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-The Project Gutenberg EBook of Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations in the
-Northern Solomons, by John C. Chapin
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations in the Northern Solomons
-
-Author: John C. Chapin
-
-Release Date: April 27, 2015 [EBook #48808]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TOP OF THE LADDER ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online
-Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
-file was produced from images generously made available
-by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Transcriber's note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber and placed
-into the Public Domain. Boldface text is indicated as =equals signs=.
-
-
-Contents
-
-  Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations in the Northern Solomons
-    SIDEBAR: Major General Allen H. Turnage, USMC
-  Planning the Operation
-    SIDEBAR: 3d Marine Division
-  Diversionary Landings
-    SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers
-  Battle at Sea
-  Action Ashore: Koromokina
-    SIDEBAR: 37th Infantry Division
-  The Battle for Piva Trail
-    SIDEBAR: War Dogs
-  The Coconut Grove Battle
-    SIDEBAR: Navajo Code Talkers
-    SIDEBAR: ‘Corpsman!’
-  Piva Forks Battle
-  Hand Grenade Hill
-  The Koiari Raid
-  Hellzapoppin Ridge
-  Epilogue
-  Bougainville Finale
-  Sources
-  About the Author
-  About this series of pamphlets
-  Transcriber’s Notes
-
-
-
-
-    TOP OF THE LADDER:
-
-    MARINE OPERATIONS IN THE
-    NORTHERN SOLOMONS
-
-    MARINES IN
-    WORLD WAR II
-    COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
-
-    BY CAPTAIN JOHN C. CHAPIN
-    U.S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE (RET)
-
-[Illustration: _Riflemen clad in camouflage dungarees await the
-lowering of their landing craft from_ George Clymer _(APA 27) for
-their dash to the beaches in their amphibious assault landing on
-Bougainville_. (National Archives Photo 80-G-55810)]
-
-
-[Illustration: _Raiders, up to their hips in water, man a machine gun
-along a jungle trail_. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 70764]
-
-
-
-
-Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations in the Northern Solomons
-
-_by Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)_
-
-
-Assault landings began for the men in the blackness of the early
-hours of the morning. On 1 November 1943, the troops of the 3d Marine
-Division were awakened before 0400, went to General Quarters at 0500,
-ate a tense breakfast, and then stood by for the decisive command,
-“Land the Landing Force.” All around them the preinvasion bombardment
-thundered, as the accompanying destroyers poured their 5-inch shells
-into the target areas, and spotters in aircraft helped to adjust the
-fire.
-
-As the sun rose on a bright, clear day, the word came at 0710 for the
-first LCVPs (Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel) to pull away from
-their transport ships and head for the shore, a 5,000-yard run across
-Empress Augusta Bay to the beaches of an island called Bougainville.
-
-Almost 7,500 Marines were entering their LCVPs (with Coast Guard
-crew and coxswains) for an assault on 12 color-coded beaches. Eleven
-of these extended west from Cape Torokina for 8,000 yards to the
-Koromokina Lagoon. The 12th was on Puruata Island just offshore from
-the beaches. The six beaches on the right were assigned to Colonel
-George W. McHenry’s 3d Marines and Lieutenant Colonel Alan Shapley’s 2d
-Raider Regiment (less one battalion). The five on the left and Puruata
-Island were the objectives of Colonel Edward A. Craig’s 9th Marines and
-Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Bean’s 3d Raider Battalion.
-
-[Illustration]
-
-As the men headed for shore, 31 Marine torpedo and scout bombers,
-covered by fighters, came screaming in from their base at Munda,
-bombing and strafing to give the beaches a final plastering. At 0726,
-the first wave touched ground, four minutes ahead of the official
-H-Hour. As the other waves came in, it was immediately apparent that
-there was serious trouble in two ways. A high surf was tossing the
-LCVPs and LCMs (Landing Craft, Medium) around, and they were landing
-on the wrong beaches, broaching, and smashing into each other in the
-big waves. By the middle of the morning, 64 LCVPs and 22 LCMs were
-hulks littering the beaches. Three of the designated beaches had to be
-abandoned as unusable.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 62751
-
-_Marine riflemen keep their heads down as they get closer to the
-assault beach on D-Day._]
-
-Major Donald M. Schmuck, commanding a company in the 3d Marines, later
-recalled how, in the “mad confusion” of the beachhead, his company
-was landed in the midst of heavy gunfire in the middle of another
-battalion’s zone on the beach of Torokina. Running his company on the
-double through the other battalion and the 2d Raiders’ zone across
-inlets and swamp, Major Schmuck got his men to the right flank of his
-own battalion where they were to have landed originally. His surprised
-battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hector de Zayas, stared at
-the bedraggled new arrivals exclaiming, “Where have you been?” Major
-Schmuck pointed back to Cape Torokina and replied, “Ask the Navy!”
-
-[Illustration: _As seen from a beached landing craft, these Marines are
-under fire while wading in the last few yards to the beach._]
-
-The other trouble came from the Japanese defenders. While the 9th
-Marines on the left landed unopposed, the 3d Marines on the right met
-fierce opposition, a deadly crossfire of machine gun and artillery
-fire. One Japanese 75mm gun, sited on Cape Torokina, was sending heavy
-enfilade fire against the incoming landing waves. It smashed 14 boats
-and caused many casualties. The boat group commander’s craft took a
-direct hit, causing the following boat waves to become disorganized and
-confused. Machine gun and rifle fire, with 90mm mortar bursts added,
-covered the shoreline. Companies landed in the wrong places. Dense
-underbrush, coming right down to the beaches, shrouded the defenders in
-their 25 bunkers and numerous rifle pits. The commanding officer of the
-1st Battalion, 3d Marines, Major Leonard M. “Spike” Mason, was wounded
-and had to be evacuated, but not before he shouted to his men, “Get
-the hell in there and fight!” Nearby, the executive officer of the 2d
-Raider Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. McCaffery, was directing
-an assault when he was severely wounded. He died that night.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
-
-_Sgt Robert A. Owens was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor._]
-
-In spite of the chaos, the intensive training of the Marines took hold.
-Individuals and small groups moved in to assault the enemy, reducing
-bunker after bunker, dropping grenades down their ventilators. For an
-hour, the situation was in doubt.
-
-The fierce combat led to a wry comment by one captain, Henry Applington
-II, comparing “steak and eggs served on white tablecloths by stewards
-... and three and a half hours and a short boat ride later ... rolling
-in a ditch trying to kill another human being with a knife.”
-
-The devastating fire from the 75mm cannon on Cape Torokina was finally
-silenced when Sergeant Robert A. Owens, crept up to its bunker, and
-although wounded, charged in and killed the gun crew and the occupants
-of the bunker before he himself was killed. A posthumous Medal of Honor
-was awarded to him for this heroic action which was so crucial to the
-landing.
-
-Meanwhile, on Puruata Island, just offshore of the landing beaches, the
-noise was intense; a well-dug-in contingent of Japanese offered stiff
-resistance to a reinforced company of the 3d Battalion, 2d Raiders.
-It was midafternoon of D plus one before the defenders in pill boxes,
-rifle pits, and trees were subdued, and then some of them got away to
-fight another day. A two-pronged sweep and mop-up by the raiders on D
-plus 2 found 29 enemy dead of the 70 Japanese estimated to have been on
-that little island. The raiders lost five killed and 32 wounded.
-
-An hour after the landings on the main beaches a traditional Marine
-signal was flashed from shore to the command and staff still afloat,
-“Situation well in hand.” This achievement of the riflemen came in
-spite of the ineffective prelanding fire of the destroyers. The men
-in front-line combat found that none of the 25 enemy bunkers on the
-right-hand beaches had been hit. Some of the naval bombardment had
-begun at a range of over seven miles, and the official Marine history
-summarized, “The gunfire plan ... had accomplished nothing.”
-
-[Illustration: _On a beach, rifles pointing toward the enemy, Marines
-get ready to fight their way inland._
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 69782
-]
-
-Unloading supplies and getting them in usable order on the chaotic
-beaches was a major problem. Seabees, sailors, and Marines all turned
-to the task, with 40 percent of the entire landing force laboring as
-the shore party. They sweated 6,500 tons of supplies ashore.
-
-[Illustration: THE LANDING AT CAPE TOROKINA
-
-I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
-
-1 NOVEMBER 1943
-
-Yellow beaches for cargo unloading during assault phase]
-
-Simultaneously, the batteries of the 12th Marines were struggling to
-get their artillery pieces ashore and set to fire. One battery, in
-support of the 2d Raider Battalion, waded through a lagoon to find
-firing positions. Amtracs (amphibian tractors), supplemented by rubber
-boats, were used to ferry the men and ammunition to the beaches. The
-90mm antiaircraft guns of the 3d Defense Battalion were also brought
-ashore early to defend against the anticipated air attacks.
-
-The Japanese had been quick to respond to this concentration of
-American ships. Before the first assault boats had hit the beach, a
-large flight of enemy carrier planes was on its way to attack the
-Marines and their supporting ships. New Zealand and Marine fighters
-met them in the air and the covering destroyers put up a hail of
-antiaircraft fire, while the transports and cargo ships took evasive
-action. Successive Japanese flights were beaten off; 26 enemy planes
-were shot down.
-
-[Illustration: THE SOLOMON ISLANDS
-
-1943]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 61899
-
-_LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift was an early commander of IMAC._]
-
-The men in the rifle battalions long remembered the sight. On one
-occasion, a Marine Corsair was about to pull the trigger on an enemy
-Zeke (“Zero”) fighter set up perfectly in the pilot’s sights when
-a burst of fire from Marine .50-caliber machine guns on the beach,
-meant for the Zeke, shot the American down. One of the riflemen later
-recalled that the Marine pilot fell into the ocean and surfaced with a
-broken leg. “We waded out to get him. He was ticked off--mostly because
-he missed the Jap.”
-
-In spite of all these problems, the assault battalions had, by the
-end of D-Day, reached their objectives on the Initial Beachhead Line,
-600-1,000 yards inland. One enormous unexpected obstacle, however, had
-now become painfully clear. Available maps were nearly useless, and a
-large, almost impenetrable swamp, with water three to six feet deep,
-lay right behind the beaches and made movement inland and lateral
-contact among the Marine units impossible.
-
-The night of D-Day was typical for the ground troops. By 1800, darkness
-had set in and the men all knew the iron-clad rule: be in your foxhole
-and stay there. Anyone moving around out there was a Japanese soldier
-trying to infiltrate. John A. Monks, Jr., quoted a Marine in his book,
-A Ribbon and a Star:
-
-  From seven o’clock in the evening till dawn, with only centipedes
-  and lizards and scorpions and mosquitoes begging to get
-  acquainted--wet, cold, exhausted, but unable to sleep--you lay
-  there and shivered and thought and hated and prayed. But you stayed
-  there. You didn’t cough, you didn’t snore, you changed your
-  position with the least amount of noise. For it was still great to
-  be alive.
-
-At sea, the transports and cargo ships were withdrawn; there was
-intelligence that enemy naval forces were on the move.
-
-
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 5):] Major General Allen H. Turnage, USMC
-
-
-[Illustration]
-
-Allen Hal Turnage was born in Farmville, North Carolina, on 3 January
-1891. After attending Horner Military Academy and then the University
-of North Carolina, at age 22 he was appointed a second lieutenant in
-the U.S. Marine Corps. Sent to Haiti, he served with the 2d Marine
-Regiment from 1915 to 1918, becoming a company commander in the Haitian
-Gendarmerie.
-
-A captain in 1917, Turnage did get to France where he commanded the 5th
-Marine Brigade Machine Gun Battalion. Home in 1919, he was assigned
-to the 5th Marines at Quantico and became regimental adjutant and an
-instructor for the first Field Officers School, 1920-22.
-
-A major in 1927, Turnage had three years with the Pacific fleet, and
-then he served with the U.S. Electoral Mission in Nicaragua (1932).
-He came back to Washington, made lieutenant colonel in 1934 and
-full colonel in 1939. He was director of the Basic School at the
-Philadelphia Navy Yard, and, in the spring of 1939, he was sent to
-China to head Marine forces in North China.
-
-In summer of 1941, on the eve of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
-he returned to Headquarters in Washington. In 1942, as a brigadier
-general, he commanded the burgeoning Marine Base and Training Center at
-New River, North Carolina.
-
-When the 3d Marine Division was formed in September 1942, he was
-named assistant division commander. In the summer of 1943 Turnage was
-promoted to major general and selected to head the division. He then
-led the division on Bougainville and in the liberation of Guam, the
-first American territory to be recaptured from the enemy.
-
-After the war, he was appointed Assistant Commandant, followed by
-promotion to lieutenant general and command of FMFPac (Fleet Marine
-Force, Pacific). He retired 1 January 1948, and died 22 October 1971.
-
-His awards included the Navy Cross, the Navy Distinguished Service
-Medal, and the Presidential Unit Citation (which his men received for
-both Guam and Iwo Jima).
-
-
-
-
-_Planning the Operation_
-
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Photo courtesy of Cyril J. O’Brien
-
-_LtGen Haruyoshi Hyakutake, commanded the Japanese forces on
-Bougainville._]
-
-This kind of strong enemy reaction, in the air and at sea, had been
-expected by American staff officers who had put in long weeks planning
-the Bougainville operation. Looking at a map of the Solomon Islands
-chain, it was obvious that this largest island (130 by 30 miles) on
-the northwest end was a prime objective to cap the long and painful
-progress northward from the springboard of Guadalcanal at the south
-end. As Guadalcanal had been the beginning of the island chain, so
-now Bougainville would mark the top of the ladder in the Northern
-Solomons. From Bougainville airfields, American planes could neutralize
-the crucial Japanese base of Rabaul less than 250 miles away on
-New Britain. From Bougainville, the enemy could defend his massive
-air-naval complex at Rabaul. “Viewed from either camp, the island was a
-priority possession.”
-
-There were the usual sequences of high level planning conferences, but,
-on 1 October 1943, Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander, South Pacific
-Area, notified General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander,
-Southwest Pacific Area, that the beaches on Empress Augusta Bay in the
-middle of Bougainville’s west coast would be the main objective. This
-location was selected as the point to strike because with the main
-Japanese forces 25 miles away at the opposite north and south ends of
-the island, it would be the point of least opposition. In addition,
-it provided a natural defensive region once the Marines had landed
-and their airfields had been gouged out of the swamp and jungle.
-Finally, the target area would provide a site for a long-range radar
-installation and an advanced naval base for PT (patrol torpedo) boats.
-
-It promised to be a campaign in a miserable location. And it was.
-There were centipedes three fingers wide, butterflies as big as little
-birds, thick and nearly impenetrable jungles, bottomless mangrove
-swamps, crocodile infested rivers, millions of insects, and heavy daily
-torrents of rain with enervating humidity.
-
-Major General Allen H. Turnage, the 3d Marine Division commander,
-summarized these horrors. “Never had men in the Marine Corps had to
-fight and maintain themselves over such difficult terrain as was
-encountered on Bougainville.”
-
-To carry out this operation, Lieutenant General Alexander A.
-Vandegrift, Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Corps (IMAC),[A]
-had in his command for the operation:
-
-  3d Marine Division
-
-  1st Marine Parachute Regiment
-
-  2d Marine Raider Regiment
-
-  37th Infantry Division, USA (in reserve)
-
-    [A] Gen Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commander on
-        Guadalcanal, relieved MajGen Clayton B. Vogel as IMAC
-        commander in July 1943. He in turn was relieved as IMAC
-        commander by MajGen Charles D. Barrett on 27 September. Gen
-        Vandegrift was on his way home to Washington to become 18th
-        Commandant of the Marine Corps when, on the sudden death of
-        Gen Barrett on 8 October, he was recalled to the Pacific
-        to resume command of IMAC and lead it in the Bougainville
-        operation. He, in turn, was relieved by MajGen Roy S.
-        Geiger on 9 November.
-
-The Marine riflemen in these units were supplemented by a wide range
-of support: 155mm artillery; motor transport; amphibian tractor; and
-signal, medical, special weapons, Seabee, and tank battalions. The 3d
-Division had its own engineers and pioneers in the 19th Marines and
-artillery in the 12th Marines.
-
-Immediately following Vandegrift’s operation order, practice landing
-exercises were conducted in the New Hebrides and on Guadalcanal and
-Florida Islands.
-
-[Illustration: TREASURY ISLANDS LANDINGS
-
-I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
-
-27 OCTOBER 1943]
-
-[Illustration: _LtCol Victor H. Krulak was commander of the Choiseul
-operation._
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
-]
-
-The objectives assigned on Bougainville were to seize a substantial
-beachhead and build airstrips. Then American planes could assure final
-neutralization of the Japanese airfields at Kahili, Buka, and Bonis
-airfields at the north and south ends of Bougainville. (By 31 October,
-American planes had initially rendered the Japanese fields inoperable.)
-After that would come a massive increase in air operations against
-Rabaul.
-
-Facing the invading Marines was a formidable enemy force dispersed
-on the island. At Buin, for instance, there were 21,800 Japanese.
-Responsible for the defense was an old adversary, Lieutenant General
-Haruyoshi Hyakutake, commander of the _Seventeenth Army_, and the man
-the Marines had defeated at Guadalcanal. His main force was the _6th
-Division_.
-
-Working with the ground U. S. forces were the aviators of Air Solomons:
-New Zealand fighters, Army Air Force bombers, and the 1st and 2d Marine
-Aircraft Wings. As early as 15 August fighter planes from VMF-214
-(the famous Black Sheep squadron) had strafed the Kahili airfield at
-the southern end of Bougainville. Now, in October, there were repeated
-strikes against the Japanese planes at other Bougainville airfields.
-
-At sea, Halsey had designated Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson as
-commander of Task Force 31. Under him were Rear Admiral Frederick C.
-Sherman with the carriers (TF 38) and Rear Admiral Aaron S. “Tip”
-Merrill with the cruisers and destroyers (TF 39). Their job was to
-soften up the defenders before the landing and to safeguard the
-Marine-held beachhead.
-
-
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 8):] 3d Marine Division
-
-
-With Japan’s initial conquests spread over vast reaches of the Pacific,
-it quickly became obvious that additional Marine divisions were sorely
-needed. Accordingly, a letter from the Commandant on 29 August 1942
-authorized the formation of the 3d Marine Division.
-
-There was the 3d Marines, which had been activated first on 20 December
-1916 at Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic. Deactivated in August
-1922, the regiment was again brought to life on 16 June 1942 at
-Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and strengthened by boots from Parris
-Island. Its commander, Colonel Oscar R. Cauldwell, soon led to it to
-Samoa, arriving there in September 1942. Intensive training in jungle
-tactics and practice landings took place there. Then, in March 1943,
-it received a substantial number of reinforcing units and became a
-full-fledged regimental combat team, beefing up its strength to 5,600.
-Finally, in May 1943, it sailed for New Zealand, where the 3d Marine
-Division would come together.
-
-Also with World War I roots, the 9th Marines was born 20 November 1917
-at Quantico, Virginia, and was sent to Cuba. From there it moved to
-Texas, before being deactivated at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in April
-1919. Reactivated on 12 February 1942 at Camp Elliott, California,
-under Colonel Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., it underwent training at the new
-Camp Pendleton. Similarly reinforced, by 1 January 1943 it was ready as
-a regimental combat team with 5,500 men. Movement overseas brought it
-to New Zealand on 5 February 1943.
-
-The third infantry regiment that would make up the division was the
-21st Marines. It was formed from a cadre of well-trained men from the
-6th Marines, who had just returned from duty in Iceland. Arriving at
-Camp Lejeune on 15 July 1942, the cadre was augmented by boots from
-Parris Island and officers from Quantico. Colonel Daniel E. Campbell
-assumed command and the training began. Moving to join the other
-elements, the regiment arrived in New Zealand 11 March 1943.
-
-The reinforcing of the infantry regiments to make them into
-self-sustaining regimental combat teams drew heavily on their two
-complementary regiments: the 12th Marines and the 19th Marines. The
-12th Marines was a salty old unit, led by Brigadier General Smedley D.
-Butler in China in the 1920s. It’s antecedent was a small provisional
-contingent sent to protect American interests in China and designated
-the 12th Regiment (infantry), 4 October 1927. The 12th was reactivated
-at Camp Elliott on 1 September 1942 for World War II as an artillery
-regiment under command of Colonel John B. Wilson. Concluding its
-training, the regiment arrived in New Zealand on 11 March 1943.
-
-The 19th Marines was different. It was made up of Seabees, engineers,
-bakers, piledrivers, pioneers, paving specialists, and many old timers
-from the 25th Naval Construction Battalion at the U.S. Naval Advance
-Base, Port Hueneme, California. It, too, was formed at Camp Elliott
-and its birthday was 16 September 1942. This was the regiment with
-pontoons for bridges, power plants, photographic darkrooms, bulldozers,
-excavators, needles, thread, and water purification machinery. No
-landing force would dare take an island without them. Colonel Robert M.
-Montague took command of the unit in New Zealand on 11 March 1943.
-
-The division’s first commander was Major General Charles D. Barrett,
-a veteran of World War I. He assumed command in September 1942, but
-left a year later to take charge of IMAC and the planning for the
-Bougainville operation.
-
-His assistant division commander had been Brigadier General Allen
-H. Turnage, and, upon Barrett’s death, he was promoted to major
-general and given command of the division which he would soon lead at
-Bougainville.
-
-
-
-
-_Diversionary Landings_
-
-
-There was another key element in the American plan: diversion. To
-mislead the enemy on the real objective, Bougainville, the IMAC
-operations order on 15 October directed the 8th Brigade Group of the
-3d New Zealand Division to land on the Treasury Islands, 75 miles
-southeast of Empress Augusta Bay. There, on 27 October, the New
-Zealanders, under Brigadier R. A. Row, with 1,900 Marine support
-troops, went ashore on two small islands.
-
-One was named Mono and the other Sterling. Mono is about four miles
-wide, north to south, and seven miles long. It looks like a pancake.
-Sterling, shaped like a hook, is four miles long, narrow in places to
-300 yards, but with plenty of room on its margins for airstrips.
-
-In a drizzly overcast, the 29th NZ Battalion (Lieutenant
-Colonel F. L. H. Davis) and the 36th (Lieutenant Colonel K. B.
-McKenzie-Muirson) hit Mono at Falami Point, and the 34th (under
-Lieutenant Colonel R. J. Eyre) struck the beach of Sterling Island off
-Blanche Harbor. There was light opposition. Help for the assault troops
-came from LCI (landing craft, infantry) gunboats which knocked out at
-least one deadly Japanese 40mm twin-mount gun and a couple of enemy
-bunkers.
-
-A simultaneous landing was then made on the opposite or north side of
-Mono Island at Soanotalu. This was perhaps the most important landing
-of all, for there New Zealand soldiers, American Seabees, and U.S.
-radar specialists would set up a big long-range radar station.
-
-The Japanese soon reacted to the Soanotalu landing and hurled
-themselves against the perimeter. On one occasion, 80-90 Japanese
-attacked 50 New Zealanders who waited until they saw “the whites of
-their eyes.” They killed 40 of the Japanese and dispersed the rest.
-
-There was unexpected machine gunfire at Sterling. One Seabee bulldozer
-operator attacked the machine gun with his big blade. An Army corporal,
-a medic, said he couldn’t believe it, “The Seabee ran his dozer over
-and over the machine gun nest until everything was quiet.... It all
-began to stink after a couple of days.”
-
-Outmanned, the Japanese drew back to higher ground, were hunted down,
-and killed. Surrender was still not in their book. On 12 November,
-the New Zealanders could call the Treasuries their own with the radar
-station in operation. Japanese dead totaled 205, and the brigade took
-only eight prisoners. The operation had secured the seaside flank of
-Bougainville, and very soon on Sterling there was an airfield. It began
-to operate against enemy forces on Bougainville on Christmas Day, 1943.
-
-A second diversion, east of the Treasury Islands and 45 miles from
-Bougainville, took place on Choiseul Island. Sub-Lieutenant C. W.
-Seton, Royal Australian Navy and coastwatcher on Choiseul, said the
-Japanese there appeared worried. The garrison troops were shooting at
-their own shadows, perhaps because American and Australian patrols had
-been criss-crossing the 80-miles-long (20-miles-wide) island since
-September, scouting out the Japanese positions. There were also some
-3,500 transient enemy troops on Choiseul, bivouacked and waiting to
-be shipped the 45 miles north to Buin on Bougainville, where there
-was already a major Japanese garrison force. Uncertainty about the
-American threat of invasion somewhere was enough to make the Japanese,
-especially Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka, Commander, Southeast Area
-Fleet, at Rabaul jittery. It was he who wanted much of the Japanese
-_Seventeenth Army_ concentrated at Buin, for, he thought, the Allies
-might strike there.
-
-General Vandegrift wanted to be sure that the Japanese were focused
-on Buin. So, on 20 October, he called in Lieutenant Colonel Robert H.
-Williams, commanding the 1st Parachute Regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel
-Victor H. Krulak, commanding its 2d Battalion. Get ashore on Choiseul,
-the general ordered, and stir up the biggest commotion possible, “Make
-sure they think the invasion has commenced....”
-
-It was a most unusual raid, 656 men, a handful of native guides, and
-an Australian coastwatcher with a road map. The Navy took Krulak’s
-reinforced battalion of parachutists to a beach site near a hamlet
-called Voza. That would be the CP (command post) location for the
-duration. The troops slipped ashore on 28 October at 0021 and soon had
-all their gear concealed in the bush.
-
-By daylight, the Marines had established a base on a high jungle
-plateau in the Voza area. The Japanese soon spotted the intruders, sent
-a few fighter planes to rake the beach, but that did no harm. They did
-not see the four small landing craft which Krulak had brought along and
-hidden among some mangroves with their Navy crews on call.
-
-Krulak then outlined two targets. Eight miles south from their CP at
-Voza there was a large enemy barge base near the Vagara River. The
-Australian said some 150 Japanese were there. The other objective was
-an enemy outpost in the opposite direction, 17 miles north on the
-Warrior River. Then Krulak took his operations officer, Major Tolson A.
-Smoak, 17 men, and a few natives as scouts, and headed for the barge
-basin. On the way, 10 unlucky Japanese were encountered unloading a
-barge. The Marines opened fire, killing seven of them and sinking the
-barge. After reconnoitering the main objective, the barge basin, the
-patrol returned to Voza.
-
-The following morning, Krulak sent a patrol near the barge basin to
-the Vagara River for security and then to wave in his small landing
-craft bringing up his troops to attack. But, back at Voza, along came
-a flight of American planes which shot up the Marines and sank one
-of their vital boats. Now Krulak’s attack would have to walk to the
-village of Sangigai by the Japanese barge basin. To soften up Sangigai,
-Krulak called in 26 fighters escorting 12 torpedo bombers. They dropped
-two tons of bombs and it looked for all the world like a real invasion.
-
-Krulak then sent a company to attack the basin from the beach, and
-another company with rifles, machine guns, rockets, and mortars to get
-behind the barge center. It was a pincer and it worked. The Marines
-attacked at 1400 on 30 October. What the battle didn’t destroy, the
-Marines blew up. The Japanese lost 72 dead; the Marines, 4 killed and
-12 wounded.
-
-All was not so well in the other direction. Major Warner T. Bigger,
-Krulak’s executive officer, had been sent north with 87 Marines toward
-the big emplacement on Choiseul Bay near the Warrior River. His mission
-was to destroy, first the emplacement, with Guppy Island, just off
-shore and fat with supplies, as his secondary target.
-
-Bigger got to the Warrior River, but his landing craft became stuck
-in the shallows, so he brought them to a nearby cove, hid them in the
-jungle, and proceeded on foot north to Choiseul Bay. Soon his scouts
-said that they were lost. It was late in the day so Bigger bivouacked
-for the night. He sent a patrol back to the Warrior where it found a
-Japanese force. Slipping stealthily by them, the patrol got back to
-Voza. This led Krulak to call for fighter cover and PT boats to try to
-get up and withdraw Bigger.
-
-But Bigger didn’t know he was in trouble, and he went ahead and blasted
-Guppy island with mortars, because he couldn’t get to the main enemy
-emplacement. When Bigger and his men barely got back to the Warrior
-River, there were no rescue boats, but there were plenty of Japanese.
-As the men waited tensely, the rescue boats came at the last moment,
-the very last. Thankfully, the men scrambled on board under enemy fire.
-Then two PT boats arrived, gun blazing, and provided cover so Bigger’s
-patrol could get back to Voza. One of the PT boats was commanded by
-Lieutenant John F. Kennedy, USN, later the President of the United
-States, who took 55 Marines on board when their escape boat sank.
-
-[Illustration: CHOISEUL DIVERSION
-
-2d PARACHUTE BATTALION
-
-28 OCTOBER-3 NOVEMBER 1943]
-
-Krulak had already used up all his time and luck. The Japanese were
-now on top of him, their commanders particularly chagrined that they
-had been fooled, for the big landing had already occurred at Empress
-Augusta Bay. Krulak had to get out; Coastwatcher Seton said there was
-not much time. On the night of 3 November, three LCIs rendezvoused off
-Voza. Krulak gave all his rations to the natives as the Marines boarded
-the LCIs. They could hear their mines and booby traps exploding to
-delay the Japanese. Within hours after the departure, a strong Japanese
-pincer snapped shut around the Voza encampment, but the Marines had
-gone, having suffered 9 killed, 15 wounded, and 2 missing, but
-leaving at least 143 enemy dead on Choiseul.
-
-
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 9):] The Coastwatchers
-
-
-It was on Bougainville, as well as on other islands of the Solomons
-chain, that the Australian coastwatchers played their most decisive
-role in transmitting vital advance warnings to Allied forces in
-the lower Solomon Islands. Japanese war planes and ships summoned
-in urgency to smash the beachhead at Guadalcanal had to pass over
-Bougainville, the big island in the middle of the route from Rabaul.
-
-Paul Mason, short, bespectacled, soft spoken, held an aerie in the
-south mountains over Buin, and dark, wiry W. J. “Jack” Read watched
-the ship and aircraft movements of the Japanese in and around Buka
-in the north. One memorable Mason wireless dispatch: “Twenty-five
-torpedo bombers headed yours.” The message cost the Japanese Imperial
-Navy every one of those airplanes, save one. Read reported a dozen
-or so Japanese transports assembling at Buka before their trip to
-Guadalcanal, with enough troops loaded on board to take the island
-back. All of the transports were lost or beached under the fierce
-attack of U.S. warplanes.
-
-In 1941, as the war with Japan commenced, there were 100 coastwatchers
-in the Solomons. There were 10 times that number as the war ended,
-later including Americans. Assembled first as a tight group of island
-veterans in 1939 (although there had been coastwatchers after World War
-I) under Lieutenant Commander A. Eric Feldt, Royal Australian Navy,
-their job was to cover about a half million miles of land, sea, and air.
-
-The very first moves of the Japanese on Guadalcanal were observed
-by coastwatchers in the surrounding hills. The coastwatchers could
-count the Japanese hammer strokes, almost see the nails. When the
-Japanese began the airfield (later to be called Henderson Field),
-the report of the coastwatchers went all the way up the American
-Joint Chiefs of Staff and across the desk of Admiral Ernest J. King,
-Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
-
-Later, General Alexander A. Vandegrift on Guadalcanal banked heavily on
-the intelligence coming in from the radios of the coastwatchers. The
-attacks on the Treasuries and Choiseul were based on the information
-provided them. On New Georgia, long before Americans decided to take
-it, a coastwatcher had set up a haven for downed Allied pilots. And
-if the Americans needed a captured Japanese officer or soldier for
-interrogation, the local scouts were often able to provide one.
-
-The key to coastwatching was the tele-radio or wireless, good to 600
-miles by key, 400 by voice. Cumbersome, heavy, the set took more than
-a dozen men to carry it--an indication of how much the Allies depended
-upon the local natives.
-
-The risks were great. Death would come after torture. But Mason
-recalled the risk was worth it, seeing the sleek, orderly formations
-heading for Guadalcanal, then limping back home with gaping holes
-in their hulls. Mason and Read were highly decorated by both the
-Australians and Americans for their vital services.
-
-
-
-
-_Battle at Sea_
-
-
-A final part of the planning for the main landing on Bougainville had
-envisioned the certainty of a Japanese naval sortie to attack the
-invasion transports. It came very early on the morning of D plus 1. On
-the enemy side, Japanese destroyer Captain Tameichi Hara, skipper of
-the _Shigure_, later recalled it was cold, drizzly, and murky, with
-very limited visibility as his destroyer pulled out of Simpson Harbor,
-Rabaul. He was a part of the interception force determined to chew
-up the U.S. invasion troops that had just landed at Empress Augusta
-Bay. The _Shigure_ was one of the six destroyers in the van of the
-assigned element of the _Southeast Area Fleet_, which included the
-heavy cruisers _Myoko_ and _Haguro_, together with the light cruisers
-_Agano_ and _Sendai_. At 0027, 2 November 1943, he would run abreast
-of U.S. Task Force 39 under Rear Admiral Merrill, who stood by to bar
-the enemy approach with four light cruisers and eight destroyers. Among
-his captains was the daring and determined Arleigh Burke on board the
-_Charles S. Ausburne_ (DD 570) commanding DesDiv (Destroyer Division)
-45.
-
-This encounter was crucial to the Bougainville campaign. At Rabaul,
-Rear Admiral Matsuji Ijuin had told his sailors, “Japan will topple if
-Bougainville falls.”
-
-At 0250, the American ships were in action. Captain Burke (later to
-become Chief of Naval Operations) closed in on the nearest of the
-enemy force under Vice Admiral Sentaro Omori. Burke’s destroyers fired
-25 torpedoes, and then Merrill maneuvered his cruiser to avoid the
-expected “Long Lance” torpedo response of the Japanese and to put his
-ships in position to fire with their six-inch guns.
-
-“I shuddered,” Hara wrote later, “at the realization that they must
-have already released their torpedoes. The initiative was in the hands
-of the enemy. In an instant, I yelled two orders: ‘Launch torpedoes!
-Hard right rudder.’” Not a single Japanese or American torpedo found
-its mark in the first exchange. Merrill then brought all his guns to
-bear. The Japanese answered in kind. The Japanese eight-inch gun salvos
-were either short or ahead. The Americans were luckier. One shell of
-their first broadside slammed amidships into the cruiser _Sendai_
-which carried Admiral Ijuin. There was frantic maneuvering to avoid
-shells, with giant warships, yards apart at times, cutting at speeds
-of 30 knots. Still _Sendai_ managed to avoid eight American torpedoes,
-even with her rudder jammed. Then a Japanese torpedo caught the U.S.
-destroyer _Foote_ (DD 511) and blew off her stern, leaving her dead in
-the water.
-
-Samuel Eliot Morison in _Breaking the Bismarck Barrier_, tells how
-“Merrill maneuvered his cruisers so smartly and kept them at such range
-that no enemy torpedoes could hit.” Admiral Omori showed the same skill
-and judgement, but he was a blind man. Only the American had radar.
-Hara afterwards explained, “Japan did not see the enemy, failed to size
-up the enemy and failed to locate it.... The Japanese fleet was a blind
-man swinging a stick against a seeing opponent. The Japanese fleet had
-no advantage at all....”
-
-What Japan had lacked in electronic sight, however, it partially made
-up with its super-brilliant airplane-dropped flares and naval gunfire
-star shells. Commander Charles H. Pollow, USN, a former radio officer
-on the _Denver_ (CL 58), recalled the “unblinking star shells that
-would let you read the fine print in the bible....” The Japanese also
-had a range advantage in their eight-inch guns, “Sometimes we couldn’t
-touch them....” Three shells hit his _Denver_--not one detonated, but
-the ship was damaged. _Columbia_ (CL 56) also took an eight-inch hole
-through her armor plate.
-
-Then Merrill confused the enemy ships with smoke so dense that the
-Japanese believed the Americans were heading one way when they were
-in fact steaming in another direction. But before Admiral Omori could
-break away, Burke and his destroyer division of “Little Beavers” was
-in among them. First the _Sendai_ was sent to the bottom with 335 men,
-then _Hatsukaze_, brushed in an accident with _Myoko_, was finished
-off by Burke’s destroyers and sank with all hands on board--240
-men. Damaged were the cruisers _Haguro_, _Myoko_, and destroyers
-_Shiratsuyu_ and _Samidare_. But, most important, the threat to the
-beachhead had been stopped.
-
-The Americans got off with severe damage to the _Foote_ and light
-damage to the _Denver_, _Spence_ (DD 512), and _Columbia_. Hara later
-wrote, “had they pursued us really hot[ly] ... practically all the
-Japanese ships would have perished.” The Americans had left the fight
-too soon.
-
-And Admiral Ijuin’s prediction that Japan would topple after the loss
-of Bougainville proved to be accurate, but not because of this loss,
-particularly. It was just one of the number of defeats which were to
-doom Japan.
-
-
-
-
-_Action Ashore: Koromokina_
-
-
-Back on Bougainville, following the landing, the days D plus 1 to D
-plus 5 saw the initiation of Phase II of the operation, involving
-shifting of units’ positions, reorganizing the shambles of supplies,
-incessant patrols, road building, the beginning of the construction of
-a fighter airstrip, and the deepening of the beachhead to 2,000 yards.
-
-[Illustration: JAPANESE COUNTERLANDING
-
-LARUMA RIVER AREA
-
-7 NOVEMBER 1943]
-
-Then, at dawn on the morning of 7 November (D plus 6), the Japanese
-struck. Four of their destroyers put ashore 475 men well west of
-the Marine perimeter, between the Laruma River and the Koromokina
-Lagoon. They landed in 21 craft: barges, ramped landing boats, even
-a motor boat, but, to their disadvantage, along too wide a front for
-coordinating and organizing a strike in unison and immediately. A
-Marine Corps combat correspondent, Sergeant Cyril J. O’Brien, saw the
-skinny young Japanese who scampered up the beach with 80-pound packs
-two-and-a-half miles from the Laruma to near the Koromokina, left flank
-of the Marines, to join their comrades.
-
-They were eager enough, even to die. A little prayer often in the
-pockets of the dead voiced the fatalistic wish that “whether I
-float a corpse under the waters, or sink beneath the grasses of the
-mountainside, I willingly die for the Emperor.”
-
-The first few Japanese ashore near the Laruma, however, did not die. An
-antitank platoon with the 9th Marines did not fire because the landing
-craft in the mist looked so much like their own, even to the big white
-numbers on the prow. Near Koromokina, they seemed to be all over the
-beach. One outpost platoon, which included Private First Class John F.
-Perella, 19 years old, was cut off on the beach. Perella swam through
-the surf 1,000 yards to Marine lines and came with a Navy rescue boat
-and earned a Silver Star Medal.
-
-[Illustration: _Sgt Herbert J. Thomas was posthumously awarded the
-Medal of Honor._
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) 302918
-]
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Walter Asmuth, Jr., commanding officer of the 3d
-Battalion, 9th Marines, ordered a company attack, called on mortars
-and the artillery of the 12th Marines. The Japanese were well equipped
-with the so-called knee mortars (actually grenade launchers) and Nambu
-machine guns and fought back fiercely. In that jungle, you could not
-see, hear, or smell a man five feet away. Private First Class Challis
-L. Still found a faint trail and settled his machine gun beside it.
-An ambush was easy. The lead Japanese were close enough to touch when
-Still opened up. He killed 30 in the column; he was a recipient of the
-Silver Star Medal.
-
-Yet, the Japanese didn’t give way. Ashore only hours, they had already
-dug strong defenses. Even a Marine double envelopment in water,
-sometimes up to the waist, did not work. By 1315, the weakened 9th
-Marines company was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, coming
-in from the beachhead’s right flank.
-
-During darkness on that night of 7 November, enemy infiltrators got
-through to the hospital. Bullets ripped through tents as surgeons
-performed operations. The doctors of the 3d Medical Battalion, under
-Commander Robert R. Callaway, were protected by a makeshift line of
-cooks, bakers, and stretcher bearers. (As a memorable statistic, less
-than one percent died of wounds on Bougainville after having arrived at
-a field hospital.)
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 12756
-
-_PFC Henry Gurke was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor._]
-
-The 1st Battalion was close to the enemy, close enough to exchange
-shouts. The Japanese yelled “Moline you die” ... and the Marines made
-earthy references to Premier Tojo’s diet. Marine Captain Gordon Warner
-was fluent in Japanese, so he could quickly reply to the Japanese, even
-yell believable orders for a bayonet charge. He received the Navy Cross
-for destroying machine gun nests with a helmet full of hand grenades.
-He lost a leg in the battle.
-
-Sergeant Herbert J. Thomas gave his life near the Koromokina. His
-platoon was forced prone by machine gunfire, and Thomas threw a grenade
-to silence the weapon. The grenade rebounded from jungle vines and the
-young West Virginian smothered it with his body. He posthumously was
-awarded the Medal of Honor.
-
-General Turnage saw that reinforcements were needed. The day before
-(6 November) the first echelon of the 21st Marines had come ashore.
-Now the battle command was transferred to Lieutenant Colonel Ernest
-W. Fry, Jr., of the 1st Battalion. With two companies, he was set for
-a counterattack, but not until after two intense saturations of the
-Japanese positions by mortars and five batteries of artillery. They
-slammed into a concentrated area, 300 yards wide and 600 deep, early on
-8 November. Light tanks then moved in to support the attack.
-
-When Colonel Fry’s advancing companies reached the area where the
-Japanese had been, there was stillness, desolation, ploughed earth, and
-uprooted trees. Combat correspondent Alvin Josephy wrote of men hanging
-in trees, “Some lay crumpled and twisted beside their shattered
-weapons, some covered by chunks of jagged logs and jungle earth, [by]
-a blasted bunker....” In that no-man’s land, Colonel Fry and his men
-walked over and around the bodies of over 250 enemy soldiers. To
-complete the annihilation of the Japanese landing force, Marine dive
-bombers from Munda bombed and strafed the survivors on 9 November.
-
-By now, the veteran 148th Infantry, the first unit of the Army’s 37th
-Infantry Division, was coming ashore, seasoned in the Munda campaign
-on New Georgia. Later, to take over the left flank of the beachhead,
-would come its other infantry regiments, the 129th on 13 November and
-the 145th on 19 November. The Army’s 135th, 136th, and 140th Field
-Artillery came ashore, too, and would be invaluable in supporting later
-advances on the right flank. Major General Robert S. Beightler, USA,
-was division commander.
-
-
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 13):] 37th Infantry Division
-
-
-[Illustration: _Major General Robert S. Beightler, USA_]
-
-Called the “Buckeye” Division, the 37th was among the very first
-American troops sent to the Pacific at the beginning of the war.
-
-The 37th was an outfit with a long history and many battle streamers,
-dating from August 1917, when it was formed at Camp Sheridan, Alabama.
-It left for overseas in 1918, and took part in five major operations in
-France before returning in 1919, and facing demobilization that same
-year.
-
-As an Ohio National Guard unit, the “Buckeye” Division was inducted
-into federal service in 1940, and by June of 1942, it was heading into
-the Pacific war, sent to garrison the Fiji Islands. First combat was
-on New Georgia, which included taking the critical Munda airfield. The
-37th joined the 3d Marine Division on Bougainville, and then trained on
-the island for the campaign on Luzon Island in the Philippines.
-
-Landing with the Sixth Army at Lingayen Gulf, 9 January 1945, the 37th
-raced inland to Clark Field and Fort Stotsenburg. It entered Manila,
-and its commander, Major General Robert S. Beightler, accepted the
-surrender of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Next came the capture of
-Baguio and liberation there of 1,300 internees at the Bilibid Prison.
-The division came home for demobilization in November 1945.
-
-Its commander, Major General Beightler, was born 21 March 1892, and
-enlisted in the U.S. Army as a private in 1911. Promoted quickly to
-corporal, sergeant, and then first sergeant of his company, he was then
-commissioned as a second lieutenant in March 1914. After service on the
-Mexican border, he took part in five major campaigns in World War I
-with the famous 42d (Rainbow) Division.
-
-[Illustration]
-
-A graduate of Ohio State University, Beightler finished first in his
-class in the Reserve Officers’ Course of the Command and General Staff
-School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1926. After that he served as a
-member of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff
-(1932-36).
-
-After World War II, he assumed command of the Fifth Service Command at
-Fort Hayes, Ohio, and then was assigned (1947) to the Personnel Board
-of the Secretary of War. In 1949, he was sent to the Far East and took
-over the Marianas-Bonins Command on Guam. In 1950 he was named Deputy
-Governor of the Ryukyus Command on Okinawa.
-
-Major General Beightler received the Distinguished Service Cross, the
-nation’s second highest honor, for his leadership in the Philippine
-campaign, as well as a Distinguished Service Medal for the New
-Georgia operation, with an Oak Leaf Cluster as a second award for his
-outstanding service on Bougainville and then on Luzon in the Philippine
-Islands. He also wore the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, the
-Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Silver Star Medal, and the
-Purple Heart.
-
-He died 12 February 1978.
-
-
-
-
-_The Battle for Piva Trail_
-
-
-[Illustration: BATTLE FOR PIVA TRAIL
-
-2d RAIDER REGIMENT
-
-8-9 NOVEMBER]
-
-Captain Conrad M. Fowler, a company commander in the 1st Battalion, 9th
-Marines, later recalled how an attack down the trails was expected:
-“They had to come our way to meet us face-to-face. The trails were the
-only way overland through that rainforest.” His company would be there
-to meet them. He was awarded a Silver Star Medal.
-
-[Illustration: COCONUT GROVE
-
-2d BATTALION, 21st MARINES
-
-13-14 NOVEMBER]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 52622
-
-_MajGen Roy S. Geiger assumed command of IMAC on 9 November 1943._]
-
-With just such a Japanese attack anticipated, General Turnage had
-dispatched a company of the 2d Raider Regiment up the Mission (Piva)
-trail on D-Day to set up a road block--just up from the old Buretoni
-Catholic Mission (still in operation today). At first the raiders had
-little business, and by 4 November elements of the 9th Marines had
-arrived to join them. The enemy, the _23rd Infantry_ up from Buin,
-struck on 7 November. Their attack was timed to coincide with the
-Koromokina landings. The raiders held, but “the woods were full of
-Japs, dead.... The most we had to do was bury them.”
-
-At this point General Turnage told Colonel Edward A. Craig, commanding
-officer of the 9th Marines, to clear the way ahead and advance to the
-junction of the Piva and Numa-Numa trails. That mission Craig gave
-to the 2d Raider Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Alan B. Shapley.
-The actual attack would be led by Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans,
-3d Raider Battalion, just in from Puruata Island and would include
-elements of the 9th Marines and weapons companies.
-
-The Japanese didn’t wait for a Marine attack; they came in on 5
-November and threatened to overrun the trailblock. It soon became a
-matter of brutal small encounters, and battles raged for five days.
-They were many brave acts. Privates First Class Henry Gurke and Donald
-G. Probst, with an automatic weapon, were about to be overwhelmed.
-A grenade plopped in the foxhole between them. To save the critical
-position and his companion, Gurke thrust Probst aside and threw
-himself on the grenade and died. He was awarded the Medal of Honor
-posthumously; Probst, the Silver Star Medal.
-
-Mortars and artillery dueled from each side. The Japanese would
-creep right next to the Marine positions for safety. Marines had to
-call friendly fire almost into their laps. On the narrow trail, men
-often had to expose themselves. The Japanese got the worst of it,
-for suddenly, shortly after noon on 9 November the enemy resistance
-crumbled. By 1500, the junction of the Piva and Numa-Numa trails was
-reached and secured. Some 550 Japanese died. There were 19 Marines dead
-and 32 wounded.
-
-[Illustration: _Adm William F. Halsey (pith helmet) and MajGen Geiger
-(“fore and aft” cover) watch Army reinforcements come ashore at
-Bougainville._
-
-    National Archives Photo 127-N-65494
-]
-
-To consolidate the hard-won position, Marine torpedo bombers from
-Munda blasted the surrounding area on 10 November. This allowed two
-battalions of the 9th Marines to settle into good defensive positions
-along the Numa-Numa Trail with, as usual, “aggressive” patrols
-immediately fanning out. The battle for the Piva Trail had ended
-victoriously.
-
-The key logistical element in this engagement--and nearly all others
-on Bougainville--was the amtrac. There were vast areas where tanks
-and half-tracks, much less trucks, simply could not negotiate the
-bottomless swamps, omnipresent streams, and viscous mud from the
-daily rains. The amtracs proved amazingly flexible; they moved men,
-ammunition, rations, water, barbed wire, and even radio jeeps to the
-front lines where they were most needed. Heading back, they evacuated
-the wounded to reach the desperately needed medical centers in the
-rear.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 65162
-
-_A bloody encounter on 14 November at the junction of the Numa-Numa and
-Piva Trails: Marine infantrymen had been stopped by well dug-in and
-camouflaged enemy troops. Five Marine tanks rushed up and attacked on a
-250-yard front through the jungle._]
-
-Other developments came at this juncture in the campaign. As noted,
-the 37th Infantry Division was fed into the perimeter. At the top of
-the command echelon Major General Roy S. Geiger relieved Vandegrift
-as Commanding General, IMAC, on 9 November and took charge of Marine
-and Army units in the campaign from an advanced command post on
-Bougainville.
-
-The Seabees and Marine engineers were hard at work now. Operating
-dangerously 1,500 yards ahead of the front lines, guarded by a strong
-combat patrol, they managed to cut two 5,000-foot survey lanes east to
-west across the front of the perimeter.
-
-
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 16):] War Dogs
-
-
-[Illustration]
-
-In an interview with Captain Wilcie O’Bannon long after the war,
-Captain John Monks, Jr., gained an insight into one of the least known
-aspects of Marine tactics. It was an added asset that the official
-Marine history called “invaluable”: war dogs. O’Bannon, the first
-patrol leader to have them, related:
-
-  One dog was a German Shepherd female, the other was a Doberman
-  male, and they had three men with them. The third man handled
-  the dogs all the time in the platoon area prior to our going on
-  patrol--petting the dogs, talking to them, and being nice to them.
-  The other two handlers--one would go to the head of the column and
-  one would go to the rear with the female messenger dog.... If the
-  dog in front received enemy fire and got away, he could either
-  come back to me or circle to the back of the column. If I needed
-  to send a message I would write it, give it to the handler, and
-  he would pin it on the dog’s collar. He would clap his hands and
-  say, “Report,” and the dog would be off like a gunshot to go to the
-  third man in the rear who had handled him before the patrol.
-
-The war dogs proved very versatile. They ran telephone wire, detected
-ambushes, smelled out enemy patrols, and even a few machine gun nests.
-The dog got GI chow, slept on nice mats and straw, and in mud-filled
-foxholes. First Lieutenant Clyde Henderson with one of the dog platoons
-recalled how the speed and intelligence of dogs was crucial in light
-of the abominable communications in the jungle, where sometimes
-communications equipment was not much better than yelling.
-
-Under such circumstances, a German Shepherd named “Caesar” made the
-difference between life and death for at least one company. With all
-wires cut and no communication, Caesar got through repeatedly to the
-battalion command post and returned to the lines. One Japanese rifle
-wound didn’t stop him, but a second had Caesar returned to the rear
-on a stretcher. A memorable letter from Commandant Thomas B. Holcomb
-described how Caesar another time had saved the life of a Marine
-when the dog attacked a Japanese about to throw a hand grenade. The
-Commandant also cited in letters four other dogs for their actions on
-Bougainville.
-
-Sergeant William O. McDaniel, in the 9th Marines, remembered, “One
-night, one of the dogs growled and Slim Livesay, a squad leader from
-Montana, shot and hit a Jap right between the eyes. We found the Jap
-the next morning, three feet in front of the hole.”
-
-One Marine said that what Marines liked most was the security dogs gave
-at night and the rare chance to sleep in peace. No enemy would slip
-through the lines with a dog on guard.
-
-There were 52 men and 36 dogs in the K-9 company on Bougainville.
-
-
-
-
-_The Coconut Grove Battle_
-
-
-On D plus 10, 11 November, a new operation order was issued. “Continue
-the attack with the 3d Marine Division on the right (east) and the 37th
-Infantry Division on the left (west).” An Army-Marine artillery group
-was assembled under IMAC control to provide massed fire, and Marine
-air would be on call for close support.
-
-The first objective in the renewed push was to seize control of the
-critical junction of the Numa-Numa Trail and the East-West trail. On 13
-November a company of the 21st Marines led off the advance at 0800. At
-1100 it was ambushed by a “sizeable” enemy force concealed in a coconut
-palm grove near the trail junction. The Japanese had won the race to
-the crossroads, and the situation for the lead Marine company soon
-became critical. The 2d Battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Eustace
-R. Smoak, sent up his executive officer, Major Glenn Fissell, with 12th
-Marines’ artillery observers. They reported the situation as all bad.
-Then Major Fissell was killed. Disdaining flank security, Smoak moved
-closer to the fight and fed in reinforcing companies. (By now a lateral
-road across the front of the perimeter had been built.)
-
-The next day tanks were brought up and artillery registered around the
-battalion. Smoak also called in 18 torpedo bombers. The reorganized
-riflemen lunged forward again in a renewed attack. The tanks proved an
-ineffective disaster, causing chaos at one point by firing on fellow
-Marines on their flank and running over several of their own men.
-Nevertheless, the Japanese positions were overrun by the end of the
-day, with the enemy survivors driven off into a swamp. The Marines now
-commanded the junction of the two vital trails. As a result, the entire
-beachhead was able to spring forward 1,000 to 1,500 yards, reaching
-Inland Defense Line D, 5,000 yards from the beach.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Photo courtesy of Cyril J. O’Brien.
-
-_“Marine Drive” constructed by the 53d Naval Construction Battalion
-enabled casualties to be sent to medical facilities in the rear and
-supplies to be brought forward easily._]
-
-One important result of this advance was that the two main airstrips
-could now be built. The airfields would be the work of the Seabees.
-The 25th, 53d, and 71st Naval Construction Battalions (“Seabees”) had
-landed on D-Day with the assault waves of the 3d Marine Division--to
-get ready at once to build roads, airfields, and camp areas. (They
-had a fighter strip operating at Torokina by December). Always
-close to Marines, the Seabees earned their merit in the eyes of the
-Leathernecks. Often Marines had to clear the way with fire so a Seabee
-could do his work. Many would recall the bold Seabee bulldozer driver
-covering a sputtering machine gun nest with his blade. Marines on the
-Piva Trail later saw another determined bulldozer operator filling in
-holes in the tarmac of his burgeoning bomber strip as fast as Japanese
-artillery could tear it up. Any Marine who returned from the dismal
-swamps toward the beach would retain the wonderment of the “Marine
-Drive.” It was a two-lane asphalt highway, complete with wide shoulders
-and drainage ditches. It lay across jungle so dense that the tired men
-had had to hack their way through it only a week or so before.
