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diff --git a/46630-tei/46630-tei.tei b/46630-tei/46630-tei.tei new file mode 100644 index 0000000..397b359 --- /dev/null +++ b/46630-tei/46630-tei.tei @@ -0,0 +1,21880 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> + +<!DOCTYPE TEI.2 SYSTEM "http://www.gutenberg.org/tei/marcello/0.4/dtd/pgtei.dtd" [ + +<!ENTITY u5 "http://www.tei-c.org/Lite/"> + +]> + +<TEI.2 lang="en"> +<teiHeader> + <fileDesc> + <titleStmt> + <title>The Supernatural in the New Testament</title> + <title type="sub">Possible, Credible, and Historical</title> + <author><name reg="Row, Charles A.">Charles A. Row</name></author> + </titleStmt> + <editionStmt> + <edition n="1">Edition 1</edition> + </editionStmt> + <publicationStmt> + <publisher>Project Gutenberg</publisher> + <date>August 19, 2014</date> + <idno type="etext-no">46630</idno> + <availability> + <p>This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and + with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it + away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg + License online at www.gutenberg.org/license</p> + </availability> + </publicationStmt> + <sourceDesc> + <bibl> + Created electronically. + </bibl> + </sourceDesc> + </fileDesc> + <encodingDesc> + </encodingDesc> + <profileDesc> + <langUsage> + <language id="en"></language> + <language id="la"></language> + </langUsage> + </profileDesc> + <revisionDesc> + <change> + <date value="2014-08-19">August 19, 2014</date> + <respStmt> + <name> + Produced by David King, and the Online + Distributed Proofreading Team at <http://www.pgdp.net/>. + </name> + </respStmt> + <item>Project Gutenberg TEI edition 1</item> + </change> + </revisionDesc> +</teiHeader> + +<pgExtensions> + <pgStyleSheet> + .boxed { x-class: boxed } + .shaded { x-class: shaded } + .rules { x-class: rules; rules: all } + .indent { margin-left: 2 } + .bold { font-weight: bold } + .italic { font-style: italic } + .smallcaps { font-variant: small-caps } + </pgStyleSheet> + + <pgCharMap formats="txt.iso-8859-1"> + <char id="U0x2014"> + <charName>mdash</charName> + <desc>EM DASH</desc> + <mapping>--</mapping> + </char> + <char id="U0x2003"> + <charName>emsp</charName> + <desc>EM SPACE</desc> + <mapping> </mapping> + </char> + <char id="U0x2026"> + <charName>hellip</charName> + <desc>HORIZONTAL ELLIPSIS</desc> + <mapping>...</mapping> + </char> + </pgCharMap> +</pgExtensions> + +<text lang="en"> + <front> + <div> + <divGen type="pgheader" /> + </div> + <div> + <divGen type="encodingDesc" /> + </div> + + <div rend="page-break-before: always"> + <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">The Supernatural in the New Testament</p> + <p rend="font-size: x-large; text-align: center">Possible, Credible, and Historical</p> + <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">Or: An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation</p> + <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">By the</p> + <p rend="font-size: x-large; text-align: center">Rev. Charles A. Row, M.A.</p> + <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">Prebendary of St. Paul's</p> + <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">Author of <q>The Jesus of the Evangelists,</q> <q>The Nature and Extent of Divine Inspiration,</q> <q>The Moral Teaching of the New Testament,</q> Etc.</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">London</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">Frederic Norgate</p> + <p rend="text-align: center">1875</p> + </div> + <div rend="page-break-before: always"> + <head>Contents</head> + <divGen type="toc" /> + </div> + + </front> +<body> + +<div> +<p rend='text-align: center'> + <figure url='images/cover.jpg' rend='width: 30%'> + <figDesc>Cover Art</figDesc> + </figure> +</p> +<p> +[Transcriber's Note: The above cover image was produced by the submitter at +Distributed Proofreaders, and is being placed into the public domain.] +</p> +</div> + +<pb n='iii'/><anchor id='Pgiii'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Dedication.</head> + +<p> +To The Committee +Of The +Christian Evidence Society. +</p> + +<p> +My Lords and Gentlemen, +</p> + +<p> +Having undertaken to compose this work at +your request, I beg permission to dedicate it to you. +In doing so I feel that it is a duty which I owe both to +you and to myself that I should state the position which +we respectively occupy with regard to it. Your responsibility +is confined to having requested me to +compose a work in refutation of certain principles now +widely disseminated, which impugn the supernatural +elements contained in the New Testament. For the +contents of the work and for the mode of treatment I +alone am responsible. When I considered the position +of the present controversy, I felt that it was impossible +to treat the subject satisfactorily except on the principle +that the responsibility for the mode of conducting +the argument and of answering the objections should +rest with the writer alone. In dealing with a subject +so complicated, involving as it does questions of philosophy +and science as well as the principles of historical +criticism, I can scarcely venture to hope that every +position which I have taken will prove acceptable to +<pb n='iv'/><anchor id='Pgiv'/> +all the various shades of theological thought. I have +endeavoured to take such as seemed to me to be +logically defensible without any reference to particular +schools of theological opinion. As the entire question +is essentially historical, I have done my utmost to +exclude from it all discussions that are strictly theological. +Modern unbelief however puts in two objections +which if valid render all historical evidence in proof of +the occurrence of miracles nugatory, namely that they +are both impossible and incredible. In meeting these +I have been compelled to appeal to what appear to me +to be the principles of a sound philosophy. In all +other respects I have viewed the question before me +as exclusively one of historical evidence. +</p> + +<p> +If the Resurrection of our Lord is an actual occurrence, +it follows that Christianity must be a divine +revelation. If it is not, no amount of other evidence +will avail to prove it to be so. As it has been strongly +affirmed that for this great fact, which constitutes the +central position of Christianity, the historical evidence +is worthless, I have devoted the latter portion of this +volume to the consideration of this question, with a +view of putting before the reader the value of the New +Testament when contemplated as simple history. +Using the Epistles as the foundation of my argument, +I have endeavoured to prove that the greatest of all +the miracles recorded in the Gospels rests on an attestation +that is unsurpassed by any event recorded in +history. For this purpose I have used the Epistles as +simple historical documents, and I have claimed for +them precisely the same value which is conceded to +other writings of a similar description. The feeling +<pb n='v'/><anchor id='Pgv'/> +among Christians that these writings contain the great +principles of the Christian faith has occasioned it to be +overlooked that they are also contemporary historical +documents of the highest order. As such I have used +them in proof of the great facts of Christianity, above +all in proof of the greatest of them, the Resurrection of +our Lord. +</p> + +<p> +With these observations I now present you the +following work, with the hope that it may prove the +means of removing many of the difficulties with which +recent controversial writers have endeavoured to +obscure the subject. Trusting that it maybe accepted +by the great Head of the Church, the reality of whose +life and teaching as they are recorded in the Gospels it +is designed to establish, +</p> + +<p> +I remain, my Lords and Gentlemen,<lb/> +Your's faithfully,<lb/> +C. A. Row. +</p> + +<p> +London, January, 1875. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='001'/><anchor id='Pg001'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter I. Introduction. The Position of the Controversy Between the Opponents +and the Defenders of Christianity.</head> + +<p> +Although every portion of the Bible is vehemently +assailed by the various forms of modern Scepticism, it +is clear that the real turning point of the controversy +between those who affirm that God has made a supernatural +revelation of himself to mankind, and those who +deny it, centres in those portions of the New Testament +which affirm the presence of the supernatural. The +question may be still further narrowed into the inquiry +whether the person and actions of Jesus Christ, as +they are depicted in the Gospels, are historical facts, or +fictitious inventions. If the opponents of Revelation +can prove that they are the latter, the entire controversy +will end in their favour. It would in that case be +utterly useless to attempt to defend any other portion +of the Bible; and the controversy respecting the Old +Testament becomes a mere waste of labour. If, on the +other hand, Christians can prove that the narratives of +the four Gospels, or even of any one of them, are a true +representation of historical facts, then it is certain that +God has made a revelation of himself, notwithstanding +the objections which may be urged against certain +<pb n='002'/><anchor id='Pg002'/> +positions which have been taken by Ecclesiastical Christianity, +and the difficulties by which certain questions +connected with the Old Testament are surrounded. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that the historical truth of the +facts narrated in the Gospels constitutes the central +position of the entire controversy. It is not my purpose +on the present occasion to discuss the general +question, whether the delineation of Jesus Christ which +the Gospels contain is one of an ideal or an historical +person. That question I have already considered in +<q>The Jesus of the Evangelists.</q> But as the various +forms of modern unbelief are making the most strenuous +efforts to prove that the supernatural elements of +the New Testament are hopelessly incredible, and that +the attestation on which the supernatural occurrences +mentioned in it rests, is simply worthless, it is my intention +to devote the present volume to the consideration +of this special subject, and to examine the question +of miracles, and their historical credibility. +</p> + +<p> +Modern scepticism makes with respect to supernatural +occurrences (under which more general term I +include the miracles of the New Testament), the three +following assertions, and endeavours to substantiate +them by every available argument: +</p> + +<p> +1st. That all supernatural occurrences are impossible. +</p> + +<p> +2nd. That, if not impossible, they are incredible; +that is, that they are contrary to reason. +</p> + +<p> +3rd. That those which are narrated in the New Testament +are devoid of any adequate historical attestation, +and owe their origin to the inventive powers of +the mythic and legendary spirit. +</p> + +<p> +It is my purpose, in the course of the present work, +to traverse each of these three positions, and to +show: +</p> + +<pb n='003'/><anchor id='Pg003'/> + +<p> +1st. That miracles and supernatural occurrences are +not impossible; and that the arguments by which this +has been attempted to be established are wholly inconclusive. +</p> + +<p> +2nd. That they are neither incredible, nor contrary +to reason; but are entirely consistent with its dictates. +</p> + +<p> +3rd, That the greatest of all the miracles which are +recorded in the New Testament, and which, if an actual +historical occurrence, is sufficient to carry with it all +the others, the resurrection of Jesus Christ, rests on the +highest form of historical testimony. +</p> + +<p> +Such is my position. +</p> + +<p> +A recent writer, who has ably advocated the principles +of modern scepticism, the author of <q>Supernatural +Religion,</q> has in the opening passage of his +work clearly placed before us the real point at issue. +He states the case as follows: +</p> + +<p> +<q>On the very threshold of inquiry into the origin +and true character of Christianity we are brought face +to face with the supernatural. It is impossible, without +totally setting aside its peculiar and indispensable +claim to be a direct external revelation from God of +truths which otherwise human reason could not have +discovered, to treat Ecclesiastical Christianity as a form +of religion developed by the wisdom of man. Not +only in form does it profess to be the result of divine +communication, but in its very essence, in its principal +dogmas it is either superhuman or untenable. There +is no question here of mere accessories, which are comparatively +unimportant, and do not necessarily affect +the essential matter, but we have to do with a scheme +of religion claiming to be miraculous in all points, in +form, in essence, and in evidence. This religion cannot +be accepted without an emphatic belief in supernatural +interposition, and it is absurd to imagine that its +<pb n='004'/><anchor id='Pg004'/> +dogmas can be held, whilst the miraculous is rejected. +Those who profess to hold the religion, whilst they discredit +the supernatural element, and they are many at +the present day, have widely receded from Ecclesiastical +Christianity. It is most important that the inseparable +connection of the miraculous with the origin, +doctrines, and the evidence of Christianity should be +clearly understood, in order that inquiry may pursue a +logical and consistent course.</q>—<hi rend='italic'>Supernatural Religion, +page 1.</hi><note place='foot'>My quotations throughout this work are taken from the first edition. +The passage here quoted is somewhat altered in the third edition, but +not so as to affect the general meaning.</note> +</p> + +<p> +I fully accept all the chief positions laid down in this +passage as an adequate statement of the points at issue +between those who affirm and those who deny that +Christianity is a divine revelation. A few minor points +require a slight modification, as incurring the danger +of confusing ideas that ought to be carefully distinguished. +</p> + +<p> +The writer before me also raises no minor issue. +Although the work is entitled <q>Supernatural Religion, +or an inquiry into the reality of divine revelation,</q> its +object, which is consistently carried out throughout it, +is to impugn the historical character of the Gospels, +and to prove that the supernatural occurrences which +are recorded in them are fictitious. The title of the +work might have justified the writer in assailing other +portions of the Bible; but he clearly sees that to adopt +this course is only to attack the outworks of Christianity, +and to leave the key of the entire position unassailed. +In doing so he has pursued a far nobler course than +that which has been adopted by many of the opponents +of the Christian faith. He has directed his attack +against the very centre of the Christian position, the historical +<pb n='005'/><anchor id='Pg005'/> +credibility of the supernatural actions attributed +to Jesus Christ in the Gospels, being well aware that a +successful assault on this position will involve the capture +of all the outworks by which it is supposed to be +protected; while it by no means follows that a successful +assault on any of the latter involves the capture +of the citadel itself. This writer does not take up a +bye question, but he goes direct to the foundation on +which Christianity rests. In doing so, it must be acknowledged +that he has taken a straightforward course, +and one which must bring the question of the truth or +falsehood of Christianity to a direct issue. +</p> + +<p> +I fully agree with the chief position taken in the +quotation before us, that Christianity involves the +presence of the supernatural and the superhuman, +what in fact is generally designated as the miraculous, +or it is nothing. To remove these elements out of +the pages of the New Testament, is not to retain the +same religion, but to manufacture another quite different +and distinct from it. In the first place, we have +the great central figure in the Gospels, the divine +person of Jesus Christ our Lord, and the entire body +of his actions and his teaching. He, although depicted +as human, is at the same time depicted as superhuman +and supernatural, not merely in his miraculous +works, but in his entire character. To remove the +divine lineaments of Jesus Christ out of the Gospels is +simply to destroy them. Besides this, we have a large +number of miraculous actions attributed to him. +These are inextricably interwoven with the entire +narrative, which, when they are taken away, loses all +cohesion. Lives of Jesus which have been set forth, +deprived of their supernatural and superhuman elements, +are in fact nothing better than a new Gospel +composed out of the subjective consciousness of the +<pb n='006'/><anchor id='Pg006'/> +writers. Various attempts have been made to pare +down the supernatural and superhuman elements in the +Gospels to the smallest possible dimensions. Still they +obstinately persist in remaining. If everything else is +struck out of the Gospels, except their moral teaching, +we are left in the presence of teaching which is raised +at an immense elevation above the thoughts and conceptions +of the age that produced it; and of a teacher, +who while distinguished by the marks of pre-eminent +holiness and greatness of mind, is also distinguished by +a degree of self-assertion in his utterances of moral +truth, which is without parallel, even among the most +presumptuous of men. Deal with the Gospels as we +will, while we allow any portions of them to remain as +historical, we are still in the presence of the superhuman. +</p> + +<p> +As the narrative now stands it is at least harmonious. +The lofty pretensions of the teacher bear the most intimate +correlation to the supernatural and superhuman +facts that are reported of him. The one are the complement +of the other. If the facts are true, the lofty +self-assertion of the teacher is justified; if they are not +true, his pretensions conflict with the entire conception +of his holiness and elevation of mind. The use +which a wide spread school of modern criticism so +freely makes of the critical dissecting knife, for the +purpose of amputating the supernatural from the +Gospels, can only be attended by the fatal termination +of destroying the entire Gospels as of the smallest +historical value. It is marvellous that persons who +retain any respect for Christianity as a system of religious +and moral teaching, should have attempted to +throw discredit on this element in the Gospels with a +view of saving the remainder. +</p> + +<p> +Nor is the case different with the other portions of +<pb n='007'/><anchor id='Pg007'/> +the New Testament. Christianity, as enunciated by +its writers, does not profess merely to teach a new and +improved system of morality. If this was its only pretension, +it would certainly have but little claim to be +viewed as a divine revelation. In morals its teaching +is both unsystematic and fragmentary; though it is an +unquestionable fact, that a great system of moral +teaching may be deduced from the principles it unfolds. +But if one thing is plainer than another on the +face of the New Testament, it is that the great purpose +sought to be effected by Christianity is to impart a new +moral and spiritual power to mankind. It professes to +be, not a body of moral rules, but a mighty moral force, +which is concentrated in the person of its Founder. The +acceptance of it had generated a new power or energy, +a moral and spiritual life, which raised those who had +embraced it above their former selves; and which it +professes to be able to impart to all time. This supernatural +element, concentrated as I have said that it is +in the person of its founder, runs through the entire +epistles, and constitutes their most distinguishing +feature. If the supernatural elements in the person of +Jesus Christ be removed from their teaching nothing +remains but a number of moral precepts robbed of all +their vitality. In one word, the whole system of +teaching simply collapses. +</p> + +<p> +In a similar manner, if we eliminate every thing +supernatural out of the New Testament, with a view +of arriving at a residuum of truth, we are brought +into immediate contact with the most unique fact +in the history of man, the creation of the Church +of Jesus Christ, the greatest institution which has +ever affected the destinies of our race, and which +has for eighteen centuries exerted a most commanding +influence on human happiness and civilization. +<pb n='008'/><anchor id='Pg008'/> +This is professedly based on a miraculous fact, +the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. If, therefore, we +remove the supernatural elements out of Christianity, +this institution, mighty for good in its influence on the +progress of our race, has been based on an unreality +and a delusion. Here again we encounter something +which has very much the appearance of the supernatural. +</p> + +<p> +On these accounts, therefore, I cordially accept the +position which is laid down by the author of <q>Supernatural +Religion</q> as a correct statement of the case, +that Christianity involves the presence of the Supernatural, +or it is nothing. We must either defend the +chief supernatural elements of the New Testament or +abandon it as worthless. +</p> + +<p> +But there is an expression which occurs in this quotation, +and which is frequently made use of in subsequent +parts of the work, which requires consideration, +<q>Ecclesiastical Christianity.</q> What is intended by it? +The meaning is nowhere defined, and unless we come +to a clear understanding with respect to it, we shall be +in danger of complicating the entire question. The +expression is ambiguous. If by it is meant any other +form of thought, than that which is contained in the +pages of the New Testament; if, in fact, by it is intended +a systematic arrangement of doctrinal truth, +which has been elaborated at a subsequent period, I +emphatically assert that those who are called upon to +defend the divine character of the Christian Revelation +have nothing to do with it. The only thing which those +who maintain that the New Testament contains a divine +revelation can be called on to defend, is the express +statements of the book itself, and not a system of +thought which subsequent writers may have attempted +to deduce from it. +</p> + +<pb n='009'/><anchor id='Pg009'/> + +<p> +This point is so important, that I must make the +position which I intend taking with respect to it clear. +It involves the distinction between revelation and +theology. The religious and moral teaching which is +contained in the New Testament is in a very unsystematic +form. Not one of its writings is a formal treatise +on theology, nor does one of them contain a systematised +statement of what constitutes Christianity. Its teaching +of religious truth is incidental, and is called forth by +the special circumstances of the writer. The plain fact +is that four of the writings which comprise the New +Testament are religions memoirs. One is an historical +account of the foundation of the Church. Twenty-one +are letters, written to different Churches and individuals, +and all called forth by special emergencies. +These all partake of the historical character. The only +one which does not participate in this character is the +Apocalypse, which, being a vision, is utterly unlike a +formal or systematic treatise on Christianity. The +result of the form in which the New Testament is composed +is that its definite teaching is always incidental, +called forth to meet special circumstances and occasions +in the history of Churches and individuals, and never +formal. It is also universally couched in popular, as +distinct from scientific or technical language. Not +one of its writers makes an attempt to formulate a +system of Christian theology. +</p> + +<p> +The person of Jesus Christ constitutes Christianity +in its truest and highest sense. Three of the Gospels +embody the traditionary teaching of the Church on this +subject. The fourth is the work of an independent +writer. The epistles may be received as a set of incidental +commentaries on the person and work of Jesus Christ, +called forth by the special occasions which gave them +birth, and embodying the author's general views as to his +<pb n='010'/><anchor id='Pg010'/> +work and teaching as adapted to a number of special +circumstances and occasions. +</p> + +<p> +Between the contents of the New Testament and what +is commonly understood by Ecclesiastical Christianity +the difference is extremely wide. The New Testament +contains a divine revelation. Ecclesiastical Christianity +is a body of religious teaching in which Christianity +has been attempted to be presented in a +systematised form, or, in other words, it is a theology +more or less complete. +</p> + +<p> +It is necessary that we should have a clear appreciation +of the difference. Theology is an attempt of the +human intellect to present to us the truths communicated +in Revelation in a systematised form. It is in +fact the result of the human reason investigating the +facts and statements of Revelation. Theology therefore +is a simple creation of human reason erected on +the facts of divine revelation. As such it is subject to +all the errors and imperfections to which our rational +powers are obnoxious. It can claim no infallibility +more than any other rational action of the human +mind. Theology is a science, and is subject to the +imperfections to which all other sciences are liable. +It stands to the facts of Christianity in the same +relation as philosophy and physical science stand to +the works of nature. In the one the human intellect +investigates the divine revelation contained in the works +of nature, and endeavours to systematise its truths: +in the other it does the same with respect to the divine +revelation which in accordance with the assertions of the +New Testament has been made in the person of Jesus +Christ. +</p> + +<p> +What I am desirous of drawing attention to is that +theology is not revelation. Systems of theology may +be accurate deductions of reason from Revelation; or +<pb n='011'/><anchor id='Pg011'/> +they may be inaccurate and imperfect ones. It is very +possible that a system of theology which has been +evolved by human reason, although it may have attained +a wide acceptance, may be as inadequate an +explanation of the facts of revelation, as the Ptolemaic +system of astronomy was of the facts of the material +universe. Objections which were raised against the +latter were no real objections against the structure +of the universe itself. In the same way objections +which may be raised against a particular system of +theology, may leave the great facts of revelation entirely +untouched. +</p> + +<p> +If we look into the history of Christianity, we +shall find that as soon as the Church began to consolidate +itself into a distinct community, the reason of +man began to exert itself on the facts of revelation, and +to attempt to reduce its teaching to a systematic +form. From this source have sprung all the various +systems of theology which have from time to time predominated +in the Church. It has been a plant of +gradual growth, and as such may bear a fair comparison +with the slow growth of philosophy or physical science. +Such an action of reason on the facts of revelation was +inevitable and entirely legitimate. What I am desirous +of guarding against is the idea that when reason is +exerted on the facts of revelation, it is more infallible +than when exerted on any other subjects which come +under its cognisance. +</p> + +<p> +I am not ignorant that there is another theory respecting +the nature of theology. A large branch +of the Christian Church holds that a body of dogmatic +statements has been handed down traditionally from +the Apostles and other inspired teachers, which has +been embodied in the system of theology which is +accepted by this Church, and that this was intended to +<pb n='012'/><anchor id='Pg012'/> +be an authoritative statement of the facts of the Christian +revelation. It is also part of the same theory that +the Church as a collective body has in all ages possessed +an inspiration, which enables it to affirm authoritatively +and dogmatically, what is and what is not +Christian doctrine, and that which it thus authoritatively +affirms to be so, must be accepted as a portion of +the Christian revelation as much as the contents of the +New Testament itself. +</p> + +<p> +I fully admit that those who assume a position of this +kind are bound to act consistently, and to defend every +statement in their dogmatic creeds as an integral portion +of Christianity. Nor is it less certain, if this principle +is true, that if any portion of such dogmatic creeds can +be successfully assailed as contrary to reason, as for +instance the formulated doctrine of transubstantiation, +it would imperil the position of Christianity itself. +Those, however, who have taken such positions, must +be left to take the consequences of them. It is not my +intention in undertaking to defend the historical truth +of the supernatural elements in the New Testament, to +burden myself with an armour which seems only fitted +to crash beneath its weight the person who attempts +to use it. +</p> + +<p> +It has been necessary to be explicit on this point, +in order that the argument may be kept free from all +adventitious issues. The introduction into it of the +expression, <q>Ecclesiastical Christianity,</q> brings with +it no inconsiderable danger of diverting our attention +from what is the real point of controversy. I must +therefore repeat it. Ecclesiastical Christianity is a +development made by reason from the facts of the New +Testament, and is a thing which is entirely distinct +from the contents of the New Testament. With its +affirmations therefore I have nothing to do in the +<pb n='013'/><anchor id='Pg013'/> +present discussion. It will not be my duty to +examine into its positions, with a view of ascertaining +whether they are developments of Christian teaching +which can be logically deduced from its pages; still +less to accept and to defend them as authoritative +statements of its meaning. In defending the New +Testament as containing a divine revelation, I have +only to do with the contents and assertions of the book +itself, and with nothing outside its pages. What +others may have propounded respecting its meaning +can form no legitimate portion of the present controversy. +The real point at issue is one which is simple +and distinct. It is, are the supernatural incidents +recorded in it historical events or fictitious inventions? +As that is the question before us, I must decline to +allow any other issue to be substituted in the place of +it. Our inquiry is one which is strictly historical. +</p> + +<p> +Another statement made by the author before me +requires qualification. He says that <q>Christianity is +a scheme of religion which claims to be miraculous in +all points, in form, in essence, and in evidence.</q> This +statement I must controvert. Christianity does not +profess to be divine on all points. On the contrary, +it contains a divine and a human element so intimately +united, that it is impossible to separate the one from +the other. It is also far from clear to me how it can +be miraculous in form when it is contained in a body +of historical writings. I shall have occasion to show +hereafter, that although miracles form an important +portion of the attestation on which it rests, they are +not the only one. +</p> + +<p> +With these qualifications I fully accept the position +taken by this writer as a correct statement of the points +at issue between those who affirm, and those who deny +the claims of Christianity to be a divine revelation, and +<pb n='014'/><anchor id='Pg014'/> +accept his challenge to defend the supernatural +elements in the New Testament, or to abandon it as +worthless. To maintain that any of its dogmas can be +accepted as true while its miraculous elements are +abandoned seems to me to involve a question which is +hopelessly illogical. +</p> + +<p> +Modern unbelief rejects every supernatural occurrence +as utterly incredible. Before proceeding to examine +into the grounds of this, it will be necessary to lay +down definitely the bearing of the present argument +on the principles of atheism, pantheism, and theism. +</p> + +<p> +As far as the impossibility of supernatural occurrences +is concerned, pantheism and atheism occupy +precisely the same grounds. If either of them propounds +a true theory of the universe, any supernatural +occurrence, which necessarily implies a supernatural +agent to bring it about, is impossible, and the entire +controversy as to whether miracles have ever been +actually performed is a foregone conclusion. Modern +atheism, while it does not venture in categorical terms +to affirm that no God exists, definitely asserts that +there is no evidence that there is one. It follows that +if there is no evidence that there is a God, there can +be no evidence that a miracle ever has been performed, +for the very idea of a miracle implies the idea of a +God to work one. If therefore atheism is true, all +controversy about miracles is useless. They are simply +impossible, and to inquire whether an impossible event +has happened is absurd. To such a person the historical +enquiry, as far as a miracle is concerned, must +be a foregone conclusion. It might have a little interest +as a matter of curiosity; but even if the most +unequivocal evidence could be adduced that an occurrence +such as we call supernatural had taken place, +the utmost that it could prove would be that some +<pb n='015'/><anchor id='Pg015'/> +most extraordinary and abnormal fact had taken place +in nature of which we did not know the cause. But +to prove a miracle to any person who consistently +denies that he has any evidence that any being exists +which is not a portion of and included in the material +universe, or developed out of it, is impossible. +</p> + +<p> +Nor does the case differ in any material sense +with pantheism. When we have got rid of its hazy +mysticism, and applied to it clear principles of logic, +its affirmation is that God and the Universe are one, +and that all past and present forms of existence have +been the result of the Universe, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> God, everlastingly +developing himself in conformity with immutable law. +All things which either have existed or exist are as many +manifestations of God, who is in fact an infinite impersonal +Proteus, ever changing in his outward form. From +him, or to speak more correctly, from it (for he is no +person), all things have issued as mere phenomenal +babbles of the passing moment, and by it will be again +swallowed up in never-ending succession. Such a God +must be devoid of everything which we understand by +personality, intelligence, wisdom, volition or a moral +nature. It is evident therefore that to a person who +logically and consistently holds these views the occurrence +of a miracle is no less an impossibility than it is +to an atheist, for the conception of a miracle involves +the presence of personality, intelligence, and power at +the disposal of volition. All that the strongest evidence +could prove to those who hold such principles, +is that some abnormal event had taken place of which +the cause was unknown. +</p> + +<p> +It is evident, therefore, that the only course which +can be pursued with a professed atheist or pantheist, +is to grapple with him on the evidences of theism, and +to endeavour to prove the existence of a God possessed +<pb n='016'/><anchor id='Pg016'/> +of personality, intelligence, volition, and adequate +power, before we attempt to deal with the evidences of +miracles. Until we have convinced him of this all our +reasonings must be in vain. +</p> + +<p> +There are four modes of reasoning by which the +being of a God may be established. I will simply +enumerate them. First, the argument which is founded +on the principle of causation; second, that which rests +on the order of the universe; third, that from its +innumerable adaptations; fourth, that which is derived +from the moral nature and personality of man. If the +argument from causation fails to prove to those with +whom we are reasoning that the finite causes in the +universe must have a first cause from whence they +have originated; if that from the orderly arrangements +in the universe fails to prove that there must be +an intelligent being who produced them; if its innumerable +adaptations fail to establish the presence of a +presiding mind; and if the moral nature of man fails +to prove that must be a moral being from whom +that nature emanated, and of whom it is the image, it +follows that the minds must be so differently constituted +as to offer no common ground or basis of reasoning +on this question. The whole involves an essential +difference of principle, which no argumentation can +really reach. To attempt to prove to a mind of this +description the occurrence of a miracle, is simply a +waste of labour. +</p> + +<p> +A work, therefore, on the subject of miracles can +only be addressed to theists, because the very conception +of a miracle involves the existence of a personal +God. To take this for granted in reasoning with a +pantheist or atheist is simply to assume the point at +issue. It is perfectly true, that a legitimate body of +reasoning may be constructed, if the pantheist or the +<pb n='017'/><anchor id='Pg017'/> +atheist agrees to assume that a God exists for the +purpose of supplying a basis for the argument. We +may then reason with him precisely in the same way +as we would with a theist. But the contest will be +with one who has clad himself in armour which no +weapon at our disposal can penetrate. After the +strongest amount of historical evidence has been adduced, +and after all alleged difficulties have been +answered, he simply falls back on his atheism or his +pantheism, which assumes that all supernatural occurrences +must be impossible, and therefore that alleged +instances of them are delusions. +</p> + +<p> +This is not unfrequently the case in the present +controversy. A considerable number of objections +which are urged against the supernatural elements of +Christianity, derive whatever cogency they possess +from the assumption that there is a God who is the +moral Governor of the universe. These are not unfrequently +urged by persons who deny the possibility +of miracles on atheistic or pantheistic grounds. It is +perfectly fair to reason against Christianity on these +grounds; it is equally so for a person who holds these +opinions, to attempt to prove that the historical evidence +adduced in proof of the miracles recorded in the +New Testament is worthless as an additional reason +why men should cease to believe in them. But it is +not conducive to the interests of truth to urge objections +which have no reality except on the supposition +that a God exists who is the moral Governor of the +universe, and then to fall back on reasonings whose +whole force is dependent on the data furnished by +pantheism or atheism. I shall have occasion to notice +a remarkable instance of this involved mode of reasoning +hereafter. +</p> + +<pb n='018'/><anchor id='Pg018'/> + +<p> +I shall now proceed briefly to state the mode in +which I propose to treat the present subject. The point +which I have to defend is not any conceivable body +of miracles or their evidential value, but specially the +supernatural occurrences recorded in the New Testament. +I must therefore endeavour to ascertain what +is the extent of the supernaturalism asserted in the +New Testament, and what is the degree of evidential +value which its writers claim for it. +</p> + +<p> +It has been asserted by many writers that the sole and +only evidence of a revelation must be a miraculous testimony. +Whether this be so or not, this is not the place +to enquire. But in relation to the present controversy +the plain and obvious course is to ask the writers of the +New Testament what is the precise evidential value of +the supernatural occurrences which they have narrated. +This is far preferable to falling back on any assertions +of modern writers, however eminent, on this subject. +They may have over-estimated, or under-estimated their +evidential value. The writers of the New Testament +must be held responsible, not for the assertions of +others, but only for their own. I must therefore +carefully consider what it is that they affirm to be +proved by miracles. +</p> + +<p> +One primary objection against the possibility of +miracles is founded on that peculiar form of theoretic +belief, which affirms that both philosophy, science, and +religion alike point to the existence of a Cause of the +Universe, which is the source of all the forces which +exist, and of which the various phenomena of the universe +are manifestations, and designates this cause by +the name of God. But while it concedes his existence, +it proclaims him to be Unknown and Unknowable. If +this position is correct, the inference seems inevitable, +that any thing like a real revelation of him is impossible. +<pb n='019'/><anchor id='Pg019'/> +It will be necessary therefore for me to examine into +the validity of this position. +</p> + +<p> +A vast variety of arguments have been adduced both +on philosophic grounds and from the principles established +by physical science, for the purpose of proving +that the occurrence of any supernatural event is contrary +to our reason. If this be true, it is a fatal +objection against the entire mass of supernatural +occurrences that are recorded in the New Testament. +The most important points of these reasonings will +require a careful consideration. +</p> + +<p> +A very important objection has been urged against +the Christian mode of conducting the argument from +miracles. It is alleged that it involves reasoning in a +vicious circle, and that Christian apologists endeavour +to prove the truth of doctrines which utterly transcend +reason by miraculous evidence, and then endeavour to +prove the truth of the miracles by the doctrines. If this +allegation is true, it is no doubt a fatal objection to the +argument. I shall endeavour to show that it is founded +on a misapprehension of the entire subject. +</p> + +<p> +An attempt has been made to re-affirm the validity +of Hume's argument that no amount of evidence can +avail to prove the reality of a miracle unless the falsehood +of the evidence is more miraculous than the +alleged miracle. It will be necessary to consider the +validity of the positions which have been lately assumed +respecting it. +</p> + +<p> +A very formidable objection has been urged against +the truth of the supernatural occurrences recorded in +the New Testament on the ground that the followers +of Jesus were a prey to a number of the most grotesque +beliefs respecting the action of demons, and that their +superstition and credulity on this point was of so +extreme a character as to deprive their historical testimony, +<pb n='020'/><anchor id='Pg020'/> +on the subject of the supernatural of all value. +As this objection is not only one which is widely +extended, but has been urged with great force by the +author of <q>Supernatural Religion,</q> I shall devote four +chapters of this work to the examination of the question +of possession and demoniacal action as far as it affects +the present controversy. +</p> + +<p> +The entire school of modern unbelief found a very +considerable portion of their arguments against the +historical character of the Gospels, on the alleged credulity +and superstition of the followers of our Lord. +This is alleged to have been of a most profound character, +and it forms the weapon which is perhaps in +most constant use with the assailants of Christianity. +All difficulties which beset their arguments are met by +attributing the most unbounded credulity, superstition +and enthusiasm to the followers of Jesus. It has also +been urged that the belief in supernatural occurrences +has been so general, that it renders the attestation of +miracles to a revelation invalid. I purpose examining +into the validity of this objection. As this may +be said to be the key of the position occupied by +modern unbelief, I must examine into the reality of +the affirmation, and also how far the love of the marvellous +in mankind affects the credit of the testimony +to miracles. This I propose discussing in two distinct +chapters. +</p> + +<p> +It is an unquestionable fact that in these days we +summarily reject whole masses of alleged supernatural +occurrences, as utterly incredible, without inquiry into +the testimony on which they rest. It will be necessary +to inquire into the grounds on which we do this, and +how far it affects the credibility of the miracles recorded +in the New Testament. +</p> + +<p> +The historical value of the testimony which has +<pb n='021'/><anchor id='Pg021'/> +been adduced for the truth of the miracles recorded +in the New Testament, has been assailed by every +weapon which criticism can supply. It is affirmed +in the strongest manner that they are utterly devoid +of all reliable historical evidence. The Gospels are +pronounced to consist of a bundle of myths and +legends, with only a few grains of historic truth +hidden beneath them. They are affirmed to be late +compositions, and that we are utterly devoid of all +contemporaneous attestation for the facts recorded in +them, and that the true account of the origin of +Christianity is buried beneath a mass of fiction. If +this be true, there cannot be a doubt that it is a most +serious allegation, which affects the entire Christian +position. It is further urged that while the defenders +of Christianity publish works in which they attempt +to prove that miracles are possible and credible, they +carefully avoid grappling with the real point of the +whole question by showing that any historical evidence +can be produced for a single miracle recorded in the +Gospels, which will stand the test of such historical +criticism, and it is loudly proclaimed that no real +evidence can be made forthcoming. Such a charge as +this, it is impossible to pass over in silence. +</p> + +<p> +I propose, therefore, to examine into the general +truth of these allegations, and to consider the nature +of the historical evidence which unbelief, after it has +exhausted all its powers of criticism, still leaves us +unquestionably in possession of. +</p> + +<p> +This consists of the epistles of the New Testament +viewed as historical documents. Their value as such +has been greatly overlooked by both sides to the controversy, +especially by the Christian side. Christians +have been in the habit of viewing them as inspired +compositions, and have studied them almost exclusively +<pb n='022'/><anchor id='Pg022'/> +on account of the doctrinal and moral teaching which +they contain, and each sect has viewed them as a +kind of armoury from which to draw weapons for the +establishing its own particular opinions. In doing +this they have forgotten that they are also historical +documents of the highest order, the great majority of +which even the opponents of Christianity concede to +have been composed prior to the conclusion of the first +century of the Christian era, and many of them at a +much earlier period. +</p> + +<p> +Of these writings four are universally admitted to +be genuine, and to have been composed prior +to the year 60 of our era. Four more are genuine +beyond all reasonable doubt, and of two more the +evidence in favour of their authenticity is very +strong. The Apocalypse, which is also admitted to be +genuine, although not strictly an historical document, +can be rendered valuable for the purposes of history. +Of the remaining writings the genuineness is disputed; +but whether genuine or not, it is impossible to deny +their antiquity, and that they are faithful representations +of the ideas of those who wrote them. In fact +the names of their authors are of no great importance +in the present controversy, when the writings themselves +bear so decisively the marks of originality. +Thus the epistle of James, by whomsoever written, +bears the most unquestionable marks of the most +primitive antiquity. It is in fact a document of the +earliest form of Christianity,—in one word, the Jewish +form, before the Church was finally separated from the +synagogue. +</p> + +<p> +Such are our historical materials. Little justice has +been done to their value in the writings of Christian +apologists. As included in the Canon of the New Testament, +it has been for the most part the practice to view +<pb n='023'/><anchor id='Pg023'/> +them as standing in need of defence, rather than as +being the mainstay of the argument for historical +Christianity, and constituting its central position. +</p> + +<p> +It will be admitted that it will be impossible for me +to do full justice to such a subject in a work like the +present. To bring out all the treasures of evidence +respecting primitive Christianity, and the foundation of +the Christian Church which these writings contain, the +whole subject would require to be unfolded in a distinct +and separate treatise exclusively devoted to the subject. +Still, however, this work would be very incomplete if I +did not accept the challenge so boldly thrown down to +us, and show that Christianity rests on an historical +attestation of the highest order. To this I propose +devoting the six concluding chapters of this work. +</p> + +<p> +I intend, therefore, in the first place to examine the +value of the historical documents of the New Testament, +and show that several of the epistles take rank +as the highest form of historical documents, and present +us with what is to all intents and purposes a large mass +of contemporaneous evidence as to the primitive beliefs, +and the original foundation of the Christian Church. +In doing so I propose to treat them in the same +manner as all other similar historical documents are +treated. +</p> + +<p> +I shall then show that these documents afford a substantial +testimony to all the great facts of Christianity, +and especially to the existence of miraculous powers in +the Church, and that the various Churches were from +the very earliest period in possession of an oral account +of the actions and teachings of Jesus Christ substantially +the same as that which is now embodied in the +Gospels; and that this oral Gospel was habitually used +for the purposes of instruction. Further, that this +<pb n='024'/><anchor id='Pg024'/> +oral Gospel was a substantial embodiment of the +beliefs of the primitive followers of Jesus, and that the +Church as a community was a body especially adapted +for handing down correctly the account of the primitive +beliefs respecting its origin, and that the peculiar +position in which it was placed compelled it to do so. +</p> + +<p> +I shall further show on the evidence furnished by +those epistles, the genuineness of which unbelievers do +not dispute, that from the earliest commencement of +Christianity the whole body of believers, without distinction +of sect or party, believed in the resurrection of +Jesus Christ as a fact, and viewed it not only as the +groundwork on which Christianity rested, but as the +one sole and only reason for the existence of the +Christian Church. I shall be able also to prove on the +same evidence that a considerable number of the followers +of Jesus were persuaded that they had seen him +alive after his crucifixion, and that his appearance +was an actual resurrection from the dead. The same +writings prove to demonstration that this was the +universal belief of the whole Christian community, and +that the Church was established on its basis. +</p> + +<p> +These things being established as the basis for my +reasonings, I shall proceed to prove that it is impossible +that these beliefs of the Church could have owed +their origin to any possible form of delusion; but that +the resurrection of Jesus Christ was an historical fact, +and that no other supposition can give an adequate account +of the phenomenon. +</p> + +<p> +Having proved that the greatest of all the miracles +which are recorded in the Gospels is an historical fact, +I have got rid of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> difficulty with which the +acceptance of the Gospels as genuine historical accounts +is attended; but further, if it is an historical fact +that Jesus Christ really rose from the dead, it is in the +<pb n='025'/><anchor id='Pg025'/> +highest degree probable that other supernatural occurrences +would be connected with his person. I shall +therefore proceed to restore the Gospels to their place +as history, and to show that even on the principles of +the opponents of Christianity, they have every claim +to be accepted as true accounts of the action and +teaching of Jesus Christ as it was transmitted by the +different Churches, partly in an oral, and partly in a +written form. I shall also show that even if they were +composed at the late dates which are assigned to them +by opponents, they were yet written within the period +which is strictly historical, while tradition was fresh +and reminiscences vivid, and long before it was +possible that a great mass of facts which must have +formed the basis of the existence of the Christian +Church could have been superseded by a number of +mythic and legendary creations. Having placed these +facts on a firm foundation, I shall proceed to consider +their accounts of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and +to estimate its historical nature. +</p> + +<p> +The proof that the greatest miracle recorded in the +Gospels, the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, is an event +which has really occurred, places the remainder of +them in point of credibility in the same position as the +facts of ordinary history; and they must be accepted +and regarded in conformity with the usual methods of +testing evidence. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='026'/><anchor id='Pg026'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter II. Definitions of Terms.</head> + +<p> +Nothing has more contributed to import an almost +hopeless confusion of thought into the entire controversy +about miracles than the ambiguous senses in +which the most important terms connected with it +have been employed, both by theologians and men of +science, by the defenders of revelation as well as by its +opponents. Of these terms the words <q>nature,</q> <q>natural</q>, +<q>law,</q> <q>force,</q> <q>supernatural,</q> <q>superhuman,</q> +<q>miracle,</q> and <q>miraculous,</q> are the most conspicuous. +It is quite clear that unless we use these +terms in a definite and uniform sense, we shall be +fighting the air. The neglect to do so has thrown +the greatest obscurity over the entire subject. This +vague and uncertain use of them is not confined to +writers on theological subjects, but is diffused over a +large number of scientific works. My object in the +present chapter will be, not to lay down strictly accurate +definitions of all the terms used in the controversy +(for this in the present state of thought on the subject +is hardly possible) but to endeavour to assign a definite +meaning to those which it will be necessary for me to +employ, and to draw attention to some of the fallacies +which a vague use of language has introduced. +</p> + +<p> +First: No terms are more frequently used in this +controversy than the words <q>nature</q> and <q>natural.</q> +<pb n='027'/><anchor id='Pg027'/> +They are constantly used as if their meaning was +definite and invariable. Nothing is more common +than to use the expression <q>laws of nature,</q> and to +speak of miracles as involving contradictions, violations, +and suspensions of the laws and order of nature, +as though there was no danger of our falling into +fallacies of reasoning by classing wholly different orders +of phenomena under a common name. +</p> + +<p> +What do we mean by the terms <q>nature</q> and +<q>natural</q>? It is evident that no satisfactory result can +come from reasonings on this subject, unless the parties +to the discussion agree to attach to those words a +steady and consistent meaning. Are we in fact under +the expression <q>nature</q> to include both matter and its +phenomena, and mind and its phenomena? Is nature +to include all things which exist, including their causes; +laws, and forces; or is it to be restricted to matter, its +laws and forces? Or is it to include all things that exist, +except God? I need hardly observe that the laying +down some clear and definite principles on this subject +is vital to the present controversy. +</p> + +<p> +Again: What do we mean by the laws of nature? +How do we distinguish between the laws and the +forces of nature? Do the laws of nature, in the sense +in which that expression is used by science, possess +any efficient power whatever; or ought not efficiency to +be predicated only of the forces of nature, and never of +its laws? Or when we speak of the forces of nature, +do we recognise any distinction between material and +moral forces, or do we confound phenomena so utterly +differing in outward character, and on whose difference +some of the most important points of the controversy +about miracles rest, under a common name? What +again do we mean by the order of nature? Is it its +material order; or does it include the order of the +<pb n='028'/><anchor id='Pg028'/> +moral universe? Until we can agree to attach a definite +meaning to these expressions, to argue that +miracles are contrary to nature, or involve a suspension +of its laws, or a violation of its order, or even to affirm +the contrary position, is fighting the air. Yet this I +may almost say is the present aspect of the controversy. +</p> + +<p> +Again: What do we intend, when we use the different +expressions, <q>miracles,</q> <q>supernatural,</q> <q>superhuman,</q> +or events occurring out of the order of nature? +It is evident that whether they point to any real +distinctions or not, it is necessary to employ them +with consistency. +</p> + +<p> +The mere enumeration of these questions makes it +clear that by a vague and indefinite use of terms, or by +attaching to them meanings which they cannot accurately +be made to bear, we may unconsciously assume +the entire question at issue. +</p> + +<p> +First: With respect to the terms <q>nature</q> and +<q>natural.</q> What do we include under them? Bishop +Butler considers that the latter term is satisfied by +attaching to it the meaning <q>usual.</q> Nature then +would mean the ordinary course of things. But such +a meaning would by no means satisfy the requirements +of modern science, philosophy, or theology. +</p> + +<p> +One obvious sense to attach to the word <q>nature</q> +is to use it to denote the entire mass of phenomena as +contemplated by physical science. In this point of +view it would include matter, its forces, and its laws, +and embrace the entire range of those phenomena and +forces where action is necessary; and into the conception +of which neither volition nor freedom enters. If +<q>nature</q> and <q>natural</q> had been used only in this +sense, it would have saved us from a great mass of inconclusive +reasoning. But this is far from being the case. +<pb n='029'/><anchor id='Pg029'/> +Not only are they used to include matter, its laws and +forces, but also the whole phenomena of mind. +</p> + +<p> +To this use of the terms the Duke of Argyll has +given no inconsiderable countenance in his admirable +work, <q>The Reign of Law,</q> especially in the sixth +chapter. He uses the term law as alike applicable to +the operations of mind and matter, and this of course +implies that the whole of our mental phenomena form +a portion of nature and its order. He is led to this, +among other considerations, by the use which we make +of the word <q>natural</q> as applied to the results of all +kinds of mental operations. The question may fairly +be asked, Are not the works wrought by man in +nature, or is not the building of its nest by a bird, or +of its comb by the bee, a natural operation? If so, +man, bird, and bee, must form a portion of nature, and +their various actions, of its order. +</p> + +<p> +In a popular point of view such expressions involve +no difficulty, and as a mere verbal distinction the whole +question would not be worth the labour of discussion. +But in a question like the one now under consideration, +which requires the utmost accuracy both of thought +and reasoning, the case is far different. The classing +together of phenomena which differ so entirely as mind +and matter, under a common term, leads to the inference +that there is no essential difference between +them, which involves at the outset a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>petitio principii</foreign> +of the entire question under definition. I shall have +occasion repeatedly to point out in the course of this +work the number of fallacious reasonings which have +been introduced into the question about the possibility +and the credibility of miracles by thus including under +a common term phenomena utterly different in character. +It would be far better to get rid of words so vague as +<q>nature</q> and <q>natural</q> in this discussion, and +<pb n='030'/><anchor id='Pg030'/> +substitute for them terms of which it is impossible to +mistake the meaning, than to employ them in senses +which are simply ambiguous and misleading. But of +this more hereafter. +</p> + +<p> +What then are we to do with man? Is he a part +of nature and its order? I reply that man is within +material nature as far as regards his bodily organization; +but that he is outside, or above it, and belongs +to a different order, as far as his rational action, his +volition, and his moral powers are concerned. All that +I am contending for is that a clear distinction must be +preserved between the necessary action of the forces +of material nature, and the voluntary action of man; +and that terms must be used which accurately denote +this distinction. Matter, its forces and laws, involve +the conception of necessary action. They act in a +particular manner because they cannot help so acting. +With action purely intellectual I am not concerned, +but all moral action is voluntary. Man as an agent +can act or forbear acting; matter cannot. This distinction +is of the highest importance, and must not +be lost sight of behind a confused use of such terms +as natural, law, force, or order of nature, applied +indeterminately to the necessary action of material +agents, and the voluntary action of moral ones. +</p> + +<p> +It will doubtless be objected by a certain order of +philosophy that all mental and moral force is only some +special modification of material force, and consequently +that there is no distinction between material and +moral action, or between material and moral force, +and that the words <q>nature</q> and <q>natural</q> are correctly +applied to both alike, as being simple manifestations +of the same original force. To this it will be +sufficient to reply, first: that this is an assertion only, +<pb n='031'/><anchor id='Pg031'/> +and never has been nor can be proved. Secondly: +that it contradicts the highest of all our certitudes, the +direct testimony of consciousness, which affirms that +we live under a law of freedom, wholly different from +the necessary laws of material nature. Thirdly: that +it contradicts the universal experience of mankind, as +embodied in the primary laws of human language and +human thought. To assume this at the commencement +of the argument is to take for granted the point which +requires to be proved. +</p> + +<p> +It would be quite out of place in a treatise like the +present to attempt to discuss the question of the origin +of the free agency and the moral nature of man. It is +sufficient for the purpose to observe that, however +voluntary agency may have originated, it is a simple +fact that it exists in the universe, and that its phenomena +belong to an order of its own. It is no mere theory, +but a fact, that man not only is capable of modifying +the action of the forces of the material universe, but +that he has modified them, and has produced results +utterly different from those which would have followed +from their simple action. To use terms in this controversy +which overlook this plain and obvious fact, +can lead to no satisfactory result. +</p> + +<p> +Are then the actions of man, the bird, and the bee, +properly designated as natural? In a popular use of +language the question may be one purely verbal; but +when we are dealing with subjects requiring accurate +thought, it is in the highest degree necessary to use +language which does not confound the distinct phenomena +of mind and matter under a common designation. +Both together compose the universe; but each belongs +to a different order of phenomena. The whole difficulty +proceeds from the fact that both material forces which +act in conformity with necessary laws, and moral ones +<pb n='032'/><anchor id='Pg032'/> +which act in conformity with those of freedom, are +united in the person of man. +</p> + +<p> +Another order of thought uses the term <q>nature</q> as +including everything that exists, even God; or in +other words, it affirms that every thing which has +existed and exists is a manifestation of Him. As this +theory involves the denial of the personality of the +Divine Being, it stands excluded from the question +under consideration, namely, the credibility of miracles, +which is utterly irrelevant, except on the assumption +of the existence of a personal God. It ought to +be observed, however, that while theism affirms that +God and the universe, whether material or moral, are +distinct, it fully recognises the fact that God is immanent +in both the worlds of mind and matter, while at +the same time he transcends them both. This is an +important consideration, which is too often overlooked +by both parties to the discussion. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly: a still greater confusion has been introduced +by a vague and indefinite use of the term <q>law,</q> +and by confusing a number of utterly diverse phenomena +under the designation of the <q>laws of nature.</q> +It is absolutely necessary to trace this fallacy to its +source. The Duke of Argyll tells us in his <q>Reign of +Law</q> that there are five different senses at least in +which this word is habitually used even in scientific +writings. They are as follows:— +</p> + +<p> +<q>First, we have law as applied simply to an observed +order of facts.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>Secondly, to that order as involving the action of +some force or forces of which nothing more can be +known.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>Thirdly, as applied to individual forces, the measure +of whose operation has been more or less defined or +ascertained.</q> +</p> + +<pb n='033'/><anchor id='Pg033'/> + +<p> +<q>Fourthly, as applied to those combinations of forces +which have reference to the fulfilment of purposes or +the discharge of functions.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>Fifthly, as applied to abstract conceptions of the +mind—not corresponding with any actual phenomena, +but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought, necessary +to an understanding of them. Law, in this sense, is a +reduction of the phenomena, not merely to an order +of facts, but to an order of thought.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>These leading significations of the word Law,</q> +says the Duke, <q>all circle round the three great questions +which science asks of nature, the what, the how, +and the why.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>What are the facts in their established order?</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>How, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> from what physical causes does that order +come to be? What relation do they bear to purpose, +to the fulfilment of intention, to the discharge of +function?</q> +</p> + +<p> +Such are the multiform acceptations attached by +scientific men to the term <q>law,</q> yet the Duke is not +quite certain whether they may not be even more +numerous. It is evident that if they are all imported +into the question of the credibility of miracles, our +position must resemble that of persons who are compelled +to fight in the dark; and that the question +whether an occurrence is natural or supernatural, whether +it is contrary to, or a violation of the laws of nature, or +above nature, and many others which enter into this +controversy must be without definite meaning. It is +clear that unless we can restrict the word <q>law</q> to +one, or at most, two definite meanings, we shall get +into hopeless confusion, or to speak more correctly, we +shall open the gate wide for the introduction of any +number of fallacies. +</p> + +<p> +The primary conception implied by the term <q>law</q> +<pb n='034'/><anchor id='Pg034'/> +is unquestionably one which is strictly applicable to +man and his actions, and can only be applied metaphorically, +and in some systems of thought after a +considerable change of meaning, to the facts and phenomena +of the material universe. A law is a rule of +action for human conduct and nothing more. Such +rules of conduct for the most part pre-suppose that +they are imposed by some external authority, which +has the right or the power to enforce obedience to +them; or else that the person obeying them has an +inward feeling that it is right to do so, and knows that +his conscience will reproach him for the omission. But +law, strictly speaking, is simply the rule of action +itself, as for instance, an Act of Parliament; but as in +practice all such rules are enforced by a sanction of some +kind, our conception of a law is also united with that +of a lawgiver, who has both the right and the power +to enforce it. +</p> + +<p> +It follows therefore that such a conception is essentially +a moral one. It is also intimately united with +the knowledge that we possess the power to act or +forbear acting in conformity with its dictates, and, if +we prefer it, of taking the consequences of disobedience. +But when such a conception is transferred to +material nature it loses a considerable portion of its +original significancy. +</p> + +<p> +In its application therefore to physical science, it +may with strict propriety be used to denote an invariable +order of events: and if the human analogy +could hold in physics it might be used to include the +power which originated and enforced them. But as +the consideration of will or purpose forms no portion +of strictly physical science, and is expressly excluded +from it, the term law as used by it ought to denote +the invariable order of sequences, and not to include +<pb n='035'/><anchor id='Pg035'/> +the forces which generate them. Unless this distinction +is carefully observed, we shall be in danger of +introducing into our reasonings human analogies to +which there is nothing corresponding in nature viewed +as a mere body of unintelligent forces. +</p> + +<p> +The use of the term <q>law</q> in physical science ought +to be confined to denote the invariable sequences of +the material phenomena. Physicists profess to know +nothing of efficient causation; or of a lawgiver standing +outside his laws and possessing power to enforce +them. The whole question of intelligent agency or +purpose lies in a region outside their province. Law, +as far as physical science is acquainted with it, can +consist only of a set of antecedents, followed by +an invariable set of consequents. Of any inherent +efficacy in these antecedents to produce their consequents, +it can affirm nothing. A very popular +philosophy even denies the power of the human mind +to penetrate beyond this, and affirms that its entire +knowledge is limited to phenomena. +</p> + +<p> +But physical science also deals with forces. These, +and not its laws, are its true principles of causation. +Mere invariable sequences can effect nothing; but +forces, such as gravitation, heat, electricity, and the +entire body of chemical forces, or whatever force they +may ultimately be resolved into, can effect much. +They are in fact the antecedents of which the invariable +order of events are the consequents. Respecting +the ultimate principle of force, or what is its real nature, +or how it is directed, or came to be, physical science is +silent. All that it can do is to observe the order of +their occurrence, measure their quantities, and tabulate +their results. By this means it rises to the conception +of what are called the laws of nature. +</p> + +<p> +If in the present controversy the word law had +<pb n='036'/><anchor id='Pg036'/> +been used in this sense only, it would have been +wholly unexceptionable. But it becomes far otherwise +when the idea of force or efficiency is introduced into +it. Nothing is more common in the reasonings of +those who attempt to prove that miracles are impossible, +than to import into the term law the idea of +force, or efficient causation, even at the very time when +the presence of intelligent action is denied. It is this +which imparts to this class of reasonings their entire +speciousness. The laws of material nature are continually +spoken of as though they were forces which +are energetic in the universe, and to the energy of +which all things owe their present form; or in other +words, it is assumed that the laws of nature are causes +which have produced by their unintelligent action the +present order of the universe. +</p> + +<p> +Nothing however can be clearer than that a law of +nature, in the sense in which purely physical science +can take cognizance of one, can effectuate nothing. +What can an invariable order of sequences effect? +Before the idea of efficiency can be attached to +law, the conception of force must be introduced into +it. Modern controversy, however, is constantly in the +habit of speaking of the laws of nature as though they +were efficient agents. We hear of creation by law, +evolution by law, of results brought about by the action +of invariable laws, and a countless number of +assertions of a similar description. To such expressions +in a popular sense when no accuracy of expression +is required, there is no objection; but when +they are introduced into the controversy respecting +the credibility of miracles, they create nothing but +confusion. What is really meant is, that such results +are brought about by the action of forces which act in +conformity with invariable laws, but the idea of intelligence +<pb n='037'/><anchor id='Pg037'/> +and volition is carefully excluded from the +conception. It is clearly inaccurate to speak of laws +reigning. Laws do not reign even in political societies; +but only the power which is able to enact and enforce +them. In material nature the only things which possess +efficiency are its forces. +</p> + +<p> +There can be no objection to the use of the expression, +<q>the laws of mind,</q> when care is taken to use +language which clearly distinguishes between them +and unintelligent and necessary sequences of material +nature. But when the term <q>law</q> is without any +qualification applied to both sets of phenomena alike, +it is certain either to lead to fallacious reasoning, or to +involve the assumption of the point at issue. Whatever +may be the origin of the moral and spiritual in man, +it is certain that as they at present exist in him, they +stand out in the strongest contrast with the forces +which act upon material things, and with the laws of +their action. Nothing can be more entirely different in +character than the force of gravitation and the principles +of volition and self-consciousness, or than the +unconscious forces of material nature and those principles +which constitute our rationality. If we affirm that +the forces of mind act in conformity with law, it ought +to be clearly understood that they act in conformity +with a law of their own, which affords free action to the +principle of volition. Otherwise there is the greatest +danger that the expression will involve the covert assumption +of the truth of the doctrine of philosophical +necessity, or in other words, that all mental and material +forces are of the same character, that is to say, +that they are both equally necessary. This involves +the assumption of the very point on which the entire +controversy turns, for if moral and material forces and +laws are all alike, it destroys the conception of a God, +and the significance of a miracle. +</p> + +<pb n='038'/><anchor id='Pg038'/> + +<p> +This brings us to the conception of force, what is +it? Various definitions of it have been given sufficiently +accurate for practical purposes. It should be +observed however that physical science can know +nothing of it except as a phenomenon. The determination +of its nature, and its ultimate cause lie entirely +beyond its limits. Many facts respecting it, have been +ascertained and tabulated. Many of its manifestations, +which bear a different phenomenal aspect, it has ascertained +to be capable of transmutation into one +another. But it must never be forgotten that it is +able to affirm nothing respecting the source in which +the forces of the universe originate. All that it can +affirm is, that they do exist. The original conception of +force is one, however, which we derive, not from the +material universe, but from the action of our own +minds. We are conscious that we are efficient agents, +and that definite results follow the action of our wills. +This gives us the conception of force. We apply it in +a metaphorical sense to certain things which we observe +in the material universe and call them forces, +having abstracted from our primary idea of force the +conception of volition. But all that we really know +about force tends to prove that its origin is mental +and not material. +</p> + +<p> +It is of the utmost importance to preserve a clear +distinction between the unconscious forces of matter +and the intelligent ones of mind; otherwise we shall +inevitably be misled by such expressions as <q>the forces +of nature.</q> It is impossible to argue the question unless +the distinction is admitted as a fact, whatever theory +may be held about their origin. It is absurd to confound +principles so distinct as heat, or gravitation, or +electricity, with those which produce the most disinterested +moral actions, and designate them by the +<pb n='039'/><anchor id='Pg039'/> +common term <q>natural forces.</q> In common language +we are in no danger of error when we speak of the +force of conscience, or the force of a motive; but in +discussions like the present, where such expressions +really involve the assumption of the whole controversy, +it is absurd to classify such phenomena, and the unintelligent +forces of matter under a common designation, +unless it can be demonstrated that they are all manifestations +of the same power. +</p> + +<p> +We come now to the much vexed question as to the +meaning to be attached to the words <q>miracle</q> and +<q>miraculous;</q> and the terms closely allied to them, +<q>supernatural</q> and <q>superhuman.</q> Is there any +valid distinction between miracles and supernatural +occurrences? Are, in fact, all miracles supernatural +occurrences, and all supernatural occurrences miracles? +The determination of this question is closely connected +with an important point which will be considered hereafter, +viz., whether a miracle could have any evidential +value if it were brought about by a special adaptation +of the known or unknown forces of material nature. +</p> + +<p> +Let it be observed that we are not discussing this +question as a purely abstract one, but in reference to +the truth of Christianity. What miracles may be in +themselves, I shall not inquire; but in relation to the +question before us, what we mean when we call an occurrence +a miracle ought to be made sufficiently clear and +distinct. In this controversy it would greatly tend to +precision if we used the term <q>miracle</q> as distinguished +from an occurrence which is supernatural or +superhuman, to denote only those supernatural occurrences +which have an evidential value in connection +with the evidences of a divine revelation, since there +may be supernatural occurrences which would not be +in any proper sense evidential. +</p> + +<pb n='040'/><anchor id='Pg040'/> + +<p> +But the further question arises, Is it necessary in +order to constitute an event a miracle that it should be +one which transcends the known or the unknown forces +of material nature to have produced? It is clear that +to constitute an event a miracle it must involve supernatural +or superhuman agency of some kind; that is to +say, it must be either supernatural in the mode of its +production as an objective fact, or superhuman in its +productive elements, by which I mean, that it must be +preceded by an announcement that it is going to +occur, which must be beyond the sphere of human +knowledge. In order to render a supernatural event +evidential, or in other words to constitute it a +miracle, it must not only consist of an external objective +fact, but its occurrence must be unknown beforehand, +and take place at the bidding of the agent. +Such previous announcement, or prediction, is necessary +to render even a supernatural occurrence in the strictest +sense of the word a miracle. The prediction of some +occurrence in physical nature previously unknown may +therefore convert such an event into an evidential +miracle, although the occurrence itself as a mere +objective fact may have been brought about by some +known or unknown forces of material nature. To +render it such it would be necessary that the knowledge +of the occurrence should be clearly beyond the bounds +of existing knowledge. Thus, if any person, when the +science of astronomy was utterly unknown, had announced +beforehand the day and the hour of the occurrence +of the next two transits of Venus, and the various +places on the earth's surface in which they would be +visible, and if the events had taken place accordingly, +this would have unquestionably proved the presence of +superhuman knowledge. The only question which in +such a case would require to be determined would be +<pb n='041'/><anchor id='Pg041'/> +whether such a knowledge must have been communicated +by God, or by some being inferior to God. As +however none of the miracles recorded in the New +Testament have the smallest appearance of being of +this character, I need not further discuss a supposed +case. My only reason for referring to it is, that if +it is supposable that any of the miracles recorded in the +New Testament could, at some future day, be shown to +have been due to a combination of physical forces, +their occurring instantly at the direct command of the +agent would still give them an evidential value. +</p> + +<p> +But it is clear that the miracles recorded in the New +Testament, if caused by material forces at all, could not +have been due to their ordinary action. They must +have been due either to an unknown combination of +known forces, or to the calling of unknown forces into +activity, or to the immediate agency of the divine mind. +It is clear therefore that their occurrence as objective +facts proves the presence of mind acting in some way +on the material forces of nature. To determine the +mode in which this action mast have taken place has +nothing to do with the question of miracles, or the +reality of their occurrence. +</p> + +<p> +A miracle therefore may, for all practical purposes of +this argument, be defined as an occurrence which +cannot be effectuated by the ordinary action of the +known material forces of the Universe, and could +only have been brought about by the agency of +intelligent volition; and which is preceded by an +announcement on the part of the agent that it is about +to happen or takes place directly on his bidding. +The latter element, as I have observed, is essential to +constitute the occurrence an evidential miracle. Otherwise +in our ignorance of what unknown forces may +exist in the universe, we could have no certainty +<pb n='042'/><anchor id='Pg042'/> +that the event was not a mere unusual occurrence +effected by some already existing but unknown forces. +To the highest form of the miracles in the New +Testament, however, such an idea would be inapplicable. +</p> + +<p> +It may perhaps here be objected that in laying down +this definition of a miracle, I have not sufficiently +identified its performance with the governing power of +the universe, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> God; but that if supernatural agents +exist, inferior to God, it may be due to their operation; +and consequently that it may not be evidential of a +divine commission. This objection will be fully considered +in a subsequent portion of this work. +</p> + +<p> +A supernatural event is one which exceeds and +which cannot be effected by any force existing in +material nature. But there must always be a difficulty +in determining whether an occurrence, viewed as a bare +objective fact, belongs to that class of events which is +supernatural, or only to that which is unusual. This will +always be the case until our knowledge of the forces of +the universe is so complete that we can ascertain for +certain what are the limits of their possible action, and +whether it is possible to bring into action any forces +that may exist, but are unknown to us. In strict language +therefore, it is impossible to be certain whether +an occurrence, as a bare objective fact, is supernatural, +until we are acquainted with the possible action of +every force that exists in the universe. This difficulty, +however, is one that is entirely theoretical, and has not +the smallest practical importance with respect to the +miracles of the New Testament. Men have had several +thousand years' experience of what can be effected by the +ordinary forces of material nature. Occurrences which +lie beyond their power to effectuate prove the presence +of intelligence and volition. The introduction of an unknown +<pb n='043'/><anchor id='Pg043'/> +force can only be accomplished by a being who, +although he may be immanent in nature, is yet capable +of controlling its material forces. Occurrences therefore +which transcend the power of the known forces +existing in the universe to accomplish, whether they are +material or human, may for all practical purposes be +viewed as supernatural; that is to say, they denote the +presence and agency of a being who is possessed of +power, intelligence, and volition. Whether that being +be human, superhuman, or divine, must be determined +by an intelligent exercise of our reason. +</p> + +<p> +It is useless to discuss this question further. We +are dealing with a very definite question, the miraculous +events recorded in the Gospels. With respect +to the great majority of them, there can be no doubt +as to their being supernatural occurrences, if they took +place precisely as they are recorded. We know enough +of the ordinary forces of material nature to be certain +that the instantaneous cure of a blind or leprous man +by a word does not lie within the sphere of their operation. +Such an event must denote the special interposition +of an extremely high degree of intelligence and +power. Common sense will affirm that it could only +be brought about by the intervention of the supreme +power of the universe, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> God. +</p> + +<p> +In this sense every supernatural occurrence may +be said to be likewise evidential, when we have +ascertained for certain that it is due to supernatural +causes, and that it cannot have been brought about by +the action of unintelligent forces, or by those which +are capable of being modified by the agency of man. +But in that case it would only prove the presence and +intervention of a being who is capable of controlling the +unintelligent forces of nature. The real difficulty, as I +have observed, is to prove the supernatural nature of +<pb n='044'/><anchor id='Pg044'/> +the occurrence. But although, if it was certainly +supernatural, it would prove the intervention of a +supernatural agent, it would say nothing as to the purpose +for which such an intervention took place. It +follows therefore, that to constitute a supernatural +occurrence in the strict sense of the term a miracle, it +must take place after an announcement that it is going +to happen, and take place at the bidding of the agent +who performs it. +</p> + +<p> +It is highly important, in considering the miracles +of the Gospels, that the distinction between a merely +supernatural event and an evidential miracle should be +kept steadily in view. All creative acts would be supernatural +events, but they would not necessarily be +evidential miracles. The incarnation, and other occurrences +mentioned in the New Testament, are supernatural +ones; but to mix them up with evidential miracles is +simply to invite confusion of thought. Another class +of supernatural occurrences mentioned in the New +Testament seem to have been wrought, not for purposes +directly evidential, but to awaken attention; and another +class of supernatural endowments were vouchsafed, +to render it possible to lay deep in human society the +foundations of the Church as a visible and permanent +institution. Such occurrences are not directly but indirectly +evidential, and it will be necessary carefully +to distinguish between them and occurrences brought +about for directly evidential purposes. To keep this +distinction clear, I shall designate the last by the term +<q>miracle.</q> A miracle is supernatural in two ways: +namely, in the agency which produced the objective +fact, and in the announcement of its occurrence. +</p> + +<p> +The common definition of a miracle, as a violation or +a suspension of the laws of nature, is open to very +grave objections. The question, as I have observed, at +<pb n='045'/><anchor id='Pg045'/> +once arises, what is included under nature? It also +assumes that we are acquainted with the mode in which +miraculous agency must be exerted; which we are not. +Other definitions which have been proposed take for +granted positions which those who undertake to prove +the credibility of miracles ought never to concede. The +plain fact is, that we are simply ignorant of the mode in +which God acts on material nature; and every definition +must be faulty which assumes that we have that +knowledge. To say that miracles must involve even a +suspension of the laws of nature introduces a needless +difficulty. No law or force of nature need be suspended +in its action to render the occurrence of a supernatural +event possible. All that is necessary is that forces +should be introduced which are capable of overbalancing +the action of opposing forces. It is extremely inaccurate +to affirm that the force of gravitation must be +suspended in order to render possible either walking +on the water, or an ascent into the sky. +</p> + +<p> +It is equally unwise and unphilosophical to affirm +that God cannot work a miracle by the use of intermediate +agencies, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> by the partial employment of the +forces of the material universe. It is true that in +most of the miracles recorded in the New Testament +we cannot affirm the use of such media, although we +observe an economy in the use of divine power: <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> +no power is exerted beyond that which is necessary to +produce the particular result in question. But in the +Old Testament the use of such media is unquestionably +affirmed. To lay down in our definition of a miracle a +particular theory as to the mode in which it must be +accomplished, involves the whole subject in needless +difficulties. +</p> + +<p> +This question has been obscured by representing a +miracle as performed by the intervention of a higher +<pb n='046'/><anchor id='Pg046'/> +law, superseding the action of a lower one. This introduces +the conception of force into the idea of law, and +leads to confusion of thought. Laws, or the invariable +sequences between phenomena, are neither forces nor +powers. The counteraction of one force by another is +an event of daily occurrence. All that is needful for +the working of a miracle is the intervention of a force +or mental energy which is capable of acting on matter, +and of overbalancing those ordinary forces which would +produce a contrary result. +</p> + +<p> +It has also been urged that miracles may obey a law +of miracles. The best illustration of this idea is that +which has been supplied from the supposed operations +of Mr. Babbage's calculating machine. He supposes +that a machine might be constructed which could go +on grinding out a particular set of results for a long, +yet definite period of time; then by the operation of +the same machine, that a fresh order might be introduced; +and afterwards that it might revert to the +original one; and that this operation might be continued +for ever. If therefore the great Author of +nature had so planned the machine of the universe that +whenever a miracle was requisite in His scheme of +Providence this abnormal event occurred, like the new +series introduced into the calculating mill, in that case +miracles might be said to follow a definite law, which +might be designated the law and order of miraculous +intervention. +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible to deny the ingenuity of this theory, +but unfortunately it is not only one which takes for +granted that the perfection of mechanical contrivance +is the only thing that the Creator had in view in the +production of the universe, but even if this were an +unquestionable fact, it could afford us no help with respect +to all the most important miracles recorded in the +<pb n='047'/><anchor id='Pg047'/> +New Testament. How is it possible, I ask, to account +for many of our Lord's miracles on such a supposition? +It is expressly affirmed that this supernatural energy +was frequently made to depend on the faith of the +person who invoked His help. Could any miracle-working +mill be even conceived of, which could bring +out, as part of the normal law of its operations, the +cure of blind, deaf, and leprous men by a word, or +effectuate His own resurrection from the dead, or ascension +into Heaven? Such occurrences could not be +produced by the action of any machine which has the +smallest analogy to a calculating mill. But further: +such an operation would be impotent to answer the +purposes of a miracle, unless the particular result was +announced beforehand by one who was completely +ignorant that the machine was capable of producing +such extraordinary results. This ignorance would likewise +have to be extended to those to whom the +announcement was made. It would also be necessary +that the announcer should proclaim that on a particular +day and hour the machine would grind out the particular +result of the cure of a blind man, or a resurrection +from the dead. The ability to do this would be utterly +abnormal, and impossible ever to be ground out by the +self-acting agency of any conceivable machine, however +cleverly constructed. Mr. Babbage's miracle-working +mill, however ingenious a conception, must therefore be +dismissed as incapable of affording us the smallest help +in the present argument. +</p> + +<p> +The term <q>superhuman</q> remains to be considered. +It need not detain us long. Superhuman implies a +result brought about by the intervention of a being +superior to man. Whether such an agent be divine or +otherwise can only be determined by the exercise of +our reason. It has been objected that the agency which +<pb n='048'/><anchor id='Pg048'/> +produces an earthquake is a superhuman agency, that +is, it exceeds the powers of man to produce it. Granted: +but this has no bearing on the subject under discussion. +When we use the word <q>superhuman</q> we always mean +by it, not the action of the unintelligent forces of +material nature, but of a being possessed of intelligence +and will. +</p> + +<p> +There is a large number of other subjects having +an intimate bearing on the correct definition of the +terms habitually used in this controversy, and which +greatly modify their meaning. These however will +best be considered when I enter on the direct discussion +of the possibility and the credibility of miracles. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='049'/><anchor id='Pg049'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter III. The Supernatural Elements Contained in the New +Testament: In What Do They Consist? And What +View Do Its Writers Take Respecting Them?</head> + +<p> +Before entering on the general question of miracles, +it is only reasonable to inquire of the writers of the +New Testament what they have to say on the subject. +Their opinion of the nature and character of the supernatural +occurrences which they have reported is +certainly of more value than that of all other writers +put together. St. John and St. Paul must have been +in the habit of coming in contact with unbelievers. It +would be most important if we could ascertain the +mode adopted by them of commending Christianity to +their acceptance, and what use was made by them of +the supernatural power with which they professed to +be endowed. +</p> + +<p> +First: It is impossible to read the New Testament +without arriving at the conclusion that the superhuman +character which is ascribed to Jesus Christ is perfectly +unique, and differs entirely from that which is ascribed +to any other person. Others wrought miracles; but +they were men like ourselves. But in the person of +Jesus Christ the supernatural is represented as inherent. +To say that he possessed the power of working miracles, +is an inadequate statement of the fact. Although he +embodies the perfection of human nature with all its finite +limitations, the supernatural and the divine take up their +<pb n='050'/><anchor id='Pg050'/> +abode in his personality. Whenever our Lord is represented +as working miracles, he is always represented +as performing them by a power which was inherent in +himself. This is never once attributed to his followers. +The supernatural action which is ascribed to Jesus +Christ must be viewed, as a case distinct and separate, +by itself. The miracles performed by him are not only +evidential, but also portions of his supernatural manifestation. +</p> + +<p> +According to the author of the fourth Gospel, our +Lord himself rarely designated them by either of the +three terms by which miracles are usually designated +in the New Testament, viz., signs, wonders, and mighty +works (σημεῖα, τέρατα, δυνάμεις). He almost uniformly +called them <q>Works</q> (ἔργα). An important distinction +is here intended. Our Lord did not view his +miracles as a separate class of actions by themselves, +but as portions of his ordinary superhuman working, +and as having a distinct relation to his entire character. +Four passages will be sufficient to show this clearly. +<q>The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear +witness of me.</q> <q>My Father worketh hitherto, and I +work.</q> <q>If ye believe not me, believe the works.</q> +<q>Many good works have I showed you from my Father; +for which of those works do ye stone me?</q> When +contemplated by others only, they assume the form of +signs and wonders: <q>Except ye see signs and wonders, +ye will not believe.</q> It is highly important that we +should keep steadily in view that the divine character +attributed to Jesus is by no means restricted to the +performance of miracles; but that it extends throughout +his entire working, and that the two together +constitute an harmonious whole. It pertains no less to +its moral and spiritual aspects, than to the displays +which he made of a power capable of controlling +<pb n='051'/><anchor id='Pg051'/> +nature. Even in this portion of his working, he draws +special attention to its moral and spiritual aspects. +According to his view of his own mighty works, +they not only exhibited a power of controlling nature, +but were uniformly invested with a moral and spiritual +environment. Throughout the Gospels he is represented +as exhibiting a greatness and dignity, a purity, +holiness, humility and benevolence, so far transcending +that of other men, as to constitute him what may be +almost designated a moral and spiritual miracle. +Perfection in the moral and spiritual world is as essentially +superhuman, as power over nature is supernatural. +In considering the miracles which have been attributed +to Jesus Christ, it is important to bear in mind the +manner in which they stand related to his entire superhuman +character. Otherwise we shall fail to observe +the double aspect which they bear. They were manifestations +of the divine, which dwelt within him, and +also they possessed an evidential value. +</p> + +<p> +I shall occasionally use the term <q>superhuman</q> +instead of <q>divine,</q> as applied to Jesus Christ, because +for the purposes of this argument it will be unnecessary +for me to define the precise degree of divine character +which the evangelists intended to attribute to him. To +ascertain this is the proper function of the theologian, +by comparing together the facts and statements of the +New Testament. It is sufficient for my present purpose +to observe that the perusal of the Gospels leaves +the inevitable impression on the mind that it was the +purpose of their writers to depict a divine character in +union with a human one—a supernatural power acting +within the regions of the natural. This covers alike +the aspects of character presented of him both in the +Synoptic and the Johannine Gospels. +</p> + +<p> +Although our Lord speaks of his actions by the +<pb n='052'/><anchor id='Pg052'/> +common name of <q>works</q> (ἔργα), when the sacred +authors speak generally of miracles, they apply to +them, as I have observed, three distinct terms, signs, +mighty works, and wonders (σημεῖα, δυνάμεις, τέρατα). +Each of these denotes different aspects in which they +contemplated miracles. The sign included the supernatural +fact wrought on external nature with the whole +of its moral environment. In this point of view, the +<q>sign</q> was the direct proof of a divine mission. It +is worthy of observation that the author of the fourth +Gospel has uniformly described the supernatural actions +which he has ascribed to Jesus Christ by this term. +The expression <q>mighty works</q> is intended to bring +under our notice the power which was displayed in the +performance of a miracle, thereby directly connecting +it with a superhuman agency. The term <q>wonder</q> +contemplates a supernatural event in its simple aspect +as an occurrence pre-eminently fitted to command +attention to the person who was capable of performing +it. We may therefore conclude that the writers of the +New Testament considered that these were the three +special functions of miracles. It is quite possible that +the same miracle might have fulfilled all three at the +same time: but as three such functions of supernatural +occurrences are distinctly stated, it is quite conceivable +that there were occasions when they were limited to +some one of these in particular. +</p> + +<p> +It is evident that our Lord attached the highest +importance to a miracle contemplated as a <q>sign,</q> <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> +to the moral environment with which it was connected. +This, although more definitely brought out in St. +John's Gospel, is also distinctly borne witness to by +the Synoptics. It forms the ground of the reiterated +refusal of our Lord to comply with the demand of the +Pharisees that he would show some sign from heaven, +<pb n='053'/><anchor id='Pg053'/> +as a proof of his divine mission. His miracles combined +in one the two conceptions of signs and mighty +works. None of them were mere prodigies devoid +of a moral aspect. +</p> + +<p> +It is worthy of consideration whether our Lord's +primary purpose in performing supernatural actions +was always directly evidential. I have already drawn +attention to their twofold aspect, as divine manifestations, +and as evidential miracles. A considerable +number of the miracles recorded in the Gospels are +represented as performed by him because he was moved +with compassion. These evidently belong to the former +class of his supernatural workings. But although +this was their primary object it did not deprive them +of an evidential value. But there is also another +remarkable class of supernatural actions attributed to +him, viz., those in which he is recorded to have +expressly forbidden the persons whom he healed to +publish the fact. As it is evident that these miracles +could only have become extensively known by the persons +cured disobeying his orders, it is clear that they +could not have been directly performed for evidential +purposes, but were the manifestations of the divine +which resided in his person. +</p> + +<p> +Such are the supernatural actions attributed to Jesus +Christ in the New Testament, respecting which as a +whole, whether performed for purposes avowedly evidential +or not, he himself affirms, that they bore witness +of him, that the Father had sent him. Two other +classes of miracles, affirmed to have been performed by +his followers, require notice. +</p> + +<p> +The whole of these are stated to have been performed +by a delegated power and commission. The +great majority of them are described as having been +performed in the name of Jesus Christ. They are +<pb n='054'/><anchor id='Pg054'/> +affirmed to have been performed for two purposes; to +prove the divine commission of those who wrought +them, and to attest the reality of their Master's resurrection, +by giving exhibitions of his present power. +These therefore are distinctly affirmed to have been +evidential miracles. A few others were providential +interferences in favour of the infant Church. There is +also another class of supernatural actions referred to in +the Acts of the Apostles, such as the passing of St. +Peter's shadow, and the supposed supernatural effects +resulting from it, and the conveyance from St. Paul's +person of handkerchiefs and aprons to the sick, and +one or two other instances. These involve special +manifestations of supernatural power, and belong to +supernatural occurrences in their aspect of wonders, +or very extraordinary events, and as such were specially +adapted for drawing attention to the message of the +Apostles. But the New Testament also affirms another +and very peculiar form of the manifestation of the +supernatural, as then actually existing in the Apostolic +Church. I need hardly say that I allude to the various +gifts of the Spirit, with which large numbers of its +members believed themselves to be endowed. I shall +not consider them any further here, as it will be +necessary for me to enter largely on the subject in a +subsequent portion of this work. Their use and purpose +was to lay deep the foundations of the Christian +Church. All that will be necessary in this place is to +draw attention to them as a distinct order of supernatural +manifestations, to the existence of which the +writers of the New Testament are pledged. +</p> + +<p> +There is also one further form of supernatural manifestation +affirmed by them, namely, a great moral and +spiritual transformation effected in those who cordially +embraced the Gospel. This is most positively stated +<pb n='055'/><anchor id='Pg055'/> +by St. Paul to have been a fact constantly taking place +under his own observation. It is only necessary for me +to notice its existence, as it is a form of supernatural +manifestation, the truth or falsehood of which forms +no portion of the present controversy. +</p> + +<p> +Such then are the various forms of the supernatural, +to the existence of which the writers of the New Testament +are pledged as objective facts. To these only, +and not to any conceivable or possible ones, is the +defender of Christianity committed. If their occurrence +can be shown to have been impossible, either on +grounds of science or philosophy, or because human +testimony is of so fallible a character that it cannot +establish the truth of a supernatural occurrence, it +follows that the whole of Christianity must have been +an invention of a purely human origin, that it can have +no claim to the designation of a divine revelation, and +that it is hardly possible to free its inventors from the +charge of fraud. No mere paring down of its supernatural +elements will enable us to escape from this conclusion. +</p> + +<p> +I must now proceed to consider whether the writers +of the New Testament rest the truth of Christianity on +the evidence of miracles alone, and what position they +occupy respecting it. +</p> + +<p> +If we assume for the sake of argument that the +fourth Gospel is the work of the Apostle John, it is +evident that neither Jesus Christ nor the Apostle +accepted the theory which has been propounded by +some divines, and readily accepted by unbelievers, that +the evidence of his divine mission was exclusively +founded on the testimony of miracles. To state the +point distinctly:—This Gospel places the evidence +afforded by our Lord's own divine person, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> the moral +<pb n='056'/><anchor id='Pg056'/> +evidence of his mission, in the first rank, and his +miraculous works in the second. +</p> + +<p> +As this is a point of considerable importance, and +one to which its proper weight has been seldom attached, +I will enumerate the chief statements made in this +Gospel on this subject. +</p> + +<p> +First: The author of the Gospel directly affirms +that Jesus is <q>the light of men;</q> and he himself distinctly +affirms of himself, <q>He that seeth me seeth +Him that sent me.</q> <q>I am come a light into the +world, that whosoever believeth on me should not abide +in darkness.</q> (John xii. 45, 46.) Again, <q>I am the +light of the world; he that followeth me shall not walk +in darkness, but shall have the light of life.</q> (John viii. +12.) It is impossible to read these and kindred passages +without feeling that our Lord appealed to something +else besides his miraculous works, viewed as +mere objective facts, as a proof of his divine mission. +He evidently places the highest proof of it in his +great moral and spiritual manifestation. He asserts the +possession of an inherent illumination in his own +divine Person in union with the great truths which +he enunciated, and the entire course of his divine +working. To a mind capable of appreciating a manifestation +of holiness, his person and divine working +would be self-evidential. <q>He that seeth me, seeth +Him that sent me.</q> It is evident therefore that he +considered the moral aspect of even his supernatural +works as an important portion of the evidence that he +came from God. +</p> + +<p> +The fourth chapter of this Gospel contains an account +of our Lord's visit to the Samaritans. He performed +no miracle on this occasion. The Evangelist tells us +that many of them accepted him as the Messiah; and +expressly states that they affirmed that this was not on +<pb n='057'/><anchor id='Pg057'/> +account of the report of the woman as to his supernatural +insight into her character; but because they +themselves had heard him, and on this account they +had arrived at the persuasion that was the Christ. +There was something therefore in his moral manifestation, +even apart from his miracles, which produced this +persuasion. The Evangelist accepts this position as a +correct one. He has even gone further, and has attributed +it in the same chapter to our Lord himself. +He makes him address the nobleman who came to +solicit his interference in behalf of his sick son with +these remarkable words: <q>Except ye see signs and +wonders, ye will not believe.</q> (John iv. 48.) These +words can only imply that, in the opinion of the speaker, +there was a moral and spiritual attestation of his +divine mission, which stood higher than objective +miracles; and that those who witnessed it ought to +have received it as such. +</p> + +<p> +In John vi. 30, ff., a remarkable dialogue is described +as taking place between our Lord and the Jews on this +very subject. The Jews demand of him to work some +distinct sign in proof of his divine mission. Let it be +observed that the demand of a sign, here stated to have +been made, is of precisely the same character as similar +statements which are made by the Synoptics on the +same subject, and shows that a common conception, +underlies them all. <q>What sign,</q> say they, <q>showest +thou then, that we may see and believe thee? what +dost thou work?</q> They then proceed to define the +particular sign which they wish to see exhibited, by +making an invidious comparison between his miracles +and those of Moses, viewed as mere objective facts. +In reply our Lord does not appeal directly to even the +miracle of which the Evangelist had just described the +performance; but throughout the remainder of the +<pb n='058'/><anchor id='Pg058'/> +chapter, he proceeds to draw attention to the moral and +spiritual aspects of his working. <q>Moses gave you +not that bread from Heaven; but my Father giveth +you the true bread from Heaven; for the bread of God +is he which cometh down from Heaven, and giveth life +unto the world,</q> &c. +</p> + +<p> +In chapter vii. (17, 18) our Lord affirms: <q>If any +man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, +whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself. +He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory; +but he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same +is true, and no unrighteousness is in him.</q> Here the +affirmation is clear and distinct that there is a moral +and spiritual element in our Lord's person and teaching, +which jointly with his miraculous works bear witness +to his divine character. The testimony given by the +one is convergent with that of the other. This the +following affirmation of our Lord most strongly asserts. +<q>I am one who bear witness of myself, and the Father +who sent me hath borne witness of me,</q> that is to say, +His moral and spiritual manifestation is in a certain +sense evidential; and the Father who sent him bore a +concurrent testimony of his supernatural work. +</p> + +<p> +On similar principles our Lord reasons with the Jews +in the eighth chapter of this Gospel. In reply to the +charge that he performed miracles by the aid of the +evil one he affirms, that his own absolute sinlessness, +constitutes a complete answer to it. <q>Which of you +convinceth me of sin? and if I say the truth why do +ye not believe me?</q> (v. 46.) We have here a direct +appeal to men's moral and spiritual perception, as an +independent witness to the truth of his teaching; and +the affirmation that a being who is not simply good and +holy, but perfectly sinless, is worthy of absolute credence. +In other words, he does not rest the truth of +<pb n='059'/><anchor id='Pg059'/> +his teaching on miracles wrought to confirm his different +utterances, but on the inherent truthfulness of a +sinless character. The moral aspect of his works is +the predominant one. +</p> + +<p> +In the fourteenth chapter of this Gospel we have the +following remarkable declaration, which puts the whole +subject in the clearest light. Philip says to him; +<q>Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us.</q> Jesus said +unto him, <q>Have I been so long time with you, and yet +hast thou not known me, Philip? He that hath seen +me hath seen the Father: Believest thou not that I am +in the Father, and the Father in me? The words that I +speak unto you, I speak not of myself; but the Father +that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works. Believe me +that I am in the Father, and the Father in me, or else +believe me for the very works' sake.</q> (vs. 8-11.) +</p> + +<p> +This passage contains several most important considerations +directly bearing on this subject. I will mention +them in order. First— +</p> + +<p> +Philip asks for his complete conviction, a visible +miracle in the form of an appearance of God, such as +was recorded in the Old Testament as having taken +place at Sinai. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly. Our Lord affirms that the manifestations of +his character made in his person and work during his +previous acquaintance with him were the truest manifestations +of the person, character and being of the +Father. +</p> + +<p> +Thirdly. That the words which he spake and his +entire working, possessed an evidential character as +proving that he came from the Father: and that his +moral and spiritual perfections were such as to entitle +his affirmation to be received on his own word. +</p> + +<p> +Fourthly. That if Philip was unable to receive them +on this evidence, which occupied the highest place, then +<pb n='060'/><anchor id='Pg060'/> +he was entitled to be believed on the evidence of his +supernatural works, <q>If ye believe not me, <emph>believe the +works</emph>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +This entire passage makes it clear that in the mind +of our Lord the moral evidence afforded by him constituted +a most important portion of the attestation of +his divine mission. Nor was its value confined to +those who witnessed it during the time of his personal +ministry, but he viewed it as extending to all time. +This is made clear by his reply to Thomas in reference +to his demand to be allowed to handle his risen body. +<q>Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast +believed, Blessed are they who have not seen, and yet +have believed.</q> (xx. 29.) +</p> + +<p> +With these statements before us, unless we reject the +authority of this Gospel, it is clear that those Christian +writers who have asserted that the evidence of the +Christian revelation rests exclusively on miracles as +objective facts are in error. +</p> + +<p> +But the same Gospel refers us no less distinctly to +the miracles of our Lord as very important evidences +of his divine mission, although they are subordinated +to those we have been considering. One or two +further references will be sufficient. +</p> + +<p> +We have several declarations on this subject in the +fifth chapter. <q>My Father worketh hitherto, and I +work. The Son can do nothing of himself, but what +he seeth the Father do; for whatsoever things he +doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise.</q> (vs. 17, 19.) +<q>The works which the Father hath given me to finish, +the same works that I do bear witness of me that the +Father hath sent me.</q> (ver. 36.) +</p> + +<p> +Here a plain parallel is drawn between the whole +course of our Lord's working and that of the Father. +In this working he evidently intended to include his +<pb n='061'/><anchor id='Pg061'/> +miracles. Taken in combination with his entire character +the speaker affirms that they form a conclusive +proof that the Father had sent him. He subsequently +draws attention to the evidence afforded by his miracles +as such, <q>and the Father himself which hath sent +me hath borne witness of me.</q> (ver. 37.) +</p> + +<p> +So again in the tenth chapter, <q>The works that I do in +my Father's name, they bear witness of me,</q> (ver. 25.) +A little further on the moral aspect of his miracles, and +their close connection with his entire working is distinctly +brought forward. <q>Many good works have I +showed you from my Father; for which of those works +do ye stone me?</q> (vs 37, 38.) <q>If I do not the works of +my Father, believe me not, but if I do, <emph>though ye believe +not me, believe the works</emph>, that ye may know and believe, +that the Father is in me, and I in him.</q> (vs. 37, 38.) +No words can bring out more strongly the weight +which our Lord attached to the moral aspect of his +miracles as proofs of his divine mission. +</p> + +<p> +In the fifteenth chapter we have our Lord's own reflections +on the evidences which he had afforded of +his Messianic character, during his entire ministry. +<q>If I had not done among them the works which none +other man did, they had not had sin; but now they +have both seen and hated both me and my Father.</q> +(ver. 24.) Here the miracles are classed with the other +exhibitions of our Lord's divine character; and attention +is especially drawn to the moral aspect of his +entire working as in the highest degree evidential. +<q>They have seen and hated both me and my Father.</q> +It is worthy of remark that while our Lord uniformly +spoke of his miracles as part of his general working, +by which he manifested his divine character, the +Evangelist himself almost invariably calls them +<q>signs.</q> This is brought out when he gives us his +<pb n='062'/><anchor id='Pg062'/> +own reflections on the results of his public ministry. +<q>Though he had done so many signs<note place='foot'>The word which is here translated in the A. V. <q>miracles</q> is in +the original σημεῖα.</note> before them yet +they believed not on him.</q> (xii. 37.) So again, <q>many +other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his +disciples, which are not written in this book: but these +are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the +Christ, the Son of God.</q> (xx. 30, 31.) In both these +passages our Lord's miracles are evidently referred to. +They are pronounced to be both evidential of his divine +mission, and at the same time to be manifestations of +his character. The Evangelist while contemplating +them as miracles never loses sight of their moral +aspect. +</p> + +<p> +In the Synoptic Gospels one allusion is made to the +evidential purpose of a particular miracle which is +worthy of notice. Generally speaking they are viewed +by the authors of these Gospels as simple manifestations +of his divine character. On this occasion, when his +power to forgive sins was questioned, he directly performed +a miracle to prove that he possessed it. <q>But +that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on +earth to forgive sins, he saith to the sick of the palsy, +I say unto thee, arise, and take up thy bed and go thy +way into thine house.