which is -such that it is tolerably clear what answer those who hold it would -give to the simple question; What is it that I am judging, when I -judge, as I now do, that that is an inkstand? The type of view I mean -is that to which the view that Mill suggests, when he explains what he -means by saying that Matter is a Permanent Possibility of Sensation, -and also the view or views which Mr. Russell seems to suggest in his -"Our Knowledge of the External World," seem to belong. In the case of -views of this kind, it is, I think, tolerably clear what answer those -who hold them would give to <i>all</i> the questions I want to raise about -judgments of the kind I have described. But it does not seem to me at -all certain that any view of this type is true; and certainly many -philosophers have held and do hold that all views of this type are -false. But in the case of those who do hold them to be false, I do -not know, in any single case, what answer would be given to <i>all</i> the -questions which I want to raise. In the case of philosophers, who do -not accept any view of the Mill-Russell type, none, so far as I know, -has made it clear what answer he would give to <i>all</i> my questions: some -have made it clear what answer they would give to <i>some</i> of them; but -many, I think, have not even made it clear what answer they would give -to any. Perhaps there is some simple and satisfactory answer, which has -escaped me, that such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> philosophers could give to all my questions; but -I cannot help thinking that assumptions as to the nature of material -things have too often been made, without its even occurring to those -who made them to ask, what, if they were true, we could be judging when -we make such judgments as these; and that, if this question had been -asked, it would have become evident that those assumptions were far -less certain than they appeared to be.</p> - -<p>I do not know that there is any excuse whatever for calling <i>all</i> -judgments of the kind I mean "judgments of perception." All of them -are, of course, judgments <i>about</i> things which we are at the moment -perceiving, since, by definition, they are judgments about things -which we are seeing or feeling with our hands; and all of them are, no -doubt, also <i>based upon</i> something which we perceive about the thing -in question. But the mere fact that a judgment is both about a thing -which I am perceiving, and also based upon something which I perceive -about that thing, does not seem to be a sufficient reason for calling -it a judgment of perception; and I do not know that there is any -other reason than this for calling <i>all</i> judgments of the kind I mean -judgments of perception. I do not want therefore, to assert that <i>all</i> -of them are so. But it seems to me quite plain that enormous numbers -of them are so, in a perfectly legitimate sense. This judgment, which -I now make, to the effect that <i>that</i> is a door, seems to me quite -plainly to be a judgment of perception, in the simple sense that I -make it because I do, in fact, see that that <i>is</i> a door, and assert -in it no more than what I see; and what I see I, of course, perceive. -In every case in which I judge, with regard to something which I am -seeing or feeling with my hands, that it is a so-and-so, simply because -I do perceive, by sight or touch, that it is in fact a thing of that -kind, we can, I think, fairly say that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> the judgment in question is a -judgment of perception. And enormous numbers of judgments of the kind -I mean are, quite plainly, judgments of perception in this sense. They -are not <i>all,</i> for the simple reason that some of them are mistaken. -I may, for instance, judge, with regard to an animal which I see at -a distance, that it is a sheep, when in fact it is a pig. And here -my judgment is certainly not due to the fact that I see it to be a -sheep; since I cannot possibly see a thing to be a sheep, unless it is -one. It, therefore, is <i>not</i> a judgment of perception in this sense. -And moreover, even where such a judgment is true, it may not always -be a judgment of perception, for the reason that, whereas I only see -the thing in question, the kind of thing which I judge it to be is of -such a nature, that it is impossible for any one, by sight alone, to -perceive anything to be of that kind. How to draw the line between -judgments of this kind, which are judgments of perception, and those -which are not, I do not know. That is to say, I do not know what -conditions must be fulfilled in order that I may be truly said to be -<i>perceiving,</i> by sight or touch, such things as that that is a door, -this is a finger, and not <i>merely</i> inferring them. Some people may no -doubt think that it is very unphilosophical in me to say that we <i>ever</i> -can perceive such things as these. But it seems to me that we do, in -ordinary life, constantly talk of <i>seeing</i> such things, and that, when -we do so, we are neither using language incorrectly, nor making any -mistake about the facts—supposing something to occur which never does -in fact occur. The truth seems to me to be that we are using the term -"perceive" in a way which is both perfectly correct and expresses a -kind of thing which constantly does occur, only that some philosophers -have not recognised that this is a correct usage of the term and have -not been able to define it. I am not,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> therefore, afraid to say that I -do now perceive that that is a door, and that that is a finger. Only, -of course, when I say that I do, I do not mean to assert that part of -what I "perceive," when I "perceive" these things, may not be something -which, in an important sense, is known to me only by inference. It -would be very rash to assert that "perception," in this sense of the -word, entirely excludes inference. All that seems to me certain is that -there is an important and useful sense of the word "perception," which -is such that the amount and kind of inference, if inference there be, -which is involved in my present perception that that is a door, is no -bar to the truth of the assertion that I do perceive that it is one. -Vast numbers, then, of the kind of judgments with which I propose to -deal seem to me to be, in an important and legitimate sense, judgments -of perception; although I am not prepared to define, any further than I -have done, what that sense is. And though it is true that the questions -which I shall raise apply just as much to those of them which are not -judgments of perception as to those which are, it is, of course, also -true that they apply just as much to those which are as to those which -are not; so that I shall be really dealing with a large and important -class among judgments of perception.</p> - -<p>It is true that, if certain views which, if I understand them rightly, -some Philosophers have seriously entertained, were true ones, it would -be quite impossible that any of them should be judgments of perception. -For some philosophers seem to me to have denied that we ever do in fact -know such things as these, and others not only that we ever know them -but also that they are ever true. And, if, in fact, I never do know -such a thing, or if it is never true, it will of course, follow that I -never perceive such a thing; since I certainly cannot, in this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> sense, -perceive anything whatever, unless I both know it and it is true. But -it seems to me a sufficient refutation of such views as these, simply -to point to cases in which we do know such things. This, after all, you -know, really is a finger: there is no doubt about it: I know it, and -you all know it. And I think we may safely challenge any philosopher to -bring forward any argument in favour either of the proposition that we -do not know it, or of the proposition that it is not true, which does -not at some point, rest upon some premiss which is, beyond comparison, -less certain than is the proposition which it is designed to attack. -The questions whether we do ever know such things as these, and whether -there are any material things, seem to me, therefore, to be questions -which there is no need to take seriously: they are questions which it -is quite easy to answer, with certainty, in the affirmative. What does, -I think, need to be taken seriously, and what is really dubious, is not -the question, whether this is a finger, or whether I know that it is, -but the question <i>what,</i> in certain respects, I am knowing, when I know -that it is. And this is the question to which I will now address myself.</p> - -<p>To begin with there is one thing which seems to me to be very certain -indeed about such judgments. It is unfortunately a thing which I do -not know how properly to express. There seem to me to be objections -to every way of expressing it which I can think of. But I hope I -may be able to make my meaning clear, in spite of the inadequacy of -my expression. The thing I mean is a thing which may to some people -seem so obvious as to be scarcely worth saying. But I cannot help -thinking that it is not always clearly recognised, and even that some -philosophers, to judge from what they say, might perhaps dispute it. -It seems to me to be an assumption which is silently made in many<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> -treatments of the subject, and, as I say, it seems to me to be very -certain indeed. But I think it is at all events worth while to try to -make the assumption explicit, in case it should be disputed. If it -really is not true, then the other questions to which I shall go on, -and which seem to me really dubious and difficult, do not, I think, -arise at all.</p> - -<p>I will try to express this fundamental assumption, which seems to me -so very certain, by saying it is the assumption that, in all cases in -which I make a judgment of this sort, I have no difficulty whatever -in picking out a thing, which is, quite plainly, in a sense in which -nothing else is, <i>the</i> thing about which I am making my judgment; and -that yet, though this thing is <i>the</i> thing about which I am judging, I -am, quite certainly, <i>not</i>, in general, judging with regard to it, that -<i>it</i> is a thing of that kind for which the term, which seems to express -the predicate of my judgment, is a name. Thus, when I judge, as now, -that That is an inkstand, I have no difficulty whatever in picking out, -from what, if you like, you can call my total field of presentation -at the moment, an object, which is undoubtedly, in a sense in which -nothing else is, <i>the</i> object about which I am making this judgment; -and yet it seems to me quite certain that of <i>this</i> object I am not -judging that it is a whole inkstand. And similarly when I judge, with -regard to something which I am feeling in my pocket, "This is a coin," -I have no difficulty in picking out, from my field of presentation, -an object, which is undoubtedly <i>the</i> object with which my judgment -is concerned; and yet I am certainly not judging with regard to this -object that it is a whole coin. I say that <i>always</i><i>t</i> when I make -such a judgment, I can pick out <i>the</i> one, among the objects presented -to me at the time, about which I am making it; but I have only said -that <i>in general</i> I am not judging with regard to this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> object that -it is a thing of the kind, for which the term, which seems to express -the predicate of my judgment, is a name. And I have limited my second -proposition in this way, because there are cases, in which it does -not, at first sight, seem quite so certain that I am not doing this, -as in the two instances I have just given. When, for instance, I judge -with regard to something, which I am seeing, "This is a soap-bubble," -or "This is a drop of water," or even when I judge "This is a spot -of ink," it may not seem quite so plain, that I may not be judging, -with regard to the very object presented to me, that it is, itself, a -whole soap-bubble, a whole drop of water, or a whole spot of ink, as -it always is, in the case of an inkstand, or a coin, that I never take -the presented object, about which I am judging, to be a whole inkstand, -or a whole coin. The sort of reason why I say this will, of course, -be obvious to any one, and it is obviously of a childish order. But I -cannot say that it seems to me quite obvious that in such a case I am -not judging of the presented object that it is a whole drop of water, -in the way in which it does seem to be obvious that I am not judging -of <i>this</i> presented object that it is an inkstand. That is why I limit -myself to saying that, <i>in general</i>, when I judge "That is a so-and-so" -I am not judging with regard to the presented object, about which my -judgment is that <i>it</i> is a thing of the kind in question. As much as -this seems to me to be a thing which any child can see. Nobody will -suppose, for a moment, that when he judges such things as "This is a -sofa," or "This is a tree," he is judging, with regard to the presented -object about which his judgment plainly is, that it is a whole sofa or -a whole tree: he can, at most, suppose that he is judging it to be a -part of the surface of a sofa or a part of the surface of a tree. And -certainly in the case of most judgments of this kind which we make,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> -whether in the case of all or not, this is plainly the case: we are not -judging, with regard to the presented object about which our judgment -plainly is, that it is a thing of the kind, for which the term which -appears to express the predicate of our judgment, is a name. And that -this should be true of <i>most</i> judgments of this kind, whether of all or -not, is quite sufficient for my purpose.</p> - -<p>This much, then, seems to me to be very certain indeed. But I will try -to make clearer exactly what I mean by it, by mentioning a ground on -which I imagine it might perhaps be disputed.</p> - -<p>The object of which I have spoken as <i>the</i> object, about which, in -each particular case, such a judgment as this always is a judgment, -is, of course, always an object of the kind which some philosophers -would call a sensation, and others would call a sense-datum. Whether -all philosophers, when they talk of sensations, mean to include among -them such objects as these, I do not know. Some, who have given a great -deal of attention to the subject, and for whom I have a great respect, -talk of sensations in such a way, that I cannot be sure what they are -talking about at all or whether there are such things. But many, I -think, undoubtedly do mean to include such subjects as these. No doubt, -in general, when they call them sensations, they mean to attribute to -them properties, which it seems to me extremely doubtful whether they -possess. And perhaps even those who call them sense-data, may, in part, -be attributing to them properties which it may be doubtful whether -they possess. If we want to define a sensation or a sense-datum, in a -manner which will leave it not open to doubt what sort of things we are -talking of, and that there are such things, I do not know that we can -do it better than by saying that sense-data are the sort of things, -<i>about</i> which such judgments<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> as these always seem to be made—the sort -of things which seem to be the real or ultimate subjects of all such -judgments. Such a way of defining how the term "sense-datum" is used, -may not seem very satisfactory; but I am inclined to think it may be as -satisfactory as any which can be found. And it is certainly calculated -to obviate some misunderstandings which may arise; since everybody can -see, I think, what the thing is which I am describing as <i>the</i> thing -about which he is making his judgment, when he judges "That is an -inkstand," and that there is such a thing, even if he does not agree -that this description applies to it.</p> - -<p>I can, in fact, imagine that some of those who would call this thing a -sensation would deny that my judgment is <i>about</i> it at all. It would -sometimes be spoken of as the sensation which mediates my perception -of this inkstand in this instance. And I can imagine that some of -those who would so speak of it might be inclined to say that when -I judge "This is an inkstand," my judgment is about this inkstand -which I perceive, and not, in any sense at all, about the sensation -which mediates my perception of it. They may perhaps imagine that the -sensation mediates my perception of the inkstand only in the sense -that it brings the inkstand before my mind in such a way that, once it -is before my mind, I can make a judgment about it, which is <i>not</i> a -judgment about the mediating sensation at all; and that such a judgment -is the one I am actually expressing when I say "This is an inkstand." -Such a view, if it is held, seems to me to be quite certainly false, -and is what I have intended to deny. And perhaps I can put most clearly -the reason why it seems to me false, by saying that, if (which may -be doubted) there is anything which is this inkstand, that thing is -certainly not given to me independently of this sense-datum, in such -a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> sense that I can possibly make a judgment about it which is <i>not</i> -a judgment about this sense-datum. I am not, of course, denying that -I do perceive this inkstand, and that my judgment is, in a sense, a -judgment about it. Both these things seem to me to be quite obviously -true. I am only maintaining that my judgment is <i>also,</i> in another -sense, a judgment about this sense-datum which mediates my perception -of the inkstand. Those who say that this sense-datum does mediate my -perception of the inkstand, would, of course, admit that my perception -of the inkstand is, in a sense, dependent upon the sense-datum; that -it is dependent is implied in the mere statement that it is mediated -by it. But it might be maintained that it is dependent on it only in -the sense in which, when the idea of one object is called up in my -mind, through association, by the idea of another, the idea which is -called up is dependent on the idea which calls it up. What I wish to -maintain, and what seems to me to be quite certainly true, is that my -perception of this inkstand is dependent on this sense-datum, in a -quite different and far more intimate sense than this. It is dependent -on it in the sense that, if there is anything which is this inkstand, -then, in perceiving that thing, I am knowing it <i>only</i> as <i>the</i> thing -which stands in a certain relation to this sense-datum. When the idea -of one object is called up in my mind by the idea of another, I do -not know the second object <i>only</i> as <i>the</i> thing which has a certain -relation to the first: on the contrary, I can make a judgment about the -second object, which is not a judgment about the first. And similarly -in the case of two sense-data which are presented to me simultaneously, -I do not know the one <i>only</i> as a thing which has a certain relation to -the other. But in the case of this sense-datum and this inkstand the -case seems to me to be plainly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> quite different. If there be a thing -which is this inkstand at all, it is certainly <i>only</i> known to me as -<i>the</i> thing which stands in a certain relation to this sense-datum. It -is not given to me, in the sense in which this sense-datum is given. -If there be such a thing at all, it is quite certainly only known to -me by description, in the sense in which Mr. Russell uses that phrase; -and the description by which it is known is that of being <i>the</i> thing -which stands to this sense-datum in a certain relation. That is to -say, when I make such a judgment as "This inkstand is a good big one"; -what I am really judging is: "There is a thing which stands to <i>this</i> -in a certain relation, and which is an inkstand, and that thing is -a good big one"—where "<i>this</i>" stands for this presented object. I -am referring to or identifying the thing which is this inkstand, if -there be such a thing at all, only as the thing which stands to this -sense-datum in a certain relation; and hence my judgment, though in -one sense it may be said to be a judgment about the inkstand, is quite -certainly also, in another sense, a judgment about this sense-datum. -This seems to me so clear, that I wonder how anyone can deny it; and -perhaps nobody would. But I cannot help thinking that it is not clear -to everybody; partly because, so far as I can make out, nobody before -Mr. Russell had pointed out the extreme difference there is between a -judgment about a thing known only by description to the individual who -makes the judgment, and a judgment about a thing not known to him only -in this way; and partly because so many people seem still utterly to -have failed to understand what the distinction is which he expresses in -this way. I will try to make the point clear, in a slightly different -way. Suppose I am seeing two coins, lying side by side, and am not -perceiving them in any other way except by sight.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> It will be plain to -everybody, I think, that, when I identify the one as "This one" and -the other as "That one," I identify them only by reference to the two -visual presented objects, which correspond respectively to the one and -to the other. But what may not, I think, be realised, is that the sense -in which I identify them by reference to the corresponding sense-data, -is one which involves that every judgment which I make about the one -is a judgment about the sense-datum which corresponds to it, and every -judgment I make about the other, a judgment about the sense-datum which -corresponds to <i>it</i>: I simply cannot make a judgment about either, -which is not a judgment about the corresponding sense-datum. But if the -two coins were given to me, in the sense in which the two sense-data -are, this would certainly not be the case. I can identify and -distinguish the two sense-data <i>directly,</i> this as this one, and that -as that one: I do not need to identify either as <i>the</i> thing which has -this relation to this other thing. But I certainly cannot thus directly -identify the two coins. I have not four things presented to me (1) -<i>this</i> sense-datum, (2) <i>that</i> sense-datum, (3) <i>this</i> coin, and (4) -<i>that</i> coin, but two only<i>—this</i> sense-datum and <i>that</i> sense-datum. -When, therefore, I judge "<i>This</i> is a coin," my judgment is certainly -a judgment about the one sense-datum, and when I judge "And <i>that</i> -is also a coin," it is certainly a judgment about the other. Only, -in spite of what my language might seem to imply, I am certainly not -judging either of the one sense-datum that it is a whole coin, nor yet -of the other that it is one.</p> - -<p>This, then, seems to me fundamentally certain about judgments of this -kind. Whenever we make such a judgment we can easily pick out an object -(whether we call it a sensation or a sense-datum, or not), which is, -in an easily intelligible sense, <i>the</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> object which is the real or -ultimate subject of our judgment; and yet, in many cases at all events, -what we are judging with regard to this object is certainly not that it -is an object of the kind, for which the term which appears to express -the predicate of our judgment is a name.</p> - -<p>But if this be so, what is it that I am judging, in all such cases, -about the presented object, which is the real or ultimate subject of my -judgment? It is at this point that we come to questions which seem to -me to be really uncertain and difficult to answer.</p> - -<p>To begin with, there is one answer which is naturally suggested by the -reason I have given for saying that, in this case, it is quite obvious -that I am not judging, with regard to this presented object, that -<i>it</i> is an inkstand, whereas it is not in the same way, quite obvious -that, in making such a judgment as "This is a soap-bubble" or "This is -a drop of water," I may not be judging, of the object about which my -judgment is, that that very object really is a soap-bubble or a drop -of water. The reason I gave is that it is quite obvious that I do not -take this presented object to be a <i>whole</i> inkstand: that, at most, I -only take it to be part of the surface of an inkstand. And this reason -naturally suggests that the true answer to our question may be that -what I am judging of the presented object is just that it is a part of -the surface of an inkstand. This answer seems to me to be obviously on -quite a different level from the suggestion that I am judging it really -to be an inkstand. It is not childishly obvious that I am not judging -it to be part of the surface of an inkstand, as it is that I am not -judging it to be an inkstand—a whole one.</p> - -<p>On this view, when I say such things as "That is an inkstand," "That -is a door," "This is a coin," these expressions would really only be -a loose way of saying "That is part of the surface of an inkstand,"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> -"That is part of the surface of a door," "This is part of the surface -of a coin." And there would, I think, plainly be nothing surprising -in the fact that we should use language thus loosely. What, at first -sight, appears to be a paradox, namely that, whereas I appear to be -asserting of a given thing that it is of a certain kind, I am not -really asserting of the thing in question that it is of that kind at -all, would be susceptible of an easy explanation. And moreover, if -this view were true, it would offer an excellent illustration of the -difference between a thing known only by description and a thing not so -known, and would show how entirely free from mystery that distinction -is. On this view, when I judge "That inkstand is a good big one" I -shall in effect be judging: "There is one and only one inkstand of -which <i>this</i> is part of the surface, and the inkstand of which this is -true is a good big one." It would be quite clear that the part of the -surface of the inkstand was given to me in a sense in which the whole -was not, just as it is in fact clear that I do now <i>"see"</i> this part -of the surface of this inkstand, in a sense in which I do <i>not</i> "see" -the whole; and that my judgment, while it is, in fact, <i>about</i> both the -whole inkstand, and also <i>about</i> one particular part of its surface, is -<i>about</i> them in two entirely different senses.</p> - -<p>This view is one, which it is at first sight, I think, very natural to -suppose to be true. But before giving the reasons, why, nevertheless, -it seems to me extremely doubtful, I think it is desirable to try -to explain more precisely what I mean by it. The word "part" is one -which is often used extremely vaguely in philosophy; and I can imagine -that some people would be willing to assent to the proposition that -this sense-datum really is, in some sense or other, a "part" of this -inkstand, and that what I am judging with regard to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> it, when I -judge "This is an inkstand," is, in effect, "There is an inkstand, -of which <i>this</i> is a part," who would be far from allowing that this -can possibly be what I am judging, when once they understand what the -sense is in which I am here using the word "part." What this sense -is, I am quite unable to define; but I hope I may be able to make my -meaning sufficiently clear, by giving instances of things which are -undoubtedly "parts" of other things in the sense in question. There is, -it seems to me, a sense of the word "part," in which we all constantly -use the word with perfect precision, and, which, therefore, we all -understand very well, however little we may be able to define it. It is -the sense in which the trunk of any tree is undoubtedly a part of that -tree; in which this finger of mine is undoubtedly a part of my hand, -and my hand a part of my body. This is a sense in which every part -of a material thing or physical object is itself a material thing or -physical object; and it is, so far as I can see, the only proper sense -in which a material thing can be said to have parts. The view which I -wish to discuss is the view that I am judging this presented object to -be a part of an inkstand, in this sense. And the nature of the view -can perhaps be brought out more clearly, by mentioning one important -corollary which would follow from it. I am, of course, at this moment, -seeing many parts of the surface of this inkstand. But all these -parts, except one, are, in fact, themselves parts of that one. That -one is the one of which we should naturally speak as "<i>the</i> part of -the surface that I am now seeing" or as "<i>this</i> part of the surface of -this inkstand." There is only one part of the surface of this inkstand, -which does thus contain, as parts, all the other parts that I am now -seeing. And, if it were true that I am judging this presented object to -be a part of the surface of an inkstand at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> all, in the sense I mean, -it would follow that this presented object must, if my judgment "This -is an inkstand" be true (as it certainly is), be identical with this -part, which contains all the other parts which I am seeing; since there -is plainly no other part with which it could possibly be identified. -That is to say, if I am really judging of this presented object that it -is part of the surface of an inkstand, in the sense I mean, it must be -the case that everything which is true of what I should call "this part -of the surface of this inkstand" is, in fact, true of this presented -object.</p> - -<p>This view, therefore, that what we are judging of the ultimate subject -of our judgment, when we judge "This is a so-and-so," is, in general, -merely that the subject in question is a <i>part</i> of a thing of the -kind in question, can, I think, be most clearly discussed, by asking -whether, in this case, this presented object can really be identical -with this part of the surface of this inkstand. If it can't, then most -certainly I am not judging of it that it is a part of the surface of an -inkstand at all. For my judgment, whatever it is, is true. And yet, if -this presented object is not identical with this part of the surface of -this inkstand, it certainly is not a part of an inkstand at all; since -there is no other part, either of this inkstand or of any other, with -which it could possibly be supposed to be identical.