-
-Meanwhile, back on the beach, the U.S. Navy had been busy pouring
-in supplies and men. By D plus 12 it had landed more than 23,000
-cargo tons and nearly 34,000 men. Marine fighters overhead provided
-continuous cover from Japanese air attacks. The Marine 3d Defense
-Battalion was set up with long-range radar and its antiaircraft guns to
-give further protection. (This battalion also had long-range 155mm guns
-that pounded Japanese attacks against the perimeter.)
-
-By now, the 37th Infantry Division on the left was on firm ground,
-facing scattered opposition, and able to make substantial advances. It
-was very different for the 3d Marine Division on the right. Lagoons
-and swamps were everywhere. The riflemen were in isolated, individual
-positions, little islands of men perched in what they sarcastically
-called “dry swamps,” This meant the water and/or slimy mud was only
-shoe-top deep, rather than up to their knees or waists, as it was all
-around them. This nightmare kind of terrain, combined with heavy,
-daily, drenching rains, precluded digging foxholes. So their machine
-guns had to be lashed to tree trunks, while the men huddled miserably
-in the water and mud. They carried little in their packs, except that
-a variety of pills was essential to stay in fighting shape in their
-oppressive, bug-infested environment: salt tablets, sulfa powder,
-aspirin, iodine, vitamins, atabrine tablets (for supressing malaria),
-and insect repellent.
-
-Colonel Frazer West, who at Bougainville commanded a company in the 9th
-Marines, was interviewed by Monks 45 years later. He still remembered
-painfully what constantly living in the slimy, swamp water did to the
-Marines: “With almost no change of clothing, sand rubbing against the
-skin, stifling heat, and constant immersion in water, jungle rot was a
-pervasive problem. Men got it on their scalps, under their arms, in
-their genital areas, just all over. It was a miserable, affliction,
-and in combat there was very little that could be done to alleviate
-it. The only thing you could do was with the jungle ulcers. I’d get
-the corpsman to light a match on a razor blade, split the ulcer open,
-and squeeze sulfanilamide powder in it. I must have had at one time
-30 jungle ulcers on me. This was fairly typical.” Corpsmen painted
-many Marines with skin infections with tincture of merthiolate or a
-potassium permanganate solution so that they looked like the Picts of
-long ago who went into battle with their bodies daubed with blue woad.
-
-The Marines who had survived the first two weeks of the campaign were
-by now battlewise. They intuitively carried out their platoon tactics
-in jungle fighting whether in offense or defense. They understood their
-enemy’s tactics. And all signs indicated that they were winning.
-
-
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 18):] Navajo Code Talkers
-
-
-[Illustration]
-
-Marines who heard the urgent combat messages said Navajo sounded
-sometimes like gurgling water. Whatever the sound, the ancient
-tongue of an ancient warrior clan confused the Japanese. The Navajo
-codetalkers were busily engaged on Bougainville, and had already proved
-their worth on Guadalcanal. The Japanese could never fathom a language
-committed to sounds.
-
-Originally there were many skeptics who disdained the use of the
-Navajo language as infeasible. Technical Sergeant Philip Johnston, who
-originally recommended the use of Navajo talkers as a means of safe
-voice transmissions in combat, convinced a hardheaded colonel by a
-two-minute Navajo dispatch. Encoding and decoding, the colonel then
-admitted, would have engaged his team well over an hour.
-
-When the chips were down, time was short, and the message was urgent,
-Navajos saved the day. Only Indians could talk directly into the radio
-“mike” without concern for security. They would read the message in
-English, absorb it mentally, then deliver the words in their native
-tongue--direct, uncoded, and quickly. You couldn’t fault the Japanese,
-even other Navajos who weren’t codetalkers, couldn’t understand the
-codetalkers’ transmissions because they were in a code within the
-Navajo language.
-
-
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 19):] ‘Corpsman!’
-
-
-Less than one percent of battle casualties on Bougainville died
-of wounds after being brought to a field hospital, and during 50
-operations conducted as the battle of the Koromokina raged and bullets
-whipped through surgeons’ tents, not a patient was lost.
-
-[Illustration: Painting by Kerr Eby in the Marine Corps Art Collection]
-
-Those facts reflect the skill and dedication of the corpsmen, surgeons,
-and litter bearers who performed in an environment of enormous
-difficultly. Throughout the fight for the perimeter, the field
-hospitals were shelled and shaken by bomb blasts, even while surgical
-operations were being conducted.
-
-Every day there was rain and mud and surgeons practiced their craft
-with mud to their shoe laces. Corpsmen were shot as they treated the
-wounded right at the battle scene; others were shot as the Japanese
-ignored the International Red Cross emblem for ambulances and aid
-stations.
-
-Bougainville was the first time in combat for the corpsmen assigned
-to the 3d Marine Division. Two surgeons were with each battalion
-and, as in all other battles, a corpsman was with each platoon. Aid
-stations were as close as 30-50 yards behind the lines. The men from
-the division band were the litter bearers, always on the biting edge of
-combat.
-
-Many young Marines were not aware until combat just how close they
-would be to these corpsmen who wore the Marine uniform, and who would
-undergo every hardship and trial of the man on the line. The corpsman’s
-job required no commands; he was simply always there to patch up the
-wounded Marine enough to have him survive and get to a field hospital.
-
-Naval officers seldom had command over the corpsman. He was responsible
-directly to the platoon, company, and battalion to which he was
-assigned.
-
-Ashore on D-Day with the invading troops, Pharmacist’s Mate Second
-Class Andrew Bernard later remembered setting up his 3d Marines
-regimental aid station, just inland in the muck off the beach beside
-the “C” Medical Field Hospital. Later, as action intensified, Bernard
-saw 15 to 20 wounded Marines waiting at the hospital for care, and
-commented, “this was when I noticed Dr. Duncan Shepherd.... The flaps
-of the hospital tent went open, and there was Dr. Shepherd operating
-away, so calm, so brave, so courageous--as though he was back in the
-Mayo Clinic, where he had trained.”
-
-On 7 December, the Japanese attacked around the Koromokina. The
-official history of the 3d Marine Division described the scene:
-
-  The division hospital, situated near the beach, was subjected to
-  daily air raids, and twice to artillery shelling.... Company E of
-  the 3d Medical Battalion, which was the division hospital under
-  Commander R. R. Callaway, USN, proved that delicate work could be
-  carried on even in combat. During the battle the field hospital was
-  attacked, bullets ripped through the protecting tent, seriously
-  wounding a pharmacist’s mate.
-
-[Illustration: Painting by Franklin Boggs in _Men Without Guns_
-(Philadelphia:/The Blakiston Company, 1945)]
-
-Hellzapoppin Ridge was the most intense and miserable of the battles
-for the corpsmen of Bougainville, according to Pharmacist’s Mate First
-Class Carroll Garnett. He and three other corpsmen were assigned to the
-forward aid station located at the top of that bloody ridge. The two
-battalion surgeons were considered indispensable and discouraged from
-taking undue risks. Regardless, Assistant Battalion Surgeon Lieutenant
-Edmond A. Utkewicz, USNR, insisted on joining the corpsmen at the
-forward station and remained there throughout the entire battle. The
-doctor and his four assistants were often in the open, exposed to fire,
-and showered with the dust thrown up by mortar explosions.
-
-The corpsmen’s routine was: stop the bleeding, apply sulfa powder and
-battle dressing, shoot syrette of morphine, and administer plasma.
-The regular aid station was located at the bottom of the ridge where
-the battalion surgeon, Lieutenant Commander Horace L. Wolf, USNR,
-checked the wounded again, before sending them off in an ambulance, if
-available, to a better equipped station or a field hospital.
-
-Corpsmen (and Marines) were in deadly peril atop the ridge. Corpsman
-John A. Wetteland described volunteers bringing in a wounded paramarine
-who was still breathing when he and the medical team were hit anew by
-a shell. One corpsman was killed, another badly wounded, and Wetteland
-was badly mauled by mortar fragments, though he tried, he said, “to
-bandage myself.”
-
-Dr. Wolf later painted a grim picture of the taut circumstances under
-which the medics worked:
-
-  Several of my brave corpsmen were killed in this action. The
-  regimental band musicians were the litter bearers. I still remember
-  the terrible odor of our dead in the tropical heat. The smell
-  pinched one’s nostrils and clung to clothing.... During combat in
-  the swamps, about all one could do to try to purify water to drink
-  was to put two drops of iodine solution in a canteen. Night was the
-  worst, when we could not evacuate our sick and wounded. But, if one
-  could get a ride to the airstrip on the jeep ambulance to put the
-  sick and wounded on evacuation planes, one could see a female (Navy
-  or Army nurses) for the first time in many months.
-
-
-
-
-_Piva Forks Battle_
-
-
-The lull after the Coconut Grove fight did not last long. On 18
-November, the usual flurry of patrols soon brought back information
-that the Japanese had set up a road block on both the Numa-Numa
-Trail and the East-West Trail.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    National Archives Photo 111-5C-190032
-
-_The 155mm guns of the Marine 3d Defense Battalion provided firepower
-in support of Marine riflemen holding the Torokina perimeter._]
-
-[Illustration: _Just getting to your assigned position meant slow,
-tiring slogging through endless mud._
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 68247
-]
-
-To strike the Numa-Numa position, the 3d Marines sent in its 3d
-Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Ralph M. King), to lead the attack. It
-hit the Japanese flanks, routed them, and set up its own road block on
-19 November.
-
-The 2d Battalion of the 3d Marines immediately went after the Japanese
-block on the East-West Trail between the two forks of the Piva River.
-After seizing that position, the next objective was a 400-foot ridge
-that commanded the whole area--and, in fact, provided a view all the
-way to Empress Augusta Bay. (As the first high ground the Marines
-had found, it would clearly produce a valuable observation post for
-directing the artillery fire of the 12th Marines.)
-
-[Illustration: PIVA ACTION
-
-NOV 1943]
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Hector de Zayas, commanding the battalion, summoned
-one of his company commanders and gave a terse order, “I want you to
-take it.” Thus a patrol under First Lieutenant Steve J. Cibik was
-immediately sent to occupy it. This began a four-day epic, 20-23
-November. The Marines got to the top, realized the importance of
-the vantage point to the Japanese, dug in defensive positions, and
-got ready for the enemy counterattacks that were sure to come. And
-they came, and came, and came. There were “fanatical attempts by the
-Japanese to reoccupy the position” in the form of “wild charges that
-sometimes carried the Japanese to within a few feet of their foxholes
-on the crest of the ridge.” Cibik called in Marine artillery bursts
-within 50 yards of his men. The Marines held and were finally relieved,
-exhausted but proud. Cibik was awarded a Silver Star Medal, and the
-hill was always known thereafter as “Cibik Ridge.”
-
-While the firestorm roared where Cibik stood, the 3d Marines were
-pursuing its mission of driving the Japanese from the first and nearest
-of Piva’s forks. The 2d Battalion caught up with Cibik, and Lieutenant
-Colonel de Zayas moved it out down the reverse slope of Cibik Ridge.
-The Japanese struck hard on 21 November and de Zayas pulled back. Then,
-in true textbook fashion, the Japanese followed right behind him. The
-Marines were ready, machine guns in place. One of them killed 74 out of
-75 of the enemy attackers within 20-30 yards of the gun.
-
-The 3d Marines was supported by the 9th, and 21st Marines, and the
-raiders, while the 37th Infantry Division provided roadblocks, patrols,
-and flank security. Support was also provided by the Army’s heavy
-artillery, the 12th Marines, and the defense battalions. All the troops
-were now be entering a new phase of the campaign, during which the
-fight would be more for the hills than for the trails.
-
-Reconnaissance patrols provided a good idea of what was out there, but
-they also discovered that the enemy was not alert as he could or should
-be. A Marine rifle company, for instance, came upon a clearing where
-the Japanese were acting as if no war was on--the troops were lounging,
-kibitzing, drinking beer. The Marine mortars tore them apart. Another
-patrol waited until the occupants of a bivouac lined up for chow before
-cutting them down with mortars in a pandemonium of pots, pans, and tea
-kettles. (Jungle combat had taught the Marines the wisdom of General
-Turnage’s order: Marines go nowhere without a weapon!)
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    National Archives Photo 127-N-67228B
-
-_Marine communicators had the difficult task of stringing wire in dense
-jungle terrain while remaining wary of the enemy._]
-
-The various, successive objectives for the Marine and Army riflemen
-were codenamed using the then-current phonetic alphabet: Dog (reached
-15 November), Easy (reached 20 November, except for the 9th Marines,
-slowed by an impassable swamp), Fox (finally reached by the Marines on
-28 November) and How (part of it reached by the Army on 23 November
-since it encountered “no opposition,” and the remainder as a goal for
-the Marines). Thereafter, the Marines were to press on to the Item and
-Jig objectives “on orders from Corps Headquarters.”
-
-One account makes clear the overwhelming difficulties facing the Marine
-battalions: “water slimy and often waist deep, sometimes to the arm
-pits ... tangles of thorny vines that inflicted painful wounds ... men
-slept setting up in the water ... sultry heat and stinking muck.”
-
-In spite of this, elaborate plans were made to continue the attack
-from west to east. The “strongly entrenched” Japanese defenses, with
-1,200-1,500 men, were oriented to repel an assault from the south.
-Accordingly, the artillery observers on Cibik Ridge registered their
-fire on 23 November, in preparation for a thrust by two battalions of
-the 3d Marines to try to advance 800 yards beyond the east fork of
-the Piva River. All available tanks and supporting weapons were moved
-forward. Marine engineers from the 19th Marines joined Seabees under
-enemy fire in throwing bridges across the Piva River.
-
-On 23 November, as the night fell like a heavy curtain, seven
-battalions of artillery lined up, some almost hub-to-hub. There were
-the Army’s 155s, 105s, mortars, 90mm AA; and the same array of the 12th
-Marines’ cannons, plus 44 machine guns and even a few Hotchkiss pieces
-taken from the enemy.
-
-The attack in the morning began with the barrage at 0835, 24 November,
-Thanksgiving Day; a shuddering burst of flame and thunder, possibly
-the heaviest such barrage a Marine operation had ever before placed
-on a target. The shells, 5,600 rounds of them, descended on a narrow
-800-foot square box of rain forest, only 100 yards from the Marines,
-so close that shell splinters and concussion snapped twigs off bushes
-around them.
-
-[Illustration: BATTLE OF PIVA FORKS
-
-FIRST PHASE
-
-19-20 NOVEMBER]
-
-Yet, as the two assault battalions moved out, the redoubtable Japanese
-_23d Infantry_ crashed in with their own heavy barrage. Their shells
-left Marines dead, bleeding, and some drowned in the murky Piva River,
-“the heaviest casualties of the campaign. Twice the enemy fire walked
-up and down the attacking Marines with great accuracy.” But the 3d
-Marines came on with a juggernaut of tanks, flame throwers, and machine
-gun, mortar, and rifle fire.
-
-[Illustration: BATTLE OF PIVA FORKS
-
-FINAL PHASE
-
-21-25 NOVEMBER]
-
-Where the Army-Marine artillery barrages fell, however, there was
-desolation. Major Schmuck, a company commander in one of the assault
-battalions, later remembered:
-
-  For 500 yards, the Marines moved in a macabre world of splintered
-  trees and burned-out brush. The very earth was a churned mass of
-  mud and human bodies. The filthy, stinking streams were cesspools
-  of blasted corpses. Over all hung the stench of decaying flesh and
-  powder and smoke which revolted [even] the toughest. The first line
-  of strong points with their grisly occupants was overrun and the
-  500-yard phase line was reached.
-
-  The Japanese were not through. As the Marines moved forward a Nambu
-  machine gun stuttered and the enemy artillery roared, raking the
-  Marine line. A Japanese counterattack hit the Marines’ left flank.
-  It was hand-to-hand and tree-to-tree. One company alone suffered
-  50 casualties, including all its officers. Still the Marines drove
-  forward, finally halting 1,150 yards from their jump-off point,
-  where resistance suddenly ended. The Japanese _23d Infantry_ had
-  been totally destroyed, with 1,107 men dead on the field. The
-  Marines had incurred 115 dead and wounded. The battle for Piva
-  Forks had ended with a dramatic, hard fought victory which had
-  “broken the back of organized enemy resistance.”
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 78796
-
-_To enable a forward observer to adjust artillery fire, these 3d
-Defense Battalion Marines used a jury-rigged hoist to lift him to the
-top of a banyan tree._]
-
-There was one final flourish. It had been, after all, Thanksgiving Day,
-and a tradition had to be observed. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had
-decreed that all servicemen should get turkey--one way or another. Out
-there on the line the men got it by “the other.” Yet, few Marines of
-that era would give the Old Corps bad marks for hot chow. If they could
-get it to the frontline troops, they would. A Marine recalled, “The
-carrying parties did get the turkey to them. Nature won, though, the
-turkey had spoiled.” Another man was watching the big birds imbedded
-in rice in five gallon containers, “much like home except for baseball
-and apple pie.” For some, however, just before the turkey was served,
-the word came down, “Prepare to move out!” Those men got their turkey
-and ate it on the trail ... on the way to a new engagement, Hand
-Grenade Hill.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    National Archives Photo 127-N-69394
-
-_Concealed in the heavy jungle growth, these men of Company E, 2d
-Battalion, 21st Marines, guard a Numa-Numa Trail position in the swamp
-below Grenade Hill._]
-
-Before that could be assaulted, there was a reorganization on D plus
-24. The beat-up 3d Marines was beefed up by the 9th Marines and the 2d
-Raiders. Since D-Day a total of 2,014 Japanese dead had been counted,
-but “total enemy casualties must have been at least three times that
-figure.” And as a portent for the future use of Bougainville as a base
-for massive air strikes against the Japanese, U.S. planes were now able
-to use the airstrip right by the Torokina beachhead. With the enemy
-at last driven east of the Torokina River, Marines now occupied the
-high ground which controlled the site of the forthcoming Piva bomber
-airstrip.
-
-
-
-
-_Hand Grenade Hill_
-
-
-The lead for the next assault on 25 November was given to the fresh
-troops of Lieutenant Colonel Carey A. Randall, who had just taken over
-the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. They were joined by the 2d Raider
-Battalion under Major Richard T. Washburn. Randall could almost see his
-next objective from the prime high ground of Cibik Ridge. Just ahead
-rose another knoll, like the ridge it would be the devil to take, for
-the Japanese would hold it like a fortress. It would soon be called
-“Hand Grenade Hill” for good reason. Two of Randall’s companies went
-at it with Washburn’s raiders. But the Japanese gave a good account of
-themselves. Some 70 of them slowed the Marine attack, but one company
-got close to the top. The Marines were from five to 50 yards away from
-the Japanese, battling with small arms, automatic weapons, and hand
-grenades. The enemy resisted fiercely, and the Marines were thrown back
-by a shower of hand grenades. One Marine observed that the hill must
-been the grenade storehouse for the entire Solomon Islands.
-
-It was on Hand Grenade Hill that Lieutenant Howell T. Heflin, big,
-memorable, one of Alabama’s favorites, son of a Methodist minister,
-snatched up a BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle) and sprayed the Japanese
-positions. He pried open a way for his platoon almost to the hilltop,
-but could not hold there. He was awarded the Silver Star Medal, and
-later he went on to become Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court
-and then the senior U.S. Senator from Alabama.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    National Archives Photo 127-N-71380
-
-_Evacuation of the wounded was always difficult. These men are carrying
-out a casualty from the fighting on Hill 1000._]
-
-At the end of the action-filled day, the Marines were stalled. In the
-morning of 26 November surprised scouts found that the Japanese had
-pulled out in the darkness. Now all of the wet, smelly, churned-up
-terrain around the Piva Forks, including the strategic ridgeline
-blocking the East-West Trail, was in Marine hands.
-
-There now occurred a shuffling of units which resulted in the
-following line-up: 148th and 129th Infantry Regiments on line in the
-37th Division sector on the left of the perimeter. 9th Marines, 21st
-Marines, and 3d Marines, running from left to right, in the Marine
-sector.
-
-
-
-
-_The Koiari Raid_
-
-
-As a kind of final security measure, IMAC was concerned about a last
-ridge of hills, some 2,000 yards to the front, and really still
-dominating too much of the perimeter. Accordingly, on 28 November,
-General Geiger ordered an advance to reach Inland Defense Line Fox.
-As a preliminary, to protect this general advance from a surprise
-Japanese attack on the far right flank, a raid was planned to detect
-any enemy troop movements, destroy their supplies, and disrupt their
-communications at a place called Koiari, 10 miles down the coast from
-Cape Torokina. The 1st Parachute Battalion, just in from Vella Levella
-under Major Richard Fagan, drew the assignment, with a company of the
-3d Raider Battalion attached. While it had never made a jump in combat,
-the parachute battalion had been seasoned in the Guadalcanal campaign.
-
-Carried by a U.S. Navy landing craft, the men in the raid were put
-ashore at 0400, 29 November, almost in the middle of a Japanese supply
-dump. Total surprise all around! The Marines hastily dug in, while the
-enemy responded quickly with a “furious hail” of mortar fire, meanwhile
-lashing the beachhead with machine gun and rifle fire. Then came the
-Japanese attacks, and Marine casualties mounted “alarmingly.” They
-would have been worse except for a protective curtain of fire from the
-155mm guns of the 3d Defense Battalion back at Cape Torokina. With an
-estimated 1,200 enemy pressing in on the Marines, it was painfully
-clear that the raiding group faced disaster. Two attempts to extricate
-them by their landing craft were halted by heavy Japanese artillery
-fire. Now the Marines had their backs to the sea and were almost out
-of ammunition. Then, about 1800, three U.S. destroyers raced in close
-to the beach, firing all guns. They had come in response to a frantic
-radio signal from IMAC, where the group’s perilous situation was well
-understood. Now a wall of shell fire from the destroyers and the 155s
-allowed two rescue craft to dash for the beach and lift off the raiding
-group safely. With none of the original objectives achieved, the
-raid had been a costly failure, even though it had left at least 145
-Japanese dead.
-
-
-
-
-_Hellzapoppin Ridge_
-
-
-Now the action shifted to the final targets of the 3d Marine Division:
-that mass of hills 2,000 yards away. Once captured, they would block
-the East-West Trail where it crossed the Torokina River, and they would
-greatly strengthen the Final Inland Defense Line that was the Marines’
-ultimate objective. A supply base, called Evansville, was built up for
-the attack in the rear of Hill 600 for the forthcoming attacks.
-
-The 1st Marine Parachute Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Robert H.
-Williams, was informed, two days after its arrival on Bougainville,
-that General Turnage had assigned it to occupy those hills which IMAC
-felt still dominated much of the Marine ground. That ridgeline included
-Hill 1000 with its spur soon to be called Hellzapoppin Ridge (named
-after “Hellzapoppin,” a long-running Broadway show), Hill 600, and Hill
-600A. To take the terrain Williams got the support of elements of the
-3d, 9th, and 21st Marines (which had established on 27 November its
-own independent outpost on Hill 600). By 5 December, the 1st Parachute
-Regiment had won a general outpost line that stretched from Hill 1000
-to the junction of the East-West Trail and the Torokina River.
-
-Then on 7 December, Major Robert T. Vance on Hill 1000 with his 3d
-Parachute Battalion walked the ridge spine to locate enemy positions on
-the adjacent spur that had been abandoned. The spur was fortified by
-nature: matted jungle for concealment, gullies to impair passage, steep
-slopes to discourage everything. That particular hump, which would get
-the apt name of Hellzapoppin Ridge, was some 280 feet high, 40 feet
-across at the top, and 650 feet long, an ideal position for overall
-defense.
-
-Jumping off from Hill 1000 on the morning of 9 December to occupy the
-spur, Vance’s men were hit by a fusillade of fire. The Japanese had
-come back, 235 of them of the _23d Infantry_. The parachutists attacked
-again and again, without success. Artillery fire was called in, but the
-Japanese found protective concealment on the reverse slopes. Marine
-shells burst high in the banyan trees, up and away from the dug-in
-enemy. As a result, the parachutists were hit hard. “Ill-equipped and
-under-strength,” they were pulled back on 10 December to Hill 1000. Two
-battalions of the 21st Marines, with a battalion of the 9th Marines
-guarding their left flank, continued the attack. It would go on for six
-gruelling days.
-
-Scrambling up the slopes, the new attacking Marines would pass the
-bodies of the parachutists. John W. Yager, a first lieutenant in the
-21st recalled, “The para-Marines made the first contact and had left
-their dead there. After a few days, they had become very unpleasant
-reminders of what faced us as we crawled forward, in many instances
-right next to them.”
-
-Sergeant John F. Pelletier, also in the 21st, was a lead scout. Trying
-to cross the ridge spine over to the Hellzapoppin spur, he found dead
-paratroopers all over the hill. There were dead Japanese soldiers still
-hanging from trees, and it seemed to him that no Marine had been able
-to cross to the crest and live to tell about it.
-
-[Illustration: HELLZAPOPPIN RIDGE
-
-NEARING THE END
-
-6-18 DECEMBER]
-
-Pelletier described what happened next:
-
-  The next morning Sergeant Oliver [my squad leader] told me to
-  advance down the ridge as we were going to secure the point. That
-  point was to become our most costly battle. We moved down the
-  center until we were within 20 feet of the point. The Japs hit us
-  with machine gun, rifle, and mortar fire. They popped out of spider
-  holes. We were in a horseshoe-shaped ambush. We were firing as fast
-  as we could when Sergeant Oliver pulled me back. He gave me the
-  order to pull back up the ridge. He didn’t make it.
-
-When artillery fire proved ineffective in battering the Japanese so
-deeply dug in on Hellzapoppin Ridge, Geiger called on 13 December for
-air attacks. Six Marine planes had just landed at the newly completed
-Torokina airstrip. They came in with 100-pound bombs, guided to their
-targets by smoke shells beyond the Marine lines. But the Japanese were
-close, very close. Dozens of the bombs were dropped 75 yards from the
-Marines. With additional planes, there were four bombing and strafing
-strikes over several days. A Marine on the ground never forgot the
-bombers roaring in right over the brush, the ridge, and the heads of
-the Marines to drop their load, “It seemed right on top of us.” (This
-delivery technique was necessary to put the bombs on the reverse slope
-among the Japanese.)
-
-[Illustration: EXPANSION OF THE BEACHHEAD
-
-I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
-
-1 NOVEMBER-15 DECEMBER 1943]
-
-Helping to control these early strikes and achieve pinpoint accuracy
-was Lieutenant Colonel William K. Pottinger, G-3 (Operations Officer)
-of the Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. He had taken a radio
-out of a grounded plane, moved to the frontlines, and helped control
-the attacking Marine planes on the spot. (This technique was an
-improvised forerunner of the finely tuned procedures that Marine dive
-bombers would use later to achieve remarkable results in close air
-support of ground troops.)
-
-The 3d Marine Division’s history was pithy in its evaluation, “It was
-the air attacks which proved to be the most effective factor in the
-taking of the ridge ... the most successful examples of close air
-support thus far in the Pacific War.”
-
-Geiger wasn’t through. He had a battery of the Army’s 155mm howitzers
-moved by landing craft to new firing positions near the mouth of the
-Torokina River. Now the artillery could pour it on the enemy positions
-on the reverse slopes.
-
-In one of the daily Marine assaults, one company went up the ridge for
-two attacks against Japanese who would jump into holes they had dug
-on the reverse slope to escape bombardment. The Japanese finally were
-tricked when another company, relieving the first one, jumped into
-the enemy foxholes before their rightful owners. It cost the Japanese
-heavily to try to return.
-
-In a final assault on 18 December, the two battalions of the 21st moved
-from Hill 1000 to the spur in a pincer and double envelopment. But
-the artillery and bombs had done their work. The Japanese and their
-fortress were shattered. Stunned defenders were easily eliminated.
-
-Patrick O’Sheel, a Marine combat correspondent, summed up the bitter
-battle, “No one knows how many Japs were killed. Some 30 bodies were
-found. Another dozen might have been put together from arms, legs, and
-torsos.” The 21st suffered 12 killed and 23 wounded.
-
-With Hellzapoppin finally behind them, Marines could count what
-blessings they could find and recount how rotten their holidays were.
-There had been a Thanksgiving Day spent on the trail while gnawing a
-drumstick on the way to another engagement at Piva Forks. And now, on
-21 December, four days until Christmas, and the troops still had Hill
-600A to “square away.”
-
-[Illustration: ATTACK ON HILL 600A
-
-22-23 DEC 1943]
-
-[Illustration: ADVANCE TO THE EAST
-
-NOV-DEC 1943]
-
-[Illustration: _Chaplain Joseph A. Rabun of the 9th Marines delivers
-his sermon with a “Merry Christmas” sign overhead and a sand-bagged
-dugout close at hand._
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 74819
-]
-
-Reconnaissance found 14-18 Japanese on that hill, down by the Torokina
-River. A combat patrol from the 21st Marines moved to drive the
-Japanese off the knob. It wasn’t hard, but it cost the life of one
-Marine and one was wounded. But IMAC wanted a permanent outpost on the
-hill, and the 3d Battalion, 21st, drew the assignment. It began with
-one rifle platoon and a platoon of heavy machine guns on 22 December.
-Hill 600A was a repeat of past enemy tactics. The Japanese had come
-back to occupy it. They held against all efforts, even against a
-two-pronged attack. A full company came up and made three assaults.
-That didn’t help either. Late on the 23d, the Marines held for the
-night, preparing to mount another attack in the morning. That morning
-was Christmas Eve, 1943. Scouts went up to look. The Japanese had gone.
-Christmas wasn’t merry, but it was better. For the 3d Marine Division,
-the war was over on Bougainville.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    National Archives Photo 80-G-250368
-
-_The Piva airfields (shown here in February 1944 photograph) became key
-bomber and fighter strips in the aerial offensive against Rabaul._]
-
-The landing force had seized the beachhead, destroyed or overcome the
-enemy, and won the ground for the vital airfields. Now they prepared
-to leave, as the airfields were being readied to reduce Rabaul and its
-environs.
-
-Since 10 December, F4U Vought Corsairs of Marine Fighting Squadron
-(VMF) 216 (1st Marine Aircraft Wing) had settled on the new strip on
-Torokina, almost washed by the sea. The fighter planes would be the key
-to the successful prosecution of the AirSols (Air Solomons) offensive
-against Rabaul, for, as escorts, they made large-scale bombing raids
-feasible. Major General Ralph J. Mitchell, USMC, had become head of
-AirSols on 20 November 1943. By 9 January 1944, both the fighter
-and bomber aircraft were operating from the Piva strips. Following
-Bougainville, Mitchell would have twice the airpower and facilities
-that the Japanese had in all of the Southwest Pacific area.
-
-The campaign had cost the Marines 423 killed and 1,418 wounded. Enemy
-dead were estimated at 2,458, with only 23 prisoners captured.
-
-It was now time for the 3d Marine Division to go home to Guadalcanal,
-with a “well done” from Halsey. (In the Admiral’s colorful language,
-a message to Geiger said, “You have literally succeeded in setting up
-and opening for business a shop in the Japs’ front yard.”) Now there
-would be plenty of papayas and Lister bags, as well as a PX, a post
-office, and some sports and movies. General Turnage was relieved on
-28 December by Major General John R. Hodge of the Americal Division,
-which took over the eastern sector. The 37th Infantry Division kept its
-responsibility for the western section of the Bougainville perimeter.
-Admiral Halsey directed the Commanding General, XIV Corps, Major
-General Oscar W. Griswold, to relieve General Geiger, Commanding
-General, IMAC. The Army assumed control of the beachhead as of 15
-December. The 3d Marines left Bougainville on Christmas Day. The 9th
-left on 28 December, and had a party with two cans of beer per man.
-The 21st, last to arrive on the island, was the division’s last rifle
-regiment to leave, on 9 January 1944.
-
-Every man in those regiments knew full well the crucial role that
-the supporting battalions had played. The 19th Marines’ pioneers and
-engineers had labored ceaselessly to build the bridges and trails
-that brought the vital water, food, and ammunition to the front
-lines through seemingly impassable swamps, jungle, and water, water
-everywhere.
-
-[Illustration: _A chaplain reads prayers for the burial of the dead,
-while their friends bow their heads in sorrow at the losses._
-
-    From the Leach File, MCHC Archives
-]
-
-And the amtracs of the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion had proven
-essential in getting 22,922 tons of those supplies to the riflemen.
-They were “the most important link in the all-important supply chain.”
-
-Working behind the amtracs were the unsung men of the 3d Service
-Battalion who, under the division quartermaster, Colonel William C.
-Hall, brought order and efficiency from the original, chaotic pile-up
-of supplies on the beach. As roads were slowly built, the 6×6 trucks of
-the 3d Motor Transport Battalion moved the supplies to advance dumps
-for the amtracs to pick up.
-
-The 12th Marines and Army artillery had given barrage after barrage of
-preparatory fire--72,643 rounds in all.
-
-The invaluable role of Marine aviation, as previously mentioned,
-was symbolized by General Turnage’s repeated requests for close air
-support, 10 strikes in all.
-
-The Seabees, working at a “feverish rate,” had miraculously carved
-three airfields out of the unbelievable morass that characterized
-the area. And it was from those bases that the long-range, strategic
-effects of Bougainville would be felt by the enemy.
-
-The 3d Medical Battalion had taken care of the wounded. With
-omnipresent corpsmen on the front lines in every battle and aid
-stations and field hospitals right behind, the riflemen knew they had
-been well tended.
-
-General Turnage summarized the campaign well, “Seldom have troops
-experienced a more difficult combination of combat, supply, and
-evacuation. From its very inception, it was a bold and hazardous
-operation. Its success was due to the planning of all echelons and the
-indomitable will, courage, and devotion to duty of all members of all
-organizations participating.”
-
-Thus it was that the capture of Bougainville marked the top of the
-ladder, after the long climb up the chain of the Solomon Islands.
-
-
-
-
-_Epilogue_
-
-
-There were, however, two minor land operations to complete the
-isolation of Rabaul. The first was at Green Island, just 37 miles north
-of Bougainville. It was a crusty, eight-mile-long (four-mile-wide) oval
-ring, three islands of sand and coral around a sleepy lagoon, and only
-117 miles from Rabaul. To General Douglas MacArthur, it was the last
-step of the Solomon Islands campaign.
-
-The task of taking the island fell to the 5,800 men of the 3d New
-Zealand Division under Major General H. E. Barrowclough, less the 8th
-Brigade which had been used in the Treasuries operation. There was also
-a contingent of American soldiers, Seabees, and engineers, and cover
-from AirSol Marine planes under Brigadier General Field Harris. Rear
-Admiral Wilkinson had Task Force 31, whose warships would wait for
-targets (although Green Island would get no preinvasion bombardment).
-The atoll ring was too narrow and bombardment would pose a danger to
-island inhabitants.
-
-Late in January 1944, 300 men of the 30th New Zealand Battalion and
-Seabees and engineer specialists went ashore, measured and sized up the
-island’s potential, found spots for an airfield, checked lagoon depths,
-and sought accommodations for a boat basin.
-
-All of this warned the Japanese, but it was too late for them to do
-anything. Then, on 14 February, Japanese scout planes warned the 102
-defenders on Green Island that a large Allied convoy was on the way,
-shepherded by destroyers and cruisers. Japanese aircraft from Rabaul
-and Kavieng attacked the convoy by moonlight, but at 0641, the landing
-craft had crossed the line of departure unscathed and were almost to
-the beach. Within two hours, all were ashore, unopposed. Then Japanese
-dive bombers came roaring in, but the Allied antiaircraft fire and
-Marine fighter planes (VMF-212) were enough to prevent hits on the
-transports or beach supplies. New Zealand patrols got only slight
-resistance, a few brief firefights. By 19 February, the 33d, 37th, and
-93d Seabees were laying an airfield on the island.
-
-By 4 March, a heavy B-24 bomber was able to make an emergency landing
-on the Green Island strip. Three days later, AirSols planes were
-staging there giving the strip the name “Green.” Soon B-24s were there
-to strike the vast Japanese base at Truk.
-
-[Illustration: _Heavy, constant artillery support for the riflemen
-required a regular flow of ammunition. Here shells are being unloaded
-from a LST (Landing Ship, Tank)._
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 71180 by PFC Philip Scheer
-]
-
-The second operation saw the seizure of Emirau Island. It was well
-north of Green Island, 75 miles northwest of the New Ireland enemy
-fortress of Kavieng. Actually, Kavieng had been considered as a target
-to be invaded by the 3d Marine Division, but higher authorities
-decided the cost would be too high. Better to let Kavieng die on the
-vine. Taking Emirau and setting up air and naval bases there would
-effectively cut off the Solomon Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago
-from the Japanese. It would be a small investment with big results.
-
-Emirau is an irregularly shaped island in the St. Matthias Group, eight
-miles long, four miles wide, with much jungle and many hills, but with
-room for boat basins and airstrips. The natives said there had been no
-Japanese there since January, and air reconnaissance could find none.
-
-The unit selected for the landing bore a famous name in the lore of
-the Corps: the 4th Marines. The original regiment had been the storied
-“China Marines,” and had then been part of the desperate defense of
-Bataan and the subsequent surrender at Corregidor in the Philippines.
-Now it had been reborn as a new, independent regiment, composed of the
-tough and battle-hardened veterans of the raider battalions.
-
-The 4th Marines arrived at Emirau shortly after 0600 on 20 March
-1944. The Marines and sailors fired a few shots at nothing; then the
-amphibian tractors opened up, wounding one of the Marines. The Seabees
-got right to work on the airfields, even before the island was secured.
-In no time they laid out a 7,000-foot bomber strip and a 5,000-foot
-stretch for fighters.
-
-All was secured until attention fell on a little neighboring island
-with a Japanese fuel and ration dump. Destroyers blew it all to
-debris ... then spied at sea a large canoe escaping with some of the
-enemy. Hardly bloodthirsty after this placid operation, the destroyer
-casually pulled in close. The Japanese chose to fire a machine gun. It
-was folly. The destroyer was forced to respond. The canoe didn’t sink
-and was brought alongside with the body of a Japanese officer and 26
-living enlisted men--who may have privately questioned their officer’s
-judgement.
-
-
-
-
-_Bougainville Finale_
-
-
-These were small affairs compared to the finale on Bougainville. With
-the withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division at the end of 1943, after
-it had successfully fought its way to the final defensive line, the
-two Army divisions, the 37th Infantry and the Americal, took over and
-extended the perimeter with only sporadic brushes with the Japanese.
-
-Then, in late February and early March 1944, patrols began making
-“almost continuous” contact with the enemy. It appeared that the
-Japanese were concentrating for a serious counterattack. On 8 March,
-the 145th Infantry (of the 37th) was hit by artillery fire. Then the
-_6th Division_, parent of the old enemy, the _23d Infantry_, attacked
-hard. It took five days of “very severe” fighting, with support from
-a battalion of the 148th Infantry, combined with heavy artillery fire
-and air strikes, to drive the determined Japanese back. Meanwhile, the
-129th Infantry had also been “heavily attacked.” The enemy kept coming
-and coming, and it was a full nine days before there was a lull on 17
-March.
-
-On 24 March the Japanese, after reorganizing, launched another series
-of assaults “with even greater pressure.” This time they also threw
-in three regiments of their _17th Division_. The artillery of both
-American divisions, guided by Cub spotter planes, fired “the heaviest
-support mission ever to be put down in the South Pacific Area.” That
-broke the back of the enemy attackers, and the battle finally was over
-on 25 March.
-
-Major General Griswold, the corps commander, after eight major enemy
-attacks, wrote in a letter four days later:
-
-  I am absolutely convinced that nowhere on earth does there exist
-  a more determined will and offensive spirit in the attack than
-  that the Japs exhibited here. They come in hard, walking on their
-  own dead, usually on a front not to exceed 100 yards. They try
-  to effect a breakthrough which they exploit like water running
-  from a hose. When stopped, they dig in like termites and fight to
-  the death. They crawl up even the most insignificant fold in the
-  ground like ants. And they use all their weapons with spirit and
-  boldness.... Difficult terrain or physical difficulties have no
-  meaning for them.
-
-The Americal Division had advanced along with the 37th in the
-March-April period with its last action 13-14 April. This ended the
-serious offensive action for the two Army divisions; the enemy had been
-driven well out of artillery range of the airstrips, 12,000 yards away.
-
-For Americans this marked the end of the Bougainville saga: a tale of
-well-trained units, filled with, determined, skillful men, who fought
-their way to a resounding victory. The 3d Marine Division had led the
-way in securing a vital island base with the crucial isolation of
-Rabaul thus ensured.
-
-
-
-
-_Sources_
-
-
-The author owes a substantial debt to Cyril J. O’Brien who was a Marine
-Combat Correspondent on Bougainville. A draft he prepared describing
-this operation used U.S. Army, Coast Guard, and New Zealand as well as
-Marine Corps sources, and contained a variety of colorful vignettes and
-personal interviews, with some photographs not in official USMC files,
-all gratefully acknowledged.
-
-As always, the basic official Marine history of the Pacific campaigns
-covers Bougainville and the auxiliary landings in massive detail: Henry
-I. Shaw, Jr., and Maj Douglas T. Kane, USMC, _Isolation of Rabaul_,
-vol. 2, _History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II_
-(Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
-Corps, 1963).
-
-An earlier, more condensed official history is Maj John N. Rentz,
-USMCR, _Bougainville and the Northern Solomons_ (Washington: Historical
-Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
-Corps, 1948).
-
-The earliest, most modest official account is a mimeographed summary,
-characterized as a “first attempt”: U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters,
-Historical Division. Unpublished monograph: “The Bougainville
-Operation, First Marine Amphibious Corps, 1 November-28 December 1943,”
-dtd Feb45. VE603 1st.A2, Library, Marine Corps Historical Center,
-Washington, D.C.
-
-A quasi-official history of the 3d Marine Division was “made possible
-by the Commandant, who authorized the expenditure of the division’s
-unused Post Exchange funds.
-
-The final draft was approved by a group of 3d Division officers....”
-The book is: 1stLt Robert A. Aurthur, USMCR, and 1stLt Kenneth Cohlmia,
-USMCR, edited by LtCol Robert T. Vance, USMC, _The Third Marine
-Division_ (Washington: Infantry Journal Press. 1948).
-
-An account representing direct personal participation in the campaign,
-supplemented by later interviews, is: Capt John A. Monks, Jr., _A
-Ribbon and a Star: The Third Marines at Bougainville_ (New York: Holt
-and Co., 1945).
-
-Another history traces the campaign on the island past the Marine
-operation to the subsequent U.S. Army battles, and concludes with
-the Australians as the final troops leading to the overall Japanese
-surrender in 1945: Harry A. Gailey, _Bougainville 1943-1945--The
-Forgotten Campaign_ (Lexington, Ky: University Press of Kentucky, 1991).
-
-The full story of the crucial naval battle as the Marines landed is
-in RAdm Samuel Eliot Morison, _Breaking the Bismarck Barrier, 22 July
-1942-1 May 1944_, vol. 6, _History of United States Naval Operations in
-World War II_ (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1950).
-
-A detailed account of the death of Adm Yamamoto is in R. Cargil Hall,
-ed., _Lightning Over Bougainville_ (Washington: Smithsonian Institution
-Press, 1991).
-
-Personal Papers and Oral Histories files at the Marine Corps Historical
-Center were unproductive, but the biographical and photographic files
-were most helpful. The staff of the Marine Corps Historical Center was
-always cooperative, in particular Catherine Kerns, who prepared my
-manuscript copy.
-
-
-
-
-_About the Author_
-
-
-[Illustration]
-
-Captain John C. Chapin earned a bachelor of arts degree with honors in
-history from Yale University in 1942 and was commissioned later that
-year. He served as a rifle platoon leader in the 24th Marines, 4th
-Marine Division, and was wounded in action during assault landings on
-Roi-Namur and Saipan.
-
-Transferred to duty at the Historical Division, Headquarters Marine
-Corps, he wrote the first official histories of the 4th and 5th Marine
-Divisions. Moving to Reserve status at the end of World War II, he
-earned a master’s degree in history at George Washington University
-with a thesis on “The Marine Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1922.”
-
-Now a captain in retired status, he has been a volunteer at the Marine
-Corps Historical Center for 12 years. During that time he wrote
-_History of Marine Fighter-Attack (VMFA) Squadron 115_. With support
-from the Historical Center and the Marine Corps Historical Foundation,
-he then spent some years researching and interviewing for the writing
-of a new book, _Uncommon Men: The Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps_,
-published in 1992 by the White Mane Publishing Company.
-
-Subsequently, he wrote four monographs for this series of historical
-pamphlets, commemorating the campaigns for the Marshalls, Saipan,
-Bougainville, and Marine Aviation in the Philippines operations.
-
-
-
-
-[Illustration]
-
-
-THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in
-the World War II era, is published for the education and training of
-Marines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
-Corps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense
-observance of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.
-
-Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part
-by a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in the memory of her
-late husband, Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the
-recipient of a Purple Heart.
-
-
-=WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES=
-
-    _DIRECTOR EMERITUS OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS_
-
-    =Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)=
-
-    _GENERAL EDITOR,
-    WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES_
-
-    =Benis M. Frank=
-
-    _CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT_
-
-    =George C. MacGillivray=
-
-    _EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION_
-
-    =Robert E. Strudet=, _Senior Editor_;
-    =W. Stephen Hill=, _Visual Information Specialist_;
-    =Catherine A. Kerns=, _Composition Services Technician_.
-
-    Marine Corps Historical Center
-    Building 58, Washington Navy Yard
-    Washington, D.C. 20374-5040
-
-    1997
-
-    PCN 19000314100
-
-
-[Illustration: (back cover)]
-
-
-
-
-Transcriber’s Notes
-
-
-Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
-predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
-changed.
-
-Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48808 ***
+
+Transcriber's note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber and placed
+into the Public Domain. Boldface text is indicated as =equals signs=.
+
+
+Contents
+
+  Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations in the Northern Solomons
+    SIDEBAR: Major General Allen H. Turnage, USMC
+  Planning the Operation
+    SIDEBAR: 3d Marine Division
+  Diversionary Landings
+    SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers
+  Battle at Sea
+  Action Ashore: Koromokina
+    SIDEBAR: 37th Infantry Division
+  The Battle for Piva Trail
+    SIDEBAR: War Dogs
+  The Coconut Grove Battle
+    SIDEBAR: Navajo Code Talkers
+    SIDEBAR: ‘Corpsman!’
+  Piva Forks Battle
+  Hand Grenade Hill
+  The Koiari Raid
+  Hellzapoppin Ridge
+  Epilogue
+  Bougainville Finale
+  Sources
+  About the Author
+  About this series of pamphlets
+  Transcriber’s Notes
+
+
+
+
+    TOP OF THE LADDER:
+
+    MARINE OPERATIONS IN THE
+    NORTHERN SOLOMONS
+
+    MARINES IN
+    WORLD WAR II
+    COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
+
+    BY CAPTAIN JOHN C. CHAPIN
+    U.S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE (RET)
+
+[Illustration: _Riflemen clad in camouflage dungarees await the
+lowering of their landing craft from_ George Clymer _(APA 27) for
+their dash to the beaches in their amphibious assault landing on
+Bougainville_. (National Archives Photo 80-G-55810)]
+
+
+[Illustration: _Raiders, up to their hips in water, man a machine gun
+along a jungle trail_. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 70764]
+
+
+
+
+Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations in the Northern Solomons
+
+_by Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)_
+
+
+Assault landings began for the men in the blackness of the early
+hours of the morning. On 1 November 1943, the troops of the 3d Marine
+Division were awakened before 0400, went to General Quarters at 0500,
+ate a tense breakfast, and then stood by for the decisive command,
+“Land the Landing Force.” All around them the preinvasion bombardment
+thundered, as the accompanying destroyers poured their 5-inch shells
+into the target areas, and spotters in aircraft helped to adjust the
+fire.
+
+As the sun rose on a bright, clear day, the word came at 0710 for the
+first LCVPs (Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel) to pull away from
+their transport ships and head for the shore, a 5,000-yard run across
+Empress Augusta Bay to the beaches of an island called Bougainville.
+
+Almost 7,500 Marines were entering their LCVPs (with Coast Guard
+crew and coxswains) for an assault on 12 color-coded beaches. Eleven
+of these extended west from Cape Torokina for 8,000 yards to the
+Koromokina Lagoon. The 12th was on Puruata Island just offshore from
+the beaches. The six beaches on the right were assigned to Colonel
+George W. McHenry’s 3d Marines and Lieutenant Colonel Alan Shapley’s 2d
+Raider Regiment (less one battalion). The five on the left and Puruata
+Island were the objectives of Colonel Edward A. Craig’s 9th Marines and
+Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Bean’s 3d Raider Battalion.
+
+[Illustration]
+
+As the men headed for shore, 31 Marine torpedo and scout bombers,
+covered by fighters, came screaming in from their base at Munda,
+bombing and strafing to give the beaches a final plastering. At 0726,
+the first wave touched ground, four minutes ahead of the official
+H-Hour. As the other waves came in, it was immediately apparent that
+there was serious trouble in two ways. A high surf was tossing the
+LCVPs and LCMs (Landing Craft, Medium) around, and they were landing
+on the wrong beaches, broaching, and smashing into each other in the
+big waves. By the middle of the morning, 64 LCVPs and 22 LCMs were
+hulks littering the beaches. Three of the designated beaches had to be
+abandoned as unusable.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 62751
+
+_Marine riflemen keep their heads down as they get closer to the
+assault beach on D-Day._]
+
+Major Donald M. Schmuck, commanding a company in the 3d Marines, later
+recalled how, in the “mad confusion” of the beachhead, his company
+was landed in the midst of heavy gunfire in the middle of another
+battalion’s zone on the beach of Torokina. Running his company on the
+double through the other battalion and the 2d Raiders’ zone across
+inlets and swamp, Major Schmuck got his men to the right flank of his
+own battalion where they were to have landed originally. His surprised
+battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hector de Zayas, stared at
+the bedraggled new arrivals exclaiming, “Where have you been?” Major
+Schmuck pointed back to Cape Torokina and replied, “Ask the Navy!”
+
+[Illustration: _As seen from a beached landing craft, these Marines are
+under fire while wading in the last few yards to the beach._]
+
+The other trouble came from the Japanese defenders. While the 9th
+Marines on the left landed unopposed, the 3d Marines on the right met
+fierce opposition, a deadly crossfire of machine gun and artillery
+fire. One Japanese 75mm gun, sited on Cape Torokina, was sending heavy
+enfilade fire against the incoming landing waves. It smashed 14 boats
+and caused many casualties. The boat group commander’s craft took a
+direct hit, causing the following boat waves to become disorganized and
+confused. Machine gun and rifle fire, with 90mm mortar bursts added,
+covered the shoreline. Companies landed in the wrong places. Dense
+underbrush, coming right down to the beaches, shrouded the defenders in
+their 25 bunkers and numerous rifle pits. The commanding officer of the
+1st Battalion, 3d Marines, Major Leonard M. “Spike” Mason, was wounded
+and had to be evacuated, but not before he shouted to his men, “Get
+the hell in there and fight!” Nearby, the executive officer of the 2d
+Raider Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. McCaffery, was directing
+an assault when he was severely wounded. He died that night.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
+
+_Sgt Robert A. Owens was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor._]
+
+In spite of the chaos, the intensive training of the Marines took hold.
+Individuals and small groups moved in to assault the enemy, reducing
+bunker after bunker, dropping grenades down their ventilators. For an
+hour, the situation was in doubt.
+
+The fierce combat led to a wry comment by one captain, Henry Applington
+II, comparing “steak and eggs served on white tablecloths by stewards
+... and three and a half hours and a short boat ride later ... rolling
+in a ditch trying to kill another human being with a knife.”
+
+The devastating fire from the 75mm cannon on Cape Torokina was finally
+silenced when Sergeant Robert A. Owens, crept up to its bunker, and
+although wounded, charged in and killed the gun crew and the occupants
+of the bunker before he himself was killed. A posthumous Medal of Honor
+was awarded to him for this heroic action which was so crucial to the
+landing.
+
+Meanwhile, on Puruata Island, just offshore of the landing beaches, the
+noise was intense; a well-dug-in contingent of Japanese offered stiff
+resistance to a reinforced company of the 3d Battalion, 2d Raiders.
+It was midafternoon of D plus one before the defenders in pill boxes,
+rifle pits, and trees were subdued, and then some of them got away to
+fight another day. A two-pronged sweep and mop-up by the raiders on D
+plus 2 found 29 enemy dead of the 70 Japanese estimated to have been on
+that little island. The raiders lost five killed and 32 wounded.
+
+An hour after the landings on the main beaches a traditional Marine
+signal was flashed from shore to the command and staff still afloat,
+“Situation well in hand.” This achievement of the riflemen came in
+spite of the ineffective prelanding fire of the destroyers. The men
+in front-line combat found that none of the 25 enemy bunkers on the
+right-hand beaches had been hit. Some of the naval bombardment had
+begun at a range of over seven miles, and the official Marine history
+summarized, “The gunfire plan ... had accomplished nothing.”
+
+[Illustration: _On a beach, rifles pointing toward the enemy, Marines
+get ready to fight their way inland._
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 69782
+]
+
+Unloading supplies and getting them in usable order on the chaotic
+beaches was a major problem. Seabees, sailors, and Marines all turned
+to the task, with 40 percent of the entire landing force laboring as
+the shore party. They sweated 6,500 tons of supplies ashore.
+
+[Illustration: THE LANDING AT CAPE TOROKINA
+
+I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
+
+1 NOVEMBER 1943
+
+Yellow beaches for cargo unloading during assault phase]
+
+Simultaneously, the batteries of the 12th Marines were struggling to
+get their artillery pieces ashore and set to fire. One battery, in
+support of the 2d Raider Battalion, waded through a lagoon to find
+firing positions. Amtracs (amphibian tractors), supplemented by rubber
+boats, were used to ferry the men and ammunition to the beaches. The
+90mm antiaircraft guns of the 3d Defense Battalion were also brought
+ashore early to defend against the anticipated air attacks.
+
+The Japanese had been quick to respond to this concentration of
+American ships. Before the first assault boats had hit the beach, a
+large flight of enemy carrier planes was on its way to attack the
+Marines and their supporting ships. New Zealand and Marine fighters
+met them in the air and the covering destroyers put up a hail of
+antiaircraft fire, while the transports and cargo ships took evasive
+action. Successive Japanese flights were beaten off; 26 enemy planes
+were shot down.
+
+[Illustration: THE SOLOMON ISLANDS
+
+1943]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 61899
+
+_LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift was an early commander of IMAC._]
+
+The men in the rifle battalions long remembered the sight. On one
+occasion, a Marine Corsair was about to pull the trigger on an enemy
+Zeke (“Zero”) fighter set up perfectly in the pilot’s sights when
+a burst of fire from Marine .50-caliber machine guns on the beach,
+meant for the Zeke, shot the American down. One of the riflemen later
+recalled that the Marine pilot fell into the ocean and surfaced with a
+broken leg. “We waded out to get him. He was ticked off--mostly because
+he missed the Jap.”