</q> In this case it is clear that the +purpose of performing the miracle was not to prove +the truth of any doctrinal statement which he had +made; but to establish the reality of his divine +authority and commission. +</p> + +<p> +While it is quite true that the authors of the Synoptic +Gospels have not enunciated the purpose of our Lord's +miracles in the formal manner in which it is done in +St. John's Gospel, it is clear that they must have taken +the same view of their general character. In fact the +<pb n='063'/><anchor id='Pg063'/> +evidential purpose of their performance is less clearly +stated in them than in the fourth Gospel. All four Gospels +view his miracles only as a portion of his superhuman +manifestation, and are ignorant of that broad +distinction which has been laid down between them and +the other portions of his divine working. They are in +fact included under it; and it is the concurrence of +both together, and the moral aspect thereby impressed +on the whole, which proves him to be the Christ. +</p> + +<p> +It has been important to ascertain what are the +views of the writers of the New Testament on this +subject, because it has been strongly asserted by authors +on both sides of the controversy that the doctrines of +Christianity are proved by miracles, and that they can +rest for their attestation on no other evidence. The precise +value of this position I will consider in the following +chapter. It must, however, be observed that this +is not the view taken by the writers of the New +Testament. There is not a single miracle recorded in +it which is alleged to have been performed with the +direct purpose of proving the truth of a single doctrine +properly so called. Those wrought by our Lord are +uniformly represented as having been performed in +proof of his divine mission, or as an essential portion +of the manifestation of the divine which dwelt within +him. As such they were signs, precisely in the same +manner as the performance of those actions which can +only be performed by man are signs; that is, they are +proofs of the presence of man. In the same manner the +actions performed by our Lord are signs and proofs of +the presence of the divine man Jesus Christ. If our +Lord was in truth what he asserted himself to be, +supernatural manifestations would be the concomitants +of his presence. +</p> + +<p> +In exact conformity with these facts as we find them +<pb n='064'/><anchor id='Pg064'/> +in the Gospels is the direct dogmatic statement made +by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews on this +subject. After having asserted in the first chapter +that divine revelation is made in the person of Jesus +Christ, and that God speaks to man under the Christian +dispensation <q>in him, who is the brightness of his +glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding +all things by the word of his power,</q> the +author proceeds to compare it with the former dispensation, +and to give us his views of the evidence on +which it rests. <q>How,</q> says he, <q>shall we escape, if +we neglect so great salvation; which at the first began +to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us +by them that heard him. God also bearing them witness +both by signs and wonders, and with divers +miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to +his own will.</q> (ii. 3, 4.) +</p> + +<p> +These words distinctly inform us what were the +writer's opinions as to the nature of the evidences +on which Christianity rests. First, it reposes on the +testimony of Christ respecting himself. Secondly, it +is confirmed by a number of miracles wrought by +God. This view is strictly in accordance with our +Lord's own affirmation respecting it as recorded in the +fourth Gospel, <q>I am one that bear witness of myself, +and the Father that sent me hath borne witness of me.</q> +(viii. 18.) +</p> + +<p> +With respect to numerous miracles recorded in the +Acts of the Apostles, they are affirmed to have been +performed for purposes directly evidential, not however +to prove the truth of any doctrine, but of our +Lord's Messianic character. The affirmations on this +point are express. <q>In the name of Jesus Christ of +Nazareth, rise up and walk.</q> (iii. 6.) <q>His name, +through faith in his name, hath made this man strong.</q> +<pb n='065'/><anchor id='Pg065'/> +(iii. 16.) <q>Therefore let all the house of Israel know +assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus whom +ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ.</q> (ii. 36.) Of +the fact of the resurrection, they affirm that they were +witnesses; and that the miraculous powers imparted to +them were the consequence of that event, and a proof +of its truth. +</p> + +<p> +The nature of the other supernatural occurrences +affirmed in the New Testament must be fully considered +hereafter. There remain however two further statements, +made by the sacred writers respecting this +subject, which require to be briefly noticed here. +First, although the Gospels affirm that John the +Baptist had a divine commission to announce the +immediate setting up of the kingdom of the Messiah, +and even to point him out, they expressly assert that +he performed no objective miracle in confirmation of it. +His prophetical assertions rested for their verification +on their fulfilment only, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> on the immediate appearance +of a person who united in himself all the attributes +of the Messiah. The following was the line of argument +adopted by those who believed his testimony: +<q>John did no miracle, but all things that John spoke +of this man were true.</q> Secondly, while in the +Apostolic Epistles, miracles are stated to have been +performed by our Lord, and supernatural powers no +less clearly asserted to have been at that very time +actually present in the Church, there is only one miracle +which is directly referred to in proof of the divine +mission of Christ. I need not say that this is the +greatest of all the miracles recorded in the Gospels, viz. +his resurrection from the dead. On this their unanimous +testimony affirms that Christianity rests. This +is the one final and decisive proof of our Lord's divine +mission. On its truth they affirm that their claims as +<pb n='066'/><anchor id='Pg066'/> +divine teachers stand or fall. His resurrection from the +dead puts all his other miracles in the back ground in +point of evidential value. According to their statements +it constitutes the one great assurance that God +has given unto all men that Jesus of Nazareth is Lord +and Christ. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that if this one miracle can be +proved to have been an historical fact, it carries with +it the entire force of all the remaining miracles of the +New Testament. But it leaves entirely untouched the +moral aspects of our Lord's divine character. These, +I may say, constitute a standing miracle which will +continue to speak for itself in all time. This evidence +is again and again referred to by the writers of the +Apostolic Epistles. The two constitute one harmonious +whole. To the latter of these it is impossible to do +more than refer in the present work; I have already +devoted a distinct volume to the examination of its +evidential value, in which I have examined Christ's +witness to himself; here I must confine myself to the +consideration of the witness borne to him by the +Father. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='067'/><anchor id='Pg067'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter IV. Miracles, What Do They Prove?</head> + +<p> +Having considered the direct assertions in the New +Testament in reference to the supernatural, it will be +necessary to take a brief view of the question in relation +to modern difficulties and objections. +</p> + +<p> +The following subjects present themselves for our +consideration:— +</p> + +<p> +1st. To what extent, and in what sense are miracles +the proofs of a revelation? +</p> + +<p> +2nd. Are supernatural occurrences devoid of all +moral environment capable of affording such proof? +</p> + +<p> +3rd. Can doctrinal statements or moral truths be +proved by miracles? +</p> + +<p> +4th. Are miracles objects of faith merely, or if not, +how are they related to our reason; and if in any +sense they are objects of faith, how can they be the +media of proof? +</p> + +<p> +It will be evident that these questions will immediately +lay open a number of the most important considerations. +They can only be adequately dealt with +in the subsequent portions of this work. The natural +place to discuss them will be when I come to consider +the objections that can be urged against the possibility +and credibility of miracles. A few preliminary observations, +however, will be necessary for the purpose of +putting the reader in possession of some of the most +<pb n='068'/><anchor id='Pg068'/> +important points of debate and of the positions which +I intend to assume respecting them. They will also +help to clear the way for the solution of the various +difficulties by which the subject has been attempted to +be obscured. +</p> + +<p> +The manner in which Christianity claims to be a +divine revelation, as we have seen in the former +chapter, in its most proper and distinctive sense is +that the person of Jesus Christ constitutes that revelation. +It is the manifestation of the divine character +and perfections by means of the various acts and deeds +of his earthly life and ministry. It is a revelation of +the divine shining forth in the human. I have already +adduced some of the affirmations of the sacred writers +on this subject. It would be easy to multiply them indefinitely. +Perhaps it would be impossible to express +the position which they take on this subject in more +distinct language than by citing two brief passages in +St. Paul's epistle to the Colossians: <q>Who is,</q> says the +Apostle, <q>the image of the invisible God;</q> <q>in him +dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.</q> Both +passages affirm, as the writer's view, that all revelation +is made in the person of Jesus Christ. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that the Christian revelation in +its highest sense is not a body of abstract dogmas, but +that it consists of an objective fact, the Incarnation. +As God has manifested his eternal power and Godhead +in the material creation, so he has manifested himself +as a moral and spiritual being, 1st, imperfectly in the +moral nature of man, and afterwards perfectly, in the +perfect man who unites in himself the divine and +human, Jesus Christ. God, when he effected the work +of creation, made a manifestation of himself which +chiefly revealed his power and wisdom. When he +effected the Incarnation he made an additional manifestation +<pb n='069'/><anchor id='Pg069'/> +of himself which chiefly revealed his moral +character and perfections. The four Gospels contain +the historical account of this manifestation, as made in +the actions and teaching of Jesus Christ. As this +revelation consists of a number of historical facts, all +that was necessary was that his life and actions should +be correctly reported. The remaining books of the +New Testament are historical in character, with one +exception, and as far as they treat of doctrines, they +may be viewed as commentaries on the Divine fact of +the Incarnation. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that the essence of Christianity +consists of a superhuman or divine fact, the Incarnation. +In this point of view the supernatural is not +only a concomitant of Christianity, but it constitutes +its essence. It is the manifestation of a supernatural +and superhuman being appearing within the sphere of +the natural and the human. It cannot be too carefully +observed throughout this entire controversy that the +character which is ascribed to Jesus Christ, while it +embraces every perfection of man, is no less superhuman +than the powers which are attributed to him are +supernatural. In this sense the supernatural is not +merely an evidence of revelation, but its essence. +</p> + +<p> +The Incarnation has frequently been designated a +miracle. To do so seems to me to incur the danger of +involving the whole controversy in confusion of thought. +In a loose way of speaking, the creative acts of God +may be called miracles: that is, they involve a deviation +from the previous order of existing things, and +the introduction of a new one; all such results are unquestionable +manifestations of supernatural agency, +but they differ wholly in conception from what we +usually designate by the term miracle. The Incarnation, +therefore, ought not to be placed on the same +<pb n='070'/><anchor id='Pg070'/> +footing as miracles, which are supernatural occurrences, +having a definite evidential value, but with +God's creative acts, being the highest manifestation of +himself which he has made to man. It is perfectly +true, as I have already observed, that the miracles of +Jesus Christ stand in a double aspect, as part of his +supernatural manifestation, and as possessing an evidential +value. +</p> + +<p> +It is clear, therefore, that a supernatural event such +as the Incarnation, if evidential, can only be self-evidential. +It was not wrought for the purpose of +proving anything. But, as we have seen, the sacred +writers and our Lord himself assert that in a certain +sense it was self-evidential. <q>For the life was manifested, +and we have seen it and bear witness, and show +unto you that eternal life which was with the Father +and was manifested unto us.</q> +</p> + +<p> +A recent writer affirms that Christianity professes to +be a revelation of supernatural truths utterly inconceivable +to reason, and that such truths can only be +proved by miracles. I can understand what is meant +by a truth derived from a supernatural source of information, +or one respecting a supernatural being or +occurrence: but what a supernatural truth can be contradistinguished +from other kinds of truth is far from +evident. Revelation may disclose truths which reason +alone would have been unable to discover; but this +does not make the truths themselves, when they are +discovered, either supernatural or incomprehensible. +</p> + +<p> +I will now proceed to consider whether there is any +real ground for affirming that occurrences which we +designate as miracles are the only proofs of a divine +revelation. +</p> + +<p> +The same writer, whose object is to prove that Christianity +is utterly destitute of all claims to our acceptance +<pb n='071'/><anchor id='Pg071'/> +as a divine revelation, endeavours to show that +miracles, viewed as bare objective facts, are the only +evidence which can substantiate such a mass of incredible +assertions as those contained in the New Testament, +and that their moral environment cannot be +taken into account in estimating their evidential value. +For this purpose he quotes the following passage from +Dr. Mozley's Bampton Lectures: <q>Dr. Mozley,</q> says +he, <q>supposes the case, that if a person of evident +integrity and loftiness of character had appeared +eighteen centuries ago announcing himself as pre-existing +from all eternity, the Son of God, the maker +of the world, who had come down from heaven, and +had assumed the nature of man, in order to be the +Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world, +and so on, enumerating the other doctrines of Christianity; +Dr. Mozley then adds, what would be the +inevitable conclusion of sober reason respecting that +person? The necessary conclusion of sober reason +would be that he was disordered in his understanding.... +By no rational being would a just and a +benevolent life be accepted as a proof of such announcements. +Miracles are the necessary complements +of the truth of such announcements, which +without them are powerless and abortive, the fragments +of a design which is nothing unless it is the +whole. They are necessary to the justification of such +announcements, which unless they are supernatural +truth are the wildest delusions.</q>—<hi rend='italic'>Supernatural Religion</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +In justice to Dr. Mozley, the passage which is +omitted in this citation from his lectures ought to be +quoted. It is as follows: <q>What other decision +could be come to when a man, looking like one of our +own selves, and only exemplifying in his life and +<pb n='072'/><anchor id='Pg072'/> +circumstances the ordinary course of nature, said +this about himself, but that when reason had +lost its balance a dream of supernatural and unearthly, +grandeur might be the result.</q>—<hi rend='italic'>Bampton +Lectures.</hi> +</p> + +<p> +Some expressions in this passage leave it open to the +assumption which this writer wishes to fasten on it that +Dr. Mozley intended to affirm that the only adequate +proof of such affirmations as were made by Jesus +Christ respecting himself would have been visible +miracles wrought in confirmation of them. This, however, +is not necessarily its meaning, for the omitted +passage above cited, distinctly affirms that the person +who is supposed to make such assertions is only an +ordinary good and holy but imperfect man. +</p> + +<p> +But the assertions in question were not made by an +ordinary man like ourselves, but by one who is described +as possessed of superhuman greatness and holiness +and of profound spiritual insight into truth. He +is uniformly depicted as speaking with the fulness of +knowledge of the subject on which he speaks. I cannot +therefore admit, supposing the character of Jesus to +have been historical, that if he had made such assertions +respecting himself prior to the performance of +his first miracle at Cana, they would have been utterly +unworthy of serious attention. It must be readily +admitted that if they had been affirmed of himself by +an ordinary man like ourselves, no affirmation of his +would have been a guarantee of their truth, for the +simple reason that they would have been self-contradictory. +Nor would the performance of a miracle +have made them one atom more credible. But the +credibility of such an assertion, if it had been made +by such a person as Jesus Christ even prior to his performance +of a single miracle, is a wholly different +question. +</p> + +<pb n='073'/><anchor id='Pg073'/> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, on the supposition that the +delineation given us in the Gospels is that of an historical +reality, that his assertions respecting himself +would stand in a wholly different position from those +of any other man. He could neither deceive nor be +deceived. When he made assertions respecting himself +he must have known whether they were true. The +assertions of such a person therefore would be worthy +of all acceptation. +</p> + +<p> +Miracles are not the means of substantiating assertions +respecting the truth of unseen realities, nor +are they used for such purposes in the New Testament. +The whole question is one of adequate knowledge. If +we have the means of knowing that a person has a +complete acquaintance with truths of which we are ignorant, +we can rationally accept them as true on his +assurance that they are so, exactly on the same +principles as we accept the truths of physical science +although we ourselves are ignorant of the processes by +which they are arrived at. To state the position +generally, it is quite rational to accept the affirmations +of those who possess full knowledge of any subject of +which we ourselves are profoundly ignorant. The only +thing necessary is to attain an assurance that the +knowledge of our informant is adequate to justify his +assertions. It is on the ground of the fulness of his +knowledge that we accept the assertions of Jesus +Christ, and not because he wrought a miracle for the +purpose of proving that his assertions were true. +</p> + +<p> +Let us now consider in what sense miracles are a +proof of the truth of a divine revelation. +</p> + +<p> +I lay down that the proper function of miracles is +to establish the truth of a divine commission. From +this we argue to the truth of the assertions of the +persons who are intrusted with it. +</p> + +<pb n='074'/><anchor id='Pg074'/> + +<p> +If an ordinary man, such as a prophet or an apostle, +were to affirm that he had a communication from God +which he was directed to make to others, or in other +words that he had a divine commission, it is evident +that no one would be bound to believe him on his +mere affirmation. The simple and obvious reply would +be, Give us some proof of the reality of the fact. +Your claim is far too lofty to be admitted as valid on +your simple affirmation. The question then is, how is +such a claim to be tested? I reply by the person who +makes it performing some action which is adequate to +prove that the Great Governor of the Universe ratifies +this claim. He must do something analogous to what +all persons who claim to be acting under commissions +from others do, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> he must produce some direct and +formal credentials from the authority in whose name +he claims to be acting. In this case the authority is +God. He must therefore perform some action which +directly identifies himself with God. +</p> + +<p> +How is this to be accomplished? I answer by the +performance of an unequivocal miracle which will +directly connect him with the Great Governor of the +Universe. I say unequivocal miracle, because if there +were any doubt as to its supernatural character it +would be useless. Nor would it be of any avail if it +were a bare objective fact in external nature, devoid of +its moral and spiritual environment. What is required +is some direct manifestation of the divine on the sphere +of the human and the natural. It must, in fact, +exactly fulfil the character so often assigned to miracles +in the Gospels. It must be a σημεῖον, or indication of +the presence of God, resembling as it were the Great +Seal which is affixed to state documents as the final +mark of sovereign authority. Of such a character are +all the chief miracles recorded in the Gospels. +</p> + +<pb n='075'/><anchor id='Pg075'/> + +<p> +The question about miracles has been beclouded +by debating it in an abstract instead of in a concrete +form; thus forgetting that it is not every conceivable +form of alleged supernatural occurrence +with which we have to deal, but the miracles recorded +in the New Testament. By discussing it in this form +it has been possible to raise a number of difficulties +which may be abstractedly conceivable, but which have +no bearing whatever on the miracles in question. Thus +it has been frequently urged that to enable us to be +certain that an alleged miracle is really due to supernatural +agency, a jury of savants ought to be impanelled, +before whom the worker of the miracle should +exhibit his miraculous operation. They are to subject +it to a variety of scientific tests. Even then if they +have failed to discover error, they are to demand a +second and a third performance, in order that it may +be again and again submitted to the same process of +scientific scrutiny. Until miracles can be submitted +to and verified by tests of this description they have +been affirmed to be unworthy of credit, even on the +strongest ordinary testimony. +</p> + +<p> +I shall discuss this and kindred questions more fully +in the subsequent portions of this volume, when I +consider the nature of the evidence which is adequate +to prove the performance of a miracle. For the present +I shall only observe that the entire plausibility of this +position arises from its being stated in an abstract or +general form. We cannot help seeing in reference to +the chief miracles recorded in the New Testament, +such as the care of blind, lame or leprous persons, +instantaneously by a word or a touch, that common +sense is fully adequate to determine that such occurrences +must belong to the regions of the supernatural +and to no other. +</p> + +<pb n='076'/><anchor id='Pg076'/> + +<p> +Two things are necessary to establish the reality of +a supposed miracle. First, that the alleged fact should +not only have been brought about by supernatural +causes but previously announced by him who performs +it: secondly, that the fact actually happened as it +appeared to happen. +</p> + +<p> +There can be no doubt that the power of juggling +and sleight of hand, to perform actions which would +be supernatural, if they were only what they appear to +be, is considerable, and the difficulty of detection is +great. Enthusiasm also when once excited, is capable +of generating various unreal appearances which if +actual, would be supernatural. It is also mighty in +those regions where the union takes place between +mind and matter, but the chief miracles recorded in +the Gospels belong to a wholly different order of occurrence. +If they took place as they are reported, no one +possessed of common sense can doubt as to whether +they were due to supernatural agency. It is no less +clear that such miracles were occurrences in which +successful imposture was impossible. What is required +to prove them is the evidence of common sense, +and not of scientific analysis. Let it be observed that +it is not my intention to affirm that the whole of the +supernaturalism recorded in the New Testament is of +the same unequivocal character. +</p> + +<p> +The evidential value of a miracle viewed as a matter +of common sense maybe briefly stated thus. A person +comes to me who affirms that he has a divine message +to communicate. I ask him to prove it. He lays his +hand on one whom I have known to be blind for the +last twenty years, tells him in the name of Jesus Christ +to receive his sight, and he forthwith receives it. +There is probably no person gifted with ordinary understanding +<pb n='077'/><anchor id='Pg077'/> +who would not consider such an act to be an +adequate proof of divine agency, all theoretical or metaphysical +difficulties to the contrary notwithstanding. +</p> + +<p> +It will doubtless be objected that such an act would +prove only the presence of a superhuman instead of a +divine power. This point will be fully considered +hereafter. For my present purpose it will be sufficient +to fall back on the decision of common sense, that he +who can restore sight to the sightless eye-ball, by no +other apparent instrumentality than a word or a touch, +can be no other than the Maker of the Universe. +</p> + +<p> +I must now consider whether supernatural occurrences +devoid of all moral environment, are capable of +proving a divine commission. +</p> + +<p> +It has frequently been the habit, both of the opponents +and the defenders of Christianity, to discuss the +subject of the evidential value of miracles apart from +all reference to their moral environment. As, however, +the overwhelming majority of the miracles +recorded in the New Testament profess such an environment, +the question of the value of supposed miracles +which are destitute of it, forms no legitimate portion of +the subject before us. What might or might not be +proved by them, even if it could be determined satisfactorily, +is quite foreign to the present discussion, +which is limited to the truth or falsehood of those contained +in the New Testament. The most important of +these are not mere displays of power, but have an +unquestionable moral environment impressed upon +them, and they profess to have been wrought for a +definite end and purpose. This is less distinctly +marked in some of the miracles recorded in the Old +Testament, but with them I have no present concern. +It will be sufficient to observe that while many of them +<pb n='078'/><anchor id='Pg078'/> +were unquestionably performed in attestation of a +divine mission, as a class they bear another distinctive +purpose, viz. that of correcting the polytheistic tendencies +of the age. Hence their leading impress is +that of power. The necessity of counteracting the +tendency which I have referred to, rendered it necessary +emphatically to assert the Lordship of one God +over universal nature, in opposition to that conception +of it so widely diffused throughout the ancient world, +which saw a distinct power exerted in every combination +of material forces. +</p> + +<p> +The very conception of a miracle as a supernatural +occurrence, brought about for the purpose of authenticating +a revelation, distinguishes such an action from +one which involves only a simple exhibition of power. +All acts of moral agents must display a purpose of +some kind. No conception of God is of the smallest +religious value which does not contemplate him as +being a moral agent and a being on whose actions a +moral character of some kind must be impressed. Consequently +an act entirely devoid of all moral aspect +cannot prove that it has resulted from direct divine +intervention. The difficulty has originated from dividing +into three separate parts an action which is +essentially one, and contemplating separately the objective +fact in the supernatural action, the circumstances +attending its performance, and the purpose for which +it was performed. It is the union of all these which +constitutes the occurrence in question an evidential +miracle. +</p> + +<p> +Let me now offer a few observations on a very important +point for our consideration. Can abstract +doctrinal statements or moral truths be proved by +miracles? +</p> + +<pb n='079'/><anchor id='Pg079'/> + +<p> +I have already observed that as far as the miracles +of the New Testament were wrought for directly evidential +purposes, they were performed, not to prove +particular doctrines, but as the credentials of a divine +mission, or that they formed a part of the superhuman +manifestation of our Lord. The apparent exceptions +are those which were performed to attract attention to +the divine message, to assist in the foundation of the +Church, or to bear witness to the truth of the Resurrection. +These last were in fact attestations to the +reality of the Messianic character of Jesus Christ, which +is the highest conceivable form of a divine mission, on +which miracle the truth of Christianity is directly +pledged by the sacred writers. A mere statement of +the facts of the New Testament is a practical solution +of the difficulty. It nowhere affirms that a miracle +was ever performed to bear witness to the truth of an +abstract doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +I will now endeavour to lay down some general +principles as to the relation in which doctrinal statements +stand to supernatural manifestations. As on +such a subject it will be impossible to lay down a +general rule which will be applicable to every supernatural +event, it will be necessary to consider each case +by itself. +</p> + +<p> +First, that of our Lord. +</p> + +<p> +We believe his statements about unknown truths, on +the ground that he was perfectly veracious, and had +the most perfect knowledge of the subject on which he +spoke. The actions which he performed (I mean by +these, not his miracles merely, but the entire course of +his working) are evidences of his divine character. +He himself avers that he possessed the most intimate +knowledge of God, and of the great realities of the +<pb n='080'/><anchor id='Pg080'/> +spiritual world. <q>We speak,</q> says he, <q>that we do +know, and testify that we have seen.</q> <q>I speak that +which I have seen with my Father.</q> Throughout the +Synoptics likewise he is represented as having the most +entire knowledge of both spiritual and moral truth, +and as teaching direct from his own insight. We +believe the assertions, not because he confirmed their +truth by the performance of a miracle, but because he +afforded evidence that he was a veracious witness, and +fully acquainted with the subject on which he spoke. +His miraculous actions proved that he was God's +messenger, and as such were additional attestations to +his veracity. +</p> + +<p> +The acceptance of such affirmations as worthy of the +highest credit may be correctly designated as acts of +faith; but let us never forget that such acts of faith +are also high exercises of reason. Writers in opposition +to Christianity are never wearied in running a +contrast between reason and faith, and in representing +the two as standing in opposition to each other, and +belonging to wholly different regions of thought. Nor +can it be denied that they have received much encouragement +to do this by the indistinct or misleading +statements of some Christian writers on the subject. +Between them no little confusion has been introduced +into the controversy, and a general idea has become +prevalent that reason and faith are two distinct, if not +opposing faculties, each of which acts within a subject +matter of its own. The effect of this confusion has +been disastrous. +</p> + +<p> +My contention is that faith is only another name for +reason when operating on a particular class of phenomena. +To enter on an elaborate proof of this would be out of +place here; a few illustrations must therefore suffice. +<pb n='081'/><anchor id='Pg081'/> +To accept information from persons who have knowledge +of subjects which we have not studied, or who +have mental powers of insight or perception of which +we are destitute, or who have seen phenomena which +we have not seen, is an act in conformity with our +highest reason. A constant effort has been made by +unbelievers to confound faith with credulity: Faith is +not credulity, but the acceptance of truth on adequate +evidence, and the rejection of mere affirmation, when +the evidence is inadequate. On the other hand multitudes +of Christians have assiduously laboured to decry +reason as the instrument for the investigation of truth. +I admit that it is not a perfect instrument, but it is +the only one which we have. The light of a candle +may not be all that we can wish, but if we have no +other we shall not improve our condition by extinguishing +it. +</p> + +<p> +Let me illustrate this subject by a few examples. We +believe the assertions of Dr. Livingstone about the interior +of Africa, although we have no means of verifying +them by ocular observation, because we know that +he has travelled there, and we are persuaded that he +is a veracious witness. We accept the higher truths +of astronomy, not because we have studied them, or +are even able to appreciate the nature of the processes +by which they have been arrived at, but because they +are affirmed by persons who have afforded evidence +that they possess a high order of knowledge on that +subject. The same is true throughout the whole of the +higher departments of science. We may call this an +act of faith if we like, but it is also an act of our +reason. The same thing is true throughout every department +of human knowledge. It is astonishing how +small a part of it is the result of our own personal +observation. It follows therefore that the attempts +<pb n='082'/><anchor id='Pg082'/> +which are so constantly made to separate faith and +reason, and to erect an impassable wall between them, +are suicidal alike both to faith and reason. +</p> + +<p> +As therefore we accept the affirmations of others on +subjects within the limits of their own knowledge, +although we ourselves are ignorant of the processes by +which it has been arrived at, so we accept the affirmations +of such a person as the Jesus of the Evangelists +on those subjects on which he affirms that he possesses +the fullest knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +But it will be objected that some of these assertions +are made respecting high mysteries incomprehensible +to the human intellect. Can we accept such truths? +</p> + +<p> +I answer that we are only capable of accepting propositions +the two terms of which we are able to comprehend +with more or less distinctness. Nothing has +been the subject of greater abuse than the word <q>mystery</q> +in connection with revelation. It is frequently +represented as denoting something which from end to +end is utterly incomprehensible, like the unknowable +God of a certain system of philosophy. In the New +Testament the meaning of the word <q>mystery</q> is not +an incomprehensible proposition, but a truth which +once was hidden in the divine counsels, and has been +revealed by the Gospel. That which is actually unthinkable +is incapable of affirmation or denial. None +of the affirmations of Jesus Christ partake of this character. +They are mysteries only in the sense that they +ran up into spheres of thought which transcend the +limits of human knowledge. But this is done by all +ultimate philosophical and scientific truths. If it be +urged that some of them are difficult or incapable of +definition, the same is true of not a few of the conceptions +of science. It is also true that they respect truths +with which we could not be acquainted apart from +<pb n='083'/><anchor id='Pg083'/> +such a revelation as that made in the person of Jesus +Christ; but this is true of the phenomena of Creation +likewise. We do not acquire a knowledge of its phenomena +by reasoning, but by observation, or from the +statements of others when they lie beyond the limits +of our own observation. The Incarnation, including +as it does the divine actions and the teaching of Jesus +Christ, is not the revelation of a dogma, but the manifestation +of a new fact. This fact, like all other phenomena, +although undiscoverable by our reasoning +powers without the exercise of observation, becomes +after observation a fact on which reason may justly +exercise its powers. If he be really what he professed +to be, then his statements about himself give as an +account of his previous history, before he came under +human observation. +</p> + +<p> +Let me now consider the relation in which miracles +stand to the affirmations of those who claimed a commission +from Jesus Christ to publish his religion in the +world, and to lay the foundation of the Church. +</p> + +<p> +I must here also adhere to my original position that +miraculous powers are never described in the New +Testament as being used for the direct proof of dogmas, +but for the proof of the Messianic character of Jesus +Christ, or of the divine commission of those who +wrought them. The truth of the assertions of its +writers rests on no other foundation than the fulness of +their knowledge of the subjects on which they spake, +whether acquired by ordinary or by supernatural means, +and on their veracity, when they affirm that particular +truths were within the limits of their knowledge. Thus +St. Paul claims acceptance for the things which he +asserted because he had been taught them by Revelation +from Jesus Christ, not because he had proved their +truth, by working miracles in confirmation of them. +<pb n='084'/><anchor id='Pg084'/> +This course is uniformly adopted by him throughout +his epistles. The object of the mighty works that +were wrought by him was to prove his own apostleship +or the fact of the resurrection. +</p> + +<p> +I must not allow myself to enter on the question of +inspiration, its nature and limitations, or the degree of +supernatural guidance afforded to the apostles and +their followers. Such an inquiry would be foreign to +the present subject, which is strictly historical. It is +of course a direct and necessary inference that when +the miracles proved the reality of the commission of +those who performed them, they also proved that they +were fully instructed in its terms, and entitled to credit +within its limits. But the extent of their enlightenment +can only be inferred from the nature of the +commission itself, and from the facts and phenomena +of the New Testament. It has been an idea widely +spread that inspiration must confer a general infallibility. +The inference that a man is rendered infallible +in general matters because he is invested with a +limited and definite commission, and with endowments +adequate to render him competent to fulfil the purposes +of his mission, is one which the premises will +not justify. The utmost that the possession of such a +commission can prove is that its possessor is enlightened +up to its subject matter, but no further. +</p> + +<p> +But in the present discussion I need not go beyond +the affirmations of the New Testament. The actions +performed by Jesus Christ proved him to be the +Messiah. The miracles wrought by the apostles, were +performed either to prove the fact of his resurrection, +<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> that he was the Messiah, or their own divine +mission, which was dependent on its truth, or to draw +attention to their message. The supernatural gifts so +frequently referred to in the epistles, are affirmed to +<pb n='085'/><anchor id='Pg085'/> +have been designed for the building up of the Church +into a distinct community, and when that purpose was +accomplished they were to cease. Being functional, +the enlightenment communicated by them was necessarily +limited to the special subject matter on which +they were exercised. In this point of view miracles +may be viewed as attestations of the veracity of the +persons who performed them, and of the sufficiency of +their knowledge on the subjects they were specially +commissioned to communicate. +</p> + +<p> +But the question still remains for consideration, Can +miracles prove moral truths? +</p> + +<p> +I answer emphatically in the negative. If dogmas, +which may be viewed as intellectual truths, are incapable +of a direct proof by miracles, still more so are +moral truths. Such truths can rest only on a moral +basis. With respect to the miracles recorded in the +New Testament, the question is nugatory, for it nowhere +affirms that its miracles were wrought for such +a purpose. It is true that Jesus Christ, as the great +legislator of the kingdom of heaven, gave an authoritative +utterance to many moral precepts as the laws of his +kingdom. This royal right of legislation was inherent +in his Messiahship. But to give utterance to moral +truths in a legislative capacity, has no connection with +attempting to prove them by authority. Ordinary +human legislation has its authoritative utterances. But +when it does this, it does not rest the truths themselves +on authority, or base them on adventitious testimony. +Our Lord and his apostles uniformly appealed to the +internal perceptions of our moral and spiritual nature +as the only ground on which moral obligation rests. +</p> + +<p> +Let it be observed, however, that this by no means +pre-supposes the truth of the absurd proposition, that +every man, however imperfect or degraded, is capable of +<pb n='086'/><anchor id='Pg086'/> +reasoning out all moral truth for himself. On the contrary, +definite moral knowledge requires to be communicated, +as all other kinds of knowledge. Its great +principles require to be enunciated, and to be worked +out to their special applications. But the principles +themselves, as far as their binding power is concerned, +must ultimately rest on the internal perceptions of our +moral and spiritual being. A miracle, therefore, can +communicate to them no higher degree of certainty or +obligation. The only thing which it can aid in establishing +is, that one invested with a divine commission +may have a right to claim obedience to special precepts +on the authority of God, in whom all moral obligation +centres. +</p> + +<p> +But even in this case, the ground on which the +obligation rests is a moral one, which no miracle can +possibly prove or even confirm. A moral teacher can +only appeal to that in man which we variously designate +as conscience, moral sense, or the principles which are +the foundation of our moral perceptions. The fact +that many men through a long course of evil get +morally blinded does not alter the case. It only exemplifies +a remarkable saying of our Lord, <q>If the light +that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness.</q> +When the light within us has become darkness, there +is nothing left to which an appeal to the sense of duty +or obligation can be made. +</p> + +<p> +The objection urged against Christianity, that because +a miracle cannot prove a moral truth it is therefore +useless, is quite beyond the question at issue. The +special function of the Christian revelation is one far +higher than the mere laying down of rules for the +regulation of human conduct. Its great purpose is to +impart to man a moral and spiritual power, which is +able to make obedience to the moral law a possibility; +<pb n='087'/><anchor id='Pg087'/> +to supply a motive of sufficient potency to make us +capable of resisting the vehemence of our passions; +and one which is able to lift the morally degraded from +their degradation, and to strengthen the holy in their +holiness. According to the teaching of the New +Testament, this constitutes the great distinctive purpose +of Christianity, and the end of all divine revelation. +This most important truth has been greatly +overlooked in the present controversy. It entirely +disposes of the objection that if moral truth cannot be +proved by miracles, they must be valueless. To such +a revelation the presence of the supernatural is +essential. +</p> + +<p> +But it by no means follows because miracles are +unable to impart to us a sense of moral obligation, that +a duly commissioned moral teacher would be useless. +They might prove his superior knowledge, or as +attesting a divine commission, enable him to bring obligations +already existing to bear on the mind with +superior power. Thus it by no means follows that +because men possess in their mental constitution the +great principles on which scientific truths are based, +each man is able to reason them out for himself. The +most highly gifted man would make slow progress +without a teacher. As I have already observed, moral +truth is capable of being taught like all other truth; +and although a miracle cannot prove it, it may establish +the fact that the worker of one is a man eminently entitled +to be heard on the great subjects of moral obligation, +or that he is able to communicate knowledge +which is capable of acting mightily on our moral +being. +</p> + +<p> +I must now proceed to offer a few observations on +the question, Are miracles objects of faith? and if they +are so in any sense, how can they be the media of proof +of a revelation? +</p> + +<pb n='088'/><anchor id='Pg088'/> + +<p> +The author of <q>Supernatural Religion</q> starts the +following difficulty in connection with this subject: +<q>Consciousness of the difficulties which beset miracles +in the present age has led many able men to deal thus +illogically with them, and to represent them alternately +as evidence and as objects of faith.</q> He then proceeds +to refer to Dr. Arnold, Professor Baden Powell, and +Archbishop Trench, as having been in various degrees +guilty of making this confusion. +</p> + +<p> +I am not prepared to deny that many Christian +writers have expressed themselves with great indistinctness +on this subject, especially in works where +miracles have been only referred to incidentally, and +which only partially treat of the supernatural elements +of Christianity. This question will be discussed more +fully when we consider his definite objections; but it +will tend to a clearer understanding of the subject if +in the present place, I lay down the following propositions:— +</p> + +<p> +I. That it is impossible to believe in any assertion +which contradicts the first principles of our reason, +even if it were supposable that a miracle could be +wrought in confirmation of it. +</p> + +<p> +II. That, although the illumination which reason imparts +is imperfect, yet as it is the only instrument that +we possess for the investigation of truth, attempts to +disparage it are absurd. +</p> + +<p> +III. So far is faith from standing in opposition to +reason, that it is a legitimate branch of it when exercised +on a special subject matter. +</p> + +<p> +IV. That beliefs which reason refuses to authorise +do not originate in faith but in credulity. +</p> + +<p> +V. That even those who entertain irrational convictions +are compelled to base them on evidence of +some kind which is satisfactory to themselves: +<pb n='089'/><anchor id='Pg089'/> +that is to say, on the dictates of their own imperfect +reason. +</p> + +<p> +VI. That, while we can believe in nothing that is contrary +to our reason, yet it is perfectly rational to +believe in many things which our reason would have +been unable to discover. +</p> + +<p> +VII. That extraordinary facts which lie beyond the +limits of human experience are not contrary to our +reason: and it is perfectly rational to believe them +whenever they are adequately attested. +</p> + +<p> +VIII. That a large portion of our beliefs on subjects +scientific, philosophical, historical, moral, and religious, +rest on testimony; the belief in them is highly rational, +when the knowledge of those from whom we derive our +information is adequate: and consequently that faith +is a principle co-extensive with the activities of the +human mind, and is by no means confined to subjects +simply religious, however intimately it may be connected +with them. +</p> + +<p> +A few brief observations will suffice in this part of +our subject. +</p> + +<p> +It will be observed that I have included under the +term <q>reason</q> the whole of our mental processes +which are necessary for the cognition and the discovery +of truth. These include, not only our powers of inductive +and deductive reasoning, but our intuitions, our +forms of thought, those powers of our mind, which +whether intuitional or instinctive, form the foundation +of many of our most important convictions and our +moral conceptions. These constitute our reason as +distinct from our reasoning powers. No little confusion +has been introduced into this controversy from the +want of attending to this distinction. +</p> + +<p> +It has been asserted that we can accept things as +matters of faith which to our reason would be utterly +<pb n='090'/><anchor id='Pg090'/> +incredible. This assertion has arisen from the confusion +of things which differ widely, viz. things which +our reason might have been unable to discover, but +which when discovered may be perfectly rational, and +things directly contradictory to reason. The existence +for example of a square circle is a thing absolutely +incredible, and while thus contradictory to reason, it +is impossible to accept it by faith. So would any +doctrine which in a similar manner contradicted the +first principles of our rational convictions. No more +pernicious principle can be laid down than that things +which are contradictory to our reason can be accepted +by the principle of faith. Such a principle would +divide the human mind into two hostile camps, and if +carried to its logical consequences, must land us in +universal scepticism. +</p> + +<p> +It by no means follows that things which transcend +our rational powers to discover must be contrary to +our reason when they have been discovered. We can +only arrive at the knowledge of unknown facts by +observation, or accept them on the testimony of others. +Until they have been brought within our knowledge in +this way, no amount of reasoning could lead to their +discovery. In a similar manner with respect to several +of the facts in the New Testament connected with +the Incarnation, our reason might never have discovered +them, but when they have been discovered, +they may form suitable subjects on which to exert its +energies. +</p> + +<p> +The whole of the confusion in which this question +has become involved has originated in the assumption +that faith is a faculty of the mind distinct and separate +from our reason, and in a certain sense opposed to it; +and that things which cannot be subjects of rational +conviction may yet be the objects of faith. Whatever +<pb n='091'/><anchor id='Pg091'/> +opinions may have been held by divines upon this subject, +I can discover nothing which countenances them +in the New Testament. +</p> + +<p> +To what class of truths is the word <q>faith</q> properly +applied? I answer to those which we accept on testimony. +It has been asserted that some of the first +principles of our rational convictions, such as our belief +in the existence of an external world, or in the +truth of experience, is an act of faith. This, however, +is to introduce a confusion of thought. Such convictions +can be only acts of faith as far as we believe in +ourselves. +</p> + +<p> +Viewing faith as the acceptance of truth on adequate +testimony, it follows that all our knowledge of things, +whether natural or supernatural, that is not the result +of the action of our own minds, but which we accept +on the testimony of others, is an act of faith. Our +acceptance of them depends on the validity of the +testimony that can be adduced for them. The important +question for determination is, is the subject on +which it is given within the knowledge of the informant? +If it respects a fact, has he witnessed it, or +received it from others who have? Are his powers of +observation good and his judgment sound? Is he +worthy of credit? The determination of these and +similar points is the proper office of our rational powers, +yet the acceptance of the fact is an act of faith. When +our reason is satisfied on all these points, faith becomes +an act of reason. To assert that the acceptance of +supernatural facts belongs to a faculty of our minds +which we designate faith, and that our acceptance of +others is the result of the action of our reason, is to +lay down a distinction entirely of our own creation. +In both cases the evidences must form the subject of +<pb n='092'/><anchor id='Pg092'/> +rational investigation, and they must be accepted or +rejected as they approve themselves to our reason. +</p> + +<p> +It will perhaps be urged, that the acceptance of propositions, +such as the doctrinal statements of the New +Testament, is an act of faith which stands out in manifest +contra-distinction to an act of reason. It would be +so unquestionably, if we accepted them on insufficient +evidence; but when we do so with the knowledge that +others have a full acquaintance with the subject on +which they speak, it is in the highest degree rational +to accept and to act on their testimony. A large +portion of the business of life is conducted on this +principle. A man is ignorant on some subject, or he +distrusts his own judgment respecting it: he consults +one who knows, or on whose judgment he relies. For +example: let us suppose that I have a bottle full of a +certain substance; I do not know whether it is a +medicine that I am in need of, or a deadly poison. I +consult my chemist, and without hesitation I act on his +opinion. In all such cases (and they are spread over +the entire sphere of life) we act on faith; but it is a +faith which is in conformity with the dictates of reason. +The function of the latter is to ascertain the adequate +knowledge and the veracity of the person whose assurance +we accept. If it is a rational act thus to receive +truths on the testimony of man, whose knowledge must +be imperfect, it must be still more so to accept them on +the authority of him who knows all things, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> God. +</p> + +<p> +I am aware that certain writers have given such a +representation of faith as to produce the impression +that it is one of its special functions to accept certain +dogmas, the terms of which are extremely obscure, or +absolutely incomprehensible. But no rational evidence +can be adduced in support of this position. To exert +<pb n='093'/><anchor id='Pg093'/> +actual belief in a proposition the terms of which are +incomprehensible, is an impossibility, and we only +deceive ourselves when we imagine that we can. All +that we can do in such cases is to repeat words, but if +they have no definite meaning we cannot believe them: +for the act of faith or conviction is founded on the +affirmation that the two terms of a particular proposition +agree. It is quite true that the facts and statements +of the New Testament run up into principles +which transcend our limited power of reason; but this +is common to it, and every system of science or philosophy; +and forms no peculiarity of religion. I am +far from wishing to affirm that theologians have not +fallen into this practice; but my concern is not with +them, but with the statements of the New Testament. +One of the most important acquisitions made to our +mental science in the present day is that we have +ascertained that there are limits to our mental powers +beyond which we cannot penetrate. This was imperfectly +realized by many of the reasoners of earlier +times, and the result has been that they have fallen +into a hazy mysticism, or logomachy. +</p> + +<p> +Equally pernicious is the view that there is something +particularly meritorious in accepting truth on +little or no evidence, and that to do so is a high act +of faith. Not only is this founded on no rational principle, +but it is entirely unsupported by any account of +faith as given in the New Testament, which again and +again assumes the contrary position. Faith is the +acceptance of truths which lie beyond the sphere of +our personal knowledge on an adequate attestation. +If an astronomer should happen to be ignorant of +chemistry, and accept its truths on the testimony of +one who was an eminent master of it, this would constitute +<pb n='094'/><anchor id='Pg094'/> +an act of faith. Surely such an act is one +which is highly rational. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that although our belief in +miracles being founded, as it now must be, on testimony, +is an act of faith, yet it is also an act of our +reason. It is, therefore, by no means absurd to speak +of miracles as objects of faith, and at the same time +as possessing an evidential value. We accept them +as we do all other adequately attested facts, and +reason on them in the same manner as we do on other +facts. This is the precise course which will be pursued +by the overwhelming majority of astronomers who will +be unable to witness the coming transit of Venus. +They will accept the facts on adequate testimony, and +afterwards use them as media of proof. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='095'/><anchor id='Pg095'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter V. The Antecedent Improbability of Miracles.—The +Unknown and Unknowable God.</head> + +<p> +The proof on <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> grounds that an event is either +possible or probable, cannot establish that it has +actually occurred. This must rest on its own particular +evidence. To prove that a revelation is both possible +and probable, and that it ought to be evidenced by +miracles, may form an essential portion of our general +argument, because the degree of probability of the +occurrence of a particular fact affects the amount of +positive evidence necessary to establish its truth. But +the proof that a revelation has actually been given, or a +miracle wrought, can only be effected through the same +media as those through which other facts are established. +To prove that a revelation is probable will not be of +the smallest avail to prove that one has been actually +given, without adequate proof of the fact itself. +</p> + +<p> +Still the examination of the antecedent question is +in this case particularly important, because modern unbelief +boldly affirms that a revelation and its attestation +of miracles are both impossible and incredible. If this +can be demonstrated, the discussion of the evidence +that can be adduced for them as facts is a useless expenditure +of our reasoning powers; for no evidence can +prove the occurrence of that which is impossible. It +<pb n='096'/><anchor id='Pg096'/> +may be assumed, however, that those who make this +affirmation are not quite satisfied as to the cogency of +their reasonings; because, after having demonstrated, +as they allege, that miracles are impossible, they proceed +to attack the evidence of those narrated in the +Gospels, and pronounce it worthless. As, therefore, +the opponents of Christianity boldly affirm that both a +supernatural revelation and miracles are impossible, it +is necessary that the defender of Christianity should +examine the validity of the assertion. +</p> + +<p> +Our opponents constantly charge us with reasoning +in a circle, or assuming the fact which ought to be +proved. To avoid even the appearance of this, I lay +down the following positions:— +</p> + +<p> +If direct atheism is a just conclusion from the phenomena +of the Universe, it follows that a divine revelation +is impossible. Nor are miracles in any proper +sense of the word less so, because they are not merely +facts occurring in external nature, but facts in the +production of which we recognize intelligence and +will. With the principles of atheism the occurrence +of an extraordinary event is quite compatible, because +as it cannot rise to any higher knowledge than that +of phenomena, the knowledge of the invariability of +past phenomena is incapable of giving the fact that all +future phenomena will resemble the past. Still the +occurrence of a fact, however extraordinary, would not +constitute a miracle, and would prove only the existence +of an unknown force in the universe, or the predominance +of chance. +</p> + +<p> +The same remark is equally applicable to that form +of modern atheism which does not affirm that no God +exists, but contents itself with the denial that there is +any evidence that there is one. +</p> + +<p> +Nor is the case altogether different with regard to +<pb n='097'/><anchor id='Pg097'/> +pantheism. According to this system, God is only +another name for nature, which works out every form +of fleeting existence for itself in an unceasing round of +unconscious self-evolution. The essence of its affirmation +is, that God has no conscious personal existence, +but that He is only another name for the blind unconscious +forces of the universe. Such a being (if it +is possible to conceive of it as a being at all, or as a +unity) is everlastingly making a revelation of itself by +a ceaseless evolution of phenomena, the result of the +blind action of its inherent forces. But to whom? +Obviously only to beings capable of reason and consciousness, +whom it (I dare not say, He) has evolved +out of its own bosom, and will again resolve into unconsciousness. +Prior to their evolution this mighty τὸ πᾶν +must have been everlastingly making manifestations of +itself, without a single being in existence capable of +recognizing them. Whatever be the result of such +theories in a logical point of view, it is evident that if +pantheism be a rational account of the order of the +universe, a revelation and miracles, in any sense in +which such terms can bear meaning, are impossible. +</p> + +<p> +No less applicable is the same remark to that form of +pantheism held by Mr. Herbert Spencer, which, while +it affirms the existence of a cause of all things, as alike +required by the demands of philosophy, science, and +religion, yet affirms that He is unknown and unknowable, +and that every thing which is knowable, although +a manifestation of that great unknown cause, yet +conveys no idea of Him that the intellect can apprehend. +In one word, the unknown cause of all things is inconceivable, +and incapable of becoming the subject of +rational thought. The intellect cannot help assuming +the existence of this cause of all things; but all that it +can affirm of him is, that He is unknown and unknowable; +<pb n='098'/><anchor id='Pg098'/> +and that everything within the bounds of our +knowledge, though it may represent some mode of his +existence, cannot be he, or like him. With respect to +this theory, while it cleverly evades some of the harsher +difficulties of pantheism and atheism, it is not too +much to say that it is a civil way of bowing God out of +the universe, of which He is alleged to be the cause. +He can neither be a person, nor have wisdom, nor be +benevolent, nor be capable of conscious self-manifestation; +because all these conceptions are limited and +finite. All that we can know of Him is, that such a +cause exists beyond present phenomena; and that we +are condemned respecting Him, to a profound and +perpetual ignorance. It is possible to designate such +a being by the name of God, but it would be to use +the term in a sense peculiar to those who thus employ +it. Such a God is a bare abstract conception of the +intellect, void of all moral value. It is sufficient for +my present purpose to observe that it is impossible for +the unknown and the unknowable to make a revelation +of himself. Consequently St. Paul's affirmation with +respect to the unknown God at Athens, <q>Whom therefore +ye ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you</q> +(Acts xvii. 23), is untrue. To such a God a revelation +of Himself, and miracles to confirm it, are alike +impossible. +</p> + +<p> +It is evident, therefore, that if either of these +principles can be demonstrated to be a true account of +the nature of things, all further discussion as to the +truth of a revelation or of miracles is useless. Let us +take the most favourable hypothesis, that of Mr. +Spencer. It concedes that the necessities of reason +compel us to assume the existence of an unknown cause +of all things, which may be called God. But He is +unknowable; He is inscrutable. No conception of +<pb n='099'/><anchor id='Pg099'/> +Him can be realized in thought; it follows, therefore, +that no revelation of such a being can be made to the +finite intellect of man, for if a revelation of Him could +be made, He cannot be unknowable. This being so, +the person who attempts to reason out the truth of +Christianity is placed under a difficulty. Christianity +assumes the existence of a personal God, possessed of +moral attributes. This is the very truth, the evidence +of which these systems assert to be wanting. The +Christian advocate, therefore, has only two courses before +him: First, To assume, in conformity with the all but +universal belief of mankind, that a personal God +exists; and then to argue for the truth of Christianity, +and to answer the objections urged against it. When +we do this, objectors affirm that we beg the question. +Or, Secondly, To prove the existence of a personal +God; and then to argue for the truth of revelation. +If he adopts the latter course, he is compelled to +adduce the proof on which the belief in theism rests, +and to answer the objections to it—or, in other words, +to compose a bulky volume, before he can get at the +immediate subject of inquiry. +</p> + +<p> +Now I affirm that the defender of Christianity is no +more open to the charge of begging the question when +he assumes the existence of a personal God as the +foundation of his reasonings, than the author of a +treatise on trigonometry is, who takes for granted the +truth of Euclid's propositions. +</p> + +<p> +The author of the work to which I have already +referred does his utmost to fasten on the modern defenders +of Christianity the charge that they begin and +end in assumptions. I will not deny that much ambiguous +language has been used on this subject, but I +trust I shall show that the charge is utterly unfounded. +I must briefly notice a few of his reasonings. +</p> + +<pb n='100'/><anchor id='Pg100'/> + +<p> +At page 68 he writes as follows: <q>Dr. Mozley is +well aware that the assumption of a <q>personal</q> God +is not susceptible of proof; indeed, this is admitted in +the statement that the definition is an assumption.</q> +</p> + +<p> +An assumption, I ask, in what sense? Is it a +simple assumption without evidence, taken for granted +for the bare purposes of argument; or is it one which, +though taken for granted in the present case, rests on +a substantial basis of evidence previously established, +and which bears the same relation to the question of +miracles which the truths of Euclid do to those of trigonometry? +The latter is the fact though the mode +in which the writer puts it implies the former. Without +referring to the authority of any particular author, +is he not fully aware that theists maintain that their +belief in a Personal God rests on a basis of proof which +commends itself to their reason? Have not numbers +of men, endowed with the highest powers of intellect, +accepted it as satisfactory? Yet he seeks to imply +that, after all, it is an assumption. It is true that in +the argument for miracles we take it for granted; but +we do so, because the proof has commended itself to +our highest reason. +</p> + +<p> +I admit that Dr. Mozley has used, in speaking of +this subject, language which I cannot but think is +wanting in precision. Still it does not bear the meaning +that this author seeks to fasten on it. <q>It is then +to be admitted,</q> says he, <q>that historically, and looking +to the general actual reception of it, this conception +of God was derived from revelation. Not from +the first dawn of history to the spread of Christianity +in the world do we see in mankind at large any belief +in such a Being.</q> The learned author then states, at +considerable length, the philosophic and vulgar views +entertained of God, and shows their inadequacy and +<pb n='101'/><anchor id='Pg101'/> +imperfection, and concludes as follows: <q>But although +this conception of the Deity has been received through +the channel of the Bible, what communicates a truth +is one thing, what proves it is another.</q> He then +proceeds to summarize the general proof. +</p> + +<p> +I cannot think this statement altogether free from +ambiguity. Whatever may have been the precise +forms in which the ideas of the vulgar or the philosopher +were embodied, there is strong proof that a +higher and better conception of God, though indefinite +and indistinct, underlay them all. The most degraded +polytheist has indistinct conceptions of a Supreme God +above all the degraded objects of his worship. It +seems to me impossible that such a conception of God +can have been attained from revelation. It may, in +a certain sense, be said, looking at the precise form +in which it is embodied, that it has been derived +by us historically from the Jewish race. But it must +have had a prior origin. St. Paul considered that the +material universe manifested His eternal power and +Godhead. The primitive form of all the great oriental +religions contained in them the idea of God. It is +simply absurd to affirm that they derived it from the +Bible. It is true that the existence of a primitive +revelation anterior to the Bible has often been assumed +to account for this knowledge, but this is a bare +assumption of which we have no proof, and whose only +basis is conjecture. Judaism and Christianity have +been instrumental in widely spreading correct conceptions +of the Deity and dissipating false ones. Yet +if the conception had not existed in the mind at least +implicitly, no formal revelation could have put it there, +for every such revelation must be conveyed in language, +and all language is meaningless, unless the +mind can realize its conceptions. The assertion, +<pb n='102'/><anchor id='Pg102'/> +therefore, that the conception of God has been first +communicated through the channel of the Bible, and is +afterwards proved by reason, seems to me to be one +not devoid of danger. On the contrary, our belief that +God exists is the very pre-condition of our being able +to believe that He has revealed Himself. This conception +revelation may modify, invest with a higher +moral character, and import into it definiteness and precision, +but it cannot create it. It is on such grounds +that the author in question seeks to involve his reasoning +and that of all other defenders of Christianity in a +vicious circle. I fully admit that the conception of +God has been elevated and purified by the influence of +Christianity, and that the teaching of Christianity on +this subject is in conformity with our highest reason. +But it is absurd to affirm that this is reasoning in a +circle, and that the Christian argument involves reasoning +from Theism to Christianity and from Christianity +back to Theism. +</p> + +<p> +The following passage, cited by Professor Mozley from +Baden Powell, is referred to by this author as a proof +that all our reasonings on this subject are a simple +argument from reason to revelation, and from revelation +to reason. The passage itself is a clear statement +of the grounds of the charge, and requires our careful +consideration. <q>Everybody may collect from the +order and harmony of the physical universe the +existence of a God; but in acknowledging a God, we +do not thereby acknowledge this peculiar or doctrinal +conception of a God. We see in the structure of +nature a mind, a universal mind, but still a mind +which only operates and expresses itself by law. +Nature only does and can inform us of mind in +nature; but in no other sense does nature witness to +the existence of an omnipotent Supreme Being. Of a +<pb n='103'/><anchor id='Pg103'/> +universal mind out of nature, nature says nothing; and +of an omnipotence which does not possess an inherent +limit in nature, she says nothing either. And therefore +that conception of a supreme Being which represents +Him as a spirit independent of the physical +universe, and able from a standing-point external to +nature, to interrupt its order, is a conception of God +for which we must go elsewhere. That conception is +attained from revelation, which is asserted to be +proved by miracles. But that being the case, this +doctrine of theism rests itself upon miracles, and +therefore miracles cannot rest on this doctrine of +theism.</q> +</p> + +<p> +It will be necessary carefully to point out the inaccurate +reasoning of this passage. +</p> + +<p> +First: The author speaks of nature as another expression +for the forces, laws, and phenomena of the +physical universe, and for these alone. To this I have +no objection, for it would greatly conduce to clearness +if it was always confined to this meaning. But while he +uses it thus, he nowhere tells us in what relation man, +including his faculties, intellectual and moral, and above +all, his will, stands to nature. Are they included in, or +excluded from it? Do they, or do they not, form a +part of it? If they are included in nature, then there +are other facts in nature bearing on the being of a +God, beyond those on which the author reasons. If +they are excluded, then the reasoning is inadequate to +sustain his conclusion. Our reasonings respecting God +are founded not only on the forces and laws of physical +nature, but on man, his reason, his conscience, and his +will. What makes this fallacy the more plausible is +that the term nature is very frequently used to include +man, as well as the forces and laws of the material +universe. +</p> + +<pb n='104'/><anchor id='Pg104'/> + +<p> +As far as the physical universe is concerned, the mind +infers the existence of a God from its order and its +harmonies; that is to say, having observed that order +and harmony have been produced by intelligence within +the sphere of our own observation, and being deeply +convinced on other grounds of reasoning that they are +incapable of resulting from any other source, we infer +that the results we behold in nature are due to a similar +principle which we experience in ourselves. Such +an inference is not due to simple observation of the +order of the universe only, but unites with it an act of +reasoning founded on our own self-conscious being. +But the intelligence which produces order, as far as we +are cognisant of it, is invariably united with will. We +therefore infer from the order and harmonies of nature, +not simply the conception of a God, such as the God +of pantheism; but, if they are valid to prove anything +at all, of a God who is possessed of intelligence adequate +to arrange the order, and of purpose adequate +for its production. If the inference of the existence +of a God from the works of nature is valid, it must +be of a God possessed of the attributes in question, +for all our inferences on such a subject derive +their validity from applying to them the analogies of +our reason. +</p> + +<p> +It is quite true that in the structure of the material +universe we see only the indications of a mind operating +and expressing itself by law; that is to say, we +observe in the physical universe no instances of its +violation. But WE, that is the reasoning, rational +beings, whether existing in nature or outside it, have +inferred from the structure of the universe the existence +of mind, and we know of no mind which is not +possessed of conscious intelligence and will. If our +reasoning from the order of the material universe is +<pb n='105'/><anchor id='Pg105'/> +valid to prove the presence of mind, which is a conception +entirely derived from our consciousness of ourselves, +it must be equally so to prove the existence of +purpose and volition, for we know nothing of mind +which is devoid of these attributes. The material universe +proves that its order and harmony is the result +of the action of mind; but it cannot prove that the +mind which produced this order and harmony is unable +to introduce a different one. But if our minds form +part of nature, then they are a proof that the author +of nature has produced something else in nature besides +the order and harmonies of the physical universe. If +they are outside nature, then we have direct evidence +of the existence of beings outside and above nature, +<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> above the physical forces of the universe. It follows +that if finite beings possessed of intelligence and +will, exist within nature or without it, a God who possesses +similar powers may exist also. +</p> + +<p> +In a narrow and restricted sense it may be quite true +that nature, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> matter and its phenomena, only informs +us of the presence of mind in nature, the partner +and correlative of organized matter. But let us here +guard against a latent fallacy in this mode of statement. +We learn the presence of mind, not from material +nature, but by the application of our own reason +to the investigation of what its phenomena denote. +This is overlooked in the above argument. It is perfectly +true that as a mere matter of phenomenal appearance, +we do not actually behold in natural phenomena +manifestations of mind acting outside nature. In +fact we do not see mind at all, but simply infer its +presence from the phenomena before us through the +agency of our own reason; and this inference carries +along with it all the other attributes of mind. +</p> + +<p> +The writer before me is one of those who affirm that +<pb n='106'/><anchor id='Pg106'/> +the utmost our minds can infer from the contemplation +of nature, in which he includes every species of vital +organism, is the presence of order and harmony; and +that any inference that its phenomena testify to the +presence of adaptation, contrivance and design is invalid. +I reply that this affirmation is only valid +on the assumption of a principle which altogether +denies that from natural phenomena we can infer +the existence of mind. But we also observe in +natural phenomena, and above all in animal and vegetable +structures, that the results effected are produced, +not by simple forces, but by the careful adjustment +of many, or by one counteracting and qualifying +the action of another, and by forces intersecting one +another at precisely the right time and place. Had +any of these occurred otherwise, the result would have +been different. Throughout nature we observe innumerable +instances in which various forces have thus +combined to produce a definite result. This we usually +designate by the word <q>adaptation.</q> Adaptation implies +intelligence and purpose. We are quite as much +justified in ascribing this purpose to the power manifested +in nature, as any other quality whatever, even +the possession of mind. +</p> + +<p> +I fully concede that natural phenomena and even +the phenomena of the mind of man, only testify directly +to the existence of a power adequate to their production, +and that we cannot directly infer from them the +presence of omnipotence. But this is to quarrel about +words. For the power manifested in nature and in +man is so great that the human mind can make no distinction +between it and omnipotence; or in other +words, it justly infers from its manifestations that the +power which could originate this universe and all things +in it must be capable of effecting anything which is possible. +<pb n='107'/><anchor id='Pg107'/> +To this mind, whether in or out of nature, our +reason ascribes the attributes of intelligence and will. +Such a power it is incapable of conceiving as inherent +in material forces; it therefore assumes that this power +exists outside nature, and is capable of controlling it. +</p> + +<p> +It follows therefore that the reasoning is fallacious, +which asserts that the conception of a supreme Being +which represents Him as a spirit independent of the +physical universe, and able from a standing-point external +to nature to interrupt its order, is a conception +which we must seek from revelation, and cannot be +arrived at by any exertion of our rational powers on +the facts of nature and of man. Its apparent plausibility +has arisen solely from ignoring the presence of +man, either in nature or outside it, and neglecting to +take the facts of human nature, man's reason, conscience +and will, into consideration. To affirm that, +independently of man's moral and intellectual being, +physical nature, its forces and laws, can prove nothing, +is a simple platitude. We have not to go to revelation +for the principles on which we reason, but to man, and +the phenomena of his rational, self-conscious, and +voluntary agency. It follows, therefore, that the +affirmation that in conducting the Christian argument +we reason from God to miracles and from miracles to +God, is utterly disproved. Yet the writer before me +has ventured to affirm that, when we commence with +the being of a personal God as the groundwork of our +reasonings, we begin and end with a bare assumption. +</p> + +<p> +The philosophical writings of Dr. Mansel are also +pressed into the service for the purpose of discrediting +the evidences of Christianity, and, I own, with +considerably greater reason. Mr. Herbert Spencer has +also invoked them in confirmation of his theory that +God is unknown and unknowable. He refers to them +<pb n='108'/><anchor id='Pg108'/> +in the following words: <q>Here I cannot do better +than avail myself of the demonstration which Mr. +Mansel, carrying out in detail the doctrine of Sir W. +Hamilton, has given us in his <q>Limits of Religious +Thought.</q> And I gladly do this, not only because his +mode of presentation cannot be improved, but because +writing as he does in defence of current theology, his +reasonings will be more acceptable to the majority of +readers.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Before referring to Dr. Mansel as an unquestionable +authority on this subject, it would only have been +candid in both writers to have informed their readers +that not only have his principles been repudiated by a +considerable number of Christian writers as unsound, +but they have been carefully examined by that eminent +atheistic philosopher, Mr. Mill, who gives it as his +deliberate opinion that they are founded on fallacious +principles. It is absurd to urge principles, though +they have been maintained by an eminent Christian +writer, which an eminent unbeliever has pronounced +unsound, as a clear and conclusive argument against +Christianity. +</p> + +<p> +The work of Dr. Mansel may be described as an +attempt to prove the truth of Christianity on the principles +of the most sceptical philosophy. It may be +briefly stated thus: Reason is incapable of forming +any idea of God as He is, whether as the Infinite, the +Absolute, or the first Cause. All the conceptions which +we can frame on the subject are mutually self-destructive. +On similar principles our conceptions of His +moral attributes are wholly inadequate to inform us of +His real perfections. It by no means follows that our +human conception of benevolence or justice is a measure +of the divine benevolence, or of divine justice; and so +of His other attributes. It is affirmed that because they +<pb n='109'/><anchor id='Pg109'/> +are the attributes of an infinite Being, they lie beyond +the possibility of being realized in human thought. +Consequently, holiness in God may admit of very different +manifestations from holiness in man. Upon +these principles, which affirm the inadequacy of the +human intellect, even to conceive of anything as it +exists in God, it follows that our only possible conceptions +of God are relative; or, to use the word chosen +by the author in relation to Christianity, regulative; +<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> fitted to regulate our conduct, but not to illuminate +our understanding. +</p> + +<p> +Upon the assumption that reason, when it attempts +to analyse our ideas of the Infinite, the Absolute, or +the first Cause, lands us in hopeless contradictions, Dr. +Mansel arrives at the conclusion that it is incapable of +forming any conception of God as he actually exists. +It follows as a necessary consequence from this, that +even by revelation we are only capable of attaining +relative ideas of Him, and that these relative ideas do +not represent His real nature, but are only regulative of +conduct, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> we are to act upon them as if they were +true. <hi rend='italic'>E.g.</hi> God is revealed as holy. Our only conception +of holiness is our human conception of it. But +we cannot know that this is an adequate measure of the +divine holiness. God is declared to be benevolent. +We have no conception of benevolence but that which +is derived from the human mind. So likewise with +respect to justice. But benevolence and justice as +they exist in God may differ from these qualities as +they exist in man. The same thing follows as a necessary +conclusion from Dr. Mansel's premises with +respect to all the other attributes of God. Nothing +will better illustrate the position to which this argument +reduces us than to apply it to the truthfulness or +veracity of God. All that we know about truthfulness +<pb n='110'/><anchor id='Pg110'/> +is as it exists in finite beings, that is, in men. But +God is an infinite being. It follows therefore that +truthfulness in man is no adequate representation of +truthfulness as it exists in God, that is to say, that the +divine veracity may differ from our human conception +of it. This is certainly a very startling position. +</p> + +<p> +If, therefore, these principles are correct, acquiescence +on the part of man in the divine character is +impossible. It is impossible to love a being who does +not present to us the aspect of loveliness; or to reverence +one who does not present to us an aspect capable +of exciting this emotion; or to feel trust in a being of +whose justice we have no certainty that it resembles +our conception of justice; or to rely on the promises of +one whose veracity may differ from our own. Such +feelings cannot be made to order. They can only be +generated by the contemplation of a being who is holy, +benevolent, just, and true, in the ordinary acceptation +of these words. They cannot be excited by any merely +regulative ideas. We love, reverence, and trust, not +ideas or conceptions, but persons, possessing moral +attributes. But on the principle of merely regulative +ideas of God, the assertion that <q>God is love,</q> loses +all its value, if God is not what I mean by love, but, +because he is infinite, he may be something else, I +know not what; and thus the great precept of the +moral law, <q>Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all +thy heart, mind, soul, and strength,</q> becomes meaningless. +Such devotion of our entire nature cannot be +created by the mere command to render it. It can +only be rendered to a being whose claims over us we +both feel and know to be an absolute reality, and to +whom on the conviction of their reality we can offer +ourselves up a voluntary sacrifice. But if we cannot +know Him as He is, how is the fire of devotion to Him +<pb n='111'/><anchor id='Pg111'/> +to be kindled in our hearts? How shall we trust in +Him? How shall we acquiesce in His character? How +shall we worship Him, how shall we adore Him, if it is +true that the justice, benevolence, or holiness of the +divine character may not resemble our conception of +them? Nay, more: the theory in question lays the +axe to the root of the Christian revelation itself. There +is no affirmation of the New Testament more decisive +than that Jesus Christ in His divine and human personality +is the image of the invisible God, as far as His +moral perfections are concerned. Are the perfections +of the character of Jesus Christ only regulative, or are +they real representations of these attributes as they +exist in God? Are the divine attributes of holiness, +benevolence, or justice, adequately represented by the +manifestations of them, as made by Jesus Christ? If +we accept the testimony of St. John's Gospel, our Lord +himself has expressly affirmed, <q>He that hath seen me +hath seen the Father</q> (John xiv. 9). But this is +impossible if our conceptions of God's moral attributes +are only regulative, and if the human idea of holiness +is no adequate representation of the divine. +</p> + +<p> +However erroneous a system may be, yet if it has +been elaborated by a powerful mind, it has generally +some foundation in reason, and I am far from affirming +that, with considerable qualifications, some important +elements of truth may not be found in that of Dr. +Mansel. It is well that we should be made to feel that +there are limits of thought beyond which the human +mind cannot penetrate, and that there are profundities +of metaphysics which an imperfect measuring-line +cannot reach. But placing the matter as he has, the +Christian apologist may well feel indebted to Mr. Mill +for his crushing demolition of the dangerous portions +of Dr. Mansel's system. When unbelievers quote the +<pb n='112'/><anchor id='Pg112'/> +authority of Dr. Mansel, why do they not also tell their +readers that there was at least one unbeliever of very +high logical power, who wrote against the validity of +his system. +</p> + +<p> +It is one thing to affirm that we cannot penetrate to +the depths of the Deity, and that after we have raised +our thoughts to the highest, there is something higher +still; and quite another to affirm that our highest +thoughts of him have no validity; or, to use the terms of +a fashionable philosophy, that God is unknown and unknowable, +that no true conception of Him can be +formed in thought; in one word, that he is absolutely +unthinkable. The difficulties of this subject have +arisen mainly from discussing it in terms of pure +abstractions, instead of embodying them in a concrete +form. It is impossible in this place to enter on the +profound depths involved in these questions; but a few +observations will be necessary for the purpose of clearing +away the difficulties in which our opponents seek +to involve the subject of miracles. I shall confine +myself to our conceptions of the Infinite. +</p> + +<p> +It is affirmed that no conception of the infinite can +be framed in thought; that it is therefore unthinkable, +and transcends the limits of human knowledge; that +it is a negation; and that therefore our reason is +unable to affirm anything respecting it; that the idea +of personality is incompatible with that of infinity; +and that therefore when we speak of God as a person +who possesses infinite perfections, we enter on a region +where human thought is invalid, and respecting which +all affirmation involves a contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +But when we are told that the infinite transcends +thought, we are entitled to demand that we should not +be kept playing with an abstraction, and to ask, what +is infinite? In what sense does it transcend thought? +<pb n='113'/><anchor id='Pg113'/> +Does this mean that it is absolutely unthinkable; or +only partially so; or that our conception of it is imperfect? +Is it simply unknowable, or does it consist of +something which we know, <emph>plus</emph> something that has not +come within the limits of our knowledge, but which +something is of a similar character to the known? It +will be at once seen that the determination of these +questions is at the root of the whole controversy. If +then by the infinite we mean something known <emph>plus</emph> +something unknown, to speak of God as unknowable +and unthinkable is absurd. Our knowledge of Him +may not be full, but yet real so far as it goes. When +it is affirmed that God is a being who exists, but is unthinkable +by man, the effect is to place Him beyond the +bounds of human knowledge, and thereby free us from +all necessity of troubling ourselves about Him. We +know that He exists in the profundities of the unknown; +and that is all. For the purposes of thought and of +morality, He is thus made of less value than an +algebraic <hi rend='italic'>x</hi>. +</p> + +<p> +When it is affirmed that the infinite is unknowable, I +again ask, what infinite? The infinite as an abstract +idea has no real existence; but something that is infinite. +The conception itself is an essentially quantitative conception, +and is only strictly applicable to number and +extension. When I speak therefore of an infinite +number, what do I mean? The only answer possible +is, <q>The greatest number I can conceive, <emph>plus</emph> all +possible number without limit.</q> Does my adding on +the latter factor invalidate the reality of my conception +of the former? Is that which is added on anything +else than number? Surely here I have a valid conception. +The same is true when we speak of the infinity +of space. I mean by it the greatest space I can conceive, +<emph>plus</emph> space without limit. Is the idea of space +<pb n='114'/><anchor id='Pg114'/> +rendered unthinkable, because I add the conception of +space without limit? Does it cease to be space? But +space is conceivable. It follows therefore that neither +infinite number nor infinite extension is absolutely unthinkable. +We speak of the infinite divisibility of +matter. Does matter, because it goes on to be divided +for ever, cease to be matter? +</p> + +<p> +In the same manner we speak of God, and call Him +infinite. It would be far more correct to speak of Him +as a Being who has infinite attributes. Here, however, +if accuracy of thought is to be preserved, a distinction +must be made. Some attributes of God may be +viewed as quantitative; others cannot. It is to the +former only that the term infinite properly applies. +A moral attribute cannot have a quantitative measure +applied to it. It is therefore not infinite, but perfect. +</p> + +<p> +When we speak of God as a being possessed of infinite +power, what do we mean? The thing intended +is, that He is a being who possesses such power as +enabled Him to create the universe, and that He is +capable of exerting every other degree of power which +is possible. We may call this, if we like, power +without limit; though there is always one limit to +possible power, viz., that of working contradictions. +Of course we are ignorant of what are the limits of +possible power. +</p> + +<p> +But when we make this addition to our finite conception, +we mean by it power similar to that exhibited in +the universe—it and all other power beyond it. Must +such a conception be banished outside the limits of +rational thought? Is the idea of a being who possesses +power sufficient to build the universe, and all possible +power besides, unthinkable? Again, we speak of God +as infinitely wise. What do we mean by it? We +affirm that He knows all things actual and possible. +<pb n='115'/><anchor id='Pg115'/> +The knowledge is none the less knowledge, because to +the knowledge of the actual we add on the knowledge +of the possible. Such a being is certainly not unthinkable. +</p> + +<p> +Again: God is often spoken of, not only as a being +possessing infinite attributes and perfections, but as +the Infinite Being. Here the attempt is made to +entangle us in a puzzle. It is argued: if He be the +infinite Being, there can be no being beyond Him. He +must therefore include all being, both actual and possible. +If this be so, He must also include the finite, +otherwise there would be a being which is not included +in infinite being—or in other words, being without +limit would not include all being, which is self-contradictory. +Several other self-contradictions may be +easily adduced by reasoning on the same principles. +</p> + +<p> +I reply that the term <q>Being</q> is used here in a +sense so intensely abstract, that we have removed it +out of all those conceptions of which quantity can +legitimately be predicated. Of material being we can +affirm that it is quantitative, but of no other. The +adding on the word <q>infinite,</q> and calling God the +infinite Being, is to use words which have no validity +as conceptions. +</p> + +<p> +But it is also common to speak of God's moral attributes +as infinite, such as His benevolence, holiness, +justice and truth. This again is inaccurate, and its +result is to plunge us into hopeless confusion of +thought. Such attributes admit of no quantitative +measures. They are perfect, not infinite. To speak +of God's truthfulness as infinite is simply absurd. A +thing is true, or not true. A moral being is truthful +or not truthful. Benevolence may be perfect or imperfect; +but it cannot be measured by number or by +line. These conceptions can only mean what we mean +<pb n='116'/><anchor id='Pg116'/> +by them, and nothing else, even when applied to God, +or we are attempting to pass off forged notes for +genuine ones. The only possible additional idea which +we introduce when thus ascribing them to God, is that +in Him they are perfect, free from the imperfections +with which they exist in us. To affirm that when we +say that God is perfectly benevolent, or perfectly +truthful, we introduce into the conception, as applied +to Him, a new factor, beyond the meaning of benevolence +and truthfulness as used in human language, and +that this new factor can make the divine benevolence +different from our human conception of it, or can lead +God to actions which man can by no possibility view +as benevolent or true; and then to say that God is +benevolent or true, is an abuse of language, or, to use +Mr. Mill's words, an offensive flattery. +</p> + +<p> +But it has been urged that the moral attributes of +God, even if we view them not as infinite but as perfect, +must be beyond the limits of human thought, and +therefore may produce results different in character +from the corresponding principles in man, because +they are the attributes of an infinite being. I have +already disposed of this objection. Benevolence, holiness, +and truth cannot be other than benevolence, +holiness, and truth, to whatever being we may attribute +them. +</p> + +<p> +It is therefore no necessary consequence, because +we ascribe to God some attributes which are infinite, +and others which are perfect, that God must therefore +be unknowable or unthinkable. We may know +much about Him, without knowing all things. Our +not knowing all about things does not render them +either unknowable or unthinkable. Our knowledge +may be imperfect; but as far as it goes it maybe real. +If we were to affirm that we only know that which we +<pb n='117'/><anchor id='Pg117'/> +know perfectly, or were unable to reason on imperfect +knowledge, mental progress would be brought to a +standstill. Nor is it right to affirm that we are only +reasoning in a circle when we reason from His moral +attributes as displayed in the government of the world +in favour of the probability of a revelation; or if +because a revelation which claims to be from God, bears +the impress of His character, we employ this fact as an +evidence that it comes from Him. To affirm that He is +unknowable or unthinkable is to proclaim that man has +no concern with God, and that all revelation is impossible; +therefore, the objections urged against the evidence +of supernatural religion on these grounds are untenable. +</p> + +<p> +But there are the difficulties about the Absolute and +the First Cause. It has been urged that the Absolute +is that which is out of relation to every thing else—perfectly +independent in itself. It is argued, therefore, +if God be this Absolute, he cannot be the first +Cause, because a cause can only be a cause by its being +in relation to that of which it is the cause. For similar +reasons, if he be the first Cause, He cannot be the +Absolute. But as He is both, He must therefore be +unknowable and unthinkable. +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible in a treatise like this to enter into +such profound metaphysical questions. For my present +purpose, I can safely refer to Mr. Mill's discussion on +this subject. As far as the views in question bear +adversely on Christian evidence, he has sufficiently +refuted them. It is not fair for unbelievers to put +forth these positions as subversive of Christianity, +without answering the reasonings of so eminent an unbeliever +as Mr. Mill in proof of their inconclusiveness, +or even alluding to the fact that he has pronounced them +untenable. +</p> + +<p> +There is no point which reasoners of this class have +<pb n='118'/><anchor id='Pg118'/> +laboured more diligently to prove than that it is impossible +for human reason to think of God as a person. +The assumption of the personality of God is the +foundation of the Christian argument, without which, +even if the occurrence of miracles could be proved as +objective facts, they would have no evidential value. +It follows, therefore, that if our only mode of attaining +the knowledge of the personality of God be from +revelation, we are arguing in a vicious circle. +</p> + +<p> +Briefly stated, the argument of unbelief is as follows: +God is the infinite Being. Personality is a conception +which necessarily involves the finite. Therefore it +cannot be predicated of an infinite Being. It follows +therefore that to speak of God as infinite, and at the +same time as a person, involves a contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +It is an unquestionable fact that the only beings +whom we are directly acquainted with as persons are +finite beings, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> men. No less certain is it that the +only beings whom we know to be possessed of wisdom +and intelligence are finite beings, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> men, and those +various classes of animals by which the latter quality +is manifested. The argument is equally valid for +proving that wisdom and intelligence can only belong +to finite beings; and consequently that the existence +of wisdom and intelligence in the first Cause of all +things is inconceivable, and the assumption that He is +wise and intelligent is a contradiction. The same +argument is no less valid against ascribing any moral +perfection to Him, or in fact any other, for all our +knowledge of such things is both in itself finite, and +derived from finite beings. +</p> + +<p> +But it even goes further than this. If, as the positive +philosophy lays down, our real knowledge of things is +confined to direct subjects of cognition; as the only +beings which we know to be possessed of wisdom and +<pb n='119'/><anchor id='Pg119'/> +intelligence are men and animals, it is quite contrary +to sound reasoning to infer that these qualities can be +possessed by any other class of finite beings. To do +so is to transfer human conceptions to beings who are +not human. Equally valid would be the reasoning of +an animal, if he could reason on the subject, as for +instance a horse or a dog, that the existence of wisdom +and intelligence beyond his own limited sphere was an +unwarrantable assumption. Pantheists have also propounded +theories on the assumption of the existence in +nature of an unconscious wisdom and intelligence. +This assumption is open to the most formidable objections; +but even on their own principles it is utterly +invalid; for if on the grounds which they allege it is +impossible to ascribe personality to God, the same +reasonings are equally valid against ascribing wisdom +and intelligence to unconscious nature. +</p> + +<p> +I conclude, therefore, that it by no means follows +because our direct knowledge of personality is confined +to human beings, and is derived from them, that +personality itself cannot be conceived of as a property +belonging to any other than human beings. It is +absurd to maintain that the qualities of things must be +confined to those things from which we learn their +existence. +</p> + +<p> +But it will be objected that the very essential notion +of personality is limitation; consequently that although +it may be conceived of as belonging to limited beings, +it transcends the power of thought to conceive of it as +the attribute of a being who is unlimited or infinite; +that is to say, that although it lies within the power of +thought to conceive of the Being who had adequate +power to build the universe as a Person, because the +power may be a limited power, yet when I ascribe to +Him beyond this the possession of all possible power, +<pb n='120'/><anchor id='Pg120'/> +the conception of personality becomes unthinkable. +This is the real meaning of the affirmation, unless our +reasonings are to be confined within the region of +abstractions. But we have no assurance that such +reasonings are valid, unless we can bring them to the +test of some concrete form of thought. +</p> + +<p> +Next: It by no means follows because our conception +of personality is derived from finite beings, that it +is necessarily limited to them; and that it cannot be +thought of in connection with a being, some of whose +attributes are infinite and others perfect; in other +words, that the idea of finiteness is necessarily involved +in that of personality. What are the conceptions that +make up the idea of our own personality? I reply, +the power to affirm <q>I</q> of one's own being—the possession +of will—the power of self-consciousness, and +these in union with rationality. These conceptions we +undoubtedly derive from the contemplation of our own +finite being, but there is nothing in them which is +necessarily limited to the finite. If the conception of +an infinite being is possible (and the fact that it is so +constantly introduced into this controversy proves that +it is possible), then there is no reason why these conceptions, +which certainly contain in them nothing +quantitative, should not be applicable to such a being. +The real fact is, these conceptions are not inherently +finite, because they have nothing in them of a quantitative +character,—they are only derived from a being +whose manifestation in space we conceive of under the +form of limitation, and whose attributes are neither +infinite nor perfect. +</p> + +<p> +I must call attention to the remark already made +that the correct representation of God in thought is +not that of a pure abstraction, the infinite Being, but +of a being who possesses attributes, some of which are +<pb n='121'/><anchor id='Pg121'/> +infinite and others perfect. To affirm that such a being +is a person, is not to attempt to think that which is +unthinkable. When we affirm that God possesses the +power adequate to build the universe, and all possible +power beside, we do not ascribe to Him that of which +it is impossible to predicate the possession of will or +self-consciousness. When we affirm that such a being +exists now, that he has existed in all past known times, +and that no limits in point of time are conceivable of +him, there is nothing contradictory in ascribing to +such a Being personality. It is quite thinkable that +an ultimate particle may never have had a beginning +and never will have an end; no less so is it that such a +particle may be possessed of personality, for it is +finite. Surely therefore there is nothing in the ascription +to God of existence without beginning and without +end, which destroys the idea of His personality. +</p> + +<p> +It has been necessary to enter thus far into this subject, +because in reasoning on the Christian revelation +we must assume the existence of a personal God, unless +all such treatises, in addition to their own proper +subject-matter, must likewise contain an elaborate work +on the principles of theism, and a refutation of those +of pantheism and atheism. The defender of Christianity +is charged with reasoning in a circle, as though +he first assumed the existence of a personal God, and +then derived the idea of his existence from revelation. +This charge would undoubtedly be true if the idea of +God being a person is unthinkable. I am at a loss to +conceive how it becomes one atom more thinkable if +communicated by a revelation. Much obscurity has +undoubtedly been thrown on this subject by Christian +writers who have fancied that the more they can invalidate +our reason the greater gain accrues to Revelation. +This is not only unwise but irrational. Our +<pb n='122'/><anchor id='Pg122'/> +reason doubtless is but an imperfect light, but its extinction +is to leave us to grope in darkness. I affirm +therefore that the assumption of the divine personality +as the groundwork of our argument involves no <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>petitio +principii</foreign>, or reasoning in a circle. +</p> + +<p> +One more remark and I will bring this portion of +the subject to a close. The affirmation made by this +philosophy that certain things are unthinkable is fallacious. +What do we mean by <q>unthinkable</q>? It may +mean many things; first, that the subject cannot be +made in any sense an object of thought. This, in fact, +is the only legitimate use of the word. But in this +sense the affirmation cannot be true of even Mr. +Herbert Spencer's unknown and unknowable God, for +it is evident that he does manage to reason and think +about him somehow. It may mean a being respecting +whom we may know much and attain a knowledge continually +progressing, but respecting whom there is +much which is unknown. This unknown is called unthinkable. +But it is not unthinkable. It has only not +yet become the subject of our knowledge, and is no +more unthinkable than any other unknown truth. Or +that may be pronounced to be unthinkable respecting +which our conceptions are wanting in definiteness and +precision. But to designate such things as unthinkable +is an abuse of language. Or that may be designated +as unthinkable of which our conceptions fail fully +to represent the reality. As far as they go, they may +be true, but there may be something beyond of a similar +kind, which they do not embrace. This is the only +sense in which it can be affirmed that God is unthinkable, +but the assertion is altogether misleading. The +only correct meaning of the expression is when some +particular thing is affirmed to exist and at the same +time contradictions co-exist in it. The actual co-existence +<pb n='123'/><anchor id='Pg123'/> +of these two contradictions is unthinkable, +but nothing more. Thus the existence of a round +square is unthinkable, so would the affirmation that +the divine power was at the same time both limited +and unlimited. But in no other sense is a conception +unthinkable. To affirm that the cause of all things is +unthinkable because our conceptions of Him do not +measure the entire depths of His being is simply misleading. +</p> + +<p> +I have gone into this question because it is evident +that if God is unthinkable a revelation of Him is impossible, +and if a revelation of Him is impossible, all +miracles affirmed to have been wrought in attestation of +one must be delusions. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='124'/><anchor id='Pg124'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter VI. The Objection That Miracles Are Contrary To Reason +Considered.</head> + +<p> +Under this head are included the whole of that class +of objections which extend from the direct assertion of +the impossibility of miracles to the affirmation that +even if their possibility is conceded, they are so extremely +improbable that it is a violation of the first +principles of our reason to believe in their actual occurrence. +They are alleged to be violations and contradictions +of the laws of nature, and as such to be +incredible, as the stability of its laws is founded on a +universal experience. This unquestionably forms the +most formidable difficulty in the way of the acceptance +of miracles, as actual occurrences, at the present day, +and therefore demands a careful consideration. +</p> + +<p> +The question of the abstract impossibility of miracles +need not occupy us long. Such an affirmation can only +be made on the assumption that our reason is inadequate +to affirm the existence of such a being as a +personal God. If this can be established, the whole +argument is ended for all practical purposes. It may +be conceded that the occurrence of some anomalous +event as a bare objective fact is quite possible, even on +the principles of pantheism or atheism. But such +objective fact would be no miracle in any sense in which +the word can be used in this discussion. If the evidence +was sufficiently strong to attest it as a fact, it +<pb n='125'/><anchor id='Pg125'/> +would be explicable on the supposition of some unknown +force in nature, or even as a purely chance +occurrence. A miracle, in any sense in which it enters +into the present argument, is not only an abnormal +objective fact, but one which takes place at the bidding +of a moral agent. It is the union of these two which +imparts to a miracle any power to attest a revelation. +If, therefore, there is no evidence of the existence of a +God, miracles may be pronounced impossible for all +practical purposes in this controversy, and we need not +further discuss the question. +</p> + +<p> +The whole argument as to whether the occurrence of +a miracle is or is not contrary to reason must proceed +on the assumption of the existence of a personal God. +It is also a proposition so clear as to render all proof +of it superfluous, that if a personal God exists who has +created the universe and governs it by His Providence, +miracles are possible. +</p> + +<p> +First, I observe that a miracle cannot be pronounced +incredible, on the ground that it is an effect without an +adequate cause. On this point I may refer to the high +authority of Mr. Mill, that the idea of a miracle contradicts +no law of causation. <q>In order,</q> says he, +<q>that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a +law of causation, the allegation must be not simply that +the cause existed without being followed by the effect, +for that would be no uncommon occurrence, but that +this happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting +cause. Now in the case of an alleged miracle +the objection is the very opposite of this. It is that +the effect was defeated, not in the absence, but in consequence, +of a counteracting cause, viz., a direct +interposition of an act of will of some being who has +power over nature; and in particular of a being whose +will being assumed to have induced all the causes, with +<pb n='126'/><anchor id='Pg126'/> +the powers by which they produce their effects, may +well be supposed able to counteract them.</q> (<hi rend='italic'>Logic</hi>, +vol. ii. p. 167.) +</p> + +<p> +A miracle therefore may not be the result of the +action of any force which falls within the range of our +knowledge. It may be necessary for its performance +to neutralize the action of all existing forces by the +calling into energy of more powerful ones. But their +operation need not even be suspended. An adequate +force, or power, or cause (it matters not by what name +we call it) is present to effectuate the result; viz. the +power which rules the universe, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> God. As Mr. Mill +justly observes, the only question which can be raised +if the existence of God is assumed, is, not the want of +the presence of an adequate cause, for the supposition +pre-supposes the presence of one, but the want of will +on the part of God to bring about the result. Thus it +may be fairly argued that God will not work a miracle, +from the fact that He has not done so in the course of +previous observation. +</p> + +<p> +It has been frequently affirmed that a miracle is an +act which is contrary to the laws of nature, or a violation +of them, or a suspension of them, or a violation of +the order of nature; and that its occurrence is therefore +incredible, as being contrary to reason. A miracle +need involve neither of these. The laws of nature as +conceived by physical science are a set of antecedents +followed by a set of invariable consequents. A miracle +does not interfere with this. Its very conception +involves a new antecedent followed by its consequent. +The utmost that can be urged is that we have never +before witnessed the presence of that particular antecedent +and consequent, or that the antecedents which +we have witnessed have been followed by totally +different consequents. The only mode in which such a +<pb n='127'/><anchor id='Pg127'/> +law could be violated would be, if a particular antecedent +was present and no other capable of modifying +its action, and it failed to be attended with its proper +consequent. But this is not involved in the conception +of a miracle. +</p> + +<p> +Let us now suppose that the expression <q>laws of +nature</q> is extended so as to comprise the forces of +nature as well as its invariable sequences. Such a use +of the term is very common. In this point of view, it +is impossible to affirm that the laws of nature are +violated by the performance of a miracle. This could +only be the case if they were made to produce the +opposite results to those which they actually produce. +Thus, if a boiler were filled with water and a fire +kindled under it, and no other force was present capable +of neutralizing the action of the fire; if, instead of the +temperature of the water being raised, it gradually +froze, there would be a clear violation of the laws of +nature, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> its forces would cease to produce their +usual results. But there is nothing in the idea of a +miracle that involves this. It postulates the presence +of a force or forces which are adequate to counteract +the action of those already in existence, and to produce +the adequate result. +</p> + +<p> +It will be objected that we have never recognized the +existence of such forces in our previous experience. +Such an objection would be valid only on the assumption +that there is no force in the universe besides those +which have been already recognized by us. This, however, +science will in the present state of our knowledge +hardly venture to affirm. Besides, it is contrary to the +supposition with which we started, viz. the existence of +a power able to control nature, that is, God. +</p> + +<p> +Nor is the assertion correct that the performance of +a miracle necessarily involves even a suspension of the +<pb n='128'/><anchor id='Pg128'/> +laws of nature. This may be the mode of the divine +acting; but it is most important to observe that it by +no means follows that it must be so. A miracle may +be performed by the introduction of a force which has +sufficient power to counteract the forces of nature even +while they are in the fullest operation. To take an +illustration: It has been frequently said that the force +of gravity must have been suspended in favour of +Peter's body when he walked on the water, and in +favour of that of our Lord when he ascended into +heaven. But this is by no means the case. The mere +suspension of the law of gravitation would not in either +case have effected the results in question. The presence +of other forces was necessary. The law of gravitation +might have been in the fullest operation, and the +miracle might have been performed by the action of +other forces adequate to neutralize it. The narrative +itself implies that this force was so far from being suspended, +that it was in full operation at the time when +the miracle was performed, for the moment the power +which supported Peter's body ceased to act he began +to sink. +</p> + +<p> +But further: even if we assume that any natural +forces have been suspended in the performance of a +miracle, we are not called on to assume their general +suspension, but only in favour of the particular case in +question. This observation is rendered necessary because +it has been frequently urged against the possibility +of miracles that their performance must have +thrown the whole mechanism of the universe into confusion, +and involved an extensive reconstruction of the +processes of nature. This would unquestionably be +the case if the working of a miracle involved the difficulty +in question. But I have shown that it need not +involve even the suspension of any natural law whatever, +<pb n='129'/><anchor id='Pg129'/> +and if such suspension took place in any particular +case, the force might have been acting with full +energy everywhere else. +</p> + +<p> +The counteraction or modification of one force by the +agency of another is an event which we witness every +day. The force of gravity is in the fullest operation +whenever we lift a weight from the ground—it is not suspended +for a single moment. The ability to modify the +results of the action of one force by the agency of another, +or to combine many forces so as to produce a definite +result, constitutes the essence of all mechanical contrivance. +The self-determining power of the human will +is that which calls all these particular modifications of +existing forces into activity. By means of it, the entire +aspect of external nature has been changed from the +appearance which it would have presented, if no other +agency had existed besides the forces of nature which +belong to matter. Man has been a power manifested +in the midst of them. I am quite aware that he can +create no new force, and that he can only control or +modify the action of those which exist, but is never +capable of suspending them. Yet this power has produced +marvellous results on the external world, so that +it presents a wholly different aspect from that which +it would have done if the forces of nature had simply +continued acting uncontrolled by the influence of mind. +Even in material nature itself, we meet with repeated +instances of such modifications of the results of one +force by the action of another, as for example when the +force of gravitation is counteracted by that of magnetism, +or of capillary attraction. The action of no +force is suspended, it is only modified. +</p> + +<p> +The assertion therefore is inaccurate which affirms +that the performance of a miracle involves the suspension +of a single force in nature. It is consequently so +<pb n='130'/><anchor id='Pg130'/> +far no violation of any natural law. All that the idea of +it involves is the presence of a force which is capable +in a particular instance of counteracting the action of +those forces which would produce a contrary result if +left to themselves. It is quite unnecessary for us to +determine, in reference to the subject under consideration, +whether the result may be brought about by a +combination of forces which energize within the visible +sphere of things, or by bringing into action some latent +force, or one which only occasionally manifests itself, or +by the immediate action of the divine mind, which, +having in itself all the forces necessary to produce the +universe, must possess those which are necessary to +effect the miracle. +</p> + +<p> +It is a fact worthy of observation that in the case of +the miracles recorded in the Bible, the materials out +of which the new results were produced already existed +in nature, as in the miracle of the multiplication of the +loaves and fishes. No act of creation was necessary. +All that was required was the presence of a force or +forces, able to build up these materials into the forms +in question. God does this in ordinary course by what +we designate natural forces, by means of which corn is +grown and flesh produced. Can it be pretended that +no other forces are under the control of, or exist in +God, which are able to produce these results in a +different manner, even while the ordinary forces of +nature continue in activity? +</p> + +<p> +It has been further urged that a miracle involves a +violation of the laws of nature, because as it cannot be +effected by any of the forces of nature with which we +are acquainted, the presence of an unknown force adequate +to produce one must be a violation of the laws +of nature. +</p> + +<p> +I reply that any apparent force which this objection +<pb n='131'/><anchor id='Pg131'/> +may possess is due to an ambiguous use of the word +<q>law.