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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5b0f055 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #50086 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50086) diff --git a/old/50086-0.txt b/old/50086-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index b1d1622..0000000 --- a/old/50086-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19052 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, Creation or Evolution?, by George Ticknor -Curtis - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: Creation or Evolution? - A Philosophical Inquiry - - -Author: George Ticknor Curtis - - - -Release Date: September 30, 2015 [eBook #50086] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CREATION OR EVOLUTION?*** - - -E-text prepared by Donald Cummings, Adrian Mastronardi, Les Galloway, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page -images generously made available by Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries -(https://archive.org/details/toronto) - - - -Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this - file which includes the original illustration. - See 50086-h.htm or 50086-h.zip: - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50086/50086-h/50086-h.htm) - or - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50086/50086-h.zip) - - - Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See - https://archive.org/details/creationorevolut00curtuoft - - -Transcriber's note: - - Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). - - Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=). - - - - - -CREATION OR EVOLUTION? - -A Philosophical Inquiry. - -by - -GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. - - - - - - - -New York: -D. Appleton and Company, -1, 3, And 5 Bond Street. -1887. - -Copyright, 1887. -by George Ticknor Curtis. - - - - TO - LEWIS A. SAYRE, M. D., - WHOSE PROFESSIONAL EMINENCE IS RECOGNIZED - IN BOTH HEMISPHERES, - WHOSE SKILL AS A SURGEON - SUFFERING HUMANITY GRATEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGES, - TO WHOSE ANATOMICAL LEARNING - THE AUTHOR IS LARGELY INDEBTED, - AND OF WHOSE FRIENDSHIP HE IS PROUD, - This Book - IS AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED. - - - "_Dost thou not know, my new astronomer! - Earth, turning from the sun, brings night to man? - Man, turning from his God, brings endless night; - Where thou canst read no morals, find no friend, - Amend no manners, and expect no peace._" - - _YOUNG'S NIGHT THOUGHTS._ - - - - -PREFACE. - - -Perhaps it is expected of a writer who steps out of the sphere of his -ordinary pursuits, and deals with such a subject as that which is -treated in this work, that he will account for his so doing. It is not -necessary for me to say that no class of men can have a monopoly in any -subject. But I am quite willing to take my readers into my confidence -so far as to state how I came to write this book. - -Most men, who have a special pursuit, find the necessity for recreation -of some kind. Some take it in one way, and some in another. It has been -my habit through life to seek occasional relief from the monotony of -professional vocations in intellectual pursuits of another character. -Having this habit--which I have found by experience has no tendency -to lessen one's capacity for the duties of a profession, or one's -relish of its occupations--I some years ago took up the study of the -modern doctrine of animal evolution. Until after the death of the late -Mr. Charles Darwin, I had not given a very close attention to this -subject. The honors paid to his memory, and due to his indefatigable -research and extensive knowledge, led me to examine his "Descent of -Man" and his "Origin of Species," both of which I studied with care, -and I trust with candor. I was next induced to examine the writings -of Mr. Herbert Spencer on the subject of evolution, with which I had -also been previously unacquainted except in a general way. I was a -good deal surprised at the extent of Mr. Spencer's reputation as a -thinker, and by the currency which his peculiar philosophy has had in -this country, where it has led, among the young and inexperienced, as -well as among older persons, to very incorrect habits of reasoning on -subjects of the highest importance. The result of my studies of these -writers is the present book. I have written it because I have seen, -or believe that I have seen, where the conflict arises between some -of the deductions of modern science and the principles which ought to -regulate not only religious belief, but belief in anything that is -not open to the direct observation of our senses. But I trust that I -shall not be understood as having written for the purpose of specially -defending the foundations of religious belief. This is no official -duty of mine. How theologians manage, or ought to manage, the argument -which is to convince men of the existence and methods of God, it is -not for me to say. But a careful examination of the new philosophy -has convinced me that those who are the special teachers of religious -truth have need of great caution in the admissions or concessions which -they make, when they undertake to reconcile some of the conclusions -of modern scientists with belief in a Creator. I do not here speak of -the Biblical account of the creation, but I speak of that belief in -a Creator which is to be deduced from the phenomena of nature. While -there are naturalists, scientists, and philosophers at the present -day, whose speculations do not exclude the idea of a Supreme Being, -there are others whose theories are entirely inconsistent with a belief -in a personal God, the Creator and Governor of the universe. Moreover, -although there are great differences in this respect between the -different persons who accept evolution in some form, the whole doctrine -of the development of distinct species out of other species makes -demands upon our credulity which are irreconcilable with the principles -of belief by which we regulate, or ought to regulate, our acceptance -of any new matter of belief. The principles of belief which we apply -in the ordinary affairs of life are those which should be applied to -scientific or philosophical theories; and inasmuch as the judicial -method of reasoning upon facts is at once the most satisfactory and the -most in accordance with common sense, I have here undertaken to apply -it to the evidence which is supposed to establish the hypothesis of -animal evolution, in contrast with the hypothesis of special creations. - -I am no ecclesiastic. I advance no arguments in favor of one or another -interpretation of the Scriptures about which there is controversy among -Christians. While I firmly believe that God exists, and that he has -made a revelation to mankind, whereby he has given us direct assurance -of immortality, I do not know that this belief disqualifies me from -judging, upon proper principles of evidence, of the soundness of a -theory which denies that he specially created either the body or the -mind of man. How far the hypothesis of evolution, by destroying our -belief that God specially created us, tends to negative any purpose -for which we can suppose him to have made to us a revelation of our -immortality, it is for the theologian to consider. For myself, I am -not conscious that in examining the theory of evolution I have been -influenced by my belief in what is called revealed religion. I have, -at all events, studiously excluded from the argument all that has been -inculcated by the Hebrew or the Christian records as authorized or -inspired teachings, and have treated the Mosaic account of the creation -like any other hypothesis of the origin of man and the other animals. -The result of my study of the hypothesis of evolution is, that it is an -ingenious but delusive mode of accounting for the existence of either -the body or the mind of man; and that it employs a kind of reasoning -which no person of sound judgment would apply to anything that might -affect his welfare, his happiness, his estate, or his conduct in the -practical affairs of life. - -He who would truly know what the doctrine of evolution is, and to -what it leads, must literally begin at the beginning. He must free -his mind from the cant of agnosticism and from the cant of belief. He -must refuse to accept dogmas on the authority of any one, be they the -dogmas of the scientist, or of the theologian. He must learn that his -mental nature is placed under certain laws, as surely as his corporeal -structure; and he must cheerfully obey the necessities which compel him -to accept some conclusions and to reject others. Keeping his reasoning -powers in a well-balanced condition, he must prove all things, holding -fast to that which is in conformity with sound deduction, and to that -alone. But all persons may not be able to afford the time to pursue -truth in this way, or may not have the facilities for the requisite -research. It seemed to me, therefore, that an effort to do for them -what they can not do for themselves would be acceptable to a great many -people. - -It may be objected that the imaginary philosopher whom I have -introduced in some of my chapters under the name of Sophereus, or the -searcher after wisdom, debating the doctrines of evolution with a -supposed disciple of that school, whom I have named Kosmicos, is an -impossible person. It may perhaps be said that the conception of a man -absolutely free from all dogmatic religious teaching, from all bias to -any kind of belief, and yet having as much knowledge of various systems -of belief as I have imputed to this imaginary person, would in modern -society be the conception of an unattainable character. My answer to -this criticism would be that I felt myself at liberty to imagine any -kind of character that would suit my purpose. How successfully I have -carried out the idea of a man in mature life entirely free from all -preconceived opinions, and forming his beliefs upon principles of -pure reason, it is for my readers to judge. With regard to the other -interlocutor in the dialogues, I hope it is not necessary for me to -say that I do not impute all of his opinions or arguments to the -professors of the evolution school, or to any section of it. He is a -representative of the effects of some of their teachings, but not an -individual portrait. But as, for the purposes of the antagonism, it -was expedient to put into the mouth of this person whatever can be -said in favor of the hypothesis of evolution, it became necessary to -make him represent the dogmatic side of the theory; and thus to make -the collision and contrast between the minds of the two debaters as -strong as I could. Controversial discussion in the form of debate has -been used from the time of Plato. While I have adopted a method, I have -not presumed to imitate its great exemplars. But for the value of that -method I shall presently cite weighty testimony. It was a relief to -me to resort to it after having pursued the subject in the more usual -form of discussion; and indeed it forced itself upon me as a kind of -necessity, because it seemed the fairest way of presenting what could -be said on both sides of the question. I hope it may have the good -fortune to keep alive the interest of the reader, after he has perused -the previous chapters. - -One disadvantage of all positive writing or discourse is that there is -no one to confute, to contradict, or to maintain the negative. At the -bar, and in some public assemblies, there is an antagonist; and truth -is elicited by the collision. But in didactic writing, especially on a -philosophical topic, it is best to introduce an antagonist, and to make -him speak in his own person. Two of the best thinkers of our time have -forcibly stated the advantage--the necessity, in short--of personal -debate. Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his essay on Liberty, observes that-- - -"The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living -apprehension of a truth as is afforded by the necessity of explaining -it to or defending it against opponents, though not sufficient to -outweigh, is no trifling drawback from the benefits of its universal -recognition. Where this advantage can not be had, I confess I should -like to see the teachers of mankind endeavoring to provide a substitute -for it; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as -present to the learner's consciousness as if they were pressed upon him -by a dissentient champion eager for his conversion. - -"But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost -those they formerly had. The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently -exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this -description. They were essentially a discussion of the great questions -of life and philosophy, directed with consummate skill to the purpose -of convincing any one, who had merely adopted the commonplaces of -received opinion, that he did not understand the subject--that he as -yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed, in -order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way -to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the -meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school disputations -of the middle ages had a similar object. They were intended to make -sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary -correlation) the opinion opposed to it, and could enforce the grounds -of one and confute those of the other. The last-mentioned contests -had, indeed, the incurable defect that the premises appealed to were -taken from authority, not from reason; and as a discipline to the mind -they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which -formed the intellects of the 'Socratici viri.' But the modern mind -owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit; and the -present modes of instruction contain nothing which in the smallest -degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other.... It -is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic--that -which points out weakness in theory or errors in practice, without -establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed -be poor enough as an ultimate result, but as a means to attaining -any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it can not be -valued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained -to it there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of -intellect in any but the mathematical and physical departments of -speculation. On any other subject no one's opinions deserve the name -of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by -others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would -have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with -opponents." - -Mr. Grote, in his admirable work on "Plato and the other Companions of -Socrates," has the following passage: - -"Plato is usually extolled by his admirers as the champion of the -Absolute--of unchangeable forms, immutable truth, objective necessity, -cogent and binding on every one. He is praised for having refuted -Protagoras, who can find no standard beyond the individual recognition -and belief of his own mind or that of some one else. There is no doubt -that Plato often talks in that strain, but the method followed in his -dialogues, and the general principles of methods which he lays down -here as well as elsewhere, point to a directly opposite conclusion. -Of this the Phædrus is a signal instance. Instead of the extreme of -generality, it proclaims the extreme of speciality. The objection -which the Socrates of the Phædrus advances against the didactic -efficacy of written discourse is founded on the fact that it is the -same to all readers--that it takes no cognizance of the differences -of individual minds nor of the same mind at different times. Socrates -claims for dialectic debate the valuable privilege that it is constant -action and reaction between two individual minds--an appeal by the -inherent force and actual condition of each to the like elements in the -other--an ever-shifting presentation of the same topics, accommodated -to the measure of intelligence and cast of emotion in the talkers -and at the moment. The individuality of each mind--both questioner -and respondent--is here kept in view as the governing condition of -the process. No two minds can be approached by the same road or by -the same interrogation. The questioner can not advance a step except -by the admission of the respondent. Every respondent is the measure -to himself. He answers suitably to his own belief; he defends by -his own suggestions; he yields to the pressure of contradiction and -inconsistency _when he feels them_, and not before. Each dialogist is -(to use the Protagorean phrase) the measure to himself of truth and -falsehood, according as he himself believes it. Assent or dissent, -whichever it may be, springs only from the free working of the -individual mind in its actual condition then and there. It is to the -individual mind alone that appeal is made, and this is what Protagoras -asks for. - -"We thus find, in Plato's philosophical character, two extreme opposite -tendencies and opposite poles co-existent. We must recognize them both, -but they can never be reconciled; sometimes he obeys and follows the -one, sometimes the other. - -"If it had been Plato's purpose to proclaim and impose upon every one -something which he called 'Absolute Truth,' one and the same alike -imperative upon all, he would best proclaim it by preaching or writing. -To modify this 'Absolute,' according to the varieties of the persons -addressed, would divest it of its intrinsic attribute and excellence. -If you pretend to deal with an Absolute, you must turn away your eyes -from all diversity of apprehending intellects and believing subjects." - -With such testimony to the value of dialectic debate, I hope that my -adoption of it as a method will be regarded as something better than an -affectation. - -Mr. Spencer, in one of his works,[1] referring to and quoting from -Berkeley's "Dialogues of Hylas and Philolaus," observes that "imaginary -conversation affords great facilities for gaining a victory. When -you can put into an adversary's mouth just such replies as suit -your purpose, there is little difficulty in reaching the desired -conclusion." I have not written to gain a victory; and, indeed, I -am quite aware that it would be impossible to gain one over those -with whom I can have no common ground of reasoning. In the imaginary -conversations in this work, I have taken great care not to put into -the mouth of the supposed representative of the doctrine of evolution -anything that would suit my own purpose; and, in every instance in -which I have represented him as relying on the authority of Mr. Darwin -or of Mr. Spencer, I have either made him quote the words or have made -him state the positions as I suppose they must be understood, and have -referred the reader to the proper page in the works of those writers. - -And here I will render all honor to the admirable candor with which Mr. -Darwin discussed objections to his theory which have been propounded by -others, and suggested further difficulties himself. If I do not pay the -same tribute to Mr. Spencer, the reason will be found in those portions -of my work in which I have had occasion to call in question his methods -of reasoning. - -Some repetition of facts and arguments will be found in the following -pages in the different aspects in which the subject is treated. This -has been intentional. When the tribunal that is addressed is a limited -and special one, and is composed of a high order of minds accustomed -to deal with such a science, for example, as jurisprudence, he who -undertakes to produce conviction can afford to use condensation. -He seldom has to repeat what he has once said; and often, the more -compact his argument, the more likely it will be to command assent if -it is clear as well as close. But this work is not addressed to such a -tribunal. It is written for various classes of readers, some of whom -have already a special acquaintance with the subject, some of whom have -less, and some of whom have now none at all. It is designed to explain -what the theory of evolution is, and to encounter it in the mode -best adapted to reach the various minds of which the mass of readers -is composed. If I had written only for scientists and philosophers, I -should not have repeated anything. - -For similar reasons I have added to this volume both a general index -and a glossary of the scientific and technical terms which I have had -occasion to use. - -The whole of the text of this work had been written and electrotyped -before I had an opportunity to see the very interesting "Life and -Correspondence" of the illustrious naturalist, the late Louis Agassiz, -edited by his accomplished widow, Mrs. Elizabeth Cary Agassiz, and -published in October, 1885, by Houghton, Mifflin and Company, Boston. -For a long period of years, after his residence in this country began, -and until my removal from Boston to New York in 1862, I enjoyed as much -of his intimacy as would be likely to subsist between persons of such -different pursuits. I believe that I understood his general views of -creation, from his lectures and conversation. It is now made entirely -certain that he never accepted the doctrine of evolution of distinct -types out of preceding and different types by ordinary generation; -and it has been to me an inexpressible satisfaction to find that the -opinions and reasoning contained in my work, and adopted independently -of any influence of his, are confirmed by what has now been given to -the world. I need only refer to his letter to Prof. Sedgwick, written -in June, 1845, and to his latest utterance, the paper on "Evolution -and Permanence of Type," in the thirty-third volume of the "Atlantic -Monthly," published after his lamented death in 1873, for proof -that his opinions on the Darwinian theory never changed. Of all the -scientists whom I have ever known, or whose writings I have read, -Agassiz always seemed to me the broadest as well as the most exact and -logical reasoner. - - NEW YORK, _September, 1886_. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [1] "Principles of Psychology," vol. i, p. 336. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - CHAPTER I. - PAGE - - Nature and importance of the subject--Is there a relation of Creator - and creature between God and man?--Rules of rational belief--Is - natural theology a progressive science? 1 - - - CHAPTER II. - - The Platonic Kosmos compared with the Darwinian theory of - evolution 44 - - - CHAPTER III. - - The Darwinian pedigree of man--The evolution of organisms out of - other organisms, according to the theory of Darwin 87 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer 131 - - - CHAPTER V. - - The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further - considered 167 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further - considered 200 - - - CHAPTER VII. - - Mr. Spencer's agnosticism--His theory of the origin of religious - beliefs--The mode in which mankind are to lose the consciousness - of a personal God 257 - - - CHAPTER VIII. - - The existence, attributes, and methods of God deducible from the - phenomena of Nature--Origin of the solar system 300 - - - CHAPTER IX. - - Does evolution account for the phenomena of society and of nature? - --Necessity for a conception of a personal actor--Mr. Spencer's - protoplasmic origin of all organic life--The Mosaic account of - creation treated as a hypothesis which may be scientifically - contrasted with evolution 334 - - - CHAPTER X. - - "Species," "races," and "varieties"--Sexual division--Causation 372 - - - CHAPTER XI. - - Origin of the human mind--Mr. Spencer's theory of the composition - of mind--His system of morality 394 - - - CHAPTER XII. - - Mr. Spencer's philosophy as a whole--His psychology, and his - system of ethics--The sacred origin of moral injunctions, and - the secularization of morals 434 - - - CHAPTER XIII. - - Sophereus discourses on the nature and origin of the human mind 467 - - - GLOSSARY 547 - - - INDEX 557 - - - - -CREATION OR EVOLUTION? - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - Nature and importance of the subject--Is there a relation of Creator - and creature between God and man?--Rules of rational belief--Is - natural theology a progressive science? - - -Man finds himself in the universe a conscious and thinking being. He -has to account to himself for his own existence. He is impelled to this -by an irresistible propensity, which is constantly leading him to look -both inward and outward for an answer to the questions: What am I? How -came I to be? What is the limit of my existence? Is there any other -being in the universe between whom and myself there exists the relation -of Creator and creature? - -The whole history of the human mind, so far as we have any reliable -history, is marked by this perpetual effort to find a First Cause. - -However wild and fantastic may be the idea which the savage conceives -of a being stronger and wiser than himself; however groveling and -sensual may be his conception of the form, or attributes, or action -of that being, he is, when he strives after the comprehension of his -deity, engaged in the same intellectual effort that is made by the -most civilized and cultivated of mankind, when, speculating upon the -origin of the human soul, or its relation to the universe, or the -genesis of the material world, they reach the sublime conception of -an infinite God, the creator of all other spiritual existences and -of all the forms of animal life, or when they end in the theory that -there is no God, or in that other theory which supposes that what we -call the creation, man included, is an evolution out of primordial -matter, which has been operated upon by certain fixed laws, without any -special interposition of a creating power, exerted in the production -of the forms of animal life that now inhabit this earth, or ever have -inhabited it. In the investigation of these contrasted theories, it -is necessary to remember that the faculties of the human mind are -essentially the same in all conditions of civilization or barbarism; -that they differ only in the degree of their growth, activity, and -power of reasoning, and therefore that there must be a common standard -to which to refer all beliefs. The sole standard to which we can refer -a belief in anything is its rationality, or a comparison between that -which is believed and that which is most probable, according to the -power of human reason to weigh probabilities. In the untutored and -uncultivated savage, this power, although it exists, is still very -feeble; partly because it is exercised upon only a few objects, and -partly because the individual has comparatively but little opportunity -to know all the elements which should be taken into account in -determining a question of moral probabilities. - -In the educated and cultivated man this power of judging probabilities, -of testing beliefs by their rationality, is carried, or is capable of -being carried, to the highest point of development, so as to comprehend -in the calculation the full elements of the question, or at least to -reduce the danger of some fatal omission to the minimum. It is, of -course, true that the limited range of our faculties may prevent a full -view of all the elements of any question of probability, even when our -faculties have attained the highest point of development experienced -by the age in which we happen to live. This renders the rationality of -any hypothesis less than an absolutely certain test of truth. But this -rationality is all that we have to apply to any question of belief; and -if we attend carefully to the fact that moral probabilities constitute -the groundwork of all our beliefs, and note the mental processes by -which we reach conclusions upon any question depending upon evidence, -we shall find reason to regard this power of testing beliefs by a -conformity between the hypotheses and that which is most probable to -be the most glorious attribute of the human understanding, as it is -unquestionably the safest guide to which we can trust ourselves. - -It may be that, while philosophers will not object to my definition -of rationality, churchmen will ask what place I propose to assign to -authority in the formation of beliefs. I answer, in the first place, -that I am seeking to make myself understood by plain but reflecting -and reasoning people. Such persons will perceive that what I mean by -the rationality of a belief in any hypothesis is its fitness to be -accepted and acted upon because it has in its favor the strongest -probabilities of the case, so far as we can grasp those probabilities. -I know of no other foundation for a belief in anything; for belief -is the acceptance by the mind of some proposition, statement, or -supposed fact, the truth of which depends upon evidence addressed to -our senses, or to our intellectual perceptions, or to both. In the -next place, in regard to the influence of authority over our beliefs, -it is to be observed that the existence of the authority is a question -to be determined by evidence, and this question, therefore, of itself -involves an application of the test of rationality, or conformity with -what is probable. But, assuming that the authority is satisfactorily -established, it is not safe to leave all minds to the teaching of that -authority, without the aid of the reasoning, which, independent of -all authority, would conduct to the same conclusion. There are many -minds to whom it is useless to say, You are commanded to believe. -The question instantly arises, Commanded by whom, or what? And if the -answer is, By the Church, or by the Bible, and the matter is left to -rest upon that statement, there is great danger of unbelief. It is -apparent that a large amount of what is called infidelity, or unbelief, -now prevailing in the world, is due to the fact that men are told that -they are commanded to believe, as if they were to be passive recipients -of what is asserted, and because so little is addressed to their -understandings. - -I do not wish to be understood as maintaining that there is no place -for authority in matters of what is called religious belief. I am quite -sensible that there may be such a thing as authority even in regard to -our beliefs; that it is quite within the range of possibilities that -there should be such a relation between the human soul and an infinite -Creator as to require the creature to accept by faith whatever a proved -revelation requires that intelligent creature to believe. But, in -view of the fact that what is specially called revealed religion is -addressed to an intelligent creature, to whom the revelation itself -must be proved by some evidence that will satisfy the mind, there is an -evident necessity for treating the rationality of a belief in God as -an independent question. In some way, by some process, we must reach a -belief in the existence of a being before we can consider the claims of -a message which that being is supposed to have sent to us. What we have -to work with, before we can approach the teaching of what is called -revealed religion, is the mind of man and the material universe. Do -these furnish us with the rational basis for a belief in God? - -And here I shall be expected to say what I mean by a belief in God. -I have neither so little reverence for what I myself believe in, nor -so little respect for my readers, as to offer them anything but the -common conception of God. All that is necessary for me to do, in -order to put my own mind in contact with that of the reader, is to -express my conception of God just as it would be expressed by any one -who is accustomed to think of the being called God by the Christian, -the Jew, the Mohammedan, or by some other branches of the human race. -These different divisions of mankind may differ in regard to some of -the attributes of the Deity, or his dealings with men, or the history -or course of his government of the world. But what is common to them -all is a belief in God as the Supreme Being, who is self-existing and -eternal, by whose will all things and all other beings were created, -who is infinite in power and wisdom and in goodness and benevolence. As -an intellectual conception, this idea of a Supreme Being, one only God, -who never had a beginning and can have no end, and who is the creator -of all other beings, excludes, of course, the polytheism of the ancient -civilized nations, or that of the present barbarous tribes; and it -especially excludes the idea of what the Greeks called Destiny, which -was a power that governed the gods as well as the human race, and was -anterior and superior to Jove himself. The simple conception of the one -God held by the Christian, the Jew, or the Mohammedan, as the First -Cause of the universe and all that it embraces, creating all things -and all other beings by his will, in contrast with the modern idea -that they came into existence without the volition of a conscious and -intelligent being making special creations, is what I present to the -mind of the reader. - -This idea of God as a matter of belief presents, I repeat, a question -of moral probabilities. The existence of the universe has to be -accounted for somehow. We can not shut out this inquiry from our -thoughts. The human being who never speculates, never thinks, upon the -origin of his own soul, or upon the genesis of this wondrous frame of -things external to himself, or upon his relations to some superior -being, is a very rare animal. If he is much more than an animal, he -will have some idea of these things; and the theories by which some of -the most cultivated and acute intellects of our race, from the widest -range of accumulated physical facts and phenomena yet gathered, have -undertaken to account for the existence of species without referring -them to the volition of an infinite creator, are at once a proof of the -universal pressure of the question of creation upon the human mind, and -of the logical necessity for treating it as a question dependent upon -evidence and probability. - -I lay out of consideration, now, the longing of the human mind to -find a personal God and Creator. This sentiment, this yearning for an -infinite father, this feeling of loneliness in the universe without the -idea of God, is certainly an important moral factor in the question -of probability; but I omit it now from the number of proofs, because -it is a sentiment, and because I wish to subject the belief in God as -the Creator to the cold intellectual process by which we may discover -a conformity between that hypothesis and the phenomena of Nature as a -test of the probable truth. If such a conformity can be satisfactorily -shown, and if the result of the process as conducted can fairly claim -to be that the existence of God the Creator has by far the highest -degree of probability above and beyond all other hypotheses that have -been resorted to to account for our existence, the satisfaction of a -moral feeling of the human heart may well become a source of happiness, -a consolation in all the evils of this life, and a support in the hour -of death. - -But in this preliminary chapter I ought to state what I understand to -be the scientific hypothesis or hypotheses with which I propose to -contrast the idea of God as the creator of species by applying the test -of probability. To discuss the superior claims of one hypothesis over -another, without showing that there is a real conflict between them, -would be to set up a man of straw for the sake of knocking it down as -if it were a living and real antagonist. What I desire to do is not to -aim at a cheap victory by attacking something that does not call for -opposition; but it is to ascertain first whether there is now current -any explanation or hypothesis concerning the origin of the creation, or -anything that it contains, which rejects the idea of God as the creator -of that which we know to exist and as it exists, and then to ascertain -which of the two hypotheses ought to be accepted as the truth, because -it has in its favor the highest attainable amount of probability. There -is an amount of probability which becomes to us a moral demonstration, -because our minds are so constituted that conviction depends upon -the completeness with which the evidence in favor of one hypothesis -excludes the other from the category of rational beliefs. - -I pass by the common sort of infidelity which rejects the idea of an -intelligent creator acting in any manner whatever, whether by special -creations or by laws of development operating on some primordial form -of animal life. But among the modern scientists who have propounded -explanations of the origin of species, I distinguish those who do not, -as I understand, deny that there was an intelligent Creator by whose -will some form of animal life was originally called into being, but who -maintain that the diversified forms of animal life which we now see -were not brought into being by the special will of the Creator as we -now know them, but that they were evolved, by a process called natural -selection, out of some lower type of animated organism. Of this class, -the late Mr. Darwin is a representative. There is, however, at least -one philosopher who carries the doctrine of evolution much farther, -and who, if I rightly understand him, rejects any act of creation, -even of the lowest and simplest type of animal existence. This is -Mr. Herbert Spencer--a writer who, while he concurs in Mr. Darwin's -general theory of natural selection as the process by which distinct -organisms have been evolved out of other organisms, does not admit of -any primal organism as the origin of the whole series of animals and as -the creation of an intelligent will. - -It will be appropriate hereafter to refer to the doctrine of evolution -as a means of accounting for the existence of the human mind. At -present it is only necessary to say that I understand it to be -maintained as the hypothesis which has the highest attainable amount -of evidence in its favor, that distinct species of animals are not a -creation but a growth; and also that the mind of man is not a special -creation of a spiritual existence, but a result of a long process -by which organized matter has slowly worked itself from matter into -intellect. Wherever, for instance, these scientists may place the -non-human primate, out of which man has been evolved by what is called -natural selection, and whether they do or do not assume that he was a -creation of an intelligent will, they do not, as I understand, claim -that the primate was endowed with what we call intellect; so that at -some time there was a low form of animal life without intellect, but -intellect became evolved in the long course of countless ages, by the -process of natural selection, through the improving conditions and -better organization of that low animal which had no intellect. In -other words, we have what the scientist calls the non-human primate, -a low form of animal without intellect, but capable of so improving -its own physical organization as to create for itself and within -itself that essence which we recognize as the human mind. Here, then, -there is certainly a theory, an hypothesis, which may be and must be -contrasted with the idea that the mind of man is a spiritual essence -created by the volition of some other being having the power to create -such existences, and put into a temporary union with a physical -organization, by the establishment of a mysterious connection which -makes the body the instrument of the soul so long as the connection -exists. If I have stated correctly the theory which assigns the origin -of the human mind to the process of evolution, I have assuredly not set -up a man of straw. I stand confronted with an hypothesis which directly -encounters the idea that the human intellect is a creation, in the -sense of a direct, intelligent, conscious, and purposed production of -a special character, as the human mind and hand, in the production of -whatever is permitted to finite capacities, purposely creates some new -and independent object of its wishes, its desires, or its wants. The -human mind, says the scientist, was not created by a spiritual being as -a spiritual existence independent of matter, but it grew out of matter, -that was at first so organized that it did not manifest what we call -intellect, but that could so improve its own organization as to evolve -out of matter what we know as mind. - -And here I lay out of view entirely the comparative dignity of man as a -being whose existence is to be accounted for by the one hypothesis or -the other, because this comparative dignity is not properly an element -in the question of probability. The doctrine of evolution, as expounded -by Darwin and other modern scientists, may be true, and we shall still -have reason to exclaim with Hamlet, "What a piece of work is man!" - -On the other hand, the hypothesis that man is a special creation of -an infinite workman, if true, does not enhance the mere _a priori_ -dignity of the human race. It may, and it will hereafter appear that -it does, establish the moral accountability of man to a supreme being, -a relation which, if I correctly understand the doctrine of evolution, -is left out of the system that supposes intellect to be evolved out of -the improving process by which matter becomes nervous organization, -whose action exhibits those manifestations which we call mind. The -moral accountability of man to a supreme being may, if it becomes -established by proper evidence, be a circumstance that distinguishes -him from other animals, and may, therefore, raise him in the scale of -being. But then this dignity is a fact that comes after the process -of reasoning has shown the relation of creator and creature, and it -should not be placed at the beginning of the process among the proofs -that are to show that relation. Mr. Darwin, in concluding his great -work, "The Descent of Man," which he maintains to have been from some -very low type of animated creature, through the apes, who became -our ancestors, and who were developed into the lowest savages, and -finally into the civilized man, has anticipated that his theory will, -he regrets to say, be "highly distasteful to many"; and he adds, by -way of parrying this disgust, that "he who has seen a savage in his -native land will not feel much shame if forced to acknowledge that the -blood of some more humble creature flows in his veins." For his own -part, he adds, he would as soon be descended from a certain heroic -little monkey who exposed himself to great danger in order to save -the life of his keeper, as from a savage who delights to torture his -enemies, offers bloody sacrifices, practices infanticide, etc. Waiving -for the present the question whether the man who is called civilized -is necessarily descended from or through the kind of savage whom Mr. -Darwin saw in the Tierra del Fuego, or whether that kind of savage is a -deteriorated offshoot from some higher human creatures that possessed -moral and intellectual characteristics of a more elevated nature, I -freely concede that this question of the dignity of our descent is not -of much logical consequence. However distasteful to us may be the idea -that we are descended from the same stock as the apes, and that their -direct ancestors are to be traced to some more humble creature until -we reach the lowest form of organized and animated matter, the dignity -of our human nature is not to be reckoned among the probabilities by -which our existence is to be accounted for. It is, in this respect, -like the feeling or sentiment which prompts us to wish to find an -infinite creator, the father of our spirits and the creator of our -bodies. As a matter of reasoning, we must prove to ourselves, by -evidence that satisfies the mind, that God exists. Having reached this -conviction, the belief in his existence becomes a vast and inestimable -treasure. But our wish to believe in God does not help us to attain -that belief. In the same way our feeling about the dignity of man, the -nobleness or ignobleness of our descent from or through one kind of -creature or another, may be a satisfaction or a dissatisfaction after -we have reached a conclusion, but it affords us no aid in arriving at a -satisfactory conclusion from properly chosen premises. - -And here, in advance of the tests which I shall endeavor to apply to -the existence of God and the existence of man as a special creation, I -desire to say something respecting the question of a logical antagonism -between science and religion. I have often been a good deal puzzled to -make out what those well-meaning persons suppose, who unwarily admit -that there is no necessary antagonism between what modern science -teaches and what religion teaches. Whether there is or is not, depends -upon what we mean by science and religion. If by science we understand -the investigation of Nature, or a study of the structure and conditions -of everything that we can subject to the observation of our senses, -and the deduction of certain hypotheses from what we observe, then -we must compare the hypotheses with the teachings or conclusions -which we derive from religion. The next question, therefore, is, What -is religion? If we make it to consist in the Mosaic account of the -creation, or in the teachings of the Bible respecting God, we shall -find that we have to deal with more or less of conflict between the -interpretations that are put upon a record supposed to have been -inspired, and the conclusions of science. But if we lay aside what is -commonly understood by revealed religion, which supposes a special -communication from a superior to an inferior being of something which -the former desires the latter to know, after the latter has been for -some time in existence, then we mean by religion that belief in the -existence of a superior being which we derive from the exercise of -our reasoning powers upon whatever comes within the observation of -our senses, and upon our own intellectual faculties. In other words, -for what we call natural religion, we look both outward and inward, -in search of a belief in a Supreme Being. We look outward, because -the whole universe is a vast array of facts, from which conclusions -are to be drawn; and among this array of facts is the construction -of our bodies. We look inward, because our own minds present another -array of facts from which conclusions are to be drawn. Now, if the -conclusions which the scientist draws from the widest observation -of Nature, including the human mind itself, fail to account for the -existence of the mind of man, and natural religion does account for -it, there is an irreconcilable conflict between science and religion. -I can not avoid the conviction that Mr. Darwin has missed the point of -this conflict. "I am aware," he says, "that the conclusions arrived -at in this work will be denounced by some as highly irreligious; but -he who denounces them is bound to show why it is more irreligious to -explain the origin of man, as a distinct species by descent from a -lower form, through the laws of variation and natural selection, than -to explain the birth of the individual through the laws of ordinary -reproduction." I do not understand him, by the terms "religious" or -"irreligious," to refer to anything that involves praise or blame for -adopting one hypothesis rather than another. I suppose he meant to say -that a belief in his theory of the descent of man as a species is no -more inconsistent with a belief in God than it is to believe that the -individual is brought into being through the operation of the laws of -ordinary reproduction which God has established. This would be strictly -true, if the hypothesis of man's descent as a distinct species from -some lower form accounted for his existence by proofs that satisfy -the rules of evidence by which our beliefs ought to be and must be -determined. In that case, there would be no inconsistency between his -hypothesis and that to which natural religion conducts us. On the other -hand, if the Darwinian hypothesis fails to establish a relation between -the soul of man, as a special creation, and a competent creator, then -the antagonism between this hypothesis and natural religion is direct, -immediate, and irreconcilable; for the essence of religion consists in -that relation, and a belief in that relation is what we mean, or ought -to mean, by religion. - -There is another form in which Mr. Darwin has depreciated the idea of -any antagonism between his theory and our religious ideas, but it has -the same logical defect as the suggestion which I have just considered, -because it involves the same assumption. It is put hypothetically, -but it is still an assumption, lacking the very elements of supreme -probability that can alone give it force. "Man," he observes, "may -be excused for feeling some pride at having risen, not through his -own exertions, to the very summit of the organic scale; and the fact -of his having so risen, instead of being aboriginally placed there, -may give him some hope for a still higher destiny in the distant -future." I certainly would not misrepresent, and I earnestly desire -to understand, this distinguished writer. It is a little uncertain -whether he here refers to the hope of immortality, or of an existence -after the connection between our minds and our bodies is dissolved, or -whether he refers to the further elevation of man on this earth in the -distant future of terrestrial time. If he referred to the hope of an -existence after what we call death, then he ought to have shown that -his theory is compatible with such a continued existence of the soul -of man. It will be one of the points on which I propose to bestow some -attention, that the doctrine of evolution is entirely incompatible with -the existence of the human soul for one instant after the brain has -ceased to act as an organism, and death has wholly supervened; because -that doctrine, if I understand it rightly, regards the intellect of -man as a high development of what in other animals is called instinct, -and instinct as a confirmed and inherited habit of animal organism to -act in a certain way. If this is a true philosophical account of the -origin and nature of intellect, it can have no possible individual -existence after the organ called the brain, which has been in the habit -of acting in a certain way, has perished, any more than there can be -a digestion of food after the stomach or other assimilating organ has -been destroyed. If, on the contrary, the mind of man is a special -creation, of a spiritual essence, placed in an intimate union with -the body for a temporary period, and made to depend for a time on the -organs of that body as its means of manifestation and the exercise of -its spiritual faculties, then it is conceivable that this union may be -severed and the mind may survive. Not only is this conceivable, but, -as I shall endeavor hereafter to show, the proof of it rises very high -in the scale of probability--so high that we may accept it as a fact, -just as confidently as we accept many things of which we can not have -absolute certainty. - -And here I think it needful, although not for all readers, but for -the great majority, to lay down as distinctly as I can the rules -of evidence which necessarily govern our beliefs. I do so because, -in reading the works of many of the modern scientists who have -espoused the Darwinian doctrine of evolution, I find that the rules -of evidence are but little observed. There is a very great, often -an astonishingly great, accumulation of facts, or of assumed facts. -It is impossible not to be impressed by the learning, the industry, -and the range of these writers. Nor would I in the least impugn their -candor, or question their accuracy as witnesses of facts, which I am -not competent to dispute if I were disposed to do so. But there is one -thing for which I may suppose myself competent. I have through a long -life been accustomed to form conclusions upon facts; and this is what -every person does and must do who is asked to accept a new theory or -hypothesis of any kind upon any subject. - -Most of our beliefs depend upon what is called circumstantial -evidence. There are very few propositions which address themselves to -our belief upon one direct and isolated proof. We may class most of -the perceptions of our senses among the simple and unrelated proofs -which we accept without hesitation, although there is more or less -of an unconscious and instantaneous process of reasoning, through -which we pass before the evidence of our senses is accepted and acted -upon. Then there are truths to which we yield an instant assent, -because they prove themselves, as is the case with the mathematical -or geometrical problems, as soon as we perceive the connection in the -steps of the demonstration. Besides these, there are many propositions -which, although they involve moral reasoning, have become axioms about -which we do not care to inquire, but which we assume to have been so -repeatedly and firmly established that it would be a waste of time to -go over the ground again whenever they come up. But there is a very -large class of propositions which address themselves to our belief, -which do not depend on a single perception through our senses, and are -not isolated facts, and are not demonstrable by mathematical truth, and -are not axioms accepted because they were proved long ago, and have -by general consent been adopted into the common stock of ideas. The -class of beliefs with which the rules of circumstantial evidence are -concerned are those where the truth of the proposition, or hypothesis, -is a deduction from many distinct facts, but the coexistence of which -facts leads to the inevitable conclusion that the proposition or -hypothesis is true. We can not tell why it is that moral conviction is -forced upon us by the coexistence of certain facts and their tendency -to establish a certain conclusion. All we know is, that our minds are -so constituted that we can not resist the force of circumstantial -evidence if we suffer our faculties to act as reason has taught them. -But, then, in any given case, whether we ought to yield our belief -in anything where we have only circumstantial evidence to guide us, -there are certain rules to be observed. The first of these rules is, -that every fact in a collection of proofs from which we are to draw -a certain inference must be proved independently by direct evidence, -and must not be itself a deduction from some other fact. This is the -first step in the process of arranging a chain of moral evidence. -There is a maxim in this branch of the law of evidence that you can -not draw an inference from an inference. In other words, you can not -infer a fact from some other fact, and then unite the former with two -or more independent facts to make a chain of proofs. Every link in -the chain must have its separate existence, and its existence must be -established by the same kind and degree of evidence as if it were the -only thing to be proved. The next rule is to place the several facts, -when so proved, in their proper relation to each other in the group -from which the inference is to be drawn. In circumstantial evidence a -fact may be established by the most direct and satisfactory proofs, -and yet it may have no relation to other facts with which you attempt -to associate it. For example, suppose it to be proved that A on a -certain occasion bought a certain poison, and that soon after B died -of that kind of poison; but it does not appear that A and B were ever -seen together, or stood in any relation to each other. The fact that -A bought poison would have no proper relation to the other fact that -B died of that kind of poison. But introduce by independent evidence -the third fact, that A knew B intimately, and then add the fourth -fact, that A had a special motive for wishing B's death, you have some -ground for believing that A poisoned B, although no human eye ever saw -the poison administered. From this correlation of all the facts in a -body of circumstantial evidence, there follows a third rule, namely, -that the whole collection of facts, in order to justify the inference -sought to be drawn from them, must be consistent with that inference. -Thus, the four facts above supposed are entirely consistent with the -hypothesis that A poisoned B. But leave out the two intermediate facts, -or leave out the last one, and B might as well have been poisoned by -C as by A. Hence there is a fourth rule: that the collection of facts -from which an inference is to be drawn must not only be consistent -with the probable truth of that inference, but they must exclude the -probable truth of any other inference. Thus, not only must it be shown -that A bought poison, that B died of poison, that A was intimate with -B and had a motive for wishing B's death, but, to justify a belief in -A's guilt, the motive ought to be shown to have been so strong as to -exclude the moral probability that B was poisoned by some one else, -or poisoned himself. It is in the application of these rules that in -courts of justice the minds of jurymen often become perplexed with -doubts which they can not account for, or else they yield a too easy -credence to the guilt of the accused when the question of guilt depends -upon circumstantial evidence. - -I shall not spend much time in contending that these rules of evidence -must be applied to scientific investigations which are to affect -our belief in such a proposition as the descent of man from a common -ancestor with the monkey. This is not only an hypothesis depending upon -circumstantial evidence, but it is professedly a deduction from a great -range of facts and from a very complex state of facts. In reasoning -upon such subjects, when the facts which constitute the chain of -circumstantial evidence are very numerous, we are apt to regard their -greater comparative number as if it dispensed with a rigid application -of the rules of determination. Every one can see, in the illustration -above employed, borrowed from criminal jurisprudence, that the facts -which constitute the chain of circumstantial evidence ought to be -rigidly tested by the rules of determination before the guilt of the -accused can be safely drawn as a deduction from the facts. But, in -reasoning from physical facts to any given physical hypothesis where -the facts are very numerous, there is a strong tendency to relax the -rules of evidence, because, the greater the accumulation of supposed -facts becomes, the greater is the danger of placing in the chain of -evidence something that is not proved, and thus of vitiating the whole -process. To this tendency, which I have observed to be very frequent -among scientists, I should apply, without meaning any disrespect, -the term invention. A great accumulation of facts is made, following -one another in a certain order; all those which precede a certain -intermediate link are perhaps duly and independently proved, and the -same may be the case with those which follow that link. But there is -no proof of the fact that constitutes the link and makes a complete -chain of evidence. This vacuity of proof, if one may use such an -expression, is constantly occurring in the writings of naturalists, and -is often candidly admitted. It is gotten over by reasoning from the -antecedent and the subsequent facts that the intermediate facts must -have existed; and then the reasoning goes on to draw the inference of -the principal hypothesis from a chain of proof in which a necessary -intermediate link is itself a mere inference from facts which may be -just as consistent with the non-existence as with the existence of -the supposed intermediate link. In such cases we are often told very -frankly that no one has yet discovered that the intermediate link ever -actually existed; that the researches of science have not yet reached -demonstrative proof of the existence of a certain intermediate animal -or vegetable organization; that geological exploration has not yet -revealed to us all the specimens of the animal or vegetable kingdoms -that may have inhabited this globe at former periods of time; but that -the analogies which lead down or lead up to that as yet undiscovered -link in the chain are such that it must have existed, and that we may -confidently expect that the actual proof of it will be found hereafter. -The difficulty with this kind of reasoning is that it borrows from the -main hypothesis which one seeks to establish the means of showing the -facts from which the hypothesis is to be drawn as an inference. Thus, -for example, the hypothesis is that the species called man is a highly -developed animal formed by a process of natural selection that went on -for unknown ages among the individuals descended from the progenitor -of the anthropomorphous apes. The facts in the physical organization -and mental manifestations of the animal called man, when viewed -historically through all the conditions in which we know anything of -this species, lead up to that common supposed ancestor of the apes. -The facts in the physical organization and instinctive habits of the -ape, when viewed historically through all the conditions in which we -know anything of his species, show that he, too, was evolved by the -process of natural selection out of that same ancestor. Intermediate, -respectively, between the man and the monkey and their primordial -natural-selection ancestor or predecessor, there are links in the chain -of proof of which we have no evidence, and which must be supplied by -inferring their existence from the analogies which we can trace in -comparing things of which we have some satisfactory proof. Thus, the -main hypothesis, the theory of natural selection as the explanation -of the existence of distinct species of animals, is not drawn from a -complete chain of established facts, but it is helped out by inferring -from facts that are proved other facts that are not proved, but which -we have reason to expect will be discovered hereafter. I need not say -that this kind of argument will not do in the common affairs of life, -and that no good reason can be shown why our beliefs in matters of -science should be made to depend upon it. - -We do not rest our belief in what is called the law of gravitation -upon any chain of proof in which it is necessary to supply a link -by assuming that it exists. The theory that bodies have a tendency -to approach each other, that the larger mass attracts to itself the -smaller by a mysterious force that operates through all space, is a -deduction from a great multitude of perpetually recurring facts that -are open to our observation, no one of which is inferred from any other -fact, while the whole excludes the moral probability that any other -hypothesis will account for the phenomena which are continually and -invariably taking place around us. - -This illustration of the rules of evidence, when applied to scientific -inquiries, leads me to refer to one of the favorite postulates of -the evolution school. We are often told that it ought to be no -objection to the doctrine of evolution that it is new, or startling, -or contrary to other previous theories of the existence of species. -We are reminded again and again that Galileo's grand conception was -scouted as an irreligious as well as an irrational hypothesis, and -that the same reception attended the first promulgation of many -scientific truths which no intelligent and well-informed person now -doubts.[2] Then we have it asserted that the doctrine of evolution -is now accepted by nearly all the most advanced and accomplished -natural philosophers, especially those of the rising scientists who -have bestowed most attention upon it. Upon this there are two things -to be said: First, it is a matter of very little consequence that the -learned of a former age did not attend to the proofs of the law of -gravitation, or of any other new theory of physics, as they should -have done, and that they consequently rejected it. Their logical -habits of mind, their preconceived religious notions, and many other -disturbing causes, rendered them incapable of correct reasoning on some -particular subject, while they could reason with entire correctness -on other subjects. Secondly, the extent to which a new theory is -accepted by those whose special studies lead them to make the necessary -investigations, does not dispense with the application of the laws -of evidence to the facts which are supposed to establish the theory. -The doctrine of evolution addresses itself not only to the scientific -naturalist, but to the whole intelligent part of mankind. How is one -who does not belong to this class of investigators to regulate his -belief in the theory which they propound? Is he to take it on their -authority? or is he, while he accords to their statements of facts all -the assent which as witnesses they are entitled to expect from him, to -apply to their deduction the same principles of belief that he applies -to everything else which challenges belief, and to assent or dissent -accordingly? No one, I presume, will question that the latter is the -only way in which any new matter of belief should be approached. I have -not supposed that any scientist questions this; but I have referred to -the constant iteration that the doctrine of evolution is now generally -admitted by men of science, that the assertion, supposing it to be -true, may pass for just what it is worth. It is worth this and no -more: that candid, truthful, and competent witnesses, when they speak -of facts that they have observed, are entitled to be believed as to -the existence of those facts. When they assume facts which they do not -prove, but which are essential links in the chain of evidence, or when -the facts which they do prove do not rationally exclude every other -hypothesis excepting their own, the authority of even the whole body -of such persons is of no more account than that of any other class -of intelligent and cultivated men. In the ages when ecclesiastical -authority exercised great power over the beliefs of men upon questions -of physical science, the superiority was accorded to the authority -which claimed it, and the scientist who propounded a new physical -theory that did not suit the theologian was overborne. It seems to me -that it is a tendency of the present age to substitute the authority -of scientific experts in the place of the ecclesiastical authority -of former periods, by demanding that something more than the office -of witnesses of facts shall be accorded to them. We are told that it -is a very important proof of the soundness of deductions, that the -deductions are drawn by the greater number of the specialists who -have examined the facts. Sometimes this is carried so far as to imply -presumption in those who do not yield assent to the theory, as if it -ought to be accepted upon the authority of the experts whose proper -office it is to furnish us with the facts, and whose deductions we have -to examine upon the strength of their reasoning. Those of us who are -not professors of the particular science may be charged with ignorance -or incapacity if we do not join in the current of scientific opinion. -But, after all, the new theory challenges our belief. If we examine it -at all, we must judge of it, not by the numbers of those who propound -or accept it, or by any amount of mere authority, but by the soundness -of the reasoning by which its professors support it. - -The reader is now informed of what he may expect to find discussed -in this volume. It remains for me to indicate the mode in which the -discussion will be carried on. I propose to divest my own mind, and -so far as I may to divest the mind of the reader, of all influence -from revealed religion. I shall not refer to the Mosaic account of the -creation excepting as I refer to other hypotheses. With its authority -as an account given by the Deity himself through his chosen servant, -I have here nothing to do. Nor shall I rely upon the revelation -recorded in the New Testament. All the inquiries which I propose to -make are those which lie in the domain of natural religion; and while -I can not expect, in exploring this domain, to make discoveries or to -find arguments which can claim the merit of originality, I may avoid -traveling in a well beaten path, by pursuing the line of my own -reflections, without considering whether they coincide with or differ -from the reasonings of others. Although, at a former period of my life, -I have studied the great writers whose speculations in the science -of natural theology are the most famous and important pieces in its -literature, it is more than forty years since I have looked into one of -them; and I do not propose to turn to them now, in order to see whether -they have or have not left any traces in my mind. It is quite possible -that critics may array against me the authority of some great name or -names; but even if I am to be charged with presumption in entering upon -this field, it will not be found, so far as I am conscious, that I have -borrowed an argument, imitated a method, or followed an example. - -There is a passage in one of the writings of Lord Macaulay in which -that brilliant essayist maintained that natural theology is not -a progressive science. Macaulay's tendency to paradox was often -aggravated by the superficial way in which he used his multifarious -knowledge. As in the course of this work I am about to do that which -he regarded as idle, namely, to inquire whether natural religion, -aside from revelation, is of any value as a means of reaching a belief -in the existence and attributes of God and the immortality of man, I -cite the passage in which Macaulay makes the assertion that natural -theology has made no progress from the time of the Greek philosophers -to the present day: "As respects natural religion, revelation being -for the present altogether left out of the question, it is not easy to -see that a philosopher of the present day is more favorably situated -than Thales or Simonides. He has before him just the same evidences -of design in the structure of the universe that the early Greeks had. -We say just the same, for the discoveries of modern astronomers and -anatomists have really added nothing to the force of that argument -which a reflecting mind finds in every beast, bird, insect, fish, -leaf, flower, and shell. The reasoning by which Socrates in Xenophon's -hearing confuted the little atheist Aristophanes, is exactly the -reasoning of Paley's 'Natural Theology.' Socrates makes precisely the -same use of the statues of Polycletus and the pictures of Zeuxis which -Paley makes of the watch. As to the other great question, the question -what becomes of man after death, we do not see that a highly educated -European, left to his unassisted reason, is more likely to be in the -right than a Blackfoot Indian. Not a single one of the many sciences -in which we surpass the Blackfoot Indians throws the smallest light on -the state of the soul after the animal life is extinct. In truth, all -the philosophers, ancient and modern, who have attempted without the -aid of revelation to prove the immortality of man, from Plato down to -Franklin, appear to us to have failed deplorably. - -"Then, again, all the great enigmas which perplex the natural -theologian are the same in all ages. The ingenuity of a people just -emerging from barbarism is quite sufficient to propound those enigmas. -The genius of Locke or Clarke is quite unable to solve them. It is -a mistake to imagine that subtile speculations touching the Divine -attributes, the origin of evil, the necessity of human actions, the -foundation of moral obligation, imply any high degree of intellectual -culture. Such speculations, on the contrary, are in a peculiar manner -the delight of intelligent children and of half-civilized men. The -number of boys is not small who, at fourteen, have thought enough on -these questions to be fully entitled to the praise which Voltaire gives -to Zadig: 'Il en savait ce qu'on a su dans tous les ages; c'est à dire, -fort peu de chose.' - -"The book of Job shows that, long before letters and arts were known -to Ionia, these vexing questions were debated with no common skill and -eloquence under the tents of the Idumean emirs; nor has human reason, -in the course of three thousand years, discovered any satisfactory -solution of the riddles which perplexed Eliphaz and Zophar. Natural -theology, then, is not a progressive science."[3] - -Here, in the space of two not very long paragraphs, is a multitude -of allusions which evince the range of Lord Macaulay's reading, but -which are employed, without very close thinking, in a quite inaccurate -way, to sustain assertions that are not true. If he had said that a -modern philosopher has before him in the structure of the universe -not only all the same evidence of design which the early Greeks had, -but a great deal more, he would have hit the exact truth. It is -simple extravagance to say that modern astronomy has added nothing to -the strength of the argument which shows the existence of a supreme -lawgiver and artificer of infinite power and skill. What did the -early Greeks know about the structure of the solar system, the law -of universal gravitation, and the laws of motion? Compare the ideas -entertained by the Greek philosophers of the phenomena of the universe -with those which modern astronomy has enabled a modern philosopher -to assume as scientific facts established by rigorous demonstration; -compare what was known before the invention of the telescope with -what the telescope has revealed; compare the progress that was made -in Greek speculative philosophy from the time of Thales to the time -of Plato, and then say whether natural religion had not made advances -of the greatest importance even before modern science had multiplied -the means for still greater progress. A brief summary of the Greek -philosophy concerning the producing causes of phenomena will determine -whether Lord Macaulay was right or wrong in the assertion that the -"early Greeks" had as good means of making true deductions in natural -theology as the means which exist to-day. - -All scholars who have attended to the history of Greek speculation know -that the Greeks held to the belief in polytheistic personal agents as -the active producers of the phenomena of Nature. This was the system of -Homer and Hesiod and the other old poets. This was the popular belief -held throughout all the Hellenic world, and it continued to be the -faith of the general public, not only after the different schools of -philosophy had arisen, but down to and after the time when St. Paul -stood on Mars Hill and told the men of Athens how he had found that -they were in all things too superstitious. Thales, who flourished in -the first half of the sixth century before Christ, was the first Greek -who suggested a physical agency in place of a personal. He assumed the -material substance, water, to be the primordial matter and universal -substratum of everything in Nature. All other substances were, by -transmutations, generated from water, and when destroyed they all -returned into water. His idea of the earth was that it was a flat, -round surface floating on the immense watery expanse or ocean. In -this he agreed with the old poets; but he did not, like them, suppose -that the earth extended down to the depths of Tartarus. The Thalesian -hypothesis, therefore, rejected the Homeric Okeanus, the father of -all things, and substituted for that personal agency the agency of -one primordial physical substance, by its own energy producing all -other substances. This is about all that is known of the philosophy of -Thales, and even this is not known from any extant writing of his, but -it is derived from what subsequent writers, including Aristotle, have -imputed to him.[4] Why Lord Macaulay should have selected Thales as the -Greek philosopher who was as favorably situated as a philosopher of -the present day for dealing with questions of natural religion, is not -very apparent. All that Thales did, assuming that we know what he did, -was to strike out a new vein of thought, the direct opposite of the -poetical and popular idea of the origin of phenomena. - -From Thales to Plato, a century and a half intervened.[5] During this -period there arose, according to Mr. Grote, twelve distinct schemes -of philosophy, the authors of which that learned Englishman has -enumerated, together with an admirable summary of their respective -systems. From this summary certain things are apparent. All these -philosophers, from Thales to Democritus, while each speculated -upon Nature in an original vein of his own, endeavored to find an -explanation or hypothesis on which to account for the production and -generation of the universe by some physical agency apart from the -mythical personifications which were believed in by the populace and -assumed in the poetical theologies. Some of them, without blending -ethics and theology in their speculations, adopted, as the universal -and sufficient agents, the common, familiar, and pervading material -substances, such as water, fire, air, etc.; others, as Pythagoras and -his sect, united with ethical and theological speculations the idea -of geometrical and arithmetical combinations as the primal scientific -basis of the phenomena of Nature. But what was common to all these -speculations was the attempt to find a scientific basis on which to -explain, by physical generation, by transmutation and motion from place -to place, the generation of the Kosmos, to take the place of generation -by a divine personal agency or agencies. But while these speculations -were of course unsuccessful, their abundance and variety, the inventive -genius which they exhibit, the effort to find a scientific basis apart -from the popular and poetic belief in a multitude of personal and -divine agencies, constitute, as Mr. Grote has well said, "one of the -most memorable facts in the history of the Hellenic mind"; and "the -mental effort required to select some known agency and to connect it -by a chain of reasoning with the result, all this is a new phenomenon -in the history of the human mind." Such an amount of philosophical -speculations could not go on for a century and a half without enlarging -the means for dealing with questions of natural theology; for they very -nearly exhausted the "causings and beginnings" which could be assigned -to regular knowable and predictable agencies; and these they carried -through almost every conceivable form of action by which such agencies -could be supposed to operate. While the authors of these systems -of philosophy were constantly hampered by the popular and poetic -conceptions of a diversified and omnipresent polytheistic agency, a -belief which, as Mr. Grote has said, was "eminently captivating and -impressive," and which pervaded all the literature of their time, -their speculations accumulated a vast fund of ideas in the sphere of -scientific explanations, which, although unsatisfactory to modern -science, became, when we reach Plato, the principal influence which led -him to revert to the former idea of a divine agency, intentionally and -deliberately constructing out of a chaotic substratum the system of the -Kosmos; and which also led him to unite with it the idea of a mode in -which it acted on and through the primordial elements of matter. - -So that, from the class of philosophers to whom Lord Macaulay -presumably referred as "the early Greeks," down to and including Plato, -there was a great advance. The earlier Greek philosophers did not -divide substance from its powers or properties, nor did they conceive -of substance as a thing acted upon by power, or of power as a thing -distinct from substance. They regarded substance, some primordial -substance, with its powers and properties, as an efficient and -material cause, and as the sole cause, as a positive and final agent. -They did not seek for a final cause apart from the substances which -they supposed to be the sole agents operating to produce important -effects. But, inasmuch as they carried their various theories through -nearly the whole range of possible speculation, they enabled Plato -and Aristotle to see that there was a fundamental defect in their -reasoning; that there must be an abstract conception of power as -something distinct from substance or its properties. It was by Plato -and Aristotle that this abstract conception was reached, of course -without any influence of what we regard as revelation; and, although -they did not always describe correctly the mode in which this power -had acted, their perception of the logical necessity for such a final -cause marks a great progress in philosophical speculation. It entirely -refutes Lord Macaulay's assertion that natural theology is not a -progressive science. It had made great progress from Thales to Plato; -and while in a certain sense it is true that "a modern philosopher -has before him just the same evidence of design in the structure of -the universe which the early Greeks had"--that is, he has the same -physical phenomena to observe--it is not true that the early Greeks -did not develop conceptions of the origin of the universe valuable -to their successors. Lord Macaulay should not have compared Thales -with the modern philosopher, in respect of advantage of situation, -but he should have compared the modern philosopher with Plato, and -Plato with his predecessors; and if he had done this, he could not -have asserted with any show of truth that natural theology has -made no advance as a science from the time of Thales, the Milesian -philosopher, and Simonides, the poet, to the present day. I shall have -occasion hereafter to speak of the masterly intellectual power by -which Plato wrought out his conception of a formative divine agency in -the production of the Kosmos, and the bold and original speculation -by which he avoided the charge of infidelity toward the established -religion of his countrymen. - -When I come to speak of what modern astronomy has done in furnishing -us with new means of sound philosophical speculation on the being, -attributes, and methods of God, it will be seen whether Lord Macaulay -is correct in the assertion that it has added nothing to the argument. -At present I will briefly advert to what the "early Greeks," or any of -the Greeks, knew of the structure of the solar system. We learn, from -a work which dates from nearly the middle of the second century of the -Christian era, what was the general conception of the solar system -among the ancients, including the Greeks. This work is known as the -"Almagest" of Ptolemy, and the name of the "Ptolemaic System" has been -given to the theory which he describes. This theory was common to all -the ancient astronomers, Ptolemy's statement of it being a compendium -of what they believed. Its principal features are these: 1. The heavens -are a vast sphere, in which the heavenly bodies are set, and around the -pole of this sphere they revolve in a circle every day. 2. The earth -is likewise a sphere, and is situated in the center of the celestial -plane as a fixed point. The earth having no motion, and being in the -center of all the motions of the other bodies, the diurnal revolutions -of those bodies are in a uniform motion around it. 3. The sun, being -one of the heavenly bodies making a revolution around the earth, was -supposed to be placed outside of the position of Venus in the heavenly -sphere. The order of the Ptolemaic system was thus: The moon was first, -being nearest to the earth; then came Mercury and Venus, the sun being -between Venus and Mars. Beyond Mars came Jupiter and Saturn. Plato's -arrangement was in one respect different, his order being the moon, the -sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. But this ideal heavenly -sphere, with the earth in the center of all the revolutions of the -other bodies, and remaining quiescent--a theory which was common to all -the ancient astronomers--was the result of observing the motions of -the heavenly bodies as they appear to a spectator on the earth. Such a -spectator would have this appearance of a celestial sphere presented -to him wherever he might be; and, judging from the apparent motions -of the heavenly bodies relative to his own position at the center, he -would conclude that the earth is at that center, and that it remains -at rest, supported on nothing. It required certain discoveries to -explode this system of a celestial sphere. First came Copernicus, who, -about the middle of the sixteenth century of our era, published his -demonstrations, which convinced the world of two great propositions: 1. -That the diurnal revolution of the heavens is nothing but an apparent -motion, caused by the revolution of the earth on its own axis. 2. That -the earth is but one of a group of planets, all of which revolve around -the sun as a center. Next came Kepler, who, in the early part of the -seventeenth century, recognizing the truth of the Copernican system, -determined the three laws of planetary motion: 1. That the orbit of -each planet is an ellipse, the sun being in one focus. 2. That as each -planet moves around the sun, the line which joins it to the sun passes -over equal areas in equal times. 3. That the square of the time of a -planet's revolution around the sun is in proportion to the cube of its -mean distance from the sun. These laws were discovered by Kepler as -deductions made upon mathematical principles from observations which -had to be carried on without the aid of the telescope, and without that -knowledge of the general laws of motion which came later. Kepler's -laws, although in the main correct, were subsequently found to be -subject to certain deviations in the planetary motions. It was when -Galileo, the contemporary of Kepler, who, if he was not the first -inventor of the telescope, was the first to use it in astronomical -observations, was able by means of it to discover the general laws of -motion, that the substantial accuracy of Kepler's three laws could be -proved, while at the same time the deviations from them were accounted -for. Still, there was wanting the grand discovery, which would disclose -the cause of these motions of the planets in elliptical orbits, and the -relations between their distances and their times of revolution, and -thus reduce the whole of the phenomena to a general law. Descartes, -who flourished 1596-1650, first attempted to do this by his theory of -Vortices. He supposed the sun to be immersed in a vast fluid, which, by -the sun's rotation, was made to rotate in a whirlpool, that carried the -planets around with it, the outer ones revolving more slowly because -the parts of the ethereal fluid in which they were immersed moved more -slowly. This was a reversion back to some of the ancient speculations. -It was reserved for Newton to discover the law of universal -gravitation, by which, in the place of any physical connection between -the bodies of the solar system by any intervening medium, the force -of attraction exerted by a larger body upon a smaller would draw the -smaller body out of the straight line that it would pursue when under -a projectile force, and would thus convert its motion into a circular -revolution around the attracting body, and make the orbit of this -revolution elliptical by the degree in which the attracting force -varied in intensity according to the varying distance between the two -bodies. When Newton's laws of motion were discovered and found to be -true, the phenomena of the solar system were explained. - -It may be interesting, before leaving for the present this branch of -the subject, to advert more particularly to one of the philosophical -systems of the Greeks, which, when compared with the discoveries of -modern astronomy, illustrates the great addition that has been made -to our means of sound speculation upon the origin of the material -universe. I refer to the system of the Pythagoreans--one of the most -remarkable instances of the invention of facts to fit and carry out -a theory that can be found in the history of philosophy, although -we are not without striking examples of this practice in modern -speculations. It has already been seen that, during the whole period -of Greek philosophy before the time of Plato, the problem was to find -a primordial and universal agent by which the sensible universe was -built up and produced; supplying, that is to say, the matter and force -required for the generation of successive products.[6] It has been seen -that the Thalesian philosophers undertook to solve this problem by the -employment of some primordial physical substance, such as water, fire, -air, etc. Pythagoras and his school held that the essence of things -consisted in number; by which they did not mean simply that all things -could be numbered, but they meant that numbers were substance, endowed -with an active force, by which things were constituted as we know them. -In the Pythagorean doctrine number was the self-existing reality; not, -as in Plato's system of ideas, separate from things, but as the essence -or determining principles of things, and having, moreover, magnitude -and active force.[7] This remarkably subtle conception of an agent in -the production of material things evinces the effort that was making, -in a direction opposite to that of Thales and his immediate successors, -to find a First Cause. It was carried out by the Pythagoreans in the -movements of the heavenly bodies, in the works of human art, and in -musical harmony; in all of which departments, according to Mr. Grote, -they considered measure and number as the producing and directing -agencies. We are here concerned only with their application of this -theory to the celestial bodies. One of their writers is quoted by Mr. -Grote as a representative of the school which was founded by Pythagoras -(about 530 B. C.), and which extended into the Græco-Italian -cities, where, as a brotherhood, they had political ascendency -until they were put down and dispersed about 509 B. C.; but -they continued for several generations as a social, religious, and -philosophical sect. According to this writer (Philolaus), "the Dekad, -the full and perfect number, was of supreme and universal efficacy as -the guide and principle of life, both to the Kosmos and to man. The -nature of number was imperative and law-giving, affording the only -solution of all that was perplexing or unknown; without number all -would be indeterminate and unknowable." - -Accordingly, the Pythagoreans constructed their system of the universe -by the all-pervading and producing energy of this primordial agent, -Number, in the manner thus described by Mr. Grote (i, 12-15): "The -Pythagoreans conceived the Kosmos, or the universe, as one single -system, generated out of numbers. Of this system the central point--the -determining or limiting One--was first in order of time and in order of -philosophical conception. By the determining influence of this central -constituted One, portions of the surrounding Infinite were successively -attracted and brought into system: numbers, geometrical figures, solid -substances were generated. But, as the Kosmos thus constituted was -composed of numbers, there could be no continuum; each numeral unit -was distinct and separate from the rest by a portion of vacant space, -which was imbibed, by a sort of inhalation, from the infinite space or -spirit without. The central point was fire, called by the Pythagoreans -the Hearth of the Universe (like the public hearth or perpetual fire -maintained in the prytaneum of a Grecian city), or the watch-tower of -Zeus. Around it revolved, from west to east, ten divine bodies, with -unequal velocities, but in symmetrical movement or regular dance. -Outermost was the circle of the fixed stars, called by the Pythagoreans -Olympus, and composed of fire like the center. Within this came -successively, with orbits more and more approximating to the center, -the five planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury; next, the sun, -the moon, and the earth. Lastly, between the earth and the central -fire, an hypothetical body, called the Antichthon, or counter-earth, -was imagined for the purpose of making up a total represented by -the sacred number ten, the symbol of perfection and totality. The -Antichthon was analogous to a separated half of the earth, simultaneous -with the earth in its revolutions, and corresponding with it on the -opposite side of the central fire. The inhabited portion of the earth -was supposed to be that which was turned away from the central fire -and toward the sun, from which it received light. But the sun itself -was not self-luminous: it was conceived as a glassy disk, receiving -and concentrating light from the central fire, and reflecting it upon -the earth, so long as the two were on the same side of the central -fire. The earth revolved in an orbit obliquely intersecting that of the -sun, and in twenty-four hours, round the central fire, always turning -the same side toward that fire. The alternation of day and night was -occasioned by the earth being, during a part of such revolution, on the -same side of the central fire with the sun, and thus receiving light -reflected from him; and during the remaining part of her revolution on -the side opposite to him, so that she received no light at all from -him. The earth, with the Antichthon, made this revolution in one day; -the moon, in one month; the sun, with the planets Mercury and Venus, -in one year; the planets Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn in longer periods -respectively, according to their distances from the center; lastly, the -outermost circle of the fixed stars (the Olympus, or the Asslanes), in -some unknown period of very long duration. - -"The revolutions of such grand bodies could not take place, in the -opinion of the Pythagoreans, without producing a loud and powerful -sound; and as their distances from the central fire were supposed to -be arranged in musical ratios, so the result of all these separate -sounds was full and perfect harmony. To the objection, Why were not the -sounds heard by us? they replied that we had heard them constantly and -without intermission from the hour of our birth; hence they had become -imperceptible by habit." - -Beautiful as was this theory--the origin of the phrase, "the music of -the spheres"--it owed its perfection as a theory to a pure invention, -resorted to in order to carry out the hypothesis of the sacred -number Ten, of which all the greater numbers were only compounds and -derivatives. This perfect and normal Ten, as a basis on which to -rest a bold astronomical hypothesis, required the imagination of the -Antichthon, or counter-earth, in order, with the other bodies, to make -up the primordial number to whose generative force the whole of these -bodies owed their origin. The resort to this conception of number, as -a formative and active agent, was doubtless due to the fact that the -Pythagoreans were the earliest cultivators of mathematical science. We -are told, in fact, that they paved the way for Euclid and Archimedes, -notwithstanding their symbolical and mystical fancies, and from their -mathematical studies they were led to give exclusive supremacy to -arithmetical and geometrical views of Nature. But what is curious about -this whole speculation is, that in the invention or substitution of -certain facts in order to make a perfect theory, it resembles some -modern hypotheses, in which facts have been assumed, or argued as -existing from analogies, when there is no evidence which establishes -them. Modern instances of this will appear hereafter. - -Enough has now been said about the speculations of the "early Greeks" -to show the extravagance of Lord Macaulay's assertion that the -discoveries of modern astronomy have placed the modern philosopher in -no better situation to make safe deductions in natural theology than -that occupied by the Hellenic philosophers from Thales to Plato. The -evidences of design in the formation of the solar system--of that kind -of design which acts in direct and specific exertions of a formative -will--have been enormously multiplied by the discoveries of modern -astronomy. Those discoveries, instead of leaving us to grope among -theories which require the invention or imagination of facts, relate to -facts that are demonstrated; and they tend in the strongest manner to -establish the hypothesis of an infinite Creator, making laws to govern -material objects, and then creating a system of objects to be governed -by those laws. In a future chapter I shall endeavor to show why this -hypothesis in regard to the solar system is most conformable to the -rules of rational belief. - -Not to anticipate what will be said hereafter concerning the modern -discoveries in anatomy and in comparative zoölogy, it is enough to -say here that in the writings of the Greek philosophers, especially -of Plato and Aristotle, we may discover what the Greeks knew or did -not know, and may therefore compare their knowledge with what is -now known. What was known about the human anatomy to the Greeks of -Plato's time is probably pretty well reflected in his "Timæus," the -celebrated dissertation in which he developed his theory of the Kosmos; -for, although Plato in that superb philosophical epic made use of the -organs of the human body for ethical and theological purposes, and -did not make a special study of matters of fact, it is not probable -that in his mode of using them he so far departed from the received -ideas of his time respecting the human anatomy that his treatise would -have been regarded by his contemporaries as an absurdity. Indeed, -Mr. Grote considered that Plato had that anatomical knowledge which -an accomplished man of his time could hardly fail to acquire without -special study.[8] Moreover, even Galen, who came five centuries after -Plato, and whose anatomical knowledge was far greater than could have -been commanded in Plato's day, was wholly wrong in respect to the -functions of some of the human organs. He agreed with Plato's ethical -view of the human organism, but not in his physiological postulates. -He considered, according to Mr. Grote, that Plato had demonstrated the -hypothesis of one soul to be absurd; he accepted Plato's triplicity of -souls, but he located them differently. He held that there are three -"originating and governing organs in the body: the brain, which is the -origin of all the nerves, both of sensation and motion; the heart, the -origin of the arteries; the liver, the sanguifacient organ, and the -origin of the veins which distribute nourishment to all parts of the -body. These three are respectively the organs of the rational, the -energetic, and the appetitive soul."[9] Plato, on the other hand, had -placed the rational soul in the cranium, the energetic soul in the -thoracic cavity, and the appetitive soul in the abdominal cavity; he -connected them by the line of the spinal marrow continuous with the -brain, making the rational soul immortal, and the two inferior souls, -or two divisions of one inferior soul, mortal. Galen did not decide -what is the essence of the three souls, or whether they are immortal. -Plato assigned to the liver a very curious function, or compound of -functions, making it the assistant of the rational soul in maintaining -its ascendency over the appetitive soul, and at the same time making -it the seat of those prophetic warnings which the gods would sometimes -vouchsafe to the appetitive soul, especially when the functions of the -rational soul are suspended, as in sleep, disease, or ecstasy. - -But while there was much scientific progress from Plato to Galen, and -while Galen's physiological ideas of the functions of the brain, the -heart, and the liver held their place until Harvey's discovery of the -circulation of the blood in the seventeenth century, that discovery -and the subsequent investigations proved that Galen, although not far -wrong as to the brain, was wholly wrong as to the liver, and partially -wrong as to the heart. Yet Galen's physiological theories concerning -these organs were founded on many anatomical facts and results of -experiments, such as could then be made. - -There is another fact which marks the state of anatomical knowledge -among the Greeks in the time of Plato, and of Aristotle, who belonged -to the same century. The "Timæus" of Plato shows that there were -physicians at that period, and that he was acquainted with the writings -of Hippocrates. The important fact is, as stated by Mr. Grote, that -"the study and practice of medicine was at that time greatly affected -by the current speculations respecting Nature as a whole; accomplished -physicians combined both lines of study, implicating cosmical and -biological theories."[10] - -It is now only needful to say that modern anatomy and physiology -afford aids to sound deductions in natural theology in reference to -the structure of the human body as an animal organism, and all the -functions of its different organs, which immeasurably transcend all -that was known or assumed among the early Greeks, or in the time of -Plato and Aristotle, or in the time of Galen. Notwithstanding the -dispute whether the origin of man as an animal is to be referred to -a special act of creation, or to the process of what has been called -evolution, there can be no controversy on one point, namely, that -modern anatomy and physiology have vastly increased our knowledge -of the structure of the human frame, and the means of rational -speculation upon the nature of intellect, as compared with any means -that were possessed by the most accomplished and learned of the Greeks -of antiquity. It matters little on which side of the controversy, -between creation and evolution, the great anatomists of the present -day range themselves. It is upon the facts which their investigations -have revealed that we have to judge of the probable truth of the one -hypothesis or the other. The probable destiny of man as an immortal -being is an inquiry that has certainly lost nothing by our increased -knowledge of the facts in his animal structure which tend to support -the hypothesis of design in his creation. - -Lord Macaulay attributes an utter failure to the efforts of the -philosophers, from Plato to Franklin, to "prove" the immortality of -the soul without the help of revelation. What did he mean by proof? -Revelation is, of course, the only direct proof. It is so, because it -is direct testimony of a fact, proceeding from the only source that -can have direct and certain knowledge of that fact. When the evidences -which are supposed to establish the existence and authority of the -witness have become satisfactory to us, we are possessed of proof of -our immortality, and this proof is the only direct evidence of which -the fact admits, and it constitutes all that should be spoken of as -proof. But there is collateral although inferior evidence--inferior, -because it consists in facts which show a high degree of probability -that the soul of man is immortal, although this kind of evidence -is not like the direct testimony of a competent witness. Is all -this presumptive evidence, with its weighty tendency to establish -the probable truth of immortality, to be pronounced of no value, -because it belongs to a different order of proof from that derived -from the assertion of a competent witness to the fact? It is one of -the advantages of our situation in this life, that the collateral -evidence which tends to show the high probability of a future state of -existence is not withheld from us. As a supplemental aid to the direct -teaching of revelation, it is of inestimable importance if we do not -obscure it by theories which pervert its force, and if we reason upon -it on sound philosophical principles. What we have to do in estimating -the probable truth of our immortality, as shown by the science of -natural religion, is to give the same force to moral evidence in this -particular department of belief, that we give to the moral evidence -which convinces us of many things of which we have no direct proof, or -of which the direct proof lies in evidence of another kind. - -"He knew as much about it," said Voltaire, "as has been known in all -ages--that is to say, very little indeed." This, like many of the -witticisms of Voltaire, pressed into the service of an argument against -the value of natural religion at the present day when studied by mature -and disciplined minds, is quite out of place. What human reason has -done in the course of three thousand years is not to be put on a par -with the speculations of intelligent children or half-civilized men; -and although some of the riddles which perplexed Eliphaz and Zophar -have not had a perfectly satisfactory solution, it is quite wide -from the truth to assert that there has been no approximation to a -satisfactory solution, or that some of the riddles have not ceased to -be the riddles which they were three thousand years ago. In that period -there has been an accumulation of evidence concerning the phenomena of -Nature, and the phenomena of mind, vast beyond comparison when placed -in contrast with what was known in the tents of the Idumean emirs, and -the importance of this accumulation of evidence is proved by the fact -that theories have been built upon it which undertake to explain it -by hypotheses that were never heard of before, and which may possibly -leave the "riddles" in a far less satisfactory state than they were -in the time of Job. On the other hand, while the companions of Job may -have been unable to suggest to him any solution of the problems of -life, it does not at all follow that we are as helpless as they were, -even if we avail ourselves of nothing but what the science of natural -theology can now teach us.[11] - -It will be seen that I attach great importance to natural theology. But -I do not propose to write for the confirmed believers in revelation, on -the one hand, who have become convinced by the evidence which supports -revelation; or for those, on the other hand, who believe nothing, and -who have become confirmed in habits of thinking which unfit them for -judging of the weight of evidence on such subjects as the existence -of God and the creation of man. I write for that great mass of people -of average intelligence, who do not understand accurately what the -doctrine of evolution is as expounded by its leading representatives, -and who do not know to what it leads. It will be found that in some -respects there is a distinction between the school of which Darwin is -the representative and the school which follows Spencer. To point out -this distinction, and yet to show that both systems result in negatives -which put an end to the idea of immortality, and that the weight of -evidence is against both of them, is what I propose to do. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [2] Galileo's "heresy," that the earth moves round the sun, was - condemned by a papal decree in the sixteenth century as "absurd, - philosophically false, and formally heretical, because it is expressly - contrary to Holy Scripture." No Roman Catholic now dreams of disputing - what the Florentine astronomer maintained; and the evolutionists are - perpetually foretelling that the time will come when to question - their doctrine will be admitted to be as ridiculous as was the papal - interdict fulminated against Galileo. If their doctrine had nothing - to confront it but a similar condemnation, proceeding from some - ecclesiastical authority claiming to be "infallible," or, if it could - be met only by the assertion that it is "contrary to Holy Scripture," - there would be some analogy between the two cases. But there is a - vast unlikeness between the two cases. While the hypothesis of animal - evolution is plainly enough "contrary to Holy Scripture," no one who - has any perception of the weakness of its proofs is obliged to rest - his rejection of it on that ground. If, in the sixteenth century, - there had been as good scientific and physical grounds on which to - refute Galileo as there now are for questioning the doctrine of - the evolution of distinct species out of other species, the papal - condemnation would have been superfluous even for churchmen. We must - not forget the age in which we live, or allow any kind of truth to - fail of vindication, from fear of being classed with those who in some - former age have blunderingly mistaken the means of vindicating truth. - Belief in special creations, whatever the Bible may say, does not now, - and in all probability never will, stand on a par with the belief that - the sun moves round the earth. - - [3] Macaulay's "Essays," etc., Riverside edition, vol. ii, 502-504. - - [4] Grote's "Plato," i, 4. - - [5] Thales flourished 620-560 B. C. Plato's life extended from 427-347 - B. C. - - [6] Grote's "Plato," i, 10. I follow Mr. Grote in describing the - hypothesis of the Pythagoreans. - - [7] Ibid. - - [8] Grote, iii, 290. - - [9] Ibid., 287, 288. - - [10] Grote, iii, 289. - - [11] It should be stated that the passage from Macaulay's writings - here commented on was written and first published in 1840, before the - speculations of the scientists who maintain the doctrines of evolution - had attracted much attention, or been promulgated in their present - shape. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -The Platonic Kosmos compared with the Darwinian theory of evolution. - - -It is my purpose in this chapter to draw a parallel between the theory -of the origin of different animals propounded in the "Timæus" of Plato -and that of Mr. Darwin. The analogy between them has been briefly -hinted by Mr. Grote, but he has not followed it out in detail, as it -was no part of his object to make minute comparisons between any of -the speculations of Plato and those of modern philosophers. The great -English scholar and critic seems to regard it as somewhat uncertain how -far Plato meant in the "Timæus" to have his description of the Kosmos -stand as an expression of his own belief, or as a mere work of his -imagination and fancy. Plato, we are told, and this is quite obvious, -dealt but little with facts, while he dealt largely with theories. -But, even as a pure work of the imagination, or as a philosophical -epic, the daring conception of the Kosmos is wonderfully complete; and -it will repay any one, who follows Mr. Grote in his analysis of it, -to observe how Plato employs a process of degeneration to account for -the formation of different species of animals, from the higher to the -lower, by agencies that bear a strong resemblance to those which are -assumed by Darwin to have worked in the opposite process of variation -and natural selection, resulting in the evolution of a higher from a -lower animal. But, in order to render this comparison intelligible, it -is necessary to make an abstract of Plato's system of the Kosmos before -adverting to the analogies between that system and the Darwinian -theory. I follow, although I have greatly condensed, Mr. Grote's -description of the Platonic Kosmos. - -According to the Platonic idea of the Kosmos, as given in the "Timæus," -there existed, anterior to all time, primordial matter in a state of -chaos. This matter was not created for; according to Mr. Grote, whose -authority upon such a point is the highest, the notion of absolute -creation was unknown to the Greeks of antiquity, and it does not appear -that Plato suggests it. But, without accounting for its existence, -Plato assumes that there was matter in a condition of utter chaos -before time could have had an existence; and, in order to make the -chaotic condition the more impressive in its primitive destitution -of all form or active principles tending to union or arrangement, he -supposes that the four elements of fire, air, earth, and water had -no existence save in the abstract, or as ideas and forms. But, as -abstract ideas, these four elements of fire, air, earth, and water were -distinct, self-existing, and indestructible, coeval with the chaotic -matter which was waiting to receive their impress and to take on their -distinctive elemental characters. They had already begun to act on the -_fundamentum_, or primordial chaotic matter, as upon a recipient, but -it was in a confused way and without regularity of plan, so that they -had not become concrete existences or determinate agents. - -In this state of things there appears upon the scene the Demiurgus, -a being coeval with the chaos of matter, that is, self-existing and -eternal. But, consistently with the philosophy which did not admit of -the idea of absolute creation, the Demiurgus was not a creator, but -an architect or designer, working on materials that lay within his -reach. His moral attribute was goodness, which was, in his situation, -synonymous with order, regularity, symmetry, and proportion, and, along -with this tendency, he had supreme artistic skill. In other words, he -was the personification of νους, or reason, working against necessity: -the latter being, not what we mean by that term, something preordained -and fixed, but confusion, uncertainty, irregularity, and unreason, -which are to be overcome by their opposites. - -Besides the chaotic matter and the ideas or forms of the four elements, -as yet unrealized in the actual substances of fire, air, earth, and -water, there were coeval ideas or forms of animals, or, as we should -say, abstract animals, or conceptions of animals. The first and -grandest of these was the eternal self-animal, or the ideal of animal -existence. Next came the ideas or forms of four other animals: 1. The -celestial gods; 2. Man; 3. Birds, or animals living in air; 4. Land -or water animals. Bearing in mind that we are still in the region of -abstract conceptions in regard to these types of animals, which as -yet have no concrete existence, and that they are, so to speak, the -intellectual models from which the Demiurgus is to work, in order to -make the real animals conformably to the pre-existing and eternal -plan, we come to the process of forming the Kosmos, which is to be the -containing animal of all the other four. Out of the confused chaos of -existing matter the Demiurgus proceeds to construct the Kosmos, which -was to become the one self-animal, by impressing the idea or abstract -form of animal upon a physical structure built out of the primordial -chaotic matter and comprehending the whole of it. The first step was -to bring the four elements of fire, air, earth, and water out of their -chaotic and confused condition by separating them according to the -forms of their eternal ideas. The total of each element, when made to -take its normal form, was used in the construction of the Kosmos, which -thus came to possess the whole existing body of material; "so that," -to borrow the words of Mr. Grote, "there remained nothing of the four -elements apart, to hurt the Kosmos from without, nor anything as raw -material for a second Kosmos." - -The Kosmos was made a perfect sphere, and with a perfectly smooth outer -surface, without organs of sight or hearing, because there was nothing -outside to be seen or heard; without organs of respiration, because -there was no outside atmosphere to be breathed; and without nutritive -or excrementory organs, because it was self-sufficing, being supplied -with nourishment by its own decay. It was not furnished with limbs or -means of locomotion or standing, because, being a sphere turning on an -axis, and having only one of the seven possible varieties of movement, -namely, rotation in a circle in one and the same plane, there was -nothing for it to grasp or repel.[12] This body, the only-begotten, -because in its formation all existing bodily material was employed, -perfectly spherical and smooth, equidistant from its center to all -points of its circumference, and suspended upon its own axis traversing -its diameter, was now to be animated by a soul. - -The Demiurgus, in the formation of the soul of the Kosmos, took three -constituent ingredients and mixed them together. They were: 1. The -Same, or the Identical, the indivisible and unchangeable essence of -Ideas; 2. The Different, or the Plural, the divisible essence of -bodies or of the elements; 3. A compound of both of these ingredients -melted into one. Blended together in one grand compound, these three -ingredients formed the soul of the Kosmos by first dividing the mixture -into different portions, and then uniting the portions according to -a complicated scale of harmonious numerical proportions. The outer -or sidereal sphere of the Kosmos was made to receive the Same, or -Identity, by being placed in an even and undivided rotation toward the -right, turning on the great axis of the whole sphere. The interior, or -planetary spheres, the five planets, and the sun and the moon, were -made to be under the influence of the Different, or Diversity--that -is to say, their rotations on their separate axes, all oblique, were -toward the left, while the overpowering force of rotation of the -outer sphere carried them along with it, although the time of their -separate rotations was more or less modified by their own inherent and -countermoving forces. - -Thus the sentient capacity of the cosmical soul became the cognition -of the Same and the Different, and the blended Same and Different, -because it embodied these three ingredients in its own nature. It was -invisible; rooted at its center and pervading and inclosing the whole -visible body, circulating and communicating, without voice or sound, -all impressions and information concerning the existing relations -between the separate parts and specialties of the cosmical body. - -Anterior to the Kosmos there was no time. With the rotation of the -Kosmos time began. It was marked first by the eternal and unchanging -rotation of the outer circle, in which were placed the fixed stars, -which revolved with it in unaltered position with regard to each other; -and one revolution of this outer or most rational circle made a day. -The sun, moon, and planets were distributed in different portions of -the Circle of the Different; one revolution of the moon marking a -month, and one revolution of the sun marking a year. The earth, the -first and oldest of the sidereal and planetary gods, was packed around -the great axis which ran through the center of the Kosmos, and turned -that axis; so that the earth regulated the movement of the great -cosmical axis, and was the determining agent of night and day. - -Thus far we have the formation of the Kosmos, animated with a pervading -soul, the body being formed out of the whole of existing matter, molded -into the specific elements of fire, air, earth, and water, and the -soul being formed out of the constituent ingredients furnished by the -eternal and invisible essence of ideas. The whole, body and soul of -the Kosmos, was thus an animal, formed on the abstract but eternal -idea or form of an animal which had existed before time began. We -now approach the formation of the other animals. Of the Kosmos there -could be but one. All existing material of matter had been used in -his construction. He could not become a species, as there could be no -second Kosmos. Something could be borrowed from him, for the formation -of other animals, but nothing could be destroyed. He was not yet, -however, a full copy of the model of the Generic Animal or Idea of -Animal, because the eternal plan of that model required that he should -be peopled or inhabited by four other animals, which might constitute -species. Accordingly, the Demiurgus proceeds to form the first of -these sub-animals, the gods, who are to inhabit different portions of -the Kosmos. The first of these in formation was the earth, planted -in the center, and made sentinel over night and day; next the fixed -stars, formed chiefly out of fire, and placed in the outer circle of a -fixed revolution, or the Circle of the Same, to give to it light and -brilliancy. The sidereal orbs thus became animated beings, eternal and -divine. They remained constantly turning round in the same relative -position, but the sun, moon, and planets, belonging to the Circle of -the Different, and trying to revolve by their own effort in a direction -opposite to that of the outer sphere, became irregular in their -revolutions and varied in their relative positions. Thus the primitive -gods were the earth and the fixed stars, which revolved without -variation with the Circle of the Same, and became immortal as well as -visible; while the sun, moon, and planets were not among the primitive -gods, but were simply spherical bodies placed in the inner Circle -of the Different. The primitive gods preside over and regulate the -Kosmos. From them are generated and descended the remaining gods.[13] - -Having completed the Kosmos and the primitive gods, the Demiurgus -paused in his work. There were still other animals to be constructed, -the first and noblest of which was to be Man. But the Demiurgus, -who, in the construction of these gods, had made them immortal, not -in their own nature but through his determination, seems to have -apprehended that, if he proceeded to construct the other animals -himself, they would likewise be thereby rendered of immortal duration. -He therefore assembled the newly generated gods and made to them a -personal address. He informed them of their immortal existence, and of -his purpose to confide to them the construction of the other animals, -stating at the same time, in the case of man, that he would himself -supply an immortal element which they were to incorporate with a -mortal body, in imitation of the power which he had exercised in the -generation of themselves. He then proceeded to compound together, but -in inferior perfection and purity, the remnant of the same elements -out of which he had formed the cosmical soul.[14] He then distributed -the whole of this mass into souls equal in number to the fixed stars, -placed each of them in a star of its own, where it would be carried -round in the cosmical rotation, explained to it its immortal destiny, -and that at an appointed hour of birth it would be transferred into a -mortal body in conjunction with two inferior kinds of soul or mind. -These irrational enemies, the two inferior souls, the rational and -immortal soul would have to control and subdue, so as to live a good -life. If it triumphed in the conflict, it would return after death to -its own star, where in an everlasting abode it would dwell forever -in unison with the celestial harmonies and perfections of the outer -sphere. But, if it failed, it would be born again into an inferior -body, and on the death of that body, if it continued evil, it would be -again born into a still more degraded animal, through an indefinite -transmigration from animal to animal, until the rational soul should -have obtained the mastery over the irrational and turbulent, when it -would be released and permitted to return to its own peculiar star.[15] -Here, then, the Demiurgus retired, leaving to the gods the work of -fabricating mortal bodies for man, and two mortal and inferior souls, -with which the immortal soul was to be joined. But before he withdrew -he inculcated upon the gods to construct the new mortal animal in the -best manner, so that the immortal soul should have the fairest chance -of guiding and governing rightly, in order that the animal might -not be the cause of mischief and misery to himself; a possible and -even probable result which the Demiurgus proclaimed beforehand, thus -relieving himself of responsibility, and casting it, it would seem, -upon the gods.[16] The latter stood, then, in the position of workmen, -who have received certain directions from a superior architect, have -been supplied with certain materials, and are obliged to conform to a -prescribed model, the cosmical animal, as far as circumstances will -allow. The Demiurgus retires, and leaves the gods to their work. - -They borrow from the Kosmos, from which they are permitted to obtain -materials, portions of the four elements, for the construction of the -human body, with an engagement that these materials shall one day be -returned. These they unite in one body by numerous minute and invisible -fastenings; over this body they place a head or cranium, into which -they introduce the immortal soul, making the head, with its spherical -form like that of the Kosmos, and admitting of no motion but the -rotary, the most divine portion of the human system and master of the -body, which is to be subject and ministerial. To the body they give all -the six varieties of motive power, forward, backward, upward, downward, -to the right and to the left. The phenomena of nutrition and sensation -begin as soon as the connection is formed between the immortal soul and -the mortal body, but as the irregular movements and agitations arising -from the diverse rotations of the Same and the Different convey false -and foolish affirmations to the soul in the cranium. That soul is -destitute of intelligence when first joined to the body, and remains -so for some time. But gradually these disturbing currents abate, -the rotations of the Same and the Different in the head become more -regular, and the man becomes more intelligent. - -It is now necessary to account for the introduction of the two mortal -souls, and to show how the conflict appointed for the immortal soul -became the test of a life which was to determine whether the latter -should be permitted, on the death of the body, to return to its -peculiar star, or whether it should be degraded into some lower form -of animal. The immortal soul has its special abode in the head, which -is both united to and separated from the trunk by the neck. The gods -kept the two mortal souls separate, so that the rational or immortal -soul might be defiled by the contact as little as possible. The better -portion of the mortal soul they placed in the thoracic cavity. It -was the energetic, courageous, contentious soul, placed above the -diaphragm, so as to receive orders easily from the head, and to aid -the rational soul in keeping the mutinous soul of appetite, which was -placed below the diaphragm, in subjection. - -It is unnecessary to follow here the minute anatomical descriptions -which Plato gives of the different organs of the human body, or of -the way in which they are supposed to act on the two divisions of -the mortal soul, or to be acted on by them, or the mode in which the -latter act upon the encephalic or immortal soul which is seated in the -cranium. These descriptions evince much knowledge of the human anatomy, -and probably all the knowledge that was possessed in Plato's time. It -is immaterial how far this anatomical knowledge was correct, and of -course there was in Plato's use of the various organs a great deal that -was fanciful. It is sufficient, without following Mr. Grote's analysis -through these details, to note that, in Plato's arrangement, the -immortal soul was supposed to be fastened in the brain, the two mortal -souls in the line of the spinal marrow continuous with the brain, and -that this line formed the thread of connection between them all. - -Passing on toward the point where the process of degradation might -begin, which would result in the reduction of this new and divinely -constructed animal to a lower form, we have to note, first, that it was -made a non-sexual animal, being intended for an angelic type. In the -original plan of the gods, it was not contemplated that this primitive -type should reproduce itself by any process of generation. According -to the original scheme, it would seem that every time a new immortal -soul was to be brought down from its peculiar star, the process of -constructing for it a mortal body would have to be repeated. Plato, -Mr. Grote observes, does indeed tell us that the primitive non-sexual -type had the option of maintaining itself. But this must mean that -each individual of that type had the option of maintaining itself in -its struggle with the debasing influences of appetite and disease. -But not one representative of it has held his ground; and as it was -foreseen that such an angelic type could not maintain itself, we -are to look for a reconstruction of the whole organism. This came -about from the degeneracy of the primitive non-sexual animal below -the standard of good life which it had the option of continuing. -Men whose lives had fallen below this standard became effeminate, -cowardly, unjust. In their second birth, their immortal souls had to be -translated into a body resembling that to which they had debased the -first body into which they were born. The first transition, therefore, -was from man into woman. In other words, the gods, seeing that the -non-sexual primitive type did not maintain itself at the high point -intended for it, reconstructed the whole organism upon the bi-sexual -principle, introducing the comparatively lower type of woman. A partial -transformation of the male structure makes the female. A suitable -adjustment of the male organs, and the implanting of the sexual -impulse in both sexes, by the agency of the gods, make provision for -generative reproduction, and a species is formed, which takes the place -of the primitive non-sexual type which did not reproduce itself in the -original scheme. The primitive type disappears, and it disappears by -a process of degradation, which it undergoes by reason of its failure -to avail itself of the option which it originally had of living a good -life that would entitle the immortal soul to return to its peculiar -star without further conflict with the debasing tendencies to which it -was exposed in the first body that it inhabited. - -In this curious theory we see how a process of declension or -degradation is induced by what may almost be called a choice, since -the primitive human being, by not resisting the debasing tendencies of -his lower nature, is made by those tendencies to assume a less divine -form than that in which he originally existed. To the primitive man the -gods assigned the encephalic or head-soul, which was connected with -and suspended from the divine soul of the Kosmos. They assigned it to -each man as his presiding genius. If he neglected it, and directed -all his development toward the energetic or appetitive mortal soul, -he would become debased. He did so. Hence it became necessary for the -gods to reconstruct the whole organism, and in this reconstruction -the primitive non-sexual type becomes the bi-sexual, and a species is -formed. - -It is not necessary to enter into the metaphysical argument which -relates to the question of responsibility for this change from the -original plan. Plato tells us that the gods foresaw it as a necessary -consequence of the original scheme; and, moreover, that they foresaw -that they must make preparation for the still more degenerate varieties -of birds and quadrupeds, into which the corrupt and stupid part of -mankind would sink, all of which were according to the great eternal -scheme of the four kinds of ideal animals embraced in the idea of the -Kosmos itself. But with the moral justice of the whole theory we have -no concern here. We are here concerned, first, with the nature of the -process by which, in the Platonic theory, the bi-sexual human race -became formed out of the primitive non-sexual type; and, next, with -the process by which individuals of this race became degraded into the -lower animals.[17] - -After the process of degradation had begun, after the primitive type -had given place to the bi-sexual human race, and a species was thus -formed, further degradation would be inevitable under the same causes -which produced the first one. The female part of mankind would go on -bringing forth new males and new females, and to each one at birth -there would come from its peculiar star an immortal soul, for I do not -understand that Plato's women were supposed not to be constructed, in -this respect, upon the same plan as the men. But each of these newly -arrived immortal souls would be placed in a mortal body in contact and -conflict with the two mortal souls of appetite, disturbance, and mutiny -against the divine laws of reason. Each new human being would then be -exposed to further debasement, by which his or her human organs and -human form would undergo transformation into a lower type of animal -life. Accordingly, we find that Plato, in perfect consistency with his -theory, supposes that birds are a degraded birth or formation derived -from one peculiar mode of degeneracy in man, hair being transmuted into -feathers and wings. If we inquire from what kind of men the birds were -formed, and how they came to be assigned to the air, we shall best -learn from the words employed by Mr. Grote to express Plato's idea: -"Birds were formed from the harmless but light, airy, and superficial -men, who, though carrying their minds aloft to the study of cosmical -phenomena, studied them by visual observation and not by reason, -foolishly imagining that they had discovered the way of reaching -truth."[18] - -Next to the birds came the land-animals, a more brutal formation. -These, to borrow the words of Mr. Grote's analysis, "proceeded from men -totally destitute of philosophy, who neither looked up to the heavens -nor cared for celestial objects; from men making no use whatever of -the rotations of their encephalic soul, but following exclusively -the guidance of the lower soul in the trunk. Through such tastes and -occupations, both their heads and their anterior limbs became dragged -down to the earth by the force of affinity. Moreover, when the rotation -of the encephalic soul from want of exercise became slackened and fell -into desuetude, the round form of the cranium was lost and became -converted into an oblong or some other form. These now degenerated into -quadrupeds and multipeds, the gods furnishing a greater number of feet -in proportion to the stupidity of each, in order that its approximation -to earth might be multiplied. To some of the more stupid, however, the -gods gave no feet or limbs at all, constraining them to drag the whole -length of their bodies along the ground, and to become reptiles. Out of -the most stupid and senseless of mankind, by still greater degeneracy, -the gods formed fishes, or aquatic animals--the fourth and lowest genus -after men, birds, land-animals. This race of beings, from their extreme -want of mind, were not considered worthy to live on earth, or to -respire thin and pure air. They were condemned to respire nothing but -deep and turbid water, many of them, as oysters and other descriptions -of shell-fish, being fixed down at the lowest depth or bottom. It is by -such transitions (concludes the Platonic 'Timæus') that the different -races of animals passed originally, and still continue to pass, into -each other. The interchange is determined by the acquisition or loss of -reason or rationality."[19] - -Here, then, we have a process of degradation by which the different -races of animals were formed, by a kind of selection which, commencing -in the human species from the neglect of the encephalic soul to -maintain its high duties and aims, goes on in successive debasements -which result in the formation of lower and still lower animals until -we reach the shell-fish fixed upon the earth at the bottom of the -water. The bi-sexual principle of construction having been introduced -in the human species, was continued through all the other species -formed by the still descending process of deterioration, so that to -each successive species there remained the power of reproducing its -own type, along with the tendency to evolve a lower type by further -loss of reason or rationality. It is not material to the purpose of -the parallel, which I am about to draw between the Platonic and the -Darwinian system, to consider the precise nature of the Platonic idea -of an intelligent power, by which these successive degradations were -in one sense purposely ordained. Enough is apparent on the Platonic -system to show that, while these degradations were according to an -eternal plan, because they resulted from the conflict between reason -and unreason, order and disorder, between purity and impurity, yet the -different species of animals, after man, were not special creations by -an infinite power interfering in each case by a separate exercise of -creative will. They were a growth of an inferior organization out of a -superior through the inevitable operation of tendencies which changed -the forms of the animals. As fast as these tendencies operated--and -they were continually operating--the ministers of the Demiurgus, the -gods, stood ready to adapt the structure to the new conditions in -which the tendencies resulted, so that the new animal might be fitted -to and fixed in those conditions. Still, the gods are not represented -as making separate creations of new species as an act of their will, -without the pre-existing operation in the preceding type of tastes and -occupations which modify the structure into one of a more degraded -character. It may thus be said with entire truth that the Platonic idea -of the origin of the different races of animals presents a parallel -to the Darwinian theory, in which it will be found that the one is -the reverse of the other, both of them proceeding upon and involving -analogous principles of evolution, operating in the one system from -below upward, and in the other from a higher point downward. If, in -the Platonic system, the idea of an original immortal soul placed -in a heavenly abode, but afterward brought down and fixed in a -mortal body, is the starting-point--if a conflict of a spiritual and -angelic existence with corporeal and earthly tendencies is at first -the predominant fact--the parallel between the Platonic process of -degradation and the Darwinian process of elevation remains the same; -for, in the one system, reason degenerates into instinct, and instinct -at last reaches its lowest possible action, or ceases entirely; and, -in the other, instinct rises from its lowest action through successive -improvements until it becomes mind or intellect: so that somewhere in -the two processes there must be a point where they pass each other in -opposite directions, the one losing or merging intellect in instinct, -the other losing and merging instinct in mind, each of the two -processes being a process of development or evolution, but in opposite -directions.[20] - -It is not easy to ascertain at once what was Mr. Darwin's idea of the -mode in which a supreme intelligence has presided over the creation. -In his work on "The Descent of Man", he adduces some evidence that man -was not "originally endowed with the ennobling belief in the existence -of an Omnipotent God," this evidence being that numerous savage races -have existed, and still exist, who have had and have no words in their -language to express this idea. But this, if true, does not help us -to understand what part in Mr. Darwin's theory an Omnipotent God is -supposed to play. Scattered through the same work we find references -to the hypothesis of such a being, and to the influences which this -belief has exerted upon the advance of morality. But I assume that we -are to understand that Mr. Darwin adopts as a fact, to be taken into -account in judging of his theory of evolution, that there is such a -being as an Omnipotent God, having equally the power to make separate -creations, or to establish certain laws of matter, and to leave them -to operate through secondary causes in the production and extinction -of the past and present inhabitants of the world. In his work on the -"Origin of Species" he refers to "what we know of the laws impressed -upon matter by the Creator."[21] In his "Descent of Man" the following -passage occurs toward the close of the work: "He who believes in the -advancement of man from some low organized form will naturally ask, -How does this bear on the belief in the immortality of the soul? The -barbarous races of man, as Sir J. Lubbock has shown, possess no clear -belief of this kind; but arguments, derived from the primeval beliefs -of savages, are, as we have just seen, of little or no avail. Few -persons feel any anxiety from the impossibility of determining at what -precise period in the development of the individual, from the first -trace of a minute germinal vesicle, man becomes an immortal being; -and there is no greater cause for anxiety, because the period can not -possibly be determined in the gradually ascending organic scale." - -Surely it is a most pertinent inquiry, How does his theory of the -advancement of man from some lower organized form bear on the -immortality of the soul? and it is no answer to this inquiry to say -that upon no hypothesis of man's origin can we determine at what -precise period he becomes an immortal being. That the idea of an -Omnipotent God, capable of creating a spiritual essence, or an immortal -soul, is not denied by Mr. Darwin, is doubtless to be inferred from -his strong affirmation that our minds refuse to accept as the result -of blind chance the grand sequence of events which the birth both of -the species and the individual presents to our view. That variations of -structure, the union of pairs in marriage, the dissemination of seeds, -and similar events, have all been ordained for some special purpose, -is the hypothesis according to which he regards them as events brought -about by the laws of natural selection, which laws were ordained by -the Creator and left to operate. Now, while this hypothesis excludes, -or tends to exclude, the idea of blind chance, it still remains to -be considered whether the soul of man, or the essence which we call -intellect, is in each case a direct creation of a special character, or -whether it is a result from the operation of the laws which have been -ordained for the action of organized matter. If it is the former, the -soul may survive the destruction of the body. If it is the latter, the -soul as well as all the other manifestations or exhibitions which the -material body gives forth in its action, may and in all probability -must cease with the organs whose action leads us falsely to believe -that we are animated by an immortal spirit while we are in the flesh. -If it is a necessary result of any theory that what is supposed to be -the immortal soul of man is a product of the operation of certain laws -imposed upon organized matter, without being a special creation of -something distinct from matter, it is immaterial whether the organized -form of matter with which the soul is connected, or appears to act for -a time, was a special creation, or was an evolution out of some lower -form, or came by blind chance. Nor is it material that we can not -determine at what precise period in the genesis of the individual, by -the ordinary process of reproduction, he becomes an immortal being. The -question is, Does he ever become an immortal being, if in body and in -mind he is a mere product of organized matter, formed from some lower -type through the laws of variation and natural selection, resulting in -an animal whose manifestations or exhibitions of what we call intellect -or mind are manifestations of the same nature as the instincts of the -lower animals, differing only in degree? - -That I may not be misunderstood, and especially that I may not be -charged with misrepresentation, I will state the case for the Darwinian -theory as strongly as I can. The question here is obviously not a -question of power. An Omnipotent Creator has just the same capacity to -make special creations, by a direct and special exertion of his will, -as he has to make one primordial type and place it under fixed laws -that will in their operation cause a physical organization to act in -such a way as to evolve out of it other and more or less perfect types. -In either method of action, he would be the same Omnipotent God, by -whose will all things would exist; and I assume that upon this point -there is no difference between some of the evolution school and its -opponents. But in considering the question of the origin of the human -soul, or the intellect of man, we are dealing not with a question of -power, but with the probable method in which the conceded Omnipotent -capacity has acted. On the one hand, we have the hypothesis that the -Eternal and Omnipotent capacity has created a spiritual and immortal -being, capable of existing without any union with the body that is -formed out of earthly material, but placed for a time in unison with -such a body; and that for the effectual purpose of this temporary -union this body has been specially constructed, and constructed in two -related forms, male and female, so that this created species of animal -may perpetuate itself by certain organic laws of reproduction. Now it -is obviously immaterial that we can not detect the point of time, or -the process, at or by which the union between the spiritual essence -and the earthly body takes place in the generation of the individual. -It is conceded to be alike impossible to detect the time or mode in -which descendants of the lower animals, which had nothing resembling -intellect, become endowed with and inhabited by intellect, through the -supposed laws of variation and natural selection, operating to produce -an animal of a more elaborate organization. The point of divergence -between the two hypotheses is precisely this: that the one supposes the -mind of man to be a special creation, of a spiritual nature, designed -to be immortal, but placed in union with a mortal body for a temporary -purpose. The other hypothesis supposes no special creation of either -the mind or the body of man, but maintains that the latter is evolved -out of some lower animal, and that the former is evolved out of the -action of physical organization.[22] Either mode of projecting and -executing the creation of both the body and the mind of man is of -course competent to an Omnipotent God. The question is, Which mode has -the highest amount of probability on which to challenge our belief? -If the one, as it is described, leads to the conclusion that the mind -can not survive the body, and the other leads to the conclusion that -it can, we are left to choose between them: and our choice must be -determined by what we can discover of satisfactory proof that the mind -of man was destined to become immortal. What, then, is the Darwinian -theory of the origin of man as an animal, and to what does it lead -respecting the origin and nature of the human soul? - -Whoever will carefully examine Mr. Darwin's hypothesis of the -descent of man as an animal, will find that commencing at a point -opposite to that at which Plato began his speculations, the modern -naturalist assumes the existence of a very low form of animated and -organized matter, destitute of anything in the nature of reason, -even if acting under what may be called instinctive and unconscious -impulses, imposed upon it by the preordained laws by which animated -matter is to act. By some process of generation, either bi-sexual or -uni-sexual or non-sexual, this very low type of animal is endowed with -a power of reproducing other individuals of the same structure and -habits. In process of time, for which we must allow periods very much -longer than those of which we are accustomed to think in relation to -recorded history, the individuals of this species become enormously -multiplied. A struggle for existence takes place between these very -numerous individuals; and in this struggle there comes into operation -the law to which Mr. Darwin has given the name of "natural selection," -which is but another name for a series of events. He does not mean -by this term to imply a conscious choice on the part of the animals, -nor an active power or interfering deity. He employs it to express -a constantly occurring series of events or actions, by which, in -certain circumstances, animals secure themselves against the tendency -to destruction which is caused by the great disparity between their -numbers and the amount of food that is accessible to them, or by the -unfavorable influences of a change of climate upon so great a body -of individuals. He calls this series of events or actions _natural_ -selection, in order, as I understand, to compare what takes place -in nature with what takes place when a breeder of animals purposely -selects the most favorable individuals for the purpose of improving -or varying the breed. In nature, the selection is supposed to operate -as follows: The strongest and most active individuals of a species -of animals have the best chance of securing the requisite amount of -food from the supply that is insufficient for all. They do this by -their greater fleetness in overtaking the common prey, or by making -war upon the more feeble or inactive of their fellows; and numerous -individuals are either directly destroyed by this warfare, or are -driven off from the feeding-ground and perish for want of nourishment. -Thus the best specimens of the race survive; and to this occurrence is -given the name of the "survival of the fittest," meaning the survival -of those individuals best fitted to continue their own existence and -to continue their species. A physical change in the country inhabited -by a great multitude of individuals of a certain species, or by -different species--for example, a change of climate--operates to make -this struggle for existence still more severe, and the result would -be that those individuals of the same species which could best adapt -themselves to their new condition would tend to be preserved, as -would the different species inhabiting the same country which could -best maintain the struggle against other species. The improvement -in the structure of the animals takes place, under this process of -natural selection, in the following manner: The best individuals being -preserved, the organs of which they make most use in the struggle for -existence undergo development and slight modifications, favorable -to the preservation of the individual, and these modifications are -transmitted to their offspring. Here there comes in play a kind of -collateral aid to which is given the name of "sexual selection," -which is defined as a form of selection depending "not on a struggle -for existence in relation to other organic beings or to external -conditions, but on a struggle between individuals of one sex, generally -the males, for the possession of the other sex."[23] "The result," -continues Mr. Darwin, "is not death to the unsuccessful competitor, -but few or no offspring. Sexual selection is, therefore, less rigorous -than natural selection. Generally, the most vigorous males, those which -are best fitted for their place in nature, will leave most progeny. -But, in many cases, victory depends not so much on general vigor, as -on having special weapons, confined to the male sex." As, by means of -this warfare of sexual selection, the victor would always be allowed -to breed, his courage and his special weapons of offense or defense, -in their increased development, would descend to his offspring. Thus -the improvement and modification induced by natural selection would be -enhanced and transmitted by the sexual selection.[24] - -In regard to the operation of the two kinds of selection in the -evolution of man from a lower form of animal, we find the theory -to be this: That organic beings with peculiar habits and structure -have passed through transitions which have converted the primordial -animal into one of totally different habits and structure; that, -in these transitions, organs adapted to one condition and mode -of life have become adapted to another; that such organs are -homologous, and that in their widely varied uses they have been -formed by transitional gradations, so that, for example, a floating -apparatus, or swim-bladder, existing in a water-animal for one -purpose--flotation--has become converted in the vertebrate animals into -true lungs for the very different purpose of respiration. Thus, by -ordinary generation, from an ancient and unknown prototype, not only -have organs, by minute and successive transitions, become adapted to -changed conditions of life, but the whole organism has become changed, -and this has resulted in the production of an animal vastly superior -to his ancient and unknown prototype; and yet to that prototype, of -which we have no specimen and no record, are to be traced the germs -of all the peculiarities of structure which we find in the perfect -animals of different kinds that we thoroughly know, until we come to -man, these successive results being brought about by the two kinds of -selection--natural and sexual. - -There can be no better illustration of the character of Mr. Darwin's -theory than that to which he resorts when he means to carry it to its -most startling length, while he candidly admits that he has felt the -difficulty of this application of it far too keenly to be surprised -at the hesitation of others. This illustration is the eye. Here he -very justly says it is indispensable that reason should conquer -imagination; but on which side of the question reason or imagination -is most employed might, perhaps, be doubtful. Mr. Darwin's hypothesis -concerning the eye begins with the fact that in the highest division -of the animal kingdom, the vertebrata, we can start from an eye so -simple that it consists, as in the lancelet,[25] of a little sack of -transparent skin, furnished with a nerve, and lined with pigment, but -destitute of any other apparatus. From this prototype of a visual -organ, up to the marvelous construction of the eye of man or of the -eagle, he supposes that extremely slight and gradual modifications -have led, by the operation of natural and sexual selection; and by -way of illustrating this development, he compares the formation of -the eye to the formation of the telescope. "It is scarcely possible -to avoid comparing the eye with a telescope. We know that this -instrument has been perfected by the long-continued efforts of the -highest human intellects, and we naturally infer that the eye has been -formed by a somewhat analogous process. But may not this inference -be presumptuous? Have we any right to assume that the Creator works -by intellectual powers like those of man? If we must compare the eye -to an optical instrument, we ought, in imagination, to take a thick -layer of transparent tissue, with spaces filled with fluid, and with a -nerve sensitive to light beneath, and then suppose every part of this -layer to be continually changing slowly in density, so as to separate -into layers of different densities and thickness, placed at different -distances from each other, and with the surface of each layer slowly -changing in form. Further, we must suppose that there is a power, -represented by natural selection or the survival of the fittest, -always watching each slight alteration in the transparent layers, and -carefully preserving each which, under varied circumstances, in any way -or in any degree, tends to produce a distincter image. We must suppose -each new state of the instrument to be multiplied by the million, each -to be preserved until a better one is produced, and then the old ones -to be all destroyed. In living bodies variations will cause the slight -alterations, generation will multiply them almost infinitely, and -natural selection will pick out with unerring skill each improvement. -Let this process go on for millions of years, and during each year on -millions of individuals of many kinds, and may we not believe that a -living optical instrument might thus be formed as superior to one of -glass as the works of the Creator are to those of man?"[26] - -It might have occurred to the very learned naturalist that the -formation of a mechanical instrument by the hand of man, guided by -his intellect, admits of varieties of that instrument for different -purposes, as products of an intelligent will. Different kinds of -telescopes for different uses have been produced, not by destroying -the poorer ones and preserving the better ones, but by a special -and intentional adaptation of the structure to special uses, until -an instrument is made which will dissolve the nebulæ of the milky -way, and bring within the reach of our vision heavenly bodies of the -existence of which we had no previous knowledge. Why may not the same -intelligent and intentional formation of the human eye, as a special -structure adapted to the special conditions of such an animal as man, -have been the direct work of the Creator, just as the lowest visual -organ--that of such a creature as the lancelet--was specially made -for the conditions of its existence? Why resort to the theory that -all the intermediate varieties of the eye have grown successively out -of the lowest form of such an organ by transitional grades of which -we can not trace the series, when the probabilities concerning the -varieties of this organ of which we have any knowledge are so strongly -on the side of a special and intentional adaptation of each one to the -circumstances of the animal to which it has been given? As a question -of power in the Creator, either method of action was of course just as -competent as the other. As a question of which was his probable method, -the case is very different; for we know comparatively very little of -the modifications produced by such causes as natural or even sexual -selection, while we may, without presumption, assume that we know much -more about the purposes of special adaptation to special conditions, -which an omnipotent Creator may have designed and effected. But this is -a digression, and also an anticipation of the argument. - -To state the pedigree of man according to the Darwinian theory, we -must begin with an aquatic animal as the early progenitor of all the -vertebrata. This animal existing, it is assumed, "in the dim obscurity -of the past," was provided with branchiæ or gills, or organs for -respiration in water, with the two sexes united in the same individual, -but with the most important organs of the body, such as the brain and -heart, imperfectly or not at all developed. From this fish-like animal, -or from some of its fish descendants, there was developed an amphibious -creature, with the sexes distinct. Rising from the amphibians, through -a long line of diversified forms, we come to an ancient marsupial -animal, an order in which the young are born in a very incomplete state -of development, and carried by the mother, while sucking, in a ventral -pouch.[27] From the marsupials came the quadrumana[28] and all the -higher mammals.[29] Among these mammals there was, it is supposed, a -hairy, tailed quadruped, probably arboreal in its habits, from which -man is descended. It was an inhabitant of the Old World. It branched -into the lemuridæ, a group of four-handed animals, distinct from the -monkeys, and resembling the insectivorous quadrupeds in some of their -characters and habits;[30] and from these came the simiadæ, of which -there were two great stems--the New World and Old World monkeys. "From -the latter, at a remote period, man, the wonder and glory of the -universe, proceeded."[31] - -The reader must now, in order to do justice to this theory, imagine -a lapse of time, from the period of the existence of the aquatic -progenitor of all the vertebrata, to be counted by millions of years, -or by any figures that will represent to the mind the most conceivable -distance between a past and a present epoch. Through this enormous -stretch of centuries, in order to give scope to the operation of the -laws of natural and sexual selection, we must suppose the struggle for -existence to be going on among the individuals of the same species, and -among different species inhabiting the same country, and the sexual -selection among the individuals of the same species to be perpetually -transmitting to offspring the improved and more developed organs and -powers induced by natural selection; so that in the countless sequence -of generations there are evolved animals that are so widely different -from their remote progenitors that in classifying them we find them to -be new species, endowed with a power of reproducing their own type, and -similarly capable, it would seem, of still further development into -even higher types in the long-distant future. - -I know not how it may appear to others, but to me the parallelism -between the Platonic and the Darwinian theory is very striking. Both -speculators assume the existence of a Supreme Intelligence and Power, -presiding over the creation of animals which are to inhabit this earth. -Behind the celestial or primitive gods the Greek philosopher places -the Demiurgus, to whom the gods stand in the relation of ministers -or servants to execute his will. The modern naturalist assumes the -existence of the Omnipotent God; and although he does not directly -personify the laws of natural and sexual selection which the Omnipotent -power has made to operate in nature, they perform an office in the -transitional gradations through which the animals are successively -developed, that very closely resembles the office performed by the -gods of Plato's system in providing the modifications of structure -which the animals undergo. In the two processes the one is the reversed -complement of the other. Plato begins with the formation of an animal -of a very exalted type, and by successive degradations, induced by the -failure of the animal to live up to the high standard of its rational -existence, he supposes a descent into lower and still lower forms, the -gods all the while providing a new structure for each successive lower -form, until we reach the shell-fish fixed on the earth beneath the -water. Darwin begins with the lowest form of animated organization, -and by successive gradations induced by the struggle of the animal to -maintain its existence, he supposes an ascent into higher and still -higher forms, the laws of natural and sexual selection operating to -develop a new structure for each successive higher form, until we reach -man, "the wonder and glory of the universe," an animal whose immediate -ancestor was the same as the monkey's, and whose remote progenitor was -an aquatic creature breathing by gills and floating by a swim-bladder. - -Nor had Plato less of probability to support his theory than Darwin -had to support his. The Greek philosopher might have adduced the -constant spectacle of men debasing their habits and even their physical -appearance into a resemblance to the brutes. He might have suggested, -and he does suggest, how the degrading tendencies of the lower -appetites and the ravages of disease drag down the human frame from its -erect carriage and its commanding power over matter to an approximation -with the condition of the inferior animals. He might have adduced -innumerable proofs of the loss of reason, or rationality, through -successive generations of men, brought about by the transmission of -both appetites and physical malformation from parents to children. -He might have compared one of his Athenian fellow-citizens of the -higher class with the lowest savage known throughout all the regions -accessible to an observer of his day and country. He might have -portrayed the one as a being preserving his physical organization -in the highest state of perfection by gymnastic exercises, by a -well-chosen diet, by observance of all the conditions of health, by the -aid of the highest medical skill known to the age; cultivating his mind -by philosophy, practicing every public and private virtue as they were -understood among a people of rare refinement, and adorning his race by -an exhibition of the highest qualities that were then attainable. All -these qualities, physical, mental, and moral, Plato might have shown -were transmissible in some degree, and in a good degree were actually -transmitted from sire to son. Turning to the other picture, and -comparing "Hyperion to the satyr," he might have shown that the lowest -savage, in those physical points of structure which were best adapted -to his animal preservation as an inhabitant of the wildest portion of -the earth, had retained those which made him more nearly resemble the -brute inhabitants of the same region, and that in his intellectual -and moral qualities the resemblance between him and his Athenian -contemporary was almost wholly lost. Intermediate between these extreme -specimens of the human race, why could not Plato have found with great -probability, and often with actual proof, successive degradations of -structure and uses of organs, just as well supported by facts, or -analogies, or hypotheses, as are Mr. Darwin's successive elevations -from a lower to a higher animal? If Plato had known as much about the -animal kingdom as is now known, he could have arrayed the same facts -in support of his theory, by an argument as powerful as that which now -supports the doctrine of evolution. - -Nay, it is certain that Plato's attention was drawn to some of these -facts, and that he makes use of them in a way that is as legitimately -a probable occurrence as any use that is made of them at the present -day. For example, he was struck with the existence of what in -scientific parlance are called "rudiments," a term that is employed -to describe an organ or part which appears to have no special use -where it is found in one animal, but which, in a more developed or -in a diversified condition, has an obvious use in another animal. -Thus, he tells us that the gods, with a long-sighted providence, -introduced a sketch or rudiment of nails into the earliest organization -of man, foreseeing that the lower animals would be produced from -the degeneration of man, and that to them claws and nails would be -absolutely indispensable.[32] In the same way, he seems to regard hair -as a rudiment, relatively speaking; for while its use on different -parts of the body of man, or even on the head, is not very apparent, -its use to the lower animals is very obvious. Why, then, is it not just -as rational, and just as much in accordance with proper scientific -reasoning, to suppose those parts of animal structure which are -called "rudiments" to have been introduced as mere sketches in the -organization of a very high animal, and then to have been developed -into special uses in lower animals produced by the degeneration of the -higher, as it is to suppose that they were developed in full activity -and use in the lower animals, but sank into the condition of useless -or comparatively useless appendages as the higher animal was evolved -out of the lower by a process of elevation? The modern naturalist of -the evolution school will doubtless say that "rudiments" in the human -structure, for which there is no assignable use that can be observed, -are not to be accounted for as sketches from which Nature was to work, -in finding for them a use in some other animal in a developed and -practically important condition; that, to the extent to which such -things are found in man, they are proofs of his cognate relations to -the lower animals, in which they have a palpable use; and that the -gradations by which they have proceeded from practical and important -uses in the lower animals, until they have become mere useless or -comparatively useless sketches in the human structure, are among the -proofs of the descent of man from the lower animals which had a use for -such things. I shall endeavor hereafter to examine the argument that -is derived from "rudiments" more closely. At present, the point which -I suggest to the mind of the reader arises in the parallel between -the Platonic and the Darwinian theory of the origin of the different -species of animals. I ask, why is it not just as probably a true -hypothesis to suppose that man was first created with these rudimentary -sketches in his organization, and that they became useful appendages -in the lower animals, into which man became degenerated, as it is to -suppose that these parts existed in full development, activity, and -practical use in the lower animals, out of whom man was generated, -and that in man they lost their utility and became relatively mere -rudiments? To my mind, neither theory has the requisite amount of -probability in its favor compared with the probability of special -creations; but I can see as much probability in the Platonic as in the -Darwinian explanation, and a strong parallelism between them. - -I will pursue this parallel somewhat further by again adverting to -Plato's idea of the origin of the human soul. He supposes it to have -been an immortal being, formed out of the eternal essence of Ideas -by the Demiurgus. He manifestly makes it an existence distinct from -matter, because he places its first abode in a heavenly mansion, where -it is in unison with the celestial harmonies and perfections of the -outer circle. This heavenly sphere is again to be its abode, after it -shall have been released from its temporary abode on earth, which has -been appointed to it for purposes of discipline and trial. At a fixed -time of birth it is brought down from its celestial abode and united -with a mortal body, that it may assert and prove its power to preside -over and govern that body according to the eternal laws of reason and -rectitude. If it fulfills this high duty, when the fastenings, which -have bound it to the mortal frame, are dissolved with the dissolution -of those which hold together the material structure, the soul flies -away with delight to its own peculiar star. If it fails in this high -duty, it is on the death of the first body transferred by a second -birth into a more degraded body, resembling that to which it has -allowed the first one to be debased. At length, somewhere in the -series of transmigrations, the lower and bestial tendencies cease to -have power over the immortal soul; the animal with which it was last -united remains an animal bereft of reason, and the soul, released from -further captivity, escapes to its original abode in the heavens, more -or less contaminated by what it has undergone, but still immortal, -indestructible, spiritual, and capable of purification. - -Here, then, we have a conception of the origin and nature of the human -soul as a spiritual existence, quite as distinctly presented as it can -be by human reason. Stripped of the machinery by which Plato supposes -the soul to have come into existence, his conception of its origin and -nature is the most remarkable contribution which philosophy, apart -from the aid of what is called inspiration, has made to our means of -speculating upon this great theme. Of course, it affords, with all the -machinery of which Plato makes use, no explanation of the point or the -time of junction between the soul and the body. But, as a conception -of what in the poverty of language must be called the substance of -the soul, of its spiritual and immortal nature, of its distinctive -existence separate from what we know as matter, whether Plato borrowed -more or less from other philosophers who preceded him, it is a very -distinct presentation of the nature of the human mind. - -Turn now to what can be extracted from the Darwinian theory of the -origin and nature of the human mind, and observe where it holds with -and where it breaks from the parallelism between it and the Platonic -theory. The doctrine of evolution, so called, presents to us no -distinct suggestion that the mind of man is a separate and special -creation. Rejecting, and very properly rejecting, the Platonic idea of -an existence of the human soul anterior to the birth of the individual, -the Darwinian theory supposes that in the long course of time, during -which natural and sexual selection were operating to produce higher and -still higher animals, there came about, in the earlier and primitive -organizations, a habit of the animal to act in a certain way; that this -habit descended to offspring; that it became developed into what is now -called instinct; and that instinct became developed into what we now -call mind. I know not how otherwise to interpret Mr. Darwin's repeated -affirmations that, in comparing the mental powers of man and those of -the lower animals, there can be detected no difference in kind, but -that the difference is one of degree only; that there is no fundamental -difference, or difference in nature, between the mental powers of -an ape and a man, or between the mental power of one of the lowest -fishes, as a lamprey or lancelet, and that of one of the higher apes; -that both of these intervals, that between the ape and man, and that -between the lancelet and the ape, which are much wider in the latter -case than in the former, are filled up by numberless gradations.[33] If -this be true, it must be because the lancelet, supposing that animal to -be the progenitor, formed a habit of acting by an implanted impulse, -which became, under the operation of natural and sexual selection, -confirmed, developed, and increased in its descendants, until it not -only amounted to what is called instinct, but took on more complex -habits until something akin to reason was developed. As the higher -animals continued to be evolved out of the lower, this approach to -a reasoning power became in the ape a true mental faculty; and, at -length, in the numberless gradations of structure intermediate between -the ape and the man, we reach those intellectual faculties which -distinguish the latter by an enormous interval from all the other -animals. "If," says Mr. Darwin, "no organic being, excepting man, had -possessed any mental power, or if his powers had been of a wholly -different nature from those of the lower animals, then we never should -have been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had been -gradually developed. But it can be shown that there is no fundamental -difference of this kind."[34] - -I will not here ask how far this is theoretical assumption. I shall -endeavor to examine in another place the evidence which is supposed -to show that the mental powers of man are in no respect fundamentally -different, or different in kind, from the powers in the other animals -to which the distinguished naturalist gives the name of "mental" -powers. At present I am still concerned with the parallelism between -the Platonic and the Darwinian theory; and I again ask whether the -latter is not the former reversed, in respect to the process by which -reason in the one case becomes lost, and that by which in the other -case it becomes developed out of something to which it bears no -resemblance? Plato supposes the creation of pure reason, or mental -power, in the shape--to use the counterpart of a physical term--of -a non-physical, spiritual intelligence, or mind. It remains always -of this nature, but the successive animals which it is required to -inhabit on earth undergo such degradations that the immortal reason -loses in them the power to control their actions; nothing is left to -govern in them but mere instinct, and this at last sinks into its -lowest manifestations. Darwin, on the other hand, supposes the first -creation to have been a very low animal of a fish-like structure, with -the lowest capacity for voluntary action of any kind, but impelled to -act in a certain way by superimposed laws of self-preservation; that -in the infinitude of successive generations these laws have operated -to produce numberless gradations of structure, in the growth of which -fixed habits have become complex instincts; that further gradations -have developed these instincts into something of mental power, as the -successive higher animals have become evolved out of the lower ones, -until at length the intellect of man has been "gradually developed" by -a purely physical process of the action of organized matter. - -This materialistic way of accounting for the origin of the human -mind necessarily excludes the idea of its separate creation or its -distinctive character. The theory is perfectly consistent with itself, -in supposing that the mind of man does not differ in kind, or differ -fundamentally, from those exhibitions which in the lower animals lead -us to attribute to them some mental power. But whether the theory is -consistent with what we know of our own minds, as compared with what -we can observe in the other animals, is the real question. In the -first place, it is to be remembered that we can read our own minds, by -the power of consciousness and reflection. In the next place, it is -conceded that we can know nothing of the minds of the other animals, -excepting by their outward actions. They can not speak, to tell us -of their emotions, their memories, their fears, their hopes, their -desires, what they think, or whether they think at all. They do acts -which wonderfully resemble the acts of man, in outward appearance, -as if they were acts which proceeded from the same power of reason -but in a less perfect degree; yet they can tell us nothing of their -mental processes, if they have such processes, and the utmost that we -can do is to argue from their acts that they have mental faculties -akin to those of men. It is in the ordained nature of things that we -know and can know, by introspection, what our own minds are. We can -know the mind of no other animal excepting from his outward acts. How -far these will justify us in assuming that his mind is of the same -nature as ours, or that ours is an advanced development of his, is the -fundamental question. - -Plato was evidently led, by that study of the human mind which is open -to all cultivated intellects through the process of consciousness -and reflection, to conceive of the soul as a created intelligence of -a spiritual nature. The fanciful materials out of which he supposes -it to have been composed were the mere machinery employed to express -his conception of its spiritual nature and its indestructible -existence. He was led to employ such machinery by his highly -speculative and constructive tendencies, and because it was the habit -of Greek philosophy to account for everything. Some machinery he was -irresistibly impelled to employ, in order to give due consistency to -his theory. But his machinery in no way obscures his conception of -the nature of the soul, and we may disregard it altogether and still -have left the conception of a spiritual and immortal being, formed for -separate existence from matter, but united to matter for a temporary -purpose of discipline and trial. - -The modern naturalist, on the other hand, although assuming the -existence of the Omnipotent God, supposes the human mind to have become -what it is by the action of organized matter beginning at the lowest -point of animal life, and going on through successive gradations of -animal structure, until habits are formed which become instincts, and -instincts are gradually developed into mind. Take away the machinery -that is employed, and you have left no conception of the immortal and -indestructible nature of the human soul. The material out of which it -is constructed is all of the earth earthy, and the twofold question -arises: first, whether this was the probable method employed by the -Omnipotent Creator; and, secondly, whether it will account for such an -existence as we have reason to believe the mind of man to be. - -There is another point in the parallel between the Platonic and the -Darwinian systems which is worthy of note. We have seen that, according -to Plato, when the Demiurgus had completed the construction of the -Kosmos and that of the human soul, he retired and left to the gods the -construction of a mortal body for man and of bodies of the inferior -animals into which man would become degraded. According to Darwin, -the Omnipotent God constructs some very low form of animal, and then, -retiring from the work of direct creation, he leaves the laws of -natural and sexual selection to operate in the production of higher -animals through the process that is called evolution. Perhaps it may be -unscientific to ask why the Omnipotent God should cease to exercise, -or refrain from exercising, his power of special creation, after he -has once exerted it. Perhaps there is some view of the nature and -purposes of that infinite being which would render such an abstention -from his powers a probable occurrence. But it is difficult to conceive -what this view can be. If we take a comprehensive survey of all the -facts concerning the animal kingdom that are within the reach of our -observation; and if, then, in cases where we know of no intermediate -or transitional states, we assume that they must have existed; if we -array the whole in support of a certain theory which undertakes to -account both for what we see and for what we do not see, we very easily -reach the conclusion that the Omnipotent God performed but one act of -special creation, or at most performed but a very few of such acts, -and those of the rudest and simplest types, and then left all the -subsequent and splendid exhibitions of animal structure to be worked -out by natural selection. This is the scientific method adopted by the -evolution school to account for the existence of all the higher animals -of which we have knowledge, man included. It may be very startling, but -we must acknowledge it as the method of action of the Omnipotent God, -because it is said there is no logical impossibility in it. - -There is a passage in Mr. Darwin's "Origin of Species" which I must now -quote, because it shows how strongly the supposed action and abstention -of the infinite Creator, according to the Darwinian theory, resembles -the action and abstention of Plato's Demiurgus: "Although the belief -that an organ so perfect as the eye could have been formed by natural -selection, is enough to stagger any one; yet in the case of any organ, -if we know of a long series of gradations in complexity, each good for -its possessor; then, under changing conditions of life, there is no -logical impossibility in the acquirement of any conceivable degree of -perfection through natural selection. In the cases in which we know of -no intermediate or transitional states, we should be extremely cautious -in concluding that none can have existed, for the metamorphoses of many -organs show what wonderful changes in function are at least possible. -For instance, a swim-bladder has apparently been converted into an -air-breathing lung. The same organ having performed simultaneously -very different functions, and then having been in part or in whole -specialized for one function; and two distinct organs having performed -at the same time the same function, the one having been perfected while -aided by the other, must often have largely facilitated transitions." - -Here, then, we have it propounded that after the creation of the -rudest and simplest form of a visual organ, the infinite God abstains -from direct and special creation of such a perfect and elaborate -organ as the human eye, and leaves it to be worked out by natural -selection; there being no logical impossibility, it is said, in this -hypothesis. We are cautioned not to conclude, because we can not find -the intermediate and transitional states of the visual organs, that -they never existed; we are told that they are at least possible, and -that analogies show they must have existed; and from the possibility of -their existence and from the assumption that they happened, we are to -believe that the Omnipotent God, refraining from the exercise of his -power to create the human eye, with its wondrously perfect structure, -left it to be evolved by natural selection out of the rudest and -simplest visual organ which he directly fashioned. - -All things are possible to an infinite Creator. He who made the visual -organ of the lowest aquatic creature that ever floated could make the -human eye as we know it, or could make one that would do more than -the eye of man ever was capable of. He could by a direct exercise of -his power of creation form the eye of man, or he could leave it to be -evolved out of the only type of a visual organ on which he saw fit -to exercise his creative power. He could create in the land-animals -a true air-breathing lung as a special production of his will, or -could permit it to be formed by transitional gradations out of the -swim-bladder of an aquatic creature. But why should he abstain from the -one method and employ the other? This question brings us at once to -the probabilities of the case; and, in estimating those probabilities, -we must take into the account all that reason permits us to believe -of the attributes of the Almighty. We can not, it is true, penetrate -into his counsels without the aid of revelation. But if we confine -ourselves to the domain of science, or to the mere observation of -nature, we shall find reason for believing that the Omnipotent God -had purposes in his infinite wisdom that render the acts of special -creation vastly more probable than the theory of evolution. A study of -the animal kingdom and of all the phenomena of the universe leads us -rationally and inevitably to one of two conclusions: either that there -is no God, and that all things came by chance; or to the belief that -there is a God, and that he is a being of infinite benevolence as well -as infinite wisdom and power. Now, why should such a being, proposing -to himself the existence on earth of such an animal as man, to be -inhabited for a time by a soul destined to be immortal, abstain from -the direct creation of both soul and body, and leave the latter to be -evolved out of the lowest form of animal life, and the former to become -a mere manifestation or exhibition of phenomena, resulting from the -improved and more elaborate structures of successive types of animals? -Is there no conceivable reason why an infinitely wise, benevolent, and -omnipotent being should have chosen to exercise the direct power of -creation in forming the soul of man for an immortal existence, and also -to exercise his direct power of creation in so fashioning the body as -to fit it with the utmost exactness to be serviceable and subservient -to the mind which is to inhabit it for a season? Why depict the -infinite God as a quiescent and retired spectator of the operation of -certain laws which he has imposed upon organized matter, when there are -discoverable so many manifest reasons for the special creation of such -a being as man? It is hardly in accordance with any rational theory of -God's providence, after we have attained a conception of such a being, -to liken him intentionally or unintentionally to the Demiurgus of the -acute and ingenious Greek philosopher. We must conclude that human -society, with all that it has done or is capable of doing for man on -earth, was in the contemplation of the Almighty; and if we adopt this -conclusion, we must account for the moral sense, for moral obligation, -and for the idea of law and duty. We can not account for these things -upon any probable theory of their origin, if we reject the idea that -they were specially implanted in the structure of the human soul, and -suppose that both the intellectual faculties and the moral sense were -evolved out of the struggle of lower animals for their existence, -resulting in the formation of higher animals and in the development -of their social instincts into more complex, refined, and consciously -calculating instincts of the same nature. - -I have not drawn this parallel between the Platonic and the Darwinian -theories of the origin of different animals for any purpose of -suggesting that the one was in any sense borrowed from the other. -Plagiarism, in any form, is not, so far as I know, to be detected in -the writings of the evolution school. But the speculations of Plato in -regard to the origin and nature of the human soul, fanciful as they -are, afford great assistance in grasping the conception of a spiritual -existence; and the parallel between his process of degradation and -Darwin's process of elevation shows to my mind as great probability in -the one theory as there is in the other. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [12] Rotation was considered the movement most conformable to reason - and intelligence, and it is impracticable to any figure but the - spherical. Grote, iii, 253. - - [13] The primitive gods of Plato's conception (in the "Timæus") are - not to be confounded with the gods of the poetic and popular faith. - As Mr. Grote has pointed out, there is nothing more remarkable in - Plato's writings than the subtilty and skill with which he contrived - to elude the charge of impiety and infidelity toward the gods of - tradition and of the popular faith. In a passage of the "Timæus," - on which Mr. Grote seems to be in doubt whether it was ironical or - sincere, Plato boldly confronts the difficulty by saying that we - must believe competent witnesses whose testimony we have, respecting - the genesis of the remaining gods who have personal names and were - believed in by his contemporaries. For his own part, he says, he does - not pretend to account for their generation. The sons of the gods, - the heroic and sacred families, who must have known their own fathers - and all about their own family affairs, have given us their family - traditions, and we must obey the law and believe. But concerning - the primitive gods, the first progenitors of the remaining gods, - we are at liberty to speculate. The ingenuity of this admission of - authority where authority has spoken, reconcilable with speculation - upon matters on which authority has not spoken, is admirable. Plato, - as Mr. Grote has observed, was willing to incur the risk of one count - of the indictment which was brought against his master Socrates, - that of introducing new divine persons. In legal parlance he might - have demurred to this count, as not charging any offense against the - established religion. But the other count, for not acknowledging the - gods whom the city acknowledged, he did not choose to encounter. As to - them, he prudently, and perhaps sarcastically, accepts the testimony - of witnesses who speak by inspiration and authority. But as to the - primitive gods, the progenitors of the gods from whom were descended - the heroic and sacred families of men, he expresses in the "Timæus" - his own convictions, without appealing to authority and without - intimating that he is speaking of mysteries beyond the comprehension - of his reason. The boldness of this flight beyond all authority into - the realms of pure reason is very striking, even if it does end in - nothing but probability, which is all that Plato claims for his theory. - - [14] It must be remembered that, in the formation of the cosmical - soul, the ingredients were the eternal Ideas; of these there could be - a remnant after the cosmical soul was formed. But the cosmical body, - which was formed out of the material elements, comprehended the whole - of them, and there could be no remnant or surplus of them remaining - outside. But portions of them could be borrowed for a limited period - of mortal existence, and would return to their place in the Kosmos - when that existence terminated. If this distinction be carried along, - Plato will not be found to be inconsistent with himself. - - [15] It does not distinctly appear what was to become of the rational - soul if it finally failed in the conflict with evil, at the lowest end - of the transmigration. Being immortal, it could not perish. But in - providing for it an opportunity of final success through all the forms - of animal life to which it might be condemned, it would seem that - Plato was pressed by a reluctance to encounter the idea of endless - misery. This point, however, does not obscure his explanation of the - process by which species of animals, and a succession of inferior - animals, came to exist. - - [16] Mr. Grote has pointed out that in his other writings, notably - in the "Republic" and in the "Leges", Plato is not consistent with - this idea that the gods are responsible for the evil that man causes - to himself; and that in the "Timæus" he plainly makes the Demiurgus - responsible, because he brings, or allows to be brought, an immortal - soul down from its star, where it was living pure, intelligent, and in - harmony with reason, and makes it incur corruption, disturbance, and - stupidity, by junction with a mortal body and two mortal and inferior - souls. - - [17] I have omitted the description of the influence of disease - induced by an over-indulgence of appetite, etc., in aiding the process - of debasement from the primitive type. The reader can find this - influence developed in Grote, or can consult the original Greek of - the "Timæus." It would appear that Plato considered the effect of all - the appetites, when too much indulged, as tending in the primitive - non-sexual type toward the development of that lower kind of animal - which the gods saw fit to treat as fit only to become woman. - - [18] Grote. - - [19] Grote's "Plato," iii, 282. - - [20] See, as to the reception of the Platonic Demiurgus by the - Alexandrian Jews, first chapter. - - [21] "Origin of Species," p. 428, American edition, from the sixth - English. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1882. - - [22] Mr. Darwin refers to Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory of "the - necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation"; - and indeed it is apparent that this class of philosophers have - constructed a theory which denies the creation of the human mind as a - spiritual essence, independent of matter, although some of them may - adhere to the idea that it was God who caused matter to evolve out of - its own action the substance or existence that we call mind. - - [23] "Origin of Species," p. 69. - - [24] For the illustrations of both kinds of selection I must refer the - reader to Mr. Darwin's works. In regard to birds, he makes the sexual - selection operate less by the "law of battle" among the males, or by - fighting, and more by the attractions of plumage and voice, by which - the males carry on their rivalry for the choice of the females in - pairing. But he attributes the same effect to the sexual selection in - birds as in the other animals, namely, the transmission to offspring, - and chiefly to the male offspring, of those peculiarities of structure - which have given to the male parent the victory over his competitors. - - [25] A very low form of fish, without brain, vertebral column, or - heart, classed by the older naturalists among the worms. ("Descent of - Man," p. 159.) The technical name of the lancelet is _Amphioxus_. - - [26] "Origin of Species," p. 146. - - [27] The kangaroos and opossums are of this group. - - [28] Animals with four hands. - - [29] Animals which produce living young, and nourish them after birth - by milk from the teats of the mother. - - [30] The lemur is one of a genus of four-handed mammals, allied to - the apes, baboons, and monkeys, but with a form approaching that of - quadrupeds. - - [31] "Descent of Man," p. 165.--The reader will need to observe that - monkey is the popular name of the ape and the baboon. In zoölogy, - monkey designates the animals of the genus _Simia_, which have long - tails. The three classes are apes, without tails; monkeys, with long - tails; baboons, with short tails. - - [32] Grote, iii, p. 276. - - [33] "Descent of Man," p. 65. - - [34] "Descent of Man," p. 65. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - The Darwinian pedigree of man--The evolution of organisms out of other - organisms, according to the theory of Darwin. - - -It is doubtless an interesting speculation to go back in imagination to -a period to be counted by any number of millions of years, or covered -by an immeasurable lapse of time, and to conceive of slowly-moving -causes by which the present or the past inhabitants of this globe -became developed out of some primordial type, through successive -generations, resulting in different species, which became final -products and distinct organisms. But what the imagination can do in the -formation of a theory when acting upon a certain range of facts is, -as a matter of belief, to be tested by the inquiry whether the weight -of evidence shows that theory to be, in a supreme degree, a probable -truth, when compared with any other hypothesis. It is in this way that -I propose to examine and test the Darwinian pedigree of man. The whole -of Mr. Darwin's theory of the descent of man as an animal consists in -assigning to him a certain pedigree, which traces his organism through -a long series of other animals back to the lowest and crudest form of -animal life; and it must be remembered that this mode of accounting for -the origin of man of necessity supposes an unbroken connection of lives -with lives, back through the whole series of organisms which constitute -the pedigree, and that, according to the Darwinian theory, there was -no aboriginal creation of any of these organisms, save the very first -and lowest form with which the series commences. Not only must this -connection of lives with lives be shown, but the theory must be able -to show how it has come about that there are now distinct species of -animals which never reproduce any type but their own. - -Two great agencies, according to the Darwinian theory, have operated -to develop the different species of animals from some low primordial -type, through a long series which has culminated in man, who can not -lay claim to be a special creation, but must trace his pedigree to -some ape-like creature, and so on to the remote progenitor of all the -_Vertebrata_. It is now needful to grasp, with as much precision as -such a theory admits of, the nature and operation of these agencies, -and to note the strength or weakness of the proof which they afford of -the main hypothesis. First, we have what is called "the struggle for -existence," which may be conceded as a fact, and to which more or less -may be attributed. The term is used by Mr. Darwin in a metaphorical -sense, to include all that any being has to encounter in maintaining -its individual existence, and in leaving progeny, or perpetuating its -kind. In the animal kingdom, the struggle for individual existence -is chiefly a struggle for food among the different individuals which -depend on the same food, or against a dearth of one kind of food which -compels a resort to some other kind. The struggle for a continuation -of its species is dependent on the success with which the individual -animal maintains the contest for its own existence. Now, it is -argued that in this great and complex battle for life it would occur -that infinitely varied diversities of structure would be useful to -the animals in helping them to carry on the battle under changing -conditions. These useful diversities, consisting of the development -of new organs and powers, would be preserved and perpetuated in the -offspring, through many successive generations, while the variations -that were injurious would be rigidly destroyed. The animals in whom -these favorable individual differences and variations of structure -were preserved would have the best chance of surviving and of -procreating their kind. So that, by this "survival of the fittest," -Nature is continually selecting those variations of structure which -are useful, and continually rejecting or eliminating those which are -injurious; the result being the gradual evolution of successive higher -types of animals out of the lower ones, until we reach man, the highest -animal organism that exists on this earth. In the next place, we have, -as an auxiliary agency, in aid of natural selection, what is called -"the sexual selection," by which the best endowed and most powerful -males of a given species appropriate the females, and thus the progeny -become possessed of those variations of structure and the superior -qualities which have given to the male parent the victory over his -competitors. - -The proofs that are relied upon to establish the operation and effect -of these agencies in producing the results that are claimed for them, -ought to show that, in one or more instances, an animal of a superior -organization which, when left to the natural course of its reproduction -by the union of its two sexes, always produces its own distinct type -and no other, has, in fact, been itself evolved out of some lower and -different organism by the agencies of natural and sexual selection -operating among the individuals of that lower type. One of the proofs, -on which great stress is laid by Mr. Darwin, may be disposed of without -difficulty. It is that which is said to take place in the breeding of -domestic animals, or of animals the breeding of which man undertakes to -improve for his own practical benefit, or to please his fancy, or to -try experiments. In all that has been done in this kind of selection, -in breeding from the best specimens of any class of animals, there -is not one instance of the production of an animal varying from its -near or its remote known progenitors in anything but adventitious -peculiarities which will not warrant us in regarding it as a new or -different animal. No breeder of horses has ever produced an animal -that was not a horse. He may have brought about great and important -improvements in the qualities of fleetness, or strength, or weight, -or endurance, by careful selection of the sire and the dam; but the -race-horse or the hunter, or the draught-horse or the war-horse, is -but a horse of different qualities and powers, with the same skeleton, -viscera, organs, muscles, which mark this species of animal, and with -no other variations of structure than such as follow from the limited -development of different parts for different uses. No breeder of cows -ever produced a female animal that was not a cow, although he may have -greatly improved the quality and quantity of the milk peculiar to this -animal by careful selection of the individuals which he permits or -encourages to breed. No breeder of sheep ever produced an animal that -was not a sheep, although the quality of the fleece or of the mutton -may have been greatly improved or varied. Among the domestic fowls, no -animal that was not a bird was ever bred by any crossing of breeds, -although great varieties of plumage, structure of beak, formation of -foot, development of wing, habits of life, adaptation to changes of -situation, and many minor peculiarities, have been the consequences -of careful and intelligent breeding from different varieties of the -same fowl. In the case of the pigeon, of which Mr. Darwin has given -a great many curious facts from his own experience as a breeder, the -most remarkable variations are perhaps to be observed as the results -of intentional breeding from different races of that bird; but with -all these variations nothing that was not a bird was ever produced. -In the case of the dog, whatever was his origin, or supposing him to -have been derived from the wolf, or to belong to the same family as -the wolf, it is, of course, impossible to produce, by any crossing of -different breeds of dogs, an animal that would not belong to the class -of the _Canidæ_. Indeed, it is conceded by Darwin, with all the array -of facts which he adduces in regard to the domesticated animals, that -by crossing we can only get forms in some degree intermediate between -the parents; and that although a race may be modified by occasional -crosses, if aided by careful selection of the individuals which present -the desired character, yet to obtain a race intermediate between two -distinct races would be very difficult, if not impossible. If this is -so, how much more remote must be the possibility, by any selection, or -by any crossing to which Nature will allow the different animals to -submit, to produce an animal of so distinct a type that it would amount -to a different species from its known progenitors! - -From all that has been brought about in the efforts of man to improve -or to vary the breeds of domestic animals--a kind of selection that is -supposed to be analogous to what takes place in Nature, although under -different conditions--it is apparent that there are limitations to the -power of selection in regard to the effects that are to be attributed -to it. A line must be drawn somewhere. It will not do in scientific -reasoning, or in any other reasoning, to ignore the limitations to -which all experience and observation point with unerring certainty, so -far as experience and observation furnish us with facts. It is true -that the lapse of time during which there has been, with more or less -success, an intentional improvement in the breeds of domestic animals -carried on with recorded results has been very short when compared -with the enormous period that has elapsed since the first creation -of an animal organization, whenever or whatever that creation was. -But history furnishes us with a pretty long stretch of time through -which civilized, half-civilized, and savage nations have had to do -with various animals in first taming them from a wild state and then -in domesticating so as to make them subservient to human wants, and -finally in improving their breeds. But there is no recorded or known -instance in which there has been produced under domestication an animal -which can be said to be of a different species from its immediate known -progenitors, or one that differed from its remote known progenitors -in any but minor and adventitious peculiarities of structure. If in -passing from what has been done by human selection in the breeding of -animals to what has taken place in Nature in a much longer space of -time and on a far greater scale, we find that in Nature, too, there -are limitations to the power of that agency which is called natural -selection--that there is an impassable barrier which Nature never -crosses, an invincible division between the different species of -animals--we must conclude that there is a line between what selection -can and what it can not do. We must conclude, with all the scope and -power that can be given to natural selection, that Nature has not -developed a higher and differently organized animal out of a lower -and inferior type--has not made new species by the process called -evolution, because the infinite God has not commissioned Nature to do -that thing, but has reserved it unto himself to make special creations. -Do not all that we know of the animal kingdom--all that naturalists -have accumulated of facts and all that they concede to be the absence -of facts--show that there is a clear and well-defined limitation to -the power of natural selection, as well as to the power of that other -agency which is called sexual selection? Grant that this agency of -natural selection began to operate at a period, the commencement of -which is as remote as figures can describe; that the struggle for life -began as soon as there was an organized being existing in numbers -sufficiently large to be out of proportion to the supply of food; that -the sexual selection began at the same time, and that both together -have been operating ever since among the different species of animals -that have successively arisen and successively displaced each other -throughout the earth. The longer we imagine this period to have -been, the stronger is the argument against the theory of evolution, -because the more numerous will be the absences of the gradations and -transitions necessary to prove an unbroken descent from the remote -prototype which is assumed to have been the first progenitor of the -whole animal kingdom. Upon the hypothesis that evolution is a true -account of the origin of the different animals, we ought practically -to find no missing links in the chain. The fact is that the missing -links are both extremely numerous and important; and the longer the -period assumed--the further we get from the probability that these two -agencies of natural and sexual selection were capable of producing the -results that are claimed for them--the stronger is the proof that a -barrier has been set to their operation, and the more necessary is it -to recognize the line which separates what they can from what they can -not do. - -Let us now see what is the state of the proof. It may assist the -reader to understand the Darwinian pedigree of man if I present it in -a tabulated form, such as we are accustomed to use in exhibiting to -the eye the pedigree of a single animal. Stated in this manner, the -Darwinian pedigree of man may be traced as follows: - - I. A marine animal of the maggot form. - | - II. Group of lowly-organized fishes. - | - III. Ganoids and other fishes. - | - IV. The Amphibians. - | - V. The ancient Marsupials. - | - VI. The Quadrumana and all the higher mammals. - | - VII. The Lemuridæ. - | - VIII. The Simiadæ. - | - +-------------------+ - | | - IX. Old World Monkeys. New World Monkeys. - | - X. Man. - -These ten classes or groups of animals are supposed to be connected -together by intermediate diversified forms, which constitute the -transitions from one of the classes or groups to the other; and in -reading the table downward it must be remembered that we are reading -in fact through an ascending scale of beings, from the very lowest -organized creature to the highest. The whole, taken together, forms a -chain of evidence; and, according to the rational rules of evidence, -each distinct fact ought to be proved to have existed at some time -before our belief in the main hypothesis can be challenged. I know of -no reason why the probable truth of a scientific hypothesis should -be judged by any other rules of determination than those which are -applied to any other subject of inquiry; and, while I am ready to -concede that in matters of physical science it is allowable to employ -analogy in constructing a theory, it nevertheless remains, and must -remain, true that where there are numerous links in a supposed chain -of proofs that are established by nothing but an inference drawn from -an analogous fact, the collection of supposed proofs does not exclude -the probable truth of every other hypothesis but that which is sought -to be established, as it also does not establish the theory in favor of -which the supposed facts are adduced. Upon these principles of evidence -I propose now to examine the Darwinian pedigree of man. - -I. The group of marine animals described as resembling the larvæ of -existing Ascidians; that is to say, an aquatic animal in the form -of a grub, caterpillar, or worm, which is the first condition of an -insect at its issuing from the egg. These assumed progenitors of the -Vertebrata are reached, according to Mr. Darwin, by "an obscure glance -into a remote antiquity," and they are described as "apparently" -existing, and as "resembling" the larvæ of existing Ascidians. We are -told that these animals were provided with branchiæ, or gills, for -respiration in water, but with the most important organs of the body, -such as the brain and heart, imperfectly or not at all developed. This -simple and crude animal "we can see," it is said, "in the dim obscurity -of the past," and that it "must have been the early progenitor of -all the Vertebrata."[35] It is manifest that this creature is a mere -hypothesis, constructed, no doubt, by the aid of analogy, but existing -only in the eye of scientific imagination. Why is it placed in the -water? For no reason, apparently, but that its supposed construction -is made to resemble that of some creatures which have been found in -the water, and because it was necessary to make it the progenitor of -the next group, the lowly-organized fishes, in order to carry out the -theory of the subsequent derivations. It might have existed on the -land, unless at the period of its assumed existence the whole globe was -covered with water. If it had existed on the land, the four subsequent -forms, up to and including the Marsupials, might have been varied to -suit the exigencies of the pedigree without tracing the descent of the -Marsupials through fishes and the Amphibians. - -II. The group of lowly-organized fishes. These are said to have been -"probably" derived from the aquatic worm (I), and they are described -to have been as lowly organized as the lancelet, which is a known fish -of negative characters, without brain, vertebral column, or heart, -presenting some affinities with the Ascidians, which are invertebrate, -hermaphrodite marine creatures, permanently attached to a support, -and consisting of a simple, tough, leathery sack, with two small -projecting orifices. The larvæ of these creatures somewhat resemble -tadpoles, and have the power of swimming freely about. These larvæ of -the Ascidians are said to be, in their manner of development, related -to the Vertebrata in the relative position of the nervous system, -and in possessing a structure closely like the _chorda dorsalis_ of -vertebrate animals.[36] Here, again, it is apparent that a group of -lowly-organized fish-like animals, of which there are no remains, -have been constructed by a process of scientific reasoning from a -certain class of marine creatures that are known. As a matter of pure -theory, there can be no serious objection to this kind of construction, -especially if it is supported by strong probabilities furnished by -known facts. But when a theory requires this kind of reasoning in order -to establish an important link in a chain of proofs, it is perfectly -legitimate and necessary criticism that we are called upon to assume -the former existence of such a link; and, indeed, the theorists -themselves, with true candor and accuracy, tell us that they are -arguing upon probabilities from the known to the unknown, or that a -thing "must have existed" because analogies warrant the assumption that -it did exist. In a matter so interesting, and in many senses important, -as the evolution theory of man's descent, it is certainly none too -rigid to insist on the application of the ordinary rules of belief. - -III. The Ganoids and other fishes like the Lepidosiren. These, we -are told, "must have been developed" from the preceding (II). The -Ganoids, it is said, were fishes covered with peculiar enameled bony -scales. Most of them are said to be extinct, but enough is known about -them to lay the foundation for their "probable" development from the -first fishes that are supposed to have been derived from the aquatic -worm (I). There is a reason for arguing the existence of these first -fishes as a true fish with the power of locomotion, because the next -ascending group of animals is to be the Amphibians. In a fish, the -swim-bladder is an important organ; and it is an organ that plays an -important part in the Darwinian theory, furnishing, it is claimed, -a very remarkable illustration that an organ constructed originally -for one purpose, flotation, may be converted into one for a widely -different purpose, namely, respiration. As the Amphibians, which as -a distinct group were to come next after the fishes in the order of -development, must be furnished with a true air-breathing lung, their -progenitors, which inhabited the water only, must be provided with an -organ that would undergo, by transitional gradations, conversion into -a lung. But what is to be chiefly noted here is that it is admitted -that the prototype, which was furnished with a swim-bladder, was "an -ancient and unknown prototype"; and it is a mere inference that the -true lungs of vertebrate animals are the swim-bladder of a fish so -converted, by ordinary generation, from the unknown prototype because -the swim-bladder is "homologous or 'ideally similar' in position and -structure with the lungs of the higher vertebrate animals."[37] One -might ask here without presumption, why the Omnipotent God should not -have created in the vertebrate animals a lung for respiration, as well -as have created or permitted the formation of a swim-bladder in a fish; -and looking to the probabilities of the case, it is altogether too -strong for the learned naturalist to assert that "there is no reason -to doubt that the swim-bladder has actually been converted into lungs -or an organ used exclusively for respiration"; especially as we are -furnished with nothing but speculation to show the intermediate and -transitionary modifications between the swim-bladder and the lung. -While we may not assume "that the Creator works by intellectual powers -like those of man," in all respects, it is surely not presumptuous to -suppose that an Omnipotent and All-wise Being works by powers that are -competent to produce anything that in his infinite purposes he may see -fit specially to create. - -IV. The Amphibians. Here we come to what is now a very numerous group, -of which it is said that the first specimens received, among other -modifications, the transformation of the swim-bladder of their fish -progenitors into an air-breathing lung. We are told that from the -fishes of the last preceding group (III) "a very small advance would -carry us on to the Amphibians."[38] But whether the advance from an -animal living in the water and incapable of existing out of that -element, to an animal capable of living on the land as well as in the -water, was small or large, we look in vain, at present, for the facts -that constitute that advance. - -V. The Ancient Marsupials. These were an order of mammals such as -the existing kangaroos, opossums, etc., of which the young, born in -a very incomplete state of development, are carried by the mother, -while sucking, in a ventral pouch. They are supposed to have been -the predecessors, at an earlier geological period, of the placental -mammals, namely, the highest class of mammals, in which the embryo, -after it has attained a certain stage, is united to the mother by a -vascular connection called the _placenta_, which secures nourishment -that enables the young to be born in a more complete state. There is a -third and still lower division of the great mammalian series, called -the Montremata, and said to be allied to the Marsupials. But the -early progenitors of the existing Marsupials, classed as the Ancient -Marsupials, are supposed to constitute the connection between the -Amphibians and the placental mammals; that is to say, an animal which -produced its young by bringing forth an egg, from which the young is -hatched, became converted into an animal which produced its young from -a womb and nourished it after birth from the milk supplied by its -teats, the young being born in a very incomplete state of development -and carried by the mother in a ventral pouch while it is sucking. The -steps of variation and development by which this extraordinary change -of structure, of modes of reproduction and formation of organs, as well -as habits of life, took place, are certainly not yet discovered; and -it is admitted, in respect to forms "now so utterly unlike," that the -production of the higher forms by the process of evolution "implies -the former existence of links binding closely together all these -forms."[39] In other words, we are called upon to supply by general -reasoning links of which we have as yet no proof. - -VI. The Quadrumana and all the higher (or Placental) Mammals. These are -supposed to stand between the implacental mammals (V) and the Lemuridæ -(VII). The latter were a group of four-handed animals, distinct from -the monkeys, and "resembling the insectivorous quadrupeds." But the -gradations which would show the transformation from the implacental -Marsupials to the placental Quadrumana are wanting. - -VII. The Lemuridæ. This branch of the placental mammals is now actually -represented by only a few varieties. The early progenitors of those -which still exist are placed by Darwin in the series intermediate -between the Quadrumana and the Simiadæ; and according to Huxley they -were derived from the lowest, smallest, and least intelligent of the -placental mammalia. - -VIII. The Simiadæ. This is the general term given by naturalists to the -whole group of monkeys. From the Lemuridæ to the Simiadæ we are told by -Darwin that "the interval is not very wide." Be it wider or narrower, -it would be satisfactory to know whether the gradations by which the -former became the latter are established by anything more than general -speculation. - -IX. The Catarrhine, or Old-World Monkeys. These are the great stem -or branch of the Simiadæ which became the progenitors of man. His -immediate progenitors were "probably" a group of monkeys called by -naturalists the Anthropomorphous Apes, being a group without tails or -callosities, and in other respects resembling man. While this origin of -man is gravely put forward and maintained with much ingenuity, we are -told that "we must not fall into the error of supposing that the early -progenitor of the whole Simian stock, including man, was identical -with, or even closely resembled, any existing ape or monkey."[40] So -that somewhere between the early progenitor of the whole Simian stock -and all that we know of the monkey tribe, there were transitions and -gradations and modifications produced by natural and sexual selection -which we must supply as well as we can. - -X. Man. We have now arrived at "the wonder and glory of the universe," -and have traced his pedigree from a low form of animal, in the shape -of an aquatic worm, through successive higher forms, each developed -out of its predecessor by the operation of fixed laws, and without the -intervention of any special act of creation anywhere in the series, -whatever may have been the power and purpose by and for which existence -was given to the first organized and living creature, the aquatic worm. -Speaking of man as belonging, from a genealogical point of view, to the -Catarrhine, or Old-World stock of monkeys, Mr. Darwin observes that "we -must conclude, however much the conclusion may revolt our pride, that -our early progenitors would have been properly thus designated."[41] - -I have already said that our pride may be wholly laid out of -consideration. The question of the probable truth of this hypothesis -of man's descent should not be affected by anything but correct -reasoning and the application of proper principles of belief. Treating -it with absolute indifference in regard to the dignity of our race, -I shall request my readers to examine the argument by which it is -supported, without the smallest influence of prejudice. I am aware -that it is asking a good deal to desire the reader to divest himself -of all that nature and education and history and poetry and religion -have contributed to produce in our feelings respecting our rank in the -scale of being. When I come to treat of that which, for want of a more -suitable term, must be called the substance of the human mind, and to -suggest how it bears upon this question of the origin of man, I shall, -as I trust, give the true, and no more than the true, scope to those -considerations which lead to the comparative dignity of the race. But -this dignity, as I have before observed, should follow and should not -precede or accompany the discussion of the scientific problem. - -What has chiefly struck me in studying the theory of evolution as an -account of the origin of man is the extent to which the theory itself -has influenced the array of proofs, the inconsequential character of -the reasoning, and the amount of assumption which marks the whole -argument. This is not said with any purpose of giving offense. What is -meant by it will be fully explained and justified, and one of the chief -means for its justification will be found in what I have here more than -once adverted to--Mr. Darwin's own candor and accuracy in pointing out -the particulars in which important proofs are wanting. Another thing -by which I have been much impressed has been the repetition of what is -"probable," without a sufficient weighing of the opposite probability; -and sometimes this reliance on the "probable" has been carried to the -verge, and even beyond the verge, of all probability. Doubtless the -whole question of special creations on the one hand and of gradual -evolution on the other is a question of probability. But I now refer -to a habit among naturalists of asserting the probability of a fact or -an occurrence, and then, without proof, placing that fact or occurrence -in a chain of evidence from which the truth of their main hypothesis is -to be inferred. It is creditable to them as witnesses, that they tell -us that the particular fact or occurrence is only probably true, and -that we are to look for proof of it hereafter. But the whole theory -thus becomes an expectant one. We are to give up our belief that God -made man in his own image--that he fashioned our minds and bodies after -an image which he had conceived in his infinite wisdom--because we -are to expect at some future time to discover the proof that he did -something very different; that he formed some very lowly-organized -creature, and then sat as a retired spectator of the struggle for -existence, through which another and then another higher form of being -would be evolved, until the mind and the body of man would both have -grown out of the successive developments of organic structure. We can -not see this now; we can not prove it; but we may expect to be able to -see it and to prove it hereafter. - -The present state of the argument does not furnish very strong -grounds for the expectation of what the future is to show. As far as -I can discover, the main ground on which the principle of evolution -is accepted by those who believe in it, is general reasoning. It is -admitted that there are breaks in the organic chain between man and his -nearest supposed allies which can not be bridged over by any extinct or -living species. The answer that is made to this objection seems to me -a very singular specimen of reasoning. It is said that the objection -will not appear of much weight to those who believe in the principle -of evolution from general reasons. But how is it with those who are -inquiring, and who, failing to feel the force of the "general reasons," -seek to know what the facts are? When we are told that the breaks in -the organic chain "depend merely on the number of related forms which -have become extinct," is it asking too much to inquire how it is known -that there were such forms and that they have become extinct? Geology, -it is fully conceded on its highest authorities, affords us very little -aid in arriving at these extinct forms which would connect man with -his ape-like progenitors; for, according to Lyell, the discovery of -fossil remains of all the vertebrate classes has been a very slow and -fortuitous process, and this process has as yet reached no remains -connecting man with some extinct ape-like creature.[42] The regions -where such remains would be most likely to be found have not yet been -searched by geologists. This shows the expectant character of the -theory, and how much remains for the future in supplying the facts -which are to take the place of "general reasons." - -But perhaps the most remarkable part of the argument remains to be -stated. The breaks in the organic chain of man's supposed descent are -admitted to be of frequent occurrence in all parts of the series, "some -being wide, sharp, and defined, others less so in various degrees."[43] -But these breaks depend merely, it is said, upon the number of related -forms that have become extinct, there being as yet no proof, even by -fossil remains, that they once existed. Now, the prediction is that -at some future time such breaks will be found still more numerous and -wider, by a process of extinction that will be observed and recorded; -and hence we are not to be disturbed, in looking back into the past, -by finding breaks that can not be filled by anything but general -reasoning. The passage in which this singular kind of reasoning is -expressed by Mr. Darwin deserves to be quoted: - -"At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, -the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate and -replace the savage races throughout the world. At the same time the -anthropomorphous apes, as Prof. Schaafhausen has remarked, will no -doubt be exterminated. The break between man and his nearest allies -will then be wider, for it will intervene between man in a more -civilized state, as we may hope, even than the Caucasian, and some ape -as low as the baboon, instead of as now between the negro or Australian -and the gorilla."[44] - -I do not quite comprehend how the "more civilized state of man" in the -more or less remote future is to lead to this wider break. One can -understand how the whole of mankind may become more civilized, and -how the savage races will disappear by extermination or otherwise. It -may be, and probably will be, that the anthropomorphous apes will be -exterminated at the same time. But the question here is not in regard -to a more perfect and widely diffused civilization--a higher and -universal elevation of the intellectual and moral condition of mankind, -a more improved physical and moral well-being--but it is in regard to -a change in the physical and organic structure of the human animal, so -marked and pronounced as to produce a wider break between man and his -nearest supposed allies than that which now exists between the negro -or the Australian and the gorilla. The anthropomorphous ape existing -now will have disappeared; but it will be a well-known and recorded -animal of the past. But what reason is there to expect that natural and -sexual selection, or the advance of civilization, or the extermination -of the savage races of mankind, or all such causes combined, are going -to change essentially the structure of the human body to something -superior to or fundamentally different from the Caucasian individual? -We have had a tolerably long recorded history of the human body as it -has existed in all states of civilization or barbarism. And although -in the progress from barbarism to civilization--if utter barbarism -preceded civilization--the development of its parts has been varied, -and the brain especially has undergone a large increase in volume and -in the activity of its functions, we do not find that the plan on which -the human animal was constructed, however we may suppose him to have -originated, has undergone any material change. - -The most splendid specimen of the Caucasian race that the civilized -world can show to-day has no more organs, bones, muscles, arteries, -veins, or nerves than those which are found in the lowest savage. -He makes a different use of them, and that use has changed their -development, and to some extent has modified stature, physical, -intellectual, and moral, and many other attributes; as climate and -habits of life have modified complexion, the diseases to which the -human frame is liable, and many other peculiarities. But if we take -historic man, we find that in all the physical features of his animal -construction that constitute him a species, he has been essentially -the same animal in all states of civilization or barbarism; and unless -we boldly assume that the prehistoric man was an animal born with a -coat of hair all over his body, and that clothing was resorted to as -the hair in successive generations disappeared, we can have no very -strong reason for believing that the human body has been at any time an -essentially different structure from what it is now. Even in regard to -longevity or power of continued life, if we set aside the exceptional -cases of what is related of the patriarchs in the biblical records, -we do not find that the average duration of human life has been much -greater or much less than the threescore and ten or the fourscore years -that are said to have been the divinely appointed term. As to what may -have been the average duration of life among prehistoric men, we are -altogether in the dark. - -I must now revert to one of the most prominent of the admitted breaks -in the Darwinian pedigree, namely, that which occurs at the supposed -transition from the amphibians to the mammalia. There is a term which -is used in mechanics to mark the characteristic and fundamental -distinction between one complex machine and another. We speak of the -"principle" on which a mechanical structure operates, meaning the -essential construction and mode of operation which distinguish it from -other machines of the same general class. Although we are not to forget -that an animal organization, to which is given that mysterious essence -that is called life, may come into being by very different processes -from those which are employed by man in dealing with dead matter and -the forces which reside in it, yet there is no danger of being misled -into false analogies, if we borrow from mechanics a convenient term, -and speak of the "principle" on which an animal is constructed and on -which its animal organization operates. We find, then, that in the -animal kingdom there is a perfectly clear and pronounced division -between the modes in which the reproductive system is constructed and -by which it operates in the continuation of the species. The principle -of construction and operation of the reproductive system, by which an -individual animal is produced from an egg brought forth by the female -parent, and is thereafter nourished without anything derived from the -parental body, is as widely different from that by which the young -animal is born from a womb and nourished for a time from the milk of -the mother, as any two constructions, animate or inanimate, that can be -conceived of. Whatever may be the analogy or resemblance between the -embryo that is in the egg of one animal and the embryo that remains in -the womb of another animal, at the point at which the egg is expelled -from the parental system the analogy or resemblance ceases. In certain -animals a body that is called an egg is formed in the female parent, -containing an embryo, or fœtus, of the same species, or the substance -from which a like animal is produced. This substance is inclosed in an -air-tight vessel or shell; when this has been expelled from the parent -the growth of the embryo goes on to the stage of development at which -the young animal is to emerge from the inclosure, and, whatever may -have been the process or means of nourishment surrounding the embryo -within the shell and brought in that inclosure from the body of the -parent, the young animal never derives, at any subsequent stage of its -existence, either before or after it has left the shell, anything more -from the parental system. It may be "hatched" by parental incubation -or by heat from another source, but for nourishment, after it leaves -the shell, the young animal is dependent on substances that are not -supplied from the parental body, although they may be gathered or put -within its reach by the parental care. - -The transition from this system of reproduction to that by which the -fœtus is formed into a greater or less degree of development within the -body of the parent, and then brought forth to be nourished into further -development by the parental milk, is enormous. The principle of the -organic construction and mode of perpetuating the species, in the two -cases, is absolutely unlike after we pass the point at which the ovule -is formed by the union of the male and the female vesicles that are -supposed to constitute its substance. When we pass from the implacental -to the placental mammals we arrive at the crowning distinction between -the two great systems of reproduction which separates them by a line -that seems to forbid the idea that the one has grown out of the -other by such causes as natural selection, and without a special and -intentional creation of a new and different mode of operation. On -the one hand, we have a system of reproduction by which the ovule is -brought forth from the body of the parent in an inclosed vessel, and -thereafter derives nothing from the parental body. In the other, we -have the ovule developed into the fœtus within the body of the parent, -and the young animal is then brought forth in a more or less complete -state of development, to be nourished by the parental secretion called -milk. The intervention of the placental connection between the fœtus -and the mother, whereby nourishment is kept up so that the young animal -may be born in a more complete state of development, is a contrivance -of marvelous skill, which natural selection, or anything that can be -supposed to take place in the struggle for existence, or the result -of the sexual battle, seems to be entirely inadequate to account for. -If two such very diverse systems could be supposed to have been the -product of human contrivance, we should not hesitate to say that the -principle of the one was entirely different from that of the other, and -that the change evinced the highest constructive skill and a special -design. - -The Darwinian hypothesis is that this great transition from the one -system of reproduction to the other took place between the amphibians -and the ancient marsupials, by the operation of the influences -of natural and sexual selection. That is to say, the system of -reproduction through an egg, which is the characteristic of the -amphibians, became changed by gradations and modifications into the -system of the lowest mammals, the distinction between the former and -the latter being an obvious and palpable one. Then we are to suppose a -further change from the marsupials, or the implacental mammals, to that -wonderful contrivance, the _placenta_, by which the mother nourishes -the fœtus into a more complete state of development before the young -animal is born. This enormous change of system is supposed to have -been brought about by a struggle among the individuals of one species -for food, aided by a struggle between the males of that species for -the possession of the females, by the growth and development of organs -useful to the animal in the two battles, and by the transmission of -these enhanced powers and improved weapons to offspring, and possibly -by the crossing of different varieties of the new animals thus -produced. But what potency there could be in such causes to bring about -this great change it is extremely difficult to imagine, and we must -draw largely on our imaginations to reach it. It would seem that if -there is any one part of animal economy that is beyond the influence of -such causes as the "survival of the fittest," it is the reproductive -system, by which the great divisions of the animal kingdom continue -their respective forms. Give all the play that you can to the operation -of the successful battle for individual life, and to the victory of -the best-appointed males over their competitors for the possession -of the females, and to the transmission of acquired peculiarities to -offspring--when you come to such a change as that between the two -systems of reproduction and perpetuation, you have to account for -something which needs far more proof of the transitional gradations of -structure and habits of life than can now be found between the highest -of the amphibians and the lowest of the mammalia. I know not how there -could be higher or stronger evidence of design, of a specially planned -and intentionally elaborated construction, than is afforded by this -great interval between the one reproductive system and the other. But -it is time now to pass to those points of resemblance between man and -the other mammals which are asserted as the decisive proofs of his and -their descent from some pre-existing form, their common progenitor. -These points of resemblance may be considered in the following order: - -1. _The Bodily Structure of Man._--He is notoriously constructed on -the same general type or model as other mammals. "All the bones in his -skeleton can be compared with corresponding bones in a monkey, bat, or -seal. So it is with his muscles, nerves, blood-vessels, and internal -viscera. The brain, the most important of all the organs, follows the -same law."[45] - -2. _The Liability of Man to certain Diseases to which the Lower -Animals are liable._--These diseases, such as hydrophobia, variola, -the glanders, syphilis, cholera, etc., man both communicates to and -receives from some of the lower animals. "This fact proves the close -similarity of their tissues and blood, both in minute structure -and composition, far more plainly than does their comparison under -the best microscope or by the aid of the best chemical analysis." -Monkeys are liable to many of the same non-contagious diseases as -we are, such as catarrh and consumption. They suffer from apoplexy, -inflammation of the bowels, and cataract in the eye. Their young die -from fever when shedding their milk-teeth. Medicines produce the -same effect on them as on us, and they have a strong taste for tea, -coffee, spirituous liquors, and even tobacco. Man is infested with -both internal and external parasites of the same genera or families as -those infesting other mammals; in the case of scabies, he is infested -with the same species of parasites. He is subject to the same law of -lunar periods, in the process of gestation, and in the maturation and -duration of certain diseases. His wounds are repaired by the same -process of healing, and, after the amputation of his limbs, the stumps -occasionally possess some power of regeneration, as in the lowest -animals.[46] - -3. _The Reproductive Process._--This is strikingly the same, it is -said, in all mammals, from the first act of courtship by the male to -the birth and nurturing of the young.[47] The closeness of the parallel -here, however, is obviously between man and the other placental -mammalia, if we regard the whole process of reproduction of the -different species. - -4. _Embryonic Development._--From the human ovule, which is said to -differ in no respect from the ovule of other animals, into and through -the early embryonic period, we are told that the embryo of man can -hardly be distinguished from that of other members of the vertebrate -kingdom. It is not necessary to repeat the details of the resemblance, -which are undoubtedly striking, because they show a remarkable -similarity between the embryo of man and that of the dog and the ape, -in the earlier stage of the development, and that it is not until quite -in the later stages of development that the three depart from each -other, the difference between the young human being and the ape being -not so great as that between the ape and the dog. We may, of course, -accept Prof. Huxley's testimony that "the mode of origin [conception?] -and the early stages of the development of man are identical with those -of the animals immediately below him in the scale; without a doubt, in -these respects, he is far nearer to the apes than the apes are to the -dog."[48] - -5. _Rudiments._--This is a somewhat obscure branch of the proofs, which -requires a more detailed examination in order to appreciate its bearing -on the general theory of evolution. A distinction is made between -rudimentary and nascent organs. The former are absolutely useless to -their possessor--such as the mammæ of male quadrupeds, or the incisor -teeth of ruminants, which never cut through the gums--or else they are -of such slight service to their present possessors that they can not be -supposed to have been developed under the conditions which now exist. -These useless, or very slightly useful, organs in the human frame, -are supposed to have been organs which had an important utility in -the lower animals from which man is descended, but, by disuse at that -period of life when the organ is chiefly used, and by inheritance at a -corresponding period of life, they became of less and less utility in -the successive animals that were evolved out of the preceding forms, -until they sank into the condition of useless appendages, although -perpetuated by force of the derivation of one species of animal from -another, caused by the operation of the laws of natural and sexual -selection. Nascent organs, on the other hand, are those which, though -not fully developed to their entire capability, are of high service to -their possessor, and may be carried to a higher degree of utility. One -of the characteristics, as it is said, of rudimentary organs, is that -they often become wholly suppressed in individuals, and then reappear -occasionally in other individuals, through what is called reversion, -or a return to ancestral peculiarities.[49] We are told that "not one -of the higher animals can be named which does not bear some part in a -rudimentary condition; and man forms no exception to the rule."[50] - -Among the rudiments that are peculiar to man, and which are supposed -to be proofs of his cognate relations to the lower animals, we are -referred to certain muscles in a reduced condition, which in the other -animals are used to move, twitch, or contract the skin, and remnants -of which, in an efficient state, are found in various parts of our -bodies; for instance, the muscles which raise the eyebrows, those which -contract the scalp, those which, in some individuals, move the external -ear, and similar muscular powers in different parts of the body. These -are adduced as illustrations of the persistent transmission of an -absolutely useless, or almost useless, faculty, "probably" derived from -our remote semi-human progenitors. There is also another rudiment in -man, found in the covering of the eye, and called by anatomists the -"semi-lunar fold," which in birds is of great functional importance, -as it can be rapidly drawn across the whole eyeball. In those animals -in which, with its accessory muscles and other structures, it is well -developed, as in some reptiles and amphibians, and in sharks, it is a -third eyelid. In the two lower divisions of the mammalian series, the -monotremata and the marsupials, and in some few of the higher mammals, -as in the walrus, it is said to be fairly well developed. But in -man, in the quadrumana, and most other mammals, it has become a mere -rudiment. - -The sense of smell in man is also classed by Darwin and other -naturalists among the rudiments. It is argued that it was not -originally acquired by man as he now exists, but that he has inherited -this power, in an enfeebled and so far rudimentary condition, from some -early progenitor, to whom it was highly serviceable, and by whom it was -continually used. - -Then we have the rudiment of hair, which, so far as it now exists on -different parts of our body, is regarded as a mere remnant of the -uniform hairy coat of the lower animals. Man, as he is now born, -"differs conspicuously from all the other primates in being almost -naked." But this nearly nude condition was not, it is said, the -condition of his progenitors, and it is not the condition of his -co-descendants from the same progenitors. At some time the progenitors -of man and his co-descendants became covered all over with a coat of -hair. What remains upon our bodies of this peculiar growth, that is -called hair, is what was left after the agency of natural selection -had worked off what was useless to the successive animals, and sexual -selection had operated to transmit to offspring the absence of hair -that had accrued in the nearer progenitors and the immediate parents. -The illustrations which render this view "probable" do not need to -be repeated, nor is it necessary to follow out the speculations -concerning the mode in which our progenitors, near or remote, became -varied in respect to the quantity, position, or direction of the hairs -on various parts of their bodies. - -There are several other alleged homologues or rudiments which are -supposed to connect man with the lower animals, but which, whatever may -be the resemblances, it is not necessary to discuss in detail, because -there is one consideration at least which applies to the whole of -this class of proofs, and to that I now pass. The three great classes -of facts on which the whole argument rests, viewing man as an animal -and omitting all reference to his intellect, are the resemblances of -his bodily structure to that of the other mammals, the similarity -between his embryonic development and theirs, and the rudiments. I -reserve for separate discussion the counter-proof which may be derived -from the nature of the human mind, and the special adaptation of the -human structure to become the temporary residence and instrument of a -spiritual and immortal being. - -"It is," says Mr. Darwin, "no scientific explanation to assert that -they have all [man and the other animals of the mammalian class] been -formed on the same ideal plan."[51] The similarity of pattern is -pronounced "utterly inexplicable" upon any other hypothesis than that -all these animals are descended from a common progenitor, and that -they have become what they are by subsequent adaptation to diversified -conditions. I may incur some risk in undertaking to suggest what is -a "scientific" explanation. Certainly I do not propose to "assert" -anything. But I will endeavor to keep within the bounds of what I -suppose to be science. I take that to be a scientific explanation -which, embracing the important facts of natural history as the -groundwork of the reasoning, undertakes to show the rationality of one -hypothesis that differs from another, when the question is, Which has -the greater amount of probability in its favor? - -All correct reasoning on this subject of man's descent as an animal -begins, I presume, with the postulate of an Infinite Creator, having -under his power all the elements and forms of matter, organized and -unorganized, animate and inanimate. There is no fundamental difference -of opinion on this point, as I understand, between some of the -evolutionists and their opponents.[52] Omnipotence, boundless choice of -means and ends, illimitable wisdom, a benevolence that can not fail and -can not err, are the conceded attributes of the being who is supposed -to preside over the universe; and, however difficult it may be for us -to express a conception of infinite power and infinite wisdom, as it -is to describe infinite space and duration, we know what we mean to -assume when we speak or think of faculties that are without limit, and -of moral qualities that are subject to no imperfection. It is true that -we have no means of forming an idea of superhuman and infinite power -but by a comparison of our own limited faculties with those which we -assume to belong to an eternal and infinite God. But the nature of our -own limited powers teaches us that there may be powers that are as far -above ours as the heavens are above the earth, as the endless realms -of space stretch beyond and forever beyond any measurable distance, -as eternity stretches beyond and forever beyond all measurable time. -At all events, the postulate of an infinite God is the one common -starting-point for the scientists of the evolution school and those -who accept their doctrine, and for those who dissent from it. If I -did not assume this, I could not go one step further, for without it -there could not be a basis for any reasoning on the subject that would -lead anywhere but to the conclusion that all that exists came by blind -chance. This conclusion is rejected alike by the scientists, whose -views I am now examining, and by those who differ from them. - -In the economy of Nature, which is but another term for the economy -of the Omnipotent Creator, there is no waste of power, as there is no -abstention from the exercise of power, where its exertions are needed -to accomplish an end. By this I mean that when a general plan of -construction is found carried out through a variety of organizations, -the rational inference is that so much power has been exerted as was -needful to accomplish in each organization the objects that are common -to all of them, and that no more power has been used in that direction. -But where a special adaptation in some one variety of the same class -of constructions is needful to accomplish an object peculiar to a new -variety, the necessary amount of power never fails to be exerted. A -study of the animal kingdom reveals this great truth, as palpably as a -study of the products of human skill reveals the fact that man, from -the imperfection of his faculties, is constantly exerting more or less -power than was needful in his efforts to produce a new variety in his -mechanical constructions. Experience and accumulated knowledge enable -us to carry a general plan of construction through a considerable group -of mechanical forms; but it is when we endeavor to vary the principle -of construction so as to produce a new and special mode of operation, -that we either waste power in repeating the general plan or fail to -exercise the amount of power necessary to adapt the general plan to the -introduction of the special object at which we are aiming. Our success -in making such adaptations is often wonderful, but our failures evince -that our imperfect faculties do not always enable us to accomplish -the necessary adaptations of the general plan of construction to the -special objects which we wish to attain. To the Infinite Creator, all -such difficulties are unknown. He neither wastes power by new plans -that are unnecessary, nor makes "vain repetitions," nor fails to exert -the requisite amount of power and wisdom in the introduction of new -and special contrivances which he ingrafts upon or superadds to the -general plan, and which he has devised for the accomplishment of a -new object. With a boundless choice of means and ends, with a skill -that can not err, with a prescience that sees the end from the first -conception of the design, he can repeat the general plan throughout -any variety of constructions without any waste of power, and can -introduce the new adaptations or contrivances which are to constitute -a new construction, by the exercise of all the power that is required -to accomplish a special object. Whether we are to suppose that he does -this by the establishment of certain laws which he leaves to operate -within prescribed limits, or does it by special creations proceeding -from direct and specific exertions of his will, the question of his -power to employ the one method or the other remains always the same. -The question of which was his probable method depends upon the force of -evidence; and upon this question we must allow great weight to the fact -which all Nature discloses, namely, that the Creator does not waste -power by making new plans of construction where an existing plan may be -usefully repeated, and that he does not fail to exercise the necessary -power when he wishes to add to the general plan of construction a new -and special organism for a particular purpose. - -Is there anything presumptuous in thus speaking of the determination -and purposes of the Omnipotent Creator? We have his existence and -infinite attributes conceded as the basis of all sound reasoning on his -works. Why then should we not infer his purposes and his acts from his -works? Why should we not attribute to him a special design, when we -can not examine his works without inferring such special design, unless -we conclude that the most amazing and peculiar constructions grew up -under the operation of causes of which we have no sufficient proof, and -in the supposed result of which there are admitted chasms that can not -be bridged over? - -To return now to the resemblance between the bodily structure of -man and that of his supposed progenitors. The assertion is that a -repetition of the same general plan of construction throughout a class -of animals can only be explained upon the hypothesis of their descent -from a common progenitor. They are, it is claimed, co-descendants -from some one ancient animal; and however they may differ from each -other, in all these co-descendants from that animal we find the same -general plan of construction, the same ideal model repeated. Among the -whole class of the higher mammals, we have skeletons, muscles, nerves, -blood-vessels, internal viscera, organs, that closely correspond. What -does this prove but that there was no waste of power, because there -was no necessity in making man, for the formation of a general plan -of construction different in these particulars from that which was -employed in making the monkey, the bat, or the seal? The similarity -of pattern between the hand of a man or a monkey, the foot of a -horse, the flipper of a seal, or the wing of a bat, is pronounced -"utterly inexplicable" upon any hypothesis but that of descent from a -common progenitor. But why is not this sameness of ideal plan just as -consistent with the hypothesis that the same ideal plan would answer -for the human hand or the hand of an ape, the foot of the horse, the -flipper of the seal, or the wing of the bat?[53] It is when you pass -from such resemblances and come to the special contrivances which -separate one animal from another by a broad line of demarkation, -that you are to look for the adaptation of special contrivances to -repetitions of the same ideal model through the varying species. Take, -for example, the introduction among the mammals of the placental system -of reproduction, parturition, and subsequent nourishment of the young, -combined with the nourishment of the fœtus while it continues in the -body of the mother. This system would require no material variation -from the general plan of construction that is common to the different -mammals of this class in respect to the parts where the resemblances -are kept up throughout the series, such as those of the skeleton, -muscles, nerves, viscera, and other organs that are found in all of -them. But for the introduction of this peculiar system of reproduction -and continuation of the species, there was needful a special and -most extraordinary contrivance. If such a contrivance or anything -like it had been produced by human skill, and been introduced into a -mechanical structure, we should not hesitate to say that there had -been an invention of a most special character. When you follow this -system through the different animals in which it is found operating, -and find that the period of gestation and of suckling is varied for -each of them, that for each there is the necessary modification of -trunk, situation of the organs, assimilation of food and formation -of milk, and many other peculiarities, what are you to conclude but -that there has been an adaptation of a new system to a general plan -of construction, and that while the latter remains substantially the -same, it has had ingrafted upon or incorporated with it a most singular -contrivance, so original, comprehensive, and flexible, that its -characteristic principle admits of the most exact working in animals -that are as far asunder as man and the horse, or as the horse and the -seal, or as the seal and the bat? - -The resemblances between the embryonic development of man and the -other mammals present another instance of the constantly occurring -fact that there has been no waste of power on the one hand, and on the -other no failure to exert the amount of power requisite to produce a -new variation of the general principle. There is no more logical force -in the hypothesis of a common progenitor, in order to account for -these resemblances, than there is in the hypothesis that the general -system of embryonic development was first devised, and that it was -then varied in each distinct animal according to the requirements of -its special construction. Upon the latter supposition, there would -be resemblances to a certain stage, and then there would follow the -departures which we have no difficulty in tracing. Upon the former -supposition we should expect to find, what we actually do find, that -it is very difficult, if not impossible, to assign any reason for -the departures, or to suggest how it has happened that one animal is -so absolutely distinct from another. Thus, to begin with the embryo -itself, and to trace it through its stages of development, we find -that in man it can hardly be distinguished from that of other members -of the vertebrate kingdom. This we should expect to be the case after -we have learned the great fact that Nature operates upon a uniform -principle up to the point where variations and departures are to -supervene. The system of embryonic development being devised to operate -in parallel lines through all the placental mammals until the lines -should begin to depart from each other so as to result in animals -of different species, would necessarily show strong resemblances of -structure until the departures supervened. There would be, in other -words, a strong illustration of the truth that in the Divine economy -there is no waste of power. But when the stage is reached at which the -departures may be noted, and the lines diverge into the production of -organized beings differing widely from each other, we reach an equally -striking illustration of the corresponding truth that the amount of -power necessary to produce very different results never fails to be -put forth. There is no good reason why this latter exertion of power -should not be attributed to special design just as logically and -rationally as we must attribute to intentional purpose and infinite -skill the general system of embryonic development which has been made -for the whole class of the placental mammals. While, therefore, we may -accept as a fact Prof. Huxley's statement on this branch of comparative -anatomy, we are under no necessity to accept his conclusion. To the -question whether man originates in a different way from a dog, bird, -frog, or fish, this anatomist answers, as already quoted: "The reply -is not doubtful for a moment; without question, the mode of origin and -the early stages of the development of man are identical with those -of the animals immediately below him in the scale; without a doubt, -in these respects he is far nearer to apes than apes are to the dog." -This refers, of course, to the parallelism that obtains in the early -stages of the embryonic development. It necessarily implies, at later -stages, diverging lines, which depart more or less from each other, and -thus we have between the ape and the man a nearer approach than we have -between the ape and the dog. But how does this displace, or tend to -displace, the hypothesis of a general system of embryonic development -for all animals of a certain class, and an intentional and special -variation of that system so as to produce different species of animals? -The identity between the mode of origin and the early stages of the -development of man and those of the animals immediately below him in -the scale, is strong proof of the applicability of the same general -principle of development throughout all the animals of a certain class. -The cessation of the parallelism at the diverging lines is equally -strong proof of a design to create an animal differing as man does from -the ape, or as the ape does from the dog. The argument that these three -species are co-descendants from a common progenitor, viewing man simply -as an animal, is at least no stronger than the argument which leads to -the conclusion of special creations. - -The same thing may be said of the liability of man to certain -contagious or non-contagious diseases in common with some of the lower -animals. That there is a similarity in the chemical composition of -the blood of an entire class of animals, in the structure of their -tissues and blood-vessels, so that they are subject to the same causes -of inflammation or to the same parasites, is proof of a uniform plan -of the fluids and the vascular system, or, in other words, it evinces -that here, too, there has been in these respects no waste of power in -forming the different animals of the same class. But trace back the -supposed pedigree of the animals sharing this chemical composition -of the blood, character of tissues, and vascular system, until you -have passed through the amphibians and reached their supposed fish -progenitors. Somewhere between the fishes and the higher mammals, -you have not only a great change in the chemical composition of the -blood-vessels and tissues, but an equally great change in the apparatus -by which the blood is oxygenated.[54] How can these changes have -been brought about without a new and intentional structure of the -vessels and the apparatus for supplying the oxygen demanded for the -continuation of life? How can we explain these changes by such agencies -as the natural selection which is supposed to lead to the "survival -of the fittest," and the sexual selection which is supposed to give -to the best-appointed males of a given species the power to transmit -to their offspring the new peculiarities which they have acquired -through successive generations? Do not these changes show that there -is a line of division which such agencies alone can not cross? Do they -not clearly point to the exercise of the creative power in a special -manner, and for special purposes? That power being once exercised, the -new chemical composition and mechanical appliances being devised, the -same "ideal plan" could be carried through a new class of animals by -a repetition which is in accordance with the economy of Nature, and -which an infinite power could adapt to the formation of animals, each -of which was designed to perpetuate its own species and no other. Hence -we should expect to find in the animals sharing in the same formation -of the blood and the vascular system a corresponding process of healing -the parts severed by a wound, and a continuous secretion from such -vessels as have not been cut away; but we should not expect to find the -stumps growing into a new and perfect part, to take the place of what -has been removed by amputation.[55] We should expect to find the same -drugs affecting different animals of the same class alike; and when the -nervous system of a class of animals is upon the same general plan, -we should expect to find them similarly affected by stimulants. But -these resemblances do not militate very strongly against the hypothesis -of special creations, when we consider that it is according to the -universal economy of the Omnipotent Creator to employ the necessary, -and no more than the necessary, power in originating a plan that may -be applied to the formation of a distinct class of beings, and that -his adaptations of this plan to further and specific constructions of -beings belonging to a general class, but differing widely from each -other, are among the strongest and plainest proofs of his infinite -power and the nature of his methods. - -In regard to the "rudiments" that are found in man, the theory of Mr. -Darwin can be best stated in his own words: "In order to understand the -existence of rudimentary organs, we have only to suppose that a former -progenitor possessed the parts in question in a perfect state, and that -under changed habits of life they became greatly reduced, either from -simple disuse or through the natural selection of those individuals -which were least encumbered with a superfluous part, aided by the -other means previously indicated."[56] But, in order to do justice to -this theory, it is necessary to repeat the description and operation -of the supposed agencies of natural and sexual selection. Natural -selection is an occurrence which takes place among the individuals -of a certain species in the struggle for existence, whereby those -who are best appointed secure the necessary supply of food, and the -weaker or less active are either directly destroyed in the contest or -perish for want of nourishment. The "fittest" having survived, they -have the best chance of procreating their kind, and are likely to have -the most progeny. To these individuals there comes in aid the sexual -selection, which means chiefly the victory of the fittest males over -their less fit competitors for the possession of the females. Whatever -peculiarities of structure or development, or diminution of structure -or development, these fittest males possess, they would transmit -to their offspring. This tendency would be enhanced by the varying -conditions of life through which the successive generations might have -to pass; so that if the former progenitor possessed naturally an organ -in a perfect state, but ceased to make use of it, and for thousands -of generations its use went on diminishing, it would sink into the -condition of a mere rudiment. Supposing this to be a partially true -explanation of the modes in which organs become rudimentary, how does -it militate against the idea of separate creations? We have "only -to suppose" that the first men possessed, for example, the power of -moving the skin all over their bodies by the contraction of certain -muscles, and that their remote descendants lost it everywhere excepting -in a few parts, where it remains in an efficient state, and that it -has become varied in different individuals. The process by which -organs become rudimentary is an hypothesis just as consistent with -the separate creation of man as it is with his being a co-descendant -from some lower animal whose descendants branched into men, apes, -horses, seals, bats, etc.; for, on the supposition of the separate -creation of all these different animals, each species might have been -originally endowed with this power of muscular contraction of the -skin, and in their descendants it might have been retained or varied -or have become more or less rudimentary, according to its utility -to the particular species. The truth is, that our own faculties of -creation or construction, when we undertake to deal with matter and -its properties, are so imperfect, and that which constitutes living -organisms is so utterly beyond our reach, that we do not sufficiently -remember how entirely it is within the compass of the infinite Power, -which has given to matter all the properties that it possesses and -has living organisms under its absolute control, to form a system of -construction and operation for beings of entirely distinct characters, -carrying it through each of them in parallel lines, or causing it to -diverge into varying results with an economy that neither wastes the -constructive power nor fails to exert it where it is needed. To argue -that the presence of rudiments in different animals, in different -comparative states of development or efficiency, or in a purely useless -condition, can only be explained by a descent from some remote common -progenitor, is what the logicians call a _non sequitur_. It overlooks -the illimitable faculty of the creating Power, and disregards the -great fact that such a power acts by an economy that is saving where -uniformity will accomplish what is intended, that is profuse where -variation is needful, and that can guide its own exertions of power, -or its abstention from such exertions, by unerring wisdom, to the most -varied and exact results. - -I trust that by the use of the term "economy" in speaking of what -is observable in the works of the Creator, I shall be understood as -comprehending both the avoidance of unnecessary and the exertion of -all necessary power. Of the degree of necessity in any exercise of a -power which we suppose to be infinite, we can only judge by what we -can see. If omnipotence and omniscience are to be predicated of the -being who is supposed to preside over the universe, it is rational to -conclude, from all that we can discover, that, in applying a uniform -system of construction to different animals of a certain general class, -he acted upon a principle that his unerring faculties enabled him to -see was a comprehensive one; and that in producing variations of that -system of construction that would result in adapting its uniformity -to the varying conditions of the different species, he acted by the -same boundless wisdom and power. If these postulates of the Divine -attributes are conceded, rudiments do not by any means necessarily -lead to the conclusion that all the animals of a certain class are -co-descendants from some remote common progenitor, for they do not -exclude the hypothesis that each distinct animal was formed upon a -general plan of construction that could be applied throughout the -class, but that it was varied according to the special conditions of -its intended being. Organs or parts may thus have become more or less -rudimentary without resorting to the supposition of a common progenitor -for the whole class. That supposition, indeed, makes it necessary -to assume that the infinite Creator fashioned some one animal, and -then, abstaining from all work of further direct creation, left all -the other animals to be evolved out of that one by the operation of -secondary causes that fail even as a theory to account for what we -see, and that can not be traced through any results that have yet been -discovered. Wherever we pause in the ascending scale of the Darwinian -descent of man, wherever we place the first special act of creative -power, whether we put it at the fish-like animal of the most remote -antiquity, and call that creature the original progenitor of all the -vertebrata, or whether we suppose a special creation to have occurred -at the introduction of the mammalian series, or anywhere else, we -have to account for changes of system, new constructions, elaborately -diversified forms, by the operation of agencies that were incapable of -producing the results, if we are to judge of their capacity by anything -that we have seen or known of their effects. - -I will conclude this chapter by expressing as accurately as I can -what has struck me as the excessive tendency of modern science to -resolve everything into the operation of general laws, or into what -we call secondary causes. I may be able to suggest nothing new upon -this part of the subject, but I shall at least be able, I hope, to -put my own mind in contact with that of the reader by explaining what -has impressed me in the speculations of those who lay so much stress -upon the potency of general laws to produce the results which we -see in Nature. Of course, I do not question the great fact that the -infinite Power acts by and through the uniform methods from which we -are accustomed to infer what we call laws; which in physics is nothing -but a deduction of regularity and system from that which we see to -be perpetually and invariably happening. Now, I do not enter here -into the question of the tendency of modern science to displace our -religious ideas of a special Providence, by attributing everything -in Nature to the operation of fixed laws of matter; or its tendency, -in other words, to remove the infinite Being at a greater distance -from us than that in which our religious feelings like to contemplate -him. I am perfectly sensible that in truth the infinite God is just -as near to us, when we regard him as acting by general laws and -secondary causes, as when we believe him to be exercising a direct and -special power. I am equally sensible that it is in the very nature -of infinite power, wisdom, and benevolence to be able and willing to -ordain uniform and fixed principles of action. That Power which gives -to matter all its properties may well be supposed to have established -uniformity and regularity of movements, forces, combinations, and -qualities. How supremely consistent this uniformity and regularity -are, with what stupendous accuracy they are kept forever in operation, -we are more or less able to discern; and that benevolence which is -believed to accompany the power may well be supposed to have intended -that its intelligent and rational creatures should be able in some -degree to discover and to avail themselves of these unvarying laws of -the physical world. But are these laws to be supposed to be the only -methods by which the infinite Will has ever acted? Is it to be assumed -that, having settled and established these perpetual principles, on -which matter, organized or unorganized, is to act, he leaves everything -to their operation and abstains from all further exertion of his -creative power for any special purpose? Has he given to these general -laws a potency to produce, in and of themselves, all the results? In -other words, has he affixed to their operation no limitations, or has -he set bounds to them, and reserved to himself, by direct, specific, -and occasional exercise of his will and power, for new purposes, to -produce results for which the general laws were not ordained? - -It is not necessary here to enter into the consideration of what -are called "miracles." These, in their true meaning, are special -interpositions, which the Divine Power is supposed to make, by a -suspension or interruption of the established laws of Nature; and, -whatever may be the grounds of our belief or our unbelief in such -occurrences, they are not exercises of power such as those which are -supposed to take place in special creations of new beings. That the -hypothesis of special creations of new beings involves no interruption -or displacement of the fixed laws of Nature, is quite manifest. - - -NOTE A. - - NOTE ON AMPUTATION, OR SEVERANCE OF PARTS.--As Mr. Darwin - attached some importance to a fact which he asserted respecting the - efforts of Nature to restore a part of an organism which has been - severed by amputation, I think it well to quote his statement, and to - point out what I believe to be an inaccuracy. His statement is this: - "His [man's] wounds are repaired by the same process of healing, - and the stumps left after the amputation of his limbs, especially - during an early embryonic period, occasionally possess some power of - regeneration, as in the lowest animals." It is not quite apparent - what he means by amputation during an early embryonic period. If he - is to be understood as referring to a case of complete severance of - any part of an embryo before birth, it has not been demonstrated - that such a severance has been followed by a successful effort of - Nature to replace the severed part; and it is difficult to understand - how there could be such an amputation during embryonic life without - destroying the life of the embryo; or, if the severed part were one - of the extremities, how there could be a new extremity formed. In - such a case, if life continued and birth were to take place, the - animal must be born in an imperfect state. In regard to amputations - taking place at any time after birth, if the expression "some power - of regeneration" means to imply a new formation to take the place - of the severed part, the assertion is not correct. What occurs in - such cases may be illustrated by the very common accident of the - severance of the end of a human finger at the root of the nail. If - the incision is far enough back to remove the whole of the vessels - which secrete the horny substance that forms the nail, there will - be no after growth of anything resembling a nail. If some of those - vessels are left in the stump, there will be continuous secretion - and deposit of the horny substance, which may go so far as to form a - crude resemblance to a nail. But if all the vessels which constitute - the means of perpetuating a perfect nail are not left in their normal - number and action, there can be no such thing as the formation of a - new nail. Whether it is correct to speak of the imperfect continuation - of a few of the vessels to secrete the substance which it is their - normal function to secrete, as a "power of regeneration," is more - than doubtful, if by such a power is meant a power to make a new - and complete structure to take the place of the structure that has - been cut away. It is nothing more than the continued action of a - few vessels, less in number than the normal system required for the - continued growth and renewal of the part in question. The abortive - product in such cases looks like an unsuccessful effort of Nature - to make a new structure in place of the old one; but it is not in - reality such an effort. The fact that the same thing occurs, in just - the same way and to a corresponding extent, in different animals, has - no tendency to prove anything excepting that these different animals - share the same general system of secreting vessels for the formation - and perpetuation of the several parts of their structures. It has no - tendency to prove that they are co-descendants from a common ancestral - stock, for on the hypothesis of their special and independent creation - a common system of secreting vessels would be entirely consistent with - their peculiar and special constructions. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [35] "Descent of Man," pp. 164, 609. - - [36] "Descent of Man," p. 159. - - [37] "Origin of Species," p. 148. - - [38] "Descent of Man," p. 165. - - [39] "Descent of Man," p. 158. - - [40] "Descent of Man," p. 155. - - [41] Ibid. - - [42] "Descent of Man," pp. 156, 157. - - [43] Ibid., p. 156. - - [44] "Descent of Man," p. 156. - - [45] "Descent of Man," p. 6. - - [46] Ibid., p. 8. - - [47] Ibid. - - [48] "Descent of Man," pp. 9, 10, quoting Huxley, "Man's Place in - Nature," p. 65. - - [49] "Descent of Man," p. 11 _et seq._ - - [50] Ibid. - - [51] "Descent of Man," p. 24. Consult Mr. Darwin's note on Prof. - Bianconi's explanation of homologous structures upon mechanical - principles, in accordance with their uses. - - [52] Mr. Herbert Spencer's peculiar views are not here included in the - discussion, but they will be considered hereafter. - - [53] It is immaterial, of course, in this discussion, whether the - formation of man preceded that of the other animals, according to - the Platonic idea, or whether, as in the account given in the book - of Genesis, the other animals were first formed. So far as an ideal - plan entered into all of them, that plan may have been devised for and - first applied to any part of the series, and then varied accordingly. - - [54] The popular terms--"fish" and "flesh"--present to the mind the - most vivid idea of this change from the characteristic substance of - one of these animals to that of another. - - [55] See the note on amputation, or severance of parts, at the end of - this chapter. - - [56] "Descent of Man," p. 25. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer. - - -Passing from Mr. Darwin as the representative of that class of -naturalists who have undertaken to assign the pedigree of man by -tracing the stages of his development back to the lowest and crudest -form of animal life, I now come to a philosopher whose speculations -carry the doctrine of evolution through every field of inquiry, and -who, finding, as he supposes, evidence of its operation throughout all -the other realms of the physical and the moral word, contends that it -also obtains in the animal kingdom. It were to be wished that this -writer, whose intellect is of the order of minds to which we naturally -look for a judicial treatment of such themes, had been a little less -dogmatic in his treatment of the doctrine of special creations. Mr. -Spencer has, indeed, consistently recognized the necessity of trying -the question between the hypothesis of special creations and the -hypothesis of evolution, as one to be decided, if it is to be decided -at all, only by an examination of evidence. But to one who approaches -this question in a spirit of inquiry, and with a desire to learn -whatever can be said on both sides, it is somewhat disappointing to -find that the most eminent writer of the evolution school is unjust -in his treatment of the belief which he opposes. There can be no -objection to advocacy, or to strong and decided advocacy, when settled -convictions are to be vindicated. But with advocacy we may expect that -kind of fairness which consists in a full recognition of the opposite -argument. A great master of dialectics once laid it down as a maxim of -advocacy, "State the case of your opponent as strongly as you know how, -stronger if possible than he states it himself, and then answer it, if -you can." Some instances in which Mr. Spencer has not followed this -wise rule may now be mentioned: - -1. He attacks with great vigor the hypothesis that living beings -resulted from special creations, as a primitive hypothesis; and because -it is a very ancient belief he pronounces it to be probably untrue. He -even goes so far as to assert that its antiquity raises a presumption -against it. He classes it among a family of beliefs which began in -primitive ages, and which have one after another been destroyed by -advancing knowledge, until this one is almost the only member of the -family that survives among educated people.[57] He says that if you -catechise any one who holds this belief as to the source from which he -derived it, he is forced to confess that it was put into his mind in -childhood, as one portion of a story which, as a whole, he has long -since rejected. It will give way at last, along with all the rest of -the family of beliefs which have already been given up. It may be that -the arguments of those whose controversial writings on this subject -Mr. Spencer had before him, relied on the antiquity of this belief -as one of the strongest proofs of its probable truth. I have not -looked to see how any writer on that side of the question has used the -antiquity of the doctrine of special creations. But it is certainly -not in accordance with the sound rule, even of advocacy, to state the -argument in support of the belief which you oppose with less than the -force that may be given to it, whether your opponents have or have not -given to it the true force that belongs to it. The mere antiquity of -the belief in special creations has this force and no more: that a -belief which began in the primitive ages of mankind, and has survived -through all periods of advancing knowledge, must have something to -recommend it. It is not one of those things that can be swept away with -contempt as a nursery-tale, originating in times of profound ignorance -and handed down from generation to generation without inquiry. That it -has survived, after the rejection of other beliefs that originated at -the same period--survived in minds capable of dealing with the evidence -in the light of increasing knowledge--is proof that it has something -more to rest upon than the time of its origin. If some of its defenders -now assert its antiquity as the sole or the strongest argument in its -favor, its opponents should not assume that this is the only or the -best argument by which it can be supported. Nor can it be summarily -disposed of by classifying it as one of a family of beliefs that -originated in times of ignorance, and that have mostly disappeared from -the beliefs held by educated people. Its association with a special -class of mistaken beliefs affords no intrinsic improbability of its -truth. Every belief has come to be regarded as a mistaken or a true -one, not according to its associated relations with other beliefs that -have come to be regarded as unfounded, but according to the tests that -the knowledge of the age has been able to apply to it. Take the whole -catalogue of beliefs that began to be held in the darkest ages, and -it will be found that their association has had no influence beyond -inducing incorrect habits of reasoning on certain subjects, or a -habit of accepting the official authority of those who claimed to be -the special custodians of truth. These intellectual habits have been -temporary in their influence, and have gradually changed. Every one of -the beliefs that have been given up by the lettered or the unlettered -part of mankind, has been given up because better knowledge of a -special character has come to show that it is unfounded, and because -mere official authority has ceased to have the power that it once -had. If a belief has survived from a remote antiquity among those who -are competent to judge of the evidence in its favor, by comparing the -phenomena that increasing knowledge has accumulated, the force of the -fact that it has so survived is not weakened by its association for a -period with other beliefs that are now rejected. - -Mr. Spencer asserts that, as the supposition of special creations is -discredited by its origin in a time when men were profoundly ignorant, -so conversely the supposition that races of organisms have been -gradually evolved is credited by its origin, because it is a belief -that has come into existence in the most instructed class, living in -these better instructed times. This is a kind of argumentation that is -often the result of a love of antithesis. The soundness of the last -branch of the proposition appears to depend upon the soundness of the -first branch. Make it to appear that the origin of the elder hypothesis -is unfavorable by reason of the time of its origin, and it seems to -follow that the origin of the modern hypothesis is favorable by reason -of its time of origin. But this antithesis does not express the exact -truth in either branch of it. It is not because of its antiquity, or -of the character of the times in which it was first believed, that -the doctrine of special creations can be shown to be irrational or -improbable. There is no presumption against the truth of any belief, -to be derived from the fact that it was held by persons who also held -some erroneous beliefs on other subjects. If there were, nothing could -be worthy of belief unless it could show a recent origin, or at least -until demonstration of its truth had overcome the presumption against -it. On the other hand, there is no presumption in favor of the truth -of a new theory to be derived from the fact that it is new, or that it -originated among those who think that they do not hold any erroneous -beliefs, or because it originated in a comparatively very enlightened -age. Every physical and every moral theory, unless we mean to be -governed by mere authority, whether it is ancient or recent, must be -judged by its merits, according to the evidence. - -2. Another of Mr. Spencer's naked assertions is that the belief in -special creations is "not countenanced by a single fact." Not only did -no man "ever see a special creation," but "no one ever found indirect -proof of any kind that a special creation had taken place." In support -of this sweeping dogma, he adduces a habit of the naturalists who -maintain special creations to locate them in some region remote from -human observation.[58] This is another instance of not stating the case -of your adversary as strongly as you might state it, or as he states -it himself. "While no naturalist and no other person who believes in -special creations ever saw one take place, indirect and circumstantial -evidence tending to show that the earth is full of them has been -accumulated to an enormous amount." It is a monstrous extravagance to -assert that the hypothesis is "absolutely without support of any kind." -What if Mr. Spencer's opponents were to retort that no man ever saw -an instance in which an animal of a distinct species had been evolved -out of one of an entirely different organization; that there is no -external evidence to support the hypothesis of such derivations, and -that the naturalists of the evolution school habitually place the scene -of operations in the region of scientific imagination? The discovery -of truth is not likely to be much advanced by this mode of attacking -opposite opinions, yet it could be used with as much propriety on the -one side of this question as on the other. - -3. Next, and completing the misrepresentation, we have the assertion -that, "besides being absolutely without evidence to give it external -support, this hypothesis of special creations can not support itself -internally--can not be framed into a coherent thought.... Immediately -an attempt is made to elaborate the idea into anything like definite -shape, it proves to be a pseud-idea, admitting of no definite shape. -Is it supposed that a new organism when specially created is created -out of nothing? If so, there is a supposed creation of matter, and the -creation of matter is inconceivable, implies the establishment of a -relation in thought between nothing and something--a relation of which -one term is absent--an impossible relation.... Those who entertain -the proposition that each kind of organism results from divine -interposition do so because they refrain from translating words into -thoughts. The case is one of those where men do not really believe, -but _believe they believe_. For belief, properly so called, implies -a mental representation of the thing believed; and no such mental -representation is here possible."[59] - -When I first read this passage I could hardly trust the evidence -of my eye-sight. It seemed as if the types must have in some way -misrepresented the distinguished writer; for I could scarcely conceive -how a man of Mr. Spencer's reputation as a thinker could have -deliberately penned and published such a specimen of logic run riot. It -reads like some of the propositions propounded by the scholastics of -the middle ages. But, having assured myself that the American edition -of his work is a correct reprint, and having carefully pondered and -endeavored to ascertain his meaning, I was forced to the conclusion -that he supposes this to be a conclusive answer to the idea of absolute -creation in respect to anything whatever, because, when put into a -logical formula, one term of the relation is nothing, and the other -term is something. Logical formulas are not always the best tests of -the possibility of an intellectual conception, or of what the mind -can represent to itself by thought, although to a certain class of -readers or hearers they often appear to be a crushing refutation of the -opposite opinion or belief against which they are employed. - -Is there in truth anything impossible because it is unthinkable -in the idea of absolute creation? Is the creation of matter, for -example, inconceivable? It certainly is not if we adopt the postulate -of an infinite Creator. That postulate is just as necessary to the -evolutionist who maintains the ordination of fixed laws or systems -of matter, by the operation of which the organized forms of matter -have been evolved, as it is to those who maintain that these forms -are special creations. Who made the laws that have been impressed -upon matter? Were they made at all, or were they without any origin, -self-existing and eternal? If they were made, they were made out of -nothing, for nothing preceded them. Then apply to them the logical -formula, and say that one term of the relation is absent--is mere -nothingness--and so there is an impossible relation, a relation in -thought between nothing and something, which is inconceivable. This -dilemma is not escaped by asserting, as Mr. Spencer does, that "the -creation of force is just as inconceivable as the creation of matter." -It is necessary to inquire what he means by a "conceivable" idea. If he -means that we can not trace or understand the process by which either -force or matter was created, our inability may be at once conceded. -But if he means that, granting the postulate of an infinite creating -power, we can not conceive of the possibility that matter and all -the forces that reside in it or govern it were called into being by -the will of that power, the assertion is not true. Human faculties -are entirely equal to the conception of an infinite creating power, -whatever may be the strength or the weakness of the proof by which -the existence of such a power is supported; and if there is such a -power it is a contradiction in terms to assert that absolute creation, -or the formation of "something" out of "nothing," is an impossible -conception. Such an assertion is simply a specious play upon words, or -else it involves the negation of an infinite creating power. The term -"creation," as used in all modern philosophy, implies, _ex vi termini_, -the act of causing to exist; and, unless we assume that nothing which -exists was ever caused to exist, we must suppose that the causing power -was alike capable of giving existence to matter and to the forces that -reside in it. - -The reason why the Greek philosophers did not embrace the idea of -absolute creation was not because it was an unthinkable idea, or one -incapable of representation in thought. They were, as we have seen, -surrounded by a mythology which attributed the origin of the world -to polytheistic agencies. They struggled against the cosmogony of -poetical and popular traditions in an effort to find a cause of a -different character. Monotheism, the conception of the one only and -omnipotent God, freed philosophy from the great want which had hampered -its speculations. This want was the conception of divine power, as -abstracted from substance or the qualities of substance. When this -conception had been obtained, absolute creation was seen to be a -legitimate deduction from the illimitable scope and nature of the power -which monotheism imputed to the Being supposed to preside over the -universe, and to have existed before all the objects which the universe -contains: and this conception of the act of creation thus became -equally capable of representation in words and in thought. You may say -that it has no evidence to support it; that it leads to contradictory -ideas of the attributes claimed for the Creator; that upon the -hypothesis of those attributes, his works are inexplicable. Whether -you can say this truly or not, you can not say that absolute creation -is inconceivable; and unless you mean to claim that neither matter nor -force was ever created, that there never was a being competent to make -either the one or the other to exist, you can not deny the probability -that both were called into being by a definite and specific exercise -of power. Mr. Spencer's philosophy manifestly leads to the conclusion -that there is no God, or no such God as the hypothesis of special -creations supposes, or such as the hypothesis of evolution necessarily -calls for. If I understand him rightly, he rejects the idea of any -creation, whether of matter, or force, or the properties of matter, or -even of law of any kind, physical or moral. Hence it is that I admit -the necessity of treating the existence of the Omnipotent Creator as an -independent question to be judged upon moral evidence; and hence, too, -in reasoning upon the probable methods of the Almighty, I maintain that -the postulate of his existence is alike necessary to the evolutionist -and to those who believe in special creations, and that both must adopt -the same cardinal attributes as attributes of his power and character. - -It is well to pursue this particular topic somewhat further, because -this special difficulty arising from the creation of something out of -nothing, triumphantly propounded by a certain class of philosophers, -is echoed by others as if it concluded the question. The received -meaning of language is often a great help to the mind in representing -to itself in thought the idea that is expressed by the word. The word -contains and suggests the thought. Lexicographers are the learned -persons, one part of whose business it is to exhibit the thought that -is represented by a word, not according to the popular and, perhaps, -uncertain or erroneous use of the term, or according to its secondary -meanings, but according to the exact correspondence between the word -and the idea which it conveys in its primary and philosophic usage. -The definition given to our English verb "create," in its primary -and philosophical sense, is: "To produce," "to bring into being from -nothing"; "to cause to exist." "Creation," as a noun expressing the -act described by the verb, is defined as "the act of creating: the act -of causing to exist, and _especially_, the act of bringing this world -into existence." "Created," as the past participle which describes what -has been done, is defined as "formed from nothing: caused to exist; -produced; generated."[60] This is the sense in which the word is used -in the English version of the first verse of the book of Genesis: "In -the beginning God _created_ the heavens and the earth"; and whatever -may be said about the source from which Moses derived his knowledge -of the fact which he relates, there can be no doubt about the nature -of the fact which he intended to assert. Now, does the lexicographer, -when he describes creation as the act of causing something to exist, -or the act of producing something out of nothing, present an idea -that is incapable of mental representation--a relation impossible in -thought? What he means to express is clear enough. Is the idea which he -expresses impossible to be conceived by the mind? - -It will be a good test of this supposed insuperable difficulty to -apply the term "creation" to some human act. When Shakespeare composed -the tragedy of "Hamlet," he created something in the sense which we -are here considering.