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Wildon Carr -</title> - -<style type="text/css"> -body { color: black; - background: white; - margin-right: 10%; - margin-left: 10%; - font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; - text-align: justify } - -p {text-indent: 4% } - -p.noindent {text-indent: 0% } - -p.t1 {text-indent: 0% ; - font-size: 200%; - text-align: center } - -p.t2 {text-indent: 0% ; - font-size: 150%; - text-align: center } - -p.t2b {text-indent: 0% ; - font-size: 150%; - font-weight: bold; - text-align: center } - -p.t3 {text-indent: 0% ; - font-size: 100%; - text-align: center } - -p.t3b {text-indent: 0% ; - font-size: 100%; - font-weight: bold; - text-align: center } - -p.t4 {text-indent: 0% ; - font-size: 80%; - text-align: center } - -p.t4b {text-indent: 0% ; - font-size: 80%; - font-weight: bold; - text-align: center } - -p.t5 {text-indent: 0% ; - font-size: 60%; - text-align: center } - -h1 { text-align: center } -h2 { text-align: center } -h3 { text-align: center } -h4 { text-align: center } -h5 { text-align: center } - -p.poem {text-indent: 0%; - margin-left: 10%; } - -p.contents {text-indent: -3%; - margin-left: 5% } - -p.thought {text-indent: 0% ; - letter-spacing: 4em ; - text-align: center } - -p.letter {text-indent: 0%; - margin-left: 10% ; - margin-right: 10% } - -p.footnote {text-indent: 0% ; - font-size: 80%; - margin-left: 10% ; - margin-right: 10% } - -p.index {text-indent: -5% ; - margin-left: 5% ; - margin-top: 0% ; - margin-bottom: 0% ; - margin-right: 0% } - -p.dedication {text-indent: 0%; - margin-left: 15%; - text-align: justify } - -p.quote {text-indent: 4% ; - margin-left: 0% ; - margin-right: 0% } - -p.finis { font-size: larger ; - text-align: center ; - text-indent: 0% ; - margin-left: 0% ; - margin-right: 0% } - -.pagenum { position: absolute; - left: 1%; - font-size: 95%; - text-align: left; - text-indent: 0; - font-style: normal; - font-weight: normal; - font-variant: normal; } - -</style> - -</head> - -<body> - - -<pre> - -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Problem of Truth, by H. Wildon Carr - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Problem of Truth - -Author: H. Wildon Carr - -Release Date: December 13, 2014 [EBook #47658] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH *** - - - - -Produced by Al Haines - - - - - -</pre> - - -<h1> -<br /><br /><br /> - THE -<br /> - PROBLEM OF TRUTH<br /> -</h1> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t2"> - BY H. WILDON CARR<br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - HONORARY D.LITT., DURHAM<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - LONDON: T. C. & E. C. JACK<br /> - 67 LONG ACRE, W.C., AND EDINBURGH<br /> - NEW YORK: DODGE PUBLISHING CO.<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pv"></a>v}</span> -</p> - -<p class="t3b"> -PREFACE -</p> - -<p> -A problem of philosophy is completely different from a -problem of science. In science we accept our subject-matter -as it is presented in unanalysed experience; in -philosophy we examine the first principles and ultimate -questions that concern conscious experience itself. The -problem of truth is a problem of philosophy. It is not -a problem of merely historical interest, but a present -problem—a living controversy, the issue of which is -undecided. Its present interest may be said to centre -round the doctrine of pragmatism, which some fifteen -years ago began to challenge the generally accepted -principles of philosophy. In expounding this problem -of truth, my main purpose has been to make clear to -the reader the nature of a problem of philosophy and -to disclose the secret of its interest. My book presumes -no previous study of philosophy nor special knowledge -of its problems. The theories that I have shown in -conflict on this question are, each of them, held by -some of the leaders of philosophy. In presenting them, -therefore, I have tried to let the full dialectical force -of the argument appear. I have indicated my own -view, that the direction in which the solution lies is in -the new conception of life and the theory of knowledge -given to us in the philosophy of Bergson. If I am -right, the solution is not, like pragmatism, a doctrine of -the nature of truth, but a theory of knowledge in which -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pvi"></a>vi}</span> -the dilemma in regard to truth does not arise. But, as -always in philosophy, the solution of one problem is the -emergence of another. There is no finality. -</p> - -<p> -My grateful acknowledgment is due to my friend -Professor S. Alexander, who kindly read my manuscript -and assisted me with most valuable suggestions, and -also to my friend Dr. T. Percy Nunn for a similar -service. -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> -H. WILDON CARR. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pvii"></a>vii}</span> -</p> - -<p class="t3b"> - CONTENTS<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - CHAP.<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - I. <a href="#chap01">PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS</a><br /> - II. <a href="#chap02">APPEARANCE AND REALITY</a><br /> - III. <a href="#chap03">THE LOGICAL THEORIES</a><br /> - IV. <a href="#chap04">THE ABSOLUTE</a><br /> - V. <a href="#chap05">PRAGMATISM</a><br /> - VI. <a href="#chap06">UTILITY</a><br /> - VII. <a href="#chap07">ILLUSION</a><br /> - VIII. <a href="#chap08">THE PROBLEM OF ERROR</a><br /> - IX. <a href="#chap09">CONCLUSION</a><br /> - <a href="#chap10">BIBLIOGRAPHY</a><br /> - <a href="#chap11">INDEX</a><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap01"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P9"></a>9}</span></p> - -<p class="t2b"> -THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER I -<br /> -PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS -</h3> - -<p> -The progress of physical science leads to the continual -discovery of complexity in what is first apprehended as -simple. The atom of hydrogen, so long accepted as the -ideal limit of simplicity, is now suspected to be not the -lowest unit in the scale of elements, and it is no longer -conceived, as it used to be, as structureless, but as -an individual system, comparable to a solar system, -of electrical components preserving an equilibrium -probably only temporary. The same tendency to -discover complexity in what is first apprehended as simple -is evident in the study of philosophy. The more our -simple and ordinary notions are submitted to analysis, -the more are profound problems brought to consciousness. -It is impossible to think that we do not know -what such an ordinary, simple notion as that of truth -is; yet the attempt to give a definition of its meaning -brings quite unexpected difficulties to light, and the -widest divergence at the present time between rival -principles of philosophical interpretation is in regard to -a theory of the nature of truth. It is not a problem -that is pressed on us by any felt need, nor is anyone who -does not feel its interest called upon to occupy himself -with it. We speak our language before we know its -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P10"></a>10}</span> -grammar, and we reason just as well whether we have -learnt the science of logic or not. -</p> - -<p> -This science of Logic, or, as it is sometimes called, of -Formal Logic, was, until modern times, regarded as a -quite simple account of the principles that govern the -exercise of our reasoning faculty, and of the rules -founded on those principles by following which truth -was attained and false opinion or error avoided. It was -called formal because it was supposed to have no -relation to the matter of the subject reasoned about, but -only to the form which the reasoning must take. A -complete account of this formal science, as it was -recognised and accepted for many ages, might easily have -been set forth within the limits of a small volume such -as this. But the development of modern philosophy -has wrought an extraordinary change. Anyone now -who will set himself the task of mastering all the -problems that have been raised round the question of the -nature of logical process, will find himself confronted -with a vast library of special treatises, and involved in -discussions that embrace the whole of philosophy. The -special problem of truth that it is the object of this -little volume to explain is a quite modern question. It -has been raised within the present generation of -philosophical writers, and is to-day, perhaps, the chief -controversy in which philosophers are engaged. But -although it is only in the last few years that -controversy has been aroused on this question, the problem -is not new—it is indeed as old as philosophy itself. In -the fifth century before Christ, and in the generation -that immediately preceded Socrates, a famous philosopher, -Protagoras (481-411 B.C.) published a book -with the title <i>The Truth</i>. He had the misfortune, -common at that time, to offend the religious Athenians, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P11"></a>11}</span> -for he spoke slightingly of the gods, proposing to -"banish their existence or non-existence from writing -and speech." He was convicted of atheism, and his -books were publicly burnt, and he himself, then seventy -years of age, was either banished or at least was obliged -to flee from Athens, and on his way to Sicily he lost -his life in a shipwreck. Our knowledge of this book of -Protagoras is due to the preservation of its argument -by Plato in the dialogue "Theætetus." Protagoras, we -are there told, taught that "man is the measure of all -things—of the existence of things that are, and of the -non-existence of things that are not." "You have read -him?" asks Socrates, addressing Theætetus. "Oh yes, -again and again," is Theætetus' reply. Plato was -entirely opposed to the doctrine that Protagoras taught. -It seemed to him to bring gods and men and tadpoles -to one level as far as truth was concerned; for he drew -the deduction that if man is the measure of all things, -then to each man his own opinion is right. Plato -opposed to it the theory that truth is the vision of a -pure objective reality. -</p> - -<p> -This same problem that exercised the ancient world -is now again a chief centre of philosophical interest, and -the aim of this little book is not to decide that question, -but to serve as a guide and introduction to those who -desire to know what the question is that divides -philosophers to-day into the hostile camps of pragmatism -and intellectualism. -</p> - -<p> -The subject is not likely to interest anyone who does -not care for the study of the exact definitions and -abstract principles that lie at the basis of science and -philosophy. There are many who are engaged in the -study of the physical and natural sciences, and also -many who devote themselves to the social and political -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P12"></a>12}</span> -sciences, who hold in profound contempt the fine -distinctions and intellectual subtleties that seem to them -the whole content of logic and metaphysic. The attitude -of the scientific mind is not difficult to understand. It -has recently been rather graphically expressed by a -distinguished and popular exponent of the principles -of natural science. "One may regard the utmost possibilities -of the results of human knowledge as the contents -of a bracket, and place outside the bracket the factor -<i>x</i> to represent those unknown and unknowable -possibilities which the imagination of man is never wearied -of suggesting. This factor <i>x</i> is the plaything of the -metaphysician."[<a id="chap01fn1text"></a><a href="#chap01fn1">1</a>] This mathematical symbol of the -bracket, multiplied by <i>x</i> to represent the unknown and -unknowable possibilities beyond it, will serve me to -indicate with some exactness the problem with which I -am going to deal. The symbol is an expression of the -agnostic position. The popular caricature of the -metaphysician and his "plaything" we may disregard as a -pure fiction. The unknowable <i>x</i> of the agnostic is not -the "meta" or "beyond" of physics which the -metaphysician vainly seeks to know. The only "beyond" -of physics is consciousness or experience itself, and this -is the subject-matter of metaphysics. Our present -problem is that of the bracket, not that of the factor -outside, if there is any such factor, nor yet the particular -nature of the contents within. There are, as we shall -see, three views that are possible of the nature of the -bracket. In one view, it is merely the conception of -the extent which knowledge has attained or can attain; -it has no intimate relation to the knowledge, but marks -externally its limit. This is the view of the realist. In -another view, the whole of knowledge is intimately related -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P13"></a>13}</span> -to its particular parts; the things we know are not a -mere collection or aggregate of independent facts that -we have discovered; the bracket which contains our -knowledge gives form to it, and relates organically the -dependent parts to the whole in one comprehensive -individual system. This is the view of the idealist. -There is yet another view: human knowledge is relative -to human activity and its needs; the bracket is the -ever-changing limit of that activity—within it is all -that is relevant to human purpose and personality -without it is all that is irrelevant. This is the view of -the pragmatist. -</p> - -<p> -It is not only the scientific mind, but also the ethical -and religious mind, that is likely to be at least impatient, -if not contemptuous, of this inquiry. The question -What is truth? will probably bring to everyone's mind -the words uttered by a Roman Procurator at the supreme -moment of a great world-tragedy. Pilate's question is -usually interpreted as the cynical jest of a judge -indifferent to the significance of the great cause he was -trying—the expression of the belief that there is no revelation -of spiritual truth of the highest importance for our -human nature, or at least that there is no infallible test -by which it can be known. It is not this problem of -truth that we are now to discuss. -</p> - -<p> -There are, on the other hand, many minds that can -never rest satisfied while they have accepted only, and -not examined, the assumptions of science and the values -of social and political and religious ideals. Their quest -of first principles may appear to more practical natures -a harmless amusement or a useless waste of intellectual -energy; but they are responding to a deep need of our -human nature, a need that, it may be, is in its very nature -insatiable—the need of intellectual satisfaction. It is -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P14"></a>14}</span> -the nature of this intellectual satisfaction itself that is -our problem of truth. -</p> - -<p> -There are therefore two attitudes towards the problem -of truth and reality—that of the mind which brings a -practical test to every question, and that of the mind -restless to gain by insight or by speculation a clue to the -mystery that enshrouds the meaning of existence. The -first attitude seems peculiarly to characterise the man -of science, who delights to think that the problem of -reality is simple and open to the meanest understanding. -Between the plain man's view and that of the man of -high attainment in scientific research there is for him -only a difference of degree, and science seems almost to -require an apology if it does not directly enlarge our -command over nature. It would explain life and -consciousness as the result of chemical combination of -material elements. Philosophy, on the other hand, is -the instinctive feeling that the secret of the universe is -not open and revealed to the plain man guided by -common-sense experience alone, even if to this -experience be added the highest attainments of scientific -research. Either there is far more in matter than is -contained in the three-dimensional space it occupies, -or else the universe must owe its development to -something beyond matter. The universe must seem a poor -thing indeed to a man who can think that physical -science does or can lay bare its meaning. It is the -intense desire to catch some glimpse of its meaning -that leads the philosopher to strive to transcend the -actual world by following the speculative bent of the -reasoning power that his intellectual nature makes -possible. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap01fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap01fn1text">1</a>] Sir Kay Lankester. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap02"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P15"></a>15}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER II -<br /> -APPEARANCE AND REALITY -</h3> - -<p> -Our conscious life is one unceasing change. From the -first awakening of consciousness to the actual present, -no one moment has been the mere repetition of another, -and the moments which as we look back seem to have -made up our life are not separable elements of it but -our own divisions of a change that has been continuous. -And as it has been, so we know it will be until -consciousness ceases with death. Consciousness and life -are in this respect one and the same, although when we -speak of our consciousness we think chiefly of a passive -receptivity, and when we speak of our life we think of -an activity. Consciousness as the unity of knowing and -acting is a becoming. The past is not left behind, it -is with us in the form of memory; the future is not a -predetermined order which only a natural disability -prevents us from knowing, it is yet uncreated; -conscious life is the enduring present which grows with the -past and makes the future. -</p> - -<p> -This reality of consciousness is our continually changing -experience. But there is also another reality with -which it seems to be in necessary relation and also in -complete contrast—this is the reality of the material or -physical universe. The world of physical reality seems -to be composed of a matter that cannot change in a -space that is absolutely unchangeable. This physical -world seems made up of solid things, formed out of -matter. Change in physical science is only a rearrangement -of matter or an alteration of position in space. -</p> - -<p> -This physical reality is not, as psychical reality is, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P16"></a>16}</span> -known to us directly; it is an interpretation of our sense -experience. Immediate experience has objects, -generally called sense data. These objects are what we -actually see in sensations of sight, what we actually -hear in sensations of sound, and so on; and they lead us -to suppose or infer physical objects—that is, objects that -do not depend upon our experience for their existence, -but whose existence is the cause of our having the -experience. The process by which we infer the nature of -the external world from our felt experience is logical. -It includes perceiving, conceiving, thinking or reasoning. -The object of the logical process, the aim or ideal to -which it seeks to attain, is truth. Knowledge of reality -is truth. -</p> - -<p> -There are therefore two realities, the reality of our -felt experience from which all thinking sets out, and -the reality which in thinking we seek to know. The -one reality is immediate; it is conscious experience -itself. The other reality is that which we infer from the -fact of experience, that by which we seek to explain our -existence. The one we feel, the other we think. If -the difference between immediate knowledge and mediate -knowledge or inference lay in the feeling of certainty -alone or in the nature of belief, the distinction would -not be the difficult one that it is. The theories of -idealism and realism show how widely philosophers are -divided on the subject. We are quite as certain of -some of the things that we can only infer as we are of -the things of which we are immediately aware. Wd -cannot doubt, for instance, that there are other persons -besides ourselves, yet we can have no distinct knowledge -of any consciousness but one—our own. Our knowledge -that there are other minds is an inference from our -observation of the behaviour of some of the things we -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P17"></a>17}</span> -directly experience, and from the experience of our own -consciousness. And even those things which seem in -direct relation to us—the things we see, or hear, or -touch—are immediately present in only a very small, perhaps -an infinitesimal, part of what we know and think of as -their full reality; all but this small part is inferred. -From a momentary sensation of sight, or sound, or touch -we infer reality that far exceeds anything actually given -to us by the sensation. -</p> - -<p> -Thinking is questioning experience. When our attention -is suddenly attracted by something—a flash of light, -or a sound, or a twinge of pain—consciously or -unconsciously we say to ourself, What is that? The -<i>that</i>—a simple felt experience—contains a meaning, brings a -message, and we ask <i>what</i>? We distinguish the existence -as an appearance, and we seek to know the reality. -The quest of the reality which is made known to us by -the appearance is the logical process of thought. The -end or purpose of this logical process is to replace the -immediate