</p> - -<p>Can we, then, hold that this sense-datum really is identical with this -part of the surface of this inkstand? That everything which is true of -the one is true of the other?</p> - -<p>An enormous number of very familiar arguments have been used by various -philosophers, which, if they were sound, would show that we can not. -Some of these arguments seem to me to be quite clearly not sound—all, -for instance, which rest either on the assumption that this sense-datum -can only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> exist so long as it is perceived, or on the assumption that -it can only exist so long as it is perceived <i>by me.</i> Of others I -suspect that they may have some force, though I am quite unable to see -that they have any. Such, for instance, are all those which assume -either that this sense-datum is a sensation or feeling of mine, in a -sense which includes the assertion that it is dependent on my mind -in the very same sense in which my perception of it obviously is so; -or that it is causally dependent on my body in the sense in which my -perception of it admittedly is so. But others do seem to me to have -great force. I will, however, confine myself to trying to state one, -which seems to me to have as much as any. It will be found that this -one involves an assumption, which does seem to me to have great force, -but which yet seems to me to be doubtful. So far as I know, all good -arguments against the view that this sense-datum really is identical -with this part of the surface of the inkstand, do involve this same -assumption, and have no more force than it has. But in this, of course, -I may be wrong. Perhaps some one will be able to point out an argument, -which is obviously quite independent of it, and which yet has force.</p> - -<p>The argument I mean involves considerations which are exceedingly -familiar, so familiar that I am afraid every one may be sick of -hearing them alluded to. But, in spite of this fact, it seems to -me not quite easy to put it quite precisely, in a way which will -distinguish it clearly from other arguments involving the same familiar -considerations, but which do not seem to me to be equally cogent. I -want, therefore, to try to put it with a degree of precision, which -will prevent irrelevant objections from being made to it—objections -which would, I think, be relevant against some of these other -arguments, but are not, I think, relevant against it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span></p> - -<p>The fact is that we all, exceedingly commonly, when, at each of two -times, separated by a longer or shorter interval, we see a part of the -surface of a material thing, in the sense in which I am now seeing -this part of the surface of this inkstand, or when at one time we see -such a surface and at another perceive one by touch, make, on the -second occasion, the judgment "<i>This</i> part of a surface is the <i>same</i> -part of the surface of the same thing, as that which I was seeing -(or perceiving by touch) just now." How commonly we all do this can -scarcely be exaggerated. I look at this inkstand, and then I look -again, and on the second occasion I judge "This part of the surface -of this inkstand is the same as, or at least contains a part which is -the same as a part of, the part of its surface which I was seeing just -now." Or I look at this finger and then I touch it, and I judge, on the -second occasion, "This part of the surface of this finger is the same -as one of those I was seeing just now." We all thus constantly identify -a part of a surface of a material thing which we are perceiving at one -time with a part which we <i>were</i> perceiving at another.</p> - -<p>Now, when we do this—when we judge "This is the <i>same</i> part of the -same thing as I was seeing or touching just now," we, of course, do -not mean to exclude the possibility that the part in question may -have changed during the interval; that it is really different, on the -second occasion, either in shape or size or quality, or in all three, -from what it was on the first. That is to say, the sense of sameness -which we are here concerned with is one which clearly does not exclude -change. We may even be prepared to assert, on general grounds, in all -such cases, that the surface in question certainly must have changed. -But nevertheless there is a great difference in one respect, between -two kinds of such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> cases, both of which occur exceedingly commonly. -If I watch somebody blowing air into a child's balloon, it constantly -happens, at certain stages in the process, that I judge with regard -to the part of the surface which I am seeing at that stage, not only -that it <i>is</i> larger than it was at an earlier stage, but that it is -<i>perceptibly</i> larger. Or, if I pull the face of an india-rubber doll, -I may judge at a certain stage in the process that the patch of red -colour on its cheek not only is different in shape from what it was -at the beginning, but is <i>perceptibly</i> so; it may, for instance, be a -perceptibly flatter ellipse than it was to start with. Or, if I watch -a person blushing, I may judge at a certain stage that a certain part -of the surface of his face not only is different in colour from what -it was, when I saw it before he began to blush, but is <i>perceptibly</i> -so—perceptibly redder. In enormous numbers of cases we do thus judge -of a surface seen at a given time that it is thus <i>perceptibly</i> -different in size, or in shape, or in colour, from what it was when we -saw it before. But cases are at least equally numerous in which, though -we might, on general grounds be prepared to assert that it <i>must</i> have -changed in some respect, we should not be prepared to assert that it -had, in any respect whatever, changed <i>perceptibly.</i> Of this part -of this surface of this inkstand, for instance, I am certainly not -prepared to assert that it is now perceptibly different in any respect -from what it was when I saw it just now. And similar cases are so -numerous that I need not give further instances. We can, therefore, -divide cases, in which we judge, of a part of a surface which we are -seeing, "This is the same part of the surface of the same material -thing as the one I saw just now," into cases where we should also judge -"But it is perceptibly different from what it was then," and cases in -which, even though we might assert "It <i>must</i> be different," we are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> -certainly not prepared to assert that it is <i>perceptibly</i> so.</p> - -<p>But now let us consider the cases in which we are not prepared to -assert that the surface in question has changed perceptibly. The -strange fact, from which the argument I mean is drawn, is that, in a -very large number of such cases, it seems as if it were unmistakably -true that the presented object, about which we are making our judgment -when we talk of "This surface" at the later time, <i>is</i> perceptibly -different, from that about which we are making it when we talk of the -surface I saw just now. If, at the later time, I am at a sufficiently -greater distance from the surface, the presented object which -corresponds to it at the time seems to be perceptibly smaller, than -the one which corresponded to it before. If I am looking at it from -a sufficiently oblique angle, the later presented object often seems -to be perceptibly different in shape—a perceptibly flatter ellipse, -for instance. If I am looking at it, with blue spectacles on, when -formerly I had none, the later presented object seems to be perceptibly -different in colour from the earlier one. If I am perceiving it by -touch alone, whereas formerly I was perceiving it by sight alone, -the later presented object seems to be perceptibly different from -the earlier, in respect of the fact that it is not coloured at all, -whereas the earlier was, and that, on the other hand, it has certain -tactual qualities, which the earlier had not got. All this seems to -be as plain as it can be, and yet it makes absolutely no difference -to the fact that of the surface in question we are <i>not</i> prepared to -judge that it is perceptibly different from what it was. Sometimes, -of course, where there seems to be no doubt that the later presented -object is perceptibly different from the earlier, we may not notice -that it is so. But even where we do notice the apparent difference, we -do<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> still continue to judge of the surface in question: This surface -is not, so far as I can tell with certainty by perception, in any way -different from what it was when I saw it or touched it just now; I am -<i>not</i> prepared to assert that it has changed perceptibly. It seems, -therefore, to be absolutely impossible that the surface seen at the -later time should be identical with the object presented then, and the -surface seen at the earlier identical with the object presented then, -for the simple reason that, whereas with regard to the later seen -surface I am not prepared to judge that it is in any way perceptibly -different from that seen earlier, it seems that with regard to the -later sense-datum I cannot fail to judge that it <i>is</i> perceptibly -different from the earlier one: the fact that they are perceptibly -different simply stares me in the face. It seems, in short, that when, -in such a case, I judge: "This surface is not, so far as I can tell, -perceptibly different from the one I saw just now," I cannot possibly -be judging of the presented object "<i>This</i> is not, so far as I can -tell, perceptibly different from that object which was presented to -me just now," for the simple reason that I <i>can</i> tell, as certainly, -almost, as I can tell anything, that it is perceptibly different.</p> - -<p>That is the argument, as well as I can put it, for saying that this -presented object, is <i>not</i> identical with this part of the surface of -this inkstand; and that, therefore, when I judge "This is part of the -surface of an inkstand," I am not judging of this presented object, -which nevertheless is the ultimate subject of my judgment, that <i>it</i> is -part of the surface of an inkstand. And this argument does seem to me -to be a very powerful one.</p> - -<p>But nevertheless it does not seem to me to be quite conclusive, because -it rests on an assumption, which, though it seems to me to have great -force, does not seem to me quite certain. The assumption<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> I mean is the -assumption that, in such cases as those I have spoken of, the later -presented object really is perceptibly different from the earlier. This -assumption has, if I am not mistaken, seemed to many philosophers to -be quite unquestionable; they have never even thought of questioning -it; and I own that it used to be so with me. And I am still not sure -that I may not be talking sheer nonsense in suggesting that it can -be questioned. But, if I am, I am no longer able to see that I am. -What now seems to me to be possible is that the sense-datum which -corresponds to a tree, which I am seeing, when I am a mile off, may not -really be perceived to <i>be</i> smaller than the one, which corresponds -to the same tree, when I see it from a distance of only a hundred -yards, but that it is only perceived to <i>seem</i> smaller; that the -sense-datum which corresponds to a penny, which I am seeing obliquely, -is not really perceived to <i>be</i> different in shape from that which -corresponded to the penny, when I was straight in front of it, but is -only perceived to <i>seem</i> different—that all that is perceived is that -the one <i>seems</i> elliptical and the other circular; that the sense-datum -presented to me when I have the blue spectacles on is not perceived -to <i>be</i> different in colour from the one presented to me when I have -not, but only to <i>seem</i> so; and finally that the sense-datum presented -when I touch this finger is not perceived to <i>be</i> different in any way -from that presented to me when I see it, but only to <i>seem</i> so that -I do not perceive the one to be coloured and the other not to be so, -but only that the one <i>seems</i> coloured and the other not. If such a -view is to be possible, we shall have, of course, to maintain that -the kind of experience which I have expressed by saying one <i>seems</i> -different from the other<i>—"seems</i> circular," <i>"seems</i> blue," <i>"seems</i> -coloured," and so on—involves an ultimate, not further analysable, -kind<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> of psychological relation, not to be identified either with that -involved in being "perceived" to be so and so, or with that involved -in being "judged" to be so and so; since a presented object might, in -this sense, <i>seem</i> to be elliptical, <i>seem</i> to be blue, etc., when it -is neither perceived to be so, nor judged to be so. But there seems to -me to be no reason why there should not be such an ultimate relation. -The great objection to such a view seems to me to be the difficulty of -believing that I don't actually perceive this sense-datum to <i>be</i> red, -for instance, and that other to <i>be</i> elliptical; that I only perceive, -in many cases, that it <i>seems</i> so. I cannot, however, now persuade -myself that it is quite clear that I do perceive it to <i>be</i> so. And, -if I don't, then it seems really possible that this presented object -really is identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand; -since, when I judge, as in the cases supposed, that the surface in -question is <i>not</i>, so far as I can tell, perceptibly different from -what it was, I might really be judging of the two sense-data that they -also were not, so far as I can tell, perceptibly different, the only -difference between the two that <i>is</i> perceptible, being that the one -<i>seems</i> to be of a certain size, shape or colour, and the other to -be of a different and incompatible size, shape or colour. Of course, -in those cases, as in that of the balloon being blown up, where I -"perceive" that the surface has changed, <i>e.g.</i> in size, it would have -to be admitted that I do perceive of the two sense-data not merely that -they <i>seem</i> different in size, but that they <i>are</i> so. But I think it -would be possible to maintain that the sense in which, in these cases, -I "perceive" them to <i>be</i> different, is a different one from that in -which, both in these and in the others, I perceive them to <i>seem</i> so.</p> - -<p>Possibly in making this suggestion that sense-data, in cases where most -philosophers have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> assumed unhesitatingly that they are <i>perceived</i> to -be different, are only really perceived to <i>seem</i> different, I am, as I -said, talking sheer nonsense, though I cannot, at the moment, see that -I am. And possibly, even if this suggestion itself is not nonsense, -even if it is true, there may be other fatal objections to the view -that this presented object really is identical with this part of the -surface of this inkstand. But what seems to me certain is that, unless -this suggestion is true, then this presented object is certainly <i>not</i> -identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand. And since it -is doubtful whether it is not nonsense, and still more doubtful whether -it is true, it must, I think, be admitted to be highly doubtful whether -the two <i>are</i> identical. But, if they are not identical, then what I am -judging with regard to this presented object, when I judge "This is an -inkstand," is certainly <i>not</i> that it is itself part of the surface of -an inkstand; and hence, it is worth while to inquire further, what, if -I am not judging this, I <i>can</i> be judging with regard to it.</p> - -<p>And here, I think, the first natural suggestion to make is that just -as, when I talk of "this inkstand," what I seem really to mean is -"<i>the</i> inkstand of which <i>this</i> is part of the surface," so that the -inkstand is only known to me by description as the inkstand of which -this material surface is part of the surface, so again when I talk of -"this material surface," what I really mean is "<i>the</i> material surface -to which <i>this</i> (presented object) has a certain relation," so that -this surface is, in its turn, only known to me by description as <i>the</i> -surface which has a certain relation to this presented object. If that -were so, then what I should be judging of this presented object, when I -judge "This is part of the surface of an inkstand," would be not that -it is itself such a part, but that <i>the</i> thing which stands to it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> in -a certain relation is such a part: in short, what I should be judging -with regard to <i>it,</i> would be "There's one thing and one only which -stands to <i>this</i> in <i>this</i> relation, and the thing which does so is -part of the surface of an inkstand."</p> - -<p>But if we are to adopt the view that something of this sort is what we -are judging, there occurs at once the pressing question: What on earth -can the relation be with regard to which we are judging, that one and -only one thing stands in it to this presented object? And this is a -question to which, so far as I know, none of those philosophers, who -<i>both</i> hold (as many do) that this presented object is <i>not</i> identical -with this part of the surface of this inkstand, <i>and</i> also that there -really is something of which it could be truly predicated that it is -this part of the surface of this inkstand (that is to say, who reject -all views of the Mill-Russell type), have given anything like a clear -answer. It does not seem to have occurred to them that it requires an -answer, chiefly, I think, because it has not occurred to them to ask -what we can be judging when we make judgments of this sort. There are -only two answers, that I can think of, which might be suggested with -any plausibility.</p> - -<p>Many philosophers, who take the view that the presented objects about -which we make these judgments are sensations of ours, and some even who -do not, are in the habit of talking of <i>"the</i> causes" of these objects -as if we knew, in the case of each, that it had one and only one cause; -and many of them seem to think that this part of the surface of this -inkstand could be correctly described as <i>the</i> cause of this presented -object. They suggest, therefore, the view that what I am judging in -this case might be: "This presented object has one and only one cause, -and that cause is part of the surface of an inkstand." It seems to me -quite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> obvious that <i>this</i> view, at all events, is utterly untenable. I -do not believe for a moment, nor does any one, and certainly therefore -do not judge, that this presented object has <i>only</i> one cause: I -believe that it has a whole series of different causes. I do, in fact, -believe that this part of the surface of this inkstand is <i>one</i> among -the causes of my perception of this presented object: that seems to -me to be a very well established scientific proposition. And I am -prepared to admit that there <i>may</i> be good reasons for thinking that -it is one among the causes of this presented object itself, though I -cannot myself see that there are any. But that it is the <i>only</i> cause -of this presented object I certainly do not believe, nor, I think, -does anybody, and hence my judgment certainly cannot be "<i>The</i> cause -of this is part of the surface of an inkstand." It might no doubt, be -possible to define some <i>kind</i> of causal relation, such that it might -be plausibly held that it and it alone causes this presented object <i>in -that particular way.</i> But any such definition would, so far as I can -see, be necessarily very complicated. And, even when we have got it, -it seems to me it would be highly improbable we could truly say that -what we are judging in these cases is: "This presented object has one -and only one cause, of this special kind." Still, I do not wish to deny -that some such view may <i>possibly</i> be true.</p> - -<p>The only other suggestion I can make is that there may be some -ultimate, not further definable relation, which we might for instance, -call the relation of "being a manifestation of," such that we might -conceivably be judging: "There is one and only one thing of which this -presented object is a manifestation, and <i>that</i> thing is part of the -surface of an inkstand." And here again, it seems to me just possible -that this <i>may</i> be a true account of what we are judging; only I cannot -find the slightest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> sign that I am in fact aware of any such relation.</p> - -<p>Possibly other suggestions could be made as to what the relation is, -with regard to which it could be plausibly supposed that in all cases, -where we make these judgments we are in fact judging of the presented -object "There is one and only one thing which stands to this object in -<i>this</i> relation." But it seems to me at least very doubtful whether -there is any such relation at all; whether, therefore, our judgment -really is of this form, and whether therefore, this part of the surface -of this inkstand really is known to me by description as <i>the</i> thing -which stands in a certain relation to this presented object. But if it -isn't, and if, also, we cannot take the view that what I am judging -is that this presented object <i>itself</i> is a part of the surface of an -inkstand, there would seem to be no possible alternative but that we -must take some view of what I have called the Mill-Russell type. Views -of this type, if I understand them rightly, are distinguished from -those which I have hitherto considered, by the fact that, according to -them, there is nothing whatever in the Universe of which it could truly -be predicated that it is this part of the surface of this inkstand, -or indeed that it is <i>a</i> part of the surface of an inkstand, or an -inkstand, at all. They hold, in short, that though there are plenty of -material things in the Universe, there is nothing in it of which it -could truly be asserted that <i>it</i> is a material thing: that, though, -when I assert "This is an inkstand," my assertion is true, and is such -that it follows from it that there is in the Universe at least one -inkstand, and, therefore, at least one material thing, yet it does not -follow from it that there is anything which is a material thing. When -I judge "This is an inkstand," I am judging this presented object to -possess a certain property, which is such that, if there are things, -which possess<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> that property, there are inkstands and material things, -but which is such that nothing which possesses it is itself a material -thing; so that in judging that there are material things, we are really -always judging of some <i>other</i> property, which is not that of being a -material thing, that there are things which possess <i>it.</i> It seems to -me quite possible, of course, that some view of this type is the true -one. Indeed, this paper may be regarded, if you like, as an argument in -favour of the proposition that some such view <i>must</i> be true. Certainly -one of my main objects in writing it was to put as plainly as I can -some grave difficulties which seem to me to stand in the way of any -other view; in the hope that some of those, who reject all views of -the Mill-Russell type, may explain clearly which of the alternatives -I have suggested they would adopt, or whether, perhaps, some other -which has not occurred to me. It does not seem to me to be always -sufficiently realised how difficult it is to find <i>any</i> answer to my -question "What are we judging in these cases?" to which there are not -very grave objections, unless we adopt an answer of the Mill-Russell -type. That an answer of this type <i>is</i> the true one, I am not myself, -in spite of these objections, by any means convinced. The truth is I am -completely puzzled as to what the true answer can be. At the present -moment, I am rather inclined to favour the view that what I am judging -of this presented object is that it is itself a part of the surface of -an inkstand—that, therefore, it really is identical with this part of -the surface of this inkstand, in spite of the fact that this involves -the view that, where, hitherto, I have always supposed myself to be -perceiving of two presented objects that they really were different, I -was, in fact, only perceiving that they <i>seemed</i> to be different. But, -as I have said, it seems to me quite possible that this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> view is, as I -have hitherto supposed, sheer nonsense; and, in any case, there are, no -doubt, other serious objections to the view that this presented object -is this part of the surface of this inkstand.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="THE_CONCEPTION_OF_INTRINSIC_VALUE" id="THE_CONCEPTION_OF_INTRINSIC_VALUE">THE CONCEPTION OF INTRINSIC VALUE</a></h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>My main object in this paper is to try to define more precisely the -most important question, which, so far as I can see, is really at issue -when it is disputed with regard to any predicate of value, whether it -is or is not a "subjective" predicate. There are three chief cases in -which this controversy is apt to arise. It arises, first, with regard -to the conceptions of "right" and "wrong," and the closely allied -conception of "duty" or "what <i>ought</i> to be done." It arises, secondly, -with regard to "good" and "evil," in some sense of those words in which -the conceptions for which they stand are certainly quite distinct from -the conceptions of "right" and "wrong," but in which nevertheless it is -undeniable that ethics has to deal with them. And it arises, lastly, -with regard to certain aesthetic conceptions, such as "beautiful" and -"ugly;" or "good" and "bad," in the sense in which these words are -applied to works of art, and in which, therefore, the question what is -good and bad is a question not for ethics but for aesthetics.</p> - -<p>In all three cases there are people who maintain that the predicates -in question are purely "subjective," in a sense which can, I think, -be fairly easily defined. I am not here going to attempt a perfectly -accurate definition of the sense in question; but, as the term -"subjective" is so desperately ambiguous, I had better try to indicate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> -roughly the sense I am thinking of. Take the word "beautiful" for -example. There is a sense of the term "subjective," such that to say -that "beautiful" stands for a subjective predicate, means, roughly, -that any statement of the form "This is beautiful" merely expresses a -psychological assertion to the effect that some particular individual -or class of individuals either actually has, or would, under certain -circumstances, have, a certain kind of mental attitude towards the -thing in question. And what I mean by "having a mental attitude" -towards a thing, can be best explained by saying that to desire a thing -is to have one kind of mental attitude towards it, to be pleased with -it is to have another, to will it is to have another; and in short -that to have any kind of feeling or emotion <i>towards</i> it is to have a -certain mental attitude towards it—a different one in each case. Thus -anyone who holds that when we say that a thing is beautiful, what we -<i>mean</i> is merely that we ourselves or some particular class of people -actually do, or would under certain circumstances, have, or permanently -have, a certain feeling towards the thing in question, is taking a -"subjective" view of beauty.</p> - -<p>But in all three cases there are also a good many people who hold that -the predicates in question are not, in this sense "subjective"; and I -think that those who hold this are apt to speak as if the view which -they wish to maintain in opposition to it consisted simply and solely -in holding its contradictory—in holding, that is, that the predicates -in question are "objective," where "objective" simply means the same as -"not subjective." But in fact I think this is hardly ever really the -case. In the case of goodness and beauty, what such people are really -anxious to maintain is by no means merely that these conceptions are -"objective," but that, besides being "objective," they are also, in -a sense<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> which I shall try to explain, "intrinsic" kinds of value. -It is this conviction—the conviction that goodness and beauty are -<i>intrinsic</i> kinds of value, which is, I think, the strongest ground of -their objection to any subjective view. And indeed, when they speak -of the "objectivity" of these conceptions, what they have in mind is, -I believe, always a conception which has no proper right to be called -"objectivity," since it includes as an essential part this other -characteristic which I propose to call that of being an "intrinsic" -kind of value.</p> - -<p>The truth is, I believe, that though, from the proposition that a -particular kind of value is "intrinsic" it does follow that it must -be "objective," the converse implication by no means holds, but on -the contrary it is perfectly easy to conceive theories of <i>e.g.</i> -"goodness," according to which goodness would, in the strictest sense, -be "objective," and yet would not be "intrinsic." There is, therefore, -a very important difference between the conception of "objectivity," -and that which I will call "internality" but yet, if I am not mistaken, -when people talk about the "objectivity" of any kind of value, they -almost always confuse the two, owing to the fact that most of those -who deny the "internality" of a given kind of value, also assert its -"subjectivity." How great the difference is, and that it is a fact that -those who maintain the "objectivity" of goodness do, as a rule, mean by -this not mere "objectivity," but "internality," as well, can, I think, -be best brought out by considering an instance of a theory, according -to which goodness would be objective but would not be intrinsic.