</q> It is here used to denote the order of the various +occurrences in nature, and not its antecedents and +invariable consequents. If there are forces in nature +beyond those with which we are acquainted, how can +their action be a violation of nature's order? If God is +always present energizing in nature's forces, how can +any fresh putting forth of his energy be a violation of +nature's laws? In a certain sense of the words the +order of nature may be said to be violated whenever +one of its forces is modified by the action of another, +that is to say, an order of events results from the modified +action different from that which would have resulted +from the unmodified one. In this sense man is +daily violating the order of nature. But this has no +bearing whatever on the question at issue. +</p> + +<p> +It will perhaps be urged that the resurrection of a +dead man, or the cure of a man born blind by a word +is a violation of the laws of nature. Whether this be +so can only be determined when we are acquainted with +the means by which such an event may be brought +about. The assertion itself is a mere general statement +that, as far as human observation has gone, dead +men have never returned to life; and that blindness +has never been cured at any person's command. +</p> + +<p> +But with respect to a resurrection it may be objected +that it is an observed fact amounting to a complete induction, +that all men die and that after death has +taken place it is a fact no less universal that with the +exception of a few alleged instances to the contrary no +resurrection has ever taken place. It may therefore be +said to be a law of nature that all men die, and that +death is followed by no resurrection. This, however, if +put into other language amounts to the following proposition. +That it is a law of nature that these results +<pb n='132'/><anchor id='Pg132'/> +must follow, as long as the present forces which we observe +and no others are in energy. But it would cease +to be so as soon as any others capable of producing +such a result were brought into activity. The truth +is that death is a phenomenon which is caused by the +joint action of a multitude of natural forces. But if +these were overborne by any force of nature, or by the +Author of nature calling any unknown force into activity, +or even by the energy of his own creative will, +it would be absurd to call such an event either a violation +of the laws or of the order of nature, and therefore +to affirm that it was incredible. Death is the result +of the action of the natural forces which we observe +around us. No natural force with which we are acquainted +can effect a resurrection. If it be affirmed +that in this sense a resurrection is contrary to the laws +and order of nature, the expression is ambiguous and +misleading, for it is intended to be inferred that such a +violation would be contrary to reason and therefore +incredible. +</p> + +<p> +But the affirmation that a miracle is contrary to the +order of nature requires further consideration. What +do we intend to affirm when we speak of an order of +nature or of an event being contrary to it? +</p> + +<p> +In a scientific sense the order of nature can only +mean the results of forces energizing in conformity with +invariable law. Every event which occurs is the result +of a combination of such forces and the product +of their joint action. These results necessarily follow +an orderly arrangement; <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> the orderly result always +occurs when precisely the same antecedents and no +other are present, and is invariably altered whenever +the antecedents are modified to the precise extent of +the modification. As far then as the results in nature +are the effect of known forces unmodified in their +<pb n='133'/><anchor id='Pg133'/> +action by other forces, they follow a definite order. +Thus all the motions of the heavenly bodies present +themselves to the scientific mind as the perfection of +order, because they are the results of the action of +known forces acting in conformity with invariable law. +Whenever a fact is observed which deviates from the +order which these known forces would produce, the +action of another force which has hitherto been unknown +is inferred. The order of nature therefore +means that the same forces always produce the same +results. There is nothing inconsistent with this in the +correct conception of a miracle. Viewed as a physical +event only, it would be due to the action of a force +which has hitherto been outside the sphere of our observation. +</p> + +<p> +It is clear therefore that whenever a fresh combination +of forces takes place, their combined action will +modify the result, and a very different order of events +will take place from that which would have resulted +from their unmodified action. Such modification therefore +must produce a different order of nature from that +which would have otherwise resulted. But such modifications +frequently take place through the agency of +man. It therefore follows that man has the power of +effecting modifications in the order of nature, without +causing any violation of nature's laws. +</p> + +<p> +But various other influences, and among them those +usually designated as chances, exert a powerful influence +in changing the order of nature. It is necessary +that its forces should not only be combined, but combined +at the right time and place, or the effect which +is due to their combination will not take place; <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> a +different order of natural events would have happened. +An illustration will make this clear. Let us take the +case of a disintegrating rock; according as the different +<pb n='134'/><anchor id='Pg134'/> +forces, which act on it, meet at the suitable time and +place, the progress of disintegration is greatly lengthened +or shortened. Such concurrences of events are +what we view as pure contingencies. <hi rend='italic'>E.g.</hi> water penetrates +into one of its fissures; this takes place in +summer, and no appreciable result follows. But if in +winter a frost happens immediately afterwards, it will +produce an order of events widely different from that +which would have happened if either no rain had fallen +or frost occurred. By their joint agency the fissure is +widened, or the rock split asunder. It follows therefore +that the concurrence of these two forces is necessary +at a particular time and place to produce the particular +result. Such concurrences, though due to +natural causes, are what we call fortuitous. Yet their +occurrence or non-occurrence occasions a different order +of natural events. +</p> + +<p> +Further, let us suppose that a bird with a seed in its +mouth, in the course of its flight casually drops it into +a fissure in the rock, which has been opened by the frost; +and also that another concurrence of forces has supplied +the conditions suitable for its taking root and growth. +This produces a new series of events, which occasions a +more rapid disintegration, and modifies the whole of +the results which follow. If the casual act of the bird +had taken place at any other time or place, the whole +series would have been different, varying with the +causes which produced the seed, and the contingencies +which brought the bird to the spot, and induced it to +drop it. Let us now suppose that man with his rational +agency intervenes. He deliberately watches for +the prospect of a frosty night, pours water into the +fissures, and plants seeds in fissures where he knows +that suitable material has been prepared for their +growth. Here a new order of events has been introduced, +<pb n='135'/><anchor id='Pg135'/> +which, originating in human agency, entirely +modify the order of the results. +</p> + +<p> +It is important to observe that all theories which attempt +to account for the production of living organisms +by the principle of development are compelled at almost +every step of the process to postulate the concurrence +of forces of this description at the suitable time and +place to render their production possible. These must +have taken place in past time in numbers passing all +comprehension. In the case of many vegetable structures +the result has been entirely modified by the contingency +of some insect choosing to enter one flower +and not to enter another; and according as this takes +place a wholly different order of events follows. +Whether we choose to designate such concurrences of +events at the suitable time and place fortuitous or not, +the law which regulates them is wholly unknown, even +if they are regulated by law. So far it is impossible +to affirm that these results follow a known and definite +order in nature. The concurrence of two or more such +causes introduces a new series, and occasions a break +in the previously existing order of nature. +</p> + +<p> +Still more completely has this happened when man +with his reason and powers of volition is introduced on +the scene. It will doubtless be objected by our materialistic +philosophers, that the forces which energize +in mind act with the same uniformity as those that +energize in matter, and that volition exerts no appreciable +influence on the results of our actions. These +theories, however, contradict the experience of an overwhelming +majority of mankind. Such as do so require +that the strongest proof should be given before their +truth can be considered as established. Such proof +certainly yet remains to be given. Its advocates, +however, tell us that it will be forthcoming at some +<pb n='136'/><anchor id='Pg136'/> +future time. In the meanwhile the fact is sufficient for +our purpose that man is capable of acting on nature +and of producing most important changes in the results +of the action of its forces. This being so, it is +certain that an order of events takes place through +the interference of man, quite different from that which +would have taken place apart from his interference. +But these interferences take place in conformity with +no known law, and their results occasion a break in the +previously existing series of events, by the introduction +of a new one. Man, therefore, is capable of interfering +with and effecting changes in the order of +nature. It will be objected that all the agencies by +which such results are brought about are forces energizing +in nature in conformity with invariable law, and +consequently that the order of nature is preserved intact. +It is unquestionably true that the actual forces +at work are forces in nature. But there is another +principle at work which interferes with the regular +course of their action, and brings out a series of results +quite different to that which would have been +produced if they had not been interfered with. This +is man's reason and intelligent volition. It is impossible +to reduce the action of this to any known law +of invariable sequence. It follows therefore that man +is a power either in or out of nature, which is capable +of interfering with the order of the results of its material +forces, or, in the language of those with whom +I am reasoning, of violating the order of nature. +</p> + +<p> +But it will be further objected that man in his action +on nature can only use or combine such natural forces +as come within his knowledge; and this proves nothing +about the possibility of the action of a power outside +nature which is able to employ its known and unknown +forces for the purpose of producing such results as +<pb n='137'/><anchor id='Pg137'/> +miracles. I answer that this objection can have no +validity unless it is first assumed that man is a portion +of nature in the sense in which we are now speaking of +it. But the proof of this has certainly yet to be given. +By the word <q>nature,</q> as it is used by this philosophy, +is meant the sum total of known material forces, +acting on matter in conformity with invariable laws; +that is to say, of forces which are devoid of intelligence +and volition. It is impossible in this sense of the word +to include man in it, until his entire intellectual and +moral being can be shown to be the result of material +forces. Nor even if this could be done, would it avail +for the present argument; for however it may have +originated, man's power to modify the action of +material forces is an existing fact, and produces results +quite different in kind from the action of the unintelligent +forces of nature. +</p> + +<p> +The fact that the mind acts through a material +organism, and is incapable of calling into existence +any new force, does not alter the position above taken. +I am quite ready to take either of the following alternatives. +Man is either in nature, or he is outside of it. +If he is in it, then a power exists within it which is +capable of compelling its unintelligent forces to effectuate +the determinations of rational volition. If he is +outside nature, then a power exists outside it which is +capable of effectuating these results. It follows, +therefore, that in either case a power exists which is +capable of modifying the order of nature. Now it +would be absurd to deny that whatever man can effect, +God is able also to effect; and that He is so much the +more able, in proportion as His knowledge is more +perfect. Whether, therefore, God works in nature, or +outside it, a power exists which is capable of varying +the order of nature without interrupting the action of +<pb n='138'/><anchor id='Pg138'/> +any of its forces, or violating its laws. He also must +have other forces at His command beyond those which +are known to man, and can combine them and thereby +modify their action in conformity with His pleasure. +He must also be the primary force everywhere underlying +nature, which imparts to every other force its +energy and power. It follows that He can work a +miracle without even suspending any of the existing +forces of nature, and that the allegation that miracles +are contrary to reason, because they are contrary to +nature, and a violation of its laws and order, is +disproved. +</p> + +<p> +I will now proceed to adduce examples of these contradictions +to our reason which are said to be involved +in the occurrence of a miracle, for the purpose of +illustrating the confusion arising from the various +senses in which the words <q>nature</q> and <q>natural +law,</q> and other similar expressions have been employed. +Although the instances will be taken from the opponents +of Revelation, I by no means wish to imply that they +alone have been guilty of this ambiguous use of language. +Its defenders are equally obnoxious to the +charge. +</p> + +<p> +After quoting a brief passage from Dr. Newman, the +author of <q>Supernatural Religion</q> urges the following +objections: <q>Miracles are here described as <q>beside, +beyond, and above</q> nature, but a moment's consideration +will show that in so far as these terms have any +meaning at all, they are simply evasions, and not solutions +of a difficulty. If the course of nature be interrupted +in any way, whether the interruption be said to +proceed from some cause which is said to be beyond, +or beside, or above nature, it is certain that the interruption +is not caused by nature itself; and every disturbance +of the order of nature, call it by whatsoever +<pb n='139'/><anchor id='Pg139'/> +name we may, is contrary to nature, whose chief +characteristic is invariability of law. It is clearly +unnatural for the ordinary course of nature to be disturbed, +and indeed were this not the case, the disturbance +would be no miracle at all.</q> +</p> + +<p> +It is by no means my purpose to defend Dr. Newman's +use of the expressions, <q>natural,</q> <q>beside nature,</q> +<q>beyond nature,</q> or <q>above nature.</q> But while the +author criticises Dr. Newman, it is clear that in this +passage he has fallen into a number of very singular +confusions of thought. +</p> + +<p> +First: The words <q>nature</q> and <q>natural,</q> are used +as though they had one clear, simple, and invariable +meaning, whereas in this passage they are used so as to +include phenomena which widely differ from one +another. We are not told what is included under the +term <q>nature,</q> whether it is restricted to matter, its +forces, and its laws, or whether it also includes mind +and all its phenomena. When we speak of interruptions +in the order of nature, we usually intend it to be +assumed that volition is the cause of these interruptions. +This being so, the author has included in +nature phenomena which differ so widely from one +another as those of mind and matter. He then speaks +of the chief characteristic of nature being invariability +of law. The laws and forces which regulate matter +are distinguished by this invariability. But the action +of mind is very different. All men habitually speak of +some portions of it as capricious. Whether they are +so or not, nothing is more certain than that many of +our mental phenomena have not been reduced to the +action of known laws. +</p> + +<p> +When, therefore, such expressions as <q>beside, +beyond, and above nature,</q> and <q>natural,</q> are used, +I ask what nature is intended? Is it matter, its +<pb n='140'/><anchor id='Pg140'/> +forces and laws; or mind, including the principle of +volition; or both? If man is included in nature, then +there is a power in nature which is capable of controlling +other portions of nature, and even of acting on itself. +If man is excluded from nature, then there must exist +a power outside nature, which is <q>beyond and above +nature,</q> and is capable of acting on it. But if by +nature is meant the sum total of all the forces which +exist, whether material or immaterial, then it is clear +that a power must exist in nature which is capable of +controlling the forces of material nature, and of compelling +them to effectuate its purposes. Whichever +point of view we take of it, the objection falls to the +ground. +</p> + +<p> +But, says the author, <q>If the course of nature be +interrupted in any way, whether the interruption proceed +from a cause beyond, beside, or above nature, +such interruption cannot be caused by nature; and +every disturbance in the order of nature is contrary to +nature.</q> This passage seems to imply that an interruption +in the order of nature cannot proceed from +nature itself. But this is certainly incorrect. Natural +forces, that is to say, material ones, modify one another; +and by their combined action, they produce a series of +events quite different from what would be the result of +their separate action. Such a new series of events is +to all intents and purposes an interruption of the +previous order of nature and the introduction of a new +one. Such results are produced by fortuitous combinations +taking place, in the manner which I have +already illustrated, at the right time and place. The +fortuitous combination of forces in nature is capable of +producing a new order <q>contrary to</q> the previous +order of nature. +</p> + +<pb n='141'/><anchor id='Pg141'/> + +<p> +This, as I have shown, is still more evidently the +case if we include the phenomena of mind in nature. +</p> + +<p> +But it is affirmed, <q>if the interruption be due to a +cause either beyond, beside, or above nature, the interruption +cannot be caused by nature.</q> This is of course +a self-evident truth. But then it is inferred that +such interruption is a disturbance of the order of +nature; and that every disturbance of its order is +contrary to nature. The inference which the reader is +left to draw, and which is directly stated in other parts +of the work, is, that what is contrary to nature is contrary +to reason; that a miracle is thus contrary to +nature, and therefore contrary to reason. +</p> + +<p> +I observe that, although the interruption here referred +to cannot be caused by nature (for it is contrary +to the conditions of the case that it should be), yet it +by no means follows that it is a breach of the order of +nature in any other sense than that which I have +already discussed. Such disturbances occur every day. +It is, therefore, misleading to designate them as contrary +to nature, as they neither necessarily suspend +any natural force nor violate any natural law. I have +already proved that there is nothing in such disturbances, +or, if we persist in so designating them violations +of the order of nature, that is contrary to reason. +Such a use of the terms <q>course and order of nature</q> +is full of ambiguities and certain to betray us into fallacious +reasonings. +</p> + +<p> +But, adds the writer, <q>it is clearly unnatural that the +ordinary course of nature should be disturbed.</q> Here +the ambiguity of the expressions used, and the consequent +fallacy of the reasonings, are brought to a +culmination. +</p> + +<p> +What, I ask, is intended by the ordinary course of +nature? Is it the invariable action of its forces, or the +<pb n='142'/><anchor id='Pg142'/> +invariable sequences of their results, or the orderly +arrangement of its parts; or does it include mind and +all its phenomena, of the precise nature of the forces, +laws and order of which we are ignorant, and its action +on the physical universe? What, again, is the precise +meaning which can be attached to the word <q>unnatural</q> +in such a context, where it is evident that its +meaning must vary according as we include in nature +one, several, or all of these phenomena? If by the +word <q>unnatural</q> the meaning intended to be conveyed +is unusual or impossible, it is then clearly not +unnatural that the course of nature should be interrupted +in the manner I have previously pointed +out. Nor if man is included in nature, is it unnatural +that the results produced by its physical forces should +be greatly modified by his action? +</p> + +<p> +The remark of the author in connection with this +subject is perfectly true, that a grain could never of +itself, nor according to the law of natural development, +issue in a loaf of bread; but it is wholly aside from the +issue which he raises. It is unquestionable that forces +purely physical could not effect this result; but does +it follow from this that the production of a loaf of +bread is an event contrary to nature? The result can +only be produced by the combination and controlling +of a number of material forces by human reason. The +grain of wheat must be planted by man at the proper +season. It must be cared for by him. Various physical +forces must contribute to the growth and development +of the plant. The ears produced must be reaped +in harvest-time. This process must be repeated until +the grains are sufficient in number to produce our +intended loaf. Then they must be threshed, ground, +prepared for the oven, baked. In one word, the +miller and the baker must be invoked to control, combine, +<pb n='143'/><anchor id='Pg143'/> +modify and give a new direction to the forces of +nature under the direction of intelligence. All this +involves something more than the action of material +forces. The forces of nature carry on the work to a +certain point. Then man takes it up and interrupts +their order, although he does so by compelling other +forces to effectuate the purposes of his will. The ordinary +course of material nature is disturbed in the +production of a loaf of bread. A new order of events +is introduced. Man is either within or without nature. +In either case a power exists which is capable of producing +innovations in its order. +</p> + +<p> +But how stands the case of the feeding of five thousand +persons on seven loaves and two fishes? The +seven loaves and two fishes had been previously produced, +by the action of material forces out of materials +already existing in the ground, in water, and in the air. +Of such materials there was abundance at hand to +produce the requisite amount of food for the feeding of +the multitude. The only question was how to build +them up into the forms of bread and fish. There was no +occasion to create one single particle of matter. As to +the nature of the forces employed to work the miracle +the narrative says nothing. Nor does it imply that one +of the ordinary forces of nature was suspended on the +occasion. All that it asserts is the presence of a force +adequate to build up the materials already existing into +the forms of bread and fish, that force being God. In +the manufacture of the loaves and in the catching of the +fish, man had interfered with nature's order by the +blending of her powers. God interfered with nature's +order at a higher stage by building up the particular +forms of bread and fish out of materials already in +existence, by means of forces differing from those +which come under our cognisance. The act of man is +<pb n='144'/><anchor id='Pg144'/> +evidence of the presence of a being who is able to control +the forces of external nature for his own purposes. +The miracle would be evidence of the presence of a +Being who is able to exert a mightier influence over +them in order to effect his own. +</p> + +<p> +Equal ambiguity prevails in the use of the term +<q>law.</q> What do we mean by law when we apply the +term to nature? In physical philosophy, the Duke +of Argyll tells us it is used in a great variety of senses. +Its proper meaning is to denote an invariable sequence +of phenomena. It is frequently made to include the +conception of the forces at work which produce the +phenomena. This ambiguous use of the word has +been a source of endless confusion. The following +quotation will furnish us with an example:— +</p> + +<p> +<q>If in animated beings we have the solitary instance +of an efficient cause acting among the forces of nature +and possessing the power of initiation, this efficient +cause produces no disturbance of physical law. Its +existence is as much a recognised part of the infinite +variety of form within the order of nature, as the +existence of a crystal or a plant; and although the +character of the force exercised by it may not be clearly +understood, its effects are regulated by the same laws +as govern all the other forces of nature. If the laws of +matter are suspended by the laws of life, each time an +animated being moves any part of its body, one physical +law is suspended in precisely the same manner +and to an equivalent degree, each time another physical +law is called into action. The law of gravitation, +for instance, is suspended by the law of magnetism +each time a magnet suspends a weight in the air. In +each case a law is successfully resisted precisely to the +extent of the force employed.... No exercise +of will can overcome the law of gravitation or any +<pb n='145'/><anchor id='Pg145'/> +other law to a greater extent than the actual force +exerted, any more than a magnetic current can do +so beyond the action of the battery. Will has no +power against exhaustion. Even Moses in the sublimest +moments of faith could not hold up his arms +to heaven after his physical force was consumed.</q> +P. 44, vol. i. +</p> + +<p> +First: it is alleged <q>that an efficient cause</q> (man +for example) <q>acting among the forces of nature, and +possessing the power of initiation, produces no disturbance +of physical law.</q> What is here meant by +disturbance of physical law? It is plain that physical +forces would work out a wholly different result apart +from the action of man upon them. Though he suspends +no physical force, the action of man has produced +an order of events in nature different from that +which would have taken place without it, but by +balancing one against the other he modifies their +action. What is more, he possesses a power of self-determination. +Other forces are unintelligent. Man is +an intelligent force capable of introducing an order of +nature quite different from that which the material +forces of nature would have produced without his intervention. +</p> + +<p> +Next: we are told that the existence of man <q>is as +much a recognised part of the infinite variety of form +within the order of nature as the existence of a plant +or a crystal.</q> I again ask, what nature? Is the order +spoken of that of blind unintelligent forces, or does it +include intelligence and free agency? Unless man is +a blind unintelligent force, although he be supposed to +exist within nature, he belongs to an order wholly +different from that of a plant or a crystal. To assert the +contrary is to assume the whole question. The results +<pb n='146'/><anchor id='Pg146'/> +produced by intelligent volition differ completely in +character from those effected by the unintelligent +forces of nature. The one follows an order of necessity: +the other of freedom. The affirmation that the results +of the latter belong to the same order as those of the +former is directly contrary to facts. +</p> + +<p> +Again: <q>the laws of matter are suspended by the +laws of life.</q> If laws are the invariable sequences of +phenomena how is it possible that one law can suspend +another law? It is not even true that one force can +suspend another force. All that it can do is to neutralize +its action. Physical philosophy is constantly +attributing to laws what can only be true of forces, and +even frequently ascribes to them what is only true of intelligent +forces. It must never be overlooked in this +controversy that the laws of nature can effectuate +nothing. Forces, not laws, produce results. The following +sentence will be a correct expression of a truth, +if we substitute <q>force</q> for <q>law:</q> <q>The law of +gravitation is overcome by the law of magnetism each +time a magnet suspends a weight in the air.</q> Immediately +after, we are told that the arm falls in obedience +to law. It falls by the force of gravitation. When +theologians use metaphors of this description they are +charged with anthropomorphism. Such a charge is +equally valid against the language in which physical +philosophy expresses itself. +</p> + +<p> +Again: The author affirms <q>that the solitary instance +of an efficient cause, if it be distinguished from the +other forces of nature by the possession of an initiatory +impulse, is from the moment when that power is exerted +subject to physical laws like all other forces; and there +is no instance producible, or even logically conceivable, +of any power whose effects are opposed to the ultimate +<pb n='147'/><anchor id='Pg147'/> +ruling of the laws of nature. The occurrence of anything +opposed to these laws is incredible.</q> p. 48. +</p> + +<p> +What is meant, I ask, by <q>the intimate ruling of +the laws of nature</q>? Even if we substitute forces for +laws, the meaning is sufficiently obscure. Probably +the expression is intended to mean the combined result +effected by the energy of all the forces in nature. If +these include all mental as well as all material forces, +then the assertion is a simple truism, that nothing can +be contrary to itself. But if they exclude mental +force, then the results which they produce are clearly +opposed to the ultimate ruling of the forces of unintelligent +nature. Numerous instances are not only +logically conceivable, but actually producible. The +occurrence, therefore, of anything opposed to the ultimate +rulings of these unintelligent physical forces is +not incredible. It is perfectly true that man can only +produce results through the agency of these physical +forces; but he can modify their results, and so use +them as to make them the means of effectuating his +purposes. It is quite true that nothing can occur +opposed to the forces of nature; that is to say, that, +while the force of gravitation is in energy, and no other +force is present capable of overcoming its power, the +ascension of a human body into heaven is impossible. +But who has ever affirmed that it was possible? Those +who affirm that an ascension has taken place, also assert +that another force was in active energy, which was +capable of counteracting the force of gravitation. This +assertion, therefore, is totally irrelevant to the point +at issue. +</p> + +<p> +The consideration of the next question before us may +very properly be introduced, by quoting the following +passage of the same author: +</p> + +<p> +<q>Our highest attainable conception of infinite power +<pb n='148'/><anchor id='Pg148'/> +and wisdom is based on the universality and invariability +of law, and inexorably excludes as unworthy and +anthropomorphistic any idea of its fitful suspension.</q> +</p> + +<p> +This at once raises the very important question, +whether there is anything in the performance of a +miracle inconsistent with the divine character and perfections. +It has been often alleged by those who deny +the possibility of miracles, that God energizes in the +universe in conformity with invariable laws, which +express the uniform mode of the divine working. +From these, as the result of his wisdom, He will never +deviate. To alter or vary from this mode of acting +implies that the machinery of the universe, through +which He acts, is imperfect. The supposition that He +has worked a miracle therefore involves the assumption +that He has ceased from one mode of action and adopted +another; or, in other words, that the forces of the +universe fail to effectuate his purposes; or that the +whole machine has got out of order and requires rectification. +Any action of this kind in the case of a Being +possessed of all power, is a reflection both on his +wisdom and his immutability. Still further: it is +affirmed by some that the love of order is an attribute +so inherent in Deity, that it is inconceivable that any +alteration in the existing order of the universe should +take place under his government. +</p> + +<p> +One objection raised in the above quotation I may +dismiss summarily, viz. the idea that God interposes +with any fitful interventions in the universe. The idea +of fitful intervention is quite foreign to the conception +of a miracle, which is described in the New Testament +as one of the means by which he realizes his deliberate +purposes. I shall elsewhere disprove the allegation +that Revelation is an intervention of the Creator to +rectify a miscarriage in his creative work. +</p> + +<pb n='149'/><anchor id='Pg149'/> + +<p> +It will also be desirable in this place to answer the +charge of anthropomorphism so frequently urged +against the defenders of Christianity. When they +speak of God as a person, they are charged with manufacturing +a gigantic man. When they ascribe to Him +a moral character, or describe Him as acting in nature, +they are then accused of making a God out of a number +of conceptions which are purely human. This fault, if +it be one, must be shared alike by philosophers, men of +science, and theologians. The plain fact is, that man +has no conceptions but human ones. To abandon these +is to cease to think altogether. When philosophers +and men of science speak of nature, they are obliged +to apply to it conceptions which are strictly true only +of man. We are obliged to do precisely the same +with respect to God. So far all thought, the most +elevated and the most ordinary, is anthropomorphic. +The term can be fairly used as a reproach only when +certain material conceptions or degraded passions are +directly affirmed to exist in the divine mind. +</p> + +<p> +The author, in the following passage, places the objection +before us in a still more striking light: <q>Being +therefore limited to reason for our feeble conceptions +of the divine Being of which we are capable, and reason +being totally opposed to an order of nature so imperfect +as to require or permit repeated interference, and rejecting +the supposition of arbitrary suspension of law, +such a conception of the Deity as is proposed by theologians +must be pronounced irrational, and derogatory +to the wisdom and perfection which we recognize in the +invariable order of nature. It is impossible for us to +conceive the supreme Being acting otherwise than we +actually see in nature; and if we recognize in the +universe the operation of his infinite wisdom and power, +it is in the immutable order and regularity of all phenomena, +<pb n='150'/><anchor id='Pg150'/> +and the eternal prevalence of law that we see +their highest manifestation.</q> +</p> + +<p> +It is asserted by this writer and a great number of +others, that the most perfect conception of the universe +is that of a machine, which when once set into action +shall go on eternally grinding out its results without +the smallest occasion for the intervention of its Maker. +According to this view, all the He has to do for the +future after the machine is once set into operation, is to +retire from the scene of His creative work, and to contemplate +the results of its wonderful operations. Any +intervention on His part would imply a defect in the +construction of the machine. It follows therefore that +the most perfect conception of God (if there be one) is +that of a perfect mechanist and chemist, who has originally +formed matter with its properties and forces +acting in conformity with invariable law, and that this +has been done by Him with such perfection, that they +have gone on ever since evolving whatever has +existed, without the need of His intervention or supervision; +or to put it in other words, after the original +act of creation, His presence in the universe may be +dispensed with as unnecessary. The universe is therefore +a self-acting machine which goes on in an eternal +series of self-evolutions. +</p> + +<p> +Such a conception may be the most worthy one that +we can form of a perfect mechanist or chemist, though +it may be doubtful how far the idea of having his services +dispensed with for the future would be wholly +satisfactory to him. It is far from clear, however, that +it is the most perfect conception we can form of God. +The creations of the mechanist and of the chemist are +destitute alike of feeling, reason and volition, a moral +nature, conscience, and spiritual affections. They may +therefore when completed be left to themselves; and +<pb n='151'/><anchor id='Pg151'/> +the more perfect the irrational machine may be, the +more perfectly it will grind out its results. But many +of the constructions of God possess attributes, which +exhibit other qualities in their maker than those of a +perfect mechanist or chemist. It follows, therefore, +that this is not the most perfect nor the most worthy +conception which we can form of God. +</p> + +<p> +But it will be objected that even if we concede that +the Creator is ever present energizing in the works of +nature, and even if the forces of nature are viewed as +the expressions of His energy, His action in conformity +with unchanging order is the worthiest conception of +Him, and to assert that He ever has varied from this +mode of action is to degrade Him. Such being the +case, to affirm that miracles have been wrought by +Him, is to introduce a degraded view of the character +of God, one alike inconsistent with His wisdom, immutability +and power. +</p> + +<p> +I reply: that the objection overlooks the existence +of purpose in the divine mind, and that it may not be +confined to the realization of a mechanical result. The +purpose or idea of creation in God includes the production +of both the material and the moral worlds. +If this be so, one harmonious purpose, including the +divine manifestations, both in the material and moral +universe, may be carried out by a succession of progressive +manifestations, each forming a portion of one +great divine plan. A miracle, therefore, as a part of +such a moral intervention, would be no interruption of +the orderly action of the divine mind, but a portion +of it. +</p> + +<p> +But further: if God exists, He must have other +attributes besides those of a mechanist or a chemist. +He has created not only the material universe, but a +moral one. God, therefore, must be a moral being, and a +<pb n='152'/><anchor id='Pg152'/> +person, for moral attributes can only be conceived of +as belonging to a being who is possessed of personality. +It follows, therefore, that manifestations of Himself, +under aspects suitable to moral beings, are as much to +be expected as manifestations of His power or of His +wisdom addressed to an intellectual nature. The supposition, +therefore, that all His manifestations can only +be made through the laws of material nature, and in an +unchanging series, and that it is not a portion of His +purpose to manifest Himself as a moral being, is only +valid on the denial that He is one. It involves the +absurdity of denying to God that freedom from the +trammels of necessary law which as matter of fact He +has bestowed on man. +</p> + +<p> +If therefore God be a moral being and not an impersonal +force, it is perfectly consistent with the highest +conceptions of Him, that He should manifest Himself +in the moral as well as in the material universe. This +is the more necessary, because philosophy is never +wearied with telling us, that we can know little or +nothing of His moral attributes from material nature. +As a part of such manifestation a miracle is addressed +to our highest reason. +</p> + +<p> +It is absurd to argue on the assumption that there +is a God, and then to found our reasonings on principles +which are inconsistent with it. If there is a God, +He must be the creator of the universe. It must, +therefore, have been consistent with His perfection and +immutability to create. It follows, therefore, even on +the assumption of the truth of the Darwinian theory of +creation, that a new order must have been introduced, +when God first breathed life into the lowest +forms of matter. But if He introduced a new order +then, that is to say, when He first deviated from the +previous order of His existence, and performed His +<pb n='153'/><anchor id='Pg153'/> +first creative act, how can it possibly be contrary to +reason to affirm that He has repeated it. A miracle +would be such a repetition, or, in other words, the introduction +of a new series of events. +</p> + +<p> +I fully admit that reason is opposed to the supposition +of such an order of nature as to require repeated +interferences with it, assuming that what is intended +is a frequent meddling with it to set it right, not constant +presence and superintendence. Still more is it +opposed to the idea of arbitrary interruption of law. +The entire validity of these reasonings which we have +been considering proceeds on the assumption that +the argument requires this. I care not what some +Christian apologists may have said on this subject. +The New Testament affirms in the most unequivocal +language that revelation is the steady carrying out of +a pre-determined purpose in God to make a manifestation +of Himself not only to man, but to other rational +beings besides man. The objection therefore falls to +the ground. +</p> + +<p> +The assertion that it is impossible to conceive of the +supreme Being acting otherwise than we see him act in +nature, may be met by a direct denial. On the contrary +the presence of evil, moral and physical, forms +the greatest difficulty connected with the belief in +theism. The elder Mill was so capable of conceiving +that if a supreme Being existed, the order of the universe +would have been so wholly different from its +present order, that it led him to affirm that the proof of +His existence was altogether wanting.<note place='foot'>J. S. Mill, in his recently published essays, considers this the most +formidable objection against theism.</note> But intelligent +Christians fully recognize in the immutable order and +regularity of the universe and the eternal prevalence +of law, the operation of His infinite wisdom and power. +<pb n='154'/><anchor id='Pg154'/> +Unless there was such a general regularity and order +in the universe, the evidential force of miracles would +be deprived of all value. +</p> + +<p> +It follows therefore, whichever views we may take of +the mode in which a miracle may be performed, that +there is nothing in the idea of it which is contrary to +our reason. Whenever it is affirmed to be so, the +assertion originates in an ambiguity in the use of +terms, or in partial views of nature, or of the mode of +the divine working, or from confounding under a common +name phenomena so different in character as those +of mind and matter, or by making assumptions respecting +the divine operations which contradict the laws +of the universe, or respecting the divine character, +which reason refuses to endorse. How far the known +or unknown forces of nature may be employed in the +performance of a miracle is an abstract question that +we have no means of determining. The agency of +some of the known forces of nature is unequivocally +asserted in the Old Testament to have been the media +employed in the performance of some of its miracles. +No such affirmation is made in the New Testament. +Still there is not one word to imply that any of the +forces of material nature were for a single moment +suspended in their action. The only assertion made is +the presence and active energy of a force capable of +producing them. That force is the Creator of the universe +bearing witness to the divine mission of Jesus +Christ. <q>The Father himself, which hath sent me, +hath borne witness of me.</q> <q>The works which the +Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I +do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me.</q> +(John v. 36, 37.) +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='155'/><anchor id='Pg155'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter VII. The Allegation That No Testimony Can Prove The +Truth Of A Supernatural Event.</head> + +<p> +Hume's position, which affirmed that it is impossible +to prove the truth of a supernatural event by any +amount of testimony however strong, is certainly one +of the most plausible that have ever been assumed by +unbelief. Stated briefly and in his own words, it is +as follows: <q>A miracle is a violation of the laws of +nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has +established these laws, the proof against a miracle from +the nature of the fact is as entire as any argument +from experience can possibly be imagined.</q> Again: +<q>No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle +unless the testimony is of such a kind that its falsehood +would be more miraculous than the fact which it +endeavours to establish.</q> The fallacy of these positions, +notwithstanding the plausible arguments by +which they are supported, has already been pointed +out by a multitude of writers. Mr. Mill himself has +practically abandoned Hume's argument as either a +harmless truism, or, in another point of view, one that +requires to be modified to such an extent as to deprive +it of any real cogency. Under ordinary circumstances, +therefore, it might be passed over in silence. +</p> + +<p> +But the author of <q>Supernatural Religion</q> has endeavoured +to rehabilitate it even against Mr. Mill. He +affirms that Christian <q>Apologists find it much more +convenient to evade the simple but effective arguments +<pb n='156'/><anchor id='Pg156'/> +of Hume, than to answer them; and where it is possible, +they dismiss them with a sneer, and hasten on to +less dangerous ground.</q> He then endeavours to show +that Mr. Mill has been partly misapprehended, and is +partly inaccurate; and he proceeds to address himself +to Paley's argument against Hume, as though it was +relied on by modern apologists as entirely conclusive. +No other writer is even noticed by him. In the recent +work of the late Mr. Warington, <q>Can I believe in +miracles?</q> one chapter is devoted to the calm and dispassionate +examination of Hume's argument. It is +perhaps the ablest dissection of it in existence. Yet +this writer, who charges Christian apologists with +evasion, and even with getting rid of its force by a +sneer, has left Mr. Warington's crushing reply to +Hume completely unnoticed. The position taken by +him renders a few general observations necessary. As +it will be useless to repeat arguments that have been +fully elaborated elsewhere, I shall content myself with +briefly stating the positions which have been firmly +established on this subject. +</p> + +<p> +First: Experience consists of two kinds; 1st, That +which has fallen under our own direct cognizance, which +from the nature of the case must have been very +limited. 2dly, The general experience of all other +men, as far as we have the means of knowing it. This +latter experience we become acquainted with exclusively +by testimony, and it rests entirely on its validity. The +two together constitute what we mean when we say +that a thing is, or is not, contrary to experience. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly: There is a sense in which miracles are +contrary to our experience. They would be destitute +of all evidential value, if they were not so. But while +this is freely admitted, we must lay down clearly in +what sense we use the words. They are not so, in the +<pb n='157'/><anchor id='Pg157'/> +sense that we have had direct evidence of their non-occurrence. +They are contrary to our experience only +in the sense that we have never witnessed them, and +that the order of events which we have witnessed is +always different; for instance, we have witnessed as a +matter of experience that men die, and that none +return again to life; or that blind men, when cured, +are never cured by a word or a touch. In this sense +alone it is that the resurrection of a dead man, and the +cure of a blind man by a touch, is contrary to our +experience. +</p> + +<p> +Thirdly: It is not true that an occurrence which in +this sense is contrary to our experience cannot be +believed on adequate testimony. If it were so, all +additions to our knowledge that lie beyond the limits +of our past experience, ought to be rejected. Every +extraordinary occurrence must be at once pronounced +incredible. +</p> + +<p> +Fourthly: The experience of one age differs from +that of another. That which lies outside the experience +of one century becomes within the experience of the +next. The truth is that the sum of human experience +is receiving continual additions, in proportion as the +sphere of observation enlarges. If it is true that we +ought to reject everything contrary to experience, +it follows that if many of the inventions of the present +age had been reported in a previous one, they ought to +have been rejected as incredible. For example: if a +century ago it had been affirmed that a message had +actually been conveyed one thousand miles in five +minutes, the assertion ought on this principle to have +been rejected as contrary to the universal experience of +mankind. In an earlier age, no miracle could have +been more difficult to believe. Yet although contrary +to prior experience, it has been established as a fact. +<pb n='158'/><anchor id='Pg158'/> +The principle, therefore, as laid down by Hume, leads +to an absurd conclusion. +</p> + +<p> +Fifthly: The experience of each individual is limited +by his own observation and what he has learned respecting +that of others. This constitutes as far as he is +concerned the experience of mankind. Now, under +the Equator the experience of man is that each day and +night is twelve hours long. Neither he, nor his +ancestors, nor any person whom he trusts, have ever +had any other experience than this. To him, therefore, +the affirmation that there is a place on the earth where +each day and night is six months long, is contrary to +experience, and ought to be rejected as a fable. +</p> + +<p> +Sixthly: If we confine experience to scientific experience, +extraordinary discoveries are made and facts +established in one age which are contrary to that of +a former one. On this principle, the ground on which +Herodotus rejected the story of the Phœnician navigators +that they had sailed round Africa was satisfactory. +It was contrary to his experience that they +should have seen the sun in the position in which they +affirmed that they had seen it, though it is not contrary +to ours. +</p> + +<p> +Seventhly: Miracles viewed as mere <emph>phenomena</emph> +stand on exactly the same ground as very unusual +occurrences, or very wonderful discoveries. As far as +they are contrary to past experience, they are alike +credible or incredible. They are events of which the +cause is unknown, but may or may not hereafter be +discovered. It is quite true that any extraordinary +phenomenon requires a stronger testimony to render it +credible than an ordinary occurrence. But this involves +no question of abstract possibility or impossibility, but +is one purely of evidence, each case having to be +decided on its own merits. It must be carefully +<pb n='159'/><anchor id='Pg159'/> +observed that when we affirm that this or that matter +lies within human knowledge, or is contrary to it, +experience has to do with phenomena alone. All +questions of causation lie entirely beyond its cognizance. +</p> + +<p> +Eighthly: The moment we view an event otherwise +than as a mere phenomenon, and take into consideration +the causes producing it, however unusual it may +be, it is impossible to affirm that it is contrary to experience. +When we take these into consideration the +entire character of the event is at once changed, and +the probability of the occurrence must be estimated on +wholly different grounds. Under such circumstances, +an extremely improbable event, which we might otherwise +justly reject as contrary to experience, becomes +simply one of which we have had no experience. Thus +it is contrary to experience that men can live for one +hour under water, but when we take into consideration +and thoroughly understand the contrivance of the +diving-bell, the event becomes one of a different order +from that of which we supposed that we had experience. +Before this apparatus was invented, the assertion that +men could live an hour under water would have been +rejected as fabulous. The invention has introduced a +fresh condition into the case. The event has now +become a portion of our experience; but prior to the +discovery of the apparatus it was merely an event +lying outside our experience, and not to be rejected as +being contrary to it. In a similar way, a miracle, as +a mere phenomenon, may be said to be contrary to our +experience; but the moment that we take into account +its true character, viz. that its very conception implies +the presence of a force of some kind with which we were +previously unacquainted, then such an event is no +longer one which we can pronounce contrary to our +experience, but merely one which lies beyond or outside +<pb n='160'/><anchor id='Pg160'/> +it. In the case of miracles, therefore, the position of +Hume is inapplicable. +</p> + +<p> +Ninthly: It is not true that in estimating the truth +of testimony, we simply balance probability, against +probability, as stated in Hume's argument. The form +in which it has been put by him is too abstract to +admit of application to individual cases; nor does any +man, in estimating the truth of testimony for practical +purposes, set down and deliberately balance probabilities +against probabilities. The whole process is of a +far more instantaneous character, and a number of +minute considerations are involved, which do not admit +of statement in the form of general propositions. Thus, +if an event lying outside my present experience is +reported to me by a friend on whose veracity and +powers of judgment I have implicit reliance, I accept +the truth of his statement, notwithstanding a great +degree of abstract improbability; it being assumed +that the event was one in which it was impossible that +he should be deceived. In estimating this latter point, +we never balance the probabilities as to the truth or +falsehood of human testimony, but we consider the individual +circumstances of the case, whether they are +of such a nature that our friend could be deceived +about them. If on consideration we are convinced +that deception was impossible, we yield assent to his +known veracity, although, as far as we know, the event +reported by him has never before come within the +range of human experience. +</p> + +<p> +Let me remove the question from an abstract into a +concrete form. There are numberless events in which +it happens that men of unquestionable judgment and +veracity are deceived. There are others in which no +deception can be possible. An instance of one class is +the alleged case of persons living a considerable time +<pb n='161'/><anchor id='Pg161'/> +without food. Here astuteness may impose on the +vigilance of the most wary. Take, on the other hand, +the case of a man born blind. One informant, on +whose veracity we have the fullest reliance, tells us +that he has known the man from his birth; that, up to +a certain day, his blindness was established beyond +all reasonable doubt to every one who knew him, that +on that day, he saw a person touch the eyes of the +blind man, who not only instantly received his sight, +but could use his eyes as perfectly as those who had +enjoyed the use of them from birth. I admit that this +case is a supposed one, and does not exactly represent +any case recorded in the Gospels. But though an +assumed one, it is perfectly valid for the purposes of +argument. In it deception would be impossible. If +all this was affirmed to have come under the direct +knowledge of one, of whose veracity and judgment we +were assured, we should accept his statement as true, +without balancing the abstract probability of the truth +of evidence against the probability of its falsity, although +the event narrated lay outside the range of our +experience. Our knowledge of the judgment and +veracity of the informant is the essential element in +judging of the truth of evidence. It is only when our +means of forming this judgment are deficient that we +attempt to balance abstract probabilities. +</p> + +<p> +Tenthly: The question of the truth of testimony as +against past experience and the alleged greater probability +that testimony should be false, than that past +experience should be unreliable, is greatly modified by +the consideration that an overwhelming amount of the +sum total of past experience rests for its acceptance on +the validity of testimony itself. That portion which is +not the result of our own individual experience rests +for its truth exclusively on the validity of human testimony, +<pb n='162'/><anchor id='Pg162'/> +and must be unreliable in proportion as testimony +is invalid. It must be observed, however, that +I by no means deny that testimony is much more +frequently invalid in its narrations of extraordinary +events than of ordinary ones. +</p> + +<p> +Eleventhly: While it is freely conceded that the +evidence to prove the truth of a very extraordinary +occurrence must be far stronger than that which is +required to prove an ordinary one, it must never be +forgotten that the amount of evidence necessary to prove +any particular fact always varies with the amount of +the antecedent probability of its occurrence. The very +same action may be credible or otherwise, just in proportion +as we can discern an adequate purpose for its +performance, or infer the presence of a particular motive. +If, for example, it were reported that a man of the +highest character had been seen during the hours of +early morning issuing from one of the lowest haunts of +vice in London, those who knew him well would require +an overwhelming amount of evidence to establish +the truth of the assertion. They would undoubtedly +fall back on the question of abstract probability, and +argue that it was more likely that it was either a case +of mistaken identity (a very common error), or a +deliberate falsehood, than that the statement should be +true. But, if, on the contrary, it could be shown that +he had been sent for to visit a dying person, and had +gone at his particular request, the whole of the antecedent +improbability would vanish, and the otherwise +incredible testimony would become perfectly credible. +It follows, therefore, that the credibility of testimony +varies with our knowledge of the motive for the performance +of the action. +</p> + +<p> +This consideration ought to have due weight in considering +the evidence of miracles. Viewed as mere +<pb n='163'/><anchor id='Pg163'/> +phenomena, their abstract improbability is great. When +they are viewed as deviations from the ordinary course +of nature, their improbability becomes still greater. But +those who believe in the existence of a personal God +energizing in the universe at every moment, and in +every place, postulate the presence of a force fully adequate +to work them, for this is involved in the idea of +God. But the question arises, Will He? Until a well-attested +miracle has actually been performed, the antecedent +probability derived from our experience of the +order of nature is against the supposition that He will, +and throws on the reporter the necessity of giving a +stronger proof than we require for an ordinary fact. +But in proportion as we can show that it is probable +that God will make a revelation, the antecedent improbability +of a miracle is diminished; and if it can +be shown that it is very probable that He will do so, it +wholly disappears. +</p> + +<p> +It will be readily admitted that such an argument +can only have weight with a believer in the existence +of a God, who is the moral Governor of the Universe. +To him, however, it is of the utmost value, for on the +supposition in question, the probability of some higher +manifestation of the divine character than that displayed +in the material universe does not rest on theory, +but on the facts of man and his condition. Looking +at the past history of the world, it is matter of fact +that God has made higher and higher manifestations +of himself. So far it is antecedently probable that He +will continue to do so. His last manifestation has +been in the production of a being possessed of a moral +nature, with powers capable of immense elevation. It +is also no theory, but a fact, that this moral being now +is, and ever has been within the historical periods in a +state of great imperfection. It is therefore highly +<pb n='164'/><anchor id='Pg164'/> +probable that the Creator will adopt means for elevating +the moral being whom He has created, and that +He will effect this by acting, not on matter, but on +mind. Contemplating the actual state of man, the +known law of the Creator's previous action, and the +moral character of God, the antecedent probability +that God will make a further manifestation of himself +is established quite independently of the facts or assertions +in the Bible. +</p> + +<p> +Twelfthly: Whatever be the supposed antecedent +improbability of an occurrence, it is capable of being +overcome by an amount of evidence which can leave +no reasonable doubt in a mind endowed with common +sense. Theoretical objections may be adduced against +any evidence which can be brought in proof of particular +facts, but the ultimate appeal must be, not to a +multitude of abstract theories, but to the common +sense of mankind. Of this character is all historical +evidence. It rests on the same principles as those +which guide us in the affairs of daily life. There is a +certain amount of evidence which leaves no doubt on +the common sense of mankind, although it may be +open to many theoretical objections. Such evidence +is capable of proving a fact against a very high degree +of antecedent improbability. Mr. Mill may be considered +as a witness whose predilections were all in +favour of unbelief. Yet his clear logical mind has led +him to state the case fairly as far as the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> probability +or improbability of miracles is concerned. +His conclusions are adverse to the position assumed +by the author of <q>Supernatural Religion.</q> I will +briefly state the most important of Mr. Mill's positions. +</p> + +<p> +First. He points out that a miracle involves nothing +contradictory to any law of causation. He well remarks +that to prove such a contradiction, it is not only +<pb n='165'/><anchor id='Pg165'/> +necessary that the cause should exist without producing +the effect, but that no contravening cause should be +present. But the very idea of a miracle presupposes +an adequate contravening cause, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> God. The possibility +of a miracle therefore cannot be denied on the +ground that it does not presuppose the presence of a +force adequate to produce it. Mr. Mill states, <q>Of +the adequacy of that cause, if present, there can be +no doubt, and the only antecedent improbability that +can be objected to a miracle, is the improbability that +any such cause existed,</q> that is to say, the whole controversy +resolves itself into the question between +Pantheism and Atheism on the one hand, and Theism +on the other. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly. He observes: <q>All therefore that Hume +has made out, and this he must be considered to have +made out, is, that (at least in the imperfect state of +our knowledge of natural agencies, which leaves it +always possible that some of the physical antecedents +may have been hidden from us) no evidence can prove +a miracle to any one who did not previously believe in +the existence of a being or beings with supernatural +power, or who believes himself to have full proof that +the character of the being whom he recognises is inconsistent +with his having seen fit to interfere on the +occasion in question. If we do not already believe in +supernatural agencies, no miracle can prove to us +their existence. The miracle itself, considered as an +extraordinary fact, may be satisfactorily certified by +our senses, or by testimony; but nothing can ever +prove that it is a miracle: there is still another possible +hypothesis, that of its being the result of some +unknown cause; and this possibility cannot be so completely +shut out, as to leave no alternative but that of +admitting the existence of a being superior to nature. +<pb n='166'/><anchor id='Pg166'/> +Those, however, who already believe in such a being +have two hypotheses to choose from, a supernatural +and an unknown natural agency; and they have to +judge which of the two is the most probable in this +particular case.</q> +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible to deny that this is a correct statement +of the question. Hume's position is a generalized +statement, that no evidence can establish the reality +of a miracle, on the ground that our experience of the +uniformity of nature's laws is so firm and unalterable, +that no amount of testimony can establish a fact in +opposition to it; or as he elsewhere puts it, <q>unless the +testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would +be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours +to establish.</q> He affirms this to be equally true on the +principles of Atheism, Pantheism, or Theism, for the +only thing that he takes into account is the inadequacy +of the testimony, and not the inadequacy of the cause. +Mr. Mill therefore says correctly that all that this +argument avails to prove is, that it is impossible to +prove a miracle, except to persons who are already +convinced that a being or beings exist who are possessed +of supernatural powers, and that it is in conformity +with their character to work one. If this is +the only intelligible meaning of Hume's position (and +it is evident that it is), it reduces his argument against +miracles to a very harmless one. The conception of a +miracle as distinct from an unusual phenomenon implies +purpose. Purpose is only conceivable of a being +possessed of personality and will. To those therefore +who either deny the existence of any such being higher +than man, or who affirm that we have no evidence of +his existence, it is impossible to prove a miracle <emph>as a +miracle</emph>. The utmost that could be done would be to +prove that an event had taken place in nature which +<pb n='167'/><anchor id='Pg167'/> +in the present state of our knowledge could be assigned +to no known cause. In such a case the Pantheist +and the Atheist have always the alternative of +believing that the event in question must be due to +the operation of some unknown force in nature, but +which in the gradual development of knowledge we +may hereafter be able to detect. This is a position +that no defender of revelation worthy of the name can +be anxious to dispute. Let it further be observed that +Mr. Mill does not deny, but affirms, that the occurrence +of an extraordinary event analogous to a miracle +viewed simply as a phenomenon, may be satisfactorily +certified by our senses or by testimony. To affirm the +contrary would be simply absurd, as involving the +stereotyping of human thought, and making the wisdom +of our ancestors the only standard of truth. +There was a time when the earth was believed to be +an extended plain. If at that time any one had asserted +that by continually sailing westward he had at +last arrived at the place from which he started, or, in +other words, had circumnavigated the globe, this affirmation +ought to have been rejected, not only as founded +on testimony contrary to all previous experience, but +as intrinsically impossible. Yet if Hume's dictum has +any value as an argument against the possibility of a +miracle, it must affirm the impossibility of establishing +such an occurrence by any amount of evidence whatever. +Mr. Mill's mind was far too logical not to perceive +that such a position is altogether untenable. +</p> + +<p> +Mr. Mill, however, affirms that there is one ground +on which the argument might be tenable against a +theist, not because the evidence is insufficient to prove +the occurrence of an extraordinary fact, as a mere +phenomenon, but because it could not prove it to be a +miracle. It is not only necessary, says he, in order to +<pb n='168'/><anchor id='Pg168'/> +render this proof valid, that one should believe in the +existence of a supernatural being who is able to bring +about the occurrence, but also that <q>the character of +this Being is not inconsistent with his having seen fit +to interfere on the occasion in question.</q> Thus a man +may be a believer in the existence of God, and yet be +persuaded that it was not consistent with his character +to interfere with the course of natural phenomena at +all, or in such a manner as the conception of a miracle +pre-supposes. To such a theist the utmost that evidence +could prove would be, that the extraordinary +event had been brought about by the action of an +unknown force. Again, the same principle acts, and +acts reasonably, on the minds of multitudes of intelligent +Christians, who summarily reject a certain class +of reported miracles without inquiring into their evidence, +on the ground that the working of such miracles +is inconsistent with their conceptions of the divine +character; that is to say, they think it more probable +that the stories should be untrue, than that God +should work in the way in question. But to give this +argument any validity against the miracles wrought in +attestation of Christianity, it must be proved that it is +inconsistent with the divine character to make a revelation, +or to introduce a deviation from what is to us the +ordinary mode of His working; or that the miracles +recorded in the Gospels are repugnant to the character +of God. +</p> + +<p> +Mr. Mill's general position is therefore incontrovertible, +that those who believe in the existence of +God <q>have two hypotheses to choose from, viz. a supernatural, +or an unknown natural agency;</q> and that +they must judge which of these two is the more +probable; and that, in forming their judgment, a most +important consideration must be the character of God, +<pb n='169'/><anchor id='Pg169'/> +and the conformity of the supposed event to that +character. This position every intelligent Christian +will readily accept. +</p> + +<p> +Mr. Mill adds: <q>But with the knowledge which we +now possess of the general uniformity of the course of +nature, religion, following in the wake of science, has +been compelled to acknowledge the government of the +universe, as being on the whole carried on by general +laws, and not by special interpositions. To whosoever +holds this belief, there is a general presumption against +any supposition of divine agency, not operating through +general laws; or, in other words, there is an antecedent +improbability in every miracle, which in order to outweigh +it, requires an extraordinary strength of antecedent +probability derived from the special circumstances +of the case.</q> These observations require consideration. +</p> + +<p> +There is no doubt that the polytheistic religions +postulated the existence of a vast number of superhuman +beings by whose agency and caprice many +natural occurrences were brought about. Such a belief +indicates a very imperfect conception of <q>order</q> in +nature. But these supposed interferences with it would +by no means realize the notion of what we now +designate a miracle, the very idea of which implies an +order in nature to which the miracle forms an exception. +If there is no order in nature, there can be no +miracle. +</p> + +<p> +The Hebrew monotheism involved conceptions directly +opposite to this. It viewed the action of God as +the foundation of all the forces in nature. Whilst +above and outside nature, He was everywhere present +in nature. Its forces were the expressions of the +energy of His will. Its order (for the Hebrew recognised +a high order in nature) was the result of His good +<pb n='170'/><anchor id='Pg170'/> +pleasure, and due to His constant working. In the +Old Testament the commonest events in nature are no +less ascribed to God than those which we designate +miraculous. A Hebrew never conceived of a miracle +as a deviation from the divine order, but as a consistent +carrying out of a divine purpose in the government of +the world. A modern conception of theism differs from +this in supposing that there are certain forces in material +nature which, when once called into action, go on energizing +without any direct intervention of God. But +when this conception comes to be minutely analysed, if +we believe in a God, it is impossible to conceive of +force, at least in its ultimate form, except as a direct +expression of the divine energy. +</p> + +<p> +Science has so far modified religious thought on this +subject, that while it still continues to hold that the +various forces in nature are modes of the divine +acting, it nevertheless believes that God does not deviate +from his predetermined course for the purpose of +meeting what we are pleased to call special contingencies. +The divine action is, in fact, not altered to +meet man's convenience, and His government is carried +on as far as it lies within our cognisance by the general +forces of nature. God acts in nature in conformity with +a definite law, and from that He will not deviate, whatever +consequences man's ignorance or disregard of +his mode of action may bring upon him. Mr. Mill +observes that to any person holding this belief, there +is a general presumption against any supposition of +divine agency, not operating through general laws. +That is to say, we have had a constant experience of +his acting through general laws; and no experience of +his acting otherwise. But the idea of a revelation introduces +a factor into the case, entirely different from +anything of which we have had previous experience. +<pb n='171'/><anchor id='Pg171'/> +It forms part of a great purpose existing in the divine +mind, and is in its nature analogous to the first introduction +of life, or the first creation of a free moral +agent. Respecting the laws by which God regulates +his creative acts, we are ignorant. Yet the theist firmly +believes in creative acts of some kind, and that they +are regulated by law. In this ignorance of God's law +of creation, it is impossible to affirm that it is antecedently +improbable that in making a fresh manifestation +of himself, he will operate only through those +general laws, which are the ordinary manifestations of +his will. +</p> + +<p> +There is some want of clearness in Mr. Mill's expression, +that in order to outweigh the antecedent improbability +of miracles, arising from those modes of the +divine action which fall within the limits of our experience, +an extraordinary strength of antecedent probability, +derived from the special circumstances of the +case, is required. If by this antecedent probability he +means something such as has been above referred to, +there can be no objection to his statement. He ought +to have observed, however, that the antecedent improbability +which may be supposed to belong to miracles, +only attaches to them while contemplated as phenomena, +and that such an improbability readily yields to +positive evidence. This is virtually admitted in a subsequent +sentence. <q>According as this circumstance, +viz. the unknown cause, not having previously manifested +itself in action, or the falsity of the testimony, +appears more improbable; that is, conflicts with an +approximate generalization of a higher order, we believe +the testimony or disbelieve it with a stronger or +weaker degree of conviction, according to the preponderance, +at least until we have sifted the matter further.</q> +<q>This,</q> says the author of <q>Supernatural Religion,</q> +<pb n='172'/><anchor id='Pg172'/> +<q>is precisely Hume's argument, weakened by +the introduction of reservations which have no cogency.</q> +We say, this is precisely what Hume's argument is <emph>not</emph>, +for, if it be valid, the whole question of miracles may +be summarily dismissed without any inquiry into the +evidence on which they rest. +</p> + +<p> +Still, however, as the author affirms and endeavours +to prove that Mr. Mill's position leave Hume's argument +untouched, a few further observations will be +necessary. Hume's statement is, <q>A miracle is a +violation of the laws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable +experience has established these laws, the +proof against a miracle from the nature of the fact, is +as entire as any argument from experience which can +possibly be imagined.</q> +</p> + +<p> +I reply, that the conception of a miracle does not involve +any necessary violation of the laws of nature. +All that it implies is the presence of another force +different from those which have come under our cognisance: +and this may act so as to produce the miracle +without violating one of nature's laws. But, it is +added, <q>uniform and unalterable experience has established +these laws.</q> What has this experience really +established? It is this, and this only, Given the presence +of certain forces, <emph>and no others</emph>, certain results +invariably follow. But experience cannot tell us anything, +as to what would be the law of nature, if some +other force were in action; nor is it able to say one +word as to the non-existence of any force which has +not come under its observation. Abstractedly, it +is true that the argument against a miracle is as entire +as any argument from experience can be imagined, because +experience really supplies us with no basis for +argumentation in the case. Prior to the invention of +railways and the discovery of the uses to which steam +<pb n='173'/><anchor id='Pg173'/> +can be applied, the argument from experience was +equally valid against the possibility of travelling in a +carriage not propelled by animal force. In each case a +new force enters into the conditions, of which experience +is unable to take cognisance. +</p> + +<p> +<q>Why is it more probable that all men must die?</q> +asks this writer, <q>or that lead cannot of itself remain +suspended in the air; or that fire consumes wood, and +is extinguished by water, unless it be that these events +are found agreeable to nature, and there is required a +violation of its laws, or in other words, a miracle, to +prevent them?</q> I answer that it is probable that all +men must die, because we observe under the action of +the known forces of nature that all men do die. But +this says nothing as to what must take place if another +force was present; or a combination of existing forces +was discovered sufficiently potent to counteract the +action of those which in the present state of things +bring about the dissolution of man's frame. There is +no necessity, for the purpose of effecting this, that one +of the existing forces should be suspended. The time +was, when certain forms of disease invariably resulted +in death. The advance of medical science has averted +this result. Ought the discovery to have been rejected +because it pretended to produce a fact contrary to +prior experience? Are any of the laws of nature +violated, or are its forces suspended in such a case? +What has taken place? Man has discovered agencies +which have neutralized the effect of other agencies. +Our belief that all men must die rests on the assumption +that no force can or will at any future time +be brought into action which will counteract the forces +now in operation by which that event is produced. +</p> + +<p> +The same remark applies to the other three cases. +<pb n='174'/><anchor id='Pg174'/> +To the second of them the author has himself supplied the +answer: <q>Lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the +air.</q> Doubtless, it cannot <emph>of itself</emph>. Who ever supposed +that it could? But it can be suspended when a force +adequate to counteract that of gravitation is present. +So fire will always consume wood, or be extinguished by +water, as long as no other forces but the usual ones are +in operation. But man has already invented the means +of producing combustion under water. No violation of +nature's laws is required in any of these cases. Nor is +there any required in a miracle. The fact is, that +there is an assumption in all arguments of this kind, +which for obvious reasons is not openly avowed, but +which alone imparts to them an apparent validity. +<q>No such force can exist,</q> which translated into other +language is identical with the proposition, <q>There is +no God.</q> To keep this assumption in the background, +when the very basis of the argument for miracles is the +assumption that there is one, is a course which can +lead to no good result. +</p> + +<p> +But the author remarks further: <q>There must, therefore, +be a uniform experience against every miraculous +event, otherwise the event could not merit that appellation. +And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, +there is hence a direct and full proof from the nature +of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; +nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle +rendered credible, by any opposite proof which is +superior.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Here again we encounter the same faults of reasoning, +which amount to a virtual assumption of the point +at issue. <q>There must be a uniform experience +against any miraculous event, otherwise it would not +merit the appellation—doubtless.</q> But what is the +<pb n='175'/><anchor id='Pg175'/> +nature of this uniform experience? Exactly this, that +the ordinary forces acting around us being present, +and none other, the event has not, and therefore cannot +take place. But this is not involved in the idea of a +miracle. It assumes the presence of another force, +viz. God. But what then? The objector will urge +that we have had no experience of the existence of any +such force. Is it to be urged, that no force can exist, +except those of which we have had experience, or any +combination of forces now in action, different from the +present? The men of a former century were equally +entitled to make the same assumption. If they had +done so, it would follow, that if the discoverers of +America had found our present railway system in full +operation, and reported it to be so, the contemporaries +of Columbus would have been justified in treating him +as an impostor. +</p> + +<p> +But the author further observes: <q>Mr. Mill qualifies +his admission respecting the effect of the alleged +counteracting cause, by the all important words <q><emph>if +present</emph>;</q> for in order to be valid, the reality of the +alleged counteracting cause must be established, which +is impossible; therefore the objection falls to the +ground. No one knows better than Mr. Mill, that the +assertion of a personal deity working miracles, upon +which a miracle is allowed for a moment to come into +court, cannot be proved; and therefore, that it cannot +stand in opposition to a complete induction which +Hume takes as his standard.</q> +</p> + +<p> +This passage strikes us as an extraordinary one to +have been written by any one who possesses the logical +powers of the author. We are dealing with a formal +argument with a view of testing its validity, we have +the fullest right to test it by a supposed case. That +<pb n='176'/><anchor id='Pg176'/> +supposed case is the presence of an unknown cause, or +an unknown combination of known causes, or the +presence of a personal deity. If the argument breaks +down under the application of these tests, it is worthless. +Does the author mean to say, that it is necessary +to prove every assumption to be a fact, before it +can be used in argument? How about the assumptions +in Euclid? I submit that the reasoning is by no +means vitiated by the assumption, and consequently +that by the application of the same principles of reasoning, +Hume's argument falls to pieces. In one +sense the words <q>if present</q> are all important, yet it +is not necessary to prove the fact in order to establish +the validity of the reasoning, which is entirely independent +of the truth of the assumption. Has the +author never heard of contingent reasoning in which +both antecedent and consequent may be false, but the +proposition valid? +</p> + +<p> +<q>No one knows,</q> again says the author, <q>better +than Mr. Mill, that the allegation of a personal God +working miracles, upon which a miracle is for a +moment allowed to come into court, cannot be proved.</q> +It seems then after all that we are reasoning with a +person who rejects theism; although he has been dealing +with the question on principles which assume its +truth. In arguing a question of this kind it is necessary +to be consistent, and take our stand either on the +principles of theism, or on those of pantheism or atheism, +and not to fall back on either as the exigencies of +the case demand. Least of all should this be done by +a writer who charges the defenders of Christianity with +shifting their ground to suit the necessities of their +argument. +</p> + +<p> +But is the case correctly stated? No doubt that the +<pb n='177'/><anchor id='Pg177'/> +conception of a personal God is essential to it. But +that of a personal God actually working miracles forms +no portion of it. If this were assumed, the entire +reasoning would be a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>petitio principii</foreign>. We are considering +whether miracles are possible; or if, supposing +one to be wrought, it can be established by evidence. +All that we assume is, that God <emph>can</emph> work miracles, +not that He has wrought them. Whether we can +prove by good evidence that He has wrought miracles, +is quite independent of the present question. +</p> + +<p> +<q>No one knows better than Mr. Mill, that the assertion +of a personal deity working miracles cannot be +proved.</q> It is perfectly true that Mr. Mill believed +that the evidence adduced to prove the being of a +personal God was insufficient, and that respecting the +origin of all things, nothing can be known. But yet it +is impossible to treat the existence of a personal God +as a bare assumption. <q>It is impossible to be proved,</q> +says the author. But to whom? To minds constituted +like Mr. Mill's. The evidence that a personal +God exists has appeared irresistible to an overwhelming +majority of mankind, including a great majority of minds +gifted with equal, and even with greater powers than +that of Mr. Mill. One might imagine from the mode in +which this point is here represented, that the belief in +the existence of a personal God was exploded among +all men of intellect, and that the proofs adduced for it +were unworthy of attention. Surely the question of +miracles has a legitimate place in the court which +tries the issue of their truth or falsehood. +</p> + +<p> +One more point requires notice. Hume says, +<q>Though the being, to whom the miracle is attributed +be in this case Almighty, it does not on that account +become a whit more probable, since it is impossible for +<pb n='178'/><anchor id='Pg178'/> +us to know the attributes or actions of such a being, +otherwise than from the experience which we have +of his productions in the usual course of nature.</q> +</p> + +<p> +This position involves an evident fallacy. It is also +one which underlies one or two of the statements of Mr. +Mill, whose philosophical theory of necessity was one +almost certain to involve him in it. The statement is, +that it is impossible to know either the attributes or +the actions of such a being, except from our experience +of his productions in the course of nature. What is +the course of nature here intended? does it include +mind as well as matter? If the former is included, and +we attain our knowledge of God from that source—and +every theist maintains that our chief knowledge of +God is derived from it—then the experience we have of +man leads us to infer the presence of certain moral +attributes in God; and there is nothing in that experience +which renders the performance of a miracle inconceivable +or impossible—but as far as that experience is +concerned, it is rendered antecedently probable. What +is included, I again ask, in nature? Are <emph>we</emph>, the +percipient beings ourselves? Whether we are regarded +as included or excluded from nature, it is evident that +a considerable portion of our knowledge of the divine +character is derived from the contemplation of our own +being. God is more manifested in our rationality, +<q>personality,</q> freedom, and conscience, than in the +material forces and laws of nature. To perform a +miracle therefore is consistent with what we know of +His character. +</p> + +<p> +These observations will render it unnecessary for me +to examine in detail the writer's observations on Paley's +arguments against Hume. Even if his arguments are +not perfectly conclusive, their failure does not establish +<pb n='179'/><anchor id='Pg179'/> +the truth of Hume's positions, or invalidate the refutation +of them by others. As the object of this author +is to re-establish the validity of Hume's argument, he +ought not to have confined himself to Paley, whose +mind was little adapted to the investigation of purely +logical or metaphysical questions, but to have noticed +the argument of the numerous subsequent writers who +have more fully handled the subject. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='180'/><anchor id='Pg180'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter VIII. The Objection That The Defenders Of Christianity +Assume Certain Facts The Truth Of Which Can Only +Be Known By Revelation, And Then Reason From +Those Facts To The Truth Of The Bible, Considered.</head> + +<p> +It has been objected that the very idea of such a +revelation as that of Christianity implies a defect on +the part of the Creator in the original construction of +the Universe, and that He has been under the necessity +of interposing for the purpose of correcting this +defect. It is affirmed that divines endeavour to prove +that a revelation was probable by first assuming a +number of the most irrational propositions, which, if +true, can only be proved to be so by the authority of +the Bible, and then arguing back again that it is highly +probable that God would interfere to remedy the +defects of his creative work by a supernatural revelation; +in other words, that they assume a state of +things which reason would pronounce to be incredible, +unless their truth was asserted in the Bible, and then +argue on the principles of that reason whose validity +they deny, that it is probable that the Creator would +interfere to remedy a state of things the existence of +which reason pronounces to be incredible. +</p> + +<p> +The author of <q>Supernatural Religion</q> has strongly +urged this argument, and placed the difficulty clearly +before us. Although the entire passage is too long for +<pb n='181'/><anchor id='Pg181'/> +quotation, yet as it is important that we should have +the question which he raises before us in his own words, +I will cite a portion of it. +</p> + +<p> +<q>Here again the argument is based on an assumption. +The supposition of a divine design in a revelation +is the result of a foregone conclusion in its favour, and +not suggested by antecedent probability. Divines +assume that a communication of this nature is in +accordance with reason, and was necessary for the +salvation of the human race simply because they believe +that it took place, and no evidence worthy of the name +is ever offered in support of the assumption. A revelation +having, it is supposed, been made, that revelation +is consequently supposed to have been contemplated, +and to have justified any suspension of the order +of nature. The proposition for which evidence is +demanded is necessarily employed as evidence for +itself. The considerations involved in the assumption +of the necessity and reasonableness of such a revelation, +however, are antecedently incredible and contrary to +reason. We are asked to believe that God made man +in His own image, pure and sinless, and intended him +to continue so; but scarcely had His noblest work left +the hand of his Creator, than man was tempted into +sin by Satan, the all-powerful and persistent enemy of +God, whose existence and antagonism to a being in +whose eyes sin is an abomination, are not accounted +for and are incredible. Adam's fall brought a curse +upon the earth, and incurred the penalty of death for +himself and for the whole of his posterity. The human +race thus created perfect and without sin, thus disappointed +the expectations of the Creator, and became +daily more wicked, the evil spirit having succeeded in +frustrating the designs of the Almighty, so that God +repented that he had made man, and at length he +<pb n='182'/><anchor id='Pg182'/> +destroyed by a deluge all the inhabitants of the earth, +with the exception of eight persons who feared him. +This sweeping purification, however, was as futile as +the original design, and the race of man soon became +more wicked than ever.</q> Here follows a statement of +what may be regarded as a plan of salvation as held +by some modern Churches, and the apparent contradiction +of the whole to the divine character and perfections +is elaborately pointed out. He then concludes +as follows: <q>We are asked to believe in the frustration +of the divine design of creation, and in the fall of man +into a state of wickedness hateful to God, requiring +and justifying the divine design of a revelation, and +such a revelation as this, as a preliminary to the further +proposition that on the supposition of such a design +miracles would not be contrary to reason.</q> To this +follows an elaborate piece of reasoning, by which the +author attempts to prove that every proposition in this +so-called plan of salvation is thoroughly contrary to +reason. +</p> + +<p> +The general positions laid down in this passage +(omitting points of detail) are as follows: Certain incredible +occurrences in the past history of man are +assumed by divines to be facts on the authority of the +Bible. These include the complete breaking down of +the divine plan in the creation of man through the +agency of a being who has frustrated the purposes of +the Almighty. Next it is asserted on the same authority +that another series of events has taken place +which are in the highest degree contrary to reason, for +the purpose of remedying this failure of the original +plan. Then it is alleged that the probability of a divine +interference, in order to remedy a state of things which +reason pronounces to be incredible, is argued on the +authority of reason for the purpose of proving the +<pb n='183'/><anchor id='Pg183'/> +occurrence of another state of things equally repugnant +to reason. Such a line of argument is affirmed to +begin in irrational assumptions, and to terminate in a +vicious circle. +</p> + +<p> +I have before observed that the work from which +the above passage is taken, although entitled <q>Supernatural +Religion, or an inquiry into the reality of +Divine Revelation,</q> is really an attack on the central +position of the New Testament, the historical value +of the Gospels. In taking this course the author raises +an intelligible issue instead of spreading the argument +over an endless mass of controversial matter. If the +historical character of the Gospels cannot be maintained, +the whole controversy as to whether Christianity +is a divine revelation is ended. This forms the +key of the Christian position, to which the other parts +of the controversy stand in the relation of mere outworks. +If the events recorded in the Gospels are +historical, Christianity must be a divine revelation, +notwithstanding the difficulties connected with certain +statements of the Old Testament. The real point at +issue between those who believe and those who deny +that God has made a supernatural revelation of Himself, +is confined to the following question: Are the +contents of the Gospels historically credible? Is the +character of Jesus Christ as depicted in them the delineation +of an ideal conception or of an historical +reality? The author discerns clearly that this is the +turning point of the controversy, and has accordingly +addressed himself to prove that the Gospels are valueless +as historical documents. This line of argument is +candid, and one which, if adhered to, will save an +immense expenditure of reasoning power. +</p> + +<p> +Now the question of the historical character of the +Gospels is quite distinct from that of the truth or falsehood +<pb n='184'/><anchor id='Pg184'/> +of any system of Ecclesiastical Christianity, which +asserts that its theology is a deduction from the +Gospels and the other portions of the New Testament. +It is not revelation itself but a system erected by the +application of reason to the facts of revelation. It +is most important that this distinction should be kept +in view. The truth is, that the facts of revelation stand +in the same relation to theology as the facts of nature +do to physical science. Incorrect reasonings respecting +both the one and the other are alike possible. The Ptolemaic +theory was propounded as an adequate solution +of the facts and phenomena of the universe, and +although utterly incorrect in all its parts, it for ages +held unlimited sway over the human mind. In a +similar manner various theories have been propounded +as solutions of the facts of revelation, but it by no +means follows because they have attained a wide acceptance +that they afford the true solution. In examining +the claims of the Gospels to be viewed as historical, it +is quite as much out of place to make them responsible +for all the theories which Ecclesiastical Christianity has +propounded respecting the plan of salvation, as it would +be to make the facts and phenomena of the universe +answerable for all the theories which have been propounded +for their solution. In examining the claims +of the Gospels to be accepted as historical documents, +it is most unreasonable to make them responsible for +theories which were not formulated in the Church +until centuries after their publication. +</p> + +<p> +Most of the positions affirmed in the above quotation +were not formulated until a late period of the +Church's history. Certainly they are nowhere directly +laid down in the New Testament. The utmost which +can be asserted of them is, that they are alleged to +be derived inferentially from its teaching. They +<pb n='185'/><anchor id='Pg185'/> +form no portion of the Apostles' or of the Nicene +Creeds, which are the only formularies outside of the +New Testament which can be represented as embodying +the creed of the universal Church. Nor can +they be found even in the Athanasian creed. In discussing +the claims of the Gospels to be esteemed as +historical, they can only be made fairly responsible for +what they actually contain. To bring into such a controversy +positions only affirmed in recent attempts to +formulate a body of Christian doctrine, as though they +had any bearing on the claims of the New Testament +to be viewed as containing a divine revelation, can +lead to no satisfactory result. +</p> + +<p> +I now return to the consideration of the difficulties +above referred to. It is important to take a careful +survey of the entire question, because they are not only +put with great force in the passage which I have +quoted, but I believe that in different forms they weigh +heavily on the minds of many thoughtful men. I will +first offer a few observations on the general principle. +</p> + +<p> +Nothing is easier than to affirm that the introduction +of moral evil into the universe is a marring of the +Creator's plan in its formation. The argument is +founded on the supposition that an Almighty God +exists, who is wise, holy, and benevolent, and who +intended to manifest these attributes through the +rational beings which he has created. It is affirmed +that the existence of moral evil in man is a failure of +this purpose on the part of God. But it is the most +certain of facts that moral evil does exist in the world, +and that it exists quite independently of Christianity. +The objection therefore is not one directed solely +against the Christianity of the New Testament, but +bears with equal weight against every form of theism, +which admits that the universe has been created, and +<pb n='186'/><anchor id='Pg186'/> +is governed by a God who is almighty, wise, holy, and +benevolent. +</p> + +<p> +If there be a God who is the Creator of the Universe, +it is clear that He must have been the Creator of man, +and that man could only have come into being in conformity +with His pleasure. Now, if we decline to +admit that man was created morally perfect, yet as he +must have been created a moral agent, it is clear that +the first man must have sprung into being either with +the moral faculties of a savage, or in some intermediate +condition between these and a state of moral perfection. +It follows, therefore, that man must have been made +capable of moral progress. This is affirmed by all +those who assert that he was first produced in a savage +state. But the possibility of moral progress involves +also the possibility of retrogression. The truth of +this is borne witness to by the most palpable facts of +daily experience. Men of the highest mental powers +are capable of abusing them to the worst purposes, +and thus of sinking fearfully low in the moral scale. +The case of a man like Fouché will illustrate my argument, +a man gifted with high intellectual powers, but +who sunk into the lowest condition of moral turpitude. +Such a man is incomparably worse than the first original +savage. I submit, therefore, that whatever view we +may take of the condition in which man was originally +created, even if he were created a savage, yet he was +made a moral being capable of elevation or degradation; +and that, to use a human metaphor, the purpose +of a holy God must have been his elevation. Yet this +involves the possibility of his moral degradation. +This degradation has also become a fact. It is clear, +therefore, that the difficulty is one which is inseparable +from every possible form of theistic belief, and is no +peculiarity of Christianity. +</p> + +<pb n='187'/><anchor id='Pg187'/> + +<p> +I shall not attempt to enter on so profound a question +as the origin of evil, and how its existence is consistent +with the perfection of a holy God. It is a +subject quite beyond the issue before us, and lies not +at the foundations of Christianity, but of theism, the +truth of which is taken for granted in the objections +which the author adduces against the popular view of +the scriptural account; for if there is no God the objections +are valueless. Still he ought to have informed +his readers that it is urged as a partial explanation of +those difficulties by the defenders of Christianity, that +it is highly probable that the creation of a moral being +possessed of free agency, but who at the same time is not +capable of sinking into a state of moral degradation, +involves as great a contradiction as the conception of a +circle which should possess the property of concavity +and not of convexity. No rational man believes that +it is within the compass, even of omnipotence, to work +contradictions. If this be so, it follows that the possibility +of the existence of moral evil is a necessary condition +of the existence of free agency. The production +of a free moral agent capable of yielding a willing +obedience to the moral law is a more glorious work +than anything in the material universe, even than that +universe itself. It might, therefore, have been the +good pleasure of the wise, holy, and benevolent +Creator to create free moral agents, even if it involved +the existence of moral evil. I am far from propounding +this as a complete solution of the difficulty, +but when it is thus used unsparingly against Christianity, +it would have been only candid to have told the +reader that it bore with equal weight against every +form of theism, and to have given the partial explanation +which has been propounded by theologians. +</p> + +<p> +In reply to the definite statements before us, I +<pb n='188'/><anchor id='Pg188'/> +affirm that nowhere in the Gospels, or in any other +portion of the New Testament is it asserted or even +implied that revelation was rendered necessary by the +frustration of the divine purpose in creation, or that +redemption was a kind of afterthought in the divine +mind rendered necessary by such a failure. On the +contrary, the synoptic Gospels make no affirmation +whatever on the subject. The fourth Gospel contains +several statements about the end and purposes of the +Incarnation, but of a description totally different from +those which are alleged in the above quotation to constitute +the groundwork of Christianity. As I have already +shown, the Gospel of St. John speaks of its great +purpose as being a revelation of the moral character of +God in the person of Jesus Christ. According to its +theology God has already manifested himself in +creation; in the Gospel He makes a still higher and +nobler manifestation of His moral character in the +person of our Lord. The author of the first Epistle +ascribed to St. John, whom I must assume to have +been the author of the Gospel, makes the following +direct affirmation on the subject. <q>That which was +from the beginning, which we have heard, which we +have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, +and our hands have handled of the word of life; for +the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear +witness, and show unto you that eternal life which was +with the Father and was manifested unto us; that +which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, +that ye also may have fellowship with us: and truly +our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son +Jesus Christ.</q> In these words it is evidently the +intention of the writer to set forth the divine purpose +of the Incarnation. It is true that in other passages +he assumes the existence of evil in the universe, and +<pb n='189'/><anchor id='Pg189'/> +declares it to be the work of the devil, and that one of +the purposes of this divine manifestation was its +destruction. Still he drops no hint of any failure +in the Creation, or that it was the purpose of the +Incarnation to mend a marred scheme. On the +contrary, the great truth set forth in the Epistle and +in the Gospel is that Creation and Redemption form +portions of one great whole; and that the latter is a +manifestation of the divine glories beyond God's previous +manifestations of himself, whether in creation or +in history. +</p> + +<p> +Similar are the views of the Apostle Paul. According +to him, while many other purposes were effected +by the Incarnation, there is one great purpose +running through all divine revelation. In several +passages he affirms that its influence extends far beyond +that which it exerts on the race of man. He again and +again asserts that it was the gradual unfolding of an +idea or purpose which existed from eternity in the +divine mind. Thus he writes: <q>And to make all men +see what is the fellowship of the mystery which from +the beginning of the world hath been hid in God who +created all things by Jesus Christ, to the intent that +now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly +places might be known by the Church the manifold +wisdom of God, according to the eternal purpose +which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord.</q> (Eph. +iii. and ix.) <q>Having made known to us the mystery +of His will, according to His good pleasure, which He +purposed in Himself, that in the dispensation of the +fulness of times He might gather in one all things in +Christ, both which are in heaven and in earth, even in +Him.</q> (Eph. i. 9, 10.) <q>And having made peace by +the blood of His cross, by Him to reconcile all things +unto Himself: by Him, I say, whether they be things +<pb n='190'/><anchor id='Pg190'/> +in earth or things in heaven.</q> (Col. i. 20.) I fully +admit that the Apostle affirms that the design of +bringing man into union with God was a portion of +this purpose. Nothing however is more foreign to the +ideas of St. Paul than that revelation is an afterthought +adopted as a remedy for a marred plan. +</p> + +<p> +Nor are the views of the other writers of the New +Testament different. St. Peter tells us that the angels +desire to look into the redemption wrought by Christ. +St. James assures us that, <q>known unto God are all +His works from the foundation of the world.</q> The +author of the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks to the +same effect: <q>God, who at sundry times and in divers +manners spake in times past unto the fathers in (by) +the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us +in His Son.</q> So far from its being the idea of the +sacred writers that redemption is an afterthought +designed to remedy the failure of the original purpose +of creation, that both of them are viewed as parts of +the same whole; both are purposes which have existed +in the divine mind during the eternal ages, and have +been gradually evolved in time. Nothing is further +from their mind than that the divine mode of working +is by fits or starts, or sudden interventions. Man was +the last form of life which God has introduced into the +world, and in that sense He is said to have rested +from His creative work. But God is no less distinctly +affirmed to be always working in nature and in providence, +so that Sabbath days form no exception: <q>My +Father worketh hitherto and I work.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Such being the views of the writers of the New +Testament on this subject, the whole of those objections, +as far as they are founded on the assertion that +revelation is intended to remedy the failure of God's +creative purpose, fall to the ground. My present supposition +<pb n='191'/><anchor id='Pg191'/> +is that I am reasoning with believers in theism. +If God has gradually evolved creation, each successive +stage of the evolution forms a part of one great and comprehensive +whole. At each stage the work is incomplete, +but its incompleteness is no proof of failure. A period +has existed when the only beings in the world were +devoid of rationality. If an objector could have contemplated +it in this stage, he might have urged that +the plan of creation was a failure, while in reality it +was only incomplete. Man came in at the next stage +of the great design. The next stage, according to the +New Testament, is the Incarnation of the Son of God, +intended as a higher manifestation of the moral glories +of the Creator for the purpose of raising man to a +higher moral and spiritual elevation. To the attainment +of this purpose all the previous events in man's +history have been made subservient. Surely those +persons with whom I am reasoning ought to be the +last to object that there is anything inconsistent with +the divine character in such a gradual unfolding of the +divine purposes. We might as well object that every +advancing stage of the great design of Creation was +introduced to remedy a preceding defect as assert that +Christianity originated in this cause. The world was +in a most unfinished state when it was only tenanted +by the lower forms of life, and great fault might have +been found with its construction. But a higher came, +and a higher, then man, then Christ our Lord, the +second Adam, as St. Paul designates him, <q>from +heaven heavenly.</q> Whatever may have been the +assertions of certain classes of theologians who have +attempted to fathom the divine mind by their own +short sounding line, the sacred writers take no narrow +view of the purposes of the Incarnation. It is declared +that they will be realized in the yet distant future, +<pb n='192'/><anchor id='Pg192'/> +towards which consummation they are gradually being +carried out in time. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that the New Testament affirms +that a purpose is consistently carried out in the history +of redemption far different from that which has been +here placed before us as the assumptions of Ecclesiastical +Christianity. The author has placed these in +their most objectionable form; and if Christian apologists +have affirmed on such premises as those above +stated that a divine interposition was rendered probable, +I shall not attempt to defend them. To establish +the probability of a revelation additional to that +afforded by creation we have no occasion to appeal to +theories, but to facts. +</p> + +<p> +The existing moral and spiritual condition of mankind +is universally admitted to be imperfect. Both +believers and unbelievers in revelation alike acknowledge +that the attempt to improve it is desirable. No +less certain is it that man possesses faculties which +can only receive their perfect development in a higher +condition of things than the present. These as much +point to a higher development of man as the organization +of the lower forms of animal life points to the +higher and more perfect ones. If, therefore, God be +the Creator and moral Governor of the world, a further +manifestation of Him is rendered highly probable. +</p> + +<p> +This probability may be reasoned out by analogies +in the history of the past. Higher developments +from lower forms have been the rule. Are +they then to cease with man in his present state of +imperfection? How man came to be thus imperfect, +how his moral degradation has originated, is a question +which does not fall within the present argument. It +is a fact, by whatever theory it may be attempted to +be accounted for. If a rational being had existed in +<pb n='193'/><anchor id='Pg193'/> +those ages during which there was manifested nothing +but the lower forms of life, and had come to the conclusion +that the world as it then existed was the work +of an intelligent Creator, he would have pronounced it +highly probable that the resources of creative power +would yet receive a more glorious manifestation. When +vertebrate life was first introduced into the world, a +careful examination of the state of things would have led +to a similar conclusion. But the lower forms of vertebrate +life are typical of the higher, and the higher point +to man. Before man entered the world a being capable +of comprehending the condition of things as then +existing would have pronounced it highly probable +that there would be yet a further manifestation of +creative energy, and that the work required for its +consummation the production of rationality. +</p> + +<p> +Such and far more numerous have been the actual +stages of creative action. Are we entitled to call +them a failure because they were relatively imperfect, +or any fresh intervention of divine power an interference +to remedy a previous failure? On the contrary, +these so-called interventions are the persistent carrying +out of a determined purpose. The acts of Deity are +inaccurately designated interventions. He is always +working with the most perfect knowledge of the +means which He employs, and the most perfect controul +over them. Failure with Him is impossible. +The word <q>intervention</q> as applied to the operations +of God conveys the idea of a machine which He +originally constructed, and then left to its own operations. +Such a machine will in course of time get out +of order, or perform its work imperfectly, and require +to be supplemented by additional contrivances. +Thus when the clock ceases to go there arises a necessity +for the intervention of the clockmaker. He constructs +<pb n='194'/><anchor id='Pg194'/> +his clock and leaves it to itself. But creation +is no mere machine; the Divine worker is always present +in His works. The last idea which would have +occurred to the authors of the Bible was that God was +obliged to be making a number of special interventions +to cure defects in the results of His operations. +As the Bible cannot help using the language of +man, expressions derived from the defects of human +language are at times used in it, but the one +prevalent idea is that God is always present working +in the kingdoms of nature and of grace, that all His +actions are the constant carrying out of a predetermined +purpose, and that with Him is no variableness +neither shadow of turning. +</p> + +<p> +If the possibility of the introduction of moral evil +into the universe is a necessary condition of the creation +of a free moral agent, or in other words, if the +contrary supposition involves a contradiction, the +Creator must have viewed the production of such +a free agent as so desirable, that it formed a part of +His purpose to create him notwithstanding this possibility. +If then moral evil became a fact, it involved no +failure in the purposes of God. He must have viewed +the existence of such beings as desirable, even if this +contingency became a fact. Why, I ask, may not a +further manifestation of Himself, by means of which +moral evil might be reduced to the smallest dimensions, +or even ultimately removed, while freedom is still preserved, +form a portion of the same great purpose of the +divine mind? If this be possible, the assertion that +Redemption is a special intervention of God for +the purpose of remedying the breaking down of his +creative plan, is disproved, and with it all the other +inferences of the numerous writers whose views I am +considering. +</p> + +<pb n='195'/><anchor id='Pg195'/> + +<p> +In affirming the probability of a revelation, the +Christian apologist need not go beyond the region of +actual facts. He has no occasion to rest his proof on +any statement made by a supposed revelation the +truth of which is the point at issue. To do so would +be to assume the thing which requires to be proved. +But facts as they exist, independently of any statements +in the Bible, are quite sufficient. Man exists. +He is possessed of powers and aspirations which this +state of things does not gratify. He is capable of +moral action, and there is something within him which +affirms that he ought to obey the moral law. Yet its +realization by him is of the most imperfect character. +Does the actual condition of man afford satisfaction +even to the unbeliever, account for it as he may? Is +there not a great amount of moral evil in the world? +Do not considerable numbers of men, instead of progressing +to higher degrees of moral perfection degenerate +through various stages of moral corruption? Does +not moral evil cause a great amount of physical suffering? +Are not vast numbers of men the prey of ignorance +and superstition—great evils doubtless, and of +which unbelievers heavily complain? In one word, +when we contemplate the present condition of mankind, +does not the sternest reason affirm that it is +inconceivable that this can be the final condition of +God's creative work? Yet these things are no theories +but obvious facts, and on the supposition on which we +are reasoning, facts in the universe of God. +</p> + +<p> +It follows therefore, that facts such as these, when +contemplated by reason, establish the probability, nay +almost the certainty of a further divine action. Of +course this is based on the assumption that there is a +wise and holy God who is the author of the universe, +but both the opponents and believers in revelation can +<pb n='196'/><anchor id='Pg196'/> +only argue this subject at all on the supposition that +God exists. Any fresh mode of divine action will +probably differ from the preceding ones, because man +exists as a moral and spiritual being. It is therefore +probable that such divine action will be moral rather +than physical; or, in other words, the divine purpose +of creation includes within it a yet further manifestation +of the divine character and perfections. This is +what the New Testament affirms to have taken place +in the Incarnation. This is my position. +</p> + +<p> +I shall only add one or two more brief remarks. +Those who charge theologians with making unfounded +assumptions should be guiltless of making them themselves. +The warning against falling into this error +may be profitably taken to heart by both parties to this +controversy. It is affirmed that the constitution of +nature bears everywhere the indications of systematic +upward progression. I ask, is this systematic upward +progression everywhere true of man? Are there no +where indications of retrogression? Europeans generally +during the last two thousand years have progressed, +although even this is not universally true, for +some of the fine arts attained to greater perfection in +the ancient than in the modern world. But has the +Hindoo race progressed during the last three thousand +years? Have the Chinese? Is it not true that the +progress of these two races has been one of considerable +retrogression? Where is the progress made by the +Negro races from the first dawnings of their history? +Yet these three races form more than half of the +human family. Again, have the Arab races progressed +since the days of Abraham? Are the Mahommedan +races in a state of gradual improvement? These +are questions to which a definite answer must be +returned before the proposition above referred to can +<pb n='197'/><anchor id='Pg197'/> +be esteemed a solution of all the problems of human +history. +</p> + +<p> +It will perhaps be replied that nature is gradually +extinguishing these unprogressive races, under the +pressure of her inexorable laws. Yet they constitute +an overwhelming majority of the human race, and it is +strange to talk of this progressive improvement of the +human race as a great law of nature, if the mode of improvement +be the extinction of the great majority of +mankind. But are the Hindoo, Chinese, Negro, and +other unprogressive races less numerous than they were +three thousand years ago? The evidence is all the other +way. We want present facts and not theories of the +future. It has been affirmed, that <q>The survival of the +fittest is the stern law of nature. The invariable action +of law of itself eliminates the unfit. Progress is necessary +to existence. Extinction is the doom of Retrogression.