+
+In spite of all these problems, the assault battalions had, by the
+end of D-Day, reached their objectives on the Initial Beachhead Line,
+600-1,000 yards inland. One enormous unexpected obstacle, however, had
+now become painfully clear. Available maps were nearly useless, and a
+large, almost impenetrable swamp, with water three to six feet deep,
+lay right behind the beaches and made movement inland and lateral
+contact among the Marine units impossible.
+
+The night of D-Day was typical for the ground troops. By 1800, darkness
+had set in and the men all knew the iron-clad rule: be in your foxhole
+and stay there. Anyone moving around out there was a Japanese soldier
+trying to infiltrate. John A. Monks, Jr., quoted a Marine in his book,
+A Ribbon and a Star:
+
+  From seven o’clock in the evening till dawn, with only centipedes
+  and lizards and scorpions and mosquitoes begging to get
+  acquainted--wet, cold, exhausted, but unable to sleep--you lay
+  there and shivered and thought and hated and prayed. But you stayed
+  there. You didn’t cough, you didn’t snore, you changed your
+  position with the least amount of noise. For it was still great to
+  be alive.
+
+At sea, the transports and cargo ships were withdrawn; there was
+intelligence that enemy naval forces were on the move.
+
+
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 5):] Major General Allen H. Turnage, USMC
+
+
+[Illustration]
+
+Allen Hal Turnage was born in Farmville, North Carolina, on 3 January
+1891. After attending Horner Military Academy and then the University
+of North Carolina, at age 22 he was appointed a second lieutenant in
+the U.S. Marine Corps. Sent to Haiti, he served with the 2d Marine
+Regiment from 1915 to 1918, becoming a company commander in the Haitian
+Gendarmerie.
+
+A captain in 1917, Turnage did get to France where he commanded the 5th
+Marine Brigade Machine Gun Battalion. Home in 1919, he was assigned
+to the 5th Marines at Quantico and became regimental adjutant and an
+instructor for the first Field Officers School, 1920-22.
+
+A major in 1927, Turnage had three years with the Pacific fleet, and
+then he served with the U.S. Electoral Mission in Nicaragua (1932).
+He came back to Washington, made lieutenant colonel in 1934 and
+full colonel in 1939. He was director of the Basic School at the
+Philadelphia Navy Yard, and, in the spring of 1939, he was sent to
+China to head Marine forces in North China.
+
+In summer of 1941, on the eve of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
+he returned to Headquarters in Washington. In 1942, as a brigadier
+general, he commanded the burgeoning Marine Base and Training Center at
+New River, North Carolina.
+
+When the 3d Marine Division was formed in September 1942, he was
+named assistant division commander. In the summer of 1943 Turnage was
+promoted to major general and selected to head the division. He then
+led the division on Bougainville and in the liberation of Guam, the
+first American territory to be recaptured from the enemy.
+
+After the war, he was appointed Assistant Commandant, followed by
+promotion to lieutenant general and command of FMFPac (Fleet Marine
+Force, Pacific). He retired 1 January 1948, and died 22 October 1971.
+
+His awards included the Navy Cross, the Navy Distinguished Service
+Medal, and the Presidential Unit Citation (which his men received for
+both Guam and Iwo Jima).
+
+
+
+
+_Planning the Operation_
+
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Photo courtesy of Cyril J. O’Brien
+
+_LtGen Haruyoshi Hyakutake, commanded the Japanese forces on
+Bougainville._]
+
+This kind of strong enemy reaction, in the air and at sea, had been
+expected by American staff officers who had put in long weeks planning
+the Bougainville operation. Looking at a map of the Solomon Islands
+chain, it was obvious that this largest island (130 by 30 miles) on
+the northwest end was a prime objective to cap the long and painful
+progress northward from the springboard of Guadalcanal at the south
+end. As Guadalcanal had been the beginning of the island chain, so
+now Bougainville would mark the top of the ladder in the Northern
+Solomons. From Bougainville airfields, American planes could neutralize
+the crucial Japanese base of Rabaul less than 250 miles away on
+New Britain. From Bougainville, the enemy could defend his massive
+air-naval complex at Rabaul. “Viewed from either camp, the island was a
+priority possession.”
+
+There were the usual sequences of high level planning conferences, but,
+on 1 October 1943, Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander, South Pacific
+Area, notified General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander,
+Southwest Pacific Area, that the beaches on Empress Augusta Bay in the
+middle of Bougainville’s west coast would be the main objective. This
+location was selected as the point to strike because with the main
+Japanese forces 25 miles away at the opposite north and south ends of
+the island, it would be the point of least opposition. In addition,
+it provided a natural defensive region once the Marines had landed
+and their airfields had been gouged out of the swamp and jungle.
+Finally, the target area would provide a site for a long-range radar
+installation and an advanced naval base for PT (patrol torpedo) boats.
+
+It promised to be a campaign in a miserable location. And it was.
+There were centipedes three fingers wide, butterflies as big as little
+birds, thick and nearly impenetrable jungles, bottomless mangrove
+swamps, crocodile infested rivers, millions of insects, and heavy daily
+torrents of rain with enervating humidity.
+
+Major General Allen H. Turnage, the 3d Marine Division commander,
+summarized these horrors. “Never had men in the Marine Corps had to
+fight and maintain themselves over such difficult terrain as was
+encountered on Bougainville.”
+
+To carry out this operation, Lieutenant General Alexander A.
+Vandegrift, Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Corps (IMAC),[A]
+had in his command for the operation:
+
+  3d Marine Division
+
+  1st Marine Parachute Regiment
+
+  2d Marine Raider Regiment
+
+  37th Infantry Division, USA (in reserve)
+
+    [A] Gen Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commander on
+        Guadalcanal, relieved MajGen Clayton B. Vogel as IMAC
+        commander in July 1943. He in turn was relieved as IMAC
+        commander by MajGen Charles D. Barrett on 27 September. Gen
+        Vandegrift was on his way home to Washington to become 18th
+        Commandant of the Marine Corps when, on the sudden death of
+        Gen Barrett on 8 October, he was recalled to the Pacific
+        to resume command of IMAC and lead it in the Bougainville
+        operation. He, in turn, was relieved by MajGen Roy S.
+        Geiger on 9 November.
+
+The Marine riflemen in these units were supplemented by a wide range
+of support: 155mm artillery; motor transport; amphibian tractor; and
+signal, medical, special weapons, Seabee, and tank battalions. The 3d
+Division had its own engineers and pioneers in the 19th Marines and
+artillery in the 12th Marines.
+
+Immediately following Vandegrift’s operation order, practice landing
+exercises were conducted in the New Hebrides and on Guadalcanal and
+Florida Islands.
+
+[Illustration: TREASURY ISLANDS LANDINGS
+
+I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
+
+27 OCTOBER 1943]
+
+[Illustration: _LtCol Victor H. Krulak was commander of the Choiseul
+operation._
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
+]
+
+The objectives assigned on Bougainville were to seize a substantial
+beachhead and build airstrips. Then American planes could assure final
+neutralization of the Japanese airfields at Kahili, Buka, and Bonis
+airfields at the north and south ends of Bougainville. (By 31 October,
+American planes had initially rendered the Japanese fields inoperable.)
+After that would come a massive increase in air operations against
+Rabaul.
+
+Facing the invading Marines was a formidable enemy force dispersed
+on the island. At Buin, for instance, there were 21,800 Japanese.
+Responsible for the defense was an old adversary, Lieutenant General
+Haruyoshi Hyakutake, commander of the _Seventeenth Army_, and the man
+the Marines had defeated at Guadalcanal. His main force was the _6th
+Division_.
+
+Working with the ground U. S. forces were the aviators of Air Solomons:
+New Zealand fighters, Army Air Force bombers, and the 1st and 2d Marine
+Aircraft Wings. As early as 15 August fighter planes from VMF-214
+(the famous Black Sheep squadron) had strafed the Kahili airfield at
+the southern end of Bougainville. Now, in October, there were repeated
+strikes against the Japanese planes at other Bougainville airfields.
+
+At sea, Halsey had designated Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson as
+commander of Task Force 31. Under him were Rear Admiral Frederick C.
+Sherman with the carriers (TF 38) and Rear Admiral Aaron S. “Tip”
+Merrill with the cruisers and destroyers (TF 39). Their job was to
+soften up the defenders before the landing and to safeguard the
+Marine-held beachhead.
+
+
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 8):] 3d Marine Division
+
+
+With Japan’s initial conquests spread over vast reaches of the Pacific,
+it quickly became obvious that additional Marine divisions were sorely
+needed. Accordingly, a letter from the Commandant on 29 August 1942
+authorized the formation of the 3d Marine Division.
+
+There was the 3d Marines, which had been activated first on 20 December
+1916 at Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic. Deactivated in August
+1922, the regiment was again brought to life on 16 June 1942 at
+Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and strengthened by boots from Parris
+Island. Its commander, Colonel Oscar R. Cauldwell, soon led to it to
+Samoa, arriving there in September 1942. Intensive training in jungle
+tactics and practice landings took place there. Then, in March 1943,
+it received a substantial number of reinforcing units and became a
+full-fledged regimental combat team, beefing up its strength to 5,600.
+Finally, in May 1943, it sailed for New Zealand, where the 3d Marine
+Division would come together.
+
+Also with World War I roots, the 9th Marines was born 20 November 1917
+at Quantico, Virginia, and was sent to Cuba. From there it moved to
+Texas, before being deactivated at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in April
+1919. Reactivated on 12 February 1942 at Camp Elliott, California,
+under Colonel Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., it underwent training at the new
+Camp Pendleton. Similarly reinforced, by 1 January 1943 it was ready as
+a regimental combat team with 5,500 men. Movement overseas brought it
+to New Zealand on 5 February 1943.
+
+The third infantry regiment that would make up the division was the
+21st Marines. It was formed from a cadre of well-trained men from the
+6th Marines, who had just returned from duty in Iceland. Arriving at
+Camp Lejeune on 15 July 1942, the cadre was augmented by boots from
+Parris Island and officers from Quantico. Colonel Daniel E. Campbell
+assumed command and the training began. Moving to join the other
+elements, the regiment arrived in New Zealand 11 March 1943.
+
+The reinforcing of the infantry regiments to make them into
+self-sustaining regimental combat teams drew heavily on their two
+complementary regiments: the 12th Marines and the 19th Marines. The
+12th Marines was a salty old unit, led by Brigadier General Smedley D.
+Butler in China in the 1920s. It’s antecedent was a small provisional
+contingent sent to protect American interests in China and designated
+the 12th Regiment (infantry), 4 October 1927. The 12th was reactivated
+at Camp Elliott on 1 September 1942 for World War II as an artillery
+regiment under command of Colonel John B. Wilson. Concluding its
+training, the regiment arrived in New Zealand on 11 March 1943.
+
+The 19th Marines was different. It was made up of Seabees, engineers,
+bakers, piledrivers, pioneers, paving specialists, and many old timers
+from the 25th Naval Construction Battalion at the U.S. Naval Advance
+Base, Port Hueneme, California. It, too, was formed at Camp Elliott
+and its birthday was 16 September 1942. This was the regiment with
+pontoons for bridges, power plants, photographic darkrooms, bulldozers,
+excavators, needles, thread, and water purification machinery. No
+landing force would dare take an island without them. Colonel Robert M.
+Montague took command of the unit in New Zealand on 11 March 1943.
+
+The division’s first commander was Major General Charles D. Barrett,
+a veteran of World War I. He assumed command in September 1942, but
+left a year later to take charge of IMAC and the planning for the
+Bougainville operation.
+
+His assistant division commander had been Brigadier General Allen
+H. Turnage, and, upon Barrett’s death, he was promoted to major
+general and given command of the division which he would soon lead at
+Bougainville.
+
+
+
+
+_Diversionary Landings_
+
+
+There was another key element in the American plan: diversion. To
+mislead the enemy on the real objective, Bougainville, the IMAC
+operations order on 15 October directed the 8th Brigade Group of the
+3d New Zealand Division to land on the Treasury Islands, 75 miles
+southeast of Empress Augusta Bay. There, on 27 October, the New
+Zealanders, under Brigadier R. A. Row, with 1,900 Marine support
+troops, went ashore on two small islands.
+
+One was named Mono and the other Sterling. Mono is about four miles
+wide, north to south, and seven miles long. It looks like a pancake.
+Sterling, shaped like a hook, is four miles long, narrow in places to
+300 yards, but with plenty of room on its margins for airstrips.
+
+In a drizzly overcast, the 29th NZ Battalion (Lieutenant
+Colonel F. L. H. Davis) and the 36th (Lieutenant Colonel K. B.
+McKenzie-Muirson) hit Mono at Falami Point, and the 34th (under
+Lieutenant Colonel R. J. Eyre) struck the beach of Sterling Island off
+Blanche Harbor. There was light opposition. Help for the assault troops
+came from LCI (landing craft, infantry) gunboats which knocked out at
+least one deadly Japanese 40mm twin-mount gun and a couple of enemy
+bunkers.
+
+A simultaneous landing was then made on the opposite or north side of
+Mono Island at Soanotalu. This was perhaps the most important landing
+of all, for there New Zealand soldiers, American Seabees, and U.S.
+radar specialists would set up a big long-range radar station.
+
+The Japanese soon reacted to the Soanotalu landing and hurled
+themselves against the perimeter. On one occasion, 80-90 Japanese
+attacked 50 New Zealanders who waited until they saw “the whites of
+their eyes.” They killed 40 of the Japanese and dispersed the rest.
+
+There was unexpected machine gunfire at Sterling. One Seabee bulldozer
+operator attacked the machine gun with his big blade. An Army corporal,
+a medic, said he couldn’t believe it, “The Seabee ran his dozer over
+and over the machine gun nest until everything was quiet.... It all
+began to stink after a couple of days.”
+
+Outmanned, the Japanese drew back to higher ground, were hunted down,
+and killed. Surrender was still not in their book. On 12 November,
+the New Zealanders could call the Treasuries their own with the radar
+station in operation. Japanese dead totaled 205, and the brigade took
+only eight prisoners. The operation had secured the seaside flank of
+Bougainville, and very soon on Sterling there was an airfield. It began
+to operate against enemy forces on Bougainville on Christmas Day, 1943.
+
+A second diversion, east of the Treasury Islands and 45 miles from
+Bougainville, took place on Choiseul Island. Sub-Lieutenant C. W.
+Seton, Royal Australian Navy and coastwatcher on Choiseul, said the
+Japanese there appeared worried. The garrison troops were shooting at
+their own shadows, perhaps because American and Australian patrols had
+been criss-crossing the 80-miles-long (20-miles-wide) island since
+September, scouting out the Japanese positions. There were also some
+3,500 transient enemy troops on Choiseul, bivouacked and waiting to
+be shipped the 45 miles north to Buin on Bougainville, where there
+was already a major Japanese garrison force. Uncertainty about the
+American threat of invasion somewhere was enough to make the Japanese,
+especially Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka, Commander, Southeast Area
+Fleet, at Rabaul jittery. It was he who wanted much of the Japanese
+_Seventeenth Army_ concentrated at Buin, for, he thought, the Allies
+might strike there.
+
+General Vandegrift wanted to be sure that the Japanese were focused
+on Buin. So, on 20 October, he called in Lieutenant Colonel Robert H.
+Williams, commanding the 1st Parachute Regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel
+Victor H. Krulak, commanding its 2d Battalion. Get ashore on Choiseul,
+the general ordered, and stir up the biggest commotion possible, “Make
+sure they think the invasion has commenced....”
+
+It was a most unusual raid, 656 men, a handful of native guides, and
+an Australian coastwatcher with a road map. The Navy took Krulak’s
+reinforced battalion of parachutists to a beach site near a hamlet
+called Voza. That would be the CP (command post) location for the
+duration. The troops slipped ashore on 28 October at 0021 and soon had
+all their gear concealed in the bush.
+
+By daylight, the Marines had established a base on a high jungle
+plateau in the Voza area. The Japanese soon spotted the intruders, sent
+a few fighter planes to rake the beach, but that did no harm. They did
+not see the four small landing craft which Krulak had brought along and
+hidden among some mangroves with their Navy crews on call.
+
+Krulak then outlined two targets. Eight miles south from their CP at
+Voza there was a large enemy barge base near the Vagara River. The
+Australian said some 150 Japanese were there. The other objective was
+an enemy outpost in the opposite direction, 17 miles north on the
+Warrior River. Then Krulak took his operations officer, Major Tolson A.
+Smoak, 17 men, and a few natives as scouts, and headed for the barge
+basin. On the way, 10 unlucky Japanese were encountered unloading a
+barge. The Marines opened fire, killing seven of them and sinking the
+barge. After reconnoitering the main objective, the barge basin, the
+patrol returned to Voza.
+
+The following morning, Krulak sent a patrol near the barge basin to
+the Vagara River for security and then to wave in his small landing
+craft bringing up his troops to attack. But, back at Voza, along came
+a flight of American planes which shot up the Marines and sank one
+of their vital boats. Now Krulak’s attack would have to walk to the
+village of Sangigai by the Japanese barge basin. To soften up Sangigai,
+Krulak called in 26 fighters escorting 12 torpedo bombers. They dropped
+two tons of bombs and it looked for all the world like a real invasion.
+
+Krulak then sent a company to attack the basin from the beach, and
+another company with rifles, machine guns, rockets, and mortars to get
+behind the barge center. It was a pincer and it worked. The Marines
+attacked at 1400 on 30 October. What the battle didn’t destroy, the
+Marines blew up. The Japanese lost 72 dead; the Marines, 4 killed and
+12 wounded.
+
+All was not so well in the other direction. Major Warner T. Bigger,
+Krulak’s executive officer, had been sent north with 87 Marines toward
+the big emplacement on Choiseul Bay near the Warrior River. His mission
+was to destroy, first the emplacement, with Guppy Island, just off
+shore and fat with supplies, as his secondary target.
+
+Bigger got to the Warrior River, but his landing craft became stuck
+in the shallows, so he brought them to a nearby cove, hid them in the
+jungle, and proceeded on foot north to Choiseul Bay. Soon his scouts
+said that they were lost. It was late in the day so Bigger bivouacked
+for the night. He sent a patrol back to the Warrior where it found a
+Japanese force. Slipping stealthily by them, the patrol got back to
+Voza. This led Krulak to call for fighter cover and PT boats to try to
+get up and withdraw Bigger.
+
+But Bigger didn’t know he was in trouble, and he went ahead and blasted
+Guppy island with mortars, because he couldn’t get to the main enemy
+emplacement. When Bigger and his men barely got back to the Warrior
+River, there were no rescue boats, but there were plenty of Japanese.
+As the men waited tensely, the rescue boats came at the last moment,
+the very last. Thankfully, the men scrambled on board under enemy fire.
+Then two PT boats arrived, gun blazing, and provided cover so Bigger’s
+patrol could get back to Voza. One of the PT boats was commanded by
+Lieutenant John F. Kennedy, USN, later the President of the United
+States, who took 55 Marines on board when their escape boat sank.
+
+[Illustration: CHOISEUL DIVERSION
+
+2d PARACHUTE BATTALION
+
+28 OCTOBER-3 NOVEMBER 1943]
+
+Krulak had already used up all his time and luck. The Japanese were
+now on top of him, their commanders particularly chagrined that they
+had been fooled, for the big landing had already occurred at Empress
+Augusta Bay. Krulak had to get out; Coastwatcher Seton said there was
+not much time. On the night of 3 November, three LCIs rendezvoused off
+Voza. Krulak gave all his rations to the natives as the Marines boarded
+the LCIs. They could hear their mines and booby traps exploding to
+delay the Japanese. Within hours after the departure, a strong Japanese
+pincer snapped shut around the Voza encampment, but the Marines had
+gone, having suffered 9 killed, 15 wounded, and 2 missing, but
+leaving at least 143 enemy dead on Choiseul.
+
+
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 9):] The Coastwatchers
+
+
+It was on Bougainville, as well as on other islands of the Solomons
+chain, that the Australian coastwatchers played their most decisive
+role in transmitting vital advance warnings to Allied forces in
+the lower Solomon Islands. Japanese war planes and ships summoned
+in urgency to smash the beachhead at Guadalcanal had to pass over
+Bougainville, the big island in the middle of the route from Rabaul.
+
+Paul Mason, short, bespectacled, soft spoken, held an aerie in the
+south mountains over Buin, and dark, wiry W. J. “Jack” Read watched
+the ship and aircraft movements of the Japanese in and around Buka
+in the north. One memorable Mason wireless dispatch: “Twenty-five
+torpedo bombers headed yours.” The message cost the Japanese Imperial
+Navy every one of those airplanes, save one. Read reported a dozen
+or so Japanese transports assembling at Buka before their trip to
+Guadalcanal, with enough troops loaded on board to take the island
+back. All of the transports were lost or beached under the fierce
+attack of U.S. warplanes.
+
+In 1941, as the war with Japan commenced, there were 100 coastwatchers
+in the Solomons. There were 10 times that number as the war ended,
+later including Americans. Assembled first as a tight group of island
+veterans in 1939 (although there had been coastwatchers after World War
+I) under Lieutenant Commander A. Eric Feldt, Royal Australian Navy,
+their job was to cover about a half million miles of land, sea, and air.
+
+The very first moves of the Japanese on Guadalcanal were observed
+by coastwatchers in the surrounding hills. The coastwatchers could
+count the Japanese hammer strokes, almost see the nails. When the
+Japanese began the airfield (later to be called Henderson Field),
+the report of the coastwatchers went all the way up the American
+Joint Chiefs of Staff and across the desk of Admiral Ernest J. King,
+Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
+
+Later, General Alexander A. Vandegrift on Guadalcanal banked heavily on
+the intelligence coming in from the radios of the coastwatchers. The
+attacks on the Treasuries and Choiseul were based on the information
+provided them. On New Georgia, long before Americans decided to take
+it, a coastwatcher had set up a haven for downed Allied pilots. And
+if the Americans needed a captured Japanese officer or soldier for
+interrogation, the local scouts were often able to provide one.
+
+The key to coastwatching was the tele-radio or wireless, good to 600
+miles by key, 400 by voice. Cumbersome, heavy, the set took more than
+a dozen men to carry it--an indication of how much the Allies depended
+upon the local natives.
+
+The risks were great. Death would come after torture. But Mason
+recalled the risk was worth it, seeing the sleek, orderly formations
+heading for Guadalcanal, then limping back home with gaping holes
+in their hulls. Mason and Read were highly decorated by both the
+Australians and Americans for their vital services.
+
+
+
+
+_Battle at Sea_
+
+
+A final part of the planning for the main landing on Bougainville had
+envisioned the certainty of a Japanese naval sortie to attack the
+invasion transports. It came very early on the morning of D plus 1. On
+the enemy side, Japanese destroyer Captain Tameichi Hara, skipper of
+the _Shigure_, later recalled it was cold, drizzly, and murky, with
+very limited visibility as his destroyer pulled out of Simpson Harbor,
+Rabaul. He was a part of the interception force determined to chew
+up the U.S. invasion troops that had just landed at Empress Augusta
+Bay. The _Shigure_ was one of the six destroyers in the van of the
+assigned element of the _Southeast Area Fleet_, which included the
+heavy cruisers _Myoko_ and _Haguro_, together with the light cruisers
+_Agano_ and _Sendai_. At 0027, 2 November 1943, he would run abreast
+of U.S. Task Force 39 under Rear Admiral Merrill, who stood by to bar
+the enemy approach with four light cruisers and eight destroyers. Among
+his captains was the daring and determined Arleigh Burke on board the
+_Charles S. Ausburne_ (DD 570) commanding DesDiv (Destroyer Division)
+45.
+
+This encounter was crucial to the Bougainville campaign. At Rabaul,
+Rear Admiral Matsuji Ijuin had told his sailors, “Japan will topple if
+Bougainville falls.”
+
+At 0250, the American ships were in action. Captain Burke (later to
+become Chief of Naval Operations) closed in on the nearest of the
+enemy force under Vice Admiral Sentaro Omori. Burke’s destroyers fired
+25 torpedoes, and then Merrill maneuvered his cruiser to avoid the
+expected “Long Lance” torpedo response of the Japanese and to put his
+ships in position to fire with their six-inch guns.
+
+“I shuddered,” Hara wrote later, “at the realization that they must
+have already released their torpedoes. The initiative was in the hands
+of the enemy. In an instant, I yelled two orders: ‘Launch torpedoes!
+Hard right rudder.’” Not a single Japanese or American torpedo found
+its mark in the first exchange. Merrill then brought all his guns to
+bear. The Japanese answered in kind. The Japanese eight-inch gun salvos
+were either short or ahead. The Americans were luckier. One shell of
+their first broadside slammed amidships into the cruiser _Sendai_
+which carried Admiral Ijuin. There was frantic maneuvering to avoid
+shells, with giant warships, yards apart at times, cutting at speeds
+of 30 knots. Still _Sendai_ managed to avoid eight American torpedoes,
+even with her rudder jammed. Then a Japanese torpedo caught the U.S.
+destroyer _Foote_ (DD 511) and blew off her stern, leaving her dead in
+the water.
+
+Samuel Eliot Morison in _Breaking the Bismarck Barrier_, tells how
+“Merrill maneuvered his cruisers so smartly and kept them at such range
+that no enemy torpedoes could hit.” Admiral Omori showed the same skill
+and judgement, but he was a blind man. Only the American had radar.
+Hara afterwards explained, “Japan did not see the enemy, failed to size
+up the enemy and failed to locate it.... The Japanese fleet was a blind
+man swinging a stick against a seeing opponent. The Japanese fleet had
+no advantage at all....”
+
+What Japan had lacked in electronic sight, however, it partially made
+up with its super-brilliant airplane-dropped flares and naval gunfire
+star shells. Commander Charles H. Pollow, USN, a former radio officer
+on the _Denver_ (CL 58), recalled the “unblinking star shells that
+would let you read the fine print in the bible....” The Japanese also
+had a range advantage in their eight-inch guns, “Sometimes we couldn’t
+touch them....” Three shells hit his _Denver_--not one detonated, but
+the ship was damaged. _Columbia_ (CL 56) also took an eight-inch hole
+through her armor plate.
+
+Then Merrill confused the enemy ships with smoke so dense that the
+Japanese believed the Americans were heading one way when they were
+in fact steaming in another direction. But before Admiral Omori could
+break away, Burke and his destroyer division of “Little Beavers” was
+in among them. First the _Sendai_ was sent to the bottom with 335 men,
+then _Hatsukaze_, brushed in an accident with _Myoko_, was finished
+off by Burke’s destroyers and sank with all hands on board--240
+men. Damaged were the cruisers _Haguro_, _Myoko_, and destroyers
+_Shiratsuyu_ and _Samidare_. But, most important, the threat to the
+beachhead had been stopped.
+
+The Americans got off with severe damage to the _Foote_ and light
+damage to the _Denver_, _Spence_ (DD 512), and _Columbia_. Hara later
+wrote, “had they pursued us really hot[ly] ... practically all the
+Japanese ships would have perished.” The Americans had left the fight
+too soon.
+
+And Admiral Ijuin’s prediction that Japan would topple after the loss
+of Bougainville proved to be accurate, but not because of this loss,
+particularly. It was just one of the number of defeats which were to
+doom Japan.
+
+
+
+
+_Action Ashore: Koromokina_
+
+
+Back on Bougainville, following the landing, the days D plus 1 to D
+plus 5 saw the initiation of Phase II of the operation, involving
+shifting of units’ positions, reorganizing the shambles of supplies,
+incessant patrols, road building, the beginning of the construction of
+a fighter airstrip, and the deepening of the beachhead to 2,000 yards.
+
+[Illustration: JAPANESE COUNTERLANDING
+
+LARUMA RIVER AREA
+
+7 NOVEMBER 1943]
+
+Then, at dawn on the morning of 7 November (D plus 6), the Japanese
+struck. Four of their destroyers put ashore 475 men well west of
+the Marine perimeter, between the Laruma River and the Koromokina
+Lagoon. They landed in 21 craft: barges, ramped landing boats, even
+a motor boat, but, to their disadvantage, along too wide a front for
+coordinating and organizing a strike in unison and immediately. A
+Marine Corps combat correspondent, Sergeant Cyril J. O’Brien, saw the
+skinny young Japanese who scampered up the beach with 80-pound packs
+two-and-a-half miles from the Laruma to near the Koromokina, left flank
+of the Marines, to join their comrades.
+
+They were eager enough, even to die. A little prayer often in the
+pockets of the dead voiced the fatalistic wish that “whether I
+float a corpse under the waters, or sink beneath the grasses of the
+mountainside, I willingly die for the Emperor.”
+
+The first few Japanese ashore near the Laruma, however, did not die. An
+antitank platoon with the 9th Marines did not fire because the landing
+craft in the mist looked so much like their own, even to the big white
+numbers on the prow. Near Koromokina, they seemed to be all over the
+beach. One outpost platoon, which included Private First Class John F.
+Perella, 19 years old, was cut off on the beach. Perella swam through
+the surf 1,000 yards to Marine lines and came with a Navy rescue boat
+and earned a Silver Star Medal.
+
+[Illustration: _Sgt Herbert J. Thomas was posthumously awarded the
+Medal of Honor._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) 302918
+]
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Walter Asmuth, Jr., commanding officer of the 3d
+Battalion, 9th Marines, ordered a company attack, called on mortars
+and the artillery of the 12th Marines. The Japanese were well equipped
+with the so-called knee mortars (actually grenade launchers) and Nambu
+machine guns and fought back fiercely. In that jungle, you could not
+see, hear, or smell a man five feet away. Private First Class Challis
+L. Still found a faint trail and settled his machine gun beside it.
+An ambush was easy. The lead Japanese were close enough to touch when
+Still opened up. He killed 30 in the column; he was a recipient of the
+Silver Star Medal.
+
+Yet, the Japanese didn’t give way. Ashore only hours, they had already
+dug strong defenses. Even a Marine double envelopment in water,
+sometimes up to the waist, did not work. By 1315, the weakened 9th
+Marines company was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, coming
+in from the beachhead’s right flank.
+
+During darkness on that night of 7 November, enemy infiltrators got
+through to the hospital. Bullets ripped through tents as surgeons
+performed operations. The doctors of the 3d Medical Battalion, under
+Commander Robert R. Callaway, were protected by a makeshift line of
+cooks, bakers, and stretcher bearers. (As a memorable statistic, less
+than one percent died of wounds on Bougainville after having arrived at
+a field hospital.)
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 12756
+
+_PFC Henry Gurke was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor._]
+
+The 1st Battalion was close to the enemy, close enough to exchange
+shouts. The Japanese yelled “Moline you die” ... and the Marines made
+earthy references to Premier Tojo’s diet. Marine Captain Gordon Warner
+was fluent in Japanese, so he could quickly reply to the Japanese, even
+yell believable orders for a bayonet charge. He received the Navy Cross
+for destroying machine gun nests with a helmet full of hand grenades.
+He lost a leg in the battle.
+
+Sergeant Herbert J. Thomas gave his life near the Koromokina. His
+platoon was forced prone by machine gunfire, and Thomas threw a grenade
+to silence the weapon. The grenade rebounded from jungle vines and the
+young West Virginian smothered it with his body. He posthumously was
+awarded the Medal of Honor.
+
+General Turnage saw that reinforcements were needed. The day before
+(6 November) the first echelon of the 21st Marines had come ashore.
+Now the battle command was transferred to Lieutenant Colonel Ernest
+W. Fry, Jr., of the 1st Battalion. With two companies, he was set for
+a counterattack, but not until after two intense saturations of the
+Japanese positions by mortars and five batteries of artillery. They
+slammed into a concentrated area, 300 yards wide and 600 deep, early on
+8 November. Light tanks then moved in to support the attack.
+
+When Colonel Fry’s advancing companies reached the area where the
+Japanese had been, there was stillness, desolation, ploughed earth, and
+uprooted trees. Combat correspondent Alvin Josephy wrote of men hanging
+in trees, “Some lay crumpled and twisted beside their shattered
+weapons, some covered by chunks of jagged logs and jungle earth, [by]
+a blasted bunker....” In that no-man’s land, Colonel Fry and his men
+walked over and around the bodies of over 250 enemy soldiers. To
+complete the annihilation of the Japanese landing force, Marine dive
+bombers from Munda bombed and strafed the survivors on 9 November.
+
+By now, the veteran 148th Infantry, the first unit of the Army’s 37th
+Infantry Division, was coming ashore, seasoned in the Munda campaign
+on New Georgia. Later, to take over the left flank of the beachhead,
+would come its other infantry regiments, the 129th on 13 November and
+the 145th on 19 November. The Army’s 135th, 136th, and 140th Field
+Artillery came ashore, too, and would be invaluable in supporting later
+advances on the right flank. Major General Robert S. Beightler, USA,
+was division commander.
+
+
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 13):] 37th Infantry Division
+
+
+[Illustration: _Major General Robert S. Beightler, USA_]
+
+Called the “Buckeye” Division, the 37th was among the very first
+American troops sent to the Pacific at the beginning of the war.
+
+The 37th was an outfit with a long history and many battle streamers,
+dating from August 1917, when it was formed at Camp Sheridan, Alabama.
+It left for overseas in 1918, and took part in five major operations in
+France before returning in 1919, and facing demobilization that same
+year.
+
+As an Ohio National Guard unit, the “Buckeye” Division was inducted
+into federal service in 1940, and by June of 1942, it was heading into
+the Pacific war, sent to garrison the Fiji Islands. First combat was
+on New Georgia, which included taking the critical Munda airfield. The
+37th joined the 3d Marine Division on Bougainville, and then trained on
+the island for the campaign on Luzon Island in the Philippines.
+
+Landing with the Sixth Army at Lingayen Gulf, 9 January 1945, the 37th
+raced inland to Clark Field and Fort Stotsenburg. It entered Manila,
+and its commander, Major General Robert S. Beightler, accepted the
+surrender of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Next came the capture of
+Baguio and liberation there of 1,300 internees at the Bilibid Prison.
+The division came home for demobilization in November 1945.
+
+Its commander, Major General Beightler, was born 21 March 1892, and
+enlisted in the U.S. Army as a private in 1911. Promoted quickly to
+corporal, sergeant, and then first sergeant of his company, he was then
+commissioned as a second lieutenant in March 1914. After service on the
+Mexican border, he took part in five major campaigns in World War I
+with the famous 42d (Rainbow) Division.
+
+[Illustration]
+
+A graduate of Ohio State University, Beightler finished first in his
+class in the Reserve Officers’ Course of the Command and General Staff
+School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1926. After that he served as a
+member of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff
+(1932-36).
+
+After World War II, he assumed command of the Fifth Service Command at
+Fort Hayes, Ohio, and then was assigned (1947) to the Personnel Board
+of the Secretary of War. In 1949, he was sent to the Far East and took
+over the Marianas-Bonins Command on Guam. In 1950 he was named Deputy
+Governor of the Ryukyus Command on Okinawa.
+
+Major General Beightler received the Distinguished Service Cross, the
+nation’s second highest honor, for his leadership in the Philippine
+campaign, as well as a Distinguished Service Medal for the New
+Georgia operation, with an Oak Leaf Cluster as a second award for his
+outstanding service on Bougainville and then on Luzon in the Philippine
+Islands. He also wore the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, the
+Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Silver Star Medal, and the
+Purple Heart.
+
+He died 12 February 1978.
+
+
+
+
+_The Battle for Piva Trail_
+
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE FOR PIVA TRAIL
+
+2d RAIDER REGIMENT
+
+8-9 NOVEMBER]
+
+Captain Conrad M. Fowler, a company commander in the 1st Battalion, 9th
+Marines, later recalled how an attack down the trails was expected:
+“They had to come our way to meet us face-to-face. The trails were the
+only way overland through that rainforest.” His company would be there
+to meet them. He was awarded a Silver Star Medal.
+
+[Illustration: COCONUT GROVE
+
+2d BATTALION, 21st MARINES
+
+13-14 NOVEMBER]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 52622
+
+_MajGen Roy S. Geiger assumed command of IMAC on 9 November 1943._]
+
+With just such a Japanese attack anticipated, General Turnage had
+dispatched a company of the 2d Raider Regiment up the Mission (Piva)
+trail on D-Day to set up a road block--just up from the old Buretoni
+Catholic Mission (still in operation today). At first the raiders had
+little business, and by 4 November elements of the 9th Marines had
+arrived to join them. The enemy, the _23rd Infantry_ up from Buin,
+struck on 7 November. Their attack was timed to coincide with the
+Koromokina landings. The raiders held, but “the woods were full of
+Japs, dead.... The most we had to do was bury them.”
+
+At this point General Turnage told Colonel Edward A. Craig, commanding
+officer of the 9th Marines, to clear the way ahead and advance to the
+junction of the Piva and Numa-Numa trails. That mission Craig gave
+to the 2d Raider Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Alan B. Shapley.
+The actual attack would be led by Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans,
+3d Raider Battalion, just in from Puruata Island and would include
+elements of the 9th Marines and weapons companies.
+
+The Japanese didn’t wait for a Marine attack; they came in on 5
+November and threatened to overrun the trailblock. It soon became a
+matter of brutal small encounters, and battles raged for five days.
+They were many brave acts. Privates First Class Henry Gurke and Donald
+G. Probst, with an automatic weapon, were about to be overwhelmed.
+A grenade plopped in the foxhole between them. To save the critical
+position and his companion, Gurke thrust Probst aside and threw
+himself on the grenade and died. He was awarded the Medal of Honor
+posthumously; Probst, the Silver Star Medal.
+
+Mortars and artillery dueled from each side. The Japanese would
+creep right next to the Marine positions for safety. Marines had to
+call friendly fire almost into their laps. On the narrow trail, men
+often had to expose themselves. The Japanese got the worst of it,
+for suddenly, shortly after noon on 9 November the enemy resistance
+crumbled. By 1500, the junction of the Piva and Numa-Numa trails was
+reached and secured. Some 550 Japanese died. There were 19 Marines dead
+and 32 wounded.
+
+[Illustration: _Adm William F. Halsey (pith helmet) and MajGen Geiger
+(“fore and aft” cover) watch Army reinforcements come ashore at
+Bougainville._
+
+    National Archives Photo 127-N-65494
+]
+
+To consolidate the hard-won position, Marine torpedo bombers from
+Munda blasted the surrounding area on 10 November. This allowed two
+battalions of the 9th Marines to settle into good defensive positions
+along the Numa-Numa Trail with, as usual, “aggressive” patrols
+immediately fanning out. The battle for the Piva Trail had ended
+victoriously.
+
+The key logistical element in this engagement--and nearly all others
+on Bougainville--was the amtrac. There were vast areas where tanks
+and half-tracks, much less trucks, simply could not negotiate the
+bottomless swamps, omnipresent streams, and viscous mud from the
+daily rains. The amtracs proved amazingly flexible; they moved men,
+ammunition, rations, water, barbed wire, and even radio jeeps to the
+front lines where they were most needed. Heading back, they evacuated
+the wounded to reach the desperately needed medical centers in the
+rear.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 65162
+
+_A bloody encounter on 14 November at the junction of the Numa-Numa and
+Piva Trails: Marine infantrymen had been stopped by well dug-in and
+camouflaged enemy troops. Five Marine tanks rushed up and attacked on a
+250-yard front through the jungle._]
+
+Other developments came at this juncture in the campaign. As noted,
+the 37th Infantry Division was fed into the perimeter. At the top of
+the command echelon Major General Roy S. Geiger relieved Vandegrift
+as Commanding General, IMAC, on 9 November and took charge of Marine
+and Army units in the campaign from an advanced command post on
+Bougainville.
+
+The Seabees and Marine engineers were hard at work now. Operating
+dangerously 1,500 yards ahead of the front lines, guarded by a strong
+combat patrol, they managed to cut two 5,000-foot survey lanes east to
+west across the front of the perimeter.
+
+
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 16):] War Dogs
+
+
+[Illustration]
+
+In an interview with Captain Wilcie O’Bannon long after the war,
+Captain John Monks, Jr., gained an insight into one of the least known
+aspects of Marine tactics. It was an added asset that the official
+Marine history called “invaluable”: war dogs. O’Bannon, the first
+patrol leader to have them, related:
+
+  One dog was a German Shepherd female, the other was a Doberman
+  male, and they had three men with them. The third man handled
+  the dogs all the time in the platoon area prior to our going on
+  patrol--petting the dogs, talking to them, and being nice to them.
+  The other two handlers--one would go to the head of the column and
+  one would go to the rear with the female messenger dog.... If the
+  dog in front received enemy fire and got away, he could either
+  come back to me or circle to the back of the column. If I needed
+  to send a message I would write it, give it to the handler, and
+  he would pin it on the dog’s collar. He would clap his hands and
+  say, “Report,” and the dog would be off like a gunshot to go to the
+  third man in the rear who had handled him before the patrol.
+
+The war dogs proved very versatile. They ran telephone wire, detected
+ambushes, smelled out enemy patrols, and even a few machine gun nests.
+The dog got GI chow, slept on nice mats and straw, and in mud-filled
+foxholes. First Lieutenant Clyde Henderson with one of the dog platoons
+recalled how the speed and intelligence of dogs was crucial in light
+of the abominable communications in the jungle, where sometimes
+communications equipment was not much better than yelling.
+
+Under such circumstances, a German Shepherd named “Caesar” made the
+difference between life and death for at least one company. With all
+wires cut and no communication, Caesar got through repeatedly to the
+battalion command post and returned to the lines. One Japanese rifle
+wound didn’t stop him, but a second had Caesar returned to the rear
+on a stretcher. A memorable letter from Commandant Thomas B. Holcomb
+described how Caesar another time had saved the life of a Marine
+when the dog attacked a Japanese about to throw a hand grenade. The
+Commandant also cited in letters four other dogs for their actions on
+Bougainville.
+
+Sergeant William O. McDaniel, in the 9th Marines, remembered, “One
+night, one of the dogs growled and Slim Livesay, a squad leader from
+Montana, shot and hit a Jap right between the eyes. We found the Jap
+the next morning, three feet in front of the hole.”
+
+One Marine said that what Marines liked most was the security dogs gave
+at night and the rare chance to sleep in peace. No enemy would slip
+through the lines with a dog on guard.
+
+There were 52 men and 36 dogs in the K-9 company on Bougainville.
+
+
+
+
+_The Coconut Grove Battle_
+
+
+On D plus 10, 11 November, a new operation order was issued. “Continue
+the attack with the 3d Marine Division on the right (east) and the 37th
+Infantry Division on the left (west).” An Army-Marine artillery group
+was assembled under IMAC control to provide massed fire, and Marine
+air would be on call for close support.
+
+The first objective in the renewed push was to seize control of the
+critical junction of the Numa-Numa Trail and the East-West trail. On 13
+November a company of the 21st Marines led off the advance at 0800. At
+1100 it was ambushed by a “sizeable” enemy force concealed in a coconut
+palm grove near the trail junction. The Japanese had won the race to
+the crossroads, and the situation for the lead Marine company soon
+became critical. The 2d Battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Eustace
+R. Smoak, sent up his executive officer, Major Glenn Fissell, with 12th
+Marines’ artillery observers. They reported the situation as all bad.
+Then Major Fissell was killed. Disdaining flank security, Smoak moved
+closer to the fight and fed in reinforcing companies. (By now a lateral
+road across the front of the perimeter had been built.)
+
+The next day tanks were brought up and artillery registered around the
+battalion. Smoak also called in 18 torpedo bombers. The reorganized
+riflemen lunged forward again in a renewed attack. The tanks proved an
+ineffective disaster, causing chaos at one point by firing on fellow
+Marines on their flank and running over several of their own men.
+Nevertheless, the Japanese positions were overrun by the end of the
+day, with the enemy survivors driven off into a swamp. The Marines now
+commanded the junction of the two vital trails. As a result, the entire
+beachhead was able to spring forward 1,000 to 1,500 yards, reaching
+Inland Defense Line D, 5,000 yards from the beach.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Photo courtesy of Cyril J. O’Brien.
+
+_“Marine Drive” constructed by the 53d Naval Construction Battalion
+enabled casualties to be sent to medical facilities in the rear and
+supplies to be brought forward easily._]
+
+One important result of this advance was that the two main airstrips
+could now be built. The airfields would be the work of the Seabees.
+The 25th, 53d, and 71st Naval Construction Battalions (“Seabees”) had
+landed on D-Day with the assault waves of the 3d Marine Division--to
+get ready at once to build roads, airfields, and camp areas. (They
+had a fighter strip operating at Torokina by December). Always
+close to Marines, the Seabees earned their merit in the eyes of the
+Leathernecks. Often Marines had to clear the way with fire so a Seabee
+could do his work. Many would recall the bold Seabee bulldozer driver
+covering a sputtering machine gun nest with his blade. Marines on the
+Piva Trail later saw another determined bulldozer operator filling in
+holes in the tarmac of his burgeoning bomber strip as fast as Japanese
+artillery could tear it up. Any Marine who returned from the dismal
+swamps toward the beach would retain the wonderment of the “Marine
+Drive.” It was a two-lane asphalt highway, complete with wide shoulders
+and drainage ditches. It lay across jungle so dense that the tired men
+had had to hack their way through it only a week or so before.
+
+Meanwhile, back on the beach, the U.S. Navy had been busy pouring
+in supplies and men. By D plus 12 it had landed more than 23,000
+cargo tons and nearly 34,000 men. Marine fighters overhead provided
+continuous cover from Japanese air attacks. The Marine 3d Defense
+Battalion was set up with long-range radar and its antiaircraft guns to
+give further protection. (This battalion also had long-range 155mm guns
+that pounded Japanese attacks against the perimeter.)
+
+By now, the 37th Infantry Division on the left was on firm ground,
+facing scattered opposition, and able to make substantial advances. It
+was very different for the 3d Marine Division on the right. Lagoons
+and swamps were everywhere. The riflemen were in isolated, individual
+positions, little islands of men perched in what they sarcastically
+called “dry swamps,” This meant the water and/or slimy mud was only
+shoe-top deep, rather than up to their knees or waists, as it was all
+around them. This nightmare kind of terrain, combined with heavy,
+daily, drenching rains, precluded digging foxholes. So their machine
+guns had to be lashed to tree trunks, while the men huddled miserably
+in the water and mud. They carried little in their packs, except that
+a variety of pills was essential to stay in fighting shape in their
+oppressive, bug-infested environment: salt tablets, sulfa powder,
+aspirin, iodine, vitamins, atabrine tablets (for supressing malaria),
+and insect repellent.
+
+Colonel Frazer West, who at Bougainville commanded a company in the 9th
+Marines, was interviewed by Monks 45 years later. He still remembered
+painfully what constantly living in the slimy, swamp water did to the
+Marines: “With almost no change of clothing, sand rubbing against the
+skin, stifling heat, and constant immersion in water, jungle rot was a
+pervasive problem. Men got it on their scalps, under their arms, in
+their genital areas, just all over. It was a miserable, affliction,
+and in combat there was very little that could be done to alleviate
+it. The only thing you could do was with the jungle ulcers. I’d get
+the corpsman to light a match on a razor blade, split the ulcer open,
+and squeeze sulfanilamide powder in it. I must have had at one time
+30 jungle ulcers on me. This was fairly typical.” Corpsmen painted
+many Marines with skin infections with tincture of merthiolate or a
+potassium permanganate solution so that they looked like the Picts of
+long ago who went into battle with their bodies daubed with blue woad.
+
+The Marines who had survived the first two weeks of the campaign were
+by now battlewise. They intuitively carried out their platoon tactics
+in jungle fighting whether in offense or defense. They understood their
+enemy’s tactics. And all signs indicated that they were winning.
+
+
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 18):] Navajo Code Talkers
+
+
+[Illustration]
+
+Marines who heard the urgent combat messages said Navajo sounded
+sometimes like gurgling water. Whatever the sound, the ancient
+tongue of an ancient warrior clan confused the Japanese. The Navajo
+codetalkers were busily engaged on Bougainville, and had already proved
+their worth on Guadalcanal. The Japanese could never fathom a language
+committed to sounds.
+
+Originally there were many skeptics who disdained the use of the
+Navajo language as infeasible. Technical Sergeant Philip Johnston, who
+originally recommended the use of Navajo talkers as a means of safe
+voice transmissions in combat, convinced a hardheaded colonel by a
+two-minute Navajo dispatch. Encoding and decoding, the colonel then
+admitted, would have engaged his team well over an hour.
+
+When the chips were down, time was short, and the message was urgent,
+Navajos saved the day. Only Indians could talk directly into the radio
+“mike” without concern for security. They would read the message in
+English, absorb it mentally, then deliver the words in their native
+tongue--direct, uncoded, and quickly. You couldn’t fault the Japanese,
+even other Navajos who weren’t codetalkers, couldn’t understand the
+codetalkers’ transmissions because they were in a code within the
+Navajo language.
+
+
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 19):] ‘Corpsman!’
+
+
+Less than one percent of battle casualties on Bougainville died
+of wounds after being brought to a field hospital, and during 50
+operations conducted as the battle of the Koromokina raged and bullets
+whipped through surgeons’ tents, not a patient was lost.
+
+[Illustration: Painting by Kerr Eby in the Marine Corps Art Collection]
+
+Those facts reflect the skill and dedication of the corpsmen, surgeons,
+and litter bearers who performed in an environment of enormous
+difficultly. Throughout the fight for the perimeter, the field
+hospitals were shelled and shaken by bomb blasts, even while surgical
+operations were being conducted.
+
+Every day there was rain and mud and surgeons practiced their craft
+with mud to their shoe laces. Corpsmen were shot as they treated the
+wounded right at the battle scene; others were shot as the Japanese
+ignored the International Red Cross emblem for ambulances and aid
+stations.
+
+Bougainville was the first time in combat for the corpsmen assigned
+to the 3d Marine Division. Two surgeons were with each battalion
+and, as in all other battles, a corpsman was with each platoon. Aid
+stations were as close as 30-50 yards behind the lines. The men from
+the division band were the litter bearers, always on the biting edge of
+combat.
+
+Many young Marines were not aware until combat just how close they
+would be to these corpsmen who wore the Marine uniform, and who would
+undergo every hardship and trial of the man on the line. The corpsman’s
+job required no commands; he was simply always there to patch up the
+wounded Marine enough to have him survive and get to a field hospital.
+
+Naval officers seldom had command over the corpsman. He was responsible
+directly to the platoon, company, and battalion to which he was
+assigned.
+
+Ashore on D-Day with the invading troops, Pharmacist’s Mate Second
+Class Andrew Bernard later remembered setting up his 3d Marines
+regimental aid station, just inland in the muck off the beach beside
+the “C” Medical Field Hospital. Later, as action intensified, Bernard
+saw 15 to 20 wounded Marines waiting at the hospital for care, and
+commented, “this was when I noticed Dr. Duncan Shepherd.... The flaps
+of the hospital tent went open, and there was Dr. Shepherd operating
+away, so calm, so brave, so courageous--as though he was back in the
+Mayo Clinic, where he had trained.”
+
+On 7 December, the Japanese attacked around the Koromokina. The
+official history of the 3d Marine Division described the scene:
+
+  The division hospital, situated near the beach, was subjected to
+  daily air raids, and twice to artillery shelling.... Company E of
+  the 3d Medical Battalion, which was the division hospital under
+  Commander R. R. Callaway, USN, proved that delicate work could be
+  carried on even in combat. During the battle the field hospital was
+  attacked, bullets ripped through the protecting tent, seriously
+  wounding a pharmacist’s mate.
+
+[Illustration: Painting by Franklin Boggs in _Men Without Guns_
+(Philadelphia:/The Blakiston Company, 1945)]
+
+Hellzapoppin Ridge was the most intense and miserable of the battles
+for the corpsmen of Bougainville, according to Pharmacist’s Mate First
+Class Carroll Garnett. He and three other corpsmen were assigned to the
+forward aid station located at the top of that bloody ridge. The two
+battalion surgeons were considered indispensable and discouraged from
+taking undue risks. Regardless, Assistant Battalion Surgeon Lieutenant
+Edmond A. Utkewicz, USNR, insisted on joining the corpsmen at the
+forward station and remained there throughout the entire battle. The
+doctor and his four assistants were often in the open, exposed to fire,
+and showered with the dust thrown up by mortar explosions.
+
+The corpsmen’s routine was: stop the bleeding, apply sulfa powder and
+battle dressing, shoot syrette of morphine, and administer plasma.
+The regular aid station was located at the bottom of the ridge where
+the battalion surgeon, Lieutenant Commander Horace L. Wolf, USNR,
+checked the wounded again, before sending them off in an ambulance, if
+available, to a better equipped station or a field hospital.
+
+Corpsmen (and Marines) were in deadly peril atop the ridge. Corpsman
+John A. Wetteland described volunteers bringing in a wounded paramarine
+who was still breathing when he and the medical team were hit anew by
+a shell. One corpsman was killed, another badly wounded, and Wetteland
+was badly mauled by mortar fragments, though he tried, he said, “to
+bandage myself.”
+
+Dr. Wolf later painted a grim picture of the taut circumstances under
+which the medics worked:
+
+  Several of my brave corpsmen were killed in this action. The
+  regimental band musicians were the litter bearers. I still remember
+  the terrible odor of our dead in the tropical heat. The smell
+  pinched one’s nostrils and clung to clothing.... During combat in
+  the swamps, about all one could do to try to purify water to drink
+  was to put two drops of iodine solution in a canteen. Night was the
+  worst, when we could not evacuate our sick and wounded. But, if one
+  could get a ride to the airstrip on the jeep ambulance to put the
+  sick and wounded on evacuation planes, one could see a female (Navy
+  or Army nurses) for the first time in many months.
+
+
+
+
+_Piva Forks Battle_
+
+
+The lull after the Coconut Grove fight did not last long. On 18
+November, the usual flurry of patrols soon brought back information
+that the Japanese had set up a road block on both the Numa-Numa
+Trail and the East-West Trail.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    National Archives Photo 111-5C-190032
+
+_The 155mm guns of the Marine 3d Defense Battalion provided firepower
+in support of Marine riflemen holding the Torokina perimeter._]
+
+[Illustration: _Just getting to your assigned position meant slow,
+tiring slogging through endless mud._
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 68247
+]
+
+To strike the Numa-Numa position, the 3d Marines sent in its 3d
+Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Ralph M. King), to lead the attack. It
+hit the Japanese flanks, routed them, and set up its own road block on
+19 November.
+
+The 2d Battalion of the 3d Marines immediately went after the Japanese
+block on the East-West Trail between the two forks of the Piva River.
+After seizing that position, the next objective was a 400-foot ridge
+that commanded the whole area--and, in fact, provided a view all the
+way to Empress Augusta Bay. (As the first high ground the Marines
+had found, it would clearly produce a valuable observation post for
+directing the artillery fire of the 12th Marines.)