reality of the felt experience with a -mediated-reality—that is, a reality made known to us. Directly, -therefore, that we begin to think, the immediately -present existence becomes an appearance, and throughout -the development of our thought it is taken to be -something that requires explanation. We seek to -discover the reality which will explain it. -</p> - -<p> -It is in this distinction of appearance and reality that -the problem of truth arises. It does not depend upon -any particular theory of knowledge. The same fact is -recognised by idealists and by realists. Idealism may -deny that the knowledge of independent reality is -possible; realism may insist that it is implied in the very -fact of consciousness itself—whichever is right, the -reality which thinking brings before the mind is quite -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P18"></a>18}</span> -unlike and of a different order to that which we -immediately experience in feeling. And even if we know -nothing of philosophy, if we are ignorant of all theories -of knowledge and think of the nature of knowledge -simply from the standpoint of the natural man, the fact -is essentially the same—the true reality of things is -something concealed from outward view, something to -be found out by science or by practical wisdom. Our -knowledge of this reality may be true, in this case only -is it knowledge; or it may be false, in which case it is -not knowledge but opinion or error. -</p> - -<p> -The reality then, the knowledge of which is truth, is -not the immediate reality of feeling but the inferred -reality of thought. To have any intelligible meaning, -the affirmation that knowledge is true supposes that -there already exists a distinction between knowledge -and the reality known, between the being and the -knowing of that which is known. In immediate -knowledge, in actual conscious felt experience there is no -such distinction, and therefore to affirm truth or error -of such knowledge is unmeaning. I cannot have a -toothache without knowing that I have it. In the -actual felt toothache knowing and being are not only -inseparable—they are indistinguishable. If, however, I -think of my toothache as part of an independent order -of reality, my knowledge of it may be true or false. I -am then thinking of it as the effect of an exposed nerve, -or of an abscess or of an inflammation—as something, -that is to say, that is conditioned independently of my -consciousness and that will cease to exist when the -conditions are altered. In the same way, when I behold -a landscape, the blue expanse of sky and variegated -colour of the land which I actually experience are not -either true or false, they are immediate experience in -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P19"></a>19}</span> -which knowing is being and being is knowing. Truth -and error only apply to the interpretation of that -experience, to the independent reality that I infer from -it. We can, then, distinguish two kinds of knowledge -which we may call immediate and mediate, or, better -still, acquaintance and description. Accordingly, when -we say that something is, or when we say of anything -that it if real, we may mean either of two things. We -may mean that it is part of the changing existence that -we actually feel and that we call consciousness or life, -or we may mean that it is part of an independent order -of things whose existence we think about in order to -explain, not what our feeling is (there can be no -explanation of this), but how it comes to exist. We know by -description a vast number of things with which we never -can be actually acquainted. Such, indeed, is the case -with all the knowledge by which we rule our lives and -conceive the reality which environs us. Yet we are -absolutely dependent on the reality we know by -acquaintance for all our knowledge of these things. -Not only is immediate sense experience and the -knowledge it gives us by acquaintance the only evidence we -have of the greater and wider reality, but we are -dependent on it for the terms wherewith to describe it, -for the form in which to present it, for the matter with -which to compose it. And this is the real ground of -the study of philosophy, the justification of its -standpoint. It is this fact—this ultimate undeniable -fact—that all reality of whatever kind and in whatever way -known, whether by thought or by feeling, whether it is -perceived or conceived, remembered or imagined, is in -the end composed of sense experience: it is this fact -from which all the problems of philosophy arise. It is -this fact that our utilitarian men of science find -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P20"></a>20}</span> -themselves forced to recognise, however scornful they may -be of metaphysical methods and results. -</p> - -<p> -The special problem of the nature of truth is concerned, -then, with the reality that we have distinguished -as known by description, and conceived by us as -independent in its existence of the consciousness by which -we know it. What is the nature of the seal by which -we stamp this knowledge true? -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap03"></a></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER III -<br /> -THE LOGICAL THEORIES -</h3> - -<p> -Whoever cares to become acquainted with the difficulty -of the problem of truth must not be impatient of -dialectical subtleties. There is a well-known story in -Boswell's <i>Life of Dr. Johnson</i> which relates how the -Doctor refuted Berkeley's philosophy which affirmed the -non-existence of matter. "I observed," says Boswell, -"that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, -it is impossible to refute it. I shall never forget the -alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot -with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded -from it—'I refute it <i>thus</i>.'" Dr. Johnson is the -representative of robust common sense. It has very often -turned out in metaphysical disputes that the common-sense -answer is the one that has been justified in the -end. Those who are impatient of metaphysics are, -therefore, not without reasonable ground; and indeed -the strong belief that the common-sense view will be -justified in the end, however powerful the sceptical -doubt that seems to contradict it, however startling -the paradox that seems to be involved in it, is a -possession of the human mind without which the ordinary -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P21"></a>21}</span> -practical conduct of life would be impossible. When, -then, we ask ourselves, What is truth? the answer seems -to be simple and obvious. Truth, we reply, is a -property of certain of our ideas; it means their agreement, -as falsity means their disagreement, with reality. If I -say of anything that it is so, then, if it is so, what I say -is true; if it is not so, then what I say is false. This -simple definition of truth is one that is universally -accepted. No one really can deny it, for if he did he -would have nothing to appeal to to justify his own -theory or condemn another. The problem of truth is -only raised when we ask, What does the agreement of -an idea with reality mean? If the reader will ask -himself that question, and carefully ponder it, he will -see that there is some difficulty in the answer to the -simple question, What is truth? The answer that will -probably first of all suggest itself is that the idea is a -copy of the reality. And at once many experiences -will seem to confirm this view. Thus when we look at a -landscape we know that the lines of light which radiate -from every point of it pass through the lens of each of -our eyes to be focussed on the retina, forming there a -small picture which is the exact counterpart of the -reality. If we look into another person's eye we may -see there a picture of the whole field of his vision -reflected from his lens. It is true that what we see is -not what he sees, for that is on his retina, but the analogy -of this with a photographic camera, where we see the -picture on the ground glass, seems obvious and natural; -and so we think of knowledge, so far as it depends on -the sense of vision, as consisting in more or less vivid, -more or less faded, copies of real things stored up by -the memory. But a very little reflection will convince -us that the truth of our ideas cannot consist in the fact -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P22"></a>22}</span> -that they are copies of realities, for clearly they are not -copies in any possible meaning of the term. Take, for -example, this very illustration of seeing a landscape: -what we see is not a picture or copy of the landscape, -but the real landscape itself. We feel quite sure of -this, and with regard to the other sensations, those -that come to us by hearing, taste, smell, touch, it would -seem highly absurd to suppose that the ideas these -sensations produce in us are copies of real things. The -pain of burning is not a copy of real fire, and the truth -of the judgment, Fire burns, does not consist in the fact -that the ideas denoted by the words "fire," "burns," -faithfully copy certain real things which are not ideas. -And the whole notion is seen to be absurd if we consider -that, were it a fact that real things produce copies of -themselves in our mind, we could never know it was -so—all that we should have any knowledge of would be the -copies, and whether these were like or unlike the reality, -or indeed whether there was any reality for them to be -like would, in the nature of the case, be unknowable, -and we could never ask the question. -</p> - -<p> -If, then, our ideas are not copies of things, and if -there are things as well as ideas about things, it is quite -clear that the ideas must correspond to the things in -some way that does not make them copies of the things. -The most familiar instance of correspondence is the -symbolism we use in mathematics. Are our ideas of -this nature? And is their truth their correspondence? -Is a perfectly true idea one in which there exists a point -to point correspondence to the reality it represents? -At once there will occur to the mind a great number of -instances where this seems to be the case. A map of -England is not a copy of England such as, for example, -a photograph might be if we were to imagine it taken -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P23"></a>23}</span> -from the moon. The correctness or the truth of a map -consists in the correspondence between the reality and -the diagram, which is an arbitrary sign of it. Throughout -the whole of our ordinary life we find that we make -use of symbols and signs that are not themselves either -parts of or copies of the things for which they stand. -Language itself is of this nature, and there may be -symbols of symbols of symbols of real things. Written -language is the arbitrary visual sign of spoken language, -and spoken language is the arbitrary sign, it may be, of -an experienced thing or of an abstract idea. Is, then, -this property of our ideas which we call truth the -correspondence of ideas with their objects, and is falsity -the absence of this correspondence? It cannot be so. -To imagine that ideas can correspond with realities is -to forget that ideas simply are the knowledge of realities; -it is to slip into the notion that we know two kinds of -different things, first realities and secondly ideas, and -that we can compare together these two sorts of things. -But it is at once evident that if we could know realities -without ideas, we should never need to have recourse -to ideas. It is simply ridiculous to suppose that the -relation between consciousness and reality which we -call knowing is the discovery of a correspondence -between mental ideas and real things. The two things -that are related together in knowledge are not the idea -and its object, but the mind and its object. The idea -of the object is the knowledge of the object. There -may be correspondence between ideas, but not between -ideas and independent things, for that supposes that the -mind knows the ideas and also knows the things and -observes the correspondence between them. And even -if we suppose that ideas are an independent kind of -entity distinguishable and separable from another kind -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P24"></a>24}</span> -of entity that forms the real world, how could we know -that the two corresponded, for the one would only be -inferred from the other? -</p> - -<p> -There is, however, a form of the correspondence -theory of truth that is presented in a way which avoids -this difficulty. Truth, it is said, is concerned not with -the nature of things themselves but with our judgments -about them. Judgment is not concerned with the -terms that enter into relation—these are immediately -experienced and ultimate—but with the relations in -which they stand to one another. Thus, when we say -John is the father of James, the truth of our judgment -does not consist in the adequacy of our ideas of John -and James, nor in the correspondence of our ideas with -the realities, but is concerned only with the relation -that is affirmed to exist between them. This relation -is declared to be independent of or at least external to -the terms, and, so far as it is expressed in a judgment, -truth consists in its actual correspondence with fact. -So if I say John is the father of James, then, if John is -the father of James, the judgment is true, the affirmation -is a truth; if he is not, it is false, the affirmation -is a falsehood. This view has the merit of simplicity, and -is sufficiently obvious almost to disarm criticism. There -is, indeed, little difficulty in accepting it if we are able -to take the view of the nature of the real universe -which it assumes. The theory is best described as -pluralistic realism. It is the view that the universe -consists of or is composed of an aggregate of an infinite -number of entities. Some of these have a place in the -space and time series, and these exist. Some, on the -other hand, are possibilities which have not and may -never have any actual existence. Entities that have -their place in the perceptual order of experience exist, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P25"></a>25}</span> -or have existed, or will exist; but entities that are -concepts, such as goodness, beauty, truth, or that are -abstract symbols like numbers, geometrical figures, pure -forms, do not exist, but are none the less just as real -as the entities that do exist. These entities are the -subject-matter of our judgments, and knowing is -discovering the relations in which they stand to one -another. The whole significance of this view lies in -the doctrine that relations are external to the entities -that are related—they do not enter into and form part -of the nature of the entities. The difficulty of this -view is just this externality of the relation. It seems -difficult to conceive what nature is left in any entity -deprived of all its relations. The relation of father and -son in the judgment, John is the father of James, is so -far part of the nature of the persons John and James, -that if the judgment is false then to that extent John -and James are not the actual persons John and James -that they are thought to be. And this is the case even -in so purely external a relation as is expressed, say, in -the judgment, Edinburgh is East of Glasgow. It is -difficult to discuss any relation which can be said to be -entirely indifferent to the nature of its terms, and it is -doubtful if anything whatever would be left of a term -abstracted from all its relations. -</p> - -<p> -These difficulties have led to the formulation of an -altogether different theory, namely, the theory that -truth does not consist in correspondence between ideas -and their real counterparts, but in the consistence and -internal harmony of the ideas themselves. It is named -the coherence theory. It will be recognised at once -that there is very much in common experience to -support it. It is by the test of consistency and -coherence that we invariably judge the truth of evidence. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P26"></a>26}</span> -Also it seems a very essential part of our intellectual -nature to reject as untrue and false any statement or -any idea that is self-contradictory or irreconcilable with -the world of living experience. But then, on the other -hand, we by no means allow that that must be true -which does not exhibit logical contradiction and -inconsistency. It is a common enough experience that ideas -prove false though they have exhibited no inherent -failure to harmonise with surrounding circumstances -nor any self-contradiction. The theory, therefore, -requires more than a cursory examination. -</p> - -<p> -Thinking is the activity of our mind which discovers -the order, arrangement, and system in the reality that -the senses reveal. Without thought, our felt experience -would be a chaos and not a world. The philosopher -Kant expressed this by saying that the understanding -gives unity to the manifold of sense. The understanding, -he said, makes nature. It does this by giving form to -the matter which comes to it by the senses. The mind -is not a <i>tabula rasa</i> upon which the external world makes -and leaves impressions, it is a relating activity which -arranges the matter it receives in forms. First of all -there are space and time, which are forms in which we -receive all perceptual experience, and then there are -categories that are conceptual frames or moulds by -which we think of everything we experience as having -definite relations and belonging to a real order of -existence. Substance, causality, quality, and quantity -are categories; they are universal forms in which the -mind arranges sense experience, and which constitute -the laws of nature, the order of the world. Space and -time, and the categories of the understanding Kant -declared to be transcendental—that is to say, they are -the elements necessary to experience which are not -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P27"></a>27}</span> -themselves derived from experience, as, for example, -that every event has a cause. There are, he declared, -synthetic <i>a priori</i> judgments—that is, judgments about -experience which are not themselves derived from -experience, but, on the contrary, the conditions that -make experience possible. It is from this doctrine of -Kant that the whole of modern idealism takes its rise. -Kant, indeed, held that there are things-in-themselves, -and to this extent he was not himself an idealist, but -he also held that things-in-themselves are unknowable, -and this is essentially the idealist position. Clearly, -if we hold the view that things-in-themselves are -unknowable, truth cannot be a correspondence between -our ideas and these things-in-themselves. Truth must -be some quality of the ideas themselves, and this can -only be their logical consistency. Consistency, -because the ideas must be in agreement with one another; -and logical, because this consistency belongs to the -thinking, and logic is the science of thinking. Truth, -in effect, is the ideal of logical consistency. We -experience in thinking an activity striving to attain the -knowledge of reality, and the belief, the feeling of -satisfaction that we experience when our thinking seems to -attain the knowledge of reality, is the harmony, the -absence of contradiction, the coherence, of our ideas -themselves. This is the coherence theory. Let us see -what it implies as to the ultimate nature of truth and -reality. -</p> - -<p> -In both the theories we have now examined, truth is -a logical character of ideas. In the correspondence -theory there is indeed supposed a non-logical reality, -but it is only in the ideas that there is the conformity -or correspondence which constitutes their truth. In -the coherence theory, reality is itself ideal, and the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P28"></a>28}</span> -ultimate ground of everything is logical. This is the -theory of truth that accords with the idealist view, and -this view finds its most perfect expression in the theory -of the Absolute. The Absolute is the idea of an object -that realises perfect logical consistency. This object -logic itself creates; if it be a necessary existence, then -knowledge of it cannot be other than truth. This view, -on account of the supreme position that it assigns to -the intellect, and of the fundamental character with -which it invests the logical categories, has been named -by those who oppose it Intellectualism. It is important -that it should be clearly understood, and the next chapter -will be devoted to its exposition. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap04"></a></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER IV -<br /> -THE ABSOLUTE -</h3> - -<p> -A comparison of the two theories of truth examined -in the last chapter will show that, whereas both rest on -a logical quality in ideas, the first depends on an -external view taken by the mind of an independent -non-mental reality, whereas the second depends on the -discovery of an inner meaning in experience itself. It -is this inner meaning of experience that we seek to know -when asking any question concerning reality. It is -the development of this view, and what it implies as to -the ultimate nature of reality and truth, that we are now -to examine. -</p> - -<p> -When we ask questions about reality, we assume in -the very inquiry that reality is of a nature that -experience reveals. Reality in its ultimate nature may be -logical—that is to say, of the nature of reason, or it may -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P29"></a>29}</span> -be non-logical—that is to say, of the nature of feeling or -will; but in either case it must be a nature of which -conscious experience can give us knowledge. If indeed -we hold the view which philosophers have often -endeavoured to formulate, that reality is unknowable, -then there is no more to be said; for, whatever the picture -or the blank for a picture by which the mind tries to -present this unknowable reality, there can be no question -in relation to it of the nature and meaning of truth. -An unknowable reality, as we shall show later on, is -to all intents and purposes non-existent reality. On -the other hand, if thinking leads to the knowledge of -reality that we call truth, it is because being and -knowing are ultimately one, and this unity can only be in -conscious experience. This is the axiom on which the -idealist argument is based. -</p> - -<p> -The theory of the Absolute is a logical argument of -great dialectical force. It is not an exaggeration to -say that it is the greatest dialectical triumph of modern -philosophy. It is the most successful expression of -idealism. That this is not an extravagant estimate -is shown, I think, by the fact that, widespread and -determined as is the opposition it has had to encounter, -criticism has been directed not so much against its logic -as against the basis of intellectualism on which it rests. -The very boldness of its claim and brilliance of its -triumph lead to the suspicion that the intellect cannot -be the sole determining factor of the ultimate nature -of reality. -</p> - -<p> -It will be easier to understand the theory of the -Absolute if we first of all notice, for the sake of -afterwards comparing it, another argument very famous in -the history of philosophy—the argument to prove the -existence of God named after St. Anselm of Canterbury. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P30"></a>30}</span> -It runs thus: We have in God the idea of a perfect being; -the idea of a perfect being includes the existence of that -being, for not to exist is to fall short of perfection; -therefore God exists. The theological form of this argument -need raise no prejudice against it. It is of very great -intrinsic importance, and if it is wrong it is not easy to -point out wherein the fallacy lies. It may, of course, -be denied that we have or can have the idea of a perfect -being—that is to say, that we can present that idea to -the mind with a positive content or meaning as distinct -from a merely negative or limiting idea. But this is -practically to admit the driving force of the argument, -namely, that there may be an idea of whose content or -meaning existence forms part. With regard to everything -else the idea of existing is not existence. There -is absolutely no difference between the idea of a hundred -dollars and the idea of a hundred dollars existing, but -there is the whole difference between thought and reality -in the idea of the hundred dollars existing and the -existence of the hundred dollars. Their actual existence -in no way depends on the perfection or imperfection of -my idea, nor in the inclusion of their existence in my -idea. This is sufficiently obvious in every case in which -we are dealing with perceptual reality, and in which -we can, in the words of the philosopher Hume, produce -the impression which gives rise to the idea. But there -are some objects which by their very nature will not -submit to this test. No man hath seen God at any -time, not because God is an object existing under -conditions and circumstances of place and time impossible -for us to realise by reason of the limitations of our finite -existence, but because God is an object in a different -sense from that which has a place in the perceptual -order, and therefore it is affirmed of God that the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P31"></a>31}</span> -idea involves existence. God is not an object of -perception, either actual or possible; nor in the strict sense -is God a concept—that is to say, a universal of which -there may be particulars. He is in a special sense the -object of reason. If we believe that there is a God, it -is because our reason tells us that there must be. God, -in philosophy, is the idea of necessary existence, and -the argument runs: God must be, therefore is. If, then, -we exclude from the idea of God every mythological -and theological element—if we mean not Zeus nor -Jehovah nor Brahma, but the first principle of -existence—then we may find in the St. Anselm argument the -very ground of theism. -</p> - -<p> -I have explained this argument, which is of the class -called ontological because it is concerned with the -fundamental question of being, in order to give an -instance of the kind of argument that has given us the -theory of the Absolute. I will now try to set that -theory before the reader, asking only that he will put -himself into the position of a plain man with no special -acquaintance with philosophy, but reflective and anxious -to interpret the meaning of his ordinary experience. -</p> - -<p> -We have already seen that thinking is the questioning -of experience, and that the moment it begins it gives -rise to a distinction between appearance and reality. -It is the asking <i>what?</i> of every <i>that</i> of felt experience -to which the mind attends. The world in which we -find ourselves is extended all around us in space and -full of things which affect us in various ways: some -give us pleasure, others give us pain, and we ourselves -are things that affect other things as well as being -ourselves affected by them. When we think about the things -in the world in order to discover <i>what</i> they really are, -we very soon find that we are liable to illusion and error. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P32"></a>32}</span> -Things turn out on examination to be very different to -what we first imagined them to be. Our ideas, by which -we try to understand the reality of things are just so -many attempts to correct and set right our illusions -and errors. And so the question arises, how far are our -ideas about things truths about reality? It is very -soon evident that there are some qualities of things that -give rise to illusion and error much more readily than -others. The spatial qualities of things, solidity, shape, -size, seem to be real in a way that does not admit of -doubt. We seem able to apply to these qualities a test -that is definite and absolute. On the other hand, there -seem to be effects of these things in us such as their -colour, taste, odour, sound, coldness, or heat, qualities -that are incessantly changing and a fruitful source of -illusion and error. We therefore distinguish the spatial -qualities as primary, and consider that they are the real -things and different from their effects, which we call -their secondary qualities. And this is, perhaps, our -most ordinary test of reality. If, for example, we -should think that something we see is an unreal phantom, -or a ghost, or some kind of hallucination, and on going -up to it find that it does actually occupy space, we -correct our opinion and say the thing is real. But the -spatial or primary qualities of a thing, although they -may seem more permanent and more essential to the -reality of the thing than the secondary qualities, are -nevertheless only qualities. They are not the thing -itself, but ways in which it affects us. It seems to us -that these qualities must inhere in or belong to the -thing, and so we try to form the idea of the real thing -as a substance or substratum which has the qualities. -This was a generally accepted notion until Berkeley -(1685-1763) showed how contradictory it is. So -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P33"></a>33}</span> -simple and convincing was his criticism of the notion, -that never since has material substance been put -forward as an explanation of the reality of the things we -perceive. All that he did was to show how impossible -and contradictory it is to think that the reality of that -which we perceive is something in its nature imperceptible, -for such must material substance be apart from its -sense qualities. How can that which we perceive be -something imperceptible? And if we reflect on it, we -shall surely agree that it is so—by the thing we mean its -qualities, and apart from the qualities there is no thing. -We must try, then, in some other way to reach the reality. -</p> - -<p> -What, we shall now ask, can it be that binds together -these sense qualities so that we speak of them as a -thing? There are two elements that seem to enter -into everything whatever that comes into our experience, -and which it seems to us would remain if everything -in the universe were annihilated. These are space and -time. Are they reality? Here we are met with a new -kind of difficulty. It was possible to dismiss material -substance as a false idea, an idea of something whose -existence is impossible; but space and time are certainly -not false ideas. The difficulty about them is that we -cannot make our thought of them consistent—they are -ideas that contain a self-contradiction, or at least that -lead to a self-contradiction when we affirm them of -reality. With the ideas of space and time are closely -linked the ideas of change, of movement, of causation, -of quality and quantity, and all of these exhibit this -same puzzling characteristic, that they seem to make -us affirm what we deny and deny what we affirm. I -might fill this little book with illustrations of the -paradoxes that are involved in these ordinary working ideas. -Everyone is familiar with the difficulty involved in the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P34"></a>34}</span> -idea of time. We must think there was a beginning, -and we cannot think that there was any moment to -which there was no before. So also with space, it is -an infinite extension which we can only think of as a -beyond to every limit. This receding limit of the -infinitely extensible space involves the character of -infinite divisibility, for if there are an infinite number of -points from which straight lines can be drawn without -intersecting one another to any fixed point there is -therefore no smallest space that cannot be further -divided. The contradictions that follow from these -demonstrable contents of the idea of space are endless. -The relation of time to space is another source of -contradictory ideas. I shall perhaps, however, best make -the meaning of this self-contradictory character of our -ordinary ideas clear by following out a definite -illustration. What is known as the antinomy of motion is -probably familiar to everyone from the well-known -paradox of the Greek philosopher Zeno. The flying -arrow, he said, does not move, because if it did it would -be in two places at one and the same time, and that is -impossible. I will now put this same paradox of -movement in a form which, so far as I know, it has not been -presented before. My illustration will involve the idea -of causation as well as that of movement. If we -suppose a space to be fully occupied, we shall agree that -nothing within that space can move without thereby -displacing whatever occupies the position into which -it moves. That is to say, the movement of any occupant -of one position must cause the displacement of the -occupant of the new position into which he moves. -But on the other hand it is equally clear that the -displacement of the occupant of the new position is a -prior condition of the possibility of the movement of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P35"></a>35}</span> -the mover, for nothing can move unless there is an -unoccupied place for it to move into, and there is no -unoccupied place unless it has been vacated by its occupant -before the movement begins. We have therefore the -clear contradiction that a thing can only move when -something else which it causes to move has already -moved. Now if we reflect on it we shall see that this -is exactly the position we occupy in our three-dimensional -space. The space which surrounds us is occupied, -and therefore we cannot move until a way is made clear -for us, and nothing makes way for us unless we move. -We cannot move through stone walls because we cannot -displace solid matter, but we can move through air and -water because we are able to displace these. The -problem is the same. My movement displaces the air, -but there is no movement until the air is displaced. -Can we escape the contradiction by supposing the -displacement is the cause and the movement the effect. -Are we, like people in a theatre queue, only able to move -from behind forward as the place is vacated for us in -front? In that case we should be driven to the -incredible supposition that the original cause or -condition of our movement is the previous movement of -something at the outskirts of our occupied space, that -this somewhat moving into the void made possible the -movement of the occupant of the space next adjoining, -and so on until after a lapse of time which may be ages, -which may indeed be infinite, the possibility of -movement is opened to us. In fact we must believe that the -effect of our movement—namely, the displacement of -the previous occupants from the positions we occupy -in moving—happened before it was caused. Now it is -impossible for us to believe either of the only two -alternatives—either that we do not really move but only -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P36"></a>36}</span> -appear to do so, or that the displacement our movement -causes really precedes the movement. When we meet -with a direct self-contradiction in our thoughts about -anything, we can only suppose that that about which -we are thinking is in its nature nonsensical, or else that -our ideas about it are wrong. -</p> - -<p> -It may perhaps be thought that the whole difficulty -arises simply because what we are trying to think -consistently about is a reality that is external to us. Space -and time, movement, cause and effect are ideas that -apply to a world outside and independent of the mind -that tries to think it. May not this be the reason of -our failure and the whole explanation of the seeming -contradiction? If we turn our thoughts inward upon -our own being and think of the self, the I, the real -subject of experience, then surely where thought is at -home and its object is mental not physical, we shall -know reality. It is not so. The same self-contradiction -characterises our ideas when we try to present -the real object of inner perception as when we try to -present the real object of external perception. Not, of -course, that it is possible to doubt the reality of our own -existence, but that we fail altogether to express the -meaning of the self we so surely know to exist in any -idea which does not fall into self-contradiction. As in -the case of the thing and its qualities, we think that -there is something distinct from the qualities in which -they inhere and yet find ourselves unable to present to -the mind any consistent idea of such thing, so we think -that there must be some substance or basis of personal -identity, some real self which <i>has</i> the successive changing -conscious states, which has the character which -distinguishes our actions as personal but which nevertheless -<i>is</i> not itself these things. The self-contradiction -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P37"></a>37}</span> -in the idea of self, or I, or subject, is that it both cannot -change and is always changing. As unchanging, we -distinguish it from our body, which is an external object -among other objects and is different from other objects -only in the more direct and intimate relation in which -it stands to us. The body is always changing; never -for two successive moments is it exactly the same -combination of chemical elements. We distinguish also -ourself from that consciousness which is memory, the -awareness of past experience, from present feelings, -desires, thoughts, and strivings—these, we say, belong -to the self but are not it. The self must have qualities -and dwell in the body, guiding, directing, and controlling -it, yet this self we never perceive, nor can we conceive -it, for our idea of it is of a reality that changes and is -yet unchangeable. -</p> - -<p> -There is, however, one idea—an idea to which we -have already alluded—that seems to offer us an escape -from the whole of this logical difficulty, the idea that -reality is unknowable. May not the contradictoriness -of our ideas be due to this fact, that our knowledge is -entirely of phenomena, of appearances of things, and -not of things as they are in themselves? By a -thing-in-itself we do not mean a reality that dwells apart in -a universe of its own, out of any relation whatever to -our universe. There may or may not be such realities, -and whether there are or not is purely irrelevant to -any question of the nature of reality in our universe. -The thing-in-itself is the unknowable reality of the -thing we know. We conceive it as existing in complete -abstraction from every aspect or relation of it that -constitutes knowledge of it in another. The self-contradiction -of such an idea is not difficult to show, quite -apart from any consideration of its utter futility as an -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P38"></a>38}</span> -explanation. The thing-in-itself either is or else it is -not the reality of phenomena. If it is, then, inasmuch -as the phenomena reveal it, it is neither in-itself nor -unknowable. If, on the other hand, it is not, if it is -unrelated in any way to phenomena, then it is not only -unknowable—it does not exist to be known. It is an -idea without any content or meaning, and therefore -indistinguishable from nothing. It is simply saying of -one and the same thing that it must be and that there -is nothing that it can be. -</p> - -<p> -While, then, there is no actual thing that we experience, -whether it be an object outside of us or an object -within us, of which we can say this is not a phenomenon -or appearance of reality but the actual reality -itself, we cannot also say that we do not know reality, -because if we had no idea, no criterion, of reality we -could never know that anything was only an appearance. -It is this fact—the fact that we undoubtedly possess, in -the very process of thinking itself, a criterion of -reality—that the idealist argument lays hold of as the basis of -its doctrine. The mere fact seems, at first sight, barren -and unpromising enough, but the idealist does not find -it so. Possessed of this principle, logic, which has -seemed till now purely destructive, becomes in his -hands creative, and gives form and meaning to an -object of pure reason. -</p> - -<p> -The criterion of reality is self-consistency. We cannot -think that anything is ultimately real which has its -ground of existence in something else. A real thing is -that which can be explained without reference to some -other thing. Reality, therefore, is completely -self-contained existence, not merely dependent existence. -Contradictions cannot be true. If we have to affirm a -contradiction of anything, it must be due to an -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P39"></a>39}</span> -appearance, and the reality must reconcile the contradiction. -The idea of reality, therefore, is the idea of perfect -harmony. Knowing, then, what reality is, can we say -that there is any actual object of thought that conforms -to it? And have we in our limited experience anything -that will guide us to the attainment of this object? -The idealist is confident that we have. Some things -seem to us to possess a far higher degree of reality than -others, just because they conform in a greater degree -to this ideal of harmonious existence. It is when we -compare the reality of physical things with the reality -of mental things that the contrast is most striking, and -in it we have the clue to the nature of the higher reality. -Physical reality may seem, and indeed in a certain -sense is, the basis of existence, but when we try to -think out the meaning of physical reality, it becomes -increasingly abstract, and we seem unable to set any -actual limit to prevent it dissipating into nothing. In -physical science we never have before us an actual -element, either matter or energy, in which we can -recognise, however far below the limit of perceivability, -the ultimate stuff of which the universe is composed. -Science has simply to arrest the dissipation by boldly -assuming a matter that is the substance and foundation -of reality and an energy that is the ultimate cause of -the evolution of the universe. On the other hand, when -we consider mental existence, the pursuit of reality is -in an exactly contrary direction. There, the more -concrete, the more comprehensive, the more individual a -thing is, the greater degree of reality it seems to have. -In the spiritual realm, by which we mean, not some -supposed supra-mundane sphere, but the world of -values, the world in which ideas have reality, in which -we live our rational life, reality is always sought in a -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P40"></a>40}</span> -higher and higher individuality. The principle of -individuality is that the whole is more real