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If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: Creation or Evolution? - A Philosophical Inquiry - - -Author: George Ticknor Curtis - - - -Release Date: September 30, 2015 [eBook #50086] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CREATION OR EVOLUTION?*** - - -E-text prepared by Donald Cummings, Adrian Mastronardi, Les Galloway, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page -images generously made available by Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries -(https://archive.org/details/toronto) - - - -Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this - file which includes the original illustration. - See 50086-h.htm or 50086-h.zip: - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50086/50086-h/50086-h.htm) - or - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50086/50086-h.zip) - - - Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See - https://archive.org/details/creationorevolut00curtuoft - - -Transcriber's note: - - Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). - - Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=). - - - - - -CREATION OR EVOLUTION? - -A Philosophical Inquiry. - -by - -GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. - - - - - - - -New York: -D. Appleton and Company, -1, 3, And 5 Bond Street. -1887. - -Copyright, 1887. -by George Ticknor Curtis. - - - - TO - LEWIS A. SAYRE, M. D., - WHOSE PROFESSIONAL EMINENCE IS RECOGNIZED - IN BOTH HEMISPHERES, - WHOSE SKILL AS A SURGEON - SUFFERING HUMANITY GRATEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGES, - TO WHOSE ANATOMICAL LEARNING - THE AUTHOR IS LARGELY INDEBTED, - AND OF WHOSE FRIENDSHIP HE IS PROUD, - This Book - IS AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED. - - - "_Dost thou not know, my new astronomer! - Earth, turning from the sun, brings night to man? - Man, turning from his God, brings endless night; - Where thou canst read no morals, find no friend, - Amend no manners, and expect no peace._" - - _YOUNG'S NIGHT THOUGHTS._ - - - - -PREFACE. - - -Perhaps it is expected of a writer who steps out of the sphere of his -ordinary pursuits, and deals with such a subject as that which is -treated in this work, that he will account for his so doing. It is not -necessary for me to say that no class of men can have a monopoly in any -subject. But I am quite willing to take my readers into my confidence -so far as to state how I came to write this book. - -Most men, who have a special pursuit, find the necessity for recreation -of some kind. Some take it in one way, and some in another. It has been -my habit through life to seek occasional relief from the monotony of -professional vocations in intellectual pursuits of another character. -Having this habit--which I have found by experience has no tendency -to lessen one's capacity for the duties of a profession, or one's -relish of its occupations--I some years ago took up the study of the -modern doctrine of animal evolution. Until after the death of the late -Mr. Charles Darwin, I had not given a very close attention to this -subject. The honors paid to his memory, and due to his indefatigable -research and extensive knowledge, led me to examine his "Descent of -Man" and his "Origin of Species," both of which I studied with care, -and I trust with candor. I was next induced to examine the writings -of Mr. Herbert Spencer on the subject of evolution, with which I had -also been previously unacquainted except in a general way. I was a -good deal surprised at the extent of Mr. Spencer's reputation as a -thinker, and by the currency which his peculiar philosophy has had in -this country, where it has led, among the young and inexperienced, as -well as among older persons, to very incorrect habits of reasoning on -subjects of the highest importance. The result of my studies of these -writers is the present book. I have written it because I have seen, -or believe that I have seen, where the conflict arises between some -of the deductions of modern science and the principles which ought to -regulate not only religious belief, but belief in anything that is -not open to the direct observation of our senses. But I trust that I -shall not be understood as having written for the purpose of specially -defending the foundations of religious belief. This is no official -duty of mine. How theologians manage, or ought to manage, the argument -which is to convince men of the existence and methods of God, it is -not for me to say. But a careful examination of the new philosophy -has convinced me that those who are the special teachers of religious -truth have need of great caution in the admissions or concessions which -they make, when they undertake to reconcile some of the conclusions -of modern scientists with belief in a Creator. I do not here speak of -the Biblical account of the creation, but I speak of that belief in -a Creator which is to be deduced from the phenomena of nature. While -there are naturalists, scientists, and philosophers at the present -day, whose speculations do not exclude the idea of a Supreme Being, -there are others whose theories are entirely inconsistent with a belief -in a personal God, the Creator and Governor of the universe. Moreover, -although there are great differences in this respect between the -different persons who accept evolution in some form, the whole doctrine -of the development of distinct species out of other species makes -demands upon our credulity which are irreconcilable with the principles -of belief by which we regulate, or ought to regulate, our acceptance -of any new matter of belief. The principles of belief which we apply -in the ordinary affairs of life are those which should be applied to -scientific or philosophical theories; and inasmuch as the judicial -method of reasoning upon facts is at once the most satisfactory and the -most in accordance with common sense, I have here undertaken to apply -it to the evidence which is supposed to establish the hypothesis of -animal evolution, in contrast with the hypothesis of special creations. - -I am no ecclesiastic. I advance no arguments in favor of one or another -interpretation of the Scriptures about which there is controversy among -Christians. While I firmly believe that God exists, and that he has -made a revelation to mankind, whereby he has given us direct assurance -of immortality, I do not know that this belief disqualifies me from -judging, upon proper principles of evidence, of the soundness of a -theory which denies that he specially created either the body or the -mind of man. How far the hypothesis of evolution, by destroying our -belief that God specially created us, tends to negative any purpose -for which we can suppose him to have made to us a revelation of our -immortality, it is for the theologian to consider. For myself, I am -not conscious that in examining the theory of evolution I have been -influenced by my belief in what is called revealed religion. I have, -at all events, studiously excluded from the argument all that has been -inculcated by the Hebrew or the Christian records as authorized or -inspired teachings, and have treated the Mosaic account of the creation -like any other hypothesis of the origin of man and the other animals. -The result of my study of the hypothesis of evolution is, that it is an -ingenious but delusive mode of accounting for the existence of either -the body or the mind of man; and that it employs a kind of reasoning -which no person of sound judgment would apply to anything that might -affect his welfare, his happiness, his estate, or his conduct in the -practical affairs of life. - -He who would truly know what the doctrine of evolution is, and to -what it leads, must literally begin at the beginning. He must free -his mind from the cant of agnosticism and from the cant of belief. He -must refuse to accept dogmas on the authority of any one, be they the -dogmas of the scientist, or of the theologian. He must learn that his -mental nature is placed under certain laws, as surely as his corporeal -structure; and he must cheerfully obey the necessities which compel him -to accept some conclusions and to reject others. Keeping his reasoning -powers in a well-balanced condition, he must prove all things, holding -fast to that which is in conformity with sound deduction, and to that -alone. But all persons may not be able to afford the time to pursue -truth in this way, or may not have the facilities for the requisite -research. It seemed to me, therefore, that an effort to do for them -what they can not do for themselves would be acceptable to a great many -people. - -It may be objected that the imaginary philosopher whom I have -introduced in some of my chapters under the name of Sophereus, or the -searcher after wisdom, debating the doctrines of evolution with a -supposed disciple of that school, whom I have named Kosmicos, is an -impossible person. It may perhaps be said that the conception of a man -absolutely free from all dogmatic religious teaching, from all bias to -any kind of belief, and yet having as much knowledge of various systems -of belief as I have imputed to this imaginary person, would in modern -society be the conception of an unattainable character. My answer to -this criticism would be that I felt myself at liberty to imagine any -kind of character that would suit my purpose. How successfully I have -carried out the idea of a man in mature life entirely free from all -preconceived opinions, and forming his beliefs upon principles of -pure reason, it is for my readers to judge. With regard to the other -interlocutor in the dialogues, I hope it is not necessary for me to -say that I do not impute all of his opinions or arguments to the -professors of the evolution school, or to any section of it. He is a -representative of the effects of some of their teachings, but not an -individual portrait. But as, for the purposes of the antagonism, it -was expedient to put into the mouth of this person whatever can be -said in favor of the hypothesis of evolution, it became necessary to -make him represent the dogmatic side of the theory; and thus to make -the collision and contrast between the minds of the two debaters as -strong as I could. Controversial discussion in the form of debate has -been used from the time of Plato. While I have adopted a method, I have -not presumed to imitate its great exemplars. But for the value of that -method I shall presently cite weighty testimony. It was a relief to -me to resort to it after having pursued the subject in the more usual -form of discussion; and indeed it forced itself upon me as a kind of -necessity, because it seemed the fairest way of presenting what could -be said on both sides of the question. I hope it may have the good -fortune to keep alive the interest of the reader, after he has perused -the previous chapters. - -One disadvantage of all positive writing or discourse is that there is -no one to confute, to contradict, or to maintain the negative. At the -bar, and in some public assemblies, there is an antagonist; and truth -is elicited by the collision. But in didactic writing, especially on a -philosophical topic, it is best to introduce an antagonist, and to make -him speak in his own person. Two of the best thinkers of our time have -forcibly stated the advantage--the necessity, in short--of personal -debate. Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his essay on Liberty, observes that-- - -"The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living -apprehension of a truth as is afforded by the necessity of explaining -it to or defending it against opponents, though not sufficient to -outweigh, is no trifling drawback from the benefits of its universal -recognition. Where this advantage can not be had, I confess I should -like to see the teachers of mankind endeavoring to provide a substitute -for it; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as -present to the learner's consciousness as if they were pressed upon him -by a dissentient champion eager for his conversion. - -"But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost -those they formerly had. The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently -exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this -description. They were essentially a discussion of the great questions -of life and philosophy, directed with consummate skill to the purpose -of convincing any one, who had merely adopted the commonplaces of -received opinion, that he did not understand the subject--that he as -yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed, in -order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way -to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the -meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school disputations -of the middle ages had a similar object. They were intended to make -sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary -correlation) the opinion opposed to it, and could enforce the grounds -of one and confute those of the other. The last-mentioned contests -had, indeed, the incurable defect that the premises appealed to were -taken from authority, not from reason; and as a discipline to the mind -they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which -formed the intellects of the 'Socratici viri.' But the modern mind -owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit; and the -present modes of instruction contain nothing which in the smallest -degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other.... It -is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic--that -which points out weakness in theory or errors in practice, without -establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed -be poor enough as an ultimate result, but as a means to attaining -any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it can not be -valued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained -to it there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of -intellect in any but the mathematical and physical departments of -speculation. On any other subject no one's opinions deserve the name -of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by -others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would -have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with -opponents." - -Mr. Grote, in his admirable work on "Plato and the other Companions of -Socrates," has the following passage: - -"Plato is usually extolled by his admirers as the champion of the -Absolute--of unchangeable forms, immutable truth, objective necessity, -cogent and binding on every one. He is praised for having refuted -Protagoras, who can find no standard beyond the individual recognition -and belief of his own mind or that of some one else. There is no doubt -that Plato often talks in that strain, but the method followed in his -dialogues, and the general principles of methods which he lays down -here as well as elsewhere, point to a directly opposite conclusion. -Of this the Phædrus is a signal instance. Instead of the extreme of -generality, it proclaims the extreme of speciality. The objection -which the Socrates of the Phædrus advances against the didactic -efficacy of written discourse is founded on the fact that it is the -same to all readers--that it takes no cognizance of the differences -of individual minds nor of the same mind at different times. Socrates -claims for dialectic debate the valuable privilege that it is constant -action and reaction between two individual minds--an appeal by the -inherent force and actual condition of each to the like elements in the -other--an ever-shifting presentation of the same topics, accommodated -to the measure of intelligence and cast of emotion in the talkers -and at the moment. The individuality of each mind--both questioner -and respondent--is here kept in view as the governing condition of -the process. No two minds can be approached by the same road or by -the same interrogation. The questioner can not advance a step except -by the admission of the respondent. Every respondent is the measure -to himself. He answers suitably to his own belief; he defends by -his own suggestions; he yields to the pressure of contradiction and -inconsistency _when he feels them_, and not before. Each dialogist is -(to use the Protagorean phrase) the measure to himself of truth and -falsehood, according as he himself believes it. Assent or dissent, -whichever it may be, springs only from the free working of the -individual mind in its actual condition then and there. It is to the -individual mind alone that appeal is made, and this is what Protagoras -asks for. - -"We thus find, in Plato's philosophical character, two extreme opposite -tendencies and opposite poles co-existent. We must recognize them both, -but they can never be reconciled; sometimes he obeys and follows the -one, sometimes the other. - -"If it had been Plato's purpose to proclaim and impose upon every one -something which he called 'Absolute Truth,' one and the same alike -imperative upon all, he would best proclaim it by preaching or writing. -To modify this 'Absolute,' according to the varieties of the persons -addressed, would divest it of its intrinsic attribute and excellence. -If you pretend to deal with an Absolute, you must turn away your eyes -from all diversity of apprehending intellects and believing subjects." - -With such testimony to the value of dialectic debate, I hope that my -adoption of it as a method will be regarded as something better than an -affectation. - -Mr. Spencer, in one of his works,[1] referring to and quoting from -Berkeley's "Dialogues of Hylas and Philolaus," observes that "imaginary -conversation affords great facilities for gaining a victory. When -you can put into an adversary's mouth just such replies as suit -your purpose, there is little difficulty in reaching the desired -conclusion." I have not written to gain a victory; and, indeed, I -am quite aware that it would be impossible to gain one over those -with whom I can have no common ground of reasoning. In the imaginary -conversations in this work, I have taken great care not to put into -the mouth of the supposed representative of the doctrine of evolution -anything that would suit my own purpose; and, in every instance in -which I have represented him as relying on the authority of Mr. Darwin -or of Mr. Spencer, I have either made him quote the words or have made -him state the positions as I suppose they must be understood, and have -referred the reader to the proper page in the works of those writers. - -And here I will render all honor to the admirable candor with which Mr. -Darwin discussed objections to his theory which have been propounded by -others, and suggested further difficulties himself. If I do not pay the -same tribute to Mr. Spencer, the reason will be found in those portions -of my work in which I have had occasion to call in question his methods -of reasoning. - -Some repetition of facts and arguments will be found in the following -pages in the different aspects in which the subject is treated. This -has been intentional. When the tribunal that is addressed is a limited -and special one, and is composed of a high order of minds accustomed -to deal with such a science, for example, as jurisprudence, he who -undertakes to produce conviction can afford to use condensation. -He seldom has to repeat what he has once said; and often, the more -compact his argument, the more likely it will be to command assent if -it is clear as well as close. But this work is not addressed to such a -tribunal. It is written for various classes of readers, some of whom -have already a special acquaintance with the subject, some of whom have -less, and some of whom have now none at all. It is designed to explain -what the theory of evolution is, and to encounter it in the mode -best adapted to reach the various minds of which the mass of readers -is composed. If I had written only for scientists and philosophers, I -should not have repeated anything. - -For similar reasons I have added to this volume both a general index -and a glossary of the scientific and technical terms which I have had -occasion to use. - -The whole of the text of this work had been written and electrotyped -before I had an opportunity to see the very interesting "Life and -Correspondence" of the illustrious naturalist, the late Louis Agassiz, -edited by his accomplished widow, Mrs. Elizabeth Cary Agassiz, and -published in October, 1885, by Houghton, Mifflin and Company, Boston. -For a long period of years, after his residence in this country began, -and until my removal from Boston to New York in 1862, I enjoyed as much -of his intimacy as would be likely to subsist between persons of such -different pursuits. I believe that I understood his general views of -creation, from his lectures and conversation. It is now made entirely -certain that he never accepted the doctrine of evolution of distinct -types out of preceding and different types by ordinary generation; -and it has been to me an inexpressible satisfaction to find that the -opinions and reasoning contained in my work, and adopted independently -of any influence of his, are confirmed by what has now been given to -the world. I need only refer to his letter to Prof. Sedgwick, written -in June, 1845, and to his latest utterance, the paper on "Evolution -and Permanence of Type," in the thirty-third volume of the "Atlantic -Monthly," published after his lamented death in 1873, for proof -that his opinions on the Darwinian theory never changed. Of all the -scientists whom I have ever known, or whose writings I have read, -Agassiz always seemed to me the broadest as well as the most exact and -logical reasoner. - - NEW YORK, _September, 1886_. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [1] "Principles of Psychology," vol. i, p. 336. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - CHAPTER I. - PAGE - - Nature and importance of the subject--Is there a relation of Creator - and creature between God and man?--Rules of rational belief--Is - natural theology a progressive science? 1 - - - CHAPTER II. - - The Platonic Kosmos compared with the Darwinian theory of - evolution 44 - - - CHAPTER III. - - The Darwinian pedigree of man--The evolution of organisms out of - other organisms, according to the theory of Darwin 87 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer 131 - - - CHAPTER V. - - The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further - considered 167 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further - considered 200 - - - CHAPTER VII. - - Mr. Spencer's agnosticism--His theory of the origin of religious - beliefs--The mode in which mankind are to lose the consciousness - of a personal God 257 - - - CHAPTER VIII. - - The existence, attributes, and methods of God deducible from the - phenomena of Nature--Origin of the solar system 300 - - - CHAPTER IX. - - Does evolution account for the phenomena of society and of nature? - --Necessity for a conception of a personal actor--Mr. Spencer's - protoplasmic origin of all organic life--The Mosaic account of - creation treated as a hypothesis which may be scientifically - contrasted with evolution 334 - - - CHAPTER X. - - "Species," "races," and "varieties"--Sexual division--Causation 372 - - - CHAPTER XI. - - Origin of the human mind--Mr. Spencer's theory of the composition - of mind--His system of morality 394 - - - CHAPTER XII. - - Mr. Spencer's philosophy as a whole--His psychology, and his - system of ethics--The sacred origin of moral injunctions, and - the secularization of morals 434 - - - CHAPTER XIII. - - Sophereus discourses on the nature and origin of the human mind 467 - - - GLOSSARY 547 - - - INDEX 557 - - - - -CREATION OR EVOLUTION? - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - Nature and importance of the subject--Is there a relation of Creator - and creature between God and man?--Rules of rational belief--Is - natural theology a progressive science? - - -Man finds himself in the universe a conscious and thinking being. He -has to account to himself for his own existence. He is impelled to this -by an irresistible propensity, which is constantly leading him to look -both inward and outward for an answer to the questions: What am I? How -came I to be? What is the limit of my existence? Is there any other -being in the universe between whom and myself there exists the relation -of Creator and creature? - -The whole history of the human mind, so far as we have any reliable -history, is marked by this perpetual effort to find a First Cause. - -However wild and fantastic may be the idea which the savage conceives -of a being stronger and wiser than himself; however groveling and -sensual may be his conception of the form, or attributes, or action -of that being, he is, when he strives after the comprehension of his -deity, engaged in the same intellectual effort that is made by the -most civilized and cultivated of mankind, when, speculating upon the -origin of the human soul, or its relation to the universe, or the -genesis of the material world, they reach the sublime conception of -an infinite God, the creator of all other spiritual existences and -of all the forms of animal life, or when they end in the theory that -there is no God, or in that other theory which supposes that what we -call the creation, man included, is an evolution out of primordial -matter, which has been operated upon by certain fixed laws, without any -special interposition of a creating power, exerted in the production -of the forms of animal life that now inhabit this earth, or ever have -inhabited it. In the investigation of these contrasted theories, it -is necessary to remember that the faculties of the human mind are -essentially the same in all conditions of civilization or barbarism; -that they differ only in the degree of their growth, activity, and -power of reasoning, and therefore that there must be a common standard -to which to refer all beliefs. The sole standard to which we can refer -a belief in anything is its rationality, or a comparison between that -which is believed and that which is most probable, according to the -power of human reason to weigh probabilities. In the untutored and -uncultivated savage, this power, although it exists, is still very -feeble; partly because it is exercised upon only a few objects, and -partly because the individual has comparatively but little opportunity -to know all the elements which should be taken into account in -determining a question of moral probabilities. - -In the educated and cultivated man this power of judging probabilities, -of testing beliefs by their rationality, is carried, or is capable of -being carried, to the highest point of development, so as to comprehend -in the calculation the full elements of the question, or at least to -reduce the danger of some fatal omission to the minimum. It is, of -course, true that the limited range of our faculties may prevent a full -view of all the elements of any question of probability, even when our -faculties have attained the highest point of development experienced -by the age in which we happen to live. This renders the rationality of -any hypothesis less than an absolutely certain test of truth. But this -rationality is all that we have to apply to any question of belief; and -if we attend carefully to the fact that moral probabilities constitute -the groundwork of all our beliefs, and note the mental processes by -which we reach conclusions upon any question depending upon evidence, -we shall find reason to regard this power of testing beliefs by a -conformity between the hypotheses and that which is most probable to -be the most glorious attribute of the human understanding, as it is -unquestionably the safest guide to which we can trust ourselves. - -It may be that, while philosophers will not object to my definition -of rationality, churchmen will ask what place I propose to assign to -authority in the formation of beliefs. I answer, in the first place, -that I am seeking to make myself understood by plain but reflecting -and reasoning people. Such persons will perceive that what I mean by -the rationality of a belief in any hypothesis is its fitness to be -accepted and acted upon because it has in its favor the strongest -probabilities of the case, so far as we can grasp those probabilities. -I know of no other foundation for a belief in anything; for belief -is the acceptance by the mind of some proposition, statement, or -supposed fact, the truth of which depends upon evidence addressed to -our senses, or to our intellectual perceptions, or to both. In the -next place, in regard to the influence of authority over our beliefs, -it is to be observed that the existence of the authority is a question -to be determined by evidence, and this question, therefore, of itself -involves an application of the test of rationality, or conformity with -what is probable. But, assuming that the authority is satisfactorily -established, it is not safe to leave all minds to the teaching of that -authority, without the aid of the reasoning, which, independent of -all authority, would conduct to the same conclusion. There are many -minds to whom it is useless to say, You are commanded to believe. -The question instantly arises, Commanded by whom, or what? And if the -answer is, By the Church, or by the Bible, and the matter is left to -rest upon that statement, there is great danger of unbelief. It is -apparent that a large amount of what is called infidelity, or unbelief, -now prevailing in the world, is due to the fact that men are told that -they are commanded to believe, as if they were to be passive recipients -of what is asserted, and because so little is addressed to their -understandings. - -I do not wish to be understood as maintaining that there is no place -for authority in matters of what is called religious belief. I am quite -sensible that there may be such a thing as authority even in regard to -our beliefs; that it is quite within the range of possibilities that -there should be such a relation between the human soul and an infinite -Creator as to require the creature to accept by faith whatever a proved -revelation requires that intelligent creature to believe. But, in -view of the fact that what is specially called revealed religion is -addressed to an intelligent creature, to whom the revelation itself -must be proved by some evidence that will satisfy the mind, there is an -evident necessity for treating the rationality of a belief in God as -an independent question. In some way, by some process, we must reach a -belief in the existence of a being before we can consider the claims of -a message which that being is supposed to have sent to us. What we have -to work with, before we can approach the teaching of what is called -revealed religion, is the mind of man and the material universe. Do -these furnish us with the rational basis for a belief in God? - -And here I shall be expected to say what I mean by a belief in God. -I have neither so little reverence for what I myself believe in, nor -so little respect for my readers, as to offer them anything but the -common conception of God. All that is necessary for me to do, in -order to put my own mind in contact with that of the reader, is to -express my conception of God just as it would be expressed by any one -who is accustomed to think of the being called God by the Christian, -the Jew, the Mohammedan, or by some other branches of the human race. -These different divisions of mankind may differ in regard to some of -the attributes of the Deity, or his dealings with men, or the history -or course of his government of the world. But what is common to them -all is a belief in God as the Supreme Being, who is self-existing and -eternal, by whose will all things and all other beings were created, -who is infinite in power and wisdom and in goodness and benevolence. As -an intellectual conception, this idea of a Supreme Being, one only God, -who never had a beginning and can have no end, and who is the creator -of all other beings, excludes, of course, the polytheism of the ancient -civilized nations, or that of the present barbarous tribes; and it -especially excludes the idea of what the Greeks called Destiny, which -was a power that governed the gods as well as the human race, and was -anterior and superior to Jove himself. The simple conception of the one -God held by the Christian, the Jew, or the Mohammedan, as the First -Cause of the universe and all that it embraces, creating all things -and all other beings by his will, in contrast with the modern idea -that they came into existence without the volition of a conscious and -intelligent being making special creations, is what I present to the -mind of the reader. - -This idea of God as a matter of belief presents, I repeat, a question -of moral probabilities. The existence of the universe has to be -accounted for somehow. We can not shut out this inquiry from our -thoughts. The human being who never speculates, never thinks, upon the -origin of his own soul, or upon the genesis of this wondrous frame of -things external to himself, or upon his relations to some superior -being, is a very rare animal. If he is much more than an animal, he -will have some idea of these things; and the theories by which some of -the most cultivated and acute intellects of our race, from the widest -range of accumulated physical facts and phenomena yet gathered, have -undertaken to account for the existence of species without referring -them to the volition of an infinite creator, are at once a proof of the -universal pressure of the question of creation upon the human mind, and -of the logical necessity for treating it as a question dependent upon -evidence and probability. - -I lay out of consideration, now, the longing of the human mind to -find a personal God and Creator. This sentiment, this yearning for an -infinite father, this feeling of loneliness in the universe without the -idea of God, is certainly an important moral factor in the question -of probability; but I omit it now from the number of proofs, because -it is a sentiment, and because I wish to subject the belief in God as -the Creator to the cold intellectual process by which we may discover -a conformity between that hypothesis and the phenomena of Nature as a -test of the probable truth. If such a conformity can be satisfactorily -shown, and if the result of the process as conducted can fairly claim -to be that the existence of God the Creator has by far the highest -degree of probability above and beyond all other hypotheses that have -been resorted to to account for our existence, the satisfaction of a -moral feeling of the human heart may well become a source of happiness, -a consolation in all the evils of this life, and a support in the hour -of death. - -But in this preliminary chapter I ought to state what I understand to -be the scientific hypothesis or hypotheses with which I propose to -contrast the idea of God as the creator of species by applying the test -of probability. To discuss the superior claims of one hypothesis over -another, without showing that there is a real conflict between them, -would be to set up a man of straw for the sake of knocking it down as -if it were a living and real antagonist. What I desire to do is not to -aim at a cheap victory by attacking something that does not call for -opposition; but it is to ascertain first whether there is now current -any explanation or hypothesis concerning the origin of the creation, or -anything that it contains, which rejects the idea of God as the creator -of that which we know to exist and as it exists, and then to ascertain -which of the two hypotheses ought to be accepted as the truth, because -it has in its favor the highest attainable amount of probability. There -is an amount of probability which becomes to us a moral demonstration, -because our minds are so constituted that conviction depends upon -the completeness with which the evidence in favor of one hypothesis -excludes the other from the category of rational beliefs. - -I pass by the common sort of infidelity which rejects the idea of an -intelligent creator acting in any manner whatever, whether by special -creations or by laws of development operating on some primordial form -of animal life. But among the modern scientists who have propounded -explanations of the origin of species, I distinguish those who do not, -as I understand, deny that there was an intelligent Creator by whose -will some form of animal life was originally called into being, but who -maintain that the diversified forms of animal life which we now see -were not brought into being by the special will of the Creator as we -now know them, but that they were evolved, by a process called natural -selection, out of some lower type of animated organism. Of this class, -the late Mr. Darwin is a representative. There is, however, at least -one philosopher who carries the doctrine of evolution much farther, -and who, if I rightly understand him, rejects any act of creation, -even of the lowest and simplest type of animal existence. This is -Mr. Herbert Spencer--a writer who, while he concurs in Mr. Darwin's -general theory of natural selection as the process by which distinct -organisms have been evolved out of other organisms, does not admit of -any primal organism as the origin of the whole series of animals and as -the creation of an intelligent will. - -It will be appropriate hereafter to refer to the doctrine of evolution -as a means of accounting for the existence of the human mind. At -present it is only necessary to say that I understand it to be -maintained as the hypothesis which has the highest attainable amount -of evidence in its favor, that distinct species of animals are not a -creation but a growth; and also that the mind of man is not a special -creation of a spiritual existence, but a result of a long process -by which organized matter has slowly worked itself from matter into -intellect. Wherever, for instance, these scientists may place the -non-human primate, out of which man has been evolved by what is called -natural selection, and whether they do or do not assume that he was a -creation of an intelligent will, they do not, as I understand, claim -that the primate was endowed with what we call intellect; so that at -some time there was a low form of animal life without intellect, but -intellect became evolved in the long course of countless ages, by the -process of natural selection, through the improving conditions and -better organization of that low animal which had no intellect. In -other words, we have what the scientist calls the non-human primate, -a low form of animal without intellect, but capable of so improving -its own physical organization as to create for itself and within -itself that essence which we recognize as the human mind. Here, then, -there is certainly a theory, an hypothesis, which may be and must be -contrasted with the idea that the mind of man is a spiritual essence -created by the volition of some other being having the power to create -such existences, and put into a temporary union with a physical -organization, by the establishment of a mysterious connection which -makes the body the instrument of the soul so long as the connection -exists. If I have stated correctly the theory which assigns the origin -of the human mind to the process of evolution, I have assuredly not set -up a man of straw. I stand confronted with an hypothesis which directly -encounters the idea that the human intellect is a creation, in the -sense of a direct, intelligent, conscious, and purposed production of -a special character, as the human mind and hand, in the production of -whatever is permitted to finite capacities, purposely creates some new -and independent object of its wishes, its desires, or its wants. The -human mind, says the scientist, was not created by a spiritual being as -a spiritual existence independent of matter, but it grew out of matter, -that was at first so organized that it did not manifest what we call -intellect, but that could so improve its own organization as to evolve -out of matter what we know as mind. - -And here I lay out of view entirely the comparative dignity of man as a -being whose existence is to be accounted for by the one hypothesis or -the other, because this comparative dignity is not properly an element -in the question of probability. The doctrine of evolution, as expounded -by Darwin and other modern scientists, may be true, and we shall still -have reason to exclaim with Hamlet, "What a piece of work is man!" - -On the other hand, the hypothesis that man is a special creation of -an infinite workman, if true, does not enhance the mere _a priori_ -dignity of the human race. It may, and it will hereafter appear that -it does, establish the moral accountability of man to a supreme being, -a relation which, if I correctly understand the doctrine of evolution, -is left out of the system that supposes intellect to be evolved out of -the improving process by which matter becomes nervous organization, -whose action exhibits those manifestations which we call mind. The -moral accountability of man to a supreme being may, if it becomes -established by proper evidence, be a circumstance that distinguishes -him from other animals, and may, therefore, raise him in the scale of -being. But then this dignity is a fact that comes after the process -of reasoning has shown the relation of creator and creature, and it -should not be placed at the beginning of the process among the proofs -that are to show that relation. Mr. Darwin, in concluding his great -work, "The Descent of Man," which he maintains to have been from some -very low type of animated creature, through the apes, who became -our ancestors, and who were developed into the lowest savages, and -finally into the civilized man, has anticipated that his theory will, -he regrets to say, be "highly distasteful to many"; and he adds, by -way of parrying this disgust, that "he who has seen a savage in his -native land will not feel much shame if forced to acknowledge that the -blood of some more humble creature flows in his veins." For his own -part, he adds, he would as soon be descended from a certain heroic -little monkey who exposed himself to great danger in order to save -the life of his keeper, as from a savage who delights to torture his -enemies, offers bloody sacrifices, practices infanticide, etc. Waiving -for the present the question whether the man who is called civilized -is necessarily descended from or through the kind of savage whom Mr. -Darwin saw in the Tierra del Fuego, or whether that kind of savage is a -deteriorated offshoot from some higher human creatures that possessed -moral and intellectual characteristics of a more elevated nature, I -freely concede that this question of the dignity of our descent is not -of much logical consequence. However distasteful to us may be the idea -that we are descended from the same stock as the apes, and that their -direct ancestors are to be traced to some more humble creature until -we reach the lowest form of organized and animated matter, the dignity -of our human nature is not to be reckoned among the probabilities by -which our existence is to be accounted for. It is, in this respect, -like the feeling or sentiment which prompts us to wish to find an -infinite creator, the father of our spirits and the creator of our -bodies. As a matter of reasoning, we must prove to ourselves, by -evidence that satisfies the mind, that God exists. Having reached this -conviction, the belief in his existence becomes a vast and inestimable -treasure. But our wish to believe in God does not help us to attain -that belief. In the same way our feeling about the dignity of man, the -nobleness or ignobleness of our descent from or through one kind of -creature or another, may be a satisfaction or a dissatisfaction after -we have reached a conclusion, but it affords us no aid in arriving at a -satisfactory conclusion from properly chosen premises. - -And here, in advance of the tests which I shall endeavor to apply to -the existence of God and the existence of man as a special creation, I -desire to say something respecting the question of a logical antagonism -between science and religion. I have often been a good deal puzzled to -make out what those well-meaning persons suppose, who unwarily admit -that there is no necessary antagonism between what modern science -teaches and what religion teaches. Whether there is or is not, depends -upon what we mean by science and religion. If by science we understand -the investigation of Nature, or a study of the structure and conditions -of everything that we can subject to the observation of our senses, -and the deduction of certain hypotheses from what we observe, then -we must compare the hypotheses with the teachings or conclusions -which we derive from religion. The next question, therefore, is, What -is religion? If we make it to consist in the Mosaic account of the -creation, or in the teachings of the Bible respecting God, we shall -find that we have to deal with more or less of conflict between the -interpretations that are put upon a record supposed to have been -inspired, and the conclusions of science. But if we lay aside what is -commonly understood by revealed religion, which supposes a special -communication from a superior to an inferior being of something which -the former desires the latter to know, after the latter has been for -some time in existence, then we mean by religion that belief in the -existence of a superior being which we derive from the exercise of -our reasoning powers upon whatever comes within the observation of -our senses, and upon our own intellectual faculties. In other words, -for what we call natural religion, we look both outward and inward, -in search of a belief in a Supreme Being. We look outward, because -the whole universe is a vast array of facts, from which conclusions -are to be drawn; and among this array of facts is the construction -of our bodies. We look inward, because our own minds present another -array of facts from which conclusions are to be drawn. Now, if the -conclusions which the scientist draws from the widest observation -of Nature, including the human mind itself, fail to account for the -existence of the mind of man, and natural religion does account for -it, there is an irreconcilable conflict between science and religion. -I can not avoid the conviction that Mr. Darwin has missed the point of -this conflict. "I am aware," he says, "that the conclusions arrived -at in this work will be denounced by some as highly irreligious; but -he who denounces them is bound to show why it is more irreligious to -explain the origin of man, as a distinct species by descent from a -lower form, through the laws of variation and natural selection, than -to explain the birth of the individual through the laws of ordinary -reproduction." I do not understand him, by the terms "religious" or -"irreligious," to refer to anything that involves praise or blame for -adopting one hypothesis rather than another. I suppose he meant to say -that a belief in his theory of the descent of man as a species is no -more inconsistent with a belief in God than it is to believe that the -individual is brought into being through the operation of the laws of -ordinary reproduction which God has established. This would be strictly -true, if the hypothesis of man's descent as a distinct species from -some lower form accounted for his existence by proofs that satisfy -the rules of evidence by which our beliefs ought to be and must be -determined. In that case, there would be no inconsistency between his -hypothesis and that to which natural religion conducts us. On the other -hand, if the Darwinian hypothesis fails to establish a relation between -the soul of man, as a special creation, and a competent creator, then -the antagonism between this hypothesis and natural religion is direct, -immediate, and irreconcilable; for the essence of religion consists in -that relation, and a belief in that relation is what we mean, or ought -to mean, by religion. - -There is another form in which Mr. Darwin has depreciated the idea of -any antagonism between his theory and our religious ideas, but it has -the same logical defect as the suggestion which I have just considered, -because it involves the same assumption. It is put hypothetically, -but it is still an assumption, lacking the very elements of supreme -probability that can alone give it force. "Man," he observes, "may -be excused for feeling some pride at having risen, not through his -own exertions, to the very summit of the organic scale; and the fact -of his having so risen, instead of being aboriginally placed there, -may give him some hope for a still higher destiny in the distant -future." I certainly would not misrepresent, and I earnestly desire -to understand, this distinguished writer. It is a little uncertain -whether he here refers to the hope of immortality, or of an existence -after the connection between our minds and our bodies is dissolved, or -whether he refers to the further elevation of man on this earth in the -distant future of terrestrial time. If he referred to the hope of an -existence after what we call death, then he ought to have shown that -his theory is compatible with such a continued existence of the soul -of man. It will be one of the points on which I propose to bestow some -attention, that the doctrine of evolution is entirely incompatible with -the existence of the human soul for one instant after the brain has -ceased to act as an organism, and death has wholly supervened; because -that doctrine, if I understand it rightly, regards the intellect of -man as a high development of what in other animals is called instinct, -and instinct as a confirmed and inherited habit of animal organism to -act in a certain way. If this is a true philosophical account of the -origin and nature of intellect, it can have no possible individual -existence after the organ called the brain, which has been in the habit -of acting in a certain way, has perished, any more than there can be -a digestion of food after the stomach or other assimilating organ has -been destroyed. If, on the contrary, the mind of man is a special -creation, of a spiritual essence, placed in an intimate union with -the body for a temporary period, and made to depend for a time on the -organs of that body as its means of manifestation and the exercise of -its spiritual faculties, then it is conceivable that this union may be -severed and the mind may survive. Not only is this conceivable, but, -as I shall endeavor hereafter to show, the proof of it rises very high -in the scale of probability--so high that we may accept it as a fact, -just as confidently as we accept many things of which we can not have -absolute certainty. - -And here I think it needful, although not for all readers, but for -the great majority, to lay down as distinctly as I can the rules -of evidence which necessarily govern our beliefs. I do so because, -in reading the works of many of the modern scientists who have -espoused the Darwinian doctrine of evolution, I find that the rules -of evidence are but little observed. There is a very great, often -an astonishingly great, accumulation of facts, or of assumed facts. -It is impossible not to be impressed by the learning, the industry, -and the range of these writers. Nor would I in the least impugn their -candor, or question their accuracy as witnesses of facts, which I am -not competent to dispute if I were disposed to do so. But there is one -thing for which I may suppose myself competent. I have through a long -life been accustomed to form conclusions upon facts; and this is what -every person does and must do who is asked to accept a new theory or -hypothesis of any kind upon any subject. - -Most of our beliefs depend upon what is called circumstantial -evidence. There are very few propositions which address themselves to -our belief upon one direct and isolated proof. We may class most of -the perceptions of our senses among the simple and unrelated proofs -which we accept without hesitation, although there is more or less -of an unconscious and instantaneous process of reasoning, through -which we pass before the evidence of our senses is accepted and acted -upon. Then there are truths to which we yield an instant assent, -because they prove themselves, as is the case with the mathematical -or geometrical problems, as soon as we perceive the connection in the -steps of the demonstration. Besides these, there are many propositions -which, although they involve moral reasoning, have become axioms about -which we do not care to inquire, but which we assume to have been so -repeatedly and firmly established that it would be a waste of time to -go over the ground again whenever they come up. But there is a very -large class of propositions which address themselves to our belief, -which do not depend on a single perception through our senses, and are -not isolated facts, and are not demonstrable by mathematical truth, and -are not axioms accepted because they were proved long ago, and have -by general consent been adopted into the common stock of ideas. The -class of beliefs with which the rules of circumstantial evidence are -concerned are those where the truth of the proposition, or hypothesis, -is a deduction from many distinct facts, but the coexistence of which -facts leads to the inevitable conclusion that the proposition or -hypothesis is true. We can not tell why it is that moral conviction is -forced upon us by the coexistence of certain facts and their tendency -to establish a certain conclusion. All we know is, that our minds are -so constituted that we can not resist the force of circumstantial -evidence if we suffer our faculties to act as reason has taught them. -But, then, in any given case, whether we ought to yield our belief -in anything where we have only circumstantial evidence to guide us, -there are certain rules to be observed. The first of these rules is, -that every fact in a collection of proofs from which we are to draw -a certain inference must be proved independently by direct evidence, -and must not be itself a deduction from some other fact. This is the -first step in the process of arranging a chain of moral evidence. -There is a maxim in this branch of the law of evidence that you can -not draw an inference from an inference. In other words, you can not -infer a fact from some other fact, and then unite the former with two -or more independent facts to make a chain of proofs. Every link in -the chain must have its separate existence, and its existence must be -established by the same kind and degree of evidence as if it were the -only thing to be proved. The next rule is to place the several facts, -when so proved, in their proper relation to each other in the group -from which the inference is to be drawn. In circumstantial evidence a -fact may be established by the most direct and satisfactory proofs, -and yet it may have no relation to other facts with which you attempt -to associate it. For example, suppose it to be proved that A on a -certain occasion bought a certain poison, and that soon after B died -of that kind of poison; but it does not appear that A and B were ever -seen together, or stood in any relation to each other. The fact that -A bought poison would have no proper relation to the other fact that -B died of that kind of poison. But introduce by independent evidence -the third fact, that A knew B intimately, and then add the fourth -fact, that A had a special motive for wishing B's death, you have some -ground for believing that A poisoned B, although no human eye ever saw -the poison administered. From this correlation of all the facts in a -body of circumstantial evidence, there follows a third rule, namely, -that the whole collection of facts, in order to justify the inference -sought to be drawn from them, must be consistent with that inference. -Thus, the four facts above supposed are entirely consistent with the -hypothesis that A poisoned B. But leave out the two intermediate facts, -or leave out the last one, and B might as well have been poisoned by -C as by A. Hence there is a fourth rule: that the collection of facts -from which an inference is to be drawn must not only be consistent -with the probable truth of that inference, but they must exclude the -probable truth of any other inference. Thus, not only must it be shown -that A bought poison, that B died of poison, that A was intimate with -B and had a motive for wishing B's death, but, to justify a belief in -A's guilt, the motive ought to be shown to have been so strong as to -exclude the moral probability that B was poisoned by some one else, -or poisoned himself. It is in the application of these rules that in -courts of justice the minds of jurymen often become perplexed with -doubts which they can not account for, or else they yield a too easy -credence to the guilt of the accused when the question of guilt depends -upon circumstantial evidence. - -I shall not spend much time in contending that these rules of evidence -must be applied to scientific investigations which are to affect -our belief in such a proposition as the descent of man from a common -ancestor with the monkey. This is not only an hypothesis depending upon -circumstantial evidence, but it is professedly a deduction from a great -range of facts and from a very complex state of facts. In reasoning -upon such subjects, when the facts which constitute the chain of -circumstantial evidence are very numerous, we are apt to regard their -greater comparative number as if it dispensed with a rigid application -of the rules of determination. Every one can see, in the illustration -above employed, borrowed from criminal jurisprudence, that the facts -which constitute the chain of circumstantial evidence ought to be -rigidly tested by the rules of determination before the guilt of the -accused can be safely drawn as a deduction from the facts. But, in -reasoning from physical facts to any given physical hypothesis where -the facts are very numerous, there is a strong tendency to relax the -rules of evidence, because, the greater the accumulation of supposed -facts becomes, the greater is the danger of placing in the chain of -evidence something that is not proved, and thus of vitiating the whole -process. To this tendency, which I have observed to be very frequent -among scientists, I should apply, without meaning any disrespect, -the term invention. A great accumulation of facts is made, following -one another in a certain order; all those which precede a certain -intermediate link are perhaps duly and independently proved, and the -same may be the case with those which follow that link. But there is -no proof of the fact that constitutes the link and makes a complete -chain of evidence. This vacuity of proof, if one may use such an -expression, is constantly occurring in the writings of naturalists, and -is often candidly admitted. It is gotten over by reasoning from the -antecedent and the subsequent facts that the intermediate facts must -have existed; and then the reasoning goes on to draw the inference of -the principal hypothesis from a chain of proof in which a necessary -intermediate link is itself a mere inference from facts which may be -just as consistent with the non-existence as with the existence of -the supposed intermediate link. In such cases we are often told very -frankly that no one has yet discovered that the intermediate link ever -actually existed; that the researches of science have not yet reached -demonstrative proof of the existence of a certain intermediate animal -or vegetable organization; that geological exploration has not yet -revealed to us all the specimens of the animal or vegetable kingdoms -that may have inhabited this globe at former periods of time; but that -the analogies which lead down or lead up to that as yet undiscovered -link in the chain are such that it must have existed, and that we may -confidently expect that the actual proof of it will be found hereafter. -The difficulty with this kind of reasoning is that it borrows from the -main hypothesis which one seeks to establish the means of showing the -facts from which the hypothesis is to be drawn as an inference. Thus, -for example, the hypothesis is that the species called man is a highly -developed animal formed by a process of natural selection that went on -for unknown ages among the individuals descended from the progenitor -of the anthropomorphous apes. The facts in the physical organization -and mental manifestations of the animal called man, when viewed -historically through all the conditions in which we know anything of -this species, lead up to that common supposed ancestor of the apes. -The facts in the physical organization and instinctive habits of the -ape, when viewed historically through all the conditions in which we -know anything of his species, show that he, too, was evolved by the -process of natural selection out of that same ancestor. Intermediate, -respectively, between the man and the monkey and their primordial -natural-selection ancestor or predecessor, there are links in the chain -of proof of which we have no evidence, and which must be supplied by -inferring their existence from the analogies which we can trace in -comparing things of which we have some satisfactory proof. Thus, the -main hypothesis, the theory of natural selection as the explanation -of the existence of distinct species of animals, is not drawn from a -complete chain of established facts, but it is helped out by inferring -from facts that are proved other facts that are not proved, but which -we have reason to expect will be discovered hereafter. I need not say -that this kind of argument will not do in the common affairs of life, -and that no good reason can be shown why our beliefs in matters of -science should be made to depend upon it. - -We do not rest our belief in what is called the law of gravitation -upon any chain of proof in which it is necessary to supply a link -by assuming that it exists. The theory that bodies have a tendency -to approach each other, that the larger mass attracts to itself the -smaller by a mysterious force that operates through all space, is a -deduction from a great multitude of perpetually recurring facts that -are open to our observation, no one of which is inferred from any other -fact, while the whole excludes the moral probability that any other -hypothesis will account for the phenomena which are continually and -invariably taking place around us. - -This illustration of the rules of evidence, when applied to scientific -inquiries, leads me to refer to one of the favorite postulates of -the evolution school. We are often told that it ought to be no -objection to the doctrine of evolution that it is new, or startling, -or contrary to other previous theories of the existence of species. -We are reminded again and again that Galileo's grand conception was -scouted as an irreligious as well as an irrational hypothesis, and -that the same reception attended the first promulgation of many -scientific truths which no intelligent and well-informed person now -doubts.[2] Then we have it asserted that the doctrine of evolution -is now accepted by nearly all the most advanced and accomplished -natural philosophers, especially those of the rising scientists who -have bestowed most attention upon it. Upon this there are two things -to be said: First, it is a matter of very little consequence that the -learned of a former age did not attend to the proofs of the law of -gravitation, or of any other new theory of physics, as they should -have done, and that they consequently rejected it. Their logical -habits of mind, their preconceived religious notions, and many other -disturbing causes, rendered them incapable of correct reasoning on some -particular subject, while they could reason with entire correctness -on other subjects. Secondly, the extent to which a new theory is -accepted by those whose special studies lead them to make the necessary -investigations, does not dispense with the application of the laws -of evidence to the facts which are supposed to establish the theory. -The doctrine of evolution addresses itself not only to the scientific -naturalist, but to the whole intelligent part of mankind. How is one -who does not belong to this class of investigators to regulate his -belief in the theory which they propound? Is he to take it on their -authority? or is he, while he accords to their statements of facts all -the assent which as witnesses they are entitled to expect from him, to -apply to their deduction the same principles of belief that he applies -to everything else which challenges belief, and to assent or dissent -accordingly? No one, I presume, will question that the latter is the -only way in which any new matter of belief should be approached. I have -not supposed that any scientist questions this; but I have referred to -the constant iteration that the doctrine of evolution is now generally -admitted by men of science, that the assertion, supposing it to be -true, may pass for just what it is worth. It is worth this and no -more: that candid, truthful, and competent witnesses, when they speak -of facts that they have observed, are entitled to be believed as to -the existence of those facts. When they assume facts which they do not -prove, but which are essential links in the chain of evidence, or when -the facts which they do prove do not rationally exclude every other -hypothesis excepting their own, the authority of even the whole body -of such persons is of no more account than that of any other class -of intelligent and cultivated men. In the ages when ecclesiastical -authority exercised great power over the beliefs of men upon questions -of physical science, the superiority was accorded to the authority -which claimed it, and the scientist who propounded a new physical -theory that did not suit the theologian was overborne. It seems to me -that it is a tendency of the present age to substitute the authority -of scientific experts in the place of the ecclesiastical authority -of former periods, by demanding that something more than the office -of witnesses of facts shall be accorded to them. We are told that it -is a very important proof of the soundness of deductions, that the -deductions are drawn by the greater number of the specialists who -have examined the facts. Sometimes this is carried so far as to imply -presumption in those who do not yield assent to the theory, as if it -ought to be accepted upon the authority of the experts whose proper -office it is to furnish us with the facts, and whose deductions we have -to examine upon the strength of their reasoning. Those of us who are -not professors of the particular science may be charged with ignorance -or incapacity if we do not join in the current of scientific opinion. -But, after all, the new theory challenges our belief. If we examine it -at all, we must judge of it, not by the numbers of those who propound -or accept it, or by any amount of mere authority, but by the soundness -of the reasoning by which its professors support it. - -The reader is now informed of what he may expect to find discussed -in this volume. It remains for me to indicate the mode in which the -discussion will be carried on. I propose to divest my own mind, and -so far as I may to divest the mind of the reader, of all influence -from revealed religion. I shall not refer to the Mosaic account of the -creation excepting as I refer to other hypotheses. With its authority -as an account given by the Deity himself through his chosen servant, -I have here nothing to do. Nor shall I rely upon the revelation -recorded in the New Testament. All the inquiries which I propose to -make are those which lie in the domain of natural religion; and while -I can not expect, in exploring this domain, to make discoveries or to -find arguments which can claim the merit of originality, I may avoid -traveling in a well beaten path, by pursuing the line of my own -reflections, without considering whether they coincide with or differ -from the reasonings of others. Although, at a former period of my life, -I have studied the great writers whose speculations in the science -of natural theology are the most famous and important pieces in its -literature, it is more than forty years since I have looked into one of -them; and I do not propose to turn to them now, in order to see whether -they have or have not left any traces in my mind. It is quite possible -that critics may array against me the authority of some great name or -names; but even if I am to be charged with presumption in entering upon -this field, it will not be found, so far as I am conscious, that I have -borrowed an argument, imitated a method, or followed an example. - -There is a passage in one of the writings of Lord Macaulay in which -that brilliant essayist maintained that natural theology is not -a progressive science. Macaulay's tendency to paradox was often -aggravated by the superficial way in which he used his multifarious -knowledge. As in the course of this work I am about to do that which -he regarded as idle, namely, to inquire whether natural religion, -aside from revelation, is of any value as a means of reaching a belief -in the existence and attributes of God and the immortality of man, I -cite the passage in which Macaulay makes the assertion that natural -theology has made no progress from the time of the Greek philosophers -to the present day: "As respects natural religion, revelation being -for the present altogether left out of the question, it is not easy to -see that a philosopher of the present day is more favorably situated -than Thales or Simonides. He has before him just the same evidences -of design in the structure of the universe that the early Greeks had. -We say just the same, for the discoveries of modern astronomers and -anatomists have really added nothing to the force of that argument -which a reflecting mind finds in every beast, bird, insect, fish, -leaf, flower, and shell. The reasoning by which Socrates in Xenophon's -hearing confuted the little atheist Aristophanes, is exactly the -reasoning of Paley's 'Natural Theology.' Socrates makes precisely the -same use of the statues of Polycletus and the pictures of Zeuxis which -Paley makes of the watch. As to the other great question, the question -what becomes of man after death, we do not see that a highly educated -European, left to his unassisted reason, is more likely to be in the -right than a Blackfoot Indian. Not a single one of the many sciences -in which we surpass the Blackfoot Indians throws the smallest light on -the state of the soul after the animal life is extinct. In truth, all -the philosophers, ancient and modern, who have attempted without the -aid of revelation to prove the immortality of man, from Plato down to -Franklin, appear to us to have failed deplorably. - -"Then, again, all the great enigmas which perplex the natural -theologian are the same in all ages. The ingenuity of a people just -emerging from barbarism is quite sufficient to propound those enigmas. -The genius of Locke or Clarke is quite unable to solve them. It is -a mistake to imagine that subtile speculations touching the Divine -attributes, the origin of evil, the necessity of human actions, the -foundation of moral obligation, imply any high degree of intellectual -culture. Such speculations, on the contrary, are in a peculiar manner -the delight of intelligent children and of half-civilized men. The -number of boys is not small who, at fourteen, have thought enough on -these questions to be fully entitled to the praise which Voltaire gives -to Zadig: 'Il en savait ce qu'on a su dans tous les ages; c'est à dire, -fort peu de chose.' - -"The book of Job shows that, long before letters and arts were known -to Ionia, these vexing questions were debated with no common skill and -eloquence under the tents of the Idumean emirs; nor has human reason, -in the course of three thousand years, discovered any satisfactory -solution of the riddles which perplexed Eliphaz and Zophar. Natural -theology, then, is not a progressive science."[3] - -Here, in the space of two not very long paragraphs, is a multitude -of allusions which evince the range of Lord Macaulay's reading, but -which are employed, without very close thinking, in a quite inaccurate -way, to sustain assertions that are not true. If he had said that a -modern philosopher has before him in the structure of the universe -not only all the same evidence of design which the early Greeks had, -but a great deal more, he would have hit the exact truth. It is -simple extravagance to say that modern astronomy has added nothing to -the strength of the argument which shows the existence of a supreme -lawgiver and artificer of infinite power and skill. What did the -early Greeks know about the structure of the solar system, the law -of universal gravitation, and the laws of motion? Compare the ideas -entertained by the Greek philosophers of the phenomena of the universe -with those which modern astronomy has enabled a modern philosopher -to assume as scientific facts established by rigorous demonstration; -compare what was known before the invention of the telescope with -what the telescope has revealed; compare the progress that was made -in Greek speculative philosophy from the time of Thales to the time -of Plato, and then say whether natural religion had not made advances -of the greatest importance even before modern science had multiplied -the means for still greater progress. A brief summary of the Greek -philosophy concerning the producing causes of phenomena will determine -whether Lord Macaulay was right or wrong in the assertion that the -"early Greeks" had as good means of making true deductions in natural -theology as the means which exist to-day. - -All scholars who have attended to the history of Greek speculation know -that the Greeks held to the belief in polytheistic personal agents as -the active producers of the phenomena of Nature. This was the system of -Homer and Hesiod and the other old poets. This was the popular belief -held throughout all the Hellenic world, and it continued to be the -faith of the general public, not only after the different schools of -philosophy had arisen, but down to and after the time when St. Paul -stood on Mars Hill and told the men of Athens how he had found that -they were in all things too superstitious. Thales, who flourished in -the first half of the sixth century before Christ, was the first Greek -who suggested a physical agency in place of a personal. He assumed the -material substance, water, to be the primordial matter and universal -substratum of everything in Nature. All other substances were, by -transmutations, generated from water, and when destroyed they all -returned into water. His idea of the earth was that it was a flat, -round surface floating on the immense watery expanse or ocean. In -this he agreed with the old poets; but he did not, like them, suppose -that the earth extended down to the depths of Tartarus. The Thalesian -hypothesis, therefore, rejected the Homeric Okeanus, the father of -all things, and substituted for that personal agency the agency of -one primordial physical substance, by its own energy producing all -other substances. This is about all that is known of the philosophy of -Thales, and even this is not known from any extant writing of his, but -it is derived from what subsequent writers, including Aristotle, have -imputed to him.[4] Why Lord Macaulay should have selected Thales as the -Greek philosopher who was as favorably situated as a philosopher of -the present day for dealing with questions of natural religion, is not -very apparent. All that Thales did, assuming that we know what he did, -was to strike out a new vein of thought, the direct opposite of the -poetical and popular idea of the origin of phenomena. - -From Thales to Plato, a century and a half intervened.[5] During this -period there arose, according to Mr. Grote, twelve distinct schemes -of philosophy, the authors of which that learned Englishman has -enumerated, together with an admirable summary of their respective -systems. From this summary certain things are apparent. All these -philosophers, from Thales to Democritus, while each speculated -upon Nature in an original vein of his own, endeavored to find an -explanation or hypothesis on which to account for the production and -generation of the universe by some physical agency apart from the -mythical personifications which were believed in by the populace and -assumed in the poetical theologies. Some of them, without blending -ethics and theology in their speculations, adopted, as the universal -and sufficient agents, the common, familiar, and pervading material -substances, such as water, fire, air, etc.; others, as Pythagoras and -his sect, united with ethical and theological speculations the idea -of geometrical and arithmetical combinations as the primal scientific -basis of the phenomena of Nature. But what was common to all these -speculations was the attempt to find a scientific basis on which to -explain, by physical generation, by transmutation and motion from place -to place, the generation of the Kosmos, to take the place of generation -by a divine personal agency or agencies. But while these speculations -were of course unsuccessful, their abundance and variety, the inventive -genius which they exhibit, the effort to find a scientific basis apart -from the popular and poetic belief in a multitude of personal and -divine agencies, constitute, as Mr. Grote has well said, "one of the -most memorable facts in the history of the Hellenic mind"; and "the -mental effort required to select some known agency and to connect it -by a chain of reasoning with the result, all this is a new phenomenon -in the history of the human mind." Such an amount of philosophical -speculations could not go on for a century and a half without enlarging -the means for dealing with questions of natural theology; for they very -nearly exhausted the "causings and beginnings" which could be assigned -to regular knowable and predictable agencies; and these they carried -through almost every conceivable form of action by which such agencies -could be supposed to operate. While the authors of these systems -of philosophy were constantly hampered by the popular and poetic -conceptions of a diversified and omnipresent polytheistic agency, a -belief which, as Mr. Grote has said, was "eminently captivating and -impressive," and which pervaded all the literature of their time, -their speculations accumulated a vast fund of ideas in the sphere of -scientific explanations, which, although unsatisfactory to modern -science, became, when we reach Plato, the principal influence which led -him to revert to the former idea of a divine agency, intentionally and -deliberately constructing out of a chaotic substratum the system of the -Kosmos; and which also led him to unite with it the idea of a mode in -which it acted on and through the primordial elements of matter. - -So that, from the class of philosophers to whom Lord Macaulay -presumably referred as "the early Greeks," down to and including Plato, -there was a great advance. The earlier Greek philosophers did not -divide substance from its powers or properties, nor did they conceive -of substance as a thing acted upon by power, or of power as a thing -distinct from substance. They regarded substance, some primordial -substance, with its powers and properties, as an efficient and -material cause, and as the sole cause, as a positive and final agent. -They did not seek for a final cause apart from the substances which -they supposed to be the sole agents operating to produce important -effects. But, inasmuch as they carried their various theories through -nearly the whole range of possible speculation, they enabled Plato -and Aristotle to see that there was a fundamental defect in their -reasoning; that there must be an abstract conception of power as -something distinct from substance or its properties. It was by Plato -and Aristotle that this abstract conception was reached, of course -without any influence of what we regard as revelation; and, although -they did not always describe correctly the mode in which this power -had acted, their perception of the logical necessity for such a final -cause marks a great progress in philosophical speculation. It entirely -refutes Lord Macaulay's assertion that natural theology is not a -progressive science. It had made great progress from Thales to Plato; -and while in a certain sense it is true that "a modern philosopher -has before him just the same evidence of design in the structure of -the universe which the early Greeks had"--that is, he has the same -physical phenomena to observe--it is not true that the early Greeks -did not develop conceptions of the origin of the universe valuable -to their successors. Lord Macaulay should not have compared Thales -with the modern philosopher, in respect of advantage of situation, -but he should have compared the modern philosopher with Plato, and -Plato with his predecessors; and if he had done this, he could not -have asserted with any show of truth that natural theology has -made no advance as a science from the time of Thales, the Milesian -philosopher, and Simonides, the poet, to the present day. I shall have -occasion hereafter to speak of the masterly intellectual power by -which Plato wrought out his conception of a formative divine agency in -the production of the Kosmos, and the bold and original speculation -by which he avoided the charge of infidelity toward the established -religion of his countrymen. - -When I come to speak of what modern astronomy has done in furnishing -us with new means of sound philosophical speculation on the being, -attributes, and methods of God, it will be seen whether Lord Macaulay -is correct in the assertion that it has added nothing to the argument. -At present I will briefly advert to what the "early Greeks," or any of -the Greeks, knew of the structure of the solar system. We learn, from -a work which dates from nearly the middle of the second century of the -Christian era, what was the general conception of the solar system -among the ancients, including the Greeks. This work is known as the -"Almagest" of Ptolemy, and the name of the "Ptolemaic System" has been -given to the theory which he describes. This theory was common to all -the ancient astronomers, Ptolemy's statement of it being a compendium -of what they believed. Its principal features are these: 1. The heavens -are a vast sphere, in which the heavenly bodies are set, and around the -pole of this sphere they revolve in a circle every day. 2. The earth -is likewise a sphere, and is situated in the center of the celestial -plane as a fixed point. The earth having no motion, and being in the -center of all the motions of the other bodies, the diurnal revolutions -of those bodies are in a uniform motion around it. 3. The sun, being -one of the heavenly bodies making a revolution around the earth, was -supposed to be placed outside of the position of Venus in the heavenly -sphere. The order of the Ptolemaic system was thus: The moon was first, -being nearest to the earth; then came Mercury and Venus, the sun being -between Venus and Mars. Beyond Mars came Jupiter and Saturn. Plato's -arrangement was in one respect different, his order being the moon, the -sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. But this ideal heavenly -sphere, with the earth in the center of all the revolutions of the -other bodies, and remaining quiescent--a theory which was common to all -the ancient astronomers--was the result of observing the motions of -the heavenly bodies as they appear to a spectator on the earth. Such a -spectator would have this appearance of a celestial sphere presented -to him wherever he might be; and, judging from the apparent motions -of the heavenly bodies relative to his own position at the center, he -would conclude that the earth is at that center, and that it remains -at rest, supported on nothing. It required certain discoveries to -explode this system of a celestial sphere. First came Copernicus, who, -about the middle of the sixteenth century of our era, published his -demonstrations, which convinced the world of two great propositions: 1. -That the diurnal revolution of the heavens is nothing but an apparent -motion, caused by the revolution of the earth on its own axis. 2. That -the earth is but one of a group of planets, all of which revolve around -the sun as a center. Next came Kepler, who, in the early part of the -seventeenth century, recognizing the truth of the Copernican system, -determined the three laws of planetary motion: 1. That the orbit of -each planet is an ellipse, the sun being in one focus. 2. That as each -planet moves around the sun, the line which joins it to the sun passes -over equal areas in equal times. 3. That the square of the time of a -planet's revolution around the sun is in proportion to the cube of its -mean distance from the sun. These laws were discovered by Kepler as -deductions made upon mathematical principles from observations which -had to be carried on without the aid of the telescope, and without that -knowledge of the general laws of motion which came later. Kepler's -laws, although in the main correct, were subsequently found to be -subject to certain deviations in the planetary motions. It was when -Galileo, the contemporary of Kepler, who, if he was not the first -inventor of the telescope, was the first to use it in astronomical -observations, was able by means of it to discover the general laws of -motion, that the substantial accuracy of Kepler's three laws could be -proved, while at the same time the deviations from them were accounted -for. Still, there was wanting the grand discovery, which would disclose -the cause of these motions of the planets in elliptical orbits, and the -relations between their distances and their times of revolution, and -thus reduce the whole of the phenomena to a general law. Descartes, -who flourished 1596-1650, first attempted to do this by his theory of -Vortices. He supposed the sun to be immersed in a vast fluid, which, by -the sun's rotation, was made to rotate in a whirlpool, that carried the -planets around with it, the outer ones revolving more slowly because -the parts of the ethereal fluid in which they were immersed moved more -slowly. This was a reversion back to some of the ancient speculations. -It was reserved for Newton to discover the law of universal -gravitation, by which, in the place of any physical connection between -the bodies of the solar system by any intervening medium, the force -of attraction exerted by a larger body upon a smaller would draw the -smaller body out of the straight line that it would pursue when under -a projectile force, and would thus convert its motion into a circular -revolution around the attracting body, and make the orbit of this -revolution elliptical by the degree in which the attracting force -varied in intensity according to the varying distance between the two -bodies. When Newton's laws of motion were discovered and found to be -true, the phenomena of the solar system were explained. - -It may be interesting, before leaving for the present this branch of -the subject, to advert more particularly to one of the philosophical -systems of the Greeks, which, when compared with the discoveries of -modern astronomy, illustrates the great addition that has been made -to our means of sound speculation upon the origin of the material -universe. I refer to the system of the Pythagoreans--one of the most -remarkable instances of the invention of facts to fit and carry out -a theory that can be found in the history of philosophy, although -we are not without striking examples of this practice in modern -speculations. It has already been seen that, during the whole period -of Greek philosophy before the time of Plato, the problem was to find -a primordial and universal agent by which the sensible universe was -built up and produced; supplying, that is to say, the matter and force -required for the generation of successive products.[6] It has been seen -that the Thalesian philosophers undertook to solve this problem by the -employment of some primordial physical substance, such as water, fire, -air, etc. Pythagoras and his school held that the essence of things -consisted in number; by which they did not mean simply that all things -could be numbered, but they meant that numbers were substance, endowed -with an active force, by which things were constituted as we know them. -In the Pythagorean doctrine number was the self-existing reality; not, -as in Plato's system of ideas, separate from things, but as the essence -or determining principles of things, and having, moreover, magnitude -and active force.[7] This remarkably subtle conception of an agent in -the production of material things evinces the effort that was making, -in a direction opposite to that of Thales and his immediate successors, -to find a First Cause. It was carried out by the Pythagoreans in the -movements of the heavenly bodies, in the works of human art, and in -musical harmony; in all of which departments, according to Mr. Grote, -they considered measure and number as the producing and directing -agencies. We are here concerned only with their application of this -theory to the celestial bodies. One of their writers is quoted by Mr. -Grote as a representative of the school which was founded by Pythagoras -(about 530 B. C.), and which extended into the Græco-Italian -cities, where, as a brotherhood, they had political ascendency -until they were put down and dispersed about 509 B. C.; but -they continued for several generations as a social, religious, and -philosophical sect. According to this writer (Philolaus), "the Dekad, -the full and perfect number, was of supreme and universal efficacy as -the guide and principle of life, both to the Kosmos and to man. The -nature of number was imperative and law-giving, affording the only -solution of all that was perplexing or unknown; without number all -would be indeterminate and unknowable." - -Accordingly, the Pythagoreans constructed their system of the universe -by the all-pervading and producing energy of this primordial agent, -Number, in the manner thus described by Mr. Grote (i, 12-15): "The -Pythagoreans conceived the Kosmos, or the universe, as one single -system, generated out of numbers. Of this system the central point--the -determining or limiting One--was first in order of time and in order of -philosophical conception. By the determining influence of this central -constituted One, portions of the surrounding Infinite were successively -attracted and brought into system: numbers, geometrical figures, solid -substances were generated. But, as the Kosmos thus constituted was -composed of numbers, there could be no continuum; each numeral unit -was distinct and separate from the rest by a portion of vacant space, -which was imbibed, by a sort of inhalation, from the infinite space or -spirit without. The central point was fire, called by the Pythagoreans -the Hearth of the Universe (like the public hearth or perpetual fire -maintained in the prytaneum of a Grecian city), or the watch-tower of -Zeus. Around it revolved, from west to east, ten divine bodies, with -unequal velocities, but in symmetrical movement or regular dance. -Outermost was the circle of the fixed stars, called by the Pythagoreans -Olympus, and composed of fire like the center. Within this came -successively, with orbits more and more approximating to the center, -the five planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury; next, the sun, -the moon, and the earth. Lastly, between the earth and the central -fire, an hypothetical body, called the Antichthon, or counter-earth, -was imagined for the purpose of making up a total represented by -the sacred number ten, the symbol of perfection and totality. The -Antichthon was analogous to a separated half of the earth, simultaneous -with the earth in its revolutions, and corresponding with it on the -opposite side of the central fire. The inhabited portion of the earth -was supposed to be that which was turned away from the central fire -and toward the sun, from which it received light. But the sun itself -was not self-luminous: it was conceived as a glassy disk, receiving -and concentrating light from the central fire, and reflecting it upon -the earth, so long as the two were on the same side of the central -fire. The earth revolved in an orbit obliquely intersecting that of the -sun, and in twenty-four hours, round the central fire, always turning -the same side toward that fire. The alternation of day and night was -occasioned by the earth being, during a part of such revolution, on the -same side of the central fire with the sun, and thus receiving light -reflected from him; and during the remaining part of her revolution on -the side opposite to him, so that she received no light at all from -him. The earth, with the Antichthon, made this revolution in one day; -the moon, in one month; the sun, with the planets Mercury and Venus, -in one year; the planets Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn in longer periods -respectively, according to their distances from the center; lastly, the -outermost circle of the fixed stars (the Olympus, or the Asslanes), in -some unknown period of very long duration. - -"The revolutions of such grand bodies could not take place, in the -opinion of the Pythagoreans, without producing a loud and powerful -sound; and as their distances from the central fire were supposed to -be arranged in musical ratios, so the result of all these separate -sounds was full and perfect harmony. To the objection, Why were not the -sounds heard by us? they replied that we had heard them constantly and -without intermission from the hour of our birth; hence they had become -imperceptible by habit." - -Beautiful as was this theory--the origin of the phrase, "the music of -the spheres"--it owed its perfection as a theory to a pure invention, -resorted to in order to carry out the hypothesis of the sacred -number Ten, of which all the greater numbers were only compounds and -derivatives. This perfect and normal Ten, as a basis on which to -rest a bold astronomical hypothesis, required the imagination of the -Antichthon, or counter-earth, in order, with the other bodies, to make -up the primordial number to whose generative force the whole of these -bodies owed their origin. The resort to this conception of number, as -a formative and active agent, was doubtless due to the fact that the -Pythagoreans were the earliest cultivators of mathematical science. We -are told, in fact, that they paved the way for Euclid and Archimedes, -notwithstanding their symbolical and mystical fancies, and from their -mathematical studies they were led to give exclusive supremacy to -arithmetical and geometrical views of Nature. But what is curious about -this whole speculation is, that in the invention or substitution of -certain facts in order to make a perfect theory, it resembles some -modern hypotheses, in which facts have been assumed, or argued as -existing from analogies, when there is no evidence which establishes -them. Modern instances of this will appear hereafter. - -Enough has now been said about the speculations of the "early Greeks" -to show the extravagance of Lord Macaulay's assertion that the -discoveries of modern astronomy have placed the modern philosopher in -no better situation to make safe deductions in natural theology than -that occupied by the Hellenic philosophers from Thales to Plato. The -evidences of design in the formation of the solar system--of that kind -of design which acts in direct and specific exertions of a formative -will--have been enormously multiplied by the discoveries of modern -astronomy. Those discoveries, instead of leaving us to grope among -theories which require the invention or imagination of facts, relate to -facts that are demonstrated; and they tend in the strongest manner to -establish the hypothesis of an infinite Creator, making laws to govern -material objects, and then creating a system of objects to be governed -by those laws. In a future chapter I shall endeavor to show why this -hypothesis in regard to the solar system is most conformable to the -rules of rational belief. - -Not to anticipate what will be said hereafter concerning the modern -discoveries in anatomy and in comparative zoölogy, it is enough to -say here that in the writings of the Greek philosophers, especially -of Plato and Aristotle, we may discover what the Greeks knew or did -not know, and may therefore compare their knowledge with what is -now known. What was known about the human anatomy to the Greeks of -Plato's time is probably pretty well reflected in his "Timæus," the -celebrated dissertation in which he developed his theory of the Kosmos; -for, although Plato in that superb philosophical epic made use of the -organs of the human body for ethical and theological purposes, and -did not make a special study of matters of fact, it is not probable -that in his mode of using them he so far departed from the received -ideas of his time respecting the human anatomy that his treatise would -have been regarded by his contemporaries as an absurdity. Indeed, -Mr. Grote considered that Plato had that anatomical knowledge which -an accomplished man of his time could hardly fail to acquire without -special study.[8] Moreover, even Galen, who came five centuries after -Plato, and whose anatomical knowledge was far greater than could have -been commanded in Plato's day, was wholly wrong in respect to the -functions of some of the human organs. He agreed with Plato's ethical -view of the human organism, but not in his physiological postulates. -He considered, according to Mr. Grote, that Plato had demonstrated the -hypothesis of one soul to be absurd; he accepted Plato's triplicity of -souls, but he located them differently. He held that there are three -"originating and governing organs in the body: the brain, which is the -origin of all the nerves, both of sensation and motion; the heart, the -origin of the arteries; the liver, the sanguifacient organ, and the -origin of the veins which distribute nourishment to all parts of the -body. These three are respectively the organs of the rational, the -energetic, and the appetitive soul."[9] Plato, on the other hand, had -placed the rational soul in the cranium, the energetic soul in the -thoracic cavity, and the appetitive soul in the abdominal cavity; he -connected them by the line of the spinal marrow continuous with the -brain, making the rational soul immortal, and the two inferior souls, -or two divisions of one inferior soul, mortal. Galen did not decide -what is the essence of the three souls, or whether they are immortal. -Plato assigned to the liver a very curious function, or compound of -functions, making it the assistant of the rational soul in maintaining -its ascendency over the appetitive soul, and at the same time making -it the seat of those prophetic warnings which the gods would sometimes -vouchsafe to the appetitive soul, especially when the functions of the -rational soul are suspended, as in sleep, disease, or ecstasy. - -But while there was much scientific progress from Plato to Galen, and -while Galen's physiological ideas of the functions of the brain, the -heart, and the liver held their place until Harvey's discovery of the -circulation of the blood in the seventeenth century, that discovery -and the subsequent investigations proved that Galen, although not far -wrong as to the brain, was wholly wrong as to the liver, and partially -wrong as to the heart. Yet Galen's physiological theories concerning -these organs were founded on many anatomical facts and results of -experiments, such as could then be made. - -There is another fact which marks the state of anatomical knowledge -among the Greeks in the time of Plato, and of Aristotle, who belonged -to the same century. The "Timæus" of Plato shows that there were -physicians at that period, and that he was acquainted with the writings -of Hippocrates. The important fact is, as stated by Mr. Grote, that -"the study and practice of medicine was at that time greatly affected -by the current speculations respecting Nature as a whole; accomplished -physicians combined both lines of study, implicating cosmical and -biological theories."[10] - -It is now only needful to say that modern anatomy and physiology -afford aids to sound deductions in natural theology in reference to -the structure of the human body as an animal organism, and all the -functions of its different organs, which immeasurably transcend all -that was known or assumed among the early Greeks, or in the time of -Plato and Aristotle, or in the time of Galen. Notwithstanding the -dispute whether the origin of man as an animal is to be referred to -a special act of creation, or to the process of what has been called -evolution, there can be no controversy on one point, namely, that -modern anatomy and physiology have vastly increased our knowledge -of the structure of the human frame, and the means of rational -speculation upon the nature of intellect, as compared with any means -that were possessed by the most accomplished and learned of the Greeks -of antiquity. It matters little on which side of the controversy, -between creation and evolution, the great anatomists of the present -day range themselves. It is upon the facts which their investigations -have revealed that we have to judge of the probable truth of the one -hypothesis or the other. The probable destiny of man as an immortal -being is an inquiry that has certainly lost nothing by our increased -knowledge of the facts in his animal structure which tend to support -the hypothesis of design in his creation. - -Lord Macaulay attributes an utter failure to the efforts of the -philosophers, from Plato to Franklin, to "prove" the immortality of -the soul without the help of revelation. What did he mean by proof? -Revelation is, of course, the only direct proof. It is so, because it -is direct testimony of a fact, proceeding from the only source that -can have direct and certain knowledge of that fact. When the evidences -which are supposed to establish the existence and authority of the -witness have become satisfactory to us, we are possessed of proof of -our immortality, and this proof is the only direct evidence of which -the fact admits, and it constitutes all that should be spoken of as -proof. But there is collateral although inferior evidence--inferior, -because it consists in facts which show a high degree of probability -that the soul of man is immortal, although this kind of evidence -is not like the direct testimony of a competent witness. Is all -this presumptive evidence, with its weighty tendency to establish -the probable truth of immortality, to be pronounced of no value, -because it belongs to a different order of proof from that derived -from the assertion of a competent witness to the fact? It is one of -the advantages of our situation in this life, that the collateral -evidence which tends to show the high probability of a future state of -existence is not withheld from us. As a supplemental aid to the direct -teaching of revelation, it is of inestimable importance if we do not -obscure it by theories which pervert its force, and if we reason upon -it on sound philosophical principles. What we have to do in estimating -the probable truth of our immortality, as shown by the science of -natural religion, is to give the same force to moral evidence in this -particular department of belief, that we give to the moral evidence -which convinces us of many things of which we have no direct proof, or -of which the direct proof lies in evidence of another kind. - -"He knew as much about it," said Voltaire, "as has been known in all -ages--that is to say, very little indeed." This, like many of the -witticisms of Voltaire, pressed into the service of an argument against -the value of natural religion at the present day when studied by mature -and disciplined minds, is quite out of place. What human reason has -done in the course of three thousand years is not to be put on a par -with the speculations of intelligent children or half-civilized men; -and although some of the riddles which perplexed Eliphaz and Zophar -have not had a perfectly satisfactory solution, it is quite wide -from the truth to assert that there has been no approximation to a -satisfactory solution, or that some of the riddles have not ceased to -be the riddles which they were three thousand years ago. In that period -there has been an accumulation of evidence concerning the phenomena of -Nature, and the phenomena of mind, vast beyond comparison when placed -in contrast with what was known in the tents of the Idumean emirs, and -the importance of this accumulation of evidence is proved by the fact -that theories have been built upon it which undertake to explain it -by hypotheses that were never heard of before, and which may possibly -leave the "riddles" in a far less satisfactory state than they were -in the time of Job. On the other hand, while the companions of Job may -have been unable to suggest to him any solution of the problems of -life, it does not at all follow that we are as helpless as they were, -even if we avail ourselves of nothing but what the science of natural -theology can now teach us.[11] - -It will be seen that I attach great importance to natural theology. But -I do not propose to write for the confirmed believers in revelation, on -the one hand, who have become convinced by the evidence which supports -revelation; or for those, on the other hand, who believe nothing, and -who have become confirmed in habits of thinking which unfit them for -judging of the weight of evidence on such subjects as the existence -of God and the creation of man. I write for that great mass of people -of average intelligence, who do not understand accurately what the -doctrine of evolution is as expounded by its leading representatives, -and who do not know to what it leads. It will be found that in some -respects there is a distinction between the school of which Darwin is -the representative and the school which follows Spencer. To point out -this distinction, and yet to show that both systems result in negatives -which put an end to the idea of immortality, and that the weight of -evidence is against both of them, is what I propose to do. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [2] Galileo's "heresy," that the earth moves round the sun, was - condemned by a papal decree in the sixteenth century as "absurd, - philosophically false, and formally heretical, because it is expressly - contrary to Holy Scripture." No Roman Catholic now dreams of disputing - what the Florentine astronomer maintained; and the evolutionists are - perpetually foretelling that the time will come when to question - their doctrine will be admitted to be as ridiculous as was the papal - interdict fulminated against Galileo. If their doctrine had nothing - to confront it but a similar condemnation, proceeding from some - ecclesiastical authority claiming to be "infallible," or, if it could - be met only by the assertion that it is "contrary to Holy Scripture," - there would be some analogy between the two cases. But there is a - vast unlikeness between the two cases. While the hypothesis of animal - evolution is plainly enough "contrary to Holy Scripture," no one who - has any perception of the weakness of its proofs is obliged to rest - his rejection of it on that ground. If, in the sixteenth century, - there had been as good scientific and physical grounds on which to - refute Galileo as there now are for questioning the doctrine of - the evolution of distinct species out of other species, the papal - condemnation would have been superfluous even for churchmen. We must - not forget the age in which we live, or allow any kind of truth to - fail of vindication, from fear of being classed with those who in some - former age have blunderingly mistaken the means of vindicating truth. - Belief in special creations, whatever the Bible may say, does not now, - and in all probability never will, stand on a par with the belief that - the sun moves round the earth. - - [3] Macaulay's "Essays," etc., Riverside edition, vol. ii, 502-504. - - [4] Grote's "Plato," i, 4. - - [5] Thales flourished 620-560 B. C. Plato's life extended from 427-347 - B. C. - - [6] Grote's "Plato," i, 10. I follow Mr. Grote in describing the - hypothesis of the Pythagoreans. - - [7] Ibid. - - [8] Grote, iii, 290. - - [9] Ibid., 287, 288. - - [10] Grote, iii, 289. - - [11] It should be stated that the passage from Macaulay's writings - here commented on was written and first published in 1840, before the - speculations of the scientists who maintain the doctrines of evolution - had attracted much attention, or been promulgated in their present - shape. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -The Platonic Kosmos compared with the Darwinian theory of evolution. - - -It is my purpose in this chapter to draw a parallel between the theory -of the origin of different animals propounded in the "Timæus" of Plato -and that of Mr. Darwin. The analogy between them has been briefly -hinted by Mr. Grote, but he has not followed it out in detail, as it -was no part of his object to make minute comparisons between any of -the speculations of Plato and those of modern philosophers. The great -English scholar and critic seems to regard it as somewhat uncertain how -far Plato meant in the "Timæus" to have his description of the Kosmos -stand as an expression of his own belief, or as a mere work of his -imagination and fancy. Plato, we are told, and this is quite obvious, -dealt but little with facts, while he dealt largely with theories. -But, even as a pure work of the imagination, or as a philosophical -epic, the daring conception of the Kosmos is wonderfully complete; and -it will repay any one, who follows Mr. Grote in his analysis of it, -to observe how Plato employs a process of degeneration to account for -the formation of different species of animals, from the higher to the -lower, by agencies that bear a strong resemblance to those which are -assumed by Darwin to have worked in the opposite process of variation -and natural selection, resulting in the evolution of a higher from a -lower animal. But, in order to render this comparison intelligible, it -is necessary to make an abstract of Plato's system of the Kosmos before -adverting to the analogies between that system and the Darwinian -theory. I follow, although I have greatly condensed, Mr. Grote's -description of the Platonic Kosmos. - -According to the Platonic idea of the Kosmos, as given in the "Timæus," -there existed, anterior to all time, primordial matter in a state of -chaos. This matter was not created for; according to Mr. Grote, whose -authority upon such a point is the highest, the notion of absolute -creation was unknown to the Greeks of antiquity, and it does not appear -that Plato suggests it. But, without accounting for its existence, -Plato assumes that there was matter in a condition of utter chaos -before time could have had an existence; and, in order to make the -chaotic condition the more impressive in its primitive destitution -of all form or active principles tending to union or arrangement, he -supposes that the four elements of fire, air, earth, and water had -no existence save in the abstract, or as ideas and forms. But, as -abstract ideas, these four elements of fire, air, earth, and water were -distinct, self-existing, and indestructible, coeval with the chaotic -matter which was waiting to receive their impress and to take on their -distinctive elemental characters. They had already begun to act on the -_fundamentum_, or primordial chaotic matter, as upon a recipient, but -it was in a confused way and without regularity of plan, so that they -had not become concrete existences or determinate agents. - -In this state of things there appears upon the scene the Demiurgus, -a being coeval with the chaos of matter, that is, self-existing and -eternal. But, consistently with the philosophy which did not admit of -the idea of absolute creation, the Demiurgus was not a creator, but -an architect or designer, working on materials that lay within his -reach. His moral attribute was goodness, which was, in his situation, -synonymous with order, regularity, symmetry, and proportion, and, along -with this tendency, he had supreme artistic skill. In other words, he -was the personification of νους, or reason, working against necessity: -the latter being, not what we mean by that term, something preordained -and fixed, but confusion, uncertainty, irregularity, and unreason, -which are to be overcome by their opposites. - -Besides the chaotic matter and the ideas or forms of the four elements, -as yet unrealized in the actual substances of fire, air, earth, and -water, there were coeval ideas or forms of animals, or, as we should -say, abstract animals, or conceptions of animals. The first and -grandest of these was the eternal self-animal, or the ideal of animal -existence. Next came the ideas or forms of four other animals: 1. The -celestial gods; 2. Man; 3. Birds, or animals living in air; 4. Land -or water animals. Bearing in mind that we are still in the region of -abstract conceptions in regard to these types of animals, which as -yet have no concrete existence, and that they are, so to speak, the -intellectual models from which the Demiurgus is to work, in order to -make the real animals conformably to the pre-existing and eternal -plan, we come to the process of forming the Kosmos, which is to be the -containing animal of all the other four. Out of the confused chaos of -existing matter the Demiurgus proceeds to construct the Kosmos, which -was to become the one self-animal, by impressing the idea or abstract -form of animal upon a physical structure built out of the primordial -chaotic matter and comprehending the whole of it. The first step was -to bring the four elements of fire, air, earth, and water out of their -chaotic and confused condition by separating them according to the -forms of their eternal ideas. The total of each element, when made to -take its normal form, was used in the construction of the Kosmos, which -thus came to possess the whole existing body of material; "so that," -to borrow the words of Mr. Grote, "there remained nothing of the four -elements apart, to hurt the Kosmos from without, nor anything as raw -material for a second Kosmos." - -The Kosmos was made a perfect sphere, and with a perfectly smooth outer -surface, without organs of sight or hearing, because there was nothing -outside to be seen or heard; without organs of respiration, because -there was no outside atmosphere to be breathed; and without nutritive -or excrementory organs, because it was self-sufficing, being supplied -with nourishment by its own decay. It was not furnished with limbs or -means of locomotion or standing, because, being a sphere turning on an -axis, and having only one of the seven possible varieties of movement, -namely, rotation in a circle in one and the same plane, there was -nothing for it to grasp or repel.[12] This body, the only-begotten, -because in its formation all existing bodily material was employed, -perfectly spherical and smooth, equidistant from its center to all -points of its circumference, and suspended upon its own axis traversing -its diameter, was now to be animated by a soul. - -The Demiurgus, in the formation of the soul of the Kosmos, took three -constituent ingredients and mixed them together. They were: 1. The -Same, or the Identical, the indivisible and unchangeable essence of -Ideas; 2. The Different, or the Plural, the divisible essence of -bodies or of the elements; 3. A compound of both of these ingredients -melted into one. Blended together in one grand compound, these three -ingredients formed the soul of the Kosmos by first dividing the mixture -into different portions, and then uniting the portions according to -a complicated scale of harmonious numerical proportions. The outer -or sidereal sphere of the Kosmos was made to receive the Same, or -Identity, by being placed in an even and undivided rotation toward the -right, turning on the great axis of the whole sphere. The interior, or -planetary spheres, the five planets, and the sun and the moon, were -made to be under the influence of the Different, or Diversity--that -is to say, their rotations on their separate axes, all oblique, were -toward the left, while the overpowering force of rotation of the -outer sphere carried them along with it, although the time of their -separate rotations was more or less modified by their own inherent and -countermoving forces. - -Thus the sentient capacity of the cosmical soul became the cognition -of the Same and the Different, and the blended Same and Different, -because it embodied these three ingredients in its own nature. It was -invisible; rooted at its center and pervading and inclosing the whole -visible body, circulating and communicating, without voice or sound, -all impressions and information concerning the existing relations -between the separate parts and specialties of the cosmical body. - -Anterior to the Kosmos there was no time. With the rotation of the -Kosmos time began. It was marked first by the eternal and unchanging -rotation of the outer circle, in which were placed the fixed stars, -which revolved with it in unaltered position with regard to each other; -and one revolution of this outer or most rational circle made a day. -The sun, moon, and planets were distributed in different portions of -the Circle of the Different; one revolution of the moon marking a -month, and one revolution of the sun marking a year. The earth, the -first and oldest of the sidereal and planetary gods, was packed around -the great axis which ran through the center of the Kosmos, and turned -that axis; so that the earth regulated the movement of the great -cosmical axis, and was the determining agent of night and day. - -Thus far we have the formation of the Kosmos, animated with a pervading -soul, the body being formed out of the whole of existing matter, molded -into the specific elements of fire, air, earth, and water, and the -soul being formed out of the constituent ingredients furnished by the -eternal and invisible essence of ideas. The whole, body and soul of -the Kosmos, was thus an animal, formed on the abstract but eternal -idea or form of an animal which had existed before time began. We -now approach the formation of the other animals. Of the Kosmos there -could be but one. All existing material of matter had been used in -his construction. He could not become a species, as there could be no -second Kosmos. Something could be borrowed from him, for the formation -of other animals, but nothing could be destroyed. He was not yet, -however, a full copy of the model of the Generic Animal or Idea of -Animal, because the eternal plan of that model required that he should -be peopled or inhabited by four other animals, which might constitute -species. Accordingly, the Demiurgus proceeds to form the first of -these sub-animals, the gods, who are to inhabit different portions of -the Kosmos. The first of these in formation was the earth, planted -in the center, and made sentinel over night and day; next the fixed -stars, formed chiefly out of fire, and placed in the outer circle of a -fixed revolution, or the Circle of the Same, to give to it light and -brilliancy. The sidereal orbs thus became animated beings, eternal and -divine. They remained constantly turning round in the same relative -position, but the sun, moon, and planets, belonging to the Circle of -the Different, and trying to revolve by their own effort in a direction -opposite to that of the outer sphere, became irregular in their -revolutions and varied in their relative positions. Thus the primitive -gods were the earth and the fixed stars, which revolved without -variation with the Circle of the Same, and became immortal as well as -visible; while the sun, moon, and planets were not among the primitive -gods, but were simply spherical bodies placed in the inner Circle -of the Different. The primitive gods preside over and regulate the -Kosmos. From them are generated and descended the remaining gods.[13] - -Having completed the Kosmos and the primitive gods, the Demiurgus -paused in his work. There were still other animals to be constructed, -the first and noblest of which was to be Man. But the Demiurgus, -who, in the construction of these gods, had made them immortal, not -in their own nature but through his determination, seems to have -apprehended that, if he proceeded to construct the other animals -himself, they would likewise be thereby rendered of immortal duration. -He therefore assembled the newly generated gods and made to them a -personal address. He informed them of their immortal existence, and of -his purpose to confide to them the construction of the other animals, -stating at the same time, in the case of man, that he would himself -supply an immortal element which they were to incorporate with a -mortal body, in imitation of the power which he had exercised in the -generation of themselves. He then proceeded to compound together, but -in inferior perfection and purity, the remnant of the same elements -out of which he had formed the cosmical soul.[14] He then distributed -the whole of this mass into souls equal in number to the fixed stars, -placed each of them in a star of its own, where it would be carried -round in the cosmical rotation, explained to it its immortal destiny, -and that at an appointed hour of birth it would be transferred into a -mortal body in conjunction with two inferior kinds of soul or mind. -These irrational enemies, the two inferior souls, the rational and -immortal soul would have to control and subdue, so as to live a good -life. If it triumphed in the conflict, it would return after death to -its own star, where in an everlasting abode it would dwell forever -in unison with the celestial harmonies and perfections of the outer -sphere. But, if it failed, it would be born again into an inferior -body, and on the death of that body, if it continued evil, it would be -again born into a still more degraded animal, through an indefinite -transmigration from animal to animal, until the rational soul should -have obtained the mastery over the irrational and turbulent, when it -would be released and permitted to return to its own peculiar star.[15] -Here, then, the Demiurgus retired, leaving to the gods the work of -fabricating mortal bodies for man, and two mortal and inferior souls, -with which the immortal soul was to be joined. But before he withdrew -he inculcated upon the gods to construct the new mortal animal in the -best manner, so that the immortal soul should have the fairest chance -of guiding and governing rightly, in order that the animal might -not be the cause of mischief and misery to himself; a possible and -even probable result which the Demiurgus proclaimed beforehand, thus -relieving himself of responsibility, and casting it, it would seem, -upon the gods.[16] The latter stood, then, in the position of workmen, -who have received certain directions from a superior architect, have -been supplied with certain materials, and are obliged to conform to a -prescribed model, the cosmical animal, as far as circumstances will -allow. The Demiurgus retires, and leaves the gods to their work. - -They borrow from the Kosmos, from which they are permitted to obtain -materials, portions of the four elements, for the construction of the -human body, with an engagement that these materials shall one day be -returned. These they unite in one body by numerous minute and invisible -fastenings; over this body they place a head or cranium, into which -they introduce the immortal soul, making the head, with its spherical -form like that of the Kosmos, and admitting of no motion but the -rotary, the most divine portion of the human system and master of the -body, which is to be subject and ministerial. To the body they give all -the six varieties of motive power, forward, backward, upward, downward, -to the right and to the left. The phenomena of nutrition and sensation -begin as soon as the connection is formed between the immortal soul and -the mortal body, but as the irregular movements and agitations arising -from the diverse rotations of the Same and the Different convey false -and foolish affirmations to the soul in the cranium. That soul is -destitute of intelligence when first joined to the body, and remains -so for some time. But gradually these disturbing currents abate, -the rotations of the Same and the Different in the head become more -regular, and the man becomes more intelligent. - -It is now necessary to account for the introduction of the two mortal -souls, and to show how the conflict appointed for the immortal soul -became the test of a life which was to determine whether the latter -should be permitted, on the death of the body, to return to its -peculiar star, or whether it should be degraded into some lower form -of animal. The immortal soul has its special abode in the head, which -is both united to and separated from the trunk by the neck. The gods -kept the two mortal souls separate, so that the rational or immortal -soul might be defiled by the contact as little as possible. The better -portion of the mortal soul they placed in the thoracic cavity. It -was the energetic, courageous, contentious soul, placed above the -diaphragm, so as to receive orders easily from the head, and to aid -the rational soul in keeping the mutinous soul of appetite, which was -placed below the diaphragm, in subjection. - -It is unnecessary to follow here the minute anatomical descriptions -which Plato gives of the different organs of the human body, or of -the way in which they are supposed to act on the two divisions of -the mortal soul, or to be acted on by them, or the mode in which the -latter act upon the encephalic or immortal soul which is seated in the -cranium. These descriptions evince much knowledge of the human anatomy, -and probably all the knowledge that was possessed in Plato's time. It -is immaterial how far this anatomical knowledge was correct, and of -course there was in Plato's use of the various organs a great deal that -was fanciful. It is sufficient, without following Mr. Grote's analysis -through these details, to note that, in Plato's arrangement, the -immortal soul was supposed to be fastened in the brain, the two mortal -souls in the line of the spinal marrow continuous with the brain, and -that this line formed the thread of connection between them all. - -Passing on toward the point where the process of degradation might -begin, which would result in the reduction of this new and divinely -constructed animal to a lower form, we have to note, first, that it was -made a non-sexual animal, being intended for an angelic type. In the -original plan of the gods, it was not contemplated that this primitive -type should reproduce itself by any process of generation. According -to the original scheme, it would seem that every time a new immortal -soul was to be brought down from its peculiar star, the process of -constructing for it a mortal body would have to be repeated. Plato, -Mr. Grote observes, does indeed tell us that the primitive non-sexual -type had the option of maintaining itself. But this must mean that -each individual of that type had the option of maintaining itself in -its struggle with the debasing influences of appetite and disease. -But not one representative of it has held his ground; and as it was -foreseen that such an angelic type could not maintain itself, we -are to look for a reconstruction of the whole organism. This came -about from the degeneracy of the primitive non-sexual animal below -the standard of good life which it had the option of continuing. -Men whose lives had fallen below this standard became effeminate, -cowardly, unjust. In their second birth, their immortal souls had to be -translated into a body resembling that to which they had debased the -first body into which they were born. The first transition, therefore, -was from man into woman. In other words, the gods, seeing that the -non-sexual primitive type did not maintain itself at the high point -intended for it, reconstructed the whole organism upon the bi-sexual -principle, introducing the comparatively lower type of woman. A partial -transformation of the male structure makes the female. A suitable -adjustment of the male organs, and the implanting of the sexual -impulse in both sexes, by the agency of the gods, make provision for -generative reproduction, and a species is formed, which takes the place -of the primitive non-sexual type which did not reproduce itself in the -original scheme. The primitive type disappears, and it disappears by -a process of degradation, which it undergoes by reason of its failure -to avail itself of the option which it originally had of living a good -life that would entitle the immortal soul to return to its peculiar -star without further conflict with the debasing tendencies to which it -was exposed in the first body that it inhabited. - -In this curious theory we see how a process of declension or -degradation is induced by what may almost be called a choice, since -the primitive human being, by not resisting the debasing tendencies of -his lower nature, is made by those tendencies to assume a less divine -form than that in which he originally existed. To the primitive man the -gods assigned the encephalic or head-soul, which was connected with -and suspended from the divine soul of the Kosmos. They assigned it to -each man as his presiding genius. If he neglected it, and directed -all his development toward the energetic or appetitive mortal soul, -he would become debased. He did so. Hence it became necessary for the -gods to reconstruct the whole organism, and in this reconstruction -the primitive non-sexual type becomes the bi-sexual, and a species is -formed. - -It is not necessary to enter into the metaphysical argument which -relates to the question of responsibility for this change from the -original plan. Plato tells us that the gods foresaw it as a necessary -consequence of the original scheme; and, moreover, that they foresaw -that they must make preparation for the still more degenerate varieties -of birds and quadrupeds, into which the corrupt and stupid part of -mankind would sink, all of which were according to the great eternal -scheme of the four kinds of ideal animals embraced in the idea of the -Kosmos itself. But with the moral justice of the whole theory we have -no concern here. We are here concerned, first, with the nature of the -process by which, in the Platonic theory, the bi-sexual human race -became formed out of the primitive non-sexual type; and, next, with -the process by which individuals of this race became degraded into the -lower animals.[17] - -After the process of degradation had begun, after the primitive type -had given place to the bi-sexual human race, and a species was thus -formed, further degradation would be inevitable under the same causes -which produced the first one. The female part of mankind would go on -bringing forth new males and new females, and to each one at birth -there would come from its peculiar star an immortal soul, for I do not -understand that Plato's women were supposed not to be constructed, in -this respect, upon the same plan as the men. But each of these newly -arrived immortal souls would be placed in a mortal body in contact and -conflict with the two mortal souls of appetite, disturbance, and mutiny -against the divine laws of reason. Each new human being would then be -exposed to further debasement, by which his or her human organs and -human form would undergo transformation into a lower type of animal -life. Accordingly, we find that Plato, in perfect consistency with his -theory, supposes that birds are a degraded birth or formation derived -from one peculiar mode of degeneracy in man, hair being transmuted into -feathers and wings. If we inquire from what kind of men the birds were -formed, and how they came to be assigned to the air, we shall best -learn from the words employed by Mr. Grote to express Plato's idea: -"Birds were formed from the harmless but light, airy, and superficial -men, who, though carrying their minds aloft to the study of cosmical -phenomena, studied them by visual observation and not by reason, -foolishly imagining that they had discovered the way of reaching -truth."[18] - -Next to the birds came the land-animals, a more brutal formation. -These, to borrow the words of Mr. Grote's analysis, "proceeded from men -totally destitute of philosophy, who neither looked up to the heavens -nor cared for celestial objects; from men making no use whatever of -the rotations of their encephalic soul, but following exclusively -the guidance of the lower soul in the trunk. Through such tastes and -occupations, both their heads and their anterior limbs became dragged -down to the earth by the force of affinity. Moreover, when the rotation -of the encephalic soul from want of exercise became slackened and fell -into desuetude, the round form of the cranium was lost and became -converted into an oblong or some other form. These now degenerated into -quadrupeds and multipeds, the gods furnishing a greater number of feet -in proportion to the stupidity of each, in order that its approximation -to earth might be multiplied. To some of the more stupid, however, the -gods gave no feet or limbs at all, constraining them to drag the whole -length of their bodies along the ground, and to become reptiles. Out of -the most stupid and senseless of mankind, by still greater degeneracy, -the gods formed fishes, or aquatic animals--the fourth and lowest genus -after men, birds, land-animals. This race of beings, from their extreme -want of mind, were not considered worthy to live on earth, or to -respire thin and pure air. They were condemned to respire nothing but -deep and turbid water, many of them, as oysters and other descriptions -of shell-fish, being fixed down at the lowest depth or bottom. It is by -such transitions (concludes the Platonic 'Timæus') that the different -races of animals passed originally, and still continue to pass, into -each other. The interchange is determined by the acquisition or loss of -reason or rationality."[19] - -Here, then, we have a process of degradation by which the different -races of animals were formed, by a kind of selection which, commencing -in the human species from the neglect of the encephalic soul to -maintain its high duties and aims, goes on in successive debasements -which result in the formation of lower and still lower animals until -we reach the shell-fish fixed upon the earth at the bottom of the -water. The bi-sexual principle of construction having been introduced -in the human species, was continued through all the other species -formed by the still descending process of deterioration, so that to -each successive species there remained the power of reproducing its -own type, along with the tendency to evolve a lower type by further -loss of reason or rationality. It is not material to the purpose of -the parallel, which I am about to draw between the Platonic and the -Darwinian system, to consider the precise nature of the Platonic idea -of an intelligent power, by which these successive degradations were -in one sense purposely ordained. Enough is apparent on the Platonic -system to show that, while these degradations were according to an -eternal plan, because they resulted from the conflict between reason -and unreason, order and disorder, between purity and impurity, yet the -different species of animals, after man, were not special creations by -an infinite power interfering in each case by a separate exercise of -creative will. They were a growth of an inferior organization out of a -superior through the inevitable operation of tendencies which changed -the forms of the animals. As fast as these tendencies operated--and -they were continually operating--the ministers of the Demiurgus, the -gods, stood ready to adapt the structure to the new conditions in -which the tendencies resulted, so that the new animal might be fitted -to and fixed in those conditions. Still, the gods are not represented -as making separate creations of new species as an act of their will, -without the pre-existing operation in the preceding type of tastes and -occupations which modify the structure into one of a more degraded -character. It may thus be said with entire truth that the Platonic idea -of the origin of the different races of animals presents a parallel -to the Darwinian theory, in which it will be found that the one is -the reverse of the other, both of them proceeding upon and involving -analogous principles of evolution, operating in the one system from -below upward, and in the other from a higher point downward. If, in -the Platonic system, the idea of an original immortal soul placed -in a heavenly abode, but afterward brought down and fixed in a -mortal body, is the starting-point--if a conflict of a spiritual and -angelic existence with corporeal and earthly tendencies is at first -the predominant fact--the parallel between the Platonic process of -degradation and the Darwinian process of elevation remains the same; -for, in the one system, reason degenerates into instinct, and instinct -at last reaches its lowest possible action, or ceases entirely; and, -in the other, instinct rises from its lowest action through successive -improvements until it becomes mind or intellect: so that somewhere in -the two processes there must be a point where they pass each other in -opposite directions, the one losing or merging intellect in instinct, -the other losing and merging instinct in mind, each of the two -processes being a process of development or evolution, but in opposite -directions.[20] - -It is not easy to ascertain at once what was Mr. Darwin's idea of the -mode in which a supreme intelligence has presided over the creation. -In his work on "The Descent of Man", he adduces some evidence that man -was not "originally endowed with the ennobling belief in the existence -of an Omnipotent God," this evidence being that numerous savage races -have existed, and still exist, who have had and have no words in their -language to express this idea. But this, if true, does not help us -to understand what part in Mr. Darwin's theory an Omnipotent God is -supposed to play. Scattered through the same work we find references -to the hypothesis of such a being, and to the influences which this -belief has exerted upon the advance of morality. But I assume that we -are to understand that Mr. Darwin adopts as a fact, to be taken into -account in judging of his theory of evolution, that there is such a -being as an Omnipotent God, having equally the power to make separate -creations, or to establish certain laws of matter, and to leave them -to operate through secondary causes in the production and extinction -of the past and present inhabitants of the world. In his work on the -"Origin of Species" he refers to "what we know of the laws impressed -upon matter by the Creator."[21] In his "Descent of Man" the following -passage occurs toward the close of the work: "He who believes in the -advancement of man from some low organized form will naturally ask, -How does this bear on the belief in the immortality of the soul? The -barbarous races of man, as Sir J. Lubbock has shown, possess no clear -belief of this kind; but arguments, derived from the primeval beliefs -of savages, are, as we have just seen, of little or no avail. Few -persons feel any anxiety from the impossibility of determining at what -precise period in the development of the individual, from the first -trace of a minute germinal vesicle, man becomes an immortal being; -and there is no greater cause for anxiety, because the period can not -possibly be determined in the gradually ascending organic scale." - -Surely it is a most pertinent inquiry, How does his theory of the -advancement of man from some lower organized form bear on the -immortality of the soul? and it is no answer to this inquiry to say -that upon no hypothesis of man's origin can we determine at what -precise period he becomes an immortal being. That the idea of an -Omnipotent God, capable of creating a spiritual essence, or an immortal -soul, is not denied by Mr. Darwin, is doubtless to be inferred from -his strong affirmation that our minds refuse to accept as the result -of blind chance the grand sequence of events which the birth both of -the species and the individual presents to our view. That variations of -structure, the union of pairs in marriage, the dissemination of seeds, -and similar events, have all been ordained for some special purpose, -is the hypothesis according to which he regards them as events brought -about by the laws of natural selection, which laws were ordained by -the Creator and left to operate. Now, while this hypothesis excludes, -or tends to exclude, the idea of blind chance, it still remains to -be considered whether the soul of man, or the essence which we call -intellect, is in each case a direct creation of a special character, or -whether it is a result from the operation of the laws which have been -ordained for the action of organized matter. If it is the former, the -soul may survive the destruction of the body. If it is the latter, the -soul as well as all the other manifestations or exhibitions which the -material body gives forth in its action, may and in all probability -must cease with the organs whose action leads us falsely to believe -that we are animated by an immortal spirit while we are in the flesh. -If it is a necessary result of any theory that what is supposed to be -the immortal soul of man is a product of the operation of certain laws -imposed upon organized matter, without being a special creation of -something distinct from matter, it is immaterial whether the organized -form of matter with which the soul is connected, or appears to act for -a time, was a special creation, or was an evolution out of some lower -form, or came by blind chance. Nor is it material that we can not -determine at what precise period in the genesis of the individual, by -the ordinary process of reproduction, he becomes an immortal being. The -question is, Does he ever become an immortal being, if in body and in -mind he is a mere product of organized matter, formed from some lower -type through the laws of variation and natural selection, resulting in -an animal whose manifestations or exhibitions of what we call intellect -or mind are manifestations of the same nature as the instincts of the -lower animals, differing only in degree? - -That I may not be misunderstood, and especially that I may not be -charged with misrepresentation, I will state the case for the Darwinian -theory as strongly as I can. The question here is obviously not a -question of power. An Omnipotent Creator has just the same capacity to -make special creations, by a direct and special exertion of his will, -as he has to make one primordial type and place it under fixed laws -that will in their operation cause a physical organization to act in -such a way as to evolve out of it other and more or less perfect types. -In either method of action, he would be the same Omnipotent God, by -whose will all things would exist; and I assume that upon this point -there is no difference between some of the evolution school and its -opponents. But in considering the question of the origin of the human -soul, or the intellect of man, we are dealing not with a question of -power, but with the probable method in which the conceded Omnipotent -capacity has acted. On the one hand, we have the hypothesis that the -Eternal and Omnipotent capacity has created a spiritual and immortal -being, capable of existing without any union with the body that is -formed out of earthly material, but placed for a time in unison with -such a body; and that for the effectual purpose of this temporary -union this body has been specially constructed, and constructed in two -related forms, male and female, so that this created species of animal -may perpetuate itself by certain organic laws of reproduction. Now it -is obviously immaterial that we can not detect the point of time, or -the process, at or by which the union between the spiritual essence -and the earthly body takes place in the generation of the individual. -It is conceded to be alike impossible to detect the time or mode in -which descendants of the lower animals, which had nothing resembling -intellect, become endowed with and inhabited by intellect, through the -supposed laws of variation and natural selection, operating to produce -an animal of a more elaborate organization. The point of divergence -between the two hypotheses is precisely this: that the one supposes the -mind of man to be a special creation, of a spiritual nature, designed -to be immortal, but placed in union with a mortal body for a temporary -purpose. The other hypothesis supposes no special creation of either -the mind or the body of man, but maintains that the latter is evolved -out of some lower animal, and that the former is evolved out of the -action of physical organization.