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diff --git a/46630-8.txt b/46630-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab0a722 --- /dev/null +++ b/46630-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,15157 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Supernatural in the New Testament by +Charles A. Row + + + +This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most +other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of +the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +http://www.gutenberg.org/license. If you are not located in the United +States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you are located +before using this ebook. + + + +Title: The Supernatural in the New Testament + +Author: Charles A. Row + +Release Date: August 19, 2014 [Ebook #46630] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO 8859-1 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SUPERNATURAL IN THE NEW TESTAMENT*** + + + + + + The Supernatural in the New Testament + + Possible, Credible, and Historical + + Or: An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against + Christianity as a Divine Revelation + + By the + + Rev. Charles A. Row, M.A. + + Prebendary of St. Paul's + +Author of "The Jesus of the Evangelists," "The Nature and Extent of Divine + Inspiration," "The Moral Teaching of the New Testament," Etc. + + London + + Frederic Norgate + + 1875 + + + + + +CONTENTS + + +Dedication. +Chapter I. Introduction. The Position of the Controversy Between the +Opponents and the Defenders of Christianity. +Chapter II. Definitions of Terms. +Chapter III. The Supernatural Elements Contained in the New Testament: In +What Do They Consist? And What View Do Its Writers Take Respecting Them? +Chapter IV. Miracles, What Do They Prove? +Chapter V. The Antecedent Improbability of Miracles.--The Unknown and +Unknowable God. +Chapter VI. The Objection That Miracles Are Contrary To Reason Considered. +Chapter VII. The Allegation That No Testimony Can Prove The Truth Of A +Supernatural Event. +Chapter VIII. The Objection That The Defenders Of Christianity Assume +Certain Facts The Truth Of Which Can Only Be Known By Revelation, And Then +Reason From Those Facts To The Truth Of The Bible, Considered. +Chapter IX. Demoniacal Miracles--General Considerations. +Chapter X. The Existence And Miracles Of Satan. +Chapter XI. Possession: Is The Theory That It Was Madness Subversive Of +The Historical Value Of The Gospels Or Inconsistent With The Veracity Of +Christ? +Chapter XII. Possession, If An Objective Reality, Neither Incredible Nor +Contrary To The Ascertained Truths Of Mental Science. +Chapter XIII. The Alleged Credulity Of The Followers Of Jesus. +Chapter XIV. The Love Of The Marvellous--Its Bearing On The Value Of +Testimony To Miracles. +Chapter XV. Our Summary Rejection Of Current Supernaturalism Considered In +Its Bearing On The Evidence For Miracles. +Chapter XVI. General Objections To Miracles As Credentials Of A +Revelation. +Chapter XVII. The Historical Evidence On Which The Great Facts Of +Christianity Rest--General Considerations. +Chapter XVIII. The Testimony Of The Church, And Of St. Paul's Epistles, To +The Facts Of Primitive Christianity. Their Historical Value Considered. +Chapter XIX. The Evidence Furnished By The Epistles To The Facts Of Our +Lord's Life, And To The Truth Of The Resurrection. +Chapter XX. The Resurrection Of Jesus Christ An Historical Fact. +Chapter XXI. The Historical Value Of The Gospels As Deduced From Previous +Considerations. +Chapter XXII. The Historical Character Of The Gospels As Deduced From +Their Internal Structure. +Footnotes + + + + + + + [Cover Art] + +[Transcriber's Note: The above cover image was produced by the submitter +at Distributed Proofreaders, and is being placed into the public domain.] + + + + + +DEDICATION. + + +To The Committee Of The Christian Evidence Society. + +My Lords and Gentlemen, + +Having undertaken to compose this work at your request, I beg permission +to dedicate it to you. In doing so I feel that it is a duty which I owe +both to you and to myself that I should state the position which we +respectively occupy with regard to it. Your responsibility is confined to +having requested me to compose a work in refutation of certain principles +now widely disseminated, which impugn the supernatural elements contained +in the New Testament. For the contents of the work and for the mode of +treatment I alone am responsible. When I considered the position of the +present controversy, I felt that it was impossible to treat the subject +satisfactorily except on the principle that the responsibility for the +mode of conducting the argument and of answering the objections should +rest with the writer alone. In dealing with a subject so complicated, +involving as it does questions of philosophy and science as well as the +principles of historical criticism, I can scarcely venture to hope that +every position which I have taken will prove acceptable to all the various +shades of theological thought. I have endeavoured to take such as seemed +to me to be logically defensible without any reference to particular +schools of theological opinion. As the entire question is essentially +historical, I have done my utmost to exclude from it all discussions that +are strictly theological. Modern unbelief however puts in two objections +which if valid render all historical evidence in proof of the occurrence +of miracles nugatory, namely that they are both impossible and incredible. +In meeting these I have been compelled to appeal to what appear to me to +be the principles of a sound philosophy. In all other respects I have +viewed the question before me as exclusively one of historical evidence. + +If the Resurrection of our Lord is an actual occurrence, it follows that +Christianity must be a divine revelation. If it is not, no amount of other +evidence will avail to prove it to be so. As it has been strongly affirmed +that for this great fact, which constitutes the central position of +Christianity, the historical evidence is worthless, I have devoted the +latter portion of this volume to the consideration of this question, with +a view of putting before the reader the value of the New Testament when +contemplated as simple history. Using the Epistles as the foundation of my +argument, I have endeavoured to prove that the greatest of all the +miracles recorded in the Gospels rests on an attestation that is +unsurpassed by any event recorded in history. For this purpose I have used +the Epistles as simple historical documents, and I have claimed for them +precisely the same value which is conceded to other writings of a similar +description. The feeling among Christians that these writings contain the +great principles of the Christian faith has occasioned it to be overlooked +that they are also contemporary historical documents of the highest order. +As such I have used them in proof of the great facts of Christianity, +above all in proof of the greatest of them, the Resurrection of our Lord. + +With these observations I now present you the following work, with the +hope that it may prove the means of removing many of the difficulties with +which recent controversial writers have endeavoured to obscure the +subject. Trusting that it maybe accepted by the great Head of the Church, +the reality of whose life and teaching as they are recorded in the Gospels +it is designed to establish, + +I remain, my Lords and Gentlemen, +Your's faithfully, +C. A. Row. + +London, January, 1875. + + + + + +CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. THE POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE +OPPONENTS AND THE DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. + + +Although every portion of the Bible is vehemently assailed by the various +forms of modern Scepticism, it is clear that the real turning point of the +controversy between those who affirm that God has made a supernatural +revelation of himself to mankind, and those who deny it, centres in those +portions of the New Testament which affirm the presence of the +supernatural. The question may be still further narrowed into the inquiry +whether the person and actions of Jesus Christ, as they are depicted in +the Gospels, are historical facts, or fictitious inventions. If the +opponents of Revelation can prove that they are the latter, the entire +controversy will end in their favour. It would in that case be utterly +useless to attempt to defend any other portion of the Bible; and the +controversy respecting the Old Testament becomes a mere waste of labour. +If, on the other hand, Christians can prove that the narratives of the +four Gospels, or even of any one of them, are a true representation of +historical facts, then it is certain that God has made a revelation of +himself, notwithstanding the objections which may be urged against certain +positions which have been taken by Ecclesiastical Christianity, and the +difficulties by which certain questions connected with the Old Testament +are surrounded. + +It follows, therefore, that the historical truth of the facts narrated in +the Gospels constitutes the central position of the entire controversy. It +is not my purpose on the present occasion to discuss the general question, +whether the delineation of Jesus Christ which the Gospels contain is one +of an ideal or an historical person. That question I have already +considered in "The Jesus of the Evangelists." But as the various forms of +modern unbelief are making the most strenuous efforts to prove that the +supernatural elements of the New Testament are hopelessly incredible, and +that the attestation on which the supernatural occurrences mentioned in it +rests, is simply worthless, it is my intention to devote the present +volume to the consideration of this special subject, and to examine the +question of miracles, and their historical credibility. + +Modern scepticism makes with respect to supernatural occurrences (under +which more general term I include the miracles of the New Testament), the +three following assertions, and endeavours to substantiate them by every +available argument: + +1st. That all supernatural occurrences are impossible. + +2nd. That, if not impossible, they are incredible; that is, that they are +contrary to reason. + +3rd. That those which are narrated in the New Testament are devoid of any +adequate historical attestation, and owe their origin to the inventive +powers of the mythic and legendary spirit. + +It is my purpose, in the course of the present work, to traverse each of +these three positions, and to show: + +1st. That miracles and supernatural occurrences are not impossible; and +that the arguments by which this has been attempted to be established are +wholly inconclusive. + +2nd. That they are neither incredible, nor contrary to reason; but are +entirely consistent with its dictates. + +3rd, That the greatest of all the miracles which are recorded in the New +Testament, and which, if an actual historical occurrence, is sufficient to +carry with it all the others, the resurrection of Jesus Christ, rests on +the highest form of historical testimony. + +Such is my position. + +A recent writer, who has ably advocated the principles of modern +scepticism, the author of "Supernatural Religion," has in the opening +passage of his work clearly placed before us the real point at issue. He +states the case as follows: + +"On the very threshold of inquiry into the origin and true character of +Christianity we are brought face to face with the supernatural. It is +impossible, without totally setting aside its peculiar and indispensable +claim to be a direct external revelation from God of truths which +otherwise human reason could not have discovered, to treat Ecclesiastical +Christianity as a form of religion developed by the wisdom of man. Not +only in form does it profess to be the result of divine communication, but +in its very essence, in its principal dogmas it is either superhuman or +untenable. There is no question here of mere accessories, which are +comparatively unimportant, and do not necessarily affect the essential +matter, but we have to do with a scheme of religion claiming to be +miraculous in all points, in form, in essence, and in evidence. This +religion cannot be accepted without an emphatic belief in supernatural +interposition, and it is absurd to imagine that its dogmas can be held, +whilst the miraculous is rejected. Those who profess to hold the religion, +whilst they discredit the supernatural element, and they are many at the +present day, have widely receded from Ecclesiastical Christianity. It is +most important that the inseparable connection of the miraculous with the +origin, doctrines, and the evidence of Christianity should be clearly +understood, in order that inquiry may pursue a logical and consistent +course."--_Supernatural Religion, page 1._(1) + +I fully accept all the chief positions laid down in this passage as an +adequate statement of the points at issue between those who affirm and +those who deny that Christianity is a divine revelation. A few minor +points require a slight modification, as incurring the danger of confusing +ideas that ought to be carefully distinguished. + +The writer before me also raises no minor issue. Although the work is +entitled "Supernatural Religion, or an inquiry into the reality of divine +revelation," its object, which is consistently carried out throughout it, +is to impugn the historical character of the Gospels, and to prove that +the supernatural occurrences which are recorded in them are fictitious. +The title of the work might have justified the writer in assailing other +portions of the Bible; but he clearly sees that to adopt this course is +only to attack the outworks of Christianity, and to leave the key of the +entire position unassailed. In doing so he has pursued a far nobler course +than that which has been adopted by many of the opponents of the Christian +faith. He has directed his attack against the very centre of the Christian +position, the historical credibility of the supernatural actions +attributed to Jesus Christ in the Gospels, being well aware that a +successful assault on this position will involve the capture of all the +outworks by which it is supposed to be protected; while it by no means +follows that a successful assault on any of the latter involves the +capture of the citadel itself. This writer does not take up a bye +question, but he goes direct to the foundation on which Christianity +rests. In doing so, it must be acknowledged that he has taken a +straightforward course, and one which must bring the question of the truth +or falsehood of Christianity to a direct issue. + +I fully agree with the chief position taken in the quotation before us, +that Christianity involves the presence of the supernatural and the +superhuman, what in fact is generally designated as the miraculous, or it +is nothing. To remove these elements out of the pages of the New +Testament, is not to retain the same religion, but to manufacture another +quite different and distinct from it. In the first place, we have the +great central figure in the Gospels, the divine person of Jesus Christ our +Lord, and the entire body of his actions and his teaching. He, although +depicted as human, is at the same time depicted as superhuman and +supernatural, not merely in his miraculous works, but in his entire +character. To remove the divine lineaments of Jesus Christ out of the +Gospels is simply to destroy them. Besides this, we have a large number of +miraculous actions attributed to him. These are inextricably interwoven +with the entire narrative, which, when they are taken away, loses all +cohesion. Lives of Jesus which have been set forth, deprived of their +supernatural and superhuman elements, are in fact nothing better than a +new Gospel composed out of the subjective consciousness of the writers. +Various attempts have been made to pare down the supernatural and +superhuman elements in the Gospels to the smallest possible dimensions. +Still they obstinately persist in remaining. If everything else is struck +out of the Gospels, except their moral teaching, we are left in the +presence of teaching which is raised at an immense elevation above the +thoughts and conceptions of the age that produced it; and of a teacher, +who while distinguished by the marks of pre-eminent holiness and greatness +of mind, is also distinguished by a degree of self-assertion in his +utterances of moral truth, which is without parallel, even among the most +presumptuous of men. Deal with the Gospels as we will, while we allow any +portions of them to remain as historical, we are still in the presence of +the superhuman. + +As the narrative now stands it is at least harmonious. The lofty +pretensions of the teacher bear the most intimate correlation to the +supernatural and superhuman facts that are reported of him. The one are +the complement of the other. If the facts are true, the lofty self- +assertion of the teacher is justified; if they are not true, his +pretensions conflict with the entire conception of his holiness and +elevation of mind. The use which a wide spread school of modern criticism +so freely makes of the critical dissecting knife, for the purpose of +amputating the supernatural from the Gospels, can only be attended by the +fatal termination of destroying the entire Gospels as of the smallest +historical value. It is marvellous that persons who retain any respect for +Christianity as a system of religious and moral teaching, should have +attempted to throw discredit on this element in the Gospels with a view of +saving the remainder. + +Nor is the case different with the other portions of the New Testament. +Christianity, as enunciated by its writers, does not profess merely to +teach a new and improved system of morality. If this was its only +pretension, it would certainly have but little claim to be viewed as a +divine revelation. In morals its teaching is both unsystematic and +fragmentary; though it is an unquestionable fact, that a great system of +moral teaching may be deduced from the principles it unfolds. But if one +thing is plainer than another on the face of the New Testament, it is that +the great purpose sought to be effected by Christianity is to impart a new +moral and spiritual power to mankind. It professes to be, not a body of +moral rules, but a mighty moral force, which is concentrated in the person +of its Founder. The acceptance of it had generated a new power or energy, +a moral and spiritual life, which raised those who had embraced it above +their former selves; and which it professes to be able to impart to all +time. This supernatural element, concentrated as I have said that it is in +the person of its founder, runs through the entire epistles, and +constitutes their most distinguishing feature. If the supernatural +elements in the person of Jesus Christ be removed from their teaching +nothing remains but a number of moral precepts robbed of all their +vitality. In one word, the whole system of teaching simply collapses. + +In a similar manner, if we eliminate every thing supernatural out of the +New Testament, with a view of arriving at a residuum of truth, we are +brought into immediate contact with the most unique fact in the history of +man, the creation of the Church of Jesus Christ, the greatest institution +which has ever affected the destinies of our race, and which has for +eighteen centuries exerted a most commanding influence on human happiness +and civilization. This is professedly based on a miraculous fact, the +Resurrection of Jesus Christ. If, therefore, we remove the supernatural +elements out of Christianity, this institution, mighty for good in its +influence on the progress of our race, has been based on an unreality and +a delusion. Here again we encounter something which has very much the +appearance of the supernatural. + +On these accounts, therefore, I cordially accept the position which is +laid down by the author of "Supernatural Religion" as a correct statement +of the case, that Christianity involves the presence of the Supernatural, +or it is nothing. We must either defend the chief supernatural elements of +the New Testament or abandon it as worthless. + +But there is an expression which occurs in this quotation, and which is +frequently made use of in subsequent parts of the work, which requires +consideration, "Ecclesiastical Christianity." What is intended by it? The +meaning is nowhere defined, and unless we come to a clear understanding +with respect to it, we shall be in danger of complicating the entire +question. The expression is ambiguous. If by it is meant any other form of +thought, than that which is contained in the pages of the New Testament; +if, in fact, by it is intended a systematic arrangement of doctrinal +truth, which has been elaborated at a subsequent period, I emphatically +assert that those who are called upon to defend the divine character of +the Christian Revelation have nothing to do with it. The only thing which +those who maintain that the New Testament contains a divine revelation can +be called on to defend, is the express statements of the book itself, and +not a system of thought which subsequent writers may have attempted to +deduce from it. + +This point is so important, that I must make the position which I intend +taking with respect to it clear. It involves the distinction between +revelation and theology. The religious and moral teaching which is +contained in the New Testament is in a very unsystematic form. Not one of +its writings is a formal treatise on theology, nor does one of them +contain a systematised statement of what constitutes Christianity. Its +teaching of religious truth is incidental, and is called forth by the +special circumstances of the writer. The plain fact is that four of the +writings which comprise the New Testament are religions memoirs. One is an +historical account of the foundation of the Church. Twenty-one are +letters, written to different Churches and individuals, and all called +forth by special emergencies. These all partake of the historical +character. The only one which does not participate in this character is +the Apocalypse, which, being a vision, is utterly unlike a formal or +systematic treatise on Christianity. The result of the form in which the +New Testament is composed is that its definite teaching is always +incidental, called forth to meet special circumstances and occasions in +the history of Churches and individuals, and never formal. It is also +universally couched in popular, as distinct from scientific or technical +language. Not one of its writers makes an attempt to formulate a system of +Christian theology. + +The person of Jesus Christ constitutes Christianity in its truest and +highest sense. Three of the Gospels embody the traditionary teaching of +the Church on this subject. The fourth is the work of an independent +writer. The epistles may be received as a set of incidental commentaries +on the person and work of Jesus Christ, called forth by the special +occasions which gave them birth, and embodying the author's general views +as to his work and teaching as adapted to a number of special +circumstances and occasions. + +Between the contents of the New Testament and what is commonly understood +by Ecclesiastical Christianity the difference is extremely wide. The New +Testament contains a divine revelation. Ecclesiastical Christianity is a +body of religious teaching in which Christianity has been attempted to be +presented in a systematised form, or, in other words, it is a theology +more or less complete. + +It is necessary that we should have a clear appreciation of the +difference. Theology is an attempt of the human intellect to present to us +the truths communicated in Revelation in a systematised form. It is in +fact the result of the human reason investigating the facts and statements +of Revelation. Theology therefore is a simple creation of human reason +erected on the facts of divine revelation. As such it is subject to all +the errors and imperfections to which our rational powers are obnoxious. +It can claim no infallibility more than any other rational action of the +human mind. Theology is a science, and is subject to the imperfections to +which all other sciences are liable. It stands to the facts of +Christianity in the same relation as philosophy and physical science stand +to the works of nature. In the one the human intellect investigates the +divine revelation contained in the works of nature, and endeavours to +systematise its truths: in the other it does the same with respect to the +divine revelation which in accordance with the assertions of the New +Testament has been made in the person of Jesus Christ. + +What I am desirous of drawing attention to is that theology is not +revelation. Systems of theology may be accurate deductions of reason from +Revelation; or they may be inaccurate and imperfect ones. It is very +possible that a system of theology which has been evolved by human reason, +although it may have attained a wide acceptance, may be as inadequate an +explanation of the facts of revelation, as the Ptolemaic system of +astronomy was of the facts of the material universe. Objections which were +raised against the latter were no real objections against the structure of +the universe itself. In the same way objections which may be raised +against a particular system of theology, may leave the great facts of +revelation entirely untouched. + +If we look into the history of Christianity, we shall find that as soon as +the Church began to consolidate itself into a distinct community, the +reason of man began to exert itself on the facts of revelation, and to +attempt to reduce its teaching to a systematic form. From this source have +sprung all the various systems of theology which have from time to time +predominated in the Church. It has been a plant of gradual growth, and as +such may bear a fair comparison with the slow growth of philosophy or +physical science. Such an action of reason on the facts of revelation was +inevitable and entirely legitimate. What I am desirous of guarding against +is the idea that when reason is exerted on the facts of revelation, it is +more infallible than when exerted on any other subjects which come under +its cognisance. + +I am not ignorant that there is another theory respecting the nature of +theology. A large branch of the Christian Church holds that a body of +dogmatic statements has been handed down traditionally from the Apostles +and other inspired teachers, which has been embodied in the system of +theology which is accepted by this Church, and that this was intended to +be an authoritative statement of the facts of the Christian revelation. It +is also part of the same theory that the Church as a collective body has +in all ages possessed an inspiration, which enables it to affirm +authoritatively and dogmatically, what is and what is not Christian +doctrine, and that which it thus authoritatively affirms to be so, must be +accepted as a portion of the Christian revelation as much as the contents +of the New Testament itself. + +I fully admit that those who assume a position of this kind are bound to +act consistently, and to defend every statement in their dogmatic creeds +as an integral portion of Christianity. Nor is it less certain, if this +principle is true, that if any portion of such dogmatic creeds can be +successfully assailed as contrary to reason, as for instance the +formulated doctrine of transubstantiation, it would imperil the position +of Christianity itself. Those, however, who have taken such positions, +must be left to take the consequences of them. It is not my intention in +undertaking to defend the historical truth of the supernatural elements in +the New Testament, to burden myself with an armour which seems only fitted +to crash beneath its weight the person who attempts to use it. + +It has been necessary to be explicit on this point, in order that the +argument may be kept free from all adventitious issues. The introduction +into it of the expression, "Ecclesiastical Christianity," brings with it +no inconsiderable danger of diverting our attention from what is the real +point of controversy. I must therefore repeat it. Ecclesiastical +Christianity is a development made by reason from the facts of the New +Testament, and is a thing which is entirely distinct from the contents of +the New Testament. With its affirmations therefore I have nothing to do in +the present discussion. It will not be my duty to examine into its +positions, with a view of ascertaining whether they are developments of +Christian teaching which can be logically deduced from its pages; still +less to accept and to defend them as authoritative statements of its +meaning. In defending the New Testament as containing a divine revelation, +I have only to do with the contents and assertions of the book itself, and +with nothing outside its pages. What others may have propounded respecting +its meaning can form no legitimate portion of the present controversy. The +real point at issue is one which is simple and distinct. It is, are the +supernatural incidents recorded in it historical events or fictitious +inventions? As that is the question before us, I must decline to allow any +other issue to be substituted in the place of it. Our inquiry is one which +is strictly historical. + +Another statement made by the author before me requires qualification. He +says that "Christianity is a scheme of religion which claims to be +miraculous in all points, in form, in essence, and in evidence." This +statement I must controvert. Christianity does not profess to be divine on +all points. On the contrary, it contains a divine and a human element so +intimately united, that it is impossible to separate the one from the +other. It is also far from clear to me how it can be miraculous in form +when it is contained in a body of historical writings. I shall have +occasion to show hereafter, that although miracles form an important +portion of the attestation on which it rests, they are not the only one. + +With these qualifications I fully accept the position taken by this writer +as a correct statement of the points at issue between those who affirm, +and those who deny the claims of Christianity to be a divine revelation, +and accept his challenge to defend the supernatural elements in the New +Testament, or to abandon it as worthless. To maintain that any of its +dogmas can be accepted as true while its miraculous elements are abandoned +seems to me to involve a question which is hopelessly illogical. + +Modern unbelief rejects every supernatural occurrence as utterly +incredible. Before proceeding to examine into the grounds of this, it will +be necessary to lay down definitely the bearing of the present argument on +the principles of atheism, pantheism, and theism. + +As far as the impossibility of supernatural occurrences is concerned, +pantheism and atheism occupy precisely the same grounds. If either of them +propounds a true theory of the universe, any supernatural occurrence, +which necessarily implies a supernatural agent to bring it about, is +impossible, and the entire controversy as to whether miracles have ever +been actually performed is a foregone conclusion. Modern atheism, while it +does not venture in categorical terms to affirm that no God exists, +definitely asserts that there is no evidence that there is one. It follows +that if there is no evidence that there is a God, there can be no evidence +that a miracle ever has been performed, for the very idea of a miracle +implies the idea of a God to work one. If therefore atheism is true, all +controversy about miracles is useless. They are simply impossible, and to +inquire whether an impossible event has happened is absurd. To such a +person the historical enquiry, as far as a miracle is concerned, must be a +foregone conclusion. It might have a little interest as a matter of +curiosity; but even if the most unequivocal evidence could be adduced that +an occurrence such as we call supernatural had taken place, the utmost +that it could prove would be that some most extraordinary and abnormal +fact had taken place in nature of which we did not know the cause. But to +prove a miracle to any person who consistently denies that he has any +evidence that any being exists which is not a portion of and included in +the material universe, or developed out of it, is impossible. + +Nor does the case differ in any material sense with pantheism. When we +have got rid of its hazy mysticism, and applied to it clear principles of +logic, its affirmation is that God and the Universe are one, and that all +past and present forms of existence have been the result of the Universe, +_i.e._ God, everlastingly developing himself in conformity with immutable +law. All things which either have existed or exist are as many +manifestations of God, who is in fact an infinite impersonal Proteus, ever +changing in his outward form. From him, or to speak more correctly, from +it (for he is no person), all things have issued as mere phenomenal +babbles of the passing moment, and by it will be again swallowed up in +never-ending succession. Such a God must be devoid of everything which we +understand by personality, intelligence, wisdom, volition or a moral +nature. It is evident therefore that to a person who logically and +consistently holds these views the occurrence of a miracle is no less an +impossibility than it is to an atheist, for the conception of a miracle +involves the presence of personality, intelligence, and power at the +disposal of volition. All that the strongest evidence could prove to those +who hold such principles, is that some abnormal event had taken place of +which the cause was unknown. + +It is evident, therefore, that the only course which can be pursued with a +professed atheist or pantheist, is to grapple with him on the evidences of +theism, and to endeavour to prove the existence of a God possessed of +personality, intelligence, volition, and adequate power, before we attempt +to deal with the evidences of miracles. Until we have convinced him of +this all our reasonings must be in vain. + +There are four modes of reasoning by which the being of a God may be +established. I will simply enumerate them. First, the argument which is +founded on the principle of causation; second, that which rests on the +order of the universe; third, that from its innumerable adaptations; +fourth, that which is derived from the moral nature and personality of +man. If the argument from causation fails to prove to those with whom we +are reasoning that the finite causes in the universe must have a first +cause from whence they have originated; if that from the orderly +arrangements in the universe fails to prove that there must be an +intelligent being who produced them; if its innumerable adaptations fail +to establish the presence of a presiding mind; and if the moral nature of +man fails to prove that must be a moral being from whom that nature +emanated, and of whom it is the image, it follows that the minds must be +so differently constituted as to offer no common ground or basis of +reasoning on this question. The whole involves an essential difference of +principle, which no argumentation can really reach. To attempt to prove to +a mind of this description the occurrence of a miracle, is simply a waste +of labour. + +A work, therefore, on the subject of miracles can only be addressed to +theists, because the very conception of a miracle involves the existence +of a personal God. To take this for granted in reasoning with a pantheist +or atheist is simply to assume the point at issue. It is perfectly true, +that a legitimate body of reasoning may be constructed, if the pantheist +or the atheist agrees to assume that a God exists for the purpose of +supplying a basis for the argument. We may then reason with him precisely +in the same way as we would with a theist. But the contest will be with +one who has clad himself in armour which no weapon at our disposal can +penetrate. After the strongest amount of historical evidence has been +adduced, and after all alleged difficulties have been answered, he simply +falls back on his atheism or his pantheism, which assumes that all +supernatural occurrences must be impossible, and therefore that alleged +instances of them are delusions. + +This is not unfrequently the case in the present controversy. A +considerable number of objections which are urged against the supernatural +elements of Christianity, derive whatever cogency they possess from the +assumption that there is a God who is the moral Governor of the universe. +These are not unfrequently urged by persons who deny the possibility of +miracles on atheistic or pantheistic grounds. It is perfectly fair to +reason against Christianity on these grounds; it is equally so for a +person who holds these opinions, to attempt to prove that the historical +evidence adduced in proof of the miracles recorded in the New Testament is +worthless as an additional reason why men should cease to believe in them. +But it is not conducive to the interests of truth to urge objections which +have no reality except on the supposition that a God exists who is the +moral Governor of the universe, and then to fall back on reasonings whose +whole force is dependent on the data furnished by pantheism or atheism. I +shall have occasion to notice a remarkable instance of this involved mode +of reasoning hereafter. + +I shall now proceed briefly to state the mode in which I propose to treat +the present subject. The point which I have to defend is not any +conceivable body of miracles or their evidential value, but specially the +supernatural occurrences recorded in the New Testament. I must therefore +endeavour to ascertain what is the extent of the supernaturalism asserted +in the New Testament, and what is the degree of evidential value which its +writers claim for it. + +It has been asserted by many writers that the sole and only evidence of a +revelation must be a miraculous testimony. Whether this be so or not, this +is not the place to enquire. But in relation to the present controversy +the plain and obvious course is to ask the writers of the New Testament +what is the precise evidential value of the supernatural occurrences which +they have narrated. This is far preferable to falling back on any +assertions of modern writers, however eminent, on this subject. They may +have over-estimated, or under-estimated their evidential value. The +writers of the New Testament must be held responsible, not for the +assertions of others, but only for their own. I must therefore carefully +consider what it is that they affirm to be proved by miracles. + +One primary objection against the possibility of miracles is founded on +that peculiar form of theoretic belief, which affirms that both +philosophy, science, and religion alike point to the existence of a Cause +of the Universe, which is the source of all the forces which exist, and of +which the various phenomena of the universe are manifestations, and +designates this cause by the name of God. But while it concedes his +existence, it proclaims him to be Unknown and Unknowable. If this position +is correct, the inference seems inevitable, that any thing like a real +revelation of him is impossible. It will be necessary therefore for me to +examine into the validity of this position. + +A vast variety of arguments have been adduced both on philosophic grounds +and from the principles established by physical science, for the purpose +of proving that the occurrence of any supernatural event is contrary to +our reason. If this be true, it is a fatal objection against the entire +mass of supernatural occurrences that are recorded in the New Testament. +The most important points of these reasonings will require a careful +consideration. + +A very important objection has been urged against the Christian mode of +conducting the argument from miracles. It is alleged that it involves +reasoning in a vicious circle, and that Christian apologists endeavour to +prove the truth of doctrines which utterly transcend reason by miraculous +evidence, and then endeavour to prove the truth of the miracles by the +doctrines. If this allegation is true, it is no doubt a fatal objection to +the argument. I shall endeavour to show that it is founded on a +misapprehension of the entire subject. + +An attempt has been made to re-affirm the validity of Hume's argument that +no amount of evidence can avail to prove the reality of a miracle unless +the falsehood of the evidence is more miraculous than the alleged miracle. +It will be necessary to consider the validity of the positions which have +been lately assumed respecting it. + +A very formidable objection has been urged against the truth of the +supernatural occurrences recorded in the New Testament on the ground that +the followers of Jesus were a prey to a number of the most grotesque +beliefs respecting the action of demons, and that their superstition and +credulity on this point was of so extreme a character as to deprive their +historical testimony, on the subject of the supernatural of all value. As +this objection is not