</q> +These assertions may receive their fulfilment in +some period of the distant future, but they certainly +do not agree with the past history of man. Whatever +progress the European races may be capable of, certain +conditions of climate form an inexorable barrier to +their supplanting the Negro, the Hindoo, or the +Chinese, and we know that European blood in certain +climates has actually degenerated. +</p> + +<p> +Again, it is stated <q>that the highest effect contemplated +by the supposed revelation is to bring man into +harmony with law; and this is insured by law acting +on intelligence, and even on instinct.</q> Where, I ask, +is the proof of this derived from the history of man? +Is the moral condition of the races above referred to +higher than it was three thousand years ago? Did +the moral condition of the Greek race progress or +retrograde during the four centuries which preceded +the Advent? Which was the more elevated condition +<pb n='198'/><anchor id='Pg198'/> +of Roman morality, that of the century which preceded +and followed the conquest of Italy, or that of the +empire and its crumbling institutions? +</p> + +<p> +Again, we are told that <q>there is not in reality a +gradation of breach of law that is not followed by an +equivalent gradation of punishment.</q> This may be +the case in some Utopia in which the author lives, +but it certainly neither is nor ever has been the condition +of this world. Does villany, I ask, always receive +adequate punishment in this world? It has been the +all but universal opinion of mankind that it does not. +Did not Fouché die quietly in his bed, possessed of +wealth and honours, and a darkened conscience? Did +not Philip II. of Spain, after all his crimes, die under +the delusions of self-approbation? In a controversy +like this the most confident assertions will not supply +the want of facts on which to ground our reasonings. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that the assertion that the +Christian argument involves reasoning in a circle, or +else that it assumes the point at issue, is disproved. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='199'/><anchor id='Pg199'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter IX. Demoniacal Miracles—General Considerations.</head> + +<p> +It has been objected that the admission which the +New Testament is alleged to make as to the reality of +demoniacal miracles weakens, if it does not destroy, +the value of miracles as an attestation of a revelation. +In order to do full justice to the force of this objection +I will state it in the words of the author of <q>Supernatural +Religion:</q>— +</p> + +<p> +<q>The necessity of asserting the dependence of +miracles on doctrines is thrust upon divines by the +circumstance, that the Bible narrates so many cases of +false miracles, and contains so many warnings against +them.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>The first thought which must occur to any unprejudiced +mind is amazement that an Almighty God +should select as a guarantee of his supposed communications +signs and wonders which can be so easily imitated +by others, that there must always be a doubt +whether the message be from the kingdom of heaven, +or from the kingdom of lies. It seems <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> absolutely +incredible that a divine revelation which is so +important, and which it is intended that man should +believe, should be made in such obscure language, and +with such doubtful attestation. That heaven should +condescend to use the same arguments as hell, and +with so little difference in the degree of the power +<pb n='200'/><anchor id='Pg200'/> +exhibited, that man can scarcely, if at all, discriminate +between them, is a theory of the most startling description.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>Does not the necessity of this theory of false +miracles, of the power of God thus placed on a level +with the power of Satan, in a matter where the distinct +purpose is to authenticate by miraculous testimony +a miraculous revelation, rather betray the unreality +of miracles altogether, and indicate that the +idea of such supernatural intervention originates solely +from the superstitious ignorance of men in ages when +every phase of nature was attributed to direct supernatural +interference, and ascribed with arbitrary +promptness to God or to the devil? It is certain that +as miracles are represented as being common both to +God and Satan, they cannot be considered as a distinctive +attestation of a divine revelation.</q> +</p> + +<p> +After quoting Dr. Mozley to the effect that <q>Miraculous +evidence cannot oblige us to accept any doctrine +contrary to our moral nature</q>—an abstractly true +statement, but quite inapplicable to the New Testament, +which no where affirms that miracles have been +wrought in attestation of doctrines—the author continues: +<q>The assertion that evidence emanating from +God is in some cases to be rejected is a monstrous +proposition; and the evidential force of miracles is +totally destroyed by the logical inference from it, and +from the double character of miracles as Divine and +Satanic; that God is not only capable of exerting +supernatural power to attest what is true, but that +Satan equally possesses and exercises the same power +in opposition to God for purposes of deception. If +miraculous evidence is indifferently employed to certify +truth and error, it is at once degraded by such common +service into contempt.</q> +</p> + +<pb n='201'/><anchor id='Pg201'/> + +<p> +These passages put us in possession of the author's +views, and perhaps it would be impossible to state the +objections more strongly. I have quoted them thus +fully, not only as embodying the views of this particular +writer, but as placing before us in a clear and +distinct light the chief objections which can be urged +against the attestation that miracles give to the truth +of the Christian revelation, on the assumption that +demoniacal miracles have been performed, or even on +the admission that they are possible. +</p> + +<p> +Before I enter on the general question, I must +briefly draw attention to the statements and assumptions +contained in this remarkable passage. +</p> + +<p> +1. The assertion that miracles are alleged in proof +of doctrines, and that divines, when the necessities of +their position compel them, affirm the direct converse +of this, viz. that miracles are dependent for their truth +on doctrines, is an entire misapprehension of the Christian +argument. Its true position will be discussed in +a subsequent chapter. +</p> + +<p> +2. The assertion that the miracles of Almighty God +can be imitated by Satan is a gratuitous assumption. +Nowhere is this affirmed in the New Testament. On +the contrary, our Lord uniformly declares that His +works were clearly distinguishable from the working of +Satan, and could only maliciously be confounded with +them. +</p> + +<p> +3. While the Bible speaks of false miracles, its language +is quite consistent with the fact that they were +impositions practised on the senses, like the acts of +jugglers. +</p> + +<p> +4. The word <q>miracle</q> is here used to denote a +supernatural fact in external nature devoid of all moral +environment. I have already pointed out the inaccuracy +of this position; and shall have much to say on +<pb n='202'/><anchor id='Pg202'/> +this subject hereafter. To strip a superhuman occurrence +of its moral aspect is simply to assume the +question at issue. +</p> + +<p> +5. It is not correct that the essence of a miracle consists +in the degree of power manifested in the performance +of the outward act. The performance of a +miracle does not necessarily involve a greater exertion +of power than is manifested in the ordinary occurrences +of nature. A miracle is not only an act of power, but +it involves the elements of prediction and of purpose. +</p> + +<p> +6. The affirmation that the Christian argument +involves the position that heaven must condescend to +use the same arguments as hell, if demoniacal possession +is supposed to be possible, is altogether inaccurate. +</p> + +<p> +7. The Christian argument nowhere involves the +assumption that evidence emanating from God is +under certain circumstances to be rejected. It is quite +conceivable that a real miracle may have been wrought, +which was adequately attested when it was performed, +but that the evidence has become imperfect by lapse +of time. +</p> + +<p> +8. Even if it be supposed that demoniacal miracles +are possible, there is nothing in that assumption which +renders it necessary to take for granted that Satan is +allowed to ramble over the universe and work miracles +at his pleasure, and to imitate the miracles of God. +The New Testament uniformly asserts that whatever +agency he can exert is a permitted one, which is +confined within definite limits. +</p> + +<p> +In considering the question of demoniacal miracles +it must be kept in mind that the language employed +by the writers of the Bible is invariably phenomenal. +They describe events as they appeared to the eye of +the beholder. Hence it by no means follows, when +they refer to the arts of magic and other similar practices +<pb n='203'/><anchor id='Pg203'/> +which were so prevalent in the ancient world, and +say that the magicians did such and such things, that +they meant to affirm the reality of their performance. +Their language is always taken from the observer's +point of view. As far as he saw, they did so. We +frequently speak in the same way of modern feats of +conjurors. Thus, when it is said that the magicians +brought forth frogs, the language is quite consistent +with the act being a delusion successfully practised on +the senses. +</p> + +<p> +It is affirmed by the author that the Bible asserts the +reality of such miracles. I reply that it makes no such +assertion, but merely describes them as they appeared +to the eye of the beholder. Its strong denunciations +of such practices is no evidence that they were anything +else than deceptions which the performers endeavoured +to palm off for wicked purposes. The +precept of Moses, <q>Thou shalt not suffer a witch to +live,</q> has been urged as affording proof that the Bible +in unqualified terms asserts the reality of witchcraft. +Whether the art was real or simulated, the sentence of +the lawgiver would have been equally just, for impostors +who practise such arts for the purpose of delusion, are +far more injurious to society than many kinds of +criminals who have undergone the severest punishment. +In the New Testament <q>lying wonders</q> are occasionally +referred to. The expression may legitimately +mean one of two things, either a supernatural act +performed for the attestation or propagation of a lie, +or an apparent miracle, which is in itself a lie. It cannot +be denied that the language of the New Testament +will honestly bear this interpretation. I will quote the +strongest passage to be found in it. St. Paul, writing +to the Thessalonians, in speaking of the manifestation +of a great anti-christian power, says, <q>Whose coming +<pb n='204'/><anchor id='Pg204'/> +is after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, +and lying wonders, and with all the deceivableness of unrighteousness, +in them that perish, because they receive +not the love of the truth that they might be saved.</q> +This language is quite consistent with the idea that the +works here spoken of were not supernatural, but +deceptions wrought for the propagation of a system of +falsehood. +</p> + +<p> +There can be no question that impositions of this +kind have been systematically practised in later times +in support of a great system of ecclesiastical power, +and to attest doctrines in connection with it. But it +is worthy of observation that the demoniacal supernaturalism +which we read of in the New Testament, is +not represented as having been employed for the attestation +of any system of doctrine whatever. Elymas, +the sorcerer, practised his art for the purpose of +establishing an influence over Sergius Paulus, but for +aught that appears he was a simple impostor. All the +other cases of Satanic supernaturalism referred to in +the Gospels resolve themselves into cases of possession, +or the occasional production of a disease. +</p> + +<p> +It is further to be observed that nowhere throughout +the New Testament is a miracle, properly so called, +ascribed to Satanic action. Possession is a phenomenon +entirely different from a miracle. I admit that there is +one apparent exception, namely in the history of our +Lord's temptation. This if it is intended to be a description +of an objective fact, is undoubtedly an instance +of direct interference with the action of the forces of +nature; Satan is here represented as possessing and +exercising the power of counteracting the force of gravitation +by transporting the body of our Lord from +place to place. As this is the one solitary instance in +the New Testament in which such power is ascribed to +<pb n='205'/><anchor id='Pg205'/> +him, it demands especial consideration. We are told +that during one period of his temptation our Lord +was carried by Satan to an exceeding high mountain; +and again, that he was placed on a pinnacle of the +temple. These acts involve such an exercise of supernatural +power as may justly be put in comparison with +his walking on the water. It becomes therefore a very +important question whether this account is intended to +be taken as a literal narrative. The fact of its being +the only recorded instance of its kind affords a contrary +presumption, for if the writers had believed that +there was nothing in such interference with the physical forces +inconsistent with the ordinary course of Satanic +action it is hardly possible that they could have viewed +this as a solitary instance of the exercise of such power, +especially when the case of the demoniacs afforded so +many opportunities for its manifestation. It is clear +from the narrative itself that the only source of information +regarding the temptation must have been an +account given by our Lord himself to his disciples, as +it was an occurrence of which there could have been no +witnesses. Otherwise it must be assumed to be a mere +fiction. It is also clear that the three temptations into +which the narrative is divided are intended to describe +three great crises through which our Lord's mind +passed. According to Mark's account he is represented +as undergoing temptations during the whole period of +forty days. Matthew and Luke present us with the +general results of the entire temptation. If our Lord +gave an account of it to his disciples, there can be no +reason why he should not have embodied its results in +a narrative form, as is the course which he adopted in his +parables. If the parables were not usually introduced +with the formula <q>he spake a parable,</q> we might easily +mistake them also for narratives of actual occurrences. +<pb n='206'/><anchor id='Pg206'/> +But although this is the usual form, it is not the only +one, as appears in the parable of Dives and Lazarus. +It is therefore quite conceivable that on giving his disciples +an account of the crises through which his mind +passed during the period of the temptation he may +have put it into a parabolic form, of which himself was +the centre, as one which would be most adapted to the +level of their apprehensions; otherwise it would have +assumed the character of a number of abstract disquisitions. +</p> + +<p> +But we are not left to infer from mere probabilities that +the narrative was not intended to be understood literally. +One portion of it places it beyond doubt that it was intended +to contain a visionary or parabolic element of +some kind. In the account of the temptation to fall +down and worship Satan, it is expressly stated that the +Devil transported our Lord to an exceeding high mountain, +and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and +the glory of them. The narrative of Luke adds that all +this was done in a moment of time, which shows clearly +that it was not intended to be from one end to the +other a literal statement of facts. It is therefore +absolutely necessary to assume the presence of a +visionary element somewhere; the only question is, +where, and to what extent? If we attach the meaning +usually assigned by the writers in the New Testament +to the word <q>world,</q> it is impossible to imagine that +any amount of credulity can have believed that there +was any mountain from whose top such a view could +have been attained by the unaided power of the human +eye. But further, it is asserted not only that the +kingdoms of the world were rendered visible, but <emph>their +glory</emph>; that is to say, the spectator was able to see +their great cities, their buildings, and all their signs of +outward magnificence, for the sight of their glory was +<pb n='207'/><anchor id='Pg207'/> +obviously intended to add force to the temptation. +Yet even the most credulous people possess some +moderately correct idea as to the extent of view which +the eye can reach and would feel quite certain that +without the interposition of a miracle such a survey in +a moment of time would be impossible. +</p> + +<p> +It may probably be urged by some that the first +part of the account only is intended to be a description +of an objective fact, and that the last temptation was +visionary. To this I reply that the entire narrative is +couched in language of fact, and the latter portion +quite as much so as the former. Besides, if the sight +of the kingdoms of the world and their glory was a +visionary representation, then the reason for conveying +Jesus to a lofty mountain ceases, for such a vision +might equally well have been presented to him in a +plain; whereas if we take it as an account of a literal +fact, it is clear that the reason for conveying him to +the mountain was to afford him an extensive view. It +is therefore impossible to draw a distinction between +the two portions of the narrative. +</p> + +<p> +Every consideration therefore proves that the entire +narrative is either parabolic or an account of a visionary +transaction, precisely similar to many of those +described in the Old Testament, and not of an actual +occurrence. This being so, we arrive at the inference +that nowhere in the New Testament is Satanic +influence described as interfering with the ordinary +action of the forces of nature, by a direct exertion of +power. +</p> + +<p> +It may however be objected that there were probably +reasons why he was permitted to do so on this particular +occasion; but on such a question I shall not enter. I +shall only repeat that it is impossible to view the latter +portion of the narrative as an account of an objective +<pb n='208'/><anchor id='Pg208'/> +fact; and this being the case it is far more probable +that the whole partakes of the same character. At +any rate it is the single instance in the New Testament +in which the possession of such power is ascribed to +Satan. +</p> + +<p> +This has a very important bearing on the argument. +The author affirms that the writers of the New Testament +attributed to Satan a general power of interfering +with the forces of nature, and of working miracles +which may fairly be contrasted with the miracles of +God. But whatever may have been the opinions of +others on this subject, it is clear that such opinions +were not held by them. If they had believed that +Satanic agency was constantly exerted in the affairs +of the visible universe, there is every reason why +they should have invented numerous stories of this +description, and ascribed them to Satanic intervention. +The writer to whom I am referring, +urges in the strongest manner, that the belief in +magic, and in frequent exertions of demoniacal power +over the external universe, was universal among the +Jews at the time of the Advent. To prove this, he has +adduced a number of opinions entertained by the +writers of the Talmud and others, involving the most +grovelling superstitions, and asserts that indications of +the same are to be found in the Gospels. As an +instance, he favours us with the following story told +by Josephus, who declares that he was an eye-witness +of the fact. +</p> + +<p> +<q>Josephus had seen a countryman of his own, named +Eliezer, release people possessed of devils in the presence +of the Emperor Vespasian and his sons, and of his +army. He put a ring containing one of the roots prescribed +by Solomon, into the nose of a demoniac, and +drew the demon out of his nostrils, and in the name +<pb n='209'/><anchor id='Pg209'/> +of Solomon, and reciting one of his incantations, he +adjured him to return no more. In order to demonstrate +to the spectators that he had power to cast out +demons, Eliezer was accustomed to set a pitcher of +water a little way off, and he commanded the demon, +as he left the body of the man, to overturn it, by which +means the skill and wisdom of Solomon was made very +manifest.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The object for which this and kindred stories are +referred to, is to prove that the Jewish mind was so +intensely credulous and superstitious on the subject of +demoniacal action at the time of our Lord, that there was +nothing so monstrous, which it was not in the habit of +accepting as fact. We are also repeatedly informed +that the followers of Jesus shared in this unbounded +credulity. It may be even inferred from the assertion +before us, that they were far more credulous. The +argument which this writer adduces is plausible, and it +may be stated thus. If a writer like Josephus, who +was extensively acquainted with Greek literature, and +the Talmudists who belonged to the <foreign rend='italic'>élite</foreign> of the nation, +could narrate such follies as facts, what must have +been the beliefs of the vulgar herd? We must not +forget that the followers of Jesus were chiefly from the +lower orders. <q>The common people heard him gladly.</q> +The inference which the reader is allowed to draw is +that they must have been addicted to yet more gross +credulity. +</p> + +<p> +What were the reasons which induced Josephus, a +man who had seen the wide world, to relate this monstrous +story I shall not inquire. One can hardly +believe that he was a dupe; his reporting it, however, +no more proves that such beliefs were universal when +he wrote, than the existence of a wide-spread spiritualistic +literature proves that a belief in spirit-rapping +<pb n='210'/><anchor id='Pg210'/> +prevails generally among all classes of society at the +present day, although many of the believers in spiritualism +belong to the educated classes, and readily +accept absurdities which the sound sense of multitudes +of artisans would immediately repudiate. +</p> + +<p> +The argument before me tells in a direction precisely +opposite to that which is intended by those who have +invoked it, and it is marvellous that they do not perceive +that it is destructive of their own case. I put it +as follows: If the authors of the Gospels entertained +the views of demoniacal agency which this author represents +them to have held, their narratives, which directly +lead them to refer to that subject, would have contained +numerous references to stories of the type of +that quoted from Josephus. Let me illustrate this +argument by an example. The Arabs and other +Orientals believe in the power of demons and magicians +over external nature. They consider this action to be +of frequent occurrence. Their literature therefore +abounds with accounts of such monstrous interventions. +But the Gospels, with the exception of the history of +the Temptation, do not contain an account of a single +marvel wrought by the agency of demons on external +nature. Demoniacal agency is repeatedly mentioned +by them; but it belongs to an order of phenomena of +an entirely different character. What, I ask, is the +only legitimate inference? That the authors of the +Gospels were free from the superstitions in question. +</p> + +<p> +Before going further it will be necessary to ascertain +what is the precise nature and character of that +demoniacal supernaturalism which is apparently asserted +in the pages of the New Testament. Without +doing so, it will be impossible to form a correct opinion +on the subject under consideration. +</p> + +<p> +The New Testament apparently ascribes to Satanic +<pb n='211'/><anchor id='Pg211'/> +agency not only a power of suggesting temptations to +the minds of men, but also in certain cases of depriving +them of the supremacy of their wills, of enslaving +their intellectual and moral powers, of interfering with +the use of their bodily organs, and, in one instance, +of imparting an unusual strength. These phenomena +constitute what is designated as <q>possession,</q> and +bear no inconsiderable resemblance to different forms +of insanity. +</p> + +<p> +But the New Testament also makes mention of +lunacy as well as possession. How far they were distinguishable +from each other we have no sufficient +data to enable us to determine. At one time they are +spoken of as the same disease; at others they are +clearly distinguished from each other. +</p> + +<p> +The language of the Gospels seems to imply that +some maladies were believed to be produced by the +influence of possession. In one or two instances language +is used which may imply that a bodily disease +was brought on by Satanic agency without actual +possession. Whatever may have been the belief of the +Jews on this subject, it is certain that the cases referred +to in the Gospels are very few; and although the mention +of diseases is very common, nothing is said about their +being due to demoniacal influence. Not a single case +occurs in which ordinary accidents are referred to this +influence, although such is affirmed to have been the +common belief of the Jews. In the Acts of the +Apostles only two cases of possession are mentioned, +one that of the damsel at Philippi, and the other the +occasion when certain Jewish exorcists undertook to +exorcise demoniacs at Ephesus in the name of Jesus. +</p> + +<p> +The former case is of some importance. The girl is +described as possessed by a spirit of Pytho, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> she +pretended to practise the art of divination by the +<pb n='212'/><anchor id='Pg212'/> +inspiration of the god Apollo, and in many respects +she practised the arts of the modern fortune-teller. +Such persons were not uncommon at the time. The +Pythia at Delphi professed to prophesy under the +influence of a similar inspiration. Whatever may have +been the real causes by which this mental condition +was brought about, the paroxysms were so real that +one is recorded to have died under their influence. +Her state when under prophetic influence, is described +as one of phrensied excitement. St. Paul is represented +by the historian as addressing himself to the +spirit, and commanding him to come out in the name +of Jesus Christ. The powers of such persons were +confined to diving into the secrets of the future; but +to other kinds of supernatural power they made no +claims. +</p> + +<p> +If the language here employed be other than phenomenal, +it seems to imply that in St. Paul's opinion +certain practices of the ancient world which were far +from uncommon, were connected with demoniacal +agency. These were usually combined with certain +forms of religious phrensy, such as even in the present +day manifest themselves in connection with the more +degraded forms of religion. At no period was this +class of phenomena more prevalent than during the +century which preceded, and that which followed the +Advent, when human nature was stirred to its profoundest +depths. +</p> + +<p> +There are also a few passages in St. Paul's writings +which seem to affirm a connection between demoniacal +agency and pagan worship. Whatever may have been +his own opinions on this subject, it is evident that the +action which he supposed to have been exerted was +entirely mental. Not one word is uttered by him +which implies that he regarded this mode of demoniacal +<pb n='213'/><anchor id='Pg213'/> +action as involving a power of interfering with the +forces of the material universe. +</p> + +<p> +Such is a general statement of the facts as they +appear in the New Testament in connection with possession, +and demoniacal action. It has been necessary +thus distinctly to state them, in order that we may +keep the subject clear of all adventitious issues with +which it has been attempted to obscure it. That form +of demoniacal action involved in the supposed power +possessed by demons of tempting men to evil does not +fall within the limits of the present controversy. +</p> + +<p> +But the opponents of Christianity are not content +to reason on the facts respecting demoniacal action as +they are presented to us in the pages of the New +Testament. They charge its writers with a number of +the most grotesque beliefs on this subject, for which +the book itself furnishes us with no evidence. This +course has been taken for the purpose of fastening on +them a boundless credulity, and thereby destroying +their claim to be accepted as credible reporters of historical +facts. I will cite one or two examples of this +mode of reasoning, in order that we may be able to +form a correct estimate of its value. +</p> + +<p> +After having given a detailed account of a number +of monstrous beliefs gleaned from the Talmud and +other sources respecting angels, the author of <q>Supernatural +Religion</q> then proceeds: <q>The belief in +demons at the time of Jesus was equally emphatic +and comprehensive, and we need not mention also that +the New Testament is full of it. They are in the air, +on earth, in the bodies of men and animals, and even +at the bottom of the sea. They are the offspring of +the fallen angels who loved the daughters of men. +They have wings like angels, and can fly from one +place in the earth to another. They attain a knowledge +<pb n='214'/><anchor id='Pg214'/> +of the future by listening behind the veil of the +temple of God. Their numbers are infinite. The +earth is so full of them, that if man had the power to +see, he could not exist on account of them; there are +more demons than men, and they are about as close as +the earth thrown up out of a new made grave. It is +stated that each man had 10,000 demons on his right +hand, and 1000 on his left.... The crush on the +Sabbath in the synagogue arises from them; also the +dresses of the Rabbins become so soon worn through +their rubbing; in like manner also they cause the +tottering of the feet. He who wishes to discover these +spirits must take sifted ashes, and strew them about +his bed, and he will perceive their footprints upon them +like a cock's tread.</q> Here follow a number of the +most ineffable absurdities, unsurpassed by anything +contained in the Arabian Nights, which I need not +cite. The author then proceeds: <q>Demons, however, +take more especial delight in foul and offensive places, +and an evil spirit inhabits every private closet in the +world. Demons haunt deserted places, ruins, graves, +and certain kinds of trees. We find indications of +these superstitions throughout the Gospels. The possessed +are represented as dwelling among the tombs, +and being driven by unclean spirits into the wilderness, +and the demons can find no rest in clean places. +Demons also frequented springs and fountains. The +episode of the angel who was said to descend at +certain times and trouble the water of the pool of +Bethesda, so that he that first stepped in was healed +of whatsoever disease he had, may be mentioned here +in passing, although the passage is not found in the +older manuscripts of the fourth Gospel, and was +certainly a late addition.</q> Here follow further citations +of Rabbinical absurdities. The author then +<pb n='215'/><anchor id='Pg215'/> +proceeds: <q>The Talmud and other Rabbinical writings +are full of references to demoniacal possession, but we +need not enter into details on this point, as the New +Testament itself presents sufficient evidence respecting +it. Not only could one spirit enter into a body, but +many took possession of the same individual. There +are many instances mentioned in the Gospels, such as +Mary Magdalene, out of whom went seven demons +(ἑπτὰ δαιμόνια), and the man whose name was legion, +because many demons (πολλὰ δαιμόνια) had entered +into him. Demons likewise entered into the bodies of +animals, and in the narrative to which we have just +referred, the demons, on being expelled from the man, +requested to be allowed to enter into the herd of +swine, which being permitted, <q>the demons went out +of the man into the swine, and the herd ran violently +down the cliff into the lake and were drowned,</q> the +evil spirits, as usual, taking pleasure only in the destruction +and injury of man and beast. Besides +possession, all the diseases of men and animals are +ascribed to the action of the devil and demons. In +the Gospel, for instance, the woman with a spirit of +infirmity is described as bound by Satan, although the +case was not one of demoniacal possession.</q> The +author then proceeds to enumerate a large number of +grotesque beliefs as held by the Jews at the time of +the Advent. +</p> + +<p> +I regret the necessity which has compelled me to +cite so lengthy a passage, but it is absolutely necessary +that the reader should be enabled to see, beyond the +possibility of misapprehension, the nature of the +objections which are urged against the historical credibility +of the Gospels, and the reasonings by which they +are attempted to be supported. The general principle +that underlies them may be stated in a few words, that +<pb n='216'/><anchor id='Pg216'/> +the followers of Jesus and the authors of the Gospels +were a prey to such a multitude of degrading superstitions +on the subject of demonology as wholly to +destroy the value of their historical testimony. +</p> + +<p> +The effect of this passage with its context is to +produce the impression on the mind of the reader, not +only that these absurd beliefs were generally entertained +by the Jews at the time of the Advent, but that +they constituted the form of thought of the followers +of Jesus. It may be urged that the object of the author +is to prove the general superstition of the times; and +that he does not intend to affirm that it was shared in +by every one of the followers of Jesus. This may be +correct; but if it is not intended to be asserted that the +followers of Jesus were the prey of equal superstitions, +the reference to this mass of credulity can have no +bearing on the present argument, and is simply +misleading. To what purpose, I ask, is it made, unless +it is intended to implicate our Lord's followers in these +beliefs? Unless it were so, the fact that others entertained +them would not in the smallest degree affect the +value of their historical testimony. But on this point +we are not left to inferences; not only are passages in +the Gospels referred to, but we are repeatedly informed +that the followers of Jesus did share in these popular +delusions. +</p> + +<p> +The position, therefore, which is taken by the author +is clear. His readers are invited to believe that the +followers of our Lord were a prey to the belief in a +number of ineffable absurdities respecting demons +such as he has enumerated. If this can be established, +the conclusion is inevitable, that their historical testimony +is valueless. +</p> + +<p> +Let us now consider the mode in which the proof of +this is attempted to be established. The authorities +<pb n='217'/><anchor id='Pg217'/> +quoted are chiefly the Talmudical writers; that is to +say, persons who wrote as late as from <hi rend='smallcaps'>a.d.</hi> 200 to +<hi rend='smallcaps'>a.d.</hi> 500, are cited as the proof that such opinions were +universally entertained by the Jews in the time of +Jesus Christ. Equally valid would it be to quote the +writers of modern spiritualism to prove that such +opinions were held by our ancestors in the time of the +Stuarts or the Plantagenets. On the strength of this +and kindred evidence, such opinions are ascribed to the +original propagators of Christianity, and to the authors +of the Gospels. +</p> + +<p> +But this is not all. The only correct method of +ascertaining the superstition and credulity of any +particular writer is carefully to examine the contents of +his book, and to note the various instances which we +find in it of what we consider to be superstitions; and +then proceed to estimate their value, and, if needful, to +compare them with other contemporary authorities. +This course, however, is not that pursued by this +writer. On the contrary, he quotes the absurdities +which we have seen from the Talmudical writers, and +refers in the midst of them to nearly every passage in +the Gospels which can be made to bear even a remote +reference to the views in question. I submit that +such a mode of reasoning is not conducive to the +interests of truth. +</p> + +<p> +A few examples of this mode of conducting the +argument require notice. +</p> + +<p> +After referring to a number of monstrous superstitions, +he tells us that the Jews believed that <q>demons +took especial delight in foul and offensive places, and +that an evil spirit inhabits every private closet in the +world. Demons haunted deserted places, ruins, graves, +and certain kinds of trees. We find indications of these +superstitions throughout the Gospels. The possessed +<pb n='218'/><anchor id='Pg218'/> +are represented as dwelling among the tombs, and as +being driven by unclean spirits into the wilderness, and +demons can find no rest in clean places.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>We find indications of these superstitions throughout +the Gospels.</q> To this observation I invite the +reader's attention. Is it meant to be affirmed that any +indication can be found in the Gospels that the writers +believed that a demon inhabited every private closet in +the world? Two instances only are referred to in the +text, in one of which the demoniac of Gadara is represented +as dwelling among the tombs, and as having +been driven into the wilderness; and the other the +parable of the unclean spirit going out of the man, +and finding no rest when walking through dry places. +Do these two cases prove the truth of the sweeping +assertions above referred to? Does the parabolic representation +that the expelled demon found no rest in +dry or clean places prove that the disciples of Jesus +believed that they took especial delight in foul or +offensive ones? Does the fact that the demoniac of +Gadara had been driven by the evil spirit into the +wilderness prove that it was a universal belief that +deserts and graves were haunted by demons? +</p> + +<p> +In proof also of these assertions we are referred in a +note to five passages in the Gospels, viz. Matt. viii. 28; +xii. 43; Mark v. 3-5; Luke viii. 27-29; xi. 24. Five +passages are very few to justify the assertion that we +find indications of these superstitions throughout the +Gospels. On examining them, however, the five references +are reduced to two, three belong to the account of +the demoniac at Gadara, reported by each of the +Synoptics; and two to the twofold report of the same +parable as given by Matthew and Luke! This is a +very slender foundation on which to ground the assertion +that the followers of Jesus believed that <q>demons +<pb n='219'/><anchor id='Pg219'/> +took especial delight in foul and offensive places, that +they inhabited every private closet in the world, and +that they haunted deserted places, graves, ruins, and +certain kinds of trees, and that we find indications of +these superstitions <emph>throughout the Gospels</emph>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Still more extraordinary is the next reference. <q>Demons +haunted springs and fountains,</q> says the author. +To this he adds, <q>the episode of the angel who was +said to descend at certain seasons and trouble the water +of the pool of Bethesda, so that he who first stepped in +was cured of whatsoever disease he had, may be mentioned +in passing.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Why, I ask, mention it at all? Is the visit of an +angel to this particular pool for the purpose of working +a miracle, a proof that the followers of our Lord +believed that demons inhabited springs and fountains? +</p> + +<p> +But our astonishment at the author's reference to it +is increased when we read the following words: <q><emph>Although +the passage is not found in the oldest manuscripts +of the Fourth Gospel, and it is certainly a late +interpolation</emph>.</q> +</p> + +<p> +I must put the question again in real earnestness. +This being so, why mention it here? The author +admits that it formed no portion of the original Gospel +of St. John, and that it is certainly a late interpolation. +Now the Gospel of St. John, according to the opinion +of the most eminent unbelievers, was not published +before <hi rend='smallcaps'>a.d.</hi> 170. If this was the case (the author himself +evidently assigns to its composition a very late +date) a late interpolation could not have found its way +into its pages until about the year 250, at the earliest +200. What then is the nature of the reasoning before +us? We are referred for proof that the followers of +Jesus held these opinions to an authority which the +author himself admits to have been a late interpolation, +<pb n='220'/><anchor id='Pg220'/> +which could not have been introduced into this Gospel +earlier than 180 years after the ministry of our Lord, +as a proof that his original followers believed that +demons inhabited springs and fountains. Such reasonings +furnish their own refutation. +</p> + +<p> +The exposure of one more fallacy of this description +will be sufficient. We are told that, <q>Not only one +evil spirit entered into a body, but many took possession +of the same individual. There are <emph>many instances +mentioned in the Gospels</emph>, such as Mary Magdalene, out +of whom went seven demons, and the man whose name +was legion, because many demons had entered into +him.</q> +</p> + +<p> +I ask, where are these <q>many instances</q>? The +plain fact must be stated, that the two here referred to, +constitute the only ones which are mentioned as facts +by the Evangelists. Besides these there is the parable +of the unclean spirit going out of the man above +alluded to, who, when he could find no rest returned +to his former habitation in company with seven other +spirits more wicked than himself. It should be observed +that in two of the cases the number given is +the mystical number <q>Seven</q>; and that one of them +occurs in a parable, the moral of which is, to warn the +Jews, that although they had got rid of the evil spirit +of idolatry, they were in danger of falling into the +greater evil of Phariseeism and hypocrisy. +</p> + +<p> +But to return to the argument. The great mass of +the author's citations for the purpose of proving that +the Jews at the time of the Advent, and among them +the followers of Jesus, were a prey to these grotesque +beliefs respecting the action of demons, are made from +authors who are separated by an interval of centuries +from the ministry of our Lord. I submit, therefore, +that such authorities are utterly valueless to prove that +<pb n='221'/><anchor id='Pg221'/> +His disciples and early followers were a prey to these +gross delusions. Nor has he adduced an atom of valid +proof from the New Testament itself. The references +above referred to have either been made in a most +careless manner, or have been used to assist in proving +a foregone conclusion. +</p> + +<p> +But let us suppose for the sake of argument that +the Jews at the time of our Lord did generally entertain +these monstrous demoniacal beliefs: to what conclusion, +I ask, would such a fact, if true, indubitably +point? Credulous and superstitions people, invariably +invent stories that are the counterparts of their own +credulity. This is proved by the whole mass of existing +mythology. Mythological inventions give us the precise +measure of the beliefs of those who have originated +them. If then the demonology of those who have +elaborated these portions of the Gospels was of the +character that this writer and others assert it to have +been, the Gospels would have contained an embodiment +of such demoniacal beliefs as those which the +author has so industriously collected, and has endeavoured +to fasten upon their writers. +</p> + +<p> +Now the idea of demonology having been present in +the minds of the writers, it is obvious that they did +not omit all reference to these absurd beliefs, merely +because they were outside the subject on which they +were writing. But while demoniacal action is repeatedly +alluded to, it is an undeniable fact that no +stories of the description given by this writer are to be +found in them. The author therefore has furnished +the most conclusive proof, without intending to do so, +that these forms of thought, to whomsoever else they +may have appertained, were neither those of the original +followers of Jesus, nor of the authors of the +Gospels. +</p> + +<pb n='222'/><anchor id='Pg222'/> + +<p> +It follows therefore that this attempt to prove that +the followers of our Lord and the authors of the +Gospels were a prey to such a mass of grotesque beliefs +respecting demons, as to invalidate their historical +testimony, falls to the ground, and that the data on +which this has been attempted to be established, afford +proof on the contrary that they did not entertain the +beliefs in question. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='223'/><anchor id='Pg223'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter X. The Existence And Miracles Of Satan.</head> + +<p> +I fully admit that a difficulty is involved in the idea +that a being like Satan is permitted to perform actions +which bear even a remote analogy to divine miracles. +I have already shown that the New Testament only +apparently ascribes to him a supernatural action of a +very limited and special kind, differing widely from our +usual conception of a miracle. I now proceed to +inquire how far this limited action, thus attributed to +him, if we suppose that possession was an objective +fact, and not a form of madness, interferes with the +validity of the attestation of miracles to the Christian +revelation. +</p> + +<p> +The existence of a being like Satan is alleged as +constituting an enormous difficulty against the statements +of the New Testament. A numerous class of +writers dismiss the idea of his existence as unworthy +of serious argument, and endeavour to dispose of it +with a sneer. This world however contains numerous +analogous cases of very evil men endowed with the +highest mental powers, who have exerted the most +injurious influences on others. Their existence is a +fact; and the difficulties attending it cannot be got rid +of by any kind of evasion. The objections that have +been urged in connection with this subject are not +founded on the facts of the moral universe as they +exist; but on <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> principles alone. It has been +affirmed to be incredible that Almighty God should +<pb n='224'/><anchor id='Pg224'/> +have permitted the existence of such a being as Satan; +or if his existence is permitted, that he can be allowed +to interfere in the affairs of men. +</p> + +<p> +In dealing with this question it is evident that I +must proceed on the supposition that I am reasoning +with theists only. The whole question is irrelevant on +the principles of Pantheism or Atheism, or, to put the +case more distinctly, on such principles there is no +greater difficulty in supposing that nature has evolved +evil beings superior to men in their faculties and +powers in some other part of the universe, than that +it has evolved evil men, who are gifted with high forms +of intelligence in this; or even that such beings should +be capable of interfering in human affairs. If Pantheism +or Atheism is a correct account of the facts of +the universe, it is impossible to say what kind of +beings nature may have evolved in the past, or may +evolve in the future from her prolific womb. +</p> + +<p> +But if it is once conceded that a personal God exists, +who is the moral Governor of the Universe, the affirmation +that the existence of such beings is inconsistent +with his attributes, is only another form of asserting +that the existence of moral evil is incompatible with +them. The ground of its existence has been a problem, +into which the human mind has striven to penetrate +from the earliest dawn of thought, without ever +approaching to its solution; but into this question it +is useless to enter. In the present argument we are +dealing with facts, and the existence of aggravated +forms of moral evil in the universe is a fact. If there +be a God, it must be consistent with his attributes. +The real difficulty lies in its existence at all in the universe +of a God who is all-powerful and good. +</p> + +<p> +But since it does exist, the existence of a being like +Satan is a mere question of degree. It is an unquestionable +<pb n='225'/><anchor id='Pg225'/> +fact, whether we can explain it or not, that +many men of the worst moral principles have been +gifted with the highest intellectual powers, and have +been placed in positions in society which have enabled +them to inflict the greatest evil on others. History is +full of such cases. The most extreme forms of human +corruption have been not inaptly designated as +<q>Satanic.</q> If therefore under the moral government +of God it is a fact that such forms of human wickedness +exist; and if it is supposable, that there are other +rational beings in the universe endowed with higher +powers than man, how can it be inconceivable that they +may differ in moral character, precisely in the same +way as men do; and that some may be eminently +virtuous, and others fearfully corrupt? It is clear that +the difficulty centres in the existence of moral evil in +the universe of a God who is possessed of almighty +power, and perfect holiness and goodness. Why has +He permitted it? Is its existence a necessary condition +of the creation of a free moral agent? If so, might +not the amount of it have been greatly diminished? +The utmost light that reason can throw on these questions +consists of a few very imperfect glimmerings. +The fact is undeniable, that a large mass of moral evil +exists, and in very fearful forms. If there be a +Creator of the universe, it is plain that the present +state of things must be consistent with his attributes. +The only mode of escaping from this difficulty is by +taking refuge in the vastly greater ones of pantheism +or atheism. +</p> + +<p> +Many theists, pressed by these difficulties, have +attempted to evade them by endeavouring to reduce the +amount of moral evil in the universe, the existence +of which they cannot deny, to indefinitely small proportions, +and then affirming that it will be ultimately +<pb n='226'/><anchor id='Pg226'/> +swallowed up in the ocean of universal good. But the +mere diminishing of its amount by no means solves +the difficulty. The real question is, how has it come +even into temporary existence? But there is also a +still more grave objection to this course of reasoning. +It renders it necessary that we should close our eyes to +the most obvious facts. So far is it from being the +case that the amount of moral evil in the world is +small, that it is very large. This fact is indisputable. +The whole course of history tells us that it has existed +in all past ages and in very aggravated forms. To try +to get rid of the difficulty in this manner is simply +to close our eyes, and refuse to see it. +</p> + +<p> +But not only does moral, but physical evil exist. +This is another unquestionable fact, and its existence +bears directly on my argument. Many and vain have +been the attempts to explain it away. It has been +affirmed that pain after all is no such great matter. I +strongly suspect that those who have asserted this, +have experienced but little of it. It is true that it +may ultimately result in good under God's government, +but taken by itself, it is undeniably an evil. Do not +frightful sufferings abound? Do not most painful +diseases afflict our frames? Is it not possible to suffer +terribly from causes quite independent of our own +conduct? Is not a great earthquake a terrible calamity +to those who suffer from its effects, although it may +be attended with beneficial results to those who do +not? Pains may be said to be useful warnings; but +surely the warning might have been given without the +extremity of the suffering. They are also affirmed to +be the penalties of ignorance, and this may be partially +true: but the ignorance is in a vast majority of cases +unavoidable. It is a simple fact, that a great amount +of physical suffering exists, the reason of which we +are wholly unable to explain. +</p> + +<pb n='227'/><anchor id='Pg227'/> + +<p> +But further: moral evil propagates itself, and inflicts +calamities on those who are not implicated in its +guilt. Is it not true that men have existed both in +the ancient and modern world, whose actions have inflicted +the greatest evils on mankind for generation +after generation? Can any one doubt that descendants +suffer for the sins of remote ancestors, and +children for those of their parents? Facts are facts, +and they will not become less so by our refusing to +look at them. The evil wrought by such a man as +Philip II. of Spain, is a fact, and it has extended its +baneful influence to our own times. Is not a large +portion of the evils under which France has groaned, +traceable to the misdeeds of two of her sovereigns? +These were quietly sleeping in their graves, when the +evils they had occasioned burst on the head of their +guiltless successor. But it is needless to quote examples. +History is one long succession of them. +Whether we like it or not, the old saying is an accurate +account of the moral order of the universe as it exists, +<q>Visiting the sins of the fathers on the children unto +the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, +and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, +and keep my commandments.</q> These are facts which +the theist equally with the Christian must face, for they +exist in the universe of that God, in whose moral perfections +both believe. I repeat, therefore, that the +only way of escaping from them is by rushing into the +far greater difficulties of pantheism or atheism. +</p> + +<p> +These reasonings might be indefinitely extended. +The result which follows from them is clear, that if we +attempt to reason from abstract principles to the constitution +of a universe, we shall produce one utterly +unlike that which actually exists. It follows, that as +they cannot account for the facts of the universe, as +<pb n='228'/><anchor id='Pg228'/> +they come under our observation, they are unsafe +guides on all similar questions. Consequently they +are unable to show that the existence of evil beings +possessed of superhuman powers, is inconsistent with +the perfections of God. +</p> + +<p> +Nor is there any greater force in the objection, that +if such beings exist at all, it is inconsistent with our +conceptions of the divine government, that they should +be allowed to interfere in the affairs of men. I reply, +that it is equally inconceivable, that God should have +allowed a man, to whom he has imparted the greatest +mental endowments, and whom he has placed in an +elevated position in society, who lived centuries ago, +to exert an evil influence on the present generation. +The difficulty that a powerful influence for evil can be +exerted by men on those who have never seen them, +and of whose existence they have never heard, is just +as great as the one under consideration. Yet it is one +of the most undeniable of facts, that men do exert the +most powerful influence on one another, and that such +influence can be exerted by generations long since +passed away on those who live ages afterwards; and +that it can be exerted unconsciously. +</p> + +<p> +I am far from wishing to deny, that the difficulty is a +real one. On the contrary, I fully admit it; and that +it is one which our present faculties are unable to +explain. But it is one which is not peculiar to +Christianity, nor has it originated in it. The interference +of superhuman beings in human affairs for the +purposes of evil, would be only another form of the +same difficulty. +</p> + +<p> +Precisely similar reasonings to those which have +been employed to prove that the existence of a being +like Satan is impossible, when they are applied to other +subjects, bring us into direct collision with realities. +<pb n='229'/><anchor id='Pg229'/> +There can be no doubt, that if the constitution of the +universe had been placed in our hands, its phenomena +would have been very different. But our function is a +far humbler one. It is not to erect a universe according +to our conceptions of what is best, but to learn the +order of that in which we live, and to accept facts on +sufficient evidence, however strongly they may conflict +with abstract theories. +</p> + +<p> +I now proceed to consider the real difficulty connected +with this subject, and which has been very +strongly urged by the author of <q>Supernatural Religion.</q> +It is this. <q>If it is conceivable that beings +exist who possess superhuman knowledge and power; +and that they are capable of interfering as the New +Testament affirms, in the affairs of men, how can the +performance of a miracle be the guarantee of a divine +commission? May not inferior agents, who possess +superhuman knowledge and power, be able to produce +results which would to all outward appearance be miraculous? +Might not an evil being, who was possessed +of the highest intelligence like Satan, perform such +actions as would be equivalent to miracles, for the +purpose of authenticating falsehoods? All that such +actions prove is the presence of superhuman knowledge +and power; but they would leave it quite uncertain +whether the power was divine or Satanic.</q> Such is +the objection, and it demands an adequate solution. +</p> + +<p> +I reply, that if we view the question merely as an +abstract one, it is quite possible, if a superhuman being +of high intelligence is permitted to interfere in the +affairs of men, that he should be able to perform +actions which might have all the appearance of being +supernatural. Such results might be even brought +about by a superior acquaintance with the existing +forces of nature, and by a successful combination of +<pb n='230'/><anchor id='Pg230'/> +them, without the introduction of any new force whatever. +For such results we need not invoke the aid of +a supernatural being. They have been frequently +effected by a superior human intelligence acting on an +inferior one. We all know how Columbus used his +superior knowledge of astronomy, to predict an eclipse, +and the ignorant natives of America mistook this as +denoting the presence of a superhuman being. Such +results may be always produced, when superior knowledge +acts on ignorance; and such is the origin of no +inconsiderable number of impositions which have been +practised on mankind. It is therefore quite conceivable, +as an abstract question, that as men who possess a +very superior intelligence, are capable of producing +results which to an inferior intelligence would have the +appearance of being supernatural, without really being +so, in the same manner, if Satan is supposed to +possess an intelligence greater than that of the wisest +of mankind, and if his interference in human affairs is +permitted, he may be able to perform actions which +would have the appearance of being supernatural, by a +skilful use of the existing forces of nature. +</p> + +<p> +But to such power there must be a limit. There are +certain results which plainly lie beyond the power of +any mere combination of the forces of nature to produce. +Of these, many of the miracles recorded in the +Gospels are instances, such as the cure of blind or +leprous men by no other visible instrumentality than +a word or a touch. Actions of this kind differ wholly +in character from those which we are now considering. +If a miracle was a more objective fact taking place in +external nature, and nothing more, it might be open to +question whether its performance was owing to supernatural +agency, or to some combination of known or +unknown forces. But the miracles with which we are +<pb n='231'/><anchor id='Pg231'/> +concerned in this controversy, involve a great deal +more than more objective facts in material nature. +</p> + +<p> +But assuming, as I cannot help doing in an argument +like the present, the existence of a God, who is +the Creator and Governor of the universe, the question +is not a mere abstract one, what a Being like Satan, if he +is supposed to exist, might be capable of doing; but it +becomes entirely one of permitted agency. It is plain, +that if there is a God, every being in the universe, +however powerful or intelligent, can only act within a +certain definite sphere of operation, which the Governor +of the universe has assigned to him. Within what +limits then is he allowed act? Are subordinate +agents permitted to interfere with the material forces of +external nature? and if so, within what bounds? Can +they wander over the universe at their mere will and +pleasure, and interfere with its operations? How far +is their interference permitted in the moral and spiritual +worlds? The question before as is even reduced to +one of far narrower limits. Our only direct knowledge +of the existence of such an agency is derived from +Revelation. The real point therefore which concerns +us is, to what extent is such permitted agency affirmed +in the New Testament. Do the Satanic interventions +there described interfere with divine miracles as attestations +of a divine commission? We have nothing +whatever to do with abstract propositions or with what +Rabbinical writers may have affirmed on this subject, +but with the assertions of the New Testament alone. +</p> + +<p> +If there is a God, it is certain that the present order +of nature must be a manifestation of His will. So must +be the energy of its forces in conformity with invariable +law. Whatever power He has delegated to subordinate +agents, must form a portion of this universal order, and +be exercised in conformity with the divine purposes. +<pb n='232'/><anchor id='Pg232'/> +It is inconceivable that subordinate agents can be +allowed to break in upon it at their will and pleasure, +for the general permanence of its order forms an essential +condition for the exercise of moral agency. If +they are allowed to do so, it must be only within clear +and definite limits, which ultimately effectuate the +purposes of the Creator. Such is the nature of the +power which man can exert over material nature. It can +only modify results, by giving a new direction to its +forces. In the case of man this power is limited to the +world in which he lives. In a similar manner, if beings +superior to him in power and intelligence exist, their +interference must be subject to definite limitations. +Such is the uniform affirmation of the writers of the +New Testament. Even if we take their language in +the most literal sense, the supernatural interventions +which they attribute to Satan, are confined to a very +definite order of phenomena. In one word, the sacred +writers have described Satanic intervention as limited +to the world of mind; and as capable, through its +action on the mind, of producing certain results on the +bodily organization. To this there is one exception, +the apparent ascription of a few diseases to Satanic +agency. This I shall consider hereafter. +</p> + +<p> +It is a remarkable fact, and one worthy of particular +attention, that the supernatural action attributed to +Satan in the New Testament, with the exception above +referred to, is a mental one. It is through the action +on men's minds alone, that demoniacal agency produces +any results on their bodily frame. No direct +action on the material forces of nature is ever attributed +to it. We find nothing in the smallest degree resembling +the act of a demon overturning a pitcher of +water. The kind of influence attributed to Satan is of +a similar character, though much higher in degree, to +<pb n='233'/><anchor id='Pg233'/> +that which one man can exert over another. One man +of superior mental power is capable of exerting an +influence over a weaker mind to such a degree, as +almost to enthral it. We call this a species of fascination. +In the New Testament the similar but mightier +Satanic influence is Possession. One mind, by getting +a powerful hold on another, can exert an influence on +the body, as in mesmerism. The Satanic influence +exerted in possession is only a more powerful one. +</p> + +<p> +It is certain that the extent to which one human +mind can act on another is bounded by no narrow +limits; what is more, it is one which is frequently +exerted for evil. It is evidently within the purposes +of the Creator to permit this. Why it is allowed to +the extent to which it is, is beyond our powers to +discover. But the wide extent to which it not only +can be, but actually is exerted, is a fact that cannot be +denied. It is also an influence that can be exerted +secretly. The difference between this power and that +which is supposed to be attributed to Satan in the +New Testament is far more one of degree than of +kind; and the latter is one which is bounded by clear +and definite limits. Between a Satanic possession and a +miracle performed by Jesus the distinction is unmistakable. +</p> + +<p> +It follows from the foregoing considerations, that the +Satanic supernaturalism, which we have to consider, as +far as if stands in opposition to the miracles of God, +is reduced to very narrow limits. It consists almost +exclusively of possession and its phenomena. No +other kind of action bearing even a remote analogy to +a miracle, with the single exception of the history of +the temptation, is anywhere attributed to Satan in +the New Testament. +</p> + +<p> +In estimating the evidential character of miracles, +<pb n='234'/><anchor id='Pg234'/> +it has been a far too common practice with those who +deny the historical character of the Gospels, to keep +out of view their moral aspect as an important portion +of their evidential value. It has been affirmed that a +miracle must be estimated as an act of power quite +apart from its moral impress. The author before me +even goes the length of supposing, that, if Satan is as +cunning as he is represented in the New Testament, he +may even turn himself into an angel of light and perform +works bearing the impress of holiness for the +purpose of furthering the interests of the kingdom of +lies. +</p> + +<p> +Such an idea receives no countenance from anything +which is affirmed by St. Paul. The passage in which +allusion is made to Satan transforming himself into +an angel of light is as follows: <q>For such are false +apostles, deceitful workers, transforming themselves +into the apostles of Christ. And no marvel, for Satan +himself is transformed into an angel of light. Therefore +it is no great thing if his ministers should be +transformed as the ministers of righteousness.</q> It is +quite clear that nothing was further from the Apostle's +mind than the idea of Satanic miracles bearing the +impress of holiness as wrought in support of the kingdom +of falsehood. He is simply speaking of Judaizing +teachers, who claimed the support of apostolical authority, +for the purpose of disseminating their unchristian +views. +</p> + +<p> +The idea is absurd and ridiculous, but we know that +it occurred to the opponents of our Lord, who charged +him with working miracles by Satanic agency. The +special instance in which they made this charge was +that of his supposed expulsion of demons. Our Lord +met it by the decisive argument, <q>How can Satan cast +out Satan? If Satan be divided against himself, how +<pb n='235'/><anchor id='Pg235'/> +shall his kingdom stand?</q> In a word, he appealed to +the moral aspect of his miracles as a convincing proof +that their accusation could only have been instigated +by deliberate malice. +</p> + +<p> +The same objection was doubtless urged against his +other miracles, although it is nowhere stated in express +terms in the Gospels. But whatever absurd beliefs may +have been entertained by the learned Rabbis, they were +easily met by the common sense of the people. <q>We +know,</q> said the Rabbis, <q>that this man is a sinner.</q> +<q>How can a man that is a sinner perform such +miracles?</q> is the reply. <q>Whether he be a sinner, +I know not, but one thing I know, that whereas I was +blind, now I see.</q> <q>Can a devil open the eyes of the +blind?</q> It is evident that the difficulties suggested +by the author of <q>Supernatural Religion</q> as to the +evidential value of miracles being nullified by the views +which prevailed respecting demoniacal action were not +appreciated when the fourth Gospel was composed, +although according to this theory they ought to have +been at that time in full force. But apart from the +peculiar character ascribed to Satanic supernaturalism +in the New Testament, the entire idea that there could +have been any danger of confounding Satanic miracles +with the miracles of God, rests on the fallacy of confounding +a mere objective fact with an action of a +moral agent. A miracle does not consist merely +in the outward event, which is caused by him, but +in the occurrence united with the character and +purpose of the agent. The actions of holy beings +must bear the impress of their holiness; those of +evil ones, of the contrary. If, therefore, evil moral +agents are capable of performing actions which +are analogous to miracles, they cannot fail to be +stamped with the evil of their characters. Such would +<pb n='236'/><anchor id='Pg236'/> +always form a discriminating mark between Divine and +Satanic miracles, even on the supposition that the latter +are possible. +</p> + +<p> +This precisely represents the case as it stands in the +New Testament. All the miracles alleged to have been +wrought by God, bear a definite impress of character +and purpose. The supernaturalism ascribed to Satan +is no less definitely marked. The one clearly comes +from above. The indications that the other, if real, +must have come from below, are equally distinct. The +moral impress which the two series of events bear, is +fully sufficient to discriminate the one from the other. +</p> + +<p> +The attempt to distinguish between the miraculous +act and its moral environment, is absurd. It has been +affirmed that one miraculous act is as good as another, +quite apart from the circumstances with which they are +attended. Such a principle would destroy the distinction +between a highly meritorious act and the +foulest crime. A, for example, has killed B. The +outward act may be the same; but the accompanying +circumstances make all the distinction between a justifiable +homicide, and a most atrocious murder. It is +ridiculous to affirm that principles which are legitimate +in common life become invalid only when they +are applied to the evidences of Christianity. Why, in +the name of common sense, may not one miracle be as +clearly distinguishable from another by its moral +environment, as an event in ordinary life is similarly +distinguished? The affirmation, therefore, that the +supposition of the possibility of Satanic miracles must +invalidate the miracles of God is absurd. +</p> + +<p> +Our Lord, therefore, was right in appealing to the +character of his works as affording a conclusive proof +of the source whence they originated, and in contrasting +them with the species of supernaturalism which +<pb n='237'/><anchor id='Pg237'/> +was popularly attributed to Satan. <q>How can Satan +cast out Satan? If I do not the works of my Father, +believe me not; but if I do, though ye believe not me, +believe the works, that ye may see and believe that +the Father is in me and I in Him.</q> +</p> + +<p> +This is conclusive reasoning. It is only possible to +darken the question by treating it as one of bare possibilities, +as to what kind of actions a being like Satan +might be capable of performing, if he is allowed to +interfere with the arrangements of the universe at his +pleasure. Such a supposition is foreign to the question +at issue, which is whether the supernaturalism which +the New Testament is supposed to attribute to him can +interfere with the evidential value of the miracles +wrought by Jesus. My reply is, Examine and compare +the two. When this has been done, no doubt can +remain on any reasonable mind that the latter, if real, +are from above; and the former from below. The +affirmation therefore that if Satanic miracles, such as +possession, are possible, it invalidates the evidence of +those wrought by God in attestation of the truth of a +divine commission is disproved. +</p> + +<p> +Equally invalid is the objection against a miraculous +attestation to a divine commission, on the ground that +such testimony can be easily imitated. I reply, that +the great mass of the miracles recorded in the New +Testament do not easily admit of a fraudulent imitation. +I by no means deny that the art of legerdemain +is capable of producing results which to an ignorant +observer have the appearance of being supernatural. +But this class of actions bears not the smallest analogy +to the miracles recorded in the New Testament. No +art of legerdemain can persuade a man who has been +for many years blind to believe that he has recovered +his sight, and enable him to act accordingly. +</p> + +<pb n='238'/><anchor id='Pg238'/> + +<p> +But it has been argued; if God is the moral +Governor of the universe, is He not bound to prevent a +being like Satan from acting for the purposes of evil +in the affairs of men? This question may be best +answered by asking another. Is He not equally bound +to hinder evil men from exerting such terrible influences +on others, even long after they are dead? Is He +not bound to hinder the possibility of the bringing up +of children by their parents in various forms of vice, +so as to render them in after life, more wicked than +themselves? Yet it is an indubitable fact that such an +influence is exerted under the moral government of +God. Human life abounds with such cases, which bear +a close analogy to Satanic action exerted in the affairs +of men. When we can fully fathom the reason for the +permission of the one, we shall have made considerable +progress in understanding those of the other. The +case may be simply stated. There are difficulties in +the moral government of the universe, into the grounds +of which we cannot penetrate. These press equally on +every form of theism. The Satanic supernaturalism +described in the New Testament presents a precisely +analogous difficulty. This therefore can form no +reason why one who believes that God is the moral +Governor of the universe, as it now exists, should reject +Christianity because the difficulties are of a similar +order, and press equally on both. The only escape +from them, as I have already said, is the inevitable +position assumed by atheism, or pantheism, and the +dreary prospect which they afford to the aspirations of +the human mind. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='239'/><anchor id='Pg239'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XI. Possession: Is The Theory That It Was Madness Subversive +Of The Historical Value Of The Gospels Or +Inconsistent With The Veracity Of Christ?</head> + +<p> +There can be no doubt that the subject of possession +is attended with real difficulties, whichever view we +may take of its actual character. +</p> + +<p> +The symptoms which are alleged to have accompanied +it present many of the usual phenomena of madness. +No possession is believed to take place now, but +such phenomena are attributed to causes purely natural. +The supposed possessions therefore which are +mentioned in the New Testament or in other ancient +writings are said to be due only to ignorance of natural +causes. Many very eminent defenders of Christianity +have been so deeply impressed by these and other +reasons that they have admitted that possession is only +a form of madness, and that the language respecting +it in the New Testament is based on the current ideas +of the day. +</p> + +<p> +It is desirable that the difficulty should be put in +the strongest light. I will therefore state it in the +words of the author of <q>Supernatural Religion.</q> <q>It +would be an insult to the understanding of those who +are considering this question, to pause here to prove +that the historical books of the New Testament, speak +in the clearest and most unmistakable terms of actual +demoniacal possession.</q> Now what has become of this +theory of disease? The Archbishop of Dublin is probably +<pb n='240'/><anchor id='Pg240'/> +the only one who asserts the reality of demoniacal +possession formerly, and in the present day; and +in this way we must say that he is consistent. Dean +Milman, on the other hand, who spoke with the enlightenment +of the 19th century, <q>has no scruple in +averring his opinion on the subject of demoniacal +possession to be that of Joseph Mede, Lardner, Dr. +Mead, Paley, and all the learned modern writers. It +was a kind of insanity, and nothing is more probable +than that lunacy would take the turn, and speak the +language of the prevailing superstition of the times.</q> +The Dean, as well as <q>all the learned modern writers</q> +to whom he refers, felt the difficulty, but in seeking to +evade it, they sacrifice the Gospels. They overlook +the fact, that the writers of these narratives, not only +themselves adopt <q>the prevailing superstition of the +times,</q> but represent Jesus as doing so with equal +completeness. There is no possibility, for instance, of +evading such statements as those in the miracle of the +country of the Gadarenes, where the objectivity of the +demons is so fully recognised, that on being cast out of +the man, they are represented as requesting to be allowed +to go into the herd of swine, and being permitted by +Jesus to do so, the entry of the demons into the swine +is at once signalised by the herd running violently +down the cliff into the lake and being drowned. +(p. 131.) The author might have strengthened his case, +as far as modern authorities are concerned, by drawing +attention to the fact, that even Dr. Farrar, who seems +to maintain the objective reality of demoniacal possessions +in his recently published <q>Life of Christ,</q> admits +that in the statement that the demons locally passed +from the man into the swine, some inaccuracy has crept +into the narrative of the Evangelists. +</p> + +<p> +It will be at once seen that the all-important point +<pb n='241'/><anchor id='Pg241'/> +in this objection is the apparent acceptance by our +Lord of demoniacal possession, as being a correct account +of an objective fact. I fully agree with this +writer, that those who affirm that it was madness and +nothing else are bound, when they propose this solution +of the difficulty, to point out distinctly how it affects +the question of our Lord's veracity, and the historical +character of the Gospels. +</p> + +<p> +In approaching this question, let me at once observe +that while I entertain a definite opinion as to the +nature of the inspiration of the New Testament derived +not from <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> assumptions, but from a careful study +of its facts and phenomena, yet the question at issue +is not what is the nature or the extent of the inspiration, +but the reality of the supernatural events recorded +in the Gospels. This issue is one which is +purely historical, and therefore I have simply to examine +it on historical grounds, and not to defend any particular +theory of inspiration. Our business is first to +ascertain what are the facts of the New Testament +which are supported by historical evidence; when we +have ascertained these, we shall be in a position to +propound a theory of inspiration in accordance with +the facts and assertions; still, however, it will be +necessary to find out how a certain state of the facts +will affect the character which the Gospels attribute to +our Lord. +</p> + +<p> +The following facts are plain on the surface of the +Gospels. First, that the followers of our Lord believed +that the demoniacal possessions there recorded +were objective facts, and not mere forms of disease. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly, that our Lord himself, if the words attributed +to Him are correctly reported, used language +which seems to imply that He shared in this belief. +</p> + +<p> +Thirdly, that in a particular instance, not only do +<pb n='242'/><anchor id='Pg242'/> +the Evangelists affirm that our Lord addressed a +demoniac, but also the demons who possessed him, +and that He permitted their departure into a herd of +swine, thereby apparently confirming the objective +reality of the possession. +</p> + +<p> +The question is a far more serious one, as it affects +our Lord, than those on whose reports the statements +of the Gospels are founded. He is represented as +being a divine person, and as possessed in His human +nature, not of infinite but of superhuman knowledge. +His apparent sanction of an erroneous view is therefore +a very different thing from the apparent sanction +of it by an author of a Gospel, or from the mistaken +views which his followers might have entertained as to +the causes of a bodily disease. +</p> + +<p> +I should find no difficulty in adopting the theory of +the eminent writers above named, that the demoniacal +possessions mentioned in the New Testament, were +nothing but forms of insanity, if it were not that our +Lord has apparently recognised their reality. It has +been urged that if possession was nothing but insanity, +there is an end of the miracle. But this is not +the case, for the cure of a madman is quite as much a +supernatural act as the expulsion of a demon. +</p> + +<p> +Let me now assume for argument's sake, that possession +was simple madness. How does such a supposition +affect the veracity of the authors of the Gospels, +and their judgment as credible historians of the events +of our Lord's life? +</p> + +<p> +If we assume that possession was madness, it is +evident from the language which the Evangelists have +employed that they must have shared in the ignorance +of the times in which they lived as to the true causes +of the complaint. When however we speak of the +ignorance of any particular period, it should be observed +<pb n='243'/><anchor id='Pg243'/> +that the expression is an indefinite one. We +have no right to impute to any body of authors opinions +on particular subjects of which their writings contain +no traces. It has been affirmed, as we have seen, that +the Jews of the apostolic age held a number of opinions +on the subject of possession of the most grotesque and +monstrous description. I have already shown that to +impute these opinions to them, when no trace of them +can be found in their writings is a most unfair mode of +reasoning. +</p> + +<p> +When, therefore, I use the expression that they must +have shared in the ignorance of the age respecting the +causes of this disease, I must guard against the danger +of ascribing to them a greater degree of ignorance +than that which they have actually shown. The expression, +<q>ignorance of the age,</q> denotes no uniform +quantity of ignorance shared in by every individual +alike. In an ignorant or superstitious age, one person +may be far more so than another. It is quite conceivable +that two thousand years hence human improvement +may have become so great, that those who +live in the present century may be designated as ignorant. +It may be hereafter asserted that such writers as +Huxley, Tyndall, Herbert Spencer, and Mill shared in +the ignorance of the age in which they lived on some +important physical facts. But from this it would be +absurd to draw the conclusion that they were believers +in the alleged facts of spiritualism because large numbers +of their contemporaries were known to have believed +in them, and spiritualistic publications enjoy a +large circulation both in Europe and America in this +nineteenth century. +</p> + +<p> +As far as the Evangelists are concerned, the supposition +that I am now considering involves nothing +more than that they held a false theory as to the cause +<pb n='244'/><anchor id='Pg244'/> +of a particular form of disease, and that they have used +language respecting it that embodies this theory. In +this point of view they would not differ from writers of +every age who have entertained false theories as to the +causes of physical phenomena. In such cases it is easy +to separate the fact from the incorrect view as to what +were the causes of that fact. Ancient philosophical +writers held many false theories as to the place of the +local habitation in our bodies of certain affections of +our moral nature. These can be traced very distinctly +in the language of the present day. Thus we say that +a man is devoid of heart, and talk of making appeals +to the heart. These, and multitudes of similar expressions +which occur both in ancient and modern writings, +involve false philosophical theories; but it is easy to +separate the facts intended from the theories. Thus, +if the authors of the Gospels inform us that our Lord +cured a demoniac, and give an account of the demoniac's +outcries, as though they were the utterances of a +demon, we have only to substitute madman for +demoniac, and the correct state of the case is easily +discovered. +</p> + +<p> +The real difficulty which is felt on this subject, arises +not from the narratives as ordinary histories, but on the +supposition that the writers possessed an inspiration +which ought to have guarded them from such errors. +Popular theories of inspiration unquestionably render +such an assumption necessary, but I can see no ground +for it, either in the statements of the Gospels, or any +other portion of the New Testament. Nowhere is it +affirmed that its writers were to be guided into all +truth, scientific, philosophical, or even historical. All +that is affirmed is that they possessed a degree of +supernatural enlightenment adequate to communicate +the Christian revelation to mankind. Neither is there +<pb n='245'/><anchor id='Pg245'/> +a hint given, nor can a fact be adduced, to show that +their supernatural illumination extended beyond this. +The spiritual gifts bestowed no enlightenment beyond +the special function of those gifts. This the affirmation +of St. Paul in the Epistles to the Corinthians +makes clear. A person having the gift of tongues, if +he had not also that of interpretation was unable to +interpret his own utterances, and the possession of the +high gift of prophecy by no means exempted the +possessor from the danger of using it in a manner to +create confusion in the Church. Even the highest +apostolic gifts conferred no infallibility, but were +strictly limited to their proper functions of communicating +the great truths of the Christian revelation. The +idea that they conferred a general infallibility is no +statement of the New Testament, but a pure figment +of the imagination. +</p> + +<p> +It therefore by no means follows because the writers +of the New Testament had an illumination sufficient +for their functions that they had any other than their +ordinary enlightenment beyond that limit. They +might have been good teachers of religious truth, and +yet utterly ignorant of physical science. The assertion +may be correct that St. Luke possessed a supernatural +guidance sufficient to enable him to compose the +third Gospel, and yet it may be no less true, that as a +physician he had no medical knowledge beyond that of +his time, and that he shared in all its errors as to the +causes and cure of physical disease. A man may be a +good physician of the soul, and at the same time a +very ignorant physician of the body. It is quite conceivable, +therefore, even if the Evangelists or those +followers of Christ from whom they derived their +accounts possessed various degrees of supernatural +enlightenment on matters directly affecting Christianity, +<pb n='246'/><anchor id='Pg246'/> +that they possessed none whatever as to the causes of +disease, and that they may have viewed madness as a +result of demoniacal action, and described it accordingly. +The facts would remain the same; the symptoms +might have been exhibited, and the cure actually +effected. +</p> + +<p> +But the New Testament likewise affirms that our +Lord imparted to His followers the power of expelling +demons, as well as that of healing diseases. Now, on +the supposition that these demoniacs were simple +maniacs, how does this affect the credibility of the +narrative? +</p> + +<p> +I reply that during the mission of the Apostles and +the Seventy (for these are the cases alluded to) there is +no promise made them of supernatural enlightenment. +They were simply sent out to announce a specific fact, +the near approach and setting up of the kingdom of +heaven, and to work miracles in confirmation of it. It +is true that in His address to them, our Lord told them +that a time was coming when they would have to +testify to Him before princes and kings, and that He +promises them, that they should receive supernatural +assistance, suitable to the emergency. But this never +arose during the mission in question. They were +commanded to cure the reputed demoniac in confirmation +of their mission. This would be an equally +miraculous sign whether he was one possessed or a +simple maniac. In this case, therefore, there was no +reason why they should be supernaturally enlightened +as to the causes of this disease, more than of any other. +No doubt the theories then prevalent as to the causes +of disease generally were very faulty. It could not +be otherwise in the state of medical science at that +period. So they must always have been while such +a truth as the circulation of the blood was unknown. +<pb n='247'/><anchor id='Pg247'/> +But the object of Christianity was not to communicate +scientific knowledge, or to teach the true causes of +disease, but to discover truths mightily operative in +the moral and spiritual worlds. It follows, therefore, +that the ignorance of the disciples as to the actual +causes of mania no more affects the credibility of the +narrative than their ignorance of the causes of paralysis +or leprosy. +</p> + +<p> +It is also evident from the statements of the +Gospels, that there were a considerable number of +persons who practised exorcisms of various kinds, and +who fully believed that the persons on whom they +operated were possessed by demons. It seems also +probable from the allusions made to them, that these +exorcisms were occasionally successful in effecting a +cure; and it may be, more frequently, in mitigating +the symptoms. This, however, was not always the +case; for the Evangelists describe the disciples as +entirely unsuccessful in the case of the child, out of +whom they invoked the demon to depart in the name +of Jesus. It is worthy of observation, that in this +instance, the father of the demoniac describes his son's +case as a combination of lunacy and possession, <q>He +is lunatic and sore vexed.</q> Their failure is directly +attributed to want of faith, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> that there was something +wanting in their mental state which prevented +them from exerting the requisite influence over the +lunatic youth. The want of success with which exorcists +were not unfrequently attended is strikingly set +before us in the account given in the Acts of the +Apostles, of the attempt made by certain Jewish exorcists +to cure the demoniac at Ephesus. In this case it +not only ended in a complete failure, but in an aggravation +of the malady. +</p> + +<p> +Now when we consider the various forms which +<pb n='248'/><anchor id='Pg248'/> +mania assumes, it is quite credible that exorcisms +may have exerted a favourable influence on it, altogether +apart from any supernatural power possessed by +the operator. It is clear that the supposed maniacs +imagined themselves under the influence of demoniacal +possession. When we consider the powerful +influence that one mind is capable of exerting over +another under these circumstances we can see that the +presence of superior mental power was an influence +exactly suited to produce a favourable result. In our +modern treatment of mania (whatever may be the +opinions as to its physical origin) it is now universally +admitted that moral means are the most efficacious. +Some obvious physical causes can be dealt with and +removed, while others cannot. But the most successful +operator on these forms of lunacy is he who applies to +them the most effective moral treatment, under which +in many cases its symptoms have gradually disappeared. +One of these modes of treatment is never to cross the +patient on the subject of his delusions. Nothing is +more remarkable than the influence which the efficient +practitioner can exert over persons suffering from +these forms of madness, by the mere energy of his +will; a display of mental power analogous to that of +strong faith. This will often produce a calm among +maniacs which persons of inferior endowments utterly +fail to excite. It is an unquestionable fact that high +mental and moral power is capable of producing +striking results on different forms of maniacal disease. +</p> + +<p> +This being so, it follows that exorcists might be +capable of exerting upon maniacs a powerful influence +favourable to cure. In the ancient world the usual +treatment was that of extreme harshness. The demoniac +of Gadara had been bound with chains and +fetters. This is now known to have a direct tendency +<pb n='249'/><anchor id='Pg249'/> +to aggravate the disease, rather than to cure it. It is +no wonder, therefore, if the exorcist, by adopting an +opposite mode of treatment, and even by sympathizing +with the sufferer's delusions, was capable of alleviating +the symptoms of the complaint, if not of effecting a +cure. The whole result may have been due to moral +influence and spiritual power, which may have been +taken for the expulsion of a demon. In whatever way +it was effected, the cure or the alleviation was no +less real. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that the exorcists of the ancient +world were far from necessarily being a set of impostors, +even on the supposition that possession was simple +mania. They may have been able to effect real alleviations +or even cures of the complaint, although they were +ignorant as to its cause, or how their exertions produced +a successful result. There is nothing inconsistent +with their general honesty, if they themselves were +under the belief that they were expelling demons, +while they were really curing ordinary mania. It +should also be observed, that a real power of exerting +an influence on madmen was one which in those times +of ignorance, both of mental and physical science, admitted +of fearful abuse, and if exercised for evil purposes, +was capable of producing many of the worst +results with which the practice of witchcraft and +sorcery have been attended. A large portion of these +latter operations no doubt resulted from the successful +practice of ocular deception, but another portion of them +unquestionably resulted from the mighty influences +that a powerful mind can exert over a weak, imaginative, +and superstitious one. There are many depths of +human nature into which science has as yet failed to +penetrate; and among these are the entire phenomena +of mania and religious frenzy. +</p> + +<pb n='250'/><anchor id='Pg250'/> + +<p> +These facts and considerations are sufficient to vindicate +the credibility of the writers of the New Testament +in their statement, that a power of exorcism was +known and exercised in their time, and that its exercise +was at times attended with favourable results. +The statement on this subject attributed to our Lord, +<q>If I by Satan cast out devils, by whom do your sons +cast them out? therefore shall they be your judges,</q> +is plainly an <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad hominem</foreign> argument. It amounts to no +more than this; You Pharisees accuse me of casting +out demons through Beelzebub. You assert that your +disciples exercise a power of exorcism; and that they +do this in virtue of a divine power communicated to +them. On what principle of common sense can you +affirm that the power which I exercise is demoniacal, +and that which your disciples exercise is divine?—There +is no assertion made one way or the other as to the +reality of the acts in question; nor is there any difficulty +in supposing that our Lord recognised that some +of the influences thus exerted were genuine. +</p> + +<p> +I have hitherto, in treating this part of the subject, +been dealing with the supposition that our Lord's +disciples mistook maniacs for demoniacs, and the consequences +of such a mistake on the authenticity of the +Gospel narratives. I must now address myself to the +far more important question as to the consequences +which follow from our Lord's apparent recognition of +the existence of demoniacal possession on the supposition +that it was simple mania. +</p> + +<p> +The facts as they appear in the Gospels are unmistakable. +It was the distinct opinion of their authors +that our Lord recognised the phenomena which they +have reported as the results of demoniacal possession +and not of simple mania. In proof of this it will be +needless to refer to every instance they have recorded. +<pb n='251'/><anchor id='Pg251'/> +The account of the demoniac at Gadara and that of the +lunatic youth are among the most remarkable, and on +them the case may be allowed to rest. In the former +case the words of St. Mark, whose description of the +scene abounds in those details which are rarely seen +except in narratives derived from direct ocular testimony, +are: <q>And all the demons besought him, saying, +Send us into the swine that we may enter into them. +And forthwith Jesus gave them leave. And the unclean +spirits went out and entered into the swine, &c.</q> In +the case of the demoniac child the Evangelist describes +the Apostles as asking Jesus, <q>Why could not we cast +him out?</q> The following words are ascribed to our +Lord: <q>This kind goeth not out but by prayer and +fasting.</q> It is undeniable, therefore, that the Evangelists +have ascribed to Jesus a belief in the reality of +demoniacal possession. +</p> + +<p> +I am not concerned in the present argument with +the words and actions which they have attributed to +the demoniacs; but with the words and actions attributed +to Jesus. We know that some madmen labour +under the delusion, not only that they are emperors +and kings, but even in a few instances that they are +God himself. This being so, it is quite possible that a +maniac may confuse his personality with one or more +demons; and speak and act consistently with the delusion. +The maniacs may have given utterance to exclamations +resulting from mere delusions; but the +Evangelists in recording these utterances gave simple +statements of facts. It is quite possible, that the demoniac +of Gadara may have imagined himself possessed +by a legion of demons, and have spoken and acted +accordingly, whilst he was at the same time labouring +under simple mania. +</p> + +<p> +Now, on the assumption that possession was simple +<pb n='252'/><anchor id='Pg252'/> +mania and nothing more, the following suppositions are +the only possible ones. +</p> + +<p> +First, that our Lord really distinguished between +mania and possession; but that the Evangelists have +inaccurately reported his words and actions, through +the media of their own subjective impressions, or, in +short, have attributed to Him language that He did not +really utter. +</p> + +<p> +Second, that our Lord knew that possession was a +form of mania, and adopted the current notions of the +time in speaking of it, and that the words were really +uttered by Him. +</p> + +<p> +Third, that with similar knowledge, He adopted the +language in question as part of the curative process. +</p> + +<p> +Fourth, that He accepted the validity of the distinction, +and that it was a real one during those times. +</p> + +<p> +These alternatives demand our careful consideration, +not for the purpose of determining which is the correct +one, but of estimating the results which flow from +either of them on the central character of the Gospels. +The position which I take must be clearly stated. It +is this: If possession be mania, there is nothing in +the language which the Evangelists have attributed to +our Lord which compromises the truthfulness of his +character. If, on the other hand, we assume that +possession was an objective fact, there is nothing +in our existing scientific knowledge of the human mind +which proves that the possessions of the New Testament +were impossible. +</p> + +<p> +Let us consider the first alternative. +</p> + +<p> +A careful examination of the phenomena presented +by the synoptic Gospels leads to the irresistible conclusion +that they largely consist of accounts which had +been handed down by oral tradition, for a considerable +time prior to their being committed to writing, and +<pb n='253'/><anchor id='Pg253'/> +that these have been in various degrees supplemented +by information derived from other sources. Assuming +this to have been the case it gives an adequate account +of the differences of form which they present, their +variations in minor circumstances, and that most remarkable +of all their phenomena, the samenesses of +expression interwoven with considerable diversities, +which is presented alike by the parallel narratives and +discourses. The threefold and more frequently twofold +form in which several of the discourses have been +handed down to us, prevent us from believing that +these discourses were intended to be rigid reproductions +of the verbal utterances of our Lord. All they +can be is an accurate account of the sense and very +frequently of his words. The important question for +our present consideration is, Have the Evangelists, in +reporting the discourses of Jesus, imparted to them a +colouring derived from their own subjective impressions +or do they accurately convey to us his meaning +and his meaning only? Or with respect to the point +before us, Have the Evangelists in reporting the utterances +of Jesus to the demoniacs and his observations +on possession to his disciples given us the substance +of what He actually said, or their own impressions of +what He might have said? +</p> + +<p> +I reply, the internal grounds for assuming their +accuracy are strong. This is vouched for by the +fact that while we have a three or twofold report +of the same discourse, varying very considerably in +words and arrangement, and while we have whole sentences +in one Evangelist which materially aid in determining +the meaning, either omitted in one or inserted +in another, still with all these variations in expression, +the variations in sense are of the smallest possible +importance. This being the case the whole aspect of +<pb n='254'/><anchor id='Pg254'/> +the discourses leads us to infer that they are altogether +unaffected by the subjective impressions of those who +reported them. They are indelibly stamped with the +mind of Jesus himself and with his alone. There are +many points on which his teaching ran strongly counter +to the subjective impressions of those who reported it. +Here then if such impressions had intruded themselves +we should be certain to find indications of such intrusion, +and that in no doubtful form. But there are +none. The theory therefore of the introduction of the +subjective impressions of the followers of our Lord +into the discourses has no foundation in their contents, +and therefore it is wholly illegitimate to assume +it for the solution of a difficulty. +</p> + +<p> +The phenomena which distinguish St. Mark's Gospel +strongly display the marks of autoptic testimony. +This greatly increases the difficulty of the supposition +in question, for these expressions are found in that +Gospel, and in it we also find the remarkable saying, +<q>This kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting.</q> +It seems therefore impossible to doubt the Evangelist's +assertion that such words were uttered by our Lord. +</p> + +<p> +But I must now inquire whether Dr. Farrar's supposition +is tenable, that some misapprehension has +crept into the narrative when it affirms that the demons +in objective reality left the body of the man and entered +into the swine. +</p> + +<p> +I answer that there is nothing in the Evangelists +which requires us to consider their words as an accurately +scientific statement of the mode in which the +demon acted on the mind of the possessed. +</p> + +<p> +It is true that they repeatedly say that they entered +in and out of the man, but this may well be in conformity +with popular ideas on the subject, without +intending to assert as a scientific fact, that the demons +<pb n='255'/><anchor id='Pg255'/> +made either the body or the spirit of the man their +local habitation. The New Testament attempts to +determine nothing respecting the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>modus operandi</foreign> of +spirits. God is said to dwell in a holy man, but it is +ridiculous to affirm that the omnipresent Spirit makes +the man his local habitation. There is a case in point +as to the use of such language in the narrative of the +woman who was healed of the issue of blood. The +effect produced on her is described by our Lord and +the Evangelists by the words <q>Power (δύναμις) has +gone out of me.</q> Yet no one who considers the mode +in which the Gospels are composed, will affirm that our +Lord by using these words intended to convey a scientific +truth as to his <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>modus operandi</foreign> in performing the +miracle, or that it was actually performed by some +subtle emanation called <q>Power,</q> which issued from +his person. With those who assume that neither our +Lord nor his Apostles could use popular expressions of +this kind, but were bound to use terms of strict scientific +accuracy all reasoning is thrown away. If the +strictest verbal accuracy must be observed on every +occasion it would be incorrect to say that a physician +has cured a lunatic, for the idea on which the term +lunacy is founded is scientifically inaccurate. It follows +therefore that the terms which are so constantly applied +to demons in the New Testament, that they entered +into, departed out of, or possessed a man may well be +popular expressions, denoting that they exerted a +mighty, nay, an overwhelming influence upon him, +which in the shattered state of his physical or moral +condition he was unable to shake off, without determining +anything as to the mode in which that influence +was exerted. Thus, in St. John's Gospel, the devil is +described as having put it (βεβληκότος) <emph>into the heart</emph> +of Judas Iscariot to betray our Lord. After the giving +<pb n='256'/><anchor id='Pg256'/> +of the sop, Satan is said to have entered into him. +Surely the only fact which these words are intended to +convey is that Judas allowed his whole moral and spiritual +being to be overpowered by the influence of the +evil one. It is quite possible that the Evangelists +might have thought that the influence was exerted by +actually going in or coming out of a man. But this is +a mere physical theory as to the mode of action, and +certainly is not a point on which the writings of the +New Testament anywhere affirm that a supernatural +knowledge was imparted to their authors. +</p> + +<p> +It follows therefore that the expressions <q>going out +from the man,</q> and <q>entering into the swine,</q> may +only denote the cessation of the influence of the demons +over the man, and its exertion on the swine, without +determining the mode in which that influence was +exerted. Surely when our Lord promised that He +would come to the man who loved him and make his +abode with him, that did not imply a local indwelling +of his person but an indwelling of influence. +</p> + +<p> +With such expressions in abundance before us, in +which it is obvious that they were never intended to +denote anything local, it is absurd to fix it on the sacred +writers in this particular case. They nowhere assert +that the demons were seen to pass from the man and +enter the swine. It was simply a matter of inference +from the facts which they witnessed that they had done +so. The man ceased to rave and became a rational +creature. The swine rushed down into the lake and +perished. They also affirm that the result took place +by the permission of Jesus. Yet it is somewhat +remarkable that it is only Matthew who attributes to +him the word <q>Go.</q> Mark and Luke only mention the +request of the demons, and the result which followed. +There is nothing therefore derogatory to the character +<pb n='257'/><anchor id='Pg257'/> +of the Evangelists as historians in supposing that +the facts received a colouring from their own subjective +impressions, though it would be so if under such circumstances +they had allowed those impressions to +assign a different meaning to our Lord's words from +that which he actually conveyed. +</p> + +<p> +This conclusion at which we have arrived, that our +Lord's meaning is accurately reported by the Evangelists, +disposes of the first alternative. We will now +proceed to examine the second, viz., that our Lord +knew that possession was mania, and that He adopted +the current notions of the times in speaking of it. +The all important question is, how far does this affect +his veracity? +</p> + +<p> +On this point Archbishop Trench has laid down the +following position broadly: <q>If Jesus knew that the +Jewish belief in demoniacal possession was baseless +and that Satan did not exercise such power over the +bodies or spirits of men there would be in such language +that absence of agreement between thoughts and +words in which the essence of a lie consists.</q> +</p> + +<p> +If this position is correct it involves a principle far +more extensive than the case immediately before us. +It is nothing less than that our Lord neither in his +formal teaching nor in his conversation should have +used language which was other than scientifically correct. +It might be argued, that if He had done so He +would have lent his sanction to the error which it involved. +Even if the principle thus laid down could be +confined to religious truth (which it cannot), it would +then have been necessary that whenever the current +ideas, or the mode of conception of the day contained +an assumption involving an incorrect theory or endangering +a religious error, our Lord ought to have corrected +it in the course of his teaching. If we admit +<pb n='258'/><anchor id='Pg258'/> +that demoniacal possession was a real agency there can +be no doubt that the Jews would confound many cases +of ordinary mania with it. This being so, if the principle +is correct, our Lord ought to have pointed out +the distinction. Again, even if it is assumed that +demoniacal agency was sometimes manifested in the +phenomena of witchcraft, there can be no doubt that +much of it was due to human imposture. On the +principle laid down by the Archbishop our Lord ought +to have corrected every error that was prevalent on +that subject. On the same principle it would have been +impossible for him to have used an <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad hominem</foreign> argument +or in fact any form of expression founded on an +erroneous conception. It is therefore evident that the +principle, if accepted at all, can only be accepted under +very considerable qualifications, or we shall convert our +Lord from the revealer of truth and teacher of Christianity +into one whose duty it was to combat every +erroneous opinion of the day. On such a theory it is +difficult to see how our Lord was not bound to correct +every erroneous opinion then current respecting the +first and second chapters of Genesis, and to point out +their true relation to the modern discoveries of geology, +for He expressly referred to the second chapter in his +teaching. He also referred to the flood, respecting +which many erroneous opinions were undoubtedly current. +If the principle is good it might be urged that +He sanctioned those errors by his silence. +</p> + +<p> +The same principle must also have been applicable +to many other erroneous opinions which the Jews entertained +respecting the interpretation of the Old Testament. +In fact it would be difficult to assign any +limits to our Lord's duty of correcting popular errors +which had any kind of bearing on religious truth. +</p> + +<p> +But to return to the demoniacs. Is there any thing +<pb n='259'/><anchor id='Pg259'/> +inconsistent with our Lord's truthfulness, if we suppose +that they were lunatics and nothing more, in his using +the current language of the day respecting them? +Let it be observed that two considerations are really +involved; first, our Lord is represented as conversing +directly with the demoniac. Secondly, He also occasionally +speaks of demoniacal possession in his ordinary +teaching in the current language of the day. Now if +it be admitted to be consistent with his truthfulness to +address such language to the maniac, is it equally so to +employ such language in his discourses to others? +</p> + +<p> +I observe first, that if possession was mania, the real +ground of the popular error was an erroneous opinion +as to the cause of a natural disorder. The popular belief +in fact ascribed it to supernatural instead of natural +causes. So far, but no farther, it touched religious +questions. To correct the error involved not merely +the teaching of religious truth, but in this particular +case the enunciation of sounder principles of mental +philosophy. I think that I may fearlessly affirm that +the teaching of scientific truth, either mental or material, +did not come within the scope of our Lord's divine +mission. Political truth is a part of moral truth, and +moral truth is closely allied to religious truth. Now +although Christianity is a power which will ultimately +reform the political world, our Lord expressly affirmed +that it was no part of his mission to enunciate political +truth. +</p> + +<p> +In the same manner it may have formed no direct +portion of his mission to teach correct views respecting +the origin of mania, or to counteract the opinions +which ascribed it to supernatural causes. +</p> + +<p> +If this principle is correct, there is nothing inconsistent +with his truthfulness if when our Lord conversed +with a supposed demoniac, He addressed him in language +<pb n='260'/><anchor id='Pg260'/> +which took for granted the truth of his delusions. +Even if it is supposed that truthfulness required +that He should have exposed a popular delusion, surely +it was no occasion for doing so, when He was addressing +a madman. Who would affirm that a physician is +wanting in truthfulness if he addresses his patient in +terms of his own delusions, or imagines that it is his +duty to enter into a discussion with a madman as to +the causes of his malady? +</p> + +<p> +On these principles it is quite consistent with our +Lord's truthfulness to suppose that the dialogue with +the demoniac of Gadara actually occurred, while He +himself knew that possession was nothing but mania. +Let us suppose that the man was a raving madman. +He had been treated cruelly. He rushed towards +Jesus and was awed by the greatness of his character. +The dialogue takes place, as it is described by the +Evangelist. I see no want of truthfulness on our +Lord's part, nor can I conceive any necessity for explaining +to the man that he was not possessed by a +multitude of demons; or if the madman requested +that the demons by whom he imagined himself possessed +might be allowed to go into the swine, that our +Lord should explain to him that it was impossible that +they should do so because the idea of the demoniac was +a delusion. The case would be one of confused or +double personality, and accordingly the narrator has +described the demons and the man as alternately +speaking, and our Lord as addressing them. In such +a case the form of the narrative would be modified by +the subjective impressions of the narrator. +</p> + +<p> +But the words which our Lord is described as +addressing to the demoniac lad also require consideration. +St. Mark describes them as follows. Jesus rebuked +the foul spirit, saying unto him, <q>Thou deaf +<pb n='261'/><anchor id='Pg261'/> +and dumb spirit, I charge thee come out of him, and +enter no more into him; and the spirit cried, and rent +him sore and came out of him.