+
+[Illustration: PIVA ACTION
+
+NOV 1943]
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Hector de Zayas, commanding the battalion, summoned
+one of his company commanders and gave a terse order, “I want you to
+take it.” Thus a patrol under First Lieutenant Steve J. Cibik was
+immediately sent to occupy it. This began a four-day epic, 20-23
+November. The Marines got to the top, realized the importance of
+the vantage point to the Japanese, dug in defensive positions, and
+got ready for the enemy counterattacks that were sure to come. And
+they came, and came, and came. There were “fanatical attempts by the
+Japanese to reoccupy the position” in the form of “wild charges that
+sometimes carried the Japanese to within a few feet of their foxholes
+on the crest of the ridge.” Cibik called in Marine artillery bursts
+within 50 yards of his men. The Marines held and were finally relieved,
+exhausted but proud. Cibik was awarded a Silver Star Medal, and the
+hill was always known thereafter as “Cibik Ridge.”
+
+While the firestorm roared where Cibik stood, the 3d Marines were
+pursuing its mission of driving the Japanese from the first and nearest
+of Piva’s forks. The 2d Battalion caught up with Cibik, and Lieutenant
+Colonel de Zayas moved it out down the reverse slope of Cibik Ridge.
+The Japanese struck hard on 21 November and de Zayas pulled back. Then,
+in true textbook fashion, the Japanese followed right behind him. The
+Marines were ready, machine guns in place. One of them killed 74 out of
+75 of the enemy attackers within 20-30 yards of the gun.
+
+The 3d Marines was supported by the 9th, and 21st Marines, and the
+raiders, while the 37th Infantry Division provided roadblocks, patrols,
+and flank security. Support was also provided by the Army’s heavy
+artillery, the 12th Marines, and the defense battalions. All the troops
+were now be entering a new phase of the campaign, during which the
+fight would be more for the hills than for the trails.
+
+Reconnaissance patrols provided a good idea of what was out there, but
+they also discovered that the enemy was not alert as he could or should
+be. A Marine rifle company, for instance, came upon a clearing where
+the Japanese were acting as if no war was on--the troops were lounging,
+kibitzing, drinking beer. The Marine mortars tore them apart. Another
+patrol waited until the occupants of a bivouac lined up for chow before
+cutting them down with mortars in a pandemonium of pots, pans, and tea
+kettles. (Jungle combat had taught the Marines the wisdom of General
+Turnage’s order: Marines go nowhere without a weapon!)
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    National Archives Photo 127-N-67228B
+
+_Marine communicators had the difficult task of stringing wire in dense
+jungle terrain while remaining wary of the enemy._]
+
+The various, successive objectives for the Marine and Army riflemen
+were codenamed using the then-current phonetic alphabet: Dog (reached
+15 November), Easy (reached 20 November, except for the 9th Marines,
+slowed by an impassable swamp), Fox (finally reached by the Marines on
+28 November) and How (part of it reached by the Army on 23 November
+since it encountered “no opposition,” and the remainder as a goal for
+the Marines). Thereafter, the Marines were to press on to the Item and
+Jig objectives “on orders from Corps Headquarters.”
+
+One account makes clear the overwhelming difficulties facing the Marine
+battalions: “water slimy and often waist deep, sometimes to the arm
+pits ... tangles of thorny vines that inflicted painful wounds ... men
+slept setting up in the water ... sultry heat and stinking muck.”
+
+In spite of this, elaborate plans were made to continue the attack
+from west to east. The “strongly entrenched” Japanese defenses, with
+1,200-1,500 men, were oriented to repel an assault from the south.
+Accordingly, the artillery observers on Cibik Ridge registered their
+fire on 23 November, in preparation for a thrust by two battalions of
+the 3d Marines to try to advance 800 yards beyond the east fork of
+the Piva River. All available tanks and supporting weapons were moved
+forward. Marine engineers from the 19th Marines joined Seabees under
+enemy fire in throwing bridges across the Piva River.
+
+On 23 November, as the night fell like a heavy curtain, seven
+battalions of artillery lined up, some almost hub-to-hub. There were
+the Army’s 155s, 105s, mortars, 90mm AA; and the same array of the 12th
+Marines’ cannons, plus 44 machine guns and even a few Hotchkiss pieces
+taken from the enemy.
+
+The attack in the morning began with the barrage at 0835, 24 November,
+Thanksgiving Day; a shuddering burst of flame and thunder, possibly
+the heaviest such barrage a Marine operation had ever before placed
+on a target. The shells, 5,600 rounds of them, descended on a narrow
+800-foot square box of rain forest, only 100 yards from the Marines,
+so close that shell splinters and concussion snapped twigs off bushes
+around them.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF PIVA FORKS
+
+FIRST PHASE
+
+19-20 NOVEMBER]
+
+Yet, as the two assault battalions moved out, the redoubtable Japanese
+_23d Infantry_ crashed in with their own heavy barrage. Their shells
+left Marines dead, bleeding, and some drowned in the murky Piva River,
+“the heaviest casualties of the campaign. Twice the enemy fire walked
+up and down the attacking Marines with great accuracy.” But the 3d
+Marines came on with a juggernaut of tanks, flame throwers, and machine
+gun, mortar, and rifle fire.
+
+[Illustration: BATTLE OF PIVA FORKS
+
+FINAL PHASE
+
+21-25 NOVEMBER]
+
+Where the Army-Marine artillery barrages fell, however, there was
+desolation. Major Schmuck, a company commander in one of the assault
+battalions, later remembered:
+
+  For 500 yards, the Marines moved in a macabre world of splintered
+  trees and burned-out brush. The very earth was a churned mass of
+  mud and human bodies. The filthy, stinking streams were cesspools
+  of blasted corpses. Over all hung the stench of decaying flesh and
+  powder and smoke which revolted [even] the toughest. The first line
+  of strong points with their grisly occupants was overrun and the
+  500-yard phase line was reached.
+
+  The Japanese were not through. As the Marines moved forward a Nambu
+  machine gun stuttered and the enemy artillery roared, raking the
+  Marine line. A Japanese counterattack hit the Marines’ left flank.
+  It was hand-to-hand and tree-to-tree. One company alone suffered
+  50 casualties, including all its officers. Still the Marines drove
+  forward, finally halting 1,150 yards from their jump-off point,
+  where resistance suddenly ended. The Japanese _23d Infantry_ had
+  been totally destroyed, with 1,107 men dead on the field. The
+  Marines had incurred 115 dead and wounded. The battle for Piva
+  Forks had ended with a dramatic, hard fought victory which had
+  “broken the back of organized enemy resistance.”
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 78796
+
+_To enable a forward observer to adjust artillery fire, these 3d
+Defense Battalion Marines used a jury-rigged hoist to lift him to the
+top of a banyan tree._]
+
+There was one final flourish. It had been, after all, Thanksgiving Day,
+and a tradition had to be observed. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had
+decreed that all servicemen should get turkey--one way or another. Out
+there on the line the men got it by “the other.” Yet, few Marines of
+that era would give the Old Corps bad marks for hot chow. If they could
+get it to the frontline troops, they would. A Marine recalled, “The
+carrying parties did get the turkey to them. Nature won, though, the
+turkey had spoiled.” Another man was watching the big birds imbedded
+in rice in five gallon containers, “much like home except for baseball
+and apple pie.” For some, however, just before the turkey was served,
+the word came down, “Prepare to move out!” Those men got their turkey
+and ate it on the trail ... on the way to a new engagement, Hand
+Grenade Hill.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    National Archives Photo 127-N-69394
+
+_Concealed in the heavy jungle growth, these men of Company E, 2d
+Battalion, 21st Marines, guard a Numa-Numa Trail position in the swamp
+below Grenade Hill._]
+
+Before that could be assaulted, there was a reorganization on D plus
+24. The beat-up 3d Marines was beefed up by the 9th Marines and the 2d
+Raiders. Since D-Day a total of 2,014 Japanese dead had been counted,
+but “total enemy casualties must have been at least three times that
+figure.” And as a portent for the future use of Bougainville as a base
+for massive air strikes against the Japanese, U.S. planes were now able
+to use the airstrip right by the Torokina beachhead. With the enemy
+at last driven east of the Torokina River, Marines now occupied the
+high ground which controlled the site of the forthcoming Piva bomber
+airstrip.
+
+
+
+
+_Hand Grenade Hill_
+
+
+The lead for the next assault on 25 November was given to the fresh
+troops of Lieutenant Colonel Carey A. Randall, who had just taken over
+the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. They were joined by the 2d Raider
+Battalion under Major Richard T. Washburn. Randall could almost see his
+next objective from the prime high ground of Cibik Ridge. Just ahead
+rose another knoll, like the ridge it would be the devil to take, for
+the Japanese would hold it like a fortress. It would soon be called
+“Hand Grenade Hill” for good reason. Two of Randall’s companies went
+at it with Washburn’s raiders. But the Japanese gave a good account of
+themselves. Some 70 of them slowed the Marine attack, but one company
+got close to the top. The Marines were from five to 50 yards away from
+the Japanese, battling with small arms, automatic weapons, and hand
+grenades. The enemy resisted fiercely, and the Marines were thrown back
+by a shower of hand grenades. One Marine observed that the hill must
+been the grenade storehouse for the entire Solomon Islands.
+
+It was on Hand Grenade Hill that Lieutenant Howell T. Heflin, big,
+memorable, one of Alabama’s favorites, son of a Methodist minister,
+snatched up a BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle) and sprayed the Japanese
+positions. He pried open a way for his platoon almost to the hilltop,
+but could not hold there. He was awarded the Silver Star Medal, and
+later he went on to become Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court
+and then the senior U.S. Senator from Alabama.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    National Archives Photo 127-N-71380
+
+_Evacuation of the wounded was always difficult. These men are carrying
+out a casualty from the fighting on Hill 1000._]
+
+At the end of the action-filled day, the Marines were stalled. In the
+morning of 26 November surprised scouts found that the Japanese had
+pulled out in the darkness. Now all of the wet, smelly, churned-up
+terrain around the Piva Forks, including the strategic ridgeline
+blocking the East-West Trail, was in Marine hands.
+
+There now occurred a shuffling of units which resulted in the
+following line-up: 148th and 129th Infantry Regiments on line in the
+37th Division sector on the left of the perimeter. 9th Marines, 21st
+Marines, and 3d Marines, running from left to right, in the Marine
+sector.
+
+
+
+
+_The Koiari Raid_
+
+
+As a kind of final security measure, IMAC was concerned about a last
+ridge of hills, some 2,000 yards to the front, and really still
+dominating too much of the perimeter. Accordingly, on 28 November,
+General Geiger ordered an advance to reach Inland Defense Line Fox.
+As a preliminary, to protect this general advance from a surprise
+Japanese attack on the far right flank, a raid was planned to detect
+any enemy troop movements, destroy their supplies, and disrupt their
+communications at a place called Koiari, 10 miles down the coast from
+Cape Torokina. The 1st Parachute Battalion, just in from Vella Levella
+under Major Richard Fagan, drew the assignment, with a company of the
+3d Raider Battalion attached. While it had never made a jump in combat,
+the parachute battalion had been seasoned in the Guadalcanal campaign.
+
+Carried by a U.S. Navy landing craft, the men in the raid were put
+ashore at 0400, 29 November, almost in the middle of a Japanese supply
+dump. Total surprise all around! The Marines hastily dug in, while the
+enemy responded quickly with a “furious hail” of mortar fire, meanwhile
+lashing the beachhead with machine gun and rifle fire. Then came the
+Japanese attacks, and Marine casualties mounted “alarmingly.” They
+would have been worse except for a protective curtain of fire from the
+155mm guns of the 3d Defense Battalion back at Cape Torokina. With an
+estimated 1,200 enemy pressing in on the Marines, it was painfully
+clear that the raiding group faced disaster. Two attempts to extricate
+them by their landing craft were halted by heavy Japanese artillery
+fire. Now the Marines had their backs to the sea and were almost out
+of ammunition. Then, about 1800, three U.S. destroyers raced in close
+to the beach, firing all guns. They had come in response to a frantic
+radio signal from IMAC, where the group’s perilous situation was well
+understood. Now a wall of shell fire from the destroyers and the 155s
+allowed two rescue craft to dash for the beach and lift off the raiding
+group safely. With none of the original objectives achieved, the
+raid had been a costly failure, even though it had left at least 145
+Japanese dead.
+
+
+
+
+_Hellzapoppin Ridge_
+
+
+Now the action shifted to the final targets of the 3d Marine Division:
+that mass of hills 2,000 yards away. Once captured, they would block
+the East-West Trail where it crossed the Torokina River, and they would
+greatly strengthen the Final Inland Defense Line that was the Marines’
+ultimate objective. A supply base, called Evansville, was built up for
+the attack in the rear of Hill 600 for the forthcoming attacks.
+
+The 1st Marine Parachute Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Robert H.
+Williams, was informed, two days after its arrival on Bougainville,
+that General Turnage had assigned it to occupy those hills which IMAC
+felt still dominated much of the Marine ground. That ridgeline included
+Hill 1000 with its spur soon to be called Hellzapoppin Ridge (named
+after “Hellzapoppin,” a long-running Broadway show), Hill 600, and Hill
+600A. To take the terrain Williams got the support of elements of the
+3d, 9th, and 21st Marines (which had established on 27 November its
+own independent outpost on Hill 600). By 5 December, the 1st Parachute
+Regiment had won a general outpost line that stretched from Hill 1000
+to the junction of the East-West Trail and the Torokina River.
+
+Then on 7 December, Major Robert T. Vance on Hill 1000 with his 3d
+Parachute Battalion walked the ridge spine to locate enemy positions on
+the adjacent spur that had been abandoned. The spur was fortified by
+nature: matted jungle for concealment, gullies to impair passage, steep
+slopes to discourage everything. That particular hump, which would get
+the apt name of Hellzapoppin Ridge, was some 280 feet high, 40 feet
+across at the top, and 650 feet long, an ideal position for overall
+defense.
+
+Jumping off from Hill 1000 on the morning of 9 December to occupy the
+spur, Vance’s men were hit by a fusillade of fire. The Japanese had
+come back, 235 of them of the _23d Infantry_. The parachutists attacked
+again and again, without success. Artillery fire was called in, but the
+Japanese found protective concealment on the reverse slopes. Marine
+shells burst high in the banyan trees, up and away from the dug-in
+enemy. As a result, the parachutists were hit hard. “Ill-equipped and
+under-strength,” they were pulled back on 10 December to Hill 1000. Two
+battalions of the 21st Marines, with a battalion of the 9th Marines
+guarding their left flank, continued the attack. It would go on for six
+gruelling days.
+
+Scrambling up the slopes, the new attacking Marines would pass the
+bodies of the parachutists. John W. Yager, a first lieutenant in the
+21st recalled, “The para-Marines made the first contact and had left
+their dead there. After a few days, they had become very unpleasant
+reminders of what faced us as we crawled forward, in many instances
+right next to them.”
+
+Sergeant John F. Pelletier, also in the 21st, was a lead scout. Trying
+to cross the ridge spine over to the Hellzapoppin spur, he found dead
+paratroopers all over the hill. There were dead Japanese soldiers still
+hanging from trees, and it seemed to him that no Marine had been able
+to cross to the crest and live to tell about it.
+
+[Illustration: HELLZAPOPPIN RIDGE
+
+NEARING THE END
+
+6-18 DECEMBER]
+
+Pelletier described what happened next:
+
+  The next morning Sergeant Oliver [my squad leader] told me to
+  advance down the ridge as we were going to secure the point. That
+  point was to become our most costly battle. We moved down the
+  center until we were within 20 feet of the point. The Japs hit us
+  with machine gun, rifle, and mortar fire. They popped out of spider
+  holes. We were in a horseshoe-shaped ambush. We were firing as fast
+  as we could when Sergeant Oliver pulled me back. He gave me the
+  order to pull back up the ridge. He didn’t make it.
+
+When artillery fire proved ineffective in battering the Japanese so
+deeply dug in on Hellzapoppin Ridge, Geiger called on 13 December for
+air attacks. Six Marine planes had just landed at the newly completed
+Torokina airstrip. They came in with 100-pound bombs, guided to their
+targets by smoke shells beyond the Marine lines. But the Japanese were
+close, very close. Dozens of the bombs were dropped 75 yards from the
+Marines. With additional planes, there were four bombing and strafing
+strikes over several days. A Marine on the ground never forgot the
+bombers roaring in right over the brush, the ridge, and the heads of
+the Marines to drop their load, “It seemed right on top of us.” (This
+delivery technique was necessary to put the bombs on the reverse slope
+among the Japanese.)
+
+[Illustration: EXPANSION OF THE BEACHHEAD
+
+I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
+
+1 NOVEMBER-15 DECEMBER 1943]
+
+Helping to control these early strikes and achieve pinpoint accuracy
+was Lieutenant Colonel William K. Pottinger, G-3 (Operations Officer)
+of the Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. He had taken a radio
+out of a grounded plane, moved to the frontlines, and helped control
+the attacking Marine planes on the spot. (This technique was an
+improvised forerunner of the finely tuned procedures that Marine dive
+bombers would use later to achieve remarkable results in close air
+support of ground troops.)
+
+The 3d Marine Division’s history was pithy in its evaluation, “It was
+the air attacks which proved to be the most effective factor in the
+taking of the ridge ... the most successful examples of close air
+support thus far in the Pacific War.”
+
+Geiger wasn’t through. He had a battery of the Army’s 155mm howitzers
+moved by landing craft to new firing positions near the mouth of the
+Torokina River. Now the artillery could pour it on the enemy positions
+on the reverse slopes.
+
+In one of the daily Marine assaults, one company went up the ridge for
+two attacks against Japanese who would jump into holes they had dug
+on the reverse slope to escape bombardment. The Japanese finally were
+tricked when another company, relieving the first one, jumped into
+the enemy foxholes before their rightful owners. It cost the Japanese
+heavily to try to return.
+
+In a final assault on 18 December, the two battalions of the 21st moved
+from Hill 1000 to the spur in a pincer and double envelopment. But
+the artillery and bombs had done their work. The Japanese and their
+fortress were shattered. Stunned defenders were easily eliminated.
+
+Patrick O’Sheel, a Marine combat correspondent, summed up the bitter
+battle, “No one knows how many Japs were killed. Some 30 bodies were
+found. Another dozen might have been put together from arms, legs, and
+torsos.” The 21st suffered 12 killed and 23 wounded.
+
+With Hellzapoppin finally behind them, Marines could count what
+blessings they could find and recount how rotten their holidays were.
+There had been a Thanksgiving Day spent on the trail while gnawing a
+drumstick on the way to another engagement at Piva Forks. And now, on
+21 December, four days until Christmas, and the troops still had Hill
+600A to “square away.”
+
+[Illustration: ATTACK ON HILL 600A
+
+22-23 DEC 1943]
+
+[Illustration: ADVANCE TO THE EAST
+
+NOV-DEC 1943]
+
+[Illustration: _Chaplain Joseph A. Rabun of the 9th Marines delivers
+his sermon with a “Merry Christmas” sign overhead and a sand-bagged
+dugout close at hand._
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 74819
+]
+
+Reconnaissance found 14-18 Japanese on that hill, down by the Torokina
+River. A combat patrol from the 21st Marines moved to drive the
+Japanese off the knob. It wasn’t hard, but it cost the life of one
+Marine and one was wounded. But IMAC wanted a permanent outpost on the
+hill, and the 3d Battalion, 21st, drew the assignment. It began with
+one rifle platoon and a platoon of heavy machine guns on 22 December.
+Hill 600A was a repeat of past enemy tactics. The Japanese had come
+back to occupy it. They held against all efforts, even against a
+two-pronged attack. A full company came up and made three assaults.
+That didn’t help either. Late on the 23d, the Marines held for the
+night, preparing to mount another attack in the morning. That morning
+was Christmas Eve, 1943. Scouts went up to look. The Japanese had gone.
+Christmas wasn’t merry, but it was better. For the 3d Marine Division,
+the war was over on Bougainville.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-G-250368
+
+_The Piva airfields (shown here in February 1944 photograph) became key
+bomber and fighter strips in the aerial offensive against Rabaul._]
+
+The landing force had seized the beachhead, destroyed or overcome the
+enemy, and won the ground for the vital airfields. Now they prepared
+to leave, as the airfields were being readied to reduce Rabaul and its
+environs.
+
+Since 10 December, F4U Vought Corsairs of Marine Fighting Squadron
+(VMF) 216 (1st Marine Aircraft Wing) had settled on the new strip on
+Torokina, almost washed by the sea. The fighter planes would be the key
+to the successful prosecution of the AirSols (Air Solomons) offensive
+against Rabaul, for, as escorts, they made large-scale bombing raids
+feasible. Major General Ralph J. Mitchell, USMC, had become head of
+AirSols on 20 November 1943. By 9 January 1944, both the fighter
+and bomber aircraft were operating from the Piva strips. Following
+Bougainville, Mitchell would have twice the airpower and facilities
+that the Japanese had in all of the Southwest Pacific area.
+
+The campaign had cost the Marines 423 killed and 1,418 wounded. Enemy
+dead were estimated at 2,458, with only 23 prisoners captured.
+
+It was now time for the 3d Marine Division to go home to Guadalcanal,
+with a “well done” from Halsey. (In the Admiral’s colorful language,
+a message to Geiger said, “You have literally succeeded in setting up
+and opening for business a shop in the Japs’ front yard.”) Now there
+would be plenty of papayas and Lister bags, as well as a PX, a post
+office, and some sports and movies. General Turnage was relieved on
+28 December by Major General John R. Hodge of the Americal Division,
+which took over the eastern sector. The 37th Infantry Division kept its
+responsibility for the western section of the Bougainville perimeter.
+Admiral Halsey directed the Commanding General, XIV Corps, Major
+General Oscar W. Griswold, to relieve General Geiger, Commanding
+General, IMAC. The Army assumed control of the beachhead as of 15
+December. The 3d Marines left Bougainville on Christmas Day. The 9th
+left on 28 December, and had a party with two cans of beer per man.
+The 21st, last to arrive on the island, was the division’s last rifle
+regiment to leave, on 9 January 1944.
+
+Every man in those regiments knew full well the crucial role that
+the supporting battalions had played. The 19th Marines’ pioneers and
+engineers had labored ceaselessly to build the bridges and trails
+that brought the vital water, food, and ammunition to the front
+lines through seemingly impassable swamps, jungle, and water, water
+everywhere.
+
+[Illustration: _A chaplain reads prayers for the burial of the dead,
+while their friends bow their heads in sorrow at the losses._
+
+    From the Leach File, MCHC Archives
+]
+
+And the amtracs of the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion had proven
+essential in getting 22,922 tons of those supplies to the riflemen.
+They were “the most important link in the all-important supply chain.”
+
+Working behind the amtracs were the unsung men of the 3d Service
+Battalion who, under the division quartermaster, Colonel William C.
+Hall, brought order and efficiency from the original, chaotic pile-up
+of supplies on the beach. As roads were slowly built, the 6×6 trucks of
+the 3d Motor Transport Battalion moved the supplies to advance dumps
+for the amtracs to pick up.
+
+The 12th Marines and Army artillery had given barrage after barrage of
+preparatory fire--72,643 rounds in all.
+
+The invaluable role of Marine aviation, as previously mentioned,
+was symbolized by General Turnage’s repeated requests for close air
+support, 10 strikes in all.
+
+The Seabees, working at a “feverish rate,” had miraculously carved
+three airfields out of the unbelievable morass that characterized
+the area. And it was from those bases that the long-range, strategic
+effects of Bougainville would be felt by the enemy.
+
+The 3d Medical Battalion had taken care of the wounded. With
+omnipresent corpsmen on the front lines in every battle and aid
+stations and field hospitals right behind, the riflemen knew they had
+been well tended.
+
+General Turnage summarized the campaign well, “Seldom have troops
+experienced a more difficult combination of combat, supply, and
+evacuation. From its very inception, it was a bold and hazardous
+operation. Its success was due to the planning of all echelons and the
+indomitable will, courage, and devotion to duty of all members of all
+organizations participating.”
+
+Thus it was that the capture of Bougainville marked the top of the
+ladder, after the long climb up the chain of the Solomon Islands.
+
+
+
+
+_Epilogue_
+
+
+There were, however, two minor land operations to complete the
+isolation of Rabaul. The first was at Green Island, just 37 miles north
+of Bougainville. It was a crusty, eight-mile-long (four-mile-wide) oval
+ring, three islands of sand and coral around a sleepy lagoon, and only
+117 miles from Rabaul. To General Douglas MacArthur, it was the last
+step of the Solomon Islands campaign.
+
+The task of taking the island fell to the 5,800 men of the 3d New
+Zealand Division under Major General H. E. Barrowclough, less the 8th
+Brigade which had been used in the Treasuries operation. There was also
+a contingent of American soldiers, Seabees, and engineers, and cover
+from AirSol Marine planes under Brigadier General Field Harris. Rear
+Admiral Wilkinson had Task Force 31, whose warships would wait for
+targets (although Green Island would get no preinvasion bombardment).
+The atoll ring was too narrow and bombardment would pose a danger to
+island inhabitants.
+
+Late in January 1944, 300 men of the 30th New Zealand Battalion and
+Seabees and engineer specialists went ashore, measured and sized up the
+island’s potential, found spots for an airfield, checked lagoon depths,
+and sought accommodations for a boat basin.
+
+All of this warned the Japanese, but it was too late for them to do
+anything. Then, on 14 February, Japanese scout planes warned the 102
+defenders on Green Island that a large Allied convoy was on the way,
+shepherded by destroyers and cruisers. Japanese aircraft from Rabaul
+and Kavieng attacked the convoy by moonlight, but at 0641, the landing
+craft had crossed the line of departure unscathed and were almost to
+the beach. Within two hours, all were ashore, unopposed. Then Japanese
+dive bombers came roaring in, but the Allied antiaircraft fire and
+Marine fighter planes (VMF-212) were enough to prevent hits on the
+transports or beach supplies. New Zealand patrols got only slight
+resistance, a few brief firefights. By 19 February, the 33d, 37th, and
+93d Seabees were laying an airfield on the island.
+
+By 4 March, a heavy B-24 bomber was able to make an emergency landing
+on the Green Island strip. Three days later, AirSols planes were
+staging there giving the strip the name “Green.” Soon B-24s were there
+to strike the vast Japanese base at Truk.
+
+[Illustration: _Heavy, constant artillery support for the riflemen
+required a regular flow of ammunition. Here shells are being unloaded
+from a LST (Landing Ship, Tank)._
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 71180 by PFC Philip Scheer
+]
+
+The second operation saw the seizure of Emirau Island. It was well
+north of Green Island, 75 miles northwest of the New Ireland enemy
+fortress of Kavieng. Actually, Kavieng had been considered as a target
+to be invaded by the 3d Marine Division, but higher authorities
+decided the cost would be too high. Better to let Kavieng die on the
+vine. Taking Emirau and setting up air and naval bases there would
+effectively cut off the Solomon Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago
+from the Japanese. It would be a small investment with big results.
+
+Emirau is an irregularly shaped island in the St. Matthias Group, eight
+miles long, four miles wide, with much jungle and many hills, but with
+room for boat basins and airstrips. The natives said there had been no
+Japanese there since January, and air reconnaissance could find none.
+
+The unit selected for the landing bore a famous name in the lore of
+the Corps: the 4th Marines. The original regiment had been the storied
+“China Marines,” and had then been part of the desperate defense of
+Bataan and the subsequent surrender at Corregidor in the Philippines.
+Now it had been reborn as a new, independent regiment, composed of the
+tough and battle-hardened veterans of the raider battalions.
+
+The 4th Marines arrived at Emirau shortly after 0600 on 20 March
+1944. The Marines and sailors fired a few shots at nothing; then the
+amphibian tractors opened up, wounding one of the Marines. The Seabees
+got right to work on the airfields, even before the island was secured.
+In no time they laid out a 7,000-foot bomber strip and a 5,000-foot
+stretch for fighters.
+
+All was secured until attention fell on a little neighboring island
+with a Japanese fuel and ration dump. Destroyers blew it all to
+debris ... then spied at sea a large canoe escaping with some of the
+enemy. Hardly bloodthirsty after this placid operation, the destroyer
+casually pulled in close. The Japanese chose to fire a machine gun. It
+was folly. The destroyer was forced to respond. The canoe didn’t sink
+and was brought alongside with the body of a Japanese officer and 26
+living enlisted men--who may have privately questioned their officer’s
+judgement.
+
+
+
+
+_Bougainville Finale_
+
+
+These were small affairs compared to the finale on Bougainville. With
+the withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division at the end of 1943, after
+it had successfully fought its way to the final defensive line, the
+two Army divisions, the 37th Infantry and the Americal, took over and
+extended the perimeter with only sporadic brushes with the Japanese.
+
+Then, in late February and early March 1944, patrols began making
+“almost continuous” contact with the enemy. It appeared that the
+Japanese were concentrating for a serious counterattack. On 8 March,
+the 145th Infantry (of the 37th) was hit by artillery fire. Then the
+_6th Division_, parent of the old enemy, the _23d Infantry_, attacked
+hard. It took five days of “very severe” fighting, with support from
+a battalion of the 148th Infantry, combined with heavy artillery fire
+and air strikes, to drive the determined Japanese back. Meanwhile, the
+129th Infantry had also been “heavily attacked.” The enemy kept coming
+and coming, and it was a full nine days before there was a lull on 17
+March.
+
+On 24 March the Japanese, after reorganizing, launched another series
+of assaults “with even greater pressure.” This time they also threw
+in three regiments of their _17th Division_. The artillery of both
+American divisions, guided by Cub spotter planes, fired “the heaviest
+support mission ever to be put down in the South Pacific Area.” That
+broke the back of the enemy attackers, and the battle finally was over
+on 25 March.
+
+Major General Griswold, the corps commander, after eight major enemy
+attacks, wrote in a letter four days later:
+
+  I am absolutely convinced that nowhere on earth does there exist
+  a more determined will and offensive spirit in the attack than
+  that the Japs exhibited here. They come in hard, walking on their
+  own dead, usually on a front not to exceed 100 yards. They try
+  to effect a breakthrough which they exploit like water running
+  from a hose. When stopped, they dig in like termites and fight to
+  the death. They crawl up even the most insignificant fold in the
+  ground like ants. And they use all their weapons with spirit and
+  boldness.... Difficult terrain or physical difficulties have no
+  meaning for them.
+
+The Americal Division had advanced along with the 37th in the
+March-April period with its last action 13-14 April. This ended the
+serious offensive action for the two Army divisions; the enemy had been
+driven well out of artillery range of the airstrips, 12,000 yards away.
+
+For Americans this marked the end of the Bougainville saga: a tale of
+well-trained units, filled with, determined, skillful men, who fought
+their way to a resounding victory. The 3d Marine Division had led the
+way in securing a vital island base with the crucial isolation of
+Rabaul thus ensured.
+
+
+
+
+_Sources_
+
+
+The author owes a substantial debt to Cyril J. O’Brien who was a Marine
+Combat Correspondent on Bougainville. A draft he prepared describing
+this operation used U.S. Army, Coast Guard, and New Zealand as well as
+Marine Corps sources, and contained a variety of colorful vignettes and
+personal interviews, with some photographs not in official USMC files,
+all gratefully acknowledged.
+
+As always, the basic official Marine history of the Pacific campaigns
+covers Bougainville and the auxiliary landings in massive detail: Henry
+I. Shaw, Jr., and Maj Douglas T. Kane, USMC, _Isolation of Rabaul_,
+vol. 2, _History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II_
+(Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
+Corps, 1963).
+
+An earlier, more condensed official history is Maj John N. Rentz,
+USMCR, _Bougainville and the Northern Solomons_ (Washington: Historical
+Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
+Corps, 1948).
+
+The earliest, most modest official account is a mimeographed summary,
+characterized as a “first attempt”: U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters,
+Historical Division. Unpublished monograph: “The Bougainville
+Operation, First Marine Amphibious Corps, 1 November-28 December 1943,”
+dtd Feb45. VE603 1st.A2, Library, Marine Corps Historical Center,
+Washington, D.C.
+
+A quasi-official history of the 3d Marine Division was “made possible
+by the Commandant, who authorized the expenditure of the division’s
+unused Post Exchange funds.
+
+The final draft was approved by a group of 3d Division officers....”
+The book is: 1stLt Robert A. Aurthur, USMCR, and 1stLt Kenneth Cohlmia,
+USMCR, edited by LtCol Robert T. Vance, USMC, _The Third Marine
+Division_ (Washington: Infantry Journal Press. 1948).
+
+An account representing direct personal participation in the campaign,
+supplemented by later interviews, is: Capt John A. Monks, Jr., _A
+Ribbon and a Star: The Third Marines at Bougainville_ (New York: Holt
+and Co., 1945).
+
+Another history traces the campaign on the island past the Marine
+operation to the subsequent U.S. Army battles, and concludes with
+the Australians as the final troops leading to the overall Japanese
+surrender in 1945: Harry A. Gailey, _Bougainville 1943-1945--The
+Forgotten Campaign_ (Lexington, Ky: University Press of Kentucky, 1991).
+
+The full story of the crucial naval battle as the Marines landed is
+in RAdm Samuel Eliot Morison, _Breaking the Bismarck Barrier, 22 July
+1942-1 May 1944_, vol. 6, _History of United States Naval Operations in
+World War II_ (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1950).
+
+A detailed account of the death of Adm Yamamoto is in R. Cargil Hall,
+ed., _Lightning Over Bougainville_ (Washington: Smithsonian Institution
+Press, 1991).
+
+Personal Papers and Oral Histories files at the Marine Corps Historical
+Center were unproductive, but the biographical and photographic files
+were most helpful. The staff of the Marine Corps Historical Center was
+always cooperative, in particular Catherine Kerns, who prepared my
+manuscript copy.
+
+
+
+
+_About the Author_
+
+
+[Illustration]
+
+Captain John C. Chapin earned a bachelor of arts degree with honors in
+history from Yale University in 1942 and was commissioned later that
+year. He served as a rifle platoon leader in the 24th Marines, 4th
+Marine Division, and was wounded in action during assault landings on
+Roi-Namur and Saipan.
+
+Transferred to duty at the Historical Division, Headquarters Marine
+Corps, he wrote the first official histories of the 4th and 5th Marine
+Divisions. Moving to Reserve status at the end of World War II, he
+earned a master’s degree in history at George Washington University
+with a thesis on “The Marine Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1922.”
+
+Now a captain in retired status, he has been a volunteer at the Marine
+Corps Historical Center for 12 years. During that time he wrote
+_History of Marine Fighter-Attack (VMFA) Squadron 115_. With support
+from the Historical Center and the Marine Corps Historical Foundation,
+he then spent some years researching and interviewing for the writing
+of a new book, _Uncommon Men: The Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps_,
+published in 1992 by the White Mane Publishing Company.
+
+Subsequently, he wrote four monographs for this series of historical
+pamphlets, commemorating the campaigns for the Marshalls, Saipan,
+Bougainville, and Marine Aviation in the Philippines operations.
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration]
+
+
+THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in
+the World War II era, is published for the education and training of
+Marines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
+Corps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense
+observance of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.
+
+Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part
+by a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in the memory of her
+late husband, Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the
+recipient of a Purple Heart.
+
+
+=WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES=
+
+    _DIRECTOR EMERITUS OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS_
+
+    =Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)=
+
+    _GENERAL EDITOR,
+    WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES_
+
+    =Benis M. Frank=
+
+    _CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT_
+
+    =George C. MacGillivray=
+
+    _EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION_
+
+    =Robert E. Strudet=, _Senior Editor_;
+    =W. Stephen Hill=, _Visual Information Specialist_;
+    =Catherine A. Kerns=, _Composition Services Technician_.
+
+    Marine Corps Historical Center
+    Building 58, Washington Navy Yard
+    Washington, D.C. 20374-5040
+
+    1997
+
+    PCN 19000314100
+
+
+[Illustration: (back cover)]
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber’s Notes
+
+
+Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
+predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
+changed.
+
+Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.
+
+Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
+
+To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,
+some images have been made relatively larger than in the original
+pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other.
+Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between the chapters
+of the main text, marked as [Sidebar (page nn):], and treated as
+separate chapters.
+
+Descriptions of the Cover and Frontispiece have been moved from page 1
+of the book to just below those illustrations, and text referring to
+the locations of those illustrations has been deleted.
+
+Page 5: “had now become” was misprinted as “became”.
+
+Page 10: “rendezvoused” was misprinted as “rendezoused”.
+
+Page 22: “troops were now be entering” was printed that way.
+
+Page 22: “slogging through endless mud” was misprinted as “though”.
+
+Page 23: “men slept setting up” was printed that way.
+
+Page 27: “650 feet long, an ideal position” was misprinted as
+“and ideal”.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations
+in the Northern Solomons, by John C. Chapin
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48808 ***
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-<pre>
-
-The Project Gutenberg EBook of Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations in the
-Northern Solomons, by John C. Chapin
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations in the Northern Solomons
-
-Author: John C. Chapin
-
-Release Date: April 27, 2015 [EBook #48808]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TOP OF THE LADDER ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online
-Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
-file was produced from images generously made available
-by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
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-</pre>
-
-<div class="transnote">
-<p class="center">Transcriber's note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber
-and placed into the Public Domain.</p>
-</div>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak">Contents</h2>
-
-<div class="center vspace"><div class="center-block">
-<ul>
-<li><a href="#Top_of_the_Ladder">Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations in the Northern Solomons</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_Major_General_Allen_H_Turnage_USMC">SIDEBAR: Major General Allen H. Turnage, USMC</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Planning_the_Operation">Planning the Operation</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_3d_Marine_Division">SIDEBAR: 3d Marine Division</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Diversionary_Landings">Diversionary Landings</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_The_Coastwatchers">SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Battle_at_Sea">Battle at Sea</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Action_Ashore_Koromokina">Action Ashore: Koromokina</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_37th_Infantry_Division">SIDEBAR: 37th Infantry Division</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#The_Battle_for_Piva_Trail">The Battle for Piva Trail</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_War_Dogs">SIDEBAR: War Dogs</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#The_Coconut_Grove_Battle">The Coconut Grove Battle</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_Navajo_Code_Talkers">SIDEBAR: Navajo Code Talkers</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_Corpsman">SIDEBAR: ‘Corpsman!’</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Piva_Forks_Battle">Piva Forks Battle</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Hand_Grenade_Hill">Hand Grenade Hill</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#The_Koiari_Raid">The Koiari Raid</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Hellzapoppin_Ridge">Hellzapoppin Ridge</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Epilogue">Epilogue</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Bougainville_Finale">Bougainville Finale</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Sources">Sources</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#About_the_Author">About the Author</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#About_series">About this series of pamphlets</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</a></li>
-</ul>
-</div></div>
-
-
-<h1 style="text-align: left; clear: none;">
-<span class="smcap">Top of the Ladder</span>:<br />
-
-<span class="subhead smcap">Marine Operations in the<br />
-Northern Solomons</span></h1>
-
-<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">Marines in<br />
-World War II<br />
-Commemorative Series</span></p>
-
-<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">By Captain John C. Chapin<br />
-U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Ret)</span>
-</p>
-
-<div class="p2 figcenter" style="width: 374px;">
-<img src="images/i_a_000.jpg" width="374" height="500" alt="" />
-<div class="captionl"><p class="justify"><i>Riflemen clad in camouflage
-dungarees await the lowering of
-their landing craft from</i> George Clymer
-<i>(APA 27) for their dash to the beaches in
-their amphibious assault landing on
-Bougainville</i>. (National Archives
-Photo 80-G-55810)</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 444px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_000.jpg" width="444" height="600" alt="" />
-<div class="captionl"><p><i>Raiders, up to their hips in
-water, man a machine gun along a jungle
-trail</i>. Department of Defense Photo
-(USMC) 70764</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">1</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 style="text-align: left; margin-bottom: 0;"><a name="Top_of_the_Ladder" id="Top_of_the_Ladder"></a>Top of the Ladder:<br />
-Marine Operations in the<br />
-Northern Solomons</h2>
-
-<p class="p0 in0" style="margin-bottom: 2em;"><i>by Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)</i></p>
-
-<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">A</span>ssault</span> landings began
-for the men in the
-blackness of the early
-hours of the morning.
-On 1 November 1943,
-the troops of the 3d Marine
-Division were awakened before
-0400, went to General Quarters at
-0500, ate a tense breakfast, and
-then stood by for the decisive command,
-“Land the Landing Force.”
-All around them the preinvasion
-bombardment thundered, as the
-accompanying destroyers poured
-their 5-inch shells into the target
-areas, and spotters in aircraft
-helped to adjust the fire.</p>
-
-<p>As the sun rose on a bright,
-clear day, the word came at 0710
-for the first LCVPs (Landing
-Craft, Vehicle and Personnel) to
-pull away from their transport
-ships and head for the shore, a
-5,000-yard run across Empress
-Augusta Bay to the beaches of an
-island called Bougainville.</p>
-
-<p>Almost 7,500 Marines were
-entering their LCVPs (with Coast
-Guard crew and coxswains) for an
-assault on 12 color-coded beaches.
-Eleven of these extended west
-from Cape Torokina for 8,000
-yards to the Koromokina Lagoon.
-The 12th was on Puruata Island
-just offshore from the beaches.
-The six beaches on the right were
-assigned to Colonel George W.
-McHenry’s 3d Marines and
-Lieutenant Colonel Alan
-Shapley’s 2d Raider Regiment
-(less one battalion). The five on
-the left and Puruata Island were
-the objectives of Colonel Edward
-A. Craig’s 9th Marines and
-Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Bean’s
-3d Raider Battalion.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 459px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_001.jpg" width="459" height="600" alt="Bougainville" />
-</div>
-
-<p>As the men headed for shore, 31
-Marine torpedo and scout
-bombers, covered by fighters,
-came screaming in from their base
-at Munda, bombing and strafing
-to give the beaches a final plastering.
-At 0726, the first wave
-touched ground, four minutes
-ahead of the official H-Hour. As<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</a></span>
-the other waves came in, it was
-immediately apparent that there
-was serious trouble in two ways.
-A high surf was tossing the
-LCVPs and LCMs (Landing Craft,
-Medium) around, and they were
-landing on the wrong beaches,
-broaching, and smashing into
-each other in the big waves. By
-the middle of the morning, 64
-LCVPs and 22 LCMs were hulks
-littering the beaches. Three of the
-designated beaches had to be
-abandoned as unusable.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_002.jpg" width="600" height="477" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 62751
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>Marine riflemen keep their heads down as they get closer to the assault beach on D-Day.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Major Donald M. Schmuck,
-commanding a company in the 3d
-Marines, later recalled how, in the
-“mad confusion” of the beachhead,
-his company was landed in
-the midst of heavy gunfire in the
-middle of another battalion’s zone
-on the beach of Torokina. Running
-his company on the double
-through the other battalion and
-the 2d Raiders’ zone across inlets
-and swamp, Major Schmuck got
-his men to the right flank of his
-own battalion where they were to
-have landed originally. His surprised
-battalion commander,
-Lieutenant Colonel Hector de
-Zayas, stared at the bedraggled
-new arrivals exclaiming, “Where
-have you been?” Major Schmuck
-pointed back to Cape Torokina
-and replied, “Ask the Navy!”</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_002b.jpg" width="600" height="403" alt="" />
-<div class="captionl"><p><i>As seen from a beached landing craft, these Marines are under fire while wading in the
-last few yards to the beach.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>The other trouble came from
-the Japanese defenders. While the
-9th Marines on the left landed
-unopposed, the 3d Marines on the
-right met fierce opposition, a
-deadly crossfire of machine gun
-and artillery fire. One Japanese
-75mm gun, sited on Cape
-Torokina, was sending heavy
-enfilade fire against the incoming
-landing waves. It smashed 14
-boats and caused many casualties.
-The boat group commander’s
-craft took a direct hit, causing the
-following boat waves to become
-disorganized and confused.
-Machine gun and rifle fire, with
-90mm mortar bursts added, covered
-the shoreline. Companies
-landed in the wrong places.
-Dense underbrush, coming right
-down to the beaches, shrouded
-the defenders in their 25 bunkers
-and numerous rifle pits. The commanding
-officer of the 1st
-Battalion, 3d Marines, Major
-Leonard M. “Spike” Mason, was
-wounded and had to be evacuated,
-but not before he shouted to
-his men, “Get the hell in there and
-fight!” Nearby, the executive officer
-of the 2d Raider Regiment,
-Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J.
-McCaffery, was directing an
-assault when he was severely
-wounded. He died that night.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="figleft portrait">
-<img src="images/i_b_003.jpg" width="233" height="349" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>Sgt Robert A. Owens was posthumously
-awarded the Medal of Honor.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>In spite of the chaos, the intensive
-training of the Marines took
-hold. Individuals and small
-groups moved in to assault the
-enemy, reducing bunker after
-bunker, dropping grenades down
-their ventilators. For an hour, the
-situation was in doubt.</p>
-
-<p>The fierce combat led to a wry
-comment by one captain, Henry
-Applington II, comparing “steak
-and eggs served on white tablecloths
-by stewards ... and three
-and a half hours and a short boat
-ride later ... rolling in a ditch trying
-to kill another human being
-with a knife.”</p>
-
-<p>The devastating fire from the
-75mm cannon on Cape Torokina
-was finally silenced when
-Sergeant Robert A. Owens, crept
-up to its bunker, and although
-wounded, charged in and killed
-the gun crew and the occupants of
-the bunker before he himself was
-killed. A posthumous Medal of
-Honor was awarded to him for
-this heroic action which was so
-crucial to the landing.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, on Puruata Island,
-just offshore of the landing beaches,
-the noise was intense; a well-dug-in
-contingent of Japanese
-offered stiff resistance to a reinforced
-company of the 3d
-Battalion, 2d Raiders. It was
-midafternoon of D plus one before
-the defenders in pill boxes, rifle
-pits, and trees were subdued, and
-then some of them got away to
-fight another day. A two-pronged
-sweep and mop-up by the raiders
-on D plus 2 found 29 enemy dead
-of the 70 Japanese estimated to
-have been on that little island.
-The raiders lost five killed and 32
-wounded.</p>
-
-<p>An hour after the landings on
-the main beaches a traditional
-Marine signal was flashed from
-shore to the command and staff
-still afloat, “Situation well in
-hand.” This achievement of the
-riflemen came in spite of the ineffective
-prelanding fire of the
-destroyers. The men in front-line
-combat found that none of the 25
-enemy bunkers on the right-hand
-beaches had been hit. Some of the
-naval bombardment had begun at
-a range of over seven miles, and
-the official Marine history summarized,
-“The gunfire plan ...
-had accomplished nothing.”</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<div class="caption notbold"><p><i>On a beach, rifles pointing toward the enemy, Marines get ready to fight their way inland.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 69782<br />
-</p></div>
-<img src="images/i_b_003b.jpg" width="600" height="319" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>Unloading supplies and getting
-them in usable order on the chaotic
-beaches was a major problem.
-Seabees, sailors, and Marines all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span>
-turned to the task, with 40 percent
-of the entire landing force laboring
-as the shore party. They sweated
-6,500 tons of supplies ashore.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_004.jpg" width="600" height="478" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>THE LANDING AT CAPE TOROKINA</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS<br />
-1 NOVEMBER 1943</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">Yellow beaches for cargo unloading during assault phase</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Simultaneously, the batteries of
-the 12th Marines were struggling
-to get their artillery pieces ashore
-and set to fire. One battery, in support
-of the 2d Raider Battalion,
-waded through a lagoon to find
-firing positions. Amtracs (amphibian
-tractors), supplemented by
-rubber boats, were used to ferry
-the men and ammunition to the
-beaches. The 90mm antiaircraft
-guns of the 3d Defense Battalion
-were also brought ashore early to
-defend against the anticipated air
-attacks.</p>
-
-<p>The Japanese had been quick to
-respond to this concentration of
-American ships. Before the first
-assault boats had hit the beach, a
-large flight of enemy carrier
-planes was on its way to attack the
-Marines and their supporting
-ships. New Zealand and Marine
-fighters met them in the air and
-the covering destroyers put up a
-hail of antiaircraft fire, while the
-transports and cargo ships took
-evasive action. Successive Japanese
-flights were beaten off; 26
-enemy planes were shot down.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 890px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_004b.jpg" width="890" height="603" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>THE SOLOMON ISLANDS</p>
-
-<p>1943</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figleft portrait">
-<img src="images/i_b_006.jpg" width="234" height="360" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 61899
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift was an
-early commander of IMAC.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>The men in the rifle battalions
-long remembered the sight. On<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span>
-one occasion, a Marine Corsair
-was about to pull the trigger on an
-enemy Zeke (“Zero”) fighter set
-up perfectly in the pilot’s sights
-when a burst of fire from Marine
-.50-caliber machine guns on the
-beach, meant for the Zeke, shot
-the American down. One of the
-riflemen later recalled that the
-Marine pilot fell into the ocean
-and surfaced with a broken leg.
-“We waded out to get him. He
-was ticked off&mdash;mostly because he
-missed the Jap.”</p>
-
-<p>In spite of all these problems, the
-assault battalions had, by the end
-of D-Day, reached their objectives
-on the Initial Beachhead Line, 600&ndash;1,000
-yards inland. One enormous
-unexpected obstacle, however,
-had now become painfully
-clear. Available maps were nearly
-useless, and a large, almost
-impenetrable swamp, with water
-three to six feet deep, lay right
-behind the beaches and made
-movement inland and lateral contact
-among the Marine units
-impossible.</p>
-
-<p>The night of D-Day was typical
-for the ground troops. By 1800,
-darkness had set in and the men
-all knew the iron-clad rule: be in
-your foxhole and stay there.
-Anyone moving around out there
-was a Japanese soldier trying to
-infiltrate. John A. Monks, Jr.,
-quoted a Marine in his book, A
-Ribbon and a Star:</p>
-
-<blockquote>
-
-<p>From seven o’clock in the
-evening till dawn, with only
-centipedes and lizards and
-scorpions and mosquitoes
-begging to get acquainted&mdash;wet,
-cold, exhausted, but
-unable to sleep&mdash;you lay
-there and shivered and
-thought and hated and
-prayed. But you stayed there.
-You didn’t cough, you didn’t
-snore, you changed your<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span>
-position with the least
-amount of noise. For it was
-still great to be alive.</p></blockquote>
-
-<p>At sea, the transports and cargo
-ships were withdrawn; there was
-intelligence that enemy naval
-forces were on the move.</p>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_Major_General_Allen_H_Turnage_USMC" id="SIDEBAR_Major_General_Allen_H_Turnage_USMC"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_5">page 5</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">Major General Allen H. Turnage, USMC</h3>
-
-<div class="figright iwidth">
-<img src="images/i_b_005.jpg" width="344" height="451" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">A</span>llen</span> Hal Turnage was born in Farmville, North
-Carolina, on 3 January 1891. After attending
-Horner Military Academy and then the
-University of North Carolina, at age 22 he was appointed
-a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps. Sent to
-Haiti, he served with the 2d Marine Regiment from
-1915 to 1918, becoming a company commander in the
-Haitian Gendarmerie.</p>
-
-<p>A captain in 1917, Turnage did get to France where
-he commanded the 5th Marine Brigade Machine Gun
-Battalion. Home in 1919, he was assigned to the 5th
-Marines at Quantico and became regimental adjutant
-and an instructor for the first Field Officers School,
-1920&ndash;22.</p>
-
-<p>A major in 1927, Turnage had three years with the
-Pacific fleet, and then he served with the U.S. Electoral
-Mission in Nicaragua (1932). He came back to
-Washington, made lieutenant colonel in 1934 and full
-colonel in 1939. He was director of the Basic School at
-the Philadelphia Navy Yard, and, in the spring of 1939,
-he was sent to China to head Marine forces in North
-China.</p>
-
-<p>In summer of 1941, on the eve of the Japanese attack
-on Pearl Harbor, he returned to Headquarters in
-Washington. In 1942, as a brigadier general, he commanded
-the burgeoning Marine Base and Training
-Center at New River, North Carolina.</p>
-
-<p>When the 3d Marine Division was formed in
-September 1942, he was named assistant division commander.
-In the summer of 1943 Turnage was promoted
-to major general and selected to head the division. He
-then led the division on Bougainville and in the liberation
-of Guam, the first American territory to be recaptured
-from the enemy.</p>
-
-<p>After the war, he was appointed Assistant
-Commandant, followed by promotion to lieutenant
-general and command of FMFPac (Fleet Marine Force,
-Pacific). He retired 1 January 1948, and died 22 October
-1971.</p>
-
-<p>His awards included the Navy Cross, the Navy
-Distinguished Service Medal, and the Presidential Unit
-Citation (which his men received for both Guam and
-Iwo Jima).</p>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="Planning_the_Operation" id="Planning_the_Operation"></a><i>Planning the Operation</i></h2>
-
-<div class="figright portrait">
-<img src="images/i_b_006b.jpg" width="234" height="299" alt="" />
-
-<div class="captionr">
-<p>
-Photo courtesy of Cyril J. O’Brien
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>LtGen Haruyoshi Hyakutake, commanded
-the Japanese forces on
-Bougainville.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>This kind of strong enemy reaction,
-in the air and at sea, had been
-expected by American staff officers
-who had put in long weeks
-planning the Bougainville operation.
-Looking at a map of the
-Solomon Islands chain, it was
-obvious that this largest island
-(130 by 30 miles) on the northwest
-end was a prime objective to cap
-the long and painful progress
-northward from the springboard
-of Guadalcanal at the south end.
-As Guadalcanal had been the
-beginning of the island chain, so
-now Bougainville would mark the
-top of the ladder in the Northern
-Solomons. From Bougainville airfields,
-American planes could
-neutralize the crucial Japanese
-base of Rabaul less than 250 miles
-away on New Britain. From
-Bougainville, the enemy could
-defend his massive air-naval complex
-at Rabaul. “Viewed from
-either camp, the island was a priority
-possession.”</p>
-
-<p>There were the usual sequences
-of high level planning conferences,
-but, on 1 October 1943,
-Admiral William F. Halsey,
-Commander, South Pacific Area,
-notified General Douglas MacArthur,
-Supreme Allied
-Commander, Southwest Pacific
-Area, that the beaches on Empress
-Augusta Bay in the middle of
-Bougainville’s west coast would
-be the main objective. This location
-was selected as the point to
-strike because with the main
-Japanese forces 25 miles away at
-the opposite north and south ends
-of the island, it would be the point
-of least opposition. In addition, it
-provided a natural defensive
-region once the Marines had landed
-and their airfields had been
-gouged out of the swamp and jungle.
-Finally, the target area would
-provide a site for a long-range
-radar installation and an
-advanced naval base for PT
-(patrol torpedo) boats.</p>
-
-<p>It promised to be a campaign in
-a miserable location. And it was.
-There were centipedes three fingers
-wide, butterflies as big as little
-birds, thick and nearly impenetrable
-jungles, bottomless mangrove
-swamps, crocodile infested
-rivers, millions of insects, and
-heavy daily torrents of rain with
-enervating humidity.</p>
-
-<p>Major General Allen H.