only one which is widely extended, but has been +urged with great force by the author of "Supernatural Religion," I shall +devote four chapters of this work to the examination of the question of +possession and demoniacal action as far as it affects the present +controversy. + +The entire school of modern unbelief found a very considerable portion of +their arguments against the historical character of the Gospels, on the +alleged credulity and superstition of the followers of our Lord. This is +alleged to have been of a most profound character, and it forms the weapon +which is perhaps in most constant use with the assailants of Christianity. +All difficulties which beset their arguments are met by attributing the +most unbounded credulity, superstition and enthusiasm to the followers of +Jesus. It has also been urged that the belief in supernatural occurrences +has been so general, that it renders the attestation of miracles to a +revelation invalid. I purpose examining into the validity of this +objection. As this may be said to be the key of the position occupied by +modern unbelief, I must examine into the reality of the affirmation, and +also how far the love of the marvellous in mankind affects the credit of +the testimony to miracles. This I propose discussing in two distinct +chapters. + +It is an unquestionable fact that in these days we summarily reject whole +masses of alleged supernatural occurrences, as utterly incredible, without +inquiry into the testimony on which they rest. It will be necessary to +inquire into the grounds on which we do this, and how far it affects the +credibility of the miracles recorded in the New Testament. + +The historical value of the testimony which has been adduced for the truth +of the miracles recorded in the New Testament, has been assailed by every +weapon which criticism can supply. It is affirmed in the strongest manner +that they are utterly devoid of all reliable historical evidence. The +Gospels are pronounced to consist of a bundle of myths and legends, with +only a few grains of historic truth hidden beneath them. They are affirmed +to be late compositions, and that we are utterly devoid of all +contemporaneous attestation for the facts recorded in them, and that the +true account of the origin of Christianity is buried beneath a mass of +fiction. If this be true, there cannot be a doubt that it is a most +serious allegation, which affects the entire Christian position. It is +further urged that while the defenders of Christianity publish works in +which they attempt to prove that miracles are possible and credible, they +carefully avoid grappling with the real point of the whole question by +showing that any historical evidence can be produced for a single miracle +recorded in the Gospels, which will stand the test of such historical +criticism, and it is loudly proclaimed that no real evidence can be made +forthcoming. Such a charge as this, it is impossible to pass over in +silence. + +I propose, therefore, to examine into the general truth of these +allegations, and to consider the nature of the historical evidence which +unbelief, after it has exhausted all its powers of criticism, still leaves +us unquestionably in possession of. + +This consists of the epistles of the New Testament viewed as historical +documents. Their value as such has been greatly overlooked by both sides +to the controversy, especially by the Christian side. Christians have been +in the habit of viewing them as inspired compositions, and have studied +them almost exclusively on account of the doctrinal and moral teaching +which they contain, and each sect has viewed them as a kind of armoury +from which to draw weapons for the establishing its own particular +opinions. In doing this they have forgotten that they are also historical +documents of the highest order, the great majority of which even the +opponents of Christianity concede to have been composed prior to the +conclusion of the first century of the Christian era, and many of them at +a much earlier period. + +Of these writings four are universally admitted to be genuine, and to have +been composed prior to the year 60 of our era. Four more are genuine +beyond all reasonable doubt, and of two more the evidence in favour of +their authenticity is very strong. The Apocalypse, which is also admitted +to be genuine, although not strictly an historical document, can be +rendered valuable for the purposes of history. Of the remaining writings +the genuineness is disputed; but whether genuine or not, it is impossible +to deny their antiquity, and that they are faithful representations of the +ideas of those who wrote them. In fact the names of their authors are of +no great importance in the present controversy, when the writings +themselves bear so decisively the marks of originality. Thus the epistle +of James, by whomsoever written, bears the most unquestionable marks of +the most primitive antiquity. It is in fact a document of the earliest +form of Christianity,--in one word, the Jewish form, before the Church was +finally separated from the synagogue. + +Such are our historical materials. Little justice has been done to their +value in the writings of Christian apologists. As included in the Canon of +the New Testament, it has been for the most part the practice to view them +as standing in need of defence, rather than as being the mainstay of the +argument for historical Christianity, and constituting its central +position. + +It will be admitted that it will be impossible for me to do full justice +to such a subject in a work like the present. To bring out all the +treasures of evidence respecting primitive Christianity, and the +foundation of the Christian Church which these writings contain, the whole +subject would require to be unfolded in a distinct and separate treatise +exclusively devoted to the subject. Still, however, this work would be +very incomplete if I did not accept the challenge so boldly thrown down to +us, and show that Christianity rests on an historical attestation of the +highest order. To this I propose devoting the six concluding chapters of +this work. + +I intend, therefore, in the first place to examine the value of the +historical documents of the New Testament, and show that several of the +epistles take rank as the highest form of historical documents, and +present us with what is to all intents and purposes a large mass of +contemporaneous evidence as to the primitive beliefs, and the original +foundation of the Christian Church. In doing so I propose to treat them in +the same manner as all other similar historical documents are treated. + +I shall then show that these documents afford a substantial testimony to +all the great facts of Christianity, and especially to the existence of +miraculous powers in the Church, and that the various Churches were from +the very earliest period in possession of an oral account of the actions +and teachings of Jesus Christ substantially the same as that which is now +embodied in the Gospels; and that this oral Gospel was habitually used for +the purposes of instruction. Further, that this oral Gospel was a +substantial embodiment of the beliefs of the primitive followers of Jesus, +and that the Church as a community was a body especially adapted for +handing down correctly the account of the primitive beliefs respecting its +origin, and that the peculiar position in which it was placed compelled it +to do so. + +I shall further show on the evidence furnished by those epistles, the +genuineness of which unbelievers do not dispute, that from the earliest +commencement of Christianity the whole body of believers, without +distinction of sect or party, believed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ +as a fact, and viewed it not only as the groundwork on which Christianity +rested, but as the one sole and only reason for the existence of the +Christian Church. I shall be able also to prove on the same evidence that +a considerable number of the followers of Jesus were persuaded that they +had seen him alive after his crucifixion, and that his appearance was an +actual resurrection from the dead. The same writings prove to +demonstration that this was the universal belief of the whole Christian +community, and that the Church was established on its basis. + +These things being established as the basis for my reasonings, I shall +proceed to prove that it is impossible that these beliefs of the Church +could have owed their origin to any possible form of delusion; but that +the resurrection of Jesus Christ was an historical fact, and that no other +supposition can give an adequate account of the phenomenon. + +Having proved that the greatest of all the miracles which are recorded in +the Gospels is an historical fact, I have got rid of the _à priori_ +difficulty with which the acceptance of the Gospels as genuine historical +accounts is attended; but further, if it is an historical fact that Jesus +Christ really rose from the dead, it is in the highest degree probable +that other supernatural occurrences would be connected with his person. I +shall therefore proceed to restore the Gospels to their place as history, +and to show that even on the principles of the opponents of Christianity, +they have every claim to be accepted as true accounts of the action and +teaching of Jesus Christ as it was transmitted by the different Churches, +partly in an oral, and partly in a written form. I shall also show that +even if they were composed at the late dates which are assigned to them by +opponents, they were yet written within the period which is strictly +historical, while tradition was fresh and reminiscences vivid, and long +before it was possible that a great mass of facts which must have formed +the basis of the existence of the Christian Church could have been +superseded by a number of mythic and legendary creations. Having placed +these facts on a firm foundation, I shall proceed to consider their +accounts of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and to estimate its +historical nature. + +The proof that the greatest miracle recorded in the Gospels, the +Resurrection of Jesus Christ, is an event which has really occurred, +places the remainder of them in point of credibility in the same position +as the facts of ordinary history; and they must be accepted and regarded +in conformity with the usual methods of testing evidence. + + + + + +CHAPTER II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. + + +Nothing has more contributed to import an almost hopeless confusion of +thought into the entire controversy about miracles than the ambiguous +senses in which the most important terms connected with it have been +employed, both by theologians and men of science, by the defenders of +revelation as well as by its opponents. Of these terms the words "nature," +"natural", "law," "force," "supernatural," "superhuman," "miracle," and +"miraculous," are the most conspicuous. It is quite clear that unless we +use these terms in a definite and uniform sense, we shall be fighting the +air. The neglect to do so has thrown the greatest obscurity over the +entire subject. This vague and uncertain use of them is not confined to +writers on theological subjects, but is diffused over a large number of +scientific works. My object in the present chapter will be, not to lay +down strictly accurate definitions of all the terms used in the +controversy (for this in the present state of thought on the subject is +hardly possible) but to endeavour to assign a definite meaning to those +which it will be necessary for me to employ, and to draw attention to some +of the fallacies which a vague use of language has introduced. + +First: No terms are more frequently used in this controversy than the +words "nature" and "natural." They are constantly used as if their meaning +was definite and invariable. Nothing is more common than to use the +expression "laws of nature," and to speak of miracles as involving +contradictions, violations, and suspensions of the laws and order of +nature, as though there was no danger of our falling into fallacies of +reasoning by classing wholly different orders of phenomena under a common +name. + +What do we mean by the terms "nature" and "natural"? It is evident that no +satisfactory result can come from reasonings on this subject, unless the +parties to the discussion agree to attach to those words a steady and +consistent meaning. Are we in fact under the expression "nature" to +include both matter and its phenomena, and mind and its phenomena? Is +nature to include all things which exist, including their causes; laws, +and forces; or is it to be restricted to matter, its laws and forces? Or +is it to include all things that exist, except God? I need hardly observe +that the laying down some clear and definite principles on this subject is +vital to the present controversy. + +Again: What do we mean by the laws of nature? How do we distinguish +between the laws and the forces of nature? Do the laws of nature, in the +sense in which that expression is used by science, possess any efficient +power whatever; or ought not efficiency to be predicated only of the +forces of nature, and never of its laws? Or when we speak of the forces of +nature, do we recognise any distinction between material and moral forces, +or do we confound phenomena so utterly differing in outward character, and +on whose difference some of the most important points of the controversy +about miracles rest, under a common name? What again do we mean by the +order of nature? Is it its material order; or does it include the order of +the moral universe? Until we can agree to attach a definite meaning to +these expressions, to argue that miracles are contrary to nature, or +involve a suspension of its laws, or a violation of its order, or even to +affirm the contrary position, is fighting the air. Yet this I may almost +say is the present aspect of the controversy. + +Again: What do we intend, when we use the different expressions, +"miracles," "supernatural," "superhuman," or events occurring out of the +order of nature? It is evident that whether they point to any real +distinctions or not, it is necessary to employ them with consistency. + +The mere enumeration of these questions makes it clear that by a vague and +indefinite use of terms, or by attaching to them meanings which they +cannot accurately be made to bear, we may unconsciously assume the entire +question at issue. + +First: With respect to the terms "nature" and "natural." What do we +include under them? Bishop Butler considers that the latter term is +satisfied by attaching to it the meaning "usual." Nature then would mean +the ordinary course of things. But such a meaning would by no means +satisfy the requirements of modern science, philosophy, or theology. + +One obvious sense to attach to the word "nature" is to use it to denote +the entire mass of phenomena as contemplated by physical science. In this +point of view it would include matter, its forces, and its laws, and +embrace the entire range of those phenomena and forces where action is +necessary; and into the conception of which neither volition nor freedom +enters. If "nature" and "natural" had been used only in this sense, it +would have saved us from a great mass of inconclusive reasoning. But this +is far from being the case. Not only are they used to include matter, its +laws and forces, but also the whole phenomena of mind. + +To this use of the terms the Duke of Argyll has given no inconsiderable +countenance in his admirable work, "The Reign of Law," especially in the +sixth chapter. He uses the term law as alike applicable to the operations +of mind and matter, and this of course implies that the whole of our +mental phenomena form a portion of nature and its order. He is led to +this, among other considerations, by the use which we make of the word +"natural" as applied to the results of all kinds of mental operations. The +question may fairly be asked, Are not the works wrought by man in nature, +or is not the building of its nest by a bird, or of its comb by the bee, a +natural operation? If so, man, bird, and bee, must form a portion of +nature, and their various actions, of its order. + +In a popular point of view such expressions involve no difficulty, and as +a mere verbal distinction the whole question would not be worth the labour +of discussion. But in a question like the one now under consideration, +which requires the utmost accuracy both of thought and reasoning, the case +is far different. The classing together of phenomena which differ so +entirely as mind and matter, under a common term, leads to the inference +that there is no essential difference between them, which involves at the +outset a _petitio principii_ of the entire question under definition. I +shall have occasion repeatedly to point out in the course of this work the +number of fallacious reasonings which have been introduced into the +question about the possibility and the credibility of miracles by thus +including under a common term phenomena utterly different in character. It +would be far better to get rid of words so vague as "nature" and "natural" +in this discussion, and substitute for them terms of which it is +impossible to mistake the meaning, than to employ them in senses which are +simply ambiguous and misleading. But of this more hereafter. + +What then are we to do with man? Is he a part of nature and its order? I +reply that man is within material nature as far as regards his bodily +organization; but that he is outside, or above it, and belongs to a +different order, as far as his rational action, his volition, and his +moral powers are concerned. All that I am contending for is that a clear +distinction must be preserved between the necessary action of the forces +of material nature, and the voluntary action of man; and that terms must +be used which accurately denote this distinction. Matter, its forces and +laws, involve the conception of necessary action. They act in a particular +manner because they cannot help so acting. With action purely intellectual +I am not concerned, but all moral action is voluntary. Man as an agent can +act or forbear acting; matter cannot. This distinction is of the highest +importance, and must not be lost sight of behind a confused use of such +terms as natural, law, force, or order of nature, applied indeterminately +to the necessary action of material agents, and the voluntary action of +moral ones. + +It will doubtless be objected by a certain order of philosophy that all +mental and moral force is only some special modification of material +force, and consequently that there is no distinction between material and +moral action, or between material and moral force, and that the words +"nature" and "natural" are correctly applied to both alike, as being +simple manifestations of the same original force. To this it will be +sufficient to reply, first: that this is an assertion only, and never has +been nor can be proved. Secondly: that it contradicts the highest of all +our certitudes, the direct testimony of consciousness, which affirms that +we live under a law of freedom, wholly different from the necessary laws +of material nature. Thirdly: that it contradicts the universal experience +of mankind, as embodied in the primary laws of human language and human +thought. To assume this at the commencement of the argument is to take for +granted the point which requires to be proved. + +It would be quite out of place in a treatise like the present to attempt +to discuss the question of the origin of the free agency and the moral +nature of man. It is sufficient for the purpose to observe that, however +voluntary agency may have originated, it is a simple fact that it exists +in the universe, and that its phenomena belong to an order of its own. It +is no mere theory, but a fact, that man not only is capable of modifying +the action of the forces of the material universe, but that he has +modified them, and has produced results utterly different from those which +would have followed from their simple action. To use terms in this +controversy which overlook this plain and obvious fact, can lead to no +satisfactory result. + +Are then the actions of man, the bird, and the bee, properly designated as +natural? In a popular use of language the question may be one purely +verbal; but when we are dealing with subjects requiring accurate thought, +it is in the highest degree necessary to use language which does not +confound the distinct phenomena of mind and matter under a common +designation. Both together compose the universe; but each belongs to a +different order of phenomena. The whole difficulty proceeds from the fact +that both material forces which act in conformity with necessary laws, and +moral ones which act in conformity with those of freedom, are united in +the person of man. + +Another order of thought uses the term "nature" as including everything +that exists, even God; or in other words, it affirms that every thing +which has existed and exists is a manifestation of Him. As this theory +involves the denial of the personality of the Divine Being, it stands +excluded from the question under consideration, namely, the credibility of +miracles, which is utterly irrelevant, except on the assumption of the +existence of a personal God. It ought to be observed, however, that while +theism affirms that God and the universe, whether material or moral, are +distinct, it fully recognises the fact that God is immanent in both the +worlds of mind and matter, while at the same time he transcends them both. +This is an important consideration, which is too often overlooked by both +parties to the discussion. + +Secondly: a still greater confusion has been introduced by a vague and +indefinite use of the term "law," and by confusing a number of utterly +diverse phenomena under the designation of the "laws of nature." It is +absolutely necessary to trace this fallacy to its source. The Duke of +Argyll tells us in his "Reign of Law" that there are five different senses +at least in which this word is habitually used even in scientific +writings. They are as follows:-- + +"First, we have law as applied simply to an observed order of facts." + +"Secondly, to that order as involving the action of some force or forces +of which nothing more can be known." + +"Thirdly, as applied to individual forces, the measure of whose operation +has been more or less defined or ascertained." + +"Fourthly, as applied to those combinations of forces which have reference +to the fulfilment of purposes or the discharge of functions." + +"Fifthly, as applied to abstract conceptions of the mind--not corresponding +with any actual phenomena, but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought, +necessary to an understanding of them. Law, in this sense, is a reduction +of the phenomena, not merely to an order of facts, but to an order of +thought." + +"These leading significations of the word Law," says the Duke, "all circle +round the three great questions which science asks of nature, the what, +the how, and the why." + +"What are the facts in their established order?" + +"How, _i.e._ from what physical causes does that order come to be? What +relation do they bear to purpose, to the fulfilment of intention, to the +discharge of function?" + +Such are the multiform acceptations attached by scientific men to the term +"law," yet the Duke is not quite certain whether they may not be even more +numerous. It is evident that if they are all imported into the question of +the credibility of miracles, our position must resemble that of persons +who are compelled to fight in the dark; and that the question whether an +occurrence is natural or supernatural, whether it is contrary to, or a +violation of the laws of nature, or above nature, and many others which +enter into this controversy must be without definite meaning. It is clear +that unless we can restrict the word "law" to one, or at most, two +definite meanings, we shall get into hopeless confusion, or to speak more +correctly, we shall open the gate wide for the introduction of any number +of fallacies. + +The primary conception implied by the term "law" is unquestionably one +which is strictly applicable to man and his actions, and can only be +applied metaphorically, and in some systems of thought after a +considerable change of meaning, to the facts and phenomena of the material +universe. A law is a rule of action for human conduct and nothing more. +Such rules of conduct for the most part pre-suppose that they are imposed +by some external authority, which has the right or the power to enforce +obedience to them; or else that the person obeying them has an inward +feeling that it is right to do so, and knows that his conscience will +reproach him for the omission. But law, strictly speaking, is simply the +rule of action itself, as for instance, an Act of Parliament; but as in +practice all such rules are enforced by a sanction of some kind, our +conception of a law is also united with that of a lawgiver, who has both +the right and the power to enforce it. + +It follows therefore that such a conception is essentially a moral one. It +is also intimately united with the knowledge that we possess the power to +act or forbear acting in conformity with its dictates, and, if we prefer +it, of taking the consequences of disobedience. But when such a conception +is transferred to material nature it loses a considerable portion of its +original significancy. + +In its application therefore to physical science, it may with strict +propriety be used to denote an invariable order of events: and if the +human analogy could hold in physics it might be used to include the power +which originated and enforced them. But as the consideration of will or +purpose forms no portion of strictly physical science, and is expressly +excluded from it, the term law as used by it ought to denote the +invariable order of sequences, and not to include the forces which +generate them. Unless this distinction is carefully observed, we shall be +in danger of introducing into our reasonings human analogies to which +there is nothing corresponding in nature viewed as a mere body of +unintelligent forces. + +The use of the term "law" in physical science ought to be confined to +denote the invariable sequences of the material phenomena. Physicists +profess to know nothing of efficient causation; or of a lawgiver standing +outside his laws and possessing power to enforce them. The whole question +of intelligent agency or purpose lies in a region outside their province. +Law, as far as physical science is acquainted with it, can consist only of +a set of antecedents, followed by an invariable set of consequents. Of any +inherent efficacy in these antecedents to produce their consequents, it +can affirm nothing. A very popular philosophy even denies the power of the +human mind to penetrate beyond this, and affirms that its entire knowledge +is limited to phenomena. + +But physical science also deals with forces. These, and not its laws, are +its true principles of causation. Mere invariable sequences can effect +nothing; but forces, such as gravitation, heat, electricity, and the +entire body of chemical forces, or whatever force they may ultimately be +resolved into, can effect much. They are in fact the antecedents of which +the invariable order of events are the consequents. Respecting the +ultimate principle of force, or what is its real nature, or how it is +directed, or came to be, physical science is silent. All that it can do is +to observe the order of their occurrence, measure their quantities, and +tabulate their results. By this means it rises to the conception of what +are called the laws of nature. + +If in the present controversy the word law had been used in this sense +only, it would have been wholly unexceptionable. But it becomes far +otherwise when the idea of force or efficiency is introduced into it. +Nothing is more common in the reasonings of those who attempt to prove +that miracles are impossible, than to import into the term law the idea of +force, or efficient causation, even at the very time when the presence of +intelligent action is denied. It is this which imparts to this class of +reasonings their entire speciousness. The laws of material nature are +continually spoken of as though they were forces which are energetic in +the universe, and to the energy of which all things owe their present +form; or in other words, it is assumed that the laws of nature are causes +which have produced by their unintelligent action the present order of the +universe. + +Nothing however can be clearer than that a law of nature, in the sense in +which purely physical science can take cognizance of one, can effectuate +nothing. What can an invariable order of sequences effect? Before the idea +of efficiency can be attached to law, the conception of force must be +introduced into it. Modern controversy, however, is constantly in the +habit of speaking of the laws of nature as though they were efficient +agents. We hear of creation by law, evolution by law, of results brought +about by the action of invariable laws, and a countless number of +assertions of a similar description. To such expressions in a popular +sense when no accuracy of expression is required, there is no objection; +but when they are introduced into the controversy respecting the +credibility of miracles, they create nothing but confusion. What is really +meant is, that such results are brought about by the action of forces +which act in conformity with invariable laws, but the idea of intelligence +and volition is carefully excluded from the conception. It is clearly +inaccurate to speak of laws reigning. Laws do not reign even in political +societies; but only the power which is able to enact and enforce them. In +material nature the only things which possess efficiency are its forces. + +There can be no objection to the use of the expression, "the laws of +mind," when care is taken to use language which clearly distinguishes +between them and unintelligent and necessary sequences of material nature. +But when the term "law" is without any qualification applied to both sets +of phenomena alike, it is certain either to lead to fallacious reasoning, +or to involve the assumption of the point at issue. Whatever may be the +origin of the moral and spiritual in man, it is certain that as they at +present exist in him, they stand out in the strongest contrast with the +forces which act upon material things, and with the laws of their action. +Nothing can be more entirely different in character than the force of +gravitation and the principles of volition and self-consciousness, or than +the unconscious forces of material nature and those principles which +constitute our rationality. If we affirm that the forces of mind act in +conformity with law, it ought to be clearly understood that they act in +conformity with a law of their own, which affords free action to the +principle of volition. Otherwise there is the greatest danger that the +expression will involve the covert assumption of the truth of the doctrine +of philosophical necessity, or in other words, that all mental and +material forces are of the same character, that is to say, that they are +both equally necessary. This involves the assumption of the very point on +which the entire controversy turns, for if moral and material forces and +laws are all alike, it destroys the conception of a God, and the +significance of a miracle. + +This brings us to the conception of force, what is it? Various definitions +of it have been given sufficiently accurate for practical purposes. It +should be observed however that physical science can know nothing of it +except as a phenomenon. The determination of its nature, and its ultimate +cause lie entirely beyond its limits. Many facts respecting it, have been +ascertained and tabulated. Many of its manifestations, which bear a +different phenomenal aspect, it has ascertained to be capable of +transmutation into one another. But it must never be forgotten that it is +able to affirm nothing respecting the source in which the forces of the +universe originate. All that it can affirm is, that they do exist. The +original conception of force is one, however, which we derive, not from +the material universe, but from the action of our own minds. We are +conscious that we are efficient agents, and that definite results follow +the action of our wills. This gives us the conception of force. We apply +it in a metaphorical sense to certain things which we observe in the +material universe and call them forces, having abstracted from our primary +idea of force the conception of volition. But all that we really know +about force tends to prove that its origin is mental and not material. + +It is of the utmost importance to preserve a clear distinction between the +unconscious forces of matter and the intelligent ones of mind; otherwise +we shall inevitably be misled by such expressions as "the forces of +nature." It is impossible to argue the question unless the distinction is +admitted as a fact, whatever theory may be held about their origin. It is +absurd to confound principles so distinct as heat, or gravitation, or +electricity, with those which produce the most disinterested moral +actions, and designate them by the common term "natural forces." In common +language we are in no danger of error when we speak of the force of +conscience, or the force of a motive; but in discussions like the present, +where such expressions really involve the assumption of the whole +controversy, it is absurd to classify such phenomena, and the +unintelligent forces of matter under a common designation, unless it can +be demonstrated that they are all manifestations of the same power. + +We come now to the much vexed question as to the meaning to be attached to +the words "miracle" and "miraculous;" and the terms closely allied to +them, "supernatural" and "superhuman." Is there any valid distinction +between miracles and supernatural occurrences? Are, in fact, all miracles +supernatural occurrences, and all supernatural occurrences miracles? The +determination of this question is closely connected with an important +point which will be considered hereafter, viz., whether a miracle could +have any evidential value if it were brought about by a special adaptation +of the known or unknown forces of material nature. + +Let it be observed that we are not discussing this question as a purely +abstract one, but in reference to the truth of Christianity. What miracles +may be in themselves, I shall not inquire; but in relation to the question +before us, what we mean when we call an occurrence a miracle ought to be +made sufficiently clear and distinct. In this controversy it would greatly +tend to precision if we used the term "miracle" as distinguished from an +occurrence which is supernatural or superhuman, to denote only those +supernatural occurrences which have an evidential value in connection with +the evidences of a divine revelation, since there may be supernatural +occurrences which would not be in any proper sense evidential. + +But the further question arises, Is it necessary in order to constitute an +event a miracle that it should be one which transcends the known or the +unknown forces of material nature to have produced? It is clear that to +constitute an event a miracle it must involve supernatural or superhuman +agency of some kind; that is to say, it must be either supernatural in the +mode of its production as an objective fact, or superhuman in its +productive elements, by which I mean, that it must be preceded by an +announcement that it is going to occur, which must be beyond the sphere of +human knowledge. In order to render a supernatural event evidential, or in +other words to constitute it a miracle, it must not only consist of an +external objective fact, but its occurrence must be unknown beforehand, +and take place at the bidding of the agent. Such previous announcement, or +prediction, is necessary to render even a supernatural occurrence in the +strictest sense of the word a miracle. The prediction of some occurrence +in physical nature previously unknown may therefore convert such an event +into an evidential miracle, although the occurrence itself as a mere +objective fact may have been brought about by some known or unknown forces +of material nature. To render it such it would be necessary that the +knowledge of the occurrence should be clearly beyond the bounds of +existing knowledge. Thus, if any person, when the science of astronomy was +utterly unknown, had announced beforehand the day and the hour of the +occurrence of the next two transits of Venus, and the various places on +the earth's surface in which they would be visible, and if the events had +taken place accordingly, this would have unquestionably proved the +presence of superhuman knowledge. The only question which in such a case +would require to be determined would be whether such a knowledge must have +been communicated by God, or by some being inferior to God. As however +none of the miracles recorded in the New Testament have the smallest +appearance of being of this character, I need not further discuss a +supposed case. My only reason for referring to it is, that if it is +supposable that any of the miracles recorded in the New Testament could, +at some future day, be shown to have been due to a combination of physical +forces, their occurring instantly at the direct command of the agent would +still give them an evidential value. + +But it is clear that the miracles recorded in the New Testament, if caused +by material forces at all, could not have been due to their ordinary +action. They must have been due either to an unknown combination of known +forces, or to the calling of unknown forces into activity, or to the +immediate agency of the divine mind. It is clear therefore that their +occurrence as objective facts proves the presence of mind acting in some +way on the material forces of nature. To determine the mode in which this +action mast have taken place has nothing to do with the question of +miracles, or the reality of their occurrence. + +A miracle therefore may, for all practical purposes of this argument, be +defined as an occurrence which cannot be effectuated by the ordinary +action of the known material forces of the Universe, and could only have +been brought about by the agency of intelligent volition; and which is +preceded by an announcement on the part of the agent that it is about to +happen or takes place directly on his bidding. The latter element, as I +have observed, is essential to constitute the occurrence an evidential +miracle. Otherwise in our ignorance of what unknown forces may exist in +the universe, we could have no certainty that the event was not a mere +unusual occurrence effected by some already existing but unknown forces. +To the highest form of the miracles in the New Testament, however, such an +idea would be inapplicable. + +It may perhaps here be objected that in laying down this definition of a +miracle, I have not sufficiently identified its performance with the +governing power of the universe, _i.e._ God; but that if supernatural +agents exist, inferior to God, it may be due to their operation; and +consequently that it may not be evidential of a divine commission. This +objection will be fully considered in a subsequent portion of this work. + +A supernatural event is one which exceeds and which cannot be effected by +any force existing in material nature. But there must always be a +difficulty in determining whether an occurrence, viewed as a bare +objective fact, belongs to that class of events which is supernatural, or +only to that which is unusual. This will always be the case until our +knowledge of the forces of the universe is so complete that we can +ascertain for certain what are the limits of their possible action, and +whether it is possible to bring into action any forces that may exist, but +are unknown to us. In strict language therefore, it is impossible to be +certain whether an occurrence, as a bare objective fact, is supernatural, +until we are acquainted with the possible action of every force that +exists in the universe. This difficulty, however, is one that is entirely +theoretical, and has not the smallest practical importance with respect to +the miracles of the New Testament. Men have had several thousand years' +experience of what can be effected by the ordinary forces of material +nature. Occurrences which lie beyond their power to effectuate prove the +presence of intelligence and volition. The introduction of an unknown +force can only be accomplished by a being who, although he may be immanent +in nature, is yet capable of controlling its material forces. Occurrences +therefore which transcend the power of the known forces existing in the +universe to accomplish, whether they are material or human, may for all +practical purposes be viewed as supernatural; that is to say, they denote +the presence and agency of a being who is possessed of power, +intelligence, and volition. Whether that being be human, superhuman, or +divine, must be determined by an intelligent exercise of our