</q> Let us suppose that +the disease was mania, and that our Lord knew it to be +so, but that the father, as well as the maniac and the +others who were present believed that it was caused by +the action of an evil spirit. What was there inconsistent +with veracity in addressing the maniac in terms of his +own delusions? If it is urged that the belief in possession +was a superstition, and that to use such language +tended to confirm the belief, I reply that if we assume +that our Lord was bound not to use the language which +was common among his hearers in speaking of such +diseases, or that He ought to have given explanations of +their true causes, then we assume that his character as +a revealer of Christianity rendered it necessary that in +the course of his public ministry He should correct all +the errors which He encountered, and never use language +which had originated in them. +</p> + +<p> +The words which are ascribed to our Lord by the +Evangelist when He stilled the tempest will throw light +on this subject. St. Mark gives them as follows: <q>He +rebuked the winds and said to the sea, Peace, be still.</q> +The word here rendered <q>Be still</q> is in the Greek far +more emphatic, <hi rend='italic'>Be gagged</hi> (πεφίμωσο). In the case of +the demoniac our Lord is represented as rebuking the +evil spirit. Here He rebukes the waves. Now it is +only possible to rebuke rational agents. Such an expression +would therefore be only accurate if addressed +to a being who was capable of hearing it, and who +was uttering load cries. It may be objected that +the expression favours the notion that the speaker +supposed the roaring of the waves to be the voice of +an evil spirit, who was exciting the tempest, or, in +other words, that He gave countenance to the heathen +<pb n='262'/><anchor id='Pg262'/> +belief, that it was the voice of Æolus, the spirit of the +storm. Whatever amount of superstition may be attributed +to the Jews at the time of the Advent, it will +scarcely be urged that the followers of Jesus attributed +the roaring of the gale to the voice of a demon. Still +it may be urged on the principles above referred to +that the words uttered by our Lord tended to confirm +superstitions notions as to the nature and origin of +storms. I argue, on the other hand, that these expressions +prove indisputably that the language used by +Him was not always intended to be a literal description +of fact, any more than the numerous similar addresses +to the inanimate creation which we find in the Psalms. +</p> + +<p> +But in the case of the demoniac, the real difficulty +consists in the results which are alleged to have happened +to the swine. I have already obviated some +portion of this as far as the form of the narrative is +concerned. But there remains the fact that the swine +are stated to have rushed into the lake and perished. +As to the reality of such an occurrence there can have +been no mistake. The mere mode of expression offers +no explanation, nor can a mistake respecting such an +occurrence have originated in any possible deception +of the imagination. <emph>If it was not a fact it must have +been a fictitious invention.</emph> Can any explanation of it +be given? It has been suggested that the swine were +driven down the cliff by the madman. Against this +supposition, it has been urged that no animals are less +easily driven than swine. How then could it have +been possible to drive two thousand of them into the +water? But there is no necessity to assume that they +were driven at all. The scene as it is described by +the Evangelists was well calculated to inspire animals +with fright. It would however have been impossible +to frighten two thousand of them. Granted: but large +<pb n='263'/><anchor id='Pg263'/> +herds of animals follow their leaders implicitly. When +under excitement one makes a leap, the others will +follow. All that would have been necessary, if we +suppose that the herd was near the edge of the cliff, +was that the leaders should have received the requisite +impulse from the madman, and under its influence +rushed wildly down the cliff, and been followed by +their companions. +</p> + +<p> +But the case is different when our Lord speaks to +others, and not to the demoniacs themselves. His +observations to the Pharisees on this subject I have +already considered. There remains the striking one +addressed to the disciples: <q>This kind goeth not out +but by prayer and fasting.</q> The circumstances of the +case are these. The disciples had failed to cure the +youth, whether a demoniac or a simple lunatic. They +ask our Lord why it was that they had failed. He +tells them that it was because of their unbelief. Now +it is impossible for us to say what was the nature of +the influence of faith in affecting miraculous cures, +and why the want of it prevented success. It is sufficient +to draw attention to the fact that it is uniformly +laid down in the New Testament, that in the case of +subordinate agents working miracles faith was necessary +for their accomplishment. Our Lord also +usually required faith in the recipients of his cures, +but not always. But to his disciples when they attempted +to perform a miracle faith was indispensable +to their success. The question was not what was the +nature of the disease, but why in this particular case +they had failed to cure it. Our Lord replied that in +this instance not only was faith necessary to effect the +cure, but a very unusual degree of it. If the question +had been what was the cause of the child's disease, +and if our Lord know that it was not possession, but +<pb n='264'/><anchor id='Pg264'/> +mania, it is quite possible that He would have refused +to answer it, as He did on other occasions when curious +questions were put to him, and would have deduced +some moral lesson from the fact. This it will be remembered +was the course which He pursued when He +was asked whether only a few would be saved. But +the inquiry was not what caused the disease, but why +the attempt to cure it had proved a failure. Such +being the question, there is nothing inconsistent with +truthfulness in our Lord's answer. He avoided entering +into an explanation as to what was a physical cause of +the disease, which was quite foreign to his divine mission. +He therefore simply told them that their failure +was owing to their unbelief, and then added, in language +couched in their own forms of thought, and +which would not therefore open a discussion on subjects +foreign to the purposes of his mission, <q>This +kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Those who lay stress on difficulties of this kind +are in the habit of overlooking the plain fact, that +our Lord's teaching was specifically addressed to +the living characters of the day, and to their existing +lines of thought, and cannot without reference to them +be directly translated into our own. This remark is +no less true of the moral teaching contained in the +Gospels, than of their historical statements. It is even +more so, for a great number of the moral precepts of +Christ cannot be applied as practical guides until they +have been adapted to the altered conditions of thought +and of society.<note place='foot'>See for example, Matt. v. 39-42, Luke vi. 20, 21, 24-26, and various +others of a similar description.</note> They are in fact principles given in +the form of precepts. If our Lord's words had been +reported so as to make them square with the lines of +thought of every age, they would have given us, not +<pb n='265'/><anchor id='Pg265'/> +his actual teaching but a modification of it. It is our +duty by a careful study of the great principles on +which it is based to apply it to our present wants. +It may appear to some far more desirable that it should +have been capable of a direct instead of an indirect +application, yet the fact is as I have stated it. Want +of attention to this has occasioned no inconsiderable +number of the difficulties of the New Testament. +</p> + +<p> +One or two remarks will be all that is necessary for +illustrating the position which some have adopted that +our Lord's mode of dealing with demoniacs was intended +by Him as part of the process of cure. I +should not have alluded to this subject at all unless the +view in question had been propounded by a very eminent +writer. I have already considered its main +principles under the previous head. +</p> + +<p> +It ought to be observed that the care of demoniacs, +whatever view we may take of possession, belongs to +a class of our Lord's miracles which are distinct from +all others. All the others are described as wrought on +the human body, or on external nature. The Evangelists +do not record a single miracle beside these that was +wrought on the human mind. This is a remarkable +fact. In the course of his ministry He encountered +every form of moral and spiritual disease, from the +weaknesses of his disciples and attached friends to +the opposition of his most avowed enemies. Now, +although He emphatically asserted that He was the +physician of the soul, and although for the spiritual +diseases of men He felt the most profound sympathy, +never once is Jesus represented as exerting his supernatural +power for their care. On the contrary, He is +uniformly represented as having recourse to moral and +spiritual means and not to miracles to effect it. +Physical diseases He cures instantaneously, moral ones +<pb n='266'/><anchor id='Pg266'/> +slowly and with effort. This fact is worthy of deep +attention as showing that our Lord uniformly acted in +conformity with the laws of the moral universe. If the +Gospels are fictions, why is the Great Physician of +Souls never represented as performing a sudden or +miraculous cure in the moral and spiritual worlds, in +the same manner as He does in the material? The +need of miraculous intervention to secure Simon +Peter from the moral and spiritual danger which surrounded +him was as great as to prevent him from +sinking in the water. Yet no other than moral and +spiritual influences were called into action. +</p> + +<p> +The following is the bearing of this fact on the +question before us. If the cure of a demoniac was the +expulsion of a demon, it involved the liberation of a +moral nature from its thraldom, and at the same time +the cure of the bodily organisation as far as its +disordered condition enabled the demon to exert his +power. If, on the other hand, it was the cure of simple +mania, still the act had a direct bearing on the moral +nature of the sufferer. In either case the use of moral +means as well as supernatural agency would be especially +appropriate. If demoniacs were madmen, our +Lord was fully justified in displaying towards them the +highest degree of sympathy, and in bringing to bear +on them the mighty moral and spiritual forces which +abode in his lofty personality. The same remark would +be equally true if the sufferer was held in thrall by +demoniacal power. Each class of miracles in the +mode of their performance is exactly suited to the +condition of those on whom our Lord was operating. +On either supposition He was dealing not merely with +physical forces, but with moral agency, and He dealt +with it accordingly. +</p> + +<p> +I conclude, therefore, that if it may be taken as +<pb n='267'/><anchor id='Pg267'/> +established that possession involved nothing but simple +mania, there is nothing in the facts as they are recorded +in the New Testament inconsistent with that supposition, +or which affects the credit of the Gospels as historical +narratives. Nor are they inconsistent with the +idea that their writers were favoured with such supernatural +assistance in composing them as was adequate +for the purpose of giving us such an account of the +actions and teachings of Jesus as was necessary for +communicating all the great truths of the Christian +revelation. Nor is the supposition inconsistent, as it +has been alleged to be, with His divine character and +truthfulness. +</p> + +<p> +I will examine in the next chapter the supposition +that possession was not mania, but an actual objective +fact. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='268'/><anchor id='Pg268'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XII. Possession, If An Objective Reality, Neither Incredible +Nor Contrary To The Ascertained Truths Of +Mental Science.</head> + +<p> +I now proceed to the consideration of the remaining +alternative, the truth of which the form of the narrative +seems most to favour, viz., that our Lord accepted +the distinction between possession and mania; and +that during those times possessions were actual occurrences. +</p> + +<p> +In considering this subject, it will be necessary to +pay attention to the distinction to which I have referred +in the previous chapter, that even if many of the phenomena +that accompanied possession were due to superhuman +agency, the Gospels are by no means pledged +to any particular theory of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>modus operandi</foreign> by +which the phenomena were brought about. What I +mean is that these phenomena might have been due to +a superhuman agency, without involving the fact that +the demon had a local habitation either in the body or +the spirit of the man. All that the Gospels can be +taken to affirm is, that the evil spirit in some way or +other, of which we are ignorant, held the man in a +state of thraldom, made his mental powers the subject +of a divided consciousness, overpowered the functions +of his reason and his will, and through his action on +the mind used for his own purposes the organs of his +<pb n='269'/><anchor id='Pg269'/> +body. The writers of the New Testament are pledged +to no theory as to how such results were effected. They +have simply reported the phenomena as they presented +themselves to their observation. In doing this, the +language which they have employed denotes local habitation; +but the words used in stilling the storm make +it quite clear that the literal meaning cannot be +pressed. Considering the general character of these +narratives, it is impossible to pledge them to the particular +mode in which these results were brought about. +</p> + +<p> +One circumstance seems to militate against the supposition +that possession involved nothing but simple +mania, namely, the numbers of those who are spoken +of as possessed. If the Gospel narratives are historical, +it would appear that such cases were numerous. Not +only are several miracles of this description definitely +recorded, but the Evangelists several times affirm that +our Lord cured demoniacs in considerable numbers, +without furnishing us with the details. Now it is difficult +to believe that maniacs existed in such large numbers +in a country of the size and population of Judæa. +Yet all the phenomena of possession point to maniacal, +and not to harmless lunacy. The number of the cases +of mania that occur bears but a small proportion to +those of the latter form of derangement. It is true +that at times of popular excitement various forms and +numerous cases of frenzy manifest themselves; but these +differ from mania, though they not unfrequently terminate +in it. I have made these observations, because, in discussing +such a subject, it is only right to state fully the +difficulties with which particular theories are attended. +It is very probable, however, that as the symptoms so +closely resembled each other, many cases of actual +mania would be confounded in popular estimation with +possession, and, therefore, that cases of actual possession +<pb n='270'/><anchor id='Pg270'/> +may not have been so numerous as at first sight +would appear. +</p> + +<p> +On the supposition that possession was a reality, we +have no means of determining what moral or physical +preconditions were necessary for its manifestation. It +is clear that the authors of the Gospels must have considered +that it was owing to some predisposing causes, +physical or moral, though they have not described +them. Unless this was the case, the evil, instead of +being partial, would have been universal. Various +moral causes would naturally form a suitable precondition +for its manifestation. There can be no doubt +that a number of vices, when indulged in beyond a +certain point, reduce man's moral being to a wreck and +render him obnoxious to the action of external agency. +The power of self-control may be indefinitely weakened. +If vice is carried to its extreme forms, it produces phenomena +hardly, if at all, distinguishable from madness. +Such a state of man's moral nature would form a suitable +precondition to enable a superhuman being to +overpower the reason and the will, the supremacy of +which was already impaired by an influence from +within. In such cases possession would have been rendered +possible by a man's self-induced moral corruption. +</p> + +<p> +The testimony of history proves that during the +century which preceded and that which followed the +Advent, the state of moral corruption was extreme. +Men were sated with the old, and craving for new and +unheard of forms of sensual gratification. The old +class of ideas, moral and religious, were gradually +dying out, and men were eagerly seeking for something +to fill the void. There consequently never was +a time when a greater number of abnormal forms of +thought burst on the human mind, which was shaken +to its utmost depths. The outbreak of fanaticism +<pb n='271'/><anchor id='Pg271'/> +combined with moral wickedness, which displayed +itself forty years after in the Jewish war of independence, +is probably without a parallel in the history of +man. For this there must have been years of preparation. +A somewhat similar state of things existed +in the Pagan world, which led to the production of +numerous religious charlatans and impostors. The +times were characterised by an extravagance of thought +on almost every subject, philosophy itself forming no +exception. Such an abnormal mental condition was +peculiarly suited to the reception of external mental +influences, if we suppose them possible. +</p> + +<p> +But I am bound to admit that the facts recorded in +the Gospels prove that possession was not always the +result of moral degradation. This is proved by the +case of the youth, whose possession the father directly +connects with lunacy, and says that it had seized him +from a child. In this case the cause which rendered +the possession possible must have been physical, probably +a derangement of the nervous system. +</p> + +<p> +If I understand rightly the position which is taken +by those who affirm that possession was mania, and +nothing else, it is as follows. It is alleged that at +certain periods of history, the belief in possession has +been widely spread. Possessions are unknown in modern +times; and all the instances which have been +alleged are either cases of mania or delusion. The +belief in it has gradually died away as knowledge has +advanced. In former times it generated a number of +grotesque stories, which were pure inventions of the +imagination heated by enthusiasm. Such facts as were +real may be referred to madness as their cause. The +others are simply disbelieved. Under the influence of +increasing knowledge, there has arisen a widespread +belief in modern times, that there is nothing superhuman +<pb n='272'/><anchor id='Pg272'/> +in the causes of such phenomena, but that they +are due to influences existing within the mind itself. +This, as it is affirmed, being true of all the alleged +instances of possession in the modern world, it is inferred +that similar ones in the ancient world are equally +unreal; and if we had the requisite data before us, we +should be able to refer them all to ordinary human +causes. +</p> + +<p> +With respect to the general fact, there can be no +doubt that advancing knowledge has caused a general +disbelief in the reality of any modern form of possession, +or of witchcraft. The supreme grotesqueness of +the phenomena of the latter has caused the belief in +it to perish under the influence of common sense, aided +by an increased acquaintance with sound principles of +causation, and the stability of the operations of nature. +Still it is incorrect to affirm that the prevalence of +such beliefs has been due to no other cause than universal +ignorance. The belief in witchcraft produced +its most unhappy results during the reigns of Elizabeth +and the Stuarts, in the very age of Bacon, Shakespeare, +and Raleigh. Such beliefs originate in certain +principles of our minds whose gratification consists in +the contemplation of the marvellous, the action of which +I shall consider hereafter. They have existed in every +condition of society, and only changed the form of their +manifestation. Those who boast of our freedom from +such delusions, owing to the superior light of the nineteenth +century, seem to have forgotten the existence +at the present day of a belief in spiritualism, which is +little, if at all, less absurd than witchcraft, though the +former has encountered a less severe treatment than +the latter. This has been more due to the improvement +of our humanity than to our knowledge of physical +science. It is a fact that spiritualism is believed +<pb n='273'/><anchor id='Pg273'/> +in by multitudes; and its votaries belong far more to +the cultivated class of society than to the ignorant and +the vulgar. What the witch mania was to the sixteenth +and seventeenth centuries, spiritualism is to the +nineteenth. It is the peculiar form rather than the +possibility of such delusions that has passed away. +</p> + +<p> +It should be observed also that the demoniacal +supernaturalism of the monastic writers, and of the +middle ages, differs from that of the New Testament +to such a degree that they cannot fairly be compared. +In the former the apparition of demons and departed +spirits was a thing of constant occurrence; in the +latter, never. To the monks the devil was continually +appearing in the most phantastic forms, and performing +the most grotesque miracles. To this form of demonology +modern spiritualism can put in very strong claims +to be esteemed the genuine successor. The heated +imagination of even such a man as Luther suggested +to him that he saw Satan in visible reality. It is +worthy of remark that St. Paul knew nothing of +visible Satanic manifestations. With him they were +invariably spiritual. +</p> + +<p> +It is important to keep steadily in view the fact, that +the New Testament invariably represents possession as +consisting in the action of a stronger mind on a weaker +one. The influence which the demon exerted on the +bodily organs might have been effected through the +agency of the man himself. It is never described as +involving a visible manifestation of the demon, but his +action is one which is purely mental and spiritual. +His presence and his departure were simply judged of +by their effects. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that the denial of the possibility +of an influence of this kind must rest on a very wide +principle. It cannot be confined to such action alone, +<pb n='274'/><anchor id='Pg274'/> +but must go to the extent of denying the possibility of +the action of all spiritual beings on the mind of man. +The only principle on which the denial can rest is, that +our mental science has so far succeeded in analyzing +all the past and present operations of the human mind, +that it is justified in affirming that they all originate +entirely within the mind itself; and are never brought +about by an action on it from without by any invisible +agent. If this is the principle on which the denial +rests, it will be equally valid to exclude the action of +God on our minds, as well as that of all other invisible +beings. It will doubtless be urged that it is only +intended to deny the action of invisible evil beings. +But if it is true that our mental philosophy has ascertained +that all our thoughts originate either in the +mind itself, or in the mind acted on by external nature, +or by other men, the principle must be valid for proving +that all other spiritual agency exerted on the mind is +impossible, and that all supposed instances of it are +delusions. It is impossible on this principle to exclude +the evil agency, and not to exclude the good also. +</p> + +<p> +It is evident that this principle is far too broad to be +used for the purpose of affirming the impossibility of +the action of external evil agents only. It is based on +the supposition that our mental philosophy is so complete +as to be able to assign even the most abnormal +portions of our mental action to definite and known +forces, all of which originate within the mind itself, +and are never due to external influences. If mental +philosophy could establish this as a fact, it would +doubtless prove that possession was impossible; but +it could prove a great deal more, even that God never +acted on or influenced the spirit of man. But if +there is any one phenomenon of the mind, of the origin +of which we are ignorant, the whole principle is vitiated, +<pb n='275'/><anchor id='Pg275'/> +for that very phenomenon may be caused by the action +of an external power. The real point of the controversy +therefore is, Is our mental science thus complete? +Has it been able to reduce all our mental phenomena, +including the most abnormal of them, to the action of +known forces? Has it analyzed our mental powers +to their inmost depths? Until it has done this, it is +impossible to affirm that the abnormal actions of the +mind may not be occasioned by an external agency. +</p> + +<p> +It will probably be urged, that although our philosophy +has not yet succeeded in assigning all our mental +phenomena to the action of known forces, it hopes to +accomplish this hereafter; and that its past conquests +ought to be accepted as a pledge of its future performances; +and that the time will certainly come, when +it will be able to refer every mental phenomenon to a +cause originating in the mind itself, and acting in conformity +with invariable law. Promises, however, are +not performances; what is requisite to impart validity +to wide affirmations is present actual knowledge, not +the hope that future scientific conquests will be extended +over the entire regions of the unknown. Science +professes to walk by sight and not by faith. In a subject +of this kind it is most unphilosophical to assume +that the possibilities of the future are the realities of +the present; and to enunciate propositions whose +validity rests solely on the fact that they are so. +</p> + +<p> +I will now definitely state the principle which can +alone give any scientific value to the assertion, that +such demoniacal action as that which is described in +the New Testament, is unbelievable. It is as follows: +that we have so completely ascertained the nature of +the forces which act on our minds, and the laws +which regulate them, that we know as a scientifically +<pb n='276'/><anchor id='Pg276'/> +established truth, that they all originate either in our +own mental organization, or in the action of other men +on our minds. The statement of the principle in this +distinct form at once shows that it is invalid. +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible for one moment to affirm that our +knowledge is so complete, that we have a scientific acquaintance +with the causes of all our varied mental phenomena, +and the laws which regulate them. We have +ascertained the nature of several of our mental processes; +but how small a portion of man's mental +activity do they embrace. I need only particularize a +few of which we are in complete ignorance, as to the +forces which generate them, and the laws which regulate +their action. +</p> + +<p> +First, with respect to Genius. Genius is a mental +power which manifests itself only on rare occasions. +Who can affirm that we have ascertained the law +which regulates its birth? We may judge from +analogy that this, as other things, follows a law of some +kind; but respecting the causes which give it birth +our philosophy is profoundly ignorant. Nor have we +any knowledge of its mode of action. It manifests +itself in various forms. There is the genius which +makes the poet, the philosopher, the scientific discoverer, +the orator, the politician, and many others. +How those who are possessed of this power effectuate +their mental operations, or how their great ideas originate +in their minds is a subject which exceeds the +limits of our scientific knowledge. Take for example +the genius of the poet. Whence came, and what was +the nature of that intuitive power with which Shakespeare +was endowed, or how was it called into exercise? +We call such powers intuitions. We say that a great +poet is endowed with a species of inspiration. What +is this but to confess our entire ignorance both of the +<pb n='277'/><anchor id='Pg277'/> +origin and the mode of his mental operations. Probably +the poet himself would be unable to give us any +analysis of the origin of his own thoughts, or of the +laws that regulate them. How then can we venture to +affirm that they must all originate in the mind itself, +and not be due to the action of some external power? +The habit of speaking of his inspirations, from which +scientific men are not exempt, proves our complete +ignorance both of its nature and origin. +</p> + +<p> +But to descend to a humbler sphere—our own minds. +We are all conscious that thoughts rush into them in a +most unbidden manner, and that we pass through +mental states which our analysis is unable to explain. +Can any man affirm, however deep may be his philosophy, +that the known laws of association of ideas are +adequate to account for all the mental phenomena of +which he has been conscious? Who has not had experience +of severe efforts to realize something in +thought, which have ended in failure, and that the +right thing has suddenly come into his mind uncalled +and unbidden? Not unfrequently has a sudden thought +entered the mind (we know not whence it came) which +has entirely changed the whole current of a previous +life. Still more frequently has a happy idea occurred +to us, the origin of which it is impossible to trace. +Who again has not had experience of the sudden rushing +of a temptation into his mind with an all but +overwhelming force, even while his thoughts were +occupied with subjects in no way allied to the suggestion? +Many of our mental phenomena may be explained +by the principle of association of ideas and other +known mental powers; but who can venture to affirm +that they are adequate to account for all the various +states of which he has been conscious, or that some of +them have not originated in suggestions from without? +<pb n='278'/><anchor id='Pg278'/> +Scientific knowledge is certainly able to make no such +affirmation. +</p> + +<p> +Next: there are numerous abnormal conditions to +which the mind is unquestionably subject. Who will +venture to affirm that he has penetrated to their depths, +or ascertained the laws which regulate their action? +These have a most important bearing on the present +subject. They are best designated by the term phrenzy. +Their aspect is very varied. They differ in many respects +from mania, though they are closely allied to it. +They are confined to no one race of men, but are co-extensive +with human nature. They were prevalent in +the ancient world, and connected with various forms of +religious belief. They display themselves with peculiar +violence in the religious rites of savages. In Oriental +countries at the present day, they frequently manifest +themselves and assume a great variety of aspects. +Examples might be easily adduced. The phrenzied +fanatic often presents indications of his mind being +acted on by an overwhelming external influence; and +when under the influence of the rites of a degraded +religion, the symptoms present no little resemblance to +those which accompanied demoniacal possession. +</p> + +<p> +I have no wish to affirm that such phenomena must +be due to an action of this kind, but to draw attention +to the fact that we are ignorant of the power in which +they originate, and that such being the case, it is quite +possible that their most violent and terrible forms may +be aroused by the influence of a power external to the +mind itself. Equally ignorant are we of the causes of +even their milder manifestations. Whatever may be +the hopes which are entertained of the future triumphs +of science, it is not too much to assert, that it has not yet +reduced these abnormal conditions of the mind to any +thing like a scientific law, and that it has not succeeded +<pb n='279'/><anchor id='Pg279'/> +in tracing the phenomena to the exclusive operation of +a force acting within the mind itself. In truth our mental +science is ignorant of their causes: and for aught that +it can affirm to the contrary, many of them may be due +to causes human, superhuman, or a combination of the +two. In cases where we are profoundly ignorant, +dogmatical assertions should be carefully avoided. +While such phenomena are incapable of explanation by +the action of known mental forces, the students of +mental science are not justified in affirming that possession +contradicts its known truths. +</p> + +<p> +I fully admit, however, that there is a system of professed +mental science, which, if its truth could be proved, +would establish the fact that possession was impossible. +I need hardly say that I allude to that which affirms +that thought is the result of a function of the brain, +and nothing else. According to the views of these philosophers, +the brain secretes thought as a gland secretes +its own peculiar secretion. Until this philosophy has +succeeded in proving the truth of its first principles, it +is useless to consider its bearing on this particular +question. +</p> + +<p> +There is another abnormal mental condition, the existence +of which is unquestionable, and which has a close +connection with the present question, namely, the +ecstatic state. The forms in which this has manifested +itself have been extremely various, and it is impossible +for any one to assert that our mental philosophy has +fully fathomed them, and has succeeded in assigning +them to forces originating within the mind itself. +On the contrary it is not too much to affirm that it has +as yet wholly failed to analyze its nature, or to account +for the abnormal powers displayed by the mind when +in this condition. In the ancient world this state of +mind was closely connected with the manifestations of +<pb n='280'/><anchor id='Pg280'/> +the prophetic power, the reality of which was recognized +by many of its philosophers. It will of course +be observed that I am not speaking of this power as it +existed in the Jewish church, but of its supposed +manifestations in the heathen world. Similar ecstatic +states have frequently displayed themselves in modern +times. When in this condition the mind is especially +liable to be acted on by external influences. Is it possible, +I ask, in the present state of our mental philosophy, +to assert that we know their nature, or the forces which +produce them? The ecstatic in union with a phrenzied +state of the mind was apparently the condition of the +Delphian priestess when she delivered oracles to those +who consulted her. According to all the accounts that +we possess, she presented the appearance of being subject +to an overpowering external influence. Every +other description which we possess of the manifestation +of this prophetic power, (and we have several) describes +it as presenting phenomena closely allied to raving +madness, an influence of some kind apparently overpowering +the prophet's personality. Until the forces +which produced these phenomena in the ancient world, +and the somewhat similar ones which have been manifested +in modern times, can be shown to owe their +origin to forces originating in the mind itself, and to +nothing else, it is absurd to affirm that such a phenomenon +as possession is in contradiction to our scientific +knowledge of the human mind. +</p> + +<p> +There is another point which demands our attention, +namely, the close connection between the extreme +forms of moral wickedness, and madness. It is an unquestionable +fact that nothing is more difficult than to +draw the precise line where moral wickedness ends, +and madness begins. In their great outlines they are +easily distinguishable, but in the more advanced stages +<pb n='281'/><anchor id='Pg281'/> +of moral evil, the one passes into the other by insensible +degrees. So difficult is it to lay down the precise +line which separates them, that scientific men are not +wanting, who affirm that every extreme case of moral +wickedness is a species of mania. Consistently with +this theory frequent efforts are made to save the most +abandoned criminals from the consequences of their +crimes. If the principle is correct, it is impossible not +to assign lesser degrees of moral evil to the same +cause. Such a principle logically leads to the denial +of any distinction between moral and physical action. +Happily however, although this conclusion is one +which has been arrived at by a considerable number of +physicists, it is one which the common sense of mankind +steadily refuses to accept. It is sufficient for the +present purpose, that extreme forms of moral evil +shade off into mania by insensible degrees; and that +ultimately they are capable of producing insanity. If +insanity can be produced by moral causes, it follows +that a superhuman influence powerful for evil, acting on +a degraded moral nature, may be attended with a similar +result, and produce such a phenomenon as possession. +</p> + +<p> +But further: while madness is produced by physical +causes, it is a certain fact that it is frequently occasioned +by causes purely mental. Of this the instances +are innumerable. These mental causes react on the +brain and the nervous system; and thus they superinduce +disease on those parts of our bodily organization +by means of which the mind exercises its powers. Still +the disease itself originates in causes that are not +seated in the body, but in the mind. The mind is +therefore capable of acting powerfully on our bodily +frame. If therefore possession be viewed as the action +of one mind on another, there is no reason why it +should not be able to superinduce those forms of +<pb n='282'/><anchor id='Pg282'/> +bodily derangement which exhibited themselves in the +demoniacs by the simple action of the mind upon the +body. The mental causes capable of producing mania +are, as we know, of a varied description; and among +them is the action and influence which one mind is +capable of exerting on another. As, therefore, in +certain states of our minds, or of our nervous system, +mania with all its results can be produced by the +simple action of mind on mind, and through the action +of the mind disorder may be produced in our bodily +organization, there can be no reason why possession +with all its attendant phenomena should not originate +in similar causes. There is nothing to imply that the +superhuman agency manifested in possession was +directly exerted on the body of the possessed. An +agency which was entirely mental was fully adequate +to produce all the phenomena with which it was +accompanied. +</p> + +<p> +In cases of mania produced by mental action the +removal of the exciting cause is the precondition of +its cure, and in many cases effects it. Similarly, in +cases of possession the removal of the exciting cause +would produce similar results. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, from the foregoing considerations, +that the allegation that the possessions described +in the New Testament are incredible, because they +contradict the known truths of mental science, is disproved. +</p> + +<p> +The question really resolves itself into the following +one: Do evil beings, other than men, exist in the +universe? Or, if they exist, is it credible that they +are allowed to interfere in the affairs of men? This +question we have already considered in a former +chapter, and we have arrived at the conclusion that if +we free ourselves from the trammels of <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> theories, +<pb n='283'/><anchor id='Pg283'/> +and judge only by the facts of the universe as it exists, +neither their existence nor their intervention in human +affairs is contrary to our reason. +</p> + +<p> +Two things, however, must be steadily kept in mind. +First: that if such interventions in human affairs are +facts, the agency which can be exerted is only a permitted +agency, and only capable of being exerted in +subordination to the divine purposes in the government +of the universe. A large number of the difficulties +with which the subject is attended have originated +in the wholly inaccurate idea that a power is +attributed in the New Testament to Satan, of interfering +both in the material and the moral universe at his +own will and pleasure. This, however, is altogether +contrary to the fact. Whatever power is attributed to +him is an entirely permitted one, and exercised in subordination +to the general purposes of God. Secondly, +that although the disorder in the moral world might lead +us to suspect the presence of an evil agency, different +from that of man; yet as it is not a visible one, but +confined to the regions of the mind, it is one which +cannot come under our distinct observation, and could +therefore only become known to us by revelation. +</p> + +<p> +One more difficulty has to be considered. It is +alleged that possession never takes place now. It +is therefore inferred that it never took place at all. +</p> + +<p> +I reply first, if we grant that demoniacal action, in +the form of possession has now ceased, it by no means +follows that it was not once real. The objection overlooks +the fact that its action was a permitted one; and +could only be exercised within the limits assigned to +it. There may have been reasons at the time of the +Advent why the exercise of a Satanic agency should +be permitted at that particular period to a greater +extent than it ever has been before or since. +</p> + +<pb n='284'/><anchor id='Pg284'/> + +<p> +Secondly: certain moral and physical conditions were +necessary for its exercise. These may be no longer in +existence, but they may have passed away with many +other abnormal conditions of human nature which +existed in the ancient world. +</p> + +<p> +Thirdly: it is not possible to affirm with certainty +that, even at the present day, no supernatural agencies +bearing an analogy to possession, are exerted on the +mind. This will be only possible, when all those +abnormal phenomena which manifest themselves in +connection with various debased forms of religion and +other cases of phrenzied excitement can be traced to +known forces, originating solely in the mind itself. +</p> + +<p> +There is one further objection which requires a brief +consideration. It is urged that the writers of the New +Testament entertained the belief, that diseases were +generally occasioned by demoniacal action, quite independently +of possession; and that this belief has +received the sanction of our Lord. One case only is +alleged in proof of this, that of the woman with the +spirit of infirmity. She was no demoniac, but an +ordinary diseased person, and the disease is asserted to +have been occasioned by demoniacal action. +</p> + +<p> +I reply, that considering the large number of +diseases of various kinds mentioned in the New Testament, +in none of which is there any allusion to demoniacal +agency as their cause, a single example is +a narrow foundation on which to build the affirmation +that the followers of our Lord held such a theory as to +the origin of disease in general. I admit that disorganization +of the bodily functions is mentioned among +the phenomena of possession. But this differs widely +from a bodily evil superinduced without the agency of +possession. Let us inquire whether the special instance +affords any justification for this wide assertion. +</p> + +<pb n='285'/><anchor id='Pg285'/> + +<p> +The Evangelist states that the woman was bowed +down by a spirit of infirmity, and could in no wise lift +herself up. Here it is just as absurd to fasten on him +the intention to describe a scientific fact, as when on +another occasion it is said that <q><emph>power</emph></q> went out of +our Lord <q>and healed them all.</q> The one stands on +the same ground as the other. +</p> + +<p> +In effecting the cure, our Lord uses the words, +<q>Woman, thou art loosed from thine infirmity.</q> +Here there is no reference to Satanic agency whatever. +The only mention of it occurs in his argument with +the ruler of the synagogue on the lawfulness of effecting +such cures on the Sabbath day. The words are, +<q>Thou hypocrite, ought not this woman, who is a +daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, +these eighteen years, to be loosed from this bond on +the Sabbath day?</q> +</p> + +<p> +These words are addressed to the ruler in answer to +the objection that our Lord was no prophet, because he +effected his cures on the Sabbath. If so, as the reality +of the miracle was not denied, it was intended to be +implied that it had been wrought by the power of Satan, +of which the violation of the Sabbath was the proof. The +real point of controversy therefore was the lawfulness +of effecting cures on this day, not the Satanic origin of +the complaint. Was there any conceivable reason why +our Lord should not discuss the point with the ruler on +his own principles? Why was it necessary to raise a +wholly different issue, viz. the Satanic or non-Satanic +origin of the disease, instead of confining it strictly to +the point, which was the all-important one, that His +curing this woman on the Sabbath day was so far from +being a proof that He did not come from God, that it +was a strong reason for believing that He did so? To +have entered on a discussion as to what was the cause +<pb n='286'/><anchor id='Pg286'/> +of the complaint, would not only have diverted attention +from the real question, but would have introduced +one wholly foreign to the purposes of His divine +mission. +</p> + +<p> +Two suppositions only are possible respecting possession. +It must have been either a form of madness +produced by natural causes, or a manifestation of superhuman +power. As the facts on which a judgment +can be formed are meagre, I have not ventured to +determine which of these two theories is alone consistent +with the facts and phenomena of the New Testament. +I have therefore taken either alternative, and +shown, that neither does the theory that it was mania +interfere with the claims of the Gospels to be accepted +as historical documents, nor is the language attributed +to our Lord contrary to the truthfulness of His +character; nor does the supposition that it was due to +superhuman causes contradict the established truths of +mental science. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='287'/><anchor id='Pg287'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XIII. The Alleged Credulity Of The Followers Of Jesus.</head> + +<p> +The allegation that the followers of Jesus, and the +early Christians generally, were a body of intensely +credulous and superstitious people, may be considered +as not only the stronghold of those who impugn the +historical character of the Gospels, but also as the +arsenal from which they draw no small number of their +weapons of attack. A credulity which knew no limits +is liberally ascribed to them as showing how every +miraculous narrative might have been invented. They +have even been credited with a facility of inventing +fictions, and then deluding themselves into the belief +that they were facts which they had actually witnessed. +Thus it has been asserted that it was their firm belief +that the Messiah ought to have wrought miracles; that +Jesus himself may not even have professed to perform +them; but that the fervid imaginations of His followers +invented a set of miracles, attributed them to Him, and +ended with the belief that they had seen Him perform +them. On the other hand, whenever these objectors +are pressed by a difficulty in accounting for the origin +of particular phenomena in the Gospels, they retire on +the credulity of the followers of Jesus as into a kind of +citadel, in which they consider themselves so strongly +entrenched that they may defy every attack. There is +also another important purpose which it is made to +serve. It is asserted that it renders worthless the +<pb n='288'/><anchor id='Pg288'/> +testimony of the followers of Jesus as to the actual +occurrence of miracles. +</p> + +<p> +The allegation takes two forms: +</p> + +<p> +1st. That the followers of Jesus were the prey of a +credulity and superstition which greatly exceeded the +limits of the ordinary credulity of mankind; and that +therefore the value of their historical testimony is +destroyed. +</p> + +<p> +2nd. That the ordinary credulity of mankind with +respect to the occurrence of supernatural events is so +great and widespread, as to render the invention of +miraculous narratives easy, and to destroy the credit +of all narratives containing them. +</p> + +<p> +I propose to consider these subjects in this and the +following chapter. +</p> + +<p> +Nothing is easier than to charge a body of men with +intense credulity and superstition. Before, however, +such charges deserve to have any notice taken of them, +they should be substantiated by direct proof. It is +impossible to meet them if urged in a mere general +form. Fortunately, the author of <q>Supernatural +Religion</q> makes a number of specific and definite +charges, in which he endeavours to fasten an unspeakable +degree of credulity and superstition on the immediate +followers of Jesus and the authors of the Gospels, +and refers to authorities in support of his assertions. +I will state his general position in his own words. +</p> + +<p> +<q>We have given a most imperfect sketch of some of +the opinions and superstitions prevalent at the time of +Jesus, and when the books of the New Testament were +written. These, as we have seen, are continued with +little or no modification throughout the first centuries +of our era. It must however be remembered that the +few details that we have given, omitting much of the +grosser particulars, are the views absolutely expressed +<pb n='289'/><anchor id='Pg289'/> +by the most educated and intelligent part of the community; +and that it would have required infinitely +darker colours adequately to have portrayed the dense +ignorance and superstition of the mass of the Jews. +It is impossible to receive the report of supposed marvellous +occurrences from an age and people like this, +without the gravest suspicion. Miracles which spring +from such a hot-bed of superstition are too natural in +such a soil to be the object of surprise; and in losing +their exceptional character, their claims on attention +are proportionally weakened, if not altogether destroyed. +Preternatural interference with the affairs of +life and with the phenomena of nature was the rule in +those days, not the exception, and miracles in fact had +apparently lost all novelty, and through familiarity had +become degraded into mere commonplace.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>There can be no doubt that the writers of the New +Testament shared in the popular superstitions of the +Jews.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Before proceeding further, I must draw the reader's +attention to three affirmations in this important passage. +</p> + +<p> +1st. That the educated Jews of the time of Jesus +were a prey to the superstitions in question. +</p> + +<p> +2nd. That the common class of Jews were a prey +to yet grosser superstitious. +</p> + +<p> +3rd. That the followers of Jesus, who were chiefly +Jews of the lower classes, and the authors of the Gospels, +shared in these superstitions. +</p> + +<p> +The author devotes not less than fifty pages to a +minute description of the superstitions of the educated +classes. These are alleged to have been of so gross a +nature, that the reader will get but a very imperfect +conception of the point at issue, unless I give a brief +sketch of some of them. +</p> + +<pb n='290'/><anchor id='Pg290'/> + +<p> +I. The Jews are affirmed to have believed in an innumerable +multitude of angels, whose agency was +continually displayed in the ordinary phenomena of +nature. They presided over and energized in its ordinary +operations, as for instance, in thunder, lightning, +the winds, the seas, frost, hail, rain, mists, heat, light, +&c.; heaven and earth in fact are filled with them, and +they are also continually busying themselves in human +affairs, of which minute details are given. +</p> + +<p> +II. They are alleged to have believed in a demonology +of the most phantastic description. To this I +have elsewhere sufficiently alluded. +</p> + +<p> +III. They are likewise affirmed to have believed that +the sun, moon and stars are rational beings, and traces +of this belief are distinctly affirmed to exist in the New +Testament. +</p> + +<p> +IV. The belief in sorcery, witchcraft and magic is +affirmed to have been universal among them. To give +the reader an idea of the grossness of these beliefs, to +which even the educated classes are affirmed to have +been a prey, I must quote the following passage: +</p> + +<p> +<q>Amulets consisting of seals, or pieces of paper, +with charms written upon them, were hung round the +necks of the sick, and considered efficacious for their +cure. Charms, spells and mutterings were constantly +said over wounds, against unlucky meetings, to make +people sleep, to heal diseases, and to avert enchantments; +against mad dogs for instance, against the +demon of blindness and the like, as well as formulæ +for averting the evil eye, and mutterings over diseases.</q> +Here follow several pages of unutterable absurdities. +It is not too much to say, that there was hardly an +occurrence in nature, and hardly an event of daily life, +which was not influenced by these supernatural powers, +and very frequently in a manner unspeakably grotesque. +<pb n='291'/><anchor id='Pg291'/> +If such were the beliefs of educated people, urges the +author (and he tells us that he has omitted the grosser +forms of them), what must have been those of the +lower orders, and the extent of their degraded superstition? +It must be kept constantly in mind that the +followers of Jesus chiefly consisted of persons taken +from the lower strata of society. But the author in +express words charges them with sharing in such +beliefs. If they did not, the reference to them would +have no bearing on the argument. +</p> + +<p> +We have therefore in this portion of the work a +definite issue raised for our consideration. It is no +vague charge of general boundless credulity and superstition, +such as is generally urged against the followers +of Jesus and the authors of the Gospels. It is presented +to us in a clear and definite form. I fully allow +that if this charge could be substantiated, it would +deprive the Evangelists of all historical credit. +</p> + +<p> +The issue which is thus raised is consequently one +of the highest importance. It will be necessary therefore +for us carefully to examine the mode in which it +is attempted to establish the truth of these charges. +The process is an extremely singular one. +</p> + +<p> +When we have a set of writings before us and endeavour +to estimate the amount of credulity and superstition +to which their authors were a prey, the only +legitimate mode of proceeding is to subject these +writings to a thorough and minute examination as to +the indications of credulity and superstition contained +in them. Having done this, it then becomes our duty +to ascertain the amount of general good sense or the +want of it which is displayed by them in these or in +other subjects, and then to form a general conclusion +by fairly balancing the indications of credulity and +good sense against each other. The author, however, +<pb n='292'/><anchor id='Pg292'/> +seems not to have had the smallest idea that it is the +duty of the critic to ascertain what are the facts of the +case as presented by the writings, and to form a general +conclusion by a careful review of the entire evidence. +On the contrary, his mode of reasoning is to quote a +number of opinions held by various writers, widely +separated from each other in time, to charge them on +the contemporaries of our Lord, and refer to nearly +every passage in the New Testament which has even +the remotest bearing on the subject, for the purpose of +fastening these superstitions on the followers of Jesus. +Such a mode of reasoning can only avail to establish a +foregone conclusion. +</p> + +<p> +Again: In forming a judgment on such a subject, it +also behoves us most carefully to consider whether the +subject-matter of the writings is or is not of such a +character, that if their authors had been addicted to +such gross superstitions, there would not of necessity +have been frequent examples of them in their pages? +Also whether the absence of such references, when the +subject on which they were writing was certain to +have suggested them to their minds, does not constitute +a strong proof that these superstitions were +not held by them? In one word, it is absurd to attempt +to charge writers with boundless credulity and +superstition, on the ground that a multitude of grotesque +beliefs were prevalent in their day. No author +can be held responsible for beliefs other than those +which appear in his pages, especially when subject-matter +of his writings would have been certain to call +them into activity if he had entertained them. +</p> + +<p> +The course pursued by the author is directly opposite +to this. He has been compelled to adopt it, because +it is the only method by which extreme credulity +and superstition can be fastened on the writers of the +<pb n='293'/><anchor id='Pg293'/> +Gospels. The available contemporary literature, besides +that contained in the New Testament, which can +throw light on the opinions of the followers of Jesus, +is very small. The point which requires proof is that +the entire Jewish nation, <emph>without any exception</emph>, was a +prey to the basest superstition and credulity. Unless +this can be established, the charge against the authors +of the Gospels falls to the ground, except so far as it +can be proved by the Gospels themselves. The contemporary +proof of it, however, failing, he endeavours +to substantiate his position by quoting the opinions of +writers separated from the times of Jesus by several +centuries, and affirming that they were held by the +entire body of His contemporaries. Such a mode of +reasoning is useless to support anything but a foregone +conclusion. +</p> + +<p> +A brief reference to the authorities relied upon will +at once expose the fallacy of the argument. First, +certain differences existing between the Septuagint +and the Hebrew Scriptures are pressed into the service, +which are no instances of either credulity or +superstition. Then the frequent idolatries which prevailed +among the Jews prior to the captivity are adduced +as a proof of the superstitious tendencies of the +Jewish mind, as if superstitions prevalent at the time +of Becket were any evidence of the condition of +English thought at the present day. Next the absurdities +in the Apocryphal Book of Tobit are put in as +evidence, although the contrary evidence afforded by +the other books of the Apocrypha, which contain no +traces of such superstitions, is left without mention. +The writings of an Assyrian Jew who lived about three +hundred and fifty years before the Christian era are +about as valid to prove the opinions held by Christ +and his followers as the opinions of Cicero would be in +<pb n='294'/><anchor id='Pg294'/> +evidence of the beliefs of Constantine. Then reference +is made to the angelology and demonology contained in +the writings of Philo, who was unquestionably a contemporary +of our Lord; but not the smallest hint is +given to the reader that he was deeply tinged with +the principles of the Neo-Platonic philosophy, a mode +of thought wholly alien from that of the Palestinian +Jews, or that Philo was himself an Alexandrian Jew. +Next the book of Enoch is quoted, which (whenever it +was written, for its date is uncertain) is unquestionably +not the work of a Palestinian Jew. This book, which +is an Apocalypse, contains a monstrous angelology and +demonology, and abounds with extravagances. Although +part of it was written prior to the Advent, +other portions are clearly subsequent to it. Its author +is unknown; but it is highly probable from certain +resemblances of expression between it and the New +Testament, that he was acquainted with portions of +the latter; or, to state the theory of unbelievers, that +the authors of the New Testament borrowed from it. +If this view is true, then it is evident that they must +have rejected its angelology and demonology, for that +contained in the New Testament is utterly dissimilar +in character to that which we read in the book of +Enoch. As far, therefore, as the evidence of this book +is concerned, it affords a distinct proof that they were +not a prey to its monstrous superstitions. This remark +is equally applicable to the book of Tobit, and the +writings of Philo. +</p> + +<p> +But there is a reference made to Philo which +deserves particular notice as an exemplification of the +mode adopted by those who endeavour to fix the charge +of unbounded credulity on the authors of the Gospels. +I cite the author. +</p> + +<p> +<q>The belief that the sun, moon and stars were +<pb n='295'/><anchor id='Pg295'/> +living entities possessed of souls was generally held +by the Jews at the beginning of our era, along with +Greek philosophers, and we shall presently see it expressed +by the fathers. Philo Judæus considers the +stars spiritual beings full of virtue and perfection, and +that to them is granted lordship over other heavenly +bodies, not absolute, but as viceroys under the Supreme +Being. We find a similar view expressed regarding +the nature of the stars in the Apocalypse, and it constantly +occurs in the Talmud and Targums.</q> +</p> + +<p> +<q>We find,</q> says the author, <q>a similar view expressed +regarding the nature of the stars in the Apocalypse,</q> +<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> that the stars are spiritual beings full of +virtue and perfection, and that they hold lordship over +other heavenly bodies. No quotation is made from this +book, but four passages are referred to in a note as +proving this. They are as follows: <q>The mystery of +the seven stars which thou sawest in my right hand, +and the seven golden candlesticks. The seven stars are +the angels of the seven churches, and the seven candlesticks +which thou sawest are the seven churches.</q> +(Rev. i. 20.) With as good reason may it be said that +the book of Revelation teaches the rationality of candlesticks. +</p> + +<p> +<q>These things saith He that hath the seven Spirits +of God, and the seven stars.</q> (Rev. iii. 1.) It is difficult +to see how this proves that the author of the +Revelation was of opinion that the stars were rational +entities. The next passage referred to (Rev. iv. 5) +makes no mention of stars at all, but of <q>seven lamps +of fire burning before the throne, which are the seven +Spirits of God.</q> The last reference is: <q>I saw a star +fall from heaven unto the earth; and to him was given +the key of the bottomless pit.</q> (Rev. ix. 1.) Here a +star is spoken of as a living agent; but to refer in +<pb n='296'/><anchor id='Pg296'/> +proof of this to a book which is full of symbols and is +an avowed vision is ridiculous and misleading. On +the contrary, the New Testament supplies the most +unquestionable evidence that its writers were free from +this superstition, into which even philosophers had +fallen. +</p> + +<p> +The next writer referred to, to prove that the followers +of Jesus were a prey to credulity and superstition, +is Josephus, in his narrative of the signs which +preceded the destruction of Jerusalem. +</p> + +<p> +To what extent Josephus embellished these signs +may be a question. Most of them have a very heathen +aspect, and it is unquestionable that he was much disposed +to conciliate his heathen readers. It is sufficient +to observe that the pages of the New Testament contain +nothing resembling them. +</p> + +<p> +But the chief source whence these ineffable puerilities +are derived, and charged on the contemporaries of our +Lord, and through them on the writers of the New +Testament, is the Talmud. Probably there are no +writings in existence from which a more monstrous set +of absurdities can be collected than from those of the +Talmudists. But how does this prove that this mass +of nonsense was believed in by the Jewish nation in our +Lord's day? One portion of the Talmud, the Mishna, +was composed between <hi rend='smallcaps'>a.d.</hi> 180 and <hi rend='smallcaps'>a.d.</hi> 200, or some +years after the date assigned by unbelievers to the +Fourth Gospel. The lateness of this date is urged by +them as conclusive proof that that Gospel does not +embody the real traditions of the early followers of +Jesus. How then can it be urged with any thing +like consistency that the Mishna adequately represents +their views respecting the order of nature? But the +other portion of the Talmud, the Gemara, was not put +forth in a written form prior to <hi rend='smallcaps'>a.d.</hi> 500. To quote +<pb n='297'/><anchor id='Pg297'/> +works thus remote in time as proofs of the superstitions +of the followers of Jesus, is to adopt a course which if +applied generally to history, would reduce it to a tissue of +falsehoods. Bishop Jewell was a believer in witchcraft; +but it would be absurd if some future writer +were to quote the writings of modern spiritualists as a +proof that he believed in their doctrines. +</p> + +<p> +Nor is it true that the opinions of the masses of a +nation are at all adequately represented by those of its +learned men, especially when learning, as in the case in +question, assumed the most unbounded licence of speculation. +In most cases the common sense of the masses +who are brought into contact with the hard facts of +daily life will preserve them from puerilities, into which +learning, which draws exclusively on the imagination, is +certain to fall. There is sufficient evidence of the superstition +of the masses during the middle ages; but nothing +would be more absurd than to quote some monstrous +opinions held by the great scholastic writers +to prove that they were the current opinions of the +vulgar. Yet the principle here adopted is to adduce +opinions propounded by learned writers, who lived +centuries afterwards, as a proof that they were current +among the entire Jewish race at the time of Jesus +Christ. +</p> + +<p> +The remaining references in proof of this position +are still more noteworthy. To establish the superstition +of the Jews at the time of the Advent, a set of +opinions are adduced which were held by Christian +Fathers, whose writings cover a period of not less than +four centuries. A list of them will be sufficient. The +apocryphal Barnabas and Hermas, Justin Martyr, +Theophilus, Clement of Alexandria, Tatian, Tertullian, +Cyprian, Origen, Augustine, Jerome, Chrysostom, +Lactantius, Eusebius, and Cyril of Jerusalem. A number +<pb n='298'/><anchor id='Pg298'/> +of grotesque opinions are collected from these +writers, as though they could have any possible bearing +on the question whether the followers of Jesus were +able correctly to report what they saw and heard. +</p> + +<p> +I submit therefore that the facts adduced utterly +fail to establish the charge of intense superstition and +credulity against the followers of Jesus. But I go +further, and affirm that they furnish the means of +giving a most conclusive proof of the contrary. +</p> + +<p> +These quotations furnish us with a clear and conclusive +proof, which is also furnished by the entire range +of literature, that when writers are the prey of a definite +class of superstitions, their pages will afford +abundant evidence not only of their existence, but of +their nature and character. This, of course, must be +qualified by the supposition that the subject-matter +on which they wrote is one suitable to call their latent +superstitions into activity. This always happens when +the works are of a religious character. In such cases +they will faithfully reflect the superstitions entertained +by their authors. This is pre-eminently the case with +all the writings in question. They are all on religious +subjects, on which they allowed their imaginations to +run riot. They entertained a number of grotesque +opinions, and accordingly we find in their writings a +grotesque super-naturalism, exactly corresponding to +the peculiar ideas of each individual writer. On the +principle that <q>out of the abundance of the heart the +mouth speaketh,</q> we may be quite certain that when +an author is extremely credulous and superstitious, it +will find expression in his pages whenever he is writing +on a subject on which his imagination gives scope to +exhibit them. +</p> + +<p> +I put the argument as follows: all writers exhibit in +their pages the superstitions to which they are a prey. +<pb n='299'/><anchor id='Pg299'/> +The writers of the New Testament do not exhibit the +superstitions in question. It follows therefore that +from these particular superstitions they are free. Consequently +the charge against them of intense superstition +and credulity falls to the ground, as far as it +rests on the evidence in question. +</p> + +<p> +The amount of subject-matter in the New Testament +which, independently of a general belief in miracles, +the opponents of Christianity can designate as superstitious, +is of a very limited and definite nature. It +may be said to be almost exclusively confined to a +belief in the reality of possession;—a few cases of +disease occasioned by Satanic agency;—an occasional +intervention of angels, and their power to act on +nature;—and perhaps that demonology and heathenism +were in some way connected with each other. This is +the sum total of such beliefs which appear on the face +of the New Testament. They appear in unequal degrees +in the works of different writers; and viewing +them as mere human compositions, we have no right +to charge on one writer the beliefs of another. The +book of Revelation, and its imagery as professedly +merely seen in a vision, cannot fairly be introduced +into this controversy. +</p> + +<p> +If then we concede, for the sake of argument, that +the Jews in the time of Christ were a prey to the +extravagant superstitions referred to; if they believed +that the whole course of nature and human life was +incessantly interfered with by an army of spirits in +numbers passing all comprehension, and that these +interferences were of the most grotesque and phantastic +character; if they universally believed in magic, charms +and incantations, the non-appearance of such phenomena +in the pages of the New Testament is a proof that its +authors were not a prey to the current superstitions of +<pb n='300'/><anchor id='Pg300'/> +the day. No inconsiderable number of supernatural +events are recorded in their pages, but unbelief itself +is compelled to admit that they are all of a dignified +character, with perhaps the exception of the entrance +of the demons into the swine, and the discovery of the +piece of money in the mouth of the fish. From what +is monstrous, grotesque and phantastic, they are absolutely +free. +</p> + +<p> +If it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that +miracles are possible, then it cannot be denied that +those of the New Testament, taken as a whole, stand +out in marked contrast to the current supernaturalism +of superstition. Their whole conception is lofty; there +is in them nothing mean or contemptible; they subserve +a great purpose; they are worthy of that great +character to whom they are ascribed, Jesus Christ. I +put the question boldly: how is it, if the followers of +Jesus were a prey to the degrading superstitions +above referred to, that we find no indications of them +in their pages? Also: how is it possible that men of +such a character should have invented such a number +of noble creations? Let unbelievers account for this +on any principle which a sound philosophy can recognise. +</p> + +<p> +But further: the Gospels mention a certain number of +possessions, and their cures effected by our Lord. Here +then we are in the very presence of a demonology such +as was actually believed in by the followers of Jesus. +Here, therefore, is the very condition of mind and outward +circumstances where, if they had been a prey to +the phantastic and disgusting beliefs about demons +above referred to, such beliefs would certainly have +made their appearance in their pages. But, as I have +shown, the demonology of the Gospels stands in marked +contrast to that of the Talmud, of Josephus, and of the +<pb n='301'/><anchor id='Pg301'/> +Christian Fathers. We have no fumigations of demoniacs +with the liver of a fish, we hear nothing of a demon +drawn out of a man's nose, and overturning a basin of +water, nothing of a demon inhabiting every private +closet. On the contrary, their action is described as +mental, and, through the mind, affecting the body, +with the exception of a few doubtful cases. I am not +here arguing whether a belief in the reality of demoniacal +possession is a superstition or not. But I affirm +that if the writers of the New Testament had been a +prey to the superstitions with which they are charged, +these are the narratives in which they could not have +failed to make their appearance. Again: It has been +affirmed that they held a monstrous angelology. I +reply that although angels are unquestionably stated +to have appeared, and their existence is affirmed by the +writers of the New Testament, still their recorded +appearances are rare. They are confined to a few very +remarkable occasions, viz.: the Annunciation and birth +of our Lord, the temptation, the agony in the garden, +and the resurrection. Surely this does not look as if +the authors of the Gospels thought that they were always +interfering with the course of nature or the events of +life. In the Acts of the Apostles, they appear at the +Ascension; once to liberate St. Peter, and at another +time the Apostles, from prison; to direct Philip to +preach to the eunuch; twice in a vision to St. Paul; +and Herod Agrippa is also said to have been smitten +by the ministry of an angel. There were certainly +many occasions when, if the writers had believed in the +habitual intervention of angels, we should have found +them introduced. Thus an angel is not sent to deliver +Paul from prison, or to still the tempest, but simply to +assure him of his safety. St. Paul enumerates in a +passage of some length the various dangers which beset +<pb n='302'/><anchor id='Pg302'/> +him in his missions, especially mentioning the perils he +encountered in travel. But neither he nor St. Luke +once refers to an angelic intervention in his favour. +In numerous passages he refers to dangers and persecutions +which he encountered. But it is our Lord, and +not angels, who delivered him. Is this consistent with +a belief in their habitual intervention in nature? If +he was the visionary which he has been asserted to +have been, would he not have been continually seeing +visions of angels for his protection? +</p> + +<p> +In St. Paul's writings we are in the presence of +documents which are in the highest degree historical. +Even those who endeavour to prove that the Gospels +and the Acts were not written until the second century, +are obliged to allow that at least four of the most important +of his letters were written within 30 years after +the Crucifixion, and that the evidence that four of the +remainder are his, vastly preponderates. Here then +we are in the presence of historical documents of the +highest order, compared with which such a writing as +the book of Enoch is worthless, and the Talmud and +the Fathers are modern compositions. What light +then do these letters throw on the opinions of St. Paul +and the Pauline Churches? Much every way: they +let us into the secret of their inner life. They tell us +that these Christians thought they possessed certain +supernatural gifts; that St. Paul asserted that he +wrought miracles; that demons by an invisible agency +tempted men to sin, and opposed the progress of the +Gospel; but beyond this there is scarcely a trace of +angelology or demonology in them. With these epistles +in our hands, is it credible that their writer, or those +to whom he wrote, held a multitude of monstrous and +phantastic beliefs on this subject? Are not these +writings characterized by supreme good sense? Do +<pb n='303'/><anchor id='Pg303'/> +they not in this point of view marvellously contrast +even with those of the earliest Fathers? The writer +undoubtedly believed that unseen spiritual agencies +were capable of acting on the mind of man, and that +they were active agents in the production of moral evil; +but where is the evidence that he considered that +external nature was under their control, or that they +made themselves visible to the mortal eye? Although +he affirms that he possessed a supernatural illumination +on religious subjects, only on two occasions does he +refer to visions as actually seen by him; and he directly +affirms that he had the power of distinguishing the +ecstatic from the ordinary condition of his mind. Even +with the aid of the Acts of the Apostles, we can only +add a few more to the number. Surely this is not the +mental condition of a man who was a prey to unbounded +superstition. Contrast the amount of good sense in +the epistles of St. Paul with an equal number of +consecutive pages from the Fathers and the Talmud, +and the difference is enormous. Where are the ineffable +puerilities found in these writings even hinted at in +those of St. Paul? +</p> + +<p> +Again: if we include in our examination the other +writings of the New Testament, they wholly fail to +supply us with any evidence of the superstition or +credulity of their authors. On the contrary they are +characterized by the marks of uniform good sense. +It will be doubtless objected that they, as well as +St. Paul, were bad logicians, and that their applications +of the Old Testament Scriptures are inapt: but this +does not affect their trustworthiness as historians. +They were undoubtedly men of great religious fervour, +yet they are both sparing in the use of miracles, and +when they report them, the miraculous action is never +represented as extending beyond the necessities of the +<pb n='304'/><anchor id='Pg304'/> +case. Their miracles consist of simple acts, as for +instance the cure of diseases, but all marvellous superadditions +are wanting. It has been urged that in +comparing the miracles of the Gospels with other +miraculous narratives, we have no right to do more than +compare the external miracle of the one with the external +miracle of the other; as for instance a resurrection +with a resurrection, or a cure of blindness recorded in +one with a similar case recorded in another; and not +to take into account either the external circumstances +or the moral aspect of the miracle. I have elsewhere +proved that this position is untenable. But for the +purpose of the argument let us here assume that all +the circumstances may be the invention of the narrator. +If it be so, it proves at any rate the soundness of his +judgment and the elevation of his ideas, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> that it is +impossible that he could have been either intensely +superstitious or credulous. How is it possible, I ask, +for minds which were a prey to such monstrous beliefs +as those which we have been considering, to have +dramatized miraculous narratives of the elevated type +of those contained in the Gospels? Would not all the +circumstances with which they invested them be the +counter-part of their own degraded conceptions? +</p> + +<p> +But there is one most distinctive phenomenon presented +by the Gospels which affords a conclusive proof +that neither their authors nor the followers of Jesus +could have been a prey to either degrading superstition +or credulous fanaticism. I allude to the fact that, +whatever theory may be propounded to account for their +origin, the Gospels, as a matter of fact, unquestionably +contain a delineation of the greatest of all characters, +whether actual or ideal, that of Jesus Christ. I shall +hereafter draw attention to the portraiture of this +character for the purpose of proving that they are +<pb n='305'/><anchor id='Pg305'/> +veritable historical documents. In this place I refer to it +simply for the purpose of proving that their authors +and those who invented the alleged fictions of which +their contents consist, were possessed of a soundness +of judgment which is wholly inconsistent with the +truth of the assertion that they were a prey to boundless +superstition or credulity. +</p> + +<p> +For the purpose of the argument I must assume +that this character is a fictitious one, because to assume +that it is a delineation of an actual historical character, +would be to take for granted the entire question at +issue. If the Jesus of the Evangelists is an historical +personage, there can be no doubt respecting the claims +of the Gospel to be a divine revelation. But even if we +make the assumption above mentioned, it is quite clear +that those persons who invented the character, or who +put it together out of the number of legendary stories +floating about in the Church, must have been possessed +of a sound judgment, and the highest appreciation of +what was great and noble. The character we have before +us, and it is confessedly the noblest which can be found +either in history or fiction. The inventors, whoever +they were, have succeeded in portraying a great harmonious +whole. Such a character could only have +been delineated by men possessed of sound discriminating +judgment. The more the Gospels are depreciated +as histories the more does this depreciation establish +the credit of their authors as the successful delineators +of an ideal character, to which they have succeeded in +imparting a naturalness which men of the most exalted +genius have mistaken for an historical reality. They +must have been, therefore, consummate masters of the +art of ideal delineation. The mental powers adequate +to effect such results are those of high genius, to which +in this case must have been added a very elevated conception +<pb n='306'/><anchor id='Pg306'/> +of morality. Such mental qualities are never +exhibited by men who are the prey of gross credulity +and superstition. The great ideal delineations of poets +have been only capable of being produced by the +<foreign rend='italic'>élite</foreign> of the human race. On the other hand, if we assume +that the character is a fictitious one, and its inventors +men of the mental calibre which they are affirmed to +have been by those against whom I am reasoning, it +would have been inevitable that its proportions should +be marred by the introduction into it of traits marked +by meanness, puerility, and monstrosity. +</p> + +<p> +In support of this assertion we have no occasion to +appeal to theories but to facts. Happily antiquity has +preserved to us several delineations of a mythical Jesus +on which the inventors have stamped the most +unmistakable impress of their own credulity and superstition. +I need not say that I allude to the Apocryphal +Gospels, the delineations of Jesus which they contain, +and above all to their miraculous narratives. Those +who reiterate these charges against the authors of the +Canonical Gospels, are very slow to draw attention +to their bearing on this portion of the argument. +In the Apocryphal Gospels we are brought face to +face with the legendary spirit exerting itself in the +invention of miraculous stories. There can be no +doubt that their authors were both extremely credulous +and superstitious; and their miraculous narratives give +us the precise measure of their credulity. There is +every reason to believe that two of these compositions +were written as early as the second century. What, +I ask, is the general character of the miracles which +they have attributed to Jesus? There can be only +one answer. They are mean, ridiculous, degraded, +burlesque, destitute of all trait of moral grandeur. If +the authors of the four Gospels, or the inventors of their +<pb n='307'/><anchor id='Pg307'/> +miraculous narratives, whoever they may have been, +had been a prey to similar credulity and superstition, +the marks of them would have been indelibly stamped +on their pages. +</p> + +<p> +These documents also contain accounts of miracles +wrought by Jesus, some of which, as bare facts, are +precisely the same as some recorded in the Canonical +Gospels, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> they contain accounts of resurrections +from the dead, and the cure of diseases. I ask, do +their accompanying circumstances and moral aspect +stand as nothing in our estimate of the credibility of +their authors? Compare the account of the resurrection +of Lazarus, or that of our Lord himself, with the +resurrections in the Apocryphal Gospels, and mark the +difference. Compare likewise the other miracles, +which, as bare facts, resemble one another. The one +have the stamp of historical probability, and precisely +fit in with the lofty character of Jesus; the other of an +unbelievable legend, in which the character is degraded +to a level with the conceptions of the inventors. +</p> + +<p> +Let not unbelievers, therefore, decline to grapple +with the question. Let them cease to pass it over in +silence. I propose to them the following questions for +solution. If both sets of Gospels originated with +minds intensely credulous and superstitious, whence +has come the difference between them? Why is the +one set of miracles dignified, and the other mean? +Whence the entire difference of their moral aspect? +Why is the Jesus of the Canonical Gospels the most +elevated personage in history, and the Jesus of the +Apocryphal ones, one of the most mean and silly? If +two of the Apocryphal and the four Canonical Gospels +are the production of the superstition and credulity of +the same century, whence the marvellous contrast +between them? Which of the Fathers of the second +<pb n='308'/><anchor id='Pg308'/> +or third century was equal to the task of reducing a +mass of floating legends, the creations of numbers of +superstitious men, into their present form, as they +stand in our Canonical Gospels? Would they not +certainly have coloured the events with their own +absurdities? If, on the other hand, it be allowed that +the Canonical Gospels are the production of the first +century, and the Apocryphal Gospels of subsequent +ones, how came the credulous followers of Jesus to +produce fictions dramatized with such admirable taste +in the first century, and the same spirit in subsequent +centuries to present so striking a contrast? The only +possible answer which can be returned to these +questions is that the phenomena of the Canonical +Gospels are inconsistent with the supposition that +their miraculous narratives are the invention of men +who were the prey either of credulity or dense superstition; +they must have been men well able to distinguish +between a genuine miracle and a mythic parody +of one. +</p> + +<p> +But it has been urged that the dignified character of +Jesus induced the compilers of our present Gospels to +select all the miraculous stories of a high type which +were current in the hotbed of Christian fanaticism, and +to attribute them to Jesus, and to suppress all of a +contrary description. If this be the true solution of +the facts, then it certainly follows that the compilers of +the Gospels must have been free from the superstitions +of the times in which they lived. Otherwise, how +came they to select all the elevated stories and attribute +them to Jesus, and to consign those of a lower +type to a well-merited oblivion? Is it not a fact that +credulous and superstitious people have often attributed +what is contemptible and mean to elevated characters? +Let the Apocryphal Gospels bear witness. It follows, +<pb n='309'/><anchor id='Pg309'/> +therefore, that even on this supposition the question +must be decided in favour of the authors of our present +Canonical Gospels, that they must have been free +from the degraded superstitious to which their fellow-believers +were a prey. +</p> + +<p> +But there is yet another problem, even if we assume +the above supposition to be true, which urgently +demands solution. If, among the mass of legends +with which the history of Jesus was incrusted, a certain +portion of the miraculous stories were of an elevated +type, who among His credulous and superstitious +followers were the inventors of them? Were they +men of like credulity with the remainder? There are +only two alternatives. They were, or they were not. +If they were, I ask, how came they to invent elevated +stories? If they were not, then it follows that there +were persons among His followers who were neither +intensely credulous nor superstitious. If the latter be +the alternative adopted, then the theory which I have +been considering, which attributes to the followers of +Jesus such a degree of those qualities as to render +their historical testimony valueless, falls to the ground. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, on a careful consideration of +the position, that the data on which the charge +which we have been considering is made against the +followers of Jesus and the authors of the Gospels +utterly fail to establish it; and that the phenomena of +the New Testament prove the contrary to have been +the fact. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='310'/><anchor id='Pg310'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XIV. The Love Of The Marvellous—Its Bearing On The +Value Of Testimony To Miracles.</head> + +<p> +It has been objected that the love of the marvellous +has in every age constituted so remarkable a phase of +human nature as greatly to weaken, if not entirely to +invalidate the testimony to the performance of miracles. +It is alleged that the great historians of ancient times +have recorded a number of supernatural occurrences +which are now summarily rejected as incredible: and +it is therefore argued that all narratives of miraculous +occurrences must share the same fate. This objection +differs from that which I have considered in the former +chapter, in that it avoids the necessity of imputing to +the followers of Jesus and the authors of the Gospels +a degree of superstition and credulity greatly in excess +of that which characterizes the majority of mankind. +It will be therefore necessary to give this subject a +careful consideration. +</p> + +<p> +It is an unquestionable fact that the human mind +has been in all ages disposed to accept a number of +narratives of supernatural occurrences upon very insufficient +testimony, and which the principles of sound +reason lead us to reject as untrue. Such beliefs have +been peculiar to no one period of the world's history, +but have been co-extensive with the human race; and +they form one of the most remarkable facts in our +nature. Many of the ancient historians have reported +such occurrences without apparent suspicion; or if +<pb n='311'/><anchor id='Pg311'/> +they entertained any doubts respecting their truth, +they did not venture even to whisper them into the +popular ear. What is still more; eminent men of the +ancient world did not scruple to act in matters of this +kind a part which they knew to be deceptive, because +they held the opinion that such beliefs, though they +might be laughed at by philosophers, were necessary +to act as restraints on the vulgar. Thus we know, on +the most indubitable authority, that a Roman Augur +could gravely act his part before the public at the very +time that he was secretly laughing in his sleeve at the +ridiculousness of his art. It does not therefore follow +because the ancient historians have reported numbers +of occurrences of this nature with considerable gravity, +that they accepted them as facts. They were frequently +influenced by the spirit of accommodation, thinking it +necessary for the welfare of society to keep up the +vulgar ideas on the subject. It would be inaccurate +therefore to attribute all the accounts of such things +which we meet with in ancient writers to simple +credulity, or to infer from them that they did not +believe in an inviolable order of nature of some kind. +With respect to the arts of magic, however, one feels +that even the greatest of the ancient writers contemplated +them with a kind of bated breath. This would +appear to have been the state of mind even of Tacitus, +with one exception the greatest historian of the ancient +world, and one who was intimately acquainted with the +various systems of its philosophy. Conscious as he +was that vast numbers of the professors of magic were +impostors, he seems hardly able to realize the fact that +the whole art was a delusion. +</p> + +<p> +It has been affirmed that the progress of physical +science has destroyed in this nineteenth century all +belief in the actual occurrence of the supernatural, and +<pb n='312'/><anchor id='Pg312'/> +that it now prevails only in some of the dark corners of +Christendom. The widespread belief in the phenomena +of spiritualism, which is certainly very far from being +confined to religious men, and from which some +students of physical science have not been exempt, is +a striking proof of the contrary. All that can be +affirmed with truth is that, in these modern times, +these forms of belief have taken a new direction. +Modern science has done much to establish and spread +the belief that the operations of all natural, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> material +forces are uniform. Many of its students have even +brought themselves to the belief that the occurrence of +any event whose existence is due to the action of any +other than the known forces of nature, is impossible: +though this is far from being the invariable, and is +certainly not the necessary result of its study. Still, +probably, the most ardent votary of these opinions +would find it difficult to keep himself wholly free from +terrors arising from unseen causes, if they were aroused +by a suitable apparatus. The study of physical science +is far from being a universal safeguard against the +invasions of superstition. Its causes lie far more +deeply rooted in our nature than the principles of +physical science can reach. Nor is it able to guard +against an extravagant use of the imagination. +</p> + +<p> +Whether, in the present state of our philosophy, we +have fully penetrated to the depths of this principle +thus working in the mind of man, may admit of doubt; +but its presence there, as an essential portion of our +nature, is an unquestionable fact. We are not without the +means of getting a general idea of its character. It is +doubtless intimately connected with those principles of +our nature which constitute man a religious being, and +which form a fundamental part of his mental constitution. +As such it must, like all our other faculties, +<pb n='313'/><anchor id='Pg313'/> +have a legitimate and an illegitimate action. It points, +as we shall see, to the existence of the supernatural. +A rational religion forms the object for its appropriate +exercise. Whenever man has been destitute of this, +and his reason has been weak, this principle, devoid of +its proper object, has always manifested itself in various +forms of extravagance. So powerful is it in the human +mind that even avowed atheism has not been proof +against its power. Julius Cæsar was an atheist, and +possessed one of the most powerful minds that ever +inhabited the human frame. Yet, on the great day of +his triumph, he ascended the steps of the Capitol for +the purpose of averting an avenging Nemesis. Napoleon +the First was no atheist, though few persons who have +ever lived have been more free from the restraints of +religion or superstition. Although he possessed a +mighty intellect and was no stranger to the truths of +modern science, yet even he believed in his star. +Many other instances of men of powerful intellect who +disbelieved in religion, yet who entertained singular +superstitions, might be easily adduced. I refer to them +for the purpose of proving that the principle out of +which such things originate must be one which is deep-seated +in the nature of man, and therefore an essential +portion of it. If it is founded on a fundamental +principle of our mental constitution, it follows that it +must have a legitimate subject-matter on which to +exercise its powers, and that the abnormal forms of it +which are so frequently manifested are the results of +some disorder in its action. What then is its nature? +</p> + +<p> +There are certain principles deeply-seated within us, +which form as definite a portion of ourselves as even +our rational faculties, and which directly prompt to the +belief in the supernatural, and therefore point to its +existence. Among these, the faculties of imagination, +<pb n='314'/><anchor id='Pg314'/> +wonder, reverence and awe, hold a conspicuous place. +It is impossible to deny that they form portions of the +actual constitution of our minds, however we may +account for their origin. Is it then our duty to eradicate +them because they prompt us to the belief in +something which transcends the visible order of nature? +This will hardly be affirmed by the most thorough-going +sceptic; for if it be our duty to do so, the +human mind must be a mass of disorder in the midst +of a universe of order. If we were to make the +attempt (for indeed it has been attempted) the result +would be to upset the balance of our mental constitution, +and it would terminate in failure. Human nature, +taken as it is, constitutes a whole. These faculties +hold in it a place subordinate to reason and to +conscience. When our rational, our imaginative, and +our moral powers act harmoniously together, they +constitute man a religious being. +</p> + +<p> +But, for the purposes of the present argument, I +have simply to draw attention to the fact that imagination, +wonder, reverence and awe form an essential +portion of our being. It would be in the highest +degree undesirable to get rid of them, even if we were +able. How mighty is the influence of the first of these +principles! It lies at the foundation of everything +that is great and noble in man. To it are due the +magnificent creations of poetry; in fact everything +which adorns life, and much of that which raises us +above the mechanical forces of nature. Destitute of +it, our reason could not act; nay, it could not even +exist; and we should be reduced to the mere mechanical +action of the understanding, the wheels of which +would be in danger of rusting. Nor has the faculty +of wonder a less definite place in our being. It is +closely connected with our imagination, which supplies +<pb n='315'/><anchor id='Pg315'/> +it with objects fitted to excite it, and ought to be +exercised under the guidance of reason. Its object is +the great and the vast, shall I not say, the infinite? +Regulated by reason and united with awe, it produces +reverence. Reverence points to the existence of some +object which is really worthy of veneration. Veneration +can only be legitimately exercised on that which +is truly venerable. As such it directly points to a +personal God, and refuses to rest in anything short of +Him as able fully to gratify its aspirations. Viewing +them as a whole, the legitimate object of these faculties, +and the subject from which they can receive their +fullest gratification, is that Great Being who everywhere +manifests Himself in this glorious universe. +But when man has ceased to contemplate in nature a +rational power guiding and controlling it, the principle +of wonder has frequently prompted him to gratify its +aspirations by peopling it with a multitude of phantastic +creations. When under the influence of awe, +he has contemplated it in its terrible aspects, unguided +by a being who possesses a moral character, these +feelings have prompted the imagination to fill it with +beings who excite the feeling of superstitious dread. +</p> + +<p> +Although the vastness of the material universe and the +energy of its forces can excite the feeling of wonder, +yet that of reverence refuses to find in the mere extension +of space, or the might of material forces, any +object adequate to its demands. The vastness of the +material universe may fill the mind with wonder and +admiration; but even wonder refuses to rest satisfied +with a vastness of which the limits are known. It +demands something which is conceivable, which yet +runs up into the regions of the inconceivable. But +even here the feeling of reverence can find nothing on +which to energize. It directly points to a moral being +<pb n='316'/><anchor id='Pg316'/> +in whom it can find a centre, and it will find its gratification +in nothing short of one. To talk, as many +Pantheists do, of feeling reverence for an impersonal +Universe, is a misuse of language. What! to reverence +a Being, if the impersonal Universe can be called a +Being, which is everlastingly casting up the bubbles +of existence in the form of moral agents, and is everlastingly +devouring them, devoid alike of consciousness, +volition, and a moral nature! +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, if these principles form a constituent +portion of our nature, that like all our other +faculties, they must admit of a right and a perverted +use. It is therefore absurd to lay down as a general +principle, because they admit of an illegitimate use, +that the whole class of phenomena connected with +them are worthy of nothing but summary rejection, +without exercising our reason on the evidence on which +they stand. All that their existence can prove in +reference to this subject is something which is very +like a truism; that mankind, being liable to all kinds +of mistakes and errors, and having frequently fallen +into them, no class of phenomena ought to be accepted +as facts, until evidence of their occurrence has been +adduced which is capable of satisfying our reason. +But this is a very harmless proposition. +</p> + +<p> +There can be no doubt that to a perverted use of +these faculties is due the belief in a kind of current +supernaturalism, which in various forms runs through +the entire history of man. This has owed its origin +to the efforts of the imagination to supply objects for +its gratification when the reason is feeble and the moral +faculties have become perverted. Hence the readiness +of large masses of mankind to accept narratives of +marvels without regard to the evidence on which they +rest. They are accepted simply as gratifying the principle +<pb n='317'/><anchor id='Pg317'/> +of wonder. This is the cause of what I have +designated by the term <q>Current Supernaturalism.</q> +</p> + +<p> +But because all our faculties admit of abuse, and +the higher they are, the greater, this forms no reason +for rejecting their legitimate use, or the entire subject-matter +on which they operate. As I have observed, +the principle is found energizing wherever man exists. +Although in one age it may be more active than in +another, it is alike the inheritance of the civilized man +and the savage. It has displayed itself in the creations +of the poet and the writer of fiction; in the various +forms of religious thought; in the production of ghost-stories +and pictures of the under-world; in the creation +of the various forms of demonology, witchcraft and +magic; in the milder form of fairy-tales; in charms +and incantations, and in efforts to pry into the future. +Even in philosophy and science we may trace its influence, +not only in aiding and suggesting their great +discoveries, but in propounding multitudes of startling +theories, erected on the smallest basis of fact. These +not only gratify this feeling, but promise an apparently +royal road to knowledge, which avoids the long and +tedious one of only propounding theories after a careful +investigation of facts. But in the regions of intellectual +pursuit, its abnormal manifestations are pre-eminently +in the science of historical criticism, in those +numerous departments of historical inquiry where the +facts are few and vague. Here nothing is easier than +to supply the absence of facts by theory, and to erect +a magnificent edifice on a foundation of sand. The +ancient soothsayer gratified vulgar curiosity by guessing +at the events of the future. There is a species of +modern soothsaying which expends its energies in +guessing at the events of the past. Such guessing +presents an unspeakable fascination to a large number +<pb n='318'/><anchor id='Pg318'/> +of minds, by its happy mixture of fiction and fact, and +is the true analogue to many of the forms of ancient +thought. It has been necessary to draw attention to +these things for the purpose of proving the widespread +influence of this principle on human nature. Its action +has manifested itself in different forms in different +ages; but the cause is the same in all, the existence +in man of a principle which points to the existence of +God, and which can only receive its adequate gratification +in Him. +</p> + +<p> +The action of similar principles produces in man the +love of the extraordinary, the unusual and the novel. +This is so powerful that unless it is kept in subordination +to reason, it produces a number of fictitious beliefs. +So strong is it, that it may be truly said of large +numbers of mankind that they spend all the time +which they are not compelled to devote to the serious +realities of life, in little else than hearing and speaking +of some new thing. It is undoubtedly the cause of a +large number of fictitious beliefs, and produces, in +minds where the rational powers are weak, a ready +acceptance of the unusual, the strange, and the wonderful. +The same principle, acting in conjunction with +others, when uncontrolled by reason, has occasioned +many of the exaggerations which are to be found in +history. +</p> + +<p> +Still, as one of the fundamental principles of our +minds, it cannot but have a legitimate sphere of action. +United with curiosity, it is the chief source of all mental +activity. It is that which produces the earnest desire +to penetrate into the regions of the unknown. As +such, it is essential to the activity of our rational +faculties, and has been the exciting cause which has +rendered all our great discoveries possible. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that if these principles form +<pb n='319'/><anchor id='Pg319'/> +part of our mental constitution, the objection that +they destroy the value of miracles as a testimony to a +revelation is absurd. We might as well argue that +because the love of the marvellous has generated a +belief in a number of fictions as facts in ordinary history, +it invalidates its testimony to events which have really +happened, or renders all unusual occurrences incredible. +I will illustrate this by an example. Herodotus tells +us in his history that there were certain tribes who +dwelt in wooden habitations erected over lakes, and +he gives us several particulars as to their manner of +life. This fact, until a comparatively recent period, +might have been pronounced incredible, and have been +supposed to have originated in the simple love of the +marvellous, either in the author or in his informants. +I own that when I first read the historian, this was the +opinion which I formed respecting it. But we now know +that he reported an actual fact. On the other hand it +is certain that a great portion of the details of the +Scythian expedition of Darius must have originated +in the undue activity of the mental faculties to which I +have referred, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> that they are inventions. But if the +principle of summarily rejecting narratives of events +which lie beyond our experience is valid, because the +abnormal activity of certain faculties has urged men to +invent, and believe in a multitude of fictions, the account +of the lake-dwellings given by the historian ought to +have been rejected as equally unworthy of credit, with +some of the occurrences of the Scythian expedition. +It is impossible to deal with the events of history +on any general <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> principles; they must stand or +fall on their own intrinsic evidence. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that if these principles admit of +an abnormal action, we are still by no means justified in +a summary rejection of all unusual occurrences. It only +<pb n='320'/><anchor id='Pg320'/> +forms an adequate reason for closely scrutinizing the +evidence on which the credibility of history rests. The +faculty of imagination, instigated by that of wonder, +has produced widespread beliefs in a mass of supernatural +events which are utterly incredible. But as +that faculty must have a legitimate action somewhere, +it is clear that its abuse can be no valid reason for the +rejection of all supernatural occurrences, unless for +other reasons they are proved to be incredible. The +whole must be a question of evidence and of reason. If +it formed a valid ground for the rejection of miracles, it +is clear that the principle on which it is founded cannot +be confined to any such narrow limits, but must have a +wide and general application, and extend to all that is +wonderful and unusual. +</p> + +<p> +It is an unquestionable fact that a large proportion +of mankind in every age have eagerly sought the means +of affording gratification to the feeling of wonder, and +that this has been the means of introducing into history +a considerable number of fictions of various kinds. +But does this invalidate its testimony? Does it justify +us in rejecting whole classes of phenomena as unworthy +of consideration? We have already seen that whatever +principle is applied to miracles must be equally +applied to all extraordinary events, because as phenomena +there is no difference between them. We +admit that many fictions have got into history. These +it is the duty of the critical historian to detect and +displace. Will anyone affirm that their introduction +invalidates the events in the history of the past, +which rest on an adequate attestation? What that +is, I shall consider hereafter. Whatever effect this +may have exerted on the minor details of history, +will anyone affirm that its great outlines do not rest on +a substantial basis of truth? It is impossible to lay +<pb n='321'/><anchor id='Pg321'/> +down on these subjects a wide and comprehensive +canon which will save us the trouble of careful and +accurate investigation. All reports of extraordinary +events, marvels, and miracles, must stand or fall with +the adequacy of the evidence which can be adduced for +their occurrence, and cannot be decided by any artificial +rule. If the evidence is good, they must be accepted, +notwithstanding the fact that extensive classes of marvels +have been accepted by mankind on testimony wholly +insufficient to establish their truth. If the evidence +fails, they must be regarded as the result of the abnormal +exercise of faculties which yet have a legitimate +place in our mental constitution. +</p> + +<p> +Nothing is more common than the assertion that at +certain periods of history, mankind have been ignorant +that there is an order in nature; and that this ignorance +has given these faculties such unbounded play as to +render all reports of supernatural occurrences unworthy +of credit, notwithstanding any amount of evidence +which may be alleged in their favour. It is urged that, +if men are ignorant that there is an order in nature, to +such a state of mind nothing would be really supernatural; +but every event, whether supernatural or +otherwise, would be viewed as a matter of ordinary +occurrence. To this state of mind a miracle would +convey no meaning, and therefore it would be valueless +as evidence of a divine revelation. In other words, it +has been affirmed that there have been certain conditions +of mankind in which the love of the marvellous +has been so powerful, and the action of reason so weak, +as to destroy all sense of the distinction between a +natural and a supernatural occurrence. +</p> + +<p> +I reply that the Christian revelation was not +addressed to such a condition of the human mind. +On the contrary, it was made after a long course of +<pb n='322'/><anchor id='Pg322'/> +preparation for its introduction. After the whole +course of previous history, under the controlling providence +of God, had prepared the way for His Advent, +Jesus Christ appeared. The Gospel was not preached +to men in the lowest state of barbarism, but to civilized +man. What may have been the ideas of degraded +savages, at some early period of the history of our +race, it will be needless to inquire. With mankind in +such a condition we have nothing to do in the present +controversy, but with the state of thought in the +Roman Empire during the first century of our era. +This was no period of mental darkness or of boundless +credulity. In the early ages, when every phenomenon +of nature was viewed as due to the action of some +capricious god, the belief in an order of nature must +have been in a high degree vague and uncertain. But +such a state of things, whatever it might once have +been, had long since passed away. The period of +history now under consideration was one of widespread +intelligence, varying greatly in different parts of the +empire, but still one of intelligence and civilization. +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible for men to attain a degree of progress +necessary for the existence of civilization, and +still to remain ignorant that a large class of natural +occurrences follow an order which does not admit of +deviation. Civilization would be impossible unless +this were generally recognized. It is in fact founded +on its recognition. At the same time, there is a class +of phenomena which are not recognized by the ordinary +mind as following a definite order. It is within +this alone that the beliefs of current supernaturalism +exert their activity. But the supernatural occurrences +narrated in the New Testament do not belong to this +ambiguous order of events, and are therefore unaffected +by them. +</p> + +<pb n='323'/><anchor id='Pg323'/> + +<p> +There is a large class of events which civilized man +cannot help recognizing as belonging to a definite +order and sequence, and where the belief in the marvellous +exerts little or no influence. The violation of +this order he views as impossible. Thus he cannot +fail to recognize the fact that men cannot walk on the +water without support; that thousands of persons +cannot be fed by a few loaves and fishes; that diseases +never leave us instantaneously by no other agency +than that of a touch or a word; and that men who +have been actually dead have never returned to life. +No amount of the love of the marvellous has ever induced +men to consider such occurrences possible. +Whatever may have been the current supernaturalism +of the ancient world, it did not embody beliefs of this +description. This is proved by the entire course of +ancient history. Its supernaturalism is of a wholly +different order. The love of the marvellous, therefore, +has never so confounded the distinction between the +natural and the supernatural among civilized men, as +to have deprived a miracle of its significance. +</p> + +<p> +Such an assertion respecting any part of the Roman +Empire, during the century which preceded and that +which followed the Advent, would be contrary to fact. +On the contrary, certain classes of events which were +reported to have happened, were invariably believed to +have been really supernatural. They were so far from +being considered as devoid of meaning, that persons +supposed to be skilled in the art of interpreting them +were habitually consulted as to what they were intended +to denote. The only exceptions to this were +those occurrences which were supposed to have been +brought about by the art of magic. These seem to +have been viewed as in some measure due to the existence +of occult powers in nature, the results of which +<pb n='324'/><anchor id='Pg324'/> +the professors of the art had succeeded in mastering. +It may be safely affirmed that at no portion of this +period was the love of the marvellous so prevalent in +any portion of the Roman Empire as to have deprived +a real miracle of its signification. +</p> + +<p> +It follows therefore that it is impossible to lay down +any abstract rule which will save us the trouble of +investigating the evidence of miracles, because mankind +has in all ages been greatly influenced by the love +of the marvellous, and under its influence has invented +a number of occurrences which reason pronounces incredible. +The action of this principle is far from being +confined to subjects connected with religion, but extends +over the whole range of literature. While it is quite +true that, under the influence of various principles of +this description, numbers of fictions have been reported +by ancient historians, this forms a valid reason only +for rejecting those which rest on no adequate attestation. +The adoption of the other principle would render +all knowledge of the past impossible. All the faculties +of our minds admit of a legitimate and an illegitimate +use. To reject the results of the right use of our +faculties, because they are capable of a wrong one, is +absurd. +</p> + +<p> +But an opposite view may be taken of the entire +question, and one which is dictated by the principles +of reason. +</p> + +<p> +Several principles in man directly point to the +existence of the supernatural. Among these veneration +and conscience occupy a conspicuous place. These +acting in conjunction with reason constitute man a +religious being. Man alone of all living beings is +capable of religion. The principle of reverence finds +its only adequate gratification in the contemplation of +moral perfection. Moral perfection is inconceivable +<pb n='325'/><anchor id='Pg325'/> +where personality and volition are not. This principle +therefore forms the counterpart in man which is directly +correlated to the being and the perfections of a personal +God. It follows that instead of these principles +invalidating the existence of the supernatural, they +establish it. The conception of immensity is the adequate +subject-matter on which our faculty of wonder +works. The highest conception of greatness is realized +in God. In Him therefore this faculty receives its most +perfect realization. Reverence points to greatness +united with supreme moral goodness. The imperfection +of man will not satisfy it. It therefore impels man to +bow down before the throne of One who transcends +the imperfections of the created universe. If there be +a personal God, supremely good, who is the Creator +and moral Governor of the universe, nothing is more +in conformity with our highest reason than that He +should make a further manifestation of Himself to +man, in addition to that which He has made in the +material universe. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='326'/><anchor id='Pg326'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XV. Our Summary Rejection Of Current Supernaturalism +Considered In Its Bearing On The Evidence For +Miracles.</head> + +<p> +There can be no doubt that there is an enormous +mass of supernatural beliefs which we feel at once +justified in rejecting without troubling ourselves to +inquire into the evidence on which they rest. Others +also we reject because on investigation we find them +altogether destitute of evidence. Others again which +rest on evidence which would be sufficient to establish +an ordinary fact, we reject notwithstanding this attestation, +on the ground of their inherent improbability. +It has been objected that our summary rejection +of the great mass of current supernaturalism +puts the case of miracles out of court, and renders +them so improbable, that it is unnecessary minutely to +examine the evidence which can be adduced in support +of them. I propose therefore in this chapter to consider +the reasons for our summary rejection of the +great mass of current supernaturalism, and its bearing +on the credibility of the miracles in the New Testament. +</p> + +<p> +First: I observe that the stories of current supernaturalism +are not the only ones which we reject in a +summary manner. We treat in the same way a great +number of other stories which offend against the principles +of common sense. It is clear that in these latter +<pb n='327'/><anchor id='Pg327'/> +cases, we do not reject them merely because they are +supernatural, but because they are generally incredible. +The fact therefore that we thus reject a number of +absurd narratives without inquiry into the evidence on +which they rest, cannot be urged as a reason for rejecting +other occurrences which are not involved in +any such absurdity. If the principle is valid against +miracles, it must be equally so against other extensive +classes of facts. To assert that miracles are thus +absurd or ridiculous is to assume the point which ought +to be proved. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly: We reject the great mass of current +supernaturalism because it is unable to assign any +adequate reason for its existence. When it is alleged +that a miracle has been performed as an attestation of +a revelation, if it forms a necessary portion of such +attestation, this is an adequate reason for the miracle. +But the great mass of current supernaturalism is utterly +unable to assign any reason for its existence; or if +reasons have been given, they are quite inadequate. +Of this the case of magic is an example. If it were a +reality, it would not only interfere with the order of +nature, but no reason could be given for this interference. +If, on the other hand, its phenomena were +alleged to be due to secret forces in nature, then they +would belong to an order of grotesque and monstrous +phenomena, which we are justified at once in refusing +to believe to be due to the action of intelligence or +goodness; and on the supposition that there is a moral +Governor of the universe, it is utterly incredible that +they would occur either by his agency or with his +permission. +</p> + +<p> +Perhaps the best attested occurrences of current +supernaturalism are the phenomena of spiritualism. +It will tend to the illustration of this subject, if we +<pb n='328'/><anchor id='Pg328'/> +consider the grounds on which we reject a large portion +of its reported phenomena quite irrespectively of the +evidence produced in favour of their reality, and ascribe +the belief in them to the effect of an excited imagination, +and in some cases to imposture. In considering +this subject, it is not necessary to examine whether +the phenomena alleged by spiritualists, if true, would +be really supernatural, or belong to an order of nature +hitherto unknown. +</p> + +<p> +Many of the manifestations of spiritualism possess +a grotesqueness which we see in no other class of +natural phenomena. If they are alleged to be the +results of the action of natural forces previously +unknown, then they must belong to a class of forces +which contrast in a most remarkable degree with all +known ones; that is to say, the known and the unknown +forces of nature must be utterly out of harmony +with one another. I am now speaking on the supposition +that such forces are merely natural ones, not under +the guidance of intelligence. In that case they must +have been always in existence, only latent; yet they +now for the first time manifest themselves under very +special circumstances and conditions, such as are highly +favourable to the existence of delusion. The abnormal +character of these phenomena, so entirely at variance +with the known order of nature, forms the strongest +ground for the conviction that they cannot be the +results of the action of unknown natural forces. It +would require an overwhelming amount of evidence to +convince us that these two sets of natural forces, distinguishable +by the strongest possible contrasts, (viz. +those which produce the visible phenomena of nature, +and those which produce another class, intermittent +in their action, of which grotesqueness and monstrosity +are the most striking characteristics, and which +<pb n='329'/><anchor id='Pg329'/> +only manifest their existence under circumstances calculated +to throw a suspicion on their reality), can be +the results of the action of forces which have been +present in nature during all past time. +</p> + +<p> +But further: these phenomena, if natural, must belong +to an order of nature which is not only unlike +the visible order, but would throw its action into confusion. +I am here reasoning on the supposition that +the moral order of the universe is due to the action of +nothing but physical forces. If this be so, it must +form a portion of the existing order of nature. But +the forces which, on the supposition of the truth of +spiritualism, must be capable of being brought into +activity, would interrupt that moral order of which we +are actually conscious. Their action, if real, would +interrupt the entire course of the moral world. No +man would be safe from their intrusion. Even in +our deepest retirement we should never be free from +the invasion of their prying curiosity. Such a power +would be incompatible with the moral order of society. +It follows, therefore, that an unknown order of nature, +presenting the most violent contrast to the visible +one, whose phenomena do not follow an invariable +but an intermittent law, and are only alleged +to manifest themselves under conditions favourable +to imposture, possesses such a degree of inherent +improbability as to justify its rejection, even by those +who recognise the action of none but material forces +in the universe. +</p> + +<p> +But to those who recognise the present order of +nature as due to the action of a wise and intelligent +Creator, it becomes absolutely incredible that forces +such as the phenomena of spiritualism require for their +production, can form a portion of that order which He +<pb n='330'/><anchor id='Pg330'/> +has created, as they contradict every conception which +we can rationally form of his character. +</p> + +<p> +But if these phenomena are viewed as due to the +action of supernatural agency, the reality of their +occurrence becomes still more inconceivable. If +such agency is capable of being exerted, we can +only conceive that its exertion is permitted for the +realization of some known end. Yet the phenomena +of spiritualism serve no purpose whatever. Spiritualists +have been holding their <foreign rend='italic'>séances</foreign> for many years; but +no one practical result has yet been realized by them. +The spirits of the departed have been invoked, but +they have never yet given a single useful response. +Surely if there be a spirit world, its occupations +cannot be the production of the abnormal, the mean +and the grotesque. Its employments must possess +some pretensions to be esteemed dignified. It has +been alleged that such manifestations help to convince +the incredulous of the reality of the immortality of +man. On the contrary, the idea that spirits can be +guilty of such phantastic tricks can only help to throw +discredit on the doctrine. It follows, therefore, that +if the phenomena of spiritualism are viewed as due to +supernatural causes, it is utterly incredible either that +the Governor of the Universe would permit such a +course of action, or that the spirits themselves, unless +deprived of reason, would exhibit themselves in such a +variety of phantastic forms, and for no other apparent +purpose than to effect a number of capricious interferences +with the visible order of nature. This incredibility +is so great as to entitle us summarily to reject +the idea that the reputed phenomena can be actual +occurrences. In addition to this, the alleged manifestations +are made under circumstances pre-eminently +suited to excite suspicion. +</p> + +<pb n='331'/><anchor id='Pg331'/> + +<p> +The phenomena of modern spiritualism are a fair +illustration of the general character of the current +supernaturalism of the ancient world. It was for the +most part equally senseless and absurd. The attestation +to its actual occurrence was of a very inferior +character to that which can be urged in favour of the +alleged facts of spiritualism. I have merely taken +notice of these latter as an illustration of the general +aspect of the phenomena of current supernaturalism, +and as placing before us the reasons which fully justify +us in rejecting a large portion of it without minutely +inquiring into its evidence. +</p> + +<p> +I will now proceed to contrast the entire mass of +current supernaturalism with the miracles of the New +Testament for the purpose of still further illustrating +the grounds on which we reject it, while we claim for +the latter that their reality must be tested by the evidence +which can be adduced in favour of their actual +occurrence. +</p> + +<p> +Let me again draw attention to the fact that the +only correct conception of a miracle in connection with +this controversy, is that of an event wrought in external +nature with a definite moral aim and purpose. +Extraordinary events, to which no such moral aim and +purpose can be assigned, may be unusual occurrences, +but are in no proper sense of the words evidential +miracles. An isolated occurrence of an extraordinary +nature, and an event marked with a definite moral +purpose, are two wholly different things. The one may +be credible, and the other wholly incredible. We habitually +recognise the distinction in ordinary life, and it +entirely affects our judgment of the probability of an +event. We esteem the action of a particular person +quite credible under one set of circumstances, which +we should reject as incredible under another. Thus +<pb n='332'/><anchor id='Pg332'/> +if we were informed that a friend with whom we were +intimately acquainted, had precipitated himself from a +height into the water, supposing him to be sane, we +should not believe it. But if we received the information +that he had done it to save a person from drowning, +and we knew that he was a man of courage, we should +accept the fact without the smallest hesitation. On +this account, therefore, the moral aspect of the alleged +miracle is of the utmost importance; and it is +necessary for its correct conception that it should +not only be an extraordinary occurrence in external +nature, but that it should take place at the bidding of +another, and in order to render it credible, that it +should be calculated to effectuate some definite moral +purpose. +</p> + +<p> +Alleged supernatural events, which are destitute of +these accompaniments, are always liable to a very high +degree of <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> suspicion. In fact it would be difficult +to prove them to be supernatural. All that could be +affirmed respecting them would be that they were very +unusual occurrences, which it was impossible to account +for by the action of any known force. If the universe +is under the government of God, all supernatural action +must either be the result of His agency or permission. +If He interferes with the order of occurrences, it is +evident that such interference cannot be capricious, but +must have a definite purpose. We are justified, therefore, +in refusing to accept occurrences as supernatural, +which are destitute of all appearance of purpose in their +performance. +</p> + +<p> +But further: the alleged miracle must be consistent +with the character of God, before it is possible to +attribute it to Him as wrought by His direct agency. +This rests on the same principle on which we refuse to +<pb n='333'/><anchor id='Pg333'/> +credit the reports of actions performed by men which +are contradictory to their well known characters. But +this is far more certain with respect to God than it can +be of man. Human characters can at best be but +imperfectly known, and there are unseen depths in the +human heart which sometimes render actions possible, +which stand in striking contrast to the general character +of the agents. To state the truth generally, as it is +impossible that man can act in opposition to the inmost +principles of his moral being, so in a far higher degree +is it impossible that God can contradict the perfections +of His moral nature. This being so, it follows that +we are entitled to reject all miracles alleged to have been +wrought by God, which are contrary to His moral +attributes; all which are low, mean, or grotesque, and +unfitted to realize an elevated moral purpose. +</p> + +<p> +It will here be objected that if these positions are +true, demoniacal miracles are rendered impossible. I +have already pointed out that if demoniacal supernaturalism +is affirmed in the New Testament to be an actuality, +its action is described as being limited to the human +mind, and that whatever permitted activity is conceded +to it, always bears the most distinctive marks of being +from beneath. There is no possibility of mistaking between +such supernatural occurrences and the miracles +of God. +</p> + +<p> +Such then are our general principles, the truth of +which can hardly be contested. If they are true, the +great mass of current supernaturalism is worthy of +rejection for the following reasons. +</p> + +<p> +1. While it claims to be the result of supernatural +agency, it is destitute of all definite moral purpose, and +such moral impress as it bears is mean and degraded. +What end, I ask, was it designed to serve? It involved +an almost continual interference with the order of +<pb n='334'/><anchor id='Pg334'/> +nature; or if at times it claimed to be due to occult +forces, they were only suited to confound the visible +order of the universe. I am reasoning on the supposition +that there is a God who rules the world. +This being so, it is impossible to conceive that such a +mode of acting can be His. Under this head of supernaturalism +fall all the monstrous and the grotesque, and +the entire range of magical phenomena. +</p> + +<p> +2. The whole range of ancient supernaturalism is in +contradiction to everything which we can conceive of +the moral character of God. Let us take as an +illustration the phenomena of Soothsaying. Who +can believe that God employed the entrails of slaughtered +beasts as the means of revealing the future? or +that it was consistent with his character to manifest +his will through a multitude of monstrous portents? +There is perhaps not a single occurrence of ancient +supernaturalism which does not offend against our +primary conception of the Divine character; and, +therefore, the whole is worthy of summary rejection. +</p> + +<p> +3. Ancient supernaturalism assigned its occurrences +to no cause adequate to produce them. Those who +asserted its reality, referred it to the action of deities +who possessed very limited power, or to occult powers +in nature. Such occult powers we now know to have +no existence, and the power attributed to the supposed +deities was far too limited to be capable of producing +the results in question. All reputed events, the alleged +cause of which is unable to produce them, we are entitled +to reject without further investigation. +</p> + +<p> +4. A large amount of ancient supernaturalism rested +on no evidence whatever. Of those portions for which +any reasons were alleged, the evidence itself was +of a character exactly suited to discredit it. Of this +kind was the whole of the supernaturalism connected +<pb n='335'/><anchor id='Pg335'/> +with the state religions. These were in the hands of +men who used them for the purpose of acting on the +vulgar, and who therefore readily accepted the report +of anything, however incredible, which could subserve +their end. Other portions were palpable impostures +worked for the basest and most selfish purposes. A +very brief acquaintance with the nature of the evidence +on which it rests is sufficient to justify us in rejecting +it without entering on any inquiry as to its details. +</p> + +<p> +Such being the general character of ancient supernaturalism, +it is absurd to argue that its existence is a +reason for rejecting along with it another order of +supernaturalism, which stands contrasted with it in +every particular. We might as well urge the existence +of a vast number of counterfeits as a reason for +rejecting everything which is genuine. We do not +reject it because it is supernatural, but because it is +utterly incredible. A statement of a few particulars +will exhibit the contrast between it and the supernaturalism +of the New Testament in a striking point +of view. +</p> + +<p> +1. Christian supernaturalism alleges that its occurrences +are the result of the action of a force which, if +present, is certainly adequate to produce them. Ancient +supernaturalism alleges no cause whatever, or one +wholly inadequate. +</p> + +<p> +2. Christian supernaturalism alleges a perfectly adequate +purpose for its production; that purpose being +the attestation of the divine mission of Jesus. Ancient +supernaturalism alleges either no purpose at all, or a +degraded one. +</p> + +<p> +3. Christian supernaturalism is made to centre around +the greatest and most exalted character that has ever +appeared in history. Ancient supernaturalism, instead +of being connected with the most eminent characters +<pb n='336'/><anchor id='Pg336'/> +of the times, directly connects itself with the most +questionable. +</p> + +<p> +4. Christian supernaturalism is stamped throughout +with a high moral character and aspect. This is wholly +wanting in the supernaturalism of the ancient world. +</p> + +<p> +5. Christian supernaturalism belongs to an elevated +order and type; the objects realized by it were for the +most part benevolent. The mode of its action was +dignified and the effects produced by it were instantaneous, +following directly on the word of the agent. +The mode in which its miracles were performed is +characterized by the utmost simplicity, destitute alike +of anything scenic or fantastic, entirely in harmony +with the great character who performed them. The +supernaturalism of the ancient world is marked by the +opposite characteristics. +</p> + +<p> +6. Christian supernaturalism, or to speak more correctly, +the greatest supernatural occurrence which +Christianity records, namely the Resurrection of Christ, +has not only left a mighty impression on history, but +has created a civilization of its own which embraces all +the progressive nations of the world, and exerts a +powerful influence even on those who deny its truth. +The only result wrought by the supernaturalism of the +ancient world was the moral degradation of those +among whom it prevailed. +</p> + +<p> +7. The supernaturalism of Christianity rests on an +attestation which even unbelievers would allow to be +quite sufficient to establish the truth of any ordinary +facts. The other rests either on no testimony at all, or +on one which is open to the gravest suspicion. +</p> + +<p> +Such are some of the striking contrasts which distinguish +the supernaturalism of the New Testament +from that of the ancient world. When two series of +events present such opposite features, it is the duty of +<pb n='337'/><anchor id='Pg337'/> +a sound philosophy to trace these distinctions to their +causes, and to show what is the nature of the forces +which have impressed on each series its own peculiar +characteristics. Instead of this, however, we are invited +to pronounce both alike incredible; that is to say, +because one series of events is deeply impressed with +characteristics which render them incredible, we are +invited to pronounce a similar condemnation on another +series, which is distinguished by the most opposite +features, and which has only this point in common +with the former, that both belong to an order of events +which we designate as supernatural. Nothing can be +more unphilosophical than such a mode of reasoning. +We reject the one series in a mass, not because the +events which it contains are supernatural, but because +they are absolutely incredible. A similar rule +we apply to ordinary, no less than supernatural occurrences. +</p> + +<p> +But it will doubtless be objected that there is another +series of supernatural occurrences which rational men, +with a few exceptions, greet with an equally summary +rejection, viz. the long series of ecclesiastical miracles +which extends in an almost unbroken succession from +the second century of our era nearly to the present day. +These, it has been urged, are alleged to have been +wrought in attestation of Christianity, and bear some +remarkable analogy, as facts wrought in external +nature, to the miracles recorded in the Gospels. It is +argued that if we reject the one, we are for the same +reason bound to reject the others. +</p> + +<p> +The following points may be considered as admitted. +</p> + +<p> +First; That every century from the second downwards +has been characterized by a considerable amount +of pretension to the possession of supernatural power; +<pb n='338'/><anchor id='Pg338'/> +and during this period one section of the Christian +Church claims to have actually wrought miracles. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly; Several of these miracles, viewed merely +as phenomena in outward nature, are precisely similar +to those recorded in the New Testament. +</p> + +<p> +Thirdly; When a miracle is alleged to have been +performed at the present day, as has recently been the +case in a neighbouring country, not only all unbelievers +in the possibility of supernatural occurrences, but also +all rational Christians concur in its summary rejection, +not merely on the ground that the evidence is insufficient, +but that the event is in itself incredible. +</p> + +<p> +Fourthly; That rational men reject in a similar +manner and for similar reasons the great mass of ecclesiastical +miracles as unworthy of serious inquiry into +their attestation. +</p> + +<p> +With respect to the second point, I have already +observed that if we view miracles merely as phenomena +in external nature, and if a similar belief in a current +supernaturalism, which we have seen to be one of the +phenomena of human nature, prevailed in the Church, +it was to be expected that the current forms of ecclesiastical +supernaturalism would adopt those of the New +Testament for their basis, and consequently that it would +abound in narratives of resurrections from the dead +and the cures of various diseases. This is actually the +case. It may also not only excite our wonder that +the model was not far more exactly copied, but that +ecclesiastical, and especially monkish miracles, which +constitute an overwhelming majority of the miracles of +Church history, abound so largely in features which +stand in such marked contrast to the miracles of the +New Testament, their peculiar characteristics being the +same as those of ancient supernaturalism, viz. the +<pb n='339'/><anchor id='Pg339'/> +monstrous and the grotesque. This point is one which +demands the serious consideration of unbelievers; for +if, as they aver, they are both due to the action of the +same causes, this diversity requires to be accounted for. +The truth is, that with the exception that both series +contain reports of miracles which are similar or mere +objective occurrences, in other respects their characteristics +differ widely. +</p> + +<p> +With respect to the fact that rational men concur in +the rejection of modern miracles, it should be observed +that this is not because all supernatural events are +believed to be incredible; but because the reputed +events themselves possess characteristics which excite +in us the gravest suspicions of their truth; and especially +because by far the greatest number of them are +well known not to have originated in mere credulity, +but in actual imposture. Men or communities who +have once lent themselves to the deliberate coining of +miracles, are of blasted reputations, and whenever +marvellous occurrences are reported by such persons, +we are justified in rejecting them without further +inquiry. It is evident that these are the grounds on +which such stories are rejected, and not simply because +they are supernatural, since those who believe in the +supernaturalism of the New Testament concur with +those who disbelieve in it, in thus rejecting them. +</p> + +<p> +I must now briefly consider the general grounds on +which we reject the great mass of ecclesiastical miracles, +while we accept those in the Gospels as actual occurrences. +</p> + +<p> +The general ground of our rejection of them is +precisely the same as that on which we reject the +supernaturalism of the ancient world. The only thing +which distinguishes them from the latter, is that they +<pb n='340'/><anchor id='Pg340'/> +contain a number of events which viewed as bare facts +are similar to those recorded in the Gospels. In +every other respect the contrast is complete. I shall +only draw attention to a few considerations which might +otherwise escape the notice of the reader. +</p> + +<p> +The ecclesiastical miracles were not wrought in +attestation that the person working them had a divine +commission, but that a divine power permanently abode +in the Church. The qualification which was thought +necessary for the exhibition of this power was the +possession of a great degree of reputed sanctity. The +exercise of miraculous power was supposed to prove, +not that its possessor had a divine commission, but +that he was a saint. The saint was supposed to have +in himself some inherent power of working miracles, +bearing a considerable analogy to that which the woman +with the issue of blood believed to be possessed by our +Lord. A miraculous power in the shape of a virtue +issued from the saint. Hence the supernatural power +which was ascribed to dead men's bones and to relics. +Such a supernatural power is devoid of everything +which presupposes a divine purpose, and of all evidential +value. Its frequency would destroy the nature of a +miracle as an attestation of a divine commission, and +involve an interference with the order of nature, which +would destroy the sense of its regularity, the knowledge +of which is so essential to our well being, as well as to +the conception of a miracle. Moreover, the supernatural +agency is not supposed to be due to the direct intervention +of God, but to some imaginary virtue residing +in man. +</p> + +<p> +The ecclesiastical miracles of which we have anything +like a detailed account, when they are not simply regarded +as due to the direct sanctity of the person +<pb n='341'/><anchor id='Pg341'/> +performing them, are never alleged to be performed in +proof of a divine commission; but when they are +asserted to have been evidential, they are affirmed to +have been wrought in proof of some doctrine, or in +favour of some particular party in the Church; or, what +invests them with a still greater degree of suspicion, +in favour of the power of a particular order. The last +class of alleged miracles may at once be dismissed as +due to simple imposture. The first are strongly contrasted +with those of the New Testament, where we +cannot find the account of a single miracle wrought in +attestation of a doctrine, the one or two apparent +exceptions being really performed to attest a divine +commission. But when a miracle is wrought to prove an +irrational doctrine, the credibility of the miracle perishes +with the truth of the doctrine. We are, therefore, +justified in rejecting the miracles whenever we have +sufficient evidence that the doctrines which they +were alleged to attest are untrue. Again: whenever +a particular party alleges a divine attestation in its +favour, its character may be known by its works. +The parties in the Church who have claimed such +miraculous attestation, have proved by their actions +that the idea of a divine interference in their favour is +incredible, as being inconsistent with the divine +character. +</p> + +<p> +It is perfectly true that at the present day all rational +men, with few exceptions, concur in rejecting almost +the entire mass of ecclesiastical miracles. They do this, +however, not because they believe miracles to be +impossible, but because they are persuaded that God +will not work one on a light or trivial occasion, and +because the great mass of such pretended miracles are +characterised by marks which are inconsistent with the +<pb n='342'/><anchor id='Pg342'/> +idea that they have been wrought by God. With our +larger acquaintance with the order of nature, we no +longer believe that it is possible for miracles to be +wrought by any inherent virtue in things themselves, +but that if performed at all, it can only be by the direct +agency or permission of the Author of Nature. In a +word, the general incredibility of the ecclesiastical +miracles, and their repugnance to our conception of the +mode of the divine acting is the reason why we reject +them altogether. +</p> + +<p> +It is also unquestionably true that at the present day +a great majority even of religious persons would receive +with no little incredulity the report of a miracle, while +such incredulity would not have existed at a former +period. This is due to two causes: first, our increased +knowledge of the permanence of the forces of material +Nature; and secondly, our belief that supernatural +occurrences can only take place by the direct agency +and permission of God, and not by means of my supernatural +power inherent in particular persons. From +this we draw the inference that almost all the alleged +ecclesiastical miracles must be rejected as inconsistent +with the divine character. We are of opinion, therefore, +that a miracle wrought for any other purpose than +the attestation of a revelation is not credible; and as +from the nature of the case revelations must be rare, we +summarily reject all reports of supernatural occurrences +as impostures, or the offspring of a heated and undisciplined +imagination. +</p> + +<p> +Now although this is generally the case, yet it is +unquestionable that if a miracle was reported to us +with a pre-eminently strong attestation, no rational +person would refuse to give a serious consideration +to the evidence merely because the event was +<pb n='343'/><anchor id='Pg343'/> +supernatural. A reported miracle would doubtless be +attended with no inconsiderable degree of antecedent +improbability; but if a man with whom we were intimately +acquainted, of sound intellect, and high moral +character were to allege that he had performed an act +which, if real, must have been indisputably miraculous, +it would be altogether irrational to reject his assertion +summarily as unworthy of consideration merely because +in all ages miraculous stories have been extensively +believed. The application of such a principle would +lead us into the grossest error. +</p> + +<p> +This question has a very important bearing on the +subject before us. It has been alleged that while +nothing has been more common than the ascription of +miracles to eminent men, it is impossible to find a man +of sound judgment and high moral character who has +deliberately affirmed that he has performed one himself. +That such affirmations have been very rare is certain, +and for the simple reason, that miracles have been +very rare occurrences. But the assertion that no such +cases are to be found is inaccurate. One, at all events, +exists, although probably the only one, but it is that of +a man of the most undoubted veracity, the Apostle +Paul. As I have already observed, four of the most +important writings which have been attributed to him +are admitted by a vast majority of those unbelievers +who are competent to form an opinion on the subject, +to be his genuine productions. These are before us, +and we can form from them a full judgment as to the +character of the man. In them he distinctly tells us +that he performed miracles. He writes: <q>I have +therefore whereof I may glory in those things which +pertain to God. For I will not dare to speak of any of +those things which Christ hath not wrought by me to +<pb n='344'/><anchor id='Pg344'/> +make the Gentiles obedient by word and deed, through +mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit +of God; so that from Jerusalem, and round about unto +Illyricum, I have fully preached the Gospel of Christ.</q> +(Rom. xv. 18, 19.) Here at least we have a direct +affirmation on the subject. It is not the only one made +by him. But there is also one which is equivalent +to another affirmation made by One whom unbelievers +must admit to have been the greatest man who ever +lived, Jesus Christ Himself. Those with whom I am +reasoning allow that the discourses in the Synoptic +Gospels are accounts of His real utterances. In them +He directly affirms that He performed miracles. +</p> + +<p> +Even those against whose opinions I am arguing, +will concede that the characters of Christ and St. Paul +stand at the greatest height of moral elevation. If +there are any other persons whose utterances have +been handed down to us, who have deliberately made +this affirmation, their numbers are unquestionably few. +Certainly no other thoroughly great and elevated character +has done so. This is a remarkable fact and well +worthy of consideration. While many of the Fathers +have affirmed that miracles were performed by others, +not one of them has affirmed that he has wrought +any himself. The supernaturalism of the New Testament +differs, as we have seen, from all other alleged +kinds of supernatural occurrences. It differs moreover +in this respect, that one of the persons through +whose agency these miracles are declared to have been +performed, has made a deliberate affirmation that he +wrought them; and that the founder of Christianity, +in recorded utterances which are admitted to be +genuine, has likewise asserted that miracles were +wrought by Him. +</p> + +<pb n='345'/><anchor id='Pg345'/> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that our summary rejection of +all the current supernaturalism which has been alleged +to have taken place at various periods of history, is +quite consistent with our accepting as true the series of +supernatural events recorded in the New Testament, +which are distinguished by characteristics of an entirely +different order. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='346'/><anchor id='Pg346'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XVI. General Objections To Miracles As Credentials Of A +Revelation.</head> + +<p> +While considering this subject, it will be necessary +to keep steadily in view that miracles are not alleged +in the New Testament to have been performed to prove +the truth of doctrines, but that a particular person possesses +a divine commission; or in attestation of particular +facts, such as the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. +</p> + +<p> +The truth of a divine commission being established, +it follows that the divinely-appointed messenger must +have some message to communicate. We further infer +that God will not intrust a message to any person +whom He has not previously fully enlightened as to the +subject which he has to communicate, and who would +not truthfully communicate the message with which he +is intrusted. A miracle is therefore not only an attestation +to the divine commission of the person performing +one, but also to the adequate information and +veracity of the messenger. Although a miracle is not +wrought to prove the truth of a particular doctrine, +but that a particular person is intrusted with a divine +commission, we accept a doctrinal statement as true, +when made by a messenger thus attested, within the +limits of the message with which he affirms himself to +be intrusted, on the ground that such a messenger +must both be truthful, and possess adequate knowledge. +<pb n='347'/><anchor id='Pg347'/> +In other words, our belief in the doctrinal statement +does not rest on the miracle, but on the veracity of God. +</p> + +<p> +This is the affirmation made in the New Testament +respecting the most important class of the miracles +which it records. As I have elsewhere observed, not a +single instance occurs in it of a miracle wrought for the +purpose of proving that a doctrine is true. Our Lord's +distinct affirmation is, <q>The same works that I do, +bear witness of me that the Father hath sent me.</q> +(John v. 36.) <q>If I say the truth, why do ye not +believe me?</q> (John viii. 46.) The miracles which +are alleged to have been performed by the Apostles for +directly evidential purposes, were wrought in proof of +the Resurrection of Christ, and of their own divine +commission, which directly depended on it. +</p> + +<p> +Let it also be observed that it by no means follows +that every miracle recorded in the New Testament was +performed exclusively for evidential purposes. This +point I shall consider hereafter. +</p> + +<p> +If these principles are correct, they will at once +dispose of two objections which are alleged against +miracles: first, that they cannot prove a doctrine; and +secondly, that they cannot prove a moral truth. I +fully accept the statement that moral truths cannot be +proved by the evidence of miracles, but must rest on +their own inherent evidence; and that all positive +duties rest on the command of God, to whom we feel, on +other grounds, that all love, reverence, and adoration +are due. The truth of doctrines also cannot be established +by the performance of a miracle; but when +we accept them on external authority, they rest on +the testimony of God, and our full persuasion that +He must be in possession of all truth. Although, +therefore, I accept as correct these principles, on +which the objection is founded, they have no bearing +<pb n='348'/><anchor id='Pg348'/> +on the point at issue; for the New Testament nowhere +affirms that its miracles were wrought to prove either +doctrinal statements or moral truths, but facts. +</p> + +<p> +1. It is objected that the prevalence of supernatural +beliefs renders the existence of miracles <q>so hackneyed +as scarcely to attract the notice of the nation to whom +the Christian revelation was in the first instance +addressed.</q> (<hi rend='italic'>Supernatural Religion.</hi>) +</p> + +<p> +I reply that this objection contains two inaccuracies. +First, it is not true that the miracles of Jesus scarcely +attracted the notice of those among whom they were performed. +The only authority on this point is the New +Testament itself, and this assertion contradicts its express +statements. Numerous passages in the Gospels directly +affirm that the miracles of our Lord attracted very +general attention, and produced a profound astonishment; +and that those who had witnessed them considered +that there was a wide distinction between them +and the miraculous pretensions then current. His +fame is represented as having been spread by them in +regions beyond Palestine; and great multitudes are +stated to have collected, both for the purpose of hearing +Him and of being healed of their diseases. The fourth +Gospel represents our Lord as rebuking the multitudes, +for attending on Him for sordid purposes. It is quite +true, that notwithstanding the miracles, the body of +the Jewish nation ultimately rejected Christianity, +though the epistles bear witness that the Jewish element +which was attracted into the Christian Church was +large. The assertion, therefore, is simply contrary to +fact, that miracles were in those days so common and +hackneyed as to attract little or no attention to him +who professed to work them. +</p> + +<p> +Equally inaccurate is the assertion that the evidence +of miracles as the attestation to a revelation was a +<pb n='349'/><anchor id='Pg349'/> +<q>hackneyed</q> one. The Old Testament professed to +rest on miraculous evidence. This being the case, the +Jews were fully entitled to expect that if God made a +further revelation of His will, it would be accompanied +by a miraculous attestation. But Judaism was the +only religion of the ancient world which professed to +be founded on the evidence of miracles. A belief in a +current supernaturalism was no doubt mixed up with +the ancient religions, but its wonders were not alleged +to have been wrought in attestation of the fact that +they were revelations, nor even as attestations to their +truth. The religion of the Greeks possessed both +priests and prophets; but they performed no miracles in +attestation of a divine commission. The only attestation +of this kind which they claimed was the utterance +of obscure or mendacious oracles. I am not +aware that anyone who pretended to be a revealer of +the divine will in ancient times ever professed to perform +visible and palpable miracles in proof of his +assertions. Similar is the position of the old religions +which still exist in the modern world. Many of them +abound in stories of the most fantastic manifestations +of their gods in ancient times. Their votaries believe +in the efficacy of magic, charms, and incantations. But +none of these things have been affirmed to have been +wrought in attestation of a divine commission. Mahometanism +claims, in the strictest sense, to be a divine +revelation; yet the Koran even offers apologies for the +fact that its founder wrought no miracles in attestation +of his claim to be a divine messenger. So far therefore +is it from being the fact that miracles are so generally +alleged by religions in vindication of their claim to be +revelations, that Judaism and Christianity are absolutely +unique in this respect. The idea of working a miracle +in attestation of a divine commission is so far from +<pb n='350'/><anchor id='Pg350'/> +being a <q>hackneyed</q> one, that it has the strongest +claims to originality. +</p> + +<p> +2. It is urged by the same writer that <q>every marvel +and every narrative of supernatural interference seemed +a matter of course to the superstitious credulity of the +age. However much miracles are the exception to the +order of nature, they have always been the rule in +the history of ignorance. In fact the excess of belief in +them throughout many centuries of darkness, is almost +fatal to their claims to credence now. They have been +limited to periods of ignorance and superstition, and +are unknown to ages of enlightenment. The Christian +miracles are rendered almost as suspicious from their +place in a long series of similar occurrences, as they are +by their being exceptions to the sequence of natural +phenomena. It would be extraordinary if cycles of +miracles occurring before and since those of the Gospels, +and in connection with every religion, could be +repudiated as fables, and these alone maintained as +genuine.</q> +</p> + +<p> +The principles which I have laid down in a former +chapter fully meet the chief points raised in these +objections. A few additional observations on them, +therefore, are all that will be necessary. +</p> + +<p> +First: the assertion that every marvel or narrative +of supernatural interference seemed a matter of course +to the superstitious credulity of the age, is inaccurate. +If they had been of habitual or constant occurrence, +they would have ceased to be marvels at all. In such +a case the trade of the impostor would have gone, for +it would not have paid him. The entire plausibility +of such reasonings arises from confounding under a +common name phenomena wholly different in character. +I ask emphatically, did the current supernaturalism of +any age or nation accept as matters of course such +<pb n='351'/><anchor id='Pg351'/> +events as the resurrection of Christ, or the cure of a +blind man, or a man full of leprosy, by a word or a +touch? Have not heathen writers pronounced actual +resurrections from the dead to be impossibilities? +Were such occurrences ever believed to be within the +power of magic to effect? Belief in the possibility of +such occurrences became current only under the influence +of Christianity. +</p> + +<p> +2. It is not correct to assert that the belief in miracles +has been confined to ages of ignorance. Will it be +affirmed that the most flourishing period of Grecian +literature was an age of ignorance? Yet a belief in a +current supernaturalism prevailed in it. Was the +Augustan age an age of ignorance? Both ages were +ignorant of physical science: but during few periods +has the human intellect been equally active. Each age +contained men endowed with common sense sufficient +to make them adequate judges whether the supernatural +occurrences above referred to were possible or not. +</p> + +<p> +3. It is inaccurate to affirm that the Christian miracles +are interposed between two similar series of supernatural +occurrences. There is only one point in common +between them; the claim to be supernatural. As I +have proved, in every other respect they are strongly +contrasted. It is, therefore, by no means extraordinary +that a series of supernatural occurrences, which have +the highest moral impress, and possess other distinguishing +characteristics, should be true; and that the +others, one of which took place before and the other +after that in question, and which are stamped with the +very opposite characteristics, should be false. +</p> + +<p> +The same author adduces the following objections, +as lying at the root of miraculous testimony to a revelation: +<q>Surely supernatural evidence of so common +and prodigal a nature betrays great want of force +<pb n='352'/><anchor id='Pg352'/> +and divine originality. How could that be considered +as special evidence for a new revelation, which was +already so well known to all the world, and which was +scattered broadcast over so many centuries, as well as +successfully simulated by Satan.</q> Again: <q>Instead +of a few evidential miracles taking place at one epoch +of history, and filling the world with surprise at such +novel and exceptional phenomena, we find miracles +represented as taking place in all ages and in all +countries. The Gospel miracles are set in the midst of +a series of similar wonders which commenced many +centuries before the dawn of Christianity, and continued +without interruption fifteen centuries after it. No divine +originality characterized the evidence selected to accredit +the divine revelation.</q> (P. 192.) +</p> + +<p> +I reply, First: It behoves those who except against +the plan of attesting a divine revelation by miracles, +to inform us in what other way it is possible that the +truth of a divine commission can be attested. It is +doubtless possible for God to make a special revelation +of His will to each individual man; yet even this would +involve supernatural agency of some kind; and it is +very questionable whether to do so would be consistent +with the plan of God's moral government which comes +under our actual observation. But the Christian revelation +is founded on the idea of making a divine +manifestation additional to, and of a different order +from, that which is made by the created universe; and +not simply of imparting so much additional information +to each individual. This manifestation professes +to be made by the Incarnation. How, I ask, was such +a manifestation to be made except by a supernatural +action of some kind? It is clear, therefore, that every +manifestation of God differing from that made by the +ordinary forces of nature, or by the moral nature of +<pb n='353'/><anchor id='Pg353'/> +man, must be supernatural. There can be no doubt as +to the means which must be employed. The only question +which can be raised is one which I have considered +elsewhere, namely: whether it is the purpose of God +to make such a manifestation of Himself. +</p> + +<p> +It will be objected that such a manifestation might +have been made self-evident to the moral nature of man, +and consequently it would have required no additional +attestation. To this I reply that, on the supposition +that it is God's purpose to make such an additional +manifestation of Himself, He must be allowed to be the +only adequate judge of the right mode of accomplishing +it. +</p> + +<p> +But even if a revelation involved no such manifestation +of God, but only a communication of truth to +man, it is incumbent on those who object to its +attestation by miracles, to find some other method by +which the reality of a divine commission could be +attested, and to show that this mode would be preferable +to an attestation by miracles. +</p> + +<p> +But further: if we regard a miracle as a supernatural +occurrence wrought in attestation of a divine commission, +which is the unquestionable aspect of a considerable +number of those recorded in the New Testament, the +fact that there was a wide-spread belief in the existence +of supernatural events is far from interfering with its +efficacy. What did the current beliefs imply? That +there existed beings, other than the blind forces of +nature, who interfered in human affairs; and that they +were in some way or other capable of communicating +with man. What is the very conception implied by a +revelation? That a God exists, who is the moral +Governor of the universe, who cares for man, and is +capable of holding communications with him. Both +conceptions rest on a common ground—the existence of +<pb n='354'/><anchor id='Pg354'/> +supernatural beings capable of manifesting themselves +by outward indications. Why then should not the +moral Governor of the universe, if it was His purpose +to make a revelation, employ media, which were all but +universally recognized? No inconsiderable number of +the objections of unbelievers rest on the assumption, +that if there be a God, it is derogatory to His character +to suppose that He is capable of condescending +to the weaknesses and imperfections of man. A God +who neither will nor can do so may be a very grand +conception; but one who is very ill adapted to the +wants of human nature, and who is incapable of +exciting human sympathies. The only thing that +would be necessary, on the supposition that it was His +purpose to make such a revelation, would be that His +mode of manifesting His presence should be one clearly +distinguishable from the events of current supernaturalism. +What was requisite would have been to +afford evidence that the manifestation in question was +due to no other being than Himself; that is to say, +that the miracles should bear the unquestionable impress +of His own perfections. The subject of alleged +demoniacal miracles I have considered elsewhere. The +simple question before us is—Are the supernatural +events recorded in the Gospels clearly distinguishable +in their general character from the supernaturalism +which was current previous to the Advent? I have +already shown that it contains no doubtful indications +as to who the agent must have been, if we suppose the +facts to have been actual occurrences. +</p> + +<p> +But further: if the objection has any validity, it presupposes +that God ought not to make a revelation in +ages of superstition and ignorance; but must wait +until knowledge has cleared away the mists of ignorance +and error, and supplied us with the means of +<pb n='355'/><anchor id='Pg355'/> +infallibly discriminating between true miracles and +false ones; or, in other words, we must wait for the +much-talked-of jury of scientific men, who can submit +His alleged miracles to the whole range of scientific +tests. Happily, however, God has gifted a considerable +number of men with common sense, which is quite +adequate to determine whether a certain class of events +wrought under certain circumstances are miraculous +operations, or mere natural occurrences, or due to +imposture. If this be so, what is there, I ask, +unworthy of God, in making a revelation at such times +as man stands in special need of one? +</p> + +<p> +It is further objected that a miraculous attestation to +a divine commission shows a want of force and divine +originality. I ask, how? The fact is that with the +exception of Judaism, no ancient religion professed to +be so attested; and the Jew would naturally expect +that any fresh revelation would be attested in a manner +similar to that which he believed in as divine. +</p> + +<p> +The objection that because the belief in supernaturalism +was so general, therefore miracles must be +worthless as evidence, I have already shown to be +fallacious. +</p> + +<p> +But it is also objected: <q>Instead of a few evidential +miracles taking place at one particular period of history +and filling the world with surprise at such novel and +exceptional phenomena, we find them represented as +taking place in all ages and in all countries.</q> +</p> + +<p> +This is the old objection of the Jews who demanded +of our Lord a sign from Heaven. Both demand +a particular class and order of miracle, viz.: something +stupendous, or terrific. The value of each +objection lies in conceiving of a miracle as a mere +objective fact in external nature, stript of all its moral +accompaniments. In one word, it contemplates the +miracle in its most vulgar aspect, as a bare act of power, +<pb n='356'/><anchor id='Pg356'/> +a portent, a prodigy. A great light everywhere appearing +in the heavens might have appeared to vulgar +minds a greater miracle, and have attracted more +attention than the cure of a man full of leprosy by the +utterance of a word. But it would not have presented +stronger evidences of having been wrought by the +power of God. +</p> + +<p> +But with respect to the general question, I ask, Is +not the resurrection of Jesus Christ in every respect +an exceptional event? Where are resurrections to be +found in the history of current supernaturalism? Who +ever pretended, before or since, to have a divine +commission which was attested by his own resurrection +from the dead? This miracle is at any rate absolutely +unique; and it must never be forgotten that it is the +only one recorded in the New Testament on the truth +of which its writers stake the claim of Christianity to +be regarded as a divine revelation. Although they +refer to other miracles, wonders and signs which God +wrought by Him, yet whenever they adduce the full +and conclusive evidence of His divine mission, they +always appeal to the fact that God had raised Him +from the dead. +</p> + +<p> +But a further objection is urged as invalidating this +kind of testimony: <q>At the very time when the knowledge +of the laws of nature began to render men capable +of judging of the reality of miracles, these wonders +entirely ceased. This extraordinary cessation of miracles +at a time when their evidence ought to have +acquired value from an appeal to persons capable of +appreciating them, is perfectly unintelligible, if they +are viewed as the supernatural credentials of a divine +revelation.</q> +</p> + +<p> +This passage contains several fallacies. One, to +which I have repeatedly drawn attention, runs through +it, viz., the classing together every kind of alleged +<pb n='357'/><anchor id='Pg357'/> +supernatural occurrence, from the miracles of Jesus +to the fantastic performances of the magician, as +though they all stood on the same level. I need not +further allude to the fallacy of such reasoning. +</p> + +<p> +2. It is affirmed that miracles entirely ceased when +the knowledge of the laws of nature began to render +men capable of judging of their reality. I conclude +that by the word <q>miracles</q> in this passage, the +author means ecclesiastical miracles, viz., those which +have been alleged to be wrought in attestation of the +established system of belief. If it is meant to be +asserted that all belief in a current supernaturalism +has now ceased, the affirmation is inaccurate, as the +wide-spread belief in spiritualism abundantly testifies. +</p> + +<p> +But if the assertion is intended to be confined to +ecclesiastical miracles, it involves an inaccuracy as to +a matter of history. They had become thoroughly discredited +long before the birth of modern physical +science. The cure of blind and leprous persons by a +touch, or the feeding of five thousand persons on seven +loaves and a few fishes, require nothing else than sound +common sense for the appreciation of their supernatural +character, or the testing of their reality. The +assertion, therefore, that miracles ceased precisely at +the time when their evidence would have been most +valuable, by their being able to be tested by those +persons best capable of appreciating them, is entirely +inaccurate. +</p> + +<p> +I fully admit that a belief in a current supernaturalism, +as for instance in the absurdities of witchcraft, +survived the Reformation. What the Reformation +destroyed was a belief in a divine order of miracles +wrought in support of an ecclesiastical system. The +belief in this current supernaturalism has been gradually +diminishing ever since, under the combined influence +<pb n='358'/><anchor id='Pg358'/> +of the increase of the knowledge of physical +science, and common sense. The objection raised is +simply irrelevant to the point at issue. +</p> + +<p> +But there is another subject which demands consideration. +Hitherto we have been dealing with the +evidential character of miracles. But although all +miracles have an evidential value, if they can be adequately +attested, it by no means follows that every +miracle recorded in the New Testament was intended +to subserve this purpose alone. It was necessary not +only that a revelation should be communicated, and +receive an adequate attestation, but that it should be +propagated among mankind. To render this possible, +it was necessary that its messengers should be armed +with some means of insuring that their message should +be heard with attention. There was also another object +to be effected; namely, the establishment in the world +of that great institution, the Christian Church, which +was intended so largely to influence its destinies. +</p> + +<p> +It will be quite clear to any person who carefully +considers the various supernatural occurrences recorded +in the New Testament that they are not all of equal +evidential value. The highest class of them are directly +affirmed to have been performed for the purpose of +attesting the divine mission of Jesus Christ, and as a +portion of His supernatural manifestation. To this +class belong the miracles wrought by Himself, and +several of those performed by the Apostles. But there +is another class referred to in the Acts of the Apostles, +of which the primary object seems to have been to +awaken attention to the Apostolic message, though +even these were not destitute of evidential value. +There is also another order of manifestations frequently +referred to in the Epistles, viz., the supernatural +gifts of the Spirit, one of the declared purposes +<pb n='359'/><anchor id='Pg359'/> +of which was to lay deep the foundations of the +Christian Church. As divine interpositions, they were +all to a certain extent evidential; but it will be important +to observe that there is an order of supernatural +manifestations mentioned in the New Testament, whose +apparent primary intention was to subserve a different +purpose. +</p> + +<p> +Let it be observed therefore, that at the introduction +of Christianity, two distinct purposes had to be +effected: first, to attest the truth of the revelation; +secondly, to establish the Church. +</p> + +<p> +I will briefly draw attention to this latter portion of +the subject, as far as it affects certain portions of the +supernatural action affirmed in the New Testament. +I allude to a certain class of miracles, such as the cure +of the cripple at Lystra, those wrought by the passing +of Peter's shadow, and by garments brought from +Paul's person, and some others; also to the entire +class of the supernatural gifts mentioned in the Acts +of the Apostles, and so frequently referred to in the +Epistles. +</p> + +<p> +One of the greatest difficulties which beset the missionary +is to obtain a hearing in the midst of the hostile +elements by which he is surrounded. Yet to obtain +this is the necessary condition of carrying on his work. +In this respect, the modern missionary possesses great +advantages compared with the primitive missionary of +Christianity. He belongs to a superior civilization, +and is therefore able to bring to bear the whole force +of a higher on a lower one. This was exactly reversed +in the case of the primitive missionaries. Instead of +being able to bring to bear the prestige of a high +civilization on those among whom they laboured, they +belonged to a despised race; or if the missionary himself +was a member of the race whom he addressed, he +<pb n='360'/><anchor id='Pg360'/> +belonged to the lower sections of society. How was +this enormous deficiency to be supplied? How was a +man thus despised to obtain a hearing for the message +with which he was charged? The New Testament +affirms that the deficiency was supplied by imparting +to the early Church a certain number of supernatural +endowments, which, when once communicated, acted +like our ordinary faculties; also that a supernatural +gift of curing certain diseases was imparted to particular +individuals, a gift which was exactly suited to +obtain an attentive hearing for their message. +</p> + +<p> +Among the supernatural gifts which St. Paul affirms +to have been communicated to the Church, there were +two of which he asserts that the operation was distinct, +but which are merged in the modern idea of +miracles. These he designated by the expressions +ἐνεργήματα δυναμέων, or the inworking of powers; and +χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων, endowments of healing powers. The +distinction in function between these powers is affirmed +by him no less than three times; what it consisted in, +we are only able to judge from the terms themselves, +and the nature of the case. There is every probability +that the distinction points to a higher and a lower +exercise of supernatural power; the one being the +evidential miracle properly so called, and the other a +supernatural knowledge of how to effect cures—a gift +which would be exactly suited to enable the missionary +to obtain that attentive hearing of his message which +he so urgently required. The Epistle of St. James +furnishes us with a general idea of the nature of the +gift, when he directs, that in case a person was sick, +the elders of the Church were to be sent for, who were +to pray over the sick man, and anoint him with oil in +the name of the Lord; <q>And the prayer of faith,</q> +says he, <q>shall save the sick; and the Lord shall raise +<pb n='361'/><anchor id='Pg361'/> +him up.</q> (James v. 15.) The whole description +points to a cure which, although in a measure supernatural, +was not instantaneous; the latter point being +one which would be required to make a miracle in the +proper sense of the word evidential. A power of +effecting cures, however, whether by a knowledge of +natural means supernaturally acquired, or by supernatural +agency, would be one which would obtain for +the despised Jewish missionary a hearing in Gentile +cities, which otherwise he would be unable to obtain. +</p> + +<p> +To such a class of supernatural operations would +belong such cures as those effected by the conveyance +of handkerchiefs and aprons from St. Paul's body to +the sick. These are only asserted to have taken place +on one occasion, at Ephesus, a city greatly addicted to +the arts of magic. They were adapted to the circumstances +of the place, where the Apostle had to encounter +a particular form of supernaturalism; and +they would have been exactly suited to meet the +difficulty in question. The historian tells us that the +success was great, for many of those who had used +magical arts came forward and confessed their deeds, +collected together their magical books, which were +worth a considerable sum of money, and publicly +burned them. The same observations apply to Peter's +shadow. Although the historian does not tell us that +cures were wrought by it, yet the narrative presupposes +that a large outburst of supernatural power took place +in connection with Peter's person. Although the +cure of the cripple at Lystra belongs to a class of +miracles which is strictly evidential, yet the immediate +occasion of its performance seems to have been with +the view of arousing the attention of an ignorant +heathen population. +</p> + +<p> +But not only had a revelation to be communicated +<pb n='362'/><anchor id='Pg362'/> +and attested, not only had converts to be made and +instructed, but it was also necessary that the foundations +of the Church, the visible kingdom of Christ, +should be firmly laid, and that it should be established +among the visible institutions of the earth. Sufficient +attention has not been paid to this portion of the subject +in considering the question of supernatural intervention. +The establishment of the Church as a visible institution, +which was intended gradually to leaven mankind +with the great principles of His revelation, is again +and again affirmed by Jesus Christ to have been one of +the great purposes of His coming. A description of +its character and functions forms the subject of no +inconsiderable number of His parables, and it is the +great end and purpose for which He gave the great +final Apostolic commission to go and gather it together +out of all the nations of the earth. +</p> + +<p> +The Church of Christ had therefore to be formed +into a community out of the most heterogeneous +elements. It was destined not for a momentary +existence, but for a continuous growth, so as to leaven +human nature with its influences. The creation of +such a society was a conception so bold that it had +never previously entered the head of either poet or +philosopher. Those with whom I am reasoning will +not deny that the attempt was a very arduous, and to +all appearance a most chimerical one. +</p> + +<p> +Yet it is the most certain of facts that the Church +of Christ is now in the nineteenth century of its +existence. The boldness of the undertaking will be +more fully estimated when we reflect that the Church +was intended to be a society which, while existing in +the world, should differ in its essential character from +all the other societies on the earth. Its action was to +be entirely spiritual and moral. Its founder intended +<pb n='363'/><anchor id='Pg363'/> +it to be invested with no coercive powers. The appeal +was to be, not to force, but to conscience. +</p> + +<p> +Those who offered to enroll themselves as the subjects +of Christ's spiritual kingdom had to be formed +into a social organization. Unless this could be +effected, one of the great objects for which the revelation +was given must have proved a failure. The +elements of which it had to be composed were of the +most unpromising description. The first converts +consisted of no small number of Jews and proselytes, +who were extensively leavened with the narrowest +prejudices of Judaism. When the Gentiles began to +join the new community, its members were chiefly +derived from the lower ranks of society, including a +considerable number of slaves. The infant Church +embraced a great diversity of opinions and characters. +When converts were made, the time for their instruction +was short. Yet such an institution had to contend +with mighty civilization, the habits and prejudices of +existing society, the self-interest of a corrupt religion, +and the opposition of a powerful government. +</p> + +<p> +Such were some of the difficulties which had to be +surmounted before this new institution could be firmly +planted among the existing societies of the world, and +expand itself with the life which was peculiarly its own. +If the primitive followers of Jesus were animated by +the credulous superstition which unbelievers delight in +attributing to them, none should be better qualified +than they to form a judgment of the difficulties which +must have beset their path. Yet these have been surmounted. +To this fact the vigorous life of the Church +during eighteen centuries testifies. It has not only +held its ground, but it has succeeded in leavening all +existing civilizations with its influences. How has +this been accomplished? The Apostolic Epistles return +<pb n='364'/><anchor id='Pg364'/> +an answer. They affirm that the early converts were +endowed with a number of supernatural gifts, exactly +fitted to qualify them for the various functions which +they were called upon to discharge. I subjoin a list of +them, as they are directly affirmed by St. Paul to be +then existing in the Corinthian Church. They were +nine in number, each of which is asserted by him to +have had a distinct and separate function and subject-matter: +the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, faith, working +of miracles, endowments of healing powers, prophecy, +discerning of spirits, tongues, and interpretation. It +does not appear whether this last is meant to be exhaustive +of the supernatural mental endowments which the +members of the early churches supposed themselves to +possess, or whether they were varied for the purpose +of meeting particular exigences. Nor do I ask those +with whom I am reasoning to accept this statement as +a true account of an objective fact; but only that they +were supposed to be so by the Apostle and those to +whom he wrote. It is plain, however, that these supernatural +endowments, if real, were precisely such as the +Church was in urgent need of, as the instrumentality +for welding together the discordant elements of which +it was composed, and enabling it firmly to plant itself +in the soil of human nature. +</p> + +<p> +These supernatural gifts of the Spirit, with two exceptions, +produced no results on external nature. They +constituted enlargements of the powers of the human +mind. As such, they cannot with strict propriety be +said to belong to the class of evidential miracles, +although like all other supernatural operations of which +God is the Author, they cannot fail to be indirectly +evidential. It is important to observe that they belong +to a separate class of supernatural phenomena, which +were as necessary in reference to the Christian revelation, +<pb n='365'/><anchor id='Pg365'/> +contemplating as it did the institution of a divine +society, as the order of supernatural manifestations +which directly attested the divine mission of Jesus +Christ and His Apostles. If this was their end and +purpose we can understand why they were withdrawn +at a very early period, before they could be submitted +to the tests of our modern <emph>savants</emph>. They were given +for a special purpose, and they were withdrawn when +they had accomplished it. The Apostle who affirms +their existence asserts that they were not intended +permanently to continue in the Church. +</p> + +<p> +There is one more allegation which is occasionally +urged against the miracles of the New Testament, and +which I must briefly consider. It is alleged that pious +frauds have been very general in all ages of Christian +history; that many good men have not hesitated to +participate in them; and that literary forgeries were +very abundant in the first ages of Christianity, and +were even common in the days of the Apostles. It is +insinuated that this state of mind throws great suspicion +on the alleged miracles of the apostolic age. +</p> + +<p> +As the charge of pious fraud is not made against +Jesus himself or his immediate followers, it is difficult +to meet so indefinite an objection. It seems to be put +in to add force to others, rather than for its intrinsic +value. Modern unbelievers express a nearly unanimous +concurrence in endeavouring to account for the miracles +of the New Testament, by assuming that the followers +of Jesus were the victims of the most intense enthusiasm, +superstition, and credulity. It is difficult to +comprehend, on the assumption that the existence of +the supernatural portions of the New Testament is due +to these causes, how direct fraud could have anything to +do with the concoction of these miraculous stories. Intense +enthusiasm and fanaticism, and deliberate fraud, +<pb n='366'/><anchor id='Pg366'/> +are usually opposite poles of character; and if we call in +one to account for these miracles, we must exclude the +other from exerting an influence on their origination. +To make the charge of any avail against the narratives +of the Gospel, it is necessary not to prove that pious +frauds were common in the second, third, or fourth +century, or even in the first, but to establish directly +either that Jesus professed to work miracles while He +knew that they were not such, or that His followers +deliberately invented a number of miraculous stories +and attributed them to Him, well knowing that He had +performed none. The charge that the miracles of the +New Testament originated in enthusiasm and credulity +is a definite one, and can be definitely met. So is the +one that they originated in deliberate fraud. So would +be the charge that the innocent followers of Jesus were +imposed upon by fraudulent impostors. But to combine +the charge of intense enthusiasm and credulity with +that of conscious fraud, is a mode of reasoning which +contains the grounds of its own refutation. +</p> + +<p> +It is no doubt a fact, that the practice of literary +forgery was not unknown to the early ages of Christianity. +St. Paul seems to have thought that there +were in the world impostors daring enough to attempt +to forge a letter in his name, and to try to foist it +on the churches which he had planted, as a genuine +production. But the existence of such impostors has +no bearing whatever on the question whether the +miracles recorded in the New Testament are facts or +fiction. Did not St. Paul himself assert that he had +performed miracles? Was he an impostor? Did he +not believe that Jesus Christ in veritable reality rose +from the dead? What have such beliefs to do with +the existence of a set of daring literary impostors? +Happily, however, the whole of this class of ancient +<pb n='367'/><anchor id='Pg367'/> +writers were utter bunglers in the art of fictitious composition. +It is a universal characteristic of them, that +they were entirely unable to throw themselves into the +spirit of former times, or of the persons whose names +they assumed. In their references to history, geography, +manners, customs, and character, they lay themselves +open at almost every point to certain detection. There +is good reason for believing that no forger or writer of +fiction in the ancient world has succeeded in his art. +In investing fiction with apparent probability, the +modern world has completely outstript the ancient. +Still, however, even in the most perfect works, when +the fictions are extended over a wide sphere of action, +no amount of genius will protect a writer from leaving +some weak point unguarded. It is probably not too +much to say that neither in ancient nor modern times, +has a fictitious work or a forgery been able to maintain +its ground against the apparatus which can be +brought to bear on it by a sound and rational criticism. +</p> + +<p> +Most of the other objections which are adduced +against the miracles of the New Testament have been +answered in principle under the foregoing heads. I must +now adduce some of the most important considerations +which prove them to have been historical facts. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='368'/><anchor id='Pg368'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XVII. The Historical Evidence On Which The Great Facts Of +Christianity Rest—General Considerations.</head> + +<p> +It has been urged by opponents, that the defenders of +historical Christianity rest content with endeavouring +to prove that miracles are possible or probable; but +that they neglect an all-important part of their duty, +viz.: that of adducing historical proof that miracles +have been actually performed. If the fact is as here +stated, there can be no doubt that works which profess +to discuss the subject of miracles, and omit to give a +clear statement of the chief points of the evidence +which can be adduced to prove that they have actually +occurred, must be unsatisfactory. To answer the +objections which are urged to prove that miracles are +impossible, or which affirm on general principles that all +evidence in their favour is unworthy of credit, is an +essential preliminary to the consideration of the historical +evidence which can be adduced to prove their +actual occurrence. But to afford proof, that as facts +they rest upon an adequate attestation, is the essential +duty of every one who asserts their reality. To this +portion of the work I will now proceed to address myself. +</p> + +<p> +What then is the position occupied by the Christian +advocate? Is it requisite in order to establish the +truth of Christianity, that he should give an historical +proof of everyone of the miracles recorded in the New +Testament? I answer this question emphatically in +<pb n='369'/><anchor id='Pg369'/> +the negative, and for the following reason. The New +Testament itself, while it affirm that many miracles +have been performed, rests the truth of Christianity on +one miracle alone, the Resurrection of Jesus Christ from +the dead. This is the great event which, according to +the Acts of the Apostles, the early missionaries urged +as the distinctive proof of their Master's divine mission. +The views expressed in the Apostolic Epistles are +precisely similar. In them, the entire evidence of the +truth of our Lord's divine mission is made to centre in +the fact of His resurrection. Not only is the great fact +referred to either directly or indirectly in almost every +page, but St. Paul has distinctly rested the truth of +Christianity on the reality of its occurrence. Such a +statement is made respecting no other miraculous +event recorded in the New Testament. It is the +miracle of miracles, unique and alone, by which the +seal of God was affixed to the divine mission of Jesus +Christ. It formed the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>locus standi</foreign> of the Church, and +the sole ground of its existence. If it was not an +objective fact, those who testified to its occurrence +must have been false witnesses, and the whole of +Christianity either a delusion or an imposture. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that this great miracle forms the +very key of the Christian position. Everything else is +an outwork, an important one it may be, but yet an +outwork. If this position can be successfully assailed, +the entire fortress of Christianity must surrender at +discretion. If, on the other hand, the most determined +unbeliever could be convinced that there is good historical +evidence that Jesus Christ rose from the dead, he +would find no difficulty in accepting the Gospels as +historical documents, and the whole <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> objection +against them would disappear. +</p> + +<p> +Again: If the Resurrection of Christ is a fact, Christianity +<pb n='370'/><anchor id='Pg370'/> +must be a divine revelation. The perfect +historical accuracy of the Gospels in minute details +may be still open to question; deep thought and careful +investigation may be necessary for ascertaining the +precise amount of truth communicated by that revelation; +past ages may have erred in its interpretation, +or in their deductions from it; many questions as to +the relation in which revelation stands to science or +history may be open ones—all this is both conceivable +and possible—but still, if Jesus Christ rose from the +dead, his entire manifestation, work, and teaching, +must be a communication from God to man. +</p> + +<p> +This then is my position. The real question stands +within very narrow limits. The miracle that requires +strong historical proof is the Resurrection. The other +supernatural occurrences recorded in the Gospels are +important portions of the revelation made by Christ. +They were important evidences to those who witnessed +them. But to us in these latter times the one great +question is: Is the Resurrection capable of being +established as an actual occurrence? If it is, it will +carry with it all the others. If it is not, the proof of +the others will fall along with it. +</p> + +<p> +Let us examine the historical conditions of the case. +Christianity differs from all other religions in professing +not to consist of a mass of abstract dogmatic statements, +but to be founded on, and largely to consist of, +a number of historical facts. There are unquestionably +a considerable number of dogmatic statements in the +pages of the New Testament; but they profess to grow +out of the facts and to be explanations of them. The +facts form, so to say, the essence of the religion. The +Christianity of the New Testament is a growth which +encircles itself around the person of its founder in a +manner in which no other system of thought or religion, +<pb n='371'/><anchor id='Pg371'/> +which has existed among men, has ever done. If we +take the person of Jesus Christ out of the New Testament, +the whole system of its teaching crumbles into +nothingness. If we remove the person of its founder +from every other system of human thought—its great +religions form no exception—the system remains intact. +This is a very striking peculiarity in Christianity. In +this respect it stands absolutely unique. +</p> + +<p> +But as Christianity is founded on an historical person, +who lived in a particular age, so He is the founder of a +great historical institution, the Christian Church. This +institution differs from every other society which has +ever existed, in that both its origination and its continued +existence are inextricably bound up with the +person of its founder. Other societies could exist even +if it could be proved that their reputed founders were +creations of the imagination; but this would be fatal to +the life of the Church of Christ. If it could be proved +that Jesus Christ was a myth, or nothing but a learned +Rabbi, the Christian Church, mighty society as it is, +would certainly collapse. The Christian Church without +Christ would be far more out of place than the play of +Hamlet with the part of Hamlet omitted. In this +respect it is a institution unique among all those +which the world has ever seen, whether political or +religious. +</p> + +<p> +This great society, which now comprehends a vast +majority of the intelligence of mankind, and all the +progressive nations of the world, had a definite beginning +in historical times. It differs wholly from a +philosophic sect, whose bond of union consists in the +acceptance of a body of dogmatic teaching. It is and +ever has been an organized society with specific purposes +and aims, and one which has ever meditated +schemes of conquest. It differs widely from all political +<pb n='372'/><anchor id='Pg372'/> +institutions, and yet ever since its birth it has taken a +place beside them. +</p> + +<p> +The origin of this society is not lost, like that of +many others, in the mists of the hoary past. History +enables us to assign a definite time when this society +was certainly not in existence. It no less definitely +marks out a period when it not only was in existence, +but had entered on a condition of active growth. Its +origin did not take place in the cloud-land of the +mythic or the semi-mythic period of history, but in the +reign of Tiberius Cæsar, and in a country occupied +by Roman garrisons, and presided over by Roman +governors. +</p> + +<p> +It will be objected that our only accounts of the +causes which led to the organization of this society are +writings composed by its own members. In this there +is nothing peculiar; for until societies have grown sufficiently +powerful to attract the attention of the world +outside them, there can be no other source of information. +Still the fact can be ascertained on the most +unquestionable authority, that at a certain date this +society was not in existence, and that within a certain +number of years afterwards, it was not only in existence, +but rapidly increasing; and that it originated +in Jesus Christ, who was put to death by the Roman +government. +</p> + +<p> +This society, therefore, came into existence at a definite +period of time. Its early writers give us an +account of how it originated. They affirm that its +founder was Jesus Christ; and that, having been interrupted +by His death, it was called into a new existence +by His resurrection. To this great event they +most positively affirm that the origin of the Church, as +an institution, was due. To the belief in it as a fact, +it has certainly owed its gradual enlargement, until it +<pb n='373'/><anchor id='Pg373'/> +has attained its present dimensions after more than +eighteen centuries of existence. To this belief is due +the great moral power which it has exercised on mankind; +and if its members could be persuaded that the +belief in the Resurrection of its founder was a mere +delusion, great as this society is, it would certainly +perish. +</p> + +<p> +There are five facts connected with the origin of this +society, which no one who believes in the possibility of +historic truth will dispute. +</p> + +<p> +First: That at the year A.D. 25, this society had no +existence. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly: That in A.D. 40, it was in a state of +vigorous growth. +</p> + +<p> +Thirdly: That it was founded by Jesus Christ. +</p> + +<p> +Fourthly: That His crucifixion by the Roman government +caused its temporary collapse. +</p> + +<p> +Fifthly: That an event of some kind, which took +place shortly after His death, imparted to it a new +vitality, which it has never lost to the present hour, +and which has caused it to exert a mightier influence +on mankind than any other community, whether political +or religious, that has ever existed. +</p> + +<p> +The problem, therefore, which history has to solve, +is to account for the renewed life, the marvellous progress, +the intense vitality of this society, and the +mighty influence which it has exerted on the destinies +of mankind; originating as it did in the smallest possible +beginnings, and in a manner differing from all +other existing institutions. +</p> + +<p> +The Christian Church has propounded, from the first +commencement of its renewed life, its own solution of +this problem. It is: that its founder, after having +been crucified, rose again from the dead. This account +has this clear and obvious advantage, that if it be true, +<pb n='374'/><anchor id='Pg374'/> +it sufficiently accounts for all the phenomena whose existence +we have to solve. His resurrection was a power +adequate to revive the society after its temporary collapse, +to impart to it its mighty moral and spiritual +energy, and to impress on the original work and teaching +of Jesus, a new and peculiar aspect. In short, assuming +the Resurrection to have been a fact, it assigns +a cause adequate to account for all the phenomena +which have been presented by the Church. Here +then we have firm ground on which to take our stand; +viz., the belief of this society as to its origin, capable of +being traced historically to the first hour of its renewed +life, and which also, if true, affords a rational account +of it. +</p> + +<p> +But further; besides this account which the Church +has given of its own origin, there is no rival account of +it in existence. As far as historical documents are +concerned, there is no other. All others are founded +on conjecture. +</p> + +<p> +Our opponents, however, affirm that the alleged fact +which the Church asserts to have been the cause of its +existence is incredible, because all miracles are impossible. +Then, leaving <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> grounds, they also affirm +that the evidence to prove the Resurrection to have +been an historical fact is insufficient for the purpose. +</p> + +<p> +The Church, however, is clearly in possession of a +vantage-ground, from which it is not easy to dislodge +her. The cause which she alleges is adequate to account +for all the phenomena. +</p> + +<p> +The <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>onus probandi</foreign> therefore clearly rests on the opponents +of Christianity. If they deny the truth of the +fact which the Church has ever handed down as the +true account of her origin, they are bound not only to +show that it is devoid of historical attestation, but to +propound a theory which will adequately account for +<pb n='375'/><anchor id='Pg375'/> +all the facts to which history testifies. It is clear that +nothing short of this is required of them as philosophical +historians. Certain facts are plain and undeniable. +A society, of a very special character, sprang into existence +at a definite point of history, and has exerted +a mightier influence than any other on the destinies +of man. If therefore they reject the account which +the Church herself gives, they are bound to supply a +rational account of how this great society came into +being; how the phenomena which constitute its history +have been brought about; and what it was that +imparted to it its vitality and power. We are in the +presence of the greatest institution with which history +is acquainted, founded as it is on the greatest ideal +conception (if it is not historical) which the human +mind has ever succeeded in inventing. Both these +came into existence, not in pre-historic times, but in +the midst of a period of contemporaneous history. +Respecting the times, the modes of thought, and the +general character of the period, we have extensive historical +data. The religious, moral, and philosophical +opinions, and the general line of thought, are well +known. The various forces which were then in activity +we are able to appreciate. With all these data +before him, it is incumbent on the philosophical historian +to give us an account of the moral and religious +forces in activity at this period, which were capable of +creating the Christian Church, and generating its conception +of the ideal Christ. If it is alleged that after +the utmost investigation it is impossible to account for +their origin by the action of any known moral or spiritual +forces acting on the human mind, this would be +at once to confess that the origin of Christianity and +the Church is entirely abnormal, or in other words, +that it is a moral and spiritual miracle. +</p> + +<pb n='376'/><anchor id='Pg376'/> + +<p> +To do unbelievers justice, they have not been slow +to recognize the fact that if they reject the account +which the Church has given of its origin, they are +bound to give us a rational one of how Christianity +came into existence. Accordingly, theory after theory +has been propounded on this subject. No intellectual +exertion has been spared to point out how Christianity +and the Church have succeeded in getting into existence, +and in effecting their religious and moral conquests, +by forces purely human, and without the aid of +any supernatural intervention. +</p> + +<p> +One thing respecting these theories is worthy of +particular attention. No unbeliever has as yet been +able to suggest one which has succeeded in commanding, +I will not say the universal, but even the general +assent of the unbelieving world. Theory after theory +has been propounded and abandoned. It is therefore +clear that the difficulty of accounting for the origin of +Christianity and the Church through the action of the +ordinary forces that operate on the human mind, is +extreme. There is no analogous case in the whole +history of man. Let me briefly enumerate the chief +principles which have been invoked to aid in the solution +of this problem. +</p> + +<p> +First, it has been attempted to get rid of the supernatural +elements contained in the Gospels by representing +them as distorted representations of real facts. +This has been justly abandoned as childish. Then came +the mythic and legendary theories. These, having +been found inadequate, have been supplemented by +various theories of development of ideas; and the +supposition of a violent party spirit existing in the +Church, which under the influence of a spirit of accommodation +produced various compromises; a mass of +varied and often contending opinions seething in the +<pb n='377'/><anchor id='Pg377'/> +bosom of a society continually threatened with disruption, +until they somehow succeeded in welding themselves +together; enthusiasm, fanaticism, boundless +credulity, aided by a prodigious power of mythic and +legendary invention, and whenever occasion so required, +the presence of a moral atmosphere, which on great +emergencies did not shrink from deliberate imposture. +All these, in ever varying degrees and proportions, +have been pressed into the service of creating the +Church, the ideal Christ, and the Christianity of the +New Testament. It is impossible in a work like the +present to examine these various theories, and show +their inadequacy as philosophical explanations of the +fact. This I have already done in a former work,<note place='foot'><q>The Jesus of the Evangelists.</q></note> to +which I must refer the reader for their refutation. A +few observations only will be necessary in this place. +</p> + +<p> +First: The positions taken by unbelievers are +theories, which rest on the smallest basis of historical +evidence. I readily admit that where there is a known +fact, but the recollection of the events which would +give an account of its origin has perished, if a theory +can be propounded which fully accounts for the fact, +then it has a right to take its place as an historical event +which rests on evidence of the highest probability. +An example derived from the mode in which the study +of comparative philology discloses the history of the +past will explain my meaning. We have before us +the facts of language. The history of those who +formerly used it has perished; the accounts of their +migrations have nowhere been preserved. But certain +facts of comparative philology justify the assumption +that certain primitive races of men must have migrated +in particular directions. These assumed migrations +are really a theory, but one which is exactly adequate +<pb n='378'/><anchor id='Pg378'/> +to account for the facts which language unquestionably +presents. Thus the facts of the Indo-Germanic +languages justify the assumption that in the pre-historic +ages, migrations westward must have taken place, of +which history contains no record. Still the theory +affords so perfect an explanation of the facts, that the +occurrence of the migrations is as certain as if they +had been recorded by contemporaneous writers. On +similar grounds it has been inferred with a degree of +probability so high as to be equal to certainty, that a +language earlier than the Sanskrit, and from which both +it and the Indo-Germanic family of languages have been +derived, was spoken by a previous race. Investigations +of this kind are largely adding to our historical +knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +Let us observe the basis on which such arguments +rest. In all these cases we have before us not mere +conjectures, but a distinct and positive fact, or set of +facts. The connecting links are missing. By the +aid of conjecture we propound a theory; or in other +words, we suppose a set of events to have occurred, +which, if they really happened, would be adequate to +account for the facts in question. When they thus +account for them, and for them alone, and no other +conjectural occurrence will do so, the assumed fact is +fully entitled to take its place in history as an event +which has actually happened. The reason of this is, +that it can stand the test of historical verification. +</p> + +<p> +A problem similar to that above referred to is the one +which those who deny the historical truth of the Gospels +are called upon to solve. We are in the presence of +certain unquestionable historical facts, viz., the five +above referred to, and many others. The denial of +the truth of the Christian account leaves them without +the connecting link which once united them. What +<pb n='379'/><anchor id='Pg379'/> +was that link? It can only be supplied by conjecture. +But to enable such a conjectural fact or facts to take +rank as historical events, they must be adequate to +account for the facts, and be true to human nature, and +to the circumstances of the case; in other words, they +must be capable of enduring a rigid historical verification. +Theories which cannot endure this are no better +than ropes of sand. This is the character of the +theories which have been propounded to account for +the Christianity of the New Testament. +</p> + +<p> +Let me illustrate this by one of the favourite theories +used by unbelievers for this purpose. We are told +that a number of extremely hostile factions divided the +primitive Church. Of these the followers of James, +Peter, and Paul may be taken as fairly representative. +These were in a state of great hostility to each other, +and went on gradually elaborating a Christianity that +was in conformity with their own views and tastes. +After a while it occurred to these hostile parties that +it would be advantageous to compromise their differences. +An influential person, such as we may +suppose the author of the Acts of the Apostles to have +been, composed a history, for the purpose of making +matters smooth, and to afford a common ground of +union among the contending factions. This process +was repeated as often as was necessary; and in good +time, by the aid of myth and legend, and the whole of +the needful apparatus, appeared the Christianity of the +New Testament, and the Church was consolidated out +of these varied elements. +</p> + +<p> +Such theories grievously offend against the logic of +history, and are in direct variance with the facts of +human life. We are here in the midst of a whole mass +of conjectural facts, each of which is imagined to +account for the existence of the other; and the whole +<pb n='380'/><anchor id='Pg380'/> +of them taken together fail to give an adequate solution +of the phenomena before us. They are both untrue to +human nature and unable to account for either the facts +of Christianity or the existence of the Church. I must +content myself with selecting one of them for illustration. +We are asked to believe that the Church was +divided into a number of parties, the opposition +between whom was violent; and that these effected a +number of compromises, out of which was ultimately +evolved a common Christianity. This result is in +direct contradiction to the testimony of the religious +history of man. Religious parties do not effect compromises, +but go on contending and widening their +differences, until their enthusiasm wears out and they +die of inanition. To this the history of all sects bears +ample testimony, and the greater the enthusiasm and +not unfrequently the lesser the grounds of difference, +the greater the animosity. Compromises between +hostile sects, in the rare cases in which they have +taken place, have been brought about by means of external +coercion. The religious history of mankind +presents no example of furious religious parties, while +animated by a living enthusiasm, voluntarily coalescing +on the general principle of compromise. Witness +the unsuccessful attempts at compromise between the +Eastern and Western Churches, even when it was +urged by the strongest external pressure. Witness +the sects which grew out of the Reformation. Compromises +have frequently originated among politicians, +but these have in vain tried their healing influences +among contending sects. Occasionally they have been +brought about by the aid of pressure exerted by the +temporal power, as in the Church of England. +Nothing more strongly illustrates the difficulty with +which compromise between religious parties can be +<pb n='381'/><anchor id='Pg381'/> +effected than the failure of the attempts to reconcile +the Church of England and the Methodists. The compromiser +who will effect this union exists only in the +hopes of the future. But we need not confine ourselves +to the manifestations of sectarian spirit in connection +with Christianity. The Mahometan Church is also +divided by sectarian differences. Is there any tendency +to produce a common Mahometanism, erected +on the basis of compromise? Do Buddhism and Brahminism +show any disposition to compromise their +differences by fusing them into a common Pantheism +which shall suit both parties? The idea of producing +a Christianity by a succession of happy compromises +entered into by violently hostile parties in the early +Church, is a dream which, however plausible it may +have seemed in the closet, is rudely dissipated the +moment we come in contact with the stern realities of +life. +</p> + +<p> +But further: the wide separation of the early +Churches from each other; and, according to the +opinions of those against whom I am reasoning, their +want of a governing power acknowledged by all, must +have rendered agreement on the basis of mutual compromise +impossible. Compromises are the results of +considerations of policy, and are unheard of among +fanatics, such as my opponents assert the early followers +of Jesus to have been. But what further renders this +theory untenable is, that it is compelled to imagine a +number of developments accompanied by corresponding +compromises between hostile parties, before we +can succeed in evolving the Christianity of the New +Testament. Not only does it contradict the history of +man; not only is it an assumption made to form the +connecting link between other established facts, but it +is itself founded on other assumptions. Among these +<pb n='382'/><anchor id='Pg382'/> +are the assertions made as to the evidence of the party +spirit existing in the Church, and the opposition +between its leaders. Party spirit we know to have +existed, but not with the violence which this theory is +compelled to postulate. The statement also that the +doctrinal opposition between these parties was of so +declared a type is not founded on the evidence that we +possess, but on a highly exaggerated view of it, distorted +for the purpose of adding strength to the +theory; or, in other words, it is founded on a set of +unwarranted assumptions. The passages in the New +Testament alleged to prove the declared opposition +between the leaders of the Church, which this theory is +compelled to pre-suppose, can only be made to do so +by taking it for granted that they do. For example, the +assertion that the person denounced in the Epistles to +the Seven Churches in the book of Revelation, is +St. Paul, is a simply gratuitous one, the only evidence +for which is the will and pleasure of those who make +it. The theory, therefore, not only contradicts the +history of man, but is based upon a number of alleged +facts which are either absolute assumptions or exaggerations, +and fail to give any account of the origin +of Christianity which will stand the test of the scrutiny +of a sound philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +The mythic and legendary theories are equally +unable to account for the facts as they stand in the +New Testament. I cannot here attempt to follow them +in their innumerable windings. Taken by themselves +they are not now accepted as adequate accounts of +them, but other theories are called in to aid them. +Still, whatever assistance these are supposed to impart, +myth and legend must always hold a prominent place +in the systems of those who endeavour to account for +the origin of the Gospels on purely human principles. +<pb n='383'/><anchor id='Pg383'/> +As they contain a large supernatural element, it is +certain that if this is not historical, it must have +originated in some species of fiction, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> either in the +mythic and legendary spirit, or in pure invention. +Hence the use of myths and legends must always be +freely invoked by those who, while they deny the historical +character of the Gospels, do not go to the length +of accusing the original followers of Jesus of deliberate +invention. +</p> + +<p> +I must here draw attention to one particular portion +of the evidence, the full significance of which I have +described elsewhere. Whatever opinions may be +formed as to the unhistorical character of the Gospels, +there is one fact respecting them as to which believers +and unbelievers must alike agree, namely that they +contain a delineation of the most perfect conception +ever formed by the mind of man, the character of +Jesus Christ. There it is, beyond the power of contradiction; +the overwhelming majority of men possessed +of the most powerful minds have recognized it +as the greatest of ideals, as well as the millions of ordinary +men to whom it has been the object of supreme +admiration and attraction. The following questions +respecting it therefore urgently demand an answer. +</p> + +<p> +If the Gospels are a mere collection of mythic and +legendary stories, generated and put together in the +manner affirmed by those who deny their historical +character, how got this great character there? If the +fables of which they are composed are the inventions of +many minds, whence its unity? If their inventors +were credulous enthusiasts and fanatics, whence its +perfection? If they were implicated in all the superstitions +of the age, whence its moral elevation? Of +what order of thought then existing is it the embodiment? +How could the credulity which was necessary +<pb n='384'/><anchor id='Pg384'/> +for the acceptance of such fictions, or how could the +spirit which invented them, have conceived these +moral elements? There the character is—let us be +distinctly informed how it was put together; how much +of it is fact, and how much fiction; how the fictions +were welded together with the facts so as to compose +the whole; and what class or order of minds in the +early Church was equal to its elaboration. This delineation +must have been made at an early period, and +could not have been a late invention; for it is substantially +the same as that contained in those Epistles of +St. Paul, which are acknowledged to have been written +within thirty years of the date of the Crucifixion. A +distinct answer to these questions is demanded of those +who affirm that the Gospels have no value as histories. +It is impossible to deny that they have a most important +bearing on the present question. Why do not unbelievers +set themselves to grapple with this problem? +</p> + +<p> +But the value to be assigned to the Gospels as +histories must be a matter for subsequent consideration. +At present I need simply draw attention to the fact +that while the opponents of Christianity fully recognize +the necessity of propounding a rational theory of its +origin, the more we examine their various theories in +detail, the more apparent becomes their inadequacy to +account for the phenomena. The fact, already alluded +to, that unbelievers cannot come to any agreement +among themselves on this subject, shows that they +find the problem extremely difficult of solution. The +plausibility of their theories is due to the abstract +and general form in which they are presented. Various +causes are held up without any discrimination as to +what each of them is capable of effecting; and the +wished-for result is ascribed to their combined action. +But when we analyse the various forces at their command, +<pb n='385'/><anchor id='Pg385'/> +ascertain the mode of their action, the difficulties +they would have to encounter before they +could effectuate their results, and examine whether +they are true to the facts of human nature as testified +to by the long course of history, it is not too much +to affirm that all the investigations of unbelievers +have completely failed to give an account of the +origin of Christianity which can take the place of that +handed down to us by the Church. Until this can be +given, notwithstanding all the expenditure of intellect +on the question, we are justified in affirming that the +problem is insoluble, although Christianity originated +in a period unquestionably historical, in the midst of +the Roman Empire over which it rapidly spread, despite +the opposition of the government and the entire organization +of society. +</p> + +<p> +Before proceeding to the direct considerations by +which the great fact of Christianity is attested, I must +take a general glance at the nature of the materials +which we have at our command, and at their historical +value. +</p> + +<p> +I shall take as my starting-point the five facts already +mentioned, the historical certainty of which it is needless +to prove. My starting-point, therefore, is the continuous +existence of the Church, which came into being +at a definite period of time, to which it can be traced up +in one unbroken succession. This society has always +affirmed that its corporate existence, as well as the life +of its individual members, is due to the Resurrection of +its founder. I shall also carefully examine and estimate +the contemporaneous evidence afforded by the Epistles +of St. Paul, especially those which are acknowledged +to be genuine, as well as that of the other writings of +the New Testament, for the purpose of estimating the +value of their testimony on this subject. Even if some +<pb n='386'/><anchor id='Pg386'/> +of these writings are not allowed by unbelievers to be +the productions of the persons whose names they bear, +still they are all of a very early date, and unquestionably +reflect the thoughts and ideas of those who wrote +them, and of the persons to whom they are addressed. +But before I enter on my immediate subject, it will be +necessary to lay down the leading principles of historical +evidence, and to estimate the value of tradition as a +testimony to historical facts. +</p> + +<p> +I am fully prepared to abide by the chief principles +laid down by Sir G. C. Lewis on this subject in his +great work on the <hi rend='italic'>Credibility of Early Roman History</hi>. +They are generally considered to be sufficiently severe +and exacting. By many they are viewed as of far too +stringent a character. The evidence on which the +great fact of the Resurrection rests, will endure their +most rigid application. They have this great advantage, +that they are laid down for the investigation of a +subject purely secular, with which religion has nothing +to do. They are therefore wholly free from religious +bias, and are simply the principles for testing the +claims of ordinary facts on our belief. If the chief +facts of Christianity can stand this scrutiny, it is +impossible to affirm that they are not supported by the +strongest historical testimony. +</p> + +<p> +1. Every alleged fact, in order to be entitled to +our belief, must be shown to rest on direct contemporaneous +testimony, or that which is its historical +equivalent. +</p> + +<p> +This rule is by no means intended to affirm that +every fact for which contemporaneous testimony can +be adduced is true; but only that it is to be accepted +as such when there is no reason for disbelieving it. +We must have some means to enable us to form a +judgment of the knowledge and veracity of the +<pb n='387'/><anchor id='Pg387'/> +informant. It remains for consideration, when the +direct testimony of a contemporary is not to be had, +as must be frequently the case with events long past, +what may be considered as its historical equivalent? +</p> + +<p> +It must be kept in mind that one of the most valuable +forms of contemporaneous testimony, if not the most +valuable of all, is a set of letters which contain +various and definite allusions to the current events, +habits, and modes of thought of the time. For certain +purposes these are far more valuable than formal +histories. The latter are frequently written under the +influence of party spirit, partiality, or bias. The writer +of a history is usually on his guard, has carefully considered +what he says, and affords us but little opportunity +of interrogating him. But the writer of a +letter, unless he has special reasons for being guarded, +places before his correspondent his entire mind. We +are therefore capable of interrogating him. He often +lets us into the secret causes of events. He also +makes a number of incidental allusions to events +which are passing. These form testimony of a most +valuable kind. We can in a manner almost converse +with him. As a confirmation of the facts which +formal histories narrate, and as letting us into the +secret springs of events, a series of letters, written by +persons who were actively engaged in them, are +historical documents of the highest order. Their +value is increased when they bear all the appearance +of coming from the writer's heart. Nothing is more +striking than the happy results which have accrued +from the extensive use made by modern historians of +original correspondence. It is not too much to say +that it has largely modified our view of events, as they +have been reported in formal histories. Another very +high form of contemporaneous testimony is the +<pb n='388'/><anchor id='Pg388'/> +existence of institutions and monuments which can be +certainly traced up to a particular period, and which +owed their existence to events of that period. These +form a species of living witnesses to the truth of the +facts out of which they have originated, and as far as +their testimony goes, it is incapable of falsehood. The +most valuable testimony of this kind is a great institution +of which we possess definite evidence that it +originated in a particular event, or in the belief of it. +This kind of evidence Christianity possesses in the +highest form, in the continued existence of that great +institution, the Christian Church. +</p> + +<p> +2. Testimony has a general credibility, subject of +course to the knowledge and honesty of the informant, +when the reports are derived from those who lived +during the generation in which a particular event +occurred, supposing it to have been one of sufficient +notoriety to attract attention, and that the reporter +possessed adequate means of information, and investigated +it with sufficient care. We are always justified +in assuming that he tells the truth unless there are +reasons for suspecting the contrary. +</p> + +<p> +3. Narratives of events which a man has heard +from his father or his contemporaries, but which happened +before his own recollection, are for the purpose +of history, (but subject to the requisite qualifications) +fair representations of contemporaneous testimony. +</p> + +<p> +History admits hearsay testimony under proper +restrictions. The knowledge of the past would be +impossible, if it were to allow itself to be fettered by +the technical rules which have been introduced into +the administration of justice. The all-important considerations +with the historian, are the notoriety of the +fact and the truthfulness of the informant. Facts that +a man may have heard detailed by his grandfather or +<pb n='389'/><anchor id='Pg389'/> +his contemporaries as having happened in their time +stand as representations of contemporaneous testimony +in the same position as those derived from the earlier +generation. +</p> + +<p> +4. But when a third stage is interposed in the transmission +of events, as for instance when we learn from +our fathers or grandfathers what they have learnt from +theirs, an element of uncertainty is introduced. Still +an historian, writing after such an interval of time, if he +sifted evidence with care, would be able to report with +accuracy all the great events, whatever difficulty he +might have in ascertaining the minor details. Within +this period abundance of sources of accurate information +exist on all points of importance, although the +details gradually fade out of people's recollections. +After this interval, the accounts of events are likely to +receive a certain amount of colouring, according to the +prejudices of the narrators; but the interval is too +short, and the remembrance of them too recent, to +allow of their becoming incrusted with important mythical +additions. All the materials for investigation are +in existence, and within the reach of the honest historian. +He might find difficulty in arranging the details +in historical sequence; but if he does not give an +accurate account of the great outlines, it is owing, not +to the want of historical materials, but to the absence +of a desire to investigate and report the truth. +</p> + +<p> +5. The limits of time during which tradition can be +considered as a sufficiently accurate medium for preserving +the memory of events, may be put generally at +from one hundred to one hundred and twenty years. +Within this period careful investigation and inquiry +will enable the historian to report the main features of +events with substantial truth, from the testimony of +those who were contemporaries, or who derived their +<pb n='390'/><anchor id='Pg390'/> +information from those who were. Beyond this period, +when the knowledge of occurrences has to pass through +three or four media of transmission, tradition becomes +an uncertain and untrustworthy informant, and after +the lapse of a greater interval, it is utterly unreliable, +affording no means of checking the introduction of +legendary narratives. There may be a few exceptional +cases which have impressed themselves deeply on the +public recollection. Occasionally the protracted lives +of a few individuals may lengthen the period of trustworthy +transmission, but this is an event of such rare +occurrence as but slightly to modify the general rule. +</p> + +<p> +It must be observed that there are two cases in which +the traditional knowledge of events is transmitted with +far more accuracy, and over far longer intervals of +time than in ordinary ones, viz., those of families which +have an historical importance derived from the actions +of their ancestors, and those of bodies of men who have +a kind of corporate life, succeeding one another in unbroken +succession, especially when this corporate life +is founded on the events themselves. This latter case +presents the means best adapted for the traditionary +transmission of facts, and one in which it is hardly possible +that they should fail of being accurately transmitted +within a reasonable interval of time. This was +precisely the position occupied by the Christian Church +during the first century of its existence respecting the +chief events in the life of its founder. +</p> + +<p> +An example will illustrate this: If there had been no +written memorials of the life of John Wesley, there can +be no doubt that the society which he founded would +have handed down to the present day an account of the +chief events of his life, which would have been accurate +in its main outlines. Thousands of persons are now +living who have conversed with those who have heard +<pb n='391'/><anchor id='Pg391'/> +him preach; I myself have done so. It would therefore +be impossible to impose upon them a wholly +mythic account in place of that which would have been +handed down by the Wesleyan body. Yet this society +is founded on a set of dogmas, not on the historical +facts of its founder's life. The Christian Church therefore +was in a far superior position for preserving a substantially +accurate account of the chief events in the +life of Jesus Christ, yet the interval which separates us +from the death of Wesley is greater than that which +elapsed between the death of Christ, and the publication +of the latest of the Synoptic Gospels, even if we +accept the dates which are assigned to them by our +opponents. +</p> + +<p> +6. When the knowledge of past events has perished, +it is impossible to re-construct them by the aid of conjecture, +except within the limits to which I have previously +alluded. These limits must be strictly defined, +otherwise that which is propounded as history becomes +nothing else than a statement of our subjective impressions. +Conjectures which cannot stand the test of +historical verification cannot be accepted as facts of +history. +</p> + +<p> +Nothing is easier than, when facts are wanting, to +invent them, and thus bridge over the intervals which +lie between others, the connecting links of which have +perished. But how are we to know that such conjectural +events were real facts, and not mere creations of +the imagination? Clearly this can be determined in +no other way than by subjecting them to a rigid verification. +If they will not endure this, they must be +rejected. Historical conjectures have no higher claims +for acceptance than scientific ones. Both must be subject +to the same tests, and must share the same fate. +I do not deny that many such conjectures may have a +<pb n='392'/><anchor id='Pg392'/> +considerable degree of plausibility; but, unless we +rigidly reject from the rank of historic facts those that +break down under the test of verification, histories will +be converted into novels or poems. If our knowledge +of the connecting links between events in the history +of the past has perished, we shall not improve it by +imagining facts, and calling the result by the name of +history. +</p> + +<p> +We cannot be too guarded in this particular subject, +because an almost boundless license has been introduced +into the present controversy. Pure creations of +the imagination, which it is impossible to verify, are +constantly propounded as facts in the history of the +past. I by no means wish to deny that both parties +must plead guilty to the charge of this species of historical +forgery. The fact may be unpleasant, but we +shall do no good by refusing to recognize it. When +the knowledge of past events has perished, and our +conjectures break down under the test of verification, +we have nothing to do but to remain content with our +ignorance. +</p> + +<p> +If these principles are correct, a considerable number +of recently published lives of Jesus, and other similar +compositions, have no claim to the designation of historical +writings. They are mere novels evolved out of +the self-consciousness of their authors. They are nothing +but simple imaginations of what, under certain +conjectural circumstances, might have happened, but +are destitute of all evidence that they actually occurred. +If history is thus degraded, it must become devoid of +all scientific value. I have pressed this point because +nowhere is this license of conjectural guessing at events +more largely indulged in, than in questions connected +with the Bible and its criticism. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='393'/><anchor id='Pg393'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XVIII. The Testimony Of The Church, And Of St. Paul's Epistles, +To The Facts Of Primitive Christianity. Their +Historical Value Considered.