[22] Either mode of projecting and -executing the creation of both the body and the mind of man is of -course competent to an Omnipotent God. The question is, Which mode has -the highest amount of probability on which to challenge our belief? -If the one, as it is described, leads to the conclusion that the mind -can not survive the body, and the other leads to the conclusion that -it can, we are left to choose between them: and our choice must be -determined by what we can discover of satisfactory proof that the mind -of man was destined to become immortal. What, then, is the Darwinian -theory of the origin of man as an animal, and to what does it lead -respecting the origin and nature of the human soul? - -Whoever will carefully examine Mr. Darwin's hypothesis of the -descent of man as an animal, will find that commencing at a point -opposite to that at which Plato began his speculations, the modern -naturalist assumes the existence of a very low form of animated and -organized matter, destitute of anything in the nature of reason, -even if acting under what may be called instinctive and unconscious -impulses, imposed upon it by the preordained laws by which animated -matter is to act. By some process of generation, either bi-sexual or -uni-sexual or non-sexual, this very low type of animal is endowed with -a power of reproducing other individuals of the same structure and -habits. In process of time, for which we must allow periods very much -longer than those of which we are accustomed to think in relation to -recorded history, the individuals of this species become enormously -multiplied. A struggle for existence takes place between these very -numerous individuals; and in this struggle there comes into operation -the law to which Mr. Darwin has given the name of "natural selection," -which is but another name for a series of events. He does not mean -by this term to imply a conscious choice on the part of the animals, -nor an active power or interfering deity. He employs it to express -a constantly occurring series of events or actions, by which, in -certain circumstances, animals secure themselves against the tendency -to destruction which is caused by the great disparity between their -numbers and the amount of food that is accessible to them, or by the -unfavorable influences of a change of climate upon so great a body -of individuals. He calls this series of events or actions _natural_ -selection, in order, as I understand, to compare what takes place -in nature with what takes place when a breeder of animals purposely -selects the most favorable individuals for the purpose of improving -or varying the breed. In nature, the selection is supposed to operate -as follows: The strongest and most active individuals of a species -of animals have the best chance of securing the requisite amount of -food from the supply that is insufficient for all. They do this by -their greater fleetness in overtaking the common prey, or by making -war upon the more feeble or inactive of their fellows; and numerous -individuals are either directly destroyed by this warfare, or are -driven off from the feeding-ground and perish for want of nourishment. -Thus the best specimens of the race survive; and to this occurrence is -given the name of the "survival of the fittest," meaning the survival -of those individuals best fitted to continue their own existence and -to continue their species. A physical change in the country inhabited -by a great multitude of individuals of a certain species, or by -different species--for example, a change of climate--operates to make -this struggle for existence still more severe, and the result would -be that those individuals of the same species which could best adapt -themselves to their new condition would tend to be preserved, as -would the different species inhabiting the same country which could -best maintain the struggle against other species. The improvement -in the structure of the animals takes place, under this process of -natural selection, in the following manner: The best individuals being -preserved, the organs of which they make most use in the struggle for -existence undergo development and slight modifications, favorable -to the preservation of the individual, and these modifications are -transmitted to their offspring. Here there comes in play a kind of -collateral aid to which is given the name of "sexual selection," -which is defined as a form of selection depending "not on a struggle -for existence in relation to other organic beings or to external -conditions, but on a struggle between individuals of one sex, generally -the males, for the possession of the other sex."[23] "The result," -continues Mr. Darwin, "is not death to the unsuccessful competitor, -but few or no offspring. Sexual selection is, therefore, less rigorous -than natural selection. Generally, the most vigorous males, those which -are best fitted for their place in nature, will leave most progeny. -But, in many cases, victory depends not so much on general vigor, as -on having special weapons, confined to the male sex." As, by means of -this warfare of sexual selection, the victor would always be allowed -to breed, his courage and his special weapons of offense or defense, -in their increased development, would descend to his offspring. Thus -the improvement and modification induced by natural selection would be -enhanced and transmitted by the sexual selection.[24] - -In regard to the operation of the two kinds of selection in the -evolution of man from a lower form of animal, we find the theory -to be this: That organic beings with peculiar habits and structure -have passed through transitions which have converted the primordial -animal into one of totally different habits and structure; that, -in these transitions, organs adapted to one condition and mode -of life have become adapted to another; that such organs are -homologous, and that in their widely varied uses they have been -formed by transitional gradations, so that, for example, a floating -apparatus, or swim-bladder, existing in a water-animal for one -purpose--flotation--has become converted in the vertebrate animals into -true lungs for the very different purpose of respiration. Thus, by -ordinary generation, from an ancient and unknown prototype, not only -have organs, by minute and successive transitions, become adapted to -changed conditions of life, but the whole organism has become changed, -and this has resulted in the production of an animal vastly superior -to his ancient and unknown prototype; and yet to that prototype, of -which we have no specimen and no record, are to be traced the germs -of all the peculiarities of structure which we find in the perfect -animals of different kinds that we thoroughly know, until we come to -man, these successive results being brought about by the two kinds of -selection--natural and sexual. - -There can be no better illustration of the character of Mr. Darwin's -theory than that to which he resorts when he means to carry it to its -most startling length, while he candidly admits that he has felt the -difficulty of this application of it far too keenly to be surprised -at the hesitation of others. This illustration is the eye. Here he -very justly says it is indispensable that reason should conquer -imagination; but on which side of the question reason or imagination -is most employed might, perhaps, be doubtful. Mr. Darwin's hypothesis -concerning the eye begins with the fact that in the highest division -of the animal kingdom, the vertebrata, we can start from an eye so -simple that it consists, as in the lancelet,[25] of a little sack of -transparent skin, furnished with a nerve, and lined with pigment, but -destitute of any other apparatus. From this prototype of a visual -organ, up to the marvelous construction of the eye of man or of the -eagle, he supposes that extremely slight and gradual modifications -have led, by the operation of natural and sexual selection; and by -way of illustrating this development, he compares the formation of -the eye to the formation of the telescope. "It is scarcely possible -to avoid comparing the eye with a telescope. We know that this -instrument has been perfected by the long-continued efforts of the -highest human intellects, and we naturally infer that the eye has been -formed by a somewhat analogous process. But may not this inference -be presumptuous? Have we any right to assume that the Creator works -by intellectual powers like those of man? If we must compare the eye -to an optical instrument, we ought, in imagination, to take a thick -layer of transparent tissue, with spaces filled with fluid, and with a -nerve sensitive to light beneath, and then suppose every part of this -layer to be continually changing slowly in density, so as to separate -into layers of different densities and thickness, placed at different -distances from each other, and with the surface of each layer slowly -changing in form. Further, we must suppose that there is a power, -represented by natural selection or the survival of the fittest, -always watching each slight alteration in the transparent layers, and -carefully preserving each which, under varied circumstances, in any way -or in any degree, tends to produce a distincter image. We must suppose -each new state of the instrument to be multiplied by the million, each -to be preserved until a better one is produced, and then the old ones -to be all destroyed. In living bodies variations will cause the slight -alterations, generation will multiply them almost infinitely, and -natural selection will pick out with unerring skill each improvement. -Let this process go on for millions of years, and during each year on -millions of individuals of many kinds, and may we not believe that a -living optical instrument might thus be formed as superior to one of -glass as the works of the Creator are to those of man?"[26] - -It might have occurred to the very learned naturalist that the -formation of a mechanical instrument by the hand of man, guided by -his intellect, admits of varieties of that instrument for different -purposes, as products of an intelligent will. Different kinds of -telescopes for different uses have been produced, not by destroying -the poorer ones and preserving the better ones, but by a special -and intentional adaptation of the structure to special uses, until -an instrument is made which will dissolve the nebulæ of the milky -way, and bring within the reach of our vision heavenly bodies of the -existence of which we had no previous knowledge. Why may not the same -intelligent and intentional formation of the human eye, as a special -structure adapted to the special conditions of such an animal as man, -have been the direct work of the Creator, just as the lowest visual -organ--that of such a creature as the lancelet--was specially made -for the conditions of its existence? Why resort to the theory that -all the intermediate varieties of the eye have grown successively out -of the lowest form of such an organ by transitional grades of which -we can not trace the series, when the probabilities concerning the -varieties of this organ of which we have any knowledge are so strongly -on the side of a special and intentional adaptation of each one to the -circumstances of the animal to which it has been given? As a question -of power in the Creator, either method of action was of course just as -competent as the other. As a question of which was his probable method, -the case is very different; for we know comparatively very little of -the modifications produced by such causes as natural or even sexual -selection, while we may, without presumption, assume that we know much -more about the purposes of special adaptation to special conditions, -which an omnipotent Creator may have designed and effected. But this is -a digression, and also an anticipation of the argument. - -To state the pedigree of man according to the Darwinian theory, we -must begin with an aquatic animal as the early progenitor of all the -vertebrata. This animal existing, it is assumed, "in the dim obscurity -of the past," was provided with branchiæ or gills, or organs for -respiration in water, with the two sexes united in the same individual, -but with the most important organs of the body, such as the brain and -heart, imperfectly or not at all developed. From this fish-like animal, -or from some of its fish descendants, there was developed an amphibious -creature, with the sexes distinct. Rising from the amphibians, through -a long line of diversified forms, we come to an ancient marsupial -animal, an order in which the young are born in a very incomplete state -of development, and carried by the mother, while sucking, in a ventral -pouch.[27] From the marsupials came the quadrumana[28] and all the -higher mammals.[29] Among these mammals there was, it is supposed, a -hairy, tailed quadruped, probably arboreal in its habits, from which -man is descended. It was an inhabitant of the Old World. It branched -into the lemuridæ, a group of four-handed animals, distinct from the -monkeys, and resembling the insectivorous quadrupeds in some of their -characters and habits;[30] and from these came the simiadæ, of which -there were two great stems--the New World and Old World monkeys. "From -the latter, at a remote period, man, the wonder and glory of the -universe, proceeded."[31] - -The reader must now, in order to do justice to this theory, imagine -a lapse of time, from the period of the existence of the aquatic -progenitor of all the vertebrata, to be counted by millions of years, -or by any figures that will represent to the mind the most conceivable -distance between a past and a present epoch. Through this enormous -stretch of centuries, in order to give scope to the operation of the -laws of natural and sexual selection, we must suppose the struggle for -existence to be going on among the individuals of the same species, and -among different species inhabiting the same country, and the sexual -selection among the individuals of the same species to be perpetually -transmitting to offspring the improved and more developed organs and -powers induced by natural selection; so that in the countless sequence -of generations there are evolved animals that are so widely different -from their remote progenitors that in classifying them we find them to -be new species, endowed with a power of reproducing their own type, and -similarly capable, it would seem, of still further development into -even higher types in the long-distant future. - -I know not how it may appear to others, but to me the parallelism -between the Platonic and the Darwinian theory is very striking. Both -speculators assume the existence of a Supreme Intelligence and Power, -presiding over the creation of animals which are to inhabit this earth. -Behind the celestial or primitive gods the Greek philosopher places -the Demiurgus, to whom the gods stand in the relation of ministers -or servants to execute his will. The modern naturalist assumes the -existence of the Omnipotent God; and although he does not directly -personify the laws of natural and sexual selection which the Omnipotent -power has made to operate in nature, they perform an office in the -transitional gradations through which the animals are successively -developed, that very closely resembles the office performed by the -gods of Plato's system in providing the modifications of structure -which the animals undergo. In the two processes the one is the reversed -complement of the other. Plato begins with the formation of an animal -of a very exalted type, and by successive degradations, induced by the -failure of the animal to live up to the high standard of its rational -existence, he supposes a descent into lower and still lower forms, the -gods all the while providing a new structure for each successive lower -form, until we reach the shell-fish fixed on the earth beneath the -water. Darwin begins with the lowest form of animated organization, -and by successive gradations induced by the struggle of the animal to -maintain its existence, he supposes an ascent into higher and still -higher forms, the laws of natural and sexual selection operating to -develop a new structure for each successive higher form, until we reach -man, "the wonder and glory of the universe," an animal whose immediate -ancestor was the same as the monkey's, and whose remote progenitor was -an aquatic creature breathing by gills and floating by a swim-bladder. - -Nor had Plato less of probability to support his theory than Darwin -had to support his. The Greek philosopher might have adduced the -constant spectacle of men debasing their habits and even their physical -appearance into a resemblance to the brutes. He might have suggested, -and he does suggest, how the degrading tendencies of the lower -appetites and the ravages of disease drag down the human frame from its -erect carriage and its commanding power over matter to an approximation -with the condition of the inferior animals. He might have adduced -innumerable proofs of the loss of reason, or rationality, through -successive generations of men, brought about by the transmission of -both appetites and physical malformation from parents to children. -He might have compared one of his Athenian fellow-citizens of the -higher class with the lowest savage known throughout all the regions -accessible to an observer of his day and country. He might have -portrayed the one as a being preserving his physical organization -in the highest state of perfection by gymnastic exercises, by a -well-chosen diet, by observance of all the conditions of health, by the -aid of the highest medical skill known to the age; cultivating his mind -by philosophy, practicing every public and private virtue as they were -understood among a people of rare refinement, and adorning his race by -an exhibition of the highest qualities that were then attainable. All -these qualities, physical, mental, and moral, Plato might have shown -were transmissible in some degree, and in a good degree were actually -transmitted from sire to son. Turning to the other picture, and -comparing "Hyperion to the satyr," he might have shown that the lowest -savage, in those physical points of structure which were best adapted -to his animal preservation as an inhabitant of the wildest portion of -the earth, had retained those which made him more nearly resemble the -brute inhabitants of the same region, and that in his intellectual -and moral qualities the resemblance between him and his Athenian -contemporary was almost wholly lost. Intermediate between these extreme -specimens of the human race, why could not Plato have found with great -probability, and often with actual proof, successive degradations of -structure and uses of organs, just as well supported by facts, or -analogies, or hypotheses, as are Mr. Darwin's successive elevations -from a lower to a higher animal? If Plato had known as much about the -animal kingdom as is now known, he could have arrayed the same facts -in support of his theory, by an argument as powerful as that which now -supports the doctrine of evolution. - -Nay, it is certain that Plato's attention was drawn to some of these -facts, and that he makes use of them in a way that is as legitimately -a probable occurrence as any use that is made of them at the present -day. For example, he was struck with the existence of what in -scientific parlance are called "rudiments," a term that is employed -to describe an organ or part which appears to have no special use -where it is found in one animal, but which, in a more developed or -in a diversified condition, has an obvious use in another animal. -Thus, he tells us that the gods, with a long-sighted providence, -introduced a sketch or rudiment of nails into the earliest organization -of man, foreseeing that the lower animals would be produced from -the degeneration of man, and that to them claws and nails would be -absolutely indispensable.[32] In the same way, he seems to regard hair -as a rudiment, relatively speaking; for while its use on different -parts of the body of man, or even on the head, is not very apparent, -its use to the lower animals is very obvious. Why, then, is it not just -as rational, and just as much in accordance with proper scientific -reasoning, to suppose those parts of animal structure which are -called "rudiments" to have been introduced as mere sketches in the -organization of a very high animal, and then to have been developed -into special uses in lower animals produced by the degeneration of the -higher, as it is to suppose that they were developed in full activity -and use in the lower animals, but sank into the condition of useless -or comparatively useless appendages as the higher animal was evolved -out of the lower by a process of elevation? The modern naturalist of -the evolution school will doubtless say that "rudiments" in the human -structure, for which there is no assignable use that can be observed, -are not to be accounted for as sketches from which Nature was to work, -in finding for them a use in some other animal in a developed and -practically important condition; that, to the extent to which such -things are found in man, they are proofs of his cognate relations to -the lower animals, in which they have a palpable use; and that the -gradations by which they have proceeded from practical and important -uses in the lower animals, until they have become mere useless or -comparatively useless sketches in the human structure, are among the -proofs of the descent of man from the lower animals which had a use for -such things. I shall endeavor hereafter to examine the argument that -is derived from "rudiments" more closely. At present, the point which -I suggest to the mind of the reader arises in the parallel between -the Platonic and the Darwinian theory of the origin of the different -species of animals. I ask, why is it not just as probably a true -hypothesis to suppose that man was first created with these rudimentary -sketches in his organization, and that they became useful appendages -in the lower animals, into which man became degenerated, as it is to -suppose that these parts existed in full development, activity, and -practical use in the lower animals, out of whom man was generated, -and that in man they lost their utility and became relatively mere -rudiments? To my mind, neither theory has the requisite amount of -probability in its favor compared with the probability of special -creations; but I can see as much probability in the Platonic as in the -Darwinian explanation, and a strong parallelism between them. - -I will pursue this parallel somewhat further by again adverting to -Plato's idea of the origin of the human soul. He supposes it to have -been an immortal being, formed out of the eternal essence of Ideas -by the Demiurgus. He manifestly makes it an existence distinct from -matter, because he places its first abode in a heavenly mansion, where -it is in unison with the celestial harmonies and perfections of the -outer circle. This heavenly sphere is again to be its abode, after it -shall have been released from its temporary abode on earth, which has -been appointed to it for purposes of discipline and trial. At a fixed -time of birth it is brought down from its celestial abode and united -with a mortal body, that it may assert and prove its power to preside -over and govern that body according to the eternal laws of reason and -rectitude. If it fulfills this high duty, when the fastenings, which -have bound it to the mortal frame, are dissolved with the dissolution -of those which hold together the material structure, the soul flies -away with delight to its own peculiar star. If it fails in this high -duty, it is on the death of the first body transferred by a second -birth into a more degraded body, resembling that to which it has -allowed the first one to be debased. At length, somewhere in the -series of transmigrations, the lower and bestial tendencies cease to -have power over the immortal soul; the animal with which it was last -united remains an animal bereft of reason, and the soul, released from -further captivity, escapes to its original abode in the heavens, more -or less contaminated by what it has undergone, but still immortal, -indestructible, spiritual, and capable of purification. - -Here, then, we have a conception of the origin and nature of the human -soul as a spiritual existence, quite as distinctly presented as it can -be by human reason. Stripped of the machinery by which Plato supposes -the soul to have come into existence, his conception of its origin and -nature is the most remarkable contribution which philosophy, apart -from the aid of what is called inspiration, has made to our means of -speculating upon this great theme. Of course, it affords, with all the -machinery of which Plato makes use, no explanation of the point or the -time of junction between the soul and the body. But, as a conception -of what in the poverty of language must be called the substance of -the soul, of its spiritual and immortal nature, of its distinctive -existence separate from what we know as matter, whether Plato borrowed -more or less from other philosophers who preceded him, it is a very -distinct presentation of the nature of the human mind. - -Turn now to what can be extracted from the Darwinian theory of the -origin and nature of the human mind, and observe where it holds with -and where it breaks from the parallelism between it and the Platonic -theory. The doctrine of evolution, so called, presents to us no -distinct suggestion that the mind of man is a separate and special -creation. Rejecting, and very properly rejecting, the Platonic idea of -an existence of the human soul anterior to the birth of the individual, -the Darwinian theory supposes that in the long course of time, during -which natural and sexual selection were operating to produce higher and -still higher animals, there came about, in the earlier and primitive -organizations, a habit of the animal to act in a certain way; that this -habit descended to offspring; that it became developed into what is now -called instinct; and that instinct became developed into what we now -call mind. I know not how otherwise to interpret Mr. Darwin's repeated -affirmations that, in comparing the mental powers of man and those of -the lower animals, there can be detected no difference in kind, but -that the difference is one of degree only; that there is no fundamental -difference, or difference in nature, between the mental powers of -an ape and a man, or between the mental power of one of the lowest -fishes, as a lamprey or lancelet, and that of one of the higher apes; -that both of these intervals, that between the ape and man, and that -between the lancelet and the ape, which are much wider in the latter -case than in the former, are filled up by numberless gradations.[33] If -this be true, it must be because the lancelet, supposing that animal to -be the progenitor, formed a habit of acting by an implanted impulse, -which became, under the operation of natural and sexual selection, -confirmed, developed, and increased in its descendants, until it not -only amounted to what is called instinct, but took on more complex -habits until something akin to reason was developed. As the higher -animals continued to be evolved out of the lower, this approach to -a reasoning power became in the ape a true mental faculty; and, at -length, in the numberless gradations of structure intermediate between -the ape and the man, we reach those intellectual faculties which -distinguish the latter by an enormous interval from all the other -animals. "If," says Mr. Darwin, "no organic being, excepting man, had -possessed any mental power, or if his powers had been of a wholly -different nature from those of the lower animals, then we never should -have been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had been -gradually developed. But it can be shown that there is no fundamental -difference of this kind."[34] - -I will not here ask how far this is theoretical assumption. I shall -endeavor to examine in another place the evidence which is supposed -to show that the mental powers of man are in no respect fundamentally -different, or different in kind, from the powers in the other animals -to which the distinguished naturalist gives the name of "mental" -powers. At present I am still concerned with the parallelism between -the Platonic and the Darwinian theory; and I again ask whether the -latter is not the former reversed, in respect to the process by which -reason in the one case becomes lost, and that by which in the other -case it becomes developed out of something to which it bears no -resemblance? Plato supposes the creation of pure reason, or mental -power, in the shape--to use the counterpart of a physical term--of -a non-physical, spiritual intelligence, or mind. It remains always -of this nature, but the successive animals which it is required to -inhabit on earth undergo such degradations that the immortal reason -loses in them the power to control their actions; nothing is left to -govern in them but mere instinct, and this at last sinks into its -lowest manifestations. Darwin, on the other hand, supposes the first -creation to have been a very low animal of a fish-like structure, with -the lowest capacity for voluntary action of any kind, but impelled to -act in a certain way by superimposed laws of self-preservation; that -in the infinitude of successive generations these laws have operated -to produce numberless gradations of structure, in the growth of which -fixed habits have become complex instincts; that further gradations -have developed these instincts into something of mental power, as the -successive higher animals have become evolved out of the lower ones, -until at length the intellect of man has been "gradually developed" by -a purely physical process of the action of organized matter. - -This materialistic way of accounting for the origin of the human -mind necessarily excludes the idea of its separate creation or its -distinctive character. The theory is perfectly consistent with itself, -in supposing that the mind of man does not differ in kind, or differ -fundamentally, from those exhibitions which in the lower animals lead -us to attribute to them some mental power. But whether the theory is -consistent with what we know of our own minds, as compared with what -we can observe in the other animals, is the real question. In the -first place, it is to be remembered that we can read our own minds, by -the power of consciousness and reflection. In the next place, it is -conceded that we can know nothing of the minds of the other animals, -excepting by their outward actions. They can not speak, to tell us -of their emotions, their memories, their fears, their hopes, their -desires, what they think, or whether they think at all. They do acts -which wonderfully resemble the acts of man, in outward appearance, -as if they were acts which proceeded from the same power of reason -but in a less perfect degree; yet they can tell us nothing of their -mental processes, if they have such processes, and the utmost that we -can do is to argue from their acts that they have mental faculties -akin to those of men. It is in the ordained nature of things that we -know and can know, by introspection, what our own minds are. We can -know the mind of no other animal excepting from his outward acts. How -far these will justify us in assuming that his mind is of the same -nature as ours, or that ours is an advanced development of his, is the -fundamental question. - -Plato was evidently led, by that study of the human mind which is open -to all cultivated intellects through the process of consciousness -and reflection, to conceive of the soul as a created intelligence of -a spiritual nature. The fanciful materials out of which he supposes -it to have been composed were the mere machinery employed to express -his conception of its spiritual nature and its indestructible -existence. He was led to employ such machinery by his highly -speculative and constructive tendencies, and because it was the habit -of Greek philosophy to account for everything. Some machinery he was -irresistibly impelled to employ, in order to give due consistency to -his theory. But his machinery in no way obscures his conception of -the nature of the soul, and we may disregard it altogether and still -have left the conception of a spiritual and immortal being, formed for -separate existence from matter, but united to matter for a temporary -purpose of discipline and trial. - -The modern naturalist, on the other hand, although assuming the -existence of the Omnipotent God, supposes the human mind to have become -what it is by the action of organized matter beginning at the lowest -point of animal life, and going on through successive gradations of -animal structure, until habits are formed which become instincts, and -instincts are gradually developed into mind. Take away the machinery -that is employed, and you have left no conception of the immortal and -indestructible nature of the human soul. The material out of which it -is constructed is all of the earth earthy, and the twofold question -arises: first, whether this was the probable method employed by the -Omnipotent Creator; and, secondly, whether it will account for such an -existence as we have reason to believe the mind of man to be. - -There is another point in the parallel between the Platonic and the -Darwinian systems which is worthy of note. We have seen that, according -to Plato, when the Demiurgus had completed the construction of the -Kosmos and that of the human soul, he retired and left to the gods the -construction of a mortal body for man and of bodies of the inferior -animals into which man would become degraded. According to Darwin, -the Omnipotent God constructs some very low form of animal, and then, -retiring from the work of direct creation, he leaves the laws of -natural and sexual selection to operate in the production of higher -animals through the process that is called evolution. Perhaps it may be -unscientific to ask why the Omnipotent God should cease to exercise, -or refrain from exercising, his power of special creation, after he -has once exerted it. Perhaps there is some view of the nature and -purposes of that infinite being which would render such an abstention -from his powers a probable occurrence. But it is difficult to conceive -what this view can be. If we take a comprehensive survey of all the -facts concerning the animal kingdom that are within the reach of our -observation; and if, then, in cases where we know of no intermediate -or transitional states, we assume that they must have existed; if we -array the whole in support of a certain theory which undertakes to -account both for what we see and for what we do not see, we very easily -reach the conclusion that the Omnipotent God performed but one act of -special creation, or at most performed but a very few of such acts, -and those of the rudest and simplest types, and then left all the -subsequent and splendid exhibitions of animal structure to be worked -out by natural selection. This is the scientific method adopted by the -evolution school to account for the existence of all the higher animals -of which we have knowledge, man included. It may be very startling, but -we must acknowledge it as the method of action of the Omnipotent God, -because it is said there is no logical impossibility in it. - -There is a passage in Mr. Darwin's "Origin of Species" which I must now -quote, because it shows how strongly the supposed action and abstention -of the infinite Creator, according to the Darwinian theory, resembles -the action and abstention of Plato's Demiurgus: "Although the belief -that an organ so perfect as the eye could have been formed by natural -selection, is enough to stagger any one; yet in the case of any organ, -if we know of a long series of gradations in complexity, each good for -its possessor; then, under changing conditions of life, there is no -logical impossibility in the acquirement of any conceivable degree of -perfection through natural selection. In the cases in which we know of -no intermediate or transitional states, we should be extremely cautious -in concluding that none can have existed, for the metamorphoses of many -organs show what wonderful changes in function are at least possible. -For instance, a swim-bladder has apparently been converted into an -air-breathing lung. The same organ having performed simultaneously -very different functions, and then having been in part or in whole -specialized for one function; and two distinct organs having performed -at the same time the same function, the one having been perfected while -aided by the other, must often have largely facilitated transitions." - -Here, then, we have it propounded that after the creation of the -rudest and simplest form of a visual organ, the infinite God abstains -from direct and special creation of such a perfect and elaborate -organ as the human eye, and leaves it to be worked out by natural -selection; there being no logical impossibility, it is said, in this -hypothesis. We are cautioned not to conclude, because we can not find -the intermediate and transitional states of the visual organs, that -they never existed; we are told that they are at least possible, and -that analogies show they must have existed; and from the possibility of -their existence and from the assumption that they happened, we are to -believe that the Omnipotent God, refraining from the exercise of his -power to create the human eye, with its wondrously perfect structure, -left it to be evolved by natural selection out of the rudest and -simplest visual organ which he directly fashioned. - -All things are possible to an infinite Creator. He who made the visual -organ of the lowest aquatic creature that ever floated could make the -human eye as we know it, or could make one that would do more than -the eye of man ever was capable of. He could by a direct exercise of -his power of creation form the eye of man, or he could leave it to be -evolved out of the only type of a visual organ on which he saw fit -to exercise his creative power. He could create in the land-animals -a true air-breathing lung as a special production of his will, or -could permit it to be formed by transitional gradations out of the -swim-bladder of an aquatic creature. But why should he abstain from the -one method and employ the other? This question brings us at once to -the probabilities of the case; and, in estimating those probabilities, -we must take into the account all that reason permits us to believe -of the attributes of the Almighty. We can not, it is true, penetrate -into his counsels without the aid of revelation. But if we confine -ourselves to the domain of science, or to the mere observation of -nature, we shall find reason for believing that the Omnipotent God -had purposes in his infinite wisdom that render the acts of special -creation vastly more probable than the theory of evolution. A study of -the animal kingdom and of all the phenomena of the universe leads us -rationally and inevitably to one of two conclusions: either that there -is no God, and that all things came by chance; or to the belief that -there is a God, and that he is a being of infinite benevolence as well -as infinite wisdom and power. Now, why should such a being, proposing -to himself the existence on earth of such an animal as man, to be -inhabited for a time by a soul destined to be immortal, abstain from -the direct creation of both soul and body, and leave the latter to be -evolved out of the lowest form of animal life, and the former to become -a mere manifestation or exhibition of phenomena, resulting from the -improved and more elaborate structures of successive types of animals? -Is there no conceivable reason why an infinitely wise, benevolent, and -omnipotent being should have chosen to exercise the direct power of -creation in forming the soul of man for an immortal existence, and also -to exercise his direct power of creation in so fashioning the body as -to fit it with the utmost exactness to be serviceable and subservient -to the mind which is to inhabit it for a season? Why depict the -infinite God as a quiescent and retired spectator of the operation of -certain laws which he has imposed upon organized matter, when there are -discoverable so many manifest reasons for the special creation of such -a being as man? It is hardly in accordance with any rational theory of -God's providence, after we have attained a conception of such a being, -to liken him intentionally or unintentionally to the Demiurgus of the -acute and ingenious Greek philosopher. We must conclude that human -society, with all that it has done or is capable of doing for man on -earth, was in the contemplation of the Almighty; and if we adopt this -conclusion, we must account for the moral sense, for moral obligation, -and for the idea of law and duty. We can not account for these things -upon any probable theory of their origin, if we reject the idea that -they were specially implanted in the structure of the human soul, and -suppose that both the intellectual faculties and the moral sense were -evolved out of the struggle of lower animals for their existence, -resulting in the formation of higher animals and in the development -of their social instincts into more complex, refined, and consciously -calculating instincts of the same nature. - -I have not drawn this parallel between the Platonic and the Darwinian -theories of the origin of different animals for any purpose of -suggesting that the one was in any sense borrowed from the other. -Plagiarism, in any form, is not, so far as I know, to be detected in -the writings of the evolution school. But the speculations of Plato in -regard to the origin and nature of the human soul, fanciful as they -are, afford great assistance in grasping the conception of a spiritual -existence; and the parallel between his process of degradation and -Darwin's process of elevation shows to my mind as great probability in -the one theory as there is in the other. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [12] Rotation was considered the movement most conformable to reason - and intelligence, and it is impracticable to any figure but the - spherical. Grote, iii, 253. - - [13] The primitive gods of Plato's conception (in the "Timæus") are - not to be confounded with the gods of the poetic and popular faith. - As Mr. Grote has pointed out, there is nothing more remarkable in - Plato's writings than the subtilty and skill with which he contrived - to elude the charge of impiety and infidelity toward the gods of - tradition and of the popular faith. In a passage of the "Timæus," - on which Mr. Grote seems to be in doubt whether it was ironical or - sincere, Plato boldly confronts the difficulty by saying that we - must believe competent witnesses whose testimony we have, respecting - the genesis of the remaining gods who have personal names and were - believed in by his contemporaries. For his own part, he says, he does - not pretend to account for their generation. The sons of the gods, - the heroic and sacred families, who must have known their own fathers - and all about their own family affairs, have given us their family - traditions, and we must obey the law and believe. But concerning - the primitive gods, the first progenitors of the remaining gods, - we are at liberty to speculate. The ingenuity of this admission of - authority where authority has spoken, reconcilable with speculation - upon matters on which authority has not spoken, is admirable. Plato, - as Mr. Grote has observed, was willing to incur the risk of one count - of the indictment which was brought against his master Socrates, - that of introducing new divine persons. In legal parlance he might - have demurred to this count, as not charging any offense against the - established religion. But the other count, for not acknowledging the - gods whom the city acknowledged, he did not choose to encounter. As to - them, he prudently, and perhaps sarcastically, accepts the testimony - of witnesses who speak by inspiration and authority. But as to the - primitive gods, the progenitors of the gods from whom were descended - the heroic and sacred families of men, he expresses in the "Timæus" - his own convictions, without appealing to authority and without - intimating that he is speaking of mysteries beyond the comprehension - of his reason. The boldness of this flight beyond all authority into - the realms of pure reason is very striking, even if it does end in - nothing but probability, which is all that Plato claims for his theory. - - [14] It must be remembered that, in the formation of the cosmical - soul, the ingredients were the eternal Ideas; of these there could be - a remnant after the cosmical soul was formed. But the cosmical body, - which was formed out of the material elements, comprehended the whole - of them, and there could be no remnant or surplus of them remaining - outside. But portions of them could be borrowed for a limited period - of mortal existence, and would return to their place in the Kosmos - when that existence terminated. If this distinction be carried along, - Plato will not be found to be inconsistent with himself. - - [15] It does not distinctly appear what was to become of the rational - soul if it finally failed in the conflict with evil, at the lowest end - of the transmigration. Being immortal, it could not perish. But in - providing for it an opportunity of final success through all the forms - of animal life to which it might be condemned, it would seem that - Plato was pressed by a reluctance to encounter the idea of endless - misery. This point, however, does not obscure his explanation of the - process by which species of animals, and a succession of inferior - animals, came to exist. - - [16] Mr. Grote has pointed out that in his other writings, notably - in the "Republic" and in the "Leges", Plato is not consistent with - this idea that the gods are responsible for the evil that man causes - to himself; and that in the "Timæus" he plainly makes the Demiurgus - responsible, because he brings, or allows to be brought, an immortal - soul down from its star, where it was living pure, intelligent, and in - harmony with reason, and makes it incur corruption, disturbance, and - stupidity, by junction with a mortal body and two mortal and inferior - souls. - - [17] I have omitted the description of the influence of disease - induced by an over-indulgence of appetite, etc., in aiding the process - of debasement from the primitive type. The reader can find this - influence developed in Grote, or can consult the original Greek of - the "Timæus." It would appear that Plato considered the effect of all - the appetites, when too much indulged, as tending in the primitive - non-sexual type toward the development of that lower kind of animal - which the gods saw fit to treat as fit only to become woman. - - [18] Grote. - - [19] Grote's "Plato," iii, 282. - - [20] See, as to the reception of the Platonic Demiurgus by the - Alexandrian Jews, first chapter. - - [21] "Origin of Species," p. 428, American edition, from the sixth - English. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1882. - - [22] Mr. Darwin refers to Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory of "the - necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation"; - and indeed it is apparent that this class of philosophers have - constructed a theory which denies the creation of the human mind as a - spiritual essence, independent of matter, although some of them may - adhere to the idea that it was God who caused matter to evolve out of - its own action the substance or existence that we call mind. - - [23] "Origin of Species," p. 69. - - [24] For the illustrations of both kinds of selection I must refer the - reader to Mr. Darwin's works. In regard to birds, he makes the sexual - selection operate less by the "law of battle" among the males, or by - fighting, and more by the attractions of plumage and voice, by which - the males carry on their rivalry for the choice of the females in - pairing. But he attributes the same effect to the sexual selection in - birds as in the other animals, namely, the transmission to offspring, - and chiefly to the male offspring, of those peculiarities of structure - which have given to the male parent the victory over his competitors. - - [25] A very low form of fish, without brain, vertebral column, or - heart, classed by the older naturalists among the worms. ("Descent of - Man," p. 159.) The technical name of the lancelet is _Amphioxus_. - - [26] "Origin of Species," p. 146. - - [27] The kangaroos and opossums are of this group. - - [28] Animals with four hands. - - [29] Animals which produce living young, and nourish them after birth - by milk from the teats of the mother. - - [30] The lemur is one of a genus of four-handed mammals, allied to - the apes, baboons, and monkeys, but with a form approaching that of - quadrupeds. - - [31] "Descent of Man," p. 165.--The reader will need to observe that - monkey is the popular name of the ape and the baboon. In zoölogy, - monkey designates the animals of the genus _Simia_, which have long - tails. The three classes are apes, without tails; monkeys, with long - tails; baboons, with short tails. - - [32] Grote, iii, p. 276. - - [33] "Descent of Man," p. 65. - - [34] "Descent of Man," p. 65. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - The Darwinian pedigree of man--The evolution of organisms out of other - organisms, according to the theory of Darwin. - - -It is doubtless an interesting speculation to go back in imagination to -a period to be counted by any number of millions of years, or covered -by an immeasurable lapse of time, and to conceive of slowly-moving -causes by which the present or the past inhabitants of this globe -became developed out of some primordial type, through successive -generations, resulting in different species, which became final -products and distinct organisms. But what the imagination can do in the -formation of a theory when acting upon a certain range of facts is, -as a matter of belief, to be tested by the inquiry whether the weight -of evidence shows that theory to be, in a supreme degree, a probable -truth, when compared with any other hypothesis. It is in this way that -I propose to examine and test the Darwinian pedigree of man. The whole -of Mr. Darwin's theory of the descent of man as an animal consists in -assigning to him a certain pedigree, which traces his organism through -a long series of other animals back to the lowest and crudest form of -animal life; and it must be remembered that this mode of accounting for -the origin of man of necessity supposes an unbroken connection of lives -with lives, back through the whole series of organisms which constitute -the pedigree, and that, according to the Darwinian theory, there was -no aboriginal creation of any of these organisms, save the very first -and lowest form with which the series commences. Not only must this -connection of lives with lives be shown, but the theory must be able -to show how it has come about that there are now distinct species of -animals which never reproduce any type but their own. - -Two great agencies, according to the Darwinian theory, have operated -to develop the different species of animals from some low primordial -type, through a long series which has culminated in man, who can not -lay claim to be a special creation, but must trace his pedigree to -some ape-like creature, and so on to the remote progenitor of all the -_Vertebrata_. It is now needful to grasp, with as much precision as -such a theory admits of, the nature and operation of these agencies, -and to note the strength or weakness of the proof which they afford of -the main hypothesis. First, we have what is called "the struggle for -existence," which may be conceded as a fact, and to which more or less -may be attributed. The term is used by Mr. Darwin in a metaphorical -sense, to include all that any being has to encounter in maintaining -its individual existence, and in leaving progeny, or perpetuating its -kind. In the animal kingdom, the struggle for individual existence -is chiefly a struggle for food among the different individuals which -depend on the same food, or against a dearth of one kind of food which -compels a resort to some other kind. The struggle for a continuation -of its species is dependent on the success with which the individual -animal maintains the contest for its own existence. Now, it is -argued that in this great and complex battle for life it would occur -that infinitely varied diversities of structure would be useful to -the animals in helping them to carry on the battle under changing -conditions. These useful diversities, consisting of the development -of new organs and powers, would be preserved and perpetuated in the -offspring, through many successive generations, while the variations -that were injurious would be rigidly destroyed. The animals in whom -these favorable individual differences and variations of structure -were preserved would have the best chance of surviving and of -procreating their kind. So that, by this "survival of the fittest," -Nature is continually selecting those variations of structure which -are useful, and continually rejecting or eliminating those which are -injurious; the result being the gradual evolution of successive higher -types of animals out of the lower ones, until we reach man, the highest -animal organism that exists on this earth. In the next place, we have, -as an auxiliary agency, in aid of natural selection, what is called -"the sexual selection," by which the best endowed and most powerful -males of a given species appropriate the females, and thus the progeny -become possessed of those variations of structure and the superior -qualities which have given to the male parent the victory over his -competitors. - -The proofs that are relied upon to establish the operation and effect -of these agencies in producing the results that are claimed for them, -ought to show that, in one or more instances, an animal of a superior -organization which, when left to the natural course of its reproduction -by the union of its two sexes, always produces its own distinct type -and no other, has, in fact, been itself evolved out of some lower and -different organism by the agencies of natural and sexual selection -operating among the individuals of that lower type. One of the proofs, -on which great stress is laid by Mr. Darwin, may be disposed of without -difficulty. It is that which is said to take place in the breeding of -domestic animals, or of animals the breeding of which man undertakes to -improve for his own practical benefit, or to please his fancy, or to -try experiments. In all that has been done in this kind of selection, -in breeding from the best specimens of any class of animals, there -is not one instance of the production of an animal varying from its -near or its remote known progenitors in anything but adventitious -peculiarities which will not warrant us in regarding it as a new or -different animal. No breeder of horses has ever produced an animal -that was not a horse. He may have brought about great and important -improvements in the qualities of fleetness, or strength, or weight, -or endurance, by careful selection of the sire and the dam; but the -race-horse or the hunter, or the draught-horse or the war-horse, is -but a horse of different qualities and powers, with the same skeleton, -viscera, organs, muscles, which mark this species of animal, and with -no other variations of structure than such as follow from the limited -development of different parts for different uses. No breeder of cows -ever produced a female animal that was not a cow, although he may have -greatly improved the quality and quantity of the milk peculiar to this -animal by careful selection of the individuals which he permits or -encourages to breed. No breeder of sheep ever produced an animal that -was not a sheep, although the quality of the fleece or of the mutton -may have been greatly improved or varied. Among the domestic fowls, no -animal that was not a bird was ever bred by any crossing of breeds, -although great varieties of plumage, structure of beak, formation of -foot, development of wing, habits of life, adaptation to changes of -situation, and many minor peculiarities, have been the consequences -of careful and intelligent breeding from different varieties of the -same fowl. In the case of the pigeon, of which Mr. Darwin has given -a great many curious facts from his own experience as a breeder, the -most remarkable variations are perhaps to be observed as the results -of intentional breeding from different races of that bird; but with -all these variations nothing that was not a bird was ever produced. -In the case of the dog, whatever was his origin, or supposing him to -have been derived from the wolf, or to belong to the same family as -the wolf, it is, of course, impossible to produce, by any crossing of -different breeds of dogs, an animal that would not belong to the class -of the _Canidæ_. Indeed, it is conceded by Darwin, with all the array -of facts which he adduces in regard to the domesticated animals, that -by crossing we can only get forms in some degree intermediate between -the parents; and that although a race may be modified by occasional -crosses, if aided by careful selection of the individuals which present -the desired character, yet to obtain a race intermediate between two -distinct races would be very difficult, if not impossible. If this is -so, how much more remote must be the possibility, by any selection, or -by any crossing to which Nature will allow the different animals to -submit, to produce an animal of so distinct a type that it would amount -to a different species from its known progenitors! - -From all that has been brought about in the efforts of man to improve -or to vary the breeds of domestic animals--a kind of selection that is -supposed to be analogous to what takes place in Nature, although under -different conditions--it is apparent that there are limitations to the -power of selection in regard to the effects that are to be attributed -to it. A line must be drawn somewhere. It will not do in scientific -reasoning, or in any other reasoning, to ignore the limitations to -which all experience and observation point with unerring certainty, so -far as experience and observation furnish us with facts. It is true -that the lapse of time during which there has been, with more or less -success, an intentional improvement in the breeds of domestic animals -carried on with recorded results has been very short when compared -with the enormous period that has elapsed since the first creation -of an animal organization, whenever or whatever that creation was. -But history furnishes us with a pretty long stretch of time through -which civilized, half-civilized, and savage nations have had to do -with various animals in first taming them from a wild state and then -in domesticating so as to make them subservient to human wants, and -finally in improving their breeds. But there is no recorded or known -instance in which there has been produced under domestication an animal -which can be said to be of a different species from its immediate known -progenitors, or one that differed from its remote known progenitors -in any but minor and adventitious peculiarities of structure. If in -passing from what has been done by human selection in the breeding of -animals to what has taken place in Nature in a much longer space of -time and on a far greater scale, we find that in Nature, too, there -are limitations to the power of that agency which is called natural -selection--that there is an impassable barrier which Nature never -crosses, an invincible division between the different species of -animals--we must conclude that there is a line between what selection -can and what it can not do. We must conclude, with all the scope and -power that can be given to natural selection, that Nature has not -developed a higher and differently organized animal out of a lower -and inferior type--has not made new species by the process called -evolution, because the infinite God has not commissioned Nature to do -that thing, but has reserved it unto himself to make special creations. -Do not all that we know of the animal kingdom--all that naturalists -have accumulated of facts and all that they concede to be the absence -of facts--show that there is a clear and well-defined limitation to -the power of natural selection, as well as to the power of that other -agency which is called sexual selection? Grant that this agency of -natural selection began to operate at a period, the commencement of -which is as remote as figures can describe; that the struggle for life -began as soon as there was an organized being existing in numbers -sufficiently large to be out of proportion to the supply of food; that -the sexual selection began at the same time, and that both together -have been operating ever since among the different species of animals -that have successively arisen and successively displaced each other -throughout the earth. The longer we imagine this period to have -been, the stronger is the argument against the theory of evolution, -because the more numerous will be the absences of the gradations and -transitions necessary to prove an unbroken descent from the remote -prototype which is assumed to have been the first progenitor of the -whole animal kingdom. Upon the hypothesis that evolution is a true -account of the origin of the different animals, we ought practically -to find no missing links in the chain. The fact is that the missing -links are both extremely numerous and important; and the longer the -period assumed--the further we get from the probability that these two -agencies of natural and sexual selection were capable of producing the -results that are claimed for them--the stronger is the proof that a -barrier has been set to their operation, and the more necessary is it -to recognize the line which separates what they can from what they can -not do. - -Let us now see what is the state of the proof. It may assist the -reader to understand the Darwinian pedigree of man if I present it in -a tabulated form, such as we are accustomed to use in exhibiting to -the eye the pedigree of a single animal. Stated in this manner, the -Darwinian pedigree of man may be traced as follows: - - I. A marine animal of the maggot form. - | - II. Group of lowly-organized fishes. - | - III. Ganoids and other fishes. - | - IV. The Amphibians. - | - V. The ancient Marsupials. - | - VI. The Quadrumana and all the higher mammals. - | - VII. The Lemuridæ. - | - VIII. The Simiadæ. - | - +-------------------+ - | | - IX. Old World Monkeys. New World Monkeys. - | - X. Man. - -These ten classes or groups of animals are supposed to be connected -together by intermediate diversified forms, which constitute the -transitions from one of the classes or groups to the other; and in -reading the table downward it must be remembered that we are reading -in fact through an ascending scale of beings, from the very lowest -organized creature to the highest. The whole, taken together, forms a -chain of evidence; and, according to the rational rules of evidence, -each distinct fact ought to be proved to have existed at some time -before our belief in the main hypothesis can be challenged. I know of -no reason why the probable truth of a scientific hypothesis should -be judged by any other rules of determination than those which are -applied to any other subject of inquiry; and, while I am ready to -concede that in matters of physical science it is allowable to employ -analogy in constructing a theory, it nevertheless remains, and must -remain, true that where there are numerous links in a supposed chain -of proofs that are established by nothing but an inference drawn from -an analogous fact, the collection of supposed proofs does not exclude -the probable truth of every other hypothesis but that which is sought -to be established, as it also does not establish the theory in favor of -which the supposed facts are adduced. Upon these principles of evidence -I propose now to examine the Darwinian pedigree of man. - -I. The group of marine animals described as resembling the larvæ of -existing Ascidians; that is to say, an aquatic animal in the form -of a grub, caterpillar, or worm, which is the first condition of an -insect at its issuing from the egg. These assumed progenitors of the -Vertebrata are reached, according to Mr. Darwin, by "an obscure glance -into a remote antiquity," and they are described as "apparently" -existing, and as "resembling" the larvæ of existing Ascidians. We are -told that these animals were provided with branchiæ, or gills, for -respiration in water, but with the most important organs of the body, -such as the brain and heart, imperfectly or not at all developed. This -simple and crude animal "we can see," it is said, "in the dim obscurity -of the past," and that it "must have been the early progenitor of -all the Vertebrata."[35] It is manifest that this creature is a mere -hypothesis, constructed, no doubt, by the aid of analogy, but existing -only in the eye of scientific imagination. Why is it placed in the -water? For no reason, apparently, but that its supposed construction -is made to resemble that of some creatures which have been found in -the water, and because it was necessary to make it the progenitor of -the next group, the lowly-organized fishes, in order to carry out the -theory of the subsequent derivations. It might have existed on the -land, unless at the period of its assumed existence the whole globe was -covered with water. If it had existed on the land, the four subsequent -forms, up to and including the Marsupials, might have been varied to -suit the exigencies of the pedigree without tracing the descent of the -Marsupials through fishes and the Amphibians. - -II. The group of lowly-organized fishes. These are said to have been -"probably" derived from the aquatic worm (I), and they are described -to have been as lowly organized as the lancelet, which is a known fish -of negative characters, without brain, vertebral column, or heart, -presenting some affinities with the Ascidians, which are invertebrate, -hermaphrodite marine creatures, permanently attached to a support, -and consisting of a simple, tough, leathery sack, with two small -projecting orifices. The larvæ of these creatures somewhat resemble -tadpoles, and have the power of swimming freely about. These larvæ of -the Ascidians are said to be, in their manner of development, related -to the Vertebrata in the relative position of the nervous system, -and in possessing a structure closely like the _chorda dorsalis_ of -vertebrate animals.[36] Here, again, it is apparent that a group of -lowly-organized fish-like animals, of which there are no remains, -have been constructed by a process of scientific reasoning from a -certain class of marine creatures that are known. As a matter of pure -theory, there can be no serious objection to this kind of construction, -especially if it is supported by strong probabilities furnished by -known facts. But when a theory requires this kind of reasoning in order -to establish an important link in a chain of proofs, it is perfectly -legitimate and necessary criticism that we are called upon to assume -the former existence of such a link; and, indeed, the theorists -themselves, with true candor and accuracy, tell us that they are -arguing upon probabilities from the known to the unknown, or that a -thing "must have existed" because analogies warrant the assumption that -it did exist. In a matter so interesting, and in many senses important, -as the evolution theory of man's descent, it is certainly none too -rigid to insist on the application of the ordinary rules of belief. - -III. The Ganoids and other fishes like the Lepidosiren. These, we -are told, "must have been developed" from the preceding (II). The -Ganoids, it is said, were fishes covered with peculiar enameled bony -scales. Most of them are said to be extinct, but enough is known about -them to lay the foundation for their "probable" development from the -first fishes that are supposed to have been derived from the aquatic -worm (I). There is a reason for arguing the existence of these first -fishes as a true fish with the power of locomotion, because the next -ascending group of animals is to be the Amphibians. In a fish, the -swim-bladder is an important organ; and it is an organ that plays an -important part in the Darwinian theory, furnishing, it is claimed, -a very remarkable illustration that an organ constructed originally -for one purpose, flotation, may be converted into one for a widely -different purpose, namely, respiration. As the Amphibians, which as -a distinct group were to come next after the fishes in the order of -development, must be furnished with a true air-breathing lung, their -progenitors, which inhabited the water only, must be provided with an -organ that would undergo, by transitional gradations, conversion into -a lung. But what is to be chiefly noted here is that it is admitted -that the prototype, which was furnished with a swim-bladder, was "an -ancient and unknown prototype"; and it is a mere inference that the -true lungs of vertebrate animals are the swim-bladder of a fish so -converted, by ordinary generation, from the unknown prototype because -the swim-bladder is "homologous or 'ideally similar' in position and -structure with the lungs of the higher vertebrate animals."[37] One -might ask here without presumption, why the Omnipotent God should not -have created in the vertebrate animals a lung for respiration, as well -as have created or permitted the formation of a swim-bladder in a fish; -and looking to the probabilities of the case, it is altogether too -strong for the learned naturalist to assert that "there is no reason -to doubt that the swim-bladder has actually been converted into lungs -or an organ used exclusively for respiration"; especially as we are -furnished with nothing but speculation to show the intermediate and -transitionary modifications between the swim-bladder and the lung. -While we may not assume "that the Creator works by intellectual powers -like those of man," in all respects, it is surely not presumptuous to -suppose that an Omnipotent and All-wise Being works by powers that are -competent to produce anything that in his infinite purposes he may see -fit specially to create. - -IV. The Amphibians. Here we come to what is now a very numerous group, -of which it is said that the first specimens received, among other -modifications, the transformation of the swim-bladder of their fish -progenitors into an air-breathing lung. We are told that from the -fishes of the last preceding group (III) "a very small advance would -carry us on to the Amphibians."[38] But whether the advance from an -animal living in the water and incapable of existing out of that -element, to an animal capable of living on the land as well as in the -water, was small or large, we look in vain, at present, for the facts -that constitute that advance. - -V. The Ancient Marsupials. These were an order of mammals such as -the existing kangaroos, opossums, etc., of which the young, born in -a very incomplete state of development, are carried by the mother, -while sucking, in a ventral pouch. They are supposed to have been -the predecessors, at an earlier geological period, of the placental -mammals, namely, the highest class of mammals, in which the embryo, -after it has attained a certain stage, is united to the mother by a -vascular connection called the _placenta_, which secures nourishment -that enables the young to be born in a more complete state. There is a -third and still lower division of the great mammalian series, called -the Montremata, and said to be allied to the Marsupials. But the -early progenitors of the existing Marsupials, classed as the Ancient -Marsupials, are supposed to constitute the connection between the -Amphibians and the placental mammals; that is to say, an animal which -produced its young by bringing forth an egg, from which the young is -hatched, became converted into an animal which produced its young from -a womb and nourished it after birth from the milk supplied by its -teats, the young being born in a very incomplete state of development -and carried by the mother in a ventral pouch while it is sucking. The -steps of variation and development by which this extraordinary change -of structure, of modes of reproduction and formation of organs, as well -as habits of life, took place, are certainly not yet discovered; and -it is admitted, in respect to forms "now so utterly unlike," that the -production of the higher forms by the process of evolution "implies -the former existence of links binding closely together all these -forms."[39] In other words, we are called upon to supply by general -reasoning links of which we have as yet no proof. - -VI. The Quadrumana and all the higher (or Placental) Mammals. These are -supposed to stand between the implacental mammals (V) and the Lemuridæ -(VII). The latter were a group of four-handed animals, distinct from -the monkeys, and "resembling the insectivorous quadrupeds." But the -gradations which would show the transformation from the implacental -Marsupials to the placental Quadrumana are wanting. - -VII. The Lemuridæ. This branch of the placental mammals is now actually -represented by only a few varieties. The early progenitors of those -which still exist are placed by Darwin in the series intermediate -between the Quadrumana and the Simiadæ; and according to Huxley they -were derived from the lowest, smallest, and least intelligent of the -placental mammalia. - -VIII. The Simiadæ. This is the general term given by naturalists to the -whole group of monkeys. From the Lemuridæ to the Simiadæ we are told by -Darwin that "the interval is not very wide." Be it wider or narrower, -it would be satisfactory to know whether the gradations by which the -former became the latter are established by anything more than general -speculation. - -IX. The Catarrhine, or Old-World Monkeys. These are the great stem -or branch of the Simiadæ which became the progenitors of man. His -immediate progenitors were "probably" a group of monkeys called by -naturalists the Anthropomorphous Apes, being a group without tails or -callosities, and in other respects resembling man. While this origin of -man is gravely put forward and maintained with much ingenuity, we are -told that "we must not fall into the error of supposing that the early -progenitor of the whole Simian stock, including man, was identical -with, or even closely resembled, any existing ape or monkey."[40] So -that somewhere between the early progenitor of the whole Simian stock -and all that we know of the monkey tribe, there were transitions and -gradations and modifications produced by natural and sexual selection -which we must supply as well as we can. - -X. Man. We have now arrived at "the wonder and glory of the universe," -and have traced his pedigree from a low form of animal, in the shape -of an aquatic worm, through successive higher forms, each developed -out of its predecessor by the operation of fixed laws, and without the -intervention of any special act of creation anywhere in the series, -whatever may have been the power and purpose by and for which existence -was given to the first organized and living creature, the aquatic worm. -Speaking of man as belonging, from a genealogical point of view, to the -Catarrhine, or Old-World stock of monkeys, Mr. Darwin observes that "we -must conclude, however much the conclusion may revolt our pride, that -our early progenitors would have been properly thus designated."[41] - -I have already said that our pride may be wholly laid out of -consideration. The question of the probable truth of this hypothesis -of man's descent should not be affected by anything but correct -reasoning and the application of proper principles of belief. Treating -it with absolute indifference in regard to the dignity of our race, -I shall request my readers to examine the argument by which it is -supported, without the smallest influence of prejudice. I am aware -that it is asking a good deal to desire the reader to divest himself -of all that nature and education and history and poetry and religion -have contributed to produce in our feelings respecting our rank in the -scale of being. When I come to treat of that which, for want of a more -suitable term, must be called the substance of the human mind, and to -suggest how it bears upon this question of the origin of man, I shall, -as I trust, give the true, and no more than the true, scope to those -considerations which lead to the comparative dignity of the race. But -this dignity, as I have before observed, should follow and should not -precede or accompany the discussion of the scientific problem. - -What has chiefly struck me in studying the theory of evolution as an -account of the origin of man is the extent to which the theory itself -has influenced the array of proofs, the inconsequential character of -the reasoning, and the amount of assumption which marks the whole -argument. This is not said with any purpose of giving offense. What is -meant by it will be fully explained and justified, and one of the chief -means for its justification will be found in what I have here more than -once adverted to--Mr. Darwin's own candor and accuracy in pointing out -the particulars in which important proofs are wanting. Another thing -by which I have been much impressed has been the repetition of what is -"probable," without a sufficient weighing of the opposite probability; -and sometimes this reliance on the "probable" has been carried to the -verge, and even beyond the verge, of all probability. Doubtless the -whole question of special creations on the one hand and of gradual -evolution on the other is a question of probability. But I now refer -to a habit among naturalists of asserting the probability of a fact or -an occurrence, and then, without proof, placing that fact or occurrence -in a chain of evidence from which the truth of their main hypothesis is -to be inferred. It is creditable to them as witnesses, that they tell -us that the particular fact or occurrence is only probably true, and -that we are to look for proof of it hereafter. But the whole theory -thus becomes an expectant one. We are to give up our belief that God -made man in his own image--that he fashioned our minds and bodies after -an image which he had conceived in his infinite wisdom--because we -are to expect at some future time to discover the proof that he did -something very different; that he formed some very lowly-organized -creature, and then sat as a retired spectator of the struggle for -existence, through which another and then another higher form of being -would be evolved, until the mind and the body of man would both have -grown out of the successive developments of organic structure. We can -not see this now; we can not prove it; but we may expect to be able to -see it and to prove it hereafter. - -The present state of the argument does not furnish very strong -grounds for the expectation of what the future is to show. As far as -I can discover, the main ground on which the principle of evolution -is accepted by those who believe in it, is general reasoning. It is -admitted that there are breaks in the organic chain between man and his -nearest supposed allies which can not be bridged over by any extinct or -living species. The answer that is made to this objection seems to me -a very singular specimen of reasoning. It is said that the objection -will not appear of much weight to those who believe in the principle -of evolution from general reasons. But how is it with those who are -inquiring, and who, failing to feel the force of the "general reasons," -seek to know what the facts are? When we are told that the breaks in -the organic chain "depend merely on the number of related forms which -have become extinct," is it asking too much to inquire how it is known -that there were such forms and that they have become extinct? Geology, -it is fully conceded on its highest authorities, affords us very little -aid in arriving at these extinct forms which would connect man with -his ape-like progenitors; for, according to Lyell, the discovery of -fossil remains of all the vertebrate classes has been a very slow and -fortuitous process, and this process has as yet reached no remains -connecting man with some extinct ape-like creature.[42] The regions -where such remains would be most likely to be found have not yet been -searched by geologists. This shows the expectant character of the -theory, and how much remains for the future in supplying the facts -which are to take the place of "general reasons." - -But perhaps the most remarkable part of the argument remains to be -stated. The breaks in the organic chain of man's supposed descent are -admitted to be of frequent occurrence in all parts of the series, "some -being wide, sharp, and defined, others less so in various degrees."[43] -But these breaks depend merely, it is said, upon the number of related -forms that have become extinct, there being as yet no proof, even by -fossil remains, that they once existed. Now, the prediction is that -at some future time such breaks will be found still more numerous and -wider, by a process of extinction that will be observed and recorded; -and hence we are not to be disturbed, in looking back into the past, -by finding breaks that can not be filled by anything but general -reasoning. The passage in which this singular kind of reasoning is -expressed by Mr. Darwin deserves to be quoted: - -"At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, -the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate and -replace the savage races throughout the world. At the same time the -anthropomorphous apes, as Prof. Schaafhausen has remarked, will no -doubt be exterminated. The break between man and his nearest allies -will then be wider, for it will intervene between man in a more -civilized state, as we may hope, even than the Caucasian, and some ape -as low as the baboon, instead of as now between the negro or Australian -and the gorilla."[44] - -I do not quite comprehend how the "more civilized state of man" in the -more or less remote future is to lead to this wider break. One can -understand how the whole of mankind may become more civilized, and -how the savage races will disappear by extermination or otherwise. It -may be, and probably will be, that the anthropomorphous apes will be -exterminated at the same time. But the question here is not in regard -to a more perfect and widely diffused civilization--a higher and -universal elevation of the intellectual and moral condition of mankind, -a more improved physical and moral well-being--but it is in regard to -a change in the physical and organic structure of the human animal, so -marked and pronounced as to produce a wider break between man and his -nearest supposed allies than that which now exists between the negro -or the Australian and the gorilla. The anthropomorphous ape existing -now will have disappeared; but it will be a well-known and recorded -animal of the past. But what reason is there to expect that natural and -sexual selection, or the advance of civilization, or the extermination -of the savage races of mankind, or all such causes combined, are going -to change essentially the structure of the human body to something -superior to or fundamentally different from the Caucasian individual? -We have had a tolerably long recorded history of the human body as it -has existed in all states of civilization or barbarism. And although -in the progress from barbarism to civilization--if utter barbarism -preceded civilization--the development of its parts has been varied, -and the brain especially has undergone a large increase in volume and -in the activity of its functions, we do not find that the plan on which -the human animal was constructed, however we may suppose him to have -originated, has undergone any material change. - -The most splendid specimen of the Caucasian race that the civilized -world can show to-day has no more organs, bones, muscles, arteries, -veins, or nerves than those which are found in the lowest savage. -He makes a different use of them, and that use has changed their -development, and to some extent has modified stature, physical, -intellectual, and moral, and many other attributes; as climate and -habits of life have modified complexion, the diseases to which the -human frame is liable, and many other peculiarities. But if we take -historic man, we find that in all the physical features of his animal -construction that constitute him a species, he has been essentially -the same animal in all states of civilization or barbarism; and unless -we boldly assume that the prehistoric man was an animal born with a -coat of hair all over his body, and that clothing was resorted to as -the hair in successive generations disappeared, we can have no very -strong reason for believing that the human body has been at any time an -essentially different structure from what it is now. Even in regard to -longevity or power of continued life, if we set aside the exceptional -cases of what is related of the patriarchs in the biblical records, -we do not find that the average duration of human life has been much -greater or much less than the threescore and ten or the fourscore years -that are said to have been the divinely appointed term. As to what may -have been the average duration of life among prehistoric men, we are -altogether in the dark. - -I must now revert to one of the most prominent of the admitted breaks -in the Darwinian pedigree, namely, that which occurs at the supposed -transition from the amphibians to the mammalia. There is a term which -is used in mechanics to mark the characteristic and fundamental -distinction between one complex machine and another. We speak of the -"principle" on which a mechanical structure operates, meaning the -essential construction and mode of operation which distinguish it from -other machines of the same general class. Although we are not to forget -that an animal organization, to which is given that mysterious essence -that is called life, may come into being by very different processes -from those which are employed by man in dealing with dead matter and -the forces which reside in it, yet there is no danger of being misled -into false analogies, if we borrow from mechanics a convenient term, -and speak of the "principle" on which an animal is constructed and on -which its animal organization operates. We find, then, that in the -animal kingdom there is a perfectly clear and pronounced division -between the modes in which the reproductive system is constructed and -by which it operates in the continuation of the species. The principle -of construction and operation of the reproductive system, by which an -individual animal is produced from an egg brought forth by the female -parent, and is thereafter nourished without anything derived from the -parental body, is as widely different from that by which the young -animal is born from a womb and nourished for a time from the milk of -the mother, as any two constructions, animate or inanimate, that can be -conceived of. Whatever may be the analogy or resemblance between the -embryo that is in the egg of one animal and the embryo that remains in -the womb of another animal, at the point at which the egg is expelled -from the parental system the analogy or resemblance ceases. In certain -animals a body that is called an egg is formed in the female parent, -containing an embryo, or fœtus, of the same species, or the substance -from which a like animal is produced. This substance is inclosed in an -air-tight vessel or shell; when this has been expelled from the parent -the growth of the embryo goes on to the stage of development at which -the young animal is to emerge from the inclosure, and, whatever may -have been the process or means of nourishment surrounding the embryo -within the shell and brought in that inclosure from the body of the -parent, the young animal never derives, at any subsequent stage of its -existence, either before or after it has left the shell, anything more -from the parental system. It may be "hatched" by parental incubation -or by heat from another source, but for nourishment, after it leaves -the shell, the young animal is dependent on substances that are not -supplied from the parental body, although they may be gathered or put -within its reach by the parental care. - -The transition from this system of reproduction to that by which the -fœtus is formed into a greater or less degree of development within the -body of the parent, and then brought forth to be nourished into further -development by the parental milk, is enormous. The principle of the -organic construction and mode of perpetuating the species, in the two -cases, is absolutely unlike after we pass the point at which the ovule -is formed by the union of the male and the female vesicles that are -supposed to constitute its substance. When we pass from the implacental -to the placental mammals we arrive at the crowning distinction between -the two great systems of reproduction which separates them by a line -that seems to forbid the idea that the one has grown out of the -other by such causes as natural selection, and without a special and -intentional creation of a new and different mode of operation. On -the one hand, we have a system of reproduction by which the ovule is -brought forth from the body of the parent in an inclosed vessel, and -thereafter derives nothing from the parental body. In the other, we -have the ovule developed into the fœtus within the body of the parent, -and the young animal is then brought forth in a more or less complete -state of development, to be nourished by the parental secretion called -milk. The intervention of the placental connection between the fœtus -and the mother, whereby nourishment is kept up so that the young animal -may be born in a more complete state of development, is a contrivance -of marvelous skill, which natural selection, or anything that can be -supposed to take place in the struggle for existence, or the result -of the sexual battle, seems to be entirely inadequate to account for. -If two such very diverse systems could be supposed to have been the -product of human contrivance, we should not hesitate to say that the -principle of the one was entirely different from that of the other, and -that the change evinced the highest constructive skill and a special -design. - -The Darwinian hypothesis is that this great transition from the one -system of reproduction to the other took place between the amphibians -and the ancient marsupials, by the operation of the influences -of natural and sexual selection. That is to say, the system of -reproduction through an egg, which is the characteristic of the -amphibians, became changed by gradations and modifications into the -system of the lowest mammals, the distinction between the former and -the latter being an obvious and palpable one. Then we are to suppose a -further change from the marsupials, or the implacental mammals, to that -wonderful contrivance, the _placenta_, by which the mother nourishes -the fœtus into a more complete state of development before the young -animal is born. This enormous change of system is supposed to have -been brought about by a struggle among the individuals of one species -for food, aided by a struggle between the males of that species for -the possession of the females, by the growth and development of organs -useful to the animal in the two battles, and by the transmission of -these enhanced powers and improved weapons to offspring, and possibly -by the crossing of different varieties of the new animals thus -produced. But what potency there could be in such causes to bring about -this great change it is extremely difficult to imagine, and we must -draw largely on our imaginations to reach it. It would seem that if -there is any one part of animal economy that is beyond the influence of -such causes as the "survival of the fittest," it is the reproductive -system, by which the great divisions of the animal kingdom continue -their respective forms. Give all the play that you can to the operation -of the successful battle for individual life, and to the victory of -the best-appointed males over their competitors for the possession -of the females, and to the transmission of acquired peculiarities to -offspring--when you come to such a change as that between the two -systems of reproduction and perpetuation, you have to account for -something which needs far more proof of the transitional gradations of -structure and habits of life than can now be found between the highest -of the amphibians and the lowest of the mammalia. I know not how there -could be higher or stronger evidence of design, of a specially planned -and intentionally elaborated construction, than is afforded by this -great interval between the one reproductive system and the other. But -it is time now to pass to those points of resemblance between man and -the other mammals which are asserted as the decisive proofs of his and -their descent from some pre-existing form, their common progenitor. -These points of resemblance may be considered in the following order: - -1. _The Bodily Structure of Man._--He is notoriously constructed on -the same general type or model as other mammals. "All the bones in his -skeleton can be compared with corresponding bones in a monkey, bat, or -seal. So it is with his muscles, nerves, blood-vessels, and internal -viscera. The brain, the most important of all the organs, follows the -same law."[45] - -2. _The Liability of Man to certain Diseases to which the Lower -Animals are liable._--These diseases, such as hydrophobia, variola, -the glanders, syphilis, cholera, etc., man both communicates to and -receives from some of the lower animals. "This fact proves the close -similarity of their tissues and blood, both in minute structure -and composition, far more plainly than does their comparison under -the best microscope or by the aid of the best chemical analysis." -Monkeys are liable to many of the same non-contagious diseases as -we are, such as catarrh and consumption. They suffer from apoplexy, -inflammation of the bowels, and cataract in the eye. Their young die -from fever when shedding their milk-teeth. Medicines produce the -same effect on them as on us, and they have a strong taste for tea, -coffee, spirituous liquors, and even tobacco. Man is infested with -both internal and external parasites of the same genera or families as -those infesting other mammals; in the case of scabies, he is infested -with the same species of parasites. He is subject to the same law of -lunar periods, in the process of gestation, and in the maturation and -duration of certain diseases. His wounds are repaired by the same -process of healing, and, after the amputation of his limbs, the stumps -occasionally possess some power of regeneration, as in the lowest -animals.[46] - -3. _The Reproductive Process._--This is strikingly the same, it is -said, in all mammals, from the first act of courtship by the male to -the birth and nurturing of the young.[47] The closeness of the parallel -here, however, is obviously between man and the other placental -mammalia, if we regard the whole process of reproduction of the -different species. - -4. _Embryonic Development._--From the human ovule, which is said to -differ in no respect from the ovule of other animals, into and through -the early embryonic period, we are told that the embryo of man can -hardly be distinguished from that of other members of the vertebrate -kingdom. It is not necessary to repeat the details of the resemblance, -which are undoubtedly striking, because they show a remarkable -similarity between the embryo of man and that of the dog and the ape, -in the earlier stage of the development, and that it is not until quite -in the later stages of development that the three depart from each -other, the difference between the young human being and the ape being -not so great as that between the ape and the dog. We may, of course, -accept Prof. Huxley's testimony that "the mode of origin [conception?] -and the early stages of the development of man are identical with those -of the animals immediately below him in the scale; without a doubt, in -these respects, he is far nearer to the apes than the apes are to the -dog."[48] - -5. _Rudiments._--This is a somewhat obscure branch of the proofs, which -requires a more detailed examination in order to appreciate its bearing -on the general theory of evolution. A distinction is made between -rudimentary and nascent organs. The former are absolutely useless to -their possessor--such as the mammæ of male quadrupeds, or the incisor -teeth of ruminants, which never cut through the gums--or else they are -of such slight service to their present possessors that they can not be -supposed to have been developed under the conditions which now exist. -These useless, or very slightly useful, organs in the human frame, -are supposed to have been organs which had an important utility in -the lower animals from which man is descended, but, by disuse at that -period of life when the organ is chiefly used, and by inheritance at a -corresponding period of life, they became of less and less utility in -the successive animals that were evolved out of the preceding forms, -until they sank into the condition of useless appendages, although -perpetuated by force of the derivation of one species of animal from -another, caused by the operation of the laws of natural and sexual -selection. Nascent organs, on the other hand, are those which, though -not fully developed to their entire capability, are of high service to -their possessor, and may be carried to a higher degree of utility. One -of the characteristics, as it is said, of rudimentary organs, is that -they often become wholly suppressed in individuals, and then reappear -occasionally in other individuals, through what is called reversion, -or a return to ancestral peculiarities.[49] We are told that "not one -of the higher animals can be named which does not bear some part in a -rudimentary condition; and man forms no exception to the rule."[50] - -Among the rudiments that are peculiar to man, and which are supposed -to be proofs of his cognate relations to the lower animals, we are -referred to certain muscles in a reduced condition, which in the other -animals are used to move, twitch, or contract the skin, and remnants -of which, in an efficient state, are found in various parts of our -bodies; for instance, the muscles which raise the eyebrows, those which -contract the scalp, those which, in some individuals, move the external -ear, and similar muscular powers in different parts of the body. These -are adduced as illustrations of the persistent transmission of an -absolutely useless, or almost useless, faculty, "probably" derived from -our remote semi-human progenitors. There is also another rudiment in -man, found in the covering of the eye, and called by anatomists the -"semi-lunar fold," which in birds is of great functional importance, -as it can be rapidly drawn across the whole eyeball. In those animals -in which, with its accessory muscles and other structures, it is well -developed, as in some reptiles and amphibians, and in sharks, it is a -third eyelid. In the two lower divisions of the mammalian series, the -monotremata and the marsupials, and in some few of the higher mammals, -as in the walrus, it is said to be fairly well developed. But in -man, in the quadrumana, and most other mammals, it has become a mere -rudiment. - -The sense of smell in man is also classed by Darwin and other -naturalists among the rudiments. It is argued that it was not -originally acquired by man as he now exists, but that he has inherited -this power, in an enfeebled and so far rudimentary condition, from some -early progenitor, to whom it was highly serviceable, and by whom it was -continually used. - -Then we have the rudiment of hair, which, so far as it now exists on -different parts of our body, is regarded as a mere remnant of the -uniform hairy coat of the lower animals. Man, as he is now born, -"differs conspicuously from all the other primates in being almost -naked." But this nearly nude condition was not, it is said, the -condition of his progenitors, and it is not the condition of his -co-descendants from the same progenitors. At some time the progenitors -of man and his co-descendants became covered all over with a coat of -hair. What remains upon our bodies of this peculiar growth, that is -called hair, is what was left after the agency of natural selection -had worked off what was useless to the successive animals, and sexual -selection had operated to transmit to offspring the absence of hair -that had accrued in the nearer progenitors and the immediate parents. -The illustrations which render this view "probable" do not need to -be repeated, nor is it necessary to follow out the speculations -concerning the mode in which our progenitors, near or remote, became -varied in respect to the quantity, position, or direction of the hairs -on various parts of their bodies. - -There are several other alleged homologues or rudiments which are -supposed to connect man with the lower animals, but which, whatever may -be the resemblances, it is not necessary to discuss in detail, because -there is one consideration at least which applies to the whole of -this class of proofs, and to that I now pass. The three great classes -of facts on which the whole argument rests, viewing man as an animal -and omitting all reference to his intellect, are the resemblances of -his bodily structure to that of the other mammals, the similarity -between his embryonic development and theirs, and the rudiments. I -reserve for separate discussion the counter-proof which may be derived -from the nature of the human mind, and the special adaptation of the -human structure to become the temporary residence and instrument of a -spiritual and immortal being. - -"It is," says Mr. Darwin, "no scientific explanation to assert that -they have all [man and the other animals of the mammalian class] been -formed on the same ideal plan."[51] The similarity of pattern is -pronounced "utterly inexplicable" upon any other hypothesis than that -all these animals are descended from a common progenitor, and that -they have become what they are by subsequent adaptation to diversified -conditions. I may incur some risk in undertaking to suggest what is -a "scientific" explanation. Certainly I do not propose to "assert" -anything. But I will endeavor to keep within the bounds of what I -suppose to be science. I take that to be a scientific explanation -which, embracing the important facts of natural history as the -groundwork of the reasoning, undertakes to show the rationality of one -hypothesis that differs from another, when the question is, Which has -the greater amount of probability in its favor? - -All correct reasoning on this subject of man's descent as an animal -begins, I presume, with the postulate of an Infinite Creator, having -under his power all the elements and forms of matter, organized and -unorganized, animate and inanimate. There is no fundamental difference -of opinion on this point, as I understand, between some of the -evolutionists and their opponents.[52] Omnipotence, boundless choice of -means and ends, illimitable wisdom, a benevolence that can not fail and -can not err, are the conceded attributes of the being who is supposed -to preside over the universe; and, however difficult it may be for us -to express a conception of infinite power and infinite wisdom, as it -is to describe infinite space and duration, we know what we mean to -assume when we speak or think of faculties that are without limit, and -of moral qualities that are subject to no imperfection. It is true that -we have no means of forming an idea of superhuman and infinite power -but by a comparison of our own limited faculties with those which we -assume to belong to an eternal and infinite God. But the nature of our -own limited powers teaches us that there may be powers that are as far -above ours as the heavens are above the earth, as the endless realms -of space stretch beyond and forever beyond any measurable distance, -as eternity stretches beyond and forever beyond all measurable time. -At all events, the postulate of an infinite God is the one common -starting-point for the scientists of the evolution school and those -who accept their doctrine, and for those who dissent from it. If I -did not assume this, I could not go one step further, for without it -there could not be a basis for any reasoning on the subject that would -lead anywhere but to the conclusion that all that exists came by blind -chance. This conclusion is rejected alike by the scientists, whose -views I am now examining, and by those who differ from them. - -In the economy of Nature, which is but another term for the economy -of the Omnipotent Creator, there is no waste of power, as there is no -abstention from the exercise of power, where its exertions are needed -to accomplish an end. By this I mean that when a general plan of -construction is found carried out through a variety of organizations, -the rational inference is that so much power has been exerted as was -needful to accomplish in each organization the objects that are common -to all of them, and that no more power has been used in that direction. -But where a special adaptation in some one variety of the same class -of constructions is needful to accomplish an object peculiar to a new -variety, the necessary amount of power never fails to be exerted. A -study of the animal kingdom reveals this great truth, as palpably as a -study of the products of human skill reveals the fact that man, from -the imperfection of his faculties, is constantly exerting more or less -power than was needful in his efforts to produce a new variety in his -mechanical constructions. Experience and accumulated knowledge enable -us to carry a general plan of construction through a considerable group -of mechanical forms; but it is when we endeavor to vary the principle -of construction so as to produce a new and special mode of operation, -that we either waste power in repeating the general plan or fail to -exercise the amount of power necessary to adapt the general plan to the -introduction of the special object at which we are aiming. Our success -in making such adaptations is often wonderful, but our failures evince -that our imperfect faculties do not always enable us to accomplish -the necessary adaptations of the general plan of construction to the -special objects which we wish to attain. To the Infinite Creator, all -such difficulties are unknown. He neither wastes power by new plans -that are unnecessary, nor makes "vain repetitions," nor fails to exert -the requisite amount of power and wisdom in the introduction of new -and special contrivances which he ingrafts upon or superadds to the -general plan, and which he has devised for the accomplishment of a -new object. With a boundless choice of means and ends, with a skill -that can not err, with a prescience that sees the end from the first -conception of the design, he can repeat the general plan throughout -any variety of constructions without any waste of power, and can -introduce the new adaptations or contrivances which are to constitute -a new construction, by the exercise of all the power that is required -to accomplish a special object. Whether we are to suppose that he does -this by the establishment of certain laws which he leaves to operate -within prescribed limits, or does it by special creations proceeding -from direct and specific exertions of his will, the question of his -power to employ the one method or the other remains always the same. -The question of which was his probable method depends upon the force of -evidence; and upon this question we must allow great weight to the fact -which all Nature discloses, namely, that the Creator does not waste -power by making new plans of construction where an existing plan may be -usefully repeated, and that he does not fail to exercise the necessary -power when he wishes to add to the general plan of construction a new -and special organism for a particular purpose. - -Is there anything presumptuous in thus speaking of the determination -and purposes of the Omnipotent Creator? We have his existence and -infinite attributes conceded as the basis of all sound reasoning on his -works. Why then should we not infer his purposes and his acts from his -works? Why should we not attribute to him a special design, when we -can not examine his works without inferring such special design, unless -we conclude that the most amazing and peculiar constructions grew up -under the operation of causes of which we have no sufficient proof, and -in the supposed result of which there are admitted chasms that can not -be bridged over? - -To return now to the resemblance between the bodily structure of -man and that of his supposed progenitors. The assertion is that a -repetition of the same general plan of construction throughout a class -of animals can only be explained upon the hypothesis of their descent -from a common progenitor. They are, it is claimed, co-descendants -from some one ancient animal; and however they may differ from each -other, in all these co-descendants from that animal we find the same -general plan of construction, the same ideal model repeated. Among the -whole class of the higher mammals, we have skeletons, muscles, nerves, -blood-vessels, internal viscera, organs, that closely correspond. What -does this prove but that there was no waste of power, because there -was no necessity in making man, for the formation of a general plan -of construction different in these particulars from that which was -employed in making the monkey, the bat, or the seal? The similarity -of pattern between the hand of a man or a monkey, the foot of a -horse, the flipper of a seal, or the wing of a bat, is pronounced -"utterly inexplicable" upon any hypothesis but that of descent from a -common progenitor. But why is not this sameness of ideal plan just as -consistent with the hypothesis that the same ideal plan would answer -for the human hand or the hand of an ape, the foot of the horse, the -flipper of the seal, or the wing of the bat?[53] It is when you pass -from such resemblances and come to the special contrivances which -separate one animal from another by a broad line of demarkation, -that you are to look for the adaptation of special contrivances to -repetitions of the same ideal model through the varying species. Take, -for example, the introduction among the mammals of the placental system -of reproduction, parturition, and subsequent nourishment of the young, -combined with the nourishment of the fœtus while it continues in the -body of the mother. This system would require no material variation -from the general plan of construction that is common to the different -mammals of this class in respect to the parts where the resemblances -are kept up throughout the series, such as those of the skeleton, -muscles, nerves, viscera, and other organs that are found in all of -them. But for the introduction of this peculiar system of reproduction -and continuation of the species, there was needful a special and -most extraordinary contrivance. If such a contrivance or anything -like it had been produced by human skill, and been introduced into a -mechanical structure, we should not hesitate to say that there had -been an invention of a most special character. When you follow this -system through the different animals in which it is found operating, -and find that the period of gestation and of suckling is varied for -each of them, that for each there is the necessary modification of -trunk, situation of the organs, assimilation of food and formation -of milk, and many other peculiarities, what are you to conclude but -that there has been an adaptation of a new system to a general plan -of construction, and that while the latter remains substantially the -same, it has had ingrafted upon or incorporated with it a most singular -contrivance, so original, comprehensive, and flexible, that its -characteristic principle admits of the most exact working in animals -that are as far asunder as man and the horse, or as the horse and the -seal, or as the seal and the bat? - -The resemblances between the embryonic development of man and the -other mammals present another instance of the constantly occurring -fact that there has been no waste of power on the one hand, and on the -other no failure to exert the amount of power requisite to produce a -new variation of the general principle. There is no more logical force -in the hypothesis of a common progenitor, in order to account for -these resemblances, than there is in the hypothesis that the general -system of embryonic development was first devised, and that it was -then varied in each distinct animal according to the requirements of -its special construction. Upon the latter supposition, there would -be resemblances to a certain stage, and then there would follow the -departures which we have no difficulty in tracing. Upon the former -supposition we should expect to find, what we actually do find, that -it is very difficult, if not impossible, to assign any reason for -the departures, or to suggest how it has happened that one animal is -so absolutely distinct from another. Thus, to begin with the embryo -itself, and to trace it through its stages of development, we find -that in man it can hardly be distinguished from that of other members -of the vertebrate kingdom. This we should expect to be the case after -we have learned the great fact that Nature operates upon a uniform -principle up to the point where variations and departures are to -supervene. The system of embryonic development being devised to operate -in parallel lines through all the placental mammals until the lines -should begin to depart from each other so as to result in animals -of different species, would necessarily show strong resemblances of -structure until the departures supervened. There would be, in other -words, a strong illustration of the truth that in the Divine economy -there is no waste of power. But when the stage is reached at which the -departures may be noted, and the lines diverge into the production of -organized beings differing widely from each other, we reach an equally -striking illustration of the corresponding truth that the amount of -power necessary to produce very different results never fails to be -put forth. There is no good reason why this latter exertion of power -should not be attributed to special design just as logically and -rationally as we must attribute to intentional purpose and infinite -skill the general system of embryonic development which has been made -for the whole class of the placental mammals. While, therefore, we may -accept as a fact Prof. Huxley's statement on this branch of comparative -anatomy, we are under no necessity to accept his conclusion. To the -question whether man originates in a different way from a dog, bird, -frog, or fish, this anatomist answers, as already quoted: "The reply -is not doubtful for a moment; without question, the mode of origin and -the early stages of the development of man are identical with those -of the animals immediately below him in the scale; without a doubt, -in these respects he is far nearer to apes than apes are to the dog." -This refers, of course, to the parallelism that obtains in the early -stages of the embryonic development. It necessarily implies, at later -stages, diverging lines, which depart more or less from each other, and -thus we have between the ape and the man a nearer approach than we have -between the ape and the dog. But how does this displace, or tend to -displace, the hypothesis of a general system of embryonic development -for all animals of a certain class, and an intentional and special -variation of that system so as to produce different species of animals? -The identity between the mode of origin and the early stages of the -development of man and those of the animals immediately below him in -the scale, is strong proof of the applicability of the same general -principle of development throughout all the animals of a certain class. -The cessation of the parallelism at the diverging lines is equally -strong proof of a design to create an animal differing as man does from -the ape, or as the ape does from the dog. The argument that these three -species are co-descendants from a common progenitor, viewing man simply -as an animal, is at least no stronger than the argument which leads to -the conclusion of special creations. - -The same thing may be said of the liability of man to certain -contagious or non-contagious diseases in common with some of the lower -animals. That there is a similarity in the chemical composition of -the blood of an entire class of animals, in the structure of their -tissues and blood-vessels, so that they are subject to the same causes -of inflammation or to the same parasites, is proof of a uniform plan -of the fluids and the vascular system, or, in other words, it evinces -that here, too, there has been in these respects no waste of power in -forming the different animals of the same class. But trace back the -supposed pedigree of the animals sharing this chemical composition -of the blood, character of tissues, and vascular system, until you -have passed through the amphibians and reached their supposed fish -progenitors. Somewhere between the fishes and the higher mammals, -you have not only a great change in the chemical composition of the -blood-vessels and tissues, but an equally great change in the apparatus -by which the blood is oxygenated.[54] How can these changes have -been brought about without a new and intentional structure of the -vessels and the apparatus for supplying the oxygen demanded for the -continuation of life? How can we explain these changes by such agencies -as the natural selection which is supposed to lead to the "survival -of the fittest," and the sexual selection which is supposed to give -to the best-appointed males of a given species the power to transmit -to their offspring the new peculiarities which they have acquired -through successive generations? Do not these changes show that there -is a line of division which such agencies alone can not cross? Do they -not clearly point to the exercise of the creative power in a special -manner, and for special purposes? That power being once exercised, the -new chemical composition and mechanical appliances being devised, the -same "ideal plan" could be carried through a new class of animals by -a repetition which is in accordance with the economy of Nature, and -which an infinite power could adapt to the formation of animals, each -of which was designed to perpetuate its own species and no other. Hence -we should expect to find in the animals sharing in the same formation -of the blood and the vascular system a corresponding process of healing -the parts severed by a wound, and a continuous secretion from such -vessels as have not been cut away; but we should not expect to find the -stumps growing into a new and perfect part, to take the place of what -has been removed by amputation.[55] We should expect to find the same -drugs affecting different animals of the same class alike; and when the -nervous system of a class of animals is upon the same general plan, -we should expect to find them similarly affected by stimulants. But -these resemblances do not militate very strongly against the hypothesis -of special creations, when we consider that it is according to the -universal economy of the Omnipotent Creator to employ the necessary, -and no more than the necessary, power in originating a plan that may -be applied to the formation of a distinct class of beings, and that -his adaptations of this plan to further and specific constructions of -beings belonging to a general class, but differing widely from each -other, are among the strongest and plainest proofs of his infinite -power and the nature of his methods. - -In regard to the "rudiments" that are found in man, the theory of Mr. -Darwin can be best stated in his own words: "In order to understand the -existence of rudimentary organs, we have only to suppose that a former -progenitor possessed the parts in question in a perfect state, and that -under changed habits of life they became greatly reduced, either from -simple disuse or through the natural selection of those individuals -which were least encumbered with a superfluous part, aided by the -other means previously indicated."[56] But, in order to do justice to -this theory, it is necessary to repeat the description and operation -of the supposed agencies of natural and sexual selection. Natural -selection is an occurrence which takes place among the individuals -of a certain species in the struggle for existence, whereby those -who are best appointed secure the necessary supply of food, and the -weaker or less active are either directly destroyed in the contest or -perish for want of nourishment. The "fittest" having survived, they -have the best chance of procreating their kind, and are likely to have -the most progeny. To these individuals there comes in aid the sexual -selection, which means chiefly the victory of the fittest males over -their less fit competitors for the possession of the females. Whatever -peculiarities of structure or development, or diminution of structure -or development, these fittest males possess, they would transmit -to their offspring. This tendency would be enhanced by the varying -conditions of life through which the successive generations might have -to pass; so that if the former progenitor possessed naturally an organ -in a perfect state, but ceased to make use of it, and for thousands -of generations its use went on diminishing, it would sink into the -condition of a mere rudiment. Supposing this to be a partially true -explanation of the modes in which organs become rudimentary, how does -it militate against the idea of separate creations? We have "only -to suppose" that the first men possessed, for example, the power of -moving the skin all over their bodies by the contraction of certain -muscles, and that their remote descendants lost it everywhere excepting -in a few parts, where it remains in an efficient state, and that it -has become varied in different individuals. The process by which -organs become rudimentary is an hypothesis just as consistent with -the separate creation of man as it is with his being a co-descendant -from some lower animal whose descendants branched into men, apes, -horses, seals, bats, etc.; for, on the supposition of the separate -creation of all these different animals, each species might have been -originally endowed with this power of muscular contraction of the -skin, and in their descendants it might have been retained or varied -or have become more or less rudimentary, according to its utility -to the particular species. The truth is, that our own faculties of -creation or construction, when we undertake to deal with matter and -its properties, are so imperfect, and that which constitutes living -organisms is so utterly beyond our reach, that we do not sufficiently -remember how entirely it is within the compass of the infinite Power, -which has given to matter all the properties that it possesses and -has living organisms under its absolute control, to form a system of -construction and operation for beings of entirely distinct characters, -carrying it through each of them in parallel lines, or causing it to -diverge into varying results with an economy that neither wastes the -constructive power nor fails to exert it where it is needed. To argue -that the presence of rudiments in different animals, in different -comparative states of development or efficiency, or in a purely useless -condition, can only be explained by a descent from some remote common -progenitor, is what the logicians call a _non sequitur_. It overlooks -the illimitable faculty of the creating Power, and disregards the -great fact that such a power acts by an economy that is saving where -uniformity will accomplish what is intended, that is profuse where -variation is needful, and that can guide its own exertions of power, -or its abstention from such exertions, by unerring wisdom, to the most -varied and exact results. - -I trust that by the use of the term "economy" in speaking of what -is observable in the works of the Creator, I shall be understood as -comprehending both the avoidance of unnecessary and the exertion of -all necessary power. Of the degree of necessity in any exercise of a -power which we suppose to be infinite, we can only judge by what we -can see. If omnipotence and omniscience are to be predicated of the -being who is supposed to preside over the universe, it is rational to -conclude, from all that we can discover, that, in applying a uniform -system of construction to different animals of a certain general class, -he acted upon a principle that his unerring faculties enabled him to -see was a comprehensive one; and that in producing variations of that -system of construction that would result in adapting its uniformity -to the varying conditions of the different species, he acted by the -same boundless wisdom and power. If these postulates of the Divine -attributes are conceded, rudiments do not by any means necessarily -lead to the conclusion that all the animals of a certain class are -co-descendants from some remote common progenitor, for they do not -exclude the hypothesis that each distinct animal was formed upon a -general plan of construction that could be applied throughout the -class, but that it was varied according to the special conditions of -its intended being. Organs or parts may thus have become more or less -rudimentary without resorting to the supposition of a common progenitor -for the whole class. That supposition, indeed, makes it necessary -to assume that the infinite Creator fashioned some one animal, and -then, abstaining from all work of further direct creation, left all -the other animals to be evolved out of that one by the operation of -secondary causes that fail even as a theory to account for what we -see, and that can not be traced through any results that have yet been -discovered. Wherever we pause in the ascending scale of the Darwinian -descent of man, wherever we place the first special act of creative -power, whether we put it at the fish-like animal of the most remote -antiquity, and call that creature the original progenitor of all the -vertebrata, or whether we suppose a special creation to have occurred -at the introduction of the mammalian series, or anywhere else, we -have to account for changes of system, new constructions, elaborately -diversified forms, by the operation of agencies that were incapable of -producing the results, if we are to judge of their capacity by anything -that we have seen or known of their effects. - -I will conclude this chapter by expressing as accurately as I can -what has struck me as the excessive tendency of modern science to -resolve everything into the operation of general laws, or into what -we call secondary causes. I may be able to suggest nothing new upon -this part of the subject, but I shall at least be able, I hope, to -put my own mind in contact with that of the reader by explaining what -has impressed me in the speculations of those who lay so much stress -upon the potency of general laws to produce the results which we -see in Nature. Of course, I do not question the great fact that the -infinite Power acts by and through the uniform methods from which we -are accustomed to infer what we call laws; which in physics is nothing -but a deduction of regularity and system from that which we see to -be perpetually and invariably happening. Now, I do not enter here -into the question of the tendency of modern science to displace our -religious ideas of a special Providence, by attributing everything -in Nature to the operation of fixed laws of matter; or its tendency, -in other words, to remove the infinite Being at a greater distance -from us than that in which our religious feelings like to contemplate -him. I am perfectly sensible that in truth the infinite God is just -as near to us, when we regard him as acting by general laws and -secondary causes, as when we believe him to be exercising a direct and -special power. I am equally sensible that it is in the very nature -of infinite power, wisdom, and benevolence to be able and willing to -ordain uniform and fixed principles of action. That Power which gives -to matter all its properties may well be supposed to have established -uniformity and regularity of movements, forces, combinations, and -qualities. How supremely consistent this uniformity and regularity -are, with what stupendous accuracy they are kept forever in operation, -we are more or less able to discern; and that benevolence which is -believed to accompany the power may well be supposed to have intended -that its intelligent and rational creatures should be able in some -degree to discover and to avail themselves of these unvarying laws of -the physical world. But are these laws to be supposed to be the only -methods by which the infinite Will has ever acted? Is it to be assumed -that, having settled and established these perpetual principles, on -which matter, organized or unorganized, is to act, he leaves everything -to their operation and abstains from all further exertion of his -creative power for any special purpose? Has he given to these general -laws a potency to produce, in and of themselves, all the results? In -other words, has he affixed to their operation no limitations, or has -he set bounds to them, and reserved to himself, by direct, specific, -and occasional exercise of his will and power, for new purposes, to -produce results for which the general laws were not ordained? - -It is not necessary here to enter into the consideration of what -are called "miracles." These, in their true meaning, are special -interpositions, which the Divine Power is supposed to make, by a -suspension or interruption of the established laws of Nature; and, -whatever may be the grounds of our belief or our unbelief in such -occurrences, they are not exercises of power such as those which are -supposed to take place in special creations of new beings. That the -hypothesis of special creations of new beings involves no interruption -or displacement of the fixed laws of Nature, is quite manifest. - - -NOTE A. - - NOTE ON AMPUTATION, OR SEVERANCE OF PARTS.--As Mr. Darwin - attached some importance to a fact which he asserted respecting the - efforts of Nature to restore a part of an organism which has been - severed by amputation, I think it well to quote his statement, and to - point out what I believe to be an inaccuracy. His statement is this: - "His [man's] wounds are repaired by the same process of healing, - and the stumps left after the amputation of his limbs, especially - during an early embryonic period, occasionally possess some power of - regeneration, as in the lowest animals." It is not quite apparent - what he means by amputation during an early embryonic period. If he - is to be understood as referring to a case of complete severance of - any part of an embryo before birth, it has not been demonstrated - that such a severance has been followed by a successful effort of - Nature to replace the severed part; and it is difficult to understand - how there could be such an amputation during embryonic life without - destroying the life of the embryo; or, if the severed part were one - of the extremities, how there could be a new extremity formed. In - such a case, if life continued and birth were to take place, the - animal must be born in an imperfect state. In regard to amputations - taking place at any time after birth, if the expression "some power - of regeneration" means to imply a new formation to take the place - of the severed part, the assertion is not correct. What occurs in - such cases may be illustrated by the very common accident of the - severance of the end of a human finger at the root of the nail. If - the incision is far enough back to remove the whole of the vessels - which secrete the horny substance that forms the nail, there will - be no after growth of anything resembling a nail. If some of those - vessels are left in the stump, there will be continuous secretion - and deposit of the horny substance, which may go so far as to form a - crude resemblance to a nail. But if all the vessels which constitute - the means of perpetuating a perfect nail are not left in their normal - number and action, there can be no such thing as the formation of a - new nail. Whether it is correct to speak of the imperfect continuation - of a few of the vessels to secrete the substance which it is their - normal function to secrete, as a "power of regeneration," is more - than doubtful, if by such a power is meant a power to make a new - and complete structure to take the place of the structure that has - been cut away. It is nothing more than the continued action of a - few vessels, less in number than the normal system required for the - continued growth and renewal of the part in question. The abortive - product in such cases looks like an unsuccessful effort of Nature - to make a new structure in place of the old one; but it is not in - reality such an effort. The fact that the same thing occurs, in just - the same way and to a corresponding extent, in different animals, has - no tendency to prove anything excepting that these different animals - share the same general system of secreting vessels for the formation - and perpetuation of the several parts of their structures. It has no - tendency to prove that they are co-descendants from a common ancestral - stock, for on the hypothesis of their special and independent creation - a common system of secreting vessels would be entirely consistent with - their peculiar and special constructions. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [35] "Descent of Man," pp. 164, 609. - - [36] "Descent of Man," p. 159. - - [37] "Origin of Species," p. 148. - - [38] "Descent of Man," p. 165. - - [39] "Descent of Man," p. 158. - - [40] "Descent of Man," p. 155. - - [41] Ibid. - - [42] "Descent of Man," pp. 156, 157. - - [43] Ibid., p. 156. - - [44] "Descent of Man," p. 156. - - [45] "Descent of Man," p. 6. - - [46] Ibid., p. 8. - - [47] Ibid. - - [48] "Descent of Man," pp. 9, 10, quoting Huxley, "Man's Place in - Nature," p. 65. - - [49] "Descent of Man," p. 11 _et seq._ - - [50] Ibid. - - [51] "Descent of Man," p. 24. Consult Mr. Darwin's note on Prof. - Bianconi's explanation of homologous structures upon mechanical - principles, in accordance with their uses. - - [52] Mr. Herbert Spencer's peculiar views are not here included in the - discussion, but they will be considered hereafter. - - [53] It is immaterial, of course, in this discussion, whether the - formation of man preceded that of the other animals, according to - the Platonic idea, or whether, as in the account given in the book - of Genesis, the other animals were first formed. So far as an ideal - plan entered into all of them, that plan may have been devised for and - first applied to any part of the series, and then varied accordingly. - - [54] The popular terms--"fish" and "flesh"--present to the mind the - most vivid idea of this change from the characteristic substance of - one of these animals to that of another. - - [55] See the note on amputation, or severance of parts, at the end of - this chapter. - - [56] "Descent of Man," p. 25. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer. - - -Passing from Mr. Darwin as the representative of that class of -naturalists who have undertaken to assign the pedigree of man by -tracing the stages of his development back to the lowest and crudest -form of animal life, I now come to a philosopher whose speculations -carry the doctrine of evolution through every field of inquiry, and -who, finding, as he supposes, evidence of its operation throughout all -the other realms of the physical and the moral word, contends that it -also obtains in the animal kingdom. It were to be wished that this -writer, whose intellect is of the order of minds to which we naturally -look for a judicial treatment of such themes, had been a little less -dogmatic in his treatment of the doctrine of special creations. Mr. -Spencer has, indeed, consistently recognized the necessity of trying -the question between the hypothesis of special creations and the -hypothesis of evolution, as one to be decided, if it is to be decided -at all, only by an examination of evidence. But to one who approaches -this question in a spirit of inquiry, and with a desire to learn -whatever can be said on both sides, it is somewhat disappointing to -find that the most eminent writer of the evolution school is unjust -in his treatment of the belief which he opposes. There can be no -objection to advocacy, or to strong and decided advocacy, when settled -convictions are to be vindicated. But with advocacy we may expect that -kind of fairness which consists in a full recognition of the opposite -argument. A great master of dialectics once laid it down as a maxim of -advocacy, "State the case of your opponent as strongly as you know how, -stronger if possible than he states it himself, and then answer it, if -you can." Some instances in which Mr. Spencer has not followed this -wise rule may now be mentioned: - -1. He attacks with great vigor the hypothesis that living beings -resulted from special creations, as a primitive hypothesis; and because -it is a very ancient belief he pronounces it to be probably untrue. He -even goes so far as to assert that its antiquity raises a presumption -against it. He classes it among a family of beliefs which began in -primitive ages, and which have one after another been destroyed by -advancing knowledge, until this one is almost the only member of the -family that survives among educated people.