[61] He created that something out of nothing: -for he caused something to exist which did not exist before. He did -not merely inscribe certain words upon paper, by the material process -of writing, and afterward cause the same words to be repeated by the -material process of printing upon another paper. He gave intellectual -existence to certain male and female persons of his imagination, -carried them through certain periods of their imaginary lives, and -made them and their history an imperishable intellectual idea. It is -entirely immaterial to the present discussion that such a product of -the imagination presents to us nothing but intellectual ideas; that -Hamlet and Ophelia, and the King and Queen, and all the rest of the -_dramatis personæ_, were mere creatures of the poet's fancy. Although -they were nothing but intellectual conceptions, they were "creations" -in the sense of being intellectual products that never existed in idea -before the poet made them, and therefore they were made out of nothing. -Now, although we can not look into the mind of Shakespeare and describe -the process by which he formed these creatures of his imagination, -we experience no difficulty when we contemplate these imaginary -personages, in representing in thought what we mean when we say that -he "created" them. It would be simple absurdity to say that he did not -create these ideal persons, because the notion of creation implies -the formation of something out of nothing. That is the very meaning -of creation in its primary and philosophical sense; and, when applied -to works of the human imagination, it presents to us an idea that is -perfectly capable of representation in thought. - -Pass from this illustration of the idea of human creation to the -hypothesis of a supreme being, possessing infinite power, and existing -before the material universe began. The hypothesis of his existence -includes the power to call into being things that had no previous -being, whether these things be matter and material properties or -moral and intellectual ideas. The whole realms of possible existence, -spiritual and material, the whole void which consists in mere -nothingness, are, according to the hypothesis, under his absolute sway. -He holds the power of absolute creation; and the power this hypothesis -imputes to him is no more incapable of representation in thought -than is the inferior and limited power of creation, which we know -to be performed by the finite human intellect, and which we have no -difficulty in conceiving as a true creating faculty. When Watt formed -the steam-engine, he did something more than to place certain portions -of matter in certain relations, and make them to operate in a certain -manner so as to produce a certain effect. He made the intellectual plan -of a certain arrangement of matter; and to this act of giving being to -something, both intellectual and physical, which did not exist before, -we ascribe in its true sense the act of creation, and the idea we -express by the term is perfectly capable of mental representation. - -"Those," says Mr. Spencer, "who entertain the proposition that each -kind of organism results from a divine interposition, do so because -they refrain from translating words into thoughts"; and he adds, quite -truly, that there is no assignable mode or conceivable way in which the -making of a new organism can be described. Let this be applied to some -new mechanical structure produced by the intellect and hand of man. It -is a result or product of human interposition. When we describe this -human product as an invention, do we refrain from translating words -into thoughts because we can not describe the process of invention? or, -in other words, because we can not assign the mode in which the mind -of the inventor reached his conception, are we to conclude that he did -not attain to the conception which is plainly embodied in the machine -that stands before our eyes? If we say that he created something, do we -make a statement that can not be consistently imagined because we can -not assign the mode in which his mind operated when it thought out the -idea and constructed the plan? We can see how he put together certain -material substances, and how they operate; but we can not see or -describe the mental process by which he obtained his conception. Yet -we ascribe to his act, and rightly ascribe to it, the idea of creation; -and the term represents a thought of the mind that is as capable of -being imagined as the word is of being spoken and understood. - -When Raphael painted the Sistine Madonna, he formed in his mind an -image of the heaven-chosen mother of Christ, and the marvelous skill of -his artist hand transferred that face of surpassing loveliness to the -canvas. The story that it tells may be a fiction or a fact. The image -is a reality. It was a new existence; and, if we call it a creation, -do we use a word which we can not translate into thought because we do -not know how the painter attained to that sweet conception of the human -mother's tenderness, and the dignity of her appointed office as the -handmaiden of the Lord? - -There is nothing unphilosophical in thus ascribing what is done by -finite human faculties and what is done by the infinite Creator to -a power that is of the same nature, but which in the one being is -limited and imperfect, and in the other is superhuman and boundless. -If we know, as we certainly do, that weak and finite man can perform -some acts of creation, can cause some things to exist that did not -previously exist, how much more may we safely conclude that a being -of infinite powers can call into existence, out of the primeval -nothingness, objects of the most stupendous proportions, of the -nicest adaptations, of the most palpable uses--can cause matter and -force and law to be where before all was vacuity, where force was -unknown, where law had never operated! When the mind contemplates that -Omnipotent Power, it reaches forth to an awful presence; but it does -not contemplate something of which it can not conceive, for its own -inferior faculties teach it that creation is a possible occurrence. - -We do not need to be and are not indebted to superstition, to -tradition, or to deceptive words, for the idea of creation. At an -immeasurable distance from the Almighty Power, we ourselves are -constantly creating; and it is when we do so that our acts resemble -his in their nature, however below his productions may be the -productions of our poor human faculties. It is one of the proofs of -our relationship to the infinite Creator, a proof for which we are not -indebted solely to revelation, that we are endowed in this imperfect -degree with a power that resembles his. It is also one of the chief -of the characteristics that distinguish man from the other animals: -for, wonderful as are the constructions made by some of them, they are -uniformly made under the involuntary and uncontrollable impulse of an -implanted instinct; whereas, the constructions of man are made by the -exercise of a constructive faculty that is guided by his will, which -enables him to effect variations of structure entirely unattainable -by any other being that exists on this earth. All the other animals -are confined in the exercise of their constructive faculties to -an invariable model, appointed for each of them according to the -circumstances of its being. The range of choice is bounded by the -limitations of the instinct under which the animal is compelled to do -its work. It may appear to select a favorable site for its habitation, -to cull its materials with judgment, to guard against disturbance from -the elements or from enemies. But we have not much reason to suppose -that any of these things are done from anything but an irresistible -impulse, and we certainly have no reason to suppose that the animal has -the moral power to do them or to refrain from them. To man alone does -there appear to have been given the power of varying his constructions -by the exercise of an intelligent will; and that will is bounded only -by the limitations of his power over matter: so that, in respect to -material structures, the power of man to make creations approaches -nearest to the power of the Almighty Creator, and is, within its -limitations, a true creating power. In the realm of intellectual or -ideal creations, the resemblance of human and divine power is the same, -and the limitations upon the former are those fixed by the finite -nature of human faculties.[62] - -4. Mr. Spencer has a great deal to urge against "the current -theology," and he treats of some of the theological difficulties in -which those who espouse the hypothesis of special creations entangle -themselves.[63] I have nothing to do with the current theology. I do -not borrow from it or rely upon it, and do not undertake to disentangle -its professors from any of the difficulties in which they may have -involved themselves. The only question that interests me is, whether -the objections propounded by this philosopher as an answer to the -hypothesis of special creations present insuperable difficulties to -one who does not depend upon the current theology for arguments, -explanations, or means of judgment. I shall therefore endeavor to -state fairly and fully the chief of the supposed difficulties, without -considering the answer that is made to them by those who are taken as -the representatives of the current theology. - -Put into a condensed form, one of Mr. Spencer's grand objections -to the belief in special creations of organized beings is that it -involves a deliberate intention on the part of the Creator to produce -misery, suffering, pain, and an incalculable amount of evil, or else -that there was an inability to prevent these results. Omitting for -the present the human race, and confining our first view to the other -animals, the earth is largely peopled by creatures which inflict on -each other and on themselves a vast amount of suffering. The animals -are endowed with countless different pain-inflicting appliances and -instincts; the earth has been a scene of warfare among all sentient -creatures; and geology informs us that, from the earliest eras which -it records, there has been going on this universal carnage. Throughout -all past time there has been a perpetual preying of the superior upon -the inferior--a ceaseless devouring of the weak by the strong. In -almost every species, the number of individuals annually born is such -that the majority die of starvation or by violence before arriving at -maturity. But this is not all. Not only do the superior animals prey -upon the inferior, for which there may be suggested some compensating -benefit by the sustentation of a higher order of life through the death -of the lower, or by leaving the most perfect members of a species to -continue that species, but the inferior prey upon the superior, and -organisms that are incapable of feeling have appliances for securing -their prosperity at the expense of misery to organisms capable of -happiness. Of the animal kingdom, as a whole, more than half, it is -said, are parasites, and almost every known animal has its peculiar -species. Passing over the evils thus inflicted on animals of inferior -dignity and coming to man, we find that he is infested by animal and -vegetable parasites of which two or three dozens may be distinctly -enumerated; which are endowed with constitutions fitting them to live -by absorbing the juices of the human body, furnished with appliances by -which they root themselves in the human system, and made prolific in -an almost incredible degree. They produce great suffering, sometimes -cause insanity, and not infrequently death.[64] - -The dilemma that is supposed to be created by these facts for those -who believe in the doctrine of special creations is this: If any -animals are special creations, all are so; and each animal must be -supposed to have been created for the special purposes that are -apparent upon an examination of its structure and mode of life. As the -superior are constantly preying upon the inferior, and as there are -numerous inferior animals that are constantly inflicting evil upon -the superior, it results that malevolence rather than benevolence was -a characteristic attribute of the creating power, or else that the -power which is supposed to have created was unable to make the perfect -creation which the hypothesis of infinite benevolence calls for. -Infinite goodness fails to be demonstrated by a world that is full of -misery, caused by special appliances to bring it about; and infinite -power can not have existed, unless it comprehended the power to produce -perfect and universal happiness. - -I pass entirely aside from the argument which is drawn from the -supposed manifestations of Almighty power in the creation of -diversified forms of animal and vegetable life, because that argument -leads doubtless to the inquiry whether the Almighty made these -manifestations to demonstrate his power to himself, or made them to -demonstrate it to his human creatures. Admitting the fact, as Mr. -Spencer puts it, that millions of these demonstrations took place on -earth when there were no intelligent beings to contemplate them--a -statement that is said to be verified by the deductions of geology -and paleontology--an inquiry into the period or the purpose of these -manifestations of divine power as manifestations only, merely leads -us into some of the arguments of the current theology. There is -another realm of thought and reasoning into which it will be far more -profitable to enter. It is that realm which lies outside of tradition -and the teachings of theologians, and which takes the hypothesis of -infinite power and infinite goodness, not as something which we have -been taught to believe, but as a postulate of philosophical reasoning; -and, applying this hypothesis to the known facts of the animal and -vegetable world, endeavors to ascertain whether these facts necessarily -create an insuperable difficulty in the hypothesis which lies at the -basis of all sound reasoning on the subject. For I must again insist, -and shall endeavor specifically to show, that this hypothesis of -infinite power and goodness is equally necessary to the evolutionist -and to the believer in special creations, unless all speculation on the -genesis of the world is to end in blind chance, and the negation of a -personal creating power of any kind. - -What, then, is the true philosophical mode of dealing with the -existence in the world of physical and moral evil, in reference to -the hypothesis of infinite power and infinite goodness? I do not -ask what is a perfect demonstration of the problem of physical and -moral evil--although I think that the natural solution is very near -to demonstration; but the inquiry which I now make is. What is the -reasonable mode of comparing the existence of suffering, pain, misery, -and their immediate agencies, with the supposition of an all-wise, -all-powerful, and perfectly beneficent Creator?[65] - -What we have to do, in the first place, is to contemplate the scope -of infinite goodness; or, in other words, to consider that infinite -benevolence is, in its very nature, guided by unerring wisdom, and -consequently that its methods, its plans, and its results are as far -beyond the methods, plans, and results which our imperfect benevolence -would adopt or achieve, as infinite power is beyond our finite and -imperfect capacity. This does not call upon us to conceive of something -that is inconceivable, or that can not be represented in thought; -for power and goodness are qualities that we know to exist: we know -that they exist in degrees; and that what exists in a measurable and -limited degree may exist without measurable limitation, or in absolute -perfection. The philosophic mode of regarding perfect goodness requires -us to consider its methods and results with reference to its perfect -character, and not to measure them by the inferior standards of human -wisdom. Following out this obvious truth, we have next to inquire -whether the physical and moral evil which we see ought to destroy the -very idea of an infinitely benevolent Creator, and to compel us to -regard him as a malevolent being, or else to destroy our belief in -his infinite power, because his power has been unable to make a world -of perfect happiness and enjoyment for his creatures. If this dilemma -seriously exists, it is just as great a difficulty for the hypothesis -of evolution as it is for that of special creations, and it drives -both schools into the utter negation of any intelligent causing power -adequate to produce what we see. - -In the next place, let us see what is the sum total of the physical -and moral evil in the animal kingdom, which, in reference to the sum -total of happiness, is supposed to create this formidable impeachment -of the Almighty benevolence on the one hand, or of the Almighty power -on the other. As to the order of things which permits the superior -animals to prey upon the inferior, there is an explanation which lies -on the surface of the facts, and which would seem to satisfy all the -requirements of philosophic reasoning, whatever may be the mode in -which this part of the moral problem is dealt with by theologians. -We find the fact to be that, as we rise higher and higher in the -scale of organized beings, the superior are capable of happiness -in a greater degree than the inferior, in some proportion to the -superiority of their organization. The comparative duration of life -among the different animals also enters into the estimate of the sum -total of happiness. As a general rule, the inferior organizations -are individually more short-lived than the superior. Now, it might -have pleased the Creator to cause all animals to be fed by manna from -heaven, or to find their sustenance only in vegetable products; and -he could thus have dispensed with the carnivorous appetite, and have -rendered it unnecessary for the superior to prey upon and destroy the -inferior. But, although he could thus have made a world from which the -misery of this perpetual carnage would have been absent, and which -would have been so far a world of perfect happiness, the fact is -that this law of universal destruction is so shaped as to follow the -increasing capacity for happiness and enjoyment which moves through -the ascending scale of the organized beings. It also follows another -obvious purpose of the carnivorous appetite and of the permission to -indulge it. A large part of the whole animal kingdom is so constructed -that sustentation requires animal food. The blood, the tissues, the -whole substance of some animal structures require to be renewed by -similar substances; and although life may sometimes be continued by the -assimilation of vegetable substances alone, it is not the life for -which the animal was formed, because it is not always the life which -makes the full end of its being, and realizes its best capacity for -enjoyment and for the continuation of its species. In some cases, the -carnivorous appetite is withheld. The animal lives and thrives best -upon a vegetable diet, and so far as the flesh of these animals enters -into the wholesome and beneficial food of man, the animal fulfills one -purpose of its existence. Some animals, before they become fit food -for man, have been nourished by the substance of still other animals. -In all this variety of modes in which animal food is prepared for -man, and in the whole of the stupendous economy by which the superior -organizations prey upon the inferior in order that each species may -continue itself and may fulfill the purposes of its existence, we may -without any difficulty trace an obvious reason for the permission that -has been given to such destruction of individual life. When to the sum -total of happiness and benefit which this permission bestows on each -of the orders of the inferior animals according to its capacity for -enjoyment, whether it does or does not enter into the food of man, -whether it comes or never comes within the reach of his arm, we add -the sum total of happiness and benefit which this law of universal -destruction bestows on man, so far as he avails himself of it, we shall -find no reason to impeach the Divine Goodness or to adopt a conclusion -derogatory to the Infinite Power. We may dismiss the difficulty that is -supposed to arise from the warfare of the superior upon the inferior -beings, because that warfare, when we trace it through all its stages, -involves no sort of deduction from the perfect character of the Divine -Goodness or the Divine Power. - -Next, we come to the liability of animals, man included, to be preyed -upon by parasites, creatures of a very inferior order when compared -to the animals which they infest. I have looked in vain through Mr. -Spencer's speculations for any explanation which makes the existence -of the parasitic animals a support to the theory of evolution without -involving the same impeachment of the Divine Power or the Divine -Goodness which is supposed to be involved in the hypothesis of special -creations. We are indeed told that evolution brings about an increasing -amount of happiness, all evils being but incidental; that, applying -alike to the lowest and to the highest forms of organization, there is -in all cases a progressive adaptation, and a survival of the fittest. -"If," it is argued, "in the uniform working of the process, there are -evolved organisms of low types, which prey on those of higher types, -the evils inflicted form but a deduction from the average benefits. The -universal and necessary tendency toward supremacy and multiplication -of the best, applying to the organic creation as a whole as well as -to each species, is ever diminishing the damage done, tends ever -to maintain those most superior organizations which, in one way or -another, escape the invasions of the inferior, and so tends to produce -a type less liable to the invasions of the inferior. Thus the evils -accompanying evolution are ever being self-eliminated."[66] - -Admitting, for the argument's sake, that this is true, how does the -hypothesis of evolution meet the difficulty? The parasitic inferior -organizations exist, and they have existed, more or less, as long as we -have known anything of the superior organizations on which they prey. -They have inflicted and still inflict an incalculable amount of evil, -an untold diminution of the happiness that might have been enjoyed if -they had never existed. The mode in which they came into existence, -whether by the process of evolution or by special creations of their -respective forms, does not affect the amount of evil which their -ravages have produced and are still producing. If they exist under an -order of things which has made them the products of an evolving process -that has formed them out of still lower types, while they exist they -have the same power of inflicting evil as if they had been specially -made in their respective types without the former existence of any -other type. If they owe their existence to the process of evolution, -they exist under a system that was designed to lead to their production -by the operation of uniform laws working out a uniform process; and -under this process, so long as they are produced by it, they imply -gratuitous malevolence, just as truly as they do if they are supposed -to have been specially created. The evils which they have inflicted -and still inflict were deliberately inflicted, unless we suppose that -the hypothetical process of evolution was not a system ordained by any -supreme and superhuman power, but was a result of blind chance; that -the system was not created, but, without the volition of any power -whatever, grew out of nothing. - -The compensating tendency of the evolution system to evolve superior -organisms, which in one way or other "will escape the parasitic -invasions," by becoming less liable to them, and so to diminish the -damage done, as a sum total, finds a corresponding result in the system -of special creations by a different process and at a more rapid rate. -For the hypothesis of special creations, rightly regarded, does not -assume the special creation of each individual animal as a miraculous -or semi-miraculous interposition of divine power; and even when we -apply it to the lowest types of animals it implies only the formation -of that type with the power in most cases of continuing its species. -Assuming the parasitic animals to be in this sense special creations, -the superior organisms on which they prey during their existence may -become less liable to their invasions by an infinity of causes which -will diminish and finally put an end to the parasitic ravages. In -the progress of medical science man may be wholly relieved from the -worst and most obscure parasites that have ever infested him, without -waiting for their evolution into some other type of animal that does -not desire or need to prey upon the human system, or without waiting -to have the human organism developed into one that will not be exposed -to such causes of suffering or death. We know already that very simple -precautions will ward off from man some of the most subtle of these -enemies; and even in the case of animals lower than man we know that -instinct teaches them how to avoid the ravages of some of the parasites -to which they are exposed, even if there are others which they can not -now escape. - -So that, viewing as a whole the amount of misery inflicted by the -inferior organisms upon the superior, and looking from the first -forward to the last "syllable of recorded time," we are able upon -either of the two hypotheses respecting the origin of animals to -reach certain definite conclusions, which may be stated as follows: -This world was not intended to be a state of unmixed and unbroken -individual happiness for any of the animal organisms. Death for every -individual in some form was necessary to the carrying on and the -carrying out of the scheme of average enjoyment and the accomplishment -of a sum total of benefit that becomes larger and larger as time goes -on; and, although death without suffering might have been ordained, -the moral purpose for which suffering was allowed to precede death -required that it should be permitted in numberless cases and forms, -and by almost numberless agencies, although not always made necessary. -This great purpose can be discerned without taking into view at all -the idea of a future state of existence for man or any of the other -terrestrial beings, and looking only at the moral development of man -individually and collectively as an agent in the promotion of happiness -on this earth. Man, however he originated, stands at the head of the -whole animal kingdom. If for himself and for all the inferior animal -organisms death without suffering had been ordained as the universal -rule, he would have been without the full strength of the moral -stimulus which now leads him to relieve, to palliate, to diminish, and, -as far as possible, to terminate every kind of suffering for himself -and the superior organisms that are below him in the scale, which are -the most capable of enjoyment and happiness, next after himself, in -their various proportionate capacities. He would have had no strong -motive for exterminating the inferior and noxious organisms excepting -for his own individual and immediate benefit; no reason for extending -the protection of his scientific acquirements to the lower animals -excepting to promote his own immediate advantage. Human society would -have been without that approach to moral perfection which is indicated -by a tenderness for life in all its forms, where its destruction is -not needed by some controlling necessity or expediency, and by the -alleviation of suffering in all its forms for the sake of increasing -the sum total of possible happiness. Human life itself would have been -less sacred in human estimation if there had been no suffering to draw -forth our sympathies and to stimulate us to the utmost contention -against its evils. Civilization would have been destitute of that which -is now its highest and noblest attribute. Wars would have been more -frequent among the most advanced portions of the human race; pestilence -would not have been encountered with half the vigor or the skill which -now wage battle against it; poverty would have been left to take care -of itself, or would have been alleviated from only the lowest and most -selfish motives, which would have left half its evils to be aggravated -by neglect. As the world has been constituted, and as we have the -strongest reason to believe it will continue to the end, there is to -be added to the immeasurable sum of mere animal enjoyment of life that -other immeasurable sum of moral happiness which man derives from doing -good and from the cultivation of his power to do it--an acquisition -and accumulation of benefit which would have been wanting if there had -been no physical suffering to awaken pity and to prompt our exertions -for its relief. - -So that the objection that the hypothesis of infinite goodness required -a world where physical pain would have been unknown to any of its -organisms, where human sorrow would never have been felt, where human -tears would have never flowed, and where death would have been always -and only euthanasia, is by no manner of means a necessary conclusion, -as the existence of suffering is no impeachment of the Infinite Power. -If we consider man only in the light of his rank at the head of all the -terrestrial beings, and as therefore capable of the greatest amount -of benefit, to himself and to the other creatures, and if we regard -him individually as nothing more than a being dwelling on this earth -for a short-lived existence and endowed with the power of perpetuating -his species, he would have been morally an inferior being to what he -is now capable of becoming, and human society would have been far -below what it can be made and what we know that to a large degree it -already is, if physical suffering had been excluded from the world. All -this can be discerned without the aid of revelation; it can be seen -by the eye of philosophic reason alone; and it is all equally true -upon any hypothesis of the physical origin of man or any other living -creature on this earth, unless we suppose that the whole animal kingdom -came into being without any intentional design, without any plan of -intentional benefit, without any purpose, and without the conscious -exertion of any power of any kind. - -And, if the question is asked, What is to be the end of this world? or -if we go forward in imagination toward the probable end of all this -animal life, I can not see that the hypothesis of evolution has more -to recommend it than the hypothesis of special creations in reference -to the perfectibility of the world, or to the sum of approximate -perfection that seems to be attainable. As, upon either of the two -hypotheses, a perfect world does not even now seem to have demanded -an absence of suffering, since suffering tends obviously to produce -greater benefit than could have followed from its absence, so, in -the remotest conceivable future, a nearer and nearer approximation -to a state of universal happiness will continue to be worked out by -physical and moral causes, which will be as potent under the system of -special creations as they can be supposed to be under the system of -evolution. It is true that the moral causes will supplement and aid -the physical under either of the two systems. But one difficulty with -the evolution theory as the sole method by which the past or present -inhabitants of the world have come into existence is that, so far as -we can judge, it has done and completed its work just as effectually -and finally as special creation appears to have terminated in certain -forms, some of which are extinct and some of which are living. Take -the Darwinian pedigree of man, as stated in a former chapter, or any -other mode of tracing the supposed stages of animal evolution. The -process has hypothetically culminated in man. At whatever species in -the ascending scale you pause, you find that the particular type of -animal has either become extinct or that it has continued and still -continues to be produced in that same type, with only such variations -and incidental differences as have resulted from changed conditions -of life, and from the intermingling of different breeds of the same -animal. I do not now speak of the theory, which admits, of course, of -the hypothetical development of every known animal, past or present, -out of its supposed predecessors. But I speak of the facts as yet -revealed by the researches of naturalists among all the extinct and -living forms of animal life. If there had ever been discovered any one -instance in which it could be claimed by satisfactory proof that an -animal of a distinct species had been evolved out of races of animals -of a fundamentally different organization, and without the special -interposition of any creating power operating to make a new organism, -we should certainly have it cited and relied upon as a fact of the -utmost importance. I do not say that it would be reasonable to expect -direct and ocular demonstration of such a product, any more than it -would be reasonable to expect direct and ocular demonstration of an -act of special creation. But I say that it could be shown by proofs -that ought to be satisfactory if there were any evidence from which the -inference that such a fact ever occurred could be reasonably drawn; -just as it is possible to draw the inference of special creation by -reasonable deduction from the evidence that tends to establish it as -a safe conclusion. But if there has ever been such an instance of the -evolution of any known species of animal out of other species shown by -satisfactory proof, or if we assume such an occurrence in the past as -the theory calls for, what reason have we to suppose that the process -of evolution is still going on, and to expect it to go on to the end -of time? We must judge of the future by the past, for we have no other -means of judging it. The past and the present both show, so far as we -can yet perceive by the facts, that each distinct and peculiar type -of animal life remains a perfect and completed production, however it -was fashioned or grew into that type; and that, so far as we have any -means of actual knowledge, no crosses of different races of that animal -produce anything but incidental variations of structure and mode of -life. It is a mere hypothesis that they produce distinct species. - -Apply this to the most important of the supposed connections between -different animals according to the theory of evolution--that between -man and the monkey. The theory calls for the intermediate link or -links. Nothing can be yet found that shows the pedigree without -eking it out by general reasoning, and by assumptions that are more -or less imaginary. But suppose that the chain of proof were complete, -what would it show? It would show that the process of evolution has -culminated in man, as its crown and summit, and has there stopped. For, -whatever may have been the length of time required for the production -of this result, we know what the product is. We have the history of man -as an animal for a period of time that has been quite long enough to -show that, after he had become in his essential structure as an animal -what we know him to be, no subsequent intermingling of the races or -families into which the species became divided has produced any change -in his essential structure, or any new organs or any differences but -differences in the development of powers which are to be found in him -at all the stages of his known existence as parts of his characteristic -animal structure. The period of his known existence is certainly -infinitely small when compared with the whole indefinite future. It -is long enough, however, to afford some basis of reasoning about the -future; and, short as it is, it tends very strongly to show that the -further development of man on earth is to be chiefly a moral and -intellectual development; that in physical structure he is a completed -type; and that whatever superiorities of mere animal life he may -attain to hereafter are to be such improvements as can be worked out, -within the limits of his animal constitution, by the science which his -accumulating experience and knowledge will enable him to apply to the -physical and moral well-being of his race. - -To return now to the line of thought from which these suggestions have -diverged. If, as we have every reason to believe upon either hypothesis -of man's origin, he is a completed animal, standing by original -creation or by the effect of the evolution process at the head of the -whole animal kingdom in the apparent purpose of his existence, his -agency and his power in promoting the sum of happiness on earth, for -himself and all the other animals, are the same upon either hypothesis -of his origin. The hypothesis of his origin by evolution gives him no -greater power over his own happiness or that of the other creatures -than he has if we suppose him to have been specially created; and it is -only by adopting the belief that in his own constitution he is to be -hereafter developed into a being incapable of suffering, or one vastly -less capable of suffering than the animal called man now is, that the -theory of evolution, even in regard to the sum total of happiness on -earth, has any advantage over the theory of special creations. If we -suppose the future gradual development of a terrestrial being standing -still higher in the animal scale than man now stands, exempt from the -suffering which man now suffers, we have a great amount of suffering -hereafter eliminated from the world by a certain process. But how does -this better satisfy the idea of infinite goodness in the power that -devised the process, than the hypothesis of special creation which has -formed man as an ultimate product of the divine benevolence and power -acting together, endowed him with the faculty of eliminating pain and -evil from the circumstances of his existence, by his own exertions, -and furnished him with the strongest motives as well as with almost -immeasurable means for diminishing the amount of evil for himself and -all the other beings within his reach? - -5. Another of the specific objections urged by Mr. Spencer against -the doctrine of special creations is so put that it is manifestly -directed against one of the positions assumed by the representatives -of the current theology. The learned philosopher begins this part of -his argument by imputing to those who assert this doctrine as their -reason for maintaining it, that it "honors the Unknown Cause of -things," and that they think any other doctrine amounts to an exclusion -of divine power from the world. To encounter this supposed reason for -maintaining the doctrine of special creations, he proceeds to ask -whether the divine power "would not have been still better demonstrated -by the separate creation of each individual than it is by the separate -creation of each species? Why should there exist this process of -natural generation? Why should not omnipotence have been proved by the -supernatural production of plants and animals everywhere throughout -the world from hour to hour? Is it replied that the Creator was able -to make individuals arise from one another in natural selection, but -not to make species thus arise? This is to assign a limit to power -instead of magnifying it. Is it replied that the occasional miraculous -origination of a species was practicable, but that the perpetual -miraculous origination of countless individuals was impracticable? This -also is a derogation. Either it was possible or not possible to create -species and individuals after the same general methods. To say that it -was not possible is suicidal in those who use this argument; and, if it -was possible, it is required to say what end is served by the special -creation of species that would not be better served by the special -creation of individuals?"[67] I must again disclaim any participation -in the views of those who contemplate this question with reference -to the manifestations of divine power by one method of its supposed -action or another, or who are influenced by the idea of honoring or -dishonoring the Creator. This is not a question of the mode in which -the Creator has chosen to manifest his power for the purpose of making -it more impressive in the eyes of his intelligent human creatures or -more palpable to their perceptions. Nor is it a question, excepting for -the theologian who begins to reason upon it from a peculiar point of -view, by what belief we best honor the Creator, or the power which Mr. -Spencer describes as the "Unknown Cause." In the eye of philosophic -reason, apart from all the religious dogmas that have been taught by -human interpretations of revelation, this is a question of the probable -mode in which the assumed omnipotent power has acted; and it is not a -question of how we can best honor or magnify that power by believing -that it has acted in one mode and not in another. We have to take, -first, the postulate of an infinitely powerful Creator, whose existence -is an independent inquiry, which we are to make out upon evidence that -satisfies the mind. The hypothesis of his existence and attributes -includes the power to create species and to establish the process of -natural generation for the continuation of each species, or the power -to make separate creations of each individual, as Mr. Spencer phrases -it, "from hour to hour." In either mode of action, the power was the -same. It is no derogation from it to suppose that the one or the other -mode was adopted. It is no augmentation of it to suppose that the one -was adopted instead of the other. It is simply a question of what -does the evidence show, to the reasonable satisfaction of the human -mind, to have been most probably the method that was chosen by a power -that could adopt any method whatever. If we find that the creation of -species and the establishment of the process of natural generation for -the multiplication of individuals is upon the whole sustained by a -predominating weight of evidence, it is safe to adopt the belief that -this hypothesis of the Almighty method is in accordance with the facts. -If the evidence fails to show that species have arisen from each other -in the same way that individuals have arisen from each other in natural -succession, we have no reason to conclude that such has been the fact. -On the other hand, if the evidence shows, by reasonably satisfactory -proofs, that a process has been established for the evolution of -distinct species out of other and different species, similar to -the process by which individuals arise from each other by natural -generation, it will be safe to conclude that such has been the fact. -Upon either hypothesis, the power of the Creator remains the same. - -Nor is it in any degree necessary to consider in what sense the one -method of action or the other was "miraculous," or that the one was an -occasional and the other a perpetual exercise of power. The special -creations of individuals from hour to hour would be just as miraculous -as the special creation of species, and it would be occasional, -although the occasions would be indefinite in number. The special -creation of species would be just as miraculous as the special creation -of individuals, but the occasional exercise of such a power would be -limited by the number of species, each of which would be a finality -in itself. The dilemma that is suggested by Mr. Spencer is a dilemma -only for those who think it necessary to mingle the idea of honoring -or dishonoring the Creator by one or another mode of interpreting his -works, with a question of his probable method of action. His method of -action is to be judged upon the evidence which a study of his works -discloses. - -6. Mr. Spencer, in summing up his objections to the doctrine of -special creations, has said that it not only "fails to satisfy men's -intellectual need of an interpretation," but that it also "fails to -satisfy their moral sentiment"; that "their moral sentiment is much -better satisfied by the doctrine of evolution, since that doctrine -raises no contradictory implications respecting the Unknown Cause, such -as are raised by the antagonist doctrine."[68] I have already suggested -what seems to me a sufficient answer to the supposed contradictory -implications respecting the goodness and power of the Almighty Creator. -But it is here worthy of the further inquiry, What has been the -influence upon the sacredness of human life, in human estimation, of -a belief in any other theory of man's origin, or of no belief on the -subject, compared with the effect of a belief in the doctrine that he -is a creature of an Almighty Creator, formed by an exercise of infinite -power for the enjoyment of greater happiness on earth than any other -creature, and therefore having a peculiarly sacred individual right to -the life that has been given to him? This, to be sure, does not afford -a direct test of the probable truth of the hypothesis respecting his -origin. But the answer to this inquiry will afford some test of the -claim upon our consideration that may be put forward for any other -hypothesis than the one that embraces the full idea of man's special -creation, even if we do not look beyond this world. Compare, then, the -civilization of the Romans at the period when it was at its highest -development (the age of Julius and Augustus Cæsar), when in many -respects it was a splendid civilization. Neither among the vulgar, -nor among the most cultivated; not among the most accomplished of the -statesmen or philosophers, was there any such belief as the simple -belief in the relation between Creator and creature, such as had been -held by a people who were regarded by the Romans as barbarians, in -respect to man and all the other animals; or such a belief as is now -held by the least educated peasant of modern Europe. One consequence -of the absence of this belief, or of the want of a vivid perception of -it, was that the highest persons in the Roman state, men possessed of -all the culture and refinement of their age, not only furnished for the -popular amusement combats of wild beasts of the most ferocious natures, -but they provided gladiatorial shows in which human beings, trained for -the purpose, were by each other "butchered to make a Roman holiday." -The statesmen who thus catered to the popular tastes, and never -thought of correcting them, subjected themselves to enormous expenses -for the purpose; and all that was noble and dignified and cultured of -both sexes, as well as the rabble, looked on with delight at the horrid -spectacle. But this was not all. The Roman law, in many ways a code -of admirable ethics, in utter disregard of the natural rights of men, -left the life of the slave within the absolute power of the master, -without any mitigation of the existing law of nations which made slaves -of the captive in war and his posterity. Compare all this with the -civilization of any modern country in which the life or liberty of -man can be taken away only by judicial process and public authority, -for actual crime; in which institutions exist for the relief of human -suffering and for the prevention of cruelty to the inferior creatures; -and then say whether the belief in special creations is not a doctrine -that has worked vast good in the world, and one that should not be -scouted because it is a "primitive belief." - -Again, compare the ages in modern Europe when statesmen and politicians -of the highest standing with entire impunity employed assassination for -political ends, with periods in the same countries when assassination -had come to be regarded not only with abhorrence, but as incapable of -justification for any end whatever, public or private, and then say -whether the world can lose its belief that man is a special creation of -God, without losing one of the strongest safeguards of human life that -can be derived from any belief on the subject. All these, and a great -many similar considerations, while they do not prove the hypothesis -of special creation, show strongly that, unlike some of the family of -beliefs with which it was associated in the darkest ages, this one -has worked no mischiefs; that, on the contrary, it has been producing -moral, social, and political benefits in all the ages in which it has -been most vividly present to the popular faith. The command, "Thou -shalt do no murder," from whatever source it came, whether it was -delivered to Moses on the mount of fire, or came from the teachings of -Nature and the dictates of social expediency, whether it is a divine or -a human law, or both, has unhappily been broken in all times, in all -lands, and in all conditions of civilization. It is broken still. But -it has never yet ceased, for its moral foundation and for the moral -sanction of all the methods which have aimed to enforce it, to rest -on the belief that man is peculiarly the child of God, whose life is -sacred beyond the life of all other creatures. Whether any other belief -of man's origin will afford an equally good foundation for that law, -is a question which modern scientific speculation may or may not be -able to answer. If its speculations conduct to the conclusion that the -"unknown cause" has not specially caused anything, has not established -any relation of Creator and creature, that is sufficiently special to -imply divine care for the creature, we know what the answer must be. -The theologian is not the only person who has occasion to examine the -doctrine of evolution; it must be examined by the statesman as well. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [57] "The Principles of Biology," by Herbert Spencer, vol. i, p. 334 - _et seq._ I use the American edition, D. Appleton & Co., 1881. - - [58] "Biology," i, p. 336. - - [59] "Biology," i, pp. 336, 337. - - [60] Webster's "Dictionary of the English Language." - - [61] Let it be remembered that the sense which is here considered - comprehends not only material objects, but also ideas, images, and - in short whatever, in its kind, had no previous existence. This is - just as true of an original poem, or picture, or statue, or musical - composition, as it is of a machine that is both original and new as a - piece of mechanism. - - [62] Perhaps I owe an apology to a large class of readers for having - bestowed so much attention upon the logical formula with which Mr. - Spencer aims to dispose of the idea of creation. But I have observed, - especially among young persons and others whose habits of thinking - are unformed or not corrected by sound and comprehensive reasoning, a - popular reception of this particular dogma, which makes it necessary - to subject it to some careful analysis. In fact, one of my chief - objects in writing this book has been to contribute what I might - to the formation of habits of testing philosophical and scientific - theories by something better than specious assumptions which can be - thrown into the plausible form of logical propositions. There is - nothing more valuable than logic, when its forms represent a true and - correct ratiocination; and, when they do not, there is nothing that is - more delusive. It needs some discipline of mind to enable people to - see when logic is valuable and when it is not. - - [63] "Biology," i, p. 340 _et seq._ - - [64] This is given almost _verbatim_ from Mr. Spencer's "Biology," i, - p. 340 _et seq._ - - [65] In treating of the existence of physical and moral evil, I do - not mean to include sin in the discussion. I mean now by moral evil - that loss or diminution of happiness, for the individual or a race, - which results from physical evil produced by causes for which the - sufferer is not responsible. The sin that is in the world is a matter - that is to be considered entirely with reference to the accountability - of man as a moral being; and the reasons which may be assigned for - its permission may be quite distinct from those which relate to the - existence of physical suffering for which man is not responsible upon - any rational theory of moral accountability. - - [66] "Biology," i, p. 354. - - [67] "Biology," i, p. 339. - - [68] "Biology," i, pp. 344, 355. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further -considered. - - -In the last preceding chapter, I have examined Mr. Spencer's chief -objection to the doctrine of special creations when considered in -its general aspects. I now advance to the general aspects of the -evolution hypothesis as applied by this philosopher to the animal -kingdom. I have already suggested the appropriate answer to the -claim that the derivation of the evolution hypothesis is favorable -because it has originated "among the most instructed class and in -these better-instructed times," and that the derivation of the other -hypothesis is unfavorable because "it originated in times of profound -ignorance." On this point it is unnecessary to say more. But there is -a supposed "kindred antithesis" between "the two families of beliefs" -to which these two hypotheses are said respectively to belong; one of -which families "has been dying out," while the other family "has been -multiplying." This brings into view the peculiar philosophical system -of Mr. Spencer, by which he maintains "the unity of Nature," or the -prevalence of a universal law of evolution, as the law which is to be -discerned in remote fields of inquiry, and which "will presently be -recognized as the law of the phenomena which we are here considering," -namely, the phenomena of animal life. "The discovery that evolution has -gone on, and is going on, in so many departments of Nature, becomes a -reason for believing that there is no department of Nature in which it -does not go on."[69] - -In considering this mode of generalization it is important to -distinguish between the phenomena that are observable in those -departments of Nature which include only dead or inanimate matter, and -the phenomena that are peculiar to matter organized into living beings. -Again: it is important to distinguish between phenomena which have been -influenced by human agencies and those which can not have been affected -by the power of man. Another distinction of the greatest consequence -is that which divides the phenomena in question according to their -relation to a moral purpose. In one class of phenomena, a moral purpose -may be plainly discovered as the purpose of an intelligent causing -power, which has chosen a particular means for the accomplishment -of an end. In another class of phenomena, a moral purpose may not -be discoverable as the end for which the existing arrangement of -things was specially designed, and to which that arrangement was an -indispensable means. By classifying the departments of Nature and -observing their phenomena with these discriminations, we shall be -able to judge of the value of Mr. Spencer's philosophical system when -applied to the animal kingdom. - -In grouping the departments and their respective phenomena as -departments in which the law of evolution has obtained, and in drawing -from them the sweeping deduction that there is no department in which -this law has not obtained as the _causa causans_, Mr. Spencer does not -appear to have made these necessary discriminations. He specifies the -following remote fields of inquiry, in which he maintains that this law -of evolution is now admitted to be the solution of the phenomena that -lie in those respective fields: First, the solar system, which, as he -asserts, astronomers now consider has been gradually evolved out of -diffused matter.[70] Second, geological discoveries, which show that -the earth has reached its present varied structure through a process of -evolution. Third, society, which has progressed through a corresponding -process of gradual development. "Constitutions are not made, but grow," -is said to be now a recognized truth among "philosophical politicians," -and a part of the more general truth that "societies are not made, but -grow." Fourth, languages, which, we are told, are now believed not -to have been artificially or supernaturally formed, but to have been -developed. Finally, the histories of religions, philosophy, science, -the fine arts, and the industrial arts, show, it is said, development -"through as unobtrusive changes as those which the mind of a child -passes on its way to maturity."[71] - -It is obvious that in some of these departments neither human agency -nor the human will and choice can have had any influence in producing -the phenomena, while in some of them human agency, will, and choice -have had a vast influence in making the phenomena what they are. That -political constitutions or social institutions are not made, but grow, -is a dogma that is by no means universally true, however wise it may -sound, or with whatever confidence in a paradox it may be asserted by -"some political philosophers." While past events and present exigencies -may have largely shaped some political constitutions, we know that -others have been deliberately modified by a choice that has had more -or less of a free scope, and that sometimes this has amounted to an -arbitrary decision. Languages may or may not have been a direct and -supernatural gift from Heaven, but we know that their structure has -been powerfully influenced by human agencies, when they have come -to be written expressions of thought; for they have then received -expansion by the actual coinage of new words, as well as by new -meanings of old words; and even when they were in the first stages -of a spoken tongue, inflections that were purely arbitrary have been -introduced. So it has been with systems of religion, philosophy, the -fine arts, the mechanic arts, legislation, and jurisprudence. While -in all these departments changes have been going on, which upon a -superficial view appear to indicate a kind of spontaneous development, -when they are analyzed they are seen to have been wholly caused, or -more or less influenced, by the genius, the thought, the discoveries, -the exertions, and the acts of particular individuals who have had the -force to impress themselves upon the age, and thus to make new systems, -new beliefs, new products, new rules of social or political life, new -tastes, and new habits of thinking and acting. - -Again: in some of the various orders of phenomena which are found in -these different departments, there is discernible a distinct moral -purpose in the shape which they have been made to assume, and in -others of them there is no moral purpose discoverable, which we can -say required the employment of the particular means to effect the -end. Thus, astronomers can not assign a moral purpose for which the -distribution of the fixed stars was made to be what it is, and which -purpose could not have been answered by some other arrangement. At -the same time, it is easy to see that the solar system was arranged -with reference to the law of universal gravitation, which made this -arrangement of the different bodies essential to the harmonious working -of a great and complex piece of mechanism. The present formation of -the earth may have resulted just as geologists think it has, and yet -they can not say that there was no moral purpose in the division of the -exterior surface of our globe into land and water, seas, continents, -mountains, etc. These are departments of Nature in which man has had no -influence in producing the phenomena. When we turn to those departments -in which man is placed as an actor, we often find an adjustment of -means to an end that is so comprehensive, as well as so plain, that -we may justly conclude it to have been chosen by the creating power, -with the express intent that human agency should be the means by which -certain effects are to be produced. For example: man is eminently -a social animal. Human society is a result of his strong social -propensities. He is placed in it as an actor; and in this arrangement -there is discoverable a moral purpose so plain that we may rightfully -regard the social phenomena of mutual protection and improvement -as proofs that society was ordained as the sphere of man's highest -development on earth. - -So that, in reasoning about the phenomena of any of the departments -of Nature as affording indications of the so-called universal law -of evolution, we must not forget the distinction between organized -inanimate and organized animated matter; or the distinction between -those departments in which human will or choice, or the human -intellect, has had no influence in shaping the phenomena, and those -in which they have had great influence; or the distinction between -phenomena in which a special moral purpose can be and those in which -it can not be discovered, as the reason for the existing order of -things. It is especially hazardous to argue that because a spontaneous -development, or a gradual evolution, can be traced in some of the -phenomena of inanimate matter, it therefore must obtain in the animal -kingdom. It is alike hazardous to argue, because there has been what -is called evolution in some departments of Nature over which man has -had no control, that the same law obtains in other departments over -which he has also had no control, or those in which he has had a large -control. - -The bearing of these discriminations upon the supposed universality -of the law of evolution may now be seen if we attend to the further -inquiry whether that law obtains throughout all the phenomena of -any one department of Nature as the sole cause of the phenomena in -that department. Take again, for example, the solar system. Suppose -it to be true that the bodies which compose it, the sun and the -planetary spheres, were gradually evolved out of diffused matter. Does -it necessarily follow that their existing arrangements and mutual -relations were not specially designed? That their orbits, their -revolutions, their distances from each other, were not specially -planned? That they were not hung in their respective positions with -an intentional adjustment to the great force of gravitation that was -prevailing throughout the universe? Must we suppose that all this part -of the whole phenomena of the solar system resulted from the operation -of an ungoverned evolution, because the bodies themselves may have been -gradually formed out of diffused matter into their present condition -without being spoken at once into that condition by the fiat of the -Almighty? We can certainly see that the existing arrangements must have -been intentional; and, if intentional, the intention must have taken -effect in the production of the phenomena exhibited by the arrangement, -as any design takes effect in the production of the phenomena which -are open to our observation. The moral purpose evinced by one part of -this arrangement, the alternation of day and night upon the earth, -for example, might have been effected by some other means than the -means which now produce it. But there is the strongest evidence that -a certain means was chosen and intentionally put into operation; and -although we can not tell why that means was preferred, the fact that it -was both designed and preferred makes it a special creation. To suppose -that it was left to be worked out by a process such as the hypothesis -of evolution assumes, by the gradual, fortuitous, and ungoverned -operation of infinitely slow-moving causes, which might have made the -adjustments very different from what they are, is to deprive it of the -element of intentional preference that is proved by its existence. -The hypothesis of evolution, when applied to all the phenomena of the -solar system, relegates one great branch of those phenomena to a realm -from which all special purposes and all direct design are absent, and -confines the explanation of the phenomena to the operation of causes -that might have brought about very different arrangements. That this -supposed process of evolution has, in fact, been followed by the -existing arrangements of the solar system, does not prove, or tend to -prove, that the existing arrangements are solely due to the supposed -method of their production; for we can not leave out the element of -some design, and if there was a design, the very nature of the system -required that the design should be executed by a special creation of a -plan for the mutual relations of the bodies composing it. The bodies -themselves might have been gradually formed out of diffused matter, -floating loosely in the realms of space. The relations of the bodies -to each other required the act of an intelligent will, in the direct -formation of an intentional plan; and that act was an act of special -creation in the same sense in which the structural plan of a species of -animal was a special creation. - -Here, then, is one department of Nature in which it is not necessary -and not philosophical to assume that the law of so-called evolution has -been the universal law to which all the phenomena of that department -are to be attributed. If we follow out the same inquiry in other -departments of Nature remote from the animal kingdom, we shall find -reason to adopt the same conclusion in respect to their phenomena. -Thus, let us for a moment contemplate another of the departments -in which inanimate matter is the subject of observation, and in -which human will or intelligence has had no agency in producing the -phenomena, namely, the formation of the present structure of the -earth as it is described by geologists. This is a department in which -the hypothesis of evolution finds perhaps its stronghold. Yet it is -necessary even here to recognize an intentional plan and direct design -in some part of the phenomena. Let us suppose that during the period -required by any of the speculations of geologists, however long, a -mass of matter was gathered in an unformed condition, and gradually -shaped into the present condition of the earth by the action of its -constituent elements upon each other, influenced by the laws of -mechanical forces, of chemical combinations, of light and heat, and -of whatever physical agencies were made to operate in the process of -evolving the mass into the condition in which it has been known to us -for a certain time. Is it a rational conclusion that the intelligent -power which put these forces in operation--an hypothesis with which we -must begin to reason, or leave the origin of both matter and forces to -blind chance--did not guide their operation at all to the intentional -production of the results which we see? The results disclose some -manifest purposes; and although these purposes, or others equally -beneficent, might have been accomplished by different arrangements, -we can see that they have been effected by a certain arrangement of a -specific character. The results have been continents, seas, mountains, -rivers, lakes, formation and distribution of minerals, growth of -forests, and an almost innumerable, and certainly a very varied, -catalogue of phenomena, physical formations, and adaptations. All these -varied results disclose a plan by which this earth became a marvelously -convenient abode for the living creatures that have inhabited or still -inhabit it, especially for man. The formation of this plan was an -intelligent act, if we suppose that any intelligent being projected -the original gathering of the crude primordial matter and subjected it -to the operation of the forces employed to shape it into its present -condition. This plan was an act of special creation, in the same -sense in which the plan of a particular animal organism may have been -a special creation. While, therefore, a process which may be called -evolution may have operated as the agency through which the earth has -reached its present physical condition, the plan of that condition was -certainly not formed by any such process; for it was, if it was the -product of anything, the product of an intelligent will operating in -the production of preconceived results by the exercise of superhuman -and infinite wisdom and foresight. - -When we turn to a department in which human influence has largely -or wholly shaped the phenomena, we find numerous special creations -that are not attributable to the operation of any law of development -or evolution such as is supposed to have led to the production of -one species of animal out of another, or out of several previous -species. In short, a survey of all the departments of Nature leads to -the conclusion that while there may be phenomena which are properly -traceable to the operation of the forces of Nature, or to fixed -general systems of production, there is another very large class -of the phenomena which owe their existence to special acts of an -intelligent will, finite or infinite, human or divine, according as -their production required superhuman power or admitted of the efficacy -of man's intervention. - -The way is now somewhat cleared for an examination of Mr. Spencer's -application of the law of evolution to the gradual formation of -different species of animals out of one or more previous species, -without any act of special creation intervening anywhere in the series. -We have seen that this alleged law is not of universal force as the -cause of all the phenomena in all the departments of Nature. When -we come to apply it as the hypothesis which is to account for the -existence of different species of animals of very different types, we -must remember that we are dealing with organisms endowed with life, -and, although we can not sufficiently explain what life is, we know -that animated organisms are brought into being by systems of production -that are widely different from the modes in which inanimate matter -may have been or has been made to assume its existing forms. Bearing -this in mind, we come to the arguments and proofs by which Mr. Spencer -maintains the immense superiority of the evolution hypothesis over -that of special creations, in reference to the animal kingdom. It must -be remembered that this is a department in which man can have had no -agency in producing the phenomena, for whatever may have been the -slight variations produced by human interference with the breeding of -animals domesticated from their wild condition, we must investigate the -origin of species as if there had never been any human intervention -in the crossing of breeds, because that origin is to be looked for in -a sphere entirely removed from all human interference. Man himself is -included in the investigation, and we must make that investigation in -reference to a time when he did not exist, or when he did not exist as -we now know him. - -One of the favorite methods of Mr. Spencer consists in arraying -difficulties for the believers in special creations, which, he argues, -can not be encountered by their hypothesis, and then arguing that there -are no difficulties in the way of the hypothesis of evolution. His -position shall be stated with all the strength that he gives to it, -and with all the care that I can bestow upon its treatment. He puts -the argument thus: In the animal kingdom individuals come into being -by a process of generation--that is to say, they arise out of other -individuals of the same species. If we contemplate the individuals -of any species, we find an evolution repeated in every one of them by -a uniform process of development, which, in a short space of time, -produces a series of astonishing changes. The seed becomes a tree, -and the tree differs from the seed immeasurably in bulk, structure, -color, form, specific gravity, and chemical composition; so that -no visible resemblance can be pointed out between them. The small, -semi-transparent gelatinous spherule constituting the human ovum -becomes the newly-born child; and this human infant "is so complex in -its structure that a cyclopædia is needed to describe its constituent -parts. The germinal vesicle is so simple that it may be defined in a -line. Nevertheless, a few months suffice to develop the one out of -the other, and that, too, by a series of modifications so small that -were the embryo examined, at successive minutes, even a microscope -would with difficulty disclose any sensible changes. Aided by such -facts, the conception of general evolution may be rendered as definite -a conception as any of our complex conceptions can be rendered. If, -instead of the successive minutes of a child's fœtal life, we take -successive generations of creatures, if we regard the successive -generations as differing from each other no more than the fœtus did in -successive minutes, our imaginations must indeed be feeble if we fail -to realize in thought the evolution of the most complex organism out of -the simplest. If a single cell, under appropriate conditions, becomes -a man in the space of a few years, there can surely be no difficulty -in understanding how, under appropriate conditions, a cell may, in the -course of untold millions of years, give origin to the human race."[72] - -Here, then, we have a comparison between what takes place in the -development of the individual animal in the space of a few years, -and what may be supposed to take place in the successive generations -of different creatures through untold millions of years. We turn -then to the proof, direct or indirect, that races of entirely -distinct organisms have resulted from antecedent races by gradual -transformation. Direct proof sufficient to establish the progressive -modifications of antecedent races into other races is not claimed to -exist; yet it is claimed that there are numerous facts of the order -required by the hypothesis which warrant our acceptance of it. These -facts are the alterations of structure which take place in successive -generations of the same species, amounting, in the course of several -generations of the same race, to additions and suppressions of parts. -These changes among the individuals of the same race, comprehended in -what is scientifically called "heredity" and "variation," are exhibited -by the transmission of ancestral peculiarities of structure, by their -occasional suppression in some individuals of the race and their -reappearance in others, and by a difference in the relative sizes of -parts. These variations, arising in successive short intervals of time, -are said to be quite as marked as those which arise in a developing -embryo, and, in fact, they are said to be often much more marked. "The -structural modifications proved to have taken place since organisms -have been observed is not less than the hypothesis demands--bears as -great a ratio to this brief period as the total amount of structural -change seen in the evolution of a complex organism out of a simple germ -bears to the vast period during which living forms have existed on -earth."[73] - -The difficulty that is thus prepared for the hypothesis of the special -creation of species may now be stated. There is a professed conception -of the ultimate power which is manifested to us through phenomena. -That conception implies omnipotence and omniscience, and it therefore -implies regularity of method, because uniformity of method is a mark -of strength, whereas irregularity of method is a mark of weakness. "A -persistent process, adapted to all contingencies, implies greater skill -in the achievement of an end than its achievement by the process of -meeting the contingencies as they severally arise." And, therefore, -those who adopt the notion of the special creation of species do, it -is said, in truth impair the professed character of the power to which -they assume that the phenomena of the existence of species are to be -referred, whereas the hypothesis of the evolution of species out of -other species is much more consistent with the professed conception of -the ultimate power. - -In this claim of superiority for the evolution hypothesis, the learned -philosopher seems to have been almost oblivious of the fact that he was -dealing with animal organisms in two aspects: first, in regard to the -method by which individuals of the same species come into existence; -and, secondly, in regard to the method by which different species have -come into existence. In the first case, regularity of method is evinced -by the establishment of a uniform process of procreation and gestation. -This process, while retaining throughout the different classes of -animals one fundamental and characteristic method, namely, the union -of the sexes, is widely varied in respect to the time of gestation, -the fœtal development, and the nourishment of the young before and -after birth. There is no difficulty whatever in discovering the great -reason for which this system of the reproduction of individuals was -established. The tie that it makes between parents and offspring, and -more especially the tie between the female parent and the offspring, -was obviously one grand end for which this system of giving existence -to individuals was adopted; and although the instinct which arises -out of it is in some species feeble and almost inactive, it rises -higher and higher in its power and its manifestations in proportion -as the animals rise in the scale of being, until in man it exhibits -its greatest force and its most various effects, producing at last -pride of ancestry, and affecting in various ways the social and even -the political condition of mankind. But how can any corresponding -connection between one race of animals and another, or between -antecedent and subsequent species, be imagined? The sexual impulse -implanted in animals leads to the production of offspring of the same -race. The desire for offspring keeps up the perpetual succession of -individuals, and love of the offspring insures the protection of the -newly born by the most powerful of impulses. But what can be imagined -as an analogous impulse, appetite, or propensity which should lead one -species to strive after the production of another species? Is it said -that the different species are evolved out of one another by a process -in which the conscious desires, the efforts, the aspirations of the -preceding races play no part? This is certainly true, if there was -ever any such process as the evolution of species out of species; and -it follows that, in respect to one great moral purpose of a process, -there is no analogy to be derived from the regularity and uniformity of -the process by which individuals of the same species are multiplied. -Moreover, in regard to the latter process, we know that a barrier has -been set to its operation; for Nature does not now admit of the sexual -union between animals of entirely distinct species, and we have no -reason to believe that it ever did admit of it at any period in the -geological history of the earth. - -Still further: In what sense are special creations "irregularities -of method"? In what sense are they "contingencies"? And if they are -"contingencies," how does it imply less skill to suppose that they -have been met as they have severally arisen, than would be implied by -supposing that they have been achieved by a uniform process adapted -to all contingencies? This notion that something is derogated from -the idea of omnipotence and omniscience by the hypothesis that such -a power has acted by special exercises of its creating faculty in -the production of different orders of beings as completed and final -types, instead of allowing or causing them to be successively evolved -out of each other by gradual derivations, is neither logical nor -philosophical. In no proper sense is a method of action an irregular -method unless it was imposed upon the actor by some antecedent -necessity, which compelled him to apply a method which was made uniform -in one case to another case in which the same kind of uniformity -would not be indispensable. The uniformity of the process by which -individuals of the same species are multiplied is a uniformity for that -particular end. The regularity in that case is a regularity that has -its special objects to accomplish. The uniformity and regularity of -a different method of causing different types of organisms to exist, -so long as the object is always effected in the same way, is just as -truly a regularity and uniformity for that case, and just as completely -fulfills the idea of infinite skill. That such creations are specially -made, that they are independently made, and that each is made for a -distinct purpose and also for the complex purposes of a varied class -of organisms, does not render them contingencies arising at random, or -make the method of meeting them an occasional, irregular, spasmodic -device for encountering something unforeseen and unexpected. The very -purposes for which the distinct organisms exist--purposes that are -apparent on a comprehensive survey of their various structures and -modes of life--and the fact that they have come into existence by some -process that was for the production of the ends a uniform and regular -one, whether that process was special creation or evolution, render the -two methods of action equally consistent with the professed conception -of the ultimate power. On the hypothesis of special creations so many -different types of organism as the Creator has seen fit to create have -been made by the exercise of a power remaining uniformly of the same -infinite nature, but varying the products at will for the purposes of -infinite wisdom. - -What, again, does the learned author mean by meeting "contingencies" -"as they have severally arisen"? This suggestion of a difficulty for -the believers in special creations seems to imply that the distinct -types of animal organisms arose somehow as necessities outside of the -divine will, and that the Almighty artificer had to devise occasional -methods of meeting successive demands which he did not create. The -hypothesis of special creations does not drive its believers into any -such implications. The several distinct types of animal organisms are -supposed to have arisen in the divine mind as types which the Almighty -saw fit to create for certain purposes, and to have been severally -fashioned as types by his infinite power. They are in no sense -"contingencies" which he had to meet as occasions arising outside of -his infinite will. A human artificer has conceived and executed upon a -novel plan a machine that is distinguishable from all other machines. -He did not create the demand for that machine; the demand has grown -out of the wants of society; and the artificer has met the demand by -his genius and his mechanical skill, which have effected a marked -improvement in the condition of society. In one sense, therefore, he -has met a "contingency," because he has met a demand. But the infinite -Creator, upon the hypothesis of his existence and attributes, does not -meet an external demand; there is no demand upon him; he creates the -occasion; he makes the different organisms to effectuate the infinite -purposes which he also creates; the want and the means of satisfying -the want alike arise in the infinite wisdom and will. Such is the -hypothesis. We may now, therefore, pursue in some further detail the -argument which maintains that this hypothesis is of far inferior -strength to that of evolution, as the method in which the Almighty -power has acted in the production of different animal organisms. - -First we have the analogy that is supposed to be afforded by what takes -place in the development of a single cell into a man in the space of -a few years, and an alleged correspondence of development by which -a single cell, in the course of untold millions of years, has given -origin to the human race. Granting any difference of time which this -comparison calls for, and substituting in place of the successive -moments or years of an individual life, from the formation of the -ovum to the fully developed animal, the successive generations of any -imaginable series of animals, the question is not merely what we can -definitely conceive, or how successfully we can construct a theory. -It is whether the supposed analogy will hold; whether we can find -that in the two cases development takes place in the same way or in -a way that is so nearly alike in the two cases as to warrant us in -reasoning from the one to the other. In the case of the development of -the single cell into the mature animal, although we can not, either -before or after birth, detect the changes that are taking place from -minute to minute, the infinitesimal accretions or losses, we know that -there is a perpetual and unbroken connection of life maintained from -the moment when the fœtus is formed to the moment when the mature -animal stands before us. Break this connection anywhere in the process -of development, and life is destroyed; the development is at once -arrested. It is this connection that constitutes, as I presume, what -the learned author calls the "appropriate conditions," in the case of -the production of the individual animal; it is, at all events, the one -grand and indispensable condition to the development of the cell into -the fœtus, of the fœtus into the newly born child, and of the child -into the man. Now, if we are to reason from this case of individual -development to the other case of successive generations of creatures -differing from each other in the same or any other ratio in which -the perfect man differs from the ovum, the fœtus, or the newly born -child, which are all successive stages of one and the same individual -life, we ought to find in the successive generations of the different -creatures some bond of connection, some continuity of lives with lives, -some perpetuation from one organism to another, that will constitute -the "appropriate conditions" for a corresponding development from a -single cell through the successive types of animal life into the human -race. Without such connection, continuity, perpetuation from organism -to organism, shown by some satisfactory proof, we have nothing but a -theory, and a theory that is destitute of the grand conditions that -will alone support the analogy between the two cases. If anywhere in -the supposed chain of successive generations of different animals the -continuity of animal and animal is broken, the hypothesis of special -creations of new organisms must come in: for we must remember that -we are reasoning about animal life, and if the continuity of lives -with one another is interrupted, the series terminates, just as the -series between the ovum, the fœtus, the child, and the man terminates, -at whatever stage it is interrupted by a cause that destroys the -mysterious principle of life. It is therefore absolutely necessary to -look for some proof which will show that in the supposed series of -successive generations of animals out of antecedent types, by whatever -gradations and in whatever space of time we may suppose the process -of evolution to have been worked, there has been a continuity of life -between the different types, a perpetuation of organism from organism, -a connection of lives with lives. - -We now come to another supposed analogy, on which great stress is laid -by the evolution school, and especially by Mr. Spencer. Individuals -of the same family are found to be marked by striking peculiarities -of structure, ancestral traits, which appear and disappear and then -appear again, in successive generations. This is obviously a case where -the "appropriate conditions" are all comprehended in the connection -of life with life. When we trace the pedigree of a single man or any -other individual animal back to a remote pair of ancestors, we connect -together in an unbroken chain the successive generations of parents -and offspring. If the chain is anywhere broken, so that direct descent -can not be traced throughout the series, we can not by direct evidence -carry the peculiarities of family traits any further back than the -ancestor or pair of ancestors with which we can find an unbroken -connection of life with life. We do indeed often say in common parlance -that an individual must have a trace of a certain blood in his veins, -because of certain peculiarities of structure, complexion, or other -tokens of descent, even when we can not find a perfect pedigree -which would show where the infusion of the supposed blood came in. -But although it might be allowable, in making out the descent of an -individual man or any other animal, from a certain ancestor or pair of -ancestors, to aid the pedigree by strong family or race resemblance, -even when a link is wanting, it could only be for the purpose of -establishing a pedigree, a connection of lives with lives, that such -collateral evidence could be resorted to. If by direct proof of an -unbroken descent a full pedigree is made out, or if, when some link is -wanting, the collateral proof from strong family or race resemblances -is sufficient to warrant the belief that the link once existed, we -might accept it as a fact that the individual descended from the -supposed ancestors in a direct line, or that some peculiarity of blood -came into his constitution at some point in the descent of individuals -from individuals.[74] - -Can we apply this mode of reasoning to the evolution of distinct types -of animals out of antecedent and different types? The very nature of -the descent or derivation that is to be satisfactorily established -requires a connection of lives with lives, just as such a connection is -required in making out the pedigree of an individual animal. We must -construct a pedigree for the different classes or types of animals -through which, by direct or collateral evidence, we can connect the -different organisms together, so as to warrant the belief that by -the ordinary process of generation these animals of widely different -organizations have been successfully developed out of each other, life -from life, organisms from organisms. The hypothesis is, that from a -single cell all the various races and types of animals have in process -of time been gradually formed out of each other, through an ascending -scale, until we reach the human race, whose race pedigree consists of a -series of imperceptible formations, back to the single cell from which -the whole series proceeded. This, we must remember, is not a case of -the evolving production of different forms of inanimate matter, but it -is the case of the evolving production of different forms of animal -life out of other preceding and different forms, by the process of -animal generation. - -Of direct evidence of this evolution of species, it can not be said -that we have any which will make it a parallel case with the direct -evidence of the descent of an individual from parents and other -ancestors. We have different animal organisms that are marked by -distinctions which compel us to regard them as separate species, and -there is no known instance in which we can directly trace a production -of one of these distinct species out of another or others by finding -a connection of lives with lives. Even in the vegetable kingdom, with -all the crosses for which Nature has made such wonderful and various -provision, we do not find such occurrences as the production of an oak -out of the seed of an apple, or the production of an orange-tree out of -an acorn. We do not gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles. There -are barriers set to miscegenation even in the vegetable world, and we -have no direct evidence that at any period in the geological history of -the earth these barriers have been crossed, and very little indirect -evidence to warrant us in believing that they ever have been or ever -will be. In the animal kingdom such barriers are extremely prominent -and certain. We not only have no direct evidence that any one species -of animal was at any period of the earth's history or in any length of -time gradually evolved out of another distinct species, but we know -that the union of the sexes and the production of new individuals can -not take place out of certain limits; that, while Nature will permit -of the crossing of different breeds of the same animal, and so will -admit of very limited variations of structure, she will not admit of -the sexual union of different species, so as to produce individuals -having a union of the different organisms, or a resultant of a third -organism of a different type from any that had preceded it. Is it, for -example, from mere taste or moral feeling that such occurrences as the -sexual union between man and beast have not been known to have produced -a third and different animal? We know that it is because the Almighty -has "fixed his canon" against such a union in the case of man and in -the cases of all the other distinct animal organisms; and to find this -canon we do not need to go to Scripture or revelation, although we may -find it there also. - -We are remitted, therefore, to indirect evidence, and in considering -this evidence we have to note that we have nothing but an imaginary -pedigree, or one hypothetically constructed, to which to apply it. In -tracing the pedigree of an individual animal, we have a certain number -of known connections of life with life; and where it becomes necessary -to bridge over a break in the connection so as to carry the line back -to an earlier ancestor, we may perhaps apply the collateral evidence -of family or race resemblance to assist in making the connection with -that particular ancestor a reasonably safe deduction. But in the case -of the hypothetical pedigree which supposes the human race to have been -evolved from a single cell through successive organisms rising higher -and higher in the scale of being, we have no known connections of lives -with lives to which to apply the collateral proofs. The collateral -proofs are not auxiliary evidence; they are the sole evidence; and -unless they are such as to exclude every other reasonable explanation -of the phenomena which they exhibit excepting that of the supposed -evolution, they can not be said to satisfy the rules of rational belief -in the hypothesis to which we apply them. - -What, then, is the indirect and collateral evidence? It consists, as -we have already seen, of two principal classes of phenomena: first, -resemblances of fœtal development which are found on comparing the -fœtal growth of different species of animals; second, resemblances in -the structure of different species of animals after birth and maturity. -These various resemblances are supposed to constitute proof of descent -from a common stock, which may be carried back in the series as far as -the resemblance can be carried, at whatever point that may be. Thus, -in comparing all the vertebrata, we find certain marked peculiarities -of structure common to the whole class: the deduction is, that all the -vertebrate animals came from a common stock. In comparing all the -mammalia, we find certain marked peculiarities of structure common -to the whole class: the deduction is that all the mammalia came from -a common stock. Going still further back in the supposed series, we -come to the amphibians, as the supposed common stock from which the -vertebrate and mammalian land animals were derived; and, comparing the -different classes of the amphibians, we find certain resemblances which -point to the fish inhabitants of the water as their common stock; and -then we trace the more highly organized fishes through the more lowly -organized back to the aquatic worm, which may itself be supposed to -have been developed out of a single cell.[75] - -The resemblances of structure, wherever we make the comparison -between different species, are referable to an ideal plan of animal -construction, followed throughout a class of animals, and adjusted to -their peculiar differences which distinguish one species from another, -just as in the vegetable world there is an ideal plan of construction -of trees followed throughout a class of plants, and adjusted to the -peculiar differences which distinguish one kind of tree from another. -As between man and the monkey, or between man and the horse, or the -seal, or the bat, or the bird, there are certain resemblances in the -structure of the skeleton, which indicate an identity of plan, although -varied in its adjustments to the distinguishing structure of each -separate species of animal. In a former chapter, I have shown why the -adoption of an ideal plan of a general character is consistent with -what I have called the "economy of Nature" in the special creation of -different species. On a careful revision of the subject, I can see -no reason to change the expression, or to modify the idea which it -was intended to convey, and which I will here repeat. It is entirely -consistent with the conception of an infinite and all-wise creating -power, to suppose that in the formation of a large class of organisms, -all the constructive power that was needed for the formation of a -general plan was exercised throughout the class, and that there was -super added the exercise of all the power of variation that was needful -to produce distinct species. Repetition of the same general plan of -construction is certainly no mark of inferiority of original power, -if accompanied by adaptations to new and further conditions. It is -a proof that in one direction all the necessary power was used, and -no more, and that in producing the distinct organisms the necessary -amount of further power was also used. If we follow the resemblances of -structure that may be traced through all the animals of a varied class, -we shall find that they may be referred, as a rational and consistent -hypothesis, to this method of giving to each animal its characteristic -formation. If this is a rational hypothesis, it is so because it is -consistent with all the observable phenomena; and consequently, the -opposite hypothesis that all these phenomena of resemblances and -differences are due to the law of evolution does not exclude every -other explanation of their existence. - -To apply this now to one of the comparisons on which great stress -is laid--the comparison between the brain of man and that of the -ape. Two questions arise in this comparison: 1. Do the resemblances -necessarily show that these two animals came from a common stock? 2. -Do the resemblances necessarily show that man was descended from some -ape through intermediate animals by gradual transformations? And, when -I ask whether the comparison necessarily leads to these conclusions, -I mean to ask whether the resemblances point so strongly to the -conclusions that they must rationally be held to exclude every other -hypothesis. - -Prof. Huxley furnished to Mr. Darwin a very learned note, in which he -stated the results of all that is now known concerning the resemblances -and differences in the structure and the development of the brain in -man and the apes. The differences may be laid aside in the present -discussion, because it is not necessary, for my present purpose, to -found anything upon them. But the resemblances, just as they are stated -by the eminent anatomist, without regard to controverted details, -are the important facts to be considered. The substance of the whole -comparison is that the cerebral hemispheres in man and the higher apes -are disposed after the very same pattern in him as in them; that every -principal "gyrus" and "sulcus" of a chimpanzee's brain is clearly -represented in that of a man, so that the terminology which applies -to one answers for the other; that there is no dispute as to the -resemblance in fundamental character between the ape's brain and man's; -and that even the details of the arrangement of the "gyri" and "sulci" -of the cerebral hemispheres present a wonderfully close similarity -between the chimpanzee, orang, and man.[76] These are said to be -the result of a comparison of the adult brain of man and the higher -apes; and, although it is claimed by some anatomists that there are -fundamental differences in the mode of their development which point -to a difference of origin, this is denied by Huxley, who maintains -that there is a fundamental agreement in the development of the brain -in man and apes. His views of the facts for the purpose of the present -inquiry may be accepted without controversy, not only because he is an -authority whose statements of facts I am not disposed to dispute, but -because it is not necessary to dispute them. What, then, do they show? - -They show that there are animals known as apes and animals known as -men, whose brains are found to be fundamentally constructed upon the -same general plan, with strong resemblances throughout the different -parts of the organ; and the first question is, Do these resemblances -show that the two animals came from a common stock? Upon the theory -that man has resulted from the gradual modifications of the same form -as that from which the apes have sprung, the resemblances in the -structure of their respective brains are claimed as having a tendency -to show that there was an animal which preceded both of them, and which -was their common ancestor, in the same sense in which an individual -progenitor was the common ancestor of two other individuals, whether -one of these two individuals was or was not descended from the other in -a direct line. On the other hand, upon the hypothesis of the special -creation of the ape as one animal, and the special creation of man as -another animal, there was no common stock from which the two animals -have been derived, and the resemblances of their brains point to the -adoption of a general plan of construction for that organ, or its -construction upon the same model, and the adaptation of that model to -the other parts of the structure, and the purposes of the existence of -each of the two animals. Without again repeating the argument which -shows that the latter hypothesis is perfectly consistent with the -professed conception of the infinite power, I will now inquire whether, -on the former hypothesis, we have anything to which we can apply the -evidence of resemblance as a collateral aid in reaching the conclusion -that these two animals were derived from a common progenitor, or from -some antecedent animal whose brain and other parts of the structure -became modified into theirs by numerous intermediate gradations. - -Between the higher apes, or between any of the apes and any known -antecedent and different animal, no naturalist has discovered the -intermediate link or links. Darwin supposes that there was some -one extremely ancient progenitor from which proceeded the two main -divisions of the _Simiadæ_--namely, the Catarrhine and Platyrhine -monkeys, with their sub-groups. This extremely ancient progenitor is -nothing but a scientific hypothesis; or, to use a legal phrase, it -had nothing but a constructive existence. It is necessary to believe -in the principle of evolution, in order to work out the hypothesis -of this creature from which the two great stems of the _Simiadæ_ are -supposed to have proceeded. Here, then, we have the case of a pedigree -or succession of animal races, the _propositum_ of which has no known -existence. Next we have two known divisions of the _Simiadæ_, or -monkeys; but, between them and their imaginary common progenitor, we -have no known intermediate animals constituting the gradations of -structure from the progenitor to the descendants. The whole chain has -to be made out by tracing resemblances among the animals of a certain -class that are known, then applying these resemblances to the supposed -divergencies from the structure of a supposed progenitor, and then -drawing the conclusion that there was such a progenitor. It may be -submitted to the common sense of mankind, whether this is a state of -facts which will warrant scientists or philosophers in using toward -those who do not accept their theory quite so much of the _de haut en -bas_ style of remark as we find in the writings of Mr. Spencer.[77] -If the researches of geologists had ever discovered any remains of -an animal that would fulfill the requirements, and thus stand as the -progenitor of the _Simiadæ_. By the case would correspond to that of a -known individual from whom we undertake to trace the descent of another -individual through many intermediates; and in such a case strong family -resemblances of various kinds might possibly afford some aid in making -out the pedigree as a reliable conclusion. But there is no means of -connecting the Old World and the New World apes with any but an unknown -and imaginary, progenitor. Darwin himself frankly tells us that "the -early progenitor of the whole Simian stock, including man," is an -undiscovered animal, which may not have been identical with, or may not -even have closely resembled, any existing ape or monkey.[78] - -Passing from the supposed common progenitor to the resemblances -between the brain of the higher apes and the brain of man, we come to -the question whether these resemblances show that man was descended -from any of the Simian stock through intermediate animals by gradual -transformation. Here the case is in one respect different; for the -animals that are to be compared are known, and their respective brains -have been subjected to close anatomical scrutiny. This part of the -process of evolution begins from one true species, the ape, and ends -in another true species, the man. We are unable to trace the man and -the ape to a common progenitor race; but we find the ape possessed of -a brain which strongly resembles man's. I have searched diligently in -the writings of naturalists for a sound reason which ought rationally -to exclude the hypothesis that the brain of the ape was formed upon -the same ideal plan as the brain of man, each animal being a distinct -species and separately created. Anatomical comparison of the two -brains shows that, whether they were separately planned upon the same -general model, or the one was derived from the other by a process of -gradual transformation through successive intermediate animals, the -resemblances are consistent with either hypothesis. We are remitted, -therefore, to an inquiry for the evidence which will establish the -existence of a race or races of animals through whom there descended -to man the peculiar structure of brain found in one of the classes of -apes--namely, the Catarrhine or Old World monkeys. If such intermediate -races could be found, their existence at any period anterior to the -period of man's appearance on earth would have some tendency to -show that man was descended from one of the families of apes, and -this tendency would become stronger in proportion to the number of -successive links in the family chain that could be made out. But not -one of these links is known to have existed. There is an assumption -that man, "from a genealogical point of view, belongs to the Catarrhine -or Old World stock" of monkeys; and this assumption is claimed to be -supported by the fact that the character of his brain is fundamentally -the same as theirs. - -A brain is an organ which, upon the hypothesis of an independent -creation of distinct species of animals, would be expected to be found -in very numerous species, although they might differ widely from -each other. In all the vertebrate animals this organ is the one from -which, by its connection with the spinal chord, the central portion -of the nervous system, that system descends through the arches of -the vertebræ, and thence radiates to the various other organs of -the body. The brain is the central seat of sensation, to which are -transmitted, along certain nerves, the impressions produced upon or -arising in the other organs; and it is the source from which voluntary -activity is transmitted along other nerves to organs and muscles that -are subjected to a power of movement from within. The office which -such an organ performs in a complex piece of animal mechanism is -therefore the same in all the vertebrate animals in which it is found; -and it would necessarily be found to be constructed upon the same -uniform plan, and with just the degree of uniformity and adaptation -which would fit it to perform its office in the particular species -of animal to which it might be given. In point of fact, we find this -office of the brain performed in all the vertebrate animals upon the -same uniform plan, with the necessary adaptations to the various -structures of the different animals. Resemblances, therefore, in the -convolutions of different parts of this organ, as found in different -vertebrate animals, however close they may be, prove nothing more than -the adoption of a general plan for the production of objects common -to the whole class of the vertebrate animals; and unless we can find -other and independent proof that one species was descended from another -by connection of lives with lives through successive generations, -the hypothesis of special creations of the different species is not -excluded by the facts. - -Let us now further examine the supposed kinship of man with the -monkey, as evidenced by the similarity of the structure of the -brains of the two animals, in reference to the supposed process of -evolution as the means of accounting for the origin of two species -so essentially distinct. How has it happened that different species -have become completed and final types, transmitting, after they have -become completed, one and the same type, by the ordinary process of -generation, and not admitting of the sexual union with any other -distinct species? On the theory of the evolution of animal out of -animal, we must suppose that at some time the secondary causes of -natural and sexual selection have done their work. It ends in the -production of a species which thereafter remains one and the same -animal, and Nature has established a barrier to any sexual union with -any other species. If we give the rein to our imaginations, and, taking -the process of evolution as it is described to us, suppose that in the -long course of countless ages the struggle for existence among very -numerous individuals has led to gradual transformations of structure -which the sexual selection has transmitted to offspring, and so a new -animal has at length been formed through the successive "survivals of -the fittest," we reach an animal of a new species, and that species, -under no circumstances, produces any type but its own, so far as we -have any means of knowledge. All the knowledge respecting the ape that -has been accumulated shows only that this species of animal, since it -became a completed type, has procreated its own type and no other. -Whatever struggle for existence the individuals of this type have had -to undergo, whatever modifications of structure or habits of life the -survival of the fittest individuals of this type may have produced -from the earliest imaginable period until the present time, the fact -remains that this species of animal is a completed and final product. -At the same time we have another completed and final type of animal -known as man, which, so long as he has been known at all, is a distinct -and peculiar species. Between the brain of this animal and the brain -of the other we find certain strong resemblances. In each of them -this organ is a structure performing the same office in the animal -mechanism, with adaptations peculiar to the varying structure of each -of them. In order to justify the conclusion that the one animal is a -modified descendant from the other, so as to exclude the hypothesis -that the resemblances of any one or of all of their respective organs -was a result of the adoption of a general plan in special creations of -distinct species, we ought to find some instance or instances in which -the completed animal called the ape has been developed into an animal -approaching more nearly to man than the man, as he is first known to -us, approached to the first ape that is known to us. Without such -intermediate connections, the analogy of the descent of individuals -from other individuals of the same species will not hold. There is -nothing left but resemblances of structure in one or more organs, which -are just as consistent with the hypothesis of special creations as with -that of evolution. Strong resemblances of structure and in the offices -of different organs may be found between man and the horse, but upon -no theory of evolution has it been suggested that man is descended -from the horse, or from any other animal to which he bears more or -less resemblance, excepting the monkey; and it is quite possible that -naturalists have been led unconsciously to make this exception by -external resemblances of the monkey and the man, by the imitative power -of the inferior animal when it comes in contact with man, and by some -of its habits when found in its wild and native haunts. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [69] "Biology," i, pp. 346-348 _et seq._ - - [70] Concerning the nebular hypothesis, and what astronomers now - consider, see _post._ - - [71] "Biology," i. - - [72] "Biology," i, pp. 349, 350. - - [73] "Biology," i, p. 351. I am not quite sure that I understand - what Mr. Spencer means by "direct" proof. In the passage immediately - following the sentence last quoted, he speaks of "the kind and - quantity of _direct evidence_ that all organic beings have gradually - arisen," etc., whereas, in a previous passage, he had admitted that - the facts at present assignable in _direct_ proof of this hypothesis - are insufficient. I presume he meant insufficient in number. (Compare - "Biology," i, pp. 351 and 352). Now, I should say that _direct_ proof - of the hypothesis that all animal organisms have arisen successively - out of one another would require more or less positive evidence of - such occurrences; and that the proof which is afforded by what has - taken place within the limits of a single species in the course of - successive generations would be _indirect_ evidence of what may have - taken place in the evolution of different species, because it requires - the aid of analogy to connect the two. I am not aware that there is - supposed to be any proof of the evolution of species out of species, - excepting that which is derived from what has taken place in single - races in the development of the ovum into the infant, the development - of the infant into the mature animal, and the limited varieties of - structure appearing among individuals of the same race. As I go on - through the examination of Mr. Spencer's argument, it will appear - whether there are grounds for regarding this kind of reasoning as - satisfactory or the reverse. - - [74] I have stated here, in reference to the pedigree of an - individual, a far more liberal rule of evidence than would probably be - allowed in courts of justice, where anything of value was depending - upon the establishment of a descent from a certain ancestor. But I - have purposely suggested the broadest rule that can be applied to - family or race resemblances as a means of aiding a pedigree in popular - determination or in a _judicium rusticum_. For example, suppose that - there were persons now living in this country who trace their descent - from the English husband of Pocahontas, the daughter of an Indian - chief, and from her. They bear, we will suppose, the family name of - the Englishman whom she is known to have married, and perhaps one of - them bears very strong resemblance to the Indian race in features, - complexion, and hair. In a judicial trial of this person's supposed - pedigree I do not suppose that these resemblances, if they constituted - his sole evidence, together with the name of Rolfe which he bears, and - which a certain number of his ancestors may have borne before him, - would be received as evidence of his descent from the Indian girl - whose name was Pocahontas, and who married an Englishman of the name - of Rolfe more than two centuries ago. It would be necessary to make - some proof of the whole pedigree by the kind of evidence which the law - admits in such cases, and then the resemblances of the individual to - the Indian race might possibly be received as confirmatory proof, in - aid of the proof derived from the family name of Pocahontas's English - husband, from reputation, written or oral declarations of deceased - witnesses, family documents, ancient gravestones, and the like. In - popular judgment most persons would be apt to accept the family name - of Rolfe and the apparent trace of Indian blood as sufficient proof of - the descent of the individual from the Indian girl who married John - Rolfe. But in a court of justice these facts would go for nothing - without some independent proof of the pedigree. - - [75] See the table of the Darwinian pedigree of man, _ante_. Any - other mode of arranging the order of evolution that will admit of the - application of the steps of supposed development to what is known of - the animal kingdom, will equally serve to illustrate the theory. - - [76] Darwin's "Descent of Man," Prof. Huxley's note, p. 199 _et seq._ - - [77] Mr. Spencer observes that the hypothesis of special creations is - one "which formulates absolute ignorance into a semblance of positive - knowledge...." Thus, however regarded, the hypothesis of special - creations turns out to be worthless--worthless by its derivation; - worthless in its intrinsic incoherence; worthless as absolutely - without evidence; worthless as not satisfying a moral want. "We must - therefore consider it as counting for nothing, in opposition to any - other hypothesis respecting the origin of organic beings." There is a - great deal more in the same tone. (See "Biology," i, pp. 344, 345, and - _passim_ throughout Chapters II and III of Part III of that work.) Mr. - Darwin, who is sufficiently positive, is much more moderate, and in my - opinion a much better reasoner, although I can not subscribe to his - reasoning or his conclusions. A rather irreverent naval officer of my - acquaintance once extolled a doctrinal sermon, which he had just heard - preached by a Unitarian clergyman, in this fashion: "I tell you what, - sir, the preacher did not leave the Trinity a leg to stand upon." - Probably some of Mr. Spencer's readers think that he has equally - demolished the doctrine of special creations. - - [78] "Descent of Man," p. 155. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - The doctrine of evolution, according to Herbert Spencer, further - considered. - - -In the last two preceding chapters I have examined what Mr. Spencer -regards as the direct supports of the doctrine of evolution. I have now -to consider the different orders of facts which, as he claims, yield to -it indirect support. These are the facts derived from classification, -from embryology, from morphology, and from distribution. An explanation -is here needful of the sense in which he uses these respective terms, -before the reader, who is not accustomed to them, is called upon to -understand and appreciate the argument: - -1. By classification is meant an arrangement of organic beings in some -systematic manner, according to attributes which they have in common, -and which may form the principle of a division into different classes -or families. Pointing out that in the early history of botanical and -zoölogical science the tendency was to make classifications according -to a single characteristic, Mr. Spencer reminds us that later -naturalists, by attending to a greater number of characteristics, -and finally to the greatest number that can be found to be common to -various classes of vegetable and animal organisms, have constructed -systems of classification which, in place of a linear or a serial -order, have exhibited the alliances of different groups, then the -sub-groups, and the sub-sub-groups, so that the divergences and -redivergences become developed, while the resemblances which obtain -are preserved throughout the whole class. But it is at once apparent -that, although classification, on whatever principle it is conducted, -may be valuable as a means of fixing in the mind the resemblances -or differences of structure that obtain in the different orders -of organized beings, as, for example, among the vertebrate or the -invertebrate animals, the flowering or the flowerless plants, the seeds -naked or the seeds inclosed in seed-vessels, yet that any other system -of classification, based upon other resemblances or differences which -actually present means of grouping or separating the different families -of organized beings, is just as valuable an aid in the investigation of -facts. How far any classification affords an argument, or the means of -constructing an argument, which will yield a support to the doctrine of -evolution superior to that which it yields to the doctrine of special -creations, is of course a question. - -2. Embryology: This is the term employed to express that branch of -inquiry which is concerned in a comparison of the increase of different -organisms through the stages of their embryonic life, and in noting -at different stages of this growth the characters which they have -in common with each other; the resemblances of structure which at -corresponding phases of a later embryonic stage are displayed by a less -extensive multitude of organisms; and so on step by step, until we find -the class of resembling embryos becoming narrower and narrower, and -then we finally end in the species of which a particular embryo is a -member. This process of tracing and eliminating embryonic resemblances -is said to have "a profound significance"; because, beginning with -a great multitude of resemblances between the embryonic development -of different organisms, it reveals the divergences which they take -on, and through every successive step we find new divergences, by -means of which "we may construct an embryological tree, expressing -the developmental relations of the organisms, resembling the tree -which symbolizes their classificatory relations." We thus arrive at -"that subordination of classes, orders, genera and species, to which -naturalists have been gradually led," and which is said to be "that -subordination which results from the divergence and redivergence -of embryos, as they all unfold."[79] On this mode of comparing the -embryonic development of different organized beings Mr. Spencer builds -a scientific parallelism, which indicates, as he claims, a "primordial -kinship of all organisms," and a "progressive differentiation of them," -which justifies a belief in an original stock from which they have all -been derived. In what way this method of investigation destroys or -tends to destroy the hypothesis of special creations, or how it affords -an important support to the doctrine of evolution, will be considered -hereafter.[80] - -3. Morphology, or the science of form, involves a comparison of -the structure of different organisms in their mature state; an -ascertainment of the resemblances between their structures, and of -the community of plan that exists between them. Here, as in the aids -derived from classification and embryology, it is claimed that the -fundamental likenesses of forms of structure have a meaning which is -altogether inconsistent with the hypothesis of predetermined typical -plans pursued throughout immensely varied forms of organisms. - -4. Distribution: This is the term applied to the phenomena exhibited -by the presence of different organisms in different localities of the -globe; or, as Mr. Spencer phrases it, "the phenomena of distribution -in space." These phenomena are very various. Sometimes, it is said, we -find adjacent territories, with similar conditions, occupied by quite -different faunas. In other regions, we find closely allied faunas in -areas remote from each other in latitude, and contrasted in both soil -and climate. The reasoning, as given by Mr. Darwin and adopted by Mr. -Spencer, is this: that "as like organisms are not universally or even -generally found in like habitats, nor very unlike organisms in very -unlike habitats, there is no predetermined adaptation of the organisms -to the habitats." "In other words," Mr. Spencer adds, "the facts of -distribution in space do not conform to the hypothesis of design." -The reason why they do not is claimed to be that there are impassable -barriers between the similar areas which are peopled by dissimilar -forms; whereas there are no such barriers between the dissimilar areas -which are peopled by dissimilar forms. The conclusion is, "that each -species of organism tends ever to expand its sphere of existence--to -intrude on other areas, other modes of life, other media." That is -to say, there is a constant competition among races of organisms -for possession of the fields in which they can find the means of -subsistence and expansion; and this leads to new modes of existence, -new media of life, new structures and new habitats. - -The reader can now retrace his steps, and advert to the facts that are -relied upon, under the four heads of the argument: - -1. With regard to the argument derived from classification: it is to -be observed that any system of classification is in a certain sense -artificial, and at all events is manifestly conventional. But, in -order that no injustice may be done to this branch of the argument for -evolution, I shall state it in its full force. The classifications -which naturalists make of the different organized beings according -to their resemblances and differences reveal the fact of unity amid -multiformity. This fact it is said points to propinquity of descent, -"which is the only known cause of the similarity of organic beings." -It is the bond, hidden indeed by various degrees of modification, but -nevertheless revealed to us by the classifications which display the -resemblances. Again, we have, it is said, in the influence of various -conditions of animated organisms, "the only known cause of divergence -of structure." Classification reveals to us these divergences. We have, -then, the bond of resemblances which indicate propinquity of descent, -and the divergences of structure produced by varying conditions of -life. Put the two together, and we have remarkable harmonies of -likenesses obscured by unlikenesses; and to this state of facts it is -claimed that no consistent interpretation can be given, without the -hypothesis that the likenesses and the unlikenesses were produced by -the evolution of organisms out of organisms by successive generation, -through a great lapse of time. - -This argument contains no inconsiderable amount of assumption. While -it may be true that some naturalists do not assign any cause for the -similarity which obtains among organic beings excepting their descent -from a common ancestral stock, it is not true that the similarity -of structure is inconsistent with the hypothesis of another cause, -namely, the adoption of a general plan of structure for a large class -of organisms, and an intentional variation in those parts of structure -which mark the divisions of that class into species that are very -unlike. It is true that evolutionists treat with scorn the idea of -a pattern of structure followed throughout a class of animals, but -made by designed adaptations to coalesce with differences that mark -the peculiarities which distinguish one organism of that class from -all the others. Mr. Spencer, for example, observes that "to say that -the Creator followed a pattern throughout, merely for the purpose of -maintaining the pattern, is to assign a motive which, if avowed by a -human being, we should call whimsical." - -Let us now follow this mode of disposing of the hypothesis of special -creations, by adverting to some of the facts that are adduced in its -summary condemnation; and, although the passage which I am about to -quote is found in Mr. Spencer's work under the head of morphology, the -illustration applies equally well to his argument from classification. -Speaking of fundamental likenesses of structure, he says: "Under -the immensely varied forms of insects, greatly elongated like the -dragon-fly, or contracted in shape like the lady-bird, winged like -the butterfly, or wingless like the flea, we find this character in -common--there are primarily twenty segments. These segments may be -distinctly marked, or they may be so fused as to make it difficult to -find the divisions between them. This is not all. It has been shown -that the same number of segments is possessed by all the _Crustacea_. -The highly consolidated crab, and the squilla with its long, -loosely-jointed divisions, are composed of the same number of somites. -Though, in the higher crustaceans, some of these successive indurated -rings, forming the exo-skeleton, are never more than partially marked -off from each other, yet they are identifiable as homologous with -segments, which, in other crustaceans, are definitely divided. What, -now, can be the meaning of this community of structure among these -hundreds of thousands of species filling the air, burrowing in the -earth, swimming in the water, creeping about among the sea-weed, and -having such enormous differences of size, outline, and substance, as -that no community would be suspected between them? Why, under the -down-covered body of the moth and under the hard wing-cases of the -beetle, should there be discovered the same number of divisions as in -the calcareous framework of the lobster? It can not be by _chance_ that -there exist just twenty segments in all these hundreds of thousands of -species. There is no reason to think it was _necessary_, in the sense -that no other number would have made a possible organism. And to say -that it is the result of _design_--to say that the Creator followed -this pattern throughout, merely for the purpose of maintaining the -pattern--is to assign a motive which, if avowed by a human being, we -should call whimsical. No rational interpretation of this, and hosts -of like morphological truths, can be given except by the hypothesis of -evolution; and from the hypothesis of evolution they are corollaries. -If organic forms have arisen from common stocks by perpetual -divergences and redivergences--if they have continued to inherit, more -or less clearly, the characters of ancestral races, then there will -naturally result these communities of fundamental structure among -extensive assemblages of creatures, that have severally become modified -in countless ways and degrees, in adaptation to their respective -modes of life. To this let it be added that, while the belief in an -intentional adhesion to a predetermined pattern throughout a whole -group is totally negatived by the occurrence of occasional deviations -from the pattern, such deviations are reconcilable with the belief in -evolution. As pointed out in the last chapter, there is reason to think -that remote ancestral traits will be obscured more or less according -as the superposed modifications of structure have or have not been -great or long maintained. Hence, though the occurrence of articulate -animals, such as spiders and mites, having fewer than twenty segments, -is fatal to the supposition that twenty segments was decided on for the -three groups of superior _Articulata_, it is not incongruous with the -supposition that some primitive races of articulate animals bequeathed -to these three groups this common typical character--a character which -has nevertheless, in many cases, become greatly obscured, and in some -of the most aberrant orders of these classes quite lost."[81] - -Whatever may be the explanation suggested by one or another hypothesis -as to the mode in which this uniformity of structure came to exist, it -is certain that it does exist. Twenty segments are found in hundreds -of thousands of species which are immensely different from each other -in size, outline, substance and modes of existence. Here, then, is a -plan. There is a pattern, on which all these different organisms are -constructed with a common peculiarity. It is averred that this could -not have been the result of design, because this would be to impute to -the Creator a whimsical motive, namely, that he followed the pattern -throughout a vast group of different organisms merely for the purpose -of following it. On the contrary, it may be contended that this -uniformity of plan, this repeated pattern, affords the highest probable -evidence of design; and that the supposed whimsicality of motive will -entirely disappear as soon as we reach a purpose which may have had -very solid reasons for this uniformity of structure. When we reason -about the works of the Creator, we are reasoning about the methods of -a being who, we must suppose, is governed by a purpose in all that he -does. In reasoning about the methods of such a being, it is entirely -unphilosophical to suppose that he has done anything merely for the -sake of doing it, or for the sake of exercising or displaying his -powers in repetitions that had no practical value. In order to reason -consistently with the supposed attributes of the Creator, we should -endeavor to find the value of any given pattern which we discover in a -certain very large class of organisms differing widely from each other -in other respects; and in order to find that value it is by no means -essential to make out that the particular plan of construction was -necessary to the making of any organism whatever. The true question -is, not whether twenty segments were necessary to the construction -of any organism, but whether, in each of the different species, this -peculiar number of divisions was useful to each particular organism. If -naturalists of the evolution school, instead of looking at everything -through the medium of a certain theory, would in their dissection, -for example, of the framework of the lobster, the body of the moth, -and the body of the beetle, furnish us with facts which would show -that these twenty divisions are of no use either for strength, or -resistance, or suppleness, or adaptation to what is contained within -them, we should have a body of evidence that could be claimed as -tending to overthrow the hypothesis of intentional design. They might -then speak of the repetition of this pattern as whimsical, upon the -hypothesis that it was a repetition by design. But so little is done -by this class of naturalists to give due consideration to the value -of such repetitions, and so little heed is paid to the truth that -the Creator does nothing that is useless--a truth which all sound -philosophy must assume, because it is a necessary corollary from the -attributes of the Creator--that we are left without the aid which we -might expect from these specialists in natural science. Is it, then, -impossible to discover, or even to suggest, that for each of these -organisms this number of twenty divisions had a value? If they were of -no value, we may safely conclude that they would never have existed, -unless we ignore the hypothesis of infinite wisdom and skill. That -hypothesis is a postulate without which we can not reason on the -case at all. With it, we have as a starting-point the conception of -a being of infinite perfections, who does nothing idly, nothing from -whim, nothing from caprice, and nothing that is without value to the -creature in which it is found. So that, while we can not in all cases -as yet assign that value, we have the strongest reasons for believing -that there is a value; and, instead of asserting that an extensive -community of structure throughout a great branch of the animal kingdom -has no meaning excepting upon the doctrine of evolution, it is the -part of true science to assume that it may have another meaning, and -to discover if possible what that other meaning is. This is the part -of true science, because it is the part of sound philosophy. There -is another remark to be made upon Mr. Spencer's reasoning on this -particular case of a community of pattern. He says that it can not -be imputed to _chance_. It was, then, either an intentional design, -or it came about through the process of descent "from common stocks, -which process was at the same time producing perpetual divergences and -redivergences." Without turning aside for the present to ask from how -many common stocks, it may be shown as in the highest degree probable -that the occasional deviations from the pattern did not arise by the -evolution process, because that process has in itself an element -of chance which is fatal to the theory. The assertion is that "an -intentional adhesion to a predetermined plan throughout a whole group -is totally negatived by the occurrence of occasional deviations from -the pattern." Let this assertion be examined first in the light of -facts, and secondly by the absence of facts. - -The hypothesis is that some primitive race of articulated animals, -possessed by some means of the twenty segments, transmitted this -ancestral trait to hundreds of thousands of species having no community -of structure in other respects. Unfortunately for the theory, no -figures can measure the chances against the preservation of a single -pattern through such a multitude of differing organisms descending -from a common stock. Infinity alone can express the chances against -such a result. While, according to the theory, the deviations from the -original type were constantly working out new organisms of the most -diversified forms, until there came to be hundreds of thousands of new -species differing from each other in all but this one peculiarity--a -diversity which is supposed to have been caused by the fundamental law -of evolution--how did it happen that the same law did not break this -uniformity of articulation? If it was potent enough to differentiate -the enormous multitude of these animals in all other traits, why did -it not vary the number of segments with which the primitive race -was endowed? Is the law of evolution limited or unlimited? If it is -limited in its effects, then there are patterns of animal structure -which it has not modified, and the presence of which in hundreds of -thousands of different species must be explained as a form of structure -designed for some end that was to be common to a great multitude -of different beings. If the law of evolution was unlimited in its -power, then the community of pattern has had to undergo chances of -destruction or discontinuance that are immeasurable; as there can be -no measure which will represent to the mind the infinitely diversified -and innumerable causes that have produced the dissimilarities -which compel a classification into the different species, upon the -hypothesis of their descent from a common stock. Grant, too, for the -purpose of the argument, that the occasional deviations from the -pattern of twenty segments, producing a few groups with a smaller -number of articulations, are reconcilable with the belief that some -later ancestral form became endowed with the smaller number which it -transmitted to its descendants. How came that later ancestral form -to be endowed with the smaller number of segments? Was there a still -more remote ancestral race, which in some way became possessed of the -smaller number, or did the spiders and the mites, in the countless -generations of evolution, branch off from ancestral races having the -full number of twenty segments? Upon either supposition, what an -infinity of chances there were, against the natural selection of the -smaller number, and against its preservation as the unvarying type of -articulation found in the spiders and the mites! The supposition that -the number of twenty segments was decided on for the three groups of -superior _Articulata_ for the mere sake of adhering to a pattern is -doubtless unphilosophical. But it is not unphilosophical to suppose -that whatever amount of articulation is found in each species was -given to it because in that species it would be useful. If in some of -the most aberrant orders of these animals the articulation is greatly -obscured, or not found at all, the conclusion that it was not needed, -or not needed in a like degree, is far more rational than the theory -which commits the particular result to an infinity of chances against -it; or which supposes it to have been worked by a process that might -have produced a very different result, since it can not be claimed that -natural selection works by methods of which any definite result can be -predicated more than another. - -Thus far I have considered Mr. Spencer's argument from the _Articulata_ -in the light of the facts that he adduces. Let us now test it by the -absence of facts. In a former discussion, I have asked for facts -which show, aside from the theory, that any one species of animal, -distinctly marked as a continuing type, is connected by intermediate -types or forms with any pre-existing race of another character. Take -this class of the articulated animals, said to be of hundreds of -thousands of different species having no community of form but this -of articulation, and now known as perfect organisms, each after its -kind. What naturalist has discovered the continuity of lives with -lives, which would furnish the steps of descent of any one of this -species from an antecedent and a different species? It is very easy -to construct a theory, and from it to argue that there must have been -intermediate links, which, if discovered, would show the continuity -of lives from lives which the descent of one organism from another -necessarily implies. To a certain extent, within certain limits, the -sub-groups and the sub-sub-groups of the articulated class of animals, -which classification or morphology reveals, may lay the foundation for -a theoretical belief in an ancestral stock from which the different -and now perfect forms of these distinct animals may have become -developed by successive changes of structure. But the extent to which -connected changes can be actually traced in the animal kingdom is -extremely limited; and the important practical question is whether any -one fact, or class of facts, has been discovered which will warrant -the belief that beings of totally dissimilar forms and habits of -life have, without any design, been evolved by the ordinary process -of successive generation, through the operation of causes that have -gradually modified the structure in all respects save one, and have at -the same time enabled or allowed that one peculiarity of structure to -escape from the influences which have modified both structure and modes -of life in every other respect. Why, for example, upon the hypothesis -of descent from a common stock, has that stock deviated under the -influences of natural selection into the lobster, the moth, and the -beetle, and yet the community of twenty segments of articulation -has entirely escaped the effect of those influences? No reason can -be assigned for the fact that it has escaped those influences, -excepting that it was originally designed, and was impressed upon the -proto-typical stock with such force as to place it beyond the reach -of all such causes of modification as those which are ascribed to -natural or sexual selection. Without the latter supposition, those -causes were just as potent to bring about a modification in the number -of articulations as they were to bring about all the astonishing -diversities of structure and modes of life that we see, and therefore -the most probable conclusion from the fact of this uniformity of the -twenty segments is, that there was a barrier placed in this whole -class of organisms, which has limited the modifying force of the -supposed process of evolution, for the reason of some peculiar utility -in this plan of articulation. - -Perhaps it will be said that the process of evolution itself tends to -the preservation of whatever is most useful, while the modifications -are going on which develop new organs and new structures; and that -thus, in the case before us, the twenty segments have been preserved -throughout an enormous group by one of the fundamental laws of -evolution, so that, if there is any peculiar utility in the twenty -segments, that utility has been answered by the very process of gradual -descent of one organism from another. But the difficulty with this -reasoning is, that while it assumes for the modifying influences of -natural and sexual selection a range of fortuitous causes sufficient to -change the ancestral type into the acquisition of vastly diversified -organs, powers, and modes of existence, so as to constitute new -animals, it yet assumes that, by some recognition of a superior and -paramount utility in the particular number of segments, the law of -evolution has preserved that number from the influence of causes -which have changed everything else. Now, the range of causes which -was sufficiently varied, accidental, long-continued and complex to -produce the diversities of structure in all other respects, by the -infinitely modifying influences which have developed new organs and -new modes of existence, must also have been of a sufficiently varied, -accidental, long-continued, and complex character to have broken this -plan of the twenty segments, unless we suppose that in some mysterious -and inexplicable manner the different generations of these beings were -endowed with some kind of sagacity which would enable them to strive -for the preservation of this one peculiarity, or unless we suppose that -Nature was ever on the watch to guard them from its destruction or -variation, on account of its peculiar utility. The first supposition is -not in accordance with the evolution theory; for that theory rejects -all idea of conscious exertion on the part of any of the organisms. -The second supposition leads us at once to the inquiry, how came it -to be imposed upon a whole group of beings as a law of nature, that -whatever utility of structure was of paramount importance to the -whole group should be preserved against the modifying influences that -were to produce species differing absolutely from each other, through -hundreds of thousands of varieties, in every other feature of their -existence? Can we get along here without the hypothesis of design? And, -if there was such design, how does the fact of this uniformity amid -such diversity become an argument against the hypothesis of a Creator? -Or, how does it tend to displace the hypothesis of special creations, -when we find that the very process of so-called evolution has failed -to break the uniformity of a pattern that is conceded not to have been -the result of chance, although that pattern was exposed to just as -many and as powerful causes of modification as those which are assumed -to have brought about the modifications in every other feature of the -animal existence? The truth would seem to be, that the uniformity amid -so great a diversity was either the result of a design which placed it -out of the reach of all the modifying influences, or else it has, by a -most incalculable result, escaped from the effect of those influences -by a chance in which the ratio of one to infinity can alone measure the -probability of such an escape. - -Let us now advert to another of Mr. Spencer's illustrations of the -futility of the "supernatural" and of the rationality of the "natural" -interpretation.[82] This illustration is derived from what are -called "homologous" organs; and the particular instance selected is -the vertebral column.[83] There are creatures, such as snakes, a low -order of the vertebrate kingdom, in which the bony axis is divided -into segments of about the same dimensions from end to end, for the -obvious advantage of flexibility throughout the whole length of the -animal. But in most of the higher vertebrata, some parts of this axis -are flexible and others are inflexible; and this is especially the case -in that part of the vertebral column called the sacrum, which is the -fulcrum that has to bear the greatest strain to which the skeleton is -exposed, and which is yet made not of one long segment or vertebra, -but of several segments "fused together." Mr. Spencer says: "In man -there are five of these confluent sacral vertebræ; and in the ostrich -tribe they number from seventeen to twenty. Why is this? Why, if the -skeleton of each species was separately contrived, was this bony mass -made by soldering together a number of vertebræ like those forming the -rest of the column, instead of being made out of one single piece? And -why, if typical uniformity was to be maintained, does the number of -sacral vertebræ vary within the same order of birds? Why, too, should -the development of the sacrum be the roundabout process of first -forming its separate constituent vertebræ, and then destroying their -separativeness? In the embryo of a mammal or bird, the substance of the -vertebral column is, at the outset, continuous. The segments that are -to become vertebræ, arise gradually in the midst of this originally -homogeneous axis. Equally in those parts of the spine which are to -remain flexible, and in those which are to grow rigid, these segments -are formed, and that part of the spine which is to compose the sacrum, -having passed out of its original unity into disunity by separating -itself into segments, passes again into unity by the coalescence of -these segments. To what end is this construction and reconstruction? -If, originally, the spine in vertebrate animals consisted from head to -tail of separate movable segments, as it does still in fishes and some -reptiles--if, in the evolution of the higher vertebrata, certain of -these movable segments were rendered less movable with respect to each -other, by the mechanical conditions to which they were exposed, and at -length became relatively immovable--it is comprehensible why the sacrum -formed out of them should continue ever after to show more or less -clearly its originally segmented structure. But on any other hypothesis -this segmented structure is inexplicable." - -We here see the predominating force of a theory which refuses all -possible rationality to any hypothesis but its own. The confident tone -with which facts are arrayed and are then pronounced inexplicable -upon any other hypothesis than that which the writer asserts, without -one scintilla of proof of their tendency to exclude every other -supposition, renders the refutation of such reasoning a wearisome -task. But there is here one plain and sufficient answer to the whole -of the supposed difficulty. The evolution theory, in this particular -application of it, is that originally there were vertebrate animals -in which the spine consisted of separate movable segments from head -to tail, as it does now in fishes and reptiles; but, as the higher -vertebrata were evolved out of these lower forms, the movable segments -were rendered less movable with respect to each other, and at length -in the sacrum the segments became relatively immovable, and yet the -originally segmented structure was retained in this part of the -column, by force of the propinquity of descent from an antecedent type -which had the whole column divided into movable segments. Upon no other -hypothesis, it is asserted, is this result explicable. - -Mr. Spencer's analysis of the sacrum is somewhat defective. It is, as -he says, that part of the vertebrate column which in the higher class -of vertebrate animals is, during fœtal life, composed, like all the -rest of the column, of distinct vertebræ. These vertebræ, like the -others, are flexible in the fœtal stage, but after birth they become -coalesced or united into one piece, instead of remaining in separate -pieces. Thus far, Mr. Spencer's description is, I am informed by -anatomists, correct. But the questions which he propounds as if they -were unanswerable upon the assumption that this change is inexplicable -upon any other hypothesis than that of the evolution of the higher -vertebrata out of the lower vertebrate animals, and that the sacrum, -with its continuous piece, has retained the segmented outward form by -force of the descent, demand closer consideration. Let us trace the -process of formation in the human species, and then see what is the -just conclusion to be derived from it. In the embryonic condition, -the substance which is to form the vertebral column is continuous. -As the fœtus is developed, this substance separates itself into -the segments which are called vertebræ, and these segments remain -flexible and movable throughout the column. After birth, the five -lower segments become united in what is substantially one piece, -but of course the marks of the original segments remain. This is -what occurs in the origin and growth of the individual. Now, looking -back to the period when this species of animal did not exist, and -supposing it to have been specially created in the two related forms -of male and female, endowed with the same process of procreation and -gestation that has been going on ever since there is any recorded or -traditionary knowledge of the race, why should not this very growth -of the sacrum have been designed, in order to produce, after the -birth of the individual, that relative rigidity which would in this -part of the vertebral column be useful to an animal destined to an -upright posture of the whole skeleton and to the habits and life of -a biped? And, if we extend the inquiry to other species, why should -we not expect to find, as in the case of an oviparous vertebrate like -the ostrich, a repetition of the same general plan of forming the -spinal column, for the same ultimate purpose, with such a variation in -the number of original segments that are to constitute the sacrum as -would be most useful to that bird, thus establishing for the ostrich -a sacrum that in a reptile or a fish would not only not be required, -but would be a positive incumbrance? Upon the hypothesis of special -creations of the different species of vertebrate animals, every one -of Mr. Spencer's questions, asked as if they were unanswerable, can -receive a satisfactory solution. Thus, he asks, "Why, if the skeleton -of each species was separately contrived, was this bony mass [the -sacrum] made by soldering together a number of vertebræ like those -forming the rest of the column, instead of being made [aboriginally] -in one single piece?" The answer is, that in the establishment of -the process of gestation and fœtal growth, if a human artificer and -designer could have devised the process, he would have selected the -very one that now exists, for certain obvious reasons. First, he would -have designedly made the process to consist, in the embryo, of a -division of the substance which was to form the vertebral column in a -continuous and uniform division into segments, because the whole column -is to have at first the flexibility that may be derived from such a -division. Secondly, when the time was to arrive at which the formation -of the sacrum, with its practical continuity of a single piece, was -to commence, he would select the number of the lower vertebræ that -would make a sacrum most useful to the particular species of animal, -and would weld them together so as to give them the relative rigidity -and action of a single piece. But as the whole formation is the result -of a growth of the sacrum out of a part of the slowly forming column -originally divided into vertebræ, the marks of these separate vertebræ -would remain distinguishable, while they would cease to have the -mechanical action of separate vertebræ. - -Another of Mr. Spencer's questions is, "Why, if typical uniformity was -to be maintained, does the number of sacral vertebræ vary within the -same order of birds?" The answer is the same as that which assigns -a reason for all other variations in the skeleton of animals of the -same order but of different varieties, namely, the special utility -of the variations in the number of sacral vertebræ that would be -most useful in that variety. The typical uniformity maintained is a -uniformity in the process of growth and formation, down to a point -where the variations are to come in which mark one animal from another; -and I have more than once had occasion to suggest that the typical -uniformity, and its adaptation to the varying requirements of different -beings, is the highest kind of moral evidence of the existence, wisdom, -and power of a supreme artificer, and that it militates so strongly -against the doctrine of evolution that, without more proof than can -possibly be claimed for that doctrine, we ought not to yield to it our -belief. - -The theory that the original condition of all vertebrate animals was -that of separate movable segments throughout the spinal column, as it -is now in fishes and some reptiles, and that in the evolution of the -higher vertebrates out of these lower forms, certain of these movable -segments were rendered less movable with respect to each other by -the mechanical conditions to which the successive generations were -exposed, until at length the sacrum was formed, is undoubtedly a theory -that excludes all design of an infinite artificer, and all intention -whatever. It is a theory which relegates the most special contrivances -and the most exact adaptations to the fortuitous operation of causes -that could not have produced the variations of structure and at the -same time have preserved the typical uniformity. It is certainly a -theory which we should not apply to the works of man, if we were -investigating products which seemed to be the result of human ingenuity -and skill, but of the origin of which we had no direct evidence. In -such a case, we should not shut our eyes to the proofs of intentional -variations and adaptation, or, if we did, our speculations would not -be likely to command the assent of cultivated and sound reasoners. We -may treat the works of Nature by a system of logic that we should not -apply to the works of man, but if we do, we shall end in no tenable -results. The principal and in fact the only essential distinction to -be observed between the works of Nature and the works of man relates -to the degree of power, intelligence, and skill in the actor. If we -assume, as we must, that in the one case there was an actor, applying -will, intelligence, and power to the properties of matter, and molding -it into certain products and uses, and that in the other case there -was no actor, but that all products and results are but the ungoverned -effects of what are called natural laws in contradistinction to all -intentional purposes, we must argue upon principles that are logically -and diametrically inconsistent in themselves, and at variance with -fundamental laws of reasoning. - -I will now advert to an omission in Mr. Spencer's analysis of the -sacrum, which overlooks one of the strongest proofs of intentional -design afforded by that part of the spinal column. We have seen what -was its general purpose and growth, and the process of its formation. -We have now to note its variations in the male and the female skeleton. -In the male, the sacrum, thus formed before birth, after birth answers -to and performs its ultimate function of a comparatively rigid and -inflexible piece of bone, and it is provided with no other special -characteristic. In the female, on the contrary, there is a most -remarkable adaptation of this piece to the function of maternity. While -all the upper vertebræ of which this piece was originally composed -are welded together after birth in the female as in the male, in the -female the lowest segment of all remains for a certain time flexible -relatively to the upper part of the sacrum, in order to admit of the -necessary expansion of the pelvis during the passage of the infant -from the womb of the mother. In the normal condition of females of -all the vertebrate orders, this flexibility of the lower part of the -sacrum continues while the period of possible maternity continues. If -in any individual female it happens to be wanting during the period -of possible conception, delivery can not take place without danger -to the mother or the offspring, or both. Hence, in very bad cases, -nature has to be assisted by extraordinary means. But in the normal -condition of the female sacrum, this flexibility, so essential in the -process of safe delivery, is always found, and its special purpose is -known to every anatomist, while it has no existence in the structure -of the male. Is this distinction to be accounted for by the same -kind of reasoning that undertakes to account for all the other great -distinctions between the related forms of male and female, which -reproduce their kind by a common process of the sexual union, namely, -that this division of male and female came about by a habit that -resulted now in the production of a male and now in the production -of a female, from tendencies that were ungoverned by any special -purpose? Must we not conclude, however inscrutable are the causes that -determine the sex of a particular infant, that the sexes themselves -were specially ordained? And if they were specially ordained, how are -we to account for the special construction and function of each of -them, without the interposition of a special design? And when we find -a structure in the female obviously designed for a special purpose, and -not existing in the male, are we to conclude that some particular race -of females, in some remote period of antiquity, among the countless -generations of the vertebrata, found that this flexibility of the -sacrum would be highly convenient to them, and, having adopted it -as a habit, transmitted it, as a specially acquired peculiarity of -structure, to their female descendants? This is all very well as a -theoretical speculation, but as a speculation it is entirely defective, -because it assigns the peculiarity of structure to a cause that could -not have produced it. On the other hand, the hypothesis of its special -creation assigns it to a cause that could have produced it, and its -existence is among the highest of the multitudinous evidences of -intentional design and special formation. - -Wherein consists the irrationality of the hypothesis that a plan of -construction was intentionally, and with supreme skill, framed for -very different beings, to answer in each of them a common purpose? The -asserted irrational character of this hypothesis consists in nothing -but a denial that there was a Creator. It comes down to this, if it -comes to anything: because, if we assume that there was a Supreme Being -who took any care whatever of the complex and manifold product that we -call nature--if we suppose that he ordained anything--we must suppose -that his power to construct was boundless, and that a repetition of -his plans wherever they would be useful, to answer the beneficent -and diversified ends of infinite skill and benevolence, is just as -much in accordance with the whole hypothesis of his attributes as it -is to suppose that he caused anything whatever to exist. If we deny -his existence, if we can not satisfy ourselves of it at all, if we -suppose that nothing was ordained, nothing was created, but that all -these diversified forms of animal organisms grew out of a protoplasmic -substance, and that there was never any absolute commencement of -organic life on the globe, or any absolute commencement of anything -whatever, it is of course idle to speculate upon the adoption or -preservation of patterns, as it is equally idle to pursue the theory of -evolution through stages which at last end nowhere whatever.[84] - -It may be well to cite Mr. Spencer's final summary of the general -truths which he claims to be revealed by morphology, because it will -enable the reader to see just where the logical inconsequence of his -position occurs: "The general truths of morphology thus coincide -in their implications. Unity of type, maintained under extreme -dissimilarities of form and mode of life, is explicable as resulting -from descent with modification; but is otherwise inexplicable. The -likenesses disguised by unlikenesses, which the comparative anatomist -discovers between various organs in the same organisms, are worse than -meaningless if it be supposed that organisms were severally formed as -we now see them; but they fit in quite harmoniously with the belief -that each kind of organism is a product of accumulated modifications -upon modifications. And the presence, in all kinds of animals and -plants, of functionally useless parts corresponding to parts that are -functionally useful in allied animals and plants, while it is totally -incongruous with the belief in a construction of each organism by -miraculous interposition, is just what we are led to expect by the -belief that organisms have arisen by progression."[85] - -Without expending much criticism upon the phrase "miraculous -interposition," as a description of what takes place in special -creation, it is sufficient to say that the act of special creation of a -distinct organism is to be first viewed by itself, as if it stood alone -in nature, and that it is like any other act of causing a new thing -to exist which did not exist before. To this idea should be added -the fact that in the creation of an animal organism there is involved -the direct formation of a peculiar type of animal, with a capacity -of producing other individuals of the same type through a process of -generation. When, after having attained this conception of the act of -special creation, and contemplated a single instance of the supposed -exercise of such a power, we extend our inquiries, we find many other -instances of the exercise of the same power; and then we observe a -certain unity of type in some peculiarity of structure, maintained -under extreme dissimilarities of form and mode of life. How, then, -is this one similarity of pattern, amid such multiformity in other -respects, "worse than meaningless," if we suppose that "organisms were -severally framed as we now see them"? The very hypothesis that they -were so severally framed carries in itself a meaning which can not be -thus summarily ignored; because that hypothesis implies a power in the -Creator to do just what we see. You may deny the power; but if you -admit the existence of the infinite creating power, you are remitted -to the inquiry into its probable methods; and you can no more say that -the special creation of distinct organisms, with a certain unity amid -a great multiformity, leaves the whole phenomena without a meaning, -than you can say that any method which you can suggest is necessarily -the only method which will afford a rational meaning in what we see. -You must go the length of denying the entire postulate of a Creator, -before you can be in a situation to deny the meaning that is involved -in the idea of creation; for that idea implies an absolute power to -apply a uniform pattern of structure to a whole class of organisms -varied in all other respects. The theory that each kind of organism -is a product of accumulated modifications upon modifications, without -any special interposition to produce the modified and distinct forms, -must be maintained on one of two suppositions: either that at some -period there was an absolute commencement of organic life in some form, -upon this globe, and that then all the other forms which we see were -left to be evolved out of that one by the ungoverned accumulation of -modifications upon modifications, or else that there was never any -absolute commencement of organic life at any time, but that matter, -by some peculiar property derived from some source that is not -suggested, took on combinations which resulted in some crude form of -animated organism, and that then the accumulations of modifications -upon modifications followed from some process of generation by which -the successive organisms became multiplied and varied. Of the former -supposition, I understand Mr. Darwin to have been a representative -naturalist. Of the latter, I understand Mr. Spencer to be an advocate. -Upon what may be called the Darwinian doctrine, the idea of a Creator, -causing to exist at some time some crude form of animal life, is -admitted. Upon the Spencerian doctrine, which will be in this respect -more closely examined hereafter, I do not see that the idea of a -creating power comes in anywhere, either at the commencement of a -series of organisms or at any point in that series. But, upon the -logical proposition asserted in the passage last above quoted, it is -obvious that, unless the idea of a Creator is absolutely denied, the -presence of a unity of type amid any amount of dissimilarities of form -and mode of life can not be pronounced to be without meaning, because -the idea of a Creator implies a power to make that very unity amid the -uniformity, which is asserted to be inexplicable without resorting -to the theory that it was not made at all, but that it grew out of -events over which no superintending or governing power was exercised. -Upon this kind of dogmatic assertion there can be no common ground of -reasoning. - -The assumed incongruity between the facts and the hypothesis of a -special creation of each organism is an incongruity that arises out of -the assumption that such special creation was an impossibility. If once -the idea of an infinite creating faculty is assumed as the basis of the -reasoning, all seeming incongruity vanishes, and the probable method -of that creating power must be determined by the preponderance of -evidence. If the power is denied, we must grope our way through systems -which impute everything to the properties of substance, without any -suggestion of a source from which those properties were derived, and -without anything to guide them but the tendencies implanted in them, -we know not how or when, and of the origin of which we have not even a -suggestion. Some of the speculations of Greek philosophers adverted to -in a previous chapter may serve to show us what comes of the omission -to conceive of power as abstracted from substance or its properties. -The philosophy which first attained to this conception led the way -to that conception of an Infinite Being, without whose existence and -attributes all speculation upon the phenomena of nature leads to -nothing. A belief in his existence and attributes must undoubtedly be -attained by an examination of his works, if we set aside the teachings -of revealed religion. But if we can not attain it, we have no better -means for believing in the doctrine of evolution than we have for -believing in any other method by which the phenomena of nature have -become what they are. - -The question here is, not whether descent of organisms from organisms, -with modifications upon modifications, is a supposable theory, but -whether it is so satisfactorily shown that it can be said to exclude -the hypothesis of a special creation of each organism. There may be -parts of structure in one animal which seem to have no functional use, -although we should be cautious in making the assumption that they are -of no use because we have not yet discovered that use. But let it be -assumed that these apparently useless parts in one animal correspond to -parts which in another animal are functionally useful. If there was -established for these two separately created animals a like system of -procreation and gestation, that system, affected at the same time by a -law of growth imposed by the special type of the species, might in one -species lead to the presence of parts of which we can not recognize -the use, and might in other species lead to the presence of parts of -which we can see the use. It does not help to a better explanation -to say that there has been an accumulation of modifications upon -modifications in the course of an unknown descent of one organism from -another. Why did these modifications stop short of the production of -a species or of several species in which no resemblance of parts more -or less functionally useful could be found? The supposition is that -the modifications have been going on through millions of years. Time -enough, therefore, has elapsed for the destruction of all uniformity -of structure; and the causes of modification are as immeasurable as -the period through which they are supposed to have been operating. -The imaginary ancestral stock, wherever it is placed in the line of -remote descent, had, in its first distinctive existence, a peculiar -structure, which it bequeaths to its offspring. In the countless -generations of its descendants, modifications of that structure take -place, until a new animal is evolved. What preserved any unity of -type from the modifying influences? It was not choice on the part of -the several descending species; not a conscious exertion to preserve -something; it was nothing but the propinquity of descent, which by the -law of heredity transmitted certain resemblances. But why was that -law so potent that it could preserve a certain unity of type, and at -the same time so powerless as not to prevent the modifications which -the successive organisms have undergone in all other respects? Or, to -reverse the terms of the question, why were the causes of modification -sufficiently powerful to produce distinct species, and yet not -powerful enough to eliminate the resemblances which we find obtaining -throughout the whole group of animals to which these several species -belong? It would seem that here we are not to lose sight of the fact -that, in the animal kingdom, procreation never takes place between -a male and a female of distinct species, and that we have no reason -to believe that it ever did take place. Now, although the evolution -hypothesis supposes that, starting from an ancestral stock, the -modifications of structure have been produced in offspring descended -from parents of that same stock, which have transmitted acquired -peculiarities to their immediate progeny, and so on indefinitely, yet -there must have been a time when the diverging species became distinct -and peculiar organisms, and when it became impossible for any crossing -of these organisms to take place. All the supposed modifications, -therefore, have taken place within the limits of an actual descent of -one kind of animal from another, each successive pair belonging to the -species from which they were individually generated. In this descent -of lives from lives, there came about changes which in progress of -time led to two animals as wide asunder as the man and the ostrich, -or as the man and the horse, and yet the causes which were powerful -enough to produce these widely diverging species were not powerful -enough to break up all unity of plan in some one or more respects. If -naturalists of the evolution school would explain how there has come to -be, for example, in the skeleton of the _vertebrata_, a bony structure -called the spine, in which a certain resemblance and a certain function -obtain throughout the whole class, and yet one species creeps upon its -belly, another walks on four legs, and another on two, and one flies -in the air and another never can do so, and how this could be without -any design or special interposition of a creating power, but that the -whole of this uniformity amid such diversity has arisen from acquired -habits among the different descendants from an aboriginal stock that -had no such habits in either mode of locomotion, and no organs for such -modes of life, they would at least be able to commend their theory to -a better appreciation of its claims than is now possible to those who -want "grounds more relative" than a naked hypothesis. - -3. The argument from embryology requires for its appreciation a -careful statement of its abstract proposition, and a statement of -it in a concrete form. As an abstract proposition, embryology, or -the comparison of the development of different organisms under their -embryonic stages, shows that in the earliest stage of any organism -it has the greatest number of characters in common with all other -organisms in their earliest stage; that at a later stage its structure -is like the structures displayed at corresponding phases by a less -extensive number of organisms; that at each subsequent stage the -developing embryo becomes more and more distinguished from the groups -of embryos that it previously resembled; and that this divergence goes -on, until we reach the species of which the embryo is a member, in -which the class of similar forms is finally narrowed to that species. - -It seems that Von Baer formulated this generalization of embryologic -development into an "embryologic law," which, according to Mr. -Spencer, becomes a support to the hypothesis of evolution in this way: -Species that had a common ancestry will exhibit a parallelism in the -embryonic development of their individual members. As the embryos of -the ancestral stock were developed in their growth, so the embryos of -the descended species would be developed at corresponding phases in a -similar way. As one species diverged from its ancestral stock, there -would come about modifications in the development of its embryos, and -thus a later ancestral stock would be formed, which would in turn -transmit to its descendants in the development of the embryo less and -less resemblances, and so on, until finally the individual animal, at -birth, would structurally resemble only the individual infants of its -own race. - -Here, then, is another remarkable instance of the force of an adopted -theory. First, we have a comparison of the embryonic development of -different animals from their seminal germs which displays certain -phenomena of resemblances and departures. Next, we have the assumption -of an ancestral stock, the common origin of all the organisms in the -development of whose embryos among its descendants an embryologic law -was to work, starting from the visible resemblance of all the germs, -then exhibiting structural changes into later ancestral stocks, and so -on, until the resemblances are reduced to those which obtain only among -individuals of the same species. So that, without the hypothesis, the -assumption of an ancestral stock of all the organisms, formed somehow -in the course of descent from a germ that gave rise to an animal of -some kind, we have nothing to which to apply the embryologic law. We -are to infer the embryologic law from the parallelism of embryonic -development which prevails in the whole series of animal generation, or -from its divergences, or from both, and then we draw from _this law_ -the inference that the whole series of animals came from some common -stock. The difficulty with this whole theory is, as I have more than -once suggested, that we have no means, aside from the theory itself, of -connecting lives with lives, in the generation of one distinct species -out of another. Without some proof of the fact that the human fœtus was -a diverging growth out of some ancestral stock that was the same as -that from which the fœtus of another animal was a different diverging -growth, the embryologic law is no help to us whatever. If this kinship -of the human fœtus with the fœtus of some other animal can not be -found, by tracing the intermediate links which carry them respectively -back to their common ancestor, between what animals in respect to -their embryonic development can such kinship be found, excepting upon -the theoretical assumption of a common origin of the whole vertebral -class? If there was such a common ancestral stock, where is it to -be placed, what was its character, when did the law of embryologic -development begin to operate upon its descendants? Until some facts -can be adduced which will have a satisfactory tendency to show the -kinship of one animal with another by reason of ancestral descent from -a common ancestral stock that was unlike either of them, the phenomena -of embryologic development have no tendency to displace the hypothesis -of special creations; for, on the latter hypothesis, the phenomena of -resemblances and differences in the growth from the germ into the fœtus -and from the fœtus into the newly born infant, evinced by any range of -comparison of the different species, would be the same. If man was a -special creation, and one of the higher quadrumana was also a distinct -and separate creation, the establishment for each of a like process of -procreation and gestation would produce all the resemblances of fœtal -growth that obtain between them, and the ordained differences of their -animal destinies would explain all the divergences. Let us see if this -is not a rational conclusion. - -It is exceedingly difficult for the common reader of such a work -as that of Mr. Spencer, on which I am now commenting, to avoid the -influence of the perpetual assertion that facts are explicable upon -one hypothesis alone. At each step in the argument, the array of facts -terminates with the assertion that, upon the hypothesis of design, the -facts are inexplicable; and yet we are furnished with no reasoning -that has a tendency to show that the facts necessarily exclude -the hypothesis of design, or, in other words, that the facts are -inconsistent with that hypothesis. It is essential to understand what -is the true scope of the hypothesis of special creation; for, without -a definite idea of what that term implies, we have no proper means of -comparing the facts of animal resemblances or differences with the -rationality of the hypothesis that they resulted from an intentional -design. Recollecting, then, that we are now pursuing the resemblances -and divergences that are found in a comparison of the embryologic -development of different species of animals, let us endeavor to -understand the meaning of what I have suggested at the close of the -last preceding paragraph; namely, the establishment for a large class -of animals of a like general system of procreation and gestation, and -the ordination of different destinies for the different species of -animals belonging to that class. I have said that the two branches of -this hypothesis would account for the resemblances in the embryological -growth of different animals, and would explain the divergences which -obtain among their embryological developments. The first inquiry is, -whether this hypothesis presents a true philosophic idea of special -creation. The next inquiry is, whether it affords a satisfactory -explanation of the phenomena of comparative embryologic development. - -We must never lose sight of the one grand postulate of an infinite -Creator. This postulate must be conceded to the believers in special -creations, because any idea of creation implies a creating power. If -we conceive of creation without a Creator, we must stop all argument. -Now, the hypothesis of creation, as I have more than once said, -implies a being of boundless faculties. There can be absolutely no -limitation to the power of such a being, either in respect to the -methods by which he will accomplish his objects, or to the number and -variety of these objects, or to the purposes for which they are to -exist. If we narrow our conception of creating power to anything less -than an infinite faculty; if we suppose it to be restricted in any -direction; if we argue about it as if there were things that it can not -do, we shall be without the means of reasoning soundly upon anything -that it is supposed to have done. It is quite otherwise when we are -reasoning about the operation and effect of secondary causes. There -is no secondary cause--no imaginable operation of a fixed quality of -substance--no action of any of the properties of substance--that is not -limited. The scope of its action may be very wide; within its sphere it -may be enormously potent; but in its very nature it is bounded.[86] It -is not so with the First Cause of all things; not so with the Infinite -Power which, upon the hypothesis of a First Cause, has established all -the physical laws of the universe and all the properties of matter. -So that, when we reason about the methods of that infinite creating -power, if we find a general system established, or a pattern repeated -through a very large class of organisms, the proper inference is, not -that the power was limited, but that it has been exercised to the whole -extent of what was useful, and in that direction has been exercised -no further; and if we find variations or additional structures -incorporated with the repetition of a general pattern, the proper -inference is that the unlimited creating power has put forth all the -additional exertion and skill needful for the formation of new beings. - -What, then, does the establishment of a like system of procreation -and gestation imply, upon the supposition of the distinct creation of -species? It implies a certain parallel embryonic development, from -the germ to the fœtus and from the fœtus to the new-born infant, -throughout a large group of different animals; and this parallelism -would in certain stages of the embryonic growth display identity -or close similarity of form and structure. But as in each species -of animal the distinct creation would necessarily imply a distinct -destiny, the parallelism of embryonic form and structure would cease -at the point of development at which the characteristic structure -of the species would begin to unfold itself. The general system of -procreation and gestation common to a whole class of different animals, -and the ordained diversity of species, would present the same phenomena -of resemblances and differences in the embryonic development that -are supposed to be explicable only by the hypothesis of a descent of -all the species from a common ancestral stock through the process of -evolution. - -Notwithstanding the mystery and obscurity in which the process of -animal procreation is involved--a mystery and obscurity which will -perhaps never be fully solved--we can see enough to warrant some -definite conclusions. One of these conclusions is that, in the -formation of the germ which becomes developed into the fœtus, the male -and female parent each contributes some cellular substance to the -compound which constitutes that germ. We may safely infer this, because -the individual animal becomes a union of characteristics belonging -to both the parents, although the traits that are peculiar to one of -the parents may be more or less marked in their different offspring, -so that in one of the descendants the paternal and in another the -maternal traits will predominate. But in every descendant from the -same pair there is more or less of the peculiarities of each parent -plainly discernible. The inference, therefore, may be safely drawn -that the male and the female parent each contributes to the formation -of the ante-fœtal germ some cellular substance, in which resides the -typical characteristic of animal organism which each parent possesses. -The compound germ that is thus formed is endowed with the mysterious -principle of animal life which admits of growth and development; and -whether after its formation the female parent bestows most or bestows -least upon the product, that product consists of a union of cellular -substances contributed by both the male and the female parent in -the sexual act of procreation. This compound resultant germ, in the -earliest stage of its formation, like the separate cells of which it is -a union, exhibits no visible difference when we compare the ante-fœtal -germ of one animal with that of a different animal. Perhaps we shall -never be able to detect either chemical or mechanical differences -in the cellular substances or in the earliest stage of the compound -product which has resulted from their union. But in that compound -product there resides a contributory cellular substance derived from -each of the parents; and it is a just inference from this fact, and -from what we learn when we trace the further development, that there -is a peculiar and typical structure impressed upon and inwrapped in -this compound germ, which is to grow into a fœtal development by a -law of its own. There will at the same time be a particular law of -development for each distinct species of animal, and a general law of -development for a great variety of species among whom there obtains a -common process of the sexual union and of the contribution of male and -female cellular substance. When the fœtus becomes formed, there will -still be marked resemblances in the different species, before the stage -is reached at which the characteristic structure of each species is to -begin to unfold itself. But at some time the fundamental difference of -structure originally lodged in the cellular substances of which the -compound ante-fœtal germ was composed, and impressed upon that germ as -the type which was gradually to unfold itself into a distinct being, -will begin to exert its force. The resemblances of structure will -become less and less, as the fœtus of the different animals approaches -to the time of birth. Organs, or appearances of organs, which at one -stage of the comparison have seemed to indicate descent from a common -ancestral stock, but which may have been only the result of a common -process of fœtal development, will be found to be varied by force of -the original diversity of structure and destiny that was made to reside -in the seminal substance of each distinct species of animal; and, at -length, this original and intentional peculiarity of structure and -being would become perfected at or before the period when birth is to -take place, leaving only those resemblances which must obtain in all -organisms constructed in certain respects upon a uniform plan, and -brought into being by a common process of procreation and gestation. - -Let us now see whether this reasoning involves any such unphilosophical -or unscientific belief as is supposed. Passing by the often-repeated -assertion that the facts of comparative embryologic development are -reconcilable only with the belief in evolution, let us advert to some -of those facts. "The substitutions," says Mr. Spencer, "of organs and -the suppression of organs, are among those secondary embryological -phenomena which harmonize with the belief in evolution, but can not -be reconciled with any other belief. There are cases where, during -its earlier stages of development, an embryo possesses organs that -afterward dwindle away, as there arise other organs to discharge the -same functions. And there are cases where organs make their appearance, -grow to certain points, have no functions to discharge, and disappear -by absorption." The concrete illustration of this substitution and -suppression of organs is thus given by Mr. Spencer: - -"We have a remarkable instance of this substitution in the successive -temporary appliances for aërating the blood which the mammalian embryo -exhibits. During the first phase of its development, the mammalian -embryo circulates its blood through a system of vessels distributed -over what is called the _area vasculosa_, a system of vessels -homologous with one which, among fishes, serves for aërating the blood -until the permanent respiratory organs come into play. After a time, -there buds out from the mammalian embryo a vascular membrane called the -allantois, homologous with one which, in birds and reptiles, replaces -the first as a breathing apparatus. But while, in the higher oviparous -vertebrates, the allantois serves the purpose of a lung during the -rest of embryonic life, it does not do so in the mammalian embryo. In -implacental mammals it aborts, having no function to discharge; and in -the higher mammals it becomes "placentiferous, and serves as the means -of intercommunication between the parent and the offspring"--becomes -an organ of nutrition more than of respiration. Now, since the first -system of external blood-vessels, not being in contact with a directly -oxygenated medium, can not be very serviceable to the mammalian embryo -as a lung; and since the second system of external blood-vessels is, to -the implacental embryo, of no greater avail than the first; and since -the communication between the embryo and the placenta among placental -mammals might as well or better have been made directly, instead -of by metamorphosis of the allantois--these substitutions appear -unaccountable as results of design. But they are quite congruous with -the supposition that the mammalian type arose out of lower vertebrate -types. For, in such case, the mammalian embryo, passing through states -representing, more or less distinctly, those which its remote ancestors -had, in common with the lower _vertebrata_, develops these subsidiary -organs in like ways with the lower vertebrata."[87] - -In what way, then, are these substitutions unaccountable as results -of design, and why are they any more congruous with the supposition -that the mammalian type arose out of the lower vertebrate type? In the -first place, it is necessary to have a distinct conception of what -is meant by design. In the present case, it means that for a certain -large group of animals there was established a system of reproduction -by the sexual union of male and female, each contributing a cellular -substance peculiar to itself, in the formation of a compound cellular -substance in which the separate substances are united, and which is -to be developed into the fœtus by a law of growth; and as a further -design there is wrapped up in the compound germ of each distinct -species of animal a typical plan of ultimate form and structure. -This typical plan can not be detected in the germ itself, as it is -too subtile and obscure even for the microscope; but we have every -reason to believe that it is there in all its distinctness of original -purpose, because at a later stage of the embryonic development we -find a distinct species of animal is the result. This is a conclusion -that must be adopted by the evolutionist, as well as by the believer -in special creations, because it has nothing to do with the question -of how distinct species came to exist. Whether they were designedly -and separately created, or were evolved out of one another, the -reproductive process by which the individuals of the same species -are brought into being alike involves the conclusion that, in the -ante-fœtal germ of that species, there is somehow involved, in a form -so minute that it can not be seen, the type of animal which is to -belong to that species, and to no other. Here, then, we have the grand -and compound design which is to obtain throughout a whole group of -different animals; namely, that they shall multiply in the production -of individuals of their own types, by a sexual union, in which the -male and the female each contributes a cellular substance of its own -to the formation of a compound germ, and in that germ there is made -to reside the typical form and structure of a distinct organism, so -minute that we can not see it, but which we must conclude from the -result has been put there to be developed by a law of growth ordained -for the accomplishment of a certain distinct order of beings. But -the very obscurity of this type, in the earliest stage of embryonic -development, leads to the conclusion that while it will never be lost, -so long as its life is preserved, it will unfold itself in ways that -will be equally beyond our ken, until the point is reached where it is -no longer obscured, but where it is revealed in all its distinctness -of outline and its peculiarity of structure. What is certain and -invariable is, that the type peculiar to the species is at some time -in the growth of the individual animal perfectly developed. But in the -modes of its development through different embryonic stages, there will -be variations and substitutions of organs in the different species, -but in each distinct species these variations and substitutions will -be uniformly the same, because the law of development imposed by -the distinct type, while it may operate differently among different -species, will always operate in the same way in the same species. -Thus in one animal the development from the original type which was -implanted in its seminal ante-fœtal germ may at one stage exhibit an -organ for which at a later stage another organ will be substituted; and -in another animal a seemingly corresponding organ may serve a different -purpose, or may altogether abort. These embryologic phenomena, varying -in different species, but occurring uniformly in the same species, -are necessarily among the most obscure of all the phenomena of animal -life, on account of the fact that they take place where we can not -watch the changes or modifications as they are taking place during -actual fœtal life. But they are no more explicable upon the hypothesis -of the descent of distinct animals from a common stock, than they are -upon the hypothesis of distinct creations of species. Upon the former -hypothesis, the assumed propinquity of descent implies the preservation -of the same mode of embryonic development until it becomes varied by -the operation of causes that bring about a new habit of development, -and then a fixation in this new habit after a new species or a new -ancestral stock is formed; so that in each distinct species there comes -at length to be a uniform process of substituting and suppressing -organs, or changing the functions of organs. But how are we to account -for the operation of causes that have preserved a parallelism of -development, along with the operation of causes that have produced the -different modes of development, when all the species are supposed to be -derived from a common ancestral stock, which first began to procreate -and to develop its descendants in one and the same way? What are the -facts which will enable us to say that the mammalian type arose out -of the lower vertebrate types, when we compare the different modes -of their embryologic development? How are we to estimate the chances -for a preservation of so much resemblance as exists between the two -in their embryologic lives, and the chances for the variations that -are observable? What we can safely conclude is that there is a law -which holds each species in a constant repetition of its own fœtal -growth, according to its unvarying development in the same series of -changes, substitutions, or suppressions. But we can not safely conclude -that this species became formed in the supposed process of descent -from a remote ancestral stock, which may or may not have originally -exhibited the same series of changes, substitutions, or suppressions. -If the ancestors of the mammalian vertebrates were the kind of animal -supposed, we have to find, in order to justify the supposed descent, -those states which represent the correspondence between the mode in -which the ancestral stock developed its own embryos, when compared -with the mode in which the type of the lower vertebrata developed its -embryos, so as to make it reasonably certain that these subsidiary -organs derived their several substitutions or suppressions from the -process of descent, and not from any special mode of development -ordained for each distinct species. We may imagine these states through -which the mammalian embryo has passed, but as yet we have only a theory -which suggests their existence without facts to support it. The truth -would seem to be that this whole subject of comparative embryology, -upon the hypothesis of the kinship of all organized beings, or the -descent of many distinct species from a common stock, is involved in -very great difficulties; not the least of which is the difficulty of -explaining how the diverging descendants from that stock came to be -endowed with habits of embryologic life and growth that resulted in the -production of very different modes of development, and at the same time -preserved for each new species its own peculiar mode of development. -To say, for example, that the mammalian embryo passed through states -representing, more or less distinctly, those which its remote ancestors -had in common with the lower vertebrata, and that it developed certain -subsidiary organs in like ways with the lower vertebrata, is merely to -state a theory, which, without some evidence that the mammalian embryo -was a formation resulting from a connection of lives with lives back -to a common ancestor whose embryo was developed as those of the lower -vertebrata are, amounts to nothing. Often as this want of evidence has -been adverted to, it must be here again pointed out: for the whole -argument from embryology, like that derived from a comparison of the -forms of mature animals, lacks the support of facts that are essential -to show the connection of life with life which descent from a common -ancestral stock necessarily implies. - -On the other hand, the hypothesis of the distinct creation of -different species deals with the phenomena of embryologic life in -a very different way. It supposes the creation of a pair, male and -female, and a law of procreation, designed for the multiplication of -individuals of a fixed type. It supposes many such creations, each -having in its own peculiar germ the characteristic type of organism -that will distinguish the mature animal from all the others. It -supposes finally a law of development common to all the species the -individuals of which are multiplied by the sexual union of male -and female; a law of growth under like conditions, which leads to -a parallelism of development until the typical plan of form and -structure designed for each distinct animal, and implanted in its germ, -begins to take on a mode of development peculiar to that species, -and at length the perfect individual of that species is the result. -In this hypothesis, therefore, there is no necessity for resorting -to any connection with an imaginary ancestral stock of a different -type, or for resorting to a theoretical process by which successive -generations may be supposed to have gradually arisen out of the -ancestral stock by successive changes which have at length resulted -in a totally new species. The new species is what is supposed to have -been aboriginally created, and to have been placed under its own law -for the multiplication of individuals of the same type. In point of -simplicity, of comparative certainty, of freedom from accidental -causes of variation of which we can predicate no specific result, this -hypothesis seems to have a far greater degree of probable evidence in -its favor than the theory which entirely lacks the requisite evidence -of intermediate connections between the lives of one species with the -lives of a remote and different species. For, while it may be truly -said that no man ever saw a special creation take place, and while such -an act of the infinite power is of a nature that places it beyond the -observation of our senses, it is neither inconceivable nor improbable, -nor inconsistent with the idea of the divine attributes which we -derive from the study of nature. On the other hand, it is not only -equally true that no man ever saw, or in the nature of things ever can -see, an evolution of distinct species out of other distinct species, -but the whole nature of the supposed process of transformation involves -an element of chance which forbids all calculation of the results. -How, for example, in this very matter of comparative embryological -development on the hypothesis of descent of all the species of the -vertebrate animals from a common ancestral stock of a different type, -are we to account for the fact that the embryo of any one of the -descended species has come to be developed in a mode peculiar to itself -and differing from the mode in which the embryo of the ancestral stock -was developed? The law of sexual union, under which the individuals -of the supposed ancestral stock were multiplied, must have imposed on -that species an invincible necessity of reproducing in its offspring -the same type that constituted the peculiar organism of the parents, -whether these parents were or were not the fittest survivors of their -race after the severest struggle for existence which they may have had -to undergo. If the pair, or the male of that pair, has in the course -of that struggle acquired a new organ, or more completely developed -an old one, before the act of procreation takes place, how is it that -the ovum is developed into the fœtus, and the fœtus into the newly -born infant, in an invariable mode peculiar to the species to which -the parents belonged? Why did not the same causes of variation which -are supposed to have changed the ancestral type into one of a new and -entirely distinct character, also vary the mode of fœtal development? -When and how did the new organs become fixed in the type which the -parents have transmitted to the offspring? And if they became so -fixed in the germ which was formed out of the cellular substance -contributed by each of the parents, why do we find in every known -species participating in this process of reproduction a uniform mode -of embryologic development peculiar to the species, and exhibiting its -own suppressions and substitutions of organs, irrespective of any newly -acquired peculiarities in the individual structures of the parents? - -The believer in special creations has to answer no such questions as -these. His hypothesis assumes the creation of a pair of animals of a -certain distinct species; a law of procreation and gestation common -to a vast multitude of organisms; and a law of embryologic growth -peculiar to each species. Whatever peculiarities of structure may have -been possessed by the immediate parents of any individual of any one -of these different species--peculiarities which did not separate the -parents from their race, but only made them the fittest survivors of -their race--those peculiarities would or would not descend to their -immediate offspring, according to varying and very inappreciable -circumstances. But that which constituted the special type of the -race, and especially that which constituted its peculiar mode of -development during the embryonic stage, would remain unaffected by -these incidental and accidental peculiarities of the parents, because, -from all that we can discover, that special type was impressed upon -the embryo at the earliest stage of its existence, and constituted -the living model that was to be developed into the perfect animal of -that species, by a law which placed it beyond the influence of any -adventitious and non-essential advantages which the male or female -parent may have acquired over other individuals of the same race. So -that, if the postulate of a special creation of species be assumed -as the groundwork of the reasoning, we have to go through with no -speculations about a common ancestral stock of all the species, and -we have to account for no phenomena that are exposed to chances which -might have produced very different results from those which are open to -our observation, and results of which we can predicate nothing with -any degree of certainty. On the hypothesis of the special creation of -a species, and an aboriginal pair of each species, with all that this -implies, we can with a high degree of certainty predicate most of the -phenomena that we have to observe, and more especially so much of the -phenomena of embryologic growth of the different species as are open to -our investigation after the life of both mother and embryo has become -extinct. - -It only remains for me to give to this reasoning a concrete -application. Take the case made use of by Mr. Spencer in the passage -above cited--that of the "allantois," a vascular membrane, which is -said to be in the mammalian embryo homologous with one which in the -higher oviparous vertebrates, such as the birds and reptiles, replaces -what was at first a breathing apparatus, and becomes for them, during -the rest of embryonic life, a sort of lung, or an organ that aërates -the blood until the permanent respiratory organs come into play. In -the mammalian embryo, the first appliance for aërating the blood is -described as a system of vessels distributed over the _area vasculosa_, -and like that which is first observable for the same purpose in -fishes. But, as the mammalian embryo continues to grow, a change -takes place. There buds out from it the vascular membrane called the -"allantois," which is substituted in the place of the first aërating -apparatus. Then a further change takes place, as between the higher -oviparous vertebrates and the mammalian vertebrates. In the former, the -"allantois" continues to perform the breathing function through the -rest of the embryonic life. In the mammalian vertebrates it undergoes -two changes: In the implacental mammals, it aborts, having no function -to discharge; in the placental mammals it becomes modified into another -organ, namely, that which serves to convey nutrition from the mother to -the offspring. After birth, it is of course ended. - -Now, the reasoning, or rather the assertion, that these substitutions -are unaccountable as the results of design, appears to me to be -singularly inconclusive. It is quite illogical, according to all -philosophic meaning of design as applied to the works of the Creator, -or to the works of nature, if that term is preferred, to argue that -a particular object could have been better accomplished directly, -than by a metamorphosis of an organ from one function to another, or -by substitution. The metamorphosis, or substitution, which in such -cases we find in nature, is of itself the very highest evidence that -the indirect method was the best, if we admit the idea of a Creator, -because it was the method chosen by a being of infinite perfections -for reasons which we may not be able to discover, but which we must -presume to have existed, if we concede that hypothesis of attributes -which "design" in this case necessarily implies. But how are these -metamorphoses and substitutions any more accountable upon the -supposition that the mammalian type arose by generation out of the -lower vertebrate types which in their embryonic life exhibited the same -changes? The doctrine or theory of evolution does not account for them -at all; for, while the doctrine supposes, as matters of pure theory, -that there were certain states through which the mammalian embryo -passed, which represented more or less distinctly those which it had in -common with its assumed remote ancestors, the lower vertebrata, it does -nothing more than to suggest the theoretical idea that the mammalian -embryo came to develop these subsidiary organs in the mode in which -they were developed in the embryo of the lower vertebrata, because it -was descended from the lower vertebrata. The varying states through -which the embryo passed from the lower vertebrata to the mammalian -type, are all hypothetical, and there is, therefore, no basis of -fact on which to rest the belief in a common mode of development, as -resulting from a connection of lives with lives between the mammalian -type and the types of birds, reptiles, or fishes. - -On the other hand, the hypothesis of the special creation of a species -implies the simple fact of a designed process of embryonic development -for each species, with substitutions of organs and changes of function -in certain organs peculiar to that species; a fact which may well -consist in a certain parallelism in the different metamorphoses, and -a preservation of the same unvarying changes in the development of -each separate embryo. Why these changes should exist, we can not tell; -but their existence is very strong proof that they were designed, or -made to take place, for some reason, if we admit the hypothesis of a -Creator. For that hypothesis, we must look to a wider class of facts, -and to the whole phenomena of nature. - -4. We now come to the argument from distribution. This is one of the -weakest of the indirect supports of the doctrine of evolution; but, -as it is much relied upon, it must be stated with all the force that -it is supposed to have. The facts that are relied upon are these: -When we survey the whole surface of the globe, so far as it is known -to us, we find, in the first place, that the areas which have similar -conditions (of soil and climate), and sometimes, where the areas are -nearly adjacent, are occupied by quite different faunas. On the other -hand, it is said that areas remote from each other in latitude, and -contrasted in soil and climate, are occupied by closely allied faunas. -The inference drawn is, that there is no manifest predetermined -adaptation of the organisms to the areas, or habitats, in which they -are found, because we do not find that like organisms are universally -or generally found in like habitats, nor very unlike organisms in very -unlike habitats. The conclusion is, that the facts of distribution -in space do not conform to the hypothesis of design. In other words, -the different animals found in different regions were not specially -designed for those regions, but some of them have extended into regions -of a different character; and when the regions are very unlike there -are not found very unlike organisms, but there is a general similarity, -or a less extensive variety. There is said, also, to be another -important fact, namely, that "the similar areas peopled by dissimilar -forms are those between which there are impassable barriers; while the -dissimilar areas peopled by similar forms, are those between which -there are no such barriers." Hence is drawn the conclusion that "each -species of organism tends ever to expand its sphere of existence--to -intrude on other areas, other modes of life, other media."[88] A good -deal of aid is supposed to be derived for this argument respecting -animal life by analogies drawn from the vegetable kingdom; but I -can not help thinking that there is much caution to be observed in -formulating such analogies into a law of universal application, or into -one that relates to the existence of animal organisms. The origin, -the multiplication, and the spread of animals involve a principle of -life, organization and development which is very different in some -important respects from that which obtains in the vegetable world. -But, without laying any stress upon this distinction, and without -intending to deprive the argument for animal evolution of any aid which -it can derive from such supposed analogies, I pass to the specific -argument respecting animal distribution. The argument is this: Races -of organisms become distributed over different areas, and also through -different media. They are thrust by the pressure of overpopulation from -their old into new habitats, and as they diverge more widely in space -they undergo more and more modifications of structure, by reason of the -new conditions on which they enter. Thus, these powerfully incident -forces, the new conditions on which the migrating races enter in new -regions, vary the structure which they originally brought with them, -and which descended to them from the common stock of which they were -modified descendants. The widest divergences in space, under such -circumstances, will indicate the longest periods of time during which -these various descendants from a common stock have been subject to -modifying conditions. There will, therefore, come to be, it is said, -among organisms of the same group, smaller contrasts of structure in -the smaller areas; and, where the varying incident forces vary greatly -within given areas, the alterations will become more numerous than in -equal areas which are less variously conditioned: that is to say, in -the most uniform regions there will be the fewest species, and in the -most multiform regions there will be the most numerous species. These -hypotheses are said to be in accordance with the facts of distribution -in space.[89] - -But there are also facts of distribution through different media. The -meaning of this is, that, whereas all forms of organisms have descended -from some primordial simplest form, which inhabited some one medium, -such as the water, its descendants, by migration into some other -medium or other media, underwent adaptations to media quite unlike -the original medium. In other words, the earth and the air have been -colonized from the water. Numerous facts are adduced in support of this -conclusion, which are thus summarized: - - There are particular habitats in which animals are subject to changes - of media. In such habitats exist animals having, in various degrees, - the power to live in both media, consequent on various phases of - transitional organization. Near akin to these animals, there are some - that, after passing their early lives in the water, acquire more - completely the structures fitting them to live on land, to which - they then migrate. Lastly, we have closely-allied creatures like - the Surinam toad and the terrestrial salamander, which, though they - belong by their structures to the class Amphibia, are not amphibious - in their habits--creatures the larvæ of which do not pass their early - lives in the water, and yet go through these same metamorphoses! - Must we, then, think that the distribution of kindred organisms - through different media presents an insurmountable difficulty? On the - contrary, with facts like these before us, the evolution-hypothesis - supplies possible interpretations of many phenomena that are else - unaccountable. Realizing the way in which such changes of media are - in some cases gradually imposed by physical conditions, and in other - cases voluntarily commenced and slowly increased in the search after - food, we shall begin to understand how, in the course of evolution, - there have arisen those strange obscurations of one type by the - externals of another type. When we see land-birds occasionally feeding - by the water-side, and then learn that one of them, the water-ouzel, - an "anomalous member of the strictly terrestrial thrush family, wholly - subsists by diving--grasping the stones with its feet and using its - wings under water"--we are enabled to comprehend how, under pressure - of population, aquatic habits may be acquired by creatures organized - for aërial life; and how there may eventually arise an ornithic type, - in which the traits of the bird are very much disguised. - - Finding among mammals some that, in search of prey or shelter, have - taken to the water in various degrees, we shall cease to be perplexed - on discovering the mammalian structure hidden under a fish-like form, - as it is in the Cetacea. Grant that there has even been going on that - redistribution of organisms which we see still resulting from their - intrusions on one another's areas, media, and modes of life, and we - have an explanation of those multitudinous cases in which homologies - of structure are complicated with analogies. And while it accounts for - the occurrence, in one medium of organic types fundamentally organized - for another medium, the doctrine of evolution accounts also for the - accompanying unfitness. Either the seal has descended from some mammal - which, little by little, became aquatic in its habits, in which - case the structure of its hind-limbs has a meaning; or else it was - specially framed for its present habitat, in which case the structure - of its hind-limbs is incomprehensible.[90] - -Along with these phenomena of distribution in space and in medium of -life, we have the further element of distribution in time; the facts -of which are admitted, however, to be too fragmentary to be conclusive -either for or against the doctrine of evolution. Still it is claimed -that there is one general truth respecting distribution in time, -which is "profoundly significant, namely, that the relations between -the extinct forms of life, found by geological exploration, and the -present forms of life, especially in each great geographical region, -show in the aggregate a close kinship, and a connection which is in -perfect harmony with the belief in evolution, but quite irreconcilable -with any other belief. As Mr. Darwin has expressed it, there is 'a -wonderful relationship in the same continent between the living and the -dead.'"[91] - -The argument from distribution is thus summed up by Mr. Spencer: - - Given, then, that pressure which species exercise on one another, - in consequence of the universal overfilling of their respective - habitats--given the resulting tendency to thrust themselves into one - another's areas, and media, and modes of life, along such lines of - least resistance as from time to time are found--given, besides the - changes in modes of life hence arising, those other changes which - physical alterations of habitats necessitate--given the structural - modifications directly or indirectly produced in organisms by modified - conditions--and the facts of distribution in space and time are - accounted for. That divergence and redivergence of organic forms, - which we saw to be shadowed forth by the truths of classification - and the truths of embryology, we see to be also shadowed forth by - the truths of distribution. If that aptitude to multiply, to spread, - to separate, and to differentiate, which the human races have in - all times shown, be a tendency common to races in general, as we - have ample reason to assume, then there will result that kind of - relation among the species, and genera, and orders, peopling the - earth's surface, which we find exists. Those remarkable identities - of type discovered between organisms inhabiting one medium, and - strangely-modified organisms inhabiting another medium, are at - the same time rendered comprehensible. And the appearances and - disappearances of species which the geological record shows us, as - well as the connections between successive groups of species from - early eras down to our own, cease to be inexplicable.[92] - -Passing by what is here said of the aptitude of the human race to -multiply, to spread, to separate, and to differentiate--an aptitude -which has never resulted in the production of an essentially different -animal, or in anything but incidental variations within the limits -of the same species--I propose now to apply to this argument from -distribution a test which seems to me to be a perfectly fair one, -and one which it ought to be able to encounter. If the theory that -the different species of animals now known to us have been evolved -successively by descent from some primordial simplest form through -modifications induced by change of habitation, of medium of life, and -accumulation of new structures occurring through an immense period of -time, be a sound hypothesis, the process which has evolved superior out -of inferior organizations ought, in consistency with itself and with -all its supposed conditions, to be capable of being reversed, so as -to lead to the evolution of inferior out of superior organisms. For, -although the doctrine of evolution has thus far been applied only to -facts which are supposed to show an ascent in the scale of being, the -argument ought to be equally good for a descent in the scale of being, -provided we take care to include all the elements and causes of a -change of structure, mode and medium of life, and the necessary element -of time, in the operation of the process. The imaginary case that is -about to be put shall include all the elements of the evolutionary -hypothesis, and will serve to test at least the rationality of that -theory. - -Let it be supposed, then, that there was a period in the history of -this earth when the whole human race, however it originated, was -confined to an island, thousands of miles from any other land. This -race of men adapted to a life in one medium, the air, may be supposed -to have so far advanced in the ruder arts of hunting and fishing, -and in the higher art of tillage, as to be able for many generations -to support life by what the sea and the land would put within their -reach, and by the product which their rude agriculture could extract -from the soil, or which the soil would spontaneously yield. But as the -centuries flow on, the population begins to press upon the resources -of the territory, and the struggle for life becomes very great. At -length a point is reached where the supply of food from the land -becomes inadequate to sustain the population, and what can be made -up from the sea will not supply the deficiency. The population will -then slowly decrease, but, while this decrease goes on, there comes -in a disturbing cause which will prevent any adjustment of the supply -of food to the diminished number of the consumers. The sea begins by -almost imperceptible but steadily progressing encroachments to diminish -the area of dry land; a change of climate reduces the number of other -animals available for human food, and reduces the productive capacity -of the earth. Then ensues that struggle for existence which is supposed -to entail changes of medium of life, and to induce transformations of -structure. The conditions of existence have become wholly changed. -The wretched descendants of a once comparatively thriving race are -dwelling on a territory which has become a marsh. They have no means -of migrating to another territory; they can only migrate to another -medium. They begin by feeding exclusively on what the water will -afford. They pass their lives in the pursuit of a prey which lives -only in the water, and in this change of life they acquire or develop -organs adapted to the new condition, organs which, in such miserable -reproduction of their own species as can go on, they transmit to their -offspring. Modifications upon modifications accumulate in this way -through untold periods of time, until at last a new aquatic or a new -amphibious creature is formed, and the difference between that creature -and his remote ancestral human stock is as great as that between man -and the seal, or between man and any fish that swims. Still, there will -be peculiarities of structure retained, which might lead any inhabitant -of another world, alighting on this globe and undertaking to trace the -origin of this new creature, to the supposition that he was akin to a -race of men whose fossil remains he might find buried in some stratum -beneath the marsh which was the last habitat of this unfortunate race, -when it had all the characteristics of its original type. - -Is it conceivable that this transformation could take place? Could such -a condition and situation result in anything but the utter extinction -of the human race, or, in other words, in an absolute break? Could -there be any modifications exhibited by the last survivors of that race -other than those which are familiar to us among the varieties of the -human species which have never separated themselves from their race, -and between whom and their ancestral stock, wherever it was originally -placed on this globe, we recognize no fundamental difference of -structure, whatever may have been the changes of habitat or conditions -of life? Yet the conditions and elements of this imaginary case, -which is simply the process of evolution reversed, are just what the -evolution theory assumes as the causes of that modification which -proceeds from a lower to a higher organism; and whatever may be said of -the tendency, through "the survival of the fittest," to evolve higher -out of lower forms of animal life, if we allow time enough for the -process, there is no reason, in the nature of things, why corresponding -conditions should not lead to a degradation as well as to an elevation -in the scale of beings. There is, however, one reason why no such -potency should be ascribed to the conditions, either in respect to -the one result or the other. That reason is that all such causes of -modification, either in the ascending or the descending scale, are so -limited in their effects that distinct beings can not be rationally -predicated as their product, whereas the power of the Infinite -Artificer to give existence to distinct beings is absolutely without -limit. If naturalists would turn their attention to the limitations -upon the power of all such causes as those which are supposed to work -in the process of evolution, and would give us the explanations to -which those limitations point, in those cases of local variation which -are exhibited by animals that can clearly be traced to a parent form, -they would not be compelled to resort to a sweeping theory that refuses -all force to any hypothesis but its own. - -But now let us go a step further in this imaginary case. Let us suppose -that after this new creature, fish or amphibian, descended from the -human race, has inhabited the water surrounding the ill-fated island -for a million of years, another great change takes place. The water -begins to recede from the land by gradations as slow as those by which -in the former period it encroached. The land rises from the low level -to which it had sunk, by volcanic action. Forests spring up upon the -sides of mountains. The soil becomes firm; verdure overspreads the -fields; the climate grows genial; the wilderness blossoms as the rose. -Allow another million years for this restoration of the territory -to an inhabitable condition. Slowly and in an unbroken series of -generations the aquatic creatures, descended from the ancient human -inhabitants of the island, emerge from the sea and betake themselves -to the land. Modifications upon modifications accumulate, new organs -are acquired; the survival of the fittest perpetuates them; the animals -ascend in the scale of being, until the human type is again evolved -out of the degraded descendants of the population which two millions -of years previously dwelt as men upon the island, and carried on in -some primitive fashion the simpler arts of human life. Is not this just -as supposable as the evolution of the human race out of some lower -form of organism? Are not all the elements--time, migration from one -medium to another, change of conditions, and what is supposed to lead -to the production of different organisms--just as powerful to produce -the inferior out of the superior as to produce the superior out of the -inferior, and so on interchangeably? The answer in each case is, that -all such causes of modification in the animal kingdom are limited; that -when once a distinct species is in existence, we have no evidence that -it loses its distinct type or merges itself in another, although the -earth may be full of evidence that types which formerly existed are no -longer among the living organisms. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [79] "Biology," i, p. 366. - - [80] "In the presence of the various genealogical trees of animal - descent which have been put forward so frequently of late, a judicious - skepticism seems the attitude best warranted by the evidence yet - obtained. If so many similar forms have arisen in mutual independence, - then the affinities of the animal kingdom can never be represented by - the symbol of a tree. Rather, we should conceive of the existence of - a grove of trees, closely approximated, greatly differing in age and - size, with their branches interlaced in a most complex entanglement. - The great group of apes is composed of two such branches; but their - relations one to another, to the other branches which represent - mammalian groups, and to the trunks from which such branches diverge, - are problems still awaiting solution."--_"Encyclopædia Britannica," - article "Apes."_ - - [81] "Biology," i, pp. 380-382. - - [82] I use these terms with quotation-marks, because I do not admit - any philosophical antagonism such as they are intended to imply. - - [83] "Homology" is defined by lexicographers as "the doctrine of - similar parts." "Homologous organs" is a term used by scientific - writers to describe organs having a relation of some proportion to - each other. In this particular case of the vertebral column, the - different parts of the column are treated as if they were different - organs, and they are said to be homologous organs in the same animal, - because they bear a certain relation or ratio of proportion to each - other. - - [84] See the discussion of how evolution works, _post_. - - [85] "Biology," i, p. 387. - - [86] The Greek philosophers, as we have seen, before Plato and - Aristotle, found that their systems of causes, which did not involve - the idea of power as abstracted from substance, would not account for - the phenomena of nature. With all their subtilty and ingenuity, they - did not reach the truth that secondary causes are necessarily limited - in their action, and that there must be an unlimited cause. - - [87] "Biology," i, pp. 369, 370. - - [88] "Biology," i, p. 388. - - [89] "Biology," i, pp. 390, 391. - - [90] "Biology," i, p. 396. - - [91] "Biology," i, p. 399. It is to be noted that the relationship - here referred to is supposed or apparent kinship between the - _aggregate_ of the surviving and the _aggregate_ of the extinct forms - which have died out in recent geologic times. But this does not supply - the steps of descent by which any one surviving form can be traced - back to any one extinct form. - - [92] "Biology," i, p. 401. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - Mr. Spencer's agnosticism--His theory of the origin of religious - beliefs--The mode in which mankind are to lose the consciousness of a - personal God. - - -In a former chapter I had occasion to advert to one of Mr. Spencer's -favorite dogmas, namely, the impossibility of an intellectual -conception of creation, which he thinks is made apparent by the -statement that one term of the relation, the thing created, is -something, and the other term of the relation, that out of which the -thing was created, is nothing. When I wrote the chapter in which I -commented on this extraordinary kind of logic, I felt a little disposed -to apologize to my readers for answering it. I had not then met with -the fuller statement of Mr. Spencer's peculiar agnosticism which I -am now about to quote. The controversy recently carried on between -Mr. Spencer and Mr. Harrison was closed by the former in an article -entitled "Last Words about Agnosticism and the Religion of Humanity," -which appeared in the "Nineteenth Century" for November, 1884. This -drew my attention to a passage in Mr. Spencer's "Essays," which he -has reproduced in his late article for the purpose of repeating his -position against some of the misrepresentations which he complains -had been made of it by Mr. Harrison. I have nothing to do with the -controversy between these two gentlemen, or with any of the arguments -which Mr. Spencer's opponents, be they churchmen or laymen, have -employed against him. I take the passage as he has quoted it from his -"Essays," for the purpose of making his agnostic views the subject of -a more extended commentary than I had bestowed on them in my previous -chapter, in writing which I had before me only a passage contained in -his "Biology." There is no occasion, however, for altering a word of -what I had previously written; for, on a comparison of his position as -given in the "Biology," and that given in the "Essays," it appears very -plainly that I had not misunderstood him. But as the passage in the -"Essays" displays much more fully the peculiar reasoning by which he -supports his agnostic philosophy, I should not do justice to him or to -my readers if I did not notice it. The passage is the following: - - Always implying terms in relation, thought implies that both terms - shall be more or less defined; and as fast as one of them becomes - indefinite, the relation also becomes indefinite, and thought becomes - indistinct. Take the case of magnitudes. I think of an inch; I think - of a foot; and having tolerably definite ideas of the two, I have a - tolerably definite idea of the relation between them. I substitute - for the foot a mile; and being able to represent a mile much less - definitely, I can not so definitely think of the relation between an - inch and a mile--can not distinguish it in thought from the relation - between an inch and two miles, as clearly as I can distinguish in - thought the relation between an inch and one foot from the relation - between an inch and two feet. And now, if I endeavor to think of the - relation between an inch and the 240,000 miles from here to the moon, - or the relation between an inch and the 92,000,000 miles from here to - the sun, I find that while these distances, practically inconceivable, - have become little more than numbers to which I frame no answering - ideas, so too has the relation between an inch and either of them - become practically inconceivable. Now this partial failure in the - process of forming thought relations, which happens even with finite - magnitudes when one of them is immense, passes into complete failure - when one of them can not be brought within any limits. The relation - itself becomes unrepresentable at the same time that one of its terms - becomes unrepresentable. Nevertheless, in this case it is to be - observed that the almost blank form of relation preserves a certain - qualitative character. It is still distinguishable as belonging to - the consciousness of extensions, not to the consciousnesses of forces - or durations; and in so far remains a vaguely identifiable relation. - But now suppose we ask what happens when one term of the relation has - not simply magnitude having no known limits, and duration of which - neither beginning nor end is cognizable, but is also an existence - not to be defined? In other words, what must happen if one term - of the relation is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively - unrepresentable? Clearly in this case the relation does not simply - cease to be thinkable except as a relation of a certain class, but it - lapses completely. When one of the terms becomes wholly unknowable, - the law of thought can no longer be conformed to; both because one - term can not be present, and because relation itself can not be framed - ... In brief, then, to Mr. Martineau's objection I reply that the - insoluble difficulties he indicates arise here, as elsewhere, when - thought is applied to that which transcends the sphere of thought; - and that just as when we try to pass beyond phenomenal manifestations - to the Ultimate Reality manifested, we have to symbolize it out of - such materials as the phenomenal manifestations give us; so we have - simultaneously to symbolize the connection between this Ultimate - Reality and its manifestations, as somehow allied to the connections - among the phenomenal manifestations themselves. The truth Mr. - Martineau's criticism adumbrates is that the law of thought fails - where the elements of thought fail; and this is a conclusion quite - conformable to the general view I defend. Still holding the validity - of my argument against Hamilton and Mansel, that in pursuance of - their own principle the Relative is not at all thinkable _as such_, - unless in contradiction to some existence posited, however vaguely, - as the other term of a relation, conceived however indefinitely; it - is consistent on my part to hold that in this effort which thought - inevitably makes to pass beyond its sphere, not only does the product - of thought become a dim symbol of a product, but the process of - thought becomes a dim symbol of a process; and hence any predicament - inferable from the law of thought can not be asserted.[93] - -In judging of the soundness of this reasoning, the first thing to be -done is to determine what we are thinking about when we compare the -finite with the infinite, or when, to put it as Mr. Spencer does, we -have two terms of a relation, one of which is a thing open to the -observation of our senses, and the other of which lies beyond them. -In this case, does all thinkable relation lapse, or fade into an -impossible conception, when we undertake to conceive of that which -lies beyond what we see? Does the relation between the two supposed -terms cease to be a continuously existing relation? Or, to quote Mr. -Spencer's words, is it true that "insoluble difficulties arise, because -thought is applied to that which is beyond the sphere of thought"? - -We must be careful to distinguish between the "insoluble difficulties" -which arise out of the imperfection of language adequate to give -a formal description of a thing, and which may lead us to suppose -ourselves involved in contradictions, and the "insoluble difficulties" -which may arise out of the impossibility of having a mental -representation of that thing. The latter is the only difficulty about -which we need concern ourselves; and the best way to test the supposed -difficulty as an insuperable one is to take one of the illustrations -used by Mr. Spencer--the idea of space. We measure a foot or a mile -of space, and then compare it with the idea of endless or (to us) -immeasurable space. Figures afford us the means of expressing in -language a certain definite number of miles of space, but, beyond the -highest figures of which we have definite forms of expression, we can -not go in definite descriptions of space. But when we have exhausted -all the expressions of number that our arithmetical forms of expression -admit, does it follow that we can not conceive of extension beyond -that number? On the contrary, the very measure which we are able to -express in figures, to a certain extent, in regard both to space and -time, gives us the idea of space and time, and shows us that there -must be an extension of both beyond and forever beyond the portion of -either which language will allow us definitely to describe. This to -us immeasurable and indescribable extent of space or time becomes a -thinkable idea, because we are all the while thinking of space or time, -whether it is a measurable portion of either, or an immeasurable and -endless existence. - -Take as another illustration a purely moral idea. We know that there is -a moral quality which we call goodness; an attribute of human character -of which we have a clear conception, and which we can describe because -it is manifested to us in human lives. When we speak of the moral -phenomena to which we give the name of goodness, or virtue, all mankind -know what is meant. But human virtue is imperfect, limited, measurable. -It may be idealized into something approaching to perfection, but the -ideal character thus drawn must fall short of perfection if it is made -consistent with human nature. But from human character we derive the -idea of goodness or virtue as a thinkable idea. Is the idea of absolute -perfection of this quality any less thinkable? Absolute perfection -of moral character can not be described by a definition; but, as we -know that a measurable goodness which we can describe exists, wherein -consists the failure or lapse of a thinkable relation, when we reason -from that which exists in a measurable degree to that which transcends -all degree? We are all the while thinking of goodness or virtue, -whether we think of it as limited and imperfect, or as unlimited and -perfect. Take another quality--power. We know that there is such a -quality as power, wielded by human beings, and guided by their will. -But human power is limited, measurable, and therefore finite. When we -reason from the finite power of man to the idea of an infinite and -immeasurable power held and wielded by another being, do we strive to -conceive of something that is unthinkable because we can only say that -the power of that other being is without limit? We are all the while -thinking of power, of the quality of power, whether we think of it -as measurable or immeasurable. All qualities and all faculties which -are manifested to us in a limited degree, when we conceive of them -as unlimited and without degree, become proofs that what exists in a -measurable and limited degree may exist without limitation and without -degree. Although we can only define the finite, the infinite is not -the less a subject of true thinking, because, whether we think of the -finite or the infinite, what we are all the time thinking about is the -quality of power, and nothing else. In the one case it is limited, in -the other it is unlimited, but it is all the time the quality itself of -which we are thinking.[94] - -But now let us attend a little more closely to Mr. Spencer's grand -objection to this mode of thinking. The reader will be careful to note -that what he needs to ascertain is, whether Mr. Spencer's agnostic -theory is really sound. To test it, he must inquire just where the -supposed difficulty lies. Translated into other language, Mr. Spencer's -position is this: In order to keep within the sphere of possible -thought, there must be a definite relation between any two ideas, which -must not lapse, but the two ideas must be equally capable of mental -representation. When one term of the relation is an idea capable of -mental representation, as when we think of a thing cognizable by our -senses, and the other term of the relation is something that lies -beyond them, the law of thought, according to Mr. Spencer, can no -longer be conformed to; the relation lapses; the latter term can not -be present to the mind; we pass out of the sphere of thought into that -which can not be a subject of thought, the unknown and the unknowable. -What takes place in this process is assumed to be this: We take -certain phenomenal manifestations which we are able to observe and to -describe. Out of the materials which these phenomenal manifestations -give us, we "symbolize the Ultimate Reality." We do this, by arguing -from the phenomenal manifestations which convince us of the existence -of a being whom we know and can observe, to the existence of a being -in whom we "symbolize" qualities and faculties which the phenomenal -manifestations show us to belong to human beings. At the same time we -represent to ourselves by the same symbolizing process a connection -between the Ultimate Reality and its manifestation, which is allied to -the connections among the phenomenal manifestations which we observe in -man, or in nature. In other words, we reason from what we see and can -measure and describe, to that which we can not see or describe, and we -end in a term of the relation which can not be present to the mind, and -thus no thinkable relation can be framed. - -Whatever may be said of the rational force of the evidence derived from -phenomenal manifestations which we can observe when we reason about -other phenomenal manifestations which we can not measure, it can not -be said that we have reached a term in the relation that is beyond -the sphere of thought. What I understand Mr. Spencer to mean when he -speaks of "symbolizing" out of the materials which the phenomenal -manifestations give us, may be a process liable to error, but it does -not involve or lead to the "insoluble difficulties" that are supposed -to arise. For example, when, from the existence and power of man, a -being whom we know, and whose phenomenal manifestations lead us to a -knowledge of his limited faculties, we reason to the existence of a -being whose faculties are boundless, we may be in danger of conclusions -into which imperfection will find its way; but it certainly is not -true that in thinking of unlimited power or goodness, or any other -unlimited quality, we transcend the sphere of thought. When we have -expressed in figures the greatest measurable idea of space that can -be so expressed, what do we "symbolize," when we say that beyond that -measured space there stretches a space that we can not measure, and to -which there is of necessity no limit? Does a thinkable relation cease -to exist, because one of the terms is immeasurable to us? As soon as we -have formed an idea of a measurable portion of space, we necessarily -have an idea of endless and immeasurable space; and in this deduction -we have employed no "symbol" formed out of the materials which the -measurable manifestations have given us. We have simply reached a -conclusion that is inevitable. We are all the while thinking of space, -whether it is definite space that we can measure, or indefinite space -that we can not measure. - -When the moral and intellectual qualities of men constitute one part -of the phenomenal manifestations which we adopt as the basis of -reasoning to the existence of God, we are in danger of assigning to -that being attributes of character which would be far from perfection. -Nearly all the religions that have existed, and of which we have much -knowledge--perhaps all of them but one--have displayed more or less of -this tendency. It is only necessary to instance the Hebrew Scriptures, -for there are parts of that narrative in which the Deity is represented -as actuated by something very much like human passions and motives, and -these representations are among the hardest things to be reconciled -with the idea that those books were inspired writings. Every one knows -with what effect these passages of the Hebrew Scriptures are used by -those who reject both the Old and the New Testaments as inspired books. -But is philosophy therefore to shrink from the use of materials with -which the world is filled, and which lead to the conception of a being -of infinite faculties and perfect goodness? Grant all that may be said -of the stupid and fatal errors into which men have been led by likening -the Deity to man: there remains a vast store-house of materials on -which to reason to the existence of God, which philosophy can not -afford to reject, which can be freed from the peril that has often -attended their use, and which involve no "symbolizing" process of the -kind which Mr. Spencer imagines. - -Let us again translate Mr. Spencer's language, and endeavor to analyze -his position. There is, he says, a law of thought, which requires and -depends upon certain elements of thought. By "thought" he means a -conceivable idea, or one which the mind can represent to itself. By -the elements of thought he means, I suppose, the data which enable us -to have an idea of a product. The process of reaching this product -is supposed to be conducted according to a law which requires us to -have the data or elements by which the process is to be conducted. For -example, in the process of reaching an idea of definite space as a -product of thought, we take certain data or elements, by conceiving of -space as divided into successive portions to which we give the name of -feet or miles. The product of thought is the number of feet or miles -into which we divide the definite space of which we form an idea. In -this process we have conformed to Mr. Spencer's law of thought, because -we have data or elements by which to conduct the process and reach the -product. - -But now, says Mr. Spencer, when thought undertakes to have as its -product the idea of endless space, it makes an effort to pass beyond -its sphere; the elements of thought fail, and therefore the law of -thought fails; the product is nothing but a dim symbol of a product; -the process becomes nothing but a dim symbol of a process; and no -predicament, that is, no fact, is here inferable from the law of -thought as a fact or predicament that can be asserted. But what, in the -case supposed, is the fact or predicament that is asserted, when we -speak or think of endless space, or of space that transcends all our -powers of measurement? Is it correct to say that the law of thought -fails, because we can not express endless space in feet or miles? Is it -true that we have only "symbolized" the product of endless space out -of the data or elements of measurable space? Here it is necessary to -inquire what the learned philosopher means by "symbolizing" a product -or a process. I understand him to mean, in the case supposed, that -whereas in reference to the idea or product of a measurable space we -have certain data or elements out of which to form that idea, when -we undertake to think of endless space we transfer the notion of a -measurable space to that of which no measure can be predicated, and -therefore we can have no conception of endless space, but only a -"formless consciousness of the inscrutable." Let us see if this is -sound. - -Take as a convenient idea of a measurable space the 92,000,000 miles -from the earth to the sun, and lay it down on paper. If, after having -measured this space, we could transport ourselves to the sun, we could -extend the line in the same direction beyond the sun, by laying down -a further measurement of 92,000,000 miles from the sun to any object -that we could observe beyond the sun. This process we could repeat -indefinitely and forever, if we could be successively removed to the -different stages at each point of departure. But when an aggregate of -such multiplied measurements had been reached greater than could be -expressed in figures, we should still have the intellectual power of -thinking of an extension of space indefinitely beyond that which we -have measured. Nothing would have failed us but the power of expressing -in figures the endless extent of space which lies beyond the utmost -limit that we can so express. - -It is precisely here, as I suppose, that Mr. Spencer's "symbolizing -process" and his "symbolized product" come in. We have taken as the -elements of thought the idea of successive measurements of space; and -the law of thought permits us to have as a definite product whatever -extent of space can be marked off by such successive measurements. -But when we undertake to have, as the product of thought, a -consciousness, or conception, of endless space, we have merely used -the idea of a definite space as a "symbol," or _simulacrum_, of that -which is without form, and is only a "formless consciousness of the -inscrutable"--whatever that means. - -Let us see what has happened. The power of measuring, or describing -in form, a definite extent of space, has given us an idea of space. -The product of our thought is extension between two given points. Such -extensions must be capable of indefinite multiplication, although we -can not express in figures an indefinite multiplicand. The product is -then something beyond what we can express in a definite form; but is -it beyond the sphere of thought? What is it? It is an idea which we -deduce by a strict process of reasoning, and to which we do not need to -give and can not give expression in figures. The process of reasoning -is this: Measurement has given us an idea of space; our faculty of -applying measurement is limited; but our faculty of conceiving of space -through which we could go on forever multiplying such measurements, -if we had the means, is certainly a faculty of which all men are -conscious who are accustomed to analyze the processes of thought. In -this process we may reach that which in one sense is "inscrutable." It -is inscrutable, inasmuch as we can not understand how eternity of space -or time came to exist. Our experience of phenomena enables us to have -an idea of space and time, and from the fact that we have measured off -portions of space or time, we deduce the fact that there must be an -eternity of both. It is immaterial whether we call this a "symbolizing" -process, or call it something else. The product is an idea at which we -arrive by a strict process of reasoning. Eternity of space or time is -an inscrutable idea, when we attempt to inquire how it came to be. That -it exists, is an idea from which the human mind can not escape, and -which it reaches by a perfectly sound deduction. We are all the while -thinking of space or time, whether we are thinking of that which is -measurable, or of that which is immeasurable. - -I now come to a passage in Mr. Spencer's recent article which it is -necessary to attempt to explain to the unlearned reader, and to bring -it, if possible, within the reach of ordinary minds. This passage, -which follows in his recent article immediately after his quotation -from his "Essays," is the following: - - Thus, then, criticisms like this of Mr. Martineau, often recurring in - one shape or other, and now again made by Mr. Harrison, do not show - the invalidity of my argument, but once more show the imbecility of - human intelligence when brought to bear on the ultimate question. - Phenomenon without noumenon is unthinkable; and yet noumenon can not - be thought of in the true sense of thinking. We are at once obliged - to be conscious of a reality behind appearance, and yet can neither - bring this consciousness of reality into any shape, nor can bring into - any shape its connection with appearance. The forms of our thought, - molded on experience of phenomena, as well as the connotations of our - words formed to express the relations of phenomena, involve us in - contradictions when we try to think of that which is beyond phenomena; - and yet the existence of that which is beyond phenomena is a necessary - datum alike of our thoughts and our words. We have no choice but to - accept a formless consciousness of the inscrutable. - -Some definitions must now be given. The word "phenomenon" has become -naturalized in our English tongue. Derived as a noun from the Greek -verb Φαίνομαι, _to appear_, it means anything visible; whatever -is presented to the eye by observation or experiment, or what is -discovered to exist; as the phenomena of the natural world, the -phenomena of the heavenly bodies, of terrestrial substances, the -phenomena of heat and color.[95] In this application the word denotes -what appears to us, or what we discover by our senses. It is also used, -in the plural, more loosely, to denote occurrences or things which we -observe to happen; as when, speaking of physical occurrences, we mean -physical facts the happening of which we observe. Moral phenomena, on -the other hand, are the appearances exhibited by the action of mind. - -The word _noumenon_ has not become naturalized in our language, and -did not exist in Greek.[96] It can convey no intelligible meaning to -common readers without tracing its derivation, and when it is analyzed -we can attribute to it no meaning but a purely arbitrary one, even if -we can arrive at that arbitrary signification. In fact, it is a word -made by and for the school of Kant. Its first syllable is the Greek -noun νοῦς or νόος, which corresponds to our English word _thought_ or -_intelligence_. The Greek verb νοέω, _to think_, was primarily used as -_I perceive_; the act of the mind in seeing. This idea was distinct -from εἴδω, which conveyed the plain meaning of I _see_. But so subtile -were the Greeks in their use of words, that εἴδω was sometimes used -specifically to mean _to see with the mind's eye_, or, as we sometimes -say, to _realize_, or to have a mental perception of. In the Greek -use of the two words νοεω and εἴδω, no distinction was made between -_phenomenon_ and _noumenon_. To a cultivated Greek, _phenomenon_ -would mean something perceived, and _noumenon_, if he had possessed -the word, would have had the same meaning. He would have used the two -words interchangeably, to express either sight by the visual organs or -mental perception. Mr. Spencer uses them as if they meant different -things, as if _phenomenon_ were something different from _noumenon_. -But _noumenon_, according to its derivation (for it is coined as the -participle of nοεων), means a thing, subject, or object, _perceived by -the mind_. The root idea is mind-action, the verb νοεω meaning to do -what the mind does in apprehending a subject or object. So that the -derivation of _noumenon_ does not help us to understand the Kantian or -Spencerian use of the word. - -As this use of the word is, then, purely arbitrary, we must try to -understand, as well as we can, what this arbitrary meaning is. As well -as I can fathom it, in contrast with _phenomenon_, the meaning is that -_phenomenon_ is something that we see, and _noumenon_ is the ghost or -double of what we see. We see a thing with our eyes; but our mind does -not see it--it perceives its ghostly double. This is _noumenon_. - -Penetrating, or trying to penetrate, a little further into Mr. -Spencer's meaning, it would seem that when he says that _phenomenon_ -without _noumenon_ is unthinkable, he means that, although we can see a -thing with our corporeal eye, we can not think of it without the mental -act of seeing its image with the mind's eye; and then he adds that -_noumenon_ can not be thought of in the true sense of thinking, because -_noumenon_ is an abstraction or a mere ghost of a subject or an object. - -What is all this but a kind of play upon words? We are so constituted -that the impressions which a thing external to us produces upon our -nerves of perception are instantly transmitted to the brain, and the -mind has an instantaneous perception of that object. The phenomenon -which we see with our eyes, or become sensible of by touch, thus -becomes a thing perceived by the mind, and when we think of it we do -not think of its ghost, but we think of the thing itself. Did Laura -Bridgman, who had neither eye-sight nor hearing nor speech, but who -acquired all her ideas of external objects by the sense of touch, -conceive of a round or a square, a rough or a smooth surface, by -contemplating the ghost or double of what she touched? And had she no -thinking in the true sense of thinking, because the double, or _imago_ -of the thing which she touched--the so-called _noumenon_--was at once -necessary to her mental perception, and yet could not be thought of -without seeing the object by the corporeal eye? She had no corporeal -eye in which there was any vision. All her mental perceptions of -external objects were acquired by the sense of touch alone; and we -may well believe that she did not need the supposed _noumenon_ to -give her an idea of _phenomenon_. She perceived many phenomena by the -simple transmission to her brain, along her nerves of touch, of the -impressions produced upon them by external objects; and there is every -reason to believe that many of her perceptions were as accurate and -true as those which we derive from all our senses. We may now dismiss -Mr. Spencer's distinction between _phenomenon_ and _noumenon_ as a -distinction quite needless for the elucidation of what takes place in -thinking of that which is behind appearance, and may proceed with the -discussion of what remains of the passage above quoted. - -At the risk of wearying by repetition, I will again resort to the -illustration before employed, and will again describe how we reach the -conception, for example, of endless space. According to Mr. Spencer, -space, or extension, as a thinkable idea, or a subject of thought, -is confined to a measurable extent of space. This is the phenomenon, -or appearance. All our forms of thought are, it is said, molded on -our experience of phenomena that are measurable, or capable of being -definitely described; and the connotations of our words which express -the relations of phenomena relate to phenomena that we measure, or see, -and can definitely describe. Therefore, we can not think of a reality -that is behind appearance; can not bring the consciousness of such a -reality into any shape, nor bring into any shape its connection with -appearance. - -If mankind are never to think of that which is behind appearance--can -never think of a reality that is behind what they see--because their -forms of thought are molded on experiences of phenomena that they see, -and because the connotations of their words express the relations of -those phenomena and no others, a vast domain of thinking is necessarily -closed to them. This is not the experience of our minds. Every day of -our lives we go on in search of that which is beyond appearance, and we -find it. Take again, for example, the phenomena of a measurable portion -of space or time. What appears to us gives an idea of space and time. -We measure as great a portion of either as our forms of expression -admit of our describing by definite terms, but we are immediately -conscious of another reality, an endless extension or duration, because -we are conscious that we have not exhausted and can not exhaust, by our -measurements and descriptions, the whole possible existence of space or -time. This new reality behind appearance is just as truly thinkable, -just as true a consciousness, as is the measurable portion of time or -space; for it is time or space of which we are constantly thinking, -whether it is an extent or duration which we can describe in words, or -whether we can only say that it is extent or duration without beginning -and without end. Our minds are so constituted that the existence which -is manifested to us by observable phenomena leads us to go behind -the appearance in search of another reality beyond that which is -manifested by the phenomena that we see. All that is inscrutable about -this other reality that lies behind appearance is that we can not -understand how it came to be, any more than we can understand how the -phenomenon which we see and can measure and describe in a definite -form came to exist. We do not bring, and do not need to bring, this -other reality into connection with appearance. We first have an idea of -space and time from observable and measurable phenomena. The reality -of extension without limit, and duration without end, follows of -necessity, by a process of thought which we can not escape. - -But now it becomes needful to answer a further objection. I have said -that we are all the while thinking of space, whether it is a measurable -and limited or an immeasurable and illimitable space. Mr. Spencer, -anticipating this obvious statement, admits that the form of relation -between the two ideas, although "almost blank," preserves a certain -qualitative character; that is, it is of the quality of space of which -we think, whether it is measurable or immeasurable, and therefore it -remains "a vaguely identifiable relation." But when, in place of one -of the terms of the relation qualitatively the same as the other, we -substitute an existence that can not be defined, and is therefore both -quantitatively and qualitatively unrepresentable, the relation, he -asserts, lapses entirely; one of the terms becomes wholly "unknowable." - -I will not again repeat that extension or magnitude having no known -limits is a thinkable term, because the subject of thought is the -quality of extension or magnitude; quantity not being essential to -the idea of extension or magnitude. But I will pass to the idea of an -existence which can not be defined. I suppose that by an existence is -meant a being. If we undertake to think of a being whose quality we -do not know to be the same as the quality of another being whom we -do know, and the quantity of whose powers and faculties we can not -measure, we propose, says Mr. Spencer, a term of impossible thought, -because the law of thought can not be conformed to; the term can not be -present to the mind, and no thinkable relation can be framed. Let this -supposed difficulty be tested by a plain inquiry into that which we -undertake to make the subject of thought when we think of a being who -is said to be "unknowable." - -"Agnosticism" is a doctrine which eludes a definite grasp. I have -seen it defined by one of its most distinguished professors in this -way: "Agnosticism is of the essence of science, whether ancient or -modern. It simply means that a man shall not say he knows or believes -that which he has no scientific grounds for professing to know or -believe.... Agnosticism simply says that we know nothing of what may -be beyond phenomena."[97] Mankind are apt to be rather practical in -their habits of thinking: experience teaches them that there is a -well-founded distinction between knowledge and belief, when it comes to -be a question of asserting the one or the other.[98] They find, too, -by experience that, in regard to what they speak of when they say that -they know a thing, there is a distinction to be observed in respect to -the means of knowledge. No one hesitates to say that he knows there -was such a man as Napoleon Bonaparte, although he never saw him, and -although our knowledge of him is now derived from hearsay. But when we -speak of knowing that a certain living person was at a certain spot on -a certain day, we become immediately aware that in order to justify the -assertion we or some one ought to have seen the person at the time and -place, especially if anything important depends upon the assertion. -There are a great many things that we say we know without scientific or -other rigorous proof, and there are a great many other things which we -do not say that we know without the kind of proof which is required. -All our actions in life proceed upon this distinction, and we could -not live in this world with any comfort if we did not act upon the -assumption that we know things of which we have no scientific proof. - -A very clever _jeu d'esprit_ went the rounds of the periodical press -some time ago, in which a well-born and highly educated young agnostic -was represented as losing his birthright, his _fiancée_, and all his -prospects in life, because he demanded rigorous proof of everything -that affected him. As he would not admit that he was the son of his own -parents, without having better proof of it than their assertion, he was -turned out-of-doors and disinherited. He would not accept the bloom on -the cheek of his mistress as natural unless she gave him her word that -she did not paint; and he would not admit that they loved each other -without some better proof than their mutual feelings, about which they -might be mistaken. The young lady indignantly dismissed him, but he -consoled himself as a martyr to the truth of agnosticism. He became -tutor to the son of a nobleman, whose belief in the boy's extraordinary -talents, although justified by his progress in his studies, the tutor -would not admit had the requisite proof. He propounded his denial of -what the father had no proper grounds for maintaining, in an offensive -way, and of course he lost his place. He retired to a sort of agnostic -brotherhood, glorying in his adhesion to truth. Some of his companions -remained long enough in the brotherhood to find out that they were -making fools of themselves, and at the first opportunity for acting on -the ordinary grounds of knowing a fact without rigorous demonstration -of it they left him in solitude, went into the world, and achieved -success. - -"A man shall not say he knows or believes that which he has no -scientific grounds for professing to know or believe." By "scientific -grounds," I presume is meant, in the case of a fact or occurrence, -proper proof of the fact or occurrence. This varies with the nature of -the thing which one professes to know. We constantly act upon proofs -which do not amount to demonstration, and there could be no practical -enjoyment of our lives and no safety if we did not. If a government -were to receive information that a foreign army was on the border of -the country and about to invade it, and the information fell short of -being the testimony of eye-witnesses, what would be thought of the -rulers if they were to fold their hands and say that they did not know -the fact because they had no "scientific grounds for professing to know -it"? On the other hand, if in a court of justice the question to be -determined were the presence of an individual at a certain place and at -a certain time, the established rules of evidence require certain kinds -of proof of the fact. - -Belief, however, is a conviction of something which may or may not -require what are called "scientific grounds" before we can be permitted -to profess that we believe. It depends upon the thing which we profess -to believe, and upon the grounds on which we rest the belief, whether -we have or have not safe and sufficient means of belief. Belief in -the law of gravitation as a force operating throughout the universe -is arrived at as a deduction from scientific data. Belief in an -existence beyond phenomena, in a being who is the producing agent -of the phenomena, depends upon a great variety of grounds, some of -which are scientific data and some of which are the elements of moral -reasoning. We may not say that we "_know_" that God or any other -supernatural being exists, but we may say that we "_believe_" in his -existence. Here knowledge is one thing; belief is another. Knowledge -of the existence of God, like knowledge of the existence of any other -being, might come to us through the testimony of a competent witness -commissioned and authorized to inform us. Belief in the existence of -God may be founded on many and various grounds without the direct -testimony of the competent witness; and these grounds may be perfectly -satisfactory without being mathematical or scientific demonstration. It -is a very remarkable fact that some of the most eminent of the school -of agnosticism profess to have, and probably have, the most undoubting -faith in the theory and actual occurrence of animal evolution, without -any data, scientific or other, which can enable other men to arrive -at the same conviction, whatever may be the character of the supposed -proofs. They certainly have no grounds for professing to know that -an evolution of species out of species has ever taken place; and the -grounds of their belief in the fact, whether denominated "scientific" -or called something else, do not satisfy the rules of belief on -which mankind must act, in accordance with their mental and moral -constitutions; and this belief does not rise any higher in the scale of -moral probabilities than the belief in special creations, nor does it -rise so high. But to return to Mr. Spencer. - -If we did not act upon the process of thinking of another reality than -that which appearance gives, act upon it fearlessly and by a mode of -thinking to which we can safely trust ourselves, science would stand -still, there would be no progress in physics, discoveries would cease, -there would be no improvement in morals, the world would remain -stationary. What did Columbus do, when, going behind the phenomena -that made the earth appear to be a flat surface, he thought of it as a -sphere? Did he break the law of thought? He formed an idea of a reality -behind appearance, not by employing the phenomenal manifestations to -help him to the new conception, but by going away from them in search -of a reality that lay behind them, and which they seemed to contradict. -This conception of a sphere as the reality of the earth's condition -proved to be the truth. He did not bring it, and did not need to bring -it, into connection with appearance. He did not use, and did not need -to use, the relations of the visible phenomena to help him to attain -his conception of a spherical form of the earth. He contradicted them -all. - -Did all the moral lawgivers who have reformed the world break the law -of thought, when, going behind the phenomena of human conduct, with -their relations pointing to one idea of right and wrong, they conceived -the idea of a new and a better rule of life? When it was said, in place -of the old law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, "Love your -enemies and pray for those who persecute you"--when for the old rule -of revenge there was substituted forgiveness of injuries--something -was inculcated that contradicted all the appearances of the social -phenomena, and that lay beyond them. Did the consciousness of this new -reality become "a formless consciousness of the inscrutable"? What -is there about it that is inscrutable? There is nothing inscrutable -about it, or in the consciousness of it, excepting the mode in which -the being who promulgated it came to exist. The idea of forgiveness is -clearly within the compass of human thought and of human endeavor. - -When we are in the process of making a new physical discovery, or of -forming a new rule of moral action, we work away from the materials -which the phenomenal manifestations give us, to a new conception. -We become conscious of a new reality behind appearance, and of an -existence beyond the relations of the phenomena with which we have -heretofore been familiar. It is to this striving after realities behind -appearances--striving by an entirely true process of thinking--that the -world owes its progress. - -When the phenomenal manifestations of an intellectual and moral nature -in man have given us the idea of an existence of an intellectual and -moral being as a reality of which we become conscious, what is to -prevent us from thinking of another intellectual and moral being as a -reality, with faculties and powers immeasurably superior to ours? It -is true that the phenomenal manifestations of man's intellectual and -moral nature give us an idea of a being of very limited faculties and -very imperfect moral qualities. But what is the "insoluble difficulty" -in which we become involved, when we think of a being whose faculties -are boundless, and whose moral nature is perfect? Does the "insoluble -difficulty" consist in the impossibility of thinking of that which -transcends all our powers of measurement? All that we have done, in the -case of man, is to have a consciousness of a being whose phenomenal -manifestations evince the existence of an intellectual and moral -nature. He happens to be a being of very limited faculties and very -imperfect moral characteristics. What prevents us from thinking, in -the true sense of thinking, of another being, whose powers are without -limit, and whose moral nature is perfect? Is it said that we can -not bring into any shape the idea of unlimited power or of perfect -goodness, or bring into any shape its connection with appearance, -because all our ideas of power and goodness, all our forms of thought -and expression, are molded on experiences of limited power and -imperfect goodness? The truth is that we do not and need not strive -to bring into connection with appearance the idea of any quality -which we conceive of as unlimited. What we derive from the phenomenal -manifestations of human power and goodness is a consciousness of the -qualities of power and goodness. It is perfectly correct thinking to -reason that these qualities, whose phenomenal manifestations, in the -case of man, show that in him they exist only in a limited degree, may -exist in another being in unlimited perfection and without degree. -Our minds are so constituted that we reason from the finite to the -infinite, by observing that one class of phenomena evince the existence -of the finite and another class of phenomena evince the existence of -the infinite. - -When, therefore, we pass from the phenomenal manifestations of human -power and goodness, we come into the presence of other phenomena which -we know could not be and were not produced by such a limited and -imperfect being as man, but which must yet have had an author, a maker, -an originator, a creator. We thus contemplate and investigate facts -which show that the phenomena were the products of a skill, wisdom, and -power that transcend all measurement. Is it said that the phenomena of -nature, stupendous and varied and minute and wonderful as they are, -evince only that a certain degree of power and wisdom was exerted in -their production, even if their production is attributed to a being -competent to bring them about? And therefore that the idea of a being -of unlimited faculties and perfect goodness is as far as ever from our -reach by any true process of thought? This assumption begs something -that should not be taken for granted. It assumes that the production -of the phenomena of nature does not evince unlimited power and perfect -goodness; did not call for the existence of boundless faculties and -inexhaustible benevolence; involved only a degree of such qualities, -although a vastly superior degree to that possessed by us. The -correctness of this assumption depends upon the force of the evidence -which nature affords of the character of the Deity. It is an assumption -which has led to enormous errors--errors of conception and belief -which impute to the Supreme Being only a superior degree of power and -wisdom, greater than our own, but still limited and imperfect, liable -to error, and acting in modes which distress us with contradictions and -inconsistencies. - -It may without rashness be asserted that the phenomena of the universe -could not have been produced by a power and wisdom that were subject to -any limitations. While all the researches of science, from the first -beginnings of human observation to the present moment, show that in -the production of the phenomena of nature there has been exerted a -certain amount of power and wisdom, they also show that it is an amount -which we can not measure; that there is, moreover, a power and wisdom -that have not been exhausted; that the reserved force and skill and -benevolence are without limit. For, in every successive new discovery -that we make, in every new revelation of the power and goodness -which our investigations bring forth, we continuously reach proofs -of an endless capacity, an inexhaustible variety of methods and of -products. So that, if we conceive of the whole human race, with all its -accumulated knowledge, as ending at last in one individual possessed -of all that has been learned on earth, and imagine him to be then -translated to another state of existence, with all his faculties of -observation and study preserved, and new fields of inquiry to be opened -to him, his experience on earth would lead him to expect to find, and -we must believe that in his new experience he will find, that the -physical and the moral phenomena of the universe are an inexhaustible -study; that search and discovery must go on forever; and that forever -new revelations of power and goodness will be made to the perceptions -whose training began in a very limited sphere. His experience in -that limited sphere has taught him that there was no end to the -discoveries which were here partially within his reach. His experience -in the new sphere will be a continuation of his experience in the old -one; for there is a law by which we judge of the future by the past. -This law is one of the conditions of our intellectual existence; an -inevitable habit of our minds; imposed upon us by an inexorable but -familiar authority. Our experience in this life has taught us that, -in the investigation of the phenomena of nature that are open to our -observation here, we have never reached the end of possible discovery; -that every fresh discovery has evinced that there are still new things -to be learned, new manifestations of power to be revealed, new products -and new methods to be seen. However long we may suppose the human race -to exist on earth and its researches to be prosecuted here, we must -suppose an endless accumulation of knowledge hereafter, because the -law which compels us to judge of the future by the past obliges us to -accept as the fruition of the future that which has been the fruition -of the past.[99] - -Is there in this any violation of the true law of thought? Does the -relation between our past experience and the experience which we -forecast for the future fade into a dim symbol of a relation? On the -contrary, both are equally capable of mental representation; for -we are mentally so constituted that the consciousness of what has -happened to us in the past--the unending succession of new discoveries, -the constant accumulation of knowledge, which we have experienced -here--gives us the conception of the same endless progress hereafter, -compels us to believe in it, and enables us to grasp it as a product of -true thought. - -Mr. Spencer has much to say of "the imbecility of human intelligence -when brought to bear on the ultimate question." What is the ultimate -question? The ultimate question with which science and philosophy are -concerned is the existence of the Supreme Being. It is of the utmost -consequence for us to understand wherein consists the imbecility of -human intelligence when brought to bear upon this question of the -existence of God. How does our imbecility manifest itself? What is -the point beyond which thought can not go? We become conscious of the -existence of the being called man, because, from the phenomena which we -know that he produces by the exercise of his will and power, and which -we know must have had an author and producer, we deduce an existence -beyond the phenomena, an actor in their production. What more, or -what that is different, do we do or undertake to do, when, from the -phenomena of nature which we know that man did not produce, we think -of another existence beyond the phenomena? In both cases, we study -the phenomena by our senses and powers of observation; in both cases -we reason that there is an actor who produces the phenomena; yet the -existence of the actor who produces the phenomena is inscrutable in the -case of the Deity in the same sense and for the same reason that it -is inscrutable in the case of man. How the human mind came to exist, -by what process it was made to exist, by what means it was created, -what was the genesis of the human intellect, is just as inscrutable, -no more and no less so, as the mode in which the Deity came to exist. -In both cases the existence of a being is what we think of; and when -we think of either being we think of that which is beyond phenomena -but which we deduce from phenomena. In neither case do we "accept a -formless consciousness of the inscrutable"; for what we accept is the -consciousness of a being, and it is not a consciousness of the mode in -which he came to exist. The latter consciousness is the inscrutable -problem. The existence is what we think of, and we think of it by a -perfectly true process of thought, deducing it from the simple truth -that the phenomena must have had an actor in their production. We do -not undertake to think of the process by which man was created, or of -the mode in which that other existence came to be without beginning and -without end. - -I have thus discriminated between what we do and what we do not think -of, when we think of an existence beyond phenomena, but which we deduce -from phenomena. This is a most necessary discrimination; for, in -thinking of the existence, we do not try to think how it came to be an -existence. We think only of the existence; and we deduce it from our -observation and study of phenomena, which teach us that they must have -had an actor, an author, a producer, and that they did not produce or -create themselves. - -It remains for me to advert to Mr. Spencer's theory of the origin of -the religious consciousness, or the origin of the idea of supernatural -beings, and hence of one highest supernatural being. This is his -ghost-theory. He has recently told us that in his "Descriptive -Sociology"--a work commenced in 1867, and which preceded his -"Principles of Sociology" (written in 1874)--he caused to be gathered -adequate materials for generalization, consisting of a great number -of excerpts from the writings of travelers and historians who have -given accounts of the religious beliefs of the uncivilized races. He -numbers 697 of these extracts which refer to the ghost-theory, and -only 87 which refer to fetichism. This great ratio of eight to one -he considers overwhelming proof that the ghost-theory, as opposed -to fetichism, is sustained by the beliefs of a vast majority of the -uncivilized races. What if it is? What is the ghost-theory, and -what is fetichism, as the chief source and origin of religion? Mr. -Spencer, in his recent article, explains fetichism as most persons -understand it, namely, the worship of inanimate objects, or belief in -their supernatural powers. The ghost-theory, which his 697 extracts -illustrate, is "the belief in a wandering double, which goes away -during sleep, or fainting, and deserts the body for a longer period -at death; a double which can enter and possess other persons, causing -disease, epilepsy, insanity, etc., which gives rise to ideas of -spirits, demons, etc., and which, originates propitiation and worship -of ghosts."[100] Further on, he reiterates his ghost-theory as the -origin of religious beliefs, and explains it thus: - - Setting out with the statement that "unlike the ordinary - consciousness, the religious consciousness is concerned with that - which lies beyond the sphere of sense," I went on to show that the - rise of this consciousness begins among primitive men with the - belief in a double belonging to each individual, which, capable of - wandering away from him during life, becomes his ghost or spirit after - death; and that from this idea of a being eventually distinguished - as supernatural, there develop, in course of time, the ideas of - supernatural beings of all orders up to the highest. Mr. Harrison has - alleged that the primitive religion is not belief in and propitiation - of the ghost, but is worship of "physical objects treated frankly as - physical objects" (p. 498). That he has disproved the one view and - proved the other, no one will, I think, assert. Contrariwise, he has - given occasion for me to cite weighty authorities against him. - - Next it was contended that in the assemblage of supernatural beings - thus originating in each tribe, some, derived from chiefs, were - superior to others; and that, as the compounding and recompounding - of tribes gave origin to societies having social grades and rulers - of different orders, there resulted that conception of a hierarchy - of ghosts or gods which polytheism shows us. Further it was argued - that while, with the growth of civilization and knowledge, the - minor supernatural agents became merged in the major supernatural - agent, this single great supernatural agent, gradually losing the - anthropomorphic attributes at first ascribed, has come in our days to - retain but few of them; and, eventually losing these, will then merge - into a consciousness of an Omnipresent Power to which no attributes - can be ascribed. This proposition has not been contested. - -Without entering into any consideration of what Mr. Harrison has -disproved or proved, as between fetichism and the ghost-theory, I will -now ask why the beliefs of the uncivilized races, or of the primitive -men, should be regarded as important evidence of the origin of beliefs -among civilized and cultivated men? Is modern philosophy, in accounting -for or justifying the belief in a Supreme Being which is held to-day -by most of the cultivated and educated part of mankind, to assign its -origin to the primitive and uncivilized men? Is the whole idea of a -supernatural being to be regarded as traditionally handed down from our -barbarian ancestors? Is there no other source from which we can derive -that idea? Are we none of us capable of finding for ourselves rational -grounds of belief in a supernatural agent, deducing his existence from -a study of nature? Or must we trace this belief back through the ages -until we arrive at an origin which we shall of course despise? What has -philosophy to do now with "the primitive religion"? Is there nothing -that science and reason and disciplined methods of thought and sound -deduction can teach us? Are we to throw away all the proofs which -nature spreads before us, and for the investigation of which we have -accumulated so many facilities, and turn to the beliefs of uncivilized -men? Are the conceptions of supernatural beings, to which a barbarian -attained, to be taken as the origin of the conception of a personal -God to which an educated philosopher can now attain? And because of the -inadequate and childish superstitions of the past, and of their growth -into a belief of one supreme supernatural agent--whatever that idea of -him may have been--is the consciousness which we have of a personal God -to be hereafter merged into a consciousness of an Omnipresent Power to -which no attributes can be ascribed? - -It should seem that the mode in which philosophy, after it came to be -cultivated by civilized thinkers and observers, freed itself first -from fetichism and the ghost-theory and all the beliefs of polytheism, -next from physical agents as the causes of all phenomena, and finally -attained an independent conception of a First Cause as a supreme -personal intelligence and power, is worthy of some consideration. - -In the first chapter of this work, borrowing from the English scholar -and critic, Mr. Grote, I have given a condensed account of some of -the systems of Greek philosophy which began in the first half of the -sixth century before Christ, and extended down to Plato, whose life -was embraced in 427-347 of the ante-Christian era. About 150 B. -C., the Greek philosophy, and especially the speculations of -Plato, encountered at Alexandria the monotheism of the Hellenizing -Jews.[101] This history of Greek philosophy, as developed by Mr. Grote, -shows that the struggle against polytheistic agencies, as the causes of -natural phenomena, began with efforts to find purely physical agencies; -that this struggle, in spite of the surrounding beliefs in a multitude -of supernatural beings of different orders, was long continued, and -gave rise to a most remarkable variety of scientific explanations: -that it passed through an extraordinary number of physical theories, -until at length in Plato there was developed the idea of a distinct -personal constructive actor, the Demiurgus, a being to whom, whether -intended by Plato as a philosophical myth, or as an entity in which -he had something of faith or conviction, he assigned the formation of -his Kosmos. With characteristic acumen, the English commentator points -out Plato's skill in eluding the possible charge of infidelity to the -established religion of Athens, while he at the same time propounded -the existence of a personal First Cause that was in a striking degree -inconsistent with the popular faith. The whole course of this history -of Greek speculation evinces that from an early period the Greek -philosophers were utter skeptics in regard to the popular religion and -the poetic traditions; that they not only did not derive anything from -the primitive religion, from fetichism, from the ghost-beliefs of their -barbarian ancestors--if their ancestors had such beliefs--or from their -heroic ages, or from the multitudinous gods of the popular theology and -the popular worship, or from the old poetical imagery, but that they -strove to get away from all these sources, and to construct theories -of the universe that would explain the ultimate cause or causes in a -very different manner. The earliest Greek speculators got no further in -their theories than the construction of systems of physical agencies, -or agencies that stood to them in the quality of physical actors. -Plato, on the other hand, resorted to the conception of a supreme -personal actor. - -Mr. Grote has further mentioned a very striking fact, which is, that -before the Christian era, the Demiurgus of Plato was received by the -Hellenizing Jews at Alexandria as a conception kindred to the God of -Moses. His statement, in substance the same as that previously made by -a Continental critic, Gfrörer, is so interesting and important that -I quote his words: "But though the idea of a pre-kosmic Demiurgus -found little favor among the Grecian schools of philosophy before -the Christian era, it was greatly welcomed among the Hellenizing Jews -at Alexandria, from Aristobulus (about B. C. 150) down to -Philo. It formed the suitable point of conjunction between Hellenic -and Judaic speculation. The marked distinction drawn by Plato between -the Demiurgus, and the constructed or generated Kosmos, with its -in-dwelling gods, provided a suitable place for the Supreme God of the -Jews, degrading the pagan gods by comparison. The 'Timæus' was compared -with the book of Genesis, from which it was even affirmed that Plato -had copied. He received the denomination of the Atticising Moses--Moses -writing in Attic Greek. It was thus that the Platonic 'Timæus' became -the medium of transition from the polytheistic theology, which served -as philosophy among the early ages of Greece, to the omnipotent -monotheism to which philosophy became subordinated after the Christian -era."