than the parts. -An individual human being, for example, is a whole, -an indivisible organic unity, not merely an aggregation -of physiological organs with special functions, nor are -these a mere collection of special cells, nor these a mere -concourse of chemical elements. The State as a -community is an individual organic unity with a reality -that is more than the mere total of the reality of -individual citizens who compose it. It is this principle of -individuality that is the true criterion of reality. It is -this principle that, while it leads us to seek the unity -in an individuality ever higher and more complete than -we have attained, at the same time explains the -discrepancy of our partial view, explains contradictions as -the necessary result of the effort to understand the -parts in independence of the whole which gives to -them their reality. Thus, while on the one hand the -scientific search for reality is ever towards greater -simplicity and abstractness, a simplicity whose ideal -limit is zero, the philosophical search for reality is ever -towards greater concreteness, towards full comprehensiveness, -and its ideal limit is the whole universe as -one perfect and completely harmonious individual. -This idea of full reality is the Absolute. There are not -two realities, one material and the other spiritual; the -material and the spiritual are two directions in which -we may seek the one reality, but there is only one -pathway by which we shall find it. -</p> - -<p> -The Absolute is the whole universe not in its aspect -of an aggregate of infinitely diverse separate elements, -whether these are material or spiritual, but in its aspect -of an individual whole and in its nature as a whole. -This nature of the whole is to be individual—only in -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P41"></a>41}</span> -the individual are contradictions reconciled. Is the -Absolute more than an idea? Does it actually exist? -Clearly we cannot claim to know it by direct experience, -by acquaintance; it is not a <i>that</i> of which we can ask -<i>what</i>? It is the object of reason itself, therefore we -know that it must be. Also we know that it can be; it -is a possible object in the logical meaning that it is not -a self-contradictory idea, like every other idea that we -can have. It is not self-contradictory, for it is itself -the idea of that which is consistent. Therefore, argues -the idealist, it is, for that which must be, and can be, -surely exists. The reader will now understand why I -introduced this account of the Absolute with a description -for comparison of the St. Anselm proof of the -existence of God. -</p> - -<p> -There is one further question. Whether the Absolute -does or does not exist, is it, either in idea or reality, of -any use to us? The reply is that its value lies in this, -that it reveals to us the nature of reality and the -meaning of truth. Logic is the creative power of thought -which leads us to the discovery of higher and higher -degrees of reality. The Satyr, in the fable, drove his -guest from his shelter because the man blew into his -hands to warm them, and into his porridge to cool it. -The Satyr could not reconcile the contradiction that -one could with the same breath blow hot and cold. -Nor would he reconcile it ever, so long as he sought -truth as correspondence. Truth would have shown -the facts coherent by reconciling the contradiction in -a higher reality. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap05"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P42"></a>42}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER V -<br /> -PRAGMATISM -</h3> - -<p> -The theory of the Absolute is only one form of Idealism, -but it illustrates the nature and general direction of -the development of philosophy along the line of -speculation that began with Kant. There have been, of -course, other directions. In particular many attempts -have been made to make philosophy an adjunct of -physical science, but the theory I have sketched is -characteristic of the prevailing movement in philosophy -during the last period of the Nineteenth Century, and -until the movement known as Pragmatism directed -criticism upon it. The form the pragmatical criticism -of the theory of the Absolute took was to direct attention -to the logical or intellectual principle on which it -rests—in fact to raise the problem of the nature of truth. -Pragmatism is a theory of the meaning of truth. It is -the denial of a purely logical criterion of truth, and the -insistence that truth is always dependent on psychological -conditions. Pragmatism therefore rejects both -the views that we have examined—the theory that truth -is a correspondence of the idea with its object, and the -theory that it is the logical coherence and consistency -of the idea itself. It proposes instead the theory that -truth is always founded on a practical postulate, and -consists in the verification of that postulate; the -verification not being the discovery of something that was -waiting to be discovered, but the discovery that the -postulate that claims to be true is useful, in that it -works. Truth is what works. -</p> - -<p> -The Absolute is reality and truth. The idealist -argument which we have followed was an attempt to -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P43"></a>43}</span> -determine the nature of reality, and not an attempt to -explain what we mean when we say that an idea agrees -with its object. What is true about reality? was the -starting point, and not, What is truth? nor even, What -is true about truth? The search for reality failed to -discover any object that agreed with its idea, but at -last there was found an idea that must agree with its -object, an idea whose object cannot not be. This idea, -the Absolute, reveals the nature of reality. The -pragmatist when he asks, What is truth? seems to dig -beneath the argument, seems indeed even to reach the -bedrock, but it is only in appearance that this is so. -How, indeed, could he hope to be able to answer the -question he has himself asked, if there is no way of -distinguishing the true answer from the false? We -must already know what truth is even to be able to -ask what it is—a point which many pragmatist writers -appear to me to have overlooked. -</p> - -<p> -In challenging the idea of truth, the pragmatist raises -the no less important question of the nature of error. -A theory of truth must not only show in what truth -consists, but must distinguish false from true and show -the nature of error. The pragmatist claims for his -theory that it alone can give a consistent account of -illusion and error. Now, as we saw in our account of -the idealist argument, it is the fact of illusion and error -that compels us to seek reality behind the appearances -that are the sense data of our conscious experience. -The whole force of the pragmatist movement in -philosophy is directed to proving that truth is a prior -consideration to reality. If we understand the nature -of truth, we shall see reality in the making. Reality -can in fact be left to look after itself; our business is -with our conceptions alone, which are either true or -false. The distinction of appearance and reality does -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P44"></a>44}</span> -not explain illusion and error because it does not -distinguish between true and false appearance. There -is no principle in idealism by which the Absolute rejects -the false appearance and reconciles the true. -</p> - -<p> -Before I examine the pragmatist argument, I ought -first to explain the meaning and origin of the word. -The term pragmatism, that has in the last few years -entered so widely into all philosophical discussion, was -used first by Mr. C. S. Peirce, an American philosopher, -in a magazine article written as long ago as 1878, but -it attracted no attention for nearly twenty years, when -it was recalled by William James in the criticism of -the current philosophy in his <i>Will to Believe</i>, a book -which marks the beginning of the new movement. -Pragmatism was first put forward as the principle that -the whole meaning of any conception expresses itself -in practical consequences. The conception of the -practical effects of a conception is the whole conception -of the object. The pragmatist maxim is—would you -know what any idea or conception means, then consider -what practical consequences are involved by its acceptance -or rejection. Dr. Schiller, the leading exponent of -the principle in England, prefers to call the philosophy -"Humanism" in order still more to emphasize the -psychological and personal character of knowledge. -The name is suggested by the maxim of Protagoras, -"Man is the measure of all things." The term -Intellectualism is used by pragmatist writers to include all -theories of knowledge that do not agree with their own, -very much as the Greeks called all who were not Greeks, -Barbarians. It must not be taken to mean, as its -etymology would imply, a philosophy like that of -Plato, which held that only universals, the ideas, are -real, or like that of Hegel, who said that "the actual -is the rational and the rational is the actual." The -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P45"></a>45}</span> -pragmatists apply the term intellectualist to all -philosophers who recognise an objective character in the -logical ideal of truth, whether or not they also recognise -non-logical elements in reality, and whether or not -these non-logical elements are physical, such as matter -and energy, or purely psychical, such as will, desire, -emotion, pleasure, and pain. -</p> - -<p> -Pragmatism is a criticism and a theory. If reality -in its full meaning is the Absolute, and if all seeming -reality is only a degree of or approximation to this full -reality, if the knowledge of this reality only is truth, -must it not seem to us that truth is useless knowledge? -Useless, not in the sense that it is without value to the -mind that cares to contemplate it, but useless in so far -as the hard everyday working world in which we have -to spend our lives is concerned. We who have to win -our existence in the struggle of life, need truth. We -need truth in order to act. Truth that transcends our -temporal needs, truth that is eternal, truth that reconciles -illusion and error, that accepts them as a necessary -condition of appearance in time, is useless in practice, -however it may inspire the poet and philosopher. Truth -to serve us must reject error and not reconcile it, must -be a working criterion and not only a rational one. -Whatever truth is, it is not useless; it is a necessity -of life, not a luxury of speculation. Pragmatism therefore -rejects the logical criterion of truth because it is -purely formal and therefore useless. It demands for -us a practical criterion, one that will serve our continual -needs. Whether our working ideas—cause, time, space, -movement, things and their qualities, terms and their -relations, and the like—are consistent or inconsistent -in themselves, they more or less work; and in so far as -they work they are useful and serve us, and because -they work, and just in so far as they work, they are true. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P46"></a>46}</span> -The pragmatist therefore declares that utility, not -logical consistency, is the criterion of truth. Ideas are -true in so far as they work. The discovery that they -serve us is their verification. If we discover ideas that -will serve us better, the old ideas that were true become -untrue, and the new ideas that we adopt become true -because they are found to work. -</p> - -<p> -This doctrine of the verification or making true of -ideas leads to a theory of the origin of the ideas -themselves. Each idea has arisen or been called forth by a -human need. It has been formed by human nature to -meet a need of human nature. It is a practical -postulate claiming truth. Even the axioms that now seem -to us self-evident—such, for example, as the very law of -contradiction itself, from which, as we have seen, the -logical criterion of consistency is deduced—were in their -origin practical postulates, called forth by a need, and, -because found to work, true. The inconsistencies and -contradictions in our ideas do not condemn them as -appearance, and compel us to construct a reality in -which they disappear or are reconciled, but are evidence -of their origin in practical need and of their provisional -character. Truth is not eternal, it is changing. New -conditions are ever calling forth new ideas, and truths -become untrue. Each new idea comes forward with a -claim to truth, and its claim is tested by its -practicability. Truth is not something we discover, and which -was there to be discovered. We verify ideas. To -verify is not to find true but to make true. -</p> - -<p> -The pragmatist theory therefore is that truth is made. -In all other theories truth is found. But if we make -truth we must make reality, for it is clear that if reality -is there already, the agreement with it of man-made -truth would be nothing short of a miracle. The -pragmatist, or at all events the pragmatist who is also a -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P47"></a>47}</span> -humanist, finds no difficulty in accepting this -consequence of the theory, although at the same time -insisting that the whole problem, of being as well as of -knowing is concerned with truth. We shall see, however, -that it offers a serious difficulty to the acceptance -of the theory—a theory which in very many respects -agrees with ordinary practice and with scientific method. -Take, for example, scientific method. Is not all -progress in science made by suggesting a hypothesis, and -testing it by experiment to see if it works? Do we not -judge its claim to truth by the practical consequences -involved in accepting or rejecting it? Is there any -other verification? This is the simple pragmatist -test,—does the laboratory worker add to it or find it in any -respect insufficient? If truth can be considered alone, -then we must admit that it is the attribute of knowledge -which is comprised under the term useful, the term -being used in its most comprehensive meaning to include -every kind of practical consequence. It is the question -of reality that raises the difficulty for the scientific -worker. We cannot believe, or perhaps we should say, -the ordinary man and the scientific man would find it -very difficult to believe, that reality changes correspondingly -with our success or failure in the verification -of our hypothesis. When the scientific worker verifies -his hypothesis, he feels not that he has made something -true which before was not true, but that he has -discovered what always was true, although until the -discovery he did not know it. To this the pragmatist -reply is, that this very belief is a practical consequence -involved in the verification of the hypothesis, involved -in the discovery that it works. What he denies is that -truth reveals, or ever can reveal, a reality entirely -irrelevant to any human purpose. It is also very important -to add that in declaring that truth is verification, the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P48"></a>48}</span> -pragmatist does not set up a purely practical or -utilitarian standard. The "working" of truth means -theoretical as well as practical working. Much of the -current criticism of pragmatism has failed to take notice -of this intention or meaning of its principle, and hence -the common misapprehension that the maxim "truth is -what works" must mean that whatever a man believes is -for him truth. -</p> - -<p> -The pragmatist doctrine and attitude will perhaps be -easier to understand if we take it in regard to a -particular instance of truth and error in regard to -fundamental notions. In the last four or five years a new -principle has been formulated in Physics, named the -Principle of Relativity. It revolutionises the current -conceptions of space and time. It is so recent that -probably some of my readers now hear of it for the first -time, and therefore before I refer to its formulation by -mathematicians I will give a simple illustration to -explain what it is. Suppose that you are walking up and -down the deck of a steamer, and let us suppose that -the steamer is proceeding at the speed of four miles an -hour, the space that you cover and the interval of time -that you occupy are exactly the same for you whether -you are moving up the deck in the direction the steamer -is going or down the deck in the direction which is the -reverse of the steamer's movement. But suppose some -one on the shore could observe you moving while the -ship was invisible to him, your movement would appear -to him entirely different to what it is to you. When -you were walking up the deck you would seem to be -going at twice the speed you would be going, and when -you were going down the deck you would seem not to -be moving at all. The time measurement would also -seem different to the observer on the shore, for while -to you each moment would be measured by an equal -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P49"></a>49}</span> -space covered, to him one moment you would be -moving rapidly, the next at rest. This is simple and -easy to understand. Now suppose that both you and -the observer were each observing a natural phenomenon, -say a thunder-storm, it would seem that each of you -ought to observe it with a difference—a difference -strictly calculable from the system of movement, the -ship, in which you were placed in relation to him. The -propagation of the sound and of the light would have -to undergo a correction if each of you described your -experience to the other. If you were moving in the -direction of the light waves they would be slower for -you than for him, and if against their direction they -would be faster for you than for him. Of course the -immense velocity of the light waves, about 200,000 miles -a second, would make the difference in a movement of -four miles an hour so infinitesimal as to be altogether -inappreciable, but it would not be nothing, and you -would feel quite confident that if it could be measured -the infinitesimal quantity would appear in the result. -Now suppose that we could measure it with absolute -accuracy, and that the result was the discovery that the -supposed difference did not exist at all—and of course, -we suppose that there is no doubt whatever about the -measurement—what, then, should we be obliged to -think? We should be forced to believe that as the -velocity of light was the same for the two observers, -one moving, one at rest, therefore the space and the -time must be different for each. Now, however strange -it may seem, such a measurement has been made, and -with this surprising result. In consequence there has -been formulated a new principle in Physics named the -Principle of Relativity. I take this Principle of -Relativity for my illustration because it is based on -reasoning that practically admits of no doubt, and because -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P50"></a>50}</span> -it requires us to form new conceptions of space and -time which seem to alter fundamentally what we have -hitherto considered as the evident and unmistakable -nature of those realities. It has always seemed that -the distance separating two points, and the interval of -time separating two events, were each independent of -the other and each absolute. However different the -distance and the interval may appear to observers in -movement or to observers in different systems of -movement in relation to ourselves and to one another, in -themselves they are the same distance and the same -interval for all. They are the same for the man in the -express train as for the man standing on the station -platform. The Principle of Relativity requires us to -think that this is not so, but that, contrary to all our -settled notions, the actual space and time vary—really -undergo an alteration, a contraction or expansion—with -each different system of movement of translation to -which the observer is bound. Events that for an -observer belonging to one system of movement happen -in the same place, for another observer in a different -system of movement happen in different places. Events -that for one observer happen simultaneously, for other -observers are separated by a time interval according -to the movement of translation of the system to which -they belong. So that space, which Newton described -as rigid, and time which he described as flowing at a -constant rate, and which for him was absolute, are for -the new theory relative, different for an observer in -every different system of movement of translation. Or -we may state it in the opposite way, and say that the -Principle of Relativity shows us that the reason why -natural phenomena, such as the rate of propagation of -light, undergo no alteration when we pass from one -system of movement of translation to another, as we -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P51"></a>51}</span> -are constantly doing in the changing velocity of the -earth's movement round the sun, is that space and time -alter with the velocity. I cannot here give the -argument or describe the experiments which have given -this result—I am simply taking it as an illustration.[<a id="chap05fn1text"></a><a href="#chap05fn1">1</a>] It -seems to me admirably suited to compare the -pragmatist method and the pragmatist attitude with that -of scientific realism and of absolute idealism. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap05fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap05fn1text">1</a>] The Principle of Relativity is mainly -the result of the recent -mathematical work of H. A. Lorentz, -Einstein, and the late Professor -Minkowski. A very interesting -and not excessively difficult, account -of it is contained in <i>Dernières Pensées</i>, -by the late Henri Poincaré; Paris, Alcan. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -Here, then, is a question in which the truth of our -accepted notions is called in question, and new notions -claim to be true. The sole question involved, -pragmatism insists, is the truth of conceptions, not the -reality of things, and there is but one way of testing the -truth of conceptions—and that is by comparing the -rival conceptions in respect of the practical -consequences that follow from them and adopting those that -will work. If the old conceptions of space and time fail -to conform to a new need, then what was true before -the need was revealed is no longer true, the new -conception has become true. By verifying the new -conception, we make it true. But, objects the realist, an -idea cannot become true; what is now true always was -true, and what is no longer true never was true, though -we may have worked with the false notion ignorant -that it was false. Behind truth there is reality. The -earth was spherical even when all mankind believed it -flat and found the belief work. To this the pragmatist -reply is that reality is only our objectification of truth; -it possesses no meaning divorced from human purposes. -Had anyone announced that the earth was a sphere -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P52"></a>52}</span> -when it was generally held to be flat, unless his -announcement had some relevance to a defect in the flat -earth notion, or a claim to revise that notion, his -announcement would have been neither a truth nor a -falsehood in any intelligible meaning of the term—he -would have been making an irrelevant remark. The -notions of space and time that Newton held worked, -and were therefore true; if a new need requires us to -replace them with other notions, and these other -notions will work and are therefore true, they have -become true and Newton's notions have become false. If -it is still objected that the new notions were also true -for Newton, although he was ignorant of them, the need -for them not having arisen, the only reply is that truth, -or reality, in complete detachment from human -purposes, cannot be either affirmed or denied. -</p> - -<p> -With this view the idealist will be in agreement; his -objection is of a different kind. He rejects, as the -pragmatist does, the notion of a reality independent of -human nature that forces upon us the changes that our -conceptions undergo. These changes, he holds, are -the inner working of the conceptions themselves, the -manifestation of our intellectual nature, ever striving -for an ideal of logical consistency. Truth is this ideal. -We do not make it; we move towards it. If we compare, -then, the idealist and the pragmatist doctrine, it will -seem that, while for the idealist truth is growing with -advancing knowledge into an ever larger because more -comprehensive system of reality, for the pragmatist -it is ever narrowing, discarding failures as useless and -irrelevant to present purpose. How indeed, the idealist -will ask, if practical consequences be the meaning of -truth, is it possible to understand that knowledge has -advanced or can advance? Does not the history of -science prove a continual expansion, an increasing -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P53"></a>53}</span> -comprehension? It is within the conception that the -inconsistency is revealed, not in any mere outward use -of the conceptions, and the intellectual effort is to -reconcile the contradiction by relating the conception -to a more comprehensive whole. How, then, does the -idealist meet this case which we have specially instanced, -the demand for new notions of space and time made by -the Principle of Relativity? He denies that the new -conceptions are called forth by human needs in the -narrow sense—that is to say, in the sense that working -hypotheses or practical postulates are required. The -need is purely logical. The inconsistency revealed in -the notions that have hitherto served us can only be -reconciled by apprehending a higher unity. If the -older notions of space and time are inadequate to the -more comprehensive view of the universe as a -co-ordination of systems of movement, then this very -negation of the older notions is the affirmation of the -new, and from the negation by pure logic the content -and meaning which are the truth of the new notions -are derived. To this objection the pragmatist reply -is that if this be the meaning of the truth there is no -way shown by which it can be distinguished from error. -There is in fact for idealism no error, no illusion, no -falsehood; as real facts, there are only degrees of truth. -But a theory of truth which ignores such stubborn -realities as illusion, falsehood, and error is, from -whatever standpoint we view it, useless. On the other -hand, pragmatism offers a test by which we can -discriminate between true and false—namely, the method of -judging conceptions by their practical consequences. -Can we or can we not make our conceptions work? -That is the whole meaning of asking, Are they true or -false? And now, lest the reader is alarmed at the -prospect of having to revise his working ideas of space and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P54"></a>54}</span> -time, I will, to reassure him, quote the words with which -Henri Poincaré concluded his account of the new -conceptions, and which admirably express and illustrate -the pragmatist's attitude: "What is to be our position -in view of these new conceptions? Are we about to -be forced to modify our conclusions? No, indeed: -we had adopted a convention because it seemed to us -convenient, and we declared that nothing could compel -us to abandon it. To-day certain physicists wish to -adopt a new convention. It is not because they are -compelled to; they judge this new convention to be -more convenient—that is all; and those who are not of -this opinion can legitimately keep the old and so leave -their old habits undisturbed. I think, between ourselves, -that this is what they will do for a long time to come." -</p> - -<p> -I have so far considered pragmatism rather as a -criticism than as a doctrine. I will now try and characterise -it on its positive side. It declares that there is -no such thing as pure thought, but that all thinking is -personal and purposive; that all knowing is directed, -controlled, and qualified by psychological conditions -such as interest, attention, desire, emotion, and the like; -and that we cannot, as formal logic does, abstract from -any of these, for logic itself is part of a psychical process. -Truth therefore depends upon belief; truths are matters -of belief, and beliefs are rules of action. It is this -doctrine that gives to pragmatism its paradoxical, some -have even said its grotesque, character. It seems to say -that the same proposition is both true and false—true for -the man who believes it, false for the man who cannot. -It seems to say that we can make anything true by -believing it, and we can believe anything so long as the -consequences of acting on it are not absolutely disastrous. -And the proposition, All truths work, seems to involve -the conclusion that all that works is true; and the -proposition, The true is the useful, seems to imply that -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P55"></a>55}</span> -whatever is useful is therefore true. No small part of -the pragmatist controversy has been directed to the -attempt to show that all and each of these corollaries -are, or arise from, misconceptions of the doctrine. I -think, and I shall endeavour to show, that there is a -serious defect in the pragmatist statement, and that -these misconceptions are in a great part due to it. -Nevertheless, we must accept the pragmatist disavowal. -And there is no difficulty in doing so, for the meaning -of the theory is sufficiently clear. Truth, according to -pragmatism, is a value and not a fact. Truth is thus -connected with the conception of "good." In saying -that truth is useful, we say that it is a means to an end, -a good. It is not a moral end, but a cognitive end, -just as "beauty" is an esthetic end. Truth, beauty, -and goodness thus stand together as judgments of value -or worth. It is only by recognising that truth is a -value that we can possess an actual criterion to -distinguish it from error, for if truth is a judgment of fact, -if it asserts existence, so also does error. -</p> - -<p> -The pragmatist principle has an important bearing -on religion. It justifies the Faith attitude. It shows -that the good aimed at by a "truth claim" is only -attainable by the exercise of the will to believe. Thus -it replaces the intellectual maxim, Believe in nothing you -can possibly doubt, with the practical maxim, Resolve -not to quench any impulse to believe because doubts of -the truth are possible. Belief may even be a condition -of the success of the truth claim. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap06"></a></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VI -<br /> -UTILITY -</h3> - -<p> -We have seen in the last chapter that pragmatism is -both a criticism and a theory. It shows us that the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P56"></a>56}</span> -notion that truth is correspondence involves the -conception of an "impossible" knowledge, and the notion -that truth is coherence or consistency involves the -conception of a "useless" knowledge. The explanation -pragmatism itself offers is of the kind that is called in -the technical language of philosophy teleological. This -means that to explain or to give a meaning to truth -all we can do is to point out the purpose on account of -which it exists. This is not scientific explanation. -Physical science explains a fact or an event by showing -the conditions which give rise to it or that determine -its character. Pragmatism recognises no conditions -determining truth such as those which science embodies -in the conception of a natural law—that is, the idea of -a connection of natural events with one another which -is not dependent on human thoughts about them nor -on human purposes in regard to them. Truth is in -intimate association with human practical activity; its -meaning lies wholly in its utility. We must therefore -now examine somewhat closely this notion of utility. -</p> - -<p> -There appears to me to be a serious defect in the -pragmatist conception and application of the principle -of utility; it is based on a conception altogether too -narrow. A theory that condemns any purely logical -process as resulting in "useless" knowledge can only -justify itself by insisting on an application of the -principle of utility that will be found to exclude not -merely the Absolute of philosophy but most if not all -of the results of pure mathematics and physics, for these -sciences apply a method of pure logical deduction and -induction indistinguishable from that which pragmatism -condemns. The intellectual nature of man is an -endowment which sharply distinguishes him from other -forms of living creatures. So supreme a position does -our intellect assign to us, so wide is the gap that separates -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P57"></a>57}</span> -us from other creatures little different from ourselves -in respect of perfection of material organisation and -adaptation to environment, that it seems almost natural -to suppose that our intellect is that for which we exist, -and not merely a mode of controlling, directing, and -advancing our life. Now it is possible to hold—and this -is the view that I shall endeavour in what follows to -develop—that the intellect is subservient to life, and that -we can show the manner and method of its working and -the purpose it serves. So far we may agree with the -pragmatist, but it is not the same thing to say that the -intellect serves a useful purpose and to say that truth, -the ideal of the intellect, the end which it strives for, is -itself only a utility. Were there no meaning in truth -except that it is what works, were there no meaning -independent of and altogether distinct from the practical -consequences of belief, of what value to us would the -intellect be? If the meaning the intellect assigns to -truth is itself not true, how can the intellect serve us? -The very essence of its service is reduced to nought; for -what else but the conception of an objective truth, a -logical reality independent of any and every psychological -condition, is the utility that the intellect puts -us in possession of? It is this conception alone that -constitutes it an effective mode of activity. Therefore, -if we hold with the pragmatist that the intellect is -subservient to life, truth is indeed a utility, but it is a -utility just because it has a meaning distinct from -usefulness. On the other hand, to condemn any knowledge -as "useless" is to deny utility to the intellect. -</p> - -<p> -Before I try to show that the logical method of the -idealist philosophy, which pragmatism condemns because -it leads to "useless" knowledge, is identical in every -respect with the method employed in pure mathematics -and physics, I will give for comparison two illustrations -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P58"></a>58}</span> -that seem to me instances of a narrow and of a wide -use of the concept of utility. -</p> - -<p> -A short time ago an orang-utang escaped from its -cage in the Zoological Gardens under somewhat singular -and very interesting circumstances. The cage was -secured with meshed wire of great strength, judged -sufficient to resist the direct impact of the most powerful -of the carnivora; but the ape, by attention to the twisting -of the plied wire, had by constant trying succeeded in -loosening and finally in unwinding a large section. It -escaped from its enclosure, and after doing considerable -damage in the corridor, including the tearing out of a -window frame, made its way into the grounds and took -refuge in a tree, twisting the branches into a platform -said to be similar to the constructions it makes in its -native forests. -</p> - -<p> -In taking this action as an illustration, I am not -concerned with the question of what may be the distinction -between action that is intelligent and action that is -instinctive. If we take intelligence in a wide and general -meaning, we may compare the intelligence shown by this -ape with the intelligence shown by man in the highest -processes of the mind. Psychologists would, I think, -be unanimous in holding that in the mind of the ape -there was no conception of freedom, no kind of mental -image of unrestricted life and of a distinct means of -attaining it, no clearly purposed end, the means of -attaining which was what prompted the undoing of the -wire, such as we should certainly suppose in the case of -a man in a similar situation. It was the kind of intelligent -action that psychologists denote by the description -"trial and error." It seems to me, however, that this -exactly fulfils the conditions that the pragmatist doctrine -of the meaning of truth require. We see the intellect -of the ape making true by finding out what works. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P59"></a>59}</span> -We can suppose an entire absence of the idea of objective -truth to which reality must conform, of truth unaffected -by purpose. Here, then, we seem to have the pure type -of truth in its simplest conditions, a practical activity -using intelligence to discover what works. Is the difference -between this practical activity and the higher mental -activities as we employ them in the abstract sciences one -of degree of complexity only, or is it different in kind? -</p> - -<p> -Let us consider now, as an illustration of the method -of the abstract sciences, the well-known case of the -discovery of the planet Neptune. This planet was -discovered by calculation and deduction, and was only -seen when its position had been so accurately -determined that the astronomers who searched for it knew -exactly the point of the heavens to which to direct their -telescopes. The calculation was one of extraordinary -intricacy, and was made independently by two -mathematicians, Adams of Cambridge and Leverrier of Paris, -between the years 1843 and 1846. Each communicated -his result independently—Adams to the astronomer -Challis, the Director of the Cambridge Observatory, -and Leverrier to Dr. Galle of the Berlin Observatory. -Within six weeks of one another and entirely unknown -to one another, in August and September 1846, each of -these astronomers observed the planet where he had -been told to look for it. This is one of the romances -of modern science. It is not the discovery but the -method that led to it which may throw light on our -problem of the nature of truth. -</p> - -<p> -At first sight this seems exactly to accord with and -even to illustrate the pragmatist theory, that truth is -what works. The investigation is prompted by the -discrepancies between the actual and the calculated -positions of Uranus, the outermost planet, as it was then -supposed, of the system. This revealed a need, and this -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P60"></a>60}</span> -need was met by the practical postulate of the -existence of another planet as yet unseen. The hypothesis -was found to work even before the actual observation -put the final seal of actuality on the discovery. What -else but the practical consequences of the truth claim -in the form of the hypothesis of an undiscovered planet -were ever in question? Yes, we reply, but the actual -method adopted, and the knowledge sought for by the -method, are precisely of the kind that pragmatism -rejects as "useless" knowledge. Why were not the -observed movements of Uranus accepted as what they -were? Why was it felt that they must be other than -they were seen to be unless there was another planet? -The need lay in the idea of system. It was inconsistent -with the system then believed complete, and the need -was to find the complete system in which it would -harmonise. The truth that was sought for was a -harmonious individual whole, and the method employed -precisely that which the Absolutist theory of reality -employs. There is observed a discrepancy, an -inconsistency, a contradiction within the whole conceived as -a system. This negation is treated as a defect, is -calculated and accurately determined, and is then -positively affirmed of the reality. Now, what is distinctive -in this method is that reality is conceived as a complete -system. If the felt defect in this system cannot be -made good by direct discovery, its place is supplied by -a fiction, using the term in its etymological meaning to -express something made and not in its derived meaning -to express something found false. This intellectual -process of construction is purely logical; no psychological -element in the sense of the will to believe enters -into it or colours it in any way. -</p> - -<p> -This is not an isolated instance, it illustrates the -method of science in all theorising. An even more -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P61"></a>61}</span> -striking illustration than that we have just given is the -case of the hypothesis of the luminiferous æther—a -supposed existence, a fiction, that has served a useful, -even an indispensable service in the history of modern -physics. To many physicists, even to Lord Kelvin, the -hypothesis seemed so surely established that its -nonexistence hardly seemed thinkable, yet all the -experiments designed to detect its presence have been -uniformly negative in result, and it now seems not even -necessary as a hypothesis, and likely to disappear. The -æther was not only not discovered, it was not even -suspected to exist, as in the case of the unknown planet -Neptune—it was logically constructed. It was required -to support the theory of the undulatory nature of light -and to fulfil the possibility of light propagation in space. -It was therefore a postulate, called forth by a need—so -far we may adopt the pragmatist account. But -what was the nature of the need, and what was the -method by which the postulate was called forth? It -is in answering this question that the pragmatist -criterion fails. The need was intellectual in the purely -logical meaning of the term, and it was met by a purely -logical construction. The need was a practical human -need only in so far as the intellect working by logical -process is a human endowment but not in any personal -sense such as is conveyed by the term psychological. -Willingness or unwillingness to believe, desire, aversion, -interest were all irrelevant. Given the intellect, the -logical necessity was the only need that called forth by -logical process the "truth-claiming" hypothesis of the -æther. But even so, the pragmatist will urge, is its -truth anything else but its usefulness as shown in the -practical consequences of believing it? Was it not -true while it was useful, and is it not only now false, if -it is false, if it is actually discovered not to be useful? -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P62"></a>62}</span> -The