reason. + +It is useless to discuss this question further. We are dealing with a very +definite question, the miraculous events recorded in the Gospels. With +respect to the great majority of them, there can be no doubt as to their +being supernatural occurrences, if they took place precisely as they are +recorded. We know enough of the ordinary forces of material nature to be +certain that the instantaneous cure of a blind or leprous man by a word +does not lie within the sphere of their operation. Such an event must +denote the special interposition of an extremely high degree of +intelligence and power. Common sense will affirm that it could only be +brought about by the intervention of the supreme power of the universe, +_i.e._ God. + +In this sense every supernatural occurrence may be said to be likewise +evidential, when we have ascertained for certain that it is due to +supernatural causes, and that it cannot have been brought about by the +action of unintelligent forces, or by those which are capable of being +modified by the agency of man. But in that case it would only prove the +presence and intervention of a being who is capable of controlling the +unintelligent forces of nature. The real difficulty, as I have observed, +is to prove the supernatural nature of the occurrence. But although, if it +was certainly supernatural, it would prove the intervention of a +supernatural agent, it would say nothing as to the purpose for which such +an intervention took place. It follows therefore, that to constitute a +supernatural occurrence in the strict sense of the term a miracle, it must +take place after an announcement that it is going to happen, and take +place at the bidding of the agent who performs it. + +It is highly important, in considering the miracles of the Gospels, that +the distinction between a merely supernatural event and an evidential +miracle should be kept steadily in view. All creative acts would be +supernatural events, but they would not necessarily be evidential +miracles. The incarnation, and other occurrences mentioned in the New +Testament, are supernatural ones; but to mix them up with evidential +miracles is simply to invite confusion of thought. Another class of +supernatural occurrences mentioned in the New Testament seem to have been +wrought, not for purposes directly evidential, but to awaken attention; +and another class of supernatural endowments were vouchsafed, to render it +possible to lay deep in human society the foundations of the Church as a +visible and permanent institution. Such occurrences are not directly but +indirectly evidential, and it will be necessary carefully to distinguish +between them and occurrences brought about for directly evidential +purposes. To keep this distinction clear, I shall designate the last by +the term "miracle." A miracle is supernatural in two ways: namely, in the +agency which produced the objective fact, and in the announcement of its +occurrence. + +The common definition of a miracle, as a violation or a suspension of the +laws of nature, is open to very grave objections. The question, as I have +observed, at once arises, what is included under nature? It also assumes +that we are acquainted with the mode in which miraculous agency must be +exerted; which we are not. Other definitions which have been proposed take +for granted positions which those who undertake to prove the credibility +of miracles ought never to concede. The plain fact is, that we are simply +ignorant of the mode in which God acts on material nature; and every +definition must be faulty which assumes that we have that knowledge. To +say that miracles must involve even a suspension of the laws of nature +introduces a needless difficulty. No law or force of nature need be +suspended in its action to render the occurrence of a supernatural event +possible. All that is necessary is that forces should be introduced which +are capable of overbalancing the action of opposing forces. It is +extremely inaccurate to affirm that the force of gravitation must be +suspended in order to render possible either walking on the water, or an +ascent into the sky. + +It is equally unwise and unphilosophical to affirm that God cannot work a +miracle by the use of intermediate agencies, _i.e._ by the partial +employment of the forces of the material universe. It is true that in most +of the miracles recorded in the New Testament we cannot affirm the use of +such media, although we observe an economy in the use of divine power: +_i.e._ no power is exerted beyond that which is necessary to produce the +particular result in question. But in the Old Testament the use of such +media is unquestionably affirmed. To lay down in our definition of a +miracle a particular theory as to the mode in which it must be +accomplished, involves the whole subject in needless difficulties. + +This question has been obscured by representing a miracle as performed by +the intervention of a higher law, superseding the action of a lower one. +This introduces the conception of force into the idea of law, and leads to +confusion of thought. Laws, or the invariable sequences between phenomena, +are neither forces nor powers. The counteraction of one force by another +is an event of daily occurrence. All that is needful for the working of a +miracle is the intervention of a force or mental energy which is capable +of acting on matter, and of overbalancing those ordinary forces which +would produce a contrary result. + +It has also been urged that miracles may obey a law of miracles. The best +illustration of this idea is that which has been supplied from the +supposed operations of Mr. Babbage's calculating machine. He supposes that +a machine might be constructed which could go on grinding out a particular +set of results for a long, yet definite period of time; then by the +operation of the same machine, that a fresh order might be introduced; and +afterwards that it might revert to the original one; and that this +operation might be continued for ever. If therefore the great Author of +nature had so planned the machine of the universe that whenever a miracle +was requisite in His scheme of Providence this abnormal event occurred, +like the new series introduced into the calculating mill, in that case +miracles might be said to follow a definite law, which might be designated +the law and order of miraculous intervention. + +It is impossible to deny the ingenuity of this theory, but unfortunately +it is not only one which takes for granted that the perfection of +mechanical contrivance is the only thing that the Creator had in view in +the production of the universe, but even if this were an unquestionable +fact, it could afford us no help with respect to all the most important +miracles recorded in the New Testament. How is it possible, I ask, to +account for many of our Lord's miracles on such a supposition? It is +expressly affirmed that this supernatural energy was frequently made to +depend on the faith of the person who invoked His help. Could any miracle- +working mill be even conceived of, which could bring out, as part of the +normal law of its operations, the cure of blind, deaf, and leprous men by +a word, or effectuate His own resurrection from the dead, or ascension +into Heaven? Such occurrences could not be produced by the action of any +machine which has the smallest analogy to a calculating mill. But further: +such an operation would be impotent to answer the purposes of a miracle, +unless the particular result was announced beforehand by one who was +completely ignorant that the machine was capable of producing such +extraordinary results. This ignorance would likewise have to be extended +to those to whom the announcement was made. It would also be necessary +that the announcer should proclaim that on a particular day and hour the +machine would grind out the particular result of the cure of a blind man, +or a resurrection from the dead. The ability to do this would be utterly +abnormal, and impossible ever to be ground out by the self-acting agency +of any conceivable machine, however cleverly constructed. Mr. Babbage's +miracle-working mill, however ingenious a conception, must therefore be +dismissed as incapable of affording us the smallest help in the present +argument. + +The term "superhuman" remains to be considered. It need not detain us +long. Superhuman implies a result brought about by the intervention of a +being superior to man. Whether such an agent be divine or otherwise can +only be determined by the exercise of our reason. It has been objected +that the agency which produces an earthquake is a superhuman agency, that +is, it exceeds the powers of man to produce it. Granted: but this has no +bearing on the subject under discussion. When we use the word "superhuman" +we always mean by it, not the action of the unintelligent forces of +material nature, but of a being possessed of intelligence and will. + +There is a large number of other subjects having an intimate bearing on +the correct definition of the terms habitually used in this controversy, +and which greatly modify their meaning. These however will best be +considered when I enter on the direct discussion of the possibility and +the credibility of miracles. + + + + + +CHAPTER III. THE SUPERNATURAL ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE NEW TESTAMENT: IN +WHAT DO THEY CONSIST? AND WHAT VIEW DO ITS WRITERS TAKE RESPECTING THEM? + + +Before entering on the general question of miracles, it is only reasonable +to inquire of the writers of the New Testament what they have to say on +the subject. Their opinion of the nature and character of the supernatural +occurrences which they have reported is certainly of more value than that +of all other writers put together. St. John and St. Paul must have been in +the habit of coming in contact with unbelievers. It would be most +important if we could ascertain the mode adopted by them of commending +Christianity to their acceptance, and what use was made by them of the +supernatural power with which they professed to be endowed. + +First: It is impossible to read the New Testament without arriving at the +conclusion that the superhuman character which is ascribed to Jesus Christ +is perfectly unique, and differs entirely from that which is ascribed to +any other person. Others wrought miracles; but they were men like +ourselves. But in the person of Jesus Christ the supernatural is +represented as inherent. To say that he possessed the power of working +miracles, is an inadequate statement of the fact. Although he embodies the +perfection of human nature with all its finite limitations, the +supernatural and the divine take up their abode in his personality. +Whenever our Lord is represented as working miracles, he is always +represented as performing them by a power which was inherent in himself. +This is never once attributed to his followers. The supernatural action +which is ascribed to Jesus Christ must be viewed, as a case distinct and +separate, by itself. The miracles performed by him are not only +evidential, but also portions of his supernatural manifestation. + +According to the author of the fourth Gospel, our Lord himself rarely +designated them by either of the three terms by which miracles are usually +designated in the New Testament, viz., signs, wonders, and mighty works +({~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}). He almost uniformly called them "Works" +({~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}). An important distinction is here intended. Our Lord did not view +his miracles as a separate class of actions by themselves, but as portions +of his ordinary superhuman working, and as having a distinct relation to +his entire character. Four passages will be sufficient to show this +clearly. "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of +me." "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." "If ye believe not me, +believe the works." "Many good works have I showed you from my Father; for +which of those works do ye stone me?" When contemplated by others only, +they assume the form of signs and wonders: "Except ye see signs and +wonders, ye will not believe." It is highly important that we should keep +steadily in view that the divine character attributed to Jesus is by no +means restricted to the performance of miracles; but that it extends +throughout his entire working, and that the two together constitute an +harmonious whole. It pertains no less to its moral and spiritual aspects, +than to the displays which he made of a power capable of controlling +nature. Even in this portion of his working, he draws special attention to +its moral and spiritual aspects. According to his view of his own mighty +works, they not only exhibited a power of controlling nature, but were +uniformly invested with a moral and spiritual environment. Throughout the +Gospels he is represented as exhibiting a greatness and dignity, a purity, +holiness, humility and benevolence, so far transcending that of other men, +as to constitute him what may be almost designated a moral and spiritual +miracle. Perfection in the moral and spiritual world is as essentially +superhuman, as power over nature is supernatural. In considering the +miracles which have been attributed to Jesus Christ, it is important to +bear in mind the manner in which they stand related to his entire +superhuman character. Otherwise we shall fail to observe the double aspect +which they bear. They were manifestations of the divine, which dwelt +within him, and also they possessed an evidential value. + +I shall occasionally use the term "superhuman" instead of "divine," as +applied to Jesus Christ, because for the purposes of this argument it will +be unnecessary for me to define the precise degree of divine character +which the evangelists intended to attribute to him. To ascertain this is +the proper function of the theologian, by comparing together the facts and +statements of the New Testament. It is sufficient for my present purpose +to observe that the perusal of the Gospels leaves the inevitable +impression on the mind that it was the purpose of their writers to depict +a divine character in union with a human one--a supernatural power acting +within the regions of the natural. This covers alike the aspects of +character presented of him both in the Synoptic and the Johannine Gospels. + +Although our Lord speaks of his actions by the common name of "works" +({~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}), when the sacred authors speak generally of miracles, they apply to +them, as I have observed, three distinct terms, signs, mighty works, and +wonders ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}). Each of these denotes different +aspects in which they contemplated miracles. The sign included the +supernatural fact wrought on external nature with the whole of its moral +environment. In this point of view, the "sign" was the direct proof of a +divine mission. It is worthy of observation that the author of the fourth +Gospel has uniformly described the supernatural actions which he has +ascribed to Jesus Christ by this term. The expression "mighty works" is +intended to bring under our notice the power which was displayed in the +performance of a miracle, thereby directly connecting it with a superhuman +agency. The term "wonder" contemplates a supernatural event in its simple +aspect as an occurrence pre-eminently fitted to command attention to the +person who was capable of performing it. We may therefore conclude that +the writers of the New Testament considered that these were the three +special functions of miracles. It is quite possible that the same miracle +might have fulfilled all three at the same time: but as three such +functions of supernatural occurrences are distinctly stated, it is quite +conceivable that there were occasions when they were limited to some one +of these in particular. + +It is evident that our Lord attached the highest importance to a miracle +contemplated as a "sign," _i.e._ to the moral environment with which it +was connected. This, although more definitely brought out in St. John's +Gospel, is also distinctly borne witness to by the Synoptics. It forms the +ground of the reiterated refusal of our Lord to comply with the demand of +the Pharisees that he would show some sign from heaven, as a proof of his +divine mission. His miracles combined in one the two conceptions of signs +and mighty works. None of them were mere prodigies devoid of a moral +aspect. + +It is worthy of consideration whether our Lord's primary purpose in +performing supernatural actions was always directly evidential. I have +already drawn attention to their twofold aspect, as divine manifestations, +and as evidential miracles. A considerable number of the miracles recorded +in the Gospels are represented as performed by him because he was moved +with compassion. These evidently belong to the former class of his +supernatural workings. But although this was their primary object it did +not deprive them of an evidential value. But there is also another +remarkable class of supernatural actions attributed to him, viz., those in +which he is recorded to have expressly forbidden the persons whom he +healed to publish the fact. As it is evident that these miracles could +only have become extensively known by the persons cured disobeying his +orders, it is clear that they could not have been directly performed for +evidential purposes, but were the manifestations of the divine which +resided in his person. + +Such are the supernatural actions attributed to Jesus Christ in the New +Testament, respecting which as a whole, whether performed for purposes +avowedly evidential or not, he himself affirms, that they bore witness of +him, that the Father had sent him. Two other classes of miracles, affirmed +to have been performed by his followers, require notice. + +The whole of these are stated to have been performed by a delegated power +and commission. The great majority of them are described as having been +performed in the name of Jesus Christ. They are affirmed to have been +performed for two purposes; to prove the divine commission of those who +wrought them, and to attest the reality of their Master's resurrection, by +giving exhibitions of his present power. These therefore are distinctly +affirmed to have been evidential miracles. A few others were providential +interferences in favour of the infant Church. There is also another class +of supernatural actions referred to in the Acts of the Apostles, such as +the passing of St. Peter's shadow, and the supposed supernatural effects +resulting from it, and the conveyance from St. Paul's person of +handkerchiefs and aprons to the sick, and one or two other instances. +These involve special manifestations of supernatural power, and belong to +supernatural occurrences in their aspect of wonders, or very extraordinary +events, and as such were specially adapted for drawing attention to the +message of the Apostles. But the New Testament also affirms another and +very peculiar form of the manifestation of the supernatural, as then +actually existing in the Apostolic Church. I need hardly say that I allude +to the various gifts of the Spirit, with which large numbers of its +members believed themselves to be endowed. I shall not consider them any +further here, as it will be necessary for me to enter largely on the +subject in a subsequent portion of this work. Their use and purpose was to +lay deep the foundations of the Christian Church. All that will be +necessary in this place is to draw attention to them as a distinct order +of supernatural manifestations, to the existence of which the writers of +the New Testament are pledged. + +There is also one further form of supernatural manifestation affirmed by +them, namely, a great moral and spiritual transformation effected in those +who cordially embraced the Gospel. This is most positively stated by St. +Paul to have been a fact constantly taking place under his own +observation. It is only necessary for me to notice its existence, as it is +a form of supernatural manifestation, the truth or falsehood of which +forms no portion of the present controversy. + +Such then are the various forms of the supernatural, to the existence of +which the writers of the New Testament are pledged as objective facts. To +these only, and not to any conceivable or possible ones, is the defender +of Christianity committed. If their occurrence can be shown to have been +impossible, either on grounds of science or philosophy, or because human +testimony is of so fallible a character that it cannot establish the truth +of a supernatural occurrence, it follows that the whole of Christianity +must have been an invention of a purely human origin, that it can have no +claim to the designation of a divine revelation, and that it is hardly +possible to free its inventors from the charge of fraud. No mere paring +down of its supernatural elements will enable us to escape from this +conclusion. + +I must now proceed to consider whether the writers of the New Testament +rest the truth of Christianity on the evidence of miracles alone, and what +position they occupy respecting it. + +If we assume for the sake of argument that the fourth Gospel is the work +of the Apostle John, it is evident that neither Jesus Christ nor the +Apostle accepted the theory which has been propounded by some divines, and +readily accepted by unbelievers, that the evidence of his divine mission +was exclusively founded on the testimony of miracles. To state the point +distinctly:--This Gospel places the evidence afforded by our Lord's own +divine person, _i.e._ the moral evidence of his mission, in the first +rank, and his miraculous works in the second. + +As this is a point of considerable importance, and one to which its proper +weight has been seldom attached, I will enumerate the chief statements +made in this Gospel on this subject. + +First: The author of the Gospel directly affirms that Jesus is "the light +of men;" and he himself distinctly affirms of himself, "He that seeth me +seeth Him that sent me." "I am come a light into the world, that whosoever +believeth on me should not abide in darkness." (John xii. 45, 46.) Again, +"I am the light of the world; he that followeth me shall not walk in +darkness, but shall have the light of life." (John viii. 12.) It is +impossible to read these and kindred passages without feeling that our +Lord appealed to something else besides his miraculous works, viewed as +mere objective facts, as a proof of his divine mission. He evidently +places the highest proof of it in his great moral and spiritual +manifestation. He asserts the possession of an inherent illumination in +his own divine Person in union with the great truths which he enunciated, +and the entire course of his divine working. To a mind capable of +appreciating a manifestation of holiness, his person and divine working +would be self-evidential. "He that seeth me, seeth Him that sent me." It +is evident therefore that he considered the moral aspect of even his +supernatural works as an important portion of the evidence that he came +from God. + +The fourth chapter of this Gospel contains an account of our Lord's visit +to the Samaritans. He performed no miracle on this occasion. The +Evangelist tells us that many of them accepted him as the Messiah; and +expressly states that they affirmed that this was not on account of the +report of the woman as to his supernatural insight into her character; but +because they themselves had heard him, and on this account they had +arrived at the persuasion that was the Christ. There was something +therefore in his moral manifestation, even apart from his miracles, which +produced this persuasion. The Evangelist accepts this position as a +correct one. He has even gone further, and has attributed it in the same +chapter to our Lord himself. He makes him address the nobleman who came to +solicit his interference in behalf of his sick son with these remarkable +words: "Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe." (John iv. +48.) These words can only imply that, in the opinion of the speaker, there +was a moral and spiritual attestation of his divine mission, which stood +higher than objective miracles; and that those who witnessed it ought to +have received it as such. + +In John vi. 30, ff., a remarkable dialogue is described as taking place +between our Lord and the Jews on this very subject. The Jews demand of him +to work some distinct sign in proof of his divine mission. Let it be +observed that the demand of a sign, here stated to have been made, is of +precisely the same character as similar statements which are made by the +Synoptics on the same subject, and shows that a common conception, +underlies them all. "What sign," say they, "showest thou then, that we may +see and believe thee? what dost thou work?" They then proceed to define +the particular sign which they wish to see exhibited, by making an +invidious comparison between his miracles and those of Moses, viewed as +mere objective facts. In reply our Lord does not appeal directly to even +the miracle of which the Evangelist had just described the performance; +but throughout the remainder of the chapter, he proceeds to draw attention +to the moral and spiritual aspects of his working. "Moses gave you not +that bread from Heaven; but my Father giveth you the true bread from +Heaven; for the bread of God is he which cometh down from Heaven, and +giveth life unto the world," &c. + +In chapter vii. (17, 18) our Lord affirms: "If any man will do his will, +he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of +myself. He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory; but he that +seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness +is in him." Here the affirmation is clear and distinct that there is a +moral and spiritual element in our Lord's person and teaching, which +jointly with his miraculous works bear witness to his divine character. +The testimony given by the one is convergent with that of the other. This +the following affirmation of our Lord most strongly asserts. "I am one who +bear witness of myself, and the Father who sent me hath borne witness of +me," that is to say, His moral and spiritual manifestation is in a certain +sense evidential; and the Father who sent him bore a concurrent testimony +of his supernatural work. + +On similar principles our Lord reasons with the Jews in the eighth chapter +of this Gospel. In reply to the charge that he performed miracles by the +aid of the evil one he affirms, that his own absolute sinlessness, +constitutes a complete answer to it. "Which of you convinceth me of sin? +and if I say the truth why do ye not believe me?" (v. 46.) We have here a +direct appeal to men's moral and spiritual perception, as an independent +witness to the truth of his teaching; and the affirmation that a being who +is not simply good and holy, but perfectly sinless, is worthy of absolute +credence. In other words, he does not rest the truth of his teaching on +miracles wrought to confirm his different utterances, but on the inherent +truthfulness of a sinless character. The moral aspect of his works is the +predominant one. + +In the fourteenth chapter of this Gospel we have the following remarkable +declaration, which puts the whole subject in the clearest light. Philip +says to him; "Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us." Jesus said unto +him, "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, +Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father: Believest thou not that +I am in the Father, and the Father in me? The words that I speak unto you, +I speak not of myself; but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the +works. Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me, or else +believe me for the very works' sake." (vs. 8-11.) + +This passage contains several most important considerations directly +bearing on this subject. I will mention them in order. First-- + +Philip asks for his complete conviction, a visible miracle in the form of +an appearance of God, such as was recorded in the Old Testament as having +taken place at Sinai. + +Secondly. Our Lord affirms that the manifestations of his character made +in his person and work during his previous acquaintance with him were the +truest manifestations of the person, character and being of the Father. + +Thirdly. That the words which he spake and his entire working, possessed +an evidential character as proving that he came from the Father: and that +his moral and spiritual perfections were such as to entitle his +affirmation to be received on his own word. + +Fourthly. That if Philip was unable to receive them on this evidence, +which occupied the highest place, then he was entitled to be believed on +the evidence of his supernatural works, "If ye believe not me, _believe +the works_." + +This entire passage makes it clear that in the mind of our Lord the moral +evidence afforded by him constituted a most important portion of the +attestation of his divine mission. Nor was its value confined to those who +witnessed it during the time of his personal ministry, but he viewed it as +extending to all time. This is made clear by his reply to Thomas in +reference to his demand to be allowed to handle his risen body. "Thomas, +because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed, Blessed are they who have +not seen, and yet have believed." (xx. 29.) + +With these statements before us, unless we reject the authority of this +Gospel, it is clear that those Christian writers who have asserted that +the evidence of the Christian revelation rests exclusively on miracles as +objective facts are in error. + +But the same Gospel refers us no less distinctly to the miracles of our +Lord as very important evidences of his divine mission, although they are +subordinated to those we have been considering. One or two further +references will be sufficient. + +We have several declarations on this subject in the fifth chapter. "My +Father worketh hitherto, and I work. The Son can do nothing of himself, +but what he seeth the Father do; for whatsoever things he doeth, these +also doeth the Son likewise." (vs. 17, 19.) "The works which the Father +hath given me to finish, the same works that I do bear witness of me that +the Father hath sent me." (ver. 36.) + +Here a plain parallel is drawn between the whole course of our Lord's +working and that of the Father. In this working he evidently intended to +include his miracles. Taken in combination with his entire character the +speaker affirms that they form a conclusive proof that the Father had sent +him. He subsequently draws attention to the evidence afforded by his +miracles as such, "and the Father himself which hath sent me hath borne +witness of me." (ver. 37.) + +So again in the tenth chapter, "The works that I do in my Father's name, +they bear witness of me," (ver. 25.) A little further on the moral aspect +of his miracles, and their close connection with his entire working is +distinctly brought forward. "Many good works have I showed you from my +Father; for which of those works do ye stone me?" (vs 37, 38.) "If I do +not the works of my Father, believe me not, but if I do, _though ye +believe not me, believe the works_, that ye may know and believe, that the +Father is in me, and I in him." (vs. 37, 38.) No words can bring out more +strongly the weight which our Lord attached to the moral aspect of his +miracles as proofs of his divine mission. + +In the fifteenth chapter we have our Lord's own reflections on the +evidences which he had afforded of his Messianic character, during his +entire ministry. "If I had not done among them the works which none other +man did, they had not had sin; but now they have both seen and hated both +me and my Father." (ver. 24.) Here the miracles are classed with the other +exhibitions of our Lord's divine character; and attention is especially +drawn to the moral aspect of his entire working as in the highest degree +evidential. "They have seen and hated both me and my Father." It is worthy +of remark that while our Lord uniformly spoke of his miracles as part of +his general working, by which he manifested his divine character, the +Evangelist himself almost invariably calls them "signs." This is brought +out when he gives us his own reflections on the results of his public +ministry. "Though he had done so many signs(2) before them yet they +believed not on him." (xii. 37.) So again, "many other signs truly did +Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this +book: but these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the +Christ, the Son of God." (xx. 30, 31.) In both these passages our Lord's +miracles are evidently referred to. They are pronounced to be both +evidential of his divine mission, and at the same time to be +manifestations of his character. The Evangelist while contemplating them +as miracles never loses sight of their moral aspect. + +In the Synoptic Gospels one allusion is made to the evidential purpose of +a particular miracle which is worthy of notice. Generally speaking they +are viewed by the authors of these Gospels as simple manifestations of his +divine character. On this occasion, when his power to forgive sins was +questioned, he directly performed a miracle to prove that he possessed it. +"But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive +sins, he saith to the sick of the palsy, I say unto thee, arise, and take +up thy bed and go thy way into thine house." In this case it is clear that +the purpose of performing the miracle was not to prove the truth of any +doctrinal statement which he had made; but to establish the reality of his +divine authority and commission. + +While it is quite true that the authors of the Synoptic Gospels have not +enunciated the purpose of our Lord's miracles in the formal manner in +which it is done in St. John's Gospel, it is clear that they must have +taken the same view of their general character. In fact the evidential +purpose of their performance is less clearly stated in them than in the +fourth Gospel. All four Gospels view his miracles only as a portion of his +superhuman manifestation, and are ignorant of that broad distinction which +has been laid down between them and the other portions of his divine +working. They are in fact included under it; and it is the concurrence of +both together, and the moral aspect thereby impressed on the whole, which +proves him to be the Christ. + +It has been important to ascertain what are the views of the writers of +the New Testament on this subject, because it has been strongly asserted +by authors on both sides of the controversy that the doctrines of +Christianity are proved by miracles, and that they can rest for their +attestation on no other evidence. The precise value of this position I +will consider in the following chapter. It must, however, be observed that +this is not the view taken by the writers of the New Testament. There is +not a single miracle recorded in it which is alleged to have been +performed with the direct purpose of proving the truth of a single +doctrine properly so called. Those wrought by our Lord are uniformly +represented as having been performed in proof of his divine mission, or as +an essential portion of the manifestation of the divine which dwelt within +him. As such they were signs, precisely in the same manner as the +performance of those actions which can only be performed by man are signs; +that is, they are proofs of the presence of man. In the same manner the +actions performed by our Lord are signs and proofs of the presence of the +divine man Jesus Christ. If our Lord was in truth what he asserted himself +to be, supernatural manifestations would be the concomitants of his +presence. + +In exact conformity with these facts as we find them in the Gospels is the +direct dogmatic statement made by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews +on this subject. After having asserted in the first chapter that divine +revelation is made in the person of Jesus Christ, and that God speaks to +man under the Christian dispensation "in him, who is the brightness of his +glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by +the word of his power," the author proceeds to compare it with the former +dispensation, and to give us his views of the evidence on which it rests. +"How," says he, "shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation; which +at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by +them that heard him. God also bearing them witness both by signs and +wonders, and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according +to his own will." (ii. 3, 4.) + +These words distinctly inform us what were the writer's opinions as to the +nature of the evidences on which Christianity rests. First, it reposes on +the testimony of Christ respecting himself. Secondly, it is confirmed by a +number of miracles wrought by God. This view is strictly in accordance +with our Lord's own affirmation respecting it as recorded in the fourth +Gospel, "I am one that bear witness of myself, and the Father that sent me +hath borne witness of me." (viii. 18.) + +With respect to numerous miracles recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, +they are affirmed to have been performed for purposes directly evidential, +not however to prove the truth of any doctrine, but of our Lord's +Messianic character. The affirmations on this point are express. "In the +name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk." (iii. 6.) "His name, +through faith in his name, hath made this man strong." (iii. 16.) +"Therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made +that same Jesus whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ." (ii. 36.) +Of the fact of the resurrection, they affirm that they were witnesses; and +that the miraculous powers imparted to them were the consequence of that +event, and a proof of its truth. + +The nature of the other supernatural occurrences affirmed in the New +Testament must be fully considered hereafter. There remain however two +further statements, made by the sacred writers respecting this subject, +which require to be briefly noticed here. First, although the Gospels +affirm that John the Baptist had a divine commission to announce the +immediate setting up of the kingdom of the Messiah, and even to point him +out, they expressly assert that he performed no objective miracle in +confirmation of it. His prophetical assertions rested for their +verification on their fulfilment only, _i.e._ on the immediate appearance +of a person who united in himself all the attributes of the Messiah. The +following was the line of argument adopted by those who believed his +testimony: "John did no miracle, but all things that John spoke of this +man were true." Secondly, while in the Apostolic Epistles, miracles are +stated to have been performed by our Lord, and supernatural powers no less +clearly asserted to have been at that very time actually present in the +Church, there is only one miracle which is directly referred to in proof +of the divine mission of Christ. I need not say that this is the greatest +of all the miracles recorded in the Gospels, viz. his resurrection from +the dead. On this their unanimous testimony affirms that Christianity +rests. This is the one final and decisive proof of our Lord's divine +mission. On its truth they affirm that their claims as divine teachers +stand or fall. His resurrection from the dead puts all his other miracles +in the back ground in point of evidential value. According to their +statements it constitutes the one great assurance that God has given unto +all men that Jesus of Nazareth is Lord and Christ. + +It follows, therefore, that if this one miracle can be proved to have been +an historical fact, it carries with it the entire force of all the +remaining miracles of the New Testament. But it leaves entirely untouched +the moral aspects of our Lord's divine character. These, I may say, +constitute a standing miracle which will continue to speak for itself in +all time. This evidence is again and again referred to by the writers of +the Apostolic Epistles. The two constitute one harmonious whole. To the +latter of these it is impossible to do more than refer in the present +work; I have already devoted a distinct volume to the examination of its +evidential value, in which I have examined Christ's witness to himself; +here I must confine myself to the consideration of the witness borne to +him by the Father. + + + + + +CHAPTER IV. MIRACLES, WHAT DO THEY PROVE? + + +Having considered the direct assertions in the New Testament in reference +to the supernatural, it will be necessary to take a brief view of the +question in relation to modern difficulties and objections. + +The following subjects present themselves for our consideration:-- + +1st. To what extent, and in what sense are miracles the proofs of a +revelation? + +2nd. Are supernatural occurrences devoid of all moral environment capable +of affording such proof? + +3rd. Can doctrinal statements or moral truths be proved by miracles? + +4th. Are miracles objects of faith merely, or if not, how are they related +to our