[102] - -Perhaps there is no more remarkable fact than this in the whole history -of philosophical speculation. Possibly Mr. Spencer would say that it -adds another proof to his ghost-theory. But the important fact is that -Plato's Demiurgus partakes in no degree of the ghost idea, and, instead -of being a modification of that idea, is an original and perfectly -independent conception. The Demiurgus of Plato is not a chief spirit -evolved in imagination out of a hierarchy of spirits. He is himself the -originator and fashioner of the gods, of whom he makes use as ministers -in the formation of the bodies of the primitive men, after he has -himself formed the souls which are to inhabit them for a season. - -It appears, by Mr. Grote's citations from Gfrörer, that the latter had -previously noted what Aristobulus maintained one hundred and fifty -years earlier than Philo, namely, that "not only the oldest Grecian -poets, Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, etc., but also the most celebrated -thinkers, especially Plato, had acquired all their wisdom from a -very old translation of the Pentateuch." Neither of these modern -critics appears to have accepted the assertion of Aristobulus, and -its intrinsic improbability is very great. Certainly the internal -evidence of the "Timæus" negatives the assumption that Plato had seen -the Pentateuch, for his Demiurgus is not the God of Moses, although -it was very natural for the Alexandrian Jews to think they recognized -a resemblance. Mr. Grote, moreover, seems to put this matter beyond -doubt, for he says that the Platonic "Timæus" _became the medium of -transition_ from the polytheism of early Greece to the monotheism -of the Christian era. This implies very clearly that Mr. Grote did -not consider the Demiurgus of Plato to be either derived from the -polytheism of the early Grecian ages, on the one hand, or from the -Mosaic Jehovah, on the other hand, but that he considered it a -conception which stood between them. The point of resemblance is in -the idea of a divine and supreme personal actor in the production of -phenomena. - -It does not seem, therefore, that a philosopher at the present day is -confined to the source of the primitive religion, be that source what -it may. The primitive religion, whether its origin was fetichism or a -belief in ghosts, has imposed no shackles upon our minds. The beliefs -of the primitive men may have originated as Mr. Spencer supposes, but -the question for us--revelation being laid aside--is just what it was -for Plato, the difference being that our means of investigation are -superior to his. The grounds of our belief in a personal God are not -the same as those on which the uncivilized races formed first the idea -of a wandering double emanating from the human body, then conceived -of spirits or ghosts, next of different orders of spirits or ghosts, -and finally of a chief and supreme spirit. Our materials for sound -deduction are not the same as those of the primitive races of mankind, -or of the uncivilized tribes of the present day. I have before remarked -that the intellectual effort of a savage in striving for the idea of a -deity is the same kind of effort as that of the civilized and educated -man; but that the difference between them is in the growth and activity -of the reasoning power, and in the materials on which it is exercised. -While our barbarian predecessors lived in an age of ignorance, we live -in an age of knowledge. We are surrounded by extraordinary discoveries, -and are possessed of the means of still further research. They had -almost no means for investigating physical phenomena. We are, or ought -to be, disciplined reasoners. They, on the contrary, while able to -reason correctly on a very few subjects, could not reason correctly -on all subjects. We are, or ought to be, capable of subjecting the -materials which the phenomena of nature spread before us, to sound -processes of thought and to logical deductions. We are, or ought to -be, capable of discriminating between that which is really inscrutable -and that which is not so. We are, or ought to be, able to know when we -are within the bounds of possible thought, and when we transcend them. -We are, or ought to be, able to see that the existence of phenomena -necessarily implies a causing power; that when the phenomena are such -as we know that man produces, the idea of an intelligent personal actor -is both a legitimate deduction and a perfectly appreciable subject -of thought. Are we not entitled to apply the same reasoning to the -phenomena of nature which we know that man did not produce? And when -we so reason, do we borrow anything whatever from the primitive idea -of ghosts or spirits, whether they are supposed to have first emanated -from human bodies, or to reside in inanimate objects? - -There are two distinct values to be assigned to the researches of -science. One of them consists in the practical improvement of the -material condition of society; the lessening of physical evil, the -increase of physical good; the advancement of our power over matter. -In an age intensely devoted to this materialistic improvement, there -will be a great accumulation of physical knowledge. At the same -time there are accumulating in the same ratio new materials for -philosophical speculation concerning the causes of the phenomena that -are investigated. The specialists who carry on the investigations -may not always be the best reasoners in the application of the new -materials to the purpose of philosophical inquiry into the producing -causes of the phenomena. But the other distinct value of their -investigations consists in the accumulation of materials from which the -philosopher can deduce the existence of an actor in the production of -the phenomena. When, from these materials, constantly accumulating and -constantly to be used in a uniform process of reasoning to which the -human mind is both able and obliged to resort, the philosopher deduces -the conception of a supreme, personal, intelligent being, he assigns -to that being just those attributes which the phenomena of nature -compel him to believe in, because if the attributes did not exist the -phenomena of nature could not have become what they are. There can be -no reason to suppose that as the materials increase, as the researches -of science, for whatever purpose carried on, lead to greater and still -greater accumulations of knowledge, the law of thought by which we -deduce the idea of an actor in the production of phenomena will change, -or that the logical necessity for conceiving, or the intellectual -capacity to conceive of, the attributes of that actor will either -diminish or fade away. An Omnipotent Power without attributes, or one -to which no attributes can be assigned, is not likely to be the end of -all philosophical speculation about the ultimate cause. Power without -attributes, power without a determining will, power without guidance, -or purposes, or objects, is not a conception to which a well-trained -intellect is now likely to attain; and the greater the accumulation of -physical knowledge becomes, the greater will be the necessity to such -an intellect for recognizing attributes, and for assigning them to the -power which is manifested by the phenomena. - -According to Mr. Spencer, the process by which mankind are ultimately -to lose the consciousness of a personal Deity is the following: -Anthropomorphic attributes were at first ascribed to the single great -supernatural agent of whom the primitive men conceived. But in our -days, the idea of such a supreme supernatural agent has come to retain -but a few of these attributes. These few will eventually be lost, -and there will be nothing left but a consciousness of an Omnipotent -Power to which no attributes can be ascribed. The probability of -this result depends upon the necessity for ascribing what are called -anthropomorphic attributes to the Supreme Being; or, in other words, it -depends upon the inquiry whether, in order to ascribe to the Supreme -Being any attributes at all, we are necessarily confined to those which -are anthropomorphic. - -"Anthropomorphism," a term compounded from the Greek ἄνθρωπος, man, -and μορφή, form, has come to signify the representation of the Deity -under a human form, or with human attributes and affections. It is -therefore important to know what we in fact do, when reasoning on the -phenomena of nature, we reach the conclusion that they must have had -an author or producer, and then ascribe to him certain attributes. The -fact that the ancient religious beliefs ascribed to the Supreme Being -grossly anthropomorphic attributes, is unimportant. So is the fact that -the anthropomorphic attributes have been slowly diminishing in the -conceptions of the reasoning and cultivated part of mankind. The really -important question is whether there can be no conception of a Supreme -Being without ascribing to him attributes which liken him to man; or -whether, when the anthropomorphic attributes are lost, the idea of a -personal God will be lost. - -The essential character of any anthropomorphic or human -attribute--power for example, or wisdom, or goodness--is that it is -limited, imperfect, and liable to error. But when we conceive of these -qualities as existing in absolute perfection and boundless capacity, -while we retain the idea that they are personal qualities, we in fact -divest them of their anthropomorphic or human character. It is a -contradiction in terms to say that an imperfect human capacity is the -same attribute as a divine and unlimited capacity. The difficulty with -the ancient religious beliefs, the whole error of anthropomorphism, -was that the conceptions stopped short of the idea of unlimited power, -wisdom, and benevolence. The attributes ascribed to the Deity likened -him to man in form, character, powers, dispositions, passions. He was -an exaggerated human being, with vastly more power, more skill, more -wisdom, but still with the same kind of power, skill, and wisdom, -actuated by like motives and governed by like passions. Now the truth -is, that the difference between a limited and imperfect attribute of -character and one that is boundless--power, for example--is more than -a difference of degree. It is a difference in kind; for while in both -cases we conceive of a personal capacity to act and a will to guide -the act, in the one case we are thinking of that which is inferior, -limited, and feeble, and in the other case we are thinking of that -which knows no limitations and is absolutely inexhaustible. It is -not true, therefore, that there can be no conception of a Supreme -Being without ascribing to him human attributes. When we reason from -phenomena to the conclusion that they must have had an author--when -we reach the conviction that phenomena must have had a cause, that -there must have been an actor, a process, and a product--we have -to deal with two classes of phenomena. One is the class in which we -know, from the observations of our senses and our experience, that the -author and actor was man. It becomes verified to us with irresistible -certainty that the phenomena of human society were produced by an -actor, and that that actor was man; a personal agent with a limited and -imperfect power. When we turn to the phenomena of nature which we know -that man did not produce, we are led by the same irresistible logical -sequence of thought to the conviction that these phenomena must have -been caused to exist, for human reason revolts at the idea that the -phenomena which exist were not caused to exist. We come immediately -to perceive that the phenomena of nature are of such a character that -the power which has produced them must not only have been superhuman, -but it must have been absolutely boundless. At the moment we depart -from the investigation of phenomena which belong in the department of -human efforts, and come to the phenomena which belong in the department -of nature alone, while the necessity for a personal actor continues, -the character and capacities of the actor become entirely changed. -We see that the phenomena of nature required for their production -power without limitation, skill incapable of error, benevolence that -was inexhaustible. We thus pass entirely away from anthropomorphic -attributes, to the conception of attributes that are not human. We -may go on to divest the idea of a Supreme Being of all the attributes -that can appropriately be classed as anthropomorphic, and there will -still remain the conception of a Supreme Being to whom we not only may -but must ascribe attributes that are forced upon our convictions, not -because some of them belong in an inferior degree to man, but because -all of them are of such a character that if they did not exist in -boundless perfection the phenomena of nature could not have existed. - -Among the origins which have been assigned to religious beliefs, -there is one remarkable hypothesis which may be contrasted with the -ghost-theory, and which, so far as the beliefs of cultivated men at -the present day are concerned, is about as important as the origin of -the belief in ghosts, or as fetichism. It seems that some of the Greek -philosophers and historians, entirely regardless of the ghost-theory as -the origin of beliefs in supernatural beings, considered that they were -fictions invented by the first lawgivers, and promulgated by them for -useful purposes. Belief in the gods was thus imposed by the authority -of those who organized society and dictated what men were to believe in -order to exercise a useful restraint. Plato himself regarded this as -the origin of what the communities around him believed respecting the -attributes and acts of the gods; the matters believed being fictions -prescribed by the lawgivers. In his "Republic," in which he sketches -the entire political, social, ethical, and religious constitution of -an ideal city, assuming it to be planned and put in operation by an -absolute and unlimited authority, he laid it down as essential for -the lawgiver to determine what the fictions were to be in which his -own community were to be required to believe. Some fictions there -must be; for in the community there would be originally nothing but a -vague emotional tendency to belief in supernatural beings, and this -tendency must be availed of by some positive mythical inventions which -it was for the lawgiver to produce and the citizens to accept. Such -fictions were the accredited stories about the gods and heroes, which -formed the religious beliefs among Plato's contemporaries, and were -everywhere embodied in the works of poets, painters, and sculptors, -and in the religious ceremonies. But the ancient fictions were, in -Plato's opinion, bad, inasmuch as they gave wrong ethical ideas of the -characters of the gods. They did not rest upon traditionary evidence, -or divine inspiration, being merely pious frauds, constructed by -authority and for an orthodox purpose. But they did not fulfill the -purpose as well as they should have done. Accordingly, Plato directs -in his "Republic" the coinage of a new body of legends, for which he -claims no character of veracity, but which will be more in harmony -with what he conceives to be the true characters of the gods, and -will produce a more salutary ethical effect upon those who are to -be the efficient rulers of the commonwealth after it is founded. As -the founder of his ideal city, he claims and exercises an exclusive -monopoly of coining and circulating such fictions, and they are to -be absolutely accepted by those who are to constitute its rulers, -and who are to promulgate and teach them to the community, as the -physician administers wholesome remedies. To prevent the circulation of -dissenting narratives, he establishes a peremptory censorship. There is -thus no question of absolute truth or absolute falsehood. That is true -which is stamped at the mint of the lawgiver, and that is false which -he interdicts.[103] - -Nowhere has orthodoxy been rested more distinctly upon the basis of -absolute human authority--authority acting upon the highest motives of -the public good, for the most salutary purposes, but without claiming -anything in the nature of divine inspiration, or even pretending to any -other truth than conformity to preconceived ideas of the characters -of the gods. As evidence of what Plato regarded as the origin of the -religious beliefs which were held by his contemporaries, his "Republic" -is an important testimony; for he assigns almost nothing to mankind in -general, but an emotional tendency to believe in invisible quasi-human -agents, of whom they had no definite conceptions, and at the same time -they were entirely ignorant of recorded history, past and present. -They needed distinct legendary fictions and invented narratives; these -were furnished to them by those who could coin them, and were accepted -upon the authority of those who promulgated them. Those who first -embodied the fictions as narratives were the oldest poets; in progress -of time the authority which dictated belief in them came to be the -state. Plato rejected the fictions of the state, and in his "Republic" -proposed to substitute fictions of his own. The testimony of Plato, -therefore, in respect to the origin of religious beliefs in the early -ages of Greece is decidedly against the ghost-theory, whatever support -may be found for that theory in the beliefs of the uncivilized races -of our own day, or in the beliefs of other nations of antiquity. But -neither the ghost-theory, as the origin of beliefs in supernatural -beings, nor the origin of such beliefs in the will of the lawgiver, -which Plato clearly held in his "Republic" to be the foundation of -orthodoxy, is any test or measure of what philosophy may attain to as a -rational conception at the present day.[104] - -I propose, therefore, to imagine a man of mature years, without any -religious prepossessions whatever, a perfectly independent thinker, -furnished with the knowledge that is now within the easy reach of human -acquisition, capable of correct reasoning, and with no bias to any kind -of belief. It is only necessary to personify in one individual the -intellectual capacity of the cultivated and educated part of mankind, -but without the religious ideas instilled into them by education, in -order to have a valuable witness to the mental processes and results -which can be followed and attained by a right employment of our -faculties. And, the better to exhibit the processes and results, I -propose to let this imaginary person discuss in the form of dialogue, -in which another imaginary interlocutor shall be a modern disciple of -the evolution school, whatever topics would be likely to come into -debate between such persons. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [93] "Essays," vol. iii, pp. 293-296. - - [94] For the answer to the objection that we thus ascribe - anthropomorphic attributes to the Supreme Being, see _infra._ - - [95] Webster's Dictionary, "Phenomenon." - - [96] Our other American lexicographer, Worcester, who was pretty - strict in regard to the words which he admitted into the English - language, gives the word "noumenon," but he was careful to designate - its arbitrary use. His definition is this: - - "Noumenon, _n._ [Gr. νοῦς, the mind.] In the philosophy of Kant, an - object in itself, not relatively to us; opposed to _phenomenon_. - _Fleming_." - - [97] Prof. Huxley, who claims a sort of patent right or priority of - invention in the term and doctrine "agnosticism." - - [98] "There are some things I know and some things I believe," said - the Syrian; "I know that I have a soul, and I believe that it is - immortal." ... - - "I wish I could assure myself of the personality of the Creator," said - Lothair; "I cling to that, but they say it is unphilosophical!" "In - what sense," asked the Syrian, "is it more unphilosophical to believe - in a personal God, omnipotent and omniscient, than in natural forces, - unconscious and irresistible? Is it unphilosophical to combine power - with intelligence?"--_Disraeli's "Lothair."_ - - [99] The practice of judging of the future by the past is sometimes - treated as if it were a mere habit of the uncultivated and - undisciplined part of mankind--a kind of mental weakness. Undoubtedly, - our past experience is not always an infallible guide to what is to - be our experience in the future. We often have to correct our past - experience, by carefully separating the accidental from the essential; - by more comprehensive analysis of the facts which constitute our - former experience. But when we have full, comprehensive, and accurate - views of that which has happened to us heretofore, our beliefs in what - is to happen to us hereafter are not only attained by a safe process - of reasoning, but that process is imposed upon us by a law of our - mental constitution. - - [100] "Nineteenth Century" for November, 1884, p. 827. - - [101] Grote's "Plato," iii, pp. 284, 285. - - [102] Grote's "Plato," iii, p. 285, and notes. - - [103] Grote's "Plato," iii, p. 181 _et seq._ - - [104] The contradictions between Plato's ideas of the origin of - beliefs in the gods, as given in his various writings, are of course - unimportant in reference to the present discussion. In the "Timæus," - as Mr. Grote has pointed out, Plato "accepts the received genealogy - of the gods, upon the authority of the sons and early descendants of - the gods. These eons must have known their own fathers; we ought, - therefore, to 'follow the law and believe them,' though they spoke - without either probable or demonstrative proof.... That which Plato - here enjoins to be believed is the genealogy of Hesiod and other - poets, though he does not expressly name the poets." (Grote, iii, p. - 189, note.) In other words, the sons of the gods are authoritative - witnesses to their genealogy, whose _ipsi diximus_ must be believed. - On the other hand, in his "Republic" and "Leges," Plato rejects the - authority of those witnesses, and boldly proclaims that their legends - are fictions, which must be displaced by better fictions, more - consonant to a true ethical conception of the characters of the gods. - It is the province of the lawgiver to supply these better legends, but - they are all the while fictions, although the multitude do not know - that they are so. Mr. Grote accounts for these and other discrepancies - in the writings of Plato by explaining that his different dialogues - are not interdependent productions, but separate disquisitions. (See - his admirable and critical examination of the Platonic canon, in - Chapters IV, V, VI, of his first volume.) - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - The existence, attributes, and methods of God deducible from the - phenomena of Nature--Origin of the solar system. - - -In all that has been said in the preceding chapters respecting the -two hypotheses of special creation and evolution, the existence and -attributes of the Supreme Being have been assumed. The question of the -existence and attributes of God has been reserved for discussion as -an independent inquiry; and this inquiry it is now proposed to make, -without any reference to the teachings of revealed religion, or to -the traditionary beliefs of mankind. The simple idea of God, which I -suppose to be capable of being reached as a philosophical deduction -from the phenomena of the universe, embraces the conception of a -Supreme Being existing from and through all eternity, and possessed of -the attributes of infinite power and goodness, boundless, that is to -say in faculties, incapable of error, and of supreme beneficence. While -this idea of God corresponds with that which has been held from an -early period under more or less of the influence exerted by teachings -which have been accepted as inspired, or as authorized by the Deity -himself, the question here to be considered is whether the same idea of -God is a rationally philosophical deduction from the phenomena of the -universe without the aid of revelation. - -In order to conduct this inquiry so as to exclude all influence of -traditionary beliefs derived from sources believed to have been -inspired, or from any authority whatever, let us suppose a man to -have been born into this world in the full maturity of average human -faculties, as they are found in well-disciplined intellects of the -present age, but without any inculcated ideas on religious subjects. -In the place of education commencing in infancy and carried on to the -years of maturity, in the course of which more or less of dogmatic -theology would have become incorporated almost with the texture of the -mind, let us suppose that the mind of our inquirer is at first a total -blank in respect to a belief in or conception of such a being as God, -but that his intellectual powers are so well developed that he can -reason soundly upon whatever comes within the reach of his observation -or study. Let us further imagine him to be so situated that he can -command at will the knowledge that science, as it now exists, could -furnish to him, and that he is able to judge impartially any theories -with which he meets. Such a person would be likely to deal rationally -and independently with any question that might arise in the course of -his investigations; and the fundamental question that would be likely -to present itself to his mind would be, How came this universe and its -countless phenomena to exist? - -Stimulated by an eager curiosity, but careful to make his -investigations with entire coolness of reasoning, let us suppose -that our inquirer first turns his attention to the phenomena of the -solar system, and to what astronomy can teach him in regard to its -construction. He finds it to consist of-- - -1. The sun, a great central body giving forth light and heat. - -2. A group of four interior planets: Mercury, Venus, the Earth, and -Mars. - -3. A group of small planets, called asteroids, revolving beyond the -orbit of Mars, and numbering, according to the latest discoveries, -about two hundred and twenty. - -4. A group of four planets beyond the asteroids: Jupiter, Saturn, -Uranus, and Neptune. - -5. The satellites of the planets, of which there are twenty now known; -all but three of them belonging to the outer planets. - -6. An intermediate number of bodies called comets and meteors, which -revolve in very eccentric orbits. - -This system of bodies, constituting a mechanism by itself, apart from -what are called the fixed stars, is the first object in nature to which -our inquirer directs his studies. Inasmuch as the comets and meteors -move in very eccentric orbits, and are supposed to come into our system -from the illimitable spaces beyond it, although in the case of the -comets, or some of them, mathematical calculations enable astronomers -to predict their return when they have passed out of the solar system, -and inasmuch as the sun and the superior planets may be contemplated -as a grand piece of mechanism, and as the greatest mechanical object -in nature of whose construction and movements we have some accurate -knowledge, we will suppose that our inquirer confines his attention -to this part of the solar system, without adverting to the action of -the bodies which are not always, as these are, within the range of the -telescope. - -One of the first things that would strike him would be the enormous -range in the sizes, distances, and relative weights of these different -bodies. He would learn, for example, that Neptune is eighty times as -far from the sun as Mercury, and that Jupiter is several thousand times -as heavy; and he would observe that these differences in magnitude, -distance from the sun, and weight of each mass, are carried through a -range of proportions stupendously great. If he followed the best lights -of modern astronomy, he would learn that what is known, or accepted as -known, in regard to the operation of any law among these bodies, is -that they are bound together by the law of universal gravitation as -a force to which all matter would be subjected when it should come to -exist, in whatever forms it might be distributed; secondly, that when -the bodies now composing the solar system should come into existence, -the system would not owe its proportions to the operation of the law of -gravitation, but would be the result of a plan so shaped as to admit -of its being governed by the law of gravitation after the system had -been made, in such a manner as to produce regularity and certainty of -movement and to prevent dislocation and disturbance. What the great -modern telescopes have enabled astronomers to discover tends very -strongly to show that the plan of the solar system, in respect to the -relative distances, magnitudes, and revolutions of the different bodies -around the sun, and their relations to that central body and to each -other, are not the result of any antecedent law which gradually evolved -this particular plan, but that the plan itself was primarily designed -and executed as one on which the law of gravitation could operate -uniformly, and so as to prevent any disturbance in the relations of the -different bodies to each other.[105] - -An illustration will help to make the meaning of this apparent. Let -us suppose a human artificer to project the formation of a complex -mechanism, in which different solid bodies would be made to revolve -around a central body; and let us imagine him to be situated outside -of the earth's attraction, so that its attraction would not disturb -him. He would then have to consider the law of gravitation only in -reference to its operation among the different bodies of his machine; -and he would adjust their relative distances, weights, and orbits of -revolution around the central body, so that the law of gravitation, -instead of producing dislocation and disturbance, would bind the -whole together in a fixed system of movement, by counteracting the -centrifugal tendency of a revolving body to depart from its intended -orbit, and at the same time relying on the effect of the two forces in -preventing the revolving bodies from falling into the center or from -rushing off into the endless realms of space. - -This is what may well be supposed to have taken place in the formation -of the solar system, for it is consistent with the law which must have -preceded the existence of that system. We can not suppose that the law -of gravitation was itself a mere result of the relative distances, -magnitudes, and orbits of the different bodies. This supposition would -make gravitation not a law, but a phenomenon. We do indeed arrive at -the existence of the law of gravitation by observing the actions of -the bodies which compose the solar system; in other words, we discover -the law that holds them together, by observing their actions. But we -should entirely reverse the proper process of reasoning, if we were to -conclude that the law of gravitation is a phenomenon resulting from -an arrangement of certain bodies according to a certain plan. The -discoveries of astronomy, on the contrary, should lead us to regard -gravitation as a universal law, which existed before the existence of -the bodies which have been subjected to it. This is the only way in -which our inquirer could reason in regard to the formation of the solar -system, whether he supposed its plan to have been a special creation, -or to have been evolved out of a nebulous vapor by the operation of -the laws of motion or any other laws. Reasoning upon the hypothesis -that the law of gravitation existed before there were any bodies for -it to operate upon, or, in other words, that it had become in some -way an ordained or established principle by which all bodies would be -governed, he would have the means of understanding the adaptation of -the solar system to be operated upon by the law which he had discovered. - -He would next ask himself, How came this law of gravitation to exist? -That it must have had an origin, must have proceeded from some lawgiver -competent to make and enforce it, would be a conclusion to which he -would be irresistibly led, for the very idea of a law implies that -it is a command proceeding from an authority and power capable of -ordaining and executing it. When it is said that a law is a rule of -action ordained by a supreme power, which is perhaps the most familiar -as it is the most exact definition, the idea of a command and of a -power to enforce it is necessarily implied. This is just as true of a -physical as it is of a moral law; of a law that is to govern matter as -of a law that is to govern moral and accountable beings. Both proceed -from a supreme authority and power, and both are commands. There is, -however, one distinction between a moral law and a law of Nature, -which relates to the mode in which we arrive at a knowledge of the -law; a distinction which our inquirer would learn in the course of his -investigations. We infer the existence of a law of Nature, or a law -designed to operate upon matter, from the regularity and uniformity -of certain physical phenomena. As the phenomena occur always in the -same way we infer it to be an ordinance of Nature that they shall -occur in that way. But the moral phenomena exhibited by the actions -of men have not this regularity and uniformity. They are sometimes -in accordance with and sometimes grossly variant from any supposed -rule of moral action. We can not, therefore, deduce a moral law from -our observation of the actions of the beings whom it was designed to -govern, but we must discover it from the rules of right reason and -from such information as has been given to us by whatever revelation -may have come to us from another source than our own minds. But this -distinction between the modes of reaching a knowledge of physical -and moral laws does not apply to the authority from which they have -proceeded. Both of them being commands, or fixed rules of action, both -must have had an enacting authority. We learn the one by observing the -phenomena of Nature. We learn the other from reason and revelation. - -To return now to the examination of the solar system, which our -inquirer is supposed to be prosecuting. The study, which astronomy -and its implements will have enabled him to make, has taught him -the existence of the law of gravitation, and has led him to the -conclusion that it must have had an enacting authority. Following out -the operation of this law, through the stupendous spaces of the solar -system, he would begin to form conclusions respecting the attributes -of its author. He would see that the power must have been superhuman; -in other words, that it must have immeasurably transcended anything -that can be imagined of power wielded by a being of less than infinite -capacities; for, although the space occupied by the solar system, from -the central sun out to the orbit of the planet Neptune, is a measurable -distance, the conception of the law of gravitation, and its execution, -through such an enormous space and among such a complex system of -bodies, evince a faculty in the lawgiver that must have been boundless -in power and skill. The force of gravitation is found to exactly -balance the centrifugal tendency of the bodies revolving around the -sun, so that, when once set in motion around that center, they remain -in their respective orbits and never fall into the sun or into each -other. Our learner would thus see the nature of the adjustment required -to produce such a result; and, even if he endeavored to follow out -this balancing of forces no farther than to the extreme boundary of -the solar system, he would see that the being, who could conceive and -execute such a design on such a scale, must have had supreme power and -boundless intelligence. So that, by the study of the solar system, as -its arrangements and movements are disclosed by astronomy, our inquirer -would be naturally led to the conception of a lawgiver and artificer of -infinite power and wisdom, ordaining the law of gravitation to operate -against the centrifugal force, which would otherwise conduct out of its -orbit a body revolving around a center, and then adjusting the relative -distances, weights, and revolutions of the different bodies, so as to -subject them to the operation of the great law that is to preserve them -in fixed relations to each other. - -If, next, our inquirer should go farther in his investigations of the -solar system, and endeavor to satisfy himself concerning the mode in -which the different bodies of this system came into existence in their -respective positions, the history of astronomy would teach him that -there has been a theory on this subject which fails to account for -the existence of this system of bodies without the hypothesis of some -special creation. This theory is what is called the nebular hypothesis. -It supposes that the solar system was evolved out of a mass of fiery -vapor, which filled the stellar spaces, and which became the bodies -now observable by the telescope, and that they were finally swung into -their respective places by the operation of the fixed laws of motion. -But all that astronomers now undertake to say is that this hypothesis -is a probably true account of the origin of the solar system, and not -that it is an established scientific fact, or a fact supported by -such proofs as those which show the existence of the laws of motion. -The history of the nebular hypothesis, from the time of its first -suggestion to the present day, shows that there are no satisfactory -means of accounting for the method in which the supposed mass of -fiery vapor became separated, consolidated, and formed into different -bodies, and those bodies became ranged and located in their respective -positions. The hypothesis that these results were all produced by -fixed laws working upon a mass of fiery vapor, is one that has been -reasoned out in very different ways; and this diversity of views is -such that astronomers of the higher order do not undertake to say that -opinions may not reasonably differ in regard to the principal question, -namely, the question between the nebular hypothesis and the hypothesis -of a special act or acts of creation. - -Inasmuch, therefore, as scientific astronomy would present to our -inquirer nothing but the nebular hypothesis to account for the -production of the bodies of the solar system as they now exist, and as -there are admitted difficulties in this hypothesis which may not be -insurmountable but which have not been as yet by any means overcome, -it can not be said that philosophers are warranted in assuming that -all the phenomena of the solar system are to be explained by this -theory. The hypothesis that the phenomena, or some part of them, have -been produced by a cause operating in a different way, that is, by -an act or acts of intentional and direct or special creation, is not -excluded by the discoveries of the astronomer. Those discoveries lie -in the domain of astronomy, and they do not exclude the hypothesis of -a special creation of the solar system upon the plan on which we find -it arranged. The latter hypothesis lies in the domain of philosophy. It -is to be judged by the inquiry whether it is a rational explanation of -phenomena, which astronomy does not show as an established scientific -fact, or by proofs that ought to be deemed satisfactory, to have been -produced by the method suggested by the nebular hypothesis. - -The philosophic reasoning, which would conduct our inquirer to his -conclusions, would begin for him with the existence of an omnipotent -being, by whom the laws of matter and motion were established. This -conception and belief he has attained from having discovered those -laws, which must have had an author. He would soon hear the scientist -speak of "natural" and "supernatural" methods, and he would understand -that by the former is meant the operation of certain fixed laws, and, -by the latter, a mode of action in a different way. But he would also -and easily understand that the power which could establish the laws -of matter and motion, the operation of which the scientist calls the -natural method, could equally act in another way, which the scientist -calls the supernatural, but which, in the eye of philosophy, is just -as competent to the Infinite Power as the method called natural. To -state it in different words, but with the same meaning, that which -the scientist calls the supernatural is to the philosopher just as -conceivable and just as consistent with the idea of a supreme being as -the order of what we call Nature; for Nature is the phenomena that are -open to our observation, and from which we deduce the probable method -by which they have been brought about. It will never do to say that -they could not have been produced by a cause operating differently from -a system of fixed laws so long as we reason from the hypothesis of the -existence and attributes of a Supreme Being. If we reason without that -hypothesis, we may persuade ourselves of anything or of nothing. - -This idea of a Supreme Being, possessed of the attributes of infinite -power and wisdom, is one that our inquirer would have reached as a -rational deduction from the operation of a law (gravitation) which must -have had an author; from the structure of a mechanism so designed as to -be governed successfully by that law, and from the execution of the law -through such enormous spaces that nothing short of infinite power and -wisdom could have produced the result. - -At this stage of his investigations, our inquirer encounters a modern -scientist. I shall take the liberty of coining convenient names for -these two interlocutors: calling the one Sophereus, as representing -the spirit of unprejudiced research in the formation of beliefs without -the influence of previous teaching; and the other Kosmicos, as a -representative of the dogmatic school of evolution and agnosticism. - -Sophereus has imparted to his scientific friend the conclusions which -he has thus far reached, concerning the existence and attributes of a -supreme lawgiver and artificer, as deduced from the phenomena of the -solar system. The discussion between them then proceeds as follows: - -KOSMICOS. I do not wish to convince you at present of my -own views on this subject, but I put before you a difficulty which -you ought to solve, if you can, to your own satisfaction, before you -proceed farther. You have learned of the law of gravitation; and you -have imagined a being who has established this and other laws by which -matter is to be governed. To this being you have imputed certain -personal attributes, which you call infinite power and boundless -wisdom. Observe now that the laws to which you assign this origin are -of perpetual duration; they have operated without change from the -remotest period of their existence just as they operate now, and we -have no reason to doubt that they will continue to operate in the same -way through the indefinite future. They constitute the order of Nature. -Now, you suppose a Supreme Being, who has established these invariable -laws, but has not left them anything to do; has not left to them the -production of the solar system, but has specially interposed, and in a -supernatural mode of action has constructed the machine which has the -sun for its center and the surrounding bodies which revolve about it. -How can you suppose that the same being has acted in different ways? -How can you suppose that the being who you imagine established the -general laws of Nature and gave to them a fixed operation throughout -the universe, so that they never would be suspended or interrupted, -has gone aside from them, and made occasional constructions by special -interpositions of his power? Is it not a contradiction to suppose that -an Almighty Being, who must have acted by uniform methods without -reference to occasions, has acted on certain occasions by special -methods that were not uniform with his fixed laws? Does not this -hypothesis imply that his fixed laws were insufficient for the purposes -for which he designed them, and that he had to resort to other means? -How do you get over this difficulty? - -SOPHEREUS. What you propound as a difficulty does not disturb -me. I understand the distinction which you make between the natural -and the supernatural. I can see in the solar system how the law of -gravitation and all the other laws of motion operate; but I do not -see, nor can you explain, how these laws, or the laws of chemical -combination or any other laws, can have evolved the plan of the solar -system out of a mass of fiery vapor. I can understand the enactment and -establishment of laws of motion, of chemical combination, and of the -mechanical action of different states of matter upon each other, to -operate in fixed and invariable ways, in certain conditions. But I do -not see that there is any interruption or displacement of these laws, -after they are established, when an end that is to be accomplished -calls for a complex system of new objects among which they are to -operate. It is manifest that the question is whether the different -bodies of the solar system have been formed and placed in their -respective positions, according to a special design of their relative -distances, magnitudes, and orbits, or whether these are the results -of the operation of fixed laws, without any special interposition -of a creating power. Astronomers have not explained how the latter -hypothesis is anything more than a probable conjecture. It remains -for me to consider whether the hypothesis of a special interposition, -whereby the plan of the solar system has been made, is attended with -the difficulty which you suggest. We are reasoning about a period of -the remote past when this system of bodies did not exist, but when the -general laws that were to govern all matter may be supposed to have -been previously ordained. If we think of the solar system, conceived -and projected by the Supreme Being, as a complex mechanism that was to -exist in Nature, the occasion would be one calling for the exercise -of infinite wisdom and power. The production of such a mechanism, to -answer any ends for which it was intended that it should exist, implies -attributes that transcend all our human experience of the qualities of -power and wisdom. That it was an occasional exercise of power, in no -way implies any irregularity or inconsistency of method, if the power -was so exercised as to leave all the general laws of Nature in full -operation, so that there would be no clashing between what you call -the natural and the supernatural. I have first to ascertain what was -the probably intended scope of the general laws which are supposed to -have been ordained before the solar system came into existence. If -it appears to have been the purpose of the constructor to have these -laws work out this system of bodies without any special interposition -and formative skill directly exercised, I need go no further. But I -see no evidence of that purpose. No one has suggested anything but a -theory on this subject, which is not supported by any satisfactory -proofs. I am left, therefore, to the consideration of the question -whether an act of special interposition, in the formation of a plan -obviously calling for the exercise of infinite wisdom and power, is -in any way inconsistent with the establishment of a system of laws -which were to operate on these bodies and among them after they had -come to exist. My conclusion, from what I have learned of the solar -system, is, that in the exercise by the same being of the method which -you call the natural, and the exercise of the method which you call -the supernatural, there is no inconsistency; that each of the fixed -laws of matter and motion was designed to have its own scope; and that -each of them may well consist, within its limitations, with occasional -exercises of power, for the production of objects that were to be -operated upon by the laws, but of which they were not designed to be -the producing cause. Thus it seems to me to be a rational conclusion -that the law of gravitation, the general laws of motion, and all the -other laws of matter, which preceded the existence of the solar system, -were not designed to be the agents by which the plan of that system -would be worked out, but that the plan was so formed and executed that -the bodies composing it would be subject to the operation of laws -enacted by the Infinite Will for the government of all the forms of -matter. The question is, whether the plan of the solar system is due to -the operation of the fixed laws, or to a special interposition; or, to -state it in another way, whether the whole of the phenomena, the plan -and arrangement of the solar system included, are to be referred to the -operation of certain fixed laws as the producing agents, or whether -some part of the phenomena, namely, the mechanism of the system, -should be referred to the special interposition. I am taught, by the -physics on which astronomers are now agreed, that gravitation is a -force by which the particles of matter act on each other; _that every -particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with -a force varying directly as their masses, and inversely as the square -of the distance which separates them_. This I understand to be the -formula in which the law of universal gravitation is expressed. But, -for the purpose of illustrating what I understand to be the operation -of this force, I have constructed a diagram, in which two bodies are -represented as A and B. From each of these bodies there radiates in -all directions an attracting force, which acts directly upon every -other body in the universe, and which is represented in the diagram -by dotted lines. In the diagram, the bodies A and B are first supposed -to be one thousand miles apart. A certain portion of the attracting -rays proceeding from A would strike directly upon B. All the other rays -proceeding in the same direction from A would pass on either side of B -without striking it. If B is removed to the distance of two thousand -miles from A, the sum total of the attractive force which A would exert -upon B would be diminished by the square of the distance, because B -would intercept just one fourth of the number of rays proceeding from -A compared with the number which it intercepts when the two bodies -are only one thousand miles apart; and the rays which B does not -intercept would pass along through the realms of space, until they -encountered some other body, on which they would exert a force that -would follow the same law of diminution. In the diagram, the two bodies -A and B may be single particles of matter or collections of particles; -they are represented as cubes; but the law of direct action of the -attracting force and the law of its diminution would be the same if the -bodies were spheres or oblongs. The power of attraction which bodies -exert upon each other resides in every individual particle of matter -composing the body, and the attraction which that body exerts upon -another body is the sum total of the attractions which proceed from all -the particles composing the mass and which impinge upon that other body. - -[Illustration] - -In the diagram the two bodies A and B are supposed to be of the same -mass. If, as in the case of the sun and the earth, one of the bodies -is of far greater mass than the other, then the attraction of the -sun for the earth is the same as the attraction of the earth for the -sun, because the action is mutual; but the sun, being the greater -mass, tends, by reason of its correspondingly greater inertia, to -remain comparatively stationary, or, in other words, it has a greater -resistance to being pulled out of its normal position, while the -earth, having less inertia, is more easily deflected from its straight -course in which its momentum tends to carry it, and so travels in an -orbit around the sun, the resisting or centrifugal pull of the earth, -due to its inertia, exactly balancing the inward pull due to the -mutual attraction. I understand that, besides the law of universal -gravitation, there are two fundamental laws of motion. By one of these -laws, if a body be set in motion and be acted on by no other than the -projectile force, it will move forward in a straight line and with a -uniform velocity forever. But by another law, if the moving body is -acted on by another force than that which originally projected it in -a straight line, it will deviate from that line in the direction of -that other force and in proportion to it. If A, the earth, liable to -be drawn toward B, the sun, by their mutual attraction, was originally -projected into space, at a certain distance from the sun, by a force -which would carry it on in a straight line, it would be acted on by two -forces: the projectile force would cause it to move in a straight line; -the force of the mutual attraction would cause it to deviate from that -line in the direction of the sun. The result would be that the earth -would be carried around the sun in a circular or an elliptical orbit. -Every other planet in the solar system would be under the operation of -the same compound forces governed by the same laws; and while the sun -would exert upon each of them its force of attraction, and they would -each exert upon the others an attractive force that would be diminished -by the squares of their distances from one another, each of them -would be deflected from the straight line that would have otherwise -been the path of its motion, and the result would be a perpetual -revolution around the body that could exert upon each just the amount -of attraction requisite to overcome the projectile force by which it -was first put in motion. - -KOSMICOS. You have made an ingenious explanation of the law of -gravitation, which may or may not be correct. But now let me understand -what you infer from this hypothesis, supposing it to be true. What -should have prevented the law of gravitation and the laws of motion -from working out this very system of bodies, by operating upon a mass -of crude matter lying in the universe, supposing it to have been fiery -vapor or anything else? - -SOPHEREUS. I have thus far arrived, by the aid of what -astronomy teaches, at a complex system of physical laws, the law of -universal gravitation, and the laws of motion. I must suppose that -these laws had an intelligent author. I must suppose that they were -enacted, in the same sense in which we speak of any rule of action -ordained by a power competent to conceive of it and to put it into -execution. To me, as I view the facts of the solar system, the idea -that the law of gravitation and the laws of motion are to be regarded -as mere phenomena of matter, or as qualities of matter according to -which, from some inherent condition, it must act, does not explain the -solar system. I can not explain to myself what I see, without asking -myself how these qualities of matter came to exist. How came it to -be a condition of all matter that its particles should attract each -other by a certain force according to a certain rule? How came it to -be a law of motion that bodies projected into space should continue to -move on forever in a straight line, unless deviated from that line by -some other force? To say that things happen, but that no power ever -commanded them to happen; that things occur because they do occur, and -not because some power has ordained that they shall occur, is to me an -inconceivable kind of reasoning, if it be reasoning at all. Because men -act or profess to act upon certain principles of moral conduct, I can -not suppose that justice, and truth, and mercy are mere phenomena of -human conduct, that they never had any origin as moral laws in the will -of a lawgiver. For the same reason I can not suppose that the physical -laws of matter, stupendous in their scope, and of unerring certainty in -their operation, did not proceed from an enacting authority. In short, -it seems to me that the conception of power, as something independent -of the qualities of substance, is a logical necessity. - -KOSMICOS. I am not now trying to persuade you that the law -of gravitation and the laws of motion did not have an intelligent -author. For the purposes of the argument, I will concede that they were -enacted, as you term it. You have explained your understanding of the -operation of these; laws as they are expressed in the formula given -by astronomers, and for the present I will assume that they operate -in some such way. I will also concede that the idea of power in the -abstract, as something independent of the qualities of substance, is -necessary to the explanation of all physical phenomena. But I now -recall your attention to the point which I originally suggested. -Explain to me how it has happened that the being who you suppose -established certain laws for the government of all matter has not -allowed those laws to evolve out of diffused matter certain bodies -which we find grouped together in the universe, but has specially -interposed by another act, and constructed this system of bodies -without the agency of his own laws. All that we know about the law of -gravitation and the laws of motion we derive from observing the actions -of these bodies which compose the solar system. We infer the existence -of these laws from the actions of these bodies. Now tell me how you -suppose that the same being who ordained these laws as fixed conditions -to which matter was to be subjected, and made them to operate upon all -matter, whether in a crude and unformed state or after it had become -organized into bodies of definite shapes and dimensions, did not rely -upon these inherent conditions of matter to produce those shapes and -dimensions, but went to work by special interposition, and produced the -mechanism of the solar system as a human artificer would make a machine -of a corresponding character. - -SOPHEREUS. We must take things in a certain order. I -understand you to concede, for the present, that the laws of -gravitation and motion must, or may, have existed before the sun -and the planets were formed. We are agreed, then, that power has an -existence anterior to and separate from the qualities of substance. -What, then, is the difficulty attending the hypothesis that the -Infinite Power, which devised and established the laws of gravitation -and motion before the bodies of the solar system were formed, so -fashioned and distributed those bodies that while each of them -shall exert upon every other a certain amount of direct attraction, -that attraction shall diminish in a certain fixed ratio, as the -distance between them increases? We can not suppose that the relative -magnitudes, weights, and distances of these bodies were accidental, or -that they resulted from the property of attraction that was given to -the particles of matter of which they are composed. That property of -mutual attraction became at some time a fixed condition of all matter, -but it will not account for the formation of a system of bodies so -adjusted that the attracting force will act among them by a specific -law, by the operation of which they will be prevented from exerting -on each other an excessive amount of such force, or any amount but -that which is exactly needful to preserve their relative distances -from each other. Let it be supposed that the property of attraction -was impressed upon all the particles of matter in the universe, and -then that the Infinite Power, abstaining from all farther action, and -without forming and arranging the bodies of the solar system upon any -intentional plan, left all that plan to be worked out by that property -of matter; what reason have we to conclude that the law of gravitation -would, as the sole efficient cause, have produced just exactly this -complex piece of mechanism, so wonderfully adjusted? What reason have -we to conclude that the property of attraction, although ordained as an -inherent quality of all matter, would not, if left without any special -interposition, have resulted in some very different arrangement and -disposition of the matter lying in the space now occupied by the solar -system? - -KOSMICOS. Give me your idea of the condition which is called -"chaos," and I will then explain to you why it is that you do not do -justice to the scientific distinction between the natural and the -supernatural method by which things have been produced as we see them. - -SOPHEREUS. I presume you do not mean to ask how I suppose -chaotic matter came to exist. Its origin is one thing--its condition -is another. In regard to its condition, it seems very plain that there -was a period when diffused matter had not received the impress of the -qualities or been subjected to the laws which we now recognize. Take -the Mosaic hypothesis, where it speaks of the earth, for example, as -"without form and void." In this terse expression, there is embraced -the idea of a condition of matter without qualities, properties, or -laws; lying in an utterly crude state, waiting to receive the impress -of the divine will. The laws of motion have not begun to operate upon -it; the laws of chemical combination have not been applied to it. It -is a rational conclusion that this was the condition of things in that -remote period of eternity before the solar system was formed. Chaos, -then, was the condition of primeval matter before it had received the -fixed properties that were afterward to belong to it, and before the -laws that were ever afterward to govern it had been ordained. Lying in -this utterly crude state, without tendencies, without combinations, -without definite motion, floating in the universe without fixed form or -qualities, it awaits the action of the Infinite Power. It pleases that -power, out of its illimitable resources, to bestow upon this chaotic -matter certain properties, and to subject it to certain laws. One of -these properties is that its particles shall attract one another by a -certain force; one of these laws is that this force shall operate by an -invariable and fixed rule of direct action, and by an invariable and -fixed rule of diminution, according to the distance of the particles -from each other; and another law is that a body projected into space, -by any force, shall continue to move in a straight line until and -unless it is deflected from that line by some other force. There -are, too, chemical properties belonging to matter as we know it, by -which it takes on certain combinations and undergoes modifications -and arrangements of its particles. All these properties, qualities, -and laws--these unavoidable methods of action--must have been imposed -upon the chaotic matter at some time by a power competent to establish -them, and to put them in operation. But the laws and the methods of -their operation do not account for the PLAN on which the solar -system has been formed, consisting of different bodies of such shapes, -dimensions, and relative distances, that the laws, when applied to -them, will produce the wonderfully exact and perpetual movements which -the telescope reveals. That PLAN is a _creation_, for which we -must look to something more than the laws and properties of matter; and -we can only find it in the will and purposes of the infinite artificer -who devised the laws by which this mechanism was to be governed after -it had been made, and who has so made it that it would be governed by -them. - -KOSMICOS. I do not see that you have yet reached a stronger -ground on which to rest the hypothesis of special interposition than -that on which is based the hypothesis which imputes the formation of -the solar system to certain fixed laws operating upon crude matter -not yet formed into definite shapes or placed in certain relative -positions. You will have to adduce some proof that has a stronger -tendency to exclude the supposition that the mechanism of the solar -system was produced by the laws of matter and motion working upon some -material that lay in the condition which you have described as "chaos." - -SOPHEREUS. Let us, then, look a little farther into some of -the details of this vast machine. Take one that is most obvious, and -that lies the nearest to us; I mean the moon, which accompanies our -earth as its satellite. The most remarkable thing about the motion of -the moon is the fact that she makes one revolution on her axis in the -same time that she takes to revolve around the earth, and consequently -she always presents to us the same face, and her other side is never -seen by human eyes. How came this to be the case? How came this to be -the adjustment of the two motions, the axial revolution of the moon and -her revolution around the earth, causing her always to present to us -the same side? It is said by astronomers that the two motions are so -exactly adjusted to each other that the longer axis of the moon always -points to the earth, without the slightest variation. It is conceded, -as I understand, to be infinitely improbable that this adjustment was -the result of chance. A cause for it is therefore to be found. Where -are we to look for that cause, unless we look for it in the will and -design of the Creator, who established it for some special purpose? - -KOSMICOS. You are aware that there is a physical explanation -of this phenomenon which accounts for it without the special design. -This explanation is that the moon was once in a partially fluid state, -and that she rotated on her axis in a period different from the present -one. In such a condition, the attraction of the earth would produce -great tides in the fluid substance of the moon; this attraction, -combined with the centrifugal force of the moon's rotation on her own -axis, would cause a friction, and this friction would retard the rate -of her axial rotation, until it became coincident with the rate of her -revolution around the earth. It is highly improbable that the moon was -originally set in rotation on her axis with just the same velocity with -which she was made to revolve around the earth. This improbability is -based on the ellipticity of the moon's orbit, which is caused by the -attraction of the sun. The mean distance of the moon from the earth -is 240,300 miles; her smallest possible distance is 221,000 miles; -and the greatest possible distance is 259,600. The usual oscillation -between these extremes is about 13,000 miles on each side of the mean -distance of 240,300. The diameter of the moon is 2,160 miles, or less -than two sevenths of the earth's diameter. In volume she is about one -fiftieth as large as the earth, but her density, or the specific -gravity of her material, is supposed to be a little more than half -of that of our globe; and her weight is about three and a half times -the weight of the same bulk of water. When she is nearest to the sun, -the superior attraction of that body tends to draw her out of her -circular orbit around the earth; when she is farthest from the sun, -this attraction is diminished, and thus her terrestrial orbit becomes -slightly elliptical. But there is another attraction to be taken into -account. This other attraction, in her former fluid condition, has -given her the shape, not of a perfect sphere, but of an ellipsoid, or -an elongated body with three unequal axes. The shortest of her axes is -that around which she rotates; the next longest is that which points -in the direction in which she is moving; and the longest of all points -toward the earth. This shape of the moon, resulting from the earth's -attraction, has been produced by drawing the matter of the moon which -is nearest to the earth toward the earth, and by the centrifugal force -which tends to throw outward the matter farthest from the earth. The -substance of the moon being a liquid, so as to yield freely, she would -be elongated in the direction of the earth. But if she was originally -set in motion on her own axis at precisely the same rate with which -she was made to revolve around the earth, the correspondence between -the two motions could not have been kept up; her axial rotation would -have varied, by reason of the fact that her relative distance from the -sun and the earth varies with the ellipticity of her orbit around the -earth, and thus the two motions would not correspond. But if we allow -for the attraction of the earth upon a liquid or semi-liquid body, -producing for the moon an elongated shape, her axial rotation would, -if the two motions were in the beginning very near together, vary -with her revolutions around the earth, and the correspondence between -the two motions would be kept up. Here, then, you have a physical -explanation of the phenomenon which strikes you as so remarkable--a -result brought about by natural causes, without the supposition of what -you call intentional design, or formative skill directly exercised by a -supernatural interposition. - -SOPHEREUS. This is a very plausible theory, but it all depends -upon two assumptions: First, it assumes it to be extremely improbable -that the two motions were aboriginally made to correspond, by an -intentional adjustment of the moon's weight, dimensions, and shape, -upon such a plan that the laws of gravitation and movement would keep -the two motions in exact correspondence. Why should not the rates -of movement have been originally designed and put in execution as -we find them? You anticipate the answer to this question by another -assumption, namely, that the substance of the moon was at first in a -fluid or semi-fluid state, so that she owed her present shape to the -effect of the earth's attraction, and the centrifugal tendency of -its most distant part to be thrown out of the line of its motion. I -should be glad to have you explain why it is extremely improbable that -the Creator planned this part of the solar system, the earth and its -satellite, and so adjusted the dimensions, shapes, and weights of each -of them, and fixed the rates of revolution of the satellite, that the -laws of attraction and motion would find a mechanism which they would -keep perpetually in operation, and thus preserve a constant relation -between the moon's axial rotation and her revolution around the -earth. I have thus far learned to regard the probable methods of the -Creator somewhat differently from those which you scientists ascribe -to him. Most of you, I observe, have a strong tendency to regard -the Deity as having no specific plan in the production of anything, -which plan he directly executed; and, so far as you regard a First -Cause as the producing cause of phenomena, you limit its activity to -the establishment of certain fixed laws, and explain all phenomena -upon the hypothesis that the Supreme Being--if you admit one--made no -special interpositions of his will and power in any direction, after -he had established his system of general laws. But to me it seems that -the weight of probability is entirely against your hypothesis. In this -particular case of which we have been speaking, that of the moon's -revolution, the supposed improbability of an original and intentional -adjustment of the two motions turns altogether on the argument that if -they had been so adjusted at the beginning they would not have kept -on, and this argument is supported by the assumption that the moon -was at first a mass of fluid. I do not understand this mode of making -facts to support theories; and I wish you would explain to me why, in -this particular instance, the inference of a divine and intentional -plan in the structure of this part of the solar system is so extremely -improbable. To me it seems so obvious a piece of invented mechanism, -that I can not avoid the conclusion that it was the intentional work -of a constructor, any more than I could if I were to find a piece of -mechanism under circumstances which indicated that it was produced by -human hands. - -KOSMICOS. You do not even yet do justice to the scientific -method of reasoning. The deductions of science--the conclusions -which the scientist draws from the phenomena of Nature--rest upon -the postulate of fixed laws of Nature, which never change, and which -have not been varied by any supernatural interference. We mean by -a supernatural cause one which is not uniformly in operation, or -which operates in some way different from the fixed laws which we -have deduced from the observed order of the phenomena that we have -studied and found to be invariable. We adopt this distinction between -the natural and the supernatural because the observable phenomena of -Nature do not furnish any means of discovering as a fact the operation -of anything but the fixed laws, or any cause which has acted in a -different way. Let us now apply this to the phenomena which we have -been considering--the composition and arrangement of the solar system. -What do we find? We find a system of bodies in the movements of which -we detect certain fixed laws operating invariably in the same way. -When the question is asked, How were these bodies produced? we have no -means of reaching a conclusion except by reasoning upon the operation -of the forces which these laws disclose, working on the primordial -matter out of which the bodies became formed. It is for this reason -that, in accounting for their existence, we speak of the method of -their formation as the natural, in contradistinction to some other -method which we call the supernatural; by which latter term we mean -some mode in which there has been a power exerted differently from the -established and fixed agency of the laws of matter, which constitute -all that we have ever discovered. The nebular hypothesis affords a -good illustration of the distinction which I am endeavoring to show -you, whether it is well established or not, or is ever likely to be. -It supposes that there was a mass of fiery vapor, floating in the -space now occupied by the solar system. Under the operation of the -laws of gravitation and motion, of mechanical forces and chemical -combination, this crude matter becomes consolidated and formed into -the different bodies known to us as the sun and the planets, and the -laws which thus formed them continue to operate to keep them in the -fixed relations to each other which resulted from the process of their -formation. Whether as a matter of fact the solar system was formed in -this way, this, or some other mode of operation through the action of -certain established laws operating upon primeval matter, is what we -call the natural method, in opposition to the supernatural; and we can -not discover the supernatural method, because the closest and most -extensive investigations never enable us to find in nature any method -of operation but that which acts in a fixed and invariable way. - -SOPHEREUS. What you have now said brings me to a question that -I have all along desired to ask you: How do you know that the Infinite -Power never acts, or never has acted, in any way different from the -established order of Nature? Is science able to determine this? If it -is not, it must be for philosophy to consider whether there can have -been, or probably has been, in operation at any time any cause other -than those fixed laws of Nature which the scientist is able to deduce -from observable phenomena. Because science can only discover certain -fixed laws as the forces governing the bodies which compose the solar -system, or governing the materials of which they are supposed to be -made, it does not seem to me that a philosopher is precluded from -deducing, by a proper method of reasoning upon a study of the solar -system, the probable truth that its mechanism was specially planned -and executed by a special act of the creating power. The degree to -which this probability rises--whether it rises higher in the scale -than any other hypothesis--must depend upon the inquiry whether any -other hypothesis will better account for the existence of this great -object, with its enormous mechanism, its adjustments, and its unerring -movements. I must say, from what I have learned of this planetary -system, with the sun as its center, viewed as a mechanism, that I can -conceive of no hypothesis concerning its origin and formation which -compares in probability with the hypothesis that it was directly and -specially created, as we know it, by the Infinite Artificer. - -KOSMICOS. Pray, tell me what you mean by an act of creation? -Did you or any other man ever see one? Can you tell what creation is? - -SOPHEREUS. I think that your question can be answered. -Creation is the act of giving existence to something that did not -previously exist. We see such acts performed by men, very frequently, -so that we do not hesitate to speak of the product as a created thing. -We do not see acts of creation performed by the Infinite Power, but it -is surely not unphilosophical to suppose that what can be and is done -by finite human faculties, can be and has been done by the infinite -faculties of the Deity, and done upon a scale and in a perfection that -transcend everything that human power has produced. The sense in which -I have been led to conceive of the solar system as a creation is the -same as that by which I represent to myself the production, by human -power and skill, of some physical object which never existed before, -such as a machine, a statue, a picture, a pyramid, or an obelisk; any -concrete object which, whether or not new of its kind, did not as an -individual object previously exist. In weighing the probabilities as -to the mode in which the solar system came to exist, the reasons why -the idea of its special creation stands by far the highest in the scale -are these: 1. There must have been a period when this great object in -nature did not exist, and therefore it must have been caused to exist. -2. The necessary hypothesis of a causing power leads inevitably to the -conclusion that the power was adequate to the production of a system of -bodies so proportioned and arranged that they would act on each other -by certain fixed rules. 3. The causing or creating power must have -conceived the proportions and arrangements of the different bodies as -a plan, and must have executed that plan according to the conception. -4. While as a theory we can represent to ourselves that the causing -power established certain laws of matter and motion, which would by -their fixed operation on crude substances lying in the universe produce -this system of bodies without any preconceived and predetermined plan, -without any occasional or special interposition, yet that the system, -as we find it, is a product of such a nature as to have called for -and required the special interposition of a formative will. For, if -we proceed upon the hypothesis that this enormous and exact mechanism -was nothing but the product of certain pre-established laws operating -on crude matter, without direct and special interposition exerted in -the execution of a formed design, we have to obtain some definite -conception, and to find some proof of a method by which these laws -can have operated to produce this system of bodies exactly as we know -them to be proportioned and arranged. Astronomical science, and all -other science, has not discovered, or even suggested, any method by -which this result could have been brought about, without a special -act of creation in the execution of an original design. On the other -hand, the hypothesis of a special interposition in the execution of a -preconceived plan of construction is the most rational, the most in -accordance with probability, because it best meets the requirements of -the case. These requirements were that the proportions, arrangements, -and relations of the different bodies composing one grand mechanism, -should be such that the laws of gravitation and motion would operate -upon and among them so as to keep them in uniform and unvarying -movement. - -KOSMICOS. Very well. You have now come to the end of your -reasoning. Tell me, then, why it is not just as rational a supposition -that the Deity conceived of the plan of the solar system as a product -that would result, and that he intended should result, from the -operation of his fixed laws of matter and motion, and then left it to -the unerring certainty of their operation to produce the mechanism by -the process of gradual evolution? - -SOPHEREUS. The being who is supposed to hold and exercise -supreme power over the universe, holds a power to execute, by direct -and special creation, any design which he conceives and proposes to -accomplish. I am prepared to concede that the process of gradual -evolution can produce and apparently has produced some results. But -when we are looking for the probable methods of the Deity in the -production of such a mechanism as the solar system, we must recognize -the superior probability of the direct method, because the indirect -method which you describe as gradual evolution does not seem adequate -to the production of such a system of bodies. If we could obtain -facts which could have any tendency to show that, without any special -interposition, the mechanism of the solar system, or any part of it, is -a mere result of the working of the laws of gravitation and motion upon -a mass of crude matter, we might yield assent to the probability of -that occurrence. But of course we have no such facts; we have nothing -but theories; and therefore there appears nothing to exclude the -probable truth of a special creation. - -KOSMICOS. We shall not convince each other. You have stated -your conclusions concerning the solar system fairly enough, and I have -endeavored to answer them. But now let me understand how you propose -to apply them to other departments of Nature, in which we have means -of closer investigation. You will find it very difficult, I imagine, -to maintain that every organism, every plant, animal, fish, insect, or -bird, is a special creation, or even that man himself is. - -SOPHEREUS. Let me state for myself just what my conclusions -are in regard to the solar system. You will then know what the -convictions are with which I shall come to the study of other -departments. I have arrived at the conception of an Infinite Being -having the power to create anything that seems to him good; and I -have experienced no difficulty in conceiving what an act of creation -is. I have also reached the conviction that there is one great object -in Nature, the existence of which I can not account for without the -hypothesis of some special act of creation. Whether I shall find this -to be the case in regard to every other object in Nature, I can not -now tell. Perhaps, as many of these objects are nearer to us, and more -within our powers of investigation, the result may be different. I -shall endeavor to keep my mind open to the necessary discriminations -which facts may disclose. Possibly I may find reason to reverse the -conclusions at which I have arrived in regard to the solar system, if -I find that the hypothesis of evolution is fairly sustained by other -phenomena. - - NOTE.--Newton, whose reasoning powers have certainly not - been surpassed by those of any other philosopher, ancient or modern, - not only deduced the existence of a personal God from the phenomena - of Nature, but he felt no difficulty in ascribing to the Deity those - personal attributes which the phenomena of Nature show that he must - possess, because without them "all that diversity of natural things - which we find suited to different times and places" could not have - been produced. They could, he reasons, "arise from nothing but the - ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing." Newton does indeed - say that all our notions of God are taken from the ways of mankind; - but this is by way of allegory and similitude. There is a likeness, - but not a perfect likeness. There is therefore no necessity for - ascribing to God anthropomorphic attributes, because the enlargement - of the faculties and powers to superhuman and boundless attributes - takes them out of the category of anthropomorphic qualities and - capacities. In his "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy," - Newton had occasion to treat of the theory of vortices, as a - hypothesis by which the formation of the solar system is to be - explained. The "General Scholium," by which he concludes the third - book of his "Principia," lays down the masterly reasoning by which he - maintains that the bodies of the solar system, while they persevere - in their orbits by the mere laws of gravity, could by no means have - at first derived the regular position of the orbits themselves from - those laws. I had written the whole of the preceding chapter on the - origin of the solar system just as I have printed it, before I looked - into the "Principia" to see what confirmation might be derived from - Newton's speculations. I found that while I had not included the - comets in my examination of the solar system, but had confined myself - to the bodies that are at all times within the reach of the telescope, - the same deductions are re-enforced by the comets, eccentric as are - the orbits through which they range into and out of our system. I - quote the entire Scholium, as given in Motte's English translation of - the "Principia" from the Latin in which Newton wrote, published with a - Life by Chittenden, at New York, in the year 1848. - - -"GENERAL SCHOLIUM. - -"The hypothesis of vortices is pressed with many difficulties. -That every planet by a radius drawn to the sun may describe areas -proportional to the times of description, the periodic times of the -several parts of the vortices should observe the duplicate proportion -of their distances from the sun; but that the periodic times of the -planets may obtain the sesquiplicate proportion of their distances -from the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the vortex ought -to be in the sesquiplicate proportion of their distances. That the -smaller vortices may maintain their lesser revolutions about _Saturn_, -_Jupiter_, and other planets, and swim quietly and undisturbed in the -greater vortex of the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the -sun's vortex should be equal; but the rotation of the sun and planets -about their axes, which ought to correspond with the motions of their -vortices, recede far from all these proportions. The motions of the -comets are exceedingly regular, are governed by the same laws with the -motions of the planets, and can by no means be accounted for by the -hypothesis of vortices; for comets are carried with very eccentric -motions through all parts of the heavens indifferently, with a freedom -that is incompatible with the notion of a vortex. Bodies projected in -our air suffer no resistance but from the air. Withdraw the air, as is -done in Mr. _Boyle's_ vacuum, and the resistance ceases; for in this -void a bit of fine down and a piece of solid gold descend with equal -velocity. And the parity of reason must take place in the celestial -spaces above the earth's atmosphere; in which spaces, where there is no -air to resist their motions, all bodies will move with the greatest -freedom; and the planets and comets will constantly pursue their -revolutions in orbits given in kind and position, according to the laws -above explained; but though these bodies may, indeed, persevere in -their orbits by the mere laws of gravity, yet they could by no means -have at first derived the regular position of the orbits themselves -from those laws. - -"The six primary planets are revolved about the sun in circles -concentric with the sun, and with motions directed toward the same -parts, and almost in the same plane. Ten moons are revolved about the -earth, Jupiter, and Saturn, in circles concentric with them, with -the same direction of motion, and nearly in the planes of the orbits -of those planets; but it is not to be conceived that mere mechanical -causes could give birth to so many regular motions, since the comets -range over all parts of the heavens in very eccentric orbits; for by -that kind of motion they pass easily through the orbits of the planets, -and with great rapidity; and in their aphelions, where they move the -slowest, and are detained the longest, they recede to the greatest -distances from each other, and thence suffer the least disturbance -from their mutual attractions. This most beautiful system of the sun, -planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion -of an intelligent and powerful Being. And if the fixed stars are the -centers of other like systems, these being formed by the like wise -counsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One; especially since -the light of the fixed stars is of the same nature with the light of -the sun, and from every system light passes into all the other systems; -and lest the systems of the fixed stars should, by their gravity, -fall on each other mutually, he hath placed those systems at immense -distances one from another." - - FOOTNOTES: - - [105] The reader will understand that I do not assert this to be what - astronomers teach, but I maintain it to be a rational deduction from - the facts which they furnish to us. - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - - Does evolution account for the phenomena of society and of - nature?--Necessity for a conception of a personal actor--Mr. - Spencer's protoplasmic origin of all organic life--The Mosaic account - of creation treated as a hypothesis which may be scientifically - contrasted with evolution. - - -A long interval has elapsed since the conference described in the last -chapter, between the searcher after wisdom and his scientific friend. -At their next interview they take up the subject of a First Cause where -they left it at the conclusion of their debate on the solar system. - -KOSMICOS. Well, Sophereus, what have you been studying since -we last met? - -SOPHEREUS. Many things. I have been studying what is commonly -called Nature, and I have been studying society. With regard to -society, I have been endeavoring to discover to what the phenomena of -social life are to be attributed as their producing cause or causes; -whether they can be said to owe their existence to the direct action -or influence of intelligent wills, or are to be considered as effects -produced in the course of an ungoverned development, wrought by -incidental forces in varying conditions of human existence. The latter, -I find, is one of the theories now prevailing. - -KOSMICOS. And what is your conclusion? - -SOPHEREUS. My general conclusion in regard to the phenomena -of human society is the same as that which I formed from a study of -the phenomena of the solar system. I find a great many things which -I can not explain without the hypothesis of a direct creating power -exerted by an intelligent being. I know that you object to the idea -of creation, but I explained to you in our last discussion that I -understood it to mean the causing something to exist which did not -exist before, and the doing it by an intentional and direct act of -production. - -KOSMICOS. No matter about your definition. What are the facts -that you propose to discuss? - -SOPHEREUS. In the social phenomena I find many acts of -creation. I do not find that buildings spring out of the ground without -human intervention, or that machinery is formed by the spontaneous -arrangement of matter in certain forms and relations, or by the -tendencies that are implanted in matter as its inherent properties. -I find an enormous multitude of concrete objects, formed out of dead -matter, by human intervention, availing itself of those properties of -matter, which without such active intervention would have remained -quiescent, and would not have resulted in the production of these -objects. It is a common form of expression to speak of the "growth" -of cities, but no one understands by this form of speech that a city -has become what it is without the action of numerous individuals -projecting and building their separate structures, or without the -combined action of the whole body of the inhabitants in determining and -executing a general plan to which individuals are to conform, more or -less exactly, their particular erections. Again, I find that there are -rules of social life, which take the form of what are called "laws," -and these are imposed by the will of some governing authority; they are -always the product of some one human will, or of the collective will -of a greater number of persons. I have looked into history and have -found many instances of military conquest, invasions of the territory -inhabited by one race of men by another race, domination of different -dynasties, overthrow of one governing power, and substitution of -another. Although the changes thus produced are often very complex, -sometimes rapid and sometimes slow in reaching the consequences, I do -not find that they have ever taken place without the direct action of -some one human will, or of the aggregate force of many human wills. -The conquests of Alexander and Napoleon are instances of what a single -human will can do in changing the condition of nations; and I have -not been able to read history by the interpretation that makes such -men mere instruments in the hands of their age, which would, without -their special existences and characters, have brought about the same or -something like the same results. The invasions of the Roman Empire by -the Northern barbarians are instances of the pressure of one population -upon another, not attributable, perhaps, to the will and leadership -of any one individual, but produced by the united force of a great -horde of individuals determined to enjoy the plunder which a superior -civilization spread before them. Then, with regard to the phenomena of -what are called constitutions of government, or the political systems -of exercising public authority, I find numerous cases in which the -force of an individual will and intelligence has been not only a great -factor, but by far the largest factor in the production of particular -institutions. The genius of Cæsar, and his extraordinary constructive -faculties, molded the institutions of Rome in the most direct manner, -and created an imperial system that lasted for a thousand years, -and that even out of its ruins affected all subsequent European -civilization. In such cases, more than once repeated in modern times, -the particular circumstances of the age and the co-operation of many -other individuals have helped on the result, but the conception, the -plan, the purpose, and the execution, have had their origin in some -one mind. But for the individual character, the ambition, the force, -and the mental resources of the first Napoleon, can one believe that -the first French Empire of modern times would have grown out of the -condition of France? Suppose that Oliver Cromwell had never lived. The -protectorate, the system of government which he gave to England, was -the most absolute product of the will and intellect of one man that the -world in that kind of product had ever seen; for, although the people -of England were ready for and needed that system, and although the -antecedent and the surrounding circumstances furnished to Cromwell many -materials for a political structure that was not the old monarchy, and -yet had while it lasted all the vigor, and more than the vigor, of the -old monarchy, still, without his personal characteristics, his ambition -to found a dynasty on the wants of his country, and his personal -capacity to devise and execute such a system, one can not believe that -England would have had what he gave her. What he could not give her -was a son capable of wielding the scepter which he had fashioned. Here -is this America of yours--a country in which, to a certain extent, -the political institutions have been influenced by the circumstances -that followed the separation of your colonies from the English crown. -Undoubtedly, your ancestors of the Revolutionary epoch could not -construct a monarchy for the group of thirteen newly existing States, -each with its right and enjoyment of an actual autonomy. The habits -and genius of the people forbade the experiment of monarchical or -aristocratic institutions; no materials for either existed. But within -the range of republican institutions there was a choice open, and the -people exercised that choice. They made one system of confederated -States, and found it would not answer. They then deliberately assembled -their wisest and greatest men. They gave to them a commission that -was restricted by nothing but the practical necessity of framing -a government that would unite the requirements of power with the -requirements of liberty. The result was the Constitution of the United -States--a system of government that was, within the limitations of -certain practical necessities, both in its fundamental principles and -in many of its details, the deliberate choice and product of certain -leading minds, aided by the public consent, to a degree that is almost -unparalleled in the formation of political institutions. After it had -gone into operation, it was believed that the requirements of liberty -had not been sufficiently regarded, and it was directly and purposely -modified by the intervention of the collective will of the whole -people. And when I turn to the history of philosophies, of religions, -of the fine arts, or of the mechanical arts, I find everywhere traces -of the force of individual genius, of the direct intervention of -individual wills, and of the power of men to cause new systems of -thought and action to come into existence, and to create new objects of -admiration or utility. In regard to languages, I have read a good deal -about the controversy concerning their origin, but I have observed one -thing to be very apparent: whether the gift of articulate speech was -bestowed on man, when he had become a distinct being, in a manner and -for a purpose which would distinguish him from all the other animals, -or whether it became a developed faculty akin to that by which other -animals utter vocal sounds intelligible to those of their species, it -is certain that in man there is a power of varying his vocal utterances -at pleasure, which is possessed by no other creature on this earth. -The expansion of languages, therefore, the coinage of new words, -the addition of new inflections, the introduction of new shades of -meaning, the method of utterance which is called pronunciation, and -the different dialects of the same tongue, are all matters which have -been under the control of individuals dwelling together, and have all -resulted from the arbitrary determination of more or less numerous -persons, followed by the great mass of their nation, their race, or -their tribe. Even when a new and third language has been formed by -the contact of two peoples speaking separate tongues, we may trace the -same arbitrary adoption of parts of each separate tongue, in the first -beginning of the fusion, and the new language consequently exhibits a -greater or a less predominance of the characteristics of one of its -parent tongues, according as the one population has compelled the other -to adopt the greater part of its peculiar modes of speech. - -KOSMICOS. You have gone over a good deal of ground, but now -what do you infer from all this, supposing that you have taken a right -view of the facts? - -SOPHEREUS. I infer that, as in the social phenomena there are -products and effects which have owed their existence to human will -and direct human action, so, in other departments, for example, in -the domain which is called Nature, and which is out of the sphere of -human agency and human force, it is reasonable to conclude that there -are products and effects which must have owed their existence to a -will and a power capable of conceiving and producing them. And this is -what leads me, as I was led in the examination of the solar system, -to the idea of a Supreme Being, capable of producing those objects in -nature which are so varied, so complex, so marvelously constructed, so -nicely adapted to the conditions of each separate organism, that if we -attribute their existence to any intelligent power, it must be to a -power of infinite capacities, since nothing short of such capacities -could have conceived and executed them. - -KOSMICOS. You have now come to the very point at which I have -been expecting to see you arrive, and at which I will put to you this -question: Why do you personify the power to which you trace these -products in the natural world? Substitute for the term God, or the -Creator, the power of Nature. You then have a force that is not only -immense, but is in truth without any limit--a force that embraces -everything, gives life to everything, is at once cause and effect, -is incessantly active and inexhaustible. It commands all methods, -accomplishes all objects, and uses time, space, and matter as its -means. Why do you personify this all-pervading and sufficient power of -Nature? Why make it a being, a deity, when all you know is that it is a -power? "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the world?" is a -question that God is supposed to have asked of Job; and it simply shows -that Job had been traditionally taught to believe that there is such a -being as God, and that that being laid the foundations of the world. -Substitute Nature in the question, let Nature ask the question, and it -is just as pertinent, and involves the same problem of human existence. -Where was man when Nature began to exhibit that power which has evolved -all things that we see out of the primeval nothingness? - -SOPHEREUS. Well, here I must say that you have left out -certain ideas that are essential to all true reasoning on this -subject. Power without a guide, power without control, power without a -determining will, power that acts without a volition which determines -the how and the when, is a thing that I can not conceive. I thought -that in our former conversation, when we were considering the solar -system, you conceded that power, as something abstracted from substance -or its properties, was a logically necessary conception. - -KOSMICOS. I did. But I did not concede that power must be -converted into a person. You must not misunderstand me. It certainly is -my idea that power is a thing to be contemplated by itself; and we are -surrounded everywhere by its manifestations. But it is not my idea that -it is held and exercised by the being called God, or by any being. We -only know of it by its effects; and these show that Nature is, after -all, both cause and effect, manner and execution, design and product. -You can go no farther. You can not go behind Nature and find a being -who sat in the heavens and laid the foundations of the world, unless -you mean to accept a story which wise men have at last abandoned along -with many kindred beliefs which came from the ages of the greatest -ignorance. - -SOPHEREUS. Pardon me: the question that was put to Job has -more than one aspect. But I have considered the narrative that is found -in the first chapter of Genesis only as a hypothesis to be weighed -with other hypotheses of the origin of the world and its inhabitants. -I have studied the phenomena to which you give the name of Nature, and -I will tell you what seems to me to be a postulate necessary to be -carried into that study. I have observed that in the works of man two -things are apparent: One is, that power is exercised; the other is, -that the exercise of the power is always accompanied by a determining -will, which decides that the power shall be exerted, or that it shall -be deferred, or that it shall be applied variously as respects the mode -and the time. In human hands, power is not illimitable, but within -certain limitations it may be exercised, and it is always under the -guidance of a will. A man determines to build a house; he decides -on its dimensions, and when he will begin to erect it. A general -determines to attack the enemy on a certain day, and he marshals his -forces accordingly. A people determine to change their government, and -they decide what their new government shall be. An artist determines to -paint a certain picture, and he paints it. Whenever we see human power -exercised, so that we can connect product and power, the power itself -is put in motion by an intelligent will. I say, therefore, that the -idea of power without a controlling will, without a determining design, -is inconceivable: for I am obliged to draw my conclusions from what -I observe, and certainly the phenomena of society do not present any -instances of a product resulting from an exercise of power without a -determination to exercise it. Power diffused, power without guidance, -power moving by its own volition and without the volition of any -intelligent being, is not exhibited in the works of man. - -KOSMICOS. But we are now dealing with the works of Nature; -and the question is, whether the power that is manifest in Nature is, -to adopt your language, under the control or guidance of a being who -is something other than the power itself. You must remember that this -is a domain in which you can see nothing but products and effects. You -must also remember that if the immensity and variety of those products -and effects lead to the conclusion that the power transcends all -human faculty, is superhuman, and, so far as we can tell, boundless, -all that we can know is that the power itself is illimitable. The -quality of an infinite and illimitable capacity may be imputed to the -power of Nature, because a power without limit seems necessary to -the production of such effects as we see. But here we must stop. We -have no warrant for believing that the power which we trace in the -phenomena of Nature is held and controlled by a person, as man holds -and controls the power which he exercises with his hands. What we -see in Nature is the exercise of an immense and apparently boundless -power. But the imputation of that power to a being distinct from the -power itself, is a mere exercise of the human imagination, without -any proof whatever. See how this imagination has worked at different -periods. Monotheism and polytheism are alike in their origin. The one -has imputed to different beings all the phenomena in the different -departments of Nature, one being having the charge and superintendence -of one department and another being having another department. Good -and evil have thus been parceled out to different deities or demons. -On the other hand, monotheism attributes all to some one being, and -his existence is no more rational than the existence of the whole -catalogue of the mythologies of all antiquity, or the stupid beliefs of -the present barbarous tribes. But Nature is a great fact, or rather a -vast store-house of facts, which we can study; and what we learn from -it is that there is a power which Nature is constantly exerting, which -is without any assignable limit, which is itself both cause and effect, -and beyond this we can not go. - -SOPHEREUS. Let us see if you are correct. In the first -place, do you not observe that the tendency of mankind to personify -the powers of Nature is one of the strongest proofs of the logical -necessity for an interpretation which seeks for an intelligent being -of some kind as the actor in the production of the phenomena? It is -the fashion, I find, among a certain class of philosophers, to impute -this propensity to the proneness of the human mind toward superstitious -beliefs; to the mere effect of poetical or imaginary temperament -in certain races of men, or to fear in other races; or to a vague -longing for some superior being who can sympathize with human sorrows -or assist human efforts. Something of all these influences has, no -doubt, in different degrees and in various ways, worked itself into -the religious beliefs of mankind. But neither any one of them, nor the -whole of them, will satisfactorily account for either polytheism or -monotheism. We must go deeper. There has been an unconscious reasoning -at work, more or less unconscious, which has led to the conclusion -that power, the manifestation of power, necessarily implies that the -power is held and wielded by some intelligent being. The beliefs of -mankind, whether embracing one such being or many, have not been the -mere results of superstition, or fear, or longing for divine sympathy, -or for superhuman companionship or protection. Those beliefs owe as -much to the reasoning powers of mankind as they do to the influence -of imagination. In many ages there have been powerful intellects, -which have been free from the influence of superstition or fancy, and -which have recognized the logical necessity for a conception of power -as a force that must be under the guidance and control of intellect. -While the popular belief has not attained this conviction by the same -conscious and logically conducted process of reasoning, it has been -unconsciously led through the same process, by what is open to the -observation of human faculties, even in the less civilized portions of -the human race. The savage who is sufficiently raised above the brute -creation to exercise his own will and intelligence in the pursuit of -his game, or in building his wigwam, or in fighting his enemy, knows -that he exercises a power that is under his own control; and, as -soon as he begins to observe the phenomena of Nature, he conceives -of some being who holds a like power over the material universe, and -whom he begins to personify, to propitiate, and to worship. This is -the result of reasoning: feeble in some cases, but in all cases the -intellectual process is the same. Now let us see whether this process -is a sound one. Are you sure that you are correct in saying that the -power of Nature is without limit? Is there a single force in Nature, -a single property of matter, or any sequence of natural events, that -is not circumscribed? Do not the very regularity and uniformity of -the phenomena of Nature imply that some authority has said, from the -beginning, Thus far shalt thou go and no farther? You surely do not -imagine that the law of universal gravitation made itself, or that it -settled itself into an exact and invariable method of action by the -mere force of habit, beginning without prescribed and superimposed -limits, and finally resulting in a fixed rule which never changes. -You do not imagine that the mysterious, impalpable motion to which is -now given the name of electricity, created for itself, as a matter -of habit, the perpetual tendency to seek an equilibration of the -quantity accumulated in one body with the quantity that is contained -in another, by transmission through intermediate bodies; or that it -established for itself the conditions which make one substance a -better conducting medium than another. You do not suppose, I take it, -that certain particles of matter adopted for themselves a capacity -to arrange themselves in crystals of certain fixed combinations and -shapes, and that other particles of matter did not choose to take on -this habit. All these forces, powers, and tendencies are of very great -extent, much beyond any that man can exercise; but they all have their -limitations, their prescribed and invariable methods of action; they -all act as if they have been commanded to act in a certain way and to -a certain extent, and not as if they have chosen for themselves both -method and scope. Now, is it not a rational deduction that what is -really illimitable is not the power of Nature, but the power which made -Nature what it is? Is it not a necessary conclusion that, inasmuch as -all Nature acts within certain limits, stupendous and minute and varied -as the products or effects may be, there must have been behind Nature -a power that could and did prescribe the methods, the limitations, the -lines within which Nature was to move and act? You can not put into -the mouth of Nature the question, Where wast thou (Man) when I laid -the foundations of the world? without suggesting the retort, "Where -wast _thou_ (Nature) when the foundations of the world _were_ laid?" -And this question Nature can no more answer, for itself, than man can -answer for himself when the question is put to him. Each must answer, -I was nowhere--I did not exist. Each must answer, There was a power -which called me into being, which prescribed the conditions of my -existence, which gave me the capacities that I possess, which ordained -the limitations within which I was to act. - -KOSMICOS. And all this you derive from the fact that a being -whom we call Man has some power over matter; that he has an intelligent -faculty by which he can do certain things with matter, and that he -actually does produce certain concrete forms of new things that he did -not find made to his hand. Is this the basis of your reasoning about -the origin of Nature? - -SOPHEREUS. It is, and I will tell you why. Man is the -one being on this earth in whom we find an intelligent will and -constructive faculty united, to a degree which shows a power of -variation and execution superior to that of all other beings of whose -actions we have the direct evidence of our senses. We might select one -or more of the inferior animals, and find in them a strong constructive -faculty; but we do not find it accompanied by a power of variation and -adaptation that is equal to that of man in degree, or that is probably -the same in kind. I will not insist on the distinction between reason -and instinct, but I presume you will admit that, when we compare -the constructive faculty of man and that of the most ingenious and -wonderfully endowed animal or insect, the latter acts always under an -implanted impulse, which we have no good ground for regarding as of -the same nature as man's reasoning power, however striking may be the -products. When, therefore, we select the human power of construction -or creation as the basis of reasoning upon the works of Nature, we -resort to a being in whom that power is the highest of which we have -direct evidence. In the works of man we have direct and palpable proof -that the phenomena--the products of human skill and human force--are -brought about by the faculties of an intelligent and reasoning being. -If we dig into the earth and find there a statue, an implement, or a -weapon, we do not hesitate to conclude that the spot was once inhabited -by men, just as surely as we should conclude the same thing if we -found there human bones. The world, above-ground and below-ground, -is full of concrete objects that we know must have been fashioned by -human skill, guided by human intelligence. This intelligence, this -intellect, is not matter; it is a being; it is a person. It is not a -force, acting without consciousness; it is a being wielding a force -which is under the control of volition. The force and the volition are -both limited, but within the limitations they constitute the power -of man. Pass, then, to the works of Nature, or to what you call the -power of Nature. As, in the case of man, you can not conclude that he -created for himself his own faculties, that he prescribed for himself -the limitations of his power over matter, or that he formed those -limitations as mere matters of habit, or that it was from habit alone -that he derived his great constructive powers, so, in studying the -works of Nature, you must conclude that some intelligent being made the -laws of matter and motion, prescribed the unvarying order and method -of action, laid down the limitations, originated the properties, and, -in so doing, acted by volition, choice, and design. The distinction, -as I conceive, between man and Nature is, that there has been bestowed -on man, in a very inferior degree, a part of the original power of -creation. On Nature there has been bestowed none of this power. As we -find that the existence of man as an intelligent being, endowed with -certain high faculties, among which is a certain degree of the power of -creating new objects, can not be accounted for without the hypothesis -of a creator, still less can we account for the existence and phenomena -of Nature, which has in itself no degree of the creating power, without -the same hypothesis. - -KOSMICOS. Stop where you are. Why do you separate man from -Nature? Have you yet to learn that man is a part of Nature? I suspect -you have, after all, been reading the book of Genesis for something -more than a hypothesis, and that you have adopted the notion that God -made Adam a living soul. Put away all the nursery-stories, and come -down to the "hard-pan" of actual facts, which show by an overwhelming -array of evidence that man had a very different origin. - -SOPHEREUS. You know, my friend, that I never learned any -nursery-stories, and therefore I have none to unlearn. It may be my -misfortune, but I find myself here in the world in mature years, -studying the phenomena of life, without having had any early teaching, -but with such reasoning as I can apply to what I observe, and to what -science, history, and philosophy can furnish to me. I belong to no -church, to no sect, to no party, and I have not even a country. I am -a citizen of the world, on my travels through it, learning what I -can. Now, what are your facts? Let us get down, as you say, upon the -"hard-pan," and make it as hard as you please. - -KOSMICOS. First answer my question: Why do you separate man -from Nature? - -SOPHEREUS. I know very well that in a certain sense man is a -part of Nature. But it is necessary to contemplate man apart from all -the rest of Nature, because we find that he is endowed with intellect, -and we have very good and direct evidence that his intellect is an -actor; and we know that he is endowed with consciousness, and we have -very good and direct evidence that, by introspection, he becomes aware -of his own consciousness, and what it is. - -KOSMICOS. Very well, assume all that if you choose. Now let me -show you an origin of man, with his intellect and consciousness, which -will entirely overthrow the idea that he was a special creation in the -sense to which you seem to be drifting, namely, that of miraculous -interposition by a being called God. You must be aware, as you have -read so much, that modern science has made great discoveries, and that -there are certain conclusions on this subject which are drawn from -very numerous and important data. Those data involve the origin of -all the different animals, man included. They are all to be accounted -for in the same way and by the same reasoning. Now, if we go back to -a period when none of them existed, we find a method of accounting -for them that is infinitely superior as a hypothesis to any idea of -their special creation as an act or as a series of acts of divine and -direct interposition. I will take this method as it is given by Herbert -Spencer, because, as he has reasoned it, it accounts for both intellect -and consciousness; and Mr. Spencer is allowed to be one of the leading -minds of this age. Mark the starting-point of his whole philosophy -on this subject of organic life. Darwin, as you know, supposes some -one very low form of organic life, an aquatic grub, and out of it he -evolves all the other animal organisms, by the process of natural and -sexual selection, through successive generations, ending in man. This -hypothesis leaves the original organism to be accounted for, and, -although Darwin does not expressly assert that it was the Creator who -fashioned the first organism, he leaves it to be implied. Spencer, on -the other hand, explicitly denies the absolute commencement of organic -life on the globe. Observe that the terms of his theory of evolution -are much more complete than Darwin's, for he says that "the affirmation -of universal evolution is in itself a negation of an absolute -commencement of anything. Construed in terms of evolution, every -kind of being is conceived as a product of modifications wrought by -insensible gradations on a pre-existing being; and this holds as fully -of the supposed commencement of organic life, or a first organism, as -of all subsequent developments of organic life."[106] - -You will see, therefore, that the idea of a Creator, fashioning a -type of animal organism, or making a commencement of organic life, is -excluded by this great philosopher, although he does concur in the main -in Darwin's general explanation of the mode in which one organism is -evolved out of a pre-existing organism. He goes much farther, because -his system of universal evolution embraces the elements out of which -any organic life whatever has been developed, and negatives the idea -of any absolute commencement of anything whatever. He begins with the -original molecules of organizable matter. By modifications induced -upon modifications these become formed, by their inherent tendencies, -into higher types of organic molecules, as we see in the artificial -evolution effected by chemists in their laboratories; who, although -they are unable to form the complex combinations directly from their -elements, can form them indirectly through successive modifications -of simpler combinations, by the use of equivalents. In Nature, the -more complex combinations are formed by modifications directly from -the elements, and each modification is a change of the molecule into -equilibrium with its environment, subjecting it, that is to say, to -new conditions. Then, larger aggregates, compound molecules, are -successively generated; more complex or heterogeneous aggregates arise -out of one another, and there results a geometrically increasing -multitude of these larger and more complex aggregates. So that by the -action of the successive higher forms on one another, joined with the -action of the environing conditions, the highest forms of organic -molecules are reached. Thus in the early world, as in the modern -laboratory, inferior types of organic substances, by their mutual -actions under fit conditions, evolved the superior types of organic -substances, and at length ended in organizable protoplasm. Now, let -me read to you Mr. Spencer's description of the mode in which the -substance called "protein" becomes developed into organic life. "And -it can hardly be doubted," he says, "that the shaping of organizable -protoplasm, which is a substance modifiable in multitudinous ways -with extreme facility, went on after the same manner. As I learn -from one of our first chemists, Prof. Frankland, protein is capable -of existing under probably at least a thousand isomeric forms; and, -as we shall presently see, it is capable of forming, with itself -and other elements, substances yet more intricate in composition, -that are practically intricate in their varieties of kind. Exposed -to those innumerable modifications of conditions which the earth's -surface afforded, here in amount of light, there in amount of heat, -and elsewhere in the mineral quality of its aqueous medium, this -extremely changeable substance must have undergone, now one, now -another, of its countless metamorphoses. And to the mutual influences -of its metamorphic forms, under favoring conditions, we may ascribe -the production of the still more composite, still more sensitive, -still more variously-changeable portions of organic matter, which, in -masses more minute and simpler than existing _protozoa_, displayed -actions varying little by little into those called vital actions, which -protein itself exhibits in a certain degree, and which the lowest known -living things exhibit only in a greater degree. Thus, setting out -with inductions from the experiences of organic chemists at the one -extreme, and with inductions from the observations of biologists at the -other extreme, we are enabled to deductively bridge the interval--are -enabled to conceive how organic compounds were evolved, and how, by a -continuance of the process, the nascent life displayed in these becomes -gradually more pronounced."[107] - -It is in this way that Spencer accounts for the formation of the cell -which becomes developed into a living organism, out of which are -successively evolved all the higher forms of animal organisms, until we -reach man. - -SOPHEREUS. And is this put forward as something which rational -people are to believe? - -KOSMICOS. Undoubtedly it is put forward as something that is -to be believed, because it is supported by a vast array of evidence; -and let me tell you that this conception of Nature as a whole is -the consummate flower of this nineteenth century in the domain of -philosophic speculation. - -SOPHEREUS. Perhaps it is. But although this nineteenth -century has witnessed many great scientific discoveries, and has -produced extraordinary inventions, I do not find that among the -speculative philosophers of this age there are such very superior -powers of reasoning displayed that we ought to regard them as -authorities entitled to challenge our acceptance of their theories -without examination. I must say that among your scientific people of -the present day, and especially among the philosophers of the class -of which Mr. Spencer is the leading representative, there are certain -tendencies and defects which surprise me. One of their defects is that -they do not obviate remote difficulties, perhaps because they have not -been trained, as other men have, to foresee where such difficulties -must arise. This is sometimes apparent even when the difficulties -are not very remote, but are quite obvious. One of their tendencies -is to arrive at a theory from some of the phenomena, and then to -strain the remaining phenomena to suit the theory; and sometimes -they proceed to the invention or imagination of phenomena which are -necessary to the completion of a chain of proof. This last process -is called bridging the interval. I will now apply this criticism to -Mr. Spencer's philosophy of the origin of man. In the first place he -has not obviated a fundamental difficulty, whether it be a near or a -remote one. Where did the molecules get their tendency or capacity to -arrange themselves into higher and more complex forms? Whence came the -auxiliary or additional force of their surrounding environment? What -endowed _protein_ with its capacity to assume a thousand isomeric -forms? What made the favoring conditions which have helped on the -influence of its metamorphic tendencies, so as to produce still more -sensitive and variously-changeable portions of organic matter? These -questions must have an answer; and, when we ask them, we see the -significance of the inquiry, "Where wast thou (man) when I laid the -foundations of the world?" For these things, on the evolution theory, -_are_ the foundations of the world. It is no answer to say, as Mr. -Spencer does, that these tendencies, or capacities of matter, and -these laws of the favoring conditions, came from the Unknown Cause. -Known or unknown, did they have a cause, or did they make themselves? -Did these, the foundations of the world, have an origin, or were they -without any origin? If they had an origin, was it from the will and -power of a being capable of giving existence to them and prescribing -their modes of action? If they had no origin, if they existed from all -eternity, how came it that they formed this extraordinary habit of -invariable action in a certain method, which amid all its multiformity -shows an astonishing persistency? If we deny, with Mr. Spencer, the -absolute commencement of organic life on the globe, we must still go -back of all the traces of organic life, and inquire whence matter, -molecules, organized or unorganized, derived the capacities or -tendencies to become organized, and how the favoring conditions became -established as auxiliary or subsidiary forces. And therefore it is that -this difficulty, whether remote or near at hand, is not met by Mr. -Spencer: for whether we call the cause an unknown or a known cause, the -question is, Was there a cause, or did the foundations of the world -lay themselves? The reasoning powers of mankind, exercised by daily -observation of cause and effect, of creative power and created product, -are equal to the conception of a First Cause as a being who could have -laid the foundations of the world, but they are utterly unequal to -the conception that they had no origin whatever. Again, consider how -numerous are the missing links in the chain of evolution, how many gaps -are filled up by pure inventions or assumptions. The evolution of one -distinct and perfect animal, or being, out of a pre-existing animal -or being of a different type, has never been proved as a fact. Yet -whole pedigrees of such generation of species have been constructed -upon the same principles as we should construct the pedigree of an -individual. Furthermore, if we regard the facts about which there can -be no controversy, we find not only distinct species of animals, but -we find the same species divided into male and female, with a system -of procreation and gestation established for the multiplication of -individuals of that species. Now go back to the imaginary period when -protein began to form itself into something verging toward organic -life, and then there became evolved the nascent life of an organized -being. How did the division of the sexes originate? Did some of the -molecules or their progressive forms, or their aggregates, or masses, -under some conditions, tend to the production of the male, and others -under certain conditions tend to the development of the female, so -that the sexes were formed by a mere habit of arrangement without any -special intervention? Here is one of the most serious difficulties -which the doctrine of evolution, whether it be the Darwinian or the -Spencerian theory, has to encounter. There is a division into male and -female: there is a law of procreation by the union of the two sexes. -This is a fact about which there can be no dispute. It is one of the -most remarkable facts in Nature. It is the means by which species are -continued, and the world is peopled with individuals of each species. -Is it conceivable that this occurred without any design, that it had no -origin in a formative will, that it had, properly speaking, no origin -at all, but that it grew out of the tendencies of organized matter to -take on such a diversity in varying conditions? And if the latter was -all the origin that it had, whence came the tendencies and whence the -favoring conditions that helped them on toward the result? It seems to -me that the Spencerian theory, so far as it suggests a mode in which -the two sexes of animals came to exist, is hardly less fanciful than -what Plato has given us in his "Timæus." I have studied them both. - -If you will hand me Mr. Spencer's work from which you have just quoted, -I will point out a passage which fully justifies my criticism. It is -this: "Before it can be ascertained how organized beings have been -gradually evolved, there must be reached the conviction that they have -been gradually evolved." He says this in praise of De Maillet, one of -the earliest of the modern speculators who reached this conviction, -and whose "wild notions" as to the way should not make us, says Mr. -Spencer, "forget the merit of his intuition that animals and plants -were produced by natural causes."[108] That is to say, first form -to yourself a theory, and have a thorough conviction of it. Then -investigate, and shape the facts so as to support the theory. Is it -not plain that an inquiry into the mode in which organized beings have -been gradually evolved must precede any conclusion or conviction on the -subject? It is one of those cases in which the _how_ a thing has been -done lies at the basis of the inquiry whether it has probably been done -at all. If a suggested mode turns out to be wild and visionary, what is -the value of any "intuition" of the main fact? But, what is still more -extraordinary in this kind of deduction, which is no deduction, is the -way in which, according to Mr. Spencer, the first conviction is to be -reached before one looks for the facts. The process of the evolution -of organisms, according to Mr. Spencer's philosophy, is contained as -a part in the great whole of evolution in general. We first convince -ourselves that evolution obtains in all the other departments of -Nature, and is the interpretation of all their phenomena. Then we -conclude that it has obtained in the animal kingdom, and so we have the -conviction necessary to be acquired before we examine the phenomena; -and then we make that investigation so as to reconcile the facts with -the supposed universal laws of matter and motion. I do not exaggerate -in the least. Here is what he says: "Only when the process of evolution -of organisms is affiliated on the process of evolution in general can -it be truly said to be explained. The thing required is to show that -its various results are corollaries from first principles. We have -to reconcile the facts with the universal laws of the redistribution -of matter and motion."[109] What would Bacon have thought of this -method of establishing the probable truth of a theory? It leaves out -of consideration a multitude of facts, and one of them at least is of -the utmost importance. It is that in the domain of animated matter, -in organized beings, and most signally in the animal kingdom, there -is a principle of life; and, whatever may be the universal laws of -the redistribution of matter and motion, in their operation upon or -among the products which are not endowed with this principle, when -we come to reason about products that _are_ endowed with it we are -not entitled to conclude that this principle of animal life is itself -a product of the operation of those laws because they have resulted -in products which do not possess life, or life of the same kind. In -order to reach the conviction that animal organisms have resulted -solely from the operation of the laws of matter and motion, we must -not undertake to reconcile the facts with those laws, but we must have -some evidence that those laws have produced living beings with complex -and diversified organisms, and this evidence must at least tend to -exclude every other hypothesis. It is not enough to flout at all other -hypotheses, or to pronounce them _ex cathedra_ to be idle tales. - -KOSMICOS. You must not catch at single expressions and -make yourself a captious critic. That would be unworthy of such an -inquirer as you profess to be, and as I believe you are. Mr. Spencer -did not mean, by reconciling the facts with the laws of matter and -motion, that we are to distort the facts. He meant that we are to -discover the correspondence between the facts and the operation of -those laws. Now, let me show you more explicitly that he is quite -right. There are certain laws of matter and motion, discoverable and -discovered by scientific investigation, which prevail throughout all -Nature. The phenomena which they produce, although not yet fully -understood, justify the assumption of their universality and their -modes of operation. It is perfectly legitimate, therefore, to reason -that the same laws which have produced the observable phenomena in -other departments of Nature have had a like potency as causes by which -the phenomena in the animal kingdom have been produced. Using this -legitimate mode of reasoning, Mr. Spencer traces the operation of -those laws upon the primal molecules, which are peculiarly sensitive -to their effects. He follows them through the successive aggregations -of higher combinations until he arrives at the protoplasmic substance, -out of which, from its capability of assuming an infinity of forms, -aided by the environing conditions, the simplest organic forms become -evolved, and thus what you call the principle of life gradually arose -through a vast extent of time. He is therefore perfectly consistent -with himself in denying the absolute commencement of organic life on -the globe; for you must understand that he means by this to deny that -there was any point of time, or any particular organism, at or in which -animal life can be said to have had its first commencement, without -having been preceded by some other kind of being, out of which the more -highly organized being has been produced by modifications wrought by -insensible gradations. If you will attend closely to his reasoning, -you will see that you have small cause for criticising it as you have; -and, if you will look at one of his illustrations, you will see the -strength of his position. Hear what he says: "It is no more needful to -suppose an absolute commencement of organic life or a 'first organism' -than it is needful to suppose an absolute commencement of social life -and a first social organism. The assumption of such a necessity in this -last case, made by early speculators with their theories of 'social -contracts' and the like, is disproved by the facts; and the facts, -so far as they are ascertained, disprove the assumption of such a -necessity in the first case."[110] That is to say, as the social facts, -the social phenomena, disprove the "social contract" as an occurrence -taking place by human design and intention, so the phenomena of animal -life disprove the assumption of such an occurrence as its commencement -by divine intervention, or its commencement at all. - -SOPHEREUS. I think I understood all this before, just as you -put it, but I am not the less obliged to you for the restatement. -In regard to society, I know not why the family, the institution of -marriage, is not to be regarded as the first social organism, and -the union of two or more families in some kind of mutual league is -certainly the first society in a more comprehensive sense. I care -very little about the theory of the social contract, as applied to -more complex societies, although, as a kind of legal fiction, it is -well enough for all the uses which sound reasoners nowadays make of -it. But the institution of marriage, the family, is no fiction at -all; it is a fact, however it was first established, and it was the -absolute commencement of social life. But I do not hold to this sort -of analogies, or to this mode of reasoning from what happens in a -department, in which the actions of men have largely or exclusively -influenced the complex phenomena, to a department in which human -influence has had nothing to do with the phenomena. But now let us come -back to the proposition that there never was any absolute commencement -of organic life on the globe. I will take Mr. Spencer's meaning--his -denial, as you put it--and will test it by one or two observations -upon his own explanation, as given in the elaborate paper in which -he replied to a critic in the "North American Review" a little more -than four years ago.[111] In the first place, then, as to time. It -will not do to say that there never was a time when such a product as -life, animated or organized life, had its first existence. To whatever -it owed its existence, it must at some time have begun to exist. It -matters not how far back in the ages of the globe you place it: you -must contemplate a time when it did not exist, and a point of time at -which it began to exist. It matters not that you can not fix this time. -There was such a time, whether you can fix it chronologically or not. -In the next place, however minute the supposed gradations which you -trace backward from a recognizable organism to the primal protoplasmic -substance, out of which you suppose it to have been gradually evolved, -and through whatever extent of time you imagine these gradations -to have been worked out by the operation of the forces of Nature, -modifying successive beings, you must find an organism to which you can -attribute life. Whatever that organism was, it was the commencement of -organic life; for, when you go back of it in the series, you come to -something that was not organic life, but was merely a collection of -molecules or a product of aggregated molecules, that had a capacity to -be developed into an animated organism under favorable conditions. "It -is," says Mr. Spencer, "by the action of the successively higher forms -on one another, joined with the action of environing conditions, that -the highest forms are reached." Some one, then, of those highest forms, -something that can be called an animal organism, some being endowed -with life, was the commencement of organic life on the globe; and it -is just as correct and necessary to speak of it as the "absolute" -commencement as it is when we speak of Darwin's aquatic grub, or of the -Mosaic account of the creation of the different animals by the hand -and will of God. Neither Mr. Spencer nor any other man can construct a -chain of animated existence back into the region of its non-existence -without showing that it began to have an existence. He can say that -the affirmation of universal evolution is in itself a negation of an -absolute commencement of anything. And so it is theoretically. But this -does not get over the difficulty. On his own explanation of the mode -in which organisms have been evolved, there must have been a first -organism, and in that first organism life began. So that I am not yet -prepared to yield my criticism, or to yield my convictions to a writer -who is so much carried away by his theory. - -KOSMICOS. But you will allow that the theory is perfect in -itself; and why, then, do you say that he is carried away by it? You -ought either to give up your criticism, or to show that there is a -superior hypothesis by which to account for the origin of organisms, -and one that is supported by stronger proofs and better reasoning. You -have nothing to oppose to Mr. Spencer's explanation of the origin of -organic life, excepting the fable which you find in the book of Genesis. - -SOPHEREUS. Undoubtedly the opposite hypothesis is that which -attributes to a Creator the production of organic life; and whether -the Mosaic account, as it stands, be a fable or a true narrative of an -actual occurrence, what we have to do is to ascertain, upon correct -principles of reasoning, whether the creating power can be dispensed -with. Mr. Spencer dispenses with it altogether. He gives it a direct -negative in the most absolute manner. But the perfection of his theory -depends upon its ability to sustain itself as an explanation of the -existence of organisms without the intervention of a creating power -anywhere at any time. I have already suggested the serious defect of -his whole philosophic scheme as applied to the existence of organisms, -namely, that the foundation of the theory, the existence of the -molecules with their properties and capacities tending to rearrangement -under the laws of matter and motion, those laws themselves, and the -environing conditions which assist the process of adjustment and -combination, must all have had an origin, or a cause. If we can get -along without that origin, without any cause, without any actor -laying the foundations of the world, we can make a theory. But that -theory can not sustain itself by such a negation if all experience, -observation, and reflection amount to anything; for these all point in -one direction. They all tend to show that every existing thing must -have had a cause, that every product must have had an origin, and, if -we place that origin in the operation of certain laws of matter and -motion upon and among the primal molecules of matter, we still have to -look for the origin of those laws and of the molecules on which they -have operated. If we say that these things had no origin, that they -existed without having been caused to exist, we end in a negation at -which reason at once rebels. If, on the other hand, we reject, as we -must reject, this negation, then the same power which could establish -the laws of matter and motion, and give origin to the molecules and -the favoring conditions by which their aggregated higher forms are -supposed to have been developed, was alike capable of the direct -production of species, the creation of the sexes, and the establishment -of the laws of procreation and gestation. So that it becomes a question -of probability, of the weight of evidence, as to whether we can explain -the phenomena of species, of the sexual division and the sexual -union, with all that they involve, without the hypothesis of direct -intervention, design, and formative skill of a boundless character. I -have seen no explanation of the origin of species and of the sexual -distinction, with its concomitant methods of reproduction, that does -not end in an utter blank, whenever it undertakes to dispense with -that kind of direct design to which is derisively given the name of -"miraculous interposition," but which in truth implies no miracle at -all. - -KOSMICOS. I have to be perpetually recalling you to the first -principles of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. You seem to think it enough -to point to the existence of species and the sexual division, as if -his philosophy did not afford the means of accounting for them by the -operation of natural causes. Let me put to you, then, this question: If -natural causes have produced a crystal, by successive new combinations -of molecules of matter through gradations rising successively into -higher forms, why should not natural causes, acting upon other -molecules in a corresponding way, have produced organic life, or -animated organisms? If natural causes have evolved out of certain -molecules the substance known as organizable protein, why should not -the continued operation of the same or similar causes have modified -organizable protein into some distinct and recognizable animated -organism? If you admit this as a possible or highly probable result, -why should not natural causes have produced, in the course of millions -of years, the division of the sexes and the methods of procreation and -multiplication? - -SOPHEREUS. I will assign the reasons for not adopting the -conclusions to which you expect me to arrive, in a certain order. In -the first place, the capacity of certain molecules to result in the -formation of a crystal, under the operation of what you call natural -causes, requires that the molecules, their capacity, and the natural -causes should all have had an origin, call it known or unknown. The -cause was of equal potency to produce the crystal directly, or anything -else that exists in Nature. The same thing is true of certain other -molecules which, under the operation of the so-called natural causes, -have resulted in organizable protein. There must have been an origin -to the molecules, to their capacity, and to the laws which effect -their combinations; and this cause could equally fashion an organism -and fashion it in the related forms of male and female by direct -intervention, for to such a power there is no assignable limit. In the -next place, the distinction between inanimate and animated matter, -between beings endowed and beings not endowed with animal life, is a -distinction that can not be overlooked; for, although we find this -distinction to be a fact that has resulted after the operation of -whatever causes may have produced it, we must still note that there is -a distinction, and a very important one. It may be that the dividing -line is very difficult of detection; that it is impossible to determine -in all cases just where organizable matter passes from dead matter into -a living organism. But that at some point there has arisen a living -organism, however produced, is certain. Now, suppose that what you -call natural causes have operated to bring organizable matter up to -this dividing line, the question is, whether we can conclude that they -have had the potency to pass that line, and to lead of themselves to -all the varying and manifold results of species, the division of the -sexes, and all that follows that division. Certain great facts seem to -me to negative this conclusion. The first is, that we have species, -which differ absolutely from each other as organisms, in their modes -of life, and their destinies, however strong may be the resemblances -which obtain among them in certain respects. The second fact is, that -each of the true species is divided into the related forms of male and -female, and is placed under a law of procreation, by the sexual union, -for the multiplication of individuals of that species. The third fact -is, that no crosses take place in Nature between different species -of animals--between the true species--resulting in a third species, -or a third animal. It is true that multiplication of individuals of -some of the lowest organisms takes place without the bisexual process -of procreation, as where, in the severance of a part of an organism -the severed part grows, under favorable conditions, into a perfect -organism of the same kind, as in the analogous phenomenon of a plant -propagated by a branch or a slip from the parent stem. But this -occurrence does not take place among the animals which are placed -for their multiplication under the law of the sexual union and the -sexual procreation. The sexual division, therefore, the law of sexual -procreation, and all that they involve, have to be accounted for. -Can they be accounted for by the theory of evolution? Wherever you -place their first occurrence, you have to find a process adequate to -their production. What, then, entitles you to say that the hypothesis -of their production, by the capacity and tendency of organizable -substances, when they have reached certain combinations, is superior -to the hypothesis of a direct interposition and a formative will? At -the outset, you must begin with some interposition and some formative -will; you must account for the existence of the very capacities of -matter to become organized under the laws of the redistribution of -matter and motion, or you will end nowhere whatever. If you assume, as -you must, that, in laying "the foundations of the world," there was -exercised some interposition and some formative will, you have a power -which was just as adequate to the production of species, and their -sexual division, as it was to the endowment of matter with certain -properties and capacities, and the establishment of any laws for the -redistribution of matter and motion. If you deny the existence and -potency of the original power in the one production you must deny them -in the other. If you concede them in the one case, you must concede -them in the other. Now, although the original power was equal to the -endowment of organizable matter with its capacities for and tendencies -to organization, and may be theoretically assumed to have made that -endowment, the question is, whether these capacities and tendencies, -without special formative interposition, and by the mere force of what -you call natural causes, were equal to the production of such phenomena -as the division of the sexes and all that follows that division. Can -it with any truth he said that the so-called natural causes have -produced any phenomena which can be compared, on the question of -special design, to the phenomena of the sexual division, the law of -sexual procreation, and the whole system of the multiplication of -individuals of distinct and true species? When I can see any facts -which will warrant the belief that the origin of the sexes is to be -attributed to the capacity of organizable protein to form itself into -new compounds, to the capacity of these new compounds to become living -organisms, and to the capacity of these living organisms, without the -intervention of any formative will specially designing the result, to -divide themselves into related forms of male and female, to establish -for themselves the law of procreation, and to limit that procreation -to the same species, I shall, perhaps, begin to see some ground for -the superior claims of the evolution hypothesis. I should like, -by-the-by, to see a system of classification of animal organisms, based -exclusively on the distinction between the bisexual and the unisexual, -or the non-sexual, methods of reproduction, and without running it out -into the analogies of the vegetable world. I fancy that it would be -found extremely difficult to account for the bisexual division without -reaching the conclusion that it required and was effected by a special -interposition. At all events, I should like to see it explained how the -asexual and the unisexual construction passed into the bisexual by the -mere operation of what you call natural causes. - -KOSMICOS. You said, a while ago, that you had never learned -any nursery-stories. Yet, all along, you seem to me to have been under -the influence of the Mosaic account of the creation. Of course you -have read it, and, although you did not learn anything about it in -childhood, and now try to treat it solely as a hypothesis, without any -regard to its claims as a divinely inspired narrative, it is certainly -worth your while to see how completely it becomes an idle tale of the -nursery when scientific tests are applied to it. Hear what Spencer says -about the creation of man, as given by Moses: "The old Hebrew idea -that God takes clay and molds a new creature, as a potter might mold a -vessel, is probably too grossly anthropomorphic to be accepted by any -modern defender of special creations." - -SOPHEREUS. Let us see about this. Let us discard all idea -of the source from which Moses received his information of the -occurrences which he relates, and put his account upon the same level -with Plato's description of the origin of animals, and with the -Darwinian or Spencerian theory of that origin; regarding all three -of them, that is to say, as mere hypotheses. Whatever may be the -supposed conflict between the Mosaic account of the creation and the -conclusions of geologists concerning the periods during which the -earth may have become formed as we now find it, the question is, on -the one hand, whether the Hebrew historian's account of the process -of creation is a conception substantially the same as that at which -we should have arrived from a study of Nature if we had never had -that account transmitted to us from a period when the traditions of -mankind were taking the shapes in which they have reached us from -different sources; or whether, on the other hand, it is so "grossly -anthropomorphic" and absurd that it is not worthy of any consideration -as an occurrence that it will bear the slightest test of scientific -scrutiny. Let any one take the Mosaic narrative, and, divesting himself -of all influence of supposed inspiration or divine authority speaking -through the chosen servant of God, and disregarding the meaning of -those obscure statements which divide the stages of the work into -the first and the second "day," etc., let him follow out the order -in which the Creator is said by Moses to have acted. He will find in -the narrative an immense condensation, highly figurative expressions, -and many elliptical passages. But he will also find that the Creator -is described as proceeding in the exertion of his omnipotent power -in a manner which we should be very likely to deduce from a study of -his works without this narrative. We have, first, the reduction of -the earth from its chaotic condition--"without form and void"--to the -separation of its elemental substances; then the creation of light; -the separation of earth and water; the productive capacity of the -dry land; the establishment of the vegetable kingdom, each product -"after its kind"; the formation of the heavenly bodies as lights in -the firmament, to make the division of day and night, seasons and -years. It is obviously immaterial, so far as this order of the work is -concerned, down to the stage when the formation of the first animals -took place, in what length of time this first stage of the work was -accomplished; whether it was done by an Omnipotence that could speak -things into existence by a word, or whether the process was carried on -through periods of time of which we can have no measure, and by the -operation of infinitely slow-moving agencies selected and employed for -the accomplishment of a certain result. Confining our attention to the -first stage of the work as we find it described, we have the formation -of the earth, light, air, the heavenly bodies, alternations of day -and night, seasons and years, and the vegetable kingdom, before any -animal creation. We then come to the formation of animals which are to -inhabit this convenient abode, and which are described as taking place -in the following order: first the water animals, the fowls of the air, -and the beasts of the field, "each after its kind"; then, and finally, -the creation of man. Respecting his creation, we are told that it was -the purpose of the Almighty to make a being after a very different -"image" from that of any other creature on the earth; and whatever may -be the true interpretation of the language employed, whether man was -created literally "in our image, after our likeness," or according -to an image and a likeness of which his Creator had conceived, there -can be no doubt that what Moses described as the purpose of God was -to make a being differing absolutely from all the other animals by -a broad line of demarkation which is perfectly discoverable through -all the resemblances that obtain between him and all the other living -creatures. To this new being there was given, we are told, dominion -over all the other animals, and the fruits of the earth were assigned -to him for food; he was formed out of the dust of the earth, the breath -of life was breathed into his nostrils, and he became "a living soul." -Let us now see if this statement of the creation of man is so "grossly -anthropomorphic" as is supposed. You are aware that Buffon, who was -certainly no mean naturalist or philosopher, and who was uninfluenced -by the idea that the book of Genesis was an inspired production, -reached the conclusion that a study of nature renders the order of -man's creation as described by Moses a substantially true hypothesis. -"We are persuaded," said Buffon, "independently of the authority of -the sacred books, that man was created last, and that he only came to -wield the scepter of the earth when that earth was found worthy of -his sway."[112] You evolutionists will say that this may be very true -upon your hypothesis of his gradual development out of other animals, -through untold periods of time. But now let us see whether Moses was -so grossly unscientific, upon the supposition that God created man -as he describes. If man was created, or molded, by the Deity, he was -formed, in his physical structure, out of matter; and all matter may -be figuratively and even scientifically described as "the dust of the -earth," or as "clay," or by any other term that will give an idea of a -substance that was not spirit. If Moses had said that man's body was -formed out of the constituent elements of matter, or some of them, he -would have said nothing that a modern believer in special creations -need shrink from, for he would have stated an indisputable fact. He -stated in one form of expression the very same fact that a modern -scientist would have to state in another form, whatever might have been -the mode, or the power, or the time in or by which the constituent -elements were brought together and molded into the human body. So that -the derisive figure of God taking clay and molding it into the human -form, as a potter would mold a vessel, does not strike me as presenting -any proof that the account given by Moses is so destitute of scientific -accuracy, or as rendering his statements a ridiculous hypothesis. - -KOSMICOS. Well, then, it comes at last to this: that you -consider the substance of the Mosaic account of the creation, -independent of its authority as an inspired statement, to be entitled -to stand as a hypothesis against the explanations given to us by the -scientists of the great modern school of evolution, notwithstanding -those explanations are in one form or another now accepted by the most -advanced scientific thinkers and explorers? - -SOPHEREUS. I certainly do. But understand me explicitly. -As, after my study of the probable origin of the solar system, and -our discussion of that subject, I expressed my conclusion that the -phenomena called for and manifested the exercise of a formative will -by some acts of special creation, so now, in reference to the animal -kingdom, I have reached the same conclusion, for reasons which I have -endeavored to assign. I can see that the operation of the process which -you call evolution may have caused certain limited modifications in -the structure and habits of life of different animals; or rather, that -limited modifications of structure and habits of life have occurred, -and hence you deduce what you call the process of evolution. But -to me this entirely fails to account for, or to suggest a rational -explanation of, the distinct existence of species, their division into -male and female, and the establishment of the laws of procreation by -which individuals of a species are multiplied--a process which does not -admit of the production of individuals of an essentially different type -from the parents, and which, so far as we have any means of knowledge, -has never commenced in one species and ended in another, in any length -of time that can be imagined, or through any series of modifications. - -KOSMICOS. Let us postpone the farther discussion of the origin -of species to some future time, when I will endeavor to convince you -that both Darwin and Spencer have satisfactorily accounted for them. - -SOPHEREUS. Very well; I shall be glad to be enlightened. - - -THE SINGLE-CELL HYPOTHESIS. - - NOTE.--It will readily occur to the reader that Sophereus - might most pertinently have asked: Whence did the primal cell - originate? It is conceived of as the ultimate unit of organizable - matter; invisible to the naked eye, perhaps incapable of being - reached by the microscope, but consisting of an infinitesimally small - portion of matter, more or less organized in itself, and possessing a - capacity to unite with itself other minute particles of matter, and - so to form larger aggregates of molecules. The hypothesis is, that - this single cell has given origin to all animated organisms, and, - through an indefinite series of such organisms, to the human race. - The single cell, then, having this capacity and this extraordinary - destiny, was either the first and only one of its kind, or it was one - of many of the same kind. If we select any supposed point of time - in the far antecedent history of matter, the question may be asked - whether there existed at first but one such cell, or many. If there - were many of such cells, how came they to exist? If one only was - selected out of many, for this extraordinary destiny of giving origin - to all the animated organisms, who or what made the selection for - this transcendent office of the one cell? If there never was but one - such cell, how did it come to exist? As these questions are clearly - pertinent, the effort to answer them inevitably conducts us to the - idea of creation, or else to the conclusion that the numerous cells - and the selected one had no origin; that the selection was not made, - but was accidental; or that the one cell, if there never was but one, - was not a created thing. Human reason can not accept this conclusion. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [106] "Biology," i, p. 482. - - [107] "Biology," i, Appendix, pp. 483, 484. - - [108] "Biology," i, p. 408. - - [109] "Biology," i, pp. 409, 410. - - [110] "Biology," i, p. 482. - - [111] Now contained in "Biology," i, Appendix. - - [112] Quoted by M. Guizot in his "History of France," vol. vi, p. - 328. Guizot observes that Buffon was "absolutely unshackled by any - religious prejudice," and that he "involuntarily recurred to the - account given in Genesis." - - - - -CHAPTER X. - - "Species," "races," and "varieties"--Sexual division--Causation. - - -The two friendly disputants have again met. Sophereus begins their -further colloquy, in an effort to reach a common understanding of -certain terms, so that they may not be speaking of different things. - -SOPHEREUS. I have more than once referred to the fact that -Nature does not permit crosses between the true species of animals, -in breeding, and that we have no reason to suppose it ever did. This -is a very important fact to be considered in weighing the claims of -your theory of evolution. I have been looking into Darwin, and I find -it somewhat uncertain in what sense he uses the terms "species," -"races," and "varieties." In his "Descent of Man," he devotes a good -deal of space to the discussion of the various classifications made by -different naturalists under these respective terms; and there is no -small danger of confusion arising from the use of these terms unless -they are defined. The possibility of the process of evolution, as a -means of accounting for the existence of any known animal, depends -in some degree upon the animals among which, by sexual generation, -the supposed transition from one kind of animal to another kind has -taken place. Darwin speaks of the difficulty of defining "species"; -and yet it is obvious (is it not?) that the theory of the graduation -of different forms into one another depends for its possibility upon -the forms which have admitted of interbreeding. While, therefore, -the term "species" is in one sense arbitrary, as used by different -naturalists, and there is no definition of it common to them all, it is -still necessary to have a clear idea of the limits within which crosses -can take place in breeding, because there are such limits in nature. -Thus, in the case of man, as known to us in history and by observation, -there are different families, which are classed as "races." Darwin -speaks of the weighty arguments which naturalists have, or may have, -for "raising the _races_ of man to the dignity of _species_." Whether -this would be anything more than a matter of scientific nomenclature, -is perhaps unnecessary to consider. Whether we call the "races" of men -"species," or speak of them as families of one race, we know as a fact -that interbreeding can take place among them all, and that between man -and any other animal it can not take place. The same thing is true of -the equine and the bovine races and their several varieties. Whether, -in speaking of the different families or races of men, we consider them -all as one "species," or as different species--and so of the varieties -of the equine or the bovine races--the important fact is, that there -are limits within which interbreeding can take place, and out of which -it can not take place. Do you admit or deny that the barriers against -sexual generation between animals of essentially different types, -which are established in nature, are important facts in judging of the -hypothesis of animal evolution? - -KOSMICOS. Take care that you have an accurate idea of what the -theory of evolution is. Apply it, for example, to the origin of man, -as an animal, proceeding "by a series of forms graduating insensibly -from some ape-like creature to man as he now exists." This expresses -the whole theory as applied to one animal, man, without going behind -his ape-like progenitors. It does not suppose a crossing between -the ape-like creature and some other creature that was not an ape. -It supposes a gradual development of the ape-like creature into the -man as he now exists; and, of course, the interbreeding took place -between the males and the females of that ape-like race and their -descendants--the descendants, through a long series of forms, being -gradually modified into men, by the operation of the laws of natural -and sexual selection, which I need not again explain to you. - -SOPHEREUS. Very well, I have always so understood the theory. -But then I have also understood it to be a part of the same theory that -there is important auxiliary proof of the supposed process of evolution -to be derived from what is known to take place in the interbreeding -of different races or families of the same animal. Whatever value -there may be in this last fact, as auxiliary evidence of the supposed -process of evolution, there must have been a time, in the development -of the long series of forms proceeding from the ape-like progenitor, -when an animal had been produced which could propagate nothing but -its own type, and between which and the surrounding other animals no -propagation could take place, if we are to judge by what all nature -teaches us. You may say that the laws of natural and sexual selection -would still go on operating among the numerous individuals of this -animal which had become in itself a completed product, and that to -their descendants would be transmitted newly acquired organs and -powers, new habits of life, and all else that natural and sexual -selection can be imagined to have brought about. But at some time, -somewhere in the series, you reach an animal of a distinct character, -in which natural and sexual selection have done all that they can -do; in which there can be no propagation of offspring but those of -a distinct and peculiar type, and the invincible barrier against a -sexual union with any other type becomes established. For this reason, -we must recognize the limits of possible interbreeding. It is best -for us, therefore, to come to some understanding of the sense in -which we shall use the term "species." For I shall press upon you -this consideration--that animals differ absolutely from each other; -that there can be no interbreeding between animals which so differ; -and yet that, without interbreeding between animals having distinct -organizations, natural and sexual selection had not the force necessary -to produce, in any length of time, such a being as man out of such a -being as the ape. - -KOSMICOS. I will let Darwin answer you, in a passage which -I will read. "Whether primeval man," he observes, "when he possessed -but few arts, and those of the rudest kind, and when his power of -language was extremely imperfect, would have deserved to be called -man, must depend on the definition which we employ. In a long series -of forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to man as -he now exists, it would be impossible to fix on any definite time when -the term 'man' ought to be used. But this is a matter of very little -importance." That is to say, in the long series of forms descending -from the ape-like creature, we can not fix on any one of the modified -descendants which we can pronounce to be separated from the family -of apes, and to have become the new family, man, because to do this -requires a definition of man. Man as he now exists we know, but the -primeval man we do not know. He may have been an animal capable of -sexual union with some of his kindred who stood nearest to him, but -yet remained apes, or he may not. It is not important what he was, or -whether we can find the time when he ceased to belong to the family -of apes and became the primeval man. The hypothesis of his descent -remains good, notwithstanding we can not find that time, because it is -supported by a great multitude of facts. - -SOPHEREUS. I have never seen any facts which I can regard -as giving direct support to the theory. But, waiving this want -of evidence, doubtless it is not important to find the time, -chronologically, when the modified descendants, supposed to have -proceeded from the ape-like creature, became the primeval man; but -it is of the utmost importance to have some satisfactory grounds for -believing that there ever was such an occurrence as the development of -the animal man, primeval or modern man, out of such an animal as the -ape. And therefore, without reference to the sense in which naturalists -use the term "species," I shall give you the sense in which I use it. -I use it to designate the animals which are distinct from each other, -as the man, the horse, the ape, and the dog are all distinct from each -other. Speaking of man as one true species, I include all the races -of men. Speaking of the apes as another species, I include all the -families of apes. Speaking of the bovine, the equine, or the canine -species, I include in each their respective varieties. Now, as crosses -in interbreeding can take place between the different varieties or -families of these several species, and can not take place between the -species themselves--between those which I thus class as species--the -limits of such crosses become important facts in considering the theory -of evolution, because they narrow the inquiry to the possibility of -effecting a propagation of one species out of another species. Take any -animal which has become a completed and final product--a peculiar and -distinct creature--whether made so by aboriginal creation or produced -by what you call evolution. The reproductive faculty of the males and -the females of this distinct and peculiar animal is limited to the -generative reproduction of individuals of the same type, by a sexual -union of two individuals of that type. Their progeny, in successive -generations, may be marked by adventitious and slowly acquired -peculiarities; but unless there can be found some instance or instances -in which the process of modification has resulted in an animal which -we must regard as an 'essentially new creature--a new species--what -becomes of the auxiliary evidence which is supposed to be derived -from the effects of interbreeding between those individuals which -can interbreed? I lose all hold upon the theory of evolution, unless -I can have some proof that natural and sexual selection have overcome -the barriers against a sexual union among animals which are divided -into males and females of the several species, each of which is placed -under a law of procreation and gestation peculiar to itself, and never -produces any type but its own. - -KOSMICOS. You wander from the principle of evolution. I -have to be perpetually restating it. Observe, then, that there are -multitudes of facts which warrant the belief that, starting with -any one kind of animal organism, however peculiar and distinct, the -struggle for existence among the enormous number of individuals of -that animal becomes most intense, and a furious battle is constantly -going on. The best-appointed males, in the fierceness of the strife -for possession of the females, develop new organs and powers, or their -original organs and powers are greatly enhanced. Their descendants -share in these modifications; and the modifications go on in a -geometrical ratio of increase through millions of years, until at -some time there is developed an animal which differs absolutely from -its remote progenitors which were away back in the remote past, and -which began the struggle for individual life and the continuation -of their species or their race in a condition of things which left -the fittest survivors the sole or nearly the sole propagators of new -individuals. This struggle for existence may have begun--probably -it did begin--before the separation of the sexes, when the organism -was unisexual or even asexual. That is to say, there may have been, -and there probably was, an organism which multiplied with enormous -rapidity, without the bisexual method of reproduction. The vast -multitude of such individuals would lead to the destruction of the -weakest; the strong survivors would continue to give rise to other -individuals, modified from the original type, until at length, by -force of this perpetual exertion and struggle and the survival of the -fittest, modifications of the method of reproduction would ensue, and -the bisexual division would be developed and perpetuated. - -SOPHEREUS. I confess I did not expect to hear you go quite so -far. I will yield all the potency to natural and sexual selection that -can be fairly claimed for them as modifying agencies operating after -the sexual division has come about; but I have, I repeat, seen no facts -which justify the hypothesis that they have led to distinct organisms -between which no propagation can take place. But now you expect me to -accept the startling conclusion that at some time the asexual or the -unisexual method of reproduction passed into the bisexual, without -any formative will or design of a creating power, and without any -act of direct creation. We know what Plato imagined as the origin -of the sexual division, and that he could not get along without the -intervention of the gods. What modern naturalist has done any better? I -have examined Darwin's works pretty diligently, and I can not get from -them any solution of the origin of the bisexual division. I am left to -reason upon it as I best can. We know, then, that in the higher animal -organisms the individuals of each species are divided into the related -forms of male and female, and that for each species there exists the -one invariable method of the sexual union, and a law of gestation -peculiar to itself. One hypothesis is that this system was produced by -the operation of natural causes, like those which are supposed to have -differentiated the various kinds of organisms; the other hypothesis is -that it was introduced with special design, by an act of some creative -will. If we view the phenomena of the sexual division and the sexual -genesis in the highest animal in which they obtain, we find that -they lead to certain social results, which plainly indicate that in -this animal they exist for a great and comprehensive moral purpose, -which far transcends all that can be imagined as the moral purpose -for which they exist in the other animals. To a comparatively very -limited extent, certain social consequences flow from the law of sexual -division and genesis among the other animals. But there is no animal in -which the moral and social effects of this law are to be compared to -those which it produces in the human race. Not only does the same law -of multiplication obtain among the human race; not only does it lead to -love of the offspring far more durable and powerful than in the case -of any other animal; not only is it the origin of a society far more -complex, more lasting, and more varied in its conditions than any that -can be discovered in the associations of other animals which appear -to have some social habits and to form themselves into communities, -but in the human race alone, so far as we have any means of knowledge, -has the passion of sexual love become refined into a sentiment. You -may remember the passage in the "Paradise Lost" in which Raphael, in -his conversation with Adam, touches so finely the distinction between -sexual love in the human race and in all the other animals. The angel -reminds Adam that he shares with the brutes the physical enjoyment -which leads to propagation; and then tells him that there was implanted -in his nature a higher and different capacity of enjoyment in love. The -conclusion is:-- - - "... for this cause - Among the beasts no mate for thee was found." - -In the human being alone, even when there is not much else to -distinguish the savage from the beasts around him, the passion of -love is often something more nearly akin to what might be looked for -in an elevated nature, than it can be among the brutes. What do the -poetry and romance of the ruder nations show, but that this passion of -sexual love in the human being is one in which physical appetite and -sentimental feeling are so "well commingled" that their union marks the -compound nature of an animal and a spiritual being? How human society -has resulted from this passion, how in the great aggregate of its -forces it moves the world, how in its highest development it gives rise -to the social virtues, and in its baser manifestations leads to vice, -misery, and degradation, I do not need to remind you. How, then, is it -possible to avoid the conclusion that in man the sexual passion was -implanted by special design and for a special purpose, which extends -far beyond the immediate end of a continuation of the race? - -KOSMICOS. Why do you resort to a special purpose in the -constitution of one animal, and to the absence of a similar purpose -from the constitution of another animal? In both, the consequences make -a case of the _post hoc_ just as plainly as they make a case of the -_propter hoc_. It is just as rational to conclude that they only show -the former as it is to conclude that they establish the latter. In man, -we have the physical fact of the sexual division, and all you can say -is that it is followed by certain great and varied moral phenomena. In -the other animals, we have the same physical fact, followed by moral -phenomena less complex and varied, and not so lasting. In neither case -can you say that there was a special and separate design, according -to which the same physical fact was intended to produce the special -consequences which we observe in each. Why, as the species called man -became developed into beings of a higher order than the primates of -the race or than their remote progenitors, should not this passion of -sexual love have become elevated into a sentiment and been followed by -the effects of that elevation, just as the gratification of another -appetite, that for food, _par exemple_, has been refined by the -intellectual pleasures of the social banquet and the interchange of -social courtesies? Is there anything to be proved by the institution -or the practice of marriage, beyond this--that it has been found by -experience to be of great social utility, and is therefore regulated -by human laws and customs, which vary in the different races of -mankind? Monogamy is the rule among some nations, polygamy is at least -allowed in others. You can predicate nothing of either excepting that -each society deems its own practice to be upon the whole the most -advantageous. You can not say that there is any fixed law of nature -which renders it unnatural for one man to have more than one wife. -In many ages of the world there have been states of society in which -the family has had as good a foundation in polygamous as it has had -in monogamous unions. Looking, then, at these undeniable facts, and -also at the fact that marriage, whether monogamous or polygamous, is -an institution regulated by human law and custom, we have to inquire -for the reason why human law and custom take any cognizance of the -relation. We find that, among some of the other animals, the sexes -do not pair excepting for a single birth. The connection lasts no -longer than for a certain period during which the protection of both -parents is needed by the offspring, and not always so long even as -that. It has become the experience of mankind that the connection -of the parents ought to be formed for more than one birth; shall be -of indefinite duration; and this because of the physical and social -benefits which flow from such a permanency of the union. This has given -rise to certain moral feelings concerning the relation of husband and -wife. But we have no more warrant, from anything that we can discover -in nature, for regarding the permanency of marriage among the human -race as a divine institution than we have for regarding its temporary -continuance among the other animals as a divinely appointed temporary -arrangement. In the one case, the permanency of the union has resulted -from experience of its utility. In the other case, the animal perceives -no such utility, and therefore does not follow the practice. Upon the -hypothesis that all the animals, man included, had a common origin, -it is very easy to account for the difference which prevails between -man and the other animals in this matter of marriage, or the pairing -of the sexes. As man became by insensible gradations evolved out of -some pre-existing organism, and as moral sentiments became evolved -out of his superior and more complex relations with his fellows, from -his experience of the practical utility of certain kinds of conduct -and practice, the sentiments became insensibly interwoven with his -feelings about the most important of his social relations, the union -of the sexes in marriage. This is quite sufficient to account for the -difference between man and the other animals in regard to the duration -of such unions, without resorting to any intentional or divine or -superhuman origin of that difference. - -SOPHEREUS. For the purpose of the argument, I concede that -this is a case of either the _post hoc_ or the _propter hoc_. I have -been pretty careful, however, in all my investigations, not to lose -sight of this distinction in reasoning on the phenomena of nature or -those of society. I think I can perceive when there is a connection -between cause and effect, when that connection evinces an intelligent -design, and when the phenomena bear no relation to a certain fact -beyond that of sequence in time. What, then, have we to begin with? -We have the fact that the human race is divided into the two forms of -male and female, and that the passion or appetite of sexual love exists -in both sexes, and that its gratification is the immediate cause of -a production of other individuals of the same species. We next have -the fact that this union of the sexes is followed by an extraordinary -amount of moral and social phenomena that are peculiar to the human -race. This sequence proves to me an intentional design that the moral -and social phenomena shall flow from the occurrence of the sexual -union, for it establishes not only a possibility, but an immensely -strong probability, that the phenomena were designed to flow from -this one occurrence among this particular species of animal. If this -connection between the original physiological fact and the moral and -social phenomena be established to our reasonable satisfaction, it is -the highest kind of moral evidence of a special design in the existence -of the sexual division and the sexual passion among the human race. -You remember old Sir Thomas Browne's suggestion, that men might have -been propagated as trees are. But they are not so propagated. If they -were, no such consequences would have followed as those which do follow -from the mode in which they are in fact propagated. These consequences -are most numerous and complex, and they are capable of being assigned -to nothing but the sexual division and the sexual union as the means -of continuing the race. Turn now to some of the other animals among -whom there prevail the same bisexual division and the same method of -procreation and multiplication. You find they result in sexual unions -of very short duration, and that, if it is followed by phenomena that -in some feeble degree resemble those which are found in human society, -they bear no comparison in point of complexity and character to those -which in the human race mark the family, the tribe, and the nation. -And here there occurs something which is closely analogous to what -I pointed out to you in considering the supposed development of the -first animal organism. I said that although you may theoretically -suppose that the first animal organism was formed by the spontaneous -union of molecular aggregates, and that the higher organisms were -evolved out of the lower solely by the operation of causes which you -call "natural," yet that when you come to account for the existence of -true and distinct species, each with its sexual division and its law -of procreation and gestation, you must infer a special design and a -formative will, because there has never been suggested any method by -which the so-called natural causes could have produced this division -of the sexes and this invariable law of the sexual procreation among -individuals of the same species. Here, then, we arrive at a distinct -moral purpose; for, when we compare the different social phenomena -which follow the operation of the sexual division and procreation in -man with the social phenomena which follow in the case of the other -animals, we find a difference that is not simply one of degree, but -is one of kind. We find the origin of the family, the tribe, and the -nation: the source of the complex phenomena of human society. We may -therefore rationally conclude that in man the sexual division and -the sexual passion were designed to have effects that they were not -designed to have in the other animals. To suppose that these vastly -superior consequences in the case of man are the mere results of his -perception of their utility will not account for the fact that when -he does not recognize the utility--when he departs from the law of -his human existence--human society can not be formed and continued. -Although it is possible for human society to exist with polygamous -marriages, and even to have some strength and duration, yet human -society without the family, with promiscuous sexual intercourse, with -no marriages and no ties between parents and children, never has -existed or can exist. Compare Plato's curious constitution of the body -of "guardians," in his "Republic," and the strange method of unions, -the offspring of which were not allowed to know their parents or the -parents to know their own children. This was not imagined as a form -of human society, but was entirely like a breeding-stud. Among the -brutes, permanent marriages, families, do not exist, not because the -animals do not perceive their social utility, but because the purposes -of their lives, their manifest destinies, show that there was no reason -for endowing them with any higher capacity for the sexual enjoyment -than that which leads to the very limited consequences for which the -division of the sexes was in their cases ordained. But in the case of -man there is a further and higher capacity for the sexual enjoyment, -which becomes the root of his social happiness, and which distinguishes -him from the brute creation quite as palpably as the superiority of his -intellectual faculties. In all this we must recognize a moral purpose. - -KOSMICOS. Pray tell me why it is not just as rational to -conclude that these moral phenomena, as results of the human passion -of love, have become, in all their complex and diversified aspects, -the consequences of a progressive elevation of the human animal to a -higher plane of existence than that occupied by the inferior species, -or than that occupied by the primeval man. When man had become -developed into an animal in whom the intellect could become what it -is, he could begin to perceive the social utility of certain modes -of life, and from this idea of their utility would result certain -maxims of conduct which would be acted on as moral obligations. Thus, -commencing with a consciousness that the race exists with the sexual -division into male and female, there would begin to be formed some -ideas of the superior social utility of a regulated sexual union of -individuals and of permanent marriages. These ideas would become -refined as the progressive elevation of the race went on, and that -which we recognize as the sentimental element in the passion of love -would become developed out of the perceptions of a superior utility -in the permanent devotion and consecration of two individuals to -each other. If, then, by a moral purpose in the establishment of the -bisexual division you mean that all these social phenomena of the -family, the tribe, and the nation were designed in the human race to -follow from that division, I see no necessity for resorting to any such -moral purpose on the part of a creator, because they might just as -well have followed from the progressive elevation and development of -the human animal, supposing him to be descended from some pre-existing -type of animal of another and inferior organization. The philosophy -which you seem to be cultivating closely resembles that which ascribes -everything to the action of mind as its cause. This, you must be aware, -it is the tendency of modern science to antagonize by a different -view of causation. What have you been reading, that you adhere so -pertinaciously to the idea of a moral purpose adopted by some being, -overlooking those physical causes which may have produced all the -results without that hypothesis? - -SOPHEREUS. I have been reading a good deal, but I have -reflected more. I may not be able to reconcile the metaphysical -speculations of the different schools of philosophy by explanations -that will satisfy others, but I can satisfy myself on one point. This -is, that power, force, energy, causation, are all attributes of mind, -and can exist in a mind only. Let us pass for a moment from abstract -reasoning to an illustration drawn from familiar objects. A ton of coal -contains a certain amount of what is scientifically called energy. -This energy becomes developed by combustion, which liberates heat. The -heat, when applied to water, converts the water into a vapor called -steam--a highly elastic substance. The expansion of the steam against a -mechanical instrument called a piston produces motion, and an engine is -driven. The force thus obtained represents the energy that was latent -in the coal. If we inquire whence the coal obtained this latent energy, -there is a hypothesis which assigns its origin to the sun, which laid -up a certain quantity of it in the vegetable substances that became -converted into coal in one of the geological periods of the earth's -formation. But in order to find the ultimate and original cause--the -_causa causans_ of the whole process--we must go behind the steam and -its expansive quality, behind the heat which converts the water into -steam, behind the coal and its combustible quality, and behind the sun -and its indwelling heat, a portion of which was imparted to and left -latent in the vegetable substances that became coal. We must inquire -whence they all originated. If they did not create themselves--an -inconceivable and inadmissible hypothesis--they must have originated -in some creating power, which commanded them to exist and established -their connections. Without a mental energy and its exertions, matter -and all its properties, substance and all its qualities, the sun's -indwelling heat and its capacity to be stored up in vegetable fiber -in a latent condition, could not have existed, and the forces of -nature of which we avail ourselves would never have emerged from the -non-existent state that we conceive of as "chaos." I know very well -that we are accustomed to associate with inanimate matter the ideas of -power, force, energy, and causation. But if we rest in the conception -of these as acting of themselves, and without being under the control -of an originating mind or a determining will, we may think that we -have arrived at ultimate causes, but we have not. We have arrived at -subsidiary causes--the instruments, so to speak, in the control of an -intellect which has ordained and uses them. Whether we look at the -physical causes by which the early Greek philosophers endeavored to -explain the phenomena of the universe, or at one of Plato's conceptions -of a designing and volitional agency in the formation of the Kosmos, -or to another of his conceptions, the sovereignty of universal ideas -or metaphysical abstractions, we are everywhere confronted with the -necessity for assigning an origin to the physical causes, or to -the universal ideas; and the result is that the idea of a supreme, -designing, and volitional agency is forced upon us--it is upon me--by -an irresistible process of reasoning, an invincible necessity of my -mental constitution. I can not agree with Auguste Comte, who regards -it as the natural progress of the human mind to explain phenomena at -first by reference to some personal agency, and to pass from this -mode of explanation to that by metaphysical abstractions. Nor can I -agree with you scientists, who not only rest satisfied yourselves with -the explanation of the ultimate cause of phenomena by mere physical -agencies, but who insist that others shall not deduce a personal and -volitional agency from the existence of those physical agencies. To me -it seems indispensable, in the study of phenomena, to recognize moral -purposes for which they have been made to be what they are: and of -course a moral purpose is not assignable to the physical agencies of -matter, or to metaphysical abstractions. Hence it is that in reasoning -on the phenomena of human society, I am obliged to recognize a moral -purpose in the sexual division, of far greater scope and far more -varied consequences than can be found in the case of the same division -among the other animals. - -KOSMICOS. I put to you this question: What do you mean by a -moral purpose? In teleology, or the science of the final causes of -things, you must find out the producing agencies. Let me give you a -theory of causation, which will show you that your notion of a moral -purpose is altogether out of place. The only true causes are phenomenal -ones, or what is certified by experience. There are uniform and -unconditional antecedents, and uniform and unconditional sequences. -Something goes before, uniformly and invariably; something uniformly -and invariably follows. The first are causes; the last are effects. -We can not go farther back than the antecedent cause; we can not go -farther forward than the effect. We can not connect the effect with -anything but the antecedent cause. When, therefore, you speak of a -moral purpose, what do you mean? Where do you get the evidence of the -moral purpose? What is the purpose, and what is the evidence of it? - -SOPHEREUS. I answer you as I have before--that the agencies -which you call phenomenal causes could not have established themselves; -could not have originated their own uniformity; could not have made -the invariable connection between themselves and the effects. If we -discard the idea of a moral and sentient being, a mind originating -and ordaining the physical agencies, we have nothing left but those -agencies; and in this the human mind can not rest. It is not enough to -say that it ought to rest there. It does not, will not, and can not. -Science--what you call science--may rest there, but philosophy can not. -It is unphilosophical to speak of the Unknown Cause, or the Unknown -Power, underlying all manifestations, as something of which we can not -conceive and must not personify. The ultimate power which underlies -all phenomena necessarily implies a will, an intellectual origin, and -a mental energy. That it is something whose mental operations we can -not trace, is no argument against its personality, and no reason why we -should not conceive of it as a mental energy. - -KOSMICOS. You have more than once referred to the constitution -of the human mind as if it had been constructed with an irresistible -necessity to attribute everything to the action of a being, an -intelligence, and a will. You should rather say that _some minds_ have -trained themselves to this mode of reasoning, because they have first -received the idea of such a being as the final cause, as a matter of -dogmatic teaching, and they have tried to reason it out so as to attain -a conviction that what they have been taught is true. It is in this way -that they have found what they consider as evidence of a moral purpose. -But you have no warrant for the assumption that the human intellect -has been put together in such a way that it can not avoid reaching the -conclusion that all phenomena are to be imputed to the volition of a -mind as their producing cause. - -SOPHEREUS. In speaking of the human mind and its incapacity -to rest satisfied with what science can discover of immediate physical -agencies in the production of phenomena, I have not overlooked the -fact that the idea of a Creator has been dogmatically inculcated as -a matter of belief. But I form my conception of the construction of -the human mind from the operations of my own mind. I have not trained -myself into any mode of reasoning. I have somehow been so placed in -this world that, as I have frequently told you and as I am perfectly -conscious, I am uninfluenced by any early teaching, and can judge -for myself of the force of evidence. When I say, therefore, that -the human intellect is so constituted that it is obliged to regard -mind as the source of power, I exclude all teaching but the teaching -of experience. There can not be two courses of reasoning that are -alike correct. If you uncover a portion of the earth's surface, and -find there structures, implements, and various objects which you -are convinced that the forces of nature did not produce, you must -conclude that they were the productions of mind availing itself of the -capabilities of matter to be molded and arranged by the force of an -intelligent will. You do not see that mind, you do not see the work in -progress, but you are irresistibly led to the conclusion that there -was a mind which produced what you have found. You can not reason on -the phenomena at all, without having the conviction forced upon you -that the ultimate cause was an intelligent being. You can not explain -the phenomena without this conclusion. How, then, can you explain the -more various and extraordinary phenomena of nature without attributing -their production to mind? You have no more direct evidence that the -Pyramids of Egypt, or an obelisk which has lain buried in the earth -for thousands of years, were made by human hands, than you have for -believing that an animal organism, or the solar system, was planned -and executed by an intelligent being. In both cases, you have only -indirect evidence; but in both cases that evidence addresses itself to -your intellect upon the same principles of belief. In the case of the -pyramid or the obelisk, you refer the construction to mind, because you -see that mind alone could have been the real cause of its existence. -In the case of the animal organism, or the mechanism of the heavenly -bodies, you are obliged to reason in the same way. Hence I say that -our minds are so constituted that there is but one method of correct -reasoning, whether the phenomena are those which can be attributed only -to human intellect, or are those which must be attributed to superhuman -power and intelligence. Hence, too, I speak of a moral purpose as -indicated by the phenomena. The pyramid and the obelisk were built -with a moral purpose. The animal organism and all that follows from -it, the structure of the solar system and all that follows from it, -were made to be what they are with a moral purpose. When you ask me for -the evidence of this purpose, I point to the fact that the phenomenal -causes, as you denominate the mere physical agencies employed in the -production of certain objects, were incapable of any volitional action, -and that without volition the connection between the physical agencies -and their effects could not have been established. The stone and the -chisel were the immediate physical agencies which produced the obelisk. -But who selected the stone and wielded the chisel? And who designed the -moral uses of the obelisk? Procreation, by the sexual union, is the -immediate physical cause of the existence of an individual animal. But -who designed its structure, appointed for it a law of its being, and -established the physical agencies which brought the individual into -existence and the moral consequences that those agencies produce? - -KOSMICOS. We are no nearer to an agreement than we have been -in our former discussions. And the reason is that you do not perceive -the mission and the method of science. Science undertakes to discover -those causes of phenomena which can be verified by experience; so that -we can truly say that our knowledge has been advanced, and that we -really do know something of the things which we talk about. This is the -domain of science. Its conclusions do not extend into the region of -that which is unknown and unknowable. Inasmuch as its conclusions are -strictly positive, because they are demonstrated by experience, they -negative, as matter of knowledge, anything beyond. You may speculate -about what lies beyond, but you have no reason for saying that you know -anything about it; whereas men who reason as you do, and yet who do -not accept dogmas simply as matters of faith, are constantly trying to -persuade themselves that they know something about that of which they -have no means of knowledge. If you accept that something as a matter of -faith, because you are satisfied with the evidence which establishes, -or is supposed to establish, a divine revelation, you have a ground for -belief with which science does not undertake to interfere. But you have -no ground for maintaining that, from the phenomena of nature alone, you -can derive any knowledge beyond that which you can demonstrate as a -scientific fact. - -SOPHEREUS. I accept your definition of the aims and methods -of science. But what I find fault with is the assumption that we are -not entitled to say that we know or believe a thing which can not be -demonstrated as a scientific fact, when we are all the time grounding -such knowledge or belief upon reasoning that convinces us of the truth -and reality of other things which in like manner are not demonstrable -as scientific facts. You may say that this is not the knowledge -which we derive from scientific facts, and therefore it is not to be -dignified by the name of knowledge. But we are always acting and must -act upon proofs which are not scientific demonstrations; and whether we -call this knowledge, or call it belief, we govern our lives according -to it. We accept the proof that a buried city was the habitation and -work of intelligent human beings, because we know that the forces of -nature, not guided and applied by intelligent wills, never constructed -a city. We accept the proof that men are just, merciful, courageous, -truthful, or the reverse of all this, because their actions prove it, -although we can not look into their hearts. What does all the estimate -of the characters of men rest upon, but upon their actions? And is not -this entitled to be ranked as knowledge of the characters of individual -men? - -KOSMICOS. We must each retain his conclusions. Let our next -discussion relate to the origin of the human mind, and then we shall -see whether you will be able to resist the origin which evolution -assigns to it. - -SOPHEREUS. I shall be glad to meet you again. - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - - Origin of the human mind--Mr. Spencer's theory of the composition of - mind--His system of morality. - - -According to their appointment, our two disputants have met to discuss -the origin of mind. - -SOPHEREUS. Will you begin this conference by stating the -evolution theory of the origin of the human mind? - -KOSMICOS. Most willingly. I have thus far spoken of the -hypothesis of evolution as affording an explanation of the origin of -distinct animals, regarded simply as living organisms, differentiated -from each other by the slow process of development from a common stock, -by the operation of certain physical causes. I am now to account to you -for the origin of the human mind, upon the same hypothesis, namely, -that man is a development from some previous and lower organism. I -acknowledge that what we call mind, or intellect, has to be accounted -for; and that we who hold the evolution theory of the origin of man as -an animal must be able to suggest how his intellect became developed by -the operation of the same natural causes which produced his physical -organization. It is not material, in this inquiry, whether we agree -with Darwin in assuming some one distinct living organism of a very -low type, as the original stock from which all the other animal -organisms have been derived, or whether we go with Spencer back to -the primal molecules of organizable matter, and suppose that from a -single cell have been developed all the organisms possessing life, in -a regular order of succession. Upon either supposition, the doctrine -of evolution explains the origin of the human mind. For, upon either -supposition, there was a point in the long series of new forms, each -descending from a pre-existing form, at which the manifestations of -what we call mind may be said to have begun. This link in the connected -chain of organisms occurred where nervous organization began to act -with some spontaneous movement, with some power of voluntary exertion, -as distinguished from the involuntary exertions of a substance that -acted only in a certain and fixed way, although that substance was -endowed with life. The substance of nervous organization is alike -in all animals. In some it acts in a limited manner, and without -volitional control; in others, it acts in more varied modes, and it -manifests some power of volitional control and volitional rest, as -well as of involuntary movement. But in all animals the substance of -which nervous organization is composed--the substance which acts in -producing movement, whether voluntary or involuntary--is the same kind -of physical structure. In the higher animals, the great nerve-center -is the organ called the brain. To this organ proceed the impressions -produced upon one set of nerves by external objects, or by light or -heat. From the same organ proceed, by another set of nerves, those -movements which the animal is endowed with the power of making from -within. Contemplating, then, the whole animal kingdom as one great -connected family, but divided into different species, all of which have -a nervous organization, we find that each species is endowed with the -power of generating other individuals of the same species and of the -same nervous organization. In the long course of development of the -several species, or forms of animal life, there comes about a nervous -organization which acts freely within certain limits, but in a fixed -and invariable mode, so that the movements are uniformly the same, -and not in any proper sense volitional. To such an animal we should -not attribute any mind, for mind implies some power of comparison and -variation, some ability to act in more than a prescribed way. This -animal, which I have just supposed to possess a very limited power of -nervous action, transmits that power to its descendants; and in some of -the successive generations the power remains always at the same fixed -point. But the laws of natural and sexual selection are perpetually -operating among those descendants. In progress of time there comes -to be developed another organism, which has a wider range of nervous -action; and, as this ceaseless process of modification and improvement -goes on, there is developed still another nervous organization which -acts with still more varied movements. As the different species -of animals become evolved out of those that have gone before, the -expansion of nervous organization goes on; and as each new and higher -and more complex stage is gained, individuals of the species have the -power to transmit it to their descendants by ordinary generation. -At length, as in some of the mammalia, a nervous organization is -attained, whose action exhibits manifestations of what we call mind. -There appears to be a power of something like reasoning and volition, -because the nervous actions are so various and so much adapted to -outward circumstances. Thus, before we reach the human animal, we -find nervous organizations widely separated from those of the remote -progenitor species, because they can do so much more, and can do it -with an apparent power of voluntary variation. At last, this process of -modifications accumulating upon modifications culminates in an animal -in whose nervous organization we find the freest, the most complex, -and the most various power of receiving into his brain the impressions -derived from the external world, and of transmitting from his brain to -the different organs of his body those movements which the external -circumstances of his life, or his internal efforts, cause him to strive -for and to effect. This animal was the primeval man.[113] - -Looking back, then, to the primal source of all nervous organization, -in the remote animal in which the nervous structure and action were -at the crudest state of development, and remembering that there was -a power of transmitting it to offspring, and that natural and sexual -selection were unceasingly operating to expand and perfect it, we may -trace the successive stages of its modification and growth, from the -lowest to the highest, until we reach in the primeval man the highest -development that it had yet attained. But throughout all its stages, -from the lowest to the highest, the system of nervous organization and -action is the same in kind. We do not call its manifestations or action -mind, or speak of them as indicating mind, until we find it developed -into a condition of some voluntary activity and power of variation, as -it is in many of the animals inferior to man. But in all the animals, -man included, mind is the action of the nervous organization when it -evinces a superior power of variation; and we speak of the brain of -such animals as the seat of mind because that organ is the source to -and from which nervous action proceeds. - -Let me now illustrate this view by the acquisition of articulate speech -and the formation of language. In many of the lower animals with -which we are acquainted there is a power of uttering vocal sounds, -and of understanding them when uttered by their fellows. It must have -been a power possessed by those animals which were the progenitors -of man in the long line of descent of one species from another. But -in them it was a very limited power. It increased as the nervous -organization and the vocal organs became in the successive species -capable of a more varied action. The sounds of the external world -impressed themselves upon the brains of the primeval men more forcibly -than they did upon the brains of the other animals, and excited the -nervous organization to reproduce or imitate them. Those emotions -and desires which originated in the brain itself--the impressions -of pain or the sensations of pleasure experienced in the nervous -system--sought expression through the vocal organs. Certain sounds -repeated alike by the same individual, or by numerous individuals, for -a long time, became associated in their brains with certain feelings -or sensations. What are called words were thus formed; which, at -first, could have been nothing but the utterance of certain sounds -by the vocal organs, expressing the sensations felt by the nervous -organization, or the imitations of external noises. At length these -vocal sounds are gathered in the memory, multiplied and systematized, -and a rude language is formed. But, all the while, the first crude -human language was nothing but the result of nervous action excited -to greater activity than in the other animals, accompanied by nicer -and more capable vocal organs and a greater power of using them. -This acquisition, obtained by the primeval men, was transmitted to -their descendants as an improved physical organization, and in those -descendants it finally reached the marvelous development of the most -perfect languages of antiquity. - -Let us now retrace our steps back to the time when nervous -organization, in the successive generations of the whole animal series -regarded as one great family of kindred animals successively developed -out of a common stock, began to act in such a way as to evince the -presence of what we call mind. Once attained, this improved nervous -organization would be transmitted by the parents to new individuals; -and so on through countless generations, just as the offspring would -inherit the same physical structure as the parents in other respects. - -Mental phenomena are the products of nervous organization. We have no -means of knowing that mind is an organism or an entity. If it is an -existence capable of surviving the death of the body, which evolution -neither affirms nor denies, you must go to revelation for the grounds -of belief in its immortality. There is no conflict between the -evolution theory of the nature of mind and the doctrine of immortality -as taught by revealed religion. - -SOPHEREUS. I am not disposed to constitute myself a champion -of revealed religion. I have lately read in the writings of some -well-meaning persons, whose positions and convictions made them anxious -about the truths of revelation, expressions of the opinion that there -is no necessary conflict between the hypothesis of a revelation and -the teachings of evolution. I have been rather surprised by such -concessions. But through all our discussions, and throughout all my -reflections and inquiries, I have excluded revealed religion from the -number of proofs of our immortality. But it seems to me that, as to -the possibility of a survival of the mind after the death of the body, -you have stated yourself out of court, not because you have propounded -something that is inconsistent with revelation, although it certainly -is, but because you have made mind to consist in nothing but the -action of nervous organization, and when that has perished what can -remain? You may say that science does not undertake to determine that -mind is or is not a special existence capable of surviving the body. -But, observe that you attribute to nervous action the production of -phenomena to which you give the name of mind, when the nervous action -evinces some power of volitional variation and control. Now, when and -where did this begin, in the long series of animal organisms which -you assume have been successively evolved out of one another? Remember -that, according to the system of evolution, there are supposed to -have been countless forms of animal organisms, graduating by slow -improvements into higher and higher organisms. Where and when and what -was the first animal that possessed a nervous organization which would -manifest the power of variation in so marked a degree as to render -it proper to speak of the animal as possessing or evincing mind? Are -not the works of naturalists of the evolution school filled with -comparisons of the minds of different animals, and do they not contend -that in many of them there are manifestations of mental power, of the -exercise of reason and comparison, and a volitional action according -to varying circumstances? Did, then, these manifestations of something -like mental power begin in the anthropomorphous ape from whom we are -supposed to be descended, or who is supposed to be of kin to us? Or did -it begin in any one and which of the innumerable intermediate forms -between that ape-like creature and the primeval man? And when once this -improved and improving nervous organization had been developed and -put into a condition to be transmitted to descendants, until in the -primeval man it had attained its highest development, what was it but -a more sensitive, more various, and complex condition of the substance -of which all nervous tissues are composed? And when these tissues are -decomposed and resolved into their original material elements, where -and what is the mind, whether of man or beast? It is nowhere and -nothing, unless you suppose that the improved and improving action -of the nervous organization at last developed an existence which is -not in itself material or physical, and which may be imperishable and -indestructible, while the material and physical organs by and through -which it acts for a time perish daily in our sight. If this is a -possible, it is a very improbable hypothesis, because the nature of the -human mind points to a very different origin. - -I surely do not need to tell you that like produces like. If the mind -of man is now a spiritual essence, it is a wild conjecture to suppose -that it was generated out of the action of a material substance, in -whatever animal, or supposed species of animal, its genesis is imagined -to have begun. We must therefore determine, from all the evidence -within our reach, whether the mind is a spiritual existence. If it is, -it is not difficult to reach a rational conclusion that its Creator -contrived a means of connecting it for a season with the bodily organs, -and made the generative production of each new individual body at the -same time give birth to a new individual mind, whenever a new child is -born into the world. We can not discover the nature of the connection, -or the process by which generative production of a new body becomes -also generative production of a new mind. These are mysteries that -are hidden from us. But the fact of the connection--the simultaneous -production of the new body and the new mind--is a fact that the birth -of every child demonstrates. Whether the union takes place at any -time before birth, or whether it is only at birth that the mind, the -spiritual essence, comes into existence, and so may become capable of -an endless life, we can not know. But that this occurs at some time in -the history of every human being, we are justified in saying that we -know. - -I shall now contrast your hypothesis of the origin of the human mind -with another and a very different one; and, in stating it, I shall -borrow nothing from the Mosaic account of the creation of Adam and -Eve. I shall not assert, on the authority of Moses, that God breathed -into Adam a living soul, for that would be to resort to a kind of -evidence which, for the present, I mean to avoid, and which would -bring into consideration the nature of the means by which the Hebrew -historian was informed of the fact which he relates, and which he could -have known in no other way. It would also give rise to a question -of what was meant by "a living soul." But I shall assume that there -is a spiritual and a material world; that a spiritual existence is -one thing and a material existence is another. I shall assume that -there is a spiritual world, because all our commonest experience, our -introspection and consciousness, our observation of what the human mind -can do, its operations and its productions, its capacity to originate -thought and to send it down the course of ages, its power to recognize -and obey a moral law as a divine command, the monuments of every kind -which attest that it is something which is not matter or material -substance, prove to us that the human mind is essentially a spiritual -existence; and that while it acts and must act by and through bodily -organs, so long as it acts in this world, it is a being quite distinct -from all the physical substance and physical organism with which it is -connected for a time. Physiology alone can teach us this much at least, -that mind is not matter; and experience, consciousness, and observation -teach us that while the action of the mind may be suspended for a -time when the nervous organization can not normally act, from disease -or injury, the mind itself is not destroyed, but its action may be -restored with the restoration of the brain to its normal condition. - -I am going to assume another thing--the existence of the Creator, the -Supreme Governor of the universe, having under his control the whole -realms of the spiritual and the material world; alike capable of giving -existence to spiritual entities and to material organisms, and capable -of uniting them by any connection and for any purpose that might seem -to him good. I shall assume this, because some of you evolutionists -concede, if I understand rightly, the existence and capacities of the -Supreme Being, since you assume, and rightly, that the whole question -relates to his methods; and you believe that he chose the method of -evolution instead of the method of special creation for all the types -of animal life excepting the aboriginal and created lowest form, out -of which all the others have been evolved. With these two assumptions, -then, the nature of a spiritual existence, and the existence and -capacities of the Creator, I now state to you the opposite hypothesis -of the origin and nature of the human mind. - -A pair of human beings, male and female, is created by the hand and -will of the Almighty; and to each is given a physical organism, -and a spiritual, intellectual self, or mind, which is endowed -with consciousness and capable of thought. Why is this a rational -supposition, aside from any evidence of the fact derived from its -assertion by an inspired or a divinely instructed witness? It is so, -because, when this aboriginal pair of human creatures fulfill the law -of their being, by the procreation of other creatures of the same -kind, the offspring must be supposed to possess whatever the parents -possessed of peculiar and characteristic organization. This law of -transmission is stamped upon all the forms of organic life; and we -may well apply it to the first pair of human beings. Its operation -must have begun in them and their offspring. Every law that proceeded -from the will of the Supreme Being began to operate at some time; and -this law, like all others, must have been put in operation by the -Creator at some definite period. He created in the first pair a bodily -organization, and he created in each of them the spiritual entity that -we now call mind, and established its connection with their bodily -organs. He established in them also the power of procreating offspring; -and this included the production of a new individual of the same -species, in whom would be united, by the same mysterious bond, the -same kind of physical organization and the same kind of spiritual or -intellectual existence, which is not matter, and could not have been -generated out of matter alone. The beginning of this connection of body -and mind in the first parents was an occasional and special exercise of -the divine power. It was not a miraculous exercise of power, because -a miracle, in the proper sense, implies some action aside from a -previously established course of things. It was simply a first exercise -of the power in the case of the creation of the first human pair; -that is, it was the establishment in them, specially, of the union of -the body and soul. Its repetition in the offspring, for all time, and -through successive generations, was left to the operation of the laws -of procreation and heredity. The nature and operation of those laws are -wrapped in mystery; but about the fact of their existence, and of the -compound procreation of a new body and a new mind at every new birth, -there can be no doubt whatever. - -It seems to me that this hypothesis has in its favor a vast -preponderance of probability, because-- - -1. The generation of mind or spirit out of matter is inconceivable. - -2. The creation of mind by the Almighty is just as conceivable as his -creation of a material organism; and the latter is conceded by all -naturalists who admit that there was a first animal organism; and -even some of the evolutionists hold that the first animal organism -was directly fashioned by the Creator, although all the succeeding -organisms were formed, as they contend, by natural and sexual selection. - -3. The nature of mind--of the human mind--is the same in all -individuals of the race. They may differ in mental power, but they -all possess an intellectual principle that is the same in kind. To -the production of mind, or its formation, the process of evolution -was not necessary. Not only was it unnecessary, but in the nature of -things it was not adapted to do what it is supposed to have done in -the production of physical organisms. To suppose that the Creator, -instead of the direct exercise of his power of creation, left it to the -material laws of natural and sexual selection to produce a mind, is -to suppose him to have resorted to a method that was both unnecessary -and indirect, and was furthermore incapable of effecting that kind of -product. In reasoning about the methods of the Creator, it is certainly -irrational to suppose him to have resorted to one that was so ill -adapted to the accomplishment of his object. In the accomplishment -of some physical objects, we may well suppose that they have been -brought about by physical agencies that have operated very slowly -and indirectly; and we can see that this has often been the case in -regard to many material products. But for the production of mind, for -the accomplishment of a spiritual existence, there can be imagined no -secondary agencies, no gradual growth out of antecedent existences or -substances, no evolution out of some other and that other a material -organism. The first mind, the first human soul, must have come direct -from the hand and will of God. The succeeding minds may well have been -left to owe their existence to the laws of procreation, by a process -which we can not understand, but of which we have proof in the birth of -every child that has been born of woman. - -KOSMICOS. We now have the two hypotheses of the origin and -nature of the human mind fairly before us; and here I must point out -to you wherein you do injustice to my side of the question. In the -first place, your assumption of one pair of progenitors of the human -race from whom have diverged all the varieties of the race, does not -encounter the evolution process of man's descent as an animal. It -is either an arbitrary assumption, or it is derived from the Mosaic -account of the creation, which, in a scientific point of view, and -aside from the supposed authority of that story, is just as arbitrary -an assumption as if the book of Genesis had never existed. Take, -therefore, Darwin's hypothesis of the zoölogical series: First, a -fish-like animal, of course inhabiting the water; next, the amphibians, -capable of living in the water and on the land; next, the ancient -marsupials; next, the quadrumana and all the higher mammals, among -whom are to be classed the _Simiadæ_ or monkeys; and out of these came -the hairy, tailed quadruped, arboreal in its habits, from which man is -descended. This long line of descent is filled with diversified forms, -intermediate between the several principal forms which are known to us, -and which were successively the progenitors of man. Now, hear Darwin on -the subject of one pair of progenitors: - -"But since he [man] attained to the rank of manhood he has diverged -into distinct races, or, as they may be more fitly called, sub-species. -Some of these, such as the negro and European, are so distinct that, -if specimens had been brought to a naturalist without any further -information, they would undoubtedly have been considered by him as -good and true species. Nevertheless, all the races agree in so many -unimportant details of structure and in so many mental peculiarities, -that these can be accounted for only by inheritance from a common -progenitor; and a progenitor thus characterized would probably deserve -to rank as man. It must not be supposed that the divergence of each -race from the other races, and of all from a common stock, can be -traced back to any one pair of progenitors. On the contrary, at every -stage in the process of modification all the individuals which were in -any way better fitted for their conditions of life, though in different -degrees, would have survived in greater numbers than the less well -fitted. The process would have been like that followed by man, when he -does not intentionally select particular individuals, but breeds from -all the superior individuals and neglects the inferior. He thus slowly -but surely modifies his stock, and unconsciously forms a new strain. -So with respect to modifications acquired independently of selection, -and due to variations arising from the nature of the organism and the -action of the surrounding conditions, or from changed habits of life, -no single pair will have been modified much more than the other pairs -inhabiting the same country, for all will have been continually blended -through free intercrossing."[114] - -The meaning of this is that if you go back to the period when an -animal, by the slow process of modification which was continually -operating among the preceding organisms, had been raised to the -present state of man, and then follow out the divergencies into the -distinct races of men, those divergencies would not have occurred in -consequence of any one pair having been modified much more than the -other pairs inhabiting the same country, but all the individuals would -have undergone a continually blending process through unrestrained -intercrossing; and those individuals of both sexes, who became in -a superior degree fitted for their conditions of life, would have -survived in greater numbers than the less well fitted, and would have -transmitted to their posterity those peculiarities which tended at last -to produce different races of the human family. So that the notion of a -single pair of the negro variety, or of a single pair of the Caucasian -variety, formed and completed as an independent stock, is not necessary -to account for these varieties. - -To apply this, now, to the slow production of man's intellectual -faculties, we must, if we would do justice to Darwin's hypothesis of -the method in which he was developed as an animal, bear in mind that -his mental powers, like his animal structure, have been the necessary -acquirement of new powers and capacities by gradation, through the -perpetual process of modification, and retention and transmission of -the new acquisitions. Darwin, indeed, does not professedly undertake -the genealogy of the human mind; but he appears to hold the opinion -that in future psychology will be based on the gradual acquisition of -each mental power and capacity, as distinguished from their complete -production in any one pair, or in any one being; and he refers to -Herbert Spencer as having already securely laid the foundation for this -new psychology.[115] - -I take, therefore, the great English naturalist as the person who has -most satisfactorily explained the origin of man as an animal, and -the great English philosopher as the person who has propounded the -most satisfactory theory of the origin of the human mind. The two -hypotheses run parallel to and support each other. Man, as respects his -mere animal structure, is an organism developed by a slow process of -modification out of preceding organisms. His mental faculties have one -by one grown out of the operation of the same physical agencies that -have formed his animal structure, and they have not been bestowed at -once upon any one pair, or upon any one individual of the race. After -they have all been acquired, as we now know and recognize them, they -have descended to the successive generations of the race. - -SOPHEREUS. I have studied Mr. Spencer's "System of -Psychology," but I do not know whether we understand it alike. You -say that he has propounded the most satisfactory theory of the origin -of mind. Assuming that mind was evolved as an aggregate of powers and -capacities, slowly acquired, _pari passu_ with the evolution of the -animal organism, be good enough to tell me whether Mr. Spencer does -or does not conclude that mind is anything more than an aggregate of -powers and capacities of the nervous organization. I am quite aware -of the mode in which he meets the charge of materialism; but waiving -for the present the question of materialism, I should be glad to know, -according to your understanding of his philosophy, what he considers -mind to be. - -KOSMICOS. To answer your question requires an analysis of -Spencer's "Principles of Psychology." You have here on your table the -third edition of that work, which received his latest corrections and -additions.[116] If you look at the preface of this edition, you will -see that, as between Realism and Idealism, he enunciates a view which -recognizes an element of truth in each, but rejects the rest. By this -"Transfigured Realism" he aims to conciliate what is true in Realism -with what is true in Idealism; and it is by this conciliation that he -answers the partisans of both systems, who will not sacrifice any part -of their respective doctrines. It is important for you to remember this -in judging of his psychological system. He begins by a description -of the structure and functions of the nervous system, and the nature -of nervous actions. Without repeating in all its minute details the -structure which he describes, it is enough to say that in all animals, -from the lowest to the highest, this peculiar part of the organism -which we call the nervous system is composed of two tissues which -differ considerably from those composing the rest of the organism. -In color they are distinguished from one another as gray and white, -and in their minute structures as vesicular and fibrous. In the gray -tissue, the vesicles or corpuscles contain a soft protein substance, -with granules imbedded in it, consisting of fatty matter. The more -developed of these nerve-corpuscles give off branching processes, and -the terminations of nerve-fibers are distributed among them. The white -tissue is composed of minute tubes containing a medullary substance or -pulp, viscid like oil. Imbedded in this pulp, which fills the tubes, -there lies a delicate fiber or axis-cylinder, which is uniform and -continuous instead of having its continuity broken by fat-granules. -This central thread is the essential nerve; and the sheath of -medullary matter, and its surrounding membranous sheath, are only its -accessories. While, therefore, the matter of nerve-fiber has much in -common with the matter of nerve-vesicle, in the latter the protein -substance contains more water, is mingled with fat-granules, and forms -part of an unstable mass; whereas in the former, the nerve-tube, the -protein substance, is denser, is distinct from the fatty compounds that -surround it, and so presents an arrangement that is relatively stable. - -Conceive, then, of this interlaced physical structure extending -throughout the whole organism as a kind of circular mechanism, having -its periphery at the surface of the body and limbs, ramifying among -and into the internal organs, with various nerve-centers distributed -through the interior mechanism, and the one great nerve-center in the -brain. Conceive of this structure, further, as fed continually by the -blood-vessels, which repair its waste of tissue and keep it in proper -tone and activity. Then imagine it as first put in operation in some -animal in whom it has become developed as we now know it in ourselves, -and let that animal stand as the primeval man, who has become, by -inherited transmission of gradual accumulations, possessed of this -consummate development of nervous organization. You can then observe -the method of its action, and can perceive how mind became developed, -and what it is. - -What I have now given you is only a general description of the -structure of the nervous mechanism, and in order to understand its -functions, we may take it up, in an individual, at a point of time -when it had not experienced a single movement or change from a state -of rest, but when it was completely fitted to act. Observe, then, -that its action will consist in the origination and accomplishment -of motion; or, in other words, in molecular change of the substance -composing the nerves, which, for illustration only, may be likened to -the conductor through which the molecular disturbance passes which is -popularly, but not scientifically, called the electric fluid. At the -surface of the body and limbs, the external termini of the nerves are -exposed to disturbance by contact with an external object. Along the -highly sensitive and minute conductor, the nerve which has by contact -with an external object at its outer extremity received a slight shock, -there passes through the fluid or semi-fluid substance of the nerve a -wave of disturbance, or a succession of such waves. This disturbance -reaches the brain, the great nerve-center, where it becomes a feeling. -In this way is generated the feeling of contact with an external -object, and this is what is commonly called the sense of touch, which -is simply a feeling produced in the great nerve-center of the brain. -Now, to reverse the process, let us suppose that this feeling, caused -by touching an external object, provokes or excites a desire to remove -that object, or to get rid of the continuance of the feeling, and -to be without the irritation or pain which it is causing. From the -central seat of nervous action, the brain, along another nerve, there -proceeds a wave, or a series of waves, in the fluid or semi-fluid -substance of which the conductor of that nerve is composed, and motion -is communicated to some muscle or set of muscles, which need to be put -in motion in order to break the contact with the external object. In -like manner, all internal organs of the body, the viscera, are supplied -with a system of nerves connected with the great nerve-center. If a -disturbance arises in one of the viscera, some action that is abnormal, -a sensation that is called pain is produced. So, too, in regard to the -normal action of the viscera, kept up by involuntary movements--those -movements originate in and are transmitted from the nerve-center, by -waves in the fluid or semi-fluid substance of which the special nerves -are composed, whose office it is to cause the necessary movements in -the muscular substance, or the tissue, of the particular organ. - -In this way began, in the supposed individual, those simpler states of -feeling which pain or irritation produced in the nervous system, and -those other involuntary movements which were essential to the normal -and unconscious action of the viscera. These varying conditions of -the highly sensitive nervous system, which constitute and are rightly -denominated feelings, were constantly repeated; and, so far as they -are capable of becoming a part of consciousness, that consciousness -is a repetition of the same nervous actions many times over. Pass, -then, from the feelings called sensations to the feelings called -emotions, and it will be found that while both are states of nervous -action, the former are peripherally initiated and the latter are -centrally initiated. The meaning of this is that a sensation is an -effect produced at the nerve-center by the transmission, from the -outer terminus of a particular nerve, of the waves in the fluid or -semi-fluid substance of the nerve. The strong forms of feeling called -sensations are peripherally initiated, and the feelings called emotions -are centrally initiated. Now, any feeling of any kind is directly known -by each person in no other place than his own consciousness; and the -question is, Of what is consciousness composed? In order to afford an -answer to this question, Mr. Spencer proceeds to examine the substance -of mind, and then passes to a consideration of the composition of -mind. These are not the same thing; for, if there be no such thing, -properly speaking, as the substance of mind, its composition, or its -nature, must be looked for in another way. The expression "substance -of mind," if used in any way but that in which we use the _x_ of an -algebraic equation, has no meaning. If we undertake to interpret mind -in the terms of matter, as crude materialism does, we are at once -brought to this result, that we know, and can know, nothing of the -ultimate substance of either. We know matter only as forms of certain -units; but the ultimate unit, of which the ultimate homogeneous units -are probably composed, must remain absolutely unknown. In like manner, -if mind consists of homogeneous units of feeling, the ultimate unit, -as a substance, must remain unknown. When, therefore, we think of the -substance of mind, the simplest form under which we can think of it -is nothing but a symbol of something that can never be rendered into -thought, just as the concept we form to ourselves of matter is but the -symbol of some form of power absolutely and forever unknown to us, as -the representation of all objective activities in terms of motion is -only a symbolic representation, and not a knowledge of them. Symbols of -unknown forms of existence, whether in the case of matter, motion, or -mind, are mere representations which do not determine anything about -the ultimate substance of either. "Our only course is constantly to -recognize our symbols as symbols only, and to rest content with that -duality of them which our constitution necessitates. The unknowable as -manifested to us within the limits of consciousness in the shape of -feeling, being no less inscrutable than the unknowable as manifested -beyond the limits of consciousness in other shapes, we approach no -nearer to understanding the last by rendering it into the first."[117] - -Discarding, then, the expression "substance of mind," excepting as -a mere symbol, Mr. Spencer passes to the "composition of mind"; and -here we reach his explanation of mind as an evolution traceable -through ascending stages of composition, conformably to the laws of -evolution in general, so that the composition of mind, as something -evolved out of simple elements, does not need or involve a symbolical -representation in the terms of matter. - -The method of composition, by which the whole fabric of mind is -constituted, from the formation of its simplest feelings up to the -formation of the complex aggregates of feelings which are its highest -developments, can now be sketched. A sensation is formed by the -consolidation of successive units of feeling; but the feelings called -sensations can not of themselves constitute mind, even when many of -different kinds are present together. When, however, each sensation, -as it occurs, is linked in association with the faint forms of -previous sensations of the same kind, mind is constituted; for, by the -consolidation of successive sensations, there is formed a knowledge -of the particular sensation as a distinct subject of what we call -thought, or the smallest separable portion of thought as distinguished -from mere confused sentiency. Thus, as the primitive units of feeling -are compounded into sensations, by the same method simple sensations, -and the relations among them, are compounded into states of definite -consciousness. The next highest stage of mental composition is a -repetition of the same process. Take a special object, which produces -in us a vivid cluster of related sensations. When these are united with -the faint forms of like clusters that have been before produced by -such objects, we know the object. Knowledge of it is the assimilation -of the combined group of real feelings which it excites, with one or -more preceding ideal groups which were once excited by objects of the -same kind; and, when the series of ideal groups is large, the knowledge -is clear. In the same way, by the connections between each special -cluster of related sensations produced by one object, and the special -clusters generated by other objects, a wider knowledge is obtained. -By assimilating the more or less complex relations exhibited in the -actions of things in space and time, with other such complex relations, -knowledge of the powers and habits of things is constituted. If we -can not so assimilate them, or parts of them, we have no knowledge of -their actions. So it is, without definite limit, through those tracts -of higher consciousness which are formed of clusters of clusters of -feelings held together by extremely involved relations. This law -of the composition of mind is, therefore, the assimilation of real -feelings and groups of real feelings with the ideal feelings or ideal -groups of feelings which objects of the same kind once produced. You -can follow out, without my assistance, the correspondence which Mr. -Spencer exhibits between the views of mental composition and the -general truths respecting nervous structure and nervous functions with -which he began the treatment of mind, which consists largely, and in -one sense entirely, of feelings. The inferior tracts of consciousness -are constituted by feelings; and the feelings are the materials out of -which are constituted the superior tracts of consciousness, and thus -intellect is evolved by structural combination. "Everywhere feeling is -the substance of which, when it is present, intellect is the form. And -where intellect is not present, or but little present, mind consists -of feelings that are unformed or but little formed."[118] Does not -this statement, which in substance is Mr. Spencer's explanation of the -formation of mind, explain to you why he denominates it "transfigured -realism"? - -SOPHEREUS. I have attentively and carefully read Mr. Spencer's -book from which you have made this partial analysis of his view of the -nature of mind, but whether it is realism "transfigured," or whatever -is, I think it must be admitted that its basis is a truly realistic -one; for it comes back at last to just what I suggested to you at the -beginning of this discussion, that mind, according to his view, is -constituted by the action of the nervous system, or, in other words, -that mind consists of the phenomena of movements which take place in a -physical structure. If this is all that can be predicated of mind, it -is not something that can have an independent and continuous existence -after the dissolution of the physical structure called the nervous -system. That structure is one that is analogous in its action to the -other part of the organism by which digestion, or the assimilation -of food, is carried on. We might as well suppose that by the action -of the digestive system there has been constituted a something which -will remain as a digestive function after the organs of digestion -have perished, as to suppose that the action of the nervous system -has constituted a something which will remain mind, a conscious and -independent existence, after the nervous system has been resolved -into its original material elements. Indeed, I do not understand Mr. -Spencer's philosophy as including, providing for, or leading to, any -possible continued existence of the mind after the death of the body. -He seems to exclude it altogether. There is a passage at the end of one -of his chapters which appears to be a summary of his whole philosophic -scheme, and which is one of the dreariest conclusions I have ever met -with. "Once more," he says, "we are brought round to the conclusion -repeatedly reached by other routes, that behind all manifestations, -inner and outer, there is a Power manifested. Here, as before, it has -become clear that while the nature of this Power can not be known, -while we lack the faculty of forming even the dimmest conception of it, -yet its universal presence is the absolute fact without which there can -be no relative facts. Every feeling and thought being but transitory, -an entire life made up of such feelings and thoughts being also but -transitory, nay, the objects amid which life is passed, though less -transitory, being severally in course of losing their individualities -quickly or slowly; we learn that the one thing permanent is the -Unknowable Reality hidden under all these changing shapes."[119] - -I will not say that the mournful character of this hopelessness -of human destiny is proof of its unsoundness. I have accustomed -myself to accept results, whatever may be the gloom in which they -involve us, provided they are deductions of sound reasoning; and -our wishes or hopes can not change the constitution of the universe -or become important evidence for or against any view of what that -constitution is. But let me ask, what does this philosopher mean by -the transitory character of an entire life made up of transitory -feelings and thoughts, occupied throughout their continuance with -transitory objects, or objects which are quickly or slowly losing -their individualities? What possible room does he leave for the -development and discipline of an immortal being, supposing that man -is an immortal being, by an entire life passed in feelings, thoughts, -and action about objects which, relatively to the individual, may, -quickly or slowly, pass away from him? Or, what room does he allow -for the effect on such a being of an entire life spent in the pursuit -of objects or the enjoyment of pleasures which develop only his baser -nature and unfit him for anything else? In any scheme of philosophy -which omits to regard this life as a preparatory school for some -other life, it seems to me that something is left out which ought to -be included, and which ought to be included for the very reason that -the evidence which tends to show that mind is not constituted as Mr. -Spencer supposes, but that it is an existence of a special character, -not generated by the action of a physical structure, but deriving its -existence from the direct action of the creating Power, is so strong -that, if we leave this conclusion out of the hypothesis, we shall have -left out the strongest probabilities of the case. It is no answer to -the necessity for including this conclusion to say that there is a -power which we can not know, or an Unknowable Reality hidden under -all changing manifestations, among which are those of mind. A study -of those manifestations leads rightly to some conclusions respecting -the Power which underlies all manifestations. It is necessary, -therefore, to subject Mr. Spencer's philosophy of mind to the further -inquiry, How does he account for the moral sense? How does he explain -that part of consciousness which recognizes moral obligations--the -recognition of moral law and duty? We may easily dispense with the -phrase "substance of the mind," if we wish to avoid a term of matter; -but if mind is constituted by the perception of feelings excited in -the nervous system, what is it that perceives? Is there a something -that is reached by the feelings which constitute sensations in the -great nerve-center, which takes cognizance of them, which combines -them into portions of consciousness, or is consciousness nothing but -a succession of sensations, and if so, what is "thought"? And what -is that portion of thought which takes cognizance of moral duty, and -which shows man to be capable of recognizing and obeying or breaking -a moral law? I have somewhere read a suggestion that the polity which -is said to have been given to the Hebrew people on the Mount of Sinai, -and which is described as ten statutes written on two tablets of stone, -consisted of five laws on one tablet and five on the other; one set -of them expressing the relations of the Hebrews to the Deity, and the -other being the fundamental laws of the social life which the Hebrews -were commanded to lead. This division is not accurate, because the -commandments which express the relations of the Hebrews to the Deity -are four in number, and the commandments which were to constitute -their social law are six. But that there is a line of demarkation -between the two kinds of laws is obvious, and how they were written -on the tablets, or whether they were written at all, is immaterial. -Looking, then, first at the social law, whether there was more or less -of the same ethical character in the codes of other ancient peoples, -or whether the social law which is said to have been delivered to -Moses and by him communicated to his nation stands as an embodiment -of morality unequaled by anything that had preceded it, it is certain -that it found the Hebrew people capable of the idea of law as a divine -command. It is true that the corner-stone of the whole superstructure -is to be found in the fact that the several commands which constituted -this social code--"Honor thy father and thy mother," "Thou shalt do -no murder," "Thou shalt not commit adultery," "Thou shalt not steal," -"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor," "Thou shalt -not covet thy neighbor's house," etc.--were addressed to a people to -whose representatives the Almighty is supposed to have revealed himself -amid "thunders and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and -the voice of a trumpet exceeding loud, and all the people that were -in the camp [below] trembled." It is also true that the first of -these awful annunciations was said to have been, "I am the Lord thy -God, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of -bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before [or beside] me."[120] So -that the source whence all the following commands proceeded was the -one and only God, who is described as having thus revealed himself in -fire and cloud and earthquake, and thus to have secured instant and -implicit faith in what he spoke. But what he is asserted to have said -was addressed to human minds. This is in one aspect the most important -fact in the whole Hebrew history. It makes no difference whether Moses -performed a piece of jugglery, or whether he actually went within -the fire and the cloud, and actually spoke with God and received his -commands. The indisputable truth remains that the individual minds -of the Hebrew people, whom Moses had led out of Egypt, received and -obeyed, as divine commands, an original and unique moral code, because -they were so constituted that they could embrace and act upon the idea -of law emanating from another than an earthly or a human source. What, -then, was this constitution of the human mind, that could thus receive -and act upon a divine command; and what is it now? It matters not, in -the view in which I ask this question, whether there was any deceit -practiced or not, or whether there is any practiced now in respect to -the authority giving the command. What is to be accounted for is the -capacity of the human mind to embrace and accept the idea of a moral -law, be it that of Moses, or of Christ, or of Mohammed. - -KOSMICOS. I am glad that you put this matter of the ten -commandments hypothetically, because otherwise we might have been led -aside into an argument about the authenticity of the narrative. I -recognize, however, the bearing of the question which you have put, and -shall endeavor to answer it. Your question implies that the essential -constitution of the human mind has been the same in all ages; that -it was the same in this race of nomads, who had been, they and their -fathers for ages, serfs of the Egyptian kings, that it is in us. -Perhaps this assumption may be allowed; and, at all events, the real -question is, How did the idea of a moral law originate, and what is -the sense of moral obligation? Like all things else, it is a product -of the process of evolution. I shall not argue this by any elaborate -reasoning, but will proceed to state the grounds on which it rests. -I will first give you what I understand to be Darwin's view of the -origin of the habit of thinking and feeling, which we call the moral -sense. Primeval man must have existed in a state of barbarism. When he -had become developed out of some pre-existing animal, he was a mere -savage, distinguishable from his predecessors only by the possession -of some superior degree of mental power. Savages, like some other -animals, form themselves into tribes or bands. Certain social instincts -arise, out of which spring what are regarded as virtues. Individuals -of the tribe begin to desire the sympathy and approbation of their -fellows. They perceive that certain actions, such as protection -of other and weaker individuals against danger, gain for them the -sympathy and approbation of the tribe. There are thus formed some -ideas of the common advantage to the tribe of certain actions, and -of the common disadvantage of the opposite actions. Man is eminently -a social animal, and this desire for the sympathy and approbation of -his tribe, and this fear of their disapprobation, is so strong that -the individual savage is led to perceive that the common good of the -tribe is the object at which he must aim to conform. The first social -instincts, therefore, are those which perceive the relations between -certain kinds of conduct and the common good of the tribe; and out of -these relations, with the aid of increasing intellectual powers, is -developed the golden rule, "As ye would that men should do to you, do -ye to them likewise," which lies at the foundation of morality. These -social instincts, thus leading at last to the great rule of social -morality, are developed very slowly. They are at first confined to the -benefit of the same tribe, and they have no force in the relations of -that tribe to the members of any other. To a savage it is a highly -meritorious action to save the life of another member of his own tribe, -and if he loses his own life in the effort it is so much the more -meritorious. But he does not extend this idea of doing a good action -to the members of a different tribe, and, whether his own tribe is -or is not at war with the other tribe, he and his own community will -think it no harm if he murders a member of that other tribe. But as -the approach to civilization goes on--as man advances in intellectual -power, and can trace the more remote consequences of his actions, and -as he rejects baneful customs and superstitions, he begins to regard -more and more not only the welfare but the happiness of his fellow-men. -Habit, resulting from beneficial experiences, instruction and example, -renders his sympathies more tender and widely diffused, until at last -he extends them to men of all races, to the imbecile, maimed, and other -useless members of society, and to the inferior animals. Thus the -standard of morality rises higher and higher; but its origin is in the -social instincts, which spring out of the love of approbation and the -fear of disapprobation.[121] - -But morality comprehends also the self-regarding virtues, those which -directly affect the individual, and which affect society but remotely -and incidentally. How did the idea of these originate? There is a -very wide difference between the morality of savages, in respect to -the self-regarding virtues, and the morality of civilized nations. -Among the former, the greatest intemperance, utter licentiousness, -and unnatural crimes are very common. But as soon as marriage was -introduced, whether monogamous or polygamous, jealousy led to the -inculcation of female virtue; and this, being honored, spread to the -unmarried females. Chastity, the hatred of indecency, temperance, and -many other self-regarding virtues, originating first in the social -instincts, have come to be highly prized by civilized nations as -affecting, first, the welfare of the community, and, secondly, the -welfare of the individual. This was the origin of the so-called "moral -sense." It rejects the intuitive theory of morality, and bases its -origin on the increasing perception of the advantage of certain conduct -to the community and the individual.[122] - -SOPHEREUS. And in this origin of the social and the -self-regarding virtues, which I understand you to say is the theory of -Darwin, is the idea of a divine command to practice certain things, and -to avoid doing certain other things, left out? - -KOSMICOS. The idea of a divine command, as the source of -morality, is not necessary to the explanation of the mode in which -the social or the self-regarding virtues were gradually developed. -In the progress from barbarism to civilization, what is called the -moral sense has been slowly developed as an increasing perception of -what is beneficial, and this has become an inherited faculty. We thus -have a sure scientific basis for the moral intuitions which we do not -individually stay to analyze when we are called upon to determine the -morality or the immorality of certain actions. The supposed divine -command is something that is aside from the process by which the idea -of morality or immorality became developed. - -SOPHEREUS. And is this also Mr. Spencer's philosophy of the -moral sense? - -KOSMICOS. Let me read you what Spencer says: "I believe that -the experience of utility, organized and consolidated through all -past generations of the human race, has been producing corresponding -modifications which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have -become in us certain _faculties_ of moral intuition--certain _emotions_ -responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no _apparent_ basis -in the _individual_ experiences of utility."[123] I have emphasized -certain words in this passage in order to make its meaning distinct. -Mr. Spencer's theory is that we have certain _faculties_ of moral -intuition, which have become such by transmission and accumulation; -that the original ideas of right and wrong sprang from perceptions of -utility; and that when to the individual the question of a good or a -bad action in others or himself is now presented, he feels an _emotion_ -which responds to right or wrong conduct, and feels it in the _faculty_ -which he has inherited from ancestors, without referring it to his -_individual_ experience of the utility or inutility of certain conduct. - -Now, in regard to the divine command as the origin of our ideas -of right and wrong, if you turn to Mr. Spencer's "Principles of -Sociology," you will find an immense collection of evidence which shows -the genesis of deities of all kinds. Beginning with the ideas formed -by the primitive men of souls, ghosts, spirits, and demons, the ideas -of another life and of another world, there came about the ideas of -supernatural beings, aided in their development by ancestor-worship, -idol-worship, fetich-worship, animal-worship, plant-worship, and -nature-worship. Hence came the ideas of deities of various kinds, one -class of which is that of the human personality greatly disguised, and -the other is the class which has arisen by simple idealization and -expansion of the human personality. The last class, although always -coexisting with the other, at length becomes predominant, and finally -there is developed the idea of one chief or supreme deity. Having -traced the origin of this idea of a supreme deity, Mr. Spencer puts and -answers this question: "While among all races and all regions, from -the earliest times down to the most recent, the conceptions of deities -have been naturally evolved in the way shown, must we conclude that -a small clan of the Semitic race had given to it, supernaturally, a -conception which, though superficially like the rest, was in substance -absolutely unlike them?"[124] He then proceeds to show that the Hebrew -Jehovah, or God, was a conception that had a kindred genesis with all -the other conceptions of a deity or deities. "Here," he says, "pursuing -the methods of science, and disregarding foregone conclusions, we must -deal with the Hebrew conception in the same manner as with all the -others." Dealing with it by the scientific method, he shows that behind -the supernatural being of the order of the Hebrew God, as behind the -supernatural beings of all other orders, there has in every case been -a human personality. Thus, taking the narrative as it has come down to -us of God's dealing with Abraham, he shows that what Abraham thought, -or is described as thinking by those who preserved the tradition, was -of a terrestrial ruler who could, like any other earthly potentate, -make a covenant with him about land or anything else, or that he was -the maker of all things, and that Abraham believed the earth and the -heavens were produced by one who eats and drinks, and feels weary -after walking. Upon either idea, Abraham's conception of a Deity -remains identical with that of his modern Semitic representative, -and with that of the uncivilized in general. But the ideas of Deity -entertained by cultivated people, instead of being innate, arise only -at a comparatively advanced stage, as results of accumulated knowledge, -greater intellectual grasp, and higher sentiment.[125] - -To return now to the supposed divine command as the origin of morality, -it is obvious that the conception of the being who has uttered the -command makes the nature of the command partake of the attributes -ascribed to that being. Accordingly, the grossest superstitions, the -most revolting practices, the most immoral actions, have found their -sanction in what the particular deity who is believed in is supposed -to have inculcated or required. I do not need to enumerate to you the -proofs of this, or to tell you that the Hebrew God is no exception to -it. One illustration of it, however, is worth repeating. Speaking of -the ceremony by which the covenant between God and Abraham is said to -have been established, Mr. Spencer says: "Abraham and each of his male -descendants, and each of his slaves, is circumcised. The mark of the -covenant, observe, is to be borne not only by Abraham and those of -his blood, but also by those of other blood whom he has bought. The -mark is a strange one, and the extension of it is a strange one, if -we assume it to be imposed by the Creator of the universe, as a mark -on a favored man and his descendants; and on this assumption it is no -less strange that the one transgression for which every 'soul shall -be cut off' is, not any crime, but the neglect of this rite. But such -a ceremony insisted on by a living potentate, under penalty of death, -is not strange, for, as we shall hereafter see, circumcision is one of -various mutilations imposed as marks on subject persons by terrestrial -superiors."[126] - -So that the Hebrew God who made the covenant with Abraham was not, -in Abraham's own conception, the First Cause of all things, or a -supernatural being, but he was a powerful human ruler, making an -agreement with a shepherd chief. In all religions, the things required -or commanded by the supposed deified person have been marked by the -characteristics of human rulers; and as a source of morality, or as -a standard of morality, the requirements or commands of the deified -person, however they are supposed to have been communicated, fail to -answer the indispensable condition of a fixed and innate system of -morality, which is that it must have proceeded from the Creator of -the universe, and not from a being who partakes of human passions, -infirmities, and desires, and is merely a deified human potentate. - -Pass, now, to Mr. Spencer's "Principles of Morality"; and although but -one volume of this work has been as yet published, we may see that -he is entirely consistent with what he has said in his "Sociology" -and his other writings.[127] He does not leave us in any doubt as to -his theory of morals. It appears, from the preface to his "Data of -Ethics," that he has been compelled by ill-health to deviate from the -plan which he had mapped out for himself, and to publish one volume -of his "Principles of Morality" before completing his "Principles of -Sociology." But while we have reason for his sake and for the sake -of the world to regret this, we can easily understand his system of -morality. He means to rest the rules of right conduct on a scientific -basis, and he shows that this is a pressing need. In his preface, he -says: - - I am the more anxious to indicate in outline, if I can not complete, - this final proof, because the establishment of rules of right conduct - on a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now that moral injunctions - are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the - secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few things can happen - more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no - longer fit, before another and fitter regulative system has grown - up to replace it. Most of those who reject the current creed appear - to assume that the controlling agency furnished by it may be safely - thrown aside, and the vacancy left unfilled by any other controlling - agency. Meanwhile, those who defend the current creed allege that, in - the absence of the guidance it yields, no guidance can exist; divine - commandments they think the only possible guides. Thus, between these - extreme opponents there is a certain community. The one holds that - the gap left by disappearance of the code of supernatural ethics need - not be filled by a code of natural ethics; and the other holds that it - can not be so filled. Both contemplate a vacuum, which the one wishes - and the other fears. As the change which promises or threatens to - bring about this state, desired or dreaded, is rapidly progressing, - those who believe that the vacuum can be filled are called upon to do - something in pursuance of their belief. - -The code of natural ethics which Mr. Spencer propounds, and which is -a product of the process of evolution, may be summarized as follows: -Conduct is an aggregate of actions which are not purposeless, but -which include all acts that are adjusted to ends, from the simplest to -the most complex. The division or aspect of conduct with which ethics -deals, the behavior we call good or bad, is a part of an organic whole; -but, although inextricably bound up with acts which are neither good -nor bad, it is distinguishable as comprehending those acts with which -morality is concerned. The evolution of conduct, from the simplest -and most indifferent actions up to those on which ethical judgments -are passed, is what Mr. Spencer means by the scientific method of -investigating the origin of morality. We must begin with the conduct -of all living creatures, because the complete comprehension of conduct -is not to be obtained by contemplating the conduct of human beings -only. "The conduct of the higher animals as compared with that of -man, and the conduct of the lower animals as compared with that of -the higher, mainly differ in this, that the adjustments of acts to -ends are relatively simple and relatively incomplete. And as in other -cases, so in this case, we must interpret the more developed by the -less developed. Just as, fully to understand the part of conduct which -ethics deals with, we must study human conduct as a whole, so, fully -to understand human conduct as a whole, we must study it as a part of -that larger whole constituted by the conduct of animate beings in -general."[128] - -Begin, for example, with an infusorium swimming about at random, -determined in its course not by an object which it perceives and which -is to be pursued or escaped, but apparently by varying stimuli in its -medium, the water. Its acts, unadjusted in any appreciable way to -ends, lead it now into contact with some nutritive substance which it -absorbs, and now into the neighborhood of some creature by which it is -swallowed and digested. Pass on to another aquatic creature, which, -although of a low type, is much higher than the infusorium, such as -a rotifer. With larger size, more developed structures, and greater -power of combining functions, there comes an advance in conduct. It -preserves itself for a longer period by better adjusting its own -actions, so that, it is less dependent on the actions going on around. -Again, compare a low mollusk, such as a floating ascidian, with a high -mollusk, such as a cephalopod, and it is apparent how greater organic -evolution is accompanied by more evolved conduct. And if you pass then -to the vertebrate animals, you see how, along with advance in structure -and functions, there is evolved an advance in conduct, until at length, -when you reach the doings of the highest of mammals, mankind, you not -only find that the adjustments of acts to ends are both more numerous -and better than among the lower mammals, but you find the same thing on -comparing the doings of the higher races of men with those of the lower -races. There is a greater completeness of achievement by civilized -men than by savages, and there is also an achievement of relatively -numerous minor ends subserving major ends. - -Recollecting, then, what conduct is--namely, the adjustment of acts to -ends--and observing how this adjustment becomes more and more complete -as the organism becomes more developed, we have to note the order of -the ends to which the acts are adjusted. The first end, the first -stage of evolving conduct, is the further prolongation of life. The -next is that adjustment of acts to ends which furthers an increased -amount of life. Thus far the ends are complete individual life. Then -come those adjustments which have for their final purpose the life of -the species. Then there is a third kind of conduct, which results from -the fact that the multitudinous creatures which fill the earth can not -live wholly apart from one another, but are more or less in presence -of one another, are interfered with by one another. No one species can -so act as to secure the greatest amount of life to its individuals -and the preservation of the species--can make a successful adjustment -of its acts to these ends--without interfering with the corresponding -adjustments by other creatures of their acts to their ends. That -some may live, others must die. Finally, when we contemplate those -adjustments of acts to ends which miss completeness, because they can -not be made by one creature without other creatures being prevented -from making them, we reach the thought of adjustments such that each -creature may make them without preventing them from being made by other -creatures. Let me now quote Mr. Spencer's concrete illustrations of -these abstract statements: - -"Recognizing men as the beings whose conduct is most evolved, let -us ask under what conditions their conduct, in all three aspects of -its evolution, reaches its limit. Clearly while the lives led are -entirely predatory, as those of savages, the adjustments of acts -to ends fall short of this highest form of conduct in every way. -Individual life, ill carried on from hour to hour, is prematurely -cut short; the fostering of offspring often fails, and is incomplete -when it does not fail; and in so far as the ends of self-maintenance -and race-maintenance are met, they are met by destruction of other -beings, of different kind, or of like kind. In social groups formed -by compounding and recompounding primitive hordes, conduct remains -imperfectly evolved in proportion as there continue antagonisms between -the groups and antagonisms between members of the same group--two -traits necessarily associated; since the nature which prompts -international aggression prompts aggression of individuals on one -another. Hence, the limit of evolution can be reached by conduct only -in permanently peaceful societies. That perfect adjustment of acts -to ends in maintaining individual life and rearing new individuals, -which is effected by each without hindering others from effecting like -perfect adjustments, is, in its very definition, shown to constitute a -kind of conduct that can be approached only as war decreases and dies -out. - -"A gap in this outline must now be filled up. There remains a further -advance not yet even hinted. For beyond so behaving that each achieves -his ends without preventing others from achieving their ends, the -members of a society may give mutual help in the achievement of ends. -And if, either indirectly by industrial co-operation, or directly -by volunteered aid, fellow-citizens can make easier for one another -the adjustments of acts to ends, then their conduct assumes a still -higher phase of evolution; since whatever facilitates the making of -adjustments by each, increases the totality of the adjustments made, -and serves to render the lives of all more complete." - -In the outline which I have now given you of the evolution of conduct, -you will perceive the foundation of Spencer's system of ethics. Actions -begin to assume an ethical character--conduct becomes good or bad--when -the acts tend to promote or to prevent the general well-being of the -community. But how is the perception or recognition of this quality -in an action reached? What is the determining reason for considering -an action good or bad? Obviously, conduct is considered by us as good -or bad according as its aggregate results to self, or others, or -both, are pleasurable or painful. Mr. Spencer shows that every other -proposed standard of conduct derives its authority from this standard: -"No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable -state of feeling called by whatever name--gratification, enjoyment, -happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, -is an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much a necessary -form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual -intuition."[129] - -On this fundamental basis, Mr. Spencer rests his system of absolute -ethics and relative ethics. Relative ethics are those by which, -allowing for the friction of an incomplete life and the imperfections -of existing natures, we may ascertain with approximate correctness what -is the relatively right. This is often exceedingly difficult, because -two cases are rarely the same in all their circumstances. But absolute -ethics are the ideal ethical truths, expressing the absolutely right. -Such a system of ideal ethical truths, which must have precedence over -relative ethics, is reached only when there has been, in conformity -with the laws of evolution in general, and in conformity with the laws -of organization in particular, an adaptation of humanity to the social -state, changing it in the direction of an ideal congruity. But, as in -relative ethics, the production of happiness or pleasure is the aim, -however imperfectly accomplished, so in the ideal state the aim is -the same, the difference being that in the latter the accomplishment -of happiness or pleasure and the exclusion or prevention of pain are -complete. - -SOPHEREUS. And do I understand you that in this system of -ethics the idea of a moral law proceeding from and consisting of the -command of a Supreme Lawgiver is left out? - -KOSMICOS. Certainly it is. Did I not just now read to you from -Mr. Spencer's preface his complete rejection of the supposed sacred -origin of moral injunctions, and what he says of the necessity for the -secularization of morals to take the place of that system which is -losing its authority? - -SOPHEREUS. And this philosopher is the same writer who -negatives the idea of any creation of organic life, and who also -negatives the idea that the human mind is an existence of a spiritual -nature, owing its existence to a Creator? - -KOSMICOS. Undoubtedly; we have gone over all that ground. - -SOPHEREUS. And he is the same philosopher who denies the -existence of a Supreme Being, Creator, and Governor of the universe? - -KOSMICOS. Perhaps you may call it denial, although what he -maintains is that we know, and can know, nothing on the subject of a -personal God. - -SOPHEREUS. Very well. I will reflect upon all this until we -meet again. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [113] Probably Kosmicos did not mean that man excels all other animals - in the delicacy and perfection of his nervous organization, for some - of his senses are inferior to those of some of the other animals, as - his movements are less swift. Apparently his meaning is that, taken as - a whole, the nervous organization of man evinces the greatest power of - variation and the widest range of action. - - [114] Darwin's "Descent of Man," pp. 608, 609. - - [115] Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 428. - - [116] "The Principles of Psychology," by Herbert Spencer, third - edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1885. - - [117] "Principles of Psychology," i, p. 162. - - [118] "Principles of Psychology," ii, p. 503. - - [119] "Principles of Psychology," ii, p. 503. - - [120] Revised version. - - [121] Darwin, "Descent of Man," Part I, chap. iv. - - [122] "Descent of Man," Part I, chap. iv. - - [123] Quoted in Darwin's "Descent of Man," p. 123. - - [124] "Principles of Sociology," i, p. 433, § 202. - - [125] Ibid., chap. XXV, p. 414 _et seq._ - - [126] "Principles of Sociology," i, p. 135. - - [127] "Principles of Morality," vol. i. I. "The Data of Ethics." By - Herbert Spencer. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1884. - - [128] "The Data of Ethics," pp. 6, 7, by Herbert Spencer. New York: D. - Appleton & Co., 1884. - - [129] "The Data of Ethics," pp. 45, 46, by Herbert Spencer. New York: - D. Appleton & Co., 1884. - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - - Mr. Spencer's philosophy as a whole--His psychology, and his system of - ethics--The sacred origin of moral injunctions, and the secularization - of morals. - - -A certain honesty and directness of mind prevent Sophereus from being -bewildered by the Spencerian philosophy. Before his next meeting with -the scientist, he has reviewed the main features of this philosophy as -developed in Mr. Spencer's published works; and he has taken notice of -the warning which Mr. Spencer has given to his readers in the preface -to his "Data of Ethics," that "there will probably be singled out for -reprobation from this volume, doctrines which, taken by themselves, may -readily be made to seem utterly wrong." There is not much likelihood -that Sophereus will be able, if he is willing, to avail himself of -this "opportunity for misrepresentation" in a discussion with such a -champion of Mr. Spencer's philosophy as the scientist who explains and -defends it, especially as they have the works before them to refer to. -Being thus respectively equipped for the discussion, the conference -between them proceeds: - -SOPHEREUS. Before I give you my convictions respecting Mr. -Spencer's philosophy as a whole, I wish to say something about the -passage which you read from the preface to his "Data of Ethics," -because it is the key to his ethical system. In the first place, to -what does he refer when he speaks of "the current creed"? When I -undertake to investigate a system of morality, the only "creed" that -I care about--the only one that is of any importance--is that which -accepts, as a matter of belief, the existence of the Creator and -Supreme Governor of the universe, from whose infinite will and purposes -have proceeded certain moral as well as physical laws. This, I take -it, is the "creed" of which Mr. Spencer speaks; the one which assigns -moral injunctions to the will of a Supreme Lawgiver as "their supposed -sacred origin." It is to this creed that he opposes his "secularization -of morals," which must take the place of their supposed sacred origin, -because the authority of the latter is rapidly dying out of the world. -It is this "creed" which is rejected by those who "assume that the -controlling agency furnished by it may be safely thrown aside, and the -vacancy left unfilled by any other agency." - -Undoubtedly there are and always have been numerous persons who appear -practically to think that the sacred origin of morality can be safely -rejected, and that the vacancy may be left unfilled by any other -restraining agency. The deliberate and willful murderer, the burglar, -the adulterer, and many of the other criminal classes, not only appear -to reject "the current creed," but they would be very glad to have it -assumed that there is no other restraining agency to take its place. -So, too, there are persons who break no moral law, whose lives are -pure, but who, having theoretically persuaded themselves that there is -no sacred origin of moral injunctions, omit to provide, for themselves -or others, any other controlling agency to fill the vacuum. But this -latter class is not very numerous; and if, without meaning any offense -to them, their number is added to that of the criminal classes, to make -up the aggregate of those who reject "the current creed," we have not -a very large body compared with the whole body of persons in civilized -communities who adhere to "the current creed," who live by it, and who -think that others should live by it too, as the ultimate foundation of -those social laws which take cognizance of men's conduct toward one -another. So that I do not quite understand the assertion that "moral -injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred -origin"; connected as it is with the other assertion that society is -"rapidly progressing" to that vacuum which is to follow the complete -rejection of the one guide without the substitution of another in its -place. I am quite aware that there has been of late years an increasing -amount of what is called infidelity, or unbelief, or atheism. But I am -quite sure that there has not been a general theoretical or practical -rejection of so much of the religious creed of mankind as assigns -to the will of a supreme and supernatural lawgiver certain moral -injunctions. If we confine our view to Christendom alone, it is certain -that the growth, activity, and influence of the various religious -bodies are not materially checked, and that religious beliefs are not -by any means losing their hold upon great multitudes of people. If -we survey the regions where the Mohammedan faith prevails, the same -general result is found, whatever Christians may think of the beliefs -or practices of that vast body of the human race. And, even when we -penetrate among the races which are less civilized, we find very few -races or tribes in which there does not prevail some idea of some kind -of command proceeding from some deity or other, whatever we may think -of the character of that deity or of the nature of the command. - -But I presume that Mr. Spencer meant to confine his assertion of the -necessity for a secularization of morals, and his assumption that -their sacred origin is rapidly passing away from men's beliefs, to -the state of society as it exists now in Western civilization; and my -observation of this portion of the world is, that those who reject -what I presume he means by "the current creed" are, first, a class of -theorizers: and, secondly, the criminal classes; and that the aggregate -of the two is not, after all, so formidable that we ought to conclude -that the regulative system of the sacred origin of moral injunctions -is "no longer fit" for any practical purpose. I do not, therefore, -recognize what he considers the supreme practical necessity for "the -secularization of morals" to take the place of a system which is worn -out. - -KOSMICOS. You have left out of the case a very important -element. Mr. Spencer antagonizes those who reject the current creed -against those who defend it. The former, while they reject the current -creed, do not recognize the necessity for any other controlling agency. -The latter, while they defend the current creed, maintain that nothing -can take its place as a regulating agency. Between them they create a -vacuum, which one class wishes for and the other fears. This is the -vacuum which he says can be and must be filled by the secularization of -morals. It is a vacuum in philosophical speculation about the origin of -morality, and, when the conclusion is reached, it becomes a practical -and pressing question how it is to be carried out. - -SOPHEREUS. Precisely; and, when the conclusion is reached, it -is to be carried out in legislation and government, or else the conduct -of men toward one another in society is not to be regulated by public -authority at all, but is to be left to each man's perception of what -will produce the greatest amount of pleasure and happiness, or the -least amount of pain and misery. Now, it is pretty important to settle -at the outset whether those who defend the current creed are right or -wrong when they say that nothing which will answer the same purpose -can be found to take its place. They constitute one of the classes who -will be responsible for the supposed vacuum; and their share in that -vacuum, their contribution to it, if I may use such an expression, -consists in their assertion that nothing of any value can take the -place of the sacred origin of moral injunctions. The practical test of -whether they are right or wrong is to be found in legislation. Let us -suppose, then, a legislative assembly in which there is a proposal to -change the law of murder, or to do away with it altogether. A member -who does not believe in any sacred origin of the command "Thou shalt do -no murder," moves not only to abolish the death-penalty, but to abolish -all legal definition of the crime, and leave every man to be restrained -by the consciousness that, if he takes the life of another, he will -cause a great deal of pain and misery to the relations and friends of -that person. The mover argues that "the current creed" of morality is -worn out; is "no longer fit," as a regulator; and that the safest and -best regulator is the perception of the beneficial effects of actions -of kindness and good-will, and of the disastrous effects of cruelty and -malice. He is answered by one who defends the current creed, and who -maintains that, as human nature is constituted, the utilitarian system -of morals can not take the place of the sacred origin as the ultimate -foundation of social relations. But the majority of the assembly think -that the mover of the proposition has the best of the argument, and -they proceed to "secularize" morals by passing his bill doing away with -the law of murder altogether. I am not obliged to extend my travels -anywhere, where I do not care to go, and I confess I should not like to -visit that country after it had thus "secularized" morality. - -KOSMICOS. Now just be careful to note that this whole science -of conduct--the science of ethics--the foundation of right and wrong, -is a product of evolution. As in the development of organisms the -higher and more elaborate are reached after a great length of time, as -in mechanics knowledge of the empirical sort evolves into mechanical -science by first omitting all qualifying circumstances and generalizing -in absolute ways the fundamental laws of forces, so empirical ethics -evolve into rational ethics by first neglecting all complicating -incidents and formulating the laws of right action apart from the -obscuring effects of special conditions. There are thus reached, after -a great lapse of time, those ideal ethical truths which express the -absolutely right. Mr. Spencer treats of the ideal man among ideal men; -the ideal man existing in the ideal social state. "On the evolution -hypothesis," he says, "the two presuppose one another; and only when -they coexist can there exist that ideal conduct which absolute ethics -has to formulate, and which relative ethics has to take as the standard -by which to estimate divergences from right, or degrees of wrong."[130] -But, again, observe that society is now in a transition state; the -ultimate man has not yet been reached; the evolution of ethics is, -however, going on, retarded as it may be by various frictions arising -from imperfect natures. But there is in progress an adaptation of -humanity to the social state, and the ultimate man will be one in -whom this process has gone so far as to produce a correspondence -between all the promptings of his nature and all the requirements of -his life, as carried on in society; so that there is an ideal code of -conduct formulating the behavior of the completely adapted man in the -completely evolved society.[131] - -SOPHEREUS. But I understand that we have already reached, or -are very soon to reach, a condition of things in which the supposed -sacred origin of moral injunctions is now, or very shortly will become, -no guide. We are to fill the vacuum which is caused, or is about to -be caused, by its disappearance, by substituting as the standard of -right and wrong the perceptions which we can have of the effects of -actions upon the sum total of happiness, because this will be the sole -standard in the ideal state of society in which the ideal man will -ultimately find himself. I will not insist on the total depravity of -man's nature, because I never borrow an argument from theologians. -But it has been one of the conclusions that I have drawn from some -study of human nature, that it requires very strong restraints. Not -only must some of the restraints be of the strongest kind, but they -must be simple, positive, and adapted to the varying dispositions and -intelligence of men. There can not well be imagined any restraining -moral force so efficacious as that which is derived from a belief -that the Creator of the universe has ordained some moral laws; has -specialized certain conduct as right and certain conduct as wrong, -without regard to varying circumstances. As the foundation of all that -part of legislation that takes cognizance of the simpler relations of -men to one another--those relations which are always the same--the -sacred origin of moral injunctions is of far greater force than the -perception of the greatest-happiness principle can possibly be. If -a man is tempted to commit murder, is he not far more likely to be -restrained by a law which he knows will punish him without regard to -the misery he would cause to the friends and relatives of the person -whom he is tempted to kill, than he would be if the law were based on -the latter consideration alone? Do away with all legislation which -punishes the simpler crimes first and foremost because they break -the laws of God, and substitute as the restraining agency individual -recognition of the effect of actions upon the sum total of happiness, -and you would soon see that one of two consequences would follow: -either you would have no criminal code at all, or it would be one that -would be governed by the most fluctuating and uncertain standards. -Moreover, how is the transition from the sacred source of the simpler -moral injunctions to the secularization of morals to be effected? -I once heard a wise person say that if a thing is to be done, an -ingenious man ought to be able to show how it is to be done. I suppose -the secularization of morals means the complete renovation of our -ideas of right and wrong, by taking as the sole standard the pleasure -or pain, the happiness or unhappiness, which actions will produce. How -are you going to reach this ideal state? The vacuum is rapidly coming -about. How are you going to take the first step in filling it? Before -the vacuum is complete, you must do something. You have waited until -the evolution of conduct of the purely utilitarian type has made some -great advances; but the ideal state is not yet reached by all men. -You wish to hasten its approach, and you must begin to act. There is -nothing for you to do but to formulate the new moral code and put it in -operation. You must make your laws--if you continue to have laws--so -that murder and lying and theft will not be punished because the -Almighty has prohibited them, but they will be punished simply because -they produce misery. Do you think you would ever see every individual -of such a community brought to an ideal congruity between all the -promptings of his nature and all the requirements of his life, as -carried on in society? That you would have nothing but "the completely -adapted man in the completely evolved society"? I fancy that you would -often have to fall back upon the sacred origin of moral injunctions, -and to punish some conduct because it breaks a law of divine authority. -I may have been too much in the habit of looking at things practically; -but I have not yet discovered that the feeling of obligation, the sense -of duty, what is recognized as moral obligation, having its origin in -some command, and enforced by some kind of compulsion, can be dispensed -with. - -KOSMICOS. I must refer you to Mr. Spencer's explanation of the -fact that the sense of duty or moral obligation fades away as the moral -motive emerges from all the political, religious, and social motives, -and frees itself from the consciousness of subordination to some -external agency. He does not shrink from the conclusion because it will -be startling. He tells us that it will be to most very startling to -be informed that "the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, -and will diminish as fast as moralization increases." He fortifies his -position thus: - - Startling though it is, this conclusion may be satisfactorily - defended. Even now progress toward the implied ultimate state is - traceable. The observation is not infrequent that persistence in - performing a duty ends in making it a pleasure, and this amounts to - the admission that, while at first the motive contains an element - of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act - is performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perform - it. The contrast between the youth on whom diligence is enjoined, - and the man of business so absorbed in affairs that he can not be - induced to relax, shows us how the doing of work, originally under the - consciousness that it _ought_ to be done, may eventually cease to have - any such accompanying consciousness. Sometimes, indeed, the relation - comes to be reversed; and the man of business persists in work from - pure love of it when told that he ought not. Nor is it thus with - self-regarding feelings only. That the maintaining and protecting of - wife by husband often result solely from feelings directly gratified - by these actions, without any thought of _must_; and that the - fostering of children by parents is in many cases made an absorbing - occupation without any coercive feeling of _ought_; are obvious - truths which show us that even now, with some of the fundamental - other-regarding duties, the sense of obligation has retreated - into the background of the mind. And it is in some degree so with - other-regarding duties of a higher kind. Conscientiousness has in many - outgrown that stage in which the sense of a compelling power is joined - with rectitude of action. The truly honest man, here and there to be - found, is not only without thought of legal, religious, or social - compulsion, when he discharges an equitable claim on him; but he is - without thought of self-compulsion. He does the right thing with a - simple feeling of satisfaction in doing it; and is, indeed, impatient - if anything prevents him from having the satisfaction of doing it. - - Evidently, then, with complete adaptation to the social state, that - element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word - obligation will disappear. The higher actions required for the - harmonious carrying on of life will be as much matters of course - as are those lower actions which the simple desires prompt. In - their proper times and places and proportions, the moral sentiments - will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the - sensations. And though, joined with their regulating influence when - this is called for, will exist latent ideas of the evils which - non-conformity would bring, these will occupy the mind no more than do - ideas of the evils of starvation at the time when a healthy appetite - is being satisfied by a meal. - -SOPHEREUS. There is a religion in the world called -Christianity, with which we are tolerably familiar. It comprehends -a system of morality which, when completely observed, develops the -truly good man, the man who does the right thing with a feeling of -satisfaction in doing it, and brings about those higher actions which -are required for the harmonious carrying on of life, as matters of -course, just as surely as the same result can be brought about by the -most ideal secularization of morals that any philosophical theories -can accomplish. Whatever may be the evidences by which the sacred -origin of Christianity is supposed to be established, it is certain -that this religion does not omit, but on the contrary it presupposes -and asserts, as the foundation of its moral code, that the sense of -obligation to which it appeals is the consciousness of obligation to -obey divine commands. It proceeds upon the idea that human nature -stands in need of some coercion; that the sense of obligation is not to -be allowed to retreat into the background of the mind, but that a sense -of the compelling power must be kept joined with rectitude of action, -otherwise there will be a failure of rectitude. It is considered, I -believe, that the adaptation of the Christian morality to the whole -nature of man, by means of the compelling power, the consciousness of -which is not to be transitory, but is to be universal and perpetual, is -very strong proof that this religion came from a being who understood -human nature better than we can understand it. However this may be, -it is, at all events, certain that the scheme of Christian morality -proceeds upon the necessity for a more efficacious regulator of human -conduct than the simple feeling of satisfaction in doing right, or -the feeling of dissatisfaction in doing wrong; and, although the true -Christian is, in completeness of moral character, like Mr. Spencer's -ideal man, and although a society completely Christian would be that -ideal social state in which there would be perfect congruity between -the lives of men and the welfare of that society, yet the Christian -religion, if I understand it rightly, does not assume that there will -be more than an approximation to that universal state of perfection -while the human race remains on earth. The proof of this is to be found -in the fact that this religion does not contemplate a time when divine -command is to cease as the restraining agency on earth; but, on the -contrary, it appears to assume that obedience to the divine will is to -continue in another life to be a perpetual motive, as it has been in -this life. All this may be without such proof as "science" demands, -but it is certain that the scheme of Christian morality is based upon -the idea that the Creator has made obedience to his laws, because they -are his laws, the great regulator of human conduct. If the Creator -had so made men that the consciousness of the effect of conduct on -the happiness or misery of our fellow-men would be sufficient as a -regulator, it is rational to conclude that he would not have imposed -commands which were to be obeyed because they are commands. However -great may be the approximation to a complete adaptation of the social -state, I do not look forward to the disappearance of that element in -the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation, -because obligation, in its ultimate sense, is obedience to a higher -power. Obedience for its own sake, obedience because there is a -command, irrespective of all the reasons for the command, is a law -which is illustrated in very many of the relations of life. A wise -parent will sometimes explain to his child why he commands some things -and prohibits others; but if he means to train that child in the way he -should go, he will sometimes require him to obey for the mere purpose -of teaching him that obedience without question or inquiry is a law of -his nature. A master of a vessel, which is in peril at sea, gives an -order to the sailors. They may or may not understand the reasons for -it. But what sort of sailors would they be if they did not act upon the -consciousness that unquestioning obedience is the law of their relation -to the ship? - -In the earliest traditions that we have of the human race, as those -traditions are accepted by the Western nations, we find a pretty -striking and very simple instance of this law of obedience. The first -pair of human beings are placed in a garden where they are at liberty -to eat of the fruit of every tree save one, but of that one their -Creator absolutely forbids them to partake. He assigns to them no -reason for the prohibition, but he lays upon them his absolute command, -on the penalty of death if they are disobedient. One of them begins to -reason about the matter--an allegorical creature or being, called the -serpent, tempting her with certain advantages that she will get from -eating this particular fruit. She yields, disobeys, and persuades her -husband to do the same. The consequences follow, as their Creator told -them they would. The law of obedience which this story illustrates -has been in operation through all the ages, and society can no more -dispense with it than it can dispense with any of the physical laws -that govern the universe. - -KOSMICOS. Are you going back to the fables for the sacred -origin of moral injunctions? I thought you had got beyond that. - -SOPHEREUS. I use an illustration wherever I find it. I am -perfectly content that you should call the story of Adam and Eve a -fable, but the law of obedience which it illustrates is a tremendous -fact. The incident, fable or no fable, is eminently human, and it is -occurring every day in human experience. It is not strange that the -first Hebrew tradition should have been one that illustrates in so -simple a manner the existence of the law of obedience. In like manner, -it is not strange that the Christian system of ethics should have been -based on the existence of this same law of obedience to commands. This -Christian system of ethics has dispensed with a great many minute -observances which one branch of the Semitic race believed were imposed -upon them as commands by their Creator; but it has not displaced the -law of obedience, or dispensed with certain moral injunctions as divine -commands, for it proceeds upon the great truth that human nature -requires that kind of restraint, and that there are certain actions -which can not be left without it. - -KOSMICOS. Mr. Spencer has anticipated you. Your reference to -Christianity is not happy. Having gone through with the explanation of -the evolution process in the development of the highest conception of -morals, and having shown that what now characterizes the exceptionally -highest natures will eventually characterize all, he has something -to say about the reception of his conclusions, to which, as you have -referred to the Christian system of morals, you would do well to attend: - - § 98. That these conclusions will meet with any considerable - acceptance is improbable. Neither with current ideas nor with current - sentiments are they sufficiently congruous. - - Such a view will not be agreeable to those who lament the spreading - disbelief in eternal damnation, nor to those who follow the apostle of - brute force in thinking that because the rule of the strong hand was - once good it is good for all time; nor to those whose reverence for - one who told them to put up the sword is shown by using the sword to - spread his doctrine among heathens. From the ten thousand priests of - the religion of love, who are silent when the nation is moved by the - religion of hate, will come no sign of assent; nor from their bishops - who, far from urging the extreme precept of the Master they pretend to - follow, to turn the other cheek when one is smitten, vote for acting - on the principle--strike lest ye be struck. Nor will any approval be - felt by legislators who, after praying to be forgiven their trespasses - as they forgive the trespasses of others, forthwith decide to attack - those who have not trespassed against them; and who, after a Queen's - speech has invoked "the blessing of Almighty God" on their councils, - immediately provide means for committing political burglary. - - But though men who profess Christianity and practice paganism can feel - no sympathy with such a view, there are some, classed as antagonists - to the current creed, who may not think it absurd to believe that a - rationalized version of its ethical principles will eventually be - acted upon. - -SOPHEREUS. "Our withers are unwrung." I am not a believer -in eternal damnation; I am not an apostle of brute force; I am not -in favor of using the sword to spread a religion of love; I am not a -priest or a bishop, nor am I a member of Parliament or of any other -legislative body. I am a simple inquirer, endeavoring to ascertain -the soundness of certain systems of philosophy. If there are men who -profess Christianity and practice paganism, I do not see that this fact -should deter me from estimating the nature of the Christian religion, -as I would endeavor to estimate the character of any other religion. -It is no concern of mine whether men who profess Christianity and -practice paganism can feel any sympathy with Mr. Spencer's views. The -question for me is whether _I_ can feel any sympathy with his views. I -will, therefore, go on to tell you why I do not believe that a merely -"rationalized version" of the ethical principles of Christianity will -take the place of those divine injunctions on which the ethics of -Christianity are primarily based. Observe, now, that I do not enter -upon the proofs of the divine authority or the divine nature of Christ. -I point to nothing but the fact that the Christian ethics presuppose -a divine and superhuman origin of moral injunctions. About the fact -that they presuppose and assume the sacred origin of moral injunctions, -there can be no controversy. We read that the question was put to -Jesus, "What commandment is first of all?" and the answer was, "The -first is, Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God, the Lord is one; and thou -shalt love thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with -all thy strength. The second is this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as -thyself. There is none other commandment greater than these."