</p> - -<p>Let us suppose it to be held, for instance, that what is meant by -saying that one type of human being A is "better" than another type B, -is merely that the course of evolution tends to increase the numbers of -type A and to decrease those of type<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> B. Such a view has, in fact, been -often suggested, even if it has not been held in this exact form; it -amounts merely to the familiar suggestion that "better" means "better -fitted to survive." Obviously "better," on this interpretation of its -meaning, is in no sense a "subjective" conception: the conception of -belonging to a type which tends to be favoured by the struggle for -existence more than another is as "objective" as any conception can be. -But yet, if I am not mistaken, all those who object to a subjective -view of "goodness," and insist upon its "objectivity," would object -just as strongly to this interpretation of its meaning as to any -"subjective" interpretation. Obviously, therefore, what they are really -anxious to contend for is not merely that goodness is "objective," -since they are here objecting to a theory which is "objective;" but -something else. And this something else is, I think, certainly just -that it is "intrinsic"—a character which is just as incompatible -with this objective evolutionary interpretation as with any and every -subjective interpretation. For if you say that to call type A "better" -than type B means merely that it is more favoured in the struggle for -existence, it follows that the being "better" is a predicate which does -<i>not depend merely on the intrinsic nature of A and B respectively.</i> -On the contrary, although here and now A may be more favoured than B, -it is obvious that under other circumstances or with different natural -laws the very same type B might be more favoured than A, so that the -very same type which, under one set of circumstances, is better than -B, would, under another set, be worse. Here, then, we have a case -where an interpretation of "goodness," which does make it "objective," -is incompatible with its being "intrinsic." And it is just this same -fact—the fact that, on any "subjective" interpretation, the very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> same -kind of thing which, under some circumstances, is better than another, -would, under others, be worse—which constitutes, so far as I can -see, the fundamental objection to all "subjective" interpretations. -Obviously, therefore, to express this objection by saying that goodness -is "objective" is very incorrect; since goodness might quite well be -"objective" and yet <i>not</i> possess the very characteristic which it is -mainly wished to assert that it has.</p> - -<p>In the case, therefore, of ethical and aesthetic "goodness," I think -that what those who contend for the "objectivity" of these conceptions -really wish to contend for is not mere "objectivity" at all, but -principally and essentially that they are <i>intrinsic</i> kinds of value. -But in the case of "right" and "wrong" and "duty," the same cannot -be said, because many of those who object to the view that these -conceptions are "subjective," nevertheless do not hold that they are -"intrinsic." We cannot, therefore, say that what those who contend for -the "objectivity" of right and wrong really mean is always chiefly -that those conceptions are intrinsic, but we can, I think, say that -what they do mean is certainly <i>not</i> "objectivity" in this case any -more than the other; since here, just as there, it would be possible -to find certain views, which are in every sense "objective," to -which they would object just as strongly as to any subjective view. -And though what is meant by "objectivity" in this case, is not that -"right" and "wrong" are <i>themselves</i> "intrinsic," what is, I think, -meant here too is that they have a fixed relation to a kind of value -which <i>is</i> "intrinsic." It is this fixed relation to an intrinsic -kind of value, so far as I can see, which gives to right and wrong -that kind and degree of fixity and impartiality which they actually -are felt to possess, and which is what people are thinking of when -they talk of their "objectivity." Here, too, therefore,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> to talk of -the characteristic meant as "objectivity" is just as great a misnomer -as in the other cases; since though it is a characteristic which is -incompatible with any kind of "subjectivity," it is also incompatible, -for the same reason, with many kinds of "objectivity."</p> - -<p>For these reasons I think that what those who contend for the -"objectivity" of certain kinds of value, or for the "objectivity" of -judgments of value, commonly have in mind is not really "objectivity" -at all, but either that the kinds of value in question are themselves -"intrinsic," or else that they have a fixed relation to some kind that -is so. The conception upon which they really wish to lay stress is not -that of "objective value," but that of "intrinsic value," though they -confuse the two. And I think this is the case to a considerable extent -not only with the defenders of so-called "objectivity," but also with -its opponents. Many of those who hold strongly (as many do) that <i>all</i> -kinds of value are "subjective" certainly object to the so-called -"objective" view, not so much because it is <i>objective</i>, as because it -is not <i>naturalistic ox positivistic</i>—a characteristic which does -naturally follow from the contention that value is "intrinsic," but -does not follow from the mere contention that it is "objective." To a -view which is at the same time both "naturalistic" or "positivistic" -and also "objective," such as the Evolutionary view which I sketched -just now, they do not feel at all the same kind or degree of objection -as to any so-called "objective" view. With regard to so-called -"objective" views they are apt to feel not only that they are false, -but that they involve a particularly poisonous kind of falsehood—the -erecting into a "metaphysical" entity of what is really susceptible of -a simple naturalistic explanation. They feel that to hold such a view -is not merely to make a mistake, but to make a superstitious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> mistake. -They feel the same kind of contempt for those who hold it, which we -are apt to feel towards those whom we regard as grossly superstitious, -and which is felt by certain persons for what they call "metaphysics." -Obviously, therefore, what they really object to is not simply the view -that these predicates are "objective," but something else—something -which does not at all follow from the contention that they are -"objective," but which does follow from the contention that they are -"intrinsic."</p> - -<p>In disputes, therefore, as to whether particular kinds of value are -or are not "subjective," I think that the issue which is really felt -to be important, almost always by one side, and often by both, is not -really the issue between "subjective" and "non-subjective," but between -"intrinsic" and "non-intrinsic." And not only is this felt to be the -more important issue; I think it really is so. For the difference that -must be made to our view of the Universe, according as we hold that -some kinds of value are "intrinsic" or that none are, is much greater -than any which follows from a mere difference of opinion as to whether -some are "non-subjective," or all without exception "subjective." To -hold that any kinds of value are "intrinsic" entails the recognition of -a kind of predicate extremely different from any we should otherwise -have to recognise and perhaps unique; whereas it is in any case certain -that there are "objective" predicates as well as "subjective."</p> - -<p>But now what is this "internality" of which I have been speaking? -What is meant by saying with regard to a kind of value that it is -"intrinsic?" To express roughly what is meant is, I think, simple -enough; and everybody will recognise it at once, as a notion which -is constantly in people's heads; but I want to dwell upon it at some -length,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> because I know of no place where it is expressly explained and -defined, and because, though it seems very simple and fundamental, the -task of defining it precisely is by no moans easy and involves some -difficulties which I must confess that I do not know how to solve.</p> - -<p>I have already given incidentally the main idea in speaking of that -evolutionary interpretation of "goodness," according to which, as I -said, goodness would be "objective" but would not be "intrinsic." -I there used as equivalent to the assertion that 'better,' on -that definition, would not be 'intrinsic,' the assertion that the -question whether one type of being A was better than another B would -<i>not</i> depend <i>solely on the intrinsic natures of A and B,</i> but on -circumstances and the laws of nature. And I think that this phrase will -in fact suggest to everybody just what I do mean by "intrinsic" value. -We can, in fact, set up the following definition. <i>To say that a kind -of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the question whether a thing -possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the -intrinsic nature of the thing in question.</i></p> - -<p>But though this definition does, I think, convey exactly what I mean, -I want to dwell upon its meaning, partly because the conception of -'differing in intrinsic nature which I believe to be of fundamental -importance, is liable to be confused with other conceptions, and partly -because the definition involves notions, which I do not know how to -define exactly.</p> - -<p>When I say, with regard to any particular kind of value, that the -question whether and in what degree anything possesses it <i>depends -solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question</i>, I mean to say -two different things at the same time. I mean to say (1) that it is -<i>impossible</i> for what is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> strictly <i>one and the same</i> thing to possess -that kind of value at one time, or in one set of circumstances, and -<i>not</i> to possess it at another; and equally <i>impossible</i> for it to -possess it in one degree at one time, or in one set of circumstances, -and to possess it in a different degree at another, or in a different -set. This, I think, is obviously part of what is naturally conveyed by -saying that the question whether and in what degree a thing possesses -the kind of value in question always depends <i>solely</i> on the intrinsic -nature of the thing. For if <i>x</i> and <i>y</i> have different intrinsic -natures, it follows that <i>x</i> cannot be quite strictly one and the same -thing as <i>y</i>; and hence if <i>x</i> and <i>y</i> can have a different intrinsic -value, only where their intrinsic natures are different, it follows -that one and the same thing must always have the same intrinsic value. -This, then, is part of what is meant; and about this part I think I -need say no more, except to call attention to the fact that it involves -a conception, which as we shall see is also involved in the other part, -and which involves the same difficulty in both cases—I mean, the -conception which is expressed by the word 'impossible.' (2) The second -part of what is meant is that if a given thing possesses any kind of -intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not only must that same thing -possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but also -anything <i>exactly like</i> it, must, under all circumstances, possess it -in exactly the same degree. Or to put it in the corresponding negative -form: It is <i>impossible</i> that of two exactly similar things one should -possess it and the other not, or that one should possess it in one -degree, and the other in a different one.</p> - -<p>I think this second proposition also is naturally conveyed by saying -that the kind of value in question depends solely on the intrinsic -nature of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> what possesses it. For we should naturally say of two -things which were <i>exactly alike</i> intrinsically, in spite of their -being <i>two,</i> that they possessed the <i>same</i> intrinsic nature. But -it is important to call attention expressly to the fact that what -I mean by the expression 'having a different intrinsic nature' is -equivalent to 'not exactly alike' because here there is real risk of -confusion between this conception and a different one. This comes -about as follows. It is natural to suppose that the phrase 'having a -different intrinsic nature' is equivalent to the phrase 'intrinsically -different' or 'having different intrinsic properties.' But, if we do -make this identification, there is a risk of confusion. For it is -obvious that there is a sense in which, when things are exactly like, -they must be 'intrinsically different' and have different intrinsic -properties, merely because they are two. For instance, two patches of -colour may be exactly alike, in spite of the fact that each possesses a -constituent which the other does not possess, provided only that their -two constituents are exactly alike. And yet, in a certain sense, it -is obvious that the fact that each has a constituent, which the other -has not got, does constitute an intrinsic difference between them, and -implies that each has an intrinsic property which the other has not -got. And even where the two things are simple the mere fact that they -are <i>numerically</i> different does in a sense constitute an intrinsic -difference between them, and each will have at least one intrinsic -property which the other has not got—namely that of being identical -with itself. It is obvious therefore that the phrases 'intrinsically -different' and 'having different intrinsic properties' are ambiguous. -They may be used in such a sense that to say of two things that they -are intrinsically different or have different intrinsic properties does -<i>not</i> imply that they are not exactly alike, but only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> that they are -<i>numerically</i> different. Or they may be used in a sense in which two -things can be said to be intrinsically different, and to have different -intrinsic properties <i>only</i> when they are not exactly alike. It is, -therefore, extremely important to insist that when I say: Two things -can differ in intrinsic value, only when they have different intrinsic -natures, I am using the expression 'having different intrinsic natures' -in the latter sense and not the former:—in a sense in which the mere -fact that two things are two, or differ numerically, does <i>not</i> imply -that they have different intrinsic natures, but in which they can -be said to have different intrinsic natures, <i>only</i> where, besides -differing numerically, they are also <i>not</i> exactly alike.</p> - -<p>But as soon as this is explained, another risk of confusion arises -owing to the fact that when people contrast mere numerical difference -with a kind of intrinsic difference, which is <i>not</i> merely numerical, -they are apt to identify the latter with <i>qualitative</i> difference. It -might, therefore, easily be thought that by 'difference in intrinsic -nature' I mean 'difference in quality.' But this identification of -difference in quality with difference in intrinsic nature would also -be a mistake. It is true that what is commonly meant by difference -of quality, in the strict sense, always is a difference of intrinsic -nature: two things cannot differ in quality without differing in -intrinsic nature; and that fact is one of the most important facts -about qualitative difference. But the converse is by no means also -true: although two things cannot differ in quality without differing in -intrinsic nature, they can differ in intrinsic nature without differing -in quality; or, in other words, difference in quality is only <i>one</i> -species of difference in intrinsic nature. That this is so follows -from the fact that, as I explained, I am using the phrase 'different -in intrinsic nature' as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> equivalent to 'not exactly like for it is -quite plain that two things may not be exactly alike, in spite of the -fact that they don't differ in quality, <i>e.g.</i> if the only difference -between them were in respect of the <i>degree</i> in which they possess -some quality they do possess. Nobody would say that a very loud sound -was exactly like a very soft one, even if they were exactly like in -quality; and yet it is plain there is a sense in which their intrinsic -nature is different For this reason alone qualitative difference cannot -be identified with difference in intrinsic nature. And there are still -other reasons. Difference in size, for instance may be a difference -in intrinsic nature, in the sense I mean, but it can hardly be called -a difference in quality. Or take such a difference as the difference -between two patterns consisting in the fact that the one is a yellow -circle with a red spot in the middle, and the other a yellow circle -with a blue spot in the middle. This difference would perhaps be -loosely called a difference of quality; but obviously it would be more -accurate to call it a difference which consists in the fact that the -one pattern has a <i>constituent</i> which is qualitatively different from -any which the other has; and the difference between being qualitatively -different and having qualitatively different constituents is important -both because the latter can only be defined in terms of the former, and -because it is possible for simple things to differ from one another -in the former way, whereas it is only possible for complex things to -differ in the latter.</p> - -<p>I hope this is sufficient to make clear exactly what the conception is -which I am expressing by the phrase "different in intrinsic nature." -The important points are (1) that it is a kind of difference which -does <i>not</i> hold between two things, when they are <i>merely</i> numerically -different, but only when, besides being numerically different, they -are also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> <i>not</i> exactly alike and (2) that it is <i>not</i> identical -with qualitative difference; although qualitative difference is one -particular species of it. The conception seems to me to be an extremely -important and fundamental one, although, so far as I can see, it has no -quite simple and unambiguous name: and this is the reason why I have -dwelt on it at such length. "Not exactly like" is the least ambiguous -way of expressing it; but this has the disadvantage that it looks as -if the idea of exact likeness were the fundamental one from which this -was derived, whereas I believe the contrary to be the case. For this -reason it is perhaps better to stick to the cumbrous phrase "different -in intrinsic nature."</p> - -<p>So much for the question what is meant by saying of two things that -they "differ in intrinsic nature." We have now to turn to the more -difficult question as to what is meant by the words "impossible" and -"necessary" in the statement: A kind of value is intrinsic if and only -if, it is <i>impossible</i> that <i>x</i> and <i>y</i> should have different values of -the kind, unless they differ in intrinsic nature; and in the equivalent -statement: A kind of value is intrinsic if and only if, when anything -possesses it, that same thing or anything exactly like it would -<i>necessarily</i> or <i>must</i> always, under all circumstances, possess it in -exactly the same degree.</p> - -<p>As regards the meaning of this necessity and impossibility, we may -begin by making two points clear.</p> - -<p>(1) It is sometimes contended, and with some plausibility, that what -we mean by saying that it is <i>possible</i> for a thing which possesses -one predicate F to possess another G, is, sometimes at least, merely -that some things which possess F do in fact also possess G. And if -we give this meaning to "possible," the corresponding meaning of the -statement it is <i>impossible</i> for a thing which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> possesses F to possess -G will be merely: Things which possess F never do in fact possess G. -If, then, we understood "impossible" in this sense, the condition for -the "internality" of a kind of value, which I have stated by saying -that if a kind of value is to be "intrinsic" it must be <i>impossible</i> -for two things to possess it in different degrees, if they are exactly -like one another, will amount merely to saying that no two things -which are exactly like one another ever do, in fact, possess it in -different degrees. It follows, that, if this were all that were meant, -this condition would be satisfied, if only it were true (as for all -I know it may be) that, in the case of all things which possess any -particular kind of intrinsic value, there happens to be nothing else -in the Universe exactly like any one of them; for if this were so, it -would, of course, follow that no two things which are exactly alike did -in fact possess the kind of value in question in different degrees, -for the simple reason that everything which possessed it at all would -be unique in the sense that there was nothing else exactly like it. If -this were all that were meant, therefore, we could prove any particular -kind of value to satisfy this condition, by merely proving that there -never has in fact and never will be anything exactly like any one of -the things which possess it: and our assertion that it satisfied this -condition would merely be an empirical generalisation. Moreover if -this were all that was meant it would obviously be by no means certain -that purely subjective predicates could not satisfy the condition in -question; since it would be satisfied by any subjective predicate of -which it happened to be true that everything which possessed it was, -in fact, unique—that there was nothing exactly like it; and for all -I know there may be many subjective predicates of which this is true. -It is, therefore, scarcely necessary to say that I am<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> not using -"impossible" in this sense. When I say that a kind of value, to be -intrinsic, must satisfy the condition that it must be <i>impossible</i> for -two things exactly alike to possess it in different degrees, I do not -mean by this condition anything which a kind of value could be proved -to satisfy, by the mere empirical fact that there was nothing else -exactly like any of the things which possessed it. It is, of course, -an essential part of my meaning that we must be able to say not merely -that no two exactly similar things do <i>in fact</i> possess it in different -degrees, but that, <i>if</i> there had been or were going to be anything -exactly similar to a thing which does possess it, even though, in -fact, there has not and won't be any such thing, that thing would have -possessed or would possess the kind of value in question in exactly the -same degree. It is essential to this meaning of "impossibility" that -it should entitle us to assert what <i>would</i> have been the case, under -conditions which never have been and never will be realised; and it -seems obvious that no mere empirical generalisation can entitle us to -do this.</p> - -<p>But (2) to say that I am not using 'necessity' in this first sense, -is by no means sufficient to explain what I do mean. For it certainly -seems as if causal laws (though this is disputed) do entitle us to make -assertions of the very kind that mere empirical generalisations do not -entitle us to make. In virtue of a causal law we do seem to be entitled -to assert such things as that, if a given thing had had a property -or were to have a property F which it didn't have or won't have, it -<i>would</i> have had or <i>would</i> have some other property G. And it might, -therefore, be thought that the kind of 'necessity' and 'impossibility' -I am talking of is this kind of causal 'necessity' and 'impossibility.' -It is, therefore, important to insist that I do <i>not</i> mean this kind -either. If this were all I meant, it would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> again be by no means -obvious, that purely subjective predicates might not satisfy our second -condition. It may, for instance, for all I know, be true that there -are causal laws which insure that in the case of everything that is -'beautiful,' anything exactly like any of these things would, in this -Universe, excite a particular kind of feeling in everybody to whom it -were presented in a particular way: and if that were so, we should have -a subjective predicate which satisfied the condition that, when a given -thing possesses that predicate, it is impossible (in the causal sense) -that any exactly similar thing should not also possess it. The kind -of necessity I am talking of is not, therefore, mere causal necessity -either. When I say that if a given thing possesses a certain degree of -intrinsic value, anything precisely similar to it <i>would</i> necessarily -<i>have</i> possessed that value in exactly the same degree, I mean that it -<i>would</i> have done so, even if it had existed in a Universe in which -the causal laws were quite different from what they are in this one. I -mean, in short, that it is <i>impossible</i> for any precisely similar thing -to possess a different value, in precisely such a sense as that, in -which it is, I think, generally admitted that it is <i>not</i> impossible -that causal laws should have been different from what they are—a sense -of impossibility, therefore, which certainly does not depend merely on -causal laws.</p> - -<p>That there is such a sense of necessity—a sense which entitles us to -say that what has F <i>would have</i> G, even if causal laws were quite -different from what they are—is, I think, quite clear from such -instances as the following. Suppose you take a particular patch of -colour, which is yellow. We can, I think, say with certainty that any -patch exactly like that one, <i>would</i> be yellow, even if it existed in -a Universe in which causal laws were quite different<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> from what they -are in this one. We can say that any such patch <i>must</i> be yellow, -quite unconditionally, whatever the circumstances, and whatever -the causal laws. And it is in a sense similar to this, in respect -of the fact that it is neither empirical nor causal, that I mean -the 'must' to be understood, when I say that if a kind of value is -to be 'intrinsic,' then, supposing a given-thing possesses it in a -certain degree, anything exactly like that thing <i>must</i> possess it in -exactly the same degree. To say, of 'beauty' or 'goodness' that they -are 'intrinsic' is only, therefore, to say that this thing which is -obviously true of 'yellowness' and 'blueness' and 'redness' is true -of them. And if we give this sense to 'must' in our definition, then -I think it is obvious that to say of a given kind of value that it is -intrinsic <i>is</i> inconsistent with its being 'subjective.' For there -is, I think, pretty clearly no subjective predicate of which we can -say thus unconditionally, that, <i>if</i> a given thing possesses it, then -anything exactly like that thing, <i>would,</i> under any circumstances, and -under any causal laws, also possess it. For instance, whatever kind of -feeling you take, it is plainly not true that supposing I have that -feeling towards a given thing A, then <i>I</i> should necessarily under any -circumstances have that feeling towards anything precisely similar to -A: for the simple reason that a thing precisely similar to A <i>might</i> -exist in a Universe in which I did not exist at all. And similarly -it is not true of any feeling whatever, that if <i>somebody</i> has that -feeling towards a given thing A, then, in arty Universe, in which -a thing precisely similar to A existed, <i>somebody</i> would have that -feeling towards it. Nor finally is it even true, that if it is true of -a given thing A, that, under actual causal laws, any one to whom A were -presented in a certain way <i>would</i> have a certain feeling towards it, -then the same hypothetical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> predicate would, in any Universe, belong to -anything precisely similar to A: in every case it seems to be possible -that there <i>might</i> be a Universe, in which the causal laws were such -that the proposition would not be true.</p> - -<p>It is, then, because in my definition of 'intrinsic' value the 'must' -is to be understood in this unconditional sense, that I think that the -proposition that a kind of value is 'intrinsic' is inconsistent with -its being subjective. But it should be observed that in holding that -there is this inconsistency, I am contradicting a doctrine which seems -to be held by many philosophers. There are, as you probably know, some -philosophers who insist strongly on a doctrine which they express by -saying that no relations are purely external. And so far as I can make -out one thing which they mean by this is just that, whenever r has any -relation whatever which <i>y</i> has not got, <i>x</i> and <i>y cannot</i> be exactly -alike: That any difference in relation necessarily entails a difference -in intrinsic nature. There is, I think, no doubt that when these -philosophers say this, they mean by their 'cannot' and 'necessarily' -an unconditional 'cannot' and 'must.' And hence it follows they are -holding that, if, for instance, a thing A pleases me now, then any -other thing, B, precisely similar to A, must, under any circumstances, -and in any Universe, please me also: since, if B did not please me, it -would <i>not</i> possess a relation which A does possess, and therefore, by -their principle, <i>could</i> not be precisely similar to A<i>—must</i> differ -from it in intrinsic nature. But it seems to me to be obvious that this -principle is false. If it were true, it would follow that I can know <i>a -priori</i> such things as that no patch of colour which is seen by you and -is not seen by me is ever exactly like any patch which is seen by me -and is not seen by you; or that no patch of colour which is surrounded -by a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> red ring is ever exactly like one which is not so surrounded. But -it is surely obvious, that, whether these things are true or not they -are things which I cannot know <i>a priori.</i> It is simply <i>not</i> evident -<i>a priori</i> that no patch of colour which is seen by A and not by B is -ever exactly like one which is seen by B and not by A, and that no -patch of colour which is surrounded by a red ring is ever exactly like -one which is not. And this illustration serves to bring out very well -both what is meant by saying of such a predicate as 'beautiful 'that -it is intrinsic,' and why, if it is, it cannot be subjective. What is -meant is just that if A is beautiful and B is not, you could know <i>a -priori</i> that A and B are <i>not</i> exactly alike; whereas, with any such -subjective predicate, as that of exciting a particular feeling in me, -or that of being a thing which would excite such a feeling in any -spectator, you cannot tell <i>a priori</i> that a thing A which did possess -such a predicate and a thing B which did not, could not be exactly -alike.