reply is that no mathematician or physicist would -recognise the possibility of working with a conception -of truth that simply identified truth with utility, and -for this reason that he can only conceive reality as a -system whose truth is symbolised in an equation. It -is the system that determines and characterises the -postulate, and not the postulate advanced at a venture, -tried and verified, that constitutes the system. The -mathematician begins by placing symbols to represent -the unknown factors in his equation, and proceeds by -means of his known factors to determine their value. -The æther is at first a pure fiction constructed to supply -an unknown existence recognised as a defect. Its truth -cannot mean that it works for it cannot but work, -having been constructed purely for that purpose. Its -truth means that it corresponds to some actual -existence at present unknown. To prove its truth the -physicist does not appeal to its value as a hypothesis, -but devises experiments by which, if it does exist, its -existence will be demonstrated. In this actual case the -experiments have had a uniformly negative result, and -therefore the truth of the hypothesis is made doubtful -or denied. The hypothesis continues to work as well -as it ever did, and physicists will probably long -continue to use it, but it has failed to establish its truth -claim. The result is the modern Principle of Relativity, -which, as we have already said, has produced a -revolution in modern physics. The abolition of the æther -would have been impossible if the physicist had been -content with the utility of his hypothesis and had not -experimented to prove its truth. The relation between -truth and utility is thus proved to be that it is useful -to know what is true. -</p> - -<p> -These two illustrations of scientific method—namely, -the discovery of Neptune and the negative discovery -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P63"></a>63}</span> -that the æther is non-existent—make it evident that -verification is the intellectual process not of making -true, but of finding true. We can, indeed, distinguish -quite clearly the two processes. The first process, that -of making true, is the constructing of the fiction by -which we complete an incomplete system, and the -second is the testing of that fiction to see if it -corresponds to anything actually existing. No kind of -intellectual activity will make an idea true, and conversely -we may say that were truth only a utility, then -knowledge instead of being systematic would be chaotic. -Existence has its roots in reality, not in knowledge. -Reality does not depend on truth. Truth is the -intellectual apprehension of reality. -</p> - -<p> -If the pragmatist objects that in this argument I -have throughout supposed him to be urging the narrow -meaning of utility, namely, that it is usefulness in the -strictly practical sense, whereas he intends it in the -widest possible meaning—a meaning that includes -theoretical usefulness—then the trouble is a different -one; it is to know how and where the pragmatist stops -short of the coherence theory of truth, and wherein his -method differs from that of the idealist. -</p> - -<p> -This brings me to the consideration of another theory -in which the concept of utility plays a large, indeed a -predominant part. This is the theory of the relation -of knowledge to life that is given to us in the philosophy -of Bergson. I have in one of the volumes of this series -given an account of this philosophy; I am here only dealing -with its relation to this special problem of the nature -of truth. It has been claimed that this philosophy is -only a form of pragmatism, but it is not a theory of -truth, and it has this essential difference from -pragmatism that it is the intellect and not truth that is a -utility. Before we consider the question that it gives -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P64"></a>64}</span> -rise to in regard to truth, let us first examine the theory -of the intellect, and the nature of its utility. The -intellect is a mode of activity, an endowment acquired -in the course of evolution, and which has been retained -and perfected because of its utility. This does not -mean that the intellect directs us to what is useful and -inhibits us from courses fatal to life, neither does it -mean that it gives us any power to make true what is -not already true, it means that the power to acquire -knowledge is useful. There is a contrast in our own -existence between our life and our intellect. -</p> - -<p> -To understand the way in which the intellect serves -the living creature endowed with it, we need only regard -it from the standpoint of ordinary experience. We -know in ourselves that our life is wider than our intellect, -and that our intellect serves the activity of our life. -The common expressions we employ, such as using our -wits, taking an intelligent interest, trying to think, all -imply a utility distinct from the intellect. So viewed, -our life appears as an active principle within us, -maintaining our organism in its relations, active and passive, -and reactive to the reality outside and independent of -it. Our intellect also seems both active and passive. -It receives the influences that stream in upon us from -the reality around us, it apprehends and interprets -them, and works out the lines of our possible action in -regard to them. The influences that flow in upon us -from the outside world are already selected before our -intellect apprehends them, for they flow in by the -avenues of our senses, and the senses are natural -instruments of selection. If we picture these influences as -vibrations, then we may say that a certain group of -vibrations of a very rapid frequency are selected by -the eye and give rise to vision, that another group of very -much lower frequency are selected by the ear and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P65"></a>65}</span> -give the sensation of sound, and other groups are -selected by taste, smell, and touch. Many groups are -known indirectly by means of artificial instruments, -and all the infinite series that unite these groups of the -actually experienced vibrations escape our apprehension -altogether—we have no means of selecting them. -But all these sense data, as we may call them, come to -us without exertion or activity on our part; it is the -intellect which gives them meaning, which interprets -them, which makes them the apprehension or awareness -of objects or things. And the active part that the -intellect plays is also a process of selection. This is -evident if we reflect upon the universal form which our -intellectual activity takes, namely, attention. It is in -the act of attention that we are conscious of mental -activity, and attention is essentially selection—the -selection of an interest. Besides the natural selection that -is effected by our senses and the conscious selection that -is manifest in attention, there is also a more or less -arbitrary selection that our intellect performs in -marking out the lines of our practical interest and possible -action. In this work of selection the intellect makes -the world conform to the necessities of our action. -</p> - -<p> -So far we have looked at our intellectual endowment -from the standpoint of ordinary common-sense -experience. Let us now consider the philosophical theory -based on this view, which explains the nature of -knowledge by showing its purpose. The intellect not only -selects, but in selecting transforms the reality. It -presents us with knowledge that indeed corresponds -with reality, for it is essentially a view of reality, but also -in selecting it marks out divisions, and gives to reality -a form that is determined by practical interest. The -same reality is different to different individuals and to -different species according to their practical interests. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P66"></a>66}</span> -The practical end which the human intellect serves is -to present us with a field for our life activity. This -is the real world for us, as we know it, real objects in a -real space. Had we no other way of knowing but that -of our intellect we should not know the life which is -active within us as it is really lived, we should be as -those who, standing outside, watch a movement, and -not as those who are carried along in the movement -and experience it from within. In life and intellect we -have the counterpart of reality and appearance. Life -is not something that changes; it is the change of which -the something is the appearance. Life is the reality of -which all things, as we understand them, are the -appearances, and on account of which they appear. The solid -things in space and time are not in reality what they -appear; they are views of the reality. The intellect -guided by our practical interest presents reality under -this form of solid spatial things. Clearly, then, if this -view be true, the whole world, as it is presented to us -and thought of by us, is an illusion. Our science is not -unreal, but it is a transformed reality. The illusions -may be useful, may, indeed, be necessary and indispensable, -but nevertheless it is illusion. -</p> - -<p> -But here there arises a new difficulty in regard to -truth. If the usefulness of the intellect consists in the -active production of an illusion, can we say that the -intellect leads us to truth? Is it not only if we can -turn away from the intellect and obtain a non-intellectual -intuition that we can know truth? -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap07"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P67"></a>67}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VII -<br /> -ILLUSION -</h3> - -<p> -The doctrine that the world that appears is essentially -unlike the world that is is neither new nor peculiar to any -particular theory of philosophy. It has received a new -interest and a new interpretation lately in the theory -that we are now considering, that the clue to the -appearance of the world to us is to be found in the conception -of the nature of the utility of the intellect and in the -mode of its activity. The idea that we are perhaps -disqualified by our very nature itself from beholding -reality and knowing truth is illustrated in the -well-known allegory in the <i>Republic</i> of Plato: -</p> - -<p> -"And now let me show in a figure how far our -nature is enlightened or unenlightened. Behold! human -beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth -open towards the light and reaching all along the den; -here they have been from their childhood, and have -their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move -and can only see before them, being prevented by the -chains from turning round their heads. Above and -behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between -the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you -will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like -the screen which marionette players have in front of -them, over which they show the puppets. And men are -passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and -statues, and figures of animals made of wood and stone -and various materials, which appear over the wall.... -</p> - -<p> -"They are strange prisoners, like ourselves, and they -see only their own shadows or the shadows of one -another which the fire throws on the opposite wall of -the cave. And so also of the objects carried and of the -passers-by; to the prisoners the truth would be literally -nothing but the shadows of the images. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P68"></a>68}</span> -</p> - -<p> -"And now look again, and see what will naturally -follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of -their error. At first, when any of them, is liberated and -compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round -and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp -pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable -to see the realities of which in his former state he had -seen the shadows. And then conceive someone saying -to him that what he saw before was an illusion, but -that now, when he is approaching nearer to being, and -his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has -a clearer vision, and what will be his reply? Will he -not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw -are truer than the objects which are now shown to -him?... -</p> - -<p> -"And suppose that he is forced into the presence of -the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? -When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, -and he will not be able to see anything at all of what -are now called realities." -</p> - -<p> -The thought that Plato has expressed in this wonderful -allegory has entered deeply into all philosophy. -What we first take for reality is merely a shadow world. -But in Plato's view it is the intellect which gives us the -means of escape, the power to turn from the illusion to -behold the reality. It is not until now that philosophy -has sought the clue to the illusion in the nature of the -intellect itself. The very instrument of truth is unfitted -to reveal to us the reality as it is, because its nature -and purpose is to transform reality, to make reality -appear in a form which, though of paramount importance -to us as active beings, is essentially an illusion. The -intellectual bent of our mind leads us away from, and not -towards a vision of reality in its purity. The more our -intellect progresses, and the more and more clearly we -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P69"></a>69}</span> -see into a greater and ever greater number of things, -the farther are we from, and not the nearer to a grasp -of reality as it is. To obtain this vision of reality we -have to turn away from the intellect and find ourselves -again in that wider life out of which the intellect is -formed. Life, as it lives, is an intuition that is -nonintellectual. -</p> - -<p> -"Human intelligence," writes Bergson, "is not at -all what Plato taught in the allegory of the cave. Its -function is not to look at passing shadows, nor yet to -turn itself round and contemplate the glaring sun. It -has something else to do. Harnessed, like yoked oxen, -to a heavy task, we feel the play of our muscles and -joints, the weight of the plough, and the resistance of the -soil. To act and to know that we are acting, to come -into touch with reality and even to live it, but only in -the measure in which it concerns the work that is being -accomplished and the furrow that is being ploughed, -such is the function of human intelligence." -</p> - -<p> -The illusion to which our intellectual nature subjects -us is the necessity we are under to regard the things of -the universe as more ultimate, as more fundamental -than the movement which actuates the universe. It -seems to us impossible that there could exist movement -or change, unless there already existed things to be -moved or changed, things whose nature is not altered, -but only their form and their external relations, when -they are moved or changed. This necessity of thought -seems to have received authoritative recognition in all -attempts, religious and scientific, to conceive origins. -Thus we read in the Book of Genesis: -</p> - -<p> -</p> - -<p> -"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. -And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness -was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved -upon the face of the waters." -</p> - -<p> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P70"></a>70}</span> -The matter of the universe, it is felt, must be in existence -before the movement which vivifies it. The dead inert -stuff must be created before it can receive the breath -of life. And if God the creator is conceived as living -before the matter which He has created, it is as an -external principle, the relation of which to the creation -is by most religious minds thought to transcend the -power of the finite understanding to conceive. -</p> - -<p> -The same fundamental conception of the primacy -of matter over movement is evident in the scientific -theories of the nature and origin of life. Life appears -to science as a form of energy that requires things, -matter occupying space, to support it. According to -one view, life is the result of a certain combination or -synthesis of chemical or physical elements, previously -existing separately—a combination of very great -complexity, and one that may possibly have occurred once -only in the long process of nature, but which nevertheless -might be, and some think probably, or even certainly, -will be brought about by a chemist working in his -laboratory. This is the mechanistic or materialist view. -On the other hand, there is the theory of vitalism. -Life, it is contended, cannot be due to such a synthesis -of material elements as the mechanistic view supposes, -because it is of the nature of an "entelechy"—that is, -an individual existence which functions, as a whole, in -every minutest part of the organism it "vitalises." Life -has supervened upon, and not arisen out of the -material organism which it guides and controls not by -relating independent parts, but by making every part -subserve the activity and unity of the whole. But the -vitalist theory, as well as the mechanistic theory, -conceives the movement and change which is life as -dependent on the previous existence of a matter or stuff -which is moved or changed. The philosophical -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P71"></a>71}</span> -conception differs, therefore, from both these theories. It -is that life is an original movement, and that this -movement is the whole reality of which things, inert -matter, even spatial extension, are appearances. True -duration is change, not the permanence of something -amidst change. There are no unchanging things. -Everything changes. Reality is the flux; things are -views of the flux, arrests or contractions of the flowing -that the intellect makes. The appearance of the world -to us is our intellectual grasp of a reality that flows. -This original movement is the life of the universe. -Briefly stated, the argument on which the theory is -based is that it is logically impossible to explain change -by changelessness, movement by immobility. Real -change cannot be a succession of states themselves -fixed and changeless; real movement cannot be the -immobile positions in which some thing is successively -at rest. On the other hand, if movement is original, the -interruption of movement, in whatever way effected, -will appear as things. The experience which confirms -this argument is the insight that everyone may obtain -of the reality of his own life as continuous movement, -unceasing change, wherein all that exists exists -together in a present activity. To develop this argument -would exceed the limits of this book, and would be -outside its purpose. It is essential, however, that such -a theory should be understood, for clearly it is possible -to hold not only that we are subject to illusion, but -that illusion is of the very nature of intellectual -apprehension. If, then, the understanding works illusion for -the sake of action, is it thereby disqualified as an -instrument for the attainment of truth? -</p> - -<p> -We are brought, then, to the critical point of our -inquiry. If illusion is the essential condition of human -activity, if the intellect, the very instrument of truth, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P72"></a>72}</span> -is itself affected, what is to save us from universal -scepticism? If the salt have lost his savour, wherewith -shall it be salted? The intellect with its frames -and moulds shapes living change and movement into -fixed immobile states; the process of knowing alters -profoundly the reality known. Must we not conclude -that knowledge, however useful, is not true? And to -what shall we turn for truth? There is, indeed, if this -be so, a deeper irony in the question, What is truth? than -even Pilate could have imagined. We have absolutely -no practical concern with truth—we must leave it -to the mystic, to the unpractical, the contemplative man -who has turned aside from the stern task of busy life. -</p> - -<p> -It is not so. The problem that seems so fundamental -admits a quite simple solution. Illusion is not error, -nor is it falsehood; it is the appearance of reality. It is -the reality that appears, and when we grasp the -principle of utility we understand the shape that the -appearance must assume. This shape may seem to us a -distortion, but in recognising appearance we are in -touch with reality, and practical interest is the key that -opens to us the interpretation of intellectual experience. -And it is not only by the intellect that we interpret the -nature of reality, for besides logic there is life, and in -life we directly perceive the reality that in logic we -think about. -</p> - -<p> -The intellect, then, does not make truth, neither does -it make reality; it makes reality take the form of spatial -things, and it makes things seem to be the ground of -reality. Were our nature not intellectual, if all -consciousness was intuitive, the world would not then -appear as things—there would be no things. But, -notwithstanding that our world is an illusion, it is not the -less on that account a true world, and our science is -true knowledge, in the objective meaning of truth, for -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P73"></a>73}</span> -once an illusion is interpreted, it becomes an integral -part of the conception of reality. It would be easy to -find abundant illustration of this fact within science -itself. Thus in the familiar case of the straight stick -which appears bent when partly immersed in water, as -soon as the illusion is understood as due to the different -refraction of light in media of different density, air and -water, it ceases to be an illusion. We then recognise -that if a partly immersed stick did not appear bent, it -would really be bent. Again, the illusion that clings to -us most persistently throughout our experience is that -which is connected with movement and rest. The -system of movement in which we are ourselves carried -along appears to us stationary, while that which is -outside it seems alone to move. In very simple cases, -such as viewing the landscape from a railway-carriage -window, habit has long caused the illusion to cease, -but we all remember the child's feeling that the trees -and fields were flying past us. The earth's motion -never becomes to us a real experience of movement, we -accept the fact and never doubt the scientific evidence -on which it rests, yet we always speak and think of -sunrise and sunset; and this is not merely due to the -accident that our language was fixed before the nature -of the celestial movement was known, but to a natural -illusion which it is far more convenient to retain than -to abandon. -</p> - -<p> -The fact of illusion is not the tenet of any particular -philosophy, nor even of philosophy itself; it is a -recognised factor in common life and in physical science, -but in instancing the theory of Bergson's philosophy -I am choosing an extreme case. Berkeley held that -illusion is practically universal; Kant taught that the -apparent objectivity of phenomena is the form that the -understanding imposes on things; but Bergson teaches -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P74"></a>74}</span> -not only that all material reality is illusion, but also -that this very illusion is the work of the intellect, that -the intellect is formed for this purpose, intellect and -matter being correlative, evolving <i>pari passu</i>. To such -a doctrine there is of necessity a positive side, for it is -impossible that it can rest on universal scepticism—scepticism -both of knowledge and of the instrument of -knowledge. If the intellectual view of reality as solid -matter in absolute space is illusion, it must be possible -to apprehend the reality from which the judgment that -it is illusion is derived. If the intellect distorts, there -must be an intuition which is pure, and the relation -between these will be the relation between reality and -appearance. Neither, then, is reality truth, nor -appearance error. There is a truth of appearance, a truth -that is a value in itself, a truth that is more than the -mere negation that appearance is not reality. The -appearance is our hold upon the reality, our actual -contact with it, the mode and direction of our action upon it. -What, then, is error? It cannot consist in the fact -that we know appearance only, not reality, for we can -only know reality by its appearance. It cannot be an -appearance behind which there is no reality, for -non-being cannot appear. It cannot be nothing at all or -pure non-being, for to think of absolute nothing is not -to think. In error there is some object of thought -which is denied real being. What this is is the problem -of error. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap08"></a></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VIII -<br /> -THE PROBLEM OF ERROR -</h3> - -<p> -In the <i>Theætetus</i> of Plato, Socrates has been discussing -with Theætetus what knowledge is, and when at last -agreement seems to be reached in the definition that -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P75"></a>75}</span> -knowledge is true opinion, a new difficulty occurs to -Socrates: -</p> - -<p> -"There is a point which often troubles me and is a -great perplexity to me both in regard to myself and to -others. I cannot make out the nature or origin of the -mental experience to which I refer. How there can be -false opinion—that difficulty still troubles the eye of -my mind. Do we not speak of false opinion, and say -that one man holds a false and another a true opinion, -as though there were some natural distinction between -them? All things and everything are either known or -not known. He who knows, cannot but know; and he -who does not know, cannot know.... Where, then, -is false opinion? For if all things are either known or -unknown, there can be no opinion which is not comprehended -under this alternative, and so false opinion is -excluded." -</p> - -<p> -This difficulty may appear at first sight purely verbal, -and we shall perhaps be inclined to see the answer to it -in the double use that we make of the word knowledge. -We use the word in two senses, in one of which it -includes all and everything that is or can be present to -the mind in thinking, and in another and narrower -sense the word knowledge means truth. It was in the -narrow sense of the word that whatever is not true is -not knowledge that Socrates interpreted the meaning -of the Delphic oracle that had declared him the wisest -of men. His wisdom must be, he said, that whereas -other men seemed to be wise and to know something, -he knew that he knew nothing. All men have opinion, -but opinion is not knowledge, though easily and -generally mistaken for it. His perplexity was to understand -what actually this false opinion could be which passed -for knowledge. It could not be nothing at all, for then -it would simply mean ignorance; but in false opinion -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P76"></a>76}</span> -some object is present to the mind. Everything that -the mind thinks of has being. A thing may have being -that does not exist if by existence is meant the particular -existence of an event in time, for most of the things we -think about are timeless—they are ideas, such as -whiteness, goodness, numbers and the properties of numbers, -faith, love, and such-like. All such ideas are called -universals, because their reality does not mean that -they exist at one particular moment and no other, but -they are real, they have being. How, then, can there -be anything intermediate between being and not being, -anything that is and also is not, for this is what false -opinion or error seems to be? -</p> - -<p> -There is, then, a problem of error, and it is quite distinct -from the problem of truth. The problem of truth is to -know by what criterion we can test the agreement of -our ideas with reality; the problem of error is to know -how there can be false opinion. There is false opinion, -of this no one needs to be convinced; but where its place -is in the fundamental scheme of the mental process, in -what precisely it consists, whether it is purely a -negation or whether it has a positive nature of its own, this -is the problem we have now to consider. -</p> - -<p> -There is an important distinction in logic between -what is contradictory and what is contrary. Of two -contradictory propositions one must be true, the other -must be false; but of two contrary propositions one -must be false, but both may be false. Of contradictory -propositions one is always a pure negation, one declares -the non-existence of what the other affirms the existence; -but of contrary propositions each has a positive content, -and both may be false. A true proposition may be -based on a false opinion, and it is very important to -have a clear idea of what we intend by false opinion. -We do not mean by false opinion such plainly false -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P77"></a>77}</span> -propositions as that two and two are five or that there -may be no corners in a square—such propositions are -false, because they contradict propositions that are -self-evident. If anyone should seriously affirm them, we -should not, I think, say that such a one had a false -opinion, but that he failed, perhaps through some -illusion, to understand the meaning of the terms he was -using. An example of what would now, I suppose, be -unquestionably regarded by everyone as error is that -whole body of opinion that found expression in the -theory and practice of witchcraft. This was once -almost universally accepted, and though probably at no -period nor in any country was there not some one -who doubted or disbelieved, still the reasons of such -doubt or disbelief would probably be very different -from those reasons which lead us to reject it to-day. -For witchcraft was grounded on a general belief that -spiritual agencies, beneficent and malign, were the cause -of material well-being or evil. This conception has now -given place to the mechanistic or naturalistic theory on -which our modern physical science is based. We -interpret all physical occurrences as caused by material -agency. But this belief, quite as much as the belief in -spiritual agencies, is opinion, not knowledge, and it may -be false. It is conceivable that future generations will -reject our scientific notions, self-evident though they -seem to us, as completely as we reject the notions of -the dark ages. It is even conceivable that the whole -of our modern science may come to appear to mankind -as not even an approximation to knowledge. Error, -like illusion, may be universal. No one whose opinion -counts as a rational belief now holds that sickness may -be caused by the malign influence of the evil eye, and -that this influence may be neutralised by making the -sign of the cross; some, but very few, believe that a -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P78"></a>78}</span> -sick man may be healed by the prayers and anointing -of righteous men; many believe that material disease, -however malignant, may be expelled from the body by -faith; while the majority of rational men, whatever -independent religious views they hold, regard sickness -and disease as material in the ordinary sense, and -expect them to yield to drugs and treatment. Now, of -these various opinions some must be false, while all -may be false. Let us add some illustrations from -philosophy. Some philosophers hold, in common with -general opinion, that sense experience is caused by -physical objects; others hold that there are no physical -objects, but that consciousness is the one and only -reality; and there are others who think that the -reality that gives rise to our sense experience is neither -physical in the sense of a material thing, nor mental -in the sense of consciousness or thought, but is -movement or change—change that requires no support and -is absolute. All these are opinions, and may be false, -and our belief that any one of them is true does not -depend on immediate experience, but on reasons. The -best that can be said in favour of any belief is that -there is no reason for supposing it false, and the worst -that can be said against any belief is that there is no -reason for supposing it true. Our problem, then, is to -know what constitutes the nature of error in any one -of these examples if it is, as each one may be, false? -</p> - -<p> -The instances we have given are all of them propositions -or judgments, or else conceptions formed out of -propositions or judgments, the purpose of which is to -interpret experience. The actual experience itself, in -so far as it consists of the actual presence of the object -to the mind aware of it, is, as we have seen, neither -truth nor error; it simply is what it is. It is the -conceptions by which we interpret this experience that are -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P79"></a>79}</span> -true or false. And our problem is that the meaning or -content of a conception, that which is present to the -mind when we make a judgment, is precisely the same -whether the conception is true or false, there is no -distinctive mark or feature by which we can know that -in the one case the object of thought is a real or actual -fact, in the other an opinion to which no reality -corresponds. And, further, it seems exceedingly difficult to -understand in what way a non-reality can be present -to the mind at all. -</p> - -<p> -Let us now examine some attempts to solve this -problem, and first of all let us take the pragmatist -solution. Pragmatism claims that it has no difficulty -in explaining error, because, as we have already seen, -it acknowledges no other test or criterion of truth except -a pragmatic one. Every proposition or judgment that -we make must, in order to have any meaning whatever, -be relevant to some human purpose; every such -proposition is a truth-claim; and every truth-claim is -tested by its workability. Consequently, error is simply -the failure of a proposition to establish its claim by the -practical test of working. Propositions marked by such -failure are errors. As there is no truth independent of -time, place, and circumstance, no irrelevant truth, no -truth independent of the conditions under which its -claim is put forward, there is no truth that may not -become error. No judgment, according to pragmatism, -is an error pure and simple—that is to say, it cannot -come into existence as error, for it comes claiming -truth, and maintaining that claim until challenged; it -becomes an error in retrospect only, and always in -relation to another judgment which corrects it. Error -does not characterise a class of judgments; it is something -that happens to a judgment, it is a judgment whose -truth-claim is rejected in reference to another judgment -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P80"></a>80}</span> -which succeeds. The essential thing in the pragmatist -doctrine of error is that in claiming to be true a -judgment is not challenging comparison with some independent -reality, nor is it claiming to belong to a timeless -order of existence—to be eternal; it is claiming to fulfil -the particular purpose for which it has been called -forth, whether that purpose be practical or theoretical. -</p> - -<p> -Let us now consider the explanation of error offered -by the idealist philosophy. In this view only the whole -truth is wholly true; the Absolute, as a perfect, concrete, -individual system, is the ideal, and all that falls short of -it can only possess a degree of truth—a degree which -is greater or less according as it approximates to the ideal. -The degrees of truth are not quantitative, not a mixture -of truth and error, but a nearer or more distant approach -to the ideal. There can be no absolute error, because -if truth is the whole, error, if it exists at all, must in -some way be included in truth. Clearly error cannot -as such be truth, and therefore it must follow that, in -the whole, error loses its character of error, and finds -reconciliation of its contradiction to truth. Error, -then, if it is something, and not a pure negation, is partial -or incomplete truth; the perplexity and contradiction -that it gives rise to are incidental to our partial view. -Knowledge, it must seem to us, can exist only for -omniscience. Unless we know everything, we know -nothing. -</p> - -<p> -These two doctrines are in a sense the exact antithesis -of one another. They agree together in this, that -in each the explanation of error follows as a -consequence of the conception of the nature of truth. The -pragmatist theory implies that there is no truth in any -real sense, but only more or less successful error. The -idealist theory implies that there is no real error, but only -a variety in the degree of truth. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P81"></a>81}</span> -</p> - -<p> -Most people, however, are convinced that truth and -error are not related to one another, nor to the -circumstances that call forth belief or disbelief. Let us now -examine a theory that recognises this. There are false -judgments, and they need explanation; error has a -nature of its own. If a judgment is false, it is absolutely -and unalterably false; if it is true, it is unconditionally -true and with no reserve. No logical process, no -psychological disposition, can make what is false true. Error -must lie in the nature of knowledge, and to discover that -nature we must understand the theory of knowledge -and determine the exact nature of the mental act in -knowing. The first essential is to distinguish the kind -of knowledge to which truth and error can apply. We -pointed out in the second chapter that all knowledge -rests ultimately on immediate experience. In immediate -experience the relation between the mental act of knowing -and the object that is known is so simple that any -question as to truth or error in regard to it is unmeaning. -To question the truth of immediate experience is to -question its existence; it is to ask if it is what it is, and -this is plainly unmeaning. But thinking, we said, is -questioning experience in order to know its content or -meaning, and in thinking, the simplicity of the relation -which unites the mind to its object in immediate -experience is left behind, and a logical process of very -great complexity takes its place. It is in this complexity -that the possibility of error lies. -</p> - -<p> -Let us look at it a little more closely. Knowing is -a relation which unites two things, one the mind that -knows, the other the thing known. In every act of -knowing, something is present to the mind; if knowing -is simply awareness of this actually present something, -we call it immediate experience, we are acquainted with -the object. But our knowledge is not only of objects -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P82"></a>82}</span> -immediately present to the mind and with which we -are therefore acquainted. Knowledge embraces the -past and future and the distant realms of space. Indeed -were knowledge only of what is actually present to the -mind, it is difficult to imagine that we could, in the -ordinary meaning of the word, know anything at all. -I may be thinking, for example, of an absent friend; all -that is present to my mind is, it may be, a memory -image, a faint recall of his appearance on some one -occasion, or perhaps a recollection of the tone of his -voice, or it may be the black marks on white paper -which I recognise as his handwriting. This image is -present to my mind, but the image is not the object, -my friend, about whom I think and make endless -judgments, true and false. So also, if what is present to -the mind is affecting me through the external senses, -if it is a sense impression, it is clear that what is actually -present is not the whole object of which I am aware, -but only a very small part of it, or, it may be, no part -of it at all, but something, a sound, or an odour, that -represents it. The immediate data of consciousness are -named by some philosophers sense data, by others, -presentations, by others images, and there is much -controversy as to their nature and existence, but with -this controversy we are not here concerned—we are -seeking to make clear an obvious distinction, namely, -the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and -knowledge by description. -</p> - -<p> -What kind of knowledge is it that we acquire by -description? Knowledge about things with which we -are not first acquainted. The most important knowledge -that we possess or acquire is knowledge of objects -which we know only by the knowledge we have about -them—objects that we know about without knowing -them. They are not direct impressions on our senses, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P83"></a>83}</span> -nor are they ideas known in actual experience. We -make judgments about them, and the subjects about -which we make these judgments are really composed -of these judgments that we make about them. To go -back to our illustrations, we may know a great deal -about the evil eye, a malignant influence, disease, faith, -healing, causality, physical objects, without any -acquaintance with them, without even knowing that they -exist. Such knowledge is descriptive, and the objects -are descriptions. Knowledge by description is never -quite simple, and is often very complex, for, besides the -relation of the mental act to the object known, there -are the terms and relations which are the elements -in the judgment and the relations of the judgments -themselves. If we analyse a judgment, every word -in which it is expressed, whether it is a noun or a -verb or a preposition or a conjunction, conveys a -distinct meaning, indicates a term or a relation, each of -which can be made a distinct object to the mind, and all -of which are combined in the single meaning the judgment -expresses. It is in this complexity that the possibility -of error lies, and the possibility increases as the -complexity increases. All the terms and the relations -which a judgment contains depend on the knowledge -we have by acquaintance—that is to say, we are -ultimately dependent on our actual experience for all -knowledge whatever, whether it is acquaintance or -description, for we can only describe in terms with which -we are acquainted; but in the judgment these elements -are combined into new objects, or a certain relation is -declared to exist between objects, and it is this -combination of the elements of the judgment that involves -its truth or falsehood. -</p> - -<p> -If this view of the nature of the mental act of knowing -is accepted, we are able to understand