[132] -The person who made this answer may or may not have been a divinely -commissioned teacher, but, whatever he was, the question that was put -to him was a very searching one, and both question and answer assume -two things: first, that there is a being, man, to whom commands are -addressed; secondly, that there is a being, God, by whom commands are -given. Jesus undertakes to inform those who questioned him, what are -the two commandments than which there are none greater addressed to -human beings; and in this answer he covers the existence of man as -one being and the existence of God as another being. In any scheme of -philosophy which ignores the existence of these two beings--ignores -the existence of man as a being capable of receiving and acting upon a -command, and the existence of a being capable of addressing a command -to man--there must necessarily be a great defect; not because Jesus, a -supposed divinely commissioned teacher, assumed that there are two such -beings, but because without the hypothesis of their existence there can -be no ethical system whatever. The crucial test of the soundness of Mr. -Spencer's philosophy is, therefore, whether he negatives the existence -of man and the existence of God. - -Undoubtedly, there is a certain kind of consistency and completeness -in Mr. Spencer's whole philosophy. Beginning with biology, he traces -all organized life back to the original molecules of organizable -matter, and he makes man, in his physical structure, a product of -successive modifications of organisms out of one another, by simple -generation. This ignores the Creator as a being specially fashioning -the human animal, which Mr. Spencer thinks is a conception too grossly -anthropomorphic to stand the slightest scientific scrutiny. He then -takes up what he calls "psychology," and deals with what he considers -the origin and nature of the human mind. He makes consciousness to -consist in tracts of feeling in the nervous organization. He denies -that mind is an entity, a being, perceiving and recognizing ideas -suggested by the impressions produced upon the nervous organization -by external objects. According to his psychological system, there is -no _ego_, no person, no thinking being, behind the sensations and -feelings in the nerve-center, and to whom the nerve-center suggests -ideas. Rejecting the hypothesis of such a being, Mr. Spencer treats -of the composition of mind; and he makes it consist, not in a being, -but in components of feelings produced by the molecular changes of -which nerve-corpuscles are the seats, and the molecular changes -transmitted through fibers. He does not regard the ultimate fabric of -mind as a thing admitting of any inquiry. He says that its proximate -components can be investigated, and that these are feelings and the -relations between feelings. This "method of composition remains the -same throughout the entire composition of mind, from the formation of -its simplest feelings up to the formation of those immense and complex -aggregates of feelings which characterize its highest development." -Here, then, we must stop. We are not to conceive of mind as an -organized entity, or as an organism; or as a something in which certain -powers inhere, and which affords a field for their action. We may talk -of a "thread of consciousness," meaning aggregates of feelings produced -by successive waves of molecular change in the nerve-corpuscles, but we -may not talk of "consciousness" as perception by a conscious subject. -We may talk of feelings, but not of a subject that feels. Mind, then, -is not an existence apart from physical organization. Its phenomena are -products of our corporeal organization. Man is not a person; and, if -he is not, how he is to have a sense of obligation, how there is to be -any intuitional idea of right and wrong, in the sense of a command or -an injunction addressed by one being to another, I do not understand. -Mr. Spencer does not help me to understand this, and obviously he does -not intend to, because he denies it absolutely. His system of ethics -plainly ignores it; and to that I now pass. - -He makes conduct consist in the adjustment of actions to ends. Good -conduct is when the actions are adjusted to the ends of producing all -the pleasure and happiness that they can be made to bring about. Bad -conduct is when the actions produce only pain or misery to some one, -or there is not a proper adjustment of them to the end of happiness. -Beginning, as you described it in our last conference, with the lowest -orders of animals, the conduct of man is the same adjustment of actions -to ends that it is in them; the difference being, in the case of man, -that as an animal he has a greater and more varied power of complete -adjustment of his actions to wider and more comprehensive ends than -any other animal. These wider and more comprehensive ends consist in -the full accomplishment of happiness and pleasure to other beings. -This, according to Mr. Spencer, is impliedly admitted by those who -assert the sacred origin of moral injunctions; for, when pressed for -the reason why moral injunctions have been given, all moralists, -he says, admit that the ultimate moral aim is a desirable state of -feeling, gratification, enjoyment, happiness to some being or beings. -That the welfare of society is _one_ of the moral aims which moral -injunctions of the sacred order were designed to accomplish, so far as -special injunctions are believed to have been given, is plain enough. -But that this congruity between the divine commands and the happiness -of others--the useful effect of such commands--comprehends the whole -purpose of such commands, is the ultimate and sole reason for their -being given, so far as they are believed to have been given, may be -disproved without difficulty. For example, an individual may be an -utterly worthless person, a curse to his relatives and friends and to -society, irreclaimably sunk in vice and misery, a mere cumberer of the -ground. To kill him will produce no unhappiness to any one, but will -be a positive relief and benefit. According to "the current creed," -there stands a sacred injunction, "Thou shalt do NO murder." -This is accepted as an absolute, fixed, eternal canon of the divine -will. You are not to take upon yourself individually to determine, by -any standard of utility applied to a particular case, that you can -rightfully kill a human being. A miser is alone in the world. I can -steal his hoarded gold, and apply it to good objects. There stands -the command, "Thou shalt _not_ steal." For no purpose, for no object -whatever, for no end whatever, shall you commit a theft. "Society," to -borrow a phrase of one of the strongest men of our time, "would go all -to pieces in an hour" if it were to adopt only the utilitarian standard -of morality, and to reject the sacred origin of moral injunctions.[133] -The reception of that sacred origin--the belief in it--implies that -man is a being capable of receiving and obeying a divine command. The -existence of such a being is negatived by Mr. Spencer's psychological -system. That he equally negatives the existence of God as a being -capable of giving, and who has given, moral injunctions to man, is -apparent throughout his whole scheme of philosophy. According to that -philosophy, there is nothing in the universe but an Omnipotent Power, -which underlies all manifestations. To ascribe a personality to that -Power is a relic of the primitive beliefs of barbarians, and it is one -that is rapidly dying out of the conceptions of educated men. - -There is, therefore, no room in Mr. Spencer's philosophy for any -moral intuitions, such as are implied in the hypothesis that man was -placed under an obligation to obey his Creator, and made capable -of recognizing that obligation. I can perceive no other ultimate -foundation for a system of ethics. As to the idea that we can make -a system of ethics which is to relegate to individual judgment the -adaptability of actions to produce complete happiness, and to have no -other standard of right and wrong, we might as well at once act upon -the maxim that the end justifies the means, and leave every man to -determine that the end is a good one; and, therefore, the action is -good. - -KOSMICOS. How do you justify the death-penalty which is -inflicted by society? Have you any justification for it, excepting the -claim that it is a useful restraint? - -SOPHEREUS. When society acts judicially in the punishment of -crime, it inflicts such punishments as experience shows will prevent, -or tend to prevent, others from committing that crime. Its authority -to punish with death or some other penalty is founded, primarily, in -regard to the simpler crimes, such as murder, theft, adultery, false -testimony, etc., on the divine prohibition, which a belief in the -sacred origin of certain special moral injunctions leads it to accept; -and, secondly, on the general welfare of mankind.[134] Eliminate from -the ethical code all belief in the sacred origin of moral injunctions, -and confine the judicial action of society to the merely utilitarian -effect of individual conduct, and you will surrender the whole criminal -code to the doctrine that the individual who does a certain act is to -be punished or not to be punished, according to the effect of his act -on the person or persons who are immediately or remotely affected by -it. It is because of Mr. Spencer's negation of man's intuitive sense of -obligation to obey divine commands, because of his peculiar system of -"psychology," that I can not accept the system to which he gives the -name of "ethics." He ought to have invented a new term for his science -of mind. "Psychology," according to its derivation, and as it is used -in the English language, means discourse or treatise on the human soul, -or the doctrine of man's spiritual nature. If he has no spiritual -nature, no soul, what does this philosopher mean by entitling his work -"The Principles of Psychology"? It seems to me that in this use of a -term which implies something that he labors to show does not exist, he -is not quite consistent, for he certainly does not mean to admit that -man has a soul, in the sense in which the learned world have generally -used the term "psychology." But, not to stickle for verbal criticisms, -I will endeavor to give you my conception of his "scientific" analysis -of the mind, and to contrast it with the other analysis, which seems to -me to be better supported. - -KOSMICOS. Take care that you do not misrepresent him. - -SOPHEREUS. I shall take the utmost care to represent him -in the only sense in which I can understand him; and, if I do not -represent him accurately, you will correct me. Take, in the first -place, the following passage, in which he defines the only _ego_ that -has any existence: - - That the _ego_ is something more than the passing group of feelings - and ideas is true or untrue according to the degree of comprehension - we give to the word. It is true if we include the body and its - functions; but it is untrue if we include only what is given in - consciousness. - - Physically considered, the _ego_ is the entire organism, including its - nervous system; and the nature of this _ego_ is predetermined: the - infant had no more to do with the structure of its brain than with the - color of its eyes. Further, the _ego_, considered physically, includes - all the functions carried on by these structures when supplied with - the requisite materials. These functions have for their net result - to liberate from the food, etc., certain latent forces. And that - distribution of these forces shown by the activities of the organism, - is from moment to moment caused partly by the existing arrangement of - its parts and partly by the environing conditions. - - The physical structures thus pervaded by the forces thus obtained, - constitute that substantial _ego_ which lies behind and determines - those ever-changing states of consciousness we call mind. And - while this substantial _ego_, unknowable in ultimate nature, is - phenomenally known to us under its statical form as the organism, it - is phenomenally known under its dynamical form as the energy diffusing - itself through the organism, and, among other parts, through the - nervous system. Given the external stimuli, and the nervous changes - with their correlative mental states depend partly on the nervous - structures and partly on the amount of this diffused energy, each of - which factors is determined by causes not in consciousness but beneath - consciousness. The aggregate of feelings and ideas constituting the - mental _I_, have not in themselves the principle of cohesion holding - them together as a whole; but the _I_ which continually survives as - the subject of these changing states is that portion of the Unknowable - Power which is statically conditioned in special nervous structures - pervaded by a dynamically-conditioned portion of the Unknowable Power - called energy.[135] - -It is now necessary to translate this; and in translating it, it is -necessary to attend to the meaning of words. Let us begin with the -first proposition comprehended in this statement: "That the _ego_ is -something more than the passing group of feelings and ideas, is true -or untrue according to the degree of comprehensiveness we give to the -word. It is true if we include the body and its functions; but it is -untrue if we include only what is given in consciousness." The natural -antithesis would have been to contrast what is included in the _body_ -with what is included in the _mind_. But as he does not admit that -the mind is an existence, as there is nothing but a passing group of -feelings and ideas, not a person who perceives feelings and has ideas, -he speaks of _what is given in consciousness_, consciousness being -nothing but that passing group, an ever-changing series, never the -same, and never laid hold of and appropriated by a conscious subject. -We do, indeed, call these ever-changing states of consciousness mind, -but this is a misnomer, if we mean it in the sense of a being. What is -to be considered, therefore, when the analysis seeks to ascertain the -real and only _ego_, is the body and its functions, and the passing -group of feelings and ideas which is given in consciousness. - -Let us pass on: The body is the physical structure and its functions. -It is pervaded by the forces which its functions liberate from the -latent condition in which they exist in food and other environment. -This physical structure, thus pervaded by certain forces, is the -substantial _ego_ which lies behind and determines the ever-changing -states of consciousness which we call mind. There is no other _ego_ -than the body. It is phenomenally known to us under its _statical_ -form as the organism; that is to say, when the body is contemplated -as an organism which is not acting, or as a mere structure. But it -is phenomenally known to us also under its _dynamical_ form, which -is when the energy derived from the pervading forces is diffusing -itself through the organism. Statical,[136] I understand, refers to -a body at rest, or in equilibrium, not acting; dynamical refers to -bodies in motion, or acted on by force, in movement. The human body is -phenomenally known to us in both of these conditions or states. When -it is in the dynamical state, that is, when it is acted on by external -stimuli, there will be nervous changes; these nervous changes have -correlative mental states, which depend partly on the nervous structure -and partly on the amount of the diffused energy which pervades the -organism. But these two factors, the nervous changes and the diffused -energy, are each determined by causes that are not in consciousness, -but beneath consciousness. This I understand to mean that when there -are nervous changes from a state of rest or non-action, produced by -external stimuli, and a certain amount of diffused energy pervades the -organism, there will be correlative mental states, which are determined -by factors that are not in consciousness but beneath consciousness. -Consciousness, therefore, is not a perception by a conscious subject, -or a consciousness of a self experienced by a being, but it is a -passing group of feelings and ideas, which have no cohesion, are never -the same, but are ever-changing successions of impressions produced in -the physical organism. - -I come now to the summary and conclusion of the whole matter as -expressed in the last sentence of the paragraph which I have read. -There is a mental I, but it is not a person, an existence, an -independent _ego_. It is constituted of an aggregate of feelings and -ideas, which have not in themselves a principle of cohesion that -holds them together as a whole. They are merely passing groups of -feelings and ideas which are never the same, but which succeed one -another without connection or cohesion. There is an I which continually -survives as the subject of these changing states, but it is that -portion of the Unknowable Power which is statically conditioned in -special nervous structures pervaded by a dynamically conditioned -portion of the Unknowable Power called energy. - -So that each individual of the human race is to be contemplated, -not as a dual existence, composed of a body and a mind, united for -a certain period, but as a subject which is continuously undergoing -certain physical changes by the action through it of a portion of the -energy exerted by the Unknowable Power. The Unknowable Power pulsates -through my bodily organism a certain portion of its energy, and that -of which continuous existence can alone be predicated is this portion -of the Unknowable Power which is statically conditioned in my nervous -structure, pervaded by a dynamically conditioned portion of that -Unknown Power. - -I trust, now, it will not be said that I misrepresent Mr. Spencer -when I assert that he ignores, denies, and endeavors to disprove -the existence of the mind of man as a spiritual entity, capable of -surviving his body. Have you any fault to find with my paraphrase of -the passage on which I have commented? - -KOSMICOS. You have paraphrased that passage fairly enough, but -you ought to attend to the proof which he adduces in support of his -position in the subsequent passage to which he refers you in the one -that you have quoted. Let me read it: - - § 469. And now, before closing the chapter, let me parenthetically - remark on a striking parallelism between the conception of the - Object thus built up, and that which we shall find to be the proper - conception of the Subject. For just in the same way that the - Object is the unknown permanent _nexus_ which is never itself a - phenomenon, but is that which holds phenomena together; so is the - Subject the unknown permanent _nexus_ which is never itself a state - of consciousness, but which holds states of consciousness together. - Limiting himself to self-analysis, the Subject can never learn - anything about this _nexus_, further than that it forms part of the - _nexus_ to that peculiar vivid aggregate he distinguishes as his - body. If, however, he makes a vicarious examination, the facts of - nervous structure and function, as exhibited in other bodies like - his own, enable him to see how, for each changing cluster of ideas, - there exists a permanent _nexus_ which, in a sense, corresponds to the - permanent _nexus_ holding together the changing cluster of appearances - referable to the external body. - - For, as shown in earlier parts of this work, an idea is the psychical - side of what on its physical side is an involved set of molecular - changes propagated through an involved set of nervous plexuses. That - which makes possible this idea is the pre-existence of these plexuses, - so organized that a wave of molecular motion diffused through them - will produce, as its psychical correlative, the components of the - conception, in due order and degree. This idea lasts while the waves - of molecular motion last, ceasing when they cease; but that which - remains is the set of plexuses. These constitute the potentiality of - the idea, and make possible future ideas like it. Each such set of - plexuses, perpetually modified in detail by perpetual new actions; - capable of entering into countless combinations with others, just - as the objects thought of entered into countless combinations; and - capable of having its several parts variously excited, just as the - external object presents its combined attributes in various ways--is - thus the permanent internal _nexus_ for ideas, answering to the - permanent external _nexus_ for phenomena. And just as the external - _nexus_ is that which continues to exist amid transitory appearances, - so the internal _nexus_ is that which continues to exist amid - transitory ideas. The ideas have no more a continued existence than - we have found the impressions to have. They are like the successive - chords and cadences brought out from a piano, which successively die - away as other ones are sounded. And it would be as proper to say that - these passing chords and cadences thereafter exist in the piano, as it - is proper to say that passing ideas thereafter exist in the brain. In - the one case, as in the other, the actual existence is the structure - which, under like conditions, again evolves like combinations. - - It is true that we seem to have somewhere within us these sets of - faint states answering to sets of vivid states which once occurred. - It is true that in common life ideas are spoken of as being treasured - up, forming a store of knowledge; the implied notion being that they - are duly arranged and, as it were, pigeon-holed for future use. It - is true that in psychological explanations, ideas are often referred - to as thus having a continued existence. It is true that our forms - of expression are such as to make this implication unavoidable; and - that in many places throughout this work the phrases used apparently - countenance it; though, I believe, they are always transformable - into their scientific equivalents, as above expressed. But here, as - in metaphysical discussions at large, where our express object is - to make a final analysis, and to disentangle facts from hypotheses, - it behooves us to recognize the truth that this popular conception, - habitually adopted into psychological and metaphysical discussions, - is not simply gratuitous, but absolutely at variance with experience. - All which introspection shows us is that under certain conditions - there occurs a state of consciousness more or less like that which - previously occurred under more or less like conditions. Not only are - we without proof that during the interval this state of consciousness - existed under some form; but, so far as observation reaches, it gives - positive evidence to the contrary. For the new state is never the - same--is never more than an approximate likeness of that which went - before. It has not that identity of structure which it would have were - it a pre-existing thing presenting itself afresh. Nay, more; even - during its presence its identity of structure is not preserved--it is - not literally the same for two seconds together. No idea, even of the - most familiar object, preserves its stability while in consciousness. - To carry further the foregoing simile, its temporary existence is - like that of a continuously-sounded chord, of which the components - severally vary from instant to instant in pitch and loudness. Quite - apart, however, from any interpretation of ideas as not substantive - things but psychical changes, corresponding to physical changes - wrought in a physical structure, it suffices to insist upon the - obvious truth that the existence in the Subject of any other ideas - than those which are passing, is pure hypothesis absolutely without - any evidence whatever. - - And here we come upon yet another phase of that contradiction which - the anti-realistic conception everywhere presents. For setting out - from the data embodied in the popular speech, which asserts both the - continued existence of ideas and the continued existence of objects, - it accepts the fiction as a fact, and on the strength of it tries to - show that the fact is a fiction. Continued existence being claimed for - that which has it not, is thereupon denied to that which has it.[137] - -SOPHEREUS. The writings of Mr. Spencer, more than those of -any other person of equal reputation that I have met with, require -close examination in order to test the soundness of his propositions -and assertions. Such a passage as the one which you have now quoted -appears, on a first reading, to be quite plausible. When it is read -carefully two or three times, and analyzed, it is found to be untenable -in its reasoning, and largely made up of dogmatic assumptions. I shall -now give you my reasons for this criticism. In the first place, let us -go through the passage and fix the meanings of words. "Nexus," although -not a term adopted into the English language, means, I presume, bond -or ligament. "Plexus" is a word that we find in English dictionaries -as a scientific term, and it means a union of vessels, nerves, or -fibers, in the form of net-work.[138] Taking along these meanings, we -find that the subject, the only thing of which a subjective existence -can be predicated, is the ligament which holds states of consciousness -together, and this permanent ligament is unknown. It is not itself -a state of consciousness, but it is the bond which holds states of -consciousness together. These states of consciousness are the ideas -which are passing in the subject, which are never the same, which are -not a permanent possession, and therefore there is in the subject no -other existence than the passing ideas of the moment. Ideas, then, -are not substantive things, but psychical changes, corresponding to -physical changes wrought in a physical structure. The proof which is -supposed to make this a tenable hypothesis consists of, first, what -can be learned by self-analysis, or by my introspection of myself; -next by vicarious examination, or by observing the facts of nervous -structure and function exhibited in other bodies like my own. These -examinations enable us to discover, what? Not a conscious person, -learning, appropriating, and holding ideas, but that there exists only, -for each changing cluster of ideas, a permanent _nexus_, corresponding -to the permanent _nexus_ which holds together the changing cluster of -appearances referable to the external body. We next have the assertion -that ideas have no more a continued existence than the impressions -made in the external body. Both are transitory, and in both the only -continued existence is the _nexus_, or ligament which binds together -the changing impressions and the changing clusters of ideas. This Mr. -Spencer illustrates by the successive chords and cadences brought -out from a piano. These have no existence in the piano, which is -nothing but a mechanical structure, giving forth sounds, when they -are struck, which sounds are merely passing chords and cadences; and -he concludes that it would be just as proper to say that the passing -chords and cadences, after they have died away, exist in the piano, as -it is to say that passing ideas, after the nervous impressions have -ceased, exist in the brain. Let us now go back and examine this kind -of psychology in detail. Mr. Spencer speaks of self-analysis, and of -the analysis of other minds and bodies like our own. He uses the terms -self, others, me, mine, him, his. Who or what is this thing which -examines himself or another? Who and what are "you" or "I," who sit -here talking to each other? Are these mere forms of expression, always -transformable into their scientific equivalents? What is the scientific -equivalent for he, his, me, mine, you, yours? Mr. Spencer says that, -under certain conditions, there occurs a state of consciousness more or -less like other states of consciousness that have existed before, but -that the only permanent thing is the _nexus_ which holds these states -of consciousness together. His illustration of the piano fails. If -the piano were a structure that could of its own volition give forth -such sounds as it chose to utter, it might be correct to speak of it -as an existence having a store of sounds which it could make reach our -ears when and as it saw fit. But it does not happen to be an automatic -machine. It is a mere collection of strings, of different sizes and -tensions, which, when struck by an instrument called a hammer, cause -certain vibrations in the air. But a human being is an automatic -organism; one that can at pleasure give utterance to ideas through -the vocal organs, so that they are communicated to you. When I give -utterance to an idea, through my vocal organs, in speaking to you, do -I draw on a stock of permanent ideas, some of which I express, or do -I express nothing but a passing state of consciousness, more or less -like other states of consciousness that have before passed through -my nervous organization? Mr. Spencer asserts that the notion of the -continued existence of ideas is absolutely at variance with experience. -On the contrary, experience proves it every moment of our lives. - -For example: Years ago a person related to me a fact very interesting -and important to me, but I have not until now had occasion to make use -of it. I have a perfect recollection of what he told me. It bears no -resemblance to any other fact of which I ever heard. It concerns me -alone. I have a perfect recollection of it. I stored it up for future -use whenever I should need to use it. Is it a self-delusion that I have -stored up and treasured this information? When I recollect and repeat -it, just as it was told me, am I doing nothing but giving expression to -a passing idea, more or less like the original idea? This would be a -rather dangerous doctrine to adopt as the interpretation of experience. -Human testimony respecting things that we have been told, or have seen, -would be a pretty uncertain reliance if the memory had no other power -than to assimilate a passing idea, more or less, to a former state of -consciousness which more or less resembled the present consciousness. -Men deviate from the truth rather frequently, now; but, teach them that -memory is nothing but the assimilation, more or less, of a passing -idea to some other idea that formerly passed through their heads, and -I should be rather afraid of their testimony. I should fear that the -"psychological changes" would be a little too frequent, and that the -story would not have "that identity of structure which it would have -were it a pre-existing thing presenting itself afresh." - -What is all the learning of the scholar? Has he treasured up nothing? -Has he nothing in the pigeon-holes of his mind? Has he no mind in which -to store his acquisitions? Is the sole actual existence "the structure -which, under like conditions, again evolves like combinations"? Must -he find himself under like conditions which will again evolve like -combinations of ideas in passing trains of consciousness, before he can -bring forth from the store-house of his mind the pre-existing thing -that lies within it? - -KOSMICOS. I must here interject a question in my turn. What is -the proof that ideas have a continued existence? Speaking of the brain -as the nerve-center, in which impressions are produced by molecular -changes transmitted along the nerve-fibers, what proof is there that an -idea which is now passing through the brain continues to exist there, -any more than the passing chord or cadence continues to exist in the -piano? - -SOPHEREUS. Do you not see that the very power of -discrimination which we possess, whereby we distinguish between -present and former conditions, and present and former combinations, -proves that there is a permanent existing thing in an idea which -presents itself afresh, and with which we compare the passing idea, so -as to determine whether they are the same? If we did not possess this -power, all thinking, all expression of ideas, all memory, all that -part of consciousness which is not made up of mere bodily feelings and -sensations, would be nothing but the repetition of the passing idea; -and all learning, information, knowledge, and experience, would be -utterly useless. If there did not exist something with which to compare -the passing idea of the present moment, we should be always floating -on the surface of the passing idea. There would be no continuity in -our intellectual existence. We should be reduced to the condition of -the piano, and could only give forth such chords and cadences as are -produced by successive blows of the hammer upon the strings of the -instrument. And how could anything originate in ourselves? What is -the faculty which produces ideas that are not only new to ourselves, -not only not suggested by passing ideas, but new to all other human -intellects, and never embraced in their experience until we put -them within their apprehension? What did Dante do when he produced -the "Inferno"? or Milton, when he composed the "Paradise Lost"? or -Shakespeare, when he composed his "Hamlet"? or Goethe, when he produced -his "Faust"? Does the poet, when he gives us ideas that we never -possessed before, originate nothing? If he is a maker, a creator, in -the realm of ideas, are those original ideas, which neither he nor -any one else ever had before, the mere result of like combinations -evolved out of like conditions, when neither the old conditions nor -the combinations have anything to do with the new ideas which he has -produced? Surely, in reference to the great productions of human -genius, we must contemplate the mind as an existence, having the power -to do something more than to produce the transitory ideas that are -passing through the brain from the impressions on it, communicated -through the nervous structure. Surely there is some other structure -than that which can be likened to the piano. Surely there is something -more than a set of plexuses "which constitute the potentiality of an -idea, and make possible future ideas like it"; for there are possible -future ideas which are not like any former ideas, which do not depend -on any set of plexuses, and do not cease to be possible when the -waves of molecular motion cease. These possible future ideas are the -conceptions which the mind originates in itself; which are unlike -anything that has gone before, or that is passing now. So that there -are two kinds of ideas: the kind that has a continued existence, and -that consists in knowledge, and is drawn upon by memory; and the other, -the kind of which continued existence is not to be predicated until it -has been formulated by the faculty of original production, not produced -by an exercise of memory, but produced by original creation. - -KOSMICOS. Has not Mr. Spencer allowed for and accounted for -all that you claim as the power of originating new ideas? Does he not -say that "each set of plexuses"--each set of the net-work of ideas--is -"perpetually modified in detail by perpetual new actions"; is "capable -of entering into countless combinations with others, just as the -objects thought of entered into countless combinations; and capable of -having its several parts variously excited, just as the external object -presents its combined attributes in various ways"? Is not this the -whole matter, in regard to what you call the power of originating new -ideas? - -SOPHEREUS. No, it is not. In the first place, I do not believe -that he was here intentionally speaking of any ideas but those which -are suggested by, or involve external objects. But, if he did mean to -include the production of new and original ideas through the countless -combinations into which old ones may be made to enter, his theory does -not fit the case of poetical invention of new ideas, or the invention -of imaginary characters, or lives; for these are creations which are -not mere combinations of old ideas, and the more they depart from -everything suggested by, or resembling, former ideas, the more we are -obliged to recognize as a faculty of the mind the power to originate -and formulate new ideas that did not previously exist. - -KOSMICOS. Well, you have criticised Mr. Spencer's mental -philosophy from your point of view. Now let me hear your hypothesis of -the origin and nature of mind, with which you promised to contrast his -psychology, and which you think is better supported. - -SOPHEREUS. I think I had better put my views in writing, and -read them to you at our next meeting. You can then have them before -you to examine at your leisure. Let me say in advance, however, that -I shall not rely on any of the metaphysicians, but shall endeavor to -give you my conception of the nature of mind from my own reflections, -and from common experience. I shall make my examination of the nature -of mind precede any suggestion of its probable origin, just as I think -we should examine the structure of any organism before we undertake to -deduce its probable origin. - - * * * * * - -Here, then, closes the debate between these two persons, from whom, -at the end of the next chapter, I shall part with a reluctance which -I hope the reader will share. Not for victory do I allow Sophereus to -explain his analysis of mind, without describing how his scientific -friend receives it. - - FOOTNOTES: - - [130] "Data of Ethics," chap. xv. - - [131] Ibid. - - [132] Revised version of St. Mark's gospel. - - [133] The late Jeremiah S. Black is the person whose language is here - quoted, although it was used with reference to something else. - - [134] This does not imply that the punishment inflicted by society - is to be always the same. It implies only that there is to be some - punishment, so long as the prohibited act continues to be committed. - - [135] "Principles of Psychology," vol. i, pp. 503, 504, § 220. - - [136] _Statical_: pertaining to bodies at rest or in equilibrium. - - _Dynamical_: pertaining to strength or power. - - _Dynamics_: that part of mechanical philosophy which treats of bodies - in motion; opposed to _statics_. ("Webster's Dictionary.") - - [137] "Principles of Psychology," vol. ii, p. 484, _et seq._ - - [138] "Webster's Dictionary." PLEXUS. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - -Sophereus discourses on the Nature and Origin of the Human Mind. - - -SOPHEREUS, in fulfillment of his intention expressed at their -last meeting, reads to the scientist the following - - -DISCOURSE ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN MIND. - -I regard the mind as an organism, capable of anatomical examination, as -the body is, but of course by very different means. In the anatomical -examination of an animal organism we use our eye-sight to acquire -a knowledge of its component parts, its organs, and its structure, -by dissection of a dead or inspection of a living subject. But, in -studying the anatomy of mind, we have a subject that is beyond our -visual perception. It is not, however, beyond our examination. We carry -on that examination by means of the introspection which consciousness -enables us to have of our own minds, and by observing and comparing the -phenomena of mind as manifested in other persons. If these respective -means of investigation enable us to reach the conviction that in each -individual of the human race there is an existence of a spiritual -nature and another existence of a corporeal or physical nature, we -shall have attained this conclusion by observing the difference between -the two organisms. The fact that we can not detect the bond that unites -them while they are united should not lead us to doubt their distinct -existence as organisms of different natures, but made for a temporary -period to act on and with each other. - -Before entering further into the subject, I will refer to some of the -terms which we are obliged to use in speaking of the nature of mind as -an organism, when contrasted with the nature of the physical organism. -We speak, for example, and from the want of another term we are obliged -to speak, of the substance of mind. But, while we thus speak of mind -in a term of matter, there is no implication that the subject of which -we speak is of the same nature as that which constitutes the physical -organism; nor is there any danger of the incorporation of materialistic -ideas with our ideas of the fabric of mind. On the contrary, the -very nature of the inquiry is whether that which constitutes mind is -something different from that which constitutes body; and, although in -speaking of both we use the term substance, we mean in the one case -organized matter, and in the other case organized spirit. There is a -very notable instance of a corresponding use of terms in the passage -of one of St. Paul's epistles, where he discourses on the doctrine -of the resurrection. According to my universal custom when I refer -to any of the writings regarded by the Christian world as sacred, -or inspired, I lay aside altogether the idea of a person speaking -by divine or any other authority. I cite the statement of St. Paul, -in its philosophical aspect, as an instance of the use of the term -body applied to each of the distinct organisms. His statement, or -assertion, or assumption--call it what you please--is, "If there is -a natural body, there is also a spiritual body";[139] he uses the -term _body_ in speaking of that which is natural, or of the earth, -earthy, and of that which is spiritual, or heavenly. Without following -him into the nature of the occurrence which he affirms is to take -place in the resurrection, the question is whether he was or was not -philosophically correct, in speaking of two kinds of organisms, one -composed of matter, and liable to corruption and dissolution, and the -other composed of spirit, indestructible and imperishable. - -In order to be understood, he was obliged to use the term _body_ in -reference to both of these organisms, just as we are obliged to use the -term _substance_ when we speak of the subject of contemplation as a -physical or as a spiritual organism. Can this distinctness of nature be -predicated of the body and the mind of man before what we call death? - -The peculiar occurrence which St. Paul so vigorously and vividly -describes as what is to happen at the resurrection, is a prophecy in -which he mingles with great force philosophical illustrations and the -information which he claims to have received from inspiration; or -things revealed to him by the Almighty through the Holy Spirit. He -expresses himself in terms level to the apprehension of those whom he -is addressing; and in this use of terms he does just what we do when we -speak of a natural body and a spiritual body. He puts the existence of -the natural body hypothetically: - -"_If_ there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body."[140] -Paraphrased as the whole passage may be, he says, "You well know that -there is a natural body, and I tell you that there is also a spiritual -body." Laying aside the mode in which the spiritual body is to be -manifested at and after the resurrection, we have to consider whether, -during this life, there is a bodily organism and a mental organism, -distinct in their natures, but united for a time by a bond which is -hidden from our detection. - -I have used the term anatomy of the mind, from the same necessity which -compels me to speak of the substance of mind. You will understand -that, when I speak of anatomical examination of the mind, I mean -that analysis of its structure which we can make by the use of the -appropriate means, and which enables us to conceive that it is an -organized structure of a peculiar character. - -The grand difficulty with Mr. Spencer's "Psychology" is, that after he -has made what he calls "the proximate components of mind" to consist -of "two broadly contrasted kinds--feelings and the relations between -feelings," which are mere impressions produced on the nerve-center by -molecular changes in the fluid or semi-fluid substance of the nerves, -he has not approached to a solution of the question whether there is or -is not a something to which these feelings and the relations between -them suggest ideas, and which holds ideas continuously for future use. - -Thus he makes consciousness to consist in passing groups of feelings -and their relations, and not in a conscious subject. He denies that -there is any _ego_, in the sense in which every person is conscious -of a self, and maintains that the only substantive existence is the -unknown ligament which holds together the ever-changing states of -feelings and impressions produced in the nerve-center. There is a far -better method of investigation. It is to inquire into the fabric of the -mind as an organism, by determining whether mental phenomena justify -us in the conclusion that it is an organism. In this way we may reach -a satisfactory conclusion that the mind is a substantive existence, -possessing a uniform structure, of a character, however, fundamentally -different from the bodily structure; and in this way we may be able to -explain, wholly or in part, how the mind and the body act on and with -each other so long as the connection is maintained. - -I am entirely free to acknowledge that, when I speak of the -substance of mind, or speak of it as an organism, I am and must -remain ignorant of the nature of its substance beyond the point where -its self-manifestations cease. But the question is, whether we are -not under an irresistible necessity of adopting as a postulate the -existence of a something which has certain inherent powers, and whether -the mental phenomena, the self-manifestations of those powers, do not -necessarily lead us to the conception and conviction that mind is a -substantive existence. I can not talk or think of consciousness apart -from a conscious subject, or of feelings without a subject that feels. -A thread of consciousness, or a series of feelings, conveys no meaning -to me, apart from a being who has the consciousness and perceives the -feelings.[141] - -One very important question to be considered in all such investigations -is, Whether our experience does not teach us that we are mentally so -constituted that certain conceptions are necessary to us? Our mental -nature is placed under certain laws, as our physical or corporeal -nature is placed under certain other laws. One of these necessary -conceptions, which are imposed on us, as it seems to me, by a law of -our mental constitution, is a conception of the fundamental difference -between matter and spirit. In what way is it forced upon us that there -is a natural world and a spiritual world? The phenomena of matter -and the phenomena of mind are essentially different. In ourselves -they occur in conjunction, and they occur in disjunction. They are -manifested synchronously, and they are manifested separately in point -of time. The normal action of all the functions of the body is not -necessary to the action of the mind. The body may be prostrated by -disease, and the moment of its death may be at hand; yet the mind, -to the last moment of the physical life, may be unclouded, and its -manifestations may be as perfect as they ever were in the full health -and activity of the vital functions of the body. No one who stands at -a death-bed where this phenomenon occurs, and observes how completely -the mind is master of itself; how it holds in consciousness the past -and the present; how it essays to grasp the future for those whom it is -to leave and for itself, can easily escape the conviction that death -is nothing but the dissolution of the bond which has hitherto held -together the two existences that constituted the human being, one of -which is to be dissolved into its elemental and material substances, -and the other of which is to go elsewhere, intact and indestructible. - -Let me now refer to what is taking place while I am writing this essay. -I have said that the phenomena of our bodily organism and the phenomena -of our mental organism may occur synchronously in the same individual. -The act of writing an original composition is an instance of this. The -action of certain organs of the body and the action of the mind are -simultaneous. In time, they can not be separated. In themselves, they -are separable and separate. The thought springing up in the mind may be -retained there, or may flow into language and be written by the hand -upon the page. No one can detect in himself any instant of time when -the mental formation of a sentence, or any clause of a sentence, as -he writes, is separable from the physical act of writing. In that not -very common, but still possible, feat of dictating to two amanuenses, -at what appears to be the same time, on two distinct subjects, there -is undoubtedly an appreciable interval, in which the mind passes from -one subject to the other, and then back again, with great rapidity. -But, when one is one's own amanuensis, when the act of thinking and -formulating the thought, and the act of writing it down in words, is -performed by the same person, there is a simultaneous action of that -which originates the thought and clothes it in words, and the act of -the bodily organ which inscribes the words upon paper. How is this -phenomenon to be explained? And to what does it lead? Is there anything -in the whole range of Mr. Spencer's "Psychology" that will interpret -this familiar experience? May it not be interpreted by an anatomical -examination of the mind as an organism? - -I do not now refer to cases where a thought is completely formulated -before the pen begins to be moved over the paper, and is then recalled -by an effort of the memory and written down. I am referring to what -I suppose is the habit of many persons in writing, namely, the -origination and formulation of the thought as the hand moves the pen, -a habit of which most practiced writers are perfectly conscious. The -same thing occurs in what is truly called extemporaneous speaking,[142] -when oral discourse is not a mere repetition, _memoriter_, of thoughts -and sentences which had been previously formulated, but, as the -word extemporaneous implies, when the thought and the language flow -from the vocal organs _eo instanti_ with their conception. In these -and the similar cases of improvisation and animated conversation, -in which there is a synchronous action of the mind and the bodily -organs, it would be impossible for us to have that action if mind were -constituted as Mr. Spencer supposes it to be. If there were no mind in -the sense of an organized entity, conceiving a thought and clothing -it in the language needful to give it written or oral expression, -"if the _ego_ were nothing more than the passing group of feelings -and ideas"--if an "idea lasts (only) while the nerves of molecular -motion last, ceasing when they cease"--if that which remains is (only) -the "set of plexuses"--how could we originate any new thought? The -very illustration to which Mr. Spencer resorts, when he likens the -automatic human being to the non-automatic piano, and makes them -analogous in their action, in order to show that passing ideas do not -have a continual existence in the mind, but that the actual existence -is the physical structure which, under like conditions, again evolves -like combinations, reduces us at once to the level of the piano, -and precludes the potentiality of a new and original idea which is -not a combination of former ideas, and is produced under different -conditions. The assertion or argument that each set of plexuses is -capable of entering into countless combinations with others, and so -renders possible future ideas, does not advance us one step to the -solution of what takes place when we conceive a new thought, clothe it -in language, and write it down on paper, or give it oral expression. - -In justification of this criticism, let me now refer to that -intellectual process which is called "invention," in its application -to the mechanic arts. I do not mean to suggest or to claim that this -kind of invention is an act which is to be referred to a distinct and -peculiar faculty of certain minds, in the possession of which one -man may differ from another. But I shall endeavor to describe what -takes place when one conceives the intellectual plan of a certain new -combination of mechanical devices, and embodies that plan in a machine -which differs from all other previous machines in its characteristic -method of operation. For convenience, I shall speak of the person who -produces such a machine as the inventor, which is the same as speaking -of him as the maker, as the poet is the maker of a poem. This act of -invention, or the making of some concrete new thing, is an act of -creation. The inventor, then, may be supposed to have learned all -that empirical and all that scientific mechanics could teach him; to -have had any quantity of passing groups of ideas pass through his -consciousness; to be possessed of any number of plexuses capable of -entering into countless combinations with others. These plexuses, or -networks of transitory ideas, consisting of former impressions in the -nerve-center, must, it is said, be recalled under the like conditions -which produced them. But the conditions for the inventor are not the -same. Something is to be produced into which the old ideas do not -enter. There is to be a new arrangement of old mechanical devices; -a new combination is to be made, which will possess a method of -operation and accomplish a result never before seen or obtained. -A new concrete thing, a new machine, is to be created. That the -conception must be formed, that the objective point, to which the whole -intellectual effort is to aim, must be seen, is manifest. A tentative -intellectual process may have to be gone through before the full -conception is reached, just as a tentative experimental process may be -necessary in finding out how the practical embodiment of the conception -is to be reached in building the structure. These processes may go on -simultaneously or separately; but, when they are both completed, when -the new machine stands before us, we see at once that the plan is an -intellectual conception, perfectly original, and the physical structure -is a new arrangement of matter effected by the hand of the inventor -or by the hands of others, which he uses as his instruments in doing -the physical work. I do not know, therefore, how this phenomenon is -to be explained upon the theory that the only _ego_ is the body and -its functions, which lies behind and determines ever-changing states -of consciousness. I know not how else to interpret the phenomenon of -invention, excepting to adopt the postulate that there is a mind, a -substantive existence, which, while its consciousness holds ideas -suggested by former conditions, has the inherent power to originate -ideas that did not form a part of any previous state of consciousness. - -I have spoken of mind as an organism and as a substantive existence. -This is a deduction to be drawn from the manifestations of mental -phenomena. In order to guard against an objection that may possibly -be interposed in the way of this method of investigation, I will -anticipate and answer it. It will be said that we can not define or -describe the substance of mind; can not tell whether it is a unit, -in itself, or an aggregate of units; we know and can know nothing -more than its approximate components, and all that we know of these -does not justify us in assuming to speak of the substance of mind. I -have more than once suggested, in our former conferences, that our -inability to define and to describe the substance of any supposed -existence is no proper objection to the hypothesis that there is such -an existence. When we undertake to define matter, or to describe the -substance of that which we call matter, we find that we soon reach a -point where precise definition or description ceases. Yet we do not -for that reason refrain from deducing the existence of matter from the -manifestations of certain phenomena and from our experience with them. -It is perfectly true that we know matter only by the manifestations of -certain physical phenomena; that we can not define the nature of its -substance. All we can do, by the most minute analysis, is to arrive at -the perception of the ultimate particles or units of matter; and the -nature of the substance of which these units are composed is incapable -of any further description. "Matter"[143] is one of the words in the -English language which are used in a great variety of senses, exact and -inexact, literal and figurative. In its philosophical sense, meaning -the substance of which all physical bodies are composed, the efforts of -lexicographers to give a definition, descriptive of the nature of what -is defined, show that definition is, strictly speaking, impossible. -All that can be said is that matter is "substance extended"; or that -which is visible or tangible, as "earth, wood, stone, air, vapor, -water"; or "the substance of which all bodies are composed." But these -efforts at definition express only what is needful to be expressed in -contrasting matter with that other existence which is called "spirit." -This is another word which is used in very different senses, but of -which no more exact definition can be given, when it is used in its -philosophical sense, than can be given of "matter." Lexicographers -have defined "spirit," in one of its meanings, as "the _soul_ of man; -the intelligent, immaterial, and immortal part of human beings"; and in -another of its meanings, more broadly, as "an immaterial, intelligent -substance." In these definitions they have followed the metaphysicians, -and the uses of the word in the English translation of the Bible. -When we turn to the definition of "soul," we find it given as "the -spiritual and immortal substance in man, which distinguishes him from -brutes; that part of man which enables him to think and reason, and -which renders him a subject of moral government." We also have it -defined as "the understanding, the intellectual principle." Undoubtedly -these definitions involve certain assumptions, such as the existence -of a substance called spirit, and the existence of an intellectual -principle, of which "soul," "spirit," and "intellect" are mere names. -But there is no difficulty in the way of our knowing what is meant when -these terms are used. The difficulty of giving a definition without -a circuitous use of terms, explaining the one by the other, and then -explaining the last by the first, does not prevent us from having a -definite conception of the thing spoken of. When we speak of mind, -soul, or intellect, what we think of is the something in ourselves -of which we are conscious, and whose manifestations we observe in -other beings like ourselves; and what we have to do is to examine the -evidence which may bring home to our convictions the existence of this -something that perceives, thinks, acts, originates new ideas; holds -former ideas in consciousness, is connected with and acts upon and -is acted on by bodily organs, and is at the same time more than and -different from those organs. - -I have referred to some of the mental phenomena which have the -strongest tendency to prove the existence of the mind as an organized -entity. These are the phenomena which occur in our waking hours, -when the intellectual faculties and the bodily organs are in the full -exercise of their normal functions respectively. There is another class -of mental phenomena which may be said to be abnormal, in this, that -the intellectual faculties and the bodily organs do not preserve the -same relations to each other in all respects that they do when we are -fully awake. These are the phenomena that occur during sleep--a class -of mental phenomena of great consequence to be observed and analyzed in -any study of psychology. They are of an extraordinary variety, complex -in the highest degree, and dependent on numerous causes of mental and -physical disturbance; but it is quite possible to extract from some of -them certain definite conclusions. - -Sleep, properly regarded, when it is perfect, is a state of absolute -rest and inactivity of all the organs and functions of the body -save the digestion of food and the circulation of the blood, and of -all the mental faculties. Perfect sleep, sleep in which there is -absolutely no consciousness, is more rare than those states in which -there is more or less consciousness. But it is often an actual state -of both body and mind, and it was evidently designed to renew the -vigor of both, and to prevent the wear and tear of unbroken activity. -Between absolute unconsciousness induced by perfect sleep and the -full consciousness of our waking moments, there are many intermediate -states; and the phenomena of these intermediate states present very -strong proofs of the existence of the mind as a special and spiritual -entity, capable in greater or less degree of acting without the aid -of the physical organs. I do not except even the organ of the brain -from this suspension of action during certain states when the mind -is in more or less of activity; for I am convinced that in some -of the mental phenomena to which I shall advert and which I shall -endeavor to describe, the brain is in a state of perfect sleep, and -that in the production of those phenomena it takes no part. In other -mental phenomena, which occur during sleep, the brain or some part -of it is evidently acted upon by the mind, as in the somnambulistic -condition, when the nerves of motion, responding to the action of the -mind, communicate action to the muscles, and the body walks about and -performs other external acts. - -There are other mental phenomena occurring during very profound sleep -of the body and its organs, when the mind does not appear to derive -its action from the brain, or to be dependent on the brain for its -activity; when it is exceedingly active, and when it communicates -action to none of the bodily organs; when, for example, it carries on -long trains of thought, composes sentences, invents conversations, -makes poetry and prose, and performs other intellectual processes. -Distributed into classes, the most important mental phenomena occurring -during sleep are the following: - -First, and presenting perhaps the strongest proof of the mind's -independence of all the bodily organs, is that whole class of mental -phenomena in which, during profound sleep of the body, we carry on -conversations, compose original matter in the form of oral or written -discourse, which we seem to ourselves to be producing, and solve -intellectual difficulties which have baffled us when awake, or imagine -that we receive from an unexpected source important information that we -are not conscious of having previously received. - -The phenomena of conversations, to which we appear to ourselves to be -listening during sleep, or in which we appear to ourselves to be taking -part, are, when analyzed, most remarkable occurrences, for it is the -mind of the sleeper which originates the whole of what appears to be -said by different persons. These conversations are as vivid, as much -marked by different intellectual and personal characteristics, sudden -and unexpected turns, apt repartee, interchange of ideas between two or -more persons, as are the real conversations which we overhear, or in -which we take part, when we are awake. Yet the whole of what is said, -or appears to us to be said, is the invention of the one mind, which -appears to itself to be listening to or talking with other minds, and -all the while the body is wrapped in profound sleep. This extraordinary -intellectual feat, so familiar to us that it scarcely attracts our -attention unless we undertake to analyze it, is closely akin to the -action of the mind when the body and the mind are neither of them -asleep, and when we invent a conversation between different persons. -But this occurrence is marked by another extraordinary peculiarity: -for it happens, during sleep, to persons who could not, when awake, -invent and write such conversations at will, and who in their waking -hours have very little of the imaginative faculty needed for such -productions. I account for this phenomenon by the hypothesis that when -the mind is free from the necessity of depending on the bodily organs -for its action, as it is during profound sleep of the body, when its -normal relations with the body are completely suspended and it is left -to its independent action, it has a power of separate action. This, I -think, accounts for a kind of mental action which, when compared with -that which occurs in conjunction with the action of the bodily organs, -may be called abnormal. Under the impulse of its own unrestrained and -uncorrected activity, the mind goes through processes of invention, -the products of which are sometimes wild and incoherent, sometimes -exceedingly coherent, sensible, and apt. Let the person to whom this -occurs be thoroughly awakened out of one of these states, and the mind -becomes immediately again subjected to the necessity of acting along -with, and under the conditions of its normal relations to the body. - -Akin to this mental feat of inventing conversations, during a sleep of -the body, is the power of composing, during such sleep, oral discourse -of one's own, or the power of composing something which we appear -to ourselves to be writing. I suppose this is an occurrence which -happens to most persons who are much accustomed to writing or to public -speaking. It is often an involuntary action of the mind; that is to -say, it is sometimes accompanied with a distinct consciousness that -it is a process that ought to be arrested because it is a dangerous -one, and yet it can not be arrested before full waking consciousness -returns. On goes the flow of thought and language, apparently with -great success; we seem to be speaking or writing with even more than -our usual power, and all the while in the style that belongs to us; -but, until we are fully restored to the normal relation of the mind -and the body, we can not at will arrest this independent action of -the mind, but must wait until our bodily senses are again in full -activity. I do not suppose that this phenomenon ought to be explained -by the hypothesis that there are certain parts or organs of the brain -which are specially concerned in the work of original composition of -intellectual matter, and that these organs are not affected by the -sleep that is prevailing in other parts of the brain. While it is -doubtless true that there are special systems of nerves which proceed -from or conduct to special parts of the brain, and by which action -is imparted to or received from the other organs of the body, and -while some of these special parts of the brain may be in the state -of absolute inactivity called sleep, and others are not, I know of -no warrant for the hypothesis that the intellectual operations or -processes are dependent upon any particular organ or organs of the -brain, as distinguished from those from and to which proceed special -systems of nerves. If any person, who is much accustomed to that kind -of intellectual activity which consists in original composition of -intellectual matter, will attend to his own consciousness, and probe -it as far as he may, he will not find reason, I apprehend, to conclude -that the power of thought and of clothing thought in language resides -in any special part of the brain. His experience and introspection -will be more likely to lead him to the conclusion that this power, -whether it is exerted when he is asleep or awake bodily, is a power -that inheres in the mind itself regarded as a spiritual existence and -organism, and that the action of the brain, or of any part of it, is -necessary to the exercise of this power only when it is necessary, as -it is in our waking moments, to use some of the bodily organs in order -to give the thought oral or written expression by giving it utterance -through the vocal organs or by writing it down on paper. Certain it -is that we conceive thoughts in more or less of connected sequence, -and clothe them intellectually in language of which we have entire -consciousness while the process is going on, without the action of any -part of the body. - -It may be objected to this view that the intellectual products which -we seem to ourselves to be making when we are asleep would, if they -could be repeated by an effort of the memory, word for word, just as -they seem to have occurred, be found to be of the same incoherent, -senseless stuff of which all dreams are made; and that this test would -show that the brain is at such times not absolutely and completely in -the condition which is called sleep, but that it is only partially in -that condition; that it is performing its function feebly, imperfectly, -and not as it performs that function when the whole body is awake. In -reference to this hypothesis, I will repeat an anecdote which I have -somewhere read, which is equally valuable whether it was an imaginary -or a real occurrence. - -A gentleman of literary pursuits, who was a very respectable poet, was -subject to this habit of composition during sleep. One night he awoke -his wife and informed her that he had composed in his dream some of -the best and most original verses that he had ever written. He begged -her at once to get a candle, pen, ink, and paper, and let him dictate -to her the new composition that appeared to him so striking. When they -read together the new poem on the next morning, it turned out to be -nonsensically puerile. But occurrences of this kind, if they could be -multiplied, would prove only that we are liable to illusions in sleep, -in regard to the comparative merits of our intellectual products, -which we imagine ourselves to be creating when we are in that state, -as we are in regard to other things. We are under a delusion when we -imagine in our dreams that we encounter and converse with another -person, living or dead. We are perhaps deluding ourselves when in sleep -we compose or seem to compose an original poem. But what is it that -deludes itself, either in respect to the interview with another person, -or in respect to the new composition? Is it the brain, or is it the -mind? Is it a person, or a bodily organ that has the false impression, -in the one case or the other? There must be a something that is subject -to an illusion, before there can be an illusion. If both brain and -mind are in profound sleep, absolute suspension of all action, there -can be no illusion about anything. If the brain is absolutely asleep -and the mind is not, the illusion is in the mind and not in the brain. -That the latter is what often occurs, the experience of the illiterate -and uncultivated makes them aware, as well as the experience of the -lettered scholar and the practiced writer.[144] - -Under the same head, I will now refer to those strange but familiar -occurrences which take place when there come to us, in sleep, solutions -of difficulties which we had not overcome by all our efforts while -awake, and which appeared to us utterly dark when we lay down to rest. -These mental phenomena are almost innumerably various. They take place -in regard to all kinds of subjects, to lines of conduct and action, to -everything about which our thoughts are employed; and they are a class -of phenomena within everybody's experience. There is scarcely any one -to whom it has not happened to lie down at night with a mind distressed -and perplexed about some problem that requires a definite solution, -and to rise in the morning, usually after a night of undisturbed -rest, with his mind perfectly clear on the subject, and with just the -solution that did not come to him when he devoted to it all his waking -thoughts. What is the explanation of this phenomenon? If the mind -is an independent entity, a spiritual organism, capable of its own -action without the aid of the body under certain circumstances, this -phenomenon can be explained. If the mind is not a spiritual organism, -capable, under any circumstances, of acting without the aid of the -bodily organs, this phenomenon can not be explained. - -The most probable explanation is this: When we are awake, and devote -our thoughts to a particular subject that is attended with great -difficulties, we go over the same ground repeatedly--the mind travels -and toils in the same ruts. Nothing new occurs, because we look at the -subject in the same way every time we think of it. We are liable to be -kept in the same beaten path by the associations between our thoughts -and the bodily states in which we have those thoughts--associations -which are exceedingly powerful. But let these associations be dissolved -as they are during perfect sleep--let the mind be in a condition to act -without being dependent on the brain or any other bodily organ for aid, -or exposed to be hampered by the conditions of the body, and there will -be a mental activity in which ideas will be wrought out that did not -occur to us while we were awake. The memory, too, may recall a fact -which we had learned while awake, and yet we may be unable to recollect -how it came to our knowledge. At such times, the fact is recalled; but -as the mind is acting in a condition which is abnormal when compared -with the waking condition, and is liable to delusions about some -things, we imagine that the fact is revealed to us in some wild and -supernatural way, as by a person who is dead and who has come to us to -communicate it. There is a well-authenticated account of an occurrence -of this kind, given by Sir Walter Scott in one of the notes to his -"Antiquary," and on which he founds an incident related by one of the -personages in his story. The real occurrence was this: A gentleman in -Scotland was involved in a litigation about a claim asserted upon his -landed estate. He had a strong conviction that his father had bargained -and paid for a release of the claim, but he could find no such paper. -Without it he was sure to be defeated in the suit. Distressed by this -prospect, but utterly unable to see any way out of his misfortune, he -lay down to sleep, on the night before he was to go into Edinburgh to -attend the trial of the cause. He dreamed that his father appeared to -him, and told him that the claim had been released, and that the paper -was in the hands of a lawyer in a neighboring town, whose name the -paternal shade mentioned. - -Before going into Edinburgh on the next day, the gentleman rode to -the place which his father had indicated, and found the lawyer, of -whose name he had been previously unconscious. This person turned out -to be an old man, who had forgotten the fact that he had transacted -this piece of business for the gentleman's father; but on being -told of the fact that his client had paid his fee in a foreign coin -of a peculiar character--which was one part of the story which the -father's apparition related to the son--he recalled the whole of the -circumstances, searched for the paper, and found it. The gentleman's -estate was saved to him; but he became very superstitious about dreams, -and suffered much from that cause, as was quite natural. Sir Walter's -solution of the whole affair is of course the correct one: "The dream -was only the recapitulation of information which Mr. R---- had really -received from his father while in life, but which at first he merely -recalled as a general impression that the claim was settled. It is not -uncommon for persons to recover, during sleep, the thread of ideas -which they have lost during their waking hours."[145] Sir Walter makes -another observation which is worthy of being repeated--that in dreams -men are not surprised by apparitions. Why are we not? Because the mind -is in a state of abnormal activity, in which everything that occurs to -it seems perfectly natural. The delusion in regard to the mode in which -the very important fact was communicated to Mr. R---- in his dream, was -substituted in the place of the actual communication made to him by -his father during life. The latter he had wholly forgotten, and he had -forgotten the circumstance of payment of the lawyer's fee in a peculiar -coin, which had also been mentioned to him by his father when living. -This remarkable incident, which might doubtless be paralleled by many -similar occurrences, proves one of two things: either that the exercise -of the memory is wholly dependent upon a waking condition of the brain, -or that there may be an abnormal and imperfect act of memory while -the brain is in profound sleep, in the course of which a fact becomes -mixed with a delusion about the mode in which we are told of the fact. -What happened to Mr. R---- was that his mind recalled the fact, but -imagined that he then learned it for the first time from an apparition. -I do not know how such a phenomenon can be explained, excepting by the -hypothesis that the mind is a special existence, which acts during -sleep of the body upon facts that are lodged in the memory, but mixes -them with imaginary and delusive appearances, so that the mode in which -the fact was actually learned is obliterated from the memory, and some -supernatural mode of communication takes its place. On the return of -waking consciousness, the mode in which the fact was actually learned -is still shut out from recollection, and, if the person to whom this -kind of delusion has occurred is of a superstitious turn, he will act -on what he has imagined was told him by the apparition, because he has -no other means of rescuing himself from an evil. - -In regard to the mental phenomena which occur without delusions or -apparitions, where the thoughts on a difficult subject become clearer -and more satisfactory to us when we awake from sleep than they ever -were during our waking hours, I suppose the explanation is this: During -profound sleep of the body, including the brain, there is an entire -suspension of every bodily function excepting the digestion of food and -the circulation of the blood. If there is excited in some of the other -organs an action of a peculiar kind, by an excitation of the nerves -connected with those organs, it is proof that the condition of perfect -sleep is not prevailing in all parts of the brain. The state to which I -now refer supposes a complete inactivity of the whole bodily organism -save in the digestive function and the circulation of the blood. In -such a state, the mind, that which thinks and reasons, does not act -upon the brain, and is not acted upon by it. It is capable of thinking -on any subject which has employed its thoughts during the waking hours; -and while, in some cases, it is visited by apparitions and subject -to delusions, it is in other cases engaged in ideas that involve no -delusive appearances. Freed from all the associations of these ideas -with the feelings prevailing in the body when we think of the subject -during our waking hours, we are able to perceive relations of the -subject which have not before occurred to us. When we pass from the -condition of sleep to the full consciousness of our bodily and mental -organism, we are intellectually possessed of these new relations of the -subject, which we have brought with us out of the state in which we -acquired them, and they furnish us with new materials for the solution -of the problem that we had not solved when we lay down to rest. It -is not, I am persuaded, because the mind was at rest during sleep, -and when we become awake is by reason of that rest better able to -grapple with the difficulties of the subject, that we do grapple with -them successfully; for in the case supposed, which is a very common -experience, the thoughts are actually employed on the subject, while -the body and the brain are in the absolute rest and inactivity of all -the organic functions excepting those of digestion and circulation of -the blood. I do not know that it is possible to detect, in a person -sleeping, an increased circulation of the blood to any part of the -brain which may be supposed to be concerned in the act of thinking, -and at the same time to know that thinking is going on, unless such an -observation could be made of a person in the state called somnambulism, -which is not the state of which I am now speaking. But reasoning upon -the phenomenon which I have now described, according to all that we can -learn from our own experience or from observation of others, I reach -the conclusion that the mind, the thinking and reasoning entity, can -and does, in profound sleep of the body and the brain, employ itself -upon a subject that has occupied us when awake, and can perceive new -relations of that subject, which had not before occurred to us, without -the activity of any portion of the nerve-center which is called the -brain. Does this hypothesis assume that our thoughts when asleep are -more valuable than our waking thoughts? It does, to a certain extent -and under certain circumstances, for experience proves that in sleep -we acquire ideas which we did not have before we fell asleep, and which -we bring with us out of that condition. - -That I have now given the true explanation of this familiar experience -will appear, I think, from this consideration: There are very few -nights when we do not in sleep have many thoughts. The states of -perfect unconsciousness are comparatively rare. If the brain were never -entirely asleep, if it were always engaged in the physical work of -thinking--whatever that work may be--it would be worn out prematurely. -But if the brain is perfectly at rest, while the mind is actively -employed, the brain undergoes no strain and suffers no exhaustion; and -the mind suffers no strain or exhaustion because it is in its nature -incapable of wear and tear. It is only when the mind acts on the brain -that exhaustion takes place. I speak now of what happens in states of -ordinarily good health.[146] - -I shall now refer to some of the very peculiar phenomena of -somnambulism; and in illustration of their various phases I shall -resort to Shakespeare's picture of the sleep-walking of Lady Macbeth, -which, although purely imaginary, is a most accurate exhibition of -nature. Treating it, as we are entitled to treat it, as if it were a -real occurrence at which we ourselves were witnesses, with a knowledge -of her character and history, an analysis of the situation in which she -was placed when the habit of somnambulism came upon her, and of the -mode in which her mind acted upon her body, will enable us to see the -phenomena in their true philosophical aspect. We may suppose ourselves -present, with the doctor and the gentlewoman of her bedchamber, when -she comes forth in her night-dress and with a candle in her hand, and -we witness the impressive scene of a disturbed mind overmastering the -body while the body is asleep. It seems that, after the murder of -Duncan, when she imbrued her own hands with his blood in smearing the -faces of his sleeping grooms, the habit of sleep-walking had come -over her. As we stand by the side of the awe-stricken witnesses, and -hear their whispered conversation, we get the first description of -her actions since the new king, Macbeth, her husband, whom she had -instigated to murder the old king, went into the field. These first -actions of hers, as described by the gentlewoman to the doctor, do not -necessarily exhibit the working of a guilty conscience. They exhibit -a mind oppressed and disturbed by cares of business and of state; -and they are a distinct class of the phenomena of somnambulism. The -gentlewoman tells the doctor that "since his Majesty went into the -field, I have seen her rise from her bed, throw her night-gown upon -her, unlock her closet, take forth paper, fold it, write upon it, read -it, afterward seal it, and again return to bed; yet all this while in -a most fast sleep." This is merely a description of what the witness -has seen, and it might occur to any person of strong intellectual -faculties, disturbed by great cares, without the action of a guilty -conscience. It makes the situation real when the doctor recognizes -the fact of this "great perturbation in nature! to receive at once -the benefit of sleep, and do the effects of watching." As they are -whispering together, the doctor trying to make the gentlewoman tell -him what at such times she has heard her say, which the loyal servant -refuses to tell, Lady Macbeth moves forward, with the taper in her hand. - -Here we may pause upon the first exhibition of the phenomenon called -sleep-walking, which we get by description only, and analyze the nature -of the action. It is perfectly apparent that what the poet accepted -as true, is the power of the mind to move the body while the body is -asleep, so as to make it perform many acts. Experience makes this -assumption perfectly correct. I presume it will not be questioned that -this phenomenon is described by Shakespeare with entire accuracy, -and it is explicable only upon the hypothesis that the mind has some -control over the body while the body is asleep. Actions as minute and -as much premeditated as those performed by Lady Macbeth "in a most fast -sleep," have been witnessed in persons who were undoubtedly asleep, -and whose eyes were open for some purposes, but, as in her case, their -sense was shut for other purposes. - -We now pass to the more awful exhibition of a mind worked upon by a -guilty conscience. Lady Macbeth comes out of her bedroom fast asleep, -but with a light in her hand. The gentlewoman who interprets her -state to the doctor informs him that she has a light by her bedside -continuously; and we thus learn that her nights are so disturbed -that she can not bear darkness. They notice that her eyes are open, -but "their sense is shut." Then begin the terrific manifestations of -the control of a guilty conscience over both mind and body, when the -memory, alive to certain terrible facts, plays fantastic tricks with -itself, and mingles delusions with realities. As she approaches, with -the taper in her hand, she performs an action which the gentlewoman -says she has repeatedly seen her go through, for a quarter of an hour -at a time, endeavoring to rub a spot of blood off from one of her -hands. Her hands have been clean, physically, since the time when she -first washed them on the fatal night; but the delusion that is upon her -is that there is blood on them still. She goes on rubbing them, and her -first exclamation is, "Out, damned spot! out, I say!" Yet it will not -out. That little hand wears what she imagines to be an indelible stain. -After her first exclamation, the memory rushes back to the moment -before the murder. She thinks she hears, perhaps does hear, the clock -strike--"one, two"; and then, as if speaking to her husband, she says, -"Why, then 'tis time to do't." Then there is a pause, and out comes -the reflection, "Hell is murky!" This seems to indicate that darkness, -in which she and her husband are whispering together just before -the murder, is a hell, and so very fit for what is about to be done. -Hell is murky, as this chamber is. Then she remembers her husband's -reluctance, and fancying that she is still talking with him and -bracing him up to the deed, she says: "Fye, my lord, fye! a soldier, -and afeard? What need we _fear_ who knows it, when none can call our -_power_ to account?" Presently she is looking back upon the deed, and -exclaims, "Yet who would have thought the old man to have had so much -blood in him!" Then she recurs to herself as if she were another: "The -thane of Fife had a wife; where is _she_ now?" Again she thinks of her -stained hands: "What, will these hands _ne'er_ be clean?" Are they to -wear this horrible stain forever? Instantly she is again at the door -of Duncan's chamber, speaking to her husband: "No more o' that, my -lord, no more o' that: you mar all with this starting!" Then her hands -again, her poor hands; they _smell_ of the blood: "Here's the smell -of the blood still: all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this -little hand! Oh, oh, oh!" Then, after another pause, she is speaking -to her husband, when the deed has been done: "Wash your hands, put on -your night-gown; look not so pale!" In another instant she is thinking -of Banquo's murder, which occurred after Duncan's, and she says to her -husband: "I tell you yet again, Banquo's _buried_; he can not come out -of his _grave_!" Once more she is back at the door of Duncan's chamber, -in the darkness, and the murder has been committed. Speaking to her -husband, she says: "To bed, to bed; there's knocking at the gate. Come, -come, come, come, give me your hand. What's done can not be undone. To -bed, to bed, to bed!" Then she goes quickly toward her chamber and to -bed, believing that Macbeth is with her and that she is holding his -hand. - -How mixed, how wild, how fantastic, how coherent and incoherent are -these phantoms of the imagination! If she were awake, things would -not thus present themselves to her. Every event in the dreadful story -would stand in its true relations, and, however she might be suffering -the pangs of a guilty conscience, she would not mix up the scenes -through which she had passed, but every fact would stand in its due -order. She would be conscious that there was no blood upon her hands, -and that they did not need the perfumes of Arabia to sweeten them. -She would know that Duncan had been murdered, and would not enact the -murder over again. She would remember that Banquo's murder had not been -distinctly made known to her, and that she had only surmised it, when -at the banquet Macbeth fancied that the ghost of Banquo rose and sat -at the table--an apparition which neither she nor any one else saw. -But, in that strange scene, it flashed across her mind that Banquo was -dead, and to herself she interpreted truly what was passing in her -husband's mind, and instantly explained his conduct to the company as -the recurrence of an old malady to which he was subject. - -If we go back to what had actually happened before the banquet, and -then go forward to the condition in which she is seen by the doctor and -her attendant, we shall understand how her mind was working, not upon -a fact that she knew, but upon a fact which she had truly surmised. -In her somnambulistic state, she says to her husband: "_I tell you -yet again_, Banquo's buried; he can not come out of his grave." Had -she said this to him before? According to the course of the story, as -the text of the play gives it to us, she had not. In the second scene -of the third act, where, after Duncan had been murdered and Macbeth -had become king, they are preparing for the banquet, to which Banquo -was expected as one of the guests, Macbeth and his wife are talking -together, and she is trying to get him out of the contemplative and -conscience-stricken mood in which he looks back upon what they have -done. He concludes one of his mixed and melancholy reflections with -these words: - - Duncan is in his grave; - After life's fitful fever he sleeps well; - Treason has done his worst: nor steel, nor poison, - Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing - Can touch him further! - -Then she says to him: - - _Lady Macbeth._ Come on; - Gentle my lord, sleek o'er your rugged looks; - Be bright and jovial 'mong your guests to-night. - - _Macbeth._ So shall I, love; and so, I pray, be you; - Let your remembrance apply to _Banquo_; - _Present him eminence_,[147] _both with eye and tongue_: - Unsafe the while, that we - Must lave our honors in these flattering streams; - And make our faces vizards to our hearts, - Disguising what they are. - -Just at this moment, therefore, he is not thinking of killing Banquo, -but wishes him to be received with all honor. But, in answer to his -last reflection on the hypocritical part that they must act, she says -to him: - - You must leave this. - -Then bursts forth the terrific oppression of his soul: - - _Macb._ Oh, full of scorpions is my mind, dear wife! - Thou know'st that Banquo, and his Fleance, _lives_. - _Lady M._ _But in them nature's copy's not eterne._[148] - _Macb._ There's comfort yet; they _are_ assailable; - Then be thou jocund: ere the bat hath flown - His cloistered flight; ere, to black Hecate's summons, - The shard-borne beetle, with his drowsy hums, - Hath rung night's yawning peal, there shall be done - A deed of dreadful note! - -She affects not to understand him--perhaps does not--and she asks: - - _What's_ to be done? - _Macb._ Be innocent of the _knowledge_, dearest chuck, - Till thou applaud the _deed_. Come, seeling night, - Skarf up the tender eye of pitiful day; - And, with thy bloody and invisible hand, - Cancel, and tear to pieces, that great bond - Which keeps me pale!--Light thickens; and the crow - Makes wing to the rooky wood; - Good things of day begin to droop and drowse; - While night's black agents to their prey do rouse. - Thou marvel'st at my words: but hold thee still; - Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill: - So, prithee, go with me. [_Exeunt._ - -In the next scene, the murderers, previously engaged by Macbeth, -waylay Banquo in the park as he is approaching the castle, and kill -him, his son Fleance and a servant escaping. Then follows the banquet, -Macbeth himself moving about at first, and then he takes a seat at -the table lower down. One of the murderers comes in and whispers to -him what has been done. The stage direction is, "The ghost of Banquo -rises and sits in Macbeth's place." As no one at the table but Macbeth -sees this apparition, it might be inferred that it is the force of -his imagination which presents the spectacle to him, as Lady Macbeth -supposes, when she says to him: - - O proper stuff! - This is the very painting of your fear: - This is the air-drawn dagger, which, you said, - Led you to Duncan. - -But the stage direction must be taken as a literal appearance of the -ghost, so as to make it visible to the audience, while it is invisible -to all at the table excepting Macbeth himself. - -If, now, we go forward to the night when Lady Macbeth is walking in her -sleep, and remember what had occurred previous to and at the banquet, -we see how, without any actual previous knowledge that her husband -intended to have Banquo killed, and with only the surmise that he had -been killed, which comes to her at the banquet, she came to say to her -husband, in her dream: - - I tell you yet again, Banquo's buried; he can not come out of his grave. - -Here we have a fact lodged in the mind during the waking hours, and -in sleep wrought into a strange mixture with the killing of Duncan, -with which it had in reality no connection, having transpired -afterward. This is very strong proof of the capacity of the mind to -act during sleep without the action of the brain. The mind of the -guilty sleep-walker is filled with horrible memories, which it can not -shut out, but with which it can not deal in their actual order and -true relations, because the sequences of thought, during sleep, are -abnormal. Those whose experience has never involved any such workings -of conscience are perfectly aware of the fact that in dreams ideas -that are separately lodged in the consciousness become entangled with -each other in the most fantastic manner. Lady Macbeth at one moment -even thinks of herself as if she were some one else, and asks, Where -is the woman now who was the wife of the thane of Fife? Every one has -experienced in sleep the same projection of one's self out of one's own -consciousness; so that we seem to be contemplating ourselves as if we -were a different person. - -The phenomena that occur during the delirium of fever, where the -normal consciousness is lost for the time being, are in some respects -analogous to and in some respects different from those which occur -during the somnambulistic condition. Delirium occurs when the body -and the brain are not in the condition of sleep; but the senses of -perception convey false impressions to the mind, and the mind itself -has temporarily lost its power of correcting its own action by its -former experience. The nearest friends who are around the bedside -are not recognized by the sufferer; they appear to be strangers, -and the patient talks to them as if both they and he were not their -real selves. It would seem that we can safely infer from the state -of delirium a suspension of the direct and normal connection between -the brain and the mind; that neither of them can act, in relation to -the other, as they both act when there is no such disturbance: but -that this condition, so far from proving or tending to prove that the -mind is not an independent spiritual existence, has a strong tendency -to prove that it is. Insanity, on the other hand, is probably a -derangement of the mental organism akin to derangement of the physical -organism, but not necessarily connected with or induced by the latter, -for the bodily health of the insane is often entirely sound while -the mind is in an entirely unsound and irrational condition. But the -phenomena of insanity are too various and multiform, and too much -dependent on both physical and moral causes, to afford any satisfactory -proofs of the postulate which I propound in this essay. The safest -line of investigation is that which I suggested in the first instance, -namely, to regard the mind as an organism, and to ascertain whether -it is susceptible of anatomical examination in a sense analogous -to anatomical examination of the bodily organism. All that I have -hitherto said is useful by way of preliminary illustration of my main -hypothesis. It has a strong tendency to show that the mind, instead -of consisting, as some philosophers now suppose, of the products of -a material organism, is itself an organized being with a definite -structure and capable of living a life of its own, although at present -dwelling in a corporeal organism which affects it in various ways -while the connection lasts. The theory that all mental phenomena are -products of our corporeal organism is one that appears to derive -great support from examinations of the structure of the brain and of -the whole nervous system. The physical anatomy of man exhibits very -striking illustrations of the influence of corporeal changes upon the -mental state, as the mental changes show corresponding influences upon -the corporeal state. But, then, there are undoubtedly phenomena that -are purely and exclusively mental; and therefore when we undertake to -solve these mental phenomena by the materialistic hypothesis we find a -sense of inadequate causation confronting us so directly that we are -compelled to look for a solution elsewhere. It is certain that things -take place in the inner recesses of our minds, in the production of -which the bodily senses not only render no aid, but in which they -have no part whatever. It is necessary, therefore, to carry our -investigations into a class of mental phenomena in which all physical -causation ceases to afford an adequate guide to a conclusion. - -It will not be denied that the products of material organisms can be -proved to consist of matter and of nothing else. Their presence can -be detected by some physical test. For example, if it be true that -all animals have been evolved from protoplasm, the organisms are -simply changes in the form of a certain portion of matter. If, in an -individual organism having a highly developed nervous structure, there -are actions produced by an excitation of the nerves of sensation, -those actions are simply molecular changes in the matter comprising -the sensitive and easily moved substance of the nerve-fibers. However -far and into whatever minutiæ we carry our investigations into -organized matter, we find that its products remain material, and that -they consist only of changes in the material substance of a material -organization. But, when we pass from such material products into -the domain of purely mental phenomena, are we warranted in saying -that, although the latter are not, properly speaking, _products_ of -the material organization, they are _effects_ corresponding to and -dependent upon the excitation of the nerves of sensation? This last -hypothesis must assume one of two things: either that there is a -distinction between those corporeal feelings which do not and those -which do produce mental changes or mental effects, or, if there are -corporeal feelings which produce corresponding mental states and -mental action, there must be a something on which the effects can -be wrought, and this something must be an independent organism. It -is doubtless true that there are many corporeal feelings which are -followed by no very important mental effects, especially during a -sound state of bodily health. But it is equally true that, if there -are corporeal feelings which influence our mental action, there must -be an organism which is capable of being so influenced; and our -experience and consciousness teach us that there is such a difference -between corporeal feelings and mental phenomena that the probability -of a difference in the originating causes becomes very great. We know -that the mind can and does act with great force when bodily suffering -is extreme; that it has an energy of its own which enables it to rise -above all the power of physical pain to restrain or influence it. I -must therefore follow out, as I had originally projected, my anatomical -analysis of the mind as an independent spiritual organism. - -In order to arrive at a correct conclusion concerning the structure -of mind, we must first observe that there are four special corporeal -organs by which the capability of the mind to receive impressions -from matter is acted upon. It is through these means that the -properties of matter, or those properties which can make themselves -known to us, become known to us. The senses, as they are usually -called, are sight, hearing, smell, and taste. The external organ of -each of these senses is furnished with a set of nerves, the function -of which is to transmit from that organ a wave of molecular motion -along the fluid or semi-fluid substance inclosed in the nerve-tubes -to the great nerve-center the brain, the central recipient of all -such motions. Such, at least, is the theory, which may be accepted -as a fact. But, then, the question remains, What is the intellectual -perception or mental cognition of the idea suggested by one of these -supposed transmissions of a wave of molecular motion? Is there a -being, a person, a spiritual entity, conceiving the idea or having an -intellectual perception of it? Or is there no such being, and while we -attribute to the office of the nervous system the function of producing -certain feelings or sensations in the brain, do these sensations or -feelings constitute all that there is of consciousness? - -It is impossible for me to conceive of consciousness as anything but an -intuitive sense of his own existence, experienced by a being capable of -such an experience, because endowed with such a faculty. It is certain -that when we so regard consciousness we are not deceiving ourselves; -for if any one will consider what would happen to him if he should -lose this faculty of being sensible of his own existence, he will see -that in the event of that loss he could neither distinguish himself -from other persons, nor have any control over his own actions, or any -cognition whatever. For this reason, the theory on which I made some -criticisms in one of our late conversations is the one with which -I contrast my conception of mind. If that theory fails to satisfy -a reflecting person in regard to the nature of consciousness, as -certified to him by his own experience, the hypothesis that the mind is -an extended and organized being, of which a conception can be formed, -and not an unextended and unorganized something of which no conception -can be formed, must be accepted as the alternative. - -I explained in our former discussion my understanding of Mr. Spencer's -theory of the only _ego_ that can be scientifically recognized; and, -in order to encounter it by my own hypothesis, I will here restate its -substantial position in a condensed form. - -By the _ego_ of which he treats, I understand him to mean all that -we can arrive at by an analysis of what takes place in the body -and its functions, and of "what is given in consciousness." This -phrase--"what is given in consciousness"--reveals to us his purpose to -reduce consciousness from a self-conviction and cognition of one's own -existence to a mere passing group of feelings, which constitute "the -ever-changing states of consciousness" that we "_call_ mind." So that, -when we speak of mind, we mean and can mean nothing more than certain -states of feeling produced in our brains by perpetually changing -impressions. We do not and can not mean that there is a person who -perceives and holds ideas suggested by external objects through the -action of his nervous system. All that we know about any _ego_, any -mental I, is that there is a physical structure, pervaded by certain -physical forces, that produce "consecutive states," which Mr. Spencer -calls "mental _states_"; and the aggregate of the feelings and ideas -which thus constitute the _mental states_ is the only _ego_ of which -any continued existence can be predicated. But even these aggregates of -feelings and ideas have, according to this philosopher, no principle -of cohesion holding them together as a whole; and, therefore, all -that we can assume as having any continuously surviving and durable -existence is the changing _states_ produced by the action through us -of a certain unknowable power, statically conditioned in our nervous -organism, which is pervaded by a dynamically conditioned portion of -that unknowable power which is operating everywhere in nature, and is -called "energy."[149] - -So far as this theory is based upon the existence of a physical -organism, whose functions liberate from the food supplied to it certain -forces, which are distributed by the activities of the organism, we may -accept it as a statement of what actually takes place in the form of -physical phenomena. But when we follow the physical phenomena of the -diffused energy into its action upon the brain, by the transmission -of an impulse, we must stop with the effect of that impulse upon a -corporeal organ, or we must go further and find a something which -receives into itself and appropriates to itself the idea the elements -of which the impulse has transmitted. The presence of that something -in ourselves may be illustrated by its absence from a mechanism in -which we know that it does not exist, but which appears superficially -to be animated by an intelligent principle possessing volition. We -stand, for example, before one of those automatic machines which -perform actions that seem to be guided by a living spirit. They are -mere physical organisms, constructed without the principle of life -that inhabits animal organisms, but they are so admirably contrived -for the production of certain limited but complex movements that they -suggest the presence of a spiritual being acting as we ourselves act. -But the least reflection upon what we see makes us aware that there is -nothing before us but a mechanical organism, in which the artisan who -made it has availed himself of certain forces of nature and properties -of matter, whereby he uses a portion of the energy that pervades the -universe. There is nothing within the machine to which this energy -communicates ideas that are to be the subject of its future voluntary -operation. All is comprehended in a fixed mechanical operation of -certain machinery, and, when we have analyzed and understood the -physical phenomena, we can follow them no further, because there is -no translation of the physical energy into mental phenomena. But in -ourselves there is such a translation, and we must follow it into the -mental phenomena. So following it, we find ourselves in the presence -of a something which has a self-conscious individuality, and which, by -a mysterious bond of connection, is so united with a physical organism -that it is capable of receiving, appropriating, and preserving the -ideas which the physical organism was designed to produce in it. - -My objection to Mr. Spencer's system of psychology may be summed up in -what I shall now say upon his chief position, which is that "an idea -is the psychical side of what, on its physical side, is an involved -set of molecular changes, propagated through an involved set of -nervous plexuses." Translated into what I take to be his meaning, the -assertion, or hypothesis, is this: An idea is the mental cognition of -an external object, as, for example, a tree. When we are looking at -or thinking of a tree, we have a mental cognition of a tree; and this -idea of a tree is said to be the psychical side of that which on its -physical side has been transmitted to our brain by molecular changes -through our visual nerves. The idea of the tree is the psychical -correlative of a wave of molecular motion diffused through our organs -of vision; and the conception of a tree thus becomes a possible -conception. But why did not the learned philosopher follow the wave -of molecular motion until he found the impression of the object which -the visual organs have transmitted to the brain, or the nerve-center, -translated into a thought by an intelligent being, capable, by its own -organization, of having that thought? Why does he speak of an idea -as the psychical side of what, on its physical side, is one and the -same thing? Obviously, because he meant to ignore the psychical or -mental existence as an independent existence, or as any existence at -all. Now, there is no way in which the psychical side and the physical -side can be bridged over, excepting by the hypothesis that the mind -is an entity of a peculiar nature, different in structure from the -bodily organism, but capable, by the connection between them, of -receiving and transmuting into thought the impressions which the waves -of molecular motion transmit to the brain from the external object. -To say that the set of plexuses, or networks, which hold together -the waves of molecular motion, constitute the potentiality of the -idea and make possible future ideas like it, explains nothing. The -potentiality of the idea, or the possibility of ideas like it, depends -upon the existence of a something which is capable of conceiving -the idea, holding it, and reproducing it to itself, after the waves -of molecular motion cease. I call this a process of translation, or -transmutation, because there is no other convenient term for it. It is -a process analogous to the physical assimilation of food by the organs -of physical digestion, with this difference, however, that the action -of the mental organism in the assimilation of ideas is the action of -a spiritual and intellectual organism upon materials that are brought -within its reach by the means of communication with the external world -afforded by the physical senses and the nervous system. The image of -the tree produced upon the retina of the eye by the lines of light -that proceed from every point of that object is the food which the -mind assimilates and transmutes into the idea of the tree; and this -may remain as a permanent mental perception or cognition, although -the object itself may have been seen but once. If seen many times, -the various aspects in which it has been seen are transmuted into so -many distinct ideas. If many kinds of trees, of different shapes -and dimensions, have been seen, the varieties become a part of our -consciousness in the several degrees of their precise resemblances -and differences which we happen to have observed, when the different -impressions were produced upon the retina. Can there be any doubt that -this is the process by which the infant begins to acquire ideas of -external objects, and that, as adolescence goes on and the powers of -sense expand with the growth and exercise of the physical organs, there -is a corresponding growth and expansion of the mental powers? - -This hypothesis of the progress of mental growth, _paris passibus_ with -the growth of the physical organism, brings me to the consideration of -one of those specimens of Mr. Spencer's peculiar logic, in a passage -in which he undertakes to disprove the existence of mind as anything -more than what he calls the psychical side of physical impressions. He -is treating of the impossibility of our "knowing" anything about the -substance of mind; and he propounds this impossibility in the following -logical formula: - - ...To know anything is to distinguish it as such or such--to class - it as of this or that order. An object is said to be but little - known when it is alien to objects of which we have had experience; - and it is said to be well known when there is great community of - attributes between it and objects of which we have had experience. - Hence, by implication, an object is completely known when this - recognized community is complete; and completely unknown when there - is no recognized community at all. Manifestly, then, the smallest - conceivable degree of knowledge implies at least two things between - which some community is recognized. But, if so, how can we know the - substance of mind? To know the substance of mind is to be conscious - of some community between it and some other substance. If, with - the idealist, we say that there exists no other substance, then, - necessarily, as there is nothing with which the substance of mind can - be even compared, much less assimilated, it remains unknown; while, if - we hold with the realist that being is fundamentally divisible into - that which is present to us as mind, and that which, lying outside of - it, is not mind, then, as this proposition itself asserts a difference - and not a likeness, it is equally clear that mind remains unclassable - and therefore unknowable. - -The answer to this supposed insuperable dilemma may be made by -determining what we mean when we speak of knowing a thing. Definition -of knowing is here essential, and the first inquiry we have to make -is whether, in order to know mind, it is necessary to find and -recognize some community between the substance of mind and some other -substance? The statement is, on the one hand, that there exists no -other substance with which the substance of mind can be compared, much -less assimilated, and therefore there is no aid to be derived from -resemblance; or, on the other hand, that, if being is fundamentally -divisible into something which is mind and something which is not -mind, we depend for a knowledge of mind on a difference, and not on a -likeness, and we have no means of knowing that difference. Upon either -proposition, mind remains unclassable and therefore unknowable. - -It may be conceded that our knowledge of the properties and forms of -matter consists in recognizing a community or a difference between -things which belong to the same class, so that there is a comparison -between things which are of the same substance. But what is to prevent -us from classifying the substance of mind, when the fundamental idea -of its substance is that it is something which resembles no other -substance, but constitutes a class or description of being that stands -entirely by itself, and in which, for a knowledge of its properties we -distinguish its properties from those of any other substance? The only -difficulty that arises here springs from the fact that we have but one -word--substance--by which to speak of the two existences that we call -mind and matter; just as we can only speak of an organism when we speak -of the natural body and the spiritual body. But this use of the same -term to express things which in our consciousness stand fundamentally -opposed to each other does not prevent us from discriminating between -the means by which we become conscious of the two things, or from -classifying the knowledge which we have of mind as something distinct -from the knowledge which we have of matter. - -We must discriminate between the means by which the properties of -matter become known to us and the means by which the properties of -mind become known to us. In both cases there is knowledge, but it is -knowledge of a different kind; it is obtained by different means; -and we must therefore recognize a fundamental difference between -the substance of mind and the substance of matter. It is true that -our knowledge of the properties of matter and our knowledge of the -properties of mind are alike in this, that in both cases it is -knowledge by one and the same person; but the distinction is that, in -the one case, I have knowledge of objects external to myself, and, in -the other case, I have knowledge of myself as the person possessing -knowledge of external objects. The knowledge that we have of ourselves -is what most persons mean by consciousness, and it is what we should -scientifically understand by that term, although consciousness is -often used as synonymous with mental cognition of things external to -ourselves, and as cognition of ourselves also. - -I shall now quote from the chapter in which Mr. Spencer makes a special -synthesis of reason, and in which he denies the existence of the -commonly assumed _hiatus_ between reason and instinct, maintaining that -the former is the continuation of the latter, because, as he thinks, -the highest forms of psychical activity arise little by little out of -the lowest and can not be separated from them. The passage which I -shall now analyze is this: - -"Here seems to be the fittest place for pointing out how the general -doctrine that has been developed supplies a reconciliation between the -experience-hypothesis as commonly interpreted and the hypothesis which -the transcendentalists oppose to it. - -"The universal law, that, other things equal, the cohesion of psychical -states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed -one another in experience, supplies an explanation of the so-called -'forms of thought,' as soon as it is supplemented by the law that -habitual psychical successions entail some hereditary tendency to such -successions, which, under persistent conditions, will become cumulative -in generation after generation. We saw that the establishment of those -compound reflex actions called instincts is comprehensible on the -principle that inner relations are, by perpetual repetition, organized -into correspondence with outer relations. We have now to observe that -the establishment of those consolidated, those indissoluble, those -instinctive mental relations constituting our ideas of space and time, -is comprehensible on the same principle. - -"For, if, even to external relations that are often experienced -during the life of a single organism, answering internal relations -are established that become next to automatic--if such a combination -of psychical changes as that which guides a savage in hitting a bird -with an arrow becomes, by constant repetition, so organized as to -be performed almost without thought of the processes of adjustment -gone through--and if skill of this kind is so far transmissible that -particular races of men become characterized by particular aptitudes, -which are nothing else than partially organized psychical connections; -then, if there exist certain external relations which are experienced -by all organisms at all instants of their waking lives--relations -which are absolutely constant, absolutely universal--there will -be established answering internal relations that are absolutely -constant, absolutely universal. Such relations we have in those of -space and time. The organization of subjective relations adjusted to -these objective relations has been cumulative, not in each race of -creatures only, but throughout successive races of creatures; and such -subjective relations have, therefore, become more consolidated than -all others. Being experienced in every perception and every action of -each creature, these connections among outer existences must, for this -reason, too, be responded to by connections among inner feelings that -are, above all others, indissoluble. As the substrata of all other -relations in the _non-ego_, they must be responded to by conceptions -that are the substrata of all other relations in the _ego_. Being the -constant and infinitely repeated elements of thought, they must become -the automatic elements of thought--the elements of thought which it is -impossible to get rid of--the 'forms of intuition.' - -"Such, it seems to me, is the only possible reconciliation between the -experience-hypothesis and the hypothesis of the transcendentalists, -neither of which is tenable by itself. Insurmountable difficulties -are presented by the Kantian doctrine (as we shall hereafter see); -and the antagonist doctrine, taken alone, presents difficulties that -are equally insurmountable. To rest with the unqualified assertion -that, antecedent to experience, the mind is a blank, is to ignore the -questions: Whence comes the power of organizing experiences? Whence -arise the different degrees of that power possessed by different races -of organisms, and different individuals of the same race? If, at birth, -there exists nothing but a passive receptivity of impressions, why -is not a horse as educable as a man? Should it be said that language -makes the difference, then why do not the cat and the dog, reared in -the same household, arrive at equal degrees and kinds of intelligence? -Understood in its current form, the experience-hypothesis implies -that the presence of a definitely organized nervous system is a -circumstance of no moment--a fact not needing to be taken into account! -Yet it is the all-important fact--the fact to which, in one sense, the -criticisms of Leibnitz and others pointed--the fact without which an -assimilation of experiences is inexplicable. - -"Throughout the animal kingdom in general the actions are dependent -on the nervous structure. The physiologist shows us that each reflex -movement implies the agency of certain nerves and ganglia; that a -development of complicated instincts is accompanied by complication -of the nervous centers and their commissural connections; that the -same creature in different stages, as larva and imago, for example, -changes its instincts as its nervous structure changes; and that, -as we advance to creatures of high intelligence, a vast increase in -the size and in the complexity of the nervous system takes place. -What is the obvious inference? It is that the ability to co-ordinate -impressions and to perform the appropriate actions always implies -the pre-existence of certain nerves arranged in a certain way. What -is the meaning of the human brain? It is that the many _established_ -relations among its parts stand for so many _established_ relations -among the psychical changes. Each of the constant connections among -the fibers of the cerebral masses answers to some constant connection -of phenomena in the experiences of the race. Just as the organized -arrangement subsisting between the sensory nerves of the nostrils and -the motor nerves of the respiratory muscles not only makes possible a -sneeze, but also, in the newly born infant, implies sneezings to be -hereafter performed, so, all the organized arrangements subsisting -among the nerves of the infant's brain not only make possible certain -combinations of impressions, but also imply that such combinations -will hereafter be made, imply that there are answering combinations in -the outer world, imply a preparedness to cognize these combinations, -imply faculties of comprehending them. It is true that the resulting -compound psychical changes do not take place with the same readiness -and automatic precision as the simple reflex action instanced; it is -true that some individual experiences seem required to establish them. -But, while this is partly due to the fact that these combinations are -highly involved, extremely varied in their modes of occurrence, made -up, therefore, of psychical relations less completely coherent, and -hence need further repetitions to perfect them, it is in a much greater -degree due to the fact that at birth the organization of the brain is -incomplete, and does not cease its spontaneous progress for twenty or -thirty years afterward. Those who contend that knowledge results wholly -from the experiences of the individual, ignoring as they do the mental -evolution which accompanies the autogenous development of the nervous -system, fall into an error as great as if they were to ascribe all -bodily growth and structure to exercise, forgetting the innate tendency -to assume the adult form. Were the infant born with a full-sized and -completely constructed brain, their position would be less untenable. -But, as the case stands, the gradually increasing intelligence -displayed throughout childhood and youth is more attributable to -the completion of the cerebral organization than to the individual -experiences--a truth proved by the fact that in adult life there is -sometimes displayed a high endowment of some faculty which, during -education, was never brought into play. Doubtless, experiences received -by the individual furnish the concrete materials for all thought. -Doubtless, the organized and semi-organized arrangements existing -among the cerebral nerves can give no knowledge until there has been -a presentation of the external relations to which they correspond. -And, doubtless, the child's daily observations and reasonings aid the -formation of those involved nervous connections that are in process of -spontaneous evolution, just as its daily gambols aid the development -of its limbs. But saying this is quite a different thing from saying -that its intelligence is wholly _produced_ by its experiences. That is -an utterly inadmissible doctrine--a doctrine which makes the presence -of a brain meaningless--a doctrine which makes idiocy unaccountable. - -"In the sense, then, that there exist in the nervous system certain -pre-established relations answering to relations in the environment, -there is truth in the doctrine of 'forms of intuition'--not the truth -which its defenders suppose, but a parallel truth. Corresponding to -absolute external relations, there are established in the structure -of the nervous system absolute internal relations--relations that are -potentially present before birth in the shape of definite nervous -connections, that are antecedent to, and independent of, individual -experiences, and that are automatically disclosed along with the first -cognitions. And, as here understood, it is not only these fundamental -relations which are thus predetermined, but also hosts of other -relations of a more or less constant kind, which are congenitally -represented by more or less complete nervous connections. But these -predetermined internal relations, though independent of the experiences -of the individual, are not independent of experiences in general: they -have been determined by the experiences of preceding organisms. The -corollary here drawn from the general argument is that the human brain -is an organized register of infinitely numerous experiences received -during the evolution of life, or, rather, during the evolution of that -series of organisms through which the human organism has been reached. -The effects of the most uniform and frequent of these experiences have -been successively bequeathed, principal and interest; and have slowly -amounted to that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain -of the infant--which the infant in after-life exercises and perhaps -strengthens or further complicates, and which, with minute additions, -it bequeaths to future generations; and thus it happens that the -European inherits from twenty to thirty cubic inches more brain than -the Papuan. Thus it happens that faculties, as of music, which scarcely -exist in some inferior human races, become congenital in superior ones. -Thus it happens that out of savages unable to count up to the number of -their fingers, and speaking a language containing only nouns and verbs, -arise at length our Newtons and Shakespeares."[150] - -The learned philosopher has here dealt with two hypotheses, neither -of which he considers tenable by itself. The first is that the -individual mind, anterior to experience, is a blank; that at birth -there exists nothing but a passive receptivity of impressions, which -become organized into intelligence by experience. The other hypothesis -is that of the transcendental school, which attributes the growth of -intelligence wholly to implanted intuitions, which become expanded by -the increase of mental power. His argument is put thus: If at birth the -mind of the individual is a blank, and it becomes capable of thought -or possessed of intelligence by experience, beginning with a passive -receptivity of impressions, and going on to their organization into -intelligence by the repetition of experiences and their increasing -complexity--why, he asks, is not a horse as educable as a man? Why -do not the cat and the dog, reared in the same household and hearing -human beings use language every moment of their lives, arrive at equal -degrees and kinds of intelligence? In the first place, as a matter -of fact, many animals are educable beyond their natural capacity of -intelligence, or beyond the point at which they would arrive without -such education, to a very remarkable degree. I have heard a credible -description of a dog which would ascend to a chamber and bring down -an article that he had been told to bring. Many repetitions of the -command and the performance had taught the animal to associate the -name of the article which he was to bring down with the act which he -was to perform. While I am writing, a bear beneath my window is going -through performances, at the word of command, of very considerable -varieties; actions which he would not do if he had not been trained -to do them. The trained war-horse knows the meaning of the different -airs played on the bugle upon the battle-field or the parade-ground, -and instantly charges or wheels about, without waiting to be prompted -by the bit or the spur. Insects can be trained, to some extent, in the -same way; birds to a much greater extent. Is the explanation of these -capacities to be found in a definitely organized nervous system as the -all-important fact without which an assimilation of experiences is -inexplicable? Grant that, as we advance from creatures of very low to -creatures of very high intelligence, we find a vast increase in the -size and complexity of the nervous system taking place through the -series, until we arrive at its highest and most complex development -in man. What is the hypothesis which explains the difference in -mental power between man and all the other creatures below him in the -capability of co-ordinating impressions and performing the appropriate -actions? It is, according to Mr. Spencer, that the capability implies -the existence of certain nerves arranged in a certain way; that where -this arrangement does not exist the capability is not found; and where -it exists in only a low degree the capability exists only in the same -degree. As two parallel and concurring facts these may be conceded. But -why are not these facts entirely consistent with another hypothesis, -namely, that to each creature, along with its specially organized -nervous system, there has been given by divine appointment a certain -degree of innate mental power, to explain which we must follow the -impressions produced in the nervous system into their transmutation -into intelligence, until we arrive at the limit of that intelligence? -Mr. Spencer's answer to this inquiry is twofold: first, that the -experience-hypothesis, in the case of the individual creature, or the -constant repetition of the impressions and the appropriate actions, is -insufficient to account for what takes place, without recognizing the -fact that the actions are dependent on the nervous structure, without -which the impressions would not be followed by the actions; second, -that the nervous structure in the different races of animals has come -to be what it is in each race by gradual modifications and increments -through the process of evolution of organisms out of one another, and -that these accumulations have resulted in the human brain, which has -the highest power of co-ordinating the impressions and performing the -appropriate actions. Then he puts, with an air of final solution, the -question, "What is the human brain?" which he answers in his own way. - -His mode of answering this question is that the brain is an organ -with established relations among its parts, which stand for so many -established relations among the psychical changes. I understand this -to mean, that as the human brain, in the process of animal evolution, -has come to have certain constant connections among the fibers of the -cerebral masses, each of these connections answers to some constant -connection of phenomena in the experiences of the race. His corollary -is that the human brain is an organized register of infinitely numerous -experiences received by the race during the evolution of life, or -during the evolution of that series of organisms through which the -human organism has been reached. Each infant of the human race, to -whom has descended this improved and perfect brain, has latent in that -organ a high capacity for intelligence. This it begins to exercise and -strengthen and further complicate as life goes on, and at the end of -twenty or thirty years the individual brain is fully developed, and -this development, or capacity for development, the individual bequeaths -with minute additions, principal and interest, to future generations. -In different races of men the cubic bulk of the brain varies greatly, -according to the size transmitted from ancestors; and so certain -faculties which scarcely exist in some races become congenital in -others; and whereas the remote ancestors of all of us were savages, -incapable even of conceiving of numbers, and possessing but the rudest -elements of language, there have at length arisen our Newtons and -Shakespeares. - -This hypothesis leads me to ask a question and to state a fact. The -question is, What is it in the infant of the most developed and -cultivated race that constitutes the high intelligence which is said -to lie latent in his brain? In other words, is there nothing in that -infant, or in the adult which he becomes, but a brain and a nervous -system of a highly organized and complex physical structure adapted -to receive impressions on itself from without? Are the experiences -which have been enjoyed by the progenitors of the human infant or by -preceding organisms registered in his brain, and is his capacity of -intelligence dependent on his having inherited the same or nearly the -same volume of brain as that which was possessed by his progenitors? -And does the intelligence consist, in degree or in kind, in nothing -but a repetition of the same experiences as those through which his -progenitors were carried, or is there a something in him to which his -individual experiences contribute the mental food by which the mind is -nourished and by the assimilation of which its individual intellectual -growth becomes possible? - -It is not necessary to question the fact that individuals of great -intellect, the Newtons and the Shakespeares, have had or may have -had large brains; or the fact that, as between races of men, the -most intelligent have brains of greater cubic measure than the less -intelligent. But it has not always been found that individuals of -superior intellect have had comparatively larger brains than other -individuals, nor that those who have had very large brains have -transmitted them to their children. The important fact to which I meant -to advert is that, since we have known much about the human brain and -the nervous system connected with it, it has not been found that, in -its several parts and in the action of the nerves connected with it, -it has been differently organized and acted upon in the lowest savages -from what we know of it in the European and the most civilized races. -There is a difference in volume, but not in the organization or the -office of the brain in different races of men, as there is in different -individuals of the same race. The fact that all men, since they became -a completed type of animal, however they originated and became men, -have possessed a capacity to become in different degrees intelligent -and thinking beings, points strongly to the conclusion that while in -each individual there is a nervous system so organized as to transmit -impressions from external objects to the central physical organ called -the brain, there must be another existence in that individual, of a -spiritual and intellectual nature, of a substance that is not physical, -to which the brain supplies the materials of thought, thought being -mental cognition of an idea. If I am asked for the proof of such an -existence, I answer that the proof is consciousness, as I define it, -and this I conceive is the highest kind of proof. - -One may appeal to the convictions of mankind for an answer to the -question, What is the highest and most satisfactory kind of knowledge -that any of us possess? The most intelligent man may be mistaken in -that part of self-knowledge that relates to his own character or -motives. Others may see him very differently from the light in which -he sees himself, and they may be right and he may be wrong. He may -think, too, that he knows a great deal that he does not know; but no -intelligent man is mistaken or in any way deluded when he believes in -his own existence. No man in his waking moments and in his right mind -ever confounded his own identity, as we have seen that Lady Macbeth -did when she was walking in her sleep, with the identity of another -person. No man in his right mind loses the constant, ever-present -sense of himself as a being and as one distinct from all other beings. -The reason is that his own existence is certified to him by the most -unerring of witnesses, one who can not lie, because the fact of one's -own existence is the fact of which that witness must speak. Of all -other facts the witness may speak falsely. The mind can not speak -falsely when it speaks to us of our own existence, for the witness who -speaks and the person spoken to are one and the same. The falsehood, if -there could be a falsehood, would be instantly detected. - -As the mind certifies to itself its own existence by the most direct -and the highest kind of proof, so it certifies to itself the powers -with which it is endowed; and this brings me to the anatomical -examination of the structure of the mind. I shall not make this -analysis a very minute one, but shall confine it to those distinct -elementary powers which are constituted by systems, as the powers of -the bodily organism are constituted by systems distinguishable by the -functions which they perform. In the bodily organism we recognize the -digestive system, the system of circulation of the blood, the muscular -system, the nervous system, the sensory system, which is distributed -into the different organs of sense, the male and female systems of -sexual generation, and the female system of gestation. These several -systems, acting together as one complex mechanism endowed with the -mysterious principle of life, form in each human being of either sex -the physical existence of the individual. Acting in each individual of -either sex simultaneously and with mutual involved interdependencies, -they form a whole which, in its several parts and their functions, may -be likened to the several parts and functions in one of those machines -which we ourselves construct--with this difference, however, that -in one life is present and in the other it is not. The fundamental -question is whether this complex animal mechanism, thus constituted -of certain physical systems, also constitutes during this life the -entire individual. If so, the individual existence is a unit, and, when -the physical organism perishes by what we call death, the individual -existence ceases. If, on the contrary, we have satisfactory proof -that there is, during this life, in each individual an organized and -extended entity, composed, like the systems of the bodily organisms, -of certain systems of its own but of a substance that is not material, -then the existence of each individual is a dual existence; and one of -the two existences now associated and acting together may be dissolved -into its original material elements, while the other, composed of a -different substance, may be indissoluble and have an endless life. -There is no middle ground that I can perceive between these two -hypotheses. One or the other of them is absolutely true, independent of -the inquiry as to the mode in which mind came to exist; for after going -through with all the reasoning and all the proofs that are supposed to -show its origin by the process called evolution, we must still come -back to the question of what mind is after it has come into existence; -must determine on which side lies the preponderating probability of its -continuance after the death of the body; and must accept the conclusion -of its destruction or cessation when the body dies, or the other -conclusion that it is unlike the body in its substance, and therefore -indestructible by the means which destroy the body. For this reason we -must examine the mind for proof that it is an organism of a special -nature because composed of a special substance, and this proof is to be -reached by an analysis of the systems of which the mind is composed. I -select, of course, for the purposes of this analysis, any individual -whose physical and mental faculties have had the average development -into the condition that is called a sound mind in a sound body--_mens -sana in corpore sano_. I shall treat incidentally of the condition of -idiocy. - -We may classify the distinct systems of the mind, with their several -functions, as easily as we can classify the distinct systems of our -physical structure and their functions. I have seen the systems of -the mind distributed into five; and although I do not adopt the whole -analysis made by the writer to whom I refer, or make use of the same -terminology, I shall follow his classification because it is one which -any thinking person must recognize as a description of mental powers -of which he is conscious.[151] We are all aware that we possess the -following mental systems in which inhere certain elementary powers that -are mental powers: - -1. A sensory system, by which the mind takes impressions from matter. - -2. A system of intellectual faculties, such as reason, imagination, -reflection, combination of ideas, discrimination between different -ideas. - -3. A system of emotions, or susceptibilities to pleasure or pain, of a -moral and intellectual nature as distinguished from the pleasurable or -painful excitation of our nerves. - -4. A system of desires, which prompt us to wish for and acquire some -good, or to avoid some evil. - -5. A system of affections, which prompt us to like or dislike persons, -things, situations, and whatever is attractive or unattractive, as the -case may be. - -A little further analysis of each of these systems will explain why -they are respectively to be thus classified as distinguishable organic -powers or functions of the human mind: - -_First._ The mind is placed as a recipient in correspondence with the -material universe through the nerves of sensation and the special -corporeal organs, whereby the properties of matter become to some -extent known to us. As the power of the physical senses to obtain for -us a knowledge of the properties of matter is limited, even when our -senses are in the utmost state of their normal capacity, there may be -properties of matter which will never become known to us in our present -existence. But certain of its properties do become known to us, and we -are perfectly aware that this takes place through our physical organs -of sense, which convey to our mental reception certain impressions. -This power of the mind, therefore, to receive such impressions, to -retain and transmute them into thought, is to be recognized as a power -exerted by means of an organic physical contrivance and an organic -mental structure, the two acting together, the resultant being the -mind's faculty for receiving ideas from the external world. Let us -suppose, then, that the bodily senses are impaired by the partial -destruction of their organs. It does not follow that the knowledge -which has been derived from them, when they were in full activity, -is destroyed; all that happens is that we acquire no more of such -knowledge by the same means, or do not acquire it so readily and -completely. If the destruction of the physical senses is so complete -as it becomes when death of the whole body takes place, the materials -derived from the impressions conveyed to the mind from external objects -during life have been transmuted into ideas and thoughts, and, as -that which holds the ideas and the thoughts is of a substance unlike -in nature to the substance of the physical organs which conveyed the -impressions, the rational conclusion is that the ideas and thoughts -will continue to be held by it, after the dissolution of the body, as -they were held while the body was in full life. - -_Second._ I recognize in the mind a system of intellectual faculties. -Of intellect, I should say that the ascertainment of truth is its -primary function; and hence I should say that the power of retaining -permanent possession of truth already ascertained is the means by -which we maintain continued ascertainment, or the utilization of -truth already ascertained.[152] For the exercise of this power of -ascertaining, holding, applying, and expressing truth--the processes -of intellect--we have three recognized faculties. These are the -intuitive faculty; the faculty of association or combination; and -the introspective faculty, or the capacity to look inward upon the -processes of our own minds. The philosophers who maintain that all -our knowledge is derived from experience admit neither the intuitive -faculty nor the fact of intuition. On the other hand, the philosophers -who maintain, as Mr. Spencer does, that the brain of every infant is -an organized register of the experiences of his ancestors, do not -allow of the existence of any intuitions as facts in the individual -life of the infant, because they regard the individual experiences -of the infant as mere repetitions of former experiences that took -place in its progenitors. But rightly regarded the true meaning of -the intuitive faculty is this: that at the instant when a new sensory -impression is received by the infant, or the adult, there is an innate -and implanted power which comes into play, by which is asserted the -reality of that from which the sensory impression is received. This -power, the intuitive faculty, is infallible. It was ordained as the -means by which a sensory impression becomes to us a reality. We are so -constructed, mentally, that we must believe those primary facts which -the sensory impressions certify to us to be facts. On the veracity of -this certification we are absolutely dependent, because we can not -contradict the affirmations of reality which causation makes to our -intuitive mental perceptions. On this veracity we risk our lives; we -could not be safe if we were not subjected to this belief. Intuition, -therefore, is something anterior to experience; it is that power by -which the first experience and the last become to us the means of -belief in a reality. This is a power that can belong to and inhere -in a spiritual organism alone. We must, therefore, recognize in the -infant this original implanted endowment, the capacity to be mentally -convinced of realities; and while, in order to meet the first exercise -of this capacity there must be a physical organism which will conduct -the sensory impressions to the brain and a brain that will receive -them, the capacity of the infant to have its first conviction of the -reality certified to it by the sensory impression is at once the -capacity of an intellectual being, and a necessity imposed upon him by -the law of his existence. Idiocy, when complete, is the absence of this -capacity, by reason of some failure of connection between the brain, as -the central recipient of sensory impressions, and the mind which should -receive and transmute those impressions into thought. We are scarcely -warranted in regarding the idiot as a human animal possessed of no mind -whatever. The absolute idiot should be defined as a human creature whom -we can not educate at all--in whom we can awaken no intelligence; but -we are not therefore authorized in believing that there is no provision -whatever for the development of intelligence after the mere physical -life of the body is ended. Absolute idiocy, or what, from our as yet -imperfect means of developing intelligence in such unfortunate persons -we must regard as at present absolute, is probably very rare. Between -human creatures so born and those vast multitudes in whom average -intelligence is developed by surrounding influences, whatever they may -be, there are various degrees of the capacity for development; and what -happens in these intermediate cases proves that there are different -degrees in which the connection between the physical and the mental -organism is established at birth, so that in some the connection may -be said to be abnormal and imperfect, while in the enormous majority -it is at least so nearly normal and complete that intelligence may be -developed. - -Here, then, is the place to advert to Mr. Spencer's assertion that -the doctrine that intelligence in the human being is wholly produced -by experience is utterly inadmissible; that it makes the presence -of a brain meaningless, and idiocy unaccountable. A doctrine which -imputes the development of intelligence _wholly_ to the experience of -the individual is of course untenable. There must be a brain and a -nervous system; but we are not warranted, in the case of the idiot, in -assuming that he has a differently organized brain and nervous system -from those of his parents or others of the human race, as Mr. Spencer -appears to me to assume. What we are warranted in believing is that -while the brain and nervous system of the idiot child may be just -as complete in his structure as in those of the parents, there has -somehow occurred, from some cause, antecedent in some cases to birth, -but operating after birth in other cases, a failure of the adequate -connection between the brain and the mind, so that intelligence can -not be developed at all, or can be developed but partially. The -individual may have inherited just as good an "organized register" of -the experience of his ancestors--just as good a natural brain as his -brothers and sisters who are perhaps highly intelligent from their -birth, or capable of becoming intelligent. Yet he lacks the ability -to co-ordinate impressions and to perform the actions appropriate -to those impressions, because there has failed to be established in -him the necessary connection between the impressions and the sensory -intellectual system which constitutes one organic part of the mind. The -experiences, however often repeated, of the impressions produced by -his physical senses on his brain, remain there as corporeal feelings. -They reach no further. They do not become transmuted into ideas, -and so intelligence can not be developed, or is developed but to a -very feeble extent. Instead of saying that "the gradually increasing -intelligence displayed throughout childhood is more attributable to -the completion of the cerebral organization than to the individual -experiences," I should say that it is most attributable to the presence -of an established connection between the function of the cerebral -organization and the mental receptivity of impressions, which is -not merely passive, but is incessantly active because incessantly -receiving, and that, where this connection is wanting, the receptivity, -although it may exist, can not become active, and so intelligence -can not be developed in this life. But there may be another state of -existence, in which the mind of the idiot, no longer dependent on a -physical organization of brain and nervous system for the reception -of ideas and for intellectual growth, but retaining its capacity for -mental development, may begin and carry on such development by other -means; whereas, if the brain and the nervous system constitute all -there is of any human being, whether born an idiot or born capable of -intellectual growth through his individual experiences, he can have no -future after that brain and nervous system are destroyed, unless we -suppose that mind is something that has been developed out of matter -into a spiritual existence--a supposition which is to me inconceivable. - -The second of the intellectual faculties is the associative, or -that intuitive power by which ideas are combined and associated or -held in disjunction and separation. I regard this as an intuitive -faculty, because, as our observation teaches us, its presence and -power, manifested at the first dawning of infantile intelligence, are -attested by every exercise of the organs through which the external -world reaches our minds, to the last moment of our mortal existence. -Experience is, of course, necessary to the first action of this -intuitive faculty. This is only another way of saying that there must -occur a sensory impression upon the brain which becomes transmuted -into the idea of the external object, and then a repetition of that -impression produces a repetition of the idea, and the associative -faculty combines or disjoins them. But unless there exists an intuitive -power, inherent in the intellective system, whereby the first idea and -the second can be associated and compared, there can be no knowledge, -no acquisition of truth, because the sensory impressions will stop -in the brain as so many feelings excited through the nervous system, -instead of being transmuted into thought. - -The introspective faculty, on the other hand, does not deal solely -with sensory impressions, or with the ideas which they have suggested. -It is that power of the mind by which it can look inward upon itself. -This is seemingly a paradox; but nevertheless, the existence of such a -faculty is a necessary hypothesis, not only because we are conscious -of it, but because without it we could have no means of analyzing -our own mental structure, although we could make some very partial -analysis of the mind of another individual by studying his actions. As -regards ourselves, it is as if our visual organs possessed the power -of looking at the process by which an image of an external object is -impressed upon the retina and is thence transmitted to the brain, where -the sensory impression is produced. This, of course, is a physical -impossibility. All we can do is to examine the physical structure of -the eye, with its wonderful provision of lenses and other means for -the reception and the effect of light, and to reason upon what we can -discover that the process of what is called seeing must be thus or -thus. But that process itself we can not see by the same organs by -which it is carried on. In the case of the mind, however--and herein -is one of the remarkable proofs of its unlikeness as an organism to -the bodily organism--there is a power to witness, to observe, to -be sensible of its own operations. This power, like all the other -mental powers, may be very feeble in some individuals, for want of -exercise, but in others, from long and frequent exercise, it may become -exceedingly vigorous, and be the means of advancing mental philosophy -if its observations are preserved and recorded. It is one of the -systems which, as a whole, constitute the spiritual organism to which -we give the name of mind. Such a capacity can not be predicated of a -physical organism. It is impossible for us to conceive of a machine -standing and looking upon its own operations, speculating upon their -improvement, or thinking of the relation of its mechanism to the human -author of its being. It is equally impossible for us to think of the -body of man contemplating its own existence, or being sensible of it; -but it is perfectly easy to conceive of its being known to the mind -that inhabits it, which takes cognizance both of its own operations -and of the operations of the physical organism, reflects upon them -separately or in their action upon one another, and spontaneously -refers both to an author. - -_Third._ I have placed third in the category of mental systems the -system of emotions or susceptibilities to mental pleasure or pain, as -distinguished from the pleasurable or painful excitation of our nervous -system. No one can doubt that, however powerful may be the influence -upon our mental states of physical pain or physical sensations that -are pleasurable, there is such a thing as mental pain and mental -pleasure, satisfaction or dissatisfaction, wholly unconnected with -and in no way dependent upon our corporeal feelings, present or past. -It is from this susceptibility to mental pain or pleasure that we -come to have the idea of goodness or badness, which is originally a -classification of the qualities of external things as good or bad; -the good being those which affect us pleasurably, and the bad those -which affect us painfully. By our mental organization we are placed -in such correspondence with the material universe, that things apart -from ourselves affect us agreeably or disagreeably; sights, sounds, -odors, and tastes give us pleasure or pain. We are also placed in -correspondence with the spiritual universe, and thereby certain acts, -relations, and traits of character give us pleasure, or the reverse. -In process of time, the youth whose mental systems are in the course -of expansion comes to perceive that his own acts give him pleasure or -pain, and hence he derives the perception of good or bad qualities -in himself. Moral goodness in ourselves--goodness of disposition, -of intention, of volition, of habit--is found to be distinct from -physical and intellectual goodness; and thus the consciousness of moral -goodness becomes the intellectual faculty to which moral commands can -be addressed, with a prospect that the connection between obedience -and happiness will be perceived. This susceptibility to mental pain -or pleasure, from the qualities of external things, from the acts and -dispositions of other persons, and from our own, is one that can inhere -in a mental organization, but it can not possibly inhere in a physical -organism. The physical organism is undoubtedly the means by which the -mental susceptibility to pleasure or pain is reached from the external -universe; but, unless there is a mental organism to feel the pleasure -or the pain, the action of the physical organization is nothing but the -excitation of the nervous system. I, therefore, make a distinct class -among the mental systems, and assign to it the faculty of experiencing -mental pleasure or mental pain as a capacity distinct from the -pleasurable or painful excitation of our nerves. - -_Fourth._ In the category of mental systems may be placed those desires -which lead us to wish for and strive to obtain some good or to avoid -some evil. This, surely, is not to be regarded as anything but an -intellectual perception of what is to us a good or an evil. It is a -structural capacity of the soul which, after an experience of that -which we learn to be good for us, or the reverse of good, is always -prompting us to take the steps or to perform the acts which will insure -a repetition of that experience, in the acquisition of further good -or the avoidance of further evil. Its operations may be perverted. -We may, from bad habits or erroneous ideas of good and evil, pursue -objects that are pernicious. But whether we strive for that which is -truly good, or is deceptively regarded as a good, we are perpetually -acting under the impulse of a desire that is implanted in us, and -that operates as a desire whether its objects are worthy or unworthy, -beneficial or injurious, noxious or innoxious to our moral health. - -_Fifth_, and lastly, we may classify the affections as one of the -structural systems of our spiritual existence. It is that part of -our natures that makes us like or dislike both persons and things; -and, in regard to the former, it is the capacity for love in its high -distinction from the physical appetite of sexual passion. The range -of its operation is most various and multiform, but throughout all of -its operations it is a spiritual capacity, implanted in us for our -happiness as spiritual beings. - -If it is objected that this is an arbitrary classification--that as -an analysis of structural systems in our mental organization it bears -no analogy to the anatomical exploration and classification of the -structural systems of our physical organism--the answer is, that in -regard to the latter we make the examination by the exercise of our -corporeal senses, chiefly by the visual organs, as we do in the case of -all other organized matter. In analyzing the structural organization -of our minds, we are examining a subject that is not laid bare to the -inspection of any of our corporeal organs; the scalpel in the hand -of the dissector can afford us no aid in this investigation, but the -inspection must be carried on by turning the eye of the mind inward -upon itself. This we are mentally constituted to do. While, therefore, -it may be true that the classification which I have made, or which may -have been made by others, of the structural mental systems, is in one -sense arbitrary, and while in any method of describing them they may -run into or overlap one another in a complex organism, it will always -remain true that the mind is capable of such examinations, and that the -analysis, however given, is useful to the comprehension of the mind -as an organized and extended entity. No one can carry on this mental -examination without perceiving that he is examining a something which -has an independent existence and a life of its own, whether he supposes -it to have been evolved out of organized matter, or embraces the idea -of its distinct and special creation by an exercise of the Divine Will. - -The two main hypotheses concerning the origin of mind may now be -contrasted. In the long process of development of animal organisms -out of one another there come to be, it is said, higher and higher -degrees of intelligence, as the nervous system becomes more and more -capable of complex impressions, until we arrive at the consummate -physical organization and the supreme intelligence of the human race. -The physical organization is open to our examination, and we find the -human brain divided into cerebral masses, with ganglia of sensory -nerves extending to the external sensory organs. Intelligence is the -faculty of comprehending by previous preparation the combinations of -impressions made on the brain through the sensory nerves. The brain -being an organized register in which the experiences of progenitors -have accumulated a high degree of this faculty, each human infant born -into the world comes into it with a prepared capacity to acquire the -combinations of impressions produced in his individual experience. -Transmitted from generation to generation, this inherited capacity -becomes the means by which each individual manifests and enjoys what -we call intelligence; and the resulting aggregate of all the faculties -thus called into exercise is what we denominate mind. It must be -observed, however, that this theory or explanation of the origin of -mind, rejecting the hypothesis of its special creation as a being -of a spiritual nature, assumes it to be a something which has been -developed out of the growth and improvement of a physical organism. -When you inquire whether the nature of this something is supposed to -be a product of a different substance from matter, although developed -out of matter, you are left without an answer; and when you press the -inquiry whether a spiritual existence can be conceived as having grown -out of the action of a physical organism, you are told that there are -no means of determining what a spiritual existence is, because there -is nothing with which you can compare it so as to ascertain what it -resembles or what it does not resemble. Or if there are some who -accept the evolution theory of the origin of mind, and who think it -possible that a spiritual existence can owe its origin to the action of -matter without any intervention of a creating power purposely giving -existence to a spiritual essence, you have to ask a question to which -you can only get this answer: that it has pleased the Almighty Being -to establish a system by which a spiritual in contradistinction to a -physical existence has been developed in countless ages out of the -action of material substances organized into definite systems and -endowed with the principle of life. Those who assume this hypothesis -must necessarily assume also that the spiritual existence is, after it -has come into being, an existence distinct from the physical organism, -although generated out of it, and then they must encounter the further -inquiry as to the probability of the supposed method of production -resorted to by the Supreme Being. - -More than once in the course of our colloquies I have had occasion to -say that, in all our inquiries of this nature, whether in regard to the -origin of our physical organism or that of our mental existence, we -must constantly bear in mind the unbounded capacity of the Creator to -adopt any method of production whatever; that it is just as much within -his power to call things of the most opposite natures into existence -by a single word as it is to establish methods by which they shall be -developed through innumerable ages of what we call time. That the Being -who is supposed to preside over the universe and to hold this unlimited -power is an hypothesis I readily admit; but I affirm that his existence -and attributes are necessary postulates, without which there can be no -reasoning concerning the origin of anything. Whether that Being exists -and possesses the attributes which we impute to him I have all along -said is a matter of which we must be satisfied by independent proofs -before we undertake to investigate his probable methods. - -The hypothesis of the origin of mind which I now mean to contrast -with that of the evolutionists may be stated as follows: It is a -rational deduction, from all that we know of our physical organism, -that procreation of new individuals of that organism by the sexual -union of male and female was established as the means of continuing -the species of animal known as man. When or how established is not a -material part of the inquiry that I now make. It may have been that -the division of the sexes came about by a very slow process, or it -may have been by the aboriginal creation of a completed pair, male -and female. However or whenever it came to exist, there came to be -one uniform method of bringing into existence new individuals of a -peculiar and perfectly distinguishable animal type. If we confine our -attention to the physical organism of man, it is perfectly apparent -that when procreation and gestation take place they happen because of -the established law that a new individual of this species of animal -shall be produced by the sexual union of two other individuals, male -and female, and that the new individual shall have the same physical -organism as the parents. A new physical life thus springs out of two -other physical lives by a process the secret of which we can not -detect, although we can trace it through some of its stages so far as -to see that there is a secret process by which two physical organisms -give existence to another physical organism of the same type and having -the same principle of life. - -As the new individual animal grows into further development, we find -that along with his animal organism and united with it by a tie which -we can not see, but about which we can reason, there is apparently -present a kind of life that is something more than the life of the -body. The further we carry our investigations of the phenomena which -indicate the existence of this mental life, the more we become -convinced that it is the life of a spiritual organism. As the Creator -had the power to give existence to the corporeal organism, why had he -not an equal power to give existence to a spiritual organism? If he -established the law of sexual union between a male and a female in -order to perpetuate the type of animal to which they belong--the law -which gives existence to a new individual of that animal type every -time that a new conception and a new birth take place--why should he -not have established the collateral law that every time there is a -new birth of an infant there shall come into existence a spiritual -entity which shall be united to the corporeal organism for a time, -thus constituting in that infant a dual existence which makes his -whole individuality during this life? If we suppose that the physical -organism of our double natures was left to be worked out by a very -slow process, by which physical organisms are developed out of one -another--or by which we theoretically suppose them to have been so -developed--why is it necessary to suppose that our spirits or souls -have been developed in the same way or by an analogous method? What -reason have we to believe that the Creator works by the same methods in -the spiritual world, or by methods that are of the same nature as those -which we think we can discover to be his methods in giving existence -to corporeal organisms? The two realms of spirit and matter are so -completely unlike that we are not compelled to believe that the methods -by which creation of organisms of the two kinds are effected by the -Almighty are necessarily or probably the same. - -In order to be clearly understood I will now repeat my hypothesis -in a distinct form. I assume the existence of a pair of animals of -the human type, male and female, endowed with the power of producing -new individuals of the same type. In their physical organisms is -established the law of procreation, and in the female counterpart of -that organism is established the concomitant law of conception and -parturition. Thus far provision is made for the production of a new -individual physically organized like the parents. In those parents -there is also established another law, by the operation of which the -same process which results in the production of the new individual -animal organism brings into existence a spiritual organism, which is -united with and becomes the companion of the physical organism so -long as the latter shall continue to live. These laws established -in the first pair and in every succeeding pair continue to operate -through every succeeding generation. Perhaps it will be said that -this attributes the production of a spiritual organism to a physical -process; but, in truth, it does no more than to assert the simultaneous -production of the two existences. It is not necessary to assume that -the fœtus which becomes at birth the human infant is before birth -animated by a soul; for it is not necessary to suppose, nor is it -apparently true, that the physical organism is complete until birth -takes place and the breath of life enters the lungs, thus constituting -a new life other than that of the fœtus or the unborn child, although -the one is a continuation of the other. At whatever point of time the -complete animal organism is in a condition to be observed so that we -can say here is a living child, at that point we begin to perceive a -capacity to receive impressions from the external world without the -connection that has theretofore existed between the unborn child and -the maternal system. This capacity must either be attributed to the -individual experience of the infant, so that without experience of -his own he can not begin to be possessed of a growing intelligence, -or it must be imputed to an innate and implanted power resident in -a spiritual organism that comes into exercise whenever the physical -organism has begun to draw the breath of life. - -The evolution hypothesis of the origin of the human mind necessarily -leaves its nature in an indeterminate state that will not satisfy the -requirements of sound reasoning. In one mode of stating and reasoning -upon this hypothesis it is assumed that there is not now and never was -a mental existence that was created in each individual of the race -at his birth; but that at some very remote period in the history of -successive animal organisms there was produced an animal of a highly -developed nervous structure, capable of intelligence by reason of a -superior power of receiving physical impressions and co-ordinating -them into states of consciousness which correspond to the physical -feelings; and to the perpetually recurring series of these states of -consciousness we give the name of mind. This capacity of intelligence -is transmitted from parents to offspring, the experiences of the former -being registered in the brain of the latter; but however complete may -be the inherited nervous structure, and however great the capacity -for intelligence, mind in each individual of the race is evidenced by -nothing but a constant succession and variation of certain states of -feelings produced in the nervous structure. - -Against this view we may place what we know from constant observation. -We know that it has been ordained, as a consequence of the sexual union -of two individuals of opposite sex, there shall come into existence a -new individual of the same physical organism as the parents. Of the -interior process by which this product is effected we must remain -ignorant, but about the fact there can be no doubt. That fact is, -that by the union of certain vesicles contributed by each of the -parents there results a new individual organism. We know further -that simultaneously with the complete production of the new physical -organism, there comes into being, and is incorporated with it, an -existence that we are compelled by the phenomena which it manifests to -regard as a non-physical and a spiritual organism. Of the process by -which this distinct existence is effected, we must remain as ignorant -as we are of the process by which the physical organism was made to -result from the sexual union of the parents. But of the fact there can -be no more doubt in the one case than in the other. In every instance -of a new birth of a perfect infant, we know that there results a dual -existence in the same individual; the one manifested by physical, the -other by mental phenomena. To argue that the mental and spiritual -existence grew out of an improved and improving physical organism -in long-past ages, and became an adjunct to that organism after it -had attained a certain development, without any intervention of the -creating power at each new birth of an individual infant, is to limit -the power of the Creator in a realm wherein the subject of his creating -power is essentially unlike the subject with which he deals when he -deals with physical organisms. In all reasoning upon the origin and -nature of the human mind, the boundless power of the Creator must be -assumed. In judging of the probabilities of his methods of action, it -is the safest course to be guided by what we can see takes place at -every new birth of a human infant. The physical organism results from -the operation of a certain law. The mental organism results, it is -alike rational to presume, from the operation of a certain other law. -How either of these laws operates we are not permitted to know, but -we can as safely infer the one as the other, from what is open to our -observation. - -I shall now touch briefly upon another argument, the foundation of -which is to be tested by historical facts into the truth of which I -shall not here inquire, because they must, for the purposes for which -I use them, be assumed. The immortality of the human soul is said to -have been proved by a Divine revelation. This great fact is supposed -to be established by evidence of a character quite different from that -which convinces us of the existence and attributes of the Almighty. -But, assuming revelation to be a fact, it has an important bearing -upon the subject of this essay, because the question arises, for what -conceivable reason the Almighty should have made to us a revelation of -our immortality, through the direct testimony of a competent witness, -if we are not spiritual beings. Information of a fact supposes that -there was a person to be informed. Concurrently with the consciousness -which assures us of our personality, we have the assurance of our -immortality certified to us by a messenger expressly authorized to give -us the information. If the mind, or that part of our individuality -which we call the soul, is in its origin and nature nothing but what -the evolution theory supposes, what was there to be informed of -immortality, or of anything else? The possibility and certainty of -an existence after the death of the body is a conviction that must -exercise great influence over the conduct of men in this life. It is -consistent with the whole apparent scheme of the revelation to suppose -that it was made for a twofold purpose: first, to cause men to lead -better lives in this world than they might have led without this -information and conviction; and, secondly, to form them for greater -happiness in another world. The first of these purposes might have -been effectuated by causing men to believe in their own immortality, -notwithstanding the belief might be a delusion because there is no -being capable, in fact, of any existence after the life of the body -is ended. But such a method of action is hardly to be imputed to the -Creator and Supreme Governor of the universe, according to the ideas -of his character which natural religion alone will give us. It is not -in accordance with rational conceptions of his attributes to suppose -that he deludes his rational creatures with assurances or apparent -proofs of something that is not true for the sake of making them act -as if it were true. When we find ourselves running into a hypothesis -of this kind, we may be pretty sure that we are departing from correct -principles of reasoning. In regard to the second of the supposed -purposes for which the revelation of immortality was made--to form -men for greater happiness in another state of existence--it is quite -obvious that the supposed scheme of the revelation is a mere delusion, -if we are not beings capable of a continued spiritual existence after -the death of our bodies. It is therefore a matter of great consequence -to determine what the evolution theory of the origin and nature of the -human mind makes us out to be. - -I have never seen any statement of that theory that does not lead to -the conclusion that man is a highly developed animal organism, whose -mental existence is not something created in each individual of the -race, and of a substance and organized structure different from the -physical organism, but whose mental phenomena are merely exhibitions -and effects of occurrences taking place in the physical system, and -assuming the shape of what for distinctness is called thought. In -whatever form this theory has been stated by its most distinguished -professors, it leaves only an interval of degree, and not an interval -of kind, between the mind of man and that which, in some of the other -animals, is supposed to be mind. The evolution doctrine, taken in one -of its aspects, supposes one grand chain of animal organisms, rising -higher and higher in the scale of animal life, but connected together -by ordinary generation, so that they are of one kindred throughout; but -that, as each distinct species grows out of predecessors, by gradual -improvements and increments, forming more and more elaborate organisms, -man is the consummate product of the whole process. But when we ask -at what point or stage in the series of developing animal organisms -the mind of man was produced, or what it was when produced, we get no -satisfactory answer. To the first question, it can only be answered, -as Darwin himself answers, that there must be a definition of man -before we can determine at what time he came to exist. To the second -question, we have answers which differ materially from each other. -First, we have whatever we can extract from such a system of psychology -as Mr. Spencer's, which ignores the capability of the mind to exist -independent of the nervous structure and the brain, because it excludes -the idea of any ego, any me, any person, and makes consciousness to -consist of a connected series of physical feelings, to which there are -corresponding psychical equivalents that he calls mental states. It -would seem to follow, therefore, that when there is no longer remaining -for the individual any nervous structure and any brain, the mental -states, or psychical side of the physical impressions, must cease; or, -in other words, that the only existing ego has come to an end. - -On the other hand, I have seen an ingenious hypothesis which it is well -to refer to, because it illustrates the efforts that are often made -to reconcile the doctrines of evolution with a belief in immortality. -This hypothesis by no means ignores the possibility of a spiritual -existence, or the spiritual as distinguished from the material world. -But it assumes that man was produced under the operation of physical -laws; and that after he had become a completed product--the consummate -and finished end of the whole process of evolution--he passed under the -dominion and operation of other and different laws, and is saved from -annihilation by the intervention of a change from the physical to the -spiritual laws of his Creator. Put into a condensed form, this theory -has been thus stated: Having spent countless æons in forming man, by -the slow process of animal evolution, God will not suffer him to fall -back into elemental flames, and be consumed by the further operation of -physical laws, but will transfer him into the dominion of the spiritual -laws that are held in reserve for his salvation. - -One of the first questions to be asked, in reference to this -hypothesis, is, Who or what is it that God is supposed to have spent -countless æons in creating by the slow process of animal evolution? If -we contemplate a single specimen of the human race, we find a bodily -organism, endowed with life like that of other animals, and acted upon -by physical laws throughout the whole period of its existence. We -also find present in the same individual a mental existence, which is -certified to us by evidence entirely different from that by which we -obtain a knowledge of the physical organism. As the methods employed -by the Creator in the production of the physical organism, whatever -we may suppose them to have been, were physical laws operating upon -matter, so the methods employed by him in the production of a spiritual -existence must have operated in a domain that was wholly aside from -the physical world. Each of these distinct realms is equally under the -government of an Omnipotent Being; and while we may suppose that in the -one he employed a very slow process, such as the evolution of animal -organisms out of one another is imagined to have been, there is no -conceivable reason why he should not, in the other and very different -realm, have resorted to the direct creation of a spiritual existence, -which can not, in the nature of things, have required to be produced by -the action of physical laws. When, at the birth of each individual of -the human race, the two existences become united, when, in consequence -of the operation of that sexual union of the parents which has been -ordained for the production of a new individual, the physical and the -spiritual existence become incorporated in the one being, the fact that -they remain for a certain time mutually dependent and mutually useful, -co-operating in the purposes of their temporary connection, does not -change their essential nature. The one may be destructible because the -operation of physical laws may dissolve the ligaments that hold it -together; the other may be indestructible, because the operation of -spiritual laws will hold together the spiritual organism that is in its -nature independent of the laws of matter. - -I can therefore see no necessary connection between the methods -employed by the Almighty in the production of an animal and the methods -employed by him in the production of a soul. That in the birth of -the individual the two come into existence simultaneously, and are -temporarily united in one and the same being, only proves that the two -existences are contemporaneous in their joint inception. It does not -prove that they are of the same nature, or the same substance, or that -the physical organism is the only ego, or that the psychical existence -is nothing but certain states of the material structure, to whose -aggregate manifestations certain philosophers give the name of mind, -while denying to them personal individuality and the consciousness of a -distinct being. - -And now, in bringing this discussion to a close, I will only add that -the great want of this age is the prosecution of inquiry into the -nature of the human mind as an organic structure, regarded as such. -It seems to me that the whole mission of Science is now perverted by -a wrong aim, which is to find out the external to the neglect of the -internal--to make all exploration terminate in the laws of the physical -universe, and go aside from the examination of the spiritual world. -It is no reproach to those who essay the latter inquiry that they -are scoffed at as "the metaphysicians." It matters not what they are -called, so long as they pursue the right path. It is now in regard to -the pursuit of science as it was formerly in regard to the writing of -history. That philosophical French historian, M. Taine, has luminously -marked the change which has come over the methods and objects of -historical studies in the following passage: - -"When you consider with your eyes the visible man, what do you look -for? The man invisible. The words which salute your ears, the gestures, -the motions of his head, the clothes he wears, visible acts and deeds -of every kind, are expressions merely; somewhat is revealed beneath -them, and that is a soul--an inner man is concealed beneath the outer -man; the second does not reveal the first; ... all the externals are -but avenues converging toward a center; you enter them simply to reach -that center, and that center is the genuine man--I mean that mass of -faculties and feelings which are the inner man. We have reached a new -world, which is infinite, because every action which we see involves -an infinite association of reasonings, emotions, sensations new and -old, which have served to bring it to light, and which, like great -rocks deep-seated in the ground, find in it their end and their level. -This under-world is a new subject-matter proper to the historian.... -This precise and proved interpretation of past sensations has given -to history, in our days, a second birth; hardly anything of the sort -was known to the preceding century. They thought men of every race and -country were all but identical--the Greek, the barbarian, the Hindoo, -the man of the Renaissance, and the man of the eighteenth century--as -if they had all been turned out of a common mold, and all in conformity -to a certain abstract conception which served for the whole human -race. They knew man, but not men; they had not penetrated to the soul; -they had not seen the infinite diversity and complexity of souls; they -did not know that the moral constitution of a people or an age is as -particular and distinct as the physical structure of a family of plants -or an order of animals."[153] - -In the same way psychology needs a new birth, like the new birth of -history. If we would know the mind, we must reach the conviction that -there is a mind: and this conviction can be reached only by penetrating -through all the externals, through the physical organism, through the -diversities of race, through the environment of matter, until we have -found the soul. If history, like zoölogy, has found its anatomy, mental -science must, in like manner, be prosecuted as an anatomical study. So -long as we allow the anatomy of zoölogy to be the predominant and only -explanation, the beginning and the end of the mental manifestations, -so long we shall fail to comprehend the nature of man, and to see the -reason for his immortality. - - - FOOTNOTES: - - [139] Corinthians, revised version. - - [140] In the "authorized" version the passage is rendered thus: "There - is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." Sophereus quotes - the late revised version. The meaning is the same. St. Paul assumes - the existence of a natural body, and then asserts that there is - likewise a spiritual body. - - [141] I have met, by the kindness of the author, with a little - treatise which contains a great deal of sound mental philosophy, with - which in the main I concur, and to which I am indebted for some very - valuable suggestions. This modest little book is entitled "The Heart - of Man: An Attempt in Mental Anatomy." The author is Mr. P. P. Bishop, - a resident of San Mateo, in Florida. It was printed at Chicago, by - Shepard & Johnson, for the author, in 1883. I know not if it is on - sale. I suppose that Mr. Bishop was led to send me his interesting - treatise by the publication, in the "Manhattan Magazine," at New York, - in 1884, of the substance of the first three chapters of the present - work. I take this opportunity of expressing my high appreciation - of his treatise, and of explaining the meaning of its title. As I - understand him, he uses the term "Heart of Man" as synonymous with - structure of the mind, and not as referring to what is figuratively - called "the human heart." He has explained "Mental Anatomy" as - follows: "The method of investigation, which I have employed in making - my way to the conclusions set forth in this discussion, I call 'The - Anatomical Method,' because it is based on the conception of mind as - an organized being, and aims to discover the structure of that being." - ... "At the risk," he adds, "of appearing egotistical, I think it best - to relate an experience." He did not need to deprecate the appearance - of egotism, for his method of investigation, based on his own mental - experience, was the very best that he could have followed. It were to - be wished that we could have more of this kind of self-analysis by - persons competent to make it, and less of theoretical reasoning from - premises more or less arbitrarily assumed. - - I have endeavored to make my imaginary philosopher, Sophereus, avoid - the method of reasoning which I thus condemn, and to keep him within - the bounds of experience. - - [142] "Extemporaneous," Latin, _ex_, from; and _tempus_, time, at the - same time, or from the same time. Extemporaneous discourse is when the - thought and the expression in which it is clothed occur at the time - it is uttered, or without premeditation of both thought and language. - "Improvisation" means the same thing, but it is specially applied - to the act of making poetry or performing music extemporaneously, - that is, without prevision of what one is to say or sing. Rapid - conversation is of the same nature. So is an instantaneous and - unpremeditated answer to a question. - - [143] Webster's Dictionary--"Matter." - - [144] "And it shall be as when a hungry man dreameth, and behold, he - eateth: but he awaketh, and his soul is empty; or as when a thirsty - man dreameth, and behold, he drinketh: but he awaketh, and behold, he - is faint, and his soul hath appetite."--ISAIAH. - - [145] Scott's "Antiquary," note v. - - [146] If it is objected that I have allowed Sophereus to overstate - the power of the mind to deal better with difficulties after "a good - night's sleep," as we say, than it had dealt with them before, I will - cite the testimony of one of the most prolific of writers and one - of the most self-observing of men, Sir Walter Scott, whose greatest - success was achieved in the field of poetical and prose fiction. This - is a department in which inventive genius is the main reliance, and - is put to its greatest tasks. In that part of Scott's "Diary" which - covers the year 1826--the period when he was writing "Woodstock"--he - says: - - "The half-hour between waking and rising has all my life proved - propitious to any task which was exercising my invention. When I got - over any knotty difficulty in a story, or have had in former times - to fill up a passage in a poem, it was always when I first opened my - eyes that the desired ideas thronged upon me. This is so much the - case that I am in the habit of relying upon it and saying to myself - when I am at a loss, 'Never mind, we shall have it at seven o'clock - to-morrow morning.' If I have forgot a circumstance, a name, or a copy - of verses, it is the same thing.... This morning I had some new ideas - respecting 'Woodstock' which will make the story better." (Lockhart's - "Life of Scott," vol. viii, chap. lxviii.) - - This, it is true, was the experience of a man of extraordinary genius, - whose facility of invention was as marvelous as the ease and rapidity - with which he wrote. But his experience was a very common one. It has - been shared by persons of much more humble faculties. I am sure that - persons in my own profession, who have been engaged in pursuits very - different from those of the poet or the novelist, will, from their - own experience, confirm what is assumed by Sophereus as a well-known - mental phenomenon. I could describe in detail many instances in which - I have gone through with the same fruition of new ideas, resulting - from the acquisitions obtained during sleep, or following from the - benefits of sleep. For example, when having to do with a complex state - of facts, needing orderly arrangement and analysis, it has repeatedly - happened to me to rise in the morning after a night of undisturbed - sleep, with the whole of an entangled skein unraveled, whereas before - retiring to rest the mass of facts lay in some confusion in the mind. - In like manner the mind can often deal with a legal question of a - new and difficult character. The rule that ought to be applied to a - particular case has to be extracted from many precedents, and perhaps - none of them exactly cover the case in hand. On such occasions, if - one refrains from pushing the study of his subject while awake to the - severest analysis, and postpones the effort until the next morning, - the experience of Sir Walter is very likely to be repeated. "It was - always," he says, "when I first opened my eyes that the desired ideas - thronged upon me." I am persuaded, therefore, that although in the - study of any subject omission to master all its elements and details, - when alone one can accumulate them, is not to be recommended, there is - undoubtedly much to be gained by relieving the mind from the continued - effort, and allowing some hours of sleep to intervene, during which - the mind can act independently of all the bodily organs. - - The question is, then, as above suggested, whether there come to us - during sleep acquisitions of new ideas with or without a simultaneous - consciousness that we are thinking of the subject, or whether the - new ideas follow from the benefits of sleep as a state of absolute - rest and inactivity of the brain, and of the intellectual faculties, - so that when we awake both the brain and the mental powers are in - greater vigor. The expression used by Scott in describing his own - experience is that as soon as he awoke the desired ideas _thronged_ - upon him. This might happen upon the hypothesis that the desired ideas - came because the brain and the mental powers, refreshed by sleep, - were in greater vigor. But I incline to believe that his meaning was - the reverse of this. At all events, it seems to me that the true - explanation of the phenomenon is that during sound and undisturbed - sleep of the body, including the brain, we do unconsciously think of - the subject on which our waking thoughts had been previously employed; - that in these states there are acquisitions of new ideas which we - bring with us out of the state in which they were acquired, or, as Sir - Walter expressed it, which _throng_ upon us as soon as we open our - eyes. While, therefore, it may be said that this hypothesis assumes - the existence of the mind as a spiritual or intellectual entity - capable of action as a thinking being without any action of the bodily - organs, the question is, on the other hand, whether the phenomena - here considered have not a very strong tendency to prove that the - mind is such a substantive and independent existence. When it is - remembered how common is the experience here referred to, how various - the phenomena are, how they are manifested on all kinds of subjects, - in regard to lines of conduct, and to everything about which we are - perplexed, and when we add these peculiar phenomena to the other - evidence which tends to establish the same belief in the existence - of the mind as something entirely apart from all its physical - environment, it seems to me that the argument becomes very strong, - and that I have not made my imaginary philosopher press it beyond its - legitimate bounds. - - [147] Do him every honor. - - [148] By some commentators, this hint, given with female subtilty, is - explained to mean that their copy-hold, or lease, by which Banquo and - his son hold their lives, is not eternal. The more probable meaning is - that, if they are cut off, nature will produce no more copies of their - race. But in either meaning the hint that she gave was the same, and - it included both Banquo and his son. - - [149] When the unknowable power ceases to pulsate through our physical - organism, this "mental state" ceases--nothing survives--continuity is - ended. - - [150] "Principles of Psychology," i, § 208, pp. 465-471. - - [151] I have allowed Sophereus to follow in the main the writer to - whom I have already referred in the note on page 471--Mr. Bishop, of - Florida. - - [152] Bishop. - - [153] Introduction to Taine's "History of English Literature," - translated by H. Van Laun. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1885. - - - - - GLOSSARY - OF - SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THIS WORK. - - - [The following definitions marked with an asterisk are borrowed from - the glossary annexed to Darwin's "Origin of Species." The remainder of - the definitions are taken from Webster's Dictionary.] - - =*Aberrant.= Forms or groups of animals or plants which deviate in - important characters from their nearest allies, so as not to be easily - included in the same group with them, are said to be aberrant. - - =*Abnormal.= Contrary to the general rule. - - =*Aborted.= An organ is said to be aborted when its development has - been arrested at a very early stage. - - =Aërate= (Zoöl.). To subject to the influence of the air by the - natural organs of respiration; to arterialize; especially used of - animals not having lungs. - - =Agnostic= (_a._). Professing ignorance; involving no dogmatic - assertion; leaving a question or problem still in doubt; pertaining to - or involving agnosticism. - - =Agnostic= (_n._). One who professes ignorance, or refrains from - dogmatic assertion; one who supports agnosticism, neither affirming - nor denying the existence of a personal Deity. - - =Agnosticism.= That doctrine which, professing ignorance, neither - asserts nor denies; specifically, in theology, the doctrine that the - existence of a personal Deity can be neither asserted nor denied, - neither proved nor disproved, because of the necessary limits of the - human mind (as sometimes charged upon _Hamilton_ and _Mansel_), or - because of the insufficiency of the evidence furnished by psychical - and physical data, to warrant a positive conclusion (as taught by the - school of _Herbert Spencer_); opposed alike to dogmatic skepticism and - to dogmatic theism. - - =Allantois=, =Allantoid=. A thin membrane, situated between the - chorion and amnion, and forming one of the membranes which invest the - fœtus. - - =*Analogy.= That resemblance of structures which depends upon - similarity of function, as in the wings of insects and birds. Such - structures are said to be _analogous_, and to be _analogues_ of each - other. - - =Anthropomorphism.= The representation of the Deity under a human - form, or with human attributes. - - =*Articulata.= A great division of the animal kingdom, characterized - generally by having the surface of the body divided into rings, called - segments, a greater or less number of which are furnished with jointed - legs (such as insects, crustaceans, and centipeds). - - =Articulation= (Anat.). The joining or juncture of the bones of a - skeleton. - - =Ascidians.= A class of acephalous mollusks, having often a leathery - exterior. - - =Biology.= The science of life; that part of physiology which treats - of life in general, or of the different forces of life. - - =Brain.= The upper part of the head. 1. (Anat.) The whitish, soft mass - which constitutes the anterior or cephalic extremity of the nervous - system in man and other vertebrates, occupying the upper cavity of - the skull; and (_b_) the anterior or cephalic ganglion in insects and - other invertebrates. - - 2. The organ or seat of intellect; hence, the understanding. - - 3. The affections; fancy; imagination. - -=*Branchiæ.= Gills, or organs for respiration in water. - -=*Branchial.= Pertaining to gills or branchiæ. - -=*Canidæ.= The dog family, including the dog, wolf, fox, jackal, etc. - -=Cell.= A minute, inclosed space or sac, filled with fluid, making -up the cellular tissue of plants, and of many parts of animals, and -originating the parts by their growth and reproduction; the constituent -element of all plants and animals (though not universal for all parts -of such structure), much as a crystalline molecule is the element of a -crystal. In the simplest plants and animals (as the _infusoria_), one -single cell constitutes the complete individual, such species being -called _unicellular_ plants or animals. - -=Cephalopod= (Fr. _céphalopode_, from Gr., head and foot). (Zoöl.) An -animal of the sub-kingdom _Mollusca_, characterized by a distinct head, -surrounded by a circle of long arms or tentacles, which they use for -crawling and for seizing objects. See MOLLUSK. - -=*Cetacea.= An order of Mammalia, including the whales, dolphins, etc., -having the form of the body fish-like, the skin naked, and only the -fore-limbs developed. - - -=Chaos.= 1. An empty, infinite space; a yawning chasm. - - 2. The rude, confused state, or unorganized condition, of matter - before the creation of the universe. - -=Consciousness.= 1. The knowledge of sensations and mental operations, -or of what passes in one's own mind; the act of the mind which makes -known an internal object. - - 2. Immediate knowledge of any object whatever. - -=*Crustaceans.= A class of articulated animals having the skin of the -body generally more or less hardened by the deposition of calcareous -matter, breathing by means of gills. (_Examples_, crab, lobster, -shrimp, etc.) - -=Dynamically.= In accordance with the principles of dynamics or moving -forces. - -=*Embryo.= The young animal undergoing development within the egg or -womb. - -=*Embryology.= The study of the development of the embryo. - -=Ethics.= The science of human duty; the body of rules of duty drawn -from this science; a particular system of principles and rules -concerning duty, whether true or false; rules of practice in respect to -a single class of human actions; as political or social ethics. - -=*Fauna.= The totality of the animals naturally inhabiting a certain -country or region, or which have lived during a given geological period. - -=Fetichism=, =Feticism=. One of the lowest and grossest forms of -superstition, consisting in the worship of some material object, as a -stone, a tree, or an animal, often casually selected; practiced among -tribes of lowest mental endowment, as certain races of negroes. - -=*Flora.= The totality of the plants growing naturally in a country or -during a given geological period. - -=*Fœtal.= Of or belonging to the fœtus, or embryo in course of -development. - -=Fœtus=, same as =Fetus=. The young of viviparous animals in the womb, -and of oviparous animals in the egg, after it is perfectly formed, -before which time it is called _embryo_. - -=*Ganoid Fishes.= Fishes covered with peculiar enameled bony scales. -Most of them are extinct. - -=Genus= (Science). An assemblage of species possessing certain -characters in common, by which they are distinguished from all others. -It is subordinate to _tribe_ and _sub-tribe_; hence, a single species -having distinctive characters that seem of more than specific value may -constitute a genus. - -=*Germinal Vesicle.= A minute vesicle in the eggs of animals, from -which the development of the embryo proceeds. - -=Gravitation= (Physics). That species of attraction or force by -which all bodies or particles of matter in the universe tend toward -each other; called also _attraction of gravitation_, _universal -gravitation_, and _universal gravity_. - -=Gravity= (Physics). The tendency of a mass of matter toward a center -of attraction; especially the tendency of a body toward the center of -the earth, terrestrial gravitation. - -=Gyrus=, pl. =Gyri= (Anat.). A convolution of the brain. - -=*Habitat.= The locality in which a plant or animal naturally lives. - -=Heredity.= The transmission of the physical and psychical qualities of -parents to their offspring; the biological law by which living beings -tend to repeat themselves in their descendants. - -=Homologous.= Having the same relative proportion, position, value, or -structure; especially--(_a_) (Geom.) Corresponding in relative position -and proportion. (_b_) (Alg.) Having the same relative proportion or -value, as the two antecedents or the two consequents of a proportion. -(_c_) (Chem.) Being of the same chemical type or series; differing -by a multiple or arithmetical ratio in certain constituents, while -the physical qualities are wholly analogous, with small relative -differences, as if corresponding to a series of parallels; as, the -species in the group of alcohols are said to be _homologous_. (_d_) -(Zoöl.) Being of the same typical structure; having like relations to -a fundamental type of structure; as, those bones in the hand of man -and the fore-foot of a horse are _homologous_ that correspond in their -structural relations--that is, in their relations to the type-structure -of the fore-limb in vertebrates. - -=Homology.= That relation between parts which results from their -development from corresponding embryonic parts, either in different -animals, as in the case of the arm of a man, the fore-leg of a -quadruped, and the wing of a bird; or in the same individual, as in the -case of the fore and hind legs in quadrupeds, and the segments or rings -and their appendages of which the body of a worm, a centiped, etc., is -composed. The latter is called _serial homology_. The parts which stand -in such a relation to each other are said to be _homologous_, and one -such part or organ is called the _homologue_ of the other. In different -plants the parts of the flower are homologous, and in general these -parts are regarded as homologous with leaves. - -=Hypothesis.= 1. A supposition; a proposition or principle which -is supposed or taken for granted, in order to draw a conclusion or -inference for proof of the point in question; something not proved, but -assumed for the purpose of argument. - - 2. A system or theory imagined or assumed to account for known facts - or phenomena. - -=Imago.= The perfect (generally winged) reproductive state of an insect. - -=Implacenta= (_n._). A mammal having no placenta. (_a._) Without a -placenta, as certain marsupial animals. - -=Insectivorous.= Feeding on insects. - -=Instinct= (_n._). Inward impulse; unconscious, involuntary, or -unreasoning prompting to action; a disposition to any mode of action, -whether bodily or spiritual, without a distinct apprehension of the end -or object which Nature has designed should be accomplished thereby; -specifically, the natural, unreasoning impulse in an animal, by which -it is guided to the performance of any action, without thought of -improvement in the method. - -=Invertebrata=, or =Invertebrate Animals=. Those animals which do not -possess a backbone or spinal column. - -=Isomeric= (from Gr., equal and part). (Chem.) Having the quality of -isomerism; as _isomeric_ compounds. - -=Isomerism= (Chem.). An identity of elements and of atomic proportions -with a difference in the amount combined in the compound molecule, and -of its essential qualities; as in the case of the physically unlike -compounds of carbon and hydrogen, consisting one of one part of each, -another of two parts of each, and a third of four of each. - -=Kangaroo.= A ruminating marsupial animal of the genus _Macropus_, -found in Australia and the neighboring islands. - -=Larva= (plural =Larvæ=). The first condition of an insect at its -issuing from the egg, when it is usually in the form of a grub, -caterpillar, or maggot. - -=Lemuridæ.= A group of four-handed animals, distinct from the monkeys, -and approaching the insectivorous quadrupeds in some of their -characters and habits. Its members have the nostrils curved or twisted, -and a claw instead of a nail upon the first finger of the hind hands. - -=Lepidosiren.= An eel-shaped animal covered with rounded scales, having -four rod-like members, and breathing water like a fish. It is found in -ponds and rivers of intertropical Africa and South America. By some it -is regarded as a fish, and by others as a batrachian. - -=Mammal.= Belonging to the breast; from _mamma_, the breast or pap. An -animal of the highest class of vertebrates, characterized by the female -suckling its young. - -=Mammalia.= The highest class of animals, including the ordinary hairy -quadrupeds, the whales, and man, and characterized by the production of -living young, which are nourished after birth by milk from the teats -(_mammæ_, _mammary glands_) of the mother. A striking difference in -embryonic development has led to the division of this class into two -great groups: in one of these, when the embryo has attained a certain -stage, a vascular connection, called the _placenta_, is formed between -the embryo and the mother; in the other this is wanting, and the -young are produced in a very incomplete state. The former, including -the greater part of the class, are called _placental mammals_; the -latter, or _aplacental mammals_, include the marsupials and monotremes -(_ornithorhynchus_). - -=Marsupials.= An order of Mammalia in which the young are born in a -very incomplete state of development, and carried by the mother, while -sucking, in a ventral pouch (_marsupium_), such as the kangaroos, -opossums, etc. (see MAMMALIA). - -=Molecule.= A mass; one of the invisible particles supposed to -constitute matter of any kind. - -=Mollusk.= An invertebrate animal, having a soft, fleshy body (whence -the name), which is inarticulate, and not radiate internally. - -=Monkey.= See SIMIA. - -=Monogamy.= A marriage to one wife only, or the state of such as are -restricted to a single wife, or may not marry again after the death of -a first wife. - -=Monotheism.= The doctrine or belief that there is but one God. - -=Morphology.= The law of form or structure independent of function. - -=Nascent.= Commencing development. - -=Nexus.= Connection; tie. - -=Nictitating Membrane.= A semi-transparent membrane, which can be drawn -across the eye in birds and reptiles, either to moderate the effects of -a strong light or to sweep particles of dust, etc., from the surface of -the eye. - -=Noumenon= (Metaph.). The of itself unknown and unknowable rational -object, or _thing in itself_, which is distinguished from the -_phenomenon_ in which it occurs to apprehension, and by which it is -interpreted and understood; so used in the philosophy of Kant and his -followers. - -=Opossum.= An animal of several species of marsupial quadrupeds of the -genus _Didelphys_. The common species of the United States is the _D. -Virginiana_. Another species, common in Texas and California, is _D. -Californica_, and other species are found in South America. - -=Organism.= An organized being, whether plant or animal. - -=Ovule.= An egg. (Bot.) The rudimentary state of a seed. It consists -essentially of a nucleus developed directly from the placenta. - -=Parasite.= An animal or plant living upon or in, and at the expense -of, another organism. - -=Pelvis.= The bony arch to which the hind-limbs of vertebrate animals -are articulated. - -=Placentalia=, =Placentata=, or =Placental Mammals=. See MAMMALIA. - -=Protozoa.= The lowest great division of the Animal Kingdom. These -animals are composed of a gelatinous material, and show scarcely any -trace of distinct organs. The infusoria, foraminifera, and sponges, -with some other forms, belong to this division. - -=Phenomenon.= 1. An appearance; anything visible; whatever is -presented to the eye; whatever, in matter or spirit, is apparent -to, or is apprehended by, observation, as distinguished from its -ground, substance, or unknown constitution; as _phenomena_ of heat or -electricity; phenomena of imagination or memory. - - 2. Sometimes a remarkable or unusual appearance whose cause is not - immediately obvious. - -=Plexus.= Any net-work of vessels, nerves, or fibers. - -=Polygamy.= A plurality of wives or husbands at the same time, or the -having of such plurality; usually the condition of a man having more -than one wife. - -=Polytheism.= The doctrine of a plurality of gods or invisible beings -superior to man, and having an agency in the government of the world. - -=Proteine= (_n._ Lat., _proteinum_, from Gr., _first_--to be the -first--the first place, chief rank, because it occupies the first -place in relation to the albuminous principles). (Chem.) A substance -claimed by Mulder to be obtained as a distinct substance from albumen, -fibrine, or caseine, and considered by him to be the basis of animal -tissue and of some substances of vegetable origin. - - The theory of proteine can not be maintained.--_Gregory._ - - The theory of Mulder is doubted and denied by many chemists, and also - the existence of _proteine_ as a distinct substance. - -=Psychology.= A discourse or treatise on the human soul; the science of -the human soul; specifically, the systematic or scientific knowledge of -the powers and functions of the human soul, so far as they are known by -consciousness. - -=Quadrumane.= An animal having four feet that correspond to the hands -of a man, as a monkey. - -=Race.= 1. The descendants of a common ancestor; a family, tribe, -people, or nation, believed or presumed to belong to the same stock; a -lineage; a breed. - - 2. A root. - -=Retina.= The delicate inner coat of the eye, formed by nervous -filaments spreading from the optic nerve, and serving for the -perception of the impressions produced by light. - -=Rotifer= (_n._ Lat. _rotifer_, from Lat. _rota_, a wheel, and _ferro_, -to bear. Fr. _rotifère_). (Zoöl.) One of a group of microscopic -crustaceans, having no limbs, and moving by means of rows of cilia -about the head or the anterior extremity. - -=Rudiment= (Nat. Hist.). An imperfect organ, or one which is never -fully formed. - -=Sacral.= Belonging to the sacrum, or the bone composed usually of two -or more united vertebræ to which the sides of the pelvis in vertebrate -animals are attached. - -=Sacrum.= The bone which forms the posterior part of the pelvis. It is -triangular in form. - -=Secularize.= To convert from spiritual to secular or common use; as to -secularize a church, or church property. - -=Segments.= The transverse rings of which the body of an articulate -animal or annelid is composed. - -=Simia= (plural =Simiadæ=) (Lat., an ape, from _simus_, flat-nosed, -snub-nosed). (Zoöl.) A Linnæan genus of animals, including the ape, -monkey, and the like; a general name of the various tribes of monkeys. - -=Species= (Nat. Hist.). A permanent class of existing things or beings, -associated according to attributes or properties which are determined -by scientific observation. - -=Spinal Cord.= The central portion of the nervous system in the -vertebrata, which descends from the brain through the arches of the -vertebræ, and gives off nearly all the nerves to the various organs of -the body. - -=Statical.= To stand. 1. Pertaining to bodies at rest, or in -equilibrium. - - 2. Resting; acting by mere weight without motion; as _statical_ - pressure. - -=Sulcus.= A fissure of the brain, separating two convolutions, or -_gyri_. - -=Teleology= (Fr., _téléologie_, from Gr., the end or issue, and -discourse). The science or doctrine of the final causes of things; the -philosophical consideration of final causes in general. - -=Variety= (Nat. Hist., Bot., and Zoöl.). Any form or condition of -structure under a species which differs in its characteristics from -those typical to the species, as in color, shape, size, and the like, -and which is capable either of perpetuating itself for a period, or of -being perpetuated by artificial means; also, any of the various forms -under a species meeting the conditions mentioned. A form characterized -by an abnormity of structure, or any difference from the type that is -not capable of being perpetuated through two or more generations, is -not called a variety. - -=Vascular.= Containing blood-vessels. - -=Vertebrata=; or =Vertebrate Animals=. The highest division of the -animal kingdom, so called from the presence in most cases of a -back-bone composed of numerous joints or _vertebræ_, which constitutes -the center of the skeleton, and at the same time supports and protects -the central parts of the nervous system. - -=Vesicle.= A bladder-like vessel; a membranous cavity; a cyst; a cell; -especially (_a_) (Bot.) a small bladder-like body in the substance of a -vegetable, or upon the surface of a leaf.--_Gray._ (_b_) (Med.) A small -orbicular elevation of the cuticle containing lymph, and succeeded by -a scurf or laminated scab; also, any small cavity or sac in the human -body; as the umbilical vesicle. - -=Vortices= (_verto_, to turn). 1. A whirling or circular motion of any -fluid, usually of water, forming a kind of cavity in the center of -the circle, and in some instances drawing in water or absorbing other -things; a whirlpool. - - 2. A whirling of the air; a whirlwind. - - 3. (_Cartesian system._) A supposed collection of particles of very - subtile matter, endowed with a rapid rotary motion around an axis. - By means of these _vortices_ Descartes attempted to account for the - formation of the universe. - - - - -INDEX. - - - Advocacy, maxim of, 132. - - Affections, structural system of, 532. - - Agnosticism, as defined by Huxley, 274. - - Allantois, the, office of, 236 _et seq._, 245. - - Almagest. See PTOLEMAIC SYSTEM. - - Amphibians in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71, 96, 98. - - Amphioxus. See LANCELET. - - Amputation before or after birth, 129, 130. - - Anatomy, modern, great advance of, 40, 41. - Plato's knowledge of, 38. - - Anatomy of the mind, 470. - - Animals, origin of, according to Plato, 57 _et seq._ - origin of, according to Darwin, 60 _et seq._ - - Anthropomorphic attributes not necessary to the conception of God, 293 - _et seq._ - - Anthropomorphism, meaning, 293. - - Antichthon, or counter-earth, invented by the Pythagoreans, 36. - - Apes, varieties of, 71. - anthropomorphous, 100. - - Apparitions, facts communicated by, 486-488. - - Aquatic worm, 94. - - Areas, effect of change of, 248. - - Articulata, likeness of structure in, 205 _et seq._ - - Ascidians, larvæ of, 94. - - Assassination, once employed with impunity, 165. - - Associative faculty, what it is, 528. - - Athenian, the, compared with a savage, 73, 74. - - Authority, as affecting belief, 3. - ecclesiastic and scientific, 22, 23. - in science, 21. - - Automatic machines, analysis of, 505. - - - Baboons, how different from monkeys, 71, _note_. - - Belief, foundations of, 1-3. - antiquity of, how to be regarded, 132 _et seq._ - grounds of, 274-277. - - Birds, origin of, according to Plato, 57. - sexual selection among, 67, _note_. - - Bishop, P. P., "The Heart of Man," 471, _note_. - - Blood, similarity in the composition of, 122. - great change in, 122. - - Body, natural and spiritual, 468. - - Brain of men and apes compared, 191. - human, 518. - office of, 196. - - Breaks in the organic chain, 103-106. - - Buffon, accepted Mosaic account of creation, 368, 369. - - - Causation, ultimate, 386. - - Cell, hypothesis of the single, 371, _note_. - - Chaos, Plato's conception of, 45. - - Classification, how it supports evolution, 200, 203. - - Common stock, hypothesis of descent from, 209. - - Composition, what occurs in, 473, 474. - - Comte, Auguste, one of his suggestions, 387, 388. - - Conduct, Spencer's view of, 427 _et seq._ - - Consciousness, what it is, 470, 471, 503. - - Constitutions, political, supposed growth of, 168. - - Conversations invented during sleep, 480, 481. - - Conversion of organs, 67. - - Copernicus, system of, 32. - - Creation, special, contrasted with evolution, 1 _et seq._ - absolute, unknown to the Greeks, 45. - influence of the belief in, 164, 165. - man's power of, 144. - Mosaic account of, 23. - poetical, 140, 141. - what it is, 136 _et seq._, 139, 140, 223. - - Creator, the, postulate of, 115. - honoring or dishonoring the, not the question, 160 _et seq._ - method of, 207. - - Creator, methods of, in the two realms of spirit and matter, 537. - power of, boundless, 224, 232, 535. - - Crosses not permissible between distinct species, 372. - - - Darwin, Charles, his theory of evolution, 7. - bearing of his theory on man's immortality, 12, 13. - candor and accuracy of, 101. - difference of, from Spencer, 43, 225. - his pedigree of man, 70-72, 87. - his view of human dignity, 10. - on primeval man, 375. - on the belief in God, 60, 61. - rejects an aboriginal pair, 406. - tabulated form of his pedigree of man, 93. - - Dekad, the perfect number of the Pythagoreans, 35. - - Delirium, explanation of, 499, 500. - - Demiurgus, the, constructor of Plato's Kosmos, 46. - - Descartes, his theory of vortices, 33. - - Descent, must be unbroken, 211. - - Design, when hypothesis of, necessary, 214. - - Desires, mental system of, 532. - - Domestic animals, breeding of, 89. - - Distribution in space, how it affects evolution, 203, 247. - in time, 251. - - Dreams, phenomena of, 479-490. - - - Earth. See SOLAR SYSTEM. - - Economy of Nature, meaning of, 116, 126. - - Elements, the four, in the Platonic Kosmos, 45, 46. - - Eliphaz and Zophar. See JOB. - - Embryonic development, resemblances in, 111, 120. - - Embryology, cautions respecting, 241. - how it supports evolution, 229. - - Emotions, system of, 530-532. - - Energy. See POWER, CAUSATION. - - Evidence, rules of circumstantial, 14-17. - applicable to scientific investigation, 17, 18. - missing links in chain of, 18-20. - process of, 67, 68. - - Evil, rational explanation of, 148 _et seq._ - - Evolution, assumptions in the theory of, 18-20. - general reasons for, 102. - law of, limited, 210. - of man, 373. - principle of, 377. - process reversed, 252-256. - - Experts, true office of, 21, 22. - - Extemporaneous speaking, what is, 474. - - Eye, the, formation of, 68-70, 83, 84. - - - Faunas of different areas, 247. - - Fetichism. See SPENCER. - - Fishes, origin of, according to Plato, 58. - most lowly organized, 95. - shell, the lowest form of, 58. - - Fœtus, growth of the, 234 _et seq._ - - - Galen, mistakes of, in anatomy, 39, 40. - how he differed from Plato, 39. - - Galileo, confirms and rectifies Kepler's laws, 32. - Papal condemnation of, 20, 21, _note_. - - Ganoids, description of, 96. - - Genealogical trees of no value in zoölogy, 202, _note_. - - General laws and special creations, 127, 128. - - Germ, ante-fœtal, how formed, 234. - - Gladiatorial shows, part of Roman civilization, 164. - - God, existence of, how proved, 11, 12. - a necessary postulate, 402. - a personal, denied by Spencer, 433. - consciousness of, how to be lost, according to Spencer, 285 _et seq._ - existence and attributes of, how deduced, 300 _et seq._ - his dealing with Abraham, 425. - probable methods of, 63, 64, 82-85, 102. - unlike Plato's Demiurgus, 85. - - Gods, the, origin of, among the Greeks, 50. - genesis of, according to Plato, 46, 48-50, _note_. - office of, in the formation of Plato's Kosmos, 49. - - Gravitation, law of, how deduced, 20. - - Greek philosophy, account of, 24 _et seq._ - encounters monotheism at Alexandria, 287. - how hampered by the mythology, 138. - schools of, before Plato, 28. - - Grote, his Plato cited and followed, 27-40, 287, 288, 290. - - - Harvey discovers the circulation of the blood, 40. - - Heat, origin of, 386, 387. - - Hebrews receive divine commands, 418. - - Heredity, law of, limited, 225. - - Homologous organs, meaning of, 97. - See SWIM-BLADDER AND LUNG. - meaning of, 215, _note_. - - Human life, peculiar sacredness of, 164-166. - - Huxley, Professor, on the brain of man and apes, 192. - - Huxley, Professor, quoted, 121. - - - Ideal persons, are creations, 140, 141. - - Ideal plan, objection to, 114, 118. - - Ideas in Plato's system, coeval with primordial matter, 45, 46. - how acquired, 506-508. - - Idiocy, absolute, probably does not exist, 526. - what it is, 526-528. - - Idiot. See IDIOCY. - - Immortality, what is proof of, 41, 540. - belief in, 61, 62. - fanciful explanation of, 543. - - Improvisation, what is, 474. - - Infinite goodness consistent with the existence of suffering, 156. - - Instinct, genesis of, according to Plato, 60. - genesis of, according to Darwin, _ib._ - - Intellectual faculties, system of, 525. - - Interbreeding. See SPECIES. - - Introspective faculty, power of the, 529. - - Intuitive faculty, office of, 525, 526. - - Invention in mechanics, 475. - - Invention is creation, 142. - - - Job and his friends, 25 _et seq._ - - - Kangaroos, structure of, 98. - - Kepler, his laws of the planetary motions, 32. - - Knowledge not limited to scientific demonstration, 392. - of ourselves, 520, 521. - - Kosmos, the. See PLATO. - - - Lancelet, visual organ of the, 68. - - Languages, origin of, 168, 397, 398. - - Lemuridæ in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71. - characteristics of, 99. - - Logic, abuse of, 136 _et seq._ - right use of, 220. - use and misuse of its forms, 145. - - Lung in vertebrates, supposed homologue with a swim-bladder, 67. - conversion of, from swim-bladder, 97. - - - Macaulay, Lord, his depreciation of natural theology, 24 _et seq._ - - Macbeth, Lady, her sleep-walking analyzed, 491-499. - - Man, dignity of, how to be treated, 9, 10. - bodily structure of, 109. - common ancestor of, and the apes, 71, 100. - constructive faculty of, 346. - immortality of, 12, 13. - liability to certain diseases, 110. - moral accountability of, 9, 10. - origin of, 348. - pedigree of, according to Darwin, 70-72. - rank of, in scale of being, 101. - - Marriage, scientific view of, 381. - - Marsupials in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71. - ancient, 98. - - Matter, primordial, according to Plato, 45. - - Matter and spirit contrasted, 477. - - Medium, effect of change of, 248, 249. - - Mind, origin of, 8, 9. - a created being, 407 _et seq._ - a spiritual creation, 401-404. - contrasted theories of, 533 _et seq._ - evolution origin of the, 538. - evolution theory of origin of, 394 _et seq._ - is an organism, 476. - of animals below man, 80, 81. - origin and nature of, 467-546. - origin of, according to Darwin, 78. - origin of, according to Plato, 79, 80. - structure of, 502. - substance of, 509. - systems of, 523 _et seq._ - the human, placed under certain laws, 389, 390. - - Miracles, meaning of, 129. - - Miraculous interposition not necessary, 163. - - Modern civilization, what it owes to belief in special creation, - 164-166. - - Monkeys, two great stems of, 71. - Catarrhine, or Old-World, 100. - - Monotheism, its influence on philosophy, 138. - origin of, 342. - - Monotremata, division of the mammalian series, 98. - - Moral injunctions, sacred origin of, 418. - - Moral injunctions, Spencer's denial of, 427 _et seq._, 433. - - Moral law, capacity of human beings to receive, 420. - scientific view of the, 420 _et seq._ - - Moral purposes in the phenomena of nature, 387, 388. - - Moral sense, origin of, 86. - - Morphology, how it supports evolution, 202. - - Mosaic account of creation, rationality of, 366 _et seq._ - - Murder, punishment of, moral foundation for, 166. - - "Music of the spheres," origin of the phrase, 37. - - - Nascent organs, meaning of, 111, 112. - - "Natural," meaning of, 214. - - Natural theology, progress of, from Thales to Plato and Aristotle, 28, - 29. - importance of, 43. - - Nervous organization, Spencer's view of, 409 _et seq._ - - Newton, Sir Isaac, discovers the law of universal gravitation, 33. - deduces a personal God from nature, 331, _note_. - his General Scholium, 332. - - Noumenon, an invented word, 269. - - Number. See DEKAD, and PYTHAGORAS. - - - Opossums, structure of, 98. - - Orthodoxy, Plato's idea of, as suggested in his "Republic," 296, 297. - - Oviparous animals, 98. - - - Pairs, of animals, opposite views of, 405. - - Pairs, assumed existence of, 537. - - Parasites, how to be viewed, 151 _et seq._ - - Pattern of structure, argument concerning, 204. - - Pedigree, rule for tracing, 185-187. - - Pedigree of man, Darwinian, 70 _et seq._ - - Phenomenon and noumenon, 268. - - Philolaus as quoted by Grote, 35. - - Philosophy, modern and ancient compared, 24 _et seq._ - - Physicians in Plato's time, 40. - - Placental mammals, 99. - - Plato, period of, 28, _note_. - as given in "Timæus," 298. - his Demiurgus, 287, 288. - his genealogy of the gods, 298, _note_. - his Kosmos and Darwin's hypothesis compared, 44-86. - his origin of religious beliefs as given in "Republic," 296. - his triplicity of souls, 39. - his view of rudiments, 74, 75. - originality of, 289, 290. - - Polytheism, origin of, 342. - - Power, distinct from substance, 226, 233, _note_; 339 _et seq._ - an attribute of mind, 386. - of nature, limited, 343-345. - - Primitive beliefs, not necessarily wrong, 132 _et seq._ - - "Principle" of construction, 106, 107. - - Probability, force of, in reasoning, 7. - - Psychology, needs a new birth, 546. - - Ptolemaic system, description of, 31. - - Pyramids, why referable to mind, 390, 391. - - Pythagoras, school of, 34 _et seq._ - - - Quadrumana, in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71. - and other mammals, 99. - - - Races, what are, 372. - - Raphael, created images, 143. - - Religion, what is, 11, 12. - natural, 23. - when in conflict with science, 11-13, 399. - - Religious consciousness, Spencer's origin of, 284. - - Reproduction, two grand systems of, 107, 108. - - Reproductive process, parallel in the, 110. - - Reptiles, Plato's origin of, 58. - - Resurrection, St. Paul's doctrine of the, 468. - - Revelation, how treated in this work, 23. - purpose of, 540. - - Roman civilization, lacked belief in creation, 164. - law, slavery under, 165. - - Rudiments, Plato's view of, 74, 75. - instances of, 111-114, 124, 125. - - - Sacrum, analysis of the human, 215. - structure of the female, 220. - - Savages, beliefs of, 60, 61. - - Science, domain of, 391, 392. - present tendency of, 352. - tendencies of, 127. - values of, 291. - when in conflict with religion, meaning of, 11, 12. - wrong aims of, 545. - - Scott, Sir Walter, his reliance on thoughts obtained during sleep, - 490, _note_. - - Secularization of morals discussed, 434 _et seq._ - - Segments. See ARTICULATA; VERTEBRATES. - - Selection, natural, 65, 72, 89. - limitations to, 91. - office of, 72. - sexual, 66, 72, 89. - - Senses, the corporeal, 503. - - Sexes, origin of, in Plato's Kosmos, 55. - in Nature, 221, 354 _et seq._, 378. - - Sexual love, in men and brutes, 379. - moral and social phenomena of, 382. - - Sexual union, operation of, 234 _et seq._ - - Sexual unions, purpose of, 384, 385. - - Shakespeare, created imaginary persons, 140, 141. - - Simiadæ, general term for monkeys, 99. - - Simonides, poetical theologies of, 24 _et seq._ - - Sixteenth century, intellectual habits in the, 21. - - Sin, how to be viewed, 148, _note_. - - Slavery, under the Roman law, 165. - - Sleep, phenomena of, 479 _et seq._ - better thoughts during, 489. - - Society, phenomena of, 334 _et seq._ - - Solar system, how viewed by the Greeks, 31 _et seq._ - origin of, 168, 172, 301. - - Somnambulism, phenomena of, 491. - - Soul, meaning of, 478. - - Souls, of men, genesis of, in Plato's Kosmos, 51, 76, 77. - transmigration of, 78. - triplicity of, 51, 76, 77. - - Space, illimitable, concepts of, 260 _et seq._ - - Species, finality of, 157 _et seq._ - meaning of, 372 _et seq._ - - Spencer, Herbert, his theory of animal evolution, 7, 8. - answers to his objections, 145 _et seq._ - attacks "the current creed," 434. - creation is something made out of nothing, 136. - creation incapable of being conceived, 136. - creation not supported by any proof, 135. - his agnosticism examined, 257 _et seq._ - his argument from parasites, 151 _et seq._ - his denial of the possibility of knowing mind, 508. - his doctrine of evolution, 131. - his ethical system, 427 _et seq._ - his ghost-theory, 284 _et seq._ - his origin of man, 348-351, 357. - his psychological system, 408 _et seq._ - his psychology criticised, 470, 504. - his theory of mind, 510-516. - his theory of the moral sense, 418, 423. - his treatment of the divine attributes, 293. - his "unknown cause," 163, 166. - how his theory differs from Darwin's, 225. - on the evolution of mind, 64. - on the evolution of animals, 179. - on universal law of evolution, 167. - special creations presumptively absurd, 132 _et seq._ - - St. Paul, his doctrine of the resurrection, 468. - - Struggle for existence, meaning of, 88. - - Substance, distinct from power, 233. - of mind, 469. - - Substitution and suppression of organs, 236 _et seq._ - - "Supernatural," meaning of, 214. - - "Survival of the fittest," meaning of, 65, 66. - - Swim-bladder, supposed homologue of a lung, 67. - conversion of, 96. - - - Taine, M., his views of the objects of history, 545. - - Telescope, formation of the, 68-70. - - Thales, philosophy of, 24, 27, 28. - period of, 28, _note_. - - Theology, the current, not to be considered, 145. - - Time, beginning of, in Plato's Kosmos, 48. - conception of endless, 262 _et seq._ - - Transmigration, from animal to animal, 54-59. - - Typical plan, concealed in the ante-fœtal germ, 238. - - - Uniformity. See PATTERN. - - - Varieties, what are, 372. - - Vertebral column, analysis of, 215. - - Voltaire, saying of, 25. - - Von Baer, his embryologic law, 229. - - Vortices. See DESCARTES. - - - Women, origin of, in Plato's Kosmos, 55. - - - THE END. - - - - -BY GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. - - - =LIFE OF DANIEL WEBSTER.= By GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. Illustrated with - Steel Portrait and Woodcuts. Two vols., 8vo. Cloth, $4.00; sheep, - $6.00; half morocco, $10.00. - -A most valuable and important contribution to the history of American -parties and politics, and to the best class of our literature. It is a -model biography of a most gifted man, wherein the intermingling of the -statesman and lawyer with the husband, father, and friend, is painted -so that we feel the reality of the picture. - - "We believe the present work to be a most valuable and - important contribution to the history of American parties and - politics."--_London Saturday Review._ - - "Of Mr. Curtis's labor we wish to record our opinion, in addition - to what we have already said, that, in the writing of this book, - he has made a most valuable contribution to the best class of our - literature."--_New York Tribune._ - - "This 'Life of Webster' is a monument to both subject and author, and - one that will stand well the wear of time."--_Boston Post._ - - "Mr. Curtis, it will be remembered, was one of the literary executors - named by Mr. Webster, in his will, to do this work; and owing to the - death of two of the others, Mr. Everett and President Felton, and the - advanced age of Mr. Ticknor, Mr. Curtis has prepared the biography - himself, and it has passed under Mr. Ticknor's revision. We believe - the work will satisfy the wishes of Mr. Webster's most devoted - friends."--_Boston Journal._ - - - =THE LAST YEARS OF DANIEL WEBSTER.= A MONOGRAPH. By GEORGE TICKNOR - CURTIS. 8vo. Paper, 50 cents. - - "Laying aside, so far as I may be able, the partiality of a friend and - biographer, I shall subject to the scrutiny of reason and good sense - the accusation that, in Mr. Webster's later years, for the sake of - attaining the Presidency, by bidding for the political support of the - Southern States, he renounced the principles which he had professed - all his life on the subject of slavery."--_The Author._ - - - =McCLELLAN'S LAST SERVICE TO THE REPUBLIC=, together with a Tribute to - his Memory. By GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. With a Map showing the Position - of the Union and Confederate Forces on the Night of November 7, 1862. - 12mo. Paper, 30 cents. - - "Every statement of a fact, contained in these pages, which was not - founded on General McClellan's official report of his campaigns, or - derived from some other public source, was given to me by the General - in the spring of 1880, and was written down by me at the time. At my - request he superintended the preparation of the map which shows his - position and that of the Confederate troops on the 7th and 8th of - November, 1862, and compared it with the military maps issued by the - Government after the close of the civil war."--_From the Author's - Prefatory Note._ - - - New York: D. APPLETON & CO., 1, 3, & 5 Bond Street. - - - - - * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - - Obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected. Variations - in spelling, punctuation, accents and hyphenation remain as in the - original. - - In Chapter 12, Page 526, the sentence: "This is a power that - can belong to and inhere in a spiritual organism alone. We must, - therefore, recognize in the infant this original implanted endowment, - the capacity to be mentally convinced of realities; and while, in - order to the first exercise of this capacity there must be a physical - organism which will conduct the sensory impressions to the brain ..." - - Has been amended to read "... in order to meet the first exercise of this - capacity ..." - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CREATION OR EVOLUTION?*** - - -******* This file should be named 50086-0.txt or 50086-0.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/0/0/8/50086 - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it -under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this -eBook or online at <a -href="http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you are not -located in the United States, you'll have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this ebook.</p> -<p>Title: Creation or Evolution?</p> -<p> A Philosophical Inquiry</p> -<p>Author: George Ticknor Curtis</p> -<p>Release Date: September 30, 2015 [eBook #50086]</p> -<p>Language: English</p> -<p>Character set encoding: UTF-8</p> -<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CREATION OR EVOLUTION?***</p> -<p> </p> -<h4>E-text prepared by<br /> - Donald Cummings, Adrian Mastronardi, Les Galloway, - and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br /> - (<a href="http://www.pgdp.net">http://www.pgdp.net</a>)<br /> - from page images generously made available by<br /> - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries<br /> - (<a href="https://archive.org/details/toronto">https://archive.org/details/toronto</a>)</h4><p> </p> -<table border="0" style="background-color: #ccccff;margin: 0 auto;" cellpadding="10"> - <tr> - <td valign="top"> - Note: - </td> - <td> - Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See - <a href="https://archive.org/details/creationorevolut00curtuoft"> - https://archive.org/details/creationorevolut00curtuoft</a> - </td> - </tr> -</table> -<p> </p> -<hr class="full" /> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> - - -<h1>CREATION<br /> - -OR EVOLUTION?</h1> - -<p class="center"><i>A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY.</i></p> - -<p class="center space-above"><small>BY</small><br /> -GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS.</p> - - -<p class="center space-above"> NEW YORK:<br /> -D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,<br /> -<small> 1, 3, AND 5 BOND STREET.<br /> -1887</small>.</p> - - -<p class="center space-above"><span class="xs"><span class="smcap">Copyright, 1887.</span><br /> - By GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS.</span></p> - -<p class="center space-above"><small>TO</small><br /> - LEWIS A. SAYRE, M. D.,<br /> - <small>WHOSE PROFESSIONAL EMINENCE IS RECOGNIZED<br /> - IN BOTH HEMISPHERES,<br /> - WHOSE SKILL AS A SURGEON<br /> - SUFFERING HUMANITY GRATEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGES,<br /> - TO WHOSE ANATOMICAL LEARNING<br /> - THE AUTHOR IS LARGELY INDEBTED,<br /> - AND OF WHOSE FRIENDSHIP HE IS PROUD,<br /> - <i><b>This Book</b></i><br /> - IS AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED</small>.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div class="poetry-container"> -<div class="poetry"><div class="stanza"> -<div class="verse">"<i>Dost thou not know, my new astronomer!</i><br /></div> -<div class="verse"><i>Earth, turning from the sun, brings night to man?</i><br /></div> -<div class="verse"><i>Man, turning from his God, brings endless night;</i><br /></div> -<div class="verse"><i>Where thou canst read no morals, find no friend,</i><br /></div> -<div class="verse"><i>Amend no manners, and expect no peace.</i>"<br /></div> -<div class="verse indent12"><i><small>YOUNG'S NIGHT THOUGHTS</small>.</i><br /></div> -</div></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> -<div class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></div> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE">PREFACE.</a></h2> -</div> - -<p>Perhaps it is expected of a writer who steps out of -the sphere of his ordinary pursuits, and deals with such a -subject as that which is treated in this work, that he will -account for his so doing. It is not necessary for me to say -that no class of men can have a monopoly in any subject. -But I am quite willing to take my readers into my confidence -so far as to state how I came to write this book.</p> - -<p>Most men, who have a special pursuit, find the necessity -for recreation of some kind. Some take it in one way, and -some in another. It has been my habit through life to seek -occasional relief from the monotony of professional vocations -in intellectual pursuits of another character. Having -this habit—which I have found by experience has no tendency -to lessen one's capacity for the duties of a profession, -or one's relish of its occupations—I some years ago took -up the study of the modern doctrine of animal evolution. -Until after the death of the late Mr. Charles Darwin, I -had not given a very close attention to this subject. The -honors paid to his memory, and due to his indefatigable -research and extensive knowledge, led me to examine his -"Descent of Man" and his "Origin of Species," both of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span> -which I studied with care, and I trust with candor. I was -next induced to examine the writings of Mr. Herbert -Spencer on the subject of evolution, with which I had also -been previously unacquainted except in a general way. I -was a good deal surprised at the extent of Mr. Spencer's -reputation as a thinker, and by the currency which his peculiar -philosophy has had in this country, where it has led, -among the young and inexperienced, as well as among -older persons, to very incorrect habits of reasoning on subjects -of the highest importance. The result of my studies -of these writers is the present book. I have written it because -I have seen, or believe that I have seen, where the -conflict arises between some of the deductions of modern -science and the principles which ought to regulate not -only religious belief, but belief in anything that is not -open to the direct observation of our senses. But I trust -that I shall not be understood as having written for the -purpose of specially defending the foundations of religious -belief. This is no official duty of mine. How theologians -manage, or ought to manage, the argument which is to -convince men of the existence and methods of God, it is -not for me to say. But a careful examination of the new -philosophy has convinced me that those who are the special -teachers of religious truth have need of great caution in -the admissions or concessions which they make, when they -undertake to reconcile some of the conclusions of modern -scientists with belief in a Creator. I do not here speak of -the Biblical account of the creation, but I speak of that -belief in a Creator which is to be deduced from the phenomena -of nature. While there are naturalists, scientists,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span> -and philosophers at the present day, whose speculations do -not exclude the idea of a Supreme Being, there are others -whose theories are entirely inconsistent with a belief in a -personal God, the Creator and Governor of the universe. -Moreover, although there are great differences in this respect -between the different persons who accept evolution -in some form, the whole doctrine of the development of -distinct species out of other species makes demands upon -our credulity which are irreconcilable with the principles -of belief by which we regulate, or ought to regulate, our acceptance -of any new matter of belief. The principles of -belief which we apply in the ordinary affairs of life are -those which should be applied to scientific or philosophical -theories; and inasmuch as the judicial method of reasoning -upon facts is at once the most satisfactory and the -most in accordance with common sense, I have here undertaken -to apply it to the evidence which is supposed to establish -the hypothesis of animal evolution, in contrast with -the hypothesis of special creations.</p> - -<p>I am no ecclesiastic. I advance no arguments in favor of -one or another interpretation of the Scriptures about which -there is controversy among Christians. While I firmly believe -that God exists, and that he has made a revelation -to mankind, whereby he has given us direct assurance of -immortality, I do not know that this belief disqualifies me -from judging, upon proper principles of evidence, of the -soundness of a theory which denies that he specially created -either the body or the mind of man. How far the hypothesis -of evolution, by destroying our belief that God -specially created us, tends to negative any purpose for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span> -which we can suppose him to have made to us a revelation -of our immortality, it is for the theologian to consider. -For myself, I am not conscious that in examining the -theory of evolution I have been influenced by my belief -in what is called revealed religion. I have, at all events, -studiously excluded from the argument all that has been -inculcated by the Hebrew or the Christian records as authorized -or inspired teachings, and have treated the Mosaic -account of the creation like any other hypothesis of -the origin of man and the other animals. The result of -my study of the hypothesis of evolution is, that it is an ingenious -but delusive mode of accounting for the existence -of either the body or the mind of man; and that it employs -a kind of reasoning which no person of sound judgment -would apply to anything that might affect his welfare, -his happiness, his estate, or his conduct in the practical -affairs of life.</p> - -<p>He who would truly know what the doctrine of evolution -is, and to what it leads, must literally begin at the -beginning. He must free his mind from the cant of agnosticism -and from the cant of belief. He must refuse to -accept dogmas on the authority of any one, be they the -dogmas of the scientist, or of the theologian. He must -learn that his mental nature is placed under certain -laws, as surely as his corporeal structure; and he must -cheerfully obey the necessities which compel him to accept -some conclusions and to reject others. Keeping his -reasoning powers in a well-balanced condition, he must -prove all things, holding fast to that which is in conformity -with sound deduction, and to that alone. But all per<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span>sons -may not be able to afford the time to pursue truth in -this way, or may not have the facilities for the requisite -research. It seemed to me, therefore, that an effort to do -for them what they can not do for themselves would be -acceptable to a great many people.</p> - -<p>It may be objected that the imaginary philosopher -whom I have introduced in some of my chapters under -the name of Sophereus, or the searcher after wisdom, debating -the doctrines of evolution with a supposed disciple -of that school, whom I have named Kosmicos, is an impossible -person. It may perhaps be said that the conception -of a man absolutely free from all dogmatic religious -teaching, from all bias to any kind of belief, and yet having -as much knowledge of various systems of belief as I -have imputed to this imaginary person, would in modern -society be the conception of an unattainable character. -My answer to this criticism would be that I felt myself at -liberty to imagine any kind of character that would suit -my purpose. How successfully I have carried out the -idea of a man in mature life entirely free from all preconceived -opinions, and forming his beliefs upon principles -of pure reason, it is for my readers to judge. With -regard to the other interlocutor in the dialogues, I hope -it is not necessary for me to say that I do not impute all -of his opinions or arguments to the professors of the evolution -school, or to any section of it. He is a representative -of the effects of some of their teachings, but not an -individual portrait. But as, for the purposes of the antagonism, -it was expedient to put into the mouth of this -person whatever can be said in favor of the hypothesis of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span> -evolution, it became necessary to make him represent the -dogmatic side of the theory; and thus to make the collision -and contrast between the minds of the two debaters -as strong as I could. Controversial discussion in the -form of debate has been used from the time of Plato. -While I have adopted a method, I have not presumed to -imitate its great exemplars. But for the value of that -method I shall presently cite weighty testimony. It was -a relief to me to resort to it after having pursued the -subject in the more usual form of discussion; and indeed -it forced itself upon me as a kind of necessity, because -it seemed the fairest way of presenting what could -be said on both sides of the question. I hope it may have -the good fortune to keep alive the interest of the reader, -after he has perused the previous chapters.</p> - -<p>One disadvantage of all positive writing or discourse -is that there is no one to confute, to contradict, or to -maintain the negative. At the bar, and in some public -assemblies, there is an antagonist; and truth is elicited -by the collision. But in didactic writing, especially on -a philosophical topic, it is best to introduce an antagonist, -and to make him speak in his own person. Two -of the best thinkers of our time have forcibly stated the -advantage—the necessity, in short—of personal debate. -Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his essay on Liberty, observes -that—</p> - -<p>"The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent -and living apprehension of a truth as is afforded by the -necessity of explaining it to or defending it against opponents, -though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span> -drawback from the benefits of its universal recognition. -Where this advantage can not be had, I confess I should -like to see the teachers of mankind endeavoring to provide -a substitute for it; some contrivance for making the -difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness -as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient -champion eager for his conversion.</p> - -<p>"But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, -they have lost those they formerly had. The Socratic -dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues -of Plato, were a contrivance of this description. They -were essentially a discussion of the great questions of life -and philosophy, directed with consummate skill to the -purpose of convincing any one, who had merely adopted -the commonplaces of received opinion, that he did not -understand the subject—that he as yet attached no definite -meaning to the doctrines he professed, in order that, -becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the -way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension -both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. -The school disputations of the middle ages had -a similar object. They were intended to make sure that -the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary -correlation) the opinion opposed to it, and could enforce -the grounds of one and confute those of the other. The -last-mentioned contests had, indeed, the incurable defect -that the premises appealed to were taken from authority, -not from reason; and as a discipline to the mind they -were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics -which formed the intellects of the 'Socratici viri.' But<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span> -the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally -willing to admit; and the present modes of instruction -contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies -the place either of the one or of the other.... It is the -fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic—that -which points out weakness in theory or errors in -practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative -criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate -result, but as a means to attaining any positive -knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it can not be -valued too highly; and until people are again systematically -trained to it there will be few great thinkers, and a -low general average of intellect in any but the mathematical -and physical departments of speculation. On -any other subject no one's opinions deserve the name of -knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon -him by others, or gone through of himself, the same -mental process which would have been required of him -in carrying on an active controversy with opponents."</p> - -<p>Mr. Grote, in his admirable work on "Plato and the -other Companions of Socrates," has the following passage:</p> - -<p>"Plato is usually extolled by his admirers as the champion -of the Absolute—of unchangeable forms, immutable -truth, objective necessity, cogent and binding on every -one. He is praised for having refuted Protagoras, who -can find no standard beyond the individual recognition -and belief of his own mind or that of some one else. -There is no doubt that Plato often talks in that strain, -but the method followed in his dialogues, and the general -principles of methods which he lays down here as well as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span> -elsewhere, point to a directly opposite conclusion. Of this -the Phædrus is a signal instance. Instead of the extreme -of generality, it proclaims the extreme of speciality. The -objection which the Socrates of the Phædrus advances -against the didactic efficacy of written discourse is founded -on the fact that it is the same to all readers—that it takes -no cognizance of the differences of individual minds nor -of the same mind at different times. Socrates claims for -dialectic debate the valuable privilege that it is constant -action and reaction between two individual minds—an -appeal by the inherent force and actual condition of each -to the like elements in the other—an ever-shifting presentation -of the same topics, accommodated to the measure -of intelligence and cast of emotion in the talkers and at -the moment. The individuality of each mind—both questioner -and respondent—is here kept in view as the governing -condition of the process. No two minds can be approached -by the same road or by the same interrogation. -The questioner can not advance a step except by the admission -of the respondent. Every respondent is the measure -to himself. He answers suitably to his own belief; -he defends by his own suggestions; he yields to the pressure -of contradiction and inconsistency <em>when he feels them</em>, -and not before. Each dialogist is (to use the Protagorean -phrase) the measure to himself of truth and falsehood, -according as he himself believes it. Assent or dissent, -whichever it may be, springs only from the free working -of the individual mind in its actual condition then and -there. It is to the individual mind alone that appeal is -made, and this is what Protagoras asks for.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span></p> - -<p>"We thus find, in Plato's philosophical character, two -extreme opposite tendencies and opposite poles co-existent. -We must recognize them both, but they can never be -reconciled; sometimes he obeys and follows the one, sometimes -the other.</p> - -<p>"If it had been Plato's purpose to proclaim and impose -upon every one something which he called 'Absolute -Truth,' one and the same alike imperative upon all, he -would best proclaim it by preaching or writing. To -modify this 'Absolute,' according to the varieties of the -persons addressed, would divest it of its intrinsic attribute -and excellence. If you pretend to deal with an Absolute, -you must turn away your eyes from all diversity of apprehending -intellects and believing subjects."</p> - -<p>With such testimony to the value of dialectic debate, -I hope that my adoption of it as a method will be regarded -as something better than an affectation.</p> - -<p>Mr. Spencer, in one of his works,<a name="FNanchor_1" id="FNanchor_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> referring to and -quoting from Berkeley's "Dialogues of Hylas and Philolaus," -observes that "imaginary conversation affords great -facilities for gaining a victory. When you can put into -an adversary's mouth just such replies as suit your purpose, -there is little difficulty in reaching the desired conclusion." -I have not written to gain a victory; and, -indeed, I am quite aware that it would be impossible to -gain one over those with whom I can have no common -ground of reasoning. In the imaginary conversations in -this work, I have taken great care not to put into the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[Pg xvii]</a></span> -mouth of the supposed representative of the doctrine of -evolution anything that would suit my own purpose; and, -in every instance in which I have represented him as relying -on the authority of Mr. Darwin or of Mr. Spencer, I -have either made him quote the words or have made him -state the positions as I suppose they must be understood, -and have referred the reader to the proper page in the -works of those writers.</p> - -<p>And here I will render all honor to the admirable candor -with which Mr. Darwin discussed objections to his -theory which have been propounded by others, and suggested -further difficulties himself. If I do not pay the -same tribute to Mr. Spencer, the reason will be found in -those portions of my work in which I have had occasion -to call in question his methods of reasoning.</p> - -<p>Some repetition of facts and arguments will be found -in the following pages in the different aspects in which -the subject is treated. This has been intentional. When -the tribunal that is addressed is a limited and special one, -and is composed of a high order of minds accustomed to -deal with such a science, for example, as jurisprudence, he -who undertakes to produce conviction can afford to use -condensation. He seldom has to repeat what he has once -said; and often, the more compact his argument, the -more likely it will be to command assent if it is clear as -well as close. But this work is not addressed to such a -tribunal. It is written for various classes of readers, some -of whom have already a special acquaintance with the subject, -some of whom have less, and some of whom have -now none at all. It is designed to explain what the theory<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[Pg xviii]</a></span> -of evolution is, and to encounter it in the mode best -adapted to reach the various minds of which the mass of -readers is composed. If I had written only for scientists -and philosophers, I should not have repeated anything.</p> - -<p>For similar reasons I have added to this volume both a -general index and a glossary of the scientific and technical -terms which I have had occasion to use.</p> - -<p>The whole of the text of this work had been written -and electrotyped before I had an opportunity to see the -very interesting "Life and Correspondence" of the illustrious -naturalist, the late Louis Agassiz, edited by his -accomplished widow, Mrs. Elizabeth Cary Agassiz, and -published in October, 1885, by Houghton, Mifflin and -Company, Boston. For a long period of years, after his -residence in this country began, and until my removal -from Boston to New York in 1862, I enjoyed as much of -his intimacy as would be likely to subsist between persons -of such different pursuits. I believe that I understood his -general views of creation, from his lectures and conversation. -It is now made entirely certain that he never accepted -the doctrine of evolution of distinct types out of -preceding and different types by ordinary generation; and -it has been to me an inexpressible satisfaction to find that -the opinions and reasoning contained in my work, and -adopted independently of any influence of his, are confirmed -by what has now been given to the world. I need -only refer to his letter to Prof. Sedgwick, written in June, -1845, and to his latest utterance, the paper on "Evolution -and Permanence of Type," in the thirty-third volume of -the "Atlantic Monthly," published after his lamented<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[Pg xix]</a></span> -death in 1873, for proof that his opinions on the Darwinian -theory never changed. Of all the scientists whom I -have ever known, or whose writings I have read, Agassiz -always seemed to me the broadest as well as the most exact -and logical reasoner.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">New York</span>, <i>September, 1886</i>.</p></blockquote> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">[Pg xx]</a><br /><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">[Pg xxi]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS.</a></h2> -</div> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td></td><td class="tdrb"><span class="xs"> PAGE</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">Nature and importance of the subject—Is there a relation of Creator -and creature between God and man?—Rules of rational belief—Is -natural theology a progressive science?</td><td class="tdrb"> 1</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">The Platonic Kosmos compared with the Darwinian theory of evolution</td><td class="tdrb"> 44</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">The Darwinian pedigree of man—The evolution of organisms out of -other organisms, according to the theory of Darwin </td><td class="tdrb">87</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer</td><td class="tdrb"> 131</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further considered </td><td class="tdrb">167</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further considered </td><td class="tdrb"> 200</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">Mr. Spencer's agnosticism—His theory of the origin of religious beliefs—The -mode in which mankind are to lose the consciousness of a -personal God</td><td class="tdrb">257<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii">[Pg xxii]</a></span></td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">The existence, attributes, and methods of God deducible from the phenomena -of Nature—Origin of the solar system </td><td class="tdrb">300</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">Does evolution account for the phenomena of society and of nature?—Necessity -for a conception of a personal actor—Mr. Spencer's -protoplasmic origin of all organic life—The Mosaic account of -creation treated as a hypothesis which may be scientifically contrasted -with evolution</td><td class="tdrb">334</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">"Species," "races," and "varieties"—Sexual division—Causation</td><td class="tdrb"> 372</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">Origin of the human mind—Mr. Spencer's theory of the composition -of mind—His system of morality</td><td class="tdrb"> 394</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">Mr. Spencer's philosophy as a whole—His psychology, and his system -of ethics—The sacred origin of moral injunctions, and the secularization -of morals</td><td class="tdrb">434</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdc"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">CHAPTER XIII</a>.</td></tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh">Sophereus discourses on the nature and origin of the human mind </td><td class="tdrb"> 467</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh"><span class="smcap"><a href="#GLOSSARY">Glossary</a></span></td><td class="tdrb"> 547</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td class="tdlh"><span class="smcap"><a href="#INDEX">Index</a></span> </td><td class="tdrb"> 557</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> - - - -<p class="ph1">CREATION OR EVOLUTION?</p> - - - - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I.</a></h2> -</div> - -<p class="intro">Nature and importance of the subject—Is there a relation of Creator and -creature between God and man?—Rules of rational belief—Is natural -theology a progressive science?</p> - - -<p>Man finds himself in the universe a conscious and -thinking being. He has to account to himself for his own -existence. He is impelled to this by an irresistible propensity, -which is constantly leading him to look both inward -and outward for an answer to the questions: What -am I? How came I to be? What is the limit of my existence? -Is there any other being in the universe between -whom and myself there exists the relation of Creator and -creature?</p> - -<p>The whole history of the human mind, so far as we have -any reliable history, is marked by this perpetual effort to -find a First Cause.</p> - -<p>However wild and fantastic may be the idea which the -savage conceives of a being stronger and wiser than himself; -however groveling and sensual may be his conception -of the form, or attributes, or action of that being, he is, -when he strives after the comprehension of his deity, engaged -in the same intellectual effort that is made by the -most civilized and cultivated of mankind, when, speculating -upon the origin of the human soul, or its relation to -the universe, or the genesis of the material world, they -reach the sublime conception of an infinite God, the creator<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> -of all other spiritual existences and of all the forms of animal -life, or when they end in the theory that there is no -God, or in that other theory which supposes that what we -call the creation, man included, is an evolution out of primordial -matter, which has been operated upon by certain -fixed laws, without any special interposition of a creating -power, exerted in the production of the forms of animal -life that now inhabit this earth, or ever have inhabited it. -In the investigation of these contrasted theories, it is necessary -to remember that the faculties of the human mind are -essentially the same in all conditions of civilization or barbarism; -that they differ only in the degree of their growth, -activity, and power of reasoning, and therefore that there -must be a common standard to which to refer all beliefs. -The sole standard to which we can refer a belief in anything -is its rationality, or a comparison between that which is believed -and that which is most probable, according to the -power of human reason to weigh probabilities. In the untutored -and uncultivated savage, this power, although it -exists, is still very feeble; partly because it is exercised -upon only a few objects, and partly because the individual -has comparatively but little opportunity to know all the -elements which should be taken into account in determining -a question of moral probabilities.</p> - -<p>In the educated and cultivated man this power of judging -probabilities, of testing beliefs by their rationality, is -carried, or is capable of being carried, to the highest point -of development, so as to comprehend in the calculation the -full elements of the question, or at least to reduce the -danger of some fatal omission to the minimum. It is, of -course, true that the limited range of our faculties may prevent -a full view of all the elements of any question of probability, -even when our faculties have attained the highest -point of development experienced by the age in which we -happen to live. This renders the rationality of any hy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span>pothesis -less than an absolutely certain test of truth. But -this rationality is all that we have to apply to any question -of belief; and if we attend carefully to the fact that moral -probabilities constitute the groundwork of all our beliefs, -and note the mental processes by which we reach conclusions -upon any question depending upon evidence, we shall find -reason to regard this power of testing beliefs by a conformity -between the hypotheses and that which is most probable -to be the most glorious attribute of the human understanding, -as it is unquestionably the safest guide to which we -can trust ourselves.</p> - -<p>It may be that, while philosophers will not object to -my definition of rationality, churchmen will ask what place -I propose to assign to authority in the formation of beliefs. -I answer, in the first place, that I am seeking to make myself -understood by plain but reflecting and reasoning people. -Such persons will perceive that what I mean by the rationality -of a belief in any hypothesis is its fitness to be accepted -and acted upon because it has in its favor the strongest -probabilities of the case, so far as we can grasp those probabilities. -I know of no other foundation for a belief in anything; -for belief is the acceptance by the mind of some -proposition, statement, or supposed fact, the truth of which -depends upon evidence addressed to our senses, or to our -intellectual perceptions, or to both. In the next place, in -regard to the influence of authority over our beliefs, it is -to be observed that the existence of the authority is a question -to be determined by evidence, and this question, therefore, -of itself involves an application of the test of rationality, -or conformity with what is probable. But, assuming -that the authority is satisfactorily established, it is not safe -to leave all minds to the teaching of that authority, without -the aid of the reasoning, which, independent of all authority, -would conduct to the same conclusion. There are -many minds to whom it is useless to say, You are com<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span>manded -to believe. The question instantly arises, Commanded -by whom, or what? And if the answer is, By the -Church, or by the Bible, and the matter is left to rest upon -that statement, there is great danger of unbelief. It is -apparent that a large amount of what is called infidelity, or -unbelief, now prevailing in the world, is due to the fact -that men are told that they are commanded to believe, as if -they were to be passive recipients of what is asserted, and -because so little is addressed to their understandings.</p> - -<p>I do not wish to be understood as maintaining that -there is no place for authority in matters of what is called -religious belief. I am quite sensible that there may be -such a thing as authority even in regard to our beliefs; that -it is quite within the range of possibilities that there should -be such a relation between the human soul and an infinite -Creator as to require the creature to accept by faith whatever -a proved revelation requires that intelligent creature -to believe. But, in view of the fact that what is specially -called revealed religion is addressed to an intelligent creature, -to whom the revelation itself must be proved by some -evidence that will satisfy the mind, there is an evident necessity -for treating the rationality of a belief in God as an -independent question. In some way, by some process, we -must reach a belief in the existence of a being before we -can consider the claims of a message which that being is -supposed to have sent to us. What we have to work with, -before we can approach the teaching of what is called revealed -religion, is the mind of man and the material universe. -Do these furnish us with the rational basis for a belief -in God?</p> - -<p>And here I shall be expected to say what I mean by a -belief in God. I have neither so little reverence for what -I myself believe in, nor so little respect for my readers, -as to offer them anything but the common conception of -God. All that is necessary for me to do, in order to put<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> -my own mind in contact with that of the reader, is to express -my conception of God just as it would be expressed -by any one who is accustomed to think of the being called -God by the Christian, the Jew, the Mohammedan, or by -some other branches of the human race. These different -divisions of mankind may differ in regard to some of the -attributes of the Deity, or his dealings with men, or the -history or course of his government of the world. But -what is common to them all is a belief in God as the Supreme -Being, who is self-existing and eternal, by whose will -all things and all other beings were created, who is infinite -in power and wisdom and in goodness and benevolence. -As an intellectual conception, this idea of a Supreme Being, -one only God, who never had a beginning and can -have no end, and who is the creator of all other beings, excludes, -of course, the polytheism of the ancient civilized -nations, or that of the present barbarous tribes; and it especially -excludes the idea of what the Greeks called Destiny, -which was a power that governed the gods as well as -the human race, and was anterior and superior to Jove -himself. The simple conception of the one God held by -the Christian, the Jew, or the Mohammedan, as the First -Cause of the universe and all that it embraces, creating all -things and all other beings by his will, in contrast with -the modern idea that they came into existence without the -volition of a conscious and intelligent being making special -creations, is what I present to the mind of the reader.</p> - -<p>This idea of God as a matter of belief presents, I repeat, -a question of moral probabilities. The existence of -the universe has to be accounted for somehow. We can -not shut out this inquiry from our thoughts. The human -being who never speculates, never thinks, upon the origin -of his own soul, or upon the genesis of this wondrous -frame of things external to himself, or upon his relations -to some superior being, is a very rare animal. If he is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> -much more than an animal, he will have some idea of these -things; and the theories by which some of the most cultivated -and acute intellects of our race, from the widest -range of accumulated physical facts and phenomena yet -gathered, have undertaken to account for the existence of -species without referring them to the volition of an infinite -creator, are at once a proof of the universal pressure of the -question of creation upon the human mind, and of the logical -necessity for treating it as a question dependent upon -evidence and probability.</p> - -<p>I lay out of consideration, now, the longing of the human -mind to find a personal God and Creator. This sentiment, -this yearning for an infinite father, this feeling of -loneliness in the universe without the idea of God, is certainly -an important moral factor in the question of probability; -but I omit it now from the number of proofs, because -it is a sentiment, and because I wish to subject the -belief in God as the Creator to the cold intellectual process -by which we may discover a conformity between that hypothesis -and the phenomena of Nature as a test of the -probable truth. If such a conformity can be satisfactorily -shown, and if the result of the process as conducted can -fairly claim to be that the existence of God the Creator has -by far the highest degree of probability above and beyond -all other hypotheses that have been resorted to to account -for our existence, the satisfaction of a moral feeling of the -human heart may well become a source of happiness, a consolation -in all the evils of this life, and a support in the -hour of death.</p> - -<p>But in this preliminary chapter I ought to state what I -understand to be the scientific hypothesis or hypotheses -with which I propose to contrast the idea of God as the -creator of species by applying the test of probability. To -discuss the superior claims of one hypothesis over another, -without showing that there is a real conflict between them,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> -would be to set up a man of straw for the sake of knocking -it down as if it were a living and real antagonist. What -I desire to do is not to aim at a cheap victory by attacking -something that does not call for opposition; but it is to -ascertain first whether there is now current any explanation -or hypothesis concerning the origin of the creation, or anything -that it contains, which rejects the idea of God as the -creator of that which we know to exist and as it exists, and -then to ascertain which of the two hypotheses ought to be -accepted as the truth, because it has in its favor the highest -attainable amount of probability. There is an amount of -probability which becomes to us a moral demonstration, because -our minds are so constituted that conviction depends -upon the completeness with which the evidence in favor of -one hypothesis excludes the other from the category of rational -beliefs.</p> - -<p>I pass by the common sort of infidelity which rejects -the idea of an intelligent creator acting in any manner -whatever, whether by special creations or by laws of development -operating on some primordial form of animal life. -But among the modern scientists who have propounded -explanations of the origin of species, I distinguish those -who do not, as I understand, deny that there was an intelligent -Creator by whose will some form of animal life was -originally called into being, but who maintain that the -diversified forms of animal life which we now see were not -brought into being by the special will of the Creator as we -now know them, but that they were evolved, by a process -called natural selection, out of some lower type of animated -organism. Of this class, the late Mr. Darwin is a representative. -There is, however, at least one philosopher who -carries the doctrine of evolution much farther, and who, if -I rightly understand him, rejects any act of creation, even -of the lowest and simplest type of animal existence. This -is Mr. Herbert Spencer—a writer who, while he concurs in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> -Mr. Darwin's general theory of natural selection as the process -by which distinct organisms have been evolved out of -other organisms, does not admit of any primal organism -as the origin of the whole series of animals and as the creation -of an intelligent will.</p> - -<p>It will be appropriate hereafter to refer to the doctrine -of evolution as a means of accounting for the existence of -the human mind. At present it is only necessary to say -that I understand it to be maintained as the hypothesis -which has the highest attainable amount of evidence in its -favor, that distinct species of animals are not a creation but -a growth; and also that the mind of man is not a special -creation of a spiritual existence, but a result of a long process -by which organized matter has slowly worked itself -from matter into intellect. Wherever, for instance, these -scientists may place the non-human primate, out of which -man has been evolved by what is called natural selection, -and whether they do or do not assume that he was a creation -of an intelligent will, they do not, as I understand, -claim that the primate was endowed with what we call intellect; -so that at some time there was a low form of -animal life without intellect, but intellect became evolved -in the long course of countless ages, by the process of natural -selection, through the improving conditions and better -organization of that low animal which had no intellect. In -other words, we have what the scientist calls the non-human -primate, a low form of animal without intellect, but capable -of so improving its own physical organization as to create -for itself and within itself that essence which we recognize -as the human mind. Here, then, there is certainly a theory, -an hypothesis, which may be and must be contrasted -with the idea that the mind of man is a spiritual essence -created by the volition of some other being having the -power to create such existences, and put into a temporary -union with a physical organization, by the establishment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> -of a mysterious connection which makes the body the -instrument of the soul so long as the connection exists. -If I have stated correctly the theory which assigns the origin -of the human mind to the process of evolution, I have -assuredly not set up a man of straw. I stand confronted -with an hypothesis which directly encounters the idea that -the human intellect is a creation, in the sense of a direct, -intelligent, conscious, and purposed production of a special -character, as the human mind and hand, in the production -of whatever is permitted to finite capacities, purposely creates -some new and independent object of its wishes, its desires, -or its wants. The human mind, says the scientist, -was not created by a spiritual being as a spiritual existence -independent of matter, but it grew out of matter, that was -at first so organized that it did not manifest what we call -intellect, but that could so improve its own organization as -to evolve out of matter what we know as mind.</p> - -<p>And here I lay out of view entirely the comparative dignity -of man as a being whose existence is to be accounted -for by the one hypothesis or the other, because this comparative -dignity is not properly an element in the question -of probability. The doctrine of evolution, as expounded by -Darwin and other modern scientists, may be true, and we -shall still have reason to exclaim with Hamlet, "What a -piece of work is man!"</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the hypothesis that man is a special -creation of an infinite workman, if true, does not enhance -the mere <i lang="la">a priori</i> dignity of the human race. It may, and -it will hereafter appear that it does, establish the moral accountability -of man to a supreme being, a relation which, -if I correctly understand the doctrine of evolution, is left -out of the system that supposes intellect to be evolved out -of the improving process by which matter becomes nervous -organization, whose action exhibits those manifestations -which we call mind. The moral accountability of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> -man to a supreme being may, if it becomes established -by proper evidence, be a circumstance that distinguishes -him from other animals, and may, therefore, raise him in -the scale of being. But then this dignity is a fact that -comes after the process of reasoning has shown the relation -of creator and creature, and it should not be placed at -the beginning of the process among the proofs that are to -show that relation. Mr. Darwin, in concluding his great -work, "The Descent of Man," which he maintains to have -been from some very low type of animated creature, through -the apes, who became our ancestors, and who were developed -into the lowest savages, and finally into the civilized -man, has anticipated that his theory will, he regrets to say, -be "highly distasteful to many"; and he adds, by way of -parrying this disgust, that "he who has seen a savage in -his native land will not feel much shame if forced to acknowledge -that the blood of some more humble creature -flows in his veins." For his own part, he adds, he would -as soon be descended from a certain heroic little monkey -who exposed himself to great danger in order to save the -life of his keeper, as from a savage who delights to torture -his enemies, offers bloody sacrifices, practices infanticide, -etc. Waiving for the present the question whether the -man who is called civilized is necessarily descended from -or through the kind of savage whom Mr. Darwin saw in the -Tierra del Fuego, or whether that kind of savage is a deteriorated -offshoot from some higher human creatures that -possessed moral and intellectual characteristics of a more -elevated nature, I freely concede that this question of the -dignity of our descent is not of much logical consequence. -However distasteful to us may be the idea that we are descended -from the same stock as the apes, and that their direct -ancestors are to be traced to some more humble creature until -we reach the lowest form of organized and animated matter, -the dignity of our human nature is not to be reckoned<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> -among the probabilities by which our existence is to be accounted -for. It is, in this respect, like the feeling or sentiment -which prompts us to wish to find an infinite creator, -the father of our spirits and the creator of our bodies. As -a matter of reasoning, we must prove to ourselves, by evidence -that satisfies the mind, that God exists. Having -reached this conviction, the belief in his existence becomes -a vast and inestimable treasure. But our wish to believe in -God does not help us to attain that belief. In the same -way our feeling about the dignity of man, the nobleness or -ignobleness of our descent from or through one kind of -creature or another, may be a satisfaction or a dissatisfaction -after we have reached a conclusion, but it affords us no -aid in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion from properly -chosen premises.</p> - -<p>And here, in advance of the tests which I shall endeavor -to apply to the existence of God and the existence of man -as a special creation, I desire to say something respecting -the question of a logical antagonism between science and -religion. I have often been a good deal puzzled to make -out what those well-meaning persons suppose, who unwarily -admit that there is no necessary antagonism between what -modern science teaches and what religion teaches. Whether -there is or is not, depends upon what we mean by science -and religion. If by science we understand the investigation -of Nature, or a study of the structure and conditions of -everything that we can subject to the observation of our -senses, and the deduction of certain hypotheses from what -we observe, then we must compare the hypotheses with the -teachings or conclusions which we derive from religion. -The next question, therefore, is, What is religion? If we -make it to consist in the Mosaic account of the creation, -or in the teachings of the Bible respecting God, we shall -find that we have to deal with more or less of conflict between -the interpretations that are put upon a record sup<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span>posed -to have been inspired, and the conclusions of science. -But if we lay aside what is commonly understood by revealed -religion, which supposes a special communication -from a superior to an inferior being of something which -the former desires the latter to know, after the latter has -been for some time in existence, then we mean by religion -that belief in the existence of a superior being which we -derive from the exercise of our reasoning powers upon -whatever comes within the observation of our senses, -and upon our own intellectual faculties. In other words, -for what we call natural religion, we look both outward -and inward, in search of a belief in a Supreme -Being. We look outward, because the whole universe -is a vast array of facts, from which conclusions are to -be drawn; and among this array of facts is the construction -of our bodies. We look inward, because our own -minds present another array of facts from which conclusions -are to be drawn. Now, if the conclusions which the -scientist draws from the widest observation of Nature, including -the human mind itself, fail to account for the existence -of the mind of man, and natural religion does account -for it, there is an irreconcilable conflict between science -and religion. I can not avoid the conviction that Mr. Darwin -has missed the point of this conflict. "I am aware," -he says, "that the conclusions arrived at in this work will -be denounced by some as highly irreligious; but he who -denounces them is bound to show why it is more irreligious -to explain the origin of man, as a distinct species by descent -from a lower form, through the laws of variation and natural -selection, than to explain the birth of the individual -through the laws of ordinary reproduction." I do not understand -him, by the terms "religious" or "irreligious," -to refer to anything that involves praise or blame for adopting -one hypothesis rather than another. I suppose he -meant to say that a belief in his theory of the descent of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> -man as a species is no more inconsistent with a belief in -God than it is to believe that the individual is brought -into being through the operation of the laws of ordinary -reproduction which God has established. This would be -strictly true, if the hypothesis of man's descent as a distinct -species from some lower form accounted for his existence -by proofs that satisfy the rules of evidence by which -our beliefs ought to be and must be determined. In that -case, there would be no inconsistency between his hypothesis -and that to which natural religion conducts us. -On the other hand, if the Darwinian hypothesis fails to -establish a relation between the soul of man, as a special -creation, and a competent creator, then the antagonism between -this hypothesis and natural religion is direct, immediate, -and irreconcilable; for the essence of religion consists -in that relation, and a belief in that relation is what we -mean, or ought to mean, by religion.</p> - -<p>There is another form in which Mr. Darwin has depreciated -the idea of any antagonism between his theory and -our religious ideas, but it has the same logical defect as the -suggestion which I have just considered, because it involves -the same assumption. It is put hypothetically, but it is still -an assumption, lacking the very elements of supreme probability -that can alone give it force. "Man," he observes, -"may be excused for feeling some pride at having risen, -not through his own exertions, to the very summit of the -organic scale; and the fact of his having so risen, instead -of being aboriginally placed there, may give him some hope -for a still higher destiny in the distant future." I certainly -would not misrepresent, and I earnestly desire to understand, -this distinguished writer. It is a little uncertain -whether he here refers to the hope of immortality, or of an -existence after the connection between our minds and our -bodies is dissolved, or whether he refers to the further elevation -of man on this earth in the distant future of terres<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span>trial -time. If he referred to the hope of an existence after -what we call death, then he ought to have shown that his -theory is compatible with such a continued existence of the -soul of man. It will be one of the points on which I propose -to bestow some attention, that the doctrine of evolution -is entirely incompatible with the existence of the -human soul for one instant after the brain has ceased to act -as an organism, and death has wholly supervened; because -that doctrine, if I understand it rightly, regards the intellect -of man as a high development of what in other animals -is called instinct, and instinct as a confirmed and inherited -habit of animal organism to act in a certain way. If this -is a true philosophical account of the origin and nature of -intellect, it can have no possible individual existence after -the organ called the brain, which has been in the habit of -acting in a certain way, has perished, any more than there -can be a digestion of food after the stomach or other assimilating -organ has been destroyed. If, on the contrary, -the mind of man is a special creation, of a spiritual essence, -placed in an intimate union with the body for a temporary -period, and made to depend for a time on the organs of -that body as its means of manifestation and the exercise of -its spiritual faculties, then it is conceivable that this union -may be severed and the mind may survive. Not only is -this conceivable, but, as I shall endeavor hereafter to show, -the proof of it rises very high in the scale of probability—so -high that we may accept it as a fact, just as confidently -as we accept many things of which we can not have absolute -certainty.