</p> - -<p>It seems to me, therefore, quite certain, in spite of the dogma that no -relations are purely external, that there are many predicates, such for -instance as most (if not all) subjective predicates or the objective -one of being surrounded by a red ring, which do <i>not</i> depend solely -on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them: or, in other words, -of which it is <i>not</i> true that if <i>x</i> possesses them and <i>y</i> does -not, <i>x</i> and <i>y must</i> differ in intrinsic nature. But what precisely -is meant by this unconditional 'must,' I must confess I don't know. -The obvious thing to suggest is that it is the logical 'must,' which -certainly is unconditional in just this sense: the kind of necessity, -which we assert to hold, for instance, when we say that whatever is a -right-angled triangle <i>must</i> be a triangle, or that whatever is yellow -<i>must</i> be either yellow or blue. But I must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> say I cannot see that -all unconditional necessity is of this nature. I do not see how it -can be deduced from any logical law that, if a given patch of colour -be yellow, then any patch which were exactly like the first would be -yellow too. And similarly in our case of 'intrinsic' value, though I -think it is true that beauty, for instance, is 'intrinsic,' I do not -see how it can be deduced from any logical law, that if A is beautiful, -anything that were exactly like A would be beautiful too, in exactly -the same degree.</p> - -<p>Moreover, though I do believe that both "yellow" (in the sense in -which it applies to sense-data) and "beautiful" are predicates which, -in this unconditional sense, depend only on the intrinsic nature of -what possesses them, there seems to me to be an extremely important -difference between them which constitutes a further difficulty in the -way of getting quite clear as to what this unconditional sense of -"must" is. The difference I mean is one which I am inclined to express -by saying that though both yellowness and beauty are predicates which -<i>depend</i> only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them, yet -while yellowness is itself an <i>intrinsic</i> predicate, <i>beauty</i> is not. -Indeed it seems to me to be one of the most important truths about -predicates of value, that though many of them <i>are</i> intrinsic kinds of -value, in the sense I have defined, yet <i>none</i> of them are intrinsic -properties, in the sense in which such properties as "yellow" or the -property of "being a state of pleasure" or "being a state of things -which contains a balance of pleasure" are intrinsic properties. It is -obvious, for instance, that, if we are to reject <i>all</i> naturalistic -theories of value, we must not only reject those theories, according to -which no kind of value would be intrinsic, but must also reject such -theories as those which assert, for instance, that to say that a state -of mind is good<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> is to say that it is a state of being pleased; or -that to say that a state of things is good is to say that it contains -a balance of pleasure over pain. There are, in short, two entirely -different types of naturalistic theory, the difference between which -may be illustrated by the difference between the assertion, "A is good" -<i>means</i> "A is pleasant" and the assertion "A is good" <i>means</i> "A is a -state of pleasure." Theories of the former type imply that goodness is -<i>not</i> an intrinsic kind of value, whereas theories of the latter type -imply equally emphatically that it is: since obviously such predicates -as that "of being a state of pleasure," or "containing a balance of -pleasure," <i>are</i> predicates like "yellow" in respect of the fact that -if a given thing possesses them, anything exactly like the thing in -question must possess them. It seems to me equally obvious that <i>both</i> -types of theory are false: but I do not know how to exclude them both -except by saying that two different propositions are both true of -<i>goodness</i>, namely: (1) that it does depend <i>only</i> on the intrinsic -nature of what possesses it—which excludes theories of the first type -and (2) that, <i>though</i> this is so, it is yet not itself an intrinsic -property—which excludes those of the second. It was for this reason -that I said above that, if there are any intrinsic kinds of value, -they would constitute a class of predicates which is, perhaps, unique; -for I cannot think of any other predicate which resembles them in -respect of the fact, that though <i>not</i> itself intrinsic, it yet shares -with intrinsic properties the characteristics of depending solely on -the intrinsic nature of what possesses it. So far as I know, certain -predicates of value are the only non-intrinsic properties which share -with intrinsic properties this characteristic of depending only on the -intrinsic nature of what possesses them.</p> - -<p>If, however, we are thus to say that predicates of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> value, though -<i>dependent</i> solely on intrinsic properties, are not themselves -intrinsic properties, there must be some characteristic belonging to -intrinsic properties which predicates of value never possess. And -it seems to me quite obvious that there is; only I can't see <i>what</i> -it is. It seems to me quite obvious that if you assert of a given -state of things that it contains a balance of pleasure over pain, you -are asserting of it not only a <i>different</i> predicate, from what you -would be asserting of it if you said it was "good"—but a predicate -which is of quite a different <i>kind</i>; and in the same way that when -you assert of a patch of colour that it is "yellow," the predicate -you assert is not only <i>different</i> from "beautiful," but of quite a -different <i>kind,</i> in the same way as before. And of course the mere -fact that many people have thought that goodness and beauty were -subjective is evidence that there is <i>some</i> great difference of kind -between them and such predicates as being yellow or containing a -balance of pleasure. But <i>what</i> the difference is, if we suppose, as I -suppose, that goodness and beauty are <i>not</i> subjective, and that they -do share with "yellowness" and "containing pleasure," the property -of depending <i>solely</i> on the intrinsic nature of what possesses -them, I confess I cannot say. I can only vaguely express the kind of -difference I feel there to be by saying that intrinsic properties seem -to <i>describe</i> the intrinsic nature of what possesses them in a sense -in which predicates of value never do. If you could enumerate <i>all</i> -the intrinsic properties a given thing possessed, you would have given -a <i>complete</i> description of it, and would not need to mention any -predicates of value it possessed; whereas no description of a given -thing could be <i>complete</i> which omitted any intrinsic property. But, -in any case, owing to the fact that predicates of intrinsic value are -not themselves<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> intrinsic properties, you cannot define "intrinsic -property," in the way which at first sight seems obviously the right -one. You cannot say that an intrinsic property is a property such that, -if one thing possesses it and another does not, the intrinsic nature of -the two things <i>must</i> be different. For this is the very thing which we -are maintaining to be true of predicates of intrinsic value, while at -the same time we say that they are <i>not</i> intrinsic properties. Such a -definition of "intrinsic property" would therefore only be possible if, -we could say that the necessity there is that, if <i>x</i> and <i>y</i> possess -different intrinsic properties, their nature must be different, is a -necessity of a <i>different kind</i> from the necessity there is that, if -<i>x</i> and <i>y</i> are of different intrinsic values, their nature must be -different, although both necessities are unconditional. And it seems to -me possible that this is the true explanation. But, if so, it obviously -adds to the difficulty of explaining the meaning of the unconditional -"must," since, in this case, there would be two different meanings of -"must," both unconditional, and yet neither, apparently, identical with -the logical "must."</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="EXTERNAL_AND_INTERNAL_RELATIONS" id="EXTERNAL_AND_INTERNAL_RELATIONS">EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS</a></h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - - -<p>In the index to <i>Appearance and Reality</i> (First Edition) Mr. Bradley -declares that <i>all</i> relations are "intrinsical"; and the following are -some of the phrases by means of which he tries to explain what he means -by this assertion. "A relation must at both ends <i>affect,</i> and pass -into, the being of its terms" (p. 364). "Every relation essentially -penetrates the being of its terms, and is, in this sense, intrinsical" -(p. 392). "To stand in a relation and not to be relative, to support -it and yet not to be infected and undermined by it, seems out of the -question" (p. 142). And a good many other philosophers seem inclined to -take the same view about relations which Mr. Bradley is here trying to -express. Other phrases which seem to be sometimes used to express it, -or a part of it, are these: "No relations are purely external"; "All -relations qualify or modify or make a difference to the terms between -which they hold"; "No terms are independent of any of the relations in -which they stand to other terms." (See <i>e.g.,</i> Joachim, <i>The Nature of -Truth,</i> pp. 11, 12, 46).</p> - -<p>It is, I think, by no means easy to make out exactly what these -philosophers mean by these assertions. And the main object of this -paper is to try to define clearly one proposition, which, even if it -does not give the whole of what they mean, seems to me to be always -implied by what they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> mean, and to be certainly false. I shall try to -make clear the exact meaning of this proposition, to point out some -of its most important consequences, and to distinguish it clearly -from certain other propositions which are, I think, more or less -liable to be confused with it. And I shall maintain that, if we give -to the assertion that a relation is "internal" the meaning which this -proposition would give to it, then, though, in that sense, <i>some</i> -relations are "internal," others, no less certainly, are not, but are -"purely external."</p> - -<p>To begin with, we may, I think, clear the ground, by putting on -one side two propositions about relations, which, though they seem -sometimes to be confused with the view we are discussing, do, I think, -quite certainly not give the whole meaning of that view.</p> - -<p>The first is a proposition which is quite certainly and obviously true -of all relations, without exception, and which, though it raises points -of great difficulty, can, I think, be clearly enough stated for its -truth to be obvious. It is the proposition that, in the case of any -relation whatever, the kind of fact which we express by saying that -a given term A has that relation to another term B, or to a pair of -terms B and C, or to three terms B, C, and D, and so on, in no case -simply consists in the terms in question <i>together with</i> the relation. -Thus the fact which we express by saying that Edward VII was father -of George V, obviously does not simply consist in Edward, George, -<i>and</i> the relation of fatherhood. In order that the fact may be, it -is obviously not sufficient that there should merely be George and -Edward and the relation of fatherhood; it is further necessary that the -relation should <i>relate</i> Edward to George, and not only so, but also -that it should relate them in the particular way which we express by -saying that Edward was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> father of George, and not merely in the way -which we should express by saying that George was father of Edward. -This proposition is, I think, obviously true of all relations without -exception: and the only reason why I have mentioned it is because, -in an article in which Mr. Bradley criticises Mr. Russell (<i>Mind,</i> -1910, p. 179), he seems to suggest that it is inconsistent with the -proposition that any relations are merely external, and because, so far -as I can make out, some other people who maintain that all relations -are internal seem sometimes to think that their contention follows -from this proposition. The way in which Mr. Bradley puts it is that -such facts are unities which are not <i>completely analysable</i>; and this -is, of course, true, if it means merely that in the case of no such -fact is there any set of constituents of which we can truly say: This -fact is <i>identical with</i> these constituents. But whether from this it -follows that all relations are internal must of course depend upon -what is meant by the latter statement. If it be merely used to express -this proposition itself, or anything which follows from it, then, of -course, there can be no doubt that all relations are internal. But I -think there is no doubt that those who say this do not mean by their -words <i>merely</i> this obvious proposition itself; and I am going to point -out something which I think they always imply, and which certainly does -<i>not</i> follow from it.</p> - -<p>The second proposition which, I think, may be put aside at once as -certainly not giving the whole of what is meant, is the proposition -which is, I think, the natural meaning of the phrases "All relations -modify or affect their terms" or "All relations make a difference to -their terms." There is one perfectly natural and intelligible sense in -which a given relation may be said to modify a term which stands in -that relation, namely, the sense in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> which we should say that, if, by -putting a stick of sealing-wax into a flame, we make the sealing-wax -melt, its relationship to the flame has modified the sealing-wax. -This is a sense of the word "modify" in which part of what is meant -by saying of any term that it is modified, is that it has actually -undergone a change: and I think it is clear that a sense in which this -is part of its meaning is the only one in which the word "modify" can -properly be used. If, however, those who say that all relations modify -their terms were using the word in this, its proper, sense, part of -what would be meant by this assertion would be that all terms which -have relations at all actually undergo changes. Such an assertion would -be obviously false, for the simple reason that there are terms which -have relation? and which yet never change at all. And I think it is -quite clear that those who assert that all relations are internal, in -the sense we are concerned with, mean by this something which could be -consistently asserted to be true of all relations without exception, -even if it were admitted that some terms which have relations do -not change. When, therefore, they use the phrase that all relations -"modify" their terms as equivalent to "all relations are internal," -they must be using "modify" in some metaphorical sense other than its -natural one. I think, indeed, that most of them would be inclined to -assert that in every case in which a term A comes to have to another -term B a relation, which it did not have to B in some immediately -preceding interval, its having of that relation to that term causes -it to undergo some change, which it would not have undergone if it -had not stood in precisely that relation to B and I think perhaps -they would think that this proposition follows from some proposition -which is true of all relations, without exception, and which is what -they mean by saying<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> that all relations are internal. The question -whether the coming into a new relation does thus always cause some -modification in the term which comes into it is one which is often -discussed, as if it had something to do with the question whether all -relations are internal as when, for instance, it is discussed whether -knowledge of a thing alters the thing known. And for my part I should -maintain that this proposition is certainly not true. But what I am -concerned with now is not the question whether it is true, but simply -to point out that, so far as I can see, it can have nothing to do -with the question whether all relations are internal, for the simple -reason that it cannot possibly follow from any proposition with regard -to <i>all</i> relations without exception. It asserts with regard to all -relational properties of a certain kind, that they have a certain kind -of <i>effect</i>; and no proposition of this sort can, I think follow from -any universal proposition with regard to <i>all</i> relations.</p> - -<p>We have, therefore, rejected as certainly not giving the whole meaning -of the dogma that all relations are internal: (1) the obviously true -proposition that no relational facts are <i>completely</i> analysable, -in the precise sense which I gave to that assertion; and (2) the -obviously false proposition that all relations modify their terms, -in the natural sense of the term "modify," in which it always has as -part of its meaning "cause to undergo a change." And we have also seen -that this false proposition that any relation which a term comes to -have always causes it to undergo a change is wholly irrelevant to the -question whether <i>all</i> relations are internal or not. We have seen -finally that if the assertion that all relations modify their terms is -to be understood as equivalent to the assertion that all are internal, -"modify" must be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> understood in some metaphorical sense. The question -is: What is this metaphorical sense?</p> - -<p>And one point is, I think, pretty clear to begin with. It is obvious -that, in the case of some relations, a given term A may have the -relation in question, not only to one other term, but to several -different terms. If, for instance, we consider the relation of -fatherhood, it is obvious that a man may be father, not only of -one, but of several different children. And those who say that all -relations modify their terms always mean, I think, not merely that -every different relation which a term has modifies it; but also that, -where the relation is one which the term has to several different other -terms, then, in the case of <i>each</i> of these terms, it is modified by -the fact that it has the relation in question to that particular term. -If, for instance, A is father of three children, B, C, and D, they -mean to assert that he is modified, not merely by being a father, but -by being the father of B, also by being the father of C, and also by -being the father of D. The mere assertion that all <i>relations</i> modify -their terms does not, of course, make it quite clear that this is what -is meant; but I think there is no doubt that it is always meant; and -I think we can express it more clearly by using a term, which I have -already introduced, and saying the doctrine is that all <i>relational -properties</i> modify their terms, in a sense which remains to be -defined. I think there is no difficulty in understanding what I mean -by a <i>relational property.</i> If A is father of B, then what you assert -of A when you say that he is so is a <i>relational property</i>—namely -the property of being father of B; and it is quite clear that this -property is not itself a <i>relation</i>, in the same fundamental sense -in which the relation of fatherhood is so; and also that, if C is a -different child from B, then the property of being father of C is a -different relational<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> property from that of being father of B, although -there is only <i>one</i> relation, that of fatherhood, from which both are -derived. So far as I can make out, those philosophers who talk of -all <i>relations</i> being internal, often actually mean by "relations" -"relational properties"; when they talk of all the "relations" of a -given term, they mean all its relational properties, and not merely -all the different relations, of each of which it is true that the term -has that relation to something. It will, I think, conduce to clearness -to use a different word for these two entirely different uses of the -term "relation" to call "fatherhood" a relation, and "fatherhood of -B" a "relational property." And the fundamental proposition, which is -meant by the assertion that all relations are internal, is, I think, a -proposition with regard to relational properties, and not with regard -to relations properly so-called. There is no doubt that those who -maintain this dogma mean to maintain that all relational properties are -related in a peculiar way to the terms which possess them—that they -modify or are internal to them, in some metaphorical sense. And once we -have defined what this sense is in which a <i>relational property</i> can be -said to be internal to a term which possesses it, we can easily derive -from it a corresponding sense in which the <i>relations</i>, strictly so -called, from which relational properties are derived, can be said to be -internal.</p> - -<p>Our question is then: What is the metaphorical sense of "modify" in -which the proposition that all relations are internal is equivalent to -the proposition that all relational properties "modify" the terms which -possess them? I think it is clear that the term "modify" would never -have been used at all to express the relation meant, unless there had -been some analogy between this relation and that which we have seen is -the proper sense of "modify,"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> namely, <i>causes</i> to change. And I think -we can see where the analogy comes in by considering the statement, -with regard to any particular term A and any relational property P -which belongs to it, that A <i>would have been different from what it -is if it had not had</i> P: the statement, for instance, that Edward VII -would have been different if he had not been father of George V. This -is a thing which we can obviously truly say of A and P, in some sense, -whenever it is true of P that it <i>modified</i> A in the proper sense of -the word: if the being held in the flame causes the sealing-wax to -melt, we can truly say (in some sense) that the sealing-wax would not -have been in a melted state if it had not been in the flame. But it -seems as if it were a thing which might also be true of A and P, where -it is <i>not</i> true that the possession of P <i>caused</i> A to change; since -the mere assertion that A would have been different, if it had not -had P, does not necessarily imply that the possession of P <i>caused -A</i> to have any property which it would not have had otherwise. And -those who say that all relations are internal do sometimes tend to -speak as if what they meant could be put in the form: In the case of -every relational property which a thing has, it is always true that -the thing which has it would have been different if it had not had -that property; they sometimes say even: If P be a relational property -and A a term which has it, then it is always true that A <i>would not -have been A</i> if it had not had P. This is, I think, obviously a clumsy -way of expressing anything which could possibly be true, since, taken -strictly, it implies the self-contradictory proposition that if A had -not had P, it would not have been true that A did not have P. But it -is nevertheless a more or less natural way of expressing a proposition -which might quite well be true, namely, that, supposing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> A has P, then -anything which had not had P would necessarily have been different -from A. This is the proposition which I wish to suggest as giving the -metaphorical meaning of "P <i>modifies</i> A," of which we are in search. -It is a proposition to which I think a perfectly precise meaning can -be given, and one which does not at all imply that the possession of P -<i>caused</i> any change in A, but which might conceivably be true of all -terms and all the relational properties they have, without exception. -And it seems to me that it is not unnatural that the proposition that -this is true of P and A, should have been expressed in the form, "P -modifies A," since it can be more or less naturally expressed in the -perverted form, "If A had not had P it would have been different,"—a -form of words, which, as we saw, can also be used whenever P does, in -the proper sense, modify A.</p> - -<p>I want to suggest, then, that one thing which is always implied by -the dogma that, "All relations are internal," is that, in the case of -every relational property, it can always be truly asserted of any term -A which has that property, that any term which had not had it would -necessarily have been different from A.</p> - -<p>This is the proposition to which I want to direct attention. And there -are two phrases in it, which require some further explanation.</p> - -<p>The first is the phrase "would necessarily have been." And the meaning -of this can be explained, in a preliminary way, as follows:—To say -of a pair of properties P and Q, that any term which had had P would -necessarily have had Q, is equivalent to saying that, in every case, -from the proposition with regard to any given term that it has P, it -<i>follows</i> that that term has Q: <i>follows</i> being understood in the sense -in which from the proposition with regard to any term, that it is a -right angle, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> <i>follows</i> that it is an angle, and in which from the -proposition with regard to any term that it is red it <i>follows</i> that -it is coloured. There is obviously some very important sense in which -from the proposition that a thing is a right angle, it does follow -that it is an angle, and from the proposition that a thing is red it -does follow that it is coloured. And what I am maintaining is that the -metaphorical sense of "modify," in which it is maintained that all -relational properties modify the subjects which possess them, can be -defined by reference to this sense of "follows." The definition is: To -say of a given relational property P that it modifies or is internal to -a given term A which possesses it, is to say that from the proposition -that a thing has not got P it follows that that thing is different -from A. In other words, it is to say that the property of <i>not</i> -possessing P, and the property of being different from A are related -to one another in the peculiar way in which the property of being a -right-angled triangle is related to that of being a triangle, or that -of being red to that of being coloured.</p> - -<p>To complete the definition it is necessary, however, to define the -sense in which "different from A" is to be understood. There are two -different senses which the statement that A is different from B may -bear. It may be meant merely that A is <i>numerically</i> different from -B, <i>other</i> than B, not identical with B. Or it may be meant that not -only is this the case, but also that A is related to B in a way which -can be roughly expressed by saying that A is <i>qualitatively</i> different -from B. And of these two meanings, those who say "All relations make -a <i>difference</i> to their terms," always, I think, mean difference -in the latter sense and not merely in the former. That is to say, -they mean, that if P be a relational property which belongs to A, -then the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> absence of P entails not only numerical difference from A, -but qualitative difference. But, in fact, from the proposition that -a thing is qualitatively different from A, it does follow that it -is also numerically different. And hence they are maintaining that -every relational property is "internal to" its terms in both of two -different senses at the same time. They are maintaining that, if P be a -relational property which belongs to A, then P is internal to A both in -the sense (1) that the absence of P entails qualitative difference from -A; and (2) that the absence of P entails numerical difference from A. -It seems to me that neither of these propositions is true; and I will -say something about each in turn.</p> - -<p>As for the first, I said before that I think some relational properties -really are "internal to" their terms, though by no means all are. -But, if we understand "internal to" in this first sense, I am not -really sure that any are. In order to get an example of one which -was, we should have, I think, to say that any two different qualities -are always <i>qualitatively</i> different from one another: that, for -instance, it is not only the case that anything which is pure red is -qualitatively different from anything which is pure blue, but that -the quality "pure red" itself is qualitatively different from the -quality "pure blue." I am not quite sure that we can say this, but I -think we can; and if so, it is easy to get an example of a relational -property which is internal in our first sense. The quality "orange" is -intermediate in shade between the qualities yellow and red. This is a -relational property, and it is quite clear that, on our assumption, -it is an internal one. Since it is quite clear that any quality which -were <i>not</i> intermediate between yellow and red, would necessarily -be <i>other</i> than orange; and if any quality <i>other</i> than orange must -be <i>qualitatively</i> different<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> from orange, then it follows that -"intermediate between yellow and red" is internal to "orange." That is -to say, the absence of the relational property "intermediate between -yellow and red," <i>entails</i> the property "different in quality from -orange."</p> - -<p>There is then, I think, a difficulty in being sure that <i>any</i> -relational properties are internal in this first sense. But, if what we -want to do is to show that some are <i>not,</i> and that therefore the dogma -that all relations are internal is false, I think the most conclusive -reason for saying this is that if <i>all</i> were internal in this first -sense, all would necessarily be internal in the second, and that this -is plainly false. I think, in fact, the most important consequence of -the dogma that all relations are internal, is that it follows from it -that all relational properties are internal in this second sense. I -propose, therefore, at once to consider this proposition, with a view -to bringing out quite clearly what it means and involves, and what are -the main reasons for saying that it is false.