[57] He says that if you -catechise any one who holds this belief as to the source from which he -derived it, he is forced to confess that it was put into his mind in -childhood, as one portion of a story which, as a whole, he has long -since rejected. It will give way at last, along with all the rest of -the family of beliefs which have already been given up. It may be that -the arguments of those whose controversial writings on this subject -Mr. Spencer had before him, relied on the antiquity of this belief -as one of the strongest proofs of its probable truth. I have not -looked to see how any writer on that side of the question has used the -antiquity of the doctrine of special creations. But it is certainly -not in accordance with the sound rule, even of advocacy, to state the -argument in support of the belief which you oppose with less than the -force that may be given to it, whether your opponents have or have not -given to it the true force that belongs to it. The mere antiquity of -the belief in special creations has this force and no more: that a -belief which began in the primitive ages of mankind, and has survived -through all periods of advancing knowledge, must have something to -recommend it. It is not one of those things that can be swept away with -contempt as a nursery-tale, originating in times of profound ignorance -and handed down from generation to generation without inquiry. That it -has survived, after the rejection of other beliefs that originated at -the same period--survived in minds capable of dealing with the evidence -in the light of increasing knowledge--is proof that it has something -more to rest upon than the time of its origin. If some of its defenders -now assert its antiquity as the sole or the strongest argument in its -favor, its opponents should not assume that this is the only or the -best argument by which it can be supported. Nor can it be summarily -disposed of by classifying it as one of a family of beliefs that -originated in times of ignorance, and that have mostly disappeared from -the beliefs held by educated people. Its association with a special -class of mistaken beliefs affords no intrinsic improbability of its -truth. Every belief has come to be regarded as a mistaken or a true -one, not according to its associated relations with other beliefs that -have come to be regarded as unfounded, but according to the tests that -the knowledge of the age has been able to apply to it. Take the whole -catalogue of beliefs that began to be held in the darkest ages, and -it will be found that their association has had no influence beyond -inducing incorrect habits of reasoning on certain subjects, or a -habit of accepting the official authority of those who claimed to be -the special custodians of truth. These intellectual habits have been -temporary in their influence, and have gradually changed. Every one of -the beliefs that have been given up by the lettered or the unlettered -part of mankind, has been given up because better knowledge of a -special character has come to show that it is unfounded, and because -mere official authority has ceased to have the power that it once -had. If a belief has survived from a remote antiquity among those who -are competent to judge of the evidence in its favor, by comparing the -phenomena that increasing knowledge has accumulated, the force of the -fact that it has so survived is not weakened by its association for a -period with other beliefs that are now rejected. - -Mr. Spencer asserts that, as the supposition of special creations is -discredited by its origin in a time when men were profoundly ignorant, -so conversely the supposition that races of organisms have been -gradually evolved is credited by its origin, because it is a belief -that has come into existence in the most instructed class, living in -these better instructed times. This is a kind of argumentation that is -often the result of a love of antithesis. The soundness of the last -branch of the proposition appears to depend upon the soundness of the -first branch. Make it to appear that the origin of the elder hypothesis -is unfavorable by reason of the time of its origin, and it seems to -follow that the origin of the modern hypothesis is favorable by reason -of its time of origin. But this antithesis does not express the exact -truth in either branch of it. It is not because of its antiquity, or -of the character of the times in which it was first believed, that -the doctrine of special creations can be shown to be irrational or -improbable. There is no presumption against the truth of any belief, -to be derived from the fact that it was held by persons who also held -some erroneous beliefs on other subjects. If there were, nothing could -be worthy of belief unless it could show a recent origin, or at least -until demonstration of its truth had overcome the presumption against -it. On the other hand, there is no presumption in favor of the truth -of a new theory to be derived from the fact that it is new, or that it -originated among those who think that they do not hold any erroneous -beliefs, or because it originated in a comparatively very enlightened -age. Every physical and every moral theory, unless we mean to be -governed by mere authority, whether it is ancient or recent, must be -judged by its merits, according to the evidence. - -2. Another of Mr. Spencer's naked assertions is that the belief in -special creations is "not countenanced by a single fact." Not only did -no man "ever see a special creation," but "no one ever found indirect -proof of any kind that a special creation had taken place." In support -of this sweeping dogma, he adduces a habit of the naturalists who -maintain special creations to locate them in some region remote from -human observation.[58] This is another instance of not stating the case -of your adversary as strongly as you might state it, or as he states -it himself. "While no naturalist and no other person who believes in -special creations ever saw one take place, indirect and circumstantial -evidence tending to show that the earth is full of them has been -accumulated to an enormous amount." It is a monstrous extravagance to -assert that the hypothesis is "absolutely without support of any kind." -What if Mr. Spencer's opponents were to retort that no man ever saw -an instance in which an animal of a distinct species had been evolved -out of one of an entirely different organization; that there is no -external evidence to support the hypothesis of such derivations, and -that the naturalists of the evolution school habitually place the scene -of operations in the region of scientific imagination? The discovery -of truth is not likely to be much advanced by this mode of attacking -opposite opinions, yet it could be used with as much propriety on the -one side of this question as on the other. - -3. Next, and completing the misrepresentation, we have the assertion -that, "besides being absolutely without evidence to give it external -support, this hypothesis of special creations can not support itself -internally--can not be framed into a coherent thought.... Immediately -an attempt is made to elaborate the idea into anything like definite -shape, it proves to be a pseud-idea, admitting of no definite shape. -Is it supposed that a new organism when specially created is created -out of nothing? If so, there is a supposed creation of matter, and the -creation of matter is inconceivable, implies the establishment of a -relation in thought between nothing and something--a relation of which -one term is absent--an impossible relation.... Those who entertain -the proposition that each kind of organism results from divine -interposition do so because they refrain from translating words into -thoughts. The case is one of those where men do not really believe, -but _believe they believe_. For belief, properly so called, implies -a mental representation of the thing believed; and no such mental -representation is here possible."[59] - -When I first read this passage I could hardly trust the evidence -of my eye-sight. It seemed as if the types must have in some way -misrepresented the distinguished writer; for I could scarcely conceive -how a man of Mr. Spencer's reputation as a thinker could have -deliberately penned and published such a specimen of logic run riot. It -reads like some of the propositions propounded by the scholastics of -the middle ages. But, having assured myself that the American edition -of his work is a correct reprint, and having carefully pondered and -endeavored to ascertain his meaning, I was forced to the conclusion -that he supposes this to be a conclusive answer to the idea of absolute -creation in respect to anything whatever, because, when put into a -logical formula, one term of the relation is nothing, and the other -term is something. Logical formulas are not always the best tests of -the possibility of an intellectual conception, or of what the mind -can represent to itself by thought, although to a certain class of -readers or hearers they often appear to be a crushing refutation of the -opposite opinion or belief against which they are employed. - -Is there in truth anything impossible because it is unthinkable -in the idea of absolute creation? Is the creation of matter, for -example, inconceivable? It certainly is not if we adopt the postulate -of an infinite Creator. That postulate is just as necessary to the -evolutionist who maintains the ordination of fixed laws or systems -of matter, by the operation of which the organized forms of matter -have been evolved, as it is to those who maintain that these forms -are special creations. Who made the laws that have been impressed -upon matter? Were they made at all, or were they without any origin, -self-existing and eternal? If they were made, they were made out of -nothing, for nothing preceded them. Then apply to them the logical -formula, and say that one term of the relation is absent--is mere -nothingness--and so there is an impossible relation, a relation in -thought between nothing and something, which is inconceivable. This -dilemma is not escaped by asserting, as Mr. Spencer does, that "the -creation of force is just as inconceivable as the creation of matter." -It is necessary to inquire what he means by a "conceivable" idea. If he -means that we can not trace or understand the process by which either -force or matter was created, our inability may be at once conceded. -But if he means that, granting the postulate of an infinite creating -power, we can not conceive of the possibility that matter and all -the forces that reside in it or govern it were called into being by -the will of that power, the assertion is not true. Human faculties -are entirely equal to the conception of an infinite creating power, -whatever may be the strength or the weakness of the proof by which -the existence of such a power is supported; and if there is such a -power it is a contradiction in terms to assert that absolute creation, -or the formation of "something" out of "nothing," is an impossible -conception. Such an assertion is simply a specious play upon words, or -else it involves the negation of an infinite creating power. The term -"creation," as used in all modern philosophy, implies, _ex vi termini_, -the act of causing to exist; and, unless we assume that nothing which -exists was ever caused to exist, we must suppose that the causing power -was alike capable of giving existence to matter and to the forces that -reside in it. - -The reason why the Greek philosophers did not embrace the idea of -absolute creation was not because it was an unthinkable idea, or one -incapable of representation in thought. They were, as we have seen, -surrounded by a mythology which attributed the origin of the world -to polytheistic agencies. They struggled against the cosmogony of -poetical and popular traditions in an effort to find a cause of a -different character. Monotheism, the conception of the one only and -omnipotent God, freed philosophy from the great want which had hampered -its speculations. This want was the conception of divine power, as -abstracted from substance or the qualities of substance. When this -conception had been obtained, absolute creation was seen to be a -legitimate deduction from the illimitable scope and nature of the power -which monotheism imputed to the Being supposed to preside over the -universe, and to have existed before all the objects which the universe -contains: and this conception of the act of creation thus became -equally capable of representation in words and in thought. You may say -that it has no evidence to support it; that it leads to contradictory -ideas of the attributes claimed for the Creator; that upon the -hypothesis of those attributes, his works are inexplicable. Whether -you can say this truly or not, you can not say that absolute creation -is inconceivable; and unless you mean to claim that neither matter nor -force was ever created, that there never was a being competent to make -either the one or the other to exist, you can not deny the probability -that both were called into being by a definite and specific exercise -of power. Mr. Spencer's philosophy manifestly leads to the conclusion -that there is no God, or no such God as the hypothesis of special -creations supposes, or such as the hypothesis of evolution necessarily -calls for. If I understand him rightly, he rejects the idea of any -creation, whether of matter, or force, or the properties of matter, or -even of law of any kind, physical or moral. Hence it is that I admit -the necessity of treating the existence of the Omnipotent Creator as an -independent question to be judged upon moral evidence; and hence, too, -in reasoning upon the probable methods of the Almighty, I maintain that -the postulate of his existence is alike necessary to the evolutionist -and to those who believe in special creations, and that both must adopt -the same cardinal attributes as attributes of his power and character. - -It is well to pursue this particular topic somewhat further, because -this special difficulty arising from the creation of something out of -nothing, triumphantly propounded by a certain class of philosophers, -is echoed by others as if it concluded the question. The received -meaning of language is often a great help to the mind in representing -to itself in thought the idea that is expressed by the word. The word -contains and suggests the thought. Lexicographers are the learned -persons, one part of whose business it is to exhibit the thought that -is represented by a word, not according to the popular and, perhaps, -uncertain or erroneous use of the term, or according to its secondary -meanings, but according to the exact correspondence between the word -and the idea which it conveys in its primary and philosophic usage. -The definition given to our English verb "create," in its primary -and philosophical sense, is: "To produce," "to bring into being from -nothing"; "to cause to exist." "Creation," as a noun expressing the -act described by the verb, is defined as "the act of creating: the act -of causing to exist, and _especially_, the act of bringing this world -into existence." "Created," as the past participle which describes what -has been done, is defined as "formed from nothing: caused to exist; -produced; generated."[60] This is the sense in which the word is used -in the English version of the first verse of the book of Genesis: "In -the beginning God _created_ the heavens and the earth"; and whatever -may be said about the source from which Moses derived his knowledge -of the fact which he relates, there can be no doubt about the nature -of the fact which he intended to assert. Now, does the lexicographer, -when he describes creation as the act of causing something to exist, -or the act of producing something out of nothing, present an idea -that is incapable of mental representation--a relation impossible in -thought? What he means to express is clear enough. Is the idea which he -expresses impossible to be conceived by the mind? - -It will be a good test of this supposed insuperable difficulty to -apply the term "creation" to some human act. When Shakespeare composed -the tragedy of "Hamlet," he created something in the sense which we -are here considering.[61] He created that something out of nothing: -for he caused something to exist which did not exist before. He did -not merely inscribe certain words upon paper, by the material process -of writing, and afterward cause the same words to be repeated by the -material process of printing upon another paper. He gave intellectual -existence to certain male and female persons of his imagination, -carried them through certain periods of their imaginary lives, and -made them and their history an imperishable intellectual idea. It is -entirely immaterial to the present discussion that such a product of -the imagination presents to us nothing but intellectual ideas; that -Hamlet and Ophelia, and the King and Queen, and all the rest of the -_dramatis personæ_, were mere creatures of the poet's fancy. Although -they were nothing but intellectual conceptions, they were "creations" -in the sense of being intellectual products that never existed in idea -before the poet made them, and therefore they were made out of nothing. -Now, although we can not look into the mind of Shakespeare and describe -the process by which he formed these creatures of his imagination, -we experience no difficulty when we contemplate these imaginary -personages, in representing in thought what we mean when we say that -he "created" them. It would be simple absurdity to say that he did not -create these ideal persons, because the notion of creation implies -the formation of something out of nothing. That is the very meaning -of creation in its primary and philosophical sense; and, when applied -to works of the human imagination, it presents to us an idea that is -perfectly capable of representation in thought. - -Pass from this illustration of the idea of human creation to the -hypothesis of a supreme being, possessing infinite power, and existing -before the material universe began. The hypothesis of his existence -includes the power to call into being things that had no previous -being, whether these things be matter and material properties or -moral and intellectual ideas. The whole realms of possible existence, -spiritual and material, the whole void which consists in mere -nothingness, are, according to the hypothesis, under his absolute sway. -He holds the power of absolute creation; and the power this hypothesis -imputes to him is no more incapable of representation in thought -than is the inferior and limited power of creation, which we know -to be performed by the finite human intellect, and which we have no -difficulty in conceiving as a true creating faculty. When Watt formed -the steam-engine, he did something more than to place certain portions -of matter in certain relations, and make them to operate in a certain -manner so as to produce a certain effect. He made the intellectual plan -of a certain arrangement of matter; and to this act of giving being to -something, both intellectual and physical, which did not exist before, -we ascribe in its true sense the act of creation, and the idea we -express by the term is perfectly capable of mental representation. - -"Those," says Mr. Spencer, "who entertain the proposition that each -kind of organism results from a divine interposition, do so because -they refrain from translating words into thoughts"; and he adds, quite -truly, that there is no assignable mode or conceivable way in which the -making of a new organism can be described. Let this be applied to some -new mechanical structure produced by the intellect and hand of man. It -is a result or product of human interposition. When we describe this -human product as an invention, do we refrain from translating words -into thoughts because we can not describe the process of invention? or, -in other words, because we can not assign the mode in which the mind -of the inventor reached his conception, are we to conclude that he did -not attain to the conception which is plainly embodied in the machine -that stands before our eyes? If we say that he created something, do we -make a statement that can not be consistently imagined because we can -not assign the mode in which his mind operated when it thought out the -idea and constructed the plan? We can see how he put together certain -material substances, and how they operate; but we can not see or -describe the mental process by which he obtained his conception. Yet -we ascribe to his act, and rightly ascribe to it, the idea of creation; -and the term represents a thought of the mind that is as capable of -being imagined as the word is of being spoken and understood. - -When Raphael painted the Sistine Madonna, he formed in his mind an -image of the heaven-chosen mother of Christ, and the marvelous skill of -his artist hand transferred that face of surpassing loveliness to the -canvas. The story that it tells may be a fiction or a fact. The image -is a reality. It was a new existence; and, if we call it a creation, -do we use a word which we can not translate into thought because we do -not know how the painter attained to that sweet conception of the human -mother's tenderness, and the dignity of her appointed office as the -handmaiden of the Lord? - -There is nothing unphilosophical in thus ascribing what is done by -finite human faculties and what is done by the infinite Creator to -a power that is of the same nature, but which in the one being is -limited and imperfect, and in the other is superhuman and boundless. -If we know, as we certainly do, that weak and finite man can perform -some acts of creation, can cause some things to exist that did not -previously exist, how much more may we safely conclude that a being -of infinite powers can call into existence, out of the primeval -nothingness, objects of the most stupendous proportions, of the -nicest adaptations, of the most palpable uses--can cause matter and -force and law to be where before all was vacuity, where force was -unknown, where law had never operated! When the mind contemplates that -Omnipotent Power, it reaches forth to an awful presence; but it does -not contemplate something of which it can not conceive, for its own -inferior faculties teach it that creation is a possible occurrence. - -We do not need to be and are not indebted to superstition, to -tradition, or to deceptive words, for the idea of creation. At an -immeasurable distance from the Almighty Power, we ourselves are -constantly creating; and it is when we do so that our acts resemble -his in their nature, however below his productions may be the -productions of our poor human faculties. It is one of the proofs of -our relationship to the infinite Creator, a proof for which we are not -indebted solely to revelation, that we are endowed in this imperfect -degree with a power that resembles his. It is also one of the chief -of the characteristics that distinguish man from the other animals: -for, wonderful as are the constructions made by some of them, they are -uniformly made under the involuntary and uncontrollable impulse of an -implanted instinct; whereas, the constructions of man are made by the -exercise of a constructive faculty that is guided by his will, which -enables him to effect variations of structure entirely unattainable -by any other being that exists on this earth. All the other animals -are confined in the exercise of their constructive faculties to -an invariable model, appointed for each of them according to the -circumstances of its being. The range of choice is bounded by the -limitations of the instinct under which the animal is compelled to do -its work. It may appear to select a favorable site for its habitation, -to cull its materials with judgment, to guard against disturbance from -the elements or from enemies. But we have not much reason to suppose -that any of these things are done from anything but an irresistible -impulse, and we certainly have no reason to suppose that the animal has -the moral power to do them or to refrain from them. To man alone does -there appear to have been given the power of varying his constructions -by the exercise of an intelligent will; and that will is bounded only -by the limitations of his power over matter: so that, in respect to -material structures, the power of man to make creations approaches -nearest to the power of the Almighty Creator, and is, within its -limitations, a true creating power. In the realm of intellectual or -ideal creations, the resemblance of human and divine power is the same, -and the limitations upon the former are those fixed by the finite -nature of human faculties.[62] - -4. Mr. Spencer has a great deal to urge against "the current -theology," and he treats of some of the theological difficulties in -which those who espouse the hypothesis of special creations entangle -themselves.[63] I have nothing to do with the current theology. I do -not borrow from it or rely upon it, and do not undertake to disentangle -its professors from any of the difficulties in which they may have -involved themselves. The only question that interests me is, whether -the objections propounded by this philosopher as an answer to the -hypothesis of special creations present insuperable difficulties to -one who does not depend upon the current theology for arguments, -explanations, or means of judgment. I shall therefore endeavor to -state fairly and fully the chief of the supposed difficulties, without -considering the answer that is made to them by those who are taken as -the representatives of the current theology. - -Put into a condensed form, one of Mr. Spencer's grand objections -to the belief in special creations of organized beings is that it -involves a deliberate intention on the part of the Creator to produce -misery, suffering, pain, and an incalculable amount of evil, or else -that there was an inability to prevent these results. Omitting for -the present the human race, and confining our first view to the other -animals, the earth is largely peopled by creatures which inflict on -each other and on themselves a vast amount of suffering. The animals -are endowed with countless different pain-inflicting appliances and -instincts; the earth has been a scene of warfare among all sentient -creatures; and geology informs us that, from the earliest eras which -it records, there has been going on this universal carnage. Throughout -all past time there has been a perpetual preying of the superior upon -the inferior--a ceaseless devouring of the weak by the strong. In -almost every species, the number of individuals annually born is such -that the majority die of starvation or by violence before arriving at -maturity. But this is not all. Not only do the superior animals prey -upon the inferior, for which there may be suggested some compensating -benefit by the sustentation of a higher order of life through the death -of the lower, or by leaving the most perfect members of a species to -continue that species, but the inferior prey upon the superior, and -organisms that are incapable of feeling have appliances for securing -their prosperity at the expense of misery to organisms capable of -happiness. Of the animal kingdom, as a whole, more than half, it is -said, are parasites, and almost every known animal has its peculiar -species. Passing over the evils thus inflicted on animals of inferior -dignity and coming to man, we find that he is infested by animal and -vegetable parasites of which two or three dozens may be distinctly -enumerated; which are endowed with constitutions fitting them to live -by absorbing the juices of the human body, furnished with appliances by -which they root themselves in the human system, and made prolific in -an almost incredible degree. They produce great suffering, sometimes -cause insanity, and not infrequently death.[64] - -The dilemma that is supposed to be created by these facts for those -who believe in the doctrine of special creations is this: If any -animals are special creations, all are so; and each animal must be -supposed to have been created for the special purposes that are -apparent upon an examination of its structure and mode of life. As the -superior are constantly preying upon the inferior, and as there are -numerous inferior animals that are constantly inflicting evil upon -the superior, it results that malevolence rather than benevolence was -a characteristic attribute of the creating power, or else that the -power which is supposed to have created was unable to make the perfect -creation which the hypothesis of infinite benevolence calls for. -Infinite goodness fails to be demonstrated by a world that is full of -misery, caused by special appliances to bring it about; and infinite -power can not have existed, unless it comprehended the power to produce -perfect and universal happiness. - -I pass entirely aside from the argument which is drawn from the -supposed manifestations of Almighty power in the creation of -diversified forms of animal and vegetable life, because that argument -leads doubtless to the inquiry whether the Almighty made these -manifestations to demonstrate his power to himself, or made them to -demonstrate it to his human creatures. Admitting the fact, as Mr. -Spencer puts it, that millions of these demonstrations took place on -earth when there were no intelligent beings to contemplate them--a -statement that is said to be verified by the deductions of geology -and paleontology--an inquiry into the period or the purpose of these -manifestations of divine power as manifestations only, merely leads -us into some of the arguments of the current theology. There is -another realm of thought and reasoning into which it will be far more -profitable to enter. It is that realm which lies outside of tradition -and the teachings of theologians, and which takes the hypothesis of -infinite power and infinite goodness, not as something which we have -been taught to believe, but as a postulate of philosophical reasoning; -and, applying this hypothesis to the known facts of the animal and -vegetable world, endeavors to ascertain whether these facts necessarily -create an insuperable difficulty in the hypothesis which lies at the -basis of all sound reasoning on the subject. For I must again insist, -and shall endeavor specifically to show, that this hypothesis of -infinite power and goodness is equally necessary to the evolutionist -and to the believer in special creations, unless all speculation on the -genesis of the world is to end in blind chance, and the negation of a -personal creating power of any kind. - -What, then, is the true philosophical mode of dealing with the -existence in the world of physical and moral evil, in reference to -the hypothesis of infinite power and infinite goodness? I do not -ask what is a perfect demonstration of the problem of physical and -moral evil--although I think that the natural solution is very near -to demonstration; but the inquiry which I now make is. What is the -reasonable mode of comparing the existence of suffering, pain, misery, -and their immediate agencies, with the supposition of an all-wise, -all-powerful, and perfectly beneficent Creator?[65] - -What we have to do, in the first place, is to contemplate the scope -of infinite goodness; or, in other words, to consider that infinite -benevolence is, in its very nature, guided by unerring wisdom, and -consequently that its methods, its plans, and its results are as far -beyond the methods, plans, and results which our imperfect benevolence -would adopt or achieve, as infinite power is beyond our finite and -imperfect capacity. This does not call upon us to conceive of something -that is inconceivable, or that can not be represented in thought; -for power and goodness are qualities that we know to exist: we know -that they exist in degrees; and that what exists in a measurable and -limited degree may exist without measurable limitation, or in absolute -perfection. The philosophic mode of regarding perfect goodness requires -us to consider its methods and results with reference to its perfect -character, and not to measure them by the inferior standards of human -wisdom. Following out this obvious truth, we have next to inquire -whether the physical and moral evil which we see ought to destroy the -very idea of an infinitely benevolent Creator, and to compel us to -regard him as a malevolent being, or else to destroy our belief in -his infinite power, because his power has been unable to make a world -of perfect happiness and enjoyment for his creatures. If this dilemma -seriously exists, it is just as great a difficulty for the hypothesis -of evolution as it is for that of special creations, and it drives -both schools into the utter negation of any intelligent causing power -adequate to produce what we see. - -In the next place, let us see what is the sum total of the physical -and moral evil in the animal kingdom, which, in reference to the sum -total of happiness, is supposed to create this formidable impeachment -of the Almighty benevolence on the one hand, or of the Almighty power -on the other. As to the order of things which permits the superior -animals to prey upon the inferior, there is an explanation which lies -on the surface of the facts, and which would seem to satisfy all the -requirements of philosophic reasoning, whatever may be the mode in -which this part of the moral problem is dealt with by theologians. -We find the fact to be that, as we rise higher and higher in the -scale of organized beings, the superior are capable of happiness -in a greater degree than the inferior, in some proportion to the -superiority of their organization. The comparative duration of life -among the different animals also enters into the estimate of the sum -total of happiness. As a general rule, the inferior organizations -are individually more short-lived than the superior. Now, it might -have pleased the Creator to cause all animals to be fed by manna from -heaven, or to find their sustenance only in vegetable products; and -he could thus have dispensed with the carnivorous appetite, and have -rendered it unnecessary for the superior to prey upon and destroy the -inferior. But, although he could thus have made a world from which the -misery of this perpetual carnage would have been absent, and which -would have been so far a world of perfect happiness, the fact is -that this law of universal destruction is so shaped as to follow the -increasing capacity for happiness and enjoyment which moves through -the ascending scale of the organized beings. It also follows another -obvious purpose of the carnivorous appetite and of the permission to -indulge it. A large part of the whole animal kingdom is so constructed -that sustentation requires animal food. The blood, the tissues, the -whole substance of some animal structures require to be renewed by -similar substances; and although life may sometimes be continued by the -assimilation of vegetable substances alone, it is not the life for -which the animal was formed, because it is not always the life which -makes the full end of its being, and realizes its best capacity for -enjoyment and for the continuation of its species. In some cases, the -carnivorous appetite is withheld. The animal lives and thrives best -upon a vegetable diet, and so far as the flesh of these animals enters -into the wholesome and beneficial food of man, the animal fulfills one -purpose of its existence. Some animals, before they become fit food -for man, have been nourished by the substance of still other animals. -In all this variety of modes in which animal food is prepared for -man, and in the whole of the stupendous economy by which the superior -organizations prey upon the inferior in order that each species may -continue itself and may fulfill the purposes of its existence, we may -without any difficulty trace an obvious reason for the permission that -has been given to such destruction of individual life. When to the sum -total of happiness and benefit which this permission bestows on each -of the orders of the inferior animals according to its capacity for -enjoyment, whether it does or does not enter into the food of man, -whether it comes or never comes within the reach of his arm, we add -the sum total of happiness and benefit which this law of universal -destruction bestows on man, so far as he avails himself of it, we shall -find no reason to impeach the Divine Goodness or to adopt a conclusion -derogatory to the Infinite Power. We may dismiss the difficulty that is -supposed to arise from the warfare of the superior upon the inferior -beings, because that warfare, when we trace it through all its stages, -involves no sort of deduction from the perfect character of the Divine -Goodness or the Divine Power. - -Next, we come to the liability of animals, man included, to be preyed -upon by parasites, creatures of a very inferior order when compared -to the animals which they infest. I have looked in vain through Mr. -Spencer's speculations for any explanation which makes the existence -of the parasitic animals a support to the theory of evolution without -involving the same impeachment of the Divine Power or the Divine -Goodness which is supposed to be involved in the hypothesis of special -creations. We are indeed told that evolution brings about an increasing -amount of happiness, all evils being but incidental; that, applying -alike to the lowest and to the highest forms of organization, there is -in all cases a progressive adaptation, and a survival of the fittest. -"If," it is argued, "in the uniform working of the process, there are -evolved organisms of low types, which prey on those of higher types, -the evils inflicted form but a deduction from the average benefits. The -universal and necessary tendency toward supremacy and multiplication -of the best, applying to the organic creation as a whole as well as -to each species, is ever diminishing the damage done, tends ever -to maintain those most superior organizations which, in one way or -another, escape the invasions of the inferior, and so tends to produce -a type less liable to the invasions of the inferior. Thus the evils -accompanying evolution are ever being self-eliminated."[66] - -Admitting, for the argument's sake, that this is true, how does the -hypothesis of evolution meet the difficulty? The parasitic inferior -organizations exist, and they have existed, more or less, as long as we -have known anything of the superior organizations on which they prey. -They have inflicted and still inflict an incalculable amount of evil, -an untold diminution of the happiness that might have been enjoyed if -they had never existed. The mode in which they came into existence, -whether by the process of evolution or by special creations of their -respective forms, does not affect the amount of evil which their -ravages have produced and are still producing. If they exist under an -order of things which has made them the products of an evolving process -that has formed them out of still lower types, while they exist they -have the same power of inflicting evil as if they had been specially -made in their respective types without the former existence of any -other type. If they owe their existence to the process of evolution, -they exist under a system that was designed to lead to their production -by the operation of uniform laws working out a uniform process; and -under this process, so long as they are produced by it, they imply -gratuitous malevolence, just as truly as they do if they are supposed -to have been specially created. The evils which they have inflicted -and still inflict were deliberately inflicted, unless we suppose that -the hypothetical process of evolution was not a system ordained by any -supreme and superhuman power, but was a result of blind chance; that -the system was not created, but, without the volition of any power -whatever, grew out of nothing. - -The compensating tendency of the evolution system to evolve superior -organisms, which in one way or other "will escape the parasitic -invasions," by becoming less liable to them, and so to diminish the -damage done, as a sum total, finds a corresponding result in the system -of special creations by a different process and at a more rapid rate. -For the hypothesis of special creations, rightly regarded, does not -assume the special creation of each individual animal as a miraculous -or semi-miraculous interposition of divine power; and even when we -apply it to the lowest types of animals it implies only the formation -of that type with the power in most cases of continuing its species. -Assuming the parasitic animals to be in this sense special creations, -the superior organisms on which they prey during their existence may -become less liable to their invasions by an infinity of causes which -will diminish and finally put an end to the parasitic ravages. In -the progress of medical science man may be wholly relieved from the -worst and most obscure parasites that have ever infested him, without -waiting for their evolution into some other type of animal that does -not desire or need to prey upon the human system, or without waiting -to have the human organism developed into one that will not be exposed -to such causes of suffering or death. We know already that very simple -precautions will ward off from man some of the most subtle of these -enemies; and even in the case of animals lower than man we know that -instinct teaches them how to avoid the ravages of some of the parasites -to which they are exposed, even if there are others which they can not -now escape. - -So that, viewing as a whole the amount of misery inflicted by the -inferior organisms upon the superior, and looking from the first -forward to the last "syllable of recorded time," we are able upon -either of the two hypotheses respecting the origin of animals to -reach certain definite conclusions, which may be stated as follows: -This world was not intended to be a state of unmixed and unbroken -individual happiness for any of the animal organisms. Death for every -individual in some form was necessary to the carrying on and the -carrying out of the scheme of average enjoyment and the accomplishment -of a sum total of benefit that becomes larger and larger as time goes -on; and, although death without suffering might have been ordained, -the moral purpose for which suffering was allowed to precede death -required that it should be permitted in numberless cases and forms, -and by almost numberless agencies, although not always made necessary. -This great purpose can be discerned without taking into view at all -the idea of a future state of existence for man or any of the other -terrestrial beings, and looking only at the moral development of man -individually and collectively as an agent in the promotion of happiness -on this earth. Man, however he originated, stands at the head of the -whole animal kingdom. If for himself and for all the inferior animal -organisms death without suffering had been ordained as the universal -rule, he would have been without the full strength of the moral -stimulus which now leads him to relieve, to palliate, to diminish, and, -as far as possible, to terminate every kind of suffering for himself -and the superior organisms that are below him in the scale, which are -the most capable of enjoyment and happiness, next after himself, in -their various proportionate capacities. He would have had no strong -motive for exterminating the inferior and noxious organisms excepting -for his own individual and immediate benefit; no reason for extending -the protection of his scientific acquirements to the lower animals -excepting to promote his own immediate advantage. Human society would -have been without that approach to moral perfection which is indicated -by a tenderness for life in all its forms, where its destruction is -not needed by some controlling necessity or expediency, and by the -alleviation of suffering in all its forms for the sake of increasing -the sum total of possible happiness. Human life itself would have been -less sacred in human estimation if there had been no suffering to draw -forth our sympathies and to stimulate us to the utmost contention -against its evils. Civilization would have been destitute of that which -is now its highest and noblest attribute. Wars would have been more -frequent among the most advanced portions of the human race; pestilence -would not have been encountered with half the vigor or the skill which -now wage battle against it; poverty would have been left to take care -of itself, or would have been alleviated from only the lowest and most -selfish motives, which would have left half its evils to be aggravated -by neglect. As the world has been constituted, and as we have the -strongest reason to believe it will continue to the end, there is to -be added to the immeasurable sum of mere animal enjoyment of life that -other immeasurable sum of moral happiness which man derives from doing -good and from the cultivation of his power to do it--an acquisition -and accumulation of benefit which would have been wanting if there had -been no physical suffering to awaken pity and to prompt our exertions -for its relief. - -So that the objection that the hypothesis of infinite goodness required -a world where physical pain would have been unknown to any of its -organisms, where human sorrow would never have been felt, where human -tears would have never flowed, and where death would have been always -and only euthanasia, is by no manner of means a necessary conclusion, -as the existence of suffering is no impeachment of the Infinite Power. -If we consider man only in the light of his rank at the head of all the -terrestrial beings, and as therefore capable of the greatest amount -of benefit, to himself and to the other creatures, and if we regard -him individually as nothing more than a being dwelling on this earth -for a short-lived existence and endowed with the power of perpetuating -his species, he would have been morally an inferior being to what he -is now capable of becoming, and human society would have been far -below what it can be made and what we know that to a large degree it -already is, if physical suffering had been excluded from the world. All -this can be discerned without the aid of revelation; it can be seen -by the eye of philosophic reason alone; and it is all equally true -upon any hypothesis of the physical origin of man or any other living -creature on this earth, unless we suppose that the whole animal kingdom -came into being without any intentional design, without any plan of -intentional benefit, without any purpose, and without the conscious -exertion of any power of any kind. - -And, if the question is asked, What is to be the end of this world? or -if we go forward in imagination toward the probable end of all this -animal life, I can not see that the hypothesis of evolution has more -to recommend it than the hypothesis of special creations in reference -to the perfectibility of the world, or to the sum of approximate -perfection that seems to be attainable. As, upon either of the two -hypotheses, a perfect world does not even now seem to have demanded -an absence of suffering, since suffering tends obviously to produce -greater benefit than could have followed from its absence, so, in -the remotest conceivable future, a nearer and nearer approximation -to a state of universal happiness will continue to be worked out by -physical and moral causes, which will be as potent under the system of -special creations as they can be supposed to be under the system of -evolution. It is true that the moral causes will supplement and aid -the physical under either of the two systems. But one difficulty with -the evolution theory as the sole method by which the past or present -inhabitants of the world have come into existence is that, so far as -we can judge, it has done and completed its work just as effectually -and finally as special creation appears to have terminated in certain -forms, some of which are extinct and some of which are living. Take -the Darwinian pedigree of man, as stated in a former chapter, or any -other mode of tracing the supposed stages of animal evolution. The -process has hypothetically culminated in man. At whatever species in -the ascending scale you pause, you find that the particular type of -animal has either become extinct or that it has continued and still -continues to be produced in that same type, with only such variations -and incidental differences as have resulted from changed conditions -of life, and from the intermingling of different breeds of the same -animal. I do not now speak of the theory, which admits, of course, of -the hypothetical development of every known animal, past or present, -out of its supposed predecessors. But I speak of the facts as yet -revealed by the researches of naturalists among all the extinct and -living forms of animal life. If there had ever been discovered any one -instance in which it could be claimed by satisfactory proof that an -animal of a distinct species had been evolved out of races of animals -of a fundamentally different organization, and without the special -interposition of any creating power operating to make a new organism, -we should certainly have it cited and relied upon as a fact of the -utmost importance. I do not say that it would be reasonable to expect -direct and ocular demonstration of such a product, any more than it -would be reasonable to expect direct and ocular demonstration of an -act of special creation. But I say that it could be shown by proofs -that ought to be satisfactory if there were any evidence from which the -inference that such a fact ever occurred could be reasonably drawn; -just as it is possible to draw the inference of special creation by -reasonable deduction from the evidence that tends to establish it as -a safe conclusion. But if there has ever been such an instance of the -evolution of any known species of animal out of other species shown by -satisfactory proof, or if we assume such an occurrence in the past as -the theory calls for, what reason have we to suppose that the process -of evolution is still going on, and to expect it to go on to the end -of time? We must judge of the future by the past, for we have no other -means of judging it. The past and the present both show, so far as we -can yet perceive by the facts, that each distinct and peculiar type -of animal life remains a perfect and completed production, however it -was fashioned or grew into that type; and that, so far as we have any -means of actual knowledge, no crosses of different races of that animal -produce anything but incidental variations of structure and mode of -life. It is a mere hypothesis that they produce distinct species. - -Apply this to the most important of the supposed connections between -different animals according to the theory of evolution--that between -man and the monkey. The theory calls for the intermediate link or -links. Nothing can be yet found that shows the pedigree without -eking it out by general reasoning, and by assumptions that are more -or less imaginary. But suppose that the chain of proof were complete, -what would it show? It would show that the process of evolution has -culminated in man, as its crown and summit, and has there stopped. For, -whatever may have been the length of time required for the production -of this result, we know what the product is. We have the history of man -as an animal for a period of time that has been quite long enough to -show that, after he had become in his essential structure as an animal -what we know him to be, no subsequent intermingling of the races or -families into which the species became divided has produced any change -in his essential structure, or any new organs or any differences but -differences in the development of powers which are to be found in him -at all the stages of his known existence as parts of his characteristic -animal structure. The period of his known existence is certainly -infinitely small when compared with the whole indefinite future. It -is long enough, however, to afford some basis of reasoning about the -future; and, short as it is, it tends very strongly to show that the -further development of man on earth is to be chiefly a moral and -intellectual development; that in physical structure he is a completed -type; and that whatever superiorities of mere animal life he may -attain to hereafter are to be such improvements as can be worked out, -within the limits of his animal constitution, by the science which his -accumulating experience and knowledge will enable him to apply to the -physical and moral well-being of his race. - -To return now to the line of thought from which these suggestions have -diverged. If, as we have every reason to believe upon either hypothesis -of man's origin, he is a completed animal, standing by original -creation or by the effect of the evolution process at the head of the -whole animal kingdom in the apparent purpose of his existence, his -agency and his power in promoting the sum of happiness on earth, for -himself and all the other animals, are the same upon either hypothesis -of his origin. The hypothesis of his origin by evolution gives him no -greater power over his own happiness or that of the other creatures -than he has if we suppose him to have been specially created; and it is -only by adopting the belief that in his own constitution he is to be -hereafter developed into a being incapable of suffering, or one vastly -less capable of suffering than the animal called man now is, that the -theory of evolution, even in regard to the sum total of happiness on -earth, has any advantage over the theory of special creations. If we -suppose the future gradual development of a terrestrial being standing -still higher in the animal scale than man now stands, exempt from the -suffering which man now suffers, we have a great amount of suffering -hereafter eliminated from the world by a certain process. But how does -this better satisfy the idea of infinite goodness in the power that -devised the process, than the hypothesis of special creation which has -formed man as an ultimate product of the divine benevolence and power -acting together, endowed him with the faculty of eliminating pain and -evil from the circumstances of his existence, by his own exertions, -and furnished him with the strongest motives as well as with almost -immeasurable means for diminishing the amount of evil for himself and -all the other beings within his reach? - -5. Another of the specific objections urged by Mr. Spencer against -the doctrine of special creations is so put that it is manifestly -directed against one of the positions assumed by the representatives -of the current theology. The learned philosopher begins this part of -his argument by imputing to those who assert this doctrine as their -reason for maintaining it, that it "honors the Unknown Cause of -things," and that they think any other doctrine amounts to an exclusion -of divine power from the world. To encounter this supposed reason for -maintaining the doctrine of special creations, he proceeds to ask -whether the divine power "would not have been still better demonstrated -by the separate creation of each individual than it is by the separate -creation of each species? Why should there exist this process of -natural generation? Why should not omnipotence have been proved by the -supernatural production of plants and animals everywhere throughout -the world from hour to hour? Is it replied that the Creator was able -to make individuals arise from one another in natural selection, but -not to make species thus arise? This is to assign a limit to power -instead of magnifying it. Is it replied that the occasional miraculous -origination of a species was practicable, but that the perpetual -miraculous origination of countless individuals was impracticable? This -also is a derogation. Either it was possible or not possible to create -species and individuals after the same general methods. To say that it -was not possible is suicidal in those who use this argument; and, if it -was possible, it is required to say what end is served by the special -creation of species that would not be better served by the special -creation of individuals?"[67] I must again disclaim any participation -in the views of those who contemplate this question with reference -to the manifestations of divine power by one method of its supposed -action or another, or who are influenced by the idea of honoring or -dishonoring the Creator. This is not a question of the mode in which -the Creator has chosen to manifest his power for the purpose of making -it more impressive in the eyes of his intelligent human creatures or -more palpable to their perceptions. Nor is it a question, excepting for -the theologian who begins to reason upon it from a peculiar point of -view, by what belief we best honor the Creator, or the power which Mr. -Spencer describes as the "Unknown Cause." In the eye of philosophic -reason, apart from all the religious dogmas that have been taught by -human interpretations of revelation, this is a question of the probable -mode in which the assumed omnipotent power has acted; and it is not a -question of how we can best honor or magnify that power by believing -that it has acted in one mode and not in another. We have to take, -first, the postulate of an infinitely powerful Creator, whose existence -is an independent inquiry, which we are to make out upon evidence that -satisfies the mind. The hypothesis of his existence and attributes -includes the power to create species and to establish the process of -natural generation for the continuation of each species, or the power -to make separate creations of each individual, as Mr. Spencer phrases -it, "from hour to hour." In either mode of action, the power was the -same. It is no derogation from it to suppose that the one or the other -mode was adopted. It is no augmentation of it to suppose that the one -was adopted instead of the other. It is simply a question of what -does the evidence show, to the reasonable satisfaction of the human -mind, to have been most probably the method that was chosen by a power -that could adopt any method whatever. If we find that the creation of -species and the establishment of the process of natural generation for -the multiplication of individuals is upon the whole sustained by a -predominating weight of evidence, it is safe to adopt the belief that -this hypothesis of the Almighty method is in accordance with the facts. -If the evidence fails to show that species have arisen from each other -in the same way that individuals have arisen from each other in natural -succession, we have no reason to conclude that such has been the fact. -On the other hand, if the evidence shows, by reasonably satisfactory -proofs, that a process has been established for the evolution of -distinct species out of other and different species, similar to -the process by which individuals arise from each other by natural -generation, it will be safe to conclude that such has been the fact. -Upon either hypothesis, the power of the Creator remains the same. - -Nor is it in any degree necessary to consider in what sense the one -method of action or the other was "miraculous," or that the one was an -occasional and the other a perpetual exercise of power. The special -creations of individuals from hour to hour would be just as miraculous -as the special creation of species, and it would be occasional, -although the occasions would be indefinite in number. The special -creation of species would be just as miraculous as the special creation -of individuals, but the occasional exercise of such a power would be -limited by the number of species, each of which would be a finality -in itself. The dilemma that is suggested by Mr. Spencer is a dilemma -only for those who think it necessary to mingle the idea of honoring -or dishonoring the Creator by one or another mode of interpreting his -works, with a question of his probable method of action. His method of -action is to be judged upon the evidence which a study of his works -discloses. - -6. Mr. Spencer, in summing up his objections to the doctrine of -special creations, has said that it not only "fails to satisfy men's -intellectual need of an interpretation," but that it also "fails to -satisfy their moral sentiment"; that "their moral sentiment is much -better satisfied by the doctrine of evolution, since that doctrine -raises no contradictory implications respecting the Unknown Cause, such -as are raised by the antagonist doctrine."[68] I have already suggested -what seems to me a sufficient answer to the supposed contradictory -implications respecting the goodness and power of the Almighty Creator. -But it is here worthy of the further inquiry, What has been the -influence upon the sacredness of human life, in human estimation, of -a belief in any other theory of man's origin, or of no belief on the -subject, compared with the effect of a belief in the doctrine that he -is a creature of an Almighty Creator, formed by an exercise of infinite -power for the enjoyment of greater happiness on earth than any other -creature, and therefore having a peculiarly sacred individual right to -the life that has been given to him? This, to be sure, does not afford -a direct test of the probable truth of the hypothesis respecting his -origin. But the answer to this inquiry will afford some test of the -claim upon our consideration that may be put forward for any other -hypothesis than the one that embraces the full idea of man's special -creation, even if we do not look beyond this world. Compare, then, the -civilization of the Romans at the period when it was at its highest -development (the age of Julius and Augustus Cæsar), when in many -respects it was a splendid civilization. Neither among the vulgar, -nor among the most cultivated; not among the most accomplished of the -statesmen or philosophers, was there any such belief as the simple -belief in the relation between Creator and creature, such as had been -held by a people who were regarded by the Romans as barbarians, in -respect to man and all the other animals; or such a belief as is now -held by the least educated peasant of modern Europe. One consequence -of the absence of this belief, or of the want of a vivid perception of -it, was that the highest persons in the Roman state, men possessed of -all the culture and refinement of their age, not only furnished for the -popular amusement combats of wild beasts of the most ferocious natures, -but they provided gladiatorial shows in which human beings, trained for -the purpose, were by each other "butchered to make a Roman holiday." -The statesmen who thus catered to the popular tastes, and never -thought of correcting them, subjected themselves to enormous expenses -for the purpose; and all that was noble and dignified and cultured of -both sexes, as well as the rabble, looked on with delight at the horrid -spectacle. But this was not all. The Roman law, in many ways a code -of admirable ethics, in utter disregard of the natural rights of men, -left the life of the slave within the absolute power of the master, -without any mitigation of the existing law of nations which made slaves -of the captive in war and his posterity. Compare all this with the -civilization of any modern country in which the life or liberty of -man can be taken away only by judicial process and public authority, -for actual crime; in which institutions exist for the relief of human -suffering and for the prevention of cruelty to the inferior creatures; -and then say whether the belief in special creations is not a doctrine -that has worked vast good in the world, and one that should not be -scouted because it is a "primitive belief." - -Again, compare the ages in modern Europe when statesmen and politicians -of the highest standing with entire impunity employed assassination for -political ends, with periods in the same countries when assassination -had come to be regarded not only with abhorrence, but as incapable of -justification for any end whatever, public or private, and then say -whether the world can lose its belief that man is a special creation of -God, without losing one of the strongest safeguards of human life that -can be derived from any belief on the subject. All these, and a great -many similar considerations, while they do not prove the hypothesis -of special creation, show strongly that, unlike some of the family of -beliefs with which it was associated in the darkest ages, this one -has worked no mischiefs; that, on the contrary, it has been producing -moral, social, and political benefits in all the ages in which it has -been most vividly present to the popular faith. The command, "Thou -shalt do no murder," from whatever source it came, whether it was -delivered to Moses on the mount of fire, or came from the teachings of -Nature and the dictates of social expediency, whether it is a divine or -a human law, or both, has unhappily been broken in all times, in all -lands, and in all conditions of civilization. It is broken still. But -it has never yet ceased, for its moral foundation and for the moral -sanction of all the methods which have aimed to enforce it, to rest -on the belief that man is peculiarly the child of God, whose life is -sacred beyond the life of all other creatures. Whether any other belief -of man's origin will afford an equally good foundation for that law, -is a question which modern scientific speculation may or may not be -able to answer. If its speculations conduct to the conclusion that the -"unknown cause" has not specially caused anything, has not established -any relation of Creator and creature, that is sufficiently special to -imply divine care for the creature, we know what the answer must be. -The theologian is not the only person who has occasion to examine the -doctrine of evolution; it must be examined by the statesman as well. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [57] "The Principles of Biology," by Herbert Spencer, vol. i, p. 334 - _et seq._ I use the American edition, D. Appleton & Co., 1881. - - [58] "Biology," i, p. 336. - - [59] "Biology," i, pp. 336, 337. - - [60] Webster's "Dictionary of the English Language." - - [61] Let it be remembered that the sense which is here considered - comprehends not only material objects, but also ideas, images, and - in short whatever, in its kind, had no previous existence. This is - just as true of an original poem, or picture, or statue, or musical - composition, as it is of a machine that is both original and new as a - piece of mechanism. - - [62] Perhaps I owe an apology to a large class of readers for having - bestowed so much attention upon the logical formula with which Mr. - Spencer aims to dispose of the idea of creation. But I have observed, - especially among young persons and others whose habits of thinking - are unformed or not corrected by sound and comprehensive reasoning, a - popular reception of this particular dogma, which makes it necessary - to subject it to some careful analysis. In fact, one of my chief - objects in writing this book has been to contribute what I might - to the formation of habits of testing philosophical and scientific - theories by something better than specious assumptions which can be - thrown into the plausible form of logical propositions. There is - nothing more valuable than logic, when its forms represent a true and - correct ratiocination; and, when they do not, there is nothing that is - more delusive. It needs some discipline of mind to enable people to - see when logic is valuable and when it is not. - - [63] "Biology," i, p. 340 _et seq._ - - [64] This is given almost _verbatim_ from Mr. Spencer's "Biology," i, - p. 340 _et seq._ - - [65] In treating of the existence of physical and moral evil, I do - not mean to include sin in the discussion. I mean now by moral evil - that loss or diminution of happiness, for the individual or a race, - which results from physical evil produced by causes for which the - sufferer is not responsible. The sin that is in the world is a matter - that is to be considered entirely with reference to the accountability - of man as a moral being; and the reasons which may be assigned for - its permission may be quite distinct from those which relate to the - existence of physical suffering for which man is not responsible upon - any rational theory of moral accountability. - - [66] "Biology," i, p. 354. - - [67] "Biology," i, p. 339. - - [68] "Biology," i, pp. 344, 355. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further -considered. - - -In the last preceding chapter, I have examined Mr. Spencer's chief -objection to the doctrine of special creations when considered in -its general aspects. I now advance to the general aspects of the -evolution hypothesis as applied by this philosopher to the animal -kingdom. I have already suggested the appropriate answer to the -claim that the derivation of the evolution hypothesis is favorable -because it has originated "among the most instructed class and in -these better-instructed times," and that the derivation of the other -hypothesis is unfavorable because "it originated in times of profound -ignorance." On this point it is unnecessary to say more. But there is -a supposed "kindred antithesis" between "the two families of beliefs" -to which these two hypotheses are said respectively to belong; one of -which families "has been dying out," while the other family "has been -multiplying." This brings into view the peculiar philosophical system -of Mr. Spencer, by which he maintains "the unity of Nature," or the -prevalence of a universal law of evolution, as the law which is to be -discerned in remote fields of inquiry, and which "will presently be -recognized as the law of the phenomena which we are here considering," -namely, the phenomena of animal life. "The discovery that evolution has -gone on, and is going on, in so many departments of Nature, becomes a -reason for believing that there is no department of Nature in which it -does not go on."[69] - -In considering this mode of generalization it is important to -distinguish between the phenomena that are observable in those -departments of Nature which include only dead or inanimate matter, and -the phenomena that are peculiar to matter organized into living beings. -Again: it is important to distinguish between phenomena which have been -influenced by human agencies and those which can not have been affected -by the power of man. Another distinction of the greatest consequence -is that which divides the phenomena in question according to their -relation to a moral purpose. In one class of phenomena, a moral purpose -may be plainly discovered as the purpose of an intelligent causing -power, which has chosen a particular means for the accomplishment -of an end. In another class of phenomena, a moral purpose may not -be discoverable as the end for which the existing arrangement of -things was specially designed, and to which that arrangement was an -indispensable means. By classifying the departments of Nature and -observing their phenomena with these discriminations, we shall be -able to judge of the value of Mr. Spencer's philosophical system when -applied to the animal kingdom. - -In grouping the departments and their respective phenomena as -departments in which the law of evolution has obtained, and in drawing -from them the sweeping deduction that there is no department in which -this law has not obtained as the _causa causans_, Mr. Spencer does not -appear to have made these necessary discriminations. He specifies the -following remote fields of inquiry, in which he maintains that this law -of evolution is now admitted to be the solution of the phenomena that -lie in those respective fields: First, the solar system, which, as he -asserts, astronomers now consider has been gradually evolved out of -diffused matter.[70] Second, geological discoveries, which show that -the earth has reached its present varied structure through a process of -evolution. Third, society, which has progressed through a corresponding -process of gradual development. "Constitutions are not made, but grow," -is said to be now a recognized truth among "philosophical politicians," -and a part of the more general truth that "societies are not made, but -grow." Fourth, languages, which, we are told, are now believed not -to have been artificially or supernaturally formed, but to have been -developed. Finally, the histories of religions, philosophy, science, -the fine arts, and the industrial arts, show, it is said, development -"through as unobtrusive changes as those which the mind of a child -passes on its way to maturity."[71] - -It is obvious that in some of these departments neither human agency -nor the human will and choice can have had any influence in producing -the phenomena, while in some of them human agency, will, and choice -have had a vast influence in making the phenomena what they are. That -political constitutions or social institutions are not made, but grow, -is a dogma that is by no means universally true, however wise it may -sound, or with whatever confidence in a paradox it may be asserted by -"some political philosophers." While past events and present exigencies -may have largely shaped some political constitutions, we know that -others have been deliberately modified by a choice that has had more -or less of a free scope, and that sometimes this has amounted to an -arbitrary decision. Languages may or may not have been a direct and -supernatural gift from Heaven, but we know that their structure has -been powerfully influenced by human agencies, when they have come -to be written expressions of thought; for they have then received -expansion by the actual coinage of new words, as well as by new -meanings of old words; and even when they were in the first stages -of a spoken tongue, inflections that were purely arbitrary have been -introduced. So it has been with systems of religion, philosophy, the -fine arts, the mechanic arts, legislation, and jurisprudence. While -in all these departments changes have been going on, which upon a -superficial view appear to indicate a kind of spontaneous development, -when they are analyzed they are seen to have been wholly caused, or -more or less influenced, by the genius, the thought, the discoveries, -the exertions, and the acts of particular individuals who have had the -force to impress themselves upon the age, and thus to make new systems, -new beliefs, new products, new rules of social or political life, new -tastes, and new habits of thinking and acting. - -Again: in some of the various orders of phenomena which are found in -these different departments, there is discernible a distinct moral -purpose in the shape which they have been made to assume, and in -others of them there is no moral purpose discoverable, which we can -say required the employment of the particular means to effect the -end. Thus, astronomers can not assign a moral purpose for which the -distribution of the fixed stars was made to be what it is, and which -purpose could not have been answered by some other arrangement. At -the same time, it is easy to see that the solar system was arranged -with reference to the law of universal gravitation, which made this -arrangement of the different bodies essential to the harmonious working -of a great and complex piece of mechanism. The present formation of -the earth may have resulted just as geologists think it has, and yet -they can not say that there was no moral purpose in the division of the -exterior surface of our globe into land and water, seas, continents, -mountains, etc. These are departments of Nature in which man has had no -influence in producing the phenomena. When we turn to those departments -in which man is placed as an actor, we often find an adjustment of -means to an end that is so comprehensive, as well as so plain, that -we may justly conclude it to have been chosen by the creating power, -with the express intent that human agency should be the means by which -certain effects are to be produced. For example: man is eminently -a social animal. Human society is a result of his strong social -propensities. He is placed in it as an actor; and in this arrangement -there is discoverable a moral purpose so plain that we may rightfully -regard the social phenomena of mutual protection and improvement -as proofs that society was ordained as the sphere of man's highest -development on earth. - -So that, in reasoning about the phenomena of any of the departments -of Nature as affording indications of the so-called universal law -of evolution, we must not forget the distinction between organized -inanimate and organized animated matter; or the distinction between -those departments in which human will or choice, or the human -intellect, has had no influence in shaping the phenomena, and those -in which they have had great influence; or the distinction between -phenomena in which a special moral purpose can be and those in which -it can not be discovered, as the reason for the existing order of -things. It is especially hazardous to argue that because a spontaneous -development, or a gradual evolution, can be traced in some of the -phenomena of inanimate matter, it therefore must obtain in the animal -kingdom. It is alike hazardous to argue, because there has been what -is called evolution in some departments of Nature over which man has -had no control, that the same law obtains in other departments over -which he has also had no control, or those in which he has had a large -control. - -The bearing of these discriminations upon the supposed universality -of the law of evolution may now be seen if we attend to the further -inquiry whether that law obtains throughout all the phenomena of -any one department of Nature as the sole cause of the phenomena in -that department. Take again, for example, the solar system. Suppose -it to be true that the bodies which compose it, the sun and the -planetary spheres, were gradually evolved out of diffused matter. Does -it necessarily follow that their existing arrangements and mutual -relations were not specially designed? That their orbits, their -revolutions, their distances from each other, were not specially -planned? That they were not hung in their respective positions with -an intentional adjustment to the great force of gravitation that was -prevailing throughout the universe? Must we suppose that all this part -of the whole phenomena of the solar system resulted from the operation -of an ungoverned evolution, because the bodies themselves may have been -gradually formed out of diffused matter into their present condition -without being spoken at once into that condition by the fiat of the -Almighty? We can certainly see that the existing arrangements must have -been intentional; and, if intentional, the intention must have taken -effect in the production of the phenomena exhibited by the arrangement, -as any design takes effect in the production of the phenomena which -are open to our observation. The moral purpose evinced by one part of -this arrangement, the alternation of day and night upon the earth, -for example, might have been effected by some other means than the -means which now produce it. But there is the strongest evidence that -a certain means was chosen and intentionally put into operation; and -although we can not tell why that means was preferred, the fact that it -was both designed and preferred makes it a special creation. To suppose -that it was left to be worked out by a process such as the hypothesis -of evolution assumes, by the gradual, fortuitous, and ungoverned -operation of infinitely slow-moving causes, which might have made the -adjustments very different from what they are, is to deprive it of the -element of intentional preference that is proved by its existence. -The hypothesis of evolution, when applied to all the phenomena of the -solar system, relegates one great branch of those phenomena to a realm -from which all special purposes and all direct design are absent, and -confines the explanation of the phenomena to the operation of causes -that might have brought about very different arrangements. That this -supposed process of evolution has, in fact, been followed by the -existing arrangements of the solar system, does not prove, or tend to -prove, that the existing arrangements are solely due to the supposed -method of their production; for we can not leave out the element of -some design, and if there was a design, the very nature of the system -required that the design should be executed by a special creation of a -plan for the mutual relations of the bodies composing it. The bodies -themselves might have been gradually formed out of diffused matter, -floating loosely in the realms of space. The relations of the bodies -to each other required the act of an intelligent will, in the direct -formation of an intentional plan; and that act was an act of special -creation in the same sense in which the structural plan of a species of -animal was a special creation. - -Here, then, is one department of Nature in which it is not necessary -and not philosophical to assume that the law of so-called evolution has -been the universal law to which all the phenomena of that department -are to be attributed. If we follow out the same inquiry in other -departments of Nature remote from the animal kingdom, we shall find -reason to adopt the same conclusion in respect to their phenomena. -Thus, let us for a moment contemplate another of the departments -in which inanimate matter is the subject of observation, and in -which human will or intelligence has had no agency in producing the -phenomena, namely, the formation of the present structure of the -earth as it is described by geologists. This is a department in which -the hypothesis of evolution finds perhaps its stronghold. Yet it is -necessary even here to recognize an intentional plan and direct design -in some part of the phenomena. Let us suppose that during the period -required by any of the speculations of geologists, however long, a -mass of matter was gathered in an unformed condition, and gradually -shaped into the present condition of the earth by the action of its -constituent elements upon each other, influenced by the laws of -mechanical forces, of chemical combinations, of light and heat, and -of whatever physical agencies were made to operate in the process of -evolving the mass into the condition in which it has been known to us -for a certain time. Is it a rational conclusion that the intelligent -power which put these forces in operation--an hypothesis with which we -must begin to reason, or leave the origin of both matter and forces to -blind chance--did not guide their operation at all to the intentional -production of the results which we see? The results disclose some -manifest purposes; and although these purposes, or others equally -beneficent, might have been accomplished by different arrangements, -we can see that they have been effected by a certain arrangement of a -specific character. The results have been continents, seas, mountains, -rivers, lakes, formation and distribution of minerals, growth of -forests, and an almost innumerable, and certainly a very varied, -catalogue of phenomena, physical formations, and adaptations. All these -varied results disclose a plan by which this earth became a marvelously -convenient abode for the living creatures that have inhabited or still -inhabit it, especially for man. The formation of this plan was an -intelligent act, if we suppose that any intelligent being projected -the original gathering of the crude primordial matter and subjected it -to the operation of the forces employed to shape it into its present -condition. This plan was an act of special creation, in the same -sense in which the plan of a particular animal organism may have been -a special creation. While, therefore, a process which may be called -evolution may have operated as the agency through which the earth has -reached its present physical condition, the plan of that condition was -certainly not formed by any such process; for it was, if it was the -product of anything, the product of an intelligent will operating in -the production of preconceived results by the exercise of superhuman -and infinite wisdom and foresight. - -When we turn to a department in which human influence has largely -or wholly shaped the phenomena, we find numerous special creations -that are not attributable to the operation of any law of development -or evolution such as is supposed to have led to the production of -one species of animal out of another, or out of several previous -species. In short, a survey of all the departments of Nature leads to -the conclusion that while there may be phenomena which are properly -traceable to the operation of the forces of Nature, or to fixed -general systems of production, there is another very large class -of the phenomena which owe their existence to special acts of an -intelligent will, finite or infinite, human or divine, according as -their production required superhuman power or admitted of the efficacy -of man's intervention. - -The way is now somewhat cleared for an examination of Mr. Spencer's -application of the law of evolution to the gradual formation of -different species of animals out of one or more previous species, -without any act of special creation intervening anywhere in the series. -We have seen that this alleged law is not of universal force as the -cause of all the phenomena in all the departments of Nature. When -we come to apply it as the hypothesis which is to account for the -existence of different species of animals of very different types, we -must remember that we are dealing with organisms endowed with life, -and, although we can not sufficiently explain what life is, we know -that animated organisms are brought into being by systems of production -that are widely different from the modes in which inanimate matter -may have been or has been made to assume its existing forms. Bearing -this in mind, we come to the arguments and proofs by which Mr. Spencer -maintains the immense superiority of the evolution hypothesis over -that of special creations, in reference to the animal kingdom. It must -be remembered that this is a department in which man can have had no -agency in producing the phenomena, for whatever may have been the -slight variations produced by human interference with the breeding of -animals domesticated from their wild condition, we must investigate the -origin of species as if there had never been any human intervention -in the crossing of breeds, because that origin is to be looked for in -a sphere entirely removed from all human interference. Man himself is -included in the investigation, and we must make that investigation in -reference to a time when he did not exist, or when he did not exist as -we now know him. - -One of the favorite methods of Mr. Spencer consists in arraying -difficulties for the believers in special creations, which, he argues, -can not be encountered by their hypothesis, and then arguing that there -are no difficulties in the way of the hypothesis of evolution. His -position shall be stated with all the strength that he gives to it, -and with all the care that I can bestow upon its treatment. He puts -the argument thus: In the animal kingdom individuals come into being -by a process of generation--that is to say, they arise out of other -individuals of the same species. If we contemplate the individuals -of any species, we find an evolution repeated in every one of them by -a uniform process of development, which, in a short space of time, -produces a series of astonishing changes. The seed becomes a tree, -and the tree differs from the seed immeasurably in bulk, structure, -color, form, specific gravity, and chemical composition; so that -no visible resemblance can be pointed out between them. The small, -semi-transparent gelatinous spherule constituting the human ovum -becomes the newly-born child; and this human infant "is so complex in -its structure that a cyclopædia is needed to describe its constituent -parts. The germinal vesicle is so simple that it may be defined in a -line. Nevertheless, a few months suffice to develop the one out of -the other, and that, too, by a series of modifications so small that -were the embryo examined, at successive minutes, even a microscope -would with difficulty disclose any sensible changes. Aided by such -facts, the conception of general evolution may be rendered as definite -a conception as any of our complex conceptions can be rendered. If, -instead of the successive minutes of a child's fœtal life, we take -successive generations of creatures, if we regard the successive -generations as differing from each other no more than the fœtus did in -successive minutes, our imaginations must indeed be feeble if we fail -to realize in thought the evolution of the most complex organism out of -the simplest. If a single cell, under appropriate conditions, becomes -a man in the space of a few years, there can surely be no difficulty -in understanding how, under appropriate conditions, a cell may, in the -course of untold millions of years, give origin to the human race."[72] - -Here, then, we have a comparison between what takes place in the -development of the individual animal in the space of a few years, -and what may be supposed to take place in the successive generations -of different creatures through untold millions of years. We turn -then to the proof, direct or indirect, that races of entirely -distinct organisms have resulted from antecedent races by gradual -transformation. Direct proof sufficient to establish the progressive -modifications of antecedent races into other races is not claimed to -exist; yet it is claimed that there are numerous facts of the order -required by the hypothesis which warrant our acceptance of it. These -facts are the alterations of structure which take place in successive -generations of the same species, amounting, in the course of several -generations of the same race, to additions and suppressions of parts. -These changes among the individuals of the same race, comprehended in -what is scientifically called "heredity" and "variation," are exhibited -by the transmission of ancestral peculiarities of structure, by their -occasional suppression in some individuals of the race and their -reappearance in others, and by a difference in the relative sizes of -parts. These variations, arising in successive short intervals of time, -are said to be quite as marked as those which arise in a developing -embryo, and, in fact, they are said to be often much more marked. "The -structural modifications proved to have taken place since organisms -have been observed is not less than the hypothesis demands--bears as -great a ratio to this brief period as the total amount of structural -change seen in the evolution of a complex organism out of a simple germ -bears to the vast period during which living forms have existed on -earth."[73] - -The difficulty that is thus prepared for the hypothesis of the special -creation of species may now be stated. There is a professed conception -of the ultimate power which is manifested to us through phenomena. -That conception implies omnipotence and omniscience, and it therefore -implies regularity of method, because uniformity of method is a mark -of strength, whereas irregularity of method is a mark of weakness. "A -persistent process, adapted to all contingencies, implies greater skill -in the achievement of an end than its achievement by the process of -meeting the contingencies as they severally arise." And, therefore, -those who adopt the notion of the special creation of species do, it -is said, in truth impair the professed character of the power to which -they assume that the phenomena of the existence of species are to be -referred, whereas the hypothesis of the evolution of species out of -other species is much more consistent with the professed conception of -the ultimate power. - -In this claim of superiority for the evolution hypothesis, the learned -philosopher seems to have been almost oblivious of the fact that he was -dealing with animal organisms in two aspects: first, in regard to the -method by which individuals of the same species come into existence; -and, secondly, in regard to the method by which different species have -come into existence. In the first case, regularity of method is evinced -by the establishment of a uniform process of procreation and gestation. -This process, while retaining throughout the different classes of -animals one fundamental and characteristic method, namely, the union -of the sexes, is widely varied in respect to the time of gestation, -the fœtal development, and the nourishment of the young before and -after birth. There is no difficulty whatever in discovering the great -reason for which this system of the reproduction of individuals was -established. The tie that it makes between parents and offspring, and -more especially the tie between the female parent and the offspring, -was obviously one grand end for which this system of giving existence -to individuals was adopted; and although the instinct which arises -out of it is in some species feeble and almost inactive, it rises -higher and higher in its power and its manifestations in proportion -as the animals rise in the scale of being, until in man it exhibits -its greatest force and its most various effects, producing at last -pride of ancestry, and affecting in various ways the social and even -the political condition of mankind. But how can any corresponding -connection between one race of animals and another, or between -antecedent and subsequent species, be imagined? The sexual impulse -implanted in animals leads to the production of offspring of the same -race. The desire for offspring keeps up the perpetual succession of -individuals, and love of the offspring insures the protection of the -newly born by the most powerful of impulses. But what can be imagined -as an analogous impulse, appetite, or propensity which should lead one -species to strive after the production of another species? Is it said -that the different species are evolved out of one another by a process -in which the conscious desires, the efforts, the aspirations of the -preceding races play no part? This is certainly true, if there was -ever any such process as the evolution of species out of species; and -it follows that, in respect to one great moral purpose of a process, -there is no analogy to be derived from the regularity and uniformity of -the process by which individuals of the same species are multiplied. -Moreover, in regard to the latter process, we know that a barrier has -been set to its operation; for Nature does not now admit of the sexual -union between animals of entirely distinct species, and we have no -reason to believe that it ever did admit of it at any period in the -geological history of the earth. - -Still further: In what sense are special creations "irregularities -of method"? In what sense are they "contingencies"? And if they are -"contingencies," how does it imply less skill to suppose that they -have been met as they have severally arisen, than would be implied by -supposing that they have been achieved by a uniform process adapted -to all contingencies? This notion that something is derogated from -the idea of omnipotence and omniscience by the hypothesis that such -a power has acted by special exercises of its creating faculty in -the production of different orders of beings as completed and final -types, instead of allowing or causing them to be successively evolved -out of each other by gradual derivations, is neither logical nor -philosophical. In no proper sense is a method of action an irregular -method unless it was imposed upon the actor by some antecedent -necessity, which compelled him to apply a method which was made uniform -in one case to another case in which the same kind of uniformity -would not be indispensable. The uniformity of the process by which -individuals of the same species are multiplied is a uniformity for that -particular end. The regularity in that case is a regularity that has -its special objects to accomplish. The uniformity and regularity of -a different method of causing different types of organisms to exist, -so long as the object is always effected in the same way, is just as -truly a regularity and uniformity for that case, and just as completely -fulfills the idea of infinite skill. That such creations are specially -made, that they are independently made, and that each is made for a -distinct purpose and also for the complex purposes of a varied class -of organisms, does not render them contingencies arising at random, or -make the method of meeting them an occasional, irregular, spasmodic -device for encountering something unforeseen and unexpected. The very -purposes for which the distinct organisms exist--purposes that are -apparent on a comprehensive survey of their various structures and -modes of life--and the fact that they have come into existence by some -process that was for the production of the ends a uniform and regular -one, whether that process was special creation or evolution, render the -two methods of action equally consistent with the professed conception -of the ultimate power. On the hypothesis of special creations so many -different types of organism as the Creator has seen fit to create have -been made by the exercise of a power remaining uniformly of the same -infinite nature, but varying the products at will for the purposes of -infinite wisdom. - -What, again, does the learned author mean by meeting "contingencies" -"as they have severally arisen"? This suggestion of a difficulty for -the believers in special creations seems to imply that the distinct -types of animal organisms arose somehow as necessities outside of the -divine will, and that the Almighty artificer had to devise occasional -methods of meeting successive demands which he did not create. The -hypothesis of special creations does not drive its believers into any -such implications. The several distinct types of animal organisms are -supposed to have arisen in the divine mind as types which the Almighty -saw fit to create for certain purposes, and to have been severally -fashioned as types by his infinite power. They are in no sense -"contingencies" which he had to meet as occasions arising outside of -his infinite will. A human artificer has conceived and executed upon a -novel plan a machine that is distinguishable from all other machines. -He did not create the demand for that machine; the demand has grown -out of the wants of society; and the artificer has met the demand by -his genius and his mechanical skill, which have effected a marked -improvement in the condition of society. In one sense, therefore, he -has met a "contingency," because he has met a demand. But the infinite -Creator, upon the hypothesis of his existence and attributes, does not -meet an external demand; there is no demand upon him; he creates the -occasion; he makes the different organisms to effectuate the infinite -purposes which he also creates; the want and the means of satisfying -the want alike arise in the infinite wisdom and will. Such is the -hypothesis. We may now, therefore, pursue in some further detail the -argument which maintains that this hypothesis is of far inferior -strength to that of evolution, as the method in which the Almighty -power has acted in the production of different animal organisms. - -First we have the analogy that is supposed to be afforded by what takes -place in the development of a single cell into a man in the space of -a few years, and an alleged correspondence of development by which -a single cell, in the course of untold millions of years, has given -origin to the human race. Granting any difference of time which this -comparison calls for, and substituting in place of the successive -moments or years of an individual life, from the formation of the -ovum to the fully developed animal, the successive generations of any -imaginable series of animals, the question is not merely what we can -definitely conceive, or how successfully we can construct a theory. -It is whether the supposed analogy will hold; whether we can find -that in the two cases development takes place in the same way or in -a way that is so nearly alike in the two cases as to warrant us in -reasoning from the one to the other. In the case of the development of -the single cell into the mature animal, although we can not, either -before or after birth, detect the changes that are taking place from -minute to minute, the infinitesimal accretions or losses, we know that -there is a perpetual and unbroken connection of life maintained from -the moment when the fœtus is formed to the moment when the mature -animal stands before us. Break this connection anywhere in the process -of development, and life is destroyed; the development is at once -arrested. It is this connection that constitutes, as I presume, what -the learned author calls the "appropriate conditions," in the case of -the production of the individual animal; it is, at all events, the one -grand and indispensable condition to the development of the cell into -the fœtus, of the fœtus into the newly born child, and of the child -into the man. Now, if we are to reason from this case of individual -development to the other case of successive generations of creatures -differing from each other in the same or any other ratio in which -the perfect man differs from the ovum, the fœtus, or the newly born -child, which are all successive stages of one and the same individual -life, we ought to find in the successive generations of the different -creatures some bond of connection, some continuity of lives with lives, -some perpetuation from one organism to another, that will constitute -the "appropriate conditions" for a corresponding development from a -single cell through the successive types of animal life into the human -race. Without such connection, continuity, perpetuation from organism -to organism, shown by some satisfactory proof, we have nothing but a -theory, and a theory that is destitute of the grand conditions that -will alone support the analogy between the two cases. If anywhere in -the supposed chain of successive generations of different animals the -continuity of animal and animal is broken, the hypothesis of special -creations of new organisms must come in: for we must remember that -we are reasoning about animal life, and if the continuity of lives -with one another is interrupted, the series terminates, just as the -series between the ovum, the fœtus, the child, and the man terminates, -at whatever stage it is interrupted by a cause that destroys the -mysterious principle of life. It is therefore absolutely necessary to -look for some proof which will show that in the supposed series of -successive generations of animals out of antecedent types, by whatever -gradations and in whatever space of time we may suppose the process -of evolution to have been worked, there has been a continuity of life -between the different types, a perpetuation of organism from organism, -a connection of lives with lives. - -We now come to another supposed analogy, on which great stress is laid -by the evolution school, and especially by Mr. Spencer. Individuals -of the same family are found to be marked by striking peculiarities -of structure, ancestral traits, which appear and disappear and then -appear again, in successive generations. This is obviously a case where -the "appropriate conditions" are all comprehended in the connection -of life with life. When we trace the pedigree of a single man or any -other individual animal back to a remote pair of ancestors, we connect -together in an unbroken chain the successive generations of parents -and offspring. If the chain is anywhere broken, so that direct descent -can not be traced throughout the series, we can not by direct evidence -carry the peculiarities of family traits any further back than the -ancestor or pair of ancestors with which we can find an unbroken -connection of life with life. We do indeed often say in common parlance -that an individual must have a trace of a certain blood in his veins, -because of certain peculiarities of structure, complexion, or other -tokens of descent, even when we can not find a perfect pedigree -which would show where the infusion of the supposed blood came in. -But although it might be allowable, in making out the descent of an -individual man or any other animal, from a certain ancestor or pair of -ancestors, to aid the pedigree by strong family or race resemblance, -even when a link is wanting, it could only be for the purpose of -establishing a pedigree, a connection of lives with lives, that such -collateral evidence could be resorted to. If by direct proof of an -unbroken descent a full pedigree is made out, or if, when some link is -wanting, the collateral proof from strong family or race resemblances -is sufficient to warrant the belief that the link once existed, we -might accept it as a fact that the individual descended from the -supposed ancestors in a direct line, or that some peculiarity of blood -came into his constitution at some point in the descent of individuals -from individuals.[74] - -Can we apply this mode of reasoning to the evolution of distinct types -of animals out of antecedent and different types? The very nature of -the descent or derivation that is to be satisfactorily established -requires a connection of lives with lives, just as such a connection is -required in making out the pedigree of an individual animal. We must -construct a pedigree for the different classes or types of animals -through which, by direct or collateral evidence, we can connect the -different organisms together, so as to warrant the belief that by -the ordinary process of generation these animals of widely different -organizations have been successfully developed out of each other, life -from life, organisms from organisms. The hypothesis is, that from a -single cell all the various races and types of animals have in process -of time been gradually formed out of each other, through an ascending -scale, until we reach the human race, whose race pedigree consists of a -series of imperceptible formations, back to the single cell from which -the whole series proceeded. This, we must remember, is not a case of -the evolving production of different forms of inanimate matter, but it -is the case of the evolving production of different forms of animal -life out of other preceding and different forms, by the process of -animal generation. - -Of direct evidence of this evolution of species, it can not be said -that we have any which will make it a parallel case with the direct -evidence of the descent of an individual from parents and other -ancestors. We have different animal organisms that are marked by -distinctions which compel us to regard them as separate species, and -there is no known instance in which we can directly trace a production -of one of these distinct species out of another or others by finding -a connection of lives with lives. Even in the vegetable kingdom, with -all the crosses for which Nature has made such wonderful and various -provision, we do not find such occurrences as the production of an oak -out of the seed of an apple, or the production of an orange-tree out of -an acorn. We do not gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles. There -are barriers set to miscegenation even in the vegetable world, and we -have no direct evidence that at any period in the geological history of -the earth these barriers have been crossed, and very little indirect -evidence to warrant us in believing that they ever have been or ever -will be. In the animal kingdom such barriers are extremely prominent -and certain. We not only have no direct evidence that any one species -of animal was at any period of the earth's history or in any length of -time gradually evolved out of another distinct species, but we know -that the union of the sexes and the production of new individuals can -not take place out of certain limits; that, while Nature will permit -of the crossing of different breeds of the same animal, and so will -admit of very limited variations of structure, she will not admit of -the sexual union of different species, so as to produce individuals -having a union of the different organisms, or a resultant of a third -organism of a different type from any that had preceded it. Is it, for -example, from mere taste or moral feeling that such occurrences as the -sexual union between man and beast have not been known to have produced -a third and different animal? We know that it is because the Almighty -has "fixed his canon" against such a union in the case of man and in -the cases of all the other distinct animal organisms; and to find this -canon we do not need to go to Scripture or revelation, although we may -find it there also. - -We are remitted, therefore, to indirect evidence, and in considering -this evidence we have to note that we have nothing but an imaginary -pedigree, or one hypothetically constructed, to which to apply it. In -tracing the pedigree of an individual animal, we have a certain number -of known connections of life with life; and where it becomes necessary -to bridge over a break in the connection so as to carry the line back -to an earlier ancestor, we may perhaps apply the collateral evidence -of family or race resemblance to assist in making the connection with -that particular ancestor a reasonably safe deduction. But in the case -of the hypothetical pedigree which supposes the human race to have been -evolved from a single cell through successive organisms rising higher -and higher in the scale of being, we have no known connections of lives -with lives to which to apply the collateral proofs. The collateral -proofs are not auxiliary evidence; they are the sole evidence; and -unless they are such as to exclude every other reasonable explanation -of the phenomena which they exhibit excepting that of the supposed -evolution, they can not be said to satisfy the rules of rational belief -in the hypothesis to which we apply them. - -What, then, is the indirect and collateral evidence? It consists, as -we have already seen, of two principal classes of phenomena: first, -resemblances of fœtal development which are found on comparing the -fœtal growth of different species of animals; second, resemblances in -the structure of different species of animals after birth and maturity. -These various resemblances are supposed to constitute proof of descent -from a common stock, which may be carried back in the series as far as -the resemblance can be carried, at whatever point that may be. Thus, -in comparing all the vertebrata, we find certain marked peculiarities -of structure common to the whole class: the deduction is, that all the -vertebrate animals came from a common stock. In comparing all the -mammalia, we find certain marked peculiarities of structure common -to the whole class: the deduction is that all the mammalia came from -a common stock. Going still further back in the supposed series, we -come to the amphibians, as the supposed common stock from which the -vertebrate and mammalian land animals were derived; and, comparing the -different classes of the amphibians, we find certain resemblances which -point to the fish inhabitants of the water as their common stock; and -then we trace the more highly organized fishes through the more lowly -organized back to the aquatic worm, which may itself be supposed to -have been developed out of a single cell.[75] - -The resemblances of structure, wherever we make the comparison -between different species, are referable to an ideal plan of animal -construction, followed throughout a class of animals, and adjusted to -their peculiar differences which distinguish one species from another, -just as in the vegetable world there is an ideal plan of construction -of trees followed throughout a class of plants, and adjusted to the -peculiar differences which distinguish one kind of tree from another. -As between man and the monkey, or between man and the horse, or the -seal, or the bat, or the bird, there are certain resemblances in the -structure of the skeleton, which indicate an identity of plan, although -varied in its adjustments to the distinguishing structure of each -separate species of animal. In a former chapter, I have shown why the -adoption of an ideal plan of a general character is consistent with -what I have called the "economy of Nature" in the special creation of -different species. On a careful revision of the subject, I can see -no reason to change the expression, or to modify the idea which it -was intended to convey, and which I will here repeat. It is entirely -consistent with the conception of an infinite and all-wise creating -power, to suppose that in the formation of a large class of organisms, -all the constructive power that was needed for the formation of a -general plan was exercised throughout the class, and that there was -super added the exercise of all the power of variation that was needful -to produce distinct species. Repetition of the same general plan of -construction is certainly no mark of inferiority of original power, -if accompanied by adaptations to new and further conditions. It is -a proof that in one direction all the necessary power was used, and -no more, and that in producing the distinct organisms the necessary -amount of further power was also used. If we follow the resemblances of -structure that may be traced through all the animals of a varied class, -we shall find that they may be referred, as a rational and consistent -hypothesis, to this method of giving to each animal its characteristic -formation. If this is a rational hypothesis, it is so because it is -consistent with all the observable phenomena; and consequently, the -opposite hypothesis that all these phenomena of resemblances and -differences are due to the law of evolution does not exclude every -other explanation of their existence. - -To apply this now to one of the comparisons on which great stress -is laid--the comparison between the brain of man and that of the -ape. Two questions arise in this comparison: 1. Do the resemblances -necessarily show that these two animals came from a common stock? 2. -Do the resemblances necessarily show that man was descended from some -ape through intermediate animals by gradual transformations? And, when -I ask whether the comparison necessarily leads to these conclusions, -I mean to ask whether the resemblances point so strongly to the -conclusions that they must rationally be held to exclude every other -hypothesis. - -Prof. Huxley furnished to Mr. Darwin a very learned note, in which he -stated the results of all that is now known concerning the resemblances -and differences in the structure and the development of the brain in -man and the apes. The differences may be laid aside in the present -discussion, because it is not necessary, for my present purpose, to -found anything upon them. But the resemblances, just as they are stated -by the eminent anatomist, without regard to controverted details, -are the important facts to be considered. The substance of the whole -comparison is that the cerebral hemispheres in man and the higher apes -are disposed after the very same pattern in him as in them; that every -principal "gyrus" and "sulcus" of a chimpanzee's brain is clearly -represented in that of a man, so that the terminology which applies -to one answers for the other; that there is no dispute as to the -resemblance in fundamental character between the ape's brain and man's; -and that even the details of the arrangement of the "gyri" and "sulci" -of the cerebral hemispheres present a wonderfully close similarity -between the chimpanzee, orang, and man.[76] These are said to be -the result of a comparison of the adult brain of man and the higher -apes; and, although it is claimed by some anatomists that there are -fundamental differences in the mode of their development which point -to a difference of origin, this is denied by Huxley, who maintains -that there is a fundamental agreement in the development of the brain -in man and apes. His views of the facts for the purpose of the present -inquiry may be accepted without controversy, not only because he is an -authority whose statements of facts I am not disposed to dispute, but -because it is not necessary to dispute them. What, then, do they show? - -They show that there are animals known as apes and animals known as -men, whose brains are found to be fundamentally constructed upon the -same general plan, with strong resemblances throughout the different -parts of the organ; and the first question is, Do these resemblances -show that the two animals came from a common stock? Upon the theory -that man has resulted from the gradual modifications of the same form -as that from which the apes have sprung, the resemblances in the -structure of their respective brains are claimed as having a tendency -to show that there was an animal which preceded both of them, and which -was their common ancestor, in the same sense in which an individual -progenitor was the common ancestor of two other individuals, whether -one of these two individuals was or was not descended from the other in -a direct line. On the other hand, upon the hypothesis of the special -creation of the ape as one animal, and the special creation of man as -another animal, there was no common stock from which the two animals -have been derived, and the resemblances of their brains point to the -adoption of a general plan of construction for that organ, or its -construction upon the same model, and the adaptation of that model to -the other parts of the structure, and the purposes of the existence of -each of the two animals. Without again repeating the argument which -shows that the latter hypothesis is perfectly consistent with the -professed conception of the infinite power, I will now inquire whether, -on the former hypothesis, we have anything to which we can apply the -evidence of resemblance as a collateral aid in reaching the conclusion -that these two animals were derived from a common progenitor, or from -some antecedent animal whose brain and other parts of the structure -became modified into theirs by numerous intermediate gradations. - -Between the higher apes, or between any of the apes and any known -antecedent and different animal, no naturalist has discovered the -intermediate link or links. Darwin supposes that there was some -one extremely ancient progenitor from which proceeded the two main -divisions of the _Simiadæ_--namely, the Catarrhine and Platyrhine -monkeys, with their sub-groups. This extremely ancient progenitor is -nothing but a scientific hypothesis; or, to use a legal phrase, it -had nothing but a constructive existence. It is necessary to believe -in the principle of evolution, in order to work out the hypothesis -of this creature from which the two great stems of the _Simiadæ_ are -supposed to have proceeded. Here, then, we have the case of a pedigree -or succession of animal races, the _propositum_ of which has no known -existence. Next we have two known divisions of the _Simiadæ_, or -monkeys; but, between them and their imaginary common progenitor, we -have no known intermediate animals constituting the gradations of -structure from the progenitor to the descendants. The whole chain has -to be made out by tracing resemblances among the animals of a certain -class that are known, then applying these resemblances to the supposed -divergencies from the structure of a supposed progenitor, and then -drawing the conclusion that there was such a progenitor. It may be -submitted to the common sense of mankind, whether this is a state of -facts which will warrant scientists or philosophers in using toward -those who do not accept their theory quite so much of the _de haut en -bas_ style of remark as we find in the writings of Mr. Spencer.[77] -If the researches of geologists had ever discovered any remains of -an animal that would fulfill the requirements, and thus stand as the -progenitor of the _Simiadæ_. By the case would correspond to that of a -known individual from whom we undertake to trace the descent of another -individual through many intermediates; and in such a case strong family -resemblances of various kinds might possibly afford some aid in making -out the pedigree as a reliable conclusion. But there is no means of -connecting the Old World and the New World apes with any but an unknown -and imaginary, progenitor. Darwin himself frankly tells us that "the -early progenitor of the whole Simian stock, including man," is an -undiscovered animal, which may not have been identical with, or may not -even have closely resembled, any existing ape or monkey.[78] - -Passing from the supposed common progenitor to the resemblances -between the brain of the higher apes and the brain of man, we come to -the question whether these resemblances show that man was descended -from any of the Simian stock through intermediate animals by gradual -transformation. Here the case is in one respect different; for the -animals that are to be compared are known, and their respective brains -have been subjected to close anatomical scrutiny. This part of the -process of evolution begins from one true species, the ape, and ends -in another true species, the man. We are unable to trace the man and -the ape to a common progenitor race; but we find the ape possessed of -a brain which strongly resembles man's. I have searched diligently in -the writings of naturalists for a sound reason which ought rationally -to exclude the hypothesis that the brain of the ape was formed upon -the same ideal plan as the brain of man, each animal being a distinct -species and separately created. Anatomical comparison of the two -brains shows that, whether they were separately planned upon the same -general model, or the one was derived from the other by a process of -gradual transformation through successive intermediate animals, the -resemblances are consistent with either hypothesis. We are remitted, -therefore, to an inquiry for the evidence which will establish the -existence of a race or races of animals through whom there descended -to man the peculiar structure of brain found in one of the classes of -apes--namely, the Catarrhine or Old World monkeys. If such intermediate -races could be found, their existence at any period anterior to the -period of man's appearance on earth would have some tendency to -show that man was descended from one of the families of apes, and -this tendency would become stronger in proportion to the number of -successive links in the family chain that could be made out. But not -one of these links is known to have existed. There is an assumption -that man, "from a genealogical point of view, belongs to the Catarrhine -or Old World stock" of monkeys; and this assumption is claimed to be -supported by the fact that the character of his brain is fundamentally -the same as theirs. - -A brain is an organ which, upon the hypothesis of an independent -creation of distinct species of animals, would be expected to be found -in very numerous species, although they might differ widely from -each other. In all the vertebrate animals this organ is the one from -which, by its connection with the spinal chord, the central portion -of the nervous system, that system descends through the arches of -the vertebræ, and thence radiates to the various other organs of -the body. The brain is the central seat of sensation, to which are -transmitted, along certain nerves, the impressions produced upon or -arising in the other organs; and it is the source from which voluntary -activity is transmitted along other nerves to organs and muscles that -are subjected to a power of movement from within. The office which -such an organ performs in a complex piece of animal mechanism is -therefore the same in all the vertebrate animals in which it is found; -and it would necessarily be found to be constructed upon the same -uniform plan, and with just the degree of uniformity and adaptation -which would fit it to perform its office in the particular species -of animal to which it might be given. In point of fact, we find this -office of the brain performed in all the vertebrate animals upon the -same uniform plan, with the necessary adaptations to the various -structures of the different animals. Resemblances, therefore, in the -convolutions of different parts of this organ, as found in different -vertebrate animals, however close they may be, prove nothing more than -the adoption of a general plan for the production of objects common -to the whole class of the vertebrate animals; and unless we can find -other and independent proof that one species was descended from another -by connection of lives with lives through successive generations, -the hypothesis of special creations of the different species is not -excluded by the facts. - -Let us now further examine the supposed kinship of man with the -monkey, as evidenced by the similarity of the structure of the -brains of the two animals, in reference to the supposed process of -evolution as the means of accounting for the origin of two species -so essentially distinct. How has it happened that different species -have become completed and final types, transmitting, after they have -become completed, one and the same type, by the ordinary process of -generation, and not admitting of the sexual union with any other -distinct species? On the theory of the evolution of animal out of -animal, we must suppose that at some time the secondary causes of -natural and sexual selection have done their work. It ends in the -production of a species which thereafter remains one and the same -animal, and Nature has established a barrier to any sexual union with -any other species. If we give the rein to our imaginations, and, taking -the process of evolution as it is described to us, suppose that in the -long course of countless ages the struggle for existence among very -numerous individuals has led to gradual transformations of structure -which the sexual selection has transmitted to offspring, and so a new -animal has at length been formed through the successive "survivals of -the fittest," we reach an animal of a new species, and that species, -under no circumstances, produces any type but its own, so far as we -have any means of knowledge. All the knowledge respecting the ape that -has been accumulated shows only that this species of animal, since it -became a completed type, has procreated its own type and no other. -Whatever struggle for existence the individuals of this type have had -to undergo, whatever modifications of structure or habits of life the -survival of the fittest individuals of this type may have produced -from the earliest imaginable period until the present time, the fact -remains that this species of animal is a completed and final product. -At the same time we have another completed and final type of animal -known as man, which, so long as he has been known at all, is a distinct -and peculiar species. Between the brain of this animal and the brain -of the other we find certain strong resemblances. In each of them -this organ is a structure performing the same office in the animal -mechanism, with adaptations peculiar to the varying structure of each -of them. In order to justify the conclusion that the one animal is a -modified descendant from the other, so as to exclude the hypothesis -that the resemblances of any one or of all of their respective organs -was a result of the adoption of a general plan in special creations of -distinct species, we ought to find some instance or instances in which -the completed animal called the ape has been developed into an animal -approaching more nearly to man than the man, as he is first known to -us, approached to the first ape that is known to us. Without such -intermediate connections, the analogy of the descent of individuals -from other individuals of the same species will not hold. There is -nothing left but resemblances of structure in one or more organs, which -are just as consistent with the hypothesis of special creations as with -that of evolution. Strong resemblances of structure and in the offices -of different organs may be found between man and the horse, but upon -no theory of evolution has it been suggested that man is descended -from the horse, or from any other animal to which he bears more or -less resemblance, excepting the monkey; and it is quite possible that -naturalists have been led unconsciously to make this exception by -external resemblances of the monkey and the man, by the imitative power -of the inferior animal when it comes in contact with man, and by some -of its habits when found in its wild and native haunts. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [69] "Biology," i, pp. 346-348 _et seq._ - - [70] Concerning the nebular hypothesis, and what astronomers now - consider, see _post._ - - [71] "Biology," i. - - [72] "Biology," i, pp. 349, 350. - - [73] "Biology," i, p. 351. I am not quite sure that I understand - what Mr. Spencer means by "direct" proof. In the passage immediately - following the sentence last quoted, he speaks of "the kind and - quantity of _direct evidence_ that all organic beings have gradually - arisen," etc., whereas, in a previous passage, he had admitted that - the facts at present assignable in _direct_ proof of this hypothesis - are insufficient. I presume he meant insufficient in number. (Compare - "Biology," i, pp. 351 and 352). Now, I should say that _direct_ proof - of the hypothesis that all animal organisms have arisen successively - out of one another would require more or less positive evidence of - such occurrences; and that the proof which is afforded by what has - taken place within the limits of a single species in the course of - successive generations would be _indirect_ evidence of what may have - taken place in the evolution of different species, because it requires - the aid of analogy to connect the two. I am not aware that there is - supposed to be any proof of the evolution of species out of species, - excepting that which is derived from what has taken place in single - races in the development of the ovum into the infant, the development - of the infant into the mature animal, and the limited varieties of - structure appearing among individuals of the same race. As I go on - through the examination of Mr. Spencer's argument, it will appear - whether there are grounds for regarding this kind of reasoning as - satisfactory or the reverse. - - [74] I have stated here, in reference to the pedigree of an - individual, a far more liberal rule of evidence than would probably be - allowed in courts of justice, where anything of value was depending - upon the establishment of a descent from a certain ancestor. But I - have purposely suggested the broadest rule that can be applied to - family or race resemblances as a means of aiding a pedigree in popular - determination or in a _judicium rusticum_. For example, suppose that - there were persons now living in this country who trace their descent - from the English husband of Pocahontas, the daughter of an Indian - chief, and from her. They bear, we will suppose, the family name of - the Englishman whom she is known to have married, and perhaps one of - them bears very strong resemblance to the Indian race in features, - complexion, and hair. In a judicial trial of this person's supposed - pedigree I do not suppose that these resemblances, if they constituted - his sole evidence, together with the name of Rolfe which he bears, and - which a certain number of his ancestors may have borne before him, - would be received as evidence of his descent from the Indian girl - whose name was Pocahontas, and who married an Englishman of the name - of Rolfe more than two centuries ago. It would be necessary to make - some proof of the whole pedigree by the kind of evidence which the law - admits in such cases, and then the resemblances of the individual to - the Indian race might possibly be received as confirmatory proof, in - aid of the proof derived from the family name of Pocahontas's English - husband, from reputation, written or oral declarations of deceased - witnesses, family documents, ancient gravestones, and the like. In - popular judgment most persons would be apt to accept the family name - of Rolfe and the apparent trace of Indian blood as sufficient proof of - the descent of the individual from the Indian girl who married John - Rolfe. But in a court of justice these facts would go for nothing - without some independent proof of the pedigree. - - [75] See the table of the Darwinian pedigree of man, _ante_. Any - other mode of arranging the order of evolution that will admit of the - application of the steps of supposed development to what is known of - the animal kingdom, will equally serve to illustrate the theory. - - [76] Darwin's "Descent of Man," Prof. Huxley's note, p. 199 _et seq._ - - [77] Mr. Spencer observes that the hypothesis of special creations is - one "which formulates absolute ignorance into a semblance of positive - knowledge...." Thus, however regarded, the hypothesis of special - creations turns out to be worthless--worthless by its derivation; - worthless in its intrinsic incoherence; worthless as absolutely - without evidence; worthless as not satisfying a moral want. "We must - therefore consider it as counting for nothing, in opposition to any - other hypothesis respecting the origin of organic beings." There is a - great deal more in the same tone. (See "Biology," i, pp. 344, 345, and - _passim_ throughout Chapters II and III of Part III of that work.) Mr. - Darwin, who is sufficiently positive, is much more moderate, and in my - opinion a much better reasoner, although I can not subscribe to his - reasoning or his conclusions. A rather irreverent naval officer of my - acquaintance once extolled a doctrinal sermon, which he had just heard - preached by a Unitarian clergyman, in this fashion: "I tell you what, - sir, the preacher did not leave the Trinity a leg to stand upon." - Probably some of Mr. Spencer's readers think that he has equally - demolished the doctrine of special creations. - - [78] "Descent of Man," p. 155. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - The doctrine of evolution, according to Herbert Spencer, further - considered. - - -In the last two preceding chapters I have examined what Mr. Spencer -regards as the direct supports of the doctrine of evolution. I have now -to consider the different orders of facts which, as he claims, yield to -it indirect support. These are the facts derived from classification, -from embryology, from morphology, and from distribution. An explanation -is here needful of the sense in which he uses these respective terms, -before the reader, who is not accustomed to them, is called upon to -understand and appreciate the argument: - -1. By classification is meant an arrangement of organic beings in some -systematic manner, according to attributes which they have in common, -and which may form the principle of a division into different classes -or families. Pointing out that in the early history of botanical and -zoölogical science the tendency was to make classifications according -to a single characteristic, Mr. Spencer reminds us that later -naturalists, by attending to a greater number of characteristics, -and finally to the greatest number that can be found to be common to -various classes of vegetable and animal organisms, have constructed -systems of classification which, in place of a linear or a serial -order, have exhibited the alliances of different groups, then the -sub-groups, and the sub-sub-groups, so that the divergences and -redivergences become developed, while the resemblances which obtain -are preserved throughout the whole class. But it is at once apparent -that, although classification, on whatever principle it is conducted, -may be valuable as a means of fixing in the mind the resemblances -or differences of structure that obtain in the different orders -of organized beings, as, for example, among the vertebrate or the -invertebrate animals, the flowering or the flowerless plants, the seeds -naked or the seeds inclosed in seed-vessels, yet that any other system -of classification, based upon other resemblances or differences which -actually present means of grouping or separating the different families -of organized beings, is just as valuable an aid in the investigation of -facts. How far any classification affords an argument, or the means of -constructing an argument, which will yield a support to the doctrine of -evolution superior to that which it yields to the doctrine of special -creations, is of course a question. - -2. Embryology: This is the term employed to express that branch of -inquiry which is concerned in a comparison of the increase of different -organisms through the stages of their embryonic life, and in noting -at different stages of this growth the characters which they have -in common with each other; the resemblances of structure which at -corresponding phases of a later embryonic stage are displayed by a less -extensive multitude of organisms; and so on step by step, until we find -the class of resembling embryos becoming narrower and narrower, and -then we finally end in the species of which a particular embryo is a -member. This process of tracing and eliminating embryonic resemblances -is said to have "a profound significance"; because, beginning with -a great multitude of resemblances between the embryonic development -of different organisms, it reveals the divergences which they take -on, and through every successive step we find new divergences, by -means of which "we may construct an embryological tree, expressing -the developmental relations of the organisms, resembling the tree -which symbolizes their classificatory relations." We thus arrive at -"that subordination of classes, orders, genera and species, to which -naturalists have been gradually led," and which is said to be "that -subordination which results from the divergence and redivergence -of embryos, as they all unfold."[79] On this mode of comparing the -embryonic development of different organized beings Mr. Spencer builds -a scientific parallelism, which indicates, as he claims, a "primordial -kinship of all organisms," and a "progressive differentiation of them," -which justifies a belief in an original stock from which they have all -been derived. In what way this method of investigation destroys or -tends to destroy the hypothesis of special creations, or how it affords -an important support to the doctrine of evolution, will be considered -hereafter.[80] - -3. Morphology, or the science of form, involves a comparison of -the structure of different organisms in their mature state; an -ascertainment of the resemblances between their structures, and of -the community of plan that exists between them. Here, as in the aids -derived from classification and embryology, it is claimed that the -fundamental likenesses of forms of structure have a meaning which is -altogether inconsistent with the hypothesis of predetermined typical -plans pursued throughout immensely varied forms of organisms. - -4. Distribution: This is the term applied to the phenomena exhibited -by the presence of different organisms in different localities of the -globe; or, as Mr. Spencer phrases it, "the phenomena of distribution -in space." These phenomena are very various. Sometimes, it is said, we -find adjacent territories, with similar conditions, occupied by quite -different faunas. In other regions, we find closely allied faunas in -areas remote from each other in latitude, and contrasted in both soil -and climate. The reasoning, as given by Mr. Darwin and adopted by Mr. -Spencer, is this: that "as like organisms are not universally or even -generally found in like habitats, nor very unlike organisms in very -unlike habitats, there is no predetermined adaptation of the organisms -to the habitats." "In other words," Mr. Spencer adds, "the facts of -distribution in space do not conform to the hypothesis of design." -The reason why they do not is claimed to be that there are impassable -barriers between the similar areas which are peopled by dissimilar -forms; whereas there are no such barriers between the dissimilar areas -which are peopled by dissimilar forms. The conclusion is, "that each -species of organism tends ever to expand its sphere of existence--to -intrude on other areas, other modes of life, other media." That is -to say, there is a constant competition among races of organisms -for possession of the fields in which they can find the means of -subsistence and expansion; and this leads to new modes of existence, -new media of life, new structures and new habitats. - -The reader can now retrace his steps, and advert to the facts that are -relied upon, under the four heads of the argument: - -1. With regard to the argument derived from classification: it is to -be observed that any system of classification is in a certain sense -artificial, and at all events is manifestly conventional. But, in -order that no injustice may be done to this branch of the argument for -evolution, I shall state it in its full force. The classifications -which naturalists make of the different organized beings according -to their resemblances and differences reveal the fact of unity amid -multiformity. This fact it is said points to propinquity of descent, -"which is the only known cause of the similarity of organic beings." -It is the bond, hidden indeed by various degrees of modification, but -nevertheless revealed to us by the classifications which display the -resemblances. Again, we have, it is said, in the influence of various -conditions of animated organisms, "the only known cause of divergence -of structure." Classification reveals to us these divergences. We have, -then, the bond of resemblances which indicate propinquity of descent, -and the divergences of structure produced by varying conditions of -life. Put the two together, and we have remarkable harmonies of -likenesses obscured by unlikenesses; and to this state of facts it is -claimed that no consistent interpretation can be given, without the -hypothesis that the likenesses and the unlikenesses were produced by -the evolution of organisms out of organisms by successive generation, -through a great lapse of time. - -This argument contains no inconsiderable amount of assumption. While -it may be true that some naturalists do not assign any cause for the -similarity which obtains among organic beings excepting their descent -from a common ancestral stock, it is not true that the similarity -of structure is inconsistent with the hypothesis of another cause, -namely, the adoption of a general plan of structure for a large class -of organisms, and an intentional variation in those parts of structure -which mark the divisions of that class into species that are very -unlike. It is true that evolutionists treat with scorn the idea of -a pattern of structure followed throughout a class of animals, but -made by designed adaptations to coalesce with differences that mark -the peculiarities which distinguish one organism of that class from -all the others. Mr. Spencer, for example, observes that "to say that -the Creator followed a pattern throughout, merely for the purpose of -maintaining the pattern, is to assign a motive which, if avowed by a -human being, we should call whimsical." - -Let us now follow this mode of disposing of the hypothesis of special -creations, by adverting to some of the facts that are adduced in its -summary condemnation; and, although the passage which I am about to -quote is found in Mr. Spencer's work under the head of morphology, the -illustration applies equally well to his argument from classification. -Speaking of fundamental likenesses of structure, he says: "Under -the immensely varied forms of insects, greatly elongated like the -dragon-fly, or contracted in shape like the lady-bird, winged like -the butterfly, or wingless like the flea, we find this character in -common--there are primarily twenty segments. These segments may be -distinctly marked, or they may be so fused as to make it difficult to -find the divisions between them. This is not all. It has been shown -that the same number of segments is possessed by all the _Crustacea_. -The highly consolidated crab, and the squilla with its long, -loosely-jointed divisions, are composed of the same number of somites. -Though, in the higher crustaceans, some of these successive indurated -rings, forming the exo-skeleton, are never more than partially marked -off from each other, yet they are identifiable as homologous with -segments, which, in other crustaceans, are definitely divided. What, -now, can be the meaning of this community of structure among these -hundreds of thousands of species filling the air, burrowing in the -earth, swimming in the water, creeping about among the sea-weed, and -having such enormous differences of size, outline, and substance, as -that no community would be suspected between them? Why, under the -down-covered body of the moth and under the hard wing-cases of the -beetle, should there be discovered the same number of divisions as in -the calcareous framework of the lobster? It can not be by _chance_ that -there exist just twenty segments in all these hundreds of thousands of -species. There is no reason to think it was _necessary_, in the sense -that no other number would have made a possible organism. And to say -that it is the result of _design_--to say that the Creator followed -this pattern throughout, merely for the purpose of maintaining the -pattern--is to assign a motive which, if avowed by a human being, we -should call whimsical. No rational interpretation of this, and hosts -of like morphological truths, can be given except by the hypothesis of -evolution; and from the hypothesis of evolution they are corollaries. -If organic forms have arisen from common stocks by perpetual -divergences and redivergences--if they have continued to inherit, more -or less clearly, the characters of ancestral races, then there will -naturally result these communities of fundamental structure among -extensive assemblages of creatures, that have severally become modified -in countless ways and degrees, in adaptation to their respective -modes of life. To this let it be added that, while the belief in an -intentional adhesion to a predetermined pattern throughout a whole -group is totally negatived by the occurrence of occasional deviations -from the pattern, such deviations are reconcilable with the belief in -evolution. As pointed out in the last chapter, there is reason to think -that remote ancestral traits will be obscured more or less according -as the superposed modifications of structure have or have not been -great or long maintained. Hence, though the occurrence of articulate -animals, such as spiders and mites, having fewer than twenty segments, -is fatal to the supposition that twenty segments was decided on for the -three groups of superior _Articulata_, it is not incongruous with the -supposition that some primitive races of articulate animals bequeathed -to these three groups this common typical character--a character which -has nevertheless, in many cases, become greatly obscured, and in some -of the most aberrant orders of these classes quite lost."