</p> - -<p>And here I think it needful, although not for all readers, -but for the great majority, to lay down as distinctly as -I can the rules of evidence which necessarily govern our -beliefs. I do so because, in reading the works of many of -the modern scientists who have espoused the Darwinian -doctrine of evolution, I find that the rules of evidence are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> -but little observed. There is a very great, often an astonishingly -great, accumulation of facts, or of assumed facts. -It is impossible not to be impressed by the learning, the industry, -and the range of these writers. Nor would I in the -least impugn their candor, or question their accuracy as -witnesses of facts, which I am not competent to dispute if -I were disposed to do so. But there is one thing for which -I may suppose myself competent. I have through a long -life been accustomed to form conclusions upon facts; and -this is what every person does and must do who is asked to -accept a new theory or hypothesis of any kind upon any -subject.</p> - -<p>Most of our beliefs depend upon what is called circumstantial -evidence. There are very few propositions which -address themselves to our belief upon one direct and isolated -proof. We may class most of the perceptions of our -senses among the simple and unrelated proofs which we -accept without hesitation, although there is more or less of -an unconscious and instantaneous process of reasoning, -through which we pass before the evidence of our senses is -accepted and acted upon. Then there are truths to which -we yield an instant assent, because they prove themselves, -as is the case with the mathematical or geometrical problems, -as soon as we perceive the connection in the steps of -the demonstration. Besides these, there are many propositions -which, although they involve moral reasoning, have -become axioms about which we do not care to inquire, but -which we assume to have been so repeatedly and firmly -established that it would be a waste of time to go over the -ground again whenever they come up. But there is a -very large class of propositions which address themselves -to our belief, which do not depend on a single perception -through our senses, and are not isolated facts, and are not -demonstrable by mathematical truth, and are not axioms -accepted because they were proved long ago, and have by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> -general consent been adopted into the common stock of -ideas. The class of beliefs with which the rules of circumstantial -evidence are concerned are those where the truth -of the proposition, or hypothesis, is a deduction from -many distinct facts, but the coexistence of which facts -leads to the inevitable conclusion that the proposition or -hypothesis is true. We can not tell why it is that moral -conviction is forced upon us by the coexistence of certain -facts and their tendency to establish a certain conclusion. -All we know is, that our minds are so constituted that we -can not resist the force of circumstantial evidence if we -suffer our faculties to act as reason has taught them. But, -then, in any given case, whether we ought to yield our -belief in anything where we have only circumstantial evidence -to guide us, there are certain rules to be observed. -The first of these rules is, that every fact in a collection of -proofs from which we are to draw a certain inference must -be proved independently by direct evidence, and must not -be itself a deduction from some other fact. This is the -first step in the process of arranging a chain of moral evidence. -There is a maxim in this branch of the law of -evidence that you can not draw an inference from an inference. -In other words, you can not infer a fact from -some other fact, and then unite the former with two or -more independent facts to make a chain of proofs. Every -link in the chain must have its separate existence, and its -existence must be established by the same kind and degree -of evidence as if it were the only thing to be proved. The -next rule is to place the several facts, when so proved, in -their proper relation to each other in the group from which -the inference is to be drawn. In circumstantial evidence a -fact may be established by the most direct and satisfactory -proofs, and yet it may have no relation to other facts with -which you attempt to associate it. For example, suppose -it to be proved that A on a certain occasion bought a cer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span>tain -poison, and that soon after B died of that kind of -poison; but it does not appear that A and B were ever -seen together, or stood in any relation to each other. The -fact that A bought poison would have no proper relation -to the other fact that B died of that kind of poison. But -introduce by independent evidence the third fact, that A -knew B intimately, and then add the fourth fact, that A -had a special motive for wishing B's death, you have some -ground for believing that A poisoned B, although no human -eye ever saw the poison administered. From this correlation -of all the facts in a body of circumstantial evidence, -there follows a third rule, namely, that the whole collection -of facts, in order to justify the inference sought to be -drawn from them, must be consistent with that inference. -Thus, the four facts above supposed are entirely consistent -with the hypothesis that A poisoned B. But leave out the -two intermediate facts, or leave out the last one, and B -might as well have been poisoned by C as by A. Hence -there is a fourth rule: that the collection of facts from -which an inference is to be drawn must not only be consistent -with the probable truth of that inference, but they -must exclude the probable truth of any other inference. -Thus, not only must it be shown that A bought poison, -that B died of poison, that A was intimate with B and had -a motive for wishing B's death, but, to justify a belief in -A's guilt, the motive ought to be shown to have been so -strong as to exclude the moral probability that B was poisoned -by some one else, or poisoned himself. It is in the -application of these rules that in courts of justice the minds -of jurymen often become perplexed with doubts which they -can not account for, or else they yield a too easy credence -to the guilt of the accused when the question of guilt depends -upon circumstantial evidence.</p> - -<p>I shall not spend much time in contending that these -rules of evidence must be applied to scientific investigations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> -which are to affect our belief in such a proposition as the -descent of man from a common ancestor with the monkey. -This is not only an hypothesis depending upon circumstantial -evidence, but it is professedly a deduction from a great -range of facts and from a very complex state of facts. In -reasoning upon such subjects, when the facts which constitute -the chain of circumstantial evidence are very numerous, -we are apt to regard their greater comparative number -as if it dispensed with a rigid application of the rules of determination. -Every one can see, in the illustration above -employed, borrowed from criminal jurisprudence, that the -facts which constitute the chain of circumstantial evidence -ought to be rigidly tested by the rules of determination before -the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn as a deduction -from the facts. But, in reasoning from physical facts -to any given physical hypothesis where the facts are very -numerous, there is a strong tendency to relax the rules of -evidence, because, the greater the accumulation of supposed -facts becomes, the greater is the danger of placing in the -chain of evidence something that is not proved, and thus of -vitiating the whole process. To this tendency, which I have -observed to be very frequent among scientists, I should apply, -without meaning any disrespect, the term invention. -A great accumulation of facts is made, following one another -in a certain order; all those which precede a certain intermediate -link are perhaps duly and independently proved, -and the same may be the case with those which follow that -link. But there is no proof of the fact that constitutes the -link and makes a complete chain of evidence. This vacuity -of proof, if one may use such an expression, is constantly occurring -in the writings of naturalists, and is often candidly -admitted. It is gotten over by reasoning from the antecedent -and the subsequent facts that the intermediate facts -must have existed; and then the reasoning goes on to draw -the inference of the principal hypothesis from a chain of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> -proof in which a necessary intermediate link is itself a mere -inference from facts which may be just as consistent with -the non-existence as with the existence of the supposed -intermediate link. In such cases we are often told very -frankly that no one has yet discovered that the intermediate -link ever actually existed; that the researches of science -have not yet reached demonstrative proof of the existence -of a certain intermediate animal or vegetable organization; -that geological exploration has not yet revealed to us all the -specimens of the animal or vegetable kingdoms that may -have inhabited this globe at former periods of time; but -that the analogies which lead down or lead up to that as -yet undiscovered link in the chain are such that it must -have existed, and that we may confidently expect that the -actual proof of it will be found hereafter. The difficulty -with this kind of reasoning is that it borrows from the main -hypothesis which one seeks to establish the means of showing -the facts from which the hypothesis is to be drawn as -an inference. Thus, for example, the hypothesis is that -the species called man is a highly developed animal formed -by a process of natural selection that went on for unknown -ages among the individuals descended from the progenitor -of the anthropomorphous apes. The facts in the physical -organization and mental manifestations of the animal called -man, when viewed historically through all the conditions -in which we know anything of this species, lead up to that -common supposed ancestor of the apes. The facts in the -physical organization and instinctive habits of the ape, -when viewed historically through all the conditions in -which we know anything of his species, show that he, too, -was evolved by the process of natural selection out of that -same ancestor. Intermediate, respectively, between the -man and the monkey and their primordial natural-selection -ancestor or predecessor, there are links in the chain -of proof of which we have no evidence, and which must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> -be supplied by inferring their existence from the analogies -which we can trace in comparing things of which -we have some satisfactory proof. Thus, the main hypothesis, -the theory of natural selection as the explanation -of the existence of distinct species of animals, is not -drawn from a complete chain of established facts, but it -is helped out by inferring from facts that are proved -other facts that are not proved, but which we have reason -to expect will be discovered hereafter. I need not say -that this kind of argument will not do in the common -affairs of life, and that no good reason can be shown why -our beliefs in matters of science should be made to depend -upon it.</p> - -<p>We do not rest our belief in what is called the law of -gravitation upon any chain of proof in which it is necessary -to supply a link by assuming that it exists. The theory -that bodies have a tendency to approach each other, that -the larger mass attracts to itself the smaller by a mysterious -force that operates through all space, is a deduction from -a great multitude of perpetually recurring facts that are -open to our observation, no one of which is inferred from -any other fact, while the whole excludes the moral probability -that any other hypothesis will account for the phenomena -which are continually and invariably taking place -around us.</p> - -<p>This illustration of the rules of evidence, when applied -to scientific inquiries, leads me to refer to one of the -favorite postulates of the evolution school. We are often -told that it ought to be no objection to the doctrine of -evolution that it is new, or startling, or contrary to other -previous theories of the existence of species. We are reminded -again and again that Galileo's grand conception was -scouted as an irreligious as well as an irrational hypothesis, -and that the same reception attended the first promulgation -of many scientific truths which no intelligent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> -and well-informed person now doubts.<a name="FNanchor_2" id="FNanchor_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> Then we have it -asserted that the doctrine of evolution is now accepted by -nearly all the most advanced and accomplished natural -philosophers, especially those of the rising scientists who -have bestowed most attention upon it. Upon this there -are two things to be said: First, it is a matter of very -little consequence that the learned of a former age did not -attend to the proofs of the law of gravitation, or of any -other new theory of physics, as they should have done, and -that they consequently rejected it. Their logical habits of -mind, their preconceived religious notions, and many other -disturbing causes, rendered them incapable of correct reasoning -on some particular subject, while they could reason with -entire correctness on other subjects. Secondly, the extent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> -to which a new theory is accepted by those whose special -studies lead them to make the necessary investigations, -does not dispense with the application of the laws of evidence -to the facts which are supposed to establish the -theory. The doctrine of evolution addresses itself not -only to the scientific naturalist, but to the whole intelligent -part of mankind. How is one who does not belong to this -class of investigators to regulate his belief in the theory -which they propound? Is he to take it on their authority? -or is he, while he accords to their statements of facts all -the assent which as witnesses they are entitled to expect -from him, to apply to their deduction the same principles -of belief that he applies to everything else which challenges -belief, and to assent or dissent accordingly? No one, I -presume, will question that the latter is the only way in -which any new matter of belief should be approached. I -have not supposed that any scientist questions this; but I -have referred to the constant iteration that the doctrine of -evolution is now generally admitted by men of science, -that the assertion, supposing it to be true, may pass for just -what it is worth. It is worth this and no more: that -candid, truthful, and competent witnesses, when they speak -of facts that they have observed, are entitled to be believed -as to the existence of those facts. When they assume facts -which they do not prove, but which are essential links in -the chain of evidence, or when the facts which they do -prove do not rationally exclude every other hypothesis -excepting their own, the authority of even the whole body -of such persons is of no more account than that of any -other class of intelligent and cultivated men. In the ages -when ecclesiastical authority exercised great power over the -beliefs of men upon questions of physical science, the superiority -was accorded to the authority which claimed it, -and the scientist who propounded a new physical theory -that did not suit the theologian was overborne. It seems<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> -to me that it is a tendency of the present age to substitute -the authority of scientific experts in the place of the ecclesiastical -authority of former periods, by demanding that -something more than the office of witnesses of facts shall -be accorded to them. We are told that it is a very important -proof of the soundness of deductions, that the deductions -are drawn by the greater number of the specialists -who have examined the facts. Sometimes this is carried -so far as to imply presumption in those who do not yield -assent to the theory, as if it ought to be accepted upon the -authority of the experts whose proper office it is to furnish -us with the facts, and whose deductions we have to examine -upon the strength of their reasoning. Those of us who are -not professors of the particular science may be charged with -ignorance or incapacity if we do not join in the current of -scientific opinion. But, after all, the new theory challenges -our belief. If we examine it at all, we must judge of it, -not by the numbers of those who propound or accept it, -or by any amount of mere authority, but by the soundness -of the reasoning by which its professors support it.</p> - -<p>The reader is now informed of what he may expect to -find discussed in this volume. It remains for me to indicate -the mode in which the discussion will be carried on. -I propose to divest my own mind, and so far as I may -to divest the mind of the reader, of all influence from revealed -religion. I shall not refer to the Mosaic account of -the creation excepting as I refer to other hypotheses. With -its authority as an account given by the Deity himself -through his chosen servant, I have here nothing to do. -Nor shall I rely upon the revelation recorded in the New -Testament. All the inquiries which I propose to make -are those which lie in the domain of natural religion; -and while I can not expect, in exploring this domain, -to make discoveries or to find arguments which can claim -the merit of originality, I may avoid traveling in a <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span>well beaten -path, by pursuing the line of my own reflections, -without considering whether they coincide with or differ -from the reasonings of others. Although, at a former -period of my life, I have studied the great writers whose -speculations in the science of natural theology are the most -famous and important pieces in its literature, it is more -than forty years since I have looked into one of them; and -I do not propose to turn to them now, in order to see -whether they have or have not left any traces in my mind. -It is quite possible that critics may array against me the -authority of some great name or names; but even if I am -to be charged with presumption in entering upon this field, -it will not be found, so far as I am conscious, that I have -borrowed an argument, imitated a method, or followed an -example.</p> - -<p>There is a passage in one of the writings of Lord Macaulay -in which that brilliant essayist maintained that -natural theology is not a progressive science. Macaulay's -tendency to paradox was often aggravated by the superficial -way in which he used his multifarious knowledge. -As in the course of this work I am about to do that which -he regarded as idle, namely, to inquire whether natural religion, -aside from revelation, is of any value as a means of -reaching a belief in the existence and attributes of God and -the immortality of man, I cite the passage in which Macaulay -makes the assertion that natural theology has made -no progress from the time of the Greek philosophers to the -present day: "As respects natural religion, revelation being -for the present altogether left out of the question, it is -not easy to see that a philosopher of the present day is -more favorably situated than Thales or Simonides. He has -before him just the same evidences of design in the structure -of the universe that the early Greeks had. We say just -the same, for the discoveries of modern astronomers and -anatomists have really added nothing to the force of that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> -argument which a reflecting mind finds in every beast, bird, -insect, fish, leaf, flower, and shell. The reasoning by which -Socrates in Xenophon's hearing confuted the little atheist -Aristophanes, is exactly the reasoning of Paley's 'Natural -Theology.' Socrates makes precisely the same use of the -statues of Polycletus and the pictures of Zeuxis which Paley -makes of the watch. As to the other great question, the -question what becomes of man after death, we do not see -that a highly educated European, left to his unassisted reason, -is more likely to be in the right than a Blackfoot Indian. -Not a single one of the many sciences in which we surpass -the Blackfoot Indians throws the smallest light on the -state of the soul after the animal life is extinct. In truth, -all the philosophers, ancient and modern, who have attempted -without the aid of revelation to prove the immortality -of man, from Plato down to Franklin, appear to us -to have failed deplorably.</p> - -<p>"Then, again, all the great enigmas which perplex the -natural theologian are the same in all ages. The ingenuity -of a people just emerging from barbarism is quite sufficient -to propound those enigmas. The genius of Locke or Clarke -is quite unable to solve them. It is a mistake to imagine -that subtile speculations touching the Divine attributes, -the origin of evil, the necessity of human actions, the foundation -of moral obligation, imply any high degree of intellectual -culture. Such speculations, on the contrary, are -in a peculiar manner the delight of intelligent children and -of half-civilized men. The number of boys is not small -who, at fourteen, have thought enough on these questions -to be fully entitled to the praise which Voltaire gives to -Zadig: 'Il en savait ce qu'on a su dans tous les ages; c'est -à dire, fort peu de chose.'</p> - -<p>"The book of Job shows that, long before letters and -arts were known to Ionia, these vexing questions were -debated with no common skill and eloquence under the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> -tents of the Idumean emirs; nor has human reason, in -the course of three thousand years, discovered any satisfactory -solution of the riddles which perplexed Eliphaz -and Zophar. Natural theology, then, is not a progressive -science."<a name="FNanchor_3" id="FNanchor_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<p>Here, in the space of two not very long paragraphs, is -a multitude of allusions which evince the range of Lord -Macaulay's reading, but which are employed, without very -close thinking, in a quite inaccurate way, to sustain assertions -that are not true. If he had said that a modern philosopher -has before him in the structure of the universe not -only all the same evidence of design which the early Greeks -had, but a great deal more, he would have hit the exact -truth. It is simple extravagance to say that modern astronomy -has added nothing to the strength of the argument -which shows the existence of a supreme lawgiver and artificer -of infinite power and skill. What did the early Greeks -know about the structure of the solar system, the law of -universal gravitation, and the laws of motion? Compare -the ideas entertained by the Greek philosophers of the phenomena -of the universe with those which modern astronomy -has enabled a modern philosopher to assume as scientific -facts established by rigorous demonstration; compare -what was known before the invention of the telescope -with what the telescope has revealed; compare the progress -that was made in Greek speculative philosophy from the -time of Thales to the time of Plato, and then say whether -natural religion had not made advances of the greatest importance -even before modern science had multiplied the -means for still greater progress. A brief summary of the -Greek philosophy concerning the producing causes of phenomena -will determine whether Lord Macaulay was right -or wrong in the assertion that the "early Greeks" had as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> -good means of making true deductions in natural theology -as the means which exist to-day.</p> - -<p>All scholars who have attended to the history of Greek -speculation know that the Greeks held to the belief in polytheistic -personal agents as the active producers of the phenomena -of Nature. This was the system of Homer and -Hesiod and the other old poets. This was the popular belief -held throughout all the Hellenic world, and it continued -to be the faith of the general public, not only after the -different schools of philosophy had arisen, but down to and -after the time when St. Paul stood on Mars Hill and told -the men of Athens how he had found that they were in all -things too superstitious. Thales, who flourished in the -first half of the sixth century before Christ, was the first -Greek who suggested a physical agency in place of a personal. -He assumed the material substance, water, to be -the primordial matter and universal substratum of everything -in Nature. All other substances were, by transmutations, -generated from water, and when destroyed they all -returned into water. His idea of the earth was that it was -a flat, round surface floating on the immense watery expanse -or ocean. In this he agreed with the old poets; but -he did not, like them, suppose that the earth extended -down to the depths of Tartarus. The Thalesian hypothesis, -therefore, rejected the Homeric Okeanus, the father of -all things, and substituted for that personal agency the -agency of one primordial physical substance, by its own -energy producing all other substances. This is about all -that is known of the philosophy of Thales, and even this is -not known from any extant writing of his, but it is derived -from what subsequent writers, including Aristotle, -have imputed to him.<a name="FNanchor_4" id="FNanchor_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Why Lord Macaulay should have -selected Thales as the Greek philosopher who was as favor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span>ably -situated as a philosopher of the present day for dealing -with questions of natural religion, is not very apparent. All -that Thales did, assuming that we know what he did, was -to strike out a new vein of thought, the direct opposite of -the poetical and popular idea of the origin of phenomena.</p> - -<p>From Thales to Plato, a century and a half intervened.<a name="FNanchor_5" id="FNanchor_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -During this period there arose, according to Mr. Grote, -twelve distinct schemes of philosophy, the authors of which -that learned Englishman has enumerated, together with an -admirable summary of their respective systems. From this -summary certain things are apparent. All these philosophers, -from Thales to Democritus, while each speculated -upon Nature in an original vein of his own, endeavored to -find an explanation or hypothesis on which to account for -the production and generation of the universe by some -physical agency apart from the mythical personifications -which were believed in by the populace and assumed in the -poetical theologies. Some of them, without blending ethics -and theology in their speculations, adopted, as the universal -and sufficient agents, the common, familiar, and pervading -material substances, such as water, fire, air, etc.; others, -as Pythagoras and his sect, united with ethical and theological -speculations the idea of geometrical and arithmetical -combinations as the primal scientific basis of the phenomena -of Nature. But what was common to all these -speculations was the attempt to find a scientific basis on -which to explain, by physical generation, by transmutation -and motion from place to place, the generation of the Kosmos, -to take the place of generation by a divine personal -agency or agencies. But while these speculations were of -course unsuccessful, their abundance and variety, the inventive -genius which they exhibit, the effort to find a scientific -basis apart from the popular and poetic belief in a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> -multitude of personal and divine agencies, constitute, as -Mr. Grote has well said, "one of the most memorable facts -in the history of the Hellenic mind"; and "the mental -effort required to select some known agency and to connect -it by a chain of reasoning with the result, all this is a new -phenomenon in the history of the human mind." Such an -amount of philosophical speculations could not go on for a -century and a half without enlarging the means for dealing -with questions of natural theology; for they very nearly -exhausted the "causings and beginnings" which could be -assigned to regular knowable and predictable agencies; and -these they carried through almost every conceivable form of -action by which such agencies could be supposed to operate. -While the authors of these systems of philosophy were constantly -hampered by the popular and poetic conceptions of -a diversified and omnipresent polytheistic agency, a belief -which, as Mr. Grote has said, was "eminently captivating -and impressive," and which pervaded all the literature of -their time, their speculations accumulated a vast fund of -ideas in the sphere of scientific explanations, which, although -unsatisfactory to modern science, became, when we -reach Plato, the principal influence which led him to revert -to the former idea of a divine agency, intentionally and deliberately -constructing out of a chaotic substratum the system -of the Kosmos; and which also led him to unite with -it the idea of a mode in which it acted on and through the -primordial elements of matter.</p> - -<p>So that, from the class of philosophers to whom Lord -Macaulay presumably referred as "the early Greeks," down -to and including Plato, there was a great advance. The -earlier Greek philosophers did not divide substance from its -powers or properties, nor did they conceive of substance as -a thing acted upon by power, or of power as a thing distinct -from substance. They regarded substance, some primordial -substance, with its powers and properties, as an efficient and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> -material cause, and as the sole cause, as a positive and final -agent. They did not seek for a final cause apart from the -substances which they supposed to be the sole agents operating -to produce important effects. But, inasmuch as they -carried their various theories through nearly the whole range -of possible speculation, they enabled Plato and Aristotle to -see that there was a fundamental defect in their reasoning; -that there must be an abstract conception of power as something -distinct from substance or its properties. It was by -Plato and Aristotle that this abstract conception was reached, -of course without any influence of what we regard as revelation; -and, although they did not always describe correctly -the mode in which this power had acted, their perception -of the logical necessity for such a final cause marks a great -progress in philosophical speculation. It entirely refutes -Lord Macaulay's assertion that natural theology is not a -progressive science. It had made great progress from -Thales to Plato; and while in a certain sense it is true -that "a modern philosopher has before him just the same -evidence of design in the structure of the universe which -the early Greeks had"—that is, he has the same physical -phenomena to observe—it is not true that the early Greeks -did not develop conceptions of the origin of the universe -valuable to their successors. Lord Macaulay should not -have compared Thales with the modern philosopher, in respect -of advantage of situation, but he should have compared -the modern philosopher with Plato, and Plato with -his predecessors; and if he had done this, he could not have -asserted with any show of truth that natural theology has -made no advance as a science from the time of Thales, -the Milesian philosopher, and Simonides, the poet, to the -present day. I shall have occasion hereafter to speak of -the masterly intellectual power by which Plato wrought -out his conception of a formative divine agency in the production -of the Kosmos, and the bold and original specula<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span>tion -by which he avoided the charge of infidelity toward -the established religion of his countrymen.</p> - -<p>When I come to speak of what modern astronomy has -done in furnishing us with new means of sound philosophical -speculation on the being, attributes, and methods -of God, it will be seen whether Lord Macaulay is correct -in the assertion that it has added nothing to the argument. -At present I will briefly advert to what the "early -Greeks," or any of the Greeks, knew of the structure of -the solar system. We learn, from a work which dates from -nearly the middle of the second century of the Christian -era, what was the general conception of the solar system -among the ancients, including the Greeks. This work is -known as the "Almagest" of Ptolemy, and the name of -the "Ptolemaic System" has been given to the theory -which he describes. This theory was common to all the -ancient astronomers, Ptolemy's statement of it being a -compendium of what they believed. Its principal features -are these: 1. The heavens are a vast sphere, in which the -heavenly bodies are set, and around the pole of this sphere -they revolve in a circle every day. 2. The earth is likewise -a sphere, and is situated in the center of the celestial -plane as a fixed point. The earth having no motion, and -being in the center of all the motions of the other bodies, -the diurnal revolutions of those bodies are in a uniform -motion around it. 3. The sun, being one of the heavenly -bodies making a revolution around the earth, was supposed -to be placed outside of the position of Venus in the heavenly -sphere. The order of the Ptolemaic system was thus: -The moon was first, being nearest to the earth; then came -Mercury and Venus, the sun being between Venus and -Mars. Beyond Mars came Jupiter and Saturn. Plato's -arrangement was in one respect different, his order being -the moon, the sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and -Saturn. But this ideal heavenly sphere, with the earth in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> -the center of all the revolutions of the other bodies, and -remaining quiescent—a theory which was common to all the -ancient astronomers—was the result of observing the motions -of the heavenly bodies as they appear to a spectator -on the earth. Such a spectator would have this appearance -of a celestial sphere presented to him wherever he -might be; and, judging from the apparent motions of the -heavenly bodies relative to his own position at the center, -he would conclude that the earth is at that center, and that -it remains at rest, supported on nothing. It required certain -discoveries to explode this system of a celestial sphere. -First came Copernicus, who, about the middle of the sixteenth -century of our era, published his demonstrations, -which convinced the world of two great propositions: 1. -That the diurnal revolution of the heavens is nothing but -an apparent motion, caused by the revolution of the earth -on its own axis. 2. That the earth is but one of a group -of planets, all of which revolve around the sun as a center. -Next came Kepler, who, in the early part of the seventeenth -century, recognizing the truth of the Copernican -system, determined the three laws of planetary motion: 1. -That the orbit of each planet is an ellipse, the sun being in -one focus. 2. That as each planet moves around the sun, -the line which joins it to the sun passes over equal areas in -equal times. 3. That the square of the time of a planet's -revolution around the sun is in proportion to the cube of -its mean distance from the sun. These laws were discovered -by Kepler as deductions made upon mathematical -principles from observations which had to be carried on -without the aid of the telescope, and without that knowledge -of the general laws of motion which came later. Kepler's -laws, although in the main correct, were subsequently -found to be subject to certain deviations in the planetary -motions. It was when Galileo, the contemporary of Kepler, -who, if he was not the first inventor of the telescope,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> -was the first to use it in astronomical observations, was able -by means of it to discover the general laws of motion, that -the substantial accuracy of Kepler's three laws could be -proved, while at the same time the deviations from them -were accounted for. Still, there was wanting the grand -discovery, which would disclose the cause of these motions -of the planets in elliptical orbits, and the relations between -their distances and their times of revolution, and thus reduce -the whole of the phenomena to a general law. Descartes, -who flourished 1596-1650, first attempted to do -this by his theory of Vortices. He supposed the sun to be -immersed in a vast fluid, which, by the sun's rotation, was -made to rotate in a whirlpool, that carried the planets -around with it, the outer ones revolving more slowly because -the parts of the ethereal fluid in which they were immersed -moved more slowly. This was a reversion back to -some of the ancient speculations. It was reserved for -Newton to discover the law of universal gravitation, by -which, in the place of any physical connection between the -bodies of the solar system by any intervening medium, the -force of attraction exerted by a larger body upon a smaller -would draw the smaller body out of the straight line that -it would pursue when under a projectile force, and would -thus convert its motion into a circular revolution around -the attracting body, and make the orbit of this revolution -elliptical by the degree in which the attracting force varied -in intensity according to the varying distance between the -two bodies. When Newton's laws of motion were discovered -and found to be true, the phenomena of the solar -system were explained.</p> - -<p>It may be interesting, before leaving for the present this -branch of the subject, to advert more particularly to one of -the philosophical systems of the Greeks, which, when compared -with the discoveries of modern astronomy, illustrates -the great addition that has been made to our means of sound<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> -speculation upon the origin of the material universe. I -refer to the system of the Pythagoreans—one of the most -remarkable instances of the invention of facts to fit and -carry out a theory that can be found in the history of philosophy, -although we are not without striking examples of -this practice in modern speculations. It has already been -seen that, during the whole period of Greek philosophy -before the time of Plato, the problem was to find a primordial -and universal agent by which the sensible universe was -built up and produced; supplying, that is to say, the matter -and force required for the generation of successive -products.<a name="FNanchor_6" id="FNanchor_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> It has been seen that the Thalesian philosophers -undertook to solve this problem by the employment -of some primordial physical substance, such as water, -fire, air, etc. Pythagoras and his school held that the essence -of things consisted in number; by which they did -not mean simply that all things could be numbered, but -they meant that numbers were substance, endowed with an -active force, by which things were constituted as we know -them. In the Pythagorean doctrine number was the self-existing -reality; not, as in Plato's system of ideas, separate -from things, but as the essence or determining principles -of things, and having, moreover, magnitude and active -force.<a name="FNanchor_7" id="FNanchor_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> This remarkably subtle conception of an agent in -the production of material things evinces the effort that -was making, in a direction opposite to that of Thales and -his immediate successors, to find a First Cause. It was -carried out by the Pythagoreans in the movements of the -heavenly bodies, in the works of human art, and in musical -harmony; in all of which departments, according to Mr. -Grote, they considered measure and number as the producing -and directing agencies. We are here concerned only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> -with their application of this theory to the celestial bodies. -One of their writers is quoted by Mr. Grote as a representative -of the school which was founded by Pythagoras (about -530 <span class="smcap">B. C.</span>), and which extended into the Græco-Italian -cities, where, as a brotherhood, they had political ascendency -until they were put down and dispersed about 509 -<span class="smcap">B. C.</span>; but they continued for several generations as a social, -religious, and philosophical sect. According to this writer -(Philolaus), "the Dekad, the full and perfect number, was -of supreme and universal efficacy as the guide and principle -of life, both to the Kosmos and to man. The nature of -number was imperative and law-giving, affording the only -solution of all that was perplexing or unknown; without -number all would be indeterminate and unknowable."</p> - -<p>Accordingly, the Pythagoreans constructed their system -of the universe by the all-pervading and producing -energy of this primordial agent, Number, in the manner -thus described by Mr. Grote (i, 12-15): "The Pythagoreans -conceived the Kosmos, or the universe, as one single -system, generated out of numbers. Of this system the central -point—the determining or limiting One—was first in -order of time and in order of philosophical conception. By -the determining influence of this central constituted One, -portions of the surrounding Infinite were successively attracted -and brought into system: numbers, geometrical -figures, solid substances were generated. But, as the Kosmos -thus constituted was composed of numbers, there could -be no continuum; each numeral unit was distinct and separate -from the rest by a portion of vacant space, which was -imbibed, by a sort of inhalation, from the infinite space -or spirit without. The central point was fire, called by the -Pythagoreans the Hearth of the Universe (like the public -hearth or perpetual fire maintained in the prytaneum of a -Grecian city), or the watch-tower of Zeus. Around it revolved, -from west to east, ten divine bodies, with unequal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> -velocities, but in symmetrical movement or regular dance. -Outermost was the circle of the fixed stars, called by the -Pythagoreans Olympus, and composed of fire like the center. -Within this came successively, with orbits more and more -approximating to the center, the five planets, Saturn, Jupiter, -Mars, Venus, Mercury; next, the sun, the moon, and -the earth. Lastly, between the earth and the central fire, -an hypothetical body, called the Antichthon, or counter-earth, -was imagined for the purpose of making up a total -represented by the sacred number ten, the symbol of perfection -and totality. The Antichthon was analogous to a -separated half of the earth, simultaneous with the earth in -its revolutions, and corresponding with it on the opposite -side of the central fire. The inhabited portion of the earth -was supposed to be that which was turned away from the -central fire and toward the sun, from which it received -light. But the sun itself was not self-luminous: it was -conceived as a glassy disk, receiving and concentrating light -from the central fire, and reflecting it upon the earth, so -long as the two were on the same side of the central fire. -The earth revolved in an orbit obliquely intersecting that -of the sun, and in twenty-four hours, round the central fire, -always turning the same side toward that fire. The alternation -of day and night was occasioned by the earth being, -during a part of such revolution, on the same side of the -central fire with the sun, and thus receiving light reflected -from him; and during the remaining part of her revolution -on the side opposite to him, so that she received no light at -all from him. The earth, with the Antichthon, made this -revolution in one day; the moon, in one month; the sun, -with the planets Mercury and Venus, in one year; the planets -Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn in longer periods respectively, -according to their distances from the center; lastly, the -outermost circle of the fixed stars (the Olympus, or the -Asslanes), in some unknown period of very long duration.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span></p> - -<p>"The revolutions of such grand bodies could not take -place, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, without producing -a loud and powerful sound; and as their distances from -the central fire were supposed to be arranged in musical -ratios, so the result of all these separate sounds was full and -perfect harmony. To the objection, Why were not the -sounds heard by us? they replied that we had heard them -constantly and without intermission from the hour of our -birth; hence they had become imperceptible by habit."</p> - -<p>Beautiful as was this theory—the origin of the phrase, -"the music of the spheres"—it owed its perfection as a -theory to a pure invention, resorted to in order to carry out -the hypothesis of the sacred number Ten, of which all the -greater numbers were only compounds and derivatives. This -perfect and normal Ten, as a basis on which to rest a bold -astronomical hypothesis, required the imagination of the -Antichthon, or counter-earth, in order, with the other bodies, -to make up the primordial number to whose generative -force the whole of these bodies owed their origin. The resort -to this conception of number, as a formative and active -agent, was doubtless due to the fact that the Pythagoreans -were the earliest cultivators of mathematical science. We -are told, in fact, that they paved the way for Euclid and -Archimedes, notwithstanding their symbolical and mystical -fancies, and from their mathematical studies they were led -to give exclusive supremacy to arithmetical and geometrical -views of Nature. But what is curious about this whole -speculation is, that in the invention or substitution of certain -facts in order to make a perfect theory, it resembles -some modern hypotheses, in which facts have been assumed, -or argued as existing from analogies, when there is no evidence -which establishes them. Modern instances of this -will appear hereafter.</p> - -<p>Enough has now been said about the speculations of the -"early Greeks" to show the extravagance of Lord Macau<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span>lay's -assertion that the discoveries of modern astronomy -have placed the modern philosopher in no better situation -to make safe deductions in natural theology than that occupied -by the Hellenic philosophers from Thales to Plato. -The evidences of design in the formation of the solar system—of -that kind of design which acts in direct and specific -exertions of a formative will—have been enormously multiplied -by the discoveries of modern astronomy. Those discoveries, -instead of leaving us to grope among theories -which require the invention or imagination of facts, relate -to facts that are demonstrated; and they tend in the -strongest manner to establish the hypothesis of an infinite -Creator, making laws to govern material objects, and then -creating a system of objects to be governed by those laws. -In a future chapter I shall endeavor to show why this hypothesis -in regard to the solar system is most conformable -to the rules of rational belief.</p> - -<p>Not to anticipate what will be said hereafter concerning -the modern discoveries in anatomy and in comparative -zoölogy, it is enough to say here that in the writings of the -Greek philosophers, especially of Plato and Aristotle, we -may discover what the Greeks knew or did not know, and -may therefore compare their knowledge with what is now -known. What was known about the human anatomy to -the Greeks of Plato's time is probably pretty well reflected -in his "Timæus," the celebrated dissertation in which he -developed his theory of the Kosmos; for, although Plato in -that superb philosophical epic made use of the organs of -the human body for ethical and theological purposes, and -did not make a special study of matters of fact, it is not -probable that in his mode of using them he so far departed -from the received ideas of his time respecting the human -anatomy that his treatise would have been regarded by his -contemporaries as an absurdity. Indeed, Mr. Grote considered -that Plato had that anatomical knowledge which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> -an accomplished man of his time could hardly fail to acquire -without special study.<a name="FNanchor_8" id="FNanchor_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Moreover, even Galen, who -came five centuries after Plato, and whose anatomical knowledge -was far greater than could have been commanded in -Plato's day, was wholly wrong in respect to the functions -of some of the human organs. He agreed with Plato's -ethical view of the human organism, but not in his physiological -postulates. He considered, according to Mr. Grote, -that Plato had demonstrated the hypothesis of one soul to -be absurd; he accepted Plato's triplicity of souls, but he -located them differently. He held that there are three -"originating and governing organs in the body: the brain, -which is the origin of all the nerves, both of sensation and -motion; the heart, the origin of the arteries; the liver, the -sanguifacient organ, and the origin of the veins which distribute -nourishment to all parts of the body. These three -are respectively the organs of the rational, the energetic, -and the appetitive soul."<a name="FNanchor_9" id="FNanchor_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Plato, on the other hand, had -placed the rational soul in the cranium, the energetic soul -in the thoracic cavity, and the appetitive soul in the abdominal -cavity; he connected them by the line of the spinal -marrow continuous with the brain, making the rational -soul immortal, and the two inferior souls, or two divisions -of one inferior soul, mortal. Galen did not decide what is -the essence of the three souls, or whether they are immortal. -Plato assigned to the liver a very curious function, or -compound of functions, making it the assistant of the rational -soul in maintaining its ascendency over the appetitive -soul, and at the same time making it the seat of those -prophetic warnings which the gods would sometimes vouchsafe -to the appetitive soul, especially when the functions of -the rational soul are suspended, as in sleep, disease, or ecstasy.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span></p> - -<p>But while there was much scientific progress from Plato -to Galen, and while Galen's physiological ideas of the functions -of the brain, the heart, and the liver held their place -until Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood in -the seventeenth century, that discovery and the subsequent -investigations proved that Galen, although not far wrong as -to the brain, was wholly wrong as to the liver, and partially -wrong as to the heart. Yet Galen's physiological theories -concerning these organs were founded on many anatomical -facts and results of experiments, such as could then be -made.</p> - -<p>There is another fact which marks the state of anatomical -knowledge among the Greeks in the time of Plato, and -of Aristotle, who belonged to the same century. The -"Timæus" of Plato shows that there were physicians at -that period, and that he was acquainted with the writings -of Hippocrates. The important fact is, as stated by Mr. -Grote, that "the study and practice of medicine was at -that time greatly affected by the current speculations respecting -Nature as a whole; accomplished physicians combined -both lines of study, implicating cosmical and biological -theories."<a name="FNanchor_10" id="FNanchor_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p>It is now only needful to say that modern anatomy and -physiology afford aids to sound deductions in natural theology -in reference to the structure of the human body as an -animal organism, and all the functions of its different organs, -which immeasurably transcend all that was known or -assumed among the early Greeks, or in the time of Plato -and Aristotle, or in the time of Galen. Notwithstanding -the dispute whether the origin of man as an animal is to be -referred to a special act of creation, or to the process of -what has been called evolution, there can be no controversy -on one point, namely, that modern anatomy and physiology<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> -have vastly increased our knowledge of the structure of the -human frame, and the means of rational speculation upon -the nature of intellect, as compared with any means that -were possessed by the most accomplished and learned of the -Greeks of antiquity. It matters little on which side of the -controversy, between creation and evolution, the great anatomists -of the present day range themselves. It is upon -the facts which their investigations have revealed that we -have to judge of the probable truth of the one hypothesis -or the other. The probable destiny of man as an immortal -being is an inquiry that has certainly lost nothing by our -increased knowledge of the facts in his animal structure -which tend to support the hypothesis of design in his creation.</p> - -<p>Lord Macaulay attributes an utter failure to the efforts -of the philosophers, from Plato to Franklin, to "prove" -the immortality of the soul without the help of revelation. -What did he mean by proof? Revelation is, of course, the -only direct proof. It is so, because it is direct testimony -of a fact, proceeding from the only source that can have -direct and certain knowledge of that fact. When the evidences -which are supposed to establish the existence and -authority of the witness have become satisfactory to us, we -are possessed of proof of our immortality, and this proof is -the only direct evidence of which the fact admits, and it -constitutes all that should be spoken of as proof. But there -is collateral although inferior evidence—inferior, because it -consists in facts which show a high degree of probability -that the soul of man is immortal, although this kind of -evidence is not like the direct testimony of a competent -witness. Is all this presumptive evidence, with its weighty -tendency to establish the probable truth of immortality, to -be pronounced of no value, because it belongs to a different -order of proof from that derived from the assertion of a -competent witness to the fact? It is one of the advantages<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> -of our situation in this life, that the collateral evidence -which tends to show the high probability of a future state -of existence is not withheld from us. As a supplemental -aid to the direct teaching of revelation, it is of inestimable -importance if we do not obscure it by theories which pervert -its force, and if we reason upon it on sound philosophical -principles. What we have to do in estimating the -probable truth of our immortality, as shown by the science -of natural religion, is to give the same force to moral evidence -in this particular department of belief, that we give -to the moral evidence which convinces us of many things -of which we have no direct proof, or of which the direct -proof lies in evidence of another kind.</p> - -<p>"He knew as much about it," said Voltaire, "as has -been known in all ages—that is to say, very little indeed." -This, like many of the witticisms of Voltaire, pressed into -the service of an argument against the value of natural religion -at the present day when studied by mature and disciplined -minds, is quite out of place. What human reason -has done in the course of three thousand years is not to be -put on a par with the speculations of intelligent children -or half-civilized men; and although some of the riddles -which perplexed Eliphaz and Zophar have not had a perfectly -satisfactory solution, it is quite wide from the truth -to assert that there has been no approximation to a satisfactory -solution, or that some of the riddles have not ceased -to be the riddles which they were three thousand years ago. -In that period there has been an accumulation of evidence -concerning the phenomena of Nature, and the phenomena -of mind, vast beyond comparison when placed in contrast -with what was known in the tents of the Idumean emirs, -and the importance of this accumulation of evidence is -proved by the fact that theories have been built upon it -which undertake to explain it by hypotheses that were -never heard of before, and which may possibly leave the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> -"riddles" in a far less satisfactory state than they were in -the time of Job. On the other hand, while the companions -of Job may have been unable to suggest to him any solution -of the problems of life, it does not at all follow that we are -as helpless as they were, even if we avail ourselves of nothing -but what the science of natural theology can now teach -us.<a name="FNanchor_11" id="FNanchor_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> - -<p>It will be seen that I attach great importance to natural -theology. But I do not propose to write for the confirmed -believers in revelation, on the one hand, who have become -convinced by the evidence which supports revelation; or for -those, on the other hand, who believe nothing, and who -have become confirmed in habits of thinking which unfit -them for judging of the weight of evidence on such subjects -as the existence of God and the creation of man. I -write for that great mass of people of average intelligence, -who do not understand accurately what the doctrine of -evolution is as expounded by its leading representatives, -and who do not know to what it leads. It will be found -that in some respects there is a distinction between the -school of which Darwin is the representative and the school -which follows Spencer. To point out this distinction, and -yet to show that both systems result in negatives which put -an end to the idea of immortality, and that the weight of -evidence is against both of them, is what I propose to do.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.</a></h2> -</div> - -<p class="intro">The Platonic Kosmos compared with the Darwinian theory of evolution. -</p> - - -<p>It is my purpose in this chapter to draw a parallel between -the theory of the origin of different animals propounded -in the "Timæus" of Plato and that of Mr. Darwin. -The analogy between them has been briefly hinted by Mr. -Grote, but he has not followed it out in detail, as it was no -part of his object to make minute comparisons between any -of the speculations of Plato and those of modern philosophers. -The great English scholar and critic seems to regard -it as somewhat uncertain how far Plato meant in the -"Timæus" to have his description of the Kosmos stand as an -expression of his own belief, or as a mere work of his imagination -and fancy. Plato, we are told, and this is quite obvious, -dealt but little with facts, while he dealt largely with -theories. But, even as a pure work of the imagination, or -as a philosophical epic, the daring conception of the Kosmos -is wonderfully complete; and it will repay any one, who -follows Mr. Grote in his analysis of it, to observe how Plato -employs a process of degeneration to account for the formation -of different species of animals, from the higher to the -lower, by agencies that bear a strong resemblance to those -which are assumed by Darwin to have worked in the opposite -process of variation and natural selection, resulting in -the evolution of a higher from a lower animal. But, in -order to render this comparison intelligible, it is necessary -to make an abstract of Plato's system of the Kosmos before -adverting to the analogies between that system and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> -Darwinian theory. I follow, although I have greatly condensed, -Mr. Grote's description of the Platonic Kosmos.</p> - -<p>According to the Platonic idea of the Kosmos, as given -in the "Timæus," there existed, anterior to all time, primordial -matter in a state of chaos. This matter was not created -for; according to Mr. Grote, whose authority upon -such a point is the highest, the notion of absolute creation -was unknown to the Greeks of antiquity, and it does not -appear that Plato suggests it. But, without accounting for -its existence, Plato assumes that there was matter in a condition -of utter chaos before time could have had an existence; -and, in order to make the chaotic condition the more -impressive in its primitive destitution of all form or active -principles tending to union or arrangement, he supposes -that the four elements of fire, air, earth, and water had no -existence save in the abstract, or as ideas and forms. But, -as abstract ideas, these four elements of fire, air, earth, and -water were distinct, self-existing, and indestructible, coeval -with the chaotic matter which was waiting to receive their -impress and to take on their distinctive elemental characters. -They had already begun to act on the <i lang="la">fundamentum</i>, -or primordial chaotic matter, as upon a recipient, but it -was in a confused way and without regularity of plan, so -that they had not become concrete existences or determinate -agents.</p> - -<p>In this state of things there appears upon the scene the -Demiurgus, a being coeval with the chaos of matter, that is, -self-existing and eternal. But, consistently with the philosophy -which did not admit of the idea of absolute creation, -the Demiurgus was not a creator, but an architect or -designer, working on materials that lay within his reach. -His moral attribute was goodness, which was, in his situation, -synonymous with order, regularity, symmetry, and -proportion, and, along with this tendency, he had supreme -artistic skill. In other words, he was the personification of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> -νους, or reason, working against necessity: the latter being, -not what we mean by that term, something preordained -and fixed, but confusion, uncertainty, irregularity, and unreason, -which are to be overcome by their opposites.</p> - -<p>Besides the chaotic matter and the ideas or forms of the -four elements, as yet unrealized in the actual substances of -fire, air, earth, and water, there were coeval ideas or forms -of animals, or, as we should say, abstract animals, or conceptions -of animals. The first and grandest of these was -the eternal self-animal, or the ideal of animal existence. -Next came the ideas or forms of four other animals: 1. The -celestial gods; 2. Man; 3. Birds, or animals living in air; -4. Land or water animals. Bearing in mind that we are -still in the region of abstract conceptions in regard to these -types of animals, which as yet have no concrete existence, -and that they are, so to speak, the intellectual models from -which the Demiurgus is to work, in order to make the real -animals conformably to the pre-existing and eternal plan, -we come to the process of forming the Kosmos, which is to -be the containing animal of all the other four. Out of the -confused chaos of existing matter the Demiurgus proceeds -to construct the Kosmos, which was to become the one self-animal, -by impressing the idea or abstract form of animal -upon a physical structure built out of the primordial chaotic -matter and comprehending the whole of it. The first -step was to bring the four elements of fire, air, earth, and -water out of their chaotic and confused condition by separating -them according to the forms of their eternal ideas. -The total of each element, when made to take its normal -form, was used in the construction of the Kosmos, which -thus came to possess the whole existing body of material; -"so that," to borrow the words of Mr. Grote, "there remained -nothing of the four elements apart, to hurt the -Kosmos from without, nor anything as raw material for a -second Kosmos."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Kosmos was made a perfect sphere, and with a perfectly -smooth outer surface, without organs of sight or -hearing, because there was nothing outside to be seen or -heard; without organs of respiration, because there was no -outside atmosphere to be breathed; and without nutritive -or excrementory organs, because it was self-sufficing, being -supplied with nourishment by its own decay. It was not -furnished with limbs or means of locomotion or standing, -because, being a sphere turning on an axis, and having only -one of the seven possible varieties of movement, namely, -rotation in a circle in one and the same plane, there was -nothing for it to grasp or repel.<a name="FNanchor_12" id="FNanchor_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> This body, the only-begotten, -because in its formation all existing bodily material -was employed, perfectly spherical and smooth, equidistant -from its center to all points of its circumference, and suspended -upon its own axis traversing its diameter, was now -to be animated by a soul.</p> - -<p>The Demiurgus, in the formation of the soul of the -Kosmos, took three constituent ingredients and mixed -them together. They were: 1. The Same, or the Identical, -the indivisible and unchangeable essence of Ideas; 2. The -Different, or the Plural, the divisible essence of bodies or of -the elements; 3. A compound of both of these ingredients -melted into one. Blended together in one grand compound, -these three ingredients formed the soul of the Kosmos by -first dividing the mixture into different portions, and then -uniting the portions according to a complicated scale of -harmonious numerical proportions. The outer or sidereal -sphere of the Kosmos was made to receive the Same, or -Identity, by being placed in an even and undivided rotation -toward the right, turning on the great axis of the -whole sphere. The interior, or planetary spheres, the five<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> -planets, and the sun and the moon, were made to be -under the influence of the Different, or Diversity—that is -to say, their rotations on their separate axes, all oblique, -were toward the left, while the overpowering force of -rotation of the outer sphere carried them along with it, -although the time of their separate rotations was more or -less modified by their own inherent and countermoving -forces.</p> - -<p>Thus the sentient capacity of the cosmical soul became -the cognition of the Same and the Different, and the blended -Same and Different, because it embodied these three ingredients -in its own nature. It was invisible; rooted at -its center and pervading and inclosing the whole visible -body, circulating and communicating, without voice or -sound, all impressions and information concerning the -existing relations between the separate parts and specialties -of the cosmical body.</p> - -<p>Anterior to the Kosmos there was no time. With the -rotation of the Kosmos time began. It was marked first -by the eternal and unchanging rotation of the outer circle, -in which were placed the fixed stars, which revolved with -it in unaltered position with regard to each other; and one -revolution of this outer or most rational circle made a day. -The sun, moon, and planets were distributed in different -portions of the Circle of the Different; one revolution of -the moon marking a month, and one revolution of the sun -marking a year. The earth, the first and oldest of the -sidereal and planetary gods, was packed around the great -axis which ran through the center of the Kosmos, and -turned that axis; so that the earth regulated the movement -of the great cosmical axis, and was the determining -agent of night and day.</p> - -<p>Thus far we have the formation of the Kosmos, animated -with a pervading soul, the body being formed out of the -whole of existing matter, molded into the specific elements<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> -of fire, air, earth, and water, and the soul being formed out -of the constituent ingredients furnished by the eternal and -invisible essence of ideas. The whole, body and soul of the -Kosmos, was thus an animal, formed on the abstract but -eternal idea or form of an animal which had existed before -time began. We now approach the formation of the other -animals. Of the Kosmos there could be but one. All existing -material of matter had been used in his construction. -He could not become a species, as there could be no second -Kosmos. Something could be borrowed from him, for the -formation of other animals, but nothing could be destroyed. -He was not yet, however, a full copy of the model of the -Generic Animal or Idea of Animal, because the eternal -plan of that model required that he should be peopled or -inhabited by four other animals, which might constitute -species. Accordingly, the Demiurgus proceeds to form the -first of these sub-animals, the gods, who are to inhabit -different portions of the Kosmos. The first of these in -formation was the earth, planted in the center, and made -sentinel over night and day; next the fixed stars, formed -chiefly out of fire, and placed in the outer circle of a fixed -revolution, or the Circle of the Same, to give to it light -and brilliancy. The sidereal orbs thus became animated -beings, eternal and divine. They remained constantly -turning round in the same relative position, but the sun, -moon, and planets, belonging to the Circle of the Different, -and trying to revolve by their own effort in a direction -opposite to that of the outer sphere, became irregular in -their revolutions and varied in their relative positions. -Thus the primitive gods were the earth and the fixed stars, -which revolved without variation with the Circle of the -Same, and became immortal as well as visible; while the -sun, moon, and planets were not among the primitive -gods, but were simply spherical bodies placed in the inner -Circle of the Different. The primitive gods preside over<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> -and regulate the Kosmos. From them are generated and -descended the remaining gods.<a name="FNanchor_13" id="FNanchor_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<p>Having completed the Kosmos and the primitive gods, -the Demiurgus paused in his work. There were still other -animals to be constructed, the first and noblest of which -was to be Man. But the Demiurgus, who, in the construction -of these gods, had made them immortal, not in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> -their own nature but through his determination, seems -to have apprehended that, if he proceeded to construct the -other animals himself, they would likewise be thereby rendered -of immortal duration. He therefore assembled the -newly generated gods and made to them a personal address. -He informed them of their immortal existence, and of his -purpose to confide to them the construction of the other -animals, stating at the same time, in the case of man, that -he would himself supply an immortal element which they -were to incorporate with a mortal body, in imitation of the -power which he had exercised in the generation of themselves. -He then proceeded to compound together, but in -inferior perfection and purity, the remnant of the same -elements out of which he had formed the cosmical soul.<a name="FNanchor_14" id="FNanchor_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> -He then distributed the whole of this mass into souls equal -in number to the fixed stars, placed each of them in a star -of its own, where it would be carried round in the cosmical -rotation, explained to it its immortal destiny, and that -at an appointed hour of birth it would be transferred into -a mortal body in conjunction with two inferior kinds of -soul or mind. These irrational enemies, the two inferior -souls, the rational and immortal soul would have to control -and subdue, so as to live a good life. If it triumphed -in the conflict, it would return after death to its own star, -where in an everlasting abode it would dwell forever in -unison with the celestial harmonies and perfections of the -outer sphere. But, if it failed, it would be born again into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> -an inferior body, and on the death of that body, if it continued -evil, it would be again born into a still more degraded -animal, through an indefinite transmigration from -animal to animal, until the rational soul should have obtained -the mastery over the irrational and turbulent, when -it would be released and permitted to return to its own -peculiar star.<a name="FNanchor_15" id="FNanchor_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Here, then, the Demiurgus retired, leaving -to the gods the work of fabricating mortal bodies for man, -and two mortal and inferior souls, with which the immortal -soul was to be joined. But before he withdrew he inculcated -upon the gods to construct the new mortal animal -in the best manner, so that the immortal soul should have -the fairest chance of guiding and governing rightly, in -order that the animal might not be the cause of mischief -and misery to himself; a possible and even probable result -which the Demiurgus proclaimed beforehand, thus relieving -himself of responsibility, and casting it, it would seem, -upon the gods.<a name="FNanchor_16" id="FNanchor_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> The latter stood, then, in the position of -workmen, who have received certain directions from a -superior architect, have been supplied with certain materials, -and are obliged to conform to a prescribed model, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> -cosmical animal, as far as circumstances will allow. The -Demiurgus retires, and leaves the gods to their work.</p> - -<p>They borrow from the Kosmos, from which they are -permitted to obtain materials, portions of the four elements, -for the construction of the human body, with an -engagement that these materials shall one day be returned. -These they unite in one body by numerous minute and -invisible fastenings; over this body they place a head or -cranium, into which they introduce the immortal soul, -making the head, with its spherical form like that of the -Kosmos, and admitting of no motion but the rotary, the -most divine portion of the human system and master of -the body, which is to be subject and ministerial. To the -body they give all the six varieties of motive power, forward, -backward, upward, downward, to the right and to -the left. The phenomena of nutrition and sensation begin -as soon as the connection is formed between the immortal -soul and the mortal body, but as the irregular movements -and agitations arising from the diverse rotations of the -Same and the Different convey false and foolish affirmations -to the soul in the cranium. That soul is destitute of intelligence -when first joined to the body, and remains so for -some time. But gradually these disturbing currents abate, -the rotations of the Same and the Different in the head -become more regular, and the man becomes more intelligent.</p> - -<p>It is now necessary to account for the introduction of -the two mortal souls, and to show how the conflict appointed -for the immortal soul became the test of a life -which was to determine whether the latter should be permitted, -on the death of the body, to return to its peculiar -star, or whether it should be degraded into some lower -form of animal. The immortal soul has its special abode -in the head, which is both united to and separated from -the trunk by the neck. The gods kept the two mortal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> -souls separate, so that the rational or immortal soul might -be defiled by the contact as little as possible. The better -portion of the mortal soul they placed in the thoracic -cavity. It was the energetic, courageous, contentious soul, -placed above the diaphragm, so as to receive orders easily -from the head, and to aid the rational soul in keeping the -mutinous soul of appetite, which was placed below the -diaphragm, in subjection.</p> - -<p>It is unnecessary to follow here the minute anatomical -descriptions which Plato gives of the different organs of -the human body, or of the way in which they are supposed -to act on the two divisions of the mortal soul, or to be -acted on by them, or the mode in which the latter act -upon the encephalic or immortal soul which is seated in -the cranium. These descriptions evince much knowledge -of the human anatomy, and probably all the knowledge -that was possessed in Plato's time. It is immaterial how -far this anatomical knowledge was correct, and of course -there was in Plato's use of the various organs a great deal -that was fanciful. It is sufficient, without following Mr. -Grote's analysis through these details, to note that, in -Plato's arrangement, the immortal soul was supposed to be -fastened in the brain, the two mortal souls in the line of -the spinal marrow continuous with the brain, and that this -line formed the thread of connection between them all.</p> - -<p>Passing on toward the point where the process of degradation -might begin, which would result in the reduction -of this new and divinely constructed animal to a lower -form, we have to note, first, that it was made a non-sexual -animal, being intended for an angelic type. In the original -plan of the gods, it was not contemplated that this -primitive type should reproduce itself by any process of -generation. According to the original scheme, it would -seem that every time a new immortal soul was to be -brought down from its peculiar star, the process of con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span>structing -for it a mortal body would have to be repeated. -Plato, Mr. Grote observes, does indeed tell us that the -primitive non-sexual type had the option of maintaining -itself. But this must mean that each individual of that -type had the option of maintaining itself in its struggle -with the debasing influences of appetite and disease. But -not one representative of it has held his ground; and as it -was foreseen that such an angelic type could not maintain -itself, we are to look for a reconstruction of the whole -organism. This came about from the degeneracy of the -primitive non-sexual animal below the standard of good life -which it had the option of continuing. Men whose lives -had fallen below this standard became effeminate, cowardly, -unjust. In their second birth, their immortal souls had to -be translated into a body resembling that to which they had -debased the first body into which they were born. The first -transition, therefore, was from man into woman. In other -words, the gods, seeing that the non-sexual primitive type -did not maintain itself at the high point intended for it, -reconstructed the whole organism upon the bi-sexual principle, -introducing the comparatively lower type of woman. -A partial transformation of the male structure makes the -female. A suitable adjustment of the male organs, and -the implanting of the sexual impulse in both sexes, by the -agency of the gods, make provision for generative reproduction, -and a species is formed, which takes the place of -the primitive non-sexual type which did not reproduce itself -in the original scheme. The primitive type disappears, and -it disappears by a process of degradation, which it undergoes -by reason of its failure to avail itself of the option -which it originally had of living a good life that would entitle -the immortal soul to return to its peculiar star without -further conflict with the debasing tendencies to which -it was exposed in the first body that it inhabited.</p> - -<p>In this curious theory we see how a process of declen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span>sion -or degradation is induced by what may almost be -called a choice, since the primitive human being, by not -resisting the debasing tendencies of his lower nature, is -made by those tendencies to assume a less divine form than -that in which he originally existed. To the primitive man -the gods assigned the encephalic or head-soul, which was -connected with and suspended from the divine soul of the -Kosmos. They assigned it to each man as his presiding -genius. If he neglected it, and directed all his development -toward the energetic or appetitive mortal soul, he -would become debased. He did so. Hence it became -necessary for the gods to reconstruct the whole organism, -and in this reconstruction the primitive non-sexual type becomes -the bi-sexual, and a species is formed.</p> - -<p>It is not necessary to enter into the metaphysical argument -which relates to the question of responsibility for this -change from the original plan. Plato tells us that the -gods foresaw it as a necessary consequence of the original -scheme; and, moreover, that they foresaw that they must -make preparation for the still more degenerate varieties of -birds and quadrupeds, into which the corrupt and stupid -part of mankind would sink, all of which were according -to the great eternal scheme of the four kinds of ideal -animals embraced in the idea of the Kosmos itself. But -with the moral justice of the whole theory we have no concern -here. We are here concerned, first, with the nature of -the process by which, in the Platonic theory, the bi-sexual -human race became formed out of the primitive non-sexual -type; and, next, with the process by which individuals of -this race became degraded into the lower animals.<a name="FNanchor_17" id="FNanchor_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span></p> - -<p>After the process of degradation had begun, after the -primitive type had given place to the bi-sexual human race, -and a species was thus formed, further degradation would -be inevitable under the same causes which produced the first -one. The female part of mankind would go on bringing -forth new males and new females, and to each one at birth -there would come from its peculiar star an immortal soul, -for I do not understand that Plato's women were supposed -not to be constructed, in this respect, upon the same plan -as the men. But each of these newly arrived immortal -souls would be placed in a mortal body in contact and conflict -with the two mortal souls of appetite, disturbance, and -mutiny against the divine laws of reason. Each new human -being would then be exposed to further debasement, by -which his or her human organs and human form would -undergo transformation into a lower type of animal life. -Accordingly, we find that Plato, in perfect consistency with -his theory, supposes that birds are a degraded birth or -formation derived from one peculiar mode of degeneracy in -man, hair being transmuted into feathers and wings. If -we inquire from what kind of men the birds were formed, -and how they came to be assigned to the air, we shall best -learn from the words employed by Mr. Grote to express -Plato's idea: "Birds were formed from the harmless but -light, airy, and superficial men, who, though carrying their -minds aloft to the study of cosmical phenomena, studied -them by visual observation and not by reason, foolishly -imagining that they had discovered the way of reaching -truth."<a name="FNanchor_18" id="FNanchor_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p>Next to the birds came the land-animals, a more brutal -formation. These, to borrow the words of Mr. Grote's -analysis, "proceeded from men totally destitute of philoso<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span>phy, -who neither looked up to the heavens nor cared for -celestial objects; from men making no use whatever of the -rotations of their encephalic soul, but following exclusively -the guidance of the lower soul in the trunk. Through such -tastes and occupations, both their heads and their anterior -limbs became dragged down to the earth by the force of -affinity. Moreover, when the rotation of the encephalic -soul from want of exercise became slackened and fell into -desuetude, the round form of the cranium was lost and became -converted into an oblong or some other form. These -now degenerated into quadrupeds and multipeds, the gods -furnishing a greater number of feet in proportion to the -stupidity of each, in order that its approximation to earth -might be multiplied. To some of the more stupid, however, -the gods gave no feet or limbs at all, constraining them -to drag the whole length of their bodies along the ground, -and to become reptiles. Out of the most stupid and senseless -of mankind, by still greater degeneracy, the gods -formed fishes, or aquatic animals—the fourth and lowest -genus after men, birds, land-animals. This race of beings, -from their extreme want of mind, were not considered -worthy to live on earth, or to respire thin and pure air. -They were condemned to respire nothing but deep and turbid -water, many of them, as oysters and other descriptions -of shell-fish, being fixed down at the lowest depth or bottom. -It is by such transitions (concludes the Platonic -'Timæus') that the different races of animals passed originally, -and still continue to pass, into each other. The interchange -is determined by the acquisition or loss of reason -or rationality."<a name="FNanchor_19" id="FNanchor_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> - -<p>Here, then, we have a process of degradation by which -the different races of animals were formed, by a kind of -selection which, commencing in the human species from the -neglect of the encephalic soul to maintain its high duties<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> -and aims, goes on in successive debasements which result in -the formation of lower and still lower animals until we reach -the shell-fish fixed upon the earth at the bottom of the -water. The bi-sexual principle of construction having been -introduced in the human species, was continued through -all the other species formed by the still descending process -of deterioration, so that to each successive species there remained -the power of reproducing its own type, along with -the tendency to evolve a lower type by further loss of reason -or rationality. It is not material to the purpose of the -parallel, which I am about to draw between the Platonic and -the Darwinian system, to consider the precise nature of the -Platonic idea of an intelligent power, by which these successive -degradations were in one sense purposely ordained. -Enough is apparent on the Platonic system to show that, -while these degradations were according to an eternal plan, -because they resulted from the conflict between reason and -unreason, order and disorder, between purity and impurity, -yet the different species of animals, after man, were not -special creations by an infinite power interfering in each -case by a separate exercise of creative will. They were a -growth of an inferior organization out of a superior through -the inevitable operation of tendencies which changed the -forms of the animals. As fast as these tendencies operated—and -they were continually operating—the ministers of the -Demiurgus, the gods, stood ready to adapt the structure to -the new conditions in which the tendencies resulted, so -that the new animal might be fitted to and fixed in those -conditions. Still, the gods are not represented as making -separate creations of new species as an act of their will, -without the pre-existing operation in the preceding type of -tastes and occupations which modify the structure into one -of a more degraded character. It may thus be said with -entire truth that the Platonic idea of the origin of the different -races of animals presents a parallel to the Darwinian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> -theory, in which it will be found that the one is the reverse -of the other, both of them proceeding upon and involving -analogous principles of evolution, operating in the one system -from below upward, and in the other from a higher -point downward. If, in the Platonic system, the idea of -an original immortal soul placed in a heavenly abode, but -afterward brought down and fixed in a mortal body, is the -starting-point—if a conflict of a spiritual and angelic existence -with corporeal and earthly tendencies is at first the -predominant fact—the parallel between the Platonic process -of degradation and the Darwinian process of elevation -remains the same; for, in the one system, reason degenerates -into instinct, and instinct at last reaches its lowest possible -action, or ceases entirely; and, in the other, instinct -rises from its lowest action through successive improvements -until it becomes mind or intellect: so that somewhere -in the two processes there must be a point where -they pass each other in opposite directions, the one losing -or merging intellect in instinct, the other losing and merging -instinct in mind, each of the two processes being a process -of development or evolution, but in opposite directions.<a name="FNanchor_20" id="FNanchor_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<p>It is not easy to ascertain at once what was Mr. Darwin's -idea of the mode in which a supreme intelligence has -presided over the creation. In his work on "The Descent -of Man", he adduces some evidence that man was not -"originally endowed with the ennobling belief in the existence -of an Omnipotent God," this evidence being that numerous -savage races have existed, and still exist, who have -had and have no words in their language to express this -idea. But this, if true, does not help us to understand -what part in Mr. Darwin's theory an Omnipotent God is -supposed to play. Scattered through the same work we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> -find references to the hypothesis of such a being, and to the -influences which this belief has exerted upon the advance of -morality. But I assume that we are to understand that Mr. -Darwin adopts as a fact, to be taken into account in judging -of his theory of evolution, that there is such a being as -an Omnipotent God, having equally the power to make -separate creations, or to establish certain laws of matter, and -to leave them to operate through secondary causes in the -production and extinction of the past and present inhabitants -of the world. In his work on the "Origin of Species" -he refers to "what we know of the laws impressed upon -matter by the Creator."<a name="FNanchor_21" id="FNanchor_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> In his "Descent of Man" the -following passage occurs toward the close of the work: -"He who believes in the advancement of man from some -low organized form will naturally ask, How does this bear -on the belief in the immortality of the soul? The barbarous -races of man, as Sir J. Lubbock has shown, possess no -clear belief of this kind; but arguments, derived from the -primeval beliefs of savages, are, as we have just seen, of -little or no avail. Few persons feel any anxiety from the -impossibility of determining at what precise period in the -development of the individual, from the first trace of a -minute germinal vesicle, man becomes an immortal being; -and there is no greater cause for anxiety, because the period -can not possibly be determined in the gradually ascending -organic scale."</p> - -<p>Surely it is a most pertinent inquiry, How does his theory -of the advancement of man from some lower organized -form bear on the immortality of the soul? and it is no answer -to this inquiry to say that upon no hypothesis of man's -origin can we determine at what precise period he becomes -an immortal being. That the idea of an Omnipotent God, -capable of creating a spiritual essence, or an immortal soul,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> -is not denied by Mr. Darwin, is doubtless to be inferred -from his strong affirmation that our minds refuse to accept -as the result of blind chance the grand sequence of events -which the birth both of the species and the individual -presents to our view. That variations of structure, the -union of pairs in marriage, the dissemination of seeds, and -similar events, have all been ordained for some special purpose, -is the hypothesis according to which he regards them -as events brought about by the laws of natural selection, -which laws were ordained by the Creator and left to operate. -Now, while this hypothesis excludes, or tends to exclude, -the idea of blind chance, it still remains to be considered -whether the soul of man, or the essence which we call intellect, -is in each case a direct creation of a special character, -or whether it is a result from the operation of the laws -which have been ordained for the action of organized matter. -If it is the former, the soul may survive the destruction -of the body. If it is the latter, the soul as well as all the -other manifestations or exhibitions which the material body -gives forth in its action, may and in all probability must -cease with the organs whose action leads us falsely to believe -that we are animated by an immortal spirit while we -are in the flesh. If it is a necessary result of any theory -that what is supposed to be the immortal soul of man is a -product of the operation of certain laws imposed upon organized -matter, without being a special creation of something -distinct from matter, it is immaterial whether the -organized form of matter with which the soul is connected, -or appears to act for a time, was a special creation, or was -an evolution out of some lower form, or came by blind -chance. Nor is it material that we can not determine at -what precise period in the genesis of the individual, by the -ordinary process of reproduction, he becomes an immortal -being. The question is, Does he ever become an immortal -being, if in body and in mind he is a mere product of or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span>ganized -matter, formed from some lower type through the -laws of variation and natural selection, resulting in an -animal whose manifestations or exhibitions of what we call -intellect or mind are manifestations of the same nature as -the instincts of the lower animals, differing only in degree?</p> - -<p>That I may not be misunderstood, and especially that I -may not be charged with misrepresentation, I will state the -case for the Darwinian theory as strongly as I can. The -question here is obviously not a question of power. An -Omnipotent Creator has just the same capacity to make -special creations, by a direct and special exertion of his -will, as he has to make one primordial type and place -it under fixed laws that will in their operation cause a -physical organization to act in such a way as to evolve -out of it other and more or less perfect types. In either -method of action, he would be the same Omnipotent God, -by whose will all things would exist; and I assume that -upon this point there is no difference between some of -the evolution school and its opponents. But in considering -the question of the origin of the human soul, or the intellect -of man, we are dealing not with a question of power, -but with the probable method in which the conceded Omnipotent -capacity has acted. On the one hand, we have -the hypothesis that the Eternal and Omnipotent capacity -has created a spiritual and immortal being, capable of existing -without any union with the body that is formed out -of earthly material, but placed for a time in unison with -such a body; and that for the effectual purpose of this -temporary union this body has been specially constructed, -and constructed in two related forms, male and female, so -that this created species of animal may perpetuate itself by -certain organic laws of reproduction. Now it is obviously -immaterial that we can not detect the point of time, or the -process, at or by which the union between the spiritual -essence and the earthly body takes place in the generation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> -of the individual. It is conceded to be alike impossible -to detect the time or mode in which descendants of the -lower animals, which had nothing resembling intellect, -become endowed with and inhabited by intellect, through -the supposed laws of variation and natural selection, operating -to produce an animal of a more elaborate organization. -The point of divergence between the two hypotheses is precisely -this: that the one supposes the mind of man to be a -special creation, of a spiritual nature, designed to be immortal, -but placed in union with a mortal body for a temporary -purpose. The other hypothesis supposes no special -creation of either the mind or the body of man, but maintains -that the latter is evolved out of some lower animal, -and that the former is evolved out of the action of physical -organization.<a name="FNanchor_22" id="FNanchor_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> Either mode of projecting and executing -the creation of both the body and the mind of man is of -course competent to an Omnipotent God. The question is, -Which mode has the highest amount of probability on which -to challenge our belief? If the one, as it is described, -leads to the conclusion that the mind can not survive the -body, and the other leads to the conclusion that it can, we -are left to choose between them: and our choice must be -determined by what we can discover of satisfactory proof -that the mind of man was destined to become immortal. -What, then, is the Darwinian theory of the origin of man as -an animal, and to what does it lead respecting the origin -and nature of the human soul?</p> - -<p>Whoever will carefully examine Mr. Darwin's hypothe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span>sis -of the descent of man as an animal, will find that commencing -at a point opposite to that at which Plato began -his speculations, the modern naturalist assumes the existence -of a very low form of animated and organized matter, -destitute of anything in the nature of reason, even if -acting under what may be called instinctive and unconscious -impulses, imposed upon it by the preordained laws -by which animated matter is to act. By some process of -generation, either bi-sexual or uni-sexual or non-sexual, this -very low type of animal is endowed with a power of reproducing -other individuals of the same structure and habits. -In process of time, for which we must allow periods -very much longer than those of which we are accustomed -to think in relation to recorded history, the individuals of -this species become enormously multiplied. A struggle for -existence takes place between these very numerous individuals; -and in this struggle there comes into operation the -law to which Mr. Darwin has given the name of "natural -selection," which is but another name for a series of events. -He does not mean by this term to imply a conscious choice -on the part of the animals, nor an active power or interfering -deity. He employs it to express a constantly occurring -series of events or actions, by which, in certain circumstances, -animals secure themselves against the tendency to -destruction which is caused by the great disparity between -their numbers and the amount of food that is accessible to -them, or by the unfavorable influences of a change of climate -upon so great a body of individuals. He calls this -series of events or actions <em>natural</em> selection, in order, as I -understand, to compare what takes place in nature with -what takes place when a breeder of animals purposely selects -the most favorable individuals for the purpose of improving -or varying the breed. In nature, the selection is -supposed to operate as follows: The strongest and most -active individuals of a species of animals have the best<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> -chance of securing the requisite amount of food from the -supply that is insufficient for all. They do this by their -greater fleetness in overtaking the common prey, or by making -war upon the more feeble or inactive of their fellows; -and numerous individuals are either directly destroyed by -this warfare, or are driven off from the feeding-ground and -perish for want of nourishment. Thus the best specimens -of the race survive; and to this occurrence is given the name -of the "survival of the fittest," meaning the survival of those -individuals best fitted to continue their own existence and -to continue their species. A physical change in the country -inhabited by a great multitude of individuals of a certain -species, or by different species—for example, a change of climate—operates -to make this struggle for existence still more -severe, and the result would be that those individuals of the -same species which could best adapt themselves to their new -condition would tend to be preserved, as would the different -species inhabiting the same country which could best -maintain the struggle against other species. The improvement -in the structure of the animals takes place, under this -process of natural selection, in the following manner: The -best individuals being preserved, the organs of which they -make most use in the struggle for existence undergo development -and slight modifications, favorable to the preservation -of the individual, and these modifications are transmitted -to their offspring. Here there comes in play a kind -of collateral aid to which is given the name of "sexual -selection," which is defined as a form of selection depending -"not on a struggle for existence in relation to other -organic beings or to external conditions, but on a struggle -between individuals of one sex, generally the males, for the -possession of the other sex."<a name="FNanchor_23" id="FNanchor_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> "The result," continues -Mr. Darwin, "is not death to the unsuccessful competitor,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> -but few or no offspring. Sexual selection is, therefore, less -rigorous than natural selection. Generally, the most vigorous -males, those which are best fitted for their place in -nature, will leave most progeny. But, in many cases, victory -depends not so much on general vigor, as on having -special weapons, confined to the male sex." As, by means -of this warfare of sexual selection, the victor would always -be allowed to breed, his courage and his special weapons of -offense or defense, in their increased development, would -descend to his offspring. Thus the improvement and -modification induced by natural selection would be enhanced -and transmitted by the sexual selection.<a name="FNanchor_24" id="FNanchor_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p> - -<p>In regard to the operation of the two kinds of selection -in the evolution of man from a lower form of animal, we -find the theory to be this: That organic beings with -peculiar habits and structure have passed through transitions -which have converted the primordial animal into one -of totally different habits and structure; that, in these -transitions, organs adapted to one condition and mode of -life have become adapted to another; that such organs are -homologous, and that in their widely varied uses they have -been formed by transitional gradations, so that, for example, -a floating apparatus, or swim-bladder, existing in a -water-animal for one purpose—flotation—has become converted -in the vertebrate animals into true lungs for the -very different purpose of respiration. Thus, by ordinary -generation, from an ancient and unknown prototype, not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> -only have organs, by minute and successive transitions, become -adapted to changed conditions of life, but the whole -organism has become changed, and this has resulted in the -production of an animal vastly superior to his ancient and -unknown prototype; and yet to that prototype, of which we -have no specimen and no record, are to be traced the germs -of all the peculiarities of structure which we find in the perfect -animals of different kinds that we thoroughly know, -until we come to man, these successive results being brought -about by the two kinds of selection—natural and sexual.</p> - -<p>There can be no better illustration of the character of -Mr. Darwin's theory than that to which he resorts when -he means to carry it to its most startling length, while he -candidly admits that he has felt the difficulty of this application -of it far too keenly to be surprised at the hesitation -of others. This illustration is the eye. Here he very -justly says it is indispensable that reason should conquer -imagination; but on which side of the question reason or -imagination is most employed might, perhaps, be doubtful. -Mr. Darwin's hypothesis concerning the eye begins -with the fact that in the highest division of the animal -kingdom, the vertebrata, we can start from an eye so simple -that it consists, as in the lancelet,<a name="FNanchor_25" id="FNanchor_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> of a little sack of -transparent skin, furnished with a nerve, and lined with -pigment, but destitute of any other apparatus. From this -prototype of a visual organ, up to the marvelous construction -of the eye of man or of the eagle, he supposes that extremely -slight and gradual modifications have led, by the -operation of natural and sexual selection; and by way of -illustrating this development, he compares the formation -of the eye to the formation of the telescope. "It is -scarcely possible to avoid comparing the eye with a tele<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span>scope. -We know that this instrument has been perfected -by the long-continued efforts of the highest human intellects, -and we naturally infer that the eye has been formed -by a somewhat analogous process. But may not this inference -be presumptuous? Have we any right to assume that -the Creator works by intellectual powers like those of man? -If we must compare the eye to an optical instrument, we -ought, in imagination, to take a thick layer of transparent -tissue, with spaces filled with fluid, and with a nerve sensitive -to light beneath, and then suppose every part of this -layer to be continually changing slowly in density, so as to -separate into layers of different densities and thickness, -placed at different distances from each other, and with the -surface of each layer slowly changing in form. Further, -we must suppose that there is a power, represented by -natural selection or the survival of the fittest, always -watching each slight alteration in the transparent layers, -and carefully preserving each which, under varied circumstances, -in any way or in any degree, tends to produce a -distincter image. We must suppose each new state of the -instrument to be multiplied by the million, each to be preserved -until a better one is produced, and then the old ones -to be all destroyed. In living bodies variations will cause -the slight alterations, generation will multiply them almost -infinitely, and natural selection will pick out with unerring -skill each improvement. Let this process go on for millions -of years, and during each year on millions of individuals -of many kinds, and may we not believe that a living optical -instrument might thus be formed as superior to one of -glass as the works of the Creator are to those of man?"<a name="FNanchor_26" id="FNanchor_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a></p> - -<p>It might have occurred to the very learned naturalist -that the formation of a mechanical instrument by the hand -of man, guided by his intellect, admits of varieties of that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> -instrument for different purposes, as products of an intelligent -will. Different kinds of telescopes for different uses -have been produced, not by destroying the poorer ones and -preserving the better ones, but by a special and intentional -adaptation of the structure to special uses, until an instrument -is made which will dissolve the nebulæ of the milky -way, and bring within the reach of our vision heavenly -bodies of the existence of which we had no previous knowledge. -Why may not the same intelligent and intentional -formation of the human eye, as a special structure adapted -to the special conditions of such an animal as man, have -been the direct work of the Creator, just as the lowest -visual organ—that of such a creature as the lancelet—was -specially made for the conditions of its existence? Why -resort to the theory that all the intermediate varieties of -the eye have grown successively out of the lowest form of -such an organ by transitional grades of which we can not -trace the series, when the probabilities concerning the -varieties of this organ of which we have any knowledge are -so strongly on the side of a special and intentional adaptation -of each one to the circumstances of the animal to -which it has been given? As a question of power in the -Creator, either method of action was of course just as competent -as the other. As a question of which was his probable -method, the case is very different; for we know comparatively -very little of the modifications produced by such -causes as natural or even sexual selection, while we may, -without presumption, assume that we know much more -about the purposes of special adaptation to special conditions, -which an omnipotent Creator may have designed and -effected. But this is a digression, and also an anticipation -of the argument.</p> - -<p>To state the pedigree of man according to the Darwinian -theory, we must begin with an aquatic animal as the -early progenitor of all the vertebrata. This animal exist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span>ing, -it is assumed, "in the dim obscurity of the past," was -provided with branchiæ or gills, or organs for respiration -in water, with the two sexes united in the same individual, -but with the most important organs of the body, such as -the brain and heart, imperfectly or not at all developed. -From this fish-like animal, or from some of its fish descendants, -there was developed an amphibious creature, with the -sexes distinct. Rising from the amphibians, through a -long line of diversified forms, we come to an ancient marsupial -animal, an order in which the young are born in a -very incomplete state of development, and carried by the -mother, while sucking, in a ventral pouch.<a name="FNanchor_27" id="FNanchor_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> From the -marsupials came the quadrumana<a name="FNanchor_28" id="FNanchor_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> and all the higher mammals.<a name="FNanchor_29" id="FNanchor_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> -Among these mammals there was, it is supposed, -a hairy, tailed quadruped, probably arboreal in its habits, -from which man is descended. It was an inhabitant of -the Old World. It branched into the lemuridæ, a group -of four-handed animals, distinct from the monkeys, and -resembling the insectivorous quadrupeds in some of their -characters and habits;<a name="FNanchor_30" id="FNanchor_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> and from these came the simiadæ, -of which there were two great stems—the New World and -Old World monkeys. "From the latter, at a remote -period, man, the wonder and glory of the universe, proceeded."<a name="FNanchor_31" id="FNanchor_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span></p> - -<p>The reader must now, in order to do justice to this theory, -imagine a lapse of time, from the period of the existence -of the aquatic progenitor of all the vertebrata, to be -counted by millions of years, or by any figures that will -represent to the mind the most conceivable distance between -a past and a present epoch. Through this enormous -stretch of centuries, in order to give scope to the operation -of the laws of natural and sexual selection, we must suppose -the struggle for existence to be going on among the -individuals of the same species, and among different species -inhabiting the same country, and the sexual selection -among the individuals of the same species to be perpetually -transmitting to offspring the improved and more developed -organs and powers induced by natural selection; so that in -the countless sequence of generations there are evolved animals -that are so widely different from their remote progenitors -that in classifying them we find them to be new -species, endowed with a power of reproducing their own -type, and similarly capable, it would seem, of still further -development into even higher types in the long-distant -future.</p> - -<p>I know not how it may appear to others, but to me the -parallelism between the Platonic and the Darwinian theory -is very striking. Both speculators assume the existence of -a Supreme Intelligence and Power, presiding over the -creation of animals which are to inhabit this earth. Behind -the celestial or primitive gods the Greek philosopher -places the Demiurgus, to whom the gods stand in the relation -of ministers or servants to execute his will. The -modern naturalist assumes the existence of the Omnipotent -God; and although he does not directly personify the -laws of natural and sexual selection which the Omnipotent -power has made to operate in nature, they perform an office -in the transitional gradations through which the animals are -successively developed, that very closely resembles the office<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> -performed by the gods of Plato's system in providing the -modifications of structure which the animals undergo. In -the two processes the one is the reversed complement of -the other. Plato begins with the formation of an animal of -a very exalted type, and by successive degradations, induced -by the failure of the animal to live up to the high standard -of its rational existence, he supposes a descent into lower -and still lower forms, the gods all the while providing a -new structure for each successive lower form, until we -reach the shell-fish fixed on the earth beneath the water. -Darwin begins with the lowest form of animated organization, -and by successive gradations induced by the struggle -of the animal to maintain its existence, he supposes an ascent -into higher and still higher forms, the laws of natural -and sexual selection operating to develop a new structure -for each successive higher form, until we reach man, "the -wonder and glory of the universe," an animal whose immediate -ancestor was the same as the monkey's, and whose remote -progenitor was an aquatic creature breathing by gills -and floating by a swim-bladder.</p> - -<p>Nor had Plato less of probability to support his theory -than Darwin had to support his. The Greek philosopher -might have adduced the constant spectacle of men debasing -their habits and even their physical appearance into a -resemblance to the brutes. He might have suggested, and -he does suggest, how the degrading tendencies of the lower -appetites and the ravages of disease drag down the human -frame from its erect carriage and its commanding power -over matter to an approximation with the condition of the -inferior animals. He might have adduced innumerable -proofs of the loss of reason, or rationality, through successive -generations of men, brought about by the transmission -of both appetites and physical malformation from parents -to children. He might have compared one of his Athenian -fellow-citizens of the higher class with the lowest savage<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> -known throughout all the regions accessible to an observer -of his day and country. He might have portrayed the one -as a being preserving his physical organization in the highest -state of perfection by gymnastic exercises, by a well-chosen -diet, by observance of all the conditions of health, -by the aid of the highest medical skill known to the age; -cultivating his mind by philosophy, practicing every public -and private virtue as they were understood among a people -of rare refinement, and adorning his race by an exhibition -of the highest qualities that were then attainable. All -these qualities, physical, mental, and moral, Plato might -have shown were transmissible in some degree, and in a -good degree were actually transmitted from sire to son. -Turning to the other picture, and comparing "Hyperion -to the satyr," he might have shown that the lowest savage, -in those physical points of structure which were best -adapted to his animal preservation as an inhabitant of the -wildest portion of the earth, had retained those which -made him more nearly resemble the brute inhabitants of -the same region, and that in his intellectual and moral -qualities the resemblance between him and his Athenian -contemporary was almost wholly lost. Intermediate between -these extreme specimens of the human race, why -could not Plato have found with great probability, and -often with actual proof, successive degradations of structure -and uses of organs, just as well supported by facts, or -analogies, or hypotheses, as are Mr. Darwin's successive -elevations from a lower to a higher animal? If Plato had -known as much about the animal kingdom as is now known, -he could have arrayed the same facts in support of his theory, -by an argument as powerful as that which now supports -the doctrine of evolution.</p> - -<p>Nay, it is certain that Plato's attention was drawn to -some of these facts, and that he makes use of them in a -way that is as legitimately a probable occurrence as any use<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> -that is made of them at the present day. For example, he -was struck with the existence of what in scientific parlance -are called "rudiments," a term that is employed to describe -an organ or part which appears to have no special use where -it is found in one animal, but which, in a more developed -or in a diversified condition, has an obvious use in another -animal. Thus, he tells us that the gods, with a long-sighted -providence, introduced a sketch or rudiment of -nails into the earliest organization of man, foreseeing that -the lower animals would be produced from the degeneration -of man, and that to them claws and nails would be absolutely -indispensable.<a name="FNanchor_32" id="FNanchor_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> In the same way, he seems to regard -hair as a rudiment, relatively speaking; for while its -use on different parts of the body of man, or even on the -head, is not very apparent, its use to the lower animals is -very obvious. Why, then, is it not just as rational, and -just as much in accordance with proper scientific reasoning, -to suppose those parts of animal structure which are called -"rudiments" to have been introduced as mere sketches in -the organization of a very high animal, and then to have -been developed into special uses in lower animals produced -by the degeneration of the higher, as it is to suppose that -they were developed in full activity and use in the lower -animals, but sank into the condition of useless or comparatively -useless appendages as the higher animal was evolved -out of the lower by a process of elevation? The modern -naturalist of the evolution school will doubtless say that -"rudiments" in the human structure, for which there is -no assignable use that can be observed, are not to be accounted -for as sketches from which Nature was to work, -in finding for them a use in some other animal in a developed -and practically important condition; that, to the extent -to which such things are found in man, they are proofs<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> -of his cognate relations to the lower animals, in which they -have a palpable use; and that the gradations by which they -have proceeded from practical and important uses in the -lower animals, until they have become mere useless or -comparatively useless sketches in the human structure, are -among the proofs of the descent of man from the lower animals -which had a use for such things. I shall endeavor -hereafter to examine the argument that is derived from -"rudiments" more closely. At present, the point which -I suggest to the mind of the reader arises in the parallel -between the Platonic and the Darwinian theory of the origin -of the different species of animals. I ask, why is it not -just as probably a true hypothesis to suppose that man was -first created with these rudimentary sketches in his organization, -and that they became useful appendages in the lower -animals, into which man became degenerated, as it is to -suppose that these parts existed in full development, activity, -and practical use in the lower animals, out of whom -man was generated, and that in man they lost their utility -and became relatively mere rudiments? To my mind, -neither theory has the requisite amount of probability in -its favor compared with the probability of special creations; -but I can see as much probability in the Platonic as in the -Darwinian explanation, and a strong parallelism between -them.</p> - -<p>I will pursue this parallel somewhat further by again -adverting to Plato's idea of the origin of the human soul. -He supposes it to have been an immortal being, formed out -of the eternal essence of Ideas by the Demiurgus. He -manifestly makes it an existence distinct from matter, because -he places its first abode in a heavenly mansion, where -it is in unison with the celestial harmonies and perfections -of the outer circle. This heavenly sphere is again to be its -abode, after it shall have been released from its temporary -abode on earth, which has been appointed to it for purposes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> -of discipline and trial. At a fixed time of birth it is brought -down from its celestial abode and united with a mortal body, -that it may assert and prove its power to preside over and -govern that body according to the eternal laws of reason -and rectitude. If it fulfills this high duty, when the fastenings, -which have bound it to the mortal frame, are dissolved -with the dissolution of those which hold together -the material structure, the soul flies away with delight to -its own peculiar star. If it fails in this high duty, it is on -the death of the first body transferred by a second birth -into a more degraded body, resembling that to which it has -allowed the first one to be debased. At length, somewhere -in the series of transmigrations, the lower and bestial tendencies -cease to have power over the immortal soul; the -animal with which it was last united remains an animal -bereft of reason, and the soul, released from further captivity, -escapes to its original abode in the heavens, more -or less contaminated by what it has undergone, but still -immortal, indestructible, spiritual, and capable of purification.</p> - -<p>Here, then, we have a conception of the origin and nature -of the human soul as a spiritual existence, quite as distinctly -presented as it can be by human reason. Stripped -of the machinery by which Plato supposes the soul to have -come into existence, his conception of its origin and nature -is the most remarkable contribution which philosophy, apart -from the aid of what is called inspiration, has made to our -means of speculating upon this great theme. Of course, it -affords, with all the machinery of which Plato makes use, -no explanation of the point or the time of junction between -the soul and the body. But, as a conception of what in -the poverty of language must be called the substance of the -soul, of its spiritual and immortal nature, of its distinctive -existence separate from what we know as matter, whether -Plato borrowed more or less from other philosophers who<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> -preceded him, it is a very distinct presentation of the nature -of the human mind.</p> - -<p>Turn now to what can be extracted from the Darwinian -theory of the origin and nature of the human mind, and -observe where it holds with and where it breaks from the -parallelism between it and the Platonic theory. The doctrine -of evolution, so called, presents to us no distinct suggestion -that the mind of man is a separate and special creation. -Rejecting, and very properly rejecting, the Platonic -idea of an existence of the human soul anterior to the birth -of the individual, the Darwinian theory supposes that in -the long course of time, during which natural and sexual -selection were operating to produce higher and still higher -animals, there came about, in the earlier and primitive -organizations, a habit of the animal to act in a certain way; -that this habit descended to offspring; that it became -developed into what is now called instinct; and that instinct -became developed into what we now call mind. I know -not how otherwise to interpret Mr. Darwin's repeated -affirmations that, in comparing the mental powers of man and -those of the lower animals, there can be detected no difference -in kind, but that the difference is one of degree only; -that there is no fundamental difference, or difference in -nature, between the mental powers of an ape and a man, or -between the mental power of one of the lowest fishes, as a -lamprey or lancelet, and that of one of the higher apes; -that both of these intervals, that between the ape and man, -and that between the lancelet and the ape, which are much -wider in the latter case than in the former, are filled up by -numberless gradations.<a name="FNanchor_33" id="FNanchor_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> If this be true, it must be because -the lancelet, supposing that animal to be the progenitor, -formed a habit of acting by an implanted impulse, -which became, under the operation of natural and sexual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> -selection, confirmed, developed, and increased in its descendants, -until it not only amounted to what is called instinct, -but took on more complex habits until something -akin to reason was developed. As the higher animals continued -to be evolved out of the lower, this approach to a -reasoning power became in the ape a true mental faculty; -and, at length, in the numberless gradations of structure -intermediate between the ape and the man, we reach those -intellectual faculties which distinguish the latter by an -enormous interval from all the other animals. "If," says -Mr. Darwin, "no organic being, excepting man, had possessed -any mental power, or if his powers had been of a -wholly different nature from those of the lower animals, -then we never should have been able to convince ourselves -that our high faculties had been gradually developed. But -it can be shown that there is no fundamental difference of -this kind."<a name="FNanchor_34" id="FNanchor_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a></p> - -<p>I will not here ask how far this is theoretical assumption. -I shall endeavor to examine in another place the evidence -which is supposed to show that the mental powers of -man are in no respect fundamentally different, or different -in kind, from the powers in the other animals to which the -distinguished naturalist gives the name of "mental" powers. -At present I am still concerned with the parallelism -between the Platonic and the Darwinian theory; and I -again ask whether the latter is not the former reversed, in -respect to the process by which reason in the one case becomes -lost, and that by which in the other case it becomes -developed out of something to which it bears no resemblance? -Plato supposes the creation of pure reason, or -mental power, in the shape—to use the counterpart of a -physical term—of a non-physical, spiritual intelligence, or -mind. It remains always of this nature, but the successive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> -animals which it is required to inhabit on earth undergo -such degradations that the immortal reason loses in them -the power to control their actions; nothing is left to govern -in them but mere instinct, and this at last sinks into -its lowest manifestations. Darwin, on the other hand, supposes -the first creation to have been a very low animal of a -fish-like structure, with the lowest capacity for voluntary -action of any kind, but impelled to act in a certain way by -superimposed laws of self-preservation; that in the infinitude -of successive generations these laws have operated to -produce numberless gradations of structure, in the growth -of which fixed habits have become complex instincts; that -further gradations have developed these instincts into -something of mental power, as the successive higher animals -have become evolved out of the lower ones, until at -length the intellect of man has been "gradually developed" -by a purely physical process of the action of organized -matter.</p> - -<p>This materialistic way of accounting for the origin of -the human mind necessarily excludes the idea of its separate -creation or its distinctive character. The theory is perfectly -consistent with itself, in supposing that the mind of -man does not differ in kind, or differ fundamentally, from -those exhibitions which in the lower animals lead us to attribute -to them some mental power. But whether the theory -is consistent with what we know of our own minds, as -compared with what we can observe in the other animals, -is the real question. In the first place, it is to be remembered -that we can read our own minds, by the power of consciousness -and reflection. In the next place, it is conceded -that we can know nothing of the minds of the other animals, -excepting by their outward actions. They can not -speak, to tell us of their emotions, their memories, their -fears, their hopes, their desires, what they think, or whether -they think at all. They do acts which wonderfully resem<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span>ble -the acts of man, in outward appearance, as if they were -acts which proceeded from the same power of reason but in -a less perfect degree; yet they can tell us nothing of their -mental processes, if they have such processes, and the utmost -that we can do is to argue from their acts that they -have mental faculties akin to those of men. It is in the -ordained nature of things that we know and can know, by -introspection, what our own minds are. We can know the -mind of no other animal excepting from his outward acts. -How far these will justify us in assuming that his mind is -of the same nature as ours, or that ours is an advanced development -of his, is the fundamental question.</p> - -<p>Plato was evidently led, by that study of the human -mind which is open to all cultivated intellects through the -process of consciousness and reflection, to conceive of the -soul as a created intelligence of a spiritual nature. The -fanciful materials out of which he supposes it to have been -composed were the mere machinery employed to express -his conception of its spiritual nature and its indestructible -existence. He was led to employ such machinery by his -highly speculative and constructive tendencies, and because -it was the habit of Greek philosophy to account for everything. -Some machinery he was irresistibly impelled to employ, -in order to give due consistency to his theory. But -his machinery in no way obscures his conception of the nature -of the soul, and we may disregard it altogether and -still have left the conception of a spiritual and immortal -being, formed for separate existence from matter, but united -to matter for a temporary purpose of discipline and trial.</p> - -<p>The modern naturalist, on the other hand, although assuming -the existence of the Omnipotent God, supposes the -human mind to have become what it is by the action of -organized matter beginning at the lowest point of animal -life, and going on through successive gradations of animal -structure, until habits are formed which become instincts,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> -and instincts are gradually developed into mind. Take -away the machinery that is employed, and you have left no -conception of the immortal and indestructible nature of the -human soul. The material out of which it is constructed -is all of the earth earthy, and the twofold question arises: -first, whether this was the probable method employed by the -Omnipotent Creator; and, secondly, whether it will account -for such an existence as we have reason to believe the mind -of man to be.</p> - -<p>There is another point in the parallel between the Platonic -and the Darwinian systems which is worthy of note. -We have seen that, according to Plato, when the Demiurgus -had completed the construction of the Kosmos and that of -the human soul, he retired and left to the gods the construction -of a mortal body for man and of bodies of the inferior -animals into which man would become degraded. According -to Darwin, the Omnipotent God constructs some very -low form of animal, and then, retiring from the work of -direct creation, he leaves the laws of natural and sexual -selection to operate in the production of higher animals -through the process that is called evolution. Perhaps it -may be unscientific to ask why the Omnipotent God should -cease to exercise, or refrain from exercising, his power of -special creation, after he has once exerted it. Perhaps -there is some view of the nature and purposes of that infinite -being which would render such an abstention from -his powers a probable occurrence. But it is difficult to -conceive what this view can be. If we take a comprehensive -survey of all the facts concerning the animal kingdom -that are within the reach of our observation; and if, then, -in cases where we know of no intermediate or transitional -states, we assume that they must have existed; if we array -the whole in support of a certain theory which undertakes to -account both for what we see and for what we do not see, we -very easily reach the conclusion that the Omnipotent God<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> -performed but one act of special creation, or at most performed -but a very few of such acts, and those of the rudest -and simplest types, and then left all the subsequent and -splendid exhibitions of animal structure to be worked out -by natural selection. This is the scientific method adopted -by the evolution school to account for the existence of all -the higher animals of which we have knowledge, man included. -It may be very startling, but we must acknowledge -it as the method of action of the Omnipotent God, because -it is said there is no logical impossibility in it.</p> - -<p>There is a passage in Mr. Darwin's "Origin of Species" -which I must now quote, because it shows how strongly -the supposed action and abstention of the infinite Creator, -according to the Darwinian theory, resembles the action -and abstention of Plato's Demiurgus: "Although the belief -that an organ so perfect as the eye could have been -formed by natural selection, is enough to stagger any one; -yet in the case of any organ, if we know of a long series of -gradations in complexity, each good for its possessor; then, -under changing conditions of life, there is no logical impossibility -in the acquirement of any conceivable degree of -perfection through natural selection. In the cases in which -we know of no intermediate or transitional states, we -should be extremely cautious in concluding that none can -have existed, for the metamorphoses of many organs show -what wonderful changes in function are at least possible. -For instance, a swim-bladder has apparently been converted -into an air-breathing lung. The same organ having performed -simultaneously very different functions, and then -having been in part or in whole specialized for one function; -and two distinct organs having performed at the -same time the same function, the one having been perfected -while aided by the other, must often have largely facilitated -transitions."</p> - -<p>Here, then, we have it propounded that after the creation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> -of the rudest and simplest form of a visual organ, the infinite -God abstains from direct and special creation of such -a perfect and elaborate organ as the human eye, and leaves -it to be worked out by natural selection; there being no -logical impossibility, it is said, in this hypothesis. We are -cautioned not to conclude, because we can not find the intermediate -and transitional states of the visual organs, that they -never existed; we are told that they are at least possible, -and that analogies show they must have existed; and from -the possibility of their existence and from the assumption -that they happened, we are to believe that the Omnipotent -God, refraining from the exercise of his power to create -the human eye, with its wondrously perfect structure, left -it to be evolved by natural selection out of the rudest and -simplest visual organ which he directly fashioned.</p> - -<p>All things are possible to an infinite Creator. He who -made the visual organ of the lowest aquatic creature that -ever floated could make the human eye as we know it, or -could make one that would do more than the eye of man -ever was capable of. He could by a direct exercise of his -power of creation form the eye of man, or he could leave -it to be evolved out of the only type of a visual organ on -which he saw fit to exercise his creative power. He could -create in the land-animals a true air-breathing lung as a -special production of his will, or could permit it to be -formed by transitional gradations out of the swim-bladder -of an aquatic creature. But why should he abstain from -the one method and employ the other? This question -brings us at once to the probabilities of the case; and, in -estimating those probabilities, we must take into the account -all that reason permits us to believe of the attributes -of the Almighty. We can not, it is true, penetrate into his -counsels without the aid of revelation. But if we confine -ourselves to the domain of science, or to the mere observation -of nature, we shall find reason for believing that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> -Omnipotent God had purposes in his infinite wisdom that -render the acts of special creation vastly more probable -than the theory of evolution. A study of the animal kingdom -and of all the phenomena of the universe leads us -rationally and inevitably to one of two conclusions: either -that there is no God, and that all things came by chance; -or to the belief that there is a God, and that he is a being -of infinite benevolence as well as infinite wisdom and -power. Now, why should such a being, proposing to himself -the existence on earth of such an animal as man, to be -inhabited for a time by a soul destined to be immortal, -abstain from the direct creation of both soul and body, and -leave the latter to be evolved out of the lowest form of -animal life, and the former to become a mere manifestation -or exhibition of phenomena, resulting from the improved -and more elaborate structures of successive types of animals? -Is there no conceivable reason why an infinitely -wise, benevolent, and omnipotent being should have chosen -to exercise the direct power of creation in forming the soul -of man for an immortal existence, and also to exercise his -direct power of creation in so fashioning the body as to fit -it with the utmost exactness to be serviceable and subservient -to the mind which is to inhabit it for a season? Why -depict the infinite God as a quiescent and retired spectator -of the operation of certain laws which he has imposed upon -organized matter, when there are discoverable so many -manifest reasons for the special creation of such a being as -man? It is hardly in accordance with any rational theory -of God's providence, after we have attained a conception -of such a being, to liken him intentionally or unintentionally -to the Demiurgus of the acute and ingenious -Greek philosopher. We must conclude that human society, -with all that it has done or is capable of doing for man on -earth, was in the contemplation of the Almighty; and if -we adopt this conclusion, we must account for the moral<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> -sense, for moral obligation, and for the idea of law and duty. -We can not account for these things upon any probable -theory of their origin, if we reject the idea that they were -specially implanted in the structure of the human soul, and -suppose that both the intellectual faculties and the moral -sense were evolved out of the struggle of lower animals for -their existence, resulting in the formation of higher animals -and in the development of their social instincts into more -complex, refined, and consciously calculating instincts of -the same nature.</p> - -<p>I have not drawn this parallel between the Platonic and -the Darwinian theories of the origin of different animals -for any purpose of suggesting that the one was in any sense -borrowed from the other. Plagiarism, in any form, is not, -so far as I know, to be detected in the writings of the evolution -school. But the speculations of Plato in regard to -the origin and nature of the human soul, fanciful as they -are, afford great assistance in grasping the conception of a -spiritual existence; and the parallel between his process of -degradation and Darwin's process of elevation shows to my -mind as great probability in the one theory as there is in -the other.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III.</a></h2> -</div> - -<p class="intro">The Darwinian pedigree of man—The evolution of organisms out of other -organisms, according to the theory of Darwin.</p> - - -<p>It is doubtless an interesting speculation to go back in -imagination to a period to be counted by any number of -millions of years, or covered by an immeasurable lapse of -time, and to conceive of slowly-moving causes by which the -present or the past inhabitants of this globe became developed -out of some primordial type, through successive -generations, resulting in different species, which became -final products and distinct organisms. But what the imagination -can do in the formation of a theory when acting -upon a certain range of facts is, as a matter of belief, to be -tested by the inquiry whether the weight of evidence shows -that theory to be, in a supreme degree, a probable truth, -when compared with any other hypothesis. It is in this -way that I propose to examine and test the Darwinian pedigree -of man. The whole of Mr. Darwin's theory of the -descent of man as an animal consists in assigning to him a -certain pedigree, which traces his organism through a long -series of other animals back to the lowest and crudest form -of animal life; and it must be remembered that this mode -of accounting for the origin of man of necessity supposes -an unbroken connection of lives with lives, back through -the whole series of organisms which constitute the pedigree, -and that, according to the Darwinian theory, there -was no aboriginal creation of any of these organisms, save -the very first and lowest form with which the series com<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span>mences. -Not only must this connection of lives with lives -be shown, but the theory must be able to show how it has -come about that there are now distinct species of animals -which never reproduce any type but their own.</p> - -<p>Two great agencies, according to the Darwinian theory, -have operated to develop the different species of animals -from some low primordial type, through a long series which -has culminated in man, who can not lay claim to be a special -creation, but must trace his pedigree to some ape-like creature, -and so on to the remote progenitor of all the <i lang="la">Vertebrata</i>. -It is now needful to grasp, with as much precision as such -a theory admits of, the nature and operation of these agencies, -and to note the strength or weakness of the proof -which they afford of the main hypothesis. First, we have -what is called "the struggle for existence," which may be -conceded as a fact, and to which more or less may be attributed. -The term is used by Mr. Darwin in a metaphorical -sense, to include all that any being has to encounter in -maintaining its individual existence, and in leaving progeny, -or perpetuating its kind. In the animal kingdom, -the struggle for individual existence is chiefly a struggle -for food among the different individuals which depend on -the same food, or against a dearth of one kind of food -which compels a resort to some other kind. The struggle -for a continuation of its species is dependent on the success -with which the individual animal maintains the contest for -its own existence. Now, it is argued that in this great and -complex battle for life it would occur that infinitely varied -diversities of structure would be useful to the animals in -helping them to carry on the battle under changing conditions. -These useful diversities, consisting of the development -of new organs and powers, would be preserved -and perpetuated in the offspring, through many successive -generations, while the variations that were injurious would -be rigidly destroyed. The animals in whom these favor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span>able -individual differences and variations of structure were -preserved would have the best chance of surviving and of -procreating their kind. So that, by this "survival of the -fittest," Nature is continually selecting those variations of -structure which are useful, and continually rejecting or -eliminating those which are injurious; the result being the -gradual evolution of successive higher types of animals out -of the lower ones, until we reach man, the highest animal -organism that exists on this earth. In the next place, we -have, as an auxiliary agency, in aid of natural selection, what -is called "the sexual selection," by which the best endowed -and most powerful males of a given species appropriate the -females, and thus the progeny become possessed of those -variations of structure and the superior qualities which have -given to the male parent the victory over his competitors.</p> - -<p>The proofs that are relied upon to establish the operation -and effect of these agencies in producing the results -that are claimed for them, ought to show that, in one or -more instances, an animal of a superior organization which, -when left to the natural course of its reproduction by the -union of its two sexes, always produces its own distinct -type and no other, has, in fact, been itself evolved out of -some lower and different organism by the agencies of natural -and sexual selection operating among the individuals of -that lower type. One of the proofs, on which great stress -is laid by Mr. Darwin, may be disposed of without difficulty. -It is that which is said to take place in the breeding -of domestic animals, or of animals the breeding of which -man undertakes to improve for his own practical benefit, -or to please his fancy, or to try experiments. In all that -has been done in this kind of selection, in breeding from -the best specimens of any class of animals, there is not one -instance of the production of an animal varying from its -near or its remote known progenitors in anything but adventitious -peculiarities which will not warrant us in regard<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span>ing -it as a new or different animal. No breeder of horses -has ever produced an animal that was not a horse. He -may have brought about great and important improvements -in the qualities of fleetness, or strength, or weight, or endurance, -by careful selection of the sire and the dam; but -the race-horse or the hunter, or the draught-horse or the war-horse, -is but a horse of different qualities and powers, with -the same skeleton, viscera, organs, muscles, which mark -this species of animal, and with no other variations of -structure than such as follow from the limited development -of different parts for different uses. No breeder of cows -ever produced a female animal that was not a cow, although -he may have greatly improved the quality and quantity of -the milk peculiar to this animal by careful selection of the -individuals which he permits or encourages to breed. No -breeder of sheep ever produced an animal that was not a -sheep, although the quality of the fleece or of the mutton -may have been greatly improved or varied. Among the -domestic fowls, no animal that was not a bird was ever bred -by any crossing of breeds, although great varieties of plumage, -structure of beak, formation of foot, development of -wing, habits of life, adaptation to changes of situation, and -many minor peculiarities, have been the consequences of -careful and intelligent breeding from different varieties of -the same fowl. In the case of the pigeon, of which Mr. -Darwin has given a great many curious facts from his own -experience as a breeder, the most remarkable variations are -perhaps to be observed as the results of intentional breeding -from different races of that bird; but with all these -variations nothing that was not a bird was ever produced. -In the case of the dog, whatever was his origin, or supposing -him to have been derived from the wolf, or to belong -to the same family as the wolf, it is, of course, impossible -to produce, by any crossing of different breeds of dogs, an -animal that would not belong to the class of the <i lang="la">Canidæ</i>.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> -Indeed, it is conceded by Darwin, with all the array of -facts which he adduces in regard to the domesticated animals, -that by crossing we can only get forms in some degree -intermediate between the parents; and that although -a race may be modified by occasional crosses, if aided by -careful selection of the individuals which present the desired -character, yet to obtain a race intermediate between -two distinct races would be very difficult, if not impossible. -If this is so, how much more remote must be the possibility, -by any selection, or by any crossing to which Nature -will allow the different animals to submit, to produce an -animal of so distinct a type that it would amount to a different -species from its known progenitors!</p> - -<p>From all that has been brought about in the efforts of -man to improve or to vary the breeds of domestic animals—a -kind of selection that is supposed to be analogous to what -takes place in Nature, although under different conditions—it -is apparent that there are limitations to the power of -selection in regard to the effects that are to be attributed to -it. A line must be drawn somewhere. It will not do in -scientific reasoning, or in any other reasoning, to ignore -the limitations to which all experience and observation -point with unerring certainty, so far as experience and observation -furnish us with facts. It is true that the lapse -of time during which there has been, with more or less -success, an intentional improvement in the breeds of domestic -animals carried on with recorded results has been -very short when compared with the enormous period that -has elapsed since the first creation of an animal organization, -whenever or whatever that creation was. But history -furnishes us with a pretty long stretch of time through -which civilized, half-civilized, and savage nations have had -to do with various animals in first taming them from a wild -state and then in domesticating so as to make them subservient -to human wants, and finally in improving their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> -breeds. But there is no recorded or known instance in -which there has been produced under domestication an animal -which can be said to be of a different species from its -immediate known progenitors, or one that differed from its -remote known progenitors in any but minor and adventitious -peculiarities of structure. If in passing from what -has been done by human selection in the breeding of animals -to what has taken place in Nature in a much longer -space of time and on a far greater scale, we find that in -Nature, too, there are limitations to the power of that -agency which is called natural selection—that there is an -impassable barrier which Nature never crosses, an invincible -division between the different species of animals—we -must conclude that there is a line between what selection -can and what it can not do. We must conclude, -with all the scope and power that can be given to natural -selection, that Nature has not developed a higher and -differently organized animal out of a lower and inferior -type—has not made new species by the process called -evolution, because the infinite God has not commissioned -Nature to do that thing, but has reserved it unto himself -to make special creations. Do not all that we know -of the animal kingdom—all that naturalists have accumulated -of facts and all that they concede to be the absence -of facts—show that there is a clear and well-defined -limitation to the power of natural selection, as well as to -the power of that other agency which is called sexual selection? -Grant that this agency of natural selection began to -operate at a period, the commencement of which is as remote -as figures can describe; that the struggle for life began -as soon as there was an organized being existing in -numbers sufficiently large to be out of proportion to the -supply of food; that the sexual selection began at the same -time, and that both together have been operating ever since -among the different species of animals that have success<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span>ively -arisen and successively displaced each other throughout -the earth. The longer we imagine this period to have -been, the stronger is the argument against the theory of -evolution, because the more numerous will be the absences -of the gradations and transitions necessary to prove an unbroken -descent from the remote prototype which is assumed -to have been the first progenitor of the whole animal kingdom. -Upon the hypothesis that evolution is a true account -of the origin of the different animals, we ought practically -to find no missing links in the chain. The fact is that the -missing links are both extremely numerous and important; -and the longer the period assumed—the further we get from -the probability that these two agencies of natural and sexual -selection were capable of producing the results that are -claimed for them—the stronger is the proof that a barrier -has been set to their operation, and the more necessary is -it to recognize the line which separates what they can from -what they can not do.</p> - -<p>Let us now see what is the state of the proof. It may -assist the reader to understand the Darwinian pedigree of -man if I present it in a tabulated form, such as we are accustomed -to use in exhibiting to the eye the pedigree of a single -animal. Stated in this manner, the Darwinian pedigree of -man may be traced as follows:</p> - - - -<div class="center lh"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">I. A marine animal of the maggot form.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">|</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">II. Group of lowly-organized fishes.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">|</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">III. Ganoids and other fishes.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">|</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">IV. The Amphibians.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">|</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">V. The ancient Marsupials.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">|</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">VI. The Quadrumana and all the higher mammals.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">|</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">VII. The Lemuridæ.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">|</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">VIII. The Simiadæ.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">┌──────┴───────┐</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center">│ </td><td align="center">│</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center">IX. Old World Monkeys.</td><td align="center">New World Monkeys.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">|</td></tr> -<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">X. Man.</td></tr> -</table></div> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span></p> - -<p>These ten classes or groups of animals are supposed to -be connected together by intermediate diversified forms, -which constitute the transitions from one of the classes or -groups to the other; and in reading the table downward it -must be remembered that we are reading in fact through -an ascending scale of beings, from the very lowest organized -creature to the highest. The whole, taken together, forms -a chain of evidence; and, according to the rational rules of -evidence, each distinct fact ought to be proved to have existed -at some time before our belief in the main hypothesis -can be challenged. I know of no reason why the probable -truth of a scientific hypothesis should be judged by any -other rules of determination than those which are applied -to any other subject of inquiry; and, while I am ready to -concede that in matters of physical science it is allowable -to employ analogy in constructing a theory, it nevertheless -remains, and must remain, true that where there are numerous -links in a supposed chain of proofs that are established -by nothing but an inference drawn from an analogous -fact, the collection of supposed proofs does not exclude -the probable truth of every other hypothesis but that -which is sought to be established, as it also does not establish -the theory in favor of which the supposed facts are -adduced. Upon these principles of evidence I propose now -to examine the Darwinian pedigree of man.</p> - -<p>I. The group of marine animals described as resembling -the larvæ of existing Ascidians; that is to say, an aquatic -animal in the form of a grub, caterpillar, or worm, which is -the first condition of an insect at its issuing from the egg. -These assumed progenitors of the Vertebrata are reached, -according to Mr. Darwin, by "an obscure glance into a -remote antiquity," and they are described as "apparently" -existing, and as "resembling" the larvæ of existing Ascidians. -We are told that these animals were provided with -branchiæ, or gills, for respiration in water, but with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> -most important organs of the body, such as the brain and -heart, imperfectly or not at all developed. This simple -and crude animal "we can see," it is said, "in the dim -obscurity of the past," and that it "must have been the -early progenitor of all the Vertebrata."<a name="FNanchor_35" id="FNanchor_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> It is manifest -that this creature is a mere hypothesis, constructed, no -doubt, by the aid of analogy, but existing only in the eye -of scientific imagination. Why is it placed in the water? -For no reason, apparently, but that its supposed construction -is made to resemble that of some creatures which have -been found in the water, and because it was necessary to -make it the progenitor of the next group, the lowly-organized -fishes, in order to carry out the theory of the subsequent -derivations. It might have existed on the land, unless -at the period of its assumed existence the whole globe -was covered with water. If it had existed on the land, the -four subsequent forms, up to and including the Marsupials, -might have been varied to suit the exigencies of the pedigree -without tracing the descent of the Marsupials through -fishes and the Amphibians.</p> - -<p>II. The group of lowly-organized fishes. These are -said to have been "probably" derived from the aquatic -worm (I), and they are described to have been as lowly -organized as the lancelet, which is a known fish of negative -characters, without brain, vertebral column, or heart, presenting -some affinities with the Ascidians, which are invertebrate, -hermaphrodite marine creatures, permanently -attached to a support, and consisting of a simple, tough, -leathery sack, with two small projecting orifices. The -larvæ of these creatures somewhat resemble tadpoles, and -have the power of swimming freely about. These larvæ of -the Ascidians are said to be, in their manner of development, -related to the Vertebrata in the relative position of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> -the nervous system, and in possessing a structure closely -like the <i lang="la">chorda dorsalis</i> of vertebrate animals.<a name="FNanchor_36" id="FNanchor_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> Here, -again, it is apparent that a group of lowly-organized fish-like -animals, of which there are no remains, have been constructed -by a process of scientific reasoning from a certain -class of marine creatures that are known. As a matter of -pure theory, there can be no serious objection to this kind -of construction, especially if it is supported by strong probabilities -furnished by known facts. But when a theory requires -this kind of reasoning in order to establish an important -link in a chain of proofs, it is perfectly legitimate -and necessary criticism that we are called upon to assume the -former existence of such a link; and, indeed, the theorists -themselves, with true candor and accuracy, tell us that they -are arguing upon probabilities from the known to the unknown, -or that a thing "must have existed" because analogies -warrant the assumption that it did exist. In a matter -so interesting, and in many senses important, as the evolution -theory of man's descent, it is certainly none too rigid to -insist on the application of the ordinary rules of belief.</p> - -<p>III. The Ganoids and other fishes like the Lepidosiren. -These, we are told, "must have been developed" from the -preceding (II). The Ganoids, it is said, were fishes covered -with peculiar enameled bony scales. Most of them -are said to be extinct, but enough is known about them to -lay the foundation for their "probable" development from -the first fishes that are supposed to have been derived from -the aquatic worm (I). There is a reason for arguing the -existence of these first fishes as a true fish with the power -of locomotion, because the next ascending group of animals -is to be the Amphibians. In a fish, the swim-bladder is an -important organ; and it is an organ that plays an important -part in the Darwinian theory, furnishing, it is claimed,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> -a very remarkable illustration that an organ constructed -originally for one purpose, flotation, may be converted into -one for a widely different purpose, namely, respiration. As -the Amphibians, which as a distinct group were to come -next after the fishes in the order of development, must be -furnished with a true air-breathing lung, their progenitors, -which inhabited the water only, must be provided with an -organ that would undergo, by transitional gradations, conversion -into a lung. But what is to be chiefly noted here -is that it is admitted that the prototype, which was furnished -with a swim-bladder, was "an ancient and unknown -prototype"; and it is a mere inference that the true lungs -of vertebrate animals are the swim-bladder of a fish so converted, -by ordinary generation, from the unknown prototype -because the swim-bladder is "homologous or 'ideally -similar' in position and structure with the lungs of the -higher vertebrate animals."<a name="FNanchor_37" id="FNanchor_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> One might ask here without -presumption, why the Omnipotent God should not have -created in the vertebrate animals a lung for respiration, as -well as have created or permitted the formation of a swim-bladder -in a fish; and looking to the probabilities of the -case, it is altogether too strong for the learned naturalist to -assert that "there is no reason to doubt that the swim-bladder -has actually been converted into lungs or an organ -used exclusively for respiration"; especially as we are furnished -with nothing but speculation to show the intermediate -and transitionary modifications between the swim-bladder -and the lung. While we may not assume "that -the Creator works by intellectual powers like those of man," -in all respects, it is surely not presumptuous to suppose that -an Omnipotent and All-wise Being works by powers that -are competent to produce anything that in his infinite purposes -he may see fit specially to create.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p> - -<p>IV. The Amphibians. Here we come to what is now -a very numerous group, of which it is said that the first -specimens received, among other modifications, the transformation -of the swim-bladder of their fish progenitors into -an air-breathing lung. We are told that from the fishes of -the last preceding group (III) "a very small advance would -carry us on to the Amphibians."<a name="FNanchor_38" id="FNanchor_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> But whether the advance -from an animal living in the water and incapable of -existing out of that element, to an animal capable of living -on the land as well as in the water, was small or large, we -look in vain, at present, for the facts that constitute that -advance.</p> - -<p>V. The Ancient Marsupials. These were an order of -mammals such as the existing kangaroos, opossums, etc., -of which the young, born in a very incomplete state of development, -are carried by the mother, while sucking, in a -ventral pouch. They are supposed to have been the predecessors, -at an earlier geological period, of the placental -mammals, namely, the highest class of mammals, in which -the embryo, after it has attained a certain stage, is united -to the mother by a vascular connection called the <em>placenta</em>, -which secures nourishment that enables the young to be -born in a more complete state. There is a third and still -lower division of the great mammalian series, called the -Montremata, and said to be allied to the Marsupials. But -the early progenitors of the existing Marsupials, classed as -the Ancient Marsupials, are supposed to constitute the -connection between the Amphibians and the placental -mammals; that is to say, an animal which produced its -young by bringing forth an egg, from which the young -is hatched, became converted into an animal which produced -its young from a womb and nourished it after birth -from the milk supplied by its teats, the young being born<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> -in a very incomplete state of development and carried by -the mother in a ventral pouch while it is sucking. The -steps of variation and development by which this extraordinary -change of structure, of modes of reproduction and -formation of organs, as well as habits of life, took place, -are certainly not yet discovered; and it is admitted, in respect -to forms "now so utterly unlike," that the production -of the higher forms by the process of evolution "implies the -former existence of links binding closely together all these -forms."<a name="FNanchor_39" id="FNanchor_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> In other words, we are called upon to supply by -general reasoning links of which we have as yet no proof.</p> - -<p>VI. The Quadrumana and all the higher (or Placental) -Mammals. These are supposed to stand between the implacental -mammals (V) and the Lemuridæ (VII). The -latter were a group of four-handed animals, distinct from -the monkeys, and "resembling the insectivorous quadrupeds." -But the gradations which would show the transformation -from the implacental Marsupials to the placental -Quadrumana are wanting.</p> - -<p>VII. The Lemuridæ. This branch of the placental -mammals is now actually represented by only a few varieties. -The early progenitors of those which still exist -are placed by Darwin in the series intermediate between -the Quadrumana and the Simiadæ; and according to Huxley -they were derived from the lowest, smallest, and least -intelligent of the placental mammalia.</p> - -<p>VIII. The Simiadæ. This is the general term given -by naturalists to the whole group of monkeys. From the -Lemuridæ to the Simiadæ we are told by Darwin that "the -interval is not very wide." Be it wider or narrower, it -would be satisfactory to know whether the gradations by -which the former became the latter are established by anything -more than general speculation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span></p> - -<p>IX. The Catarrhine, or Old-World Monkeys. These -are the great stem or branch of the Simiadæ which became -the progenitors of man. His immediate progenitors were -"probably" a group of monkeys called by naturalists the -Anthropomorphous Apes, being a group without tails or -callosities, and in other respects resembling man. While -this origin of man is gravely put forward and maintained -with much ingenuity, we are told that "we must not fall -into the error of supposing that the early progenitor of the -whole Simian stock, including man, was identical with, or -even closely resembled, any existing ape or monkey."<a name="FNanchor_40" id="FNanchor_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> So -that somewhere between the early progenitor of the whole -Simian stock and all that we know of the monkey tribe, -there were transitions and gradations and modifications -produced by natural and sexual selection which we must -supply as well as we can.</p> - -<p>X. Man. We have now arrived at "the wonder and -glory of the universe," and have traced his pedigree from a -low form of animal, in the shape of an aquatic worm, -through successive higher forms, each developed out of its -predecessor by the operation of fixed laws, and without the -intervention of any special act of creation anywhere in the -series, whatever may have been the power and purpose by -and for which existence was given to the first organized -and living creature, the aquatic worm. Speaking of man -as belonging, from a genealogical point of view, to the Catarrhine, -or Old-World stock of monkeys, Mr. Darwin observes -that "we must conclude, however much the conclusion -may revolt our pride, that our early progenitors -would have been properly thus designated."<a name="FNanchor_41" id="FNanchor_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a></p> - -<p>I have already said that our pride may be wholly laid -out of consideration. The question of the probable truth -of this hypothesis of man's descent should not be affected<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> -by anything but correct reasoning and the application of -proper principles of belief. Treating it with absolute indifference -in regard to the dignity of our race, I shall request -my readers to examine the argument by which it is -supported, without the smallest influence of prejudice. I -am aware that it is asking a good deal to desire the reader -to divest himself of all that nature and education and history -and poetry and religion have contributed to produce -in our feelings respecting our rank in the scale of being. -When I come to treat of that which, for want of a more -suitable term, must be called the substance of the human -mind, and to suggest how it bears upon this question of the -origin of man, I shall, as I trust, give the true, and no -more than the true, scope to those considerations which -lead to the comparative dignity of the race. But this dignity, -as I have before observed, should follow and should -not precede or accompany the discussion of the scientific -problem.</p> - -<p>What has chiefly struck me in studying the theory of -evolution as an account of the origin of man is the extent -to which the theory itself has influenced the array of proofs, -the inconsequential character of the reasoning, and the -amount of assumption which marks the whole argument. -This is not said with any purpose of giving offense. What -is meant by it will be fully explained and justified, and one -of the chief means for its justification will be found in what -I have here more than once adverted to—Mr. Darwin's -own candor and accuracy in pointing out the particulars in -which important proofs are wanting. Another thing by -which I have been much impressed has been the repetition -of what is "probable," without a sufficient weighing of the -opposite probability; and sometimes this reliance on the -"probable" has been carried to the verge, and even beyond -the verge, of all probability. Doubtless the whole question -of special creations on the one hand and of gradual evo<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span>lution -on the other is a question of probability. But I -now refer to a habit among naturalists of asserting the -probability of a fact or an occurrence, and then, without -proof, placing that fact or occurrence in a chain of evidence -from which the truth of their main hypothesis is to be inferred. -It is creditable to them as witnesses, that they tell -us that the particular fact or occurrence is only probably -true, and that we are to look for proof of it hereafter. But -the whole theory thus becomes an expectant one. We are -to give up our belief that God made man in his own image—that -he fashioned our minds and bodies after an image -which he had conceived in his infinite wisdom—because we -are to expect at some future time to discover the proof that -he did something very different; that he formed some very -lowly-organized creature, and then sat as a retired spectator -of the struggle for existence, through which another and -then another higher form of being would be evolved, until -the mind and the body of man would both have grown out -of the successive developments of organic structure. We -can not see this now; we can not prove it; but we may -expect to be able to see it and to prove it hereafter.</p> - -<p>The present state of the argument does not furnish -very strong grounds for the expectation of what the -future is to show. As far as I can discover, the main -ground on which the principle of evolution is accepted by -those who believe in it, is general reasoning. It is admitted -that there are breaks in the organic chain between -man and his nearest supposed allies which can not be bridged -over by any extinct or living species. The answer that is -made to this objection seems to me a very singular specimen -of reasoning. It is said that the objection will not -appear of much weight to those who believe in the principle -of evolution from general reasons. But how is it with -those who are inquiring, and who, failing to feel the force -of the "general reasons," seek to know what the facts are?<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> -When we are told that the breaks in the organic chain -"depend merely on the number of related forms which -have become extinct," is it asking too much to inquire how -it is known that there were such forms and that they have -become extinct? Geology, it is fully conceded on its highest -authorities, affords us very little aid in arriving at these -extinct forms which would connect man with his ape-like -progenitors; for, according to Lyell, the discovery of fossil -remains of all the vertebrate classes has been a very slow -and fortuitous process, and this process has as yet reached -no remains connecting man with some extinct ape-like -creature.<a name="FNanchor_42" id="FNanchor_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> The regions where such remains would be most -likely to be found have not yet been searched by geologists. -This shows the expectant character of the theory, -and how much remains for the future in supplying the -facts which are to take the place of "general reasons."</p> - -<p>But perhaps the most remarkable part of the argument -remains to be stated. The breaks in the organic chain of -man's supposed descent are admitted to be of frequent occurrence -in all parts of the series, "some being wide, sharp, -and defined, others less so in various degrees."<a name="FNanchor_43" id="FNanchor_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> But these -breaks depend merely, it is said, upon the number of related -forms that have become extinct, there being as yet no proof, -even by fossil remains, that they once existed. Now, the -prediction is that at some future time such breaks will be -found still more numerous and wider, by a process of extinction -that will be observed and recorded; and hence we -are not to be disturbed, in looking back into the past, by -finding breaks that can not be filled by anything but general -reasoning. The passage in which this singular kind -of reasoning is expressed by Mr. Darwin deserves to be -quoted:</p> - -<p>"At some future period, not very distant as measured<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> -by centuries, the civilized races of man will almost certainly -exterminate and replace the savage races throughout -the world. At the same time the anthropomorphous apes, -as Prof. Schaafhausen has remarked, will no doubt be -exterminated. The break between man and his nearest -allies will then be wider, for it will intervene between man -in a more civilized state, as we may hope, even than the -Caucasian, and some ape as low as the baboon, instead of -as now between the negro or Australian and the gorilla."<a name="FNanchor_44" id="FNanchor_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a></p> - -<p>I do not quite comprehend how the "more civilized -state of man" in the more or less remote future is to lead -to this wider break. One can understand how the whole of -mankind may become more civilized, and how the savage -races will disappear by extermination or otherwise. It may -be, and probably will be, that the anthropomorphous apes -will be exterminated at the same time. But the question -here is not in regard to a more perfect and widely diffused -civilization—a higher and universal elevation of the intellectual -and moral condition of mankind, a more improved -physical and moral well-being—but it is in regard to a -change in the physical and organic structure of the human -animal, so marked and pronounced as to produce a wider -break between man and his nearest supposed allies than that -which now exists between the negro or the Australian and -the gorilla. The anthropomorphous ape existing now will -have disappeared; but it will be a well-known and recorded -animal of the past. But what reason is there to expect that -natural and sexual selection, or the advance of civilization, -or the extermination of the savage races of mankind, or all -such causes combined, are going to change essentially the -structure of the human body to something superior to or -fundamentally different from the Caucasian individual? -We have had a tolerably long recorded history of the human<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> -body as it has existed in all states of civilization or barbarism. -And although in the progress from barbarism to civilization—if -utter barbarism preceded civilization—the development -of its parts has been varied, and the brain especially -has undergone a large increase in volume and in the activity -of its functions, we do not find that the plan on which the -human animal was constructed, however we may suppose -him to have originated, has undergone any material change.</p> - -<p>The most splendid specimen of the Caucasian race that -the civilized world can show to-day has no more organs, -bones, muscles, arteries, veins, or nerves than those which -are found in the lowest savage. He makes a different use -of them, and that use has changed their development, and -to some extent has modified stature, physical, intellectual, -and moral, and many other attributes; as climate and -habits of life have modified complexion, the diseases to -which the human frame is liable, and many other peculiarities. -But if we take historic man, we find that in all the -physical features of his animal construction that constitute -him a species, he has been essentially the same animal in all -states of civilization or barbarism; and unless we boldly -assume that the prehistoric man was an animal born with a -coat of hair all over his body, and that clothing was resorted -to as the hair in successive generations disappeared, -we can have no very strong reason for believing that the -human body has been at any time an essentially different -structure from what it is now. Even in regard to longevity -or power of continued life, if we set aside the exceptional -cases of what is related of the patriarchs in the biblical -records, we do not find that the average duration of human -life has been much greater or much less than the -threescore and ten or the fourscore years that are said to -have been the divinely appointed term. As to what may -have been the average duration of life among prehistoric -men, we are altogether in the dark.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span></p> - -<p>I must now revert to one of the most prominent of the -admitted breaks in the Darwinian pedigree, namely, that -which occurs at the supposed transition from the amphibians -to the mammalia. There is a term which is used in -mechanics to mark the characteristic and fundamental distinction -between one complex machine and another. We -speak of the "principle" on which a mechanical structure -operates, meaning the essential construction and mode of -operation which distinguish it from other machines of the -same general class. Although we are not to forget that -an animal organization, to which is given that mysterious -essence that is called life, may come into being by very -different processes from those which are employed by man -in dealing with dead matter and the forces which reside in -it, yet there is no danger of being misled into false analogies, -if we borrow from mechanics a convenient term, and -speak of the "principle" on which an animal is constructed -and on which its animal organization operates. We find, -then, that in the animal kingdom there is a perfectly clear -and pronounced division between the modes in which the -reproductive system is constructed and by which it operates -in the continuation of the species. The principle of -construction and operation of the reproductive system, -by which an individual animal is produced from an egg -brought forth by the female parent, and is thereafter nourished -without anything derived from the parental body, is -as widely different from that by which the young animal -is born from a womb and nourished for a time from the -milk of the mother, as any two constructions, animate or -inanimate, that can be conceived of. Whatever may be the -analogy or resemblance between the embryo that is in the -egg of one animal and the embryo that remains in the womb -of another animal, at the point at which the egg is expelled -from the parental system the analogy or resemblance ceases. -In certain animals a body that is called an egg is formed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> -in the female parent, containing an embryo, or fœtus, of -the same species, or the substance from which a like animal -is produced. This substance is inclosed in an air-tight vessel -or shell; when this has been expelled from the parent -the growth of the embryo goes on to the stage of development -at which the young animal is to emerge from the inclosure, -and, whatever may have been the process or means -of nourishment surrounding the embryo within the shell -and brought in that inclosure from the body of the parent, -the young animal never derives, at any subsequent stage of -its existence, either before or after it has left the shell, anything -more from the parental system. It may be "hatched" -by parental incubation or by heat from another source, but -for nourishment, after it leaves the shell, the young animal -is dependent on substances that are not supplied from the -parental body, although they may be gathered or put within -its reach by the parental care.</p> - -<p>The transition from this system of reproduction to that -by which the fœtus is formed into a greater or less degree -of development within the body of the parent, and then -brought forth to be nourished into further development by -the parental milk, is enormous. The principle of the organic -construction and mode of perpetuating the species, -in the two cases, is absolutely unlike after we pass the point -at which the ovule is formed by the union of the male and -the female vesicles that are supposed to constitute its substance. -When we pass from the implacental to the placental -mammals we arrive at the crowning distinction between -the two great systems of reproduction which separates -them by a line that seems to forbid the idea that the one -has grown out of the other by such causes as natural selection, -and without a special and intentional creation of a -new and different mode of operation. On the one hand, -we have a system of reproduction by which the ovule is -brought forth from the body of the parent in an inclosed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> -vessel, and thereafter derives nothing from the parental -body. In the other, we have the ovule developed into the -fœtus within the body of the parent, and the young animal -is then brought forth in a more or less complete state of -development, to be nourished by the parental secretion -called milk. The intervention of the placental connection -between the fœtus and the mother, whereby nourishment -is kept up so that the young animal may be born in a more -complete state of development, is a contrivance of marvelous -skill, which natural selection, or anything that can be -supposed to take place in the struggle for existence, or the -result of the sexual battle, seems to be entirely inadequate -to account for. If two such very diverse systems could be -supposed to have been the product of human contrivance, -we should not hesitate to say that the principle of the one -was entirely different from that of the other, and that the -change evinced the highest constructive skill and a special -design.</p> - -<p>The Darwinian hypothesis is that this great transition -from the one system of reproduction to the other took place -between the amphibians and the ancient marsupials, by -the operation of the influences of natural and sexual selection. -That is to say, the system of reproduction through -an egg, which is the characteristic of the amphibians, -became changed by gradations and modifications into the -system of the lowest mammals, the distinction between -the former and the latter being an obvious and palpable -one. Then we are to suppose a further change from -the marsupials, or the implacental mammals, to that wonderful -contrivance, the <em>placenta</em>, by which the mother -nourishes the fœtus into a more complete state of development -before the young animal is born. This enormous -change of system is supposed to have been brought about -by a struggle among the individuals of one species for food, -aided by a struggle between the males of that species for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> -the possession of the females, by the growth and development -of organs useful to the animal in the two battles, and -by the transmission of these enhanced powers and improved -weapons to offspring, and possibly by the crossing of different -varieties of the new animals thus produced. But what -potency there could be in such causes to bring about this -great change it is extremely difficult to imagine, and we -must draw largely on our imaginations to reach it. It -would seem that if there is any one part of animal economy -that is beyond the influence of such causes as the "survival -of the fittest," it is the reproductive system, by which the -great divisions of the animal kingdom continue their respective -forms. Give all the play that you can to the operation -of the successful battle for individual life, and to the -victory of the best-appointed males over their competitors -for the possession of the females, and to the transmission -of acquired peculiarities to offspring—when you come to -such a change as that between the two systems of reproduction -and perpetuation, you have to account for something -which needs far more proof of the transitional gradations -of structure and habits of life than can now be found -between the highest of the amphibians and the lowest of -the mammalia. I know not how there could be higher or -stronger evidence of design, of a specially planned and intentionally -elaborated construction, than is afforded by this -great interval between the one reproductive system and the -other. But it is time now to pass to those points of resemblance -between man and the other mammals which are -asserted as the decisive proofs of his and their descent from -some pre-existing form, their common progenitor. These -points of resemblance may be considered in the following -order:</p> - -<p>1. <em>The Bodily Structure of Man.</em>—He is notoriously -constructed on the same general type or model as other -mammals. "All the bones in his skeleton can be com<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span>pared -with corresponding bones in a monkey, bat, or seal. -So it is with his muscles, nerves, blood-vessels, and internal -viscera. The brain, the most important of all the organs, -follows the same law."<a name="FNanchor_45" id="FNanchor_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p> - -<p>2. <em>The Liability of Man to certain Diseases to which -the Lower Animals are liable.</em>—These diseases, such as hydrophobia, -variola, the glanders, syphilis, cholera, etc., man -both communicates to and receives from some of the lower -animals. "This fact proves the close similarity of their -tissues and blood, both in minute structure and composition, -far more plainly than does their comparison under -the best microscope or by the aid of the best chemical analysis." -Monkeys are liable to many of the same non-contagious -diseases as we are, such as catarrh and consumption. -They suffer from apoplexy, inflammation of the bowels, and -cataract in the eye. Their young die from fever when shedding -their milk-teeth. Medicines produce the same effect -on them as on us, and they have a strong taste for tea, coffee, -spirituous liquors, and even tobacco. Man is infested -with both internal and external parasites of the same genera -or families as those infesting other mammals; in the case of -scabies, he is infested with the same species of parasites. -He is subject to the same law of lunar periods, in the -process of gestation, and in the maturation and duration -of certain diseases. His wounds are repaired by the same -process of healing, and, after the amputation of his limbs, -the stumps occasionally possess some power of regeneration, -as in the lowest animals.<a name="FNanchor_46" id="FNanchor_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></p> - -<p>3. <em>The Reproductive Process.</em>—This is strikingly the -same, it is said, in all mammals, from the first act of courtship -by the male to the birth and nurturing of the young.<a name="FNanchor_47" id="FNanchor_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> -The closeness of the parallel here, however, is obviously -between man and the other placental mammalia, if we re<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span>gard -the whole process of reproduction of the different -species.</p> - -<p>4. <em>Embryonic Development.</em>—From the human ovule, -which is said to differ in no respect from the ovule of other -animals, into and through the early embryonic period, we -are told that the embryo of man can hardly be distinguished -from that of other members of the vertebrate kingdom. -It is not necessary to repeat the details of the resemblance, -which are undoubtedly striking, because they show -a remarkable similarity between the embryo of man and -that of the dog and the ape, in the earlier stage of the -development, and that it is not until quite in the later -stages of development that the three depart from each -other, the difference between the young human being and -the ape being not so great as that between the ape and the -dog. We may, of course, accept Prof. Huxley's testimony -that "the mode of origin [conception?] and the early -stages of the development of man are identical with those -of the animals immediately below him in the scale; without -a doubt, in these respects, he is far nearer to the apes -than the apes are to the dog."<a name="FNanchor_48" id="FNanchor_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a></p> - -<p>5. <em>Rudiments.</em>—This is a somewhat obscure branch of -the proofs, which requires a more detailed examination in -order to appreciate its bearing on the general theory of evolution. -A distinction is made between rudimentary and -nascent organs. The former are absolutely useless to their -possessor—such as the mammæ of male quadrupeds, or the -incisor teeth of ruminants, which never cut through the -gums—or else they are of such slight service to their present -possessors that they can not be supposed to have been -developed under the conditions which now exist. These -useless, or very slightly useful, organs in the human frame, -are supposed to have been organs which had an important<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> -utility in the lower animals from which man is descended, -but, by disuse at that period of life when the organ is -chiefly used, and by inheritance at a corresponding period -of life, they became of less and less utility in the successive -animals that were evolved out of the preceding forms, -until they sank into the condition of useless appendages, -although perpetuated by force of the derivation of one -species of animal from another, caused by the operation of -the laws of natural and sexual selection. Nascent organs, -on the other hand, are those which, though not fully developed -to their entire capability, are of high service to -their possessor, and may be carried to a higher degree of -utility. One of the characteristics, as it is said, of rudimentary -organs, is that they often become wholly suppressed -in individuals, and then reappear occasionally in -other individuals, through what is called reversion, or a -return to ancestral peculiarities.<a name="FNanchor_49" id="FNanchor_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> We are told that "not -one of the higher animals can be named which does not -bear some part in a rudimentary condition; and man forms -no exception to the rule."<a name="FNanchor_50" id="FNanchor_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p> - -<p>Among the rudiments that are peculiar to man, and -which are supposed to be proofs of his cognate relations to -the lower animals, we are referred to certain muscles in a -reduced condition, which in the other animals are used to -move, twitch, or contract the skin, and remnants of which, -in an efficient state, are found in various parts of our -bodies; for instance, the muscles which raise the eyebrows, -those which contract the scalp, those which, in some individuals, -move the external ear, and similar muscular powers -in different parts of the body. These are adduced as illustrations -of the persistent transmission of an absolutely useless, -or almost useless, faculty, "probably" derived from -our remote semi-human progenitors. There is also another<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> -rudiment in man, found in the covering of the eye, and -called by anatomists the "semi-lunar fold," which in birds -is of great functional importance, as it can be rapidly drawn -across the whole eyeball. In those animals in which, with its -accessory muscles and other structures, it is well developed, -as in some reptiles and amphibians, and in sharks, it is a -third eyelid. In the two lower divisions of the mammalian -series, the monotremata and the marsupials, and in some -few of the higher mammals, as in the walrus, it is said to be -fairly well developed. But in man, in the quadrumana, -and most other mammals, it has become a mere rudiment.</p> - -<p>The sense of smell in man is also classed by Darwin and -other naturalists among the rudiments. It is argued that -it was not originally acquired by man as he now exists, but -that he has inherited this power, in an enfeebled and so -far rudimentary condition, from some early progenitor, to -whom it was highly serviceable, and by whom it was continually -used.</p> - -<p>Then we have the rudiment of hair, which, so far as it -now exists on different parts of our body, is regarded as a -mere remnant of the uniform hairy coat of the lower animals. -Man, as he is now born, "differs conspicuously -from all the other primates in being almost naked." But -this nearly nude condition was not, it is said, the condition -of his progenitors, and it is not the condition of his co-descendants -from the same progenitors. At some time the -progenitors of man and his co-descendants became covered -all over with a coat of hair. What remains upon our bodies -of this peculiar growth, that is called hair, is what was left -after the agency of natural selection had worked off what -was useless to the successive animals, and sexual selection -had operated to transmit to offspring the absence of hair -that had accrued in the nearer progenitors and the immediate -parents. The illustrations which render this view -"probable" do not need to be repeated, nor is it necessary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> -to follow out the speculations concerning the mode in -which our progenitors, near or remote, became varied in -respect to the quantity, position, or direction of the hairs -on various parts of their bodies.</p> - -<p>There are several other alleged homologues or rudiments -which are supposed to connect man with the lower animals, -but which, whatever may be the resemblances, it is not -necessary to discuss in detail, because there is one consideration -at least which applies to the whole of this class of -proofs, and to that I now pass. The three great classes of -facts on which the whole argument rests, viewing man as -an animal and omitting all reference to his intellect, are -the resemblances of his bodily structure to that of the other -mammals, the similarity between his embryonic development -and theirs, and the rudiments. I reserve for separate -discussion the counter-proof which may be derived from -the nature of the human mind, and the special adaptation -of the human structure to become the temporary residence -and instrument of a spiritual and immortal being.</p> - -<p>"It is," says Mr. Darwin, "no scientific explanation to -assert that they have all [man and the other animals of the -mammalian class] been formed on the same ideal plan."<a name="FNanchor_51" id="FNanchor_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> -The similarity of pattern is pronounced "utterly inexplicable" -upon any other hypothesis than that all these animals -are descended from a common progenitor, and that they -have become what they are by subsequent adaptation to -diversified conditions. I may incur some risk in undertaking -to suggest what is a "scientific" explanation. Certainly -I do not propose to "assert" anything. But I will -endeavor to keep within the bounds of what I suppose to -be science. I take that to be a scientific explanation -which, embracing the important facts of natural history<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> -as the groundwork of the reasoning, undertakes to show -the rationality of one hypothesis that differs from another, -when the question is, Which has the greater amount of -probability in its favor?</p> - -<p>All correct reasoning on this subject of man's descent -as an animal begins, I presume, with the postulate of an -Infinite Creator, having under his power all the elements -and forms of matter, organized and unorganized, animate -and inanimate. There is no fundamental difference of -opinion on this point, as I understand, between some of -the evolutionists and their opponents.<a name="FNanchor_52" id="FNanchor_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> Omnipotence, -boundless choice of means and ends, illimitable wisdom, a -benevolence that can not fail and can not err, are the conceded -attributes of the being who is supposed to preside -over the universe; and, however difficult it may be for us -to express a conception of infinite power and infinite wisdom, -as it is to describe infinite space and duration, we -know what we mean to assume when we speak or think of -faculties that are without limit, and of moral qualities that -are subject to no imperfection. It is true that we have no -means of forming an idea of superhuman and infinite -power but by a comparison of our own limited faculties -with those which we assume to belong to an eternal and -infinite God. But the nature of our own limited powers -teaches us that there may be powers that are as far above -ours as the heavens are above the earth, as the endless -realms of space stretch beyond and forever beyond any -measurable distance, as eternity stretches beyond and forever -beyond all measurable time. At all events, the postulate -of an infinite God is the one common starting-point for -the scientists of the evolution school and those who accept -their doctrine, and for those who dissent from it. If I did -not assume this, I could not go one step further, for with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span>out -it there could not be a basis for any reasoning on the -subject that would lead anywhere but to the conclusion that -all that exists came by blind chance. This conclusion is -rejected alike by the scientists, whose views I am now examining, -and by those who differ from them.</p> - -<p>In the economy of Nature, which is but another term -for the economy of the Omnipotent Creator, there is no -waste of power, as there is no abstention from the exercise -of power, where its exertions are needed to accomplish an -end. By this I mean that when a general plan of construction -is found carried out through a variety of organizations, -the rational inference is that so much power has been exerted -as was needful to accomplish in each organization the -objects that are common to all of them, and that no more -power has been used in that direction. But where a special -adaptation in some one variety of the same class of constructions -is needful to accomplish an object peculiar to a -new variety, the necessary amount of power never fails to -be exerted. A study of the animal kingdom reveals this -great truth, as palpably as a study of the products of -human skill reveals the fact that man, from the imperfection -of his faculties, is constantly exerting more or less -power than was needful in his efforts to produce a new -variety in his mechanical constructions. Experience and -accumulated knowledge enable us to carry a general plan -of construction through a considerable group of mechanical -forms; but it is when we endeavor to vary the principle of -construction so as to produce a new and special mode of -operation, that we either waste power in repeating the -general plan or fail to exercise the amount of power necessary -to adapt the general plan to the introduction of the -special object at which we are aiming. Our success in -making such adaptations is often wonderful, but our failures -evince that our imperfect faculties do not always enable -us to accomplish the necessary adaptations of the gen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span>eral -plan of construction to the special objects which we -wish to attain. To the Infinite Creator, all such difficulties -are unknown. He neither wastes power by new plans -that are unnecessary, nor makes "vain repetitions," nor -fails to exert the requisite amount of power and wisdom in -the introduction of new and special contrivances which he -ingrafts upon or superadds to the general plan, and which -he has devised for the accomplishment of a new object. -With a boundless choice of means and ends, with a skill -that can not err, with a prescience that sees the end from -the first conception of the design, he can repeat the general -plan throughout any variety of constructions without any -waste of power, and can introduce the new adaptations or -contrivances which are to constitute a new construction, -by the exercise of all the power that is required to accomplish -a special object. Whether we are to suppose that he -does this by the establishment of certain laws which he -leaves to operate within prescribed limits, or does it by -special creations proceeding from direct and specific exertions -of his will, the question of his power to employ the -one method or the other remains always the same. The -question of which was his probable method depends upon the -force of evidence; and upon this question we must allow -great weight to the fact which all Nature discloses, namely, -that the Creator does not waste power by making new plans -of construction where an existing plan may be usefully repeated, -and that he does not fail to exercise the necessary -power when he wishes to add to the general plan of construction -a new and special organism for a particular purpose.</p> - -<p>Is there anything presumptuous in thus speaking of the -determination and purposes of the Omnipotent Creator? -We have his existence and infinite attributes conceded as -the basis of all sound reasoning on his works. Why then -should we not infer his purposes and his acts from his -works? Why should we not attribute to him a special<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> -design, when we can not examine his works without inferring -such special design, unless we conclude that the most -amazing and peculiar constructions grew up under the -operation of causes of which we have no sufficient proof, -and in the supposed result of which there are admitted -chasms that can not be bridged over?</p> - -<p>To return now to the resemblance between the bodily -structure of man and that of his supposed progenitors. -The assertion is that a repetition of the same general plan -of construction throughout a class of animals can only be -explained upon the hypothesis of their descent from a common -progenitor. They are, it is claimed, co-descendants -from some one ancient animal; and however they may -differ from each other, in all these co-descendants from -that animal we find the same general plan of construction, -the same ideal model repeated. Among the whole class of -the higher mammals, we have skeletons, muscles, nerves, -blood-vessels, internal viscera, organs, that closely correspond. -What does this prove but that there was no waste -of power, because there was no necessity in making man, -for the formation of a general plan of construction different -in these particulars from that which was employed in -making the monkey, the bat, or the seal? The similarity -of pattern between the hand of a man or a monkey, the -foot of a horse, the flipper of a seal, or the wing of a bat, -is pronounced "utterly inexplicable" upon any hypothesis -but that of descent from a common progenitor. But why -is not this sameness of ideal plan just as consistent with -the hypothesis that the same ideal plan would answer for -the human hand or the hand of an ape, the foot of the -horse, the flipper of the seal, or the wing of the bat?<a name="FNanchor_53" id="FNanchor_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> -is when you pass from such resemblances and come to the -special contrivances which separate one animal from another -by a broad line of demarkation, that you are to look -for the adaptation of special contrivances to repetitions of -the same ideal model through the varying species. Take, -for example, the introduction among the mammals of the -placental system of reproduction, parturition, and subsequent -nourishment of the young, combined with the nourishment -of the fœtus while it continues in the body of the -mother. This system would require no material variation -from the general plan of construction that is common to -the different mammals of this class in respect to the parts -where the resemblances are kept up throughout the series, -such as those of the skeleton, muscles, nerves, viscera, and -other organs that are found in all of them. But for the -introduction of this peculiar system of reproduction and -continuation of the species, there was needful a special and -most extraordinary contrivance. If such a contrivance or -anything like it had been produced by human skill, and -been introduced into a mechanical structure, we should -not hesitate to say that there had been an invention of a -most special character. When you follow this system -through the different animals in which it is found operating, -and find that the period of gestation and of suckling is -varied for each of them, that for each there is the necessary -modification of trunk, situation of the organs, assimilation -of food and formation of milk, and many other peculiarities, -what are you to conclude but that there has been an -adaptation of a new system to a general plan of construction, -and that while the latter remains substantially the same, it -has had ingrafted upon or incorporated with it a most singular -contrivance, so original, comprehensive, and flexible, -that its characteristic principle admits of the most exact<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> -working in animals that are as far asunder as man and -the horse, or as the horse and the seal, or as the seal and -the bat?</p> - -<p>The resemblances between the embryonic development -of man and the other mammals present another instance of -the constantly occurring fact that there has been no waste -of power on the one hand, and on the other no failure to -exert the amount of power requisite to produce a new -variation of the general principle. There is no more logical -force in the hypothesis of a common progenitor, in -order to account for these resemblances, than there is in -the hypothesis that the general system of embryonic development -was first devised, and that it was then varied in -each distinct animal according to the requirements of its -special construction. Upon the latter supposition, there -would be resemblances to a certain stage, and then there -would follow the departures which we have no difficulty in -tracing. Upon the former supposition we should expect -to find, what we actually do find, that it is very difficult, if -not impossible, to assign any reason for the departures, or -to suggest how it has happened that one animal is so absolutely -distinct from another. Thus, to begin with the -embryo itself, and to trace it through its stages of development, -we find that in man it can hardly be distinguished -from that of other members of the vertebrate kingdom. -This we should expect to be the case after we have learned -the great fact that Nature operates upon a uniform principle -up to the point where variations and departures are to -supervene. The system of embryonic development being -devised to operate in parallel lines through all the placental -mammals until the lines should begin to depart from each -other so as to result in animals of different species, would -necessarily show strong resemblances of structure until the -departures supervened. There would be, in other words, a -strong illustration of the truth that in the Divine economy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> -there is no waste of power. But when the stage is reached -at which the departures may be noted, and the lines diverge -into the production of organized beings differing widely -from each other, we reach an equally striking illustration -of the corresponding truth that the amount of power necessary -to produce very different results never fails to be put -forth. There is no good reason why this latter exertion of -power should not be attributed to special design just as -logically and rationally as we must attribute to intentional -purpose and infinite skill the general system of embryonic -development which has been made for the whole class of -the placental mammals. While, therefore, we may accept -as a fact Prof. Huxley's statement on this branch of comparative -anatomy, we are under no necessity to accept -his conclusion. To the question whether man originates -in a different way from a dog, bird, frog, or fish, this -anatomist answers, as already quoted: "The reply is not -doubtful for a moment; without question, the mode of -origin and the early stages of the development of man -are identical with those of the animals immediately below -him in the scale; without a doubt, in these respects he is -far nearer to apes than apes are to the dog." This refers, -of course, to the parallelism that obtains in the early stages -of the embryonic development. It necessarily implies, at -later stages, diverging lines, which depart more or less -from each other, and thus we have between the ape and -the man a nearer approach than we have between the ape -and the dog. But how does this displace, or tend to displace, -the hypothesis of a general system of embryonic development -for all animals of a certain class, and an intentional -and special variation of that system so as to produce -different species of animals? The identity between the -mode of origin and the early stages of the development of -man and those of the animals immediately below him in -the scale, is strong proof of the applicability of the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> -general principle of development throughout all the animals -of a certain class. The cessation of the parallelism at -the diverging lines is equally strong proof of a design to -create an animal differing as man does from the ape, or as -the ape does from the dog. The argument that these -three species are co-descendants from a common progenitor, -viewing man simply as an animal, is at least no stronger -than the argument which leads to the conclusion of special -creations.</p> - -<p>The same thing may be said of the liability of man to -certain contagious or non-contagious diseases in common -with some of the lower animals. That there is a similarity -in the chemical composition of the blood of an entire class -of animals, in the structure of their tissues and blood-vessels, -so that they are subject to the same causes of inflammation -or to the same parasites, is proof of a uniform -plan of the fluids and the vascular system, or, in other -words, it evinces that here, too, there has been in these -respects no waste of power in forming the different animals -of the same class. But trace back the supposed pedigree -of the animals sharing this chemical composition of the -blood, character of tissues, and vascular system, until you -have passed through the amphibians and reached their supposed -fish progenitors. Somewhere between the fishes and -the higher mammals, you have not only a great change in -the chemical composition of the blood-vessels and tissues, -but an equally great change in the apparatus by which the -blood is oxygenated.<a name="FNanchor_54" id="FNanchor_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> How can these changes have been -brought about without a new and intentional structure of -the vessels and the apparatus for supplying the oxygen demanded -for the continuation of life? How can we explain -these changes by such agencies as the natural selec<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span>tion -which is supposed to lead to the "survival of the -fittest," and the sexual selection which is supposed to give -to the best-appointed males of a given species the power to -transmit to their offspring the new peculiarities which they -have acquired through successive generations? Do not -these changes show that there is a line of division which -such agencies alone can not cross? Do they not clearly -point to the exercise of the creative power in a special -manner, and for special purposes? That power being once -exercised, the new chemical composition and mechanical -appliances being devised, the same "ideal plan" could be -carried through a new class of animals by a repetition -which is in accordance with the economy of Nature, and -which an infinite power could adapt to the formation of -animals, each of which was designed to perpetuate its own -species and no other. Hence we should expect to find in -the animals sharing in the same formation of the blood and -the vascular system a corresponding process of healing the -parts severed by a wound, and a continuous secretion from -such vessels as have not been cut away; but we should not -expect to find the stumps growing into a new and perfect -part, to take the place of what has been removed by amputation.<a name="FNanchor_55" id="FNanchor_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> -We should expect to find the same drugs affecting -different animals of the same class alike; and when -the nervous system of a class of animals is upon the same -general plan, we should expect to find them similarly affected -by stimulants. But these resemblances do not -militate very strongly against the hypothesis of special -creations, when we consider that it is according to the -universal economy of the Omnipotent Creator to employ -the necessary, and no more than the necessary, power in -originating a plan that may be applied to the formation of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> -a distinct class of beings, and that his adaptations of this -plan to further and specific constructions of beings belonging -to a general class, but differing widely from each other, -are among the strongest and plainest proofs of his infinite -power and the nature of his methods.</p> - -<p>In regard to the "rudiments" that are found in man, -the theory of Mr. Darwin can be best stated in his own -words: "In order to understand the existence of rudimentary -organs, we have only to suppose that a former -progenitor possessed the parts in question in a perfect state, -and that under changed habits of life they became greatly -reduced, either from simple disuse or through the natural -selection of those individuals which were least encumbered -with a superfluous part, aided by the other means previously -indicated."<a name="FNanchor_56" id="FNanchor_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> But, in order to do justice to this theory, -it is necessary to repeat the description and operation of -the supposed agencies of natural and sexual selection. -Natural selection is an occurrence which takes place among -the individuals of a certain species in the struggle for existence, -whereby those who are best appointed secure the -necessary supply of food, and the weaker or less active are -either directly destroyed in the contest or perish for want -of nourishment. The "fittest" having survived, they have -the best chance of procreating their kind, and are likely to -have the most progeny. To these individuals there comes -in aid the sexual selection, which means chiefly the victory -of the fittest males over their less fit competitors for the -possession of the females. Whatever peculiarities of structure -or development, or diminution of structure or development, -these fittest males possess, they would transmit to -their offspring. This tendency would be enhanced by the -varying conditions of life through which the successive -generations might have to pass; so that if the former pro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span>genitor -possessed naturally an organ in a perfect state, but -ceased to make use of it, and for thousands of generations -its use went on diminishing, it would sink into the condition -of a mere rudiment. Supposing this to be a partially -true explanation of the modes in which organs become rudimentary, -how does it militate against the idea of separate -creations? We have "only to suppose" that the first men -possessed, for example, the power of moving the skin all -over their bodies by the contraction of certain muscles, -and that their remote descendants lost it everywhere excepting -in a few parts, where it remains in an efficient -state, and that it has become varied in different individuals. -The process by which organs become rudimentary is -an hypothesis just as consistent with the separate creation -of man as it is with his being a co-descendant from some -lower animal whose descendants branched into men, apes, -horses, seals, bats, etc.; for, on the supposition of the -separate creation of all these different animals, each species -might have been originally endowed with this power of -muscular contraction of the skin, and in their descendants it -might have been retained or varied or have become more or -less rudimentary, according to its utility to the particular -species. The truth is, that our own faculties of creation or -construction, when we undertake to deal with matter and -its properties, are so imperfect, and that which constitutes -living organisms is so utterly beyond our reach, that we do -not sufficiently remember how entirely it is within the -compass of the infinite Power, which has given to matter -all the properties that it possesses and has living organisms -under its absolute control, to form a system of construction -and operation for beings of entirely distinct characters, carrying -it through each of them in parallel lines, or causing -it to diverge into varying results with an economy that -neither wastes the constructive power nor fails to exert it -where it is needed. To argue that the presence of rudi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span>ments -in different animals, in different comparative states -of development or efficiency, or in a purely useless condition, -can only be explained by a descent from some remote -common progenitor, is what the logicians call a <i lang="la">non sequitur</i>. -It overlooks the illimitable faculty of the creating -Power, and disregards the great fact that such a power acts -by an economy that is saving where uniformity will accomplish -what is intended, that is profuse where variation is -needful, and that can guide its own exertions of power, or -its abstention from such exertions, by unerring wisdom, to -the most varied and exact results.</p> - -<p>I trust that by the use of the term "economy" in speaking -of what is observable in the works of the Creator, I -shall be understood as comprehending both the avoidance -of unnecessary and the exertion of all necessary power. Of -the degree of necessity in any exercise of a power which we -suppose to be infinite, we can only judge by what we can -see. If omnipotence and omniscience are to be predicated -of the being who is supposed to preside over the universe, -it is rational to conclude, from all that we can discover, -that, in applying a uniform system of construction to different -animals of a certain general class, he acted upon a principle -that his unerring faculties enabled him to see was a -comprehensive one; and that in producing variations of -that system of construction that would result in adapting -its uniformity to the varying conditions of the different -species, he acted by the same boundless wisdom and power. -If these postulates of the Divine attributes are conceded, -rudiments do not by any means necessarily lead to the conclusion -that all the animals of a certain class are co-descendants -from some remote common progenitor, for they do not -exclude the hypothesis that each distinct animal was formed -upon a general plan of construction that could be applied -throughout the class, but that it was varied according to -the special conditions of its intended being. Organs or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> -parts may thus have become more or less rudimentary without -resorting to the supposition of a common progenitor for -the whole class. That supposition, indeed, makes it necessary -to assume that the infinite Creator fashioned some one -animal, and then, abstaining from all work of further direct -creation, left all the other animals to be evolved out of -that one by the operation of secondary causes that fail even -as a theory to account for what we see, and that can not be -traced through any results that have yet been discovered. -Wherever we pause in the ascending scale of the Darwinian -descent of man, wherever we place the first special act of -creative power, whether we put it at the fish-like animal -of the most remote antiquity, and call that creature the -original progenitor of all the vertebrata, or whether we -suppose a special creation to have occurred at the introduction -of the mammalian series, or anywhere else, we -have to account for changes of system, new constructions, -elaborately diversified forms, by the operation of agencies -that were incapable of producing the results, if we are to -judge of their capacity by anything that we have seen or -known of their effects.</p> - -<p>I will conclude this chapter by expressing as accurately -as I can what has struck me as the excessive tendency of -modern science to resolve everything into the operation of -general laws, or into what we call secondary causes. I may -be able to suggest nothing new upon this part of the subject, -but I shall at least be able, I hope, to put my own -mind in contact with that of the reader by explaining what -has impressed me in the speculations of those who lay so -much stress upon the potency of general laws to produce -the results which we see in Nature. Of course, I do not -question the great fact that the infinite Power acts by and -through the uniform methods from which we are accustomed -to infer what we call laws; which in physics is nothing -but a deduction of regularity and system from that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> -which we see to be perpetually and invariably happening. -Now, I do not enter here into the question of the tendency -of modern science to displace our religious ideas of a special -Providence, by attributing everything in Nature to the -operation of fixed laws of matter; or its tendency, in other -words, to remove the infinite Being at a greater distance -from us than that in which our religious feelings like to -contemplate him. I am perfectly sensible that in truth the -infinite God is just as near to us, when we regard him as -acting by general laws and secondary causes, as when we believe -him to be exercising a direct and special power. I am -equally sensible that it is in the very nature of infinite power, -wisdom, and benevolence to be able and willing to ordain -uniform and fixed principles of action. That Power which -gives to matter all its properties may well be supposed to -have established uniformity and regularity of movements, -forces, combinations, and qualities. How supremely consistent -this uniformity and regularity are, with what stupendous -accuracy they are kept forever in operation, we are -more or less able to discern; and that benevolence which is -believed to accompany the power may well be supposed -to have intended that its intelligent and rational creatures -should be able in some degree to discover and to avail themselves -of these unvarying laws of the physical world. But -are these laws to be supposed to be the only methods by -which the infinite Will has ever acted? Is it to be assumed -that, having settled and established these perpetual principles, -on which matter, organized or unorganized, is to act, -he leaves everything to their operation and abstains from -all further exertion of his creative power for any special -purpose? Has he given to these general laws a potency to -produce, in and of themselves, all the results? In other -words, has he affixed to their operation no limitations, or -has he set bounds to them, and reserved to himself, by direct, -specific, and occasional exercise of his will and power,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> -for new purposes, to produce results for which the general -laws were not ordained?</p> - -<p>It is not necessary here to enter into the consideration -of what are called "miracles." These, in their true meaning, -are special interpositions, which the Divine Power is -supposed to make, by a suspension or interruption of the -established laws of Nature; and, whatever may be the -grounds of our belief or our unbelief in such occurrences, -they are not exercises of power such as those which are supposed -to take place in special creations of new beings. That -the hypothesis of special creations of new beings involves -no interruption or displacement of the fixed laws of Nature, -is quite manifest.</p> - -<blockquote> -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Note A.</span></p> - - - -<p><span class="smcap">Note on Amputation, or Severance of Parts.</span>—As Mr. Darwin attached -some importance to a fact which he asserted respecting the efforts -of Nature to restore a part of an organism which has been severed by -amputation, I think it well to quote his statement, and to point out what -I believe to be an inaccuracy. His statement is this: "His [man's] -wounds are repaired by the same process of healing, and the stumps left -after the amputation of his limbs, especially during an early embryonic -period, occasionally possess some power of regeneration, as in the lowest -animals." It is not quite apparent what he means by amputation during -an early embryonic period. If he is to be understood as referring to a case -of complete severance of any part of an embryo before birth, it has not -been demonstrated that such a severance has been followed by a successful -effort of Nature to replace the severed part; and it is difficult to understand -how there could be such an amputation during embryonic life without -destroying the life of the embryo; or, if the severed part were one of the -extremities, how there could be a new extremity formed. In such a case, -if life continued and birth were to take place, the animal must be born in -an imperfect state. In regard to amputations taking place at any time -after birth, if the expression "some power of regeneration" means to imply -a new formation to take the place of the severed part, the assertion is not -correct. What occurs in such cases may be illustrated by the very common -accident of the severance of the end of a human finger at the root of the -nail. If the incision is far enough back to remove the whole of the vessels -which secrete the horny substance that forms the nail, there will be no <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span>after growth -of anything resembling a nail. If some of those vessels are left in -the stump, there will be continuous secretion and deposit of the horny substance, -which may go so far as to form a crude resemblance to a nail. But -if all the vessels which constitute the means of perpetuating a perfect nail -are not left in their normal number and action, there can be no such thing -as the formation of a new nail. Whether it is correct to speak of the imperfect -continuation of a few of the vessels to secrete the substance which -it is their normal function to secrete, as a "power of regeneration," is more -than doubtful, if by such a power is meant a power to make a new and complete -structure to take the place of the structure that has been cut away. -It is nothing more than the continued action of a few vessels, less in number -than the normal system required for the continued growth and renewal -of the part in question. The abortive product in such cases looks like an unsuccessful -effort of Nature to make a new structure in place of the old one; -but it is not in reality such an effort. The fact that the same thing occurs, -in just the same way and to a corresponding extent, in different animals, has -no tendency to prove anything excepting that these different animals share -the same general system of secreting vessels for the formation and perpetuation -of the several parts of their structures. It has no tendency to prove -that they are co-descendants from a common ancestral stock, for on the -hypothesis of their special and independent creation a common system of -secreting vessels would be entirely consistent with their peculiar and special -constructions.</p></blockquote> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV.</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="intro">The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer.</p> - - -<p>Passing from Mr. Darwin as the representative of that -class of naturalists who have undertaken to assign the pedigree -of man by tracing the stages of his development back -to the lowest and crudest form of animal life, I now come -to a philosopher whose speculations carry the doctrine of -evolution through every field of inquiry, and who, finding, -as he supposes, evidence of its operation throughout all the -other realms of the physical and the moral word, contends -that it also obtains in the animal kingdom. It were to be -wished that this writer, whose intellect is of the order of -minds to which we naturally look for a judicial treatment -of such themes, had been a little less dogmatic in his treatment -of the doctrine of special creations. Mr. Spencer has, -indeed, consistently recognized the necessity of trying the -question between the hypothesis of special creations and -the hypothesis of evolution, as one to be decided, if it is to -be decided at all, only by an examination of evidence. But -to one who approaches this question in a spirit of inquiry, -and with a desire to learn whatever can be said on both -sides, it is somewhat disappointing to find that the most -eminent writer of the evolution school is unjust in his -treatment of the belief which he opposes. There can be -no objection to advocacy, or to strong and decided advocacy, -when settled convictions are to be vindicated. But -with advocacy we may expect that kind of fairness which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> -consists in a full recognition of the opposite argument. A -great master of dialectics once laid it down as a maxim of -advocacy, "State the case of your opponent as strongly as -you know how, stronger if possible than he states it himself, -and then answer it, if you can." Some instances in -which Mr. Spencer has not followed this wise rule may -now be mentioned:</p> - -<p>1. He attacks with great vigor the hypothesis that living -beings resulted from special creations, as a primitive -hypothesis; and because it is a very ancient belief he pronounces -it to be probably untrue. He even goes so far as -to assert that its antiquity raises a presumption against it. -He classes it among a family of beliefs which began in -primitive ages, and which have one after another been destroyed -by advancing knowledge, until this one is almost -the only member of the family that survives among educated -people.<a name="FNanchor_57" id="FNanchor_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> He says that if you catechise any one who holds -this belief as to the source from which he derived it, he is -forced to confess that it was put into his mind in childhood, -as one portion of a story which, as a whole, he has -long since rejected. It will give way at last, along with all -the rest of the family of beliefs which have already been -given up. It may be that the arguments of those whose -controversial writings on this subject Mr. Spencer had before -him, relied on the antiquity of this belief as one of the -strongest proofs of its probable truth. I have not looked -to see how any writer on that side of the question has used -the antiquity of the doctrine of special creations. But it -is certainly not in accordance with the sound rule, even of -advocacy, to state the argument in support of the belief -which you oppose with less than the force that may be -given to it, whether your opponents have or have not given -to it the true force that belongs to it. The mere antiquity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> -of the belief in special creations has this force and no more: -that a belief which began in the primitive ages of mankind, -and has survived through all periods of advancing knowledge, -must have something to recommend it. It is not -one of those things that can be swept away with contempt -as a nursery-tale, originating in times of profound ignorance -and handed down from generation to generation without -inquiry. That it has survived, after the rejection of -other beliefs that originated at the same period—survived -in minds capable of dealing with the evidence in the light -of increasing knowledge—is proof that it has something -more to rest upon than the time of its origin. If some of -its defenders now assert its antiquity as the sole or the -strongest argument in its favor, its opponents should not -assume that this is the only or the best argument by which -it can be supported. Nor can it be summarily disposed of -by classifying it as one of a family of beliefs that originated -in times of ignorance, and that have mostly disappeared -from the beliefs held by educated people. Its association -with a special class of mistaken beliefs affords no intrinsic -improbability of its truth. Every belief has come to be -regarded as a mistaken or a true one, not according to its -associated relations with other beliefs that have come to be -regarded as unfounded, but according to the tests that the -knowledge of the age has been able to apply to it. Take -the whole catalogue of beliefs that began to be held in the -darkest ages, and it will be found that their association has -had no influence beyond inducing incorrect habits of reasoning -on certain subjects, or a habit of accepting the official -authority of those who claimed to be the special custodians -of truth. These intellectual habits have been temporary -in their influence, and have gradually changed. -Every one of the beliefs that have been given up by the lettered -or the unlettered part of mankind, has been given up -because better knowledge of a special character has come<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> -to show that it is unfounded, and because mere official authority -has ceased to have the power that it once had. If -a belief has survived from a remote antiquity among those -who are competent to judge of the evidence in its favor, by -comparing the phenomena that increasing knowledge has -accumulated, the force of the fact that it has so survived -is not weakened by its association for a period with other -beliefs that are now rejected.</p> - -<p>Mr. Spencer asserts that, as the supposition of special -creations is discredited by its origin in a time when men -were profoundly ignorant, so conversely the supposition -that races of organisms have been gradually evolved is credited -by its origin, because it is a belief that has come into -existence in the most instructed class, living in these better -instructed times. This is a kind of argumentation that is -often the result of a love of antithesis. The soundness of -the last branch of the proposition appears to depend upon -the soundness of the first branch. Make it to appear that -the origin of the elder hypothesis is unfavorable by reason -of the time of its origin, and it seems to follow that the -origin of the modern hypothesis is favorable by reason of -its time of origin. But this antithesis does not express the -exact truth in either branch of it. It is not because of its -antiquity, or of the character of the times in which it was -first believed, that the doctrine of special creations can be -shown to be irrational or improbable. There is no presumption -against the truth of any belief, to be derived -from the fact that it was held by persons who also held -some erroneous beliefs on other subjects. If there were, -nothing could be worthy of belief unless it could show a -recent origin, or at least until demonstration of its truth -had overcome the presumption against it. On the other -hand, there is no presumption in favor of the truth of a -new theory to be derived from the fact that it is new, or -that it originated among those who think that they do not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> -hold any erroneous beliefs, or because it originated in a -comparatively very enlightened age. Every physical and -every moral theory, unless we mean to be governed by mere -authority, whether it is ancient or recent, must be judged -by its merits, according to the evidence.</p> - -<p>2. Another of Mr. Spencer's naked assertions is that the -belief in special creations is "not countenanced by a single -fact." Not only did no man "ever see a special creation," -but "no one ever found indirect proof of any kind that a -special creation had taken place." In support of this sweeping -dogma, he adduces a habit of the naturalists who maintain -special creations to locate them in some region remote -from human observation.<a name="FNanchor_58" id="FNanchor_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> This is another instance of not -stating the case of your adversary as strongly as you might -state it, or as he states it himself. "While no naturalist and -no other person who believes in special creations ever saw -one take place, indirect and circumstantial evidence tending -to show that the earth is full of them has been accumulated -to an enormous amount." It is a monstrous extravagance -to assert that the hypothesis is "absolutely without -support of any kind." What if Mr. Spencer's opponents -were to retort that no man ever saw an instance in which -an animal of a distinct species had been evolved out of one -of an entirely different organization; that there is no external -evidence to support the hypothesis of such derivations, -and that the naturalists of the evolution school habitually -place the scene of operations in the region of scientific -imagination? The discovery of truth is not likely to -be much advanced by this mode of attacking opposite opinions, -yet it could be used with as much propriety on the -one side of this question as on the other.</p> - -<p>3. Next, and completing the misrepresentation, we have -the assertion that, "besides being absolutely without evi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span>dence -to give it external support, this hypothesis of special -creations can not support itself internally—can not be -framed into a coherent thought.... Immediately an attempt -is made to elaborate the idea into anything like definite -shape, it proves to be a pseud-idea, admitting of no -definite shape. Is it supposed that a new organism when -specially created is created out of nothing? If so, there is -a supposed creation of matter, and the creation of matter -is inconceivable, implies the establishment of a relation in -thought between nothing and something—a relation of -which one term is absent—an impossible relation.... -Those who entertain the proposition that each kind of organism -results from divine interposition do so because they -refrain from translating words into thoughts. The case is -one of those where men do not really believe, but <em>believe -they believe</em>. For belief, properly so called, implies a mental -representation of the thing believed; and no such mental -representation is here possible."<a name="FNanchor_59" id="FNanchor_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a></p> - -<p>When I first read this passage I could hardly trust -the evidence of my eye-sight. It seemed as if the types -must have in some way misrepresented the distinguished -writer; for I could scarcely conceive how a man of Mr. -Spencer's reputation as a thinker could have deliberately -penned and published such a specimen of logic run riot. -It reads like some of the propositions propounded by the -scholastics of the middle ages. But, having assured myself -that the American edition of his work is a correct reprint, -and having carefully pondered and endeavored to -ascertain his meaning, I was forced to the conclusion that -he supposes this to be a conclusive answer to the idea of -absolute creation in respect to anything whatever, because, -when put into a logical formula, one term of the relation -is nothing, and the other term is something. Logical for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span>mulas -are not always the best tests of the possibility of an -intellectual conception, or of what the mind can represent -to itself by thought, although to a certain class of readers -or hearers they often appear to be a crushing refutation of -the opposite opinion or belief against which they are employed.</p> - -<p>Is there in truth anything impossible because it is unthinkable -in the idea of absolute creation? Is the creation -of matter, for example, inconceivable? It certainly is not -if we adopt the postulate of an infinite Creator. That postulate -is just as necessary to the evolutionist who maintains -the ordination of fixed laws or systems of matter, by the -operation of which the organized forms of matter have -been evolved, as it is to those who maintain that these -forms are special creations. Who made the laws that have -been impressed upon matter? Were they made at all, or -were they without any origin, self-existing and eternal? -If they were made, they were made out of nothing, for -nothing preceded them. Then apply to them the logical -formula, and say that one term of the relation is absent—is -mere nothingness—and so there is an impossible relation, -a relation in thought between nothing and something, which -is inconceivable. This dilemma is not escaped by asserting, -as Mr. Spencer does, that "the creation of force is -just as inconceivable as the creation of matter." It is necessary -to inquire what he means by a "conceivable" idea. -If he means that we can not trace or understand the process -by which either force or matter was created, our inability -may be at once conceded. But if he means that, granting -the postulate of an infinite creating power, we can not conceive -of the possibility that matter and all the forces that -reside in it or govern it were called into being by the will of -that power, the assertion is not true. Human faculties are -entirely equal to the conception of an infinite creating power, -whatever may be the strength or the weakness of the proof<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> -by which the existence of such a power is supported; and -if there is such a power it is a contradiction in terms to -assert that absolute creation, or the formation of "something" -out of "nothing," is an impossible conception. -Such an assertion is simply a specious play upon words, or -else it involves the negation of an infinite creating power. -The term "creation," as used in all modern philosophy, -implies, <i lang="la">ex vi termini</i>, the act of causing to exist; and, -unless we assume that nothing which exists was ever caused -to exist, we must suppose that the causing power was alike -capable of giving existence to matter and to the forces that -reside in it.</p> - -<p>The reason why the Greek philosophers did not embrace -the idea of absolute creation was not because it was an -unthinkable idea, or one incapable of representation in -thought. They were, as we have seen, surrounded by a -mythology which attributed the origin of the world to -polytheistic agencies. They struggled against the cosmogony -of poetical and popular traditions in an effort to find -a cause of a different character. Monotheism, the conception -of the one only and omnipotent God, freed philosophy -from the great want which had hampered its speculations. -This want was the conception of divine power, as abstracted -from substance or the qualities of substance. When this -conception had been obtained, absolute creation was seen to -be a legitimate deduction from the illimitable scope and -nature of the power which monotheism imputed to the -Being supposed to preside over the universe, and to have -existed before all the objects which the universe contains: -and this conception of the act of creation thus became -equally capable of representation in words and in thought. -You may say that it has no evidence to support it; that it -leads to contradictory ideas of the attributes claimed for the -Creator; that upon the hypothesis of those attributes, his -works are inexplicable. Whether you can say this truly or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> -not, you can not say that absolute creation is inconceivable; -and unless you mean to claim that neither matter nor force -was ever created, that there never was a being competent to -make either the one or the other to exist, you can not deny -the probability that both were called into being by a definite -and specific exercise of power. Mr. Spencer's philosophy -manifestly leads to the conclusion that there is no God, or -no such God as the hypothesis of special creations supposes, -or such as the hypothesis of evolution necessarily calls for. -If I understand him rightly, he rejects the idea of any creation, -whether of matter, or force, or the properties of -matter, or even of law of any kind, physical or moral. -Hence it is that I admit the necessity of treating the existence -of the Omnipotent Creator as an independent question -to be judged upon moral evidence; and hence, too, in reasoning -upon the probable methods of the Almighty, I maintain -that the postulate of his existence is alike necessary to -the evolutionist and to those who believe in special creations, -and that both must adopt the same cardinal attributes -as attributes of his power and character.</p> - -<p>It is well to pursue this particular topic somewhat further, -because this special difficulty arising from the creation -of something out of nothing, triumphantly propounded by -a certain class of philosophers, is echoed by others as if it -concluded the question. The received meaning of language -is often a great help to the mind in representing to itself in -thought the idea that is expressed by the word. The word -contains and suggests the thought. Lexicographers are the -learned persons, one part of whose business it is to exhibit -the thought that is represented by a word, not according to -the popular and, perhaps, uncertain or erroneous use of the -term, or according to its secondary meanings, but according -to the exact correspondence between the word and the -idea which it conveys in its primary and philosophic usage. -The definition given to our English verb "create," in its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> -primary and philosophical sense, is: "To produce," "to -bring into being from nothing"; "to cause to exist." -"Creation," as a noun expressing the act described by the -verb, is defined as "the act of creating: the act of causing -to exist, and <em>especially</em>, the act of bringing this world into -existence." "Created," as the past participle which describes -what has been done, is defined as "formed from nothing: -caused to exist; produced; generated."<a name="FNanchor_60" id="FNanchor_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> This is the -sense in which the word is used in the English version of the -first verse of the book of Genesis: "In the beginning God -<em>created</em> the heavens and the earth"; and whatever may be -said about the source from which Moses derived his knowledge -of the fact which he relates, there can be no doubt -about the nature of the fact which he intended to assert. -Now, does the lexicographer, when he describes creation as -the act of causing something to exist, or the act of producing -something out of nothing, present an idea that is incapable -of mental representation—a relation impossible in thought? -What he means to express is clear enough. Is the idea -which he expresses impossible to be conceived by the mind?</p> - -<p>It will be a good test of this supposed insuperable difficulty -to apply the term "creation" to some human act. -When Shakespeare composed the tragedy of "Hamlet," he -created something in the sense which we are here considering.<a name="FNanchor_61" id="FNanchor_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> -He created that something out of nothing: for he -caused something to exist which did not exist before. He -did not merely inscribe certain words upon paper, by the -material process of writing, and afterward cause the same -words to be repeated by the material process of printing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> -upon another paper. He gave intellectual existence to certain -male and female persons of his imagination, carried them -through certain periods of their imaginary lives, and made -them and their history an imperishable intellectual idea. -It is entirely immaterial to the present discussion that such -a product of the imagination presents to us nothing but -intellectual ideas; that Hamlet and Ophelia, and the King -and Queen, and all the rest of the <i lang="la">dramatis personæ</i>, were -mere creatures of the poet's fancy. Although they were -nothing but intellectual conceptions, they were "creations" -in the sense of being intellectual products that never existed -in idea before the poet made them, and therefore they were -made out of nothing. Now, although we can not look into -the mind of Shakespeare and describe the process by which -he formed these creatures of his imagination, we experience -no difficulty when we contemplate these imaginary personages, -in representing in thought what we mean when we -say that he "created" them. It would be simple absurdity -to say that he did not create these ideal persons, because -the notion of creation implies the formation of something -out of nothing. That is the very meaning of creation in -its primary and philosophical sense; and, when applied to -works of the human imagination, it presents to us an idea -that is perfectly capable of representation in thought.</p> - -<p>Pass from this illustration of the idea of human creation -to the hypothesis of a supreme being, possessing infinite -power, and existing before the material universe began. -The hypothesis of his existence includes the power to call -into being things that had no previous being, whether these -things be matter and material properties or moral and intellectual -ideas. The whole realms of possible existence, -spiritual and material, the whole void which consists in -mere nothingness, are, according to the hypothesis, under -his absolute sway. He holds the power of absolute creation; -and the power this hypothesis imputes to him is no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> -more incapable of representation in thought than is the -inferior and limited power of creation, which we know to -be performed by the finite human intellect, and which we -have no difficulty in conceiving as a true creating faculty. -When Watt formed the steam-engine, he did something -more than to place certain portions of matter in certain -relations, and make them to operate in a certain manner so -as to produce a certain effect. He made the intellectual -plan of a certain arrangement of matter; and to this act of -giving being to something, both intellectual and physical, -which did not exist before, we ascribe in its true sense the -act of creation, and the idea we express by the term is perfectly -capable of mental representation.</p> - -<p>"Those," says Mr. Spencer, "who entertain the proposition -that each kind of organism results from a divine interposition, -do so because they refrain from translating -words into thoughts"; and he adds, quite truly, that there -is no assignable mode or conceivable way in which the -making of a new organism can be described. Let this be -applied to some new mechanical structure produced by the -intellect and hand of man. It is a result or product of -human interposition. When we describe this human product -as an invention, do we refrain from translating words -into thoughts because we can not describe the process of -invention? or, in other words, because we can not assign -the mode in which the mind of the inventor reached his -conception, are we to conclude that he did not attain to -the conception which is plainly embodied in the machine -that stands before our eyes? If we say that he created -something, do we make a statement that can not be consistently -imagined because we can not assign the mode in -which his mind operated when it thought out the idea and -constructed the plan? We can see how he put together -certain material substances, and how they operate; but we -can not see or describe the mental process by which he ob<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span>tained -his conception. Yet we ascribe to his act, and -rightly ascribe to it, the idea of creation; and the term -represents a thought of the mind that is as capable of being -imagined as the word is of being spoken and understood.</p> - -<p>When Raphael painted the Sistine Madonna, he formed -in his mind an image of the heaven-chosen mother of -Christ, and the marvelous skill of his artist hand transferred -that face of surpassing loveliness to the canvas. The -story that it tells may be a fiction or a fact. The image is -a reality. It was a new existence; and, if we call it a creation, -do we use a word which we can not translate into -thought because we do not know how the painter attained -to that sweet conception of the human mother's tenderness, -and the dignity of her appointed office as the handmaiden -of the Lord?</p> - -<p>There is nothing unphilosophical in thus ascribing what -is done by finite human faculties and what is done by the -infinite Creator to a power that is of the same nature, but -which in the one being is limited and imperfect, and in the -other is superhuman and boundless. If we know, as we -certainly do, that weak and finite man can perform some -acts of creation, can cause some things to exist that did not -previously exist, how much more may we safely conclude -that a being of infinite powers can call into existence, out -of the primeval nothingness, objects of the most stupendous -proportions, of the nicest adaptations, of the most palpable -uses—can cause matter and force and law to be where before -all was vacuity, where force was unknown, where law -had never operated! When the mind contemplates that -Omnipotent Power, it reaches forth to an awful presence; -but it does not contemplate something of which it can not -conceive, for its own inferior faculties teach it that creation -is a possible occurrence.</p> - -<p>We do not need to be and are not indebted to superstition, -to tradition, or to deceptive words, for the idea of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> -creation. At an immeasurable distance from the Almighty -Power, we ourselves are constantly creating; and it is when -we do so that our acts resemble his in their nature, however -below his productions may be the productions of our poor -human faculties. It is one of the proofs of our relationship -to the infinite Creator, a proof for which we are not -indebted solely to revelation, that we are endowed in this -imperfect degree with a power that resembles his. It is -also one of the chief of the characteristics that distinguish -man from the other animals: for, wonderful as are the -constructions made by some of them, they are uniformly -made under the involuntary and uncontrollable impulse of -an implanted instinct; whereas, the constructions of man -are made by the exercise of a constructive faculty that is -guided by his will, which enables him to effect variations -of structure entirely unattainable by any other being that -exists on this earth. All the other animals are confined in -the exercise of their constructive faculties to an invariable -model, appointed for each of them according to the circumstances -of its being. The range of choice is bounded by -the limitations of the instinct under which the animal is -compelled to do its work. It may appear to select a favorable -site for its habitation, to cull its materials with judgment, -to guard against disturbance from the elements or -from enemies. But we have not much reason to suppose -that any of these things are done from anything but an -irresistible impulse, and we certainly have no reason to suppose -that the animal has the moral power to do them or to -refrain from them. To man alone does there appear to -have been given the power of varying his constructions by -the exercise of an intelligent will; and that will is bounded -only by the limitations of his power over matter: so that, -in respect to material structures, the power of man to make -creations approaches nearest to the power of the Almighty -Creator, and is, within its limitations, a true creating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> -power. In the realm of intellectual or ideal creations, the -resemblance of human and divine power is the same, and -the limitations upon the former are those fixed by the finite -nature of human faculties.<a name="FNanchor_62" id="FNanchor_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a></p> - -<p>4. Mr. Spencer has a great deal to urge against "the -current theology," and he treats of some of the theological -difficulties in which those who espouse the hypothesis of -special creations entangle themselves.<a name="FNanchor_63" id="FNanchor_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> I have nothing to -do with the current theology. I do not borrow from it or -rely upon it, and do not undertake to disentangle its professors -from any of the difficulties in which they may have -involved themselves. The only question that interests me -is, whether the objections propounded by this philosopher -as an answer to the hypothesis of special creations present -insuperable difficulties to one who does not depend upon -the current theology for arguments, explanations, or means -of judgment. I shall therefore endeavor to state fairly and -fully the chief of the supposed difficulties, without considering -the answer that is made to them by those who are -taken as the representatives of the current theology.</p> - -<p>Put into a condensed form, one of Mr. Spencer's grand -objections to the belief in special creations of organized<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> -beings is that it involves a deliberate intention on the part -of the Creator to produce misery, suffering, pain, and an -incalculable amount of evil, or else that there was an inability -to prevent these results. Omitting for the present -the human race, and confining our first view to the other -animals, the earth is largely peopled by creatures which -inflict on each other and on themselves a vast amount of -suffering. The animals are endowed with countless different -pain-inflicting appliances and instincts; the earth has -been a scene of warfare among all sentient creatures; and -geology informs us that, from the earliest eras which it -records, there has been going on this universal carnage. -Throughout all past time there has been a perpetual preying -of the superior upon the inferior—a ceaseless devouring -of the weak by the strong. In almost every species, the -number of individuals annually born is such that the majority -die of starvation or by violence before arriving at -maturity. But this is not all. Not only do the superior -animals prey upon the inferior, for which there may be -suggested some compensating benefit by the sustentation -of a higher order of life through the death of the lower, or -by leaving the most perfect members of a species to continue -that species, but the inferior prey upon the superior, -and organisms that are incapable of feeling have appliances -for securing their prosperity at the expense of misery to -organisms capable of happiness. Of the animal kingdom, -as a whole, more than half, it is said, are parasites, and -almost every known animal has its peculiar species. Passing -over the evils thus inflicted on animals of inferior dignity -and coming to man, we find that he is infested by -animal and vegetable parasites of which two or three dozens -may be distinctly enumerated; which are endowed with -constitutions fitting them to live by absorbing the juices -of the human body, furnished with appliances by which -they root themselves in the human system, and made pro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span>lific -in an almost incredible degree. They produce great -suffering, sometimes cause insanity, and not infrequently -death.<a name="FNanchor_64" id="FNanchor_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a></p> - -<p>The dilemma that is supposed to be created by these -facts for those who believe in the doctrine of special creations -is this: If any animals are special creations, all are -so; and each animal must be supposed to have been created -for the special purposes that are apparent upon an examination -of its structure and mode of life. As the superior -are constantly preying upon the inferior, and as there are -numerous inferior animals that are constantly inflicting evil -upon the superior, it results that malevolence rather than -benevolence was a characteristic attribute of the creating -power, or else that the power which is supposed to have -created was unable to make the perfect creation which the -hypothesis of infinite benevolence calls for. Infinite goodness -fails to be demonstrated by a world that is full of -misery, caused by special appliances to bring it about; and -infinite power can not have existed, unless it comprehended -the power to produce perfect and universal happiness.</p> - -<p>I pass entirely aside from the argument which is drawn -from the supposed manifestations of Almighty power in the -creation of diversified forms of animal and vegetable life, -because that argument leads doubtless to the inquiry whether -the Almighty made these manifestations to demonstrate -his power to himself, or made them to demonstrate it to -his human creatures. Admitting the fact, as Mr. Spencer -puts it, that millions of these demonstrations took place on -earth when there were no intelligent beings to contemplate -them—a statement that is said to be verified by the deductions -of geology and paleontology—an inquiry into the -period or the purpose of these manifestations of divine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> -power as manifestations only, merely leads us into some of -the arguments of the current theology. There is another -realm of thought and reasoning into which it will be far -more profitable to enter. It is that realm which lies outside -of tradition and the teachings of theologians, and -which takes the hypothesis of infinite power and infinite -goodness, not as something which we have been taught to -believe, but as a postulate of philosophical reasoning; and, -applying this hypothesis to the known facts of the animal -and vegetable world, endeavors to ascertain whether these -facts necessarily create an insuperable difficulty in the hypothesis -which lies at the basis of all sound reasoning on -the subject. For I must again insist, and shall endeavor -specifically to show, that this hypothesis of infinite power -and goodness is equally necessary to the evolutionist and -to the believer in special creations, unless all speculation -on the genesis of the world is to end in blind chance, and -the negation of a personal creating power of any kind.</p> - -<p>What, then, is the true philosophical mode of dealing -with the existence in the world of physical and moral evil, -in reference to the hypothesis of infinite power and infinite -goodness? I do not ask what is a perfect demonstration -of the problem of physical and moral evil—although I -think that the natural solution is very near to demonstration; -but the inquiry which I now make is. What is the -reasonable mode of comparing the existence of suffering, -pain, misery, and their immediate agencies, with the supposition -of an all-wise, all-powerful, and perfectly beneficent -Creator?<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_65" id="FNanchor_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a></p> - -<p>What we have to do, in the first place, is to contemplate -the scope of infinite goodness; or, in other words, to consider -that infinite benevolence is, in its very nature, guided -by unerring wisdom, and consequently that its methods, -its plans, and its results are as far beyond the methods, -plans, and results which our imperfect benevolence would -adopt or achieve, as infinite power is beyond our finite and -imperfect capacity. This does not call upon us to conceive -of something that is inconceivable, or that can not be represented -in thought; for power and goodness are qualities -that we know to exist: we know that they exist in degrees; -and that what exists in a measurable and limited degree -may exist without measurable limitation, or in absolute -perfection. The philosophic mode of regarding perfect -goodness requires us to consider its methods and results -with reference to its perfect character, and not to measure -them by the inferior standards of human wisdom. Following -out this obvious truth, we have next to inquire whether -the physical and moral evil which we see ought to destroy -the very idea of an infinitely benevolent Creator, and to -compel us to regard him as a malevolent being, or else to -destroy our belief in his infinite power, because his power -has been unable to make a world of perfect happiness and -enjoyment for his creatures. If this dilemma seriously -exists, it is just as great a difficulty for the hypothesis of -evolution as it is for that of special creations, and it drives -both schools into the utter negation of any intelligent -causing power adequate to produce what we see.</p> - -<p>In the next place, let us see what is the sum total of -the physical and moral evil in the animal kingdom, which, -in reference to the sum total of happiness, is supposed to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> -create this formidable impeachment of the Almighty benevolence -on the one hand, or of the Almighty power on the -other. As to the order of things which permits the superior -animals to prey upon the inferior, there is an explanation -which lies on the surface of the facts, and which -would seem to satisfy all the requirements of philosophic -reasoning, whatever may be the mode in which this part -of the moral problem is dealt with by theologians. We -find the fact to be that, as we rise higher and higher in -the scale of organized beings, the superior are capable of -happiness in a greater degree than the inferior, in some -proportion to the superiority of their organization. The -comparative duration of life among the different animals -also enters into the estimate of the sum total of happiness. -As a general rule, the inferior organizations are individually -more short-lived than the superior. Now, it might -have pleased the Creator to cause all animals to be fed -by manna from heaven, or to find their sustenance only -in vegetable products; and he could thus have dispensed -with the carnivorous appetite, and have rendered it unnecessary -for the superior to prey upon and destroy the inferior. -But, although he could thus have made a world from -which the misery of this perpetual carnage would have -been absent, and which would have been so far a world of -perfect happiness, the fact is that this law of universal destruction -is so shaped as to follow the increasing capacity -for happiness and enjoyment which moves through the ascending -scale of the organized beings. It also follows another -obvious purpose of the carnivorous appetite and of -the permission to indulge it. A large part of the whole -animal kingdom is so constructed that sustentation requires -animal food. The blood, the tissues, the whole substance -of some animal structures require to be renewed by similar -substances; and although life may sometimes be continued -by the assimilation of vegetable substances alone, it is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> -the life for which the animal was formed, because it is not -always the life which makes the full end of its being, and -realizes its best capacity for enjoyment and for the continuation -of its species. In some cases, the carnivorous appetite -is withheld. The animal lives and thrives best upon a -vegetable diet, and so far as the flesh of these animals enters -into the wholesome and beneficial food of man, the -animal fulfills one purpose of its existence. Some animals, -before they become fit food for man, have been nourished -by the substance of still other animals. In all this variety -of modes in which animal food is prepared for man, and in -the whole of the stupendous economy by which the superior -organizations prey upon the inferior in order that each -species may continue itself and may fulfill the purposes of -its existence, we may without any difficulty trace an obvious -reason for the permission that has been given to such destruction -of individual life. When to the sum total of happiness -and benefit which this permission bestows on each of the -orders of the inferior animals according to its capacity for -enjoyment, whether it does or does not enter into the food -of man, whether it comes or never comes within the reach -of his arm, we add the sum total of happiness and benefit -which this law of universal destruction bestows on man, so -far as he avails himself of it, we shall find no reason to impeach -the Divine Goodness or to adopt a conclusion derogatory -to the Infinite Power. We may dismiss the difficulty -that is supposed to arise from the warfare of the superior -upon the inferior beings, because that warfare, when we -trace it through all its stages, involves no sort of deduction -from the perfect character of the Divine Goodness or the -Divine Power.</p> - -<p>Next, we come to the liability of animals, man included, -to be preyed upon by parasites, creatures of a very inferior -order when compared to the animals which they infest. I -have looked in vain through Mr. Spencer's speculations for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> -any explanation which makes the existence of the parasitic -animals a support to the theory of evolution without involving -the same impeachment of the Divine Power or -the Divine Goodness which is supposed to be involved in the -hypothesis of special creations. We are indeed told that -evolution brings about an increasing amount of happiness, -all evils being but incidental; that, applying alike to the -lowest and to the highest forms of organization, there is -in all cases a progressive adaptation, and a survival of the -fittest. "If," it is argued, "in the uniform working of -the process, there are evolved organisms of low types, which -prey on those of higher types, the evils inflicted form but a -deduction from the average benefits. The universal and -necessary tendency toward supremacy and multiplication of -the best, applying to the organic creation as a whole as well -as to each species, is ever diminishing the damage done, -tends ever to maintain those most superior organizations -which, in one way or another, escape the invasions of the -inferior, and so tends to produce a type less liable to the -invasions of the inferior. Thus the evils accompanying -evolution are ever being self-eliminated."<a name="FNanchor_66" id="FNanchor_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p> - -<p>Admitting, for the argument's sake, that this is true, -how does the hypothesis of evolution meet the difficulty? -The parasitic inferior organizations exist, and they have -existed, more or less, as long as we have known anything -of the superior organizations on which they prey. They -have inflicted and still inflict an incalculable amount of -evil, an untold diminution of the happiness that might -have been enjoyed if they had never existed. The mode in -which they came into existence, whether by the process of -evolution or by special creations of their respective forms, -does not affect the amount of evil which their ravages have -produced and are still producing. If they exist under an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> -order of things which has made them the products of an -evolving process that has formed them out of still lower -types, while they exist they have the same power of inflicting -evil as if they had been specially made in their respective -types without the former existence of any other type. -If they owe their existence to the process of evolution, they -exist under a system that was designed to lead to their -production by the operation of uniform laws working out -a uniform process; and under this process, so long as they -are produced by it, they imply gratuitous malevolence, just -as truly as they do if they are supposed to have been specially -created. The evils which they have inflicted and still -inflict were deliberately inflicted, unless we suppose that the -hypothetical process of evolution was not a system ordained -by any supreme and superhuman power, but was a result of -blind chance; that the system was not created, but, without -the volition of any power whatever, grew out of nothing.</p> - -<p>The compensating tendency of the evolution system to -evolve superior organisms, which in one way or other "will -escape the parasitic invasions," by becoming less liable to -them, and so to diminish the damage done, as a sum total, -finds a corresponding result in the system of special creations -by a different process and at a more rapid rate. For -the hypothesis of special creations, rightly regarded, does -not assume the special creation of each individual animal -as a miraculous or semi-miraculous interposition of divine -power; and even when we apply it to the lowest types of -animals it implies only the formation of that type with the -power in most cases of continuing its species. Assuming -the parasitic animals to be in this sense special creations, -the superior organisms on which they prey during their -existence may become less liable to their invasions by an -infinity of causes which will diminish and finally put an -end to the parasitic ravages. In the progress of medical science -man may be wholly relieved from the worst and most<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> -obscure parasites that have ever infested him, without waiting -for their evolution into some other type of animal that -does not desire or need to prey upon the human system, or -without waiting to have the human organism developed -into one that will not be exposed to such causes of suffering -or death. We know already that very simple precautions -will ward off from man some of the most subtle of these -enemies; and even in the case of animals lower than man -we know that instinct teaches them how to avoid the ravages -of some of the parasites to which they are exposed, even -if there are others which they can not now escape.</p> - -<p>So that, viewing as a whole the amount of misery inflicted -by the inferior organisms upon the superior, and looking -from the first forward to the last "syllable of recorded -time," we are able upon either of the two hypotheses respecting -the origin of animals to reach certain definite conclusions, -which may be stated as follows: This world was -not intended to be a state of unmixed and unbroken individual -happiness for any of the animal organisms. Death -for every individual in some form was necessary to the carrying -on and the carrying out of the scheme of average enjoyment -and the accomplishment of a sum total of benefit -that becomes larger and larger as time goes on; and, although -death without suffering might have been ordained, -the moral purpose for which suffering was allowed to precede -death required that it should be permitted in numberless -cases and forms, and by almost numberless agencies, -although not always made necessary. This great purpose -can be discerned without taking into view at all the idea of -a future state of existence for man or any of the other terrestrial -beings, and looking only at the moral development -of man individually and collectively as an agent in the promotion -of happiness on this earth. Man, however he originated, -stands at the head of the whole animal kingdom. -If for himself and for all the inferior animal organisms<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> -death without suffering had been ordained as the universal -rule, he would have been without the full strength of the -moral stimulus which now leads him to relieve, to palliate, -to diminish, and, as far as possible, to terminate every kind -of suffering for himself and the superior organisms that are -below him in the scale, which are the most capable of enjoyment -and happiness, next after himself, in their various -proportionate capacities. He would have had no strong -motive for exterminating the inferior and noxious organisms -excepting for his own individual and immediate benefit; -no reason for extending the protection of his scientific -acquirements to the lower animals excepting to promote his -own immediate advantage. Human society would have -been without that approach to moral perfection which is -indicated by a tenderness for life in all its forms, where its -destruction is not needed by some controlling necessity or -expediency, and by the alleviation of suffering in all its -forms for the sake of increasing the sum total of possible -happiness. Human life itself would have been less sacred -in human estimation if there had been no suffering to draw -forth our sympathies and to stimulate us to the utmost contention -against its evils. Civilization would have been destitute -of that which is now its highest and noblest attribute. -Wars would have been more frequent among the -most advanced portions of the human race; pestilence -would not have been encountered with half the vigor or the -skill which now wage battle against it; poverty would have -been left to take care of itself, or would have been alleviated -from only the lowest and most selfish motives, which would -have left half its evils to be aggravated by neglect. As the -world has been constituted, and as we have the strongest -reason to believe it will continue to the end, there is to be -added to the immeasurable sum of mere animal enjoyment -of life that other immeasurable sum of moral happiness -which man derives from doing good and from the cultiva<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span>tion -of his power to do it—an acquisition and accumulation -of benefit which would have been wanting if there had -been no physical suffering to awaken pity and to prompt -our exertions for its relief.</p> - -<p>So that the objection that the hypothesis of infinite -goodness required a world where physical pain would have -been unknown to any of its organisms, where human sorrow -would never have been felt, where human tears would -have never flowed, and where death would have been -always and only euthanasia, is by no manner of means a -necessary conclusion, as the existence of suffering is no impeachment -of the Infinite Power. If we consider man only -in the light of his rank at the head of all the terrestrial -beings, and as therefore capable of the greatest amount of -benefit, to himself and to the other creatures, and if we regard -him individually as nothing more than a being dwelling -on this earth for a short-lived existence and endowed -with the power of perpetuating his species, he would have -been morally an inferior being to what he is now capable -of becoming, and human society would have been far below -what it can be made and what we know that to a large -degree it already is, if physical suffering had been excluded -from the world. All this can be discerned without the aid -of revelation; it can be seen by the eye of philosophic reason -alone; and it is all equally true upon any hypothesis -of the physical origin of man or any other living creature -on this earth, unless we suppose that the whole animal -kingdom came into being without any intentional design, -without any plan of intentional benefit, without any purpose, -and without the conscious exertion of any power of -any kind.</p> - -<p>And, if the question is asked, What is to be the end of -this world? or if we go forward in imagination toward the -probable end of all this animal life, I can not see that the -hypothesis of evolution has more to recommend it than the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> -hypothesis of special creations in reference to the perfectibility -of the world, or to the sum of approximate perfection -that seems to be attainable. As, upon either of the -two hypotheses, a perfect world does not even now seem to -have demanded an absence of suffering, since suffering tends -obviously to produce greater benefit than could have followed -from its absence, so, in the remotest conceivable future, -a nearer and nearer approximation to a state of universal -happiness will continue to be worked out by physical -and moral causes, which will be as potent under the system -of special creations as they can be supposed to be under the -system of evolution. It is true that the moral causes will -supplement and aid the physical under either of the two systems. -But one difficulty with the evolution theory as the -sole method by which the past or present inhabitants of the -world have come into existence is that, so far as we can -judge, it has done and completed its work just as effectually -and finally as special creation appears to have terminated -in certain forms, some of which are extinct and some -of which are living. Take the Darwinian pedigree of man, -as stated in a former chapter, or any other mode of tracing -the supposed stages of animal evolution. The process has -hypothetically culminated in man. At whatever species in -the ascending scale you pause, you find that the particular -type of animal has either become extinct or that it has continued -and still continues to be produced in that same type, -with only such variations and incidental differences as have -resulted from changed conditions of life, and from the intermingling -of different breeds of the same animal. I do -not now speak of the theory, which admits, of course, of -the hypothetical development of every known animal, past -or present, out of its supposed predecessors. But I speak -of the facts as yet revealed by the researches of naturalists -among all the extinct and living forms of animal life. If -there had ever been discovered any one instance in which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> -it could be claimed by satisfactory proof that an animal of -a distinct species had been evolved out of races of animals -of a fundamentally different organization, and without the -special interposition of any creating power operating to -make a new organism, we should certainly have it cited -and relied upon as a fact of the utmost importance. I do -not say that it would be reasonable to expect direct and -ocular demonstration of such a product, any more than it -would be reasonable to expect direct and ocular demonstration -of an act of special creation. But I say that it -could be shown by proofs that ought to be satisfactory if -there were any evidence from which the inference that -such a fact ever occurred could be reasonably drawn; just -as it is possible to draw the inference of special creation by -reasonable deduction from the evidence that tends to establish -it as a safe conclusion. But if there has ever been such -an instance of the evolution of any known species of animal -out of other species shown by satisfactory proof, or if -we assume such an occurrence in the past as the theory -calls for, what reason have we to suppose that the process -of evolution is still going on, and to expect it to go on to -the end of time? We must judge of the future by the -past, for we have no other means of judging it. The past -and the present both show, so far as we can yet perceive by -the facts, that each distinct and peculiar type of animal -life remains a perfect and completed production, however -it was fashioned or grew into that type; and that, so far as -we have any means of actual knowledge, no crosses of different -races of that animal produce anything but incidental -variations of structure and mode of life. It is a mere hypothesis -that they produce distinct species.</p> - -<p>Apply this to the most important of the supposed connections -between different animals according to the theory -of evolution—that between man and the monkey. The -theory calls for the intermediate link or links. Nothing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> -can be yet found that shows the pedigree without eking it -out by general reasoning, and by assumptions that are more -or less imaginary. But suppose that the chain of proof -were complete, what would it show? It would show that -the process of evolution has culminated in man, as its -crown and summit, and has there stopped. For, whatever -may have been the length of time required for the production -of this result, we know what the product is. We have -the history of man as an animal for a period of time that has -been quite long enough to show that, after he had become -in his essential structure as an animal what we know him -to be, no subsequent intermingling of the races or families -into which the species became divided has produced any -change in his essential structure, or any new organs or any -differences but differences in the development of powers -which are to be found in him at all the stages of his known -existence as parts of his characteristic animal structure. -The period of his known existence is certainly infinitely -small when compared with the whole indefinite future. It -is long enough, however, to afford some basis of reasoning -about the future; and, short as it is, it tends very strongly -to show that the further development of man on earth is -to be chiefly a moral and intellectual development; that -in physical structure he is a completed type; and that whatever -superiorities of mere animal life he may attain to hereafter -are to be such improvements as can be worked out, -within the limits of his animal constitution, by the science -which his accumulating experience and knowledge will enable -him to apply to the physical and moral well-being of -his race.</p> - -<p>To return now to the line of thought from which these -suggestions have diverged. If, as we have every reason to -believe upon either hypothesis of man's origin, he is a completed -animal, standing by original creation or by the effect -of the evolution process at the head of the whole animal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> -kingdom in the apparent purpose of his existence, his -agency and his power in promoting the sum of happiness -on earth, for himself and all the other animals, are the -same upon either hypothesis of his origin. The hypothesis -of his origin by evolution gives him no greater power over -his own happiness or that of the other creatures than he -has if we suppose him to have been specially created; and -it is only by adopting the belief that in his own constitution -he is to be hereafter developed into a being incapable -of suffering, or one vastly less capable of suffering than the -animal called man now is, that the theory of evolution, -even in regard to the sum total of happiness on earth, has -any advantage over the theory of special creations. If we -suppose the future gradual development of a terrestrial -being standing still higher in the animal scale than man -now stands, exempt from the suffering which man now -suffers, we have a great amount of suffering hereafter -eliminated from the world by a certain process. But how -does this better satisfy the idea of infinite goodness in the -power that devised the process, than the hypothesis of -special creation which has formed man as an ultimate product -of the divine benevolence and power acting together, -endowed him with the faculty of eliminating pain and evil -from the circumstances of his existence, by his own exertions, -and furnished him with the strongest motives as well -as with almost immeasurable means for diminishing the -amount of evil for himself and all the other beings within -his reach?</p> - -<p>5. Another of the specific objections urged by Mr. Spencer -against the doctrine of special creations is so put that -it is manifestly directed against one of the positions assumed -by the representatives of the current theology. The -learned philosopher begins this part of his argument by -imputing to those who assert this doctrine as their reason -for maintaining it, that it "honors the Unknown Cause of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> -things," and that they think any other doctrine amounts -to an exclusion of divine power from the world. To encounter -this supposed reason for maintaining the doctrine -of special creations, he proceeds to ask whether the divine -power "would not have been still better demonstrated by -the separate creation of each individual than it is by the -separate creation of each species? Why should there exist -this process of natural generation? Why should not omnipotence -have been proved by the supernatural production -of plants and animals everywhere throughout the world -from hour to hour? Is it replied that the Creator was able -to make individuals arise from one another in natural selection, -but not to make species thus arise? This is to assign -a limit to power instead of magnifying it. Is it replied -that the occasional miraculous origination of a species was -practicable, but that the perpetual miraculous origination -of countless individuals was impracticable? This also is a -derogation. Either it was possible or not possible to create -species and individuals after the same general methods. -To say that it was not possible is suicidal in those who use -this argument; and, if it was possible, it is required to say -what end is served by the special creation of species that -would not be better served by the special creation of individuals?"<a name="FNanchor_67" id="FNanchor_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> -I must again disclaim any participation in the -views of those who contemplate this question with reference -to the manifestations of divine power by one method of its -supposed action or another, or who are influenced by the -idea of honoring or dishonoring the Creator. This is not -a question of the mode in which the Creator has chosen to -manifest his power for the purpose of making it more impressive -in the eyes of his intelligent human creatures -or more palpable to their perceptions. Nor is it a question, -excepting for the theologian who begins to reason<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> -upon it from a peculiar point of view, by what belief we -best honor the Creator, or the power which Mr. Spencer -describes as the "Unknown Cause." In the eye of philosophic -reason, apart from all the religious dogmas that -have been taught by human interpretations of revelation, -this is a question of the probable mode in which the assumed -omnipotent power has acted; and it is not a question of -how we can best honor or magnify that power by believing -that it has acted in one mode and not in another. We -have to take, first, the postulate of an infinitely powerful -Creator, whose existence is an independent inquiry, which -we are to make out upon evidence that satisfies the mind. -The hypothesis of his existence and attributes includes the -power to create species and to establish the process of natural -generation for the continuation of each species, or the -power to make separate creations of each individual, as Mr. -Spencer phrases it, "from hour to hour." In either mode -of action, the power was the same. It is no derogation -from it to suppose that the one or the other mode was -adopted. It is no augmentation of it to suppose that the -one was adopted instead of the other. It is simply a question -of what does the evidence show, to the reasonable satisfaction -of the human mind, to have been most probably -the method that was chosen by a power that could adopt -any method whatever. If we find that the creation of -species and the establishment of the process of natural -generation for the multiplication of individuals is upon the -whole sustained by a predominating weight of evidence, it -is safe to adopt the belief that this hypothesis of the Almighty -method is in accordance with the facts. If the evidence -fails to show that species have arisen from each other -in the same way that individuals have arisen from each -other in natural succession, we have no reason to conclude -that such has been the fact. On the other hand, if the -evidence shows, by reasonably satisfactory proofs, that a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> -process has been established for the evolution of distinct -species out of other and different species, similar to the -process by which individuals arise from each other by natural -generation, it will be safe to conclude that such has -been the fact. Upon either hypothesis, the power of the -Creator remains the same.</p> - -<p>Nor is it in any degree necessary to consider in what -sense the one method of action or the other was "miraculous," -or that the one was an occasional and the other a -perpetual exercise of power. The special creations of individuals -from hour to hour would be just as miraculous as -the special creation of species, and it would be occasional, -although the occasions would be indefinite in number. The -special creation of species would be just as miraculous as -the special creation of individuals, but the occasional exercise -of such a power would be limited by the number of -species, each of which would be a finality in itself. The -dilemma that is suggested by Mr. Spencer is a dilemma -only for those who think it necessary to mingle the idea of -honoring or dishonoring the Creator by one or another -mode of interpreting his works, with a question of his -probable method of action. His method of action is to be -judged upon the evidence which a study of his works discloses.</p> - -<p>6. Mr. Spencer, in summing up his objections to the -doctrine of special creations, has said that it not only "fails -to satisfy men's intellectual need of an interpretation," but -that it also "fails to satisfy their moral sentiment"; that -"their moral sentiment is much better satisfied by the doctrine -of evolution, since that doctrine raises no contradictory -implications respecting the Unknown Cause, such as -are raised by the antagonist doctrine."