-Turnage, the 3d Marine Division
-commander, summarized these
-horrors. “Never had men in the
-Marine Corps had to fight and
-maintain themselves over such
-difficult terrain as was encountered
-on Bougainville.”</p>
-
-<p>To carry out this operation,
-Lieutenant General Alexander A.
-Vandegrift, Commanding General,
-I Marine Amphibious Corps
-(IMAC),<a name="FNanchor_A" id="FNanchor_A" href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</a> had in his command for
-the operation:</p>
-
-<blockquote>
-
-<p>3d Marine Division</p>
-
-<p>1st Marine Parachute Regiment</p>
-
-<p>2d Marine Raider Regiment</p>
-
-<p>37th Infantry Division, USA (in reserve)</p></blockquote>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p><a name="Footnote_A" id="Footnote_A" href="#FNanchor_A" class="fnanchor">A</a> Gen Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commander
-on Guadalcanal, relieved MajGen
-Clayton B. Vogel as IMAC commander in July
-1943. He in turn was relieved as IMAC commander
-by MajGen Charles D. Barrett on 27
-September. Gen Vandegrift was on his way
-home to Washington to become 18th
-Commandant of the Marine Corps when, on
-the sudden death of Gen Barrett on 8 October,
-he was recalled to the Pacific to resume command
-of IMAC and lead it in the Bougainville
-operation. He, in turn, was relieved by MajGen
-Roy S. Geiger on 9 November.</p></div>
-
-<p>The Marine riflemen in these
-units were supplemented by a
-wide range of support: 155mm
-artillery; motor transport; amphibian
-tractor; and signal, medical,
-special weapons, Seabee, and tank
-battalions. The 3d Division had its
-own engineers and pioneers in the
-19th Marines and artillery in the
-12th Marines.</p>
-
-<p>Immediately following Vandegrift’s
-operation order, practice
-landing exercises were conducted
-in the New Hebrides and on
-Guadalcanal and Florida Islands.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_007.jpg" width="600" height="510" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>TREASURY ISLANDS LANDINGS</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS<br />
-27 OCTOBER 1943</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="figright portrait">
-<div class="captionl"><p><i>LtCol Victor H. Krulak was commander
-of the Choiseul operation.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC)<br />
-</p></div>
-<img src="images/i_b_007b.jpg" width="234" height="302" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>The objectives assigned on
-Bougainville were to seize a substantial
-beachhead and build
-airstrips. Then American planes
-could assure final neutralization
-of the Japanese airfields at Kahili,
-Buka, and Bonis airfields at the
-north and south ends of
-Bougainville. (By 31 October,
-American planes had initially rendered
-the Japanese fields inoperable.)
-After that would come a massive
-increase in air operations
-against Rabaul.</p>
-
-<p>Facing the invading Marines
-was a formidable enemy force dispersed
-on the island. At Buin, for
-instance, there were 21,800
-Japanese. Responsible for the
-defense was an old adversary,
-Lieutenant General Haruyoshi
-Hyakutake, commander of the
-<i>Seventeenth Army</i>, and the man the
-Marines had defeated at
-Guadalcanal. His main force was
-the <i>6th Division</i>.</p>
-
-<p>Working with the ground U. S.
-forces were the aviators of Air
-Solomons: New Zealand fighters,
-Army Air Force bombers, and the
-1st and 2d Marine Aircraft Wings.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</a></span>
-As early as 15 August fighter
-planes from VMF-214 (the famous
-Black Sheep squadron) had
-strafed the Kahili airfield at the
-southern end of Bougainville.
-Now, in October, there were
-repeated strikes against the
-Japanese planes at other
-Bougainville airfields.</p>
-
-<p>At sea, Halsey had designated
-Rear Admiral Theodore S.
-Wilkinson as commander of Task
-Force 31. Under him were Rear
-Admiral Frederick C. Sherman
-with the carriers (TF 38) and Rear
-Admiral Aaron S. “Tip” Merrill
-with the cruisers and destroyers
-(TF 39). Their job was to soften up
-the defenders before the landing
-and to safeguard the Marine-held
-beachhead.</p>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar green">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_3d_Marine_Division" id="SIDEBAR_3d_Marine_Division"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_8">page 8</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">3d Marine Division</h3>
-
-<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">With</span> Japan’s initial conquests spread over vast
-reaches of the Pacific, it quickly became obvious
-that additional Marine divisions were
-sorely needed. Accordingly, a letter from the
-Commandant on 29 August 1942 authorized the formation
-of the 3d Marine Division.</p>
-
-<p>There was the 3d Marines, which had been activated
-first on 20 December 1916 at Santo Domingo in the
-Dominican Republic. Deactivated in August 1922, the
-regiment was again brought to life on 16 June 1942 at
-Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and strengthened by
-boots from Parris Island. Its commander, Colonel Oscar
-R. Cauldwell, soon led to it to Samoa, arriving there in
-September 1942. Intensive training in jungle tactics and
-practice landings took place there. Then, in March 1943,
-it received a substantial number of reinforcing units
-and became a full-fledged regimental combat team,
-beefing up its strength to 5,600. Finally, in May 1943, it
-sailed for New Zealand, where the 3d Marine Division
-would come together.</p>
-
-<p>Also with World War I roots, the 9th Marines was
-born 20 November 1917 at Quantico, Virginia, and was
-sent to Cuba. From there it moved to Texas, before
-being deactivated at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in
-April 1919. Reactivated on 12 February 1942 at Camp
-Elliott, California, under Colonel Lemuel C. Shepherd,
-Jr., it underwent training at the new Camp Pendleton.
-Similarly reinforced, by 1 January 1943 it was ready as
-a regimental combat team with 5,500 men. Movement
-overseas brought it to New Zealand on 5 February
-1943.</p>
-
-<p>The third infantry regiment that would make up the
-division was the 21st Marines. It was formed from a
-cadre of well-trained men from the 6th Marines, who
-had just returned from duty in Iceland. Arriving at
-Camp Lejeune on 15 July 1942, the cadre was augmented
-by boots from Parris Island and officers from
-Quantico. Colonel Daniel E. Campbell assumed command
-and the training began. Moving to join the other
-elements, the regiment arrived in New Zealand 11
-March 1943.</p>
-
-<p>The reinforcing of the infantry regiments to make
-them into self-sustaining regimental combat teams
-drew heavily on their two complementary regiments:
-the 12th Marines and the 19th Marines. The 12th
-Marines was a salty old unit, led by Brigadier General
-Smedley D. Butler in China in the 1920s. It’s antecedent
-was a small provisional contingent sent to protect
-American interests in China and designated the 12th
-Regiment (infantry), 4 October 1927. The 12th was reactivated
-at Camp Elliott on 1 September 1942 for World
-War II as an artillery regiment under command of
-Colonel John B. Wilson. Concluding its training, the
-regiment arrived in New Zealand on 11 March 1943.</p>
-
-<p>The 19th Marines was different. It was made up of
-Seabees, engineers, bakers, piledrivers, pioneers,
-paving specialists, and many old timers from the 25th
-Naval Construction Battalion at the U.S. Naval
-Advance Base, Port Hueneme, California. It, too, was
-formed at Camp Elliott and its birthday was 16
-September 1942. This was the regiment with pontoons
-for bridges, power plants, photographic darkrooms,
-bulldozers, excavators, needles, thread, and water
-purification machinery. No landing force would dare
-take an island without them. Colonel Robert M.
-Montague took command of the unit in New Zealand
-on 11 March 1943.</p>
-
-<p>The division’s first commander was Major General
-Charles D. Barrett, a veteran of World War I. He
-assumed command in September 1942, but left a year
-later to take charge of IMAC and the planning for the
-Bougainville operation.</p>
-
-<p>His assistant division commander had been
-Brigadier General Allen H. Turnage, and, upon
-Barrett’s death, he was promoted to major general and
-given command of the division which he would soon
-lead at Bougainville.</p>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="Diversionary_Landings" id="Diversionary_Landings"></a><i>Diversionary Landings</i></h2>
-
-<p>There was another key element
-in the American plan: diversion.
-To mislead the enemy on the real
-objective, Bougainville, the IMAC
-operations order on 15 October
-directed the 8th Brigade Group of
-the 3d New Zealand Division to
-land on the Treasury Islands, 75
-miles southeast of Empress
-Augusta Bay. There, on 27 October,
-the New Zealanders, under
-Brigadier R.&nbsp;A. Row, with 1,900
-Marine support troops, went
-ashore on two small islands.</p>
-
-<p>One was named Mono and the
-other Sterling. Mono is about four
-miles wide, north to south, and
-seven miles long. It looks like a
-pancake. Sterling, shaped like a
-hook, is four miles long, narrow in
-places to 300 yards, but with plenty
-of room on its margins for
-airstrips.</p>
-
-<p>In a drizzly overcast, the 29th
-NZ Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel
-F.&nbsp;L.&nbsp;H. Davis) and the 36th
-(Lieutenant Colonel K.&nbsp;B.
-McKenzie-Muirson) hit Mono at
-Falami Point, and the 34th (under
-Lieutenant Colonel R.&nbsp;J. Eyre)
-struck the beach of Sterling Island
-off Blanche Harbor. There was
-light opposition. Help for the
-assault troops came from LCI
-(landing craft, infantry) gunboats
-which knocked out at least one
-deadly Japanese 40mm twin-mount
-gun and a couple of enemy
-bunkers.</p>
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">9</a></span></p>
-<p>A simultaneous landing was
-then made on the opposite or
-north side of Mono Island at
-Soanotalu. This was perhaps the
-most important landing of all, for
-there New Zealand soldiers,
-American Seabees, and U.S. radar
-specialists would set up a big
-long-range radar station.</p>
-
-<p>The Japanese soon reacted to
-the Soanotalu landing and hurled
-themselves against the perimeter.
-On one occasion, 80&ndash;90 Japanese
-attacked 50 New Zealanders who
-waited until they saw “the whites
-of their eyes.” They killed 40 of the
-Japanese and dispersed the rest.</p>
-
-<p>There was unexpected machine
-gunfire at Sterling. One Seabee
-bulldozer operator attacked the
-machine gun with his big blade.
-An Army corporal, a medic, said
-he couldn’t believe it, “The
-Seabee ran his dozer over and
-over the machine gun nest until
-everything was quiet.... It all
-began to stink after a couple of
-days.”</p>
-
-<p>Outmanned, the Japanese drew
-back to higher ground, were hunted
-down, and killed. Surrender
-was still not in their book. On 12
-November, the New Zealanders
-could call the Treasuries their own
-with the radar station in operation.
-Japanese dead totaled 205,
-and the brigade took only eight
-prisoners. The operation had
-secured the seaside flank of
-Bougainville, and very soon on
-Sterling there was an airfield. It
-began to operate against enemy
-forces on Bougainville on
-Christmas Day, 1943.</p>
-
-<p>A second diversion, east of the
-Treasury Islands and 45 miles
-from Bougainville, took place on
-Choiseul Island. Sub-Lieutenant
-C.&nbsp;W. Seton, Royal Australian
-Navy and coastwatcher on
-Choiseul, said the Japanese there
-appeared worried. The garrison
-troops were shooting at their own
-shadows, perhaps because
-American and Australian patrols
-had been criss-crossing the 80-miles-long
-(20-miles-wide) island
-since September, scouting out the
-Japanese positions. There were
-also some 3,500 transient enemy
-troops on Choiseul, bivouacked
-and waiting to be shipped the 45
-miles north to Buin on
-Bougainville, where there was
-already a major Japanese garrison
-force. Uncertainty about the
-American threat of invasion
-somewhere was enough to make
-the Japanese, especially Vice
-Admiral Jinichi Kusaka,
-Commander, Southeast Area
-Fleet, at Rabaul jittery. It was he
-who wanted much of the Japanese
-<i>Seventeenth Army</i> concentrated at
-Buin, for, he thought, the Allies
-might strike there.</p>
-
-<p>General Vandegrift wanted to
-be sure that the Japanese were
-focused on Buin. So, on 20
-October, he called in Lieutenant
-Colonel Robert H. Williams, commanding
-the 1st Parachute
-Regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel
-Victor H. Krulak, commanding its
-2d Battalion. Get ashore on
-Choiseul, the general ordered,
-and stir up the biggest commotion
-possible, “Make sure they think
-the invasion has commenced....”</p>
-
-<p>It was a most unusual raid, 656
-men, a handful of native guides,
-and an Australian coastwatcher
-with a road map. The Navy took
-Krulak’s reinforced battalion of
-parachutists to a beach site near a
-hamlet called Voza. That would
-be the CP (command post) location
-for the duration. The troops
-slipped ashore on 28 October at
-0021 and soon had all their gear
-concealed in the bush.</p>
-
-<p>By daylight, the Marines had
-established a base on a high jungle
-plateau in the Voza area. The
-Japanese soon spotted the intruders,
-sent a few fighter planes to
-rake the beach, but that did no
-harm. They did not see the four
-small landing craft which Krulak
-had brought along and hidden
-among some mangroves with
-their Navy crews on call.</p>
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></span></p>
-<p>Krulak then outlined two targets.
-Eight miles south from their
-CP at Voza there was a large
-enemy barge base near the Vagara
-River. The Australian said some
-150 Japanese were there. The
-other objective was an enemy outpost
-in the opposite direction, 17
-miles north on the Warrior River.
-Then Krulak took his operations
-officer, Major Tolson A. Smoak, 17
-men, and a few natives as scouts,
-and headed for the barge basin.
-On the way, 10 unlucky Japanese
-were encountered unloading a
-barge. The Marines opened fire,
-killing seven of them and sinking
-the barge. After reconnoitering
-the main objective, the barge
-basin, the patrol returned to Voza.</p>
-
-<p>The following morning, Krulak
-sent a patrol near the barge basin
-to the Vagara River for security
-and then to wave in his small
-landing craft bringing up his
-troops to attack. But, back at
-Voza, along came a flight of
-American planes which shot up
-the Marines and sank one of their
-vital boats. Now Krulak’s attack
-would have to walk to the village
-of Sangigai by the Japanese barge
-basin. To soften up Sangigai,
-Krulak called in 26 fighters escorting
-12 torpedo bombers. They
-dropped two tons of bombs and it
-looked for all the world like a real
-invasion.</p>
-
-<p>Krulak then sent a company to
-attack the basin from the beach,
-and another company with rifles,
-machine guns, rockets, and mortars
-to get behind the barge center.
-It was a pincer and it worked. The
-Marines attacked at 1400 on 30
-October. What the battle didn’t
-destroy, the Marines blew up. The
-Japanese lost 72 dead; the
-Marines, 4 killed and 12 wounded.</p>
-
-<p>All was not so well in the other
-direction. Major Warner T. Bigger,
-Krulak’s executive officer, had
-been sent north with 87 Marines
-toward the big emplacement on
-Choiseul Bay near the Warrior
-River. His mission was to destroy,
-first the emplacement, with
-Guppy Island, just off shore and
-fat with supplies, as his secondary
-target.</p>
-
-<p>Bigger got to the Warrior River,
-but his landing craft became stuck
-in the shallows, so he brought
-them to a nearby cove, hid them in
-the jungle, and proceeded on foot
-north to Choiseul Bay. Soon his
-scouts said that they were lost. It
-was late in the day so Bigger
-bivouacked for the night. He sent
-a patrol back to the Warrior where
-it found a Japanese force. Slipping
-stealthily by them, the patrol got
-back to Voza. This led Krulak to
-call for fighter cover and PT boats
-to try to get up and withdraw
-Bigger.</p>
-
-<p>But Bigger didn’t know he was
-in trouble, and he went ahead and
-blasted Guppy island with mortars,
-because he couldn’t get to the
-main enemy emplacement. When
-Bigger and his men barely got
-back to the Warrior River, there
-were no rescue boats, but there
-were plenty of Japanese. As the
-men waited tensely, the rescue
-boats came at the last moment, the
-very last. Thankfully, the men
-scrambled on board under enemy
-fire. Then two PT boats arrived,
-gun blazing, and provided cover
-so Bigger’s patrol could get back
-to Voza. One of the PT boats was
-commanded by Lieutenant John F.
-Kennedy, USN, later the President
-of the United States, who took 55
-Marines on board when their
-escape boat sank.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_010.jpg" width="600" height="464" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>CHOISEUL DIVERSION</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">2d PARACHUTE BATTALION<br />
-28 OCTOBER&ndash;3 NOVEMBER 1943</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Krulak had already used up all
-his time and luck. The Japanese
-were now on top of him, their
-commanders particularly chagrined
-that they had been fooled,
-for the big landing had already
-occurred at Empress Augusta Bay.
-Krulak had to get out;
-Coastwatcher Seton said there
-was not much time. On the night
-of 3 November, three LCIs rendezvoused
-off Voza. Krulak gave all
-his rations to the natives as the
-Marines boarded the LCIs. They
-could hear their mines and booby
-traps exploding to delay the
-Japanese. Within hours after the
-departure, a strong Japanese pincer
-snapped shut around the Voza
-encampment, but the Marines had
-gone, having suffered 9 killed, 15<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span>
-wounded, and 2 missing, but leaving
-at least 143 enemy dead on
-Choiseul.</p>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar grey">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_The_Coastwatchers" id="SIDEBAR_The_Coastwatchers"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_9">page 9</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Coastwatchers</h3>
-
-<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">It</span> was on Bougainville, as well as on other islands of
-the Solomons chain, that the Australian coastwatchers
-played their most decisive role in transmitting
-vital advance warnings to Allied forces in the lower
-Solomon Islands. Japanese war planes and ships summoned
-in urgency to smash the beachhead at
-Guadalcanal had to pass over Bougainville, the big
-island in the middle of the route from Rabaul.</p>
-
-<p>Paul Mason, short, bespectacled, soft spoken, held
-an aerie in the south mountains over Buin, and dark,
-wiry W.&nbsp;J. “Jack” Read watched the ship and aircraft
-movements of the Japanese in and around Buka in the
-north. One memorable Mason wireless dispatch:
-“Twenty-five torpedo bombers headed yours.” The
-message cost the Japanese Imperial Navy every one of
-those airplanes, save one. Read reported a dozen or so
-Japanese transports assembling at Buka before their
-trip to Guadalcanal, with enough troops loaded on
-board to take the island back. All of the transports were
-lost or beached under the fierce attack of U.S. warplanes.</p>
-
-<p>In 1941, as the war with Japan commenced, there
-were 100 coastwatchers in the Solomons. There were 10
-times that number as the war ended, later including
-Americans. Assembled first as a tight group of island
-veterans in 1939 (although there had been coastwatchers
-after World War I) under Lieutenant Commander A.
-Eric Feldt, Royal Australian Navy, their job was to
-cover about a half million miles of land, sea, and air.</p>
-
-<p>The very first moves of the Japanese on Guadalcanal
-were observed by coastwatchers in the surrounding
-hills. The coastwatchers could count the Japanese hammer
-strokes, almost see the nails. When the Japanese
-began the airfield (later to be called Henderson Field),
-the report of the coastwatchers went all the way up the
-American Joint Chiefs of Staff and across the desk of
-Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
-Fleet.</p>
-
-<p>Later, General Alexander A. Vandegrift on
-Guadalcanal banked heavily on the intelligence coming
-in from the radios of the coastwatchers. The attacks on
-the Treasuries and Choiseul were based on the information
-provided them. On New Georgia, long before
-Americans decided to take it, a coastwatcher had set up
-a haven for downed Allied pilots. And if the Americans
-needed a captured Japanese officer or soldier for interrogation,
-the local scouts were often able to provide
-one.</p>
-
-<p>The key to coastwatching was the tele-radio or wireless,
-good to 600 miles by key, 400 by voice.
-Cumbersome, heavy, the set took more than a dozen
-men to carry it&mdash;an indication of how much the Allies
-depended upon the local natives.</p>
-
-<p>The risks were great. Death would come after torture.
-But Mason recalled the risk was worth it, seeing
-the sleek, orderly formations heading for Guadalcanal,
-then limping back home with gaping holes in their
-hulls. Mason and Read were highly decorated by both
-the Australians and Americans for their vital services.</p>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="Battle_at_Sea" id="Battle_at_Sea"></a><i>Battle at Sea</i></h2>
-
-<p>A final part of the planning for
-the main landing on Bougainville
-had envisioned the certainty of a
-Japanese naval sortie to attack the
-invasion transports. It came very
-early on the morning of D plus 1.
-On the enemy side, Japanese
-destroyer Captain Tameichi Hara,
-skipper of the <i>Shigure</i>, later
-recalled it was cold, drizzly, and
-murky, with very limited visibility
-as his destroyer pulled out of
-Simpson Harbor, Rabaul. He was
-a part of the interception force
-determined to chew up the U.S.
-invasion troops that had just landed
-at Empress Augusta Bay. The
-<i>Shigure</i> was one of the six destroyers
-in the van of the assigned element
-of the <i>Southeast Area Fleet</i>,
-which included the heavy cruisers
-<i>Myoko</i> and <i>Haguro</i>, together with
-the light cruisers <i>Agano</i> and
-<i>Sendai</i>. At 0027, 2 November 1943,
-he would run abreast of U.S. Task
-Force 39 under Rear Admiral
-Merrill, who stood by to bar the
-enemy approach with four light
-cruisers and eight destroyers.
-Among his captains was the daring
-and determined Arleigh Burke
-on board the <i>Charles S. Ausburne</i>
-(DD 570) commanding DesDiv
-(Destroyer Division) 45.</p>
-
-<p>This encounter was crucial to
-the Bougainville campaign. At
-Rabaul, Rear Admiral Matsuji
-Ijuin had told his sailors, “Japan
-will topple if Bougainville falls.”</p>
-
-<p>At 0250, the American ships
-were in action. Captain Burke
-(later to become Chief of Naval
-Operations) closed in on the nearest
-of the enemy force under Vice
-Admiral Sentaro Omori. Burke’s
-destroyers fired 25 torpedoes, and
-then Merrill maneuvered his
-cruiser to avoid the expected
-“Long Lance” torpedo response of
-the Japanese and to put his ships
-in position to fire with their six-inch
-guns.</p>
-
-<p>“I shuddered,” Hara wrote
-later, “at the realization that they
-must have already released their
-torpedoes. The initiative was in
-the hands of the enemy. In an
-instant, I yelled two orders:
-‘Launch torpedoes! Hard right
-rudder.’” Not a single Japanese or
-American torpedo found its mark
-in the first exchange. Merrill then
-brought all his guns to bear. The
-Japanese answered in kind. The
-Japanese eight-inch gun salvos
-were either short or ahead. The
-Americans were luckier. One shell
-of their first broadside slammed
-amidships into the cruiser <i>Sendai</i>
-which carried Admiral Ijuin.
-There was frantic maneuvering to
-avoid shells, with giant warships,
-yards apart at times, cutting at
-speeds of 30 knots. Still <i>Sendai</i>
-managed to avoid eight American
-torpedoes, even with her rudder
-jammed. Then a Japanese torpedo
-caught the U.S. destroyer <i>Foote</i>
-(DD 511) and blew off her stern,
-leaving her dead in the water.</p>
-
-<p>Samuel Eliot Morison in
-<i>Breaking the Bismarck Barrier</i>, tells
-how “Merrill maneuvered his
-cruisers so smartly and kept them
-at such range that no enemy torpedoes
-could hit.” Admiral Omori
-showed the same skill and
-judgement, but he was a blind
-man. Only the American had
-radar. Hara afterwards explained,
-“Japan did not see the enemy,
-failed to size up the enemy and
-failed to locate it.... The Japanese
-fleet was a blind man swinging a
-stick against a seeing opponent.
-The Japanese fleet had no advantage
-at all....”</p>
-
-<p>What Japan had lacked in electronic
-sight, however, it partially
-made up with its super-brilliant
-airplane-dropped flares and naval
-gunfire star shells. Commander
-Charles H. Pollow, USN, a former
-radio officer on the <i>Denver</i> (CL
-58), recalled the “unblinking star
-shells that would let you read the
-fine print in the bible....” The
-Japanese also had a range advantage
-in their eight-inch guns,
-“Sometimes we couldn’t touch
-them....” Three shells hit his
-<i>Denver</i>&mdash;not one detonated, but
-the ship was damaged. <i>Columbia</i>
-(CL 56) also took an eight-inch
-hole through her armor plate.</p>
-
-<p>Then Merrill confused the
-enemy ships with smoke so dense
-that the Japanese believed the
-Americans were heading one way
-when they were in fact steaming
-in another direction. But before
-Admiral Omori could break away,
-Burke and his destroyer division
-of “Little Beavers” was in among
-them. First the <i>Sendai</i> was sent to
-the bottom with 335 men, then
-<i>Hatsukaze</i>, brushed in an accident
-with <i>Myoko</i>, was finished off by
-Burke’s destroyers and sank with
-all hands on board&mdash;240 men.
-Damaged were the cruisers
-<i>Haguro</i>, <i>Myoko</i>, and destroyers
-<i>Shiratsuyu</i> and <i>Samidare</i>. But,
-most important, the threat to the
-beachhead had been stopped.</p>
-
-<p>The Americans got off with
-severe damage to the <i>Foote</i> and
-light damage to the <i>Denver</i>, <i>Spence</i>
-(DD 512), and <i>Columbia</i>. Hara
-later wrote, “had they pursued us
-really hot[ly] ... practically all
-the Japanese ships would have
-perished.” The Americans had left
-the fight too soon.</p>
-
-<p>And Admiral Ijuin’s prediction
-that Japan would topple after the
-loss of Bougainville proved to be
-accurate, but not because of this
-loss, particularly. It was just one of
-the number of defeats which were
-to doom Japan.</p>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="Action_Ashore_Koromokina" id="Action_Ashore_Koromokina"></a><i>Action Ashore: Koromokina</i></h2>
-
-<p>Back on Bougainville, following
-the landing, the days D plus 1 to D<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span>
-plus 5 saw the initiation of Phase
-II of the operation, involving shifting
-of units’ positions, reorganizing
-the shambles of supplies,
-incessant patrols, road building,
-the beginning of the construction
-of a fighter airstrip, and the deepening
-of the beachhead to 2,000
-yards.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_012.jpg" width="600" height="471" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>JAPANESE COUNTERLANDING</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">LARUMA RIVER AREA<br />
-7 NOVEMBER 1943</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Then, at dawn on the morning
-of 7 November (D plus 6), the
-Japanese struck. Four of their
-destroyers put ashore 475 men
-well west of the Marine perimeter,
-between the Laruma River and
-the Koromokina Lagoon. They
-landed in 21 craft: barges, ramped
-landing boats, even a motor boat,
-but, to their disadvantage, along
-too wide a front for coordinating
-and organizing a strike in unison
-and immediately. A Marine Corps
-combat correspondent, Sergeant
-Cyril J. O’Brien, saw the skinny
-young Japanese who scampered
-up the beach with 80-pound packs
-two-and-a-half miles from the
-Laruma to near the Koromokina,
-left flank of the Marines, to join
-their comrades.</p>
-
-<p>They were eager enough, even
-to die. A little prayer often in the
-pockets of the dead voiced the
-fatalistic wish that “whether I
-float a corpse under the waters, or
-sink beneath the grasses of the
-mountainside, I willingly die for
-the Emperor.”</p>
-
-<p>The first few Japanese ashore
-near the Laruma, however, did
-not die. An antitank platoon with
-the 9th Marines did not fire
-because the landing craft in the
-mist looked so much like their
-own, even to the big white numbers
-on the prow. Near
-Koromokina, they seemed to be
-all over the beach. One outpost
-platoon, which included Private
-First Class John F. Perella, 19 years
-old, was cut off on the beach.
-Perella swam through the surf
-1,000 yards to Marine lines and
-came with a Navy rescue boat and
-earned a Silver Star Medal.</p>
-
-<div class="figright portrait">
-<div class="captionl"><p><i>Sgt Herbert J. Thomas was posthumously
-awarded the Medal of Honor.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-Department of Defense (USMC) 302918<br />
-</p></div>
-<img src="images/i_b_012b.jpg" width="236" height="329" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Walter
-Asmuth, Jr., commanding officer
-of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,
-ordered a company attack, called
-on mortars and the artillery of the
-12th Marines. The Japanese were
-well equipped with the so-called
-knee mortars (actually grenade
-launchers) and Nambu machine
-guns and fought back fiercely. In
-that jungle, you could not see,
-hear, or smell a man five feet
-away. Private First Class Challis
-L. Still found a faint trail and settled
-his machine gun beside it. An
-ambush was easy. The lead
-Japanese were close enough to
-touch when Still opened up. He
-killed 30 in the column; he was a
-recipient of the Silver Star Medal.</p>
-
-<p>Yet, the Japanese didn’t give
-way. Ashore only hours, they had
-already dug strong defenses.
-Even a Marine double envelopment
-in water, sometimes up to
-the waist, did not work. By 1315,
-the weakened 9th Marines company
-was relieved by the 1st
-Battalion, 3d Marines, coming in
-from the beachhead’s right flank.</p>
-
-<p>During darkness on that night
-of 7 November, enemy infiltrators
-got through to the hospital.
-Bullets ripped through tents as
-surgeons performed operations.
-The doctors of the 3d Medical
-Battalion, under Commander
-Robert R. Callaway, were protected
-by a makeshift line of cooks,
-bakers, and stretcher bearers. (As
-a memorable statistic, less than
-one percent died of wounds on
-Bougainville after having arrived
-at a field hospital.)</p>
-
-<div class="figleft portrait">
-<img src="images/i_b_014.jpg" width="238" height="321" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 12756
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>PFC Henry Gurke was posthumously
-awarded the Medal of Honor.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</a></span></p>
-<p>The 1st Battalion was close to
-the enemy, close enough to
-exchange shouts. The Japanese
-yelled “Moline you die” ... and
-the Marines made earthy references
-to Premier Tojo’s diet.
-Marine Captain Gordon Warner
-was fluent in Japanese, so he
-could quickly reply to the
-Japanese, even yell believable
-orders for a bayonet charge. He
-received the Navy Cross for
-destroying machine gun nests
-with a helmet full of hand
-grenades. He lost a leg in the battle.</p>
-
-<p>Sergeant Herbert J. Thomas
-gave his life near the Koromokina.
-His platoon was forced prone by
-machine gunfire, and Thomas
-threw a grenade to silence the
-weapon. The grenade rebounded
-from jungle vines and the young
-West Virginian smothered it with
-his body. He posthumously was
-awarded the Medal of Honor.</p>
-
-<p>General Turnage saw that reinforcements
-were needed. The day
-before (6 November) the first echelon
-of the 21st Marines had come
-ashore. Now the battle command
-was transferred to Lieutenant
-Colonel Ernest W. Fry, Jr., of the
-1st Battalion. With two companies,
-he was set for a counterattack,
-but not until after two
-intense saturations of the Japanese
-positions by mortars and five batteries
-of artillery. They slammed
-into a concentrated area, 300
-yards wide and 600 deep, early on
-8 November. Light tanks then
-moved in to support the attack.</p>
-
-<p>When Colonel Fry’s advancing
-companies reached the area where
-the Japanese had been, there was
-stillness, desolation, ploughed
-earth, and uprooted trees.
-Combat correspondent Alvin
-Josephy wrote of men hanging in
-trees, “Some lay crumpled and
-twisted beside their shattered
-weapons, some covered by
-chunks of jagged logs and jungle
-earth, [by] a blasted bunker....”
-In that no-man’s land, Colonel Fry
-and his men walked over and
-around the bodies of over 250
-enemy soldiers. To complete the
-annihilation of the Japanese landing
-force, Marine dive bombers
-from Munda bombed and strafed
-the survivors on 9 November.</p>
-
-<p>By now, the veteran 148th
-Infantry, the first unit of the
-Army’s 37th Infantry Division,
-was coming ashore, seasoned in
-the Munda campaign on New
-Georgia. Later, to take over the
-left flank of the beachhead, would
-come its other infantry regiments,
-the 129th on 13 November and the
-145th on 19 November. The
-Army’s 135th, 136th, and 140th
-Field Artillery came ashore, too,
-and would be invaluable in supporting
-later advances on the
-right flank. Major General Robert
-S. Beightler, USA, was division
-commander.</p>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar green">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_37th_Infantry_Division" id="SIDEBAR_37th_Infantry_Division"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_14">page 13)</a>:]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">37th Infantry Division</h3>
-
-<div class="figright iwidth">
-<img src="images/i_b_013.jpg" width="340" height="487" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p><i>Major General Robert S. Beightler, USA</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Called</span> the “Buckeye” Division, the 37th was
-among the very first American troops sent to the
-Pacific at the beginning of the war.</p>
-
-<p>The 37th was an outfit with a long history and many
-battle streamers, dating from August 1917, when it was
-formed at Camp Sheridan, Alabama. It left for overseas
-in 1918, and took part in five major operations in France
-before returning in 1919, and facing demobilization that
-same year.</p>
-
-<p>As an Ohio National Guard unit, the “Buckeye”
-Division was inducted into federal service in 1940, and
-by June of 1942, it was heading into the Pacific war, sent
-to garrison the Fiji Islands. First combat was on New
-Georgia, which included taking the critical Munda airfield.
-The 37th joined the 3d Marine Division on
-Bougainville, and then trained on the island for the
-campaign on Luzon Island in the Philippines.</p>
-
-<p>Landing with the Sixth Army at Lingayen Gulf, 9
-January 1945, the 37th raced inland to Clark Field and
-Fort Stotsenburg. It entered Manila, and its commander,
-Major General Robert S. Beightler, accepted the
-surrender of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Next came
-the capture of Baguio and liberation there of 1,300
-internees at the Bilibid Prison. The division came home
-for demobilization in November 1945.</p>
-
-<p>Its commander, Major General Beightler, was born 21
-March 1892, and enlisted in the U.S. Army as a private
-in 1911. Promoted quickly to corporal, sergeant, and
-then first sergeant of his company, he was then commissioned
-as a second lieutenant in March 1914. After
-service on the Mexican border, he took part in five
-major campaigns in World War I with the famous 42d
-(Rainbow) Division.</p>
-
-<div class="figleft" style="width: 100px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_013b.jpg" width="100" height="101" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>A graduate of Ohio State University, Beightler finished
-first in his class in the Reserve Officers’ Course of
-the Command and General Staff School, Fort
-Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1926. After that he served as a
-member of the War Plans Division of the War
-Department General Staff (1932&ndash;36).</p>
-
-<p>After World War II, he assumed command of the
-Fifth Service Command at Fort Hayes, Ohio, and then
-was assigned (1947) to the Personnel Board of the
-Secretary of War. In 1949, he was sent to the Far East
-and took over the Marianas-Bonins Command on
-Guam. In 1950 he was named Deputy Governor of the
-Ryukyus Command on Okinawa.</p>
-
-<p>Major General Beightler received the Distinguished
-Service Cross, the nation’s second highest honor, for his
-leadership in the Philippine campaign, as well as a
-Distinguished Service Medal for the New Georgia operation,
-with an Oak Leaf Cluster as a second award for
-his outstanding service on Bougainville and then on
-Luzon in the Philippine Islands. He also wore the
-Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Bronze Star
-with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Silver Star Medal, and the
-Purple Heart.</p>
-
-<p>He died 12 February 1978.</p>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="The_Battle_for_Piva_Trail" id="The_Battle_for_Piva_Trail"></a><i>The Battle for Piva Trail</i></h2>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_014b.jpg" width="600" height="387" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>BATTLE FOR PIVA TRAIL</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">2d RAIDER REGIMENT<br />
-8&ndash;9 NOVEMBER</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Captain Conrad M. Fowler, a
-company commander in the 1st
-Battalion, 9th Marines, later
-recalled how an attack down the
-trails was expected: “They had to
-come our way to meet us face-to-face.
-The trails were the only way
-overland through that rainforest.”
-His company would be there to
-meet them. He was awarded a
-Silver Star Medal.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_015.jpg" width="600" height="386" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>COCONUT GROVE</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">2d BATTALION, 21st MARINES<br />
-13&ndash;14 NOVEMBER</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figright portrait">
-<img src="images/i_b_015b.jpg" width="236" height="301" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 52622
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>MajGen Roy S. Geiger assumed command
-of IMAC on 9 November 1943.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>With just such a Japanese attack
-anticipated, General Turnage had
-dispatched a company of the 2d
-Raider Regiment up the Mission
-(Piva) trail on D-Day to set up a
-road block&mdash;just up from the old
-Buretoni Catholic Mission (still in
-operation today). At first the
-raiders had little business, and by
-4 November elements of the 9th
-Marines had arrived to join them.
-The enemy, the <i>23rd Infantry</i> up
-from Buin, struck on 7 November.
-Their attack was timed to coincide<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</a></span>
-with the Koromokina landings.
-The raiders held, but “the woods
-were full of Japs, dead.... The
-most we had to do was bury
-them.”</p>
-
-<p>At this point General Turnage
-told Colonel Edward A. Craig,
-commanding officer of the 9th
-Marines, to clear the way ahead
-and advance to the junction of the
-Piva and Numa-Numa trails.
-That mission Craig gave to the 2d
-Raider Regiment under Lieutenant
-Colonel Alan B. Shapley. The
-actual attack would be led by
-Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans,
-3d Raider Battalion, just in from
-Puruata Island and would include
-elements of the 9th Marines and
-weapons companies.</p>
-
-<p>The Japanese didn’t wait for a
-Marine attack; they came in on 5<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span>
-November and threatened to
-overrun the trailblock. It soon
-became a matter of brutal small
-encounters, and battles raged for
-five days. They were many brave
-acts. Privates First Class Henry
-Gurke and Donald G. Probst, with
-an automatic weapon, were about
-to be overwhelmed. A grenade
-plopped in the foxhole between
-them. To save the critical position
-and his companion, Gurke thrust
-Probst aside and threw himself on
-the grenade and died. He was
-awarded the Medal of Honor
-posthumously; Probst, the Silver
-Star Medal.</p>
-
-<p>Mortars and artillery dueled
-from each side. The Japanese
-would creep right next to the
-Marine positions for safety.
-Marines had to call friendly fire
-almost into their laps. On the narrow
-trail, men often had to expose
-themselves. The Japanese got the
-worst of it, for suddenly, shortly
-after noon on 9 November the
-enemy resistance crumbled. By
-1500, the junction of the Piva and
-Numa-Numa trails was reached
-and secured. Some 550 Japanese
-died. There were 19 Marines dead
-and 32 wounded.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<div class="captionl"><p><i>Adm William F. Halsey (pith helmet) and MajGen Geiger (“fore and aft” cover) watch Army reinforcements come ashore at
-Bougainville.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-National Archives Photo 127-N-65494<br />
-</p></div>
-<img src="images/i_b_015c.jpg" width="600" height="389" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>To consolidate the hard-won
-position, Marine torpedo bombers
-from Munda blasted the surrounding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span>
-area on 10 November.
-This allowed two battalions of the
-9th Marines to settle into good
-defensive positions along the
-Numa-Numa Trail with, as usual,
-“aggressive” patrols immediately
-fanning out. The battle for the
-Piva Trail had ended victoriously.</p>
-
-<p>The key logistical element in
-this engagement&mdash;and nearly all
-others on Bougainville&mdash;was the
-amtrac. There were vast areas
-where tanks and half-tracks,
-much less trucks, simply could
-not negotiate the bottomless
-swamps, omnipresent streams,
-and viscous mud from the daily
-rains. The amtracs proved amazingly
-flexible; they moved men,
-ammunition, rations, water,
-barbed wire, and even radio jeeps
-to the front lines where they were
-most needed. Heading back, they
-evacuated the wounded to reach
-the desperately needed medical
-centers in the rear.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_017.jpg" width="600" height="451" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 65162
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>A bloody encounter on 14 November at the junction of the Numa-Numa and Piva
-Trails: Marine infantrymen had been stopped by well dug-in and camouflaged enemy
-troops. Five Marine tanks rushed up and attacked on a 250-yard front through the
-jungle.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Other developments came at
-this juncture in the campaign. As
-noted, the 37th Infantry Division
-was fed into the perimeter. At the
-top of the command echelon
-Major General Roy S. Geiger
-relieved Vandegrift as Commanding
-General, IMAC, on 9
-November and took charge of
-Marine and Army units in the
-campaign from an advanced command
-post on Bougainville.</p>
-
-<p>The Seabees and Marine engineers
-were hard at work now.
-Operating dangerously 1,500
-yards ahead of the front lines,
-guarded by a strong combat
-patrol, they managed to cut two
-5,000-foot survey lanes east to
-west across the front of the
-perimeter.</p>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar grey">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_War_Dogs" id="SIDEBAR_War_Dogs"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_16">page 16</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">War Dogs</h3>
-
-<div class="figright iwidth">
-<img src="images/i_b_016.jpg" width="600" height="544" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">In</span> an interview with Captain Wilcie O’Bannon long
-after the war, Captain John Monks, Jr., gained an
-insight into one of the least known aspects of Marine
-tactics. It was an added asset that the official Marine
-history called “invaluable”: war dogs. O’Bannon, the
-first patrol leader to have them, related:</p>
-
-<blockquote>
-
-<p>One dog was a German Shepherd
-female, the other was a Doberman
-male, and they had three men with
-them. The third man handled the dogs
-all the time in the platoon area prior to
-our going on patrol&mdash;petting the dogs,
-talking to them, and being nice to
-them. The other two handlers&mdash;one
-would go to the head of the column
-and one would go to the rear with the
-female messenger dog.... If the dog in
-front received enemy fire and got
-away, he could either come back to me
-or circle to the back of the column. If I
-needed to send a message I would
-write it, give it to the handler, and he
-would pin it on the dog’s collar. He
-would clap his hands and say,
-“Report,” and the dog would be off
-like a gunshot to go to the third man in
-the rear who had handled him before
-the patrol.</p></blockquote>
-
-<p>The war dogs proved very versatile. They ran telephone
-wire, detected ambushes, smelled out enemy
-patrols, and even a few machine gun nests. The dog got
-GI chow, slept on nice mats and straw, and in mud-filled
-foxholes. First Lieutenant Clyde Henderson with
-one of the dog platoons recalled how the speed and
-intelligence of dogs was crucial in light of the abominable
-communications in the jungle, where sometimes
-communications equipment was not much better than
-yelling.</p>
-
-<p>Under such circumstances, a German Shepherd
-named “Caesar” made the difference between life and
-death for at least one company. With all wires cut and
-no communication, Caesar got through repeatedly to
-the battalion command post and returned to the lines.
-One Japanese rifle wound didn’t stop him, but a second
-had Caesar returned to the rear on a stretcher. A memorable
-letter from Commandant Thomas B. Holcomb
-described how Caesar another time had saved the life
-of a Marine when the dog attacked a Japanese about to
-throw a hand grenade. The Commandant also cited in
-letters four other dogs for their actions on Bougainville.</p>
-
-<p>Sergeant William O. McDaniel, in the 9th Marines,
-remembered, “One night, one of the dogs growled and
-Slim Livesay, a squad leader from Montana, shot and
-hit a Jap right between the eyes. We found the Jap the
-next morning, three feet in front of the hole.”</p>
-
-<p>One Marine said that what Marines liked most was
-the security dogs gave at night and the rare chance to
-sleep in peace. No enemy would slip through the lines
-with a dog on guard.</p>
-
-<p>There were 52 men and 36 dogs in the K-9 company
-on Bougainville.</p>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="The_Coconut_Grove_Battle" id="The_Coconut_Grove_Battle"></a><i>The Coconut Grove Battle</i></h2>
-
-<p>On D plus 10, 11 November, a
-new operation order was issued.
-“Continue the attack with the 3d
-Marine Division on the right (east)
-and the 37th Infantry Division on
-the left (west).” An Army-Marine
-artillery group was assembled
-under IMAC control to provide
-massed fire, and Marine air would
-be on call for close support.</p>
-
-<p>The first objective in the
-renewed push was to seize control
-of the critical junction of the
-Numa-Numa Trail and the East-West
-trail. On 13 November a
-company of the 21st Marines led
-off the advance at 0800. At 1100 it
-was ambushed by a “sizeable”
-enemy force concealed in a
-coconut palm grove near the trail
-junction. The Japanese had won
-the race to the crossroads, and the
-situation for the lead Marine company
-soon became critical. The 2d
-Battalion commander, Lieutenant
-Colonel Eustace R. Smoak, sent up
-his executive officer, Major Glenn
-Fissell, with 12th Marines’
-artillery observers. They reported
-the situation as all bad. Then
-Major Fissell was killed. Disdaining
-flank security, Smoak
-moved closer to the fight and fed
-in reinforcing companies. (By
-now a lateral road across the front
-of the perimeter had been built.)</p>
-
-<p>The next day tanks were
-brought up and artillery registered
-around the battalion. Smoak
-also called in 18 torpedo bombers.
-The reorganized riflemen lunged
-forward again in a renewed
-attack. The tanks proved an ineffective
-disaster, causing chaos at
-one point by firing on fellow
-Marines on their flank and running
-over several of their own
-men. Nevertheless, the Japanese
-positions were overrun by the end
-of the day, with the enemy survivors
-driven off into a swamp.
-The Marines now commanded the
-junction of the two vital trails. As
-a result, the entire beachhead was
-able to spring forward 1,000 to
-1,500 yards, reaching Inland
-Defense Line D, 5,000 yards from
-the beach.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_018.jpg" width="600" height="363" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Photo courtesy of Cyril J. O’Brien.
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>“Marine Drive” constructed by the 53d Naval Construction Battalion enabled casualties
-to be sent to medical facilities in the rear and supplies to be brought forward easily.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>One important result of this
-advance was that the two main
-airstrips could now be built. The
-airfields would be the work of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span>
-Seabees. The 25th, 53d, and 71st
-Naval Construction Battalions
-(“Seabees”) had landed on D-Day
-with the assault waves of the 3d
-Marine Division&mdash;to get ready at
-once to build roads, airfields, and
-camp areas. (They had a fighter
-strip operating at Torokina by
-December). Always close to
-Marines, the Seabees earned their
-merit in the eyes of the
-Leathernecks. Often Marines had
-to clear the way with fire so a
-Seabee could do his work. Many
-would recall the bold Seabee bulldozer
-driver covering a sputtering
-machine gun nest with his blade.
-Marines on the Piva Trail later
-saw another determined bulldozer
-operator filling in holes in the
-tarmac of his burgeoning bomber
-strip as fast as Japanese artillery
-could tear it up. Any Marine who
-returned from the dismal swamps
-toward the beach would retain the
-wonderment of the “Marine
-Drive.” It was a two-lane asphalt
-highway, complete with wide
-shoulders and drainage ditches. It
-lay across jungle so dense that the
-tired men had had to hack their
-way through it only a week or so
-before.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, back on the beach,
-the U.S. Navy had been busy
-pouring in supplies and men. By
-D plus 12 it had landed more than
-23,000 cargo tons and nearly
-34,000 men. Marine fighters overhead
-provided continuous cover
-from Japanese air attacks. The
-Marine 3d Defense Battalion was
-set up with long-range radar and
-its antiaircraft guns to give further
-protection. (This battalion also
-had long-range 155mm guns that
-pounded Japanese attacks against
-the perimeter.)</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></span></p>
-<p>By now, the 37th Infantry
-Division on the left was on firm
-ground, facing scattered opposition,
-and able to make substantial
-advances. It was very different
-for the 3d Marine Division on the
-right. Lagoons and swamps were
-everywhere. The riflemen were in
-isolated, individual positions, little
-islands of men perched in what
-they sarcastically called “dry
-swamps,” This meant the water
-and/or slimy mud was only shoe-top
-deep, rather than up to their
-knees or waists, as it was all
-around them. This nightmare
-kind of terrain, combined with
-heavy, daily, drenching rains, precluded
-digging foxholes. So their
-machine guns had to be lashed to
-tree trunks, while the men huddled
-miserably in the water and
-mud. They carried little in their
-packs, except that a variety of pills
-was essential to stay in fighting
-shape in their oppressive, bug-infested
-environment: salt tablets,
-sulfa powder, aspirin, iodine, vitamins,
-atabrine tablets (for supressing
-malaria), and insect repellent.</p>
-
-<p>Colonel Frazer West, who at
-Bougainville commanded a company
-in the 9th Marines, was
-interviewed by Monks 45 years
-later. He still remembered painfully
-what constantly living in the
-slimy, swamp water did to the
-Marines: “With almost no change
-of clothing, sand rubbing against
-the skin, stifling heat, and constant
-immersion in water, jungle
-rot was a pervasive problem. Men
-got it on their scalps, under their
-arms, in their genital areas, just all
-over. It was a miserable, affliction,
-and in combat there was very little
-that could be done to alleviate it.
-The only thing you could do was
-with the jungle ulcers. I’d get the
-corpsman to light a match on a
-razor blade, split the ulcer open,
-and squeeze sulfanilamide powder
-in it. I must have had at one
-time 30 jungle ulcers on me. This
-was fairly typical.” Corpsmen
-painted many Marines with skin
-infections with tincture of merthiolate
-or a potassium permanganate
-solution so that they
-looked like the Picts of long ago
-who went into battle with their
-bodies daubed with blue woad.</p>
-
-<p>The Marines who had survived
-the first two weeks of the campaign
-were by now battlewise.
-They intuitively carried out their
-platoon tactics in jungle fighting
-whether in offense or defense.
-They understood their enemy’s
-tactics. And all signs indicated
-that they were winning.</p>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar green">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_Navajo_Code_Talkers" id="SIDEBAR_Navajo_Code_Talkers"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_18">page 18</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">Navajo Code Talkers</h3>
-
-<div class="figright iwidth">
-<img src="images/i_b_018b.jpg" width="600" height="507" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Marines</span> who heard the urgent combat messages
-said Navajo sounded sometimes like gurgling
-water. Whatever the sound, the ancient
-tongue of an ancient warrior clan confused the
-Japanese. The Navajo codetalkers were busily engaged
-on Bougainville, and had already proved their worth
-on Guadalcanal. The Japanese could never fathom a
-language committed to sounds.</p>
-
-<p>Originally there were many skeptics who disdained
-the use of the Navajo language as infeasible. Technical
-Sergeant Philip Johnston, who originally recommended
-the use of Navajo talkers as a means of safe voice transmissions
-in combat, convinced a hardheaded colonel by
-a two-minute Navajo dispatch. Encoding and decoding,
-the colonel then admitted, would have engaged his
-team well over an hour.</p>
-
-<p>When the chips were down, time was short, and the
-message was urgent, Navajos saved the day. Only
-Indians could talk directly into the radio “mike” without
-concern for security. They would read the message
-in English, absorb it mentally, then deliver the words in
-their native tongue&mdash;direct, uncoded, and quickly. You
-couldn’t fault the Japanese, even other Navajos who
-weren’t codetalkers, couldn’t understand the codetalkers’
-transmissions because they were in a code within
-the Navajo language.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_Corpsman" id="SIDEBAR_Corpsman"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_20">page 19</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">‘Corpsman!’</h3>
-
-<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">L</span>ess</span> than one percent of battle casualties on
-Bougainville died of wounds after being brought
-to a field hospital, and during 50 operations conducted
-as the battle of the Koromokina raged and bullets
-whipped through surgeons’ tents, not a patient was
-lost.</p>
-
-<div class="figright iwidth">
-<div class="captionl"><p>Painting by Kerr Eby in the Marine Corps Art Collection</p></div>
-<img src="images/i_b_019b.jpg" width="452" height="600" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>Those facts reflect the skill and dedication of the
-corpsmen, surgeons, and litter bearers who performed
-in an environment of enormous difficultly. Throughout
-the fight for the perimeter, the field hospitals were
-shelled and shaken by bomb blasts, even while surgical
-operations were being conducted.</p>
-
-<p>Every day there was rain and mud and surgeons
-practiced their craft with mud to their shoe laces.
-Corpsmen were shot as they treated the wounded right
-at the battle scene; others were shot as the Japanese
-ignored the International Red Cross emblem for ambulances
-and aid stations.</p>
-
-<p>Bougainville was the first time in combat for the
-corpsmen assigned to the 3d Marine Division. Two surgeons
-were with each battalion and, as in all other battles,
-a corpsman was with each platoon. Aid stations
-were as close as 30&ndash;50 yards behind the lines. The men
-from the division band were the litter bearers, always
-on the biting edge of combat.</p>
-
-<p>Many young Marines were not aware until combat
-just how close they would be to these corpsmen who
-wore the Marine uniform, and who would undergo
-every hardship and trial of the man on the line. The
-corpsman’s job required no commands; he was simply
-always there to patch up the wounded Marine enough
-to have him survive and get to a field hospital.</p>
-
-<p>Naval officers seldom had command over the corpsman.
-He was responsible directly to the platoon, company,
-and battalion to which he was assigned.</p>
-
-<p>Ashore on D-Day with the invading troops,
-Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Andrew Bernard later
-remembered setting up his 3d Marines regimental aid
-station, just inland in the muck off the beach beside the
-“C” Medical Field Hospital. Later, as action intensified,
-Bernard saw 15 to 20 wounded Marines waiting at the
-hospital for care, and commented, “this was when I
-noticed Dr. Duncan Shepherd.... The flaps of the hospital
-tent went open, and there was Dr. Shepherd operating
-away, so calm, so brave, so courageous&mdash;as
-though he was back in the Mayo Clinic, where he had
-trained.”</p>
-
-<p>On 7 December, the Japanese attacked around the
-Koromokina. The official history of the 3d Marine
-Division described the scene:</p>
-
-<blockquote>
-
-<p>The division hospital, situated near the
-beach, was subjected to daily air raids, and
-twice to artillery shelling.... Company E of
-the 3d Medical Battalion, which was the division
-hospital under Commander R.&nbsp;R.
-Callaway, USN, proved that delicate work
-could be carried on even in combat. During the
-battle the field hospital was attacked, bullets
-ripped through the protecting tent, seriously
-wounding a pharmacist’s mate.</p></blockquote>
-
-<div class="figleft iwidth">
-<img src="images/i_b_019.jpg" width="479" height="600" alt="" />
-<div class="captionl top"><p>Painting by Franklin Boggs in <i>Men Without Guns</i> (Philadelphia:/The
-Blakiston Company, 1945)</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Hellzapoppin Ridge was the most intense and miserable
-of the battles for the corpsmen of Bougainville,
-according to Pharmacist’s Mate First Class Carroll
-Garnett. He and three other corpsmen were assigned to
-the forward aid station located at the top of that bloody
-ridge. The two battalion surgeons were considered
-indispensable and discouraged from taking undue
-risks. Regardless, Assistant Battalion Surgeon
-Lieutenant Edmond A. Utkewicz, USNR, insisted on
-joining the corpsmen at the forward station and
-remained there throughout the entire battle. The doctor
-and his four assistants were often in the open, exposed
-to fire, and showered with the dust thrown up by mortar
-explosions.</p>
-
-<p>The corpsmen’s routine was: stop the bleeding,
-apply sulfa powder and battle dressing, shoot syrette of
-morphine, and administer plasma. The regular aid station
-was located at the bottom of the ridge where the
-battalion surgeon, Lieutenant Commander Horace L.