reason; and if in any sense they are objects of faith, how can they +be the media of proof? + +It will be evident that these questions will immediately lay open a number +of the most important considerations. They can only be adequately dealt +with in the subsequent portions of this work. The natural place to discuss +them will be when I come to consider the objections that can be urged +against the possibility and credibility of miracles. A few preliminary +observations, however, will be necessary for the purpose of putting the +reader in possession of some of the most important points of debate and of +the positions which I intend to assume respecting them. They will also +help to clear the way for the solution of the various difficulties by +which the subject has been attempted to be obscured. + +The manner in which Christianity claims to be a divine revelation, as we +have seen in the former chapter, in its most proper and distinctive sense +is that the person of Jesus Christ constitutes that revelation. It is the +manifestation of the divine character and perfections by means of the +various acts and deeds of his earthly life and ministry. It is a +revelation of the divine shining forth in the human. I have already +adduced some of the affirmations of the sacred writers on this subject. It +would be easy to multiply them indefinitely. Perhaps it would be +impossible to express the position which they take on this subject in more +distinct language than by citing two brief passages in St. Paul's epistle +to the Colossians: "Who is," says the Apostle, "the image of the invisible +God;" "in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." Both +passages affirm, as the writer's view, that all revelation is made in the +person of Jesus Christ. + +It follows, therefore, that the Christian revelation in its highest sense +is not a body of abstract dogmas, but that it consists of an objective +fact, the Incarnation. As God has manifested his eternal power and Godhead +in the material creation, so he has manifested himself as a moral and +spiritual being, 1st, imperfectly in the moral nature of man, and +afterwards perfectly, in the perfect man who unites in himself the divine +and human, Jesus Christ. God, when he effected the work of creation, made +a manifestation of himself which chiefly revealed his power and wisdom. +When he effected the Incarnation he made an additional manifestation of +himself which chiefly revealed his moral character and perfections. The +four Gospels contain the historical account of this manifestation, as made +in the actions and teaching of Jesus Christ. As this revelation consists +of a number of historical facts, all that was necessary was that his life +and actions should be correctly reported. The remaining books of the New +Testament are historical in character, with one exception, and as far as +they treat of doctrines, they may be viewed as commentaries on the Divine +fact of the Incarnation. + +It follows, therefore, that the essence of Christianity consists of a +superhuman or divine fact, the Incarnation. In this point of view the +supernatural is not only a concomitant of Christianity, but it constitutes +its essence. It is the manifestation of a supernatural and superhuman +being appearing within the sphere of the natural and the human. It cannot +be too carefully observed throughout this entire controversy that the +character which is ascribed to Jesus Christ, while it embraces every +perfection of man, is no less superhuman than the powers which are +attributed to him are supernatural. In this sense the supernatural is not +merely an evidence of revelation, but its essence. + +The Incarnation has frequently been designated a miracle. To do so seems +to me to incur the danger of involving the whole controversy in confusion +of thought. In a loose way of speaking, the creative acts of God may be +called miracles: that is, they involve a deviation from the previous order +of existing things, and the introduction of a new one; all such results +are unquestionable manifestations of supernatural agency, but they differ +wholly in conception from what we usually designate by the term miracle. +The Incarnation, therefore, ought not to be placed on the same footing as +miracles, which are supernatural occurrences, having a definite evidential +value, but with God's creative acts, being the highest manifestation of +himself which he has made to man. It is perfectly true, as I have already +observed, that the miracles of Jesus Christ stand in a double aspect, as +part of his supernatural manifestation, and as possessing an evidential +value. + +It is clear, therefore, that a supernatural event such as the Incarnation, +if evidential, can only be self-evidential. It was not wrought for the +purpose of proving anything. But, as we have seen, the sacred writers and +our Lord himself assert that in a certain sense it was self-evidential. +"For the life was manifested, and we have seen it and bear witness, and +show unto you that eternal life which was with the Father and was +manifested unto us." + +A recent writer affirms that Christianity professes to be a revelation of +supernatural truths utterly inconceivable to reason, and that such truths +can only be proved by miracles. I can understand what is meant by a truth +derived from a supernatural source of information, or one respecting a +supernatural being or occurrence: but what a supernatural truth can be +contradistinguished from other kinds of truth is far from evident. +Revelation may disclose truths which reason alone would have been unable +to discover; but this does not make the truths themselves, when they are +discovered, either supernatural or incomprehensible. + +I will now proceed to consider whether there is any real ground for +affirming that occurrences which we designate as miracles are the only +proofs of a divine revelation. + +The same writer, whose object is to prove that Christianity is utterly +destitute of all claims to our acceptance as a divine revelation, +endeavours to show that miracles, viewed as bare objective facts, are the +only evidence which can substantiate such a mass of incredible assertions +as those contained in the New Testament, and that their moral environment +cannot be taken into account in estimating their evidential value. For +this purpose he quotes the following passage from Dr. Mozley's Bampton +Lectures: "Dr. Mozley," says he, "supposes the case, that if a person of +evident integrity and loftiness of character had appeared eighteen +centuries ago announcing himself as pre-existing from all eternity, the +Son of God, the maker of the world, who had come down from heaven, and had +assumed the nature of man, in order to be the Lamb of God that taketh away +the sins of the world, and so on, enumerating the other doctrines of +Christianity; Dr. Mozley then adds, what would be the inevitable +conclusion of sober reason respecting that person? The necessary +conclusion of sober reason would be that he was disordered in his +understanding.... By no rational being would a just and a benevolent life +be accepted as a proof of such announcements. Miracles are the necessary +complements of the truth of such announcements, which without them are +powerless and abortive, the fragments of a design which is nothing unless +it is the whole. They are necessary to the justification of such +announcements, which unless they are supernatural truth are the wildest +delusions."--_Supernatural Religion_. + +In justice to Dr. Mozley, the passage which is omitted in this citation +from his lectures ought to be quoted. It is as follows: "What other +decision could be come to when a man, looking like one of our own selves, +and only exemplifying in his life and circumstances the ordinary course of +nature, said this about himself, but that when reason had lost its balance +a dream of supernatural and unearthly, grandeur might be the +result."--_Bampton Lectures._ + +Some expressions in this passage leave it open to the assumption which +this writer wishes to fasten on it that Dr. Mozley intended to affirm that +the only adequate proof of such affirmations as were made by Jesus Christ +respecting himself would have been visible miracles wrought in +confirmation of them. This, however, is not necessarily its meaning, for +the omitted passage above cited, distinctly affirms that the person who is +supposed to make such assertions is only an ordinary good and holy but +imperfect man. + +But the assertions in question were not made by an ordinary man like +ourselves, but by one who is described as possessed of superhuman +greatness and holiness and of profound spiritual insight into truth. He is +uniformly depicted as speaking with the fulness of knowledge of the +subject on which he speaks. I cannot therefore admit, supposing the +character of Jesus to have been historical, that if he had made such +assertions respecting himself prior to the performance of his first +miracle at Cana, they would have been utterly unworthy of serious +attention. It must be readily admitted that if they had been affirmed of +himself by an ordinary man like ourselves, no affirmation of his would +have been a guarantee of their truth, for the simple reason that they +would have been self-contradictory. Nor would the performance of a miracle +have made them one atom more credible. But the credibility of such an +assertion, if it had been made by such a person as Jesus Christ even prior +to his performance of a single miracle, is a wholly different question. + +It follows, therefore, on the supposition that the delineation given us in +the Gospels is that of an historical reality, that his assertions +respecting himself would stand in a wholly different position from those +of any other man. He could neither deceive nor be deceived. When he made +assertions respecting himself he must have known whether they were true. +The assertions of such a person therefore would be worthy of all +acceptation. + +Miracles are not the means of substantiating assertions respecting the +truth of unseen realities, nor are they used for such purposes in the New +Testament. The whole question is one of adequate knowledge. If we have the +means of knowing that a person has a complete acquaintance with truths of +which we are ignorant, we can rationally accept them as true on his +assurance that they are so, exactly on the same principles as we accept +the truths of physical science although we ourselves are ignorant of the +processes by which they are arrived at. To state the position generally, +it is quite rational to accept the affirmations of those who possess full +knowledge of any subject of which we ourselves are profoundly ignorant. +The only thing necessary is to attain an assurance that the knowledge of +our informant is adequate to justify his assertions. It is on the ground +of the fulness of his knowledge that we accept the assertions of Jesus +Christ, and not because he wrought a miracle for the purpose of proving +that his assertions were true. + +Let us now consider in what sense miracles are a proof of the truth of a +divine revelation. + +I lay down that the proper function of miracles is to establish the truth +of a divine commission. From this we argue to the truth of the assertions +of the persons who are intrusted with it. + +If an ordinary man, such as a prophet or an apostle, were to affirm that +he had a communication from God which he was directed to make to others, +or in other words that he had a divine commission, it is evident that no +one would be bound to believe him on his mere affirmation. The simple and +obvious reply would be, Give us some proof of the reality of the fact. +Your claim is far too lofty to be admitted as valid on your simple +affirmation. The question then is, how is such a claim to be tested? I +reply by the person who makes it performing some action which is adequate +to prove that the Great Governor of the Universe ratifies this claim. He +must do something analogous to what all persons who claim to be acting +under commissions from others do, _i.e._ he must produce some direct and +formal credentials from the authority in whose name he claims to be +acting. In this case the authority is God. He must therefore perform some +action which directly identifies himself with God. + +How is this to be accomplished? I answer by the performance of an +unequivocal miracle which will directly connect him with the Great +Governor of the Universe. I say unequivocal miracle, because if there were +any doubt as to its supernatural character it would be useless. Nor would +it be of any avail if it were a bare objective fact in external nature, +devoid of its moral and spiritual environment. What is required is some +direct manifestation of the divine on the sphere of the human and the +natural. It must, in fact, exactly fulfil the character so often assigned +to miracles in the Gospels. It must be a {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, or indication of the +presence of God, resembling as it were the Great Seal which is affixed to +state documents as the final mark of sovereign authority. Of such a +character are all the chief miracles recorded in the Gospels. + +The question about miracles has been beclouded by debating it in an +abstract instead of in a concrete form; thus forgetting that it is not +every conceivable form of alleged supernatural occurrence with which we +have to deal, but the miracles recorded in the New Testament. By +discussing it in this form it has been possible to raise a number of +difficulties which may be abstractedly conceivable, but which have no +bearing whatever on the miracles in question. Thus it has been frequently +urged that to enable us to be certain that an alleged miracle is really +due to supernatural agency, a jury of savants ought to be impanelled, +before whom the worker of the miracle should exhibit his miraculous +operation. They are to subject it to a variety of scientific tests. Even +then if they have failed to discover error, they are to demand a second +and a third performance, in order that it may be again and again submitted +to the same process of scientific scrutiny. Until miracles can be +submitted to and verified by tests of this description they have been +affirmed to be unworthy of credit, even on the strongest ordinary +testimony. + +I shall discuss this and kindred questions more fully in the subsequent +portions of this volume, when I consider the nature of the evidence which +is adequate to prove the performance of a miracle. For the present I shall +only observe that the entire plausibility of this position arises from its +being stated in an abstract or general form. We cannot help seeing in +reference to the chief miracles recorded in the New Testament, such as the +care of blind, lame or leprous persons, instantaneously by a word or a +touch, that common sense is fully adequate to determine that such +occurrences must belong to the regions of the supernatural and to no +other. + +Two things are necessary to establish the reality of a supposed miracle. +First, that the alleged fact should not only have been brought about by +supernatural causes but previously announced by him who performs it: +secondly, that the fact actually happened as it appeared to happen. + +There can be no doubt that the power of juggling and sleight of hand, to +perform actions which would be supernatural, if they were only what they +appear to be, is considerable, and the difficulty of detection is great. +Enthusiasm also when once excited, is capable of generating various unreal +appearances which if actual, would be supernatural. It is also mighty in +those regions where the union takes place between mind and matter, but the +chief miracles recorded in the Gospels belong to a wholly different order +of occurrence. If they took place as they are reported, no one possessed +of common sense can doubt as to whether they were due to supernatural +agency. It is no less clear that such miracles were occurrences in which +successful imposture was impossible. What is required to prove them is the +evidence of common sense, and not of scientific analysis. Let it be +observed that it is not my intention to affirm that the whole of the +supernaturalism recorded in the New Testament is of the same unequivocal +character. + +The evidential value of a miracle viewed as a matter of common sense maybe +briefly stated thus. A person comes to me who affirms that he has a divine +message to communicate. I ask him to prove it. He lays his hand on one +whom I have known to be blind for the last twenty years, tells him in the +name of Jesus Christ to receive his sight, and he forthwith receives it. +There is probably no person gifted with ordinary understanding who would +not consider such an act to be an adequate proof of divine agency, all +theoretical or metaphysical difficulties to the contrary notwithstanding. + +It will doubtless be objected that such an act would prove only the +presence of a superhuman instead of a divine power. This point will be +fully considered hereafter. For my present purpose it will be sufficient +to fall back on the decision of common sense, that he who can restore +sight to the sightless eye-ball, by no other apparent instrumentality than +a word or a touch, can be no other than the Maker of the Universe. + +I must now consider whether supernatural occurrences devoid of all moral +environment, are capable of proving a divine commission. + +It has frequently been the habit, both of the opponents and the defenders +of Christianity, to discuss the subject of the evidential value of +miracles apart from all reference to their moral environment. As, however, +the overwhelming majority of the miracles recorded in the New Testament +profess such an environment, the question of the value of supposed +miracles which are destitute of it, forms no legitimate portion of the +subject before us. What might or might not be proved by them, even if it +could be determined satisfactorily, is quite foreign to the present +discussion, which is limited to the truth or falsehood of those contained +in the New Testament. The most important of these are not mere displays of +power, but have an unquestionable moral environment impressed upon them, +and they profess to have been wrought for a definite end and purpose. This +is less distinctly marked in some of the miracles recorded in the Old +Testament, but with them I have no present concern. It will be sufficient +to observe that while many of them were unquestionably performed in +attestation of a divine mission, as a class they bear another distinctive +purpose, viz. that of correcting the polytheistic tendencies of the age. +Hence their leading impress is that of power. The necessity of +counteracting the tendency which I have referred to, rendered it necessary +emphatically to assert the Lordship of one God over universal nature, in +opposition to that conception of it so widely diffused throughout the +ancient world, which saw a distinct power exerted in every combination of +material forces. + +The very conception of a miracle as a supernatural occurrence, brought +about for the purpose of authenticating a revelation, distinguishes such +an action from one which involves only a simple exhibition of power. All +acts of moral agents must display a purpose of some kind. No conception of +God is of the smallest religious value which does not contemplate him as +being a moral agent and a being on whose actions a moral character of some +kind must be impressed. Consequently an act entirely devoid of all moral +aspect cannot prove that it has resulted from direct divine intervention. +The difficulty has originated from dividing into three separate parts an +action which is essentially one, and contemplating separately the +objective fact in the supernatural action, the circumstances attending its +performance, and the purpose for which it was performed. It is the union +of all these which constitutes the occurrence in question an evidential +miracle. + +Let me now offer a few observations on a very important point for our +consideration. Can abstract doctrinal statements or moral truths be proved +by miracles? + +I have already observed that as far as the miracles of the New Testament +were wrought for directly evidential purposes, they were performed, not to +prove particular doctrines, but as the credentials of a divine mission, or +that they formed a part of the superhuman manifestation of our Lord. The +apparent exceptions are those which were performed to attract attention to +the divine message, to assist in the foundation of the Church, or to bear +witness to the truth of the Resurrection. These last were in fact +attestations to the reality of the Messianic character of Jesus Christ, +which is the highest conceivable form of a divine mission, on which +miracle the truth of Christianity is directly pledged by the sacred +writers. A mere statement of the facts of the New Testament is a practical +solution of the difficulty. It nowhere affirms that a miracle was ever +performed to bear witness to the truth of an abstract doctrine. + +I will now endeavour to lay down some general principles as to the +relation in which doctrinal statements stand to supernatural +manifestations. As on such a subject it will be impossible to lay down a +general rule which will be applicable to every supernatural event, it will +be necessary to consider each case by itself. + +First, that of our Lord. + +We believe his statements about unknown truths, on the ground that he was +perfectly veracious, and had the most perfect knowledge of the subject on +which he spoke. The actions which he performed (I mean by these, not his +miracles merely, but the entire course of his working) are evidences of +his divine character. He himself avers that he possessed the most intimate +knowledge of God, and of the great realities of the spiritual world. "We +speak," says he, "that we do know, and testify that we have seen." "I +speak that which I have seen with my Father." Throughout the Synoptics +likewise he is represented as having the most entire knowledge of both +spiritual and moral truth, and as teaching direct from his own insight. We +believe the assertions, not because he confirmed their truth by the +performance of a miracle, but because he afforded evidence that he was a +veracious witness, and fully acquainted with the subject on which he +spoke. His miraculous actions proved that he was God's messenger, and as +such were additional attestations to his veracity. + +The acceptance of such affirmations as worthy of the highest credit may be +correctly designated as acts of faith; but let us never forget that such +acts of faith are also high exercises of reason. Writers in opposition to +Christianity are never wearied in running a contrast between reason and +faith, and in representing the two as standing in opposition to each +other, and belonging to wholly different regions of thought. Nor can it be +denied that they have received much encouragement to do this by the +indistinct or misleading statements of some Christian writers on the +subject. Between them no little confusion has been introduced into the +controversy, and a general idea has become prevalent that reason and faith +are two distinct, if not opposing faculties, each of which acts within a +subject matter of its own. The effect of this confusion has been +disastrous. + +My contention is that faith is only another name for reason when operating +on a particular class of phenomena. To enter on an elaborate proof of this +would be out of place here; a few illustrations must therefore suffice. To +accept information from persons who have knowledge of subjects which we +have not studied, or who have mental powers of insight or perception of +which we are destitute, or who have seen phenomena which we have not seen, +is an act in conformity with our highest reason. A constant effort has +been made by unbelievers to confound faith with credulity: Faith is not +credulity, but the acceptance of truth on adequate evidence, and the +rejection of mere affirmation, when the evidence is inadequate. On the +other hand multitudes of Christians have assiduously laboured to decry +reason as the instrument for the investigation of truth. I admit that it +is not a perfect instrument, but it is the only one which we have. The +light of a candle may not be all that we can wish, but if we have no other +we shall not improve our condition by extinguishing it. + +Let me illustrate this subject by a few examples. We believe the +assertions of Dr. Livingstone about the interior of Africa, although we +have no means of verifying them by ocular observation, because we know +that he has travelled there, and we are persuaded that he is a veracious +witness. We accept the higher truths of astronomy, not because we have +studied them, or are even able to appreciate the nature of the processes +by which they have been arrived at, but because they are affirmed by +persons who have afforded evidence that they possess a high order of +knowledge on that subject. The same is true throughout the whole of the +higher departments of science. We may call this an act of faith if we +like, but it is also an act of our reason. The same thing is true +throughout every department of human knowledge. It is astonishing how +small a part of it is the result of our own personal observation. It +follows therefore that the attempts which are so constantly made to +separate faith and reason, and to erect an impassable wall between them, +are suicidal alike both to faith and reason. + +As therefore we accept the affirmations of others on subjects within the +limits of their own knowledge, although we ourselves are ignorant of the +processes by which it has been arrived at, so we accept the affirmations +of such a person as the Jesus of the Evangelists on those subjects on +which he affirms that he possesses the fullest knowledge. + +But it will be objected that some of these assertions are made respecting +high mysteries incomprehensible to the human intellect. Can we accept such +truths? + +I answer that we are only capable of accepting propositions the two terms +of which we are able to comprehend with more or less distinctness. Nothing +has been the subject of greater abuse than the word "mystery" in +connection with revelation. It is frequently represented as denoting +something which from end to end is utterly incomprehensible, like the +unknowable God of a certain system of philosophy. In the New Testament the +meaning of the word "mystery" is not an incomprehensible proposition, but +a truth which once was hidden in the divine counsels, and has been +revealed by the Gospel. That which is actually unthinkable is incapable of +affirmation or denial. None of the affirmations of Jesus Christ partake of +this character. They are mysteries only in the sense that they ran up into +spheres of thought which transcend the limits of human knowledge. But this +is done by all ultimate philosophical and scientific truths. If it be +urged that some of them are difficult or incapable of definition, the same +is true of not a few of the conceptions of science. It is also true that +they respect truths with which we could not be acquainted apart from such +a revelation as that made in the person of Jesus Christ; but this is true +of the phenomena of Creation likewise. We do not acquire a knowledge of +its phenomena by reasoning, but by observation, or from the statements of +others when they lie beyond the limits of our own observation. The +Incarnation, including as it does the divine actions and the teaching of +Jesus Christ, is not the revelation of a dogma, but the manifestation of a +new fact. This fact, like all other phenomena, although undiscoverable by +our reasoning powers without the exercise of observation, becomes after +observation a fact on which reason may justly exercise its powers. If he +be really what he professed to be, then his statements about himself give +as an account of his previous history, before he came under human +observation. + +Let me now consider the relation in which miracles stand to the +affirmations of those who claimed a commission from Jesus Christ to +publish his religion in the world, and to lay the foundation of the +Church. + +I must here also adhere to my original position that miraculous powers are +never described in the New Testament as being used for the direct proof of +dogmas, but for the proof of the Messianic character of Jesus Christ, or +of the divine commission of those who wrought them. The truth of the +assertions of its writers rests on no other foundation than the fulness of +their knowledge of the subjects on which they spake, whether acquired by +ordinary or by supernatural means, and on their veracity, when they affirm +that particular truths were within the limits of their knowledge. Thus St. +Paul claims acceptance for the things which he asserted because he had +been taught them by Revelation from Jesus Christ, not because he had +proved their truth, by working miracles in confirmation of them. This +course is uniformly adopted by him throughout his epistles. The object of +the mighty works that were wrought by him was to prove his own apostleship +or the fact of the resurrection. + +I must not allow myself to enter on the question of inspiration, its +nature and limitations, or the degree of supernatural guidance afforded to +the apostles and their followers. Such an inquiry would be foreign to the +present subject, which is strictly historical. It is of course a direct +and necessary inference that when the miracles proved the reality of the +commission of those who performed them, they also proved that they were +fully instructed in its terms, and entitled to credit within its limits. +But the extent of their enlightenment can only be inferred from the nature +of the commission itself, and from the facts and phenomena of the New +Testament. It has been an idea widely spread that inspiration must confer +a general infallibility. The inference that a man is rendered infallible +in general matters because he is invested with a limited and definite +commission, and with endowments adequate to render him competent to fulfil +the purposes of his mission, is one which the premises will not justify. +The utmost that the possession of such a commission can prove is that its +possessor is enlightened up to its subject matter, but no further. + +But in the present discussion I need not go beyond the affirmations of the +New Testament. The actions performed by Jesus Christ proved him to be the +Messiah. The miracles wrought by the apostles, were performed either to +prove the fact of his resurrection, _i.e._ that he was the Messiah, or +their own divine mission, which was dependent on its truth, or to draw +attention to their message. The supernatural gifts so frequently referred +to in the epistles, are affirmed to have been designed for the building up +of the Church into a distinct community, and when that purpose was +accomplished they were to cease. Being functional, the enlightenment +communicated by them was necessarily limited to the special subject matter +on which they were exercised. In this point of view miracles may be viewed +as attestations of the veracity of the persons who performed them, and of +the sufficiency of their knowledge on the subjects they were specially +commissioned to communicate. + +But the question still remains for consideration, Can miracles prove moral +truths? + +I answer emphatically in the negative. If dogmas, which may be viewed as +intellectual truths, are incapable of a direct proof by miracles, still +more so are moral truths. Such truths can rest only on a moral basis. With +respect to the miracles recorded in the New Testament, the question is +nugatory, for it nowhere affirms that its miracles were wrought for such a +purpose. It is true that Jesus Christ, as the great legislator of the +kingdom of heaven, gave an authoritative utterance to many moral precepts +as the laws of his kingdom. This royal right of legislation was inherent +in his Messiahship. But to give utterance to moral truths in a legislative +capacity, has no connection with attempting to prove them by authority. +Ordinary human legislation has its authoritative utterances. But when it +does this, it does not rest the truths themselves on authority, or base +them on adventitious testimony. Our Lord and his apostles uniformly +appealed to the internal perceptions of our moral and spiritual nature as +the only ground on which moral obligation rests. + +Let it be observed, however, that this by no means pre-supposes the truth +of the absurd proposition, that every man, however imperfect or degraded, +is capable of reasoning out all moral truth for himself. On the contrary, +definite moral knowledge requires to be communicated, as all other kinds +of knowledge. Its great principles require to be enunciated, and to be +worked out to their special applications. But the principles themselves, +as far as their binding power is concerned, must ultimately rest on the +internal perceptions of our moral and spiritual being. A miracle, +therefore, can communicate to them no higher degree of certainty or +obligation. The only thing which it can aid in establishing is, that one +invested with a divine commission may have a right to claim obedience to +special precepts on the authority of God, in whom all moral obligation +centres. + +But even in this case, the ground on which the obligation rests is a moral +one, which no miracle can possibly prove or even confirm. A moral teacher +can only appeal to that in man which we variously designate as conscience, +moral sense, or the principles which are the foundation of our moral +perceptions. The fact that many men through a long course of evil get +morally blinded does not alter the case. It only exemplifies a remarkable +saying of our Lord, "If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great +is that darkness." When the light within us has become darkness, there is +nothing left to which an appeal to the sense of duty or obligation can be +made. + +The objection urged against Christianity, that because a miracle cannot +prove a moral truth it is therefore useless, is quite beyond the question +at issue. The special function of the Christian revelation is one far +higher than the mere laying down of rules for the regulation of human +conduct. Its great purpose is to impart to man a moral and spiritual +power, which is able to make obedience to the moral law a possibility; to +supply a motive of sufficient potency to make us capable of resisting the +vehemence of our passions; and one which is able to lift the morally +degraded from their degradation, and to strengthen the holy in their +holiness. According to the teaching of the New Testament, this constitutes +the great distinctive purpose of Christianity, and the end of all divine +revelation. This most important truth has been greatly overlooked in the +present controversy. It entirely disposes of the objection that if moral +truth cannot be proved by miracles, they must be valueless. To such a +revelation the presence of the supernatural is essential. + +But it by no means follows because miracles are unable to impart to us a +sense of moral obligation, that a duly commissioned moral teacher would be +useless. They might prove his superior knowledge, or as attesting a divine +commission, enable him to bring obligations already existing to bear on +the mind with superior power. Thus it by no means follows that because men +possess in their mental constitution the great principles on which +scientific truths are based, each man is able to reason them out for +himself. The most highly gifted man would make slow progress without a +teacher. As I have already observed, moral truth is capable of being +taught like all other truth; and although a miracle cannot prove it, it +may establish the fact that the worker of one is a man eminently entitled +to be heard on the great subjects of moral obligation, or that he is able +to communicate knowledge which is capable of acting mightily on our moral +being. + +I must now proceed to offer a few observations on the question, Are +miracles objects of faith? and if they are so in any sense, how can they +be the media of proof of a revelation? + +The author of "Supernatural Religion" starts the following difficulty in +connection with this subject: "Consciousness of the difficulties which +beset miracles in the present age has led many able men to deal thus +illogically with them, and to represent them alternately as evidence and +as objects of faith." He then proceeds to refer to Dr. Arnold, Professor +Baden Powell, and Archbishop Trench, as having been in various degrees +guilty of making this confusion. + +I am not prepared to deny that many Christian writers have expressed +themselves with great indistinctness on this subject, especially in works +where miracles have been only referred to incidentally, and which only +partially treat of the supernatural elements of Christianity. This +question will be discussed more fully when we consider his definite +objections; but it will tend to a clearer understanding of the subject if +in the present place, I lay down the following propositions:-- + +I. That it is impossible to believe in any assertion which contradicts the +first principles of our reason, even if it were supposable that a miracle +could be wrought in confirmation of it. + +II. That, although the illumination which reason imparts is imperfect, yet +as it is the only instrument that we possess for the investigation of +truth, attempts to disparage it are absurd. + +III. So far is faith from standing in opposition to reason, that it is a +legitimate branch of it when exercised on a special subject matter. + +IV. That beliefs which reason refuses to authorise do not originate in +faith but in credulity. + +V. That even those who entertain irrational convictions are compelled to +base them on evidence of some kind which is satisfactory to themselves: +that is to say, on the dictates of their own imperfect reason. + +VI. That, while we can believe in nothing that is contrary to our reason, +yet it is perfectly rational to believe in many things which our reason +would have been unable to discover. + +VII. That extraordinary facts which lie beyond the limits of human +experience are not contrary to our reason: and it is perfectly rational to +believe them whenever they are adequately attested. + +VIII. That a large portion of our beliefs on subjects scientific, +philosophical, historical, moral, and religious, rest on testimony; the +belief in them is highly rational, when the knowledge of those from whom +we derive our information is adequate: and consequently that faith is a +principle co-extensive with the activities of the human mind, and is by no +means confined to subjects simply religious, however intimately it may be +connected with them. + +A few brief observations will suffice in this part of our subject. + +It will be observed that I have included under the term "reason" the whole +of our mental processes which are necessary for the cognition and the +discovery of truth. These include, not only our powers of inductive and +deductive reasoning, but our intuitions, our forms of thought, those +powers of our mind, which whether intuitional or instinctive, form the +foundation of many of our most important convictions and our moral +conceptions. These constitute our reason as distinct from our reasoning +powers. No little confusion has been introduced into this controversy from +the want of attending to this distinction. + +It has been asserted that we can accept things as matters of faith which +to our reason would be utterly incredible. This assertion has arisen from +the confusion of things which differ widely, viz. things which our reason +might have been unable to discover, but which when discovered may be +perfectly rational, and things directly contradictory to reason. The +existence for example of a square circle is a thing absolutely incredible, +and while thus contradictory to reason, it is impossible to accept it by +faith. So would any doctrine which in a similar manner contradicted the +first principles of our rational convictions. No more pernicious principle +can be laid down than that things which are contradictory to our reason +can be accepted by the principle of faith. Such a principle would divide +the human mind into two hostile camps, and if carried to its logical +consequences, must land us in universal scepticism. + +It by no means follows that things which transcend our rational powers to +discover must be contrary to our reason when they have been discovered. We +can only arrive at the knowledge of unknown facts by observation, or +accept them on the testimony of others. Until they have been brought +within our knowledge in this way, no amount of reasoning could lead to +their discovery. In a similar manner with respect to several of the facts +in the New Testament connected with the Incarnation, our reason might +never have discovered them, but when they have been discovered, they may +form suitable subjects on which to exert its energies. + +The whole of the confusion in which this question has become involved has +originated in the assumption that faith is a faculty of the mind distinct +and separate from our reason, and in a certain sense opposed to it; and +that things which cannot be subjects of rational conviction may yet be the +objects of faith. Whatever opinions may have been held by divines upon +this subject, I can discover nothing which countenances them in the New +Testament. + +To what class of truths is the word "faith" properly applied? I answer to +those which we accept on testimony. It has been asserted that some of the +first principles of our rational convictions, such as our belief in the +existence of an external world, or in the truth of experience, is an act +of faith. This, however, is to introduce a confusion of thought. Such +convictions can be only acts of faith as far as we believe in ourselves. + +Viewing faith as the acceptance of truth on adequate testimony, it follows +that all our knowledge of things, whether natural or supernatural, that is +not the result of the action of our own minds, but which we accept on the +testimony of others, is an act of faith. Our acceptance of them depends on +the validity of the testimony that can be adduced for them. The important +question for determination is, is the subject on which it is given within +the knowledge of the informant? If it respects a fact, has he witnessed +it, or received it from others who have? Are his powers of observation +good and his judgment sound? Is he worthy of credit? The determination of +these and similar points is the proper office of our rational powers, yet +the acceptance of the fact is an act of faith. When our reason is +satisfied on all these points, faith becomes an act of reason. To assert +that the acceptance of supernatural facts belongs to a faculty of our +minds which we designate faith, and that our acceptance of others is the +result of the action of our reason, is to lay down a distinction entirely +of our own creation. In both cases the evidences must form the subject of +rational investigation, and they must be accepted or rejected as they +approve themselves to our reason. + +It will perhaps be urged, that the acceptance of propositions, such as the +doctrinal statements of the New Testament, is an act of faith which stands +out in manifest contra-distinction to an act of reason. It would be so +unquestionably, if we accepted them on insufficient evidence; but when we +do so with the knowledge that others have a full acquaintance with the +subject on which they speak, it is in the highest degree rational to +accept and to act on their testimony. A large portion of the business of +life is conducted on this principle. A man is ignorant on some subject, or +he distrusts his own judgment respecting it: he consults one who knows, or +on whose judgment he relies. For example: let us suppose that I have a +bottle full of a certain substance; I do not know whether it is a medicine +that I am in need of, or a deadly poison. I consult my chemist, and +without hesitation I act on his opinion. In all such cases (and they are +spread over the entire sphere of life) we act on faith; but it is a faith +which is in conformity with the dictates of reason. The function of the +latter is to ascertain the adequate knowledge and the veracity of the +person whose assurance we accept. If it is a rational act thus to receive +truths on the testimony of man, whose knowledge must be imperfect, it must +be still more so to accept them on the authority of him who knows all +things, _i.e._ God. + +I am aware that certain writers have given such a representation of faith +as to produce the impression that it is one of its special functions to +accept certain dogmas, the terms of which are extremely obscure, or +absolutely incomprehensible. But no rational evidence can be adduced in +support of this position. To exert actual belief in a proposition the +terms of which are incomprehensible, is an impossibility, and we only +deceive ourselves when we imagine that we can. All that we can do in such +cases is to repeat words, but if they have no definite meaning we cannot +believe them: for the act of faith or conviction is founded on the +affirmation that the two terms of a particular proposition agree. It is +quite true that the facts and statements of the New Testament run up into +principles which transcend our limited power of reason; but this is common +to it, and every system of science or philosophy; and forms no peculiarity +of religion. I am far from wishing to affirm that theologians have not +fallen into this practice; but my concern is not with them, but with the +statements of the New Testament. One of the most important acquisitions +made to our mental science in the present day is that we have ascertained +that there are limits to our mental powers beyond which we cannot +penetrate. This was imperfectly realized by many of the reasoners of +earlier times, and the result has been that they have fallen into a hazy +mysticism, or logomachy. + +Equally pernicious is the view that there is something particularly +meritorious in accepting truth on little or no evidence, and that to do so +is a high act of faith. Not only is this founded on no rational principle, +but it is entirely unsupported by any account of faith as given in the New +Testament, which again and again assumes the contrary position. Faith is +the acceptance of truths which lie beyond the sphere of our personal +knowledge on an adequate attestation. If an astronomer should happen to be +ignorant of chemistry, and accept its truths on the testimony of one who +was an eminent master of it, this would constitute an act of faith. Surely +such an act is one which is highly rational. + +It follows, therefore, that although our belief in miracles being founded, +as it now must be, on testimony, is an act of faith, yet it is also an act +of our reason. It is, therefore, by no means absurd to speak of miracles +as objects of faith, and at the same time as possessing an evidential +value. We accept them as we do all other adequately attested facts, and +reason on them in the same manner as we do on other facts. This is the +precise course which will be pursued by the overwhelming majority of +astronomers who will be unable to witness the coming transit of Venus. +They will accept the facts on adequate testimony, and afterwards use them +as media of proof. + + + + + +CHAPTER V. THE ANTECEDENT IMPROBABILITY OF MIRACLES.--THE UNKNOWN AND +UNKNOWABLE GOD. + + +The proof on _à priori_ grounds that an event is either possible or +probable, cannot establish that it has actually occurred. This must rest +on its own particular evidence. To prove that a revelation is both +possible and probable, and that it ought to be evidenced by miracles, may +form an essential portion of our general argument, because the degree of +probability of the occurrence of a particular fact affects the amount of +positive evidence necessary to establish its truth. But the proof that a +revelation has actually been given, or a miracle wrought, can only be +effected through the same media as those through which other facts are +established. To prove that a revelation is probable will not be of the +smallest avail to prove that one has been actually given, without adequate +proof of the fact itself. + +Still the examination of the antecedent question is in this case +particularly important, because modern unbelief boldly affirms that a +revelation and its attestation of miracles are both impossible and +incredible. If this can be demonstrated, the discussion of the evidence +that can be adduced for them as facts is a useless expenditure of our +reasoning powers; for no evidence can prove the occurrence of that which +is impossible. It may be assumed, however, that those who make this +affirmation are not quite satisfied as to the cogency of their reasonings; +because, after having demonstrated, as they allege, that miracles are +impossible, they proceed to attack the evidence of those narrated in the +Gospels, and pronounce it worthless. As, therefore, the opponents of +Christianity boldly affirm that both a supernatural revelation and +miracles are impossible, it is necessary that the defender of Christianity +should examine the validity of the assertion. + +Our opponents constantly charge us with reasoning in a circle, or assuming +the fact which ought to be proved. To avoid even the appearance of this, I +lay down the following positions:-- + +If direct atheism is a just conclusion from the phenomena of the Universe, +it follows that a divine revelation is impossible. Nor are miracles in any +proper sense of the word less so, because they are not merely facts +occurring in external nature, but facts in the production of which we +recognize intelligence and will. With the principles of atheism the +occurrence of an extraordinary event is quite compatible, because as it +cannot rise to any higher knowledge than that of phenomena, the knowledge +of the invariability of past phenomena is incapable of giving the fact +that all future phenomena will resemble the past. Still the occurrence of +a fact, however extraordinary, would not constitute a miracle, and would +prove only the existence of an unknown force in the universe, or the +predominance of chance. + +The same remark is equally applicable to that form of modern atheism which +does not affirm that no God exists, but contents itself with the denial +that there is any evidence that there is one. + +Nor is the case altogether different with regard to pantheism. According +to this system, God is only another name for nature, which works out every +form of fleeting existence for itself in an unceasing round of unconscious +self-evolution. The essence of its affirmation is, that God has no +conscious personal existence, but that He is only another name for the +blind unconscious forces of the universe. Such a being (if it is possible +to conceive of it as a being at all, or as a unity) is everlastingly +making a revelation of itself by a ceaseless evolution of phenomena, the +result of the blind action of its inherent forces. But to whom? Obviously +only to beings capable of reason and consciousness, whom it (I dare not +say, He) has evolved out of its own bosom, and will again resolve into +unconsciousness. Prior to their evolution this mighty {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} must have +been everlastingly making manifestations of itself, without a single being +in existence capable of recognizing them. Whatever be the result of such +theories in a logical point of view, it is evident that if pantheism be a +rational account of the order of the universe, a revelation and miracles, +in any sense in which such terms can bear meaning, are impossible. + +No less applicable is the same remark to that form of pantheism held by +Mr. Herbert Spencer, which, while it affirms the existence of a cause of +all things, as alike required by the demands of philosophy, science, and +religion, yet affirms that He is unknown and unknowable, and that every +thing which is knowable, although a manifestation of that great unknown +cause, yet conveys no idea of Him that the intellect can apprehend. In one +word, the unknown cause of all things is inconceivable, and incapable of +becoming the subject of rational thought. The intellect cannot help +assuming the existence of this cause of all things; but all that it can +affirm of him is, that He is unknown and unknowable; and that everything +within the bounds of our knowledge, though it may represent some mode of +his existence, cannot be he, or like him. With respect to this theory, +while it cleverly evades some of the harsher difficulties of pantheism and +atheism, it is not too much to say that it is a civil way of bowing God +out of the universe, of which He is alleged to be the cause. He can +neither be a person, nor have wisdom, nor be benevolent, nor be capable of +conscious self-manifestation; because all these conceptions are limited +and finite. All that we can know of Him is, that such a cause exists +beyond present phenomena; and that we are condemned respecting Him, to a +profound and perpetual ignorance. It is possible to designate such a being +by the name of God, but it would be to use the term in a sense peculiar to +those who thus employ it. Such a God is a bare abstract conception of the +intellect, void of all moral value. It is sufficient for my present +purpose to observe that it is impossible for the unknown and the +unknowable to make a revelation of himself. Consequently St. Paul's +affirmation with respect to the unknown God at Athens, "Whom therefore ye +ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you" (Acts xvii. 23), is untrue. To +such a God a revelation of Himself, and miracles to confirm it, are alike +impossible. + +It is evident, therefore, that if either of these principles can be +demonstrated to be a true account of the nature of things, all further +discussion as to the truth of a revelation or of miracles is useless. Let +us take the most favourable hypothesis, that of Mr. Spencer. It concedes +that the necessities of reason compel us to assume the existence of an +unknown cause of all things, which may be called God. But He is +unknowable; He is inscrutable. No conception of Him can be realized in +thought; it follows, therefore, that no revelation of such a being can be +made to the finite intellect of man, for if a revelation of Him could be +made, He cannot be unknowable. This being so, the person who attempts to +reason out the truth of Christianity is placed under a difficulty. +Christianity assumes the existence of a personal God, possessed of moral +attributes. This is the very truth, the evidence of which these systems +assert to be wanting. The Christian advocate, therefore, has only two +courses before him: First, To assume, in conformity with the all but +universal belief of mankind, that a personal God exists; and then to argue +for the truth of Christianity, and to answer the objections urged against +it. When we do this, objectors affirm that we beg the question. Or, +Secondly, To prove the existence of a personal God; and then to argue for +the truth of revelation. If he adopts the latter course, he is compelled +to adduce the proof on which the belief in theism rests, and to answer the +objections to it--or, in other words, to compose a bulky volume, before he +can get at the immediate subject of inquiry. + +Now I affirm that the defender of Christianity is no more open to the +charge of begging the question when he assumes the existence of a personal +God as the foundation of his reasonings, than the author of a treatise on +trigonometry is, who takes for granted the truth of Euclid's propositions. + +The author of the work to which I have already referred does his utmost to +fasten on the modern defenders of Christianity the charge that they begin +and end in assumptions. I will not deny that much ambiguous language has +been used on this subject, but I trust I shall show that the charge is +utterly unfounded. I must briefly notice a few of his reasonings. + +At page 68 he writes as follows: "Dr. Mozley is well aware that the +assumption of a 'personal' God is not susceptible of proof; indeed, this +is admitted in the statement that the definition is an assumption." + +An assumption, I ask, in what sense? Is it a simple assumption without +evidence, taken for granted for the bare purposes of argument; or is it +one which, though taken for granted in the present case, rests on a +substantial basis of evidence previously established, and which bears the +same relation to the question of miracles which the truths of Euclid do to +those of trigonometry? The latter is the fact though the mode in which the +writer puts it implies the former. Without referring to the authority of +any particular author, is he not fully aware that theists maintain that +their belief in a Personal God rests on a basis of proof which commends +itself to their reason? Have not numbers of men, endowed with the highest +powers of intellect, accepted it as satisfactory? Yet he seeks to imply +that, after all, it is an assumption. It is true that in the argument for +miracles we take it for granted; but we do so, because the proof has +commended itself to our highest reason. + +I admit that Dr. Mozley has used, in speaking of this subject, language +which I cannot but think is wanting in precision. Still it does not bear +the meaning that this author seeks to fasten on it. "It is then to be +admitted," says he, "that historically, and looking to the general actual +reception of it, this conception of God was derived from revelation. Not +from the first dawn of history to the spread of Christianity in the world +do we see in mankind at large any belief in such a Being." The learned +author then states, at considerable length, the philosophic and vulgar +views entertained of God, and shows their inadequacy and imperfection, and +concludes as follows: "But although this conception of the Deity has been +received through the channel of the Bible, what communicates a truth is +one thing, what proves it is another." He then proceeds to summarize the +general proof. + +I cannot think this statement altogether free from ambiguity. Whatever may +have been the precise forms in which the ideas of the vulgar or the +philosopher were embodied, there is strong proof that a higher and better +conception of God, though indefinite and indistinct, underlay them all. +The most degraded polytheist has indistinct conceptions of a Supreme God +above all the degraded objects of his worship. It seems to me impossible +that such a conception of God can have been attained from revelation. It +may, in a certain sense, be said, looking at the precise form in which it +is embodied, that it has been derived by us historically from the Jewish +race. But it must have had a prior origin. St. Paul considered that the +material universe manifested His eternal power and Godhead. The primitive +form of all the great oriental religions contained in them the idea of +God. It is simply absurd to affirm that they derived it from the Bible. It +is true that the existence of a primitive revelation anterior to the Bible +has often been assumed to account for this knowledge, but this is a bare +assumption of which we have no proof, and whose only basis is conjecture. +Judaism and Christianity have been instrumental in widely spreading +correct conceptions of the Deity and dissipating false ones. Yet if the +conception had not existed in the mind at least implicitly, no formal +revelation could have put it there, for every such revelation must be +conveyed in language, and all language is meaningless, unless the mind can +realize its conceptions. The assertion, therefore, that the conception of +God has been first communicated through the channel of the Bible, and is +afterwards proved by reason, seems to me to be one not devoid of danger. +On the contrary, our belief that God exists is the very pre-condition of +our being able to believe that He has revealed Himself. This conception +revelation may modify, invest with a higher moral character, and import +into it definiteness and precision, but it cannot create it. It is on such +grounds that the author in question seeks to involve his reasoning and +that of all other defenders of Christianity in a vicious circle. I fully +admit that the conception of God has been elevated and purified by the +influence of Christianity, and that the teaching of Christianity on this +subject is in conformity with our highest reason. But it is absurd to +affirm that this is reasoning in a circle, and that the Christian argument +involves reasoning from Theism to Christianity and from Christianity back +to Theism. + +The following passage, cited by Professor Mozley from Baden Powell, is +referred to by this author as a proof that all our reasonings on this +subject are a simple argument from reason to revelation, and from +revelation to reason. The passage itself is a clear statement of the +grounds of the charge, and requires our careful consideration. "Everybody +may collect from the order and harmony of the physical universe the +existence of a God; but in acknowledging a God, we do not thereby +acknowledge this peculiar or doctrinal conception of a God. We see in the +structure of nature a mind, a universal mind, but still a mind which only +operates and expresses itself by law. Nature only does and can inform us +of mind in nature; but in no other sense does nature witness to the +existence of an omnipotent Supreme Being. Of a universal mind out of +nature, nature says nothing; and of an omnipotence which does not possess +an inherent limit in nature, she says nothing either. And therefore that +conception of a supreme Being which represents Him as a spirit independent +of the physical universe, and able from a standing-point external to +nature, to interrupt its order, is a conception of God for which we must +go elsewhere. That conception is attained from revelation, which is +asserted to be proved by miracles. But that being the case, this doctrine +of theism rests itself upon miracles, and therefore miracles cannot rest +on this doctrine of theism." + +It will be necessary carefully to point out the inaccurate reasoning of +this passage. + +First: The author speaks of nature as another expression for the forces, +laws, and phenomena of the physical universe, and for these alone. To this +I have no objection, for it would greatly conduce to clearness if it was +always confined to this meaning. But while he uses it thus, he nowhere +tells us in what relation man, including his faculties, intellectual and +moral, and above all, his will, stands to nature. Are they included in, or +excluded from it? Do they, or do they not, form a part of it? If they are +included in nature, then there are other facts in nature bearing on the +being of a God, beyond those on which the author reasons. If they are +excluded, then the reasoning is inadequate to sustain his conclusion. Our +reasonings respecting God are founded not only on the forces and laws of +physical nature, but on man, his reason, his conscience, and his will. +What makes this fallacy the more plausible is that the term nature is very +frequently used to include man, as well as the forces and laws of the +material universe. + +As far as the physical universe is concerned, the mind infers the +existence of a God from its order and its harmonies; that is to say, +having observed that order and harmony have been produced by intelligence +within the sphere of our own observation, and being deeply convinced on +other grounds of reasoning that they are incapable of resulting from any +other source, we infer that the results we behold in nature are due to a +similar principle which we experience in ourselves. Such an inference is +not due to simple observation of the order of the universe only, but +unites with it an act of reasoning founded on our own self-conscious +being. But the intelligence which produces order, as far as we are +cognisant of it, is invariably united with will. We therefore infer from +the order and harmonies of nature, not simply the conception of a God, +such as the God of pantheism; but, if they are valid to prove anything at +all, of a God who is possessed of intelligence adequate to arrange the +order, and of purpose adequate for its production. If the inference of the +existence of a God from the works of nature is valid, it must be of a God +possessed of the attributes in question, for all our inferences on such a +subject derive their validity from applying to them the analogies of our +reason. + +It is quite true that in the structure of the material universe we see +only the indications of a mind operating and expressing itself by law; +that is to say, we observe in the physical universe no instances of its +violation. But WE, that is the reasoning, rational beings, whether +existing in nature or outside it, have inferred from the structure of the +universe the existence of mind, and we know of no mind which is not +possessed of conscious intelligence and will. If our reasoning from the +order of the material universe is valid to prove the presence of mind, +which is a conception entirely derived from our consciousness of +ourselves, it must be equally so to prove the existence of purpose and +volition, for we know nothing of mind which is devoid of these attributes. +The material universe proves that its order and harmony is the result of +the action of mind; but it cannot prove that the mind which produced this +order and harmony is unable to introduce a different one. But if our minds +form part of nature, then they are a proof that the author of nature has +produced something else in nature besides the order and harmonies of the +physical universe. If they are outside nature, then we have direct +evidence of the existence of beings outside and above nature, _i.e._ above +the physical forces of the universe. It follows that if finite beings +possessed of intelligence and will, exist within nature or without it, a +God who possesses similar powers may exist also. + +In a narrow and restricted sense it may be quite true that nature, _i.e._ +matter and its phenomena, only informs us of the presence of mind in +nature, the partner and correlative of organized matter. But let us here +guard against a latent fallacy in this mode of statement. We learn the +presence of mind, not from material nature, but by the application of our +own reason to the investigation of what its phenomena denote. This is +overlooked in the above argument. It is perfectly true that as a mere +matter of phenomenal appearance, we do not actually behold in natural +phenomena manifestations of mind acting outside nature. In fact we do not +see mind at all, but simply infer its presence from the phenomena before +us through the agency of our own reason; and this inference carries along +with it all the other attributes of mind. + +The writer before me is one of those who affirm that the utmost our minds +can infer from the contemplation of nature, in which he includes every +species of vital organism, is the presence of order and harmony; and that +any inference that its phenomena testify to the presence of adaptation, +contrivance and design is invalid. I reply that this affirmation is only +valid on the assumption of a principle which altogether denies that from +natural phenomena we can infer the existence of mind. But we also observe +in natural phenomena, and above all in animal and vegetable structures, +that the results effected are produced, not by simple forces, but by the +careful adjustment of many, or by one counteracting and qualifying the +action of another, and by forces intersecting one another at precisely the +right time and place. Had any of these occurred otherwise, the result +would have been different. Throughout nature we observe innumerable +instances in which various forces have thus combined to produce a definite +result. This we usually designate by the word "adaptation." Adaptation +implies intelligence and purpose. We are quite as much justified in +ascribing this purpose to the power manifested in nature, as any other +quality whatever, even the possession of mind. + +I fully concede that natural phenomena and even the phenomena of the mind +of man, only testify directly to the existence of a power adequate to +their production, and that we cannot directly infer from them the presence +of omnipotence. But this is to quarrel about words. For the power +manifested in nature and in man is so great that the human mind can make +no distinction between it and omnipotence; or in other words, it justly +infers from its manifestations that the power which could originate this +universe and all things in it must be capable of effecting anything which +is possible. To this mind, whether in or out of nature, our reason +ascribes the attributes of intelligence and will. Such a power it is +incapable of conceiving as inherent in material forces; it therefore +assumes that this power exists outside nature, and is capable of +controlling it. + +It follows therefore that the reasoning is fallacious, which asserts that +the conception of a supreme Being which represents Him as a spirit +independent of the physical universe, and able from a standing-point +external to nature to interrupt its order, is a conception which we must +seek from revelation, and cannot be arrived at by any exertion of our +rational powers on the facts of nature and of man. Its apparent +plausibility has arisen solely from ignoring the presence of man, either +in nature or outside it, and neglecting to take the facts of human nature, +man's reason, conscience and will, into consideration. To affirm that, +independently of man's moral and intellectual being, physical nature, its +forces and laws, can prove nothing, is a simple platitude. We have not to +go to revelation for the principles on which we reason, but to man, and +the phenomena of his rational, self-conscious, and voluntary agency. It +follows, therefore, that the affirmation that in conducting the Christian +argument we reason from God to miracles and from miracles to God, is +utterly disproved. Yet the writer before me has ventured to affirm that, +when we commence with the being of a personal God as the groundwork of our +reasonings, we begin and end with a bare assumption. + +The philosophical writings of Dr. Mansel are also pressed into the service +for the purpose of discrediting the evidences of Christianity, and, I own, +with considerably greater reason. Mr. Herbert Spencer has also invoked +them in confirmation of his theory that God is unknown and unknowable. He +refers to them in the following words: "Here I cannot do better than avail +myself of the demonstration which Mr. Mansel, carrying out in detail the +doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton, has given us in his 'Limits of Religious +Thought.' And I gladly do this, not only because his mode of presentation +cannot be improved, but because writing as he does in defence of current +theology, his reasonings will be more acceptable to the majority of +readers." + +Before referring to Dr. Mansel as an unquestionable authority on this +subject, it would only have been candid in both writers to have informed +their readers that not only have his principles been repudiated by a +considerable number of Christian writers as unsound, but they have been +carefully examined by that eminent atheistic philosopher, Mr. Mill, who +gives it as his deliberate opinion that they are founded on fallacious +principles. It is absurd to urge principles, though they have been +maintained by an eminent Christian writer, which an eminent unbeliever has +pronounced unsound, as a clear and conclusive argument against +Christianity. + +The work of Dr. Mansel may be described as an attempt to prove the truth +of Christianity on the principles of the most sceptical philosophy. It may +be briefly stated thus: Reason is incapable of forming any idea of God as +He is, whether as the Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause. All the +conceptions which we can frame on the subject are mutually self- +destructive. On similar principles our conceptions of His moral attributes +are wholly inadequate to inform us of His real perfections. It by no means +follows that our human conception of benevolence or justice is a measure +of the divine benevolence, or of divine justice; and so of His other +attributes. It is affirmed that because they are the attributes of an +infinite Being, they lie beyond the possibility of being realized in human +thought. Consequently, holiness in God may admit of very different +manifestations from holiness in man. Upon these principles, which affirm +the inadequacy of the human intellect, even to conceive of anything as it +exists in God, it follows that our only possible conceptions of God are +relative; or, to use the word chosen by the author in relation to +Christianity, regulative; _i.e._ fitted to regulate our conduct, but not +to illuminate our understanding. + +Upon the assumption that reason, when it attempts to analyse our ideas of +the Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause, lands us in hopeless +contradictions, Dr. Mansel arrives at the conclusion that it is incapable +of forming any conception of God as he actually exists. It follows as a +necessary consequence from this, that even by revelation we are only +capable of attaining relative ideas of Him, and that these relative ideas +do not represent His real nature, but are only regulative of conduct, +_i.e._ we are to act upon them as if they were true. _E.g._ God is +revealed as holy. Our only conception of holiness is our human conception +of it. But we cannot know that this is an adequate measure of the divine +holiness. God is declared to be benevolent. We have no conception of +benevolence but that which is derived from the human mind. So likewise +with respect to justice. But benevolence and justice as they exist in God +may differ from these qualities as they exist in man. The same thing +follows as a necessary conclusion from Dr. Mansel's premises with respect +to all the other attributes of God. Nothing will better illustrate the +position to which this argument reduces us than to apply it to the +truthfulness or veracity of God. All that we know about truthfulness is as +it exists in finite beings, that is, in men. But God is an infinite being. +It follows therefore that truthfulness in man is no adequate +representation of truthfulness as it exists in God, that is to say, that +the divine veracity may differ from our human conception of it. This is +certainly a very startling position. + +If, therefore, these principles are correct, acquiescence on the part of +man in the divine character is impossible. It is impossible to love a +being who does not present to us the aspect of loveliness; or to reverence +one who does not present to us an aspect capable of exciting this emotion; +or to feel trust in a being of whose justice we have no certainty that it +resembles our conception of justice; or to rely on the promises of one +whose veracity may differ from our own. Such feelings cannot be made to +order. They can only be generated by the contemplation of a being who is +holy, benevolent, just, and true, in the ordinary acceptation of these +words. They cannot be excited by any merely regulative ideas. We love, +reverence, and trust, not ideas or conceptions, but persons, possessing +moral attributes. But on the principle of merely regulative ideas of God, +the assertion that "God is love," loses all its value, if God is not what +I mean by love, but, because he is infinite, he may be something else, I +know not what; and thus the great precept of the moral law, "Thou shalt +love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, mind, soul, and strength," +becomes meaningless. Such devotion of our entire nature cannot be created +by the mere command to render it. It can only be rendered to a being whose +claims over us we both feel and know to be an absolute reality, and to +whom on the conviction of their reality we can offer ourselves up a +voluntary sacrifice. But if we cannot know Him as He is, how is the fire +of devotion to Him to be kindled in our hearts? How shall we trust in Him? +How shall we acquiesce in His character? How shall we worship Him, how +shall we adore Him, if it is true that the justice, benevolence, or +holiness of the divine character may not resemble our conception of them? +Nay, more: the theory in question lays the axe to the root of the +Christian revelation itself. There is no affirmation of the New Testament +more decisive than that Jesus Christ in His divine and human personality +is the image of the invisible God, as far as His moral perfections are +concerned. Are the perfections of the character of Jesus Christ only +regulative, or are they real representations of these attributes as they +exist in God? Are the divine attributes of holiness, benevolence, or +justice, adequately represented by the manifestations of them, as made by +Jesus Christ? If we accept the testimony of St. John's Gospel, our Lord +himself has expressly affirmed, "He that hath seen me hath seen the +Father" (John xiv. 9). But this is impossible if our conceptions of God's +moral attributes are only regulative, and if the human idea of holiness is +no adequate representation of the divine. + +However erroneous a system may be, yet if it has been elaborated by a +powerful mind, it has generally some foundation in reason, and I am far +from affirming that, with considerable qualifications, some important +elements of truth may not be found in that of Dr. Mansel. It is well that +we should be made to feel that there are limits of thought beyond which +the human mind cannot penetrate, and that there are profundities of +metaphysics which an imperfect measuring-line cannot reach. But placing +the matter as he has, the Christian apologist may well feel indebted to +Mr. Mill for his crushing demolition of the dangerous portions of Dr. +Mansel's system. When unbelievers quote the authority of Dr. Mansel, why +do they not also tell their readers that there was at least one unbeliever +of very high logical power, who wrote against the validity of his system. + +It is one thing to affirm that we cannot penetrate to the depths of the +Deity, and that after we have raised our thoughts to the highest, there is +something higher still; and quite another to affirm that our highest +thoughts of him have no validity; or, to use the terms of a fashionable +philosophy, that God is unknown and unknowable, that no true conception of +Him can be formed in thought; in one word, that he is absolutely +unthinkable. The difficulties of this subject have arisen mainly from +discussing it in terms of pure abstractions, instead of embodying them in +a concrete form. It is impossible in this place to enter on the profound +depths involved in these questions; but a few observations will be +necessary for the purpose of clearing away the difficulties in which our +opponents seek to involve the subject of miracles. I shall confine myself +to our conceptions of the Infinite. + +It is affirmed that no conception of the infinite can be framed in +thought; that it is therefore unthinkable, and transcends the limits of +human knowledge; that it is a negation; and that therefore our reason is +unable to affirm anything respecting it; that the idea of personality is +incompatible with that of infinity; and that therefore when we speak of +God as a person who possesses infinite perfections, we enter on a region +where human thought is invalid, and respecting which all affirmation +involves a contradiction. + +But when we are told that the infinite transcends thought, we are entitled +to demand that we should not be kept playing with an abstraction, and to +ask, what is infinite? In what sense does it transcend thought? Does this +mean that it is absolutely unthinkable; or only partially so; or that our +conception of it is imperfect? Is it simply unknowable, or does it consist +of something which we know, _plus_ something that has not come within the +limits of our knowledge, but which something is of a similar character to +the known? It will be at once seen that the determination of these +questions is at the root of the whole controversy. If then by the infinite +we mean something known _plus_ something unknown, to speak of God as +unknowable and unthinkable is absurd. Our knowledge of Him may not be +full, but yet real so far as it goes. When it is affirmed that God is a +being who exists, but is unthinkable by man, the effect is to place Him +beyond the bounds of human knowledge, and thereby free us from all +necessity of troubling ourselves about Him. We know that He exists in the +profundities of the unknown; and that is all. For the purposes of thought +and of morality, He is thus made of less value than an algebraic _x_. + +When it is affirmed that the infinite is unknowable, I again ask, what +infinite? The infinite as an abstract idea has no real existence; but +something that is infinite. The conception itself is an essentially +quantitative conception, and is only strictly applicable to number and +extension. When I speak therefore of an infinite number, what do I mean? +The only answer possible is, "The greatest number I can conceive, _plus_ +all possible number without limit." Does my adding on the latter factor +invalidate the reality of my conception of the former? Is that which is +added on anything else than number? Surely here I have a valid conception. +The same is true when we speak of the infinity of space. I mean by it the +greatest space I can conceive, _plus_ space without limit. Is the idea of +space rendered unthinkable, because I add the conception of space without +limit? Does it cease to be space? But space is conceivable. It follows +therefore that neither infinite number nor infinite extension is +absolutely unthinkable. We speak of the infinite divisibility of matter. +Does matter, because it goes on to be divided for ever, cease to be +matter? + +In the same manner we speak of God, and call Him infinite. It would be far +more correct to speak of Him as a Being who has infinite attributes. Here, +however, if accuracy of thought