</p> - -<p>The proposition in question is that, if P be a relational property -and A a term to which it does in fact belong, then, no matter what -P and A may be, it may always be truly asserted of them, that any -term which had <i>not</i> possessed P would necessarily have been other -than—numerically different from—A: or in other words, that A would -necessarily, in all conceivable circumstances, have possessed P. -And with this sense of "internal," as distinguished from that which -says <i>qualitatively different,</i> it is quite easy to point out some -relational properties which certainly are internal in this sense. -Let us take as an example the relational property which we assert to -belong to a visual sense-datum when we say of it that it has another -visual sense-datum as a spatial part: the assertion, for instance, -with regard to a coloured patch half of which is red and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> half yellow. -"This whole patch contains this patch" (where "this patch" is a proper -name for the red half). It is here, I think, quite plain that, in a -perfectly clear and intelligible sense, we can say that any whole, -which had not contained that red patch, could not have been identical -with the whole in question: that from the proposition with regard to -any term whatever that it does not contain <i>that</i> particular patch it -<i>follows</i> that that term is <i>other</i> than the whole in question—though -<i>not</i> necessarily that it is qualitatively different from it. <i>That</i> -particular whole could not have existed without having that particular -patch for a part. But it seems no less clear, at first sight, that -there are many other relational properties of which this is not true. -In order to get an example, we have only to consider the relation which -the red patch has to the whole patch, instead of considering as before -that which the whole has to it. It seems quite clear that, though the -whole could not have existed without having the red patch for a part, -the red patch might perfectly well have existed without being part -of that particular whole. In other words, though every relational -property of the form "having <i>this</i> for a spatial part" is "internal" -in our sense, it seems equally clear that every property of the form -"is a spatial part of this whole" is <i>not</i> internal, but purely -external. Yet this last, according to me, is one of the things which -the dogma of internal relations denies. It implies that it is just -as necessary that anything, which is in fact a part of a particular -whole, should be a part of that whole, as that any whole, which has -a particular thing for a part, should have that thing for a part. It -implies, in fact, quite generally, that any term which does in fact -have a particular relational property, could not have existed without -having that property. And in saying this it obviously flies in the -face of common<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> sense. It seems quite obvious that in the case of many -relational properties which things have, the fact that they have them -is <i>a mere matter of fact:</i> that the things in question <i>might</i> have -existed without having them. That this, which seems obvious, is true, -seems to me to be the most important thing that can be meant by saying -that some relations are purely external. And the difficulty is to see -how any philosopher could have supposed that it was not true: that, for -instance, the relation of part to whole is no more external than that -of whole to part. I will give at once one main reason which seems to me -to have led to the view, that <i>all</i> relational properties are internal -in this sense.</p> - -<p>What I am maintaining is the common-sense view, which seems obviously -true, that it may be true that A has in fact got P and yet also true -that A might have existed without having P. And I say that this -is equivalent to saying that it may be true that A has P, and yet -<i>not</i> true that from the proposition that a thing has <i>not</i> got P it -<i>follows</i> that that thing is <i>other</i> than A—numerically different from -it. And one reason why this is disputed is, I think, simply because it -is in fact true that if A has P, and <i>x</i> has <i>not</i>, it <i>does</i> follow -that <i>x</i> is other than A. These two propositions, the one which I admit -to be true (1) that if A has P, and <i>x</i> has not, it <i>does</i> follow that -<i>x</i> is other than A, and the one which I maintain to be false (2) that -if A has P, then from the proposition with regard to any term <i>x</i> -that it has not got P, it <i>follows</i> that <i>x</i> is other than A, are, I -think, easily confused with one another. And it is in fact the case -that if they are not different, or if (2) follows from (1), then no -relational properties are external. For (1) is certainly true, and (2) -is certainly equivalent to asserting that none are. It is therefore -absolutely essential, if we are to maintain external relations, to -maintain that (2)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> does <i>not</i> follow from (1). These two propositions -(1) and (2), with regard to which I maintain that (1) is true, and (2) -is false, can be put in another way, as follows: (1) asserts that if A -has P, then any term which has not, <i>must</i> be other than A. (2) asserts -that if A has P, then any term which had not, <i>would necessarily be</i> -other than A. And when they are put in this form, it is, I think, easy -to see why they should be confused: you have only to confuse "must" -or "is necessarily" with "would necessarily be." And their connexion -with the question of external relations can be brought out as follows: -To maintain external relations you have to maintain such things as -that, though Edward VII was in fact father of George V, he <i>might</i> -have existed without being father of George V. But to maintain this, -you have to maintain that it is <i>not</i> true that a person who was <i>not</i> -father of George would necessarily have been other than Edward. Yet -it is, in fact, the case, that any person who was not the father of -George, <i>must</i> have been other than Edward. Unless, therefore, you can -maintain that from this true proposition it does <i>not</i> follow that any -person who was <i>not</i> father of George <i>would necessarily</i> have been -other than Edward, you will have to give up the view that Edward might -have existed without being father of George.</p> - -<p>By far the most important point in connexion with the dogma of internal -relations seems to me to be simply to see clearly the difference -between these two propositions (1) and (2), and that (2) does <i>not</i> -follow from (1). If this is not understood, nothing in connexion with -the dogma, can, I think, be understood. And perhaps the difference may -seem so clear, that no more need be said about it. But I cannot help -thinking it is not clear to everybody, and that it does involve the -rejection of certain views, which are sometimes held as to the meaning<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> -of "follows." So I will try to put the point again in a perfectly -strict form.</p> - -<p>Let P be a relational property, and A a term to which it does in fact -belong. I propose to define what is meant by saying that P is internal -to A (in the sense we are now concerned with) as meaning that from the -proposition that a thing has not got P, it "follows" that it is <i>other</i> -than A.</p> - -<p>That is to say, this proposition asserts that between the two -properties "not having P" and "other than A," there holds that relation -which holds between the property "being a right angle" and the property -"being an angle," or between the property "red" and the property -"coloured," and which we express by saying that, in the case of any -thing whatever, from the proposition that that thing is a right angle -it follows, or is deducible, that it is an angle.</p> - -<p>Let us now adopt certain conventions for expressing this proposition.</p> - -<p>We require, first of all, some term to express the <i>converse</i> of that -relation which we assert to hold between a particular proposition <i>q</i> -and a particular proposition <i>p</i>, when we assert that <i>q follows from</i> -or <i>is deducible from p.</i> Let us use the term "entails" to express the -converse of this relation. We shall then be able to say truly that "<i>p</i> -entails <i>q</i>," when and only when we are able to say truly that "<i>q</i> -follows from <i>p</i>" or "is deducible from <i>p</i>," in the sense in which the -conclusion of a syllogism in Barbara follows from the two premisses, -taken as one conjunctive proposition; or in which the proposition -"This is coloured" follows from "This is red." "<i>p</i> entails <i>q</i>" will -be related to "<i>q</i> follows from, <i>p</i>" in the same way in which "A is -greater than B" is related to "B is less than A."</p> - -<p>We require, next, some short and clear method of expressing the -proposition, with regard to two properties P and Q, that <i>any</i> -proposition which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> asserts of a given thing that it has the property -P <i>entails</i> the proposition that the thing in question also has the -property Q. Let us express this proposition in the form</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>x</i>P entails <i>x</i>Q<br /> -</p> - -<p>That is to say "<i>x</i>P entails <i>x</i>Q" is to mean the same as "Each one of -all the various propositions, which are alike in respect of the fact -that each asserts with regard to some given thing that that thing has -P, entails <i>that one</i> among the various propositions, alike in respect -of the fact that each asserts with regard to some given thing that -that thing has Q, which makes this assertion with regard to the <i>same -thing</i>, with regard to which the proposition of the first class asserts -that it has P." In other words "<i>x</i>P entails <i>x</i>Q" is to be true, if -and only if the proposition "AP entails AQ" is true, and if also all -propositions which resemble this, in the way in which "BP entails BQ" -resembles it, are true also; where "AP" means the same as "A has P," -"AQ" the same as "A has Q" etc., etc.</p> - -<p>We require, next, some way of expressing the proposition, with regard -to two properties P and Q, that any proposition which <i>denies</i> of a -given thing that it has P <i>entails</i> the proposition, with regard to the -thing in question, that it has Q.</p> - -<p>Let us, in the case of any proposition, <i>p</i>, express the contradictory -of that proposition by <i>p</i>. The proposition "It is not the case that A -has P" will then be expressed by <span class="over">AP</span>; and it will then be natural, in -accordance with the last convention to express the proposition that any -proposition which <i>denies</i> of a given thing that it has P <i>entails</i> the -proposition, with regard to the thing in question,</p> - -<p>that it has Q, by</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<span class="over"><i>x</i>P</span> entails <i>xQ.</i><br /> -</p> - -<p>And we require, finally, some short way of expressing the proposition, -with regard to two<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> things B and A, that B is <i>other</i> than (or not -identical with) A. Let us express "B is identical with A" by "B = A"; -and it will then be natural, according to the last convention, to -express "B is not identical with A" by</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<span class="over">B = A</span> -</p> - -<p>We have now got everything which is required for expressing, in a short -symbolic form, the proposition, with regard to a given thing A and -a given relational property P, which A in fact possesses, that P is -<i>internal</i> to A. The required expression is</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>xP</i> entails (<span class="over"><i>x</i> = A</span>)<br /> -</p> - -<p>which is to mean the same as "Every proposition which asserts of any -given thing that it has not got P <i>entails</i> the proposition, with -regard to the thing in question, that it is other than A." And this -proposition is, of course, logically equivalent to</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -(<i>x</i> = A) entails <i>x</i> P<br /> -</p> - -<p>where we are using "logically equivalent," in such a sense that to -say of any proposition <i>p</i> that it is logically equivalent to another -proposition <i>q</i> is to say that both <i>p</i> entails <i>q</i> and <i>q</i> entails -<i>p.</i> This last proposition again, is, so far as I can see, either -identical with or logically equivalent to the propositions expressed -by "anything which were identical with A would, in any conceivable -universe, necessarily have P" or by "A could not have existed in any -possible world without having P"; just as the proposition expressed by -"In any possible world a right angle must be an angle" is, I take it, -either identical with or logically equivalent to the proposition "(<i>x</i> -is a right angle) entails (r is an angle)."</p> - -<p>We have now, therefore, got a short means of symbolising, with -regard to any particular thing A and any particular property P, the -proposition that P is <i>internal</i> to A in the second of the two senses<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> -distinguished on <a href="#Page_286">p. 286</a>. But we still require a means of symbolising -the general proposition that <i>every</i> relational property is internal -to any term which possesses it—the proposition, namely, which was -referred to on <a href="#Page_287">p. 287</a>, as the most important consequence of the dogma -of internal relations, and which was called (2) on <a href="#Page_289">p. 289</a>.</p> - -<p>In order to get this, let us first get a means of expressing with -regard to some one particular relational property P, the proposition -that P is internal to <i>any</i> term which possesses it. This is a -proposition which takes the form of asserting with regard to one -particular property, namely P, that any term which possesses that -property also possesses another—namely the one expressed by saying -that P is internal to it. It is, that is to say, an ordinary universal -proposition, like "All men are mortal." But such a form of words is, -as has often been pointed out, ambiguous. It may stand for either of -two different propositions. It may stand merely for the proposition -"There is nothing, which both is a man, and is not mortal"—a -proposition which may also be expressed by "If anything is a man, -that thing is mortal," and which is distinguished by the fact that -it makes no assertion as to whether there are any men or not; or it -may stand for the conjunctive proposition "If anything is a man, that -thing is mortal, <i>and there are men."</i> It will be sufficient for our -purposes to deal with propositions of the first kind—those namely, -which assert with regard to some two properties, say Q and R, that -there is nothing which both does possess Q and does not possess R, -without asserting that anything does possess Q. Such a proposition is -obviously equivalent to the assertion that <i>any</i> pair of propositions -which resembles the pair "AQ" and "AR," in respect of the fact that -one of them asserts of some particular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> thing that it has Q and the -other, of the same thing, that it has R, stand to one another in a -certain relation: the relation, namely, which, in the case of "AQ" -and "AR," can be expressed by saying that "It is not the case both -that A has Q and that A has not got R." When we say "There is nothing -which does possess Q and does not possess R" we are obviously saying -something which is either identical with or logically equivalent to the -proposition "In the case of every such pair of propositions it is not -the case both that the one which asserts a particular thing to have -Q is true, and that the one which asserts it to have R is false." We -require, therefore, a short way of expressing the relation between two -propositions <i>p</i> and <i>q,</i> which can be expressed by "It is not the case -that <i>p</i> is true and <i>q</i> false." And I am going, quite arbitrarily to -express this relation by writing</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>p</i> * <i>q</i><br /> -</p> - -<p>for "It is not the case that <i>p</i> is true and <i>q</i> false."</p> - -<p>The relation in question is one which logicians have sometimes -expressed by "<i>p</i> implies <i>q</i>." It is, for instance, the one which -Mr. Russell in the <i>'Principles of Mathematics</i> calls "material -implication," and which he and Dr. Whitehead in <i>Principia Mathematica</i> -call simply "implication." And if we do use "implication" to stand for -this relation, we, of course, got the apparently paradoxical results -that every false proposition implies every other proposition, both -true and false, and that every true proposition implies every other -true proposition: since it is quite clear that if <i>p</i> is false then, -whatever <i>q</i> may be, "it is not the case that <i>p</i> is true and <i>q</i> -false," and quite clear also, that if <i>p</i> and <i>q</i> are both true, then -also "it is not the case that <i>p</i> is true and <i>q</i> false." And these -results, it seems to me, appear to be paradoxical, solely because, -if we use "implies" in any ordinary sense, they are quite certainly -false.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> Why logicians should have thus chosen to use the word "implies" -as a name for a relation, for which it never is used by any one else, -I do not know. It is partly, no doubt, because the relation for which -they do use it—that expressed by saying "It is not the case that <i>p</i> -is true and <i>q</i> false"—is one for which it is very important that -they should have a short name, because it is a relation which is very -fundamental and about which they need constantly to talk, while (so far -as I can discover) it simply has no short name in ordinary life. And -it is partly, perhaps, for a reason which leads us back to our present -reason for giving some name to this relation. It is, in fact, natural -to use "<i>p</i> implies <i>q</i>" to mean the same as "If <i>p,</i> then <i>q."</i> And -though "If <i>p</i> then <i>q</i>" is hardly ever, if ever, used to mean the -same as "It is not the case that <i>p</i> is true and <i>q</i> false"; yet the -expression "If <i>anything</i> has Q, <i>it</i> has R" may, I think, be naturally -used to express the proposition that, in the case of <i>every</i> pair of -propositions which resembles the pair A Q and A R in respect of the -fact that the first of the pair asserts of some particular thing that -it has Q and the second, of the same thing, that it has R, it is not -the case that the first is true and the second false. That is to say, -if (as I propose to do) we express "It is not the case both that AQ is -true and AR false" by</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -AQ * AR,<br /> -</p> - -<p>and if, further (on the analogy of the similar case with regard -to "entails)," we express the proposition that of <i>every</i> pair of -propositions which resemble A Q and A R in the respect just mentioned, -it is true that the first has the relation * to the second by</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>x</i>Q * <i>x</i>R<br /> -</p> - -<p>then, it <i>is</i> natural to express <i>x</i>Q * <i>x</i>R, by "If <i>anything</i> has -Q, then <i>that thing</i> has R." And logicians may, I think, have falsely -inferred that <i>since</i> it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> natural to express "<i>x</i>Q * <i>x</i>R" by "If -<i>anything</i> has Q, then <i>that thing</i> has R," it <i>must</i> be natural to -express "AQ * AR" by "If AQ, then AR," and therefore also by "AQ -implies AR." If this has been their reason for expressing "<i>p * q</i>" -by "<i>p</i> implies <i>q</i>" then obviously their reason is a fallacy. And, -whatever the reason may have been, it seems to me quite certain that -"AQ * AR" cannot be properly expressed either by "AQ implies AR" or by -"If AQ, then AR," although "<i>r</i>Q * <i>x</i>R" can be properly expressed by -"If anything has Q, then that thing has R."</p> - -<p>I am going, then, to express the universal proposition, with regard to -two particular properties Q and R, which asserts that "Whatever has -Q, has R" or "If anything has Q, it has R," without asserting that -anything has Q, by</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>x</i>Q * <i>x</i>R<br /> -</p> - -<p>—a means of expressing it, which since we have adopted the convention -that "<i>p</i> * <i>q</i>" is to mean the same as "It is not the case that -<i>p</i> is true and <i>q</i> false," brings out the important fact that this -proposition is either identical with or logically equivalent to the -proposition that of <i>every</i> such pair of propositions as AQ and AR, -it is true that it is not the case that the first is true and the -second false. And having adopted this convention, we can now see how, -in accordance with it, the proposition, with regard to a particular -property P, that P is <i>internal</i> to <i>everything</i> which possesses it, is -to be expressed. We saw that P is <i>internal</i> to A is to be expressed by</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<span class="over"><i>xP</i></span> entails (<span class="over"><i>x</i> = A</span>)<br /> -</p> - -<p>or by the logically equivalent proposition</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -(<i>x =</i> A) entails <i>xP</i><br /> -</p> - -<p>And we have now only to express the proposition that <i>anything</i> that -has P, has also the property that P is <i>internal</i> to it. The required -expression is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> obviously as follows. Just as "Anything that has Q, has -R" is to be expressed by</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>x</i>Q * <i>x</i>R<br /> -</p> - -<p>so "Anything that has P, has also the property that P is internal to -it" will be expressed by</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>x</i>P * {<span class="over"><i>y</i>P</span> entails (<span class="over"><i>y x</i></span>)}<br /> -</p> - -<p>or by</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>x</i>P * {(<i>v x</i>) entails <i>y</i>P}.<br /> -</p> - -<p>We have thus got, in the case of any particular property P, a means -of expressing the proposition that it is <i>internal</i> to <i>every</i> term -that possesses it, which is both short and brings out clearly the -notions that are involved in it. And we do not need, I think, any -further special convention for symbolising the proposition that <i>every</i> -relational property is internal to any term which possesses it—the -proposition, namely, which I called (2) above (pp. <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>), and which -on <a href="#Page_287">p. 287</a>, I called the most important consequence of the dogma of -internal relations. We can express it simply enough as follows:—</p> - -<p>(2) = "What we assert of P when we say <i>xP</i> * {<span class="over"><i>y</i>P</span> entails -(<span class="over"><i>y = x</i></span>)} can be truly asserted of every relational property."</p> - -<p>And now, for the purpose of comparing (2) with (1), and seeing exactly -what is involved in my assertion that (2) does not follow from (1), let -us try to express (1) by means of the same conventions.</p> - -<p>Let us first take the assertion with regard to a particular thing A -and a particular relational property P that, from the proposition that -A has P it <i>follows</i> that nothing which has not got P is identical -with A. This is an assertion which is quite certainly true; since, if -anything which had not got P were identical with A, it would follow -that <span class="over">AP</span>; and from the proposition AP, it certainly <i>follows</i> that -<span class="over">AP</span> is false, and therefore also that "Something<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> which has not got P -is identical with A" is false, or that "Nothing which has not got P is -identical with A" is true. And this assertion, in accordance with the -conventions we have adopted, will be expressed</p> - -<p>by</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -AP entails {<span class="over"><i>x</i>P</span> * (<span class="over"><i>x</i> = A</span>)}<br /> -</p> - -<p>We want, next, in order to express (1), a means of expressing with -regard to a particular relational property P, the assertion that, from -the proposition, with regard to <i>anything</i> whatever, that that thing -has got P, it <i>follows</i> that nothing which has not got P is identical -with the thing in question. This also is an assertion which is quite -certainly true; since it merely asserts (what is obviously true) that -what</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -AP entails {<span class="over"><i>x</i>P</span> * (<span class="over"><i>x</i> = A</span>)}<br /> -</p> - -<p>asserts of A, can be truly asserted of anything whatever. And this -assertion, in accordance with the conventions we have adopted, will be -expressed by</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>x</i>P entails {<span class="over"><i>y</i>P</span> * (<span class="over"><i>y</i> = x</span>)}.<br /> -</p> - -<p>The proposition, which I meant to call (1), but which I expressed -before rather clumsily, can now be expressed by</p> - -<p>(1) = "What we assert of P, when we say,</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"><i>x</i>P entails {<span class="over"><i>y</i>P</span> * (<span class="over">y = <i>x</i></span>)}</p> - -<p>can be truly asserted of every relational property." This is a -proposition which is again quite certainly true; and, in order to -compare it with (2), there is, I think, no need to adopt any further -convention for expressing it, since the questions whether it is or is -not different from (2), and whether (2) does or does not follow from -it, will obviously depend on the same questions with regard to the two -propositions, with regard to the particular relational property, P,</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>x</i>P entails {<span class="over"><i>y</i>P</span> * (<span class="over"><i>y = x</i></span>)}<br /> -</p> - -<p>and</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>x</i>P * {<i>y</i>P entails (<i>y = x</i>)}<br /> -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span></p> - -<p>Now what I maintain with regard to (1) and (2) is that, whereas (1) is -true, (2) is false. I maintain, that is to say, that the proposition -"What we assert of P, when we say</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>x</i>P * {<span class="over"><i>y</i>P</span> entails (<span class="over"><i>y = x</i>)</span>}.<br /> -</p> - -<p>is true of <i>every</i> relational property" is false, though I admit that -what we here assert of P is true of <i>some</i> relational properties. -Those of which it is true, I propose to call <i>internal</i> relational -properties, those of which it is false <i>external</i> relational -properties. The dogma of internal relations, on the other hand, implies -that (2) is true; that is to say, that <i>every</i> relational property is -<i>internal</i> and that there are no <i>external</i> relational properties. And -what I suggest is that the dogma of internal relations has been held -only because (2) has been falsely thought to follow from (1).</p> - -<p>And that (2) does not follow from (1), can, I think, be easily seen as -follows. It can follow from (1) only if from any proposition of the form</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>p</i> entails (<i>q</i> * <i>r</i>)<br /> -</p> - -<p>there follows the corresponding proposition of the form</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"><i>p</i> * (<i>q</i> entails <i>r</i>),</p> - -<p>And that this is not the case can, I think, be easily seen by -considering the following three propositions. Let <i>p</i> = "All the books -on this shelf are blue," let <i>q</i> = "My copy of the <i>Principles of -Mathematics</i> is a book on this shelf," and let <i>r</i> = "My copy of the -<i>Principles of Mathematics</i> is blue." Now <i>p</i> here does absolutely -<i>entail</i> (<i>q * r</i>). That is to say, it absolutely follows from <i>p</i> -that "My copy of the <i>Principles</i> is on this shelf," and "My copy of -the <i>Principles</i> is <i>not</i> blue," are not, as a matter of fact, both -true. But it by no means follows from this that <i>p</i> * (<i>q</i> entails -<i>r</i>). For what this latter proposition means is "It is not the case -both that <i>p</i> is true and that (<i>q</i> entails <i>r</i>) is false." And, as a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> -matter of fact, (<i>q</i> entails <i>r</i>) is quite certainly false; for from -the proposition "My copy of the <i>Principles</i> is on this shelf" the -proposition "My copy of the <i>Principles</i> is blue" does <i>not</i> follow. It -is simply not the case that the second of these two propositions can be -deduced from the first <i>by itself:</i> it is simply not the case that it -stands to it in the relation in which it does stand to the conjunctive -proposition "All the books on this shelf are blue <i>and,</i> my copy of the -<i>Principles</i> is on this shelf." This conjunctive proposition really -does <i>entail</i> "My copy of the <i>Principles</i> is blue." But "My copy of -the <i>Principles</i> is on this shelf," <i>by itself</i> quite certainly does -not entail "My copy of the Principles is blue." It is simply not the -case that my copy of the Principles <i>couldn't</i> have been on this shelf -without being blue, (<i>q</i> entails <i>r</i>) is, therefore, false. And hence -"<i>p</i> * (<i>q</i> entails <i>r</i>)," can only follow from "<i>p</i> entails (<i>q</i> * -<i>r</i>)," if from this latter proposition <span class="over"><i>p</i></span> follows. But <i>p</i> quite -certainly does not follow from this proposition: from the fact that (<i>q -* r</i>) is deducible from <i>p</i>, it does not in the least follow that <span class="over"><i>p</i></span> -is true. It is, therefore, clearly not the case that every proposition -of the form</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>p</i> entails (<i>q * r</i>)<br /> -</p> - -<p>entails the corresponding proposition of the form</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>p</i> * {<i>q</i> entails <i>r</i>},<br /> -</p> - -<p>since we have found one particular proposition of the first form which -does <i>not</i> entail the corresponding proposition of the second.