-Wolf, USNR, checked the wounded again, before sending
-them off in an ambulance, if available, to a better
-equipped station or a field hospital.</p>
-
-<p>Corpsmen (and Marines) were in deadly peril atop
-the ridge. Corpsman John A. Wetteland described volunteers
-bringing in a wounded paramarine who was
-still breathing when he and the medical team were hit
-anew by a shell. One corpsman was killed, another
-badly wounded, and Wetteland was badly mauled by
-mortar fragments, though he tried, he said, “to bandage
-myself.”</p>
-
-<p>Dr. Wolf later painted a grim picture of the taut circumstances
-under which the medics worked:</p>
-
-<blockquote>
-
-<p>Several of my brave corpsmen were killed in
-this action. The regimental band musicians
-were the litter bearers. I still remember the terrible
-odor of our dead in the tropical heat. The
-smell pinched one’s nostrils and clung to clothing....
-During combat in the swamps, about
-all one could do to try to purify water to drink
-was to put two drops of iodine solution in a
-canteen. Night was the worst, when we could
-not evacuate our sick and wounded. But, if one
-could get a ride to the airstrip on the jeep
-ambulance to put the sick and wounded on
-evacuation planes, one could see a female
-(Navy or Army nurses) for the first time in
-many months.</p></blockquote>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="Piva_Forks_Battle" id="Piva_Forks_Battle"></a><i>Piva Forks Battle</i></h2>
-
-<p>The lull after the Coconut
-Grove fight did not last long. On
-18 November, the usual flurry of
-patrols soon brought back information
-that the Japanese had set
-up a road block on both the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></span>
-Numa-Numa Trail and the East-West
-Trail.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_021.jpg" width="600" height="331" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-National Archives Photo 111&ndash;5C-190032
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>The 155mm guns of the Marine 3d Defense Battalion provided firepower in support of Marine riflemen holding the Torokina
-perimeter.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<div class="caption notbold"><p><i>Just getting to your assigned position meant slow, tiring slogging through endless mud.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 68247<br />
-</p></div>
-<img src="images/i_b_021b.jpg" width="600" height="399" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>To strike the Numa-Numa position,
-the 3d Marines sent in its 3d
-Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel
-Ralph M. King), to lead the attack.
-It hit the Japanese flanks, routed
-them, and set up its own road
-block on 19 November.</p>
-
-<p>The 2d Battalion of the 3d
-Marines immediately went after
-the Japanese block on the East-West
-Trail between the two forks
-of the Piva River. After seizing
-that position, the next objective
-was a 400-foot ridge that commanded
-the whole area&mdash;and, in
-fact, provided a view all the way
-to Empress Augusta Bay. (As the
-first high ground the Marines had
-found, it would clearly produce a
-valuable observation post for
-directing the artillery fire of the
-12th Marines.)</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 884px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_022.jpg" width="884" height="433" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>PIVA ACTION<br />
-<span class="smaller">NOV 1943</span></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Hector de
-Zayas, commanding the battalion,
-summoned one of his company
-commanders and gave a terse
-order, “I want you to take it.”
-Thus a patrol under First
-Lieutenant Steve J. Cibik was
-immediately sent to occupy it.
-This began a four-day epic, 20&ndash;23
-November. The Marines got to
-the top, realized the importance of
-the vantage point to the Japanese,
-dug in defensive positions, and
-got ready for the enemy counterattacks
-that were sure to come.
-And they came, and came, and
-came. There were “fanatical
-attempts by the Japanese to reoccupy
-the position” in the form of
-“wild charges that sometimes carried
-the Japanese to within a few
-feet of their foxholes on the crest
-of the ridge.” Cibik called in
-Marine artillery bursts within 50
-yards of his men. The Marines
-held and were finally relieved,
-exhausted but proud. Cibik was
-awarded a Silver Star Medal, and
-the hill was always known thereafter
-as “Cibik Ridge.”</p>
-
-<p>While the firestorm roared
-where Cibik stood, the 3d Marines
-were pursuing its mission of driving
-the Japanese from the first
-and nearest of Piva’s forks. The
-2d Battalion caught up with Cibik,
-and Lieutenant Colonel de Zayas
-moved it out down the reverse
-slope of Cibik Ridge. The
-Japanese struck hard on 21
-November and de Zayas pulled
-back. Then, in true textbook fashion,
-the Japanese followed right
-behind him. The Marines were
-ready, machine guns in place.
-One of them killed 74 out of 75 of
-the enemy attackers within 20&ndash;30
-yards of the gun.</p>
-
-<p>The 3d Marines was supported
-by the 9th, and 21st Marines, and
-the raiders, while the 37th
-Infantry Division provided roadblocks,
-patrols, and flank security.
-Support was also provided by the
-Army’s heavy artillery, the 12th
-Marines, and the defense battalions.
-All the troops were now be
-entering a new phase of the campaign,
-during which the fight
-would be more for the hills than
-for the trails.</p>
-
-<p>Reconnaissance patrols provided
-a good idea of what was out
-there, but they also discovered
-that the enemy was not alert as he
-could or should be. A Marine rifle
-company, for instance, came upon
-a clearing where the Japanese
-were acting as if no war was on&mdash;the
-troops were lounging, kibitzing,
-drinking beer. The Marine
-mortars tore them apart. Another
-patrol waited until the occupants
-of a bivouac lined up for chow
-before cutting them down with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span>
-mortars in a pandemonium of
-pots, pans, and tea kettles. (Jungle
-combat had taught the Marines
-the wisdom of General Turnage’s
-order: Marines go nowhere without
-a weapon!)</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 446px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_023.jpg" width="446" height="600" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-National Archives Photo 127-N-67228B
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>Marine communicators had the difficult task of stringing wire in dense jungle terrain
-while remaining wary of the enemy.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>The various, successive objectives
-for the Marine and Army
-riflemen were codenamed using
-the then-current phonetic alphabet:
-Dog (reached 15 November),
-Easy (reached 20 November,
-except for the 9th Marines, slowed
-by an impassable swamp), Fox
-(finally reached by the Marines on
-28 November) and How (part of it
-reached by the Army on 23
-November since it encountered
-“no opposition,” and the remainder
-as a goal for the Marines).
-Thereafter, the Marines were to
-press on to the Item and Jig objectives
-“on orders from Corps
-Headquarters.”</p>
-
-<p>One account makes clear the
-overwhelming difficulties facing
-the Marine battalions: “water
-slimy and often waist deep, sometimes
-to the arm pits ... tangles of
-thorny vines that inflicted painful
-wounds ... men slept setting up in
-the water ... sultry heat and stinking
-muck.”</p>
-
-<p>In spite of this, elaborate plans
-were made to continue the attack
-from west to east. The “strongly
-entrenched” Japanese defenses,
-with 1,200&ndash;1,500 men, were oriented
-to repel an assault from the
-south. Accordingly, the artillery
-observers on Cibik Ridge registered
-their fire on 23 November, in
-preparation for a thrust by two
-battalions of the 3d Marines to try
-to advance 800 yards beyond the
-east fork of the Piva River. All
-available tanks and supporting
-weapons were moved forward.
-Marine engineers from the 19th
-Marines joined Seabees under
-enemy fire in throwing bridges
-across the Piva River.</p>
-
-<p>On 23 November, as the night
-fell like a heavy curtain, seven
-battalions of artillery lined up,
-some almost hub-to-hub. There
-were the Army’s 155s, 105s, mortars,
-90mm AA; and the same
-array of the 12th Marines’ cannons,
-plus 44 machine guns and
-even a few Hotchkiss pieces taken
-from the enemy.</p>
-
-<p>The attack in the morning
-began with the barrage at 0835, 24
-November, Thanksgiving Day; a
-shuddering burst of flame and
-thunder, possibly the heaviest
-such barrage a Marine operation
-had ever before placed on a target.
-The shells, 5,600 rounds of them,
-descended on a narrow 800-foot
-square box of rain forest, only 100
-yards from the Marines, so close
-that shell splinters and concussion
-snapped twigs off bushes around
-them.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_024.jpg" width="600" height="394" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>BATTLE OF PIVA FORKS</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">FIRST PHASE<br />
-19&ndash;20 NOVEMBER</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Yet, as the two assault battalions
-moved out, the redoubtable
-Japanese <i>23d Infantry</i> crashed in
-with their own heavy barrage.
-Their shells left Marines dead,
-bleeding, and some drowned in
-the murky Piva River, “the heaviest
-casualties of the campaign.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span>
-Twice the enemy fire walked up
-and down the attacking Marines
-with great accuracy.” But the 3d
-Marines came on with a juggernaut
-of tanks, flame throwers, and
-machine gun, mortar, and rifle
-fire.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_024c.jpg" width="600" height="383" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>BATTLE OF PIVA FORKS</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">FINAL PHASE<br />
-21&ndash;25 NOVEMBER</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Where the Army-Marine
-artillery barrages fell, however,
-there was desolation. Major
-Schmuck, a company commander
-in one of the assault battalions,
-later remembered:</p>
-
-<blockquote>
-
-<p>For 500 yards, the Marines
-moved in a macabre world of
-splintered trees and burned-out
-brush. The very earth
-was a churned mass of mud
-and human bodies. The
-filthy, stinking streams were
-cesspools of blasted corpses.
-Over all hung the stench of
-decaying flesh and powder
-and smoke which revolted
-[even] the toughest. The first
-line of strong points with
-their grisly occupants was
-overrun and the 500-yard
-phase line was reached.</p>
-
-<p>The Japanese were not
-through. As the Marines
-moved forward a Nambu
-machine gun stuttered and
-the enemy artillery roared,
-raking the Marine line. A
-Japanese counterattack hit
-the Marines’ left flank. It
-was hand-to-hand and tree-to-tree.
-One company alone
-suffered 50 casualties,
-including all its officers. Still
-the Marines drove forward,
-finally halting 1,150 yards
-from their jump-off point,
-where resistance suddenly
-ended. The Japanese <i>23d
-Infantry</i> had been totally
-destroyed, with 1,107 men
-dead on the field. The
-Marines had incurred 115
-dead and wounded. The battle
-for Piva Forks had ended
-with a dramatic, hard fought
-victory which had “broken
-the back of organized enemy
-resistance.”</p></blockquote>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 553px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_024b.jpg" width="553" height="600" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 78796
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>To enable a forward observer to adjust
-artillery fire, these 3d Defense Battalion
-Marines used a jury-rigged hoist to lift
-him to the top of a banyan tree.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>There was one final flourish. It
-had been, after all, Thanksgiving
-Day, and a tradition had to be
-observed. President Franklin D.
-Roosevelt had decreed that all servicemen
-should get turkey&mdash;one
-way or another. Out there on the
-line the men got it by “the other.”
-Yet, few Marines of that era would
-give the Old Corps bad marks for
-hot chow. If they could get it to
-the frontline troops, they would.
-A Marine recalled, “The carrying
-parties did get the turkey to them.
-Nature won, though, the turkey
-had spoiled.” Another man was
-watching the big birds imbedded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span>
-in rice in five gallon containers,
-“much like home except for baseball
-and apple pie.” For some,
-however, just before the turkey
-was served, the word came down,
-“Prepare to move out!” Those
-men got their turkey and ate it on
-the trail ... on the way to a new
-engagement, Hand Grenade Hill.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 478px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_025.jpg" width="478" height="600" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-National Archives Photo 127-N-69394
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>Concealed in the heavy jungle growth, these men of Company E, 2d Battalion, 21st
-Marines, guard a Numa-Numa Trail position in the swamp below Grenade Hill.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Before that could be assaulted,
-there was a reorganization on D
-plus 24. The beat-up 3d Marines
-was beefed up by the 9th Marines
-and the 2d Raiders. Since D-Day a
-total of 2,014 Japanese dead had
-been counted, but “total enemy
-casualties must have been at least
-three times that figure.” And as a
-portent for the future use of
-Bougainville as a base for massive
-air strikes against the Japanese,
-U.S. planes were now able to use
-the airstrip right by the Torokina
-beachhead. With the enemy at
-last driven east of the Torokina
-River, Marines now occupied the
-high ground which controlled the
-site of the forthcoming Piva
-bomber airstrip.</p>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="Hand_Grenade_Hill" id="Hand_Grenade_Hill"></a><i>Hand Grenade Hill</i></h2>
-
-<p>The lead for the next assault on
-25 November was given to the
-fresh troops of Lieutenant Colonel
-Carey A. Randall, who had just
-taken over the 1st Battalion, 9th
-Marines. They were joined by the
-2d Raider Battalion under Major
-Richard T. Washburn. Randall
-could almost see his next objective
-from the prime high ground of
-Cibik Ridge. Just ahead rose
-another knoll, like the ridge it
-would be the devil to take, for the
-Japanese would hold it like a
-fortress. It would soon be called
-“Hand Grenade Hill” for good
-reason. Two of Randall’s companies
-went at it with Washburn’s
-raiders. But the Japanese gave a
-good account of themselves.
-Some 70 of them slowed the
-Marine attack, but one company
-got close to the top. The Marines
-were from five to 50 yards away
-from the Japanese, battling with
-small arms, automatic weapons,
-and hand grenades. The enemy
-resisted fiercely, and the Marines
-were thrown back by a shower of
-hand grenades. One Marine
-observed that the hill must been
-the grenade storehouse for the
-entire Solomon Islands.</p>
-
-<p>It was on Hand Grenade Hill
-that Lieutenant Howell T. Heflin,
-big, memorable, one of Alabama’s
-favorites, son of a Methodist minister,
-snatched up a BAR
-(Browning Automatic Rifle) and
-sprayed the Japanese positions.
-He pried open a way for his platoon
-almost to the hilltop, but
-could not hold there. He was
-awarded the Silver Star Medal,
-and later he went on to become
-Chief Justice of the Alabama
-Supreme Court and then the
-senior U.S. Senator from Alabama.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_026.jpg" width="600" height="468" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-National Archives Photo 127-N-71380
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>Evacuation of the wounded was always difficult. These men are carrying out a casualty
-from the fighting on Hill 1000.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>At the end of the action-filled
-day, the Marines were stalled. In
-the morning of 26 November surprised
-scouts found that the
-Japanese had pulled out in the
-darkness. Now all of the wet,
-smelly, churned-up terrain around
-the Piva Forks, including the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">26</a></span>
-strategic ridgeline blocking the
-East-West Trail, was in Marine
-hands.</p>
-
-<p>There now occurred a shuffling
-of units which resulted in the following
-line-up: 148th and 129th
-Infantry Regiments on line in the
-37th Division sector on the left of
-the perimeter. 9th Marines, 21st
-Marines, and 3d Marines, running
-from left to right, in the Marine
-sector.</p>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="The_Koiari_Raid" id="The_Koiari_Raid"></a><i>The Koiari Raid</i></h2>
-
-<p>As a kind of final security measure,
-IMAC was concerned about
-a last ridge of hills, some 2,000
-yards to the front, and really still
-dominating too much of the
-perimeter. Accordingly, on 28
-November, General Geiger
-ordered an advance to reach
-Inland Defense Line Fox. As a preliminary,
-to protect this general
-advance from a surprise Japanese
-attack on the far right flank, a raid
-was planned to detect any enemy
-troop movements, destroy their
-supplies, and disrupt their communications
-at a place called
-Koiari, 10 miles down the coast
-from Cape Torokina. The 1st
-Parachute Battalion, just in from
-Vella Levella under Major Richard
-Fagan, drew the assignment, with
-a company of the 3d Raider
-Battalion attached. While it had
-never made a jump in combat, the
-parachute battalion had been seasoned
-in the Guadalcanal campaign.</p>
-
-<p>Carried by a U.S. Navy landing
-craft, the men in the raid were put
-ashore at 0400, 29 November,
-almost in the middle of a Japanese
-supply dump. Total surprise all
-around! The Marines hastily dug
-in, while the enemy responded
-quickly with a “furious hail” of
-mortar fire, meanwhile lashing
-the beachhead with machine gun
-and rifle fire. Then came the
-Japanese attacks, and Marine
-casualties mounted “alarmingly.”
-They would have been worse
-except for a protective curtain of
-fire from the 155mm guns of the
-3d Defense Battalion back at Cape
-Torokina. With an estimated 1,200
-enemy pressing in on the Marines,
-it was painfully clear that the raiding
-group faced disaster. Two
-attempts to extricate them by their
-landing craft were halted by
-heavy Japanese artillery fire.
-Now the Marines had their backs
-to the sea and were almost out of
-ammunition. Then, about 1800,
-three U.S. destroyers raced in
-close to the beach, firing all guns.
-They had come in response to a
-frantic radio signal from IMAC,
-where the group’s perilous situation
-was well understood. Now a
-wall of shell fire from the destroyers
-and the 155s allowed two rescue
-craft to dash for the beach and
-lift off the raiding group safely.
-With none of the original objectives
-achieved, the raid had been a
-costly failure, even though it had
-left at least 145 Japanese dead.</p>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="Hellzapoppin_Ridge" id="Hellzapoppin_Ridge"></a><i>Hellzapoppin Ridge</i></h2>
-
-<p>Now the action shifted to the
-final targets of the 3d Marine
-Division: that mass of hills 2,000
-yards away. Once captured, they
-would block the East-West Trail
-where it crossed the Torokina
-River, and they would greatly
-strengthen the Final Inland
-Defense Line that was the
-Marines’ ultimate objective. A
-supply base, called Evansville,
-was built up for the attack in the
-rear of Hill 600 for the forthcoming
-attacks.</p>
-
-<p>The 1st Marine Parachute
-Regiment, under Lieutenant
-Colonel Robert H. Williams, was
-informed, two days after its
-arrival on Bougainville, that
-General Turnage had assigned it
-to occupy those hills which IMAC
-felt still dominated much of the
-Marine ground. That ridgeline
-included Hill 1000 with its spur
-soon to be called Hellzapoppin
-Ridge (named after “Hellzapoppin,”
-a long-running Broadway
-show), Hill 600, and Hill 600A. To<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span>
-take the terrain Williams got the
-support of elements of the 3d, 9th,
-and 21st Marines (which had
-established on 27 November its
-own independent outpost on Hill
-600). By 5 December, the 1st
-Parachute Regiment had won a
-general outpost line that stretched
-from Hill 1000 to the junction of
-the East-West Trail and the
-Torokina River.</p>
-
-<p>Then on 7 December, Major
-Robert T. Vance on Hill 1000 with
-his 3d Parachute Battalion walked
-the ridge spine to locate enemy
-positions on the adjacent spur that
-had been abandoned. The spur
-was fortified by nature: matted
-jungle for concealment, gullies to
-impair passage, steep slopes to
-discourage everything. That particular
-hump, which would get
-the apt name of Hellzapoppin
-Ridge, was some 280 feet high, 40
-feet across at the top, and 650 feet
-long, an ideal position for overall
-defense.</p>
-
-<p>Jumping off from Hill 1000 on
-the morning of 9 December to
-occupy the spur, Vance’s men
-were hit by a fusillade of fire. The
-Japanese had come back, 235 of
-them of the <i>23d Infantry</i>. The parachutists
-attacked again and again,
-without success. Artillery fire was
-called in, but the Japanese found
-protective concealment on the
-reverse slopes. Marine shells burst
-high in the banyan trees, up and
-away from the dug-in enemy. As a
-result, the parachutists were hit
-hard. “Ill-equipped and under-strength,”
-they were pulled back
-on 10 December to Hill 1000. Two
-battalions of the 21st Marines,
-with a battalion of the 9th Marines
-guarding their left flank, continued
-the attack. It would go on for
-six gruelling days.</p>
-
-<p>Scrambling up the slopes, the
-new attacking Marines would
-pass the bodies of the parachutists.
-John W. Yager, a first lieutenant
-in the 21st recalled, “The
-para-Marines made the first contact
-and had left their dead there.
-After a few days, they had become
-very unpleasant reminders of
-what faced us as we crawled forward,
-in many instances right
-next to them.”</p>
-
-<p>Sergeant John F. Pelletier, also
-in the 21st, was a lead scout.
-Trying to cross the ridge spine
-over to the Hellzapoppin spur, he
-found dead paratroopers all over
-the hill. There were dead Japanese
-soldiers still hanging from trees,
-and it seemed to him that no
-Marine had been able to cross to
-the crest and live to tell about it.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_027.jpg" width="600" height="391" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>HELLZAPOPPIN RIDGE</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">NEARING THE END<br />
-6&ndash;18 DECEMBER</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Pelletier described what happened
-next:</p>
-
-<blockquote>
-
-<p>The next morning Sergeant
-Oliver [my squad leader]
-told me to advance down the
-ridge as we were going to
-secure the point. That point
-was to become our most costly
-battle. We moved down
-the center until we were
-within 20 feet of the point.
-The Japs hit us with machine
-gun, rifle, and mortar fire.
-They popped out of spider
-holes. We were in a horseshoe-shaped
-ambush. We
-were firing as fast as we
-could when Sergeant Oliver
-pulled me back. He gave me
-the order to pull back up the
-ridge. He didn’t make it.</p></blockquote>
-
-<p>When artillery fire proved ineffective
-in battering the Japanese
-so deeply dug in on Hellzapoppin
-Ridge, Geiger called on 13
-December for air attacks. Six
-Marine planes had just landed at
-the newly completed Torokina
-airstrip. They came in with 100-pound
-bombs, guided to their targets
-by smoke shells beyond the
-Marine lines. But the Japanese
-were close, very close. Dozens of
-the bombs were dropped 75 yards
-from the Marines. With additional
-planes, there were four bombing
-and strafing strikes over several
-days. A Marine on the ground
-never forgot the bombers roaring
-in right over the brush, the ridge,
-and the heads of the Marines to
-drop their load, “It seemed right
-on top of us.” (This delivery technique
-was necessary to put the
-bombs on the reverse slope
-among the Japanese.)</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_028.jpg" width="600" height="466" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>EXPANSION OF THE BEACHHEAD</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS<br />
-1 NOVEMBER&ndash;15 DECEMBER 1943</p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Helping to control these early
-strikes and achieve pinpoint accuracy
-was Lieutenant Colonel
-William K. Pottinger, G-3
-(Operations Officer) of the
-Forward Echelon, 1st Marine
-Aircraft Wing. He had taken a
-radio out of a grounded plane,
-moved to the frontlines, and
-helped control the attacking
-Marine planes on the spot. (This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span>
-technique was an improvised
-forerunner of the finely tuned procedures
-that Marine dive bombers
-would use later to achieve
-remarkable results in close air
-support of ground troops.)</p>
-
-<p>The 3d Marine Division’s history
-was pithy in its evaluation, “It
-was the air attacks which proved
-to be the most effective factor in
-the taking of the ridge ... the most
-successful examples of close air
-support thus far in the Pacific
-War.”</p>
-
-<p>Geiger wasn’t through. He had
-a battery of the Army’s 155mm
-howitzers moved by landing craft
-to new firing positions near the
-mouth of the Torokina River. Now
-the artillery could pour it on the
-enemy positions on the reverse
-slopes.</p>
-
-<p>In one of the daily Marine
-assaults, one company went up
-the ridge for two attacks against
-Japanese who would jump into
-holes they had dug on the reverse
-slope to escape bombardment.
-The Japanese finally were tricked
-when another company, relieving
-the first one, jumped into the
-enemy foxholes before their rightful
-owners. It cost the Japanese
-heavily to try to return.</p>
-
-<p>In a final assault on 18
-December, the two battalions of
-the 21st moved from Hill 1000 to
-the spur in a pincer and double
-envelopment. But the artillery and
-bombs had done their work. The
-Japanese and their fortress were
-shattered. Stunned defenders
-were easily eliminated.</p>
-
-<p>Patrick O’Sheel, a Marine combat
-correspondent, summed up
-the bitter battle, “No one knows
-how many Japs were killed. Some
-30 bodies were found. Another
-dozen might have been put
-together from arms, legs, and torsos.”
-The 21st suffered 12 killed
-and 23 wounded.</p>
-
-<p>With Hellzapoppin finally
-behind them, Marines could count
-what blessings they could find
-and recount how rotten their holidays
-were. There had been a
-Thanksgiving Day spent on the
-trail while gnawing a drumstick
-on the way to another engagement
-at Piva Forks. And now, on
-21 December, four days until
-Christmas, and the troops still had
-Hill 600A to “square away.”</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_028b.jpg" width="600" height="394" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>ATTACK ON HILL 600A<br />
-<span class="smaller">22&ndash;23 DEC 1943</span></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_029.jpg" width="600" height="346" alt="" />
-<div class="caption"><p>ADVANCE TO THE EAST<br />
-<span class="smaller">NOV-DEC 1943</span></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<div class="captionl"><p><i>Chaplain Joseph A. Rabun of the 9th Marines delivers his sermon with a “Merry Christmas” sign overhead and a sand-bagged
-dugout close at hand.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 74819<br />
-</p></div>
-<img src="images/i_b_029b.jpg" width="600" height="422" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>Reconnaissance found 14&ndash;18
-Japanese on that hill, down by the
-Torokina River. A combat patrol
-from the 21st Marines moved to
-drive the Japanese off the knob. It
-wasn’t hard, but it cost the life of
-one Marine and one was wounded.
-But IMAC wanted a permanent
-outpost on the hill, and the
-3d Battalion, 21st, drew the
-assignment. It began with one
-rifle platoon and a platoon of
-heavy machine guns on 22
-December. Hill 600A was a repeat
-of past enemy tactics. The
-Japanese had come back to occupy
-it. They held against all efforts,
-even against a two-pronged
-attack. A full company came up
-and made three assaults. That didn’t<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span>
-help either. Late on the 23d,
-the Marines held for the night,
-preparing to mount another
-attack in the morning. That morning
-was Christmas Eve, 1943.
-Scouts went up to look. The
-Japanese had gone. Christmas
-wasn’t merry, but it was better.
-For the 3d Marine Division, the
-war was over on Bougainville.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<img src="images/i_b_030.jpg" width="600" height="335" alt="" />
-<div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-National Archives Photo 80-G-250368
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>The Piva airfields (shown here in February 1944 photograph) became key bomber and
-fighter strips in the aerial offensive against Rabaul.</i></p></div>
-</div>
-
-<p>The landing force had seized
-the beachhead, destroyed or overcome
-the enemy, and won the
-ground for the vital airfields. Now
-they prepared to leave, as the airfields
-were being readied to
-reduce Rabaul and its environs.</p>
-
-<p>Since 10 December, F4U Vought
-Corsairs of Marine Fighting
-Squadron (VMF) 216 (1st Marine
-Aircraft Wing) had settled on the
-new strip on Torokina, almost
-washed by the sea. The fighter
-planes would be the key to the
-successful prosecution of the
-AirSols (Air Solomons) offensive
-against Rabaul, for, as escorts,
-they made large-scale bombing
-raids feasible. Major General
-Ralph J. Mitchell, USMC, had
-become head of AirSols on 20
-November 1943. By 9 January
-1944, both the fighter and bomber
-aircraft were operating from the
-Piva strips. Following Bougainville,
-Mitchell would have twice
-the airpower and facilities that the
-Japanese had in all of the
-Southwest Pacific area.</p>
-
-<p>The campaign had cost the
-Marines 423 killed and 1,418
-wounded. Enemy dead were estimated
-at 2,458, with only 23 prisoners
-captured.</p>
-
-<p>It was now time for the 3d
-Marine Division to go home to
-Guadalcanal, with a “well done”
-from Halsey. (In the Admiral’s colorful
-language, a message to
-Geiger said, “You have literally
-succeeded in setting up and opening
-for business a shop in the Japs’
-front yard.”) Now there would be
-plenty of papayas and Lister bags,
-as well as a PX, a post office, and
-some sports and movies. General
-Turnage was relieved on 28
-December by Major General John
-R. Hodge of the Americal
-Division, which took over the
-eastern sector. The 37th Infantry
-Division kept its responsibility for
-the western section of the
-Bougainville perimeter. Admiral
-Halsey directed the Commanding
-General, XIV Corps, Major
-General Oscar W. Griswold, to
-relieve General Geiger, Commanding
-General, IMAC. The
-Army assumed control of the
-beachhead as of 15 December. The
-3d Marines left Bougainville on
-Christmas Day. The 9th left on 28
-December, and had a party with
-two cans of beer per man. The
-21st, last to arrive on the island,
-was the division’s last rifle regiment
-to leave, on 9 January 1944.</p>
-
-<p>Every man in those regiments
-knew full well the crucial role that
-the supporting battalions had
-played. The 19th Marines’ pioneers
-and engineers had labored
-ceaselessly to build the bridges
-and trails that brought the vital
-water, food, and ammunition to
-the front lines through seemingly
-impassable swamps, jungle, and
-water, water everywhere.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<div class="captionl"><p><i>A chaplain reads prayers for the burial of the dead, while their friends bow their heads
-in sorrow at the losses.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-From the Leach File, MCHC Archives<br />
-</p></div>
-<img src="images/i_b_030b.jpg" width="600" height="341" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>And the amtracs of the 3d
-Amphibian Tractor Battalion had
-proven essential in getting 22,922<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></span>
-tons of those supplies to the riflemen.
-They were “the most important
-link in the all-important supply
-chain.”</p>
-
-<p>Working behind the amtracs
-were the unsung men of the 3d
-Service Battalion who, under the
-division quartermaster, Colonel
-William C. Hall, brought order
-and efficiency from the original,
-chaotic pile-up of supplies on the
-beach. As roads were slowly built,
-the 6×6 trucks of the 3d Motor
-Transport Battalion moved the
-supplies to advance dumps for
-the amtracs to pick up.</p>
-
-<p>The 12th Marines and Army
-artillery had given barrage after
-barrage of preparatory fire&mdash;72,643
-rounds in all.</p>
-
-<p>The invaluable role of Marine
-aviation, as previously mentioned,
-was symbolized by
-General Turnage’s repeated
-requests for close air support, 10
-strikes in all.</p>
-
-<p>The Seabees, working at a
-“feverish rate,” had miraculously
-carved three airfields out of the
-unbelievable morass that characterized
-the area. And it was from
-those bases that the long-range,
-strategic effects of Bougainville
-would be felt by the enemy.</p>
-
-<p>The 3d Medical Battalion had
-taken care of the wounded. With
-omnipresent corpsmen on the
-front lines in every battle and aid
-stations and field hospitals right
-behind, the riflemen knew they
-had been well tended.</p>
-
-<p>General Turnage summarized
-the campaign well, “Seldom have
-troops experienced a more difficult
-combination of combat, supply,
-and evacuation. From its very
-inception, it was a bold and hazardous
-operation. Its success was
-due to the planning of all echelons
-and the indomitable will, courage,
-and devotion to duty of all members
-of all organizations participating.”</p>
-
-<p>Thus it was that the capture of
-Bougainville marked the top of
-the ladder, after the long climb up
-the chain of the Solomon Islands.</p>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="Epilogue" id="Epilogue"></a><i>Epilogue</i></h2>
-
-<p>There were, however, two
-minor land operations to complete
-the isolation of Rabaul. The first
-was at Green Island, just 37 miles
-north of Bougainville. It was a
-crusty, eight-mile-long (four-mile-wide)
-oval ring, three islands of
-sand and coral around a sleepy
-lagoon, and only 117 miles from
-Rabaul. To General Douglas
-MacArthur, it was the last step of
-the Solomon Islands campaign.</p>
-
-<p>The task of taking the island fell
-to the 5,800 men of the 3d New
-Zealand Division under Major
-General H.&nbsp;E. Barrowclough, less
-the 8th Brigade which had been
-used in the Treasuries operation.
-There was also a contingent of
-American soldiers, Seabees, and
-engineers, and cover from AirSol
-Marine planes under Brigadier
-General Field Harris. Rear
-Admiral Wilkinson had Task
-Force 31, whose warships would
-wait for targets (although Green
-Island would get no preinvasion
-bombardment). The atoll ring was
-too narrow and bombardment
-would pose a danger to island
-inhabitants.</p>
-
-<p>Late in January 1944, 300 men
-of the 30th New Zealand Battalion
-and Seabees and engineer specialists
-went ashore, measured and
-sized up the island’s potential,
-found spots for an airfield,
-checked lagoon depths, and
-sought accommodations for a
-boat basin.</p>
-
-<p>All of this warned the Japanese,
-but it was too late for them to do
-anything. Then, on 14 February,
-Japanese scout planes warned the
-102 defenders on Green Island
-that a large Allied convoy was on
-the way, shepherded by destroyers
-and cruisers. Japanese aircraft
-from Rabaul and Kavieng
-attacked the convoy by moonlight,
-but at 0641, the landing craft
-had crossed the line of departure
-unscathed and were almost to the
-beach. Within two hours, all were
-ashore, unopposed. Then Japanese
-dive bombers came roaring
-in, but the Allied antiaircraft fire
-and Marine fighter planes (VMF-212)
-were enough to prevent hits
-on the transports or beach supplies.
-New Zealand patrols got
-only slight resistance, a few brief
-firefights. By 19 February, the 33d,
-37th, and 93d Seabees were laying
-an airfield on the island.</p>
-
-<p>By 4 March, a heavy B-24
-bomber was able to make an
-emergency landing on the Green
-Island strip. Three days later,
-AirSols planes were staging there
-giving the strip the name
-“Green.” Soon B-24s were there to
-strike the vast Japanese base at
-Truk.</p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
-<div class="captionl"><p><i>Heavy, constant artillery support for the riflemen required a regular flow of ammunition.
-Here shells are being unloaded from a LST (Landing Ship, Tank).</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 71180 by PFC Philip Scheer<br />
-</p></div>
-<img src="images/i_b_031.jpg" width="600" height="242" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>The second operation saw the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></span>
-seizure of Emirau Island. It was
-well north of Green Island, 75
-miles northwest of the New
-Ireland enemy fortress of
-Kavieng. Actually, Kavieng had
-been considered as a target to be
-invaded by the 3d Marine
-Division, but higher authorities
-decided the cost would be too
-high. Better to let Kavieng die on
-the vine. Taking Emirau and setting
-up air and naval bases there
-would effectively cut off the
-Solomon Islands and the
-Bismarck Archipelago from the
-Japanese. It would be a small
-investment with big results.</p>
-
-<p>Emirau is an irregularly shaped
-island in the St. Matthias Group,
-eight miles long, four miles wide,
-with much jungle and many hills,
-but with room for boat basins and
-airstrips. The natives said there
-had been no Japanese there since
-January, and air reconnaissance
-could find none.</p>
-
-<p>The unit selected for the landing
-bore a famous name in the lore
-of the Corps: the 4th Marines. The
-original regiment had been the
-storied “China Marines,” and had
-then been part of the desperate
-defense of Bataan and the subsequent
-surrender at Corregidor in
-the Philippines. Now it had been
-reborn as a new, independent regiment,
-composed of the tough and
-battle-hardened veterans of the
-raider battalions.</p>
-
-<p>The 4th Marines arrived at
-Emirau shortly after 0600 on 20
-March 1944. The Marines and
-sailors fired a few shots at nothing;
-then the amphibian tractors
-opened up, wounding one of the
-Marines. The Seabees got right to
-work on the airfields, even before
-the island was secured. In no time
-they laid out a 7,000-foot bomber
-strip and a 5,000-foot stretch for
-fighters.</p>
-
-<p>All was secured until attention
-fell on a little neighboring island
-with a Japanese fuel and ration
-dump. Destroyers blew it all to
-debris ... then spied at sea a large
-canoe escaping with some of the
-enemy. Hardly bloodthirsty after
-this placid operation, the destroyer
-casually pulled in close. The
-Japanese chose to fire a machine
-gun. It was folly. The destroyer
-was forced to respond. The canoe
-didn’t sink and was brought
-alongside with the body of a
-Japanese officer and 26 living
-enlisted men&mdash;who may have privately
-questioned their officer’s
-judgement.</p>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="Bougainville_Finale" id="Bougainville_Finale"></a><i>Bougainville Finale</i></h2>
-
-<p>These were small affairs compared
-to the finale on Bougainville.
-With the withdrawal of the
-3d Marine Division at the end of
-1943, after it had successfully
-fought its way to the final defensive
-line, the two Army divisions,
-the 37th Infantry and the
-Americal, took over and extended
-the perimeter with only sporadic
-brushes with the Japanese.</p>
-
-<p>Then, in late February and early
-March 1944, patrols began making
-“almost continuous” contact with
-the enemy. It appeared that the
-Japanese were concentrating for a
-serious counterattack. On 8
-March, the 145th Infantry (of the
-37th) was hit by artillery fire. Then
-the <i>6th Division</i>, parent of the old
-enemy, the <i>23d Infantry</i>, attacked
-hard. It took five days of “very
-severe” fighting, with support
-from a battalion of the 148th
-Infantry, combined with heavy
-artillery fire and air strikes, to
-drive the determined Japanese
-back. Meanwhile, the 129th
-Infantry had also been “heavily
-attacked.” The enemy kept coming
-and coming, and it was a full
-nine days before there was a lull
-on 17 March.</p>
-
-<p>On 24 March the Japanese, after
-reorganizing, launched another
-series of assaults “with even
-greater pressure.” This time they
-also threw in three regiments of
-their <i>17th Division</i>. The artillery of
-both American divisions, guided
-by Cub spotter planes, fired “the
-heaviest support mission ever to
-be put down in the South Pacific
-Area.” That broke the back of the
-enemy attackers, and the battle
-finally was over on 25 March.</p>
-
-<p>Major General Griswold, the
-corps commander, after eight
-major enemy attacks, wrote in a
-letter four days later:</p>
-
-<blockquote>
-
-<p>I am absolutely convinced
-that nowhere on earth does
-there exist a more determined
-will and offensive
-spirit in the attack than that
-the Japs exhibited here. They
-come in hard, walking on
-their own dead, usually on a
-front not to exceed 100 yards.
-They try to effect a breakthrough
-which they exploit
-like water running from a
-hose. When stopped, they
-dig in like termites and fight
-to the death. They crawl up
-even the most insignificant
-fold in the ground like ants.
-And they use all their
-weapons with spirit and
-boldness.... Difficult terrain
-or physical difficulties have
-no meaning for them.</p></blockquote>
-
-<p>The Americal Division had
-advanced along with the 37th in
-the March-April period with its
-last action 13&ndash;14 April. This ended
-the serious offensive action for the
-two Army divisions; the enemy
-had been driven well out of
-artillery range of the airstrips,
-12,000 yards away.</p>
-
-<p>For Americans this marked the
-end of the Bougainville saga: a tale
-of well-trained units, filled with,
-determined, skillful men, who
-fought their way to a resounding
-victory. The 3d Marine Division
-had led the way in securing a vital
-island base with the crucial isolation
-of Rabaul thus ensured.</p>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="Sources" id="Sources"></a><i>Sources</i></h2>
-
-<p>The author owes a substantial debt to Cyril
-J. O’Brien who was a Marine Combat
-Correspondent on Bougainville. A draft he prepared
-describing this operation used U.S.
-Army, Coast Guard, and New Zealand as well
-as Marine Corps sources, and contained a variety
-of colorful vignettes and personal interviews,
-with some photographs not in official
-USMC files, all gratefully acknowledged.</p>
-
-<p>As always, the basic official Marine history
-of the Pacific campaigns covers Bougainville
-and the auxiliary landings in massive detail:
-Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Maj Douglas T. Kane,
-USMC, <i>Isolation of Rabaul</i>, vol. 2, <i>History of U.S.
-Marine Corps Operations in World War II</i>
-(Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division,
-Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1963).</p>
-
-<p>An earlier, more condensed official history
-is Maj John N. Rentz, USMCR, <i>Bougainville and
-the Northern Solomons</i> (Washington: Historical
-Section, Division of Public Information,
-Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1948).</p>
-
-<p>The earliest, most modest official account is
-a mimeographed summary, characterized as a
-“first attempt”: U.S. Marine Corps,
-Headquarters, Historical Division. Unpublished
-monograph: “The Bougainville
-Operation, First Marine Amphibious Corps, 1
-November&ndash;28 December 1943,” dtd Feb45.
-VE603 1st.A2, Library, Marine Corps Historical
-Center, Washington, D.C.</p>
-
-<p>A quasi-official history of the 3d Marine
-Division was “made possible by the
-Commandant, who authorized the expenditure
-of the division’s unused Post Exchange funds.</p>
-
-<p>The final draft was approved by a group of
-3d Division officers....” The book is: 1stLt
-Robert A. Aurthur, USMCR, and 1stLt Kenneth
-Cohlmia, USMCR, edited by LtCol Robert T.
-Vance, USMC, <i>The Third Marine Division</i>
-(Washington: Infantry Journal Press. 1948).</p>
-
-<p>An account representing direct personal
-participation in the campaign, supplemented
-by later interviews, is: Capt John A. Monks, Jr.,
-<i>A Ribbon and a Star: The Third Marines at
-Bougainville</i> (New York: Holt and Co., 1945).</p>
-
-<p>Another history traces the campaign on the
-island past the Marine operation to the subsequent
-U.S. Army battles, and concludes with
-the Australians as the final troops leading to the
-overall Japanese surrender in 1945: Harry A.
-Gailey, <i>Bougainville 1943&ndash;1945&mdash;The Forgotten
-Campaign</i> (Lexington, Ky: University Press of
-Kentucky, 1991).</p>
-
-<p>The full story of the crucial naval battle as
-the Marines landed is in RAdm Samuel Eliot
-Morison, <i>Breaking the Bismarck Barrier, 22 July
-1942&ndash;1 May 1944</i>, vol. 6, <i>History of United States
-Naval Operations in World War II</i> (Boston: Little
-Brown and Co., 1950).</p>
-
-<p>A detailed account of the death of Adm
-Yamamoto is in R. Cargil Hall, ed., <i>Lightning
-Over Bougainville</i> (Washington: Smithsonian
-Institution Press, 1991).</p>
-
-<p>Personal Papers and Oral Histories files at
-the Marine Corps Historical Center were
-unproductive, but the biographical and photographic
-files were most helpful. The staff of the
-Marine Corps Historical Center was always
-cooperative, in particular Catherine Kerns, who
-prepared my manuscript copy.</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 class="green"><a name="About_the_Author" id="About_the_Author"></a><i>About the Author</i></h2>
-
-<div class="figleft" style="width: 186px; margin-top: 0;">
-<img src="images/i_b_033.jpg" width="186" height="202" alt="Captain John C. Chapin" style="border-top: 0; padding-top: 0;" />
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Captain</span> John C. Chapin earned a bachelor
-of arts degree with honors in history from
-Yale University in 1942 and was commissioned
-later that year. He served as a rifle platoon
-leader in the 24th Marines, 4th Marine
-Division, and was wounded in action during
-assault landings on Roi-Namur and Saipan.</p>
-
-<p>Transferred to duty at the Historical
-Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, he
-wrote the first official histories of the 4th and
-5th Marine Divisions. Moving to Reserve status at the end of World War II, he
-earned a master’s degree in history at George Washington University with a
-thesis on “The Marine Occupation of Haiti, 1915&ndash;1922.”</p>
-
-<p>Now a captain in retired status, he has been a volunteer at the Marine Corps
-Historical Center for 12 years. During that time he wrote <i>History of Marine
-Fighter-Attack (VMFA) Squadron 115</i>. With support from the Historical Center
-and the Marine Corps Historical Foundation, he then spent some years
-researching and interviewing for the writing of a new book, <i>Uncommon Men:
-The Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps</i>, published in 1992 by the White Mane
-Publishing Company.</p>
-
-<p>Subsequently, he wrote four monographs for this series of historical pamphlets,
-commemorating the campaigns for the Marshalls, Saipan, Bougainville,
-and Marine Aviation in the Philippines operations.</p>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar" id="About_series">
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px; margin-top: 0; padding-top: 0;">
-<img src="images/i_b_033b.jpg" width="600" height="166" alt="Logos" style="margin-top: 0; padding-top: 0;" />
-</div>
-
-<p>THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in
-the World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines
-by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
-Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance of
-the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.</p>
-
-<p>Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by
-a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in the memory of her late husband,
-Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of
-a Purple Heart.</p>
-
-<div class="center">
-<p class="p1 bold" style="font-family: sans-serif, serif;">WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</p>
-
-<p>
-<i>DIRECTOR EMERITUS OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS</i><br />
-
-<b>Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)</b></p>
-
-<p><i>GENERAL EDITOR,<br />
-WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</i><br />
-
-<b>Benis M. Frank</b></p>
-
-<p><i>CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT</i><br />
-
-<b>George C. MacGillivray</b></p>
-
-<p><i>EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION</i><br />
-
-<b>Robert E. Strudet</b>, <i>Senior Editor</i>; <b>W. Stephen Hill</b>, <i>Visual Information Specialist</i>;<br />
-<b>Catherine A. Kerns</b>, <i>Composition Services Technician</i>.</p>
-
-<p>Marine Corps Historical Center<br />
-Building 58, Washington Navy Yard<br />
-Washington, D.C. 20374&ndash;5040</p>
-
-<p>1997</p>
-
-<p>PCN 19000314100</p>
-</div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 438px;">
-<img src="images/i_back.jpg" width="438" height="592" alt="back cover" />
-</div>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="transnote">
-<h2 class="p1 nobreak"><a name="Transcribers_Notes" id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
-
-<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
-preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.</p>
-
-<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
-quotation marks retained.</p>
-
-<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p>
-
-<p>To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,
-some images have been made relatively larger than in the original
-pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other.
-Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between the chapters
-of the main text, marked as [Sidebar (page nn):], and treated as separate
-chapters.</p>
-
-<p>Descriptions of the Cover and Frontispiece have been moved from
-page 1 of the book to just below those illustrations, and text
-referring to the locations of those illustrations has been deleted.</p>
-
-<p>Page <a href="#Page_5">5</a>: “had now become” was misprinted as “became”.</p>
-
-<p>Page <a href="#Page_10">10</a>: “rendezvoused” was misprinted as “rendezoused”.</p>
-
-<p>Page <a href="#Page_22">22</a>: “troops were now be entering” was printed that way.</p>
-
-<p>Page <a href="#Page_22">22</a>: “slogging through endless mud” was misprinted as “though”.</p>
-
-<p>Page <a href="#Page_23">23</a>: “men slept setting up” was printed that way.</p>
-
-<p>Page <a href="#Page_27">27</a>: “650 feet long, an ideal position” was misprinted
-as “and ideal”.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-<pre>
-
-
-
-
-
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+<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48808 ***</div>
+
+<div class="transnote">
+<p class="center">Transcriber's note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber
+and placed into the Public Domain.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak">Contents</h2>
+
+<div class="center vspace"><div class="center-block">
+<ul>
+<li><a href="#Top_of_the_Ladder">Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations in the Northern Solomons</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_Major_General_Allen_H_Turnage_USMC">SIDEBAR: Major General Allen H. Turnage, USMC</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Planning_the_Operation">Planning the Operation</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_3d_Marine_Division">SIDEBAR: 3d Marine Division</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Diversionary_Landings">Diversionary Landings</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_The_Coastwatchers">SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Battle_at_Sea">Battle at Sea</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Action_Ashore_Koromokina">Action Ashore: Koromokina</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_37th_Infantry_Division">SIDEBAR: 37th Infantry Division</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#The_Battle_for_Piva_Trail">The Battle for Piva Trail</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_War_Dogs">SIDEBAR: War Dogs</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#The_Coconut_Grove_Battle">The Coconut Grove Battle</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_Navajo_Code_Talkers">SIDEBAR: Navajo Code Talkers</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#SIDEBAR_Corpsman">SIDEBAR: ‘Corpsman!’</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Piva_Forks_Battle">Piva Forks Battle</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Hand_Grenade_Hill">Hand Grenade Hill</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#The_Koiari_Raid">The Koiari Raid</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Hellzapoppin_Ridge">Hellzapoppin Ridge</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Epilogue">Epilogue</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Bougainville_Finale">Bougainville Finale</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Sources">Sources</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#About_the_Author">About the Author</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#About_series">About this series of pamphlets</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</a></li>
+</ul>
+</div></div>
+
+
+<h1 style="text-align: left; clear: none;">
+<span class="smcap">Top of the Ladder</span>:<br />
+
+<span class="subhead smcap">Marine Operations in the<br />
+Northern Solomons</span></h1>
+
+<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">Marines in<br />
+World War II<br />
+Commemorative Series</span></p>
+
+<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">By Captain John C. Chapin<br />
+U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Ret)</span>
+</p>
+
+<div class="p2 figcenter" style="width: 374px;">
+<img src="images/i_a_000.jpg" width="374" height="500" alt="" />
+<div class="captionl"><p class="justify"><i>Riflemen clad in camouflage
+dungarees await the lowering of
+their landing craft from</i> George Clymer
+<i>(APA 27) for their dash to the beaches in
+their amphibious assault landing on
+Bougainville</i>. (National Archives
+Photo 80-G-55810)</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 444px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_000.jpg" width="444" height="600" alt="" />
+<div class="captionl"><p><i>Raiders, up to their hips in
+water, man a machine gun along a jungle
+trail</i>. Department of Defense Photo
+(USMC) 70764</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">1</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 style="text-align: left; margin-bottom: 0;"><a name="Top_of_the_Ladder" id="Top_of_the_Ladder"></a>Top of the Ladder:<br />
+Marine Operations in the<br />
+Northern Solomons</h2>
+
+<p class="p0 in0" style="margin-bottom: 2em;"><i>by Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)</i></p>
+
+<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">A</span>ssault</span> landings began
+for the men in the
+blackness of the early
+hours of the morning.
+On 1 November 1943,
+the troops of the 3d Marine
+Division were awakened before
+0400, went to General Quarters at
+0500, ate a tense breakfast, and
+then stood by for the decisive command,
+“Land the Landing Force.”
+All around them the preinvasion
+bombardment thundered, as the
+accompanying destroyers poured
+their 5-inch shells into the target
+areas, and spotters in aircraft
+helped to adjust the fire.</p>
+
+<p>As the sun rose on a bright,
+clear day, the word came at 0710
+for the first LCVPs (Landing
+Craft, Vehicle and Personnel) to
+pull away from their transport
+ships and head for the shore, a
+5,000-yard run across Empress
+Augusta Bay to the beaches of an
+island called Bougainville.</p>
+
+<p>Almost 7,500 Marines were
+entering their LCVPs (with Coast
+Guard crew and coxswains) for an
+assault on 12 color-coded beaches.
+Eleven of these extended west
+from Cape Torokina for 8,000
+yards to the Koromokina Lagoon.
+The 12th was on Puruata Island
+just offshore from the beaches.
+The six beaches on the right were
+assigned to Colonel George W.
+McHenry’s 3d Marines and
+Lieutenant Colonel Alan
+Shapley’s 2d Raider Regiment
+(less one battalion). The five on
+the left and Puruata Island were
+the objectives of Colonel Edward
+A. Craig’s 9th Marines and
+Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Bean’s
+3d Raider Battalion.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 459px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_001.jpg" width="459" height="600" alt="Bougainville" />
+</div>
+
+<p>As the men headed for shore, 31
+Marine torpedo and scout
+bombers, covered by fighters,
+came screaming in from their base
+at Munda, bombing and strafing
+to give the beaches a final plastering.
+At 0726, the first wave
+touched ground, four minutes
+ahead of the official H-Hour. As<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</a></span>
+the other waves came in, it was
+immediately apparent that there
+was serious trouble in two ways.
+A high surf was tossing the
+LCVPs and LCMs (Landing Craft,
+Medium) around, and they were
+landing on the wrong beaches,
+broaching, and smashing into
+each other in the big waves. By
+the middle of the morning, 64
+LCVPs and 22 LCMs were hulks
+littering the beaches. Three of the
+designated beaches had to be
+abandoned as unusable.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_002.jpg" width="600" height="477" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 62751
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>Marine riflemen keep their heads down as they get closer to the assault beach on D-Day.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Major Donald M. Schmuck,
+commanding a company in the 3d
+Marines, later recalled how, in the
+“mad confusion” of the beachhead,
+his company was landed in
+the midst of heavy gunfire in the
+middle of another battalion’s zone
+on the beach of Torokina. Running
+his company on the double
+through the other battalion and
+the 2d Raiders’ zone across inlets
+and swamp, Major Schmuck got
+his men to the right flank of his
+own battalion where they were to
+have landed originally. His surprised
+battalion commander,
+Lieutenant Colonel Hector de
+Zayas, stared at the bedraggled
+new arrivals exclaiming, “Where
+have you been?” Major Schmuck
+pointed back to Cape Torokina
+and replied, “Ask the Navy!”</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_002b.jpg" width="600" height="403" alt="" />
+<div class="captionl"><p><i>As seen from a beached landing craft, these Marines are under fire while wading in the
+last few yards to the beach.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>The other trouble came from
+the Japanese defenders. While the
+9th Marines on the left landed
+unopposed, the 3d Marines on the
+right met fierce opposition, a
+deadly crossfire of machine gun
+and artillery fire. One Japanese
+75mm gun, sited on Cape
+Torokina, was sending heavy
+enfilade fire against the incoming
+landing waves. It smashed 14
+boats and caused many casualties.
+The boat group commander’s
+craft took a direct hit, causing the
+following boat waves to become
+disorganized and confused.
+Machine gun and rifle fire, with
+90mm mortar bursts added, covered
+the shoreline. Companies
+landed in the wrong places.
+Dense underbrush, coming right
+down to the beaches, shrouded
+the defenders in their 25 bunkers
+and numerous rifle pits. The commanding
+officer of the 1st
+Battalion, 3d Marines, Major
+Leonard M. “Spike” Mason, was
+wounded and had to be evacuated,
+but not before he shouted to
+his men, “Get the hell in there and
+fight!” Nearby, the executive officer
+of the 2d Raider Regiment,
+Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J.
+McCaffery, was directing an
+assault when he was severely
+wounded. He died that night.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="figleft portrait">
+<img src="images/i_b_003.jpg" width="233" height="349" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>Sgt Robert A. Owens was posthumously
+awarded the Medal of Honor.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>In spite of the chaos, the intensive
+training of the Marines took
+hold. Individuals and small
+groups moved in to assault the
+enemy, reducing bunker after
+bunker, dropping grenades down
+their ventilators. For an hour, the
+situation was in doubt.</p>
+
+<p>The fierce combat led to a wry
+comment by one captain, Henry
+Applington II, comparing “steak
+and eggs served on white tablecloths
+by stewards ... and three
+and a half hours and a short boat
+ride later ... rolling in a ditch trying
+to kill another human being
+with a knife.”</p>
+
+<p>The devastating fire from the
+75mm cannon on Cape Torokina
+was finally silenced when
+Sergeant Robert A. Owens, crept
+up to its bunker, and although
+wounded, charged in and killed
+the gun crew and the occupants of
+the bunker before he himself was
+killed. A posthumous Medal of
+Honor was awarded to him for
+this heroic action which was so
+crucial to the landing.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, on Puruata Island,
+just offshore of the landing beaches,
+the noise was intense; a well-dug-in
+contingent of Japanese
+offered stiff resistance to a reinforced
+company of the 3d
+Battalion, 2d Raiders. It was
+midafternoon of D plus one before
+the defenders in pill boxes, rifle
+pits, and trees were subdued, and
+then some of them got away to
+fight another day. A two-pronged
+sweep and mop-up by the raiders
+on D plus 2 found 29 enemy dead
+of the 70 Japanese estimated to
+have been on that little island.