</head> + +<p> +I have in the preceding chapter drawn attention to +the chief principles of historical evidence, and to the +importance of certain classes of historical documents; +also to the important bearing which the continued existence +of a great institution like the Christian Church +has on this subject, especially as its origin can be +traced up to a definite period of history. I have +further shown that as the Church gives a definite +account of its origin, which, if true, is an adequate +one; it is incumbent on those who reject this account +to propound another which shall be able to stand the +application of the principles of a sound philosophy of +human nature. I must now consider the evidence +which the existence of the Church as a visible institution, +and the Epistles of St. Paul, afford to the great +facts on which Christianity is based. +</p> + +<p> +If it can be proved beyond question that the Church +immediately after it assumed a distinctive form not only +believed in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, as one +among many miraculous facts, but affirmed that the +belief in its truth was the one sole ground of its corporate +existence, within a very short interval after the +date of His crucifixion, it must be admitted, even by +<pb n='394'/><anchor id='Pg394'/> +unbelievers, to involve a question of the most serious +importance. It proves for certain that the belief in +one miracle, and that the greatest of all recorded in +the Gospels, was neither a mythic nor a legendary +creation. It further follows that if the original followers +of Jesus thought that He had risen from the +dead, it may be taken as a moral certainty that they +must have believed that other supernatural actions +were performed by Him during His life. The solution +which unbelievers propound as the account of the +origin of the miraculous narratives in the Gospels is +that they are a gradual creation of a mythic and legendary +spirit. Hence their efforts to assign them to the +latest possible date. If their publication can be deferred +to the early years of the second century, they +consider that this would afford the requisite time for +surrounding the history of Jesus with a halo of mythic +and legendary environment. But if it can be shown +that the new-born Christian Church, within a short interval +after the Crucifixion, affirmed that the sole +ground of its renewed life was the belief in the Resurrection +of its founder, the possibility that such +belief could have been either mythic or legendary is +taken away. Whatever may be urged about the other +parts of the story, there remains one miracle (and that +the greatest of all), which it is impossible to affirm +to have been either a mythical or a legendary creation. +If the Church accepted it as the sole ground of its existence, +and if that belief can be traced to the hour of +its birth, it must have been due either to some species +of delusion, or to a fact. If Jesus was thus believed to +have risen from the dead, it is useless to assign the +belief in His other miracles to a later legendary spirit. +</p> + +<p> +But further: The Church, within a short number of +years from the date of its birth, must have had all the +<pb n='395'/><anchor id='Pg395'/> +consciousness that it was a young society. It was +engaged in a constant struggle for existence, and had +before it the alternative of enlarging its numbers, or +perishing. A new society constantly struggling for +existence could not fail within this interval of time +to have the most lively consciousness of what it was to +which it owed its origin, and which formed the bond of +union among its members. It must have been to +them a constantly recurring thought. Every one +must have known that it was an alleged miraculous +fact, a supposed Resurrection of one who had been +crucified. Was it possible for the members of such a +society to avoid looking back with anxiety on the +alleged ground of its existence? It was no dogma +capable of endless discussion, but a fact. The bond +of union was allegiance to a living person. Is it +conceivable that this person was not the object of +daily interest to its members, or that they did not +make His history the subject of earnest inquiry? +Can we suppose for one moment that any of them were +ignorant of or had forgotten the grounds on which +they had joined the new community, or which formed +the basis of its life? The recollections of the members +of a society which is only between twenty and thirty +years old must be fresh. +</p> + +<p> +But it may be said, these people were very credulous. +Be it so. Credulous people placed in the circumstances +of the Christian Church are never deficient in curiosity. +Even if the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus had +originated in credulity, the first principles of human +nature would have urged them to get all the information +which they could respecting it. They were in the +exact position to enable them to do this. Within ten, +twenty, thirty, or forty years, there must have been +plenty of information at hand to enable them to ascertain +<pb n='396'/><anchor id='Pg396'/> +whether the society to which they belonged did +or did not owe its existence to this belief, and to get +full information as to the general outline of the story +on which it was founded. It is impossible for members +of a society whose origin was so recent to have +remained ignorant of the circumstances which gave it +birth. They must have been handed down by a lively +tradition. I conclude therefore, that it would have +been simply impossible for the members of the Church, +within this short time, to be mistaken as to whether +its existence and continued life was due to the belief +that its founder had risen from the dead, or whether +He was supposed to have worked miracles during His +life; and that its belief could not have been due to +mythic or legendary causes. +</p> + +<p> +The question before us then, becomes clear and +definite, freed from the vagueness with which it has +been endeavoured to obscure it. If it can be proved +that the Christian Church owed its origin to its belief +in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and that its +renewed life began within the briefest interval after +His crucifixion, the whole discussion becomes narrowed +into the following issue: Is it possible that such a +belief, within so short a time after His death, could have +originated in a fiction? Three alternatives are open +for our acceptance, and three only; either: +</p> + +<p> +Jesus did not really die, while his followers supposed +that He had, and they mistook some appearance of Him +after His crucifixion for a resurrection: +</p> + +<p> +Or they imagined that He appeared to some of them +after His death, but the appearance was a delusion of +their imaginations: +</p> + +<p> +Or He rose from the dead as an objective fact. +</p> + +<p> +Other alternatives there are none; and with respect +to this particular miracle, the whole apparatus of myth, +<pb n='397'/><anchor id='Pg397'/> +legend, development and compromise, which is so +liberally used to account for the supernatural portions +of the Gospels, is simply worthless as a rational account +of the origin of the story. +</p> + +<p> +A very bold affirmation has been made, that no contemporary +testimony can be adduced for the performance +of any miracle recorded in the New Testament. +This assertion is founded on the supposition that none +of the Gospels can be proved to have been written +earlier than the end of the first, or the beginning of +the second century. It is alleged that they are of +very uncertain authorship, that two of them do not +profess to communicate anything but second-hand +information; and the proof of the early composition +of the other two utterly fails. The three first Gospels +being thus quietly assigned to the region of myths +and legends, and the fourth affirmed to be a forgery, it +is asserted that contemporary evidence for the truth +of the supernatural narratives of the Gospels wholly +disappears. +</p> + +<p> +What then is contemporaneous testimony to a fact? +Few persons who actually witness events compose +histories of them. There is scarcely an account of a +great battle which has been composed by the general +who commanded in it; and when such accounts have +been published by persons who were actually present, +they could have witnessed but a small portion of the +events which they describe. Such is the case with the +great mass of facts which constitute the history of the +past. The chief actors in them are seldom the historians. +</p> + +<p> +But although such persons rarely compose narratives +of events at which they were actually present, yet it is +quite possible to possess testimony which for all practical +purposes is of equal value. As I have already +pointed out, such testimony consists of historical documents +<pb n='398'/><anchor id='Pg398'/> +composed by persons who lived during the time +in question, and who had ample means of procuring +information from those who must have known the truth +of the occurrences. +</p> + +<p> +We possess contemporaneous testimony of the highest +order in the Epistles of St. Paul. I have already +observed that no documents are of higher historical +value than letters composed by persons actively engaged +in the events to which they refer. I must now point +out specifically the importance of these letters as historical +documents. +</p> + +<p> +First: four of the longest of them are admitted, by +every school of unbelievers, who have given any consideration +to the subject, to be the genuine productions +of the Apostle. The evidence, both external and +internal, of his authorship, is of the highest character. +If it is not valid to prove that they were written by +him, all historical certitude is rendered impossible. +They are the two to the Corinthians, and those addressed +to the Romans and the Galatians. Their importance +is greatly enhanced by their presenting to us a more +distinct picture of the innermost life of the Apostle +than any others which have been attributed to him. +To these may be added four more, viz. the two to the +Thessalonians, and those to the Philippians and to +Philemon, which, although doubted by some, are yet +fully admitted by other unbelievers, among whom is +Renan, to be genuine. The internal evidence that the +Epistles to the Philippians and to Philemon were +written by the same person who composed those to the +Corinthians and Galatians, is as strong as such evidence +can possibly be. The whole form of thought is instinct +with the presence of the same mind. Nor can the two +to the Thessalonians admit of any reasonable doubt. +To these follow the two to the Colossians and the +<pb n='399'/><anchor id='Pg399'/> +Ephesians, for which the evidence is certainly less +strong; but Renan admits that it greatly preponderates +on the side of their being genuine productions of St. +Paul. Altogether, then, we have eight letters which +are undoubtedly his, and two more which are probably +so; instinct with his mind, and placing before us a +vivid picture of the innermost life of the early Church. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly, as to their date. Six of them were unquestionably +written within twenty-eight years after +the crucifixion, by the most active agent in the propagation +of Christianity, who had been employed in this +work for a period of at least eighteen years previously. +Let us consider what such a period of time really +means. Twenty-eight years is about the period which +lies between the present year and the repeal of the +corn-laws. While some of those who effected it have +passed away, many of those who took a most active part +in it are still living. All the events connected with it +lie within the period of the most lively historical recollection. +Many persons are still alive who can look +back with the most perfect reminiscence to the great +events of the anti-corn-law agitation. While these persons +live, it will be impossible to encircle the chief actors +in it with a halo of myth or legend. In precisely the +same position must multitudes have stood to the +ministry of Jesus Christ, and the foundation of the +Christian Church, when these Epistles were written. +The fact is worthy of our deepest attention, that when +we read these letters and the various statements they +contain, we are in the immediate presence of some of +the most important events in history. +</p> + +<p> +Although St. Paul had never seen Jesus himself, yet +his age was such when he wrote these letters, that his +recollection was good for many years before the commencement +of His ministry. Great numbers of persons +<pb n='400'/><anchor id='Pg400'/> +also were alive whose recollections of events that +occurred at a much earlier date must have been distinct +and clear. With the early followers of Jesus he had +for not less than twenty years every facility for holding +communication. Is it to be believed that a man whose +entire being was swallowed up in one continuous +sacrifice of himself to Jesus Christ, and who was penetrated +with the profoundest love towards Him, had not +accurately informed himself of the great facts of His +earthly life, when during the last twenty years he had +enjoyed every means of obtaining information from His +followers, and previously had investigated it with the +keen scent of an angry persecutor? The idea is incredible. +In these letters of St. Paul therefore, as far +as they throw light on this subject, we are in the +presence of contemporaneous historical evidence of the +highest order. +</p> + +<p> +Thirdly: Although these letters were written within +so brief an interval after the Crucifixion as from twenty-five +to thirty years, yet they afford evidence which carries +us up to a much earlier period. St. Paul's conversion +dates at least eighteen years earlier than the earliest of +them. His testimony therefore is good as to the general +nature of the beliefs of the Christian Church during the +whole period of his ministry. It proves, among many +other things, this all-important point, that the Resurrection +of Christ was believed by the whole Christian +community, and formed the groundwork of the existence +of the Church, within less than ten years +after the crucifixion. But the Apostle's hostile connection +with the Christian sect dates still earlier. As +a persecutor he must have ascertained what were the +leading subjects of the Christian belief, and must have +subjected the whole matter to a rigid investigation. +Above all, he could not have failed to know whether +<pb n='401'/><anchor id='Pg401'/> +the belief in the Resurrection of Christ was or was not +from its commencement the ground of the renewed life +of the Christian Church. +</p> + +<p> +Every consideration must have induced him when +a persecutor to make this entire question the subject +of a most careful investigation. Nothing was more +important than that he should ascertain whether any +considerable interval had elapsed between the Crucifixion +of Christ and the propagation of the report of +His Resurrection; and his means of ascertaining the +truth about it must have been complete. To determine +this for certain would have been most important in his +work of convicting the founders of the new sect of imposture; +for if any considerable time had elapsed +between the death and reported resurrection, it would +have afforded that of which all the theories of +unbelief stand in need, a sufficient interval for the +delusion to grow and propagate itself; or, if the belief +was the result of fraud, for the imposition to be +concocted and spread. St. Paul's testimony therefore +affords the most conclusive proof that the belief in the +Resurrection as a fact was contemporaneous with the +foundation of the Church; that it was the cause of its +renewed vitality; that no interval could have elapsed +between the death of Jesus and His reported resurrection, +sufficient for the growth of myth or legend, the +fabrication of an imposture, or the gradual spreading +of the hallucinations of a single individual among a +multitude of persons. In one word, if the belief in +the Resurrection originated in the conversion of some +subjective delusion into an objective fact, it must have +been one which spread with incomprehensible rapidity. +</p> + +<p> +These letters also form the most convincing proof, +not only that the Resurrection was universally believed +as a fact by the communities to which they were +<pb n='402'/><anchor id='Pg402'/> +addressed, but that it was accepted by the individual +members of these Churches from the first commencement +of their Christianity. Although two of these +Churches had been planted by St. Paul, that of the +Romans was not planted by him, and was of considerable +standing when he wrote the letter. Its fame +had spread throughout the whole Christian world. +Everything in the Epistle denotes that its Christianity +was of no recent growth. Many of these Churches, +especially the Jewish portions of them, could carry +their recollections up to a much earlier time. It +should be carefully observed that the interval of twenty-eight +years from the foundation of a sect is a period +wholly insufficient for the growth of an hereditary and +otiose faith. The majority of the members of these +Churches were beyond all doubt actual converts, who +had once been either Jews or Pagans. However +credulous we may suppose them to have been, their +conversion must have been due to an inquiry of some +kind. The short period which had elapsed since the +foundation of the Church and the supreme interest +which the whole of the events and circumstances must +have excited in the converts, were precisely what was +requisite for preserving traditionary recollections with +the utmost soundness. There could have been no +doubt in any of their minds whether or not the belief +in the Resurrection was the groundwork of their +Christianity. They must have known therefore whether +it was a story which had gradually spread, or had existed +from the beginning; or whether the peculiar +form of it was an invention of St. Paul; or whether it +was the foundation of the convictions of those by whom +they had been converted. The manner in which the +fact of the Resurrection is referred to in these Epistles +proves that the belief was of no recent growth, but had +<pb n='403'/><anchor id='Pg403'/> +existed from the beginning. The Epistle to the +Romans opens with these words:—<q>Concerning His +Son Jesus Christ ... who was declared to be the Son of +God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, <emph>by +the resurrection from the dead</emph>.</q> It is impossible that a +writer could have made such a reference as this at the +opening of his letter, unless he had been certain that +the belief in the Resurrection had been accepted as +a fact by those whom he addressed, and by the whole +Christian community with whom they were acquainted. +</p> + +<p> +But further: it is utterly incredible that if the converts +accepted the fact of the Resurrection of Jesus +Christ as the foundation of their Christianity, they +should have contentedly remained ignorant of the facts +of His previous history, at a period when there must +have been abundant means of obtaining an acquaintance +with it. +</p> + +<p> +Fourthly: the value of these letters as historical +documents is greatly increased by the fact that a strong +spirit of party existed in the Churches. None are +more ready to accept the fact that the Church was +divided into a number of parties than the opponents of +Christianity. Not only have they admitted it, but for +their own purposes they have greatly exaggerated it. +But it is a weapon which can be used in defence of +Christianity more efficaciously than in opposition to it. +It is clear on the face of these letters not only that the +Churches were divided into parties, but that party-spirit +existed in them with considerable violence. It +is needless for the purpose of the present argument to +ascertain the number of the parties into which some of +the Churches were divided; but these letters, confirmed +as they are by incidental references in the Acts of the +Apostles, leave no doubt that the opposition between +St. Paul and those who followed his teaching, and a +<pb n='404'/><anchor id='Pg404'/> +powerful Judaizing party in the Church, was of a very +decided character; that this party had a great dislike +to the person of the Apostle; and that he himself denounced +them as corrupters of the fundamental principles +of the Gospel. They make it quite clear that +even in the Churches of which he was the founder, the +Apostle was far from having it all his own way. Judaizing +teachers had made very considerable progress in +alienating the Galatian Churches from him. His letter +to these Churches discusses the entire question between +him and his opponents, who actually went the length +of denying his apostolical authority. In the Church of +Corinth also there was a powerful Judaizing party, who +affirmed that he was no true Apostle. In this Church +there were also other parties who designated themselves +by the names of particular leaders in various +degrees of opposition to St. Paul. It is evident that +these parties must have derived their views of Christianity +from a source quite independent of the Apostle. +Portions of the first and not less than half of the +second Epistle are occupied by St. Paul in setting +forth his claims in opposition to these leaders. It is +altogether a mistake to suppose that these Churches +were disposed to accept his assertions without question, +as equivalent to oracles from Heaven. On the contrary, +Judaizing teachers habitually followed his steps, +and to some extent succeeded in subverting the faith +even of his own converts. +</p> + +<p> +Nothing can more enhance the value of these letters +as historical documents than the existence of this party-spirit +in the Churches to which they were addressed. +If St. Paul had written them to none but devoted admirers, +as is frequently the case with the leaders of +religious sects, his assertions might have been open to +grave suspicion. It might have been urged that such +<pb n='405'/><anchor id='Pg405'/> +persons were ready to accept anything and everything +which he affirmed. But nothing is more keen-eyed +than religious party-spirit in detecting and denouncing +the false positions of an opponent, even when it is +sufficiently ready to accept everything which makes in +its own favour. So strong was the opposition to the +Apostle, that in two of these Churches, as we have +seen, a powerful party existed who went the extreme +length of denying his right to the apostolic office. +Yet these letters were not only intended to be read to +the whole Church, but portions of them are directly +addressed to the opponents in question. What +guarantee of the truthfulness of statements can compare +with this? The Apostle's letters are openly read +in the presence of the opposing party, before the +assembled Church, challenging them to impugn his +statements. It will perhaps be objected that we have +no record of the discussion which followed the reading +of his letters, and of the results attending it. The +second Epistle to the Corinthians has preserved some +of those results, though it is plain that an opposing +party still continued. This Epistle is a very strenuous +attack on them. The man who had the moral courage +to write such letters as the second to the Corinthians +and that to the Galatians, to be openly read in the +presence of his adversaries, must have been well +assured of the goodness of his cause. Common sense +alone would have suggested to him not to make in +them statements which were sure to receive direct and +instant contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +It is clear, therefore, that certain points on which +these letters make very definite statements must have +been held in common by St. Paul and his opponents. +If it had not been so, it is impossible that the letters +could have been written in their present form. The +<pb n='406'/><anchor id='Pg406'/> +Christianity on which the two parties agreed beyond +all doubt, concentrated itself around the Messianic +character of Jesus. The letters themselves make the +points on which they disagreed sufficiently obvious, +centering as they did on the necessity of observing the +rites of the Mosaic law in the Christian Church. But +the Epistles contain a vast number of allusions to other +subjects, not a few of which are of a very incidental +character. What is the only legitimate inference which +can be deduced from this circumstance? Obviously +that the Apostle wrote them with the fullest conviction +that his statements on these subjects would be +accepted by his opponents as part of their joint belief; +and not only by them, but by all the members of the +Church. It is inconceivable that a man of the mental +calibre of St. Paul should have written letters such as +those to the Corinthians and Galatians, abounding as +they do with references to facts and doctrines, if he +had not been fully persuaded that they constituted the +common faith of himself and those to whom he wrote. +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible to over-estimate the historical importance +of letters like these, when in this incidental +manner they contain numerous references to facts and +opinions, and to the actual controversies then existing +in the Church. The form in which they are made constitute +us almost as adequate judges of their value as +if we were able to interrogate their author. We have +him, in fact, in the witness-box before us, and can narrowly +scrutinize his mental character. They can leave +no doubt on our minds as to whether the allusions were +incidental, or made for a purpose. The value of letters, +written by persons who have impressed on them the +image of their own inner life and character, and referring +at the same time to current events and opinions, +is now universally acknowledged as the best means +<pb n='407'/><anchor id='Pg407'/> +of correcting the mistakes and misrepresentations of +formal histories. But when we take into consideration +that these letters of St. Paul are outpourings of his +inmost mind, intended not only for admiring friends, +but for scrutinizing opponents, we have before us historical +evidence of the highest order. +</p> + +<p> +Fifthly: The Apostle presents himself to us in these +letters in the fullest outbursts of his heart. We have +the whole man before us, intellectually, morally, and +religiously. Probably no eight letters exist in all +literature, from which it is possible to construct in +equal fulness the mental portraiture of the writer. +Nowhere can we find stronger bursts of feeling. He +was a man of deep sensibility, united with the firmest +resolve. His sacrifice of self, and complete freedom +from all selfish aims, is exceeded by only one character +in history. Who can read these letters through, +and question the sincerity of the writer? Can any one +believe that he was not true to his convictions, or that +he was capable of deliberately stating what he knew to +be false? If the facts were not as he has stated them, +the only possible alternative is that he was the prey of +an hallucination. Yet in every detail of business, and +in disposing of all practical questions, his judgment +was of the soundest character. +</p> + +<p> +There is one remarkable fact which these letters +bring out distinctly, which is probably true of no other +man that ever lived. The Apostle claimed to decide +certain questions authoritatively in virtue of a divine +guidance which he possessed. He gave that decision +on two points, having the closest bearing on the daily +life of the Christians of that day, and which excited +deep conscientious scruples. These were: whether the +obligation of observing certain days was binding on the +<pb n='408'/><anchor id='Pg408'/> +Christian conscience, and whether it was unlawful to +eat meat which had been offered in sacrifice to a +heathen god. On each of these points he gives his +own apostolical decision; yet in the very act of doing +so, he directly enjoins that the conscientious scruples +of those who could not acquiesce in it should be respected. +Can this be said of any other man who thought +that he possessed a supernatural guidance? Enthusiastic +he was; but his was an enthusiasm which did +not blind his judgment. He was a man, too, of a +highly delicate mind, yet capable of using a refined +sarcasm in dealing with his opponents. We have the +whole man before us, and his entire character renders +him a witness of the highest order. +</p> + +<p> +As modern unbelievers refuse to allow us to appeal +to the Gospels as historical documents, it becomes a +matter of the highest importance to ascertain what +facts in connection with the origin of Christianity and +the beliefs of the earliest followers of Jesus can be +established with the aid of these letters. Unbelievers +cannot dispute that they are the authentic writings of +the most active agent in the propagation of Christianity, +who has contributed more to its permanent establishment +than any other of the disciples of Jesus. This +being so, it is impossible to deny that they are contemporary +historical records of the highest value. Our +opponents demand contemporary testimony, and we +present them with the Epistles of St. Paul. In pursuing +this argument, it will be my duty to forget that we +Christians consider that the man who wrote them had +a supernatural guidance, and to use them as I would +the letters of Cicero. I will proceed to examine their +testimony. +</p> + +<p> +First: It has been asserted, with a view of weakening +<pb n='409'/><anchor id='Pg409'/> +the evidence of the supernatural portions of the New +Testament, that although its writers have reported +miracles as wrought by others, not one of them has +affirmed that he himself ever performed one. +</p> + +<p> +I reply that St. Paul distinctly affirms that he believed +he wrought miracles. <q>Truly,</q> says he, <q>the signs of +an apostle were wrought among you in all patience, in +signs, and wonders, and mighty deeds.</q> (2 Cor. xii. 12.) +He here affirms that such a power was possessed not +only by himself, but by other Apostles also. The +power to perform <q>signs, wonders, and mighty deeds</q> +was directly connected with the apostolic office. +</p> + +<p> +Again, he says to the Galatians (iii. 5), <q>He that +ministereth to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles +among you.</q> In this reference he evidently means +himself, and affirms that he had performed miracles in +Galatia. +</p> + +<p> +In the Epistle to the Romans he makes the following +affirmation: <q>For I will not dare to speak of +any of those things which Christ hath not wrought +by me, to make the Gentiles obedient, by word and +deed, through mighty signs and wonders, by the +power of the Spirit of God; so that from Jerusalem, +and round about unto Illyricum, I have fully preached +the Gospel of Christ.</q> (Rom. xv. 18, 19.) Here then +we have St. Paul's direct affirmation that in his own +opinion, throughout the mission in question, he had +been in the habit of performing <q>mighty signs and +wonders.</q> After these passages it is needless to quote +further. The Apostle deliberately affirms to the Corinthians +and Galatians that he performed miracles, and +the whole passage makes it clear that he supposed +they would fully recognize the fact of his having done +so. Of course this affirmation does not prove that +they were real miracles; but it does prove that he +<pb n='410'/><anchor id='Pg410'/> +and those to whom he wrote thought that they were +so. Not less distinct is his affirmation to the Romans. +These passages further distinctly prove that it was +an accepted belief in the Churches when the Apostle +wrote, and even at a much earlier period, that supernatural +manifestations attended the early preaching of +Christianity. It follows therefore that the invention +of miraculous stories was not due to a later mythic and +legendary spirit. This the statement made by the +Apostle in his Epistle to the Romans distinctly proves; +for he evidently considered that he had been in the +habit of performing miracles up to the very time when +he wrote the letter, and during the whole course of +his preceding ministry. Also the affirmation that +miracles were the signs of an Apostle, and admitted to +be such, is a strong corroboration of the statement +made by the Synoptics that our Lord was supposed to +have conferred such powers on the Apostles; and as it +is simply incredible that any should have believed that +He conferred on the Apostles powers which He did +not exercise himself, it carries up the belief of the +Church that Jesus was a professed worker of miracles +to the very first years of Christianity. I am quite +aware that these beliefs of the Church do not prove +these miracles to have been real ones. But they do +prove that the belief in their actual performance was +contemporary with the birth of Christianity itself. +They therefore could not have originated, as the opponents +of Christianity are never weary of assuming, in a +mythic or legendary spirit; for myths and legends require +a considerable time to grow; and it is impossible +that they can encircle an eminent character with an +unreal halo till after those who witnessed his actions +and personally know him are silent in the grave. But +in the case before us we have affirmations of St. Paul +<pb n='411'/><anchor id='Pg411'/> +respecting himself, which put the whole apparatus of +myths and legends out of the question. If then this +belief in the manifestation of a supernatural power in +connection with Christianity dates thus early, there +are only three modes in which it is possible to account +for it, viz. that it was due to deliberate and conscious +imposture; or that Jesus and His immediate +followers laboured under a delusion when they thought +that they performed miracles; or that they were really +wrought. As no one now-a-days pretends to maintain +the truth of the first alternative, we may dismiss it +from further consideration. +</p> + +<p> +But it will be asserted that St. Paul does not mention +any specific miracles which he considered that he had +performed, and that his statements are merely general. +I reply that such a mode of statement is precisely what +we should expect to find in a letter of this kind, and is +just the one which would be adopted by a person who +was satisfied that those to whom he was writing were +as firmly convinced of the fact as he was himself.... A +formal and distinct description of the miracles which +he had performed would have been quite out of place +in a reference of this kind, and would have implied +that doubts respecting them existed on one side or the +other. Besides, the words which he uses embrace all +the different expressions by which the various kinds +and aspects of miracles are designated in the New Testament. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly: These letters also afford unquestionable +evidence that at the time when they were written both +the writer and those to whom he addressed them, were +firmly convinced that there was then actively operating +in the Church a number of supernatural manifestations +of a very peculiar character, and widely different from +any species of supernatural belief which has been current +<pb n='412'/><anchor id='Pg412'/> +before or since. I allude to the gifts of the Spirit, +to which the Apostle has so frequently alluded in these +Epistles, and of the nature of which he has in those to +the Corinthians given a distinct account, together with +definite rules to regulate their use. The reason why +he has given us a far more definite account of this class +of manifestations than of the other is obvious. In the +Church in question they had become the subjects of +ambitious rivalry, and under its influence some of them +had been perverted to pernicious uses. The whole subject +is definitely treated of in the 12th, 13th, and 14th +chapters of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, besides +a number of distinct references to it in other portions +of his writings. These assertions on the part of St. +Paul that both he and those to whom he wrote were +fully of opinion that supernatural powers were then +manifested in the Church, are so clear that they require +a most careful consideration. The following points respecting +them are proved by this Epistle. +</p> + +<p> +1. That St. Paul, and the various parties in the Corinthian +Church, however much they might disagree on +other points, fully believed that these supernatural +powers were <emph>then and there</emph> manifesting themselves in +the Church. This belief might have been a delusion, +but the letter proves beyond doubt that it was entertained +by the whole Church, including all its various +parties. +</p> + +<p> +2. That these gifts were earnestly coveted by the +various members of this Church; that many of them +made a very ostentatious use of them; and that stringent +rules were required to prevent their use from +degenerating into an abuse. +</p> + +<p> +3. Nine of these supernatural endowments are enumerated +by the Apostle. It is not clear whether the +list is intended to be exhaustive. Probably it is not; +<pb n='413'/><anchor id='Pg413'/> +but it is evident that the writer intended to enumerate +the chief of them. They are as follows: the gifts of +wisdom, knowledge, faith; gifts of healing (χαρίσματα +ἰαμάτων); working of miracles (ἐνεργήματα δυναμέων); +the gift of prophecy, those of discerning spirits; tongues +and interpretation. This list of gifts in a slightly +altered form is repeated no less than three times in the +same chapter. They are affirmed to be supernatural +endowments, qualifying the possessor for distinct functions +in the Church. It is worthy of particular remark, +as showing how free the Apostle was from contemplating +the subject with the eye of a credulous enthusiast, +that he distinctly asserts that they were designed for +a definite purpose only, and that when that was effected +they were to cease. A fanatic would certainly have +considered that they were destined to continue for +ever. This point is worthy of our deepest attention. +</p> + +<p> +4. The existence of a marked distinction between +these gifts is definitely affirmed by the Apostle. They +were not confined to a particular order of men, but +were spread over the entire community. They also +differed not only in kind but in degree. Some of them +subserved higher, others humbler purposes. The reason +for which they were given was the building up of the +Church into a distinctive community. When that was +effected they were to cease. +</p> + +<p> +5. The Apostle also most carefully points out that a +distinction of function existed between these various +supernatural endowments. This is a very important +consideration. Whether we view them as realities, or +as delusions, it is plain that this distinction of function +must have pointed to some corresponding facts well +known in the Church, at the time when the Epistles +were written. The possession of one of them by no +means implied that of another, although the subject-matter +<pb n='414'/><anchor id='Pg414'/> +upon which they operated was closely akin. +Thus the possession of the gift of tongues (whatever it +may have been), did not imply the possession of the +gift of interpretation. On the contrary, the rules which +the Apostle gives for the regulation of those gifts, as well +as his statements respecting them, prove that they were +a set of distinct manifestations, and were possessed very +often by different persons, and that the presence of the +one power by no means implied that of the other. +This must unquestionably point to the existence of a +remarkable phenomenon of some kind. Even if it is +supposed that St. Paul and those to whom he wrote +were labouring under a delusion, it proves that the +Apostle possessed a power of discrimination which is +not exhibited by an ordinary enthusiast or fanatic. +</p> + +<p> +A distinction which St. Paul affirms to have existed +between two of these gifts, viz. between the gifts of +healing and of miracles, deserves special attention. +That a real distinction existed between them is affirmed +three times over in the same chapter. Both of these +gifts, according to our present mode of viewing the +subject, would be confounded under the designation of +a power of working miracles. But it is clear from the +Apostle's statement, that he, and those to whom he +wrote, saw an appreciable distinction between them. +<q>To another,</q> says he, <q>are given the gifts of healing +by the same Spirit; to another the working of miracles.</q> +<q>But all these worketh that one and the self-same Spirit, +<emph>dividing to every man severally as he will</emph>.</q> (1 Cor. xii. +9-11.) Again, in summing up their relative importance, +he says: <q>thirdly teachers, after that miracles, <emph>then +gifts of healing</emph>,</q> (ver. 28); and again, as qualifying +individuals for particular offices: <q>Are all apostles? +are all prophets? <emph>are all workers of miracles? Have +all the gifts of healing?</emph></q> (ver. 29, 30.) Now although +<pb n='415'/><anchor id='Pg415'/> +we may deny that these phenomena were supernatural +in their character, it is plain that there must have been +something in existence in this Church corresponding to +them, and of which they were the supposed manifestation. +The Apostle and those to whom be wrote +evidently understood one another. +</p> + +<p> +What this distinction was it is now impossible accurately +to determine. As I have already observed, it +probably had reference to a higher and lower class of +miracles; those which were in the proper sense evidential; +and those which might in various degrees have +resembled the act mentioned by St. James, the anointing +a sick man with oil in the name of the Lord, the +offering fervent prayer for his recovery, and the gradual +cure of his complaint. Such would belong to a lower +class of miracles to which I have elsewhere alluded, as +rather fitted to procure a favourable attention to the +missionary than for evidential purposes. Be the distinction +what it may, and even supposing that St. Paul +and the Corinthians were under a delusion as to their +supernatural character, it is plain that some real +difference, which was clearly distinguishable, must +have existed in the outward manifestations. This is a +fact of very considerable importance, as it proves that +both the Apostle and the Corinthians were in a state +of mind in which they were capable of exercising a +clear discrimination between these gifts, which is the +last thing of which visionary and credulous enthusiasts +ever think. +</p> + +<p> +6. These gifts were likewise clearly separate in respect +to the subject-matter on which they operated. +The Apostle and the Corinthians supposed that they +communicated a supernatural illumination of some +kind; but the illumination conferred by one might +leave the possessor completely in the dark with respect +<pb n='416'/><anchor id='Pg416'/> +to the special subject-matter of the other. This is definitely +affirmed with respect to the gift of tongues, and +interpretation. A person might possess the former +and yet be altogether destitute of the latter. There +can be no doubt that the same analogy ran through +them all. This is affirmed when St. Paul asserts that +all these gifts were the work of one and the same Spirit +<emph>dividing to every man severally as he will</emph> (1 Cor. xii), +and is implied by the comparison which he institutes +between them and the members of the human body +and their respective functions. Thus: the power of +seeing furnishes no information in matters of sound; +nor the latter on the perceptions we derive through the +sense of smell. Equally functional were these gifts, +each being confined to its own proper subject-matter. +If the idea was that the possessor had an inspiration, +as far as respects the subject-matter of his gift, it conferred +on him no supernatural knowledge on matters +outside its special function. Thus a man who had the +gift of tongues might remain perfectly ignorant of the +interpretation of them, if he had not the latter gift. One +who possessed the power of discerning of spirits might +have been destitute of the power of working miracles. +One who had the gift of prophecy might have had +no illumination with respect to that special knowledge +which was conferred by the gift of wisdom. The inspiration +which was supposed to be conferred by them, +conferred no general infallibility—it was strictly functional +and did not extend beyond the limits of the +gift. +</p> + +<p> +All these points are of the highest importance in an +historical point of view. Whether we think that +St. Paul and the Corinthians were, or were not, under +delusions about this matter, they clearly prove that +there must have been phenomena of some kind which +<pb n='417'/><anchor id='Pg417'/> +were supposed to be the results of the gifts in question; +and that the persons who believed that they possessed +them exercised a discriminating judgment respecting +them. It is no less clear that they did believe that +they actually possessed them. Some of them were of +such a nature that it is difficult to comprehend how +the possessor could be under delusion on the subject. +Take for example the power of discerning spirits. +Once the possessor had it not. Afterwards he must +have believed that he possessed a supernatural insight +into the character of others. It is difficult to comprehend +how a man's consciousness could be deceived on +a point like this. He must have surely known whether +within a definite period of time he had obtained an insight +into character, which he did not possess before. +Everywhere in the account given us of these gifts we +seem to be dealing with facts. The distinctions laid +down as existing between them, and the separateness +of their functions are truly philosophical, supposing the +gifts to have been real, and were the last things which +were likely to have occurred to credulous enthusiasts. +</p> + +<p> +7. These gifts admitted of being abused. The possession +of them was not sufficient to confer any infallibility +in the use of them. This fact is worthy of deep +attention, not only as pointing to the reality of the +manifestations but to the soundness of the Apostle's +judgment. If these gifts had been mere inventions of +a credulous imagination they would have been represented +as guarded from the possibility of abuse by +the supernatural power in which they originated. +Even at the present day it is a very common idea that +the gift of inspiration cannot possibly be a functional +one which is limited to a definite subject-matter, but +that it must confer a general infallibility. Very different +were the views of St. Paul and of the Churches +<pb n='418'/><anchor id='Pg418'/> +to which he wrote. The Apostle was of opinion that +when they had been once conferred, they were subject +to the control of the will, and capable of a good or bad +use in the same manner as our ordinary faculties. His +statement is clear that in this Church they were used +in a manner little conducive to edification. In order to +suppress this abuse he adopted some stringent rules. +No person was to be allowed in the congregation to use +the gift of tongues (a gift which he was so far from +underrating that he thanked God that he possessed it +more largely than any other member of the Church), +unless there was some one present who had the gift of +interpretation. The gift of prophecy held the second +rank in point of importance. Yet from the eagerness of +its possessors to use it, confusion arose in the congregation; +and the Apostle was compelled to prescribe +rules for limiting its exercise and enforcing order +among the prophets. The more the account is studied +the stronger must be the conviction that it points to +actual phenomena, which were exhibited in the Apostolic +Churches; and that St. Paul, in his description +of them, exhibits the strongest indications of a sound +judgment. +</p> + +<p> +Such were the phenomena which the Apostle, and +those to whom he wrote, considered to be supernatural +manifestations. I observe respecting them: +</p> + +<p> +First: That it is clear that when St. Paul wrote +these Epistles, both he and those whom he addressed +were fully persuaded that certain supernatural manifestations +were then habitually present in the Church. +It is impossible to attribute this belief to the presence +of the mythic or legendary spirit. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly: It is clear from other statements in the +Epistles, not only that St. Paul firmly believed that he +himself was endowed with several of these supernatural +<pb n='419'/><anchor id='Pg419'/> +gifts, but that he had been the means of imparting +them to others. +</p> + +<p> +Thirdly: If we consider the nature of some of these +gifts, it is difficult to conceive that a man like St. Paul +could have been deceived respecting their reality. +Several of them involved accessions of mental power, +as for example the gift of wisdom, knowledge, and +discerning of spirits. He must have known that at +one time he had nothing but his natural endowments. +At a later period he must have believed that his +wisdom, knowledge, and power of discerning character +was increased. These must have been definite facts of +his mental consciousness. It is difficult to conceive +how delusion was possible, when in his treatment of +the entire subject he displays such clear indications of +sound judgment and common sense. +</p> + +<p> +Fourthly: It is necessary to suppose not only that +St. Paul was a prey to delusion on this subject—if we +deny that the gifts were real—but that a similar delusion +was spread over the entire Church. Its individual +members believed that they possessed them, no less +than the Apostle. Those who possessed only the lower +gifts were emulously desirous of possessing the higher +ones. They also made an ostentatious use of them. +Such are not the phenomena presented by enthusiasm. +Was it possible that considerable numbers of persons +should be deceived in supposing that they had acquired +particular mental endowments of which they well knew +that they had been previously destitute? +</p> + +<p> +Fifthly: While the phenomena under consideration +were unquestionably believed both by St. Paul and the +Corinthian Church to be supernatural manifestations, +yet it is a supernaturalism which differs in its entire +aspect and character from any other which has been +believed in by man. We may wander over the entire +<pb n='420'/><anchor id='Pg420'/> +regions of history and fable, and we shall fail to find +any belief in the supernatural, bearing the smallest +resemblance to it. It is most definitely contrasted +with that which has been ascribed to the contemporaries +of our Lord; and which I have considered in the +earlier portions of this work. Whence has come this +most striking contrast? If St. Paul and the members +of the Corinthian Church were a prey to the superstitious +beliefs above referred to, how was it possible +for them to have considered themselves to be living in +the midst of an atmosphere which presented so marvellous +a contrast. The gifts, if real, were precisely +suited to the wants of the Church, for building it up +into the great institution which it became. It required +accessions to its numbers from the populations in the +midst of which it lived. The two miraculous gifts, +even if they were not evidential, were fitted to draw +attention to its claims. Collected as its members were +from Judaism and Heathenism, without sufficient means +for their definite instruction, those who performed this +office were qualified for it by two gifts conferring +various degrees of enlightenment. Then there was the +prophet, who as an inspired preacher expounded and +enforced the truths of Christianity. Its members were +ill-qualified for public offices, owing to the low condition +of the society from which they sprang. Here again +were two mental endowments to supply the need, the +power of discerning spirits and the supernatural gift of +faith. All these gifts here enumerated, were the very +endowments suited for the building up of a body of +converts taken from such unpromising sources, into +the great society to which it speedily grew. A new +society had to be formed of a wholly different character +from any previously existing. It was designed to leaven +by new influences the state of religious, moral, and +<pb n='421'/><anchor id='Pg421'/> +political thought out of which it originated. The old +social organization met it with determined opposition. +The problem was how was it to be erected on such a +basis as would give it permanence? The Church of +Jesus Christ was to be a new moral creation in the +midst of effete society. An extensive communication +of endowments, such as are referred to in the Pauline +Epistles, was the very thing which was requisite to +accomplish this purpose. It came into existence; it +grew; it struggled; it conquered; it subverted the +old forms of civilization; it created new ones. These +are facts which require to be accounted for. The forces +referred to in these Epistles as in active energy before +the eyes of St. Paul and the members of these Churches, +were adequate to have effected this. Without some such +moral creation attending the first planting of Christianity, +the formation of this unique society out of the +various elements of which it was composed, and their +welding together into an organization instinct with life, +which has imbued with its principles all existing institutions, +must remain a problem which baffles all +the attempts of philosophy to solve. +</p> + +<p> +Lastly: These letters prove on the highest historical +evidence that a supernatural power was believed to be +manifested in the Church at the date of their composition, +wholly different from any kind of ordinary +current supernatural belief. Through the Acts of the +Apostles, its existence can be traced up to a still earlier +period. Two of these gifts, but two only, involved a +power which we should now designate as essentially +miraculous. This being so, the testimony of St. Paul, +involving as it does that of the entire Church, is express +as to the belief of contemporaries that miracles were +actually performed. We can trace this belief up to the +first origin of Christianity. If Jesus was believed to +<pb n='422'/><anchor id='Pg422'/> +have endowed His followers with this power, it is impossible +to believe that He was not supposed to have +possessed it himself. These Epistles therefore are +evidence that the earliest followers of Jesus believed +that He was a worker of miracles. So far the proof is +complete that the ascription of miracles to Jesus and +His original followers was not due to the imagination +of subsequent generations. +</p> + +<p> +The careful perusal of these Epistles can leave only +one impression on the mind of the reader, that he is in +the presence of facts of an unquestionably historical +character. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='423'/><anchor id='Pg423'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XIX. The Evidence Furnished By The Epistles To The Facts +Of Our Lord's Life, And To The Truth Of The Resurrection.</head> + +<p> +I have proved in the last chapter that St. Paul and +those to whom he wrote his Epistles firmly believed +that a number of supernatural manifestations were displaying +themselves in the Church under their immediate +observation, and that their presence can be traced up +to a much earlier date. I have also shown that St. Paul +asserts in the most positive language that he was persuaded +that he wrought miracles during the whole +course of his mission. It is therefore in the highest +degree probable that the servant was convinced +that he did by the divine power of his Master that +which he believed that his Master had accomplished +before him; in other words, that he was a worker of +miracles. But as it has been asserted that St. Paul +knew only of a divine, and scarcely anything of a +human Jesus, that is to say, that he was to a great +extent ignorant of the events of our Lord's life, I must +inquire what light the Epistles throw on this subject; +for if it can be shown that St. Paul allowed himself to +be ignorant of the human life of Jesus, it lowers the +value of his testimony to the fact of the Resurrection. +</p> + +<p> +The ground of this affirmation is that the direct +references to the events of our Lord's life are few, and +that he chiefly dwells on the glorified aspect of it after +His Resurrection. The only passage, as far as I am +aware, which has been adduced as proving this strange +position is the following:—<q>He died for all, that they +<pb n='424'/><anchor id='Pg424'/> +which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, +but unto him which died for them and rose again. +Wherefore, henceforth know we no man after the flesh; +yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet +now henceforth know we him no more. Therefore, if +any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things +are passed away; behold all things are become new.</q> +2 Cor. v. 15-17. The utmost that this passage can +be made to prove is, that the belief in the Resurrection +of Christ had thrown an entirely new aspect over His +human life. The persons who had witnessed it had +not seen its true significance. This is what the +Synoptic Gospels plainly affirm to have been the case +even with the Apostles during His public ministry. +They had witnessed the events, but they had failed to +penetrate into their inner life. This is what the Apostle +means by <q>knowing Christ after the flesh,</q> <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> according +to the uniform meaning of that expression in +the New Testament, the knowing the events of His life +merely externally, as so many bare objective facts +devoid of spiritual significance. This he affirms would +be the mode in which neither he nor the Church would +in future contemplate this subject. The very words +which he uses imply that he and others had had this +knowledge of Jesus. But such a knowledge would +have been impossible without an intimate acquaintance +with the events of His human life. What he affirms is, +that he will contemplate them in future in their moral +and religions aspect. +</p> + +<p> +The affirmation that St. Paul was not thoroughly +acquainted with the details of our Lord's ministry, +and that after his conversion he was simply absorbed +in the contemplation of a divine Christ is incredible. +When we are asked to accept a startling proposition, +it is necessary that it should not offend against the first +<pb n='425'/><anchor id='Pg425'/> +principles of human nature. That a man like St. Paul +did not make accurate inquiries into the facts of his +Master's life is inconceivable. In his eyes His human was +the manifestation of His divine life. Did not the persecutor +Saul thoroughly inform himself respecting the life +and actions of Him whose divine mission he denied, +and whom he believed to be an impostor? Was not this +the obvious course to take, in order to enable him to +expose imposition, and to destroy the Church? On +the other hand, the converted Paul was animated by a +more intense love for Jesus than one man ever felt for +another. Is it conceivable that such love did not +impel him to treasure up in his bosom every reminiscence +which fell within his reach, and to inquire with the +most profound interest into the life and actions of him +who was become the object of his adoration? Is it +conceivable that the man who was incessantly inquiring +into the condition of his converts, made no inquiry +about the life and actions of his Master? +</p> + +<p> +The position of St. Paul, the ardour of his temperament, +the fierceness of his opposition, and the +intense self-sacrifice with which he afterwards consecrated +himself to Jesus Christ, falling into communication +as he must with persons who had witnessed His +earthly ministry, are sufficient proof that the Apostle +had used every available means of becoming acquainted +with the facts of His life. But in the Epistles themselves, +although owing to the circumstances which called +them forth, they contain few direct references to it, +the indirect allusions are quite sufficient to prove +that St. Paul and those whom he addressed, were in +possession of a number of facts respecting their +Master's life which formed the subject of a common +Christology. I am quite ready to admit that when the +Apostle wrote, none of our present Gospels were in +<pb n='426'/><anchor id='Pg426'/> +existence. The converts had to receive their instruction +orally, or from short written memoranda. But +instruction of some kind they must have had. Without +it, converts from Paganism could have known nothing +about Him to whom in the act of joining the Church +they professed allegiance; Jewish converts living in +Gentile cities, but little. As Christianity was not a +mere body of dogmas, like a philosophy, but consisted +in direct adhesion to a person, it is clear that it could +not be propagated at all without at the same time communicating +information respecting His history. The +early missionaries announced that Jesus was the Christ. +Such an announcement would have been meaningless +unless they had given an account of who Jesus was, +what He had done to claim the homage of those +addressed, and what was the nature of His office. +These considerations establish the fact that an oral +account of His life must have been handed down in the +Church prior to the publication of written Gospels, +sufficiently definite to constitute the Christianity of +the converts. The intimations contained in the Epistles +prove that such was the fact. +</p> + +<p> +First let us consider St. Paul's own positive assertions. +The most important is in 1 Cor. xv. <q>Moreover, +brethren, I declare unto you (γνωρίζω, I remind +you of, or refresh your memories respecting) the +Gospel (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) which I preached unto you, +which also ye have received, and wherein ye stand; +by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what +I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain. +For I delivered unto you first of all (ἐν πρώτοις, as +matter of prime importance) that which I also received, +how that Christ died for our sins according to the +Scriptures; and that He was buried, and that He rose +again the third day according to the Scriptures.</q> +</p> + +<pb n='427'/><anchor id='Pg427'/> + +<p> +Let it be observed that the subject which the +Apostle was here discussing with certain members of +this Church—the possibility of a resurrection of the +dead—led him to refer to the first principles of +Christianity as he had taught them. They denied the +truth of a material resurrection. St. Paul draws their +attention to the fact that Christianity as taught by +him consisted of a body of facts. The following points +are clearly deducible from the passage before us. +</p> + +<p> +1. The εὐαγγέλλιον, or message of good news, which +the Apostle had announced at his first preaching at +Corinth, consisted of a body of facts as distinct from +mere doctrinal teachings; and that whatever doctrines +he taught were built on them as a foundation. +</p> + +<p> +2. Among the facts of prime importance which he +announced, was the death, burial, and resurrection of +Christ. +</p> + +<p> +3. He states that in his preaching there were matters +of prime importance, of which Christ's death and +resurrection was one. It follows therefore that there +were other matters of prime importance, which his +present argument did not require him to notice. This +is obvious from the nature of the case: the announcement +of Christ's death and resurrection would have +been scarcely intelligible without the addition of a +great many other facts to give it meaning. But further, +the assertion that there were facts of prime importance, +implies that there were also points of secondary +importance, which he must have announced likewise, +or in other words, that the Gospel which he proclaimed +must have consisted of an account, more or less full, of +the human life of Jesus. +</p> + +<p> +4. This account the Apostle says that he delivered +to the Corinthian Church. The words imply that he +committed it in a formal manner to their keeping, as +<pb n='428'/><anchor id='Pg428'/> +the ground of their Christian instruction. This he +likewise affirms that he had no less formally received. +</p> + +<p> +5. As his statement respecting the Resurrection is +somewhat minute, the inference is, that the other +facts of prime importance were communicated with +equal detail. It is also fairly presumable that in his +oral communications the Apostle did not give a bare +list of the appearances of Jesus after his Resurrection, +but a detailed account of them; and so with respect to +his other facts. This his converts would naturally have +required him to do, if we suppose that they were only +animated by common curiosity. The less important +facts would be necessary to connect together those of +primary importance. In short, the Apostle's narrative +must have been what we may call a brief Gospel. +</p> + +<p> +6. As St. Paul states that one of the facts which he +committed to the Church was that Christ died for our +sins, it follows that he must have given an account of +his death more or less resembling those in our present +Gospels. +</p> + +<p> +7. One of the great facts which he delivered to the +Church, was that of the Resurrection of Christ. This +is the great miracle of Christianity; the one to which +it is expressly affirmed that the Church owes its being. +The Apostle's Gospel therefore contained a detailed +account of one great miracle. It is also fairly presumable +that among his other facts of primary or secondary +importance were accounts of supernatural occurrences +in the life of Jesus. +</p> + +<p> +8. The Apostle does not leave us without the means +of judging respecting the amount of matter in these +narratives of events in the life of Christ which he committed +to the Church. He has given us (in 1 Cor. +xi. 23-25) a formal account of the institution of our +Lord's Supper, quite as full as that contained in either +<pb n='429'/><anchor id='Pg429'/> +of our Gospels. This account he prefaces by the same +words which we have already considered, as denoting +the form or mode in which he received it, and delivered +it to the Church: <q>For I have received of the +Lord that which also I delivered unto you, that the +Lord Jesus the same night in which He was betrayed +took bread; and when He had given thanks He brake +it, and said, Take, eat; this is My body which is +broken for you. This do in remembrance of Me. After +the same manner also He took the cup, when He had +supped, saying, This cup is the New Testament in +My blood: this do ye as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance +of me.</q> This account varies in words, but it is +equal in minuteness, and substantially agrees with those +in our present Gospels; although it more nearly approaches, +while it is not precisely identical with that +of Luke, who is asserted in the Acts to have been the +companion of the Apostle. Judging therefore by this +example, the historical details which St. Paul committed +to the Church respecting the life of Jesus must +have been of considerable minuteness. +</p> + +<p> +8. Another fact in the life of our Lord is directly referred +to in these letters, His descent from the family +of David. <q>Who was made,</q> says the Apostle, <q>of +the seed of David, according to the flesh, and declared +to be the Son of God with power according to the +spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead.</q> +These words prove that St. Paul was in possession of +an account of the birth of Jesus, which in this particular +point was in agreement with that in St. Matthew's +and St. Luke's Gospels, and that it was known to the +members of the Church at Rome, and received by +them as true. He does not positively affirm that the +birth was supernatural; but his language clearly implies +it. It would be absurd in speaking of an ordinary +<pb n='430'/><anchor id='Pg430'/> +human birth to say that the person born was descended +from his ancestors, <q>according to the flesh.</q> +The natural meaning of such an expression is that +both the writer and those whom he was addressing +were well acquainted with an account of the supernatural +birth of Jesus, and accepted it as true. So far +their accounts and that in the Gospels agreed in the +main issue. +</p> + +<p> +9. One more reference must be added: <q>Jesus +Christ,</q> says the Apostle, <q>was made a minister of +the circumcision for the truth of God, to confirm the +promises made unto the fathers; and that the Gentiles +might glorify God for His mercy.</q> This passage not +only proves that the Apostle and those to whom he +wrote were in possession of an account of the circumcision +of Christ, but also that they well knew that His +ministry had been confined to the Jewish people, but +with the ultimate purpose of His being manifested to +the Gentiles. In these particulars it exactly corresponded +with the account given in our Gospels. +</p> + +<p> +10. There are also several passages in which the +Apostle directly refers to our Lord's teaching, and +clearly distinguishes it from his own. These references +uniformly agree with that which is attributed to Jesus +in the Synoptic Gospels, and prove that the Apostle +and the Church were in possession of details of it. +</p> + +<p> +Such are the direct references to the life of Jesus in +these Epistles. But there are numerous indirect references +which prove that the Apostle and those to whom +he wrote must have been acquainted with accounts of +the life of its Founder, which went into a considerable +degree of detail. I shall give a few instances: +</p> + +<p> +1. His preaching of the Gospel to the Thessalonians +is described as a proclamation that Jesus was the +Christ or Messiah. In one of the Epistles to this +<pb n='431'/><anchor id='Pg431'/> +Church he speaks of them as having been so powerfully +influenced that in consequence of it <q>they had +turned to God <emph>from idols</emph> to serve the living and true +God,</q> and <q>as having become <emph>followers of him and of +the Lord</emph>.</q> Among persons thus utterly ignorant of +Christianity, as they were when he first preached to +them, it would have been impossible to make an announcement +of this kind, or to set forth the Messianic +claims of Jesus, without laying before them a great +many of the details of His human life. The expression +above quoted, implies clearly that he had put his converts +in possession of such an account of the life of Christ +as to enable them to become <q>followers of the Lord.</q> +</p> + +<p> +2. These Epistles contain many definite assertions +as to the duty of imitating Christ. <q>Put ye on the +Lord Jesus Christ;</q> <q>As many as have been baptized +into Christ have put on Christ;</q> <q>Let every one +of us please his brother for his good unto edification, +for even so Christ pleased not himself;</q> <q>The God of +patience and consolation grant you to be like minded +one toward another, according to Christ Jesus;</q> <q>I +beseech you by the meekness and gentleness of Christ;</q> +<q>Ye have not so learned Christ;</q> <q>Be ye followers +of me, as I am of Christ.</q> Many other similar expressions +might be cited, but these are sufficient. +</p> + +<p> +First: I observe that the exhortation to put on the +character of another is meaningless, unless the persons +so exhorted were known to have been thoroughly acquainted +with the life and actions of him whom they +are urged to imitate. The same observation is true +when we are deliberately recommended to make another +person our example. Again, the exhortation to lay +ourselves out in efforts to please others for their good +to edification, on the ground that Christ pleased not +himself, would be without meaning, unless the writer +<pb n='432'/><anchor id='Pg432'/> +felt assured that those whom he addressed were in possession +of facts in the life of Christ, which exhibited +Him in the character of a sacrificer of self. So again, +the exhortation to patience, after the example of Christ, +is founded on the assumption that those whom the +Apostle was addressing were acquainted with details +which exhibited him as a model of patience. The +same remark is true with respect to the entreaty addressed +to the Corinthians by the meekness and gentleness +of Christ. They must have been acquainted +with actions of His which exhibited Him as supremely +meek and gentle. These and other indirect references +form an indisputable proof that the churches to whom +St. Paul wrote must have been in possession of a very +considerable number of details of the human life of +Jesus, in which a large portion of the instruction given +to those Churches consisted. This imparts to them a +far higher value than if they had been direct. It is +the mode universally adopted in genuine letters, where +the writer, and those to whom he writes, are freely +communicating to each other their inmost thoughts. +When one party is firmly persuaded that the other is +well acquainted with a certain set of events, they never +detail them formally, but simply refer to them in passing +allusions. Such allusions are the strongest possible +evidence that the events in question are the +common property of the writer and of those whom he +is addressing. +</p> + +<p> +The whole of these Epistles contain a continuous +body of references to the various aspects of our Lord's +divine and human character as it is depicted in +the four Gospels. The references to the former are +very numerous. They contain a Christianity of so +advanced a character as to resemble in all its great +features that which we read of in St. John's Gospel, +<pb n='433'/><anchor id='Pg433'/> +and which are only distinguishable from it, if distinguishable +at all, by the aid of minute criticism. I have +treated this subject at length in another work in +reference to its evidential value, and therefore need not +discuss it here. I shall only observe that the incidental +references in these Epistles to these subjects form the +strongest historical proofs that St. Paul and those to +whom he wrote were in possession of a sufficient number +of facts respecting the life of Jesus to enable them to +found on them a definite Christology; and that there +must have been well known in the Churches a general +outline of His human life, which must have been to their +members as recent converts a subject of the profoundest +interest. I fully admit that if Paul and the early +Christians, while centering their highest affections on +the glorified Christ, had been contented to remain in +ignorance of the facts of His human life, the value of +their testimony to the truth of the Resurrection would +have been greatly weakened. But the supposition is +not only untrue to human nature, but is contradicted +by the facts of the Epistles, which it is impossible not +to admit as documents of the highest historical value. +</p> + +<p> +I will now proceed to examine the evidence which +these Epistles afford to the truth of the Resurrection. +The references which they contain to this great miracle +of Christianity are extremely numerous, occurring in +some form or other in almost every page. Shall I not +say that their entire contents are written on the supposition +of its reality? They are of the most direct as +well as of the most incidental character. They make it +clear that the belief in it lay at the foundation of the +existence of the Church; that it was that which was +supposed to communicate its moral power to Christianity, +and that it was the source of the new spiritual life +of every individual believer. In the following passage +<pb n='434'/><anchor id='Pg434'/> +St. Paul distinctly pledges the truth of Christianity on +the reality of the fact: <q>And if Christ be not risen, +then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain; +yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because +we have testified of God that he raised up Christ, whom +he raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not, ... +and if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet +in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep +in Christ are perished. If in this life only we have +hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.</q> +(1 Cor. xv. 14, etc.) Whatever opinion may be formed +as to the genuineness of the other writings of the New +Testament, they give one consistent testimony that the +belief in the Resurrection was co-extensive with the +Church, and constituted the only ground of its existence. +How could it be otherwise? The Church, as a community, +was founded on the belief of the personal +Messiahship of Christ; a dead Messiah would have been +utterly worthless to it. Without a living Messiah to +form its centre the whole superstructure must collapse. +</p> + +<p> +The following are some of the most important points +which these letters prove as matters of fact respecting +the Resurrection. +</p> + +<p> +First: That the belief in it was co-extensive with the +entire Church. It was not the belief of any single +party in it, but of the whole community. +</p> + +<p> +This they establish on the most indisputable evidence. +The existence of various parties in the Church in direct +opposition to St. Paul proves beyond the possibility of +contradiction that it was the one belief respecting which +there was not the smallest diversity of opinion. If +these parties had not existed, it might have been urged +with some degree of plausibility that the testimony of +these letters was inconclusive, because all the members of +the Churches received servilely whatever St. Paul chose +<pb n='435'/><anchor id='Pg435'/> +to dictate. But as we have already seen, a powerful +party existed in both the Corinthian and Galatian +Churches, who summarily rejected his claim to apostolic +authority, maintaining that the twelve were the only +genuine Apostles. Nevertheless, the Epistles make it +clear that they must have believed in the Resurrection +quite as strongly as St. Paul did himself. +</p> + +<p> +Let us suppose for a moment that they doubted it. +How is it conceivable that St. Paul should have addressed +to them such letters as those to the Corinthians, +abounding everywhere with both direct and incidental +allusions to it as an acknowledged truth and as the +foundation of his reasonings? Would anyone in his +senses have thus exposed himself to instant denunciation +if he had supposed that there was the smallest doubt +respecting its reality in the minds of his opponents? +Would they not at once, if they had entertained it, +have made short work with the Apostle and his reasonings? +But the point is almost too clear to need any +argument. +</p> + +<p> +In one of the passages where he is discussing with them +the reality of his apostleship he urges as the foundation +of his claim to this office: <q>Have not I seen Jesus +Christ our Lord?</q> This reasoning is evidently founded +on the supposition that all the other Apostles professed +to have seen Him; and that none could have a valid +claim to the office who had not seen Him. But Paul +could only have seen Christ after the Resurrection; and +it was in virtue of an appointment from the risen Jesus +that he claimed to hold the office. If there had been +the smallest doubt in the minds of his opponents as to +the reality of the Resurrection, or if they had not been +persuaded that the Apostles, whose claims they set up +against those of St. Paul, affirmed that they had seen +Him also, this would at once have settled the controversy +<pb n='436'/><anchor id='Pg436'/> +and covered the Apostle with confusion before the +assembled Church. +</p> + +<p> +But if this reasoning requires any additional confirmation, +it is afforded by the Epistle to the Galatians. +The opposition leaders in this Church were yet more +hostile to St. Paul than those at Corinth. His denunciation +of them is very severe. They are described +as <q>false apostles, deceitful workers,</q> and subverters +of the Gospel. Yet in the very opening words of his +address to this Church in which he thus sharply denounces +his opponents, the Apostle writes: <q>Paul, an +Apostle, not of man nor by man, but by Jesus Christ, +and God the Father <emph>who raised him from the dead</emph>.</q> +Is it conceivable, I ask, that St. Paul should have used +such language, under such circumstances, in addressing +this Church, unless he was absolutely certain that +his opponents accepted the Resurrection of Christ as +a fact? We shall see hereafter that these assertions +and allusions of the Apostle not only prove that the +Resurrection was believed in by every section of the +Christian community at the time when he wrote these +letters, but that they enable us to carry up the date of +this belief to the very commencement of Christianity. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly: The Epistle to the Romans sets before us +the state of this belief in a Church which St. Paul +had not visited. Of the exact date of the foundation +of this Church we have no record; but the entire +contents of the Epistle prove that it had been in +existence for many years before the Apostle addressed +to them this letter. The general impression produced +by it is that this was one of the most important +Christian communities then in existence. We learn +from it that among its members were persons attached +to the household of Nero. As the intercourse between +Rome and Judæa was very considerable, there can be +<pb n='437'/><anchor id='Pg437'/> +no doubt that the Church originated at an early period, +either by Christian Jews visiting the imperial city, or +by Roman Jews visiting Judæa and having thus become +converted. At any rate its Christianity must have +been derived from a source entirely independent of St. +Paul. The evidence afforded by this Epistle as to the +importance and universal prevalence of the belief in +the Resurrection, and to its early origin is conclusive. +The allusions to it are more numerous than in any +other of St. Paul's Epistles. Most of them are of +an entirely incidental character, and their general +nature proves beyond the possibility of question that +both the writer and those to whom he wrote must have +viewed the fact as the fundamental groundwork of +Christianity. The reference to a few passages will +render this point indubitable. +</p> + +<p> +An allusion of a most incidental character as forming +the ground of the writer's apostleship occurs in the very +opening words of the Epistle: <q>And declared to be +the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of +holiness, <emph>by the resurrection from the dead</emph>; by whom +we have <emph>received grace and apostleship</emph> for obedience to +the faith among all nations for his name.</q> It is inconceivable +that St. Paul should have thus addressed a +body of strangers, at the very commencement of his +letter, unless he had been certain that they accepted +this belief as an unquestionable fact. +</p> + +<p> +Besides several references in the intermediate chapters, +there are three allusions to it in the sixth chapter +of the most incidental character, in which the belief in +the Resurrection is directly connected with baptism, +and affirmed to lie at the very foundation of Christianity, +and to be the divine power exhibited in the renewed +Christian life. <q>Know ye not that as many of us +as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into +<pb n='438'/><anchor id='Pg438'/> +his death? Therefore we are buried with him by +baptism into death, that like as Christ was raised up +from the dead by the glory of the Father, even we also +should walk in newness of life. For if we have been +planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall +be also in the likeness of his resurrection: knowing +this, that our old man is crucified with him, that the +body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we +should not serve sin. For he that is dead is freed +from sin. Now if we be dead with Christ, we believe +we shall also live with him: knowing that Christ being +raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no +more dominion over him. For in that He died, He +died unto sin once; but in that He liveth, He liveth +unto God. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be +dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through +Jesus Christ our Lord.</q> +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible to read this passage without feeling +that it is conclusive of the question before us: the +whole community to whom it was addressed must have +accepted the Resurrection as a fact, and that acceptance +must have been contemporary with the very +commencement of their Christianity. A portion of the +baptismal rite to which they had all submitted was +viewed by them as symbolical of their Master's death: +the other portion, of His Resurrection. His death +and resurrection were considered by them as setting +forth their cessation from their old habits, principles +and character, in which they had lived as Jews or +Pagans; and their entrance into that new moral life +into which they were brought by Christianity. The +Apostle directly appeals to the recollection of those +whom he is addressing, to say whether it was not a +certain fact that their entire Christianity, including all +its moral influence, centered in this truth. His words +<pb n='439'/><anchor id='Pg439'/> +therefore carry this belief up to the first origin of this +Church. They go, moreover, a step further, and +involve the belief and testimony of those by whom its +first members had been converted. +</p> + +<p> +But further: the Apostle, throughout this chapter, +speaks of the Resurrection of Christ as being the great +moral and spiritual power of Christianity. The members +of the Church had entered on a new moral and +religious life. They had died to their former sinful +habits and practices. They were living to God, and +were reaping the fruits of holiness instead of receiving +the wages of sin. That these facts were true, the +Apostle appeals to their consciousness to witness. +Was this a fact or was it not? It would have been +impossible for St. Paul to write in this manner unless +he had been assured that those to whom he wrote +thought so. This power had for its centre the belief +in the Resurrection of Christ. It was caused by their +connection with Him as a living person to whom all +their regards were due. +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible to have stronger historical evidence +that this belief was esteemed by the Church to be fundamental +to Christianity when this letter was written. +I shall therefore only quote two more passages as +showing the purely incidental character of the allusions:— +</p> + +<p> +<q>Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's +elect? It is God that justifieth; who is he that condemneth? +It is Christ that died, yea rather, that is +risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who +also maketh intercession for us. Who shall separate +us from the love of Christ?</q> (Rom. viii. 38, &c.) +Again: <q>He that regardeth the day regardeth it unto +the Lord; and he that regardeth not the day, to the +Lord he doth not regard it. He that eateth, eateth to +<pb n='440'/><anchor id='Pg440'/> +the Lord, for he giveth God thanks; and he that +eateth not, to the Lord he eateth not, and giveth God +thanks. For none of us liveth to himself, and no man +dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto +the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord.... +For to this end Christ both died and rose, and +revived, that He might be Lord both of the dead and +living.</q> It is impossible that any words could make +it clearer than these do that the belief in the Resurrection +formed the centre of the daily life of Christians at +the time when the Apostle was writing. The Christian +was a man who was consecrated to the service of Christ +as to a living person, who had a right to his supreme +regard. +</p> + +<p> +It is therefore established beyond the possibility of a +doubt that the belief in the Resurrection of Christ was +universal in the Church when St. Paul wrote these +letters, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> within less than thirty years after the +event. At this period of time the traditional recollection +of it, according to the principles laid down by Sir +G. C. Lewis, would have formed the best material for +history. All the other writings of the New Testament, +whatever be their supposed date, give a uniform testimony +in complete agreement with this. One of them +demands a special notice—the book of Revelation. +</p> + +<p> +Unbelievers do not dispute that this is a contemporaneous +document, the work of the Apostle John, and +freely use it to support their own theories as to the +intensity of the opposition between the Jewish Apostles +and St. Paul. I am quite sensible that a book which +is professedly an apocalypse must be used with caution +as an historical document, or we may fall into numerous +errors in drawing inferences from obscure allusions +contained in visions. But if there is one point more +than another which this book makes clear, it is the +<pb n='441'/><anchor id='Pg441'/> +strength of the author's belief in the Resurrection of +Jesus. The frequent allusions to it, and to Jesus as +being the Christ, put this beyond all dispute. We have +here the testimony of a book which unbelievers concur +in considering to have been composed not later than +a year after the death of Nero, and allow it to be +the one solitary writing in the New Testament composed +by one of the twelve Apostles. +</p> + +<p> +According to the opinions of the opponents of the +historical character of the Gospels, St. John was the +most Judaizing of the original apostles of Christ. Of +this they think that they discern very distinct traces +in the book of Revelation. His opposition to St. Paul +was in their opinion extreme; and they think that he +is actually referred to in the second and third chapters +as teaching the Jewish Christians to apostatize. To +discuss the truth or falsehood of these opinions can +form no portion of the present work; but it is plain +that in either case we cannot have a more unexceptionable +witness. If these views are correct, the +Apostle may be considered as the spokesman of the +Jewish Christians. At any rate he was one of the +original followers of Jesus. Now there is no book in +the New Testament which testifies more strongly to +the completeness of the belief in the Resurrection of +Christ, and of His continued Messianic life in the +heavenly world. The writer had conversed with Him +before His crucifixion. The vision is to a considerable +extent a description of His resurrection life. +</p> + +<p> +This testimony alone carries with it the belief of +the primitive Church at Jerusalem, and proves that +on this point at least they and St. Paul were at +one. This his Epistles place beyond the possibility of +question. The parties in opposition were beyond all +doubt Judaizing Christians. According to those +<pb n='442'/><anchor id='Pg442'/> +against whom I am reasoning, they represented the +opinions and claimed to act under the authority of St. +James and the Church at Jerusalem. But as these +Judaizing teachers were at one with Paul about the +fact of the Resurrection, it follows that the leaders of +that Church concurred with him in opinion also. If +their opposition was as strenuous as has been attested, +if there had been any difference between St. Paul and +the twelve on so fundamental a point, it is impossible +that they could have avoided adducing it to the Apostle's +prejudice. +</p> + +<p> +The strength of St. Paul's assurance, that there was +no diversity of opinion in the Church respecting this +fact is remarkably illustrated by a passage in 1 Cor. xv. +Had it not been so, his reasoning would have been +simply absurd. There were persons in that Church who +denied the fact of a future Resurrection. Yet they +must have admitted the truth of the Resurrection of +Christ. This is clear from the following words:—<q>If +there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ +not risen.</q> The reply to this argument is so obvious +that it could not have escaped the dullest apprehension; +if those who denied the reality of a future +resurrection of the dead had entertained the smallest +doubt as to the Resurrection of Christ, they would have +had nothing to do but to affirm that the fact was +doubtful, and the whole argument would fall to pieces. +On the contrary, however, St. Paul thought that they +were so fully persuaded of the truth of Christ's +Resurrection, that he could safely use the fact to prove +the possibility of that future resurrection which they +denied. It is clear, that unless the belief was of the +firmest character, no logical position could be more +dangerous than this line of argument. +</p> + +<p> +The Epistle to the Romans establishes the same +<pb n='443'/><anchor id='Pg443'/> +conclusion. The belief of this Church in the Resurrection +as the fundamental fact of Christianity can be +traced up, as I have already observed, not only to the +commencement of their own Christianity, which was +palpably of many years' standing, but even to the +birth of Christianity itself. Of this, one brief incidental +allusion offers decisive proof: <q>Salute,</q> says St. Paul, +<q>Andronicus and Junia, my kinsmen, and my fellow-prisoners, +who were of note among the Apostles, who +were also in Christ before me.</q> +</p> + +<p> +This passage makes the following points clear. +Andronicus and Junia were converted to Christianity +before St. Paul, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> within less than ten years from the +date of the Crucifixion. They must therefore have been +members of the Jerusalem Church. They were of note +among the Apostles. This expression cannot mean +less than that they were highly esteemed by the original +twelve, and by the leaders of the Church at Jerusalem. +Yet the Apostle wrote this Epistle in the fullest confidence +that they would accept his Christology, including +his account of the Resurrection. This proves that +both they and the Church at Jerusalem, including +all its chief leaders, accepted the Resurrection as a +fact within a very short interval after its supposed +date. But it does more: it proves that its importance +as vital to Christianity was fully recognized; +or, in other words, it proves that the belief must +have been contemporaneous with the origin of the +Church. +</p> + +<p> +Equally decisive is the proof afforded by the Epistle +to the Galatians. It mentions two visits which the +writer made to Jerusalem. One in which he paid +Peter a visit of fifteen days, during which time he +communicated with James. On the second occasion +he went up to Jerusalem as a member of an embassy +<pb n='444'/><anchor id='Pg444'/> +from the Church at Antioch, for the purpose of settling +points under dispute between the Jewish and Gentile +converts. On this occasion he tells us that he had a +formal interview with the leaders of the Jewish Church, +of which Peter, James, and John were esteemed the +pillars. He expressly informs us that he communicated +to them the leading points of the Gospel which he +preached among the Gentiles; and that he received +from them the right hand of fellowship, which can +only mean that they sanctioned his views and fundamental +principles. It is true that the Resurrection is +not expressly mentioned as one of these; but it is impossible +that the statement that he communicated his +Gospel to them can be true, if this was not one of the +facts which he imparted to them. +</p> + +<p> +It is a very important fact, and worthy of special +notice, that in the account given in the Epistle to the +Corinthians of the appearances of Jesus after His +Resurrection, St. Paul expressly affirms that the risen +Jesus was seen by Peter and by James; the latter +appearance being mentioned nowhere else: and the +former only referred to in the exclamation which +greeted Cleopas and his companion on their return from +Emmaus. It seems, therefore, morally certain that +St. Paul had heard an account of these two appearances +from the Apostles in question. If so, it brings us directly +into contact with two of the most important of the +apostolic body, who must have believed that they had +actually seen him. Respecting the belief of St. John, +the third pillar of the Church at Jerusalem, the +testimony of the book of Revelation leaves no room +for doubt. These writings enable us to affirm that +three of the original Apostles believed that they had +seen Jesus, risen from the dead. It is evident, therefore, +that this brings us into the presence of historical +<pb n='445'/><anchor id='Pg445'/> +evidence of the first order, quite independently of the +affirmations of the Gospels. +</p> + +<p> +If the first Epistle of St. Peter is genuine (and there +is nothing but surmises and <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> assumptions about +the opposition of his views to those of St. Paul on +which the doubts respecting its genuineness are based) +then we have the affirmation of the fulness of his +belief in the Resurrection under his own hand. +Besides the strong external testimony that it was +written by St. Peter, there is one proof of its genuineness +which is almost conclusive, and to which sufficient +weight has not been attached by either the defenders +or the opponents of Christianity. It is hardly possible +to read this Epistle carefully without feeling that the +writer of it is the same man as the Peter of the +Gospels; the one being separated from the other by a +considerable interval of time; the Peter of the Epistle +being in fact a mellowed form of the Peter of the +Gospels. But this has not only a direct bearing on +the evidence of the Resurrection, but also a most +important one, which I shall notice hereafter, on the +historical character of the Gospels themselves. +</p> + +<p> +One more writing of the New Testament must be +alluded to, because whoever was its author it belongs +to a school of thought distinct from the other writings +of the New Testament. I need hardly say that I +allude to the Epistle to the Hebrews. The testimony +of this writing to the fact that the belief in the +Resurrection of Jesus was fundamental to Christianity +is no less decisive; it not only proves what were the +individual opinions of the writer, but of the school of +Christian thought for whom it was intended. It +affords abundant proof that the writer knew that their +opinions on the subject were entirely in accordance +with his own. +</p> + +<pb n='446'/><anchor id='Pg446'/> + +<p> +I have now shown on the strongest historical evidence +that it is impossible that the belief in the Resurrection +can have grown up slowly and only succeeded in +gradually establishing itself. On the contrary, I have +proved that it was coeval with the birth of the Church, +and that it formed the one sole ground of its existence. +I have also proved that the belief in it was universal, +and that it was accepted by the entire Christian community +without distinction of party; and that their +belief can be traced up as the sole cause of the renewed +life of the Church after the crucifixion. I shall +consider in the following chapter the bearing of these +facts on the truth of the Resurrection, and show that +the facts before us are inconsistent with any other +supposition but that of its objective occurrence, and +that it is impossible to account for it by any theory +which endeavours to explain it on the supposition that +the belief originated in the credulity and enthusiasm +of the followers of Jesus. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='447'/><anchor id='Pg447'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XX. The Resurrection Of Jesus Christ An Historical Fact.</head> + +<p> +I have proved in the preceding chapter, on the testimony +of the highest order of historical evidence:— +</p> + +<p> +1. That the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus was +universal in the Church when St. Paul wrote these +Epistles. +</p> + +<p> +2. That this belief was held by every section in the +Church, by the strongest opponents no less than by the +admiring friends of St. Paul. +</p> + +<p> +3. That the Churches holding this belief were +separated from each other by a wide geographical area, +and consisted of a great diversity of character, thereby +affording the greatest obstacle to the spreading of an +absurd story. +</p> + +<p> +4. That these Churches did not merely accept the +Resurrection as a bare fact, but that they considered +that their existence as communities was based on its +truth. +</p> + +<p> +5. That they viewed the fact of the Resurrection not +only as the great bond of union, but as the source of +the moral power of the Christianity which they professed, +and fully believed that their acceptance of it +had exercised a mighty influence in turning them from +the low and debasing pursuits of their previous life. +</p> + +<p> +6. That their belief in the Resurrection was closely +bound up with all the pursuits of their daily life. +</p> + +<p> +7. That these Epistles not only afford indisputable +<pb n='448'/><anchor id='Pg448'/> +proof that this state of things existed in the Churches +within less than twenty-eight years after the crucifixion, +but they no less clearly show that the earliest +Christian communities, such as the Churches of +Antioch and Jerusalem, entertained similar beliefs. +</p> + +<p> +8. That it is an unquestionable historical fact that +the belief in the Resurrection was co-eval with the +restored life of the Church which had been extinguished +by the crucifixion. +</p> + +<p> +9. That the three pillar Apostles of the Church of +Jerusalem believed that they had seen Jesus after +His Resurrection, and that the entire body entertained +a similar opinion. +</p> + +<p> +10. That as late as <hi rend='smallcaps'>a.d.</hi> 57 or 58 more than 250 +persons were still living who believed that they had +seen Jesus after His Resurrection; and that originally +more than five hundred persons entertained a similar +persuasion. +</p> + +<p> +Such are plain facts of history. The question now +before us is, how are they to be accounted for? Only +three possible alternatives present themselves. Either: +</p> + +<p> +Some of the followers of Jesus must have fancied +that they saw Him risen from the dead, and have communicated +this delusion to the rest. Or: +</p> + +<p> +That He did not actually die, when He was supposed +to have done so; and that His subsequent appearance, +when partially recovered, was mistaken for a resurrection. +Or: +</p> + +<p> +That He rose from the dead in veritable reality, and +was seen by His followers, and conversed with them. +</p> + +<p> +I omit another possible supposition, that the belief +in the Resurrection was due to a deliberate fraud, +because no one capable of appreciating moral or historical +evidence ventures to affirm it. The idea that +the greatest and purest of human institutions can owe +<pb n='449'/><anchor id='Pg449'/> +its origin to a deliberate imposture is a libel on human +nature. +</p> + +<p> +Around one or other of these alternatives the contest +lies. It is useless to attempt to becloud the +question with a number of barren and indefinite generalities, +such as myths and legends, vague charges of +enthusiasm, fanaticism, and credulity, or general assertions +of developments brought about by a succession +of compromises between hostile parties. We are here +in the presence of stern historical facts, which require +a clear and definite solution. The Christian Church +exists as a fact. We can trace it up to its first origin. +It asserts that its existence is due to the Resurrection +of Jesus Christ, and to nothing else. If unbelievers +affirm that the fact is false, they are bound to offer +some theory which is true to human nature, and lies +within the possibilities of things, to show us how this +belief originated, and how it was able to consolidate +the life of this new community. +</p> + +<p> +The idea that the greatest moral power which has +ever appeared among mankind has had no other origin +than a baseless delusion is supremely melancholy. That +Christianity has been such a moral power will be disputed +by few; and a large number of unbelievers will +allow that notwithstanding the faults which they attribute +to it, nothing has equally contributed to the civilization +and elevation of the race. Yet if it be a delusion, +it must be recognised as such, and we must +submit to our hard fate. Still it is a terrible proposition +to realize, that the noblest of human institutions +has originated in a lie, even if it be one which +was not deliberately intended as such. +</p> + +<p> +It is evident that however great may be the general +credulity of mankind, it is a very difficult matter to get +any number of men to accept as a fact the assertion +<pb n='450'/><anchor id='Pg450'/> +that a person who has actually died has returned again +to bodily life. Such a belief will only be effected by +the production of evidence which, if not true, is at all +events in the highest degree plausible. This, as I +have already observed, is fully established by the history +of the past, for however numerous the narratives +of marvellous occurrences may be, whether in histories +or fictions, it is next to impossible to find reports of beliefs +in the actual occurrence of a resurrection, or even +in the possibility of one prior to that of Jesus Christ. +Now St. Paul's conversion cannot be dated later than +within ten years of the crucifixion; most probably it +was earlier. It is clear that, prior to his conversion, +communities of Jewish Christians must have existed in +considerable numbers—in such numbers, in fact, as to +raise his wrath and indignation to the highest point. +The spirit of persecution is aroused by a sense of +danger. It is clear, therefore, from the fact of the +persecution, that the persons in power saw danger +from the progress of the new sect, and that its numbers +most have been considerable. From St. Paul's +testimony, it is also certain that Christianity had spread +at least to one place beyond Judæa. The inference, +therefore, seems irresistible that in the period which +elapsed between the crucifixion and St. Paul's conversion, +the number of the believers in the Resurrection +of Jesus had increased to several thousands. Those, +therefore, against whom I am reasoning, cannot help +admitting that an interval of eight or ten years is a very +short one for the conversion of such a large number of +persons to the belief that a man who had been publicly +executed, in the very city in which many of them lived, +had been restored to life. +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible that this belief could have been +entertained by only a few solitary individuals who +<pb n='451'/><anchor id='Pg451'/> +treasured it up secretly in their bosoms. On the contrary, +the conditions of the case prove that it must +have spread rapidly. It was not sufficient for the creation +of the Church that a few solitary enthusiasts should +believe that their Master was risen from the dead, but +it was necessary that the Society, which Jesus had +formed in his life-time, should be immediately reorganized +on the basis of this belief. The belief in the +Messiahship of Jesus constituted the original bond of +union. A dead Messiah was, in the eyes of a Jew, an +absurdity; still more so one who had been publicly +crucified. With the death of Jesus, therefore, the bond +of union among His followers must have been severed. +Unless the Church was to perish in His grave, it was +absolutely necessary that it should be re-constructed on +the basis of His renewed life. The slowness with which +any large number of even credulous people will accept +the fact of a resurrection from the dead, must have +formed an obstacle, the force of which it is impossible +to over-estimate. Yet the work was done, and, within +a period of seven or eight years, the belief had spread +so widely that its adherents could be numbered by +thousands. The truth of the Resurrection, founded on +the direct testimony of a considerable number of persons +who had had sufficient opportunity of testing it +by the evidence of their senses, would fully account for +the rapid growth of the belief. If, however, it originated +in the brain of one or two crazed fanatics, if the +belief of so prodigious an event could propagate itself +at all, a considerable interval of time was absolutely +necessary for its doing so. The memory of the Crucifixion +was fresh and recent. What would have been +the natural effect of announcing the fact of His Resurrection? +Incredulity! What has become of His body? +Why does He not appear to His former friends? The +<pb n='452'/><anchor id='Pg452'/> +strangeness of the event must have prompted even the +most credulous to make some inquiry about the matter, +and the inquiry must have dissipated the delusion. +Such a belief could only readily propagate itself after +recent memories had grown dim, and a long interval of +time had elapsed, sufficient for the Founder of Christianity +to become surrounded with a halo of imaginary +glory. +</p> + +<p> +Let us now consider the position in which the followers +of Jesus must have found themselves on the +night of the Crucifixion, and during the following days. +Their hopes had been based on Him as the Messiah, +who was to reign in the kingdom promised by the prophets; +and they expected important places in that +kingdom as the reward of their fidelity. These hopes +must have been annihilated. The Messiah whom they +expected to reign had perished at the hands of His +enemies. What was to be hoped for more? Many +could not help thinking that he had been a self-deceiver, +if not an impostor. Was there any ground for +hoping that He could be raised from the dead? Many +of the prophets of the ancient Church had perished by +the authority of former governments, or by the violence +of the mob. But God had never interfered to vindicate +the cause of one of them by raising him from the dead. +The utmost that He had done was to raise up some new +prophet to take his place. But this man was more +than a prophet—he was the Messiah. Did not all the +old prophets promise Him a kingdom and a glory and +a mighty triumph? Yet He had been cut off by His +enemies, instead of triumphing over them; and His +dead body was silent in the grave. Any hint that the +Gospels allege Jesus to have given His followers of His +own Resurrection is, according to the theory of those +with whom I am reasoning, a late invention. On the +<pb n='453'/><anchor id='Pg453'/> +days, therefore, which followed the Crucifixion, the +Church must have presented the stillness of death, +broken only by a few utterances of loving despair. +</p> + +<p> +But the Church did not perish; it set itself to the +work of reconstruction. It expanded and grew. +Within the space of eight years after the Crucifixion, +the believers in the Resurrection could be numbered +by thousands. This is an indisputable fact. Again it +expanded and grew, and it never ceased to grow until +in less than three hundred years after the public +execution of its Founder by the authority of the Roman +government, one of its professed adherents mounted +the imperial throne, and found its strength sufficient to +enable him to make it one of the institutions of the +State. These facts are without a parallel in history. +How are they to be accounted for? The followers of +Jesus affirmed that their Master rose from the dead; +and that He thus resumed His place as the Messiah of +His Church. Unbelievers, in the face of the evidence +before us, cannot deny that the great body of His +followers must have believed that He had done so +within the short interval of a few months after His +public execution. Our documents on this point are +distinct and definite. They affirm that He was not +only seen but handled by many of His disciples after +His Resurrection, that He ate with them, and that +they had interviews with Him individually and collectively. +I must now examine the alternative positions; +and first, that His supposed appearances were delusions +of the imagination. +</p> + +<p> +The loose and general affirmation has been made +that the followers of Jesus were so enthusiastically +attached to Him that the idea of His death was simply +unbearable, and that they attempted to get rid of the +fact by supposing that He had risen from the dead. +</p> + +<pb n='454'/><anchor id='Pg454'/> + +<p> +I reply first: that all such general statements are +worthless. We have specific facts before us; and these +can only be accounted for by facts which are equally +definite, and not mere fancies. The assertion before +me is not only a bare supposition without one atom of +evidence to rest upon, but it contradicts all the known +facts of the case. So far is it from having been the +case that the disciples were in such a state of enthusiastic +exultation, that our own documents inform us that +they had fallen into the lowest state of despondency. +</p> + +<p> +But further: when a theory is propounded to account +for an historical fact, the possibility of the supposition +must be supported by some analogous cases in +the history of man, more or less resembling it. All +theories which are devoid of this support are worthless +as history. Let those, therefore, who would urge this +on our acceptance as an account of the origin of the +greatest event in history, show that something like it +has occurred in the records of the past. Let them +show us one instance of a body of men whose enthusiasm +for their leader was so great that, when he had +been put to death by the authority of the government +of the country, they got over this by fancying that he +had been raised from the dead, and then took to persuading +others of its truth. The enthusiasm of followers +for their leaders has urged them to form plots, +and even to make attempts to rescue them from the +hands of their enemies. Such enthusiasm, however, is +not even hinted at in the case of the disciples of Christ. +No whisper of tradition has reached us that any of them +formed a plot, or made a solitary attempt to rescue +their Master. Are we then to believe that they +imagined a resurrection to repair the damage of His +Crucifixion? Such imaginative conceits would never +have made a single convert to their story. They left +<pb n='455'/><anchor id='Pg455'/> +their Master to perish in His agony, and when He had +expired under the hands of His executioners, restored +Him to an ideal life by imagining that He was risen +from the dead. Such fictions may be safely dismissed +without further notice. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly: Let us suppose that some one of His disciples +thought that he actually saw Him, and in the +height of his enthusiasm converted a fancy into a fact; +and persuaded the other disciples that He was risen +from the dead: that these too, in turn, were wrought +up into so high a state of enthusiasm that they likewise +fancied that they saw Him: thus the delusion spread. +I reply:— +</p> + +<p> +First: As I have already observed, we are entitled +to demand that some analogous case should be adduced +before we can be rationally asked to accept such +theories as to the solution of an unquestionable historical +fact. Surely, if such are the workings of human +nature under influences so general as enthusiasm and +credulity, some similar occurrence must be no uncommon +event in history. Let one therefore be adduced. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly: Nothing is easier to affirm than that some +credulous and enthusiastic follower of Jesus mistook +a fancy of his imagination for a fact, thought that he +had seen Him alive, and communicated his enthusiasm +to the rest. Whatever may be said as to the possibility +in fits of enthusiasm of a few half-crazy fanatics mistaking +fancies for facts, it is clear that to communicate +this enthusiasm to others is a very difficult undertaking, +especially when they are in a depressed state of mind. +As I have already shown, it is in the highest degree +difficult, if not impossible, to persuade even very +credulous persons of the occurrence of an actual +resurrection, as all history and fiction prior to the +Advent testify. A case of a person who professed to +<pb n='456'/><anchor id='Pg456'/> +have seen, touched, conversed, and eaten with one who +was raised from the dead is not on record. The belief +in ghost stories and apparitions of the departed is to +be met with at every turn. Sorcery professed to be +able to bring departed spirits from the under-world, +but it never attempted to restore to life a body which +once was dead. +</p> + +<p> +Between these two classes of facts the distinction is +most important. The enthusiasm or credulity which +easily creates the one belief, refuses to accept the other. +What we have to account for in this case is, not that +some imaginative follower thought that he had seen +the spirit of the crucified Jesus, come from the under-world +to make a communication to his followers, and +that the other disciples credulously accepted the report: +but that the appearance was that of his body restored +to the functions of animal life—in one word, a <emph>Resurrection</emph>, +able to repair the damage which had been +occasioned by his Crucifixion. +</p> + +<p> +But for the purpose of arguing the question we must +suppose that some one of the enthusiastic followers of +Jesus fancied that he saw Him after His death, and +mistook that fancy for a fact. I own that it is very +difficult even to assume the existence of enthusiasm in +the present instance, because all the known facts as +well as the conditions of the case prove that whatever +enthusiasm had once existed, it was at a very low ebb +on the morning of the supposed Resurrection. Still, +however, the assumption must be made, or argument +will be impossible. As one enthusiast will be as good +as another, let us assume that our supposed enthusiast +was Mary Magdalene, who went early to the sepulchre, +found the stone gone, saw the gardener in the dim +light, mistook him for Jesus, and went and told her +friends that she had seen Him risen from the dead: or +<pb n='457'/><anchor id='Pg457'/> +to put the case more simply, that her excited brain +created some spectral illusion; and that under its influence +she thought she saw Him, and proceeded to +convey the report to her friends. +</p> + +<p> +It at once strikes us as most unaccountable that, +enthusiastic as she must have been, she did not do something +to assure herself of the reality of the bodily presence +of her Master. It was hard even for an enthusiast +to believe that it was He. If she had spoken, and it +was the gardener, she would have been at once cured +of her delusion. If she had attempted to embrace Him +and it had been a phantom, the same result would +have followed. Surely the intensity of her love, however +credulous or fanatical she might be, would not +have allowed her to leave the spot without some +suitable demonstration. Equally incredible is it that +she should have left Him, without inquiring whither He +intended to betake Himself, or obtaining the promise +of some future meeting at which His disconcerted +friends might see Him. However enthusiastic she +may have been, it is simply untrue to human nature, +that she should have thought that her much loved +Master had appeared to her in bodily reality, and that +she should neither have spoken to Him, touched Him, +nor endeavoured to ascertain the place of His proposed +retreat, nor what His intentions were about the future. +If she had done any of these things, it would have +dissipated her delusions. +</p> + +<p> +Let us suppose, however, that all these difficulties +do not exist, and that she is gone to publish among +the friends of Jesus that she had seen Him risen from +the dead. His death had proved to them a stunning +blow; but let us suppose that they were still eagerly +desirous of the occurrence of something which might +renew their old faith in their Master's Messiahship. It is +<pb n='458'/><anchor id='Pg458'/> +clear that nothing short of a belief in His resurrection +could have accomplished this. Yet however desirous +they may have been of His return to life, they were +confronted with the stern fact that He had been publicly +executed, and that the credulity of the past had not succeeded +in restoring dead men to life. Their despondency +occasioned by the events of the last three days was +extreme. Let us suppose that Mary Magdalene rushes +in with the announcement: <q>I have seen the Lord,—the +tomb is empty,—He is risen from the dead.