is to be preserved, a distinction must be +made. Some attributes of God may be viewed as quantitative; others cannot. +It is to the former only that the term infinite properly applies. A moral +attribute cannot have a quantitative measure applied to it. It is +therefore not infinite, but perfect. + +When we speak of God as a being possessed of infinite power, what do we +mean? The thing intended is, that He is a being who possesses such power +as enabled Him to create the universe, and that He is capable of exerting +every other degree of power which is possible. We may call this, if we +like, power without limit; though there is always one limit to possible +power, viz., that of working contradictions. Of course we are ignorant of +what are the limits of possible power. + +But when we make this addition to our finite conception, we mean by it +power similar to that exhibited in the universe--it and all other power +beyond it. Must such a conception be banished outside the limits of +rational thought? Is the idea of a being who possesses power sufficient to +build the universe, and all possible power besides, unthinkable? Again, we +speak of God as infinitely wise. What do we mean by it? We affirm that He +knows all things actual and possible. The knowledge is none the less +knowledge, because to the knowledge of the actual we add on the knowledge +of the possible. Such a being is certainly not unthinkable. + +Again: God is often spoken of, not only as a being possessing infinite +attributes and perfections, but as the Infinite Being. Here the attempt is +made to entangle us in a puzzle. It is argued: if He be the infinite +Being, there can be no being beyond Him. He must therefore include all +being, both actual and possible. If this be so, He must also include the +finite, otherwise there would be a being which is not included in infinite +being--or in other words, being without limit would not include all being, +which is self-contradictory. Several other self-contradictions may be +easily adduced by reasoning on the same principles. + +I reply that the term "Being" is used here in a sense so intensely +abstract, that we have removed it out of all those conceptions of which +quantity can legitimately be predicated. Of material being we can affirm +that it is quantitative, but of no other. The adding on the word +"infinite," and calling God the infinite Being, is to use words which have +no validity as conceptions. + +But it is also common to speak of God's moral attributes as infinite, such +as His benevolence, holiness, justice and truth. This again is inaccurate, +and its result is to plunge us into hopeless confusion of thought. Such +attributes admit of no quantitative measures. They are perfect, not +infinite. To speak of God's truthfulness as infinite is simply absurd. A +thing is true, or not true. A moral being is truthful or not truthful. +Benevolence may be perfect or imperfect; but it cannot be measured by +number or by line. These conceptions can only mean what we mean by them, +and nothing else, even when applied to God, or we are attempting to pass +off forged notes for genuine ones. The only possible additional idea which +we introduce when thus ascribing them to God, is that in Him they are +perfect, free from the imperfections with which they exist in us. To +affirm that when we say that God is perfectly benevolent, or perfectly +truthful, we introduce into the conception, as applied to Him, a new +factor, beyond the meaning of benevolence and truthfulness as used in +human language, and that this new factor can make the divine benevolence +different from our human conception of it, or can lead God to actions +which man can by no possibility view as benevolent or true; and then to +say that God is benevolent or true, is an abuse of language, or, to use +Mr. Mill's words, an offensive flattery. + +But it has been urged that the moral attributes of God, even if we view +them not as infinite but as perfect, must be beyond the limits of human +thought, and therefore may produce results different in character from the +corresponding principles in man, because they are the attributes of an +infinite being. I have already disposed of this objection. Benevolence, +holiness, and truth cannot be other than benevolence, holiness, and truth, +to whatever being we may attribute them. + +It is therefore no necessary consequence, because we ascribe to God some +attributes which are infinite, and others which are perfect, that God must +therefore be unknowable or unthinkable. We may know much about Him, +without knowing all things. Our not knowing all about things does not +render them either unknowable or unthinkable. Our knowledge may be +imperfect; but as far as it goes it maybe real. If we were to affirm that +we only know that which we know perfectly, or were unable to reason on +imperfect knowledge, mental progress would be brought to a standstill. Nor +is it right to affirm that we are only reasoning in a circle when we +reason from His moral attributes as displayed in the government of the +world in favour of the probability of a revelation; or if because a +revelation which claims to be from God, bears the impress of His +character, we employ this fact as an evidence that it comes from Him. To +affirm that He is unknowable or unthinkable is to proclaim that man has no +concern with God, and that all revelation is impossible; therefore, the +objections urged against the evidence of supernatural religion on these +grounds are untenable. + +But there are the difficulties about the Absolute and the First Cause. It +has been urged that the Absolute is that which is out of relation to every +thing else--perfectly independent in itself. It is argued, therefore, if +God be this Absolute, he cannot be the first Cause, because a cause can +only be a cause by its being in relation to that of which it is the cause. +For similar reasons, if he be the first Cause, He cannot be the Absolute. +But as He is both, He must therefore be unknowable and unthinkable. + +It is impossible in a treatise like this to enter into such profound +metaphysical questions. For my present purpose, I can safely refer to Mr. +Mill's discussion on this subject. As far as the views in question bear +adversely on Christian evidence, he has sufficiently refuted them. It is +not fair for unbelievers to put forth these positions as subversive of +Christianity, without answering the reasonings of so eminent an unbeliever +as Mr. Mill in proof of their inconclusiveness, or even alluding to the +fact that he has pronounced them untenable. + +There is no point which reasoners of this class have laboured more +diligently to prove than that it is impossible for human reason to think +of God as a person. The assumption of the personality of God is the +foundation of the Christian argument, without which, even if the +occurrence of miracles could be proved as objective facts, they would have +no evidential value. It follows, therefore, that if our only mode of +attaining the knowledge of the personality of God be from revelation, we +are arguing in a vicious circle. + +Briefly stated, the argument of unbelief is as follows: God is the +infinite Being. Personality is a conception which necessarily involves the +finite. Therefore it cannot be predicated of an infinite Being. It follows +therefore that to speak of God as infinite, and at the same time as a +person, involves a contradiction. + +It is an unquestionable fact that the only beings whom we are directly +acquainted with as persons are finite beings, _i.e._ men. No less certain +is it that the only beings whom we know to be possessed of wisdom and +intelligence are finite beings, _i.e._ men, and those various classes of +animals by which the latter quality is manifested. The argument is equally +valid for proving that wisdom and intelligence can only belong to finite +beings; and consequently that the existence of wisdom and intelligence in +the first Cause of all things is inconceivable, and the assumption that He +is wise and intelligent is a contradiction. The same argument is no less +valid against ascribing any moral perfection to Him, or in fact any other, +for all our knowledge of such things is both in itself finite, and derived +from finite beings. + +But it even goes further than this. If, as the positive philosophy lays +down, our real knowledge of things is confined to direct subjects of +cognition; as the only beings which we know to be possessed of wisdom and +intelligence are men and animals, it is quite contrary to sound reasoning +to infer that these qualities can be possessed by any other class of +finite beings. To do so is to transfer human conceptions to beings who are +not human. Equally valid would be the reasoning of an animal, if he could +reason on the subject, as for instance a horse or a dog, that the +existence of wisdom and intelligence beyond his own limited sphere was an +unwarrantable assumption. Pantheists have also propounded theories on the +assumption of the existence in nature of an unconscious wisdom and +intelligence. This assumption is open to the most formidable objections; +but even on their own principles it is utterly invalid; for if on the +grounds which they allege it is impossible to ascribe personality to God, +the same reasonings are equally valid against ascribing wisdom and +intelligence to unconscious nature. + +I conclude, therefore, that it by no means follows because our direct +knowledge of personality is confined to human beings, and is derived from +them, that personality itself cannot be conceived of as a property +belonging to any other than human beings. It is absurd to maintain that +the qualities of things must be confined to those things from which we +learn their existence. + +But it will be objected that the very essential notion of personality is +limitation; consequently that although it may be conceived of as belonging +to limited beings, it transcends the power of thought to conceive of it as +the attribute of a being who is unlimited or infinite; that is to say, +that although it lies within the power of thought to conceive of the Being +who had adequate power to build the universe as a Person, because the +power may be a limited power, yet when I ascribe to Him beyond this the +possession of all possible power, the conception of personality becomes +unthinkable. This is the real meaning of the affirmation, unless our +reasonings are to be confined within the region of abstractions. But we +have no assurance that such reasonings are valid, unless we can bring them +to the test of some concrete form of thought. + +Next: It by no means follows because our conception of personality is +derived from finite beings, that it is necessarily limited to them; and +that it cannot be thought of in connection with a being, some of whose +attributes are infinite and others perfect; in other words, that the idea +of finiteness is necessarily involved in that of personality. What are the +conceptions that make up the idea of our own personality? I reply, the +power to affirm "I" of one's own being--the possession of will--the power of +self-consciousness, and these in union with rationality. These conceptions +we undoubtedly derive from the contemplation of our own finite being, but +there is nothing in them which is necessarily limited to the finite. If +the conception of an infinite being is possible (and the fact that it is +so constantly introduced into this controversy proves that it is +possible), then there is no reason why these conceptions, which certainly +contain in them nothing quantitative, should not be applicable to such a +being. The real fact is, these conceptions are not inherently finite, +because they have nothing in them of a quantitative character,--they are +only derived from a being whose manifestation in space we conceive of +under the form of limitation, and whose attributes are neither infinite +nor perfect. + +I must call attention to the remark already made that the correct +representation of God in thought is not that of a pure abstraction, the +infinite Being, but of a being who possesses attributes, some of which are +infinite and others perfect. To affirm that such a being is a person, is +not to attempt to think that which is unthinkable. When we affirm that God +possesses the power adequate to build the universe, and all possible power +beside, we do not ascribe to Him that of which it is impossible to +predicate the possession of will or self-consciousness. When we affirm +that such a being exists now, that he has existed in all past known times, +and that no limits in point of time are conceivable of him, there is +nothing contradictory in ascribing to such a Being personality. It is +quite thinkable that an ultimate particle may never have had a beginning +and never will have an end; no less so is it that such a particle may be +possessed of personality, for it is finite. Surely therefore there is +nothing in the ascription to God of existence without beginning and +without end, which destroys the idea of His personality. + +It has been necessary to enter thus far into this subject, because in +reasoning on the Christian revelation we must assume the existence of a +personal God, unless all such treatises, in addition to their own proper +subject-matter, must likewise contain an elaborate work on the principles +of theism, and a refutation of those of pantheism and atheism. The +defender of Christianity is charged with reasoning in a circle, as though +he first assumed the existence of a personal God, and then derived the +idea of his existence from revelation. This charge would undoubtedly be +true if the idea of God being a person is unthinkable. I am at a loss to +conceive how it becomes one atom more thinkable if communicated by a +revelation. Much obscurity has undoubtedly been thrown on this subject by +Christian writers who have fancied that the more they can invalidate our +reason the greater gain accrues to Revelation. This is not only unwise but +irrational. Our reason doubtless is but an imperfect light, but its +extinction is to leave us to grope in darkness. I affirm therefore that +the assumption of the divine personality as the groundwork of our argument +involves no _petitio principii_, or reasoning in a circle. + +One more remark and I will bring this portion of the subject to a close. +The affirmation made by this philosophy that certain things are +unthinkable is fallacious. What do we mean by "unthinkable"? It may mean +many things; first, that the subject cannot be made in any sense an object +of thought. This, in fact, is the only legitimate use of the word. But in +this sense the affirmation cannot be true of even Mr. Herbert Spencer's +unknown and unknowable God, for it is evident that he does manage to +reason and think about him somehow. It may mean a being respecting whom we +may know much and attain a knowledge continually progressing, but +respecting whom there is much which is unknown. This unknown is called +unthinkable. But it is not unthinkable. It has only not yet become the +subject of our knowledge, and is no more unthinkable than any other +unknown truth. Or that may be pronounced to be unthinkable respecting +which our conceptions are wanting in definiteness and precision. But to +designate such things as unthinkable is an abuse of language. Or that may +be designated as unthinkable of which our conceptions fail fully to +represent the reality. As far as they go, they may be true, but there may +be something beyond of a similar kind, which they do not embrace. This is +the only sense in which it can be affirmed that God is unthinkable, but +the assertion is altogether misleading. The only correct meaning of the +expression is when some particular thing is affirmed to exist and at the +same time contradictions co-exist in it. The actual co-existence of these +two contradictions is unthinkable, but nothing more. Thus the existence of +a round square is unthinkable, so would the affirmation that the divine +power was at the same time both limited and unlimited. But in no other +sense is a conception unthinkable. To affirm that the cause of all things +is unthinkable because our conceptions of Him do not measure the entire +depths of His being is simply misleading. + +I have gone into this question because it is evident that if God is +unthinkable a revelation of Him is impossible, and if a revelation of Him +is impossible, all miracles affirmed to have been wrought in attestation +of one must be delusions. + + + + + +CHAPTER VI. THE OBJECTION THAT MIRACLES ARE CONTRARY TO REASON CONSIDERED. + + +Under this head are included the whole of that class of objections which +extend from the direct assertion of the impossibility of miracles to the +affirmation that even if their possibility is conceded, they are so +extremely improbable that it is a violation of the first principles of our +reason to believe in their actual occurrence. They are alleged to be +violations and contradictions of the laws of nature, and as such to be +incredible, as the stability of its laws is founded on a universal +experience. This unquestionably forms the most formidable difficulty in +the way of the acceptance of miracles, as actual occurrences, at the +present day, and therefore demands a careful consideration. + +The question of the abstract impossibility of miracles need not occupy us +long. Such an affirmation can only be made on the assumption that our +reason is inadequate to affirm the existence of such a being as a personal +God. If this can be established, the whole argument is ended for all +practical purposes. It may be conceded that the occurrence of some +anomalous event as a bare objective fact is quite possible, even on the +principles of pantheism or atheism. But such objective fact would be no +miracle in any sense in which the word can be used in this discussion. If +the evidence was sufficiently strong to attest it as a fact, it would be +explicable on the supposition of some unknown force in nature, or even as +a purely chance occurrence. A miracle, in any sense in which it enters +into the present argument, is not only an abnormal objective fact, but one +which takes place at the bidding of a moral agent. It is the union of +these two which imparts to a miracle any power to attest a revelation. If, +therefore, there is no evidence of the existence of a God, miracles may be +pronounced impossible for all practical purposes in this controversy, and +we need not further discuss the question. + +The whole argument as to whether the occurrence of a miracle is or is not +contrary to reason must proceed on the assumption of the existence of a +personal God. It is also a proposition so clear as to render all proof of +it superfluous, that if a personal God exists who has created the universe +and governs it by His Providence, miracles are possible. + +First, I observe that a miracle cannot be pronounced incredible, on the +ground that it is an effect without an adequate cause. On this point I may +refer to the high authority of Mr. Mill, that the idea of a miracle +contradicts no law of causation. "In order," says he, "that any alleged +fact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be +not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect, +for that would be no uncommon occurrence, but that this happened in the +absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of an alleged +miracle the objection is the very opposite of this. It is that the effect +was defeated, not in the absence, but in consequence, of a counteracting +cause, viz., a direct interposition of an act of will of some being who +has power over nature; and in particular of a being whose will being +assumed to have induced all the causes, with the powers by which they +produce their effects, may well be supposed able to counteract them." +(_Logic_, vol. ii. p. 167.) + +A miracle therefore may not be the result of the action of any force which +falls within the range of our knowledge. It may be necessary for its +performance to neutralize the action of all existing forces by the calling +into energy of more powerful ones. But their operation need not even be +suspended. An adequate force, or power, or cause (it matters not by what +name we call it) is present to effectuate the result; viz. the power which +rules the universe, _i.e._ God. As Mr. Mill justly observes, the only +question which can be raised if the existence of God is assumed, is, not +the want of the presence of an adequate cause, for the supposition pre- +supposes the presence of one, but the want of will on the part of God to +bring about the result. Thus it may be fairly argued that God will not +work a miracle, from the fact that He has not done so in the course of +previous observation. + +It has been frequently affirmed that a miracle is an act which is contrary +to the laws of nature, or a violation of them, or a suspension of them, or +a violation of the order of nature; and that its occurrence is therefore +incredible, as being contrary to reason. A miracle need involve neither of +these. The laws of nature as conceived by physical science are a set of +antecedents followed by a set of invariable consequents. A miracle does +not interfere with this. Its very conception involves a new antecedent +followed by its consequent. The utmost that can be urged is that we have +never before witnessed the presence of that particular antecedent and +consequent, or that the antecedents which we have witnessed have been +followed by totally different consequents. The only mode in which such a +law could be violated would be, if a particular antecedent was present and +no other capable of modifying its action, and it failed to be attended +with its proper consequent. But this is not involved in the conception of +a miracle. + +Let us now suppose that the expression "laws of nature" is extended so as +to comprise the forces of nature as well as its invariable sequences. Such +a use of the term is very common. In this point of view, it is impossible +to affirm that the laws of nature are violated by the performance of a +miracle. This could only be the case if they were made to produce the +opposite results to those which they actually produce. Thus, if a boiler +were filled with water and a fire kindled under it, and no other force was +present capable of neutralizing the action of the fire; if, instead of the +temperature of the water being raised, it gradually froze, there would be +a clear violation of the laws of nature, _i.e._ its forces would cease to +produce their usual results. But there is nothing in the idea of a miracle +that involves this. It postulates the presence of a force or forces which +are adequate to counteract the action of those already in existence, and +to produce the adequate result. + +It will be objected that we have never recognized the existence of such +forces in our previous experience. Such an objection would be valid only +on the assumption that there is no force in the universe besides those +which have been already recognized by us. This, however, science will in +the present state of our knowledge hardly venture to affirm. Besides, it +is contrary to the supposition with which we started, viz. the existence +of a power able to control nature, that is, God. + +Nor is the assertion correct that the performance of a miracle necessarily +involves even a suspension of the laws of nature. This may be the mode of +the divine acting; but it is most important to observe that it by no means +follows that it must be so. A miracle may be performed by the introduction +of a force which has sufficient power to counteract the forces of nature +even while they are in the fullest operation. To take an illustration: It +has been frequently said that the force of gravity must have been +suspended in favour of Peter's body when he walked on the water, and in +favour of that of our Lord when he ascended into heaven. But this is by no +means the case. The mere suspension of the law of gravitation would not in +either case have effected the results in question. The presence of other +forces was necessary. The law of gravitation might have been in the +fullest operation, and the miracle might have been performed by the action +of other forces adequate to neutralize it. The narrative itself implies +that this force was so far from being suspended, that it was in full +operation at the time when the miracle was performed, for the moment the +power which supported Peter's body ceased to act he began to sink. + +But further: even if we assume that any natural forces have been suspended +in the performance of a miracle, we are not called on to assume their +general suspension, but only in favour of the particular case in question. +This observation is rendered necessary because it has been frequently +urged against the possibility of miracles that their performance must have +thrown the whole mechanism of the universe into confusion, and involved an +extensive reconstruction of the processes of nature. This would +unquestionably be the case if the working of a miracle involved the +difficulty in question. But I have shown that it need not involve even the +suspension of any natural law whatever, and if such suspension took place +in any particular case, the force might have been acting with full energy +everywhere else. + +The counteraction or modification of one force by the agency of another is +an event which we witness every day. The force of gravity is in the +fullest operation whenever we lift a weight from the ground--it is not +suspended for a single moment. The ability to modify the results of the +action of one force by the agency of another, or to combine many forces so +as to produce a definite result, constitutes the essence of all mechanical +contrivance. The self-determining power of the human will is that which +calls all these particular modifications of existing forces into activity. +By means of it, the entire aspect of external nature has been changed from +the appearance which it would have presented, if no other agency had +existed besides the forces of nature which belong to matter. Man has been +a power manifested in the midst of them. I am quite aware that he can +create no new force, and that he can only control or modify the action of +those which exist, but is never capable of suspending them. Yet this power +has produced marvellous results on the external world, so that it presents +a wholly different aspect from that which it would have done if the forces +of nature had simply continued acting uncontrolled by the influence of +mind. Even in material nature itself, we meet with repeated instances of +such modifications of the results of one force by the action of another, +as for example when the force of gravitation is counteracted by that of +magnetism, or of capillary attraction. The action of no force is +suspended, it is only modified. + +The assertion therefore is inaccurate which affirms that the performance +of a miracle involves the suspension of a single force in nature. It is +consequently so far no violation of any natural law. All that the idea of +it involves is the presence of a force which is capable in a particular +instance of counteracting the action of those forces which would produce a +contrary result if left to themselves. It is quite unnecessary for us to +determine, in reference to the subject under consideration, whether the +result may be brought about by a combination of forces which energize +within the visible sphere of things, or by bringing into action some +latent force, or one which only occasionally manifests itself, or by the +immediate action of the divine mind, which, having in itself all the +forces necessary to produce the universe, must possess those which are +necessary to effect the miracle. + +It is a fact worthy of observation that in the case of the miracles +recorded in the Bible, the materials out of which the new results were +produced already existed in nature, as in the miracle of the +multiplication of the loaves and fishes. No act of creation was necessary. +All that was required was the presence of a force or forces, able to build +up these materials into the forms in question. God does this in ordinary +course by what we designate natural forces, by means of which corn is +grown and flesh produced. Can it be pretended that no other forces are +under the control of, or exist in God, which are able to produce these +results in a different manner, even while the ordinary forces of nature +continue in activity? + +It has been further urged that a miracle involves a violation of the laws +of nature, because as it cannot be effected by any of the forces of nature +with which we are acquainted, the presence of an unknown force adequate to +produce one must be a violation of the laws of nature. + +I reply that any apparent force which this objection may possess is due to +an ambiguous use of the word "law." It is here used to denote the order of +the various occurrences in nature, and not its antecedents and invariable +consequents. If there are forces in nature beyond those with which we are +acquainted, how can their action be a violation of nature's order? If God +is always present energizing in nature's forces, how can any fresh putting +forth of his energy be a violation of nature's laws? In a certain sense of +the words the order of nature may be said to be violated whenever one of +its forces is modified by the action of another, that is to say, an order +of events results from the modified action different from that which would +have resulted from the unmodified one. In this sense man is daily +violating the order of nature. But this has no bearing whatever on the +question at issue. + +It will perhaps be urged that the resurrection of a dead man, or the cure +of a man born blind by a word is a violation of the laws of nature. +Whether this be so can only be determined when we are acquainted with the +means by which such an event may be brought about. The assertion itself is +a mere general statement that, as far as human observation has gone, dead +men have never returned to life; and that blindness has never been cured +at any person's command. + +But with respect to a resurrection it may be objected that it is an +observed fact amounting to a complete induction, that all men die and that +after death has taken place it is a fact no less universal that with the +exception of a few alleged instances to the contrary no resurrection has +ever taken place. It may therefore be said to be a law of nature that all +men die, and that death is followed by no resurrection. This, however, if +put into other language amounts to the following proposition. That it is a +law of nature that these results must follow, as long as the present +forces which we observe and no others are in energy. But it would cease to +be so as soon as any others capable of producing such a result were +brought into activity. The truth is that death is a phenomenon which is +caused by the joint action of a multitude of natural forces. But if these +were overborne by any force of nature, or by the Author of nature calling +any unknown force into activity, or even by the energy of his own creative +will, it would be absurd to call such an event either a violation of the +laws or of the order of nature, and therefore to affirm that it was +incredible. Death is the result of the action of the natural forces which +we observe around us. No natural force with which we are acquainted can +effect a resurrection. If it be affirmed that in this sense a resurrection +is contrary to the laws and order of nature, the expression is ambiguous +and misleading, for it is intended to be inferred that such a violation +would be contrary to reason and therefore incredible. + +But the affirmation that a miracle is contrary to the order of nature +requires further consideration. What do we intend to affirm when we speak +of an order of nature or of an event being contrary to it? + +In a scientific sense the order of nature can only mean the results of +forces energizing in conformity with invariable law. Every event which +occurs is the result of a combination of such forces and the product of +their joint action. These results necessarily follow an orderly +arrangement; _i.e._ the orderly result always occurs when precisely the +same antecedents and no other are present, and is invariably altered +whenever the antecedents are modified to the precise extent of the +modification. As far then as the results in nature are the effect of known +forces unmodified in their action by other forces, they follow a definite +order. Thus all the motions of the heavenly bodies present themselves to +the scientific mind as the perfection of order, because they are the +results of the action of known forces acting in conformity with invariable +law. Whenever a fact is observed which deviates from the order which these +known forces would produce, the action of another force which has hitherto +been unknown is inferred. The order of nature therefore means that the +same forces always produce the same results. There is nothing inconsistent +with this in the correct conception of a miracle. Viewed as a physical +event only, it would be due to the action of a force which has hitherto +been outside the sphere of our observation. + +It is clear therefore that whenever a fresh combination of forces takes +place, their combined action will modify the result, and a very different +order of events will take place from that which would have resulted from +their unmodified action. Such modification therefore must produce a +different order of nature from that which would have otherwise resulted. +But such modifications frequently take place through the agency of man. It +therefore follows that man has the power of effecting modifications in the +order of nature, without causing any violation of nature's laws. + +But various other influences, and among them those usually designated as +chances, exert a powerful influence in changing the order of nature. It is +necessary that its forces should not only be combined, but combined at the +right time and place, or the effect which is due to their combination will +not take place; _i.e._ a different order of natural events would have +happened. An illustration will make this clear. Let us take the case of a +disintegrating rock; according as the different forces, which act on it, +meet at the suitable time and place, the progress of disintegration is +greatly lengthened or shortened. Such concurrences of events are what we +view as pure contingencies. _E.g._ water penetrates into one of its +fissures; this takes place in summer, and no appreciable result follows. +But if in winter a frost happens immediately afterwards, it will produce +an order of events widely different from that which would have happened if +either no rain had fallen or frost occurred. By their joint agency the +fissure is widened, or the rock split asunder. It follows therefore that +the concurrence of these two forces is necessary at a particular time and +place to produce the particular result. Such concurrences, though due to +natural causes, are what we call fortuitous. Yet their occurrence or non- +occurrence occasions a different order of natural events. + +Further, let us suppose that a bird with a seed in its mouth, in the +course of its flight casually drops it into a fissure in the rock, which +has been opened by the frost; and also that another concurrence of forces +has supplied the conditions suitable for its taking root and growth. This +produces a new series of events, which occasions a more rapid +disintegration, and modifies the whole of the results which follow. If the +casual act of the bird had taken place at any other time or place, the +whole series would have been different, varying with the causes which +produced the seed, and the contingencies which brought the bird to the +spot, and induced it to drop it. Let us now suppose that man with his +rational agency intervenes. He deliberately watches for the prospect of a +frosty night, pours water into the fissures, and plants seeds in fissures +where he knows that suitable material has been prepared for their growth. +Here a new order of events has been introduced, which, originating in +human agency, entirely modify the order of the results. + +It is important to observe that all theories which attempt to account for +the production of living organisms by the principle of development are +compelled at almost every step of the process to postulate the concurrence +of forces of this description at the suitable time and place to render +their production possible. These must have taken place in past time in +numbers passing all comprehension. In the case of many vegetable +structures the result has been entirely modified by the contingency of +some insect choosing to enter one flower and not to enter another; and +according as this takes place a wholly different order of events follows. +Whether we choose to designate such concurrences of events at the suitable +time and place fortuitous or not, the law which regulates them is wholly +unknown, even if they are regulated by law. So far it is impossible to +affirm that these results follow a known and definite order in nature. The +concurrence of two or more such causes introduces a new series, and +occasions a break in the previously existing order of nature. + +Still more completely has this happened when man with his reason and +powers of volition is introduced on the scene. It will doubtless be +objected by our materialistic philosophers, that the forces which energize +in mind act with the same uniformity as those that energize in matter, and +that volition exerts no appreciable influence on the results of our +actions. These theories, however, contradict the experience of an +overwhelming majority of mankind. Such as do so require that the strongest +proof should be given before their truth can be considered as established. +Such proof certainly yet remains to be given. Its advocates, however, tell +us that it will be forthcoming at some future time. In the meanwhile the +fact is sufficient for our purpose that man is capable of acting on nature +and of producing most important changes in the results of the action of +its forces. This being so, it is certain that an order of events takes +place through the interference of man, quite different from that which +would have taken place apart from his interference. But these +interferences take place in conformity with no known law, and their +results occasion a break in the previously existing series of events, by +the introduction of a new one. Man, therefore, is capable of interfering +with and effecting changes in the order of nature. It will be objected +that all the agencies by which such results are brought about are forces +energizing in nature in conformity with invariable law, and consequently +that the order of nature is preserved intact. It is unquestionably true +that the actual forces at work are forces in nature. But there is another +principle at work which interferes with the regular course of their +action, and brings out a series of results quite different to that which +would have been produced if they had not been interfered with. This is +man's reason and intelligent volition. It is impossible to reduce the +action of this to any known law of invariable sequence. It follows +therefore that man is a power either in or out of nature, which is capable +of interfering with the order of the results of its material forces, or, +in the language of those with whom I am reasoning, of violating the order +of nature. + +But it will be further objected that man in his action on nature can only +use or combine such natural forces as come within his knowledge; and this +proves nothing about the possibility of the action of a power outside +nature which is able to employ its known and unknown forces for the +purpose of producing such results as miracles. I answer that this +objection can have no validity unless it is first assumed that man is a +portion of nature in the sense in which we are now speaking of it. But the +proof of this has certainly yet to be given. By the word "nature," as it +is used by this philosophy, is meant the sum total of known material +forces, acting on matter in conformity with invariable laws; that is to +say, of forces which are devoid of intelligence and volition. It is +impossible in this sense of the word to include man in it, until his +entire intellectual and moral being can be shown to be the result of +material forces. Nor even if this could be done, would it avail for the +present argument; for however it may have originated, man's power to +modify the action of material forces is an existing fact, and produces +results quite different in kind from the action of the unintelligent +forces of nature. + +The fact that the mind acts through a material organism, and is incapable +of calling into existence any new force, does not alter the position above +taken. I am quite ready to take either of the following alternatives. Man +is either in nature, or he is outside of it. If he is in it, then a power +exists within it which is capable of compelling its unintelligent forces +to effectuate the determinations of rational