+The raiders lost five killed and 32
+wounded.</p>
+
+<p>An hour after the landings on
+the main beaches a traditional
+Marine signal was flashed from
+shore to the command and staff
+still afloat, “Situation well in
+hand.” This achievement of the
+riflemen came in spite of the ineffective
+prelanding fire of the
+destroyers. The men in front-line
+combat found that none of the 25
+enemy bunkers on the right-hand
+beaches had been hit. Some of the
+naval bombardment had begun at
+a range of over seven miles, and
+the official Marine history summarized,
+“The gunfire plan ...
+had accomplished nothing.”</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<div class="caption notbold"><p><i>On a beach, rifles pointing toward the enemy, Marines get ready to fight their way inland.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 69782<br />
+</p></div>
+<img src="images/i_b_003b.jpg" width="600" height="319" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Unloading supplies and getting
+them in usable order on the chaotic
+beaches was a major problem.
+Seabees, sailors, and Marines all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span>
+turned to the task, with 40 percent
+of the entire landing force laboring
+as the shore party. They sweated
+6,500 tons of supplies ashore.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_004.jpg" width="600" height="478" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>THE LANDING AT CAPE TOROKINA</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS<br />
+1 NOVEMBER 1943</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">Yellow beaches for cargo unloading during assault phase</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Simultaneously, the batteries of
+the 12th Marines were struggling
+to get their artillery pieces ashore
+and set to fire. One battery, in support
+of the 2d Raider Battalion,
+waded through a lagoon to find
+firing positions. Amtracs (amphibian
+tractors), supplemented by
+rubber boats, were used to ferry
+the men and ammunition to the
+beaches. The 90mm antiaircraft
+guns of the 3d Defense Battalion
+were also brought ashore early to
+defend against the anticipated air
+attacks.</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese had been quick to
+respond to this concentration of
+American ships. Before the first
+assault boats had hit the beach, a
+large flight of enemy carrier
+planes was on its way to attack the
+Marines and their supporting
+ships. New Zealand and Marine
+fighters met them in the air and
+the covering destroyers put up a
+hail of antiaircraft fire, while the
+transports and cargo ships took
+evasive action. Successive Japanese
+flights were beaten off; 26
+enemy planes were shot down.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 890px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_004b.jpg" width="890" height="603" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>THE SOLOMON ISLANDS</p>
+
+<p>1943</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="figleft portrait">
+<img src="images/i_b_006.jpg" width="234" height="360" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 61899
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift was an
+early commander of IMAC.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>The men in the rifle battalions
+long remembered the sight. On<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span>
+one occasion, a Marine Corsair
+was about to pull the trigger on an
+enemy Zeke (“Zero”) fighter set
+up perfectly in the pilot’s sights
+when a burst of fire from Marine
+.50-caliber machine guns on the
+beach, meant for the Zeke, shot
+the American down. One of the
+riflemen later recalled that the
+Marine pilot fell into the ocean
+and surfaced with a broken leg.
+“We waded out to get him. He
+was ticked off&mdash;mostly because he
+missed the Jap.”</p>
+
+<p>In spite of all these problems, the
+assault battalions had, by the end
+of D-Day, reached their objectives
+on the Initial Beachhead Line, 600&ndash;1,000
+yards inland. One enormous
+unexpected obstacle, however,
+had now become painfully
+clear. Available maps were nearly
+useless, and a large, almost
+impenetrable swamp, with water
+three to six feet deep, lay right
+behind the beaches and made
+movement inland and lateral contact
+among the Marine units
+impossible.</p>
+
+<p>The night of D-Day was typical
+for the ground troops. By 1800,
+darkness had set in and the men
+all knew the iron-clad rule: be in
+your foxhole and stay there.
+Anyone moving around out there
+was a Japanese soldier trying to
+infiltrate. John A. Monks, Jr.,
+quoted a Marine in his book, A
+Ribbon and a Star:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>From seven o’clock in the
+evening till dawn, with only
+centipedes and lizards and
+scorpions and mosquitoes
+begging to get acquainted&mdash;wet,
+cold, exhausted, but
+unable to sleep&mdash;you lay
+there and shivered and
+thought and hated and
+prayed. But you stayed there.
+You didn’t cough, you didn’t
+snore, you changed your<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span>
+position with the least
+amount of noise. For it was
+still great to be alive.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>At sea, the transports and cargo
+ships were withdrawn; there was
+intelligence that enemy naval
+forces were on the move.</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_Major_General_Allen_H_Turnage_USMC" id="SIDEBAR_Major_General_Allen_H_Turnage_USMC"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_5">page 5</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">Major General Allen H. Turnage, USMC</h3>
+
+<div class="figright iwidth">
+<img src="images/i_b_005.jpg" width="344" height="451" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">A</span>llen</span> Hal Turnage was born in Farmville, North
+Carolina, on 3 January 1891. After attending
+Horner Military Academy and then the
+University of North Carolina, at age 22 he was appointed
+a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps. Sent to
+Haiti, he served with the 2d Marine Regiment from
+1915 to 1918, becoming a company commander in the
+Haitian Gendarmerie.</p>
+
+<p>A captain in 1917, Turnage did get to France where
+he commanded the 5th Marine Brigade Machine Gun
+Battalion. Home in 1919, he was assigned to the 5th
+Marines at Quantico and became regimental adjutant
+and an instructor for the first Field Officers School,
+1920&ndash;22.</p>
+
+<p>A major in 1927, Turnage had three years with the
+Pacific fleet, and then he served with the U.S. Electoral
+Mission in Nicaragua (1932). He came back to
+Washington, made lieutenant colonel in 1934 and full
+colonel in 1939. He was director of the Basic School at
+the Philadelphia Navy Yard, and, in the spring of 1939,
+he was sent to China to head Marine forces in North
+China.</p>
+
+<p>In summer of 1941, on the eve of the Japanese attack
+on Pearl Harbor, he returned to Headquarters in
+Washington. In 1942, as a brigadier general, he commanded
+the burgeoning Marine Base and Training
+Center at New River, North Carolina.</p>
+
+<p>When the 3d Marine Division was formed in
+September 1942, he was named assistant division commander.
+In the summer of 1943 Turnage was promoted
+to major general and selected to head the division. He
+then led the division on Bougainville and in the liberation
+of Guam, the first American territory to be recaptured
+from the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>After the war, he was appointed Assistant
+Commandant, followed by promotion to lieutenant
+general and command of FMFPac (Fleet Marine Force,
+Pacific). He retired 1 January 1948, and died 22 October
+1971.</p>
+
+<p>His awards included the Navy Cross, the Navy
+Distinguished Service Medal, and the Presidential Unit
+Citation (which his men received for both Guam and
+Iwo Jima).</p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="Planning_the_Operation" id="Planning_the_Operation"></a><i>Planning the Operation</i></h2>
+
+<div class="figright portrait">
+<img src="images/i_b_006b.jpg" width="234" height="299" alt="" />
+
+<div class="captionr">
+<p>
+Photo courtesy of Cyril J. O’Brien
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>LtGen Haruyoshi Hyakutake, commanded
+the Japanese forces on
+Bougainville.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>This kind of strong enemy reaction,
+in the air and at sea, had been
+expected by American staff officers
+who had put in long weeks
+planning the Bougainville operation.
+Looking at a map of the
+Solomon Islands chain, it was
+obvious that this largest island
+(130 by 30 miles) on the northwest
+end was a prime objective to cap
+the long and painful progress
+northward from the springboard
+of Guadalcanal at the south end.
+As Guadalcanal had been the
+beginning of the island chain, so
+now Bougainville would mark the
+top of the ladder in the Northern
+Solomons. From Bougainville airfields,
+American planes could
+neutralize the crucial Japanese
+base of Rabaul less than 250 miles
+away on New Britain. From
+Bougainville, the enemy could
+defend his massive air-naval complex
+at Rabaul. “Viewed from
+either camp, the island was a priority
+possession.”</p>
+
+<p>There were the usual sequences
+of high level planning conferences,
+but, on 1 October 1943,
+Admiral William F. Halsey,
+Commander, South Pacific Area,
+notified General Douglas MacArthur,
+Supreme Allied
+Commander, Southwest Pacific
+Area, that the beaches on Empress
+Augusta Bay in the middle of
+Bougainville’s west coast would
+be the main objective. This location
+was selected as the point to
+strike because with the main
+Japanese forces 25 miles away at
+the opposite north and south ends
+of the island, it would be the point
+of least opposition. In addition, it
+provided a natural defensive
+region once the Marines had landed
+and their airfields had been
+gouged out of the swamp and jungle.
+Finally, the target area would
+provide a site for a long-range
+radar installation and an
+advanced naval base for PT
+(patrol torpedo) boats.</p>
+
+<p>It promised to be a campaign in
+a miserable location. And it was.
+There were centipedes three fingers
+wide, butterflies as big as little
+birds, thick and nearly impenetrable
+jungles, bottomless mangrove
+swamps, crocodile infested
+rivers, millions of insects, and
+heavy daily torrents of rain with
+enervating humidity.</p>
+
+<p>Major General Allen H.
+Turnage, the 3d Marine Division
+commander, summarized these
+horrors. “Never had men in the
+Marine Corps had to fight and
+maintain themselves over such
+difficult terrain as was encountered
+on Bougainville.”</p>
+
+<p>To carry out this operation,
+Lieutenant General Alexander A.
+Vandegrift, Commanding General,
+I Marine Amphibious Corps
+(IMAC),<a name="FNanchor_A" id="FNanchor_A" href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</a> had in his command for
+the operation:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>3d Marine Division</p>
+
+<p>1st Marine Parachute Regiment</p>
+
+<p>2d Marine Raider Regiment</p>
+
+<p>37th Infantry Division, USA (in reserve)</p></blockquote>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_A" id="Footnote_A" href="#FNanchor_A" class="fnanchor">A</a> Gen Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commander
+on Guadalcanal, relieved MajGen
+Clayton B. Vogel as IMAC commander in July
+1943. He in turn was relieved as IMAC commander
+by MajGen Charles D. Barrett on 27
+September. Gen Vandegrift was on his way
+home to Washington to become 18th
+Commandant of the Marine Corps when, on
+the sudden death of Gen Barrett on 8 October,
+he was recalled to the Pacific to resume command
+of IMAC and lead it in the Bougainville
+operation. He, in turn, was relieved by MajGen
+Roy S. Geiger on 9 November.</p></div>
+
+<p>The Marine riflemen in these
+units were supplemented by a
+wide range of support: 155mm
+artillery; motor transport; amphibian
+tractor; and signal, medical,
+special weapons, Seabee, and tank
+battalions. The 3d Division had its
+own engineers and pioneers in the
+19th Marines and artillery in the
+12th Marines.</p>
+
+<p>Immediately following Vandegrift’s
+operation order, practice
+landing exercises were conducted
+in the New Hebrides and on
+Guadalcanal and Florida Islands.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_007.jpg" width="600" height="510" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>TREASURY ISLANDS LANDINGS</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS<br />
+27 OCTOBER 1943</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="figright portrait">
+<div class="captionl"><p><i>LtCol Victor H. Krulak was commander
+of the Choiseul operation.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC)<br />
+</p></div>
+<img src="images/i_b_007b.jpg" width="234" height="302" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The objectives assigned on
+Bougainville were to seize a substantial
+beachhead and build
+airstrips. Then American planes
+could assure final neutralization
+of the Japanese airfields at Kahili,
+Buka, and Bonis airfields at the
+north and south ends of
+Bougainville. (By 31 October,
+American planes had initially rendered
+the Japanese fields inoperable.)
+After that would come a massive
+increase in air operations
+against Rabaul.</p>
+
+<p>Facing the invading Marines
+was a formidable enemy force dispersed
+on the island. At Buin, for
+instance, there were 21,800
+Japanese. Responsible for the
+defense was an old adversary,
+Lieutenant General Haruyoshi
+Hyakutake, commander of the
+<i>Seventeenth Army</i>, and the man the
+Marines had defeated at
+Guadalcanal. His main force was
+the <i>6th Division</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Working with the ground U. S.
+forces were the aviators of Air
+Solomons: New Zealand fighters,
+Army Air Force bombers, and the
+1st and 2d Marine Aircraft Wings.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</a></span>
+As early as 15 August fighter
+planes from VMF-214 (the famous
+Black Sheep squadron) had
+strafed the Kahili airfield at the
+southern end of Bougainville.
+Now, in October, there were
+repeated strikes against the
+Japanese planes at other
+Bougainville airfields.</p>
+
+<p>At sea, Halsey had designated
+Rear Admiral Theodore S.
+Wilkinson as commander of Task
+Force 31. Under him were Rear
+Admiral Frederick C. Sherman
+with the carriers (TF 38) and Rear
+Admiral Aaron S. “Tip” Merrill
+with the cruisers and destroyers
+(TF 39). Their job was to soften up
+the defenders before the landing
+and to safeguard the Marine-held
+beachhead.</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_3d_Marine_Division" id="SIDEBAR_3d_Marine_Division"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_8">page 8</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">3d Marine Division</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">With</span> Japan’s initial conquests spread over vast
+reaches of the Pacific, it quickly became obvious
+that additional Marine divisions were
+sorely needed. Accordingly, a letter from the
+Commandant on 29 August 1942 authorized the formation
+of the 3d Marine Division.</p>
+
+<p>There was the 3d Marines, which had been activated
+first on 20 December 1916 at Santo Domingo in the
+Dominican Republic. Deactivated in August 1922, the
+regiment was again brought to life on 16 June 1942 at
+Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and strengthened by
+boots from Parris Island. Its commander, Colonel Oscar
+R. Cauldwell, soon led to it to Samoa, arriving there in
+September 1942. Intensive training in jungle tactics and
+practice landings took place there. Then, in March 1943,
+it received a substantial number of reinforcing units
+and became a full-fledged regimental combat team,
+beefing up its strength to 5,600. Finally, in May 1943, it
+sailed for New Zealand, where the 3d Marine Division
+would come together.</p>
+
+<p>Also with World War I roots, the 9th Marines was
+born 20 November 1917 at Quantico, Virginia, and was
+sent to Cuba. From there it moved to Texas, before
+being deactivated at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in
+April 1919. Reactivated on 12 February 1942 at Camp
+Elliott, California, under Colonel Lemuel C. Shepherd,
+Jr., it underwent training at the new Camp Pendleton.
+Similarly reinforced, by 1 January 1943 it was ready as
+a regimental combat team with 5,500 men. Movement
+overseas brought it to New Zealand on 5 February
+1943.</p>
+
+<p>The third infantry regiment that would make up the
+division was the 21st Marines. It was formed from a
+cadre of well-trained men from the 6th Marines, who
+had just returned from duty in Iceland. Arriving at
+Camp Lejeune on 15 July 1942, the cadre was augmented
+by boots from Parris Island and officers from
+Quantico. Colonel Daniel E. Campbell assumed command
+and the training began. Moving to join the other
+elements, the regiment arrived in New Zealand 11
+March 1943.</p>
+
+<p>The reinforcing of the infantry regiments to make
+them into self-sustaining regimental combat teams
+drew heavily on their two complementary regiments:
+the 12th Marines and the 19th Marines. The 12th
+Marines was a salty old unit, led by Brigadier General
+Smedley D. Butler in China in the 1920s. It’s antecedent
+was a small provisional contingent sent to protect
+American interests in China and designated the 12th
+Regiment (infantry), 4 October 1927. The 12th was reactivated
+at Camp Elliott on 1 September 1942 for World
+War II as an artillery regiment under command of
+Colonel John B. Wilson. Concluding its training, the
+regiment arrived in New Zealand on 11 March 1943.</p>
+
+<p>The 19th Marines was different. It was made up of
+Seabees, engineers, bakers, piledrivers, pioneers,
+paving specialists, and many old timers from the 25th
+Naval Construction Battalion at the U.S. Naval
+Advance Base, Port Hueneme, California. It, too, was
+formed at Camp Elliott and its birthday was 16
+September 1942. This was the regiment with pontoons
+for bridges, power plants, photographic darkrooms,
+bulldozers, excavators, needles, thread, and water
+purification machinery. No landing force would dare
+take an island without them. Colonel Robert M.
+Montague took command of the unit in New Zealand
+on 11 March 1943.</p>
+
+<p>The division’s first commander was Major General
+Charles D. Barrett, a veteran of World War I. He
+assumed command in September 1942, but left a year
+later to take charge of IMAC and the planning for the
+Bougainville operation.</p>
+
+<p>His assistant division commander had been
+Brigadier General Allen H. Turnage, and, upon
+Barrett’s death, he was promoted to major general and
+given command of the division which he would soon
+lead at Bougainville.</p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="Diversionary_Landings" id="Diversionary_Landings"></a><i>Diversionary Landings</i></h2>
+
+<p>There was another key element
+in the American plan: diversion.
+To mislead the enemy on the real
+objective, Bougainville, the IMAC
+operations order on 15 October
+directed the 8th Brigade Group of
+the 3d New Zealand Division to
+land on the Treasury Islands, 75
+miles southeast of Empress
+Augusta Bay. There, on 27 October,
+the New Zealanders, under
+Brigadier R.&nbsp;A. Row, with 1,900
+Marine support troops, went
+ashore on two small islands.</p>
+
+<p>One was named Mono and the
+other Sterling. Mono is about four
+miles wide, north to south, and
+seven miles long. It looks like a
+pancake. Sterling, shaped like a
+hook, is four miles long, narrow in
+places to 300 yards, but with plenty
+of room on its margins for
+airstrips.</p>
+
+<p>In a drizzly overcast, the 29th
+NZ Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel
+F.&nbsp;L.&nbsp;H. Davis) and the 36th
+(Lieutenant Colonel K.&nbsp;B.
+McKenzie-Muirson) hit Mono at
+Falami Point, and the 34th (under
+Lieutenant Colonel R.&nbsp;J. Eyre)
+struck the beach of Sterling Island
+off Blanche Harbor. There was
+light opposition. Help for the
+assault troops came from LCI
+(landing craft, infantry) gunboats
+which knocked out at least one
+deadly Japanese 40mm twin-mount
+gun and a couple of enemy
+bunkers.</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">9</a></span></p>
+<p>A simultaneous landing was
+then made on the opposite or
+north side of Mono Island at
+Soanotalu. This was perhaps the
+most important landing of all, for
+there New Zealand soldiers,
+American Seabees, and U.S. radar
+specialists would set up a big
+long-range radar station.</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese soon reacted to
+the Soanotalu landing and hurled
+themselves against the perimeter.
+On one occasion, 80&ndash;90 Japanese
+attacked 50 New Zealanders who
+waited until they saw “the whites
+of their eyes.” They killed 40 of the
+Japanese and dispersed the rest.</p>
+
+<p>There was unexpected machine
+gunfire at Sterling. One Seabee
+bulldozer operator attacked the
+machine gun with his big blade.
+An Army corporal, a medic, said
+he couldn’t believe it, “The
+Seabee ran his dozer over and
+over the machine gun nest until
+everything was quiet.... It all
+began to stink after a couple of
+days.”</p>
+
+<p>Outmanned, the Japanese drew
+back to higher ground, were hunted
+down, and killed. Surrender
+was still not in their book. On 12
+November, the New Zealanders
+could call the Treasuries their own
+with the radar station in operation.
+Japanese dead totaled 205,
+and the brigade took only eight
+prisoners. The operation had
+secured the seaside flank of
+Bougainville, and very soon on
+Sterling there was an airfield. It
+began to operate against enemy
+forces on Bougainville on
+Christmas Day, 1943.</p>
+
+<p>A second diversion, east of the
+Treasury Islands and 45 miles
+from Bougainville, took place on
+Choiseul Island. Sub-Lieutenant
+C.&nbsp;W. Seton, Royal Australian
+Navy and coastwatcher on
+Choiseul, said the Japanese there
+appeared worried. The garrison
+troops were shooting at their own
+shadows, perhaps because
+American and Australian patrols
+had been criss-crossing the 80-miles-long
+(20-miles-wide) island
+since September, scouting out the
+Japanese positions. There were
+also some 3,500 transient enemy
+troops on Choiseul, bivouacked
+and waiting to be shipped the 45
+miles north to Buin on
+Bougainville, where there was
+already a major Japanese garrison
+force. Uncertainty about the
+American threat of invasion
+somewhere was enough to make
+the Japanese, especially Vice
+Admiral Jinichi Kusaka,
+Commander, Southeast Area
+Fleet, at Rabaul jittery. It was he
+who wanted much of the Japanese
+<i>Seventeenth Army</i> concentrated at
+Buin, for, he thought, the Allies
+might strike there.</p>
+
+<p>General Vandegrift wanted to
+be sure that the Japanese were
+focused on Buin. So, on 20
+October, he called in Lieutenant
+Colonel Robert H. Williams, commanding
+the 1st Parachute
+Regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel
+Victor H. Krulak, commanding its
+2d Battalion. Get ashore on
+Choiseul, the general ordered,
+and stir up the biggest commotion
+possible, “Make sure they think
+the invasion has commenced....”</p>
+
+<p>It was a most unusual raid, 656
+men, a handful of native guides,
+and an Australian coastwatcher
+with a road map. The Navy took
+Krulak’s reinforced battalion of
+parachutists to a beach site near a
+hamlet called Voza. That would
+be the CP (command post) location
+for the duration. The troops
+slipped ashore on 28 October at
+0021 and soon had all their gear
+concealed in the bush.</p>
+
+<p>By daylight, the Marines had
+established a base on a high jungle
+plateau in the Voza area. The
+Japanese soon spotted the intruders,
+sent a few fighter planes to
+rake the beach, but that did no
+harm. They did not see the four
+small landing craft which Krulak
+had brought along and hidden
+among some mangroves with
+their Navy crews on call.</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></span></p>
+<p>Krulak then outlined two targets.
+Eight miles south from their
+CP at Voza there was a large
+enemy barge base near the Vagara
+River. The Australian said some
+150 Japanese were there. The
+other objective was an enemy outpost
+in the opposite direction, 17
+miles north on the Warrior River.
+Then Krulak took his operations
+officer, Major Tolson A. Smoak, 17
+men, and a few natives as scouts,
+and headed for the barge basin.
+On the way, 10 unlucky Japanese
+were encountered unloading a
+barge. The Marines opened fire,
+killing seven of them and sinking
+the barge. After reconnoitering
+the main objective, the barge
+basin, the patrol returned to Voza.</p>
+
+<p>The following morning, Krulak
+sent a patrol near the barge basin
+to the Vagara River for security
+and then to wave in his small
+landing craft bringing up his
+troops to attack. But, back at
+Voza, along came a flight of
+American planes which shot up
+the Marines and sank one of their
+vital boats. Now Krulak’s attack
+would have to walk to the village
+of Sangigai by the Japanese barge
+basin. To soften up Sangigai,
+Krulak called in 26 fighters escorting
+12 torpedo bombers. They
+dropped two tons of bombs and it
+looked for all the world like a real
+invasion.</p>
+
+<p>Krulak then sent a company to
+attack the basin from the beach,
+and another company with rifles,
+machine guns, rockets, and mortars
+to get behind the barge center.
+It was a pincer and it worked. The
+Marines attacked at 1400 on 30
+October. What the battle didn’t
+destroy, the Marines blew up. The
+Japanese lost 72 dead; the
+Marines, 4 killed and 12 wounded.</p>
+
+<p>All was not so well in the other
+direction. Major Warner T. Bigger,
+Krulak’s executive officer, had
+been sent north with 87 Marines
+toward the big emplacement on
+Choiseul Bay near the Warrior
+River. His mission was to destroy,
+first the emplacement, with
+Guppy Island, just off shore and
+fat with supplies, as his secondary
+target.</p>
+
+<p>Bigger got to the Warrior River,
+but his landing craft became stuck
+in the shallows, so he brought
+them to a nearby cove, hid them in
+the jungle, and proceeded on foot
+north to Choiseul Bay. Soon his
+scouts said that they were lost. It
+was late in the day so Bigger
+bivouacked for the night. He sent
+a patrol back to the Warrior where
+it found a Japanese force. Slipping
+stealthily by them, the patrol got
+back to Voza. This led Krulak to
+call for fighter cover and PT boats
+to try to get up and withdraw
+Bigger.</p>
+
+<p>But Bigger didn’t know he was
+in trouble, and he went ahead and
+blasted Guppy island with mortars,
+because he couldn’t get to the
+main enemy emplacement. When
+Bigger and his men barely got
+back to the Warrior River, there
+were no rescue boats, but there
+were plenty of Japanese. As the
+men waited tensely, the rescue
+boats came at the last moment, the
+very last. Thankfully, the men
+scrambled on board under enemy
+fire. Then two PT boats arrived,
+gun blazing, and provided cover
+so Bigger’s patrol could get back
+to Voza. One of the PT boats was
+commanded by Lieutenant John F.
+Kennedy, USN, later the President
+of the United States, who took 55
+Marines on board when their
+escape boat sank.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_010.jpg" width="600" height="464" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>CHOISEUL DIVERSION</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">2d PARACHUTE BATTALION<br />
+28 OCTOBER&ndash;3 NOVEMBER 1943</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Krulak had already used up all
+his time and luck. The Japanese
+were now on top of him, their
+commanders particularly chagrined
+that they had been fooled,
+for the big landing had already
+occurred at Empress Augusta Bay.
+Krulak had to get out;
+Coastwatcher Seton said there
+was not much time. On the night
+of 3 November, three LCIs rendezvoused
+off Voza. Krulak gave all
+his rations to the natives as the
+Marines boarded the LCIs. They
+could hear their mines and booby
+traps exploding to delay the
+Japanese. Within hours after the
+departure, a strong Japanese pincer
+snapped shut around the Voza
+encampment, but the Marines had
+gone, having suffered 9 killed, 15<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span>
+wounded, and 2 missing, but leaving
+at least 143 enemy dead on
+Choiseul.</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar grey">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_The_Coastwatchers" id="SIDEBAR_The_Coastwatchers"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_9">page 9</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Coastwatchers</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">It</span> was on Bougainville, as well as on other islands of
+the Solomons chain, that the Australian coastwatchers
+played their most decisive role in transmitting
+vital advance warnings to Allied forces in the lower
+Solomon Islands. Japanese war planes and ships summoned
+in urgency to smash the beachhead at
+Guadalcanal had to pass over Bougainville, the big
+island in the middle of the route from Rabaul.</p>
+
+<p>Paul Mason, short, bespectacled, soft spoken, held
+an aerie in the south mountains over Buin, and dark,
+wiry W.&nbsp;J. “Jack” Read watched the ship and aircraft
+movements of the Japanese in and around Buka in the
+north. One memorable Mason wireless dispatch:
+“Twenty-five torpedo bombers headed yours.” The
+message cost the Japanese Imperial Navy every one of
+those airplanes, save one. Read reported a dozen or so
+Japanese transports assembling at Buka before their
+trip to Guadalcanal, with enough troops loaded on
+board to take the island back. All of the transports were
+lost or beached under the fierce attack of U.S. warplanes.</p>
+
+<p>In 1941, as the war with Japan commenced, there
+were 100 coastwatchers in the Solomons. There were 10
+times that number as the war ended, later including
+Americans. Assembled first as a tight group of island
+veterans in 1939 (although there had been coastwatchers
+after World War I) under Lieutenant Commander A.
+Eric Feldt, Royal Australian Navy, their job was to
+cover about a half million miles of land, sea, and air.</p>
+
+<p>The very first moves of the Japanese on Guadalcanal
+were observed by coastwatchers in the surrounding
+hills. The coastwatchers could count the Japanese hammer
+strokes, almost see the nails. When the Japanese
+began the airfield (later to be called Henderson Field),
+the report of the coastwatchers went all the way up the
+American Joint Chiefs of Staff and across the desk of
+Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
+Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>Later, General Alexander A. Vandegrift on
+Guadalcanal banked heavily on the intelligence coming
+in from the radios of the coastwatchers. The attacks on
+the Treasuries and Choiseul were based on the information
+provided them. On New Georgia, long before
+Americans decided to take it, a coastwatcher had set up
+a haven for downed Allied pilots. And if the Americans
+needed a captured Japanese officer or soldier for interrogation,
+the local scouts were often able to provide
+one.</p>
+
+<p>The key to coastwatching was the tele-radio or wireless,
+good to 600 miles by key, 400 by voice.
+Cumbersome, heavy, the set took more than a dozen
+men to carry it&mdash;an indication of how much the Allies
+depended upon the local natives.</p>
+
+<p>The risks were great. Death would come after torture.
+But Mason recalled the risk was worth it, seeing
+the sleek, orderly formations heading for Guadalcanal,
+then limping back home with gaping holes in their
+hulls. Mason and Read were highly decorated by both
+the Australians and Americans for their vital services.</p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="Battle_at_Sea" id="Battle_at_Sea"></a><i>Battle at Sea</i></h2>
+
+<p>A final part of the planning for
+the main landing on Bougainville
+had envisioned the certainty of a
+Japanese naval sortie to attack the
+invasion transports. It came very
+early on the morning of D plus 1.
+On the enemy side, Japanese
+destroyer Captain Tameichi Hara,
+skipper of the <i>Shigure</i>, later
+recalled it was cold, drizzly, and
+murky, with very limited visibility
+as his destroyer pulled out of
+Simpson Harbor, Rabaul. He was
+a part of the interception force
+determined to chew up the U.S.
+invasion troops that had just landed
+at Empress Augusta Bay. The
+<i>Shigure</i> was one of the six destroyers
+in the van of the assigned element
+of the <i>Southeast Area Fleet</i>,
+which included the heavy cruisers
+<i>Myoko</i> and <i>Haguro</i>, together with
+the light cruisers <i>Agano</i> and
+<i>Sendai</i>. At 0027, 2 November 1943,
+he would run abreast of U.S. Task
+Force 39 under Rear Admiral
+Merrill, who stood by to bar the
+enemy approach with four light
+cruisers and eight destroyers.
+Among his captains was the daring
+and determined Arleigh Burke
+on board the <i>Charles S. Ausburne</i>
+(DD 570) commanding DesDiv
+(Destroyer Division) 45.</p>
+
+<p>This encounter was crucial to
+the Bougainville campaign. At
+Rabaul, Rear Admiral Matsuji
+Ijuin had told his sailors, “Japan
+will topple if Bougainville falls.”</p>
+
+<p>At 0250, the American ships
+were in action. Captain Burke
+(later to become Chief of Naval
+Operations) closed in on the nearest
+of the enemy force under Vice
+Admiral Sentaro Omori. Burke’s
+destroyers fired 25 torpedoes, and
+then Merrill maneuvered his
+cruiser to avoid the expected
+“Long Lance” torpedo response of
+the Japanese and to put his ships
+in position to fire with their six-inch
+guns.</p>
+
+<p>“I shuddered,” Hara wrote
+later, “at the realization that they
+must have already released their
+torpedoes. The initiative was in
+the hands of the enemy. In an
+instant, I yelled two orders:
+‘Launch torpedoes! Hard right
+rudder.’” Not a single Japanese or
+American torpedo found its mark
+in the first exchange. Merrill then
+brought all his guns to bear. The
+Japanese answered in kind. The
+Japanese eight-inch gun salvos
+were either short or ahead. The
+Americans were luckier. One shell
+of their first broadside slammed
+amidships into the cruiser <i>Sendai</i>
+which carried Admiral Ijuin.
+There was frantic maneuvering to
+avoid shells, with giant warships,
+yards apart at times, cutting at
+speeds of 30 knots. Still <i>Sendai</i>
+managed to avoid eight American
+torpedoes, even with her rudder
+jammed. Then a Japanese torpedo
+caught the U.S. destroyer <i>Foote</i>
+(DD 511) and blew off her stern,
+leaving her dead in the water.</p>
+
+<p>Samuel Eliot Morison in
+<i>Breaking the Bismarck Barrier</i>, tells
+how “Merrill maneuvered his
+cruisers so smartly and kept them
+at such range that no enemy torpedoes
+could hit.” Admiral Omori
+showed the same skill and
+judgement, but he was a blind
+man. Only the American had
+radar. Hara afterwards explained,
+“Japan did not see the enemy,
+failed to size up the enemy and
+failed to locate it.... The Japanese
+fleet was a blind man swinging a
+stick against a seeing opponent.
+The Japanese fleet had no advantage
+at all....”</p>
+
+<p>What Japan had lacked in electronic
+sight, however, it partially
+made up with its super-brilliant
+airplane-dropped flares and naval
+gunfire star shells. Commander
+Charles H. Pollow, USN, a former
+radio officer on the <i>Denver</i> (CL
+58), recalled the “unblinking star
+shells that would let you read the
+fine print in the bible....” The
+Japanese also had a range advantage
+in their eight-inch guns,
+“Sometimes we couldn’t touch
+them....” Three shells hit his
+<i>Denver</i>&mdash;not one detonated, but
+the ship was damaged. <i>Columbia</i>
+(CL 56) also took an eight-inch
+hole through her armor plate.</p>
+
+<p>Then Merrill confused the
+enemy ships with smoke so dense
+that the Japanese believed the
+Americans were heading one way
+when they were in fact steaming
+in another direction. But before
+Admiral Omori could break away,
+Burke and his destroyer division
+of “Little Beavers” was in among
+them. First the <i>Sendai</i> was sent to
+the bottom with 335 men, then
+<i>Hatsukaze</i>, brushed in an accident
+with <i>Myoko</i>, was finished off by
+Burke’s destroyers and sank with
+all hands on board&mdash;240 men.
+Damaged were the cruisers
+<i>Haguro</i>, <i>Myoko</i>, and destroyers
+<i>Shiratsuyu</i> and <i>Samidare</i>. But,
+most important, the threat to the
+beachhead had been stopped.</p>
+
+<p>The Americans got off with
+severe damage to the <i>Foote</i> and
+light damage to the <i>Denver</i>, <i>Spence</i>
+(DD 512), and <i>Columbia</i>. Hara
+later wrote, “had they pursued us
+really hot[ly] ... practically all
+the Japanese ships would have
+perished.” The Americans had left
+the fight too soon.</p>
+
+<p>And Admiral Ijuin’s prediction
+that Japan would topple after the
+loss of Bougainville proved to be
+accurate, but not because of this
+loss, particularly. It was just one of
+the number of defeats which were
+to doom Japan.</p>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="Action_Ashore_Koromokina" id="Action_Ashore_Koromokina"></a><i>Action Ashore: Koromokina</i></h2>
+
+<p>Back on Bougainville, following
+the landing, the days D plus 1 to D<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span>
+plus 5 saw the initiation of Phase
+II of the operation, involving shifting
+of units’ positions, reorganizing
+the shambles of supplies,
+incessant patrols, road building,
+the beginning of the construction
+of a fighter airstrip, and the deepening
+of the beachhead to 2,000
+yards.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_012.jpg" width="600" height="471" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>JAPANESE COUNTERLANDING</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">LARUMA RIVER AREA<br />
+7 NOVEMBER 1943</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Then, at dawn on the morning
+of 7 November (D plus 6), the
+Japanese struck. Four of their
+destroyers put ashore 475 men
+well west of the Marine perimeter,
+between the Laruma River and
+the Koromokina Lagoon. They
+landed in 21 craft: barges, ramped
+landing boats, even a motor boat,
+but, to their disadvantage, along
+too wide a front for coordinating
+and organizing a strike in unison
+and immediately. A Marine Corps
+combat correspondent, Sergeant
+Cyril J. O’Brien, saw the skinny
+young Japanese who scampered
+up the beach with 80-pound packs
+two-and-a-half miles from the
+Laruma to near the Koromokina,
+left flank of the Marines, to join
+their comrades.</p>
+
+<p>They were eager enough, even
+to die. A little prayer often in the
+pockets of the dead voiced the
+fatalistic wish that “whether I
+float a corpse under the waters, or
+sink beneath the grasses of the
+mountainside, I willingly die for
+the Emperor.”</p>
+
+<p>The first few Japanese ashore
+near the Laruma, however, did
+not die. An antitank platoon with
+the 9th Marines did not fire
+because the landing craft in the
+mist looked so much like their
+own, even to the big white numbers
+on the prow. Near
+Koromokina, they seemed to be
+all over the beach. One outpost
+platoon, which included Private
+First Class John F. Perella, 19 years
+old, was cut off on the beach.
+Perella swam through the surf
+1,000 yards to Marine lines and
+came with a Navy rescue boat and
+earned a Silver Star Medal.</p>
+
+<div class="figright portrait">
+<div class="captionl"><p><i>Sgt Herbert J. Thomas was posthumously
+awarded the Medal of Honor.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) 302918<br />
+</p></div>
+<img src="images/i_b_012b.jpg" width="236" height="329" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Walter
+Asmuth, Jr., commanding officer
+of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,
+ordered a company attack, called
+on mortars and the artillery of the
+12th Marines. The Japanese were
+well equipped with the so-called
+knee mortars (actually grenade
+launchers) and Nambu machine
+guns and fought back fiercely. In
+that jungle, you could not see,
+hear, or smell a man five feet
+away. Private First Class Challis
+L. Still found a faint trail and settled
+his machine gun beside it. An
+ambush was easy. The lead
+Japanese were close enough to
+touch when Still opened up. He
+killed 30 in the column; he was a
+recipient of the Silver Star Medal.</p>
+
+<p>Yet, the Japanese didn’t give
+way. Ashore only hours, they had
+already dug strong defenses.
+Even a Marine double envelopment
+in water, sometimes up to
+the waist, did not work. By 1315,
+the weakened 9th Marines company
+was relieved by the 1st
+Battalion, 3d Marines, coming in
+from the beachhead’s right flank.</p>
+
+<p>During darkness on that night
+of 7 November, enemy infiltrators
+got through to the hospital.
+Bullets ripped through tents as
+surgeons performed operations.
+The doctors of the 3d Medical
+Battalion, under Commander
+Robert R. Callaway, were protected
+by a makeshift line of cooks,
+bakers, and stretcher bearers. (As
+a memorable statistic, less than
+one percent died of wounds on
+Bougainville after having arrived
+at a field hospital.)</p>
+
+<div class="figleft portrait">
+<img src="images/i_b_014.jpg" width="238" height="321" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 12756
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>PFC Henry Gurke was posthumously
+awarded the Medal of Honor.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</a></span></p>
+<p>The 1st Battalion was close to
+the enemy, close enough to
+exchange shouts. The Japanese
+yelled “Moline you die” ... and
+the Marines made earthy references
+to Premier Tojo’s diet.
+Marine Captain Gordon Warner
+was fluent in Japanese, so he
+could quickly reply to the
+Japanese, even yell believable
+orders for a bayonet charge. He
+received the Navy Cross for
+destroying machine gun nests
+with a helmet full of hand
+grenades. He lost a leg in the battle.</p>
+
+<p>Sergeant Herbert J. Thomas
+gave his life near the Koromokina.
+His platoon was forced prone by
+machine gunfire, and Thomas
+threw a grenade to silence the
+weapon. The grenade rebounded
+from jungle vines and the young
+West Virginian smothered it with
+his body. He posthumously was
+awarded the Medal of Honor.</p>
+
+<p>General Turnage saw that reinforcements
+were needed. The day
+before (6 November) the first echelon
+of the 21st Marines had come
+ashore. Now the battle command
+was transferred to Lieutenant
+Colonel Ernest W. Fry, Jr., of the
+1st Battalion. With two companies,
+he was set for a counterattack,
+but not until after two
+intense saturations of the Japanese
+positions by mortars and five batteries
+of artillery. They slammed
+into a concentrated area, 300
+yards wide and 600 deep, early on
+8 November. Light tanks then
+moved in to support the attack.</p>
+
+<p>When Colonel Fry’s advancing
+companies reached the area where
+the Japanese had been, there was
+stillness, desolation, ploughed
+earth, and uprooted trees.
+Combat correspondent Alvin
+Josephy wrote of men hanging in
+trees, “Some lay crumpled and
+twisted beside their shattered
+weapons, some covered by
+chunks of jagged logs and jungle
+earth, [by] a blasted bunker....”
+In that no-man’s land, Colonel Fry
+and his men walked over and
+around the bodies of over 250
+enemy soldiers. To complete the
+annihilation of the Japanese landing
+force, Marine dive bombers
+from Munda bombed and strafed
+the survivors on 9 November.</p>
+
+<p>By now, the veteran 148th
+Infantry, the first unit of the
+Army’s 37th Infantry Division,
+was coming ashore, seasoned in
+the Munda campaign on New
+Georgia. Later, to take over the
+left flank of the beachhead, would
+come its other infantry regiments,
+the 129th on 13 November and the
+145th on 19 November. The
+Army’s 135th, 136th, and 140th
+Field Artillery came ashore, too,
+and would be invaluable in supporting
+later advances on the
+right flank. Major General Robert
+S. Beightler, USA, was division
+commander.</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_37th_Infantry_Division" id="SIDEBAR_37th_Infantry_Division"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_14">page 13)</a>:]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">37th Infantry Division</h3>
+
+<div class="figright iwidth">
+<img src="images/i_b_013.jpg" width="340" height="487" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p><i>Major General Robert S. Beightler, USA</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Called</span> the “Buckeye” Division, the 37th was
+among the very first American troops sent to the
+Pacific at the beginning of the war.</p>
+
+<p>The 37th was an outfit with a long history and many
+battle streamers, dating from August 1917, when it was
+formed at Camp Sheridan, Alabama. It left for overseas
+in 1918, and took part in five major operations in France
+before returning in 1919, and facing demobilization that
+same year.</p>
+
+<p>As an Ohio National Guard unit, the “Buckeye”
+Division was inducted into federal service in 1940, and
+by June of 1942, it was heading into the Pacific war, sent
+to garrison the Fiji Islands. First combat was on New
+Georgia, which included taking the critical Munda airfield.
+The 37th joined the 3d Marine Division on
+Bougainville, and then trained on the island for the
+campaign on Luzon Island in the Philippines.</p>
+
+<p>Landing with the Sixth Army at Lingayen Gulf, 9
+January 1945, the 37th raced inland to Clark Field and
+Fort Stotsenburg. It entered Manila, and its commander,
+Major General Robert S. Beightler, accepted the
+surrender of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Next came
+the capture of Baguio and liberation there of 1,300
+internees at the Bilibid Prison. The division came home
+for demobilization in November 1945.</p>
+
+<p>Its commander, Major General Beightler, was born 21
+March 1892, and enlisted in the U.S. Army as a private
+in 1911. Promoted quickly to corporal, sergeant, and
+then first sergeant of his company, he was then commissioned
+as a second lieutenant in March 1914. After
+service on the Mexican border, he took part in five
+major campaigns in World War I with the famous 42d
+(Rainbow) Division.</p>
+
+<div class="figleft" style="width: 100px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_013b.jpg" width="100" height="101" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>A graduate of Ohio State University, Beightler finished
+first in his class in the Reserve Officers’ Course of
+the Command and General Staff School, Fort
+Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1926. After that he served as a
+member of the War Plans Division of the War
+Department General Staff (1932&ndash;36).</p>
+
+<p>After World War II, he assumed command of the
+Fifth Service Command at Fort Hayes, Ohio, and then
+was assigned (1947) to the Personnel Board of the
+Secretary of War. In 1949, he was sent to the Far East
+and took over the Marianas-Bonins Command on
+Guam. In 1950 he was named Deputy Governor of the
+Ryukyus Command on Okinawa.</p>
+
+<p>Major General Beightler received the Distinguished
+Service Cross, the nation’s second highest honor, for his
+leadership in the Philippine campaign, as well as a
+Distinguished Service Medal for the New Georgia operation,
+with an Oak Leaf Cluster as a second award for
+his outstanding service on Bougainville and then on
+Luzon in the Philippine Islands. He also wore the
+Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Bronze Star
+with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Silver Star Medal, and the
+Purple Heart.</p>
+
+<p>He died 12 February 1978.</p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="The_Battle_for_Piva_Trail" id="The_Battle_for_Piva_Trail"></a><i>The Battle for Piva Trail</i></h2>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_014b.jpg" width="600" height="387" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>BATTLE FOR PIVA TRAIL</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">2d RAIDER REGIMENT<br />
+8&ndash;9 NOVEMBER</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Captain Conrad M. Fowler, a
+company commander in the 1st
+Battalion, 9th Marines, later
+recalled how an attack down the
+trails was expected: “They had to
+come our way to meet us face-to-face.
+The trails were the only way
+overland through that rainforest.”
+His company would be there to
+meet them. He was awarded a
+Silver Star Medal.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_015.jpg" width="600" height="386" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>COCONUT GROVE</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">2d BATTALION, 21st MARINES<br />
+13&ndash;14 NOVEMBER</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="figright portrait">
+<img src="images/i_b_015b.jpg" width="236" height="301" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 52622
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>MajGen Roy S. Geiger assumed command
+of IMAC on 9 November 1943.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>With just such a Japanese attack
+anticipated, General Turnage had
+dispatched a company of the 2d
+Raider Regiment up the Mission
+(Piva) trail on D-Day to set up a
+road block&mdash;just up from the old
+Buretoni Catholic Mission (still in
+operation today). At first the
+raiders had little business, and by
+4 November elements of the 9th
+Marines had arrived to join them.
+The enemy, the <i>23rd Infantry</i> up
+from Buin, struck on 7 November.
+Their attack was timed to coincide<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</a></span>
+with the Koromokina landings.
+The raiders held, but “the woods
+were full of Japs, dead.... The
+most we had to do was bury
+them.”</p>
+
+<p>At this point General Turnage
+told Colonel Edward A. Craig,
+commanding officer of the 9th
+Marines, to clear the way ahead
+and advance to the junction of the
+Piva and Numa-Numa trails.
+That mission Craig gave to the 2d
+Raider Regiment under Lieutenant
+Colonel Alan B. Shapley. The
+actual attack would be led by
+Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans,
+3d Raider Battalion, just in from
+Puruata Island and would include
+elements of the 9th Marines and
+weapons companies.</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese didn’t wait for a
+Marine attack; they came in on 5<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span>
+November and threatened to
+overrun the trailblock. It soon
+became a matter of brutal small
+encounters, and battles raged for
+five days. They were many brave
+acts. Privates First Class Henry
+Gurke and Donald G. Probst, with
+an automatic weapon, were about
+to be overwhelmed. A grenade
+plopped in the foxhole between
+them. To save the critical position
+and his companion, Gurke thrust
+Probst aside and threw himself on
+the grenade and died. He was
+awarded the Medal of Honor
+posthumously; Probst, the Silver
+Star Medal.</p>
+
+<p>Mortars and artillery dueled
+from each side. The Japanese
+would creep right next to the
+Marine positions for safety.
+Marines had to call friendly fire
+almost into their laps. On the narrow
+trail, men often had to expose
+themselves. The Japanese got the
+worst of it, for suddenly, shortly
+after noon on 9 November the
+enemy resistance crumbled. By
+1500, the junction of the Piva and
+Numa-Numa trails was reached
+and secured. Some 550 Japanese
+died. There were 19 Marines dead
+and 32 wounded.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<div class="captionl"><p><i>Adm William F. Halsey (pith helmet) and MajGen Geiger (“fore and aft” cover) watch Army reinforcements come ashore at
+Bougainville.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 127-N-65494<br />
+</p></div>
+<img src="images/i_b_015c.jpg" width="600" height="389" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>To consolidate the hard-won
+position, Marine torpedo bombers
+from Munda blasted the surrounding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span>
+area on 10 November.
+This allowed two battalions of the
+9th Marines to settle into good
+defensive positions along the
+Numa-Numa Trail with, as usual,
+“aggressive” patrols immediately
+fanning out. The battle for the
+Piva Trail had ended victoriously.</p>
+
+<p>The key logistical element in
+this engagement&mdash;and nearly all
+others on Bougainville&mdash;was the
+amtrac. There were vast areas
+where tanks and half-tracks,
+much less trucks, simply could
+not negotiate the bottomless
+swamps, omnipresent streams,
+and viscous mud from the daily
+rains. The amtracs proved amazingly
+flexible; they moved men,
+ammunition, rations, water,
+barbed wire, and even radio jeeps
+to the front lines where they were
+most needed. Heading back, they
+evacuated the wounded to reach
+the desperately needed medical
+centers in the rear.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_017.jpg" width="600" height="451" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 65162
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>A bloody encounter on 14 November at the junction of the Numa-Numa and Piva
+Trails: Marine infantrymen had been stopped by well dug-in and camouflaged enemy
+troops. Five Marine tanks rushed up and attacked on a 250-yard front through the
+jungle.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Other developments came at
+this juncture in the campaign. As
+noted, the 37th Infantry Division
+was fed into the perimeter. At the
+top of the command echelon
+Major General Roy S. Geiger
+relieved Vandegrift as Commanding
+General, IMAC, on 9
+November and took charge of
+Marine and Army units in the
+campaign from an advanced command
+post on Bougainville.</p>
+
+<p>The Seabees and Marine engineers
+were hard at work now.
+Operating dangerously 1,500
+yards ahead of the front lines,
+guarded by a strong combat
+patrol, they managed to cut two
+5,000-foot survey lanes east to
+west across the front of the
+perimeter.</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar grey">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_War_Dogs" id="SIDEBAR_War_Dogs"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_16">page 16</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">War Dogs</h3>
+
+<div class="figright iwidth">
+<img src="images/i_b_016.jpg" width="600" height="544" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">In</span> an interview with Captain Wilcie O’Bannon long
+after the war, Captain John Monks, Jr., gained an
+insight into one of the least known aspects of Marine
+tactics. It was an added asset that the official Marine
+history called “invaluable”: war dogs. O’Bannon, the
+first patrol leader to have them, related:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>One dog was a German Shepherd
+female, the other was a Doberman
+male, and they had three men with
+them. The third man handled the dogs
+all the time in the platoon area prior to
+our going on patrol&mdash;petting the dogs,
+talking to them, and being nice to
+them. The other two handlers&mdash;one
+would go to the head of the column
+and one would go to the rear with the
+female messenger dog.... If the dog in
+front received enemy fire and got
+away, he could either come back to me
+or circle to the back of the column. If I
+needed to send a message I would
+write it, give it to the handler, and he
+would pin it on the dog’s collar. He
+would clap his hands and say,
+“Report,” and the dog would be off
+like a gunshot to go to the third man in
+the rear who had handled him before
+the patrol.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The war dogs proved very versatile. They ran telephone
+wire, detected ambushes, smelled out enemy
+patrols, and even a few machine gun nests. The dog got
+GI chow, slept on nice mats and straw, and in mud-filled
+foxholes. First Lieutenant Clyde Henderson with
+one of the dog platoons recalled how the speed and
+intelligence of dogs was crucial in light of the abominable
+communications in the jungle, where sometimes
+communications equipment was not much better than
+yelling.</p>
+
+<p>Under such circumstances, a German Shepherd
+named “Caesar” made the difference between life and
+death for at least one company. With all wires cut and
+no communication, Caesar got through repeatedly to
+the battalion command post and returned to the lines.
+One Japanese rifle wound didn’t stop him, but a second
+had Caesar returned to the rear on a stretcher. A memorable
+letter from Commandant Thomas B. Holcomb
+described how Caesar another time had saved the life
+of a Marine when the dog attacked a Japanese about to
+throw a hand grenade. The Commandant also cited in
+letters four other dogs for their actions on Bougainville.</p>
+
+<p>Sergeant William O. McDaniel, in the 9th Marines,
+remembered, “One night, one of the dogs growled and
+Slim Livesay, a squad leader from Montana, shot and
+hit a Jap right between the eyes. We found the Jap the
+next morning, three feet in front of the hole.”</p>
+
+<p>One Marine said that what Marines liked most was
+the security dogs gave at night and the rare chance to
+sleep in peace. No enemy would slip through the lines
+with a dog on guard.</p>
+
+<p>There were 52 men and 36 dogs in the K-9 company
+on Bougainville.</p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="The_Coconut_Grove_Battle" id="The_Coconut_Grove_Battle"></a><i>The Coconut Grove Battle</i></h2>
+
+<p>On D plus 10, 11 November, a
+new operation order was issued.
+“Continue the attack with the 3d
+Marine Division on the right (east)
+and the 37th Infantry Division on
+the left (west).” An Army-Marine
+artillery group was assembled
+under IMAC control to provide
+massed fire, and Marine air would
+be on call for close support.</p>
+
+<p>The first objective in the
+renewed push was to seize control
+of the critical junction of the
+Numa-Numa Trail and the East-West
+trail. On 13 November a
+company of the 21st Marines led
+off the advance at 0800. At 1100 it
+was ambushed by a “sizeable”
+enemy force concealed in a
+coconut palm grove near the trail
+junction. The Japanese had won
+the race to the crossroads, and the
+situation for the lead Marine company
+soon became critical. The 2d
+Battalion commander, Lieutenant
+Colonel Eustace R. Smoak, sent up
+his executive officer, Major Glenn
+Fissell, with 12th Marines’
+artillery observers. They reported
+the situation as all bad. Then
+Major Fissell was killed. Disdaining
+flank security, Smoak
+moved closer to the fight and fed
+in reinforcing companies. (By
+now a lateral road across the front
+of the perimeter had been built.)</p>
+
+<p>The next day tanks were
+brought up and artillery registered
+around the battalion. Smoak
+also called in 18 torpedo bombers.
+The reorganized riflemen lunged
+forward again in a renewed
+attack. The tanks proved an ineffective
+disaster, causing chaos at
+one point by firing on fellow
+Marines on their flank and running
+over several of their own
+men. Nevertheless, the Japanese
+positions were overrun by the end
+of the day, with the enemy survivors
+driven off into a swamp.
+The Marines now commanded the
+junction of the two vital trails. As
+a result, the entire beachhead was
+able to spring forward 1,000 to
+1,500 yards, reaching Inland
+Defense Line D, 5,000 yards from
+the beach.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_018.jpg" width="600" height="363" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Photo courtesy of Cyril J. O’Brien.
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>“Marine Drive” constructed by the 53d Naval Construction Battalion enabled casualties
+to be sent to medical facilities in the rear and supplies to be brought forward easily.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>One important result of this
+advance was that the two main
+airstrips could now be built. The
+airfields would be the work of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span>
+Seabees. The 25th, 53d, and 71st
+Naval Construction Battalions
+(“Seabees”) had landed on D-Day
+with the assault waves of the 3d
+Marine Division&mdash;to get ready at
+once to build roads, airfields, and
+camp areas. (They had a fighter
+strip operating at Torokina by
+December). Always close to
+Marines, the Seabees earned their
+merit in the eyes of the
+Leathernecks. Often Marines had
+to clear the way with fire so a
+Seabee could do his work. Many
+would recall the bold Seabee bulldozer
+driver covering a sputtering
+machine gun nest with his blade.