[81] - -Whatever may be the explanation suggested by one or another hypothesis -as to the mode in which this uniformity of structure came to exist, it -is certain that it does exist. Twenty segments are found in hundreds -of thousands of species which are immensely different from each other -in size, outline, substance and modes of existence. Here, then, is a -plan. There is a pattern, on which all these different organisms are -constructed with a common peculiarity. It is averred that this could -not have been the result of design, because this would be to impute to -the Creator a whimsical motive, namely, that he followed the pattern -throughout a vast group of different organisms merely for the purpose -of following it. On the contrary, it may be contended that this -uniformity of plan, this repeated pattern, affords the highest probable -evidence of design; and that the supposed whimsicality of motive will -entirely disappear as soon as we reach a purpose which may have had -very solid reasons for this uniformity of structure. When we reason -about the works of the Creator, we are reasoning about the methods of -a being who, we must suppose, is governed by a purpose in all that he -does. In reasoning about the methods of such a being, it is entirely -unphilosophical to suppose that he has done anything merely for the -sake of doing it, or for the sake of exercising or displaying his -powers in repetitions that had no practical value. In order to reason -consistently with the supposed attributes of the Creator, we should -endeavor to find the value of any given pattern which we discover in a -certain very large class of organisms differing widely from each other -in other respects; and in order to find that value it is by no means -essential to make out that the particular plan of construction was -necessary to the making of any organism whatever. The true question -is, not whether twenty segments were necessary to the construction -of any organism, but whether, in each of the different species, this -peculiar number of divisions was useful to each particular organism. If -naturalists of the evolution school, instead of looking at everything -through the medium of a certain theory, would in their dissection, -for example, of the framework of the lobster, the body of the moth, -and the body of the beetle, furnish us with facts which would show -that these twenty divisions are of no use either for strength, or -resistance, or suppleness, or adaptation to what is contained within -them, we should have a body of evidence that could be claimed as -tending to overthrow the hypothesis of intentional design. They might -then speak of the repetition of this pattern as whimsical, upon the -hypothesis that it was a repetition by design. But so little is done -by this class of naturalists to give due consideration to the value -of such repetitions, and so little heed is paid to the truth that -the Creator does nothing that is useless--a truth which all sound -philosophy must assume, because it is a necessary corollary from the -attributes of the Creator--that we are left without the aid which we -might expect from these specialists in natural science. Is it, then, -impossible to discover, or even to suggest, that for each of these -organisms this number of twenty divisions had a value? If they were of -no value, we may safely conclude that they would never have existed, -unless we ignore the hypothesis of infinite wisdom and skill. That -hypothesis is a postulate without which we can not reason on the -case at all. With it, we have as a starting-point the conception of -a being of infinite perfections, who does nothing idly, nothing from -whim, nothing from caprice, and nothing that is without value to the -creature in which it is found. So that, while we can not in all cases -as yet assign that value, we have the strongest reasons for believing -that there is a value; and, instead of asserting that an extensive -community of structure throughout a great branch of the animal kingdom -has no meaning excepting upon the doctrine of evolution, it is the -part of true science to assume that it may have another meaning, and -to discover if possible what that other meaning is. This is the part -of true science, because it is the part of sound philosophy. There -is another remark to be made upon Mr. Spencer's reasoning on this -particular case of a community of pattern. He says that it can not -be imputed to _chance_. It was, then, either an intentional design, -or it came about through the process of descent "from common stocks, -which process was at the same time producing perpetual divergences and -redivergences." Without turning aside for the present to ask from how -many common stocks, it may be shown as in the highest degree probable -that the occasional deviations from the pattern did not arise by the -evolution process, because that process has in itself an element -of chance which is fatal to the theory. The assertion is that "an -intentional adhesion to a predetermined plan throughout a whole group -is totally negatived by the occurrence of occasional deviations from -the pattern." Let this assertion be examined first in the light of -facts, and secondly by the absence of facts. - -The hypothesis is that some primitive race of articulated animals, -possessed by some means of the twenty segments, transmitted this -ancestral trait to hundreds of thousands of species having no community -of structure in other respects. Unfortunately for the theory, no -figures can measure the chances against the preservation of a single -pattern through such a multitude of differing organisms descending -from a common stock. Infinity alone can express the chances against -such a result. While, according to the theory, the deviations from the -original type were constantly working out new organisms of the most -diversified forms, until there came to be hundreds of thousands of new -species differing from each other in all but this one peculiarity--a -diversity which is supposed to have been caused by the fundamental law -of evolution--how did it happen that the same law did not break this -uniformity of articulation? If it was potent enough to differentiate -the enormous multitude of these animals in all other traits, why did -it not vary the number of segments with which the primitive race -was endowed? Is the law of evolution limited or unlimited? If it is -limited in its effects, then there are patterns of animal structure -which it has not modified, and the presence of which in hundreds of -thousands of different species must be explained as a form of structure -designed for some end that was to be common to a great multitude -of different beings. If the law of evolution was unlimited in its -power, then the community of pattern has had to undergo chances of -destruction or discontinuance that are immeasurable; as there can be -no measure which will represent to the mind the infinitely diversified -and innumerable causes that have produced the dissimilarities -which compel a classification into the different species, upon the -hypothesis of their descent from a common stock. Grant, too, for the -purpose of the argument, that the occasional deviations from the -pattern of twenty segments, producing a few groups with a smaller -number of articulations, are reconcilable with the belief that some -later ancestral form became endowed with the smaller number which it -transmitted to its descendants. How came that later ancestral form -to be endowed with the smaller number of segments? Was there a still -more remote ancestral race, which in some way became possessed of the -smaller number, or did the spiders and the mites, in the countless -generations of evolution, branch off from ancestral races having the -full number of twenty segments? Upon either supposition, what an -infinity of chances there were, against the natural selection of the -smaller number, and against its preservation as the unvarying type of -articulation found in the spiders and the mites! The supposition that -the number of twenty segments was decided on for the three groups of -superior _Articulata_ for the mere sake of adhering to a pattern is -doubtless unphilosophical. But it is not unphilosophical to suppose -that whatever amount of articulation is found in each species was -given to it because in that species it would be useful. If in some of -the most aberrant orders of these animals the articulation is greatly -obscured, or not found at all, the conclusion that it was not needed, -or not needed in a like degree, is far more rational than the theory -which commits the particular result to an infinity of chances against -it; or which supposes it to have been worked by a process that might -have produced a very different result, since it can not be claimed that -natural selection works by methods of which any definite result can be -predicated more than another. - -Thus far I have considered Mr. Spencer's argument from the _Articulata_ -in the light of the facts that he adduces. Let us now test it by the -absence of facts. In a former discussion, I have asked for facts -which show, aside from the theory, that any one species of animal, -distinctly marked as a continuing type, is connected by intermediate -types or forms with any pre-existing race of another character. Take -this class of the articulated animals, said to be of hundreds of -thousands of different species having no community of form but this -of articulation, and now known as perfect organisms, each after its -kind. What naturalist has discovered the continuity of lives with -lives, which would furnish the steps of descent of any one of this -species from an antecedent and a different species? It is very easy -to construct a theory, and from it to argue that there must have been -intermediate links, which, if discovered, would show the continuity -of lives from lives which the descent of one organism from another -necessarily implies. To a certain extent, within certain limits, the -sub-groups and the sub-sub-groups of the articulated class of animals, -which classification or morphology reveals, may lay the foundation for -a theoretical belief in an ancestral stock from which the different -and now perfect forms of these distinct animals may have become -developed by successive changes of structure. But the extent to which -connected changes can be actually traced in the animal kingdom is -extremely limited; and the important practical question is whether any -one fact, or class of facts, has been discovered which will warrant -the belief that beings of totally dissimilar forms and habits of -life have, without any design, been evolved by the ordinary process -of successive generation, through the operation of causes that have -gradually modified the structure in all respects save one, and have at -the same time enabled or allowed that one peculiarity of structure to -escape from the influences which have modified both structure and modes -of life in every other respect. Why, for example, upon the hypothesis -of descent from a common stock, has that stock deviated under the -influences of natural selection into the lobster, the moth, and the -beetle, and yet the community of twenty segments of articulation -has entirely escaped the effect of those influences? No reason can -be assigned for the fact that it has escaped those influences, -excepting that it was originally designed, and was impressed upon the -proto-typical stock with such force as to place it beyond the reach -of all such causes of modification as those which are ascribed to -natural or sexual selection. Without the latter supposition, those -causes were just as potent to bring about a modification in the number -of articulations as they were to bring about all the astonishing -diversities of structure and modes of life that we see, and therefore -the most probable conclusion from the fact of this uniformity of the -twenty segments is, that there was a barrier placed in this whole -class of organisms, which has limited the modifying force of the -supposed process of evolution, for the reason of some peculiar utility -in this plan of articulation. - -Perhaps it will be said that the process of evolution itself tends to -the preservation of whatever is most useful, while the modifications -are going on which develop new organs and new structures; and that -thus, in the case before us, the twenty segments have been preserved -throughout an enormous group by one of the fundamental laws of -evolution, so that, if there is any peculiar utility in the twenty -segments, that utility has been answered by the very process of gradual -descent of one organism from another. But the difficulty with this -reasoning is, that while it assumes for the modifying influences of -natural and sexual selection a range of fortuitous causes sufficient to -change the ancestral type into the acquisition of vastly diversified -organs, powers, and modes of existence, so as to constitute new -animals, it yet assumes that, by some recognition of a superior and -paramount utility in the particular number of segments, the law of -evolution has preserved that number from the influence of causes -which have changed everything else. Now, the range of causes which -was sufficiently varied, accidental, long-continued and complex to -produce the diversities of structure in all other respects, by the -infinitely modifying influences which have developed new organs and -new modes of existence, must also have been of a sufficiently varied, -accidental, long-continued, and complex character to have broken this -plan of the twenty segments, unless we suppose that in some mysterious -and inexplicable manner the different generations of these beings were -endowed with some kind of sagacity which would enable them to strive -for the preservation of this one peculiarity, or unless we suppose that -Nature was ever on the watch to guard them from its destruction or -variation, on account of its peculiar utility. The first supposition is -not in accordance with the evolution theory; for that theory rejects -all idea of conscious exertion on the part of any of the organisms. -The second supposition leads us at once to the inquiry, how came it -to be imposed upon a whole group of beings as a law of nature, that -whatever utility of structure was of paramount importance to the -whole group should be preserved against the modifying influences that -were to produce species differing absolutely from each other, through -hundreds of thousands of varieties, in every other feature of their -existence? Can we get along here without the hypothesis of design? And, -if there was such design, how does the fact of this uniformity amid -such diversity become an argument against the hypothesis of a Creator? -Or, how does it tend to displace the hypothesis of special creations, -when we find that the very process of so-called evolution has failed -to break the uniformity of a pattern that is conceded not to have been -the result of chance, although that pattern was exposed to just as -many and as powerful causes of modification as those which are assumed -to have brought about the modifications in every other feature of the -animal existence? The truth would seem to be, that the uniformity amid -so great a diversity was either the result of a design which placed it -out of the reach of all the modifying influences, or else it has, by a -most incalculable result, escaped from the effect of those influences -by a chance in which the ratio of one to infinity can alone measure the -probability of such an escape. - -Let us now advert to another of Mr. Spencer's illustrations of the -futility of the "supernatural" and of the rationality of the "natural" -interpretation.[82] This illustration is derived from what are -called "homologous" organs; and the particular instance selected is -the vertebral column.[83] There are creatures, such as snakes, a low -order of the vertebrate kingdom, in which the bony axis is divided -into segments of about the same dimensions from end to end, for the -obvious advantage of flexibility throughout the whole length of the -animal. But in most of the higher vertebrata, some parts of this axis -are flexible and others are inflexible; and this is especially the case -in that part of the vertebral column called the sacrum, which is the -fulcrum that has to bear the greatest strain to which the skeleton is -exposed, and which is yet made not of one long segment or vertebra, -but of several segments "fused together." Mr. Spencer says: "In man -there are five of these confluent sacral vertebræ; and in the ostrich -tribe they number from seventeen to twenty. Why is this? Why, if the -skeleton of each species was separately contrived, was this bony mass -made by soldering together a number of vertebræ like those forming the -rest of the column, instead of being made out of one single piece? And -why, if typical uniformity was to be maintained, does the number of -sacral vertebræ vary within the same order of birds? Why, too, should -the development of the sacrum be the roundabout process of first -forming its separate constituent vertebræ, and then destroying their -separativeness? In the embryo of a mammal or bird, the substance of the -vertebral column is, at the outset, continuous. The segments that are -to become vertebræ, arise gradually in the midst of this originally -homogeneous axis. Equally in those parts of the spine which are to -remain flexible, and in those which are to grow rigid, these segments -are formed, and that part of the spine which is to compose the sacrum, -having passed out of its original unity into disunity by separating -itself into segments, passes again into unity by the coalescence of -these segments. To what end is this construction and reconstruction? -If, originally, the spine in vertebrate animals consisted from head to -tail of separate movable segments, as it does still in fishes and some -reptiles--if, in the evolution of the higher vertebrata, certain of -these movable segments were rendered less movable with respect to each -other, by the mechanical conditions to which they were exposed, and at -length became relatively immovable--it is comprehensible why the sacrum -formed out of them should continue ever after to show more or less -clearly its originally segmented structure. But on any other hypothesis -this segmented structure is inexplicable." - -We here see the predominating force of a theory which refuses all -possible rationality to any hypothesis but its own. The confident tone -with which facts are arrayed and are then pronounced inexplicable -upon any other hypothesis than that which the writer asserts, without -one scintilla of proof of their tendency to exclude every other -supposition, renders the refutation of such reasoning a wearisome -task. But there is here one plain and sufficient answer to the whole -of the supposed difficulty. The evolution theory, in this particular -application of it, is that originally there were vertebrate animals -in which the spine consisted of separate movable segments from head -to tail, as it does now in fishes and reptiles; but, as the higher -vertebrata were evolved out of these lower forms, the movable segments -were rendered less movable with respect to each other, and at length -in the sacrum the segments became relatively immovable, and yet the -originally segmented structure was retained in this part of the -column, by force of the propinquity of descent from an antecedent type -which had the whole column divided into movable segments. Upon no other -hypothesis, it is asserted, is this result explicable. - -Mr. Spencer's analysis of the sacrum is somewhat defective. It is, as -he says, that part of the vertebrate column which in the higher class -of vertebrate animals is, during fœtal life, composed, like all the -rest of the column, of distinct vertebræ. These vertebræ, like the -others, are flexible in the fœtal stage, but after birth they become -coalesced or united into one piece, instead of remaining in separate -pieces. Thus far, Mr. Spencer's description is, I am informed by -anatomists, correct. But the questions which he propounds as if they -were unanswerable upon the assumption that this change is inexplicable -upon any other hypothesis than that of the evolution of the higher -vertebrata out of the lower vertebrate animals, and that the sacrum, -with its continuous piece, has retained the segmented outward form by -force of the descent, demand closer consideration. Let us trace the -process of formation in the human species, and then see what is the -just conclusion to be derived from it. In the embryonic condition, -the substance which is to form the vertebral column is continuous. -As the fœtus is developed, this substance separates itself into -the segments which are called vertebræ, and these segments remain -flexible and movable throughout the column. After birth, the five -lower segments become united in what is substantially one piece, -but of course the marks of the original segments remain. This is -what occurs in the origin and growth of the individual. Now, looking -back to the period when this species of animal did not exist, and -supposing it to have been specially created in the two related forms -of male and female, endowed with the same process of procreation and -gestation that has been going on ever since there is any recorded or -traditionary knowledge of the race, why should not this very growth -of the sacrum have been designed, in order to produce, after the -birth of the individual, that relative rigidity which would in this -part of the vertebral column be useful to an animal destined to an -upright posture of the whole skeleton and to the habits and life of -a biped? And, if we extend the inquiry to other species, why should -we not expect to find, as in the case of an oviparous vertebrate like -the ostrich, a repetition of the same general plan of forming the -spinal column, for the same ultimate purpose, with such a variation in -the number of original segments that are to constitute the sacrum as -would be most useful to that bird, thus establishing for the ostrich -a sacrum that in a reptile or a fish would not only not be required, -but would be a positive incumbrance? Upon the hypothesis of special -creations of the different species of vertebrate animals, every one -of Mr. Spencer's questions, asked as if they were unanswerable, can -receive a satisfactory solution. Thus, he asks, "Why, if the skeleton -of each species was separately contrived, was this bony mass [the -sacrum] made by soldering together a number of vertebræ like those -forming the rest of the column, instead of being made [aboriginally] -in one single piece?" The answer is, that in the establishment of -the process of gestation and fœtal growth, if a human artificer and -designer could have devised the process, he would have selected the -very one that now exists, for certain obvious reasons. First, he would -have designedly made the process to consist, in the embryo, of a -division of the substance which was to form the vertebral column in a -continuous and uniform division into segments, because the whole column -is to have at first the flexibility that may be derived from such a -division. Secondly, when the time was to arrive at which the formation -of the sacrum, with its practical continuity of a single piece, was -to commence, he would select the number of the lower vertebræ that -would make a sacrum most useful to the particular species of animal, -and would weld them together so as to give them the relative rigidity -and action of a single piece. But as the whole formation is the result -of a growth of the sacrum out of a part of the slowly forming column -originally divided into vertebræ, the marks of these separate vertebræ -would remain distinguishable, while they would cease to have the -mechanical action of separate vertebræ. - -Another of Mr. Spencer's questions is, "Why, if typical uniformity was -to be maintained, does the number of sacral vertebræ vary within the -same order of birds?" The answer is the same as that which assigns -a reason for all other variations in the skeleton of animals of the -same order but of different varieties, namely, the special utility -of the variations in the number of sacral vertebræ that would be -most useful in that variety. The typical uniformity maintained is a -uniformity in the process of growth and formation, down to a point -where the variations are to come in which mark one animal from another; -and I have more than once had occasion to suggest that the typical -uniformity, and its adaptation to the varying requirements of different -beings, is the highest kind of moral evidence of the existence, wisdom, -and power of a supreme artificer, and that it militates so strongly -against the doctrine of evolution that, without more proof than can -possibly be claimed for that doctrine, we ought not to yield to it our -belief. - -The theory that the original condition of all vertebrate animals was -that of separate movable segments throughout the spinal column, as it -is now in fishes and some reptiles, and that in the evolution of the -higher vertebrates out of these lower forms, certain of these movable -segments were rendered less movable with respect to each other by -the mechanical conditions to which the successive generations were -exposed, until at length the sacrum was formed, is undoubtedly a theory -that excludes all design of an infinite artificer, and all intention -whatever. It is a theory which relegates the most special contrivances -and the most exact adaptations to the fortuitous operation of causes -that could not have produced the variations of structure and at the -same time have preserved the typical uniformity. It is certainly a -theory which we should not apply to the works of man, if we were -investigating products which seemed to be the result of human ingenuity -and skill, but of the origin of which we had no direct evidence. In -such a case, we should not shut our eyes to the proofs of intentional -variations and adaptation, or, if we did, our speculations would not -be likely to command the assent of cultivated and sound reasoners. We -may treat the works of Nature by a system of logic that we should not -apply to the works of man, but if we do, we shall end in no tenable -results. The principal and in fact the only essential distinction to -be observed between the works of Nature and the works of man relates -to the degree of power, intelligence, and skill in the actor. If we -assume, as we must, that in the one case there was an actor, applying -will, intelligence, and power to the properties of matter, and molding -it into certain products and uses, and that in the other case there -was no actor, but that all products and results are but the ungoverned -effects of what are called natural laws in contradistinction to all -intentional purposes, we must argue upon principles that are logically -and diametrically inconsistent in themselves, and at variance with -fundamental laws of reasoning. - -I will now advert to an omission in Mr. Spencer's analysis of the -sacrum, which overlooks one of the strongest proofs of intentional -design afforded by that part of the spinal column. We have seen what -was its general purpose and growth, and the process of its formation. -We have now to note its variations in the male and the female skeleton. -In the male, the sacrum, thus formed before birth, after birth answers -to and performs its ultimate function of a comparatively rigid and -inflexible piece of bone, and it is provided with no other special -characteristic. In the female, on the contrary, there is a most -remarkable adaptation of this piece to the function of maternity. While -all the upper vertebræ of which this piece was originally composed -are welded together after birth in the female as in the male, in the -female the lowest segment of all remains for a certain time flexible -relatively to the upper part of the sacrum, in order to admit of the -necessary expansion of the pelvis during the passage of the infant -from the womb of the mother. In the normal condition of females of -all the vertebrate orders, this flexibility of the lower part of the -sacrum continues while the period of possible maternity continues. If -in any individual female it happens to be wanting during the period -of possible conception, delivery can not take place without danger -to the mother or the offspring, or both. Hence, in very bad cases, -nature has to be assisted by extraordinary means. But in the normal -condition of the female sacrum, this flexibility, so essential in the -process of safe delivery, is always found, and its special purpose is -known to every anatomist, while it has no existence in the structure -of the male. Is this distinction to be accounted for by the same -kind of reasoning that undertakes to account for all the other great -distinctions between the related forms of male and female, which -reproduce their kind by a common process of the sexual union, namely, -that this division of male and female came about by a habit that -resulted now in the production of a male and now in the production -of a female, from tendencies that were ungoverned by any special -purpose? Must we not conclude, however inscrutable are the causes that -determine the sex of a particular infant, that the sexes themselves -were specially ordained? And if they were specially ordained, how are -we to account for the special construction and function of each of -them, without the interposition of a special design? And when we find -a structure in the female obviously designed for a special purpose, and -not existing in the male, are we to conclude that some particular race -of females, in some remote period of antiquity, among the countless -generations of the vertebrata, found that this flexibility of the -sacrum would be highly convenient to them, and, having adopted it -as a habit, transmitted it, as a specially acquired peculiarity of -structure, to their female descendants? This is all very well as a -theoretical speculation, but as a speculation it is entirely defective, -because it assigns the peculiarity of structure to a cause that could -not have produced it. On the other hand, the hypothesis of its special -creation assigns it to a cause that could have produced it, and its -existence is among the highest of the multitudinous evidences of -intentional design and special formation. - -Wherein consists the irrationality of the hypothesis that a plan of -construction was intentionally, and with supreme skill, framed for -very different beings, to answer in each of them a common purpose? The -asserted irrational character of this hypothesis consists in nothing -but a denial that there was a Creator. It comes down to this, if it -comes to anything: because, if we assume that there was a Supreme Being -who took any care whatever of the complex and manifold product that we -call nature--if we suppose that he ordained anything--we must suppose -that his power to construct was boundless, and that a repetition of -his plans wherever they would be useful, to answer the beneficent -and diversified ends of infinite skill and benevolence, is just as -much in accordance with the whole hypothesis of his attributes as it -is to suppose that he caused anything whatever to exist. If we deny -his existence, if we can not satisfy ourselves of it at all, if we -suppose that nothing was ordained, nothing was created, but that all -these diversified forms of animal organisms grew out of a protoplasmic -substance, and that there was never any absolute commencement of -organic life on the globe, or any absolute commencement of anything -whatever, it is of course idle to speculate upon the adoption or -preservation of patterns, as it is equally idle to pursue the theory of -evolution through stages which at last end nowhere whatever.[84] - -It may be well to cite Mr. Spencer's final summary of the general -truths which he claims to be revealed by morphology, because it will -enable the reader to see just where the logical inconsequence of his -position occurs: "The general truths of morphology thus coincide -in their implications. Unity of type, maintained under extreme -dissimilarities of form and mode of life, is explicable as resulting -from descent with modification; but is otherwise inexplicable. The -likenesses disguised by unlikenesses, which the comparative anatomist -discovers between various organs in the same organisms, are worse than -meaningless if it be supposed that organisms were severally formed as -we now see them; but they fit in quite harmoniously with the belief -that each kind of organism is a product of accumulated modifications -upon modifications. And the presence, in all kinds of animals and -plants, of functionally useless parts corresponding to parts that are -functionally useful in allied animals and plants, while it is totally -incongruous with the belief in a construction of each organism by -miraculous interposition, is just what we are led to expect by the -belief that organisms have arisen by progression."[85] - -Without expending much criticism upon the phrase "miraculous -interposition," as a description of what takes place in special -creation, it is sufficient to say that the act of special creation of a -distinct organism is to be first viewed by itself, as if it stood alone -in nature, and that it is like any other act of causing a new thing -to exist which did not exist before. To this idea should be added -the fact that in the creation of an animal organism there is involved -the direct formation of a peculiar type of animal, with a capacity -of producing other individuals of the same type through a process of -generation. When, after having attained this conception of the act of -special creation, and contemplated a single instance of the supposed -exercise of such a power, we extend our inquiries, we find many other -instances of the exercise of the same power; and then we observe a -certain unity of type in some peculiarity of structure, maintained -under extreme dissimilarities of form and mode of life. How, then, -is this one similarity of pattern, amid such multiformity in other -respects, "worse than meaningless," if we suppose that "organisms were -severally framed as we now see them"? The very hypothesis that they -were so severally framed carries in itself a meaning which can not be -thus summarily ignored; because that hypothesis implies a power in the -Creator to do just what we see. You may deny the power; but if you -admit the existence of the infinite creating power, you are remitted -to the inquiry into its probable methods; and you can no more say that -the special creation of distinct organisms, with a certain unity amid -a great multiformity, leaves the whole phenomena without a meaning, -than you can say that any method which you can suggest is necessarily -the only method which will afford a rational meaning in what we see. -You must go the length of denying the entire postulate of a Creator, -before you can be in a situation to deny the meaning that is involved -in the idea of creation; for that idea implies an absolute power to -apply a uniform pattern of structure to a whole class of organisms -varied in all other respects. The theory that each kind of organism -is a product of accumulated modifications upon modifications, without -any special interposition to produce the modified and distinct forms, -must be maintained on one of two suppositions: either that at some -period there was an absolute commencement of organic life in some form, -upon this globe, and that then all the other forms which we see were -left to be evolved out of that one by the ungoverned accumulation of -modifications upon modifications, or else that there was never any -absolute commencement of organic life at any time, but that matter, -by some peculiar property derived from some source that is not -suggested, took on combinations which resulted in some crude form of -animated organism, and that then the accumulations of modifications -upon modifications followed from some process of generation by which -the successive organisms became multiplied and varied. Of the former -supposition, I understand Mr. Darwin to have been a representative -naturalist. Of the latter, I understand Mr. Spencer to be an advocate. -Upon what may be called the Darwinian doctrine, the idea of a Creator, -causing to exist at some time some crude form of animal life, is -admitted. Upon the Spencerian doctrine, which will be in this respect -more closely examined hereafter, I do not see that the idea of a -creating power comes in anywhere, either at the commencement of a -series of organisms or at any point in that series. But, upon the -logical proposition asserted in the passage last above quoted, it is -obvious that, unless the idea of a Creator is absolutely denied, the -presence of a unity of type amid any amount of dissimilarities of form -and mode of life can not be pronounced to be without meaning, because -the idea of a Creator implies a power to make that very unity amid the -uniformity, which is asserted to be inexplicable without resorting -to the theory that it was not made at all, but that it grew out of -events over which no superintending or governing power was exercised. -Upon this kind of dogmatic assertion there can be no common ground of -reasoning. - -The assumed incongruity between the facts and the hypothesis of a -special creation of each organism is an incongruity that arises out of -the assumption that such special creation was an impossibility. If once -the idea of an infinite creating faculty is assumed as the basis of the -reasoning, all seeming incongruity vanishes, and the probable method -of that creating power must be determined by the preponderance of -evidence. If the power is denied, we must grope our way through systems -which impute everything to the properties of substance, without any -suggestion of a source from which those properties were derived, and -without anything to guide them but the tendencies implanted in them, -we know not how or when, and of the origin of which we have not even a -suggestion. Some of the speculations of Greek philosophers adverted to -in a previous chapter may serve to show us what comes of the omission -to conceive of power as abstracted from substance or its properties. -The philosophy which first attained to this conception led the way -to that conception of an Infinite Being, without whose existence and -attributes all speculation upon the phenomena of nature leads to -nothing. A belief in his existence and attributes must undoubtedly be -attained by an examination of his works, if we set aside the teachings -of revealed religion. But if we can not attain it, we have no better -means for believing in the doctrine of evolution than we have for -believing in any other method by which the phenomena of nature have -become what they are. - -The question here is, not whether descent of organisms from organisms, -with modifications upon modifications, is a supposable theory, but -whether it is so satisfactorily shown that it can be said to exclude -the hypothesis of a special creation of each organism. There may be -parts of structure in one animal which seem to have no functional use, -although we should be cautious in making the assumption that they are -of no use because we have not yet discovered that use. But let it be -assumed that these apparently useless parts in one animal correspond to -parts which in another animal are functionally useful. If there was -established for these two separately created animals a like system of -procreation and gestation, that system, affected at the same time by a -law of growth imposed by the special type of the species, might in one -species lead to the presence of parts of which we can not recognize -the use, and might in other species lead to the presence of parts of -which we can see the use. It does not help to a better explanation -to say that there has been an accumulation of modifications upon -modifications in the course of an unknown descent of one organism from -another. Why did these modifications stop short of the production of -a species or of several species in which no resemblance of parts more -or less functionally useful could be found? The supposition is that -the modifications have been going on through millions of years. Time -enough, therefore, has elapsed for the destruction of all uniformity -of structure; and the causes of modification are as immeasurable as -the period through which they are supposed to have been operating. -The imaginary ancestral stock, wherever it is placed in the line of -remote descent, had, in its first distinctive existence, a peculiar -structure, which it bequeaths to its offspring. In the countless -generations of its descendants, modifications of that structure take -place, until a new animal is evolved. What preserved any unity of -type from the modifying influences? It was not choice on the part of -the several descending species; not a conscious exertion to preserve -something; it was nothing but the propinquity of descent, which by the -law of heredity transmitted certain resemblances. But why was that -law so potent that it could preserve a certain unity of type, and at -the same time so powerless as not to prevent the modifications which -the successive organisms have undergone in all other respects? Or, to -reverse the terms of the question, why were the causes of modification -sufficiently powerful to produce distinct species, and yet not -powerful enough to eliminate the resemblances which we find obtaining -throughout the whole group of animals to which these several species -belong? It would seem that here we are not to lose sight of the fact -that, in the animal kingdom, procreation never takes place between -a male and a female of distinct species, and that we have no reason -to believe that it ever did take place. Now, although the evolution -hypothesis supposes that, starting from an ancestral stock, the -modifications of structure have been produced in offspring descended -from parents of that same stock, which have transmitted acquired -peculiarities to their immediate progeny, and so on indefinitely, yet -there must have been a time when the diverging species became distinct -and peculiar organisms, and when it became impossible for any crossing -of these organisms to take place. All the supposed modifications, -therefore, have taken place within the limits of an actual descent of -one kind of animal from another, each successive pair belonging to the -species from which they were individually generated. In this descent -of lives from lives, there came about changes which in progress of -time led to two animals as wide asunder as the man and the ostrich, -or as the man and the horse, and yet the causes which were powerful -enough to produce these widely diverging species were not powerful -enough to break up all unity of plan in some one or more respects. If -naturalists of the evolution school would explain how there has come to -be, for example, in the skeleton of the _vertebrata_, a bony structure -called the spine, in which a certain resemblance and a certain function -obtain throughout the whole class, and yet one species creeps upon its -belly, another walks on four legs, and another on two, and one flies -in the air and another never can do so, and how this could be without -any design or special interposition of a creating power, but that the -whole of this uniformity amid such diversity has arisen from acquired -habits among the different descendants from an aboriginal stock that -had no such habits in either mode of locomotion, and no organs for such -modes of life, they would at least be able to commend their theory to -a better appreciation of its claims than is now possible to those who -want "grounds more relative" than a naked hypothesis. - -3. The argument from embryology requires for its appreciation a -careful statement of its abstract proposition, and a statement of -it in a concrete form. As an abstract proposition, embryology, or -the comparison of the development of different organisms under their -embryonic stages, shows that in the earliest stage of any organism -it has the greatest number of characters in common with all other -organisms in their earliest stage; that at a later stage its structure -is like the structures displayed at corresponding phases by a less -extensive number of organisms; that at each subsequent stage the -developing embryo becomes more and more distinguished from the groups -of embryos that it previously resembled; and that this divergence goes -on, until we reach the species of which the embryo is a member, in -which the class of similar forms is finally narrowed to that species. - -It seems that Von Baer formulated this generalization of embryologic -development into an "embryologic law," which, according to Mr. -Spencer, becomes a support to the hypothesis of evolution in this way: -Species that had a common ancestry will exhibit a parallelism in the -embryonic development of their individual members. As the embryos of -the ancestral stock were developed in their growth, so the embryos of -the descended species would be developed at corresponding phases in a -similar way. As one species diverged from its ancestral stock, there -would come about modifications in the development of its embryos, and -thus a later ancestral stock would be formed, which would in turn -transmit to its descendants in the development of the embryo less and -less resemblances, and so on, until finally the individual animal, at -birth, would structurally resemble only the individual infants of its -own race. - -Here, then, is another remarkable instance of the force of an adopted -theory. First, we have a comparison of the embryonic development of -different animals from their seminal germs which displays certain -phenomena of resemblances and departures. Next, we have the assumption -of an ancestral stock, the common origin of all the organisms in the -development of whose embryos among its descendants an embryologic law -was to work, starting from the visible resemblance of all the germs, -then exhibiting structural changes into later ancestral stocks, and so -on, until the resemblances are reduced to those which obtain only among -individuals of the same species. So that, without the hypothesis, the -assumption of an ancestral stock of all the organisms, formed somehow -in the course of descent from a germ that gave rise to an animal of -some kind, we have nothing to which to apply the embryologic law. We -are to infer the embryologic law from the parallelism of embryonic -development which prevails in the whole series of animal generation, or -from its divergences, or from both, and then we draw from _this law_ -the inference that the whole series of animals came from some common -stock. The difficulty with this whole theory is, as I have more than -once suggested, that we have no means, aside from the theory itself, of -connecting lives with lives, in the generation of one distinct species -out of another. Without some proof of the fact that the human fœtus was -a diverging growth out of some ancestral stock that was the same as -that from which the fœtus of another animal was a different diverging -growth, the embryologic law is no help to us whatever. If this kinship -of the human fœtus with the fœtus of some other animal can not be -found, by tracing the intermediate links which carry them respectively -back to their common ancestor, between what animals in respect to -their embryonic development can such kinship be found, excepting upon -the theoretical assumption of a common origin of the whole vertebral -class? If there was such a common ancestral stock, where is it to -be placed, what was its character, when did the law of embryologic -development begin to operate upon its descendants? Until some facts -can be adduced which will have a satisfactory tendency to show the -kinship of one animal with another by reason of ancestral descent from -a common ancestral stock that was unlike either of them, the phenomena -of embryologic development have no tendency to displace the hypothesis -of special creations; for, on the latter hypothesis, the phenomena of -resemblances and differences in the growth from the germ into the fœtus -and from the fœtus into the newly born infant, evinced by any range of -comparison of the different species, would be the same. If man was a -special creation, and one of the higher quadrumana was also a distinct -and separate creation, the establishment for each of a like process of -procreation and gestation would produce all the resemblances of fœtal -growth that obtain between them, and the ordained differences of their -animal destinies would explain all the divergences. Let us see if this -is not a rational conclusion. - -It is exceedingly difficult for the common reader of such a work -as that of Mr. Spencer, on which I am now commenting, to avoid the -influence of the perpetual assertion that facts are explicable upon -one hypothesis alone. At each step in the argument, the array of facts -terminates with the assertion that, upon the hypothesis of design, the -facts are inexplicable; and yet we are furnished with no reasoning -that has a tendency to show that the facts necessarily exclude -the hypothesis of design, or, in other words, that the facts are -inconsistent with that hypothesis. It is essential to understand what -is the true scope of the hypothesis of special creation; for, without -a definite idea of what that term implies, we have no proper means of -comparing the facts of animal resemblances or differences with the -rationality of the hypothesis that they resulted from an intentional -design. Recollecting, then, that we are now pursuing the resemblances -and divergences that are found in a comparison of the embryologic -development of different species of animals, let us endeavor to -understand the meaning of what I have suggested at the close of the -last preceding paragraph; namely, the establishment for a large class -of animals of a like general system of procreation and gestation, and -the ordination of different destinies for the different species of -animals belonging to that class. I have said that the two branches of -this hypothesis would account for the resemblances in the embryological -growth of different animals, and would explain the divergences which -obtain among their embryological developments. The first inquiry is, -whether this hypothesis presents a true philosophic idea of special -creation. The next inquiry is, whether it affords a satisfactory -explanation of the phenomena of comparative embryologic development. - -We must never lose sight of the one grand postulate of an infinite -Creator. This postulate must be conceded to the believers in special -creations, because any idea of creation implies a creating power. If -we conceive of creation without a Creator, we must stop all argument. -Now, the hypothesis of creation, as I have more than once said, -implies a being of boundless faculties. There can be absolutely no -limitation to the power of such a being, either in respect to the -methods by which he will accomplish his objects, or to the number and -variety of these objects, or to the purposes for which they are to -exist. If we narrow our conception of creating power to anything less -than an infinite faculty; if we suppose it to be restricted in any -direction; if we argue about it as if there were things that it can not -do, we shall be without the means of reasoning soundly upon anything -that it is supposed to have done. It is quite otherwise when we are -reasoning about the operation and effect of secondary causes. There -is no secondary cause--no imaginable operation of a fixed quality of -substance--no action of any of the properties of substance--that is not -limited. The scope of its action may be very wide; within its sphere it -may be enormously potent; but in its very nature it is bounded.[86] It -is not so with the First Cause of all things; not so with the Infinite -Power which, upon the hypothesis of a First Cause, has established all -the physical laws of the universe and all the properties of matter. -So that, when we reason about the methods of that infinite creating -power, if we find a general system established, or a pattern repeated -through a very large class of organisms, the proper inference is, not -that the power was limited, but that it has been exercised to the whole -extent of what was useful, and in that direction has been exercised -no further; and if we find variations or additional structures -incorporated with the repetition of a general pattern, the proper -inference is that the unlimited creating power has put forth all the -additional exertion and skill needful for the formation of new beings. - -What, then, does the establishment of a like system of procreation -and gestation imply, upon the supposition of the distinct creation of -species? It implies a certain parallel embryonic development, from -the germ to the fœtus and from the fœtus to the new-born infant, -throughout a large group of different animals; and this parallelism -would in certain stages of the embryonic growth display identity -or close similarity of form and structure. But as in each species -of animal the distinct creation would necessarily imply a distinct -destiny, the parallelism of embryonic form and structure would cease -at the point of development at which the characteristic structure -of the species would begin to unfold itself. The general system of -procreation and gestation common to a whole class of different animals, -and the ordained diversity of species, would present the same phenomena -of resemblances and differences in the embryonic development that -are supposed to be explicable only by the hypothesis of a descent of -all the species from a common ancestral stock through the process of -evolution. - -Notwithstanding the mystery and obscurity in which the process of -animal procreation is involved--a mystery and obscurity which will -perhaps never be fully solved--we can see enough to warrant some -definite conclusions. One of these conclusions is that, in the -formation of the germ which becomes developed into the fœtus, the male -and female parent each contributes some cellular substance to the -compound which constitutes that germ. We may safely infer this, because -the individual animal becomes a union of characteristics belonging -to both the parents, although the traits that are peculiar to one of -the parents may be more or less marked in their different offspring, -so that in one of the descendants the paternal and in another the -maternal traits will predominate. But in every descendant from the -same pair there is more or less of the peculiarities of each parent -plainly discernible. The inference, therefore, may be safely drawn -that the male and the female parent each contributes to the formation -of the ante-fœtal germ some cellular substance, in which resides the -typical characteristic of animal organism which each parent possesses. -The compound germ that is thus formed is endowed with the mysterious -principle of animal life which admits of growth and development; and -whether after its formation the female parent bestows most or bestows -least upon the product, that product consists of a union of cellular -substances contributed by both the male and the female parent in -the sexual act of procreation. This compound resultant germ, in the -earliest stage of its formation, like the separate cells of which it is -a union, exhibits no visible difference when we compare the ante-fœtal -germ of one animal with that of a different animal. Perhaps we shall -never be able to detect either chemical or mechanical differences -in the cellular substances or in the earliest stage of the compound -product which has resulted from their union. But in that compound -product there resides a contributory cellular substance derived from -each of the parents; and it is a just inference from this fact, and -from what we learn when we trace the further development, that there -is a peculiar and typical structure impressed upon and inwrapped in -this compound germ, which is to grow into a fœtal development by a -law of its own. There will at the same time be a particular law of -development for each distinct species of animal, and a general law of -development for a great variety of species among whom there obtains a -common process of the sexual union and of the contribution of male and -female cellular substance. When the fœtus becomes formed, there will -still be marked resemblances in the different species, before the stage -is reached at which the characteristic structure of each species is to -begin to unfold itself. But at some time the fundamental difference of -structure originally lodged in the cellular substances of which the -compound ante-fœtal germ was composed, and impressed upon that germ as -the type which was gradually to unfold itself into a distinct being, -will begin to exert its force. The resemblances of structure will -become less and less, as the fœtus of the different animals approaches -to the time of birth. Organs, or appearances of organs, which at one -stage of the comparison have seemed to indicate descent from a common -ancestral stock, but which may have been only the result of a common -process of fœtal development, will be found to be varied by force of -the original diversity of structure and destiny that was made to reside -in the seminal substance of each distinct species of animal; and, at -length, this original and intentional peculiarity of structure and -being would become perfected at or before the period when birth is to -take place, leaving only those resemblances which must obtain in all -organisms constructed in certain respects upon a uniform plan, and -brought into being by a common process of procreation and gestation. - -Let us now see whether this reasoning involves any such unphilosophical -or unscientific belief as is supposed. Passing by the often-repeated -assertion that the facts of comparative embryologic development are -reconcilable only with the belief in evolution, let us advert to some -of those facts. "The substitutions," says Mr. Spencer, "of organs and -the suppression of organs, are among those secondary embryological -phenomena which harmonize with the belief in evolution, but can not -be reconciled with any other belief. There are cases where, during -its earlier stages of development, an embryo possesses organs that -afterward dwindle away, as there arise other organs to discharge the -same functions. And there are cases where organs make their appearance, -grow to certain points, have no functions to discharge, and disappear -by absorption." The concrete illustration of this substitution and -suppression of organs is thus given by Mr. Spencer: - -"We have a remarkable instance of this substitution in the successive -temporary appliances for aërating the blood which the mammalian embryo -exhibits. During the first phase of its development, the mammalian -embryo circulates its blood through a system of vessels distributed -over what is called the _area vasculosa_, a system of vessels -homologous with one which, among fishes, serves for aërating the blood -until the permanent respiratory organs come into play. After a time, -there buds out from the mammalian embryo a vascular membrane called the -allantois, homologous with one which, in birds and reptiles, replaces -the first as a breathing apparatus. But while, in the higher oviparous -vertebrates, the allantois serves the purpose of a lung during the -rest of embryonic life, it does not do so in the mammalian embryo. In -implacental mammals it aborts, having no function to discharge; and in -the higher mammals it becomes "placentiferous, and serves as the means -of intercommunication between the parent and the offspring"--becomes -an organ of nutrition more than of respiration. Now, since the first -system of external blood-vessels, not being in contact with a directly -oxygenated medium, can not be very serviceable to the mammalian embryo -as a lung; and since the second system of external blood-vessels is, to -the implacental embryo, of no greater avail than the first; and since -the communication between the embryo and the placenta among placental -mammals might as well or better have been made directly, instead -of by metamorphosis of the allantois--these substitutions appear -unaccountable as results of design. But they are quite congruous with -the supposition that the mammalian type arose out of lower vertebrate -types. For, in such case, the mammalian embryo, passing through states -representing, more or less distinctly, those which its remote ancestors -had, in common with the lower _vertebrata_, develops these subsidiary -organs in like ways with the lower vertebrata."[87] - -In what way, then, are these substitutions unaccountable as results -of design, and why are they any more congruous with the supposition -that the mammalian type arose out of the lower vertebrate type? In the -first place, it is necessary to have a distinct conception of what -is meant by design. In the present case, it means that for a certain -large group of animals there was established a system of reproduction -by the sexual union of male and female, each contributing a cellular -substance peculiar to itself, in the formation of a compound cellular -substance in which the separate substances are united, and which is -to be developed into the fœtus by a law of growth; and as a further -design there is wrapped up in the compound germ of each distinct -species of animal a typical plan of ultimate form and structure. -This typical plan can not be detected in the germ itself, as it is -too subtile and obscure even for the microscope; but we have every -reason to believe that it is there in all its distinctness of original -purpose, because at a later stage of the embryonic development we -find a distinct species of animal is the result. This is a conclusion -that must be adopted by the evolutionist, as well as by the believer -in special creations, because it has nothing to do with the question -of how distinct species came to exist. Whether they were designedly -and separately created, or were evolved out of one another, the -reproductive process by which the individuals of the same species -are brought into being alike involves the conclusion that, in the -ante-fœtal germ of that species, there is somehow involved, in a form -so minute that it can not be seen, the type of animal which is to -belong to that species, and to no other. Here, then, we have the grand -and compound design which is to obtain throughout a whole group of -different animals; namely, that they shall multiply in the production -of individuals of their own types, by a sexual union, in which the -male and the female each contributes a cellular substance of its own -to the formation of a compound germ, and in that germ there is made -to reside the typical form and structure of a distinct organism, so -minute that we can not see it, but which we must conclude from the -result has been put there to be developed by a law of growth ordained -for the accomplishment of a certain distinct order of beings. But -the very obscurity of this type, in the earliest stage of embryonic -development, leads to the conclusion that while it will never be lost, -so long as its life is preserved, it will unfold itself in ways that -will be equally beyond our ken, until the point is reached where it is -no longer obscured, but where it is revealed in all its distinctness -of outline and its peculiarity of structure. What is certain and -invariable is, that the type peculiar to the species is at some time -in the growth of the individual animal perfectly developed. But in the -modes of its development through different embryonic stages, there will -be variations and substitutions of organs in the different species, -but in each distinct species these variations and substitutions will -be uniformly the same, because the law of development imposed by -the distinct type, while it may operate differently among different -species, will always operate in the same way in the same species. -Thus in one animal the development from the original type which was -implanted in its seminal ante-fœtal germ may at one stage exhibit an -organ for which at a later stage another organ will be substituted; and -in another animal a seemingly corresponding organ may serve a different -purpose, or may altogether abort. These embryologic phenomena, varying -in different species, but occurring uniformly in the same species, -are necessarily among the most obscure of all the phenomena of animal -life, on account of the fact that they take place where we can not -watch the changes or modifications as they are taking place during -actual fœtal life. But they are no more explicable upon the hypothesis -of the descent of distinct animals from a common stock, than they are -upon the hypothesis of distinct creations of species. Upon the former -hypothesis, the assumed propinquity of descent implies the preservation -of the same mode of embryonic development until it becomes varied by -the operation of causes that bring about a new habit of development, -and then a fixation in this new habit after a new species or a new -ancestral stock is formed; so that in each distinct species there comes -at length to be a uniform process of substituting and suppressing -organs, or changing the functions of organs. But how are we to account -for the operation of causes that have preserved a parallelism of -development, along with the operation of causes that have produced the -different modes of development, when all the species are supposed to be -derived from a common ancestral stock, which first began to procreate -and to develop its descendants in one and the same way? What are the -facts which will enable us to say that the mammalian type arose out -of the lower vertebrate types, when we compare the different modes -of their embryologic development? How are we to estimate the chances -for a preservation of so much resemblance as exists between the two -in their embryologic lives, and the chances for the variations that -are observable? What we can safely conclude is that there is a law -which holds each species in a constant repetition of its own fœtal -growth, according to its unvarying development in the same series of -changes, substitutions, or suppressions. But we can not safely conclude -that this species became formed in the supposed process of descent -from a remote ancestral stock, which may or may not have originally -exhibited the same series of changes, substitutions, or suppressions. -If the ancestors of the mammalian vertebrates were the kind of animal -supposed, we have to find, in order to justify the supposed descent, -those states which represent the correspondence between the mode in -which the ancestral stock developed its own embryos, when compared -with the mode in which the type of the lower vertebrata developed its -embryos, so as to make it reasonably certain that these subsidiary -organs derived their several substitutions or suppressions from the -process of descent, and not from any special mode of development -ordained for each distinct species. We may imagine these states through -which the mammalian embryo has passed, but as yet we have only a theory -which suggests their existence without facts to support it. The truth -would seem to be that this whole subject of comparative embryology, -upon the hypothesis of the kinship of all organized beings, or the -descent of many distinct species from a common stock, is involved in -very great difficulties; not the least of which is the difficulty of -explaining how the diverging descendants from that stock came to be -endowed with habits of embryologic life and growth that resulted in the -production of very different modes of development, and at the same time -preserved for each new species its own peculiar mode of development. -To say, for example, that the mammalian embryo passed through states -representing, more or less distinctly, those which its remote ancestors -had in common with the lower vertebrata, and that it developed certain -subsidiary organs in like ways with the lower vertebrata, is merely to -state a theory, which, without some evidence that the mammalian embryo -was a formation resulting from a connection of lives with lives back -to a common ancestor whose embryo was developed as those of the lower -vertebrata are, amounts to nothing. Often as this want of evidence has -been adverted to, it must be here again pointed out: for the whole -argument from embryology, like that derived from a comparison of the -forms of mature animals, lacks the support of facts that are essential -to show the connection of life with life which descent from a common -ancestral stock necessarily implies. - -On the other hand, the hypothesis of the distinct creation of -different species deals with the phenomena of embryologic life in -a very different way. It supposes the creation of a pair, male and -female, and a law of procreation, designed for the multiplication of -individuals of a fixed type. It supposes many such creations, each -having in its own peculiar germ the characteristic type of organism -that will distinguish the mature animal from all the others. It -supposes finally a law of development common to all the species the -individuals of which are multiplied by the sexual union of male -and female; a law of growth under like conditions, which leads to -a parallelism of development until the typical plan of form and -structure designed for each distinct animal, and implanted in its germ, -begins to take on a mode of development peculiar to that species, -and at length the perfect individual of that species is the result. -In this hypothesis, therefore, there is no necessity for resorting -to any connection with an imaginary ancestral stock of a different -type, or for resorting to a theoretical process by which successive -generations may be supposed to have gradually arisen out of the -ancestral stock by successive changes which have at length resulted -in a totally new species. The new species is what is supposed to have -been aboriginally created, and to have been placed under its own law -for the multiplication of individuals of the same type. In point of -simplicity, of comparative certainty, of freedom from accidental -causes of variation of which we can predicate no specific result, this -hypothesis seems to have a far greater degree of probable evidence in -its favor than the theory which entirely lacks the requisite evidence -of intermediate connections between the lives of one species with the -lives of a remote and different species. For, while it may be truly -said that no man ever saw a special creation take place, and while such -an act of the infinite power is of a nature that places it beyond the -observation of our senses, it is neither inconceivable nor improbable, -nor inconsistent with the idea of the divine attributes which we -derive from the study of nature. On the other hand, it is not only -equally true that no man ever saw, or in the nature of things ever can -see, an evolution of distinct species out of other distinct species, -but the whole nature of the supposed process of transformation involves -an element of chance which forbids all calculation of the results. -How, for example, in this very matter of comparative embryological -development on the hypothesis of descent of all the species of the -vertebrate animals from a common ancestral stock of a different type, -are we to account for the fact that the embryo of any one of the -descended species has come to be developed in a mode peculiar to itself -and differing from the mode in which the embryo of the ancestral stock -was developed? The law of sexual union, under which the individuals -of the supposed ancestral stock were multiplied, must have imposed on -that species an invincible necessity of reproducing in its offspring -the same type that constituted the peculiar organism of the parents, -whether these parents were or were not the fittest survivors of their -race after the severest struggle for existence which they may have had -to undergo. If the pair, or the male of that pair, has in the course -of that struggle acquired a new organ, or more completely developed -an old one, before the act of procreation takes place, how is it that -the ovum is developed into the fœtus, and the fœtus into the newly -born infant, in an invariable mode peculiar to the species to which -the parents belonged? Why did not the same causes of variation which -are supposed to have changed the ancestral type into one of a new and -entirely distinct character, also vary the mode of fœtal development? -When and how did the new organs become fixed in the type which the -parents have transmitted to the offspring? And if they became so -fixed in the germ which was formed out of the cellular substance -contributed by each of the parents, why do we find in every known -species participating in this process of reproduction a uniform mode -of embryologic development peculiar to the species, and exhibiting its -own suppressions and substitutions of organs, irrespective of any newly -acquired peculiarities in the individual structures of the parents? - -The believer in special creations has to answer no such questions as -these. His hypothesis assumes the creation of a pair of animals of a -certain distinct species; a law of procreation and gestation common -to a vast multitude of organisms; and a law of embryologic growth -peculiar to each species. Whatever peculiarities of structure may have -been possessed by the immediate parents of any individual of any one -of these different species--peculiarities which did not separate the -parents from their race, but only made them the fittest survivors of -their race--those peculiarities would or would not descend to their -immediate offspring, according to varying and very inappreciable -circumstances. But that which constituted the special type of the -race, and especially that which constituted its peculiar mode of -development during the embryonic stage, would remain unaffected by -these incidental and accidental peculiarities of the parents, because, -from all that we can discover, that special type was impressed upon -the embryo at the earliest stage of its existence, and constituted -the living model that was to be developed into the perfect animal of -that species, by a law which placed it beyond the influence of any -adventitious and non-essential advantages which the male or female -parent may have acquired over other individuals of the same race. So -that, if the postulate of a special creation of species be assumed -as the groundwork of the reasoning, we have to go through with no -speculations about a common ancestral stock of all the species, and -we have to account for no phenomena that are exposed to chances which -might have produced very different results from those which are open to -our observation, and results of which we can predicate nothing with -any degree of certainty. On the hypothesis of the special creation of -a species, and an aboriginal pair of each species, with all that this -implies, we can with a high degree of certainty predicate most of the -phenomena that we have to observe, and more especially so much of the -phenomena of embryologic growth of the different species as are open to -our investigation after the life of both mother and embryo has become -extinct. - -It only remains for me to give to this reasoning a concrete -application. Take the case made use of by Mr. Spencer in the passage -above cited--that of the "allantois," a vascular membrane, which is -said to be in the mammalian embryo homologous with one which in the -higher oviparous vertebrates, such as the birds and reptiles, replaces -what was at first a breathing apparatus, and becomes for them, during -the rest of embryonic life, a sort of lung, or an organ that aërates -the blood until the permanent respiratory organs come into play. In -the mammalian embryo, the first appliance for aërating the blood is -described as a system of vessels distributed over the _area vasculosa_, -and like that which is first observable for the same purpose in -fishes. But, as the mammalian embryo continues to grow, a change -takes place. There buds out from it the vascular membrane called the -"allantois," which is substituted in the place of the first aërating -apparatus. Then a further change takes place, as between the higher -oviparous vertebrates and the mammalian vertebrates. In the former, the -"allantois" continues to perform the breathing function through the -rest of the embryonic life. In the mammalian vertebrates it undergoes -two changes: In the implacental mammals, it aborts, having no function -to discharge; in the placental mammals it becomes modified into another -organ, namely, that which serves to convey nutrition from the mother to -the offspring. After birth, it is of course ended. - -Now, the reasoning, or rather the assertion, that these substitutions -are unaccountable as the results of design, appears to me to be -singularly inconclusive. It is quite illogical, according to all -philosophic meaning of design as applied to the works of the Creator, -or to the works of nature, if that term is preferred, to argue that -a particular object could have been better accomplished directly, -than by a metamorphosis of an organ from one function to another, or -by substitution. The metamorphosis, or substitution, which in such -cases we find in nature, is of itself the very highest evidence that -the indirect method was the best, if we admit the idea of a Creator, -because it was the method chosen by a being of infinite perfections -for reasons which we may not be able to discover, but which we must -presume to have existed, if we concede that hypothesis of attributes -which "design" in this case necessarily implies. But how are these -metamorphoses and substitutions any more accountable upon the -supposition that the mammalian type arose by generation out of the -lower vertebrate types which in their embryonic life exhibited the same -changes? The doctrine or theory of evolution does not account for them -at all; for, while the doctrine supposes, as matters of pure theory, -that there were certain states through which the mammalian embryo -passed, which represented more or less distinctly those which it had in -common with its assumed remote ancestors, the lower vertebrata, it does -nothing more than to suggest the theoretical idea that the mammalian -embryo came to develop these subsidiary organs in the mode in which -they were developed in the embryo of the lower vertebrata, because it -was descended from the lower vertebrata. The varying states through -which the embryo passed from the lower vertebrata to the mammalian -type, are all hypothetical, and there is, therefore, no basis of -fact on which to rest the belief in a common mode of development, as -resulting from a connection of lives with lives between the mammalian -type and the types of birds, reptiles, or fishes. - -On the other hand, the hypothesis of the special creation of a species -implies the simple fact of a designed process of embryonic development -for each species, with substitutions of organs and changes of function -in certain organs peculiar to that species; a fact which may well -consist in a certain parallelism in the different metamorphoses, and -a preservation of the same unvarying changes in the development of -each separate embryo. Why these changes should exist, we can not tell; -but their existence is very strong proof that they were designed, or -made to take place, for some reason, if we admit the hypothesis of a -Creator. For that hypothesis, we must look to a wider class of facts, -and to the whole phenomena of nature. - -4. We now come to the argument from distribution. This is one of the -weakest of the indirect supports of the doctrine of evolution; but, -as it is much relied upon, it must be stated with all the force that -it is supposed to have. The facts that are relied upon are these: -When we survey the whole surface of the globe, so far as it is known -to us, we find, in the first place, that the areas which have similar -conditions (of soil and climate), and sometimes, where the areas are -nearly adjacent, are occupied by quite different faunas. On the other -hand, it is said that areas remote from each other in latitude, and -contrasted in soil and climate, are occupied by closely allied faunas. -The inference drawn is, that there is no manifest predetermined -adaptation of the organisms to the areas, or habitats, in which they -are found, because we do not find that like organisms are universally -or generally found in like habitats, nor very unlike organisms in very -unlike habitats. The conclusion is, that the facts of distribution -in space do not conform to the hypothesis of design. In other words, -the different animals found in different regions were not specially -designed for those regions, but some of them have extended into regions -of a different character; and when the regions are very unlike there -are not found very unlike organisms, but there is a general similarity, -or a less extensive variety. There is said, also, to be another -important fact, namely, that "the similar areas peopled by dissimilar -forms are those between which there are impassable barriers; while the -dissimilar areas peopled by similar forms, are those between which -there are no such barriers." Hence is drawn the conclusion that "each -species of organism tends ever to expand its sphere of existence--to -intrude on other areas, other modes of life, other media."[88] A good -deal of aid is supposed to be derived for this argument respecting -animal life by analogies drawn from the vegetable kingdom; but I -can not help thinking that there is much caution to be observed in -formulating such analogies into a law of universal application, or into -one that relates to the existence of animal organisms. The origin, -the multiplication, and the spread of animals involve a principle of -life, organization and development which is very different in some -important respects from that which obtains in the vegetable world. -But, without laying any stress upon this distinction, and without -intending to deprive the argument for animal evolution of any aid which -it can derive from such supposed analogies, I pass to the specific -argument respecting animal distribution. The argument is this: Races -of organisms become distributed over different areas, and also through -different media. They are thrust by the pressure of overpopulation from -their old into new habitats, and as they diverge more widely in space -they undergo more and more modifications of structure, by reason of the -new conditions on which they enter. Thus, these powerfully incident -forces, the new conditions on which the migrating races enter in new -regions, vary the structure which they originally brought with them, -and which descended to them from the common stock of which they were -modified descendants. The widest divergences in space, under such -circumstances, will indicate the longest periods of time during which -these various descendants from a common stock have been subject to -modifying conditions. There will, therefore, come to be, it is said, -among organisms of the same group, smaller contrasts of structure in -the smaller areas; and, where the varying incident forces vary greatly -within given areas, the alterations will become more numerous than in -equal areas which are less variously conditioned: that is to say, in -the most uniform regions there will be the fewest species, and in the -most multiform regions there will be the most numerous species. These -hypotheses are said to be in accordance with the facts of distribution -in space.[89] - -But there are also facts of distribution through different media. The -meaning of this is, that, whereas all forms of organisms have descended -from some primordial simplest form, which inhabited some one medium, -such as the water, its descendants, by migration into some other -medium or other media, underwent adaptations to media quite unlike -the original medium. In other words, the earth and the air have been -colonized from the water. Numerous facts are adduced in support of this -conclusion, which are thus summarized: - - There are particular habitats in which animals are subject to changes - of media. In such habitats exist animals having, in various degrees, - the power to live in both media, consequent on various phases of - transitional organization. Near akin to these animals, there are some - that, after passing their early lives in the water, acquire more - completely the structures fitting them to live on land, to which - they then migrate. Lastly, we have closely-allied creatures like - the Surinam toad and the terrestrial salamander, which, though they - belong by their structures to the class Amphibia, are not amphibious - in their habits--creatures the larvæ of which do not pass their early - lives in the water, and yet go through these same metamorphoses! - Must we, then, think that the distribution of kindred organisms - through different media presents an insurmountable difficulty? On the - contrary, with facts like these before us, the evolution-hypothesis - supplies possible interpretations of many phenomena that are else - unaccountable. Realizing the way in which such changes of media are - in some cases gradually imposed by physical conditions, and in other - cases voluntarily commenced and slowly increased in the search after - food, we shall begin to understand how, in the course of evolution, - there have arisen those strange obscurations of one type by the - externals of another type. When we see land-birds occasionally feeding - by the water-side, and then learn that one of them, the water-ouzel, - an "anomalous member of the strictly terrestrial thrush family, wholly - subsists by diving--grasping the stones with its feet and using its - wings under water"--we are enabled to comprehend how, under pressure - of population, aquatic habits may be acquired by creatures organized - for aërial life; and how there may eventually arise an ornithic type, - in which the traits of the bird are very much disguised. - - Finding among mammals some that, in search of prey or shelter, have - taken to the water in various degrees, we shall cease to be perplexed - on discovering the mammalian structure hidden under a fish-like form, - as it is in the Cetacea. Grant that there has even been going on that - redistribution of organisms which we see still resulting from their - intrusions on one another's areas, media, and modes of life, and we - have an explanation of those multitudinous cases in which homologies - of structure are complicated with analogies. And while it accounts for - the occurrence, in one medium of organic types fundamentally organized - for another medium, the doctrine of evolution accounts also for the - accompanying unfitness. Either the seal has descended from some mammal - which, little by little, became aquatic in its habits, in which - case the structure of its hind-limbs has a meaning; or else it was - specially framed for its present habitat, in which case the structure - of its hind-limbs is incomprehensible.[90] - -Along with these phenomena of distribution in space and in medium of -life, we have the further element of distribution in time; the facts -of which are admitted, however, to be too fragmentary to be conclusive -either for or against the doctrine of evolution. Still it is claimed -that there is one general truth respecting distribution in time, -which is "profoundly significant, namely, that the relations between -the extinct forms of life, found by geological exploration, and the -present forms of life, especially in each great geographical region, -show in the aggregate a close kinship, and a connection which is in -perfect harmony with the belief in evolution, but quite irreconcilable -with any other belief. As Mr. Darwin has expressed it, there is 'a -wonderful relationship in the same continent between the living and the -dead.'"[91] - -The argument from distribution is thus summed up by Mr. Spencer: - - Given, then, that pressure which species exercise on one another, - in consequence of the universal overfilling of their respective - habitats--given the resulting tendency to thrust themselves into one - another's areas, and media, and modes of life, along such lines of - least resistance as from time to time are found--given, besides the - changes in modes of life hence arising, those other changes which - physical alterations of habitats necessitate--given the structural - modifications directly or indirectly produced in organisms by modified - conditions--and the facts of distribution in space and time are - accounted for. That divergence and redivergence of organic forms, - which we saw to be shadowed forth by the truths of classification - and the truths of embryology, we see to be also shadowed forth by - the truths of distribution. If that aptitude to multiply, to spread, - to separate, and to differentiate, which the human races have in - all times shown, be a tendency common to races in general, as we - have ample reason to assume, then there will result that kind of - relation among the species, and genera, and orders, peopling the - earth's surface, which we find exists. Those remarkable identities - of type discovered between organisms inhabiting one medium, and - strangely-modified organisms inhabiting another medium, are at - the same time rendered comprehensible. And the appearances and - disappearances of species which the geological record shows us, as - well as the connections between successive groups of species from - early eras down to our own, cease to be inexplicable.[92] - -Passing by what is here said of the aptitude of the human race to -multiply, to spread, to separate, and to differentiate--an aptitude -which has never resulted in the production of an essentially different -animal, or in anything but incidental variations within the limits -of the same species--I propose now to apply to this argument from -distribution a test which seems to me to be a perfectly fair one, -and one which it ought to be able to encounter. If the theory that -the different species of animals now known to us have been evolved -successively by descent from some primordial simplest form through -modifications induced by change of habitation, of medium of life, and -accumulation of new structures occurring through an immense period of -time, be a sound hypothesis, the process which has evolved superior out -of inferior organizations ought, in consistency with itself and with -all its supposed conditions, to be capable of being reversed, so as -to lead to the evolution of inferior out of superior organisms. For, -although the doctrine of evolution has thus far been applied only to -facts which are supposed to show an ascent in the scale of being, the -argument ought to be equally good for a descent in the scale of being, -provided we take care to include all the elements and causes of a -change of structure, mode and medium of life, and the necessary element -of time, in the operation of the process. The imaginary case that is -about to be put shall include all the elements of the evolutionary -hypothesis, and will serve to test at least the rationality of that -theory. - -Let it be supposed, then, that there was a period in the history of -this earth when the whole human race, however it originated, was -confined to an island, thousands of miles from any other land. This -race of men adapted to a life in one medium, the air, may be supposed -to have so far advanced in the ruder arts of hunting and fishing, -and in the higher art of tillage, as to be able for many generations -to support life by what the sea and the land would put within their -reach, and by the product which their rude agriculture could extract -from the soil, or which the soil would spontaneously yield. But as the -centuries flow on, the population begins to press upon the resources -of the territory, and the struggle for life becomes very great. At -length a point is reached where the supply of food from the land -becomes inadequate to sustain the population, and what can be made -up from the sea will not supply the deficiency. The population will -then slowly decrease, but, while this decrease goes on, there comes -in a disturbing cause which will prevent any adjustment of the supply -of food to the diminished number of the consumers. The sea begins by -almost imperceptible but steadily progressing encroachments to diminish -the area of dry land; a change of climate reduces the number of other -animals available for human food, and reduces the productive capacity -of the earth. Then ensues that struggle for existence which is supposed -to entail changes of medium of life, and to induce transformations of -structure. The conditions of existence have become wholly changed. -The wretched descendants of a once comparatively thriving race are -dwelling on a territory which has become a marsh. They have no means -of migrating to another territory; they can only migrate to another -medium. They begin by feeding exclusively on what the water will -afford. They pass their lives in the pursuit of a prey which lives -only in the water, and in this change of life they acquire or develop -organs adapted to the new condition, organs which, in such miserable -reproduction of their own species as can go on, they transmit to their -offspring. Modifications upon modifications accumulate in this way -through untold periods of time, until at last a new aquatic or a new -amphibious creature is formed, and the difference between that creature -and his remote ancestral human stock is as great as that between man -and the seal, or between man and any fish that swims. Still, there will -be peculiarities of structure retained, which might lead any inhabitant -of another world, alighting on this globe and undertaking to trace the -origin of this new creature, to the supposition that he was akin to a -race of men whose fossil remains he might find buried in some stratum -beneath the marsh which was the last habitat of this unfortunate race, -when it had all the characteristics of its original type. - -Is it conceivable that this transformation could take place? Could such -a condition and situation result in anything but the utter extinction -of the human race, or, in other words, in an absolute break? Could -there be any modifications exhibited by the last survivors of that race -other than those which are familiar to us among the varieties of the -human species which have never separated themselves from their race, -and between whom and their ancestral stock, wherever it was originally -placed on this globe, we recognize no fundamental difference of -structure, whatever may have been the changes of habitat or conditions -of life? Yet the conditions and elements of this imaginary case, -which is simply the process of evolution reversed, are just what the -evolution theory assumes as the causes of that modification which -proceeds from a lower to a higher organism; and whatever may be said of -the tendency, through "the survival of the fittest," to evolve higher -out of lower forms of animal life, if we allow time enough for the -process, there is no reason, in the nature of things, why corresponding -conditions should not lead to a degradation as well as to an elevation -in the scale of beings. There is, however, one reason why no such -potency should be ascribed to the conditions, either in respect to -the one result or the other. That reason is that all such causes of -modification, either in the ascending or the descending scale, are so -limited in their effects that distinct beings can not be rationally -predicated as their product, whereas the power of the Infinite -Artificer to give existence to distinct beings is absolutely without -limit. If naturalists would turn their attention to the limitations -upon the power of all such causes as those which are supposed to work -in the process of evolution, and would give us the explanations to -which those limitations point, in those cases of local variation which -are exhibited by animals that can clearly be traced to a parent form, -they would not be compelled to resort to a sweeping theory that refuses -all force to any hypothesis but its own. - -But now let us go a step further in this imaginary case. Let us suppose -that after this new creature, fish or amphibian, descended from the -human race, has inhabited the water surrounding the ill-fated island -for a million of years, another great change takes place. The water -begins to recede from the land by gradations as slow as those by which -in the former period it encroached. The land rises from the low level -to which it had sunk, by volcanic action. Forests spring up upon the -sides of mountains. The soil becomes firm; verdure overspreads the -fields; the climate grows genial; the wilderness blossoms as the rose. -Allow another million years for this restoration of the territory -to an inhabitable condition. Slowly and in an unbroken series of -generations the aquatic creatures, descended from the ancient human -inhabitants of the island, emerge from the sea and betake themselves -to the land. Modifications upon modifications accumulate, new organs -are acquired; the survival of the fittest perpetuates them; the animals -ascend in the scale of being, until the human type is again evolved -out of the degraded descendants of the population which two millions -of years previously dwelt as men upon the island, and carried on in -some primitive fashion the simpler arts of human life. Is not this just -as supposable as the evolution of the human race out of some lower -form of organism? Are not all the elements--time, migration from one -medium to another, change of conditions, and what is supposed to lead -to the production of different organisms--just as powerful to produce -the inferior out of the superior as to produce the superior out of the -inferior, and so on interchangeably? The answer in each case is, that -all such causes of modification in the animal kingdom are limited; that -when once a distinct species is in existence, we have no evidence that -it loses its distinct type or merges itself in another, although the -earth may be full of evidence that types which formerly existed are no -longer among the living organisms. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [79] "Biology," i, p. 366. - - [80] "In the presence of the various genealogical trees of animal - descent which have been put forward so frequently of late, a judicious - skepticism seems the attitude best warranted by the evidence yet - obtained. If so many similar forms have arisen in mutual independence, - then the affinities of the animal kingdom can never be represented by - the symbol of a tree. Rather, we should conceive of the existence of - a grove of trees, closely approximated, greatly differing in age and - size, with their branches interlaced in a most complex entanglement. - The great group of apes is composed of two such branches; but their - relations one to another, to the other branches which represent - mammalian groups, and to the trunks from which such branches diverge, - are problems still awaiting solution."--_"Encyclopædia Britannica," - article "Apes."_ - - [81] "Biology," i, pp. 380-382. - - [82] I use these terms with quotation-marks, because I do not admit - any philosophical antagonism such as they are intended to imply. - - [83] "Homology" is defined by lexicographers as "the doctrine of - similar parts." "Homologous organs" is a term used by scientific - writers to describe organs having a relation of some proportion to - each other. In this particular case of the vertebral column, the - different parts of the column are treated as if they were different - organs, and they are said to be homologous organs in the same animal, - because they bear a certain relation or ratio of proportion to each - other. - - [84] See the discussion of how evolution works, _post_. - - [85] "Biology," i, p. 387. - - [86] The Greek philosophers, as we have seen, before Plato and - Aristotle, found that their systems of causes, which did not involve - the idea of power as abstracted from substance, would not account for - the phenomena of nature. With all their subtilty and ingenuity, they - did not reach the truth that secondary causes are necessarily limited - in their action, and that there must be an unlimited cause. - - [87] "Biology," i, pp. 369, 370. - - [88] "Biology," i, p. 388. - - [89] "Biology," i, pp. 390, 391. - - [90] "Biology," i, p. 396. - - [91] "Biology," i, p. 399. It is to be noted that the relationship - here referred to is supposed or apparent kinship between the - _aggregate_ of the surviving and the _aggregate_ of the extinct forms - which have died out in recent geologic times. But this does not supply - the steps of descent by which any one surviving form can be traced - back to any one extinct form. - - [92] "Biology," i, p. 401. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - Mr. Spencer's agnosticism--His theory of the origin of religious - beliefs--The mode in which mankind are to lose the consciousness of a - personal God. - - -In a former chapter I had occasion to advert to one of Mr. Spencer's -favorite dogmas, namely, the impossibility of an intellectual -conception of creation, which he thinks is made apparent by the -statement that one term of the relation, the thing created, is -something, and the other term of the relation, that out of which the -thing was created, is nothing. When I wrote the chapter in which I -commented on this extraordinary kind of logic, I felt a little disposed -to apologize to my readers for answering it. I had not then met with -the fuller statement of Mr. Spencer's peculiar agnosticism which I -am now about to quote. The controversy recently carried on between -Mr. Spencer and Mr. Harrison was closed by the former in an article -entitled "Last Words about Agnosticism and the Religion of Humanity," -which appeared in the "Nineteenth Century" for November, 1884. This -drew my attention to a passage in Mr. Spencer's "Essays," which he -has reproduced in his late article for the purpose of repeating his -position against some of the misrepresentations which he complains -had been made of it by Mr. Harrison. I have nothing to do with the -controversy between these two gentlemen, or with any of the arguments -which Mr. Spencer's opponents, be they churchmen or laymen, have -employed against him. I take the passage as he has quoted it from his -"Essays," for the purpose of making his agnostic views the subject of -a more extended commentary than I had bestowed on them in my previous -chapter, in writing which I had before me only a passage contained in -his "Biology." There is no occasion, however, for altering a word of -what I had previously written; for, on a comparison of his position as -given in the "Biology," and that given in the "Essays," it appears very -plainly that I had not misunderstood him. But as the passage in the -"Essays" displays much more fully the peculiar reasoning by which he -supports his agnostic philosophy, I should not do justice to him or to -my readers if I did not notice it. The passage is the following: - - Always implying terms in relation, thought implies that both terms - shall be more or less defined; and as fast as one of them becomes - indefinite, the relation also becomes indefinite, and thought becomes - indistinct. Take the case of magnitudes. I think of an inch; I think - of a foot; and having tolerably definite ideas of the two, I have a - tolerably definite idea of the relation between them. I substitute - for the foot a mile; and being able to represent a mile much less - definitely, I can not so definitely think of the relation between an - inch and a mile--can not distinguish it in thought from the relation - between an inch and two miles, as clearly as I can distinguish in - thought the relation between an inch and one foot from the relation - between an inch and two feet. And now, if I endeavor to think of the - relation between an inch and the 240,000 miles from here to the moon, - or the relation between an inch and the 92,000,000 miles from here to - the sun, I find that while these distances, practically inconceivable, - have become little more than numbers to which I frame no answering - ideas, so too has the relation between an inch and either of them - become practically inconceivable. Now this partial failure in the - process of forming thought relations, which happens even with finite - magnitudes when one of them is immense, passes into complete failure - when one of them can not be brought within any limits. The relation - itself becomes unrepresentable at the same time that one of its terms - becomes unrepresentable. Nevertheless, in this case it is to be - observed that the almost blank form of relation preserves a certain - qualitative character. It is still distinguishable as belonging to - the consciousness of extensions, not to the consciousnesses of forces - or durations; and in so far remains a vaguely identifiable relation. - But now suppose we ask what happens when one term of the relation has - not simply magnitude having no known limits, and duration of which - neither beginning nor end is cognizable, but is also an existence - not to be defined? In other words, what must happen if one term - of the relation is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively - unrepresentable? Clearly in this case the relation does not simply - cease to be thinkable except as a relation of a certain class, but it - lapses completely. When one of the terms becomes wholly unknowable, - the law of thought can no longer be conformed to; both because one - term can not be present, and because relation itself can not be framed - ... In brief, then, to Mr. Martineau's objection I reply that the - insoluble difficulties he indicates arise here, as elsewhere, when - thought is applied to that which transcends the sphere of thought; - and that just as when we try to pass beyond phenomenal manifestations - to the Ultimate Reality manifested, we have to symbolize it out of - such materials as the phenomenal manifestations give us; so we have - simultaneously to symbolize the connection between this Ultimate - Reality and its manifestations, as somehow allied to the connections - among the phenomenal manifestations themselves. The truth Mr. - Martineau's criticism adumbrates is that the law of thought fails - where the elements of thought fail; and this is a conclusion quite - conformable to the general view I defend. Still holding the validity - of my argument against Hamilton and Mansel, that in pursuance of - their own principle the Relative is not at all thinkable _as such_, - unless in contradiction to some existence posited, however vaguely, - as the other term of a relation, conceived however indefinitely; it - is consistent on my part to hold that in this effort which thought - inevitably makes to pass beyond its sphere, not only does the product - of thought become a dim symbol of a product, but the process of - thought becomes a dim symbol of a process; and hence any predicament - inferable from the law of thought can not be asserted.[93] - -In judging of the soundness of this reasoning, the first thing to be -done is to determine what we are thinking about when we compare the -finite with the infinite, or when, to put it as Mr. Spencer does, we -have two terms of a relation, one of which is a thing open to the -observation of our senses, and the other of which lies beyond them. -In this case, does all thinkable relation lapse, or fade into an -impossible conception, when we undertake to conceive of that which -lies beyond what we see? Does the relation between the two supposed -terms cease to be a continuously existing relation? Or, to quote Mr. -Spencer's words, is it true that "insoluble difficulties arise, because -thought is applied to that which is beyond the sphere of thought"? - -We must be careful to distinguish between the "insoluble difficulties" -which arise out of the imperfection of language adequate to give -a formal description of a thing, and which may lead us to suppose -ourselves involved in contradictions, and the "insoluble difficulties" -which may arise out of the impossibility of having a mental -representation of that thing. The latter is the only difficulty about -which we need concern ourselves; and the best way to test the supposed -difficulty as an insuperable one is to take one of the illustrations -used by Mr. Spencer--the idea of space. We measure a foot or a mile -of space, and then compare it with the idea of endless or (to us) -immeasurable space. Figures afford us the means of expressing in -language a certain definite number of miles of space, but, beyond the -highest figures of which we have definite forms of expression, we can -not go in definite descriptions of space. But when we have exhausted -all the expressions of number that our arithmetical forms of expression -admit, does it follow that we can not conceive of extension beyond -that number? On the contrary, the very measure which we are able to -express in figures, to a certain extent, in regard both to space and -time, gives us the idea of space and time, and shows us that there -must be an extension of both beyond and forever beyond the portion of -either which language will allow us definitely to describe. This to -us immeasurable and indescribable extent of space or time becomes a -thinkable idea, because we are all the while thinking of space or time, -whether it is a measurable portion of either, or an immeasurable and -endless existence. - -Take as another illustration a purely moral idea. We know that there is -a moral quality which we call goodness; an attribute of human character -of which we have a clear conception, and which we can describe because -it is manifested to us in human lives. When we speak of the moral -phenomena to which we give the name of goodness, or virtue, all mankind -know what is meant. But human virtue is imperfect, limited, measurable. -It may be idealized into something approaching to perfection, but the -ideal character thus drawn must fall short of perfection if it is made -consistent with human nature. But from human character we derive the -idea of goodness or virtue as a thinkable idea. Is the idea of absolute -perfection of this quality any less thinkable? Absolute perfection -of moral character can not be described by a definition; but, as we -know that a measurable goodness which we can describe exists, wherein -consists the failure or lapse of a thinkable relation, when we reason -from that which exists in a measurable degree to that which transcends -all degree? We are all the while thinking of goodness or virtue, -whether we think of it as limited and imperfect, or as unlimited and -perfect. Take another quality--power. We know that there is such a -quality as power, wielded by human beings, and guided by their will. -But human power is limited, measurable, and therefore finite. When we -reason from the finite power of man to the idea of an infinite and -immeasurable power held and wielded by another being, do we strive to -conceive of something that is unthinkable because we can only say that -the power of that other being is without limit? We are all the while -thinking of power, of the quality of power, whether we think of it -as measurable or immeasurable. All qualities and all faculties which -are manifested to us in a limited degree, when we conceive of them -as unlimited and without degree, become proofs that what exists in a -measurable and limited degree may exist without limitation and without -degree. Although we can only define the finite, the infinite is not -the less a subject of true thinking, because, whether we think of the -finite or the infinite, what we are all the time thinking about is the -quality of power, and nothing else. In the one case it is limited, in -the other it is unlimited, but it is all the time the quality itself of -which we are thinking.[94] - -But now let us attend a little more closely to Mr. Spencer's grand -objection to this mode of thinking. The reader will be careful to note -that what he needs to ascertain is, whether Mr. Spencer's agnostic -theory is really sound. To test it, he must inquire just where the -supposed difficulty lies. Translated into other language, Mr. Spencer's -position is this: In order to keep within the sphere of possible -thought, there must be a definite relation between any two ideas, which -must not lapse, but the two ideas must be equally capable of mental -representation. When one term of the relation is an idea capable of -mental representation, as when we think of a thing cognizable by our -senses, and the other term of the relation is something that lies -beyond them, the law of thought, according to Mr. Spencer, can no -longer be conformed to; the relation lapses; the latter term can not -be present to the mind; we pass out of the sphere of thought into that -which can not be a subject of thought, the unknown and the unknowable. -What takes place in this process is assumed to be this: We take -certain phenomenal manifestations which we are able to observe and to -describe. Out of the materials which these phenomenal manifestations -give us, we "symbolize the Ultimate Reality." We do this, by arguing -from the phenomenal manifestations which convince us of the existence -of a being whom we know and can observe, to the existence of a being -in whom we "symbolize" qualities and faculties which the phenomenal -manifestations show us to belong to human beings. At the same time we -represent to ourselves by the same symbolizing process a connection -between the Ultimate Reality and its manifestation, which is allied to -the connections among the phenomenal manifestations which we observe in -man, or in nature. In other words, we reason from what we see and can -measure and describe, to that which we can not see or describe, and we -end in a term of the relation which can not be present to the mind, and -thus no thinkable relation can be framed. - -Whatever may be said of the rational force of the evidence derived from -phenomenal manifestations which we can observe when we reason about -other phenomenal manifestations which we can not measure, it can not -be said that we have reached a term in the relation that is beyond -the sphere of thought. What I understand Mr. Spencer to mean when he -speaks of "symbolizing" out of the materials which the phenomenal -manifestations give us, may be a process liable to error, but it does -not involve or lead to the "insoluble difficulties" that are supposed -to arise. For example, when, from the existence and power of man, a -being whom we know, and whose phenomenal manifestations lead us to a -knowledge of his limited faculties, we reason to the existence of a -being whose faculties are boundless, we may be in danger of conclusions -into which imperfection will find its way; but it certainly is not -true that in thinking of unlimited power or goodness, or any other -unlimited quality, we transcend the sphere of thought. When we have -expressed in figures the greatest measurable idea of space that can -be so expressed, what do we "symbolize," when we say that beyond that -measured space there stretches a space that we can not measure, and to -which there is of necessity no limit? Does a thinkable relation cease -to exist, because one of the terms is immeasurable to us? As soon as we -have formed an idea of a measurable portion of space, we necessarily -have an idea of endless and immeasurable space; and in this deduction -we have employed no "symbol" formed out of the materials which the -measurable manifestations have given us. We have simply reached a -conclusion that is inevitable. We are all the while thinking of space, -whether it is definite space that we can measure, or indefinite space -that we can not measure. - -When the moral and intellectual qualities of men constitute one part -of the phenomenal manifestations which we adopt as the basis of -reasoning to the existence of God, we are in danger of assigning to -that being attributes of character which would be far from perfection. -Nearly all the religions that have existed, and of which we have much -knowledge--perhaps all of them but one--have displayed more or less of -this tendency. It is only necessary to instance the Hebrew Scriptures, -for there are parts of that narrative in which the Deity is represented -as actuated by something very much like human passions and motives, and -these representations are among the hardest things to be reconciled -with the idea that those books were inspired writings. Every one knows -with what effect these passages of the Hebrew Scriptures are used by -those who reject both the Old and the New Testaments as inspired books. -But is philosophy therefore to shrink from the use of materials with -which the world is filled, and which lead to the conception of a being -of infinite faculties and perfect goodness? Grant all that may be said -of the stupid and fatal errors into which men have been led by likening -the Deity to man: there remains a vast store-house of materials on -which to reason to the existence of God, which philosophy can not -afford to reject, which can be freed from the peril that has often -attended their use, and which involve no "symbolizing" process of the -kind which Mr. Spencer imagines. - -Let us again translate Mr. Spencer's language, and endeavor to analyze -his position. There is, he says, a law of thought, which requires and -depends upon certain elements of thought. By "thought" he means a -conceivable idea, or one which the mind can represent to itself. By -the elements of thought he means, I suppose, the data which enable us -to have an idea of a product. The process of reaching this product -is supposed to be conducted according to a law which requires us to -have the data or elements by which the process is to be conducted. For -example, in the process of reaching an idea of definite space as a -product of thought, we take certain data or elements, by conceiving of -space as divided into successive portions to which we give the name of -feet or miles. The product of thought is the number of feet or miles -into which we divide the definite space of which we form an idea. In -this process we have conformed to Mr. Spencer's law of thought, because -we have data or elements by which to conduct the process and reach the -product. - -But now, says Mr. Spencer, when thought undertakes to have as its -product the idea of endless space, it makes an effort to pass beyond -its sphere; the elements of thought fail, and therefore the law of -thought fails; the product is nothing but a dim symbol of a product; -the process becomes nothing but a dim symbol of a process; and no -predicament, that is, no fact, is here inferable from the law of -thought as a fact or predicament that can be asserted. But what, in the -case supposed, is the fact or predicament that is asserted, when we -speak or think of endless space, or of space that transcends all our -powers of measurement? Is it correct to say that the law of thought -fails, because we can not express endless space in feet or miles? Is it -true that we have only "symbolized" the product of endless space out -of the data or elements of measurable space? Here it is necessary to -inquire what the learned philosopher means by "symbolizing" a product -or a process. I understand him to mean, in the case supposed, that -whereas in reference to the idea or product of a measurable space we -have certain data or elements out of which to form that idea, when -we undertake to think of endless space we transfer the notion of a -measurable space to that of which no measure can be predicated, and -therefore we can have no conception of endless space, but only a -"formless consciousness of the inscrutable." Let us see if this is -sound. - -Take as a convenient idea of a measurable space the 92,000,000 miles -from the earth to the sun, and lay it down on paper. If, after having -measured this space, we could transport ourselves to the sun, we could -extend the line in the same direction beyond the sun, by laying down -a further measurement of 92,000,000 miles from the sun to any object -that we could observe beyond the sun. This process we could repeat -indefinitely and forever, if we could be successively removed to the -different stages at each point of departure. But when an aggregate of -such multiplied measurements had been reached greater than could be -expressed in figures, we should still have the intellectual power of -thinking of an extension of space indefinitely beyond that which we -have measured. Nothing would have failed us but the power of expressing -in figures the endless extent of space which lies beyond the utmost -limit that we can so express. - -It is precisely here, as I suppose, that Mr. Spencer's "symbolizing -process" and his "symbolized product" come in. We have taken as the -elements of thought the idea of successive measurements of space; and -the law of thought permits us to have as a definite product whatever -extent of space can be marked off by such successive measurements. -But when we undertake to have, as the product of thought, a -consciousness, or conception, of endless space, we have merely used -the idea of a definite space as a "symbol," or _simulacrum_, of that -which is without form, and is only a "formless consciousness of the -inscrutable"--whatever that means. - -Let us see what has happened. The power of measuring, or describing -in form, a definite extent of space, has given us an idea of space. -The product of our thought is extension between two given points. Such -extensions must be capable of indefinite multiplication, although we -can not express in figures an indefinite multiplicand. The product is -then something beyond what we can express in a definite form; but is -it beyond the sphere of thought? What is it? It is an idea which we -deduce by a strict process of reasoning, and to which we do not need to -give and can not give expression in figures. The process of reasoning -is this: Measurement has given us an idea of space; our faculty of -applying measurement is limited; but our faculty of conceiving of space -through which we could go on forever multiplying such measurements, -if we had the means, is certainly a faculty of which all men are -conscious who are accustomed to analyze the processes of thought. In -this process we may reach that which in one sense is "inscrutable." It -is inscrutable, inasmuch as we can not understand how eternity of space -or time came to exist. Our experience of phenomena enables us to have -an idea of space and time, and from the fact that we have measured off -portions of space or time, we deduce the fact that there must be an -eternity of both. It is immaterial whether we call this a "symbolizing" -process, or call it something else. The product is an idea at which we -arrive by a strict process of reasoning. Eternity of space or time is -an inscrutable idea, when we attempt to inquire how it came to be. That -it exists, is an idea from which the human mind can not escape, and -which it reaches by a perfectly sound deduction. We are all the while -thinking of space or time, whether we are thinking of that which is -measurable, or of that which is immeasurable. - -I now come to a passage in Mr. Spencer's recent article which it is -necessary to attempt to explain to the unlearned reader, and to bring -it, if possible, within the reach of ordinary minds. This passage, -which follows in his recent article immediately after his quotation -from his "Essays," is the following: - - Thus, then, criticisms like this of Mr. Martineau, often recurring in - one shape or other, and now again made by Mr. Harrison, do not show - the invalidity of my argument, but once more show the imbecility of - human intelligence when brought to bear on the ultimate question. - Phenomenon without noumenon is unthinkable; and yet noumenon can not - be thought of in the true sense of thinking. We are at once obliged - to be conscious of a reality behind appearance, and yet can neither - bring this consciousness of reality into any shape, nor can bring into - any shape its connection with appearance. The forms of our thought, - molded on experience of phenomena, as well as the connotations of our - words formed to express the relations of phenomena, involve us in - contradictions when we try to think of that which is beyond phenomena; - and yet the existence of that which is beyond phenomena is a necessary - datum alike of our thoughts and our words. We have no choice but to - accept a formless consciousness of the inscrutable. - -Some definitions must now be given. The word "phenomenon" has become -naturalized in our English tongue. Derived as a noun from the Greek -verb Φαίνομαι, _to appear_, it means anything visible; whatever -is presented to the eye by observation or experiment, or what is -discovered to exist; as the phenomena of the natural world, the -phenomena of the heavenly bodies, of terrestrial substances, the -phenomena of heat and color.[95] In this application the word denotes -what appears to us, or what we discover by our senses. It is also used, -in the plural, more loosely, to denote occurrences or things which we -observe to happen; as when, speaking of physical occurrences, we mean -physical facts the happening of which we observe. Moral phenomena, on -the other hand, are the appearances exhibited by the action of mind. - -The word _noumenon_ has not become naturalized in our language, and -did not exist in Greek.[96] It can convey no intelligible meaning to -common readers without tracing its derivation, and when it is analyzed -we can attribute to it no meaning but a purely arbitrary one, even if -we can arrive at that arbitrary signification. In fact, it is a word -made by and for the school of Kant. Its first syllable is the Greek -noun νοῦς or νόος, which corresponds to our English word _thought_ or -_intelligence_. The Greek verb νοέω, _to think_, was primarily used as -_I perceive_; the act of the mind in seeing. This idea was distinct -from εἴδω, which conveyed the plain meaning of I _see_. But so subtile -were the Greeks in their use of words, that εἴδω was sometimes used -specifically to mean _to see with the mind's eye_, or, as we sometimes -say, to _realize_, or to have a mental perception of. In the Greek -use of the two words νοεω and εἴδω, no distinction was made between -_phenomenon_ and _noumenon_. To a cultivated Greek, _phenomenon_ -would mean something perceived, and _noumenon_, if he had possessed -the word, would have had the same meaning. He would have used the two -words interchangeably, to express either sight by the visual organs or -mental perception. Mr. Spencer uses them as if they meant different -things, as if _phenomenon_ were something different from _noumenon_. -But _noumenon_, according to its derivation (for it is coined as the -participle of nοεων), means a thing, subject, or object, _perceived by -the mind_. The root idea is mind-action, the verb νοεω meaning to do -what the mind does in apprehending a subject or object. So that the -derivation of _noumenon_ does not help us to understand the Kantian or -Spencerian use of the word. - -As this use of the word is, then, purely arbitrary, we must try to -understand, as well as we can, what this arbitrary meaning is. As well -as I can fathom it, in contrast with _phenomenon_, the meaning is that -_phenomenon_ is something that we see, and _noumenon_ is the ghost or -double of what we see. We see a thing with our eyes; but our mind does -not see it--it perceives its ghostly double. This is _noumenon_. - -Penetrating, or trying to penetrate, a little further into Mr. -Spencer's meaning, it would seem that when he says that _phenomenon_ -without _noumenon_ is unthinkable, he means that, although we can see a -thing with our corporeal eye, we can not think of it without the mental -act of seeing its image with the mind's eye; and then he adds that -_noumenon_ can not be thought of in the true sense of thinking, because -_noumenon_ is an abstraction or a mere ghost of a subject or an object. - -What is all this but a kind of play upon words? We are so constituted -that the impressions which a thing external to us produces upon our -nerves of perception are instantly transmitted to the brain, and the -mind has an instantaneous perception of that object. The phenomenon -which we see with our eyes, or become sensible of by touch, thus -becomes a thing perceived by the mind, and when we think of it we do -not think of its ghost, but we think of the thing itself. Did Laura -Bridgman, who had neither eye-sight nor hearing nor speech, but who -acquired all her ideas of external objects by the sense of touch, -conceive of a round or a square, a rough or a smooth surface, by -contemplating the ghost or double of what she touched? And had she no -thinking in the true sense of thinking, because the double, or _imago_ -of the thing which she touched--the so-called _noumenon_--was at once -necessary to her mental perception, and yet could not be thought of -without seeing the object by the corporeal eye? She had no corporeal -eye in which there was any vision. All her mental perceptions of -external objects were acquired by the sense of touch alone; and we -may well believe that she did not need the supposed _noumenon_ to -give her an idea of _phenomenon_. She perceived many phenomena by the -simple transmission to her brain, along her nerves of touch, of the -impressions produced upon them by external objects; and there is every -reason to believe that many of her perceptions were as accurate and -true as those which we derive from all our senses. We may now dismiss -Mr. Spencer's distinction between _phenomenon_ and _noumenon_ as a -distinction quite needless for the elucidation of what takes place in -thinking of that which is behind appearance, and may proceed with the -discussion of what remains of the passage above quoted. - -At the risk of wearying by repetition, I will again resort to the -illustration before employed, and will again describe how we reach the -conception, for example, of endless space. According to Mr. Spencer, -space, or extension, as a thinkable idea, or a subject of thought, -is confined to a measurable extent of space. This is the phenomenon, -or appearance. All our forms of thought are, it is said, molded on -our experience of phenomena that are measurable, or capable of being -definitely described; and the connotations of our words which express -the relations of phenomena relate to phenomena that we measure, or see, -and can definitely describe. Therefore, we can not think of a reality -that is behind appearance; can not bring the consciousness of such a -reality into any shape, nor bring into any shape its connection with -appearance. - -If mankind are never to think of that which is behind appearance--can -never think of a reality that is behind what they see--because their -forms of thought are molded on experiences of phenomena that they see, -and because the connotations of their words express the relations of -those phenomena and no others, a vast domain of thinking is necessarily -closed to them. This is not the experience of our minds. Every day of -our lives we go on in search of that which is beyond appearance, and we -find it. Take again, for example, the phenomena of a measurable portion -of space or time. What appears to us gives an idea of space and time. -We measure as great a portion of either as our forms of expression -admit of our describing by definite terms, but we are immediately -conscious of another reality, an endless extension or duration, because -we are conscious that we have not exhausted and can not exhaust, by our -measurements and descriptions, the whole possible existence of space or -time. This new reality behind appearance is just as truly thinkable, -just as true a consciousness, as is the measurable portion of time or -space; for it is time or space of which we are constantly thinking, -whether it is an extent or duration which we can describe in words, or -whether we can only say that it is extent or duration without beginning -and without end. Our minds are so constituted that the existence which -is manifested to us by observable phenomena leads us to go behind -the appearance in search of another reality beyond that which is -manifested by the phenomena that we see. All that is inscrutable about -this other reality that lies behind appearance is that we can not -understand how it came to be, any more than we can understand how the -phenomenon which we see and can measure and describe in a definite -form came to exist. We do not bring, and do not need to bring, this -other reality into connection with appearance. We first have an idea of -space and time from observable and measurable phenomena. The reality -of extension without limit, and duration without end, follows of -necessity, by a process of thought which we can not escape. - -But now it becomes needful to answer a further objection. I have said -that we are all the while thinking of space, whether it is a measurable -and limited or an immeasurable and illimitable space. Mr. Spencer, -anticipating this obvious statement, admits that the form of relation -between the two ideas, although "almost blank," preserves a certain -qualitative character; that is, it is of the quality of space of which -we think, whether it is measurable or immeasurable, and therefore it -remains "a vaguely identifiable relation." But when, in place of one -of the terms of the relation qualitatively the same as the other, we -substitute an existence that can not be defined, and is therefore both -quantitatively and qualitatively unrepresentable, the relation, he -asserts, lapses entirely; one of the terms becomes wholly "unknowable." - -I will not again repeat that extension or magnitude having no known -limits is a thinkable term, because the subject of thought is the -quality of extension or magnitude; quantity not being essential to -the idea of extension or magnitude. But I will pass to the idea of an -existence which can not be defined. I suppose that by an existence is -meant a being. If we undertake to think of a being whose quality we -do not know to be the same as the quality of another being whom we -do know, and the quantity of whose powers and faculties we can not -measure, we propose, says Mr. Spencer, a term of impossible thought, -because the law of thought can not be conformed to; the term can not be -present to the mind, and no thinkable relation can be framed. Let this -supposed difficulty be tested by a plain inquiry into that which we -undertake to make the subject of thought when we think of a being who -is said to be "unknowable." - -"Agnosticism" is a doctrine which eludes a definite grasp. I have -seen it defined by one of its most distinguished professors in this -way: "Agnosticism is of the essence of science, whether ancient or -modern. It simply means that a man shall not say he knows or believes -that which he has no scientific grounds for professing to know or -believe.... Agnosticism simply says that we know nothing of what may -be beyond phenomena."[97] Mankind are apt to be rather practical in -their habits of thinking: experience teaches them that there is a -well-founded distinction between knowledge and belief, when it comes to -be a question of asserting the one or the other.