how false opinion -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P84"></a>84}</span> -is consistent with the fact that all knowledge is truth. -We escape both the alternatives that seemed to Socrates -the only possible ones. "When a man has a false -opinion, does he think that which he knows to be some -other thing which he knows, and knowing both is he at the -same time ignorant of both? Or does he think of -something which he does not know as some other thing which -he does not know?" No, neither; in error he thinks -that something that he knows is in a relation that he -knows to some other thing that he knows, when in fact -that relation is not relating the two things. The false -proposition is not one in which the constituent terms -and relations are unknown or non-existent, but one in -which a combination of these terms and relations is -thought to exist when in fact it does not exist; and the -true proposition is that in which the combination -thought to exist does exist. We can, therefore, if this -account be true, at least know what false opinion or -error can be, whether or not we have any means of -deciding in regard to any particular opinion that it is -false. -</p> - -<p> -There is one other theory, the last we shall notice. -It is in one respect the most important of all, namely, -that it is the most direct attempt to grapple with the -problem of error. It is founded on a theory of -knowledge which we owe mainly to the profound and acute -work of a German philosopher (Meinong), and which -at the present time is being keenly discussed. It is an -attempt to determine more exactly than has yet been -done the fundamental scheme of the mental life and -development. The brief account that I am now offering, -I owe to a paper by Prof. G. F. Stout on "Some -Fundamental Points in the Theory of Knowledge." We have -seen that the problem of error is the difficulty there is -in conceiving how there can be any real thing, any real -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P85"></a>85}</span> -object of thought, intermediate between being and -not-being. Error seems to exist and yet to have a nature -which is a negation of existence, and it seems therefore -to be a downright contradiction when we affirm that -error or false opinion can <i>be</i>—that there is a real object -of thought when we judge falsely. This theory meets -the difficulty directly by distinguishing in the mental -act of knowing a process that is neither perceiving nor -thinking of things, and that involves neither believing -nor disbelieving on the one hand nor desiring or willing -on the other: this is the process of supposing. -Corresponding to this mental act of supposing, there is a -distinct kind of object intended or meant by the mind—an -object that is neither a sense datum nor an idea, -nor a judgment, but a supposition. Also and again -corresponding to this mental act of supposing and its -intended object the supposition, there is a mode of -being which is neither existence nor non-existence, but -is named subsistence. A supposition, it is said, does not -exist—it subsists. This thesis, it will easily be -understood, is based on an analysis, and deals with arguments -that touch the most fundamental problems of theory -of knowledge. Moreover, its presentment is excessively -technical, and only those highly trained in the habit of -psychological introspection and skilled in philosophical -analysis are really competent to discuss it. It is not -possible to offer here anything but a simple outline of -the part of the theory that concerns the present problem. -The actual experience of knowing is a relation between -two things, one of which is a mental <i>act</i>, the act of -perceiving or thinking or having ideas, and the other is -an <i>object</i>, that which is perceived or thought of. The -act is a particular mental existence, it is the act of a -psychical individual. The object is not included within -the actual experience which is the knowing of it, it is -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P86"></a>86}</span> -that which is meant or intended by the experience. -The act, then, is the mental process of meaning or -intending, the object the thing meant or intended. The -mental act differs according to the kind of object -intended. The act of perceiving is the direction of the -mind towards sense data and ideas; the act of judging -is the direction of the mind towards judgments or -propositions about things, propositions that affirm or -deny relations between things; the act of supposing -is different from both these—it is the direction of the -mind towards suppositions. Suppositions differ from -ideas in this, that they may be either positive or -negative, whereas ideas are never negative. This may seem -to contradict experience. Can we not, for example, -have an idea of not-red just as well as an idea of red? -No, the two ideas can easily be seen to be one and the -same; in each case it is red we are actually acquainted -with, and the difference is in affirming or denying -existence to the one idea. The difference is in our -judgment, which may be affirmative or negative. A -supposition is like a judgment in this respect; it may be -either affirmative or negative, but it differs from a -judgment in another respect, that while a judgment always -conveys a conviction, always expresses belief or -disbelief, a supposition does not—it is neither believed nor -disbelieved. -</p> - -<p> -Before I show the application of this analysis of -knowledge to the problem of error, let me try and clear -up its obscurity, for undoubtedly it is difficult to -comprehend. Its difficulty lies in this, that though all the -ideas with which it deals are quite familiar—suppositions, -real and unreal possibilities, fulfilled and non-fulfilled -beliefs—yet it seems to run counter to all our -notions of the extreme simplicity of the appeal to reality. -It seems strange and paradoxical to our ordinary habit -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P87"></a>87}</span> -of thinking to affirm that there are real things and real -relations between things which though real yet do not -exist, and also that non-existent realities are not things -that once were real but now are nought—they are things -that subsist. Yet this is no new doctrine. The most -familiar case of such realities is that of numbers. The -Greeks discovered that numbers do not exist—that is to -say, that their reality is of another kind to that which -we denote by existence. Numbers are realities, -otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. -Pythagoras (about 540-500 B.C.) taught that numbers are the -reality from which all else is derived. And there are -many other things of the mind that seem indeed to be -more real than the things of sense. It is this very -problem of error that brings into relief this most -important doctrine. -</p> - -<p> -Now let us apply this theory of the supposition to the -problem of error, and we shall then see how there can -be an object present to the mind when we judge falsely, -and also that the object is the same whether we judge -truly or falsely. Suppositions are real possibilities; -they are alternatives that may be fulfilled or that may -never be fulfilled. These real possibilities, or these -possible alternatives, are objects of thought; they do -not belong to the mental act of thinking; they are not -in the mind, but realities present to the mind. In mere -supposing they are present as alternatives; in judging, -we affirm of them or deny of them the relation to general -reality that they are fulfilled. Judgments therefore -are true or false accordingly as the fulfilment they affirm -does or does not agree with reality. In this way, then, -we may answer the perplexing question, How can there -be an object of thought in a false judgment? The -answer is, that the objects of thought about which we -make judgments are suppositions, and our judgments -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P88"></a>88}</span> -concern their fulfilment, and their fulfilment is a relation -external to them—it is their agreement or disagreement -with reality. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap09"></a></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER IX -<br /> -CONCLUSION -</h3> - -<p> -I will now briefly sum up the argument of this book. -The problem of truth is to discover the nature of the -agreement between the things of the mind, our ideas, -and the reality of which ideas are the knowledge. We -call the agreement truth. What is it? We have seen -that there are three different answers, namely—(1) That -it is a correspondence between the idea and the reality; -(2) That it is the coherence of the idea in a consistent -and harmonious whole; and (3) That it is a value that -we ourselves give to our ideas. -</p> - -<p> -The theory that truth is correspondence we found to -offer this difficulty. To say of an idea that it -corresponds with reality supposes a knowledge of reality in -addition to and distinct from the knowledge that is the -idea, and yet the knowledge of reality is the idea of it. -And if it be said that not the idea but the judgment -is what corresponds with reality in truth, this equally -supposes a knowledge of reality that is not a judgment. -If, as the common sense of mankind requires us to -believe, the reality that is known by us exists in entire -independence of our relation of knowing to it, how can -we state this fact without falling into contradiction in -the very statement of it? This is the difficulty of a -realist theory of knowledge. -</p> - -<p> -We next examined the theory that truth is coherence, -and this seemed to present to us an unattainable ideal. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P89"></a>89}</span> -Only the whole truth is wholly true. We followed the -idealist argument on which it is based, and this seemed -to lead us inevitably, in the doctrine of the Absolute, -to the paradox that unless we know everything we -know nothing. -</p> - -<p> -In pragmatism we met a new principle, the proposal -to regard truth as a value. Truth, it is said, is -something that happens to ideas; they become true, or are -made true. There is no criterion, no absolute standard, -independent of ideas to which they must conform if -they are judged to be true. The value of an idea is -its practical usefulness as tested by its workability. -Truth is what works. This led us to criticise the concept -of utility. We found that it is impossible to identify -utility with truth even if we include theoretical utility -in its widest meaning, because over and above the -usefulness and workability of an idea there always -remains the question of its relation to reality. But we -recognised in the principle of truth-value an important -advance towards a theory of knowledge. -</p> - -<p> -The solution of the problem of truth, it became clear, -must be sought in a theory of knowledge. Have we, -in the new theory of life and knowledge of Bergson's -philosophy, an answer to the question, What is truth? -Yes, but not in the form of a direct solution of the -dilemma which confronts us in every theory that -accepts the independence of knowledge and reality—rather -in a theory of knowledge in which the dilemma -does not and cannot arise. -</p> - -<p> -The theory of Bergson is that in the intuition of life -we know reality as it is, our knowledge is one with our -knowing; and in the intellect we possess a mode of -knowing which is equally immediate but the essential -quality of which is that it externalises or spatialises -reality. We understand this mode of knowing in -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P90"></a>90}</span> -recognising the purpose it serves, its practical advantage to -us. The theory, therefore, resembles pragmatism in -bringing the concept of utility to the aid of its theory -of knowledge. But, we insisted, the resemblance is -outward only, for the essential tenet of pragmatism, -that truth itself is a value, is fatal to the theory. It -would mean, in fact, that not the mode of knowing, that -is the intellect, but the actual knowledge itself, is a -practical endowment. But the problem of truth arises -in a new form, for the practical utility of the intellect -consists in the illusion which it produces in us. It -makes the flowing reality appear as fixed states. How, -then, can universal illusion be consistent with the -possession of truth? To answer this question we -examined the nature of illusion and its distinction -from error. -</p> - -<p> -In the last chapter we have dealt with the problem -of error. The fact of error presented a difficulty -distinct from the question, What is truth? for it implied -a real object of thought, of which it seemed equally -contradictory to say that it exists and that it does not -exist. In the solutions that have been proposed we -saw how the problem is forcing philosophers to examine -again the fundamental processes of the mind and the -nature of the universe they reveal. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap10"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P91"></a>91}</span></p> - -<h3> -BIBLIOGRAPHY -</h3> - -<p> -The <i>Theætetus</i> of Plato is an exposition of the problem -of truth and error as it presented itself in ancient -philosophy. The quotation I have made from it, and also -the quotations from the <i>Republic</i>, are from Jowett's -translation. -</p> - -<p> -The most clear exposition of what I have called the -realistic doctrine is <i>The Problems of Philosophy</i>, by the -Hon. Bertrand Russell, in the Home University Library -(Williams and Norgate). I have adopted Mr. Russell's -terms, "acquaintance" and "description"; the distinction -they denote seems to me of fundamental importance, -and Mr. Russell's doctrine on this point a permanent -addition to philosophy. Mr. Russell's theory, that in -the judgment what is present to the mind is a -relation which is external to the terms of the judgment, -and that agreement or disagreement between this -relation and reality makes the truth or falsehood of the -judgment, can only be appreciated if studied in -connection with his general scheme. -</p> - -<p> -The classical work on what I have called the modern -idealist doctrine (I have avoided the word intellectualist) -is Mr. F. H. Bradley's <i>Appearance and Reality</i>. I have -attempted to give the main lines of the theory in my -chapter on "The Absolute." Although it is a book for -advanced students, it is not a closed volume even to -the uninstructed. The brilliant dialectical skill of the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P92"></a>92}</span> -author is acknowledged and may be enjoyed by those -who reject or may fail to understand his conclusion. -Mr. Harold H. Joachim's <i>The Nature of Truth</i> (Oxford, -Clarendon Press) is a most able and scholarly argument -for the coherence theory of truth. -</p> - -<p> -The principal expositions of Pragmatism are the -works of William James and of Dr. F. C. S. Schiller. -William James' <i>The Will to Believe</i> was the first distinct -formulation of the principle. <i>Pragmatism, a New Name -for some Old Ways of Thinking</i>, is the fullest and most -systematic statement of the doctrine. <i>The Meaning -of Truth</i> is a defence of the doctrine against the criticism -that had been meted out to it unsparingly. All three -books are published by Longmans. -</p> - -<p> -Dr. F. C. S. Schiller is uncompromising in his advocacy -of a complete return to the doctrine taught in the ancient -world by Protagoras. He has defended that philosopher -against the arguments of Plato in a polemical pamphlet -entitled <i>Plato or Protagoras?</i> (Oxford, Blackwell). An -Essay on "Axioms as Postulates" in <i>Personal Idealism</i> -(Macmillan & Co.), and two volumes of collected essays -on <i>Humanism</i> (Macmillan & Co.), set forth the doctrine, -which he prefers to call Humanism, with great force, -abundant illustration, and the relief of no small amount -of humour. -</p> - -<p> -For an account of the theories of Bergson, I may -mention my own little book in this series, <i>Henri Bergson: -The Philosophy of Change</i>. M. Bergson's books are <i>Time -and Freewill</i>, <i>Matter and Memory</i>, and <i>Creative Evolution</i>. -To these has been recently added <i>An Introduction to -Metaphysics</i> (Macmillan, 1912). It is the republication -in English of an article written in 1903, which has been -for a long time out of print. It is a short and clear -statement of the doctrine of Intuition. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P93"></a>93}</span> -</p> - -<p> -The important studies of Professor G. F. Stout are -not easily accessible to the general reader, as they consist -in contributions to philosophical journals and proceedings -of learned societies. The essay referred to in the -last chapter, "Some Fundamental Points in the Theory -of Knowledge," is in the <i>St. Andrews Quincentenary -Publications</i>, 1911 (Maclehose). I may mention also -his essay on "Error" in <i>Personal Idealism</i>, noticed -above, and "The Object of Thought and Real Being," -in <i>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</i>, 1911. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap11"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P94"></a>94}</span></p> - -<h3> -INDEX -</h3> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Bergson, Mons. Henri, <a href="#P63">63</a>, <a href="#P69">69</a>, <a href="#P73">73</a>, <a href="#P89">89</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Berkeley, <a href="#P20">20</a>, <a href="#P32">32</a>, <a href="#P73">73</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Coherence Theory, <a href="#P25">25</a>, <a href="#P27">27</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Correspondence Theory, <a href="#P24">24</a>, <a href="#P27">27</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Discovery of Planet Neptune, <a href="#P59">59</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Faith-attitude of Pragmatism, <a href="#P55">55</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Formal Logic, <a href="#P10">10</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Hegel, <a href="#P44">44</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Hume, <a href="#P30">30</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Intellectualism, <a href="#P44">44</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -James, William, <a href="#P44">44</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Kant, <a href="#P26">26</a>, <a href="#P27">27</a>, <a href="#P42">42</a>, <a href="#P73">73</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Meinong, <a href="#P84">84</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Pierce, C. S., <a href="#P44">44</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Plato, <a href="#P11">11</a>, <a href="#P44">44</a>, <a href="#P67">67</a>, <a href="#P68">68</a>, <a href="#P74">74</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Pluralistic Realism, <a href="#P24">24</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Poincaré, Henri, <a href="#P54">54</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Pragmatist Theory of Truth, <a href="#P55">55</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Primary Qualities, <a href="#P32">32</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Protagoras, His book <i>The Truth</i>, <a href="#P10">10</a>, <a href="#P11">11</a>; His maxim, <a href="#P44">44</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Pythagoras, <a href="#P87">87</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Relativity, Principle of, <a href="#P48">48</a>, <a href="#P53">53</a>, <a href="#P62">62</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -<i>Republic</i> of Plato, <a href="#P67">67</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -S. Anselm's Argument, <a href="#P29">29</a>, <a href="#P31">31</a>, <a href="#P41">41</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Schiller, Dr. F. C. S., <a href="#P44">44</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Self, The Idea of, <a href="#P36">36</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Socrates, <a href="#P11">11</a>, <a href="#P74">74</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Space and Time, <a href="#P33">33</a>, <a href="#P34">34</a>, <a href="#P36">36</a> -</p> -<p class="index"> -Stout, Prof. G. F., <a href="#P84">84</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Theætetus of Plato, <a href="#P11">11</a>, <a href="#P74">74</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Unknowable, The, <a href="#P29">29</a>, <a href="#P37">37</a> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="index"> -Zeno, <a href="#P34">34</a> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t4"> - Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & Co.<br /> - Edinburgh & London<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="thought"> -******** -<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap12"></a></p> - -<p class="t2"> -THE PEOPLE'S BOOKS -</p> - -<p class="t3b"> -THE FIRST HUNDRED VOLUMES -</p> - -<p class="t3"> -(Spring 1913) -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> - SCIENCE<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - 1. The Foundations of Science . . . By W. C. D. Whetham, M.A., F.R.S.<br /> - 2. Embryology—The Beginnings of Life . . . By Prof. Gerald Leighton, M.D.<br /> - 3. Biology . . . By Prof. W. D. 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