</p> - -<p>To maintain, therefore, that (2) follows from (1) is mere confusion. -And one source of the confusion is, I think, pretty plain. (1) does -allow you to assert that, if AP is true, then the proposition "<span class="over"><i>y</i>P</span> -* {(<span class="over"><i>y</i> = A</span>)}" <i>must</i> be true. What the "must" here expresses is -merely that this proposition follows from AP, not that it is in itself -a necessary proposition. But it is supposed, through<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> confusion, that -what is asserted is that it is not the case both that AP is true -and that "<span class="over"><i>y</i>P</span> * (<span class="over"><i>y</i> = A</span>)" is not, <i>in itself,</i> a necessary -proposition; that is to say, it is supposed that what is asserted is -"AP + {<span class="over"><i>y</i>P</span> entails (<span class="over"><i>y</i> = A</span>)}"; since to say that -"<span class="over"><i>y</i>P</span> * (<span class="over"><i>y</i> = A</span>)" is, <i>in itself</i>, a necessary proposition is the same thing as to -say that "<span class="over"><i>y</i>P</span> entails (<span class="over"><i>y</i> = A</span>)" is also true. In fact it seems -to me pretty plain that what is meant by saying of propositions of -the form "<i>x</i>P * <i>x</i>Q" that they are <i>necessary</i> (or "apodeictic") -propositions, is merely that the corresponding proposition of the -form "<i>x</i>P entails <i>x</i>Q" is also true, "<i>x</i>P <i>entails</i> <i>x</i>Q" is not -<i>itself</i> a necessary proposition; but, if "<i>x</i>P entails <i>x</i>Q" is -<i>true,</i> then "<i>x</i>P * <i>x</i>Q" is a necessary proposition—and a necessary -truth, since no false propositions are necessary in themselves. Thus -what is meant by saying that "Whatever is a right angle, is also an -angle" is a necessary truth, is, so far as I can see, simply that the -proposition "(<i>x</i> is a right angle) entails (<i>x</i> is an angle)" is -also true. This seems to me to give what has, in fact, been generally -meant in philosophy by "necessary truths," <i>e.g.</i> by Leibniz; and -to point out the distinction between them and those true universal -propositions which are "mere matters of fact." And if we want to extend -the meaning of the name "necessary truth" in such a way that some -singular propositions may also be said to be "necessary truths," we -can, I think, easily do it as follows. We can say that AP is itself -a necessary truth, if and only if the universal proposition "(<i>x</i> = -A) * <i>x</i>P" (which, as we have seen, follows from AP) is a necessary -truth: that is to say, if and only if (<i>x</i> = A) entails <i>x</i>P. With -this definition, what the dogma of internal relations asserts is that -in every case in which a given thing actually has a given relational -property, the fact<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> that it has that property is a necessary truth; -whereas what I am asserting is that, if the property in question is -an "internal" property, then the fact in question will be a necessary -truth, whereas if the property in question is "external," then the fact -in question will be a mere "matter of fact."</p> - -<p>So much for the distinction between (1) which is true, and (2), or -the dogma of internal relations, which I hold to be false. But I said -above, in passing, that my contention that (2) does not follow from -(1), involves the rejection of certain views that have sometimes been -held as to the meaning of "follows"; and I think it is worth while to -say something about this.</p> - -<p>It is obvious that the possibility of maintaining that (2) does not -follow from (1), depends upon its being true that from "<i>x</i>P * <i>x</i>Q" -the proposition "<i>x</i>P entails <i>x</i>Q" does not follow. And this has -sometimes been disputed, and is, I think, often not clearly seen.</p> - -<p>To begin with, Mr. Russell, in the <i>Principles of Mathematics</i> (p. 34), -treats the phrase "<i>q</i> can be deduced from <i>p</i>" as if it meant exactly -the same thing as "<i>p * q</i>" or "<i>p</i> materially implies <i>q</i>"; and has -repeated the same error elsewhere, <i>e.g.</i> in <i>Philosophical Essays</i> -(p. 166), where he is discussing what <i>he</i> calls the axiom of internal -relations. And I am afraid a good many people have been led to suppose -that, since Mr. Russell has said this, it must be true. If it were -true, then, of course, it would be impossible to distinguish between -(1) and (2), and it would follow that, since (1) certainly is true, -what I am calling the dogma of internal relations is true too. But I -imagine that Mr. Russell himself would now be willing to admit that, so -far from being true, the statement that "<i>q</i> can be deduced from <i>p</i>" -means the same as "<i>p</i> * <i>q</i>" is simply an enormous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span> "howler"; and I do -not think I need spend any time in trying to show that it is so.</p> - -<p>But it may be held that, though "<i>p</i> entails <i>q</i>" does not mean the -same as "<i>p * q</i>," yet nevertheless from "<i>x</i>P * <i>x</i>Q" the proposition -"<i>x</i>P entails <i>x</i>Q" does follow, for a somewhat more subtle reason; -and, if this were so, it would again follow that what I am calling the -dogma of internal relations must be true. It may be held, namely, that -though "AP entails AQ" does not mean simply "AP * AQ" yet what it does -mean is simply the conjunction "AP * AQ <i>and</i> this proposition is an -instance of a true formal implication" (the phrase "formal implication" -being understood in Mr. Russell's sense, in which "<i>x</i>P * <i>x</i>Q" asserts -a formal implication). This view as to what "AP entails AQ" means, -has, for instance, if I understand him rightly, been asserted by Mr. -O. Strachey in <i>Mind,</i> N.S., 93. And the same view has been frequently -suggested (though I do not know that he has actually asserted it) by -Mr. Russell himself (<i>e.g., Principia Mathematica,</i> p. 21). If this -view were true, then, though "<i>x</i>P entails <i>x</i>Q" would not be identical -in meaning with "<i>x</i>P * <i>x</i>Q," yet it would follow from it; since, if</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<i>x</i>P * <i>x</i>Q<br /> -</p> - -<p>were true, then every particular assertion of the form AP * AQ, would -not only be true, but would be an instance of a true formal implication -(namely "<i>x</i>P * <i>x</i>Q") and this, according to the proposed definition, -is all that "<i>x</i>P entails <i>x</i>Q" asserts. If, therefore, it were true, -it would again follow that all relational properties must be internal. -But that this view also is untrue appears to me perfectly obvious. The -proposition that I am in this room does "materially imply" that I am -more than five years old, since both are true;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> and the assertion that -it does is also an instance of a true formal implication, since it is -in fact true that all the persons in this room are more than five years -old; but nothing appears to me more obvious than that the second of -these two propositions can <i>not</i> be deduced from the first—that the -kind of relation which holds between the premisses and conclusion of -a syllogism in <i>Barbara</i> does <i>not</i> hold between them. To put it in -another way: it seems to me quite obvious that the properties "being -a person in this room" and "being more than five years old" are not -related in the kind of way in which "being a right angle" <i>is</i> related -to "being an angle," and which we express by saying that, in the case -of every term, the proposition that that term is an angle can be -deduced from the proposition that it is a right angle.</p> - -<p>These are the only two suggestions as to the meaning of "<i>p</i> entails -<i>q</i>" known to me, which, if true, would yield the result that (2) -does follow from (1), and that therefore all relational properties -are internal; and both of these, it seems to me, are obviously -false. All other suggested meanings, so far as I know, would leave -it true that (2) does not follow from (1), and therefore that I may -possibly be right in maintaining that some relational properties are -external. It might, for instance, be suggested that the last proposed -definition should be amended as follows—that we should say: "<i>p</i> -entails <i>q</i>" means "<i>p * q and</i> this proposition is an instance of a -formal implication, which is not merely true but <i>self-evident,</i> like -the laws of Formal Logic." This proposed definition would avoid the -paradoxes involved in Mr. Strachey's definition, since such true formal -implications as "all the persons in this room are more than five years -old" are certainly not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> self-evident; and, so far as I. can see, it may -state something which is in fact true of <i>p</i> and <i>q,</i> whenever and only -when <i>p</i> entails <i>q.</i> I do not myself think that it gives the <i>meaning</i> -of "<i>p</i> entails <i>q,</i>" since the kind of relation which I see to hold -between the premisses and conclusion of a syllogism seems to me to be -one which is purely "objective" in the sense that no psychological -term, such as is involved in the meaning of "self-evident," is involved -in its definition (if it has one). I am not, however, concerned to -dispute that some such definition of "<i>p</i> entails <i>q</i>" as this may be -true. Since it is evident that, even if it were, my proposition that -"<i>x</i>P entails <i>x</i>Q" does <i>not</i> follow from "<i>x</i>P * <i>x</i>Q," would still -be true; and hence also my contention that (2) does not follow from (1).</p> - -<p>So much by way of arguing that we are not bound to hold that all -relational properties are internal in the particular sense, with which -we are now concerned, in which to say that they are means that in every -case in which a thing A has a relational property, it follows from the -proposition that a term has <i>not</i> got that property that the term in -question is <i>other</i> than A. But I have gone further and asserted that -some relational properties certainly are <i>not</i> internal. And in defence -of this proposition I do not know that I have anything to say but that -it seems to me evident in many cases that a term which <i>has</i> a certain -relational property <i>might</i> quite well not have had it: that, for -instance, from the mere proposition that this is this, it by no means -follows that this has to other things all the relations which it in -fact has. Everybody, of course, must admit that if all the propositions -which assert of it that it has these properties, do in fact follow from -the proposition that this is this, we cannot see that they do. And so -far as I can see, there is no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> reason of any kind for asserting that -they do, except the confusion which I have exposed. But it seems to me -further that we can see in many cases that the proposition that this -has that relation does <i>not</i> follow from the fact that it is this: -that, for instance, the proposition that Edward VII was father of -George V <i>is</i> a <i>mere</i> matter of fact.</p> - -<p>I want now to return for a moment to that other meaning of "internal," -(<a href="#Page_286">p. 286</a>) in which to say that P is internal to A means not merely that -anything which had not P would necessarily be <i>other</i> than A, but that -it would necessarily be <i>qualitatively</i> different. I said that this -was the meaning of "internal" in which the dogma of internal relations -holds that all relational properties are "internal"; and that one of -the most important consequences which followed from it, was that all -relational properties are "internal" in the less extreme sense that -we have just been considering. But, if I am not mistaken, there is -another important consequence which also follows from it, namely, the -Identity of Indiscernibles. For if it be true, in the case of every -relational property, that any term which had net that property would -necessarily be qualitatively different from any which had, it follows -of course that, in the case of two terms one of which has a relational -property, which the other has not the two are qualitatively different. -But, from the proposition that <i>x</i> is other than <i>y,</i> it <i>does</i> follow -that <i>x</i> has some relational property which <i>y</i> has not; and hence, -if the dogma of internal relations be true, it will follow that if -<i>x</i> is other than <i>y, x</i> is always also qualitatively different from -<i>y,</i> which is the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. This is, of -course, a further objection to the dogma of internal relations, since I -think it is obvious that the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is -not true. Indeed, so far as I can see, the dogma of internal relations -essentially consists in the joint assertion of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> two indefensible -propositions: (1) the proposition that in the case of no relational -property is it true of any term which has got that property, that it -<i>might</i> not have had it and (2) the Identity of Indiscernibles.</p> - -<p>I want, finally, to say something about the phrase which Mr. Russell -uses in the <i>Philosophical Essays</i> to express the dogma of internal -relations. He says it may be expressed in the form "Every relation is -grounded in the natures of the related terms" (p. 160). And it can be -easily seen, if the account which I have given be true, in what precise -sense it does hold this. Mr. Russell is uncertain as to whether by "the -nature" of a term is to be understood the term itself or something -else. For my part it seems to me that by a term's nature is meant, not -the term itself, but what may roughly be called all its qualities as -distinguished from its relational properties. But whichever meaning -we take, it will follow from what I have said, that the dogma of -internal relations does imply that every relational property which a -term has is, in a perfectly precise sense, <i>grounded</i> in its nature. -It will follow that every such property is <i>grounded</i> in <i>the term,</i> -in the sense that, in the case of every such property, it <i>follows</i> -from the mere proposition that that term is that term that it has the -property in question. And it will also follow that any such property -is grounded in the qualities which the term has, in the sense, that if -you take <i>all</i> the qualities which the term has, it will again follow -in the case of each relational property, from the proposition that the -term has <i>all</i> those qualities that it has the relational property in -question; since this is implied by the proposition that in the case of -any such property, any term which had not had it would necessarily have -been different in quality from the term in question. In both of these -two senses, then, the dogma of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span> internal relations does, I think, imply -that every relational property is grounded in the nature of every term -which possesses it; and in this sense that proposition is false. Yet -it is worth noting, I think, that there is another sense of "grounded" -in which it may quite well be true that every relational property <i>is</i> -grounded in the nature of any term which possesses it. Namely that, in -the case of every such property, the term in question has some quality -<i>without</i> which it could not have had the property. In other words that -the relational property <i>entails</i> some quality in the term, though no -quality in the term <i>entails</i> the relational property.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="THE_NATURE_OF_MORAL_PHILOSOPHY" id="THE_NATURE_OF_MORAL_PHILOSOPHY">THE NATURE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY</a></h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>I should like, if I can, to interest you to-night in one particular -question about Moral Philosophy. It is a question which resembles most -philosophical questions, in respect of the fact that philosophers are -by no means agreed as to what is the right answer to it: some seem to -be very strongly convinced that one answer is correct, while others are -equally strongly convinced of the opposite. For my own part I do feel -some doubt as to which answer is the right one, although, as you will -see, I incline rather strongly to one of the two alternatives. I should -like very much, if I could, to find some considerations which seemed to -me absolutely convincing on the one side or the other; for the question -seems to me in itself to be an exceedingly interesting one.</p> - -<p>I have said that the question is a question <i>about</i> Moral Philosophy; -and it seems to me in fact to be a very large and general question -which affects the whole of Moral Philosophy. In asking it, we are doing -no less than asking what it is that people are doing when they study -Moral Philosophy at all: we are asking what sort of questions it is -which it is the business of Moral Philosophy to discuss and try to -find the right answer to. But I intend, for the sake of simplicity, -to confine myself to asking it in two particular instances. Moral -Philosophy has, in fact,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> to discuss a good many different ideas; -and though I think this same question may be raised with regard to -them all, I intend to pick out two, which seem to me particularly -fundamental, and to ask it with regard to them only.</p> - -<p>My first business must be to explain what these two ideas are.</p> - -<p>The name Moral Philosophy naturally suggests that what is meant is a -department of philosophy which has something to do with morality. And -we all understand roughly what is meant by morality. We are accustomed -to the distinction between moral good and evil, on the one hand, and -what is sometimes called physical good and evil on the other. We all -make the distinction between a man's moral character, on the one hand, -and his agreeableness or intellectual endowments, on the other. We feel -that to accuse a man of immoral conduct is quite a different thing from -accusing him merely of bad taste or bad manners, or from accusing him -merely of stupidity or ignorance. And no less clearly we distinguish -between the idea of being under a moral obligation to do a thing, and -the idea of being merely under a legal obligation to do it. It is a -commonplace that the sphere of morality is much wider than the sphere -of law: that we are morally bound to do and avoid many things, which -are not enjoined or forbidden by the laws of our country; and it is -also sometimes held that, if a particular law is unjust or immoral, it -may even be a moral duty to disobey it—that is to say that there may -be a positive conflict between moral and legal obligation; and the mere -fact that this is held, whether truly or falsely, shows, at all events, -that the one idea is quite distinct from the other.</p> - -<p>The name Moral Philosophy, then, naturally suggests that it is a -department of philosophy concerned with morality in this common sense.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> -And it is, in fact, true that one large department of Moral Philosophy -is so concerned. But it would be a mistake to think that the whole -subject is <i>only</i> concerned with morality. Another important department -of it is, as I shall try to show, concerned with ideas which are <i>not</i> -moral ideas, in this ordinary sense, though, no doubt, they may have -something to do with them. And of the two ideas which I propose to -pick out for discussion, while one of them is a moral idea, the other -belongs to that department of Moral Philosophy, which is not concerned -solely with morality, and is not, I think, properly speaking, a moral -idea at all.</p> - -<p>Let us begin with the one of the two, which is a moral idea.</p> - -<p>The particular moral idea which I propose to pick out for discussion -is the one which I have called above the idea of moral obligation—the -idea of being morally bound to act in a particular way on a particular -occasion. But what is, so far as I can see, precisely the same idea -is also called by several other names. To say that I am under a moral -obligation to do a certain thing is, I think, clearly to say the same -thing as what we commonly express by saying that I ought to do it, -or that it is my duty to do it. That is to say, the idea of moral -obligation is identical with the idea of the moral "ought" and with the -idea of duty. And it also seems at first sight as if we might make yet -another identification.</p> - -<p>The assertion that I ought to do a certain thing seems as if it meant -much the same as the assertion that it would be wrong of me <i>not</i> to do -the thing in question: at all events it is quite clear that, whenever -it is my duty to do anything, it would be wrong of me not to do it, -and that whenever it would be wrong of me to do anything, then it is -my duty to refrain from doing it. In the case of these two ideas, the -idea of what is wrong, and the idea of what is my duty or what I ought -to do, different<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> views may be taken as to whether the one is more -fundamental than the other, or whether both are equally so; and on -the question: <i>If</i> one of the two is more fundamental than the other, -which of the two is so? Thus some people would say, that the idea of -"wrong" is the more fundamental, and that the idea of "duty" is to be -defined in terms of it: that, in fact, the statement "It is my duty to -keep that promise" merely means "It would be wrong of me not to keep -it"; and the statement "It is my duty not to tell a lie" merely means -"It would be wrong of me to tell one." Others again would apparently -say just the opposite: that duty is the more fundamental notion, and -"wrong" is to be defined in terms of it. While others perhaps would -hold that neither is more fundamental than the other; that both are -equally fundamental, and that the statement "it would be wrong to do so -and so" is only equivalent to, not identical in meaning with, "I ought -not to do it." But whichever of these three views be the true one, -there is, I think, no doubt whatever about the equivalence notion of -the two ideas; and no doubt, therefore, that whatever answer be given -to the question I am going to raise about the one, the same answer must -be given to the corresponding question about the other.</p> - -<p>The moral idea, then, which I propose to discuss, is the idea of duty -or moral obligation, or, what comes to the same thing, the idea of what -is wrong—morally wrong. Everybody would agree that this idea—or, to -speak more accurately, one or both of these two ideas—is among the -most fundamental of our moral ideas, whether or not they would admit -that all others, for example the ideas of moral goodness, involve a -reference to this one in their definition, or would hold that we have -some others which are independent of it, and equally fundamental with -it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span></p> - -<p>But there is a good deal of difficulty in getting clear as to what this -idea of moral obligation itself is. Is there in fact only one idea -which we call by this name? Or is it possible that on some occasions -when we say that so and so is a duty, we mean something different by -this expression from what we do on others? And that similarly when -we say that so and so is morally wrong, we sometimes use this name -"morally wrong" for one idea and sometimes for another; so that one -and the same thing may be "morally wrong" in one sense of the word, -and yet <i>not</i> morally wrong in another? I think, in fact, there are -two different senses in which we use these terms; and to point out the -difference between them, will help to bring out clearly more the nature -of each. And I think perhaps the difference can be brought out most -clearly by considering the sort of moral rules with which we are all of -us familiar.</p> - -<p>Everybody knows that moral teachers are largely concerned in laying -down moral rules, and in disputing the truth of rules which have been -previously accepted. And moral rules seem to consist, to a very large -extent, in assertions to the effect that it is always wrong to do -certain actions or to refrain from doing certain others; or (what comes -to the same thing) that it is always your duty to refrain from certain -actions, and positively to do certain others. The Ten Commandments for -example, are instances of moral rules; and most of them are examples -of what are called negative rules—that is to say rules which assert -merely that it is wrong to do certain positive actions, and therefore -our duty to refrain from these actions; instead of rules which assert -of certain positive actions, that it is our duty to do them and -therefore wrong to refrain from doing them. The fifth commandment, -which tells us to honour<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> our father and mother, is apparently an -exception; it seems to be a positive rule. It is not, like the others, -expressed in the negative form "Thou shalt <i>not</i> do so and so," and -it is apparently really meant to assert that we ought to do certain -positive actions, not merely that there are some positive action from -which we ought to refrain. The difference between this one and the -rest will thus serve as an example of the difference between positive -and negative moral rules, a difference which is sometimes treated as -if it were of great importance. And I do not wish to deny that there -may be some important difference between seeing only that certain -positive actions are wrong, and seeing also that, in certain cases, to -refrain from doing certain actions is just as wrong as positively to -do certain others. But this distinction between positive and negative -rules is certainly of much less importance than another which is, I -think, liable to be confused with it. So far as this distinction goes -it is only a distinction between an assertion that it is wrong to do a -positive action and an assertion that it is wrong to refrain from doing -one: and each of these assertions is equivalent to one which asserts -a duty—the first with an assertion that it is a duty to refrain, the -second with an assertion that a positive action is a duty. But there is -another distinction between some moral rules and others, which is of -much greater importance than this one, and which does, I think, give a -reason for thinking that the term "moral obligation" is actually used -in different senses on different occasions.</p> - -<p>I have said that moral rules seem to consist, <i>to a large extent</i>, -in assertions to the effect that it is always wrong to do certain -<i>actions</i> or to refrain from doing certain others, or the equivalent -assertions in terms of duty. But there is a large<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> class of moral -rules, with which we are all of us very familiar, which do not come -under this definition. They are rules which are concerned not with our -<i>actions</i>, in the natural sense of the word, but with our feelings, -thoughts and desires. An illustration of this kind of rule can again -be given from the Ten Commandments. Most of the ten, as we all know, -are concerned merely with actions; but the tenth at least is clearly -an exception. The tenth says "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's -house, nor his wife, nor his servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor -anything that is his," and, unless "covet" is merely a mistranslation -of a word which stands for some kind of action, we plainly have here a -rule which is concerned with our <i>feelings</i> and not with our actions. -And one reason which makes the distinction between rules of this kind -and rules concerned with actions important, is that our feelings are -not, as a rule, directly within the control of our will in the sense in -which many of our actions are. I cannot, for instance, by any single -act of will directly prevent from arising in my mind a desire for -something that belongs to some one else, even if, when once the desire -has arrived, I can by my will prevent its continuance; and even this -last I can hardly do <i>directly</i> but only by forcing myself to attend -to other considerations which may extinguish the desire. But though -I thus cannot prevent myself altogether from coveting my neighbour's -possessions, I can altogether prevent myself from stealing them. The -action of stealing, and the feeling of covetousness, are clearly on a -very different level in this respect. The action is <i>directly</i> within -the control of my will, whereas the feeling is not. <i>If</i> I will not -to take the thing (though of course some people may find a great -difficulty in willing this) it does in general follow directly that I -do not take it;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> whereas, it I will not to desire it, it emphatically -does not, even in general, follow directly that no desire for it will -be there. This distinction between the way in which our feelings and -our actions are under the control of our wills is, I think, a very -real one indeed; we cannot help constantly recognising that it exists. -And it has an important bearing on the distinction between those moral -rules which deal with actions and those which deal with feelings, for -the following reason. The philosopher Kant laid down a well-known -proposition to the effect that "ought" implies "can": that is to say, -that it cannot be true that you "ought" to do a thing, unless it is -true that you <i>could</i> do it, <i>if</i> you chose. And as regards one of -the senses in which we commonly use the words "ought" and "duty," I -think this rule is plainly true. When we say absolutely of ourselves -or others, "I ought to do so and so" or "you ought to," we imply, -I think, very often that the thing in question is a thing which we -<i>could</i> do, <i>if</i> we chose; though of course it may often be a thing -which it is very difficult to choose to do. Thus it is clear that I -cannot truly say of anyone that he ought to do a certain thing, if it -is a thing which it is physically impossible for him to do, however -desirable it may be that the thing should be done. And in this sense it -is clear that it cannot be truly said of me that I ought not to have a -certain feeling, or that I ought not to have had it, if it is a feeling -which I could not, by any effort of my will, prevent myself from -having. The having or the prevention of a certain feeling is not, of -course, strictly ever a <i>physical</i> impossibility, but it is very often -impossible, in exactly the same sense, in which actions are physically -impossible—that is to say that I could not possibly get it or prevent -it, even if I would. But this being so, it is plain that such a -moral rule as that I ought not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> to covet my neighbour's possessions -is, if it means to assert that I ought not, in that sense in which -"ought" implies "can," a rule which cannot possibly be true. What it -appears to assert is, absolutely universally, of <i>every</i> feeling of -covetousness, that the feeling in question is one which the person who -felt it <i>ought</i> not to have felt. But in fact a very large proportion -of such feelings (I am inclined to say the vast majority) are feelings -which the person who felt them could not have prevented feeling, if he -would: they were beyond the control of his will. And hence it is quite -emphatically <i>not</i> true that none of these feelings <i>ought</i> to have -been felt, if we are using "ought" in the sense which implies that the -person who felt them <i>could</i> have avoided them. So far from its being -true that absolutely <i>none</i> of them ought to have been felt, this is -only true of those among them, probably a small minority, which the -person who felt them <i>could</i> have avoided feeling. If, therefore, moral -rules with regard to feelings are to have a chance of being <i>nearly</i> -true, we must understand the "ought" which occurs in them in some -other sense. But with moral rules that refer to actions the case is -very different. Take stealing for example. Here again what the Eighth -Commandment appears to imply is that absolutely every theft which has -ever occurred was an act which the agent ought not to have done; and, -if the "ought" is the one which implies "can," it implies, therefore, -that every theft was an act which the agent, if he had chosen, could -have avoided. And this statement that every theft which has been -committed was an act which the thief, <i>if</i> he had so willed, could -have avoided, though it may be doubted if it is absolutely universally -true, is not a statement which is clearly absurd, like the statement -that every covetous desire could have been avoided by the will of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> -person who felt it. It is probable that the vast majority of acts of -theft have been acts which it was in the power of the thief to avoid, -if he had willed to do so; whereas this is clearly not true of the vast -majority of covetous desires. It is, therefore, quite possible that -those who believe we ought never to steal are using "ought" in a sense -which implies that stealing always <i>could</i> have been avoided; whereas -it is I think quite certain that many of those who believe that we -ought to avoid all covetous desires, do not believe for a moment that -every covetous desire that has ever been felt was a desire which the -person who felt it could have avoided feeling, if he had chosen. And -yet they certainly do believe, in some sense or other, that no covetous -desire <i>ought</i> ever to have been felt. The conclusion is, therefore, -it seems to me, unavoidable that we do use "ought," the moral "ought," -in two different senses; the one a sense in which to say that I ought -to have done so and so does really imply that I could have done it, -if I had chosen, and the other a sense in which it carries with it no -such implication. I think perhaps the difference between the two can be -expressed in this way. If we express the meaning of the first "ought," -the one which does imply "can," by saying that "I ought to have done -so and so" means "It actually <i>was</i> my duty to do it"; we can express -the meaning of the second by saying that <i>e.g.