[98] They find, too, -by experience that, in regard to what they speak of when they say that -they know a thing, there is a distinction to be observed in respect to -the means of knowledge. No one hesitates to say that he knows there -was such a man as Napoleon Bonaparte, although he never saw him, and -although our knowledge of him is now derived from hearsay. But when we -speak of knowing that a certain living person was at a certain spot on -a certain day, we become immediately aware that in order to justify the -assertion we or some one ought to have seen the person at the time and -place, especially if anything important depends upon the assertion. -There are a great many things that we say we know without scientific or -other rigorous proof, and there are a great many other things which we -do not say that we know without the kind of proof which is required. -All our actions in life proceed upon this distinction, and we could -not live in this world with any comfort if we did not act upon the -assumption that we know things of which we have no scientific proof. - -A very clever _jeu d'esprit_ went the rounds of the periodical press -some time ago, in which a well-born and highly educated young agnostic -was represented as losing his birthright, his _fiancée_, and all his -prospects in life, because he demanded rigorous proof of everything -that affected him. As he would not admit that he was the son of his own -parents, without having better proof of it than their assertion, he was -turned out-of-doors and disinherited. He would not accept the bloom on -the cheek of his mistress as natural unless she gave him her word that -she did not paint; and he would not admit that they loved each other -without some better proof than their mutual feelings, about which they -might be mistaken. The young lady indignantly dismissed him, but he -consoled himself as a martyr to the truth of agnosticism. He became -tutor to the son of a nobleman, whose belief in the boy's extraordinary -talents, although justified by his progress in his studies, the tutor -would not admit had the requisite proof. He propounded his denial of -what the father had no proper grounds for maintaining, in an offensive -way, and of course he lost his place. He retired to a sort of agnostic -brotherhood, glorying in his adhesion to truth. Some of his companions -remained long enough in the brotherhood to find out that they were -making fools of themselves, and at the first opportunity for acting on -the ordinary grounds of knowing a fact without rigorous demonstration -of it they left him in solitude, went into the world, and achieved -success. - -"A man shall not say he knows or believes that which he has no -scientific grounds for professing to know or believe." By "scientific -grounds," I presume is meant, in the case of a fact or occurrence, -proper proof of the fact or occurrence. This varies with the nature of -the thing which one professes to know. We constantly act upon proofs -which do not amount to demonstration, and there could be no practical -enjoyment of our lives and no safety if we did not. If a government -were to receive information that a foreign army was on the border of -the country and about to invade it, and the information fell short of -being the testimony of eye-witnesses, what would be thought of the -rulers if they were to fold their hands and say that they did not know -the fact because they had no "scientific grounds for professing to know -it"? On the other hand, if in a court of justice the question to be -determined were the presence of an individual at a certain place and at -a certain time, the established rules of evidence require certain kinds -of proof of the fact. - -Belief, however, is a conviction of something which may or may not -require what are called "scientific grounds" before we can be permitted -to profess that we believe. It depends upon the thing which we profess -to believe, and upon the grounds on which we rest the belief, whether -we have or have not safe and sufficient means of belief. Belief in -the law of gravitation as a force operating throughout the universe -is arrived at as a deduction from scientific data. Belief in an -existence beyond phenomena, in a being who is the producing agent -of the phenomena, depends upon a great variety of grounds, some of -which are scientific data and some of which are the elements of moral -reasoning. We may not say that we "_know_" that God or any other -supernatural being exists, but we may say that we "_believe_" in his -existence. Here knowledge is one thing; belief is another. Knowledge -of the existence of God, like knowledge of the existence of any other -being, might come to us through the testimony of a competent witness -commissioned and authorized to inform us. Belief in the existence of -God may be founded on many and various grounds without the direct -testimony of the competent witness; and these grounds may be perfectly -satisfactory without being mathematical or scientific demonstration. It -is a very remarkable fact that some of the most eminent of the school -of agnosticism profess to have, and probably have, the most undoubting -faith in the theory and actual occurrence of animal evolution, without -any data, scientific or other, which can enable other men to arrive -at the same conviction, whatever may be the character of the supposed -proofs. They certainly have no grounds for professing to know that -an evolution of species out of species has ever taken place; and the -grounds of their belief in the fact, whether denominated "scientific" -or called something else, do not satisfy the rules of belief on -which mankind must act, in accordance with their mental and moral -constitutions; and this belief does not rise any higher in the scale of -moral probabilities than the belief in special creations, nor does it -rise so high. But to return to Mr. Spencer. - -If we did not act upon the process of thinking of another reality than -that which appearance gives, act upon it fearlessly and by a mode of -thinking to which we can safely trust ourselves, science would stand -still, there would be no progress in physics, discoveries would cease, -there would be no improvement in morals, the world would remain -stationary. What did Columbus do, when, going behind the phenomena -that made the earth appear to be a flat surface, he thought of it as a -sphere? Did he break the law of thought? He formed an idea of a reality -behind appearance, not by employing the phenomenal manifestations to -help him to the new conception, but by going away from them in search -of a reality that lay behind them, and which they seemed to contradict. -This conception of a sphere as the reality of the earth's condition -proved to be the truth. He did not bring it, and did not need to bring -it, into connection with appearance. He did not use, and did not need -to use, the relations of the visible phenomena to help him to attain -his conception of a spherical form of the earth. He contradicted them -all. - -Did all the moral lawgivers who have reformed the world break the law -of thought, when, going behind the phenomena of human conduct, with -their relations pointing to one idea of right and wrong, they conceived -the idea of a new and a better rule of life? When it was said, in place -of the old law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, "Love your -enemies and pray for those who persecute you"--when for the old rule -of revenge there was substituted forgiveness of injuries--something -was inculcated that contradicted all the appearances of the social -phenomena, and that lay beyond them. Did the consciousness of this new -reality become "a formless consciousness of the inscrutable"? What -is there about it that is inscrutable? There is nothing inscrutable -about it, or in the consciousness of it, excepting the mode in which -the being who promulgated it came to exist. The idea of forgiveness is -clearly within the compass of human thought and of human endeavor. - -When we are in the process of making a new physical discovery, or of -forming a new rule of moral action, we work away from the materials -which the phenomenal manifestations give us, to a new conception. -We become conscious of a new reality behind appearance, and of an -existence beyond the relations of the phenomena with which we have -heretofore been familiar. It is to this striving after realities behind -appearances--striving by an entirely true process of thinking--that the -world owes its progress. - -When the phenomenal manifestations of an intellectual and moral nature -in man have given us the idea of an existence of an intellectual and -moral being as a reality of which we become conscious, what is to -prevent us from thinking of another intellectual and moral being as a -reality, with faculties and powers immeasurably superior to ours? It -is true that the phenomenal manifestations of man's intellectual and -moral nature give us an idea of a being of very limited faculties and -very imperfect moral qualities. But what is the "insoluble difficulty" -in which we become involved, when we think of a being whose faculties -are boundless, and whose moral nature is perfect? Does the "insoluble -difficulty" consist in the impossibility of thinking of that which -transcends all our powers of measurement? All that we have done, in the -case of man, is to have a consciousness of a being whose phenomenal -manifestations evince the existence of an intellectual and moral -nature. He happens to be a being of very limited faculties and very -imperfect moral characteristics. What prevents us from thinking, in -the true sense of thinking, of another being, whose powers are without -limit, and whose moral nature is perfect? Is it said that we can -not bring into any shape the idea of unlimited power or of perfect -goodness, or bring into any shape its connection with appearance, -because all our ideas of power and goodness, all our forms of thought -and expression, are molded on experiences of limited power and -imperfect goodness? The truth is that we do not and need not strive -to bring into connection with appearance the idea of any quality -which we conceive of as unlimited. What we derive from the phenomenal -manifestations of human power and goodness is a consciousness of the -qualities of power and goodness. It is perfectly correct thinking to -reason that these qualities, whose phenomenal manifestations, in the -case of man, show that in him they exist only in a limited degree, may -exist in another being in unlimited perfection and without degree. -Our minds are so constituted that we reason from the finite to the -infinite, by observing that one class of phenomena evince the existence -of the finite and another class of phenomena evince the existence of -the infinite. - -When, therefore, we pass from the phenomenal manifestations of human -power and goodness, we come into the presence of other phenomena which -we know could not be and were not produced by such a limited and -imperfect being as man, but which must yet have had an author, a maker, -an originator, a creator. We thus contemplate and investigate facts -which show that the phenomena were the products of a skill, wisdom, and -power that transcend all measurement. Is it said that the phenomena of -nature, stupendous and varied and minute and wonderful as they are, -evince only that a certain degree of power and wisdom was exerted in -their production, even if their production is attributed to a being -competent to bring them about? And therefore that the idea of a being -of unlimited faculties and perfect goodness is as far as ever from our -reach by any true process of thought? This assumption begs something -that should not be taken for granted. It assumes that the production -of the phenomena of nature does not evince unlimited power and perfect -goodness; did not call for the existence of boundless faculties and -inexhaustible benevolence; involved only a degree of such qualities, -although a vastly superior degree to that possessed by us. The -correctness of this assumption depends upon the force of the evidence -which nature affords of the character of the Deity. It is an assumption -which has led to enormous errors--errors of conception and belief -which impute to the Supreme Being only a superior degree of power and -wisdom, greater than our own, but still limited and imperfect, liable -to error, and acting in modes which distress us with contradictions and -inconsistencies. - -It may without rashness be asserted that the phenomena of the universe -could not have been produced by a power and wisdom that were subject to -any limitations. While all the researches of science, from the first -beginnings of human observation to the present moment, show that in -the production of the phenomena of nature there has been exerted a -certain amount of power and wisdom, they also show that it is an amount -which we can not measure; that there is, moreover, a power and wisdom -that have not been exhausted; that the reserved force and skill and -benevolence are without limit. For, in every successive new discovery -that we make, in every new revelation of the power and goodness -which our investigations bring forth, we continuously reach proofs -of an endless capacity, an inexhaustible variety of methods and of -products. So that, if we conceive of the whole human race, with all its -accumulated knowledge, as ending at last in one individual possessed -of all that has been learned on earth, and imagine him to be then -translated to another state of existence, with all his faculties of -observation and study preserved, and new fields of inquiry to be opened -to him, his experience on earth would lead him to expect to find, and -we must believe that in his new experience he will find, that the -physical and the moral phenomena of the universe are an inexhaustible -study; that search and discovery must go on forever; and that forever -new revelations of power and goodness will be made to the perceptions -whose training began in a very limited sphere. His experience in -that limited sphere has taught him that there was no end to the -discoveries which were here partially within his reach. His experience -in the new sphere will be a continuation of his experience in the old -one; for there is a law by which we judge of the future by the past. -This law is one of the conditions of our intellectual existence; an -inevitable habit of our minds; imposed upon us by an inexorable but -familiar authority. Our experience in this life has taught us that, -in the investigation of the phenomena of nature that are open to our -observation here, we have never reached the end of possible discovery; -that every fresh discovery has evinced that there are still new things -to be learned, new manifestations of power to be revealed, new products -and new methods to be seen. However long we may suppose the human race -to exist on earth and its researches to be prosecuted here, we must -suppose an endless accumulation of knowledge hereafter, because the -law which compels us to judge of the future by the past obliges us to -accept as the fruition of the future that which has been the fruition -of the past.[99] - -Is there in this any violation of the true law of thought? Does the -relation between our past experience and the experience which we -forecast for the future fade into a dim symbol of a relation? On the -contrary, both are equally capable of mental representation; for -we are mentally so constituted that the consciousness of what has -happened to us in the past--the unending succession of new discoveries, -the constant accumulation of knowledge, which we have experienced -here--gives us the conception of the same endless progress hereafter, -compels us to believe in it, and enables us to grasp it as a product of -true thought. - -Mr. Spencer has much to say of "the imbecility of human intelligence -when brought to bear on the ultimate question." What is the ultimate -question? The ultimate question with which science and philosophy are -concerned is the existence of the Supreme Being. It is of the utmost -consequence for us to understand wherein consists the imbecility of -human intelligence when brought to bear upon this question of the -existence of God. How does our imbecility manifest itself? What is -the point beyond which thought can not go? We become conscious of the -existence of the being called man, because, from the phenomena which we -know that he produces by the exercise of his will and power, and which -we know must have had an author and producer, we deduce an existence -beyond the phenomena, an actor in their production. What more, or -what that is different, do we do or undertake to do, when, from the -phenomena of nature which we know that man did not produce, we think -of another existence beyond the phenomena? In both cases, we study -the phenomena by our senses and powers of observation; in both cases -we reason that there is an actor who produces the phenomena; yet the -existence of the actor who produces the phenomena is inscrutable in the -case of the Deity in the same sense and for the same reason that it -is inscrutable in the case of man. How the human mind came to exist, -by what process it was made to exist, by what means it was created, -what was the genesis of the human intellect, is just as inscrutable, -no more and no less so, as the mode in which the Deity came to exist. -In both cases the existence of a being is what we think of; and when -we think of either being we think of that which is beyond phenomena -but which we deduce from phenomena. In neither case do we "accept a -formless consciousness of the inscrutable"; for what we accept is the -consciousness of a being, and it is not a consciousness of the mode in -which he came to exist. The latter consciousness is the inscrutable -problem. The existence is what we think of, and we think of it by a -perfectly true process of thought, deducing it from the simple truth -that the phenomena must have had an actor in their production. We do -not undertake to think of the process by which man was created, or of -the mode in which that other existence came to be without beginning and -without end. - -I have thus discriminated between what we do and what we do not think -of, when we think of an existence beyond phenomena, but which we deduce -from phenomena. This is a most necessary discrimination; for, in -thinking of the existence, we do not try to think how it came to be an -existence. We think only of the existence; and we deduce it from our -observation and study of phenomena, which teach us that they must have -had an actor, an author, a producer, and that they did not produce or -create themselves. - -It remains for me to advert to Mr. Spencer's theory of the origin of -the religious consciousness, or the origin of the idea of supernatural -beings, and hence of one highest supernatural being. This is his -ghost-theory. He has recently told us that in his "Descriptive -Sociology"--a work commenced in 1867, and which preceded his -"Principles of Sociology" (written in 1874)--he caused to be gathered -adequate materials for generalization, consisting of a great number -of excerpts from the writings of travelers and historians who have -given accounts of the religious beliefs of the uncivilized races. He -numbers 697 of these extracts which refer to the ghost-theory, and -only 87 which refer to fetichism. This great ratio of eight to one -he considers overwhelming proof that the ghost-theory, as opposed -to fetichism, is sustained by the beliefs of a vast majority of the -uncivilized races. What if it is? What is the ghost-theory, and -what is fetichism, as the chief source and origin of religion? Mr. -Spencer, in his recent article, explains fetichism as most persons -understand it, namely, the worship of inanimate objects, or belief in -their supernatural powers. The ghost-theory, which his 697 extracts -illustrate, is "the belief in a wandering double, which goes away -during sleep, or fainting, and deserts the body for a longer period -at death; a double which can enter and possess other persons, causing -disease, epilepsy, insanity, etc., which gives rise to ideas of -spirits, demons, etc., and which, originates propitiation and worship -of ghosts."[100] Further on, he reiterates his ghost-theory as the -origin of religious beliefs, and explains it thus: - - Setting out with the statement that "unlike the ordinary - consciousness, the religious consciousness is concerned with that - which lies beyond the sphere of sense," I went on to show that the - rise of this consciousness begins among primitive men with the - belief in a double belonging to each individual, which, capable of - wandering away from him during life, becomes his ghost or spirit after - death; and that from this idea of a being eventually distinguished - as supernatural, there develop, in course of time, the ideas of - supernatural beings of all orders up to the highest. Mr. Harrison has - alleged that the primitive religion is not belief in and propitiation - of the ghost, but is worship of "physical objects treated frankly as - physical objects" (p. 498). That he has disproved the one view and - proved the other, no one will, I think, assert. Contrariwise, he has - given occasion for me to cite weighty authorities against him. - - Next it was contended that in the assemblage of supernatural beings - thus originating in each tribe, some, derived from chiefs, were - superior to others; and that, as the compounding and recompounding - of tribes gave origin to societies having social grades and rulers - of different orders, there resulted that conception of a hierarchy - of ghosts or gods which polytheism shows us. Further it was argued - that while, with the growth of civilization and knowledge, the - minor supernatural agents became merged in the major supernatural - agent, this single great supernatural agent, gradually losing the - anthropomorphic attributes at first ascribed, has come in our days to - retain but few of them; and, eventually losing these, will then merge - into a consciousness of an Omnipresent Power to which no attributes - can be ascribed. This proposition has not been contested. - -Without entering into any consideration of what Mr. Harrison has -disproved or proved, as between fetichism and the ghost-theory, I will -now ask why the beliefs of the uncivilized races, or of the primitive -men, should be regarded as important evidence of the origin of beliefs -among civilized and cultivated men? Is modern philosophy, in accounting -for or justifying the belief in a Supreme Being which is held to-day -by most of the cultivated and educated part of mankind, to assign its -origin to the primitive and uncivilized men? Is the whole idea of a -supernatural being to be regarded as traditionally handed down from our -barbarian ancestors? Is there no other source from which we can derive -that idea? Are we none of us capable of finding for ourselves rational -grounds of belief in a supernatural agent, deducing his existence from -a study of nature? Or must we trace this belief back through the ages -until we arrive at an origin which we shall of course despise? What has -philosophy to do now with "the primitive religion"? Is there nothing -that science and reason and disciplined methods of thought and sound -deduction can teach us? Are we to throw away all the proofs which -nature spreads before us, and for the investigation of which we have -accumulated so many facilities, and turn to the beliefs of uncivilized -men? Are the conceptions of supernatural beings, to which a barbarian -attained, to be taken as the origin of the conception of a personal -God to which an educated philosopher can now attain? And because of the -inadequate and childish superstitions of the past, and of their growth -into a belief of one supreme supernatural agent--whatever that idea of -him may have been--is the consciousness which we have of a personal God -to be hereafter merged into a consciousness of an Omnipresent Power to -which no attributes can be ascribed? - -It should seem that the mode in which philosophy, after it came to be -cultivated by civilized thinkers and observers, freed itself first -from fetichism and the ghost-theory and all the beliefs of polytheism, -next from physical agents as the causes of all phenomena, and finally -attained an independent conception of a First Cause as a supreme -personal intelligence and power, is worthy of some consideration. - -In the first chapter of this work, borrowing from the English scholar -and critic, Mr. Grote, I have given a condensed account of some of -the systems of Greek philosophy which began in the first half of the -sixth century before Christ, and extended down to Plato, whose life -was embraced in 427-347 of the ante-Christian era. About 150 B. -C., the Greek philosophy, and especially the speculations of -Plato, encountered at Alexandria the monotheism of the Hellenizing -Jews.[101] This history of Greek philosophy, as developed by Mr. Grote, -shows that the struggle against polytheistic agencies, as the causes of -natural phenomena, began with efforts to find purely physical agencies; -that this struggle, in spite of the surrounding beliefs in a multitude -of supernatural beings of different orders, was long continued, and -gave rise to a most remarkable variety of scientific explanations: -that it passed through an extraordinary number of physical theories, -until at length in Plato there was developed the idea of a distinct -personal constructive actor, the Demiurgus, a being to whom, whether -intended by Plato as a philosophical myth, or as an entity in which -he had something of faith or conviction, he assigned the formation of -his Kosmos. With characteristic acumen, the English commentator points -out Plato's skill in eluding the possible charge of infidelity to the -established religion of Athens, while he at the same time propounded -the existence of a personal First Cause that was in a striking degree -inconsistent with the popular faith. The whole course of this history -of Greek speculation evinces that from an early period the Greek -philosophers were utter skeptics in regard to the popular religion and -the poetic traditions; that they not only did not derive anything from -the primitive religion, from fetichism, from the ghost-beliefs of their -barbarian ancestors--if their ancestors had such beliefs--or from their -heroic ages, or from the multitudinous gods of the popular theology and -the popular worship, or from the old poetical imagery, but that they -strove to get away from all these sources, and to construct theories -of the universe that would explain the ultimate cause or causes in a -very different manner. The earliest Greek speculators got no further in -their theories than the construction of systems of physical agencies, -or agencies that stood to them in the quality of physical actors. -Plato, on the other hand, resorted to the conception of a supreme -personal actor. - -Mr. Grote has further mentioned a very striking fact, which is, that -before the Christian era, the Demiurgus of Plato was received by the -Hellenizing Jews at Alexandria as a conception kindred to the God of -Moses. His statement, in substance the same as that previously made by -a Continental critic, Gfrörer, is so interesting and important that -I quote his words: "But though the idea of a pre-kosmic Demiurgus -found little favor among the Grecian schools of philosophy before -the Christian era, it was greatly welcomed among the Hellenizing Jews -at Alexandria, from Aristobulus (about B. C. 150) down to -Philo. It formed the suitable point of conjunction between Hellenic -and Judaic speculation. The marked distinction drawn by Plato between -the Demiurgus, and the constructed or generated Kosmos, with its -in-dwelling gods, provided a suitable place for the Supreme God of the -Jews, degrading the pagan gods by comparison. The 'Timæus' was compared -with the book of Genesis, from which it was even affirmed that Plato -had copied. He received the denomination of the Atticising Moses--Moses -writing in Attic Greek. It was thus that the Platonic 'Timæus' became -the medium of transition from the polytheistic theology, which served -as philosophy among the early ages of Greece, to the omnipotent -monotheism to which philosophy became subordinated after the Christian -era."[102] - -Perhaps there is no more remarkable fact than this in the whole history -of philosophical speculation. Possibly Mr. Spencer would say that it -adds another proof to his ghost-theory. But the important fact is that -Plato's Demiurgus partakes in no degree of the ghost idea, and, instead -of being a modification of that idea, is an original and perfectly -independent conception. The Demiurgus of Plato is not a chief spirit -evolved in imagination out of a hierarchy of spirits. He is himself the -originator and fashioner of the gods, of whom he makes use as ministers -in the formation of the bodies of the primitive men, after he has -himself formed the souls which are to inhabit them for a season. - -It appears, by Mr. Grote's citations from Gfrörer, that the latter had -previously noted what Aristobulus maintained one hundred and fifty -years earlier than Philo, namely, that "not only the oldest Grecian -poets, Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, etc., but also the most celebrated -thinkers, especially Plato, had acquired all their wisdom from a -very old translation of the Pentateuch." Neither of these modern -critics appears to have accepted the assertion of Aristobulus, and -its intrinsic improbability is very great. Certainly the internal -evidence of the "Timæus" negatives the assumption that Plato had seen -the Pentateuch, for his Demiurgus is not the God of Moses, although -it was very natural for the Alexandrian Jews to think they recognized -a resemblance. Mr. Grote, moreover, seems to put this matter beyond -doubt, for he says that the Platonic "Timæus" _became the medium of -transition_ from the polytheism of early Greece to the monotheism -of the Christian era. This implies very clearly that Mr. Grote did -not consider the Demiurgus of Plato to be either derived from the -polytheism of the early Grecian ages, on the one hand, or from the -Mosaic Jehovah, on the other hand, but that he considered it a -conception which stood between them. The point of resemblance is in -the idea of a divine and supreme personal actor in the production of -phenomena. - -It does not seem, therefore, that a philosopher at the present day is -confined to the source of the primitive religion, be that source what -it may. The primitive religion, whether its origin was fetichism or a -belief in ghosts, has imposed no shackles upon our minds. The beliefs -of the primitive men may have originated as Mr. Spencer supposes, but -the question for us--revelation being laid aside--is just what it was -for Plato, the difference being that our means of investigation are -superior to his. The grounds of our belief in a personal God are not -the same as those on which the uncivilized races formed first the idea -of a wandering double emanating from the human body, then conceived -of spirits or ghosts, next of different orders of spirits or ghosts, -and finally of a chief and supreme spirit. Our materials for sound -deduction are not the same as those of the primitive races of mankind, -or of the uncivilized tribes of the present day. I have before remarked -that the intellectual effort of a savage in striving for the idea of a -deity is the same kind of effort as that of the civilized and educated -man; but that the difference between them is in the growth and activity -of the reasoning power, and in the materials on which it is exercised. -While our barbarian predecessors lived in an age of ignorance, we live -in an age of knowledge. We are surrounded by extraordinary discoveries, -and are possessed of the means of still further research. They had -almost no means for investigating physical phenomena. We are, or ought -to be, disciplined reasoners. They, on the contrary, while able to -reason correctly on a very few subjects, could not reason correctly -on all subjects. We are, or ought to be, capable of subjecting the -materials which the phenomena of nature spread before us, to sound -processes of thought and to logical deductions. We are, or ought to -be, capable of discriminating between that which is really inscrutable -and that which is not so. We are, or ought to be, able to know when we -are within the bounds of possible thought, and when we transcend them. -We are, or ought to be, able to see that the existence of phenomena -necessarily implies a causing power; that when the phenomena are such -as we know that man produces, the idea of an intelligent personal actor -is both a legitimate deduction and a perfectly appreciable subject -of thought. Are we not entitled to apply the same reasoning to the -phenomena of nature which we know that man did not produce? And when -we so reason, do we borrow anything whatever from the primitive idea -of ghosts or spirits, whether they are supposed to have first emanated -from human bodies, or to reside in inanimate objects? - -There are two distinct values to be assigned to the researches of -science. One of them consists in the practical improvement of the -material condition of society; the lessening of physical evil, the -increase of physical good; the advancement of our power over matter. -In an age intensely devoted to this materialistic improvement, there -will be a great accumulation of physical knowledge. At the same -time there are accumulating in the same ratio new materials for -philosophical speculation concerning the causes of the phenomena that -are investigated. The specialists who carry on the investigations -may not always be the best reasoners in the application of the new -materials to the purpose of philosophical inquiry into the producing -causes of the phenomena. But the other distinct value of their -investigations consists in the accumulation of materials from which the -philosopher can deduce the existence of an actor in the production of -the phenomena. When, from these materials, constantly accumulating and -constantly to be used in a uniform process of reasoning to which the -human mind is both able and obliged to resort, the philosopher deduces -the conception of a supreme, personal, intelligent being, he assigns -to that being just those attributes which the phenomena of nature -compel him to believe in, because if the attributes did not exist the -phenomena of nature could not have become what they are. There can be -no reason to suppose that as the materials increase, as the researches -of science, for whatever purpose carried on, lead to greater and still -greater accumulations of knowledge, the law of thought by which we -deduce the idea of an actor in the production of phenomena will change, -or that the logical necessity for conceiving, or the intellectual -capacity to conceive of, the attributes of that actor will either -diminish or fade away. An Omnipotent Power without attributes, or one -to which no attributes can be assigned, is not likely to be the end of -all philosophical speculation about the ultimate cause. Power without -attributes, power without a determining will, power without guidance, -or purposes, or objects, is not a conception to which a well-trained -intellect is now likely to attain; and the greater the accumulation of -physical knowledge becomes, the greater will be the necessity to such -an intellect for recognizing attributes, and for assigning them to the -power which is manifested by the phenomena. - -According to Mr. Spencer, the process by which mankind are ultimately -to lose the consciousness of a personal Deity is the following: -Anthropomorphic attributes were at first ascribed to the single great -supernatural agent of whom the primitive men conceived. But in our -days, the idea of such a supreme supernatural agent has come to retain -but a few of these attributes. These few will eventually be lost, -and there will be nothing left but a consciousness of an Omnipotent -Power to which no attributes can be ascribed. The probability of -this result depends upon the necessity for ascribing what are called -anthropomorphic attributes to the Supreme Being; or, in other words, it -depends upon the inquiry whether, in order to ascribe to the Supreme -Being any attributes at all, we are necessarily confined to those which -are anthropomorphic. - -"Anthropomorphism," a term compounded from the Greek ἄνθρωπος, man, -and μορφή, form, has come to signify the representation of the Deity -under a human form, or with human attributes and affections. It is -therefore important to know what we in fact do, when reasoning on the -phenomena of nature, we reach the conclusion that they must have had -an author or producer, and then ascribe to him certain attributes. The -fact that the ancient religious beliefs ascribed to the Supreme Being -grossly anthropomorphic attributes, is unimportant. So is the fact that -the anthropomorphic attributes have been slowly diminishing in the -conceptions of the reasoning and cultivated part of mankind. The really -important question is whether there can be no conception of a Supreme -Being without ascribing to him attributes which liken him to man; or -whether, when the anthropomorphic attributes are lost, the idea of a -personal God will be lost. - -The essential character of any anthropomorphic or human -attribute--power for example, or wisdom, or goodness--is that it is -limited, imperfect, and liable to error. But when we conceive of these -qualities as existing in absolute perfection and boundless capacity, -while we retain the idea that they are personal qualities, we in fact -divest them of their anthropomorphic or human character. It is a -contradiction in terms to say that an imperfect human capacity is the -same attribute as a divine and unlimited capacity. The difficulty with -the ancient religious beliefs, the whole error of anthropomorphism, -was that the conceptions stopped short of the idea of unlimited power, -wisdom, and benevolence. The attributes ascribed to the Deity likened -him to man in form, character, powers, dispositions, passions. He was -an exaggerated human being, with vastly more power, more skill, more -wisdom, but still with the same kind of power, skill, and wisdom, -actuated by like motives and governed by like passions. Now the truth -is, that the difference between a limited and imperfect attribute of -character and one that is boundless--power, for example--is more than -a difference of degree. It is a difference in kind; for while in both -cases we conceive of a personal capacity to act and a will to guide -the act, in the one case we are thinking of that which is inferior, -limited, and feeble, and in the other case we are thinking of that -which knows no limitations and is absolutely inexhaustible. It is -not true, therefore, that there can be no conception of a Supreme -Being without ascribing to him human attributes. When we reason from -phenomena to the conclusion that they must have had an author--when -we reach the conviction that phenomena must have had a cause, that -there must have been an actor, a process, and a product--we have -to deal with two classes of phenomena. One is the class in which we -know, from the observations of our senses and our experience, that the -author and actor was man. It becomes verified to us with irresistible -certainty that the phenomena of human society were produced by an -actor, and that that actor was man; a personal agent with a limited and -imperfect power. When we turn to the phenomena of nature which we know -that man did not produce, we are led by the same irresistible logical -sequence of thought to the conviction that these phenomena must have -been caused to exist, for human reason revolts at the idea that the -phenomena which exist were not caused to exist. We come immediately -to perceive that the phenomena of nature are of such a character that -the power which has produced them must not only have been superhuman, -but it must have been absolutely boundless. At the moment we depart -from the investigation of phenomena which belong in the department of -human efforts, and come to the phenomena which belong in the department -of nature alone, while the necessity for a personal actor continues, -the character and capacities of the actor become entirely changed. -We see that the phenomena of nature required for their production -power without limitation, skill incapable of error, benevolence that -was inexhaustible. We thus pass entirely away from anthropomorphic -attributes, to the conception of attributes that are not human. We -may go on to divest the idea of a Supreme Being of all the attributes -that can appropriately be classed as anthropomorphic, and there will -still remain the conception of a Supreme Being to whom we not only may -but must ascribe attributes that are forced upon our convictions, not -because some of them belong in an inferior degree to man, but because -all of them are of such a character that if they did not exist in -boundless perfection the phenomena of nature could not have existed. - -Among the origins which have been assigned to religious beliefs, -there is one remarkable hypothesis which may be contrasted with the -ghost-theory, and which, so far as the beliefs of cultivated men at -the present day are concerned, is about as important as the origin of -the belief in ghosts, or as fetichism. It seems that some of the Greek -philosophers and historians, entirely regardless of the ghost-theory as -the origin of beliefs in supernatural beings, considered that they were -fictions invented by the first lawgivers, and promulgated by them for -useful purposes. Belief in the gods was thus imposed by the authority -of those who organized society and dictated what men were to believe in -order to exercise a useful restraint. Plato himself regarded this as -the origin of what the communities around him believed respecting the -attributes and acts of the gods; the matters believed being fictions -prescribed by the lawgivers. In his "Republic," in which he sketches -the entire political, social, ethical, and religious constitution of -an ideal city, assuming it to be planned and put in operation by an -absolute and unlimited authority, he laid it down as essential for -the lawgiver to determine what the fictions were to be in which his -own community were to be required to believe. Some fictions there -must be; for in the community there would be originally nothing but a -vague emotional tendency to belief in supernatural beings, and this -tendency must be availed of by some positive mythical inventions which -it was for the lawgiver to produce and the citizens to accept. Such -fictions were the accredited stories about the gods and heroes, which -formed the religious beliefs among Plato's contemporaries, and were -everywhere embodied in the works of poets, painters, and sculptors, -and in the religious ceremonies. But the ancient fictions were, in -Plato's opinion, bad, inasmuch as they gave wrong ethical ideas of the -characters of the gods. They did not rest upon traditionary evidence, -or divine inspiration, being merely pious frauds, constructed by -authority and for an orthodox purpose. But they did not fulfill the -purpose as well as they should have done. Accordingly, Plato directs -in his "Republic" the coinage of a new body of legends, for which he -claims no character of veracity, but which will be more in harmony -with what he conceives to be the true characters of the gods, and -will produce a more salutary ethical effect upon those who are to -be the efficient rulers of the commonwealth after it is founded. As -the founder of his ideal city, he claims and exercises an exclusive -monopoly of coining and circulating such fictions, and they are to -be absolutely accepted by those who are to constitute its rulers, -and who are to promulgate and teach them to the community, as the -physician administers wholesome remedies. To prevent the circulation of -dissenting narratives, he establishes a peremptory censorship. There is -thus no question of absolute truth or absolute falsehood. That is true -which is stamped at the mint of the lawgiver, and that is false which -he interdicts.[103] - -Nowhere has orthodoxy been rested more distinctly upon the basis of -absolute human authority--authority acting upon the highest motives of -the public good, for the most salutary purposes, but without claiming -anything in the nature of divine inspiration, or even pretending to any -other truth than conformity to preconceived ideas of the characters -of the gods. As evidence of what Plato regarded as the origin of the -religious beliefs which were held by his contemporaries, his "Republic" -is an important testimony; for he assigns almost nothing to mankind in -general, but an emotional tendency to believe in invisible quasi-human -agents, of whom they had no definite conceptions, and at the same time -they were entirely ignorant of recorded history, past and present. -They needed distinct legendary fictions and invented narratives; these -were furnished to them by those who could coin them, and were accepted -upon the authority of those who promulgated them. Those who first -embodied the fictions as narratives were the oldest poets; in progress -of time the authority which dictated belief in them came to be the -state. Plato rejected the fictions of the state, and in his "Republic" -proposed to substitute fictions of his own. The testimony of Plato, -therefore, in respect to the origin of religious beliefs in the early -ages of Greece is decidedly against the ghost-theory, whatever support -may be found for that theory in the beliefs of the uncivilized races -of our own day, or in the beliefs of other nations of antiquity. But -neither the ghost-theory, as the origin of beliefs in supernatural -beings, nor the origin of such beliefs in the will of the lawgiver, -which Plato clearly held in his "Republic" to be the foundation of -orthodoxy, is any test or measure of what philosophy may attain to as a -rational conception at the present day.[104] - -I propose, therefore, to imagine a man of mature years, without any -religious prepossessions whatever, a perfectly independent thinker, -furnished with the knowledge that is now within the easy reach of human -acquisition, capable of correct reasoning, and with no bias to any kind -of belief. It is only necessary to personify in one individual the -intellectual capacity of the cultivated and educated part of mankind, -but without the religious ideas instilled into them by education, in -order to have a valuable witness to the mental processes and results -which can be followed and attained by a right employment of our -faculties. And, the better to exhibit the processes and results, I -propose to let this imaginary person discuss in the form of dialogue, -in which another imaginary interlocutor shall be a modern disciple of -the evolution school, whatever topics would be likely to come into -debate between such persons. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [93] "Essays," vol. iii, pp. 293-296. - - [94] For the answer to the objection that we thus ascribe - anthropomorphic attributes to the Supreme Being, see _infra._ - - [95] Webster's Dictionary, "Phenomenon." - - [96] Our other American lexicographer, Worcester, who was pretty - strict in regard to the words which he admitted into the English - language, gives the word "noumenon," but he was careful to designate - its arbitrary use. His definition is this: - - "Noumenon, _n._ [Gr. νοῦς, the mind.] In the philosophy of Kant, an - object in itself, not relatively to us; opposed to _phenomenon_. - _Fleming_." - - [97] Prof. Huxley, who claims a sort of patent right or priority of - invention in the term and doctrine "agnosticism." - - [98] "There are some things I know and some things I believe," said - the Syrian; "I know that I have a soul, and I believe that it is - immortal." ... - - "I wish I could assure myself of the personality of the Creator," said - Lothair; "I cling to that, but they say it is unphilosophical!" "In - what sense," asked the Syrian, "is it more unphilosophical to believe - in a personal God, omnipotent and omniscient, than in natural forces, - unconscious and irresistible? Is it unphilosophical to combine power - with intelligence?"--_Disraeli's "Lothair."_ - - [99] The practice of judging of the future by the past is sometimes - treated as if it were a mere habit of the uncultivated and - undisciplined part of mankind--a kind of mental weakness. Undoubtedly, - our past experience is not always an infallible guide to what is to - be our experience in the future. We often have to correct our past - experience, by carefully separating the accidental from the essential; - by more comprehensive analysis of the facts which constitute our - former experience. But when we have full, comprehensive, and accurate - views of that which has happened to us heretofore, our beliefs in what - is to happen to us hereafter are not only attained by a safe process - of reasoning, but that process is imposed upon us by a law of our - mental constitution. - - [100] "Nineteenth Century" for November, 1884, p. 827. - - [101] Grote's "Plato," iii, pp. 284, 285. - - [102] Grote's "Plato," iii, p. 285, and notes. - - [103] Grote's "Plato," iii, p. 181 _et seq._ - - [104] The contradictions between Plato's ideas of the origin of - beliefs in the gods, as given in his various writings, are of course - unimportant in reference to the present discussion. In the "Timæus," - as Mr. Grote has pointed out, Plato "accepts the received genealogy - of the gods, upon the authority of the sons and early descendants of - the gods. These eons must have known their own fathers; we ought, - therefore, to 'follow the law and believe them,' though they spoke - without either probable or demonstrative proof.... That which Plato - here enjoins to be believed is the genealogy of Hesiod and other - poets, though he does not expressly name the poets." (Grote, iii, p. - 189, note.) In other words, the sons of the gods are authoritative - witnesses to their genealogy, whose _ipsi diximus_ must be believed. - On the other hand, in his "Republic" and "Leges," Plato rejects the - authority of those witnesses, and boldly proclaims that their legends - are fictions, which must be displaced by better fictions, more - consonant to a true ethical conception of the characters of the gods. - It is the province of the lawgiver to supply these better legends, but - they are all the while fictions, although the multitude do not know - that they are so. Mr. Grote accounts for these and other discrepancies - in the writings of Plato by explaining that his different dialogues - are not interdependent productions, but separate disquisitions. (See - his admirable and critical examination of the Platonic canon, in - Chapters IV, V, VI, of his first volume.) - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - The existence, attributes, and methods of God deducible from the - phenomena of Nature--Origin of the solar system. - - -In all that has been said in the preceding chapters respecting the -two hypotheses of special creation and evolution, the existence and -attributes of the Supreme Being have been assumed. The question of the -existence and attributes of God has been reserved for discussion as -an independent inquiry; and this inquiry it is now proposed to make, -without any reference to the teachings of revealed religion, or to -the traditionary beliefs of mankind. The simple idea of God, which I -suppose to be capable of being reached as a philosophical deduction -from the phenomena of the universe, embraces the conception of a -Supreme Being existing from and through all eternity, and possessed of -the attributes of infinite power and goodness, boundless, that is to -say in faculties, incapable of error, and of supreme beneficence. While -this idea of God corresponds with that which has been held from an -early period under more or less of the influence exerted by teachings -which have been accepted as inspired, or as authorized by the Deity -himself, the question here to be considered is whether the same idea of -God is a rationally philosophical deduction from the phenomena of the -universe without the aid of revelation. - -In order to conduct this inquiry so as to exclude all influence of -traditionary beliefs derived from sources believed to have been -inspired, or from any authority whatever, let us suppose a man to -have been born into this world in the full maturity of average human -faculties, as they are found in well-disciplined intellects of the -present age, but without any inculcated ideas on religious subjects. -In the place of education commencing in infancy and carried on to the -years of maturity, in the course of which more or less of dogmatic -theology would have become incorporated almost with the texture of the -mind, let us suppose that the mind of our inquirer is at first a total -blank in respect to a belief in or conception of such a being as God, -but that his intellectual powers are so well developed that he can -reason soundly upon whatever comes within the reach of his observation -or study. Let us further imagine him to be so situated that he can -command at will the knowledge that science, as it now exists, could -furnish to him, and that he is able to judge impartially any theories -with which he meets. Such a person would be likely to deal rationally -and independently with any question that might arise in the course of -his investigations; and the fundamental question that would be likely -to present itself to his mind would be, How came this universe and its -countless phenomena to exist? - -Stimulated by an eager curiosity, but careful to make his -investigations with entire coolness of reasoning, let us suppose -that our inquirer first turns his attention to the phenomena of the -solar system, and to what astronomy can teach him in regard to its -construction. He finds it to consist of-- - -1. The sun, a great central body giving forth light and heat. - -2. A group of four interior planets: Mercury, Venus, the Earth, and -Mars. - -3. A group of small planets, called asteroids, revolving beyond the -orbit of Mars, and numbering, according to the latest discoveries, -about two hundred and twenty. - -4. A group of four planets beyond the asteroids: Jupiter, Saturn, -Uranus, and Neptune. - -5. The satellites of the planets, of which there are twenty now known; -all but three of them belonging to the outer planets. - -6. An intermediate number of bodies called comets and meteors, which -revolve in very eccentric orbits. - -This system of bodies, constituting a mechanism by itself, apart from -what are called the fixed stars, is the first object in nature to which -our inquirer directs his studies. Inasmuch as the comets and meteors -move in very eccentric orbits, and are supposed to come into our system -from the illimitable spaces beyond it, although in the case of the -comets, or some of them, mathematical calculations enable astronomers -to predict their return when they have passed out of the solar system, -and inasmuch as the sun and the superior planets may be contemplated -as a grand piece of mechanism, and as the greatest mechanical object -in nature of whose construction and movements we have some accurate -knowledge, we will suppose that our inquirer confines his attention -to this part of the solar system, without adverting to the action of -the bodies which are not always, as these are, within the range of the -telescope. - -One of the first things that would strike him would be the enormous -range in the sizes, distances, and relative weights of these different -bodies. He would learn, for example, that Neptune is eighty times as -far from the sun as Mercury, and that Jupiter is several thousand times -as heavy; and he would observe that these differences in magnitude, -distance from the sun, and weight of each mass, are carried through a -range of proportions stupendously great. If he followed the best lights -of modern astronomy, he would learn that what is known, or accepted as -known, in regard to the operation of any law among these bodies, is -that they are bound together by the law of universal gravitation as -a force to which all matter would be subjected when it should come to -exist, in whatever forms it might be distributed; secondly, that when -the bodies now composing the solar system should come into existence, -the system would not owe its proportions to the operation of the law of -gravitation, but would be the result of a plan so shaped as to admit -of its being governed by the law of gravitation after the system had -been made, in such a manner as to produce regularity and certainty of -movement and to prevent dislocation and disturbance. What the great -modern telescopes have enabled astronomers to discover tends very -strongly to show that the plan of the solar system, in respect to the -relative distances, magnitudes, and revolutions of the different bodies -around the sun, and their relations to that central body and to each -other, are not the result of any antecedent law which gradually evolved -this particular plan, but that the plan itself was primarily designed -and executed as one on which the law of gravitation could operate -uniformly, and so as to prevent any disturbance in the relations of the -different bodies to each other.[105] - -An illustration will help to make the meaning of this apparent. Let -us suppose a human artificer to project the formation of a complex -mechanism, in which different solid bodies would be made to revolve -around a central body; and let us imagine him to be situated outside -of the earth's attraction, so that its attraction would not disturb -him. He would then have to consider the law of gravitation only in -reference to its operation among the different bodies of his machine; -and he would adjust their relative distances, weights, and orbits of -revolution around the central body, so that the law of gravitation, -instead of producing dislocation and disturbance, would bind the -whole together in a fixed system of movement, by counteracting the -centrifugal tendency of a revolving body to depart from its intended -orbit, and at the same time relying on the effect of the two forces in -preventing the revolving bodies from falling into the center or from -rushing off into the endless realms of space. - -This is what may well be supposed to have taken place in the formation -of the solar system, for it is consistent with the law which must have -preceded the existence of that system. We can not suppose that the law -of gravitation was itself a mere result of the relative distances, -magnitudes, and orbits of the different bodies. This supposition would -make gravitation not a law, but a phenomenon. We do indeed arrive at -the existence of the law of gravitation by observing the actions of -the bodies which compose the solar system; in other words, we discover -the law that holds them together, by observing their actions. But we -should entirely reverse the proper process of reasoning, if we were to -conclude that the law of gravitation is a phenomenon resulting from -an arrangement of certain bodies according to a certain plan. The -discoveries of astronomy, on the contrary, should lead us to regard -gravitation as a universal law, which existed before the existence of -the bodies which have been subjected to it. This is the only way in -which our inquirer could reason in regard to the formation of the solar -system, whether he supposed its plan to have been a special creation, -or to have been evolved out of a nebulous vapor by the operation of -the laws of motion or any other laws. Reasoning upon the hypothesis -that the law of gravitation existed before there were any bodies for -it to operate upon, or, in other words, that it had become in some -way an ordained or established principle by which all bodies would be -governed, he would have the means of understanding the adaptation of -the solar system to be operated upon by the law which he had discovered. - -He would next ask himself, How came this law of gravitation to exist? -That it must have had an origin, must have proceeded from some lawgiver -competent to make and enforce it, would be a conclusion to which he -would be irresistibly led, for the very idea of a law implies that -it is a command proceeding from an authority and power capable of -ordaining and executing it. When it is said that a law is a rule of -action ordained by a supreme power, which is perhaps the most familiar -as it is the most exact definition, the idea of a command and of a -power to enforce it is necessarily implied. This is just as true of a -physical as it is of a moral law; of a law that is to govern matter as -of a law that is to govern moral and accountable beings. Both proceed -from a supreme authority and power, and both are commands. There is, -however, one distinction between a moral law and a law of Nature, -which relates to the mode in which we arrive at a knowledge of the -law; a distinction which our inquirer would learn in the course of his -investigations. We infer the existence of a law of Nature, or a law -designed to operate upon matter, from the regularity and uniformity -of certain physical phenomena. As the phenomena occur always in the -same way we infer it to be an ordinance of Nature that they shall -occur in that way. But the moral phenomena exhibited by the actions -of men have not this regularity and uniformity. They are sometimes -in accordance with and sometimes grossly variant from any supposed -rule of moral action. We can not, therefore, deduce a moral law from -our observation of the actions of the beings whom it was designed to -govern, but we must discover it from the rules of right reason and -from such information as has been given to us by whatever revelation -may have come to us from another source than our own minds. But this -distinction between the modes of reaching a knowledge of physical -and moral laws does not apply to the authority from which they have -proceeded. Both of them being commands, or fixed rules of action, both -must have had an enacting authority. We learn the one by observing the -phenomena of Nature. We learn the other from reason and revelation. - -To return now to the examination of the solar system, which our -inquirer is supposed to be prosecuting. The study, which astronomy -and its implements will have enabled him to make, has taught him -the existence of the law of gravitation, and has led him to the -conclusion that it must have had an enacting authority. Following out -the operation of this law, through the stupendous spaces of the solar -system, he would begin to form conclusions respecting the attributes -of its author. He would see that the power must have been superhuman; -in other words, that it must have immeasurably transcended anything -that can be imagined of power wielded by a being of less than infinite -capacities; for, although the space occupied by the solar system, from -the central sun out to the orbit of the planet Neptune, is a measurable -distance, the conception of the law of gravitation, and its execution, -through such an enormous space and among such a complex system of -bodies, evince a faculty in the lawgiver that must have been boundless -in power and skill. The force of gravitation is found to exactly -balance the centrifugal tendency of the bodies revolving around the -sun, so that, when once set in motion around that center, they remain -in their respective orbits and never fall into the sun or into each -other. Our learner would thus see the nature of the adjustment required -to produce such a result; and, even if he endeavored to follow out -this balancing of forces no farther than to the extreme boundary of -the solar system, he would see that the being, who could conceive and -execute such a design on such a scale, must have had supreme power and -boundless intelligence. So that, by the study of the solar system, as -its arrangements and movements are disclosed by astronomy, our inquirer -would be naturally led to the conception of a lawgiver and artificer of -infinite power and wisdom, ordaining the law of gravitation to operate -against the centrifugal force, which would otherwise conduct out of its -orbit a body revolving around a center, and then adjusting the relative -distances, weights, and revolutions of the different bodies, so as to -subject them to the operation of the great law that is to preserve them -in fixed relations to each other. - -If, next, our inquirer should go farther in his investigations of the -solar system, and endeavor to satisfy himself concerning the mode in -which the different bodies of this system came into existence in their -respective positions, the history of astronomy would teach him that -there has been a theory on this subject which fails to account for -the existence of this system of bodies without the hypothesis of some -special creation. This theory is what is called the nebular hypothesis. -It supposes that the solar system was evolved out of a mass of fiery -vapor, which filled the stellar spaces, and which became the bodies -now observable by the telescope, and that they were finally swung into -their respective places by the operation of the fixed laws of motion. -But all that astronomers now undertake to say is that this hypothesis -is a probably true account of the origin of the solar system, and not -that it is an established scientific fact, or a fact supported by -such proofs as those which show the existence of the laws of motion. -The history of the nebular hypothesis, from the time of its first -suggestion to the present day, shows that there are no satisfactory -means of accounting for the method in which the supposed mass of -fiery vapor became separated, consolidated, and formed into different -bodies, and those bodies became ranged and located in their respective -positions. The hypothesis that these results were all produced by -fixed laws working upon a mass of fiery vapor, is one that has been -reasoned out in very different ways; and this diversity of views is -such that astronomers of the higher order do not undertake to say that -opinions may not reasonably differ in regard to the principal question, -namely, the question between the nebular hypothesis and the hypothesis -of a special act or acts of creation. - -Inasmuch, therefore, as scientific astronomy would present to our -inquirer nothing but the nebular hypothesis to account for the -production of the bodies of the solar system as they now exist, and as -there are admitted difficulties in this hypothesis which may not be -insurmountable but which have not been as yet by any means overcome, -it can not be said that philosophers are warranted in assuming that -all the phenomena of the solar system are to be explained by this -theory. The hypothesis that the phenomena, or some part of them, have -been produced by a cause operating in a different way, that is, by -an act or acts of intentional and direct or special creation, is not -excluded by the discoveries of the astronomer. Those discoveries lie -in the domain of astronomy, and they do not exclude the hypothesis of -a special creation of the solar system upon the plan on which we find -it arranged. The latter hypothesis lies in the domain of philosophy. It -is to be judged by the inquiry whether it is a rational explanation of -phenomena, which astronomy does not show as an established scientific -fact, or by proofs that ought to be deemed satisfactory, to have been -produced by the method suggested by the nebular hypothesis. - -The philosophic reasoning, which would conduct our inquirer to his -conclusions, would begin for him with the existence of an omnipotent -being, by whom the laws of matter and motion were established. This -conception and belief he has attained from having discovered those -laws, which must have had an author. He would soon hear the scientist -speak of "natural" and "supernatural" methods, and he would understand -that by the former is meant the operation of certain fixed laws, and, -by the latter, a mode of action in a different way. But he would also -and easily understand that the power which could establish the laws -of matter and motion, the operation of which the scientist calls the -natural method, could equally act in another way, which the scientist -calls the supernatural, but which, in the eye of philosophy, is just -as competent to the Infinite Power as the method called natural. To -state it in different words, but with the same meaning, that which -the scientist calls the supernatural is to the philosopher just as -conceivable and just as consistent with the idea of a supreme being as -the order of what we call Nature; for Nature is the phenomena that are -open to our observation, and from which we deduce the probable method -by which they have been brought about. It will never do to say that -they could not have been produced by a cause operating differently from -a system of fixed laws so long as we reason from the hypothesis of the -existence and attributes of a Supreme Being. If we reason without that -hypothesis, we may persuade ourselves of anything or of nothing. - -This idea of a Supreme Being, possessed of the attributes of infinite -power and wisdom, is one that our inquirer would have reached as a -rational deduction from the operation of a law (gravitation) which must -have had an author; from the structure of a mechanism so designed as to -be governed successfully by that law, and from the execution of the law -through such enormous spaces that nothing short of infinite power and -wisdom could have produced the result. - -At this stage of his investigations, our inquirer encounters a modern -scientist. I shall take the liberty of coining convenient names for -these two interlocutors: calling the one Sophereus, as representing -the spirit of unprejudiced research in the formation of beliefs without -the influence of previous teaching; and the other Kosmicos, as a -representative of the dogmatic school of evolution and agnosticism. - -Sophereus has imparted to his scientific friend the conclusions which -he has thus far reached, concerning the existence and attributes of a -supreme lawgiver and artificer, as deduced from the phenomena of the -solar system. The discussion between them then proceeds as follows: - -KOSMICOS. I do not wish to convince you at present of my -own views on this subject, but I put before you a difficulty which -you ought to solve, if you can, to your own satisfaction, before you -proceed farther. You have learned of the law of gravitation; and you -have imagined a being who has established this and other laws by which -matter is to be governed. To this being you have imputed certain -personal attributes, which you call infinite power and boundless -wisdom. Observe now that the laws to which you assign this origin are -of perpetual duration; they have operated without change from the -remotest period of their existence just as they operate now, and we -have no reason to doubt that they will continue to operate in the same -way through the indefinite future. They constitute the order of Nature. -Now, you suppose a Supreme Being, who has established these invariable -laws, but has not left them anything to do; has not left to them the -production of the solar system, but has specially interposed, and in a -supernatural mode of action has constructed the machine which has the -sun for its center and the surrounding bodies which revolve about it. -How can you suppose that the same being has acted in different ways? -How can you suppose that the being who you imagine established the -general laws of Nature and gave to them a fixed operation throughout -the universe, so that they never would be suspended or interrupted, -has gone aside from them, and made occasional constructions by special -interpositions of his power? Is it not a contradiction to suppose that -an Almighty Being, who must have acted by uniform methods without -reference to occasions, has acted on certain occasions by special -methods that were not uniform with his fixed laws? Does not this -hypothesis imply that his fixed laws were insufficient for the purposes -for which he designed them, and that he had to resort to other means? -How do you get over this difficulty? - -SOPHEREUS. What you propound as a difficulty does not disturb -me. I understand the distinction which you make between the natural -and the supernatural. I can see in the solar system how the law of -gravitation and all the other laws of motion operate; but I do not -see, nor can you explain, how these laws, or the laws of chemical -combination or any other laws, can have evolved the plan of the solar -system out of a mass of fiery vapor. I can understand the enactment and -establishment of laws of motion, of chemical combination, and of the -mechanical action of different states of matter upon each other, to -operate in fixed and invariable ways, in certain conditions. But I do -not see that there is any interruption or displacement of these laws, -after they are established, when an end that is to be accomplished -calls for a complex system of new objects among which they are to -operate. It is manifest that the question is whether the different -bodies of the solar system have been formed and placed in their -respective positions, according to a special design of their relative -distances, magnitudes, and orbits, or whether these are the results -of the operation of fixed laws, without any special interposition -of a creating power. Astronomers have not explained how the latter -hypothesis is anything more than a probable conjecture. It remains -for me to consider whether the hypothesis of a special interposition, -whereby the plan of the solar system has been made, is attended with -the difficulty which you suggest. We are reasoning about a period of -the remote past when this system of bodies did not exist, but when the -general laws that were to govern all matter may be supposed to have -been previously ordained. If we think of the solar system, conceived -and projected by the Supreme Being, as a complex mechanism that was to -exist in Nature, the occasion would be one calling for the exercise -of infinite wisdom and power. The production of such a mechanism, to -answer any ends for which it was intended that it should exist, implies -attributes that transcend all our human experience of the qualities of -power and wisdom. That it was an occasional exercise of power, in no -way implies any irregularity or inconsistency of method, if the power -was so exercised as to leave all the general laws of Nature in full -operation, so that there would be no clashing between what you call -the natural and the supernatural. I have first to ascertain what was -the probably intended scope of the general laws which are supposed to -have been ordained before the solar system came into existence. If -it appears to have been the purpose of the constructor to have these -laws work out this system of bodies without any special interposition -and formative skill directly exercised, I need go no further. But I -see no evidence of that purpose. No one has suggested anything but a -theory on this subject, which is not supported by any satisfactory -proofs. I am left, therefore, to the consideration of the question -whether an act of special interposition, in the formation of a plan -obviously calling for the exercise of infinite wisdom and power, is -in any way inconsistent with the establishment of a system of laws -which were to operate on these bodies and among them after they had -come to exist. My conclusion, from what I have learned of the solar -system, is, that in the exercise by the same being of the method which -you call the natural, and the exercise of the method which you call -the supernatural, there is no inconsistency; that each of the fixed -laws of matter and motion was designed to have its own scope; and that -each of them may well consist, within its limitations, with occasional -exercises of power, for the production of objects that were to be -operated upon by the laws, but of which they were not designed to be -the producing cause. Thus it seems to me to be a rational conclusion -that the law of gravitation, the general laws of motion, and all the -other laws of matter, which preceded the existence of the solar system, -were not designed to be the agents by which the plan of that system -would be worked out, but that the plan was so formed and executed that -the bodies composing it would be subject to the operation of laws -enacted by the Infinite Will for the government of all the forms of -matter. The question is, whether the plan of the solar system is due to -the operation of the fixed laws, or to a special interposition; or, to -state it in another way, whether the whole of the phenomena, the plan -and arrangement of the solar system included, are to be referred to the -operation of certain fixed laws as the producing agents, or whether -some part of the phenomena, namely, the mechanism of the system, -should be referred to the special interposition. I am taught, by the -physics on which astronomers are now agreed, that gravitation is a -force by which the particles of matter act on each other; _that every -particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with -a force varying directly as their masses, and inversely as the square -of the distance which separates them_. This I understand to be the -formula in which the law of universal gravitation is expressed. But, -for the purpose of illustrating what I understand to be the operation -of this force, I have constructed a diagram, in which two bodies are -represented as A and B. From each of these bodies there radiates in -all directions an attracting force, which acts directly upon every -other body in the universe, and which is represented in the diagram -by dotted lines. In the diagram, the bodies A and B are first supposed -to be one thousand miles apart. A certain portion of the attracting -rays proceeding from A would strike directly upon B. All the other rays -proceeding in the same direction from A would pass on either side of B -without striking it. If B is removed to the distance of two thousand -miles from A, the sum total of the attractive force which A would exert -upon B would be diminished by the square of the distance, because B -would intercept just one fourth of the number of rays proceeding from -A compared with the number which it intercepts when the two bodies -are only one thousand miles apart; and the rays which B does not -intercept would pass along through the realms of space, until they -encountered some other body, on which they would exert a force that -would follow the same law of diminution. In the diagram, the two bodies -A and B may be single particles of matter or collections of particles; -they are represented as cubes; but the law of direct action of the -attracting force and the law of its diminution would be the same if the -bodies were spheres or oblongs. The power of attraction which bodies -exert upon each other resides in every individual particle of matter -composing the body, and the attraction which that body exerts upon -another body is the sum total of the attractions which proceed from all -the particles composing the mass and which impinge upon that other body. - -[Illustration] - -In the diagram the two bodies A and B are supposed to be of the same -mass. If, as in the case of the sun and the earth, one of the bodies -is of far greater mass than the other, then the attraction of the -sun for the earth is the same as the attraction of the earth for the -sun, because the action is mutual; but the sun, being the greater -mass, tends, by reason of its correspondingly greater inertia, to -remain comparatively stationary, or, in other words, it has a greater -resistance to being pulled out of its normal position, while the -earth, having less inertia, is more easily deflected from its straight -course in which its momentum tends to carry it, and so travels in an -orbit around the sun, the resisting or centrifugal pull of the earth, -due to its inertia, exactly balancing the inward pull due to the -mutual attraction. I understand that, besides the law of universal -gravitation, there are two fundamental laws of motion. By one of these -laws, if a body be set in motion and be acted on by no other than the -projectile force, it will move forward in a straight line and with a -uniform velocity forever. But by another law, if the moving body is -acted on by another force than that which originally projected it in -a straight line, it will deviate from that line in the direction of -that other force and in proportion to it. If A, the earth, liable to -be drawn toward B, the sun, by their mutual attraction, was originally -projected into space, at a certain distance from the sun, by a force -which would carry it on in a straight line, it would be acted on by two -forces: the projectile force would cause it to move in a straight line; -the force of the mutual attraction would cause it to deviate from that -line in the direction of the sun. The result would be that the earth -would be carried around the sun in a circular or an elliptical orbit. -Every other planet in the solar system would be under the operation of -the same compound forces governed by the same laws; and while the sun -would exert upon each of them its force of attraction, and they would -each exert upon the others an attractive force that would be diminished -by the squares of their distances from one another, each of them -would be deflected from the straight line that would have otherwise -been the path of its motion, and the result would be a perpetual -revolution around the body that could exert upon each just the amount -of attraction requisite to overcome the projectile force by which it -was first put in motion. - -KOSMICOS. You have made an ingenious explanation of the law of -gravitation, which may or may not be correct. But now let me understand -what you infer from this hypothesis, supposing it to be true. What -should have prevented the law of gravitation and the laws of motion -from working out this very system of bodies, by operating upon a mass -of crude matter lying in the universe, supposing it to have been fiery -vapor or anything else? - -SOPHEREUS. I have thus far arrived, by the aid of what -astronomy teaches, at a complex system of physical laws, the law of -universal gravitation, and the laws of motion. I must suppose that -these laws had an intelligent author. I must suppose that they were -enacted, in the same sense in which we speak of any rule of action -ordained by a power competent to conceive of it and to put it into -execution. To me, as I view the facts of the solar system, the idea -that the law of gravitation and the laws of motion are to be regarded -as mere phenomena of matter, or as qualities of matter according to -which, from some inherent condition, it must act, does not explain the -solar system. I can not explain to myself what I see, without asking -myself how these qualities of matter came to exist. How came it to -be a condition of all matter that its particles should attract each -other by a certain force according to a certain rule? How came it to -be a law of motion that bodies projected into space should continue to -move on forever in a straight line, unless deviated from that line by -some other force? To say that things happen, but that no power ever -commanded them to happen; that things occur because they do occur, and -not because some power has ordained that they shall occur, is to me an -inconceivable kind of reasoning, if it be reasoning at all. Because men -act or profess to act upon certain principles of moral conduct, I can -not suppose that justice, and truth, and mercy are mere phenomena of -human conduct, that they never had any origin as moral laws in the will -of a lawgiver. For the same reason I can not suppose that the physical -laws of matter, stupendous in their scope, and of unerring certainty in -their operation, did not proceed from an enacting authority. In short, -it seems to me that the conception of power, as something independent -of the qualities of substance, is a logical necessity. - -KOSMICOS. I am not now trying to persuade you that the law -of gravitation and the laws of motion did not have an intelligent -author. For the purposes of the argument, I will concede that they were -enacted, as you term it. You have explained your understanding of the -operation of these; laws as they are expressed in the formula given -by astronomers, and for the present I will assume that they operate -in some such way. I will also concede that the idea of power in the -abstract, as something independent of the qualities of substance, is -necessary to the explanation of all physical phenomena. But I now -recall your attention to the point which I originally suggested. -Explain to me how it has happened that the being who you suppose -established certain laws for the government of all matter has not -allowed those laws to evolve out of diffused matter certain bodies -which we find grouped together in the universe, but has specially -interposed by another act, and constructed this system of bodies -without the agency of his own laws. All that we know about the law of -gravitation and the laws of motion we derive from observing the actions -of these bodies which compose the solar system. We infer the existence -of these laws from the actions of these bodies. Now tell me how you -suppose that the same being who ordained these laws as fixed conditions -to which matter was to be subjected, and made them to operate upon all -matter, whether in a crude and unformed state or after it had become -organized into bodies of definite shapes and dimensions, did not rely -upon these inherent conditions of matter to produce those shapes and -dimensions, but went to work by special interposition, and produced the -mechanism of the solar system as a human artificer would make a machine -of a corresponding character. - -SOPHEREUS. We must take things in a certain order. I -understand you to concede, for the present, that the laws of -gravitation and motion must, or may, have existed before the sun -and the planets were formed. We are agreed, then, that power has an -existence anterior to and separate from the qualities of substance. -What, then, is the difficulty attending the hypothesis that the -Infinite Power, which devised and established the laws of gravitation -and motion before the bodies of the solar system were formed, so -fashioned and distributed those bodies that while each of them -shall exert upon every other a certain amount of direct attraction, -that attraction shall diminish in a certain fixed ratio, as the -distance between them increases? We can not suppose that the relative -magnitudes, weights, and distances of these bodies were accidental, or -that they resulted from the property of attraction that was given to -the particles of matter of which they are composed. That property of -mutual attraction became at some time a fixed condition of all matter, -but it will not account for the formation of a system of bodies so -adjusted that the attracting force will act among them by a specific -law, by the operation of which they will be prevented from exerting -on each other an excessive amount of such force, or any amount but -that which is exactly needful to preserve their relative distances -from each other. Let it be supposed that the property of attraction -was impressed upon all the particles of matter in the universe, and -then that the Infinite Power, abstaining from all farther action, and -without forming and arranging the bodies of the solar system upon any -intentional plan, left all that plan to be worked out by that property -of matter; what reason have we to conclude that the law of gravitation -would, as the sole efficient cause, have produced just exactly this -complex piece of mechanism, so wonderfully adjusted? What reason have -we to conclude that the property of attraction, although ordained as an -inherent quality of all matter, would not, if left without any special -interposition, have resulted in some very different arrangement and -disposition of the matter lying in the space now occupied by the solar -system? - -KOSMICOS. Give me your idea of the condition which is called -"chaos," and I will then explain to you why it is that you do not do -justice to the scientific distinction between the natural and the -supernatural method by which things have been produced as we see them. - -SOPHEREUS. I presume you do not mean to ask how I suppose -chaotic matter came to exist. Its origin is one thing--its condition -is another. In regard to its condition, it seems very plain that there -was a period when diffused matter had not received the impress of the -qualities or been subjected to the laws which we now recognize. Take -the Mosaic hypothesis, where it speaks of the earth, for example, as -"without form and void." In this terse expression, there is embraced -the idea of a condition of matter without qualities, properties, or -laws; lying in an utterly crude state, waiting to receive the impress -of the divine will. The laws of motion have not begun to operate upon -it; the laws of chemical combination have not been applied to it. It -is a rational conclusion that this was the condition of things in that -remote period of eternity before the solar system was formed. Chaos, -then, was the condition of primeval matter before it had received the -fixed properties that were afterward to belong to it, and before the -laws that were ever afterward to govern it had been ordained. Lying in -this utterly crude state, without tendencies, without combinations, -without definite motion, floating in the universe without fixed form or -qualities, it awaits the action of the Infinite Power. It pleases that -power, out of its illimitable resources, to bestow upon this chaotic -matter certain properties, and to subject it to certain laws. One of -these properties is that its particles shall attract one another by a -certain force; one of these laws is that this force shall operate by an -invariable and fixed rule of direct action, and by an invariable and -fixed rule of diminution, according to the distance of the particles -from each other; and another law is that a body projected into space, -by any force, shall continue to move in a straight line until and -unless it is deflected from that line by some other force. There -are, too, chemical properties belonging to matter as we know it, by -which it takes on certain combinations and undergoes modifications -and arrangements of its particles. All these properties, qualities, -and laws--these unavoidable methods of action--must have been imposed -upon the chaotic matter at some time by a power competent to establish -them, and to put them in operation. But the laws and the methods of -their operation do not account for the PLAN on which the solar -system has been formed, consisting of different bodies of such shapes, -dimensions, and relative distances, that the laws, when applied to -them, will produce the wonderfully exact and perpetual movements which -the telescope reveals. That PLAN is a _creation_, for which we -must look to something more than the laws and properties of matter; and -we can only find it in the will and purposes of the infinite artificer -who devised the laws by which this mechanism was to be governed after -it had been made, and who has so made it that it would be governed by -them. - -KOSMICOS. I do not see that you have yet reached a stronger -ground on which to rest the hypothesis of special interposition than -that on which is based the hypothesis which imputes the formation of -the solar system to certain fixed laws operating upon crude matter -not yet formed into definite shapes or placed in certain relative -positions. You will have to adduce some proof that has a stronger -tendency to exclude the supposition that the mechanism of the solar -system was produced by the laws of matter and motion working upon some -material that lay in the condition which you have described as "chaos." - -SOPHEREUS. Let us, then, look a little farther into some of -the details of this vast machine. Take one that is most obvious, and -that lies the nearest to us; I mean the moon, which accompanies our -earth as its satellite. The most remarkable thing about the motion of -the moon is the fact that she makes one revolution on her axis in the -same time that she takes to revolve around the earth, and consequently -she always presents to us the same face, and her other side is never -seen by human eyes. How came this to be the case? How came this to be -the adjustment of the two motions, the axial revolution of the moon and -her revolution around the earth, causing her always to present to us -the same side? It is said by astronomers that the two motions are so -exactly adjusted to each other that the longer axis of the moon always -points to the earth, without the slightest variation. It is conceded, -as I understand, to be infinitely improbable that this adjustment was -the result of chance. A cause for it is therefore to be found. Where -are we to look for that cause, unless we look for it in the will and -design of the Creator, who established it for some special purpose? - -KOSMICOS. You are aware that there is a physical explanation -of this phenomenon which accounts for it without the special design. -This explanation is that the moon was once in a partially fluid state, -and that she rotated on her axis in a period different from the present -one. In such a condition, the attraction of the earth would produce -great tides in the fluid substance of the moon; this attraction, -combined with the centrifugal force of the moon's rotation on her own -axis, would cause a friction, and this friction would retard the rate -of her axial rotation, until it became coincident with the rate of her -revolution around the earth. It is highly improbable that the moon was -originally set in rotation on her axis with just the same velocity with -which she was made to revolve around the earth. This improbability is -based on the ellipticity of the moon's orbit, which is caused by the -attraction of the sun. The mean distance of the moon from the earth -is 240,300 miles; her smallest possible distance is 221,000 miles; -and the greatest possible distance is 259,600. The usual oscillation -between these extremes is about 13,000 miles on each side of the mean -distance of 240,300. The diameter of the moon is 2,160 miles, or less -than two sevenths of the earth's diameter. In volume she is about one -fiftieth as large as the earth, but her density, or the specific -gravity of her material, is supposed to be a little more than half -of that of our globe; and her weight is about three and a half times -the weight of the same bulk of water. When she is nearest to the sun, -the superior attraction of that body tends to draw her out of her -circular orbit around the earth; when she is farthest from the sun, -this attraction is diminished, and thus her terrestrial orbit becomes -slightly elliptical. But there is another attraction to be taken into -account. This other attraction, in her former fluid condition, has -given her the shape, not of a perfect sphere, but of an ellipsoid, or -an elongated body with three unequal axes. The shortest of her axes is -that around which she rotates; the next longest is that which points -in the direction in which she is moving; and the longest of all points -toward the earth. This shape of the moon, resulting from the earth's -attraction, has been produced by drawing the matter of the moon which -is nearest to the earth toward the earth, and by the centrifugal force -which tends to throw outward the matter farthest from the earth. The -substance of the moon being a liquid, so as to yield freely, she would -be elongated in the direction of the earth. But if she was originally -set in motion on her own axis at precisely the same rate with which -she was made to revolve around the earth, the correspondence between -the two motions could not have been kept up; her axial rotation would -have varied, by reason of the fact that her relative distance from the -sun and the earth varies with the ellipticity of her orbit around the -earth, and thus the two motions would not correspond. But if we allow -for the attraction of the earth upon a liquid or semi-liquid body, -producing for the moon an elongated shape, her axial rotation would, -if the two motions were in the beginning very near together, vary -with her revolutions around the earth, and the correspondence between -the two motions would be kept up. Here, then, you have a physical -explanation of the phenomenon which strikes you as so remarkable--a -result brought about by natural causes, without the supposition of what -you call intentional design, or formative skill directly exercised by a -supernatural interposition. - -SOPHEREUS. This is a very plausible theory, but it all depends -upon two assumptions: First, it assumes it to be extremely improbable -that the two motions were aboriginally made to correspond, by an -intentional adjustment of the moon's weight, dimensions, and shape, -upon such a plan that the laws of gravitation and movement would keep -the two motions in exact correspondence. Why should not the rates -of movement have been originally designed and put in execution as -we find them? You anticipate the answer to this question by another -assumption, namely, that the substance of the moon was at first in a -fluid or semi-fluid state, so that she owed her present shape to the -effect of the earth's attraction, and the centrifugal tendency of -its most distant part to be thrown out of the line of its motion. I -should be glad to have you explain why it is extremely improbable that -the Creator planned this part of the solar system, the earth and its -satellite, and so adjusted the dimensions, shapes, and weights of each -of them, and fixed the rates of revolution of the satellite, that the -laws of attraction and motion would find a mechanism which they would -keep perpetually in operation, and thus preserve a constant relation -between the moon's axial rotation and her revolution around the -earth. I have thus far learned to regard the probable methods of the -Creator somewhat differently from those which you scientists ascribe -to him. Most of you, I observe, have a strong tendency to regard -the Deity as having no specific plan in the production of anything, -which plan he directly executed; and, so far as you regard a First -Cause as the producing cause of phenomena, you limit its activity to -the establishment of certain fixed laws, and explain all phenomena -upon the hypothesis that the Supreme Being--if you admit one--made no -special interpositions of his will and power in any direction, after -he had established his system of general laws. But to me it seems that -the weight of probability is entirely against your hypothesis. In this -particular case of which we have been speaking, that of the moon's -revolution, the supposed improbability of an original and intentional -adjustment of the two motions turns altogether on the argument that if -they had been so adjusted at the beginning they would not have kept -on, and this argument is supported by the assumption that the moon -was at first a mass of fluid. I do not understand this mode of making -facts to support theories; and I wish you would explain to me why, in -this particular instance, the inference of a divine and intentional -plan in the structure of this part of the solar system is so extremely -improbable. To me it seems so obvious a piece of invented mechanism, -that I can not avoid the conclusion that it was the intentional work -of a constructor, any more than I could if I were to find a piece of -mechanism under circumstances which indicated that it was produced by -human hands. - -KOSMICOS. You do not even yet do justice to the scientific -method of reasoning. The deductions of science--the conclusions -which the scientist draws from the phenomena of Nature--rest upon -the postulate of fixed laws of Nature, which never change, and which -have not been varied by any supernatural interference. We mean by -a supernatural cause one which is not uniformly in operation, or -which operates in some way different from the fixed laws which we -have deduced from the observed order of the phenomena that we have -studied and found to be invariable. We adopt this distinction between -the natural and the supernatural because the observable phenomena of -Nature do not furnish any means of discovering as a fact the operation -of anything but the fixed laws, or any cause which has acted in a -different way. Let us now apply this to the phenomena which we have -been considering--the composition and arrangement of the solar system. -What do we find? We find a system of bodies in the movements of which -we detect certain fixed laws operating invariably in the same way. -When the question is asked, How were these bodies produced? we have no -means of reaching a conclusion except by reasoning upon the operation -of the forces which these laws disclose, working on the primordial -matter out of which the bodies became formed. It is for this reason -that, in accounting for their existence, we speak of the method of -their formation as the natural, in contradistinction to some other -method which we call the supernatural; by which latter term we mean -some mode in which there has been a power exerted differently from the -established and fixed agency of the laws of matter, which constitute -all that we have ever discovered. The nebular hypothesis affords a -good illustration of the distinction which I am endeavoring to show -you, whether it is well established or not, or is ever likely to be. -It supposes that there was a mass of fiery vapor, floating in the -space now occupied by the solar system. Under the operation of the -laws of gravitation and motion, of mechanical forces and chemical -combination, this crude matter becomes consolidated and formed into -the different bodies known to us as the sun and the planets, and the -laws which thus formed them continue to operate to keep them in the -fixed relations to each other which resulted from the process of their -formation. Whether as a matter of fact the solar system was formed in -this way, this, or some other mode of operation through the action of -certain established laws operating upon primeval matter, is what we -call the natural method, in opposition to the supernatural; and we can -not discover the supernatural method, because the closest and most -extensive investigations never enable us to find in nature any method -of operation but that which acts in a fixed and invariable way. - -SOPHEREUS. What you have now said brings me to a question that -I have all along desired to ask you: How do you know that the Infinite -Power never acts, or never has acted, in any way different from the -established order of Nature? Is science able to determine this? If it -is not, it must be for philosophy to consider whether there can have -been, or probably has been, in operation at any time any cause other -than those fixed laws of Nature which the scientist is able to deduce -from observable phenomena. Because science can only discover certain -fixed laws as the forces governing the bodies which compose the solar -system, or governing the materials of which they are supposed to be -made, it does not seem to me that a philosopher is precluded from -deducing, by a proper method of reasoning upon a study of the solar -system, the probable truth that its mechanism was specially planned -and executed by a special act of the creating power. The degree to -which this probability rises--whether it rises higher in the scale -than any other hypothesis--must depend upon the inquiry whether any -other hypothesis will better account for the existence of this great -object, with its enormous mechanism, its adjustments, and its unerring -movements. I must say, from what I have learned of this planetary -system, with the sun as its center, viewed as a mechanism, that I can -conceive of no hypothesis concerning its origin and formation which -compares in probability with the hypothesis that it was directly and -specially created, as we know it, by the Infinite Artificer. - -KOSMICOS. Pray, tell me what you mean by an act of creation? -Did you or any other man ever see one? Can you tell what creation is? - -SOPHEREUS. I think that your question can be answered. -Creation is the act of giving existence to something that did not -previously exist. We see such acts performed by men, very frequently, -so that we do not hesitate to speak of the product as a created thing. -We do not see acts of creation performed by the Infinite Power, but it -is surely not unphilosophical to suppose that what can be and is done -by finite human faculties, can be and has been done by the infinite -faculties of the Deity, and done upon a scale and in a perfection that -transcend everything that human power has produced. The sense in which -I have been led to conceive of the solar system as a creation is the -same as that by which I represent to myself the production, by human -power and skill, of some physical object which never existed before, -such as a machine, a statue, a picture, a pyramid, or an obelisk; any -concrete object which, whether or not new of its kind, did not as an -individual object previously exist. In weighing the probabilities as -to the mode in which the solar system came to exist, the reasons why -the idea of its special creation stands by far the highest in the scale -are these: 1. There must have been a period when this great object in -nature did not exist, and therefore it must have been caused to exist. -2. The necessary hypothesis of a causing power leads inevitably to the -conclusion that the power was adequate to the production of a system of -bodies so proportioned and arranged that they would act on each other -by certain fixed rules. 3. The causing or creating power must have -conceived the proportions and arrangements of the different bodies as -a plan, and must have executed that plan according to the conception. -4. While as a theory we can represent to ourselves that the causing -power established certain laws of matter and motion, which would by -their fixed operation on crude substances lying in the universe produce -this system of bodies without any preconceived and predetermined plan, -without any occasional or special interposition, yet that the system, -as we find it, is a product of such a nature as to have called for -and required the special interposition of a formative will. For, if -we proceed upon the hypothesis that this enormous and exact mechanism -was nothing but the product of certain pre-established laws operating -on crude matter, without direct and special interposition exerted in -the execution of a formed design, we have to obtain some definite -conception, and to find some proof of a method by which these laws -can have operated to produce this system of bodies exactly as we know -them to be proportioned and arranged. Astronomical science, and all -other science, has not discovered, or even suggested, any method by -which this result could have been brought about, without a special -act of creation in the execution of an original design. On the other -hand, the hypothesis of a special interposition in the execution of a -preconceived plan of construction is the most rational, the most in -accordance with probability, because it best meets the requirements of -the case. These requirements were that the proportions, arrangements, -and relations of the different bodies composing one grand mechanism, -should be such that the laws of gravitation and motion would operate -upon and among them so as to keep them in uniform and unvarying -movement. - -KOSMICOS. Very well. You have now come to the end of your -reasoning. Tell me, then, why it is not just as rational a supposition -that the Deity conceived of the plan of the solar system as a product -that would result, and that he intended should result, from the -operation of his fixed laws of matter and motion, and then left it to -the unerring certainty of their operation to produce the mechanism by -the process of gradual evolution? - -SOPHEREUS. The being who is supposed to hold and exercise -supreme power over the universe, holds a power to execute, by direct -and special creation, any design which he conceives and proposes to -accomplish. I am prepared to concede that the process of gradual -evolution can produce and apparently has produced some results. But -when we are looking for the probable methods of the Deity in the -production of such a mechanism as the solar system, we must recognize -the superior probability of the direct method, because the indirect -method which you describe as gradual evolution does not seem adequate -to the production of such a system of bodies. If we could obtain -facts which could have any tendency to show that, without any special -interposition, the mechanism of the solar system, or any part of it, is -a mere result of the working of the laws of gravitation and motion upon -a mass of crude matter, we might yield assent to the probability of -that occurrence. But of course we have no such facts; we have nothing -but theories; and therefore there appears nothing to exclude the -probable truth of a special creation. - -KOSMICOS. We shall not convince each other. You have stated -your conclusions concerning the solar system fairly enough, and I have -endeavored to answer them. But now let me understand how you propose -to apply them to other departments of Nature, in which we have means -of closer investigation. You will find it very difficult, I imagine, -to maintain that every organism, every plant, animal, fish, insect, or -bird, is a special creation, or even that man himself is. - -SOPHEREUS. Let me state for myself just what my conclusions -are in regard to the solar system. You will then know what the -convictions are with which I shall come to the study of other -departments. I have arrived at the conception of an Infinite Being -having the power to create anything that seems to him good; and I -have experienced no difficulty in conceiving what an act of creation -is. I have also reached the conviction that there is one great object -in Nature, the existence of which I can not account for without the -hypothesis of some special act of creation. Whether I shall find this -to be the case in regard to every other object in Nature, I can not -now tell. Perhaps, as many of these objects are nearer to us, and more -within our powers of investigation, the result may be different. I -shall endeavor to keep my mind open to the necessary discriminations -which facts may disclose. Possibly I may find reason to reverse the -conclusions at which I have arrived in regard to the solar system, if -I find that the hypothesis of evolution is fairly sustained by other -phenomena. - - NOTE.--Newton, whose reasoning powers have certainly not - been surpassed by those of any other philosopher, ancient or modern, - not only deduced the existence of a personal God from the phenomena - of Nature, but he felt no difficulty in ascribing to the Deity those - personal attributes which the phenomena of Nature show that he must - possess, because without them "all that diversity of natural things - which we find suited to different times and places" could not have - been produced. They could, he reasons, "arise from nothing but the - ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing." Newton does indeed - say that all our notions of God are taken from the ways of mankind; - but this is by way of allegory and similitude. There is a likeness, - but not a perfect likeness. There is therefore no necessity for - ascribing to God anthropomorphic attributes, because the enlargement - of the faculties and powers to superhuman and boundless attributes - takes them out of the category of anthropomorphic qualities and - capacities. In his "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy," - Newton had occasion to treat of the theory of vortices, as a - hypothesis by which the formation of the solar system is to be - explained. The "General Scholium," by which he concludes the third - book of his "Principia," lays down the masterly reasoning by which he - maintains that the bodies of the solar system, while they persevere - in their orbits by the mere laws of gravity, could by no means have - at first derived the regular position of the orbits themselves from - those laws. I had written the whole of the preceding chapter on the - origin of the solar system just as I have printed it, before I looked - into the "Principia" to see what confirmation might be derived from - Newton's speculations. I found that while I had not included the - comets in my examination of the solar system, but had confined myself - to the bodies that are at all times within the reach of the telescope, - the same deductions are re-enforced by the comets, eccentric as are - the orbits through which they range into and out of our system. I - quote the entire Scholium, as given in Motte's English translation of - the "Principia" from the Latin in which Newton wrote, published with a - Life by Chittenden, at New York, in the year 1848. - - -"GENERAL SCHOLIUM. - -"The hypothesis of vortices is pressed with many difficulties. -That every planet by a radius drawn to the sun may describe areas -proportional to the times of description, the periodic times of the -several parts of the vortices should observe the duplicate proportion -of their distances from the sun; but that the periodic times of the -planets may obtain the sesquiplicate proportion of their distances -from the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the vortex ought -to be in the sesquiplicate proportion of their distances. That the -smaller vortices may maintain their lesser revolutions about _Saturn_, -_Jupiter_, and other planets, and swim quietly and undisturbed in the -greater vortex of the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the -sun's vortex should be equal; but the rotation of the sun and planets -about their axes, which ought to correspond with the motions of their -vortices, recede far from all these proportions. The motions of the -comets are exceedingly regular, are governed by the same laws with the -motions of the planets, and can by no means be accounted for by the -hypothesis of vortices; for comets are carried with very eccentric -motions through all parts of the heavens indifferently, with a freedom -that is incompatible with the notion of a vortex. Bodies projected in -our air suffer no resistance but from the air. Withdraw the air, as is -done in Mr. _Boyle's_ vacuum, and the resistance ceases; for in this -void a bit of fine down and a piece of solid gold descend with equal -velocity. And the parity of reason must take place in the celestial -spaces above the earth's atmosphere; in which spaces, where there is no -air to resist their motions, all bodies will move with the greatest -freedom; and the planets and comets will constantly pursue their -revolutions in orbits given in kind and position, according to the laws -above explained; but though these bodies may, indeed, persevere in -their orbits by the mere laws of gravity, yet they could by no means -have at first derived the regular position of the orbits themselves -from those laws. - -"The six primary planets are revolved about the sun in circles -concentric with the sun, and with motions directed toward the same -parts, and almost in the same plane. Ten moons are revolved about the -earth, Jupiter, and Saturn, in circles concentric with them, with -the same direction of motion, and nearly in the planes of the orbits -of those planets; but it is not to be conceived that mere mechanical -causes could give birth to so many regular motions, since the comets -range over all parts of the heavens in very eccentric orbits; for by -that kind of motion they pass easily through the orbits of the planets, -and with great rapidity; and in their aphelions, where they move the -slowest, and are detained the longest, they recede to the greatest -distances from each other, and thence suffer the least disturbance -from their mutual attractions. This most beautiful system of the sun, -planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion -of an intelligent and powerful Being. And if the fixed stars are the -centers of other like systems, these being formed by the like wise -counsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One; especially since -the light of the fixed stars is of the same nature with the light of -the sun, and from every system light passes into all the other systems; -and lest the systems of the fixed stars should, by their gravity, -fall on each other mutually, he hath placed those systems at immense -distances one from another." - - FOOTNOTES: - - [105] The reader will understand that I do not assert this to be what - astronomers teach, but I maintain it to be a rational deduction from - the facts which they furnish to us. - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - - Does evolution account for the phenomena of society and of - nature?--Necessity for a conception of a personal actor--Mr. - Spencer's protoplasmic origin of all organic life--The Mosaic account - of creation treated as a hypothesis which may be scientifically - contrasted with evolution. - - -A long interval has elapsed since the conference described in the last -chapter, between the searcher after wisdom and his scientific friend. -At their next interview they take up the subject of a First Cause where -they left it at the conclusion of their debate on the solar system. - -KOSMICOS. Well, Sophereus, what have you been studying since -we last met? - -SOPHEREUS. Many things. I have been studying what is commonly -called Nature, and I have been studying society. With regard to -society, I have been endeavoring to discover to what the phenomena of -social life are to be attributed as their producing cause or causes; -whether they can be said to owe their existence to the direct action -or influence of intelligent wills, or are to be considered as effects -produced in the course of an ungoverned development, wrought by -incidental forces in varying conditions of human existence. The latter, -I find, is one of the theories now prevailing. - -KOSMICOS. And what is your conclusion? - -SOPHEREUS. My general conclusion in regard to the phenomena -of human society is the same as that which I formed from a study of -the phenomena of the solar system. I find a great many things which -I can not explain without the hypothesis of a direct creating power -exerted by an intelligent being. I know that you object to the idea -of creation, but I explained to you in our last discussion that I -understood it to mean the causing something to exist which did not -exist before, and the doing it by an intentional and direct act of -production. - -KOSMICOS. No matter about your definition. What are the facts -that you propose to discuss? - -SOPHEREUS. In the social phenomena I find many acts of -creation. I do not find that buildings spring out of the ground without -human intervention, or that machinery is formed by the spontaneous -arrangement of matter in certain forms and relations, or by the -tendencies that are implanted in matter as its inherent properties. -I find an enormous multitude of concrete objects, formed out of dead -matter, by human intervention, availing itself of those properties of -matter, which without such active intervention would have remained -quiescent, and would not have resulted in the production of these -objects. It is a common form of expression to speak of the "growth" -of cities, but no one understands by this form of speech that a city -has become what it is without the action of numerous individuals -projecting and building their separate structures, or without the -combined action of the whole body of the inhabitants in determining and -executing a general plan to which individuals are to conform, more or -less exactly, their particular erections. Again, I find that there are -rules of social life, which take the form of what are called "laws," -and these are imposed by the will of some governing authority; they are -always the product of some one human will, or of the collective will -of a greater number of persons. I have looked into history and have -found many instances of military conquest, invasions of the territory -inhabited by one race of men by another race, domination of different -dynasties, overthrow of one governing power, and substitution of -another. Although the changes thus produced are often very complex, -sometimes rapid and sometimes slow in reaching the consequences, I do -not find that they have ever taken place without the direct action of -some one human will, or of the aggregate force of many human wills. -The conquests of Alexander and Napoleon are instances of what a single -human will can do in changing the condition of nations; and I have -not been able to read history by the interpretation that makes such -men mere instruments in the hands of their age, which would, without -their special existences and characters, have brought about the same or -something like the same results. The invasions of the Roman Empire by -the Northern barbarians are instances of the pressure of one population -upon another, not attributable, perhaps, to the will and leadership -of any one individual, but produced by the united force of a great -horde of individuals determined to enjoy the plunder which a superior -civilization spread before them. Then, with regard to the phenomena of -what are called constitutions of government, or the political systems -of exercising public authority, I find numerous cases in which the -force of an individual will and intelligence has been not only a great -factor, but by far the largest factor in the production of particular -institutions. The genius of Cæsar, and his extraordinary constructive -faculties, molded the institutions of Rome in the most direct manner, -and created an imperial system that lasted for a thousand years, -and that even out of its ruins affected all subsequent European -civilization. In such cases, more than once repeated in modern times, -the particular circumstances of the age and the co-operation of many -other individuals have helped on the result, but the conception, the -plan, the purpose, and the execution, have had their origin in some -one mind. But for the individual character, the ambition, the force, -and the mental resources of the first Napoleon, can one believe that -the first French Empire of modern times would have grown out of the -condition of France? Suppose that Oliver Cromwell had never lived. The -protectorate, the system of government which he gave to England, was -the most absolute product of the will and intellect of one man that the -world in that kind of product had ever seen; for, although the people -of England were ready for and needed that system, and although the -antecedent and the surrounding circumstances furnished to Cromwell many -materials for a political structure that was not the old monarchy, and -yet had while it lasted all the vigor, and more than the vigor, of the -old monarchy, still, without his personal characteristics, his ambition -to found a dynasty on the wants of his country, and his personal -capacity to devise and execute such a system, one can not believe that -England would have had what he gave her. What he could not give her -was a son capable of wielding the scepter which he had fashioned. Here -is this America of yours--a country in which, to a certain extent, -the political institutions have been influenced by the circumstances -that followed the separation of your colonies from the English crown. -Undoubtedly, your ancestors of the Revolutionary epoch could not -construct a monarchy for the group of thirteen newly existing States, -each with its right and enjoyment of an actual autonomy. The habits -and genius of the people forbade the experiment of monarchical or -aristocratic institutions; no materials for either existed. But within -the range of republican institutions there was a choice open, and the -people exercised that choice. They made one system of confederated -States, and found it would not answer. They then deliberately assembled -their wisest and greatest men. They gave to them a commission that -was restricted by nothing but the practical necessity of framing -a government that would unite the requirements of power with the -requirements of liberty. The result was the Constitution of the United -States--a system of government that was, within the limitations of -certain practical necessities, both in its fundamental principles and -in many of its details, the deliberate choice and product of certain -leading minds, aided by the public consent, to a degree that is almost -unparalleled in the formation of political institutions. After it had -gone into operation, it was believed that the requirements of liberty -had not been sufficiently regarded, and it was directly and purposely -modified by the intervention of the collective will of the whole -people. And when I turn to the history of philosophies, of religions, -of the fine arts, or of the mechanical arts, I find everywhere traces -of the force of individual genius, of the direct intervention of -individual wills, and of the power of men to cause new systems of -thought and action to come into existence, and to create new objects of -admiration or utility. In regard to languages, I have read a good deal -about the controversy concerning their origin, but I have observed one -thing to be very apparent: whether the gift of articulate speech was -bestowed on man, when he had become a distinct being, in a manner and -for a purpose which would distinguish him from all the other animals, -or whether it became a developed faculty akin to that by which other -animals utter vocal sounds intelligible to those of their species, it -is certain that in man there is a power of varying his vocal utterances -at pleasure, which is possessed by no other creature on this earth. -The expansion of languages, therefore, the coinage of new words, -the addition of new inflections, the introduction of new shades of -meaning, the method of utterance which is called pronunciation, and -the different dialects of the same tongue, are all matters which have -been under the control of individuals dwelling together, and have all -resulted from the arbitrary determination of more or less numerous -persons, followed by the great mass of their nation, their race, or -their tribe. Even when a new and third language has been formed by -the contact of two peoples speaking separate tongues, we may trace the -same arbitrary adoption of parts of each separate tongue, in the first -beginning of the fusion, and the new language consequently exhibits a -greater or a less predominance of the characteristics of one of its -parent tongues, according as the one population has compelled the other -to adopt the greater part of its peculiar modes of speech. - -KOSMICOS. You have gone over a good deal of ground, but now -what do you infer from all this, supposing that you have taken a right -view of the facts? - -SOPHEREUS. I infer that, as in the social phenomena there are -products and effects which have owed their existence to human will -and direct human action, so, in other departments, for example, in -the domain which is called Nature, and which is out of the sphere of -human agency and human force, it is reasonable to conclude that there -are products and effects which must have owed their existence to a -will and a power capable of conceiving and producing them. And this is -what leads me, as I was led in the examination of the solar system, -to the idea of a Supreme Being, capable of producing those objects in -nature which are so varied, so complex, so marvelously constructed, so -nicely adapted to the conditions of each separate organism, that if we -attribute their existence to any intelligent power, it must be to a -power of infinite capacities, since nothing short of such capacities -could have conceived and executed them. - -KOSMICOS. You have now come to the very point at which I have -been expecting to see you arrive, and at which I will put to you this -question: Why do you personify the power to which you trace these -products in the natural world? Substitute for the term God, or the -Creator, the power of Nature. You then have a force that is not only -immense, but is in truth without any limit--a force that embraces -everything, gives life to everything, is at once cause and effect, -is incessantly active and inexhaustible. It commands all methods, -accomplishes all objects, and uses time, space, and matter as its -means. Why do you personify this all-pervading and sufficient power of -Nature? Why make it a being, a deity, when all you know is that it is a -power? "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the world?" is a -question that God is supposed to have asked of Job; and it simply shows -that Job had been traditionally taught to believe that there is such a -being as God, and that that being laid the foundations of the world. -Substitute Nature in the question, let Nature ask the question, and it -is just as pertinent, and involves the same problem of human existence. -Where was man when Nature began to exhibit that power which has evolved -all things that we see out of the primeval nothingness? - -SOPHEREUS. Well, here I must say that you have left out -certain ideas that are essential to all true reasoning on this -subject. Power without a guide, power without control, power without a -determining will, power that acts without a volition which determines -the how and the when, is a thing that I can not conceive. I thought -that in our former conversation, when we were considering the solar -system, you conceded that power, as something abstracted from substance -or its properties, was a logically necessary conception. - -KOSMICOS. I did. But I did not concede that power must be -converted into a person. You must not misunderstand me. It certainly is -my idea that power is a thing to be contemplated by itself; and we are -surrounded everywhere by its manifestations. But it is not my idea that -it is held and exercised by the being called God, or by any being. We -only know of it by its effects; and these show that Nature is, after -all, both cause and effect, manner and execution, design and product. -You can go no farther. You can not go behind Nature and find a being -who sat in the heavens and laid the foundations of the world, unless -you mean to accept a story which wise men have at last abandoned along -with many kindred beliefs which came from the ages of the greatest -ignorance. - -SOPHEREUS. Pardon me: the question that was put to Job has -more than one aspect. But I have considered the narrative that is found -in the first chapter of Genesis only as a hypothesis to be weighed -with other hypotheses of the origin of the world and its inhabitants. -I have studied the phenomena to which you give the name of Nature, and -I will tell you what seems to me to be a postulate necessary to be -carried into that study. I have observed that in the works of man two -things are apparent: One is, that power is exercised; the other is, -that the exercise of the power is always accompanied by a determining -will, which decides that the power shall be exerted, or that it shall -be deferred, or that it shall be applied variously as respects the mode -and the time. In human hands, power is not illimitable, but within -certain limitations it may be exercised, and it is always under the -guidance of a will. A man determines to build a house; he decides -on its dimensions, and when he will begin to erect it. A general -determines to attack the enemy on a certain day, and he marshals his -forces accordingly. A people determine to change their government, and -they decide what their new government shall be. An artist determines to -paint a certain picture, and he paints it. Whenever we see human power -exercised, so that we can connect product and power, the power itself -is put in motion by an intelligent will. I say, therefore, that the -idea of power without a controlling will, without a determining design, -is inconceivable: for I am obliged to draw my conclusions from what -I observe, and certainly the phenomena of society do not present any -instances of a product resulting from an exercise of power without a -determination to exercise it. Power diffused, power without guidance, -power moving by its own volition and without the volition of any -intelligent being, is not exhibited in the works of man. - -KOSMICOS. But we are now dealing with the works of Nature; -and the question is, whether the power that is manifest in Nature is, -to adopt your language, under the control or guidance of a being who -is something other than the power itself. You must remember that this -is a domain in which you can see nothing but products and effects. You -must also remember that if the immensity and variety of those products -and effects lead to the conclusion that the power transcends all -human faculty, is superhuman, and, so far as we can tell, boundless, -all that we can know is that the power itself is illimitable. The -quality of an infinite and illimitable capacity may be imputed to the -power of Nature, because a power without limit seems necessary to -the production of such effects as we see. But here we must stop. We -have no warrant for believing that the power which we trace in the -phenomena of Nature is held and controlled by a person, as man holds -and controls the power which he exercises with his hands. What we -see in Nature is the exercise of an immense and apparently boundless -power. But the imputation of that power to a being distinct from the -power itself, is a mere exercise of the human imagination, without -any proof whatever. See how this imagination has worked at different -periods. Monotheism and polytheism are alike in their origin. The one -has imputed to different beings all the phenomena in the different -departments of Nature, one being having the charge and superintendence -of one department and another being having another department. Good -and evil have thus been parceled out to different deities or demons. -On the other hand, monotheism attributes all to some one being, and -his existence is no more rational than the existence of the whole -catalogue of the mythologies of all antiquity, or the stupid beliefs of -the present barbarous tribes. But Nature is a great fact, or rather a -vast store-house of facts, which we can study; and what we learn from -it is that there is a power which Nature is constantly exerting, which -is without any assignable limit, which is itself both cause and effect, -and beyond this we can not go. - -SOPHEREUS. Let us see if you are correct. In the first -place, do you not observe that the tendency of mankind to personify -the powers of Nature is one of the strongest proofs of the logical -necessity for an interpretation which seeks for an intelligent being -of some kind as the actor in the production of the phenomena? It is -the fashion, I find, among a certain class of philosophers, to impute -this propensity to the proneness of the human mind toward superstitious -beliefs; to the mere effect of poetical or imaginary temperament -in certain races of men, or to fear in other races; or to a vague -longing for some superior being who can sympathize with human sorrows -or assist human efforts. Something of all these influences has, no -doubt, in different degrees and in various ways, worked itself into -the religious beliefs of mankind. But neither any one of them, nor the -whole of them, will satisfactorily account for either polytheism or -monotheism. We must go deeper. There has been an unconscious reasoning -at work, more or less unconscious, which has led to the conclusion -that power, the manifestation of power, necessarily implies that the -power is held and wielded by some intelligent being. The beliefs of -mankind, whether embracing one such being or many, have not been the -mere results of superstition, or fear, or longing for divine sympathy, -or for superhuman companionship or protection. Those beliefs owe as -much to the reasoning powers of mankind as they do to the influence -of imagination. In many ages there have been powerful intellects, -which have been free from the influence of superstition or fancy, and -which have recognized the logical necessity for a conception of power -as a force that must be under the guidance and control of intellect. -While the popular belief has not attained this conviction by the same -conscious and logically conducted process of reasoning, it has been -unconsciously led through the same process, by what is open to the -observation of human faculties, even in the less civilized portions of -the human race. The savage who is sufficiently raised above the brute -creation to exercise his own will and intelligence in the pursuit of -his game, or in building his wigwam, or in fighting his enemy, knows -that he exercises a power that is under his own control; and, as -soon as he begins to observe the phenomena of Nature, he conceives -of some being who holds a like power over the material universe, and -whom he begins to personify, to propitiate, and to worship. This is -the result of reasoning: feeble in some cases, but in all cases the -intellectual process is the same. Now let us see whether this process -is a sound one. Are you sure that you are correct in saying that the -power of Nature is without limit? Is there a single force in Nature, -a single property of matter, or any sequence of natural events, that -is not circumscribed? Do not the very regularity and uniformity of -the phenomena of Nature imply that some authority has said, from the -beginning, Thus far shalt thou go and no farther? You surely do not -imagine that the law of universal gravitation made itself, or that it -settled itself into an exact and invariable method of action by the -mere force of habit, beginning without prescribed and superimposed -limits, and finally resulting in a fixed rule which never changes. -You do not imagine that the mysterious, impalpable motion to which is -now given the name of electricity, created for itself, as a matter -of habit, the perpetual tendency to seek an equilibration of the -quantity accumulated in one body with the quantity that is contained -in another, by transmission through intermediate bodies; or that it -established for itself the conditions which make one substance a -better conducting medium than another. You do not suppose, I take it, -that certain particles of matter adopted for themselves a capacity -to arrange themselves in crystals of certain fixed combinations and -shapes, and that other particles of matter did not choose to take on -this habit. All these forces, powers, and tendencies are of very great -extent, much beyond any that man can exercise; but they all have their -limitations, their prescribed and invariable methods of action; they -all act as if they have been commanded to act in a certain way and to -a certain extent, and not as if they have chosen for themselves both -method and scope. Now, is it not a rational deduction that what is -really illimitable is not the power of Nature, but the power which made -Nature what it is? Is it not a necessary conclusion that, inasmuch as -all Nature acts within certain limits, stupendous and minute and varied -as the products or effects may be, there must have been behind Nature -a power that could and did prescribe the methods, the limitations, the -lines within which Nature was to move and act? You can not put into -the mouth of Nature the question, Where wast thou (Man) when I laid -the foundations of the world? without suggesting the retort, "Where -wast _thou_ (Nature) when the foundations of the world _were_ laid?" -And this question Nature can no more answer, for itself, than man can -answer for himself when the question is put to him. Each must answer, -I was nowhere--I did not exist. Each must answer, There was a power -which called me into being, which prescribed the conditions of my -existence, which gave me the capacities that I possess, which ordained -the limitations within which I was to act. - -KOSMICOS. And all this you derive from the fact that a being -whom we call Man has some power over matter; that he has an intelligent -faculty by which he can do certain things with matter, and that he -actually does produce certain concrete forms of new things that he did -not find made to his hand. Is this the basis of your reasoning about -the origin of Nature? - -SOPHEREUS. It is, and I will tell you why. Man is the -one being on this earth in whom we find an intelligent will and -constructive faculty united, to a degree which shows a power of -variation and execution superior to that of all other beings of whose -actions we have the direct evidence of our senses. We might select one -or more of the inferior animals, and find in them a strong constructive -faculty; but we do not find it accompanied by a power of variation and -adaptation that is equal to that of man in degree, or that is probably -the same in kind. I will not insist on the distinction between reason -and instinct, but I presume you will admit that, when we compare -the constructive faculty of man and that of the most ingenious and -wonderfully endowed animal or insect, the latter acts always under an -implanted impulse, which we have no good ground for regarding as of -the same nature as man's reasoning power, however striking may be the -products. When, therefore, we select the human power of construction -or creation as the basis of reasoning upon the works of Nature, we -resort to a being in whom that power is the highest of which we have -direct evidence. In the works of man we have direct and palpable proof -that the phenomena--the products of human skill and human force--are -brought about by the faculties of an intelligent and reasoning being. -If we dig into the earth and find there a statue, an implement, or a -weapon, we do not hesitate to conclude that the spot was once inhabited -by men, just as surely as we should conclude the same thing if we -found there human bones. The world, above-ground and below-ground, -is full of concrete objects that we know must have been fashioned by -human skill, guided by human intelligence. This intelligence, this -intellect, is not matter; it is a being; it is a person. It is not a -force, acting without consciousness; it is a being wielding a force -which is under the control of volition. The force and the volition are -both limited, but within the limitations they constitute the power -of man. Pass, then, to the works of Nature, or to what you call the -power of Nature. As, in the case of man, you can not conclude that he -created for himself his own faculties, that he prescribed for himself -the limitations of his power over matter, or that he formed those -limitations as mere matters of habit, or that it was from habit alone -that he derived his great constructive powers, so, in studying the -works of Nature, you must conclude that some intelligent being made the -laws of matter and motion, prescribed the unvarying order and method -of action, laid down the limitations, originated the properties, and, -in so doing, acted by volition, choice, and design. The distinction, -as I conceive, between man and Nature is, that there has been bestowed -on man, in a very inferior degree, a part of the original power of -creation. On Nature there has been bestowed none of this power. As we -find that the existence of man as an intelligent being, endowed with -certain high faculties, among which is a certain degree of the power of -creating new objects, can not be accounted for without the hypothesis -of a creator, still less can we account for the existence and phenomena -of Nature, which has in itself no degree of the creating power, without -the same hypothesis. - -KOSMICOS. Stop where you are. Why do you separate man from -Nature? Have you yet to learn that man is a part of Nature? I suspect -you have, after all, been reading the book of Genesis for something -more than a hypothesis, and that you have adopted the notion that God -made Adam a living soul. Put away all the nursery-stories, and come -down to the "hard-pan" of actual facts, which show by an overwhelming -array of evidence that man had a very different origin. - -SOPHEREUS. You know, my friend, that I never learned any -nursery-stories, and therefore I have none to unlearn. It may be my -misfortune, but I find myself here in the world in mature years, -studying the phenomena of life, without having had any early teaching, -but with such reasoning as I can apply to what I observe, and to what -science, history, and philosophy can furnish to me. I belong to no -church, to no sect, to no party, and I have not even a country. I am -a citizen of the world, on my travels through it, learning what I -can. Now, what are your facts? Let us get down, as you say, upon the -"hard-pan," and make it as hard as you please. - -KOSMICOS. First answer my question: Why do you separate man -from Nature? - -SOPHEREUS. I know very well that in a certain sense man is a -part of Nature. But it is necessary to contemplate man apart from all -the rest of Nature, because we find that he is endowed with intellect, -and we have very good and direct evidence that his intellect is an -actor; and we know that he is endowed with consciousness, and we have -very good and direct evidence that, by introspection, he becomes aware -of his own consciousness, and what it is. - -KOSMICOS. Very well, assume all that if you choose. Now let me -show you an origin of man, with his intellect and consciousness, which -will entirely overthrow the idea that he was a special creation in the -sense to which you seem to be drifting, namely, that of miraculous -interposition by a being called God. You must be aware, as you have -read so much, that modern science has made great discoveries, and that -there are certain conclusions on this subject which are drawn from -very numerous and important data. Those data involve the origin of -all the different animals, man included. They are all to be accounted -for in the same way and by the same reasoning. Now, if we go back to -a period when none of them existed, we find a method of accounting -for them that is infinitely superior as a hypothesis to any idea of -their special creation as an act or as a series of acts of divine and -direct interposition. I will take this method as it is given by Herbert -Spencer, because, as he has reasoned it, it accounts for both intellect -and consciousness; and Mr. Spencer is allowed to be one of the leading -minds of this age. Mark the starting-point of his whole philosophy -on this subject of organic life. Darwin, as you know, supposes some -one very low form of organic life, an aquatic grub, and out of it he -evolves all the other animal organisms, by the process of natural and -sexual selection, through successive generations, ending in man. This -hypothesis leaves the original organism to be accounted for, and, -although Darwin does not expressly assert that it was the Creator who -fashioned the first organism, he leaves it to be implied. Spencer, on -the other hand, explicitly denies the absolute commencement of organic -life on the globe. Observe that the terms of his theory of evolution -are much more complete than Darwin's, for he says that "the affirmation -of universal evolution is in itself a negation of an absolute -commencement of anything. Construed in terms of evolution, every -kind of being is conceived as a product of modifications wrought by -insensible gradations on a pre-existing being; and this holds as fully -of the supposed commencement of organic life, or a first organism, as -of all subsequent developments of organic life."