<a name="FNanchor_68" id="FNanchor_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> I have already suggested -what seems to me a sufficient answer to the supposed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> -contradictory implications respecting the goodness and -power of the Almighty Creator. But it is here worthy of -the further inquiry, What has been the influence upon the -sacredness of human life, in human estimation, of a belief -in any other theory of man's origin, or of no belief on the -subject, compared with the effect of a belief in the doctrine -that he is a creature of an Almighty Creator, formed by an -exercise of infinite power for the enjoyment of greater happiness -on earth than any other creature, and therefore having -a peculiarly sacred individual right to the life that has -been given to him? This, to be sure, does not afford a -direct test of the probable truth of the hypothesis respecting -his origin. But the answer to this inquiry will afford -some test of the claim upon our consideration that may be -put forward for any other hypothesis than the one that embraces -the full idea of man's special creation, even if we do -not look beyond this world. Compare, then, the civilization -of the Romans at the period when it was at its highest -development (the age of Julius and Augustus Cæsar), when -in many respects it was a splendid civilization. Neither -among the vulgar, nor among the most cultivated; not -among the most accomplished of the statesmen or philosophers, -was there any such belief as the simple belief in the -relation between Creator and creature, such as had been -held by a people who were regarded by the Romans as barbarians, -in respect to man and all the other animals; or -such a belief as is now held by the least educated peasant -of modern Europe. One consequence of the absence of this -belief, or of the want of a vivid perception of it, was that -the highest persons in the Roman state, men possessed of -all the culture and refinement of their age, not only furnished -for the popular amusement combats of wild beasts of -the most ferocious natures, but they provided gladiatorial -shows in which human beings, trained for the purpose, were -by each other "butchered to make a Roman holiday." The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> -statesmen who thus catered to the popular tastes, and never -thought of correcting them, subjected themselves to enormous -expenses for the purpose; and all that was noble and -dignified and cultured of both sexes, as well as the rabble, -looked on with delight at the horrid spectacle. But this -was not all. The Roman law, in many ways a code of admirable -ethics, in utter disregard of the natural rights of -men, left the life of the slave within the absolute power of -the master, without any mitigation of the existing law of -nations which made slaves of the captive in war and his -posterity. Compare all this with the civilization of any -modern country in which the life or liberty of man can be -taken away only by judicial process and public authority, -for actual crime; in which institutions exist for the relief -of human suffering and for the prevention of cruelty to the -inferior creatures; and then say whether the belief in special -creations is not a doctrine that has worked vast good -in the world, and one that should not be scouted because -it is a "primitive belief."</p> - -<p>Again, compare the ages in modern Europe when statesmen -and politicians of the highest standing with entire -impunity employed assassination for political ends, with -periods in the same countries when assassination had come -to be regarded not only with abhorrence, but as incapable -of justification for any end whatever, public or private, and -then say whether the world can lose its belief that man is -a special creation of God, without losing one of the strongest -safeguards of human life that can be derived from any -belief on the subject. All these, and a great many similar -considerations, while they do not prove the hypothesis of -special creation, show strongly that, unlike some of the -family of beliefs with which it was associated in the darkest -ages, this one has worked no mischiefs; that, on the contrary, -it has been producing moral, social, and political -benefits in all the ages in which it has been most vividly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> -present to the popular faith. The command, "Thou shalt -do no murder," from whatever source it came, whether it -was delivered to Moses on the mount of fire, or came from -the teachings of Nature and the dictates of social expediency, -whether it is a divine or a human law, or both, has -unhappily been broken in all times, in all lands, and in -all conditions of civilization. It is broken still. But it -has never yet ceased, for its moral foundation and for the -moral sanction of all the methods which have aimed to enforce -it, to rest on the belief that man is peculiarly the -child of God, whose life is sacred beyond the life of all -other creatures. Whether any other belief of man's origin -will afford an equally good foundation for that law, is a -question which modern scientific speculation may or may -not be able to answer. If its speculations conduct to the -conclusion that the "unknown cause" has not specially -caused anything, has not established any relation of Creator -and creature, that is sufficiently special to imply divine -care for the creature, we know what the answer must be. -The theologian is not the only person who has occasion to -examine the doctrine of evolution; it must be examined by -the statesman as well.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V.</a></h2> -</div> - -<p class="intro">The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further considered.</p> - - -<p>In the last preceding chapter, I have examined Mr. -Spencer's chief objection to the doctrine of special creations -when considered in its general aspects. I now advance to -the general aspects of the evolution hypothesis as applied -by this philosopher to the animal kingdom. I have already -suggested the appropriate answer to the claim that the -derivation of the evolution hypothesis is favorable because -it has originated "among the most instructed class and in -these better-instructed times," and that the derivation of -the other hypothesis is unfavorable because "it originated -in times of profound ignorance." On this point it is unnecessary -to say more. But there is a supposed "kindred -antithesis" between "the two families of beliefs" to which -these two hypotheses are said respectively to belong; one of -which families "has been dying out," while the other -family "has been multiplying." This brings into view the -peculiar philosophical system of Mr. Spencer, by which he -maintains "the unity of Nature," or the prevalence of a -universal law of evolution, as the law which is to be discerned -in remote fields of inquiry, and which "will presently be -recognized as the law of the phenomena which we are here -considering," namely, the phenomena of animal life. -"The discovery that evolution has gone on, and is going -on, in so many departments of Nature, becomes a reason<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> -for believing that there is no department of Nature in which -it does not go on."<a name="FNanchor_69" id="FNanchor_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a></p> - -<p>In considering this mode of generalization it is important -to distinguish between the phenomena that are observable -in those departments of Nature which include only -dead or inanimate matter, and the phenomena that are -peculiar to matter organized into living beings. Again: it -is important to distinguish between phenomena which have -been influenced by human agencies and those which can -not have been affected by the power of man. Another distinction -of the greatest consequence is that which divides -the phenomena in question according to their relation to a -moral purpose. In one class of phenomena, a moral purpose -may be plainly discovered as the purpose of an intelligent -causing power, which has chosen a particular means -for the accomplishment of an end. In another class of -phenomena, a moral purpose may not be discoverable as -the end for which the existing arrangement of things was -specially designed, and to which that arrangement was an -indispensable means. By classifying the departments of -Nature and observing their phenomena with these discriminations, -we shall be able to judge of the value of Mr. -Spencer's philosophical system when applied to the animal -kingdom.</p> - -<p>In grouping the departments and their respective phenomena -as departments in which the law of evolution has -obtained, and in drawing from them the sweeping deduction -that there is no department in which this law has not obtained -as the <i lang="la">causa causans</i>, Mr. Spencer does not appear -to have made these necessary discriminations. He specifies -the following remote fields of inquiry, in which he maintains -that this law of evolution is now admitted to be the -solution of the phenomena that lie in those respective fields:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> -First, the solar system, which, as he asserts, astronomers -now consider has been gradually evolved out of diffused -matter.<a name="FNanchor_70" id="FNanchor_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> Second, geological discoveries, which show that -the earth has reached its present varied structure through -a process of evolution. Third, society, which has progressed -through a corresponding process of gradual development. -"Constitutions are not made, but grow," is said to -be now a recognized truth among "philosophical politicians," -and a part of the more general truth that "societies -are not made, but grow." Fourth, languages, which, we -are told, are now believed not to have been artificially or -supernaturally formed, but to have been developed. Finally, -the histories of religions, philosophy, science, the fine -arts, and the industrial arts, show, it is said, development -"through as unobtrusive changes as those which the mind -of a child passes on its way to maturity."<a name="FNanchor_71" id="FNanchor_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a></p> - -<p>It is obvious that in some of these departments neither -human agency nor the human will and choice can have had -any influence in producing the phenomena, while in some -of them human agency, will, and choice have had a vast -influence in making the phenomena what they are. That -political constitutions or social institutions are not made, -but grow, is a dogma that is by no means universally true, -however wise it may sound, or with whatever confidence in -a paradox it may be asserted by "some political philosophers." -While past events and present exigencies may -have largely shaped some political constitutions, we know -that others have been deliberately modified by a choice that -has had more or less of a free scope, and that sometimes this -has amounted to an arbitrary decision. Languages may or -may not have been a direct and supernatural gift from Heaven, -but we know that their structure has been powerfully<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> -influenced by human agencies, when they have come to be -written expressions of thought; for they have then received -expansion by the actual coinage of new words, as well as by -new meanings of old words; and even when they were in the -first stages of a spoken tongue, inflections that were purely -arbitrary have been introduced. So it has been with systems -of religion, philosophy, the fine arts, the mechanic arts, -legislation, and jurisprudence. While in all these departments -changes have been going on, which upon a superficial -view appear to indicate a kind of spontaneous development, -when they are analyzed they are seen to have been -wholly caused, or more or less influenced, by the genius, -the thought, the discoveries, the exertions, and the acts of -particular individuals who have had the force to impress -themselves upon the age, and thus to make new systems, -new beliefs, new products, new rules of social or political -life, new tastes, and new habits of thinking and acting.</p> - -<p>Again: in some of the various orders of phenomena -which are found in these different departments, there is -discernible a distinct moral purpose in the shape which -they have been made to assume, and in others of them -there is no moral purpose discoverable, which we can say -required the employment of the particular means to effect -the end. Thus, astronomers can not assign a moral purpose -for which the distribution of the fixed stars was made -to be what it is, and which purpose could not have been -answered by some other arrangement. At the same time, -it is easy to see that the solar system was arranged with reference -to the law of universal gravitation, which made this -arrangement of the different bodies essential to the harmonious -working of a great and complex piece of mechanism. -The present formation of the earth may have resulted just -as geologists think it has, and yet they can not say that -there was no moral purpose in the division of the exterior -surface of our globe into land and water, seas, continents,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> -mountains, etc. These are departments of Nature in which -man has had no influence in producing the phenomena. -When we turn to those departments in which man is placed -as an actor, we often find an adjustment of means to an -end that is so comprehensive, as well as so plain, that we -may justly conclude it to have been chosen by the creating -power, with the express intent that human agency should -be the means by which certain effects are to be produced. -For example: man is eminently a social animal. Human -society is a result of his strong social propensities. He is -placed in it as an actor; and in this arrangement there is -discoverable a moral purpose so plain that we may rightfully -regard the social phenomena of mutual protection -and improvement as proofs that society was ordained as the -sphere of man's highest development on earth.</p> - -<p>So that, in reasoning about the phenomena of any of the -departments of Nature as affording indications of the so-called -universal law of evolution, we must not forget the -distinction between organized inanimate and organized animated -matter; or the distinction between those departments -in which human will or choice, or the human intellect, -has had no influence in shaping the phenomena, and -those in which they have had great influence; or the distinction -between phenomena in which a special moral purpose -can be and those in which it can not be discovered, as -the reason for the existing order of things. It is especially -hazardous to argue that because a spontaneous development, -or a gradual evolution, can be traced in some of the -phenomena of inanimate matter, it therefore must obtain -in the animal kingdom. It is alike hazardous to argue, -because there has been what is called evolution in some -departments of Nature over which man has had no control, -that the same law obtains in other departments over which -he has also had no control, or those in which he has had a -large control.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span></p> - -<p>The bearing of these discriminations upon the supposed -universality of the law of evolution may now be seen if we -attend to the further inquiry whether that law obtains -throughout all the phenomena of any one department of -Nature as the sole cause of the phenomena in that department. -Take again, for example, the solar system. Suppose -it to be true that the bodies which compose it, the sun -and the planetary spheres, were gradually evolved out of -diffused matter. Does it necessarily follow that their existing -arrangements and mutual relations were not specially -designed? That their orbits, their revolutions, their distances -from each other, were not specially planned? That -they were not hung in their respective positions with an -intentional adjustment to the great force of gravitation -that was prevailing throughout the universe? Must we -suppose that all this part of the whole phenomena of the -solar system resulted from the operation of an ungoverned -evolution, because the bodies themselves may have been -gradually formed out of diffused matter into their present -condition without being spoken at once into that condition -by the fiat of the Almighty? We can certainly see that -the existing arrangements must have been intentional; and, -if intentional, the intention must have taken effect in the -production of the phenomena exhibited by the arrangement, -as any design takes effect in the production of the -phenomena which are open to our observation. The moral -purpose evinced by one part of this arrangement, the alternation -of day and night upon the earth, for example, might -have been effected by some other means than the means -which now produce it. But there is the strongest evidence -that a certain means was chosen and intentionally put into -operation; and although we can not tell why that means -was preferred, the fact that it was both designed and preferred -makes it a special creation. To suppose that it was -left to be worked out by a process such as the hypothesis<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> -of evolution assumes, by the gradual, fortuitous, and ungoverned -operation of infinitely slow-moving causes, which -might have made the adjustments very different from what -they are, is to deprive it of the element of intentional -preference that is proved by its existence. The hypothesis -of evolution, when applied to all the phenomena of the -solar system, relegates one great branch of those phenomena -to a realm from which all special purposes and all direct -design are absent, and confines the explanation of the phenomena -to the operation of causes that might have brought -about very different arrangements. That this supposed -process of evolution has, in fact, been followed by the existing -arrangements of the solar system, does not prove, or -tend to prove, that the existing arrangements are solely -due to the supposed method of their production; for we -can not leave out the element of some design, and if there -was a design, the very nature of the system required that -the design should be executed by a special creation of a -plan for the mutual relations of the bodies composing it. -The bodies themselves might have been gradually formed -out of diffused matter, floating loosely in the realms of -space. The relations of the bodies to each other required -the act of an intelligent will, in the direct formation of an -intentional plan; and that act was an act of special creation -in the same sense in which the structural plan of a -species of animal was a special creation.</p> - -<p>Here, then, is one department of Nature in which it is -not necessary and not philosophical to assume that the law -of so-called evolution has been the universal law to which -all the phenomena of that department are to be attributed. -If we follow out the same inquiry in other departments of -Nature remote from the animal kingdom, we shall find -reason to adopt the same conclusion in respect to their -phenomena. Thus, let us for a moment contemplate another -of the departments in which inanimate matter is the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> -subject of observation, and in which human will or intelligence -has had no agency in producing the phenomena, -namely, the formation of the present structure of the -earth as it is described by geologists. This is a department -in which the hypothesis of evolution finds perhaps -its stronghold. Yet it is necessary even here to recognize -an intentional plan and direct design in some part of the -phenomena. Let us suppose that during the period required -by any of the speculations of geologists, however -long, a mass of matter was gathered in an unformed condition, -and gradually shaped into the present condition of -the earth by the action of its constituent elements upon -each other, influenced by the laws of mechanical forces, of -chemical combinations, of light and heat, and of whatever -physical agencies were made to operate in the process of -evolving the mass into the condition in which it has been -known to us for a certain time. Is it a rational conclusion -that the intelligent power which put these forces in operation—an -hypothesis with which we must begin to reason, -or leave the origin of both matter and forces to blind -chance—did not guide their operation at all to the intentional -production of the results which we see? The results -disclose some manifest purposes; and although these purposes, -or others equally beneficent, might have been accomplished -by different arrangements, we can see that -they have been effected by a certain arrangement of a -specific character. The results have been continents, seas, -mountains, rivers, lakes, formation and distribution of -minerals, growth of forests, and an almost innumerable, -and certainly a very varied, catalogue of phenomena, physical -formations, and adaptations. All these varied results -disclose a plan by which this earth became a marvelously -convenient abode for the living creatures that have inhabited -or still inhabit it, especially for man. The formation -of this plan was an intelligent act, if we suppose that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> -any intelligent being projected the original gathering of -the crude primordial matter and subjected it to the operation -of the forces employed to shape it into its present condition. -This plan was an act of special creation, in the -same sense in which the plan of a particular animal organism -may have been a special creation. While, therefore, a -process which may be called evolution may have operated -as the agency through which the earth has reached its -present physical condition, the plan of that condition was -certainly not formed by any such process; for it was, if it -was the product of anything, the product of an intelligent -will operating in the production of preconceived results by -the exercise of superhuman and infinite wisdom and foresight.</p> - -<p>When we turn to a department in which human influence -has largely or wholly shaped the phenomena, we find -numerous special creations that are not attributable to the -operation of any law of development or evolution such as is -supposed to have led to the production of one species of -animal out of another, or out of several previous species. -In short, a survey of all the departments of Nature leads to -the conclusion that while there may be phenomena which -are properly traceable to the operation of the forces of -Nature, or to fixed general systems of production, there is -another very large class of the phenomena which owe their -existence to special acts of an intelligent will, finite or -infinite, human or divine, according as their production -required superhuman power or admitted of the efficacy of -man's intervention.</p> - -<p>The way is now somewhat cleared for an examination -of Mr. Spencer's application of the law of evolution to the -gradual formation of different species of animals out of one -or more previous species, without any act of special creation -intervening anywhere in the series. We have seen that this -alleged law is not of universal force as the cause of all the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> -phenomena in all the departments of Nature. When we -come to apply it as the hypothesis which is to account for -the existence of different species of animals of very different -types, we must remember that we are dealing with organisms -endowed with life, and, although we can not sufficiently -explain what life is, we know that animated organisms -are brought into being by systems of production that -are widely different from the modes in which inanimate -matter may have been or has been made to assume its existing -forms. Bearing this in mind, we come to the arguments -and proofs by which Mr. Spencer maintains the immense -superiority of the evolution hypothesis over that of -special creations, in reference to the animal kingdom. It -must be remembered that this is a department in which -man can have had no agency in producing the phenomena, -for whatever may have been the slight variations produced -by human interference with the breeding of animals domesticated -from their wild condition, we must investigate the -origin of species as if there had never been any human intervention -in the crossing of breeds, because that origin is -to be looked for in a sphere entirely removed from all -human interference. Man himself is included in the investigation, -and we must make that investigation in reference -to a time when he did not exist, or when he did not -exist as we now know him.</p> - -<p>One of the favorite methods of Mr. Spencer consists in -arraying difficulties for the believers in special creations, -which, he argues, can not be encountered by their hypothesis, -and then arguing that there are no difficulties in the -way of the hypothesis of evolution. His position shall be -stated with all the strength that he gives to it, and with -all the care that I can bestow upon its treatment. He puts -the argument thus: In the animal kingdom individuals -come into being by a process of generation—that is to say, -they arise out of other individuals of the same species. If<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> -we contemplate the individuals of any species, we find an -evolution repeated in every one of them by a uniform process -of development, which, in a short space of time, produces -a series of astonishing changes. The seed becomes a -tree, and the tree differs from the seed immeasurably in -bulk, structure, color, form, specific gravity, and chemical -composition; so that no visible resemblance can be pointed -out between them. The small, semi-transparent gelatinous -spherule constituting the human ovum becomes the newly-born -child; and this human infant "is so complex in its -structure that a cyclopædia is needed to describe its constituent -parts. The germinal vesicle is so simple that it -may be defined in a line. Nevertheless, a few months suffice -to develop the one out of the other, and that, too, by -a series of modifications so small that were the embryo -examined, at successive minutes, even a microscope would -with difficulty disclose any sensible changes. Aided by -such facts, the conception of general evolution may be rendered -as definite a conception as any of our complex conceptions -can be rendered. If, instead of the successive -minutes of a child's fœtal life, we take successive generations -of creatures, if we regard the successive generations -as differing from each other no more than the fœtus did -in successive minutes, our imaginations must indeed be -feeble if we fail to realize in thought the evolution of the -most complex organism out of the simplest. If a single -cell, under appropriate conditions, becomes a man in the -space of a few years, there can surely be no difficulty in -understanding how, under appropriate conditions, a cell -may, in the course of untold millions of years, give origin -to the human race."<a name="FNanchor_72" id="FNanchor_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p> - -<p>Here, then, we have a comparison between what takes -place in the development of the individual animal in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> -space of a few years, and what may be supposed to take place -in the successive generations of different creatures through -untold millions of years. We turn then to the proof, direct -or indirect, that races of entirely distinct organisms have -resulted from antecedent races by gradual transformation. -Direct proof sufficient to establish the progressive modifications -of antecedent races into other races is not claimed to -exist; yet it is claimed that there are numerous facts of the -order required by the hypothesis which warrant our acceptance -of it. These facts are the alterations of structure -which take place in successive generations of the same -species, amounting, in the course of several generations of -the same race, to additions and suppressions of parts. These -changes among the individuals of the same race, comprehended -in what is scientifically called "heredity" and -"variation," are exhibited by the transmission of ancestral -peculiarities of structure, by their occasional suppression -in some individuals of the race and their reappearance in -others, and by a difference in the relative sizes of parts. -These variations, arising in successive short intervals of -time, are said to be quite as marked as those which arise -in a developing embryo, and, in fact, they are said to be -often much more marked. "The structural modifications -proved to have taken place since organisms have been observed -is not less than the hypothesis demands—bears as -great a ratio to this brief period as the total amount of -structural change seen in the evolution of a complex organism -out of a simple germ bears to the vast period during -which living forms have existed on earth."<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_73" id="FNanchor_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p> - -<p>The difficulty that is thus prepared for the hypothesis -of the special creation of species may now be stated. There -is a professed conception of the ultimate power which is -manifested to us through phenomena. That conception implies -omnipotence and omniscience, and it therefore implies -regularity of method, because uniformity of method is a -mark of strength, whereas irregularity of method is a mark -of weakness. "A persistent process, adapted to all contingencies, -implies greater skill in the achievement of an end -than its achievement by the process of meeting the contingencies -as they severally arise." And, therefore, those who -adopt the notion of the special creation of species do, it is -said, in truth impair the professed character of the power -to which they assume that the phenomena of the existence -of species are to be referred, whereas the hypothesis of the -evolution of species out of other species is much more consistent -with the professed conception of the ultimate power.</p> - -<p>In this claim of superiority for the evolution hypothesis, -the learned philosopher seems to have been almost oblivious -of the fact that he was dealing with animal organisms in two -aspects: first, in regard to the method by which individuals -of the same species come into existence; and, second<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span>ly, -in regard to the method by which different species have -come into existence. In the first case, regularity of method -is evinced by the establishment of a uniform process of -procreation and gestation. This process, while retaining -throughout the different classes of animals one fundamental -and characteristic method, namely, the union of -the sexes, is widely varied in respect to the time of gestation, -the fœtal development, and the nourishment of the -young before and after birth. There is no difficulty whatever -in discovering the great reason for which this system -of the reproduction of individuals was established. The -tie that it makes between parents and offspring, and more -especially the tie between the female parent and the offspring, -was obviously one grand end for which this system -of giving existence to individuals was adopted; and although -the instinct which arises out of it is in some species -feeble and almost inactive, it rises higher and higher in its -power and its manifestations in proportion as the animals -rise in the scale of being, until in man it exhibits its greatest -force and its most various effects, producing at last pride -of ancestry, and affecting in various ways the social and -even the political condition of mankind. But how can -any corresponding connection between one race of animals -and another, or between antecedent and subsequent species, -be imagined? The sexual impulse implanted in animals -leads to the production of offspring of the same race. The -desire for offspring keeps up the perpetual succession of -individuals, and love of the offspring insures the protection -of the newly born by the most powerful of impulses. But -what can be imagined as an analogous impulse, appetite, or -propensity which should lead one species to strive after the -production of another species? Is it said that the different -species are evolved out of one another by a process in which -the conscious desires, the efforts, the aspirations of the preceding -races play no part? This is certainly true, if there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> -was ever any such process as the evolution of species out of -species; and it follows that, in respect to one great moral -purpose of a process, there is no analogy to be derived from -the regularity and uniformity of the process by which individuals -of the same species are multiplied. Moreover, in -regard to the latter process, we know that a barrier has -been set to its operation; for Nature does not now admit -of the sexual union between animals of entirely distinct -species, and we have no reason to believe that it ever did -admit of it at any period in the geological history of the -earth.</p> - -<p>Still further: In what sense are special creations "irregularities -of method"? In what sense are they "contingencies"? -And if they are "contingencies," how does -it imply less skill to suppose that they have been met as -they have severally arisen, than would be implied by supposing -that they have been achieved by a uniform process -adapted to all contingencies? This notion that something -is derogated from the idea of omnipotence and omniscience -by the hypothesis that such a power has acted by special -exercises of its creating faculty in the production of different -orders of beings as completed and final types, instead -of allowing or causing them to be successively evolved out -of each other by gradual derivations, is neither logical nor -philosophical. In no proper sense is a method of action an -irregular method unless it was imposed upon the actor by -some antecedent necessity, which compelled him to apply -a method which was made uniform in one case to another -case in which the same kind of uniformity would not be -indispensable. The uniformity of the process by which individuals -of the same species are multiplied is a uniformity -for that particular end. The regularity in that case is a -regularity that has its special objects to accomplish. The -uniformity and regularity of a different method of causing -different types of organisms to exist, so long as the object<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> -is always effected in the same way, is just as truly a regularity -and uniformity for that case, and just as completely -fulfills the idea of infinite skill. That such creations are -specially made, that they are independently made, and that -each is made for a distinct purpose and also for the complex -purposes of a varied class of organisms, does not render -them contingencies arising at random, or make the -method of meeting them an occasional, irregular, spasmodic -device for encountering something unforeseen and -unexpected. The very purposes for which the distinct organisms -exist—purposes that are apparent on a comprehensive -survey of their various structures and modes of life—and -the fact that they have come into existence by some -process that was for the production of the ends a uniform -and regular one, whether that process was special creation -or evolution, render the two methods of action equally consistent -with the professed conception of the ultimate power. -On the hypothesis of special creations so many different -types of organism as the Creator has seen fit to create have -been made by the exercise of a power remaining uniformly -of the same infinite nature, but varying the products at -will for the purposes of infinite wisdom.</p> - -<p>What, again, does the learned author mean by meeting -"contingencies" "as they have severally arisen"? This -suggestion of a difficulty for the believers in special creations -seems to imply that the distinct types of animal organisms -arose somehow as necessities outside of the divine -will, and that the Almighty artificer had to devise occasional -methods of meeting successive demands which he -did not create. The hypothesis of special creations does -not drive its believers into any such implications. The -several distinct types of animal organisms are supposed to -have arisen in the divine mind as types which the Almighty -saw fit to create for certain purposes, and to have been severally -fashioned as types by his infinite power. They are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> -in no sense "contingencies" which he had to meet as occasions -arising outside of his infinite will. A human artificer -has conceived and executed upon a novel plan a machine -that is distinguishable from all other machines. He -did not create the demand for that machine; the demand -has grown out of the wants of society; and the artificer -has met the demand by his genius and his mechanical -skill, which have effected a marked improvement in the -condition of society. In one sense, therefore, he has met a -"contingency," because he has met a demand. But the -infinite Creator, upon the hypothesis of his existence and -attributes, does not meet an external demand; there is no -demand upon him; he creates the occasion; he makes the -different organisms to effectuate the infinite purposes which -he also creates; the want and the means of satisfying the -want alike arise in the infinite wisdom and will. Such is -the hypothesis. We may now, therefore, pursue in some -further detail the argument which maintains that this hypothesis -is of far inferior strength to that of evolution, as -the method in which the Almighty power has acted in the -production of different animal organisms.</p> - -<p>First we have the analogy that is supposed to be afforded -by what takes place in the development of a single cell -into a man in the space of a few years, and an alleged correspondence -of development by which a single cell, in the -course of untold millions of years, has given origin to the -human race. Granting any difference of time which this -comparison calls for, and substituting in place of the successive -moments or years of an individual life, from the -formation of the ovum to the fully developed animal, the -successive generations of any imaginable series of animals, -the question is not merely what we can definitely conceive, -or how successfully we can construct a theory. It is -whether the supposed analogy will hold; whether we can -find that in the two cases development takes place in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> -same way or in a way that is so nearly alike in the two cases -as to warrant us in reasoning from the one to the other. -In the case of the development of the single cell into the -mature animal, although we can not, either before or after -birth, detect the changes that are taking place from minute -to minute, the infinitesimal accretions or losses, we know -that there is a perpetual and unbroken connection of life -maintained from the moment when the fœtus is formed to -the moment when the mature animal stands before us. -Break this connection anywhere in the process of development, -and life is destroyed; the development is at once arrested. -It is this connection that constitutes, as I presume, -what the learned author calls the "appropriate conditions," -in the case of the production of the individual animal; it -is, at all events, the one grand and indispensable condition -to the development of the cell into the fœtus, of the fœtus -into the newly born child, and of the child into the man. -Now, if we are to reason from this case of individual development -to the other case of successive generations of creatures -differing from each other in the same or any other -ratio in which the perfect man differs from the ovum, the -fœtus, or the newly born child, which are all successive -stages of one and the same individual life, we ought to find -in the successive generations of the different creatures some -bond of connection, some continuity of lives with lives, -some perpetuation from one organism to another, that will -constitute the "appropriate conditions" for a corresponding -development from a single cell through the successive -types of animal life into the human race. Without such -connection, continuity, perpetuation from organism to organism, -shown by some satisfactory proof, we have nothing -but a theory, and a theory that is destitute of the grand -conditions that will alone support the analogy between the -two cases. If anywhere in the supposed chain of successive -generations of different animals the continuity of animal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> -and animal is broken, the hypothesis of special creations of -new organisms must come in: for we must remember that -we are reasoning about animal life, and if the continuity of -lives with one another is interrupted, the series terminates, -just as the series between the ovum, the fœtus, the child, -and the man terminates, at whatever stage it is interrupted -by a cause that destroys the mysterious principle of life. -It is therefore absolutely necessary to look for some proof -which will show that in the supposed series of successive -generations of animals out of antecedent types, by whatever -gradations and in whatever space of time we may suppose -the process of evolution to have been worked, there -has been a continuity of life between the different types, a -perpetuation of organism from organism, a connection of -lives with lives.</p> - -<p>We now come to another supposed analogy, on which -great stress is laid by the evolution school, and especially -by Mr. Spencer. Individuals of the same family are found -to be marked by striking peculiarities of structure, ancestral -traits, which appear and disappear and then appear -again, in successive generations. This is obviously a case -where the "appropriate conditions" are all comprehended -in the connection of life with life. When we trace the -pedigree of a single man or any other individual animal -back to a remote pair of ancestors, we connect together in -an unbroken chain the successive generations of parents -and offspring. If the chain is anywhere broken, so that -direct descent can not be traced throughout the series, we -can not by direct evidence carry the peculiarities of family -traits any further back than the ancestor or pair of ancestors -with which we can find an unbroken connection of life -with life. We do indeed often say in common parlance -that an individual must have a trace of a certain blood in -his veins, because of certain peculiarities of structure, complexion, -or other tokens of descent, even when we can not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> -find a perfect pedigree which would show where the infusion -of the supposed blood came in. But although it might -be allowable, in making out the descent of an individual -man or any other animal, from a certain ancestor or pair of -ancestors, to aid the pedigree by strong family or race resemblance, -even when a link is wanting, it could only be -for the purpose of establishing a pedigree, a connection of -lives with lives, that such collateral evidence could be resorted -to. If by direct proof of an unbroken descent a full -pedigree is made out, or if, when some link is wanting, the -collateral proof from strong family or race resemblances is -sufficient to warrant the belief that the link once existed, -we might accept it as a fact that the individual descended -from the supposed ancestors in a direct line, or that some -peculiarity of blood came into his constitution at some -point in the descent of individuals from individuals.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_74" id="FNanchor_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a></p> - -<p>Can we apply this mode of reasoning to the evolution -of distinct types of animals out of antecedent and different -types? The very nature of the descent or derivation that -is to be satisfactorily established requires a connection of -lives with lives, just as such a connection is required in -making out the pedigree of an individual animal. We -must construct a pedigree for the different classes or types -of animals through which, by direct or collateral evidence, -we can connect the different organisms together, so as to -warrant the belief that by the ordinary process of generation -these animals of widely different organizations have -been successfully developed out of each other, life from -life, organisms from organisms. The hypothesis is, that -from a single cell all the various races and types of animals -have in process of time been gradually formed out of each -other, through an ascending scale, until we reach the human -race, whose race pedigree consists of a series of imperceptible -formations, back to the single cell from which the whole -series proceeded. This, we must remember, is not a case -of the evolving production of different forms of inanimate -matter, but it is the case of the evolving production of different -forms of animal life out of other preceding and different -forms, by the process of animal generation.</p> - -<p>Of direct evidence of this evolution of species, it can -not be said that we have any which will make it a parallel -case with the direct evidence of the descent of an individual -from parents and other ancestors. We have different animal -organisms that are marked by distinctions which com<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span>pel -us to regard them as separate species, and there is no -known instance in which we can directly trace a production -of one of these distinct species out of another or others by -finding a connection of lives with lives. Even in the vegetable -kingdom, with all the crosses for which Nature has -made such wonderful and various provision, we do not find -such occurrences as the production of an oak out of the -seed of an apple, or the production of an orange-tree out of -an acorn. We do not gather grapes of thorns or figs of -thistles. There are barriers set to miscegenation even in -the vegetable world, and we have no direct evidence that at -any period in the geological history of the earth these barriers -have been crossed, and very little indirect evidence to -warrant us in believing that they ever have been or ever -will be. In the animal kingdom such barriers are extremely -prominent and certain. We not only have no direct -evidence that any one species of animal was at any period -of the earth's history or in any length of time gradually -evolved out of another distinct species, but we know that -the union of the sexes and the production of new individuals -can not take place out of certain limits; that, while -Nature will permit of the crossing of different breeds of the -same animal, and so will admit of very limited variations of -structure, she will not admit of the sexual union of different -species, so as to produce individuals having a union of -the different organisms, or a resultant of a third organism -of a different type from any that had preceded it. Is it, -for example, from mere taste or moral feeling that such -occurrences as the sexual union between man and beast -have not been known to have produced a third and different -animal? We know that it is because the Almighty has -"fixed his canon" against such a union in the case of man -and in the cases of all the other distinct animal organisms; -and to find this canon we do not need to go to Scripture or -revelation, although we may find it there also.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span></p> - -<p>We are remitted, therefore, to indirect evidence, and in -considering this evidence we have to note that we have -nothing but an imaginary pedigree, or one hypothetically -constructed, to which to apply it. In tracing the pedigree -of an individual animal, we have a certain number of -known connections of life with life; and where it becomes -necessary to bridge over a break in the connection so as to -carry the line back to an earlier ancestor, we may perhaps -apply the collateral evidence of family or race resemblance -to assist in making the connection with that particular -ancestor a reasonably safe deduction. But in the case of -the hypothetical pedigree which supposes the human race -to have been evolved from a single cell through successive -organisms rising higher and higher in the scale of being, -we have no known connections of lives with lives to which -to apply the collateral proofs. The collateral proofs are -not auxiliary evidence; they are the sole evidence; and -unless they are such as to exclude every other reasonable -explanation of the phenomena which they exhibit excepting -that of the supposed evolution, they can not be said to -satisfy the rules of rational belief in the hypothesis to -which we apply them.</p> - -<p>What, then, is the indirect and collateral evidence? It -consists, as we have already seen, of two principal classes -of phenomena: first, resemblances of fœtal development -which are found on comparing the fœtal growth of different -species of animals; second, resemblances in the structure -of different species of animals after birth and maturity. -These various resemblances are supposed to constitute proof -of descent from a common stock, which may be carried -back in the series as far as the resemblance can be carried, -at whatever point that may be. Thus, in comparing all the -vertebrata, we find certain marked peculiarities of structure -common to the whole class: the deduction is, that all -the vertebrate animals came from a common stock. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> -comparing all the mammalia, we find certain marked peculiarities -of structure common to the whole class: the deduction -is that all the mammalia came from a common -stock. Going still further back in the supposed series, we -come to the amphibians, as the supposed common stock -from which the vertebrate and mammalian land animals -were derived; and, comparing the different classes of the -amphibians, we find certain resemblances which point to -the fish inhabitants of the water as their common stock; -and then we trace the more highly organized fishes through -the more lowly organized back to the aquatic worm, which -may itself be supposed to have been developed out of a -single cell.<a name="FNanchor_75" id="FNanchor_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a></p> - -<p>The resemblances of structure, wherever we make the -comparison between different species, are referable to an -ideal plan of animal construction, followed throughout a -class of animals, and adjusted to their peculiar differences -which distinguish one species from another, just as in the -vegetable world there is an ideal plan of construction of -trees followed throughout a class of plants, and adjusted to -the peculiar differences which distinguish one kind of tree -from another. As between man and the monkey, or between -man and the horse, or the seal, or the bat, or the -bird, there are certain resemblances in the structure of the -skeleton, which indicate an identity of plan, although varied -in its adjustments to the distinguishing structure of -each separate species of animal. In a former chapter, I -have shown why the adoption of an ideal plan of a general -character is consistent with what I have called the "economy -of Nature" in the special creation of different species. -On a careful revision of the subject, I can see no reason to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> -change the expression, or to modify the idea which it was -intended to convey, and which I will here repeat. It is -entirely consistent with the conception of an infinite and -all-wise creating power, to suppose that in the formation -of a large class of organisms, all the constructive power -that was needed for the formation of a general plan was -exercised throughout the class, and that there was super added -the exercise of all the power of variation that was -needful to produce distinct species. Repetition of the same -general plan of construction is certainly no mark of inferiority -of original power, if accompanied by adaptations -to new and further conditions. It is a proof that in one -direction all the necessary power was used, and no more, -and that in producing the distinct organisms the necessary -amount of further power was also used. If we follow the -resemblances of structure that may be traced through all -the animals of a varied class, we shall find that they may -be referred, as a rational and consistent hypothesis, to this -method of giving to each animal its characteristic formation. -If this is a rational hypothesis, it is so because it is -consistent with all the observable phenomena; and consequently, -the opposite hypothesis that all these phenomena -of resemblances and differences are due to the law of evolution -does not exclude every other explanation of their existence.</p> - -<p>To apply this now to one of the comparisons on which -great stress is laid—the comparison between the brain of -man and that of the ape. Two questions arise in this comparison: -1. Do the resemblances necessarily show that -these two animals came from a common stock? 2. Do -the resemblances necessarily show that man was descended -from some ape through intermediate animals by gradual -transformations? And, when I ask whether the comparison -necessarily leads to these conclusions, I mean to ask -whether the resemblances point so strongly to the conclu<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span>sions -that they must rationally be held to exclude every -other hypothesis.</p> - -<p>Prof. Huxley furnished to Mr. Darwin a very learned -note, in which he stated the results of all that is now -known concerning the resemblances and differences in -the structure and the development of the brain in man -and the apes. The differences may be laid aside in the -present discussion, because it is not necessary, for my present -purpose, to found anything upon them. But the resemblances, -just as they are stated by the eminent anatomist, -without regard to controverted details, are the important -facts to be considered. The substance of the -whole comparison is that the cerebral hemispheres in -man and the higher apes are disposed after the very same -pattern in him as in them; that every principal "gyrus" -and "sulcus" of a chimpanzee's brain is clearly represented -in that of a man, so that the terminology which applies to -one answers for the other; that there is no dispute as to -the resemblance in fundamental character between the -ape's brain and man's; and that even the details of the -arrangement of the "gyri" and "sulci" of the cerebral -hemispheres present a wonderfully close similarity between -the chimpanzee, orang, and man.<a name="FNanchor_76" id="FNanchor_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> These are said to be -the result of a comparison of the adult brain of man and -the higher apes; and, although it is claimed by some anatomists -that there are fundamental differences in the mode -of their development which point to a difference of origin, -this is denied by Huxley, who maintains that there is a -fundamental agreement in the development of the brain in -man and apes. His views of the facts for the purpose of -the present inquiry may be accepted without controversy, -not only because he is an authority whose statements of -facts I am not disposed to dispute, but because it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> -not necessary to dispute them. What, then, do they -show?</p> - -<p>They show that there are animals known as apes and -animals known as men, whose brains are found to be fundamentally -constructed upon the same general plan, with -strong resemblances throughout the different parts of the -organ; and the first question is, Do these resemblances show -that the two animals came from a common stock? Upon -the theory that man has resulted from the gradual modifications -of the same form as that from which the apes have -sprung, the resemblances in the structure of their respective -brains are claimed as having a tendency to show that there -was an animal which preceded both of them, and which -was their common ancestor, in the same sense in which an -individual progenitor was the common ancestor of two -other individuals, whether one of these two individuals -was or was not descended from the other in a direct line. -On the other hand, upon the hypothesis of the special creation -of the ape as one animal, and the special creation of -man as another animal, there was no common stock from -which the two animals have been derived, and the resemblances -of their brains point to the adoption of a general -plan of construction for that organ, or its construction -upon the same model, and the adaptation of that model to -the other parts of the structure, and the purposes of the -existence of each of the two animals. Without again repeating -the argument which shows that the latter hypothesis -is perfectly consistent with the professed conception of -the infinite power, I will now inquire whether, on the -former hypothesis, we have anything to which we can apply -the evidence of resemblance as a collateral aid in reaching -the conclusion that these two animals were derived -from a common progenitor, or from some antecedent animal -whose brain and other parts of the structure became -modified into theirs by numerous intermediate gradations.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span></p> - -<p>Between the higher apes, or between any of the apes and -any known antecedent and different animal, no naturalist -has discovered the intermediate link or links. Darwin supposes -that there was some one extremely ancient progenitor -from which proceeded the two main divisions of the <i lang="la">Simiadæ</i>—namely, -the Catarrhine and Platyrhine monkeys, with -their sub-groups. This extremely ancient progenitor is nothing -but a scientific hypothesis; or, to use a legal phrase, it -had nothing but a constructive existence. It is necessary to -believe in the principle of evolution, in order to work out -the hypothesis of this creature from which the two great -stems of the <em>Simiadæ</em> are supposed to have proceeded. Here, -then, we have the case of a pedigree or succession of animal -races, the <i lang="la">propositum</i> of which has no known existence. -Next we have two known divisions of the <i lang="la">Simiadæ</i>, or -monkeys; but, between them and their imaginary common -progenitor, we have no known intermediate animals constituting -the gradations of structure from the progenitor to -the descendants. The whole chain has to be made out by -tracing resemblances among the animals of a certain class -that are known, then applying these resemblances to the -supposed divergencies from the structure of a supposed -progenitor, and then drawing the conclusion that there -was such a progenitor. It may be submitted to the -common sense of mankind, whether this is a state of facts -which will warrant scientists or philosophers in using toward -those who do not accept their theory quite so much of -the <i lang="fr">de haut en bas</i> style of remark as we find in the writings -of Mr. Spencer.<a name="FNanchor_77" id="FNanchor_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> If the researches of geologists had ever<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> -discovered any remains of an animal that would fulfill the -requirements, and thus stand as the progenitor of the -<em>Simiadæ</em>. By the case would correspond to that of a known individual -from whom we undertake to trace the descent of -another individual through many intermediates; and in -such a case strong family resemblances of various kinds -might possibly afford some aid in making out the pedigree -as a reliable conclusion. But there is no means of connecting -the Old World and the New World apes with any but -an unknown and imaginary, progenitor. Darwin himself -frankly tells us that "the early progenitor of the whole -Simian stock, including man," is an undiscovered animal, -which may not have been identical with, or may not even -have closely resembled, any existing ape or monkey.<a name="FNanchor_78" id="FNanchor_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p> - -<p>Passing from the supposed common progenitor to the -resemblances between the brain of the higher apes and the -brain of man, we come to the question whether these resemblances -show that man was descended from any of the -Simian stock through intermediate animals by gradual -transformation. Here the case is in one respect different; -for the animals that are to be compared are known, and -their respective brains have been subjected to close anatomical -scrutiny. This part of the process of evolution begins -from one true species, the ape, and ends in another true<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> -species, the man. We are unable to trace the man and the -ape to a common progenitor race; but we find the ape possessed -of a brain which strongly resembles man's. I have -searched diligently in the writings of naturalists for a sound -reason which ought rationally to exclude the hypothesis -that the brain of the ape was formed upon the same ideal -plan as the brain of man, each animal being a distinct species -and separately created. Anatomical comparison of the -two brains shows that, whether they were separately planned -upon the same general model, or the one was derived from -the other by a process of gradual transformation through -successive intermediate animals, the resemblances are consistent -with either hypothesis. We are remitted, therefore, -to an inquiry for the evidence which will establish the -existence of a race or races of animals through whom there -descended to man the peculiar structure of brain found in -one of the classes of apes—namely, the Catarrhine or Old -World monkeys. If such intermediate races could be -found, their existence at any period anterior to the period -of man's appearance on earth would have some tendency -to show that man was descended from one of the families -of apes, and this tendency would become stronger in proportion -to the number of successive links in the family -chain that could be made out. But not one of these links -is known to have existed. There is an assumption that -man, "from a genealogical point of view, belongs to the -Catarrhine or Old World stock" of monkeys; and this assumption -is claimed to be supported by the fact that the -character of his brain is fundamentally the same as theirs.</p> - -<p>A brain is an organ which, upon the hypothesis of an -independent creation of distinct species of animals, would -be expected to be found in very numerous species, although -they might differ widely from each other. In all the vertebrate -animals this organ is the one from which, by its -connection with the spinal chord, the central portion of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> -nervous system, that system descends through the arches of -the vertebræ, and thence radiates to the various other organs -of the body. The brain is the central seat of sensation, -to which are transmitted, along certain nerves, the -impressions produced upon or arising in the other organs; -and it is the source from which voluntary activity is transmitted -along other nerves to organs and muscles that are -subjected to a power of movement from within. The office -which such an organ performs in a complex piece of animal -mechanism is therefore the same in all the vertebrate animals -in which it is found; and it would necessarily be -found to be constructed upon the same uniform plan, and -with just the degree of uniformity and adaptation which -would fit it to perform its office in the particular species of -animal to which it might be given. In point of fact, we -find this office of the brain performed in all the vertebrate -animals upon the same uniform plan, with the necessary -adaptations to the various structures of the different animals. -Resemblances, therefore, in the convolutions of different -parts of this organ, as found in different vertebrate animals, -however close they may be, prove nothing more than -the adoption of a general plan for the production of objects -common to the whole class of the vertebrate animals; and -unless we can find other and independent proof that one -species was descended from another by connection of lives -with lives through successive generations, the hypothesis of -special creations of the different species is not excluded by -the facts.</p> - -<p>Let us now further examine the supposed kinship of -man with the monkey, as evidenced by the similarity of -the structure of the brains of the two animals, in reference -to the supposed process of evolution as the means of accounting -for the origin of two species so essentially distinct. -How has it happened that different species have become -completed and final types, transmitting, after they have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> -become completed, one and the same type, by the ordinary -process of generation, and not admitting of the sexual -union with any other distinct species? On the theory of -the evolution of animal out of animal, we must suppose -that at some time the secondary causes of natural and sexual -selection have done their work. It ends in the production -of a species which thereafter remains one and the -same animal, and Nature has established a barrier to any -sexual union with any other species. If we give the rein -to our imaginations, and, taking the process of evolution as -it is described to us, suppose that in the long course of -countless ages the struggle for existence among very numerous -individuals has led to gradual transformations of -structure which the sexual selection has transmitted to -offspring, and so a new animal has at length been formed -through the successive "survivals of the fittest," we reach -an animal of a new species, and that species, under no circumstances, -produces any type but its own, so far as we have -any means of knowledge. All the knowledge respecting -the ape that has been accumulated shows only that this -species of animal, since it became a completed type, has -procreated its own type and no other. Whatever struggle -for existence the individuals of this type have had to undergo, -whatever modifications of structure or habits of life -the survival of the fittest individuals of this type may have -produced from the earliest imaginable period until the present -time, the fact remains that this species of animal is a -completed and final product. At the same time we have -another completed and final type of animal known as man, -which, so long as he has been known at all, is a distinct -and peculiar species. Between the brain of this animal and -the brain of the other we find certain strong resemblances. -In each of them this organ is a structure performing the -same office in the animal mechanism, with adaptations peculiar -to the varying structure of each of them. In order<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> -to justify the conclusion that the one animal is a modified -descendant from the other, so as to exclude the hypothesis -that the resemblances of any one or of all of their respective -organs was a result of the adoption of a general plan in -special creations of distinct species, we ought to find some -instance or instances in which the completed animal called -the ape has been developed into an animal approaching -more nearly to man than the man, as he is first known to -us, approached to the first ape that is known to us. Without -such intermediate connections, the analogy of the descent -of individuals from other individuals of the same -species will not hold. There is nothing left but resemblances -of structure in one or more organs, which are just -as consistent with the hypothesis of special creations as -with that of evolution. Strong resemblances of structure -and in the offices of different organs may be found between -man and the horse, but upon no theory of evolution has it -been suggested that man is descended from the horse, or -from any other animal to which he bears more or less resemblance, -excepting the monkey; and it is quite possible -that naturalists have been led unconsciously to make this -exception by external resemblances of the monkey and the -man, by the imitative power of the inferior animal when it -comes in contact with man, and by some of its habits when -found in its wild and native haunts.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI.</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="intro">The doctrine of evolution, according to Herbert Spencer, further considered.</p> - - -<p>In the last two preceding chapters I have examined -what Mr. Spencer regards as the direct supports of the doctrine -of evolution. I have now to consider the different -orders of facts which, as he claims, yield to it indirect -support. These are the facts derived from classification, -from embryology, from morphology, and from distribution. -An explanation is here needful of the sense in which he -uses these respective terms, before the reader, who is not -accustomed to them, is called upon to understand and appreciate -the argument:</p> - -<p>1. By classification is meant an arrangement of organic -beings in some systematic manner, according to attributes -which they have in common, and which may form the -principle of a division into different classes or families. -Pointing out that in the early history of botanical and -zoölogical science the tendency was to make classifications -according to a single characteristic, Mr. Spencer reminds -us that later naturalists, by attending to a greater number -of characteristics, and finally to the greatest number that -can be found to be common to various classes of vegetable -and animal organisms, have constructed systems of classification -which, in place of a linear or a serial order, have -exhibited the alliances of different groups, then the sub-groups, -and the sub-sub-groups, so that the divergences -and redivergences become developed, while the resemblances<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> -which obtain are preserved throughout the whole class. -But it is at once apparent that, although classification, on -whatever principle it is conducted, may be valuable as a -means of fixing in the mind the resemblances or differences -of structure that obtain in the different orders of organized -beings, as, for example, among the vertebrate or the -invertebrate animals, the flowering or the flowerless plants, -the seeds naked or the seeds inclosed in seed-vessels, yet -that any other system of classification, based upon other -resemblances or differences which actually present means -of grouping or separating the different families of organized -beings, is just as valuable an aid in the investigation of facts. -How far any classification affords an argument, or the means -of constructing an argument, which will yield a support to -the doctrine of evolution superior to that which it yields to -the doctrine of special creations, is of course a question.</p> - -<p>2. Embryology: This is the term employed to express -that branch of inquiry which is concerned in a comparison -of the increase of different organisms through the stages of -their embryonic life, and in noting at different stages of -this growth the characters which they have in common -with each other; the resemblances of structure which at -corresponding phases of a later embryonic stage are displayed -by a less extensive multitude of organisms; and so -on step by step, until we find the class of resembling embryos -becoming narrower and narrower, and then we finally -end in the species of which a particular embryo is a member. -This process of tracing and eliminating embryonic resemblances -is said to have "a profound significance"; because, -beginning with a great multitude of resemblances between -the embryonic development of different organisms, it reveals -the divergences which they take on, and through every -successive step we find new divergences, by means of which -"we may construct an embryological tree, expressing the -developmental relations of the organisms, resembling the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> -tree which symbolizes their classificatory relations." We -thus arrive at "that subordination of classes, orders, genera -and species, to which naturalists have been gradually -led," and which is said to be "that subordination which -results from the divergence and redivergence of embryos, -as they all unfold."<a name="FNanchor_79" id="FNanchor_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> On this mode of comparing the -embryonic development of different organized beings Mr. -Spencer builds a scientific parallelism, which indicates, as -he claims, a "primordial kinship of all organisms," and a -"progressive differentiation of them," which justifies a belief -in an original stock from which they have all been derived. -In what way this method of investigation destroys -or tends to destroy the hypothesis of special creations, or -how it affords an important support to the doctrine of evolution, -will be considered hereafter.<a name="FNanchor_80" id="FNanchor_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p> - -<p>3. Morphology, or the science of form, involves a comparison -of the structure of different organisms in their -mature state; an ascertainment of the resemblances between -their structures, and of the community of plan that exists -between them. Here, as in the aids derived from classification -and embryology, it is claimed that the fundamental -likenesses of forms of structure have a meaning which is -altogether inconsistent with the hypothesis of predetermined<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> -typical plans pursued throughout immensely varied forms -of organisms.</p> - -<p>4. Distribution: This is the term applied to the phenomena -exhibited by the presence of different organisms in -different localities of the globe; or, as Mr. Spencer phrases -it, "the phenomena of distribution in space." These phenomena -are very various. Sometimes, it is said, we find -adjacent territories, with similar conditions, occupied by -quite different faunas. In other regions, we find closely -allied faunas in areas remote from each other in latitude, -and contrasted in both soil and climate. The reasoning, as -given by Mr. Darwin and adopted by Mr. Spencer, is this: -that "as like organisms are not universally or even generally -found in like habitats, nor very unlike organisms in -very unlike habitats, there is no predetermined adaptation -of the organisms to the habitats." "In other words," -Mr. Spencer adds, "the facts of distribution in space do -not conform to the hypothesis of design." The reason why -they do not is claimed to be that there are impassable barriers -between the similar areas which are peopled by dissimilar -forms; whereas there are no such barriers between the -dissimilar areas which are peopled by dissimilar forms. -The conclusion is, "that each species of organism tends ever -to expand its sphere of existence—to intrude on other areas, -other modes of life, other media." That is to say, there is a -constant competition among races of organisms for possession -of the fields in which they can find the means of subsistence -and expansion; and this leads to new modes of existence, -new media of life, new structures and new habitats.</p> - -<p>The reader can now retrace his steps, and advert to the -facts that are relied upon, under the four heads of the argument:</p> - -<p>1. With regard to the argument derived from classification: -it is to be observed that any system of classification -is in a certain sense artificial, and at all events is manifestly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> -conventional. But, in order that no injustice may be done -to this branch of the argument for evolution, I shall state -it in its full force. The classifications which naturalists -make of the different organized beings according to their -resemblances and differences reveal the fact of unity amid -multiformity. This fact it is said points to propinquity of -descent, "which is the only known cause of the similarity -of organic beings." It is the bond, hidden indeed by various -degrees of modification, but nevertheless revealed to -us by the classifications which display the resemblances. -Again, we have, it is said, in the influence of various conditions -of animated organisms, "the only known cause of -divergence of structure." Classification reveals to us these -divergences. We have, then, the bond of resemblances -which indicate propinquity of descent, and the divergences -of structure produced by varying conditions of life. Put -the two together, and we have remarkable harmonies of -likenesses obscured by unlikenesses; and to this state of -facts it is claimed that no consistent interpretation can be -given, without the hypothesis that the likenesses and the -unlikenesses were produced by the evolution of organisms -out of organisms by successive generation, through a great -lapse of time.</p> - -<p>This argument contains no inconsiderable amount of assumption. -While it may be true that some naturalists do -not assign any cause for the similarity which obtains among -organic beings excepting their descent from a common ancestral -stock, it is not true that the similarity of structure is -inconsistent with the hypothesis of another cause, namely, -the adoption of a general plan of structure for a large class -of organisms, and an intentional variation in those parts of -structure which mark the divisions of that class into species -that are very unlike. It is true that evolutionists treat with -scorn the idea of a pattern of structure followed throughout -a class of animals, but made by designed adaptations to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> -coalesce with differences that mark the peculiarities which -distinguish one organism of that class from all the others. -Mr. Spencer, for example, observes that "to say that the -Creator followed a pattern throughout, merely for the purpose -of maintaining the pattern, is to assign a motive which, -if avowed by a human being, we should call whimsical."</p> - -<p>Let us now follow this mode of disposing of the hypothesis -of special creations, by adverting to some of the facts -that are adduced in its summary condemnation; and, although -the passage which I am about to quote is found in -Mr. Spencer's work under the head of morphology, the -illustration applies equally well to his argument from classification. -Speaking of fundamental likenesses of structure, -he says: "Under the immensely varied forms of insects, -greatly elongated like the dragon-fly, or contracted in -shape like the lady-bird, winged like the butterfly, or -wingless like the flea, we find this character in common—there -are primarily twenty segments. These segments may -be distinctly marked, or they may be so fused as to make it -difficult to find the divisions between them. This is not -all. It has been shown that the same number of segments -is possessed by all the <i lang="la">Crustacea</i>. The highly consolidated -crab, and the squilla with its long, loosely-jointed divisions, -are composed of the same number of somites. Though, in -the higher crustaceans, some of these successive indurated -rings, forming the exo-skeleton, are never more than partially -marked off from each other, yet they are identifiable -as homologous with segments, which, in other crustaceans, -are definitely divided. What, now, can be the meaning -of this community of structure among these hundreds -of thousands of species filling the air, burrowing in the -earth, swimming in the water, creeping about among the -sea-weed, and having such enormous differences of size, -outline, and substance, as that no community would be -suspected between them? Why, under the down-covered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> -body of the moth and under the hard wing-cases of the -beetle, should there be discovered the same number of divisions -as in the calcareous framework of the lobster? -It can not be by <em>chance</em> that there exist just twenty segments -in all these hundreds of thousands of species. There -is no reason to think it was <em>necessary</em>, in the sense that no -other number would have made a possible organism. And -to say that it is the result of <em>design</em>—to say that the Creator -followed this pattern throughout, merely for the purpose -of maintaining the pattern—is to assign a motive -which, if avowed by a human being, we should call whimsical. -No rational interpretation of this, and hosts of like -morphological truths, can be given except by the hypothesis -of evolution; and from the hypothesis of evolution -they are corollaries. If organic forms have arisen from -common stocks by perpetual divergences and redivergences—if -they have continued to inherit, more or less -clearly, the characters of ancestral races, then there will -naturally result these communities of fundamental structure -among extensive assemblages of creatures, that have -severally become modified in countless ways and degrees, -in adaptation to their respective modes of life. To this -let it be added that, while the belief in an intentional -adhesion to a predetermined pattern throughout a whole -group is totally negatived by the occurrence of occasional -deviations from the pattern, such deviations are reconcilable -with the belief in evolution. As pointed out in the -last chapter, there is reason to think that remote ancestral -traits will be obscured more or less according as the superposed -modifications of structure have or have not been -great or long maintained. Hence, though the occurrence -of articulate animals, such as spiders and mites, having -fewer than twenty segments, is fatal to the supposition -that twenty segments was decided on for the three groups -of superior <i lang="la">Articulata</i>, it is not incongruous with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> -supposition that some primitive races of articulate animals -bequeathed to these three groups this common typical character—a -character which has nevertheless, in many cases, -become greatly obscured, and in some of the most aberrant -orders of these classes quite lost."<a name="FNanchor_81" id="FNanchor_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a></p> - -<p>Whatever may be the explanation suggested by one or -another hypothesis as to the mode in which this uniformity -of structure came to exist, it is certain that it does exist. -Twenty segments are found in hundreds of thousands of -species which are immensely different from each other in -size, outline, substance and modes of existence. Here, then, -is a plan. There is a pattern, on which all these different -organisms are constructed with a common peculiarity. It -is averred that this could not have been the result of design, -because this would be to impute to the Creator a whimsical -motive, namely, that he followed the pattern throughout -a vast group of different organisms merely for the purpose -of following it. On the contrary, it may be contended -that this uniformity of plan, this repeated pattern, affords -the highest probable evidence of design; and that the -supposed whimsicality of motive will entirely disappear as -soon as we reach a purpose which may have had very solid -reasons for this uniformity of structure. When we reason -about the works of the Creator, we are reasoning about the -methods of a being who, we must suppose, is governed by a -purpose in all that he does. In reasoning about the methods -of such a being, it is entirely unphilosophical to suppose -that he has done anything merely for the sake of doing it, -or for the sake of exercising or displaying his powers in -repetitions that had no practical value. In order to reason -consistently with the supposed attributes of the Creator, -we should endeavor to find the value of any given pattern -which we discover in a certain very large class of organisms -differing widely from each other in other respects; and in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> -order to find that value it is by no means essential to make -out that the particular plan of construction was necessary -to the making of any organism whatever. The true question -is, not whether twenty segments were necessary to the -construction of any organism, but whether, in each of the -different species, this peculiar number of divisions was useful -to each particular organism. If naturalists of the evolution -school, instead of looking at everything through -the medium of a certain theory, would in their dissection, -for example, of the framework of the lobster, the body of -the moth, and the body of the beetle, furnish us with facts -which would show that these twenty divisions are of no use -either for strength, or resistance, or suppleness, or adaptation -to what is contained within them, we should have a -body of evidence that could be claimed as tending to overthrow -the hypothesis of intentional design. They might -then speak of the repetition of this pattern as whimsical, -upon the hypothesis that it was a repetition by design. But -so little is done by this class of naturalists to give due consideration -to the value of such repetitions, and so little heed -is paid to the truth that the Creator does nothing that is -useless—a truth which all sound philosophy must assume, -because it is a necessary corollary from the attributes of the -Creator—that we are left without the aid which we might -expect from these specialists in natural science. Is it, then, -impossible to discover, or even to suggest, that for each of -these organisms this number of twenty divisions had a -value? If they were of no value, we may safely conclude -that they would never have existed, unless we ignore the -hypothesis of infinite wisdom and skill. That hypothesis -is a postulate without which we can not reason on the case -at all. With it, we have as a starting-point the conception -of a being of infinite perfections, who does nothing idly, -nothing from whim, nothing from caprice, and nothing -that is without value to the creature in which it is found.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> -So that, while we can not in all cases as yet assign that -value, we have the strongest reasons for believing that -there is a value; and, instead of asserting that an extensive -community of structure throughout a great branch of the -animal kingdom has no meaning excepting upon the doctrine -of evolution, it is the part of true science to assume -that it may have another meaning, and to discover if possible -what that other meaning is. This is the part of true -science, because it is the part of sound philosophy. There -is another remark to be made upon Mr. Spencer's reasoning -on this particular case of a community of pattern. -He says that it can not be imputed to <em>chance</em>. It was, then, -either an intentional design, or it came about through the -process of descent "from common stocks, which process -was at the same time producing perpetual divergences and -redivergences." Without turning aside for the present to -ask from how many common stocks, it may be shown as -in the highest degree probable that the occasional deviations -from the pattern did not arise by the evolution process, because -that process has in itself an element of chance which is -fatal to the theory. The assertion is that "an intentional -adhesion to a predetermined plan throughout a whole group -is totally negatived by the occurrence of occasional deviations -from the pattern." Let this assertion be examined first -in the light of facts, and secondly by the absence of facts.</p> - -<p>The hypothesis is that some primitive race of articulated -animals, possessed by some means of the twenty segments, -transmitted this ancestral trait to hundreds of thousands of -species having no community of structure in other respects. -Unfortunately for the theory, no figures can measure the -chances against the preservation of a single pattern through -such a multitude of differing organisms descending from -a common stock. Infinity alone can express the chances -against such a result. While, according to the theory, the -deviations from the original type were constantly working<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> -out new organisms of the most diversified forms, until there -came to be hundreds of thousands of new species differing -from each other in all but this one peculiarity—a diversity -which is supposed to have been caused by the fundamental -law of evolution—how did it happen that the same law did -not break this uniformity of articulation? If it was potent -enough to differentiate the enormous multitude of these -animals in all other traits, why did it not vary the number of -segments with which the primitive race was endowed? Is -the law of evolution limited or unlimited? If it is limited in -its effects, then there are patterns of animal structure which -it has not modified, and the presence of which in hundreds -of thousands of different species must be explained as a -form of structure designed for some end that was to be common -to a great multitude of different beings. If the law of -evolution was unlimited in its power, then the community -of pattern has had to undergo chances of destruction or -discontinuance that are immeasurable; as there can be no -measure which will represent to the mind the infinitely -diversified and innumerable causes that have produced the -dissimilarities which compel a classification into the different -species, upon the hypothesis of their descent from a -common stock. Grant, too, for the purpose of the argument, -that the occasional deviations from the pattern of -twenty segments, producing a few groups with a smaller -number of articulations, are reconcilable with the belief that -some later ancestral form became endowed with the smaller -number which it transmitted to its descendants. How -came that later ancestral form to be endowed with the -smaller number of segments? Was there a still more remote -ancestral race, which in some way became possessed -of the smaller number, or did the spiders and the mites, in -the countless generations of evolution, branch off from ancestral -races having the full number of twenty segments? -Upon either supposition, what an infinity of chances there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> -were, against the natural selection of the smaller number, -and against its preservation as the unvarying type of articulation -found in the spiders and the mites! The supposition -that the number of twenty segments was decided -on for the three groups of superior <i lang="la">Articulata</i> for the mere -sake of adhering to a pattern is doubtless unphilosophical. -But it is not unphilosophical to suppose that whatever -amount of articulation is found in each species was given -to it because in that species it would be useful. If in some -of the most aberrant orders of these animals the articulation -is greatly obscured, or not found at all, the conclusion -that it was not needed, or not needed in a like degree, is -far more rational than the theory which commits the particular -result to an infinity of chances against it; or which -supposes it to have been worked by a process that might -have produced a very different result, since it can not be -claimed that natural selection works by methods of which -any definite result can be predicated more than another.</p> - -<p>Thus far I have considered Mr. Spencer's argument -from the <i lang="la">Articulata</i> in the light of the facts that he adduces. -Let us now test it by the absence of facts. In a former -discussion, I have asked for facts which show, aside from -the theory, that any one species of animal, distinctly -marked as a continuing type, is connected by intermediate -types or forms with any pre-existing race of another character. -Take this class of the articulated animals, said to -be of hundreds of thousands of different species having no -community of form but this of articulation, and now known -as perfect organisms, each after its kind. What naturalist -has discovered the continuity of lives with lives, which -would furnish the steps of descent of any one of this species -from an antecedent and a different species? It is -very easy to construct a theory, and from it to argue that -there must have been intermediate links, which, if discovered, -would show the continuity of lives from lives which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> -the descent of one organism from another necessarily implies. -To a certain extent, within certain limits, the sub-groups -and the sub-sub-groups of the articulated class of -animals, which classification or morphology reveals, may -lay the foundation for a theoretical belief in an ancestral -stock from which the different and now perfect forms of -these distinct animals may have become developed by successive -changes of structure. But the extent to which -connected changes can be actually traced in the animal -kingdom is extremely limited; and the important practical -question is whether any one fact, or class of facts, has -been discovered which will warrant the belief that beings of -totally dissimilar forms and habits of life have, without any -design, been evolved by the ordinary process of successive -generation, through the operation of causes that have gradually -modified the structure in all respects save one, and -have at the same time enabled or allowed that one peculiarity -of structure to escape from the influences which have -modified both structure and modes of life in every other respect. -Why, for example, upon the hypothesis of descent -from a common stock, has that stock deviated under the -influences of natural selection into the lobster, the moth, -and the beetle, and yet the community of twenty segments -of articulation has entirely escaped the effect of those influences? -No reason can be assigned for the fact that it has -escaped those influences, excepting that it was originally -designed, and was impressed upon the proto-typical stock -with such force as to place it beyond the reach of all such -causes of modification as those which are ascribed to natural -or sexual selection. Without the latter supposition, those -causes were just as potent to bring about a modification in -the number of articulations as they were to bring about -all the astonishing diversities of structure and modes of -life that we see, and therefore the most probable conclusion -from the fact of this uniformity of the twenty segments is,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> -that there was a barrier placed in this whole class of organisms, -which has limited the modifying force of the supposed -process of evolution, for the reason of some peculiar -utility in this plan of articulation.</p> - -<p>Perhaps it will be said that the process of evolution itself -tends to the preservation of whatever is most useful, -while the modifications are going on which develop new -organs and new structures; and that thus, in the case before -us, the twenty segments have been preserved throughout -an enormous group by one of the fundamental laws of -evolution, so that, if there is any peculiar utility in the -twenty segments, that utility has been answered by the -very process of gradual descent of one organism from another. -But the difficulty with this reasoning is, that while -it assumes for the modifying influences of natural and -sexual selection a range of fortuitous causes sufficient to -change the ancestral type into the acquisition of vastly -diversified organs, powers, and modes of existence, so as to -constitute new animals, it yet assumes that, by some recognition -of a superior and paramount utility in the particular -number of segments, the law of evolution has preserved -that number from the influence of causes which have -changed everything else. Now, the range of causes which -was sufficiently varied, accidental, long-continued and complex -to produce the diversities of structure in all other -respects, by the infinitely modifying influences which have -developed new organs and new modes of existence, must -also have been of a sufficiently varied, accidental, long-continued, -and complex character to have broken this plan -of the twenty segments, unless we suppose that in some -mysterious and inexplicable manner the different generations -of these beings were endowed with some kind of -sagacity which would enable them to strive for the preservation -of this one peculiarity, or unless we suppose that Nature -was ever on the watch to guard them from its destruc<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span>tion -or variation, on account of its peculiar utility. The -first supposition is not in accordance with the evolution -theory; for that theory rejects all idea of conscious exertion -on the part of any of the organisms. The second supposition -leads us at once to the inquiry, how came it to be -imposed upon a whole group of beings as a law of nature, -that whatever utility of structure was of paramount importance -to the whole group should be preserved against -the modifying influences that were to produce species differing -absolutely from each other, through hundreds of -thousands of varieties, in every other feature of their existence? -Can we get along here without the hypothesis of -design? And, if there was such design, how does the fact -of this uniformity amid such diversity become an argument -against the hypothesis of a Creator? Or, how does it tend -to displace the hypothesis of special creations, when we -find that the very process of so-called evolution has failed -to break the uniformity of a pattern that is conceded not -to have been the result of chance, although that pattern -was exposed to just as many and as powerful causes of -modification as those which are assumed to have brought -about the modifications in every other feature of the animal -existence? The truth would seem to be, that the -uniformity amid so great a diversity was either the result -of a design which placed it out of the reach of all the -modifying influences, or else it has, by a most incalculable -result, escaped from the effect of those influences by a -chance in which the ratio of one to infinity can alone measure -the probability of such an escape.</p> - -<p>Let us now advert to another of Mr. Spencer's illustrations -of the futility of the "supernatural" and of the -rationality of the "natural" interpretation.<a name="FNanchor_82" id="FNanchor_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> This illus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span>tration -is derived from what are called "homologous" organs; -and the particular instance selected is the vertebral -column.<a name="FNanchor_83" id="FNanchor_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> There are creatures, such as snakes, a low order -of the vertebrate kingdom, in which the bony axis is divided -into segments of about the same dimensions from end to -end, for the obvious advantage of flexibility throughout the -whole length of the animal. But in most of the higher -vertebrata, some parts of this axis are flexible and others -are inflexible; and this is especially the case in that part of -the vertebral column called the sacrum, which is the fulcrum -that has to bear the greatest strain to which the skeleton -is exposed, and which is yet made not of one long segment -or vertebra, but of several segments "fused together." -Mr. Spencer says: "In man there are five of these confluent -sacral vertebræ; and in the ostrich tribe they number -from seventeen to twenty. Why is this? Why, if the -skeleton of each species was separately contrived, was this -bony mass made by soldering together a number of vertebræ -like those forming the rest of the column, instead of being -made out of one single piece? And why, if typical uniformity -was to be maintained, does the number of sacral -vertebræ vary within the same order of birds? Why, too, -should the development of the sacrum be the roundabout -process of first forming its separate constituent vertebræ, and -then destroying their separativeness? In the embryo of a -mammal or bird, the substance of the vertebral column is, at -the outset, continuous. The segments that are to become -vertebræ, arise gradually in the midst of this originally ho<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span>mogeneous -axis. Equally in those parts of the spine which -are to remain flexible, and in those which are to grow rigid, -these segments are formed, and that part of the spine which -is to compose the sacrum, having passed out of its original -unity into disunity by separating itself into segments, -passes again into unity by the coalescence of these segments. -To what end is this construction and reconstruction? If, -originally, the spine in vertebrate animals consisted from -head to tail of separate movable segments, as it does still in -fishes and some reptiles—if, in the evolution of the higher -vertebrata, certain of these movable segments were rendered -less movable with respect to each other, by the mechanical -conditions to which they were exposed, and at -length became relatively immovable—it is comprehensible -why the sacrum formed out of them should continue ever -after to show more or less clearly its originally segmented -structure. But on any other hypothesis this segmented -structure is inexplicable."</p> - -<p>We here see the predominating force of a theory which -refuses all possible rationality to any hypothesis but its -own. The confident tone with which facts are arrayed and -are then pronounced inexplicable upon any other hypothesis -than that which the writer asserts, without one scintilla -of proof of their tendency to exclude every other supposition, -renders the refutation of such reasoning a wearisome -task. But there is here one plain and sufficient answer to -the whole of the supposed difficulty. The evolution theory, -in this particular application of it, is that originally there -were vertebrate animals in which the spine consisted of -separate movable segments from head to tail, as it does now -in fishes and reptiles; but, as the higher vertebrata were -evolved out of these lower forms, the movable segments -were rendered less movable with respect to each other, and -at length in the sacrum the segments became relatively immovable, -and yet the originally segmented structure was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> -retained in this part of the column, by force of the propinquity -of descent from an antecedent type which had -the whole column divided into movable segments. Upon -no other hypothesis, it is asserted, is this result explicable.</p> - -<p>Mr. Spencer's analysis of the sacrum is somewhat defective. -It is, as he says, that part of the vertebrate column -which in the higher class of vertebrate animals is, during -fœtal life, composed, like all the rest of the column, of distinct -vertebræ. These vertebræ, like the others, are flexible -in the fœtal stage, but after birth they become coalesced -or united into one piece, instead of remaining in separate -pieces. Thus far, Mr. Spencer's description is, I am informed -by anatomists, correct. But the questions which -he propounds as if they were unanswerable upon the assumption -that this change is inexplicable upon any other -hypothesis than that of the evolution of the higher vertebrata -out of the lower vertebrate animals, and that the -sacrum, with its continuous piece, has retained the segmented -outward form by force of the descent, demand -closer consideration. Let us trace the process of formation -in the human species, and then see what is the just conclusion -to be derived from it. In the embryonic condition, -the substance which is to form the vertebral column -is continuous. As the fœtus is developed, this substance -separates itself into the segments which are called vertebræ, -and these segments remain flexible and movable throughout -the column. After birth, the five lower segments become -united in what is substantially one piece, but of course the -marks of the original segments remain. This is what occurs -in the origin and growth of the individual. Now, -looking back to the period when this species of animal did -not exist, and supposing it to have been specially created in -the two related forms of male and female, endowed with -the same process of procreation and gestation that has been -going on ever since there is any recorded or traditionary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> -knowledge of the race, why should not this very growth of -the sacrum have been designed, in order to produce, after -the birth of the individual, that relative rigidity which -would in this part of the vertebral column be useful to an -animal destined to an upright posture of the whole skeleton -and to the habits and life of a biped? And, if we extend the -inquiry to other species, why should we not expect to find, -as in the case of an oviparous vertebrate like the ostrich, -a repetition of the same general plan of forming the spinal -column, for the same ultimate purpose, with such a variation -in the number of original segments that are to constitute -the sacrum as would be most useful to that bird, thus -establishing for the ostrich a sacrum that in a reptile or a -fish would not only not be required, but would be a positive -incumbrance? Upon the hypothesis of special creations of -the different species of vertebrate animals, every one of Mr. -Spencer's questions, asked as if they were unanswerable, can -receive a satisfactory solution. Thus, he asks, "Why, if the -skeleton of each species was separately contrived, was this -bony mass [the sacrum] made by soldering together a number -of vertebræ like those forming the rest of the column, -instead of being made [aboriginally] in one single piece?" -The answer is, that in the establishment of the process of -gestation and fœtal growth, if a human artificer and designer -could have devised the process, he would have selected -the very one that now exists, for certain obvious -reasons. First, he would have designedly made the process -to consist, in the embryo, of a division of the substance -which was to form the vertebral column in a continuous -and uniform division into segments, because the whole column -is to have at first the flexibility that may be derived -from such a division. Secondly, when the time was to -arrive at which the formation of the sacrum, with its -practical continuity of a single piece, was to commence, he -would select the number of the lower vertebræ that would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> -make a sacrum most useful to the particular species of animal, -and would weld them together so as to give them the -relative rigidity and action of a single piece. But as the -whole formation is the result of a growth of the sacrum -out of a part of the slowly forming column originally -divided into vertebræ, the marks of these separate vertebræ -would remain distinguishable, while they would cease to -have the mechanical action of separate vertebræ.</p> - -<p>Another of Mr. Spencer's questions is, "Why, if typical -uniformity was to be maintained, does the number of sacral -vertebræ vary within the same order of birds?" The answer -is the same as that which assigns a reason for all other -variations in the skeleton of animals of the same order but -of different varieties, namely, the special utility of the -variations in the number of sacral vertebræ that would be -most useful in that variety. The typical uniformity maintained -is a uniformity in the process of growth and formation, -down to a point where the variations are to come in -which mark one animal from another; and I have more -than once had occasion to suggest that the typical uniformity, -and its adaptation to the varying requirements of different -beings, is the highest kind of moral evidence of the -existence, wisdom, and power of a supreme artificer, and -that it militates so strongly against the doctrine of evolution -that, without more proof than can possibly be claimed for -that doctrine, we ought not to yield to it our belief.</p> - -<p>The theory that the original condition of all vertebrate -animals was that of separate movable segments throughout -the spinal column, as it is now in fishes and some reptiles, -and that in the evolution of the higher vertebrates out of -these lower forms, certain of these movable segments were -rendered less movable with respect to each other by the mechanical -conditions to which the successive generations were -exposed, until at length the sacrum was formed, is undoubtedly -a theory that excludes all design of an infinite artificer,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> -and all intention whatever. It is a theory which relegates -the most special contrivances and the most exact adaptations -to the fortuitous operation of causes that could not have -produced the variations of structure and at the same time -have preserved the typical uniformity. It is certainly a -theory which we should not apply to the works of man, if -we were investigating products which seemed to be the result -of human ingenuity and skill, but of the origin of -which we had no direct evidence. In such a case, we -should not shut our eyes to the proofs of intentional variations -and adaptation, or, if we did, our speculations would -not be likely to command the assent of cultivated and -sound reasoners. We may treat the works of Nature by a -system of logic that we should not apply to the works of -man, but if we do, we shall end in no tenable results. The -principal and in fact the only essential distinction to be observed -between the works of Nature and the works of man -relates to the degree of power, intelligence, and skill in the -actor. If we assume, as we must, that in the one case there -was an actor, applying will, intelligence, and power to the -properties of matter, and molding it into certain products -and uses, and that in the other case there was no actor, -but that all products and results are but the ungoverned -effects of what are called natural laws in contradistinction -to all intentional purposes, we must argue upon principles -that are logically and diametrically inconsistent in themselves, -and at variance with fundamental laws of reasoning.</p> - -<p>I will now advert to an omission in Mr. Spencer's analysis -of the sacrum, which overlooks one of the strongest -proofs of intentional design afforded by that part of the -spinal column. We have seen what was its general purpose -and growth, and the process of its formation. We have now -to note its variations in the male and the female skeleton. -In the male, the sacrum, thus formed before birth, after birth -answers to and performs its ultimate function of a compara<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span>tively -rigid and inflexible piece of bone, and it is provided -with no other special characteristic. In the female, on the -contrary, there is a most remarkable adaptation of this piece -to the function of maternity. While all the upper vertebræ -of which this piece was originally composed are welded together -after birth in the female as in the male, in the female -the lowest segment of all remains for a certain time flexible -relatively to the upper part of the sacrum, in order to admit -of the necessary expansion of the pelvis during the passage -of the infant from the womb of the mother. In the normal -condition of females of all the vertebrate orders, this flexibility -of the lower part of the sacrum continues while the period -of possible maternity continues. If in any individual -female it happens to be wanting during the period of possible -conception, delivery can not take place without danger -to the mother or the offspring, or both. Hence, in -very bad cases, nature has to be assisted by extraordinary -means. But in the normal condition of the female sacrum, -this flexibility, so essential in the process of safe delivery, -is always found, and its special purpose is known to every -anatomist, while it has no existence in the structure of the -male. Is this distinction to be accounted for by the same -kind of reasoning that undertakes to account for all the -other great distinctions between the related forms of male -and female, which reproduce their kind by a common process -of the sexual union, namely, that this division of male -and female came about by a habit that resulted now in the -production of a male and now in the production of a female, -from tendencies that were ungoverned by any special -purpose? Must we not conclude, however inscrutable are -the causes that determine the sex of a particular infant, -that the sexes themselves were specially ordained? And if -they were specially ordained, how are we to account for the -special construction and function of each of them, without -the interposition of a special design? And when we find<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> -a structure in the female obviously designed for a special -purpose, and not existing in the male, are we to conclude that -some particular race of females, in some remote period of -antiquity, among the countless generations of the vertebrata, -found that this flexibility of the sacrum would be -highly convenient to them, and, having adopted it as a -habit, transmitted it, as a specially acquired peculiarity of -structure, to their female descendants? This is all very well -as a theoretical speculation, but as a speculation it is entirely -defective, because it assigns the peculiarity of structure -to a cause that could not have produced it. On the other -hand, the hypothesis of its special creation assigns it to a -cause that could have produced it, and its existence is -among the highest of the multitudinous evidences of intentional -design and special formation.</p> - -<p>Wherein consists the irrationality of the hypothesis that -a plan of construction was intentionally, and with supreme -skill, framed for very different beings, to answer in each of -them a common purpose? The asserted irrational character -of this hypothesis consists in nothing but a denial that -there was a Creator. It comes down to this, if it comes to -anything: because, if we assume that there was a Supreme -Being who took any care whatever of the complex and -manifold product that we call nature—if we suppose that -he ordained anything—we must suppose that his power to -construct was boundless, and that a repetition of his plans -wherever they would be useful, to answer the beneficent -and diversified ends of infinite skill and benevolence, is -just as much in accordance with the whole hypothesis of -his attributes as it is to suppose that he caused anything -whatever to exist. If we deny his existence, if we can not -satisfy ourselves of it at all, if we suppose that nothing was -ordained, nothing was created, but that all these diversified -forms of animal organisms grew out of a protoplasmic -substance, and that there was never any absolute commence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span>ment -of organic life on the globe, or any absolute commencement -of anything whatever, it is of course idle to -speculate upon the adoption or preservation of patterns, as -it is equally idle to pursue the theory of evolution through -stages which at last end nowhere whatever.<a name="FNanchor_84" id="FNanchor_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a></p> - -<p>It may be well to cite Mr. Spencer's final summary of -the general truths which he claims to be revealed by morphology, -because it will enable the reader to see just where -the logical inconsequence of his position occurs: "The -general truths of morphology thus coincide in their implications. -Unity of type, maintained under extreme dissimilarities -of form and mode of life, is explicable as resulting -from descent with modification; but is otherwise -inexplicable. The likenesses disguised by unlikenesses, -which the comparative anatomist discovers between various -organs in the same organisms, are worse than meaningless -if it be supposed that organisms were severally -formed as we now see them; but they fit in quite harmoniously -with the belief that each kind of organism is a product -of accumulated modifications upon modifications. And the -presence, in all kinds of animals and plants, of functionally -useless parts corresponding to parts that are functionally -useful in allied animals and plants, while it is totally incongruous -with the belief in a construction of each organism by -miraculous interposition, is just what we are led to expect -by the belief that organisms have arisen by progression."<a name="FNanchor_85" id="FNanchor_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a></p> - -<p>Without expending much criticism upon the phrase -"miraculous interposition," as a description of what takes -place in special creation, it is sufficient to say that the act -of special creation of a distinct organism is to be first viewed -by itself, as if it stood alone in nature, and that it is like -any other act of causing a new thing to exist which did not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> -exist before. To this idea should be added the fact that -in the creation of an animal organism there is involved the -direct formation of a peculiar type of animal, with a capacity -of producing other individuals of the same type through -a process of generation. When, after having attained this -conception of the act of special creation, and contemplated -a single instance of the supposed exercise of such a power, -we extend our inquiries, we find many other instances of -the exercise of the same power; and then we observe a certain -unity of type in some peculiarity of structure, maintained -under extreme dissimilarities of form and mode of -life. How, then, is this one similarity of pattern, amid -such multiformity in other respects, "worse than meaningless," -if we suppose that "organisms were severally framed -as we now see them"? The very hypothesis that they -were so severally framed carries in itself a meaning which -can not be thus summarily ignored; because that hypothesis -implies a power in the Creator to do just what we see. -You may deny the power; but if you admit the existence -of the infinite creating power, you are remitted to the inquiry -into its probable methods; and you can no more say -that the special creation of distinct organisms, with a certain -unity amid a great multiformity, leaves the whole -phenomena without a meaning, than you can say that any -method which you can suggest is necessarily the only method -which will afford a rational meaning in what we see. -You must go the length of denying the entire postulate of -a Creator, before you can be in a situation to deny the -meaning that is involved in the idea of creation; for that -idea implies an absolute power to apply a uniform pattern -of structure to a whole class of organisms varied in all other -respects. The theory that each kind of organism is a -product of accumulated modifications upon modifications, -without any special interposition to produce the modified -and distinct forms, must be maintained on one of two sup<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span>positions: -either that at some period there was an absolute -commencement of organic life in some form, upon this -globe, and that then all the other forms which we see were -left to be evolved out of that one by the ungoverned accumulation -of modifications upon modifications, or else -that there was never any absolute commencement of organic -life at any time, but that matter, by some peculiar property -derived from some source that is not suggested, took on -combinations which resulted in some crude form of animated -organism, and that then the accumulations of modifications -upon modifications followed from some process -of generation by which the successive organisms became -multiplied and varied. Of the former supposition, I understand -Mr. Darwin to have been a representative naturalist. -Of the latter, I understand Mr. Spencer to be an -advocate. Upon what may be called the Darwinian doctrine, -the idea of a Creator, causing to exist at some time -some crude form of animal life, is admitted. Upon the -Spencerian doctrine, which will be in this respect more -closely examined hereafter, I do not see that the idea of a -creating power comes in anywhere, either at the commencement -of a series of organisms or at any point in that series. -But, upon the logical proposition asserted in the passage last -above quoted, it is obvious that, unless the idea of a Creator -is absolutely denied, the presence of a unity of type amid any -amount of dissimilarities of form and mode of life can not -be pronounced to be without meaning, because the idea of -a Creator implies a power to make that very unity amid the -uniformity, which is asserted to be inexplicable without resorting -to the theory that it was not made at all, but that -it grew out of events over which no superintending or governing -power was exercised. Upon this kind of dogmatic -assertion there can be no common ground of reasoning.</p> - -<p>The assumed incongruity between the facts and the -hypothesis of a special creation of each organism is an in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span>congruity -that arises out of the assumption that such special -creation was an impossibility. If once the idea of an -infinite creating faculty is assumed as the basis of the reasoning, -all seeming incongruity vanishes, and the probable -method of that creating power must be determined by the -preponderance of evidence. If the power is denied, we -must grope our way through systems which impute everything -to the properties of substance, without any suggestion -of a source from which those properties were derived, -and without anything to guide them but the tendencies -implanted in them, we know not how or when, and of the -origin of which we have not even a suggestion. Some of -the speculations of Greek philosophers adverted to in a -previous chapter may serve to show us what comes of the -omission to conceive of power as abstracted from substance -or its properties. The philosophy which first attained to -this conception led the way to that conception of an Infinite -Being, without whose existence and attributes all speculation -upon the phenomena of nature leads to nothing. A -belief in his existence and attributes must undoubtedly be -attained by an examination of his works, if we set aside the -teachings of revealed religion. But if we can not attain it, -we have no better means for believing in the doctrine of -evolution than we have for believing in any other method by -which the phenomena of nature have become what they are.</p> - -<p>The question here is, not whether descent of organisms -from organisms, with modifications upon modifications, -is a supposable theory, but whether it is so satisfactorily -shown that it can be said to exclude the hypothesis of a -special creation of each organism. There may be parts of -structure in one animal which seem to have no functional -use, although we should be cautious in making the assumption -that they are of no use because we have not yet discovered -that use. But let it be assumed that these apparently -useless parts in one animal correspond to parts which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> -in another animal are functionally useful. If there was -established for these two separately created animals a like -system of procreation and gestation, that system, affected -at the same time by a law of growth imposed by the special -type of the species, might in one species lead to the presence -of parts of which we can not recognize the use, and -might in other species lead to the presence of parts of -which we can see the use. It does not help to a better explanation -to say that there has been an accumulation of -modifications upon modifications in the course of an unknown -descent of one organism from another. Why did -these modifications stop short of the production of a species -or of several species in which no resemblance of parts -more or less functionally useful could be found? The -supposition is that the modifications have been going on -through millions of years. Time enough, therefore, has -elapsed for the destruction of all uniformity of structure; -and the causes of modification are as immeasurable as the -period through which they are supposed to have been -operating. The imaginary ancestral stock, wherever it is -placed in the line of remote descent, had, in its first distinctive -existence, a peculiar structure, which it bequeaths -to its offspring. In the countless generations of its descendants, -modifications of that structure take place, until -a new animal is evolved. What preserved any unity of -type from the modifying influences? It was not choice -on the part of the several descending species; not a conscious -exertion to preserve something; it was nothing but -the propinquity of descent, which by the law of heredity -transmitted certain resemblances. But why was that law -so potent that it could preserve a certain unity of type, and -at the same time so powerless as not to prevent the modifications -which the successive organisms have undergone in -all other respects? Or, to reverse the terms of the question, -why were the causes of modification sufficiently<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> -powerful to produce distinct species, and yet not powerful -enough to eliminate the resemblances which we find obtaining -throughout the whole group of animals to which these -several species belong? It would seem that here we are not -to lose sight of the fact that, in the animal kingdom, procreation -never takes place between a male and a female of -distinct species, and that we have no reason to believe that -it ever did take place. Now, although the evolution hypothesis -supposes that, starting from an ancestral stock, -the modifications of structure have been produced in offspring -descended from parents of that same stock, which -have transmitted acquired peculiarities to their immediate -progeny, and so on indefinitely, yet there must have been -a time when the diverging species became distinct and peculiar -organisms, and when it became impossible for any -crossing of these organisms to take place. All the supposed -modifications, therefore, have taken place within the limits -of an actual descent of one kind of animal from another, -each successive pair belonging to the species from which -they were individually generated. In this descent of lives -from lives, there came about changes which in progress of -time led to two animals as wide asunder as the man and -the ostrich, or as the man and the horse, and yet the causes -which were powerful enough to produce these widely diverging -species were not powerful enough to break up all -unity of plan in some one or more respects. If naturalists -of the evolution school would explain how there has -come to be, for example, in the skeleton of the <i lang="la">vertebrata</i>, -a bony structure called the spine, in which a certain resemblance -and a certain function obtain throughout the whole -class, and yet one species creeps upon its belly, another -walks on four legs, and another on two, and one flies in the -air and another never can do so, and how this could be -without any design or special interposition of a creating -power, but that the whole of this uniformity amid such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> -diversity has arisen from acquired habits among the different -descendants from an aboriginal stock that had no such -habits in either mode of locomotion, and no organs for such -modes of life, they would at least be able to commend their -theory to a better appreciation of its claims than is now -possible to those who want "grounds more relative" than -a naked hypothesis.</p> - -<p>3. The argument from embryology requires for its appreciation -a careful statement of its abstract proposition, -and a statement of it in a concrete form. As an abstract -proposition, embryology, or the comparison of the development -of different organisms under their embryonic stages, -shows that in the earliest stage of any organism it has -the greatest number of characters in common with all -other organisms in their earliest stage; that at a later -stage its structure is like the structures displayed at corresponding -phases by a less extensive number of organisms; -that at each subsequent stage the developing embryo becomes -more and more distinguished from the groups of embryos -that it previously resembled; and that this divergence -goes on, until we reach the species of which the embryo -is a member, in which the class of similar forms is finally -narrowed to that species.</p> - -<p>It seems that Von Baer formulated this generalization -of embryologic development into an "embryologic law," -which, according to Mr. Spencer, becomes a support to the -hypothesis of evolution in this way: Species that had a -common ancestry will exhibit a parallelism in the embryonic -development of their individual members. As the -embryos of the ancestral stock were developed in their -growth, so the embryos of the descended species would be -developed at corresponding phases in a similar way. As -one species diverged from its ancestral stock, there would -come about modifications in the development of its embryos, -and thus a later ancestral stock would be formed,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> -which would in turn transmit to its descendants in the development -of the embryo less and less resemblances, and -so on, until finally the individual animal, at birth, would -structurally resemble only the individual infants of its own -race.</p> - -<p>Here, then, is another remarkable instance of the force -of an adopted theory. First, we have a comparison of the -embryonic development of different animals from their -seminal germs which displays certain phenomena of resemblances -and departures. Next, we have the assumption of -an ancestral stock, the common origin of all the organisms -in the development of whose embryos among its descendants -an embryologic law was to work, starting from the -visible resemblance of all the germs, then exhibiting structural -changes into later ancestral stocks, and so on, until -the resemblances are reduced to those which obtain only -among individuals of the same species. So that, without -the hypothesis, the assumption of an ancestral stock of all -the organisms, formed somehow in the course of descent -from a germ that gave rise to an animal of some kind, we -have nothing to which to apply the embryologic law. We -are to infer the embryologic law from the parallelism of -embryonic development which prevails in the whole series -of animal generation, or from its divergences, or from both, -and then we draw from <em>this law</em> the inference that the -whole series of animals came from some common stock. -The difficulty with this whole theory is, as I have more -than once suggested, that we have no means, aside from the -theory itself, of connecting lives with lives, in the generation -of one distinct species out of another. Without some -proof of the fact that the human fœtus was a diverging -growth out of some ancestral stock that was the same as -that from which the fœtus of another animal was a different -diverging growth, the embryologic law is no help to us -whatever. If this kinship of the human fœtus with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> -fœtus of some other animal can not be found, by tracing -the intermediate links which carry them respectively back -to their common ancestor, between what animals in respect -to their embryonic development can such kinship be -found, excepting upon the theoretical assumption of a common -origin of the whole vertebral class? If there was such -a common ancestral stock, where is it to be placed, what -was its character, when did the law of embryologic development -begin to operate upon its descendants? Until some -facts can be adduced which will have a satisfactory tendency -to show the kinship of one animal with another by -reason of ancestral descent from a common ancestral stock -that was unlike either of them, the phenomena of embryologic -development have no tendency to displace the hypothesis -of special creations; for, on the latter hypothesis, -the phenomena of resemblances and differences in the -growth from the germ into the fœtus and from the fœtus -into the newly born infant, evinced by any range of comparison -of the different species, would be the same. If man -was a special creation, and one of the higher quadrumana -was also a distinct and separate creation, the establishment -for each of a like process of procreation and gestation -would produce all the resemblances of fœtal growth that -obtain between them, and the ordained differences of their -animal destinies would explain all the divergences. Let us -see if this is not a rational conclusion.</p> - -<p>It is exceedingly difficult for the common reader of such -a work as that of Mr. Spencer, on which I am now commenting, -to avoid the influence of the perpetual assertion -that facts are explicable upon one hypothesis alone. At -each step in the argument, the array of facts terminates -with the assertion that, upon the hypothesis of design, the -facts are inexplicable; and yet we are furnished with no -reasoning that has a tendency to show that the facts necessarily -exclude the hypothesis of design, or, in other words,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> -that the facts are inconsistent with that hypothesis. It is -essential to understand what is the true scope of the hypothesis -of special creation; for, without a definite idea of -what that term implies, we have no proper means of comparing -the facts of animal resemblances or differences with the -rationality of the hypothesis that they resulted from an intentional -design. Recollecting, then, that we are now pursuing -the resemblances and divergences that are found in a -comparison of the embryologic development of different -species of animals, let us endeavor to understand the meaning -of what I have suggested at the close of the last preceding -paragraph; namely, the establishment for a large -class of animals of a like general system of procreation and -gestation, and the ordination of different destinies for the different -species of animals belonging to that class. I have -said that the two branches of this hypothesis would account -for the resemblances in the embryological growth of different -animals, and would explain the divergences which obtain -among their embryological developments. The first -inquiry is, whether this hypothesis presents a true philosophic -idea of special creation. The next inquiry is, whether it -affords a satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of comparative -embryologic development.</p> - -<p>We must never lose sight of the one grand postulate of -an infinite Creator. This postulate must be conceded to -the believers in special creations, because any idea of creation -implies a creating power. If we conceive of creation -without a Creator, we must stop all argument. Now, the -hypothesis of creation, as I have more than once said, implies -a being of boundless faculties. There can be absolutely -no limitation to the power of such a being, either in -respect to the methods by which he will accomplish his -objects, or to the number and variety of these objects, or to -the purposes for which they are to exist. If we narrow our -conception of creating power to anything less than an infi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span>nite -faculty; if we suppose it to be restricted in any direction; -if we argue about it as if there were things that it -can not do, we shall be without the means of reasoning -soundly upon anything that it is supposed to have done. -It is quite otherwise when we are reasoning about the operation -and effect of secondary causes. There is no secondary -cause—no imaginable operation of a fixed quality of -substance—no action of any of the properties of substance—that -is not limited. The scope of its action may be very -wide; within its sphere it may be enormously potent; but -in its very nature it is bounded.<a name="FNanchor_86" id="FNanchor_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> It is not so with the First -Cause of all things; not so with the Infinite Power which, -upon the hypothesis of a First Cause, has established all -the physical laws of the universe and all the properties of -matter. So that, when we reason about the methods of that -infinite creating power, if we find a general system established, -or a pattern repeated through a very large class of -organisms, the proper inference is, not that the power was -limited, but that it has been exercised to the whole extent -of what was useful, and in that direction has been exercised -no further; and if we find variations or additional structures -incorporated with the repetition of a general pattern, -the proper inference is that the unlimited creating power -has put forth all the additional exertion and skill needful -for the formation of new beings.</p> - -<p>What, then, does the establishment of a like system of -procreation and gestation imply, upon the supposition of -the distinct creation of species? It implies a certain parallel -embryonic development, from the germ to the fœtus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> -and from the fœtus to the new-born infant, throughout -a large group of different animals; and this parallelism -would in certain stages of the embryonic growth display -identity or close similarity of form and structure. But as -in each species of animal the distinct creation would necessarily -imply a distinct destiny, the parallelism of embryonic -form and structure would cease at the point of development -at which the characteristic structure of the species -would begin to unfold itself. The general system of -procreation and gestation common to a whole class of different -animals, and the ordained diversity of species, would -present the same phenomena of resemblances and differences -in the embryonic development that are supposed to -be explicable only by the hypothesis of a descent of all the -species from a common ancestral stock through the process -of evolution.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding the mystery and obscurity in which -the process of animal procreation is involved—a mystery -and obscurity which will perhaps never be fully solved—we -can see enough to warrant some definite conclusions. One -of these conclusions is that, in the formation of the germ -which becomes developed into the fœtus, the male and female -parent each contributes some cellular substance to the -compound which constitutes that germ. We may safely -infer this, because the individual animal becomes a union -of characteristics belonging to both the parents, although -the traits that are peculiar to one of the parents may be -more or less marked in their different offspring, so that -in one of the descendants the paternal and in another the -maternal traits will predominate. But in every descendant -from the same pair there is more or less of the peculiarities -of each parent plainly discernible. The inference, -therefore, may be safely drawn that the male and the -female parent each contributes to the formation of the -ante-fœtal germ some cellular substance, in which resides<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> -the typical characteristic of animal organism which each -parent possesses. The compound germ that is thus formed -is endowed with the mysterious principle of animal life -which admits of growth and development; and whether -after its formation the female parent bestows most or bestows -least upon the product, that product consists of a -union of cellular substances contributed by both the male -and the female parent in the sexual act of procreation. -This compound resultant germ, in the earliest stage of its -formation, like the separate cells of which it is a union, -exhibits no visible difference when we compare the ante-fœtal -germ of one animal with that of a different animal. -Perhaps we shall never be able to detect either chemical or -mechanical differences in the cellular substances or in the -earliest stage of the compound product which has resulted -from their union. But in that compound product there -resides a contributory cellular substance derived from each -of the parents; and it is a just inference from this fact, and -from what we learn when we trace the further development, -that there is a peculiar and typical structure impressed -upon and inwrapped in this compound germ, which -is to grow into a fœtal development by a law of its own. -There will at the same time be a particular law of development -for each distinct species of animal, and a general law -of development for a great variety of species among whom -there obtains a common process of the sexual union and of -the contribution of male and female cellular substance. -When the fœtus becomes formed, there will still be marked -resemblances in the different species, before the stage is -reached at which the characteristic structure of each species -is to begin to unfold itself. But at some time the fundamental -difference of structure originally lodged in the -cellular substances of which the compound ante-fœtal germ -was composed, and impressed upon that germ as the type -which was gradually to unfold itself into a distinct being,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> -will begin to exert its force. The resemblances of structure -will become less and less, as the fœtus of the different animals -approaches to the time of birth. Organs, or appearances -of organs, which at one stage of the comparison have -seemed to indicate descent from a common ancestral stock, -but which may have been only the result of a common process -of fœtal development, will be found to be varied by -force of the original diversity of structure and destiny that -was made to reside in the seminal substance of each distinct -species of animal; and, at length, this original and -intentional peculiarity of structure and being would become -perfected at or before the period when birth is to -take place, leaving only those resemblances which must -obtain in all organisms constructed in certain respects upon -a uniform plan, and brought into being by a common process -of procreation and gestation.</p> - -<p>Let us now see whether this reasoning involves any -such unphilosophical or unscientific belief as is supposed. -Passing by the often-repeated assertion that the facts of -comparative embryologic development are reconcilable only -with the belief in evolution, let us advert to some of those -facts. "The substitutions," says Mr. Spencer, "of organs -and the suppression of organs, are among those secondary -embryological phenomena which harmonize with the belief -in evolution, but can not be reconciled with any other belief. -There are cases where, during its earlier stages of -development, an embryo possesses organs that afterward -dwindle away, as there arise other organs to discharge the -same functions. And there are cases where organs make -their appearance, grow to certain points, have no functions -to discharge, and disappear by absorption." The concrete -illustration of this substitution and suppression of organs is -thus given by Mr. Spencer:</p> - -<p>"We have a remarkable instance of this substitution in -the successive temporary appliances for aërating the blood<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> -which the mammalian embryo exhibits. During the first -phase of its development, the mammalian embryo circulates -its blood through a system of vessels distributed over what is -called the <i lang="la">area vasculosa</i>, a system of vessels homologous with -one which, among fishes, serves for aërating the blood until -the permanent respiratory organs come into play. After a -time, there buds out from the mammalian embryo a vascular -membrane called the allantois, homologous with one -which, in birds and reptiles, replaces the first as a breathing -apparatus. But while, in the higher oviparous vertebrates, -the allantois serves the purpose of a lung during the rest -of embryonic life, it does not do so in the mammalian embryo. -In implacental mammals it aborts, having no function -to discharge; and in the higher mammals it becomes -"placentiferous, and serves as the means of intercommunication -between the parent and the offspring"—becomes an -organ of nutrition more than of respiration. Now, since -the first system of external blood-vessels, not being in contact -with a directly oxygenated medium, can not be very -serviceable to the mammalian embryo as a lung; and since -the second system of external blood-vessels is, to the implacental -embryo, of no greater avail than the first; and -since the communication between the embryo and the placenta -among placental mammals might as well or better -have been made directly, instead of by metamorphosis of -the allantois—these substitutions appear unaccountable as -results of design. But they are quite congruous with the -supposition that the mammalian type arose out of lower -vertebrate types. For, in such case, the mammalian embryo, -passing through states representing, more or less distinctly, -those which its remote ancestors had, in common -with the lower <i lang="la">vertebrata</i>, develops these subsidiary organs -in like ways with the lower vertebrata."<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_87" id="FNanchor_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a></p> - -<p>In what way, then, are these substitutions unaccountable -as results of design, and why are they any more congruous -with the supposition that the mammalian type -arose out of the lower vertebrate type? In the first place, -it is necessary to have a distinct conception of what is -meant by design. In the present case, it means that for -a certain large group of animals there was established a -system of reproduction by the sexual union of male and -female, each contributing a cellular substance peculiar to -itself, in the formation of a compound cellular substance in -which the separate substances are united, and which is to -be developed into the fœtus by a law of growth; and as a -further design there is wrapped up in the compound germ -of each distinct species of animal a typical plan of ultimate -form and structure. This typical plan can not be detected -in the germ itself, as it is too subtile and obscure even for -the microscope; but we have every reason to believe that it -is there in all its distinctness of original purpose, because -at a later stage of the embryonic development we find a distinct -species of animal is the result. This is a conclusion -that must be adopted by the evolutionist, as well as by the -believer in special creations, because it has nothing to do -with the question of how distinct species came to exist. -Whether they were designedly and separately created, or -were evolved out of one another, the reproductive process -by which the individuals of the same species are brought -into being alike involves the conclusion that, in the ante-fœtal -germ of that species, there is somehow involved, in a -form so minute that it can not be seen, the type of animal -which is to belong to that species, and to no other. Here, -then, we have the grand and compound design which is to -obtain throughout a whole group of different animals; -namely, that they shall multiply in the production of individuals -of their own types, by a sexual union, in which -the male and the female each contributes a cellular sub<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span>stance -of its own to the formation of a compound germ, -and in that germ there is made to reside the typical form -and structure of a distinct organism, so minute that we -can not see it, but which we must conclude from the result -has been put there to be developed by a law of growth ordained -for the accomplishment of a certain distinct order -of beings. But the very obscurity of this type, in the earliest -stage of embryonic development, leads to the conclusion -that while it will never be lost, so long as its life is preserved, -it will unfold itself in ways that will be equally beyond our -ken, until the point is reached where it is no longer obscured, -but where it is revealed in all its distinctness of -outline and its peculiarity of structure. What is certain -and invariable is, that the type peculiar to the species is at -some time in the growth of the individual animal perfectly -developed. But in the modes of its development through -different embryonic stages, there will be variations and substitutions -of organs in the different species, but in each distinct -species these variations and substitutions will be uniformly -the same, because the law of development imposed -by the distinct type, while it may operate differently among -different species, will always operate in the same way in the -same species. Thus in one animal the development from -the original type which was implanted in its seminal ante-fœtal -germ may at one stage exhibit an organ for which at -a later stage another organ will be substituted; and in another -animal a seemingly corresponding organ may serve a -different purpose, or may altogether abort. These embryologic -phenomena, varying in different species, but occurring -uniformly in the same species, are necessarily among -the most obscure of all the phenomena of animal life, on -account of the fact that they take place where we can not -watch the changes or modifications as they are taking place -during actual fœtal life. But they are no more explicable -upon the hypothesis of the descent of distinct animals from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> -a common stock, than they are upon the hypothesis of distinct -creations of species. Upon the former hypothesis, -the assumed propinquity of descent implies the preservation -of the same mode of embryonic development until it -becomes varied by the operation of causes that bring about -a new habit of development, and then a fixation in this new -habit after a new species or a new ancestral stock is formed; -so that in each distinct species there comes at length to be -a uniform process of substituting and suppressing organs, -or changing the functions of organs. But how are we to -account for the operation of causes that have preserved a -parallelism of development, along with the operation of -causes that have produced the different modes of development, -when all the species are supposed to be derived from -a common ancestral stock, which first began to procreate -and to develop its descendants in one and the same way? -What are the facts which will enable us to say that the -mammalian type arose out of the lower vertebrate types, -when we compare the different modes of their embryologic -development? How are we to estimate the chances for a -preservation of so much resemblance as exists between the -two in their embryologic lives, and the chances for the -variations that are observable? What we can safely conclude -is that there is a law which holds each species in a -constant repetition of its own fœtal growth, according to -its unvarying development in the same series of changes, -substitutions, or suppressions. But we can not safely conclude -that this species became formed in the supposed process -of descent from a remote ancestral stock, which may -or may not have originally exhibited the same series of -changes, substitutions, or suppressions. If the ancestors -of the mammalian vertebrates were the kind of animal -supposed, we have to find, in order to justify the supposed -descent, those states which represent the correspondence -between the mode in which the ancestral stock developed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> -its own embryos, when compared with the mode in which -the type of the lower vertebrata developed its embryos, -so as to make it reasonably certain that these subsidiary -organs derived their several substitutions or suppressions -from the process of descent, and not from any special mode -of development ordained for each distinct species. We -may imagine these states through which the mammalian -embryo has passed, but as yet we have only a theory which -suggests their existence without facts to support it. The -truth would seem to be that this whole subject of comparative -embryology, upon the hypothesis of the kinship of all -organized beings, or the descent of many distinct species -from a common stock, is involved in very great difficulties; -not the least of which is the difficulty of explaining how -the diverging descendants from that stock came to be -endowed with habits of embryologic life and growth that -resulted in the production of very different modes of development, -and at the same time preserved for each new -species its own peculiar mode of development. To say, for -example, that the mammalian embryo passed through states -representing, more or less distinctly, those which its remote -ancestors had in common with the lower vertebrata, and that -it developed certain subsidiary organs in like ways with the -lower vertebrata, is merely to state a theory, which, without -some evidence that the mammalian embryo was a formation -resulting from a connection of lives with lives back -to a common ancestor whose embryo was developed as those -of the lower vertebrata are, amounts to nothing. Often as -this want of evidence has been adverted to, it must be here -again pointed out: for the whole argument from embryology, -like that derived from a comparison of the forms of -mature animals, lacks the support of facts that are essential -to show the connection of life with life which descent from -a common ancestral stock necessarily implies.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the hypothesis of the distinct crea<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span>tion -of different species deals with the phenomena of embryologic -life in a very different way. It supposes the -creation of a pair, male and female, and a law of procreation, -designed for the multiplication of individuals of a fixed -type. It supposes many such creations, each having in its -own peculiar germ the characteristic type of organism that -will distinguish the mature animal from all the others. It -supposes finally a law of development common to all the -species the individuals of which are multiplied by the sexual -union of male and female; a law of growth under like -conditions, which leads to a parallelism of development until -the typical plan of form and structure designed for each -distinct animal, and implanted in its germ, begins to take -on a mode of development peculiar to that species, and at -length the perfect individual of that species is the result. -In this hypothesis, therefore, there is no necessity for resorting -to any connection with an imaginary ancestral stock -of a different type, or for resorting to a theoretical process by -which successive generations may be supposed to have gradually -arisen out of the ancestral stock by successive changes -which have at length resulted in a totally new species. -The new species is what is supposed to have been aboriginally -created, and to have been placed under its own law -for the multiplication of individuals of the same type. In -point of simplicity, of comparative certainty, of freedom -from accidental causes of variation of which we can predicate -no specific result, this hypothesis seems to have a far -greater degree of probable evidence in its favor than the -theory which entirely lacks the requisite evidence of intermediate -connections between the lives of one species with -the lives of a remote and different species. For, while it -may be truly said that no man ever saw a special creation -take place, and while such an act of the infinite power is of -a nature that places it beyond the observation of our senses, -it is neither inconceivable nor improbable, nor inconsistent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> -with the idea of the divine attributes which we derive from -the study of nature. On the other hand, it is not only equally -true that no man ever saw, or in the nature of things ever -can see, an evolution of distinct species out of other distinct -species, but the whole nature of the supposed process of transformation -involves an element of chance which forbids all -calculation of the results. How, for example, in this very -matter of comparative embryological development on the -hypothesis of descent of all the species of the vertebrate animals -from a common ancestral stock of a different type, are -we to account for the fact that the embryo of any one of the -descended species has come to be developed in a mode -peculiar to itself and differing from the mode in which the -embryo of the ancestral stock was developed? The law of -sexual union, under which the individuals of the supposed -ancestral stock were multiplied, must have imposed on that -species an invincible necessity of reproducing in its offspring -the same type that constituted the peculiar organism -of the parents, whether these parents were or were not -the fittest survivors of their race after the severest struggle -for existence which they may have had to undergo. If the -pair, or the male of that pair, has in the course of that -struggle acquired a new organ, or more completely developed -an old one, before the act of procreation takes place, -how is it that the ovum is developed into the fœtus, and the -fœtus into the newly born infant, in an invariable mode -peculiar to the species to which the parents belonged? -Why did not the same causes of variation which are supposed -to have changed the ancestral type into one of a new -and entirely distinct character, also vary the mode of fœtal -development? When and how did the new organs become -fixed in the type which the parents have transmitted to the -offspring? And if they became so fixed in the germ which -was formed out of the cellular substance contributed by -each of the parents, why do we find in every known species<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> -participating in this process of reproduction a uniform -mode of embryologic development peculiar to the species, -and exhibiting its own suppressions and substitutions of -organs, irrespective of any newly acquired peculiarities in -the individual structures of the parents?</p> - -<p>The believer in special creations has to answer no such -questions as these. His hypothesis assumes the creation of -a pair of animals of a certain distinct species; a law of procreation -and gestation common to a vast multitude of organisms; -and a law of embryologic growth peculiar to each -species. Whatever peculiarities of structure may have -been possessed by the immediate parents of any individual -of any one of these different species—peculiarities which -did not separate the parents from their race, but only made -them the fittest survivors of their race—those peculiarities -would or would not descend to their immediate offspring, -according to varying and very inappreciable circumstances. -But that which constituted the special type of the race, -and especially that which constituted its peculiar mode of -development during the embryonic stage, would remain unaffected -by these incidental and accidental peculiarities of -the parents, because, from all that we can discover, that -special type was impressed upon the embryo at the earliest -stage of its existence, and constituted the living model -that was to be developed into the perfect animal of that -species, by a law which placed it beyond the influence of -any adventitious and non-essential advantages which the -male or female parent may have acquired over other individuals -of the same race. So that, if the postulate of -a special creation of species be assumed as the groundwork -of the reasoning, we have to go through with no speculations -about a common ancestral stock of all the species, -and we have to account for no phenomena that are exposed -to chances which might have produced very different -results from those which are open to our observation,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> -and results of which we can predicate nothing with any degree -of certainty. On the hypothesis of the special creation -of a species, and an aboriginal pair of each species, with all -that this implies, we can with a high degree of certainty -predicate most of the phenomena that we have to observe, -and more especially so much of the phenomena of embryologic -growth of the different species as are open to our investigation -after the life of both mother and embryo has -become extinct.</p> - -<p>It only remains for me to give to this reasoning a concrete -application. Take the case made use of by Mr. Spencer -in the passage above cited—that of the "allantois," a -vascular membrane, which is said to be in the mammalian -embryo homologous with one which in the higher oviparous -vertebrates, such as the birds and reptiles, replaces what -was at first a breathing apparatus, and becomes for them, -during the rest of embryonic life, a sort of lung, or an -organ that aërates the blood until the permanent respiratory -organs come into play. In the mammalian embryo, the -first appliance for aërating the blood is described as a system -of vessels distributed over the <i lang="la">area vasculosa</i>, and like that -which is first observable for the same purpose in fishes. -But, as the mammalian embryo continues to grow, a change -takes place. There buds out from it the vascular membrane -called the "allantois," which is substituted in the -place of the first aërating apparatus. Then a further -change takes place, as between the higher oviparous vertebrates -and the mammalian vertebrates. In the former, the -"allantois" continues to perform the breathing function -through the rest of the embryonic life. In the mammalian -vertebrates it undergoes two changes: In the implacental -mammals, it aborts, having no function to discharge; in the -placental mammals it becomes modified into another organ, -namely, that which serves to convey nutrition from the -mother to the offspring. After birth, it is of course ended.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span></p> - -<p>Now, the reasoning, or rather the assertion, that these -substitutions are unaccountable as the results of design, -appears to me to be singularly inconclusive. It is quite -illogical, according to all philosophic meaning of design as -applied to the works of the Creator, or to the works of nature, -if that term is preferred, to argue that a particular -object could have been better accomplished directly, than -by a metamorphosis of an organ from one function to -another, or by substitution. The metamorphosis, or substitution, -which in such cases we find in nature, is of itself the -very highest evidence that the indirect method was the -best, if we admit the idea of a Creator, because it was the -method chosen by a being of infinite perfections for reasons -which we may not be able to discover, but which we must -presume to have existed, if we concede that hypothesis of -attributes which "design" in this case necessarily implies. -But how are these metamorphoses and substitutions any -more accountable upon the supposition that the mammalian -type arose by generation out of the lower vertebrate types -which in their embryonic life exhibited the same changes? -The doctrine or theory of evolution does not account for -them at all; for, while the doctrine supposes, as matters of -pure theory, that there were certain states through which -the mammalian embryo passed, which represented more or -less distinctly those which it had in common with its assumed -remote ancestors, the lower vertebrata, it does -nothing more than to suggest the theoretical idea that the -mammalian embryo came to develop these subsidiary organs -in the mode in which they were developed in the embryo -of the lower vertebrata, because it was descended from the -lower vertebrata. The varying states through which the -embryo passed from the lower vertebrata to the mammalian -type, are all hypothetical, and there is, therefore, no basis -of fact on which to rest the belief in a common mode of -development, as resulting from a connection of lives with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> -lives between the mammalian type and the types of birds, -reptiles, or fishes.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the hypothesis of the special creation -of a species implies the simple fact of a designed process of -embryonic development for each species, with substitutions -of organs and changes of function in certain organs peculiar -to that species; a fact which may well consist in a certain -parallelism in the different metamorphoses, and a preservation -of the same unvarying changes in the development of -each separate embryo. Why these changes should exist, we -can not tell; but their existence is very strong proof that -they were designed, or made to take place, for some reason, -if we admit the hypothesis of a Creator. For that hypothesis, -we must look to a wider class of facts, and to the whole -phenomena of nature.</p> - -<p>4. We now come to the argument from distribution. -This is one of the weakest of the indirect supports of the -doctrine of evolution; but, as it is much relied upon, it -must be stated with all the force that it is supposed to -have. The facts that are relied upon are these: When we -survey the whole surface of the globe, so far as it is known -to us, we find, in the first place, that the areas which have -similar conditions (of soil and climate), and sometimes, -where the areas are nearly adjacent, are occupied by quite -different faunas. On the other hand, it is said that areas -remote from each other in latitude, and contrasted in soil -and climate, are occupied by closely allied faunas. The -inference drawn is, that there is no manifest predetermined -adaptation of the organisms to the areas, or habitats, in -which they are found, because we do not find that like organisms -are universally or generally found in like habitats, -nor very unlike organisms in very unlike habitats. The -conclusion is, that the facts of distribution in space do not -conform to the hypothesis of design. In other words, the -different animals found in different regions were not spe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span>cially -designed for those regions, but some of them have -extended into regions of a different character; and when -the regions are very unlike there are not found very unlike -organisms, but there is a general similarity, or a less extensive -variety. There is said, also, to be another important -fact, namely, that "the similar areas peopled by dissimilar -forms are those between which there are impassable barriers; -while the dissimilar areas peopled by similar forms, -are those between which there are no such barriers." -Hence is drawn the conclusion that "each species of organism -tends ever to expand its sphere of existence—to intrude -on other areas, other modes of life, other media."<a name="FNanchor_88" id="FNanchor_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> A -good deal of aid is supposed to be derived for this argument -respecting animal life by analogies drawn from the vegetable -kingdom; but I can not help thinking that there is -much caution to be observed in formulating such analogies -into a law of universal application, or into one that relates -to the existence of animal organisms. The origin, the -multiplication, and the spread of animals involve a principle -of life, organization and development which is very different -in some important respects from that which obtains -in the vegetable world. But, without laying any stress -upon this distinction, and without intending to deprive -the argument for animal evolution of any aid which it can -derive from such supposed analogies, I pass to the specific -argument respecting animal distribution. The argument -is this: Races of organisms become distributed over different -areas, and also through different media. They are -thrust by the pressure of overpopulation from their old -into new habitats, and as they diverge more widely in -space they undergo more and more modifications of structure, -by reason of the new conditions on which they enter. -Thus, these powerfully incident forces, the new conditions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> -on which the migrating races enter in new regions, vary -the structure which they originally brought with them, and -which descended to them from the common stock of which -they were modified descendants. The widest divergences -in space, under such circumstances, will indicate the longest -periods of time during which these various descendants -from a common stock have been subject to modifying conditions. -There will, therefore, come to be, it is said, -among organisms of the same group, smaller contrasts of -structure in the smaller areas; and, where the varying incident -forces vary greatly within given areas, the alterations -will become more numerous than in equal areas which are -less variously conditioned: that is to say, in the most uniform -regions there will be the fewest species, and in the -most multiform regions there will be the most numerous -species. These hypotheses are said to be in accordance -with the facts of distribution in space.<a name="FNanchor_89" id="FNanchor_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a></p> - -<p>But there are also facts of distribution through different -media. The meaning of this is, that, whereas all forms -of organisms have descended from some primordial simplest -form, which inhabited some one medium, such as the water, -its descendants, by migration into some other medium or -other media, underwent adaptations to media quite unlike -the original medium. In other words, the earth and the -air have been colonized from the water. Numerous facts -are adduced in support of this conclusion, which are thus -summarized:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>There are particular habitats in which animals are subject to -changes of media. In such habitats exist animals having, in various -degrees, the power to live in both media, consequent on various -phases of transitional organization. Near akin to these animals, -there are some that, after passing their early lives in the water, -acquire more completely the structures fitting them to live on land, -to which they then migrate. Lastly, we have closely-allied creat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span>ures -like the Surinam toad and the terrestrial salamander, which, -though they belong by their structures to the class Amphibia, are -not amphibious in their habits—creatures the larvæ of which do -not pass their early lives in the water, and yet go through these same -metamorphoses! Must we, then, think that the distribution of kindred -organisms through different media presents an insurmountable -difficulty? On the contrary, with facts like these before us, the evolution-hypothesis -supplies possible interpretations of many phenomena -that are else unaccountable. Realizing the way in which such -changes of media are in some cases gradually imposed by physical -conditions, and in other cases voluntarily commenced and slowly -increased in the search after food, we shall begin to understand -how, in the course of evolution, there have arisen those strange -obscurations of one type by the externals of another type. When -we see land-birds occasionally feeding by the water-side, and then -learn that one of them, the water-ouzel, an "anomalous member of -the strictly terrestrial thrush family, wholly subsists by diving—grasping -the stones with its feet and using its wings under water"—we -are enabled to comprehend how, under pressure of population, -aquatic habits may be acquired by creatures organized for aërial -life; and how there may eventually arise an ornithic type, in which -the traits of the bird are very much disguised.</p> - -<p>Finding among mammals some that, in search of prey or shelter, -have taken to the water in various degrees, we shall cease to be -perplexed on discovering the mammalian structure hidden under a -fish-like form, as it is in the Cetacea. Grant that there has even -been going on that redistribution of organisms which we see still -resulting from their intrusions on one another's areas, media, and -modes of life, and we have an explanation of those multitudinous -cases in which homologies of structure are complicated with analogies. -And while it accounts for the occurrence, in one medium of organic -types fundamentally organized for another medium, the doctrine -of evolution accounts also for the accompanying unfitness. Either the -seal has descended from some mammal which, little by little, became -aquatic in its habits, in which case the structure of its hind-limbs has -a meaning; or else it was specially framed for its present habitat, -in which case the structure of its hind-limbs is incomprehensible.<a name="FNanchor_90" id="FNanchor_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span></p> - -<p>Along with these phenomena of distribution in space -and in medium of life, we have the further element of distribution -in time; the facts of which are admitted, however, -to be too fragmentary to be conclusive either for or -against the doctrine of evolution. Still it is claimed that -there is one general truth respecting distribution in time, -which is "profoundly significant, namely, that the relations -between the extinct forms of life, found by geological -exploration, and the present forms of life, especially in each -great geographical region, show in the aggregate a close -kinship, and a connection which is in perfect harmony with -the belief in evolution, but quite irreconcilable with any -other belief. As Mr. Darwin has expressed it, there is 'a -wonderful relationship in the same continent between the -living and the dead.'"<a name="FNanchor_91" id="FNanchor_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a></p> - -<p>The argument from distribution is thus summed up by -Mr. Spencer:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Given, then, that pressure which species exercise on one another, -in consequence of the universal overfilling of their respective habitats—given -the resulting tendency to thrust themselves into one -another's areas, and media, and modes of life, along such lines of -least resistance as from time to time are found—given, besides the -changes in modes of life hence arising, those other changes which -physical alterations of habitats necessitate—given the structural -modifications directly or indirectly produced in organisms by modified -conditions—and the facts of distribution in space and time are -accounted for. That divergence and redivergence of organic forms, -which we saw to be shadowed forth by the truths of classification -and the truths of embryology, we see to be also shadowed forth by -the truths of distribution. If that aptitude to multiply, to spread, -to separate, and to differentiate, which the human races have in all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> -times shown, be a tendency common to races in general, as we have -ample reason to assume, then there will result that kind of relation -among the species, and genera, and orders, peopling the earth's -surface, which we find exists. Those remarkable identities of type -discovered between organisms inhabiting one medium, and strangely-modified -organisms inhabiting another medium, are at the same time -rendered comprehensible. And the appearances and disappearances -of species which the geological record shows us, as well as the connections -between successive groups of species from early eras down -to our own, cease to be inexplicable.<a name="FNanchor_92" id="FNanchor_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>Passing by what is here said of the aptitude of the human -race to multiply, to spread, to separate, and to differentiate—an -aptitude which has never resulted in the production -of an essentially different animal, or in anything but -incidental variations within the limits of the same species—I -propose now to apply to this argument from distribution -a test which seems to me to be a perfectly fair one, and one -which it ought to be able to encounter. If the theory that -the different species of animals now known to us have been -evolved successively by descent from some primordial simplest -form through modifications induced by change of -habitation, of medium of life, and accumulation of new -structures occurring through an immense period of time, -be a sound hypothesis, the process which has evolved superior -out of inferior organizations ought, in consistency with -itself and with all its supposed conditions, to be capable of -being reversed, so as to lead to the evolution of inferior out -of superior organisms. For, although the doctrine of evolution -has thus far been applied only to facts which are -supposed to show an ascent in the scale of being, the argument -ought to be equally good for a descent in the scale of -being, provided we take care to include all the elements and -causes of a change of structure, mode and medium of life, -and the necessary element of time, in the operation of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> -process. The imaginary case that is about to be put shall -include all the elements of the evolutionary hypothesis, -and will serve to test at least the rationality of that theory.</p> - -<p>Let it be supposed, then, that there was a period in the -history of this earth when the whole human race, however -it originated, was confined to an island, thousands of miles -from any other land. This race of men adapted to a life -in one medium, the air, may be supposed to have so far -advanced in the ruder arts of hunting and fishing, and in -the higher art of tillage, as to be able for many generations -to support life by what the sea and the land would put -within their reach, and by the product which their rude -agriculture could extract from the soil, or which the soil -would spontaneously yield. But as the centuries flow on, -the population begins to press upon the resources of the territory, -and the struggle for life becomes very great. At -length a point is reached where the supply of food from -the land becomes inadequate to sustain the population, -and what can be made up from the sea will not supply the -deficiency. The population will then slowly decrease, but, -while this decrease goes on, there comes in a disturbing -cause which will prevent any adjustment of the supply of -food to the diminished number of the consumers. The -sea begins by almost imperceptible but steadily progressing -encroachments to diminish the area of dry land; a change -of climate reduces the number of other animals available -for human food, and reduces the productive capacity of the -earth. Then ensues that struggle for existence which is -supposed to entail changes of medium of life, and to induce -transformations of structure. The conditions of existence -have become wholly changed. The wretched descendants -of a once comparatively thriving race are dwelling on a -territory which has become a marsh. They have no means -of migrating to another territory; they can only migrate -to another medium. They begin by feeding exclusively on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> -what the water will afford. They pass their lives in the -pursuit of a prey which lives only in the water, and in this -change of life they acquire or develop organs adapted to -the new condition, organs which, in such miserable reproduction -of their own species as can go on, they transmit to -their offspring. Modifications upon modifications accumulate -in this way through untold periods of time, until at -last a new aquatic or a new amphibious creature is formed, -and the difference between that creature and his remote -ancestral human stock is as great as that between man -and the seal, or between man and any fish that swims. -Still, there will be peculiarities of structure retained, which -might lead any inhabitant of another world, alighting on -this globe and undertaking to trace the origin of this new -creature, to the supposition that he was akin to a race of -men whose fossil remains he might find buried in some -stratum beneath the marsh which was the last habitat of -this unfortunate race, when it had all the characteristics of -its original type.</p> - -<p>Is it conceivable that this transformation could take -place? Could such a condition and situation result in anything -but the utter extinction of the human race, or, in -other words, in an absolute break? Could there be any -modifications exhibited by the last survivors of that race -other than those which are familiar to us among the varieties -of the human species which have never separated themselves -from their race, and between whom and their ancestral -stock, wherever it was originally placed on this globe, we -recognize no fundamental difference of structure, whatever -may have been the changes of habitat or conditions of life? -Yet the conditions and elements of this imaginary case, which -is simply the process of evolution reversed, are just what the -evolution theory assumes as the causes of that modification -which proceeds from a lower to a higher organism; and -whatever may be said of the tendency, through "the sur<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span>vival -of the fittest," to evolve higher out of lower forms of -animal life, if we allow time enough for the process, there -is no reason, in the nature of things, why corresponding -conditions should not lead to a degradation as well as to -an elevation in the scale of beings. There is, however, one -reason why no such potency should be ascribed to the conditions, -either in respect to the one result or the other. -That reason is that all such causes of modification, either -in the ascending or the descending scale, are so limited in -their effects that distinct beings can not be rationally -predicated as their product, whereas the power of the Infinite -Artificer to give existence to distinct beings is absolutely -without limit. If naturalists would turn their attention -to the limitations upon the power of all such causes as -those which are supposed to work in the process of evolution, -and would give us the explanations to which those -limitations point, in those cases of local variation which -are exhibited by animals that can clearly be traced to a -parent form, they would not be compelled to resort to a -sweeping theory that refuses all force to any hypothesis but -its own.</p> - -<p>But now let us go a step further in this imaginary case. -Let us suppose that after this new creature, fish or amphibian, -descended from the human race, has inhabited the -water surrounding the ill-fated island for a million of years, -another great change takes place. The water begins to recede -from the land by gradations as slow as those by which -in the former period it encroached. The land rises from the -low level to which it had sunk, by volcanic action. Forests -spring up upon the sides of mountains. The soil becomes -firm; verdure overspreads the fields; the climate grows -genial; the wilderness blossoms as the rose. Allow another -million years for this restoration of the territory to an inhabitable -condition. Slowly and in an unbroken series of generations -the aquatic creatures, descended from the ancient<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> -human inhabitants of the island, emerge from the sea and -betake themselves to the land. Modifications upon modifications -accumulate, new organs are acquired; the survival -of the fittest perpetuates them; the animals ascend in the -scale of being, until the human type is again evolved out -of the degraded descendants of the population which two -millions of years previously dwelt as men upon the island, -and carried on in some primitive fashion the simpler arts -of human life. Is not this just as supposable as the evolution -of the human race out of some lower form of organism? -Are not all the elements—time, migration from one -medium to another, change of conditions, and what is supposed -to lead to the production of different organisms—just -as powerful to produce the inferior out of the superior -as to produce the superior out of the inferior, and so on -interchangeably? The answer in each case is, that all such -causes of modification in the animal kingdom are limited; -that when once a distinct species is in existence, we have -no evidence that it loses its distinct type or merges itself in -another, although the earth may be full of evidence that -types which formerly existed are no longer among the living -organisms.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII.</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="intro">Mr. Spencer's agnosticism—His theory of the origin of religious beliefs—The -mode in which mankind are to lose the consciousness of a personal -God.</p> - - -<p>In a former chapter I had occasion to advert to one of -Mr. Spencer's favorite dogmas, namely, the impossibility of -an intellectual conception of creation, which he thinks is -made apparent by the statement that one term of the relation, -the thing created, is something, and the other term of -the relation, that out of which the thing was created, is -nothing. When I wrote the chapter in which I commented -on this extraordinary kind of logic, I felt a little disposed to -apologize to my readers for answering it. I had not then -met with the fuller statement of Mr. Spencer's peculiar -agnosticism which I am now about to quote. The controversy -recently carried on between Mr. Spencer and Mr. -Harrison was closed by the former in an article entitled -"Last Words about Agnosticism and the Religion of Humanity," -which appeared in the "Nineteenth Century" for November, -1884. This drew my attention to a passage in Mr. -Spencer's "Essays," which he has reproduced in his late article -for the purpose of repeating his position against some of -the misrepresentations which he complains had been made -of it by Mr. Harrison. I have nothing to do with the controversy -between these two gentlemen, or with any of the -arguments which Mr. Spencer's opponents, be they churchmen -or laymen, have employed against him. I take the -passage as he has quoted it from his "Essays," for the pur<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span>pose -of making his agnostic views the subject of a more -extended commentary than I had bestowed on them in my -previous chapter, in writing which I had before me only a -passage contained in his "Biology." There is no occasion, -however, for altering a word of what I had previously written; -for, on a comparison of his position as given in the -"Biology," and that given in the "Essays," it appears very -plainly that I had not misunderstood him. But as the -passage in the "Essays" displays much more fully the peculiar -reasoning by which he supports his agnostic philosophy, -I should not do justice to him or to my readers if I -did not notice it. The passage is the following:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Always implying terms in relation, thought implies that both -terms shall be more or less defined; and as fast as one of them becomes -indefinite, the relation also becomes indefinite, and thought -becomes indistinct. Take the case of magnitudes. I think of an -inch; I think of a foot; and having tolerably definite ideas of the -two, I have a tolerably definite idea of the relation between them. -I substitute for the foot a mile; and being able to represent a mile -much less definitely, I can not so definitely think of the relation between -an inch and a mile—can not distinguish it in thought from the -relation between an inch and two miles, as clearly as I can distinguish -in thought the relation between an inch and one foot from -the relation between an inch and two feet. And now, if I endeavor -to think of the relation between an inch and the 240,000 miles -from here to the moon, or the relation between an inch and the -92,000,000 miles from here to the sun, I find that while these distances, -practically inconceivable, have become little more than -numbers to which I frame no answering ideas, so too has the relation -between an inch and either of them become practically inconceivable. -Now this partial failure in the process of forming -thought relations, which happens even with finite magnitudes when -one of them is immense, passes into complete failure when one of -them can not be brought within any limits. The relation itself -becomes unrepresentable at the same time that one of its terms -becomes unrepresentable. Nevertheless, in this case it is to be -observed that the almost blank form of relation preserves a certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> -qualitative character. It is still distinguishable as belonging to the -consciousness of extensions, not to the consciousnesses of forces -or durations; and in so far remains a vaguely identifiable relation. -But now suppose we ask what happens when one term of the relation -has not simply magnitude having no known limits, and duration -of which neither beginning nor end is cognizable, but is also -an existence not to be defined? In other words, what must happen -if one term of the relation is not only quantitatively but also -qualitatively unrepresentable? Clearly in this case the relation -does not simply cease to be thinkable except as a relation of a certain -class, but it lapses completely. When one of the terms becomes -wholly unknowable, the law of thought can no longer be -conformed to; both because one term can not be present, and because -relation itself can not be framed ... In brief, then, to Mr. -Martineau's objection I reply that the insoluble difficulties he indicates -arise here, as elsewhere, when thought is applied to that -which transcends the sphere of thought; and that just as when we -try to pass beyond phenomenal manifestations to the Ultimate Reality -manifested, we have to symbolize it out of such materials as -the phenomenal manifestations give us; so we have simultaneously -to symbolize the connection between this Ultimate Reality and its -manifestations, as somehow allied to the connections among the -phenomenal manifestations themselves. The truth Mr. Martineau's -criticism adumbrates is that the law of thought fails where the elements -of thought fail; and this is a conclusion quite conformable -to the general view I defend. Still holding the validity of my argument -against Hamilton and Mansel, that in pursuance of their -own principle the Relative is not at all thinkable <em>as such</em>, unless in -contradiction to some existence posited, however vaguely, as the -other term of a relation, conceived however indefinitely; it is -consistent on my part to hold that in this effort which thought -inevitably makes to pass beyond its sphere, not only does the -product of thought become a dim symbol of a product, but the -process of thought becomes a dim symbol of a process; and hence -any predicament inferable from the law of thought can not be -asserted.<a name="FNanchor_93" id="FNanchor_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span></p> - -<p>In judging of the soundness of this reasoning, the first -thing to be done is to determine what we are thinking -about when we compare the finite with the infinite, or -when, to put it as Mr. Spencer does, we have two terms of -a relation, one of which is a thing open to the observation -of our senses, and the other of which lies beyond them. -In this case, does all thinkable relation lapse, or fade into -an impossible conception, when we undertake to conceive -of that which lies beyond what we see? Does the relation -between the two supposed terms cease to be a continuously -existing relation? Or, to quote Mr. Spencer's words, is it -true that "insoluble difficulties arise, because thought is -applied to that which is beyond the sphere of thought"?</p> - -<p>We must be careful to distinguish between the "insoluble -difficulties" which arise out of the imperfection of -language adequate to give a formal description of a thing, -and which may lead us to suppose ourselves involved in -contradictions, and the "insoluble difficulties" which may -arise out of the impossibility of having a mental representation -of that thing. The latter is the only difficulty -about which we need concern ourselves; and the best way -to test the supposed difficulty as an insuperable one is to -take one of the illustrations used by Mr. Spencer—the idea -of space. We measure a foot or a mile of space, and then -compare it with the idea of endless or (to us) immeasurable -space. Figures afford us the means of expressing in language -a certain definite number of miles of space, but, -beyond the highest figures of which we have definite forms -of expression, we can not go in definite descriptions of -space. But when we have exhausted all the expressions of -number that our arithmetical forms of expression admit, -does it follow that we can not conceive of extension beyond -that number? On the contrary, the very measure which -we are able to express in figures, to a certain extent, in regard -both to space and time, gives us the idea of space and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> -time, and shows us that there must be an extension of both -beyond and forever beyond the portion of either which language -will allow us definitely to describe. This to us immeasurable -and indescribable extent of space or time becomes -a thinkable idea, because we are all the while thinking -of space or time, whether it is a measurable portion of -either, or an immeasurable and endless existence.</p> - -<p>Take as another illustration a purely moral idea. We -know that there is a moral quality which we call goodness; -an attribute of human character of which we have a clear -conception, and which we can describe because it is manifested -to us in human lives. When we speak of the moral -phenomena to which we give the name of goodness, or virtue, -all mankind know what is meant. But human virtue -is imperfect, limited, measurable. It may be idealized into -something approaching to perfection, but the ideal character -thus drawn must fall short of perfection if it is made -consistent with human nature. But from human character -we derive the idea of goodness or virtue as a thinkable idea. -Is the idea of absolute perfection of this quality any less -thinkable? Absolute perfection of moral character can not -be described by a definition; but, as we know that a measurable -goodness which we can describe exists, wherein consists -the failure or lapse of a thinkable relation, when we -reason from that which exists in a measurable degree to -that which transcends all degree? We are all the while -thinking of goodness or virtue, whether we think of it as -limited and imperfect, or as unlimited and perfect. Take -another quality—power. We know that there is such a -quality as power, wielded by human beings, and guided by -their will. But human power is limited, measurable, and -therefore finite. When we reason from the finite power of -man to the idea of an infinite and immeasurable power -held and wielded by another being, do we strive to conceive -of something that is unthinkable because we can only say<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> -that the power of that other being is without limit? We -are all the while thinking of power, of the quality of power, -whether we think of it as measurable or immeasurable. -All qualities and all faculties which are manifested to us in -a limited degree, when we conceive of them as unlimited -and without degree, become proofs that what exists in a -measurable and limited degree may exist without limitation -and without degree. Although we can only define the -finite, the infinite is not the less a subject of true thinking, -because, whether we think of the finite or the infinite, what -we are all the time thinking about is the quality of power, -and nothing else. In the one case it is limited, in the -other it is unlimited, but it is all the time the quality itself -of which we are thinking.<a name="FNanchor_94" id="FNanchor_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a></p> - -<p>But now let us attend a little more closely to Mr. Spencer's -grand objection to this mode of thinking. The -reader will be careful to note that what he needs to ascertain -is, whether Mr. Spencer's agnostic theory is really -sound. To test it, he must inquire just where the supposed -difficulty lies. Translated into other language, Mr. -Spencer's position is this: In order to keep within the -sphere of possible thought, there must be a definite relation -between any two ideas, which must not lapse, but the two -ideas must be equally capable of mental representation. -When one term of the relation is an idea capable of mental -representation, as when we think of a thing cognizable by -our senses, and the other term of the relation is something -that lies beyond them, the law of thought, according to -Mr. Spencer, can no longer be conformed to; the relation -lapses; the latter term can not be present to the mind; -we pass out of the sphere of thought into that which can -not be a subject of thought, the unknown and the unknow<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span>able. -What takes place in this process is assumed to be -this: We take certain phenomenal manifestations which -we are able to observe and to describe. Out of the materials -which these phenomenal manifestations give us, we "symbolize -the Ultimate Reality." We do this, by arguing -from the phenomenal manifestations which convince us of -the existence of a being whom we know and can observe, -to the existence of a being in whom we "symbolize" qualities -and faculties which the phenomenal manifestations -show us to belong to human beings. At the same time we -represent to ourselves by the same symbolizing process a -connection between the Ultimate Reality and its manifestation, -which is allied to the connections among the phenomenal -manifestations which we observe in man, or in -nature. In other words, we reason from what we see and -can measure and describe, to that which we can not see or -describe, and we end in a term of the relation which can -not be present to the mind, and thus no thinkable relation -can be framed.</p> - -<p>Whatever may be said of the rational force of the evidence -derived from phenomenal manifestations which we -can observe when we reason about other phenomenal manifestations -which we can not measure, it can not be said -that we have reached a term in the relation that is beyond -the sphere of thought. What I understand Mr. Spencer -to mean when he speaks of "symbolizing" out of the -materials which the phenomenal manifestations give us, -may be a process liable to error, but it does not involve or -lead to the "insoluble difficulties" that are supposed to -arise. For example, when, from the existence and power -of man, a being whom we know, and whose phenomenal -manifestations lead us to a knowledge of his limited faculties, -we reason to the existence of a being whose faculties -are boundless, we may be in danger of conclusions into -which imperfection will find its way; but it certainly is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> -not true that in thinking of unlimited power or goodness, -or any other unlimited quality, we transcend the sphere of -thought. When we have expressed in figures the greatest -measurable idea of space that can be so expressed, what do -we "symbolize," when we say that beyond that measured -space there stretches a space that we can not measure, and -to which there is of necessity no limit? Does a thinkable -relation cease to exist, because one of the terms is immeasurable -to us? As soon as we have formed an idea of a -measurable portion of space, we necessarily have an idea of -endless and immeasurable space; and in this deduction we -have employed no "symbol" formed out of the materials -which the measurable manifestations have given us. We -have simply reached a conclusion that is inevitable. We are -all the while thinking of space, whether it is definite space -that we can measure, or indefinite space that we can not -measure.</p> - -<p>When the moral and intellectual qualities of men constitute -one part of the phenomenal manifestations which -we adopt as the basis of reasoning to the existence of God, -we are in danger of assigning to that being attributes of -character which would be far from perfection. Nearly all -the religions that have existed, and of which we have much -knowledge—perhaps all of them but one—have displayed -more or less of this tendency. It is only necessary to instance -the Hebrew Scriptures, for there are parts of that -narrative in which the Deity is represented as actuated by -something very much like human passions and motives, -and these representations are among the hardest things to -be reconciled with the idea that those books were inspired -writings. Every one knows with what effect these passages -of the Hebrew Scriptures are used by those who reject both -the Old and the New Testaments as inspired books. But -is philosophy therefore to shrink from the use of materials -with which the world is filled, and which lead to the con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span>ception -of a being of infinite faculties and perfect goodness? -Grant all that may be said of the stupid and fatal -errors into which men have been led by likening the Deity -to man: there remains a vast store-house of materials on -which to reason to the existence of God, which philosophy -can not afford to reject, which can be freed from the peril -that has often attended their use, and which involve no -"symbolizing" process of the kind which Mr. Spencer -imagines.</p> - -<p>Let us again translate Mr. Spencer's language, and endeavor -to analyze his position. There is, he says, a law of -thought, which requires and depends upon certain elements -of thought. By "thought" he means a conceivable idea, -or one which the mind can represent to itself. By the elements -of thought he means, I suppose, the data which -enable us to have an idea of a product. The process of -reaching this product is supposed to be conducted according -to a law which requires us to have the data or elements -by which the process is to be conducted. For example, in -the process of reaching an idea of definite space as a product -of thought, we take certain data or elements, by conceiving -of space as divided into successive portions to which -we give the name of feet or miles. The product of thought -is the number of feet or miles into which we divide the -definite space of which we form an idea. In this process -we have conformed to Mr. Spencer's law of thought, because -we have data or elements by which to conduct the -process and reach the product.</p> - -<p>But now, says Mr. Spencer, when thought undertakes -to have as its product the idea of endless space, it makes -an effort to pass beyond its sphere; the elements of thought -fail, and therefore the law of thought fails; the product -is nothing but a dim symbol of a product; the process -becomes nothing but a dim symbol of a process; and no -predicament, that is, no fact, is here inferable from the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> -law of thought as a fact or predicament that can be asserted. -But what, in the case supposed, is the fact or predicament -that is asserted, when we speak or think of endless space, -or of space that transcends all our powers of measurement? -Is it correct to say that the law of thought fails, because -we can not express endless space in feet or miles? Is it -true that we have only "symbolized" the product of endless -space out of the data or elements of measurable space? -Here it is necessary to inquire what the learned philosopher -means by "symbolizing" a product or a process. I understand -him to mean, in the case supposed, that whereas in -reference to the idea or product of a measurable space we -have certain data or elements out of which to form that -idea, when we undertake to think of endless space we -transfer the notion of a measurable space to that of which -no measure can be predicated, and therefore we can have -no conception of endless space, but only a "formless consciousness -of the inscrutable." Let us see if this is sound.</p> - -<p>Take as a convenient idea of a measurable space the -92,000,000 miles from the earth to the sun, and lay it down -on paper. If, after having measured this space, we could -transport ourselves to the sun, we could extend the line in -the same direction beyond the sun, by laying down a further -measurement of 92,000,000 miles from the sun to any -object that we could observe beyond the sun. This process -we could repeat indefinitely and forever, if we could be -successively removed to the different stages at each point -of departure. But when an aggregate of such multiplied -measurements had been reached greater than could be expressed -in figures, we should still have the intellectual power -of thinking of an extension of space indefinitely beyond -that which we have measured. Nothing would have failed -us but the power of expressing in figures the endless extent -of space which lies beyond the utmost limit that we can -so express.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span></p> - -<p>It is precisely here, as I suppose, that Mr. Spencer's -"symbolizing process" and his "symbolized product" -come in. We have taken as the elements of thought the -idea of successive measurements of space; and the law of -thought permits us to have as a definite product whatever -extent of space can be marked off by such successive -measurements. But when we undertake to have, as the -product of thought, a consciousness, or conception, of endless -space, we have merely used the idea of a definite space -as a "symbol," or <em>simulacrum</em>, of that which is without -form, and is only a "formless consciousness of the inscrutable"—whatever -that means.</p> - -<p>Let us see what has happened. The power of measuring, -or describing in form, a definite extent of space, has -given us an idea of space. The product of our thought is -extension between two given points. Such extensions must -be capable of indefinite multiplication, although we can not -express in figures an indefinite multiplicand. The product -is then something beyond what we can express in a definite -form; but is it beyond the sphere of thought? What is -it? It is an idea which we deduce by a strict process of -reasoning, and to which we do not need to give and can not -give expression in figures. The process of reasoning is this: -Measurement has given us an idea of space; our faculty -of applying measurement is limited; but our faculty of -conceiving of space through which we could go on forever -multiplying such measurements, if we had the means, is -certainly a faculty of which all men are conscious who are -accustomed to analyze the processes of thought. In this -process we may reach that which in one sense is "inscrutable." -It is inscrutable, inasmuch as we can not understand -how eternity of space or time came to exist. Our -experience of phenomena enables us to have an idea of -space and time, and from the fact that we have measured -off portions of space or time, we deduce the fact that there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> -must be an eternity of both. It is immaterial whether we -call this a "symbolizing" process, or call it something else. -The product is an idea at which we arrive by a strict process -of reasoning. Eternity of space or time is an inscrutable -idea, when we attempt to inquire how it came to be. -That it exists, is an idea from which the human mind can -not escape, and which it reaches by a perfectly sound deduction. -We are all the while thinking of space or time, -whether we are thinking of that which is measurable, or of -that which is immeasurable.</p> - -<p>I now come to a passage in Mr. Spencer's recent article -which it is necessary to attempt to explain to the unlearned -reader, and to bring it, if possible, within the reach of -ordinary minds. This passage, which follows in his recent -article immediately after his quotation from his "Essays," -is the following:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Thus, then, criticisms like this of Mr. Martineau, often recurring -in one shape or other, and now again made by Mr. Harrison, do not -show the invalidity of my argument, but once more show the -imbecility of human intelligence when brought to bear on the ultimate -question. Phenomenon without noumenon is unthinkable; -and yet noumenon can not be thought of in the true sense of thinking. -We are at once obliged to be conscious of a reality behind -appearance, and yet can neither bring this consciousness of reality -into any shape, nor can bring into any shape its connection with -appearance. The forms of our thought, molded on experience of -phenomena, as well as the connotations of our words formed to express -the relations of phenomena, involve us in contradictions when -we try to think of that which is beyond phenomena; and yet the -existence of that which is beyond phenomena is a necessary datum -alike of our thoughts and our words. We have no choice but to -accept a formless consciousness of the inscrutable.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Some definitions must now be given. The word "phenomenon" -has become naturalized in our English tongue. -Derived as a noun from the Greek verb Φαίνομαι, <em>to appear</em>, -it means anything visible; whatever is presented to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> -the eye by observation or experiment, or what is discovered -to exist; as the phenomena of the natural world, the -phenomena of the heavenly bodies, of terrestrial substances, -the phenomena of heat and color.<a name="FNanchor_95" id="FNanchor_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> In this application the -word denotes what appears to us, or what we discover by -our senses. It is also used, in the plural, more loosely, to -denote occurrences or things which we observe to happen; -as when, speaking of physical occurrences, we mean physical -facts the happening of which we observe. Moral phenomena, -on the other hand, are the appearances exhibited -by the action of mind.</p> - -<p>The word <em>noumenon</em> has not become naturalized in our -language, and did not exist in Greek.<a name="FNanchor_96" id="FNanchor_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> It can convey no -intelligible meaning to common readers without tracing its -derivation, and when it is analyzed we can attribute to it -no meaning but a purely arbitrary one, even if we can -arrive at that arbitrary signification. In fact, it is a word -made by and for the school of Kant. Its first syllable is -the Greek noun νοῦς or νόος, which corresponds to our -English word <em>thought</em> or <em>intelligence</em>. The Greek verb -νοέω, <em>to think</em>, was primarily used as <em>I perceive</em>; the act of -the mind in seeing. This idea was distinct from εἴδω, -which conveyed the plain meaning of I <em>see</em>. But so subtile -were the Greeks in their use of words, that εἴδω was sometimes -used specifically to mean <em>to see with the mind's eye</em>, -or, as we sometimes say, to <em>realize</em>, or to have a mental -perception of. In the Greek use of the two words νοεω and -εἴδω, no distinction was made between <em>phenomenon</em> and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> -<em>noumenon</em>. To a cultivated Greek, <em>phenomenon</em> would -mean something perceived, and <em>noumenon</em>, if he had possessed -the word, would have had the same meaning. He -would have used the two words interchangeably, to express -either sight by the visual organs or mental perception. Mr. -Spencer uses them as if they meant different things, as if -<em>phenomenon</em> were something different from <em>noumenon</em>. -But <em>noumenon</em>, according to its derivation (for it is coined -as the participle of nοεων), means a thing, subject, or object, -<em>perceived by the mind</em>. The root idea is mind-action, the -verb νοεω meaning to do what the mind does in apprehending -a subject or object. So that the derivation of <em>noumenon</em> -does not help us to understand the Kantian or Spencerian -use of the word.</p> - -<p>As this use of the word is, then, purely arbitrary, we -must try to understand, as well as we can, what this arbitrary -meaning is. As well as I can fathom it, in contrast -with <em>phenomenon</em>, the meaning is that <em>phenomenon</em> is something -that we see, and <em>noumenon</em> is the ghost or double -of what we see. We see a thing with our eyes; but our -mind does not see it—it perceives its ghostly double. This -is <em>noumenon</em>.</p> - -<p>Penetrating, or trying to penetrate, a little further into -Mr. Spencer's meaning, it would seem that when he says -that <em>phenomenon</em> without <em>noumenon</em> is unthinkable, he -means that, although we can see a thing with our corporeal -eye, we can not think of it without the mental act of seeing -its image with the mind's eye; and then he adds that -<em>noumenon</em> can not be thought of in the true sense of thinking, -because <em>noumenon</em> is an abstraction or a mere ghost of -a subject or an object.</p> - -<p>What is all this but a kind of play upon words? We -are so constituted that the impressions which a thing external -to us produces upon our nerves of perception are -instantly transmitted to the brain, and the mind has an in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span>stantaneous -perception of that object. The phenomenon -which we see with our eyes, or become sensible of by touch, -thus becomes a thing perceived by the mind, and when we -think of it we do not think of its ghost, but we think of -the thing itself. Did Laura Bridgman, who had neither -eye-sight nor hearing nor speech, but who acquired all her -ideas of external objects by the sense of touch, conceive of -a round or a square, a rough or a smooth surface, by contemplating -the ghost or double of what she touched? And -had she no thinking in the true sense of thinking, because -the double, or <em>imago</em> of the thing which she touched—the -so-called <em>noumenon</em>—was at once necessary to her mental -perception, and yet could not be thought of without seeing -the object by the corporeal eye? She had no corporeal eye -in which there was any vision. All her mental perceptions -of external objects were acquired by the sense of touch -alone; and we may well believe that she did not need the -supposed <em>noumenon</em> to give her an idea of <em>phenomenon</em>. -She perceived many phenomena by the simple transmission -to her brain, along her nerves of touch, of the impressions -produced upon them by external objects; and there is -every reason to believe that many of her perceptions were -as accurate and true as those which we derive from all our -senses. We may now dismiss Mr. Spencer's distinction -between <em>phenomenon</em> and <em>noumenon</em> as a distinction quite -needless for the elucidation of what takes place in thinking -of that which is behind appearance, and may proceed -with the discussion of what remains of the passage above -quoted.</p> - -<p>At the risk of wearying by repetition, I will again resort -to the illustration before employed, and will again describe -how we reach the conception, for example, of endless space. -According to Mr. Spencer, space, or extension, as a thinkable -idea, or a subject of thought, is confined to a measurable -extent of space. This is the phenomenon, or appear<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span>ance. -All our forms of thought are, it is said, molded on -our experience of phenomena that are measurable, or capable -of being definitely described; and the connotations of -our words which express the relations of phenomena relate -to phenomena that we measure, or see, and can definitely -describe. Therefore, we can not think of a reality that is -behind appearance; can not bring the consciousness of -such a reality into any shape, nor bring into any shape its -connection with appearance.</p> - -<p>If mankind are never to think of that which is behind -appearance—can never think of a reality that is behind -what they see—because their forms of thought are molded -on experiences of phenomena that they see, and because -the connotations of their words express the relations of -those phenomena and no others, a vast domain of thinking -is necessarily closed to them. This is not the experience of -our minds. Every day of our lives we go on in search of -that which is beyond appearance, and we find it. Take -again, for example, the phenomena of a measurable portion -of space or time. What appears to us gives an idea of -space and time. We measure as great a portion of either -as our forms of expression admit of our describing by definite -terms, but we are immediately conscious of another -reality, an endless extension or duration, because we are -conscious that we have not exhausted and can not exhaust, -by our measurements and descriptions, the whole possible -existence of space or time. This new reality behind appearance -is just as truly thinkable, just as true a consciousness, -as is the measurable portion of time or space; for it -is time or space of which we are constantly thinking, -whether it is an extent or duration which we can describe -in words, or whether we can only say that it is extent or -duration without beginning and without end. Our minds -are so constituted that the existence which is manifested to -us by observable phenomena leads us to go behind the ap<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span>pearance -in search of another reality beyond that which is -manifested by the phenomena that we see. All that is inscrutable -about this other reality that lies behind appearance -is that we can not understand how it came to be, any -more than we can understand how the phenomenon which -we see and can measure and describe in a definite form -came to exist. We do not bring, and do not need to bring, -this other reality into connection with appearance. We -first have an idea of space and time from observable and -measurable phenomena. The reality of extension without -limit, and duration without end, follows of necessity, by a -process of thought which we can not escape.</p> - -<p>But now it becomes needful to answer a further objection. -I have said that we are all the while thinking of space, -whether it is a measurable and limited or an immeasurable -and illimitable space. Mr. Spencer, anticipating this obvious -statement, admits that the form of relation between -the two ideas, although "almost blank," preserves a certain -qualitative character; that is, it is of the quality of -space of which we think, whether it is measurable or immeasurable, -and therefore it remains "a vaguely identifiable -relation." But when, in place of one of the terms of -the relation qualitatively the same as the other, we substitute -an existence that can not be defined, and is therefore -both quantitatively and qualitatively unrepresentable, the -relation, he asserts, lapses entirely; one of the terms becomes -wholly "unknowable."</p> - -<p>I will not again repeat that extension or magnitude -having no known limits is a thinkable term, because the -subject of thought is the quality of extension or magnitude; -quantity not being essential to the idea of extension or -magnitude. But I will pass to the idea of an existence -which can not be defined. I suppose that by an existence -is meant a being. If we undertake to think of a being -whose quality we do not know to be the same as the quality<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> -of another being whom we do know, and the quantity of -whose powers and faculties we can not measure, we propose, -says Mr. Spencer, a term of impossible thought, because -the law of thought can not be conformed to; the -term can not be present to the mind, and no thinkable relation -can be framed. Let this supposed difficulty be tested -by a plain inquiry into that which we undertake to make -the subject of thought when we think of a being who is -said to be "unknowable."</p> - -<p>"Agnosticism" is a doctrine which eludes a definite -grasp. I have seen it defined by one of its most distinguished -professors in this way: "Agnosticism is of the -essence of science, whether ancient or modern. It simply -means that a man shall not say he knows or believes that -which he has no scientific grounds for professing to know -or believe.... Agnosticism simply says that we know -nothing of what may be beyond phenomena."<a name="FNanchor_97" id="FNanchor_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> Mankind -are apt to be rather practical in their habits of thinking: -experience teaches them that there is a well-founded distinction -between knowledge and belief, when it comes to -be a question of asserting the one or the other.<a name="FNanchor_98" id="FNanchor_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> They -find, too, by experience that, in regard to what they speak -of when they say that they know a thing, there is a distinction -to be observed in respect to the means of knowledge. -No one hesitates to say that he knows there was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> -such a man as Napoleon Bonaparte, although he never -saw him, and although our knowledge of him is now derived -from hearsay. But when we speak of knowing that a -certain living person was at a certain spot on a certain day, -we become immediately aware that in order to justify the -assertion we or some one ought to have seen the person at -the time and place, especially if anything important depends -upon the assertion. There are a great many things -that we say we know without scientific or other rigorous -proof, and there are a great many other things which we -do not say that we know without the kind of proof which -is required. All our actions in life proceed upon this distinction, -and we could not live in this world with any comfort -if we did not act upon the assumption that we know -things of which we have no scientific proof.</p> - -<p>A very clever <i lang="fr">jeu d'esprit</i> went the rounds of the periodical -press some time ago, in which a well-born and highly -educated young agnostic was represented as losing his birthright, -his <em>fiancée</em>, and all his prospects in life, because he -demanded rigorous proof of everything that affected him. -As he would not admit that he was the son of his own -parents, without having better proof of it than their assertion, -he was turned out-of-doors and disinherited. He -would not accept the bloom on the cheek of his mistress as -natural unless she gave him her word that she did not -paint; and he would not admit that they loved each other -without some better proof than their mutual feelings, -about which they might be mistaken. The young lady -indignantly dismissed him, but he consoled himself as a -martyr to the truth of agnosticism. He became tutor to -the son of a nobleman, whose belief in the boy's extraordinary -talents, although justified by his progress in his studies, -the tutor would not admit had the requisite proof. -He propounded his denial of what the father had no proper -grounds for maintaining, in an offensive way, and of course<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> -he lost his place. He retired to a sort of agnostic brotherhood, -glorying in his adhesion to truth. Some of his companions -remained long enough in the brotherhood to find -out that they were making fools of themselves, and at the -first opportunity for acting on the ordinary grounds of -knowing a fact without rigorous demonstration of it they -left him in solitude, went into the world, and achieved -success.</p> - -<p>"A man shall not say he knows or believes that which -he has no scientific grounds for professing to know or believe." -By "scientific grounds," I presume is meant, in -the case of a fact or occurrence, proper proof of the fact -or occurrence. This varies with the nature of the thing -which one professes to know. We constantly act upon -proofs which do not amount to demonstration, and there -could be no practical enjoyment of our lives and no safety -if we did not. If a government were to receive information -that a foreign army was on the border of the country -and about to invade it, and the information fell short of -being the testimony of eye-witnesses, what would be thought -of the rulers if they were to fold their hands and say that -they did not know the fact because they had no "scientific -grounds for professing to know it"? On the other hand, -if in a court of justice the question to be determined were -the presence of an individual at a certain place and at a -certain time, the established rules of evidence require certain -kinds of proof of the fact.</p> - -<p>Belief, however, is a conviction of something which may -or may not require what are called "scientific grounds" -before we can be permitted to profess that we believe. It -depends upon the thing which we profess to believe, and -upon the grounds on which we rest the belief, whether we -have or have not safe and sufficient means of belief. Belief -in the law of gravitation as a force operating throughout -the universe is arrived at as a deduction from scientific<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> -data. Belief in an existence beyond phenomena, in a being -who is the producing agent of the phenomena, depends -upon a great variety of grounds, some of which are scientific -data and some of which are the elements of moral -reasoning. We may not say that we "<em>know</em>" that God or -any other supernatural being exists, but we may say that we -"<em>believe</em>" in his existence. Here knowledge is one thing; -belief is another. Knowledge of the existence of God, like -knowledge of the existence of any other being, might come -to us through the testimony of a competent witness commissioned -and authorized to inform us. Belief in the existence -of God may be founded on many and various grounds -without the direct testimony of the competent witness; -and these grounds may be perfectly satisfactory without -being mathematical or scientific demonstration. It is a very -remarkable fact that some of the most eminent of the -school of agnosticism profess to have, and probably have, -the most undoubting faith in the theory and actual occurrence -of animal evolution, without any data, scientific or -other, which can enable other men to arrive at the same -conviction, whatever may be the character of the supposed -proofs. They certainly have no grounds for professing to -know that an evolution of species out of species has ever -taken place; and the grounds of their belief in the fact, -whether denominated "scientific" or called something else, -do not satisfy the rules of belief on which mankind must -act, in accordance with their mental and moral constitutions; -and this belief does not rise any higher in the scale -of moral probabilities than the belief in special creations, -nor does it rise so high. But to return to Mr. Spencer.</p> - -<p>If we did not act upon the process of thinking of another -reality than that which appearance gives, act upon -it fearlessly and by a mode of thinking to which we can -safely trust ourselves, science would stand still, there would -be no progress in physics, discoveries would cease, there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> -would be no improvement in morals, the world would remain -stationary. What did Columbus do, when, going -behind the phenomena that made the earth appear to be a -flat surface, he thought of it as a sphere? Did he break -the law of thought? He formed an idea of a reality behind -appearance, not by employing the phenomenal manifestations -to help him to the new conception, but by going -away from them in search of a reality that lay behind -them, and which they seemed to contradict. This conception -of a sphere as the reality of the earth's condition -proved to be the truth. He did not bring it, and did not -need to bring it, into connection with appearance. He did -not use, and did not need to use, the relations of the visible -phenomena to help him to attain his conception of a spherical -form of the earth. He contradicted them all.</p> - -<p>Did all the moral lawgivers who have reformed the -world break the law of thought, when, going behind the -phenomena of human conduct, with their relations pointing -to one idea of right and wrong, they conceived the idea -of a new and a better rule of life? When it was said, in -place of the old law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a -tooth, "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute -you"—when for the old rule of revenge there was substituted -forgiveness of injuries—something was inculcated -that contradicted all the appearances of the social phenomena, -and that lay beyond them. Did the consciousness -of this new reality become "a formless consciousness -of the inscrutable"? What is there about it that is inscrutable? -There is nothing inscrutable about it, or in the -consciousness of it, excepting the mode in which the being -who promulgated it came to exist. The idea of forgiveness -is clearly within the compass of human thought and of -human endeavor.</p> - -<p>When we are in the process of making a new physical -discovery, or of forming a new rule of moral action, we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> -work away from the materials which the phenomenal -manifestations give us, to a new conception. We become -conscious of a new reality behind appearance, and of an -existence beyond the relations of the phenomena with which -we have heretofore been familiar. It is to this striving after -realities behind appearances—striving by an entirely true -process of thinking—that the world owes its progress.</p> - -<p>When the phenomenal manifestations of an intellectual -and moral nature in man have given us the idea of an existence -of an intellectual and moral being as a reality of -which we become conscious, what is to prevent us from -thinking of another intellectual and moral being as a reality, -with faculties and powers immeasurably superior to -ours? It is true that the phenomenal manifestations of -man's intellectual and moral nature give us an idea of a -being of very limited faculties and very imperfect moral -qualities. But what is the "insoluble difficulty" in which -we become involved, when we think of a being whose faculties -are boundless, and whose moral nature is perfect? -Does the "insoluble difficulty" consist in the impossibility -of thinking of that which transcends all our powers of -measurement? All that we have done, in the case of man, -is to have a consciousness of a being whose phenomenal -manifestations evince the existence of an intellectual and -moral nature. He happens to be a being of very limited -faculties and very imperfect moral characteristics. What -prevents us from thinking, in the true sense of thinking, of -another being, whose powers are without limit, and whose -moral nature is perfect? Is it said that we can not bring -into any shape the idea of unlimited power or of perfect -goodness, or bring into any shape its connection with appearance, -because all our ideas of power and goodness, all -our forms of thought and expression, are molded on experiences -of limited power and imperfect goodness? The -truth is that we do not and need not strive to bring into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> -connection with appearance the idea of any quality which -we conceive of as unlimited. What we derive from the -phenomenal manifestations of human power and goodness -is a consciousness of the qualities of power and goodness. -It is perfectly correct thinking to reason that these qualities, -whose phenomenal manifestations, in the case of man, -show that in him they exist only in a limited degree, may -exist in another being in unlimited perfection and without -degree. Our minds are so constituted that we reason from -the finite to the infinite, by observing that one class of -phenomena evince the existence of the finite and another -class of phenomena evince the existence of the infinite.</p> - -<p>When, therefore, we pass from the phenomenal manifestations -of human power and goodness, we come into the -presence of other phenomena which we know could not be -and were not produced by such a limited and imperfect -being as man, but which must yet have had an author, a -maker, an originator, a creator. We thus contemplate and -investigate facts which show that the phenomena were the -products of a skill, wisdom, and power that transcend all -measurement. Is it said that the phenomena of nature, -stupendous and varied and minute and wonderful as they -are, evince only that a certain degree of power and wisdom -was exerted in their production, even if their production is -attributed to a being competent to bring them about? -And therefore that the idea of a being of unlimited faculties -and perfect goodness is as far as ever from our reach -by any true process of thought? This assumption begs -something that should not be taken for granted. It assumes -that the production of the phenomena of nature -does not evince unlimited power and perfect goodness; did -not call for the existence of boundless faculties and inexhaustible -benevolence; involved only a degree of such qualities, -although a vastly superior degree to that possessed -by us. The correctness of this assumption depends upon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> -the force of the evidence which nature affords of the character -of the Deity. It is an assumption which has led to -enormous errors—errors of conception and belief which -impute to the Supreme Being only a superior degree of -power and wisdom, greater than our own, but still limited -and imperfect, liable to error, and acting in modes which -distress us with contradictions and inconsistencies.</p> - -<p>It may without rashness be asserted that the phenomena -of the universe could not have been produced by a power -and wisdom that were subject to any limitations. While -all the researches of science, from the first beginnings of -human observation to the present moment, show that in -the production of the phenomena of nature there has been -exerted a certain amount of power and wisdom, they also -show that it is an amount which we can not measure; that -there is, moreover, a power and wisdom that have not been -exhausted; that the reserved force and skill and benevolence -are without limit. For, in every successive new discovery -that we make, in every new revelation of the power -and goodness which our investigations bring forth, we continuously -reach proofs of an endless capacity, an inexhaustible -variety of methods and of products. So that, if we conceive -of the whole human race, with all its accumulated -knowledge, as ending at last in one individual possessed of -all that has been learned on earth, and imagine him to be -then translated to another state of existence, with all his faculties -of observation and study preserved, and new fields of -inquiry to be opened to him, his experience on earth would -lead him to expect to find, and we must believe that in his -new experience he will find, that the physical and the moral -phenomena of the universe are an inexhaustible study; -that search and discovery must go on forever; and that -forever new revelations of power and goodness will be made -to the perceptions whose training began in a very limited -sphere. His experience in that limited sphere has taught<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> -him that there was no end to the discoveries which were -here partially within his reach. His experience in the new -sphere will be a continuation of his experience in the old -one; for there is a law by which we judge of the future by -the past. This law is one of the conditions of our intellectual -existence; an inevitable habit of our minds; imposed -upon us by an inexorable but familiar authority. -Our experience in this life has taught us that, in the investigation -of the phenomena of nature that are open to our -observation here, we have never reached the end of possible -discovery; that every fresh discovery has evinced that -there are still new things to be learned, new manifestations -of power to be revealed, new products and new methods to -be seen. However long we may suppose the human race to -exist on earth and its researches to be prosecuted here, we -must suppose an endless accumulation of knowledge hereafter, -because the law which compels us to judge of the -future by the past obliges us to accept as the fruition of -the future that which has been the fruition of the past.<a name="FNanchor_99" id="FNanchor_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a></p> - -<p>Is there in this any violation of the true law of thought? -Does the relation between our past experience and the experience -which we forecast for the future fade into a dim -symbol of a relation? On the contrary, both are equally -capable of mental representation; for we are mentally so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> -constituted that the consciousness of what has happened to -us in the past—the unending succession of new discoveries, -the constant accumulation of knowledge, which we have -experienced here—gives us the conception of the same endless -progress hereafter, compels us to believe in it, and enables -us to grasp it as a product of true thought.</p> - -<p>Mr. Spencer has much to say of "the imbecility of -human intelligence when brought to bear on the ultimate -question." What is the ultimate question? The ultimate -question with which science and philosophy are concerned -is the existence of the Supreme Being. It is of the utmost -consequence for us to understand wherein consists the imbecility -of human intelligence when brought to bear upon -this question of the existence of God. How does our imbecility -manifest itself? What is the point beyond which -thought can not go? We become conscious of the existence -of the being called man, because, from the phenomena -which we know that he produces by the exercise of his will -and power, and which we know must have had an author and -producer, we deduce an existence beyond the phenomena, -an actor in their production. What more, or what that is -different, do we do or undertake to do, when, from the -phenomena of nature which we know that man did not -produce, we think of another existence beyond the phenomena? -In both cases, we study the phenomena by our -senses and powers of observation; in both cases we reason -that there is an actor who produces the phenomena; yet -the existence of the actor who produces the phenomena is -inscrutable in the case of the Deity in the same sense and -for the same reason that it is inscrutable in the case of man. -How the human mind came to exist, by what process it was -made to exist, by what means it was created, what was the -genesis of the human intellect, is just as inscrutable, no -more and no less so, as the mode in which the Deity came -to exist. In both cases the existence of a being is what we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> -think of; and when we think of either being we think -of that which is beyond phenomena but which we deduce -from phenomena. In neither case do we "accept a formless -consciousness of the inscrutable"; for what we accept is -the consciousness of a being, and it is not a consciousness of -the mode in which he came to exist. The latter consciousness -is the inscrutable problem. The existence is what we -think of, and we think of it by a perfectly true process of -thought, deducing it from the simple truth that the phenomena -must have had an actor in their production. We -do not undertake to think of the process by which man -was created, or of the mode in which that other existence -came to be without beginning and without end.</p> - -<p>I have thus discriminated between what we do and what -we do not think of, when we think of an existence beyond -phenomena, but which we deduce from phenomena. This -is a most necessary discrimination; for, in thinking of the -existence, we do not try to think how it came to be an existence. -We think only of the existence; and we deduce -it from our observation and study of phenomena, which -teach us that they must have had an actor, an author, a -producer, and that they did not produce or create themselves.</p> - -<p>It remains for me to advert to Mr. Spencer's theory of -the origin of the religious consciousness, or the origin of -the idea of supernatural beings, and hence of one highest -supernatural being. This is his ghost-theory. He has recently -told us that in his "Descriptive Sociology"—a -work commenced in 1867, and which preceded his "Principles -of Sociology" (written in 1874)—he caused to be -gathered adequate materials for generalization, consisting -of a great number of excerpts from the writings of travelers -and historians who have given accounts of the religious beliefs -of the uncivilized races. He numbers 697 of these -extracts which refer to the ghost-theory, and only 87 which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> -refer to fetichism. This great ratio of eight to one he considers -overwhelming proof that the ghost-theory, as opposed -to fetichism, is sustained by the beliefs of a vast majority -of the uncivilized races. What if it is? What is the -ghost-theory, and what is fetichism, as the chief source and -origin of religion? Mr. Spencer, in his recent article, explains -fetichism as most persons understand it, namely, -the worship of inanimate objects, or belief in their supernatural -powers. The ghost-theory, which his 697 extracts -illustrate, is "the belief in a wandering double, which goes -away during sleep, or fainting, and deserts the body for a -longer period at death; a double which can enter and possess -other persons, causing disease, epilepsy, insanity, etc., -which gives rise to ideas of spirits, demons, etc., and which, -originates propitiation and worship of ghosts."<a name="FNanchor_100" id="FNanchor_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> Further -on, he reiterates his ghost-theory as the origin of religious -beliefs, and explains it thus:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Setting out with the statement that "unlike the ordinary consciousness, -the religious consciousness is concerned with that which -lies beyond the sphere of sense," I went on to show that the rise of -this consciousness begins among primitive men with the belief in a -double belonging to each individual, which, capable of wandering -away from him during life, becomes his ghost or spirit after death; -and that from this idea of a being eventually distinguished as supernatural, -there develop, in course of time, the ideas of supernatural -beings of all orders up to the highest. Mr. Harrison has alleged that -the primitive religion is not belief in and propitiation of the ghost, -but is worship of "physical objects treated frankly as physical objects" -(p. 498). That he has disproved the one view and proved -the other, no one will, I think, assert. Contrariwise, he has given -occasion for me to cite weighty authorities against him.</p> - -<p>Next it was contended that in the assemblage of supernatural -beings thus originating in each tribe, some, derived from chiefs, -were superior to others; and that, as the compounding and recompounding -of tribes gave origin to societies having social grades and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> -rulers of different orders, there resulted that conception of a hierarchy -of ghosts or gods which polytheism shows us. Further it -was argued that while, with the growth of civilization and knowledge, -the minor supernatural agents became merged in the major -supernatural agent, this single great supernatural agent, gradually -losing the anthropomorphic attributes at first ascribed, has come in -our days to retain but few of them; and, eventually losing these, -will then merge into a consciousness of an Omnipresent Power to -which no attributes can be ascribed. This proposition has not been -contested.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Without entering into any consideration of what Mr. -Harrison has disproved or proved, as between fetichism and -the ghost-theory, I will now ask why the beliefs of the uncivilized -races, or of the primitive men, should be regarded -as important evidence of the origin of beliefs among civilized -and cultivated men? Is modern philosophy, in accounting -for or justifying the belief in a Supreme Being -which is held to-day by most of the cultivated and educated -part of mankind, to assign its origin to the primitive and -uncivilized men? Is the whole idea of a supernatural -being to be regarded as traditionally handed down from -our barbarian ancestors? Is there no other source from -which we can derive that idea? Are we none of us capable -of finding for ourselves rational grounds of belief in a supernatural -agent, deducing his existence from a study of -nature? Or must we trace this belief back through the -ages until we arrive at an origin which we shall of course -despise? What has philosophy to do now with "the -primitive religion"? Is there nothing that science and -reason and disciplined methods of thought and sound -deduction can teach us? Are we to throw away all the -proofs which nature spreads before us, and for the investigation -of which we have accumulated so many facilities, -and turn to the beliefs of uncivilized men? Are the conceptions -of supernatural beings, to which a barbarian at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span>tained, -to be taken as the origin of the conception of a -personal God to which an educated philosopher can now -attain? And because of the inadequate and childish superstitions -of the past, and of their growth into a belief of one -supreme supernatural agent—whatever that idea of him may -have been—is the consciousness which we have of a personal -God to be hereafter merged into a consciousness of -an Omnipresent Power to which no attributes can be ascribed?</p> - -<p>It should seem that the mode in which philosophy, after -it came to be cultivated by civilized thinkers and observers, -freed itself first from fetichism and the ghost-theory and -all the beliefs of polytheism, next from physical agents as -the causes of all phenomena, and finally attained an independent -conception of a First Cause as a supreme personal -intelligence and power, is worthy of some consideration.</p> - -<p>In the first chapter of this work, borrowing from the -English scholar and critic, Mr. Grote, I have given a condensed -account of some of the systems of Greek philosophy -which began in the first half of the sixth century before -Christ, and extended down to Plato, whose life was embraced -in 427-347 of the ante-Christian era. About 150 -<span class="smcap">B. C.</span>, the Greek philosophy, and especially the speculations -of Plato, encountered at Alexandria the monotheism of the -Hellenizing Jews.<a name="FNanchor_101" id="FNanchor_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> This history of Greek philosophy, as -developed by Mr. Grote, shows that the struggle against -polytheistic agencies, as the causes of natural phenomena, -began with efforts to find purely physical agencies; that -this struggle, in spite of the surrounding beliefs in a multitude -of supernatural beings of different orders, was long -continued, and gave rise to a most remarkable variety of -scientific explanations: that it passed through an extraordinary -number of physical theories, until at length in Plato<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> -there was developed the idea of a distinct personal constructive -actor, the Demiurgus, a being to whom, whether -intended by Plato as a philosophical myth, or as an entity -in which he had something of faith or conviction, he assigned -the formation of his Kosmos. With characteristic -acumen, the English commentator points out Plato's skill -in eluding the possible charge of infidelity to the established -religion of Athens, while he at the same time propounded -the existence of a personal First Cause that was in a striking -degree inconsistent with the popular faith. The whole -course of this history of Greek speculation evinces that -from an early period the Greek philosophers were utter -skeptics in regard to the popular religion and the poetic -traditions; that they not only did not derive anything from -the primitive religion, from fetichism, from the ghost-beliefs -of their barbarian ancestors—if their ancestors had -such beliefs—or from their heroic ages, or from the multitudinous -gods of the popular theology and the popular -worship, or from the old poetical imagery, but that they -strove to get away from all these sources, and to construct -theories of the universe that would explain the ultimate -cause or causes in a very different manner. The earliest -Greek speculators got no further in their theories than the -construction of systems of physical agencies, or agencies -that stood to them in the quality of physical actors. Plato, -on the other hand, resorted to the conception of a supreme -personal actor.</p> - -<p>Mr. Grote has further mentioned a very striking fact, -which is, that before the Christian era, the Demiurgus of -Plato was received by the Hellenizing Jews at Alexandria as -a conception kindred to the God of Moses. His statement, -in substance the same as that previously made by a Continental -critic, Gfrörer, is so interesting and important -that I quote his words: "But though the idea of a pre-kosmic -Demiurgus found little favor among the Grecian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> -schools of philosophy before the Christian era, it was greatly -welcomed among the Hellenizing Jews at Alexandria, -from Aristobulus (about <span class="smcap">B. C.</span> 150) down to Philo. It -formed the suitable point of conjunction between Hellenic -and Judaic speculation. The marked distinction drawn by -Plato between the Demiurgus, and the constructed or generated -Kosmos, with its in-dwelling gods, provided a suitable -place for the Supreme God of the Jews, degrading the -pagan gods by comparison. The 'Timæus' was compared -with the book of Genesis, from which it was even affirmed -that Plato had copied. He received the denomination of -the Atticising Moses—Moses writing in Attic Greek. It -was thus that the Platonic 'Timæus' became the medium -of transition from the polytheistic theology, which served -as philosophy among the early ages of Greece, to the omnipotent -monotheism to which philosophy became subordinated -after the Christian era."<a name="FNanchor_102" id="FNanchor_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a></p> - -<p>Perhaps there is no more remarkable fact than this in -the whole history of philosophical speculation. Possibly -Mr. Spencer would say that it adds another proof to his -ghost-theory. But the important fact is that Plato's Demiurgus -partakes in no degree of the ghost idea, and, instead -of being a modification of that idea, is an original and perfectly -independent conception. The Demiurgus of Plato -is not a chief spirit evolved in imagination out of a hierarchy -of spirits. He is himself the originator and fashioner -of the gods, of whom he makes use as ministers in -the formation of the bodies of the primitive men, after he -has himself formed the souls which are to inhabit them for -a season.</p> - -<p>It appears, by Mr. Grote's citations from Gfrörer, that -the latter had previously noted what Aristobulus maintained -one hundred and fifty years earlier than Philo,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> -namely, that "not only the oldest Grecian poets, Homer, -Hesiod, Orpheus, etc., but also the most celebrated thinkers, -especially Plato, had acquired all their wisdom from a very -old translation of the Pentateuch." Neither of these modern -critics appears to have accepted the assertion of Aristobulus, -and its intrinsic improbability is very great. Certainly -the internal evidence of the "Timæus" negatives -the assumption that Plato had seen the Pentateuch, for his -Demiurgus is not the God of Moses, although it was very -natural for the Alexandrian Jews to think they recognized a -resemblance. Mr. Grote, moreover, seems to put this matter -beyond doubt, for he says that the Platonic "Timæus" -<em>became the medium of transition</em> from the polytheism of -early Greece to the monotheism of the Christian era. This -implies very clearly that Mr. Grote did not consider the -Demiurgus of Plato to be either derived from the polytheism -of the early Grecian ages, on the one hand, or from -the Mosaic Jehovah, on the other hand, but that he considered -it a conception which stood between them. The -point of resemblance is in the idea of a divine and supreme -personal actor in the production of phenomena.</p> - -<p>It does not seem, therefore, that a philosopher at the -present day is confined to the source of the primitive religion, -be that source what it may. The primitive religion, -whether its origin was fetichism or a belief in ghosts, has -imposed no shackles upon our minds. The beliefs of the -primitive men may have originated as Mr. Spencer supposes, -but the question for us—revelation being laid aside—is -just what it was for Plato, the difference being that our -means of investigation are superior to his. The grounds -of our belief in a personal God are not the same as those -on which the uncivilized races formed first the idea of a -wandering double emanating from the human body, then -conceived of spirits or ghosts, next of different orders of -spirits or ghosts, and finally of a chief and supreme spirit.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> -Our materials for sound deduction are not the same as -those of the primitive races of mankind, or of the uncivilized -tribes of the present day. I have before remarked -that the intellectual effort of a savage in striving for the -idea of a deity is the same kind of effort as that of the -civilized and educated man; but that the difference between -them is in the growth and activity of the reasoning -power, and in the materials on which it is exercised. While -our barbarian predecessors lived in an age of ignorance, we -live in an age of knowledge. We are surrounded by extraordinary -discoveries, and are possessed of the means of -still further research. They had almost no means for investigating -physical phenomena. We are, or ought to be, -disciplined reasoners. They, on the contrary, while able -to reason correctly on a very few subjects, could not reason -correctly on all subjects. We are, or ought to be, capable -of subjecting the materials which the phenomena of nature -spread before us, to sound processes of thought and to -logical deductions. We are, or ought to be, capable of discriminating -between that which is really inscrutable and -that which is not so. We are, or ought to be, able to know -when we are within the bounds of possible thought, and -when we transcend them. We are, or ought to be, able to -see that the existence of phenomena necessarily implies a -causing power; that when the phenomena are such as we -know that man produces, the idea of an intelligent personal -actor is both a legitimate deduction and a perfectly -appreciable subject of thought. Are we not entitled to -apply the same reasoning to the phenomena of nature which -we know that man did not produce? And when we so -reason, do we borrow anything whatever from the primitive -idea of ghosts or spirits, whether they are supposed to have -first emanated from human bodies, or to reside in inanimate -objects?</p> - -<p>There are two distinct values to be assigned to the re<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span>searches -of science. One of them consists in the practical -improvement of the material condition of society; the lessening -of physical evil, the increase of physical good; the -advancement of our power over matter. In an age intensely -devoted to this materialistic improvement, there will be -a great accumulation of physical knowledge. At the same -time there are accumulating in the same ratio new materials -for philosophical speculation concerning the causes of -the phenomena that are investigated. The specialists who -carry on the investigations may not always be the best -reasoners in the application of the new materials to the -purpose of philosophical inquiry into the producing causes -of the phenomena. But the other distinct value of their -investigations consists in the accumulation of materials -from which the philosopher can deduce the existence of an -actor in the production of the phenomena. When, from -these materials, constantly accumulating and constantly to -be used in a uniform process of reasoning to which the -human mind is both able and obliged to resort, the philosopher -deduces the conception of a supreme, personal, intelligent -being, he assigns to that being just those attributes -which the phenomena of nature compel him to believe in, -because if the attributes did not exist the phenomena of -nature could not have become what they are. There can -be no reason to suppose that as the materials increase, as -the researches of science, for whatever purpose carried on, -lead to greater and still greater accumulations of knowledge, -the law of thought by which we deduce the idea of -an actor in the production of phenomena will change, or -that the logical necessity for conceiving, or the intellectual -capacity to conceive of, the attributes of that actor will -either diminish or fade away. An Omnipotent Power -without attributes, or one to which no attributes can be -assigned, is not likely to be the end of all philosophical -speculation about the ultimate cause. Power without at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span>tributes, -power without a determining will, power without -guidance, or purposes, or objects, is not a conception to -which a well-trained intellect is now likely to attain; and -the greater the accumulation of physical knowledge becomes, -the greater will be the necessity to such an intellect -for recognizing attributes, and for assigning them to the -power which is manifested by the phenomena.</p> - -<p>According to Mr. Spencer, the process by which mankind -are ultimately to lose the consciousness of a personal -Deity is the following: Anthropomorphic attributes were at -first ascribed to the single great supernatural agent of -whom the primitive men conceived. But in our days, the -idea of such a supreme supernatural agent has come to retain -but a few of these attributes. These few will eventually -be lost, and there will be nothing left but a consciousness -of an Omnipotent Power to which no attributes can -be ascribed. The probability of this result depends upon -the necessity for ascribing what are called anthropomorphic -attributes to the Supreme Being; or, in other words, it depends -upon the inquiry whether, in order to ascribe to the -Supreme Being any attributes at all, we are necessarily -confined to those which are anthropomorphic.</p> - -<p>"Anthropomorphism," a term compounded from the -Greek ἄνθρωπος, man, and μορφή, form, has come to signify -the representation of the Deity under a human form, -or with human attributes and affections. It is therefore -important to know what we in fact do, when reasoning on -the phenomena of nature, we reach the conclusion that -they must have had an author or producer, and then ascribe -to him certain attributes. The fact that the ancient religious -beliefs ascribed to the Supreme Being grossly anthropomorphic -attributes, is unimportant. So is the fact that -the anthropomorphic attributes have been slowly diminishing -in the conceptions of the reasoning and cultivated part -of mankind. The really important question is whether<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> -there can be no conception of a Supreme Being without -ascribing to him attributes which liken him to man; or -whether, when the anthropomorphic attributes are lost, -the idea of a personal God will be lost.</p> - -<p>The essential character of any anthropomorphic or human -attribute—power for example, or wisdom, or goodness—is -that it is limited, imperfect, and liable to error. But -when we conceive of these qualities as existing in absolute -perfection and boundless capacity, while we retain the idea -that they are personal qualities, we in fact divest them of -their anthropomorphic or human character. It is a contradiction -in terms to say that an imperfect human capacity -is the same attribute as a divine and unlimited capacity. -The difficulty with the ancient religious beliefs, the -whole error of anthropomorphism, was that the conceptions -stopped short of the idea of unlimited power, wisdom, and -benevolence. The attributes ascribed to the Deity likened -him to man in form, character, powers, dispositions, passions. -He was an exaggerated human being, with vastly -more power, more skill, more wisdom, but still with the -same kind of power, skill, and wisdom, actuated by like -motives and governed by like passions. Now the truth is, -that the difference between a limited and imperfect attribute -of character and one that is boundless—power, for example—is -more than a difference of degree. It is a difference -in kind; for while in both cases we conceive of a personal -capacity to act and a will to guide the act, in the one -case we are thinking of that which is inferior, limited, and -feeble, and in the other case we are thinking of that which -knows no limitations and is absolutely inexhaustible. It -is not true, therefore, that there can be no conception of a -Supreme Being without ascribing to him human attributes. -When we reason from phenomena to the conclusion that -they must have had an author—when we reach the conviction -that phenomena must have had a cause, that there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> -must have been an actor, a process, and a product—we -have to deal with two classes of phenomena. One is the -class in which we know, from the observations of our senses -and our experience, that the author and actor was man. -It becomes verified to us with irresistible certainty that the -phenomena of human society were produced by an actor, -and that that actor was man; a personal agent with a -limited and imperfect power. When we turn to the phenomena -of nature which we know that man did not produce, -we are led by the same irresistible logical sequence of -thought to the conviction that these phenomena must have -been caused to exist, for human reason revolts at the idea -that the phenomena which exist were not caused to exist. -We come immediately to perceive that the phenomena of -nature are of such a character that the power which has -produced them must not only have been superhuman, but -it must have been absolutely boundless. At the moment -we depart from the investigation of phenomena which belong -in the department of human efforts, and come to the phenomena -which belong in the department of nature alone, -while the necessity for a personal actor continues, the character -and capacities of the actor become entirely changed. -We see that the phenomena of nature required for their -production power without limitation, skill incapable of -error, benevolence that was inexhaustible. We thus pass -entirely away from anthropomorphic attributes, to the conception -of attributes that are not human. We may go on -to divest the idea of a Supreme Being of all the attributes -that can appropriately be classed as anthropomorphic, and -there will still remain the conception of a Supreme Being to -whom we not only may but must ascribe attributes that are -forced upon our convictions, not because some of them belong -in an inferior degree to man, but because all of them are of -such a character that if they did not exist in boundless -perfection the phenomena of nature could not have existed.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span></p> - -<p>Among the origins which have been assigned to religious -beliefs, there is one remarkable hypothesis which may -be contrasted with the ghost-theory, and which, so far as -the beliefs of cultivated men at the present day are concerned, -is about as important as the origin of the belief in -ghosts, or as fetichism. It seems that some of the Greek -philosophers and historians, entirely regardless of the ghost-theory -as the origin of beliefs in supernatural beings, considered -that they were fictions invented by the first lawgivers, -and promulgated by them for useful purposes. Belief -in the gods was thus imposed by the authority of those -who organized society and dictated what men were to believe -in order to exercise a useful restraint. Plato himself -regarded this as the origin of what the communities around -him believed respecting the attributes and acts of the gods; -the matters believed being fictions prescribed by the lawgivers. -In his "Republic," in which he sketches the entire -political, social, ethical, and religious constitution of -an ideal city, assuming it to be planned and put in operation -by an absolute and unlimited authority, he laid it -down as essential for the lawgiver to determine what the -fictions were to be in which his own community were to -be required to believe. Some fictions there must be; for -in the community there would be originally nothing but a -vague emotional tendency to belief in supernatural beings, -and this tendency must be availed of by some positive -mythical inventions which it was for the lawgiver to produce -and the citizens to accept. Such fictions were the -accredited stories about the gods and heroes, which formed -the religious beliefs among Plato's contemporaries, and -were everywhere embodied in the works of poets, painters, -and sculptors, and in the religious ceremonies. But the -ancient fictions were, in Plato's opinion, bad, inasmuch as -they gave wrong ethical ideas of the characters of the gods. -They did not rest upon traditionary evidence, or divine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> -inspiration, being merely pious frauds, constructed by authority -and for an orthodox purpose. But they did not -fulfill the purpose as well as they should have done. Accordingly, -Plato directs in his "Republic" the coinage of -a new body of legends, for which he claims no character of -veracity, but which will be more in harmony with what he -conceives to be the true characters of the gods, and will -produce a more salutary ethical effect upon those who are -to be the efficient rulers of the commonwealth after it is -founded. As the founder of his ideal city, he claims and -exercises an exclusive monopoly of coining and circulating -such fictions, and they are to be absolutely accepted by -those who are to constitute its rulers, and who are to promulgate -and teach them to the community, as the physician -administers wholesome remedies. To prevent the -circulation of dissenting narratives, he establishes a peremptory -censorship. There is thus no question of absolute -truth or absolute falsehood. That is true which is stamped -at the mint of the lawgiver, and that is false which he -interdicts.<a name="FNanchor_103" id="FNanchor_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a></p> - -<p>Nowhere has orthodoxy been rested more distinctly -upon the basis of absolute human authority—authority acting -upon the highest motives of the public good, for the -most salutary purposes, but without claiming anything in -the nature of divine inspiration, or even pretending to any -other truth than conformity to preconceived ideas of the -characters of the gods. As evidence of what Plato regarded -as the origin of the religious beliefs which were held by -his contemporaries, his "Republic" is an important testimony; -for he assigns almost nothing to mankind in general, -but an emotional tendency to believe in invisible -quasi-human agents, of whom they had no definite conceptions, -and at the same time they were entirely ignorant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> -of recorded history, past and present. They needed distinct -legendary fictions and invented narratives; these were -furnished to them by those who could coin them, and were -accepted upon the authority of those who promulgated -them. Those who first embodied the fictions as narratives -were the oldest poets; in progress of time the authority -which dictated belief in them came to be the state. Plato -rejected the fictions of the state, and in his "Republic" -proposed to substitute fictions of his own. The testimony -of Plato, therefore, in respect to the origin of religious beliefs -in the early ages of Greece is decidedly against the -ghost-theory, whatever support may be found for that -theory in the beliefs of the uncivilized races of our own -day, or in the beliefs of other nations of antiquity. But -neither the ghost-theory, as the origin of beliefs in supernatural -beings, nor the origin of such beliefs in the will -of the lawgiver, which Plato clearly held in his "Republic" -to be the foundation of orthodoxy, is any test or measure -of what philosophy may attain to as a rational conception -at the present day.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_104" id="FNanchor_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a></p> - -<p>I propose, therefore, to imagine a man of mature years, -without any religious prepossessions whatever, a perfectly -independent thinker, furnished with the knowledge that is -now within the easy reach of human acquisition, capable -of correct reasoning, and with no bias to any kind of belief. -It is only necessary to personify in one individual the intellectual -capacity of the cultivated and educated part of -mankind, but without the religious ideas instilled into -them by education, in order to have a valuable witness to -the mental processes and results which can be followed and -attained by a right employment of our faculties. And, the -better to exhibit the processes and results, I propose to let -this imaginary person discuss in the form of dialogue, in -which another imaginary interlocutor shall be a modern -disciple of the evolution school, whatever topics would be -likely to come into debate between such persons.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII.</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="intro">The existence, attributes, and methods of God deducible from the phenomena -of Nature—Origin of the solar system.</p> - - -<p>In all that has been said in the preceding chapters respecting -the two hypotheses of special creation and evolution, the -existence and attributes of the Supreme Being have been -assumed. The question of the existence and attributes of -God has been reserved for discussion as an independent inquiry; -and this inquiry it is now proposed to make, without -any reference to the teachings of revealed religion, or -to the traditionary beliefs of mankind. The simple idea of -God, which I suppose to be capable of being reached as a -philosophical deduction from the phenomena of the universe, -embraces the conception of a Supreme Being existing -from and through all eternity, and possessed of the attributes -of infinite power and goodness, boundless, that is to -say in faculties, incapable of error, and of supreme beneficence. -While this idea of God corresponds with that which -has been held from an early period under more or less of the -influence exerted by teachings which have been accepted -as inspired, or as authorized by the Deity himself, the question -here to be considered is whether the same idea of God -is a rationally philosophical deduction from the phenomena -of the universe without the aid of revelation.</p> - -<p>In order to conduct this inquiry so as to exclude all influence -of traditionary beliefs derived from sources believed -to have been inspired, or from any authority whatever, let<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> -us suppose a man to have been born into this world in -the full maturity of average human faculties, as they are -found in well-disciplined intellects of the present age, but -without any inculcated ideas on religious subjects. In the -place of education commencing in infancy and carried on -to the years of maturity, in the course of which more or -less of dogmatic theology would have become incorporated -almost with the texture of the mind, let us suppose that -the mind of our inquirer is at first a total blank in respect -to a belief in or conception of such a being as God, but -that his intellectual powers are so well developed that he -can reason soundly upon whatever comes within the reach -of his observation or study. Let us further imagine him -to be so situated that he can command at will the knowledge -that science, as it now exists, could furnish to him, -and that he is able to judge impartially any theories with -which he meets. Such a person would be likely to deal -rationally and independently with any question that might -arise in the course of his investigations; and the fundamental -question that would be likely to present itself to his -mind would be, How came this universe and its countless -phenomena to exist?</p> - -<p>Stimulated by an eager curiosity, but careful to make -his investigations with entire coolness of reasoning, let us -suppose that our inquirer first turns his attention to the -phenomena of the solar system, and to what astronomy can -teach him in regard to its construction. He finds it to -consist of—</p> - -<p>1. The sun, a great central body giving forth light and -heat.</p> - -<p>2. A group of four interior planets: Mercury, Venus, the -Earth, and Mars.</p> - -<p>3. A group of small planets, called asteroids, revolving -beyond the orbit of Mars, and numbering, according to the -latest discoveries, about two hundred and twenty.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span></p> - -<p>4. A group of four planets beyond the asteroids: Jupiter, -Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune.</p> - -<p>5. The satellites of the planets, of which there are -twenty now known; all but three of them belonging to -the outer planets.</p> - -<p>6. An intermediate number of bodies called comets and -meteors, which revolve in very eccentric orbits.</p> - -<p>This system of bodies, constituting a mechanism by itself, -apart from what are called the fixed stars, is the first -object in nature to which our inquirer directs his studies. -Inasmuch as the comets and meteors move in very eccentric -orbits, and are supposed to come into our system from -the illimitable spaces beyond it, although in the case of the -comets, or some of them, mathematical calculations enable -astronomers to predict their return when they have -passed out of the solar system, and inasmuch as the sun -and the superior planets may be contemplated as a grand -piece of mechanism, and as the greatest mechanical object -in nature of whose construction and movements we have -some accurate knowledge, we will suppose that our inquirer -confines his attention to this part of the solar system, without -adverting to the action of the bodies which are not always, -as these are, within the range of the telescope.</p> - -<p>One of the first things that would strike him would be -the enormous range in the sizes, distances, and relative -weights of these different bodies. He would learn, for example, -that Neptune is eighty times as far from the sun as -Mercury, and that Jupiter is several thousand times as -heavy; and he would observe that these differences in magnitude, -distance from the sun, and weight of each mass, are -carried through a range of proportions stupendously great. -If he followed the best lights of modern astronomy, he -would learn that what is known, or accepted as known, in -regard to the operation of any law among these bodies, is -that they are bound together by the law of universal gravi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span>tation -as a force to which all matter would be subjected -when it should come to exist, in whatever forms it might -be distributed; secondly, that when the bodies now composing -the solar system should come into existence, the -system would not owe its proportions to the operation of -the law of gravitation, but would be the result of a plan so -shaped as to admit of its being governed by the law of -gravitation after the system had been made, in such a manner -as to produce regularity and certainty of movement -and to prevent dislocation and disturbance. What the great -modern telescopes have enabled astronomers to discover -tends very strongly to show that the plan of the solar system, -in respect to the relative distances, magnitudes, and -revolutions of the different bodies around the sun, and -their relations to that central body and to each other, are -not the result of any antecedent law which gradually -evolved this particular plan, but that the plan itself was -primarily designed and executed as one on which the law -of gravitation could operate uniformly, and so as to prevent -any disturbance in the relations of the different bodies -to each other.<a name="FNanchor_105" id="FNanchor_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a></p> - -<p>An illustration will help to make the meaning of this -apparent. Let us suppose a human artificer to project the -formation of a complex mechanism, in which different -solid bodies would be made to revolve around a central -body; and let us imagine him to be situated outside of the -earth's attraction, so that its attraction would not disturb -him. He would then have to consider the law of gravitation -only in reference to its operation among the different -bodies of his machine; and he would adjust their relative -distances, weights, and orbits of revolution around the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span> -central body, so that the law of gravitation, instead of producing -dislocation and disturbance, would bind the whole -together in a fixed system of movement, by counteracting -the centrifugal tendency of a revolving body to depart -from its intended orbit, and at the same time relying on -the effect of the two forces in preventing the revolving -bodies from falling into the center or from rushing off into -the endless realms of space.</p> - -<p>This is what may well be supposed to have taken place -in the formation of the solar system, for it is consistent -with the law which must have preceded the existence of -that system. We can not suppose that the law of gravitation -was itself a mere result of the relative distances, magnitudes, -and orbits of the different bodies. This supposition -would make gravitation not a law, but a phenomenon. -We do indeed arrive at the existence of the law of gravitation -by observing the actions of the bodies which compose -the solar system; in other words, we discover the law that -holds them together, by observing their actions. But we -should entirely reverse the proper process of reasoning, if -we were to conclude that the law of gravitation is a phenomenon -resulting from an arrangement of certain bodies -according to a certain plan. The discoveries of astronomy, -on the contrary, should lead us to regard gravitation as a -universal law, which existed before the existence of the -bodies which have been subjected to it. This is the only -way in which our inquirer could reason in regard to the -formation of the solar system, whether he supposed its -plan to have been a special creation, or to have been evolved -out of a nebulous vapor by the operation of the laws of -motion or any other laws. Reasoning upon the hypothesis -that the law of gravitation existed before there were any -bodies for it to operate upon, or, in other words, that it had -become in some way an ordained or established principle by -which all bodies would be governed, he would have the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> -means of understanding the adaptation of the solar system -to be operated upon by the law which he had discovered.</p> - -<p>He would next ask himself, How came this law of -gravitation to exist? That it must have had an origin, -must have proceeded from some lawgiver competent to -make and enforce it, would be a conclusion to which he -would be irresistibly led, for the very idea of a law implies -that it is a command proceeding from an authority and -power capable of ordaining and executing it. When it is -said that a law is a rule of action ordained by a supreme -power, which is perhaps the most familiar as it is the most -exact definition, the idea of a command and of a power to -enforce it is necessarily implied. This is just as true of a -physical as it is of a moral law; of a law that is to govern -matter as of a law that is to govern moral and accountable -beings. Both proceed from a supreme authority and -power, and both are commands. There is, however, one -distinction between a moral law and a law of Nature, which -relates to the mode in which we arrive at a knowledge of -the law; a distinction which our inquirer would learn in -the course of his investigations. We infer the existence of -a law of Nature, or a law designed to operate upon matter, -from the regularity and uniformity of certain physical phenomena. -As the phenomena occur always in the same way -we infer it to be an ordinance of Nature that they shall occur -in that way. But the moral phenomena exhibited by -the actions of men have not this regularity and uniformity. -They are sometimes in accordance with and sometimes -grossly variant from any supposed rule of moral action. -We can not, therefore, deduce a moral law from our observation -of the actions of the beings whom it was designed -to govern, but we must discover it from the rules of right -reason and from such information as has been given to us -by whatever revelation may have come to us from another<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> -source than our own minds. But this distinction between -the modes of reaching a knowledge of physical and moral -laws does not apply to the authority from which they have -proceeded. Both of them being commands, or fixed rules -of action, both must have had an enacting authority. We -learn the one by observing the phenomena of Nature. We -learn the other from reason and revelation.</p> - -<p>To return now to the examination of the solar system, -which our inquirer is supposed to be prosecuting. The -study, which astronomy and its implements will have enabled -him to make, has taught him the existence of the -law of gravitation, and has led him to the conclusion that -it must have had an enacting authority. Following out the -operation of this law, through the stupendous spaces of the -solar system, he would begin to form conclusions respecting -the attributes of its author. He would see that the power -must have been superhuman; in other words, that it must -have immeasurably transcended anything that can be imagined -of power wielded by a being of less than infinite -capacities; for, although the space occupied by the solar -system, from the central sun out to the orbit of the planet -Neptune, is a measurable distance, the conception of the -law of gravitation, and its execution, through such an -enormous space and among such a complex system of bodies, -evince a faculty in the lawgiver that must have been boundless -in power and skill. The force of gravitation is found -to exactly balance the centrifugal tendency of the bodies -revolving around the sun, so that, when once set in motion -around that center, they remain in their respective orbits -and never fall into the sun or into each other. Our learner -would thus see the nature of the adjustment required to -produce such a result; and, even if he endeavored to follow -out this balancing of forces no farther than to the extreme -boundary of the solar system, he would see that the being, -who could conceive and execute such a design on such a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> -scale, must have had supreme power and boundless intelligence. -So that, by the study of the solar system, as its -arrangements and movements are disclosed by astronomy, -our inquirer would be naturally led to the conception of a -lawgiver and artificer of infinite power and wisdom, ordaining -the law of gravitation to operate against the centrifugal -force, which would otherwise conduct out of its orbit -a body revolving around a center, and then adjusting the -relative distances, weights, and revolutions of the different -bodies, so as to subject them to the operation of the great -law that is to preserve them in fixed relations to each other.</p> - -<p>If, next, our inquirer should go farther in his investigations -of the solar system, and endeavor to satisfy himself -concerning the mode in which the different bodies of this -system came into existence in their respective positions, the -history of astronomy would teach him that there has been a -theory on this subject which fails to account for the existence -of this system of bodies without the hypothesis of some -special creation. This theory is what is called the nebular -hypothesis. It supposes that the solar system was evolved -out of a mass of fiery vapor, which filled the stellar spaces, -and which became the bodies now observable by the telescope, -and that they were finally swung into their respective -places by the operation of the fixed laws of motion. But -all that astronomers now undertake to say is that this hypothesis -is a probably true account of the origin of the solar -system, and not that it is an established scientific fact, or -a fact supported by such proofs as those which show the -existence of the laws of motion. The history of the nebular -hypothesis, from the time of its first suggestion to the present -day, shows that there are no satisfactory means of accounting -for the method in which the supposed mass of -fiery vapor became separated, consolidated, and formed -into different bodies, and those bodies became ranged and -located in their respective positions. The hypothesis that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> -these results were all produced by fixed laws working upon -a mass of fiery vapor, is one that has been reasoned out in -very different ways; and this diversity of views is such that -astronomers of the higher order do not undertake to say that -opinions may not reasonably differ in regard to the principal -question, namely, the question between the nebular -hypothesis and the hypothesis of a special act or acts of -creation.</p> - -<p>Inasmuch, therefore, as scientific astronomy would present -to our inquirer nothing but the nebular hypothesis to -account for the production of the bodies of the solar system -as they now exist, and as there are admitted difficulties in -this hypothesis which may not be insurmountable but which -have not been as yet by any means overcome, it can not be -said that philosophers are warranted in assuming that all -the phenomena of the solar system are to be explained by -this theory. The hypothesis that the phenomena, or some -part of them, have been produced by a cause operating in -a different way, that is, by an act or acts of intentional and -direct or special creation, is not excluded by the discoveries -of the astronomer. Those discoveries lie in the domain of -astronomy, and they do not exclude the hypothesis of a -special creation of the solar system upon the plan on which -we find it arranged. The latter hypothesis lies in the domain -of philosophy. It is to be judged by the inquiry -whether it is a rational explanation of phenomena, which -astronomy does not show as an established scientific fact, -or by proofs that ought to be deemed satisfactory, to have -been produced by the method suggested by the nebular hypothesis.</p> - -<p>The philosophic reasoning, which would conduct our -inquirer to his conclusions, would begin for him with the -existence of an omnipotent being, by whom the laws of -matter and motion were established. This conception and -belief he has attained from having discovered those laws,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span> -which must have had an author. He would soon hear the -scientist speak of "natural" and "supernatural" methods, -and he would understand that by the former is meant the -operation of certain fixed laws, and, by the latter, a mode -of action in a different way. But he would also and easily -understand that the power which could establish the laws -of matter and motion, the operation of which the scientist -calls the natural method, could equally act in another way, -which the scientist calls the supernatural, but which, in -the eye of philosophy, is just as competent to the Infinite -Power as the method called natural. To state it in different -words, but with the same meaning, that which the -scientist calls the supernatural is to the philosopher just as -conceivable and just as consistent with the idea of a supreme -being as the order of what we call Nature; for Nature is -the phenomena that are open to our observation, and from -which we deduce the probable method by which they have -been brought about. It will never do to say that they could -not have been produced by a cause operating differently -from a system of fixed laws so long as we reason from the -hypothesis of the existence and attributes of a Supreme -Being. If we reason without that hypothesis, we may persuade -ourselves of anything or of nothing.</p> - -<p>This idea of a Supreme Being, possessed of the attributes -of infinite power and wisdom, is one that our inquirer -would have reached as a rational deduction from the operation -of a law (gravitation) which must have had an author; -from the structure of a mechanism so designed as to be -governed successfully by that law, and from the execution -of the law through such enormous spaces that nothing -short of infinite power and wisdom could have produced -the result.</p> - -<p>At this stage of his investigations, our inquirer encounters -a modern scientist. I shall take the liberty of -coining convenient names for these two interlocutors: call<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span>ing -the one Sophereus, as representing the spirit of unprejudiced -research in the formation of beliefs without the -influence of previous teaching; and the other Kosmicos, as -a representative of the dogmatic school of evolution and -agnosticism.</p> - -<p>Sophereus has imparted to his scientific friend the conclusions -which he has thus far reached, concerning the existence -and attributes of a supreme lawgiver and artificer, -as deduced from the phenomena of the solar system. The -discussion between them then proceeds as follows:</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> I do not wish to convince you at present of -my own views on this subject, but I put before you a difficulty -which you ought to solve, if you can, to your own satisfaction, -before you proceed farther. You have learned of the -law of gravitation; and you have imagined a being who -has established this and other laws by which matter is to be -governed. To this being you have imputed certain personal -attributes, which you call infinite power and boundless -wisdom. Observe now that the laws to which you -assign this origin are of perpetual duration; they have -operated without change from the remotest period of their -existence just as they operate now, and we have no reason -to doubt that they will continue to operate in the same way -through the indefinite future. They constitute the order -of Nature. Now, you suppose a Supreme Being, who has -established these invariable laws, but has not left them -anything to do; has not left to them the production of the -solar system, but has specially interposed, and in a supernatural -mode of action has constructed the machine which -has the sun for its center and the surrounding bodies which -revolve about it. How can you suppose that the same being -has acted in different ways? How can you suppose -that the being who you imagine established the general -laws of Nature and gave to them a fixed operation throughout -the universe, so that they never would be suspended or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> -interrupted, has gone aside from them, and made occasional -constructions by special interpositions of his power? Is it -not a contradiction to suppose that an Almighty Being, who -must have acted by uniform methods without reference to -occasions, has acted on certain occasions by special methods -that were not uniform with his fixed laws? Does not this -hypothesis imply that his fixed laws were insufficient for -the purposes for which he designed them, and that he had -to resort to other means? How do you get over this difficulty?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> What you propound as a difficulty does not -disturb me. I understand the distinction which you make -between the natural and the supernatural. I can see in the -solar system how the law of gravitation and all the other laws -of motion operate; but I do not see, nor can you explain, -how these laws, or the laws of chemical combination or any -other laws, can have evolved the plan of the solar system -out of a mass of fiery vapor. I can understand the enactment -and establishment of laws of motion, of chemical combination, -and of the mechanical action of different states of -matter upon each other, to operate in fixed and invariable -ways, in certain conditions. But I do not see that there is -any interruption or displacement of these laws, after they are -established, when an end that is to be accomplished calls for -a complex system of new objects among which they are to -operate. It is manifest that the question is whether the different -bodies of the solar system have been formed and placed -in their respective positions, according to a special design of -their relative distances, magnitudes, and orbits, or whether -these are the results of the operation of fixed laws, without -any special interposition of a creating power. Astronomers -have not explained how the latter hypothesis is anything -more than a probable conjecture. It remains for me -to consider whether the hypothesis of a special interposition, -whereby the plan of the solar system has been made, is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> -attended with the difficulty which you suggest. We are -reasoning about a period of the remote past when this -system of bodies did not exist, but when the general laws -that were to govern all matter may be supposed to have -been previously ordained. If we think of the solar system, -conceived and projected by the Supreme Being, as a complex -mechanism that was to exist in Nature, the occasion -would be one calling for the exercise of infinite wisdom and -power. The production of such a mechanism, to answer -any ends for which it was intended that it should exist, implies -attributes that transcend all our human experience of -the qualities of power and wisdom. That it was an occasional -exercise of power, in no way implies any irregularity -or inconsistency of method, if the power was so exercised -as to leave all the general laws of Nature in full operation, -so that there would be no clashing between what you call -the natural and the supernatural. I have first to ascertain -what was the probably intended scope of the general laws -which are supposed to have been ordained before the solar -system came into existence. If it appears to have been -the purpose of the constructor to have these laws work -out this system of bodies without any special interposition -and formative skill directly exercised, I need go no further. -But I see no evidence of that purpose. No one has -suggested anything but a theory on this subject, which -is not supported by any satisfactory proofs. I am left, -therefore, to the consideration of the question whether an -act of special interposition, in the formation of a plan obviously -calling for the exercise of infinite wisdom and power, -is in any way inconsistent with the establishment of a system -of laws which were to operate on these bodies and -among them after they had come to exist. My conclusion, -from what I have learned of the solar system, is, that in -the exercise by the same being of the method which you -call the natural, and the exercise of the method which you<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> -call the supernatural, there is no inconsistency; that each -of the fixed laws of matter and motion was designed to have -its own scope; and that each of them may well consist, -within its limitations, with occasional exercises of power, -for the production of objects that were to be operated upon -by the laws, but of which they were not designed to be the -producing cause. Thus it seems to me to be a rational -conclusion that the law of gravitation, the general laws of -motion, and all the other laws of matter, which preceded -the existence of the solar system, were not designed to be -the agents by which the plan of that system would be -worked out, but that the plan was so formed and executed -that the bodies composing it would be subject to the operation -of laws enacted by the Infinite Will for the government -of all the forms of matter. The question is, whether the -plan of the solar system is due to the operation of the fixed -laws, or to a special interposition; or, to state it in another -way, whether the whole of the phenomena, the plan -and arrangement of the solar system included, are to be -referred to the operation of certain fixed laws as the producing -agents, or whether some part of the phenomena, -namely, the mechanism of the system, should be referred to -the special interposition. I am taught, by the physics on -which astronomers are now agreed, that gravitation is a -force by which the particles of matter act on each other; -<em>that every particle of matter in the universe attracts every -other particle with a force varying directly as their masses, -and inversely as the square of the distance which separates -them</em>. This I understand to be the formula in which the -law of universal gravitation is expressed. But, for the purpose -of illustrating what I understand to be the operation -of this force, I have constructed a diagram, in which two -bodies are represented as A and B. From each of these -bodies there radiates in all directions an attracting force, -which acts directly upon every other body in the universe,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> -and which is represented -in the diagram by dotted -lines. In the diagram, -the bodies A and B are -first supposed to be one -thousand miles apart. A -certain portion of the attracting -rays proceeding -from A would strike directly -upon B. All the -other rays proceeding in -the same direction from -A would pass on either -side of B without striking -it. If B is removed -to the distance of two -thousand miles from A, -the sum total of the -attractive force which -A would exert upon B -would be diminished by -the square of the distance, -because B would -intercept just one fourth -of the number of rays -proceeding from A compared -with the number -which it intercepts when -the two bodies are only -one thousand miles apart; -and the rays which B -does not intercept would -pass along through the -realms of space, until -they encountered some other body, on which they would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> -exert a force that would follow the same law of diminution. -In the diagram, the two bodies A and B may be single particles -of matter or collections of particles; they are represented -as cubes; but the law of direct action of the attracting -force and the law of its diminution would be the same -if the bodies were spheres or oblongs. The power of attraction -which bodies exert upon each other resides in -every individual particle of matter composing the body, -and the attraction which that body exerts upon another -body is the sum total of the attractions which proceed from -all the particles composing the mass and which impinge -upon that other body.