</i> "I ought not to have -felt so and so" means <i>not</i> "it <i>was</i> my duty to avoid that feeling," -but "it <i>would</i> have been my duty to avoid it, <i>if</i> I had been able." -And corresponding to these two meanings of "ought" we should, I think, -probably distinguish two different sorts of moral rules, which though -expressed in the same language, do in fact mean very different things. -The one is a set of rules which assert (whether truly or falsely) -that it always actually <i>is</i> a duty to do or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> to refrain from certain -actions, and assert therefore that it always is in the power of the -agent's will to do or to refrain from them; whereas the other sort only -assert that so and so <i>would</i> be a duty, if it <i>were</i> within our power, -without at all asserting that it always is within our power.</p> - -<p>We may, perhaps, give a name to the distinction I mean, by calling the -first kind of rules—those which do assert that something actually is -a duty—"rules of duty," and by calling the second kind—those which -recommend or condemn something not in the control of our wills—"ideal -rules": choosing this latter name because they can be said to inculcate -a moral "ideal"—something the attainment of which is not directly -within the power of our wills. As a further example of the difference -between ideal rules and rules of duty we may take the famous passage -from the New Testament (Luke 6, 27) "Love your enemies, do good to -them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that -despitefully use you." Of these four rules, the three last may be -rules of duty, because they refer to things which are plainly, as a -rule, at least, in the power of your will; but the first, if "love" -be understood in its natural sense as referring to your feelings, is -plainly only an "ideal" rule, since such feelings are obviously not -directly under our own control, in the same way in which such actions -as doing good to, blessing or praying for a person are so. To love -certain people, or to feel no anger against them, is a thing which -it is quite impossible to attain directly by will, or perhaps ever -to attain completely at all. Whereas your behaviour towards them is -a matter within your own control: even if you hate a person, or feel -angry with him, you can so control yourself as not to do him harm, and -even to confer benefits upon him. To do good to your enemies may, then, -really be your duty; but it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> cannot, in the strict sense, be your duty -not to have evil feelings towards them: all that can possibly be true -is that it would be your duty if you were able. Yet I think there can -be no doubt that what Christ meant to condemn was the occurrence of -such feelings altogether; and since, if what he meant to assert about -them in condemning them, would have been certainly false, if he had -meant to say that you <i>could</i> avoid ever feeling them, I think it is -clear that what he meant to assert was <i>not</i> this, or not this only, -but something else, which may quite possibly be true. That is to say, -he was asserting an ideal rule, not merely a rule of duty.</p> - -<p>It will be seen that this distinction which I am making coincides, -roughly at all events, with the distinction which is often expressed -as the distinction between rules which tell you what you ought to -<i>be</i> and rules which tell you merely what you ought to <i>do</i>; or as -the distinction between rules which are concerned with your inner -life—with your thoughts and feelings—and those which are concerned -only with your external actions. The rules which are concerned with -what you ought to <i>be</i> or with your inner life are, for the most part -at all events, "ideal" rules; while those which are concerned with what -you ought to do or your external actions are very often, at least, -rules of duty. And it is often said that one great difference between -the New Testament and the Old is its comparatively greater insistence -on "ideal" rules—upon a change of heart—as opposed to mere rules of -duty. And that there is a comparatively greater insistence on ideal -rules I do not wish to deny. But that there are plenty of ideal rules -in the Old Testament too must not be forgotten. I have already given an -example from the Ten Commandments: namely the rule which says you ought -not to covet anything which belongs to your neighbour. And another -is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> supplied by the Old Testament commandment, "Love thy neighbour as -thyself," if by "love" is here meant a feeling which is not within our -own control, and not merely that the Jew is to <i>help</i> other Jews by his -external actions. Indeed, however great may be the difference between -the Old Testament and the New in respect of comparative insistence on -ideal rules rather than rules of duty, I am inclined to think that -there is at least as great a difference, illustrated by this very rule, -in another, quite different, respect—namely in the kind of rules, -<i>both ideal and of duty,</i> which are insisted on. For whereas by "thy -neighbour" in the Old Testament there is plainly meant only other Jews, -and it is not conceived either that it is the duty of a Jew to help -foreigners in general, or an ideal for him to love them; in the New -Testament, where the same words are used, "my neighbour" plainly is -meant to include all mankind. And this distinction between the view -that beneficent action and benevolent feelings should be confined to -those of our own nation, and the view that both should be extended -equally to all mankind,—a distinction which has nothing to do with -the distinction between being and doing, between inner and outer, but -affects both equally—is, I am inclined to think, at least as important -a difference between New Testament and Old, as the comparatively -greater insistence on "ideal" rules. However, the point upon which I -want at present to insist is the distinction between ideal rules and -rules of duty. Both kinds are commonly included among moral rules, -and, as my examples have shown, are often mentioned together as if no -great difference were seen between them. What I want to insist on is -that there is a great difference between them: that whereas rules of -duty do directly assert of the idea of duty, in the sense in which to -say that something is your duty implies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> that you <i>can</i> do it, that -certain things are duties, the "ideal" rules do <i>not</i> assert this, but -something different. Yet the "ideal" rules certainly do, in a sense, -assert a "moral obligation." And hence we have to recognise that the -phrase "moral obligation" is not merely a name for one idea only, but -for two very different ideas; and the same will, of course, be true of -the corresponding phrase "morally wrong."</p> - -<p>When, therefore, I say that the idea of "moral obligation" is one of -the fundamental ideas with which Moral Philosophy is concerned, I think -we must admit that this one name really stands for two different ideas. -But it does not matter for my purpose which of the two you take. Each -of them is undoubtedly a moral idea, and whatever answer be given to -the question we are going to raise about the one, will also certainly -apply to the other.</p> - -<p>But it is now time to turn to the other idea, with which I said that -Moral Philosophy has been largely concerned, though it is not, strictly -speaking, a moral idea, at all.</p> - -<p>And I think, perhaps, a good way of bringing out what this idea is, -is to refer to the Ethics of Aristotle. Everybody would admit that -the fundamental idea, with which Aristotle's Ethics is concerned, is -an idea which it is the business of Moral Philosophy to discuss; and -yet I think it is quite plain that this idea is not a moral idea at -all. Aristotle does not set out from' the idea of moral obligation -or duty (indeed throughout his treatise he only mentions this idea -quite incidentally); nor even from the idea of moral goodness or moral -excellence, though he has a good deal more to say about that; but -from the idea of what he calls "the human good," or "good for man." -He starts by raising the question what the good for man <i>is,</i> and his -whole book is arranged in the form of giving a detailed answer to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span> that -question. And I think we can gather pretty well what the idea is, which -he calls by this name, by considering what he says about it. There -are two points, in particular, which he insists upon from the outset: -first, that nothing can be good, in the sense he means, unless it is -something which is worth having for its own sake, and not merely for -the sake of something else; it must be good <i>in itself</i>; it must not, -like wealth (to use one example which he gives) be worth having merely -for the sake of what you can do with it; it must be a thing which is -worth having even if nothing further comes of it. And secondly (what -partly covers the former, but also, I think, says something more) it -must, he says, be something that is "self-sufficient": something which, -even if you had nothing else would make your life worth having. And -further light is thrown upon his meaning when he comes to tell you -what he thinks the good for man is: the good, he says, is "mental, -activity—where such activity is of an excellent kind, or, if there -are several different kinds of excellent mental activity, that which -has the best and most perfect kind of excellence; and also" (he -significantly adds) "mental activity which lasts through a sufficiently -long life." The word which I have here translated "excellence" is what -is commonly translated "virtue"; but it does not mean quite the same -as we mean by "virtue," and that in a very important respect. "Virtue" -has come to mean exclusively <i>moral</i> excellence; and if that were all -Aristotle meant, you might think that what he means by "good" came -very near being a moral idea. But it turns out that he includes among -"excellences," intellectual excellence, and even that he thinks that -the best and most perfect excellence of which he speaks is a particular -kind of intellectual excellence, which no one would think of calling a -moral quality, namely, the sort of excellence which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span> makes a man a good -philosopher. And as for the word which I have translated "activity," -the meaning of this can be best brought out by mentioning the reason -which Aristotle himself gives for saying that mere excellence itself is -not (as some of the Greeks had said) the good for man. He says, truly -enough, that a man may possess the greatest excellence—he may be a -very excellent man—even when he is asleep, or is doing nothing; and -he points out that the possession of excellence when you are asleep -is not a thing that is desirable <i>for its own sake</i>—obviously only -for the sake of the effects it may produce when you wake up. It is not -therefore, he thinks, mere mental excellence, but the <i>active exercise</i> -of mental excellence—the state of a man's mind, when he not only -possesses excellent faculties, moral or intellectual, but is actively -engaged in using them, which really constitutes the human good.</p> - -<p>Now, when Aristotle talks of "the good for man," there is, I think, as -my quotation is sufficient to show, a certain confusion in his mind -between what is <i>good</i> for man and what is <i>best</i> for man. What he -really holds is that <i>any</i> mental activity which exhibits excellence -and is pleasurable is <i>a</i> good; and when he adds that, if there are -many excellences, <i>the</i> good must be mental activity which exhibits -the <i>best</i> of them, and that it must last through a sufficiently long -life, he only means that this is necessary if a man is to get the -<i>best</i> he can get, not that this is the <i>only</i> good he can get. And -the idea which I wish to insist on is not, therefore, the idea of -"<i>the</i> human good," but the more fundamental idea of "good "; the idea, -with regard to which he holds that the working of our minds in some -excellent fashion is the only good thing that any of us can possess; -and the idea of which "better" is the comparative, when he says that -mental activity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> which exhibits some sorts of excellence is <i>better</i> -than mental activity which exhibits others, though both are good, and -that excellent mental activity continued over a longer time is <i>better</i> -than the same continued for a shorter. This idea of what is "good," in -the sense in which Aristotle uses it in these cases, is an idea which -we all of us constantly use, and which is certainly an idea which it -is the business of Moral Philosophy to discuss, though it is not a -moral idea. The main difficulty with regard to it is to distinguish it -clearly from other senses in which we use the same word. For, when we -say that a thing is "good," or one thing "better" than another, we by -no means always mean that it is better in this sense. Often, when we -call a thing good we are not attributing to it any characteristic which -it would possess <i>if it existed quite alone,</i> and if nothing further -were to come of it; but are merely saying of it that it is a sort of -thing from which other good things do in fact come, or which is such -that, when accompanied by other things, the whole thus formed is "good" -in Aristotle's sense, although, by itself, it is not. Thus a man may -be "good," and his character may be "good," and yet neither are "good" -in this fundamental sense, in which goodness is a characteristic which -a thing would possess, if it existed quite alone. For, as Aristotle -says, a good man may exist, and may have a good character, even when -he is fast asleep; and yet if there were nothing in the Universe but -good men, with good characters, all fast asleep, there would be nothing -in it which was "good" in the fundamental sense with which we are -concerned. Thus "moral goodness," in the sense of good character, as -distinguished from the actual working of a good character in various -forms of mental activity, is certainly not "good" in the sense in which -good means "good for its own<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span> sake." And even with regard to the actual -exercise of certain forms of moral excellence, it seems to me that in -estimating the value of such exercise relatively to other things, we -are apt to take into account, not merely its intrinsic value—the sort -of value which it would possess, if it existed quite alone—but also -its effects: we rate it higher than we should do if we were considering -only its intrinsic value, because we take into account the other good -things which we know are apt to flow from it. Certain things which -have intrinsic value are distinguished from others, by the fact that -more good consequences are apt to flow from them; and where this is -the case, we are apt, I think, quite unjustly, to think that their -intrinsic value must be higher too. One thing, I think, is clear about -intrinsic value—goodness in Aristotle's sense—namely that it is only -actual occurrences, actual states of things over a certain period of -time—not such things as men, or characters, or material things, that -can have any intrinsic value at all. But even this is not sufficient to -distinguish intrinsic value clearly from other sorts of goodness: since -even in the case of actual occurrences, we often call them good or bad -for the sake of their effects or their promise of effects. Thus we -all hope that the state of things in England, as a whole, will really -be better some day than it has been in the past—that there will be -progress and improvement: we hope, for instance, that, if we consider -the whole of the lives lived in England during some year in the next -century, it may turn out that the state of things, as a whole, during -that year will be really better than it ever has been in any past year. -And when we use "better" in this way—in the sense in which progress -or improvement means a change to a <i>better</i> state of things—we are -certainly thinking partly of a state of things which has a greater<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> -intrinsic value. And we certainly do not mean by improvement merely -<i>moral</i> improvement. An improvement in moral conditions, other things -being equal, may no doubt be a gain in intrinsic value; but we should -certainly hold that, moral conditions being equal, there is yet room -for improvement in other ways—in the diminution of misery and purely -physical evils, for example. But in considering the degree of a real -change for the better in intrinsic value, there is certainly danger of -confusion between the degree in which the actual lives lived are really -intrinsically better, and the degree in which there is improvement -merely in the <i>means</i> for living a good life. If we want to estimate -rightly what would constitute an intrinsic improvement in the state -of things in our imagined year next century, and whether it would on -the whole be really "good" at all, we have to consider what value it -would have if it were to be the last year of life upon this planet; -if the world were going to come to an end, as soon as it was over; -and therefore to discount entirely all the promises it might contain -of future goods. This criterion for distinguishing whether the kind -of goodness which we are attributing to anything is really intrinsic -value or not, the criterion which consists in considering whether it -is a characteristic which the thing would possess, if it were to have -absolutely no further consequences or accompaniments, seems to me to -be one which it is very necessary to apply if we wish to distinguish -clearly between different meanings of the word "good." And it is only -the idea of what is good, where by "good" is meant a characteristic -which has this mark, that I want now to consider.</p> - -<p>The two ideas, then, with regard to which I want to raise a question, -are first the moral idea of "moral obligation" or "duty," and secondly -the non-moral idea of "good" in this special sense.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span></p> - -<p>And the question with regard to them, which I want to raise, is this. -With regard to both ideas many philosophers have thought and still -think—not only <i>think</i>, but seem to be absolutely convinced, that when -we apply them to anything—when we assert of any action that it ought -not to have been done, or of any state of things that it was or would -be good or better than another, then it <i>must</i> be the case that <i>all</i> -that we are asserting of the thing or things in question is simply -and solely that some person or set of persons actually does have, or -has a tendency to have a certain sort of feeling towards the thing or -things in question: that there is absolutely no more in it than this. -While others seem to be convinced, no less strongly, that there <i>is</i> -more in it than this: that when we judge that an action is a duty or -is really wrong, we are <i>not</i> merely making a judgment to the effect -that some person or set of persons, have, or tend to have a certain -sort of feeling, when they witness or think of such actions, and that -similarly when we judge that a certain state of things was or would be -better than another, we are <i>not</i> merely making a judgment about the -feelings which some person or set of persons would have, in witnessing -or thinking of the two states of things, or in comparing them together. -The question at issue between these two views is often expressed in -other less clear forms. It is often expressed as the question whether -the ideas of duty and of good or value, are or are not, "objective" -ideas: as the problem as to the "objectivity" of duty and intrinsic -value. The first set of philosophers would maintain that the notion of -the "objectivity" of duty and of value is a mere chimera; while the -second would maintain that these ideas really are "objective." And -others express it as the question whether the ideas of duty and of good -are "absolute" or purely "relative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span>": whether there is any such thing -as an absolute duty or an absolute good, or whether good and duty are -purely relative to human feelings and desires. But both these ways -of expressing it are, I think, apt to lead to confusion. And another -even less clear way in which it is put is by asking the question: Is -the assertion that such and such a thing is a duty, or has intrinsic -value, ever <i>a dictate of reason?</i> But so far as I can gather, the -question really at issue, and expressed in these obscure ways, is the -one which I have tried to state. It is the question whether when we -judge (whether truly or falsely) that an action is a duty or a state -of things good, <i>all</i> that we are thinking about the action or the -state of things in question, is simply and solely that we ourselves -or others have or tend to have a certain feeling towards it when we -contemplate or think of it. And the question seems to me to be of great -interest, because, if this is all, then it is evident that all the -ideas with which Moral Philosophy is concerned are merely psychological -ideas; and all moral rules, and statements as to what is intrinsically -valuable, merely true or false psychological statements; so that -the whole of Moral Philosophy and Ethics will be merely departments -of Psychology. Whereas, if the contrary is the case, then these two -ideas of moral obligation and intrinsic value, will be no more purely -psychological ideas than are the ideas of shape or size or number; and -Moral Philosophy will be concerned with characteristics of actions -and feelings and states of affairs, which these actions and feelings -and states of affairs would or might have possessed, even if human -psychology had been quite different from what it is.</p> - -<p>Which, then, of these two views is the true one? Are these two ideas -merely psychological ideas in the sense which I have tried to explain, -or are they not?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span></p> - -<p>As I have said, I feel some doubts myself whether they are or not: it -does not seem to me to be a matter to dogmatize upon. But I am strongly -inclined to think that they are not merely psychological; that Moral -Philosophy and Ethics are not mere departments of Psychology. In favour -of the view that the two ideas in question are merely psychological, -there is, so far as I am aware, nothing whatever to be said, except -that so many philosophers have been absolutely convinced that they are. -None of them seem to me to have succeeded in bringing forward a single -argument in favour of their view. And against the view that they are, -there seem to me to be some quite definite arguments, though I am not -satisfied that any of these arguments are absolutely conclusive. I will -try to state briefly and clearly what seem to me the main arguments -against the view that these are merely psychological ideas; although, -in doing so, I am faced with a certain difficulty. For though, as I -have said, many philosophers are absolutely convinced, that "duty" -and "good" do merely stand for psychological ideas, they are by no -means agreed <i>what</i> the psychological ideas are for which they stand. -Different philosophers have hit on very different ideas as being the -ideas for which they stand; and this very fact that, if they <i>are</i> -psychological ideas at all, it is so difficult to agree as to <i>what</i> -ideas they are, seems to me in itself to be an argument against the -view that they are so.</p> - -<p>Let me take each of the two ideas separately, and try to exhibit the -sort of objection there seems to be to the view that it is merely a -psychological idea.</p> - -<p>Take first the idea of moral obligation. What purely psychological -assertion can I be making about an action, when I assert that it was -"wrong," that it ought not to have been done?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span></p> - -<p>In this case, one view, which is in some ways the most plausible that -can be taken, is that in every case I am merely making an assertion -about my own psychology. But what assertion about my own psychology can -I be making? Let us take as an example, the view of Prof. Westermarck, -which is as plausible a view of this type as any that I know of. He -holds that what I am judging when I judge an action to be wrong, is -merely that it is of a sort which <i>tends</i> to excite in me a peculiar -kind of feeling—the feeling of moral indignation or disapproval. He -does not say that what I am judging is that the action in question <i>is -actually</i> exciting this feeling in me. For it is obviously not true -that, when I judge an action to be much more wrong than another, I am -always actually feeling much indignation at the thought of either, or -much more indignation at the thought of the one than at that of the -other; and it is inconceivable that I should constantly be making so -great a mistake as to my own psychology, as to think that I am actually -feeling great indignation when I am not. But he thinks it is plausible -to say that I am making a judgment as to the <i>tendency</i> of such actions -to excite indignation in me; that, for instance, when I judge that one -is much more wrong than the other, I am merely asserting the fact, -taught me by my past experience, that, if I were to witness the two -actions, under similar circumstances, I should feel a much more intense -indignation at the one than at the other.<a name="FNanchor_1_6" id="FNanchor_1_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_6" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span></p> - -<p>But there is one very serious objection to such a view, which I think -that those who take it are apt not fully to realise. If this view be -true, then when I judge an action to be wrong, I am merely making a -judgment about my own feelings towards it; and when you judge it to -be wrong, you are merely making a judgment about yours. And hence the -word "wrong" in my mouth, means something entirely different from -what it does in yours; just as the word "I" in my mouth stands for an -entirely different person from what it does in yours—in mine it stands -for me, in yours it stands for you. That is to say when I judge of a -given action that it was wrong, and you perhaps of the very same action -that it was not, we are not in fact differing in opinion about it at -all; any more than we are differing in opinion if I make the judgment -"I came from Cambridge to-day" and you make the judgment "<i>I</i> did not -come from Cambridge to-day." When <i>I</i> say "That was wrong" I am merely -saying "That sort of action excites indignation in me, when I see it"; -and when you say "No; it was not wrong" you are merely saying "It -does not excite indignation in <i>me,</i> when <i>I</i> see it." And obviously -both judgments may perfectly well be true together; just as my judgment -that I did come from Cambridge to-day and yours that you did not, may -perfectly well be true together. In other words, and this is what I -want to insist on, if this view be true, then there is absolutely -no such thing as a difference of opinion upon moral questions. If -two persons think they differ in opinion on a moral question (and it -certainly seems as if they sometimes <i>think</i> so), they are always, -on this view, making a mistake, and a mistake so gross that it seems -hardly possible that they should make it: a mistake as gross as that -which would be involved in thinking that when you say "I did not come -from Cambridge to-day" you<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> are denying what I say when I say "I did." -And this seems to me to be a very serious objection to the view. -Don't people, in fact, sometimes really differ in opinion on a moral -question? Certainly all appearances are in favour of the view that they -do: and yet, if they do, that can only be if when I think a thing to -be wrong, and you think it not to be wrong, I mean by "wrong" the very -<i>same</i> characteristic which you mean, and am thinking that the action -possesses this characteristic while you are thinking it does not. It -must be the very <i>same</i> characteristic which we both mean; it cannot -be, as this view says it is, merely that I am thinking that it has to -my feelings the very same relation, which you are thinking that it -has not got to yours; since, if this were all, then there would be no -difference of opinion between us.