[106] - -You will see, therefore, that the idea of a Creator, fashioning a -type of animal organism, or making a commencement of organic life, is -excluded by this great philosopher, although he does concur in the main -in Darwin's general explanation of the mode in which one organism is -evolved out of a pre-existing organism. He goes much farther, because -his system of universal evolution embraces the elements out of which -any organic life whatever has been developed, and negatives the idea -of any absolute commencement of anything whatever. He begins with the -original molecules of organizable matter. By modifications induced -upon modifications these become formed, by their inherent tendencies, -into higher types of organic molecules, as we see in the artificial -evolution effected by chemists in their laboratories; who, although -they are unable to form the complex combinations directly from their -elements, can form them indirectly through successive modifications -of simpler combinations, by the use of equivalents. In Nature, the -more complex combinations are formed by modifications directly from -the elements, and each modification is a change of the molecule into -equilibrium with its environment, subjecting it, that is to say, to -new conditions. Then, larger aggregates, compound molecules, are -successively generated; more complex or heterogeneous aggregates arise -out of one another, and there results a geometrically increasing -multitude of these larger and more complex aggregates. So that by the -action of the successive higher forms on one another, joined with the -action of the environing conditions, the highest forms of organic -molecules are reached. Thus in the early world, as in the modern -laboratory, inferior types of organic substances, by their mutual -actions under fit conditions, evolved the superior types of organic -substances, and at length ended in organizable protoplasm. Now, let -me read to you Mr. Spencer's description of the mode in which the -substance called "protein" becomes developed into organic life. "And -it can hardly be doubted," he says, "that the shaping of organizable -protoplasm, which is a substance modifiable in multitudinous ways -with extreme facility, went on after the same manner. As I learn -from one of our first chemists, Prof. Frankland, protein is capable -of existing under probably at least a thousand isomeric forms; and, -as we shall presently see, it is capable of forming, with itself -and other elements, substances yet more intricate in composition, -that are practically intricate in their varieties of kind. Exposed -to those innumerable modifications of conditions which the earth's -surface afforded, here in amount of light, there in amount of heat, -and elsewhere in the mineral quality of its aqueous medium, this -extremely changeable substance must have undergone, now one, now -another, of its countless metamorphoses. And to the mutual influences -of its metamorphic forms, under favoring conditions, we may ascribe -the production of the still more composite, still more sensitive, -still more variously-changeable portions of organic matter, which, in -masses more minute and simpler than existing _protozoa_, displayed -actions varying little by little into those called vital actions, which -protein itself exhibits in a certain degree, and which the lowest known -living things exhibit only in a greater degree. Thus, setting out -with inductions from the experiences of organic chemists at the one -extreme, and with inductions from the observations of biologists at the -other extreme, we are enabled to deductively bridge the interval--are -enabled to conceive how organic compounds were evolved, and how, by a -continuance of the process, the nascent life displayed in these becomes -gradually more pronounced."[107] - -It is in this way that Spencer accounts for the formation of the cell -which becomes developed into a living organism, out of which are -successively evolved all the higher forms of animal organisms, until we -reach man. - -SOPHEREUS. And is this put forward as something which rational -people are to believe? - -KOSMICOS. Undoubtedly it is put forward as something that is -to be believed, because it is supported by a vast array of evidence; -and let me tell you that this conception of Nature as a whole is -the consummate flower of this nineteenth century in the domain of -philosophic speculation. - -SOPHEREUS. Perhaps it is. But although this nineteenth -century has witnessed many great scientific discoveries, and has -produced extraordinary inventions, I do not find that among the -speculative philosophers of this age there are such very superior -powers of reasoning displayed that we ought to regard them as -authorities entitled to challenge our acceptance of their theories -without examination. I must say that among your scientific people of -the present day, and especially among the philosophers of the class -of which Mr. Spencer is the leading representative, there are certain -tendencies and defects which surprise me. One of their defects is that -they do not obviate remote difficulties, perhaps because they have not -been trained, as other men have, to foresee where such difficulties -must arise. This is sometimes apparent even when the difficulties -are not very remote, but are quite obvious. One of their tendencies -is to arrive at a theory from some of the phenomena, and then to -strain the remaining phenomena to suit the theory; and sometimes -they proceed to the invention or imagination of phenomena which are -necessary to the completion of a chain of proof. This last process -is called bridging the interval. I will now apply this criticism to -Mr. Spencer's philosophy of the origin of man. In the first place he -has not obviated a fundamental difficulty, whether it be a near or a -remote one. Where did the molecules get their tendency or capacity to -arrange themselves into higher and more complex forms? Whence came the -auxiliary or additional force of their surrounding environment? What -endowed _protein_ with its capacity to assume a thousand isomeric -forms? What made the favoring conditions which have helped on the -influence of its metamorphic tendencies, so as to produce still more -sensitive and variously-changeable portions of organic matter? These -questions must have an answer; and, when we ask them, we see the -significance of the inquiry, "Where wast thou (man) when I laid the -foundations of the world?" For these things, on the evolution theory, -_are_ the foundations of the world. It is no answer to say, as Mr. -Spencer does, that these tendencies, or capacities of matter, and -these laws of the favoring conditions, came from the Unknown Cause. -Known or unknown, did they have a cause, or did they make themselves? -Did these, the foundations of the world, have an origin, or were they -without any origin? If they had an origin, was it from the will and -power of a being capable of giving existence to them and prescribing -their modes of action? If they had no origin, if they existed from all -eternity, how came it that they formed this extraordinary habit of -invariable action in a certain method, which amid all its multiformity -shows an astonishing persistency? If we deny, with Mr. Spencer, the -absolute commencement of organic life on the globe, we must still go -back of all the traces of organic life, and inquire whence matter, -molecules, organized or unorganized, derived the capacities or -tendencies to become organized, and how the favoring conditions became -established as auxiliary or subsidiary forces. And therefore it is that -this difficulty, whether remote or near at hand, is not met by Mr. -Spencer: for whether we call the cause an unknown or a known cause, the -question is, Was there a cause, or did the foundations of the world -lay themselves? The reasoning powers of mankind, exercised by daily -observation of cause and effect, of creative power and created product, -are equal to the conception of a First Cause as a being who could have -laid the foundations of the world, but they are utterly unequal to -the conception that they had no origin whatever. Again, consider how -numerous are the missing links in the chain of evolution, how many gaps -are filled up by pure inventions or assumptions. The evolution of one -distinct and perfect animal, or being, out of a pre-existing animal -or being of a different type, has never been proved as a fact. Yet -whole pedigrees of such generation of species have been constructed -upon the same principles as we should construct the pedigree of an -individual. Furthermore, if we regard the facts about which there can -be no controversy, we find not only distinct species of animals, but -we find the same species divided into male and female, with a system -of procreation and gestation established for the multiplication of -individuals of that species. Now go back to the imaginary period when -protein began to form itself into something verging toward organic -life, and then there became evolved the nascent life of an organized -being. How did the division of the sexes originate? Did some of the -molecules or their progressive forms, or their aggregates, or masses, -under some conditions, tend to the production of the male, and others -under certain conditions tend to the development of the female, so -that the sexes were formed by a mere habit of arrangement without any -special intervention? Here is one of the most serious difficulties -which the doctrine of evolution, whether it be the Darwinian or the -Spencerian theory, has to encounter. There is a division into male and -female: there is a law of procreation by the union of the two sexes. -This is a fact about which there can be no dispute. It is one of the -most remarkable facts in Nature. It is the means by which species are -continued, and the world is peopled with individuals of each species. -Is it conceivable that this occurred without any design, that it had no -origin in a formative will, that it had, properly speaking, no origin -at all, but that it grew out of the tendencies of organized matter to -take on such a diversity in varying conditions? And if the latter was -all the origin that it had, whence came the tendencies and whence the -favoring conditions that helped them on toward the result? It seems to -me that the Spencerian theory, so far as it suggests a mode in which -the two sexes of animals came to exist, is hardly less fanciful than -what Plato has given us in his "Timæus." I have studied them both. - -If you will hand me Mr. Spencer's work from which you have just quoted, -I will point out a passage which fully justifies my criticism. It is -this: "Before it can be ascertained how organized beings have been -gradually evolved, there must be reached the conviction that they have -been gradually evolved." He says this in praise of De Maillet, one of -the earliest of the modern speculators who reached this conviction, -and whose "wild notions" as to the way should not make us, says Mr. -Spencer, "forget the merit of his intuition that animals and plants -were produced by natural causes."[108] That is to say, first form -to yourself a theory, and have a thorough conviction of it. Then -investigate, and shape the facts so as to support the theory. Is it -not plain that an inquiry into the mode in which organized beings have -been gradually evolved must precede any conclusion or conviction on the -subject? It is one of those cases in which the _how_ a thing has been -done lies at the basis of the inquiry whether it has probably been done -at all. If a suggested mode turns out to be wild and visionary, what is -the value of any "intuition" of the main fact? But, what is still more -extraordinary in this kind of deduction, which is no deduction, is the -way in which, according to Mr. Spencer, the first conviction is to be -reached before one looks for the facts. The process of the evolution -of organisms, according to Mr. Spencer's philosophy, is contained as -a part in the great whole of evolution in general. We first convince -ourselves that evolution obtains in all the other departments of -Nature, and is the interpretation of all their phenomena. Then we -conclude that it has obtained in the animal kingdom, and so we have the -conviction necessary to be acquired before we examine the phenomena; -and then we make that investigation so as to reconcile the facts with -the supposed universal laws of matter and motion. I do not exaggerate -in the least. Here is what he says: "Only when the process of evolution -of organisms is affiliated on the process of evolution in general can -it be truly said to be explained. The thing required is to show that -its various results are corollaries from first principles. We have -to reconcile the facts with the universal laws of the redistribution -of matter and motion."[109] What would Bacon have thought of this -method of establishing the probable truth of a theory? It leaves out -of consideration a multitude of facts, and one of them at least is of -the utmost importance. It is that in the domain of animated matter, -in organized beings, and most signally in the animal kingdom, there -is a principle of life; and, whatever may be the universal laws of -the redistribution of matter and motion, in their operation upon or -among the products which are not endowed with this principle, when -we come to reason about products that _are_ endowed with it we are -not entitled to conclude that this principle of animal life is itself -a product of the operation of those laws because they have resulted -in products which do not possess life, or life of the same kind. In -order to reach the conviction that animal organisms have resulted -solely from the operation of the laws of matter and motion, we must -not undertake to reconcile the facts with those laws, but we must have -some evidence that those laws have produced living beings with complex -and diversified organisms, and this evidence must at least tend to -exclude every other hypothesis. It is not enough to flout at all other -hypotheses, or to pronounce them _ex cathedra_ to be idle tales. - -KOSMICOS. You must not catch at single expressions and -make yourself a captious critic. That would be unworthy of such an -inquirer as you profess to be, and as I believe you are. Mr. Spencer -did not mean, by reconciling the facts with the laws of matter and -motion, that we are to distort the facts. He meant that we are to -discover the correspondence between the facts and the operation of -those laws. Now, let me show you more explicitly that he is quite -right. There are certain laws of matter and motion, discoverable and -discovered by scientific investigation, which prevail throughout all -Nature. The phenomena which they produce, although not yet fully -understood, justify the assumption of their universality and their -modes of operation. It is perfectly legitimate, therefore, to reason -that the same laws which have produced the observable phenomena in -other departments of Nature have had a like potency as causes by which -the phenomena in the animal kingdom have been produced. Using this -legitimate mode of reasoning, Mr. Spencer traces the operation of -those laws upon the primal molecules, which are peculiarly sensitive -to their effects. He follows them through the successive aggregations -of higher combinations until he arrives at the protoplasmic substance, -out of which, from its capability of assuming an infinity of forms, -aided by the environing conditions, the simplest organic forms become -evolved, and thus what you call the principle of life gradually arose -through a vast extent of time. He is therefore perfectly consistent -with himself in denying the absolute commencement of organic life on -the globe; for you must understand that he means by this to deny that -there was any point of time, or any particular organism, at or in which -animal life can be said to have had its first commencement, without -having been preceded by some other kind of being, out of which the more -highly organized being has been produced by modifications wrought by -insensible gradations. If you will attend closely to his reasoning, -you will see that you have small cause for criticising it as you have; -and, if you will look at one of his illustrations, you will see the -strength of his position. Hear what he says: "It is no more needful to -suppose an absolute commencement of organic life or a 'first organism' -than it is needful to suppose an absolute commencement of social life -and a first social organism. The assumption of such a necessity in this -last case, made by early speculators with their theories of 'social -contracts' and the like, is disproved by the facts; and the facts, -so far as they are ascertained, disprove the assumption of such a -necessity in the first case."[110] That is to say, as the social facts, -the social phenomena, disprove the "social contract" as an occurrence -taking place by human design and intention, so the phenomena of animal -life disprove the assumption of such an occurrence as its commencement -by divine intervention, or its commencement at all. - -SOPHEREUS. I think I understood all this before, just as you -put it, but I am not the less obliged to you for the restatement. -In regard to society, I know not why the family, the institution of -marriage, is not to be regarded as the first social organism, and -the union of two or more families in some kind of mutual league is -certainly the first society in a more comprehensive sense. I care -very little about the theory of the social contract, as applied to -more complex societies, although, as a kind of legal fiction, it is -well enough for all the uses which sound reasoners nowadays make of -it. But the institution of marriage, the family, is no fiction at -all; it is a fact, however it was first established, and it was the -absolute commencement of social life. But I do not hold to this sort -of analogies, or to this mode of reasoning from what happens in a -department, in which the actions of men have largely or exclusively -influenced the complex phenomena, to a department in which human -influence has had nothing to do with the phenomena. But now let us come -back to the proposition that there never was any absolute commencement -of organic life on the globe. I will take Mr. Spencer's meaning--his -denial, as you put it--and will test it by one or two observations -upon his own explanation, as given in the elaborate paper in which -he replied to a critic in the "North American Review" a little more -than four years ago.[111] In the first place, then, as to time. It -will not do to say that there never was a time when such a product as -life, animated or organized life, had its first existence. To whatever -it owed its existence, it must at some time have begun to exist. It -matters not how far back in the ages of the globe you place it: you -must contemplate a time when it did not exist, and a point of time at -which it began to exist. It matters not that you can not fix this time. -There was such a time, whether you can fix it chronologically or not. -In the next place, however minute the supposed gradations which you -trace backward from a recognizable organism to the primal protoplasmic -substance, out of which you suppose it to have been gradually evolved, -and through whatever extent of time you imagine these gradations -to have been worked out by the operation of the forces of Nature, -modifying successive beings, you must find an organism to which you can -attribute life. Whatever that organism was, it was the commencement of -organic life; for, when you go back of it in the series, you come to -something that was not organic life, but was merely a collection of -molecules or a product of aggregated molecules, that had a capacity to -be developed into an animated organism under favorable conditions. "It -is," says Mr. Spencer, "by the action of the successively higher forms -on one another, joined with the action of environing conditions, that -the highest forms are reached." Some one, then, of those highest forms, -something that can be called an animal organism, some being endowed -with life, was the commencement of organic life on the globe; and it -is just as correct and necessary to speak of it as the "absolute" -commencement as it is when we speak of Darwin's aquatic grub, or of the -Mosaic account of the creation of the different animals by the hand -and will of God. Neither Mr. Spencer nor any other man can construct a -chain of animated existence back into the region of its non-existence -without showing that it began to have an existence. He can say that -the affirmation of universal evolution is in itself a negation of an -absolute commencement of anything. And so it is theoretically. But this -does not get over the difficulty. On his own explanation of the mode -in which organisms have been evolved, there must have been a first -organism, and in that first organism life began. So that I am not yet -prepared to yield my criticism, or to yield my convictions to a writer -who is so much carried away by his theory. - -KOSMICOS. But you will allow that the theory is perfect in -itself; and why, then, do you say that he is carried away by it? You -ought either to give up your criticism, or to show that there is a -superior hypothesis by which to account for the origin of organisms, -and one that is supported by stronger proofs and better reasoning. You -have nothing to oppose to Mr. Spencer's explanation of the origin of -organic life, excepting the fable which you find in the book of Genesis. - -SOPHEREUS. Undoubtedly the opposite hypothesis is that which -attributes to a Creator the production of organic life; and whether -the Mosaic account, as it stands, be a fable or a true narrative of an -actual occurrence, what we have to do is to ascertain, upon correct -principles of reasoning, whether the creating power can be dispensed -with. Mr. Spencer dispenses with it altogether. He gives it a direct -negative in the most absolute manner. But the perfection of his theory -depends upon its ability to sustain itself as an explanation of the -existence of organisms without the intervention of a creating power -anywhere at any time. I have already suggested the serious defect of -his whole philosophic scheme as applied to the existence of organisms, -namely, that the foundation of the theory, the existence of the -molecules with their properties and capacities tending to rearrangement -under the laws of matter and motion, those laws themselves, and the -environing conditions which assist the process of adjustment and -combination, must all have had an origin, or a cause. If we can get -along without that origin, without any cause, without any actor -laying the foundations of the world, we can make a theory. But that -theory can not sustain itself by such a negation if all experience, -observation, and reflection amount to anything; for these all point in -one direction. They all tend to show that every existing thing must -have had a cause, that every product must have had an origin, and, if -we place that origin in the operation of certain laws of matter and -motion upon and among the primal molecules of matter, we still have to -look for the origin of those laws and of the molecules on which they -have operated. If we say that these things had no origin, that they -existed without having been caused to exist, we end in a negation at -which reason at once rebels. If, on the other hand, we reject, as we -must reject, this negation, then the same power which could establish -the laws of matter and motion, and give origin to the molecules and -the favoring conditions by which their aggregated higher forms are -supposed to have been developed, was alike capable of the direct -production of species, the creation of the sexes, and the establishment -of the laws of procreation and gestation. So that it becomes a question -of probability, of the weight of evidence, as to whether we can explain -the phenomena of species, of the sexual division and the sexual -union, with all that they involve, without the hypothesis of direct -intervention, design, and formative skill of a boundless character. I -have seen no explanation of the origin of species and of the sexual -distinction, with its concomitant methods of reproduction, that does -not end in an utter blank, whenever it undertakes to dispense with -that kind of direct design to which is derisively given the name of -"miraculous interposition," but which in truth implies no miracle at -all. - -KOSMICOS. I have to be perpetually recalling you to the first -principles of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. You seem to think it enough -to point to the existence of species and the sexual division, as if -his philosophy did not afford the means of accounting for them by the -operation of natural causes. Let me put to you, then, this question: If -natural causes have produced a crystal, by successive new combinations -of molecules of matter through gradations rising successively into -higher forms, why should not natural causes, acting upon other -molecules in a corresponding way, have produced organic life, or -animated organisms? If natural causes have evolved out of certain -molecules the substance known as organizable protein, why should not -the continued operation of the same or similar causes have modified -organizable protein into some distinct and recognizable animated -organism? If you admit this as a possible or highly probable result, -why should not natural causes have produced, in the course of millions -of years, the division of the sexes and the methods of procreation and -multiplication? - -SOPHEREUS. I will assign the reasons for not adopting the -conclusions to which you expect me to arrive, in a certain order. In -the first place, the capacity of certain molecules to result in the -formation of a crystal, under the operation of what you call natural -causes, requires that the molecules, their capacity, and the natural -causes should all have had an origin, call it known or unknown. The -cause was of equal potency to produce the crystal directly, or anything -else that exists in Nature. The same thing is true of certain other -molecules which, under the operation of the so-called natural causes, -have resulted in organizable protein. There must have been an origin -to the molecules, to their capacity, and to the laws which effect -their combinations; and this cause could equally fashion an organism -and fashion it in the related forms of male and female by direct -intervention, for to such a power there is no assignable limit. In the -next place, the distinction between inanimate and animated matter, -between beings endowed and beings not endowed with animal life, is a -distinction that can not be overlooked; for, although we find this -distinction to be a fact that has resulted after the operation of -whatever causes may have produced it, we must still note that there is -a distinction, and a very important one. It may be that the dividing -line is very difficult of detection; that it is impossible to determine -in all cases just where organizable matter passes from dead matter into -a living organism. But that at some point there has arisen a living -organism, however produced, is certain. Now, suppose that what you -call natural causes have operated to bring organizable matter up to -this dividing line, the question is, whether we can conclude that they -have had the potency to pass that line, and to lead of themselves to -all the varying and manifold results of species, the division of the -sexes, and all that follows that division. Certain great facts seem to -me to negative this conclusion. The first is, that we have species, -which differ absolutely from each other as organisms, in their modes -of life, and their destinies, however strong may be the resemblances -which obtain among them in certain respects. The second fact is, that -each of the true species is divided into the related forms of male and -female, and is placed under a law of procreation, by the sexual union, -for the multiplication of individuals of that species. The third fact -is, that no crosses take place in Nature between different species -of animals--between the true species--resulting in a third species, -or a third animal. It is true that multiplication of individuals of -some of the lowest organisms takes place without the bisexual process -of procreation, as where, in the severance of a part of an organism -the severed part grows, under favorable conditions, into a perfect -organism of the same kind, as in the analogous phenomenon of a plant -propagated by a branch or a slip from the parent stem. But this -occurrence does not take place among the animals which are placed -for their multiplication under the law of the sexual union and the -sexual procreation. The sexual division, therefore, the law of sexual -procreation, and all that they involve, have to be accounted for. -Can they be accounted for by the theory of evolution? Wherever you -place their first occurrence, you have to find a process adequate to -their production. What, then, entitles you to say that the hypothesis -of their production, by the capacity and tendency of organizable -substances, when they have reached certain combinations, is superior -to the hypothesis of a direct interposition and a formative will? At -the outset, you must begin with some interposition and some formative -will; you must account for the existence of the very capacities of -matter to become organized under the laws of the redistribution of -matter and motion, or you will end nowhere whatever. If you assume, as -you must, that, in laying "the foundations of the world," there was -exercised some interposition and some formative will, you have a power -which was just as adequate to the production of species, and their -sexual division, as it was to the endowment of matter with certain -properties and capacities, and the establishment of any laws for the -redistribution of matter and motion. If you deny the existence and -potency of the original power in the one production you must deny them -in the other. If you concede them in the one case, you must concede -them in the other. Now, although the original power was equal to the -endowment of organizable matter with its capacities for and tendencies -to organization, and may be theoretically assumed to have made that -endowment, the question is, whether these capacities and tendencies, -without special formative interposition, and by the mere force of what -you call natural causes, were equal to the production of such phenomena -as the division of the sexes and all that follows that division. Can -it with any truth he said that the so-called natural causes have -produced any phenomena which can be compared, on the question of -special design, to the phenomena of the sexual division, the law of -sexual procreation, and the whole system of the multiplication of -individuals of distinct and true species? When I can see any facts -which will warrant the belief that the origin of the sexes is to be -attributed to the capacity of organizable protein to form itself into -new compounds, to the capacity of these new compounds to become living -organisms, and to the capacity of these living organisms, without the -intervention of any formative will specially designing the result, to -divide themselves into related forms of male and female, to establish -for themselves the law of procreation, and to limit that procreation -to the same species, I shall, perhaps, begin to see some ground for -the superior claims of the evolution hypothesis. I should like, -by-the-by, to see a system of classification of animal organisms, based -exclusively on the distinction between the bisexual and the unisexual, -or the non-sexual, methods of reproduction, and without running it out -into the analogies of the vegetable world. I fancy that it would be -found extremely difficult to account for the bisexual division without -reaching the conclusion that it required and was effected by a special -interposition. At all events, I should like to see it explained how the -asexual and the unisexual construction passed into the bisexual by the -mere operation of what you call natural causes. - -KOSMICOS. You said, a while ago, that you had never learned -any nursery-stories. Yet, all along, you seem to me to have been under -the influence of the Mosaic account of the creation. Of course you -have read it, and, although you did not learn anything about it in -childhood, and now try to treat it solely as a hypothesis, without any -regard to its claims as a divinely inspired narrative, it is certainly -worth your while to see how completely it becomes an idle tale of the -nursery when scientific tests are applied to it. Hear what Spencer says -about the creation of man, as given by Moses: "The old Hebrew idea -that God takes clay and molds a new creature, as a potter might mold a -vessel, is probably too grossly anthropomorphic to be accepted by any -modern defender of special creations." - -SOPHEREUS. Let us see about this. Let us discard all idea -of the source from which Moses received his information of the -occurrences which he relates, and put his account upon the same level -with Plato's description of the origin of animals, and with the -Darwinian or Spencerian theory of that origin; regarding all three -of them, that is to say, as mere hypotheses. Whatever may be the -supposed conflict between the Mosaic account of the creation and the -conclusions of geologists concerning the periods during which the -earth may have become formed as we now find it, the question is, on -the one hand, whether the Hebrew historian's account of the process -of creation is a conception substantially the same as that at which -we should have arrived from a study of Nature if we had never had -that account transmitted to us from a period when the traditions of -mankind were taking the shapes in which they have reached us from -different sources; or whether, on the other hand, it is so "grossly -anthropomorphic" and absurd that it is not worthy of any consideration -as an occurrence that it will bear the slightest test of scientific -scrutiny. Let any one take the Mosaic narrative, and, divesting himself -of all influence of supposed inspiration or divine authority speaking -through the chosen servant of God, and disregarding the meaning of -those obscure statements which divide the stages of the work into -the first and the second "day," etc., let him follow out the order -in which the Creator is said by Moses to have acted. He will find in -the narrative an immense condensation, highly figurative expressions, -and many elliptical passages. But he will also find that the Creator -is described as proceeding in the exertion of his omnipotent power -in a manner which we should be very likely to deduce from a study of -his works without this narrative. We have, first, the reduction of -the earth from its chaotic condition--"without form and void"--to the -separation of its elemental substances; then the creation of light; -the separation of earth and water; the productive capacity of the -dry land; the establishment of the vegetable kingdom, each product -"after its kind"; the formation of the heavenly bodies as lights in -the firmament, to make the division of day and night, seasons and -years. It is obviously immaterial, so far as this order of the work is -concerned, down to the stage when the formation of the first animals -took place, in what length of time this first stage of the work was -accomplished; whether it was done by an Omnipotence that could speak -things into existence by a word, or whether the process was carried on -through periods of time of which we can have no measure, and by the -operation of infinitely slow-moving agencies selected and employed for -the accomplishment of a certain result. Confining our attention to the -first stage of the work as we find it described, we have the formation -of the earth, light, air, the heavenly bodies, alternations of day -and night, seasons and years, and the vegetable kingdom, before any -animal creation. We then come to the formation of animals which are to -inhabit this convenient abode, and which are described as taking place -in the following order: first the water animals, the fowls of the air, -and the beasts of the field, "each after its kind"; then, and finally, -the creation of man. Respecting his creation, we are told that it was -the purpose of the Almighty to make a being after a very different -"image" from that of any other creature on the earth; and whatever may -be the true interpretation of the language employed, whether man was -created literally "in our image, after our likeness," or according -to an image and a likeness of which his Creator had conceived, there -can be no doubt that what Moses described as the purpose of God was -to make a being differing absolutely from all the other animals by -a broad line of demarkation which is perfectly discoverable through -all the resemblances that obtain between him and all the other living -creatures. To this new being there was given, we are told, dominion -over all the other animals, and the fruits of the earth were assigned -to him for food; he was formed out of the dust of the earth, the breath -of life was breathed into his nostrils, and he became "a living soul." -Let us now see if this statement of the creation of man is so "grossly -anthropomorphic" as is supposed. You are aware that Buffon, who was -certainly no mean naturalist or philosopher, and who was uninfluenced -by the idea that the book of Genesis was an inspired production, -reached the conclusion that a study of nature renders the order of -man's creation as described by Moses a substantially true hypothesis. -"We are persuaded," said Buffon, "independently of the authority of -the sacred books, that man was created last, and that he only came to -wield the scepter of the earth when that earth was found worthy of -his sway."[112] You evolutionists will say that this may be very true -upon your hypothesis of his gradual development out of other animals, -through untold periods of time. But now let us see whether Moses was -so grossly unscientific, upon the supposition that God created man -as he describes. If man was created, or molded, by the Deity, he was -formed, in his physical structure, out of matter; and all matter may -be figuratively and even scientifically described as "the dust of the -earth," or as "clay," or by any other term that will give an idea of a -substance that was not spirit. If Moses had said that man's body was -formed out of the constituent elements of matter, or some of them, he -would have said nothing that a modern believer in special creations -need shrink from, for he would have stated an indisputable fact. He -stated in one form of expression the very same fact that a modern -scientist would have to state in another form, whatever might have been -the mode, or the power, or the time in or by which the constituent -elements were brought together and molded into the human body. So that -the derisive figure of God taking clay and molding it into the human -form, as a potter would mold a vessel, does not strike me as presenting -any proof that the account given by Moses is so destitute of scientific -accuracy, or as rendering his statements a ridiculous hypothesis. - -KOSMICOS. Well, then, it comes at last to this: that you -consider the substance of the Mosaic account of the creation, -independent of its authority as an inspired statement, to be entitled -to stand as a hypothesis against the explanations given to us by the -scientists of the great modern school of evolution, notwithstanding -those explanations are in one form or another now accepted by the most -advanced scientific thinkers and explorers? - -SOPHEREUS. I certainly do. But understand me explicitly. -As, after my study of the probable origin of the solar system, and -our discussion of that subject, I expressed my conclusion that the -phenomena called for and manifested the exercise of a formative will -by some acts of special creation, so now, in reference to the animal -kingdom, I have reached the same conclusion, for reasons which I have -endeavored to assign. I can see that the operation of the process which -you call evolution may have caused certain limited modifications in -the structure and habits of life of different animals; or rather, that -limited modifications of structure and habits of life have occurred, -and hence you deduce what you call the process of evolution. But -to me this entirely fails to account for, or to suggest a rational -explanation of, the distinct existence of species, their division into -male and female, and the establishment of the laws of procreation by -which individuals of a species are multiplied--a process which does not -admit of the production of individuals of an essentially different type -from the parents, and which, so far as we have any means of knowledge, -has never commenced in one species and ended in another, in any length -of time that can be imagined, or through any series of modifications. - -KOSMICOS. Let us postpone the farther discussion of the origin -of species to some future time, when I will endeavor to convince you -that both Darwin and Spencer have satisfactorily accounted for them. - -SOPHEREUS. Very well; I shall be glad to be enlightened. - - -THE SINGLE-CELL HYPOTHESIS. - - NOTE.--It will readily occur to the reader that Sophereus - might most pertinently have asked: Whence did the primal cell - originate? It is conceived of as the ultimate unit of organizable - matter; invisible to the naked eye, perhaps incapable of being - reached by the microscope, but consisting of an infinitesimally small - portion of matter, more or less organized in itself, and possessing a - capacity to unite with itself other minute particles of matter, and - so to form larger aggregates of molecules. The hypothesis is, that - this single cell has given origin to all animated organisms, and, - through an indefinite series of such organisms, to the human race. - The single cell, then, having this capacity and this extraordinary - destiny, was either the first and only one of its kind, or it was one - of many of the same kind. If we select any supposed point of time - in the far antecedent history of matter, the question may be asked - whether there existed at first but one such cell, or many. If there - were many of such cells, how came they to exist? If one only was - selected out of many, for this extraordinary destiny of giving origin - to all the animated organisms, who or what made the selection for - this transcendent office of the one cell? If there never was but one - such cell, how did it come to exist? As these questions are clearly - pertinent, the effort to answer them inevitably conducts us to the - idea of creation, or else to the conclusion that the numerous cells - and the selected one had no origin; that the selection was not made, - but was accidental; or that the one cell, if there never was but one, - was not a created thing. Human reason can not accept this conclusion. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [106] "Biology," i, p. 482. - - [107] "Biology," i, Appendix, pp. 483, 484. - - [108] "Biology," i, p. 408. - - [109] "Biology," i, pp. 409, 410. - - [110] "Biology," i, p. 482. - - [111] Now contained in "Biology," i, Appendix. - - [112] Quoted by M. Guizot in his "History of France," vol. vi, p. - 328. Guizot observes that Buffon was "absolutely unshackled by any - religious prejudice," and that he "involuntarily recurred to the - account given in Genesis." - - - - -CHAPTER X. - - "Species," "races," and "varieties"--Sexual division--Causation. - - -The two friendly disputants have again met. Sophereus begins their -further colloquy, in an effort to reach a common understanding of -certain terms, so that they may not be speaking of different things. - -SOPHEREUS. I have more than once referred to the fact that -Nature does not permit crosses between the true species of animals, -in breeding, and that we have no reason to suppose it ever did. This -is a very important fact to be considered in weighing the claims of -your theory of evolution. I have been looking into Darwin, and I find -it somewhat uncertain in what sense he uses the terms "species," -"races," and "varieties." In his "Descent of Man," he devotes a good -deal of space to the discussion of the various classifications made by -different naturalists under these respective terms; and there is no -small danger of confusion arising from the use of these terms unless -they are defined. The possibility of the process of evolution, as a -means of accounting for the existence of any known animal, depends -in some degree upon the animals among which, by sexual generation, -the supposed transition from one kind of animal to another kind has -taken place. Darwin speaks of the difficulty of defining "species"; -and yet it is obvious (is it not?) that the theory of the graduation -of different forms into one another depends for its possibility upon -the forms which have admitted of interbreeding. While, therefore, -the term "species" is in one sense arbitrary, as used by different -naturalists, and there is no definition of it common to them all, it is -still necessary to have a clear idea of the limits within which crosses -can take place in breeding, because there are such limits in nature. -Thus, in the case of man, as known to us in history and by observation, -there are different families, which are classed as "races." Darwin -speaks of the weighty arguments which naturalists have, or may have, -for "raising the _races_ of man to the dignity of _species_." Whether -this would be anything more than a matter of scientific nomenclature, -is perhaps unnecessary to consider. Whether we call the "races" of men -"species," or speak of them as families of one race, we know as a fact -that interbreeding can take place among them all, and that between man -and any other animal it can not take place. The same thing is true of -the equine and the bovine races and their several varieties. Whether, -in speaking of the different families or races of men, we consider them -all as one "species," or as different species--and so of the varieties -of the equine or the bovine races--the important fact is, that there -are limits within which interbreeding can take place, and out of which -it can not take place. Do you admit or deny that the barriers against -sexual generation between animals of essentially different types, -which are established in nature, are important facts in judging of the -hypothesis of animal evolution? - -KOSMICOS. Take care that you have an accurate idea of what the -theory of evolution is. Apply it, for example, to the origin of man, -as an animal, proceeding "by a series of forms graduating insensibly -from some ape-like creature to man as he now exists." This expresses -the whole theory as applied to one animal, man, without going behind -his ape-like progenitors. It does not suppose a crossing between -the ape-like creature and some other creature that was not an ape. -It supposes a gradual development of the ape-like creature into the -man as he now exists; and, of course, the interbreeding took place -between the males and the females of that ape-like race and their -descendants--the descendants, through a long series of forms, being -gradually modified into men, by the operation of the laws of natural -and sexual selection, which I need not again explain to you. - -SOPHEREUS. Very well, I have always so understood the theory. -But then I have also understood it to be a part of the same theory that -there is important auxiliary proof of the supposed process of evolution -to be derived from what is known to take place in the interbreeding -of different races or families of the same animal. Whatever value -there may be in this last fact, as auxiliary evidence of the supposed -process of evolution, there must have been a time, in the development -of the long series of forms proceeding from the ape-like progenitor, -when an animal had been produced which could propagate nothing but -its own type, and between which and the surrounding other animals no -propagation could take place, if we are to judge by what all nature -teaches us. You may say that the laws of natural and sexual selection -would still go on operating among the numerous individuals of this -animal which had become in itself a completed product, and that to -their descendants would be transmitted newly acquired organs and -powers, new habits of life, and all else that natural and sexual -selection can be imagined to have brought about. But at some time, -somewhere in the series, you reach an animal of a distinct character, -in which natural and sexual selection have done all that they can -do; in which there can be no propagation of offspring but those of -a distinct and peculiar type, and the invincible barrier against a -sexual union with any other type becomes established. For this reason, -we must recognize the limits of possible interbreeding. It is best -for us, therefore, to come to some understanding of the sense in -which we shall use the term "species." For I shall press upon you -this consideration--that animals differ absolutely from each other; -that there can be no interbreeding between animals which so differ; -and yet that, without interbreeding between animals having distinct -organizations, natural and sexual selection had not the force necessary -to produce, in any length of time, such a being as man out of such a -being as the ape. - -KOSMICOS. I will let Darwin answer you, in a passage which -I will read. "Whether primeval man," he observes, "when he possessed -but few arts, and those of the rudest kind, and when his power of -language was extremely imperfect, would have deserved to be called -man, must depend on the definition which we employ. In a long series -of forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to man as -he now exists, it would be impossible to fix on any definite time when -the term 'man' ought to be used. But this is a matter of very little -importance." That is to say, in the long series of forms descending -from the ape-like creature, we can not fix on any one of the modified -descendants which we can pronounce to be separated from the family -of apes, and to have become the new family, man, because to do this -requires a definition of man. Man as he now exists we know, but the -primeval man we do not know. He may have been an animal capable of -sexual union with some of his kindred who stood nearest to him, but -yet remained apes, or he may not. It is not important what he was, or -whether we can find the time when he ceased to belong to the family -of apes and became the primeval man. The hypothesis of his descent -remains good, notwithstanding we can not find that time, because it is -supported by a great multitude of facts. - -SOPHEREUS. I have never seen any facts which I can regard -as giving direct support to the theory. But, waiving this want -of evidence, doubtless it is not important to find the time, -chronologically, when the modified descendants, supposed to have -proceeded from the ape-like creature, became the primeval man; but -it is of the utmost importance to have some satisfactory grounds for -believing that there ever was such an occurrence as the development of -the animal man, primeval or modern man, out of such an animal as the -ape. And therefore, without reference to the sense in which naturalists -use the term "species," I shall give you the sense in which I use it. -I use it to designate the animals which are distinct from each other, -as the man, the horse, the ape, and the dog are all distinct from each -other. Speaking of man as one true species, I include all the races -of men. Speaking of the apes as another species, I include all the -families of apes. Speaking of the bovine, the equine, or the canine -species, I include in each their respective varieties. Now, as crosses -in interbreeding can take place between the different varieties or -families of these several species, and can not take place between the -species themselves--between those which I thus class as species--the -limits of such crosses become important facts in considering the theory -of evolution, because they narrow the inquiry to the possibility of -effecting a propagation of one species out of another species. Take any -animal which has become a completed and final product--a peculiar and -distinct creature--whether made so by aboriginal creation or produced -by what you call evolution. The reproductive faculty of the males and -the females of this distinct and peculiar animal is limited to the -generative reproduction of individuals of the same type, by a sexual -union of two individuals of that type. Their progeny, in successive -generations, may be marked by adventitious and slowly acquired -peculiarities; but unless there can be found some instance or instances -in which the process of modification has resulted in an animal which -we must regard as an 'essentially new creature--a new species--what -becomes of the auxiliary evidence which is supposed to be derived -from the effects of interbreeding between those individuals which -can interbreed? I lose all hold upon the theory of evolution, unless -I can have some proof that natural and sexual selection have overcome -the barriers against a sexual union among animals which are divided -into males and females of the several species, each of which is placed -under a law of procreation and gestation peculiar to itself, and never -produces any type but its own. - -KOSMICOS. You wander from the principle of evolution. I -have to be perpetually restating it. Observe, then, that there are -multitudes of facts which warrant the belief that, starting with -any one kind of animal organism, however peculiar and distinct, the -struggle for existence among the enormous number of individuals of -that animal becomes most intense, and a furious battle is constantly -going on. The best-appointed males, in the fierceness of the strife -for possession of the females, develop new organs and powers, or their -original organs and powers are greatly enhanced. Their descendants -share in these modifications; and the modifications go on in a -geometrical ratio of increase through millions of years, until at -some time there is developed an animal which differs absolutely from -its remote progenitors which were away back in the remote past, and -which began the struggle for individual life and the continuation -of their species or their race in a condition of things which left -the fittest survivors the sole or nearly the sole propagators of new -individuals. This struggle for existence may have begun--probably -it did begin--before the separation of the sexes, when the organism -was unisexual or even asexual. That is to say, there may have been, -and there probably was, an organism which multiplied with enormous -rapidity, without the bisexual method of reproduction. The vast -multitude of such individuals would lead to the destruction of the -weakest; the strong survivors would continue to give rise to other -individuals, modified from the original type, until at length, by -force of this perpetual exertion and struggle and the survival of the -fittest, modifications of the method of reproduction would ensue, and -the bisexual division would be developed and perpetuated. - -SOPHEREUS. I confess I did not expect to hear you go quite so -far. I will yield all the potency to natural and sexual selection that -can be fairly claimed for them as modifying agencies operating after -the sexual division has come about; but I have, I repeat, seen no facts -which justify the hypothesis that they have led to distinct organisms -between which no propagation can take place. But now you expect me to -accept the startling conclusion that at some time the asexual or the -unisexual method of reproduction passed into the bisexual, without -any formative will or design of a creating power, and without any -act of direct creation. We know what Plato imagined as the origin -of the sexual division, and that he could not get along without the -intervention of the gods. What modern naturalist has done any better? I -have examined Darwin's works pretty diligently, and I can not get from -them any solution of the origin of the bisexual division. I am left to -reason upon it as I best can. We know, then, that in the higher animal -organisms the individuals of each species are divided into the related -forms of male and female, and that for each species there exists the -one invariable method of the sexual union, and a law of gestation -peculiar to itself. One hypothesis is that this system was produced by -the operation of natural causes, like those which are supposed to have -differentiated the various kinds of organisms; the other hypothesis is -that it was introduced with special design, by an act of some creative -will. If we view the phenomena of the sexual division and the sexual -genesis in the highest animal in which they obtain, we find that -they lead to certain social results, which plainly indicate that in -this animal they exist for a great and comprehensive moral purpose, -which far transcends all that can be imagined as the moral purpose -for which they exist in the other animals. To a comparatively very -limited extent, certain social consequences flow from the law of sexual -division and genesis among the other animals. But there is no animal in -which the moral and social effects of this law are to be compared to -those which it produces in the human race. Not only does the same law -of multiplication obtain among the human race; not only does it lead to -love of the offspring far more durable and powerful than in the case -of any other animal; not only is it the origin of a society far more -complex, more lasting, and more varied in its conditions than any that -can be discovered in the associations of other animals which appear -to have some social habits and to form themselves into communities, -but in the human race alone, so far as we have any means of knowledge, -has the passion of sexual love become refined into a sentiment. You -may remember the passage in the "Paradise Lost" in which Raphael, in -his conversation with Adam, touches so finely the distinction between -sexual love in the human race and in all the other animals. The angel -reminds Adam that he shares with the brutes the physical enjoyment -which leads to propagation; and then tells him that there was implanted -in his nature a higher and different capacity of enjoyment in love. The -conclusion is:-- - - "... for this cause - Among the beasts no mate for thee was found." - -In the human being alone, even when there is not much else to -distinguish the savage from the beasts around him, the passion of -love is often something more nearly akin to what might be looked for -in an elevated nature, than it can be among the brutes. What do the -poetry and romance of the ruder nations show, but that this passion of -sexual love in the human being is one in which physical appetite and -sentimental feeling are so "well commingled" that their union marks the -compound nature of an animal and a spiritual being? How human society -has resulted from this passion, how in the great aggregate of its -forces it moves the world, how in its highest development it gives rise -to the social virtues, and in its baser manifestations leads to vice, -misery, and degradation, I do not need to remind you. How, then, is it -possible to avoid the conclusion that in man the sexual passion was -implanted by special design and for a special purpose, which extends -far beyond the immediate end of a continuation of the race? - -KOSMICOS. Why do you resort to a special purpose in the -constitution of one animal, and to the absence of a similar purpose -from the constitution of another animal? In both, the consequences make -a case of the _post hoc_ just as plainly as they make a case of the -_propter hoc_. It is just as rational to conclude that they only show -the former as it is to conclude that they establish the latter. In man, -we have the physical fact of the sexual division, and all you can say -is that it is followed by certain great and varied moral phenomena. In -the other animals, we have the same physical fact, followed by moral -phenomena less complex and varied, and not so lasting. In neither case -can you say that there was a special and separate design, according -to which the same physical fact was intended to produce the special -consequences which we observe in each. Why, as the species called man -became developed into beings of a higher order than the primates of -the race or than their remote progenitors, should not this passion of -sexual love have become elevated into a sentiment and been followed by -the effects of that elevation, just as the gratification of another -appetite, that for food, _par exemple_, has been refined by the -intellectual pleasures of the social banquet and the interchange of -social courtesies? Is there anything to be proved by the institution -or the practice of marriage, beyond this--that it has been found by -experience to be of great social utility, and is therefore regulated -by human laws and customs, which vary in the different races of -mankind? Monogamy is the rule among some nations, polygamy is at least -allowed in others. You can predicate nothing of either excepting that -each society deems its own practice to be upon the whole the most -advantageous. You can not say that there is any fixed law of nature -which renders it unnatural for one man to have more than one wife. -In many ages of the world there have been states of society in which -the family has had as good a foundation in polygamous as it has had -in monogamous unions. Looking, then, at these undeniable facts, and -also at the fact that marriage, whether monogamous or polygamous, is -an institution regulated by human law and custom, we have to inquire -for the reason why human law and custom take any cognizance of the -relation. We find that, among some of the other animals, the sexes -do not pair excepting for a single birth. The connection lasts no -longer than for a certain period during which the protection of both -parents is needed by the offspring, and not always so long even as -that. It has become the experience of mankind that the connection -of the parents ought to be formed for more than one birth; shall be -of indefinite duration; and this because of the physical and social -benefits which flow from such a permanency of the union. This has given -rise to certain moral feelings concerning the relation of husband and -wife. But we have no more warrant, from anything that we can discover -in nature, for regarding the permanency of marriage among the human -race as a divine institution than we have for regarding its temporary -continuance among the other animals as a divinely appointed temporary -arrangement. In the one case, the permanency of the union has resulted -from experience of its utility. In the other case, the animal perceives -no such utility, and therefore does not follow the practice. Upon the -hypothesis that all the animals, man included, had a common origin, -it is very easy to account for the difference which prevails between -man and the other animals in this matter of marriage, or the pairing -of the sexes. As man became by insensible gradations evolved out of -some pre-existing organism, and as moral sentiments became evolved -out of his superior and more complex relations with his fellows, from -his experience of the practical utility of certain kinds of conduct -and practice, the sentiments became insensibly interwoven with his -feelings about the most important of his social relations, the union -of the sexes in marriage. This is quite sufficient to account for the -difference between man and the other animals in regard to the duration -of such unions, without resorting to any intentional or divine or -superhuman origin of that difference. - -SOPHEREUS. For the purpose of the argument, I concede that -this is a case of either the _post hoc_ or the _propter hoc_. I have -been pretty careful, however, in all my investigations, not to lose -sight of this distinction in reasoning on the phenomena of nature or -those of society. I think I can perceive when there is a connection -between cause and effect, when that connection evinces an intelligent -design, and when the phenomena bear no relation to a certain fact -beyond that of sequence in time. What, then, have we to begin with? -We have the fact that the human race is divided into the two forms of -male and female, and that the passion or appetite of sexual love exists -in both sexes, and that its gratification is the immediate cause of -a production of other individuals of the same species. We next have -the fact that this union of the sexes is followed by an extraordinary -amount of moral and social phenomena that are peculiar to the human -race. This sequence proves to me an intentional design that the moral -and social phenomena shall flow from the occurrence of the sexual -union, for it establishes not only a possibility, but an immensely -strong probability, that the phenomena were designed to flow from -this one occurrence among this particular species of animal. If this -connection between the original physiological fact and the moral and -social phenomena be established to our reasonable satisfaction, it is -the highest kind of moral evidence of a special design in the existence -of the sexual division and the sexual passion among the human race. -You remember old Sir Thomas Browne's suggestion, that men might have -been propagated as trees are. But they are not so propagated. If they -were, no such consequences would have followed as those which do follow -from the mode in which they are in fact propagated. These consequences -are most numerous and complex, and they are capable of being assigned -to nothing but the sexual division and the sexual union as the means -of continuing the race. Turn now to some of the other animals among -whom there prevail the same bisexual division and the same method of -procreation and multiplication. You find they result in sexual unions -of very short duration, and that, if it is followed by phenomena that -in some feeble degree resemble those which are found in human society, -they bear no comparison in point of complexity and character to those -which in the human race mark the family, the tribe, and the nation. -And here there occurs something which is closely analogous to what -I pointed out to you in considering the supposed development of the -first animal organism. I said that although you may theoretically -suppose that the first animal organism was formed by the spontaneous -union of molecular aggregates, and that the higher organisms were -evolved out of the lower solely by the operation of causes which you -call "natural," yet that when you come to account for the existence of -true and distinct species, each with its sexual division and its law -of procreation and gestation, you must infer a special design and a -formative will, because there has never been suggested any method by -which the so-called natural causes could have produced this division -of the sexes and this invariable law of the sexual procreation among -individuals of the same species. Here, then, we arrive at a distinct -moral purpose; for, when we compare the different social phenomena -which follow the operation of the sexual division and procreation in -man with the social phenomena which follow in the case of the other -animals, we find a difference that is not simply one of degree, but -is one of kind. We find the origin of the family, the tribe, and the -nation: the source of the complex phenomena of human society. We may -therefore rationally conclude that in man the sexual division and -the sexual passion were designed to have effects that they were not -designed to have in the other animals. To suppose that these vastly -superior consequences in the case of man are the mere results of his -perception of their utility will not account for the fact that when -he does not recognize the utility--when he departs from the law of -his human existence--human society can not be formed and continued. -Although it is possible for human society to exist with polygamous -marriages, and even to have some strength and duration, yet human -society without the family, with promiscuous sexual intercourse, with -no marriages and no ties between parents and children, never has -existed or can exist. Compare Plato's curious constitution of the body -of "guardians," in his "Republic," and the strange method of unions, -the offspring of which were not allowed to know their parents or the -parents to know their own children. This was not imagined as a form -of human society, but was entirely like a breeding-stud. Among the -brutes, permanent marriages, families, do not exist, not because the -animals do not perceive their social utility, but because the purposes -of their lives, their manifest destinies, show that there was no reason -for endowing them with any higher capacity for the sexual enjoyment -than that which leads to the very limited consequences for which the -division of the sexes was in their cases ordained. But in the case of -man there is a further and higher capacity for the sexual enjoyment, -which becomes the root of his social happiness, and which distinguishes -him from the brute creation quite as palpably as the superiority of his -intellectual faculties. In all this we must recognize a moral purpose. - -KOSMICOS. Pray tell me why it is not just as rational to -conclude that these moral phenomena, as results of the human passion -of love, have become, in all their complex and diversified aspects, -the consequences of a progressive elevation of the human animal to a -higher plane of existence than that occupied by the inferior species, -or than that occupied by the primeval man. When man had become -developed into an animal in whom the intellect could become what it -is, he could begin to perceive the social utility of certain modes -of life, and from this idea of their utility would result certain -maxims of conduct which would be acted on as moral obligations. Thus, -commencing with a consciousness that the race exists with the sexual -division into male and female, there would begin to be formed some -ideas of the superior social utility of a regulated sexual union of -individuals and of permanent marriages. These ideas would become -refined as the progressive elevation of the race went on, and that -which we recognize as the sentimental element in the passion of love -would become developed out of the perceptions of a superior utility -in the permanent devotion and consecration of two individuals to -each other. If, then, by a moral purpose in the establishment of the -bisexual division you mean that all these social phenomena of the -family, the tribe, and the nation were designed in the human race to -follow from that division, I see no necessity for resorting to any such -moral purpose on the part of a creator, because they might just as -well have followed from the progressive elevation and development of -the human animal, supposing him to be descended from some pre-existing -type of animal of another and inferior organization. The philosophy -which you seem to be cultivating closely resembles that which ascribes -everything to the action of mind as its cause. This, you must be aware, -it is the tendency of modern science to antagonize by a different -view of causation. What have you been reading, that you adhere so -pertinaciously to the idea of a moral purpose adopted by some being, -overlooking those physical causes which may have produced all the -results without that hypothesis? - -SOPHEREUS. I have been reading a good deal, but I have -reflected more. I may not be able to reconcile the metaphysical -speculations of the different schools of philosophy by explanations -that will satisfy others, but I can satisfy myself on one point. This -is, that power, force, energy, causation, are all attributes of mind, -and can exist in a mind only. Let us pass for a moment from abstract -reasoning to an illustration drawn from familiar objects. A ton of coal -contains a certain amount of what is scientifically called energy. -This energy becomes developed by combustion, which liberates heat. The -heat, when applied to water, converts the water into a vapor called -steam--a highly elastic substance. The expansion of the steam against a -mechanical instrument called a piston produces motion, and an engine is -driven. The force thus obtained represents the energy that was latent -in the coal. If we inquire whence the coal obtained this latent energy, -there is a hypothesis which assigns its origin to the sun, which laid -up a certain quantity of it in the vegetable substances that became -converted into coal in one of the geological periods of the earth's -formation. But in order to find the ultimate and original cause--the -_causa causans_ of the whole process--we must go behind the steam and -its expansive quality, behind the heat which converts the water into -steam, behind the coal and its combustible quality, and behind the sun -and its indwelling heat, a portion of which was imparted to and left -latent in the vegetable substances that became coal. We must inquire -whence they all originated. If they did not create themselves--an -inconceivable and inadmissible hypothesis--they must have originated -in some creating power, which commanded them to exist and established -their connections. Without a mental energy and its exertions, matter -and all its properties, substance and all its qualities, the sun's -indwelling heat and its capacity to be stored up in vegetable fiber -in a latent condition, could not have existed, and the forces of -nature of which we avail ourselves would never have emerged from the -non-existent state that we conceive of as "chaos." I know very well -that we are accustomed to associate with inanimate matter the ideas of -power, force, energy, and causation. But if we rest in the conception -of these as acting of themselves, and without being under the control -of an originating mind or a determining will, we may think that we -have arrived at ultimate causes, but we have not. We have arrived at -subsidiary causes--the instruments, so to speak, in the control of an -intellect which has ordained and uses them. Whether we look at the -physical causes by which the early Greek philosophers endeavored to -explain the phenomena of the universe, or at one of Plato's conceptions -of a designing and volitional agency in the formation of the Kosmos, -or to another of his conceptions, the sovereignty of universal ideas -or metaphysical abstractions, we are everywhere confronted with the -necessity for assigning an origin to the physical causes, or to -the universal ideas; and the result is that the idea of a supreme, -designing, and volitional agency is forced upon us--it is upon me--by -an irresistible process of reasoning, an invincible necessity of my -mental constitution. I can not agree with Auguste Comte, who regards -it as the natural progress of the human mind to explain phenomena at -first by reference to some personal agency, and to pass from this -mode of explanation to that by metaphysical abstractions. Nor can I -agree with you scientists, who not only rest satisfied yourselves with -the explanation of the ultimate cause of phenomena by mere physical -agencies, but who insist that others shall not deduce a personal and -volitional agency from the existence of those physical agencies. To me -it seems indispensable, in the study of phenomena, to recognize moral -purposes for which they have been made to be what they are: and of -course a moral purpose is not assignable to the physical agencies of -matter, or to metaphysical abstractions. Hence it is that in reasoning -on the phenomena of human society, I am obliged to recognize a moral -purpose in the sexual division, of far greater scope and far more -varied consequences than can be found in the case of the same division -among the other animals. - -KOSMICOS. I put to you this question: What do you mean by a -moral purpose? In teleology, or the science of the final causes of -things, you must find out the producing agencies. Let me give you a -theory of causation, which will show you that your notion of a moral -purpose is altogether out of place. The only true causes are phenomenal -ones, or what is certified by experience. There are uniform and -unconditional antecedents, and uniform and unconditional sequences. -Something goes before, uniformly and invariably; something uniformly -and invariably follows. The first are causes; the last are effects. -We can not go farther back than the antecedent cause; we can not go -farther forward than the effect. We can not connect the effect with -anything but the antecedent cause. When, therefore, you speak of a -moral purpose, what do you mean? Where do you get the evidence of the -moral purpose? What is the purpose, and what is the evidence of it? - -SOPHEREUS. I answer you as I have before--that the agencies -which you call phenomenal causes could not have established themselves; -could not have originated their own uniformity; could not have made -the invariable connection between themselves and the effects. If we -discard the idea of a moral and sentient being, a mind originating -and ordaining the physical agencies, we have nothing left but those -agencies; and in this the human mind can not rest. It is not enough to -say that it ought to rest there. It does not, will not, and can not. -Science--what you call science--may rest there, but philosophy can not. -It is unphilosophical to speak of the Unknown Cause, or the Unknown -Power, underlying all manifestations, as something of which we can not -conceive and must not personify. The ultimate power which underlies -all phenomena necessarily implies a will, an intellectual origin, and -a mental energy. That it is something whose mental operations we can -not trace, is no argument against its personality, and no reason why we -should not conceive of it as a mental energy. - -KOSMICOS. You have more than once referred to the constitution -of the human mind as if it had been constructed with an irresistible -necessity to attribute everything to the action of a being, an -intelligence, and a will. You should rather say that _some minds_ have -trained themselves to this mode of reasoning, because they have first -received the idea of such a being as the final cause, as a matter of -dogmatic teaching, and they have tried to reason it out so as to attain -a conviction that what they have been taught is true. It is in this way -that they have found what they consider as evidence of a moral purpose. -But you have no warrant for the assumption that the human intellect -has been put together in such a way that it can not avoid reaching the -conclusion that all phenomena are to be imputed to the volition of a -mind as their producing cause. - -SOPHEREUS. In speaking of the human mind and its incapacity -to rest satisfied with what science can discover of immediate physical -agencies in the production of phenomena, I have not overlooked the -fact that the idea of a Creator has been dogmatically inculcated as -a matter of belief. But I form my conception of the construction of -the human mind from the operations of my own mind. I have not trained -myself into any mode of reasoning. I have somehow been so placed in -this world that, as I have frequently told you and as I am perfectly -conscious, I am uninfluenced by any early teaching, and can judge -for myself of the force of evidence. When I say, therefore, that -the human intellect is so constituted that it is obliged to regard -mind as the source of power, I exclude all teaching but the teaching -of experience. There can not be two courses of reasoning that are -alike correct. If you uncover a portion of the earth's surface, and -find there structures, implements, and various objects which you -are convinced that the forces of nature did not produce, you must -conclude that they were the productions of mind availing itself of the -capabilities of matter to be molded and arranged by the force of an -intelligent will. You do not see that mind, you do not see the work in -progress, but you are irresistibly led to the conclusion that there -was a mind which produced what you have found. You can not reason on -the phenomena at all, without having the conviction forced upon you -that the ultimate cause was an intelligent being. You can not explain -the phenomena without this conclusion. How, then, can you explain the -more various and extraordinary phenomena of nature without attributing -their production to mind? You have no more direct evidence that the -Pyramids of Egypt, or an obelisk which has lain buried in the earth -for thousands of years, were made by human hands, than you have for -believing that an animal organism, or the solar system, was planned -and executed by an intelligent being. In both cases, you have only -indirect evidence; but in both cases that evidence addresses itself to -your intellect upon the same principles of belief. In the case of the -pyramid or the obelisk, you refer the construction to mind, because you -see that mind alone could have been the real cause of its existence. -In the case of the animal organism, or the mechanism of the heavenly -bodies, you are obliged to reason in the same way. Hence I say that -our minds are so constituted that there is but one method of correct -reasoning, whether the phenomena are those which can be attributed only -to human intellect, or are those which must be attributed to superhuman -power and intelligence. Hence, too, I speak of a moral purpose as -indicated by the phenomena. The pyramid and the obelisk were built -with a moral purpose. The animal organism and all that follows from -it, the structure of the solar system and all that follows from it, -were made to be what they are with a moral purpose. When you ask me for -the evidence of this purpose, I point to the fact that the phenomenal -causes, as you denominate the mere physical agencies employed in the -production of certain objects, were incapable of any volitional action, -and that without volition the connection between the physical agencies -and their effects could not have been established. The stone and the -chisel were the immediate physical agencies which produced the obelisk. -But who selected the stone and wielded the chisel? And who designed the -moral uses of the obelisk? Procreation, by the sexual union, is the -immediate physical cause of the existence of an individual animal. But -who designed its structure, appointed for it a law of its being, and -established the physical agencies which brought the individual into -existence and the moral consequences that those agencies produce? - -KOSMICOS. We are no nearer to an agreement than we have been -in our former discussions. And the reason is that you do not perceive -the mission and the method of science. Science undertakes to discover -those causes of phenomena which can be verified by experience; so that -we can truly say that our knowledge has been advanced, and that we -really do know something of the things which we talk about. This is the -domain of science. Its conclusions do not extend into the region of -that which is unknown and unknowable. Inasmuch as its conclusions are -strictly positive, because they are demonstrated by experience, they -negative, as matter of knowledge, anything beyond. You may speculate -about what lies beyond, but you have no reason for saying that you know -anything about it; whereas men who reason as you do, and yet who do -not accept dogmas simply as matters of faith, are constantly trying to -persuade themselves that they know something about that of which they -have no means of knowledge. If you accept that something as a matter of -faith, because you are satisfied with the evidence which establishes, -or is supposed to establish, a divine revelation, you have a ground for -belief with which science does not undertake to interfere. But you have -no ground for maintaining that, from the phenomena of nature alone, you -can derive any knowledge beyond that which you can demonstrate as a -scientific fact. - -SOPHEREUS. I accept your definition of the aims and methods -of science. But what I find fault with is the assumption that we are -not entitled to say that we know or believe a thing which can not be -demonstrated as a scientific fact, when we are all the time grounding -such knowledge or belief upon reasoning that convinces us of the truth -and reality of other things which in like manner are not demonstrable -as scientific facts. You may say that this is not the knowledge -which we derive from scientific facts, and therefore it is not to be -dignified by the name of knowledge. But we are always acting and must -act upon proofs which are not scientific demonstrations; and whether we -call this knowledge, or call it belief, we govern our lives according -to it. We accept the proof that a buried city was the habitation and -work of intelligent human beings, because we know that the forces of -nature, not guided and applied by intelligent wills, never constructed -a city. We accept the proof that men are just, merciful, courageous, -truthful, or the reverse of all this, because their actions prove it, -although we can not look into their hearts. What does all the estimate -of the characters of men rest upon, but upon their actions? And is not -this entitled to be ranked as knowledge of the characters of individual -men? - -KOSMICOS. We must each retain his conclusions. Let our next -discussion relate to the origin of the human mind, and then we shall -see whether you will be able to resist the origin which evolution -assigns to it. - -SOPHEREUS. I shall be glad to meet you again. - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - - Origin of the human mind--Mr. Spencer's theory of the composition of - mind--His system of morality. - - -According to their appointment, our two disputants have met to discuss -the origin of mind. - -SOPHEREUS. Will you begin this conference by stating the -evolution theory of the origin of the human mind? - -KOSMICOS. Most willingly. I have thus far spoken of the -hypothesis of evolution as affording an explanation of the origin of -distinct animals, regarded simply as living organisms, differentiated -from each other by the slow process of development from a common stock, -by the operation of certain physical causes. I am now to account to you -for the origin of the human mind, upon the same hypothesis, namely, -that man is a development from some previous and lower organism. I -acknowledge that what we call mind, or intellect, has to be accounted -for; and that we who hold the evolution theory of the origin of man as -an animal must be able to suggest how his intellect became developed by -the operation of the same natural causes which produced his physical -organization. It is not material, in this inquiry, whether we agree -with Darwin in assuming some one distinct living organism of a very -low type, as the original stock from which all the other animal -organisms have been derived, or whether we go with Spencer back to -the primal molecules of organizable matter, and suppose that from a -single cell have been developed all the organisms possessing life, in -a regular order of succession. Upon either supposition, the doctrine -of evolution explains the origin of the human mind. For, upon either -supposition, there was a point in the long series of new forms, each -descending from a pre-existing form, at which the manifestations of -what we call mind may be said to have begun. This link in the connected -chain of organisms occurred where nervous organization began to act -with some spontaneous movement, with some power of voluntary exertion, -as distinguished from the involuntary exertions of a substance that -acted only in a certain and fixed way, although that substance was -endowed with life. The substance of nervous organization is alike -in all animals. In some it acts in a limited manner, and without -volitional control; in others, it acts in more varied modes, and it -manifests some power of volitional control and volitional rest, as -well as of involuntary movement. But in all animals the substance of -which nervous organization is composed--the substance which acts in -producing movement, whether voluntary or involuntary--is the same kind -of physical structure. In the higher animals, the great nerve-center -is the organ called the brain. To this organ proceed the impressions -produced upon one set of nerves by external objects, or by light or -heat. From the same organ proceed, by another set of nerves, those -movements which the animal is endowed with the power of making from -within. Contemplating, then, the whole animal kingdom as one great -connected family, but divided into different species, all of which have -a nervous organization, we find that each species is endowed with the -power of generating other individuals of the same species and of the -same nervous organization. In the long course of development of the -several species, or forms of animal life, there comes about a nervous -organization which acts freely within certain limits, but in a fixed -and invariable mode, so that the movements are uniformly the same, -and not in any proper sense volitional. To such an animal we should -not attribute any mind, for mind implies some power of comparison and -variation, some ability to act in more than a prescribed way. This -animal, which I have just supposed to possess a very limited power of -nervous action, transmits that power to its descendants; and in some of -the successive generations the power remains always at the same fixed -point. But the laws of natural and sexual selection are perpetually -operating among those descendants. In progress of time there comes -to be developed another organism, which has a wider range of nervous -action; and, as this ceaseless process of modification and improvement -goes on, there is developed still another nervous organization which -acts with still more varied movements. As the different species -of animals become evolved out of those that have gone before, the -expansion of nervous organization goes on; and as each new and higher -and more complex stage is gained, individuals of the species have the -power to transmit it to their descendants by ordinary generation. -At length, as in some of the mammalia, a nervous organization is -attained, whose action exhibits manifestations of what we call mind. -There appears to be a power of something like reasoning and volition, -because the nervous actions are so various and so much adapted to -outward circumstances. Thus, before we reach the human animal, we -find nervous organizations widely separated from those of the remote -progenitor species, because they can do so much more, and can do it -with an apparent power of voluntary variation. At last, this process of -modifications accumulating upon modifications culminates in an animal -in whose nervous organization we find the freest, the most complex, -and the most various power of receiving into his brain the impressions -derived from the external world, and of transmitting from his brain to -the different organs of his body those movements which the external -circumstances of his life, or his internal efforts, cause him to strive -for and to effect. This animal was the primeval man.[113] - -Looking back, then, to the primal source of all nervous organization, -in the remote animal in which the nervous structure and action were -at the crudest state of development, and remembering that there was -a power of transmitting it to offspring, and that natural and sexual -selection were unceasingly operating to expand and perfect it, we may -trace the successive stages of its modification and growth, from the -lowest to the highest, until we reach in the primeval man the highest -development that it had yet attained. But throughout all its stages, -from the lowest to the highest, the system of nervous organization and -action is the same in kind. We do not call its manifestations or action -mind, or speak of them as indicating mind, until we find it developed -into a condition of some voluntary activity and power of variation, as -it is in many of the animals inferior to man. But in all the animals, -man included, mind is the action of the nervous organization when it -evinces a superior power of variation; and we speak of the brain of -such animals as the seat of mind because that organ is the source to -and from which nervous action proceeds. - -Let me now illustrate this view by the acquisition of articulate speech -and the formation of language. In many of the lower animals with -which we are acquainted there is a power of uttering vocal sounds, -and of understanding them when uttered by their fellows. It must have -been a power possessed by those animals which were the progenitors -of man in the long line of descent of one species from another. But -in them it was a very limited power. It increased as the nervous -organization and the vocal organs became in the successive species -capable of a more varied action. The sounds of the external world -impressed themselves upon the brains of the primeval men more forcibly -than they did upon the brains of the other animals, and excited the -nervous organization to reproduce or imitate them. Those emotions -and desires which originated in the brain itself--the impressions -of pain or the sensations of pleasure experienced in the nervous -system--sought expression through the vocal organs. Certain sounds -repeated alike by the same individual, or by numerous individuals, for -a long time, became associated in their brains with certain feelings -or sensations. What are called words were thus formed; which, at -first, could have been nothing but the utterance of certain sounds -by the vocal organs, expressing the sensations felt by the nervous -organization, or the imitations of external noises. At length these -vocal sounds are gathered in the memory, multiplied and systematized, -and a rude language is formed. But, all the while, the first crude -human language was nothing but the result of nervous action excited -to greater activity than in the other animals, accompanied by nicer -and more capable vocal organs and a greater power of using them. -This acquisition, obtained by the primeval men, was transmitted to -their descendants as an improved physical organization, and in those -descendants it finally reached the marvelous development of the most -perfect languages of antiquity. - -Let us now retrace our steps back to the time when nervous -organization, in the successive generations of the whole animal series -regarded as one great family of kindred animals successively developed -out of a common stock, began to act in such a way as to evince the -presence of what we call mind. Once attained, this improved nervous -organization would be transmitted by the parents to new individuals; -and so on through countless generations, just as the offspring would -inherit the same physical structure as the parents in other respects. - -Mental phenomena are the products of nervous organization. We have no -means of knowing that mind is an organism or an entity. If it is an -existence capable of surviving the death of the body, which evolution -neither affirms nor denies, you must go to revelation for the grounds -of belief in its immortality. There is no conflict between the -evolution theory of the nature of mind and the doctrine of immortality -as taught by revealed religion. - -SOPHEREUS. I am not disposed to constitute myself a champion -of revealed religion. I have lately read in the writings of some -well-meaning persons, whose positions and convictions made them anxious -about the truths of revelation, expressions of the opinion that there -is no necessary conflict between the hypothesis of a revelation and -the teachings of evolution. I have been rather surprised by such -concessions. But through all our discussions, and throughout all my -reflections and inquiries, I have excluded revealed religion from the -number of proofs of our immortality. But it seems to me that, as to -the possibility of a survival of the mind after the death of the body, -you have stated yourself out of court, not because you have propounded -something that is inconsistent with revelation, although it certainly -is, but because you have made mind to consist in nothing but the -action of nervous organization, and when that has perished what can -remain? You may say that science does not undertake to determine that -mind is or is not a special existence capable of surviving the body. -But, observe that you attribute to nervous action the production of -phenomena to which you give the name of mind, when the nervous action -evinces some power of volitional variation and control. Now, when and -where did this begin, in the long series of animal organisms which -you assume have been successively evolved out of one another? Remember -that, according to the system of evolution, there are supposed to -have been countless forms of animal organisms, graduating by slow -improvements into higher and higher organisms. Where and when and what -was the first animal that possessed a nervous organization which would -manifest the power of variation in so marked a degree as to render -it proper to speak of the animal as possessing or evincing mind? Are -not the works of naturalists of the evolution school filled with -comparisons of the minds of different animals, and do they not contend -that in many of them there are manifestations of mental power, of the -exercise of reason and comparison, and a volitional action according -to varying circumstances? Did, then, these manifestations of something -like mental power begin in the anthropomorphous ape from whom we are -supposed to be descended, or who is supposed to be of kin to us? Or did -it begin in any one and which of the innumerable intermediate forms -between that ape-like creature and the primeval man? And when once this -improved and improving nervous organization had been developed and -put into a condition to be transmitted to descendants, until in the -primeval man it had attained its highest development, what was it but -a more sensitive, more various, and complex condition of the substance -of which all nervous tissues are composed? And when these tissues are -decomposed and resolved into their original material elements, where -and what is the mind, whether of man or beast? It is nowhere and -nothing, unless you suppose that the improved and improving action -of the nervous organization at last developed an existence which is -not in itself material or physical, and which may be imperishable and -indestructible, while the material and physical organs by and through -which it acts for a time perish daily in our sight. If this is a -possible, it is a very improbable hypothesis, because the nature of the -human mind points to a very different origin. - -I surely do not need to tell you that like produces like. If the mind -of man is now a spiritual essence, it is a wild conjecture to suppose -that it was generated out of the action of a material substance, in -whatever animal, or supposed species of animal, its genesis is imagined -to have begun. We must therefore determine, from all the evidence -within our reach, whether the mind is a spiritual existence. If it is, -it is not difficult to reach a rational conclusion that its Creator -contrived a means of connecting it for a season with the bodily organs, -and made the generative production of each new individual body at the -same time give birth to a new individual mind, whenever a new child is -born into the world. We can not discover the nature of the connection, -or the process by which generative production of a new body becomes -also generative production of a new mind. These are mysteries that -are hidden from us. But the fact of the connection--the simultaneous -production of the new body and the new mind--is a fact that the birth -of every child demonstrates. Whether the union takes place at any -time before birth, or whether it is only at birth that the mind, the -spiritual essence, comes into existence, and so may become capable of -an endless life, we can not know. But that this occurs at some time in -the history of every human being, we are justified in saying that we -know. - -I shall now contrast your hypothesis of the origin of the human mind -with another and a very different one; and, in stating it, I shall -borrow nothing from the Mosaic account of the creation of Adam and -Eve. I shall not assert, on the authority of Moses, that God breathed -into Adam a living soul, for that would be to resort to a kind of -evidence which, for the present, I mean to avoid, and which would -bring into consideration the nature of the means by which the Hebrew -historian was informed of the fact which he relates, and which he could -have known in no other way. It would also give rise to a question -of what was meant by "a living soul." But I shall assume that there -is a spiritual and a material world; that a spiritual existence is -one thing and a material existence is another. I shall assume that -there is a spiritual world, because all our commonest experience, our -introspection and consciousness, our observation of what the human mind -can do, its operations and its productions, its capacity to originate -thought and to send it down the course of ages, its power to recognize -and obey a moral law as a divine command, the monuments of every kind -which attest that it is something which is not matter or material -substance, prove to us that the human mind is essentially a spiritual -existence; and that while it acts and must act by and through bodily -organs, so long as it acts in this world, it is a being quite distinct -from all the physical substance and physical organism with which it is -connected for a time. Physiology alone can teach us this much at least, -that mind is not matter; and experience, consciousness, and observation -teach us that while the action of the mind may be suspended for a -time when the nervous organization can not normally act, from disease -or injury, the mind itself is not destroyed, but its action may be -restored with the restoration of the brain to its normal condition. - -I am going to assume another thing--the existence of the Creator, the -Supreme Governor of the universe, having under his control the whole -realms of the spiritual and the material world; alike capable of giving -existence to spiritual entities and to material organisms, and capable -of uniting them by any connection and for any purpose that might seem -to him good. I shall assume this, because some of you evolutionists -concede, if I understand rightly, the existence and capacities of the -Supreme Being, since you assume, and rightly, that the whole question -relates to his methods; and you believe that he chose the method of -evolution instead of the method of special creation for all the types -of animal life excepting the aboriginal and created lowest form, out -of which all the others have been evolved. With these two assumptions, -then, the nature of a spiritual existence, and the existence and -capacities of the Creator, I now state to you the opposite hypothesis -of the origin and nature of the human mind. - -A pair of human beings, male and female, is created by the hand and -will of the Almighty; and to each is given a physical organism, -and a spiritual, intellectual self, or mind, which is endowed -with consciousness and capable of thought. Why is this a rational -supposition, aside from any evidence of the fact derived from its -assertion by an inspired or a divinely instructed witness? It is so, -because, when this aboriginal pair of human creatures fulfill the law -of their being, by the procreation of other creatures of the same -kind, the offspring must be supposed to possess whatever the parents -possessed of peculiar and characteristic organization. This law of -transmission is stamped upon all the forms of organic life; and we -may well apply it to the first pair of human beings. Its operation -must have begun in them and their offspring. Every law that proceeded -from the will of the Supreme Being began to operate at some time; and -this law, like all others, must have been put in operation by the -Creator at some definite period. He created in the first pair a bodily -organization, and he created in each of them the spiritual entity that -we now call mind, and established its connection with their bodily -organs. He established in them also the power of procreating offspring; -and this included the production of a new individual of the same -species, in whom would be united, by the same mysterious bond, the -same kind of physical organization and the same kind of spiritual or -intellectual existence, which is not matter, and could not have been -generated out of matter alone. The beginning of this connection of body -and mind in the first parents was an occasional and special exercise of -the divine power. It was not a miraculous exercise of power, because -a miracle, in the proper sense, implies some action aside from a -previously established course of things. It was simply a first exercise -of the power in the case of the creation of the first human pair; -that is, it was the establishment in them, specially, of the union of -the body and soul. Its repetition in the offspring, for all time, and -through successive generations, was left to the operation of the laws -of procreation and heredity. The nature and operation of those laws are -wrapped in mystery; but about the fact of their existence, and of the -compound procreation of a new body and a new mind at every new birth, -there can be no doubt whatever. - -It seems to me that this hypothesis has in its favor a vast -preponderance of probability, because-- - -1. The generation of mind or spirit out of matter is inconceivable. - -2. The creation of mind by the Almighty is just as conceivable as his -creation of a material organism; and the latter is conceded by all -naturalists who admit that there was a first animal organism; and -even some of the evolutionists hold that the first animal organism -was directly fashioned by the Creator, although all the succeeding -organisms were formed, as they contend, by natural and sexual selection. - -3. The nature of mind--of the human mind--is the same in all -individuals of the race. They may differ in mental power, but they -all possess an intellectual principle that is the same in kind. To -the production of mind, or its formation, the process of evolution -was not necessary. Not only was it unnecessary, but in the nature of -things it was not adapted to do what it is supposed to have done in -the production of physical organisms. To suppose that the Creator, -instead of the direct exercise of his power of creation, left it to the -material laws of natural and sexual selection to produce a mind, is -to suppose him to have resorted to a method that was both unnecessary -and indirect, and was furthermore incapable of effecting that kind of -product. In reasoning about the methods of the Creator, it is certainly -irrational to suppose him to have resorted to one that was so ill -adapted to the accomplishment of his object. In the accomplishment -of some physical objects, we may well suppose that they have been -brought about by physical agencies that have operated very slowly -and indirectly; and we can see that this has often been the case in -regard to many material products. But for the production of mind, for -the accomplishment of a spiritual existence, there can be imagined no -secondary agencies, no gradual growth out of antecedent existences or -substances, no evolution out of some other and that other a material -organism. The first mind, the first human soul, must have come direct -from the hand and will of God. The succeeding minds may well have been -left to owe their existence to the laws of procreation, by a process -which we can not understand, but of which we have proof in the birth of -every child that has been born of woman. - -KOSMICOS. We now have the two hypotheses of the origin and -nature of the human mind fairly before us; and here I must point out -to you wherein you do injustice to my side of the question. In the -first place, your assumption of one pair of progenitors of the human -race from whom have diverged all the varieties of the race, does not -encounter the evolution process of man's descent as an animal. It -is either an arbitrary assumption, or it is derived from the Mosaic -account of the creation, which, in a scientific point of view, and -aside from the supposed authority of that story, is just as arbitrary -an assumption as if the book of Genesis had never existed. Take, -therefore, Darwin's hypothesis of the zoölogical series: First, a -fish-like animal, of course inhabiting the water; next, the amphibians, -capable of living in the water and on the land; next, the ancient -marsupials; next, the quadrumana and all the higher mammals, among -whom are to be classed the _Simiadæ_ or monkeys; and out of these came -the hairy, tailed quadruped, arboreal in its habits, from which man is -descended. This long line of descent is filled with diversified forms, -intermediate between the several principal forms which are known to us, -and which were successively the progenitors of man. Now, hear Darwin on -the subject of one pair of progenitors: - -"But since he [man] attained to the rank of manhood he has diverged -into distinct races, or, as they may be more fitly called, sub-species. -Some of these, such as the negro and European, are so distinct that, -if specimens had been brought to a naturalist without any further -information, they would undoubtedly have been considered by him as -good and true species. Nevertheless, all the races agree in so many -unimportant details of structure and in so many mental peculiarities, -that these can be accounted for only by inheritance from a common -progenitor; and a progenitor thus characterized would probably deserve -to rank as man. It must not be supposed that the divergence of each -race from the other races, and of all from a common stock, can be -traced back to any one pair of progenitors. On the contrary, at every -stage in the process of modification all the individuals which were in -any way better fitted for their conditions of life, though in different -degrees, would have survived in greater numbers than the less well -fitted. The process would have been like that followed by man, when he -does not intentionally select particular individuals, but breeds from -all the superior individuals and neglects the inferior. He thus slowly -but surely modifies his stock, and unconsciously forms a new strain. -So with respect to modifications acquired independently of selection, -and due to variations arising from the nature of the organism and the -action of the surrounding conditions, or from changed habits of life, -no single pair will have been modified much more than the other pairs -inhabiting the same country, for all will have been continually blended -through free intercrossing."[114] - -The meaning of this is that if you go back to the period when an -animal, by the slow process of modification which was continually -operating among the preceding organisms, had been raised to the -present state of man, and then follow out the divergencies into the -distinct races of men, those divergencies would not have occurred in -consequence of any one pair having been modified much more than the -other pairs inhabiting the same country, but all the individuals would -have undergone a continually blending process through unrestrained -intercrossing; and those individuals of both sexes, who became in -a superior degree fitted for their conditions of life, would have -survived in greater numbers than the less well fitted, and would have -transmitted to their posterity those peculiarities which tended at last -to produce different races of the human family. So that the notion of a -single pair of the negro variety, or of a single pair of the Caucasian -variety, formed and completed as an independent stock, is not necessary -to account for these varieties. - -To apply this, now, to the slow production of man's intellectual -faculties, we must, if we would do justice to Darwin's hypothesis of -the method in which he was developed as an animal, bear in mind that -his mental powers, like his animal structure, have been the necessary -acquirement of new powers and capacities by gradation, through the -perpetual process of modification, and retention and transmission of -the new acquisitions. Darwin, indeed, does not professedly undertake -the genealogy of the human mind; but he appears to hold the opinion -that in future psychology will be based on the gradual acquisition of -each mental power and capacity, as distinguished from their complete -production in any one pair, or in any one being; and he refers to -Herbert Spencer as having already securely laid the foundation for this -new psychology.[115] - -I take, therefore, the great English naturalist as the person who has -most satisfactorily explained the origin of man as an animal, and -the great English philosopher as the person who has propounded the -most satisfactory theory of the origin of the human mind. The two -hypotheses run parallel to and support each other. Man, as respects his -mere animal structure, is an organism developed by a slow process of -modification out of preceding organisms. His mental faculties have one -by one grown out of the operation of the same physical agencies that -have formed his animal structure, and they have not been bestowed at -once upon any one pair, or upon any one individual of the race. After -they have all been acquired, as we now know and recognize them, they -have descended to the successive generations of the race. - -SOPHEREUS. I have studied Mr. Spencer's "System of -Psychology," but I do not know whether we understand it alike. You -say that he has propounded the most satisfactory theory of the origin -of mind. Assuming that mind was evolved as an aggregate of powers and -capacities, slowly acquired, _pari passu_ with the evolution of the -animal organism, be good enough to tell me whether Mr. Spencer does -or does not conclude that mind is anything more than an aggregate of -powers and capacities of the nervous organization. I am quite aware -of the mode in which he meets the charge of materialism; but waiving -for the present the question of materialism, I should be glad to know, -according to your understanding of his philosophy, what he considers -mind to be. - -KOSMICOS. To answer your question requires an analysis of -Spencer's "Principles of Psychology." You have here on your table the -third edition of that work, which received his latest corrections and -additions.[116] If you look at the preface of this edition, you will -see that, as between Realism and Idealism, he enunciates a view which -recognizes an element of truth in each, but rejects the rest. By this -"Transfigured Realism" he aims to conciliate what is true in Realism -with what is true in Idealism; and it is by this conciliation that he -answers the partisans of both systems, who will not sacrifice any part -of their respective doctrines. It is important for you to remember this -in judging of his psychological system. He begins by a description -of the structure and functions of the nervous system, and the nature -of nervous actions. Without repeating in all its minute details the -structure which he describes, it is enough to say that in all animals, -from the lowest to the highest, this peculiar part of the organism -which we call the nervous system is composed of two tissues which -differ considerably from those composing the rest of the organism. -In color they are distinguished from one another as gray and white, -and in their minute structures as vesicular and fibrous. In the gray -tissue, the vesicles or corpuscles contain a soft protein substance, -with granules imbedded in it, consisting of fatty matter. The more -developed of these nerve-corpuscles give off branching processes, and -the terminations of nerve-fibers are distributed among them. The white -tissue is composed of minute tubes containing a medullary substance or -pulp, viscid like oil. Imbedded in this pulp, which fills the tubes, -there lies a delicate fiber or axis-cylinder, which is uniform and -continuous instead of having its continuity broken by fat-granules. -This central thread is the essential nerve; and the sheath of -medullary matter, and its surrounding membranous sheath, are only its -accessories. While, therefore, the matter of nerve-fiber has much in -common with the matter of nerve-vesicle, in the latter the protein -substance contains more water, is mingled with fat-granules, and forms -part of an unstable mass; whereas in the former, the nerve-tube, the -protein substance, is denser, is distinct from the fatty compounds that -surround it, and so presents an arrangement that is relatively stable. - -Conceive, then, of this interlaced physical structure extending -throughout the whole organism as a kind of circular mechanism, having -its periphery at the surface of the body and limbs, ramifying among -and into the internal organs, with various nerve-centers distributed -through the interior mechanism, and the one great nerve-center in the -brain. Conceive of this structure, further, as fed continually by the -blood-vessels, which repair its waste of tissue and keep it in proper -tone and activity. Then imagine it as first put in operation in some -animal in whom it has become developed as we now know it in ourselves, -and let that animal stand as the primeval man, who has become, by -inherited transmission of gradual accumulations, possessed of this -consummate development of nervous organization. You can then observe -the method of its action, and can perceive how mind became developed, -and what it is. - -What I have now given you is only a general description of the -structure of the nervous mechanism, and in order to understand its -functions, we may take it up, in an individual, at a point of time -when it had not experienced a single movement or change from a state -of rest, but when it was completely fitted to act. Observe, then, -that its action will consist in the origination and accomplishment -of motion; or, in other words, in molecular change of the substance -composing the nerves, which, for illustration only, may be likened to -the conductor through which the molecular disturbance passes which is -popularly, but not scientifically, called the electric fluid. At the -surface of the body and limbs, the external termini of the nerves are -exposed to disturbance by contact with an external object. Along the -highly sensitive and minute conductor, the nerve which has by contact -with an external object at its outer extremity received a slight shock, -there passes through the fluid or semi-fluid substance of the nerve a -wave of disturbance, or a succession of such waves. This disturbance -reaches the brain, the great nerve-center, where it becomes a feeling. -In this way is generated the feeling of contact with an external -object, and this is what is commonly called the sense of touch, which -is simply a feeling produced in the great nerve-center of the brain. -Now, to reverse the process, let us suppose that this feeling, caused -by touching an external object, provokes or excites a desire to remove -that object, or to get rid of the continuance of the feeling, and -to be without the irritation or pain which it is causing. From the -central seat of nervous action, the brain, along another nerve, there -proceeds a wave, or a series of waves, in the fluid or semi-fluid -substance of which the conductor of that nerve is composed, and motion -is communicated to some muscle or set of muscles, which need to be put -in motion in order to break the contact with the external object. In -like manner, all internal organs of the body, the viscera, are supplied -with a system of nerves connected with the great nerve-center. If a -disturbance arises in one of the viscera, some action that is abnormal, -a sensation that is called pain is produced. So, too, in regard to the -normal action of the viscera, kept up by involuntary movements--those -movements originate in and are transmitted from the nerve-center, by -waves in the fluid or semi-fluid substance of which the special nerves -are composed, whose office it is to cause the necessary movements in -the muscular substance, or the tissue, of the particular organ. - -In this way began, in the supposed individual, those simpler states of -feeling which pain or irritation produced in the nervous system, and -those other involuntary movements which were essential to the normal -and unconscious action of the viscera. These varying conditions of -the highly sensitive nervous system, which constitute and are rightly -denominated feelings, were constantly repeated; and, so far as they -are capable of becoming a part of consciousness, that consciousness -is a repetition of the same nervous actions many times over. Pass, -then, from the feelings called sensations to the feelings called -emotions, and it will be found that while both are states of nervous -action, the former are peripherally initiated and the latter are -centrally initiated. The meaning of this is that a sensation is an -effect produced at the nerve-center by the transmission, from the -outer terminus of a particular nerve, of the waves in the fluid or -semi-fluid substance of the nerve. The strong forms of feeling called -sensations are peripherally initiated, and the feelings called emotions -are centrally initiated. Now, any feeling of any kind is directly known -by each person in no other place than his own consciousness; and the -question is, Of what is consciousness composed? In order to afford an -answer to this question, Mr. Spencer proceeds to examine the substance -of mind, and then passes to a consideration of the composition of -mind. These are not the same thing; for, if there be no such thing, -properly speaking, as the substance of mind, its composition, or its -nature, must be looked for in another way. The expression "substance -of mind," if used in any way but that in which we use the _x_ of an -algebraic equation, has no meaning. If we undertake to interpret mind -in the terms of matter, as crude materialism does, we are at once -brought to this result, that we know, and can know, nothing of the -ultimate substance of either. We know matter only as forms of certain -units; but the ultimate unit, of which the ultimate homogeneous units -are probably composed, must remain absolutely unknown. In like manner, -if mind consists of homogeneous units of feeling, the ultimate unit, -as a substance, must remain unknown. When, therefore, we think of the -substance of mind, the simplest form under which we can think of it -is nothing but a symbol of something that can never be rendered into -thought, just as the concept we form to ourselves of matter is but the -symbol of some form of power absolutely and forever unknown to us, as -the representation of all objective activities in terms of motion is -only a symbolic representation, and not a knowledge of them. Symbols of -unknown forms of existence, whether in the case of matter, motion, or -mind, are mere representations which do not determine anything about -the ultimate substance of either. "Our only course is constantly to -recognize our symbols as symbols only, and to rest content with that -duality of them which our constitution necessitates. The unknowable as -manifested to us within the limits of consciousness in the shape of -feeling, being no less inscrutable than the unknowable as manifested -beyond the limits of consciousness in other shapes, we approach no -nearer to understanding the last by rendering it into the first."[117] - -Discarding, then, the expression "substance of mind," excepting as -a mere symbol, Mr. Spencer passes to the "composition of mind"; and -here we reach his explanation of mind as an evolution traceable -through ascending stages of composition, conformably to the laws of -evolution in general, so that the composition of mind, as something -evolved out of simple elements, does not need or involve a symbolical -representation in the terms of matter. - -The method of composition, by which the whole fabric of mind is -constituted, from the formation of its simplest feelings up to the -formation of the complex aggregates of feelings which are its highest -developments, can now be sketched. A sensation is formed by the -consolidation of successive units of feeling; but the feelings called -sensations can not of themselves constitute mind, even when many of -different kinds are present together. When, however, each sensation, -as it occurs, is linked in association with the faint forms of -previous sensations of the same kind, mind is constituted; for, by the -consolidation of successive sensations, there is formed a knowledge -of the particular sensation as a distinct subject of what we call -thought, or the smallest separable portion of thought as distinguished -from mere confused sentiency. Thus, as the primitive units of feeling -are compounded into sensations, by the same method simple sensations, -and the relations among them, are compounded into states of definite -consciousness. The next highest stage of mental composition is a -repetition of the same process. Take a special object, which produces -in us a vivid cluster of related sensations. When these are united with -the faint forms of like clusters that have been before produced by -such objects, we know the object. Knowledge of it is the assimilation -of the combined group of real feelings which it excites, with one or -more preceding ideal groups which were once excited by objects of the -same kind; and, when the series of ideal groups is large, the knowledge -is clear. In the same way, by the connections between each special -cluster of related sensations produced by one object, and the special -clusters generated by other objects, a wider knowledge is obtained. -By assimilating the more or less complex relations exhibited in the -actions of things in space and time, with other such complex relations, -knowledge of the powers and habits of things is constituted. If we -can not so assimilate them, or parts of them, we have no knowledge of -their actions. So it is, without definite limit, through those tracts -of higher consciousness which are formed of clusters of clusters of -feelings held together by extremely involved relations. This law -of the composition of mind is, therefore, the assimilation of real -feelings and groups of real feelings with the ideal feelings or ideal -groups of feelings which objects of the same kind once produced. You -can follow out, without my assistance, the correspondence which Mr. -Spencer exhibits between the views of mental composition and the -general truths respecting nervous structure and nervous functions with -which he began the treatment of mind, which consists largely, and in -one sense entirely, of feelings. The inferior tracts of consciousness -are constituted by feelings; and the feelings are the materials out of -which are constituted the superior tracts of consciousness, and thus -intellect is evolved by structural combination. "Everywhere feeling is -the substance of which, when it is present, intellect is the form. And -where intellect is not present, or but little present, mind consists -of feelings that are unformed or but little formed."[118] Does not -this statement, which in substance is Mr. Spencer's explanation of the -formation of mind, explain to you why he denominates it "transfigured -realism"? - -SOPHEREUS. I have attentively and carefully read Mr. Spencer's -book from which you have made this partial analysis of his view of the -nature of mind, but whether it is realism "transfigured," or whatever -is, I think it must be admitted that its basis is a truly realistic -one; for it comes back at last to just what I suggested to you at the -beginning of this discussion, that mind, according to his view, is -constituted by the action of the nervous system, or, in other words, -that mind consists of the phenomena of movements which take place in a -physical structure. If this is all that can be predicated of mind, it -is not something that can have an independent and continuous existence -after the dissolution of the physical structure called the nervous -system. That structure is one that is analogous in its action to the -other part of the organism by which digestion, or the assimilation -of food, is carried on. We might as well suppose that by the action -of the digestive system there has been constituted a something which -will remain as a digestive function after the organs of digestion -have perished, as to suppose that the action of the nervous system -has constituted a something which will remain mind, a conscious and -independent existence, after the nervous system has been resolved -into its original material elements. Indeed, I do not understand Mr. -Spencer's philosophy as including, providing for, or leading to, any -possible continued existence of the mind after the death of the body. -He seems to exclude it altogether. There is a passage at the end of one -of his chapters which appears to be a summary of his whole philosophic -scheme, and which is one of the dreariest conclusions I have ever met -with. "Once more," he says, "we are brought round to the conclusion -repeatedly reached by other routes, that behind all manifestations, -inner and outer, there is a Power manifested. Here, as before, it has -become clear that while the nature of this Power can not be known, -while we lack the faculty of forming even the dimmest conception of it, -yet its universal presence is the absolute fact without which there can -be no relative facts. Every feeling and thought being but transitory, -an entire life made up of such feelings and thoughts being also but -transitory, nay, the objects amid which life is passed, though less -transitory, being severally in course of losing their individualities -quickly or slowly; we learn that the one thing permanent is the -Unknowable Reality hidden under all these changing shapes."[119] - -I will not say that the mournful character of this hopelessness -of human destiny is proof of its unsoundness. I have accustomed -myself to accept results, whatever may be the gloom in which they -involve us, provided they are deductions of sound reasoning; and -our wishes or hopes can not change the constitution of the universe -or become important evidence for or against any view of what that -constitution is. But let me ask, what does this philosopher mean by -the transitory character of an entire life made up of transitory -feelings and thoughts, occupied throughout their continuance with -transitory objects, or objects which are quickly or slowly losing -their individualities? What possible room does he leave for the -development and discipline of an immortal being, supposing that man -is an immortal being, by an entire life passed in feelings, thoughts, -and action about objects which, relatively to the individual, may, -quickly or slowly, pass away from him? Or, what room does he allow -for the effect on such a being of an entire life spent in the pursuit -of objects or the enjoyment of pleasures which develop only his baser -nature and unfit him for anything else? In any scheme of philosophy -which omits to regard this life as a preparatory school for some -other life, it seems to me that something is left out which ought to -be included, and which ought to be included for the very reason that -the evidence which tends to show that mind is not constituted as Mr. -Spencer supposes, but that it is an existence of a special character, -not generated by the action of a physical structure, but deriving its -existence from the direct action of the creating Power, is so strong -that, if we leave this conclusion out of the hypothesis, we shall have -left out the strongest probabilities of the case. It is no answer to -the necessity for including this conclusion to say that there is a -power which we can not know, or an Unknowable Reality hidden under -all changing manifestations, among which are those of mind. A study -of those manifestations leads rightly to some conclusions respecting -the Power which underlies all manifestations. It is necessary, -therefore, to subject Mr. Spencer's philosophy of mind to the further -inquiry, How does he account for the moral sense? How does he explain -that part of consciousness which recognizes moral obligations--the -recognition of moral law and duty? We may easily dispense with the -phrase "substance of the mind," if we wish to avoid a term of matter; -but if mind is constituted by the perception of feelings excited in -the nervous system, what is it that perceives? Is there a something -that is reached by the feelings which constitute sensations in the -great nerve-center, which takes cognizance of them, which combines -them into portions of consciousness, or is consciousness nothing but -a succession of sensations, and if so, what is "thought"? And what -is that portion of thought which takes cognizance of moral duty, and -which shows man to be capable of recognizing and obeying or breaking -a moral law? I have somewhere read a suggestion that the polity which -is said to have been given to the Hebrew people on the Mount of Sinai, -and which is described as ten statutes written on two tablets of stone, -consisted of five laws on one tablet and five on the other; one set -of them expressing the relations of the Hebrews to the Deity, and the -other being the fundamental laws of the social life which the Hebrews -were commanded to lead. This division is not accurate, because the -commandments which express the relations of the Hebrews to the Deity -are four in number, and the commandments which were to constitute -their social law are six. But that there is a line of demarkation -between the two kinds of laws is obvious, and how they were written -on the tablets, or whether they were written at all, is immaterial. -Looking, then, first at the social law, whether there was more or less -of the same ethical character in the codes of other ancient peoples, -or whether the social law which is said to have been delivered to -Moses and by him communicated to his nation stands as an embodiment -of morality unequaled by anything that had preceded it, it is certain -that it found the Hebrew people capable of the idea of law as a divine -command. It is true that the corner-stone of the whole superstructure -is to be found in the fact that the several commands which constituted -this social code--"Honor thy father and thy mother," "Thou shalt do -no murder," "Thou shalt not commit adultery," "Thou shalt not steal," -"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor," "Thou shalt -not covet thy neighbor's house," etc.--were addressed to a people to -whose representatives the Almighty is supposed to have revealed himself -amid "thunders and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and -the voice of a trumpet exceeding loud, and all the people that were -in the camp [below] trembled." It is also true that the first of -these awful annunciations was said to have been, "I am the Lord thy -God, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of -bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before [or beside] me."[120] So -that the source whence all the following commands proceeded was the -one and only God, who is described as having thus revealed himself in -fire and cloud and earthquake, and thus to have secured instant and -implicit faith in what he spoke. But what he is asserted to have said -was addressed to human minds. This is in one aspect the most important -fact in the whole Hebrew history. It makes no difference whether Moses -performed a piece of jugglery, or whether he actually went within -the fire and the cloud, and actually spoke with God and received his -commands. The indisputable truth remains that the individual minds -of the Hebrew people, whom Moses had led out of Egypt, received and -obeyed, as divine commands, an original and unique moral code, because -they were so constituted that they could embrace and act upon the idea -of law emanating from another than an earthly or a human source. What, -then, was this constitution of the human mind, that could thus receive -and act upon a divine command; and what is it now? It matters not, in -the view in which I ask this question, whether there was any deceit -practiced or not, or whether there is any practiced now in respect to -the authority giving the command. What is to be accounted for is the -capacity of the human mind to embrace and accept the idea of a moral -law, be it that of Moses, or of Christ, or of Mohammed. - -KOSMICOS. I am glad that you put this matter of the ten -commandments hypothetically, because otherwise we might have been led -aside into an argument about the authenticity of the narrative. I -recognize, however, the bearing of the question which you have put, and -shall endeavor to answer it. Your question implies that the essential -constitution of the human mind has been the same in all ages; that -it was the same in this race of nomads, who had been, they and their -fathers for ages, serfs of the Egyptian kings, that it is in us. -Perhaps this assumption may be allowed; and, at all events, the real -question is, How did the idea of a moral law originate, and what is -the sense of moral obligation? Like all things else, it is a product -of the process of evolution. I shall not argue this by any elaborate -reasoning, but will proceed to state the grounds on which it rests. -I will first give you what I understand to be Darwin's view of the -origin of the habit of thinking and feeling, which we call the moral -sense. Primeval man must have existed in a state of barbarism. When he -had become developed out of some pre-existing animal, he was a mere -savage, distinguishable from his predecessors only by the possession -of some superior degree of mental power. Savages, like some other -animals, form themselves into tribes or bands. Certain social instincts -arise, out of which spring what are regarded as virtues. Individuals -of the tribe begin to desire the sympathy and approbation of their -fellows. They perceive that certain actions, such as protection -of other and weaker individuals against danger, gain for them the -sympathy and approbation of the tribe. There are thus formed some -ideas of the common advantage to the tribe of certain actions, and -of the common disadvantage of the opposite actions. Man is eminently -a social animal, and this desire for the sympathy and approbation of -his tribe, and this fear of their disapprobation, is so strong that -the individual savage is led to perceive that the common good of the -tribe is the object at which he must aim to conform. The first social -instincts, therefore, are those which perceive the relations between -certain kinds of conduct and the common good of the tribe; and out of -these relations, with the aid of increasing intellectual powers, is -developed the golden rule, "As ye would that men should do to you, do -ye to them likewise," which lies at the foundation of morality. These -social instincts, thus leading at last to the great rule of social -morality, are developed very slowly. They are at first confined to the -benefit of the same tribe, and they have no force in the relations of -that tribe to the members of any other. To a savage it is a highly -meritorious action to save the life of another member of his own tribe, -and if he loses his own life in the effort it is so much the more -meritorious. But he does not extend this idea of doing a good action -to the members of a different tribe, and, whether his own tribe is -or is not at war with the other tribe, he and his own community will -think it no harm if he murders a member of that other tribe. But as -the approach to civilization goes on--as man advances in intellectual -power, and can trace the more remote consequences of his actions, and -as he rejects baneful customs and superstitions, he begins to regard -more and more not only the welfare but the happiness of his fellow-men. -Habit, resulting from beneficial experiences, instruction and example, -renders his sympathies more tender and widely diffused, until at last -he extends them to men of all races, to the imbecile, maimed, and other -useless members of society, and to the inferior animals. Thus the -standard of morality rises higher and higher; but its origin is in the -social instincts, which spring out of the love of approbation and the -fear of disapprobation.[121] - -But morality comprehends also the self-regarding virtues, those which -directly affect the individual, and which affect society but remotely -and incidentally. How did the idea of these originate? There is a -very wide difference between the morality of savages, in respect to -the self-regarding virtues, and the morality of civilized nations. -Among the former, the greatest intemperance, utter licentiousness, -and unnatural crimes are very common. But as soon as marriage was -introduced, whether monogamous or polygamous, jealousy led to the -inculcation of female virtue; and this, being honored, spread to the -unmarried females. Chastity, the hatred of indecency, temperance, and -many other self-regarding virtues, originating first in the social -instincts, have come to be highly prized by civilized nations as -affecting, first, the welfare of the community, and, secondly, the -welfare of the individual. This was the origin of the so-called "moral -sense." It rejects the intuitive theory of morality, and bases its -origin on the increasing perception of the advantage of certain conduct -to the community and the individual.[122] - -SOPHEREUS. And in this origin of the social and the -self-regarding virtues, which I understand you to say is the theory of -Darwin, is the idea of a divine command to practice certain things, and -to avoid doing certain other things, left out? - -KOSMICOS. The idea of a divine command, as the source of -morality, is not necessary to the explanation of the mode in which -the social or the self-regarding virtues were gradually developed. -In the progress from barbarism to civilization, what is called the -moral sense has been slowly developed as an increasing perception of -what is beneficial, and this has become an inherited faculty. We thus -have a sure scientific basis for the moral intuitions which we do not -individually stay to analyze when we are called upon to determine the -morality or the immorality of certain actions. The supposed divine -command is something that is aside from the process by which the idea -of morality or immorality became developed. - -SOPHEREUS. And is this also Mr. Spencer's philosophy of the -moral sense? - -KOSMICOS. Let me read you what Spencer says: "I believe that -the experience of utility, organized and consolidated through all -past generations of the human race, has been producing corresponding -modifications which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have -become in us certain _faculties_ of moral intuition--certain _emotions_ -responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no _apparent_ basis -in the _individual_ experiences of utility."[123] I have emphasized -certain words in this passage in order to make its meaning distinct. -Mr. Spencer's theory is that we have certain _faculties_ of moral -intuition, which have become such by transmission and accumulation; -that the original ideas of right and wrong sprang from perceptions of -utility; and that when to the individual the question of a good or a -bad action in others or himself is now presented, he feels an _emotion_ -which responds to right or wrong conduct, and feels it in the _faculty_ -which he has inherited from ancestors, without referring it to his -_individual_ experience of the utility or inutility of certain conduct. - -Now, in regard to the divine command as the origin of our ideas -of right and wrong, if you turn to Mr. Spencer's "Principles of -Sociology," you will find an immense collection of evidence which shows -the genesis of deities of all kinds. Beginning with the ideas formed -by the primitive men of souls, ghosts, spirits, and demons, the ideas -of another life and of another world, there came about the ideas of -supernatural beings, aided in their development by ancestor-worship, -idol-worship, fetich-worship, animal-worship, plant-worship, and -nature-worship. Hence came the ideas of deities of various kinds, one -class of which is that of the human personality greatly disguised, and -the other is the class which has arisen by simple idealization and -expansion of the human personality. The last class, although always -coexisting with the other, at length becomes predominant, and finally -there is developed the idea of one chief or supreme deity. Having -traced the origin of this idea of a supreme deity, Mr. Spencer puts and -answers this question: "While among all races and all regions, from -the earliest times down to the most recent, the conceptions of deities -have been naturally evolved in the way shown, must we conclude that -a small clan of the Semitic race had given to it, supernaturally, a -conception which, though superficially like the rest, was in substance -absolutely unlike them?"