volition. If he is outside +nature, then a power exists outside it which is capable of effectuating +these results. It follows, therefore, that in either case a power exists +which is capable of modifying the order of nature. Now it would be absurd +to deny that whatever man can effect, God is able also to effect; and that +He is so much the more able, in proportion as His knowledge is more +perfect. Whether, therefore, God works in nature, or outside it, a power +exists which is capable of varying the order of nature without +interrupting the action of any of its forces, or violating its laws. He +also must have other forces at His command beyond those which are known to +man, and can combine them and thereby modify their action in conformity +with His pleasure. He must also be the primary force everywhere underlying +nature, which imparts to every other force its energy and power. It +follows that He can work a miracle without even suspending any of the +existing forces of nature, and that the allegation that miracles are +contrary to reason, because they are contrary to nature, and a violation +of its laws and order, is disproved. + +I will now proceed to adduce examples of these contradictions to our +reason which are said to be involved in the occurrence of a miracle, for +the purpose of illustrating the confusion arising from the various senses +in which the words "nature" and "natural law," and other similar +expressions have been employed. Although the instances will be taken from +the opponents of Revelation, I by no means wish to imply that they alone +have been guilty of this ambiguous use of language. Its defenders are +equally obnoxious to the charge. + +After quoting a brief passage from Dr. Newman, the author of "Supernatural +Religion" urges the following objections: "Miracles are here described as +'beside, beyond, and above' nature, but a moment's consideration will show +that in so far as these terms have any meaning at all, they are simply +evasions, and not solutions of a difficulty. If the course of nature be +interrupted in any way, whether the interruption be said to proceed from +some cause which is said to be beyond, or beside, or above nature, it is +certain that the interruption is not caused by nature itself; and every +disturbance of the order of nature, call it by whatsoever name we may, is +contrary to nature, whose chief characteristic is invariability of law. It +is clearly unnatural for the ordinary course of nature to be disturbed, +and indeed were this not the case, the disturbance would be no miracle at +all." + +It is by no means my purpose to defend Dr. Newman's use of the +expressions, "natural," "beside nature," "beyond nature," or "above +nature." But while the author criticises Dr. Newman, it is clear that in +this passage he has fallen into a number of very singular confusions of +thought. + +First: The words "nature" and "natural," are used as though they had one +clear, simple, and invariable meaning, whereas in this passage they are +used so as to include phenomena which widely differ from one another. We +are not told what is included under the term "nature," whether it is +restricted to matter, its forces, and its laws, or whether it also +includes mind and all its phenomena. When we speak of interruptions in the +order of nature, we usually intend it to be assumed that volition is the +cause of these interruptions. This being so, the author has included in +nature phenomena which differ so widely from one another as those of mind +and matter. He then speaks of the chief characteristic of nature being +invariability of law. The laws and forces which regulate matter are +distinguished by this invariability. But the action of mind is very +different. All men habitually speak of some portions of it as capricious. +Whether they are so or not, nothing is more certain than that many of our +mental phenomena have not been reduced to the action of known laws. + +When, therefore, such expressions as "beside, beyond, and above nature," +and "natural," are used, I ask what nature is intended? Is it matter, its +forces and laws; or mind, including the principle of volition; or both? If +man is included in nature, then there is a power in nature which is +capable of controlling other portions of nature, and even of acting on +itself. If man is excluded from nature, then there must exist a power +outside nature, which is "beyond and above nature," and is capable of +acting on it. But if by nature is meant the sum total of all the forces +which exist, whether material or immaterial, then it is clear that a power +must exist in nature which is capable of controlling the forces of +material nature, and of compelling them to effectuate its purposes. +Whichever point of view we take of it, the objection falls to the ground. + +But, says the author, "If the course of nature be interrupted in any way, +whether the interruption proceed from a cause beyond, beside, or above +nature, such interruption cannot be caused by nature; and every +disturbance in the order of nature is contrary to nature." This passage +seems to imply that an interruption in the order of nature cannot proceed +from nature itself. But this is certainly incorrect. Natural forces, that +is to say, material ones, modify one another; and by their combined +action, they produce a series of events quite different from what would be +the result of their separate action. Such a new series of events is to all +intents and purposes an interruption of the previous order of nature and +the introduction of a new one. Such results are produced by fortuitous +combinations taking place, in the manner which I have already illustrated, +at the right time and place. The fortuitous combination of forces in +nature is capable of producing a new order "contrary to" the previous +order of nature. + +This, as I have shown, is still more evidently the case if we include the +phenomena of mind in nature. + +But it is affirmed, "if the interruption be due to a cause either beyond, +beside, or above nature, the interruption cannot be caused by nature." +This is of course a self-evident truth. But then it is inferred that such +interruption is a disturbance of the order of nature; and that every +disturbance of its order is contrary to nature. The inference which the +reader is left to draw, and which is directly stated in other parts of the +work, is, that what is contrary to nature is contrary to reason; that a +miracle is thus contrary to nature, and therefore contrary to reason. + +I observe that, although the interruption here referred to cannot be +caused by nature (for it is contrary to the conditions of the case that it +should be), yet it by no means follows that it is a breach of the order of +nature in any other sense than that which I have already discussed. Such +disturbances occur every day. It is, therefore, misleading to designate +them as contrary to nature, as they neither necessarily suspend any +natural force nor violate any natural law. I have already proved that +there is nothing in such disturbances, or, if we persist in so designating +them violations of the order of nature, that is contrary to reason. Such a +use of the terms "course and order of nature" is full of ambiguities and +certain to betray us into fallacious reasonings. + +But, adds the writer, "it is clearly unnatural that the ordinary course of +nature should be disturbed." Here the ambiguity of the expressions used, +and the consequent fallacy of the reasonings, are brought to a +culmination. + +What, I ask, is intended by the ordinary course of nature? Is it the +invariable action of its forces, or the invariable sequences of their +results, or the orderly arrangement of its parts; or does it include mind +and all its phenomena, of the precise nature of the forces, laws and order +of which we are ignorant, and its action on the physical universe? What, +again, is the precise meaning which can be attached to the word +"unnatural" in such a context, where it is evident that its meaning must +vary according as we include in nature one, several, or all of these +phenomena? If by the word "unnatural" the meaning intended to be conveyed +is unusual or impossible, it is then clearly not unnatural that the course +of nature should be interrupted in the manner I have previously pointed +out. Nor if man is included in nature, is it unnatural that the results +produced by its physical forces should be greatly modified by his action? + +The remark of the author in connection with this subject is perfectly +true, that a grain could never of itself, nor according to the law of +natural development, issue in a loaf of bread; but it is wholly aside from +the issue which he raises. It is unquestionable that forces purely +physical could not effect this result; but does it follow from this that +the production of a loaf of bread is an event contrary to nature? The +result can only be produced by the combination and controlling of a number +of material forces by human reason. The grain of wheat must be planted by +man at the proper season. It must be cared for by him. Various physical +forces must contribute to the growth and development of the plant. The +ears produced must be reaped in harvest-time. This process must be +repeated until the grains are sufficient in number to produce our intended +loaf. Then they must be threshed, ground, prepared for the oven, baked. In +one word, the miller and the baker must be invoked to control, combine, +modify and give a new direction to the forces of nature under the +direction of intelligence. All this involves something more than the +action of material forces. The forces of nature carry on the work to a +certain point. Then man takes it up and interrupts their order, although +he does so by compelling other forces to effectuate the purposes of his +will. The ordinary course of material nature is disturbed in the +production of a loaf of bread. A new order of events is introduced. Man is +either within or without nature. In either case a power exists which is +capable of producing innovations in its order. + +But how stands the case of the feeding of five thousand persons on seven +loaves and two fishes? The seven loaves and two fishes had been previously +produced, by the action of material forces out of materials already +existing in the ground, in water, and in the air. Of such materials there +was abundance at hand to produce the requisite amount of food for the +feeding of the multitude. The only question was how to build them up into +the forms of bread and fish. There was no occasion to create one single +particle of matter. As to the nature of the forces employed to work the +miracle the narrative says nothing. Nor does it imply that one of the +ordinary forces of nature was suspended on the occasion. All that it +asserts is the presence of a force adequate to build up the materials +already existing into the forms of bread and fish, that force being God. +In the manufacture of the loaves and in the catching of the fish, man had +interfered with nature's order by the blending of her powers. God +interfered with nature's order at a higher stage by building up the +particular forms of bread and fish out of materials already in existence, +by means of forces differing from those which come under our cognisance. +The act of man is evidence of the presence of a being who is able to +control the forces of external nature for his own purposes. The miracle +would be evidence of the presence of a Being who is able to exert a +mightier influence over them in order to effect his own. + +Equal ambiguity prevails in the use of the term "law." What do we mean by +law when we apply the term to nature? In physical philosophy, the Duke of +Argyll tells us it is used in a great variety of senses. Its proper +meaning is to denote an invariable sequence of phenomena. It is frequently +made to include the conception of the forces at work which produce the +phenomena. This ambiguous use of the word has been a source of endless +confusion. The following quotation will furnish us with an example:-- + +"If in animated beings we have the solitary instance of an efficient cause +acting among the forces of nature and possessing the power of initiation, +this efficient cause produces no disturbance of physical law. Its +existence is as much a recognised part of the infinite variety of form +within the order of nature, as the existence of a crystal or a plant; and +although the character of the force exercised by it may not be clearly +understood, its effects are regulated by the same laws as govern all the +other forces of nature. If the laws of matter are suspended by the laws of +life, each time an animated being moves any part of its body, one physical +law is suspended in precisely the same manner and to an equivalent degree, +each time another physical law is called into action. The law of +gravitation, for instance, is suspended by the law of magnetism each time +a magnet suspends a weight in the air. In each case a law is successfully +resisted precisely to the extent of the force employed.... No exercise of +will can overcome the law of gravitation or any other law to a greater +extent than the actual force exerted, any more than a magnetic current can +do so beyond the action of the battery. Will has no power against +exhaustion. Even Moses in the sublimest moments of faith could not hold up +his arms to heaven after his physical force was consumed." P. 44, vol. i. + +First: it is alleged "that an efficient cause" (man for example) "acting +among the forces of nature, and possessing the power of initiation, +produces no disturbance of physical law." What is here meant by +disturbance of physical law? It is plain that physical forces would work +out a wholly different result apart from the action of man upon them. +Though he suspends no physical force, the action of man has produced an +order of events in nature different from that which would have taken place +without it, but by balancing one against the other he modifies their +action. What is more, he possesses a power of self-determination. Other +forces are unintelligent. Man is an intelligent force capable of +introducing an order of nature quite different from that which the +material forces of nature would have produced without his intervention. + +Next: we are told that the existence of man "is as much a recognised part +of the infinite variety of form within the order of nature as the +existence of a plant or a crystal." I again ask, what nature? Is the order +spoken of that of blind unintelligent forces, or does it include +intelligence and free agency? Unless man is a blind unintelligent force, +although he be supposed to exist within nature, he belongs to an order +wholly different from that of a plant or a crystal. To assert the contrary +is to assume the whole question. The results produced by intelligent +volition differ completely in character from those effected by the +unintelligent forces of nature. The one follows an order of necessity: the +other of freedom. The affirmation that the results of the latter belong to +the same order as those of the former is directly contrary to facts. + +Again: "the laws of matter are suspended by the laws of life." If laws are +the invariable sequences of phenomena how is it possible that one law can +suspend another law? It is not even true that one force can suspend +another force. All that it can do is to neutralize its action. Physical +philosophy is constantly attributing to laws what can only be true of +forces, and even frequently ascribes to them what is only true of +intelligent forces. It must never be overlooked in this controversy that +the laws of nature can effectuate nothing. Forces, not laws, produce +results. The following sentence will be a correct expression of a truth, +if we substitute "force" for "law:" "The law of gravitation is overcome by +the law of magnetism each time a magnet suspends a weight in the air." +Immediately after, we are told that the arm falls in obedience to law. It +falls by the force of gravitation. When theologians use metaphors of this +description they are charged with anthropomorphism. Such a charge is +equally valid against the language in which physical philosophy expresses +itself. + +Again: The author affirms "that the solitary instance of an efficient +cause, if it be distinguished from the other forces of nature by the +possession of an initiatory impulse, is from the moment when that power is +exerted subject to physical laws like all other forces; and there is no +instance producible, or even logically conceivable, of any power whose +effects are opposed to the ultimate ruling of the laws of nature. The +occurrence of anything opposed to these laws is incredible." p. 48. + +What is meant, I ask, by "the intimate ruling of the laws of nature"? Even +if we substitute forces for laws, the meaning is sufficiently obscure. +Probably the expression is intended to mean the combined result effected +by the energy of all the forces in nature. If these include all mental as +well as all material forces, then the assertion is a simple truism, that +nothing can be contrary to itself. But if they exclude mental force, then +the results which they produce are clearly opposed to the ultimate ruling +of the forces of unintelligent nature. Numerous instances are not only +logically conceivable, but actually producible. The occurrence, therefore, +of anything opposed to the ultimate rulings of these unintelligent +physical forces is not incredible. It is perfectly true that man can only +produce results through the agency of these physical forces; but he can +modify their results, and so use them as to make them the means of +effectuating his purposes. It is quite true that nothing can occur opposed +to the forces of nature; that is to say, that, while the force of +gravitation is in energy, and no other force is present capable of +overcoming its power, the ascension of a human body into heaven is +impossible. But who has ever affirmed that it was possible? Those who +affirm that an ascension has taken place, also assert that another force +was in active energy, which was capable of counteracting the force of +gravitation. This assertion, therefore, is totally irrelevant to the point +at issue. + +The consideration of the next question before us may very properly be +introduced, by quoting the following passage of the same author: + +"Our highest attainable conception of infinite power and wisdom is based +on the universality and invariability of law, and inexorably excludes as +unworthy and anthropomorphistic any idea of its fitful suspension." + +This at once raises the very important question, whether there is anything +in the performance of a miracle inconsistent with the divine character and +perfections. It has been often alleged by those who deny the possibility +of miracles, that God energizes in the universe in conformity with +invariable laws, which express the uniform mode of the divine working. +From these, as the result of his wisdom, He will never deviate. To alter +or vary from this mode of acting implies that the machinery of the +universe, through which He acts, is imperfect. The supposition that He has +worked a miracle therefore involves the assumption that He has ceased from +one mode of action and adopted another; or, in other words, that the +forces of the universe fail to effectuate his purposes; or that the whole +machine has got out of order and requires rectification. Any action of +this kind in the case of a Being possessed of all power, is a reflection +both on his wisdom and his immutability. Still further: it is affirmed by +some that the love of order is an attribute so inherent in Deity, that it +is inconceivable that any alteration in the existing order of the universe +should take place under his government. + +One objection raised in the above quotation I may dismiss summarily, viz. +the idea that God interposes with any fitful interventions in the +universe. The idea of fitful intervention is quite foreign to the +conception of a miracle, which is described in the New Testament as one of +the means by which he realizes his deliberate purposes. I shall elsewhere +disprove the allegation that Revelation is an intervention of the Creator +to rectify a miscarriage in his creative work. + +It will also be desirable in this place to answer the charge of +anthropomorphism so frequently urged against the defenders of +Christianity. When they speak of God as a person, they are charged with +manufacturing a gigantic man. When they ascribe to Him a moral character, +or describe Him as acting in nature, they are then accused of making a God +out of a number of conceptions which are purely human. This fault, if it +be one, must be shared alike by philosophers, men of science, and +theologians. The plain fact is, that man has no conceptions but human +ones. To abandon these is to cease to think altogether. When philosophers +and men of science speak of nature, they are obliged to apply to it +conceptions which are strictly true only of man. We are obliged to do +precisely the same with respect to God. So far all thought, the most +elevated and the most ordinary, is anthropomorphic. The term can be fairly +used as a reproach only when certain material conceptions or degraded +passions are directly affirmed to exist in the divine mind. + +The author, in the following passage, places the objection before us in a +still more striking light: "Being therefore limited to reason for our +feeble conceptions of the divine Being of which we are capable, and reason +being totally opposed to an order of nature so imperfect as to require or +permit repeated interference, and rejecting the supposition of arbitrary +suspension of law, such a conception of the Deity as is proposed by +theologians must be pronounced irrational, and derogatory to the wisdom +and perfection which we recognize in the invariable order of nature. It is +impossible for us to conceive the supreme Being acting otherwise than we +actually see in nature; and if we recognize in the universe the operation +of his infinite wisdom and power, it is in the immutable order and +regularity of all phenomena, and the eternal prevalence of law that we see +their highest manifestation." + +It is asserted by this writer and a great number of others, that the most +perfect conception of the universe is that of a machine, which when once +set into action shall go on eternally grinding out its results without the +smallest occasion for the intervention of its Maker. According to this +view, all the He has to do for the future after the machine is once set +into operation, is to retire from the scene of His creative work, and to +contemplate the results of its wonderful operations. Any intervention on +His part would imply a defect in the construction of the machine. It +follows therefore that the most perfect conception of God (if there be +one) is that of a perfect mechanist and chemist, who has originally formed +matter with its properties and forces acting in conformity with invariable +law, and that this has been done by Him with such perfection, that they +have gone on ever since evolving whatever has existed, without the need of +His intervention or supervision; or to put it in other words, after the +original act of creation, His presence in the universe may be dispensed +with as unnecessary. The universe is therefore a self-acting machine which +goes on in an eternal series of self-evolutions. + +Such a conception may be the most worthy one that we can form of a perfect +mechanist or chemist, though it may be doubtful how far the idea of having +his services dispensed with for the future would be wholly satisfactory to +him. It is far from clear, however, that it is the most perfect conception +we can form of God. The creations of the mechanist and of the chemist are +destitute alike of feeling, reason and volition, a moral nature, +conscience, and spiritual affections. They may therefore when completed be +left to themselves; and the more perfect the irrational machine may be, +the more perfectly it will grind out its results. But many of the +constructions of God possess attributes, which exhibit other qualities in +their maker than those of a perfect mechanist or chemist. It follows, +therefore, that this is not the most perfect nor the most worthy +conception which we can form of God. + +But it will be objected that even if we concede that the Creator is ever +present energizing in the works of nature, and even if the forces of +nature are viewed as the expressions of His energy, His action in +conformity with unchanging order is the worthiest conception of Him, and +to assert that He ever has varied from this mode of action is to degrade +Him. Such being the case, to affirm that miracles have been wrought by +Him, is to introduce a degraded view of the character of God, one alike +inconsistent with His wisdom, immutability and power. + +I reply: that the objection overlooks the existence of purpose in the +divine mind, and that it may not be confined to the realization of a +mechanical result. The purpose or idea of creation in God includes the +production of both the material and the moral worlds. If this be so, one +harmonious purpose, including the divine manifestations, both in the +material and moral universe, may be carried out by a succession of +progressive manifestations, each forming a portion of one great divine +plan. A miracle, therefore, as a part of such a moral intervention, would +be no interruption of the orderly action of the divine mind, but a portion +of it. + +But further: if God exists, He must have other attributes besides those of +a mechanist or a chemist. He has created not only the material universe, +but a moral one. God, therefore, must be a moral being, and a person, for +moral attributes can only be conceived of as belonging to a being who is +possessed of personality. It follows, therefore, that manifestations of +Himself, under aspects suitable to moral beings, are as much to be +expected as manifestations of His power or of His wisdom addressed to an +intellectual nature. The supposition, therefore, that all His +manifestations can only be made through the laws of material nature, and +in an unchanging series, and that it is not a portion of His purpose to +manifest Himself as a moral being, is only valid on the denial that He is +one. It involves the absurdity of denying to God that freedom from the +trammels of necessary law which as matter of fact He has bestowed on man. + +If therefore God be a moral being and not an impersonal force, it is +perfectly consistent with the highest conceptions of Him, that He should +manifest Himself in the moral as well as in the material universe. This is +the more necessary, because philosophy is never wearied with telling us, +that we can know little or nothing of His moral attributes from material +nature. As a part of such manifestation a miracle is addressed to our +highest reason. + +It is absurd to argue on the assumption that there is a God, and then to +found our reasonings on principles which are inconsistent with it. If +there is a God, He must be the creator of the universe. It must, +therefore, have been consistent with His perfection and immutability to +create. It follows, therefore, even on the assumption of the truth of the +Darwinian theory of creation, that a new order must have been introduced, +when God first breathed life into the lowest forms of matter. But if He +introduced a new order then, that is to say, when He first deviated from +the previous order of His existence, and performed His first creative act, +how can it possibly be contrary to reason to affirm that He has repeated +it. A miracle would be such a repetition, or, in other words, the +introduction of a new series of events. + +I fully admit that reason is opposed to the supposition of such an order +of nature as to require repeated interferences with it, assuming that what +is intended is a frequent meddling with it to set it right, not constant +presence and superintendence. Still more is it opposed to the idea of +arbitrary interruption of law. The entire validity of these reasonings +which we have been considering proceeds on the assumption that the +argument requires this. I care not what some Christian apologists may have +said on this subject. The New Testament affirms in the most unequivocal +language that revelation is the steady carrying out of a pre-determined +purpose in God to make a manifestation of Himself not only to man, but to +other rational beings besides man. The objection therefore falls to the +ground. + +The assertion that it is impossible to conceive of the supreme Being +acting otherwise than we see him act in nature, may be met by a direct +denial. On the contrary the presence of evil, moral and physical, forms +the greatest difficulty connected with the belief in theism. The elder +Mill was so capable of conceiving that if a supreme Being existed, the +order of the universe would have been so wholly different from its present +order, that it led him to affirm that the proof of His existence was +altogether wanting.(3) But intelligent Christians fully recognize in the +immutable order and regularity of the universe and the eternal prevalence +of law, the operation of His infinite wisdom and power. Unless there was +such a general regularity and order in the universe, the evidential force +of miracles would be deprived of all value. + +It follows therefore, whichever views we may take of the mode in which a +miracle may be performed, that there is nothing in the idea of it which is +contrary to our reason. Whenever it is affirmed to be so, the assertion +originates in an ambiguity in the use of terms, or in partial views of +nature, or of the mode of the divine working, or from confounding under a +common name phenomena so different in character as those of mind and +matter, or by making assumptions respecting the divine operations which +contradict the laws of the universe, or respecting the divine character, +which reason refuses to endorse. How far the known or unknown forces of +nature may be employed in the performance of a miracle is an abstract +question that we have no means of determining. The agency of some of the +known forces of nature is unequivocally asserted in the Old Testament to +have been the media employed in the performance of some of its miracles. +No such affirmation is made in the New Testament. Still there is not one +word to imply that any of the forces of material nature were for a single +moment suspended in their action. The only assertion made is the presence +and active energy of a force capable of producing them. That force is the +Creator of the universe bearing witness to the divine mission of Jesus +Christ. "The Father himself, which hath sent me, hath borne witness of +me." "The works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works +that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me." (John v. 36, +37.) + + + + + +CHAPTER VII. THE ALLEGATION THAT NO TESTIMONY CAN PROVE THE TRUTH OF A +SUPERNATURAL EVENT. + + +Hume's position, which affirmed that it is impossible to prove the truth +of a supernatural event by any amount of testimony however strong, is +certainly one of the most plausible that have ever been assumed by +unbelief. Stated briefly and in his own words, it is as follows: "A +miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and +unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a +miracle from the nature of the fact is as entire as any argument from +experience can possibly be imagined." Again: "No testimony is sufficient +to establish a miracle unless the testimony is of such a kind that its +falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to +establish." The fallacy of these positions, notwithstanding the plausible +arguments by which they are supported, has already been pointed out by a +multitude of writers. Mr. Mill himself has practically abandoned Hume's +argument as either a harmless truism, or, in another point of view, one +that requires to be modified to such an extent as to deprive it of any +real cogency. Under ordinary circumstances, therefore, it might be passed +over in silence. + +But the author of "Supernatural Religion" has endeavoured to rehabilitate +it even against Mr. Mill. He affirms that Christian "Apologists find it +much more convenient to evade the simple but effective arguments of Hume, +than to answer them; and where it is possible, they dismiss them with a +sneer, and hasten on to less dangerous ground." He then endeavours to show +that Mr. Mill has been partly misapprehended, and is partly inaccurate; +and he proceeds to address himself to Paley's argument against Hume, as +though it was relied on by modern apologists as entirely conclusive. No +other writer is even noticed by him. In the recent work of the late Mr. +Warington, "Can I believe in miracles?" one chapter is devoted to the calm +and dispassionate examination of Hume's argument. It is perhaps the ablest +dissection of it in existence. Yet this writer, who charges Christian +apologists with evasion, and even with getting rid of its force by a +sneer, has left Mr. Warington's crushing reply to Hume completely +unnoticed. The position taken by him renders a few general observations +necessary. As it will be useless to repeat arguments that have been fully +elaborated elsewhere, I shall content myself with briefly stating the +positions which have been firmly established on this subject. + +First: Experience consists of two kinds; 1st, That which has fallen under +our own direct cognizance, which from the nature of the case must have +been very limited. 2dly, The general experience of all other men, as far +as we have the means of knowing it. This latter experience we become +acquainted with exclusively by testimony, and it rests entirely on its +validity. The two together constitute what we mean when we say that a +thing is, or is not, contrary to experience. + +Secondly: There is a sense in which miracles are contrary to our +experience. They would be destitute of all evidential value, if they were +not so. But while this is freely admitted, we must lay down clearly in +what sense we use the words. They are not so, in the sense that we have +had direct evidence of their non-occurrence. They are contrary to our +experience only in the sense that we have never witnessed them, and that +the order of events which we have witnessed is always different; for +instance, we have witnessed as a matter of experience that men die, and +that none return again to life; or that blind men, when cured, are never +cured by a word or a touch. In this sense alone it is that the +resurrection of a dead man, and the cure of a blind man by a touch, is +contrary to our experience. + +Thirdly: It is not true that an occurrence which in this sense is contrary +to our experience cannot be believed on adequate testimony. If it were so, +all additions to our knowledge that lie beyond the limits of our past +experience, ought to be rejected. Every extraordinary occurrence must be +at once pronounced incredible. + +Fourthly: The experience of one age differs from that of another. That +which lies outside the experience of one century becomes within the +experience of the next. The truth is that the sum of human experience is +receiving continual additions, in proportion as the sphere of observation +enlarges. If it is true that we ought to reject everything contrary to +experience, it follows that if many of the inventions of the present age +had been reported in a previous one, they ought to have been rejected as +incredible. For example: if a century ago it had been affirmed that a +message had actually been conveyed one thousand miles in five minutes, the +assertion ought on this principle to have been rejected as contrary to the +universal experience of mankind. In an earlier age, no miracle could have +been more difficult to believe. Yet although contrary to prior experience, +it has been established as a fact. The principle, therefore, as laid down +by Hume, leads to an absurd conclusion. + +Fifthly: The experience of each individual is limited by his own +observation and what he has learned respecting that of others. This +constitutes as far as he is concerned the experience of mankind. Now, +under the Equator the experience of man is that each day and night is +twelve hours long. Neither he, nor his ancestors, nor any person whom he +trusts, have ever had any other experience than this. To him, therefore, +the affirmation that there is a place on the earth where each day and +night is six months long, is contrary to experience, and ought to be +rejected as a fable. + +Sixthly: If we confine experience to scientific experience, extraordinary +discoveries are made and facts established in one age which are contrary +to that of a former one. On this principle, the ground on which Herodotus +rejected the story of the Phoenician navigators that they had sailed round +Africa was satisfactory. It was contrary to his experience that they +should have seen the sun in the position in which they affirmed that they +had seen it, though it is not contrary to ours. + +Seventhly: Miracles viewed as mere _phenomena_ stand on exactly the same +ground as very unusual occurrences, or very wonderful discoveries. As far +as they are contrary to past experience, they are alike credible or +incredible. They are events of which the cause is unknown, but may or may +not hereafter be discovered. It is quite true that any extraordinary +phenomenon requires a stronger testimony to render it credible than an +ordinary occurrence. But this involves no question of abstract possibility +or impossibility, but is one purely of evidence, each case having to be +decided on its own merits. It must be carefully observed that when we +affirm that this or that matter lies within human knowledge, or is +contrary to it, experience has to do with phenomena alone. All questions +of causation lie entirely beyond its cognizance. + +Eighthly: The moment we view an event otherwise than as a mere phenomenon, +and take into consideration the causes producing it, however unusual it +may be, it is impossible to affirm that it is contrary to experience. When +we take these into consideration the entire character of the event is at +once changed, and the probability of the occurrence must be estimated on +wholly different grounds. Under such circumstances, an extremely +improbable event, which we might otherwise justly reject as contrary to +experience, becomes simply one of which we have had no experience. Thus it +is contrary to experience that men can live for one hour under water, but +when we take into consideration and thoroughly understand the contrivance +of the diving-bell, the event becomes one of a different order from that +of which we supposed that we had experience. Before this apparatus was +invented, the assertion that men could live an hour under water would have +been rejected as fabulous. The invention has introduced a fresh condition +into the case. The event has now become a portion of our experience; but +prior to the discovery of the apparatus it was merely an event lying +outside our experience, and not to be rejected as being contrary to it. In +a similar way, a miracle, as a mere phenomenon, may be said to be contrary +to our experience; but the moment that we take into account its true +character, viz. that its very conception implies the presence of a force +of some kind with which we were previously unacquainted, then such an +event is no longer one which we can pronounce contrary to our experience, +but merely one which lies beyond or outside it. In the case of miracles, +therefore, the position of Hume is inapplicable. + +Ninthly: It is not true that in estimating the truth of testimony, we +simply balance probability, against probability, as stated in Hume's +argument. The form in which it has been put by him is too abstract to +admit of application to individual cases; nor does any man, in estimating +the truth of testimony for practical purposes, set down and deliberately +balance probabilities against probabilities. The whole process is of a far +more instantaneous character, and a number of minute considerations are +involved, which do not admit of statement in the form of general +propositions. Thus, if an event lying outside my present experience is +reported to me by a friend on whose veracity and powers of judgment I have +implicit reliance, I accept the truth of his statement, notwithstanding a +great degree of abstract improbability; it being assumed that the event +was one in which it was impossible that he should be deceived. In +estimating this latter point, we never balance the probabilities as to the +truth or falsehood of human testimony, but we consider the individual +circumstances of the case, whether they are of such a nature that our +friend could be deceived about them. If on consideration we are convinced +that deception was impossible, we yield assent to his known veracity, +although, as far as we know, the event reported by him has never before +come within the range of human experience. + +Let me remove the question from an abstract into a concrete form. There +are numberless events in which it happens