</p> - -<div class="figleft"> -<img src="images/illus_p314.jpg" alt="Diagram described in text" /> -</div> - -<p>In the diagram the two bodies A and B are supposed to -be of the same mass. If, as in the case of the sun and the -earth, one of the bodies is of far greater mass than the -other, then the attraction of the sun for the earth is the -same as the attraction of the earth for the sun, because the -action is mutual; but the sun, being the greater mass, -tends, by reason of its correspondingly greater inertia, to -remain comparatively stationary, or, in other words, it has -a greater resistance to being pulled out of its normal position, -while the earth, having less inertia, is more easily -deflected from its straight course in which its momentum -tends to carry it, and so travels in an orbit around the sun, -the resisting or centrifugal pull of the earth, due to its inertia, -exactly balancing the inward pull due to the mutual -attraction. I understand that, besides the law of universal -gravitation, there are two fundamental laws of motion. By -one of these laws, if a body be set in motion and be acted -on by no other than the projectile force, it will move forward -in a straight line and with a uniform velocity forever. -But by another law, if the moving body is acted on -by another force than that which originally projected it in -a straight line, it will deviate from that line in the direction -of that other force and in proportion to it. If A,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> -the earth, liable to be drawn toward B, the sun, by their -mutual attraction, was originally projected into space, at -a certain distance from the sun, by a force which would -carry it on in a straight line, it would be acted on by two -forces: the projectile force would cause it to move in a -straight line; the force of the mutual attraction would -cause it to deviate from that line in the direction of the -sun. The result would be that the earth would be carried -around the sun in a circular or an elliptical orbit. Every -other planet in the solar system would be under the operation -of the same compound forces governed by the same -laws; and while the sun would exert upon each of them -its force of attraction, and they would each exert upon the -others an attractive force that would be diminished by the -squares of their distances from one another, each of them -would be deflected from the straight line that would have -otherwise been the path of its motion, and the result would -be a perpetual revolution around the body that could exert -upon each just the amount of attraction requisite to overcome -the projectile force by which it was first put in motion.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> You have made an ingenious explanation -of the law of gravitation, which may or may not be correct. -But now let me understand what you infer from -this hypothesis, supposing it to be true. What should -have prevented the law of gravitation and the laws of -motion from working out this very system of bodies, by -operating upon a mass of crude matter lying in the universe, -supposing it to have been fiery vapor or anything -else?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I have thus far arrived, by the aid of what -astronomy teaches, at a complex system of physical laws, -the law of universal gravitation, and the laws of motion. -I must suppose that these laws had an intelligent author. -I must suppose that they were enacted, in the same sense -in which we speak of any rule of action ordained by a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> -power competent to conceive of it and to put it into execution. -To me, as I view the facts of the solar system, the -idea that the law of gravitation and the laws of motion are -to be regarded as mere phenomena of matter, or as qualities -of matter according to which, from some inherent -condition, it must act, does not explain the solar system. -I can not explain to myself what I see, without asking -myself how these qualities of matter came to exist. How -came it to be a condition of all matter that its particles -should attract each other by a certain force according to a -certain rule? How came it to be a law of motion that -bodies projected into space should continue to move on -forever in a straight line, unless deviated from that line by -some other force? To say that things happen, but that -no power ever commanded them to happen; that things -occur because they do occur, and not because some power -has ordained that they shall occur, is to me an inconceivable -kind of reasoning, if it be reasoning at all. Because -men act or profess to act upon certain principles of moral -conduct, I can not suppose that justice, and truth, and -mercy are mere phenomena of human conduct, that they -never had any origin as moral laws in the will of a lawgiver. -For the same reason I can not suppose that the -physical laws of matter, stupendous in their scope, and of -unerring certainty in their operation, did not proceed from -an enacting authority. In short, it seems to me that the -conception of power, as something independent of the -qualities of substance, is a logical necessity.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> I am not now trying to persuade you that -the law of gravitation and the laws of motion did not have -an intelligent author. For the purposes of the argument, -I will concede that they were enacted, as you term it. You -have explained your understanding of the operation of these; -laws as they are expressed in the formula given by astronomers, -and for the present I will assume that they operate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> -in some such way. I will also concede that the idea of -power in the abstract, as something independent of the -qualities of substance, is necessary to the explanation of all -physical phenomena. But I now recall your attention to -the point which I originally suggested. Explain to me -how it has happened that the being who you suppose established -certain laws for the government of all matter has -not allowed those laws to evolve out of diffused matter certain -bodies which we find grouped together in the universe, -but has specially interposed by another act, and constructed -this system of bodies without the agency of his own laws. -All that we know about the law of gravitation and the laws -of motion we derive from observing the actions of these -bodies which compose the solar system. We infer the existence -of these laws from the actions of these bodies. Now -tell me how you suppose that the same being who ordained -these laws as fixed conditions to which matter was to be -subjected, and made them to operate upon all matter, -whether in a crude and unformed state or after it had become -organized into bodies of definite shapes and dimensions, -did not rely upon these inherent conditions of matter -to produce those shapes and dimensions, but went to work -by special interposition, and produced the mechanism of -the solar system as a human artificer would make a machine -of a corresponding character.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> We must take things in a certain order. I -understand you to concede, for the present, that the laws -of gravitation and motion must, or may, have existed before -the sun and the planets were formed. We are agreed, then, -that power has an existence anterior to and separate from -the qualities of substance. What, then, is the difficulty attending -the hypothesis that the Infinite Power, which devised -and established the laws of gravitation and motion -before the bodies of the solar system were formed, so fashioned -and distributed those bodies that while each of them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> -shall exert upon every other a certain amount of direct attraction, -that attraction shall diminish in a certain fixed -ratio, as the distance between them increases? We can not -suppose that the relative magnitudes, weights, and distances -of these bodies were accidental, or that they resulted -from the property of attraction that was given to the particles -of matter of which they are composed. That property -of mutual attraction became at some time a fixed condition -of all matter, but it will not account for the formation of a -system of bodies so adjusted that the attracting force will -act among them by a specific law, by the operation of which -they will be prevented from exerting on each other an excessive -amount of such force, or any amount but that which -is exactly needful to preserve their relative distances from -each other. Let it be supposed that the property of attraction -was impressed upon all the particles of matter in -the universe, and then that the Infinite Power, abstaining -from all farther action, and without forming and arranging -the bodies of the solar system upon any intentional plan, -left all that plan to be worked out by that property of matter; -what reason have we to conclude that the law of gravitation -would, as the sole efficient cause, have produced just -exactly this complex piece of mechanism, so wonderfully -adjusted? What reason have we to conclude that the property -of attraction, although ordained as an inherent quality -of all matter, would not, if left without any special interposition, -have resulted in some very different arrangement -and disposition of the matter lying in the space now occupied -by the solar system?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Give me your idea of the condition which is -called "chaos," and I will then explain to you why it is -that you do not do justice to the scientific distinction between -the natural and the supernatural method by which -things have been produced as we see them.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I presume you do not mean to ask how I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> -suppose chaotic matter came to exist. Its origin is one -thing—its condition is another. In regard to its condition, -it seems very plain that there was a period when diffused -matter had not received the impress of the qualities or been -subjected to the laws which we now recognize. Take the -Mosaic hypothesis, where it speaks of the earth, for example, -as "without form and void." In this terse expression, -there is embraced the idea of a condition of matter without -qualities, properties, or laws; lying in an utterly crude -state, waiting to receive the impress of the divine will. -The laws of motion have not begun to operate upon it; the -laws of chemical combination have not been applied to it. -It is a rational conclusion that this was the condition of -things in that remote period of eternity before the solar system -was formed. Chaos, then, was the condition of primeval -matter before it had received the fixed properties that -were afterward to belong to it, and before the laws that -were ever afterward to govern it had been ordained. Lying -in this utterly crude state, without tendencies, without -combinations, without definite motion, floating in the universe -without fixed form or qualities, it awaits the action -of the Infinite Power. It pleases that power, out of its illimitable -resources, to bestow upon this chaotic matter certain -properties, and to subject it to certain laws. One of -these properties is that its particles shall attract one another -by a certain force; one of these laws is that this force shall -operate by an invariable and fixed rule of direct action, and -by an invariable and fixed rule of diminution, according to -the distance of the particles from each other; and another -law is that a body projected into space, by any force, -shall continue to move in a straight line until and unless -it is deflected from that line by some other force. There -are, too, chemical properties belonging to matter as we -know it, by which it takes on certain combinations and -undergoes modifications and arrangements of its particles.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> -All these properties, qualities, and laws—these unavoidable -methods of action—must have been imposed upon the chaotic -matter at some time by a power competent to establish -them, and to put them in operation. But the laws and -the methods of their operation do not account for the <span class="smcap">PLAN</span> -on which the solar system has been formed, consisting of -different bodies of such shapes, dimensions, and relative -distances, that the laws, when applied to them, will produce -the wonderfully exact and perpetual movements which -the telescope reveals. That <span class="smcap">PLAN</span> is a <em>creation</em>, for which -we must look to something more than the laws and properties -of matter; and we can only find it in the will and purposes -of the infinite artificer who devised the laws by which -this mechanism was to be governed after it had been made, -and who has so made it that it would be governed by them.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> I do not see that you have yet reached a -stronger ground on which to rest the hypothesis of special -interposition than that on which is based the hypothesis -which imputes the formation of the solar system to certain -fixed laws operating upon crude matter not yet formed into -definite shapes or placed in certain relative positions. You -will have to adduce some proof that has a stronger tendency -to exclude the supposition that the mechanism of the solar -system was produced by the laws of matter and motion -working upon some material that lay in the condition which -you have described as "chaos."</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Let us, then, look a little farther into some -of the details of this vast machine. Take one that is most -obvious, and that lies the nearest to us; I mean the moon, -which accompanies our earth as its satellite. The most remarkable -thing about the motion of the moon is the fact -that she makes one revolution on her axis in the same time -that she takes to revolve around the earth, and consequently -she always presents to us the same face, and her other side -is never seen by human eyes. How came this to be the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> -case? How came this to be the adjustment of the two -motions, the axial revolution of the moon and her revolution -around the earth, causing her always to present to us -the same side? It is said by astronomers that the two motions -are so exactly adjusted to each other that the longer -axis of the moon always points to the earth, without the -slightest variation. It is conceded, as I understand, to be -infinitely improbable that this adjustment was the result of -chance. A cause for it is therefore to be found. Where -are we to look for that cause, unless we look for it in the -will and design of the Creator, who established it for some -special purpose?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> You are aware that there is a physical explanation -of this phenomenon which accounts for it without -the special design. This explanation is that the moon -was once in a partially fluid state, and that she rotated on -her axis in a period different from the present one. In -such a condition, the attraction of the earth would produce -great tides in the fluid substance of the moon; this attraction, -combined with the centrifugal force of the moon's -rotation on her own axis, would cause a friction, and this -friction would retard the rate of her axial rotation, until it -became coincident with the rate of her revolution around -the earth. It is highly improbable that the moon was -originally set in rotation on her axis with just the same velocity -with which she was made to revolve around the earth. -This improbability is based on the ellipticity of the moon's -orbit, which is caused by the attraction of the sun. The -mean distance of the moon from the earth is 240,300 miles; -her smallest possible distance is 221,000 miles; and the -greatest possible distance is 259,600. The usual oscillation -between these extremes is about 13,000 miles on each side -of the mean distance of 240,300. The diameter of the -moon is 2,160 miles, or less than two sevenths of the earth's -diameter. In volume she is about one fiftieth as large as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> -the earth, but her density, or the specific gravity of her -material, is supposed to be a little more than half of that -of our globe; and her weight is about three and a half times -the weight of the same bulk of water. When she is nearest -to the sun, the superior attraction of that body tends to -draw her out of her circular orbit around the earth; when -she is farthest from the sun, this attraction is diminished, -and thus her terrestrial orbit becomes slightly elliptical. -But there is another attraction to be taken into account. -This other attraction, in her former fluid condition, has -given her the shape, not of a perfect sphere, but of an ellipsoid, -or an elongated body with three unequal axes. The -shortest of her axes is that around which she rotates; the -next longest is that which points in the direction in which -she is moving; and the longest of all points toward the -earth. This shape of the moon, resulting from the earth's -attraction, has been produced by drawing the matter of the -moon which is nearest to the earth toward the earth, and -by the centrifugal force which tends to throw outward the -matter farthest from the earth. The substance of the -moon being a liquid, so as to yield freely, she would be -elongated in the direction of the earth. But if she was -originally set in motion on her own axis at precisely the -same rate with which she was made to revolve around the -earth, the correspondence between the two motions could -not have been kept up; her axial rotation would have varied, -by reason of the fact that her relative distance from the sun -and the earth varies with the ellipticity of her orbit around -the earth, and thus the two motions would not correspond. -But if we allow for the attraction of the earth upon a liquid -or semi-liquid body, producing for the moon an elongated -shape, her axial rotation would, if the two motions were in -the beginning very near together, vary with her revolutions -around the earth, and the correspondence between the two -motions would be kept up. Here, then, you have a physi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span>cal -explanation of the phenomenon which strikes you as -so remarkable—a result brought about by natural causes, -without the supposition of what you call intentional design, -or formative skill directly exercised by a supernatural interposition.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> This is a very plausible theory, but it all -depends upon two assumptions: First, it assumes it to be -extremely improbable that the two motions were aboriginally -made to correspond, by an intentional adjustment of -the moon's weight, dimensions, and shape, upon such a -plan that the laws of gravitation and movement would keep -the two motions in exact correspondence. Why should not -the rates of movement have been originally designed and -put in execution as we find them? You anticipate the answer -to this question by another assumption, namely, that -the substance of the moon was at first in a fluid or semi-fluid -state, so that she owed her present shape to the effect -of the earth's attraction, and the centrifugal tendency of -its most distant part to be thrown out of the line of its motion. -I should be glad to have you explain why it is extremely -improbable that the Creator planned this part of -the solar system, the earth and its satellite, and so adjusted -the dimensions, shapes, and weights of each of them, and -fixed the rates of revolution of the satellite, that the laws -of attraction and motion would find a mechanism which -they would keep perpetually in operation, and thus preserve -a constant relation between the moon's axial rotation and -her revolution around the earth. I have thus far learned -to regard the probable methods of the Creator somewhat -differently from those which you scientists ascribe to him. -Most of you, I observe, have a strong tendency to regard -the Deity as having no specific plan in the production of -anything, which plan he directly executed; and, so far as -you regard a First Cause as the producing cause of phenomena, -you limit its activity to the establishment of certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span> -fixed laws, and explain all phenomena upon the hypothesis -that the Supreme Being—if you admit one—made no special -interpositions of his will and power in any direction, after he -had established his system of general laws. But to me it -seems that the weight of probability is entirely against your -hypothesis. In this particular case of which we have been -speaking, that of the moon's revolution, the supposed improbability -of an original and intentional adjustment of the -two motions turns altogether on the argument that if they -had been so adjusted at the beginning they would not have -kept on, and this argument is supported by the assumption -that the moon was at first a mass of fluid. I do not understand -this mode of making facts to support theories; and -I wish you would explain to me why, in this particular instance, -the inference of a divine and intentional plan in the -structure of this part of the solar system is so extremely -improbable. To me it seems so obvious a piece of invented -mechanism, that I can not avoid the conclusion that it was -the intentional work of a constructor, any more than I -could if I were to find a piece of mechanism under circumstances -which indicated that it was produced by human -hands.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> You do not even yet do justice to the scientific -method of reasoning. The deductions of science—the -conclusions which the scientist draws from the phenomena -of Nature—rest upon the postulate of fixed laws of -Nature, which never change, and which have not been varied -by any supernatural interference. We mean by a supernatural -cause one which is not uniformly in operation, or -which operates in some way different from the fixed laws -which we have deduced from the observed order of the phenomena -that we have studied and found to be invariable. -We adopt this distinction between the natural and the supernatural -because the observable phenomena of Nature do -not furnish any means of discovering as a fact the operation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> -of anything but the fixed laws, or any cause which has -acted in a different way. Let us now apply this to the -phenomena which we have been considering—the composition -and arrangement of the solar system. What do we -find? We find a system of bodies in the movements of -which we detect certain fixed laws operating invariably in -the same way. When the question is asked, How were these -bodies produced? we have no means of reaching a conclusion -except by reasoning upon the operation of the forces -which these laws disclose, working on the primordial matter -out of which the bodies became formed. It is for this -reason that, in accounting for their existence, we speak of -the method of their formation as the natural, in contradistinction -to some other method which we call the supernatural; -by which latter term we mean some mode in which -there has been a power exerted differently from the established -and fixed agency of the laws of matter, which constitute -all that we have ever discovered. The nebular hypothesis -affords a good illustration of the distinction which -I am endeavoring to show you, whether it is well established -or not, or is ever likely to be. It supposes that there was -a mass of fiery vapor, floating in the space now occupied -by the solar system. Under the operation of the laws of -gravitation and motion, of mechanical forces and chemical -combination, this crude matter becomes consolidated and -formed into the different bodies known to us as the sun and -the planets, and the laws which thus formed them continue -to operate to keep them in the fixed relations to each other -which resulted from the process of their formation. Whether -as a matter of fact the solar system was formed in this way, -this, or some other mode of operation through the action of -certain established laws operating upon primeval matter, is -what we call the natural method, in opposition to the supernatural; -and we can not discover the supernatural method, -because the closest and most extensive investigations never<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span> -enable us to find in nature any method of operation but -that which acts in a fixed and invariable way.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> What you have now said brings me to a -question that I have all along desired to ask you: How do -you know that the Infinite Power never acts, or never has -acted, in any way different from the established order of -Nature? Is science able to determine this? If it is not, it -must be for philosophy to consider whether there can have -been, or probably has been, in operation at any time any -cause other than those fixed laws of Nature which the scientist -is able to deduce from observable phenomena. Because -science can only discover certain fixed laws as the -forces governing the bodies which compose the solar system, -or governing the materials of which they are supposed to -be made, it does not seem to me that a philosopher is precluded -from deducing, by a proper method of reasoning -upon a study of the solar system, the probable truth that -its mechanism was specially planned and executed by a -special act of the creating power. The degree to which -this probability rises—whether it rises higher in the scale -than any other hypothesis—must depend upon the inquiry -whether any other hypothesis will better account for the -existence of this great object, with its enormous mechanism, -its adjustments, and its unerring movements. I must say, -from what I have learned of this planetary system, with the -sun as its center, viewed as a mechanism, that I can conceive -of no hypothesis concerning its origin and formation -which compares in probability with the hypothesis that it -was directly and specially created, as we know it, by the -Infinite Artificer.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Pray, tell me what you mean by an act of -creation? Did you or any other man ever see one? Can -you tell what creation is?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I think that your question can be answered. -Creation is the act of giving existence to something that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> -did not previously exist. We see such acts performed by -men, very frequently, so that we do not hesitate to speak -of the product as a created thing. We do not see acts of -creation performed by the Infinite Power, but it is surely -not unphilosophical to suppose that what can be and is -done by finite human faculties, can be and has been done -by the infinite faculties of the Deity, and done upon a scale -and in a perfection that transcend everything that human -power has produced. The sense in which I have been led -to conceive of the solar system as a creation is the same as -that by which I represent to myself the production, by human -power and skill, of some physical object which never -existed before, such as a machine, a statue, a picture, a pyramid, -or an obelisk; any concrete object which, whether or -not new of its kind, did not as an individual object previously -exist. In weighing the probabilities as to the mode -in which the solar system came to exist, the reasons why -the idea of its special creation stands by far the highest in -the scale are these: 1. There must have been a period -when this great object in nature did not exist, and therefore -it must have been caused to exist. 2. The necessary -hypothesis of a causing power leads inevitably to the conclusion -that the power was adequate to the production of a -system of bodies so proportioned and arranged that they -would act on each other by certain fixed rules. 3. The -causing or creating power must have conceived the proportions -and arrangements of the different bodies as a plan, -and must have executed that plan according to the conception. -4. While as a theory we can represent to ourselves -that the causing power established certain laws of matter -and motion, which would by their fixed operation on crude -substances lying in the universe produce this system of -bodies without any preconceived and predetermined plan, -without any occasional or special interposition, yet that the -system, as we find it, is a product of such a nature as to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> -have called for and required the special interposition of a -formative will. For, if we proceed upon the hypothesis -that this enormous and exact mechanism was nothing but -the product of certain pre-established laws operating on -crude matter, without direct and special interposition exerted -in the execution of a formed design, we have to obtain -some definite conception, and to find some proof of a -method by which these laws can have operated to produce -this system of bodies exactly as we know them to be proportioned -and arranged. Astronomical science, and all -other science, has not discovered, or even suggested, any -method by which this result could have been brought about, -without a special act of creation in the execution of an -original design. On the other hand, the hypothesis of a -special interposition in the execution of a preconceived -plan of construction is the most rational, the most in accordance -with probability, because it best meets the requirements -of the case. These requirements were that the proportions, -arrangements, and relations of the different bodies -composing one grand mechanism, should be such that the -laws of gravitation and motion would operate upon and -among them so as to keep them in uniform and unvarying -movement.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Very well. You have now come to the -end of your reasoning. Tell me, then, why it is not just -as rational a supposition that the Deity conceived of the -plan of the solar system as a product that would result, -and that he intended should result, from the operation of -his fixed laws of matter and motion, and then left it to the -unerring certainty of their operation to produce the mechanism -by the process of gradual evolution?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> The being who is supposed to hold and -exercise supreme power over the universe, holds a power -to execute, by direct and special creation, any design which -he conceives and proposes to accomplish. I am prepared to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> -concede that the process of gradual evolution can produce -and apparently has produced some results. But when we -are looking for the probable methods of the Deity in the -production of such a mechanism as the solar system, we -must recognize the superior probability of the direct -method, because the indirect method which you describe -as gradual evolution does not seem adequate to the production -of such a system of bodies. If we could obtain facts -which could have any tendency to show that, without any -special interposition, the mechanism of the solar system, or -any part of it, is a mere result of the working of the laws -of gravitation and motion upon a mass of crude matter, we -might yield assent to the probability of that occurrence. -But of course we have no such facts; we have nothing but -theories; and therefore there appears nothing to exclude -the probable truth of a special creation.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> We shall not convince each other. You -have stated your conclusions concerning the solar system -fairly enough, and I have endeavored to answer them. But -now let me understand how you propose to apply them to -other departments of Nature, in which we have means of -closer investigation. You will find it very difficult, I imagine, -to maintain that every organism, every plant, animal, -fish, insect, or bird, is a special creation, or even that -man himself is.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Let me state for myself just what my conclusions -are in regard to the solar system. You will then -know what the convictions are with which I shall come to -the study of other departments. I have arrived at the -conception of an Infinite Being having the power to create -anything that seems to him good; and I have experienced -no difficulty in conceiving what an act of creation is. I -have also reached the conviction that there is one great -object in Nature, the existence of which I can not account -for without the hypothesis of some special act of creation.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span> -Whether I shall find this to be the case in regard to every -other object in Nature, I can not now tell. Perhaps, as -many of these objects are nearer to us, and more within -our powers of investigation, the result may be different. -I shall endeavor to keep my mind open to the necessary -discriminations which facts may disclose. Possibly I may -find reason to reverse the conclusions at which I have -arrived in regard to the solar system, if I find that the -hypothesis of evolution is fairly sustained by other phenomena.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Note.</span>—Newton, whose reasoning powers have certainly not been surpassed -by those of any other philosopher, ancient or modern, not only -deduced the existence of a personal God from the phenomena of Nature, -but he felt no difficulty in ascribing to the Deity those personal attributes -which the phenomena of Nature show that he must possess, because without -them "all that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different -times and places" could not have been produced. They could, he -reasons, "arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily -existing." Newton does indeed say that all our notions of God are taken -from the ways of mankind; but this is by way of allegory and similitude. -There is a likeness, but not a perfect likeness. There is therefore no -necessity for ascribing to God anthropomorphic attributes, because the -enlargement of the faculties and powers to superhuman and boundless -attributes takes them out of the category of anthropomorphic qualities and -capacities. In his "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy," -Newton had occasion to treat of the theory of vortices, as a hypothesis by -which the formation of the solar system is to be explained. The "General -Scholium," by which he concludes the third book of his "Principia," lays -down the masterly reasoning by which he maintains that the bodies of the -solar system, while they persevere in their orbits by the mere laws of -gravity, could by no means have at first derived the regular position of the -orbits themselves from those laws. I had written the whole of the preceding -chapter on the origin of the solar system just as I have printed it, -before I looked into the "Principia" to see what confirmation might be -derived from Newton's speculations. I found that while I had not included -the comets in my examination of the solar system, but had confined myself -to the bodies that are at all times within the reach of the telescope, the -same deductions are re-enforced by the comets, eccentric as are the orbits -through which they range into and out of our system. I quote the entire<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> -Scholium, as given in Motte's English translation of the "Principia" from -the Latin in which Newton wrote, published with a Life by Chittenden, at -New York, in the year 1848.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3>"GENERAL SCHOLIUM.</h3> - -<p>"The hypothesis of vortices is pressed with many difficulties. -That every planet by a radius drawn to the sun -may describe areas proportional to the times of description, -the periodic times of the several parts of the vortices should -observe the duplicate proportion of their distances from -the sun; but that the periodic times of the planets may -obtain the sesquiplicate proportion of their distances from -the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the vortex ought -to be in the sesquiplicate proportion of their distances. -That the smaller vortices may maintain their lesser revolutions -about <em>Saturn</em>, <em>Jupiter</em>, and other planets, and -swim quietly and undisturbed in the greater vortex of the -sun, the periodic times of the parts of the sun's vortex -should be equal; but the rotation of the sun and planets -about their axes, which ought to correspond with the motions -of their vortices, recede far from all these proportions. -The motions of the comets are exceedingly regular, are -governed by the same laws with the motions of the planets, -and can by no means be accounted for by the hypothesis -of vortices; for comets are carried with very eccentric -motions through all parts of the heavens indifferently, -with a freedom that is incompatible with the notion of a -vortex. Bodies projected in our air suffer no resistance -but from the air. Withdraw the air, as is done in Mr. -<em>Boyle's</em> vacuum, and the resistance ceases; for in this void -a bit of fine down and a piece of solid gold descend with -equal velocity. And the parity of reason must take place -in the celestial spaces above the earth's atmosphere; in -which spaces, where there is no air to resist their motions,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span> -all bodies will move with the greatest freedom; and the -planets and comets will constantly pursue their revolutions -in orbits given in kind and position, according to the laws -above explained; but though these bodies may, indeed, -persevere in their orbits by the mere laws of gravity, yet -they could by no means have at first derived the regular -position of the orbits themselves from those laws.</p> - -<p>"The six primary planets are revolved about the sun in -circles concentric with the sun, and with motions directed -toward the same parts, and almost in the same plane. Ten -moons are revolved about the earth, Jupiter, and Saturn, in -circles concentric with them, with the same direction of -motion, and nearly in the planes of the orbits of those -planets; but it is not to be conceived that mere mechanical -causes could give birth to so many regular motions, since -the comets range over all parts of the heavens in very eccentric -orbits; for by that kind of motion they pass easily -through the orbits of the planets, and with great rapidity; -and in their aphelions, where they move the slowest, and -are detained the longest, they recede to the greatest distances -from each other, and thence suffer the least disturbance -from their mutual attractions. This most beautiful -system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed -from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful -Being. And if the fixed stars are the centers of other -like systems, these being formed by the like wise counsel, -must be all subject to the dominion of One; especially -since the light of the fixed stars is of the same nature with -the light of the sun, and from every system light passes -into all the other systems; and lest the systems of the fixed -stars should, by their gravity, fall on each other mutually, -he hath placed those systems at immense distances one from -another."</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX.</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="intro">Does evolution account for the phenomena of society and of nature?—Necessity -for a conception of a personal actor—Mr. Spencer's protoplasmic -origin of all organic life—The Mosaic account of creation -treated as a hypothesis which may be scientifically contrasted with -evolution.</p> - - -<p>A long interval has elapsed since the conference described -in the last chapter, between the searcher after wisdom -and his scientific friend. At their next interview they -take up the subject of a First Cause where they left it at -the conclusion of their debate on the solar system.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Well, Sophereus, what have you been studying -since we last met?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Many things. I have been studying what -is commonly called Nature, and I have been studying society. -With regard to society, I have been endeavoring to -discover to what the phenomena of social life are to be attributed -as their producing cause or causes; whether they -can be said to owe their existence to the direct action or -influence of intelligent wills, or are to be considered as -effects produced in the course of an ungoverned development, -wrought by incidental forces in varying conditions -of human existence. The latter, I find, is one of the theories -now prevailing.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> And what is your conclusion?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> My general conclusion in regard to the -phenomena of human society is the same as that which I -formed from a study of the phenomena of the solar system. -I find a great many things which I can not explain without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> -the hypothesis of a direct creating power exerted by an intelligent -being. I know that you object to the idea of creation, -but I explained to you in our last discussion that I -understood it to mean the causing something to exist which -did not exist before, and the doing it by an intentional and -direct act of production.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> No matter about your definition. What are -the facts that you propose to discuss?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> In the social phenomena I find many acts -of creation. I do not find that buildings spring out of the -ground without human intervention, or that machinery is -formed by the spontaneous arrangement of matter in certain -forms and relations, or by the tendencies that are implanted -in matter as its inherent properties. I find an -enormous multitude of concrete objects, formed out of dead -matter, by human intervention, availing itself of those properties -of matter, which without such active intervention -would have remained quiescent, and would not have resulted -in the production of these objects. It is a common -form of expression to speak of the "growth" of cities, but -no one understands by this form of speech that a city has -become what it is without the action of numerous individuals -projecting and building their separate structures, or -without the combined action of the whole body of the inhabitants -in determining and executing a general plan to -which individuals are to conform, more or less exactly, their -particular erections. Again, I find that there are rules of -social life, which take the form of what are called "laws," -and these are imposed by the will of some governing authority; -they are always the product of some one human -will, or of the collective will of a greater number of persons. -I have looked into history and have found many instances -of military conquest, invasions of the territory inhabited -by one race of men by another race, domination of -different dynasties, overthrow of one governing power, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span> -substitution of another. Although the changes thus produced -are often very complex, sometimes rapid and sometimes -slow in reaching the consequences, I do not find that -they have ever taken place without the direct action of -some one human will, or of the aggregate force of many -human wills. The conquests of Alexander and Napoleon -are instances of what a single human will can do in changing -the condition of nations; and I have not been able to -read history by the interpretation that makes such men -mere instruments in the hands of their age, which would, -without their special existences and characters, have brought -about the same or something like the same results. The -invasions of the Roman Empire by the Northern barbarians -are instances of the pressure of one population upon another, -not attributable, perhaps, to the will and leadership of any -one individual, but produced by the united force of a great -horde of individuals determined to enjoy the plunder which -a superior civilization spread before them. Then, with regard -to the phenomena of what are called constitutions of -government, or the political systems of exercising public -authority, I find numerous cases in which the force of an -individual will and intelligence has been not only a great -factor, but by far the largest factor in the production of -particular institutions. The genius of Cæsar, and his extraordinary -constructive faculties, molded the institutions -of Rome in the most direct manner, and created an imperial -system that lasted for a thousand years, and that even out -of its ruins affected all subsequent European civilization. -In such cases, more than once repeated in modern times, -the particular circumstances of the age and the co-operation -of many other individuals have helped on the result, but the -conception, the plan, the purpose, and the execution, have -had their origin in some one mind. But for the individual -character, the ambition, the force, and the mental resources -of the first Napoleon, can one believe that the first French<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span> -Empire of modern times would have grown out of the condition -of France? Suppose that Oliver Cromwell had -never lived. The protectorate, the system of government -which he gave to England, was the most absolute -product of the will and intellect of one man that the world -in that kind of product had ever seen; for, although the -people of England were ready for and needed that system, -and although the antecedent and the surrounding circumstances -furnished to Cromwell many materials for a political -structure that was not the old monarchy, and yet had while -it lasted all the vigor, and more than the vigor, of the old -monarchy, still, without his personal characteristics, his -ambition to found a dynasty on the wants of his country, -and his personal capacity to devise and execute such a system, -one can not believe that England would have had -what he gave her. What he could not give her was a son -capable of wielding the scepter which he had fashioned. -Here is this America of yours—a country in which, to a -certain extent, the political institutions have been influenced -by the circumstances that followed the separation of -your colonies from the English crown. Undoubtedly, your -ancestors of the Revolutionary epoch could not construct a -monarchy for the group of thirteen newly existing States, -each with its right and enjoyment of an actual autonomy. -The habits and genius of the people forbade the experiment -of monarchical or aristocratic institutions; no materials for -either existed. But within the range of republican institutions -there was a choice open, and the people exercised -that choice. They made one system of confederated States, -and found it would not answer. They then deliberately -assembled their wisest and greatest men. They gave to -them a commission that was restricted by nothing but the -practical necessity of framing a government that would -unite the requirements of power with the requirements of -liberty. The result was the Constitution of the United<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> -States—a system of government that was, within the limitations -of certain practical necessities, both in its fundamental -principles and in many of its details, the deliberate -choice and product of certain leading minds, aided by the -public consent, to a degree that is almost unparalleled in -the formation of political institutions. After it had gone -into operation, it was believed that the requirements of liberty -had not been sufficiently regarded, and it was directly -and purposely modified by the intervention of the collective -will of the whole people. And when I turn to the history -of philosophies, of religions, of the fine arts, or of the mechanical -arts, I find everywhere traces of the force of individual -genius, of the direct intervention of individual wills, -and of the power of men to cause new systems of thought -and action to come into existence, and to create new objects -of admiration or utility. In regard to languages, I have -read a good deal about the controversy concerning their -origin, but I have observed one thing to be very apparent: -whether the gift of articulate speech was bestowed on man, -when he had become a distinct being, in a manner and for -a purpose which would distinguish him from all the other -animals, or whether it became a developed faculty akin to -that by which other animals utter vocal sounds intelligible -to those of their species, it is certain that in man there is -a power of varying his vocal utterances at pleasure, which -is possessed by no other creature on this earth. The expansion -of languages, therefore, the coinage of new words, -the addition of new inflections, the introduction of new -shades of meaning, the method of utterance which is called -pronunciation, and the different dialects of the same tongue, -are all matters which have been under the control of individuals -dwelling together, and have all resulted from the -arbitrary determination of more or less numerous persons, -followed by the great mass of their nation, their race, or -their tribe. Even when a new and third language has been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> -formed by the contact of two peoples speaking separate -tongues, we may trace the same arbitrary adoption of parts -of each separate tongue, in the first beginning of the fusion, -and the new language consequently exhibits a greater or a -less predominance of the characteristics of one of its parent -tongues, according as the one population has compelled the -other to adopt the greater part of its peculiar modes of -speech.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> You have gone over a good deal of ground, -but now what do you infer from all this, supposing that -you have taken a right view of the facts?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I infer that, as in the social phenomena -there are products and effects which have owed their existence -to human will and direct human action, so, in -other departments, for example, in the domain which is -called Nature, and which is out of the sphere of human -agency and human force, it is reasonable to conclude that -there are products and effects which must have owed their -existence to a will and a power capable of conceiving and -producing them. And this is what leads me, as I was led -in the examination of the solar system, to the idea of a -Supreme Being, capable of producing those objects in nature -which are so varied, so complex, so marvelously constructed, -so nicely adapted to the conditions of each separate -organism, that if we attribute their existence to any -intelligent power, it must be to a power of infinite capacities, -since nothing short of such capacities could have conceived -and executed them.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> You have now come to the very point at -which I have been expecting to see you arrive, and at -which I will put to you this question: Why do you personify -the power to which you trace these products in the -natural world? Substitute for the term God, or the Creator, -the power of Nature. You then have a force that is -not only immense, but is in truth without any limit—a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span> -force that embraces everything, gives life to everything, is -at once cause and effect, is incessantly active and inexhaustible. -It commands all methods, accomplishes all objects, -and uses time, space, and matter as its means. Why -do you personify this all-pervading and sufficient power of -Nature? Why make it a being, a deity, when all you -know is that it is a power? "Where wast thou when I -laid the foundations of the world?" is a question that God -is supposed to have asked of Job; and it simply shows that -Job had been traditionally taught to believe that there is -such a being as God, and that that being laid the foundations -of the world. Substitute Nature in the question, let -Nature ask the question, and it is just as pertinent, and involves -the same problem of human existence. Where was -man when Nature began to exhibit that power which has -evolved all things that we see out of the primeval nothingness?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Well, here I must say that you have left -out certain ideas that are essential to all true reasoning on -this subject. Power without a guide, power without control, -power without a determining will, power that acts -without a volition which determines the how and the when, -is a thing that I can not conceive. I thought that in our -former conversation, when we were considering the solar -system, you conceded that power, as something abstracted -from substance or its properties, was a logically necessary -conception.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> I did. But I did not concede that power -must be converted into a person. You must not misunderstand -me. It certainly is my idea that power is a thing -to be contemplated by itself; and we are surrounded everywhere -by its manifestations. But it is not my idea that it -is held and exercised by the being called God, or by any -being. We only know of it by its effects; and these show -that Nature is, after all, both cause and effect, manner and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> -execution, design and product. You can go no farther. -You can not go behind Nature and find a being who sat -in the heavens and laid the foundations of the world, unless -you mean to accept a story which wise men have at -last abandoned along with many kindred beliefs which -came from the ages of the greatest ignorance.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Pardon me: the question that was put to -Job has more than one aspect. But I have considered the -narrative that is found in the first chapter of Genesis only -as a hypothesis to be weighed with other hypotheses of the -origin of the world and its inhabitants. I have studied the -phenomena to which you give the name of Nature, and I -will tell you what seems to me to be a postulate necessary -to be carried into that study. I have observed that in the -works of man two things are apparent: One is, that power -is exercised; the other is, that the exercise of the power is -always accompanied by a determining will, which decides -that the power shall be exerted, or that it shall be deferred, -or that it shall be applied variously as respects the mode -and the time. In human hands, power is not illimitable, -but within certain limitations it may be exercised, and it is -always under the guidance of a will. A man determines to -build a house; he decides on its dimensions, and when he -will begin to erect it. A general determines to attack the -enemy on a certain day, and he marshals his forces accordingly. -A people determine to change their government, -and they decide what their new government shall be. An -artist determines to paint a certain picture, and he paints -it. Whenever we see human power exercised, so that we -can connect product and power, the power itself is put in -motion by an intelligent will. I say, therefore, that the -idea of power without a controlling will, without a determining -design, is inconceivable: for I am obliged to draw my -conclusions from what I observe, and certainly the phenomena -of society do not present any instances of a product re<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span>sulting -from an exercise of power without a determination -to exercise it. Power diffused, power without guidance, -power moving by its own volition and without the volition -of any intelligent being, is not exhibited in the works of -man.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> But we are now dealing with the works of -Nature; and the question is, whether the power that is -manifest in Nature is, to adopt your language, under the -control or guidance of a being who is something other than -the power itself. You must remember that this is a domain -in which you can see nothing but products and effects. -You must also remember that if the immensity and variety -of those products and effects lead to the conclusion that the -power transcends all human faculty, is superhuman, and, so -far as we can tell, boundless, all that we can know is that the -power itself is illimitable. The quality of an infinite and -illimitable capacity may be imputed to the power of Nature, -because a power without limit seems necessary to the production -of such effects as we see. But here we must stop. -We have no warrant for believing that the power which we -trace in the phenomena of Nature is held and controlled by -a person, as man holds and controls the power which he exercises -with his hands. What we see in Nature is the exercise -of an immense and apparently boundless power. But -the imputation of that power to a being distinct from the -power itself, is a mere exercise of the human imagination, -without any proof whatever. See how this imagination has -worked at different periods. Monotheism and polytheism -are alike in their origin. The one has imputed to different -beings all the phenomena in the different departments of -Nature, one being having the charge and superintendence -of one department and another being having another department. -Good and evil have thus been parceled out to -different deities or demons. On the other hand, monotheism -attributes all to some one being, and his existence is no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> -more rational than the existence of the whole catalogue of -the mythologies of all antiquity, or the stupid beliefs of the -present barbarous tribes. But Nature is a great fact, or -rather a vast store-house of facts, which we can study; and -what we learn from it is that there is a power which Nature -is constantly exerting, which is without any assignable limit, -which is itself both cause and effect, and beyond this we -can not go.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Let us see if you are correct. In the first -place, do you not observe that the tendency of mankind to -personify the powers of Nature is one of the strongest proofs -of the logical necessity for an interpretation which seeks -for an intelligent being of some kind as the actor in the -production of the phenomena? It is the fashion, I find, -among a certain class of philosophers, to impute this propensity -to the proneness of the human mind toward superstitious -beliefs; to the mere effect of poetical or imaginary -temperament in certain races of men, or to fear in other -races; or to a vague longing for some superior being who -can sympathize with human sorrows or assist human efforts. -Something of all these influences has, no doubt, in different -degrees and in various ways, worked itself into the religious -beliefs of mankind. But neither any one of them, nor the -whole of them, will satisfactorily account for either polytheism -or monotheism. We must go deeper. There has -been an unconscious reasoning at work, more or less unconscious, -which has led to the conclusion that power, the -manifestation of power, necessarily implies that the power -is held and wielded by some intelligent being. The beliefs -of mankind, whether embracing one such being or many, -have not been the mere results of superstition, or fear, or -longing for divine sympathy, or for superhuman companionship -or protection. Those beliefs owe as much to the reasoning -powers of mankind as they do to the influence of imagination. -In many ages there have been powerful intel<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span>lects, -which have been free from the influence of superstition -or fancy, and which have recognized the logical necessity -for a conception of power as a force that must be under the -guidance and control of intellect. While the popular belief -has not attained this conviction by the same conscious and -logically conducted process of reasoning, it has been unconsciously -led through the same process, by what is open -to the observation of human faculties, even in the less civilized -portions of the human race. The savage who is sufficiently -raised above the brute creation to exercise his own -will and intelligence in the pursuit of his game, or in building -his wigwam, or in fighting his enemy, knows that he -exercises a power that is under his own control; and, as -soon as he begins to observe the phenomena of Nature, he -conceives of some being who holds a like power over the -material universe, and whom he begins to personify, to -propitiate, and to worship. This is the result of reasoning: -feeble in some cases, but in all cases the intellectual process -is the same. Now let us see whether this process is a sound -one. Are you sure that you are correct in saying that the -power of Nature is without limit? Is there a single force -in Nature, a single property of matter, or any sequence of -natural events, that is not circumscribed? Do not the -very regularity and uniformity of the phenomena of Nature -imply that some authority has said, from the beginning, -Thus far shalt thou go and no farther? You surely do not -imagine that the law of universal gravitation made itself, -or that it settled itself into an exact and invariable method -of action by the mere force of habit, beginning without prescribed -and superimposed limits, and finally resulting in a -fixed rule which never changes. You do not imagine that -the mysterious, impalpable motion to which is now given the -name of electricity, created for itself, as a matter of habit, -the perpetual tendency to seek an equilibration of the quantity -accumulated in one body with the quantity that is con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span>tained -in another, by transmission through intermediate -bodies; or that it established for itself the conditions which -make one substance a better conducting medium than another. -You do not suppose, I take it, that certain particles of -matter adopted for themselves a capacity to arrange themselves -in crystals of certain fixed combinations and shapes, -and that other particles of matter did not choose to take on -this habit. All these forces, powers, and tendencies are of -very great extent, much beyond any that man can exercise; -but they all have their limitations, their prescribed and invariable -methods of action; they all act as if they have been -commanded to act in a certain way and to a certain extent, -and not as if they have chosen for themselves both method -and scope. Now, is it not a rational deduction that what is -really illimitable is not the power of Nature, but the power -which made Nature what it is? Is it not a necessary conclusion -that, inasmuch as all Nature acts within certain -limits, stupendous and minute and varied as the products -or effects may be, there must have been behind Nature a -power that could and did prescribe the methods, the limitations, -the lines within which Nature was to move and act? -You can not put into the mouth of Nature the question, -Where wast thou (Man) when I laid the foundations of the -world? without suggesting the retort, "Where wast <em>thou</em> -(Nature) when the foundations of the world <em>were</em> laid?" -And this question Nature can no more answer, for itself, -than man can answer for himself when the question is put -to him. Each must answer, I was nowhere—I did not exist. -Each must answer, There was a power which called me into -being, which prescribed the conditions of my existence, -which gave me the capacities that I possess, which ordained -the limitations within which I was to act.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> And all this you derive from the fact that a -being whom we call Man has some power over matter; that -he has an intelligent faculty by which he can do certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> -things with matter, and that he actually does produce certain -concrete forms of new things that he did not find made -to his hand. Is this the basis of your reasoning about the -origin of Nature?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> It is, and I will tell you why. Man is the -one being on this earth in whom we find an intelligent will -and constructive faculty united, to a degree which shows -a power of variation and execution superior to that of all -other beings of whose actions we have the direct evidence -of our senses. We might select one or more of the inferior -animals, and find in them a strong constructive faculty; -but we do not find it accompanied by a power of variation -and adaptation that is equal to that of man in degree, or -that is probably the same in kind. I will not insist on the -distinction between reason and instinct, but I presume you -will admit that, when we compare the constructive faculty -of man and that of the most ingenious and wonderfully -endowed animal or insect, the latter acts always under an -implanted impulse, which we have no good ground for regarding -as of the same nature as man's reasoning power, -however striking may be the products. When, therefore, -we select the human power of construction or creation as -the basis of reasoning upon the works of Nature, we resort -to a being in whom that power is the highest of which we -have direct evidence. In the works of man we have direct -and palpable proof that the phenomena—the products of -human skill and human force—are brought about by the -faculties of an intelligent and reasoning being. If we dig -into the earth and find there a statue, an implement, or a -weapon, we do not hesitate to conclude that the spot was -once inhabited by men, just as surely as we should conclude -the same thing if we found there human bones. The world, -above-ground and below-ground, is full of concrete objects -that we know must have been fashioned by human skill, -guided by human intelligence. This intelligence, this in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span>tellect, -is not matter; it is a being; it is a person. It is -not a force, acting without consciousness; it is a being -wielding a force which is under the control of volition. -The force and the volition are both limited, but within the -limitations they constitute the power of man. Pass, then, -to the works of Nature, or to what you call the power of -Nature. As, in the case of man, you can not conclude that -he created for himself his own faculties, that he prescribed -for himself the limitations of his power over matter, or that -he formed those limitations as mere matters of habit, or -that it was from habit alone that he derived his great constructive -powers, so, in studying the works of Nature, you -must conclude that some intelligent being made the laws -of matter and motion, prescribed the unvarying order and -method of action, laid down the limitations, originated -the properties, and, in so doing, acted by volition, choice, -and design. The distinction, as I conceive, between man -and Nature is, that there has been bestowed on man, in -a very inferior degree, a part of the original power of -creation. On Nature there has been bestowed none of -this power. As we find that the existence of man as an -intelligent being, endowed with certain high faculties, -among which is a certain degree of the power of creating -new objects, can not be accounted for without the -hypothesis of a creator, still less can we account for -the existence and phenomena of Nature, which has in -itself no degree of the creating power, without the same -hypothesis.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Stop where you are. Why do you separate -man from Nature? Have you yet to learn that man is a -part of Nature? I suspect you have, after all, been reading -the book of Genesis for something more than a hypothesis, -and that you have adopted the notion that God made -Adam a living soul. Put away all the nursery-stories, and -come down to the "hard-pan" of actual facts, which show<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> -by an overwhelming array of evidence that man had a very -different origin.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> You know, my friend, that I never learned -any nursery-stories, and therefore I have none to unlearn. -It may be my misfortune, but I find myself here in the -world in mature years, studying the phenomena of life, -without having had any early teaching, but with such -reasoning as I can apply to what I observe, and to what -science, history, and philosophy can furnish to me. I belong -to no church, to no sect, to no party, and I have not -even a country. I am a citizen of the world, on my travels -through it, learning what I can. Now, what are your facts? -Let us get down, as you say, upon the "hard-pan," and -make it as hard as you please.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> First answer my question: Why do you -separate man from Nature?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I know very well that in a certain sense -man is a part of Nature. But it is necessary to contemplate -man apart from all the rest of Nature, because we find that -he is endowed with intellect, and we have very good and -direct evidence that his intellect is an actor; and we know -that he is endowed with consciousness, and we have very -good and direct evidence that, by introspection, he becomes -aware of his own consciousness, and what it is.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Very well, assume all that if you choose. -Now let me show you an origin of man, with his intellect -and consciousness, which will entirely overthrow the idea -that he was a special creation in the sense to which you -seem to be drifting, namely, that of miraculous interposition -by a being called God. You must be aware, as you -have read so much, that modern science has made great -discoveries, and that there are certain conclusions on this -subject which are drawn from very numerous and important -data. Those data involve the origin of all the different -animals, man included. They are all to be accounted for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> -in the same way and by the same reasoning. Now, if we -go back to a period when none of them existed, we find a -method of accounting for them that is infinitely superior -as a hypothesis to any idea of their special creation as an -act or as a series of acts of divine and direct interposition. -I will take this method as it is given by Herbert Spencer, -because, as he has reasoned it, it accounts for both intellect -and consciousness; and Mr. Spencer is allowed to be one -of the leading minds of this age. Mark the starting-point -of his whole philosophy on this subject of organic life. -Darwin, as you know, supposes some one very low form of -organic life, an aquatic grub, and out of it he evolves all -the other animal organisms, by the process of natural and -sexual selection, through successive generations, ending in -man. This hypothesis leaves the original organism to be -accounted for, and, although Darwin does not expressly assert -that it was the Creator who fashioned the first organism, -he leaves it to be implied. Spencer, on the other hand, -explicitly denies the absolute commencement of organic life -on the globe. Observe that the terms of his theory of evolution -are much more complete than Darwin's, for he says -that "the affirmation of universal evolution is in itself a -negation of an absolute commencement of anything. Construed -in terms of evolution, every kind of being is conceived -as a product of modifications wrought by insensible -gradations on a pre-existing being; and this holds as fully -of the supposed commencement of organic life, or a first -organism, as of all subsequent developments of organic -life."<a name="FNanchor_106" id="FNanchor_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> - -<p>You will see, therefore, that the idea of a Creator, fashioning -a type of animal organism, or making a commencement -of organic life, is excluded by this great philosopher, -although he does concur in the main in Darwin's general ex<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span>planation -of the mode in which one organism is evolved out -of a pre-existing organism. He goes much farther, because -his system of universal evolution embraces the elements out -of which any organic life whatever has been developed, and -negatives the idea of any absolute commencement of anything -whatever. He begins with the original molecules of -organizable matter. By modifications induced upon modifications -these become formed, by their inherent tendencies, -into higher types of organic molecules, as we see in the -artificial evolution effected by chemists in their laboratories; -who, although they are unable to form the complex -combinations directly from their elements, can form them -indirectly through successive modifications of simpler combinations, -by the use of equivalents. In Nature, the more -complex combinations are formed by modifications directly -from the elements, and each modification is a change of -the molecule into equilibrium with its environment, subjecting -it, that is to say, to new conditions. Then, larger -aggregates, compound molecules, are successively generated; -more complex or heterogeneous aggregates arise out of one -another, and there results a geometrically increasing multitude -of these larger and more complex aggregates. So that -by the action of the successive higher forms on one another, -joined with the action of the environing conditions, the -highest forms of organic molecules are reached. Thus in -the early world, as in the modern laboratory, inferior types -of organic substances, by their mutual actions under fit -conditions, evolved the superior types of organic substances, -and at length ended in organizable protoplasm. Now, let -me read to you Mr. Spencer's description of the mode in -which the substance called "protein" becomes developed -into organic life. "And it can hardly be doubted," he -says, "that the shaping of organizable protoplasm, which -is a substance modifiable in multitudinous ways with extreme -facility, went on after the same manner. As I learn<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> -from one of our first chemists, Prof. Frankland, protein -is capable of existing under probably at least a thousand -isomeric forms; and, as we shall presently see, it is capable -of forming, with itself and other elements, substances yet -more intricate in composition, that are practically intricate -in their varieties of kind. Exposed to those innumerable -modifications of conditions which the earth's surface afforded, -here in amount of light, there in amount of heat, -and elsewhere in the mineral quality of its aqueous medium, -this extremely changeable substance must have undergone, -now one, now another, of its countless metamorphoses. -And to the mutual influences of its metamorphic forms, -under favoring conditions, we may ascribe the production -of the still more composite, still more sensitive, still more -variously-changeable portions of organic matter, which, in -masses more minute and simpler than existing <em>protozoa</em>, -displayed actions varying little by little into those called -vital actions, which protein itself exhibits in a certain degree, -and which the lowest known living things exhibit -only in a greater degree. Thus, setting out with inductions -from the experiences of organic chemists at the one -extreme, and with inductions from the observations of -biologists at the other extreme, we are enabled to deductively -bridge the interval—are enabled to conceive how -organic compounds were evolved, and how, by a continuance -of the process, the nascent life displayed in these becomes -gradually more pronounced."<a name="FNanchor_107" id="FNanchor_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a></p> - -<p>It is in this way that Spencer accounts for the formation -of the cell which becomes developed into a living -organism, out of which are successively evolved all the -higher forms of animal organisms, until we reach man.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> And is this put forward as something -which rational people are to believe?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Undoubtedly it is put forward as something -that is to be believed, because it is supported by a vast array -of evidence; and let me tell you that this conception -of Nature as a whole is the consummate flower of this -nineteenth century in the domain of philosophic speculation.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Perhaps it is. But although this nineteenth -century has witnessed many great scientific discoveries, -and has produced extraordinary inventions, I do not -find that among the speculative philosophers of this age -there are such very superior powers of reasoning displayed -that we ought to regard them as authorities entitled to -challenge our acceptance of their theories without examination. -I must say that among your scientific people of -the present day, and especially among the philosophers of -the class of which Mr. Spencer is the leading representative, -there are certain tendencies and defects which surprise -me. One of their defects is that they do not obviate remote -difficulties, perhaps because they have not been trained, -as other men have, to foresee where such difficulties must -arise. This is sometimes apparent even when the difficulties -are not very remote, but are quite obvious. One of -their tendencies is to arrive at a theory from some of the -phenomena, and then to strain the remaining phenomena -to suit the theory; and sometimes they proceed to the invention -or imagination of phenomena which are necessary -to the completion of a chain of proof. This last process is -called bridging the interval. I will now apply this criticism -to Mr. Spencer's philosophy of the origin of man. In -the first place he has not obviated a fundamental difficulty, -whether it be a near or a remote one. Where did the -molecules get their tendency or capacity to arrange themselves -into higher and more complex forms? Whence -came the auxiliary or additional force of their surrounding -environment? What endowed <em>protein</em> with its capacity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span> -to assume a thousand isomeric forms? What made the -favoring conditions which have helped on the influence -of its metamorphic tendencies, so as to produce still more -sensitive and variously-changeable portions of organic matter? -These questions must have an answer; and, when -we ask them, we see the significance of the inquiry, "Where -wast thou (man) when I laid the foundations of the world?" -For these things, on the evolution theory, <em>are</em> the foundations -of the world. It is no answer to say, as Mr. Spencer -does, that these tendencies, or capacities of matter, and -these laws of the favoring conditions, came from the Unknown -Cause. Known or unknown, did they have a cause, -or did they make themselves? Did these, the foundations -of the world, have an origin, or were they without any -origin? If they had an origin, was it from the will and -power of a being capable of giving existence to them and -prescribing their modes of action? If they had no origin, -if they existed from all eternity, how came it that they -formed this extraordinary habit of invariable action in a -certain method, which amid all its multiformity shows an -astonishing persistency? If we deny, with Mr. Spencer, -the absolute commencement of organic life on the globe, -we must still go back of all the traces of organic life, and -inquire whence matter, molecules, organized or unorganized, -derived the capacities or tendencies to become organized, -and how the favoring conditions became established -as auxiliary or subsidiary forces. And therefore it is that -this difficulty, whether remote or near at hand, is not met -by Mr. Spencer: for whether we call the cause an unknown -or a known cause, the question is, Was there a cause, or did -the foundations of the world lay themselves? The reasoning -powers of mankind, exercised by daily observation of -cause and effect, of creative power and created product, are -equal to the conception of a First Cause as a being who -could have laid the foundations of the world, but they are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> -utterly unequal to the conception that they had no origin -whatever. Again, consider how numerous are the missing -links in the chain of evolution, how many gaps are filled -up by pure inventions or assumptions. The evolution of -one distinct and perfect animal, or being, out of a pre-existing -animal or being of a different type, has never been -proved as a fact. Yet whole pedigrees of such generation -of species have been constructed upon the same principles -as we should construct the pedigree of an individual. Furthermore, -if we regard the facts about which there can be -no controversy, we find not only distinct species of animals, -but we find the same species divided into male and female, -with a system of procreation and gestation established for -the multiplication of individuals of that species. Now go -back to the imaginary period when protein began to form -itself into something verging toward organic life, and then -there became evolved the nascent life of an organized being. -How did the division of the sexes originate? Did -some of the molecules or their progressive forms, or their -aggregates, or masses, under some conditions, tend to the -production of the male, and others under certain conditions -tend to the development of the female, so that the -sexes were formed by a mere habit of arrangement without -any special intervention? Here is one of the most serious -difficulties which the doctrine of evolution, whether it be -the Darwinian or the Spencerian theory, has to encounter. -There is a division into male and female: there is a law of -procreation by the union of the two sexes. This is a fact -about which there can be no dispute. It is one of the most -remarkable facts in Nature. It is the means by which species -are continued, and the world is peopled with individuals -of each species. Is it conceivable that this occurred without -any design, that it had no origin in a formative will, -that it had, properly speaking, no origin at all, but that it -grew out of the tendencies of organized matter to take on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> -such a diversity in varying conditions? And if the latter -was all the origin that it had, whence came the tendencies -and whence the favoring conditions that helped them on -toward the result? It seems to me that the Spencerian -theory, so far as it suggests a mode in which the two sexes -of animals came to exist, is hardly less fanciful than what -Plato has given us in his "Timæus." I have studied them -both.</p> - -<p>If you will hand me Mr. Spencer's work from which -you have just quoted, I will point out a passage which fully -justifies my criticism. It is this: "Before it can be ascertained -how organized beings have been gradually evolved, -there must be reached the conviction that they have been -gradually evolved." He says this in praise of De Maillet, -one of the earliest of the modern speculators who reached -this conviction, and whose "wild notions" as to the way -should not make us, says Mr. Spencer, "forget the merit -of his intuition that animals and plants were produced by -natural causes."<a name="FNanchor_108" id="FNanchor_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> That is to say, first form to yourself a -theory, and have a thorough conviction of it. Then investigate, -and shape the facts so as to support the theory. -Is it not plain that an inquiry into the mode in which organized -beings have been gradually evolved must precede -any conclusion or conviction on the subject? It is one of -those cases in which the <em>how</em> a thing has been done lies at -the basis of the inquiry whether it has probably been done -at all. If a suggested mode turns out to be wild and visionary, -what is the value of any "intuition" of the main -fact? But, what is still more extraordinary in this kind -of deduction, which is no deduction, is the way in which, -according to Mr. Spencer, the first conviction is to be -reached before one looks for the facts. The process of the -evolution of organisms, according to Mr. Spencer's philoso<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span>phy, -is contained as a part in the great whole of evolution -in general. We first convince ourselves that evolution obtains -in all the other departments of Nature, and is the -interpretation of all their phenomena. Then we conclude -that it has obtained in the animal kingdom, and so we have -the conviction necessary to be acquired before we examine -the phenomena; and then we make that investigation so as -to reconcile the facts with the supposed universal laws of -matter and motion. I do not exaggerate in the least. Here -is what he says: "Only when the process of evolution of -organisms is affiliated on the process of evolution in general -can it be truly said to be explained. The thing required is -to show that its various results are corollaries from first -principles. We have to reconcile the facts with the universal -laws of the redistribution of matter and motion."<a name="FNanchor_109" id="FNanchor_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> -What would Bacon have thought of this method of establishing -the probable truth of a theory? It leaves out of -consideration a multitude of facts, and one of them at least -is of the utmost importance. It is that in the domain of -animated matter, in organized beings, and most signally in -the animal kingdom, there is a principle of life; and, whatever -may be the universal laws of the redistribution of matter -and motion, in their operation upon or among the products -which are not endowed with this principle, when we -come to reason about products that <em>are</em> endowed with it -we are not entitled to conclude that this principle of animal -life is itself a product of the operation of those laws -because they have resulted in products which do not possess -life, or life of the same kind. In order to reach the conviction -that animal organisms have resulted solely from the -operation of the laws of matter and motion, we must not -undertake to reconcile the facts with those laws, but we -must have some evidence that those laws have produced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span> -living beings with complex and diversified organisms, and -this evidence must at least tend to exclude every other hypothesis. -It is not enough to flout at all other hypotheses, -or to pronounce them <i lang="la">ex cathedra</i> to be idle tales.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> You must not catch at single expressions -and make yourself a captious critic. That would be unworthy -of such an inquirer as you profess to be, and as I -believe you are. Mr. Spencer did not mean, by reconciling -the facts with the laws of matter and motion, that we are -to distort the facts. He meant that we are to discover the -correspondence between the facts and the operation of those -laws. Now, let me show you more explicitly that he is -quite right. There are certain laws of matter and motion, -discoverable and discovered by scientific investigation, which -prevail throughout all Nature. The phenomena which they -produce, although not yet fully understood, justify the assumption -of their universality and their modes of operation. -It is perfectly legitimate, therefore, to reason that the same -laws which have produced the observable phenomena in -other departments of Nature have had a like potency as -causes by which the phenomena in the animal kingdom -have been produced. Using this legitimate mode of reasoning, -Mr. Spencer traces the operation of those laws upon -the primal molecules, which are peculiarly sensitive to their -effects. He follows them through the successive aggregations -of higher combinations until he arrives at the protoplasmic -substance, out of which, from its capability of -assuming an infinity of forms, aided by the environing -conditions, the simplest organic forms become evolved, -and thus what you call the principle of life gradually arose -through a vast extent of time. He is therefore perfectly -consistent with himself in denying the absolute commencement -of organic life on the globe; for you must understand -that he means by this to deny that there was any point of -time, or any particular organism, at or in which animal life<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span> -can be said to have had its first commencement, without -having been preceded by some other kind of being, out of -which the more highly organized being has been produced -by modifications wrought by insensible gradations. If you -will attend closely to his reasoning, you will see that you -have small cause for criticising it as you have; and, if you -will look at one of his illustrations, you will see the strength -of his position. Hear what he says: "It is no more needful -to suppose an absolute commencement of organic life -or a 'first organism' than it is needful to suppose an absolute -commencement of social life and a first social organism. -The assumption of such a necessity in this last case, -made by early speculators with their theories of 'social -contracts' and the like, is disproved by the facts; and the -facts, so far as they are ascertained, disprove the assumption -of such a necessity in the first case."<a name="FNanchor_110" id="FNanchor_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> That is to -say, as the social facts, the social phenomena, disprove the -"social contract" as an occurrence taking place by human -design and intention, so the phenomena of animal life disprove -the assumption of such an occurrence as its commencement -by divine intervention, or its commencement -at all.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I think I understood all this before, just -as you put it, but I am not the less obliged to you for the -restatement. In regard to society, I know not why the -family, the institution of marriage, is not to be regarded as -the first social organism, and the union of two or more -families in some kind of mutual league is certainly the first -society in a more comprehensive sense. I care very little -about the theory of the social contract, as applied to more -complex societies, although, as a kind of legal fiction, it is -well enough for all the uses which sound reasoners nowadays -make of it. But the institution of marriage, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> -family, is no fiction at all; it is a fact, however it was first -established, and it was the absolute commencement of social -life. But I do not hold to this sort of analogies, or to this -mode of reasoning from what happens in a department, in -which the actions of men have largely or exclusively influenced -the complex phenomena, to a department in which -human influence has had nothing to do with the phenomena. -But now let us come back to the proposition that -there never was any absolute commencement of organic life -on the globe. I will take Mr. Spencer's meaning—his denial, -as you put it—and will test it by one or two observations -upon his own explanation, as given in the elaborate -paper in which he replied to a critic in the "North American -Review" a little more than four years ago.<a name="FNanchor_111" id="FNanchor_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> In the -first place, then, as to time. It will not do to say that -there never was a time when such a product as life, animated -or organized life, had its first existence. To whatever -it owed its existence, it must at some time have begun -to exist. It matters not how far back in the ages of the -globe you place it: you must contemplate a time when it -did not exist, and a point of time at which it began to exist. -It matters not that you can not fix this time. There was -such a time, whether you can fix it chronologically or not. -In the next place, however minute the supposed gradations -which you trace backward from a recognizable organism to -the primal protoplasmic substance, out of which you suppose -it to have been gradually evolved, and through whatever -extent of time you imagine these gradations to have -been worked out by the operation of the forces of Nature, -modifying successive beings, you must find an organism to -which you can attribute life. Whatever that organism was, -it was the commencement of organic life; for, when you -go back of it in the series, you come to something that was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span> -not organic life, but was merely a collection of molecules -or a product of aggregated molecules, that had a capacity -to be developed into an animated organism under favorable -conditions. "It is," says Mr. Spencer, "by the action of -the successively higher forms on one another, joined with -the action of environing conditions, that the highest forms -are reached." Some one, then, of those highest forms, -something that can be called an animal organism, some -being endowed with life, was the commencement of organic -life on the globe; and it is just as correct and necessary to -speak of it as the "absolute" commencement as it is when -we speak of Darwin's aquatic grub, or of the Mosaic account -of the creation of the different animals by the hand -and will of God. Neither Mr. Spencer nor any other man -can construct a chain of animated existence back into the -region of its non-existence without showing that it began to -have an existence. He can say that the affirmation of universal -evolution is in itself a negation of an absolute commencement -of anything. And so it is theoretically. But -this does not get over the difficulty. On his own explanation -of the mode in which organisms have been evolved, -there must have been a first organism, and in that first organism -life began. So that I am not yet prepared to yield -my criticism, or to yield my convictions to a writer who is -so much carried away by his theory.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> But you will allow that the theory is perfect -in itself; and why, then, do you say that he is carried away -by it? You ought either to give up your criticism, or to -show that there is a superior hypothesis by which to account -for the origin of organisms, and one that is supported -by stronger proofs and better reasoning. You have nothing -to oppose to Mr. Spencer's explanation of the origin of -organic life, excepting the fable which you find in the book -of Genesis.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Undoubtedly the opposite hypothesis is that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> -which attributes to a Creator the production of organic life; -and whether the Mosaic account, as it stands, be a fable or -a true narrative of an actual occurrence, what we have to -do is to ascertain, upon correct principles of reasoning, -whether the creating power can be dispensed with. Mr. -Spencer dispenses with it altogether. He gives it a direct -negative in the most absolute manner. But the perfection -of his theory depends upon its ability to sustain itself as an -explanation of the existence of organisms without the intervention of -a creating power anywhere at any time. I -have already suggested the serious defect of his whole philosophic -scheme as applied to the existence of organisms, -namely, that the foundation of the theory, the existence of -the molecules with their properties and capacities tending -to rearrangement under the laws of matter and motion, -those laws themselves, and the environing conditions which -assist the process of adjustment and combination, must all -have had an origin, or a cause. If we can get along without -that origin, without any cause, without any actor laying -the foundations of the world, we can make a theory. -But that theory can not sustain itself by such a negation if -all experience, observation, and reflection amount to anything; -for these all point in one direction. They all tend -to show that every existing thing must have had a cause, -that every product must have had an origin, and, if we -place that origin in the operation of certain laws of matter -and motion upon and among the primal molecules of matter, -we still have to look for the origin of those laws and -of the molecules on which they have operated. If we say -that these things had no origin, that they existed without -having been caused to exist, we end in a negation at which -reason at once rebels. If, on the other hand, we reject, as -we must reject, this negation, then the same power which -could establish the laws of matter and motion, and give -origin to the molecules and the favoring conditions by which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> -their aggregated higher forms are supposed to have been -developed, was alike capable of the direct production of -species, the creation of the sexes, and the establishment -of the laws of procreation and gestation. So that it becomes -a question of probability, of the weight of evidence, -as to whether we can explain the phenomena of species, of -the sexual division and the sexual union, with all that they -involve, without the hypothesis of direct intervention, design, -and formative skill of a boundless character. I have -seen no explanation of the origin of species and of the sexual -distinction, with its concomitant methods of reproduction, -that does not end in an utter blank, whenever it -undertakes to dispense with that kind of direct design to -which is derisively given the name of "miraculous interposition," -but which in truth implies no miracle at all.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> I have to be perpetually recalling you to the -first principles of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. You seem to -think it enough to point to the existence of species and the -sexual division, as if his philosophy did not afford the -means of accounting for them by the operation of natural -causes. Let me put to you, then, this question: If natural -causes have produced a crystal, by successive new combinations -of molecules of matter through gradations rising successively -into higher forms, why should not natural causes, -acting upon other molecules in a corresponding way, have -produced organic life, or animated organisms? If natural -causes have evolved out of certain molecules the substance -known as organizable protein, why should not the continued -operation of the same or similar causes have modified -organizable protein into some distinct and recognizable -animated organism? If you admit this as a possible or -highly probable result, why should not natural causes have -produced, in the course of millions of years, the division -of the sexes and the methods of procreation and multiplication?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I will assign the reasons for not adopting -the conclusions to which you expect me to arrive, in a certain -order. In the first place, the capacity of certain molecules -to result in the formation of a crystal, under the operation -of what you call natural causes, requires that the -molecules, their capacity, and the natural causes should all -have had an origin, call it known or unknown. The cause -was of equal potency to produce the crystal directly, or anything -else that exists in Nature. The same thing is true of -certain other molecules which, under the operation of the so-called -natural causes, have resulted in organizable protein. -There must have been an origin to the molecules, to their -capacity, and to the laws which effect their combinations; -and this cause could equally fashion an organism and -fashion it in the related forms of male and female by direct -intervention, for to such a power there is no assignable -limit. In the next place, the distinction between inanimate -and animated matter, between beings endowed and -beings not endowed with animal life, is a distinction that -can not be overlooked; for, although we find this distinction -to be a fact that has resulted after the operation of -whatever causes may have produced it, we must still note -that there is a distinction, and a very important one. It -may be that the dividing line is very difficult of detection; -that it is impossible to determine in all cases just where -organizable matter passes from dead matter into a living -organism. But that at some point there has arisen a living -organism, however produced, is certain. Now, suppose -that what you call natural causes have operated to bring -organizable matter up to this dividing line, the question is, -whether we can conclude that they have had the potency -to pass that line, and to lead of themselves to all the varying -and manifold results of species, the division of the sexes, -and all that follows that division. Certain great facts -seem to me to negative this conclusion. The first is, that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span> -we have species, which differ absolutely from each other as -organisms, in their modes of life, and their destinies, however -strong may be the resemblances which obtain among -them in certain respects. The second fact is, that each of -the true species is divided into the related forms of male -and female, and is placed under a law of procreation, by -the sexual union, for the multiplication of individuals of -that species. The third fact is, that no crosses take place -in Nature between different species of animals—between the -true species—resulting in a third species, or a third animal. -It is true that multiplication of individuals of some of the -lowest organisms takes place without the bisexual process -of procreation, as where, in the severance of a part of an -organism the severed part grows, under favorable conditions, -into a perfect organism of the same kind, as in the analogous -phenomenon of a plant propagated by a branch or a -slip from the parent stem. But this occurrence does not -take place among the animals which are placed for their -multiplication under the law of the sexual union and the -sexual procreation. The sexual division, therefore, the law -of sexual procreation, and all that they involve, have to be -accounted for. Can they be accounted for by the theory -of evolution? Wherever you place their first occurrence, -you have to find a process adequate to their production. -What, then, entitles you to say that the hypothesis of their -production, by the capacity and tendency of organizable -substances, when they have reached certain combinations, -is superior to the hypothesis of a direct interposition and a -formative will? At the outset, you must begin with some -interposition and some formative will; you must account -for the existence of the very capacities of matter to become -organized under the laws of the redistribution of matter -and motion, or you will end nowhere whatever. If you -assume, as you must, that, in laying "the foundations of -the world," there was exercised some interposition and some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> -formative will, you have a power which was just as adequate -to the production of species, and their sexual division, as -it was to the endowment of matter with certain properties -and capacities, and the establishment of any laws for the -redistribution of matter and motion. If you deny the existence -and potency of the original power in the one production -you must deny them in the other. If you concede -them in the one case, you must concede them in the other. -Now, although the original power was equal to the endowment -of organizable matter with its capacities for and tendencies -to organization, and may be theoretically assumed -to have made that endowment, the question is, whether -these capacities and tendencies, without special formative -interposition, and by the mere force of what you call natural -causes, were equal to the production of such phenomena -as the division of the sexes and all that follows that division. -Can it with any truth he said that the so-called -natural causes have produced any phenomena which can be -compared, on the question of special design, to the phenomena -of the sexual division, the law of sexual procreation, -and the whole system of the multiplication of individuals -of distinct and true species? When I can see any -facts which will warrant the belief that the origin of the -sexes is to be attributed to the capacity of organizable protein -to form itself into new compounds, to the capacity of -these new compounds to become living organisms, and to -the capacity of these living organisms, without the intervention -of any formative will specially designing the result, -to divide themselves into related forms of male and female, -to establish for themselves the law of procreation, and to -limit that procreation to the same species, I shall, perhaps, -begin to see some ground for the superior claims of the -evolution hypothesis. I should like, by-the-by, to see a -system of classification of animal organisms, based exclusively -on the distinction between the bisexual and the uni<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span>sexual, -or the non-sexual, methods of reproduction, and -without running it out into the analogies of the vegetable -world. I fancy that it would be found extremely difficult -to account for the bisexual division without reaching the -conclusion that it required and was effected by a special -interposition. At all events, I should like to see it explained -how the asexual and the unisexual construction passed -into the bisexual by the mere operation of what you call -natural causes.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> You said, a while ago, that you had never -learned any nursery-stories. Yet, all along, you seem to me -to have been under the influence of the Mosaic account of -the creation. Of course you have read it, and, although you -did not learn anything about it in childhood, and now try -to treat it solely as a hypothesis, without any regard to its -claims as a divinely inspired narrative, it is certainly worth -your while to see how completely it becomes an idle tale of -the nursery when scientific tests are applied to it. Hear -what Spencer says about the creation of man, as given by -Moses: "The old Hebrew idea that God takes clay and -molds a new creature, as a potter might mold a vessel, is -probably too grossly anthropomorphic to be accepted by -any modern defender of special creations."</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Let us see about this. Let us discard all -idea of the source from which Moses received his information -of the occurrences which he relates, and put his account -upon the same level with Plato's description of the -origin of animals, and with the Darwinian or Spencerian -theory of that origin; regarding all three of them, that is -to say, as mere hypotheses. Whatever may be the supposed -conflict between the Mosaic account of the creation and the -conclusions of geologists concerning the periods during -which the earth may have become formed as we now find -it, the question is, on the one hand, whether the Hebrew -historian's account of the process of creation is a concep<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span>tion -substantially the same as that at which we should have -arrived from a study of Nature if we had never had that -account transmitted to us from a period when the traditions -of mankind were taking the shapes in which they have -reached us from different sources; or whether, on the other -hand, it is so "grossly anthropomorphic" and absurd that -it is not worthy of any consideration as an occurrence that -it will bear the slightest test of scientific scrutiny. Let any -one take the Mosaic narrative, and, divesting himself of all -influence of supposed inspiration or divine authority speaking -through the chosen servant of God, and disregarding -the meaning of those obscure statements which divide the -stages of the work into the first and the second "day," etc., -let him follow out the order in which the Creator is said by -Moses to have acted. He will find in the narrative an -immense condensation, highly figurative expressions, and -many elliptical passages. But he will also find that the -Creator is described as proceeding in the exertion of his -omnipotent power in a manner which we should be very -likely to deduce from a study of his works without this -narrative. We have, first, the reduction of the earth from -its chaotic condition—"without form and void"—to the -separation of its elemental substances; then the creation of -light; the separation of earth and water; the productive -capacity of the dry land; the establishment of the vegetable -kingdom, each product "after its kind"; the formation -of the heavenly bodies as lights in the firmament, to -make the division of day and night, seasons and years. It -is obviously immaterial, so far as this order of the work is -concerned, down to the stage when the formation of the -first animals took place, in what length of time this first -stage of the work was accomplished; whether it was done -by an Omnipotence that could speak things into existence -by a word, or whether the process was carried on through -periods of time of which we can have no measure, and by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> -the operation of infinitely slow-moving agencies selected -and employed for the accomplishment of a certain result. -Confining our attention to the first stage of the work as we -find it described, we have the formation of the earth, light, -air, the heavenly bodies, alternations of day and night, -seasons and years, and the vegetable kingdom, before any -animal creation. We then come to the formation of animals -which are to inhabit this convenient abode, and which -are described as taking place in the following order: first -the water animals, the fowls of the air, and the beasts of -the field, "each after its kind"; then, and finally, the -creation of man. Respecting his creation, we are told that -it was the purpose of the Almighty to make a being after a -very different "image" from that of any other creature on -the earth; and whatever may be the true interpretation of -the language employed, whether man was created literally -"in our image, after our likeness," or according to an image -and a likeness of which his Creator had conceived, there -can be no doubt that what Moses described as the purpose -of God was to make a being differing absolutely from all -the other animals by a broad line of demarkation which is -perfectly discoverable through all the resemblances that -obtain between him and all the other living creatures. To -this new being there was given, we are told, dominion over all -the other animals, and the fruits of the earth were assigned -to him for food; he was formed out of the dust of the earth, -the breath of life was breathed into his nostrils, and he became -"a living soul." Let us now see if this statement of -the creation of man is so "grossly anthropomorphic" as is -supposed. You are aware that Buffon, who was certainly -no mean naturalist or philosopher, and who was uninfluenced -by the idea that the book of Genesis was an inspired -production, reached the conclusion that a study of nature -renders the order of man's creation as described by Moses a -substantially true hypothesis. "We are persuaded," said<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span> -Buffon, "independently of the authority of the sacred -books, that man was created last, and that he only came to -wield the scepter of the earth when that earth was found -worthy of his sway."<a name="FNanchor_112" id="FNanchor_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> You evolutionists will say that this -may be very true upon your hypothesis of his gradual development -out of other animals, through untold periods of -time. But now let us see whether Moses was so grossly -unscientific, upon the supposition that God created man as -he describes. If man was created, or molded, by the -Deity, he was formed, in his physical structure, out of matter; -and all matter may be figuratively and even scientifically -described as "the dust of the earth," or as "clay," -or by any other term that will give an idea of a substance -that was not spirit. If Moses had said that man's body -was formed out of the constituent elements of matter, or -some of them, he would have said nothing that a modern -believer in special creations need shrink from, for he would -have stated an indisputable fact. He stated in one form -of expression the very same fact that a modern scientist -would have to state in another form, whatever might have -been the mode, or the power, or the time in or by which -the constituent elements were brought together and molded -into the human body. So that the derisive figure of God -taking clay and molding it into the human form, as a potter -would mold a vessel, does not strike me as presenting any -proof that the account given by Moses is so destitute of -scientific accuracy, or as rendering his statements a ridiculous -hypothesis.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Well, then, it comes at last to this: that you -consider the substance of the Mosaic account of the creation, -independent of its authority as an inspired statement, to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> -entitled to stand as a hypothesis against the explanations -given to us by the scientists of the great modern school of -evolution, notwithstanding those explanations are in one -form or another now accepted by the most advanced scientific -thinkers and explorers?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I certainly do. But understand me explicitly. -As, after my study of the probable origin of the -solar system, and our discussion of that subject, I expressed -my conclusion that the phenomena called for and manifested -the exercise of a formative will by some acts of special -creation, so now, in reference to the animal kingdom, -I have reached the same conclusion, for reasons which I -have endeavored to assign. I can see that the operation of -the process which you call evolution may have caused certain -limited modifications in the structure and habits of -life of different animals; or rather, that limited modifications -of structure and habits of life have occurred, and -hence you deduce what you call the process of evolution. -But to me this entirely fails to account for, or to suggest -a rational explanation of, the distinct existence of species, -their division into male and female, and the establishment -of the laws of procreation by which individuals of a species -are multiplied—a process which does not admit of the -production of individuals of an essentially different type -from the parents, and which, so far as we have any means -of knowledge, has never commenced in one species and -ended in another, in any length of time that can be imagined, -or through any series of modifications.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Let us postpone the farther discussion of the -origin of species to some future time, when I will endeavor -to convince you that both Darwin and Spencer have satisfactorily -accounted for them.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Very well; I shall be glad to be enlightened.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span></p> - -<blockquote> -<h3>THE SINGLE-CELL HYPOTHESIS.</h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Note.</span>—It will readily occur to the reader that Sophereus might most -pertinently have asked: Whence did the primal cell originate? It is conceived -of as the ultimate unit of organizable matter; invisible to the naked -eye, perhaps incapable of being reached by the microscope, but consisting -of an infinitesimally small portion of matter, more or less organized in -itself, and possessing a capacity to unite with itself other minute particles -of matter, and so to form larger aggregates of molecules. The hypothesis -is, that this single cell has given origin to all animated organisms, and, -through an indefinite series of such organisms, to the human race. The -single cell, then, having this capacity and this extraordinary destiny, was -either the first and only one of its kind, or it was one of many of the same -kind. If we select any supposed point of time in the far antecedent history -of matter, the question may be asked whether there existed at first but one -such cell, or many. If there were many of such cells, how came they to -exist? If one only was selected out of many, for this extraordinary destiny -of giving origin to all the animated organisms, who or what made the -selection for this transcendent office of the one cell? If there never was -but one such cell, how did it come to exist? As these questions are clearly -pertinent, the effort to answer them inevitably conducts us to the idea of -creation, or else to the conclusion that the numerous cells and the selected -one had no origin; that the selection was not made, but was accidental; or -that the one cell, if there never was but one, was not a created thing. -Human reason can not accept this conclusion.</p></blockquote> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X.</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="intro">"Species," "races," and "varieties"—Sexual division—Causation.</p> - -<p>The two friendly disputants have again met. Sophereus -begins their further colloquy, in an effort to reach a common -understanding of certain terms, so that they may not -be speaking of different things.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I have more than once referred to the fact -that Nature does not permit crosses between the true species -of animals, in breeding, and that we have no reason to -suppose it ever did. This is a very important fact to be -considered in weighing the claims of your theory of evolution. -I have been looking into Darwin, and I find it somewhat -uncertain in what sense he uses the terms "species," -"races," and "varieties." In his "Descent of Man," he -devotes a good deal of space to the discussion of the various -classifications made by different naturalists under these respective -terms; and there is no small danger of confusion -arising from the use of these terms unless they are defined. -The possibility of the process of evolution, as a means of -accounting for the existence of any known animal, depends -in some degree upon the animals among which, by sexual -generation, the supposed transition from one kind of animal -to another kind has taken place. Darwin speaks of -the difficulty of defining "species"; and yet it is obvious -(is it not?) that the theory of the graduation of different -forms into one another depends for its possibility upon -the forms which have admitted of interbreeding. While, -therefore, the term "species" is in one sense arbitrary, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> -used by different naturalists, and there is no definition of -it common to them all, it is still necessary to have a clear -idea of the limits within which crosses can take place in -breeding, because there are such limits in nature. Thus, -in the case of man, as known to us in history and by observation, -there are different families, which are classed as -"races." Darwin speaks of the weighty arguments which -naturalists have, or may have, for "raising the <em>races</em> of -man to the dignity of <em>species</em>." Whether this would be -anything more than a matter of scientific nomenclature, is -perhaps unnecessary to consider. Whether we call the -"races" of men "species," or speak of them as families of -one race, we know as a fact that interbreeding can take -place among them all, and that between man and any other -animal it can not take place. The same thing is true of -the equine and the bovine races and their several varieties. -Whether, in speaking of the different families or races of -men, we consider them all as one "species," or as different -species—and so of the varieties of the equine or the bovine -races—the important fact is, that there are limits within -which interbreeding can take place, and out of which it can -not take place. Do you admit or deny that the barriers -against sexual generation between animals of essentially different -types, which are established in nature, are important -facts in judging of the hypothesis of animal evolution?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Take care that you have an accurate idea of -what the theory of evolution is. Apply it, for example, to -the origin of man, as an animal, proceeding "by a series -of forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature -to man as he now exists." This expresses the whole theory -as applied to one animal, man, without going behind his ape-like -progenitors. It does not suppose a crossing between -the ape-like creature and some other creature that was not -an ape. It supposes a gradual development of the ape-like -creature into the man as he now exists; and, of course, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span> -interbreeding took place between the males and the females -of that ape-like race and their descendants—the descendants, -through a long series of forms, being gradually modified -into men, by the operation of the laws of natural and -sexual selection, which I need not again explain to you.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Very well, I have always so understood the -theory. But then I have also understood it to be a part of -the same theory that there is important auxiliary proof of -the supposed process of evolution to be derived from what -is known to take place in the interbreeding of different -races or families of the same animal. Whatever value there -may be in this last fact, as auxiliary evidence of the supposed -process of evolution, there must have been a time, in -the development of the long series of forms proceeding from -the ape-like progenitor, when an animal had been produced -which could propagate nothing but its own type, and between -which and the surrounding other animals no propagation -could take place, if we are to judge by what all -nature teaches us. You may say that the laws of natural -and sexual selection would still go on operating among the -numerous individuals of this animal which had become in -itself a completed product, and that to their descendants -would be transmitted newly acquired organs and powers, -new habits of life, and all else that natural and sexual selection -can be imagined to have brought about. But at some -time, somewhere in the series, you reach an animal of a -distinct character, in which natural and sexual selection -have done all that they can do; in which there can be no -propagation of offspring but those of a distinct and peculiar -type, and the invincible barrier against a sexual union -with any other type becomes established. For this reason, -we must recognize the limits of possible interbreeding. It -is best for us, therefore, to come to some understanding of -the sense in which we shall use the term "species." For -I shall press upon you this consideration—that animals dif<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span>fer -absolutely from each other; that there can be no interbreeding -between animals which so differ; and yet that, -without interbreeding between animals having distinct organizations, -natural and sexual selection had not the force -necessary to produce, in any length of time, such a being -as man out of such a being as the ape.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> I will let Darwin answer you, in a passage -which I will read. "Whether primeval man," he observes, -"when he possessed but few arts, and those of the rudest -kind, and when his power of language was extremely imperfect, -would have deserved to be called man, must depend -on the definition which we employ. In a long series of -forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to -man as he now exists, it would be impossible to fix on any -definite time when the term 'man' ought to be used. But -this is a matter of very little importance." That is to say, -in the long series of forms descending from the ape-like -creature, we can not fix on any one of the modified descendants -which we can pronounce to be separated from -the family of apes, and to have become the new family, -man, because to do this requires a definition of man. Man -as he now exists we know, but the primeval man we do -not know. He may have been an animal capable of sexual -union with some of his kindred who stood nearest to him, -but yet remained apes, or he may not. It is not important -what he was, or whether we can find the time when he -ceased to belong to the family of apes and became the primeval -man. The hypothesis of his descent remains good, -notwithstanding we can not find that time, because it is -supported by a great multitude of facts.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I have never seen any facts which I can -regard as giving direct support to the theory. But, waiving -this want of evidence, doubtless it is not important to -find the time, chronologically, when the modified descendants, -supposed to have proceeded from the ape-like creature,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> -became the primeval man; but it is of the utmost importance -to have some satisfactory grounds for believing that -there ever was such an occurrence as the development of -the animal man, primeval or modern man, out of such an -animal as the ape. And therefore, without reference to -the sense in which naturalists use the term "species," I -shall give you the sense in which I use it. I use it to designate -the animals which are distinct from each other, as -the man, the horse, the ape, and the dog are all distinct -from each other. Speaking of man as one true species, I -include all the races of men. Speaking of the apes as another -species, I include all the families of apes. Speaking -of the bovine, the equine, or the canine species, I include -in each their respective varieties. Now, as crosses in interbreeding -can take place between the different varieties or -families of these several species, and can not take place -between the species themselves—between those which I -thus class as species—the limits of such crosses become important -facts in considering the theory of evolution, because -they narrow the inquiry to the possibility of effecting a -propagation of one species out of another species. Take -any animal which has become a completed and final product—a -peculiar and distinct creature—whether made so by -aboriginal creation or produced by what you call evolution. -The reproductive faculty of the males and the females of -this distinct and peculiar animal is limited to the generative -reproduction of individuals of the same type, by a -sexual union of two individuals of that type. Their progeny, -in successive generations, may be marked by adventitious -and slowly acquired peculiarities; but unless there -can be found some instance or instances in which the process -of modification has resulted in an animal which we -must regard as an 'essentially new creature—a new species—what -becomes of the auxiliary evidence which is supposed -to be derived from the effects of interbreeding between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span> -those individuals which can interbreed? I lose all hold -upon the theory of evolution, unless I can have some proof -that natural and sexual selection have overcome the barriers -against a sexual union among animals which are divided -into males and females of the several species, each of -which is placed under a law of procreation and gestation -peculiar to itself, and never produces any type but its own.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> You wander from the principle of evolution. -I have to be perpetually restating it. Observe, then, that -there are multitudes of facts which warrant the belief that, -starting with any one kind of animal organism, however -peculiar and distinct, the struggle for existence among the -enormous number of individuals of that animal becomes -most intense, and a furious battle is constantly going on. -The best-appointed males, in the fierceness of the strife for -possession of the females, develop new organs and powers, -or their original organs and powers are greatly enhanced. -Their descendants share in these modifications; and the -modifications go on in a geometrical ratio of increase -through millions of years, until at some time there is developed -an animal which differs absolutely from its remote -progenitors which were away back in the remote past, and -which began the struggle for individual life and the continuation -of their species or their race in a condition of -things which left the fittest survivors the sole or nearly the -sole propagators of new individuals. This struggle for existence -may have begun—probably it did begin—before the -separation of the sexes, when the organism was unisexual -or even asexual. That is to say, there may have been, -and there probably was, an organism which multiplied with -enormous rapidity, without the bisexual method of reproduction. -The vast multitude of such individuals would -lead to the destruction of the weakest; the strong survivors -would continue to give rise to other individuals, modified -from the original type, until at length, by force of this per<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span>petual -exertion and struggle and the survival of the fittest, -modifications of the method of reproduction would ensue, -and the bisexual division would be developed and perpetuated.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I confess I did not expect to hear you go -quite so far. I will yield all the potency to natural and -sexual selection that can be fairly claimed for them as -modifying agencies operating after the sexual division has -come about; but I have, I repeat, seen no facts which justify -the hypothesis that they have led to distinct organisms -between which no propagation can take place. But now -you expect me to accept the startling conclusion that at -some time the asexual or the unisexual method of reproduction -passed into the bisexual, without any formative -will or design of a creating power, and without any act of -direct creation. We know what Plato imagined as the -origin of the sexual division, and that he could not get -along without the intervention of the gods. What modern -naturalist has done any better? I have examined Darwin's -works pretty diligently, and I can not get from them any -solution of the origin of the bisexual division. I am left -to reason upon it as I best can. We know, then, that in -the higher animal organisms the individuals of each species -are divided into the related forms of male and female, and -that for each species there exists the one invariable method -of the sexual union, and a law of gestation peculiar to -itself. One hypothesis is that this system was produced by -the operation of natural causes, like those which are supposed -to have differentiated the various kinds of organisms; -the other hypothesis is that it was introduced with special -design, by an act of some creative will. If we view the -phenomena of the sexual division and the sexual genesis in -the highest animal in which they obtain, we find that they -lead to certain social results, which plainly indicate that in -this animal they exist for a great and comprehensive moral<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> -purpose, which far transcends all that can be imagined as -the moral purpose for which they exist in the other animals. -To a comparatively very limited extent, certain social -consequences flow from the law of sexual division and -genesis among the other animals. But there is no animal -in which the moral and social effects of this law are to be -compared to those which it produces in the human race. -Not only does the same law of multiplication obtain among -the human race; not only does it lead to love of the offspring -far more durable and powerful than in the case of -any other animal; not only is it the origin of a society far -more complex, more lasting, and more varied in its conditions -than any that can be discovered in the associations of -other animals which appear to have some social habits and -to form themselves into communities, but in the human -race alone, so far as we have any means of knowledge, has -the passion of sexual love become refined into a sentiment. -You may remember the passage in the "Paradise Lost" in -which Raphael, in his conversation with Adam, touches so -finely the distinction between sexual love in the human -race and in all the other animals. The angel reminds -Adam that he shares with the brutes the physical enjoyment -which leads to propagation; and then tells him that -there was implanted in his nature a higher and different -capacity of enjoyment in love. The conclusion is:—</p> - -<div class="poetry"><div class="stanza"> -<div class="verse indent12">"... for this cause</div> -<div class="verse">Among the beasts no mate for thee was found."</div> -</div></div> - -<p>In the human being alone, even when there is not much -else to distinguish the savage from the beasts around him, -the passion of love is often something more nearly akin to -what might be looked for in an elevated nature, than it can -be among the brutes. What do the poetry and romance -of the ruder nations show, but that this passion of sexual -love in the human being is one in which physical appetite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span> -and sentimental feeling are so "well commingled" that -their union marks the compound nature of an animal and -a spiritual being? How human society has resulted from -this passion, how in the great aggregate of its forces it -moves the world, how in its highest development it gives -rise to the social virtues, and in its baser manifestations -leads to vice, misery, and degradation, I do not need to -remind you. How, then, is it possible to avoid the conclusion -that in man the sexual passion was implanted by -special design and for a special purpose, which extends far -beyond the immediate end of a continuation of the race?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Why do you resort to a special purpose in -the constitution of one animal, and to the absence of a -similar purpose from the constitution of another animal? -In both, the consequences make a case of the <i lang="la">post hoc</i> just -as plainly as they make a case of the <i lang="la">propter hoc</i>. It is just -as rational to conclude that they only show the former as -it is to conclude that they establish the latter. In man, -we have the physical fact of the sexual division, and all -you can say is that it is followed by certain great and varied -moral phenomena. In the other animals, we have the -same physical fact, followed by moral phenomena less complex -and varied, and not so lasting. In neither case can -you say that there was a special and separate design, according -to which the same physical fact was intended to -produce the special consequences which we observe in each. -Why, as the species called man became developed into beings -of a higher order than the primates of the race or than -their remote progenitors, should not this passion of sexual -love have become elevated into a sentiment and been followed -by the effects of that elevation, just as the gratification -of another appetite, that for food, <i lang="fr">par exemple</i>, has -been refined by the intellectual pleasures of the social banquet -and the interchange of social courtesies? Is there -anything to be proved by the institution or the practice of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span> -marriage, beyond this—that it has been found by experience -to be of great social utility, and is therefore regulated -by human laws and customs, which vary in the different -races of mankind? Monogamy is the rule among some -nations, polygamy is at least allowed in others. You can -predicate nothing of either excepting that each society -deems its own practice to be upon the whole the most advantageous. -You can not say that there is any fixed law -of nature which renders it unnatural for one man to have -more than one wife. In many ages of the world there -have been states of society in which the family has had as -good a foundation in polygamous as it has had in monogamous -unions. Looking, then, at these undeniable facts, -and also at the fact that marriage, whether monogamous -or polygamous, is an institution regulated by human law -and custom, we have to inquire for the reason why human -law and custom take any cognizance of the relation. We -find that, among some of the other animals, the sexes do -not pair excepting for a single birth. The connection lasts -no longer than for a certain period during which the protection -of both parents is needed by the offspring, and not -always so long even as that. It has become the experience -of mankind that the connection of the parents ought to be -formed for more than one birth; shall be of indefinite -duration; and this because of the physical and social benefits -which flow from such a permanency of the union. -This has given rise to certain moral feelings concerning -the relation of husband and wife. But we have no more -warrant, from anything that we can discover in nature, for -regarding the permanency of marriage among the human -race as a divine institution than we have for regarding its -temporary continuance among the other animals as a divinely -appointed temporary arrangement. In the one case, the -permanency of the union has resulted from experience of -its utility. In the other case, the animal perceives no such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span> -utility, and therefore does not follow the practice. Upon -the hypothesis that all the animals, man included, had a -common origin, it is very easy to account for the difference -which prevails between man and the other animals in this -matter of marriage, or the pairing of the sexes. As man -became by insensible gradations evolved out of some pre-existing -organism, and as moral sentiments became evolved -out of his superior and more complex relations with his -fellows, from his experience of the practical utility of certain -kinds of conduct and practice, the sentiments became -insensibly interwoven with his feelings about the most important -of his social relations, the union of the sexes in -marriage. This is quite sufficient to account for the difference -between man and the other animals in regard to the -duration of such unions, without resorting to any intentional -or divine or superhuman origin of that difference.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> For the purpose of the argument, I concede -that this is a case of either the <i lang="la">post hoc</i> or the <i lang="la">propter -hoc</i>. I have been pretty careful, however, in all my investigations, -not to lose sight of this distinction in reasoning -on the phenomena of nature or those of society. I think I -can perceive when there is a connection between cause and -effect, when that connection evinces an intelligent design, -and when the phenomena bear no relation to a certain fact -beyond that of sequence in time. What, then, have we to -begin with? We have the fact that the human race is divided -into the two forms of male and female, and that the -passion or appetite of sexual love exists in both sexes, and -that its gratification is the immediate cause of a production -of other individuals of the same species. We next have the -fact that this union of the sexes is followed by an extraordinary -amount of moral and social phenomena that are peculiar -to the human race. This sequence proves to me an -intentional design that the moral and social phenomena -shall flow from the occurrence of the sexual union, for it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> -establishes not only a possibility, but an immensely strong -probability, that the phenomena were designed to flow from -this one occurrence among this particular species of animal. -If this connection between the original physiological fact -and the moral and social phenomena be established to our -reasonable satisfaction, it is the highest kind of moral evidence -of a special design in the existence of the sexual division -and the sexual passion among the human race. You -remember old Sir Thomas Browne's suggestion, that men -might have been propagated as trees are. But they are not -so propagated. If they were, no such consequences would -have followed as those which do follow from the mode in -which they are in fact propagated. These consequences -are most numerous and complex, and they are capable of -being assigned to nothing but the sexual division and the -sexual union as the means of continuing the race. Turn -now to some of the other animals among whom there prevail -the same bisexual division and the same method of procreation -and multiplication. You find they result in sexual -unions of very short duration, and that, if it is followed -by phenomena that in some feeble degree resemble those -which are found in human society, they bear no comparison -in point of complexity and character to those which in the -human race mark the family, the tribe, and the nation. -And here there occurs something which is closely analogous -to what I pointed out to you in considering the supposed -development of the first animal organism. I said that although -you may theoretically suppose that the first animal -organism was formed by the spontaneous union of molecular -aggregates, and that the higher organisms were evolved -out of the lower solely by the operation of causes which -you call "natural," yet that when you come to account for -the existence of true and distinct species, each with its sexual -division and its law of procreation and gestation, you -must infer a special design and a formative will, because<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> -there has never been suggested any method by which the -so-called natural causes could have produced this division -of the sexes and this invariable law of the sexual procreation -among individuals of the same species. Here, then, -we arrive at a distinct moral purpose; for, when we compare -the different social phenomena which follow the operation -of the sexual division and procreation in man with the -social phenomena which follow in the case of the other -animals, we find a difference that is not simply one of degree, -but is one of kind. We find the origin of the family, -the tribe, and the nation: the source of the complex phenomena -of human society. We may therefore rationally -conclude that in man the sexual division and the sexual -passion were designed to have effects that they were not -designed to have in the other animals. To suppose that -these vastly superior consequences in the case of man are -the mere results of his perception of their utility will not -account for the fact that when he does not recognize the -utility—when he departs from the law of his human existence—human -society can not be formed and continued. -Although it is possible for human society to exist with polygamous -marriages, and even to have some strength and -duration, yet human society without the family, with promiscuous -sexual intercourse, with no marriages and no ties -between parents and children, never has existed or can -exist. Compare Plato's curious constitution of the body of -"guardians," in his "Republic," and the strange method -of unions, the offspring of which were not allowed to know -their parents or the parents to know their own children. -This was not imagined as a form of human society, but was -entirely like a breeding-stud. Among the brutes, permanent -marriages, families, do not exist, not because the animals -do not perceive their social utility, but because the -purposes of their lives, their manifest destinies, show that -there was no reason for endowing them with any higher<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> -capacity for the sexual enjoyment than that which leads to -the very limited consequences for which the division of the -sexes was in their cases ordained. But in the case of man -there is a further and higher capacity for the sexual enjoyment, -which becomes the root of his social happiness, and -which distinguishes him from the brute creation quite as -palpably as the superiority of his intellectual faculties. In -all this we must recognize a moral purpose.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Pray tell me why it is not just as rational to -conclude that these moral phenomena, as results of the human -passion of love, have become, in all their complex and -diversified aspects, the consequences of a progressive elevation -of the human animal to a higher plane of existence -than that occupied by the inferior species, or than that -occupied by the primeval man. When man had become -developed into an animal in whom the intellect could become -what it is, he could begin to perceive the social utility -of certain modes of life, and from this idea of their -utility would result certain maxims of conduct which would -be acted on as moral obligations. Thus, commencing with -a consciousness that the race exists with the sexual division -into male and female, there would begin to be formed some -ideas of the superior social utility of a regulated sexual -union of individuals and of permanent marriages. These -ideas would become refined as the progressive elevation of -the race went on, and that which we recognize as the sentimental -element in the passion of love would become developed -out of the perceptions of a superior utility in the -permanent devotion and consecration of two individuals to -each other. If, then, by a moral purpose in the establishment -of the bisexual division you mean that all these social -phenomena of the family, the tribe, and the nation were -designed in the human race to follow from that division, I -see no necessity for resorting to any such moral purpose on -the part of a creator, because they might just as well have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> -followed from the progressive elevation and development of -the human animal, supposing him to be descended from -some pre-existing type of animal of another and inferior -organization. The philosophy which you seem to be cultivating -closely resembles that which ascribes everything to -the action of mind as its cause. This, you must be aware, -it is the tendency of modern science to antagonize by a different -view of causation. What have you been reading, -that you adhere so pertinaciously to the idea of a moral -purpose adopted by some being, overlooking those physical -causes which may have produced all the results without -that hypothesis?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I have been reading a good deal, but I -have reflected more. I may not be able to reconcile the -metaphysical speculations of the different schools of philosophy -by explanations that will satisfy others, but I can -satisfy myself on one point. This is, that power, force, -energy, causation, are all attributes of mind, and can exist -in a mind only. Let us pass for a moment from abstract -reasoning to an illustration drawn from familiar objects. -A ton of coal contains a certain amount of what is scientifically -called energy. This energy becomes developed by -combustion, which liberates heat. The heat, when applied -to water, converts the water into a vapor called steam—a -highly elastic substance. The expansion of the steam -against a mechanical instrument called a piston produces -motion, and an engine is driven. The force thus obtained -represents the energy that was latent in the coal. If we -inquire whence the coal obtained this latent energy, there -is a hypothesis which assigns its origin to the sun, which -laid up a certain quantity of it in the vegetable substances -that became converted into coal in one of the geological -periods of the earth's formation. But in order to find -the ultimate and original cause—the <i lang="la">causa causans</i> of -the whole process—we must go behind the steam and its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span> -expansive quality, behind the heat which converts the -water into steam, behind the coal and its combustible quality, -and behind the sun and its indwelling heat, a portion -of which was imparted to and left latent in the vegetable -substances that became coal. We must inquire whence -they all originated. If they did not create themselves—an -inconceivable and inadmissible hypothesis—they must have -originated in some creating power, which commanded them -to exist and established their connections. Without a mental -energy and its exertions, matter and all its properties, -substance and all its qualities, the sun's indwelling heat -and its capacity to be stored up in vegetable fiber in a latent -condition, could not have existed, and the forces of nature -of which we avail ourselves would never have emerged from -the non-existent state that we conceive of as "chaos." I -know very well that we are accustomed to associate with inanimate -matter the ideas of power, force, energy, and causation. -But if we rest in the conception of these as acting of -themselves, and without being under the control of an originating -mind or a determining will, we may think that we -have arrived at ultimate causes, but we have not. We have -arrived at subsidiary causes—the instruments, so to speak, -in the control of an intellect which has ordained and uses -them. Whether we look at the physical causes by which -the early Greek philosophers endeavored to explain the -phenomena of the universe, or at one of Plato's conceptions -of a designing and volitional agency in the formation of the -Kosmos, or to another of his conceptions, the sovereignty -of universal ideas or metaphysical abstractions, we are -everywhere confronted with the necessity for assigning an -origin to the physical causes, or to the universal ideas; and -the result is that the idea of a supreme, designing, and volitional -agency is forced upon us—it is upon me—by an irresistible -process of reasoning, an invincible necessity of my -mental constitution. I can not agree with Auguste Comte,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span> -who regards it as the natural progress of the human mind -to explain phenomena at first by reference to some personal -agency, and to pass from this mode of explanation to that -by metaphysical abstractions. Nor can I agree with you -scientists, who not only rest satisfied yourselves with the explanation -of the ultimate cause of phenomena by mere physical -agencies, but who insist that others shall not deduce a -personal and volitional agency from the existence of those -physical agencies. To me it seems indispensable, in the -study of phenomena, to recognize moral purposes for which -they have been made to be what they are: and of course a -moral purpose is not assignable to the physical agencies of -matter, or to metaphysical abstractions. Hence it is that -in reasoning on the phenomena of human society, I am -obliged to recognize a moral purpose in the sexual division, -of far greater scope and far more varied consequences than -can be found in the case of the same division among the -other animals.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> I put to you this question: What do you -mean by a moral purpose? In teleology, or the science of -the final causes of things, you must find out the producing -agencies. Let me give you a theory of causation, which -will show you that your notion of a moral purpose is altogether -out of place. The only true causes are phenomenal -ones, or what is certified by experience. There are uniform -and unconditional antecedents, and uniform and unconditional -sequences. Something goes before, uniformly and invariably; -something uniformly and invariably follows. The -first are causes; the last are effects. We can not go farther -back than the antecedent cause; we can not go farther forward -than the effect. We can not connect the effect with -anything but the antecedent cause. When, therefore, you -speak of a moral purpose, what do you mean? Where do -you get the evidence of the moral purpose? What is the -purpose, and what is the evidence of it?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I answer you as I have before—that the -agencies which you call phenomenal causes could not have -established themselves; could not have originated their own -uniformity; could not have made the invariable connection -between themselves and the effects. If we discard the idea -of a moral and sentient being, a mind originating and ordaining -the physical agencies, we have nothing left but -those agencies; and in this the human mind can not rest. -It is not enough to say that it ought to rest there. It does -not, will not, and can not. Science—what you call science—may -rest there, but philosophy can not. It is unphilosophical -to speak of the Unknown Cause, or the Unknown -Power, underlying all manifestations, as something of which -we can not conceive and must not personify. The ultimate -power which underlies all phenomena necessarily implies a -will, an intellectual origin, and a mental energy. That it -is something whose mental operations we can not trace, is -no argument against its personality, and no reason why we -should not conceive of it as a mental energy.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> You have more than once referred to the -constitution of the human mind as if it had been constructed -with an irresistible necessity to attribute everything to the -action of a being, an intelligence, and a will. You should -rather say that <em>some minds</em> have trained themselves to this -mode of reasoning, because they have first received the idea -of such a being as the final cause, as a matter of dogmatic -teaching, and they have tried to reason it out so as to attain -a conviction that what they have been taught is true. It -is in this way that they have found what they consider as -evidence of a moral purpose. But you have no warrant for -the assumption that the human intellect has been put together -in such a way that it can not avoid reaching the -conclusion that all phenomena are to be imputed to the volition -of a mind as their producing cause.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> In speaking of the human mind and its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span> -incapacity to rest satisfied with what science can discover -of immediate physical agencies in the production of phenomena, -I have not overlooked the fact that the idea of a -Creator has been dogmatically inculcated as a matter of -belief. But I form my conception of the construction of -the human mind from the operations of my own mind. I -have not trained myself into any mode of reasoning. I -have somehow been so placed in this world that, as I have -frequently told you and as I am perfectly conscious, I am -uninfluenced by any early teaching, and can judge for myself -of the force of evidence. When I say, therefore, that -the human intellect is so constituted that it is obliged to -regard mind as the source of power, I exclude all teaching -but the teaching of experience. There can not be two -courses of reasoning that are alike correct. If you uncover -a portion of the earth's surface, and find there structures, -implements, and various objects which you are convinced -that the forces of nature did not produce, you must conclude -that they were the productions of mind availing itself -of the capabilities of matter to be molded and arranged by -the force of an intelligent will. You do not see that mind, -you do not see the work in progress, but you are irresistibly -led to the conclusion that there was a mind which produced -what you have found. You can not reason on the phenomena -at all, without having the conviction forced upon you -that the ultimate cause was an intelligent being. You can -not explain the phenomena without this conclusion. How, -then, can you explain the more various and extraordinary -phenomena of nature without attributing their production -to mind? You have no more direct evidence that the Pyramids -of Egypt, or an obelisk which has lain buried in -the earth for thousands of years, were made by human -hands, than you have for believing that an animal organism, -or the solar system, was planned and executed by an intelligent -being. In both cases, you have only indirect evi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span>dence; -but in both cases that evidence addresses itself to -your intellect upon the same principles of belief. In the -case of the pyramid or the obelisk, you refer the construction -to mind, because you see that mind alone could have -been the real cause of its existence. In the case of the -animal organism, or the mechanism of the heavenly bodies, -you are obliged to reason in the same way. Hence I say -that our minds are so constituted that there is but one -method of correct reasoning, whether the phenomena are -those which can be attributed only to human intellect, or -are those which must be attributed to superhuman power -and intelligence. Hence, too, I speak of a moral purpose -as indicated by the phenomena. The pyramid and the obelisk -were built with a moral purpose. The animal organism -and all that follows from it, the structure of the solar -system and all that follows from it, were made to be what -they are with a moral purpose. When you ask me for the -evidence of this purpose, I point to the fact that the phenomenal -causes, as you denominate the mere physical agencies -employed in the production of certain objects, were -incapable of any volitional action, and that without volition -the connection between the physical agencies and their -effects could not have been established. The stone and the -chisel were the immediate physical agencies which produced -the obelisk. But who selected the stone and wielded the -chisel? And who designed the moral uses of the obelisk? -Procreation, by the sexual union, is the immediate physical -cause of the existence of an individual animal. But who -designed its structure, appointed for it a law of its being, -and established the physical agencies which brought the -individual into existence and the moral consequences that -those agencies produce?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> We are no nearer to an agreement than we -have been in our former discussions. And the reason is -that you do not perceive the mission and the method of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span> -science. Science undertakes to discover those causes of -phenomena which can be verified by experience; so that we -can truly say that our knowledge has been advanced, and -that we really do know something of the things which we -talk about. This is the domain of science. Its conclusions -do not extend into the region of that which is unknown -and unknowable. Inasmuch as its conclusions are strictly -positive, because they are demonstrated by experience, they -negative, as matter of knowledge, anything beyond. You -may speculate about what lies beyond, but you have no -reason for saying that you know anything about it; whereas -men who reason as you do, and yet who do not accept -dogmas simply as matters of faith, are constantly trying to -persuade themselves that they know something about that -of which they have no means of knowledge. If you accept -that something as a matter of faith, because you are satisfied -with the evidence which establishes, or is supposed to establish, -a divine revelation, you have a ground for belief -with which science does not undertake to interfere. But -you have no ground for maintaining that, from the phenomena -of nature alone, you can derive any knowledge beyond -that which you can demonstrate as a scientific fact.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I accept your definition of the aims and -methods of science. But what I find fault with is the assumption -that we are not entitled to say that we know or -believe a thing which can not be demonstrated as a scientific -fact, when we are all the time grounding such knowledge -or belief upon reasoning that convinces us of the truth and -reality of other things which in like manner are not demonstrable -as scientific facts. You may say that this is not -the knowledge which we derive from scientific facts, and -therefore it is not to be dignified by the name of knowledge. -But we are always acting and must act upon proofs which -are not scientific demonstrations; and whether we call this -knowledge, or call it belief, we govern our lives according<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span> -to it. We accept the proof that a buried city was the habitation -and work of intelligent human beings, because we -know that the forces of nature, not guided and applied by -intelligent wills, never constructed a city. We accept the -proof that men are just, merciful, courageous, truthful, or -the reverse of all this, because their actions prove it, although -we can not look into their hearts. What does all -the estimate of the characters of men rest upon, but upon -their actions? And is not this entitled to be ranked as -knowledge of the characters of individual men?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> We must each retain his conclusions. Let -our next discussion relate to the origin of the human mind, -and then we shall see whether you will be able to resist the -origin which evolution assigns to it.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I shall be glad to meet you again.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI.</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="intro">Origin of the human mind—Mr. Spencer's theory of the composition of -mind—His system of morality.</p> - - -<p>According to their appointment, our two disputants -have met to discuss the origin of mind.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Will you begin this conference by stating -the evolution theory of the origin of the human mind?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Most willingly. I have thus far spoken of -the hypothesis of evolution as affording an explanation of -the origin of distinct animals, regarded simply as living organisms, -differentiated from each other by the slow process -of development from a common stock, by the operation of -certain physical causes. I am now to account to you for -the origin of the human mind, upon the same hypothesis, -namely, that man is a development from some previous -and lower organism. I acknowledge that what we call -mind, or intellect, has to be accounted for; and that we -who hold the evolution theory of the origin of man as an -animal must be able to suggest how his intellect became -developed by the operation of the same natural causes which -produced his physical organization. It is not material, in -this inquiry, whether we agree with Darwin in assuming -some one distinct living organism of a very low type, as the -original stock from which all the other animal organisms -have been derived, or whether we go with Spencer back to -the primal molecules of organizable matter, and suppose -that from a single cell have been developed all the organisms<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span> -possessing life, in a regular order of succession. Upon -either supposition, the doctrine of evolution explains the -origin of the human mind. For, upon either supposition, -there was a point in the long series of new forms, each descending -from a pre-existing form, at which the manifestations -of what we call mind may be said to have begun. -This link in the connected chain of organisms occurred -where nervous organization began to act with some spontaneous -movement, with some power of voluntary exertion, -as distinguished from the involuntary exertions of a substance -that acted only in a certain and fixed way, although -that substance was endowed with life. The substance of -nervous organization is alike in all animals. In some it -acts in a limited manner, and without volitional control; -in others, it acts in more varied modes, and it manifests -some power of volitional control and volitional rest, as well -as of involuntary movement. But in all animals the substance -of which nervous organization is composed—the -substance which acts in producing movement, whether voluntary -or involuntary—is the same kind of physical structure. -In the higher animals, the great nerve-center is the -organ called the brain. To this organ proceed the impressions -produced upon one set of nerves by external objects, -or by light or heat. From the same organ proceed, -by another set of nerves, those movements which the animal -is endowed with the power of making from within. -Contemplating, then, the whole animal kingdom as one -great connected family, but divided into different species, -all of which have a nervous organization, we find that each -species is endowed with the power of generating other individuals -of the same species and of the same nervous organization. -In the long course of development of the several -species, or forms of animal life, there comes about a nervous -organization which acts freely within certain limits, but in -a fixed and invariable mode, so that the movements are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span> -uniformly the same, and not in any proper sense volitional. -To such an animal we should not attribute any mind, for -mind implies some power of comparison and variation, -some ability to act in more than a prescribed way. This -animal, which I have just supposed to possess a very limited -power of nervous action, transmits that power to its descendants; -and in some of the successive generations the -power remains always at the same fixed point. But the -laws of natural and sexual selection are perpetually operating -among those descendants. In progress of time there -comes to be developed another organism, which has a wider -range of nervous action; and, as this ceaseless process of -modification and improvement goes on, there is developed -still another nervous organization which acts with still more -varied movements. As the different species of animals become -evolved out of those that have gone before, the expansion -of nervous organization goes on; and as each new -and higher and more complex stage is gained, individuals -of the species have the power to transmit it to their descendants -by ordinary generation. At length, as in some of the -mammalia, a nervous organization is attained, whose action -exhibits manifestations of what we call mind. There appears -to be a power of something like reasoning and volition, -because the nervous actions are so various and so much -adapted to outward circumstances. Thus, before we reach -the human animal, we find nervous organizations widely -separated from those of the remote progenitor species, because -they can do so much more, and can do it with an -apparent power of voluntary variation. At last, this process -of modifications accumulating upon modifications culminates -in an animal in whose nervous organization we find -the freest, the most complex, and the most various power -of receiving into his brain the impressions derived from the -external world, and of transmitting from his brain to the -different organs of his body those movements which the ex<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span>ternal -circumstances of his life, or his internal efforts, cause -him to strive for and to effect. This animal was the primeval -man.<a name="FNanchor_113" id="FNanchor_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a></p> - -<p>Looking back, then, to the primal source of all nervous -organization, in the remote animal in which the nervous -structure and action were at the crudest state of development, -and remembering that there was a power of transmitting -it to offspring, and that natural and sexual selection -were unceasingly operating to expand and perfect it, we may -trace the successive stages of its modification and growth, -from the lowest to the highest, until we reach in the primeval -man the highest development that it had yet attained. -But throughout all its stages, from the lowest to the highest, -the system of nervous organization and action is the same -in kind. We do not call its manifestations or action mind, -or speak of them as indicating mind, until we find it developed -into a condition of some voluntary activity and -power of variation, as it is in many of the animals inferior -to man. But in all the animals, man included, mind is the -action of the nervous organization when it evinces a superior -power of variation; and we speak of the brain of such animals -as the seat of mind because that organ is the source to -and from which nervous action proceeds.</p> - -<p>Let me now illustrate this view by the acquisition of -articulate speech and the formation of language. In many -of the lower animals with which we are acquainted there is -a power of uttering vocal sounds, and of understanding -them when uttered by their fellows. It must have been a -power possessed by those animals which were the progeni<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span>tors -of man in the long line of descent of one species from -another. But in them it was a very limited power. It increased -as the nervous organization and the vocal organs -became in the successive species capable of a more varied -action. The sounds of the external world impressed themselves -upon the brains of the primeval men more forcibly -than they did upon the brains of the other animals, and excited -the nervous organization to reproduce or imitate them. -Those emotions and desires which originated in the brain -itself—the impressions of pain or the sensations of pleasure -experienced in the nervous system—sought expression -through the vocal organs. Certain sounds repeated alike -by the same individual, or by numerous individuals, for a -long time, became associated in their brains with certain -feelings or sensations. What are called words were thus -formed; which, at first, could have been nothing but the -utterance of certain sounds by the vocal organs, expressing -the sensations felt by the nervous organization, or the imitations -of external noises. At length these vocal sounds are -gathered in the memory, multiplied and systematized, and -a rude language is formed. But, all the while, the first -crude human language was nothing but the result of nervous -action excited to greater activity than in the other -animals, accompanied by nicer and more capable vocal organs -and a greater power of using them. This acquisition, -obtained by the primeval men, was transmitted to their descendants -as an improved physical organization, and in -those descendants it finally reached the marvelous development -of the most perfect languages of antiquity.</p> - -<p>Let us now retrace our steps back to the time when -nervous organization, in the successive generations of the -whole animal series regarded as one great family of kindred -animals successively developed out of a common stock, began -to act in such a way as to evince the presence of what -we call mind. Once attained, this improved nervous or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span>ganization -would be transmitted by the parents to new individuals; -and so on through countless generations, just as -the offspring would inherit the same physical structure as -the parents in other respects.</p> - -<p>Mental phenomena are the products of nervous organization. -We have no means of knowing that mind is an -organism or an entity. If it is an existence capable of surviving -the death of the body, which evolution neither affirms -nor denies, you must go to revelation for the grounds -of belief in its immortality. There is no conflict between -the evolution theory of the nature of mind and the doctrine -of immortality as taught by revealed religion.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I am not disposed to constitute myself a -champion of revealed religion. I have lately read in the -writings of some well-meaning persons, whose positions and -convictions made them anxious about the truths of revelation, -expressions of the opinion that there is no necessary -conflict between the hypothesis of a revelation and the -teachings of evolution. I have been rather surprised by -such concessions. But through all our discussions, and -throughout all my reflections and inquiries, I have excluded -revealed religion from the number of proofs of our immortality. -But it seems to me that, as to the possibility of a -survival of the mind after the death of the body, you have -stated yourself out of court, not because you have propounded -something that is inconsistent with revelation, -although it certainly is, but because you have made mind -to consist in nothing but the action of nervous organization, -and when that has perished what can remain? You -may say that science does not undertake to determine that -mind is or is not a special existence capable of surviving -the body. But, observe that you attribute to nervous action -the production of phenomena to which you give the name -of mind, when the nervous action evinces some power of -volitional variation and control. Now, when and where<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span> -did this begin, in the long series of animal organisms which -you assume have been successively evolved out of one another? -Remember that, according to the system of evolution, -there are supposed to have been countless forms of -animal organisms, graduating by slow improvements into -higher and higher organisms. Where and when and what -was the first animal that possessed a nervous organization -which would manifest the power of variation in so marked -a degree as to render it proper to speak of the animal as -possessing or evincing mind? Are not the works of naturalists -of the evolution school filled with comparisons of -the minds of different animals, and do they not contend -that in many of them there are manifestations of mental -power, of the exercise of reason and comparison, and a volitional -action according to varying circumstances? Did, -then, these manifestations of something like mental power -begin in the anthropomorphous ape from whom we are supposed -to be descended, or who is supposed to be of kin to -us? Or did it begin in any one and which of the innumerable -intermediate forms between that ape-like creature -and the primeval man? And when once this improved and -improving nervous organization had been developed and -put into a condition to be transmitted to descendants, until -in the primeval man it had attained its highest development, -what was it but a more sensitive, more various, and -complex condition of the substance of which all nervous -tissues are composed? And when these tissues are decomposed -and resolved into their original material elements, -where and what is the mind, whether of man or beast? It -is nowhere and nothing, unless you suppose that the improved -and improving action of the nervous organization at -last developed an existence which is not in itself material -or physical, and which may be imperishable and indestructible, -while the material and physical organs by and through -which it acts for a time perish daily in our sight. If this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> -is a possible, it is a very improbable hypothesis, because the -nature of the human mind points to a very different origin.</p> - -<p>I surely do not need to tell you that like produces like. -If the mind of man is now a spiritual essence, it is a wild -conjecture to suppose that it was generated out of the action -of a material substance, in whatever animal, or supposed -species of animal, its genesis is imagined to have begun. -We must therefore determine, from all the evidence -within our reach, whether the mind is a spiritual existence. -If it is, it is not difficult to reach a rational conclusion that -its Creator contrived a means of connecting it for a season -with the bodily organs, and made the generative production -of each new individual body at the same time give -birth to a new individual mind, whenever a new child is -born into the world. We can not discover the nature of -the connection, or the process by which generative production -of a new body becomes also generative production of -a new mind. These are mysteries that are hidden from us. -But the fact of the connection—the simultaneous production -of the new body and the new mind—is a fact that the -birth of every child demonstrates. Whether the union -takes place at any time before birth, or whether it is only -at birth that the mind, the spiritual essence, comes into existence, -and so may become capable of an endless life, we -can not know. But that this occurs at some time in the -history of every human being, we are justified in saying -that we know.</p> - -<p>I shall now contrast your hypothesis of the origin of the -human mind with another and a very different one; and, -in stating it, I shall borrow nothing from the Mosaic account -of the creation of Adam and Eve. I shall not assert, -on the authority of Moses, that God breathed into Adam a -living soul, for that would be to resort to a kind of evidence -which, for the present, I mean to avoid, and which would -bring into consideration the nature of the means by which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span> -the Hebrew historian was informed of the fact which he -relates, and which he could have known in no other way. -It would also give rise to a question of what was meant by -"a living soul." But I shall assume that there is a spiritual -and a material world; that a spiritual existence is one -thing and a material existence is another. I shall assume -that there is a spiritual world, because all our commonest -experience, our introspection and consciousness, our observation -of what the human mind can do, its operations and -its productions, its capacity to originate thought and to -send it down the course of ages, its power to recognize and -obey a moral law as a divine command, the monuments of -every kind which attest that it is something which is not -matter or material substance, prove to us that the human -mind is essentially a spiritual existence; and that while it -acts and must act by and through bodily organs, so long as -it acts in this world, it is a being quite distinct from all -the physical substance and physical organism with which it -is connected for a time. Physiology alone can teach us -this much at least, that mind is not matter; and experience, -consciousness, and observation teach us that while -the action of the mind may be suspended for a time when -the nervous organization can not normally act, from disease -or injury, the mind itself is not destroyed, but its action -may be restored with the restoration of the brain to its -normal condition.</p> - -<p>I am going to assume another thing—the existence of -the Creator, the Supreme Governor of the universe, having -under his control the whole realms of the spiritual and -the material world; alike capable of giving existence to -spiritual entities and to material organisms, and capable -of uniting them by any connection and for any purpose -that might seem to him good. I shall assume this, because -some of you evolutionists concede, if I understand rightly, -the existence and capacities of the Supreme Being, since<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span> -you assume, and rightly, that the whole question relates to -his methods; and you believe that he chose the method of -evolution instead of the method of special creation for all -the types of animal life excepting the aboriginal and created -lowest form, out of which all the others have been evolved. -With these two assumptions, then, the nature of a spiritual -existence, and the existence and capacities of the Creator, -I now state to you the opposite hypothesis of the origin and -nature of the human mind.</p> - -<p>A pair of human beings, male and female, is created by -the hand and will of the Almighty; and to each is given -a physical organism, and a spiritual, intellectual self, or -mind, which is endowed with consciousness and capable -of thought. Why is this a rational supposition, aside from -any evidence of the fact derived from its assertion by an -inspired or a divinely instructed witness? It is so, because, -when this aboriginal pair of human creatures fulfill the law -of their being, by the procreation of other creatures of the -same kind, the offspring must be supposed to possess whatever -the parents possessed of peculiar and characteristic -organization. This law of transmission is stamped upon all -the forms of organic life; and we may well apply it to the -first pair of human beings. Its operation must have begun -in them and their offspring. Every law that proceeded -from the will of the Supreme Being began to operate at -some time; and this law, like all others, must have been -put in operation by the Creator at some definite period. -He created in the first pair a bodily organization, and he -created in each of them the spiritual entity that we now -call mind, and established its connection with their bodily -organs. He established in them also the power of procreating -offspring; and this included the production of a new -individual of the same species, in whom would be united, -by the same mysterious bond, the same kind of physical -organization and the same kind of spiritual or intellectual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span> -existence, which is not matter, and could not have been -generated out of matter alone. The beginning of this connection -of body and mind in the first parents was an occasional -and special exercise of the divine power. It was not -a miraculous exercise of power, because a miracle, in the -proper sense, implies some action aside from a previously -established course of things. It was simply a first exercise -of the power in the case of the creation of the first human -pair; that is, it was the establishment in them, specially, -of the union of the body and soul. Its repetition in the -offspring, for all time, and through successive generations, -was left to the operation of the laws of procreation and -heredity. The nature and operation of those laws are -wrapped in mystery; but about the fact of their existence, -and of the compound procreation of a new body and a new -mind at every new birth, there can be no doubt whatever.</p> - -<p>It seems to me that this hypothesis has in its favor a -vast preponderance of probability, because—</p> - -<p>1. The generation of mind or spirit out of matter is inconceivable.</p> - -<p>2. The creation of mind by the Almighty is just as conceivable -as his creation of a material organism; and the -latter is conceded by all naturalists who admit that there -was a first animal organism; and even some of the evolutionists -hold that the first animal organism was directly -fashioned by the Creator, although all the succeeding organisms -were formed, as they contend, by natural and sexual -selection.</p> - -<p>3. The nature of mind—of the human mind—is the -same in all individuals of the race. They may differ in -mental power, but they all possess an intellectual principle -that is the same in kind. To the production of mind, or -its formation, the process of evolution was not necessary. -Not only was it unnecessary, but in the nature of things it -was not adapted to do what it is supposed to have done in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> -the production of physical organisms. To suppose that the -Creator, instead of the direct exercise of his power of creation, -left it to the material laws of natural and sexual selection -to produce a mind, is to suppose him to have resorted -to a method that was both unnecessary and indirect, and -was furthermore incapable of effecting that kind of product. -In reasoning about the methods of the Creator, it is certainly -irrational to suppose him to have resorted to one that -was so ill adapted to the accomplishment of his object. In -the accomplishment of some physical objects, we may well -suppose that they have been brought about by physical -agencies that have operated very slowly and indirectly; and -we can see that this has often been the case in regard to -many material products. But for the production of mind, -for the accomplishment of a spiritual existence, there can -be imagined no secondary agencies, no gradual growth out -of antecedent existences or substances, no evolution out of -some other and that other a material organism. The first -mind, the first human soul, must have come direct from -the hand and will of God. The succeeding minds may -well have been left to owe their existence to the laws of -procreation, by a process which we can not understand, but -of which we have proof in the birth of every child that has -been born of woman.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> We now have the two hypotheses of the -origin and nature of the human mind fairly before us; and -here I must point out to you wherein you do injustice to -my side of the question. In the first place, your assumption -of one pair of progenitors of the human race from -whom have diverged all the varieties of the race, does not -encounter the evolution process of man's descent as an animal. -It is either an arbitrary assumption, or it is derived -from the Mosaic account of the creation, which, in a scientific -point of view, and aside from the supposed authority -of that story, is just as arbitrary an assumption as if the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span> -book of Genesis had never existed. Take, therefore, Darwin's -hypothesis of the zoölogical series: First, a fish-like -animal, of course inhabiting the water; next, the amphibians, -capable of living in the water and on the land; next, -the ancient marsupials; next, the quadrumana and all the -higher mammals, among whom are to be classed the <i lang="la">Simiadæ</i> -or monkeys; and out of these came the hairy, tailed -quadruped, arboreal in its habits, from which man is descended. -This long line of descent is filled with diversified -forms, intermediate between the several principal forms -which are known to us, and which were successively the -progenitors of man. Now, hear Darwin on the subject of -one pair of progenitors:</p> - -<p>"But since he [man] attained to the rank of manhood -he has diverged into distinct races, or, as they may be -more fitly called, sub-species. Some of these, such as the -negro and European, are so distinct that, if specimens had -been brought to a naturalist without any further information, -they would undoubtedly have been considered by him -as good and true species. Nevertheless, all the races agree -in so many unimportant details of structure and in so many -mental peculiarities, that these can be accounted for only -by inheritance from a common progenitor; and a progenitor -thus characterized would probably deserve to rank as -man. It must not be supposed that the divergence of each -race from the other races, and of all from a common stock, -can be traced back to any one pair of progenitors. On the -contrary, at every stage in the process of modification all -the individuals which were in any way better fitted for -their conditions of life, though in different degrees, would -have survived in greater numbers than the less well fitted. -The process would have been like that followed by man, -when he does not intentionally select particular individuals, -but breeds from all the superior individuals and neglects -the inferior. He thus slowly but surely modifies his stock,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span> -and unconsciously forms a new strain. So with respect to -modifications acquired independently of selection, and due -to variations arising from the nature of the organism and -the action of the surrounding conditions, or from changed -habits of life, no single pair will have been modified much -more than the other pairs inhabiting the same country, for -all will have been continually blended through free intercrossing."<a name="FNanchor_114" id="FNanchor_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a></p> - -<p>The meaning of this is that if you go back to the period -when an animal, by the slow process of modification which -was continually operating among the preceding organisms, -had been raised to the present state of man, and then follow -out the divergencies into the distinct races of men, -those divergencies would not have occurred in consequence -of any one pair having been modified much more than the -other pairs inhabiting the same country, but all the individuals -would have undergone a continually blending process -through unrestrained intercrossing; and those individuals -of both sexes, who became in a superior degree fitted -for their conditions of life, would have survived in greater -numbers than the less well fitted, and would have transmitted -to their posterity those peculiarities which tended -at last to produce different races of the human family. So -that the notion of a single pair of the negro variety, or of -a single pair of the Caucasian variety, formed and completed -as an independent stock, is not necessary to account -for these varieties.</p> - -<p>To apply this, now, to the slow production of man's intellectual -faculties, we must, if we would do justice to -Darwin's hypothesis of the method in which he was developed -as an animal, bear in mind that his mental powers, -like his animal structure, have been the necessary acquirement -of new powers and capacities by gradation, through<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span> -the perpetual process of modification, and retention and -transmission of the new acquisitions. Darwin, indeed, does -not professedly undertake the genealogy of the human -mind; but he appears to hold the opinion that in future -psychology will be based on the gradual acquisition of each -mental power and capacity, as distinguished from their -complete production in any one pair, or in any one being; -and he refers to Herbert Spencer as having already securely -laid the foundation for this new psychology.<a name="FNanchor_115" id="FNanchor_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a></p> - -<p>I take, therefore, the great English naturalist as the -person who has most satisfactorily explained the origin of -man as an animal, and the great English philosopher as -the person who has propounded the most satisfactory theory -of the origin of the human mind. The two hypotheses -run parallel to and support each other. Man, as respects -his mere animal structure, is an organism developed by a -slow process of modification out of preceding organisms. -His mental faculties have one by one grown out of the -operation of the same physical agencies that have formed -his animal structure, and they have not been bestowed at -once upon any one pair, or upon any one individual of the -race. After they have all been acquired, as we now know -and recognize them, they have descended to the successive -generations of the race.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I have studied Mr. Spencer's "System of -Psychology," but I do not know whether we understand it -alike. You say that he has propounded the most satisfactory -theory of the origin of mind. Assuming that mind -was evolved as an aggregate of powers and capacities, slowly -acquired, <i lang="la">pari passu</i> with the evolution of the animal -organism, be good enough to tell me whether Mr. Spencer -does or does not conclude that mind is anything more than -an aggregate of powers and capacities of the nervous organi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span>zation. -I am quite aware of the mode in which he meets -the charge of materialism; but waiving for the present the -question of materialism, I should be glad to know, according -to your understanding of his philosophy, what he considers -mind to be.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> To answer your question requires an analysis -of Spencer's "Principles of Psychology." You have -here on your table the third edition of that work, which -received his latest corrections and additions.<a name="FNanchor_116" id="FNanchor_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> If you look -at the preface of this edition, you will see that, as between -Realism and Idealism, he enunciates a view which recognizes -an element of truth in each, but rejects the rest. By -this "Transfigured Realism" he aims to conciliate what is -true in Realism with what is true in Idealism; and it is by -this conciliation that he answers the partisans of both systems, -who will not sacrifice any part of their respective doctrines. -It is important for you to remember this in judging -of his psychological system. He begins by a description -of the structure and functions of the nervous system, and -the nature of nervous actions. Without repeating in all -its minute details the structure which he describes, it is -enough to say that in all animals, from the lowest to the -highest, this peculiar part of the organism which we call -the nervous system is composed of two tissues which differ -considerably from those composing the rest of the organism. -In color they are distinguished from one another as -gray and white, and in their minute structures as vesicular -and fibrous. In the gray tissue, the vesicles or corpuscles -contain a soft protein substance, with granules imbedded in -it, consisting of fatty matter. The more developed of these -nerve-corpuscles give off branching processes, and the -terminations of nerve-fibers are distributed among them.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span> -The white tissue is composed of minute tubes containing a -medullary substance or pulp, viscid like oil. Imbedded in -this pulp, which fills the tubes, there lies a delicate fiber or -axis-cylinder, which is uniform and continuous instead of -having its continuity broken by fat-granules. This central -thread is the essential nerve; and the sheath of medullary -matter, and its surrounding membranous sheath, are only -its accessories. While, therefore, the matter of nerve-fiber -has much in common with the matter of nerve-vesicle, in -the latter the protein substance contains more water, is -mingled with fat-granules, and forms part of an unstable -mass; whereas in the former, the nerve-tube, the protein -substance, is denser, is distinct from the fatty compounds -that surround it, and so presents an arrangement that is -relatively stable.</p> - -<p>Conceive, then, of this interlaced physical structure extending -throughout the whole organism as a kind of circular -mechanism, having its periphery at the surface of the -body and limbs, ramifying among and into the internal -organs, with various nerve-centers distributed through the -interior mechanism, and the one great nerve-center in the -brain. Conceive of this structure, further, as fed continually -by the blood-vessels, which repair its waste of tissue -and keep it in proper tone and activity. Then imagine it -as first put in operation in some animal in whom it has -become developed as we now know it in ourselves, and let -that animal stand as the primeval man, who has become, -by inherited transmission of gradual accumulations, possessed -of this consummate development of nervous organization. -You can then observe the method of its action, and -can perceive how mind became developed, and what it is.</p> - -<p>What I have now given you is only a general description -of the structure of the nervous mechanism, and in order to -understand its functions, we may take it up, in an individual, -at a point of time when it had not experienced a single<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> -movement or change from a state of rest, but when it was -completely fitted to act. Observe, then, that its action will -consist in the origination and accomplishment of motion; -or, in other words, in molecular change of the substance -composing the nerves, which, for illustration only, may be -likened to the conductor through which the molecular disturbance -passes which is popularly, but not scientifically, -called the electric fluid. At the surface of the body and -limbs, the external termini of the nerves are exposed to disturbance -by contact with an external object. Along the -highly sensitive and minute conductor, the nerve which -has by contact with an external object at its outer extremity -received a slight shock, there passes through the fluid -or semi-fluid substance of the nerve a wave of disturbance, -or a succession of such waves. This disturbance reaches -the brain, the great nerve-center, where it becomes a feeling. -In this way is generated the feeling of contact with -an external object, and this is what is commonly called the -sense of touch, which is simply a feeling produced in the -great nerve-center of the brain. Now, to reverse the process, -let us suppose that this feeling, caused by touching an -external object, provokes or excites a desire to remove that -object, or to get rid of the continuance of the feeling, and -to be without the irritation or pain which it is causing. -From the central seat of nervous action, the brain, along -another nerve, there proceeds a wave, or a series of waves, -in the fluid or semi-fluid substance of which the conductor -of that nerve is composed, and motion is communicated to -some muscle or set of muscles, which need to be put in -motion in order to break the contact with the external -object. In like manner, all internal organs of the body, -the viscera, are supplied with a system of nerves connected -with the great nerve-center. If a disturbance arises in one -of the viscera, some action that is abnormal, a sensation -that is called pain is produced. So, too, in regard to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span> -normal action of the viscera, kept up by involuntary movements—those -movements originate in and are transmitted -from the nerve-center, by waves in the fluid or semi-fluid -substance of which the special nerves are composed, whose -office it is to cause the necessary movements in the muscular -substance, or the tissue, of the particular organ.</p> - -<p>In this way began, in the supposed individual, those -simpler states of feeling which pain or irritation produced -in the nervous system, and those other involuntary movements -which were essential to the normal and unconscious -action of the viscera. These varying conditions of the -highly sensitive nervous system, which constitute and are -rightly denominated feelings, were constantly repeated; -and, so far as they are capable of becoming a part of consciousness, -that consciousness is a repetition of the same -nervous actions many times over. Pass, then, from the -feelings called sensations to the feelings called emotions, -and it will be found that while both are states of nervous -action, the former are peripherally initiated and the latter -are centrally initiated. The meaning of this is that a sensation -is an effect produced at the nerve-center by the transmission, -from the outer terminus of a particular nerve, -of the waves in the fluid or semi-fluid substance of the -nerve. The strong forms of feeling called sensations are -peripherally initiated, and the feelings called emotions are -centrally initiated. Now, any feeling of any kind is directly -known by each person in no other place than his own -consciousness; and the question is, Of what is consciousness -composed? In order to afford an answer to this question, -Mr. Spencer proceeds to examine the substance of -mind, and then passes to a consideration of the composition -of mind. These are not the same thing; for, if -there be no such thing, properly speaking, as the substance -of mind, its composition, or its nature, must be looked for -in another way. The expression "substance of mind," if<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span> -used in any way but that in which we use the <em>x</em> of an algebraic -equation, has no meaning. If we undertake to interpret -mind in the terms of matter, as crude materialism -does, we are at once brought to this result, that we know, -and can know, nothing of the ultimate substance of either. -We know matter only as forms of certain units; but the -ultimate unit, of which the ultimate homogeneous units -are probably composed, must remain absolutely unknown. -In like manner, if mind consists of homogeneous units of -feeling, the ultimate unit, as a substance, must remain unknown. -When, therefore, we think of the substance of -mind, the simplest form under which we can think of it is -nothing but a symbol of something that can never be rendered -into thought, just as the concept we form to ourselves -of matter is but the symbol of some form of power absolutely -and forever unknown to us, as the representation of -all objective activities in terms of motion is only a symbolic -representation, and not a knowledge of them. Symbols of -unknown forms of existence, whether in the case of matter, -motion, or mind, are mere representations which do not -determine anything about the ultimate substance of either. -"Our only course is constantly to recognize our symbols as -symbols only, and to rest content with that duality of them -which our constitution necessitates. The unknowable as -manifested to us within the limits of consciousness in the -shape of feeling, being no less inscrutable than the unknowable -as manifested beyond the limits of consciousness -in other shapes, we approach no nearer to understanding -the last by rendering it into the first."<a name="FNanchor_117" id="FNanchor_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a></p> - -<p>Discarding, then, the expression "substance of mind," -excepting as a mere symbol, Mr. Spencer passes to the -"composition of mind"; and here we reach his explanation -of mind as an evolution traceable through ascending<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span> -stages of composition, conformably to the laws of evolution -in general, so that the composition of mind, as something -evolved out of simple elements, does not need or involve a -symbolical representation in the terms of matter.</p> - -<p>The method of composition, by which the whole fabric -of mind is constituted, from the formation of its simplest -feelings up to the formation of the complex aggregates of -feelings which are its highest developments, can now be -sketched. A sensation is formed by the consolidation of -successive units of feeling; but the feelings called sensations -can not of themselves constitute mind, even when -many of different kinds are present together. When, however, -each sensation, as it occurs, is linked in association -with the faint forms of previous sensations of the same -kind, mind is constituted; for, by the consolidation of successive -sensations, there is formed a knowledge of the particular -sensation as a distinct subject of what we call -thought, or the smallest separable portion of thought as -distinguished from mere confused sentiency. Thus, as the -primitive units of feeling are compounded into sensations, -by the same method simple sensations, and the relations -among them, are compounded into states of definite consciousness. -The next highest stage of mental composition -is a repetition of the same process. Take a special object, -which produces in us a vivid cluster of related sensations. -When these are united with the faint forms of like clusters -that have been before produced by such objects, we know -the object. Knowledge of it is the assimilation of the -combined group of real feelings which it excites, with one -or more preceding ideal groups which were once excited -by objects of the same kind; and, when the series of ideal -groups is large, the knowledge is clear. In the same way, -by the connections between each special cluster of related -sensations produced by one object, and the special clusters -generated by other objects, a wider knowledge is obtained.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span> -By assimilating the more or less complex relations exhibited -in the actions of things in space and time, with -other such complex relations, knowledge of the powers and -habits of things is constituted. If we can not so assimilate -them, or parts of them, we have no knowledge of their -actions. So it is, without definite limit, through those -tracts of higher consciousness which are formed of clusters -of clusters of feelings held together by extremely involved -relations. This law of the composition of mind is, therefore, -the assimilation of real feelings and groups of real -feelings with the ideal feelings or ideal groups of feelings -which objects of the same kind once produced. You can -follow out, without my assistance, the correspondence -which Mr. Spencer exhibits between the views of mental -composition and the general truths respecting nervous -structure and nervous functions with which he began the -treatment of mind, which consists largely, and in one sense -entirely, of feelings. The inferior tracts of consciousness -are constituted by feelings; and the feelings are the materials -out of which are constituted the superior tracts of -consciousness, and thus intellect is evolved by structural -combination. "Everywhere feeling is the substance of -which, when it is present, intellect is the form. And -where intellect is not present, or but little present, mind -consists of feelings that are unformed or but little -formed."<a name="FNanchor_118" id="FNanchor_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> Does not this statement, which in substance is -Mr. Spencer's explanation of the formation of mind, explain -to you why he denominates it "transfigured realism"?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I have attentively and carefully read Mr. -Spencer's book from which you have made this partial -analysis of his view of the nature of mind, but whether it -is realism "transfigured," or whatever is, I think it must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span> -be admitted that its basis is a truly realistic one; for it -comes back at last to just what I suggested to you at the -beginning of this discussion, that mind, according to his -view, is constituted by the action of the nervous system, or, -in other words, that mind consists of the phenomena of -movements which take place in a physical structure. If -this is all that can be predicated of mind, it is not something -that can have an independent and continuous existence -after the dissolution of the physical structure called -the nervous system. That structure is one that is analogous -in its action to the other part of the organism by -which digestion, or the assimilation of food, is carried on. -We might as well suppose that by the action of the digestive -system there has been constituted a something which -will remain as a digestive function after the organs of digestion -have perished, as to suppose that the action of the -nervous system has constituted a something which will remain -mind, a conscious and independent existence, after -the nervous system has been resolved into its original material -elements. Indeed, I do not understand Mr. Spencer's -philosophy as including, providing for, or leading to, any -possible continued existence of the mind after the death of -the body. He seems to exclude it altogether. There is a -passage at the end of one of his chapters which appears to -be a summary of his whole philosophic scheme, and which -is one of the dreariest conclusions I have ever met with. -"Once more," he says, "we are brought round to the conclusion -repeatedly reached by other routes, that behind all -manifestations, inner and outer, there is a Power manifested. -Here, as before, it has become clear that while the nature -of this Power can not be known, while we lack the faculty -of forming even the dimmest conception of it, yet its universal -presence is the absolute fact without which there -can be no relative facts. Every feeling and thought being -but transitory, an entire life made up of such feelings<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span> -and thoughts being also but transitory, nay, the objects -amid which life is passed, though less transitory, being -severally in course of losing their individualities quickly or -slowly; we learn that the one thing permanent is the Unknowable -Reality hidden under all these changing shapes."<a name="FNanchor_119" id="FNanchor_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a></p> - -<p>I will not say that the mournful character of this hopelessness -of human destiny is proof of its unsoundness. I -have accustomed myself to accept results, whatever may be -the gloom in which they involve us, provided they are deductions -of sound reasoning; and our wishes or hopes can -not change the constitution of the universe or become -important evidence for or against any view of what that -constitution is. But let me ask, what does this philosopher -mean by the transitory character of an entire life made up -of transitory feelings and thoughts, occupied throughout -their continuance with transitory objects, or objects which -are quickly or slowly losing their individualities? What -possible room does he leave for the development and discipline -of an immortal being, supposing that man is an immortal -being, by an entire life passed in feelings, thoughts, -and action about objects which, relatively to the individual, -may, quickly or slowly, pass away from him? Or, what -room does he allow for the effect on such a being of an -entire life spent in the pursuit of objects or the enjoyment -of pleasures which develop only his baser nature and unfit -him for anything else? In any scheme of philosophy -which omits to regard this life as a preparatory school for -some other life, it seems to me that something is left out -which ought to be included, and which ought to be included -for the very reason that the evidence which tends to -show that mind is not constituted as Mr. Spencer supposes, -but that it is an existence of a special character, not generated -by the action of a physical structure, but deriving its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span> -existence from the direct action of the creating Power, is -so strong that, if we leave this conclusion out of the hypothesis, -we shall have left out the strongest probabilities -of the case. It is no answer to the necessity for including -this conclusion to say that there is a power which -we can not know, or an Unknowable Reality hidden under -all changing manifestations, among which are those -of mind. A study of those manifestations leads rightly to -some conclusions respecting the Power which underlies all -manifestations. It is necessary, therefore, to subject Mr. -Spencer's philosophy of mind to the further inquiry, How -does he account for the moral sense? How does he explain -that part of consciousness which recognizes moral obligations—the -recognition of moral law and duty? We may -easily dispense with the phrase "substance of the mind," -if we wish to avoid a term of matter; but if mind is constituted -by the perception of feelings excited in the nervous -system, what is it that perceives? Is there a something -that is reached by the feelings which constitute sensations -in the great nerve-center, which takes cognizance of them, -which combines them into portions of consciousness, or is -consciousness nothing but a succession of sensations, and if -so, what is "thought"? And what is that portion of -thought which takes cognizance of moral duty, and which -shows man to be capable of recognizing and obeying or -breaking a moral law? I have somewhere read a suggestion -that the polity which is said to have been given to the Hebrew -people on the Mount of Sinai, and which is described -as ten statutes written on two tablets of stone, consisted of -five laws on one tablet and five on the other; one set of -them expressing the relations of the Hebrews to the Deity, -and the other being the fundamental laws of the social life -which the Hebrews were commanded to lead. This division -is not accurate, because the commandments which express -the relations of the Hebrews to the Deity are four in num<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span>ber, -and the commandments which were to constitute their -social law are six. But that there is a line of demarkation -between the two kinds of laws is obvious, and how they -were written on the tablets, or whether they were written -at all, is immaterial. Looking, then, first at the social law, -whether there was more or less of the same ethical character -in the codes of other ancient peoples, or whether the -social law which is said to have been delivered to Moses and -by him communicated to his nation stands as an embodiment -of morality unequaled by anything that had preceded -it, it is certain that it found the Hebrew people capable of -the idea of law as a divine command. It is true that the -corner-stone of the whole superstructure is to be found in -the fact that the several commands which constituted this -social code—"Honor thy father and thy mother," "Thou -shalt do no murder," "Thou shalt not commit adultery," -"Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not bear false witness -against thy neighbor," "Thou shalt not covet thy -neighbor's house," etc.—were addressed to a people to whose -representatives the Almighty is supposed to have revealed -himself amid "thunders and lightnings, and a thick cloud -upon the mount, and the voice of a trumpet exceeding loud, -and all the people that were in the camp [below] trembled." -It is also true that the first of these awful annunciations -was said to have been, "I am the Lord thy God, which -brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of -bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before [or beside] -me."<a name="FNanchor_120" id="FNanchor_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> So that the source whence all the following commands -proceeded was the one and only God, who is described -as having thus revealed himself in fire and cloud -and earthquake, and thus to have secured instant and implicit -faith in what he spoke. But what he is asserted to -have said was addressed to human minds. This is in one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span> -aspect the most important fact in the whole Hebrew history. -It makes no difference whether Moses performed a -piece of jugglery, or whether he actually went within the -fire and the cloud, and actually spoke with God and received -his commands. The indisputable truth remains that -the individual minds of the Hebrew people, whom Moses -had led out of Egypt, received and obeyed, as divine commands, -an original and unique moral code, because they -were so constituted that they could embrace and act upon -the idea of law emanating from another than an earthly or -a human source. What, then, was this constitution of the -human mind, that could thus receive and act upon a divine -command; and what is it now? It matters not, in the view -in which I ask this question, whether there was any deceit -practiced or not, or whether there is any practiced now in -respect to the authority giving the command. What is to -be accounted for is the capacity of the human mind to embrace -and accept the idea of a moral law, be it that of Moses, -or of Christ, or of Mohammed.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> I am glad that you put this matter of the -ten commandments hypothetically, because otherwise we -might have been led aside into an argument about the authenticity -of the narrative. I recognize, however, the bearing -of the question which you have put, and shall endeavor -to answer it. Your question implies that the essential constitution -of the human mind has been the same in all ages; -that it was the same in this race of nomads, who had been, -they and their fathers for ages, serfs of the Egyptian kings, -that it is in us. Perhaps this assumption may be allowed; -and, at all events, the real question is, How did the idea of -a moral law originate, and what is the sense of moral obligation? -Like all things else, it is a product of the process -of evolution. I shall not argue this by any elaborate reasoning, -but will proceed to state the grounds on which it -rests. I will first give you what I understand to be Dar<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span>win's -view of the origin of the habit of thinking and feeling, -which we call the moral sense. Primeval man must -have existed in a state of barbarism. When he had become -developed out of some pre-existing animal, he was a mere -savage, distinguishable from his predecessors only by the -possession of some superior degree of mental power. Savages, -like some other animals, form themselves into tribes -or bands. Certain social instincts arise, out of which spring -what are regarded as virtues. Individuals of the tribe begin -to desire the sympathy and approbation of their fellows. -They perceive that certain actions, such as protection of -other and weaker individuals against danger, gain for them -the sympathy and approbation of the tribe. There are thus -formed some ideas of the common advantage to the tribe of -certain actions, and of the common disadvantage of the opposite -actions. Man is eminently a social animal, and this -desire for the sympathy and approbation of his tribe, and -this fear of their disapprobation, is so strong that the individual -savage is led to perceive that the common good of -the tribe is the object at which he must aim to conform. -The first social instincts, therefore, are those which perceive -the relations between certain kinds of conduct and the -common good of the tribe; and out of these relations, with -the aid of increasing intellectual powers, is developed the -golden rule, "As ye would that men should do to you, do -ye to them likewise," which lies at the foundation of morality. -These social instincts, thus leading at last to the -great rule of social morality, are developed very slowly. -They are at first confined to the benefit of the same tribe, -and they have no force in the relations of that tribe to the -members of any other. To a savage it is a highly meritorious -action to save the life of another member of his -own tribe, and if he loses his own life in the effort it is so -much the more meritorious. But he does not extend this -idea of doing a good action to the members of a different<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span> -tribe, and, whether his own tribe is or is not at war with the -other tribe, he and his own community will think it no -harm if he murders a member of that other tribe. But as -the approach to civilization goes on—as man advances in -intellectual power, and can trace the more remote consequences -of his actions, and as he rejects baneful customs -and superstitions, he begins to regard more and more not -only the welfare but the happiness of his fellow-men. -Habit, resulting from beneficial experiences, instruction -and example, renders his sympathies more tender and -widely diffused, until at last he extends them to men of -all races, to the imbecile, maimed, and other useless members -of society, and to the inferior animals. Thus the -standard of morality rises higher and higher; but its origin -is in the social instincts, which spring out of the love of -approbation and the fear of disapprobation.<a name="FNanchor_121" id="FNanchor_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a></p> - -<p>But morality comprehends also the self-regarding virtues, -those which directly affect the individual, and which -affect society but remotely and incidentally. How did the -idea of these originate? There is a very wide difference -between the morality of savages, in respect to the self-regarding -virtues, and the morality of civilized nations. -Among the former, the greatest intemperance, utter licentiousness, -and unnatural crimes are very common. But as -soon as marriage was introduced, whether monogamous or -polygamous, jealousy led to the inculcation of female virtue; -and this, being honored, spread to the unmarried -females. Chastity, the hatred of indecency, temperance, -and many other self-regarding virtues, originating first in -the social instincts, have come to be highly prized by civilized -nations as affecting, first, the welfare of the community, -and, secondly, the welfare of the individual. This was -the origin of the so-called "moral sense." It rejects the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span> -intuitive theory of morality, and bases its origin on the increasing -perception of the advantage of certain conduct to -the community and the individual.<a name="FNanchor_122" id="FNanchor_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> And in this origin of the social and the -self-regarding virtues, which I understand you to say is the -theory of Darwin, is the idea of a divine command to practice -certain things, and to avoid doing certain other things, -left out?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> The idea of a divine command, as the source -of morality, is not necessary to the explanation of the mode -in which the social or the self-regarding virtues were gradually -developed. In the progress from barbarism to civilization, -what is called the moral sense has been slowly developed -as an increasing perception of what is beneficial, and -this has become an inherited faculty. We thus have a sure -scientific basis for the moral intuitions which we do not individually -stay to analyze when we are called upon to determine -the morality or the immorality of certain actions. -The supposed divine command is something that is aside -from the process by which the idea of morality or immorality -became developed.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> And is this also Mr. Spencer's philosophy -of the moral sense?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Let me read you what Spencer says: "I -believe that the experience of utility, organized and consolidated -through all past generations of the human race, -has been producing corresponding modifications which, by -continued transmission and accumulation, have become in -us certain <em>faculties</em> of moral intuition—certain <em>emotions</em> -responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no -<em>apparent</em> basis in the <em>individual</em> experiences of utility."<a name="FNanchor_123" id="FNanchor_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> -I have emphasized certain words in this passage in order to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span> -make its meaning distinct. Mr. Spencer's theory is that -we have certain <em>faculties</em> of moral intuition, which have -become such by transmission and accumulation; that the -original ideas of right and wrong sprang from perceptions -of utility; and that when to the individual the question of -a good or a bad action in others or himself is now presented, -he feels an <em>emotion</em> which responds to right or -wrong conduct, and feels it in the <em>faculty</em> which he has -inherited from ancestors, without referring it to his <em>individual</em> -experience of the utility or inutility of certain conduct.</p> - -<p>Now, in regard to the divine command as the origin -of our ideas of right and wrong, if you turn to Mr. Spencer's -"Principles of Sociology," you will find an immense -collection of evidence which shows the genesis of deities of -all kinds. Beginning with the ideas formed by the primitive -men of souls, ghosts, spirits, and demons, the ideas of -another life and of another world, there came about the -ideas of supernatural beings, aided in their development by -ancestor-worship, idol-worship, fetich-worship, animal-worship, -plant-worship, and nature-worship. Hence came the -ideas of deities of various kinds, one class of which is that -of the human personality greatly disguised, and the other -is the class which has arisen by simple idealization and expansion -of the human personality. The last class, although -always coexisting with the other, at length becomes predominant, -and finally there is developed the idea of one -chief or supreme deity. Having traced the origin of this -idea of a supreme deity, Mr. Spencer puts and answers -this question: "While among all races and all regions, -from the earliest times down to the most recent, the conceptions -of deities have been naturally evolved in the way -shown, must we conclude that a small clan of the Semitic -race had given to it, supernaturally, a conception which, -though superficially like the rest, was in substance abso<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span>lutely -unlike them?"<a name="FNanchor_124" id="FNanchor_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> He then proceeds to show that -the Hebrew Jehovah, or God, was a conception that had -a kindred genesis with all the other conceptions of a deity -or deities. "Here," he says, "pursuing the methods of science, -and disregarding foregone conclusions, we must deal -with the Hebrew conception in the same manner as with -all the others." Dealing with it by the scientific method, -he shows that behind the supernatural being of the order -of the Hebrew God, as behind the supernatural beings of -all other orders, there has in every case been a human personality. -Thus, taking the narrative as it has come down -to us of God's dealing with Abraham, he shows that what -Abraham thought, or is described as thinking by those -who preserved the tradition, was of a terrestrial ruler who -could, like any other earthly potentate, make a covenant -with him about land or anything else, or that he was the -maker of all things, and that Abraham believed the earth -and the heavens were produced by one who eats and drinks, -and feels weary after walking. Upon either idea, Abraham's -conception of a Deity remains identical with that -of his modern Semitic representative, and with that of the -uncivilized in general. But the ideas of Deity entertained -by cultivated people, instead of being innate, arise only -at a comparatively advanced stage, as results of accumulated -knowledge, greater intellectual grasp, and higher -sentiment.<a name="FNanchor_125" id="FNanchor_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a></p> - -<p>To return now to the supposed divine command as the -origin of morality, it is obvious that the conception of the -being who has uttered the command makes the nature of -the command partake of the attributes ascribed to that being. -Accordingly, the grossest superstitions, the most revolting -practices, the most immoral actions, have found<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span> -their sanction in what the particular deity who is believed in -is supposed to have inculcated or required. I do not need -to enumerate to you the proofs of this, or to tell you that -the Hebrew God is no exception to it. One illustration of -it, however, is worth repeating. Speaking of the ceremony -by which the covenant between God and Abraham is said -to have been established, Mr. Spencer says: "Abraham and -each of his male descendants, and each of his slaves, is circumcised. -The mark of the covenant, observe, is to be -borne not only by Abraham and those of his blood, but also -by those of other blood whom he has bought. The mark -is a strange one, and the extension of it is a strange one, if -we assume it to be imposed by the Creator of the universe, -as a mark on a favored man and his descendants; and on -this assumption it is no less strange that the one transgression -for which every 'soul shall be cut off' is, not any -crime, but the neglect of this rite. But such a ceremony -insisted on by a living potentate, under penalty of death, is -not strange, for, as we shall hereafter see, circumcision is -one of various mutilations imposed as marks on subject persons -by terrestrial superiors."<a name="FNanchor_126" id="FNanchor_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a></p> - -<p>So that the Hebrew God who made the covenant with -Abraham was not, in Abraham's own conception, the First -Cause of all things, or a supernatural being, but he was a -powerful human ruler, making an agreement with a shepherd -chief. In all religions, the things required or commanded -by the supposed deified person have been marked -by the characteristics of human rulers; and as a source of -morality, or as a standard of morality, the requirements or -commands of the deified person, however they are supposed -to have been communicated, fail to answer the indispensable -condition of a fixed and innate system of morality, which -is that it must have proceeded from the Creator of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span> -universe, and not from a being who partakes of human passions, -infirmities, and desires, and is merely a deified human -potentate.</p> - -<p>Pass, now, to Mr. Spencer's "Principles of Morality"; -and although but one volume of this work has been as yet -published, we may see that he is entirely consistent with -what he has said in his "Sociology" and his other writings.<a name="FNanchor_127" id="FNanchor_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> -He does not leave us in any doubt as to his theory of morals. -It appears, from the preface to his "Data of Ethics," that -he has been compelled by ill-health to deviate from the -plan which he had mapped out for himself, and to publish -one volume of his "Principles of Morality" before -completing his "Principles of Sociology." But while we -have reason for his sake and for the sake of the world to -regret this, we can easily understand his system of morality. -He means to rest the rules of right conduct on a scientific -basis, and he shows that this is a pressing need. In his -preface, he says:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>I am the more anxious to indicate in outline, if I can not complete, -this final proof, because the establishment of rules of right -conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now that moral -injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred -origin, the secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few -things can happen more disastrous than the decay and death of a -regulative system no longer fit, before another and fitter regulative -system has grown up to replace it. Most of those who reject the -current creed appear to assume that the controlling agency furnished -by it may be safely thrown aside, and the vacancy left unfilled -by any other controlling agency. Meanwhile, those who defend the -current creed allege that, in the absence of the guidance it yields, no -guidance can exist; divine commandments they think the only possible -guides. Thus, between these extreme opponents there is a cer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span>tain -community. The one holds that the gap left by disappearance -of the code of supernatural ethics need not be filled by a code of -natural ethics; and the other holds that it can not be so filled. -Both contemplate a vacuum, which the one wishes and the other -fears. As the change which promises or threatens to bring about -this state, desired or dreaded, is rapidly progressing, those who believe -that the vacuum can be filled are called upon to do something -in pursuance of their belief.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The code of natural ethics which Mr. Spencer propounds, -and which is a product of the process of evolution, -may be summarized as follows: Conduct is an aggregate of -actions which are not purposeless, but which include all -acts that are adjusted to ends, from the simplest to the -most complex. The division or aspect of conduct with -which ethics deals, the behavior we call good or bad, is a -part of an organic whole; but, although inextricably bound -up with acts which are neither good nor bad, it is distinguishable -as comprehending those acts with which morality -is concerned. The evolution of conduct, from the simplest -and most indifferent actions up to those on which -ethical judgments are passed, is what Mr. Spencer means -by the scientific method of investigating the origin of morality. -We must begin with the conduct of all living creatures, -because the complete comprehension of conduct is not -to be obtained by contemplating the conduct of human beings -only. "The conduct of the higher animals as compared -with that of man, and the conduct of the lower animals -as compared with that of the higher, mainly differ in -this, that the adjustments of acts to ends are relatively simple -and relatively incomplete. And as in other cases, so -in this case, we must interpret the more developed by -the less developed. Just as, fully to understand the part -of conduct which ethics deals with, we must study human -conduct as a whole, so, fully to understand human -conduct as a whole, we must study it as a part of that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span> -larger whole constituted by the conduct of animate beings -in general."<a name="FNanchor_128" id="FNanchor_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a></p> - -<p>Begin, for example, with an infusorium swimming about -at random, determined in its course not by an object which -it perceives and which is to be pursued or escaped, but apparently -by varying stimuli in its medium, the water. Its -acts, unadjusted in any appreciable way to ends, lead it -now into contact with some nutritive substance which it -absorbs, and now into the neighborhood of some creature -by which it is swallowed and digested. Pass on to another -aquatic creature, which, although of a low type, is much -higher than the infusorium, such as a rotifer. With larger -size, more developed structures, and greater power of combining -functions, there comes an advance in conduct. It -preserves itself for a longer period by better adjusting its -own actions, so that, it is less dependent on the actions going -on around. Again, compare a low mollusk, such as a -floating ascidian, with a high mollusk, such as a cephalopod, -and it is apparent how greater organic evolution is -accompanied by more evolved conduct. And if you pass -then to the vertebrate animals, you see how, along with -advance in structure and functions, there is evolved an advance -in conduct, until at length, when you reach the doings -of the highest of mammals, mankind, you not only -find that the adjustments of acts to ends are both more numerous -and better than among the lower mammals, but you -find the same thing on comparing the doings of the higher -races of men with those of the lower races. There is a -greater completeness of achievement by civilized men than -by savages, and there is also an achievement of relatively -numerous minor ends subserving major ends.</p> - -<p>Recollecting, then, what conduct is—namely, the ad<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span>justment -of acts to ends—and observing how this adjustment -becomes more and more complete as the organism -becomes more developed, we have to note the order of the -ends to which the acts are adjusted. The first end, the -first stage of evolving conduct, is the further prolongation -of life. The next is that adjustment of acts to ends which -furthers an increased amount of life. Thus far the ends -are complete individual life. Then come those adjustments -which have for their final purpose the life of the -species. Then there is a third kind of conduct, which -results from the fact that the multitudinous creatures -which fill the earth can not live wholly apart from one -another, but are more or less in presence of one another, -are interfered with by one another. No one species can so -act as to secure the greatest amount of life to its individuals -and the preservation of the species—can make a successful -adjustment of its acts to these ends—without interfering -with the corresponding adjustments by other creatures -of their acts to their ends. That some may live, others -must die. Finally, when we contemplate those adjustments -of acts to ends which miss completeness, because they -can not be made by one creature without other creatures -being prevented from making them, we reach the thought -of adjustments such that each creature may make them -without preventing them from being made by other creatures. -Let me now quote Mr. Spencer's concrete illustrations -of these abstract statements:</p> - -<p>"Recognizing men as the beings whose conduct is most -evolved, let us ask under what conditions their conduct, in -all three aspects of its evolution, reaches its limit. Clearly -while the lives led are entirely predatory, as those of savages, -the adjustments of acts to ends fall short of this highest -form of conduct in every way. Individual life, ill carried -on from hour to hour, is prematurely cut short; the -fostering of offspring often fails, and is incomplete when it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span> -does not fail; and in so far as the ends of self-maintenance -and race-maintenance are met, they are met by destruction -of other beings, of different kind, or of like kind. In -social groups formed by compounding and recompounding -primitive hordes, conduct remains imperfectly evolved in -proportion as there continue antagonisms between the -groups and antagonisms between members of the same -group—two traits necessarily associated; since the nature -which prompts international aggression prompts aggression -of individuals on one another. Hence, the limit of evolution -can be reached by conduct only in permanently peaceful -societies. That perfect adjustment of acts to ends in -maintaining individual life and rearing new individuals, -which is effected by each without hindering others from -effecting like perfect adjustments, is, in its very definition, -shown to constitute a kind of conduct that can be approached -only as war decreases and dies out.</p> - -<p>"A gap in this outline must now be filled up. There -remains a further advance not yet even hinted. For beyond -so behaving that each achieves his ends without preventing -others from achieving their ends, the members of a society -may give mutual help in the achievement of ends. And if, -either indirectly by industrial co-operation, or directly by -volunteered aid, fellow-citizens can make easier for one -another the adjustments of acts to ends, then their conduct -assumes a still higher phase of evolution; since whatever -facilitates the making of adjustments by each, increases the -totality of the adjustments made, and serves to render the -lives of all more complete."</p> - -<p>In the outline which I have now given you of the evolution -of conduct, you will perceive the foundation of Spencer's -system of ethics. Actions begin to assume an ethical character—conduct -becomes good or bad—when the acts tend to -promote or to prevent the general well-being of the community. -But how is the perception or recognition of this qual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span>ity -in an action reached? What is the determining reason -for considering an action good or bad? Obviously, conduct -is considered by us as good or bad according as its aggregate -results to self, or others, or both, are pleasurable or painful. -Mr. Spencer shows that every other proposed standard of -conduct derives its authority from this standard: "No -school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable -state of feeling called by whatever name—gratification, -enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, -to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the -conception. It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition -as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition."<a name="FNanchor_129" id="FNanchor_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a></p> - -<p>On this fundamental basis, Mr. Spencer rests his system -of absolute ethics and relative ethics. Relative ethics are -those by which, allowing for the friction of an incomplete -life and the imperfections of existing natures, we may ascertain -with approximate correctness what is the relatively -right. This is often exceedingly difficult, because two cases -are rarely the same in all their circumstances. But absolute -ethics are the ideal ethical truths, expressing the absolutely -right. Such a system of ideal ethical truths, which -must have precedence over relative ethics, is reached only -when there has been, in conformity with the laws of evolution -in general, and in conformity with the laws of organization -in particular, an adaptation of humanity to the social -state, changing it in the direction of an ideal congruity. -But, as in relative ethics, the production of happiness or -pleasure is the aim, however imperfectly accomplished, so -in the ideal state the aim is the same, the difference being -that in the latter the accomplishment of happiness or pleasure -and the exclusion or prevention of pain are complete.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> And do I understand you that in this system -of ethics the idea of a moral law proceeding from and -consisting of the command of a Supreme Lawgiver is left -out?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Certainly it is. Did I not just now read to -you from Mr. Spencer's preface his complete rejection of -the supposed sacred origin of moral injunctions, and what -he says of the necessity for the secularization of morals to -take the place of that system which is losing its authority?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> And this philosopher is the same writer -who negatives the idea of any creation of organic life, and -who also negatives the idea that the human mind is an existence -of a spiritual nature, owing its existence to a Creator?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Undoubtedly; we have gone over all that -ground.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> And he is the same philosopher who denies -the existence of a Supreme Being, Creator, and Governor -of the universe?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Perhaps you may call it denial, although -what he maintains is that we know, and can know, nothing -on the subject of a personal God.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Very well. I will reflect upon all this -until we meet again.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434">[Pg 434]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII.</a></h2> -</div> - - -<p class="intro">Mr. Spencer's philosophy as a whole—His psychology, and his system of -ethics—The sacred origin of moral injunctions, and the secularization -of morals.</p> - - -<p>A certain honesty and directness of mind prevent -Sophereus from being bewildered by the Spencerian philosophy. -Before his next meeting with the scientist, he has -reviewed the main features of this philosophy as developed -in Mr. Spencer's published works; and he has taken notice -of the warning which Mr. Spencer has given to his readers -in the preface to his "Data of Ethics," that "there will -probably be singled out for reprobation from this volume, -doctrines which, taken by themselves, may readily be made -to seem utterly wrong." There is not much likelihood that -Sophereus will be able, if he is willing, to avail himself of -this "opportunity for misrepresentation" in a discussion -with such a champion of Mr. Spencer's philosophy as the -scientist who explains and defends it, especially as they -have the works before them to refer to. Being thus respectively -equipped for the discussion, the conference between -them proceeds:</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Before I give you my convictions respecting -Mr. Spencer's philosophy as a whole, I wish to say something -about the passage which you read from the preface -to his "Data of Ethics," because it is the key to his ethical -system. In the first place, to what does he refer when he -speaks of "the current creed"? When I undertake to investigate -a system of morality, the only "creed" that I care<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">[Pg 435]</a></span> -about—the only one that is of any importance—is that -which accepts, as a matter of belief, the existence of the -Creator and Supreme Governor of the universe, from whose -infinite will and purposes have proceeded certain moral as -well as physical laws. This, I take it, is the "creed" of -which Mr. Spencer speaks; the one which assigns moral -injunctions to the will of a Supreme Lawgiver as "their -supposed sacred origin." It is to this creed that he opposes -his "secularization of morals," which must take the place -of their supposed sacred origin, because the authority of -the latter is rapidly dying out of the world. It is this -"creed" which is rejected by those who "assume that the -controlling agency furnished by it may be safely thrown -aside, and the vacancy left unfilled by any other agency."</p> - -<p>Undoubtedly there are and always have been numerous -persons who appear practically to think that the sacred -origin of morality can be safely rejected, and that the vacancy -may be left unfilled by any other restraining agency. -The deliberate and willful murderer, the burglar, the adulterer, -and many of the other criminal classes, not only appear -to reject "the current creed," but they would be very -glad to have it assumed that there is no other restraining -agency to take its place. So, too, there are persons who -break no moral law, whose lives are pure, but who, having -theoretically persuaded themselves that there is no sacred -origin of moral injunctions, omit to provide, for themselves -or others, any other controlling agency to fill the vacuum. -But this latter class is not very numerous; and if, without -meaning any offense to them, their number is added to that -of the criminal classes, to make up the aggregate of those -who reject "the current creed," we have not a very large -body compared with the whole body of persons in civilized -communities who adhere to "the current creed," who live -by it, and who think that others should live by it too, as -the ultimate foundation of those social laws which take<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">[Pg 436]</a></span> -cognizance of men's conduct toward one another. So that -I do not quite understand the assertion that "moral injunctions -are losing the authority given by their supposed -sacred origin"; connected as it is with the other assertion -that society is "rapidly progressing" to that vacuum which -is to follow the complete rejection of the one guide without -the substitution of another in its place. I am quite aware -that there has been of late years an increasing amount of -what is called infidelity, or unbelief, or atheism. But I -am quite sure that there has not been a general theoretical -or practical rejection of so much of the religious creed of -mankind as assigns to the will of a supreme and supernatural -lawgiver certain moral injunctions. If we confine -our view to Christendom alone, it is certain that the growth, -activity, and influence of the various religious bodies are not -materially checked, and that religious beliefs are not by any -means losing their hold upon great multitudes of people. -If we survey the regions where the Mohammedan faith prevails, -the same general result is found, whatever Christians -may think of the beliefs or practices of that vast body of -the human race. And, even when we penetrate among the -races which are less civilized, we find very few races or -tribes in which there does not prevail some idea of some -kind of command proceeding from some deity or other, -whatever we may think of the character of that deity or of -the nature of the command.</p> - -<p>But I presume that Mr. Spencer meant to confine his -assertion of the necessity for a secularization of morals, and -his assumption that their sacred origin is rapidly passing -away from men's beliefs, to the state of society as it exists -now in Western civilization; and my observation of this -portion of the world is, that those who reject what I presume -he means by "the current creed" are, first, a class -of theorizers: and, secondly, the criminal classes; and that -the aggregate of the two is not, after all, so formidable that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">[Pg 437]</a></span> -we ought to conclude that the regulative system of the -sacred origin of moral injunctions is "no longer fit" for -any practical purpose. I do not, therefore, recognize what -he considers the supreme practical necessity for "the secularization -of morals" to take the place of a system which -is worn out.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> You have left out of the case a very important -element. Mr. Spencer antagonizes those who reject -the current creed against those who defend it. The former, -while they reject the current creed, do not recognize -the necessity for any other controlling agency. The latter, -while they defend the current creed, maintain that nothing -can take its place as a regulating agency. Between -them they create a vacuum, which one class wishes for -and the other fears. This is the vacuum which he says -can be and must be filled by the secularization of morals. -It is a vacuum in philosophical speculation about the origin -of morality, and, when the conclusion is reached, it becomes -a practical and pressing question how it is to be carried out.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Precisely; and, when the conclusion is -reached, it is to be carried out in legislation and government, -or else the conduct of men toward one another in -society is not to be regulated by public authority at all, but -is to be left to each man's perception of what will produce -the greatest amount of pleasure and happiness, or the least -amount of pain and misery. Now, it is pretty important to -settle at the outset whether those who defend the current -creed are right or wrong when they say that nothing which -will answer the same purpose can be found to take its place. -They constitute one of the classes who will be responsible -for the supposed vacuum; and their share in that vacuum, -their contribution to it, if I may use such an expression, -consists in their assertion that nothing of any value can -take the place of the sacred origin of moral injunctions. -The practical test of whether they are right or wrong is to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">[Pg 438]</a></span> -be found in legislation. Let us suppose, then, a legislative -assembly in which there is a proposal to change the law of -murder, or to do away with it altogether. A member who -does not believe in any sacred origin of the command -"Thou shalt do no murder," moves not only to abolish the -death-penalty, but to abolish all legal definition of the -crime, and leave every man to be restrained by the consciousness -that, if he takes the life of another, he will cause -a great deal of pain and misery to the relations and friends -of that person. The mover argues that "the current -creed" of morality is worn out; is "no longer fit," as a -regulator; and that the safest and best regulator is the perception -of the beneficial effects of actions of kindness and -good-will, and of the disastrous effects of cruelty and malice. -He is answered by one who defends the current creed, and -who maintains that, as human nature is constituted, the -utilitarian system of morals can not take the place of the -sacred origin as the ultimate foundation of social relations. -But the majority of the assembly think that the mover of -the proposition has the best of the argument, and they proceed -to "secularize" morals by passing his bill doing away -with the law of murder altogether. I am not obliged to -extend my travels anywhere, where I do not care to go, -and I confess I should not like to visit that country after it -had thus "secularized" morality.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Now just be careful to note that this whole -science of conduct—the science of ethics—the foundation -of right and wrong, is a product of evolution. As in the -development of organisms the higher and more elaborate -are reached after a great length of time, as in mechanics -knowledge of the empirical sort evolves into mechanical -science by first omitting all qualifying circumstances and -generalizing in absolute ways the fundamental laws of -forces, so empirical ethics evolve into rational ethics by first -neglecting all complicating incidents and formulating the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">[Pg 439]</a></span> -laws of right action apart from the obscuring effects of -special conditions. There are thus reached, after a great -lapse of time, those ideal ethical truths which express the -absolutely right. Mr. Spencer treats of the ideal man -among ideal men; the ideal man existing in the ideal social -state. "On the evolution hypothesis," he says, "the two -presuppose one another; and only when they coexist can -there exist that ideal conduct which absolute ethics has to -formulate, and which relative ethics has to take as the -standard by which to estimate divergences from right, or -degrees of wrong."<a name="FNanchor_130" id="FNanchor_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> But, again, observe that society is -now in a transition state; the ultimate man has not yet -been reached; the evolution of ethics is, however, going -on, retarded as it may be by various frictions arising from -imperfect natures. But there is in progress an adaptation -of humanity to the social state, and the ultimate man will -be one in whom this process has gone so far as to produce -a correspondence between all the promptings of his nature -and all the requirements of his life, as carried on in society; -so that there is an ideal code of conduct formulating the -behavior of the completely adapted man in the completely -evolved society.<a name="FNanchor_131" id="FNanchor_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> But I understand that we have already -reached, or are very soon to reach, a condition of things in -which the supposed sacred origin of moral injunctions is -now, or very shortly will become, no guide. We are to fill -the vacuum which is caused, or is about to be caused, by -its disappearance, by substituting as the standard of right -and wrong the perceptions which we can have of the effects -of actions upon the sum total of happiness, because -this will be the sole standard in the ideal state of society -in which the ideal man will ultimately find himself. I -will not insist on the total depravity of man's nature,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">[Pg 440]</a></span> -because I never borrow an argument from theologians. -But it has been one of the conclusions that I have drawn -from some study of human nature, that it requires very -strong restraints. Not only must some of the restraints -be of the strongest kind, but they must be simple, positive, -and adapted to the varying dispositions and intelligence -of men. There can not well be imagined any -restraining moral force so efficacious as that which is derived -from a belief that the Creator of the universe has -ordained some moral laws; has specialized certain conduct -as right and certain conduct as wrong, without regard to -varying circumstances. As the foundation of all that part -of legislation that takes cognizance of the simpler relations -of men to one another—those relations which are always -the same—the sacred origin of moral injunctions is of far -greater force than the perception of the greatest-happiness -principle can possibly be. If a man is tempted to commit -murder, is he not far more likely to be restrained by a law -which he knows will punish him without regard to the -misery he would cause to the friends and relatives of the -person whom he is tempted to kill, than he would be if the -law were based on the latter consideration alone? Do away -with all legislation which punishes the simpler crimes first -and foremost because they break the laws of God, and substitute -as the restraining agency individual recognition of -the effect of actions upon the sum total of happiness, and -you would soon see that one of two consequences would -follow: either you would have no criminal code at all, or -it would be one that would be governed by the most fluctuating -and uncertain standards. Moreover, how is the transition -from the sacred source of the simpler moral injunctions -to the secularization of morals to be effected? I once -heard a wise person say that if a thing is to be done, an ingenious -man ought to be able to show how it is to be done. -I suppose the secularization of morals means the complete<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">[Pg 441]</a></span> -renovation of our ideas of right and wrong, by taking as -the sole standard the pleasure or pain, the happiness or unhappiness, -which actions will produce. How are you going -to reach this ideal state? The vacuum is rapidly coming -about. How are you going to take the first step in filling -it? Before the vacuum is complete, you must do something. -You have waited until the evolution of conduct of -the purely utilitarian type has made some great advances; -but the ideal state is not yet reached by all men. You wish -to hasten its approach, and you must begin to act. There -is nothing for you to do but to formulate the new moral -code and put it in operation. You must make your laws—if -you continue to have laws—so that murder and lying -and theft will not be punished because the Almighty has -prohibited them, but they will be punished simply because -they produce misery. Do you think you would ever see -every individual of such a community brought to an ideal -congruity between all the promptings of his nature and all -the requirements of his life, as carried on in society? That -you would have nothing but "the completely adapted man -in the completely evolved society"? I fancy that you -would often have to fall back upon the sacred origin of -moral injunctions, and to punish some conduct because it -breaks a law of divine authority. I may have been too -much in the habit of looking at things practically; but I -have not yet discovered that the feeling of obligation, the -sense of duty, what is recognized as moral obligation, having -its origin in some command, and enforced by some kind -of compulsion, can be dispensed with.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> I must refer you to Mr. Spencer's explanation -of the fact that the sense of duty or moral obligation -fades away as the moral motive emerges from all the political, -religious, and social motives, and frees itself from the -consciousness of subordination to some external agency. -He does not shrink from the conclusion because it will be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">[Pg 442]</a></span> -startling. He tells us that it will be to most very startling -to be informed that "the sense of duty or moral obligation -is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralization increases." -He fortifies his position thus:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Startling though it is, this conclusion may be satisfactorily defended. -Even now progress toward the implied ultimate state is -traceable. The observation is not infrequent that persistence in -performing a duty ends in making it a pleasure, and this amounts -to the admission that, while at first the motive contains an element -of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act is -performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perform -it. The contrast between the youth on whom diligence is enjoined, -and the man of business so absorbed in affairs that he can not be induced -to relax, shows us how the doing of work, originally under -the consciousness that it <em>ought</em> to be done, may eventually cease to -have any such accompanying consciousness. Sometimes, indeed, -the relation comes to be reversed; and the man of business persists in -work from pure love of it when told that he ought not. Nor is it -thus with self-regarding feelings only. That the maintaining and -protecting of wife by husband often result solely from feelings directly -gratified by these actions, without any thought of <em>must</em>; and -that the fostering of children by parents is in many cases made an -absorbing occupation without any coercive feeling of <em>ought</em>; are -obvious truths which show us that even now, with some of the -fundamental other-regarding duties, the sense of obligation has -retreated into the background of the mind. And it is in some degree -so with other-regarding duties of a higher kind. Conscientiousness -has in many outgrown that stage in which the sense of a -compelling power is joined with rectitude of action. The truly -honest man, here and there to be found, is not only without thought -of legal, religious, or social compulsion, when he discharges an -equitable claim on him; but he is without thought of self-compulsion. -He does the right thing with a simple feeling of satisfaction -in doing it; and is, indeed, impatient if anything prevents him -from having the satisfaction of doing it.</p> - -<p>Evidently, then, with complete adaptation to the social state, -that element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the -word obligation will disappear. The higher actions required for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">[Pg 443]</a></span> -the harmonious carrying on of life will be as much matters of course -as are those lower actions which the simple desires prompt. In their -proper times and places and proportions, the moral sentiments will -guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations. -And though, joined with their regulating influence when -this is called for, will exist latent ideas of the evils which non-conformity -would bring, these will occupy the mind no more than do -ideas of the evils of starvation at the time when a healthy appetite -is being satisfied by a meal.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> There is a religion in the world called Christianity, -with which we are tolerably familiar. It comprehends -a system of morality which, when completely observed, -develops the truly good man, the man who does the right -thing with a feeling of satisfaction in doing it, and brings -about those higher actions which are required for the harmonious -carrying on of life, as matters of course, just as surely -as the same result can be brought about by the most ideal -secularization of morals that any philosophical theories can -accomplish. Whatever may be the evidences by which the -sacred origin of Christianity is supposed to be established, -it is certain that this religion does not omit, but on the -contrary it presupposes and asserts, as the foundation of -its moral code, that the sense of obligation to which it -appeals is the consciousness of obligation to obey divine -commands. It proceeds upon the idea that human nature -stands in need of some coercion; that the sense of obligation -is not to be allowed to retreat into the background of -the mind, but that a sense of the compelling power must -be kept joined with rectitude of action, otherwise there -will be a failure of rectitude. It is considered, I believe, -that the adaptation of the Christian morality to the whole -nature of man, by means of the compelling power, the -consciousness of which is not to be transitory, but is to be -universal and perpetual, is very strong proof that this religion -came from a being who understood human nature<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">[Pg 444]</a></span> -better than we can understand it. However this may be, -it is, at all events, certain that the scheme of Christian -morality proceeds upon the necessity for a more efficacious -regulator of human conduct than the simple feeling of satisfaction -in doing right, or the feeling of dissatisfaction in -doing wrong; and, although the true Christian is, in completeness -of moral character, like Mr. Spencer's ideal man, -and although a society completely Christian would be that -ideal social state in which there would be perfect congruity -between the lives of men and the welfare of that society, -yet the Christian religion, if I understand it rightly, does -not assume that there will be more than an approximation -to that universal state of perfection while the human race -remains on earth. The proof of this is to be found in the -fact that this religion does not contemplate a time when -divine command is to cease as the restraining agency on -earth; but, on the contrary, it appears to assume that obedience -to the divine will is to continue in another life to be -a perpetual motive, as it has been in this life. All this -may be without such proof as "science" demands, but it -is certain that the scheme of Christian morality is based -upon the idea that the Creator has made obedience to his -laws, because they are his laws, the great regulator of -human conduct. If the Creator had so made men that -the consciousness of the effect of conduct on the happiness -or misery of our fellow-men would be sufficient as a -regulator, it is rational to conclude that he would not -have imposed commands which were to be obeyed because -they are commands. However great may be the approximation -to a complete adaptation of the social state, I -do not look forward to the disappearance of that element -in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word -obligation, because obligation, in its ultimate sense, is -obedience to a higher power. Obedience for its own -sake, obedience because there is a command, irrespect<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445">[Pg 445]</a></span>ive -of all the reasons for the command, is a law which is -illustrated in very many of the relations of life. A wise -parent will sometimes explain to his child why he commands -some things and prohibits others; but if he means -to train that child in the way he should go, he will sometimes -require him to obey for the mere purpose of teaching -him that obedience without question or inquiry is a law of -his nature. A master of a vessel, which is in peril at sea, -gives an order to the sailors. They may or may not understand -the reasons for it. But what sort of sailors would -they be if they did not act upon the consciousness that -unquestioning obedience is the law of their relation to the -ship?</p> - -<p>In the earliest traditions that we have of the human -race, as those traditions are accepted by the Western nations, -we find a pretty striking and very simple instance of -this law of obedience. The first pair of human beings are -placed in a garden where they are at liberty to eat of the -fruit of every tree save one, but of that one their Creator -absolutely forbids them to partake. He assigns to them no -reason for the prohibition, but he lays upon them his absolute -command, on the penalty of death if they are disobedient. -One of them begins to reason about the matter—an -allegorical creature or being, called the serpent, tempting -her with certain advantages that she will get from eating -this particular fruit. She yields, disobeys, and persuades -her husband to do the same. The consequences follow, as -their Creator told them they would. The law of obedience -which this story illustrates has been in operation through -all the ages, and society can no more dispense with it than -it can dispense with any of the physical laws that govern -the universe.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Are you going back to the fables for the sacred -origin of moral injunctions? I thought you had got -beyond that.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446">[Pg 446]</a></span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I use an illustration wherever I find it. I -am perfectly content that you should call the story of Adam -and Eve a fable, but the law of obedience which it illustrates -is a tremendous fact. The incident, fable or no -fable, is eminently human, and it is occurring every day in -human experience. It is not strange that the first Hebrew -tradition should have been one that illustrates in so simple -a manner the existence of the law of obedience. In like -manner, it is not strange that the Christian system of ethics -should have been based on the existence of this same law of -obedience to commands. This Christian system of ethics -has dispensed with a great many minute observances which -one branch of the Semitic race believed were imposed upon -them as commands by their Creator; but it has not displaced -the law of obedience, or dispensed with certain moral -injunctions as divine commands, for it proceeds upon the -great truth that human nature requires that kind of restraint, -and that there are certain actions which can not be -left without it.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Mr. Spencer has anticipated you. Your reference -to Christianity is not happy. Having gone through -with the explanation of the evolution process in the development -of the highest conception of morals, and having -shown that what now characterizes the exceptionally highest -natures will eventually characterize all, he has something -to say about the reception of his conclusions, to which, as -you have referred to the Christian system of morals, you -would do well to attend:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>§ 98. That these conclusions will meet with any considerable acceptance -is improbable. Neither with current ideas nor with current -sentiments are they sufficiently congruous.</p> - -<p>Such a view will not be agreeable to those who lament the -spreading disbelief in eternal damnation, nor to those who follow -the apostle of brute force in thinking that because the rule of the -strong hand was once good it is good for all time; nor to those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447">[Pg 447]</a></span> -whose reverence for one who told them to put up the sword is shown -by using the sword to spread his doctrine among heathens. From -the ten thousand priests of the religion of love, who are silent when -the nation is moved by the religion of hate, will come no sign of -assent; nor from their bishops who, far from urging the extreme -precept of the Master they pretend to follow, to turn the other cheek -when one is smitten, vote for acting on the principle—strike lest ye -be struck. Nor will any approval be felt by legislators who, after -praying to be forgiven their trespasses as they forgive the trespasses -of others, forthwith decide to attack those who have not trespassed -against them; and who, after a Queen's speech has invoked "the -blessing of Almighty God" on their councils, immediately provide -means for committing political burglary.</p> - -<p>But though men who profess Christianity and practice paganism -can feel no sympathy with such a view, there are some, classed as -antagonists to the current creed, who may not think it absurd to -believe that a rationalized version of its ethical principles will eventually -be acted upon.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> "Our withers are unwrung." I am not a -believer in eternal damnation; I am not an apostle of brute -force; I am not in favor of using the sword to spread a religion -of love; I am not a priest or a bishop, nor am I a -member of Parliament or of any other legislative body. I -am a simple inquirer, endeavoring to ascertain the soundness -of certain systems of philosophy. If there are men -who profess Christianity and practice paganism, I do not -see that this fact should deter me from estimating the nature -of the Christian religion, as I would endeavor to estimate -the character of any other religion. It is no concern -of mine whether men who profess Christianity and practice -paganism can feel any sympathy with Mr. Spencer's views. -The question for me is whether <em>I</em> can feel any sympathy -with his views. I will, therefore, go on to tell you why I -do not believe that a merely "rationalized version" of the -ethical principles of Christianity will take the place of those -divine injunctions on which the ethics of Christianity are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448">[Pg 448]</a></span> -primarily based. Observe, now, that I do not enter upon -the proofs of the divine authority or the divine nature of -Christ. I point to nothing but the fact that the Christian -ethics presuppose a divine and superhuman origin of moral -injunctions. About the fact that they presuppose and assume -the sacred origin of moral injunctions, there can be -no controversy. We read that the question was put to -Jesus, "What commandment is first of all?" and the answer -was, "The first is, Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God, -the Lord is one; and thou shalt love thy God with all thy -heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength. The -second is this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. -There is none other commandment greater than these."<a name="FNanchor_132" id="FNanchor_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> -The person who made this answer may or may not have -been a divinely commissioned teacher, but, whatever he was, -the question that was put to him was a very searching one, -and both question and answer assume two things: first, that -there is a being, man, to whom commands are addressed; -secondly, that there is a being, God, by whom commands -are given. Jesus undertakes to inform those who questioned -him, what are the two commandments than which -there are none greater addressed to human beings; and in -this answer he covers the existence of man as one being and -the existence of God as another being. In any scheme of -philosophy which ignores the existence of these two beings—ignores -the existence of man as a being capable of receiving -and acting upon a command, and the existence of a -being capable of addressing a command to man—there must -necessarily be a great defect; not because Jesus, a supposed -divinely commissioned teacher, assumed that there are two -such beings, but because without the hypothesis of their -existence there can be no ethical system whatever. The -crucial test of the soundness of Mr. Spencer's philosophy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_449" id="Page_449">[Pg 449]</a></span> -is, therefore, whether he negatives the existence of man and -the existence of God.</p> - -<p>Undoubtedly, there is a certain kind of consistency and -completeness in Mr. Spencer's whole philosophy. Beginning -with biology, he traces all organized life back to the -original molecules of organizable matter, and he makes man, -in his physical structure, a product of successive modifications -of organisms out of one another, by simple generation. -This ignores the Creator as a being specially fashioning -the human animal, which Mr. Spencer thinks is a conception -too grossly anthropomorphic to stand the slightest scientific -scrutiny. He then takes up what he calls "psychology," -and deals with what he considers the origin and -nature of the human mind. He makes consciousness to -consist in tracts of feeling in the nervous organization. He -denies that mind is an entity, a being, perceiving and recognizing -ideas suggested by the impressions produced upon -the nervous organization by external objects. According -to his psychological system, there is no <em>ego</em>, no person, no -thinking being, behind the sensations and feelings in the -nerve-center, and to whom the nerve-center suggests ideas. -Rejecting the hypothesis of such a being, Mr. Spencer -treats of the composition of mind; and he makes it consist, -not in a being, but in components of feelings produced by -the molecular changes of which nerve-corpuscles are the -seats, and the molecular changes transmitted through fibers. -He does not regard the ultimate fabric of mind as a thing -admitting of any inquiry. He says that its proximate components -can be investigated, and that these are feelings and -the relations between feelings. This "method of composition -remains the same throughout the entire composition -of mind, from the formation of its simplest feelings up to -the formation of those immense and complex aggregates -of feelings which characterize its highest development." -Here, then, we must stop. We are not to conceive of mind<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_450" id="Page_450">[Pg 450]</a></span> -as an organized entity, or as an organism; or as a something -in which certain powers inhere, and which affords a -field for their action. We may talk of a "thread of consciousness," -meaning aggregates of feelings produced by -successive waves of molecular change in the nerve-corpuscles, -but we may not talk of "consciousness" as perception -by a conscious subject. We may talk of feelings, but not -of a subject that feels. Mind, then, is not an existence -apart from physical organization. Its phenomena are products -of our corporeal organization. Man is not a person; -and, if he is not, how he is to have a sense of obligation, -how there is to be any intuitional idea of right and wrong, -in the sense of a command or an injunction addressed by -one being to another, I do not understand. Mr. Spencer -does not help me to understand this, and obviously he does -not intend to, because he denies it absolutely. His system -of ethics plainly ignores it; and to that I now pass.</p> - -<p>He makes conduct consist in the adjustment of actions -to ends. Good conduct is when the actions are adjusted -to the ends of producing all the pleasure and happiness -that they can be made to bring about. Bad conduct is -when the actions produce only pain or misery to some one, -or there is not a proper adjustment of them to the end of -happiness. Beginning, as you described it in our last conference, -with the lowest orders of animals, the conduct of -man is the same adjustment of actions to ends that it is in -them; the difference being, in the case of man, that as an -animal he has a greater and more varied power of complete -adjustment of his actions to wider and more comprehensive -ends than any other animal. These wider and more comprehensive -ends consist in the full accomplishment of happiness -and pleasure to other beings. This, according to -Mr. Spencer, is impliedly admitted by those who assert the -sacred origin of moral injunctions; for, when pressed for -the reason why moral injunctions have been given, all mor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_451" id="Page_451">[Pg 451]</a></span>alists, -he says, admit that the ultimate moral aim is a desirable -state of feeling, gratification, enjoyment, happiness -to some being or beings. That the welfare of society is <em>one</em> -of the moral aims which moral injunctions of the sacred -order were designed to accomplish, so far as special injunctions -are believed to have been given, is plain enough. -But that this congruity between the divine commands and -the happiness of others—the useful effect of such commands—comprehends -the whole purpose of such commands, is the -ultimate and sole reason for their being given, so far as they -are believed to have been given, may be disproved without -difficulty. For example, an individual may be an utterly -worthless person, a curse to his relatives and friends and to -society, irreclaimably sunk in vice and misery, a mere cumberer -of the ground. To kill him will produce no unhappiness -to any one, but will be a positive relief and benefit. -According to "the current creed," there stands a sacred -injunction, "Thou shalt do <span class="smcap">NO</span> murder." This is accepted -as an absolute, fixed, eternal canon of the divine will. You -are not to take upon yourself individually to determine, by -any standard of utility applied to a particular case, that you -can rightfully kill a human being. A miser is alone in the -world. I can steal his hoarded gold, and apply it to good -objects. There stands the command, "Thou shalt <em>not</em> -steal." For no purpose, for no object whatever, for no end -whatever, shall you commit a theft. "Society," to borrow -a phrase of one of the strongest men of our time, "would go -all to pieces in an hour" if it were to adopt only the utilitarian -standard of morality, and to reject the sacred origin -of moral injunctions.<a name="FNanchor_133" id="FNanchor_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> The reception of that sacred origin—the -belief in it—implies that man is a being capable of -receiving and obeying a divine command. The existence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_452" id="Page_452">[Pg 452]</a></span> -of such a being is negatived by Mr. Spencer's psychological -system. That he equally negatives the existence of God as -a being capable of giving, and who has given, moral injunctions -to man, is apparent throughout his whole scheme -of philosophy. According to that philosophy, there is -nothing in the universe but an Omnipotent Power, which -underlies all manifestations. To ascribe a personality to -that Power is a relic of the primitive beliefs of barbarians, -and it is one that is rapidly dying out of the conceptions of -educated men.</p> - -<p>There is, therefore, no room in Mr. Spencer's philosophy -for any moral intuitions, such as are implied in the -hypothesis that man was placed under an obligation to -obey his Creator, and made capable of recognizing that -obligation. I can perceive no other ultimate foundation -for a system of ethics. As to the idea that we can make a -system of ethics which is to relegate to individual judgment -the adaptability of actions to produce complete happiness, -and to have no other standard of right and wrong, -we might as well at once act upon the maxim that the -end justifies the means, and leave every man to determine -that the end is a good one; and, therefore, the action is -good.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> How do you justify the death-penalty which -is inflicted by society? Have you any justification for it, -excepting the claim that it is a useful restraint?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> When society acts judicially in the punishment -of crime, it inflicts such punishments as experience -shows will prevent, or tend to prevent, others from committing -that crime. Its authority to punish with death -or some other penalty is founded, primarily, in regard to -the simpler crimes, such as murder, theft, adultery, false -testimony, etc., on the divine prohibition, which a belief -in the sacred origin of certain special moral injunctions -leads it to accept; and, secondly, on the general welfare<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_453" id="Page_453">[Pg 453]</a></span> -of mankind.<a name="FNanchor_134" id="FNanchor_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> Eliminate from the ethical code all belief -in the sacred origin of moral injunctions, and confine the -judicial action of society to the merely utilitarian effect of -individual conduct, and you will surrender the whole criminal -code to the doctrine that the individual who does a certain -act is to be punished or not to be punished, according -to the effect of his act on the person or persons who are -immediately or remotely affected by it. It is because of -Mr. Spencer's negation of man's intuitive sense of obligation -to obey divine commands, because of his peculiar system -of "psychology," that I can not accept the system to -which he gives the name of "ethics." He ought to have -invented a new term for his science of mind. "Psychology," -according to its derivation, and as it is used in the -English language, means discourse or treatise on the human -soul, or the doctrine of man's spiritual nature. If he has -no spiritual nature, no soul, what does this philosopher -mean by entitling his work "The Principles of Psychology"? -It seems to me that in this use of a term which implies -something that he labors to show does not exist, he is -not quite consistent, for he certainly does not mean to admit -that man has a soul, in the sense in which the learned world -have generally used the term "psychology." But, not to -stickle for verbal criticisms, I will endeavor to give you my -conception of his "scientific" analysis of the mind, and to -contrast it with the other analysis, which seems to me to be -better supported.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Take care that you do not misrepresent him.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I shall take the utmost care to represent -him in the only sense in which I can understand him; and, -if I do not represent him accurately, you will correct me.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_454" id="Page_454">[Pg 454]</a></span> -Take, in the first place, the following passage, in which he -defines the only <em>ego</em> that has any existence:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>That the <em>ego</em> is something more than the passing group of feelings -and ideas is true or untrue according to the degree of comprehension -we give to the word. It is true if we include the body and -its functions; but it is untrue if we include only what is given in -consciousness.</p> - -<p>Physically considered, the <em>ego</em> is the entire organism, including -its nervous system; and the nature of this <em>ego</em> is predetermined: -the infant had no more to do with the structure of its brain than -with the color of its eyes. Further, the <em>ego</em>, considered physically, -includes all the functions carried on by these structures when -supplied with the requisite materials. These functions have for -their net result to liberate from the food, etc., certain latent -forces. And that distribution of these forces shown by the activities -of the organism, is from moment to moment caused partly by -the existing arrangement of its parts and partly by the environing -conditions.</p> - -<p>The physical structures thus pervaded by the forces thus obtained, -constitute that substantial <em>ego</em> which lies behind and determines -those ever-changing states of consciousness we call mind. -And while this substantial <em>ego</em>, unknowable in ultimate nature, is -phenomenally known to us under its statical form as the organism, -it is phenomenally known under its dynamical form as the energy -diffusing itself through the organism, and, among other parts, -through the nervous system. Given the external stimuli, and the -nervous changes with their correlative mental states depend partly -on the nervous structures and partly on the amount of this diffused -energy, each of which factors is determined by causes not in consciousness -but beneath consciousness. The aggregate of feelings -and ideas constituting the mental <em>I</em>, have not in themselves the -principle of cohesion holding them together as a whole; but the <em>I</em> -which continually survives as the subject of these changing states -is that portion of the Unknowable Power which is statically conditioned -in special nervous structures pervaded by a dynamically-conditioned -portion of the Unknowable Power called energy.<a name="FNanchor_135" id="FNanchor_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_455" id="Page_455">[Pg 455]</a></span></p> - -<p>It is now necessary to translate this; and in translating -it, it is necessary to attend to the meaning of words. Let -us begin with the first proposition comprehended in this -statement: "That the <em>ego</em> is something more than the -passing group of feelings and ideas, is true or untrue according -to the degree of comprehensiveness we give to the -word. It is true if we include the body and its functions; -but it is untrue if we include only what is given in consciousness." -The natural antithesis would have been to -contrast what is included in the <em>body</em> with what is included -in the <em>mind</em>. But as he does not admit that the mind is -an existence, as there is nothing but a passing group of -feelings and ideas, not a person who perceives feelings and -has ideas, he speaks of <em>what is given in consciousness</em>, consciousness -being nothing but that passing group, an ever-changing -series, never the same, and never laid hold of and -appropriated by a conscious subject. We do, indeed, call -these ever-changing states of consciousness mind, but this -is a misnomer, if we mean it in the sense of a being. -What is to be considered, therefore, when the analysis -seeks to ascertain the real and only <em>ego</em>, is the body and its -functions, and the passing group of feelings and ideas -which is given in consciousness.</p> - -<p>Let us pass on: The body is the physical structure -and its functions. It is pervaded by the forces which its -functions liberate from the latent condition in which they -exist in food and other environment. This physical structure, -thus pervaded by certain forces, is the substantial <em>ego</em> -which lies behind and determines the ever-changing states -of consciousness which we call mind. There is no other -<em>ego</em> than the body. It is phenomenally known to us under -its <em>statical</em> form as the organism; that is to say, when the -body is contemplated as an organism which is not acting, -or as a mere structure. But it is phenomenally known to -us also under its <em>dynamical</em> form, which is when the energy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_456" id="Page_456">[Pg 456]</a></span> -derived from the pervading forces is diffusing itself through -the organism. Statical,<a name="FNanchor_136" id="FNanchor_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a> I understand, refers to a body at -rest, or in equilibrium, not acting; dynamical refers to -bodies in motion, or acted on by force, in movement. The -human body is phenomenally known to us in both of these -conditions or states. When it is in the dynamical state, -that is, when it is acted on by external stimuli, there will -be nervous changes; these nervous changes have correlative -mental states, which depend partly on the nervous -structure and partly on the amount of the diffused energy -which pervades the organism. But these two factors, the -nervous changes and the diffused energy, are each determined -by causes that are not in consciousness, but beneath -consciousness. This I understand to mean that when there -are nervous changes from a state of rest or non-action, produced -by external stimuli, and a certain amount of diffused -energy pervades the organism, there will be correlative -mental states, which are determined by factors that are not -in consciousness but beneath consciousness. Consciousness, -therefore, is not a perception by a conscious subject, -or a consciousness of a self experienced by a being, but it -is a passing group of feelings and ideas, which have no cohesion, -are never the same, but are ever-changing successions -of impressions produced in the physical organism.</p> - -<p>I come now to the summary and conclusion of the -whole matter as expressed in the last sentence of the paragraph -which I have read. There is a mental I, but it is -not a person, an existence, an independent <em>ego</em>. It is constituted -of an aggregate of feelings and ideas, which have -not in themselves a principle of cohesion that holds them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_457" id="Page_457">[Pg 457]</a></span> -together as a whole. They are merely passing groups of -feelings and ideas which are never the same, but which -succeed one another without connection or cohesion. -There is an I which continually survives as the subject -of these changing states, but it is that portion of the Unknowable -Power which is statically conditioned in special -nervous structures pervaded by a dynamically conditioned -portion of the Unknowable Power called energy.</p> - -<p>So that each individual of the human race is to be contemplated, -not as a dual existence, composed of a body and -a mind, united for a certain period, but as a subject which -is continuously undergoing certain physical changes by the -action through it of a portion of the energy exerted by the -Unknowable Power. The Unknowable Power pulsates -through my bodily organism a certain portion of its -energy, and that of which continuous existence can alone -be predicated is this portion of the Unknowable Power -which is statically conditioned in my nervous structure, -pervaded by a dynamically conditioned portion of that Unknown -Power.</p> - -<p>I trust, now, it will not be said that I misrepresent Mr. -Spencer when I assert that he ignores, denies, and endeavors -to disprove the existence of the mind of man as a -spiritual entity, capable of surviving his body. Have you -any fault to find with my paraphrase of the passage on -which I have commented?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> You have paraphrased that passage fairly -enough, but you ought to attend to the proof which he -adduces in support of his position in the subsequent passage -to which he refers you in the one that you have -quoted. Let me read it:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>§ 469. And now, before closing the chapter, let me parenthetically -remark on a striking parallelism between the conception of the Object -thus built up, and that which we shall find to be the proper -conception of the Subject. For just in the same way that the Ob<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_458" id="Page_458">[Pg 458]</a></span>ject -is the unknown permanent <em>nexus</em> which is never itself a phenomenon, -but is that which holds phenomena together; so is the -Subject the unknown permanent <em>nexus</em> which is never itself a state -of consciousness, but which holds states of consciousness together. -Limiting himself to self-analysis, the Subject can never learn anything -about this <em>nexus</em>, further than that it forms part of the <em>nexus</em> -to that peculiar vivid aggregate he distinguishes as his body. If, -however, he makes a vicarious examination, the facts of nervous -structure and function, as exhibited in other bodies like his own, -enable him to see how, for each changing cluster of ideas, there exists -a permanent <em>nexus</em> which, in a sense, corresponds to the permanent -<em>nexus</em> holding together the changing cluster of appearances -referable to the external body.</p> - -<p>For, as shown in earlier parts of this work, an idea is the psychical -side of what on its physical side is an involved set of molecular -changes propagated through an involved set of nervous plexuses. -That which makes possible this idea is the pre-existence of these -plexuses, so organized that a wave of molecular motion diffused -through them will produce, as its psychical correlative, the components -of the conception, in due order and degree. This idea lasts -while the waves of molecular motion last, ceasing when they cease; -but that which remains is the set of plexuses. These constitute -the potentiality of the idea, and make possible future ideas like it. -Each such set of plexuses, perpetually modified in detail by perpetual -new actions; capable of entering into countless combinations -with others, just as the objects thought of entered into countless -combinations; and capable of having its several parts variously excited, -just as the external object presents its combined attributes in -various ways—is thus the permanent internal <em>nexus</em> for ideas, answering -to the permanent external <em>nexus</em> for phenomena. And -just as the external <em>nexus</em> is that which continues to exist amid -transitory appearances, so the internal <em>nexus</em> is that which continues -to exist amid transitory ideas. The ideas have no more a continued -existence than we have found the impressions to have. They are -like the successive chords and cadences brought out from a piano, -which successively die away as other ones are sounded. And it -would be as proper to say that these passing chords and cadences -thereafter exist in the piano, as it is proper to say that passing ideas -thereafter exist in the brain. In the one case, as in the other, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_459" id="Page_459">[Pg 459]</a></span> -actual existence is the structure which, under like conditions, again -evolves like combinations.</p> - -<p>It is true that we seem to have somewhere within us these sets of -faint states answering to sets of vivid states which once occurred. -It is true that in common life ideas are spoken of as being treasured -up, forming a store of knowledge; the implied notion being that -they are duly arranged and, as it were, pigeon-holed for future use. -It is true that in psychological explanations, ideas are often referred -to as thus having a continued existence. It is true that our forms -of expression are such as to make this implication unavoidable; -and that in many places throughout this work the phrases used apparently -countenance it; though, I believe, they are always transformable -into their scientific equivalents, as above expressed. But -here, as in metaphysical discussions at large, where our express object -is to make a final analysis, and to disentangle facts from hypotheses, -it behooves us to recognize the truth that this popular conception, -habitually adopted into psychological and metaphysical discussions, -is not simply gratuitous, but absolutely at variance with -experience. All which introspection shows us is that under certain -conditions there occurs a state of consciousness more or less like -that which previously occurred under more or less like conditions. -Not only are we without proof that during the interval this state of -consciousness existed under some form; but, so far as observation -reaches, it gives positive evidence to the contrary. For the new state -is never the same—is never more than an approximate likeness of -that which went before. It has not that identity of structure -which it would have were it a pre-existing thing presenting itself -afresh. Nay, more; even during its presence its identity of structure -is not preserved—it is not literally the same for two seconds together. -No idea, even of the most familiar object, preserves its -stability while in consciousness. To carry further the foregoing -simile, its temporary existence is like that of a continuously-sounded -chord, of which the components severally vary from instant to instant -in pitch and loudness. Quite apart, however, from any interpretation -of ideas as not substantive things but psychical changes, -corresponding to physical changes wrought in a physical structure, -it suffices to insist upon the obvious truth that the existence in the -Subject of any other ideas than those which are passing, is pure -hypothesis absolutely without any evidence whatever.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_460" id="Page_460">[Pg 460]</a></span></p> - -<p>And here we come upon yet another phase of that contradiction -which the anti-realistic conception everywhere presents. For setting -out from the data embodied in the popular speech, which asserts -both the continued existence of ideas and the continued existence -of objects, it accepts the fiction as a fact, and on the strength -of it tries to show that the fact is a fiction. Continued existence -being claimed for that which has it not, is thereupon denied to that -which has it.