[124] He then proceeds to show that the Hebrew -Jehovah, or God, was a conception that had a kindred genesis with all -the other conceptions of a deity or deities. "Here," he says, "pursuing -the methods of science, and disregarding foregone conclusions, we must -deal with the Hebrew conception in the same manner as with all the -others." Dealing with it by the scientific method, he shows that behind -the supernatural being of the order of the Hebrew God, as behind the -supernatural beings of all other orders, there has in every case been -a human personality. Thus, taking the narrative as it has come down to -us of God's dealing with Abraham, he shows that what Abraham thought, -or is described as thinking by those who preserved the tradition, was -of a terrestrial ruler who could, like any other earthly potentate, -make a covenant with him about land or anything else, or that he was -the maker of all things, and that Abraham believed the earth and the -heavens were produced by one who eats and drinks, and feels weary -after walking. Upon either idea, Abraham's conception of a Deity -remains identical with that of his modern Semitic representative, -and with that of the uncivilized in general. But the ideas of Deity -entertained by cultivated people, instead of being innate, arise only -at a comparatively advanced stage, as results of accumulated knowledge, -greater intellectual grasp, and higher sentiment.[125] - -To return now to the supposed divine command as the origin of morality, -it is obvious that the conception of the being who has uttered the -command makes the nature of the command partake of the attributes -ascribed to that being. Accordingly, the grossest superstitions, the -most revolting practices, the most immoral actions, have found their -sanction in what the particular deity who is believed in is supposed -to have inculcated or required. I do not need to enumerate to you the -proofs of this, or to tell you that the Hebrew God is no exception to -it. One illustration of it, however, is worth repeating. Speaking of -the ceremony by which the covenant between God and Abraham is said to -have been established, Mr. Spencer says: "Abraham and each of his male -descendants, and each of his slaves, is circumcised. The mark of the -covenant, observe, is to be borne not only by Abraham and those of -his blood, but also by those of other blood whom he has bought. The -mark is a strange one, and the extension of it is a strange one, if -we assume it to be imposed by the Creator of the universe, as a mark -on a favored man and his descendants; and on this assumption it is no -less strange that the one transgression for which every 'soul shall -be cut off' is, not any crime, but the neglect of this rite. But such -a ceremony insisted on by a living potentate, under penalty of death, -is not strange, for, as we shall hereafter see, circumcision is one of -various mutilations imposed as marks on subject persons by terrestrial -superiors."[126] - -So that the Hebrew God who made the covenant with Abraham was not, -in Abraham's own conception, the First Cause of all things, or a -supernatural being, but he was a powerful human ruler, making an -agreement with a shepherd chief. In all religions, the things required -or commanded by the supposed deified person have been marked by the -characteristics of human rulers; and as a source of morality, or as -a standard of morality, the requirements or commands of the deified -person, however they are supposed to have been communicated, fail to -answer the indispensable condition of a fixed and innate system of -morality, which is that it must have proceeded from the Creator of -the universe, and not from a being who partakes of human passions, -infirmities, and desires, and is merely a deified human potentate. - -Pass, now, to Mr. Spencer's "Principles of Morality"; and although but -one volume of this work has been as yet published, we may see that -he is entirely consistent with what he has said in his "Sociology" -and his other writings.[127] He does not leave us in any doubt as to -his theory of morals. It appears, from the preface to his "Data of -Ethics," that he has been compelled by ill-health to deviate from the -plan which he had mapped out for himself, and to publish one volume -of his "Principles of Morality" before completing his "Principles of -Sociology." But while we have reason for his sake and for the sake -of the world to regret this, we can easily understand his system of -morality. He means to rest the rules of right conduct on a scientific -basis, and he shows that this is a pressing need. In his preface, he -says: - - I am the more anxious to indicate in outline, if I can not complete, - this final proof, because the establishment of rules of right conduct - on a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now that moral injunctions - are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the - secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few things can happen - more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no - longer fit, before another and fitter regulative system has grown - up to replace it. Most of those who reject the current creed appear - to assume that the controlling agency furnished by it may be safely - thrown aside, and the vacancy left unfilled by any other controlling - agency. Meanwhile, those who defend the current creed allege that, in - the absence of the guidance it yields, no guidance can exist; divine - commandments they think the only possible guides. Thus, between these - extreme opponents there is a certain community. The one holds that - the gap left by disappearance of the code of supernatural ethics need - not be filled by a code of natural ethics; and the other holds that it - can not be so filled. Both contemplate a vacuum, which the one wishes - and the other fears. As the change which promises or threatens to - bring about this state, desired or dreaded, is rapidly progressing, - those who believe that the vacuum can be filled are called upon to do - something in pursuance of their belief. - -The code of natural ethics which Mr. Spencer propounds, and which is -a product of the process of evolution, may be summarized as follows: -Conduct is an aggregate of actions which are not purposeless, but -which include all acts that are adjusted to ends, from the simplest to -the most complex. The division or aspect of conduct with which ethics -deals, the behavior we call good or bad, is a part of an organic whole; -but, although inextricably bound up with acts which are neither good -nor bad, it is distinguishable as comprehending those acts with which -morality is concerned. The evolution of conduct, from the simplest -and most indifferent actions up to those on which ethical judgments -are passed, is what Mr. Spencer means by the scientific method of -investigating the origin of morality. We must begin with the conduct -of all living creatures, because the complete comprehension of conduct -is not to be obtained by contemplating the conduct of human beings -only. "The conduct of the higher animals as compared with that of -man, and the conduct of the lower animals as compared with that of -the higher, mainly differ in this, that the adjustments of acts to -ends are relatively simple and relatively incomplete. And as in other -cases, so in this case, we must interpret the more developed by the -less developed. Just as, fully to understand the part of conduct which -ethics deals with, we must study human conduct as a whole, so, fully -to understand human conduct as a whole, we must study it as a part of -that larger whole constituted by the conduct of animate beings in -general."[128] - -Begin, for example, with an infusorium swimming about at random, -determined in its course not by an object which it perceives and which -is to be pursued or escaped, but apparently by varying stimuli in its -medium, the water. Its acts, unadjusted in any appreciable way to -ends, lead it now into contact with some nutritive substance which it -absorbs, and now into the neighborhood of some creature by which it is -swallowed and digested. Pass on to another aquatic creature, which, -although of a low type, is much higher than the infusorium, such as -a rotifer. With larger size, more developed structures, and greater -power of combining functions, there comes an advance in conduct. It -preserves itself for a longer period by better adjusting its own -actions, so that, it is less dependent on the actions going on around. -Again, compare a low mollusk, such as a floating ascidian, with a high -mollusk, such as a cephalopod, and it is apparent how greater organic -evolution is accompanied by more evolved conduct. And if you pass then -to the vertebrate animals, you see how, along with advance in structure -and functions, there is evolved an advance in conduct, until at length, -when you reach the doings of the highest of mammals, mankind, you not -only find that the adjustments of acts to ends are both more numerous -and better than among the lower mammals, but you find the same thing on -comparing the doings of the higher races of men with those of the lower -races. There is a greater completeness of achievement by civilized -men than by savages, and there is also an achievement of relatively -numerous minor ends subserving major ends. - -Recollecting, then, what conduct is--namely, the adjustment of acts to -ends--and observing how this adjustment becomes more and more complete -as the organism becomes more developed, we have to note the order of -the ends to which the acts are adjusted. The first end, the first -stage of evolving conduct, is the further prolongation of life. The -next is that adjustment of acts to ends which furthers an increased -amount of life. Thus far the ends are complete individual life. Then -come those adjustments which have for their final purpose the life of -the species. Then there is a third kind of conduct, which results from -the fact that the multitudinous creatures which fill the earth can not -live wholly apart from one another, but are more or less in presence -of one another, are interfered with by one another. No one species can -so act as to secure the greatest amount of life to its individuals -and the preservation of the species--can make a successful adjustment -of its acts to these ends--without interfering with the corresponding -adjustments by other creatures of their acts to their ends. That -some may live, others must die. Finally, when we contemplate those -adjustments of acts to ends which miss completeness, because they can -not be made by one creature without other creatures being prevented -from making them, we reach the thought of adjustments such that each -creature may make them without preventing them from being made by other -creatures. Let me now quote Mr. Spencer's concrete illustrations of -these abstract statements: - -"Recognizing men as the beings whose conduct is most evolved, let -us ask under what conditions their conduct, in all three aspects of -its evolution, reaches its limit. Clearly while the lives led are -entirely predatory, as those of savages, the adjustments of acts -to ends fall short of this highest form of conduct in every way. -Individual life, ill carried on from hour to hour, is prematurely -cut short; the fostering of offspring often fails, and is incomplete -when it does not fail; and in so far as the ends of self-maintenance -and race-maintenance are met, they are met by destruction of other -beings, of different kind, or of like kind. In social groups formed -by compounding and recompounding primitive hordes, conduct remains -imperfectly evolved in proportion as there continue antagonisms between -the groups and antagonisms between members of the same group--two -traits necessarily associated; since the nature which prompts -international aggression prompts aggression of individuals on one -another. Hence, the limit of evolution can be reached by conduct only -in permanently peaceful societies. That perfect adjustment of acts -to ends in maintaining individual life and rearing new individuals, -which is effected by each without hindering others from effecting like -perfect adjustments, is, in its very definition, shown to constitute a -kind of conduct that can be approached only as war decreases and dies -out. - -"A gap in this outline must now be filled up. There remains a further -advance not yet even hinted. For beyond so behaving that each achieves -his ends without preventing others from achieving their ends, the -members of a society may give mutual help in the achievement of ends. -And if, either indirectly by industrial co-operation, or directly -by volunteered aid, fellow-citizens can make easier for one another -the adjustments of acts to ends, then their conduct assumes a still -higher phase of evolution; since whatever facilitates the making of -adjustments by each, increases the totality of the adjustments made, -and serves to render the lives of all more complete." - -In the outline which I have now given you of the evolution of conduct, -you will perceive the foundation of Spencer's system of ethics. Actions -begin to assume an ethical character--conduct becomes good or bad--when -the acts tend to promote or to prevent the general well-being of the -community. But how is the perception or recognition of this quality -in an action reached? What is the determining reason for considering -an action good or bad? Obviously, conduct is considered by us as good -or bad according as its aggregate results to self, or others, or -both, are pleasurable or painful. Mr. Spencer shows that every other -proposed standard of conduct derives its authority from this standard: -"No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable -state of feeling called by whatever name--gratification, enjoyment, -happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, -is an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much a necessary -form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual -intuition."[129] - -On this fundamental basis, Mr. Spencer rests his system of absolute -ethics and relative ethics. Relative ethics are those by which, -allowing for the friction of an incomplete life and the imperfections -of existing natures, we may ascertain with approximate correctness what -is the relatively right. This is often exceedingly difficult, because -two cases are rarely the same in all their circumstances. But absolute -ethics are the ideal ethical truths, expressing the absolutely right. -Such a system of ideal ethical truths, which must have precedence over -relative ethics, is reached only when there has been, in conformity -with the laws of evolution in general, and in conformity with the laws -of organization in particular, an adaptation of humanity to the social -state, changing it in the direction of an ideal congruity. But, as in -relative ethics, the production of happiness or pleasure is the aim, -however imperfectly accomplished, so in the ideal state the aim is -the same, the difference being that in the latter the accomplishment -of happiness or pleasure and the exclusion or prevention of pain are -complete. - -SOPHEREUS. And do I understand you that in this system of -ethics the idea of a moral law proceeding from and consisting of the -command of a Supreme Lawgiver is left out? - -KOSMICOS. Certainly it is. Did I not just now read to you from -Mr. Spencer's preface his complete rejection of the supposed sacred -origin of moral injunctions, and what he says of the necessity for the -secularization of morals to take the place of that system which is -losing its authority? - -SOPHEREUS. And this philosopher is the same writer who -negatives the idea of any creation of organic life, and who also -negatives the idea that the human mind is an existence of a spiritual -nature, owing its existence to a Creator? - -KOSMICOS. Undoubtedly; we have gone over all that ground. - -SOPHEREUS. And he is the same philosopher who denies the -existence of a Supreme Being, Creator, and Governor of the universe? - -KOSMICOS. Perhaps you may call it denial, although what he -maintains is that we know, and can know, nothing on the subject of a -personal God. - -SOPHEREUS. Very well. I will reflect upon all this until we -meet again. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [113] Probably Kosmicos did not mean that man excels all other animals - in the delicacy and perfection of his nervous organization, for some - of his senses are inferior to those of some of the other animals, as - his movements are less swift. Apparently his meaning is that, taken as - a whole, the nervous organization of man evinces the greatest power of - variation and the widest range of action. - - [114] Darwin's "Descent of Man," pp. 608, 609. - - [115] Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 428. - - [116] "The Principles of Psychology," by Herbert Spencer, third - edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1885. - - [117] "Principles of Psychology," i, p. 162. - - [118] "Principles of Psychology," ii, p. 503. - - [119] "Principles of Psychology," ii, p. 503. - - [120] Revised version. - - [121] Darwin, "Descent of Man," Part I, chap. iv. - - [122] "Descent of Man," Part I, chap. iv. - - [123] Quoted in Darwin's "Descent of Man," p. 123. - - [124] "Principles of Sociology," i, p. 433, § 202. - - [125] Ibid., chap. XXV, p. 414 _et seq._ - - [126] "Principles of Sociology," i, p. 135. - - [127] "Principles of Morality," vol. i. I. "The Data of Ethics." By - Herbert Spencer. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1884. - - [128] "The Data of Ethics," pp. 6, 7, by Herbert Spencer. New York: D. - Appleton & Co., 1884. - - [129] "The Data of Ethics," pp. 45, 46, by Herbert Spencer. New York: - D. Appleton & Co., 1884. - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - - Mr. Spencer's philosophy as a whole--His psychology, and his system of - ethics--The sacred origin of moral injunctions, and the secularization - of morals. - - -A certain honesty and directness of mind prevent Sophereus from being -bewildered by the Spencerian philosophy. Before his next meeting with -the scientist, he has reviewed the main features of this philosophy as -developed in Mr. Spencer's published works; and he has taken notice of -the warning which Mr. Spencer has given to his readers in the preface -to his "Data of Ethics," that "there will probably be singled out for -reprobation from this volume, doctrines which, taken by themselves, may -readily be made to seem utterly wrong." There is not much likelihood -that Sophereus will be able, if he is willing, to avail himself of -this "opportunity for misrepresentation" in a discussion with such a -champion of Mr. Spencer's philosophy as the scientist who explains and -defends it, especially as they have the works before them to refer to. -Being thus respectively equipped for the discussion, the conference -between them proceeds: - -SOPHEREUS. Before I give you my convictions respecting Mr. -Spencer's philosophy as a whole, I wish to say something about the -passage which you read from the preface to his "Data of Ethics," -because it is the key to his ethical system. In the first place, to -what does he refer when he speaks of "the current creed"? When I -undertake to investigate a system of morality, the only "creed" that -I care about--the only one that is of any importance--is that which -accepts, as a matter of belief, the existence of the Creator and -Supreme Governor of the universe, from whose infinite will and purposes -have proceeded certain moral as well as physical laws. This, I take -it, is the "creed" of which Mr. Spencer speaks; the one which assigns -moral injunctions to the will of a Supreme Lawgiver as "their supposed -sacred origin." It is to this creed that he opposes his "secularization -of morals," which must take the place of their supposed sacred origin, -because the authority of the latter is rapidly dying out of the world. -It is this "creed" which is rejected by those who "assume that the -controlling agency furnished by it may be safely thrown aside, and the -vacancy left unfilled by any other agency." - -Undoubtedly there are and always have been numerous persons who appear -practically to think that the sacred origin of morality can be safely -rejected, and that the vacancy may be left unfilled by any other -restraining agency. The deliberate and willful murderer, the burglar, -the adulterer, and many of the other criminal classes, not only appear -to reject "the current creed," but they would be very glad to have it -assumed that there is no other restraining agency to take its place. -So, too, there are persons who break no moral law, whose lives are -pure, but who, having theoretically persuaded themselves that there is -no sacred origin of moral injunctions, omit to provide, for themselves -or others, any other controlling agency to fill the vacuum. But this -latter class is not very numerous; and if, without meaning any offense -to them, their number is added to that of the criminal classes, to make -up the aggregate of those who reject "the current creed," we have not -a very large body compared with the whole body of persons in civilized -communities who adhere to "the current creed," who live by it, and who -think that others should live by it too, as the ultimate foundation of -those social laws which take cognizance of men's conduct toward one -another. So that I do not quite understand the assertion that "moral -injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred -origin"; connected as it is with the other assertion that society is -"rapidly progressing" to that vacuum which is to follow the complete -rejection of the one guide without the substitution of another in its -place. I am quite aware that there has been of late years an increasing -amount of what is called infidelity, or unbelief, or atheism. But I am -quite sure that there has not been a general theoretical or practical -rejection of so much of the religious creed of mankind as assigns -to the will of a supreme and supernatural lawgiver certain moral -injunctions. If we confine our view to Christendom alone, it is certain -that the growth, activity, and influence of the various religious -bodies are not materially checked, and that religious beliefs are not -by any means losing their hold upon great multitudes of people. If -we survey the regions where the Mohammedan faith prevails, the same -general result is found, whatever Christians may think of the beliefs -or practices of that vast body of the human race. And, even when we -penetrate among the races which are less civilized, we find very few -races or tribes in which there does not prevail some idea of some kind -of command proceeding from some deity or other, whatever we may think -of the character of that deity or of the nature of the command. - -But I presume that Mr. Spencer meant to confine his assertion of the -necessity for a secularization of morals, and his assumption that -their sacred origin is rapidly passing away from men's beliefs, to -the state of society as it exists now in Western civilization; and my -observation of this portion of the world is, that those who reject -what I presume he means by "the current creed" are, first, a class of -theorizers: and, secondly, the criminal classes; and that the aggregate -of the two is not, after all, so formidable that we ought to conclude -that the regulative system of the sacred origin of moral injunctions -is "no longer fit" for any practical purpose. I do not, therefore, -recognize what he considers the supreme practical necessity for "the -secularization of morals" to take the place of a system which is worn -out. - -KOSMICOS. You have left out of the case a very important -element. Mr. Spencer antagonizes those who reject the current creed -against those who defend it. The former, while they reject the current -creed, do not recognize the necessity for any other controlling agency. -The latter, while they defend the current creed, maintain that nothing -can take its place as a regulating agency. Between them they create a -vacuum, which one class wishes for and the other fears. This is the -vacuum which he says can be and must be filled by the secularization of -morals. It is a vacuum in philosophical speculation about the origin of -morality, and, when the conclusion is reached, it becomes a practical -and pressing question how it is to be carried out. - -SOPHEREUS. Precisely; and, when the conclusion is reached, it -is to be carried out in legislation and government, or else the conduct -of men toward one another in society is not to be regulated by public -authority at all, but is to be left to each man's perception of what -will produce the greatest amount of pleasure and happiness, or the -least amount of pain and misery. Now, it is pretty important to settle -at the outset whether those who defend the current creed are right or -wrong when they say that nothing which will answer the same purpose -can be found to take its place. They constitute one of the classes who -will be responsible for the supposed vacuum; and their share in that -vacuum, their contribution to it, if I may use such an expression, -consists in their assertion that nothing of any value can take the -place of the sacred origin of moral injunctions. The practical test of -whether they are right or wrong is to be found in legislation. Let us -suppose, then, a legislative assembly in which there is a proposal to -change the law of murder, or to do away with it altogether. A member -who does not believe in any sacred origin of the command "Thou shalt do -no murder," moves not only to abolish the death-penalty, but to abolish -all legal definition of the crime, and leave every man to be restrained -by the consciousness that, if he takes the life of another, he will -cause a great deal of pain and misery to the relations and friends of -that person. The mover argues that "the current creed" of morality is -worn out; is "no longer fit," as a regulator; and that the safest and -best regulator is the perception of the beneficial effects of actions -of kindness and good-will, and of the disastrous effects of cruelty and -malice. He is answered by one who defends the current creed, and who -maintains that, as human nature is constituted, the utilitarian system -of morals can not take the place of the sacred origin as the ultimate -foundation of social relations. But the majority of the assembly think -that the mover of the proposition has the best of the argument, and -they proceed to "secularize" morals by passing his bill doing away with -the law of murder altogether. I am not obliged to extend my travels -anywhere, where I do not care to go, and I confess I should not like to -visit that country after it had thus "secularized" morality. - -KOSMICOS. Now just be careful to note that this whole science -of conduct--the science of ethics--the foundation of right and wrong, -is a product of evolution. As in the development of organisms the -higher and more elaborate are reached after a great length of time, as -in mechanics knowledge of the empirical sort evolves into mechanical -science by first omitting all qualifying circumstances and generalizing -in absolute ways the fundamental laws of forces, so empirical ethics -evolve into rational ethics by first neglecting all complicating -incidents and formulating the laws of right action apart from the -obscuring effects of special conditions. There are thus reached, after -a great lapse of time, those ideal ethical truths which express the -absolutely right. Mr. Spencer treats of the ideal man among ideal men; -the ideal man existing in the ideal social state. "On the evolution -hypothesis," he says, "the two presuppose one another; and only when -they coexist can there exist that ideal conduct which absolute ethics -has to formulate, and which relative ethics has to take as the standard -by which to estimate divergences from right, or degrees of wrong."[130] -But, again, observe that society is now in a transition state; the -ultimate man has not yet been reached; the evolution of ethics is, -however, going on, retarded as it may be by various frictions arising -from imperfect natures. But there is in progress an adaptation of -humanity to the social state, and the ultimate man will be one in -whom this process has gone so far as to produce a correspondence -between all the promptings of his nature and all the requirements of -his life, as carried on in society; so that there is an ideal code of -conduct formulating the behavior of the completely adapted man in the -completely evolved society.[131] - -SOPHEREUS. But I understand that we have already reached, or -are very soon to reach, a condition of things in which the supposed -sacred origin of moral injunctions is now, or very shortly will become, -no guide. We are to fill the vacuum which is caused, or is about to -be caused, by its disappearance, by substituting as the standard of -right and wrong the perceptions which we can have of the effects of -actions upon the sum total of happiness, because this will be the sole -standard in the ideal state of society in which the ideal man will -ultimately find himself. I will not insist on the total depravity of -man's nature, because I never borrow an argument from theologians. -But it has been one of the conclusions that I have drawn from some -study of human nature, that it requires very strong restraints. Not -only must some of the restraints be of the strongest kind, but they -must be simple, positive, and adapted to the varying dispositions and -intelligence of men. There can not well be imagined any restraining -moral force so efficacious as that which is derived from a belief -that the Creator of the universe has ordained some moral laws; has -specialized certain conduct as right and certain conduct as wrong, -without regard to varying circumstances. As the foundation of all that -part of legislation that takes cognizance of the simpler relations of -men to one another--those relations which are always the same--the -sacred origin of moral injunctions is of far greater force than the -perception of the greatest-happiness principle can possibly be. If -a man is tempted to commit murder, is he not far more likely to be -restrained by a law which he knows will punish him without regard to -the misery he would cause to the friends and relatives of the person -whom he is tempted to kill, than he would be if the law were based on -the latter consideration alone? Do away with all legislation which -punishes the simpler crimes first and foremost because they break -the laws of God, and substitute as the restraining agency individual -recognition of the effect of actions upon the sum total of happiness, -and you would soon see that one of two consequences would follow: -either you would have no criminal code at all, or it would be one that -would be governed by the most fluctuating and uncertain standards. -Moreover, how is the transition from the sacred source of the simpler -moral injunctions to the secularization of morals to be effected? -I once heard a wise person say that if a thing is to be done, an -ingenious man ought to be able to show how it is to be done. I suppose -the secularization of morals means the complete renovation of our -ideas of right and wrong, by taking as the sole standard the pleasure -or pain, the happiness or unhappiness, which actions will produce. How -are you going to reach this ideal state? The vacuum is rapidly coming -about. How are you going to take the first step in filling it? Before -the vacuum is complete, you must do something. You have waited until -the evolution of conduct of the purely utilitarian type has made some -great advances; but the ideal state is not yet reached by all men. -You wish to hasten its approach, and you must begin to act. There is -nothing for you to do but to formulate the new moral code and put it in -operation. You must make your laws--if you continue to have laws--so -that murder and lying and theft will not be punished because the -Almighty has prohibited them, but they will be punished simply because -they produce misery. Do you think you would ever see every individual -of such a community brought to an ideal congruity between all the -promptings of his nature and all the requirements of his life, as -carried on in society? That you would have nothing but "the completely -adapted man in the completely evolved society"? I fancy that you would -often have to fall back upon the sacred origin of moral injunctions, -and to punish some conduct because it breaks a law of divine authority. -I may have been too much in the habit of looking at things practically; -but I have not yet discovered that the feeling of obligation, the sense -of duty, what is recognized as moral obligation, having its origin in -some command, and enforced by some kind of compulsion, can be dispensed -with. - -KOSMICOS. I must refer you to Mr. Spencer's explanation of the -fact that the sense of duty or moral obligation fades away as the moral -motive emerges from all the political, religious, and social motives, -and frees itself from the consciousness of subordination to some -external agency. He does not shrink from the conclusion because it will -be startling. He tells us that it will be to most very startling to -be informed that "the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, -and will diminish as fast as moralization increases." He fortifies his -position thus: - - Startling though it is, this conclusion may be satisfactorily - defended. Even now progress toward the implied ultimate state is - traceable. The observation is not infrequent that persistence in - performing a duty ends in making it a pleasure, and this amounts to - the admission that, while at first the motive contains an element - of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act - is performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perform - it. The contrast between the youth on whom diligence is enjoined, - and the man of business so absorbed in affairs that he can not be - induced to relax, shows us how the doing of work, originally under the - consciousness that it _ought_ to be done, may eventually cease to have - any such accompanying consciousness. Sometimes, indeed, the relation - comes to be reversed; and the man of business persists in work from - pure love of it when told that he ought not. Nor is it thus with - self-regarding feelings only. That the maintaining and protecting of - wife by husband often result solely from feelings directly gratified - by these actions, without any thought of _must_; and that the - fostering of children by parents is in many cases made an absorbing - occupation without any coercive feeling of _ought_; are obvious - truths which show us that even now, with some of the fundamental - other-regarding duties, the sense of obligation has retreated - into the background of the mind. And it is in some degree so with - other-regarding duties of a higher kind. Conscientiousness has in many - outgrown that stage in which the sense of a compelling power is joined - with rectitude of action. The truly honest man, here and there to be - found, is not only without thought of legal, religious, or social - compulsion, when he discharges an equitable claim on him; but he is - without thought of self-compulsion. He does the right thing with a - simple feeling of satisfaction in doing it; and is, indeed, impatient - if anything prevents him from having the satisfaction of doing it. - - Evidently, then, with complete adaptation to the social state, that - element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word - obligation will disappear. The higher actions required for the - harmonious carrying on of life will be as much matters of course - as are those lower actions which the simple desires prompt. In - their proper times and places and proportions, the moral sentiments - will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the - sensations. And though, joined with their regulating influence when - this is called for, will exist latent ideas of the evils which - non-conformity would bring, these will occupy the mind no more than do - ideas of the evils of starvation at the time when a healthy appetite - is being satisfied by a meal. - -SOPHEREUS. There is a religion in the world called -Christianity, with which we are tolerably familiar. It comprehends -a system of morality which, when completely observed, develops the -truly good man, the man who does the right thing with a feeling of -satisfaction in doing it, and brings about those higher actions which -are required for the harmonious carrying on of life, as matters of -course, just as surely as the same result can be brought about by the -most ideal secularization of morals that any philosophical theories -can accomplish. Whatever may be the evidences by which the sacred -origin of Christianity is supposed to be established, it is certain -that this religion does not omit, but on the contrary it presupposes -and asserts, as the foundation of its moral code, that the sense of -obligation to which it appeals is the consciousness of obligation to -obey divine commands. It proceeds upon the idea that human nature -stands in need of some coercion; that the sense of obligation is not to -be allowed to retreat into the background of the mind, but that a sense -of the compelling power must be kept joined with rectitude of action, -otherwise there will be a failure of rectitude. It is considered, I -believe, that the adaptation of the Christian morality to the whole -nature of man, by means of the compelling power, the consciousness of -which is not to be transitory, but is to be universal and perpetual, is -very strong proof that this religion came from a being who understood -human nature better than we can understand it. However this may be, -it is, at all events, certain that the scheme of Christian morality -proceeds upon the necessity for a more efficacious regulator of human -conduct than the simple feeling of satisfaction in doing right, or -the feeling of dissatisfaction in doing wrong; and, although the true -Christian is, in completeness of moral character, like Mr. Spencer's -ideal man, and although a society completely Christian would be that -ideal social state in which there would be perfect congruity between -the lives of men and the welfare of that society, yet the Christian -religion, if I understand it rightly, does not assume that there will -be more than an approximation to that universal state of perfection -while the human race remains on earth. The proof of this is to be found -in the fact that this religion does not contemplate a time when divine -command is to cease as the restraining agency on earth; but, on the -contrary, it appears to assume that obedience to the divine will is to -continue in another life to be a perpetual motive, as it has been in -this life. All this may be without such proof as "science" demands, -but it is certain that the scheme of Christian morality is based upon -the idea that the Creator has made obedience to his laws, because they -are his laws, the great regulator of human conduct. If the Creator -had so made men that the consciousness of the effect of conduct on -the happiness or misery of our fellow-men would be sufficient as a -regulator, it is rational to conclude that he would not have imposed -commands which were to be obeyed because they are commands. However -great may be the approximation to a complete adaptation of the social -state, I do not look forward to the disappearance of that element in -the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation, -because obligation, in its ultimate sense, is obedience to a higher -power. Obedience for its own sake, obedience because there is a -command, irrespective of all the reasons for the command, is a law -which is illustrated in very many of the relations of life. A wise -parent will sometimes explain to his child why he commands some things -and prohibits others; but if he means to train that child in the way he -should go, he will sometimes require him to obey for the mere purpose -of teaching him that obedience without question or inquiry is a law of -his nature. A master of a vessel, which is in peril at sea, gives an -order to the sailors. They may or may not understand the reasons for -it. But what sort of sailors would they be if they did not act upon the -consciousness that unquestioning obedience is the law of their relation -to the ship? - -In the earliest traditions that we have of the human race, as those -traditions are accepted by the Western nations, we find a pretty -striking and very simple instance of this law of obedience. The first -pair of human beings are placed in a garden where they are at liberty -to eat of the fruit of every tree save one, but of that one their -Creator absolutely forbids them to partake. He assigns to them no -reason for the prohibition, but he lays upon them his absolute command, -on the penalty of death if they are disobedient. One of them begins to -reason about the matter--an allegorical creature or being, called the -serpent, tempting her with certain advantages that she will get from -eating this particular fruit. She yields, disobeys, and persuades her -husband to do the same. The consequences follow, as their Creator told -them they would. The law of obedience which this story illustrates -has been in operation through all the ages, and society can no more -dispense with it than it can dispense with any of the physical laws -that govern the universe. - -KOSMICOS. Are you going back to the fables for the sacred -origin of moral injunctions? I thought you had got beyond that. - -SOPHEREUS. I use an illustration wherever I find it. I am -perfectly content that you should call the story of Adam and Eve a -fable, but the law of obedience which it illustrates is a tremendous -fact. The incident, fable or no fable, is eminently human, and it is -occurring every day in human experience. It is not strange that the -first Hebrew tradition should have been one that illustrates in so -simple a manner the existence of the law of obedience. In like manner, -it is not strange that the Christian system of ethics should have been -based on the existence of this same law of obedience to commands. This -Christian system of ethics has dispensed with a great many minute -observances which one branch of the Semitic race believed were imposed -upon them as commands by their Creator; but it has not displaced the -law of obedience, or dispensed with certain moral injunctions as divine -commands, for it proceeds upon the great truth that human nature -requires that kind of restraint, and that there are certain actions -which can not be left without it. - -KOSMICOS. Mr. Spencer has anticipated you. Your reference to -Christianity is not happy. Having gone through with the explanation of -the evolution process in the development of the highest conception of -morals, and having shown that what now characterizes the exceptionally -highest natures will eventually characterize all, he has something -to say about the reception of his conclusions, to which, as you have -referred to the Christian system of morals, you would do well to attend: - - § 98. That these conclusions will meet with any considerable - acceptance is improbable. Neither with current ideas nor with current - sentiments are they sufficiently congruous. - - Such a view will not be agreeable to those who lament the spreading - disbelief in eternal damnation, nor to those who follow the apostle of - brute force in thinking that because the rule of the strong hand was - once good it is good for all time; nor to those whose reverence for - one who told them to put up the sword is shown by using the sword to - spread his doctrine among heathens. From the ten thousand priests of - the religion of love, who are silent when the nation is moved by the - religion of hate, will come no sign of assent; nor from their bishops - who, far from urging the extreme precept of the Master they pretend to - follow, to turn the other cheek when one is smitten, vote for acting - on the principle--strike lest ye be struck. Nor will any approval be - felt by legislators who, after praying to be forgiven their trespasses - as they forgive the trespasses of others, forthwith decide to attack - those who have not trespassed against them; and who, after a Queen's - speech has invoked "the blessing of Almighty God" on their councils, - immediately provide means for committing political burglary. - - But though men who profess Christianity and practice paganism can feel - no sympathy with such a view, there are some, classed as antagonists - to the current creed, who may not think it absurd to believe that a - rationalized version of its ethical principles will eventually be - acted upon. - -SOPHEREUS. "Our withers are unwrung." I am not a believer -in eternal damnation; I am not an apostle of brute force; I am not -in favor of using the sword to spread a religion of love; I am not a -priest or a bishop, nor am I a member of Parliament or of any other -legislative body. I am a simple inquirer, endeavoring to ascertain -the soundness of certain systems of philosophy. If there are men who -profess Christianity and practice paganism, I do not see that this fact -should deter me from estimating the nature of the Christian religion, -as I would endeavor to estimate the character of any other religion. -It is no concern of mine whether men who profess Christianity and -practice paganism can feel any sympathy with Mr. Spencer's views. The -question for me is whether _I_ can feel any sympathy with his views. I -will, therefore, go on to tell you why I do not believe that a merely -"rationalized version" of the ethical principles of Christianity will -take the place of those divine injunctions on which the ethics of -Christianity are primarily based. Observe, now, that I do not enter -upon the proofs of the divine authority or the divine nature of Christ. -I point to nothing but the fact that the Christian ethics presuppose -a divine and superhuman origin of moral injunctions. About the fact -that they presuppose and assume the sacred origin of moral injunctions, -there can be no controversy. We read that the question was put to -Jesus, "What commandment is first of all?" and the answer was, "The -first is, Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God, the Lord is one; and thou -shalt love thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with -all thy strength. The second is this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as -thyself. There is none other commandment greater than these."[132] -The person who made this answer may or may not have been a divinely -commissioned teacher, but, whatever he was, the question that was put -to him was a very searching one, and both question and answer assume -two things: first, that there is a being, man, to whom commands are -addressed; secondly, that there is a being, God, by whom commands are -given. Jesus undertakes to inform those who questioned him, what are -the two commandments than which there are none greater addressed to -human beings; and in this answer he covers the existence of man as -one being and the existence of God as another being. In any scheme of -philosophy which ignores the existence of these two beings--ignores -the existence of man as a being capable of receiving and acting upon a -command, and the existence of a being capable of addressing a command -to man--there must necessarily be a great defect; not because Jesus, a -supposed divinely commissioned teacher, assumed that there are two such -beings, but because without the hypothesis of their existence there can -be no ethical system whatever. The crucial test of the soundness of Mr. -Spencer's philosophy is, therefore, whether he negatives the existence -of man and the existence of God. - -Undoubtedly, there is a certain kind of consistency and completeness -in Mr. Spencer's whole philosophy. Beginning with biology, he traces -all organized life back to the original molecules of organizable -matter, and he makes man, in his physical structure, a product of -successive modifications of organisms out of one another, by simple -generation. This ignores the Creator as a being specially fashioning -the human animal, which Mr. Spencer thinks is a conception too grossly -anthropomorphic to stand the slightest scientific scrutiny. He then -takes up what he calls "psychology," and deals with what he considers -the origin and nature of the human mind. He makes consciousness to -consist in tracts of feeling in the nervous organization. He denies -that mind is an entity, a being, perceiving and recognizing ideas -suggested by the impressions produced upon the nervous organization -by external objects. According to his psychological system, there is -no _ego_, no person, no thinking being, behind the sensations and -feelings in the nerve-center, and to whom the nerve-center suggests -ideas. Rejecting the hypothesis of such a being, Mr. Spencer treats -of the composition of mind; and he makes it consist, not in a being, -but in components of feelings produced by the molecular changes of -which nerve-corpuscles are the seats, and the molecular changes -transmitted through fibers. He does not regard the ultimate fabric of -mind as a thing admitting of any inquiry. He says that its proximate -components can be investigated, and that these are feelings and the -relations between feelings. This "method of composition remains the -same throughout the entire composition of mind, from the formation of -its simplest feelings up to the formation of those immense and complex -aggregates of feelings which characterize its highest development." -Here, then, we must stop. We are not to conceive of mind as an -organized entity, or as an organism; or as a something in which certain -powers inhere, and which affords a field for their action. We may talk -of a "thread of consciousness," meaning aggregates of feelings produced -by successive waves of molecular change in the nerve-corpuscles, but we -may not talk of "consciousness" as perception by a conscious subject. -We may talk of feelings, but not of a subject that feels. Mind, then, -is not an existence apart from physical organization. Its phenomena are -products of our corporeal organization. Man is not a person; and, if -he is not, how he is to have a sense of obligation, how there is to be -any intuitional idea of right and wrong, in the sense of a command or -an injunction addressed by one being to another, I do not understand. -Mr. Spencer does not help me to understand this, and obviously he does -not intend to, because he denies it absolutely. His system of ethics -plainly ignores it; and to that I now pass. - -He makes conduct consist in the adjustment of actions to ends. Good -conduct is when the actions are adjusted to the ends of producing all -the pleasure and happiness that they can be made to bring about. Bad -conduct is when the actions produce only pain or misery to some one, -or there is not a proper adjustment of them to the end of happiness. -Beginning, as you described it in our last conference, with the lowest -orders of animals, the conduct of man is the same adjustment of actions -to ends that it is in them; the difference being, in the case of man, -that as an animal he has a greater and more varied power of complete -adjustment of his actions to wider and more comprehensive ends than -any other animal. These wider and more comprehensive ends consist in -the full accomplishment of happiness and pleasure to other beings. -This, according to Mr. Spencer, is impliedly admitted by those who -assert the sacred origin of moral injunctions; for, when pressed for -the reason why moral injunctions have been given, all moralists, -he says, admit that the ultimate moral aim is a desirable state of -feeling, gratification, enjoyment, happiness to some being or beings. -That the welfare of society is _one_ of the moral aims which moral -injunctions of the sacred order were designed to accomplish, so far as -special injunctions are believed to have been given, is plain enough. -But that this congruity between the divine commands and the happiness -of others--the useful effect of such commands--comprehends the whole -purpose of such commands, is the ultimate and sole reason for their -being given, so far as they are believed to have been given, may be -disproved without difficulty. For example, an individual may be an -utterly worthless person, a curse to his relatives and friends and to -society, irreclaimably sunk in vice and misery, a mere cumberer of the -ground. To kill him will produce no unhappiness to any one, but will -be a positive relief and benefit. According to "the current creed," -there stands a sacred injunction, "Thou shalt do NO murder." -This is accepted as an absolute, fixed, eternal canon of the divine -will. You are not to take upon yourself individually to determine, by -any standard of utility applied to a particular case, that you can -rightfully kill a human being. A miser is alone in the world. I can -steal his hoarded gold, and apply it to good objects. There stands -the command, "Thou shalt _not_ steal." For no purpose, for no object -whatever, for no end whatever, shall you commit a theft. "Society," to -borrow a phrase of one of the strongest men of our time, "would go all -to pieces in an hour" if it were to adopt only the utilitarian standard -of morality, and to reject the sacred origin of moral injunctions.[133] -The reception of that sacred origin--the belief in it--implies that -man is a being capable of receiving and obeying a divine command. The -existence of such a being is negatived by Mr. Spencer's psychological -system. That he equally negatives the existence of God as a being -capable of giving, and who has given, moral injunctions to man, is -apparent throughout his whole scheme of philosophy. According to that -philosophy, there is nothing in the universe but an Omnipotent Power, -which underlies all manifestations. To ascribe a personality to that -Power is a relic of the primitive beliefs of barbarians, and it is one -that is rapidly dying out of the conceptions of educated men. - -There is, therefore, no room in Mr. Spencer's philosophy for any -moral intuitions, such as are implied in the hypothesis that man was -placed under an obligation to obey his Creator, and made capable -of recognizing that obligation. I can perceive no other ultimate -foundation for a system of ethics. As to the idea that we can make -a system of ethics which is to relegate to individual judgment the -adaptability of actions to produce complete happiness, and to have no -other standard of right and wrong, we might as well at once act upon -the maxim that the end justifies the means, and leave every man to -determine that the end is a good one; and, therefore, the action is -good. - -KOSMICOS. How do you justify the death-penalty which is -inflicted by society? Have you any justification for it, excepting the -claim that it is a useful restraint? - -SOPHEREUS. When society acts judicially in the punishment of -crime, it inflicts such punishments as experience shows will prevent, -or tend to prevent, others from committing that crime. Its authority -to punish with death or some other penalty is founded, primarily, in -regard to the simpler crimes, such as murder, theft, adultery, false -testimony, etc., on the divine prohibition, which a belief in the -sacred origin of certain special moral injunctions leads it to accept; -and, secondly, on the general welfare of mankind.[134] Eliminate from -the ethical code all belief in the sacred origin of moral injunctions, -and confine the judicial action of society to the merely utilitarian -effect of individual conduct, and you will surrender the whole criminal -code to the doctrine that the individual who does a certain act is to -be punished or not to be punished, according to the effect of his act -on the person or persons who are immediately or remotely affected by -it. It is because of Mr. Spencer's negation of man's intuitive sense of -obligation to obey divine commands, because of his peculiar system of -"psychology," that I can not accept the system to which he gives the -name of "ethics." He ought to have invented a new term for his science -of mind. "Psychology," according to its derivation, and as it is used -in the English language, means discourse or treatise on the human soul, -or the doctrine of man's spiritual nature. If he has no spiritual -nature, no soul, what does this philosopher mean by entitling his work -"The Principles of Psychology"? It seems to me that in this use of a -term which implies something that he labors to show does not exist, he -is not quite consistent, for he certainly does not mean to admit that -man has a soul, in the sense in which the learned world have generally -used the term "psychology." But, not to stickle for verbal criticisms, -I will endeavor to give you my conception of his "scientific" analysis -of the mind, and to contrast it with the other analysis, which seems to -me to be better supported. - -KOSMICOS. Take care that you do not misrepresent him. - -SOPHEREUS. I shall take the utmost care to represent him -in the only sense in which I can understand him; and, if I do not -represent him accurately, you will correct me. Take, in the first -place, the following passage, in which he defines the only _ego_ that -has any existence: - - That the _ego_ is something more than the passing group of feelings - and ideas is true or untrue according to the degree of comprehension - we give to the word. It is true if we include the body and its - functions; but it is untrue if we include only what is given in - consciousness. - - Physically considered, the _ego_ is the entire organism, including its - nervous system; and the nature of this _ego_ is predetermined: the - infant had no more to do with the structure of its brain than with the - color of its eyes. Further, the _ego_, considered physically, includes - all the functions carried on by these structures when supplied with - the requisite materials. These functions have for their net result - to liberate from the food, etc., certain latent forces. And that - distribution of these forces shown by the activities of the organism, - is from moment to moment caused partly by the existing arrangement of - its parts and partly by the environing conditions. - - The physical structures thus pervaded by the forces thus obtained, - constitute that substantial _ego_ which lies behind and determines - those ever-changing states of consciousness we call mind. And - while this substantial _ego_, unknowable in ultimate nature, is - phenomenally known to us under its statical form as the organism, it - is phenomenally known under its dynamical form as the energy diffusing - itself through the organism, and, among other parts, through the - nervous system. Given the external stimuli, and the nervous changes - with their correlative mental states depend partly on the nervous - structures and partly on the amount of this diffused energy, each of - which factors is determined by causes not in consciousness but beneath - consciousness. The aggregate of feelings and ideas constituting the - mental _I_, have not in themselves the principle of cohesion holding - them together as a whole; but the _I_ which continually survives as - the subject of these changing states is that portion of the Unknowable - Power which is statically conditioned in special nervous structures - pervaded by a dynamically-conditioned portion of the Unknowable Power - called energy.[135] - -It is now necessary to translate this; and in translating it, it is -necessary to attend to the meaning of words. Let us begin with the -first proposition comprehended in this statement: "That the _ego_ is -something more than the passing group of feelings and ideas, is true -or untrue according to the degree of comprehensiveness we give to the -word. It is true if we include the body and its functions; but it is -untrue if we include only what is given in consciousness." The natural -antithesis would have been to contrast what is included in the _body_ -with what is included in the _mind_. But as he does not admit that -the mind is an existence, as there is nothing but a passing group of -feelings and ideas, not a person who perceives feelings and has ideas, -he speaks of _what is given in consciousness_, consciousness being -nothing but that passing group, an ever-changing series, never the -same, and never laid hold of and appropriated by a conscious subject. -We do, indeed, call these ever-changing states of consciousness mind, -but this is a misnomer, if we mean it in the sense of a being. What is -to be considered, therefore, when the analysis seeks to ascertain the -real and only _ego_, is the body and its functions, and the passing -group of feelings and ideas which is given in consciousness. - -Let us pass on: The body is the physical structure and its functions. -It is pervaded by the forces which its functions liberate from the -latent condition in which they exist in food and other environment. -This physical structure, thus pervaded by certain forces, is the -substantial _ego_ which lies behind and determines the ever-changing -states of consciousness which we call mind. There is no other _ego_ -than the body. It is phenomenally known to us under its _statical_ -form as the organism; that is to say, when the body is contemplated -as an organism which is not acting, or as a mere structure. But it -is phenomenally known to us also under its _dynamical_ form, which -is when the energy derived from the pervading forces is diffusing -itself through the organism. Statical,[136] I understand, refers to -a body at rest, or in equilibrium, not acting; dynamical refers to -bodies in motion, or acted on by force, in movement. The human body is -phenomenally known to us in both of these conditions or states. When -it is in the dynamical state, that is, when it is acted on by external -stimuli, there will be nervous changes; these nervous changes have -correlative mental states, which depend partly on the nervous structure -and partly on the amount of the diffused energy which pervades the -organism. But these two factors, the nervous changes and the diffused -energy, are each determined by causes that are not in consciousness, -but beneath consciousness. This I understand to mean that when there -are nervous changes from a state of rest or non-action, produced by -external stimuli, and a certain amount of diffused energy pervades the -organism, there will be correlative mental states, which are determined -by factors that are not in consciousness but beneath consciousness. -Consciousness, therefore, is not a perception by a conscious subject, -or a consciousness of a self experienced by a being, but it is a -passing group of feelings and ideas, which have no cohesion, are never -the same, but are ever-changing successions of impressions produced in -the physical organism. - -I come now to the summary and conclusion of the whole matter as -expressed in the last sentence of the paragraph which I have read. -There is a mental I, but it is not a person, an existence, an -independent _ego_. It is constituted of an aggregate of feelings and -ideas, which have not in themselves a principle of cohesion that -holds them together as a whole. They are merely passing groups of -feelings and ideas which are never the same, but which succeed one -another without connection or cohesion. There is an I which continually -survives as the subject of these changing states, but it is that -portion of the Unknowable Power which is statically conditioned in -special nervous structures pervaded by a dynamically conditioned -portion of the Unknowable Power called energy. - -So that each individual of the human race is to be contemplated, -not as a dual existence, composed of a body and a mind, united for -a certain period, but as a subject which is continuously undergoing -certain physical changes by the action through it of a portion of the -energy exerted by the Unknowable Power. The Unknowable Power pulsates -through my bodily organism a certain portion of its energy, and that -of which continuous existence can alone be predicated is this portion -of the Unknowable Power which is statically conditioned in my nervous -structure, pervaded by a dynamically conditioned portion of that -Unknown Power. - -I trust, now, it will not be said that I misrepresent Mr. Spencer -when I assert that he ignores, denies, and endeavors to disprove -the existence of the mind of man as a spiritual entity, capable of -surviving his body. Have you any fault to find with my paraphrase of -the passage on which I have commented? - -KOSMICOS. You have paraphrased that passage fairly enough, but -you ought to attend to the proof which he adduces in support of his -position in the subsequent passage to which he refers you in the one -that you have quoted. Let me read it: - - § 469. And now, before closing the chapter, let me parenthetically - remark on a striking parallelism between the conception of the - Object thus built up, and that which we shall find to be the proper - conception of the Subject. For just in the same way that the - Object is the unknown permanent _nexus_ which is never itself a - phenomenon, but is that which holds phenomena together; so is the - Subject the unknown permanent _nexus_ which is never itself a state - of consciousness, but which holds states of consciousness together. - Limiting himself to self-analysis, the Subject can never learn - anything about this _nexus_, further than that it forms part of the - _nexus_ to that peculiar vivid aggregate he distinguishes as his - body. If, however, he makes a vicarious examination, the facts of - nervous structure and function, as exhibited in other bodies like - his own, enable him to see how, for each changing cluster of ideas, - there exists a permanent _nexus_ which, in a sense, corresponds to the - permanent _nexus_ holding together the changing cluster of appearances - referable to the external body. - - For, as shown in earlier parts of this work, an idea is the psychical - side of what on its physical side is an involved set of molecular - changes propagated through an involved set of nervous plexuses. That - which makes possible this idea is the pre-existence of these plexuses, - so organized that a wave of molecular motion diffused through them - will produce, as its psychical correlative, the components of the - conception, in due order and degree. This idea lasts while the waves - of molecular motion last, ceasing when they cease; but that which - remains is the set of plexuses. These constitute the potentiality of - the idea, and make possible future ideas like it. Each such set of - plexuses, perpetually modified in detail by perpetual new actions; - capable of entering into countless combinations with others, just - as the objects thought of entered into countless combinations; and - capable of having its several parts variously excited, just as the - external object presents its combined attributes in various ways--is - thus the permanent internal _nexus_ for ideas, answering to the - permanent external _nexus_ for phenomena. And just as the external - _nexus_ is that which continues to exist amid transitory appearances, - so the internal _nexus_ is that which continues to exist amid - transitory ideas. The ideas have no more a continued existence than - we have found the impressions to have. They are like the successive - chords and cadences brought out from a piano, which successively die - away as other ones are sounded. And it would be as proper to say that - these passing chords and cadences thereafter exist in the piano, as it - is proper to say that passing ideas thereafter exist in the brain. In - the one case, as in the other, the actual existence is the structure - which, under like conditions, again evolves like combinations. - - It is true that we seem to have somewhere within us these sets of - faint states answering to sets of vivid states which once occurred. - It is true that in common life ideas are spoken of as being treasured - up, forming a store of knowledge; the implied notion being that they - are duly arranged and, as it were, pigeon-holed for future use. It - is true that in psychological explanations, ideas are often referred - to as thus having a continued existence. It is true that our forms - of expression are such as to make this implication unavoidable; and - that in many places throughout this work the phrases used apparently - countenance it; though, I believe, they are always transformable - into their scientific equivalents, as above expressed. But here, as - in metaphysical discussions at large, where our express object is - to make a final analysis, and to disentangle facts from hypotheses, - it behooves us to recognize the truth that this popular conception, - habitually adopted into psychological and metaphysical discussions, - is not simply gratuitous, but absolutely at variance with experience. - All which introspection shows us is that under certain conditions - there occurs a state of consciousness more or less like that which - previously occurred under more or less like conditions. Not only are - we without proof that during the interval this state of consciousness - existed under some form; but, so far as observation reaches, it gives - positive evidence to the contrary. For the new state is never the - same--is never more than an approximate likeness of that which went - before. It has not that identity of structure which it would have were - it a pre-existing thing presenting itself afresh. Nay, more; even - during its presence its identity of structure is not preserved--it is - not literally the same for two seconds together. No idea, even of the - most familiar object, preserves its stability while in consciousness. - To carry further the foregoing simile, its temporary existence is - like that of a continuously-sounded chord, of which the components - severally vary from instant to instant in pitch and loudness. Quite - apart, however, from any interpretation of ideas as not substantive - things but psychical changes, corresponding to physical changes - wrought in a physical structure, it suffices to insist upon the - obvious truth that the existence in the Subject of any other ideas - than those which are passing, is pure hypothesis absolutely without - any evidence whatever. - - And here we come upon yet another phase of that contradiction which - the anti-realistic conception everywhere presents. For setting out - from the data embodied in the popular speech, which asserts both the - continued existence of ideas and the continued existence of objects, - it accepts the fiction as a fact, and on the strength of it tries to - show that the fact is a fiction. Continued existence being claimed for - that which has it not, is thereupon denied to that which has it.[137] - -SOPHEREUS. The writings of Mr. Spencer, more than those of -any other person of equal reputation that I have met with, require -close examination in order to test the soundness of his propositions -and assertions. Such a passage as the one which you have now quoted -appears, on a first reading, to be quite plausible. When it is read -carefully two or three times, and analyzed, it is found to be untenable -in its reasoning, and largely made up of dogmatic assumptions. I shall -now give you my reasons for this criticism. In the first place, let us -go through the passage and fix the meanings of words. "Nexus," although -not a term adopted into the English language, means, I presume, bond -or ligament. "Plexus" is a word that we find in English dictionaries -as a scientific term, and it means a union of vessels, nerves, or -fibers, in the form of net-work.[138] Taking along these meanings, we -find that the subject, the only thing of which a subjective existence -can be predicated, is the ligament which holds states of consciousness -together, and this permanent ligament is unknown. It is not itself -a state of consciousness, but it is the bond which holds states of -consciousness together. These states of consciousness are the ideas -which are passing in the subject, which are never the same, which are -not a permanent possession, and therefore there is in the subject no -other existence than the passing ideas of the moment. Ideas, then, -are not substantive things, but psychical changes, corresponding to -physical changes wrought in a physical structure. The proof which is -supposed to make this a tenable hypothesis consists of, first, what -can be learned by self-analysis, or by my introspection of myself; -next by vicarious examination, or by observing the facts of nervous -structure and function exhibited in other bodies like my own. These -examinations enable us to discover, what? Not a conscious person, -learning, appropriating, and holding ideas, but that there exists only, -for each changing cluster of ideas, a permanent _nexus_, corresponding -to the permanent _nexus_ which holds together the changing cluster of -appearances referable to the external body. We next have the assertion -that ideas have no more a continued existence than the impressions -made in the external body. Both are transitory, and in both the only -continued existence is the _nexus_, or ligament which binds together -the changing impressions and the changing clusters of ideas. This Mr. -Spencer illustrates by the successive chords and cadences brought -out from a piano. These have no existence in the piano, which is -nothing but a mechanical structure, giving forth sounds, when they -are struck, which sounds are merely passing chords and cadences; and -he concludes that it would be just as proper to say that the passing -chords and cadences, after they have died away, exist in the piano, as -it is to say that passing ideas, after the nervous impressions have -ceased, exist in the brain. Let us now go back and examine this kind -of psychology in detail. Mr. Spencer speaks of self-analysis, and of -the analysis of other minds and bodies like our own. He uses the terms -self, others, me, mine, him, his. Who or what is this thing which -examines himself or another? Who and what are "you" or "I," who sit -here talking to each other? Are these mere forms of expression, always -transformable into their scientific equivalents? What is the scientific -equivalent for he, his, me, mine, you, yours? Mr. Spencer says that, -under certain conditions, there occurs a state of consciousness more or -less like other states of consciousness that have existed before, but -that the only permanent thing is the _nexus_ which holds these states -of consciousness together. His illustration of the piano fails. If -the piano were a structure that could of its own volition give forth -such sounds as it chose to utter, it might be correct to speak of it -as an existence having a store of sounds which it could make reach our -ears when and as it saw fit. But it does not happen to be an automatic -machine. It is a mere collection of strings, of different sizes and -tensions, which, when struck by an instrument called a hammer, cause -certain vibrations in the air. But a human being is an automatic -organism; one that can at pleasure give utterance to ideas through -the vocal organs, so that they are communicated to you. When I give -utterance to an idea, through my vocal organs, in speaking to you, do -I draw on a stock of permanent ideas, some of which I express, or do -I express nothing but a passing state of consciousness, more or less -like other states of consciousness that have before passed through -my nervous organization? Mr. Spencer asserts that the notion of the -continued existence of ideas is absolutely at variance with experience. -On the contrary, experience proves it every moment of our lives. - -For example: Years ago a person related to me a fact very interesting -and important to me, but I have not until now had occasion to make use -of it. I have a perfect recollection of what he told me. It bears no -resemblance to any other fact of which I ever heard. It concerns me -alone. I have a perfect recollection of it. I stored it up for future -use whenever I should need to use it. Is it a self-delusion that I have -stored up and treasured this information? When I recollect and repeat -it, just as it was told me, am I doing nothing but giving expression to -a passing idea, more or less like the original idea? This would be a -rather dangerous doctrine to adopt as the interpretation of experience. -Human testimony respecting things that we have been told, or have seen, -would be a pretty uncertain reliance if the memory had no other power -than to assimilate a passing idea, more or less, to a former state of -consciousness which more or less resembled the present consciousness. -Men deviate from the truth rather frequently, now; but, teach them that -memory is nothing but the assimilation, more or less, of a passing -idea to some other idea that formerly passed through their heads, and -I should be rather afraid of their testimony. I should fear that the -"psychological changes" would be a little too frequent, and that the -story would not have "that identity of structure which it would have -were it a pre-existing thing presenting itself afresh." - -What is all the learning of the scholar? Has he treasured up nothing? -Has he nothing in the pigeon-holes of his mind? Has he no mind in which -to store his acquisitions? Is the sole actual existence "the structure -which, under like conditions, again evolves like combinations"? Must -he find himself under like conditions which will again evolve like -combinations of ideas in passing trains of consciousness, before he can -bring forth from the store-house of his mind the pre-existing thing -that lies within it? - -KOSMICOS. I must here interject a question in my turn. What is -the proof that ideas have a continued existence? Speaking of the brain -as the nerve-center, in which impressions are produced by molecular -changes transmitted along the nerve-fibers, what proof is there that an -idea which is now passing through the brain continues to exist there, -any more than the passing chord or cadence continues to exist in the -piano? - -SOPHEREUS. Do you not see that the very power of -discrimination which we possess, whereby we distinguish between -present and former conditions, and present and former combinations, -proves that there is a permanent existing thing in an idea which -presents itself afresh, and with which we compare the passing idea, so -as to determine whether they are the same? If we did not possess this -power, all thinking, all expression of ideas, all memory, all that -part of consciousness which is not made up of mere bodily feelings and -sensations, would be nothing but the repetition of the passing idea; -and all learning, information, knowledge, and experience, would be -utterly useless. If there did not exist something with which to compare -the passing idea of the present moment, we should be always floating -on the surface of the passing idea. There would be no continuity in -our intellectual existence. We should be reduced to the condition of -the piano, and could only give forth such chords and cadences as are -produced by successive blows of the hammer upon the strings of the -instrument. And how could anything originate in ourselves? What is -the faculty which produces ideas that are not only new to ourselves, -not only not suggested by passing ideas, but new to all other human -intellects, and never embraced in their experience until we put -them within their apprehension? What did Dante do when he produced -the "Inferno"? or Milton, when he composed the "Paradise Lost"? or -Shakespeare, when he composed his "Hamlet"? or Goethe, when he produced -his "Faust"? Does the poet, when he gives us ideas that we never -possessed before, originate nothing? If he is a maker, a creator, in -the realm of ideas, are those original ideas, which neither he nor -any one else ever had before, the mere result of like combinations -evolved out of like conditions, when neither the old conditions nor -the combinations have anything to do with the new ideas which he has -produced? Surely, in reference to the great productions of human -genius, we must contemplate the mind as an existence, having the power -to do something more than to produce the transitory ideas that are -passing through the brain from the impressions on it, communicated -through the nervous structure. Surely there is some other structure -than that which can be likened to the piano. Surely there is something -more than a set of plexuses "which constitute the potentiality of an -idea, and make possible future ideas like it"; for there are possible -future ideas which are not like any former ideas, which do not depend -on any set of plexuses, and do not cease to be possible when the -waves of molecular motion cease. These possible future ideas are the -conceptions which the mind originates in itself; which are unlike -anything that has gone before, or that is passing now. So that there -are two kinds of ideas: the kind that has a continued existence, and -that consists in knowledge, and is drawn upon by memory; and the other, -the kind of which continued existence is not to be predicated until it -has been formulated by the faculty of original production, not produced -by an exercise of memory, but produced by original creation. - -KOSMICOS. Has not Mr. Spencer allowed for and accounted for -all that you claim as the power of originating new ideas? Does he not -say that "each set of plexuses"--each set of the net-work of ideas--is -"perpetually modified in detail by perpetual new actions"; is "capable -of entering into countless combinations with others, just as the -objects thought of entered into countless combinations; and capable of -having its several parts variously excited, just as the external object -presents its combined attributes in various ways"? Is not this the -whole matter, in regard to what you call the power of originating new -ideas? - -SOPHEREUS. No, it is not. In the first place, I do not believe -that he was here intentionally speaking of any ideas but those which -are suggested by, or involve external objects. But, if he did mean to -include the production of new and original ideas through the countless -combinations into which old ones may be made to enter, his theory does -not fit the case of poetical invention of new ideas, or the invention -of imaginary characters, or lives; for these are creations which are -not mere combinations of old ideas, and the more they depart from -everything suggested by, or resembling, former ideas, the more we are -obliged to recognize as a faculty of the mind the power to originate -and formulate new ideas that did not previously exist. - -KOSMICOS. Well, you have criticised Mr. Spencer's mental -philosophy from your point of view. Now let me hear your hypothesis of -the origin and nature of mind, with which you promised to contrast his -psychology, and which you think is better supported. - -SOPHEREUS. I think I had better put my views in writing, and -read them to you at our next meeting. You can then have them before -you to examine at your leisure. Let me say in advance, however, that -I shall not rely on any of the metaphysicians, but shall endeavor to -give you my conception of the nature of mind from my own reflections, -and from common experience. I shall make my examination of the nature -of mind precede any suggestion of its probable origin, just as I think -we should examine the structure of any organism before we undertake to -deduce its probable origin. - - * * * * * - -Here, then, closes the debate between these two persons, from whom, -at the end of the next chapter, I shall part with a reluctance which -I hope the reader will share. Not for victory do I allow Sophereus to -explain his analysis of mind, without describing how his scientific -friend receives it. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [130] "Data of Ethics," chap. xv. - - [131] Ibid. - - [132] Revised version of St. Mark's gospel. - - [133] The late Jeremiah S. Black is the person whose language is here - quoted, although it was used with reference to something else. - - [134] This does not imply that the punishment inflicted by society - is to be always the same. It implies only that there is to be some - punishment, so long as the prohibited act continues to be committed. - - [135] "Principles of Psychology," vol. i, pp. 503, 504, § 220. - - [136] _Statical_: pertaining to bodies at rest or in equilibrium. - - _Dynamical_: pertaining to strength or power. - - _Dynamics_: that part of mechanical philosophy which treats of bodies - in motion; opposed to _statics_. ("Webster's Dictionary.") - - [137] "Principles of Psychology," vol. ii, p. 484, _et seq._ - - [138] "Webster's Dictionary." PLEXUS. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - -Sophereus discourses on the Nature and Origin of the Human Mind. - - -SOPHEREUS, in fulfillment of his intention expressed at their -last meeting, reads to the scientist the following - - -DISCOURSE ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN MIND. - -I regard the mind as an organism, capable of anatomical examination, as -the body is, but of course by very different means. In the anatomical -examination of an animal organism we use our eye-sight to acquire -a knowledge of its component parts, its organs, and its structure, -by dissection of a dead or inspection of a living subject. But, in -studying the anatomy of mind, we have a subject that is beyond our -visual perception. It is not, however, beyond our examination. We carry -on that examination by means of the introspection which consciousness -enables us to have of our own minds, and by observing and comparing the -phenomena of mind as manifested in other persons. If these respective -means of investigation enable us to reach the conviction that in each -individual of the human race there is an existence of a spiritual -nature and another existence of a corporeal or physical nature, we -shall have attained this conclusion by observing the difference between -the two organisms. The fact that we can not detect the bond that unites -them while they are united should not lead us to doubt their distinct -existence as organisms of different natures, but made for a temporary -period to act on and with each other. - -Before entering further into the subject, I will refer to some of the -terms which we are obliged to use in speaking of the nature of mind as -an organism, when contrasted with the nature of the physical organism. -We speak, for example, and from the want of another term we are obliged -to speak, of the substance of mind. But, while we thus speak of mind -in a term of matter, there is no implication that the subject of which -we speak is of the same nature as that which constitutes the physical -organism; nor is there any danger of the incorporation of materialistic -ideas with our ideas of the fabric of mind. On the contrary, the -very nature of the inquiry is whether that which constitutes mind is -something different from that which constitutes body; and, although in -speaking of both we use the term substance, we mean in the one case -organized matter, and in the other case organized spirit. There is a -very notable instance of a corresponding use of terms in the passage -of one of St. Paul's epistles, where he discourses on the doctrine -of the resurrection. According to my universal custom when I refer -to any of the writings regarded by the Christian world as sacred, -or inspired, I lay aside altogether the idea of a person speaking -by divine or any other authority. I cite the statement of St. Paul, -in its philosophical aspect, as an instance of the use of the term -body applied to each of the distinct organisms. His statement, or -assertion, or assumption--call it what you please--is, "If there is -a natural body, there is also a spiritual body";[139] he uses the -term _body_ in speaking of that which is natural, or of the earth, -earthy, and of that which is spiritual, or heavenly. Without following -him into the nature of the occurrence which he affirms is to take -place in the resurrection, the question is whether he was or was not -philosophically correct, in speaking of two kinds of organisms, one -composed of matter, and liable to corruption and dissolution, and the -other composed of spirit, indestructible and imperishable. - -In order to be understood, he was obliged to use the term _body_ in -reference to both of these organisms, just as we are obliged to use the -term _substance_ when we speak of the subject of contemplation as a -physical or as a spiritual organism. Can this distinctness of nature be -predicated of the body and the mind of man before what we call death? - -The peculiar occurrence which St. Paul so vigorously and vividly -describes as what is to happen at the resurrection, is a prophecy in -which he mingles with great force philosophical illustrations and the -information which he claims to have received from inspiration; or -things revealed to him by the Almighty through the Holy Spirit. He -expresses himself in terms level to the apprehension of those whom he -is addressing; and in this use of terms he does just what we do when we -speak of a natural body and a spiritual body. He puts the existence of -the natural body hypothetically: - -"_If_ there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body."[140] -Paraphrased as the whole passage may be, he says, "You well know that -there is a natural body, and I tell you that there is also a spiritual -body." Laying aside the mode in which the spiritual body is to be -manifested at and after the resurrection, we have to consider whether, -during this life, there is a bodily organism and a mental organism, -distinct in their natures, but united for a time by a bond which is -hidden from our detection. - -I have used the term anatomy of the mind, from the same necessity which -compels me to speak of the substance of mind. You will understand -that, when I speak of anatomical examination of the mind, I mean -that analysis of its structure which we can make by the use of the -appropriate means, and which enables us to conceive that it is an -organized structure of a peculiar character. - -The grand difficulty with Mr. Spencer's "Psychology" is, that after he -has made what he calls "the proximate components of mind" to consist -of "two broadly contrasted kinds--feelings and the relations between -feelings," which are mere impressions produced on the nerve-center by -molecular changes in the fluid or semi-fluid substance of the nerves, -he has not approached to a solution of the question whether there is or -is not a something to which these feelings and the relations between -them suggest ideas, and which holds ideas continuously for future use. - -Thus he makes consciousness to consist in passing groups of feelings -and their relations, and not in a conscious subject. He denies that -there is any _ego_, in the sense in which every person is conscious -of a self, and maintains that the only substantive existence is the -unknown ligament which holds together the ever-changing states of -feelings and impressions produced in the nerve-center. There is a far -better method of investigation. It is to inquire into the fabric of the -mind as an organism, by determining whether mental phenomena justify -us in the conclusion that it is an organism. In this way we may reach -a satisfactory conclusion that the mind is a substantive existence, -possessing a uniform structure, of a character, however, fundamentally -different from the bodily structure; and in this way we may be able to -explain, wholly or in part, how the mind and the body act on and with -each other so long as the connection is maintained. - -I am entirely free to acknowledge that, when I speak of the -substance of mind, or speak of it as an organism, I am and must -remain ignorant of the nature of its substance beyond the point where -its self-manifestations cease. But the question is, whether we are -not under an irresistible necessity of adopting as a postulate the -existence of a something which has certain inherent powers, and whether -the mental phenomena, the self-manifestations of those powers, do not -necessarily lead us to the conception and conviction that mind is a -substantive existence. I can not talk or think of consciousness apart -from a conscious subject, or of feelings without a subject that feels. -A thread of consciousness, or a series of feelings, conveys no meaning -to me, apart from a being who has the consciousness and perceives the -feelings.[141] - -One very important question to be considered in all such investigations -is, Whether our experience does not teach us that we are mentally so -constituted that certain conceptions are necessary to us? Our mental -nature is placed under certain laws, as our physical or corporeal -nature is placed under certain other laws. One of these necessary -conceptions, which are imposed on us, as it seems to me, by a law of -our mental constitution, is a conception of the fundamental difference -between matter and spirit. In what way is it forced upon us that there -is a natural world and a spiritual world? The phenomena of matter -and the phenomena of mind are essentially different. In ourselves -they occur in conjunction, and they occur in disjunction. They are -manifested synchronously, and they are manifested separately in point -of time. The normal action of all the functions of the body is not -necessary to the action of the mind. The body may be prostrated by -disease, and the moment of its death may be at hand; yet the mind, -to the last moment of the physical life, may be unclouded, and its -manifestations may be as perfect as they ever were in the full health -and activity of the vital functions of the body. No one who stands at -a death-bed where this phenomenon occurs, and observes how completely -the mind is master of itself; how it holds in consciousness the past -and the present; how it essays to grasp the future for those whom it is -to leave and for itself, can easily escape the conviction that death -is nothing but the dissolution of the bond which has hitherto held -together the two existences that constituted the human being, one of -which is to be dissolved into its elemental and material substances, -and the other of which is to go elsewhere, intact and indestructible. - -Let me now refer to what is taking place while I am writing this essay. -I have said that the phenomena of our bodily organism and the phenomena -of our mental organism may occur synchronously in the same individual. -The act of writing an original composition is an instance of this. The -action of certain organs of the body and the action of the mind are -simultaneous. In time, they can not be separated. In themselves, they -are separable and separate. The thought springing up in the mind may be -retained there, or may flow into language and be written by the hand -upon the page. No one can detect in himself any instant of time when -the mental formation of a sentence, or any clause of a sentence, as -he writes, is separable from the physical act of writing. In that not -very common, but still possible, feat of dictating to two amanuenses, -at what appears to be the same time, on two distinct subjects, there -is undoubtedly an appreciable interval, in which the mind passes from -one subject to the other, and then back again, with great rapidity. -But, when one is one's own amanuensis, when the act of thinking and -formulating the thought, and the act of writing it down in words, is -performed by the same person, there is a simultaneous action of that -which originates the thought and clothes it in words, and the act of -the bodily organ which inscribes the words upon paper. How is this -phenomenon to be explained? And to what does it lead? Is there anything -in the whole range of Mr. Spencer's "Psychology" that will interpret -this familiar experience? May it not be interpreted by an anatomical -examination of the mind as an organism? - -I do not now refer to cases where a thought is completely formulated -before the pen begins to be moved over the paper, and is then recalled -by an effort of the memory and written down. I am referring to what -I suppose is the habit of many persons in writing, namely, the -origination and formulation of the thought as the hand moves the pen, -a habit of which most practiced writers are perfectly conscious. The -same thing occurs in what is truly called extemporaneous speaking,[142] -when oral discourse is not a mere repetition, _memoriter_, of thoughts -and sentences which had been previously formulated, but, as the -word extemporaneous implies, when the thought and the language flow -from the vocal organs _eo instanti_ with their conception. In these -and the similar cases of improvisation and animated conversation, -in which there is a synchronous action of the mind and the bodily -organs, it would be impossible for us to have that action if mind were -constituted as Mr. Spencer supposes it to be. If there were no mind in -the sense of an organized entity, conceiving a thought and clothing -it in the language needful to give it written or oral expression, -"if the _ego_ were nothing more than the passing group of feelings -and ideas"--if an "idea lasts (only) while the nerves of molecular -motion last, ceasing when they cease"--if that which remains is (only) -the "set of plexuses"--how could we originate any new thought? The -very illustration to which Mr. Spencer resorts, when he likens the -automatic human being to the non-automatic piano, and makes them -analogous in their action, in order to show that passing ideas do not -have a continual existence in the mind, but that the actual existence -is the physical structure which, under like conditions, again evolves -like combinations, reduces us at once to the level of the piano, -and precludes the potentiality of a new and original idea which is -not a combination of former ideas, and is produced under different -conditions. The assertion or argument that each set of plexuses is -capable of entering into countless combinations with others, and so -renders possible future ideas, does not advance us one step to the -solution of what takes place when we conceive a new thought, clothe it -in language, and write it down on paper, or give it oral expression. - -In justification of this criticism, let me now refer to that -intellectual process which is called "invention," in its application -to the mechanic arts. I do not mean to suggest or to claim that this -kind of invention is an act which is to be referred to a distinct and -peculiar faculty of certain minds, in the possession of which one -man may differ from another. But I shall endeavor to describe what -takes place when one conceives the intellectual plan of a certain new -combination of mechanical devices, and embodies that plan in a machine -which differs from all other previous machines in its characteristic -method of operation. For convenience, I shall speak of the person who -produces such a machine as the inventor, which is the same as speaking -of him as the maker, as the poet is the maker of a poem. This act of -invention, or the making of some concrete new thing, is an act of -creation. The inventor, then, may be supposed to have learned all -that empirical and all that scientific mechanics could teach him; to -have had any quantity of passing groups of ideas pass through his -consciousness; to be possessed of any number of plexuses capable of -entering into countless combinations with others. These plexuses, or -networks of transitory ideas, consisting of former impressions in the -nerve-center, must, it is said, be recalled under the like conditions -which produced them. But the conditions for the inventor are not the -same. Something is to be produced into which the old ideas do not -enter. There is to be a new arrangement of old mechanical devices; -a new combination is to be made, which will possess a method of -operation and accomplish a result never before seen or obtained. -A new concrete thing, a new machine, is to be created. That the -conception must be formed, that the objective point, to which the whole -intellectual effort is to aim, must be seen, is manifest. A tentative -intellectual process may have to be gone through before the full -conception is reached, just as a tentative experimental process may be -necessary in finding out how the practical embodiment of the conception -is to be reached in building the structure. These processes may go on -simultaneously or separately; but, when they are both completed, when -the new machine stands before us, we see at once that the plan is an -intellectual conception, perfectly original, and the physical structure -is a new arrangement of matter effected by the hand of the inventor -or by the hands of others, which he uses as his instruments in doing -the physical work. I do not know, therefore, how this phenomenon is -to be explained upon the theory that the only _ego_ is the body and -its functions, which lies behind and determines ever-changing states -of consciousness. I know not how else to interpret the phenomenon of -invention, excepting to adopt the postulate that there is a mind, a -substantive existence, which, while its consciousness holds ideas -suggested by former conditions, has the inherent power to originate -ideas that did not form a part of any previous state of consciousness. - -I have spoken of mind as an organism and as a substantive existence. -This is a deduction to be drawn from the manifestations of mental -phenomena. In order to guard against an objection that may possibly -be interposed in the way of this method of investigation, I will -anticipate and answer it. It will be said that we can not define or -describe the substance of mind; can not tell whether it is a unit, -in itself, or an aggregate of units; we know and can know nothing -more than its approximate components, and all that we know of these -does not justify us in assuming to speak of the substance of mind. I -have more than once suggested, in our former conferences, that our -inability to define and to describe the substance of any supposed -existence is no proper objection to the hypothesis that there is such -an existence. When we undertake to define matter, or to describe the -substance of that which we call matter, we find that we soon reach a -point where precise definition or description ceases. Yet we do not -for that reason refrain from deducing the existence of matter from the -manifestations of certain phenomena and from our experience with them. -It is perfectly true that we know matter only by the manifestations of -certain physical phenomena; that we can not define the nature of its -substance. All we can do, by the most minute analysis, is to arrive at -the perception of the ultimate particles or units of matter; and the -nature of the substance of which these units are composed is incapable -of any further description. "Matter"[143] is one of the words in the -English language which are used in a great variety of senses, exact and -inexact, literal and figurative. In its philosophical sense, meaning -the substance of which all physical bodies are composed, the efforts of -lexicographers to give a definition, descriptive of the nature of what -is defined, show that definition is, strictly speaking, impossible. -All that can be said is that matter is "substance extended"; or that -which is visible or tangible, as "earth, wood, stone, air, vapor, -water"; or "the substance of which all bodies are composed." But these -efforts at definition express only what is needful to be expressed in -contrasting matter with that other existence which is called "spirit." -This is another word which is used in very different senses, but of -which no more exact definition can be given, when it is used in its -philosophical sense, than can be given of "matter." Lexicographers -have defined "spirit," in one of its meanings, as "the _soul_ of man; -the intelligent, immaterial, and immortal part of human beings"; and in -another of its meanings, more broadly, as "an immaterial, intelligent -substance." In these definitions they have followed the metaphysicians, -and the uses of the word in the English translation of the Bible. -When we turn to the definition of "soul," we find it given as "the -spiritual and immortal substance in man, which distinguishes him from -brutes; that part of man which enables him to think and reason, and -which renders him a subject of moral government." We also have it -defined as "the understanding, the intellectual principle." Undoubtedly -these definitions involve certain assumptions, such as the existence -of a substance called spirit, and the existence of an intellectual -principle, of which "soul," "spirit," and "intellect" are mere names. -But there is no difficulty in the way of our knowing what is meant when -these terms are used. The difficulty of giving a definition without -a circuitous use of terms, explaining the one by the other, and then -explaining the last by the first, does not prevent us from having a -definite conception of the thing spoken of. When we speak of mind, -soul, or intellect, what we think of is the something in ourselves -of which we are conscious, and whose manifestations we observe in -other beings like ourselves; and what we have to do is to examine the -evidence which may bring home to our convictions the existence of this -something that perceives, thinks, acts, originates new ideas; holds -former ideas in consciousness, is connected with and acts upon and -is acted on by bodily organs, and is at the same time more than and -different from those organs. - -I have referred to some of the mental phenomena which have the -strongest tendency to prove the existence of the mind as an organized -entity. These are the phenomena which occur in our waking hours, -when the intellectual faculties and the bodily organs are in the full -exercise of their normal functions respectively. There is another class -of mental phenomena which may be said to be abnormal, in this, that -the intellectual faculties and the bodily organs do not preserve the -same relations to each other in all respects that they do when we are -fully awake. These are the phenomena that occur during sleep--a class -of mental phenomena of great consequence to be observed and analyzed in -any study of psychology. They are of an extraordinary variety, complex -in the highest degree, and dependent on numerous causes of mental and -physical disturbance; but it is quite possible to extract from some of -them certain definite conclusions. - -Sleep, properly regarded, when it is perfect, is a state of absolute -rest and inactivity of all the organs and functions of the body -save the digestion of food and the circulation of the blood, and of -all the mental faculties. Perfect sleep, sleep in which there is -absolutely no consciousness, is more rare than those states in which -there is more or less consciousness. But it is often an actual state -of both body and mind, and it was evidently designed to renew the -vigor of both, and to prevent the wear and tear of unbroken activity. -Between absolute unconsciousness induced by perfect sleep and the -full consciousness of our waking moments, there are many intermediate -states; and the phenomena of these intermediate states present very -strong proofs of the existence of the mind as a special and spiritual -entity, capable in greater or less degree of acting without the aid -of the physical organs. I do not except even the organ of the brain -from this suspension of action during certain states when the mind -is in more or less of activity; for I am convinced that in some -of the mental phenomena to which I shall advert and which I shall -endeavor to describe, the brain is in a state of perfect sleep, and -that in the production of those phenomena it takes no part. In other -mental phenomena, which occur during sleep, the brain or some part -of it is evidently acted upon by the mind, as in the somnambulistic -condition, when the nerves of motion, responding to the action of the -mind, communicate action to the muscles, and the body walks about and -performs other external acts. - -There are other mental phenomena occurring during very profound sleep -of the body and its organs, when the mind does not appear to derive -its action from the brain, or to be dependent on the brain for its -activity; when it is exceedingly active, and when it communicates -action to none of the bodily organs; when, for example, it carries on -long trains of thought, composes sentences, invents conversations, -makes poetry and prose, and performs other intellectual processes. -Distributed into classes, the most important mental phenomena occurring -during sleep are the following: - -First, and presenting perhaps the strongest proof of the mind's -independence of all the bodily organs, is that whole class of mental -phenomena in which, during profound sleep of the body, we carry on -conversations, compose original matter in the form of oral or written -discourse, which we seem to ourselves to be producing, and solve -intellectual difficulties which have baffled us when awake, or imagine -that we receive from an unexpected source important information that we -are not conscious of having previously received. - -The phenomena of conversations, to which we appear to ourselves to be -listening during sleep, or in which we appear to ourselves to be taking -part, are, when analyzed, most remarkable occurrences, for it is the -mind of the sleeper which originates the whole of what appears to be -said by different persons. These conversations are as vivid, as much -marked by different intellectual and personal characteristics, sudden -and unexpected turns, apt repartee, interchange of ideas between two or -more persons, as are the real conversations which we overhear, or in -which we take part, when we are awake. Yet the whole of what is said, -or appears to us to be said, is the invention of the one mind, which -appears to itself to be listening to or talking with other minds, and -all the while the body is wrapped in profound sleep. This extraordinary -intellectual feat, so familiar to us that it scarcely attracts our -attention unless we undertake to analyze it, is closely akin to the -action of the mind when the body and the mind are neither of them -asleep, and when we invent a conversation between different persons. -But this occurrence is marked by another extraordinary peculiarity: -for it happens, during sleep, to persons who could not, when awake, -invent and write such conversations at will, and who in their waking -hours have very little of the imaginative faculty needed for such -productions. I account for this phenomenon by the hypothesis that when -the mind is free from the necessity of depending on the bodily organs -for its action, as it is during profound sleep of the body, when its -normal relations with the body are completely suspended and it is left -to its independent action, it has a power of separate action. This, I -think, accounts for a kind of mental action which, when compared with -that which occurs in conjunction with the action of the bodily organs, -may be called abnormal. Under the impulse of its own unrestrained and -uncorrected activity, the mind goes through processes of invention, -the products of which are sometimes wild and incoherent, sometimes -exceedingly coherent, sensible, and apt. Let the person to whom this -occurs be thoroughly awakened out of one of these states, and the mind -becomes immediately again subjected to the necessity of acting along -with, and under the conditions of its normal relations to the body. - -Akin to this mental feat of inventing conversations, during a sleep of -the body, is the power of composing, during such sleep, oral discourse -of one's own, or the power of composing something which we appear -to ourselves to be writing. I suppose this is an occurrence which -happens to most persons who are much accustomed to writing or to public -speaking. It is often an involuntary action of the mind; that is to -say, it is sometimes accompanied with a distinct consciousness that -it is a process that ought to be arrested because it is a dangerous -one, and yet it can not be arrested before full waking consciousness -returns. On goes the flow of thought and language, apparently with -great success; we seem to be speaking or writing with even more than -our usual power, and all the while in the style that belongs to us; -but, until we are fully restored to the normal relation of the mind -and the body, we can not at will arrest this independent action of -the mind, but must wait until our bodily senses are again in full -activity. I do not suppose that this phenomenon ought to be explained -by the hypothesis that there are certain parts or organs of the brain -which are specially concerned in the work of original composition of -intellectual matter, and that these organs are not affected by the -sleep that is prevailing in other parts of the brain. While it is -doubtless true that there are special systems of nerves which proceed -from or conduct to special parts of the brain, and by which action -is imparted to or received from the other organs of the body, and -while some of these special parts of the brain may be in the state -of absolute inactivity called sleep, and others are not, I know of -no warrant for the hypothesis that the intellectual operations or -processes are dependent upon any particular organ or organs of the -brain, as distinguished from those from and to which proceed special -systems of nerves. If any person, who is much accustomed to that kind -of intellectual activity which consists in original composition of -intellectual matter, will attend to his own consciousness, and probe -it as far as he may, he will not find reason, I apprehend, to conclude -that the power of thought and of clothing thought in language resides -in any special part of the brain. His experience and introspection -will be more likely to lead him to the conclusion that this power, -whether it is exerted when he is asleep or awake bodily, is a power -that inheres in the mind itself regarded as a spiritual existence and -organism, and that the action of the brain, or of any part of it, is -necessary to the exercise of this power only when it is necessary, as -it is in our waking moments, to use some of the bodily organs in order -to give the thought oral or written expression by giving it utterance -through the vocal organs or by writing it down on paper. Certain it -is that we conceive thoughts in more or less of connected sequence, -and clothe them intellectually in language of which we have entire -consciousness while the process is going on, without the action of any -part of the body. - -It may be objected to this view that the intellectual products which -we seem to ourselves to be making when we are asleep would, if they -could be repeated by an effort of the memory, word for word, just as -they seem to have occurred, be found to be of the same incoherent, -senseless stuff of which all dreams are made; and that this test would -show that the brain is at such times not absolutely and completely in -the condition which is called sleep, but that it is only partially in -that condition; that it is performing its function feebly, imperfectly, -and not as it performs that function when the whole body is awake. In -reference to this hypothesis, I will repeat an anecdote which I have -somewhere read, which is equally valuable whether it was an imaginary -or a real occurrence. - -A gentleman of literary pursuits, who was a very respectable poet, was -subject to this habit of composition during sleep. One night he awoke -his wife and informed her that he had composed in his dream some of -the best and most original verses that he had ever written. He begged -her at once to get a candle, pen, ink, and paper, and let him dictate -to her the new composition that appeared to him so striking. When they -read together the new poem on the next morning, it turned out to be -nonsensically puerile. But occurrences of this kind, if they could be -multiplied, would prove only that we are liable to illusions in sleep, -in regard to the comparative merits of our intellectual products, -which we imagine ourselves to be creating when we are in that state, -as we are in regard to other things. We are under a delusion when we -imagine in our dreams that we encounter and converse with another -person, living or dead. We are perhaps deluding ourselves when in sleep -we compose or seem to compose an original poem. But what is it that -deludes itself, either in respect to the interview with another person, -or in respect to the new composition? Is it the brain, or is it the -mind? Is it a person, or a bodily organ that has the false impression, -in the one case or the other? There must be a something that is subject -to an illusion, before there can be an illusion. If both brain and -mind are in profound sleep, absolute suspension of all action, there -can be no illusion about anything. If the brain is absolutely asleep -and the mind is not, the illusion is in the mind and not in the brain. -That the latter is what often occurs, the experience of the illiterate -and uncultivated makes them aware, as well as the experience of the -lettered scholar and the practiced writer.[144] - -Under the same head, I will now refer to those strange but familiar -occurrences which take place when there come to us, in sleep, solutions -of difficulties which we had not overcome by all our efforts while -awake, and which appeared to us utterly dark when we lay down to rest. -These mental phenomena are almost innumerably various. They take place -in regard to all kinds of subjects, to lines of conduct and action, to -everything about which our thoughts are employed; and they are a class -of phenomena within everybody's experience. There is scarcely any one -to whom it has not happened to lie down at night with a mind distressed -and perplexed about some problem that requires a definite solution, -and to rise in the morning, usually after a night of undisturbed -rest, with his mind perfectly clear on the subject, and with just the -solution that did not come to him when he devoted to it all his waking -thoughts. What is the explanation of this phenomenon? If the mind -is an independent entity, a spiritual organism, capable of its own -action without the aid of the body under certain circumstances, this -phenomenon can be explained. If the mind is not a spiritual organism, -capable, under any circumstances, of acting without the aid of the -bodily organs, this phenomenon can not be explained. - -The most probable explanation is this: When we are awake, and devote -our thoughts to a particular subject that is attended with great -difficulties, we go over the same ground repeatedly--the mind travels -and toils in the same ruts. Nothing new occurs, because we look at the -subject in the same way every time we think of it. We are liable to be -kept in the same beaten path by the associations between our thoughts -and the bodily states in which we have those thoughts--associations -which are exceedingly powerful. But let these associations be dissolved -as they are during perfect sleep--let the mind be in a condition to act -without being dependent on the brain or any other bodily organ for aid, -or exposed to be hampered by the conditions of the body, and there will -be a mental activity in which ideas will be wrought out that did not -occur to us while we were awake. The memory, too, may recall a fact -which we had learned while awake, and yet we may be unable to recollect -how it came to our knowledge. At such times, the fact is recalled; but -as the mind is acting in a condition which is abnormal when compared -with the waking condition, and is liable to delusions about some -things, we imagine that the fact is revealed to us in some wild and -supernatural way, as by a person who is dead and who has come to us to -communicate it. There is a well-authenticated account of an occurrence -of this kind, given by Sir Walter Scott in one of the notes to his -"Antiquary," and on which he founds an incident related by one of the -personages in his story. The real occurrence was this: A gentleman in -Scotland was involved in a litigation about a claim asserted upon his -landed estate. He had a strong conviction that his father had bargained -and paid for a release of the claim, but he could find no such paper. -Without it he was sure to be defeated in the suit. Distressed by this -prospect, but utterly unable to see any way out of his misfortune, he -lay down to sleep, on the night before he was to go into Edinburgh to -attend the trial of the cause. He dreamed that his father appeared to -him, and told him that the claim had been released, and that the paper -was in the hands of a lawyer in a neighboring town, whose name the -paternal shade mentioned. - -Before going into Edinburgh on the next day, the gentleman rode to -the place which his father had indicated, and found the lawyer, of -whose name he had been previously unconscious. This person turned out -to be an old man, who had forgotten the fact that he had transacted -this piece of business for the gentleman's father; but on being -told of the fact that his client had paid his fee in a foreign coin -of a peculiar character--which was one part of the story which the -father's apparition related to the son--he recalled the whole of the -circumstances, searched for the paper, and found it. The gentleman's -estate was saved to him; but he became very superstitious about dreams, -and suffered much from that cause, as was quite natural. Sir Walter's -solution of the whole affair is of course the correct one: "The dream -was only the recapitulation of information which Mr. R---- had really -received from his father while in life, but which at first he merely -recalled as a general impression that the claim was settled. It is not -uncommon for persons to recover, during sleep, the thread of ideas -which they have lost during their waking hours."[145] Sir Walter makes -another observation which is worthy of being repeated--that in dreams -men are not surprised by apparitions. Why are we not? Because the mind -is in a state of abnormal activity, in which everything that occurs to -it seems perfectly natural. The delusion in regard to the mode in which -the very important fact was communicated to Mr. R---- in his dream, was -substituted in the place of the actual communication made to him by -his father during life. The latter he had wholly forgotten, and he had -forgotten the circumstance of payment of the lawyer's fee in a peculiar -coin, which had also been mentioned to him by his father when living. -This remarkable incident, which might doubtless be paralleled by many -similar occurrences, proves one of two things: either that the exercise -of the memory is wholly dependent upon a waking condition of the brain, -or that there may be an abnormal and imperfect act of memory while -the brain is in profound sleep, in the course of which a fact becomes -mixed with a delusion about the mode in which we are told of the fact. -What happened to Mr. R---- was that his mind recalled the fact, but -imagined that he then learned it for the first time from an apparition. -I do not know how such a phenomenon can be explained, excepting by the -hypothesis that the mind is a special existence, which acts during -sleep of the body upon facts that are lodged in the memory, but mixes -them with imaginary and delusive appearances, so that the mode in which -the fact was actually learned is obliterated from the memory, and some -supernatural mode of communication takes its place. On the return of -waking consciousness, the mode in which the fact was actually learned -is still shut out from recollection, and, if the person to whom this -kind of delusion has occurred is of a superstitious turn, he will act -on what he has imagined was told him by the apparition, because he has -no other means of rescuing himself from an evil. - -In regard to the mental phenomena which occur without delusions or -apparitions, where the thoughts on a difficult subject become clearer -and more satisfactory to us when we awake from sleep than they ever -were during our waking hours, I suppose the explanation is this: During -profound sleep of the body, including the brain, there is an entire -suspension of every bodily function excepting the digestion of food and -the circulation of the blood. If there is excited in some of the other -organs an action of a peculiar kind, by an excitation of the nerves -connected with those organs, it is proof that the condition of perfect -sleep is not prevailing in all parts of the brain. The state to which I -now refer supposes a complete inactivity of the whole bodily organism -save in the digestive function and the circulation of the blood. In -such a state, the mind, that which thinks and reasons, does not act -upon the brain, and is not acted upon by it. It is capable of thinking -on any subject which has employed its thoughts during the waking hours; -and while, in some cases, it is visited by apparitions and subject -to delusions, it is in other cases engaged in ideas that involve no -delusive appearances. Freed from all the associations of these ideas -with the feelings prevailing in the body when we think of the subject -during our waking hours, we are able to perceive relations of the -subject which have not before occurred to us. When we pass from the -condition of sleep to the full consciousness of our bodily and mental -organism, we are intellectually possessed of these new relations of the -subject, which we have brought with us out of the state in which we -acquired them, and they furnish us with new materials for the solution -of the problem that we had not solved when we lay down to rest. It -is not, I am persuaded, because the mind was at rest during sleep, -and when we become awake is by reason of that rest better able to -grapple with the difficulties of the subject, that we do grapple with -them successfully; for in the case supposed, which is a very common -experience, the thoughts are actually employed on the subject, while -the body and the brain are in the absolute rest and inactivity of all -the organic functions excepting those of digestion and circulation of -the blood. I do not know that it is possible to detect, in a person -sleeping, an increased circulation of the blood to any part of the -brain which may be supposed to be concerned in the act of thinking, -and at the same time to know that thinking is going on, unless such an -observation could be made of a person in the state called somnambulism, -which is not the state of which I am now speaking. But reasoning upon -the phenomenon which I have now described, according to all that we can -learn from our own experience or from observation of others, I reach -the conclusion that the mind, the thinking and reasoning entity, can -and does, in profound sleep of the body and the brain, employ itself -upon a subject that has occupied us when awake, and can perceive new -relations of that subject, which had not before occurred to us, without -the activity of any portion of the nerve-center which is called the -brain. Does this hypothesis assume that our thoughts when asleep are -more valuable than our waking thoughts? It does, to a certain extent -and under certain circumstances, for experience proves that in sleep -we acquire ideas which we did not have before we fell asleep, and which -we bring with us out of that condition. - -That I have now given the true explanation of this familiar experience -will appear, I think, from this consideration: There are very few -nights when we do not in sleep have many thoughts. The states of -perfect unconsciousness are comparatively rare. If the brain were never -entirely asleep, if it were always engaged in the physical work of -thinking--whatever that work may be--it would be worn out prematurely. -But if the brain is perfectly at rest, while the mind is actively -employed, the brain undergoes no strain and suffers no exhaustion; and -the mind suffers no strain or exhaustion because it is in its nature -incapable of wear and tear. It is only when the mind acts on the brain -that exhaustion takes place. I speak now of what happens in states of -ordinarily good health.[146] - -I shall now refer to some of the very peculiar phenomena of -somnambulism; and in illustration of their various phases I shall -resort to Shakespeare's picture of the sleep-walking of Lady Macbeth, -which, although purely imaginary, is a most accurate exhibition of -nature. Treating it, as we are entitled to treat it, as if it were a -real occurrence at which we ourselves were witnesses, with a knowledge -of her character and history, an analysis of the situation in which she -was placed when the habit of somnambulism came upon her, and of the -mode in which her mind acted upon her body, will enable us to see the -phenomena in their true philosophical aspect. We may suppose ourselves -present, with the doctor and the gentlewoman of her bedchamber, when -she comes forth in her night-dress and with a candle in her hand, and -we witness the impressive scene of a disturbed mind overmastering the -body while the body is asleep. It seems that, after the murder of -Duncan, when she imbrued her own hands with his blood in smearing the -faces of his sleeping grooms, the habit of sleep-walking had come -over her. As we stand by the side of the awe-stricken witnesses, and -hear their whispered conversation, we get the first description of -her actions since the new king, Macbeth, her husband, whom she had -instigated to murder the old king, went into the field. These first -actions of hers, as described by the gentlewoman to the doctor, do not -necessarily exhibit the working of a guilty conscience. They exhibit -a mind oppressed and disturbed by cares of business and of state; -and they are a distinct class of the phenomena of somnambulism. The -gentlewoman tells the doctor that "since his Majesty went into the -field, I have seen her rise from her bed, throw her night-gown upon -her, unlock her closet, take forth paper, fold it, write upon it, read -it, afterward seal it, and again return to bed; yet all this while in -a most fast sleep." This is merely a description of what the witness -has seen, and it might occur to any person of strong intellectual -faculties, disturbed by great cares, without the action of a guilty -conscience. It makes the situation real when the doctor recognizes -the fact of this "great perturbation in nature! to receive at once -the benefit of sleep, and do the effects of watching." As they are -whispering together, the doctor trying to make the gentlewoman tell -him what at such times she has heard her say, which the loyal servant -refuses to tell, Lady Macbeth moves forward, with the taper in her hand. - -Here we may pause upon the first exhibition of the phenomenon called -sleep-walking, which we get by description only, and analyze the nature -of the action. It is perfectly apparent that what the poet accepted -as true, is the power of the mind to move the body while the body is -asleep, so as to make it perform many acts. Experience makes this -assumption perfectly correct. I presume it will not be questioned that -this phenomenon is described by Shakespeare with entire accuracy, -and it is explicable only upon the hypothesis that the mind has some -control over the body while the body is asleep. Actions as minute and -as much premeditated as those performed by Lady Macbeth "in a most fast -sleep," have been witnessed in persons who were undoubtedly asleep, -and whose eyes were open for some purposes, but, as in her case, their -sense was shut for other purposes. - -We now pass to the more awful exhibition of a mind worked upon by a -guilty conscience. Lady Macbeth comes out of her bedroom fast asleep, -but with a light in her hand. The gentlewoman who interprets her -state to the doctor informs him that she has a light by her bedside -continuously; and we thus learn that her nights are so disturbed -that she can not bear darkness. They notice that her eyes are open, -but "their sense is shut." Then begin the terrific manifestations of -the control of a guilty conscience over both mind and body, when the -memory, alive to certain terrible facts, plays fantastic tricks with -itself, and mingles delusions with realities. As she approaches, with -the taper in her hand, she performs an action which the gentlewoman -says she has repeatedly seen her go through, for a quarter of an hour -at a time, endeavoring to rub a spot of blood off from one of her -hands. Her hands have been clean, physically, since the time when she -first washed them on the fatal night; but the delusion that is upon her -is that there is blood on them still. She goes on rubbing them, and her -first exclamation is, "Out, damned spot! out, I say!" Yet it will not -out. That little hand wears what she imagines to be an indelible stain. -After her first exclamation, the memory rushes back to the moment -before the murder. She thinks she hears, perhaps does hear, the clock -strike--"one, two"; and then, as if speaking to her husband, she says, -"Why, then 'tis time to do't." Then there is a pause, and out comes -the reflection, "Hell is murky!" This seems to indicate that darkness, -in which she and her husband are whispering together just before -the murder, is a hell, and so very fit for what is about to be done. -Hell is murky, as this chamber is. Then she remembers her husband's -reluctance, and fancying that she is still talking with him and -bracing him up to the deed, she says: "Fye, my lord, fye! a soldier, -and afeard? What need we _fear_ who knows it, when none can call our -_power_ to account?" Presently she is looking back upon the deed, and -exclaims, "Yet who would have thought the old man to have had so much -blood in him!" Then she recurs to herself as if she were another: "The -thane of Fife had a wife; where is _she_ now?" Again she thinks of her -stained hands: "What, will these hands _ne'er_ be clean?" Are they to -wear this horrible stain forever? Instantly she is again at the door -of Duncan's chamber, speaking to her husband: "No more o' that, my -lord, no more o' that: you mar all with this starting!" Then her hands -again, her poor hands; they _smell_ of the blood: "Here's the smell -of the blood still: all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this -little hand! Oh, oh, oh!" Then, after another pause, she is speaking -to her husband, when the deed has been done: "Wash your hands, put on -your night-gown; look not so pale!" In another instant she is thinking -of Banquo's murder, which occurred after Duncan's, and she says to her -husband: "I tell you yet again, Banquo's _buried_; he can not come out -of his _grave_!" Once more she is back at the door of Duncan's chamber, -in the darkness, and the murder has been committed. Speaking to her -husband, she says: "To bed, to bed; there's knocking at the gate. Come, -come, come, come, give me your hand. What's done can not be undone. To -bed, to bed, to bed!" Then she goes quickly toward her chamber and to -bed, believing that Macbeth is with her and that she is holding his -hand. - -How mixed, how wild, how fantastic, how coherent and incoherent are -these phantoms of the imagination! If she were awake, things would -not thus present themselves to her. Every event in the dreadful story -would stand in its true relations, and, however she might be suffering -the pangs of a guilty conscience, she would not mix up the scenes -through which she had passed, but every fact would stand in its due -order. She would be conscious that there was no blood upon her hands, -and that they did not need the perfumes of Arabia to sweeten them. -She would know that Duncan had been murdered, and would not enact the -murder over again. She would remember that Banquo's murder had not been -distinctly made known to her, and that she had only surmised it, when -at the banquet Macbeth fancied that the ghost of Banquo rose and sat -at the table--an apparition which neither she nor any one else saw. -But, in that strange scene, it flashed across her mind that Banquo was -dead, and to herself she interpreted truly what was passing in her -husband's mind, and instantly explained his conduct to the company as -the recurrence of an old malady to which he was subject. - -If we go back to what had actually happened before the banquet, and -then go forward to the condition in which she is seen by the doctor and -her attendant, we shall understand how her mind was working, not upon -a fact that she knew, but upon a fact which she had truly surmised. -In her somnambulistic state, she says to her husband: "_I tell you -yet again_, Banquo's buried; he can not come out of his grave." Had -she said this to him before? According to the course of the story, as -the text of the play gives it to us, she had not. In the second scene -of the third act, where, after Duncan had been murdered and Macbeth -had become king, they are preparing for the banquet, to which Banquo -was expected as one of the guests, Macbeth and his wife are talking -together, and she is trying to get him out of the contemplative and -conscience-stricken mood in which he looks back upon what they have -done. He concludes one of his mixed and melancholy reflections with -these words: - - Duncan is in his grave; - After life's fitful fever he sleeps well; - Treason has done his worst: nor steel, nor poison, - Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing - Can touch him further! - -Then she says to him: - - _Lady Macbeth._ Come on; - Gentle my lord, sleek o'er your rugged looks; - Be bright and jovial 'mong your guests to-night. - - _Macbeth._ So shall I, love; and so, I pray, be you; - Let your remembrance apply to _Banquo_; - _Present him eminence_,[147] _both with eye and tongue_: - Unsafe the while, that we - Must lave our honors in these flattering streams; - And make our faces vizards to our hearts, - Disguising what they are. - -Just at this moment, therefore, he is not thinking of killing Banquo, -but wishes him to be received with all honor. But, in answer to his -last reflection on the hypocritical part that they must act, she says -to him: - - You must leave this. - -Then bursts forth the terrific oppression of his soul: - - _Macb._ Oh, full of scorpions is my mind, dear wife! - Thou know'st that Banquo, and his Fleance, _lives_. - _Lady M._ _But in them nature's copy's not eterne._[148] - _Macb._ There's comfort yet; they _are_ assailable; - Then be thou jocund: ere the bat hath flown - His cloistered flight; ere, to black Hecate's summons, - The shard-borne beetle, with his drowsy hums, - Hath rung night's yawning peal, there shall be done - A deed of dreadful note! - -She affects not to understand him--perhaps does not--and she asks: - - _What's_ to be done? - _Macb._ Be innocent of the _knowledge_, dearest chuck, - Till thou applaud the _deed_. Come, seeling night, - Skarf up the tender eye of pitiful day; - And, with thy bloody and invisible hand, - Cancel, and tear to pieces, that great bond - Which keeps me pale!