</p> - -<p>And this view that when we talk of wrong or duty, we are not -merely, each of us, making a statement about the relation of the -thing in question to our own feelings, may be reinforced by another -consideration. It is commonly believed that some moral rules exhibit a -<i>higher</i> morality than others: that, for instance a person who believes -that it is our duty to do good to our enemies, has a higher moral -belief, than one who believes that he has no such duty, but only a duty -to do good to his friends or fellow-countrymen. And Westermarck himself -believes that, some moral beliefs, "mark a stage of higher refinement -in the evolution of the moral consciousness."<a name="FNanchor_2_7" id="FNanchor_2_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_7" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> But what, on his view -can be meant by saying that one moral belief is higher than another? If -A believes that it is his duty to do good to his enemies and B believes -that it is not, in what sense can A's belief be higher than B's? Not, -on this view, in the sense that what A believes is true, and what B -believes is not; for what A is believing is merely that the idea of not -doing good<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> to your enemies tends to excite in him a feeling of moral -indignation, and what B believes is merely that it does not tend to -excite this feeling in <i>him</i>: and both beliefs may perfectly well be -true; it may really be true that the same actions do excite the feeling -in A, and that they don't in B. What then, could Westermarck mean by -saying that A's morality is higher than B's? So far as I can see, what, -on his own views, he would have to mean is merely that he himself, -Westermarck, shares A's morality and does not share B's: that it is -true of him, as of A, that neglecting to do good to enemies excites -his feelings of moral indignation and not true of him as it is of B, -that it does <i>not</i> excite such feelings in him. In short he would have -to say that what he means by calling A's morality the higher is merely -"A's morality is <i>my</i> morality, and B's is not." But it seems to me -quite clear that when we say one morality is higher than another, we do -not merely mean that it is our own. We are not merely asserting that it -has a certain relation to our own feelings, but are asserting, if I may -say so, that the person who has it has a better moral taste than the -person who has not. And whether or not this means merely, as I think, -that what the one believes is true, and what the other believes is -false, it is at all events inconsistent with the view that in all cases -we are merely making a statement about our own feelings.</p> - -<p>For these reasons it seems to me extremely difficult to believe that -when we judge things to be wrong, each of us is merely making a -judgment about <i>his own</i> psychology. But if not about our own, then -about whose? I have already said that the view that, if the judgment -is merely a psychological one at all, it is a judgment about our -own psychology, is in some ways more plausible than any other view. -And I think we can now see that any other view is <i>not</i> plausible. -The alternatives<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span> are that I should be making a judgment about the -psychology of all mankind, or about that of some particular section -of it. And that the first alternative is not true, is, I think, -evident from the fact that, when I judge an action to be wrong, I -may emphatically <i>not</i> believe that it is true of all mankind that -they would regard it with feelings of moral disapproval. I may know -perfectly well that some would not. Most philosophers, therefore, have -not ventured to say that this is the judgment I am making; they say, -for instance, that I am making a judgment about the feelings of the -particular society to which I belong—about, for instance, the feelings -of an impartial spectator in that society. But, if this view be taken, -it is open to the same objections as the view that I am merely making a -judgment about my own feelings. If we could say that every man, when he -judges a thing to be wrong, was making a statement about the feelings -of all mankind, then when A says "This is wrong" and B says "No, it -isn't," they would really be differing in opinion, since A would be -saying that all mankind feel in a certain way towards the action, and -B would be saying that they don't. But if A is referring merely to his -society and B to his, and their societies are different, then obviously -they are not differing in opinion at all: it may perfectly well be true -both that an impartial spectator in A's society does have a certain -sort of feeling towards actions of the sort in question, and that an -impartial spectator in B's does not. This view, therefore, implies that -it is impossible for two men belonging to different societies ever to -differ in opinion on a moral question. And this is a view which I find -it almost as hard to accept as the view that <i>no</i> two men ever differ -in opinion on one.</p> - -<p>For these reasons I think there are serious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span> objections to the view -that the idea of moral obligation is merely a psychological idea.</p> - -<p>But now let us briefly consider the idea of "good," in Aristotle's -sense, or intrinsic value.</p> - -<p>As regards this idea, there is again a difference of opinion among -those who hold that it is a psychological idea, as to <i>what</i> idea it -is. The majority seem to hold that it is to be defined, somehow, in -terms of desire; while others have held that what we are judging when -we judge that one state of things is or would be intrinsically better -than another, is rather that the belief that the one was going to be -realized would, under certain circumstances, give more pleasure to some -man or set of men, than the belief that the other was. But the same -objections seem to me to apply whichever of these two views be taken.</p> - -<p>Let us take desire. About whose desires am I making a judgment, when I -judge that one state of things would be better than another?</p> - -<p>Here again, it may be said, first of all, that I am merely making a -judgment about my own. But in this case the view that my judgment is -merely about my own psychology is, I think, exposed to an obvious -objection to which Westermarck's view that my judgments of moral -obligation are about my own psychology was not exposed. The obvious -objection is that it is evidently not true that I do in fact always -desire more, what I judge to be better: I may judge one state of things -to be better than another, even when I know perfectly well not only -that I don't desire it more, but that I have no tendency to do so. It -is a notorious fact that men's strongest desires are, as a rule, for -things in which they themselves have some personal concern; and yet -the fact that this is so, and that they know it to be so, does not -prevent them from judging that changes, which would not affect them -personally,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> would constitute a very much greater improvement in the -world's condition, than changes which would. For this reason alone the -view that when I judge one state of things to be better than another I -am merely making a judgment about my own psychology, must, I think, be -given up: it is incredible that we should all be making such mistakes -about our feelings, as, on this view, we should constantly be doing. -And there is, of course, besides, the same objection, as applied in -the case of moral obligation: namely that, if this view were true, no -two men could ever differ in opinion as to which of two states was the -better, whereas it appears that they certainly sometimes do differ in -opinion on such an issue.</p> - -<p>My judgment, then, is not merely a judgment about my own psychology: -but, if so, about whose psychology is it a judgment? It cannot be a -judgment that all men desire the one state more than the other; because -that would include the judgment that I myself do so, which, as we have -seen, I often know to be false, even while I judge that the one state -really is better. And it cannot, I think, be a judgment merely about -the feelings or desires of an impartial spectator in my own society; -since that would involve the paradox that men belonging to different -societies could never differ in opinion as to what was better. But we -have here to consider an alternative, which did not arise in the case -of moral obligation. It is a notorious fact that the satisfaction of -some of our desires is incompatible with the satisfaction of others, -and the satisfaction of those of some men with the satisfaction of -those of others. And this fact has suggested to some philosophers that -what we mean by saying that one state of things would be better than -another, is merely that it is a state in which more of the desires, of -those who were in it, would be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> satisfied at once, than would be the -case with the other. But to this view the fundamental objection seems -to me to be that whether the one state was better than the other would -depend not merely upon the number of desires that were simultaneously -satisfied in it, but upon what the desires were desires for. I can -imagine a state of things in which all desires were satisfied, and yet -can judge of it that it would not be so good as another in which some -were left unsatisfied. And for this reason I cannot assent to the view -that my judgment, that one state of things is better than another is -merely a judgment about the psychology of the people concerned in it.</p> - -<p>This is why I find it hard to believe that either the idea of moral -obligation or the idea of intrinsic value is merely a psychological -idea. It seems to me that Moral Philosophy cannot be merely a -department of Psychology. But no doubt there may be arguments on the -other side to which I have not done justice.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_6" id="Footnote_1_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_6"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> E Westermarck, <i>The Origin and Development of Moral -Ideas</i>, Vol. I, pp. 4, 13, 17-18, 100-101. On p. 105, however, -Westermarck suggests a view inconsistent with this one; namely that, -when I judge an action to be wrong, I am not <i>merely</i> asserting that it -has a tendency to excite moral indignation in me, but am also asserting -that other people <i>would be</i> convinced that it has a tendency to excite -moral indignation in them, if they "knew the act and all its attendant -circumstances as well as [I do], and if, at the same time their -emotions were as refined as [mine]."</p></div> -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_7" id="Footnote_2_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_7"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Ibid. p. 89.</p></div> - - -<h4>THE END</h4> - - -<hr class="full" /> -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></p> - -<p style="margin-left: 15%;"> -<span class="caption">INDEX</span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Abstractions, "illegitimate" <a href='#Page_15'>15</a><br /> -Agnosticism, <a href='#Page_5'>5</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a><br /> -"Analytic" truths, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>-<a href='#Page_31'>31</a><br /> -Apprehension, direct, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>-<a href='#Page_174'>174</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a><br /> -Aristotle's Ethics, <a href='#Page_323'>323</a>-<a href='#Page_326'>326</a><br /> -Attention, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a><br /> -Awareness, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>-<a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a><br /> -<br /> -"Being" and "Reality" <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>-<a href='#Page_201'>201</a>, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>-<a href='#Page_218'>218</a><br /> -Berkeley, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a><br /> -Bradley, F, H., <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>-<a href='#Page_218'>218</a>, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a><br /> -Causal connection, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>-<a href='#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>-<a href='#Page_163'>163</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">necessity, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>-<a href='#Page_268'>268</a></span><br /> -Consciousness, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>-<a href='#Page_18'>18</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>-<a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>-<a href='#Page_25'>25</a><br /> -"Content" <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>-<a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a><br /> -<br /> -Deduction, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a>, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a><br /> -Difference,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">numerical and qualitative, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>-<a href='#Page_263'>263</a>, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>-<a href='#Page_287'>287</a>, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>-<a href='#Page_308'>308</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">intrinsic, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a>-<a href='#Page_265'>265</a></span><br /> -Direct apprehension <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>-<a href='#Page_174'>174</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">observation, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">perception, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>-<a href='#Page_71'>71</a></span><br /> -Duty and Wrong, <a href='#Page_312'>312</a>-<a href='#Page_313'>313</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"objectivity" of, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>-<a href='#Page_238'>238</a>, <a href='#Page_332'>332</a>-<a href='#Page_337'>337</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Entails, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">and "implies" <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>-<a href='#Page_301'>301</a>, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>-<a href='#Page_306'>306</a></span><br /> -<i>Esse</i> and <i>percipi,</i> <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>-<a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>-<a href='#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>-<a href='#Page_181'>181</a><br /> -Existence, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>-<a href='#Page_78'>78</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">and "reality," <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>-<a href='#Page_201'>201</a>, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>-<a href='#Page_218'>218</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">of physical objects, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>-<a href='#Page_191'>191</a></span><br /> -"Experience," ambiguity of, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>-<a href='#Page_180'>180</a>.<br /> -External objects and facts, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>-<a href='#Page_154'>154</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">relations, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>-<a href='#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>-<a href='#Page_309'>309</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Fact, matters of, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>-<a href='#Page_303'>303</a><br /> -"Follows," <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a>-<a href='#Page_285'>285</a>, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a>, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>-<a href='#Page_301'>301</a>, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>-<a href='#Page_306'>306</a><br /> -<br /> -"Given," ambiguity of, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a><br /> -"Good," ambiguity of, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>, <a href='#Page_326'>326</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">objectivity of <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>-<a href='#Page_257'>257</a>, <a href='#Page_337'>337</a>-<a href='#Page_339'>339</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"for man," <a href='#Page_323'>323</a>-<a href='#Page_325'>325</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Hegel, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a><br /> -Hume, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>-<a href='#Page_167'>167</a><br /> -<br /> -"I." <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>-<a href='#Page_175'>175</a>. <a href='#Page_333'>333</a><br /> -Idealism, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>-<a href='#Page_3'>3</a><br /> -Ideas, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>-<a href='#Page_26'>26</a><br /> -Identity of Indiscernibles, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>-<a href='#Page_308'>308</a><br /> -"Implication," <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>-<a href='#Page_297'>297</a><br /> -Indiscernibles, Identity of, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>-<a href='#Page_308'>308</a><br /> -Induction,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">conditions necessary for, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>-<a href='#Page_67'>67</a></span><br /> -Internal relations,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">dogma of, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>-<a href='#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a>-<a href='#Page_286'>286</a>, <a href='#Page_286'>286</a>-<a href='#Page_289'>289</a>, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>-<a href='#Page_309'>309</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">two senses of, <a href='#Page_286'>286</a></span><br /> -Intrinsic difference, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a>-<a href='#Page_265'>265</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">nature, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>-<a href='#Page_265'>265</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">predicates, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a>-<a href='#Page_275'>275</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">value, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>-<a href='#Page_260'>260</a>, <a href='#Page_327'>327</a>-<a href='#Page_328'>328</a>, <a href='#Page_337'>337</a>-<a href='#Page_339'>339</a></span><br /> -<br /> -James, William, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>-<a href='#Page_146'>146</a><br /> -Joachim, H. H., <a href='#Page_276'>276</a><br /> -<br /> -Kant, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a><br /> -Knowledge, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>-<a href='#Page_30'>30</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">and belief <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>-<a href='#Page_34'>34</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">by description, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Leibniz, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a><br /> -<br /> -"Manifestation of," <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>-<a href='#Page_250'>250</a><br /> -Material objects or things, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>-<a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>-<a href='#Page_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>-<a href='#Page_252'>252</a><br /> -Mill. J. S., <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>-<a href='#Page_252'>252</a><br /> -Minds, "in our," <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>-<a href='#Page_177'>177</a><br /> -"Modify," <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>-<a href='#Page_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page_282'>282</a>-<a href='#Page_284'>284</a><br /> -Moral rules, two kinds of, <a href='#Page_320'>320</a>-<a href='#Page_322'>322</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span><br /> -Necessary truths, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>-<a href='#Page_303'>303</a><br /> -Necessity, three senses of, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a>-<a href='#Page_270'>270</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">logical, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>-<a href='#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">unconditional, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>-<a href='#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>-<a href='#Page_275'>275</a></span><br /> -<br /> -"Objectivity," ambiguity of, <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>-<a href='#Page_259'>259</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">of kinds of value, <a href='#Page_329'>329</a>-<a href='#Page_339'>339</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Objects,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">external, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>-<a href='#Page_153'>153</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">material, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>-<a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>-<a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>-<a href='#Page_252'>252</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">physical, and sensibles, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>-<a href='#Page_196'>196</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>-<a href='#Page_223'>223</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Observation, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>-<a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>-<a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a><br /> -Organic unities, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a><br /> -"Ought," two meanings of, <a href='#Page_319'>319</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">objectivity of, <a href='#Page_332'>332</a>-<a href='#Page_337'>337</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">and "wrong" <a href='#Page_312'>312</a>-<a href='#Page_313'>313</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Part, physical, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>-<a href='#Page_239'>239</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">and whole, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>-<a href='#Page_289'>289</a></span><br /> -<br /> -"Perception," ambiguity of, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>-<a href='#Page_228'>228</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">direct, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>-<a href='#Page_71'>71</a></span><br /> -<i>Percipi</i> and <i>esse</i>, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>-<a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>-<a href='#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a><a href='#Page_18'>18</a>1<br /> -Physical objects and sensibles, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>-<a href='#Page_196'>196</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>-<a href='#Page_223'>223</a><br /> -Pickwickian senses, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a><br /> -"Possible," three senses of, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a>-<a href='#Page_270'>270</a><br /> -Pragmatist theory of truth, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>-<a href='#Page_146'>146</a><br /> -"Presented," ambiguity of, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a><br /> -<br /> -Reality, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>-<a href='#Page_78'>78</a>, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>-<a href='#Page_201'>201</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>-<a href='#Page_218'>218</a><br /> -Reason, "dictates of," <a href='#Page_330'>330</a><br /> -Reasons, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>-<a href='#Page_41'>41</a><br /> -Reid, T., <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a><br /> -Relational properties, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>-<a href='#Page_282'>282</a><br /> -Relations,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">dogma of internal, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>-<a href='#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a>-<a href='#Page_286'>286</a>, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>-<a href='#Page_309'>309</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">external, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>-<a href='#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>-<a href='#Page_309'>309</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">internal, <a href='#Page_286'>286</a>-<a href='#Page_289'>289</a></span><br /> -Right, objectivity of, <a href='#Page_257'>257</a>, <a href='#Page_332'>332</a>-<a href='#Page_337'>337</a><br /> -Russell, B., <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>-<a href='#Page_252'>252</a>, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a>, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a><br /> -<br /> -"See," ambiguity of, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>-<a href='#Page_188'>188</a><br /> -"Seems," <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>-<a href='#Page_246'>246</a><br /> -Sensations, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>-<a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>-<a href='#Page_232'>232</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">proper, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a></span><br /> -Sense-data, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>-<a href='#Page_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>-<a href='#Page_232'>232</a><br /> -Sensibles, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>-<a href='#Page_171'>171</a><br /> -Solipsism, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a><br /> -Spiritual, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>-<a href='#Page_2'>2</a><br /> -Strachey, O., <a href='#Page_304'>304</a><br /> -"Subjective," <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page_254'>254</a><br /> -"Synthetic" truths, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>-<a href='#Page_13'>13</a><br /> -<br /> -Taylor, A. E., <a href='#Page_8'>8</a><br /> -"Time," <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>-<a href='#Page_211'>211</a><br /> -Truth,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">and mutability <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>-<a href='#Page_138'>138</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">pragmatist theory of, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>-<a href='#Page_146'>146</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">and utility, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>-<a href='#Page_129'>129</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">and verification, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>-<a href='#Page_107'>107</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">of words, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>-<a href='#Page_136'>136</a></span><br /> -Truths, "analytic" and "synthetic" <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>-<a href='#Page_13'>13</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"man-made" <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>-<a href='#Page_143'>143</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">necessary <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>-<a href='#Page_303'>303</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Value, intrinsic, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>-<a href='#Page_260'>260</a>, <a href='#Page_327'>327</a>-<a href='#Page_328'>328</a>, <a href='#Page_337'>337</a>-<a href='#Page_339'>339</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">objectivity of, <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>-<a href='#Page_259'>259</a>, <a href='#Page_329'>329</a>-<a href='#Page_339'>339</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Westermarck, E., <a href='#Page_332'>332</a>, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a>-<a href='#Page_335'>335</a><br /> -"Wrong," objectivity of, <a href='#Page_332'>332</a>-<a href='#Page_337'>337</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">and "ought," <a href='#Page_312'>312</a>-<a href='#Page_313'>313</a></span><br /> -</p> - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's Philosophical Studies, by George Edward Moore - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES *** - -***** This file should be named 50141-h.htm or 50141-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/1/4/50141/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Hathi Trust.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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