+Marines on the Piva Trail later
+saw another determined bulldozer
+operator filling in holes in the
+tarmac of his burgeoning bomber
+strip as fast as Japanese artillery
+could tear it up. Any Marine who
+returned from the dismal swamps
+toward the beach would retain the
+wonderment of the “Marine
+Drive.” It was a two-lane asphalt
+highway, complete with wide
+shoulders and drainage ditches. It
+lay across jungle so dense that the
+tired men had had to hack their
+way through it only a week or so
+before.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, back on the beach,
+the U.S. Navy had been busy
+pouring in supplies and men. By
+D plus 12 it had landed more than
+23,000 cargo tons and nearly
+34,000 men. Marine fighters overhead
+provided continuous cover
+from Japanese air attacks. The
+Marine 3d Defense Battalion was
+set up with long-range radar and
+its antiaircraft guns to give further
+protection. (This battalion also
+had long-range 155mm guns that
+pounded Japanese attacks against
+the perimeter.)</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></span></p>
+<p>By now, the 37th Infantry
+Division on the left was on firm
+ground, facing scattered opposition,
+and able to make substantial
+advances. It was very different
+for the 3d Marine Division on the
+right. Lagoons and swamps were
+everywhere. The riflemen were in
+isolated, individual positions, little
+islands of men perched in what
+they sarcastically called “dry
+swamps,” This meant the water
+and/or slimy mud was only shoe-top
+deep, rather than up to their
+knees or waists, as it was all
+around them. This nightmare
+kind of terrain, combined with
+heavy, daily, drenching rains, precluded
+digging foxholes. So their
+machine guns had to be lashed to
+tree trunks, while the men huddled
+miserably in the water and
+mud. They carried little in their
+packs, except that a variety of pills
+was essential to stay in fighting
+shape in their oppressive, bug-infested
+environment: salt tablets,
+sulfa powder, aspirin, iodine, vitamins,
+atabrine tablets (for supressing
+malaria), and insect repellent.</p>
+
+<p>Colonel Frazer West, who at
+Bougainville commanded a company
+in the 9th Marines, was
+interviewed by Monks 45 years
+later. He still remembered painfully
+what constantly living in the
+slimy, swamp water did to the
+Marines: “With almost no change
+of clothing, sand rubbing against
+the skin, stifling heat, and constant
+immersion in water, jungle
+rot was a pervasive problem. Men
+got it on their scalps, under their
+arms, in their genital areas, just all
+over. It was a miserable, affliction,
+and in combat there was very little
+that could be done to alleviate it.
+The only thing you could do was
+with the jungle ulcers. I’d get the
+corpsman to light a match on a
+razor blade, split the ulcer open,
+and squeeze sulfanilamide powder
+in it. I must have had at one
+time 30 jungle ulcers on me. This
+was fairly typical.” Corpsmen
+painted many Marines with skin
+infections with tincture of merthiolate
+or a potassium permanganate
+solution so that they
+looked like the Picts of long ago
+who went into battle with their
+bodies daubed with blue woad.</p>
+
+<p>The Marines who had survived
+the first two weeks of the campaign
+were by now battlewise.
+They intuitively carried out their
+platoon tactics in jungle fighting
+whether in offense or defense.
+They understood their enemy’s
+tactics. And all signs indicated
+that they were winning.</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_Navajo_Code_Talkers" id="SIDEBAR_Navajo_Code_Talkers"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_18">page 18</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">Navajo Code Talkers</h3>
+
+<div class="figright iwidth">
+<img src="images/i_b_018b.jpg" width="600" height="507" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Marines</span> who heard the urgent combat messages
+said Navajo sounded sometimes like gurgling
+water. Whatever the sound, the ancient
+tongue of an ancient warrior clan confused the
+Japanese. The Navajo codetalkers were busily engaged
+on Bougainville, and had already proved their worth
+on Guadalcanal. The Japanese could never fathom a
+language committed to sounds.</p>
+
+<p>Originally there were many skeptics who disdained
+the use of the Navajo language as infeasible. Technical
+Sergeant Philip Johnston, who originally recommended
+the use of Navajo talkers as a means of safe voice transmissions
+in combat, convinced a hardheaded colonel by
+a two-minute Navajo dispatch. Encoding and decoding,
+the colonel then admitted, would have engaged his
+team well over an hour.</p>
+
+<p>When the chips were down, time was short, and the
+message was urgent, Navajos saved the day. Only
+Indians could talk directly into the radio “mike” without
+concern for security. They would read the message
+in English, absorb it mentally, then deliver the words in
+their native tongue&mdash;direct, uncoded, and quickly. You
+couldn’t fault the Japanese, even other Navajos who
+weren’t codetalkers, couldn’t understand the codetalkers’
+transmissions because they were in a code within
+the Navajo language.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="SIDEBAR_Corpsman" id="SIDEBAR_Corpsman"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_20">page 19</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">‘Corpsman!’</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap al"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">L</span>ess</span> than one percent of battle casualties on
+Bougainville died of wounds after being brought
+to a field hospital, and during 50 operations conducted
+as the battle of the Koromokina raged and bullets
+whipped through surgeons’ tents, not a patient was
+lost.</p>
+
+<div class="figright iwidth">
+<div class="captionl"><p>Painting by Kerr Eby in the Marine Corps Art Collection</p></div>
+<img src="images/i_b_019b.jpg" width="452" height="600" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Those facts reflect the skill and dedication of the
+corpsmen, surgeons, and litter bearers who performed
+in an environment of enormous difficultly. Throughout
+the fight for the perimeter, the field hospitals were
+shelled and shaken by bomb blasts, even while surgical
+operations were being conducted.</p>
+
+<p>Every day there was rain and mud and surgeons
+practiced their craft with mud to their shoe laces.
+Corpsmen were shot as they treated the wounded right
+at the battle scene; others were shot as the Japanese
+ignored the International Red Cross emblem for ambulances
+and aid stations.</p>
+
+<p>Bougainville was the first time in combat for the
+corpsmen assigned to the 3d Marine Division. Two surgeons
+were with each battalion and, as in all other battles,
+a corpsman was with each platoon. Aid stations
+were as close as 30&ndash;50 yards behind the lines. The men
+from the division band were the litter bearers, always
+on the biting edge of combat.</p>
+
+<p>Many young Marines were not aware until combat
+just how close they would be to these corpsmen who
+wore the Marine uniform, and who would undergo
+every hardship and trial of the man on the line. The
+corpsman’s job required no commands; he was simply
+always there to patch up the wounded Marine enough
+to have him survive and get to a field hospital.</p>
+
+<p>Naval officers seldom had command over the corpsman.
+He was responsible directly to the platoon, company,
+and battalion to which he was assigned.</p>
+
+<p>Ashore on D-Day with the invading troops,
+Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Andrew Bernard later
+remembered setting up his 3d Marines regimental aid
+station, just inland in the muck off the beach beside the
+“C” Medical Field Hospital. Later, as action intensified,
+Bernard saw 15 to 20 wounded Marines waiting at the
+hospital for care, and commented, “this was when I
+noticed Dr. Duncan Shepherd.... The flaps of the hospital
+tent went open, and there was Dr. Shepherd operating
+away, so calm, so brave, so courageous&mdash;as
+though he was back in the Mayo Clinic, where he had
+trained.”</p>
+
+<p>On 7 December, the Japanese attacked around the
+Koromokina. The official history of the 3d Marine
+Division described the scene:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>The division hospital, situated near the
+beach, was subjected to daily air raids, and
+twice to artillery shelling.... Company E of
+the 3d Medical Battalion, which was the division
+hospital under Commander R.&nbsp;R.
+Callaway, USN, proved that delicate work
+could be carried on even in combat. During the
+battle the field hospital was attacked, bullets
+ripped through the protecting tent, seriously
+wounding a pharmacist’s mate.</p></blockquote>
+
+<div class="figleft iwidth">
+<img src="images/i_b_019.jpg" width="479" height="600" alt="" />
+<div class="captionl top"><p>Painting by Franklin Boggs in <i>Men Without Guns</i> (Philadelphia:/The
+Blakiston Company, 1945)</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Hellzapoppin Ridge was the most intense and miserable
+of the battles for the corpsmen of Bougainville,
+according to Pharmacist’s Mate First Class Carroll
+Garnett. He and three other corpsmen were assigned to
+the forward aid station located at the top of that bloody
+ridge. The two battalion surgeons were considered
+indispensable and discouraged from taking undue
+risks. Regardless, Assistant Battalion Surgeon
+Lieutenant Edmond A. Utkewicz, USNR, insisted on
+joining the corpsmen at the forward station and
+remained there throughout the entire battle. The doctor
+and his four assistants were often in the open, exposed
+to fire, and showered with the dust thrown up by mortar
+explosions.</p>
+
+<p>The corpsmen’s routine was: stop the bleeding,
+apply sulfa powder and battle dressing, shoot syrette of
+morphine, and administer plasma. The regular aid station
+was located at the bottom of the ridge where the
+battalion surgeon, Lieutenant Commander Horace L.
+Wolf, USNR, checked the wounded again, before sending
+them off in an ambulance, if available, to a better
+equipped station or a field hospital.</p>
+
+<p>Corpsmen (and Marines) were in deadly peril atop
+the ridge. Corpsman John A. Wetteland described volunteers
+bringing in a wounded paramarine who was
+still breathing when he and the medical team were hit
+anew by a shell. One corpsman was killed, another
+badly wounded, and Wetteland was badly mauled by
+mortar fragments, though he tried, he said, “to bandage
+myself.”</p>
+
+<p>Dr. Wolf later painted a grim picture of the taut circumstances
+under which the medics worked:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>Several of my brave corpsmen were killed in
+this action. The regimental band musicians
+were the litter bearers. I still remember the terrible
+odor of our dead in the tropical heat. The
+smell pinched one’s nostrils and clung to clothing....
+During combat in the swamps, about
+all one could do to try to purify water to drink
+was to put two drops of iodine solution in a
+canteen. Night was the worst, when we could
+not evacuate our sick and wounded. But, if one
+could get a ride to the airstrip on the jeep
+ambulance to put the sick and wounded on
+evacuation planes, one could see a female
+(Navy or Army nurses) for the first time in
+many months.</p></blockquote>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="Piva_Forks_Battle" id="Piva_Forks_Battle"></a><i>Piva Forks Battle</i></h2>
+
+<p>The lull after the Coconut
+Grove fight did not last long. On
+18 November, the usual flurry of
+patrols soon brought back information
+that the Japanese had set
+up a road block on both the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></span>
+Numa-Numa Trail and the East-West
+Trail.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_021.jpg" width="600" height="331" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 111&ndash;5C-190032
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>The 155mm guns of the Marine 3d Defense Battalion provided firepower in support of Marine riflemen holding the Torokina
+perimeter.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<div class="caption notbold"><p><i>Just getting to your assigned position meant slow, tiring slogging through endless mud.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 68247<br />
+</p></div>
+<img src="images/i_b_021b.jpg" width="600" height="399" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>To strike the Numa-Numa position,
+the 3d Marines sent in its 3d
+Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel
+Ralph M. King), to lead the attack.
+It hit the Japanese flanks, routed
+them, and set up its own road
+block on 19 November.</p>
+
+<p>The 2d Battalion of the 3d
+Marines immediately went after
+the Japanese block on the East-West
+Trail between the two forks
+of the Piva River. After seizing
+that position, the next objective
+was a 400-foot ridge that commanded
+the whole area&mdash;and, in
+fact, provided a view all the way
+to Empress Augusta Bay. (As the
+first high ground the Marines had
+found, it would clearly produce a
+valuable observation post for
+directing the artillery fire of the
+12th Marines.)</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 884px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_022.jpg" width="884" height="433" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>PIVA ACTION<br />
+<span class="smaller">NOV 1943</span></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Hector de
+Zayas, commanding the battalion,
+summoned one of his company
+commanders and gave a terse
+order, “I want you to take it.”
+Thus a patrol under First
+Lieutenant Steve J. Cibik was
+immediately sent to occupy it.
+This began a four-day epic, 20&ndash;23
+November. The Marines got to
+the top, realized the importance of
+the vantage point to the Japanese,
+dug in defensive positions, and
+got ready for the enemy counterattacks
+that were sure to come.
+And they came, and came, and
+came. There were “fanatical
+attempts by the Japanese to reoccupy
+the position” in the form of
+“wild charges that sometimes carried
+the Japanese to within a few
+feet of their foxholes on the crest
+of the ridge.” Cibik called in
+Marine artillery bursts within 50
+yards of his men. The Marines
+held and were finally relieved,
+exhausted but proud. Cibik was
+awarded a Silver Star Medal, and
+the hill was always known thereafter
+as “Cibik Ridge.”</p>
+
+<p>While the firestorm roared
+where Cibik stood, the 3d Marines
+were pursuing its mission of driving
+the Japanese from the first
+and nearest of Piva’s forks. The
+2d Battalion caught up with Cibik,
+and Lieutenant Colonel de Zayas
+moved it out down the reverse
+slope of Cibik Ridge. The
+Japanese struck hard on 21
+November and de Zayas pulled
+back. Then, in true textbook fashion,
+the Japanese followed right
+behind him. The Marines were
+ready, machine guns in place.
+One of them killed 74 out of 75 of
+the enemy attackers within 20&ndash;30
+yards of the gun.</p>
+
+<p>The 3d Marines was supported
+by the 9th, and 21st Marines, and
+the raiders, while the 37th
+Infantry Division provided roadblocks,
+patrols, and flank security.
+Support was also provided by the
+Army’s heavy artillery, the 12th
+Marines, and the defense battalions.
+All the troops were now be
+entering a new phase of the campaign,
+during which the fight
+would be more for the hills than
+for the trails.</p>
+
+<p>Reconnaissance patrols provided
+a good idea of what was out
+there, but they also discovered
+that the enemy was not alert as he
+could or should be. A Marine rifle
+company, for instance, came upon
+a clearing where the Japanese
+were acting as if no war was on&mdash;the
+troops were lounging, kibitzing,
+drinking beer. The Marine
+mortars tore them apart. Another
+patrol waited until the occupants
+of a bivouac lined up for chow
+before cutting them down with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span>
+mortars in a pandemonium of
+pots, pans, and tea kettles. (Jungle
+combat had taught the Marines
+the wisdom of General Turnage’s
+order: Marines go nowhere without
+a weapon!)</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 446px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_023.jpg" width="446" height="600" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 127-N-67228B
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>Marine communicators had the difficult task of stringing wire in dense jungle terrain
+while remaining wary of the enemy.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>The various, successive objectives
+for the Marine and Army
+riflemen were codenamed using
+the then-current phonetic alphabet:
+Dog (reached 15 November),
+Easy (reached 20 November,
+except for the 9th Marines, slowed
+by an impassable swamp), Fox
+(finally reached by the Marines on
+28 November) and How (part of it
+reached by the Army on 23
+November since it encountered
+“no opposition,” and the remainder
+as a goal for the Marines).
+Thereafter, the Marines were to
+press on to the Item and Jig objectives
+“on orders from Corps
+Headquarters.”</p>
+
+<p>One account makes clear the
+overwhelming difficulties facing
+the Marine battalions: “water
+slimy and often waist deep, sometimes
+to the arm pits ... tangles of
+thorny vines that inflicted painful
+wounds ... men slept setting up in
+the water ... sultry heat and stinking
+muck.”</p>
+
+<p>In spite of this, elaborate plans
+were made to continue the attack
+from west to east. The “strongly
+entrenched” Japanese defenses,
+with 1,200&ndash;1,500 men, were oriented
+to repel an assault from the
+south. Accordingly, the artillery
+observers on Cibik Ridge registered
+their fire on 23 November, in
+preparation for a thrust by two
+battalions of the 3d Marines to try
+to advance 800 yards beyond the
+east fork of the Piva River. All
+available tanks and supporting
+weapons were moved forward.
+Marine engineers from the 19th
+Marines joined Seabees under
+enemy fire in throwing bridges
+across the Piva River.</p>
+
+<p>On 23 November, as the night
+fell like a heavy curtain, seven
+battalions of artillery lined up,
+some almost hub-to-hub. There
+were the Army’s 155s, 105s, mortars,
+90mm AA; and the same
+array of the 12th Marines’ cannons,
+plus 44 machine guns and
+even a few Hotchkiss pieces taken
+from the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The attack in the morning
+began with the barrage at 0835, 24
+November, Thanksgiving Day; a
+shuddering burst of flame and
+thunder, possibly the heaviest
+such barrage a Marine operation
+had ever before placed on a target.
+The shells, 5,600 rounds of them,
+descended on a narrow 800-foot
+square box of rain forest, only 100
+yards from the Marines, so close
+that shell splinters and concussion
+snapped twigs off bushes around
+them.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_024.jpg" width="600" height="394" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>BATTLE OF PIVA FORKS</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">FIRST PHASE<br />
+19&ndash;20 NOVEMBER</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Yet, as the two assault battalions
+moved out, the redoubtable
+Japanese <i>23d Infantry</i> crashed in
+with their own heavy barrage.
+Their shells left Marines dead,
+bleeding, and some drowned in
+the murky Piva River, “the heaviest
+casualties of the campaign.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span>
+Twice the enemy fire walked up
+and down the attacking Marines
+with great accuracy.” But the 3d
+Marines came on with a juggernaut
+of tanks, flame throwers, and
+machine gun, mortar, and rifle
+fire.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_024c.jpg" width="600" height="383" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>BATTLE OF PIVA FORKS</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">FINAL PHASE<br />
+21&ndash;25 NOVEMBER</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Where the Army-Marine
+artillery barrages fell, however,
+there was desolation. Major
+Schmuck, a company commander
+in one of the assault battalions,
+later remembered:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>For 500 yards, the Marines
+moved in a macabre world of
+splintered trees and burned-out
+brush. The very earth
+was a churned mass of mud
+and human bodies. The
+filthy, stinking streams were
+cesspools of blasted corpses.
+Over all hung the stench of
+decaying flesh and powder
+and smoke which revolted
+[even] the toughest. The first
+line of strong points with
+their grisly occupants was
+overrun and the 500-yard
+phase line was reached.</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese were not
+through. As the Marines
+moved forward a Nambu
+machine gun stuttered and
+the enemy artillery roared,
+raking the Marine line. A
+Japanese counterattack hit
+the Marines’ left flank. It
+was hand-to-hand and tree-to-tree.
+One company alone
+suffered 50 casualties,
+including all its officers. Still
+the Marines drove forward,
+finally halting 1,150 yards
+from their jump-off point,
+where resistance suddenly
+ended. The Japanese <i>23d
+Infantry</i> had been totally
+destroyed, with 1,107 men
+dead on the field. The
+Marines had incurred 115
+dead and wounded. The battle
+for Piva Forks had ended
+with a dramatic, hard fought
+victory which had “broken
+the back of organized enemy
+resistance.”</p></blockquote>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 553px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_024b.jpg" width="553" height="600" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 78796
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>To enable a forward observer to adjust
+artillery fire, these 3d Defense Battalion
+Marines used a jury-rigged hoist to lift
+him to the top of a banyan tree.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>There was one final flourish. It
+had been, after all, Thanksgiving
+Day, and a tradition had to be
+observed. President Franklin D.
+Roosevelt had decreed that all servicemen
+should get turkey&mdash;one
+way or another. Out there on the
+line the men got it by “the other.”
+Yet, few Marines of that era would
+give the Old Corps bad marks for
+hot chow. If they could get it to
+the frontline troops, they would.
+A Marine recalled, “The carrying
+parties did get the turkey to them.
+Nature won, though, the turkey
+had spoiled.” Another man was
+watching the big birds imbedded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span>
+in rice in five gallon containers,
+“much like home except for baseball
+and apple pie.” For some,
+however, just before the turkey
+was served, the word came down,
+“Prepare to move out!” Those
+men got their turkey and ate it on
+the trail ... on the way to a new
+engagement, Hand Grenade Hill.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 478px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_025.jpg" width="478" height="600" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 127-N-69394
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>Concealed in the heavy jungle growth, these men of Company E, 2d Battalion, 21st
+Marines, guard a Numa-Numa Trail position in the swamp below Grenade Hill.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Before that could be assaulted,
+there was a reorganization on D
+plus 24. The beat-up 3d Marines
+was beefed up by the 9th Marines
+and the 2d Raiders. Since D-Day a
+total of 2,014 Japanese dead had
+been counted, but “total enemy
+casualties must have been at least
+three times that figure.” And as a
+portent for the future use of
+Bougainville as a base for massive
+air strikes against the Japanese,
+U.S. planes were now able to use
+the airstrip right by the Torokina
+beachhead. With the enemy at
+last driven east of the Torokina
+River, Marines now occupied the
+high ground which controlled the
+site of the forthcoming Piva
+bomber airstrip.</p>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="Hand_Grenade_Hill" id="Hand_Grenade_Hill"></a><i>Hand Grenade Hill</i></h2>
+
+<p>The lead for the next assault on
+25 November was given to the
+fresh troops of Lieutenant Colonel
+Carey A. Randall, who had just
+taken over the 1st Battalion, 9th
+Marines. They were joined by the
+2d Raider Battalion under Major
+Richard T. Washburn. Randall
+could almost see his next objective
+from the prime high ground of
+Cibik Ridge. Just ahead rose
+another knoll, like the ridge it
+would be the devil to take, for the
+Japanese would hold it like a
+fortress. It would soon be called
+“Hand Grenade Hill” for good
+reason. Two of Randall’s companies
+went at it with Washburn’s
+raiders. But the Japanese gave a
+good account of themselves.
+Some 70 of them slowed the
+Marine attack, but one company
+got close to the top. The Marines
+were from five to 50 yards away
+from the Japanese, battling with
+small arms, automatic weapons,
+and hand grenades. The enemy
+resisted fiercely, and the Marines
+were thrown back by a shower of
+hand grenades. One Marine
+observed that the hill must been
+the grenade storehouse for the
+entire Solomon Islands.</p>
+
+<p>It was on Hand Grenade Hill
+that Lieutenant Howell T. Heflin,
+big, memorable, one of Alabama’s
+favorites, son of a Methodist minister,
+snatched up a BAR
+(Browning Automatic Rifle) and
+sprayed the Japanese positions.
+He pried open a way for his platoon
+almost to the hilltop, but
+could not hold there. He was
+awarded the Silver Star Medal,
+and later he went on to become
+Chief Justice of the Alabama
+Supreme Court and then the
+senior U.S. Senator from Alabama.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_026.jpg" width="600" height="468" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 127-N-71380
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>Evacuation of the wounded was always difficult. These men are carrying out a casualty
+from the fighting on Hill 1000.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>At the end of the action-filled
+day, the Marines were stalled. In
+the morning of 26 November surprised
+scouts found that the
+Japanese had pulled out in the
+darkness. Now all of the wet,
+smelly, churned-up terrain around
+the Piva Forks, including the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">26</a></span>
+strategic ridgeline blocking the
+East-West Trail, was in Marine
+hands.</p>
+
+<p>There now occurred a shuffling
+of units which resulted in the following
+line-up: 148th and 129th
+Infantry Regiments on line in the
+37th Division sector on the left of
+the perimeter. 9th Marines, 21st
+Marines, and 3d Marines, running
+from left to right, in the Marine
+sector.</p>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="The_Koiari_Raid" id="The_Koiari_Raid"></a><i>The Koiari Raid</i></h2>
+
+<p>As a kind of final security measure,
+IMAC was concerned about
+a last ridge of hills, some 2,000
+yards to the front, and really still
+dominating too much of the
+perimeter. Accordingly, on 28
+November, General Geiger
+ordered an advance to reach
+Inland Defense Line Fox. As a preliminary,
+to protect this general
+advance from a surprise Japanese
+attack on the far right flank, a raid
+was planned to detect any enemy
+troop movements, destroy their
+supplies, and disrupt their communications
+at a place called
+Koiari, 10 miles down the coast
+from Cape Torokina. The 1st
+Parachute Battalion, just in from
+Vella Levella under Major Richard
+Fagan, drew the assignment, with
+a company of the 3d Raider
+Battalion attached. While it had
+never made a jump in combat, the
+parachute battalion had been seasoned
+in the Guadalcanal campaign.</p>
+
+<p>Carried by a U.S. Navy landing
+craft, the men in the raid were put
+ashore at 0400, 29 November,
+almost in the middle of a Japanese
+supply dump. Total surprise all
+around! The Marines hastily dug
+in, while the enemy responded
+quickly with a “furious hail” of
+mortar fire, meanwhile lashing
+the beachhead with machine gun
+and rifle fire. Then came the
+Japanese attacks, and Marine
+casualties mounted “alarmingly.”
+They would have been worse
+except for a protective curtain of
+fire from the 155mm guns of the
+3d Defense Battalion back at Cape
+Torokina. With an estimated 1,200
+enemy pressing in on the Marines,
+it was painfully clear that the raiding
+group faced disaster. Two
+attempts to extricate them by their
+landing craft were halted by
+heavy Japanese artillery fire.
+Now the Marines had their backs
+to the sea and were almost out of
+ammunition. Then, about 1800,
+three U.S. destroyers raced in
+close to the beach, firing all guns.
+They had come in response to a
+frantic radio signal from IMAC,
+where the group’s perilous situation
+was well understood. Now a
+wall of shell fire from the destroyers
+and the 155s allowed two rescue
+craft to dash for the beach and
+lift off the raiding group safely.
+With none of the original objectives
+achieved, the raid had been a
+costly failure, even though it had
+left at least 145 Japanese dead.</p>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="Hellzapoppin_Ridge" id="Hellzapoppin_Ridge"></a><i>Hellzapoppin Ridge</i></h2>
+
+<p>Now the action shifted to the
+final targets of the 3d Marine
+Division: that mass of hills 2,000
+yards away. Once captured, they
+would block the East-West Trail
+where it crossed the Torokina
+River, and they would greatly
+strengthen the Final Inland
+Defense Line that was the
+Marines’ ultimate objective. A
+supply base, called Evansville,
+was built up for the attack in the
+rear of Hill 600 for the forthcoming
+attacks.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Marine Parachute
+Regiment, under Lieutenant
+Colonel Robert H. Williams, was
+informed, two days after its
+arrival on Bougainville, that
+General Turnage had assigned it
+to occupy those hills which IMAC
+felt still dominated much of the
+Marine ground. That ridgeline
+included Hill 1000 with its spur
+soon to be called Hellzapoppin
+Ridge (named after “Hellzapoppin,”
+a long-running Broadway
+show), Hill 600, and Hill 600A. To<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span>
+take the terrain Williams got the
+support of elements of the 3d, 9th,
+and 21st Marines (which had
+established on 27 November its
+own independent outpost on Hill
+600). By 5 December, the 1st
+Parachute Regiment had won a
+general outpost line that stretched
+from Hill 1000 to the junction of
+the East-West Trail and the
+Torokina River.</p>
+
+<p>Then on 7 December, Major
+Robert T. Vance on Hill 1000 with
+his 3d Parachute Battalion walked
+the ridge spine to locate enemy
+positions on the adjacent spur that
+had been abandoned. The spur
+was fortified by nature: matted
+jungle for concealment, gullies to
+impair passage, steep slopes to
+discourage everything. That particular
+hump, which would get
+the apt name of Hellzapoppin
+Ridge, was some 280 feet high, 40
+feet across at the top, and 650 feet
+long, an ideal position for overall
+defense.</p>
+
+<p>Jumping off from Hill 1000 on
+the morning of 9 December to
+occupy the spur, Vance’s men
+were hit by a fusillade of fire. The
+Japanese had come back, 235 of
+them of the <i>23d Infantry</i>. The parachutists
+attacked again and again,
+without success. Artillery fire was
+called in, but the Japanese found
+protective concealment on the
+reverse slopes. Marine shells burst
+high in the banyan trees, up and
+away from the dug-in enemy. As a
+result, the parachutists were hit
+hard. “Ill-equipped and under-strength,”
+they were pulled back
+on 10 December to Hill 1000. Two
+battalions of the 21st Marines,
+with a battalion of the 9th Marines
+guarding their left flank, continued
+the attack. It would go on for
+six gruelling days.</p>
+
+<p>Scrambling up the slopes, the
+new attacking Marines would
+pass the bodies of the parachutists.
+John W. Yager, a first lieutenant
+in the 21st recalled, “The
+para-Marines made the first contact
+and had left their dead there.
+After a few days, they had become
+very unpleasant reminders of
+what faced us as we crawled forward,
+in many instances right
+next to them.”</p>
+
+<p>Sergeant John F. Pelletier, also
+in the 21st, was a lead scout.
+Trying to cross the ridge spine
+over to the Hellzapoppin spur, he
+found dead paratroopers all over
+the hill. There were dead Japanese
+soldiers still hanging from trees,
+and it seemed to him that no
+Marine had been able to cross to
+the crest and live to tell about it.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_027.jpg" width="600" height="391" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>HELLZAPOPPIN RIDGE</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">NEARING THE END<br />
+6&ndash;18 DECEMBER</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Pelletier described what happened
+next:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>The next morning Sergeant
+Oliver [my squad leader]
+told me to advance down the
+ridge as we were going to
+secure the point. That point
+was to become our most costly
+battle. We moved down
+the center until we were
+within 20 feet of the point.
+The Japs hit us with machine
+gun, rifle, and mortar fire.
+They popped out of spider
+holes. We were in a horseshoe-shaped
+ambush. We
+were firing as fast as we
+could when Sergeant Oliver
+pulled me back. He gave me
+the order to pull back up the
+ridge. He didn’t make it.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>When artillery fire proved ineffective
+in battering the Japanese
+so deeply dug in on Hellzapoppin
+Ridge, Geiger called on 13
+December for air attacks. Six
+Marine planes had just landed at
+the newly completed Torokina
+airstrip. They came in with 100-pound
+bombs, guided to their targets
+by smoke shells beyond the
+Marine lines. But the Japanese
+were close, very close. Dozens of
+the bombs were dropped 75 yards
+from the Marines. With additional
+planes, there were four bombing
+and strafing strikes over several
+days. A Marine on the ground
+never forgot the bombers roaring
+in right over the brush, the ridge,
+and the heads of the Marines to
+drop their load, “It seemed right
+on top of us.” (This delivery technique
+was necessary to put the
+bombs on the reverse slope
+among the Japanese.)</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_028.jpg" width="600" height="466" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>EXPANSION OF THE BEACHHEAD</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS<br />
+1 NOVEMBER&ndash;15 DECEMBER 1943</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Helping to control these early
+strikes and achieve pinpoint accuracy
+was Lieutenant Colonel
+William K. Pottinger, G-3
+(Operations Officer) of the
+Forward Echelon, 1st Marine
+Aircraft Wing. He had taken a
+radio out of a grounded plane,
+moved to the frontlines, and
+helped control the attacking
+Marine planes on the spot. (This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span>
+technique was an improvised
+forerunner of the finely tuned procedures
+that Marine dive bombers
+would use later to achieve
+remarkable results in close air
+support of ground troops.)</p>
+
+<p>The 3d Marine Division’s history
+was pithy in its evaluation, “It
+was the air attacks which proved
+to be the most effective factor in
+the taking of the ridge ... the most
+successful examples of close air
+support thus far in the Pacific
+War.”</p>
+
+<p>Geiger wasn’t through. He had
+a battery of the Army’s 155mm
+howitzers moved by landing craft
+to new firing positions near the
+mouth of the Torokina River. Now
+the artillery could pour it on the
+enemy positions on the reverse
+slopes.</p>
+
+<p>In one of the daily Marine
+assaults, one company went up
+the ridge for two attacks against
+Japanese who would jump into
+holes they had dug on the reverse
+slope to escape bombardment.
+The Japanese finally were tricked
+when another company, relieving
+the first one, jumped into the
+enemy foxholes before their rightful
+owners. It cost the Japanese
+heavily to try to return.</p>
+
+<p>In a final assault on 18
+December, the two battalions of
+the 21st moved from Hill 1000 to
+the spur in a pincer and double
+envelopment. But the artillery and
+bombs had done their work. The
+Japanese and their fortress were
+shattered. Stunned defenders
+were easily eliminated.</p>
+
+<p>Patrick O’Sheel, a Marine combat
+correspondent, summed up
+the bitter battle, “No one knows
+how many Japs were killed. Some
+30 bodies were found. Another
+dozen might have been put
+together from arms, legs, and torsos.”
+The 21st suffered 12 killed
+and 23 wounded.</p>
+
+<p>With Hellzapoppin finally
+behind them, Marines could count
+what blessings they could find
+and recount how rotten their holidays
+were. There had been a
+Thanksgiving Day spent on the
+trail while gnawing a drumstick
+on the way to another engagement
+at Piva Forks. And now, on
+21 December, four days until
+Christmas, and the troops still had
+Hill 600A to “square away.”</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_028b.jpg" width="600" height="394" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>ATTACK ON HILL 600A<br />
+<span class="smaller">22&ndash;23 DEC 1943</span></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_029.jpg" width="600" height="346" alt="" />
+<div class="caption"><p>ADVANCE TO THE EAST<br />
+<span class="smaller">NOV-DEC 1943</span></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<div class="captionl"><p><i>Chaplain Joseph A. Rabun of the 9th Marines delivers his sermon with a “Merry Christmas” sign overhead and a sand-bagged
+dugout close at hand.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 74819<br />
+</p></div>
+<img src="images/i_b_029b.jpg" width="600" height="422" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Reconnaissance found 14&ndash;18
+Japanese on that hill, down by the
+Torokina River. A combat patrol
+from the 21st Marines moved to
+drive the Japanese off the knob. It
+wasn’t hard, but it cost the life of
+one Marine and one was wounded.
+But IMAC wanted a permanent
+outpost on the hill, and the
+3d Battalion, 21st, drew the
+assignment. It began with one
+rifle platoon and a platoon of
+heavy machine guns on 22
+December. Hill 600A was a repeat
+of past enemy tactics. The
+Japanese had come back to occupy
+it. They held against all efforts,
+even against a two-pronged
+attack. A full company came up
+and made three assaults. That didn’t<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span>
+help either. Late on the 23d,
+the Marines held for the night,
+preparing to mount another
+attack in the morning. That morning
+was Christmas Eve, 1943.
+Scouts went up to look. The
+Japanese had gone. Christmas
+wasn’t merry, but it was better.
+For the 3d Marine Division, the
+war was over on Bougainville.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<img src="images/i_b_030.jpg" width="600" height="335" alt="" />
+<div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 80-G-250368
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>The Piva airfields (shown here in February 1944 photograph) became key bomber and
+fighter strips in the aerial offensive against Rabaul.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<p>The landing force had seized
+the beachhead, destroyed or overcome
+the enemy, and won the
+ground for the vital airfields. Now
+they prepared to leave, as the airfields
+were being readied to
+reduce Rabaul and its environs.</p>
+
+<p>Since 10 December, F4U Vought
+Corsairs of Marine Fighting
+Squadron (VMF) 216 (1st Marine
+Aircraft Wing) had settled on the
+new strip on Torokina, almost
+washed by the sea. The fighter
+planes would be the key to the
+successful prosecution of the
+AirSols (Air Solomons) offensive
+against Rabaul, for, as escorts,
+they made large-scale bombing
+raids feasible. Major General
+Ralph J. Mitchell, USMC, had
+become head of AirSols on 20
+November 1943. By 9 January
+1944, both the fighter and bomber
+aircraft were operating from the
+Piva strips. Following Bougainville,
+Mitchell would have twice
+the airpower and facilities that the
+Japanese had in all of the
+Southwest Pacific area.</p>
+
+<p>The campaign had cost the
+Marines 423 killed and 1,418
+wounded. Enemy dead were estimated
+at 2,458, with only 23 prisoners
+captured.</p>
+
+<p>It was now time for the 3d
+Marine Division to go home to
+Guadalcanal, with a “well done”
+from Halsey. (In the Admiral’s colorful
+language, a message to
+Geiger said, “You have literally
+succeeded in setting up and opening
+for business a shop in the Japs’
+front yard.”) Now there would be
+plenty of papayas and Lister bags,
+as well as a PX, a post office, and
+some sports and movies. General
+Turnage was relieved on 28
+December by Major General John
+R. Hodge of the Americal
+Division, which took over the
+eastern sector. The 37th Infantry
+Division kept its responsibility for
+the western section of the
+Bougainville perimeter. Admiral
+Halsey directed the Commanding
+General, XIV Corps, Major
+General Oscar W. Griswold, to
+relieve General Geiger, Commanding
+General, IMAC. The
+Army assumed control of the
+beachhead as of 15 December. The
+3d Marines left Bougainville on
+Christmas Day. The 9th left on 28
+December, and had a party with
+two cans of beer per man. The
+21st, last to arrive on the island,
+was the division’s last rifle regiment
+to leave, on 9 January 1944.</p>
+
+<p>Every man in those regiments
+knew full well the crucial role that
+the supporting battalions had
+played. The 19th Marines’ pioneers
+and engineers had labored
+ceaselessly to build the bridges
+and trails that brought the vital
+water, food, and ammunition to
+the front lines through seemingly
+impassable swamps, jungle, and
+water, water everywhere.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<div class="captionl"><p><i>A chaplain reads prayers for the burial of the dead, while their friends bow their heads
+in sorrow at the losses.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+From the Leach File, MCHC Archives<br />
+</p></div>
+<img src="images/i_b_030b.jpg" width="600" height="341" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>And the amtracs of the 3d
+Amphibian Tractor Battalion had
+proven essential in getting 22,922<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></span>
+tons of those supplies to the riflemen.
+They were “the most important
+link in the all-important supply
+chain.”</p>
+
+<p>Working behind the amtracs
+were the unsung men of the 3d
+Service Battalion who, under the
+division quartermaster, Colonel
+William C. Hall, brought order
+and efficiency from the original,
+chaotic pile-up of supplies on the
+beach. As roads were slowly built,
+the 6×6 trucks of the 3d Motor
+Transport Battalion moved the
+supplies to advance dumps for
+the amtracs to pick up.</p>
+
+<p>The 12th Marines and Army
+artillery had given barrage after
+barrage of preparatory fire&mdash;72,643
+rounds in all.</p>
+
+<p>The invaluable role of Marine
+aviation, as previously mentioned,
+was symbolized by
+General Turnage’s repeated
+requests for close air support, 10
+strikes in all.</p>
+
+<p>The Seabees, working at a
+“feverish rate,” had miraculously
+carved three airfields out of the
+unbelievable morass that characterized
+the area. And it was from
+those bases that the long-range,
+strategic effects of Bougainville
+would be felt by the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The 3d Medical Battalion had
+taken care of the wounded. With
+omnipresent corpsmen on the
+front lines in every battle and aid
+stations and field hospitals right
+behind, the riflemen knew they
+had been well tended.</p>
+
+<p>General Turnage summarized
+the campaign well, “Seldom have
+troops experienced a more difficult
+combination of combat, supply,
+and evacuation. From its very
+inception, it was a bold and hazardous
+operation. Its success was
+due to the planning of all echelons
+and the indomitable will, courage,
+and devotion to duty of all members
+of all organizations participating.”</p>
+
+<p>Thus it was that the capture of
+Bougainville marked the top of
+the ladder, after the long climb up
+the chain of the Solomon Islands.</p>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="Epilogue" id="Epilogue"></a><i>Epilogue</i></h2>
+
+<p>There were, however, two
+minor land operations to complete
+the isolation of Rabaul. The first
+was at Green Island, just 37 miles
+north of Bougainville. It was a
+crusty, eight-mile-long (four-mile-wide)
+oval ring, three islands of
+sand and coral around a sleepy
+lagoon, and only 117 miles from
+Rabaul. To General Douglas
+MacArthur, it was the last step of
+the Solomon Islands campaign.</p>
+
+<p>The task of taking the island fell
+to the 5,800 men of the 3d New
+Zealand Division under Major
+General H.&nbsp;E. Barrowclough, less
+the 8th Brigade which had been
+used in the Treasuries operation.
+There was also a contingent of
+American soldiers, Seabees, and
+engineers, and cover from AirSol
+Marine planes under Brigadier
+General Field Harris. Rear
+Admiral Wilkinson had Task
+Force 31, whose warships would
+wait for targets (although Green
+Island would get no preinvasion
+bombardment). The atoll ring was
+too narrow and bombardment
+would pose a danger to island
+inhabitants.</p>
+
+<p>Late in January 1944, 300 men
+of the 30th New Zealand Battalion
+and Seabees and engineer specialists
+went ashore, measured and
+sized up the island’s potential,
+found spots for an airfield,
+checked lagoon depths, and
+sought accommodations for a
+boat basin.</p>
+
+<p>All of this warned the Japanese,
+but it was too late for them to do
+anything. Then, on 14 February,
+Japanese scout planes warned the
+102 defenders on Green Island
+that a large Allied convoy was on
+the way, shepherded by destroyers
+and cruisers. Japanese aircraft
+from Rabaul and Kavieng
+attacked the convoy by moonlight,
+but at 0641, the landing craft
+had crossed the line of departure
+unscathed and were almost to the
+beach. Within two hours, all were
+ashore, unopposed. Then Japanese
+dive bombers came roaring
+in, but the Allied antiaircraft fire
+and Marine fighter planes (VMF-212)
+were enough to prevent hits
+on the transports or beach supplies.
+New Zealand patrols got
+only slight resistance, a few brief
+firefights. By 19 February, the 33d,
+37th, and 93d Seabees were laying
+an airfield on the island.</p>
+
+<p>By 4 March, a heavy B-24
+bomber was able to make an
+emergency landing on the Green
+Island strip. Three days later,
+AirSols planes were staging there
+giving the strip the name
+“Green.” Soon B-24s were there to
+strike the vast Japanese base at
+Truk.</p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px;">
+<div class="captionl"><p><i>Heavy, constant artillery support for the riflemen required a regular flow of ammunition.
+Here shells are being unloaded from a LST (Landing Ship, Tank).</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 71180 by PFC Philip Scheer<br />
+</p></div>
+<img src="images/i_b_031.jpg" width="600" height="242" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The second operation saw the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></span>
+seizure of Emirau Island. It was
+well north of Green Island, 75
+miles northwest of the New
+Ireland enemy fortress of
+Kavieng. Actually, Kavieng had
+been considered as a target to be
+invaded by the 3d Marine
+Division, but higher authorities
+decided the cost would be too
+high. Better to let Kavieng die on
+the vine. Taking Emirau and setting
+up air and naval bases there
+would effectively cut off the
+Solomon Islands and the
+Bismarck Archipelago from the
+Japanese. It would be a small
+investment with big results.</p>
+
+<p>Emirau is an irregularly shaped
+island in the St. Matthias Group,
+eight miles long, four miles wide,
+with much jungle and many hills,
+but with room for boat basins and
+airstrips. The natives said there
+had been no Japanese there since
+January, and air reconnaissance
+could find none.</p>
+
+<p>The unit selected for the landing
+bore a famous name in the lore
+of the Corps: the 4th Marines. The
+original regiment had been the
+storied “China Marines,” and had
+then been part of the desperate
+defense of Bataan and the subsequent
+surrender at Corregidor in
+the Philippines. Now it had been
+reborn as a new, independent regiment,
+composed of the tough and
+battle-hardened veterans of the
+raider battalions.</p>
+
+<p>The 4th Marines arrived at
+Emirau shortly after 0600 on 20
+March 1944. The Marines and
+sailors fired a few shots at nothing;
+then the amphibian tractors
+opened up, wounding one of the
+Marines. The Seabees got right to
+work on the airfields, even before
+the island was secured. In no time
+they laid out a 7,000-foot bomber
+strip and a 5,000-foot stretch for
+fighters.</p>
+
+<p>All was secured until attention
+fell on a little neighboring island
+with a Japanese fuel and ration
+dump. Destroyers blew it all to
+debris ... then spied at sea a large
+canoe escaping with some of the
+enemy. Hardly bloodthirsty after
+this placid operation, the destroyer
+casually pulled in close. The
+Japanese chose to fire a machine
+gun. It was folly. The destroyer
+was forced to respond. The canoe
+didn’t sink and was brought
+alongside with the body of a
+Japanese officer and 26 living
+enlisted men&mdash;who may have privately
+questioned their officer’s
+judgement.</p>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="Bougainville_Finale" id="Bougainville_Finale"></a><i>Bougainville Finale</i></h2>
+
+<p>These were small affairs compared
+to the finale on Bougainville.
+With the withdrawal of the
+3d Marine Division at the end of
+1943, after it had successfully
+fought its way to the final defensive
+line, the two Army divisions,
+the 37th Infantry and the
+Americal, took over and extended
+the perimeter with only sporadic
+brushes with the Japanese.</p>
+
+<p>Then, in late February and early
+March 1944, patrols began making
+“almost continuous” contact with
+the enemy. It appeared that the
+Japanese were concentrating for a
+serious counterattack. On 8
+March, the 145th Infantry (of the
+37th) was hit by artillery fire. Then
+the <i>6th Division</i>, parent of the old
+enemy, the <i>23d Infantry</i>, attacked
+hard. It took five days of “very
+severe” fighting, with support
+from a battalion of the 148th
+Infantry, combined with heavy
+artillery fire and air strikes, to
+drive the determined Japanese
+back. Meanwhile, the 129th
+Infantry had also been “heavily
+attacked.” The enemy kept coming
+and coming, and it was a full
+nine days before there was a lull
+on 17 March.</p>
+
+<p>On 24 March the Japanese, after
+reorganizing, launched another
+series of assaults “with even
+greater pressure.” This time they
+also threw in three regiments of
+their <i>17th Division</i>. The artillery of
+both American divisions, guided
+by Cub spotter planes, fired “the
+heaviest support mission ever to
+be put down in the South Pacific
+Area.” That broke the back of the
+enemy attackers, and the battle
+finally was over on 25 March.</p>
+
+<p>Major General Griswold, the
+corps commander, after eight
+major enemy attacks, wrote in a
+letter four days later:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>I am absolutely convinced
+that nowhere on earth does
+there exist a more determined
+will and offensive
+spirit in the attack than that
+the Japs exhibited here. They
+come in hard, walking on
+their own dead, usually on a
+front not to exceed 100 yards.
+They try to effect a breakthrough
+which they exploit
+like water running from a
+hose. When stopped, they
+dig in like termites and fight
+to the death. They crawl up
+even the most insignificant
+fold in the ground like ants.
+And they use all their
+weapons with spirit and
+boldness.... Difficult terrain
+or physical difficulties have
+no meaning for them.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The Americal Division had
+advanced along with the 37th in
+the March-April period with its
+last action 13&ndash;14 April. This ended
+the serious offensive action for the
+two Army divisions; the enemy
+had been driven well out of
+artillery range of the airstrips,
+12,000 yards away.</p>
+
+<p>For Americans this marked the
+end of the Bougainville saga: a tale
+of well-trained units, filled with,
+determined, skillful men, who
+fought their way to a resounding
+victory. The 3d Marine Division
+had led the way in securing a vital
+island base with the crucial isolation
+of Rabaul thus ensured.</p>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="Sources" id="Sources"></a><i>Sources</i></h2>
+
+<p>The author owes a substantial debt to Cyril
+J. O’Brien who was a Marine Combat
+Correspondent on Bougainville. A draft he prepared
+describing this operation used U.S.
+Army, Coast Guard, and New Zealand as well
+as Marine Corps sources, and contained a variety
+of colorful vignettes and personal interviews,
+with some photographs not in official
+USMC files, all gratefully acknowledged.</p>
+
+<p>As always, the basic official Marine history
+of the Pacific campaigns covers Bougainville
+and the auxiliary landings in massive detail:
+Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Maj Douglas T. Kane,
+USMC, <i>Isolation of Rabaul</i>, vol. 2, <i>History of U.S.
+Marine Corps Operations in World War II</i>
+(Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division,
+Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1963).</p>
+
+<p>An earlier, more condensed official history
+is Maj John N. Rentz, USMCR, <i>Bougainville and
+the Northern Solomons</i> (Washington: Historical
+Section, Division of Public Information,
+Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1948).</p>
+
+<p>The earliest, most modest official account is
+a mimeographed summary, characterized as a
+“first attempt”: U.S. Marine Corps,
+Headquarters, Historical Division. Unpublished
+monograph: “The Bougainville
+Operation, First Marine Amphibious Corps, 1
+November&ndash;28 December 1943,” dtd Feb45.
+VE603 1st.A2, Library, Marine Corps Historical
+Center, Washington, D.C.</p>
+
+<p>A quasi-official history of the 3d Marine
+Division was “made possible by the
+Commandant, who authorized the expenditure
+of the division’s unused Post Exchange funds.</p>
+
+<p>The final draft was approved by a group of
+3d Division officers....” The book is: 1stLt
+Robert A. Aurthur, USMCR, and 1stLt Kenneth
+Cohlmia, USMCR, edited by LtCol Robert T.
+Vance, USMC, <i>The Third Marine Division</i>
+(Washington: Infantry Journal Press. 1948).</p>
+
+<p>An account representing direct personal
+participation in the campaign, supplemented
+by later interviews, is: Capt John A. Monks, Jr.,
+<i>A Ribbon and a Star: The Third Marines at
+Bougainville</i> (New York: Holt and Co., 1945).</p>
+
+<p>Another history traces the campaign on the
+island past the Marine operation to the subsequent
+U.S. Army battles, and concludes with
+the Australians as the final troops leading to the
+overall Japanese surrender in 1945: Harry A.
+Gailey, <i>Bougainville 1943&ndash;1945&mdash;The Forgotten
+Campaign</i> (Lexington, Ky: University Press of
+Kentucky, 1991).</p>
+
+<p>The full story of the crucial naval battle as
+the Marines landed is in RAdm Samuel Eliot
+Morison, <i>Breaking the Bismarck Barrier, 22 July
+1942&ndash;1 May 1944</i>, vol. 6, <i>History of United States
+Naval Operations in World War II</i> (Boston: Little
+Brown and Co., 1950).</p>
+
+<p>A detailed account of the death of Adm
+Yamamoto is in R. Cargil Hall, ed., <i>Lightning
+Over Bougainville</i> (Washington: Smithsonian
+Institution Press, 1991).</p>
+
+<p>Personal Papers and Oral Histories files at
+the Marine Corps Historical Center were
+unproductive, but the biographical and photographic
+files were most helpful. The staff of the
+Marine Corps Historical Center was always
+cooperative, in particular Catherine Kerns, who
+prepared my manuscript copy.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 class="green"><a name="About_the_Author" id="About_the_Author"></a><i>About the Author</i></h2>
+
+<div class="figleft" style="width: 186px; margin-top: 0;">
+<img src="images/i_b_033.jpg" width="186" height="202" alt="Captain John C. Chapin" style="border-top: 0; padding-top: 0;" />
+</div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Captain</span> John C. Chapin earned a bachelor
+of arts degree with honors in history from
+Yale University in 1942 and was commissioned
+later that year. He served as a rifle platoon
+leader in the 24th Marines, 4th Marine
+Division, and was wounded in action during
+assault landings on Roi-Namur and Saipan.</p>
+
+<p>Transferred to duty at the Historical
+Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, he
+wrote the first official histories of the 4th and
+5th Marine Divisions. Moving to Reserve status at the end of World War II, he
+earned a master’s degree in history at George Washington University with a
+thesis on “The Marine Occupation of Haiti, 1915&ndash;1922.”</p>
+
+<p>Now a captain in retired status, he has been a volunteer at the Marine Corps
+Historical Center for 12 years. During that time he wrote <i>History of Marine
+Fighter-Attack (VMFA) Squadron 115</i>. With support from the Historical Center
+and the Marine Corps Historical Foundation, he then spent some years
+researching and interviewing for the writing of a new book, <i>Uncommon Men:
+The Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps</i>, published in 1992 by the White Mane
+Publishing Company.</p>
+
+<p>Subsequently, he wrote four monographs for this series of historical pamphlets,
+commemorating the campaigns for the Marshalls, Saipan, Bougainville,
+and Marine Aviation in the Philippines operations.</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar" id="About_series">
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 600px; margin-top: 0; padding-top: 0;">
+<img src="images/i_b_033b.jpg" width="600" height="166" alt="Logos" style="margin-top: 0; padding-top: 0;" />
+</div>
+
+<p>THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in
+the World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines
+by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
+Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance of
+the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.</p>
+
+<p>Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by
+a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in the memory of her late husband,
+Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of
+a Purple Heart.</p>
+
+<div class="center">
+<p class="p1 bold" style="font-family: sans-serif, serif;">WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</p>
+
+<p>
+<i>DIRECTOR EMERITUS OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS</i><br />
+
+<b>Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)</b></p>
+
+<p><i>GENERAL EDITOR,<br />
+WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</i><br />
+
+<b>Benis M. Frank</b></p>
+
+<p><i>CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT</i><br />
+
+<b>George C. MacGillivray</b></p>
+
+<p><i>EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION</i><br />
+
+<b>Robert E. Strudet</b>, <i>Senior Editor</i>; <b>W. Stephen Hill</b>, <i>Visual Information Specialist</i>;<br />
+<b>Catherine A. Kerns</b>, <i>Composition Services Technician</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Marine Corps Historical Center<br />
+Building 58, Washington Navy Yard<br />
+Washington, D.C. 20374&ndash;5040</p>
+
+<p>1997</p>
+
+<p>PCN 19000314100</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 438px;">
+<img src="images/i_back.jpg" width="438" height="592" alt="back cover" />
+</div>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="transnote">
+<h2 class="p1 nobreak"><a name="Transcribers_Notes" id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
+
+<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
+preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.</p>
+
+<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.</p>
+
+<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p>
+
+<p>To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,
+some images have been made relatively larger than in the original
+pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other.
+Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between the chapters
+of the main text, marked as [Sidebar (page nn):], and treated as separate
+chapters.</p>
+
+<p>Descriptions of the Cover and Frontispiece have been moved from
+page 1 of the book to just below those illustrations, and text
+referring to the locations of those illustrations has been deleted.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_5">5</a>: “had now become” was misprinted as “became”.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_10">10</a>: “rendezvoused” was misprinted as “rendezoused”.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_22">22</a>: “troops were now be entering” was printed that way.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_22">22</a>: “slogging through endless mud” was misprinted as “though”.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_23">23</a>: “men slept setting up” was printed that way.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_27">27</a>: “650 feet long, an ideal position” was misprinted
+as “and ideal”.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48808 ***</div>
+</body>
+</html>
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--- a/48808/48808-h.zip
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author	nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org>	2025-02-27 12:43:39 -0800
committer	nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org>	2025-02-27 12:43:39 -0800
commit	c1a5a4e6bd16a07cdddc27316ed5eb56703531cc (patch)
tree	d5f6367f0a45d5723ab6fda1489fbc573d38630d
parent	8180e45c60f57799c66506c4f9636d557a730cba (diff)