--Light thickens; and the crow - Makes wing to the rooky wood; - Good things of day begin to droop and drowse; - While night's black agents to their prey do rouse. - Thou marvel'st at my words: but hold thee still; - Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill: - So, prithee, go with me. [_Exeunt._ - -In the next scene, the murderers, previously engaged by Macbeth, -waylay Banquo in the park as he is approaching the castle, and kill -him, his son Fleance and a servant escaping. Then follows the banquet, -Macbeth himself moving about at first, and then he takes a seat at -the table lower down. One of the murderers comes in and whispers to -him what has been done. The stage direction is, "The ghost of Banquo -rises and sits in Macbeth's place." As no one at the table but Macbeth -sees this apparition, it might be inferred that it is the force of -his imagination which presents the spectacle to him, as Lady Macbeth -supposes, when she says to him: - - O proper stuff! - This is the very painting of your fear: - This is the air-drawn dagger, which, you said, - Led you to Duncan. - -But the stage direction must be taken as a literal appearance of the -ghost, so as to make it visible to the audience, while it is invisible -to all at the table excepting Macbeth himself. - -If, now, we go forward to the night when Lady Macbeth is walking in her -sleep, and remember what had occurred previous to and at the banquet, -we see how, without any actual previous knowledge that her husband -intended to have Banquo killed, and with only the surmise that he had -been killed, which comes to her at the banquet, she came to say to her -husband, in her dream: - - I tell you yet again, Banquo's buried; he can not come out of his grave. - -Here we have a fact lodged in the mind during the waking hours, and -in sleep wrought into a strange mixture with the killing of Duncan, -with which it had in reality no connection, having transpired -afterward. This is very strong proof of the capacity of the mind to -act during sleep without the action of the brain. The mind of the -guilty sleep-walker is filled with horrible memories, which it can not -shut out, but with which it can not deal in their actual order and -true relations, because the sequences of thought, during sleep, are -abnormal. Those whose experience has never involved any such workings -of conscience are perfectly aware of the fact that in dreams ideas -that are separately lodged in the consciousness become entangled with -each other in the most fantastic manner. Lady Macbeth at one moment -even thinks of herself as if she were some one else, and asks, Where -is the woman now who was the wife of the thane of Fife? Every one has -experienced in sleep the same projection of one's self out of one's own -consciousness; so that we seem to be contemplating ourselves as if we -were a different person. - -The phenomena that occur during the delirium of fever, where the -normal consciousness is lost for the time being, are in some respects -analogous to and in some respects different from those which occur -during the somnambulistic condition. Delirium occurs when the body -and the brain are not in the condition of sleep; but the senses of -perception convey false impressions to the mind, and the mind itself -has temporarily lost its power of correcting its own action by its -former experience. The nearest friends who are around the bedside -are not recognized by the sufferer; they appear to be strangers, -and the patient talks to them as if both they and he were not their -real selves. It would seem that we can safely infer from the state -of delirium a suspension of the direct and normal connection between -the brain and the mind; that neither of them can act, in relation to -the other, as they both act when there is no such disturbance: but -that this condition, so far from proving or tending to prove that the -mind is not an independent spiritual existence, has a strong tendency -to prove that it is. Insanity, on the other hand, is probably a -derangement of the mental organism akin to derangement of the physical -organism, but not necessarily connected with or induced by the latter, -for the bodily health of the insane is often entirely sound while -the mind is in an entirely unsound and irrational condition. But the -phenomena of insanity are too various and multiform, and too much -dependent on both physical and moral causes, to afford any satisfactory -proofs of the postulate which I propound in this essay. The safest -line of investigation is that which I suggested in the first instance, -namely, to regard the mind as an organism, and to ascertain whether -it is susceptible of anatomical examination in a sense analogous -to anatomical examination of the bodily organism. All that I have -hitherto said is useful by way of preliminary illustration of my main -hypothesis. It has a strong tendency to show that the mind, instead -of consisting, as some philosophers now suppose, of the products of -a material organism, is itself an organized being with a definite -structure and capable of living a life of its own, although at present -dwelling in a corporeal organism which affects it in various ways -while the connection lasts. The theory that all mental phenomena are -products of our corporeal organism is one that appears to derive -great support from examinations of the structure of the brain and of -the whole nervous system. The physical anatomy of man exhibits very -striking illustrations of the influence of corporeal changes upon the -mental state, as the mental changes show corresponding influences upon -the corporeal state. But, then, there are undoubtedly phenomena that -are purely and exclusively mental; and therefore when we undertake to -solve these mental phenomena by the materialistic hypothesis we find a -sense of inadequate causation confronting us so directly that we are -compelled to look for a solution elsewhere. It is certain that things -take place in the inner recesses of our minds, in the production of -which the bodily senses not only render no aid, but in which they -have no part whatever. It is necessary, therefore, to carry our -investigations into a class of mental phenomena in which all physical -causation ceases to afford an adequate guide to a conclusion. - -It will not be denied that the products of material organisms can be -proved to consist of matter and of nothing else. Their presence can -be detected by some physical test. For example, if it be true that -all animals have been evolved from protoplasm, the organisms are -simply changes in the form of a certain portion of matter. If, in an -individual organism having a highly developed nervous structure, there -are actions produced by an excitation of the nerves of sensation, -those actions are simply molecular changes in the matter comprising -the sensitive and easily moved substance of the nerve-fibers. However -far and into whatever minutiæ we carry our investigations into -organized matter, we find that its products remain material, and that -they consist only of changes in the material substance of a material -organization. But, when we pass from such material products into -the domain of purely mental phenomena, are we warranted in saying -that, although the latter are not, properly speaking, _products_ of -the material organization, they are _effects_ corresponding to and -dependent upon the excitation of the nerves of sensation? This last -hypothesis must assume one of two things: either that there is a -distinction between those corporeal feelings which do not and those -which do produce mental changes or mental effects, or, if there are -corporeal feelings which produce corresponding mental states and -mental action, there must be a something on which the effects can -be wrought, and this something must be an independent organism. It -is doubtless true that there are many corporeal feelings which are -followed by no very important mental effects, especially during a -sound state of bodily health. But it is equally true that, if there -are corporeal feelings which influence our mental action, there must -be an organism which is capable of being so influenced; and our -experience and consciousness teach us that there is such a difference -between corporeal feelings and mental phenomena that the probability -of a difference in the originating causes becomes very great. We know -that the mind can and does act with great force when bodily suffering -is extreme; that it has an energy of its own which enables it to rise -above all the power of physical pain to restrain or influence it. I -must therefore follow out, as I had originally projected, my anatomical -analysis of the mind as an independent spiritual organism. - -In order to arrive at a correct conclusion concerning the structure -of mind, we must first observe that there are four special corporeal -organs by which the capability of the mind to receive impressions -from matter is acted upon. It is through these means that the -properties of matter, or those properties which can make themselves -known to us, become known to us. The senses, as they are usually -called, are sight, hearing, smell, and taste. The external organ of -each of these senses is furnished with a set of nerves, the function -of which is to transmit from that organ a wave of molecular motion -along the fluid or semi-fluid substance inclosed in the nerve-tubes -to the great nerve-center the brain, the central recipient of all -such motions. Such, at least, is the theory, which may be accepted -as a fact. But, then, the question remains, What is the intellectual -perception or mental cognition of the idea suggested by one of these -supposed transmissions of a wave of molecular motion? Is there a -being, a person, a spiritual entity, conceiving the idea or having an -intellectual perception of it? Or is there no such being, and while we -attribute to the office of the nervous system the function of producing -certain feelings or sensations in the brain, do these sensations or -feelings constitute all that there is of consciousness? - -It is impossible for me to conceive of consciousness as anything but an -intuitive sense of his own existence, experienced by a being capable of -such an experience, because endowed with such a faculty. It is certain -that when we so regard consciousness we are not deceiving ourselves; -for if any one will consider what would happen to him if he should -lose this faculty of being sensible of his own existence, he will see -that in the event of that loss he could neither distinguish himself -from other persons, nor have any control over his own actions, or any -cognition whatever. For this reason, the theory on which I made some -criticisms in one of our late conversations is the one with which -I contrast my conception of mind. If that theory fails to satisfy -a reflecting person in regard to the nature of consciousness, as -certified to him by his own experience, the hypothesis that the mind is -an extended and organized being, of which a conception can be formed, -and not an unextended and unorganized something of which no conception -can be formed, must be accepted as the alternative. - -I explained in our former discussion my understanding of Mr. Spencer's -theory of the only _ego_ that can be scientifically recognized; and, -in order to encounter it by my own hypothesis, I will here restate its -substantial position in a condensed form. - -By the _ego_ of which he treats, I understand him to mean all that -we can arrive at by an analysis of what takes place in the body -and its functions, and of "what is given in consciousness." This -phrase--"what is given in consciousness"--reveals to us his purpose to -reduce consciousness from a self-conviction and cognition of one's own -existence to a mere passing group of feelings, which constitute "the -ever-changing states of consciousness" that we "_call_ mind." So that, -when we speak of mind, we mean and can mean nothing more than certain -states of feeling produced in our brains by perpetually changing -impressions. We do not and can not mean that there is a person who -perceives and holds ideas suggested by external objects through the -action of his nervous system. All that we know about any _ego_, any -mental I, is that there is a physical structure, pervaded by certain -physical forces, that produce "consecutive states," which Mr. Spencer -calls "mental _states_"; and the aggregate of the feelings and ideas -which thus constitute the _mental states_ is the only _ego_ of which -any continued existence can be predicated. But even these aggregates of -feelings and ideas have, according to this philosopher, no principle -of cohesion holding them together as a whole; and, therefore, all -that we can assume as having any continuously surviving and durable -existence is the changing _states_ produced by the action through us -of a certain unknowable power, statically conditioned in our nervous -organism, which is pervaded by a dynamically conditioned portion of -that unknowable power which is operating everywhere in nature, and is -called "energy."[149] - -So far as this theory is based upon the existence of a physical -organism, whose functions liberate from the food supplied to it certain -forces, which are distributed by the activities of the organism, we may -accept it as a statement of what actually takes place in the form of -physical phenomena. But when we follow the physical phenomena of the -diffused energy into its action upon the brain, by the transmission -of an impulse, we must stop with the effect of that impulse upon a -corporeal organ, or we must go further and find a something which -receives into itself and appropriates to itself the idea the elements -of which the impulse has transmitted. The presence of that something -in ourselves may be illustrated by its absence from a mechanism in -which we know that it does not exist, but which appears superficially -to be animated by an intelligent principle possessing volition. We -stand, for example, before one of those automatic machines which -perform actions that seem to be guided by a living spirit. They are -mere physical organisms, constructed without the principle of life -that inhabits animal organisms, but they are so admirably contrived -for the production of certain limited but complex movements that they -suggest the presence of a spiritual being acting as we ourselves act. -But the least reflection upon what we see makes us aware that there is -nothing before us but a mechanical organism, in which the artisan who -made it has availed himself of certain forces of nature and properties -of matter, whereby he uses a portion of the energy that pervades the -universe. There is nothing within the machine to which this energy -communicates ideas that are to be the subject of its future voluntary -operation. All is comprehended in a fixed mechanical operation of -certain machinery, and, when we have analyzed and understood the -physical phenomena, we can follow them no further, because there is -no translation of the physical energy into mental phenomena. But in -ourselves there is such a translation, and we must follow it into the -mental phenomena. So following it, we find ourselves in the presence -of a something which has a self-conscious individuality, and which, by -a mysterious bond of connection, is so united with a physical organism -that it is capable of receiving, appropriating, and preserving the -ideas which the physical organism was designed to produce in it. - -My objection to Mr. Spencer's system of psychology may be summed up in -what I shall now say upon his chief position, which is that "an idea -is the psychical side of what, on its physical side, is an involved -set of molecular changes, propagated through an involved set of -nervous plexuses." Translated into what I take to be his meaning, the -assertion, or hypothesis, is this: An idea is the mental cognition of -an external object, as, for example, a tree. When we are looking at -or thinking of a tree, we have a mental cognition of a tree; and this -idea of a tree is said to be the psychical side of that which on its -physical side has been transmitted to our brain by molecular changes -through our visual nerves. The idea of the tree is the psychical -correlative of a wave of molecular motion diffused through our organs -of vision; and the conception of a tree thus becomes a possible -conception. But why did not the learned philosopher follow the wave -of molecular motion until he found the impression of the object which -the visual organs have transmitted to the brain, or the nerve-center, -translated into a thought by an intelligent being, capable, by its own -organization, of having that thought? Why does he speak of an idea -as the psychical side of what, on its physical side, is one and the -same thing? Obviously, because he meant to ignore the psychical or -mental existence as an independent existence, or as any existence at -all. Now, there is no way in which the psychical side and the physical -side can be bridged over, excepting by the hypothesis that the mind -is an entity of a peculiar nature, different in structure from the -bodily organism, but capable, by the connection between them, of -receiving and transmuting into thought the impressions which the waves -of molecular motion transmit to the brain from the external object. -To say that the set of plexuses, or networks, which hold together -the waves of molecular motion, constitute the potentiality of the -idea and make possible future ideas like it, explains nothing. The -potentiality of the idea, or the possibility of ideas like it, depends -upon the existence of a something which is capable of conceiving -the idea, holding it, and reproducing it to itself, after the waves -of molecular motion cease. I call this a process of translation, or -transmutation, because there is no other convenient term for it. It is -a process analogous to the physical assimilation of food by the organs -of physical digestion, with this difference, however, that the action -of the mental organism in the assimilation of ideas is the action of -a spiritual and intellectual organism upon materials that are brought -within its reach by the means of communication with the external world -afforded by the physical senses and the nervous system. The image of -the tree produced upon the retina of the eye by the lines of light -that proceed from every point of that object is the food which the -mind assimilates and transmutes into the idea of the tree; and this -may remain as a permanent mental perception or cognition, although -the object itself may have been seen but once. If seen many times, -the various aspects in which it has been seen are transmuted into so -many distinct ideas. If many kinds of trees, of different shapes -and dimensions, have been seen, the varieties become a part of our -consciousness in the several degrees of their precise resemblances -and differences which we happen to have observed, when the different -impressions were produced upon the retina. Can there be any doubt that -this is the process by which the infant begins to acquire ideas of -external objects, and that, as adolescence goes on and the powers of -sense expand with the growth and exercise of the physical organs, there -is a corresponding growth and expansion of the mental powers? - -This hypothesis of the progress of mental growth, _paris passibus_ with -the growth of the physical organism, brings me to the consideration of -one of those specimens of Mr. Spencer's peculiar logic, in a passage -in which he undertakes to disprove the existence of mind as anything -more than what he calls the psychical side of physical impressions. He -is treating of the impossibility of our "knowing" anything about the -substance of mind; and he propounds this impossibility in the following -logical formula: - - ...To know anything is to distinguish it as such or such--to class - it as of this or that order. An object is said to be but little - known when it is alien to objects of which we have had experience; - and it is said to be well known when there is great community of - attributes between it and objects of which we have had experience. - Hence, by implication, an object is completely known when this - recognized community is complete; and completely unknown when there - is no recognized community at all. Manifestly, then, the smallest - conceivable degree of knowledge implies at least two things between - which some community is recognized. But, if so, how can we know the - substance of mind? To know the substance of mind is to be conscious - of some community between it and some other substance. If, with - the idealist, we say that there exists no other substance, then, - necessarily, as there is nothing with which the substance of mind can - be even compared, much less assimilated, it remains unknown; while, if - we hold with the realist that being is fundamentally divisible into - that which is present to us as mind, and that which, lying outside of - it, is not mind, then, as this proposition itself asserts a difference - and not a likeness, it is equally clear that mind remains unclassable - and therefore unknowable. - -The answer to this supposed insuperable dilemma may be made by -determining what we mean when we speak of knowing a thing. Definition -of knowing is here essential, and the first inquiry we have to make -is whether, in order to know mind, it is necessary to find and -recognize some community between the substance of mind and some other -substance? The statement is, on the one hand, that there exists no -other substance with which the substance of mind can be compared, much -less assimilated, and therefore there is no aid to be derived from -resemblance; or, on the other hand, that, if being is fundamentally -divisible into something which is mind and something which is not -mind, we depend for a knowledge of mind on a difference, and not on a -likeness, and we have no means of knowing that difference. Upon either -proposition, mind remains unclassable and therefore unknowable. - -It may be conceded that our knowledge of the properties and forms of -matter consists in recognizing a community or a difference between -things which belong to the same class, so that there is a comparison -between things which are of the same substance. But what is to prevent -us from classifying the substance of mind, when the fundamental idea -of its substance is that it is something which resembles no other -substance, but constitutes a class or description of being that stands -entirely by itself, and in which, for a knowledge of its properties we -distinguish its properties from those of any other substance? The only -difficulty that arises here springs from the fact that we have but one -word--substance--by which to speak of the two existences that we call -mind and matter; just as we can only speak of an organism when we speak -of the natural body and the spiritual body. But this use of the same -term to express things which in our consciousness stand fundamentally -opposed to each other does not prevent us from discriminating between -the means by which we become conscious of the two things, or from -classifying the knowledge which we have of mind as something distinct -from the knowledge which we have of matter. - -We must discriminate between the means by which the properties of -matter become known to us and the means by which the properties of -mind become known to us. In both cases there is knowledge, but it is -knowledge of a different kind; it is obtained by different means; -and we must therefore recognize a fundamental difference between -the substance of mind and the substance of matter. It is true that -our knowledge of the properties of matter and our knowledge of the -properties of mind are alike in this, that in both cases it is -knowledge by one and the same person; but the distinction is that, in -the one case, I have knowledge of objects external to myself, and, in -the other case, I have knowledge of myself as the person possessing -knowledge of external objects. The knowledge that we have of ourselves -is what most persons mean by consciousness, and it is what we should -scientifically understand by that term, although consciousness is -often used as synonymous with mental cognition of things external to -ourselves, and as cognition of ourselves also. - -I shall now quote from the chapter in which Mr. Spencer makes a special -synthesis of reason, and in which he denies the existence of the -commonly assumed _hiatus_ between reason and instinct, maintaining that -the former is the continuation of the latter, because, as he thinks, -the highest forms of psychical activity arise little by little out of -the lowest and can not be separated from them. The passage which I -shall now analyze is this: - -"Here seems to be the fittest place for pointing out how the general -doctrine that has been developed supplies a reconciliation between the -experience-hypothesis as commonly interpreted and the hypothesis which -the transcendentalists oppose to it. - -"The universal law, that, other things equal, the cohesion of psychical -states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed -one another in experience, supplies an explanation of the so-called -'forms of thought,' as soon as it is supplemented by the law that -habitual psychical successions entail some hereditary tendency to such -successions, which, under persistent conditions, will become cumulative -in generation after generation. We saw that the establishment of those -compound reflex actions called instincts is comprehensible on the -principle that inner relations are, by perpetual repetition, organized -into correspondence with outer relations. We have now to observe that -the establishment of those consolidated, those indissoluble, those -instinctive mental relations constituting our ideas of space and time, -is comprehensible on the same principle. - -"For, if, even to external relations that are often experienced -during the life of a single organism, answering internal relations -are established that become next to automatic--if such a combination -of psychical changes as that which guides a savage in hitting a bird -with an arrow becomes, by constant repetition, so organized as to -be performed almost without thought of the processes of adjustment -gone through--and if skill of this kind is so far transmissible that -particular races of men become characterized by particular aptitudes, -which are nothing else than partially organized psychical connections; -then, if there exist certain external relations which are experienced -by all organisms at all instants of their waking lives--relations -which are absolutely constant, absolutely universal--there will -be established answering internal relations that are absolutely -constant, absolutely universal. Such relations we have in those of -space and time. The organization of subjective relations adjusted to -these objective relations has been cumulative, not in each race of -creatures only, but throughout successive races of creatures; and such -subjective relations have, therefore, become more consolidated than -all others. Being experienced in every perception and every action of -each creature, these connections among outer existences must, for this -reason, too, be responded to by connections among inner feelings that -are, above all others, indissoluble. As the substrata of all other -relations in the _non-ego_, they must be responded to by conceptions -that are the substrata of all other relations in the _ego_. Being the -constant and infinitely repeated elements of thought, they must become -the automatic elements of thought--the elements of thought which it is -impossible to get rid of--the 'forms of intuition.' - -"Such, it seems to me, is the only possible reconciliation between the -experience-hypothesis and the hypothesis of the transcendentalists, -neither of which is tenable by itself. Insurmountable difficulties -are presented by the Kantian doctrine (as we shall hereafter see); -and the antagonist doctrine, taken alone, presents difficulties that -are equally insurmountable. To rest with the unqualified assertion -that, antecedent to experience, the mind is a blank, is to ignore the -questions: Whence comes the power of organizing experiences? Whence -arise the different degrees of that power possessed by different races -of organisms, and different individuals of the same race? If, at birth, -there exists nothing but a passive receptivity of impressions, why -is not a horse as educable as a man? Should it be said that language -makes the difference, then why do not the cat and the dog, reared in -the same household, arrive at equal degrees and kinds of intelligence? -Understood in its current form, the experience-hypothesis implies -that the presence of a definitely organized nervous system is a -circumstance of no moment--a fact not needing to be taken into account! -Yet it is the all-important fact--the fact to which, in one sense, the -criticisms of Leibnitz and others pointed--the fact without which an -assimilation of experiences is inexplicable. - -"Throughout the animal kingdom in general the actions are dependent -on the nervous structure. The physiologist shows us that each reflex -movement implies the agency of certain nerves and ganglia; that a -development of complicated instincts is accompanied by complication -of the nervous centers and their commissural connections; that the -same creature in different stages, as larva and imago, for example, -changes its instincts as its nervous structure changes; and that, -as we advance to creatures of high intelligence, a vast increase in -the size and in the complexity of the nervous system takes place. -What is the obvious inference? It is that the ability to co-ordinate -impressions and to perform the appropriate actions always implies -the pre-existence of certain nerves arranged in a certain way. What -is the meaning of the human brain? It is that the many _established_ -relations among its parts stand for so many _established_ relations -among the psychical changes. Each of the constant connections among -the fibers of the cerebral masses answers to some constant connection -of phenomena in the experiences of the race. Just as the organized -arrangement subsisting between the sensory nerves of the nostrils and -the motor nerves of the respiratory muscles not only makes possible a -sneeze, but also, in the newly born infant, implies sneezings to be -hereafter performed, so, all the organized arrangements subsisting -among the nerves of the infant's brain not only make possible certain -combinations of impressions, but also imply that such combinations -will hereafter be made, imply that there are answering combinations in -the outer world, imply a preparedness to cognize these combinations, -imply faculties of comprehending them. It is true that the resulting -compound psychical changes do not take place with the same readiness -and automatic precision as the simple reflex action instanced; it is -true that some individual experiences seem required to establish them. -But, while this is partly due to the fact that these combinations are -highly involved, extremely varied in their modes of occurrence, made -up, therefore, of psychical relations less completely coherent, and -hence need further repetitions to perfect them, it is in a much greater -degree due to the fact that at birth the organization of the brain is -incomplete, and does not cease its spontaneous progress for twenty or -thirty years afterward. Those who contend that knowledge results wholly -from the experiences of the individual, ignoring as they do the mental -evolution which accompanies the autogenous development of the nervous -system, fall into an error as great as if they were to ascribe all -bodily growth and structure to exercise, forgetting the innate tendency -to assume the adult form. Were the infant born with a full-sized and -completely constructed brain, their position would be less untenable. -But, as the case stands, the gradually increasing intelligence -displayed throughout childhood and youth is more attributable to -the completion of the cerebral organization than to the individual -experiences--a truth proved by the fact that in adult life there is -sometimes displayed a high endowment of some faculty which, during -education, was never brought into play. Doubtless, experiences received -by the individual furnish the concrete materials for all thought. -Doubtless, the organized and semi-organized arrangements existing -among the cerebral nerves can give no knowledge until there has been -a presentation of the external relations to which they correspond. -And, doubtless, the child's daily observations and reasonings aid the -formation of those involved nervous connections that are in process of -spontaneous evolution, just as its daily gambols aid the development -of its limbs. But saying this is quite a different thing from saying -that its intelligence is wholly _produced_ by its experiences. That is -an utterly inadmissible doctrine--a doctrine which makes the presence -of a brain meaningless--a doctrine which makes idiocy unaccountable. - -"In the sense, then, that there exist in the nervous system certain -pre-established relations answering to relations in the environment, -there is truth in the doctrine of 'forms of intuition'--not the truth -which its defenders suppose, but a parallel truth. Corresponding to -absolute external relations, there are established in the structure -of the nervous system absolute internal relations--relations that are -potentially present before birth in the shape of definite nervous -connections, that are antecedent to, and independent of, individual -experiences, and that are automatically disclosed along with the first -cognitions. And, as here understood, it is not only these fundamental -relations which are thus predetermined, but also hosts of other -relations of a more or less constant kind, which are congenitally -represented by more or less complete nervous connections. But these -predetermined internal relations, though independent of the experiences -of the individual, are not independent of experiences in general: they -have been determined by the experiences of preceding organisms. The -corollary here drawn from the general argument is that the human brain -is an organized register of infinitely numerous experiences received -during the evolution of life, or, rather, during the evolution of that -series of organisms through which the human organism has been reached. -The effects of the most uniform and frequent of these experiences have -been successively bequeathed, principal and interest; and have slowly -amounted to that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain -of the infant--which the infant in after-life exercises and perhaps -strengthens or further complicates, and which, with minute additions, -it bequeaths to future generations; and thus it happens that the -European inherits from twenty to thirty cubic inches more brain than -the Papuan. Thus it happens that faculties, as of music, which scarcely -exist in some inferior human races, become congenital in superior ones. -Thus it happens that out of savages unable to count up to the number of -their fingers, and speaking a language containing only nouns and verbs, -arise at length our Newtons and Shakespeares."[150] - -The learned philosopher has here dealt with two hypotheses, neither -of which he considers tenable by itself. The first is that the -individual mind, anterior to experience, is a blank; that at birth -there exists nothing but a passive receptivity of impressions, which -become organized into intelligence by experience. The other hypothesis -is that of the transcendental school, which attributes the growth of -intelligence wholly to implanted intuitions, which become expanded by -the increase of mental power. His argument is put thus: If at birth the -mind of the individual is a blank, and it becomes capable of thought -or possessed of intelligence by experience, beginning with a passive -receptivity of impressions, and going on to their organization into -intelligence by the repetition of experiences and their increasing -complexity--why, he asks, is not a horse as educable as a man? Why -do not the cat and the dog, reared in the same household and hearing -human beings use language every moment of their lives, arrive at equal -degrees and kinds of intelligence? In the first place, as a matter -of fact, many animals are educable beyond their natural capacity of -intelligence, or beyond the point at which they would arrive without -such education, to a very remarkable degree. I have heard a credible -description of a dog which would ascend to a chamber and bring down -an article that he had been told to bring. Many repetitions of the -command and the performance had taught the animal to associate the -name of the article which he was to bring down with the act which he -was to perform. While I am writing, a bear beneath my window is going -through performances, at the word of command, of very considerable -varieties; actions which he would not do if he had not been trained -to do them. The trained war-horse knows the meaning of the different -airs played on the bugle upon the battle-field or the parade-ground, -and instantly charges or wheels about, without waiting to be prompted -by the bit or the spur. Insects can be trained, to some extent, in the -same way; birds to a much greater extent. Is the explanation of these -capacities to be found in a definitely organized nervous system as the -all-important fact without which an assimilation of experiences is -inexplicable? Grant that, as we advance from creatures of very low to -creatures of very high intelligence, we find a vast increase in the -size and complexity of the nervous system taking place through the -series, until we arrive at its highest and most complex development -in man. What is the hypothesis which explains the difference in -mental power between man and all the other creatures below him in the -capability of co-ordinating impressions and performing the appropriate -actions? It is, according to Mr. Spencer, that the capability implies -the existence of certain nerves arranged in a certain way; that where -this arrangement does not exist the capability is not found; and where -it exists in only a low degree the capability exists only in the same -degree. As two parallel and concurring facts these may be conceded. But -why are not these facts entirely consistent with another hypothesis, -namely, that to each creature, along with its specially organized -nervous system, there has been given by divine appointment a certain -degree of innate mental power, to explain which we must follow the -impressions produced in the nervous system into their transmutation -into intelligence, until we arrive at the limit of that intelligence? -Mr. Spencer's answer to this inquiry is twofold: first, that the -experience-hypothesis, in the case of the individual creature, or the -constant repetition of the impressions and the appropriate actions, is -insufficient to account for what takes place, without recognizing the -fact that the actions are dependent on the nervous structure, without -which the impressions would not be followed by the actions; second, -that the nervous structure in the different races of animals has come -to be what it is in each race by gradual modifications and increments -through the process of evolution of organisms out of one another, and -that these accumulations have resulted in the human brain, which has -the highest power of co-ordinating the impressions and performing the -appropriate actions. Then he puts, with an air of final solution, the -question, "What is the human brain?" which he answers in his own way. - -His mode of answering this question is that the brain is an organ -with established relations among its parts, which stand for so many -established relations among the psychical changes. I understand this -to mean, that as the human brain, in the process of animal evolution, -has come to have certain constant connections among the fibers of the -cerebral masses, each of these connections answers to some constant -connection of phenomena in the experiences of the race. His corollary -is that the human brain is an organized register of infinitely numerous -experiences received by the race during the evolution of life, or -during the evolution of that series of organisms through which the -human organism has been reached. Each infant of the human race, to -whom has descended this improved and perfect brain, has latent in that -organ a high capacity for intelligence. This it begins to exercise and -strengthen and further complicate as life goes on, and at the end of -twenty or thirty years the individual brain is fully developed, and -this development, or capacity for development, the individual bequeaths -with minute additions, principal and interest, to future generations. -In different races of men the cubic bulk of the brain varies greatly, -according to the size transmitted from ancestors; and so certain -faculties which scarcely exist in some races become congenital in -others; and whereas the remote ancestors of all of us were savages, -incapable even of conceiving of numbers, and possessing but the rudest -elements of language, there have at length arisen our Newtons and -Shakespeares. - -This hypothesis leads me to ask a question and to state a fact. The -question is, What is it in the infant of the most developed and -cultivated race that constitutes the high intelligence which is said -to lie latent in his brain? In other words, is there nothing in that -infant, or in the adult which he becomes, but a brain and a nervous -system of a highly organized and complex physical structure adapted -to receive impressions on itself from without? Are the experiences -which have been enjoyed by the progenitors of the human infant or by -preceding organisms registered in his brain, and is his capacity of -intelligence dependent on his having inherited the same or nearly the -same volume of brain as that which was possessed by his progenitors? -And does the intelligence consist, in degree or in kind, in nothing -but a repetition of the same experiences as those through which his -progenitors were carried, or is there a something in him to which his -individual experiences contribute the mental food by which the mind is -nourished and by the assimilation of which its individual intellectual -growth becomes possible? - -It is not necessary to question the fact that individuals of great -intellect, the Newtons and the Shakespeares, have had or may have -had large brains; or the fact that, as between races of men, the -most intelligent have brains of greater cubic measure than the less -intelligent. But it has not always been found that individuals of -superior intellect have had comparatively larger brains than other -individuals, nor that those who have had very large brains have -transmitted them to their children. The important fact to which I meant -to advert is that, since we have known much about the human brain and -the nervous system connected with it, it has not been found that, in -its several parts and in the action of the nerves connected with it, -it has been differently organized and acted upon in the lowest savages -from what we know of it in the European and the most civilized races. -There is a difference in volume, but not in the organization or the -office of the brain in different races of men, as there is in different -individuals of the same race. The fact that all men, since they became -a completed type of animal, however they originated and became men, -have possessed a capacity to become in different degrees intelligent -and thinking beings, points strongly to the conclusion that while in -each individual there is a nervous system so organized as to transmit -impressions from external objects to the central physical organ called -the brain, there must be another existence in that individual, of a -spiritual and intellectual nature, of a substance that is not physical, -to which the brain supplies the materials of thought, thought being -mental cognition of an idea. If I am asked for the proof of such an -existence, I answer that the proof is consciousness, as I define it, -and this I conceive is the highest kind of proof. - -One may appeal to the convictions of mankind for an answer to the -question, What is the highest and most satisfactory kind of knowledge -that any of us possess? The most intelligent man may be mistaken in -that part of self-knowledge that relates to his own character or -motives. Others may see him very differently from the light in which -he sees himself, and they may be right and he may be wrong. He may -think, too, that he knows a great deal that he does not know; but no -intelligent man is mistaken or in any way deluded when he believes in -his own existence. No man in his waking moments and in his right mind -ever confounded his own identity, as we have seen that Lady Macbeth -did when she was walking in her sleep, with the identity of another -person. No man in his right mind loses the constant, ever-present -sense of himself as a being and as one distinct from all other beings. -The reason is that his own existence is certified to him by the most -unerring of witnesses, one who can not lie, because the fact of one's -own existence is the fact of which that witness must speak. Of all -other facts the witness may speak falsely. The mind can not speak -falsely when it speaks to us of our own existence, for the witness who -speaks and the person spoken to are one and the same. The falsehood, if -there could be a falsehood, would be instantly detected. - -As the mind certifies to itself its own existence by the most direct -and the highest kind of proof, so it certifies to itself the powers -with which it is endowed; and this brings me to the anatomical -examination of the structure of the mind. I shall not make this -analysis a very minute one, but shall confine it to those distinct -elementary powers which are constituted by systems, as the powers of -the bodily organism are constituted by systems distinguishable by the -functions which they perform. In the bodily organism we recognize the -digestive system, the system of circulation of the blood, the muscular -system, the nervous system, the sensory system, which is distributed -into the different organs of sense, the male and female systems of -sexual generation, and the female system of gestation. These several -systems, acting together as one complex mechanism endowed with the -mysterious principle of life, form in each human being of either sex -the physical existence of the individual. Acting in each individual of -either sex simultaneously and with mutual involved interdependencies, -they form a whole which, in its several parts and their functions, may -be likened to the several parts and functions in one of those machines -which we ourselves construct--with this difference, however, that -in one life is present and in the other it is not. The fundamental -question is whether this complex animal mechanism, thus constituted -of certain physical systems, also constitutes during this life the -entire individual. If so, the individual existence is a unit, and, when -the physical organism perishes by what we call death, the individual -existence ceases. If, on the contrary, we have satisfactory proof -that there is, during this life, in each individual an organized and -extended entity, composed, like the systems of the bodily organisms, -of certain systems of its own but of a substance that is not material, -then the existence of each individual is a dual existence; and one of -the two existences now associated and acting together may be dissolved -into its original material elements, while the other, composed of a -different substance, may be indissoluble and have an endless life. -There is no middle ground that I can perceive between these two -hypotheses. One or the other of them is absolutely true, independent of -the inquiry as to the mode in which mind came to exist; for after going -through with all the reasoning and all the proofs that are supposed to -show its origin by the process called evolution, we must still come -back to the question of what mind is after it has come into existence; -must determine on which side lies the preponderating probability of its -continuance after the death of the body; and must accept the conclusion -of its destruction or cessation when the body dies, or the other -conclusion that it is unlike the body in its substance, and therefore -indestructible by the means which destroy the body. For this reason we -must examine the mind for proof that it is an organism of a special -nature because composed of a special substance, and this proof is to be -reached by an analysis of the systems of which the mind is composed. I -select, of course, for the purposes of this analysis, any individual -whose physical and mental faculties have had the average development -into the condition that is called a sound mind in a sound body--_mens -sana in corpore sano_. I shall treat incidentally of the condition of -idiocy. - -We may classify the distinct systems of the mind, with their several -functions, as easily as we can classify the distinct systems of our -physical structure and their functions. I have seen the systems of -the mind distributed into five; and although I do not adopt the whole -analysis made by the writer to whom I refer, or make use of the same -terminology, I shall follow his classification because it is one which -any thinking person must recognize as a description of mental powers -of which he is conscious.[151] We are all aware that we possess the -following mental systems in which inhere certain elementary powers that -are mental powers: - -1. A sensory system, by which the mind takes impressions from matter. - -2. A system of intellectual faculties, such as reason, imagination, -reflection, combination of ideas, discrimination between different -ideas. - -3. A system of emotions, or susceptibilities to pleasure or pain, of a -moral and intellectual nature as distinguished from the pleasurable or -painful excitation of our nerves. - -4. A system of desires, which prompt us to wish for and acquire some -good, or to avoid some evil. - -5. A system of affections, which prompt us to like or dislike persons, -things, situations, and whatever is attractive or unattractive, as the -case may be. - -A little further analysis of each of these systems will explain why -they are respectively to be thus classified as distinguishable organic -powers or functions of the human mind: - -_First._ The mind is placed as a recipient in correspondence with the -material universe through the nerves of sensation and the special -corporeal organs, whereby the properties of matter become to some -extent known to us. As the power of the physical senses to obtain for -us a knowledge of the properties of matter is limited, even when our -senses are in the utmost state of their normal capacity, there may be -properties of matter which will never become known to us in our present -existence. But certain of its properties do become known to us, and we -are perfectly aware that this takes place through our physical organs -of sense, which convey to our mental reception certain impressions. -This power of the mind, therefore, to receive such impressions, to -retain and transmute them into thought, is to be recognized as a power -exerted by means of an organic physical contrivance and an organic -mental structure, the two acting together, the resultant being the -mind's faculty for receiving ideas from the external world. Let us -suppose, then, that the bodily senses are impaired by the partial -destruction of their organs. It does not follow that the knowledge -which has been derived from them, when they were in full activity, -is destroyed; all that happens is that we acquire no more of such -knowledge by the same means, or do not acquire it so readily and -completely. If the destruction of the physical senses is so complete -as it becomes when death of the whole body takes place, the materials -derived from the impressions conveyed to the mind from external objects -during life have been transmuted into ideas and thoughts, and, as -that which holds the ideas and the thoughts is of a substance unlike -in nature to the substance of the physical organs which conveyed the -impressions, the rational conclusion is that the ideas and thoughts -will continue to be held by it, after the dissolution of the body, as -they were held while the body was in full life. - -_Second._ I recognize in the mind a system of intellectual faculties. -Of intellect, I should say that the ascertainment of truth is its -primary function; and hence I should say that the power of retaining -permanent possession of truth already ascertained is the means by -which we maintain continued ascertainment, or the utilization of -truth already ascertained.[152] For the exercise of this power of -ascertaining, holding, applying, and expressing truth--the processes -of intellect--we have three recognized faculties. These are the -intuitive faculty; the faculty of association or combination; and -the introspective faculty, or the capacity to look inward upon the -processes of our own minds. The philosophers who maintain that all -our knowledge is derived from experience admit neither the intuitive -faculty nor the fact of intuition. On the other hand, the philosophers -who maintain, as Mr. Spencer does, that the brain of every infant is -an organized register of the experiences of his ancestors, do not -allow of the existence of any intuitions as facts in the individual -life of the infant, because they regard the individual experiences -of the infant as mere repetitions of former experiences that took -place in its progenitors. But rightly regarded the true meaning of -the intuitive faculty is this: that at the instant when a new sensory -impression is received by the infant, or the adult, there is an innate -and implanted power which comes into play, by which is asserted the -reality of that from which the sensory impression is received. This -power, the intuitive faculty, is infallible. It was ordained as the -means by which a sensory impression becomes to us a reality. We are so -constructed, mentally, that we must believe those primary facts which -the sensory impressions certify to us to be facts. On the veracity of -this certification we are absolutely dependent, because we can not -contradict the affirmations of reality which causation makes to our -intuitive mental perceptions. On this veracity we risk our lives; we -could not be safe if we were not subjected to this belief. Intuition, -therefore, is something anterior to experience; it is that power by -which the first experience and the last become to us the means of -belief in a reality. This is a power that can belong to and inhere -in a spiritual organism alone. We must, therefore, recognize in the -infant this original implanted endowment, the capacity to be mentally -convinced of realities; and while, in order to meet the first exercise -of this capacity there must be a physical organism which will conduct -the sensory impressions to the brain and a brain that will receive -them, the capacity of the infant to have its first conviction of the -reality certified to it by the sensory impression is at once the -capacity of an intellectual being, and a necessity imposed upon him by -the law of his existence. Idiocy, when complete, is the absence of this -capacity, by reason of some failure of connection between the brain, as -the central recipient of sensory impressions, and the mind which should -receive and transmute those impressions into thought. We are scarcely -warranted in regarding the idiot as a human animal possessed of no mind -whatever. The absolute idiot should be defined as a human creature whom -we can not educate at all--in whom we can awaken no intelligence; but -we are not therefore authorized in believing that there is no provision -whatever for the development of intelligence after the mere physical -life of the body is ended. Absolute idiocy, or what, from our as yet -imperfect means of developing intelligence in such unfortunate persons -we must regard as at present absolute, is probably very rare. Between -human creatures so born and those vast multitudes in whom average -intelligence is developed by surrounding influences, whatever they may -be, there are various degrees of the capacity for development; and what -happens in these intermediate cases proves that there are different -degrees in which the connection between the physical and the mental -organism is established at birth, so that in some the connection may -be said to be abnormal and imperfect, while in the enormous majority -it is at least so nearly normal and complete that intelligence may be -developed. - -Here, then, is the place to advert to Mr. Spencer's assertion that -the doctrine that intelligence in the human being is wholly produced -by experience is utterly inadmissible; that it makes the presence -of a brain meaningless, and idiocy unaccountable. A doctrine which -imputes the development of intelligence _wholly_ to the experience of -the individual is of course untenable. There must be a brain and a -nervous system; but we are not warranted, in the case of the idiot, in -assuming that he has a differently organized brain and nervous system -from those of his parents or others of the human race, as Mr. Spencer -appears to me to assume. What we are warranted in believing is that -while the brain and nervous system of the idiot child may be just -as complete in his structure as in those of the parents, there has -somehow occurred, from some cause, antecedent in some cases to birth, -but operating after birth in other cases, a failure of the adequate -connection between the brain and the mind, so that intelligence can -not be developed at all, or can be developed but partially. The -individual may have inherited just as good an "organized register" of -the experience of his ancestors--just as good a natural brain as his -brothers and sisters who are perhaps highly intelligent from their -birth, or capable of becoming intelligent. Yet he lacks the ability -to co-ordinate impressions and to perform the actions appropriate -to those impressions, because there has failed to be established in -him the necessary connection between the impressions and the sensory -intellectual system which constitutes one organic part of the mind. The -experiences, however often repeated, of the impressions produced by -his physical senses on his brain, remain there as corporeal feelings. -They reach no further. They do not become transmuted into ideas, -and so intelligence can not be developed, or is developed but to a -very feeble extent. Instead of saying that "the gradually increasing -intelligence displayed throughout childhood is more attributable to -the completion of the cerebral organization than to the individual -experiences," I should say that it is most attributable to the presence -of an established connection between the function of the cerebral -organization and the mental receptivity of impressions, which is -not merely passive, but is incessantly active because incessantly -receiving, and that, where this connection is wanting, the receptivity, -although it may exist, can not become active, and so intelligence -can not be developed in this life. But there may be another state of -existence, in which the mind of the idiot, no longer dependent on a -physical organization of brain and nervous system for the reception -of ideas and for intellectual growth, but retaining its capacity for -mental development, may begin and carry on such development by other -means; whereas, if the brain and the nervous system constitute all -there is of any human being, whether born an idiot or born capable of -intellectual growth through his individual experiences, he can have no -future after that brain and nervous system are destroyed, unless we -suppose that mind is something that has been developed out of matter -into a spiritual existence--a supposition which is to me inconceivable. - -The second of the intellectual faculties is the associative, or -that intuitive power by which ideas are combined and associated or -held in disjunction and separation. I regard this as an intuitive -faculty, because, as our observation teaches us, its presence and -power, manifested at the first dawning of infantile intelligence, are -attested by every exercise of the organs through which the external -world reaches our minds, to the last moment of our mortal existence. -Experience is, of course, necessary to the first action of this -intuitive faculty. This is only another way of saying that there must -occur a sensory impression upon the brain which becomes transmuted -into the idea of the external object, and then a repetition of that -impression produces a repetition of the idea, and the associative -faculty combines or disjoins them. But unless there exists an intuitive -power, inherent in the intellective system, whereby the first idea and -the second can be associated and compared, there can be no knowledge, -no acquisition of truth, because the sensory impressions will stop -in the brain as so many feelings excited through the nervous system, -instead of being transmuted into thought. - -The introspective faculty, on the other hand, does not deal solely -with sensory impressions, or with the ideas which they have suggested. -It is that power of the mind by which it can look inward upon itself. -This is seemingly a paradox; but nevertheless, the existence of such a -faculty is a necessary hypothesis, not only because we are conscious -of it, but because without it we could have no means of analyzing -our own mental structure, although we could make some very partial -analysis of the mind of another individual by studying his actions. As -regards ourselves, it is as if our visual organs possessed the power -of looking at the process by which an image of an external object is -impressed upon the retina and is thence transmitted to the brain, where -the sensory impression is produced. This, of course, is a physical -impossibility. All we can do is to examine the physical structure of -the eye, with its wonderful provision of lenses and other means for -the reception and the effect of light, and to reason upon what we can -discover that the process of what is called seeing must be thus or -thus. But that process itself we can not see by the same organs by -which it is carried on. In the case of the mind, however--and herein -is one of the remarkable proofs of its unlikeness as an organism to -the bodily organism--there is a power to witness, to observe, to -be sensible of its own operations. This power, like all the other -mental powers, may be very feeble in some individuals, for want of -exercise, but in others, from long and frequent exercise, it may become -exceedingly vigorous, and be the means of advancing mental philosophy -if its observations are preserved and recorded. It is one of the -systems which, as a whole, constitute the spiritual organism to which -we give the name of mind. Such a capacity can not be predicated of a -physical organism. It is impossible for us to conceive of a machine -standing and looking upon its own operations, speculating upon their -improvement, or thinking of the relation of its mechanism to the human -author of its being. It is equally impossible for us to think of the -body of man contemplating its own existence, or being sensible of it; -but it is perfectly easy to conceive of its being known to the mind -that inhabits it, which takes cognizance both of its own operations -and of the operations of the physical organism, reflects upon them -separately or in their action upon one another, and spontaneously -refers both to an author. - -_Third._ I have placed third in the category of mental systems the -system of emotions or susceptibilities to mental pleasure or pain, as -distinguished from the pleasurable or painful excitation of our nervous -system. No one can doubt that, however powerful may be the influence -upon our mental states of physical pain or physical sensations that -are pleasurable, there is such a thing as mental pain and mental -pleasure, satisfaction or dissatisfaction, wholly unconnected with -and in no way dependent upon our corporeal feelings, present or past. -It is from this susceptibility to mental pain or pleasure that we -come to have the idea of goodness or badness, which is originally a -classification of the qualities of external things as good or bad; -the good being those which affect us pleasurably, and the bad those -which affect us painfully. By our mental organization we are placed -in such correspondence with the material universe, that things apart -from ourselves affect us agreeably or disagreeably; sights, sounds, -odors, and tastes give us pleasure or pain. We are also placed in -correspondence with the spiritual universe, and thereby certain acts, -relations, and traits of character give us pleasure, or the reverse. -In process of time, the youth whose mental systems are in the course -of expansion comes to perceive that his own acts give him pleasure or -pain, and hence he derives the perception of good or bad qualities -in himself. Moral goodness in ourselves--goodness of disposition, -of intention, of volition, of habit--is found to be distinct from -physical and intellectual goodness; and thus the consciousness of moral -goodness becomes the intellectual faculty to which moral commands can -be addressed, with a prospect that the connection between obedience -and happiness will be perceived. This susceptibility to mental pain -or pleasure, from the qualities of external things, from the acts and -dispositions of other persons, and from our own, is one that can inhere -in a mental organization, but it can not possibly inhere in a physical -organism. The physical organism is undoubtedly the means by which the -mental susceptibility to pleasure or pain is reached from the external -universe; but, unless there is a mental organism to feel the pleasure -or the pain, the action of the physical organization is nothing but the -excitation of the nervous system. I, therefore, make a distinct class -among the mental systems, and assign to it the faculty of experiencing -mental pleasure or mental pain as a capacity distinct from the -pleasurable or painful excitation of our nerves. - -_Fourth._ In the category of mental systems may be placed those desires -which lead us to wish for and strive to obtain some good or to avoid -some evil. This, surely, is not to be regarded as anything but an -intellectual perception of what is to us a good or an evil. It is a -structural capacity of the soul which, after an experience of that -which we learn to be good for us, or the reverse of good, is always -prompting us to take the steps or to perform the acts which will insure -a repetition of that experience, in the acquisition of further good -or the avoidance of further evil. Its operations may be perverted. -We may, from bad habits or erroneous ideas of good and evil, pursue -objects that are pernicious. But whether we strive for that which is -truly good, or is deceptively regarded as a good, we are perpetually -acting under the impulse of a desire that is implanted in us, and -that operates as a desire whether its objects are worthy or unworthy, -beneficial or injurious, noxious or innoxious to our moral health. - -_Fifth_, and lastly, we may classify the affections as one of the -structural systems of our spiritual existence. It is that part of -our natures that makes us like or dislike both persons and things; -and, in regard to the former, it is the capacity for love in its high -distinction from the physical appetite of sexual passion. The range -of its operation is most various and multiform, but throughout all of -its operations it is a spiritual capacity, implanted in us for our -happiness as spiritual beings. - -If it is objected that this is an arbitrary classification--that as -an analysis of structural systems in our mental organization it bears -no analogy to the anatomical exploration and classification of the -structural systems of our physical organism--the answer is, that in -regard to the latter we make the examination by the exercise of our -corporeal senses, chiefly by the visual organs, as we do in the case of -all other organized matter. In analyzing the structural organization -of our minds, we are examining a subject that is not laid bare to the -inspection of any of our corporeal organs; the scalpel in the hand -of the dissector can afford us no aid in this investigation, but the -inspection must be carried on by turning the eye of the mind inward -upon itself. This we are mentally constituted to do. While, therefore, -it may be true that the classification which I have made, or which may -have been made by others, of the structural mental systems, is in one -sense arbitrary, and while in any method of describing them they may -run into or overlap one another in a complex organism, it will always -remain true that the mind is capable of such examinations, and that the -analysis, however given, is useful to the comprehension of the mind -as an organized and extended entity. No one can carry on this mental -examination without perceiving that he is examining a something which -has an independent existence and a life of its own, whether he supposes -it to have been evolved out of organized matter, or embraces the idea -of its distinct and special creation by an exercise of the Divine Will. - -The two main hypotheses concerning the origin of mind may now be -contrasted. In the long process of development of animal organisms -out of one another there come to be, it is said, higher and higher -degrees of intelligence, as the nervous system becomes more and more -capable of complex impressions, until we arrive at the consummate -physical organization and the supreme intelligence of the human race. -The physical organization is open to our examination, and we find the -human brain divided into cerebral masses, with ganglia of sensory -nerves extending to the external sensory organs. Intelligence is the -faculty of comprehending by previous preparation the combinations of -impressions made on the brain through the sensory nerves. The brain -being an organized register in which the experiences of progenitors -have accumulated a high degree of this faculty, each human infant born -into the world comes into it with a prepared capacity to acquire the -combinations of impressions produced in his individual experience. -Transmitted from generation to generation, this inherited capacity -becomes the means by which each individual manifests and enjoys what -we call intelligence; and the resulting aggregate of all the faculties -thus called into exercise is what we denominate mind. It must be -observed, however, that this theory or explanation of the origin of -mind, rejecting the hypothesis of its special creation as a being -of a spiritual nature, assumes it to be a something which has been -developed out of the growth and improvement of a physical organism. -When you inquire whether the nature of this something is supposed to -be a product of a different substance from matter, although developed -out of matter, you are left without an answer; and when you press the -inquiry whether a spiritual existence can be conceived as having grown -out of the action of a physical organism, you are told that there are -no means of determining what a spiritual existence is, because there -is nothing with which you can compare it so as to ascertain what it -resembles or what it does not resemble. Or if there are some who -accept the evolution theory of the origin of mind, and who think it -possible that a spiritual existence can owe its origin to the action of -matter without any intervention of a creating power purposely giving -existence to a spiritual essence, you have to ask a question to which -you can only get this answer: that it has pleased the Almighty Being -to establish a system by which a spiritual in contradistinction to a -physical existence has been developed in countless ages out of the -action of material substances organized into definite systems and -endowed with the principle of life. Those who assume this hypothesis -must necessarily assume also that the spiritual existence is, after it -has come into being, an existence distinct from the physical organism, -although generated out of it, and then they must encounter the further -inquiry as to the probability of the supposed method of production -resorted to by the Supreme Being. - -More than once in the course of our colloquies I have had occasion to -say that, in all our inquiries of this nature, whether in regard to the -origin of our physical organism or that of our mental existence, we -must constantly bear in mind the unbounded capacity of the Creator to -adopt any method of production whatever; that it is just as much within -his power to call things of the most opposite natures into existence -by a single word as it is to establish methods by which they shall be -developed through innumerable ages of what we call time. That the Being -who is supposed to preside over the universe and to hold this unlimited -power is an hypothesis I readily admit; but I affirm that his existence -and attributes are necessary postulates, without which there can be no -reasoning concerning the origin of anything. Whether that Being exists -and possesses the attributes which we impute to him I have all along -said is a matter of which we must be satisfied by independent proofs -before we undertake to investigate his probable methods. - -The hypothesis of the origin of mind which I now mean to contrast -with that of the evolutionists may be stated as follows: It is a -rational deduction, from all that we know of our physical organism, -that procreation of new individuals of that organism by the sexual -union of male and female was established as the means of continuing -the species of animal known as man. When or how established is not a -material part of the inquiry that I now make. It may have been that -the division of the sexes came about by a very slow process, or it -may have been by the aboriginal creation of a completed pair, male -and female. However or whenever it came to exist, there came to be -one uniform method of bringing into existence new individuals of a -peculiar and perfectly distinguishable animal type. If we confine our -attention to the physical organism of man, it is perfectly apparent -that when procreation and gestation take place they happen because of -the established law that a new individual of this species of animal -shall be produced by the sexual union of two other individuals, male -and female, and that the new individual shall have the same physical -organism as the parents. A new physical life thus springs out of two -other physical lives by a process the secret of which we can not -detect, although we can trace it through some of its stages so far as -to see that there is a secret process by which two physical organisms -give existence to another physical organism of the same type and having -the same principle of life. - -As the new individual animal grows into further development, we find -that along with his animal organism and united with it by a tie which -we can not see, but about which we can reason, there is apparently -present a kind of life that is something more than the life of the -body. The further we carry our investigations of the phenomena which -indicate the existence of this mental life, the more we become -convinced that it is the life of a spiritual organism. As the Creator -had the power to give existence to the corporeal organism, why had he -not an equal power to give existence to a spiritual organism? If he -established the law of sexual union between a male and a female in -order to perpetuate the type of animal to which they belong--the law -which gives existence to a new individual of that animal type every -time that a new conception and a new birth take place--why should he -not have established the collateral law that every time there is a -new birth of an infant there shall come into existence a spiritual -entity which shall be united to the corporeal organism for a time, -thus constituting in that infant a dual existence which makes his -whole individuality during this life? If we suppose that the physical -organism of our double natures was left to be worked out by a very -slow process, by which physical organisms are developed out of one -another--or by which we theoretically suppose them to have been so -developed--why is it necessary to suppose that our spirits or souls -have been developed in the same way or by an analogous method? What -reason have we to believe that the Creator works by the same methods in -the spiritual world, or by methods that are of the same nature as those -which we think we can discover to be his methods in giving existence -to corporeal organisms? The two realms of spirit and matter are so -completely unlike that we are not compelled to believe that the methods -by which creation of organisms of the two kinds are effected by the -Almighty are necessarily or probably the same. - -In order to be clearly understood I will now repeat my hypothesis -in a distinct form. I assume the existence of a pair of animals of -the human type, male and female, endowed with the power of producing -new individuals of the same type. In their physical organisms is -established the law of procreation, and in the female counterpart of -that organism is established the concomitant law of conception and -parturition. Thus far provision is made for the production of a new -individual physically organized like the parents. In those parents -there is also established another law, by the operation of which the -same process which results in the production of the new individual -animal organism brings into existence a spiritual organism, which is -united with and becomes the companion of the physical organism so -long as the latter shall continue to live. These laws established -in the first pair and in every succeeding pair continue to operate -through every succeeding generation. Perhaps it will be said that -this attributes the production of a spiritual organism to a physical -process; but, in truth, it does no more than to assert the simultaneous -production of the two existences. It is not necessary to assume that -the fœtus which becomes at birth the human infant is before birth -animated by a soul; for it is not necessary to suppose, nor is it -apparently true, that the physical organism is complete until birth -takes place and the breath of life enters the lungs, thus constituting -a new life other than that of the fœtus or the unborn child, although -the one is a continuation of the other. At whatever point of time the -complete animal organism is in a condition to be observed so that we -can say here is a living child, at that point we begin to perceive a -capacity to receive impressions from the external world without the -connection that has theretofore existed between the unborn child and -the maternal system. This capacity must either be attributed to the -individual experience of the infant, so that without experience of -his own he can not begin to be possessed of a growing intelligence, -or it must be imputed to an innate and implanted power resident in -a spiritual organism that comes into exercise whenever the physical -organism has begun to draw the breath of life. - -The evolution hypothesis of the origin of the human mind necessarily -leaves its nature in an indeterminate state that will not satisfy the -requirements of sound reasoning. In one mode of stating and reasoning -upon this hypothesis it is assumed that there is not now and never was -a mental existence that was created in each individual of the race -at his birth; but that at some very remote period in the history of -successive animal organisms there was produced an animal of a highly -developed nervous structure, capable of intelligence by reason of a -superior power of receiving physical impressions and co-ordinating -them into states of consciousness which correspond to the physical -feelings; and to the perpetually recurring series of these states of -consciousness we give the name of mind. This capacity of intelligence -is transmitted from parents to offspring, the experiences of the former -being registered in the brain of the latter; but however complete may -be the inherited nervous structure, and however great the capacity -for intelligence, mind in each individual of the race is evidenced by -nothing but a constant succession and variation of certain states of -feelings produced in the nervous structure. - -Against this view we may place what we know from constant observation. -We know that it has been ordained, as a consequence of the sexual union -of two individuals of opposite sex, there shall come into existence a -new individual of the same physical organism as the parents. Of the -interior process by which this product is effected we must remain -ignorant, but about the fact there can be no doubt. That fact is, -that by the union of certain vesicles contributed by each of the -parents there results a new individual organism. We know further -that simultaneously with the complete production of the new physical -organism, there comes into being, and is incorporated with it, an -existence that we are compelled by the phenomena which it manifests to -regard as a non-physical and a spiritual organism. Of the process by -which this distinct existence is effected, we must remain as ignorant -as we are of the process by which the physical organism was made to -result from the sexual union of the parents. But of the fact there can -be no more doubt in the one case than in the other. In every instance -of a new birth of a perfect infant, we know that there results a dual -existence in the same individual; the one manifested by physical, the -other by mental phenomena. To argue that the mental and spiritual -existence grew out of an improved and improving physical organism -in long-past ages, and became an adjunct to that organism after it -had attained a certain development, without any intervention of the -creating power at each new birth of an individual infant, is to limit -the power of the Creator in a realm wherein the subject of his creating -power is essentially unlike the subject with which he deals when he -deals with physical organisms. In all reasoning upon the origin and -nature of the human mind, the boundless power of the Creator must be -assumed. In judging of the probabilities of his methods of action, it -is the safest course to be guided by what we can see takes place at -every new birth of a human infant. The physical organism results from -the operation of a certain law. The mental organism results, it is -alike rational to presume, from the operation of a certain other law. -How either of these laws operates we are not permitted to know, but -we can as safely infer the one as the other, from what is open to our -observation. - -I shall now touch briefly upon another argument, the foundation of -which is to be tested by historical facts into the truth of which I -shall not here inquire, because they must, for the purposes for which -I use them, be assumed. The immortality of the human soul is said to -have been proved by a Divine revelation. This great fact is supposed -to be established by evidence of a character quite different from that -which convinces us of the existence and attributes of the Almighty. -But, assuming revelation to be a fact, it has an important bearing -upon the subject of this essay, because the question arises, for what -conceivable reason the Almighty should have made to us a revelation of -our immortality, through the direct testimony of a competent witness, -if we are not spiritual beings. Information of a fact supposes that -there was a person to be informed. Concurrently with the consciousness -which assures us of our personality, we have the assurance of our -immortality certified to us by a messenger expressly authorized to give -us the information. If the mind, or that part of our individuality -which we call the soul, is in its origin and nature nothing but what -the evolution theory supposes, what was there to be informed of -immortality, or of anything else? The possibility and certainty of -an existence after the death of the body is a conviction that must -exercise great influence over the conduct of men in this life. It is -consistent with the whole apparent scheme of the revelation to suppose -that it was made for a twofold purpose: first, to cause men to lead -better lives in this world than they might have led without this -information and conviction; and, secondly, to form them for greater -happiness in another world. The first of these purposes might have -been effectuated by causing men to believe in their own immortality, -notwithstanding the belief might be a delusion because there is no -being capable, in fact, of any existence after the life of the body -is ended. But such a method of action is hardly to be imputed to the -Creator and Supreme Governor of the universe, according to the ideas -of his character which natural religion alone will give us. It is not -in accordance with rational conceptions of his attributes to suppose -that he deludes his rational creatures with assurances or apparent -proofs of something that is not true for the sake of making them act -as if it were true. When we find ourselves running into a hypothesis -of this kind, we may be pretty sure that we are departing from correct -principles of reasoning. In regard to the second of the supposed -purposes for which the revelation of immortality was made--to form -men for greater happiness in another state of existence--it is quite -obvious that the supposed scheme of the revelation is a mere delusion, -if we are not beings capable of a continued spiritual existence after -the death of our bodies. It is therefore a matter of great consequence -to determine what the evolution theory of the origin and nature of the -human mind makes us out to be. - -I have never seen any statement of that theory that does not lead to -the conclusion that man is a highly developed animal organism, whose -mental existence is not something created in each individual of the -race, and of a substance and organized structure different from the -physical organism, but whose mental phenomena are merely exhibitions -and effects of occurrences taking place in the physical system, and -assuming the shape of what for distinctness is called thought. In -whatever form this theory has been stated by its most distinguished -professors, it leaves only an interval of degree, and not an interval -of kind, between the mind of man and that which, in some of the other -animals, is supposed to be mind. The evolution doctrine, taken in one -of its aspects, supposes one grand chain of animal organisms, rising -higher and higher in the scale of animal life, but connected together -by ordinary generation, so that they are of one kindred throughout; but -that, as each distinct species grows out of predecessors, by gradual -improvements and increments, forming more and more elaborate organisms, -man is the consummate product of the whole process. But when we ask -at what point or stage in the series of developing animal organisms -the mind of man was produced, or what it was when produced, we get no -satisfactory answer. To the first question, it can only be answered, -as Darwin himself answers, that there must be a definition of man -before we can determine at what time he came to exist. To the second -question, we have answers which differ materially from each other. -First, we have whatever we can extract from such a system of psychology -as Mr. Spencer's, which ignores the capability of the mind to exist -independent of the nervous structure and the brain, because it excludes -the idea of any ego, any me, any person, and makes consciousness to -consist of a connected series of physical feelings, to which there are -corresponding psychical equivalents that he calls mental states. It -would seem to follow, therefore, that when there is no longer remaining -for the individual any nervous structure and any brain, the mental -states, or psychical side of the physical impressions, must cease; or, -in other words, that the only existing ego has come to an end. - -On the other hand, I have seen an ingenious hypothesis which it is well -to refer to, because it illustrates the efforts that are often made -to reconcile the doctrines of evolution with a belief in immortality. -This hypothesis by no means ignores the possibility of a spiritual -existence, or the spiritual as distinguished from the material world. -But it assumes that man was produced under the operation of physical -laws; and that after he had become a completed product--the consummate -and finished end of the whole process of evolution--he passed under the -dominion and operation of other and different laws, and is saved from -annihilation by the intervention of a change from the physical to the -spiritual laws of his Creator. Put into a condensed form, this theory -has been thus stated: Having spent countless æons in forming man, by -the slow process of animal evolution, God will not suffer him to fall -back into elemental flames, and be consumed by the further operation of -physical laws, but will transfer him into the dominion of the spiritual -laws that are held in reserve for his salvation. - -One of the first questions to be asked, in reference to this -hypothesis, is, Who or what is it that God is supposed to have spent -countless æons in creating by the slow process of animal evolution? If -we contemplate a single specimen of the human race, we find a bodily -organism, endowed with life like that of other animals, and acted upon -by physical laws throughout the whole period of its existence. We -also find present in the same individual a mental existence, which is -certified to us by evidence entirely different from that by which we -obtain a knowledge of the physical organism. As the methods employed -by the Creator in the production of the physical organism, whatever -we may suppose them to have been, were physical laws operating upon -matter, so the methods employed by him in the production of a spiritual -existence must have operated in a domain that was wholly aside from -the physical world. Each of these distinct realms is equally under the -government of an Omnipotent Being; and while we may suppose that in the -one he employed a very slow process, such as the evolution of animal -organisms out of one another is imagined to have been, there is no -conceivable reason why he should not, in the other and very different -realm, have resorted to the direct creation of a spiritual existence, -which can not, in the nature of things, have required to be produced by -the action of physical laws. When, at the birth of each individual of -the human race, the two existences become united, when, in consequence -of the operation of that sexual union of the parents which has been -ordained for the production of a new individual, the physical and the -spiritual existence become incorporated in the one being, the fact that -they remain for a certain time mutually dependent and mutually useful, -co-operating in the purposes of their temporary connection, does not -change their essential nature. The one may be destructible because the -operation of physical laws may dissolve the ligaments that hold it -together; the other may be indestructible, because the operation of -spiritual laws will hold together the spiritual organism that is in its -nature independent of the laws of matter. - -I can therefore see no necessary connection between the methods -employed by the Almighty in the production of an animal and the methods -employed by him in the production of a soul. That in the birth of -the individual the two come into existence simultaneously, and are -temporarily united in one and the same being, only proves that the two -existences are contemporaneous in their joint inception. It does not -prove that they are of the same nature, or the same substance, or that -the physical organism is the only ego, or that the psychical existence -is nothing but certain states of the material structure, to whose -aggregate manifestations certain philosophers give the name of mind, -while denying to them personal individuality and the consciousness of a -distinct being. - -And now, in bringing this discussion to a close, I will only add that -the great want of this age is the prosecution of inquiry into the -nature of the human mind as an organic structure, regarded as such. -It seems to me that the whole mission of Science is now perverted by -a wrong aim, which is to find out the external to the neglect of the -internal--to make all exploration terminate in the laws of the physical -universe, and go aside from the examination of the spiritual world. -It is no reproach to those who essay the latter inquiry that they -are scoffed at as "the metaphysicians." It matters not what they are -called, so long as they pursue the right path. It is now in regard to -the pursuit of science as it was formerly in regard to the writing of -history. That philosophical French historian, M. Taine, has luminously -marked the change which has come over the methods and objects of -historical studies in the following passage: - -"When you consider with your eyes the visible man, what do you look -for? The man invisible. The words which salute your ears, the gestures, -the motions of his head, the clothes he wears, visible acts and deeds -of every kind, are expressions merely; somewhat is revealed beneath -them, and that is a soul--an inner man is concealed beneath the outer -man; the second does not reveal the first; ... all the externals are -but avenues converging toward a center; you enter them simply to reach -that center, and that center is the genuine man--I mean that mass of -faculties and feelings which are the inner man. We have reached a new -world, which is infinite, because every action which we see involves -an infinite association of reasonings, emotions, sensations new and -old, which have served to bring it to light, and which, like great -rocks deep-seated in the ground, find in it their end and their level. -This under-world is a new subject-matter proper to the historian.... -This precise and proved interpretation of past sensations has given -to history, in our days, a second birth; hardly anything of the sort -was known to the preceding century. They thought men of every race and -country were all but identical--the Greek, the barbarian, the Hindoo, -the man of the Renaissance, and the man of the eighteenth century--as -if they had all been turned out of a common mold, and all in conformity -to a certain abstract conception which served for the whole human -race. They knew man, but not men; they had not penetrated to the soul; -they had not seen the infinite diversity and complexity of souls; they -did not know that the moral constitution of a people or an age is as -particular and distinct as the physical structure of a family of plants -or an order of animals."[153] - -In the same way psychology needs a new birth, like the new birth of -history. If we would know the mind, we must reach the conviction that -there is a mind: and this conviction can be reached only by penetrating -through all the externals, through the physical organism, through the -diversities of race, through the environment of matter, until we have -found the soul. If history, like zoölogy, has found its anatomy, mental -science must, in like manner, be prosecuted as an anatomical study. So -long as we allow the anatomy of zoölogy to be the predominant and only -explanation, the beginning and the end of the mental manifestations, -so long we shall fail to comprehend the nature of man, and to see the -reason for his immortality. - - - FOOTNOTES: - - [139] Corinthians, revised version. - - [140] In the "authorized" version the passage is rendered thus: "There - is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." Sophereus quotes - the late revised version. The meaning is the same. St. Paul assumes - the existence of a natural body, and then asserts that there is - likewise a spiritual body. - - [141] I have met, by the kindness of the author, with a little - treatise which contains a great deal of sound mental philosophy, with - which in the main I concur, and to which I am indebted for some very - valuable suggestions. This modest little book is entitled "The Heart - of Man: An Attempt in Mental Anatomy." The author is Mr. P. P. Bishop, - a resident of San Mateo, in Florida. It was printed at Chicago, by - Shepard & Johnson, for the author, in 1883. I know not if it is on - sale. I suppose that Mr. Bishop was led to send me his interesting - treatise by the publication, in the "Manhattan Magazine," at New York, - in 1884, of the substance of the first three chapters of the present - work. I take this opportunity of expressing my high appreciation - of his treatise, and of explaining the meaning of its title. As I - understand him, he uses the term "Heart of Man" as synonymous with - structure of the mind, and not as referring to what is figuratively - called "the human heart." He has explained "Mental Anatomy" as - follows: "The method of investigation, which I have employed in making - my way to the conclusions set forth in this discussion, I call 'The - Anatomical Method,' because it is based on the conception of mind as - an organized being, and aims to discover the structure of that being." - ... "At the risk," he adds, "of appearing egotistical, I think it best - to relate an experience." He did not need to deprecate the appearance - of egotism, for his method of investigation, based on his own mental - experience, was the very best that he could have followed. It were to - be wished that we could have more of this kind of self-analysis by - persons competent to make it, and less of theoretical reasoning from - premises more or less arbitrarily assumed. - - I have endeavored to make my imaginary philosopher, Sophereus, avoid - the method of reasoning which I thus condemn, and to keep him within - the bounds of experience. - - [142] "Extemporaneous," Latin, _ex_, from; and _tempus_, time, at the - same time, or from the same time. Extemporaneous discourse is when the - thought and the expression in which it is clothed occur at the time - it is uttered, or without premeditation of both thought and language. - "Improvisation" means the same thing, but it is specially applied - to the act of making poetry or performing music extemporaneously, - that is, without prevision of what one is to say or sing. Rapid - conversation is of the same nature. So is an instantaneous and - unpremeditated answer to a question. - - [143] Webster's Dictionary--"Matter." - - [144] "And it shall be as when a hungry man dreameth, and behold, he - eateth: but he awaketh, and his soul is empty; or as when a thirsty - man dreameth, and behold, he drinketh: but he awaketh, and behold, he - is faint, and his soul hath appetite."--ISAIAH. - - [145] Scott's "Antiquary," note v. - - [146] If it is objected that I have allowed Sophereus to overstate - the power of the mind to deal better with difficulties after "a good - night's sleep," as we say, than it had dealt with them before, I will - cite the testimony of one of the most prolific of writers and one - of the most self-observing of men, Sir Walter Scott, whose greatest - success was achieved in the field of poetical and prose fiction. This - is a department in which inventive genius is the main reliance, and - is put to its greatest tasks. In that part of Scott's "Diary" which - covers the year 1826--the period when he was writing "Woodstock"--he - says: - - "The half-hour between waking and rising has all my life proved - propitious to any task which was exercising my invention. When I got - over any knotty difficulty in a story, or have had in former times - to fill up a passage in a poem, it was always when I first opened my - eyes that the desired ideas thronged upon me. This is so much the - case that I am in the habit of relying upon it and saying to myself - when I am at a loss, 'Never mind, we shall have it at seven o'clock - to-morrow morning.' If I have forgot a circumstance, a name, or a copy - of verses, it is the same thing.... This morning I had some new ideas - respecting 'Woodstock' which will make the story better." (Lockhart's - "Life of Scott," vol. viii, chap. lxviii.) - - This, it is true, was the experience of a man of extraordinary genius, - whose facility of invention was as marvelous as the ease and rapidity - with which he wrote. But his experience was a very common one. It has - been shared by persons of much more humble faculties. I am sure that - persons in my own profession, who have been engaged in pursuits very - different from those of the poet or the novelist, will, from their - own experience, confirm what is assumed by Sophereus as a well-known - mental phenomenon. I could describe in detail many instances in which - I have gone through with the same fruition of new ideas, resulting - from the acquisitions obtained during sleep, or following from the - benefits of sleep. For example, when having to do with a complex state - of facts, needing orderly arrangement and analysis, it has repeatedly - happened to me to rise in the morning after a night of undisturbed - sleep, with the whole of an entangled skein unraveled, whereas before - retiring to rest the mass of facts lay in some confusion in the mind. - In like manner the mind can often deal with a legal question of a - new and difficult character. The rule that ought to be applied to a - particular case has to be extracted from many precedents, and perhaps - none of them exactly cover the case in hand. On such occasions, if - one refrains from pushing the study of his subject while awake to the - severest analysis, and postpones the effort until the next morning, - the experience of Sir Walter is very likely to be repeated. "It was - always," he says, "when I first opened my eyes that the desired ideas - thronged upon me." I am persuaded, therefore, that although in the - study of any subject omission to master all its elements and details, - when alone one can accumulate them, is not to be recommended, there is - undoubtedly much to be gained by relieving the mind from the continued - effort, and allowing some hours of sleep to intervene, during which - the mind can act independently of all the bodily organs. - - The question is, then, as above suggested, whether there come to us - during sleep acquisitions of new ideas with or without a simultaneous - consciousness that we are thinking of the subject, or whether the - new ideas follow from the benefits of sleep as a state of absolute - rest and inactivity of the brain, and of the intellectual faculties, - so that when we awake both the brain and the mental powers are in - greater vigor. The expression used by Scott in describing his own - experience is that as soon as he awoke the desired ideas _thronged_ - upon him. This might happen upon the hypothesis that the desired ideas - came because the brain and the mental powers, refreshed by sleep, - were in greater vigor. But I incline to believe that his meaning was - the reverse of this. At all events, it seems to me that the true - explanation of the phenomenon is that during sound and undisturbed - sleep of the body, including the brain, we do unconsciously think of - the subject on which our waking thoughts had been previously employed; - that in these states there are acquisitions of new ideas which we - bring with us out of the state in which they were acquired, or, as Sir - Walter expressed it, which _throng_ upon us as soon as we open our - eyes. While, therefore, it may be said that this hypothesis assumes - the existence of the mind as a spiritual or intellectual entity - capable of action as a thinking being without any action of the bodily - organs, the question is, on the other hand, whether the phenomena - here considered have not a very strong tendency to prove that the - mind is such a substantive and independent existence. When it is - remembered how common is the experience here referred to, how various - the phenomena are, how they are manifested on all kinds of subjects, - in regard to lines of conduct, and to everything about which we are - perplexed, and when we add these peculiar phenomena to the other - evidence which tends to establish the same belief in the existence - of the mind as something entirely apart from all its physical - environment, it seems to me that the argument becomes very strong, - and that I have not made my imaginary philosopher press it beyond its - legitimate bounds. - - [147] Do him every honor. - - [148] By some commentators, this hint, given with female subtilty, is - explained to mean that their copy-hold, or lease, by which Banquo and - his son hold their lives, is not eternal. The more probable meaning is - that, if they are cut off, nature will produce no more copies of their - race. But in either meaning the hint that she gave was the same, and - it included both Banquo and his son. - - [149] When the unknowable power ceases to pulsate through our physical - organism, this "mental state" ceases--nothing survives--continuity is - ended. - - [150] "Principles of Psychology," i, § 208, pp. 465-471. - - [151] I have allowed Sophereus to follow in the main the writer to - whom I have already referred in the note on page 471--Mr. Bishop, of - Florida. - - [152] Bishop. - - [153] Introduction to Taine's "History of English Literature," - translated by H. Van Laun. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1885. - - - - - GLOSSARY - OF - SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THIS WORK. - - - [The following definitions marked with an asterisk are borrowed from - the glossary annexed to Darwin's "Origin of Species." The remainder of - the definitions are taken from Webster's Dictionary.] - - =*Aberrant.= Forms or groups of animals or plants which deviate in - important characters from their nearest allies, so as not to be easily - included in the same group with them, are said to be aberrant. - - =*Abnormal.= Contrary to the general rule. - - =*Aborted.= An organ is said to be aborted when its development has - been arrested at a very early stage. - - =Aërate= (Zoöl.). To subject to the influence of the air by the - natural organs of respiration; to arterialize; especially used of - animals not having lungs. - - =Agnostic= (_a._). Professing ignorance; involving no dogmatic - assertion; leaving a question or problem still in doubt; pertaining to - or involving agnosticism. - - =Agnostic= (_n._). One who professes ignorance, or refrains from - dogmatic assertion; one who supports agnosticism, neither affirming - nor denying the existence of a personal Deity. - - =Agnosticism.= That doctrine which, professing ignorance, neither - asserts nor denies; specifically, in theology, the doctrine that the - existence of a personal Deity can be neither asserted nor denied, - neither proved nor disproved, because of the necessary limits of the - human mind (as sometimes charged upon _Hamilton_ and _Mansel_), or - because of the insufficiency of the evidence furnished by psychical - and physical data, to warrant a positive conclusion (as taught by the - school of _Herbert Spencer_); opposed alike to dogmatic skepticism and - to dogmatic theism. - - =Allantois=, =Allantoid=. A thin membrane, situated between the - chorion and amnion, and forming one of the membranes which invest the - fœtus. - - =*Analogy.= That resemblance of structures which depends upon - similarity of function, as in the wings of insects and birds. Such - structures are said to be _analogous_, and to be _analogues_ of each - other. - - =Anthropomorphism.= The representation of the Deity under a human - form, or with human attributes. - - =*Articulata.= A great division of the animal kingdom, characterized - generally by having the surface of the body divided into rings, called - segments, a greater or less number of which are furnished with jointed - legs (such as insects, crustaceans, and centipeds). - - =Articulation= (Anat.). The joining or juncture of the bones of a - skeleton. - - =Ascidians.= A class of acephalous mollusks, having often a leathery - exterior. - - =Biology.= The science of life; that part of physiology which treats - of life in general, or of the different forces of life. - - =Brain.= The upper part of the head. 1. (Anat.) The whitish, soft mass - which constitutes the anterior or cephalic extremity of the nervous - system in man and other vertebrates, occupying the upper cavity of - the skull; and (_b_) the anterior or cephalic ganglion in insects and - other invertebrates. - - 2. The organ or seat of intellect; hence, the understanding. - - 3. The affections; fancy; imagination. - -=*Branchiæ.= Gills, or organs for respiration in water. - -=*Branchial.= Pertaining to gills or branchiæ. - -=*Canidæ.= The dog family, including the dog, wolf, fox, jackal, etc. - -=Cell.= A minute, inclosed space or sac, filled with fluid, making -up the cellular tissue of plants, and of many parts of animals, and -originating the parts by their growth and reproduction; the constituent -element of all plants and animals (though not universal for all parts -of such structure), much as a crystalline molecule is the element of a -crystal. In the simplest plants and animals (as the _infusoria_), one -single cell constitutes the complete individual, such species being -called _unicellular_ plants or animals. - -=Cephalopod= (Fr. _céphalopode_, from Gr., head and foot). (Zoöl.) An -animal of the sub-kingdom _Mollusca_, characterized by a distinct head, -surrounded by a circle of long arms or tentacles, which they use for -crawling and for seizing objects. See MOLLUSK. - -=*Cetacea.= An order of Mammalia, including the whales, dolphins, etc., -having the form of the body fish-like, the skin naked, and only the -fore-limbs developed. - - -=Chaos.= 1. An empty, infinite space; a yawning chasm. - - 2. The rude, confused state, or unorganized condition, of matter - before the creation of the universe. - -=Consciousness.= 1. The knowledge of sensations and mental operations, -or of what passes in one's own mind; the act of the mind which makes -known an internal object. - - 2. Immediate knowledge of any object whatever. - -=*Crustaceans.= A class of articulated animals having the skin of the -body generally more or less hardened by the deposition of calcareous -matter, breathing by means of gills. (_Examples_, crab, lobster, -shrimp, etc.) - -=Dynamically.= In accordance with the principles of dynamics or moving -forces. - -=*Embryo.= The young animal undergoing development within the egg or -womb. - -=*Embryology.= The study of the development of the embryo. - -=Ethics.= The science of human duty; the body of rules of duty drawn -from this science; a particular system of principles and rules -concerning duty, whether true or false; rules of practice in respect to -a single class of human actions; as political or social ethics. - -=*Fauna.= The totality of the animals naturally inhabiting a certain -country or region, or which have lived during a given geological period. - -=Fetichism=, =Feticism=. One of the lowest and grossest forms of -superstition, consisting in the worship of some material object, as a -stone, a tree, or an animal, often casually selected; practiced among -tribes of lowest mental endowment, as certain races of negroes. - -=*Flora.= The totality of the plants growing naturally in a country or -during a given geological period. - -=*Fœtal.= Of or belonging to the fœtus, or embryo in course of -development. - -=Fœtus=, same as =Fetus=. The young of viviparous animals in the womb, -and of oviparous animals in the egg, after it is perfectly formed, -before which time it is called _embryo_. - -=*Ganoid Fishes.= Fishes covered with peculiar enameled bony scales. -Most of them are extinct. - -=Genus= (Science). An assemblage of species possessing certain -characters in common, by which they are distinguished from all others. -It is subordinate to _tribe_ and _sub-tribe_; hence, a single species -having distinctive characters that seem of more than specific value may -constitute a genus. - -=*Germinal Vesicle.= A minute vesicle in the eggs of animals, from -which the development of the embryo proceeds. - -=Gravitation= (Physics). That species of attraction or force by -which all bodies or particles of matter in the universe tend toward -each other; called also _attraction of gravitation_, _universal -gravitation_, and _universal gravity_. - -=Gravity= (Physics). The tendency of a mass of matter toward a center -of attraction; especially the tendency of a body toward the center of -the earth, terrestrial gravitation. - -=Gyrus=, pl. =Gyri= (Anat.). A convolution of the brain. - -=*Habitat.= The locality in which a plant or animal naturally lives. - -=Heredity.= The transmission of the physical and psychical qualities of -parents to their offspring; the biological law by which living beings -tend to repeat themselves in their descendants. - -=Homologous.= Having the same relative proportion, position, value, or -structure; especially--(_a_) (Geom.) Corresponding in relative position -and proportion. (_b_) (Alg.) Having the same relative proportion or -value, as the two antecedents or the two consequents of a proportion. -(_c_) (Chem.) Being of the same chemical type or series; differing -by a multiple or arithmetical ratio in certain constituents, while -the physical qualities are wholly analogous, with small relative -differences, as if corresponding to a series of parallels; as, the -species in the group of alcohols are said to be _homologous_. (_d_) -(Zoöl.) Being of the same typical structure; having like relations to -a fundamental type of structure; as, those bones in the hand of man -and the fore-foot of a horse are _homologous_ that correspond in their -structural relations--that is, in their relations to the type-structure -of the fore-limb in vertebrates. - -=Homology.= That relation between parts which results from their -development from corresponding embryonic parts, either in different -animals, as in the case of the arm of a man, the fore-leg of a -quadruped, and the wing of a bird; or in the same individual, as in the -case of the fore and hind legs in quadrupeds, and the segments or rings -and their appendages of which the body of a worm, a centiped, etc., is -composed. The latter is called _serial homology_. The parts which stand -in such a relation to each other are said to be _homologous_, and one -such part or organ is called the _homologue_ of the other. In different -plants the parts of the flower are homologous, and in general these -parts are regarded as homologous with leaves. - -=Hypothesis.= 1. A supposition; a proposition or principle which -is supposed or taken for granted, in order to draw a conclusion or -inference for proof of the point in question; something not proved, but -assumed for the purpose of argument. - - 2. A system or theory imagined or assumed to account for known facts - or phenomena. - -=Imago.= The perfect (generally winged) reproductive state of an insect. - -=Implacenta= (_n._). A mammal having no placenta. (_a._) Without a -placenta, as certain marsupial animals. - -=Insectivorous.= Feeding on insects. - -=Instinct= (_n._). Inward impulse; unconscious, involuntary, or -unreasoning prompting to action; a disposition to any mode of action, -whether bodily or spiritual, without a distinct apprehension of the end -or object which Nature has designed should be accomplished thereby; -specifically, the natural, unreasoning impulse in an animal, by which -it is guided to the performance of any action, without thought of -improvement in the method. - -=Invertebrata=, or =Invertebrate Animals=. Those animals which do not -possess a backbone or spinal column. - -=Isomeric= (from Gr., equal and part). (Chem.) Having the quality of -isomerism; as _isomeric_ compounds. - -=Isomerism= (Chem.). An identity of elements and of atomic proportions -with a difference in the amount combined in the compound molecule, and -of its essential qualities; as in the case of the physically unlike -compounds of carbon and hydrogen, consisting one of one part of each, -another of two parts of each, and a third of four of each. - -=Kangaroo.= A ruminating marsupial animal of the genus _Macropus_, -found in Australia and the neighboring islands. - -=Larva= (plural =Larvæ=). The first condition of an insect at its -issuing from the egg, when it is usually in the form of a grub, -caterpillar, or maggot. - -=Lemuridæ.= A group of four-handed animals, distinct from the monkeys, -and approaching the insectivorous quadrupeds in some of their -characters and habits. Its members have the nostrils curved or twisted, -and a claw instead of a nail upon the first finger of the hind hands. - -=Lepidosiren.= An eel-shaped animal covered with rounded scales, having -four rod-like members, and breathing water like a fish. It is found in -ponds and rivers of intertropical Africa and South America. By some it -is regarded as a fish, and by others as a batrachian. - -=Mammal.= Belonging to the breast; from _mamma_, the breast or pap. An -animal of the highest class of vertebrates, characterized by the female -suckling its young. - -=Mammalia.= The highest class of animals, including the ordinary hairy -quadrupeds, the whales, and man, and characterized by the production of -living young, which are nourished after birth by milk from the teats -(_mammæ_, _mammary glands_) of the mother. A striking difference in -embryonic development has led to the division of this class into two -great groups: in one of these, when the embryo has attained a certain -stage, a vascular connection, called the _placenta_, is formed between -the embryo and the mother; in the other this is wanting, and the -young are produced in a very incomplete state. The former, including -the greater part of the class, are called _placental mammals_; the -latter, or _aplacental mammals_, include the marsupials and monotremes -(_ornithorhynchus_). - -=Marsupials.= An order of Mammalia in which the young are born in a -very incomplete state of development, and carried by the mother, while -sucking, in a ventral pouch (_marsupium_), such as the kangaroos, -opossums, etc. (see MAMMALIA). - -=Molecule.= A mass; one of the invisible particles supposed to -constitute matter of any kind. - -=Mollusk.= An invertebrate animal, having a soft, fleshy body (whence -the name), which is inarticulate, and not radiate internally. - -=Monkey.= See SIMIA. - -=Monogamy.= A marriage to one wife only, or the state of such as are -restricted to a single wife, or may not marry again after the death of -a first wife. - -=Monotheism.= The doctrine or belief that there is but one God. - -=Morphology.= The law of form or structure independent of function. - -=Nascent.= Commencing development. - -=Nexus.= Connection; tie. - -=Nictitating Membrane.= A semi-transparent membrane, which can be drawn -across the eye in birds and reptiles, either to moderate the effects of -a strong light or to sweep particles of dust, etc., from the surface of -the eye. - -=Noumenon= (Metaph.). The of itself unknown and unknowable rational -object, or _thing in itself_, which is distinguished from the -_phenomenon_ in which it occurs to apprehension, and by which it is -interpreted and understood; so used in the philosophy of Kant and his -followers. - -=Opossum.= An animal of several species of marsupial quadrupeds of the -genus _Didelphys_. The common species of the United States is the _D. -Virginiana_. Another species, common in Texas and California, is _D. -Californica_, and other species are found in South America. - -=Organism.= An organized being, whether plant or animal. - -=Ovule.= An egg. (Bot.) The rudimentary state of a seed. It consists -essentially of a nucleus developed directly from the placenta. - -=Parasite.= An animal or plant living upon or in, and at the expense -of, another organism. - -=Pelvis.= The bony arch to which the hind-limbs of vertebrate animals -are articulated. - -=Placentalia=, =Placentata=, or =Placental Mammals=. See MAMMALIA. - -=Protozoa.= The lowest great division of the Animal Kingdom. These -animals are composed of a gelatinous material, and show scarcely any -trace of distinct organs. The infusoria, foraminifera, and sponges, -with some other forms, belong to this division. - -=Phenomenon.= 1. An appearance; anything visible; whatever is -presented to the eye; whatever, in matter or spirit, is apparent -to, or is apprehended by, observation, as distinguished from its -ground, substance, or unknown constitution; as _phenomena_ of heat or -electricity; phenomena of imagination or memory. - - 2. Sometimes a remarkable or unusual appearance whose cause is not - immediately obvious. - -=Plexus.= Any net-work of vessels, nerves, or fibers. - -=Polygamy.= A plurality of wives or husbands at the same time, or the -having of such plurality; usually the condition of a man having more -than one wife. - -=Polytheism.= The doctrine of a plurality of gods or invisible beings -superior to man, and having an agency in the government of the world. - -=Proteine= (_n._ Lat., _proteinum_, from Gr., _first_--to be the -first--the first place, chief rank, because it occupies the first -place in relation to the albuminous principles). (Chem.) A substance -claimed by Mulder to be obtained as a distinct substance from albumen, -fibrine, or caseine, and considered by him to be the basis of animal -tissue and of some substances of vegetable origin. - - The theory of proteine can not be maintained.--_Gregory._ - - The theory of Mulder is doubted and denied by many chemists, and also - the existence of _proteine_ as a distinct substance. - -=Psychology.= A discourse or treatise on the human soul; the science of -the human soul; specifically, the systematic or scientific knowledge of -the powers and functions of the human soul, so far as they are known by -consciousness. - -=Quadrumane.= An animal having four feet that correspond to the hands -of a man, as a monkey. - -=Race.= 1. The descendants of a common ancestor; a family, tribe, -people, or nation, believed or presumed to belong to the same stock; a -lineage; a breed. - - 2. A root. - -=Retina.= The delicate inner coat of the eye, formed by nervous -filaments spreading from the optic nerve, and serving for the -perception of the impressions produced by light. - -=Rotifer= (_n._ Lat. _rotifer_, from Lat. _rota_, a wheel, and _ferro_, -to bear. Fr. _rotifère_). (Zoöl.) One of a group of microscopic -crustaceans, having no limbs, and moving by means of rows of cilia -about the head or the anterior extremity. - -=Rudiment= (Nat. Hist.). An imperfect organ, or one which is never -fully formed. - -=Sacral.= Belonging to the sacrum, or the bone composed usually of two -or more united vertebræ to which the sides of the pelvis in vertebrate -animals are attached. - -=Sacrum.= The bone which forms the posterior part of the pelvis. It is -triangular in form. - -=Secularize.= To convert from spiritual to secular or common use; as to -secularize a church, or church property. - -=Segments.= The transverse rings of which the body of an articulate -animal or annelid is composed. - -=Simia= (plural =Simiadæ=) (Lat., an ape, from _simus_, flat-nosed, -snub-nosed). (Zoöl.) A Linnæan genus of animals, including the ape, -monkey, and the like; a general name of the various tribes of monkeys. - -=Species= (Nat. Hist.). A permanent class of existing things or beings, -associated according to attributes or properties which are determined -by scientific observation. - -=Spinal Cord.= The central portion of the nervous system in the -vertebrata, which descends from the brain through the arches of the -vertebræ, and gives off nearly all the nerves to the various organs of -the body. - -=Statical.= To stand. 1. Pertaining to bodies at rest, or in -equilibrium. - - 2. Resting; acting by mere weight without motion; as _statical_ - pressure. - -=Sulcus.= A fissure of the brain, separating two convolutions, or -_gyri_. - -=Teleology= (Fr., _téléologie_, from Gr., the end or issue, and -discourse). The science or doctrine of the final causes of things; the -philosophical consideration of final causes in general. - -=Variety= (Nat. Hist., Bot., and Zoöl.). Any form or condition of -structure under a species which differs in its characteristics from -those typical to the species, as in color, shape, size, and the like, -and which is capable either of perpetuating itself for a period, or of -being perpetuated by artificial means; also, any of the various forms -under a species meeting the conditions mentioned. A form characterized -by an abnormity of structure, or any difference from the type that is -not capable of being perpetuated through two or more generations, is -not called a variety. - -=Vascular.= Containing blood-vessels. - -=Vertebrata=; or =Vertebrate Animals=. The highest division of the -animal kingdom, so called from the presence in most cases of a -back-bone composed of numerous joints or _vertebræ_, which constitutes -the center of the skeleton, and at the same time supports and protects -the central parts of the nervous system. - -=Vesicle.= A bladder-like vessel; a membranous cavity; a cyst; a cell; -especially (_a_) (Bot.) a small bladder-like body in the substance of a -vegetable, or upon the surface of a leaf.--_Gray._ (_b_) (Med.) A small -orbicular elevation of the cuticle containing lymph, and succeeded by -a scurf or laminated scab; also, any small cavity or sac in the human -body; as the umbilical vesicle. - -=Vortices= (_verto_, to turn). 1. A whirling or circular motion of any -fluid, usually of water, forming a kind of cavity in the center of -the circle, and in some instances drawing in water or absorbing other -things; a whirlpool. - - 2. A whirling of the air; a whirlwind. - - 3. (_Cartesian system._) A supposed collection of particles of very - subtile matter, endowed with a rapid rotary motion around an axis. - By means of these _vortices_ Descartes attempted to account for the - formation of the universe. - - - - -INDEX. - - - Advocacy, maxim of, 132. - - Affections, structural system of, 532. - - Agnosticism, as defined by Huxley, 274. - - Allantois, the, office of, 236 _et seq._, 245. - - Almagest. See PTOLEMAIC SYSTEM. - - Amphibians in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71, 96, 98. - - Amphioxus. See LANCELET. - - Amputation before or after birth, 129, 130. - - Anatomy, modern, great advance of, 40, 41. - Plato's knowledge of, 38. - - Anatomy of the mind, 470. - - Animals, origin of, according to Plato, 57 _et seq._ - origin of, according to Darwin, 60 _et seq._ - - Anthropomorphic attributes not necessary to the conception of God, 293 - _et seq._ - - Anthropomorphism, meaning, 293. - - Antichthon, or counter-earth, invented by the Pythagoreans, 36. - - Apes, varieties of, 71. - anthropomorphous, 100. - - Apparitions, facts communicated by, 486-488. - - Aquatic worm, 94. - - Areas, effect of change of, 248. - - Articulata, likeness of structure in, 205 _et seq._ - - Ascidians, larvæ of, 94. - - Assassination, once employed with impunity, 165. - - Associative faculty, what it is, 528. - - Athenian, the, compared with a savage, 73, 74. - - Authority, as affecting belief, 3. - ecclesiastic and scientific, 22, 23. - in science, 21. - - Automatic machines, analysis of, 505. - - - Baboons, how different from monkeys, 71, _note_. - - Belief, foundations of, 1-3. - antiquity of, how to be regarded, 132 _et seq._ - grounds of, 274-277. - - Birds, origin of, according to Plato, 57. - sexual selection among, 67, _note_. - - Bishop, P. P., "The Heart of Man," 471, _note_. - - Blood, similarity in the composition of, 122. - great change in, 122. - - Body, natural and spiritual, 468. - - Brain of men and apes compared, 191. - human, 518. - office of, 196. - - Breaks in the organic chain, 103-106. - - Buffon, accepted Mosaic account of creation, 368, 369. - - - Causation, ultimate, 386. - - Cell, hypothesis of the single, 371, _note_. - - Chaos, Plato's conception of, 45. - - Classification, how it supports evolution, 200, 203. - - Common stock, hypothesis of descent from, 209. - - Composition, what occurs in, 473, 474. - - Comte, Auguste, one of his suggestions, 387, 388. - - Conduct, Spencer's view of, 427 _et seq._ - - Consciousness, what it is, 470, 471, 503. - - Constitutions, political, supposed growth of, 168. - - Conversations invented during sleep, 480, 481. - - Conversion of organs, 67. - - Copernicus, system of, 32. - - Creation, special, contrasted with evolution, 1 _et seq._ - absolute, unknown to the Greeks, 45. - influence of the belief in, 164, 165. - man's power of, 144. - Mosaic account of, 23. - poetical, 140, 141. - what it is, 136 _et seq._, 139, 140, 223. - - Creator, the, postulate of, 115. - honoring or dishonoring the, not the question, 160 _et seq._ - method of, 207. - - Creator, methods of, in the two realms of spirit and matter, 537. - power of, boundless, 224, 232, 535. - - Crosses not permissible between distinct species, 372. - - - Darwin, Charles, his theory of evolution, 7. - bearing of his theory on man's immortality, 12, 13. - candor and accuracy of, 101. - difference of, from Spencer, 43, 225. - his pedigree of man, 70-72, 87. - his view of human dignity, 10. - on primeval man, 375. - on the belief in God, 60, 61. - rejects an aboriginal pair, 406. - tabulated form of his pedigree of man, 93. - - Dekad, the perfect number of the Pythagoreans, 35. - - Delirium, explanation of, 499, 500. - - Demiurgus, the, constructor of Plato's Kosmos, 46. - - Descartes, his theory of vortices, 33. - - Descent, must be unbroken, 211. - - Design, when hypothesis of, necessary, 214. - - Desires, mental system of, 532. - - Domestic animals, breeding of, 89. - - Distribution in space, how it affects evolution, 203, 247. - in time, 251. - - Dreams, phenomena of, 479-490. - - - Earth. See SOLAR SYSTEM. - - Economy of Nature, meaning of, 116, 126. - - Elements, the four, in the Platonic Kosmos, 45, 46. - - Eliphaz and Zophar. See JOB. - - Embryonic development, resemblances in, 111, 120. - - Embryology, cautions respecting, 241. - how it supports evolution, 229. - - Emotions, system of, 530-532. - - Energy. See POWER, CAUSATION. - - Evidence, rules of circumstantial, 14-17. - applicable to scientific investigation, 17, 18. - missing links in chain of, 18-20. - process of, 67, 68. - - Evil, rational explanation of, 148 _et seq._ - - Evolution, assumptions in the theory of, 18-20. - general reasons for, 102. - law of, limited, 210. - of man, 373. - principle of, 377. - process reversed, 252-256. - - Experts, true office of, 21, 22. - - Extemporaneous speaking, what is, 474. - - Eye, the, formation of, 68-70, 83, 84. - - - Faunas of different areas, 247. - - Fetichism. See SPENCER. - - Fishes, origin of, according to Plato, 58. - most lowly organized, 95. - shell, the lowest form of, 58. - - Fœtus, growth of the, 234 _et seq._ - - - Galen, mistakes of, in anatomy, 39, 40. - how he differed from Plato, 39. - - Galileo, confirms and rectifies Kepler's laws, 32. - Papal condemnation of, 20, 21, _note_. - - Ganoids, description of, 96. - - Genealogical trees of no value in zoölogy, 202, _note_. - - General laws and special creations, 127, 128. - - Germ, ante-fœtal, how formed, 234. - - Gladiatorial shows, part of Roman civilization, 164. - - God, existence of, how proved, 11, 12. - a necessary postulate, 402. - a personal, denied by Spencer, 433. - consciousness of, how to be lost, according to Spencer, 285 _et seq._ - existence and attributes of, how deduced, 300 _et seq._ - his dealing with Abraham, 425. - probable methods of, 63, 64, 82-85, 102. - unlike Plato's Demiurgus, 85. - - Gods, the, origin of, among the Greeks, 50. - genesis of, according to Plato, 46, 48-50, _note_. - office of, in the formation of Plato's Kosmos, 49. - - Gravitation, law of, how deduced, 20. - - Greek philosophy, account of, 24 _et seq._ - encounters monotheism at Alexandria, 287. - how hampered by the mythology, 138. - schools of, before Plato, 28. - - Grote, his Plato cited and followed, 27-40, 287, 288, 290. - - - Harvey discovers the circulation of the blood, 40. - - Heat, origin of, 386, 387. - - Hebrews receive divine commands, 418. - - Heredity, law of, limited, 225. - - Homologous organs, meaning of, 97. - See SWIM-BLADDER AND LUNG. - meaning of, 215, _note_. - - Human life, peculiar sacredness of, 164-166. - - Huxley, Professor, on the brain of man and apes, 192. - - Huxley, Professor, quoted, 121. - - - Ideal persons, are creations, 140, 141. - - Ideal plan, objection to, 114, 118. - - Ideas in Plato's system, coeval with primordial matter, 45, 46. - how acquired, 506-508. - - Idiocy, absolute, probably does not exist, 526. - what it is, 526-528. - - Idiot. See IDIOCY. - - Immortality, what is proof of, 41, 540. - belief in, 61, 62. - fanciful explanation of, 543. - - Improvisation, what is, 474. - - Infinite goodness consistent with the existence of suffering, 156. - - Instinct, genesis of, according to Plato, 60. - genesis of, according to Darwin, _ib._ - - Intellectual faculties, system of, 525. - - Interbreeding. See SPECIES. - - Introspective faculty, power of the, 529. - - Intuitive faculty, office of, 525, 526. - - Invention in mechanics, 475. - - Invention is creation, 142. - - - Job and his friends, 25 _et seq._ - - - Kangaroos, structure of, 98. - - Kepler, his laws of the planetary motions, 32. - - Knowledge not limited to scientific demonstration, 392. - of ourselves, 520, 521. - - Kosmos, the. See PLATO. - - - Lancelet, visual organ of the, 68. - - Languages, origin of, 168, 397, 398. - - Lemuridæ in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71. - characteristics of, 99. - - Logic, abuse of, 136 _et seq._ - right use of, 220. - use and misuse of its forms, 145. - - Lung in vertebrates, supposed homologue with a swim-bladder, 67. - conversion of, from swim-bladder, 97. - - - Macaulay, Lord, his depreciation of natural theology, 24 _et seq._ - - Macbeth, Lady, her sleep-walking analyzed, 491-499. - - Man, dignity of, how to be treated, 9, 10. - bodily structure of, 109. - common ancestor of, and the apes, 71, 100. - constructive faculty of, 346. - immortality of, 12, 13. - liability to certain diseases, 110. - moral accountability of, 9, 10. - origin of, 348. - pedigree of, according to Darwin, 70-72. - rank of, in scale of being, 101. - - Marriage, scientific view of, 381. - - Marsupials in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71. - ancient, 98. - - Matter, primordial, according to Plato, 45. - - Matter and spirit contrasted, 477. - - Medium, effect of change of, 248, 249. - - Mind, origin of, 8, 9. - a created being, 407 _et seq._ - a spiritual creation, 401-404. - contrasted theories of, 533 _et seq._ - evolution origin of the, 538. - evolution theory of origin of, 394 _et seq._ - is an organism, 476. - of animals below man, 80, 81. - origin and nature of, 467-546. - origin of, according to Darwin, 78. - origin of, according to Plato, 79, 80. - structure of, 502. - substance of, 509. - systems of, 523 _et seq._ - the human, placed under certain laws, 389, 390. - - Miracles, meaning of, 129. - - Miraculous interposition not necessary, 163. - - Modern civilization, what it owes to belief in special creation, - 164-166. - - Monkeys, two great stems of, 71. - Catarrhine, or Old-World, 100. - - Monotheism, its influence on philosophy, 138. - origin of, 342. - - Monotremata, division of the mammalian series, 98. - - Moral injunctions, sacred origin of, 418. - - Moral injunctions, Spencer's denial of, 427 _et seq._, 433. - - Moral law, capacity of human beings to receive, 420. - scientific view of the, 420 _et seq._ - - Moral purposes in the phenomena of nature, 387, 388. - - Moral sense, origin of, 86. - - Morphology, how it supports evolution, 202. - - Mosaic account of creation, rationality of, 366 _et seq._ - - Murder, punishment of, moral foundation for, 166. - - "Music of the spheres," origin of the phrase, 37. - - - Nascent organs, meaning of, 111, 112. - - "Natural," meaning of, 214. - - Natural theology, progress of, from Thales to Plato and Aristotle, 28, - 29. - importance of, 43. - - Nervous organization, Spencer's view of, 409 _et seq._ - - Newton, Sir Isaac, discovers the law of universal gravitation, 33. - deduces a personal God from nature, 331, _note_. - his General Scholium, 332. - - Noumenon, an invented word, 269. - - Number. See DEKAD, and PYTHAGORAS. - - - Opossums, structure of, 98. - - Orthodoxy, Plato's idea of, as suggested in his "Republic," 296, 297. - - Oviparous animals, 98. - - - Pairs, of animals, opposite views of, 405. - - Pairs, assumed existence of, 537. - - Parasites, how to be viewed, 151 _et seq._ - - Pattern of structure, argument concerning, 204. - - Pedigree, rule for tracing, 185-187. - - Pedigree of man, Darwinian, 70 _et seq._ - - Phenomenon and noumenon, 268. - - Philolaus as quoted by Grote, 35. - - Philosophy, modern and ancient compared, 24 _et seq._ - - Physicians in Plato's time, 40. - - Placental mammals, 99. - - Plato, period of, 28, _note_. - as given in "Timæus," 298. - his Demiurgus, 287, 288. - his genealogy of the gods, 298, _note_. - his Kosmos and Darwin's hypothesis compared, 44-86. - his origin of religious beliefs as given in "Republic," 296. - his triplicity of souls, 39. - his view of rudiments, 74, 75. - originality of, 289, 290. - - Polytheism, origin of, 342. - - Power, distinct from substance, 226, 233, _note_; 339 _et seq._ - an attribute of mind, 386. - of nature, limited, 343-345. - - Primitive beliefs, not necessarily wrong, 132 _et seq._ - - "Principle" of construction, 106, 107. - - Probability, force of, in reasoning, 7. - - Psychology, needs a new birth, 546. - - Ptolemaic system, description of, 31. - - Pyramids, why referable to mind, 390, 391. - - Pythagoras, school of, 34 _et seq._ - - - Quadrumana, in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71. - and other mammals, 99. - - - Races, what are, 372. - - Raphael, created images, 143. - - Religion, what is, 11, 12. - natural, 23. - when in conflict with science, 11-13, 399. - - Religious consciousness, Spencer's origin of, 284. - - Reproduction, two grand systems of, 107, 108. - - Reproductive process, parallel in the, 110. - - Reptiles, Plato's origin of, 58. - - Resurrection, St. Paul's doctrine of the, 468. - - Revelation, how treated in this work, 23. - purpose of, 540. - - Roman civilization, lacked belief in creation, 164. - law, slavery under, 165. - - Rudiments, Plato's view of, 74, 75. - instances of, 111-114, 124, 125. - - - Sacrum, analysis of the human, 215. - structure of the female, 220. - - Savages, beliefs of, 60, 61. - - Science, domain of, 391, 392. - present tendency of, 352. - tendencies of, 127. - values of, 291. - when in conflict with religion, meaning of, 11, 12. - wrong aims of, 545. - - Scott, Sir Walter, his reliance on thoughts obtained during sleep, - 490, _note_. - - Secularization of morals discussed, 434 _et seq._ - - Segments. See ARTICULATA; VERTEBRATES. - - Selection, natural, 65, 72, 89. - limitations to, 91. - office of, 72. - sexual, 66, 72, 89. - - Senses, the corporeal, 503. - - Sexes, origin of, in Plato's Kosmos, 55. - in Nature, 221, 354 _et seq._, 378. - - Sexual love, in men and brutes, 379. - moral and social phenomena of, 382. - - Sexual union, operation of, 234 _et seq._ - - Sexual unions, purpose of, 384, 385. - - Shakespeare, created imaginary persons, 140, 141. - - Simiadæ, general term for monkeys, 99. - - Simonides, poetical theologies of, 24 _et seq._ - - Sixteenth century, intellectual habits in the, 21. - - Sin, how to be viewed, 148, _note_. - - Slavery, under the Roman law, 165. - - Sleep, phenomena of, 479 _et seq._ - better thoughts during, 489. - - Society, phenomena of, 334 _et seq._ - - Solar system, how viewed by the Greeks, 31 _et seq._ - origin of, 168, 172, 301. - - Somnambulism, phenomena of, 491. - - Soul, meaning of, 478. - - Souls, of men, genesis of, in Plato's Kosmos, 51, 76, 77. - transmigration of, 78. - triplicity of, 51, 76, 77. - - Space, illimitable, concepts of, 260 _et seq._ - - Species, finality of, 157 _et seq._ - meaning of, 372 _et seq._ - - Spencer, Herbert, his theory of animal evolution, 7, 8. - answers to his objections, 145 _et seq._ - attacks "the current creed," 434. - creation is something made out of nothing, 136. - creation incapable of being conceived, 136. - creation not supported by any proof, 135. - his agnosticism examined, 257 _et seq._ - his argument from parasites, 151 _et seq._ - his denial of the possibility of knowing mind, 508. - his doctrine of evolution, 131. - his ethical system, 427 _et seq._ - his ghost-theory, 284 _et seq._ - his origin of man, 348-351, 357. - his psychological system, 408 _et seq._ - his psychology criticised, 470, 504. - his theory of mind, 510-516. - his theory of the moral sense, 418, 423. - his treatment of the divine attributes, 293. - his "unknown cause," 163, 166. - how his theory differs from Darwin's, 225. - on the evolution of mind, 64. - on the evolution of animals, 179. - on universal law of evolution, 167. - special creations presumptively absurd, 132 _et seq._ - - St. Paul, his doctrine of the resurrection, 468. - - Struggle for existence, meaning of, 88. - - Substance, distinct from power, 233. - of mind, 469. - - Substitution and suppression of organs, 236 _et seq._ - - "Supernatural," meaning of, 214. - - "Survival of the fittest," meaning of, 65, 66. - - Swim-bladder, supposed homologue of a lung, 67. - conversion of, 96. - - - Taine, M., his views of the objects of history, 545. - - Telescope, formation of the, 68-70. - - Thales, philosophy of, 24, 27, 28. - period of, 28, _note_. - - Theology, the current, not to be considered, 145. - - Time, beginning of, in Plato's Kosmos, 48. - conception of endless, 262 _et seq._ - - Transmigration, from animal to animal, 54-59. - - Typical plan, concealed in the ante-fœtal germ, 238. - - - Uniformity. See PATTERN. - - - Varieties, what are, 372. - - Vertebral column, analysis of, 215. - - Voltaire, saying of, 25. - - Von Baer, his embryologic law, 229. - - Vortices. See DESCARTES. - - - Women, origin of, in Plato's Kosmos, 55. - - - THE END. - - - - -BY GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. - - - =LIFE OF DANIEL WEBSTER.= By GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. Illustrated with - Steel Portrait and Woodcuts. Two vols., 8vo. Cloth, $4.00; sheep, - $6.00; half morocco, $10.00. - -A most valuable and important contribution to the history of American -parties and politics, and to the best class of our literature. It is a -model biography of a most gifted man, wherein the intermingling of the -statesman and lawyer with the husband, father, and friend, is painted -so that we feel the reality of the picture. - - "We believe the present work to be a most valuable and - important contribution to the history of American parties and - politics."--_London Saturday Review._ - - "Of Mr. Curtis's labor we wish to record our opinion, in addition - to what we have already said, that, in the writing of this book, - he has made a most valuable contribution to the best class of our - literature."--_New York Tribune._ - - "This 'Life of Webster' is a monument to both subject and author, and - one that will stand well the wear of time."--_Boston Post._ - - "Mr. Curtis, it will be remembered, was one of the literary executors - named by Mr. Webster, in his will, to do this work; and owing to the - death of two of the others, Mr. Everett and President Felton, and the - advanced age of Mr. Ticknor, Mr. Curtis has prepared the biography - himself, and it has passed under Mr. Ticknor's revision. We believe - the work will satisfy the wishes of Mr. Webster's most devoted - friends."--_Boston Journal._ - - - =THE LAST YEARS OF DANIEL WEBSTER.= A MONOGRAPH. By GEORGE TICKNOR - CURTIS. 8vo. Paper, 50 cents. - - "Laying aside, so far as I may be able, the partiality of a friend and - biographer, I shall subject to the scrutiny of reason and good sense - the accusation that, in Mr. Webster's later years, for the sake of - attaining the Presidency, by bidding for the political support of the - Southern States, he renounced the principles which he had professed - all his life on the subject of slavery."--_The Author._ - - - =McCLELLAN'S LAST SERVICE TO THE REPUBLIC=, together with a Tribute to - his Memory. By GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. With a Map showing the Position - of the Union and Confederate Forces on the Night of November 7, 1862. - 12mo. Paper, 30 cents. - - "Every statement of a fact, contained in these pages, which was not - founded on General McClellan's official report of his campaigns, or - derived from some other public source, was given to me by the General - in the spring of 1880, and was written down by me at the time. At my - request he superintended the preparation of the map which shows his - position and that of the Confederate troops on the 7th and 8th of - November, 1862, and compared it with the military maps issued by the - Government after the close of the civil war."--_From the Author's - Prefatory Note._ - - - New York: D. APPLETON & CO., 1, 3, & 5 Bond Street. - - - - - * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - - Obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected. Variations - in spelling, punctuation, accents and hyphenation remain as in the - original. - - In Chapter 12, Page 526, the sentence: "This is a power that - can belong to and inhere in a spiritual organism alone. We must, - therefore, recognize in the infant this original implanted endowment, - the capacity to be mentally convinced of realities; and while, in - order to the first exercise of this capacity there must be a physical - organism which will conduct the sensory impressions to the brain ..." - - Has been amended to read "... in order to meet the first exercise of this - capacity ..." - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CREATION OR EVOLUTION?*** - - -******* This file should be named 50086-0.txt or 50086-0.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/0/0/8/50086 - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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