</q> +However desirous they might be that the news should +be true, it is evident that such an announcement must +have filled the minds of even the most credulous with +astonishment. What! not the apparition of His +departed spirit, but a bodily reality, the very man +himself? Is it possible that none of them suspected +that it was the dream of an enthusiastic woman? Is it +conceivable that men or women, passionately attached +to their Master, asked her no questions about the +interview; what He had said to her; where He was to +be found? Some replies to these and kindred questions +were inevitable; and unless they were distinct and +satisfactory, the rising enthusiasm must have been +checked. Is it true to human nature that the most +enthusiastic credulity could have accepted these things +as facts, or that the dead Jesus could have straightway +assumed His place of Messianic dignity in their minds, +if He had made no appointment where He could meet +His friends; or if that appointment was created by the +imagination of the Magdalene, but when tested by the +attempt to see him, it proved a delusion? +</p> + +<p> +But even credulity, when united with profound love +and attachment to a departed friend, must have some +farther satisfaction than a fancied sight. If the disciples, +in the height of their enthusiasm, imagined that +<pb n='459'/><anchor id='Pg459'/> +they saw Him, they surely would have spoken to Him. +Could they have helped embracing Him on his return to +life after His cruel sufferings and ignominious death? +Above all, what about the future? Was He going to +teach again in public? Was He not going to bring +confusion on His enemies? Was He actually going to +retire from public view out of their way? And if He +did so, what about His Messianic claims? Who was +to head the party for the future? Could they have no +secret interviews with Him? If He henceforth retired +into obscurity, what announcement were His friends to +make to His opponents? The most fanatical enthusiasts +must have asked some of these questions. +</p> + +<p> +Either no answer was returned, and the delusions must +have been immediately dispelled; or the enthusiasm which +generated a phantom, and mistook it for a reality, invented +an answer likewise. Any reply which fell short +of a promise to appear for the future at their head, and +either convince or confound His adversaries, must have +extinguished their belief in His Messiahship. They +either fancied they saw Him again, or they did not. +If the former was the case, they must have had repeated +interviews, all created by the imagination, at +which something definite must have been supposed to +have passed sufficient to establish the belief that He was +a Messiah returned to them from the grave. If His old +Messianic character had ceased, some definite plan must +have been propounded of the mode in which He was +going to enter on a new one. If, however, we accept +the alternative that He saw them no more, we shall possibly +be told that His followers accounted for His absence +by imagining that He had for a time been taken +up into heaven, whence He was shortly coming again +to destroy His enemies. But in that case it must have +been a cruel blow to enthusiastic love. What! their +<pb n='460'/><anchor id='Pg460'/> +much loved Master, for whom they had sacrificed their +all, to afford them one mute interview after His resurrection, +immediately to go into heaven, and leave them +without a head, exposed to the assaults of the opponents +who had murdered Him? +</p> + +<p> +But let us imagine all these difficulties got over, and +that they fancied that they caught one solitary glimpse +of Him, and that He was taken up into heaven, whence +He would come again to revive His sinking cause. +Was He to return in a few days, or months, or years? +If the days became months, and the months years, what +was to be done with the Church in the meantime? Was +it to organize itself? If so, on what new basis? Was +it to confront His foes? Was it to make converts; or +quietly to await His return? If the latter, as months +and years passed away, the Church must have simply +died of inanition, and we should have heard no more of +Christianity. If the former hypothesis be preferred, +then it is plain that His followers must have determined +to start His Messiahship on a new basis. But +what was this? How was it to be propounded to the +world? How were His other disciples to be persuaded +to accept it? Instead of an earthly, the Church for +the future must be headed by a heavenly Messiah, who +was coming at some future day to take vengeance on +His foes. Such a change of tactics must have been resolved +upon, and that speedily; the whole plan must +have been conceived and executed by a few credulous +enthusiasts, or the belief in the Messiahship of Jesus +must have been extinguished in His grave. +</p> + +<p> +But further; the necessity of converting the other +disciples to this belief was most urgent; for until this +could be done, the society was dissolving into its +individual elements. How was it to be accomplished? +It is easy to say that these enthusiasts communicated +<pb n='461'/><anchor id='Pg461'/> +their enthusiasm to the rest. But this little sentence +conceals behind it whole mountains of difficulty. +Every one to which I have already alluded, must have +had to be surmounted in each individual case. There +must have been many other disciples who dearly loved +their Master. What must have been their feelings on +hearing that He had appeared to only four or five of +them, and had gone up into heaven? What! He, +whom we loved, who dearly loved us, risen from the +dead, and gone to heaven without affording us the +consolation of a parting interview? Such a thought +was enough to chill all ordinary enthusiasm. Was His +mother one of those who fancied they saw Him come +again from the grave? If she was, could she have +been mistaken? If she did not see Him, what must +have been her feelings at the thought that He had left +the world, without allowing her to behold Him? What +would have been the feelings of the women, whose +beneficence had contributed to His support, or of His +intimate friends among the Apostles? Surely all +these would have thought it more certain that their +companions' report originated in a heated imagination, +than that Jesus should have acted thus. +</p> + +<p> +But the idea that a few fanatics only fancied that +they saw Jesus alive after His Crucifixion is negatived +by an historical fact distinctly affirmed by St. Paul +in the face of his opponents in the Corinthian Church. +Having mentioned His appearance to Peter and the +twelve, St. Paul asserts: <q>After that, He was seen +of above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the +greater part remain unto this present, but some are +fallen asleep.</q> +</p> + +<p> +Here then we are in possession of direct contemporaneous +testimony. This assertion is boldly made in +the face of the powerful party who denied St. Paul's +<pb n='462'/><anchor id='Pg462'/> +apostleship. It is clear that if they had not believed +in the truth of his assertion, they would not have lost +such an opportunity of throwing discredit upon him by +convicting him of falsehood. The Apostle affirms in +the presence of his adversaries that there were then +living more than 250 persons who believed that they +had seen Jesus Christ after He had risen from the +dead; and not only so, but that upwards of 500 persons +had seen Him on one and the same occasion. If this +assertion was false, nothing was easier than for the +opponents of the Apostle to refute it. +</p> + +<p> +On the supposition, therefore, that the belief in the +Resurrection originated in a delusion, it must have +been one on a prodigiously large scale. Unless St. +Paul, and the opposing section of the Corinthian Church, +who must have represented the opinions of the Church +at Jerusalem, were misinformed on this subject, it is +necessary to frame an hypothesis which shall not only +account for three or four fanatics, fancying that they +saw Jesus Christ alive, when it was nothing but the +creation of a disordered imagination, but for the fact +that more than five hundred persons laboured under +a similar delusion. The assertion of the Apostle is +express, not that more than five hundred persons were +persuaded to believe that some others had seen Jesus +Christ after He was risen from the dead, but that they +had actually seen Him themselves. +</p> + +<p> +The only way of evading the force of this testimony +is either by directly impugning St. Paul's veracity, or +by supposing that he made an assertion based on a +vulgar rumour. The whole character of the Apostle +renders the supposition of a deliberate falsehood incredible, +besides the danger already alluded to of +certain detection by his opponents. Nor is the other +alternative more tenable, that on such a subject he +<pb n='463'/><anchor id='Pg463'/> +adopted a mere idle rumour. No subject more occupied +his mind than the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. +For Him he sacrificed everything. To Him he devoted +his entire life. Is it conceivable that such a man would +not, under the influence of common curiosity, have +inquired into the alleged facts of his Master's Resurrection? +But these letters prove that he was a man +of far more than ordinary curiosity. It is clear from +them that he kept himself acquainted with the details +of the events which took place in the Churches which +he had planted. Messengers were sent by him to +supply him with all necessary information. Even +in so distant a Church as that of Rome, which he had +not even visited, he knew no small number of the +chief Christians by name, and took the deepest interest +in their affairs. Are we to believe that such a man +received such a fact connected with the dearest interests +of his life without taking the trouble to ascertain its +truth? Moreover, his former character as a persecutor +must have rendered it necessary that he should institute +a diligent inquiry into the alleged Resurrection of one +whom he considered an impostor, and whose adherents +he was endeavouring to compel to renounce their +allegiance. We must, therefore, conclude that what +St. Paul here affirms must have been true, that on one +definite occasion several hundreds of persons thought +that they had seen Jesus Christ after He was risen +from the dead. +</p> + +<p> +But if it is in the highest degree difficult to account +for the possibility of three or four of the disciples of +Jesus fancying they saw their risen Master, when they +saw nothing but a creation of their own imagination, +what theory can be framed to account for the fact of +several hundreds of persons having become the prey +of a similar delusion? Large numbers of persons +<pb n='464'/><anchor id='Pg464'/> +do not fall into delusions of this kind. Are we to +suppose that some of them affirmed that some distant +object which they saw was Jesus, and that the remainder +accepted the assertion without inquiry? If +He had not come near to them, would they not have +rushed up to a man, who was believed to have come up +again from the grave, and endeavoured to converse +with him? Let all history be searched for any fact at +all like this. Until something like it can be found, we +are justified in pronouncing such a delusion impossible. +Nay: however common the belief in ghost stories, it +would be impossible to find a case of several hundred +persons who believed that, on some one definite occasion, +when they were all assembled, they had seen the +ghost of a person who had recently been executed, appear +before them, and on the strength of this belief, constituted +themselves into a new society;—a society which +has endured through eighteen centuries? However +cynical our views may be, it is impossible to believe +that human nature is a lie. +</p> + +<p> +Again: If for the purposes of the argument we accept +the impossible supposition that a few deluded fanatics +persuaded themselves that they had seen their Master +risen from the dead, and that they set themselves to +persuade others that this was a fact, then it is clear +that the wish of making converts to their belief must +have been a very gradual and slow process. This, in +the face of all the evidence supplied by history, does +not require further proof. It would be impossible to +make converts at all, without adducing some overwhelming +evidence of the truth of their assertion. But +on the supposition that it was a delusion of the imagination, +such evidence could not be forthcoming. Such +beliefs are only possible after the lapse of very considerable +intervals of time, if they are possible even then. +</p> + +<pb n='465'/><anchor id='Pg465'/> + +<p> +But in the present case recollections were all fresh. +Will the attempt to persuade persons who live in the +city where a public execution has taken place, that the +man executed is alive again, succeed? Will it succeed +anywhere in the neighbourhood, while the events are +still in everybody's recollection? Living actors must +have died out, memories of the past must have become +faint, before such things can be made to wear even the +semblance of possibility. But the plain historical facts +refuse to concede the requisite interval during which +such a belief could slowly grow up. While the belief +was growing, the Church would have been perishing +from want of a Messiah to step into the place of the +dead Jesus. On the contrary, the growth of the belief +was rapid. The Church speedily rose from its ruins. +Before St. Paul's conversion, it had increased to such +numbers as to be worth persecuting. There was a +Church at Jerusalem; there were Churches in Judæa; +there were Christians in Damascus. Before this event +the small knot of deluded fanatics had persuaded thousands; +they had formed the Society which subverted +the religion and institutions of the Roman empire, and +of which all the progressive races of men profess—now +in the 19th century of its existence—to be still members. +The facts of unquestionable history utterly refuse +to the advocates of this theory the time necessary +for imparting to it even a passing plausibility. +</p> + +<p> +I infer, therefore, that the theory that one or more +credulous enthusiasts among the disciples of Jesus +fancied that they saw their Master risen from the dead, +while in reality they were labouring under some mental +hallucination, and that they communicated their enthusiasm +to the rest, and that these created the Christian +Church, is unsound in philosophy, contradicts the +facts of history, and the phenomena of human nature, +<pb n='466'/><anchor id='Pg466'/> +as testified to by past experience, and is destitute of +the possibility of verification, and also is contrary to +analogy. It follows, therefore, that this portion of +the alternative before us must be pronounced utterly +inadequate as a solution of the facts. +</p> + +<p> +Let us now consider the other alternative, that Jesus +did not actually die, but, although He had been crucified, +escaped with His life; that His disciples saw Him +after His crucifixion; and, being persuaded that He +had expired, mistook His appearance for a restoration +to life. +</p> + +<p> +This alternative need not detain us long. It is +involved in a considerable number of the difficulties +which are connected with the assumption that some +one or more of the disciples fancied that they saw Him +when they did not really see Him, and that they persuaded +the others that He was risen from the dead. +These difficulties I have already disposed of. But it has +in addition some difficulties peculiarly its own, which +I will now briefly notice. +</p> + +<p> +I admit that it was possible to recover from the effects +of crucifixion, if taken down from the cross in time. +This we learn from Josephus, who, on his return one +day from going to examine a place for the encampment +of the Roman forces, found that three of his friends had +been crucified during his absence. By his entreaties, +he obtained the orders of Titus for their being taken +down. Two died under cure; one recovered. Josephus +is silent as to whether they had been scourged +before they were crucified. This was no doubt an important +point in reference to the possibility of recovery. +Such was the usual practice; although when the +Romans crucified the Jews in large numbers, as they +had now been in the habit of doing for some time, it +may be a question whether it was always inflicted. +<pb n='467'/><anchor id='Pg467'/> +These persons had probably been suspended on the +cross for some hours before they were taken down. +They were treated with the utmost care, with a view +to their recovery; yet two out of the three died. Such +are the facts, as related by Josephus. +</p> + +<p> +It has been suggested that Jesus was only in a swoon +when taken down from the cross; that in the sepulchre +He recovered His consciousness, to which the large +quantity of spices used at His burial might have contributed; +that He managed to creep out of the grave +to some place of security, where He was seen by a few +of His disciples, but that He died not long after. This, +it is said, the disciples mistook for a Resurrection, and +that it formed the basis of the renewed life of the +Church. Let it be observed that there would be the +same difficulties in re-constituting the Church on such +a basis, and in procuring converts to this belief, as +there would have been on the other alternative, which +I have shown to be untenable. These, therefore, I need +not consider. +</p> + +<p> +This theory pre-supposes not only that the body of +Jesus was interred, but that it was committed to the +custody of His friends. This fact we have from the +Gospels; as well as the additional fact that the time +during which He was suspended on the cross did not +exceed six hours at the utmost. But we also learn +from them that, before Pilate ordered the body to be +delivered up, he took care to ascertain, from those in +charge, the certainty of the death; and the fourth +Gospel affirms that one of the soldiers, in order to remove +all doubt on the subject, pierced his side with a +spear. Now without the aid of the Gospels it would +not have been known that the body was committed to +the custody of His friends. If, therefore, their historical +testimony is good for this fact, it is absurd to refuse +<pb n='468'/><anchor id='Pg468'/> +them credence when they testify to the other facts. +We say distinctly: if the truth of the one set of facts is +denied, because the Gospels are unhistorical, the truth +of the other set (for the Gospels are the sole authorities) +must not be assumed on their testimony. Apart +from this, we are only at liberty to assume that the +crucifixion was conducted in the usual manner; and +that the bodies were disposed of accordingly, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> that, +if the crucified persons were buried at all, they were +buried ignominiously. It has also been affirmed that +Pilate sacrificed Jesus by compulsion, and that the centurion +on guard was not ill-disposed towards him. This +again, I say, we only learn from our present Gospels, +and I must again protest against the practice of accepting +their testimony on one side and ignoring it on the +other. The Romans, moreover, were not the sort of +men to allow a crucified victim to be taken down from +the cross until they were well assured that he had hung +there long enough to extinguish life; and from the +frequency of such executions they would learn how long +it would require, and what on such occasions were the +symptoms of death; nor did they concede to persons +so executed an honourable burial. +</p> + +<p> +But further: It never occurred to the Jews that it +was possible that the crucified Jesus had escaped with +His life, and that this fact was really at the bottom of +the announcement of His resurrection. If it was known +to any person concerned that He had thus escaped, nothing +could have been more dangerous on the part of +His followers than to announce that He was risen from +the dead. This was the very thing to promote inquiry, +and to arouse a suspicion among His enemies that He +had not really died, and thus to induce them to make +every effort to ascertain the place of His retreat. The +quickest way to put an end to the story of the Resurrection +<pb n='469'/><anchor id='Pg469'/> +was to produce the living Jesus, weak and exhausted +from His wounds; or, if He had really died, to +produce His body. But not a single whisper has come +down to us from the opponents of Christianity that He +did not really die. If such an idea had afforded even a +probable account of the story of the Resurrection, it +would certainly have occurred to Paul when a persecutor, +and he would have had recourse to it as a means of +dissipating the delusion. Such are some of the first +difficulties which surround this mode of accounting for +the story of the Resurrection. A sepulchre was a place +ill-fitted for a man, exhausted by scourging and crucifixion, +to recover in; nor was there a retreat at hand. +But, as we scrutinize the matter more closely, these +difficulties become impossibilities. +</p> + +<p> +It is clear that from the hour of His supposed death +on the cross, Jesus disappears from history, except in +the form of Jesus the Messiah raised again from the +dead, the great Founder of the Christian Church. If, +therefore, His supposed Resurrection was nothing but a +recovery from a swoon, one of two things is certain: +either He died shortly after from exhaustion, or He +lived somewhere in deepest retirement, only receiving +visits from those of His followers who were in +the secret, and in due course He expired. Perhaps it +may be urged that His friends succeeded in carrying +Him off into some distant country, and that some one +or more of His followers, who had seen Him slowly +recovering, mistook this for a resurrection, and propagated +the story. +</p> + +<p> +We must keep steadily in view that what we have +to account for is not a mere story of a resurrection propagated +by a crazed fanatic, but the erection of the +Christian Church on its basis. It is a plain fact that +Jesus appeared no more in public, and that His earthly +<pb n='470'/><anchor id='Pg470'/> +history ends with His crucifixion. What became of +Him? It is impossible to over-estimate the importance +of this question. +</p> + +<p> +Let us take the first supposition that He recovered +from a swoon, but died shortly afterwards from exhaustion. +This theory involves the necessity that some +one or more of His followers should have seen Him +alive and dying of exhaustion. Was it possible, I ask, +for the most deluded fanaticism to mistake such a condition +for a resurrection from the dead? Was this a +basis on which to revive the hopes of the disciples, and +to re-construct the Church? Would any amount of +enthusiastic credulity mistake such a person for the +Messiah of the future? If He died shortly afterwards, +what became of His Messiahship? Did His other followers +pay Him no visits during His illness? Did they +see Him die, or attend His burial? Surely such positions +do not require serious argument. +</p> + +<p> +But let us suppose that He recovered, lived in retirement +and only received the secret visits of a few followers, +and that out of this the story of the Resurrection grew. +How grew? I again ask. Such growths require considerable +periods of time, and these, history utterly refuses +to grant. Would it be possible, I ask, for any +deluded follower to mistake such facts for a resurrection +from the dead? Could Jesus himself have so mistaken +it? or, however well the secret might be kept, +would a Messiah, living in privacy, out of the sight of +friends and foes, be a possible Messiah, who could +impart a new life to the Church? In such a case it is +impossible to exonerate the persons concerned from +fraud, even the Great Teacher himself. Are we to +suppose that He himself actually mistook His recovery +from a swoon for a resurrection, and justified His followers +in publishing a report of it? Why then did +<pb n='471'/><anchor id='Pg471'/> +He not appear in public and assert His Messianic +claims? But could His followers have persuaded themselves +that a man who must have shown distinct indications +of slow recovery, and who never ventured to +appear again in public, was raised again from the dead +to continue His Messianic work? If this is the true +account of the matter, it was not a delusion but an imposture. +If we suppose that a few friends only visited +Him, what did His other disciples say about the matter? +Did the few, with the concurrence of their Master, +propagate the belief that He was gone into heaven, +knowing that He was still on earth? Be these things +as they may (and those who have started the idea +should solve it), if the real basis of the story of the +Resurrection be a recovery from a swoon and a subsequent +life of privacy, Jesus must have shared the +common fate of humanity and died. This must have +been known to those with whom He lived; it must +have been known to those who visited Him. His death +must have dispelled their delusions. Henceforth the +propagation of their story must have been due to wilful +fraud—a fraud for which it is impossible to assign a +motive, and which it is not the modern practice to +charge on the first propagators of Christianity. +</p> + +<p> +The remaining supposition, that Jesus, after having +been seen by one or two of His followers alive and +slowly recovering, was conveyed away to some distant +place, where they saw Him no more, and that out of +this grew the story of His Resurrection and Ascension +into Heaven, is not only in itself intrinsically incredible, +but it offends against every one of the principles which +I have established. I need not, therefore, discuss it +further. +</p> + +<p> +The existence of the Church is a fact. It is professedly +based on another fact, namely, the Resurrection +<pb n='472'/><anchor id='Pg472'/> +of Christ. If this be true, it fully accounts for the +existence, origin, and growth of the Church. No other +theory can account for it. The Resurrection is a fact, +or a delusion. If it is not a fact, two suppositions +respecting its origin are alone possible. These have +been proved, on the strongest historical evidence, to be +impossible. It follows, therefore, that the only remaining +alternative is the true one: that <hi rend='smallcaps'>Jesus Christ +rose from the dead</hi>. Its attestation is stronger than +that of any other fact in history. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='473'/><anchor id='Pg473'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XXI. The Historical Value Of The Gospels As Deduced +From Previous Considerations.</head> + +<p> +I have proved in the preceding chapters that one of +the miracles recorded in the Gospels is substantiated +by the highest form of historical testimony, on evidence +quite independent of their contents. I have adopted +this course because unbelievers affirm that the miraculous +narratives contained in them are alone sufficient to +prove them to be unhistorical. It has therefore become +necessary to prove the truth of the greatest miracle +which they narrate, without any reference to their +assertions. Christianity unquestionably existed before +the Gospels were written, and the all-important fact on +which it rests can be substantiated without their aid, +on data which are conceded by our opponents. Its +truth or falsehood therefore does not rest on any mere +question as to what was their actual date, or who were +their authors. Still they are the only records of the +life of Jesus Christ that the Church possesses. The +question therefore as to whether they are true in all +their chief outlines, is one of such importance as to +render a few observations on this subject indispensable. +</p> + +<p> +There can be no doubt that no one would have ever +thought of denying their general authenticity, except +on account of the miraculous narratives they contain. +This has made them the battle-field of Christianity, +<pb n='474'/><anchor id='Pg474'/> +because it has been supposed that if their historical +character can be shaken, Christianity would be disproved +as resting on no other basis. For this purpose +every variation in them, even the smallest, has been +noted, and these variations have been magnified into +contradictions. There is no weapon which criticism +has not employed for the purpose of impugning their +veracity. But the real ground of offence is the miraculous +narrative. As, however, I have proved that the +most important miracle recorded in them can be established +on grounds quite independent of their testimony, +we can now approach their consideration with this +great antecedent difficulty removed. If the Resurrection +of Jesus is an actual occurrence, the other miraculous +events recorded in them no longer stand in the +way of their acceptance as genuine histories. This one +miracle is sufficient to carry all the rest; not, of course, +that it proves that they occurred, but it gets rid of the +entire <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>à priori</foreign> difficulty with which their acceptance is +attended. Nay, further, if Christ rose from the dead, +it is more probable than not, that this was not the only +miracle connected with Him: or, in other words, if the +authors of the Gospels attributed to Him no other +miraculous action, it would rather afford a presumption +against them as credible historians. It follows therefore, +that although the proof of the Resurrection does +not by itself establish the reality of the other miracles +recorded as having been performed by Him, it renders +them so far probable, that the same amount of evidence, +which is sufficient to establish the ordinary facts of +history, is sufficient to establish the general truth of +the events recorded in the Gospels. I do not mean to +affirm that some miracle may not have been incorrectly +attributed to Christ in the traditions of the Church, +from which the narratives in the Gospels have been +<pb n='475'/><anchor id='Pg475'/> +derived, in the same manner as some inaccurate reports +of facts have obtained admission into ordinary histories. +But as these latter do not affect the general credibility +of history, so errors of this description would not affect +the general credibility of the Gospel narratives. All +that I claim for them is that they should be both alike +tried by the historical canons of criticism applicable to +the same species of documents. Let me state once for +all the position that I occupy. I am not called upon +to prove that no error can have crept into their accounts; +that events are all arranged in their true order +of sequence; that variations do not exist in them which +with our present knowledge of the details, it is difficult +to reconcile, or even that the Evangelists themselves +may not have misconceived their true order, or +grouped them in one that was the result of religious +considerations. The determination of such questions +may affect our views as to the nature of the inspiration +under which we suppose the Gospels to have been +written, but it is one wholly foreign to an historical +discussion. The question which I have to consider is, +not the extent of the inspiration of their authors; but +whether they do or do not contain genuine history; +and if they do, to what class of historical writings they +belong, and to estimate their testimony accordingly. +</p> + +<p> +I will consider this last question first. The Gospels +most distinctly affirm that they do not belong to the +class of professed histories, but to that of memoirs. +This is a very important consideration; for if they +only claim to be memoirs and not histories it is absurd +to demand of them an accuracy of arrangement and of +detail, which would be essential to a history, but +which forms no portion of the plan of a memoir. But +they not only affirm that they are memoirs, but +memoirs of a peculiar character; that is to say, religious +<pb n='476'/><anchor id='Pg476'/> +memoirs, composed with a double purpose, viz. +that of setting forth the events of a life, and at the +same time of teaching a religion. +</p> + +<p> +This point is so important, and is so generally overlooked +in the arguments both of those who affirm and +of those who deny their historical character, that it will +be necessary to prove it. It is not only evident from +the general nature of their contents, but three of the +Evangelists directly affirm it, and two of them, Luke +and John, in express terms. The former distinctly +asserts that he composed his Gospel in order that a +person called <q>Theophilus</q> might know the certainty +of the things in which he had been instructed. <q>Forasmuch +as many have taken in hand to set forth a +declaration of these things that are most surely +believed among us; even as they delivered them unto +us, which from the beginning were eye witnesses and +ministers of the word; it seemed good to me also, +having perfect understanding of all things from the +first, to write unto thee in order, most excellent Theophilus, +that thou mightest know the certainty of those +things in which thou hast been instructed.</q> (Luke +i. 1-4.) +</p> + +<p> +Here we have the purpose of the writer definitely +affirmed. It is to set forth a statement of the leading +facts of the life of Jesus, for the purpose of communicating +instruction in the Christian religion. In one +word, the author proposed to teach a religion by +means of a narrative of facts. It is hardly possible to +give a more accurate description of a memoir as distinguished +from a history. He also tells us that he +meant to compose it in an orderly arrangement, but he +does not tell us whether the order was intended to be +strictly chronological, or merely regulated by the +avowed religious purpose of the work. It is quite +<pb n='477'/><anchor id='Pg477'/> +possible for a writer to adopt an orderly arrangement, +who arranges his matter as much by religious considerations +as by chronological ones. According to the +statement of this preface, the religious purpose is +clearly the predominant one; and it is therefore only +reasonable to suppose that it has exerted considerable +influence on the grouping. +</p> + +<p> +We learn also from this preface that the things +most surely believed among Christians consisted of a +number of facts, which had been delivered to them by +persons who from the beginning were eye-witnesses +and ministers of the word. Several persons had +already set forth written accounts of them before the +author composed this Gospel. It is implied that he +did so because he possessed better and more accurate +sources of information than previous writers. The object, +however, is clear; it was that Theophilus might +know the certainty of those things, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> the great facts +on which the Christianity, in which he had been instructed, +was based. +</p> + +<p> +The assertion of this religious purpose in the composition +of the fourth Gospel, and that the materials +are a selection from a large mass of others is even +more distinct and definite. <q>Many other signs truly +did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not +written in this book, but these are written that ye may +believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and +that believing ye may have life through his name.</q> +(John xx. 30, 31.) +</p> + +<p> +Words could hardly have been framed which more +definitely assert that this Gospel is a memoir, and not +a history; and that the religious purpose, in its composition, +was the predominant idea of the writer. +</p> + +<p> +The assertions of the author of St. Mark's Gospel, +although not equally full, are sufficiently definite. He +<pb n='478'/><anchor id='Pg478'/> +designates it as <q>The beginning of the gladsome message +of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.</q> Here, again, +the religious idea is plainly the predominant one in the +writer's mind, and the obvious conclusion is that he +intended his work to be a memoir, and not a history. +</p> + +<p> +We have no such direct affirmation by the author of +St. Matthew's Gospel, unless the opening words, <q>The +book of the generations of Jesus Christ, the Son of +David, the Son of Abraham,</q> are intended to cover the +entire work. The nature of its contents, however, leave +not the smallest doubt that his design in writing was +precisely the same as that of the other Evangelists, +viz. to teach Christianity by setting forth a memoir of +the life of Jesus Christ. +</p> + +<p> +Such, then, is the avowed purpose of the authors of +the four Gospels. Each of them is a religious memoir. +This being so, it is absurd to demand of such writings +what can only be found in regularly composed histories. +</p> + +<p> +In what, then, does a history differ from a memoir? +The object of the historian is not only to give an account +of the events which he narrates precisely as they +occurred; but the order of his narrative is regulated +by the definite sequences of time and place. The writer +of a memoir, on the contrary, is not bound to observe +this order, but he is entitled to vary it in reference to +the special object he has in view, and the points which +he requires to illustrate. +</p> + +<p> +But the religious purpose is most definitely affirmed +to have been the predominant one in the minds of the +authors of the Gospels. It would therefore have an important +influence on their arrangement of their materials. +We should expect to find them grouped far +more in reference to this end, than to the mere sequences +of time and place. When certain of the actions or portions +<pb n='479'/><anchor id='Pg479'/> +of the teaching of our Lord illustrated the particular +subject which each Evangelist had before him, he +would neglect the exact historical order, and group +them in reference to this special purpose. +</p> + +<p> +In writings of this description, therefore, while all +the chief points of his life and his discourses ought to +present a substantial agreement, we should naturally +expect to find a considerable number of minor divergencies. +While we have the fullest right to expect +that the facts will be accurately reported, we have no +right to demand that the writer should observe no other +order in his narrative than the mere sequences of time +and place. It is on the assumption that the authors of +the Gospels intended to set forth an exact historical +account of the ministry of Christ, instead of taking +them for what they have affirmed them to be, religious +memoirs of that ministry, that no inconsiderable +number of their alleged discrepancies have originated. +</p> + +<p> +The presence of variations, or if it is preferred to +call them contradictions, in writings of this description +by no means invalidates their historical character. It +has been well observed by a writer in the <q>Westminster +Review,</q> that they are to be found in every historical +writing from Herodotus to Mr. Froude. As these discrepancies +in the Gospels are so largely dwelt on by +unbelievers, I subjoin a passage from Dean Stanley's +account of the murder of Thomas a Becket, in his +<q>Memorials of Canterbury Cathedral,</q> as showing the +existence of such inaccuracies even in the accounts of +persons who were actual eye-witnesses of events in +which they were deeply interested. Speaking of the +number of existing accounts of the murder, he says:— +</p> + +<p> +<q>Of these thirty narrators, four, Edward Grimes, +William Fitzstephen, John of Salisbury, who unfortunately +supplies but little, and the anonymous author +<pb n='480'/><anchor id='Pg480'/> +of the Lambeth manuscript, claim to have been +eye-witnesses. Three others were monks of the +convent, and although not present at the massacre, +were probably somewhere in the precincts. Three +others, though not in England at the time, had been +on terms more or less intimate with Becket, and two of +them seem to have taken the utmost pains to ascertain +the truth of the facts which they narrate. From these +several accounts, we can recover the particulars of the +death of Archbishop Becket to the minutest details. +It is true that having been written by monastic and +clerical historians, after the national feeling had been +raised to enthusiasm in his behalf, allowance must be +made for exaggeration, suppression, and every kind of +false colouring which could set off their hero to advantage. +It is true, also, that <emph>in some points the various +authorities are hopelessly irreconcilable</emph>. But still a +minute comparison of the narrators with each other, +and with the localities, leads to a conviction that on the +whole the facts have been substantially preserved; and +as often happens, the truth can be ascertained in spite +and even in consequence of attempts to distort and +suppress it.</q> +</p> + +<p> +It is clear, therefore, that the presence of variations, +nay even <emph>hopeless contradictions</emph> in such narratives, does +not interfere with their general historical character. It +appears that from narratives which contain <q>exaggeration, +suppression, and every kind of false colouring,</q> we +can ascertain the particulars of the death of Becket to +the minutest particular. Why do not unbelievers apply +the same rule to the Gospels? Why are their minor +variations in details alleged to prove that the entire +narrative is unhistorical? One thing respecting them +is clear: instead of presenting indications of <q>exaggeration, +suppression, and false colouring,</q> they are +<pb n='481'/><anchor id='Pg481'/> +characterized by a uniform sobriety in their statements. +They offer no comments, and allow the facts to produce +their own impression on the reader. +</p> + +<p> +It follows therefore that if the Gospels were ordinary +biographies, the variations in them would not interfere +with their historical character, and that differences in +mere details would leave the main facts unaffected. +Still more true is this with respect to memoirs, and +especially with those composed with the object of +teaching a religion. Attention to this obvious fact +will get rid of a large number of the objections which +have been so pertinaciously urged against them. +</p> + +<p> +With respect to their general credibility, it is important +to observe that even if the date of the Synoptics +be placed as late as that assigned to them by those +critics who deny their historical character, viz. somewhere +between <hi rend='smallcaps'>a.d.</hi> 90 and 115, still the time when +they must have been composed lies, according to the +rule of Sir G. C. Lewis, within the period of trustworthy +historical tradition. In this case the earliest of them +would bear date about sixty, and the latest of them +about eighty-five years after the events they narrate. +Renan is of opinion that their internal evidence proves +them to have been composed before the destruction of +Jerusalem. Be this as it may; even at the date +assigned to them by the most sceptical critics, good +traditionary information lay within the reach of their +respective authors. The interval is about the same in +the one case as that which separates us from the +invasion of France by the allies in 1814, and in the +other case from the outbreak of the French Revolution. +Many persons are still alive who can remember the +former event; and although nearly everyone who could +remember the latter has passed away, yet large numbers +of the existing generation, whose recollections will be +<pb n='482'/><anchor id='Pg482'/> +good for twenty years to come, have conversed with +those who took the deepest interest in the scenes in +question. While this generation lives, it would be +impossible for the whole outline of the facts to become +falsified. Minor errors might creep into the details; +their precise order and sequence might not be accurately +preserved; yet their general outline would be handed +down correctly, and it would be impossible to hide the +true history behind a set of legends. If the authors of +the Synoptic Gospels were only separated by this +interval of time from the events that they narrate, they +must have had all the materials of true history within +their reach. Persons must have been living when the +first Gospel was written who could accurately remember +the events in question; and even at the latest date +which can be assigned to the other Gospels, large +numbers of persons must have been living who had +heard narratives of them from their fathers, which, as +unspeakably interesting, they would treasure up with +the liveliest recollection. +</p> + +<p> +It follows, therefore, that even if we assume the +latest date which has been assigned for the publication +of the Synoptic Gospels it lies considerably within the +period of accurate historical recollection, even if we +suppose that their authors composed them from traditional +sources only, and were not assisted by written +documents. But the existence of documents is expressly +asserted by the author of St. Luke's Gospel. +And even if we were devoid of this testimony, we +might infer it from the inherent probability of the +case. This was inevitable, as the basis of the religion +was placed on a personal history. The system of +instruction must have involved a constant reference to +the details of that history. When, therefore, the +members of the Churches heard them from the lips +<pb n='483'/><anchor id='Pg483'/> +of original witnesses, the interest of the subject must +have induced those who were able to write, to compose +brief memoranda for the purpose of assisting their +recollections. In this way a considerable amount of +Christian literature in connection with the life of Jesus +must have grown up in the course of years, and the +necessity for it would become the more urgent in +proportion as the original disciples who had heard His +discourses and seen His actions passed away from the +scene. This is exactly in conformity with the statement +made by the author of St. Luke's Gospel. +</p> + +<p> +It is clear, therefore, that even if the publication of +our present Gospels did not take place before the time +assigned to them by unbelievers, the historical materials +at the command of their authors must have +been ample. It would have been impossible that facts +and legendary inventions should have become blended +together within so short a period. Consequently +nothing but neglect to use the materials at hand, or +a deliberate purpose of falsification could have prevented +them from giving an account of the ministry of +Jesus which would be substantially accurate in all its +main features. If on the other hand we suppose these +Gospels to have been written for the purpose of falsification, +then their contradiction to the accounts which +had been hitherto accepted by the Church must have +destroyed their credit. It would have been impossible +for the authors to have succeeded in concealing the +facts behind a mass of myths and legends while they +formed the very groundwork of the daily life of the +community. Under the peculiar circumstances of the +Christians of the first century some portion of the +events of the life and teaching of Christ must have +been brought to their minds every day. The hostility +of the Pagan world around them was alone sufficient +<pb n='484'/><anchor id='Pg484'/> +to ensure this. Moreover, the religion was not one +which was committed to the custody of a caste or +priesthood; but it appealed directly to the individual. +As distinguished from the other religions of the +world Christianity may be not incorrectly defined as +the religion of the individual. It awoke emotions +of the profoundest nature in the hearts of even its +humblest followers, addressing itself both to their consciences +and their affections. These emotions were all +centered in a personal life. If one fact is more +certain than another, it is that Jesus was viewed by +the early Christians as their religious King, to whom +they owed a personal allegiance. This must have +rendered it necessary for them to treasure up all the +facts of His history with the deepest care. +</p> + +<p> +Further: the early Christians not only lived in the +midst of a society extremely hostile to them, but +were also zealous proselyters. This alone would have +been sufficient to compel them to keep in lively remembrance +the chief events in the history of Jesus. How +else was it possible for them to persuade others that +He was the Christ? The Church was not a school of +philosophy, but consisted of a body of men whose +bond of union was adherence to a leader. To make +converts to such a religion would have been impossible +without an accurate acquaintance with the facts on +which His claims were grounded. +</p> + +<p> +Corporate bodies possess a power of handing down +a traditionary knowledge of events in a far greater +degree than individuals. The Christian Church consisted +of a set of communities which had not only +an individual, but also the strongest corporate life. +Although it contained no priesthood, properly so called, +the cohesion of these communities, placed as they were +in the midst of a hostile population, in Jewish or Gentile +<pb n='485'/><anchor id='Pg485'/> +cities, was of the strongest character, and in proportion +to their smallness, the action of each individual member +would be important. Each separate Church therefore +formed a corporation as opposed to the Jewish and +heathen world by which it was surrounded; and each +separate unit felt himself animated by a similar life, which +dictated to him the necessity of conquering or perishing. +From this arose an intense desire of making new converts +and of increasing the number of the faithful. +How was this to be accomplished? An organization +was necessary. Each of the communities had one which +was suitable to its need. One of its most important +functions must have been to instruct new converts in its +principles, and to keep actively burning the zeal of its +original members. But as the existence of the community +was founded on an adhesion to a person, the +course of instruction must have consisted to a considerable +extent of details of the actions and teaching +of Jesus. <q>How shall they believe on him of whom +they have not heard?</q> was a pertinent question of +St. Paul, <q>or how shall they hear without a preacher?</q> +No society has ever existed in the world which has had +an equal inducement to hand down accurately the +events of its founder's life, or had equal facilities for +detecting any attempt to substitute a fictitious account +of him for the true one. +</p> + +<p> +It follows therefore that at the period in question it +would have been simply impossible that a fictitious or +legendary account of the life of Jesus should have taken +the place of the one which these Churches had accepted +at the time when they first came into existence. I +have already proved that the Epistles of St. Paul put it +beyond the possibility of question that an account of +the chief facts in the ministry of Jesus formed the +<pb n='486'/><anchor id='Pg486'/> +foundation of the religious life of the Churches at the +time when he wrote them, and that it had done so +from the first. The difficulty therefore of introducing +an entirely new version of it must have been insurmountable. +A doubtful fact or two might have become +incorporated, but while the religious life of the community +was thus strong, it would have been utterly +impossible to give a new colouring to the whole. +</p> + +<p> +But further: this difficulty must have been greatly +increased by the wide separation of such Churches as +those of Rome, Corinth, Galatia, Jerusalem, and others, +from one another. Each Church must have had an +account of its own of the chief facts of our Lord's +ministry. If one of them could have been induced to +accept a new set of facts, there would have been the +greatest difficulty in persuading the others to follow its +example. Daily experience teaches us how very slow +religious bodies are in changing the fundamental articles +of their belief. However much the sentiments of individuals +may have changed, the original confessions of +faith are retained with the utmost tenacity, even after +they have ceased to embody the religious life of the +community. What confessions of faith are to modern +Churches, the chief facts of the ministry of our Lord +must have been to the primitive one; the only difference +being that these latter lived with a far greater +tenacity in the minds of the early Christians than the +former have in modern Churches. If therefore a single +Church could have been induced to accept a new +version of its Founder's life, the separation of these +different communities from one another, would have +placed an insuperable barrier in the way of imposing +such an account on the other Churches. The inquiry +must have at once arisen, Whence has this Church +<pb n='487'/><anchor id='Pg487'/> +derived its new Gospel, thus fundamentally different +from that which has from the first formed the basis of +our religious life? +</p> + +<p> +It is clear therefore that even if we accept the latest +date which had been assigned to the publication of the +Synoptic Gospels, their authors must have been in +possession of abundance of materials for setting forth +an account of the ministry of Jesus, which would have +been correct in all its great outlines; and that even if +they had been so minded it would have been impossible +for them to have succeeded in palming off a previously +unknown set of facts in place of those which had hitherto +formed the groundwork of the life of the different +Churches. We have seen also that when St. Paul wrote +his Epistles, the different Churches were in possession +of an outline of the ministry of Jesus Christ which +contained within it, as a matter of the highest importance, +the most remarkable miraculous fact which is +recorded in the Gospels. Is it to be believed that +this was the only one; or, is it possible that a set of +miraculous narratives could have succeeded in taking +the place of the account of His life and teaching which +was in possession of the Churches, within the interval +of time which separates St. Paul's Epistles from +the publication of the first of the Synoptic Gospels? +</p> + +<p> +I conclude, therefore, that the original narratives +must have attributed a number of miracles to Jesus +Christ; that the accounts of them must have been +handed down to the time when our opponents allow that +the Gospels were published, and that by this means +they have been incorporated into them. Not only has +the alleged late date of the publication of the Gospels +been urged as a reason for discrediting them as reports +of historical facts, but also the uncertainty of their +<pb n='488'/><anchor id='Pg488'/> +authorship. It will not fall within the scope of this +work to examine the value of the testimony by which +each Gospel has been assigned to its respective author. +It will be sufficient here to observe that it is as strong +as that by which the authorship of any other ancient +writing is ascertained. The internal character of two +of these Gospels fully agrees with the traditionary account. +Although the assertions of the early Fathers vary +as to the precise relation in which Mark stood to Peter, +the ancient traditions are unanimous in connecting +him in some way or other with the Apostle. The phenomena +of this Gospel are precisely such as we should +expect if this was the case. In nearly every case +where we can ascertain, either from this or from one of +the other Gospels, that Peter was an eye-witness of an +event recorded in it, St. Mark gives precisely such a +description of it as we might expect would be given by +a man of the peculiar temperament of Simon Peter. +We know, both from the Acts of the Apostles and +from the Epistles of St. Paul, that St. Luke was a +companion of that Apostle. The peculiarities of the +Gospel that bears his name are precisely such as we +should have expected if its author was a companion of +the great Apostle of the Gentiles. There is also every +reason for believing that Luke was not an eye-witness +of the ministry of Jesus. The author of the Gospel +affirms that he was not an eye-witness. In conformity +with this the Gospel bears the most distinctive marks +of compilation. So far the internal structure of these +two Gospels entirely agrees with the external testimony +as to their authorship. We know also on the +authority of the early Fathers that Matthew composed +a Gospel in the Hebrew language which was designed +for the use of Jewish Christians. Now whoever is the +<pb n='489'/><anchor id='Pg489'/> +author of the present Greek Gospel which bears his +name, it is distinguished by precisely the same characteristics +as those which are described as appertaining +to the Hebrew Gospel of St. Matthew, that is to say, +that the proportion which the discourses bear to the +narrative portions of it is very large; and its contents +make it evident that it was chiefly designed for the use +of Christians of the Jewish race. If therefore our present +Gospel was not set forth by the Apostle himself +in Greek, both the external testimony and the internal +evidence prove that it is a representation of its contents +sufficiently accurate for all the practical purposes of +history. +</p> + +<p> +But the question as to the names of the persons who +actually set forth our Gospels has been made of far +more importance than it deserves, both by the defenders +and the opponents of Christianity. The all important +point is, are they faithful accounts of the primitive +traditions of the Church respecting the chief +events of its Founder's ministry; and were they composed +within that period of time, when the recollections +of it must have been so fresh as to render it impossible +to substitute a body of fictitious and legendary narratives +in place of those which had been handed down in +the Church from the beginning? Unless we know +enough about an author from external sources of information, +to enable us to form a definite opinion as to +his judgment and means of information, our mere knowledge +of his name will help us little. The information +which ecclesiastical tradition affords us respecting the +authors of the Synoptic Gospels is little beyond that +which is contained in the New Testament itself, and +is insufficient to enable us to form a judgment respecting +their character. That judgment must be formed +<pb n='490'/><anchor id='Pg490'/> +exclusively from the writings themselves, and can only +be arrived at after a careful examination of their contents. +</p> + +<p> +It will be urged that if our present Greek Matthew +could be shown to have been the work of the Apostle, +we should then have the testimony of an eye-witness of +the ministry of Jesus; and if we have no certain evidence +that it was composed by him, then none of the +events recorded in the Synoptics rest on autoptic testimony. +The truth of this position I entirely deny. +The real question is, do the events recorded in them +faithfully represent the traditions of the Church? Have +we evidence that the traditions which were current +when these Gospels were composed, are accurate representations +of the accounts of the ministry of Jesus, +which were handed down by our Lord's original disciples? +If so, they must rest on autoptic testimony, as +they could only have been derived from our Lord's companions. +The mere knowing the name of one of them, +unless we knew a great deal about his judgment and +discretion, is of far less importance than the assurance +that we are in possession of the general testimony of +the entire body. Nor does it necessarily follow that +any one follower of Jesus, even an Apostle, was in +constant attendance on His person. We know from +the Gospels themselves that this was not always the +case. If such a person had narrated events which occurred +during his absence, he must have been indebted +for his knowledge of them to the testimony of others. +If therefore the present Greek Matthew could be proved +to be the work of the Apostle, still it by no means +follows that he was an eye-witness of every one of the +events recorded in it. If, however, it was set forth in +its present form by some other hand, I fully admit that +<pb n='491'/><anchor id='Pg491'/> +neither of the Synoptics was composed by an Apostle. +But this is a wholly different point from the consideration +whether they do or do not embody the testimony +of the eye-witnesses of the ministry of Jesus Christ. +This does not depend on our knowledge of the names +of their respective authors, but whether we have good +evidence that they faithfully embody the primitive +apostolical traditions. +</p> + +<p> +A careful perusal of the Synoptics will convince the +reader that neither of them professes to embody a set +of personal reminiscences. On the contrary, they bear +the strongest indications of being a collection of apostolic +traditions. Of this I shall offer distinctive proof +in the next chapter. The only Gospel which embodies +such personal reminiscences as indicate the authorship +of an eye-witness is that of St. John. But the indications +of the presence of an individual personality in +St. Matthew's Gospel are almost entirely wanting. In +its general structure it forms a striking contrast to that +of John. Supposing it to have been composed by the +Apostle, he has entirely hidden his individuality in his +narrative. +</p> + +<p> +The question, therefore, really turns on the conclusion +at which we are able to arrive as to whether the +Synoptic Gospels are faithful representations of the +primitive apostolic traditions. I have proved that +even at the latest date to which opponents assign their +publication, they must have been written within the +period when all the requisite materials existed for composing +a substantially correct account of all the leading +facts; that such a traditionary account was certainly +handed down in the Church; that it formed the ground-work +of its existence; that it must have been derived +from apostolic men, who had ample means of knowing +<pb n='492'/><anchor id='Pg492'/> +the facts; that the Church possessed the means of transmitting +them accurately, such as were never possessed +by any other Society; and that it was under the necessity +of doing so as the condition of its life; and that +while this account remained fresh in the recollections +both of the community and of its individual members, +it would have been impossible to foist on them a fictitious +story. I shall now proceed to inquire how far +the phenomena of the Gospels tend to establish these +positions. +</p> + +</div> + +<pb n='493'/><anchor id='Pg493'/> + +<div rend='page-break-before: always'> +<index index='toc'/> +<index index='pdf'/> +<head>Chapter XXII. The Historical Character Of The Gospels As Deduced +From Their Internal Structure.</head> + +<p> +This subject is an extremely extensive one. The +utmost, therefore, that I can do is to notice a few of +the most important points which bear on the argument. +I have already shown that the general principles of historical +evidence point to the conclusion that the Synoptic +Gospels are three different versions of the primitive +apostolical traditions respecting the actions and the +teaching of Jesus Christ, and that even on the assumption +that the dates assigned to them by the opponents +are the correct ones (which however I would by no +means be understood as conceding, for all the internal +evidence points to a much earlier period), they were +still composed within the period when such traditions +possess the highest historical value. I must now +inquire whether the general structure of these Gospels +confirms this conclusion. +</p> + +<p> +The question therefore at once arises, what is their +general character? Do they present the marks of +traditionary history; or of being three works composed +by three different authors, who not only wrote +independently of each other, but who used no common +source of information? Do their narratives present +us with the characteristics of historical truth or of +fictitious invention? The facts before us are ample, +<pb n='494'/><anchor id='Pg494'/> +and they ought to enable us to return a definite +answer to these questions. +</p> + +<p> +The most remarkable trait which first strikes the +reader is the presence of a common narrative interwoven +with a considerable amount of matter peculiar +to each Gospel. Many of the events, and several of +the discourses are narrated by all three Evangelists; +others by only two. Besides these common narratives +and discourses, which form the larger portion of the +Gospels, each of them contains narratives and discourses +peculiar to itself. While they possess much that is +common, it is clear that each writer had a distinct +object in view in the compilation of his Gospel; that +of St. Matthew being chiefly designed for Jewish Christians; +that of St. Luke for Gentile converts, and that +of St. Mark occupying an intermediate place between +the two. It was also obviously the object of the author +of St. Matthew's Gospel to set forth the discourses; +of that of St. Mark's to give a graphic description of +the actions of our Lord. Each of these Gospels is +also distinguished by a number of minor peculiarities. +</p> + +<p> +When the common narrative comes to be closely +scrutinized, it presents us with phenomena more remarkable +than any that can be found elsewhere in +literature. These narratives are couched to a considerable +extent in the same words and phrases, closely +interwoven with a number of most singular variations, +which have an important bearing on their historical +character. As far as the words are identical, they +force on us the conclusion that they must have been +derived from some common origin. These identities +are more striking in the narrative than in the discourses. +Three independent writers, if they intended to hand +down the general sense of a body of discourses, on the +supposition that they were in possession of accurate +<pb n='495'/><anchor id='Pg495'/> +information, would repeat them to a great extent in +the same words. But that three independent writers, +who used no common source of information in narrating +the same occurrences, should have employed the same +words to the extent to which it has been done by the +authors of these Gospels is simply impossible. +</p> + +<p> +But if they had all copied from the same document, +these identities of expression must inevitably have +been more complete. It would have been impossible +that they could have been of the capricious character +which they present to us in the pages of the Evangelists. +Even in the narratives, frequent as is the use of the +same words, the variations are numerous; nor are +they much less so in the discourses. They are of the +most singular character, and without the smallest +apparent purpose. Sometimes they are simple changes +in grammatical construction, or a word of nearly the +same meaning is substituted for another. Then we find +one or more lines, sometimes a whole sentence, transposed. +Sometimes words or lines which are inserted +by one Evangelist are omitted by another, the omission +obscuring, and the insertion throwing light on the +sense. At other times, a whole incident is omitted +which, if it had been inserted, would have made an +obscure context plain. In the discourses it occasionally +happens that a part of one which we read in the same +context in another Evangelist, and which seems to be +required by the connection, is omitted, when words +of nearly the same import have been attributed to our +Lord elsewhere. Again: sayings are reported in which, +while many words are the same, others are varied +without any conceivable reason for the variation. +In one or two instances, when words are put into the +mouths of persons different from those to whom they +are attributed by another Evangelist, the grammatical +<pb n='496'/><anchor id='Pg496'/> +structure is altered to suit the variation. Of this we +have two remarkable examples in the account of the +healing of the Centurion's servant, and in the narrative +of the request which the two sons of Zebedee and +Salome presented to our Lord. The words are precisely +the same, while the grammatical forms differ, +according as the one or the other is regarded as the +speaker. +</p> + +<p> +Such are the chief phenomena. But the full extent +and character of these variations, in the closest union +as they are with identities of expression, can only be +appreciated by a careful comparison of the parallel +narrative of the Gospels. Numerous, however, as are +the variations, it must be observed that they exert +scarcely any appreciable influence on the general sense. +They utterly negate the idea that they can have +originated in any set or deliberate purpose. Let us +take for example the account of the feeding of the five +thousand. The Synoptics employ the very remarkable +expression, that after the performance of the miracle, +our Lord <emph>constrained</emph> the disciples to embark, without +giving us a hint of the reason of so unusual an occurrence. +We turn to St. John's Gospel; he says not one +word about our Lord's constraining the disciples to +embark, but tells us that the multitude were designing +to come and take Jesus by force and make Him a king. +This notice, which is of the most incidental character, +gives as the fullest explanation of an event which +would otherwise have been extremely obscure. +</p> + +<p> +But further: in the account of the miracle itself, one +of the Evangelists tells us, that the numbers who were +fed were about five thousand, besides women and children. +How then were the numbers ascertained? and +how came it to pass that the men only were numbered, +and neither the women, nor children? Another Evangelist +<pb n='497'/><anchor id='Pg497'/> +tells us that the multitude were directed to sit +down in companies by hundreds and by fifties. This +at once explains how the numbers were arrived at. +But if this was the case, how came it to be known that +the men were about five thousand; and how came it +to pass, that the women and children were excluded +from the total enumeration? Here again another +Evangelist comes to our help; and informs us that although +the order was given to the whole multitude to +sit down in companies, those who actually did so were +the ἄνδρες not the ἄνθρωποι, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> that the men only sat +down, but the women and children did not. This is +told us in the most incidental form, appearing only in +the Greek. +</p> + +<p> +This last case is perhaps the most remarkable example +in the Gospels, of the manner in which an incidental +variation in one Evangelist throws light on the +obscurities of another. Can such a narrative be otherwise +than historical? This note of veracity is so +entirely incidental that it has in all probability escaped +the notice of nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every +thousand of its readers. There are many others, though +less striking, all of which are of the same incidental +character, and it is impossible to attribute them to +design. Surely this can only have resulted from our +being in the presence of facts and not of fiction. +</p> + +<p> +But the variations in the discourses require a further +notice. When variations occur in highly important +discourses, it is open to the suspicion that they have +originated in the deliberate purpose of giving a different +doctrinal meaning to the words. But when we closely +examine those in the Gospels, although they are very +numerous, we find them of a purely incidental character, +exerting a very inconsiderable influence on the sense. +I am aware that attempts have been made to show that +<pb n='498'/><anchor id='Pg498'/> +some few of these variations have originated in design; +but these attempts only prove the straits to which +those who make them are driven. Thus in the account +of the Sermon on the Mount as we read it in St. Matthew, +the passage runs: <q>Blessed are the poor in +spirit for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.</q> In the +corresponding passage in St. Luke it runs: <q>Blessed +are <emph>ye</emph> poor,</q> <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> the poor people who were our Lord's +disciples, for the Evangelist expressly tells us that these +words were addressed, not to the multitude generally, +but to them. The supposition that this variation indicates +the presence of something resembling communistic +views in the author of St. Luke's Gospel is too absurd +to be worthy of serious discussion. Taking them as a +whole, these discrepancies create no appreciable difference +in the teaching of Jesus as reported by the different +Evangelists. +</p> + +<p> +One thing respecting them is clear—they bear the +strongest testimony to the historical character of the +writings which contain them. It is simply inconceivable +that the authors of the Gospels made them deliberately. +They must have found them in the sources +from which they drew their information. They form +one of the strongest proofs that neither a forger, nor +an accommodater of facts for the purpose of making +them fit in with particular doctrinal theories, has had +any hand in originating them. In simple changes +in grammatical structure, purpose or design is inconceivable. +</p> + +<p> +But the variations in narratives, such as those +above referred to, are even more important as constituting +an attestation of their historical reality than +variations in discourses. Four separate versions of +a fictitious incident fail to clear up one another's +obscurities. But the ability to do so is the distinctive +<pb n='499'/><anchor id='Pg499'/> +mark of imperfect narratives of facts, told by +different witnesses. When two things of a complicated +mechanical construction exactly dovetail into each +other, it is a proof that they have originated in the +same mind. In a similar manner, when a number of +distinct narratives, each of which is more or less incomplete, +exactly fit into each other, this constitutes a +proof, that they did not originate in a fiction but in a +fact. +</p> + +<p> +An illustration will aid in showing the force of this +reasoning. The early history of Rome is unquestionably +of a highly legendary character. We have two +versions of it, one by Livy, and another by Dionysius. +These writers do not give us direct accounts of the +primitive legends, but their narratives are compiled +from authors of a much earlier date, who first reduced +them to writing. Still these historians may be viewed +as substantially accurate reporters of the legendary +history, as it was compiled by the earlier writers. An +important question therefore arises, does the twofold +account which we possess of these legends, after all +the efforts made by Livy and Dionysius to weave +them into a consistent whole, bear the smallest analogy +to the narratives contained in four Evangelists? It +is clear that great disagreements existed among the +original authorities. Let us take any account of the +supposed events of three years—do the variations in +the two accounts bear the smallest resemblance to the +singular phenomena which we find in the Evangelists? +Will they dovetail into one another? Will the small +additions in one throw light on the obscurities of the +other? Do the speeches present any indications of +being copies of a common original? All these questions +must be answered in the negative. Whence then +comes this difference between the narratives of the +<pb n='500'/><anchor id='Pg500'/> +Evangelists and the legendary accounts of the origin of +the Roman power? I answer, because the one is +founded on fact and the other on fiction. +</p> + +<p> +It is not my intention to discuss the innumerable +theories that have been propounded as to the origin +of the Gospels, for the purpose of accounting for the +common narrative, its variations, and the additions +peculiar to each. Many of these theories violate the +principle of common sense; and if the contrary were +not known to be the fact they would suggest the idea +that their authors had never practised the art of literary +composition. Among them I shall only notice the +theories which suppose that the Evangelists had before +them one common document when writing their Gospels; +or that one of them had before him the Gospel of +another; that they deliberately copied the common +words and phrases, and no less deliberately made the +alterations, additions, and transpositions which the +common narrative presents. Let us take for an illustration +the supposition that the author of Mark's Gospel +had that of Matthew before him, or the converse. In +the one case he must have deliberately retained all the +common words and phrases, after making the most +capricious variations and suppressions. Next, he must +have inserted all the little additions which distinguish +the Gospel of St. Mark from that of St. Matthew, and +made the requisite transpositions. But what is still +more remarkable, he must also have taxed his invention +to insert in the midst of its impersonal narrative all +those graphic descriptions which impart to Mark's +Gospel the appearance of ocular testimony. Besides all +this he must of set purpose have omitted nearly all the +discourses in which Matthew's Gospel is so full, or have +placed them in a different context. If, on the other +hand, we suppose that Mark's Gospel is the original +<pb n='501'/><anchor id='Pg501'/> +and Matthew's the copy, the whole process must be +reversed, and above all the author must have deliberately +struck out the graphic portions of Mark, except in one +or two instances, when he has added some of his own. +All theories which are founded on the supposition that +the authors of either Gospel used a common document +and deliberately altered it, or that one of them formed +his Gospel out of that of another by a number of +additions and subtractions axe simply incredible. +</p> + +<p> +But the common narrative exists with the identities +of expression interwoven with its variations. How are +we to account for this remarkable fact? The identities +of expression must have had a common origin. But +what do the variations prove? Evidently that the narrative +had passed through a period of oral transmission. +No other theory can adequately account for them. +</p> + +<p> +Such variations would naturally spring up in the +course of oral transmission. We have already seen +that the circumstances of the Church rendered such a +mode of transmission necessary, as details of our Lord's +life must have formed regular portions of Christian +instruction. In doing this, variations would inevitably +arise. After a while they would assume a distinctive +type in different Churches. If then the Synoptic narratives +are three versions of an oral Gospel handed +down in as many Churches, and put together with +additions by their respective authors, this affords a +reasonable explanation of the phenomena which the +common narrative presents. In this case the only +thing which involves a difficulty is the large number of +identities preserved by the Evangelists. This proves +the strong hold which the words must have had on the +minds of the members of the different Churches. +</p> + +<p> +The existence of a traditionary narrative is still +further proved by the fourth Gospel. No one can deny +<pb n='502'/><anchor id='Pg502'/> +that this is an independent record, and that its origin +must have been wholly different from that of the other +three. Yet in those portions which cover common +ground with the Synoptics we meet with phenomena +of a similar order, all proving that there must have +been a narrative in existence which had impressed +itself indelibly on the mind of the Church; so much +so that an entirely independent writer fell into the same +mode of expression when his subject led him to narrate +incidents common to the other three. +</p> + +<p> +Every consideration which can be brought to bear +on this subject tends to prove the existence of a traditionary +narrative of the actions and teaching of Jesus +which was handed down in the Churches prior to the +publication of either of the Synoptic Gospels, and that +their common matter must have passed through a +period of oral transmission. It follows therefore that +our three Synoptics are three different versions of the +same oral Gospel modified in the course of transmission +and supplemented by additional information introduced +by their respective authors. We know as a fact that +a traditionary narrative maintained its place in the +Church far into the second century. Papias deliberately +expressed his preference for it as compared with written +records; and the writings of other Fathers show their +acquaintance with it. +</p> + +<p> +It is clear therefore that a number of traditionary +narratives existed in the Church; and that if a number +of persons had set themselves to reduce these accounts +to writing, they would have presented phenomena +analogous to those of the Synoptic Gospels. I have +also shown that these Gospels present all the phenomena +which distinguish this species of narrative. The substantial +agreement of the three, both as to facts and as +to the discourses, is a guarantee that the actual traditions +<pb n='503'/><anchor id='Pg503'/> +of the Church have been accurately reported. +Their diversities also afford the strongest proof that +these reports were composed in perfect independence of +each other. +</p> + +<p> +It is remarkable that the great majority of those +against whom I am reasoning admit that the discourses +in the Synoptic Gospels are fairly accurate representations +of the actual utterances of Jesus, although they +must have passed through a period of oral transmission. +Yet it is certain that the accurate transmission of +discourses by oral tradition is far more difficult than +that of a report of facts through the same medium. +The difficulty of preventing the intrusion of foreign +elements is much greater. Slight alterations may +materially affect their meaning. Yet the discourses +recorded in the Synoptics bear the indelible impress of +a single mind, that of Jesus Christ.<note place='foot'>Mr. Mill, in his recently published Essay on Theism, has strongly +expressed his belief that these discourses are the veritable utterances of +Jesus.</note> It follows therefore +that if the traditions of the Church were able +to hand down accurately the discourses of our Lord +until the time when they were reduced to writing, still +more easily would they transmit a correct account of +His acts as narrated by His original followers. Except +on account of the antecedent difficulty with which the +miraculous element in the narrative is supposed to be +attended, it would be absurd to accept the one and to +reject the other as mere legendary invention. But +having once established the fact of the Resurrection, +the antecedent difficulty of the miracles is effectually +disposed of, and the facts resume their place in history. +</p> + +<p> +It forms no objection to the general argument that +some of the Synoptics contain narratives of considerable +length, which are omitted by others. It was precisely +<pb n='504'/><anchor id='Pg504'/> +what was to be expected that the traditionary accounts +would vary in this respect, and have incidents reported +by different witnesses of our Lord's ministry incorporated +into them. They abound in the Gospel of St. +Luke, who distinctly states that it is a compilation. +</p> + +<p> +A careful study of the Gospel of St. Matthew must +lead to the conclusion that its narrative portions are +derived from the same general sources as those of the +other two. We find in it precisely the same verbal +identities which have been already noticed as affording +proof of the existence of a common source of information, +and the same variations which prove that it must have +passed through a period of oral transmission. Nor are +the indications of autoptic testimony stronger in Matthew +than in the other two Evangelists; in fact, they +are less so than in Mark. The discourses in Matthew, +viewed as a whole, are a far more complete collection +of the sayings of our Lord, than those in Mark or +Luke. It seems to have been one of the chief purposes +of the author of this Gospel to make a collection of +them, and to unite them by a brief narrative of events. +But even in the discourses, some of the variations found +in Mark and Luke possess stronger claims to be regarded +as the original form of the utterances of our +Lord, than the corresponding ones in Matthew. In +the parts which are common to the Synoptics, they are +evidently founded on one common source of information; +and in this respect neither of them can put in a higher +claim to originality than the other. +</p> + +<p> +Such are some of the chief characteristics of these +Gospels, which have the most intimate bearing on their +claims to be regarded as genuine historical productions. +They are accounts of the traditions of the Church respecting +the life and teaching of its Founder at the +time when they were composed. I have already shown, +<pb n='505'/><anchor id='Pg505'/> +that if they were composed at any time between the +ministry of Jesus Christ and the first twenty years of +the second century, it would have been impossible to +have substituted a legendary narrative for the account +which was handed down in the Church. I am not +concerned to prove that no inaccuracies could have +crept into these traditionary accounts. The only +question of the smallest importance is, are they substantially +historical? On this question mere minor +details, the order and arrangement of events, or even +the introduction of two or three erroneous accounts, +has no more bearing than it has on the general credit +of other histories. Our question is, what is their value +as sources of history? This must be kept perfectly +distinct from the question as to the nature and extent +of the inspiration of the writers. +</p> + +<p> +With respect to a large number of alleged discrepancies, +their whole force as objections to the historical +character of the Gospels is disposed of by the simple +consideration that their authors assert them to be +memoirs, and not histories. No small number of others +can be shown to exist only in the imagination of those +who allege them. A few real difficulties will probably +remain; but these no more invalidate their historical +character, than similar ones which are to be found in +every writer <q>from Herodotus to Mr. Froude.</q> +</p> + +<p> +It must not be forgotten that a careful examination +of the Gospels discloses a mass of additional evidence +on this subject which is inconsistent with the idea that +their narratives are a mere congeries of legendary +inventions. It would be impossible to investigate it +in a work like the present, or even to give an idea of +its value, as shown in the intimate acquaintance of the +authors with the events, ideas, customs, and general +circumstances of the times. To compose such stories +<pb n='506'/><anchor id='Pg506'/> +out of any materials which could have been at his hand +at the beginning of the second century, supposing him +to have been devoid of all personal knowledge on the +subject, would defy any modern writer of fiction, even +one possessed of the highest genius; not to speak of +the incompetence of the ancient world in this class of +literature, rendering the attempts of such writers as +existed among the early Christians simply hopeless. +</p> + +<p> +There are two additional points to which I must +draw attention here, in the internal structure of the +Gospels, as establishing their historical character. +</p> + +<p> +The strongest evidence which the Gospels afford of +their being historical narratives is the unquestionable +fact that they contain a delineation of the greatest of +all characters, Jesus Christ our Lord. This character +is there depicted, even in the opinion of unbelievers +of the greatest eminence, with a matchless perfection. +Why will they not grapple with the question of its +origin, and show how it is possible that such a character +should ever have found a place in the Gospels, on any +theory which they have propounded to account for their +origin? It does not originate in any formal sketch or +delineation. This the Evangelists have nowhere given. +It is the combined result of all the facts and the discourses +which they contain. The whole subject matter +of the Gospels is in fact the material out of which this +great character is delineated. How came it there if +the Gospels consist only of a mass of mythic and +legendary stories which gradually accumulated in the +Church? How is it possible that a bundle of legends +thus thrown together can have created the perfect +character of Jesus Christ, forming, as it does, an harmonious +whole? How has it come to pass that the +authors of our Gospels, if they each composed their +narratives from a mass of fictions which grew up +<pb n='507'/><anchor id='Pg507'/> +during a period of seventy years, have each given us a +delineation of the same Jesus? These are problems +which have an intimate bearing on the question whether +they belong to the order of historical or fictitious compositions, +but with which unbelief has hitherto most +prudently declined to grapple. I shall not pursue +them further here, as I have discussed them fully +in the work already referred to, and shown that the +portraiture of Jesus Christ as delineated in our Gospels +is inconsistent with any theory of their origin which +has been propounded by our opponents. To this +work I must refer the reader. +</p> + +<p> +But there is a second character which is harmoniously +delineated in the Gospels, to which I have not alluded +in the work above referred to, that of Simon Peter. +This character, though a subordinate one, is also a +perfect delineation of its kind, instinct with historic +life. It differs from that of Jesus Christ in being that +of a purely human character, possessed of many of the +virtues and not a few of the frailties of ordinary +human nature. No student of the Gospels can rise +from their perusal without a lively conception of it. +If they are historical, the account of the origin of this +second character of which they present us so perfect a +delineation is a very simple one. It is that of a genuine +man, whose actions they have correctly recorded. But +if the Gospels are such as my opponents affirm them +to be, I must earnestly put to them the question, How +came this character there also? Each Gospel presents +us with a delineation of Peter. In each the same +living man is before us, in all his virtues and in all his +failings. How, I ask, is it possible that the author of +each Gospel has succeeded in creating a character of +Simon Peter—each true to nature and each manifestly +a delineation of the same person—out of a number of +<pb n='508'/><anchor id='Pg508'/> +fictions, myths, and legends? Can any one affirm that +the Peter of the Gospels presents us with one single +trait of a character formed by legend? +</p> + +<p> +But the existence of this delineation in each of the +Gospels involves those with whom I am reasoning in a +yet further difficulty. The New Testament contains a +fifth delineation of the character of Simon Peter, professedly +drawn by himself. I allude to his first Epistle. +This unbelievers say is not his genuine production, +though the external evidence for it is strong. In +either case it will be equally available for my argument. +If it was written by him, it is separated by an interval +of from thirty to forty years from the Peter of the +Gospels. After such a period of time we ought to +find the same substantial lineaments of character, but +chastened, improved, and softened by the influence of +Christianity. This is precisely what we do find. The +Peter of the Epistle is the Peter of the Gospels, in all +the substantial elements of his character, but raised to +a greater moral elevation. The Peter of the Gospels +is the Peter of youthful aspirations, who has had little +experience of the trials and struggles of human life. +The Peter of the Epistle while continually reminding +us of the Peter of the Gospels, is a deeply softened +man, with many of his infirmities changed into the +graces to which they are allied. +</p> + +<p> +Now if the four Peters of the Gospels are fictions, +how have their inventors succeeded in delineating him +true to his youthful character, and true to human +nature? If, on the other hand, the Peters of the Gospels +and of the Epistle are all five creations of the +imagination, the difficulty is increased to impossibility. +How was it possible for the forger of the Epistle to +have delineated a Peter who should be true to the +legendary character of the Peter of the Gospels, and +<pb n='509'/><anchor id='Pg509'/> +at the same time such an improved version of it as +would naturally result from the trials of between thirty +and forty years spent in the service and in attempts to +put in practice the teaching of his Master? It follows, +therefore, that the five portraitures of Simon Peter presented +us in the New Testament, are so many distinctive +proofs that the Gospels are historical realities, and +not the mere offspring of the imaginations of their respective +authors. +</p> + +<p> +I am now in a position to restore the Gospels to their +place in history, and to estimate the value of their testimony. +The Synoptics are so many versions of the +traditions, preserved in the different Churches during +the first century, of that portion of the life and teaching +of Jesus which formed the groundwork of Christianity. +Such an account, more or less full, must have been +handed down from the first origin of the Church. This +account received enlargements from different narrators +who had been witnesses of different events of our Lord's +life and ministry; but so completely was it interwoven +with the daily course of Christian life, that it is impossible +that matters inconsistent with its fundamental +conception can have become incorporated with it. +Moreover, the whole period lay within the limits of +time during which traditions are strictly historical. No +community ever existed which had equal facilities for +handing down accurately the events of its Founder's +life, or had stronger inducements to do so. The Church +was struggling for existence, and seeking to assimilate +to itself the elements by which it was surrounded. This +alone must have kept steadily in its memory the leading +events of the life of Jesus. These, as we have seen, +must also have formed the subjects in which its converts +were habitually instructed. Jesus Christ, to use +the expressive language of St. Paul, must have been to +<pb n='510'/><anchor id='Pg510'/> +the primitive Christian community from the hour of its +birth <q>all and in all.</q> +</p> + +<p> +From the various direct and indirect references in +St. Paul's Epistles we can form a general idea of the +life and teaching of Jesus, as it must have been accepted +by the Churches to which he wrote. All the outlines +furnished by these Epistles may be traced in our present +Gospels. If we descend to a still later period, we +shall find that accounts, substantially the same, were +spread over the entire Church. Even if it is true that +the early Ecclesiastical writers do not cite the Gospels, +it is evident that they were in possession of accounts, +either written or unwritten, which were for all practical +purposes the same. It follows, therefore, that as the +Synoptics contain three versions of the ministry of +Jesus which were handed down by the Churches of the +first century, their claim to the character of historical +documents substantially accurate in all their main features +is unquestionable. +</p> + +<p> +Nothing is more lamentable than the manner in +which a number of minute verbal questions have been +introduced into this great controversy. Both parties +have freely indulged in it. The life of Christianity has +been made to depend on whether some passage in a particular +Father bears a precise verbal agreement with another +passage to be found in our present Gospels. Such +matters may be interesting as mere literary questions, +but surely they are not worthy to be dignified by the title +of historical ones. To represent the life of Christianity +as depending on them, is to leave the broad basis of +historical investigation, and descend to the mere technicalities +of legal evidence, by which the parties who +are most capable of throwing light on the case are excluded +from giving evidence at all, while many minor +points are debated with the utmost ardour. I desire to +<pb n='511'/><anchor id='Pg511'/> +express no opinion as to whether this is right or wrong +in judicial processes; but the principles of history are +widely different. All evidence must be accepted for +what it is worth, and for no more. The issues are great +ones, and are not dependent on any mere set of barren +technicalities. +</p> + +<p> +Christianity is not only one of the greatest facts in +history, but the greatest; and its truth or falsehood +can never be dependent on whether a passage more or +less in Justin Martyr is an accurate citation of another +in St. Matthew's Gospel. The only questions of real +importance are: Do the numerous references of the +early Christian writers to the life and teaching of Jesus +Christ substantially agree with the accounts of that life +and teaching given in our Gospels? Do they contain +any account which gives a really different version of it? +If such agreement exists, although there may be +minor differences, the matter is settled as an historical +question. The Gospels, in all their great outlines, are +virtually accurate accounts of the traditions of the +primitive Church respecting the actions and the teaching +of its Founder, and as such they satisfy all the +conditions of history. +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible that I should in this place enter on +the question of the authorship or the date of the Fourth +Gospel. The literature on this subject would fill a +library of no mean size. I shall only refer to Mr. Sanday's +able vindication of its historical character. One +thing respecting it is clear. It is either the veritable +work of an eye-witness of the facts which it records, or +it is a consummate fiction, such as can be found nowhere +else, either in the ancient or the modern world. Its +author must have united a fixed determination to perpetrate +a forgery on a most sacred subject, with one of +the loftiest ideals of morality, and an inimitable power +<pb n='512'/><anchor id='Pg512'/> +of simple description, and of inventing fictitious scenes +in a manner which is in the highest degree true to +human nature. If this work was really written by a +person who was not a Jew, one hundred and fifty years +after the events which are described in it, and a century +after the destruction of Jerusalem, the accuracy of its +descriptions is one of the most singular phenomena in +literary history. Wherever it runs parallel with the +Synoptic Gospels, it throws light on their obscurities +without the smallest apparent intention of doing so. In +some places it helps to correct erroneous impressions +into which the reader of the Synoptic narratives might +otherwise have fallen. Even in that most striking disagreement +between them, respecting the Paschal character +of the Last Supper, we find in the Synoptics +hints which corroborate St. John's account of it. One +simple alternative, and one only, lies before us; either +to accept this Gospel as a history of the highest authority, +or to reject it as an audacious forgery. +</p> + +<p> +It now remains for me very briefly to consider the +value of the testimony of the Gospels to the truth of +the Resurrection. +</p> + +<p> +If one thing more than another is evident respecting +them, it is that they were not written for the +purposes of controversy with unbelievers, but for the +instruction of Christians. It is certain that the last +thing which occurred to their authors was to guard +their narratives against possible objections. This is +made clear by every page. At the time when they +were composed, the Resurrection had long been accepted +by the entire body of believers, as the foundation +of their faith. It was therefore not necessary for the +Gospels to prove it, as it would have been if they had +been composed with a direct view to unbelievers. This +is a point which it is important to bear in mind in considering +<pb n='513'/><anchor id='Pg513'/> +the nature of their testimony. Two of the +narratives of it are entirely incidental; and it is quite +clear that their authors never intended to give an exhaustive +account of the facts. The other two, though +giving us more details, participate largely in the same +character. It is impossible to read either narrative +with care and not feel that it was never intended to be +a systematic account of all the facts with which the +author was acquainted respecting the Resurrection. +</p> + +<p> +It is objected against these narratives that they +abound with variations, amounting to contradictions. +The variations are unquestionable, and it will readily +be conceded that it is extremely difficult to piece together +all the details of the existing accounts so as to +weave them into an harmonious whole. In fact they +are inevitable whenever the incidents described are of +exciting interest. Such must have been the character +of those connected with the Resurrection. +</p> + +<p> +The chief difficulty is found in the details of the +morning of that important day. They are in an extremely +fragmentary form, and it is quite clear that we +have not all the events before us. If we had, we should +then be in a position to judge what is the precise nature +of the variations in the minor details. But even if +contradictions could be proved to exist, how does their +presence invalidate the main facts, whose truth is established +by wholly independent testimony? The only +way in which it can be made to do so is by mixing up +questions involving particular theories of inspiration +with considerations purely historical. Such discrepancies +exist in connection with some of the most +important facts of history in their minor details, without +in the smallest degree invalidating their historical +credibility. +</p> + +<p> +This may be easily tested by examining a number of +<pb n='514'/><anchor id='Pg514'/> +newspaper accounts of any exciting event, which are +derived from reporters entirely independent of each +other. One witnesses one thing, and one another; and +it is often difficult to weave the whole into a perfectly +consistent narrative. No one can doubt that the morning +of the Resurrection must have been one in the last +degree exciting to the disciples of our Lord. They +were not mere reporters, but persons profoundly interested +in the various occurrences. It would therefore +have been inconsistent with the historical truth of their +position, if their narratives had presented us with no +variations. +</p> + +<p> +It is certain that several women accompanied our +Lord on His last journey to Jerusalem. What was +more likely than that they would visit the sepulchre at +different times, and with different purposes? Can any +one doubt that their excitement must have been great? +What conceivable difference can it make to the great +fact of the Resurrection, that one account mentions two +Marys as going to the sepulchre; that the second adds +to these Salome; that the third mentions several +women; and that the fourth mentions Mary Magdalene +alone? There might have been, as far as anything +which appears in the narratives is concerned, several +different visits; or the same person may have returned +more than once. Or what is the use of urging that +there is an apparent variation of about an hour +between the different accounts, as to the precise time +when these visits were made? Do variations of this +description, which are found in accounts derived from +eye-witnesses of Louis XVI's flight from Paris, in the +smallest degree invalidate the fact? Or what conceivable +difference does it make that one narrative represents +the women as seeing one angel, and another two; and +that one describes the appearance as taking place +<pb n='515'/><anchor id='Pg515'/> +inside, and another outside the sepulchre? It is quite +possible that all these accounts may be true, and that +these occurrences took place on different occasions. +If they were true, nothing was more unlikely than that +the women could have given an orderly narrative of +them. Variations must occur in all reports of events +when the witnesses see only a portion of them. The +great facts before us are plain and evident; and unless +they are falsehoods, there could be no possibility of +mistake respecting them. Different bodies of women +found the sepulchre empty. Some of them affirmed +that they had seen Jesus risen from the dead, and that +He sent a message by them to His disciples. Peter and +John visited the sepulchre, and found it empty. Later +in the same day, Peter affirmed that Jesus Christ +appeared to him; on which day also two other disciples +affirmed that they had seen Him on a journey, at first +without recognizing Him, but that they did so afterwards. +On the evening of the same day, these two +disciples, ten of the Apostles, with other persons in +company, saw Him in a body, and were permitted to +test the reality of His Resurrection by handling His +Person, and by seeing Him eat. About such facts there +could be no mistake. Most of them were well known +and accepted when St. Paul wrote his Epistles, when +the means of testing their truth was ample. We +know on the same authority that the whole apostolic +body asserted that they had seen the Lord, and that as +many as five hundred other persons made a similar +assertion. These are the chief facts, and a number of +minor variations such as those above referred to cannot +affect their credibility. +</p> + +<p> +It has been objected that the author of St. Matthew's +Gospel was ignorant of some of these appearances. +On what ground is the objection made? On the fact +<pb n='516'/><anchor id='Pg516'/> +that he has not mentioned them? Does a writer always +report all he knows, especially when his writing +is intended for the use of those who firmly believe the +fact already? Nothing can exceed the fragmentary +character of this portion of his narrative. If this +Gospel was composed at the late period assigned to it +by those against whom I am reasoning, namely, <hi rend='smallcaps'>a.d.</hi> 90, +it is incredible that these were the only facts known to +the writer, at least thirty years after St. Paul wrote +his Epistles. The charge of ignorance might be sustained +with far greater plausibility if it were admitted +that St. Matthew was the author of this Gospel, because +it might have been expected that he would mention +the first occasion on which his Master had appeared +to him rather than the third. But his authorship is +denied, and the publication of the Gospel assigned to +the last ten years of the century, when it was impossible +that the author, whoever he may have been, could be ignorant +that it was alleged that our Lord had appeared +on other occasions besides those mentioned by him. +</p> + +<p> +I will now consider the threefold account of the +great appearance on the morning of Easter-day. One +of them is contained in the supplement to St. Mark's +Gospel; the other two are those in Luke and John. +Let us first carefully observe the mode in which they +are narrated in the supplement. +</p> + +<p> +Its author seems to have entertained a stronger view +of the indisposition of the disciples to believe the +truth of the Resurrection than the other two narratives +appear to warrant. He first notices the appearance to +Mary Magdalene on the morning of that day, and says +that the disciples refused to credit her report. Next, +he tells us of the appearance to the two disciples as +they went into the country; and states that on their +return they told it to the remainder, <q><emph>Neither believed +<pb n='517'/><anchor id='Pg517'/> +they them.</emph></q> <q>Afterward,</q> he adds, <q>he appeared <emph>to +the eleven as they sat at meat, and upbraided them with +their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they believed +not those who had seen him after he was risen</emph>.</q> +It is evident that the author of the supplement entertained +a strong view of the incredulity of the disciples +when their companions reported to them the fact of +the Resurrection. +</p> + +<p> +Let us now examine how the facts stand in Luke's +narrative. It opens with a detailed account of the +journey into the country of Cleopas and his companion, +and of our Lord's appearance to them. Our Lord addresses +them in the following words: <q><emph>O fools and +slow of heart,</emph></q> (Ω ἀνόητοι, καὶ Βραδεῖς τῇ καρδίᾳ) <q><emph>to +believe all that the prophets have spoken.</emph></q> After their +recognition of Jesus, they are described as immediately +returning to Jerusalem, <q><emph>and find the eleven gathered +together and those that were with them, saying, the Lord +is risen indeed, and hath appeared unto Simon.</emph></q> <q><emph>And +they</emph></q> (<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> Cleopas and his companion) <q><emph>told what +things were done on the way, and how he was known +unto them in the breaking of bread.</emph></q> The narrative +then proceeds: <q><emph>And as they thus spake,</emph></q> (<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi> Cleopas +and his companion) <q><emph>Jesus himself stood in the midst +of them, and said unto them, Peace be unto you.</emph></q> It +then informs us that they were terrified and supposed +that the appearance was that of a spirit. On this our +Lord reasons with them: <q><emph>Why are ye troubled, and +why do thoughts arise in your hearts? Behold my hands +and my feet that it is I myself, for a spirit hath not +flesh and bones as ye see me have. And when he had +thus spoken, he showed them his hands and his feet.</emph></q> +The writer then adds: <q>And when they yet believed not +for joy and wondered, he said unto them, Have ye here +any meat? And they gave him a piece of a broiled fish, +<pb n='518'/><anchor id='Pg518'/> +and of an honey-comb, and he took it and did eat +before them.</q> The author then proceeds with his +narrative: <q>These are the words that I spake unto +you, while I was yet with you, that all things might +be fulfilled that are written in the law of Moses, and +in the prophets and in the Psalms concerning me.</q> +And he adds: <q><emph>Then opened he their understanding, +that they might understand the Scriptures.</emph></q> +</p> + +<p> +The following is the account given of the same +meeting in St. John's Gospel. After having given a full +description of the appearance to Mary Magdalene, he +thus describes our Lord's appearance on the evening +of Easter-day: <q>Then the first day at evening, being +the first day of the week, when the doors were shut +where the disciples were assembled for fear of the Jews, +<emph>came Jesus and stood in the midst, and said unto them, +Peace be unto you. And when he had so said, he showed +them his hands and his side.</emph> Then were the disciples +glad when they saw the Lord. <emph>Then said Jesus unto +them again, Peace be unto you: as my Father hath sent +me, even so send I you. And when he had said this he +breathed on them, and said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost.</emph></q> +</p> + +<p> +The difference between the supplement of Mark's +Gospel and the narratives of Luke and John is very +remarkable. Are the variations such as would be +found in different reports of a set of fictions, or are +they such as distinguish brief but inexact reports of +actual occurrences? This is a very important question. +</p> + +<p> +First: the three accounts bear the clearest indications +of being independent. It is incredible that any +one of the three writers having before him one or both +of the other two accounts should have composed his +own as it now stands. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly: the author of the supplement uses very +strong language in describing the unbelief of the disciples. +<pb n='519'/><anchor id='Pg519'/> +He says that when they told it to the others, they +did not believe their report. St. Luke, on the other +hand, informs us that as soon as Cleopas and his companion +entered the room where on their return they +found the Apostles and others assembled together, +they were received with the exclamation: <q><emph>The Lord is +risen indeed, and hath appeared unto Simon.</emph></q> +</p> + +<p> +Again: the author of the supplement says that when +Jesus appeared to the eleven as they sat at meat <q><emph>he +upbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of +heart</emph> (ὠνείδισε τὴν ἀπιστίαν αὐτῶν καὶ σκληροκαρδίαν) +<emph>because they did not believe them that had seen him after +he was risen.</emph></q> St. Luke tells us that not only were +Cleopas and his companion received with the joyful +exclamation, <q><emph>The Lord is risen indeed</emph>,</q> but instead of +upbraiding them Jesus addressed them with the words +<q><emph>Peace be unto you</emph>;</q> which is confirmed by the author +of the fourth Gospel, who, if St. John was really the +author, must have been present. In neither of these +Gospels is there one word of <q>upbraiding the disciples +with unbelief;</q> while both affirm that Jesus proceeded +to give them rational grounds for believing that +He was actually risen from the dead, by showing them, +according to one, <q>his hands and his feet,</q> according to +the other, <q>his hands and his side.</q> It is quite probable +that He may have done both. St. John adds, <q><emph>Then +were the disciples glad when they saw the Lord.</emph></q> +</p> + +<p> +But St. Luke's account is more specific. He tells us +that immediately on His entry fear took possession of +their minds. <q><emph>They were terrified and affrighted</emph>,</q> +and supposed that it might be a spirit, and not Jesus +actually raised from the dead. Our Lord therefore +before showing them His hands and His feet proceeded +to reason with them as to the reality of His appearance. +<q><emph>Handle me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones +<pb n='520'/><anchor id='Pg520'/> +as ye see me have.</emph></q> Here there is nothing of reproach, +such as is suggested by the supplement to St. Mark's +Gospel. Yet there was incredulity of a certain kind +in the room, but not one which was worthy of reproach. +We learn from St. Luke that it was not the incredulity +of <emph>unbelief, but of joy</emph>; in other words, that the news +seemed too good to be true, and they dared scarcely +trust the evidence of their senses. On this however +nothing in the form of a <emph>reproach</emph> passes the lips of +Jesus; but for their further satisfaction, <emph>he asks for +food and eats it before them</emph>. +</p> + +<p> +On all these points the narratives of St. Luke and +St. John throw light on each other, as such accounts, +if founded on fact, ought to do, while their independence +is indisputable. According to those with whom +I am reasoning, the Gospel of St. John is much the +latest written. If therefore the author had borrowed +from Luke, it is incredible that a writer who had such +powers of setting forth fictions in the garb of facts, +should have omitted the other remarkable incidents +mentioned by St. Luke, and not have dressed them up +with the art of which he was so consummate a master, +for these would have communicated a striking reality +to the scenes. It is therefore unquestionable that +these two accounts present all the phenomena of +history, and none of those of fiction. +</p> + +<p> +But how stands the continuation of St. Mark's +Gospel, which affirms that our Lord upbraided the +eleven with their unbelief and hardness of heart on the +occasion of His appearance on Easter evening? +</p> + +<p> +The author of the supplement was probably not +aware that Cleopas and his companion were present in +the room when our Lord appeared to the eleven, or +even that others besides the eleven were present, as is +expressly affirmed by St. Luke to have been the case. +<pb n='521'/><anchor id='Pg521'/> +The impression which it leaves on the mind is that they +reported the Resurrection to the disciples generally on +their return, and that it was disbelieved by them, and that +the appearance to the eleven was a subsequent event. +</p> + +<p> +We are now in a position to see how this misapprehension +may have originated; and that instead of +invalidating the account, it forms a strong confirmation +of its truth. There were persons in the room whom +our Lord had actually reproached for their unbelief, +viz. Cleopas and his companion; though He reproached +none who were present on the occasion of His appearance. +The words stated by St. Luke to have been +used by Him were, Ω ἀνόητοι καὶ Βραδεῖς τῇ καρδίᾳ, <q>O +fools and slow of heart.</q> Those used in St. Mark in +describing the address to the eleven are ὠνείδισε τὴν +ἀπιστίαν αὐτῶν καὶ σκληροκαρδίαν, <q>He upbraided +their unbelief and hardness of heart.</q> The one expression +is the very counterpart of the other. There +were persons present who had been thus reproached +but a few hours before: the author of the continuation +was aware of the fact that some had been thus +reproached, and he supposed that the reproach was +addressed to all the assembled disciples, instead of the +salutation of peace with its attendant circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +Then as to their having been received with expressions +of incredulity on their return, St. Luke tells us that +they returned to Jerusalem, <q><emph>and found the eleven +gathered together, and them that were with them.</emph></q> Now +as they had set out early in the day, it was necessary +on their return that they should make some inquiry as +to where the Apostles were to be found. In doing +this it is probable enough that they went to inquire of +some disciples who received their account with incredulity, +and that then this incredulity may through +misapprehension have been transferred to the whole +<pb n='522'/><anchor id='Pg522'/> +assembly. I submit therefore that notwithstanding +this disagreement between the three accounts, that of +the continuation of St. Mark's Gospel gives a strong +corroboration of the statements of the other two. +These are precisely the kind of variations which we +find in reports of events after they have passed through +a few stages of oral transmission. +</p> + +<p> +The narratives of St. Luke and St. John furnish us +with one more very incidental confirmation of each +other. St. Luke informs us that on the occasion of +this interview our Lord <q><emph>opened their understanding, +that they might understand the Scriptures.</emph></q> St. John +says that <q><emph>He breathed on them, and said, Receive ye +the Holy Ghost.</emph></q> The words and the mode of expression +differ greatly; but both statements point to +one and the same fact, that on this occasion the persons +present supposed that they received a supernatural +enlightenment. St. Luke describes the effect produced +on the minds of the disciples; St. John gives the +actual medium of its production. Coincidences of this +kind prove that the narratives must be founded on +facts, and are beyond the skill of a forger to imitate. +</p> + +<p> +I have now considered a few of the leading features +of the Gospels, which establish the general historical +character of their contents. A close examination of +them would put us in possession of a large amount of +additional evidence, but to enter on such an inquiry +here would be inconsistent with the limits of the present +work. As I have already observed, the minute +scrutiny of a number of minor details, as far as the +great historical question is concerned, would be a needless +expenditure of labour. The real question at issue +is: Is the account of our Lord's life and teaching, as it +is handed down in our present Gospels, substantially +true in its great outlines, or has one of a wholly different +<pb n='523'/><anchor id='Pg523'/> +character been substituted for the true one, and +usurped its place in the teaching of the Church? On +a broad question of this kind, minor discrepancies in +the accounts have no real bearing. If the narrative is +true in its great outlines, it follows that our Lord's +character must have been beyond all question superhuman, +and justifies us in affirming that He must have +been a <q>teacher come from God.</q> Such a conclusion +will still leave open a number of questions of the deepest +importance, but they belong to the province of theology +to investigate, and form no necessary portion of an historical +inquiry. If the Gospels <emph>in their broad outlines</emph> +are historical; above all, <emph>if Jesus Christ rose from the +dead</emph>, it follows that the New Testament must contain a +divine revelation. +</p> + +<p> +As this last fact forms the central position of Christianity, +I have made its historical truth the chief +subject of my investigation. In doing this I have +relied only on documents which are contained in +the New Testament itself, and chiefly on those whose +genuineness is conceded by opponents. I have shown +that no species of documents can possess a higher +historical value than these, and that the circumstances +under which they were written, the nature of their contents, +and the persons to whom they were addressed, +form an attestation to the truth of the facts asserted in +them, which is unrivalled in the whole course of literature. +By means of these I have firmly established the +fact that the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ +was the foundation on which the Church rested as a +community from the first dawning of its existence, and +the basis of the life of its individual members; and that +considerable numbers of the followers of Jesus Christ +affirmed that they had seen and conversed with Him +after He had risen from the dead. I have shown that +<pb n='524'/><anchor id='Pg524'/> +these facts rest on the highest form of historical attestation. +This being so, there can be only two alternatives +respecting them. Either the belief in the Resurrection +was founded on the fact that He actually rose +from the dead; or it must have originated in the delusions +of His followers. I have shown that the various +theories which have been propounded to account for it +on the latter supposition, when tested by the actual +facts, are untrue both to human nature and to the possibilities +of the case. From this it results, as a necessary +consequence, that <hi rend='smallcaps'>Jesus Christ rose from the +dead</hi>. If He rose from the dead, the truth of His +divine mission is established, and His claim to be the +King and supreme Legislator of the Church is vindicated. +This claim may be fully set forth in two sayings +of His own, recorded in St. John's Gospel: <q>I am the +light of the world; he that followeth Me shall not walk +in darkness, but shall have the light of life.</q> (xiii. 12.) +<q>Thou sayest that I am a king. For this end was I +born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I +should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is +of the truth heareth my voice.</q> (xviii. 37.) +</p> + +<p> +The practical conclusion which this investigation suggests +cannot be better expressed than in the words of +the same divine Teacher: <q>He that believeth, believeth +not on me, but on Him that sent me; and he that seeth +me seeth Him that sent me. I am come, a light into +the world, that whosoever believeth on me should not +abide in darkness. And if any man hear my words, +and believe not, I judge him not; for I came not to +judge the world, but to save the world. He that rejecteth +me, and receiveth not my words, hath one that +judgeth him; the word that I have spoken, the same +shall judge him in the last day.</q> +</p> + +<p> +THE END. +</p> + +</div> + +</body> +<back rend="page-break-before: right"> + <div id="footnotes"> + <index index="toc" /> + <index index="pdf" /> + <head>Footnotes</head> + <divGen type="footnotes"/> + </div> + <div rend="page-break-before: right"> + <divGen type="pgfooter" /> + </div> +</back> +</text> +</TEI.2> |