<a name="FNanchor_137" id="FNanchor_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> The writings of Mr. Spencer, more than -those of any other person of equal reputation that I have -met with, require close examination in order to test the -soundness of his propositions and assertions. Such a passage -as the one which you have now quoted appears, on a -first reading, to be quite plausible. When it is read carefully -two or three times, and analyzed, it is found to be -untenable in its reasoning, and largely made up of dogmatic -assumptions. I shall now give you my reasons for this -criticism. In the first place, let us go through the passage -and fix the meanings of words. "Nexus," although not a -term adopted into the English language, means, I presume, -bond or ligament. "Plexus" is a word that we find in -English dictionaries as a scientific term, and it means a -union of vessels, nerves, or fibers, in the form of net-work.<a name="FNanchor_138" id="FNanchor_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> -Taking along these meanings, we find that the subject, the -only thing of which a subjective existence can be predicated, -is the ligament which holds states of consciousness -together, and this permanent ligament is unknown. It is -not itself a state of consciousness, but it is the bond which -holds states of consciousness together. These states of consciousness -are the ideas which are passing in the subject, -which are never the same, which are not a permanent possession, -and therefore there is in the subject no other existence -than the passing ideas of the moment. Ideas, then,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_461" id="Page_461">[Pg 461]</a></span> -are not substantive things, but psychical changes, corresponding -to physical changes wrought in a physical structure. -The proof which is supposed to make this a tenable -hypothesis consists of, first, what can be learned by self-analysis, -or by my introspection of myself; next by vicarious -examination, or by observing the facts of nervous structure -and function exhibited in other bodies like my own. These -examinations enable us to discover, what? Not a conscious -person, learning, appropriating, and holding ideas, but that -there exists only, for each changing cluster of ideas, a permanent -<em>nexus</em>, corresponding to the permanent <em>nexus</em> which -holds together the changing cluster of appearances referable -to the external body. We next have the assertion that -ideas have no more a continued existence than the impressions -made in the external body. Both are transitory, and -in both the only continued existence is the <em>nexus</em>, or ligament -which binds together the changing impressions and -the changing clusters of ideas. This Mr. Spencer illustrates -by the successive chords and cadences brought out -from a piano. These have no existence in the piano, which -is nothing but a mechanical structure, giving forth sounds, -when they are struck, which sounds are merely passing -chords and cadences; and he concludes that it would be -just as proper to say that the passing chords and cadences, -after they have died away, exist in the piano, as it is to -say that passing ideas, after the nervous impressions have -ceased, exist in the brain. Let us now go back and examine -this kind of psychology in detail. Mr. Spencer speaks -of self-analysis, and of the analysis of other minds and -bodies like our own. He uses the terms self, others, me, -mine, him, his. Who or what is this thing which examines -himself or another? Who and what are "you" or "I," -who sit here talking to each other? Are these mere forms -of expression, always transformable into their scientific -equivalents? What is the scientific equivalent for he, his,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_462" id="Page_462">[Pg 462]</a></span> -me, mine, you, yours? Mr. Spencer says that, under certain -conditions, there occurs a state of consciousness more -or less like other states of consciousness that have existed -before, but that the only permanent thing is the <em>nexus</em> -which holds these states of consciousness together. His -illustration of the piano fails. If the piano were a structure -that could of its own volition give forth such sounds as -it chose to utter, it might be correct to speak of it as an -existence having a store of sounds which it could make -reach our ears when and as it saw fit. But it does not -happen to be an automatic machine. It is a mere collection -of strings, of different sizes and tensions, which, when -struck by an instrument called a hammer, cause certain -vibrations in the air. But a human being is an automatic -organism; one that can at pleasure give utterance to ideas -through the vocal organs, so that they are communicated -to you. When I give utterance to an idea, through my -vocal organs, in speaking to you, do I draw on a stock of -permanent ideas, some of which I express, or do I express -nothing but a passing state of consciousness, more or less -like other states of consciousness that have before passed -through my nervous organization? Mr. Spencer asserts -that the notion of the continued existence of ideas is absolutely -at variance with experience. On the contrary, experience -proves it every moment of our lives.</p> - -<p>For example: Years ago a person related to me a fact -very interesting and important to me, but I have not until -now had occasion to make use of it. I have a perfect recollection -of what he told me. It bears no resemblance to any -other fact of which I ever heard. It concerns me alone. -I have a perfect recollection of it. I stored it up for future -use whenever I should need to use it. Is it a self-delusion -that I have stored up and treasured this information? -When I recollect and repeat it, just as it was told me, am -I doing nothing but giving expression to a passing idea,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_463" id="Page_463">[Pg 463]</a></span> -more or less like the original idea? This would be a rather -dangerous doctrine to adopt as the interpretation of experience. -Human testimony respecting things that we have -been told, or have seen, would be a pretty uncertain reliance -if the memory had no other power than to assimilate -a passing idea, more or less, to a former state of consciousness -which more or less resembled the present consciousness. -Men deviate from the truth rather frequently, now; but, -teach them that memory is nothing but the assimilation, -more or less, of a passing idea to some other idea that formerly -passed through their heads, and I should be rather -afraid of their testimony. I should fear that the "psychological -changes" would be a little too frequent, and that the -story would not have "that identity of structure which it -would have were it a pre-existing thing presenting itself -afresh."</p> - -<p>What is all the learning of the scholar? Has he treasured -up nothing? Has he nothing in the pigeon-holes of -his mind? Has he no mind in which to store his acquisitions? -Is the sole actual existence "the structure which, -under like conditions, again evolves like combinations"? -Must he find himself under like conditions which will again -evolve like combinations of ideas in passing trains of consciousness, -before he can bring forth from the store-house -of his mind the pre-existing thing that lies within it?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> I must here interject a question in my turn. -What is the proof that ideas have a continued existence? -Speaking of the brain as the nerve-center, in which impressions -are produced by molecular changes transmitted along -the nerve-fibers, what proof is there that an idea which is -now passing through the brain continues to exist there, any -more than the passing chord or cadence continues to exist -in the piano?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> Do you not see that the very power of discrimination -which we possess, whereby we distinguish be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_464" id="Page_464">[Pg 464]</a></span>tween -present and former conditions, and present and former -combinations, proves that there is a permanent existing -thing in an idea which presents itself afresh, and with -which we compare the passing idea, so as to determine -whether they are the same? If we did not possess this -power, all thinking, all expression of ideas, all memory, all -that part of consciousness which is not made up of mere -bodily feelings and sensations, would be nothing but the -repetition of the passing idea; and all learning, information, -knowledge, and experience, would be utterly useless. -If there did not exist something with which to compare the -passing idea of the present moment, we should be always -floating on the surface of the passing idea. There would -be no continuity in our intellectual existence. We should -be reduced to the condition of the piano, and could only -give forth such chords and cadences as are produced by -successive blows of the hammer upon the strings of the instrument. -And how could anything originate in ourselves? -What is the faculty which produces ideas that are not only -new to ourselves, not only not suggested by passing ideas, -but new to all other human intellects, and never embraced -in their experience until we put them within their apprehension? -What did Dante do when he produced the "Inferno"? -or Milton, when he composed the "Paradise Lost"? -or Shakespeare, when he composed his "Hamlet"? or -Goethe, when he produced his "Faust"? Does the poet, -when he gives us ideas that we never possessed before, originate -nothing? If he is a maker, a creator, in the realm of -ideas, are those original ideas, which neither he nor any -one else ever had before, the mere result of like combinations -evolved out of like conditions, when neither the old -conditions nor the combinations have anything to do with -the new ideas which he has produced? Surely, in reference -to the great productions of human genius, we must contemplate -the mind as an existence, having the power to do<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_465" id="Page_465">[Pg 465]</a></span> -something more than to produce the transitory ideas that -are passing through the brain from the impressions on -it, communicated through the nervous structure. Surely -there is some other structure than that which can be -likened to the piano. Surely there is something more than -a set of plexuses "which constitute the potentiality of an -idea, and make possible future ideas like it"; for there are -possible future ideas which are not like any former ideas, -which do not depend on any set of plexuses, and do not -cease to be possible when the waves of molecular motion -cease. These possible future ideas are the conceptions -which the mind originates in itself; which are unlike anything -that has gone before, or that is passing now. So that -there are two kinds of ideas: the kind that has a continued -existence, and that consists in knowledge, and is drawn -upon by memory; and the other, the kind of which continued -existence is not to be predicated until it has been -formulated by the faculty of original production, not produced -by an exercise of memory, but produced by original -creation.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Has not Mr. Spencer allowed for and accounted -for all that you claim as the power of originating -new ideas? Does he not say that "each set of plexuses"—each -set of the net-work of ideas—is "perpetually modified -in detail by perpetual new actions"; is "capable of entering -into countless combinations with others, just as the -objects thought of entered into countless combinations; -and capable of having its several parts variously excited, -just as the external object presents its combined attributes -in various ways"? Is not this the whole matter, in regard -to what you call the power of originating new ideas?</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> No, it is not. In the first place, I do not -believe that he was here intentionally speaking of any ideas -but those which are suggested by, or involve external objects. -But, if he did mean to include the production of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_466" id="Page_466">[Pg 466]</a></span> -new and original ideas through the countless combinations -into which old ones may be made to enter, his theory does -not fit the case of poetical invention of new ideas, or the -invention of imaginary characters, or lives; for these are -creations which are not mere combinations of old ideas, and -the more they depart from everything suggested by, or resembling, -former ideas, the more we are obliged to recognize -as a faculty of the mind the power to originate and -formulate new ideas that did not previously exist.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Kosmicos.</span> Well, you have criticised Mr. Spencer's -mental philosophy from your point of view. Now let me -hear your hypothesis of the origin and nature of mind, with -which you promised to contrast his psychology, and which -you think is better supported.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus.</span> I think I had better put my views in writing, -and read them to you at our next meeting. You can -then have them before you to examine at your leisure. Let -me say in advance, however, that I shall not rely on any of -the metaphysicians, but shall endeavor to give you my conception -of the nature of mind from my own reflections, and -from common experience. I shall make my examination -of the nature of mind precede any suggestion of its probable -origin, just as I think we should examine the structure of -any organism before we undertake to deduce its probable -origin.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Here, then, closes the debate between these two persons, -from whom, at the end of the next chapter, I shall part -with a reluctance which I hope the reader will share. Not -for victory do I allow Sophereus to explain his analysis of -mind, without describing how his scientific friend receives -it.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_467" id="Page_467">[Pg 467]</a></span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIII" id="CHAPTER_XIII">CHAPTER XIII.</a></h2> -</div> -<p class="intro">Sophereus discourses on the Nature and Origin of the Human Mind.</p> - - -<p><span class="smcap">Sophereus</span>, in fulfillment of his intention expressed at -their last meeting, reads to the scientist the following</p> - - -<p class="center">DISCOURSE ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN -MIND.</p> - -<p>I regard the mind as an organism, capable of anatomical -examination, as the body is, but of course by very different -means. In the anatomical examination of an animal -organism we use our eye-sight to acquire a knowledge of its -component parts, its organs, and its structure, by dissection -of a dead or inspection of a living subject. But, in -studying the anatomy of mind, we have a subject that is -beyond our visual perception. It is not, however, beyond -our examination. We carry on that examination by means -of the introspection which consciousness enables us to have -of our own minds, and by observing and comparing the -phenomena of mind as manifested in other persons. If -these respective means of investigation enable us to reach -the conviction that in each individual of the human race -there is an existence of a spiritual nature and another existence -of a corporeal or physical nature, we shall have attained -this conclusion by observing the difference between -the two organisms. The fact that we can not detect the -bond that unites them while they are united should not -lead us to doubt their distinct existence as organisms of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_468" id="Page_468">[Pg 468]</a></span> -different natures, but made for a temporary period to act -on and with each other.</p> - -<p>Before entering further into the subject, I will refer to -some of the terms which we are obliged to use in speaking -of the nature of mind as an organism, when contrasted -with the nature of the physical organism. We speak, for -example, and from the want of another term we are obliged -to speak, of the substance of mind. But, while we thus -speak of mind in a term of matter, there is no implication -that the subject of which we speak is of the same nature as -that which constitutes the physical organism; nor is there -any danger of the incorporation of materialistic ideas with -our ideas of the fabric of mind. On the contrary, the very -nature of the inquiry is whether that which constitutes -mind is something different from that which constitutes -body; and, although in speaking of both we use the term -substance, we mean in the one case organized matter, and -in the other case organized spirit. There is a very notable -instance of a corresponding use of terms in the passage of -one of St. Paul's epistles, where he discourses on the doctrine -of the resurrection. According to my universal custom -when I refer to any of the writings regarded by the -Christian world as sacred, or inspired, I lay aside altogether -the idea of a person speaking by divine or any other authority. -I cite the statement of St. Paul, in its philosophical -aspect, as an instance of the use of the term body -applied to each of the distinct organisms. His statement, -or assertion, or assumption—call it what you please—is, "If -there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body";<a name="FNanchor_139" id="FNanchor_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> -he uses the term <em>body</em> in speaking of that which is natural, -or of the earth, earthy, and of that which is spiritual, or -heavenly. Without following him into the nature of the -occurrence which he affirms is to take place in the resurrection, -the question is whether he was or was not philosophi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_469" id="Page_469">[Pg 469]</a></span>cally -correct, in speaking of two kinds of organisms, one -composed of matter, and liable to corruption and dissolution, -and the other composed of spirit, indestructible and -imperishable.</p> - -<p>In order to be understood, he was obliged to use the -term <em>body</em> in reference to both of these organisms, just as -we are obliged to use the term <em>substance</em> when we speak of -the subject of contemplation as a physical or as a spiritual -organism. Can this distinctness of nature be predicated of -the body and the mind of man before what we call death?</p> - -<p>The peculiar occurrence which St. Paul so vigorously -and vividly describes as what is to happen at the resurrection, -is a prophecy in which he mingles with great force -philosophical illustrations and the information which he -claims to have received from inspiration; or things revealed -to him by the Almighty through the Holy Spirit. He -expresses himself in terms level to the apprehension of -those whom he is addressing; and in this use of terms he -does just what we do when we speak of a natural body and -a spiritual body. He puts the existence of the natural -body hypothetically:</p> - -<p>"<em>If</em> there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual -body."<a name="FNanchor_140" id="FNanchor_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> Paraphrased as the whole passage may be, he -says, "You well know that there is a natural body, and I -tell you that there is also a spiritual body." Laying aside -the mode in which the spiritual body is to be manifested at -and after the resurrection, we have to consider whether, -during this life, there is a bodily organism and a mental -organism, distinct in their natures, but united for a time -by a bond which is hidden from our detection.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_470" id="Page_470">[Pg 470]</a></span></p> - -<p>I have used the term anatomy of the mind, from the -same necessity which compels me to speak of the substance -of mind. You will understand that, when I speak of anatomical -examination of the mind, I mean that analysis -of its structure which we can make by the use of the appropriate -means, and which enables us to conceive that it -is an organized structure of a peculiar character.</p> - -<p>The grand difficulty with Mr. Spencer's "Psychology" -is, that after he has made what he calls "the proximate -components of mind" to consist of "two broadly contrasted -kinds—feelings and the relations between feelings," which -are mere impressions produced on the nerve-center by -molecular changes in the fluid or semi-fluid substance of -the nerves, he has not approached to a solution of the question -whether there is or is not a something to which these -feelings and the relations between them suggest ideas, and -which holds ideas continuously for future use.</p> - -<p>Thus he makes consciousness to consist in passing -groups of feelings and their relations, and not in a conscious -subject. He denies that there is any <em>ego</em>, in the sense in -which every person is conscious of a self, and maintains that -the only substantive existence is the unknown ligament -which holds together the ever-changing states of feelings -and impressions produced in the nerve-center. There is a -far better method of investigation. It is to inquire into the -fabric of the mind as an organism, by determining whether -mental phenomena justify us in the conclusion that it is an -organism. In this way we may reach a satisfactory conclusion -that the mind is a substantive existence, possessing -a uniform structure, of a character, however, fundamentally -different from the bodily structure; and in this way we -may be able to explain, wholly or in part, how the mind -and the body act on and with each other so long as the -connection is maintained.</p> - -<p>I am entirely free to acknowledge that, when I speak<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_471" id="Page_471">[Pg 471]</a></span> -of the substance of mind, or speak of it as an organism, I -am and must remain ignorant of the nature of its substance -beyond the point where its self-manifestations cease. But -the question is, whether we are not under an irresistible -necessity of adopting as a postulate the existence of a something -which has certain inherent powers, and whether the -mental phenomena, the self-manifestations of those powers, -do not necessarily lead us to the conception and conviction -that mind is a substantive existence. I can not talk or -think of consciousness apart from a conscious subject, or -of feelings without a subject that feels. A thread of consciousness, -or a series of feelings, conveys no meaning to -me, apart from a being who has the consciousness and perceives -the feelings.<a name="FNanchor_141" id="FNanchor_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a></p> - -<p>One very important question to be considered in all such -investigations is, Whether our experience does not teach<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_472" id="Page_472">[Pg 472]</a></span> -us that we are mentally so constituted that certain conceptions -are necessary to us? Our mental nature is placed -under certain laws, as our physical or corporeal nature is -placed under certain other laws. One of these necessary -conceptions, which are imposed on us, as it seems to me, -by a law of our mental constitution, is a conception of the -fundamental difference between matter and spirit. In what -way is it forced upon us that there is a natural world and -a spiritual world? The phenomena of matter and the phenomena -of mind are essentially different. In ourselves they -occur in conjunction, and they occur in disjunction. They -are manifested synchronously, and they are manifested -separately in point of time. The normal action of all the -functions of the body is not necessary to the action of the -mind. The body may be prostrated by disease, and the -moment of its death may be at hand; yet the mind, to the -last moment of the physical life, may be unclouded, and -its manifestations may be as perfect as they ever were in the -full health and activity of the vital functions of the body. -No one who stands at a death-bed where this phenomenon -occurs, and observes how completely the mind is master of -itself; how it holds in consciousness the past and the present; -how it essays to grasp the future for those whom it -is to leave and for itself, can easily escape the conviction -that death is nothing but the dissolution of the bond which -has hitherto held together the two existences that constituted -the human being, one of which is to be dissolved into -its elemental and material substances, and the other of -which is to go elsewhere, intact and indestructible.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_473" id="Page_473">[Pg 473]</a></span></p> - -<p>Let me now refer to what is taking place while I am -writing this essay. I have said that the phenomena of our -bodily organism and the phenomena of our mental organism -may occur synchronously in the same individual. The -act of writing an original composition is an instance of this. -The action of certain organs of the body and the action of -the mind are simultaneous. In time, they can not be separated. -In themselves, they are separable and separate. -The thought springing up in the mind may be retained -there, or may flow into language and be written by the hand -upon the page. No one can detect in himself any instant -of time when the mental formation of a sentence, or any -clause of a sentence, as he writes, is separable from the -physical act of writing. In that not very common, but still -possible, feat of dictating to two amanuenses, at what appears -to be the same time, on two distinct subjects, there -is undoubtedly an appreciable interval, in which the mind -passes from one subject to the other, and then back again, -with great rapidity. But, when one is one's own amanuensis, -when the act of thinking and formulating the -thought, and the act of writing it down in words, is performed -by the same person, there is a simultaneous action -of that which originates the thought and clothes it in words, -and the act of the bodily organ which inscribes the words -upon paper. How is this phenomenon to be explained? -And to what does it lead? Is there anything in the whole -range of Mr. Spencer's "Psychology" that will interpret -this familiar experience? May it not be interpreted by -an anatomical examination of the mind as an organism?</p> - -<p>I do not now refer to cases where a thought is completely -formulated before the pen begins to be moved over the -paper, and is then recalled by an effort of the memory and -written down. I am referring to what I suppose is the -habit of many persons in writing, namely, the origination -and formulation of the thought as the hand moves the pen,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_474" id="Page_474">[Pg 474]</a></span> -a habit of which most practiced writers are perfectly conscious. -The same thing occurs in what is truly called extemporaneous -speaking,<a name="FNanchor_142" id="FNanchor_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a> when oral discourse is not a mere -repetition, <i lang="la">memoriter</i>, of thoughts and sentences which had -been previously formulated, but, as the word extemporaneous -implies, when the thought and the language flow from -the vocal organs <i lang="la">eo instanti</i> with their conception. In -these and the similar cases of improvisation and animated -conversation, in which there is a synchronous action of the -mind and the bodily organs, it would be impossible for us -to have that action if mind were constituted as Mr. Spencer -supposes it to be. If there were no mind in the sense of -an organized entity, conceiving a thought and clothing it -in the language needful to give it written or oral expression, -"if the <em>ego</em> were nothing more than the passing group of -feelings and ideas"—if an "idea lasts (only) while the -nerves of molecular motion last, ceasing when they cease"—if -that which remains is (only) the "set of plexuses"—how -could we originate any new thought? The very illustration -to which Mr. Spencer resorts, when he likens the -automatic human being to the non-automatic piano, and -makes them analogous in their action, in order to show -that passing ideas do not have a continual existence in the -mind, but that the actual existence is the physical structure -which, under like conditions, again evolves like combinations, -reduces us at once to the level of the piano, and -precludes the potentiality of a new and original idea which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_475" id="Page_475">[Pg 475]</a></span> -is not a combination of former ideas, and is produced under -different conditions. The assertion or argument that each -set of plexuses is capable of entering into countless combinations -with others, and so renders possible future ideas, -does not advance us one step to the solution of what takes -place when we conceive a new thought, clothe it in language, -and write it down on paper, or give it oral expression.</p> - -<p>In justification of this criticism, let me now refer to that -intellectual process which is called "invention," in its application -to the mechanic arts. I do not mean to suggest -or to claim that this kind of invention is an act which is -to be referred to a distinct and peculiar faculty of certain -minds, in the possession of which one man may differ from -another. But I shall endeavor to describe what takes place -when one conceives the intellectual plan of a certain new -combination of mechanical devices, and embodies that plan -in a machine which differs from all other previous machines -in its characteristic method of operation. For convenience, -I shall speak of the person who produces such a machine -as the inventor, which is the same as speaking of him as -the maker, as the poet is the maker of a poem. This act -of invention, or the making of some concrete new thing, is -an act of creation. The inventor, then, may be supposed -to have learned all that empirical and all that scientific -mechanics could teach him; to have had any quantity of -passing groups of ideas pass through his consciousness; to -be possessed of any number of plexuses capable of entering -into countless combinations with others. These plexuses, or -networks of transitory ideas, consisting of former impressions -in the nerve-center, must, it is said, be recalled under -the like conditions which produced them. But the conditions -for the inventor are not the same. Something is to be -produced into which the old ideas do not enter. There is -to be a new arrangement of old mechanical devices; a new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_476" id="Page_476">[Pg 476]</a></span> -combination is to be made, which will possess a method of -operation and accomplish a result never before seen or obtained. -A new concrete thing, a new machine, is to be -created. That the conception must be formed, that the -objective point, to which the whole intellectual effort is to -aim, must be seen, is manifest. A tentative intellectual -process may have to be gone through before the full conception -is reached, just as a tentative experimental process -may be necessary in finding out how the practical embodiment -of the conception is to be reached in building the -structure. These processes may go on simultaneously or -separately; but, when they are both completed, when the -new machine stands before us, we see at once that the plan -is an intellectual conception, perfectly original, and the -physical structure is a new arrangement of matter effected -by the hand of the inventor or by the hands of others, -which he uses as his instruments in doing the physical -work. I do not know, therefore, how this phenomenon is -to be explained upon the theory that the only <em>ego</em> is the -body and its functions, which lies behind and determines -ever-changing states of consciousness. I know not how else -to interpret the phenomenon of invention, excepting to -adopt the postulate that there is a mind, a substantive existence, -which, while its consciousness holds ideas suggested -by former conditions, has the inherent power to originate -ideas that did not form a part of any previous state of consciousness.</p> - -<p>I have spoken of mind as an organism and as a substantive -existence. This is a deduction to be drawn from the -manifestations of mental phenomena. In order to guard -against an objection that may possibly be interposed in the -way of this method of investigation, I will anticipate and -answer it. It will be said that we can not define or describe -the substance of mind; can not tell whether it is a unit, in -itself, or an aggregate of units; we know and can know<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_477" id="Page_477">[Pg 477]</a></span> -nothing more than its approximate components, and all -that we know of these does not justify us in assuming to -speak of the substance of mind. I have more than once -suggested, in our former conferences, that our inability to -define and to describe the substance of any supposed existence -is no proper objection to the hypothesis that there -is such an existence. When we undertake to define matter, -or to describe the substance of that which we call matter, -we find that we soon reach a point where precise definition -or description ceases. Yet we do not for that reason -refrain from deducing the existence of matter from the -manifestations of certain phenomena and from our experience -with them. It is perfectly true that we know matter -only by the manifestations of certain physical phenomena; -that we can not define the nature of its substance. All we -can do, by the most minute analysis, is to arrive at the perception -of the ultimate particles or units of matter; and the -nature of the substance of which these units are composed is -incapable of any further description. "Matter"<a name="FNanchor_143" id="FNanchor_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> is one of -the words in the English language which are used in a great -variety of senses, exact and inexact, literal and figurative. -In its philosophical sense, meaning the substance of which -all physical bodies are composed, the efforts of lexicographers -to give a definition, descriptive of the nature of what is defined, -show that definition is, strictly speaking, impossible. -All that can be said is that matter is "substance extended"; -or that which is visible or tangible, as "earth, wood, stone, -air, vapor, water"; or "the substance of which all bodies -are composed." But these efforts at definition express -only what is needful to be expressed in contrasting matter -with that other existence which is called "spirit." This -is another word which is used in very different senses, but -of which no more exact definition can be given, when it is -used in its philosophical sense, than can be given of "mat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_478" id="Page_478">[Pg 478]</a></span>ter." -Lexicographers have defined "spirit," in one of -its meanings, as "the <em>soul</em> of man; the intelligent, immaterial, -and immortal part of human beings"; and in another -of its meanings, more broadly, as "an immaterial, -intelligent substance." In these definitions they have followed -the metaphysicians, and the uses of the word in the -English translation of the Bible. When we turn to the -definition of "soul," we find it given as "the spiritual and -immortal substance in man, which distinguishes him from -brutes; that part of man which enables him to think and -reason, and which renders him a subject of moral government." -We also have it defined as "the understanding, -the intellectual principle." Undoubtedly these definitions -involve certain assumptions, such as the existence of a substance -called spirit, and the existence of an intellectual -principle, of which "soul," "spirit," and "intellect" are -mere names. But there is no difficulty in the way of our -knowing what is meant when these terms are used. The -difficulty of giving a definition without a circuitous use of -terms, explaining the one by the other, and then explaining -the last by the first, does not prevent us from having -a definite conception of the thing spoken of. When we -speak of mind, soul, or intellect, what we think of is the -something in ourselves of which we are conscious, and -whose manifestations we observe in other beings like ourselves; -and what we have to do is to examine the evidence -which may bring home to our convictions the existence of -this something that perceives, thinks, acts, originates new -ideas; holds former ideas in consciousness, is connected -with and acts upon and is acted on by bodily organs, and -is at the same time more than and different from those organs.</p> - -<p>I have referred to some of the mental phenomena which -have the strongest tendency to prove the existence of the -mind as an organized entity. These are the phenomena<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_479" id="Page_479">[Pg 479]</a></span> -which occur in our waking hours, when the intellectual -faculties and the bodily organs are in the full exercise of -their normal functions respectively. There is another -class of mental phenomena which may be said to be abnormal, -in this, that the intellectual faculties and the bodily -organs do not preserve the same relations to each other -in all respects that they do when we are fully awake. -These are the phenomena that occur during sleep—a class -of mental phenomena of great consequence to be observed -and analyzed in any study of psychology. They are of an -extraordinary variety, complex in the highest degree, and -dependent on numerous causes of mental and physical disturbance; -but it is quite possible to extract from some of -them certain definite conclusions.</p> - -<p>Sleep, properly regarded, when it is perfect, is a state -of absolute rest and inactivity of all the organs and functions -of the body save the digestion of food and the circulation -of the blood, and of all the mental faculties. Perfect -sleep, sleep in which there is absolutely no consciousness, -is more rare than those states in which there is more -or less consciousness. But it is often an actual state of -both body and mind, and it was evidently designed to renew -the vigor of both, and to prevent the wear and tear of -unbroken activity. Between absolute unconsciousness induced -by perfect sleep and the full consciousness of our -waking moments, there are many intermediate states; and -the phenomena of these intermediate states present very -strong proofs of the existence of the mind as a special -and spiritual entity, capable in greater or less degree of -acting without the aid of the physical organs. I do not except -even the organ of the brain from this suspension of -action during certain states when the mind is in more or -less of activity; for I am convinced that in some of the -mental phenomena to which I shall advert and which I -shall endeavor to describe, the brain is in a state of perfect<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_480" id="Page_480">[Pg 480]</a></span> -sleep, and that in the production of those phenomena it -takes no part. In other mental phenomena, which occur -during sleep, the brain or some part of it is evidently -acted upon by the mind, as in the somnambulistic condition, -when the nerves of motion, responding to the action -of the mind, communicate action to the muscles, and the -body walks about and performs other external acts.</p> - -<p>There are other mental phenomena occurring during -very profound sleep of the body and its organs, when the -mind does not appear to derive its action from the brain, -or to be dependent on the brain for its activity; when it -is exceedingly active, and when it communicates action to -none of the bodily organs; when, for example, it carries on -long trains of thought, composes sentences, invents conversations, -makes poetry and prose, and performs other -intellectual processes. Distributed into classes, the most -important mental phenomena occurring during sleep are -the following:</p> - -<p>First, and presenting perhaps the strongest proof of the -mind's independence of all the bodily organs, is that whole -class of mental phenomena in which, during profound -sleep of the body, we carry on conversations, compose original -matter in the form of oral or written discourse, which -we seem to ourselves to be producing, and solve intellectual -difficulties which have baffled us when awake, or imagine -that we receive from an unexpected source important information -that we are not conscious of having previously -received.</p> - -<p>The phenomena of conversations, to which we appear -to ourselves to be listening during sleep, or in which we appear -to ourselves to be taking part, are, when analyzed, most -remarkable occurrences, for it is the mind of the sleeper -which originates the whole of what appears to be said by -different persons. These conversations are as vivid, as -much marked by different intellectual and personal charac<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_481" id="Page_481">[Pg 481]</a></span>teristics, -sudden and unexpected turns, apt repartee, interchange -of ideas between two or more persons, as are the -real conversations which we overhear, or in which we take -part, when we are awake. Yet the whole of what is said, -or appears to us to be said, is the invention of the one mind, -which appears to itself to be listening to or talking with -other minds, and all the while the body is wrapped in profound -sleep. This extraordinary intellectual feat, so familiar -to us that it scarcely attracts our attention unless we undertake -to analyze it, is closely akin to the action of the mind -when the body and the mind are neither of them asleep, and -when we invent a conversation between different persons. -But this occurrence is marked by another extraordinary peculiarity: -for it happens, during sleep, to persons who could -not, when awake, invent and write such conversations at -will, and who in their waking hours have very little of the -imaginative faculty needed for such productions. I account -for this phenomenon by the hypothesis that when the -mind is free from the necessity of depending on the bodily -organs for its action, as it is during profound sleep of the -body, when its normal relations with the body are completely -suspended and it is left to its independent action, it -has a power of separate action. This, I think, accounts for -a kind of mental action which, when compared with that -which occurs in conjunction with the action of the bodily -organs, may be called abnormal. Under the impulse of its -own unrestrained and uncorrected activity, the mind goes -through processes of invention, the products of which are -sometimes wild and incoherent, sometimes exceedingly coherent, -sensible, and apt. Let the person to whom this -occurs be thoroughly awakened out of one of these states, -and the mind becomes immediately again subjected to the -necessity of acting along with, and under the conditions of -its normal relations to the body.</p> - -<p>Akin to this mental feat of inventing conversations,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_482" id="Page_482">[Pg 482]</a></span> -during a sleep of the body, is the power of composing, during -such sleep, oral discourse of one's own, or the power of -composing something which we appear to ourselves to be -writing. I suppose this is an occurrence which happens to -most persons who are much accustomed to writing or to -public speaking. It is often an involuntary action of the -mind; that is to say, it is sometimes accompanied with a -distinct consciousness that it is a process that ought to be -arrested because it is a dangerous one, and yet it can not -be arrested before full waking consciousness returns. On -goes the flow of thought and language, apparently with -great success; we seem to be speaking or writing with even -more than our usual power, and all the while in the style -that belongs to us; but, until we are fully restored to the -normal relation of the mind and the body, we can not at will -arrest this independent action of the mind, but must wait -until our bodily senses are again in full activity. I do not -suppose that this phenomenon ought to be explained by the -hypothesis that there are certain parts or organs of the -brain which are specially concerned in the work of original -composition of intellectual matter, and that these organs -are not affected by the sleep that is prevailing in other -parts of the brain. While it is doubtless true that there -are special systems of nerves which proceed from or conduct -to special parts of the brain, and by which action is -imparted to or received from the other organs of the body, -and while some of these special parts of the brain may be -in the state of absolute inactivity called sleep, and others -are not, I know of no warrant for the hypothesis that the -intellectual operations or processes are dependent upon any -particular organ or organs of the brain, as distinguished -from those from and to which proceed special systems of -nerves. If any person, who is much accustomed to that -kind of intellectual activity which consists in original -composition of intellectual matter, will attend to his own<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_483" id="Page_483">[Pg 483]</a></span> -consciousness, and probe it as far as he may, he will not -find reason, I apprehend, to conclude that the power of -thought and of clothing thought in language resides in any -special part of the brain. His experience and introspection -will be more likely to lead him to the conclusion that this -power, whether it is exerted when he is asleep or awake -bodily, is a power that inheres in the mind itself regarded -as a spiritual existence and organism, and that the action -of the brain, or of any part of it, is necessary to the exercise -of this power only when it is necessary, as it is in our waking -moments, to use some of the bodily organs in order to -give the thought oral or written expression by giving it -utterance through the vocal organs or by writing it down -on paper. Certain it is that we conceive thoughts in more -or less of connected sequence, and clothe them intellectually -in language of which we have entire consciousness while -the process is going on, without the action of any part of -the body.</p> - -<p>It may be objected to this view that the intellectual -products which we seem to ourselves to be making when -we are asleep would, if they could be repeated by an effort -of the memory, word for word, just as they seem to have -occurred, be found to be of the same incoherent, senseless -stuff of which all dreams are made; and that this test -would show that the brain is at such times not absolutely -and completely in the condition which is called sleep, but -that it is only partially in that condition; that it is performing -its function feebly, imperfectly, and not as it performs -that function when the whole body is awake. In -reference to this hypothesis, I will repeat an anecdote which -I have somewhere read, which is equally valuable whether -it was an imaginary or a real occurrence.</p> - -<p>A gentleman of literary pursuits, who was a very respectable -poet, was subject to this habit of composition -during sleep. One night he awoke his wife and informed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_484" id="Page_484">[Pg 484]</a></span> -her that he had composed in his dream some of the best -and most original verses that he had ever written. He -begged her at once to get a candle, pen, ink, and paper, -and let him dictate to her the new composition that appeared -to him so striking. When they read together the -new poem on the next morning, it turned out to be nonsensically -puerile. But occurrences of this kind, if they -could be multiplied, would prove only that we are liable to -illusions in sleep, in regard to the comparative merits of -our intellectual products, which we imagine ourselves to be -creating when we are in that state, as we are in regard to -other things. We are under a delusion when we imagine -in our dreams that we encounter and converse with another -person, living or dead. We are perhaps deluding ourselves -when in sleep we compose or seem to compose an original -poem. But what is it that deludes itself, either in respect -to the interview with another person, or in respect to the -new composition? Is it the brain, or is it the mind? Is -it a person, or a bodily organ that has the false impression, -in the one case or the other? There must be a something -that is subject to an illusion, before there can be an illusion. -If both brain and mind are in profound sleep, absolute suspension -of all action, there can be no illusion about anything. -If the brain is absolutely asleep and the mind is -not, the illusion is in the mind and not in the brain. That -the latter is what often occurs, the experience of the illiterate -and uncultivated makes them aware, as well as the -experience of the lettered scholar and the practiced writer.<a name="FNanchor_144" id="FNanchor_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a></p> - -<p>Under the same head, I will now refer to those strange -but familiar occurrences which take place when there come -to us, in sleep, solutions of difficulties which we had not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_485" id="Page_485">[Pg 485]</a></span> -overcome by all our efforts while awake, and which appeared -to us utterly dark when we lay down to rest. These mental -phenomena are almost innumerably various. They take -place in regard to all kinds of subjects, to lines of conduct -and action, to everything about which our thoughts are employed; -and they are a class of phenomena within everybody's -experience. There is scarcely any one to whom it -has not happened to lie down at night with a mind distressed -and perplexed about some problem that requires a -definite solution, and to rise in the morning, usually after -a night of undisturbed rest, with his mind perfectly clear -on the subject, and with just the solution that did not -come to him when he devoted to it all his waking thoughts. -What is the explanation of this phenomenon? If the mind -is an independent entity, a spiritual organism, capable of -its own action without the aid of the body under certain -circumstances, this phenomenon can be explained. If the -mind is not a spiritual organism, capable, under any circumstances, -of acting without the aid of the bodily organs, -this phenomenon can not be explained.</p> - -<p>The most probable explanation is this: When we are -awake, and devote our thoughts to a particular subject that -is attended with great difficulties, we go over the same -ground repeatedly—the mind travels and toils in the same -ruts. Nothing new occurs, because we look at the subject -in the same way every time we think of it. We are liable -to be kept in the same beaten path by the associations between -our thoughts and the bodily states in which we have -those thoughts—associations which are exceedingly powerful. -But let these associations be dissolved as they are -during perfect sleep—let the mind be in a condition to act -without being dependent on the brain or any other bodily -organ for aid, or exposed to be hampered by the conditions -of the body, and there will be a mental activity in -which ideas will be wrought out that did not occur to us<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_486" id="Page_486">[Pg 486]</a></span> -while we were awake. The memory, too, may recall a fact -which we had learned while awake, and yet we may be unable -to recollect how it came to our knowledge. At such -times, the fact is recalled; but as the mind is acting in a -condition which is abnormal when compared with the waking -condition, and is liable to delusions about some things, -we imagine that the fact is revealed to us in some wild and -supernatural way, as by a person who is dead and who has -come to us to communicate it. There is a well-authenticated -account of an occurrence of this kind, given by Sir -Walter Scott in one of the notes to his "Antiquary," and -on which he founds an incident related by one of the personages -in his story. The real occurrence was this: A gentleman -in Scotland was involved in a litigation about a -claim asserted upon his landed estate. He had a strong -conviction that his father had bargained and paid for a release -of the claim, but he could find no such paper. Without -it he was sure to be defeated in the suit. Distressed by -this prospect, but utterly unable to see any way out of his -misfortune, he lay down to sleep, on the night before he -was to go into Edinburgh to attend the trial of the cause. -He dreamed that his father appeared to him, and told him -that the claim had been released, and that the paper was in -the hands of a lawyer in a neighboring town, whose name -the paternal shade mentioned.</p> - -<p>Before going into Edinburgh on the next day, the gentleman -rode to the place which his father had indicated, and -found the lawyer, of whose name he had been previously -unconscious. This person turned out to be an old man, -who had forgotten the fact that he had transacted this -piece of business for the gentleman's father; but on being -told of the fact that his client had paid his fee in a foreign -coin of a peculiar character—which was one part of the -story which the father's apparition related to the son—he -recalled the whole of the circumstances, searched for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_487" id="Page_487">[Pg 487]</a></span> -paper, and found it. The gentleman's estate was saved to -him; but he became very superstitious about dreams, and -suffered much from that cause, as was quite natural. Sir -Walter's solution of the whole affair is of course the correct -one: "The dream was only the recapitulation of information -which Mr. R—— had really received from his father -while in life, but which at first he merely recalled as a general -impression that the claim was settled. It is not uncommon -for persons to recover, during sleep, the thread of -ideas which they have lost during their waking hours."<a name="FNanchor_145" id="FNanchor_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> -Sir Walter makes another observation which is worthy of -being repeated—that in dreams men are not surprised by -apparitions. Why are we not? Because the mind is in a -state of abnormal activity, in which everything that occurs -to it seems perfectly natural. The delusion in regard to -the mode in which the very important fact was communicated -to Mr. R—— in his dream, was substituted in the -place of the actual communication made to him by his -father during life. The latter he had wholly forgotten, -and he had forgotten the circumstance of payment of the -lawyer's fee in a peculiar coin, which had also been mentioned -to him by his father when living. This remarkable -incident, which might doubtless be paralleled by many similar -occurrences, proves one of two things: either that the -exercise of the memory is wholly dependent upon a waking -condition of the brain, or that there may be an abnormal -and imperfect act of memory while the brain is in profound -sleep, in the course of which a fact becomes mixed with a -delusion about the mode in which we are told of the fact. -What happened to Mr. R—— was that his mind recalled -the fact, but imagined that he then learned it for the first -time from an apparition. I do not know how such a phenomenon -can be explained, excepting by the hypothesis that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_488" id="Page_488">[Pg 488]</a></span> -the mind is a special existence, which acts during sleep of -the body upon facts that are lodged in the memory, but -mixes them with imaginary and delusive appearances, so -that the mode in which the fact was actually learned is obliterated -from the memory, and some supernatural mode of -communication takes its place. On the return of waking -consciousness, the mode in which the fact was actually -learned is still shut out from recollection, and, if the person -to whom this kind of delusion has occurred is of a superstitious -turn, he will act on what he has imagined was told -him by the apparition, because he has no other means of -rescuing himself from an evil.</p> - -<p>In regard to the mental phenomena which occur without -delusions or apparitions, where the thoughts on a difficult -subject become clearer and more satisfactory to us -when we awake from sleep than they ever were during our -waking hours, I suppose the explanation is this: During -profound sleep of the body, including the brain, there is -an entire suspension of every bodily function excepting -the digestion of food and the circulation of the blood. If -there is excited in some of the other organs an action of -a peculiar kind, by an excitation of the nerves connected -with those organs, it is proof that the condition of perfect -sleep is not prevailing in all parts of the brain. The state -to which I now refer supposes a complete inactivity of the -whole bodily organism save in the digestive function and -the circulation of the blood. In such a state, the mind, -that which thinks and reasons, does not act upon the brain, -and is not acted upon by it. It is capable of thinking on -any subject which has employed its thoughts during the -waking hours; and while, in some cases, it is visited by apparitions -and subject to delusions, it is in other cases engaged -in ideas that involve no delusive appearances. Freed -from all the associations of these ideas with the feelings prevailing -in the body when we think of the subject during<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_489" id="Page_489">[Pg 489]</a></span> -our waking hours, we are able to perceive relations of the -subject which have not before occurred to us. When we -pass from the condition of sleep to the full consciousness -of our bodily and mental organism, we are intellectually -possessed of these new relations of the subject, which we -have brought with us out of the state in which we acquired -them, and they furnish us with new materials for the solution -of the problem that we had not solved when we lay -down to rest. It is not, I am persuaded, because the mind -was at rest during sleep, and when we become awake is by -reason of that rest better able to grapple with the difficulties -of the subject, that we do grapple with them successfully; -for in the case supposed, which is a very common -experience, the thoughts are actually employed on the subject, -while the body and the brain are in the absolute rest -and inactivity of all the organic functions excepting those -of digestion and circulation of the blood. I do not know -that it is possible to detect, in a person sleeping, an increased -circulation of the blood to any part of the brain -which may be supposed to be concerned in the act of thinking, -and at the same time to know that thinking is going -on, unless such an observation could be made of a person -in the state called somnambulism, which is not the state of -which I am now speaking. But reasoning upon the phenomenon -which I have now described, according to all that -we can learn from our own experience or from observation -of others, I reach the conclusion that the mind, the thinking -and reasoning entity, can and does, in profound sleep -of the body and the brain, employ itself upon a subject that -has occupied us when awake, and can perceive new relations -of that subject, which had not before occurred to us, -without the activity of any portion of the nerve-center -which is called the brain. Does this hypothesis assume -that our thoughts when asleep are more valuable than our -waking thoughts? It does, to a certain extent and under<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_490" id="Page_490">[Pg 490]</a></span> -certain circumstances, for experience proves that in sleep -we acquire ideas which we did not have before we fell -asleep, and which we bring with us out of that condition.</p> - -<p>That I have now given the true explanation of this familiar -experience will appear, I think, from this consideration: -There are very few nights when we do not in sleep -have many thoughts. The states of perfect unconsciousness -are comparatively rare. If the brain were never -entirely asleep, if it were always engaged in the physical -work of thinking—whatever that work may be—it would -be worn out prematurely. But if the brain is perfectly at -rest, while the mind is actively employed, the brain undergoes -no strain and suffers no exhaustion; and the mind -suffers no strain or exhaustion because it is in its nature -incapable of wear and tear. It is only when the mind acts -on the brain that exhaustion takes place. I speak now of -what happens in states of ordinarily good health.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_491" id="Page_491">[Pg 491]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_146" id="FNanchor_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a></p> - -<p>I shall now refer to some of the very peculiar phenomena -of somnambulism; and in illustration of their various -phases I shall resort to Shakespeare's picture of the sleep<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_492" id="Page_492">[Pg 492]</a></span>-walking -of Lady Macbeth, which, although purely imaginary, -is a most accurate exhibition of nature. Treating it, -as we are entitled to treat it, as if it were a real occurrence -at which we ourselves were witnesses, with a knowledge of -her character and history, an analysis of the situation in -which she was placed when the habit of somnambulism -came upon her, and of the mode in which her mind acted -upon her body, will enable us to see the phenomena in -their true philosophical aspect. We may suppose ourselves -present, with the doctor and the gentlewoman of her bedchamber, -when she comes forth in her night-dress and with -a candle in her hand, and we witness the impressive scene -of a disturbed mind overmastering the body while the body -is asleep. It seems that, after the murder of Duncan, when -she imbrued her own hands with his blood in smearing the -faces of his sleeping grooms, the habit of sleep-walking had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_493" id="Page_493">[Pg 493]</a></span> -come over her. As we stand by the side of the awe-stricken -witnesses, and hear their whispered conversation, -we get the first description of her actions since the new -king, Macbeth, her husband, whom she had instigated to -murder the old king, went into the field. These first actions -of hers, as described by the gentlewoman to the doctor, -do not necessarily exhibit the working of a guilty conscience. -They exhibit a mind oppressed and disturbed by -cares of business and of state; and they are a distinct class -of the phenomena of somnambulism. The gentlewoman -tells the doctor that "since his Majesty went into the field, -I have seen her rise from her bed, throw her night-gown -upon her, unlock her closet, take forth paper, fold it, write -upon it, read it, afterward seal it, and again return to bed; -yet all this while in a most fast sleep." This is merely a -description of what the witness has seen, and it might occur -to any person of strong intellectual faculties, disturbed -by great cares, without the action of a guilty conscience. It -makes the situation real when the doctor recognizes the fact -of this "great perturbation in nature! to receive at once -the benefit of sleep, and do the effects of watching." As -they are whispering together, the doctor trying to make the -gentlewoman tell him what at such times she has heard her -say, which the loyal servant refuses to tell, Lady Macbeth -moves forward, with the taper in her hand.</p> - -<p>Here we may pause upon the first exhibition of the -phenomenon called sleep-walking, which we get by description -only, and analyze the nature of the action. It is perfectly -apparent that what the poet accepted as true, is the -power of the mind to move the body while the body is -asleep, so as to make it perform many acts. Experience -makes this assumption perfectly correct. I presume it -will not be questioned that this phenomenon is described -by Shakespeare with entire accuracy, and it is explicable -only upon the hypothesis that the mind has some control<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_494" id="Page_494">[Pg 494]</a></span> -over the body while the body is asleep. Actions as minute -and as much premeditated as those performed by Lady -Macbeth "in a most fast sleep," have been witnessed in -persons who were undoubtedly asleep, and whose eyes were -open for some purposes, but, as in her case, their sense was -shut for other purposes.</p> - -<p>We now pass to the more awful exhibition of a mind -worked upon by a guilty conscience. Lady Macbeth comes -out of her bedroom fast asleep, but with a light in her -hand. The gentlewoman who interprets her state to the -doctor informs him that she has a light by her bedside continuously; -and we thus learn that her nights are so disturbed -that she can not bear darkness. They notice that -her eyes are open, but "their sense is shut." Then begin -the terrific manifestations of the control of a guilty conscience -over both mind and body, when the memory, alive -to certain terrible facts, plays fantastic tricks with itself, -and mingles delusions with realities. As she approaches, -with the taper in her hand, she performs an action which -the gentlewoman says she has repeatedly seen her go -through, for a quarter of an hour at a time, endeavoring to -rub a spot of blood off from one of her hands. Her hands -have been clean, physically, since the time when she first -washed them on the fatal night; but the delusion that is -upon her is that there is blood on them still. She goes on -rubbing them, and her first exclamation is, "Out, damned -spot! out, I say!" Yet it will not out. That little hand -wears what she imagines to be an indelible stain. After -her first exclamation, the memory rushes back to the moment -before the murder. She thinks she hears, perhaps -does hear, the clock strike—"one, two"; and then, as if -speaking to her husband, she says, "Why, then 'tis time to -do't." Then there is a pause, and out comes the reflection, -"Hell is murky!" This seems to indicate that darkness, -in which she and her husband are whispering together just<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_495" id="Page_495">[Pg 495]</a></span> -before the murder, is a hell, and so very fit for what is -about to be done. Hell is murky, as this chamber is. -Then she remembers her husband's reluctance, and fancying -that she is still talking with him and bracing him up -to the deed, she says: "Fye, my lord, fye! a soldier, and -afeard? What need we <em>fear</em> who knows it, when none can -call our <em>power</em> to account?" Presently she is looking back -upon the deed, and exclaims, "Yet who would have -thought the old man to have had so much blood in him!" -Then she recurs to herself as if she were another: "The -thane of Fife had a wife; where is <em>she</em> now?" Again -she thinks of her stained hands: "What, will these hands -<em>ne'er</em> be clean?" Are they to wear this horrible stain forever? -Instantly she is again at the door of Duncan's -chamber, speaking to her husband: "No more o' that, my -lord, no more o' that: you mar all with this starting!" -Then her hands again, her poor hands; they <em>smell</em> of the -blood: "Here's the smell of the blood still: all the perfumes -of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand! Oh, oh, -oh!" Then, after another pause, she is speaking to her husband, -when the deed has been done: "Wash your hands, -put on your night-gown; look not so pale!" In another -instant she is thinking of Banquo's murder, which occurred -after Duncan's, and she says to her husband: "I tell you -yet again, Banquo's <em>buried</em>; he can not come out of his -<em>grave</em>!" Once more she is back at the door of Duncan's -chamber, in the darkness, and the murder has been committed. -Speaking to her husband, she says: "To bed, to -bed; there's knocking at the gate. Come, come, come, -come, give me your hand. What's done can not be undone. -To bed, to bed, to bed!" Then she goes quickly toward -her chamber and to bed, believing that Macbeth is with her -and that she is holding his hand.</p> - -<p>How mixed, how wild, how fantastic, how coherent and -incoherent are these phantoms of the imagination! If she<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_496" id="Page_496">[Pg 496]</a></span> -were awake, things would not thus present themselves to -her. Every event in the dreadful story would stand in its -true relations, and, however she might be suffering the -pangs of a guilty conscience, she would not mix up the -scenes through which she had passed, but every fact would -stand in its due order. She would be conscious that there -was no blood upon her hands, and that they did not need -the perfumes of Arabia to sweeten them. She would know -that Duncan had been murdered, and would not enact the -murder over again. She would remember that Banquo's -murder had not been distinctly made known to her, and -that she had only surmised it, when at the banquet Macbeth -fancied that the ghost of Banquo rose and sat at the table—an -apparition which neither she nor any one else saw. -But, in that strange scene, it flashed across her mind that -Banquo was dead, and to herself she interpreted truly what -was passing in her husband's mind, and instantly explained -his conduct to the company as the recurrence of an old -malady to which he was subject.</p> - -<p>If we go back to what had actually happened before the -banquet, and then go forward to the condition in which -she is seen by the doctor and her attendant, we shall understand -how her mind was working, not upon a fact that -she knew, but upon a fact which she had truly surmised. -In her somnambulistic state, she says to her husband: "<em>I tell -you yet again</em>, Banquo's buried; he can not come out of -his grave." Had she said this to him before? According -to the course of the story, as the text of the play gives it -to us, she had not. In the second scene of the third act, -where, after Duncan had been murdered and Macbeth had -become king, they are preparing for the banquet, to which -Banquo was expected as one of the guests, Macbeth and his -wife are talking together, and she is trying to get him out -of the contemplative and conscience-stricken mood in -which he looks back upon what they have done. He con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_497" id="Page_497">[Pg 497]</a></span>cludes -one of his mixed and melancholy reflections with -these words:</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> -<div class="poetry"><div class="stanza"> -<div class="verse indent12">Duncan is in his grave;</div> -<div class="verse">After life's fitful fever he sleeps well;</div> -<div class="verse">Treason has done his worst: nor steel, nor poison,</div> -<div class="verse">Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing</div> -<div class="verse">Can touch him further!</div> -</div></div></div> - -<p>Then she says to him:</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> -<div class="poetry"><div class="stanza"> -<div class="verse indent2"><i>Lady Macbeth.</i> Come on;</div> -<div class="verse">Gentle my lord, sleek o'er your rugged looks;</div> -<div class="verse">Be bright and jovial 'mong your guests to-night.</div> -<div class="verse indent2"><i>Macbeth.</i> So shall I, love; and so, I pray, be you;</div> -<div class="verse">Let your remembrance apply to <i>Banquo</i>;</div> -<div class="verse"><em>Present him eminence</em>,<a name="FNanchor_147" id="FNanchor_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> <em>both with eye and tongue</em>:</div> -<div class="verse">Unsafe the while, that we</div> -<div class="verse">Must lave our honors in these flattering streams;</div> -<div class="verse">And make our faces vizards to our hearts,</div> -<div class="verse">Disguising what they are.</div> -</div></div></div> - -<p>Just at this moment, therefore, he is not thinking of -killing Banquo, but wishes him to be received with all -honor. But, in answer to his last reflection on the hypocritical -part that they must act, she says to him:</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> -<div class="poetry"><div class="stanza"> -<div class="verse">You must leave this.</div> -</div></div></div> - -<p>Then bursts forth the terrific oppression of his soul:</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> -<div class="poetry"><div class="stanza"> -<div class="verse indent2"><i>Macb.</i> Oh, full of scorpions is my mind, dear wife!</div> -<div class="verse">Thou know'st that Banquo, and his Fleance, <em>lives</em>.</div> -<div class="verse indent2"><i>Lady M.</i> <em>But in them nature's copy's not eterne.</em><a name="FNanchor_148" id="FNanchor_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a></div> -<div class="verse indent2"><i>Macb.</i> There's comfort yet; they <em>are</em> assailable;</div> -<div class="verse">Then be thou jocund: ere the bat hath flown</div><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_498" id="Page_498">[Pg 498]</a></span> -<div class="verse">His cloistered flight; ere, to black Hecate's summons,</div> -<div class="verse">The shard-borne beetle, with his drowsy hums,</div> -<div class="verse">Hath rung night's yawning peal, there shall be done</div> -<div class="verse">A deed of dreadful note!</div> -</div></div></div> - -<p>She affects not to understand him—perhaps does not—and -she asks:</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> -<div class="poetry"><div class="stanza"> -<div class="verse"><em>What's</em> to be done?</div> -<div class="verse indent2"><i>Macb.</i> Be innocent of the <em>knowledge</em>, dearest chuck,</div> -<div class="verse">Till thou applaud the <em>deed</em>. Come, seeling night,</div> -<div class="verse">Skarf up the tender eye of pitiful day;</div> -<div class="verse">And, with thy bloody and invisible hand,</div> -<div class="verse">Cancel, and tear to pieces, that great bond</div> -<div class="verse">Which keeps me pale!—Light thickens; and the crow</div> -<div class="verse">Makes wing to the rooky wood;</div> -<div class="verse">Good things of day begin to droop and drowse;</div> -<div class="verse">While night's black agents to their prey do rouse.</div> -<div class="verse">Thou marvel'st at my words: but hold thee still;</div> -<div class="verse">Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill:</div> -<div class="verse">So, prithee, go with me. [<i lang="la">Exeunt.</i></div> -</div></div></div> - -<p>In the next scene, the murderers, previously engaged -by Macbeth, waylay Banquo in the park as he is approaching -the castle, and kill him, his son Fleance and a servant -escaping. Then follows the banquet, Macbeth himself -moving about at first, and then he takes a seat at the table -lower down. One of the murderers comes in and whispers -to him what has been done. The stage direction is, "The -ghost of Banquo rises and sits in Macbeth's place." As no -one at the table but Macbeth sees this apparition, it might -be inferred that it is the force of his imagination which -presents the spectacle to him, as Lady Macbeth supposes, -when she says to him:</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> -<div class="poetry"><div class="stanza"> -<div class="verse indent12">O proper stuff!</div> -<div class="verse">This is the very painting of your fear:</div> -<div class="verse">This is the air-drawn dagger, which, you said,</div> -<div class="verse">Led you to Duncan.</div> -</div></div></div> - -<p>But the stage direction must be taken as a literal ap<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_499" id="Page_499">[Pg 499]</a></span>pearance -of the ghost, so as to make it visible to the audience, -while it is invisible to all at the table excepting Macbeth -himself.</p> - -<p>If, now, we go forward to the night when Lady Macbeth -is walking in her sleep, and remember what had occurred -previous to and at the banquet, we see how, without any -actual previous knowledge that her husband intended to -have Banquo killed, and with only the surmise that he had -been killed, which comes to her at the banquet, she came -to say to her husband, in her dream:</p> - -<div class="poetry"><div class="stanza"> -<div class="verse">I tell you yet again, Banquo's buried; he can not come out of his grave.</div> -</div></div> - -<p>Here we have a fact lodged in the mind during the -waking hours, and in sleep wrought into a strange mixture -with the killing of Duncan, with which it had in reality -no connection, having transpired afterward. This is very -strong proof of the capacity of the mind to act during sleep -without the action of the brain. The mind of the guilty -sleep-walker is filled with horrible memories, which it can -not shut out, but with which it can not deal in their actual -order and true relations, because the sequences of thought, -during sleep, are abnormal. Those whose experience has -never involved any such workings of conscience are perfectly -aware of the fact that in dreams ideas that are separately -lodged in the consciousness become entangled with -each other in the most fantastic manner. Lady Macbeth -at one moment even thinks of herself as if she were some -one else, and asks, Where is the woman now who was the -wife of the thane of Fife? Every one has experienced in -sleep the same projection of one's self out of one's own -consciousness; so that we seem to be contemplating ourselves -as if we were a different person.</p> - -<p>The phenomena that occur during the delirium of fever, -where the normal consciousness is lost for the time being,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_500" id="Page_500">[Pg 500]</a></span> -are in some respects analogous to and in some respects different -from those which occur during the somnambulistic -condition. Delirium occurs when the body and the brain -are not in the condition of sleep; but the senses of perception -convey false impressions to the mind, and the mind -itself has temporarily lost its power of correcting its own -action by its former experience. The nearest friends who -are around the bedside are not recognized by the sufferer; -they appear to be strangers, and the patient talks to them -as if both they and he were not their real selves. It would -seem that we can safely infer from the state of delirium a -suspension of the direct and normal connection between -the brain and the mind; that neither of them can act, in relation -to the other, as they both act when there is no such -disturbance: but that this condition, so far from proving -or tending to prove that the mind is not an independent -spiritual existence, has a strong tendency to prove that it -is. Insanity, on the other hand, is probably a derangement -of the mental organism akin to derangement of the -physical organism, but not necessarily connected with or -induced by the latter, for the bodily health of the insane is -often entirely sound while the mind is in an entirely unsound -and irrational condition. But the phenomena of insanity -are too various and multiform, and too much dependent -on both physical and moral causes, to afford any satisfactory -proofs of the postulate which I propound in this essay. -The safest line of investigation is that which I suggested in -the first instance, namely, to regard the mind as an organism, -and to ascertain whether it is susceptible of anatomical -examination in a sense analogous to anatomical examination -of the bodily organism. All that I have hitherto said is -useful by way of preliminary illustration of my main hypothesis. -It has a strong tendency to show that the mind, -instead of consisting, as some philosophers now suppose, of -the products of a material organism, is itself an organized<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_501" id="Page_501">[Pg 501]</a></span> -being with a definite structure and capable of living a life -of its own, although at present dwelling in a corporeal organism -which affects it in various ways while the connection -lasts. The theory that all mental phenomena are -products of our corporeal organism is one that appears to -derive great support from examinations of the structure of -the brain and of the whole nervous system. The physical -anatomy of man exhibits very striking illustrations of the -influence of corporeal changes upon the mental state, as the -mental changes show corresponding influences upon the corporeal -state. But, then, there are undoubtedly phenomena -that are purely and exclusively mental; and therefore when -we undertake to solve these mental phenomena by the materialistic -hypothesis we find a sense of inadequate causation -confronting us so directly that we are compelled to -look for a solution elsewhere. It is certain that things -take place in the inner recesses of our minds, in the production -of which the bodily senses not only render no aid, -but in which they have no part whatever. It is necessary, -therefore, to carry our investigations into a class of mental -phenomena in which all physical causation ceases to afford -an adequate guide to a conclusion.</p> - -<p>It will not be denied that the products of material organisms -can be proved to consist of matter and of nothing -else. Their presence can be detected by some physical -test. For example, if it be true that all animals have been -evolved from protoplasm, the organisms are simply changes -in the form of a certain portion of matter. If, in an individual -organism having a highly developed nervous structure, -there are actions produced by an excitation of the -nerves of sensation, those actions are simply molecular -changes in the matter comprising the sensitive and easily -moved substance of the nerve-fibers. However far and into -whatever minutiæ we carry our investigations into organized -matter, we find that its products remain material, and that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_502" id="Page_502">[Pg 502]</a></span> -they consist only of changes in the material substance of a -material organization. But, when we pass from such material -products into the domain of purely mental phenomena, are -we warranted in saying that, although the latter are not, -properly speaking, <em>products</em> of the material organization, -they are <em>effects</em> corresponding to and dependent upon the -excitation of the nerves of sensation? This last hypothesis -must assume one of two things: either that there is a distinction -between those corporeal feelings which do not and -those which do produce mental changes or mental effects, -or, if there are corporeal feelings which produce corresponding -mental states and mental action, there must be a -something on which the effects can be wrought, and this -something must be an independent organism. It is doubtless -true that there are many corporeal feelings which are -followed by no very important mental effects, especially -during a sound state of bodily health. But it is equally -true that, if there are corporeal feelings which influence our -mental action, there must be an organism which is capable -of being so influenced; and our experience and consciousness -teach us that there is such a difference between corporeal -feelings and mental phenomena that the probability -of a difference in the originating causes becomes very great. -We know that the mind can and does act with great force -when bodily suffering is extreme; that it has an energy of -its own which enables it to rise above all the power of physical -pain to restrain or influence it. I must therefore follow -out, as I had originally projected, my anatomical -analysis of the mind as an independent spiritual organism.</p> - -<p>In order to arrive at a correct conclusion concerning -the structure of mind, we must first observe that there are -four special corporeal organs by which the capability of the -mind to receive impressions from matter is acted upon. It -is through these means that the properties of matter, or -those properties which can make themselves known to us,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_503" id="Page_503">[Pg 503]</a></span> -become known to us. The senses, as they are usually -called, are sight, hearing, smell, and taste. The external -organ of each of these senses is furnished with a set of -nerves, the function of which is to transmit from that organ -a wave of molecular motion along the fluid or semi-fluid -substance inclosed in the nerve-tubes to the great -nerve-center the brain, the central recipient of all such -motions. Such, at least, is the theory, which may be accepted -as a fact. But, then, the question remains, What -is the intellectual perception or mental cognition of the -idea suggested by one of these supposed transmissions of a -wave of molecular motion? Is there a being, a person, a -spiritual entity, conceiving the idea or having an intellectual -perception of it? Or is there no such being, and -while we attribute to the office of the nervous system the -function of producing certain feelings or sensations in the -brain, do these sensations or feelings constitute all that -there is of consciousness?</p> - -<p>It is impossible for me to conceive of consciousness as -anything but an intuitive sense of his own existence, experienced -by a being capable of such an experience, because -endowed with such a faculty. It is certain that when we -so regard consciousness we are not deceiving ourselves; for -if any one will consider what would happen to him if he -should lose this faculty of being sensible of his own existence, -he will see that in the event of that loss he could -neither distinguish himself from other persons, nor have -any control over his own actions, or any cognition whatever. -For this reason, the theory on which I made some -criticisms in one of our late conversations is the one with -which I contrast my conception of mind. If that theory -fails to satisfy a reflecting person in regard to the nature -of consciousness, as certified to him by his own experience, -the hypothesis that the mind is an extended and organized -being, of which a conception can be formed, and not an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_504" id="Page_504">[Pg 504]</a></span> -unextended and unorganized something of which no conception -can be formed, must be accepted as the alternative.</p> - -<p>I explained in our former discussion my understanding -of Mr. Spencer's theory of the only <em>ego</em> that can be scientifically -recognized; and, in order to encounter it by my -own hypothesis, I will here restate its substantial position -in a condensed form.</p> - -<p>By the <em>ego</em> of which he treats, I understand him to -mean all that we can arrive at by an analysis of what takes -place in the body and its functions, and of "what is given -in consciousness." This phrase—"what is given in consciousness"—reveals -to us his purpose to reduce consciousness -from a self-conviction and cognition of one's own -existence to a mere passing group of feelings, which constitute -"the ever-changing states of consciousness" that -we "<em>call</em> mind." So that, when we speak of mind, we -mean and can mean nothing more than certain states of -feeling produced in our brains by perpetually changing impressions. -We do not and can not mean that there is -a person who perceives and holds ideas suggested by external -objects through the action of his nervous system. -All that we know about any <em>ego</em>, any mental I, is that there -is a physical structure, pervaded by certain physical forces, -that produce "consecutive states," which Mr. Spencer calls -"mental <em>states</em>"; and the aggregate of the feelings and ideas -which thus constitute the <em>mental states</em> is the only <em>ego</em> of -which any continued existence can be predicated. But even -these aggregates of feelings and ideas have, according to -this philosopher, no principle of cohesion holding them together -as a whole; and, therefore, all that we can assume as -having any continuously surviving and durable existence is -the changing <em>states</em> produced by the action through us of a -certain unknowable power, statically conditioned in our -nervous organism, which is pervaded by a dynamically con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_505" id="Page_505">[Pg 505]</a></span>ditioned -portion of that unknowable power which is operating -everywhere in nature, and is called "energy."<a name="FNanchor_149" id="FNanchor_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a></p> - -<p>So far as this theory is based upon the existence of a -physical organism, whose functions liberate from the food -supplied to it certain forces, which are distributed by the -activities of the organism, we may accept it as a statement -of what actually takes place in the form of physical phenomena. -But when we follow the physical phenomena of -the diffused energy into its action upon the brain, by the -transmission of an impulse, we must stop with the effect of -that impulse upon a corporeal organ, or we must go further -and find a something which receives into itself and appropriates -to itself the idea the elements of which the impulse -has transmitted. The presence of that something in ourselves -may be illustrated by its absence from a mechanism in -which we know that it does not exist, but which appears -superficially to be animated by an intelligent principle possessing -volition. We stand, for example, before one of those -automatic machines which perform actions that seem to be -guided by a living spirit. They are mere physical organisms, -constructed without the principle of life that inhabits -animal organisms, but they are so admirably contrived -for the production of certain limited but complex movements -that they suggest the presence of a spiritual being acting -as we ourselves act. But the least reflection upon what -we see makes us aware that there is nothing before us but -a mechanical organism, in which the artisan who made it -has availed himself of certain forces of nature and properties -of matter, whereby he uses a portion of the energy that -pervades the universe. There is nothing within the machine -to which this energy communicates ideas that are to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_506" id="Page_506">[Pg 506]</a></span> -be the subject of its future voluntary operation. All is -comprehended in a fixed mechanical operation of certain -machinery, and, when we have analyzed and understood the -physical phenomena, we can follow them no further, because -there is no translation of the physical energy into -mental phenomena. But in ourselves there is such a -translation, and we must follow it into the mental phenomena. -So following it, we find ourselves in the presence -of a something which has a self-conscious individuality, -and which, by a mysterious bond of connection, is so -united with a physical organism that it is capable of receiving, -appropriating, and preserving the ideas which the -physical organism was designed to produce in it.</p> - -<p>My objection to Mr. Spencer's system of psychology -may be summed up in what I shall now say upon his chief -position, which is that "an idea is the psychical side of -what, on its physical side, is an involved set of molecular -changes, propagated through an involved set of nervous -plexuses." Translated into what I take to be his meaning, -the assertion, or hypothesis, is this: An idea is the mental -cognition of an external object, as, for example, a tree. -When we are looking at or thinking of a tree, we have a -mental cognition of a tree; and this idea of a tree is said -to be the psychical side of that which on its physical side -has been transmitted to our brain by molecular changes -through our visual nerves. The idea of the tree is the -psychical correlative of a wave of molecular motion diffused -through our organs of vision; and the conception of -a tree thus becomes a possible conception. But why did -not the learned philosopher follow the wave of molecular -motion until he found the impression of the object which -the visual organs have transmitted to the brain, or the -nerve-center, translated into a thought by an intelligent -being, capable, by its own organization, of having that -thought? Why does he speak of an idea as the psychical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_507" id="Page_507">[Pg 507]</a></span> -side of what, on its physical side, is one and the same -thing? Obviously, because he meant to ignore the psychical -or mental existence as an independent existence, or as any -existence at all. Now, there is no way in which the psychical -side and the physical side can be bridged over, excepting -by the hypothesis that the mind is an entity of -a peculiar nature, different in structure from the bodily -organism, but capable, by the connection between them, -of receiving and transmuting into thought the impressions -which the waves of molecular motion transmit to the brain -from the external object. To say that the set of plexuses, -or networks, which hold together the waves of molecular -motion, constitute the potentiality of the idea and make -possible future ideas like it, explains nothing. The potentiality -of the idea, or the possibility of ideas like it, depends -upon the existence of a something which is capable -of conceiving the idea, holding it, and reproducing it -to itself, after the waves of molecular motion cease. I call -this a process of translation, or transmutation, because -there is no other convenient term for it. It is a process -analogous to the physical assimilation of food by the organs -of physical digestion, with this difference, however, -that the action of the mental organism in the assimilation -of ideas is the action of a spiritual and intellectual organism -upon materials that are brought within its reach by the -means of communication with the external world afforded -by the physical senses and the nervous system. The image -of the tree produced upon the retina of the eye by the lines -of light that proceed from every point of that object is the -food which the mind assimilates and transmutes into the -idea of the tree; and this may remain as a permanent -mental perception or cognition, although the object itself -may have been seen but once. If seen many times, the -various aspects in which it has been seen are transmuted -into so many distinct ideas. If many kinds of trees, of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_508" id="Page_508">[Pg 508]</a></span> -different shapes and dimensions, have been seen, the varieties -become a part of our consciousness in the several degrees -of their precise resemblances and differences which -we happen to have observed, when the different impressions -were produced upon the retina. Can there be any doubt -that this is the process by which the infant begins to acquire -ideas of external objects, and that, as adolescence goes -on and the powers of sense expand with the growth and -exercise of the physical organs, there is a corresponding -growth and expansion of the mental powers?</p> - -<p>This hypothesis of the progress of mental growth, <i lang="la">paris -passibus</i> with the growth of the physical organism, brings -me to the consideration of one of those specimens of Mr. -Spencer's peculiar logic, in a passage in which he undertakes -to disprove the existence of mind as anything more -than what he calls the psychical side of physical impressions. -He is treating of the impossibility of our "knowing" -anything about the substance of mind; and he propounds -this impossibility in the following logical formula:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>...To know anything is to distinguish it as such or such—to -class it as of this or that order. An object is said to be but little -known when it is alien to objects of which we have had experience; -and it is said to be well known when there is great community of -attributes between it and objects of which we have had experience. -Hence, by implication, an object is completely known when this -recognized community is complete; and completely unknown when -there is no recognized community at all. Manifestly, then, the -smallest conceivable degree of knowledge implies at least two things -between which some community is recognized. But, if so, how can -we know the substance of mind? To know the substance of mind -is to be conscious of some community between it and some other -substance. If, with the idealist, we say that there exists no other -substance, then, necessarily, as there is nothing with which the -substance of mind can be even compared, much less assimilated, it -remains unknown; while, if we hold with the realist that being -is fundamentally divisible into that which is present to us as mind,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_509" id="Page_509">[Pg 509]</a></span> -and that which, lying outside of it, is not mind, then, as this proposition -itself asserts a difference and not a likeness, it is equally clear -that mind remains unclassable and therefore unknowable.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The answer to this supposed insuperable dilemma may -be made by determining what we mean when we speak of -knowing a thing. Definition of knowing is here essential, -and the first inquiry we have to make is whether, in order -to know mind, it is necessary to find and recognize some -community between the substance of mind and some other -substance? The statement is, on the one hand, that there -exists no other substance with which the substance of -mind can be compared, much less assimilated, and therefore -there is no aid to be derived from resemblance; or, on -the other hand, that, if being is fundamentally divisible -into something which is mind and something which is not -mind, we depend for a knowledge of mind on a difference, -and not on a likeness, and we have no means of knowing -that difference. Upon either proposition, mind remains -unclassable and therefore unknowable.</p> - -<p>It may be conceded that our knowledge of the properties -and forms of matter consists in recognizing a community -or a difference between things which belong to the -same class, so that there is a comparison between things -which are of the same substance. But what is to prevent -us from classifying the substance of mind, when the fundamental -idea of its substance is that it is something which -resembles no other substance, but constitutes a class or -description of being that stands entirely by itself, and in -which, for a knowledge of its properties we distinguish its -properties from those of any other substance? The only -difficulty that arises here springs from the fact that we -have but one word—substance—by which to speak of the -two existences that we call mind and matter; just as we -can only speak of an organism when we speak of the natural -body and the spiritual body. But this use of the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_510" id="Page_510">[Pg 510]</a></span> -term to express things which in our consciousness stand -fundamentally opposed to each other does not prevent us -from discriminating between the means by which we become -conscious of the two things, or from classifying the -knowledge which we have of mind as something distinct -from the knowledge which we have of matter.</p> - -<p>We must discriminate between the means by which the -properties of matter become known to us and the means by -which the properties of mind become known to us. In -both cases there is knowledge, but it is knowledge of a -different kind; it is obtained by different means; and we -must therefore recognize a fundamental difference between -the substance of mind and the substance of matter. It is -true that our knowledge of the properties of matter and -our knowledge of the properties of mind are alike in this, -that in both cases it is knowledge by one and the same person; -but the distinction is that, in the one case, I have -knowledge of objects external to myself, and, in the other -case, I have knowledge of myself as the person possessing -knowledge of external objects. The knowledge that we -have of ourselves is what most persons mean by consciousness, -and it is what we should scientifically understand -by that term, although consciousness is often used as -synonymous with mental cognition of things external to -ourselves, and as cognition of ourselves also.</p> - -<p>I shall now quote from the chapter in which Mr. Spencer -makes a special synthesis of reason, and in which he -denies the existence of the commonly assumed <em>hiatus</em> between -reason and instinct, maintaining that the former is -the continuation of the latter, because, as he thinks, the -highest forms of psychical activity arise little by little out -of the lowest and can not be separated from them. The -passage which I shall now analyze is this:</p> - -<p>"Here seems to be the fittest place for pointing out -how the general doctrine that has been developed supplies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_511" id="Page_511">[Pg 511]</a></span> -a reconciliation between the experience-hypothesis as commonly -interpreted and the hypothesis which the transcendentalists -oppose to it.</p> - -<p>"The universal law, that, other things equal, the cohesion -of psychical states is proportionate to the frequency -with which they have followed one another in experience, -supplies an explanation of the so-called 'forms of thought,' -as soon as it is supplemented by the law that habitual psychical -successions entail some hereditary tendency to such -successions, which, under persistent conditions, will become -cumulative in generation after generation. We saw that -the establishment of those compound reflex actions called -instincts is comprehensible on the principle that inner relations -are, by perpetual repetition, organized into correspondence -with outer relations. We have now to observe -that the establishment of those consolidated, those indissoluble, -those instinctive mental relations constituting our -ideas of space and time, is comprehensible on the same -principle.</p> - -<p>"For, if, even to external relations that are often experienced -during the life of a single organism, answering internal -relations are established that become next to automatic—if -such a combination of psychical changes as that -which guides a savage in hitting a bird with an arrow -becomes, by constant repetition, so organized as to be performed -almost without thought of the processes of adjustment -gone through—and if skill of this kind is so far transmissible -that particular races of men become characterized -by particular aptitudes, which are nothing else than partially -organized psychical connections; then, if there exist certain -external relations which are experienced by all organisms -at all instants of their waking lives—relations which are -absolutely constant, absolutely universal—there will be established -answering internal relations that are absolutely -constant, absolutely universal. Such relations we have in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_512" id="Page_512">[Pg 512]</a></span> -those of space and time. The organization of subjective -relations adjusted to these objective relations has been cumulative, -not in each race of creatures only, but throughout -successive races of creatures; and such subjective relations -have, therefore, become more consolidated than all others. -Being experienced in every perception and every action of -each creature, these connections among outer existences -must, for this reason, too, be responded to by connections -among inner feelings that are, above all others, indissoluble. -As the substrata of all other relations in the <em>non-ego</em>, -they must be responded to by conceptions that are the substrata -of all other relations in the <em>ego</em>. Being the constant -and infinitely repeated elements of thought, they must become -the automatic elements of thought—the elements of -thought which it is impossible to get rid of—the 'forms of -intuition.'</p> - -<p>"Such, it seems to me, is the only possible reconciliation -between the experience-hypothesis and the hypothesis of -the transcendentalists, neither of which is tenable by itself. -Insurmountable difficulties are presented by the Kantian -doctrine (as we shall hereafter see); and the antagonist -doctrine, taken alone, presents difficulties that are equally -insurmountable. To rest with the unqualified assertion -that, antecedent to experience, the mind is a blank, is to -ignore the questions: Whence comes the power of organizing -experiences? Whence arise the different degrees of -that power possessed by different races of organisms, and -different individuals of the same race? If, at birth, there -exists nothing but a passive receptivity of impressions, why -is not a horse as educable as a man? Should it be said -that language makes the difference, then why do not the -cat and the dog, reared in the same household, arrive at -equal degrees and kinds of intelligence? Understood in -its current form, the experience-hypothesis implies that -the presence of a definitely organized nervous system is a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_513" id="Page_513">[Pg 513]</a></span> -circumstance of no moment—a fact not needing to be taken -into account! Yet it is the all-important fact—the fact to -which, in one sense, the criticisms of Leibnitz and others -pointed—the fact without which an assimilation of experiences -is inexplicable.</p> - -<p>"Throughout the animal kingdom in general the actions -are dependent on the nervous structure. The physiologist -shows us that each reflex movement implies the agency of -certain nerves and ganglia; that a development of complicated -instincts is accompanied by complication of the nervous -centers and their commissural connections; that the -same creature in different stages, as larva and imago, for -example, changes its instincts as its nervous structure -changes; and that, as we advance to creatures of high intelligence, -a vast increase in the size and in the complexity -of the nervous system takes place. What is the obvious -inference? It is that the ability to co-ordinate impressions -and to perform the appropriate actions always implies the -pre-existence of certain nerves arranged in a certain way. -What is the meaning of the human brain? It is that the -many <em>established</em> relations among its parts stand for so many -<em>established</em> relations among the psychical changes. Each -of the constant connections among the fibers of the cerebral -masses answers to some constant connection of phenomena -in the experiences of the race. Just as the organized arrangement -subsisting between the sensory nerves of the -nostrils and the motor nerves of the respiratory muscles -not only makes possible a sneeze, but also, in the newly -born infant, implies sneezings to be hereafter performed, -so, all the organized arrangements subsisting among the -nerves of the infant's brain not only make possible certain -combinations of impressions, but also imply that such combinations -will hereafter be made, imply that there are answering -combinations in the outer world, imply a preparedness -to cognize these combinations, imply faculties of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_514" id="Page_514">[Pg 514]</a></span> -comprehending them. It is true that the resulting compound -psychical changes do not take place with the same -readiness and automatic precision as the simple reflex action -instanced; it is true that some individual experiences seem -required to establish them. But, while this is partly due -to the fact that these combinations are highly involved, extremely -varied in their modes of occurrence, made up, therefore, -of psychical relations less completely coherent, and -hence need further repetitions to perfect them, it is in a -much greater degree due to the fact that at birth the organization -of the brain is incomplete, and does not cease -its spontaneous progress for twenty or thirty years afterward. -Those who contend that knowledge results wholly -from the experiences of the individual, ignoring as they do -the mental evolution which accompanies the autogenous -development of the nervous system, fall into an error as -great as if they were to ascribe all bodily growth and structure -to exercise, forgetting the innate tendency to assume -the adult form. Were the infant born with a full-sized and -completely constructed brain, their position would be less -untenable. But, as the case stands, the gradually increasing -intelligence displayed throughout childhood and youth -is more attributable to the completion of the cerebral organization -than to the individual experiences—a truth -proved by the fact that in adult life there is sometimes displayed -a high endowment of some faculty which, during -education, was never brought into play. Doubtless, experiences -received by the individual furnish the concrete materials -for all thought. Doubtless, the organized and semi-organized -arrangements existing among the cerebral nerves -can give no knowledge until there has been a presentation -of the external relations to which they correspond. And, -doubtless, the child's daily observations and reasonings aid -the formation of those involved nervous connections that -are in process of spontaneous evolution, just as its daily<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_515" id="Page_515">[Pg 515]</a></span> -gambols aid the development of its limbs. But saying this -is quite a different thing from saying that its intelligence is -wholly <em>produced</em> by its experiences. That is an utterly inadmissible -doctrine—a doctrine which makes the presence -of a brain meaningless—a doctrine which makes idiocy -unaccountable.</p> - -<p>"In the sense, then, that there exist in the nervous system -certain pre-established relations answering to relations -in the environment, there is truth in the doctrine of -'forms of intuition'—not the truth which its defenders -suppose, but a parallel truth. Corresponding to absolute -external relations, there are established in the structure -of the nervous system absolute internal relations—relations -that are potentially present before birth in the shape of -definite nervous connections, that are antecedent to, and -independent of, individual experiences, and that are automatically -disclosed along with the first cognitions. And, -as here understood, it is not only these fundamental relations -which are thus predetermined, but also hosts of other -relations of a more or less constant kind, which are congenitally -represented by more or less complete nervous -connections. But these predetermined internal relations, -though independent of the experiences of the individual, -are not independent of experiences in general: they have -been determined by the experiences of preceding organisms. -The corollary here drawn from the general argument is -that the human brain is an organized register of infinitely -numerous experiences received during the evolution of life, -or, rather, during the evolution of that series of organisms -through which the human organism has been reached. -The effects of the most uniform and frequent of these experiences -have been successively bequeathed, principal and -interest; and have slowly amounted to that high intelligence -which lies latent in the brain of the infant—which -the infant in after-life exercises and perhaps strengthens<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_516" id="Page_516">[Pg 516]</a></span> -or further complicates, and which, with minute additions, -it bequeaths to future generations; and thus it happens -that the European inherits from twenty to thirty cubic -inches more brain than the Papuan. Thus it happens that -faculties, as of music, which scarcely exist in some inferior -human races, become congenital in superior ones. Thus it -happens that out of savages unable to count up to the -number of their fingers, and speaking a language containing -only nouns and verbs, arise at length our Newtons and -Shakespeares."<a name="FNanchor_150" id="FNanchor_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a></p> - -<p>The learned philosopher has here dealt with two hypotheses, -neither of which he considers tenable by itself. -The first is that the individual mind, anterior to experience, -is a blank; that at birth there exists nothing but a -passive receptivity of impressions, which become organized -into intelligence by experience. The other hypothesis is -that of the transcendental school, which attributes the -growth of intelligence wholly to implanted intuitions, -which become expanded by the increase of mental power. -His argument is put thus: If at birth the mind of the individual -is a blank, and it becomes capable of thought or -possessed of intelligence by experience, beginning with a -passive receptivity of impressions, and going on to their -organization into intelligence by the repetition of experiences -and their increasing complexity—why, he asks, is -not a horse as educable as a man? Why do not the cat -and the dog, reared in the same household and hearing -human beings use language every moment of their lives, -arrive at equal degrees and kinds of intelligence? In the -first place, as a matter of fact, many animals are educable -beyond their natural capacity of intelligence, or beyond the -point at which they would arrive without such education, -to a very remarkable degree. I have heard a credible de<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_517" id="Page_517">[Pg 517]</a></span>scription -of a dog which would ascend to a chamber and -bring down an article that he had been told to bring. -Many repetitions of the command and the performance had -taught the animal to associate the name of the article which -he was to bring down with the act which he was to perform. -While I am writing, a bear beneath my window is -going through performances, at the word of command, -of very considerable varieties; actions which he would not -do if he had not been trained to do them. The trained -war-horse knows the meaning of the different airs played -on the bugle upon the battle-field or the parade-ground, -and instantly charges or wheels about, without waiting to -be prompted by the bit or the spur. Insects can be trained, -to some extent, in the same way; birds to a much greater -extent. Is the explanation of these capacities to be found -in a definitely organized nervous system as the all-important -fact without which an assimilation of experiences is -inexplicable? Grant that, as we advance from creatures of -very low to creatures of very high intelligence, we find a -vast increase in the size and complexity of the nervous system -taking place through the series, until we arrive at its -highest and most complex development in man. What is -the hypothesis which explains the difference in mental -power between man and all the other creatures below him -in the capability of co-ordinating impressions and performing -the appropriate actions? It is, according to Mr. Spencer, -that the capability implies the existence of certain -nerves arranged in a certain way; that where this arrangement -does not exist the capability is not found; and where -it exists in only a low degree the capability exists only in the -same degree. As two parallel and concurring facts these -may be conceded. But why are not these facts entirely -consistent with another hypothesis, namely, that to each -creature, along with its specially organized nervous system, -there has been given by divine appointment a certain de<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_518" id="Page_518">[Pg 518]</a></span>gree -of innate mental power, to explain which we must -follow the impressions produced in the nervous system into -their transmutation into intelligence, until we arrive at the -limit of that intelligence? Mr. Spencer's answer to this -inquiry is twofold: first, that the experience-hypothesis, -in the case of the individual creature, or the constant repetition -of the impressions and the appropriate actions, is -insufficient to account for what takes place, without recognizing -the fact that the actions are dependent on the nervous -structure, without which the impressions would not be -followed by the actions; second, that the nervous structure -in the different races of animals has come to be what it is in -each race by gradual modifications and increments through -the process of evolution of organisms out of one another, -and that these accumulations have resulted in the human -brain, which has the highest power of co-ordinating the -impressions and performing the appropriate actions. Then -he puts, with an air of final solution, the question, "What -is the human brain?" which he answers in his own way.</p> - -<p>His mode of answering this question is that the brain -is an organ with established relations among its parts, which -stand for so many established relations among the psychical -changes. I understand this to mean, that as the human -brain, in the process of animal evolution, has come to have -certain constant connections among the fibers of the cerebral -masses, each of these connections answers to some constant -connection of phenomena in the experiences of the -race. His corollary is that the human brain is an organized -register of infinitely numerous experiences received by the -race during the evolution of life, or during the evolution of -that series of organisms through which the human organism -has been reached. Each infant of the human race, to -whom has descended this improved and perfect brain, has -latent in that organ a high capacity for intelligence. This -it begins to exercise and strengthen and further compli<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_519" id="Page_519">[Pg 519]</a></span>cate -as life goes on, and at the end of twenty or thirty years -the individual brain is fully developed, and this development, -or capacity for development, the individual bequeaths -with minute additions, principal and interest, to -future generations. In different races of men the cubic -bulk of the brain varies greatly, according to the size transmitted -from ancestors; and so certain faculties which -scarcely exist in some races become congenital in others; and -whereas the remote ancestors of all of us were savages, incapable -even of conceiving of numbers, and possessing but -the rudest elements of language, there have at length arisen -our Newtons and Shakespeares.</p> - -<p>This hypothesis leads me to ask a question and to state -a fact. The question is, What is it in the infant of the -most developed and cultivated race that constitutes the -high intelligence which is said to lie latent in his brain? -In other words, is there nothing in that infant, or in the -adult which he becomes, but a brain and a nervous system -of a highly organized and complex physical structure adapted -to receive impressions on itself from without? Are the experiences -which have been enjoyed by the progenitors of the -human infant or by preceding organisms registered in his -brain, and is his capacity of intelligence dependent on his -having inherited the same or nearly the same volume of -brain as that which was possessed by his progenitors? And -does the intelligence consist, in degree or in kind, in nothing -but a repetition of the same experiences as those -through which his progenitors were carried, or is there a -something in him to which his individual experiences contribute -the mental food by which the mind is nourished -and by the assimilation of which its individual intellectual -growth becomes possible?</p> - -<p>It is not necessary to question the fact that individuals -of great intellect, the Newtons and the Shakespeares, have -had or may have had large brains; or the fact that, as be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_520" id="Page_520">[Pg 520]</a></span>tween -races of men, the most intelligent have brains of -greater cubic measure than the less intelligent. But it has -not always been found that individuals of superior intellect -have had comparatively larger brains than other individuals, -nor that those who have had very large brains have -transmitted them to their children. The important fact -to which I meant to advert is that, since we have known -much about the human brain and the nervous system connected -with it, it has not been found that, in its several -parts and in the action of the nerves connected with it, it -has been differently organized and acted upon in the lowest -savages from what we know of it in the European and the -most civilized races. There is a difference in volume, but -not in the organization or the office of the brain in different -races of men, as there is in different individuals of the -same race. The fact that all men, since they became a -completed type of animal, however they originated and became -men, have possessed a capacity to become in different -degrees intelligent and thinking beings, points strongly to -the conclusion that while in each individual there is a nervous -system so organized as to transmit impressions from external -objects to the central physical organ called the brain, -there must be another existence in that individual, of a -spiritual and intellectual nature, of a substance that is -not physical, to which the brain supplies the materials of -thought, thought being mental cognition of an idea. If I -am asked for the proof of such an existence, I answer that -the proof is consciousness, as I define it, and this I conceive -is the highest kind of proof.</p> - -<p>One may appeal to the convictions of mankind for an -answer to the question, What is the highest and most satisfactory -kind of knowledge that any of us possess? The -most intelligent man may be mistaken in that part of self-knowledge -that relates to his own character or motives. -Others may see him very differently from the light in which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_521" id="Page_521">[Pg 521]</a></span> -he sees himself, and they may be right and he may be -wrong. He may think, too, that he knows a great deal -that he does not know; but no intelligent man is mistaken -or in any way deluded when he believes in his own existence. -No man in his waking moments and in his right -mind ever confounded his own identity, as we have seen -that Lady Macbeth did when she was walking in her sleep, -with the identity of another person. No man in his right -mind loses the constant, ever-present sense of himself as -a being and as one distinct from all other beings. The -reason is that his own existence is certified to him by the -most unerring of witnesses, one who can not lie, because -the fact of one's own existence is the fact of which that -witness must speak. Of all other facts the witness may -speak falsely. The mind can not speak falsely when it -speaks to us of our own existence, for the witness who speaks -and the person spoken to are one and the same. The falsehood, -if there could be a falsehood, would be instantly detected.</p> - -<p>As the mind certifies to itself its own existence by the -most direct and the highest kind of proof, so it certifies to -itself the powers with which it is endowed; and this brings -me to the anatomical examination of the structure of the -mind. I shall not make this analysis a very minute one, -but shall confine it to those distinct elementary powers -which are constituted by systems, as the powers of the -bodily organism are constituted by systems distinguishable -by the functions which they perform. In the bodily organism -we recognize the digestive system, the system of -circulation of the blood, the muscular system, the nervous -system, the sensory system, which is distributed into the different -organs of sense, the male and female systems of sexual -generation, and the female system of gestation. These -several systems, acting together as one complex mechanism -endowed with the mysterious principle of life, form in each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_522" id="Page_522">[Pg 522]</a></span> -human being of either sex the physical existence of the individual. -Acting in each individual of either sex simultaneously -and with mutual involved interdependencies, -they form a whole which, in its several parts and their -functions, may be likened to the several parts and functions -in one of those machines which we ourselves construct—with -this difference, however, that in one life is present -and in the other it is not. The fundamental question is -whether this complex animal mechanism, thus constituted -of certain physical systems, also constitutes during this life -the entire individual. If so, the individual existence is a -unit, and, when the physical organism perishes by what we -call death, the individual existence ceases. If, on the contrary, -we have satisfactory proof that there is, during this -life, in each individual an organized and extended entity, -composed, like the systems of the bodily organisms, of certain -systems of its own but of a substance that is not material, -then the existence of each individual is a dual existence; -and one of the two existences now associated and acting together -may be dissolved into its original material elements, -while the other, composed of a different substance, may be -indissoluble and have an endless life. There is no middle -ground that I can perceive between these two hypotheses. -One or the other of them is absolutely true, independent -of the inquiry as to the mode in which mind came to exist; -for after going through with all the reasoning and all -the proofs that are supposed to show its origin by the process -called evolution, we must still come back to the question -of what mind is after it has come into existence; must -determine on which side lies the preponderating probability -of its continuance after the death of the body; and must -accept the conclusion of its destruction or cessation when -the body dies, or the other conclusion that it is unlike the -body in its substance, and therefore indestructible by the -means which destroy the body. For this reason we must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_523" id="Page_523">[Pg 523]</a></span> -examine the mind for proof that it is an organism of a special -nature because composed of a special substance, and -this proof is to be reached by an analysis of the systems of -which the mind is composed. I select, of course, for the -purposes of this analysis, any individual whose physical and -mental faculties have had the average development into the -condition that is called a sound mind in a sound body—<i lang="la">mens -sana in corpore sano</i>. I shall treat incidentally of -the condition of idiocy.</p> - -<p>We may classify the distinct systems of the mind, with -their several functions, as easily as we can classify the distinct -systems of our physical structure and their functions. -I have seen the systems of the mind distributed into five; -and although I do not adopt the whole analysis made by -the writer to whom I refer, or make use of the same terminology, -I shall follow his classification because it is -one which any thinking person must recognize as a description -of mental powers of which he is conscious.<a name="FNanchor_151" id="FNanchor_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a> We are -all aware that we possess the following mental systems in -which inhere certain elementary powers that are mental -powers:</p> - -<p>1. A sensory system, by which the mind takes impressions -from matter.</p> - -<p>2. A system of intellectual faculties, such as reason, -imagination, reflection, combination of ideas, discrimination -between different ideas.</p> - -<p>3. A system of emotions, or susceptibilities to pleasure -or pain, of a moral and intellectual nature as distinguished -from the pleasurable or painful excitation of our nerves.</p> - -<p>4. A system of desires, which prompt us to wish for -and acquire some good, or to avoid some evil.</p> - -<p>5. A system of affections, which prompt us to like or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_524" id="Page_524">[Pg 524]</a></span> -dislike persons, things, situations, and whatever is attractive -or unattractive, as the case may be.</p> - -<p>A little further analysis of each of these systems will -explain why they are respectively to be thus classified as -distinguishable organic powers or functions of the human -mind:</p> - -<p><em>First.</em> The mind is placed as a recipient in correspondence -with the material universe through the nerves of sensation -and the special corporeal organs, whereby the properties -of matter become to some extent known to us. As -the power of the physical senses to obtain for us a knowledge -of the properties of matter is limited, even when our -senses are in the utmost state of their normal capacity, -there may be properties of matter which will never become -known to us in our present existence. But certain of its -properties do become known to us, and we are perfectly -aware that this takes place through our physical organs of -sense, which convey to our mental reception certain impressions. -This power of the mind, therefore, to receive such -impressions, to retain and transmute them into thought, is -to be recognized as a power exerted by means of an organic -physical contrivance and an organic mental structure, the -two acting together, the resultant being the mind's faculty -for receiving ideas from the external world. Let us suppose, -then, that the bodily senses are impaired by the partial -destruction of their organs. It does not follow that -the knowledge which has been derived from them, when -they were in full activity, is destroyed; all that happens -is that we acquire no more of such knowledge by the same -means, or do not acquire it so readily and completely. If -the destruction of the physical senses is so complete as it becomes -when death of the whole body takes place, the materials -derived from the impressions conveyed to the mind -from external objects during life have been transmuted -into ideas and thoughts, and, as that which holds the ideas<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_525" id="Page_525">[Pg 525]</a></span> -and the thoughts is of a substance unlike in nature to the -substance of the physical organs which conveyed the impressions, -the rational conclusion is that the ideas and -thoughts will continue to be held by it, after the dissolution -of the body, as they were held while the body was in -full life.</p> - -<p><em>Second.</em> I recognize in the mind a system of intellectual -faculties. Of intellect, I should say that the ascertainment -of truth is its primary function; and hence I -should say that the power of retaining permanent possession -of truth already ascertained is the means by which we -maintain continued ascertainment, or the utilization of -truth already ascertained.<a name="FNanchor_152" id="FNanchor_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> For the exercise of this power -of ascertaining, holding, applying, and expressing truth—the -processes of intellect—we have three recognized faculties. -These are the intuitive faculty; the faculty of association -or combination; and the introspective faculty, or the capacity -to look inward upon the processes of our own minds. -The philosophers who maintain that all our knowledge is -derived from experience admit neither the intuitive faculty -nor the fact of intuition. On the other hand, the -philosophers who maintain, as Mr. Spencer does, that the -brain of every infant is an organized register of the experiences -of his ancestors, do not allow of the existence of any -intuitions as facts in the individual life of the infant, because -they regard the individual experiences of the infant -as mere repetitions of former experiences that took place in -its progenitors. But rightly regarded the true meaning -of the intuitive faculty is this: that at the instant when a -new sensory impression is received by the infant, or the -adult, there is an innate and implanted power which comes -into play, by which is asserted the reality of that from -which the sensory impression is received. This power, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_526" id="Page_526">[Pg 526]</a></span> -intuitive faculty, is infallible. It was ordained as the -means by which a sensory impression becomes to us a reality. -We are so constructed, mentally, that we must believe -those primary facts which the sensory impressions -certify to us to be facts. On the veracity of this certification -we are absolutely dependent, because we can not contradict -the affirmations of reality which causation makes -to our intuitive mental perceptions. On this veracity we -risk our lives; we could not be safe if we were not subjected -to this belief. Intuition, therefore, is something -anterior to experience; it is that power by which the first -experience and the last become to us the means of belief in -a reality. This is a power that can belong to and inhere -in a spiritual organism alone. We must, therefore, recognize -in the infant this original implanted endowment, the -capacity to be mentally convinced of realities; and while, -in order to meet the first exercise of this capacity there must be -a physical organism which will conduct the sensory impressions -to the brain and a brain that will receive them, the -capacity of the infant to have its first conviction of the -reality certified to it by the sensory impression is at once -the capacity of an intellectual being, and a necessity imposed -upon him by the law of his existence. Idiocy, when -complete, is the absence of this capacity, by reason of some -failure of connection between the brain, as the central recipient -of sensory impressions, and the mind which should -receive and transmute those impressions into thought. We -are scarcely warranted in regarding the idiot as a human -animal possessed of no mind whatever. The absolute idiot -should be defined as a human creature whom we can not -educate at all—in whom we can awaken no intelligence; -but we are not therefore authorized in believing that there -is no provision whatever for the development of intelligence -after the mere physical life of the body is ended. Absolute -idiocy, or what, from our as yet imperfect means of devel<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_527" id="Page_527">[Pg 527]</a></span>oping -intelligence in such unfortunate persons we must -regard as at present absolute, is probably very rare. Between -human creatures so born and those vast multitudes -in whom average intelligence is developed by surrounding -influences, whatever they may be, there are various degrees -of the capacity for development; and what happens in -these intermediate cases proves that there are different degrees -in which the connection between the physical and the -mental organism is established at birth, so that in some the -connection may be said to be abnormal and imperfect, -while in the enormous majority it is at least so nearly normal -and complete that intelligence may be developed.</p> - -<p>Here, then, is the place to advert to Mr. Spencer's assertion -that the doctrine that intelligence in the human being -is wholly produced by experience is utterly inadmissible; -that it makes the presence of a brain meaningless, and -idiocy unaccountable. A doctrine which imputes the development -of intelligence <em>wholly</em> to the experience of the -individual is of course untenable. There must be a brain -and a nervous system; but we are not warranted, in the -case of the idiot, in assuming that he has a differently organized -brain and nervous system from those of his parents -or others of the human race, as Mr. Spencer appears to me -to assume. What we are warranted in believing is that -while the brain and nervous system of the idiot child may -be just as complete in his structure as in those of the parents, -there has somehow occurred, from some cause, antecedent -in some cases to birth, but operating after birth in -other cases, a failure of the adequate connection between -the brain and the mind, so that intelligence can not be developed -at all, or can be developed but partially. The individual -may have inherited just as good an "organized -register" of the experience of his ancestors—just as good a -natural brain as his brothers and sisters who are perhaps -highly intelligent from their birth, or capable of becoming<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_528" id="Page_528">[Pg 528]</a></span> -intelligent. Yet he lacks the ability to co-ordinate impressions -and to perform the actions appropriate to those impressions, -because there has failed to be established in him -the necessary connection between the impressions and the -sensory intellectual system which constitutes one organic -part of the mind. The experiences, however often repeated, -of the impressions produced by his physical senses -on his brain, remain there as corporeal feelings. They -reach no further. They do not become transmuted into -ideas, and so intelligence can not be developed, or is developed -but to a very feeble extent. Instead of saying that -"the gradually increasing intelligence displayed throughout -childhood is more attributable to the completion of the -cerebral organization than to the individual experiences," -I should say that it is most attributable to the presence of -an established connection between the function of the cerebral -organization and the mental receptivity of impressions, -which is not merely passive, but is incessantly active because -incessantly receiving, and that, where this connection -is wanting, the receptivity, although it may exist, can not -become active, and so intelligence can not be developed in -this life. But there may be another state of existence, in -which the mind of the idiot, no longer dependent on a -physical organization of brain and nervous system for the -reception of ideas and for intellectual growth, but retaining -its capacity for mental development, may begin and carry -on such development by other means; whereas, if the brain -and the nervous system constitute all there is of any human -being, whether born an idiot or born capable of intellectual -growth through his individual experiences, he can have no -future after that brain and nervous system are destroyed, -unless we suppose that mind is something that has been -developed out of matter into a spiritual existence—a supposition -which is to me inconceivable.</p> - -<p>The second of the intellectual faculties is the associa<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_529" id="Page_529">[Pg 529]</a></span>tive, -or that intuitive power by which ideas are combined -and associated or held in disjunction and separation. I -regard this as an intuitive faculty, because, as our observation -teaches us, its presence and power, manifested at the -first dawning of infantile intelligence, are attested by every -exercise of the organs through which the external world -reaches our minds, to the last moment of our mortal existence. -Experience is, of course, necessary to the first action -of this intuitive faculty. This is only another way of saying -that there must occur a sensory impression upon the -brain which becomes transmuted into the idea of the external -object, and then a repetition of that impression produces -a repetition of the idea, and the associative faculty -combines or disjoins them. But unless there exists an intuitive -power, inherent in the intellective system, whereby -the first idea and the second can be associated and compared, -there can be no knowledge, no acquisition of truth, -because the sensory impressions will stop in the brain as so -many feelings excited through the nervous system, instead -of being transmuted into thought.</p> - -<p>The introspective faculty, on the other hand, does not -deal solely with sensory impressions, or with the ideas -which they have suggested. It is that power of the mind -by which it can look inward upon itself. This is seemingly -a paradox; but nevertheless, the existence of such a -faculty is a necessary hypothesis, not only because we are -conscious of it, but because without it we could have no -means of analyzing our own mental structure, although we -could make some very partial analysis of the mind of another -individual by studying his actions. As regards ourselves, -it is as if our visual organs possessed the power of -looking at the process by which an image of an external -object is impressed upon the retina and is thence transmitted -to the brain, where the sensory impression is produced. -This, of course, is a physical impossibility. All we can do<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_530" id="Page_530">[Pg 530]</a></span> -is to examine the physical structure of the eye, with its -wonderful provision of lenses and other means for the reception -and the effect of light, and to reason upon what we -can discover that the process of what is called seeing must -be thus or thus. But that process itself we can not see by -the same organs by which it is carried on. In the case of -the mind, however—and herein is one of the remarkable -proofs of its unlikeness as an organism to the bodily organism—there -is a power to witness, to observe, to be sensible -of its own operations. This power, like all the other -mental powers, may be very feeble in some individuals, for -want of exercise, but in others, from long and frequent exercise, -it may become exceedingly vigorous, and be the -means of advancing mental philosophy if its observations -are preserved and recorded. It is one of the systems which, -as a whole, constitute the spiritual organism to which we -give the name of mind. Such a capacity can not be predicated -of a physical organism. It is impossible for us to -conceive of a machine standing and looking upon its own -operations, speculating upon their improvement, or thinking -of the relation of its mechanism to the human author -of its being. It is equally impossible for us to think of the -body of man contemplating its own existence, or being sensible -of it; but it is perfectly easy to conceive of its being -known to the mind that inhabits it, which takes cognizance -both of its own operations and of the operations of the -physical organism, reflects upon them separately or in their -action upon one another, and spontaneously refers both to -an author.</p> - -<p><em>Third.</em> I have placed third in the category of mental -systems the system of emotions or susceptibilities to mental -pleasure or pain, as distinguished from the pleasurable or -painful excitation of our nervous system. No one can -doubt that, however powerful may be the influence upon -our mental states of physical pain or physical sensations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_531" id="Page_531">[Pg 531]</a></span> -that are pleasurable, there is such a thing as mental pain -and mental pleasure, satisfaction or dissatisfaction, wholly -unconnected with and in no way dependent upon our corporeal -feelings, present or past. It is from this susceptibility -to mental pain or pleasure that we come to have the -idea of goodness or badness, which is originally a classification -of the qualities of external things as good or bad; the -good being those which affect us pleasurably, and the bad -those which affect us painfully. By our mental organization -we are placed in such correspondence with the material -universe, that things apart from ourselves affect us -agreeably or disagreeably; sights, sounds, odors, and tastes -give us pleasure or pain. We are also placed in correspondence -with the spiritual universe, and thereby certain acts, -relations, and traits of character give us pleasure, or the -reverse. In process of time, the youth whose mental systems -are in the course of expansion comes to perceive that -his own acts give him pleasure or pain, and hence he derives -the perception of good or bad qualities in himself. -Moral goodness in ourselves—goodness of disposition, of -intention, of volition, of habit—is found to be distinct from -physical and intellectual goodness; and thus the consciousness -of moral goodness becomes the intellectual faculty to -which moral commands can be addressed, with a prospect -that the connection between obedience and happiness will -be perceived. This susceptibility to mental pain or pleasure, -from the qualities of external things, from the acts and -dispositions of other persons, and from our own, is one that -can inhere in a mental organization, but it can not possibly -inhere in a physical organism. The physical organism is -undoubtedly the means by which the mental susceptibility -to pleasure or pain is reached from the external universe; -but, unless there is a mental organism to feel the pleasure -or the pain, the action of the physical organization is nothing -but the excitation of the nervous system. I, therefore,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_532" id="Page_532">[Pg 532]</a></span> -make a distinct class among the mental systems, and assign -to it the faculty of experiencing mental pleasure or mental -pain as a capacity distinct from the pleasurable or painful -excitation of our nerves.</p> - -<p><em>Fourth.</em> In the category of mental systems may be placed -those desires which lead us to wish for and strive to obtain -some good or to avoid some evil. This, surely, is not to -be regarded as anything but an intellectual perception of -what is to us a good or an evil. It is a structural capacity -of the soul which, after an experience of that which we -learn to be good for us, or the reverse of good, is always -prompting us to take the steps or to perform the acts which -will insure a repetition of that experience, in the acquisition -of further good or the avoidance of further evil. Its -operations may be perverted. We may, from bad habits or -erroneous ideas of good and evil, pursue objects that are -pernicious. But whether we strive for that which is truly -good, or is deceptively regarded as a good, we are perpetually -acting under the impulse of a desire that is implanted -in us, and that operates as a desire whether its objects are -worthy or unworthy, beneficial or injurious, noxious or innoxious -to our moral health.</p> - -<p><em>Fifth</em>, and lastly, we may classify the affections as one -of the structural systems of our spiritual existence. It is -that part of our natures that makes us like or dislike both -persons and things; and, in regard to the former, it is the -capacity for love in its high distinction from the physical -appetite of sexual passion. The range of its operation is -most various and multiform, but throughout all of its -operations it is a spiritual capacity, implanted in us for -our happiness as spiritual beings.</p> - -<p>If it is objected that this is an arbitrary classification—that -as an analysis of structural systems in our mental organization -it bears no analogy to the anatomical exploration -and classification of the structural systems of our phys<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_533" id="Page_533">[Pg 533]</a></span>ical -organism—the answer is, that in regard to the latter -we make the examination by the exercise of our corporeal -senses, chiefly by the visual organs, as we do in the case of -all other organized matter. In analyzing the structural -organization of our minds, we are examining a subject that -is not laid bare to the inspection of any of our corporeal -organs; the scalpel in the hand of the dissector can afford -us no aid in this investigation, but the inspection must be -carried on by turning the eye of the mind inward upon -itself. This we are mentally constituted to do. While, -therefore, it may be true that the classification which I -have made, or which may have been made by others, of the -structural mental systems, is in one sense arbitrary, and -while in any method of describing them they may run into -or overlap one another in a complex organism, it will always -remain true that the mind is capable of such examinations, -and that the analysis, however given, is useful to -the comprehension of the mind as an organized and extended -entity. No one can carry on this mental examination -without perceiving that he is examining a something -which has an independent existence and a life of its own, -whether he supposes it to have been evolved out of organized -matter, or embraces the idea of its distinct and special -creation by an exercise of the Divine Will.</p> - -<p>The two main hypotheses concerning the origin of mind -may now be contrasted. In the long process of development -of animal organisms out of one another there come -to be, it is said, higher and higher degrees of intelligence, -as the nervous system becomes more and more capable of -complex impressions, until we arrive at the consummate -physical organization and the supreme intelligence of the -human race. The physical organization is open to our examination, -and we find the human brain divided into cerebral -masses, with ganglia of sensory nerves extending to -the external sensory organs. Intelligence is the faculty of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_534" id="Page_534">[Pg 534]</a></span> -comprehending by previous preparation the combinations -of impressions made on the brain through the sensory -nerves. The brain being an organized register in which -the experiences of progenitors have accumulated a high degree -of this faculty, each human infant born into the world -comes into it with a prepared capacity to acquire the combinations -of impressions produced in his individual experience. -Transmitted from generation to generation, this -inherited capacity becomes the means by which each individual -manifests and enjoys what we call intelligence; and -the resulting aggregate of all the faculties thus called into -exercise is what we denominate mind. It must be observed, -however, that this theory or explanation of the origin of -mind, rejecting the hypothesis of its special creation as a -being of a spiritual nature, assumes it to be a something -which has been developed out of the growth and improvement -of a physical organism. When you inquire whether -the nature of this something is supposed to be a product of -a different substance from matter, although developed out -of matter, you are left without an answer; and when you -press the inquiry whether a spiritual existence can be conceived -as having grown out of the action of a physical organism, -you are told that there are no means of determining -what a spiritual existence is, because there is nothing -with which you can compare it so as to ascertain what it -resembles or what it does not resemble. Or if there are -some who accept the evolution theory of the origin of mind, -and who think it possible that a spiritual existence can -owe its origin to the action of matter without any intervention -of a creating power purposely giving existence to a -spiritual essence, you have to ask a question to which you -can only get this answer: that it has pleased the Almighty -Being to establish a system by which a spiritual in contradistinction -to a physical existence has been developed in -countless ages out of the action of material substances or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_535" id="Page_535">[Pg 535]</a></span>ganized -into definite systems and endowed with the principle -of life. Those who assume this hypothesis must necessarily -assume also that the spiritual existence is, after it has -come into being, an existence distinct from the physical -organism, although generated out of it, and then they must -encounter the further inquiry as to the probability of the -supposed method of production resorted to by the Supreme -Being.</p> - -<p>More than once in the course of our colloquies I have -had occasion to say that, in all our inquiries of this nature, -whether in regard to the origin of our physical organism or -that of our mental existence, we must constantly bear in -mind the unbounded capacity of the Creator to adopt any -method of production whatever; that it is just as much -within his power to call things of the most opposite natures -into existence by a single word as it is to establish methods -by which they shall be developed through innumerable ages -of what we call time. That the Being who is supposed to -preside over the universe and to hold this unlimited power -is an hypothesis I readily admit; but I affirm that his existence -and attributes are necessary postulates, without which -there can be no reasoning concerning the origin of anything. -Whether that Being exists and possesses the attributes -which we impute to him I have all along said is a -matter of which we must be satisfied by independent proofs -before we undertake to investigate his probable methods.</p> - -<p>The hypothesis of the origin of mind which I now mean -to contrast with that of the evolutionists may be stated as -follows: It is a rational deduction, from all that we know -of our physical organism, that procreation of new individuals -of that organism by the sexual union of male and female -was established as the means of continuing the species of -animal known as man. When or how established is not -a material part of the inquiry that I now make. It may -have been that the division of the sexes came about by a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_536" id="Page_536">[Pg 536]</a></span> -very slow process, or it may have been by the aboriginal -creation of a completed pair, male and female. However -or whenever it came to exist, there came to be one uniform -method of bringing into existence new individuals of a -peculiar and perfectly distinguishable animal type. If we -confine our attention to the physical organism of man, it -is perfectly apparent that when procreation and gestation -take place they happen because of the established law that -a new individual of this species of animal shall be produced -by the sexual union of two other individuals, male and female, -and that the new individual shall have the same physical -organism as the parents. A new physical life thus -springs out of two other physical lives by a process the -secret of which we can not detect, although we can trace it -through some of its stages so far as to see that there is a -secret process by which two physical organisms give existence -to another physical organism of the same type and -having the same principle of life.</p> - -<p>As the new individual animal grows into further development, -we find that along with his animal organism and -united with it by a tie which we can not see, but about -which we can reason, there is apparently present a kind of -life that is something more than the life of the body. The -further we carry our investigations of the phenomena which -indicate the existence of this mental life, the more we become -convinced that it is the life of a spiritual organism. -As the Creator had the power to give existence to the corporeal -organism, why had he not an equal power to give -existence to a spiritual organism? If he established the -law of sexual union between a male and a female in order -to perpetuate the type of animal to which they belong—the -law which gives existence to a new individual of that animal -type every time that a new conception and a new birth take -place—why should he not have established the collateral -law that every time there is a new birth of an infant there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_537" id="Page_537">[Pg 537]</a></span> -shall come into existence a spiritual entity which shall be -united to the corporeal organism for a time, thus constituting -in that infant a dual existence which makes his -whole individuality during this life? If we suppose that -the physical organism of our double natures was left to be -worked out by a very slow process, by which physical organisms -are developed out of one another—or by which we -theoretically suppose them to have been so developed—why -is it necessary to suppose that our spirits or souls have been -developed in the same way or by an analogous method? -What reason have we to believe that the Creator works by -the same methods in the spiritual world, or by methods -that are of the same nature as those which we think we can -discover to be his methods in giving existence to corporeal -organisms? The two realms of spirit and matter are so -completely unlike that we are not compelled to believe that -the methods by which creation of organisms of the two -kinds are effected by the Almighty are necessarily or probably -the same.</p> - -<p>In order to be clearly understood I will now repeat my -hypothesis in a distinct form. I assume the existence of a -pair of animals of the human type, male and female, endowed -with the power of producing new individuals of the -same type. In their physical organisms is established the -law of procreation, and in the female counterpart of that organism -is established the concomitant law of conception and -parturition. Thus far provision is made for the production -of a new individual physically organized like the parents. In -those parents there is also established another law, by the -operation of which the same process which results in the -production of the new individual animal organism brings -into existence a spiritual organism, which is united with and -becomes the companion of the physical organism so long as -the latter shall continue to live. These laws established in -the first pair and in every succeeding pair continue to op<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_538" id="Page_538">[Pg 538]</a></span>erate -through every succeeding generation. Perhaps it will -be said that this attributes the production of a spiritual organism -to a physical process; but, in truth, it does no more -than to assert the simultaneous production of the two existences. -It is not necessary to assume that the fœtus -which becomes at birth the human infant is before birth -animated by a soul; for it is not necessary to suppose, nor -is it apparently true, that the physical organism is complete -until birth takes place and the breath of life enters the -lungs, thus constituting a new life other than that of the -fœtus or the unborn child, although the one is a continuation -of the other. At whatever point of time the complete -animal organism is in a condition to be observed so that we -can say here is a living child, at that point we begin to -perceive a capacity to receive impressions from the external -world without the connection that has theretofore existed -between the unborn child and the maternal system. This -capacity must either be attributed to the individual experience -of the infant, so that without experience of his own he -can not begin to be possessed of a growing intelligence, or -it must be imputed to an innate and implanted power resident -in a spiritual organism that comes into exercise whenever -the physical organism has begun to draw the breath of -life.</p> - -<p>The evolution hypothesis of the origin of the human -mind necessarily leaves its nature in an indeterminate state -that will not satisfy the requirements of sound reasoning. -In one mode of stating and reasoning upon this hypothesis -it is assumed that there is not now and never was a mental -existence that was created in each individual of the race at -his birth; but that at some very remote period in the history -of successive animal organisms there was produced an -animal of a highly developed nervous structure, capable of -intelligence by reason of a superior power of receiving physical -impressions and co-ordinating them into states of con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_539" id="Page_539">[Pg 539]</a></span>sciousness -which correspond to the physical feelings; and -to the perpetually recurring series of these states of consciousness -we give the name of mind. This capacity of intelligence -is transmitted from parents to offspring, the experiences -of the former being registered in the brain of the -latter; but however complete may be the inherited nervous -structure, and however great the capacity for intelligence, -mind in each individual of the race is evidenced by nothing -but a constant succession and variation of certain states of -feelings produced in the nervous structure.</p> - -<p>Against this view we may place what we know from -constant observation. We know that it has been ordained, -as a consequence of the sexual union of two individuals of -opposite sex, there shall come into existence a new individual -of the same physical organism as the parents. Of -the interior process by which this product is effected we -must remain ignorant, but about the fact there can be no -doubt. That fact is, that by the union of certain vesicles -contributed by each of the parents there results a new individual -organism. We know further that simultaneously -with the complete production of the new physical organism, -there comes into being, and is incorporated with it, an existence -that we are compelled by the phenomena which it -manifests to regard as a non-physical and a spiritual organism. -Of the process by which this distinct existence is -effected, we must remain as ignorant as we are of the process -by which the physical organism was made to result -from the sexual union of the parents. But of the fact -there can be no more doubt in the one case than in the -other. In every instance of a new birth of a perfect infant, -we know that there results a dual existence in the same -individual; the one manifested by physical, the other by -mental phenomena. To argue that the mental and spiritual -existence grew out of an improved and improving physical -organism in long-past ages, and became an adjunct<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_540" id="Page_540">[Pg 540]</a></span> -to that organism after it had attained a certain development, -without any intervention of the creating power at -each new birth of an individual infant, is to limit the power -of the Creator in a realm wherein the subject of his creating -power is essentially unlike the subject with which he deals -when he deals with physical organisms. In all reasoning -upon the origin and nature of the human mind, the boundless -power of the Creator must be assumed. In judging of -the probabilities of his methods of action, it is the safest -course to be guided by what we can see takes place at every -new birth of a human infant. The physical organism results -from the operation of a certain law. The mental organism -results, it is alike rational to presume, from the -operation of a certain other law. How either of these laws -operates we are not permitted to know, but we can as safely -infer the one as the other, from what is open to our observation.</p> - -<p>I shall now touch briefly upon another argument, the -foundation of which is to be tested by historical facts into -the truth of which I shall not here inquire, because they -must, for the purposes for which I use them, be assumed. -The immortality of the human soul is said to have been -proved by a Divine revelation. This great fact is supposed -to be established by evidence of a character quite different -from that which convinces us of the existence and attributes -of the Almighty. But, assuming revelation to be a -fact, it has an important bearing upon the subject of this -essay, because the question arises, for what conceivable reason -the Almighty should have made to us a revelation of -our immortality, through the direct testimony of a competent -witness, if we are not spiritual beings. Information -of a fact supposes that there was a person to be informed. -Concurrently with the consciousness which assures us of our -personality, we have the assurance of our immortality certified -to us by a messenger expressly authorized to give us<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_541" id="Page_541">[Pg 541]</a></span> -the information. If the mind, or that part of our individuality -which we call the soul, is in its origin and nature -nothing but what the evolution theory supposes, what was -there to be informed of immortality, or of anything else? -The possibility and certainty of an existence after the death -of the body is a conviction that must exercise great influence -over the conduct of men in this life. It is consistent -with the whole apparent scheme of the revelation to suppose -that it was made for a twofold purpose: first, to cause -men to lead better lives in this world than they might have -led without this information and conviction; and, secondly, -to form them for greater happiness in another world. The -first of these purposes might have been effectuated by causing -men to believe in their own immortality, notwithstanding -the belief might be a delusion because there is no being -capable, in fact, of any existence after the life of the body -is ended. But such a method of action is hardly to be imputed -to the Creator and Supreme Governor of the universe, -according to the ideas of his character which natural -religion alone will give us. It is not in accordance with -rational conceptions of his attributes to suppose that he deludes -his rational creatures with assurances or apparent -proofs of something that is not true for the sake of making -them act as if it were true. When we find ourselves running -into a hypothesis of this kind, we may be pretty sure -that we are departing from correct principles of reasoning. -In regard to the second of the supposed purposes for which -the revelation of immortality was made—to form men for -greater happiness in another state of existence—it is quite -obvious that the supposed scheme of the revelation is a -mere delusion, if we are not beings capable of a continued -spiritual existence after the death of our bodies. It is therefore -a matter of great consequence to determine what the -evolution theory of the origin and nature of the human -mind makes us out to be.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_542" id="Page_542">[Pg 542]</a></span></p> - -<p>I have never seen any statement of that theory that -does not lead to the conclusion that man is a highly developed -animal organism, whose mental existence is not something -created in each individual of the race, and of a substance -and organized structure different from the physical -organism, but whose mental phenomena are merely exhibitions -and effects of occurrences taking place in the physical -system, and assuming the shape of what for distinctness -is called thought. In whatever form this theory has -been stated by its most distinguished professors, it leaves -only an interval of degree, and not an interval of kind, -between the mind of man and that which, in some of -the other animals, is supposed to be mind. The evolution -doctrine, taken in one of its aspects, supposes one grand -chain of animal organisms, rising higher and higher in the -scale of animal life, but connected together by ordinary -generation, so that they are of one kindred throughout; -but that, as each distinct species grows out of predecessors, -by gradual improvements and increments, forming more -and more elaborate organisms, man is the consummate -product of the whole process. But when we ask at what -point or stage in the series of developing animal organisms -the mind of man was produced, or what it was when produced, -we get no satisfactory answer. To the first question, -it can only be answered, as Darwin himself answers, -that there must be a definition of man before we can determine -at what time he came to exist. To the second question, -we have answers which differ materially from each -other. First, we have whatever we can extract from such -a system of psychology as Mr. Spencer's, which ignores the -capability of the mind to exist independent of the nervous -structure and the brain, because it excludes the idea of any -ego, any me, any person, and makes consciousness to consist -of a connected series of physical feelings, to which -there are corresponding psychical equivalents that he calls<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_543" id="Page_543">[Pg 543]</a></span> -mental states. It would seem to follow, therefore, that -when there is no longer remaining for the individual any -nervous structure and any brain, the mental states, or psychical -side of the physical impressions, must cease; or, in -other words, that the only existing ego has come to an end.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, I have seen an ingenious hypothesis -which it is well to refer to, because it illustrates the -efforts that are often made to reconcile the doctrines of -evolution with a belief in immortality. This hypothesis by -no means ignores the possibility of a spiritual existence, or -the spiritual as distinguished from the material world. -But it assumes that man was produced under the operation -of physical laws; and that after he had become a completed -product—the consummate and finished end of the whole -process of evolution—he passed under the dominion and -operation of other and different laws, and is saved from -annihilation by the intervention of a change from the physical -to the spiritual laws of his Creator. Put into a condensed -form, this theory has been thus stated: Having -spent countless æons in forming man, by the slow process of -animal evolution, God will not suffer him to fall back into -elemental flames, and be consumed by the further operation -of physical laws, but will transfer him into the dominion -of the spiritual laws that are held in reserve for his -salvation.</p> - -<p>One of the first questions to be asked, in reference to -this hypothesis, is, Who or what is it that God is supposed -to have spent countless æons in creating by the slow process -of animal evolution? If we contemplate a single specimen -of the human race, we find a bodily organism, endowed -with life like that of other animals, and acted upon by -physical laws throughout the whole period of its existence. -We also find present in the same individual a mental existence, -which is certified to us by evidence entirely different -from that by which we obtain a knowledge of the physical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_544" id="Page_544">[Pg 544]</a></span> -organism. As the methods employed by the Creator in the -production of the physical organism, whatever we may suppose -them to have been, were physical laws operating upon -matter, so the methods employed by him in the production -of a spiritual existence must have operated in a domain -that was wholly aside from the physical world. Each of -these distinct realms is equally under the government of an -Omnipotent Being; and while we may suppose that in the -one he employed a very slow process, such as the evolution -of animal organisms out of one another is imagined to have -been, there is no conceivable reason why he should not, in -the other and very different realm, have resorted to the -direct creation of a spiritual existence, which can not, in -the nature of things, have required to be produced by the -action of physical laws. When, at the birth of each individual -of the human race, the two existences become -united, when, in consequence of the operation of that -sexual union of the parents which has been ordained for -the production of a new individual, the physical and the -spiritual existence become incorporated in the one being, -the fact that they remain for a certain time mutually dependent -and mutually useful, co-operating in the purposes -of their temporary connection, does not change their essential -nature. The one may be destructible because the operation -of physical laws may dissolve the ligaments that hold -it together; the other may be indestructible, because the -operation of spiritual laws will hold together the spiritual -organism that is in its nature independent of the laws of -matter.</p> - -<p>I can therefore see no necessary connection between the -methods employed by the Almighty in the production of -an animal and the methods employed by him in the production -of a soul. That in the birth of the individual the -two come into existence simultaneously, and are temporarily -united in one and the same being, only proves that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_545" id="Page_545">[Pg 545]</a></span> -two existences are contemporaneous in their joint inception. -It does not prove that they are of the same nature, or -the same substance, or that the physical organism is the -only ego, or that the psychical existence is nothing but -certain states of the material structure, to whose aggregate -manifestations certain philosophers give the name of mind, -while denying to them personal individuality and the consciousness -of a distinct being.</p> - -<p>And now, in bringing this discussion to a close, I will -only add that the great want of this age is the prosecution -of inquiry into the nature of the human mind as an organic -structure, regarded as such. It seems to me that the whole -mission of Science is now perverted by a wrong aim, which -is to find out the external to the neglect of the internal—to -make all exploration terminate in the laws of the physical -universe, and go aside from the examination of the spiritual -world. It is no reproach to those who essay the latter inquiry -that they are scoffed at as "the metaphysicians." It -matters not what they are called, so long as they pursue the -right path. It is now in regard to the pursuit of science as -it was formerly in regard to the writing of history. That -philosophical French historian, M. Taine, has luminously -marked the change which has come over the methods and -objects of historical studies in the following passage:</p> - -<p>"When you consider with your eyes the visible man, -what do you look for? The man invisible. The words which -salute your ears, the gestures, the motions of his head, the -clothes he wears, visible acts and deeds of every kind, are expressions -merely; somewhat is revealed beneath them, and -that is a soul—an inner man is concealed beneath the outer -man; the second does not reveal the first; ... all the -externals are but avenues converging toward a center; you -enter them simply to reach that center, and that center is -the genuine man—I mean that mass of faculties and feelings -which are the inner man. We have reached a new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_546" id="Page_546">[Pg 546]</a></span> -world, which is infinite, because every action which we see -involves an infinite association of reasonings, emotions, sensations -new and old, which have served to bring it to light, -and which, like great rocks deep-seated in the ground, find -in it their end and their level. This under-world is a new -subject-matter proper to the historian.... This precise -and proved interpretation of past sensations has given to -history, in our days, a second birth; hardly anything of -the sort was known to the preceding century. They thought -men of every race and country were all but identical—the -Greek, the barbarian, the Hindoo, the man of the Renaissance, -and the man of the eighteenth century—as if they -had all been turned out of a common mold, and all in -conformity to a certain abstract conception which served -for the whole human race. They knew man, but not men; -they had not penetrated to the soul; they had not seen the -infinite diversity and complexity of souls; they did not -know that the moral constitution of a people or an age is -as particular and distinct as the physical structure of a -family of plants or an order of animals."<a name="FNanchor_153" id="FNanchor_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a></p> - -<p>In the same way psychology needs a new birth, like the -new birth of history. If we would know the mind, we -must reach the conviction that there is a mind: and this conviction -can be reached only by penetrating through all the -externals, through the physical organism, through the -diversities of race, through the environment of matter, -until we have found the soul. If history, like zoölogy, -has found its anatomy, mental science must, in like manner, -be prosecuted as an anatomical study. So long as we -allow the anatomy of zoölogy to be the predominant and -only explanation, the beginning and the end of the mental -manifestations, so long we shall fail to comprehend the -nature of man, and to see the reason for his immortality.</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_547" id="Page_547">[Pg 547]</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a name="GLOSSARY" id="GLOSSARY">GLOSSARY</a></h2> -</div> -<p class="center">OF</p> - -<p class="center">SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THIS WORK.</p> - - - -<p>[The following definitions marked with an asterisk are borrowed from the -glossary annexed to Darwin's "Origin of Species." The remainder of the -definitions are taken from Webster's Dictionary.]</p> - -<div class="hang"> - -<p><b>*Aberrant.</b> Forms or groups of animals or plants which deviate in -important characters from their nearest allies, so as not to be -easily included in the same group with them, are said to be -aberrant.</p> - -<p><b>*Abnormal.</b> Contrary to the general rule.</p> - -<p><b>*Aborted.</b> An organ is said to be aborted when its development has -been arrested at a very early stage.</p> - -<p><b>Aërate</b> (Zoöl.). To subject to the influence of the air by the natural -organs of respiration; to arterialize; especially used of animals -not having lungs.</p> - -<p><b>Agnostic</b> (<em>a.</em>). Professing ignorance; involving no dogmatic assertion; -leaving a question or problem still in doubt; pertaining to -or involving agnosticism.</p> - -<p><b>Agnostic</b> (<em>n.</em>). One who professes ignorance, or refrains from dogmatic -assertion; one who supports agnosticism, neither affirming -nor denying the existence of a personal Deity.</p> - -<p><b>Agnosticism.</b> That doctrine which, professing ignorance, neither -asserts nor denies; specifically, in theology, the doctrine that the -existence of a personal Deity can be neither asserted nor denied, -neither proved nor disproved, because of the necessary limits of -the human mind (as sometimes charged upon <em>Hamilton</em> and <em>Mansel</em>), -or because of the insufficiency of the evidence furnished by -psychical and physical data, to warrant a positive conclusion (as -taught by the school of <em>Herbert Spencer</em>); opposed alike to dogmatic -skepticism and to dogmatic theism.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_548" id="Page_548">[Pg 548]</a></span></p> - -<p><b>Allantois</b>, <b>Allantoid</b>. A thin membrane, situated between the -chorion and amnion, and forming one of the membranes which invest -the fœtus.</p> - -<p><b>*Analogy.</b> That resemblance of structures which depends upon -similarity of function, as in the wings of insects and birds. Such -structures are said to be <em>analogous</em>, and to be <em>analogues</em> of each -other.</p> - -<p><b>Anthropomorphism.</b> The representation of the Deity under a -human form, or with human attributes.</p> - -<p><b>*Articulata.</b> A great division of the animal kingdom, characterized -generally by having the surface of the body divided into rings, -called segments, a greater or less number of which are furnished -with jointed legs (such as insects, crustaceans, and centipeds).</p> - -<p><b>Articulation</b> (Anat.). The joining or juncture of the bones of a -skeleton.</p> - -<p><b>Ascidians.</b> A class of acephalous mollusks, having often a leathery -exterior.</p> - -<p><b>Biology.</b> The science of life; that part of physiology which treats -of life in general, or of the different forces of life.</p> - -<p><b>Brain.</b> The upper part of the head. 1. (Anat.) The whitish, soft -mass which constitutes the anterior or cephalic extremity of the -nervous system in man and other vertebrates, occupying the upper -cavity of the skull; and (<em>b</em>) the anterior or cephalic ganglion in -insects and other invertebrates.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>2. The organ or seat of intellect; hence, the understanding.</p> - -<p>3. The affections; fancy; imagination.</p></blockquote> - -<p><b>*Branchiæ.</b> Gills, or organs for respiration in water.</p> - -<p><b>*Branchial.</b> Pertaining to gills or branchiæ.</p> - -<p><b>*Canidæ.</b> The dog family, including the dog, wolf, fox, jackal, etc.</p> - -<p><b>Cell.</b> A minute, inclosed space or sac, filled with fluid, making up -the cellular tissue of plants, and of many parts of animals, and -originating the parts by their growth and reproduction; the constituent -element of all plants and animals (though not universal -for all parts of such structure), much as a crystalline molecule is -the element of a crystal. In the simplest plants and animals (as -the <em>infusoria</em>), one single cell constitutes the complete individual, -such species being called <em>unicellular</em> plants or animals.</p> - -<p><b>Cephalopod</b> (Fr. <i lang="fr">céphalopode</i>, from Gr., head and foot). (Zoöl.) An -animal of the sub-kingdom <i lang="la">Mollusca</i>, characterized by a distinct -head, surrounded by a circle of long arms or tentacles, which they -use for crawling and for seizing objects. See <span class="smcap">Mollusk</span>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_549" id="Page_549">[Pg 549]</a></span></p> - -<p><b>*Cetacea.</b> An order of Mammalia, including the whales, dolphins, -etc., having the form of the body fish-like, the skin naked, and -only the fore-limbs developed.</p> - - -<p><b>Chaos.</b> 1. An empty, infinite space; a yawning chasm.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>2. The rude, confused state, or unorganized condition, of matter -before the creation of the universe.</p></blockquote> - -<p><b>Consciousness.</b> 1. The knowledge of sensations and mental operations, -or of what passes in one's own mind; the act of the mind -which makes known an internal object.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>2. Immediate knowledge of any object whatever.</p></blockquote> - -<p><b>*Crustaceans.</b> A class of articulated animals having the skin of the -body generally more or less hardened by the deposition of calcareous -matter, breathing by means of gills. (<em>Examples</em>, crab, -lobster, shrimp, etc.)</p> - -<p><b>Dynamically.</b> In accordance with the principles of dynamics or -moving forces.</p> - -<p><b>*Embryo.</b> The young animal undergoing development within the -egg or womb.</p> - -<p><b>*Embryology.</b> The study of the development of the embryo.</p> - -<p><b>Ethics.</b> The science of human duty; the body of rules of duty -drawn from this science; a particular system of principles and -rules concerning duty, whether true or false; rules of practice in -respect to a single class of human actions; as political or social -ethics.</p> - -<p><b>*Fauna.</b> The totality of the animals naturally inhabiting a certain -country or region, or which have lived during a given geological -period.</p> - -<p><b>Fetichism</b>, <b>Feticism</b>. One of the lowest and grossest forms of -superstition, consisting in the worship of some material object, as -a stone, a tree, or an animal, often casually selected; practiced -among tribes of lowest mental endowment, as certain races of -negroes.</p> - -<p><b>*Flora.</b> The totality of the plants growing naturally in a country -or during a given geological period.</p> - -<p><b>*Fœtal.</b> Of or belonging to the fœtus, or embryo in course of development.</p> - -<p><b>Fœtus</b>, same as <b>Fetus</b>. The young of viviparous animals in the -womb, and of oviparous animals in the egg, after it is perfectly -formed, before which time it is called <em>embryo</em>.</p> - -<p><b>*Ganoid Fishes.</b> Fishes covered with peculiar enameled bony scales. -Most of them are extinct.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_550" id="Page_550">[Pg 550]</a></span></p> - -<p><b>Genus</b> (Science). An assemblage of species possessing certain characters -in common, by which they are distinguished from all others. -It is subordinate to <em>tribe</em> and <em>sub-tribe</em>; hence, a single species having -distinctive characters that seem of more than specific value -may constitute a genus.</p> - -<p><b>*Germinal Vesicle.</b> A minute vesicle in the eggs of animals, from -which the development of the embryo proceeds.</p> - -<p><b>Gravitation</b> (Physics). That species of attraction or force by which -all bodies or particles of matter in the universe tend toward each -other; called also <em>attraction of gravitation</em>, <em>universal gravitation</em>, -and <em>universal gravity</em>.</p> - -<p><b>Gravity</b> (Physics). The tendency of a mass of matter toward a center -of attraction; especially the tendency of a body toward the -center of the earth, terrestrial gravitation.</p> - -<p><b>Gyrus</b>, pl. <b>Gyri</b> (Anat.). A convolution of the brain.</p> - -<p><b>*Habitat.</b> The locality in which a plant or animal naturally lives.</p> - -<p><b>Heredity.</b> The transmission of the physical and psychical qualities -of parents to their offspring; the biological law by which living -beings tend to repeat themselves in their descendants.</p> - -<p><b>Homologous.</b> Having the same relative proportion, position, value, -or structure; especially—(<em>a</em>) (Geom.) Corresponding in relative position -and proportion. (<em>b</em>) (Alg.) Having the same relative proportion -or value, as the two antecedents or the two consequents of a -proportion. (<em>c</em>) (Chem.) Being of the same chemical type or series; -differing by a multiple or arithmetical ratio in certain constituents, -while the physical qualities are wholly analogous, with small relative -differences, as if corresponding to a series of parallels; as, the -species in the group of alcohols are said to be <em>homologous</em>. (<em>d</em>) -(Zoöl.) Being of the same typical structure; having like relations -to a fundamental type of structure; as, those bones in the hand of -man and the fore-foot of a horse are <em>homologous</em> that correspond in -their structural relations—that is, in their relations to the type-structure -of the fore-limb in vertebrates.</p> - -<p><b>Homology.</b> That relation between parts which results from their -development from corresponding embryonic parts, either in different -animals, as in the case of the arm of a man, the fore-leg of a -quadruped, and the wing of a bird; or in the same individual, as -in the case of the fore and hind legs in quadrupeds, and the segments -or rings and their appendages of which the body of a worm, -a centiped, etc., is composed. The latter is called <em>serial homology</em>. -The parts which stand in such a relation to each other are said to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_551" id="Page_551">[Pg 551]</a></span> -be <em>homologous</em>, and one such part or organ is called the <em>homologue</em> -of the other. In different plants the parts of the flower are homologous, -and in general these parts are regarded as homologous with -leaves.</p> - -<p><b>Hypothesis.</b> 1. A supposition; a proposition or principle which is -supposed or taken for granted, in order to draw a conclusion or inference -for proof of the point in question; something not proved, -but assumed for the purpose of argument.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>2. A system or theory imagined or assumed to account for -known facts or phenomena.</p></blockquote> - -<p><b>Imago.</b> The perfect (generally winged) reproductive state of an insect.</p> - -<p><b>Implacenta</b> (<em>n.</em>). A mammal having no placenta. (<em>a.</em>) Without a -placenta, as certain marsupial animals.</p> - -<p><b>Insectivorous.</b> Feeding on insects.</p> - -<p><b>Instinct</b> (<em>n.</em>). Inward impulse; unconscious, involuntary, or unreasoning -prompting to action; a disposition to any mode of action, -whether bodily or spiritual, without a distinct apprehension of the -end or object which Nature has designed should be accomplished -thereby; specifically, the natural, unreasoning impulse in an animal, -by which it is guided to the performance of any action, without -thought of improvement in the method.</p> - -<p><b>Invertebrata</b>, or <b>Invertebrate Animals</b>. Those animals which -do not possess a backbone or spinal column.</p> - -<p><b>Isomeric</b> (from Gr., equal and part). (Chem.) Having the quality -of isomerism; as <em>isomeric</em> compounds.</p> - -<p><b>Isomerism</b> (Chem.). An identity of elements and of atomic proportions -with a difference in the amount combined in the compound -molecule, and of its essential qualities; as in the case of the -physically unlike compounds of carbon and hydrogen, consisting -one of one part of each, another of two parts of each, and a third -of four of each.</p> - -<p><b>Kangaroo.</b> A ruminating marsupial animal of the genus <i lang="la">Macropus</i>, -found in Australia and the neighboring islands.</p> - -<p><b>Larva</b> (plural <b>Larvæ</b>). The first condition of an insect at its issuing -from the egg, when it is usually in the form of a grub, caterpillar, -or maggot.</p> - -<p><b>Lemuridæ.</b> A group of four-handed animals, distinct from the -monkeys, and approaching the insectivorous quadrupeds in some -of their characters and habits. Its members have the nostrils -curved or twisted, and a claw instead of a nail upon the first finger -of the hind hands.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_552" id="Page_552">[Pg 552]</a></span></p> - -<p><b>Lepidosiren.</b> An eel-shaped animal covered with rounded scales, -having four rod-like members, and breathing water like a fish. It -is found in ponds and rivers of intertropical Africa and South -America. By some it is regarded as a fish, and by others as a batrachian.</p> - -<p><b>Mammal.</b> Belonging to the breast; from <i lang="la">mamma</i>, the breast or -pap. An animal of the highest class of vertebrates, characterized -by the female suckling its young.</p> - -<p><b>Mammalia.</b> The highest class of animals, including the ordinary -hairy quadrupeds, the whales, and man, and characterized by the -production of living young, which are nourished after birth by -milk from the teats (<i lang="la">mammæ</i>, <em>mammary glands</em>) of the mother. A -striking difference in embryonic development has led to the division -of this class into two great groups: in one of these, when the -embryo has attained a certain stage, a vascular connection, called -the <em>placenta</em>, is formed between the embryo and the mother; in -the other this is wanting, and the young are produced in a very -incomplete state. The former, including the greater part of the -class, are called <em>placental mammals</em>; the latter, or <em>aplacental mammals</em>, -include the marsupials and monotremes (<i lang="la">ornithorhynchus</i>).</p> - -<p><b>Marsupials.</b> An order of Mammalia in which the young are born -in a very incomplete state of development, and carried by the -mother, while sucking, in a ventral pouch (<i lang="la">marsupium</i>), such as the -kangaroos, opossums, etc. (see <span class="smcap">Mammalia</span>).</p> - -<p><b>Molecule.</b> A mass; one of the invisible particles supposed to constitute -matter of any kind.</p> - -<p><b>Mollusk.</b> An invertebrate animal, having a soft, fleshy body -(whence the name), which is inarticulate, and not radiate internally.</p> - -<p><b>Monkey.</b> See <span class="smcap">Simia</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Monogamy.</b> A marriage to one wife only, or the state of such as are -restricted to a single wife, or may not marry again after the death -of a first wife.</p> - -<p><b>Monotheism.</b> The doctrine or belief that there is but one God.</p> - -<p><b>Morphology.</b> The law of form or structure independent of function.</p> - -<p><b>Nascent.</b> Commencing development.</p> - -<p><b>Nexus.</b> Connection; tie.</p> - -<p><b>Nictitating Membrane.</b> A semi-transparent membrane, which can -be drawn across the eye in birds and reptiles, either to moderate -the effects of a strong light or to sweep particles of dust, etc., from -the surface of the eye.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_553" id="Page_553">[Pg 553]</a></span></p> - -<p><b>Noumenon</b> (Metaph.). The of itself unknown and unknowable rational -object, or <em>thing in itself</em>, which is distinguished from the -<em>phenomenon</em> in which it occurs to apprehension, and by which it is -interpreted and understood; so used in the philosophy of Kant and -his followers.</p> - -<p><b>Opossum.</b> An animal of several species of marsupial quadrupeds of -the genus <i lang="la">Didelphys</i>. The common species of the United States is -the <i lang="la">D. Virginiana</i>. Another species, common in Texas and California, -is <i lang="la">D. Californica</i>, and other species are found in South -America.</p> - -<p><b>Organism.</b> An organized being, whether plant or animal.</p> - -<p><b>Ovule.</b> An egg. (Bot.) The rudimentary state of a seed. It consists -essentially of a nucleus developed directly from the placenta.</p> - -<p><b>Parasite.</b> An animal or plant living upon or in, and at the expense -of, another organism.</p> - -<p><b>Pelvis.</b> The bony arch to which the hind-limbs of vertebrate animals -are articulated.</p> - -<p><b>Placentalia</b>, <b>Placentata</b>, or <b>Placental Mammals</b>. See <span class="smcap">Mammalia</span>.</p> - -<p><b>Protozoa.</b> The lowest great division of the Animal Kingdom. -These animals are composed of a gelatinous material, and show -scarcely any trace of distinct organs. The infusoria, foraminifera, -and sponges, with some other forms, belong to this division.</p> - -<p><b>Phenomenon.</b> 1. An appearance; anything visible; whatever is -presented to the eye; whatever, in matter or spirit, is apparent to, -or is apprehended by, observation, as distinguished from its ground, -substance, or unknown constitution; as <em>phenomena</em> of heat or electricity; -phenomena of imagination or memory.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>2. Sometimes a remarkable or unusual appearance whose cause -is not immediately obvious.</p></blockquote> - -<p><b>Plexus.</b> Any net-work of vessels, nerves, or fibers.</p> - -<p><b>Polygamy.</b> A plurality of wives or husbands at the same time, or -the having of such plurality; usually the condition of a man having -more than one wife.</p> - -<p><b>Polytheism.</b> The doctrine of a plurality of gods or invisible beings -superior to man, and having an agency in the government of the -world.</p> - -<p><b>Proteine</b> (<em>n.</em> Lat., <i lang="la">proteinum</i>, from Gr., <em>first</em>—to be the first—the -first place, chief rank, because it occupies the first place in relation -to the albuminous principles). (Chem.) A substance claimed by -Mulder to be obtained as a distinct substance from albumen,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_554" id="Page_554">[Pg 554]</a></span> -fibrine, or caseine, and considered by him to be the basis of animal -tissue and of some substances of vegetable origin.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The theory of proteine can not be maintained.—<em>Gregory.</em></p> - -<p>The theory of Mulder is doubted and denied by many chemists, -and also the existence of <em>proteine</em> as a distinct substance.</p></blockquote> - -<p><b>Psychology.</b> A discourse or treatise on the human soul; the science -of the human soul; specifically, the systematic or scientific -knowledge of the powers and functions of the human soul, so far -as they are known by consciousness.</p> - -<p><b>Quadrumane.</b> An animal having four feet that correspond to the -hands of a man, as a monkey.</p> - -<p><b>Race.</b> 1. The descendants of a common ancestor; a family, tribe, -people, or nation, believed or presumed to belong to the same stock; -a lineage; a breed.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>2. A root.</p></blockquote> - -<p><b>Retina.</b> The delicate inner coat of the eye, formed by nervous filaments -spreading from the optic nerve, and serving for the perception -of the impressions produced by light.</p> - -<p><b>Rotifer</b> (<em>n.</em> Lat. <i lang="la">rotifer</i>, from Lat. <i lang="la">rota</i>, a wheel, and <i lang="la">ferro</i>, to bear. -Fr. <i lang="fr">rotifère</i>). (Zoöl.) One of a group of microscopic crustaceans, -having no limbs, and moving by means of rows of cilia about the -head or the anterior extremity.</p> - -<p><b>Rudiment</b> (Nat. Hist.). An imperfect organ, or one which is never -fully formed.</p> - -<p><b>Sacral.</b> Belonging to the sacrum, or the bone composed usually of -two or more united vertebræ to which the sides of the pelvis in -vertebrate animals are attached.</p> - -<p><b>Sacrum.</b> The bone which forms the posterior part of the pelvis. It -is triangular in form.</p> - -<p><b>Secularize.</b> To convert from spiritual to secular or common use; -as to secularize a church, or church property.</p> - -<p><b>Segments.</b> The transverse rings of which the body of an articulate -animal or annelid is composed.</p> - -<p><b>Simia</b> (plural <b>Simiadæ</b>) (Lat., an ape, from <i lang="la">simus</i>, flat-nosed, snub-nosed). -(Zoöl.) A Linnæan genus of animals, including the ape, -monkey, and the like; a general name of the various tribes of -monkeys.</p> - -<p><b>Species</b> (Nat. Hist.). A permanent class of existing things or beings, -associated according to attributes or properties which are determined -by scientific observation.</p> - -<p><b>Spinal Cord.</b> The central portion of the nervous system in the ver<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_555" id="Page_555">[Pg 555]</a></span>tebrata, -which descends from the brain through the arches of the -vertebræ, and gives off nearly all the nerves to the various organs -of the body.</p> - -<p><b>Statical.</b> To stand. 1. Pertaining to bodies at rest, or in equilibrium.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>2. Resting; acting by mere weight without motion; as <em>statical</em> -pressure.</p></blockquote> - -<p><b>Sulcus.</b> A fissure of the brain, separating two convolutions, or <em>gyri</em>.</p> - -<p><b>Teleology</b> (Fr., <i lang="fr">téléologie</i>, from Gr., the end or issue, and discourse). -The science or doctrine of the final causes of things; the philosophical -consideration of final causes in general.</p> - -<p><b>Variety</b> (Nat. Hist., Bot., and Zoöl.). Any form or condition of -structure under a species which differs in its characteristics from -those typical to the species, as in color, shape, size, and the like, -and which is capable either of perpetuating itself for a period, -or of being perpetuated by artificial means; also, any of the various -forms under a species meeting the conditions mentioned. -A form characterized by an abnormity of structure, or any difference -from the type that is not capable of being perpetuated -through two or more generations, is not called a variety.</p> - -<p><b>Vascular.</b> Containing blood-vessels.</p> - -<p><b>Vertebrata</b>; or <b>Vertebrate Animals</b>. The highest division of the -animal kingdom, so called from the presence in most cases of a -back-bone composed of numerous joints or <i lang="la">vertebræ</i>, which constitutes -the center of the skeleton, and at the same time supports and -protects the central parts of the nervous system.</p> - -<p><b>Vesicle.</b> A bladder-like vessel; a membranous cavity; a cyst; a -cell; especially (<em>a</em>) (Bot.) a small bladder-like body in the substance -of a vegetable, or upon the surface of a leaf.—<em>Gray.</em> (<em>b</em>) (Med.) A -small orbicular elevation of the cuticle containing lymph, and succeeded -by a scurf or laminated scab; also, any small cavity or sac -in the human body; as the umbilical vesicle.</p> - -<p><b>Vortices</b> (<i lang="la">verto</i>, to turn). 1. A whirling or circular motion of any -fluid, usually of water, forming a kind of cavity in the center of -the circle, and in some instances drawing in water or absorbing -other things; a whirlpool.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>2. A whirling of the air; a whirlwind.</p> - -<p>3. (<em>Cartesian system.</em>) A supposed collection of particles of -very subtile matter, endowed with a rapid rotary motion around -an axis. By means of these <em>vortices</em> Descartes attempted to account -for the formation of the universe.</p></blockquote> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_556" id="Page_556">[Pg 556]</a></span></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_557" id="Page_557">[Pg 557]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="INDEX">INDEX.</a></h2> -</div> - -<div class="index"> - -<ul class="index"><li class="ifrst">Advocacy, maxim of, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Affections, structural system of, <a href='#Page_532'>532</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Agnosticism, as defined by Huxley, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Allantois, the, office of, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Almagest. See <span class="smcap">Ptolemaic System</span>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Amphibians in the Darwinian pedigree of man, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Amphioxus. See <span class="smcap">Lancelet</span>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Amputation before or after birth, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Anatomy, modern, great advance of, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">Plato's knowledge of, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Anatomy of the mind, <a href='#Page_470'>470</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Animals, origin of, according to Plato, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">origin of, according to Darwin, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Anthropomorphic attributes not necessary to the conception of God, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Anthropomorphism, meaning, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Antichthon, or counter-earth, invented by the Pythagoreans, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Apes, varieties of, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">anthropomorphous, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Apparitions, facts communicated by, <a href='#Page_486'>486</a>-488.</li> - -<li class="indx">Aquatic worm, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Areas, effect of change of, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Articulata, likeness of structure in, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Ascidians, larvæ of, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Assassination, once employed with impunity, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Associative faculty, what it is, <a href='#Page_528'>528</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Athenian, the, compared with a savage, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Authority, as affecting belief, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">ecclesiastic and scientific, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">in science, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Automatic machines, analysis of, <a href='#Page_505'>505</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Baboons, how different from monkeys, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Belief, foundations of, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>-3.</li> -<li class="isub1">antiquity of, how to be regarded, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">grounds of, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>-277.</li> - -<li class="indx">Birds, origin of, according to Plato, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">sexual selection among, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bishop, P. P., "The Heart of Man," <a href='#Page_471'>471</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Blood, similarity in the composition of, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">great change in, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Body, natural and spiritual, <a href='#Page_468'>468</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Brain of men and apes compared, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">human, <a href='#Page_518'>518</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">office of, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Breaks in the organic chain, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>-106.</li> - -<li class="indx">Buffon, accepted Mosaic account of creation, <a href='#Page_368'>368</a>, <a href='#Page_369'>369</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Causation, ultimate, <a href='#Page_386'>386</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cell, hypothesis of the single, <a href='#Page_371'>371</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Chaos, Plato's conception of, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Classification, how it supports evolution, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Common stock, hypothesis of descent from, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Composition, what occurs in, <a href='#Page_473'>473</a>, <a href='#Page_474'>474</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Comte, Auguste, one of his suggestions, <a href='#Page_387'>387</a>, <a href='#Page_388'>388</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Conduct, Spencer's view of, <a href='#Page_427'>427</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Consciousness, what it is, <a href='#Page_470'>470</a>, <a href='#Page_471'>471</a>, <a href='#Page_503'>503</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Constitutions, political, supposed growth of, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Conversations invented during sleep, <a href='#Page_480'>480</a>, <a href='#Page_481'>481</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Conversion of organs, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Copernicus, system of, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Creation, special, contrasted with evolution, <a href='#Page_1'>1</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">absolute, unknown to the Greeks, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">influence of the belief in, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">man's power of, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">Mosaic account of, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">poetical, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">what it is, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Creator, the, postulate of, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">honoring or dishonoring the, not the question, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">method of, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Creator, methods of, in the two realms of spirit and matter, <a href='#Page_537'>537</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">power of, boundless, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>, <a href='#Page_535'>535</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Crosses not permissible between distinct species, <a href='#Page_372'>372</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Darwin, Charles, his theory of evolution, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">bearing of his theory on man's immortality, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">candor and accuracy of, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">difference of, from Spencer, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his pedigree of man, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>-72, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his view of human dignity, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">on primeval man, <a href='#Page_375'>375</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">on the belief in God, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">rejects an aboriginal pair, <a href='#Page_406'>406</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">tabulated form of his pedigree of man, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Dekad, the perfect number of the Pythagoreans, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Delirium, explanation of, <a href='#Page_499'>499</a>, <a href='#Page_500'>500</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Demiurgus, the, constructor of Plato's Kosmos, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Descartes, his theory of vortices, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Descent, must be unbroken, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Design, when hypothesis of, necessary, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Desires, mental system of, <a href='#Page_532'>532</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Domestic animals, breeding of, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Distribution in space, how it affects evolution, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">in time, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Dreams, phenomena of, <a href='#Page_479'>479</a>-490.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Earth. See <span class="smcap">Solar System</span>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Economy of Nature, meaning of, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Elements, the four, in the Platonic Kosmos, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Eliphaz and Zophar. See <span class="smcap">Job</span>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Embryonic development, resemblances in, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Embryology, cautions respecting, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">how it supports evolution, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Emotions, system of, <a href='#Page_530'>530</a>-532.</li> - -<li class="indx">Energy. See <span class="smcap">Power</span>, <span class="smcap">Causation</span>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Evidence, rules of circumstantial, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>-17.</li> -<li class="isub1">applicable to scientific investigation, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">missing links in chain of, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>-20.</li> -<li class="isub1">process of, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Evil, rational explanation of, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Evolution, assumptions in the theory of, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>-20.</li> -<li class="isub1">general reasons for, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">law of, limited, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">of man, <a href='#Page_373'>373</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">principle of, <a href='#Page_377'>377</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">process reversed, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>-256.</li> - -<li class="indx">Experts, true office of, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Extemporaneous speaking, what is, <a href='#Page_474'>474</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Eye, the, formation of, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>-70, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Faunas of different areas, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Fetichism. See <span class="smcap">Spencer</span>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Fishes, origin of, according to Plato, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">most lowly organized, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">shell, the lowest form of, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Fœtus, growth of the, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Galen, mistakes of, in anatomy, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">how he differed from Plato, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Galileo, confirms and rectifies Kepler's laws, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">Papal condemnation of, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ganoids, description of, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Genealogical trees of no value in zoölogy, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> - -<li class="indx">General laws and special creations, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Germ, ante-fœtal, how formed, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Gladiatorial shows, part of Roman civilization, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">God, existence of, how proved, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">a necessary postulate, <a href='#Page_402'>402</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">a personal, denied by Spencer, <a href='#Page_433'>433</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">consciousness of, how to be lost, according to Spencer, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">existence and attributes of, how deduced, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">his dealing with Abraham, <a href='#Page_425'>425</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">probable methods of, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>-85, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">unlike Plato's Demiurgus, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Gods, the, origin of, among the Greeks, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">genesis of, according to Plato, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>-50, <i>note</i>.</li> -<li class="isub1">office of, in the formation of Plato's Kosmos, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Gravitation, law of, how deduced, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Greek philosophy, account of, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">encounters monotheism at Alexandria, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">how hampered by the mythology, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">schools of, before Plato, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Grote, his Plato cited and followed, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>-40, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Harvey discovers the circulation of the blood, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Heat, origin of, <a href='#Page_386'>386</a>, <a href='#Page_387'>387</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hebrews receive divine commands, <a href='#Page_418'>418</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Heredity, law of, limited, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Homologous organs, meaning of, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">See <span class="smcap">Swim-bladder and Lung</span>.</li> -<li class="isub1">meaning of, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Human life, peculiar sacredness of, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>-166.</li> - -<li class="indx">Huxley, Professor, on the brain of man and apes, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Huxley, Professor, quoted, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Ideal persons, are creations, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ideal plan, objection to, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ideas in Plato's system, coeval with primordial matter, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">how acquired, <a href='#Page_506'>506</a>-508.</li> - -<li class="indx">Idiocy, absolute, probably does not exist, <a href='#Page_526'>526</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">what it is, <a href='#Page_526'>526</a>-528.</li> - -<li class="indx">Idiot. See <span class="smcap">Idiocy</span>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Immortality, what is proof of, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_540'>540</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">belief in, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">fanciful explanation of, <a href='#Page_543'>543</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Improvisation, what is, <a href='#Page_474'>474</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Infinite goodness consistent with the existence of suffering, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Instinct, genesis of, according to Plato, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">genesis of, according to Darwin, <i>ib.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Intellectual faculties, system of, <a href='#Page_525'>525</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Interbreeding. See <span class="smcap">Species</span>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Introspective faculty, power of the, <a href='#Page_529'>529</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Intuitive faculty, office of, <a href='#Page_525'>525</a>, <a href='#Page_526'>526</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Invention in mechanics, <a href='#Page_475'>475</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Invention is creation, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Job and his friends, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Kangaroos, structure of, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kepler, his laws of the planetary motions, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Knowledge not limited to scientific demonstration, <a href='#Page_392'>392</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">of ourselves, <a href='#Page_520'>520</a>, <a href='#Page_521'>521</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kosmos, the. See <span class="smcap">Plato</span>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Lancelet, visual organ of the, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Languages, origin of, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_397'>397</a>, <a href='#Page_398'>398</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Lemuridæ in the Darwinian pedigree of man, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">characteristics of, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Logic, abuse of, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">right use of, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">use and misuse of its forms, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Lung in vertebrates, supposed homologue with a swim-bladder, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">conversion of, from swim-bladder, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Macaulay, Lord, his depreciation of natural theology, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Macbeth, Lady, her sleep-walking analyzed, <a href='#Page_491'>491</a>-499.</li> - -<li class="indx">Man, dignity of, how to be treated, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">bodily structure of, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">common ancestor of, and the apes, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">constructive faculty of, <a href='#Page_346'>346</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">immortality of, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">liability to certain diseases, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">moral accountability of, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">origin of, <a href='#Page_348'>348</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">pedigree of, according to Darwin, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>-72.</li> -<li class="isub1">rank of, in scale of being, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Marriage, scientific view of, <a href='#Page_381'>381</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Marsupials in the Darwinian pedigree of man, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">ancient, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Matter, primordial, according to Plato, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Matter and spirit contrasted, <a href='#Page_477'>477</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Medium, effect of change of, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mind, origin of, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">a created being, <a href='#Page_407'>407</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">a spiritual creation, <a href='#Page_401'>401</a>-404.</li> -<li class="isub1">contrasted theories of, <a href='#Page_533'>533</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">evolution origin of the, <a href='#Page_538'>538</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">evolution theory of origin of, <a href='#Page_394'>394</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">is an organism, <a href='#Page_476'>476</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">of animals below man, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">origin and nature of, <a href='#Page_467'>467</a>-546.</li> -<li class="isub1">origin of, according to Darwin, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">origin of, according to Plato, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">structure of, <a href='#Page_502'>502</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">substance of, <a href='#Page_509'>509</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">systems of, <a href='#Page_523'>523</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">the human, placed under certain laws, <a href='#Page_389'>389</a>, <a href='#Page_390'>390</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Miracles, meaning of, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Miraculous interposition not necessary, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Modern civilization, what it owes to belief in special creation, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>-166.</li> - -<li class="indx">Monkeys, two great stems of, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">Catarrhine, or Old-World, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Monotheism, its influence on philosophy, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">origin of, <a href='#Page_342'>342</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Monotremata, division of the mammalian series, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Moral injunctions, sacred origin of, <a href='#Page_418'>418</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Moral injunctions, Spencer's denial of, <a href='#Page_427'>427</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_433'>433</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Moral law, capacity of human beings to receive, <a href='#Page_420'>420</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">scientific view of the, <a href='#Page_420'>420</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Moral purposes in the phenomena of nature, <a href='#Page_387'>387</a>, <a href='#Page_388'>388</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Moral sense, origin of, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Morphology, how it supports evolution, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mosaic account of creation, rationality of, <a href='#Page_366'>366</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Murder, punishment of, moral foundation for, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">"Music of the spheres," origin of the phrase, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Nascent organs, meaning of, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">"Natural," meaning of, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Natural theology, progress of, from Thales to Plato and Aristotle, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">importance of, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Nervous organization, Spencer's view of, <a href='#Page_409'>409</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Newton, Sir Isaac, discovers the law of universal gravitation, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">deduces a personal God from nature, <a href='#Page_331'>331</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his General Scholium, <a href='#Page_332'>332</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Noumenon, an invented word, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Number. See <span class="smcap">Dekad</span>, and <span class="smcap">Pythagoras</span>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Opossums, structure of, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Orthodoxy, Plato's idea of, as suggested in his "Republic," <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Oviparous animals, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Pairs, of animals, opposite views of, <a href='#Page_405'>405</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pairs, assumed existence of, <a href='#Page_537'>537</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Parasites, how to be viewed, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Pattern of structure, argument concerning, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pedigree, rule for tracing, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>-187.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pedigree of man, Darwinian, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Phenomenon and noumenon, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Philolaus as quoted by Grote, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Philosophy, modern and ancient compared, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Physicians in Plato's time, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Placental mammals, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Plato, period of, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> -<li class="isub1">as given in "Timæus," <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his Demiurgus, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his genealogy of the gods, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his Kosmos and Darwin's hypothesis compared, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>-86.</li> -<li class="isub1">his origin of religious beliefs as given in "Republic," <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his triplicity of souls, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his view of rudiments, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">originality of, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Polytheism, origin of, <a href='#Page_342'>342</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Power, distinct from substance, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>, <i>note</i>; <a href='#Page_339'>339</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">an attribute of mind, <a href='#Page_386'>386</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">of nature, limited, <a href='#Page_343'>343</a>-345.</li> - -<li class="indx">Primitive beliefs, not necessarily wrong, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">"Principle" of construction, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Probability, force of, in reasoning, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Psychology, needs a new birth, <a href='#Page_546'>546</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ptolemaic system, description of, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pyramids, why referable to mind, <a href='#Page_390'>390</a>, <a href='#Page_391'>391</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pythagoras, school of, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Quadrumana, in the Darwinian pedigree of man, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">and other mammals, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Races, what are, <a href='#Page_372'>372</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Raphael, created images, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Religion, what is, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">natural, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">when in conflict with science, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>-13, <a href='#Page_399'>399</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Religious consciousness, Spencer's origin of, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Reproduction, two grand systems of, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Reproductive process, parallel in the, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Reptiles, Plato's origin of, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Resurrection, St. Paul's doctrine of the, <a href='#Page_468'>468</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Revelation, how treated in this work, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">purpose of, <a href='#Page_540'>540</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Roman civilization, lacked belief in creation, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">law, slavery under, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Rudiments, Plato's view of, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">instances of, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>-114, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Sacrum, analysis of the human, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">structure of the female, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Savages, beliefs of, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Science, domain of, <a href='#Page_391'>391</a>, <a href='#Page_392'>392</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">present tendency of, <a href='#Page_352'>352</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">tendencies of, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">values of, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">when in conflict with religion, meaning of, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">wrong aims of, <a href='#Page_545'>545</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Scott, Sir Walter, his reliance on thoughts obtained during sleep, <a href='#Page_490'>490</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Secularization of morals discussed, <a href='#Page_434'>434</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Segments. See <span class="smcap">Articulata</span>; <span class="smcap">Vertebrates</span>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Selection, natural, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">limitations to, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">office of, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">sexual, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Senses, the corporeal, <a href='#Page_503'>503</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sexes, origin of, in Plato's Kosmos, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">in Nature, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>, <a href='#Page_354'>354</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_378'>378</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sexual love, in men and brutes, <a href='#Page_379'>379</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">moral and social phenomena of, <a href='#Page_382'>382</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sexual union, operation of, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Sexual unions, purpose of, <a href='#Page_384'>384</a>, <a href='#Page_385'>385</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Shakespeare, created imaginary persons, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Simiadæ, general term for monkeys, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Simonides, poetical theologies of, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Sixteenth century, intellectual habits in the, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sin, how to be viewed, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Slavery, under the Roman law, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sleep, phenomena of, <a href='#Page_479'>479</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">better thoughts during, <a href='#Page_489'>489</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Society, phenomena of, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Solar system, how viewed by the Greeks, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">origin of, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Somnambulism, phenomena of, <a href='#Page_491'>491</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Soul, meaning of, <a href='#Page_478'>478</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Souls, of men, genesis of, in Plato's Kosmos, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">transmigration of, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">triplicity of, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Space, illimitable, concepts of, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Species, finality of, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">meaning of, <a href='#Page_372'>372</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Spencer, Herbert, his theory of animal evolution, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">answers to his objections, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">attacks "the current creed," <a href='#Page_434'>434</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">creation is something made out of nothing, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">creation incapable of being conceived, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">creation not supported by any proof, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his agnosticism examined, <a href='#Page_257'>257</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">his argument from parasites, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">his denial of the possibility of knowing mind, <a href='#Page_508'>508</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his doctrine of evolution, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his ethical system, <a href='#Page_427'>427</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">his ghost-theory, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">his origin of man, <a href='#Page_348'>348</a>-351, <a href='#Page_357'>357</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his psychological system, <a href='#Page_408'>408</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> -<li class="isub1">his psychology criticised, <a href='#Page_470'>470</a>, <a href='#Page_504'>504</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his theory of mind, <a href='#Page_510'>510</a>-516.</li> -<li class="isub1">his theory of the moral sense, <a href='#Page_418'>418</a>, <a href='#Page_423'>423</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his treatment of the divine attributes, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">his "unknown cause," <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">how his theory differs from Darwin's, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">on the evolution of mind, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">on the evolution of animals, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">on universal law of evolution, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">special creations presumptively absurd, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">St. Paul, his doctrine of the resurrection, <a href='#Page_468'>468</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Struggle for existence, meaning of, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Substance, distinct from power, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">of mind, <a href='#Page_469'>469</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Substitution and suppression of organs, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">"Supernatural," meaning of, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">"Survival of the fittest," meaning of, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Swim-bladder, supposed homologue of a lung, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">conversion of, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Taine, M., his views of the objects of history, <a href='#Page_545'>545</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Telescope, formation of the, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>-70.</li> - -<li class="indx">Thales, philosophy of, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">period of, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <i>note</i>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Theology, the current, not to be considered, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Time, beginning of, in Plato's Kosmos, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">conception of endless, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a> <i>et seq.</i></li> - -<li class="indx">Transmigration, from animal to animal, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>-59.</li> - -<li class="indx">Typical plan, concealed in the ante-fœtal germ, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Uniformity. See <span class="smcap">Pattern</span>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Varieties, what are, <a href='#Page_372'>372</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Vertebral column, analysis of, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Voltaire, saying of, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Von Baer, his embryologic law, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Vortices. See <span class="smcap">Descartes</span>.</li> - - -<li class="ifrst">Women, origin of, in Plato's Kosmos, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>.</li> -</ul></div> - - - -<p>THE END.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_565" id="Page_565">[Pg 565]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="center"><big>BY GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS</big>.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - - -<p class="hang"><b>LIFE OF DANIEL WEBSTER.</b> By <span class="smcap">George Ticknor Curtis</span>. -Illustrated with Steel Portrait and Woodcuts. Two vols., 8vo. -Cloth, $4.00; sheep, $6.00; half morocco, $10.00.</p> - -<p>A most valuable and important contribution to the history of American -parties and politics, and to the best class of our literature. It is a -model biography of a most gifted man, wherein the intermingling of the -statesman and lawyer with the husband, father, and friend, is painted -so that we feel the reality of the picture.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"We believe the present work to be a most valuable and important contribution -to the history of American parties and politics."—<em>London Saturday Review.</em></p> - -<p>"Of Mr. Curtis's labor we wish to record our opinion, in addition to what we -have already said, that, in the writing of this book, he has made a most valuable -contribution to the best class of our literature."—<em>New York Tribune.</em></p> - -<p>"This 'Life of Webster' is a monument to both subject and author, and one -that will stand well the wear of time."—<em>Boston Post.</em></p> - -<p>"Mr. Curtis, it will be remembered, was one of the literary executors named -by Mr. Webster, in his will, to do this work; and owing to the death of two of -the others, Mr. Everett and President Felton, and the advanced age of Mr. Ticknor, -Mr. Curtis has prepared the biography himself, and it has passed under Mr. -Ticknor's revision. We believe the work will satisfy the wishes of Mr. Webster's -most devoted friends."—<em>Boston Journal.</em></p></blockquote> - - -<p class="hang"><b>THE LAST YEARS OF DANIEL WEBSTER.</b> A MONOGRAPH. -By <span class="smcap">George Ticknor Curtis</span>. 8vo. Paper, 50 cents.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Laying aside, so far as I may be able, the partiality of a friend and biographer, -I shall subject to the scrutiny of reason and good sense the accusation that, -in Mr. Webster's later years, for the sake of attaining the Presidency, by bidding -for the political support of the Southern States, he renounced the principles -which he had professed all his life on the subject of slavery."—<em>The Author.</em></p></blockquote> - - -<p class="hang"><b>McCLELLAN'S LAST SERVICE TO THE REPUBLIC</b>, -together with a Tribute to his Memory. By <span class="smcap">George Ticknor Curtis</span>. -With a Map showing the Position of the Union and Confederate -Forces on the Night of November 7, 1862. 12mo. Paper, 30 -cents.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"Every statement of a fact, contained in these pages, which was not founded -on General McClellan's official report of his campaigns, or derived from some -other public source, was given to me by the General in the spring of 1880, and was -written down by me at the time. At my request he superintended the preparation -of the map which shows his position and that of the Confederate troops on -the 7th and 8th of November, 1862, and compared it with the military maps issued -by the Government after the close of the civil war."—<em>From the Author's Prefatory -Note.</em></p></blockquote> - -<hr class="small" /> -<p class="center">New York: D. APPLETON & CO., 1, 3, & 5 Bond Street.</p> - - -<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> -<div class="footnotes"> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1" id="Footnote_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> "Principles of Psychology," vol. i, p. 336.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2" id="Footnote_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Galileo's "heresy," that the earth moves round the sun, was condemned -by a papal decree in the sixteenth century as "absurd, philosophically -false, and formally heretical, because it is expressly contrary to Holy -Scripture." No Roman Catholic now dreams of disputing what the Florentine -astronomer maintained; and the evolutionists are perpetually foretelling -that the time will come when to question their doctrine will be admitted -to be as ridiculous as was the papal interdict fulminated against Galileo. -If their doctrine had nothing to confront it but a similar condemnation, -proceeding from some ecclesiastical authority claiming to be "infallible," -or, if it could be met only by the assertion that it is "contrary to Holy -Scripture," there would be some analogy between the two cases. But there -is a vast unlikeness between the two cases. While the hypothesis of animal -evolution is plainly enough "contrary to Holy Scripture," no one who -has any perception of the weakness of its proofs is obliged to rest his -rejection of it on that ground. If, in the sixteenth century, there had been -as good scientific and physical grounds on which to refute Galileo as there -now are for questioning the doctrine of the evolution of distinct species out -of other species, the papal condemnation would have been superfluous even -for churchmen. We must not forget the age in which we live, or allow -any kind of truth to fail of vindication, from fear of being classed with those -who in some former age have blunderingly mistaken the means of vindicating -truth. Belief in special creations, whatever the Bible may say, does -not now, and in all probability never will, stand on a par with the belief -that the sun moves round the earth.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3" id="Footnote_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Macaulay's "Essays," etc., Riverside edition, vol. ii, 502-504.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4" id="Footnote_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Grote's "Plato," i, 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5" id="Footnote_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Thales flourished 620-560 <span class="smcap">B. C.</span> Plato's life extended from 427-347 <span class="smcap">B. C.</span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6" id="Footnote_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Grote's "Plato," i, 10. I follow Mr. Grote in describing the hypothesis -of the Pythagoreans.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7" id="Footnote_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Ibid.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8" id="Footnote_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Grote, iii, 290.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9" id="Footnote_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Ibid., 287, 288.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10" id="Footnote_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Grote, iii, 289.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11" id="Footnote_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> It should be stated that the passage from Macaulay's writings here -commented on was written and first published in 1840, before the speculations -of the scientists who maintain the doctrines of evolution had -attracted much attention, or been promulgated in their present shape.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12" id="Footnote_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Rotation was considered the movement most conformable to reason -and intelligence, and it is impracticable to any figure but the spherical. -Grote, iii, 253.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13" id="Footnote_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> The primitive gods of Plato's conception (in the "Timæus") are not -to be confounded with the gods of the poetic and popular faith. As Mr. -Grote has pointed out, there is nothing more remarkable in Plato's writings -than the subtilty and skill with which he contrived to elude the charge of -impiety and infidelity toward the gods of tradition and of the popular -faith. In a passage of the "Timæus," on which Mr. Grote seems to be in -doubt whether it was ironical or sincere, Plato boldly confronts the difficulty -by saying that we must believe competent witnesses whose testimony -we have, respecting the genesis of the remaining gods who have personal -names and were believed in by his contemporaries. For his own part, he -says, he does not pretend to account for their generation. The sons of the -gods, the heroic and sacred families, who must have known their own -fathers and all about their own family affairs, have given us their family -traditions, and we must obey the law and believe. But concerning the -primitive gods, the first progenitors of the remaining gods, we are at -liberty to speculate. The ingenuity of this admission of authority where -authority has spoken, reconcilable with speculation upon matters on which -authority has not spoken, is admirable. Plato, as Mr. Grote has observed, -was willing to incur the risk of one count of the indictment which was -brought against his master Socrates, that of introducing new divine persons. -In legal parlance he might have demurred to this count, as not -charging any offense against the established religion. But the other count, -for not acknowledging the gods whom the city acknowledged, he did not -choose to encounter. As to them, he prudently, and perhaps sarcastically, -accepts the testimony of witnesses who speak by inspiration and authority. -But as to the primitive gods, the progenitors of the gods from whom were -descended the heroic and sacred families of men, he expresses in the -"Timæus" his own convictions, without appealing to authority and without -intimating that he is speaking of mysteries beyond the comprehension of -his reason. The boldness of this flight beyond all authority into the realms -of pure reason is very striking, even if it does end in nothing but probability, -which is all that Plato claims for his theory.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14" id="Footnote_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> It must be remembered that, in the formation of the cosmical soul, -the ingredients were the eternal Ideas; of these there could be a remnant -after the cosmical soul was formed. But the cosmical body, which was -formed out of the material elements, comprehended the whole of them, and -there could be no remnant or surplus of them remaining outside. But -portions of them could be borrowed for a limited period of mortal existence, -and would return to their place in the Kosmos when that existence -terminated. If this distinction be carried along, Plato will not be found -to be inconsistent with himself.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15" id="Footnote_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> It does not distinctly appear what was to become of the rational soul -if it finally failed in the conflict with evil, at the lowest end of the transmigration. -Being immortal, it could not perish. But in providing for it -an opportunity of final success through all the forms of animal life to -which it might be condemned, it would seem that Plato was pressed by a -reluctance to encounter the idea of endless misery. This point, however, -does not obscure his explanation of the process by which species of animals, -and a succession of inferior animals, came to exist.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16" id="Footnote_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Mr. Grote has pointed out that in his other writings, notably in the -"Republic" and in the "Leges", Plato is not consistent with this idea that -the gods are responsible for the evil that man causes to himself; and that -in the "Timæus" he plainly makes the Demiurgus responsible, because he -brings, or allows to be brought, an immortal soul down from its star, where -it was living pure, intelligent, and in harmony with reason, and makes it -incur corruption, disturbance, and stupidity, by junction with a mortal -body and two mortal and inferior souls.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17" id="Footnote_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> I have omitted the description of the influence of disease induced by -an over-indulgence of appetite, etc., in aiding the process of debasement -from the primitive type. The reader can find this influence developed in -Grote, or can consult the original Greek of the "Timæus." It would appear -that Plato considered the effect of all the appetites, when too much -indulged, as tending in the primitive non-sexual type toward the development -of that lower kind of animal which the gods saw fit to treat as fit only to -become woman.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18" id="Footnote_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Grote.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19" id="Footnote_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Grote's "Plato," iii, 282.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20" id="Footnote_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> See, as to the reception of the Platonic Demiurgus by the Alexandrian -Jews, first chapter.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21" id="Footnote_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> "Origin of Species," p. 428, American edition, from the sixth English. -New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1882.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22" id="Footnote_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Mr. Darwin refers to Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory of "the necessary -acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation"; and indeed -it is apparent that this class of philosophers have constructed a theory -which denies the creation of the human mind as a spiritual essence, independent -of matter, although some of them may adhere to the idea that it -was God who caused matter to evolve out of its own action the substance -or existence that we call mind.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23" id="Footnote_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> "Origin of Species," p. 69.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24" id="Footnote_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> For the illustrations of both kinds of selection I must refer the reader -to Mr. Darwin's works. In regard to birds, he makes the sexual selection -operate less by the "law of battle" among the males, or by fighting, and -more by the attractions of plumage and voice, by which the males carry on -their rivalry for the choice of the females in pairing. But he attributes the -same effect to the sexual selection in birds as in the other animals, namely, -the transmission to offspring, and chiefly to the male offspring, of those -peculiarities of structure which have given to the male parent the victory -over his competitors.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25" id="Footnote_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> A very low form of fish, without brain, vertebral column, or heart, -classed by the older naturalists among the worms. ("Descent of Man," p. -159.) The technical name of the lancelet is <em>Amphioxus</em>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26" id="Footnote_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> "Origin of Species," p. 146.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27" id="Footnote_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> The kangaroos and opossums are of this group.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28" id="Footnote_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Animals with four hands.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29" id="Footnote_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> Animals which produce living young, and nourish them after -birth by milk from the teats of the mother.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30" id="Footnote_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> The lemur is one of a genus of four-handed mammals, allied to -the apes, baboons, and monkeys, but with a form approaching -that of quadrupeds.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31" id="Footnote_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 165.—The reader will need to observe that -monkey is the popular name of the ape and the baboon. In zoölogy, -monkey designates the animals of the genus <em>Simia</em>, which have long tails. -The three classes are apes, without tails; monkeys, with long tails; baboons, -with short tails.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32" id="Footnote_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Grote, iii, p. 276.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33" id="Footnote_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 65.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34" id="Footnote_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 65.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35" id="Footnote_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> "Descent of Man," pp. 164, 609.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36" id="Footnote_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 159.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37" id="Footnote_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> "Origin of Species," p. 148.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38" id="Footnote_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 165.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39" id="Footnote_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 158.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40" id="Footnote_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 155.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41" id="Footnote_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Ibid.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42" id="Footnote_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> "Descent of Man," pp. 156, 157.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43" id="Footnote_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> Ibid., p. 156.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44" id="Footnote_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 156.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45" id="Footnote_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46" id="Footnote_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> Ibid., p. 8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47" id="Footnote_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> Ibid.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48" id="Footnote_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> "Descent of Man," pp. 9, 10, quoting Huxley, "Man's Place in Nature," -p. 65.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49" id="Footnote_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 11 <em>et seq.</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50" id="Footnote_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> Ibid.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51" id="Footnote_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 24. Consult Mr. Darwin's note on Prof. Bianconi's -explanation of homologous structures upon mechanical principles, -in accordance with their uses.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52" id="Footnote_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> Mr. Herbert Spencer's peculiar views are not here included in the discussion, -but they will be considered hereafter.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53" id="Footnote_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> It is immaterial, of course, in this discussion, whether the formation -of man preceded that of the other animals, according to the Platonic idea, -or whether, as in the account given in the book of Genesis, the other animals -were first formed. So far as an ideal plan entered into all of them, -that plan may have been devised for and first applied to any part of the -series, and then varied accordingly.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54" id="Footnote_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> The popular terms—"fish" and "flesh"—present to the mind the -most vivid idea of this change from the characteristic substance of one of -these animals to that of another.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55" id="Footnote_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> See the note on amputation, or severance of parts, at the end of this -chapter.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_56" id="Footnote_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 25.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_57" id="Footnote_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> "The Principles of Biology," by Herbert Spencer, vol. i, p. 334 <em>et -seq.</em> I use the American edition, D. Appleton & Co., 1881.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_58" id="Footnote_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 336.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_59" id="Footnote_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> "Biology," i, pp. 336, 337.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_60" id="Footnote_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> Webster's "Dictionary of the English Language."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_61" id="Footnote_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> Let it be remembered that the sense which is here considered comprehends -not only material objects, but also ideas, images, and in short whatever, -in its kind, had no previous existence. This is just as true of an -original poem, or picture, or statue, or musical composition, as it is of a -machine that is both original and new as a piece of mechanism.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_62" id="Footnote_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> Perhaps I owe an apology to a large class of readers for having bestowed -so much attention upon the logical formula with which Mr. Spencer -aims to dispose of the idea of creation. But I have observed, especially -among young persons and others whose habits of thinking are unformed or -not corrected by sound and comprehensive reasoning, a popular reception -of this particular dogma, which makes it necessary to subject it to some -careful analysis. In fact, one of my chief objects in writing this book has -been to contribute what I might to the formation of habits of testing philosophical -and scientific theories by something better than specious assumptions -which can be thrown into the plausible form of logical propositions. -There is nothing more valuable than logic, when its forms represent a true -and correct ratiocination; and, when they do not, there is nothing that is -more delusive. It needs some discipline of mind to enable people to see -when logic is valuable and when it is not.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_63" id="Footnote_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 340 <em>et seq.</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_64" id="Footnote_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> This is given almost <em>verbatim</em> from Mr. Spencer's "Biology," i, p. -340 <em>et seq.</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_65" id="Footnote_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> In treating of the existence of physical and moral evil, I do not mean -to include sin in the discussion. I mean now by moral evil that loss or -diminution of happiness, for the individual or a race, which results from -physical evil produced by causes for which the sufferer is not responsible. -The sin that is in the world is a matter that is to be considered entirely -with reference to the accountability of man as a moral being; and the -reasons which may be assigned for its permission may be quite distinct -from those which relate to the existence of physical suffering for which -man is not responsible upon any rational theory of moral accountability.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_66" id="Footnote_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 354.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_67" id="Footnote_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 339.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_68" id="Footnote_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> "Biology," i, pp. 344, 355.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_69" id="Footnote_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> "Biology," i, pp. 346-348 <em>et seq.</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_70" id="Footnote_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> Concerning the nebular hypothesis, and what astronomers now consider, -see <em>post.</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_71" id="Footnote_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> "Biology," i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_72" id="Footnote_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> "Biology," i, pp. 349, 350.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_73" id="Footnote_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 351. I am not quite sure that I understand what -Mr. Spencer means by "direct" proof. In the passage immediately following -the sentence last quoted, he speaks of "the kind and quantity of <em>direct -evidence</em> that all organic beings have gradually arisen," etc., whereas, in a -previous passage, he had admitted that the facts at present assignable in -<em>direct</em> proof of this hypothesis are insufficient. I presume he meant -insufficient in number. (Compare "Biology," i, pp. 351 and 352). Now, I should -say that <em>direct</em> proof of the hypothesis that all animal organisms have -arisen successively out of one another would require more or less positive -evidence of such occurrences; and that the proof which is afforded by what -has taken place within the limits of a single species in the course of successive -generations would be <em>indirect</em> evidence of what may have taken place -in the evolution of different species, because it requires the aid of analogy -to connect the two. I am not aware that there is supposed to be any proof -of the evolution of species out of species, excepting that which is derived -from what has taken place in single races in the development of the ovum -into the infant, the development of the infant into the mature animal, and -the limited varieties of structure appearing among individuals of the same -race. As I go on through the examination of Mr. Spencer's argument, it -will appear whether there are grounds for regarding this kind of reasoning -as satisfactory or the reverse.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_74" id="Footnote_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> I have stated here, in reference to the pedigree of an individual, a far -more liberal rule of evidence than would probably be allowed in courts of -justice, where anything of value was depending upon the establishment of -a descent from a certain ancestor. But I have purposely suggested the -broadest rule that can be applied to family or race resemblances as a means -of aiding a pedigree in popular determination or in a <em>judicium rusticum</em>. -For example, suppose that there were persons now living in this country -who trace their descent from the English husband of Pocahontas, the -daughter of an Indian chief, and from her. They bear, we will suppose, -the family name of the Englishman whom she is known to have married, -and perhaps one of them bears very strong resemblance to the Indian race -in features, complexion, and hair. In a judicial trial of this person's supposed -pedigree I do not suppose that these resemblances, if they constituted -his sole evidence, together with the name of Rolfe which he bears, and -which a certain number of his ancestors may have borne before him, would -be received as evidence of his descent from the Indian girl whose name was -Pocahontas, and who married an Englishman of the name of Rolfe more -than two centuries ago. It would be necessary to make some proof of the -whole pedigree by the kind of evidence which the law admits in such cases, -and then the resemblances of the individual to the Indian race might possibly -be received as confirmatory proof, in aid of the proof derived from -the family name of Pocahontas's English husband, from reputation, written -or oral declarations of deceased witnesses, family documents, ancient gravestones, -and the like. In popular judgment most persons would be apt to -accept the family name of Rolfe and the apparent trace of Indian blood as -sufficient proof of the descent of the individual from the Indian girl who -married John Rolfe. But in a court of justice these facts would go for -nothing without some independent proof of the pedigree.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_75" id="Footnote_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> See the table of the Darwinian pedigree of man, <em>ante</em>. Any other -mode of arranging the order of evolution that will admit of the application -of the steps of supposed development to what is known of the animal -kingdom, will equally serve to illustrate the theory.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_76" id="Footnote_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> Darwin's "Descent of Man," Prof. Huxley's note, p. 199 <em>et seq.</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_77" id="Footnote_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> Mr. Spencer observes that the hypothesis of special creations is one -"which formulates absolute ignorance into a semblance of positive knowledge...." -Thus, however regarded, the hypothesis of special creations -turns out to be worthless—worthless by its derivation; worthless in its intrinsic -incoherence; worthless as absolutely without evidence; worthless as -not satisfying a moral want. "We must therefore consider it as counting -for nothing, in opposition to any other hypothesis respecting the origin of -organic beings." There is a great deal more in the same tone. (See "Biology," -i, pp. 344, 345, and <em>passim</em> throughout Chapters II and III of Part -III of that work.) Mr. Darwin, who is sufficiently positive, is much more -moderate, and in my opinion a much better reasoner, although I can not -subscribe to his reasoning or his conclusions. A rather irreverent naval -officer of my acquaintance once extolled a doctrinal sermon, which he had -just heard preached by a Unitarian clergyman, in this fashion: "I tell you -what, sir, the preacher did not leave the Trinity a leg to stand upon." -Probably some of Mr. Spencer's readers think that he has equally demolished -the doctrine of special creations.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_78" id="Footnote_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> "Descent of Man," p. 155.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_79" id="Footnote_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 366.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_80" id="Footnote_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> "In the presence of the various genealogical trees of animal descent -which have been put forward so frequently of late, a judicious skepticism -seems the attitude best warranted by the evidence yet obtained. If so -many similar forms have arisen in mutual independence, then the affinities -of the animal kingdom can never be represented by the symbol of a tree. -Rather, we should conceive of the existence of a grove of trees, closely approximated, -greatly differing in age and size, with their branches interlaced -in a most complex entanglement. The great group of apes is composed of -two such branches; but their relations one to another, to the other branches -which represent mammalian groups, and to the trunks from which such -branches diverge, are problems still awaiting solution."—<em>"Encyclopædia -Britannica," article "Apes."</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_81" id="Footnote_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> "Biology," i, pp. 380-382.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_82" id="Footnote_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> I use these terms with quotation-marks, because I do not admit any -philosophical antagonism such as they are intended to imply.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_83" id="Footnote_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> "Homology" is defined by lexicographers as "the doctrine of similar -parts." "Homologous organs" is a term used by scientific writers to describe -organs having a relation of some proportion to each other. In this -particular case of the vertebral column, the different parts of the column -are treated as if they were different organs, and they are said to be homologous -organs in the same animal, because they bear a certain relation or -ratio of proportion to each other.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_84" id="Footnote_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> See the discussion of how evolution works, <em>post</em>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_85" id="Footnote_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 387.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_86" id="Footnote_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> The Greek philosophers, as we have seen, before Plato and Aristotle, -found that their systems of causes, which did not involve the idea of power -as abstracted from substance, would not account for the phenomena of nature. -With all their subtilty and ingenuity, they did not reach the truth -that secondary causes are necessarily limited in their action, and that there -must be an unlimited cause.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_87" id="Footnote_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> "Biology," i, pp. 369, 370.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_88" id="Footnote_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 388.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_89" id="Footnote_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> "Biology," i, pp. 390, 391.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_90" id="Footnote_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 396.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_91" id="Footnote_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 399. It is to be noted that the relationship here referred -to is supposed or apparent kinship between the <em>aggregate</em> of the surviving -and the <em>aggregate</em> of the extinct forms which have died out in recent -geologic times. But this does not supply the steps of descent by which -any one surviving form can be traced back to any one extinct form.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_92" id="Footnote_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 401.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_93" id="Footnote_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> "Essays," vol. iii, pp. 293-296.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_94" id="Footnote_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> For the answer to the objection that we thus ascribe anthropomorphic -attributes to the Supreme Being, see <em>infra.</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_95" id="Footnote_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> Webster's Dictionary, "Phenomenon."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_96" id="Footnote_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> Our other American lexicographer, Worcester, who was pretty strict -in regard to the words which he admitted into the English language, gives -the word "noumenon," but he was careful to designate its arbitrary use. -His definition is this: -</p> -<p> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">"Noumenon, <em>n.</em> [Gr. νοῦς, the mind.] In the philosophy of Kant, an</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">object in itself, not relatively to us; opposed to <em>phenomenon</em>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;"><em>Fleming</em>."</span></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_97" id="Footnote_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> Prof. Huxley, who claims a sort of patent right or priority of invention -in the term and doctrine "agnosticism."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_98" id="Footnote_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> "There are some things I know and some things I believe," said the -Syrian; "I know that I have a soul, and I believe that it is immortal." ... -</p> -<p> -"I wish I could assure myself of the personality of the Creator," said -Lothair; "I cling to that, but they say it is unphilosophical!" "In what -sense," asked the Syrian, "is it more unphilosophical to believe in a -personal God, omnipotent and omniscient, than in natural forces, unconscious -and irresistible? Is it unphilosophical to combine power with intelligence?"—<em>Disraeli's -"Lothair."</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_99" id="Footnote_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> The practice of judging of the future by the past is sometimes treated -as if it were a mere habit of the uncultivated and undisciplined part of -mankind—a kind of mental weakness. Undoubtedly, our past experience -is not always an infallible guide to what is to be our experience in the future. -We often have to correct our past experience, by carefully separating -the accidental from the essential; by more comprehensive analysis of -the facts which constitute our former experience. But when we have full, -comprehensive, and accurate views of that which has happened to us heretofore, -our beliefs in what is to happen to us hereafter are not only attained -by a safe process of reasoning, but that process is imposed upon us by a -law of our mental constitution.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_100" id="Footnote_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> "Nineteenth Century" for November, 1884, p. 827.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_101" id="Footnote_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> Grote's "Plato," iii, pp. 284, 285.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_102" id="Footnote_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> Grote's "Plato," iii, p. 285, and notes.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_103" id="Footnote_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> Grote's "Plato," iii, p. 181 <em>et seq.</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_104" id="Footnote_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> The contradictions between Plato's ideas of the origin of beliefs in -the gods, as given in his various writings, are of course unimportant in -reference to the present discussion. In the "Timæus," as Mr. Grote has -pointed out, Plato "accepts the received genealogy of the gods, upon the -authority of the sons and early descendants of the gods. These eons must -have known their own fathers; we ought, therefore, to 'follow the law -and believe them,' though they spoke without either probable or demonstrative -proof.... That which Plato here enjoins to be believed is the -genealogy of Hesiod and other poets, though he does not expressly name -the poets." (Grote, iii, p. 189, note.) In other words, the sons of the gods -are authoritative witnesses to their genealogy, whose <em>ipsi diximus</em> must be -believed. On the other hand, in his "Republic" and "Leges," Plato rejects -the authority of those witnesses, and boldly proclaims that their legends -are fictions, which must be displaced by better fictions, more consonant to -a true ethical conception of the characters of the gods. It is the province -of the lawgiver to supply these better legends, but they are all the while -fictions, although the multitude do not know that they are so. Mr. Grote -accounts for these and other discrepancies in the writings of Plato by explaining -that his different dialogues are not interdependent productions, -but separate disquisitions. (See his admirable and critical examination of -the Platonic canon, in Chapters IV, V, VI, of his first volume.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_105" id="Footnote_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> The reader will understand that I do not assert this to be what astronomers -teach, but I maintain it to be a rational deduction from the facts -which they furnish to us.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_106" id="Footnote_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 482.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_107" id="Footnote_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> "Biology," i, Appendix, pp. 483, 484.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_108" id="Footnote_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 408.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_109" id="Footnote_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> "Biology," i, pp. 409, 410.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_110" id="Footnote_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> "Biology," i, p. 482.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_111" id="Footnote_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> Now contained in "Biology," i, Appendix.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_112" id="Footnote_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> Quoted by M. Guizot in his "History of France," vol. vi, p. 328. -Guizot observes that Buffon was "absolutely unshackled by any religious -prejudice," and that he "involuntarily recurred to the account given in -Genesis."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_113" id="Footnote_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> Probably Kosmicos did not mean that man excels all other animals -in the delicacy and perfection of his nervous organization, for some of his -senses are inferior to those of some of the other animals, as his movements -are less swift. Apparently his meaning is that, taken as a whole, the nervous -organization of man evinces the greatest power of variation and the -widest range of action.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_114" id="Footnote_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> Darwin's "Descent of Man," pp. 608, 609.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_115" id="Footnote_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 428.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_116" id="Footnote_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> "The Principles of Psychology," by Herbert Spencer, third edition. -New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1885.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_117" id="Footnote_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> "Principles of Psychology," i, p. 162.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_118" id="Footnote_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> "Principles of Psychology," ii, p. 503.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_119" id="Footnote_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> "Principles of Psychology," ii, p. 503.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_120" id="Footnote_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> Revised version.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_121" id="Footnote_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_121"><span class="label">[121]</span></a> Darwin, "Descent of Man," Part I, chap. iv.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_122" id="Footnote_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_122"><span class="label">[122]</span></a> "Descent of Man," Part I, chap. iv.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_123" id="Footnote_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_123"><span class="label">[123]</span></a> Quoted in Darwin's "Descent of Man," p. 123.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_124" id="Footnote_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_124"><span class="label">[124]</span></a> "Principles of Sociology," i, p. 433, § 202.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_125" id="Footnote_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_125"><span class="label">[125]</span></a> Ibid., chap. <span class="smcap">xxv</span>, p. 414 <em>et seq.</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_126" id="Footnote_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_126"><span class="label">[126]</span></a> "Principles of Sociology," i, p. 135.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_127" id="Footnote_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_127"><span class="label">[127]</span></a> "Principles of Morality," vol. i. I. "The Data of Ethics." By -Herbert Spencer. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1884.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_128" id="Footnote_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_128"><span class="label">[128]</span></a> "The Data of Ethics," pp. 6, 7, by Herbert Spencer. New York: D. -Appleton & Co., 1884.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_129" id="Footnote_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129"><span class="label">[129]</span></a> "The Data of Ethics," pp. 45, 46, by Herbert Spencer. New York: -D. Appleton & Co., 1884.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_130" id="Footnote_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_130"><span class="label">[130]</span></a> "Data of Ethics," chap. xv.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_131" id="Footnote_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_131"><span class="label">[131]</span></a> Ibid.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_132" id="Footnote_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132"><span class="label">[132]</span></a> Revised version of St. Mark's gospel.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_133" id="Footnote_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_133"><span class="label">[133]</span></a> The late Jeremiah S. Black is the person whose language is here -quoted, although it was used with reference to something else.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_134" id="Footnote_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_134"><span class="label">[134]</span></a> This does not imply that the punishment inflicted by society is to be -always the same. It implies only that there is to be some punishment, so -long as the prohibited act continues to be committed.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_135" id="Footnote_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_135"><span class="label">[135]</span></a> "Principles of Psychology," vol. i, pp. 503, 504, § 220.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_136" id="Footnote_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_136"><span class="label">[136]</span></a> <em>Statical</em>: pertaining to bodies at rest or in equilibrium. -</p> -<p> -<em>Dynamical</em>: pertaining to strength or power. -</p> -<p> -<em>Dynamics</em>: that part of mechanical philosophy which treats of bodies -in motion; opposed to <em>statics</em>. ("Webster's Dictionary.")</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_137" id="Footnote_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137"><span class="label">[137]</span></a> "Principles of Psychology," vol. ii, p. 484, <em>et seq.</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_138" id="Footnote_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_138"><span class="label">[138]</span></a> "Webster's Dictionary." <span class="smcap">Plexus.</span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_139" id="Footnote_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_139"><span class="label">[139]</span></a> Corinthians, revised version.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_140" id="Footnote_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140"><span class="label">[140]</span></a> In the "authorized" version the passage is rendered thus: "There is -a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." Sophereus quotes the late -revised version. The meaning is the same. St. Paul assumes the existence -of a natural body, and then asserts that there is likewise a spiritual -body.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_141" id="Footnote_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_141"><span class="label">[141]</span></a> I have met, by the kindness of the author, with a little treatise which -contains a great deal of sound mental philosophy, with which in the main I -concur, and to which I am indebted for some very valuable suggestions. -This modest little book is entitled "The Heart of Man: An Attempt in Mental -Anatomy." The author is Mr. P. P. Bishop, a resident of San Mateo, -in Florida. It was printed at Chicago, by Shepard & Johnson, for the -author, in 1883. I know not if it is on sale. I suppose that Mr. Bishop -was led to send me his interesting treatise by the publication, in the "Manhattan -Magazine," at New York, in 1884, of the substance of the first -three chapters of the present work. I take this opportunity of expressing -my high appreciation of his treatise, and of explaining the meaning of its -title. As I understand him, he uses the term "Heart of Man" as synonymous -with structure of the mind, and not as referring to what is figuratively -called "the human heart." He has explained "Mental Anatomy" as follows: -"The method of investigation, which I have employed in making my -way to the conclusions set forth in this discussion, I call 'The Anatomical -Method,' because it is based on the conception of mind as an organized -being, and aims to discover the structure of that being." ... "At the risk," -he adds, "of appearing egotistical, I think it best to relate an experience." -He did not need to deprecate the appearance of egotism, for his method of -investigation, based on his own mental experience, was the very best that he -could have followed. It were to be wished that we could have more of this -kind of self-analysis by persons competent to make it, and less of theoretical -reasoning from premises more or less arbitrarily assumed. -</p> -<p> -I have endeavored to make my imaginary philosopher, Sophereus, avoid -the method of reasoning which I thus condemn, and to keep him within the -bounds of experience.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_142" id="Footnote_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142"><span class="label">[142]</span></a> "Extemporaneous," Latin, <em>ex</em>, from; and <em>tempus</em>, time, at the same -time, or from the same time. Extemporaneous discourse is when the thought -and the expression in which it is clothed occur at the time it is uttered, or -without premeditation of both thought and language. "Improvisation" -means the same thing, but it is specially applied to the act of making poetry -or performing music extemporaneously, that is, without prevision of -what one is to say or sing. Rapid conversation is of the same nature. So -is an instantaneous and unpremeditated answer to a question.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_143" id="Footnote_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_143"><span class="label">[143]</span></a> Webster's Dictionary—"Matter."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_144" id="Footnote_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_144"><span class="label">[144]</span></a> "And it shall be as when a hungry man dreameth, and behold, he -eateth: but he awaketh, and his soul is empty; or as when a thirsty man -dreameth, and behold, he drinketh: but he awaketh, and behold, he is -faint, and his soul hath appetite."—<span class="smcap">Isaiah.</span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_145" id="Footnote_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_145"><span class="label">[145]</span></a> Scott's "Antiquary," note v.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_146" id="Footnote_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_146"><span class="label">[146]</span></a> If it is objected that I have allowed Sophereus to overstate the power -of the mind to deal better with difficulties after "a good night's sleep," as -we say, than it had dealt with them before, I will cite the testimony of one -of the most prolific of writers and one of the most self-observing of men, -Sir Walter Scott, whose greatest success was achieved in the field of poetical -and prose fiction. This is a department in which inventive genius is -the main reliance, and is put to its greatest tasks. In that part of Scott's -"Diary" which covers the year 1826—the period when he was writing -"Woodstock"—he says: -</p> -<p> -"The half-hour between waking and rising has all my life proved propitious -to any task which was exercising my invention. When I got over -any knotty difficulty in a story, or have had in former times to fill up a -passage in a poem, it was always when I first opened my eyes that the -desired ideas thronged upon me. This is so much the case that I am in the -habit of relying upon it and saying to myself when I am at a loss, 'Never -mind, we shall have it at seven o'clock to-morrow morning.' If I have forgot -a circumstance, a name, or a copy of verses, it is the same thing.... -This morning I had some new ideas respecting 'Woodstock' which will make -the story better." (Lockhart's "Life of Scott," vol. viii, chap. lxviii.) -</p> -<p> -This, it is true, was the experience of a man of extraordinary genius, -whose facility of invention was as marvelous as the ease and rapidity with -which he wrote. But his experience was a very common one. It has been -shared by persons of much more humble faculties. I am sure that persons -in my own profession, who have been engaged in pursuits very different -from those of the poet or the novelist, will, from their own experience, -confirm what is assumed by Sophereus as a well-known mental phenomenon. -I could describe in detail many instances in which I have gone -through with the same fruition of new ideas, resulting from the acquisitions -obtained during sleep, or following from the benefits of sleep. For -example, when having to do with a complex state of facts, needing orderly -arrangement and analysis, it has repeatedly happened to me to rise in the -morning after a night of undisturbed sleep, with the whole of an entangled -skein unraveled, whereas before retiring to rest the mass of facts lay in -some confusion in the mind. In like manner the mind can often deal with -a legal question of a new and difficult character. The rule that ought to -be applied to a particular case has to be extracted from many precedents, -and perhaps none of them exactly cover the case in hand. On such occasions, -if one refrains from pushing the study of his subject while awake -to the severest analysis, and postpones the effort until the next morning, -the experience of Sir Walter is very likely to be repeated. "It was -always," he says, "when I first opened my eyes that the desired ideas -thronged upon me." I am persuaded, therefore, that although in the study -of any subject omission to master all its elements and details, when alone -one can accumulate them, is not to be recommended, there is undoubtedly -much to be gained by relieving the mind from the continued effort, and -allowing some hours of sleep to intervene, during which the mind can act -independently of all the bodily organs. -</p> -<p> -The question is, then, as above suggested, whether there come to us -during sleep acquisitions of new ideas with or without a simultaneous consciousness -that we are thinking of the subject, or whether the new ideas -follow from the benefits of sleep as a state of absolute rest and inactivity -of the brain, and of the intellectual faculties, so that when we awake both -the brain and the mental powers are in greater vigor. The expression used -by Scott in describing his own experience is that as soon as he awoke the -desired ideas <em>thronged</em> upon him. This might happen upon the hypothesis -that the desired ideas came because the brain and the mental powers, -refreshed by sleep, were in greater vigor. But I incline to believe that his -meaning was the reverse of this. At all events, it seems to me that the -true explanation of the phenomenon is that during sound and undisturbed -sleep of the body, including the brain, we do unconsciously think of the -subject on which our waking thoughts had been previously employed; -that in these states there are acquisitions of new ideas which we bring -with us out of the state in which they were acquired, or, as Sir Walter -expressed it, which <em>throng</em> upon us as soon as we open our eyes. While, -therefore, it may be said that this hypothesis assumes the existence of the -mind as a spiritual or intellectual entity capable of action as a thinking -being without any action of the bodily organs, the question is, on the other -hand, whether the phenomena here considered have not a very strong tendency -to prove that the mind is such a substantive and independent existence. -When it is remembered how common is the experience here referred -to, how various the phenomena are, how they are manifested on all kinds -of subjects, in regard to lines of conduct, and to everything about which we -are perplexed, and when we add these peculiar phenomena to the other -evidence which tends to establish the same belief in the existence of the -mind as something entirely apart from all its physical environment, it -seems to me that the argument becomes very strong, and that I have not -made my imaginary philosopher press it beyond its legitimate bounds.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_147" id="Footnote_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_147"><span class="label">[147]</span></a> Do him every honor.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_148" id="Footnote_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_148"><span class="label">[148]</span></a> By some commentators, this hint, given with female subtilty, is explained -to mean that their copy-hold, or lease, by which Banquo and his -son hold their lives, is not eternal. The more probable meaning is that, if -they are cut off, nature will produce no more copies of their race. But in -either meaning the hint that she gave was the same, and it included both -Banquo and his son.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_149" id="Footnote_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_149"><span class="label">[149]</span></a> When the unknowable power ceases to pulsate through our physical -organism, this "mental state" ceases—nothing survives—continuity is -ended.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_150" id="Footnote_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150"><span class="label">[150]</span></a> "Principles of Psychology," i, § 208, pp. 465-471.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_151" id="Footnote_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151"><span class="label">[151]</span></a> I have allowed Sophereus to follow in the main the writer to whom I -have already referred in the note on page <a href="#Footnote_141">471</a>—Mr. Bishop, of Florida.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_152" id="Footnote_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152"><span class="label">[152]</span></a> Bishop.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_153" id="Footnote_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153"><span class="label">[153]</span></a> Introduction to Taine's "History of English Literature," translated -by H. Van Laun. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1885.</p></div></div> -</div> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> - -<div class="transnote"> -<h3>Transcriber's Note</h3> - -<p>Obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected. Variations -in spelling, punctuation, accents and hyphenation remain as in the -original.</p> - -<p>In Chapter 12, <a href="#Page_526">Page 526</a>, the sentence: -"This is a power that can belong to and inhere -in a spiritual organism alone. We must, therefore, recognize -in the infant this original implanted endowment, the -capacity to be mentally convinced of realities; and while, -in order to the first exercise of this capacity there must be -a physical organism which will conduct the sensory impressions -to the brain ..."<br /> -Has been amended to read "... in order to meet the first exercise of this -capacity ..."</p> - -</div> - -<p> </p> -<hr class="full" /> - -<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CREATION OR EVOLUTION?***</p> -<p>******* This file should be named 50086-h.htm or 50086-h.zip *******</p> -<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br /> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/0/0/8/50086">http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/0/8/50086</a></p> -<p> -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed.</p> - -<p>Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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