that men of unquestionable +judgment and veracity are deceived. There are others in which no deception +can be possible. An instance of one class is the alleged case of persons +living a considerable time without food. Here astuteness may impose on the +vigilance of the most wary. Take, on the other hand, the case of a man +born blind. One informant, on whose veracity we have the fullest reliance, +tells us that he has known the man from his birth; that, up to a certain +day, his blindness was established beyond all reasonable doubt to every +one who knew him, that on that day, he saw a person touch the eyes of the +blind man, who not only instantly received his sight, but could use his +eyes as perfectly as those who had enjoyed the use of them from birth. I +admit that this case is a supposed one, and does not exactly represent any +case recorded in the Gospels. But though an assumed one, it is perfectly +valid for the purposes of argument. In it deception would be impossible. +If all this was affirmed to have come under the direct knowledge of one, +of whose veracity and judgment we were assured, we should accept his +statement as true, without balancing the abstract probability of the truth +of evidence against the probability of its falsity, although the event +narrated lay outside the range of our experience. Our knowledge of the +judgment and veracity of the informant is the essential element in judging +of the truth of evidence. It is only when our means of forming this +judgment are deficient that we attempt to balance abstract probabilities. + +Tenthly: The question of the truth of testimony as against past experience +and the alleged greater probability that testimony should be false, than +that past experience should be unreliable, is greatly modified by the +consideration that an overwhelming amount of the sum total of past +experience rests for its acceptance on the validity of testimony itself. +That portion which is not the result of our own individual experience +rests for its truth exclusively on the validity of human testimony, and +must be unreliable in proportion as testimony is invalid. It must be +observed, however, that I by no means deny that testimony is much more +frequently invalid in its narrations of extraordinary events than of +ordinary ones. + +Eleventhly: While it is freely conceded that the evidence to prove the +truth of a very extraordinary occurrence must be far stronger than that +which is required to prove an ordinary one, it must never be forgotten +that the amount of evidence necessary to prove any particular fact always +varies with the amount of the antecedent probability of its occurrence. +The very same action may be credible or otherwise, just in proportion as +we can discern an adequate purpose for its performance, or infer the +presence of a particular motive. If, for example, it were reported that a +man of the highest character had been seen during the hours of early +morning issuing from one of the lowest haunts of vice in London, those who +knew him well would require an overwhelming amount of evidence to +establish the truth of the assertion. They would undoubtedly fall back on +the question of abstract probability, and argue that it was more likely +that it was either a case of mistaken identity (a very common error), or a +deliberate falsehood, than that the statement should be true. But, if, on +the contrary, it could be shown that he had been sent for to visit a dying +person, and had gone at his particular request, the whole of the +antecedent improbability would vanish, and the otherwise incredible +testimony would become perfectly credible. It follows, therefore, that the +credibility of testimony varies with our knowledge of the motive for the +performance of the action. + +This consideration ought to have due weight in considering the evidence of +miracles. Viewed as mere phenomena, their abstract improbability is great. +When they are viewed as deviations from the ordinary course of nature, +their improbability becomes still greater. But those who believe in the +existence of a personal God energizing in the universe at every moment, +and in every place, postulate the presence of a force fully adequate to +work them, for this is involved in the idea of God. But the question +arises, Will He? Until a well-attested miracle has actually been +performed, the antecedent probability derived from our experience of the +order of nature is against the supposition that He will, and throws on the +reporter the necessity of giving a stronger proof than we require for an +ordinary fact. But in proportion as we can show that it is probable that +God will make a revelation, the antecedent improbability of a miracle is +diminished; and if it can be shown that it is very probable that He will +do so, it wholly disappears. + +It will be readily admitted that such an argument can only have weight +with a believer in the existence of a God, who is the moral Governor of +the Universe. To him, however, it is of the utmost value, for on the +supposition in question, the probability of some higher manifestation of +the divine character than that displayed in the material universe does not +rest on theory, but on the facts of man and his condition. Looking at the +past history of the world, it is matter of fact that God has made higher +and higher manifestations of himself. So far it is antecedently probable +that He will continue to do so. His last manifestation has been in the +production of a being possessed of a moral nature, with powers capable of +immense elevation. It is also no theory, but a fact, that this moral being +now is, and ever has been within the historical periods in a state of +great imperfection. It is therefore highly probable that the Creator will +adopt means for elevating the moral being whom He has created, and that He +will effect this by acting, not on matter, but on mind. Contemplating the +actual state of man, the known law of the Creator's previous action, and +the moral character of God, the antecedent probability that God will make +a further manifestation of himself is established quite independently of +the facts or assertions in the Bible. + +Twelfthly: Whatever be the supposed antecedent improbability of an +occurrence, it is capable of being overcome by an amount of evidence which +can leave no reasonable doubt in a mind endowed with common sense. +Theoretical objections may be adduced against any evidence which can be +brought in proof of particular facts, but the ultimate appeal must be, not +to a multitude of abstract theories, but to the common sense of mankind. +Of this character is all historical evidence. It rests on the same +principles as those which guide us in the affairs of daily life. There is +a certain amount of evidence which leaves no doubt on the common sense of +mankind, although it may be open to many theoretical objections. Such +evidence is capable of proving a fact against a very high degree of +antecedent improbability. Mr. Mill may be considered as a witness whose +predilections were all in favour of unbelief. Yet his clear logical mind +has led him to state the case fairly as far as the _à priori_ probability +or improbability of miracles is concerned. His conclusions are adverse to +the position assumed by the author of "Supernatural Religion." I will +briefly state the most important of Mr. Mill's positions. + +First. He points out that a miracle involves nothing contradictory to any +law of causation. He well remarks that to prove such a contradiction, it +is not only necessary that the cause should exist without producing the +effect, but that no contravening cause should be present. But the very +idea of a miracle presupposes an adequate contravening cause, _i.e._ God. +The possibility of a miracle therefore cannot be denied on the ground that +it does not presuppose the presence of a force adequate to produce it. Mr. +Mill states, "Of the adequacy of that cause, if present, there can be no +doubt, and the only antecedent improbability that can be objected to a +miracle, is the improbability that any such cause existed," that is to +say, the whole controversy resolves itself into the question between +Pantheism and Atheism on the one hand, and Theism on the other. + +Secondly. He observes: "All therefore that Hume has made out, and this he +must be considered to have made out, is, that (at least in the imperfect +state of our knowledge of natural agencies, which leaves it always +possible that some of the physical antecedents may have been hidden from +us) no evidence can prove a miracle to any one who did not previously +believe in the existence of a being or beings with supernatural power, or +who believes himself to have full proof that the character of the being +whom he recognises is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere +on the occasion in question. If we do not already believe in supernatural +agencies, no miracle can prove to us their existence. The miracle itself, +considered as an extraordinary fact, may be satisfactorily certified by +our senses, or by testimony; but nothing can ever prove that it is a +miracle: there is still another possible hypothesis, that of its being the +result of some unknown cause; and this possibility cannot be so completely +shut out, as to leave no alternative but that of admitting the existence +of a being superior to nature. Those, however, who already believe in such +a being have two hypotheses to choose from, a supernatural and an unknown +natural agency; and they have to judge which of the two is the most +probable in this particular case." + +It is impossible to deny that this is a correct statement of the question. +Hume's position is a generalized statement, that no evidence can establish +the reality of a miracle, on the ground that our experience of the +uniformity of nature's laws is so firm and unalterable, that no amount of +testimony can establish a fact in opposition to it; or as he elsewhere +puts it, "unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would +be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish." He +affirms this to be equally true on the principles of Atheism, Pantheism, +or Theism, for the only thing that he takes into account is the inadequacy +of the testimony, and not the inadequacy of the cause. Mr. Mill therefore +says correctly that all that this argument avails to prove is, that it is +impossible to prove a miracle, except to persons who are already convinced +that a being or beings exist who are possessed of supernatural powers, and +that it is in conformity with their character to work one. If this is the +only intelligible meaning of Hume's position (and it is evident that it +is), it reduces his argument against miracles to a very harmless one. The +conception of a miracle as distinct from an unusual phenomenon implies +purpose. Purpose is only conceivable of a being possessed of personality +and will. To those therefore who either deny the existence of any such +being higher than man, or who affirm that we have no evidence of his +existence, it is impossible to prove a miracle _as a miracle_. The utmost +that could be done would be to prove that an event had taken place in +nature which in the present state of our knowledge could be assigned to no +known cause. In such a case the Pantheist and the Atheist have always the +alternative of believing that the event in question must be due to the +operation of some unknown force in nature, but which in the gradual +development of knowledge we may hereafter be able to detect. This is a +position that no defender of revelation worthy of the name can be anxious +to dispute. Let it further be observed that Mr. Mill does not deny, but +affirms, that the occurrence of an extraordinary event analogous to a +miracle viewed simply as a phenomenon, may be satisfactorily certified by +our senses or by testimony. To affirm the contrary would be simply absurd, +as involving the stereotyping of human thought, and making the wisdom of +our ancestors the only standard of truth. There was a time when the earth +was believed to be an extended plain. If at that time any one had asserted +that by continually sailing westward he had at last arrived at the place +from which he started, or, in other words, had circumnavigated the globe, +this affirmation ought to have been rejected, not only as founded on +testimony contrary to all previous experience, but as intrinsically +impossible. Yet if Hume's dictum has any value as an argument against the +possibility of a miracle, it must affirm the impossibility of establishing +such an occurrence by any amount of evidence whatever. Mr. Mill's mind was +far too logical not to perceive that such a position is altogether +untenable. + +Mr. Mill, however, affirms that there is one ground on which the argument +might be tenable against a theist, not because the evidence is +insufficient to prove the occurrence of an extraordinary fact, as a mere +phenomenon, but because it could not prove it to be a miracle. It is not +only necessary, says he, in order to render this proof valid, that one +should believe in the existence of a supernatural being who is able to +bring about the occurrence, but also that "the character of this Being is +not inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in +question." Thus a man may be a believer in the existence of God, and yet +be persuaded that it was not consistent with his character to interfere +with the course of natural phenomena at all, or in such a manner as the +conception of a miracle pre-supposes. To such a theist the utmost that +evidence could prove would be, that the extraordinary event had been +brought about by the action of an unknown force. Again, the same principle +acts, and acts reasonably, on the minds of multitudes of intelligent +Christians, who summarily reject a certain class of reported miracles +without inquiring into their evidence, on the ground that the working of +such miracles is inconsistent with their conceptions of the divine +character; that is to say, they think it more probable that the stories +should be untrue, than that God should work in the way in question. But to +give this argument any validity against the miracles wrought in +attestation of Christianity, it must be proved that it is inconsistent +with the divine character to make a revelation, or to introduce a +deviation from what is to us the ordinary mode of His working; or that the +miracles recorded in the Gospels are repugnant to the character of God. + +Mr. Mill's general position is therefore incontrovertible, that those who +believe in the existence of God "have two hypotheses to choose from, viz. +a supernatural, or an unknown natural agency;" and that they must judge +which of these two is the more probable; and that, in forming their +judgment, a most important consideration must be the character of God, and +the conformity of the supposed event to that character. This position +every intelligent Christian will readily accept. + +Mr. Mill adds: "But with the knowledge which we now possess of the general +uniformity of the course of nature, religion, following in the wake of +science, has been compelled to acknowledge the government of the universe, +as being on the whole carried on by general laws, and not by special +interpositions. To whosoever holds this belief, there is a general +presumption against any supposition of divine agency, not operating +through general laws; or, in other words, there is an antecedent +improbability in every miracle, which in order to outweigh it, requires an +extraordinary strength of antecedent probability derived from the special +circumstances of the case." These observations require consideration. + +There is no doubt that the polytheistic religions postulated the existence +of a vast number of superhuman beings by whose agency and caprice many +natural occurrences were brought about. Such a belief indicates a very +imperfect conception of "order" in nature. But these supposed +interferences with it would by no means realize the notion of what we now +designate a miracle, the very idea of which implies an order in nature to +which the miracle forms an exception. If there is no order in nature, +there can be no miracle. + +The Hebrew monotheism involved conceptions directly opposite to this. It +viewed the action of God as the foundation of all the forces in nature. +Whilst above and outside nature, He was everywhere present in nature. Its +forces were the expressions of the energy of His will. Its order (for the +Hebrew recognised a high order in nature) was the result of His good +pleasure, and due to His constant working. In the Old Testament the +commonest events in nature are no less ascribed to God than those which we +designate miraculous. A Hebrew never conceived of a miracle as a deviation +from the divine order, but as a consistent carrying out of a divine +purpose in the government of the world. A modern conception of theism +differs from this in supposing that there are certain forces in material +nature which, when once called into action, go on energizing without any +direct intervention of God. But when this conception comes to be minutely +analysed, if we believe in a God, it is impossible to conceive of force, +at least in its ultimate form, except as a direct expression of the divine +energy. + +Science has so far modified religious thought on this subject, that while +it still continues to hold that the various forces in nature are modes of +the divine acting, it nevertheless believes that God does not deviate from +his predetermined course for the purpose of meeting what we are pleased to +call special contingencies. The divine action is, in fact, not altered to +meet man's convenience, and His government is carried on as far as it lies +within our cognisance by the general forces of nature. God acts in nature +in conformity with a definite law, and from that He will not deviate, +whatever consequences man's ignorance or disregard of his mode of action +may bring upon him. Mr. Mill observes that to any person holding this +belief, there is a general presumption against any supposition of divine +agency, not operating through general laws. That is to say, we have had a +constant experience of his acting through general laws; and no experience +of his acting otherwise. But the idea of a revelation introduces a factor +into the case, entirely different from anything of which we have had +previous experience. It forms part of a great purpose existing in the +divine mind, and is in its nature analogous to the first introduction of +life, or the first creation of a free moral agent. Respecting the laws by +which God regulates his creative acts, we are ignorant. Yet the theist +firmly believes in creative acts of some kind, and that they are regulated +by law. In this ignorance of God's law of creation, it is impossible to +affirm that it is antecedently improbable that in making a fresh +manifestation of himself, he will operate only through those general laws, +which are the ordinary manifestations of his will. + +There is some want of clearness in Mr. Mill's expression, that in order to +outweigh the antecedent improbability of miracles, arising from those +modes of the divine action which fall within the limits of our experience, +an extraordinary strength of antecedent probability, derived from the +special circumstances of the case, is required. If by this antecedent +probability he means something such as has been above referred to, there +can be no objection to his statement. He ought to have observed, however, +that the antecedent improbability which may be supposed to belong to +miracles, only attaches to them while contemplated as phenomena, and that +such an improbability readily yields to positive evidence. This is +virtually admitted in a subsequent sentence. "According as this +circumstance, viz. the unknown cause, not having previously manifested +itself in action, or the falsity of the testimony, appears more +improbable; that is, conflicts with an approximate generalization of a +higher order, we believe the testimony or disbelieve it with a stronger or +weaker degree of conviction, according to the preponderance, at least +until we have sifted the matter further." "This," says the author of +"Supernatural Religion," "is precisely Hume's argument, weakened by the +introduction of reservations which have no cogency." We say, this is +precisely what Hume's argument is _not_, for, if it be valid, the whole +question of miracles may be summarily dismissed without any inquiry into +the evidence on which they rest. + +Still, however, as the author affirms and endeavours to prove that Mr. +Mill's position leave Hume's argument untouched, a few further +observations will be necessary. Hume's statement is, "A miracle is a +violation of the laws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience +has established these laws, the proof against a miracle from the nature of +the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience which can possibly +be imagined." + +I reply, that the conception of a miracle does not involve any necessary +violation of the laws of nature. All that it implies is the presence of +another force different from those which have come under our cognisance: +and this may act so as to produce the miracle without violating one of +nature's laws. But, it is added, "uniform and unalterable experience has +established these laws." What has this experience really established? It +is this, and this only, Given the presence of certain forces, _and no +others_, certain results invariably follow. But experience cannot tell us +anything, as to what would be the law of nature, if some other force were +in action; nor is it able to say one word as to the non-existence of any +force which has not come under its observation. Abstractedly, it is true +that the argument against a miracle is as entire as any argument from +experience can be imagined, because experience really supplies us with no +basis for argumentation in the case. Prior to the invention of railways +and the discovery of the uses to which steam can be applied, the argument +from experience was equally valid against the possibility of travelling in +a carriage not propelled by animal force. In each case a new force enters +into the conditions, of which experience is unable to take cognisance. + +"Why is it more probable that all men must die?" asks this writer, "or +that lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air; or that fire +consumes wood, and is extinguished by water, unless it be that these +events are found agreeable to nature, and there is required a violation of +its laws, or in other words, a miracle, to prevent them?" I answer that it +is probable that all men must die, because we observe under the action of +the known forces of nature that all men do die. But this says nothing as +to what must take place if another force was present; or a combination of +existing forces was discovered sufficiently potent to counteract the +action of those which in the present state of things bring about the +dissolution of man's frame. There is no necessity, for the purpose of +effecting this, that one of the existing forces should be suspended. The +time was, when certain forms of disease invariably resulted in death. The +advance of medical science has averted this result. Ought the discovery to +have been rejected because it pretended to produce a fact contrary to +prior experience? Are any of the laws of nature violated, or are its +forces suspended in such a case? What has taken place? Man has discovered +agencies which have neutralized the effect of other agencies. Our belief +that all men must die rests on the assumption that no force can or will at +any future time be brought into action which will counteract the forces +now in operation by which that event is produced. + +The same remark applies to the other three cases. To the second of them +the author has himself supplied the answer: "Lead cannot of itself remain +suspended in the air." Doubtless, it cannot _of itself_. Who ever supposed +that it could? But it can be suspended when a force adequate to counteract +that of gravitation is present. So fire will always consume wood, or be +extinguished by water, as long as no other forces but the usual ones are +in operation. But man has already invented the means of producing +combustion under water. No violation of nature's laws is required in any +of these cases. Nor is there any required in a miracle. The fact is, that +there is an assumption in all arguments of this kind, which for obvious +reasons is not openly avowed, but which alone imparts to them an apparent +validity. "No such force can exist," which translated into other language +is identical with the proposition, "There is no God." To keep this +assumption in the background, when the very basis of the argument for +miracles is the assumption that there is one, is a course which can lead +to no good result. + +But the author remarks further: "There must, therefore, be a uniform +experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event could not +merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, +there is hence a direct and full proof from the nature of the fact, +against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, +or the miracle rendered credible, by any opposite proof which is +superior." + +Here again we encounter the same faults of reasoning, which amount to a +virtual assumption of the point at issue. "There must be a uniform +experience against any miraculous event, otherwise it would not merit the +appellation--doubtless." But what is the nature of this uniform experience? +Exactly this, that the ordinary forces acting around us being present, and +none other, the event has not, and therefore cannot take place. But this +is not involved in the idea of a miracle. It assumes the presence of +another force, viz. God. But what then? The objector will urge that we +have had no experience of the existence of any such force. Is it to be +urged, that no force can exist, except those of which we have had +experience, or any combination of forces now in action, different from the +present? The men of a former century were equally entitled to make the +same assumption. If they had done so, it would follow, that if the +discoverers of America had found our present railway system in full +operation, and reported it to be so, the contemporaries of Columbus would +have been justified in treating him as an impostor. + +But the author further observes: "Mr. Mill qualifies his admission +respecting the effect of the alleged counteracting cause, by the all +important words '_if present_;' for in order to be valid, the reality of +the alleged counteracting cause must be established, which is impossible; +therefore the objection falls to the ground. No one knows better than Mr. +Mill, that the assertion of a personal deity working miracles, upon which +a miracle is allowed for a moment to come into court, cannot be proved; +and therefore, that it cannot stand in opposition to a complete induction +which Hume takes as his standard." + +This passage strikes us as an extraordinary one to have been written by +any one who possesses the logical powers of the author. We are dealing +with a formal argument with a view of testing its validity, we have the +fullest right to test it by a supposed case. That supposed case is the +presence of an unknown cause, or an unknown combination of known causes, +or the presence of a personal deity. If the argument breaks down under the +application of these tests, it is worthless. Does the author mean to say, +that it is necessary to prove every assumption to be a fact, before it can +be used in argument? How about the assumptions in Euclid? I submit that +the reasoning is by no means vitiated by the assumption, and consequently +that by the application of the same principles of reasoning, Hume's +argument falls to pieces. In one sense the words "if present" are all +important, yet it is not necessary to prove the fact in order to establish +the validity of the reasoning, which is entirely independent of the truth +of the assumption. Has the author never heard of contingent reasoning in +which both antecedent and consequent may be false, but the proposition +valid? + +"No one knows," again says the author, "better than Mr. Mill, that the +allegation of a personal God working miracles, upon which a miracle is for +a moment allowed to come into court, cannot be proved." It seems then +after all that we are reasoning with a person who rejects theism; although +he has been dealing with the question on principles which assume its +truth. In arguing a question of this kind it is necessary to be +consistent, and take our stand either on the principles of theism, or on +those of pantheism or atheism, and not to fall back on either as the +exigencies of the case demand. Least of all should this be done by a +writer who charges the defenders of Christianity with shifting their +ground to suit the necessities of their argument. + +But is the case correctly stated? No doubt that the conception of a +personal God is essential to it. But that of a personal God actually +working miracles forms no portion of it. If this were assumed, the entire +reasoning would be a _petitio principii_. We are considering whether +miracles are possible; or if, supposing one to be wrought, it can be +established by evidence. All that we assume is, that God _can_ work +miracles, not that He has wrought them. Whether we can prove by good +evidence that He has wrought miracles, is quite independent of the present +question. + +"No one knows better than Mr. Mill, that the assertion of a personal deity +working miracles cannot be proved." It is perfectly true that Mr. Mill +believed that the evidence adduced to prove the being of a personal God +was insufficient, and that respecting the origin of all things, nothing +can be known. But yet it is impossible to treat the existence of a +personal God as a bare assumption. "It is impossible to be proved," says +the author. But to whom? To minds constituted like Mr. Mill's. The +evidence that a personal God exists has appeared irresistible to an +overwhelming majority of mankind, including a great majority of minds +gifted with equal, and even with greater powers than that of Mr. Mill. One +might imagine from the mode in which this point is here represented, that +the belief in the existence of a personal God was exploded among all men +of intellect, and that the proofs adduced for it were unworthy of +attention. Surely the question of miracles has a legitimate place in the +court which tries the issue of their truth or falsehood. + +One more point requires notice. Hume says, "Though the being, to whom the +miracle is attributed be in this case Almighty, it does not on that +account become a whit more probable, since it is impossible for us to know +the attributes or actions of such a being, otherwise than from the +experience which we have of his productions in the usual course of +nature." + +This position involves an evident fallacy. It is also one which underlies +one or two of the statements of Mr. Mill, whose philosophical theory of +necessity was one almost certain to involve him in it. The statement is, +that it is impossible to know either the attributes or the actions of such +a being, except from our experience of his productions in the course of +nature. What is the course of nature here intended? does it include mind +as well as matter? If the former is included, and we attain our knowledge +of God from that source--and every theist maintains that our chief +knowledge of God is derived from it--then the experience we have of man +leads us to infer the presence of certain moral attributes in God; and +there is nothing in that experience which renders the performance of a +miracle inconceivable or impossible--but as far as that experience is +concerned, it is rendered antecedently probable. What is included, I again +ask, in nature? Are _we_, the percipient beings ourselves? Whether we are +regarded as included or excluded from nature, it is evident that a +considerable portion of our knowledge of the divine character is derived +from the contemplation of our own being. God is more manifested in our +rationality, "personality," freedom, and conscience, than in the material +forces and laws of nature. To perform a miracle therefore is consistent +with what we know of His character. + +These observations will render it unnecessary for me to examine in detail +the writer's observations on Paley's arguments against Hume. Even if his +arguments are not perfectly conclusive, their failure does not establish +the truth of Hume's positions, or invalidate the refutation of them by +others. As the object of this author is to re-establish the validity of +Hume's argument, he ought not to have confined himself to Paley, whose +mind was little adapted to the investigation of purely logical or +metaphysical questions, but to have noticed the argument of the numerous +subsequent writers who have more fully handled the subject. + + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. THE OBJECTION THAT THE DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY ASSUME +CERTAIN FACTS THE TRUTH OF WHICH CAN ONLY BE KNOWN BY REVELATION, AND THEN +REASON FROM THOSE FACTS TO THE TRUTH OF THE BIBLE, CONSIDERED. + + +It has been objected that the very idea of such a revelation as that of +Christianity implies a defect on the part of the Creator in the original +construction of the Universe, and that He has been under the necessity of +interposing for the purpose of correcting this defect. It is affirmed that +divines endeavour to prove that a revelation was probable by first +assuming a number of the most irrational propositions, which, if true, can +only be proved to be so by the authority of the Bible, and then arguing +back again that it is highly probable that God would interfere to remedy +the defects of his creative work by a supernatural revelation; in other +words, that they assume a state of things which reason would pronounce to +be incredible, unless their truth was asserted in the Bible, and then +argue on the principles of that reason whose validity they deny, that it +is probable that the Creator would interfere to remedy a state of things +the existence of which reason pronounces to be incredible. + +The author of "Supernatural Religion" has strongly urged this argument, +and placed the difficulty clearly before us. Although the entire passage +is too long for quotation, yet as it is important that we should have the +question which he raises before us in his own words, I will cite a portion +of it. + +"Here again the argument is based on an assumption. The supposition of a +divine design in a revelation is the result of a foregone conclusion in +its favour, and not suggested by antecedent probability. Divines assume +that a communication of this nature is in accordance with reason, and was +necessary for the salvation of the human race simply because they believe +that it took place, and no evidence worthy of the name is ever offered in +support of the assumption. A revelation having, it is supposed, been made, +that revelation is consequently supposed to have been contemplated, and to +have justified any suspension of the order of nature. The proposition for +which evidence is demanded is necessarily employed as evidence for itself. +The considerations involved in the assumption of the necessity and +reasonableness of such a revelation, however, are antecedently incredible +and contrary to reason. We are asked to believe that God made man in His +own image, pure and sinless, and intended him to continue so; but scarcely +had His noblest work left the hand of his Creator, than man was tempted +into sin by Satan, the all-powerful and persistent enemy of God, whose +existence and antagonism to a being in whose eyes sin is an abomination, +are not accounted for and are incredible. Adam's fall brought a curse upon +the earth, and incurred the penalty of death for himself and for the whole +of his posterity. The human race thus created perfect and without sin, +thus disappointed the expectations of the Creator, and became daily more +wicked, the evil spirit having succeeded in frustrating the designs of the +Almighty, so that God repented that he had made man, and at length he +destroyed by a deluge all the inhabitants of the earth, with the exception +of eight persons who feared him. This sweeping purification, however, was +as futile as the original design, and the race of man soon became more +wicked than ever." Here follows a statement of what may be regarded as a +plan of salvation as held by some modern Churches, and the apparent +contradiction of the whole to the divine character and perfections is +elaborately pointed out. He then concludes as follows: "We are asked to +believe in the frustration of the divine design of creation, and in the +fall of man into a state of wickedness hateful to God, requiring and +justifying the divine design of a revelation, and such a revelation as +this, as a preliminary to the further proposition that on the supposition +of such a design miracles would not be contrary to reason." To this +follows an elaborate piece of reasoning, by which the author attempts to +prove that every proposition in this so-called plan of salvation is +thoroughly contrary to reason. + +The general positions laid down in this passage (omitting points of +detail) are as follows: Certain incredible occurrences in the past history +of man are assumed by divines to be facts on the authority of the Bible. +These include the complete breaking down of the divine plan in the +creation of man through the agency of a being who has frustrated the +purposes of the Almighty. Next it is asserted on the same authority that +another series of events has taken place which are in the highest degree +contrary to reason, for the purpose of remedying this failure of the +original plan. Then it is alleged that the probability of a divine +interference, in order to remedy a state of things which reason pronounces +to be incredible, is argued on the authority of reason for the purpose of +proving the occurrence of another state of things equally repugnant to +reason. Such a line of argument is affirmed to begin in irrational +assumptions, and to terminate in a vicious circle. + +I have before observed that the work from which the above passage is +taken, although entitled "Supernatural Religion, or an inquiry into the +reality of Divine Revelation," is really an attack on the central position +of the New Testament, the historical value of the Gospels. In taking this +course the author raises an intelligible issue instead of spreading the +argument over an endless mass of controversial matter. If the historical +character of the Gospels cannot be maintained, the whole controversy as to +whether Christianity is a divine revelation is ended. This forms the key +of the Christian position, to which the other parts of the controversy +stand in the relation of mere outworks. If the events recorded in the +Gospels are historical, Christianity must be a divine revelation, +notwithstanding the difficulties connected with certain statements of the +Old Testament. The real point at issue between those who believe and those +who deny that God has made a supernatural revelation of Himself, is +confined to the following question: Are the contents of the Gospels +historically credible? Is the character of Jesus Christ as depicted in +them the delineation of an ideal conception or of an historical reality? +The author discerns clearly that this is the turning point of the +controversy, and has accordingly addressed himself to prove that the +Gospels are valueless as historical documents. This line of argument is +candid, and one which, if adhered to, will save an immense expenditure of +reasoning power. + +Now the question of the historical character of the Gospels is quite +distinct from that of the truth or falsehood of any system of +Ecclesiastical Christianity, which asserts that its theology is a +deduction from the Gospels and the other portions of the New Testament. It +is not revelation itself but a system erected by the application of reason +to the facts of revelation. It is most important that this distinction +should be kept in view. The truth is, that the facts of revelation stand +in the same relation to theology as the facts of nature do to physical +science. Incorrect reasonings respecting both the one and the other are +alike possible. The Ptolemaic theory was propounded as an adequate +solution of the facts and phenomena of the universe, and although utterly +incorrect in all its parts, it for ages held unlimited sway over the human +mind. In a similar manner various theories have been propounded as +solutions of the facts of revelation, but it by no means follows because +they have attained a wide acceptance that they afford the true solution. +In examining the claims of the Gospels to be viewed as historical, it is +quite as much out of place to make them responsible for all the theories +which Ecclesiastical Christianity has propounded respecting the plan of +salvation, as it would be to make the facts and phenomena of the universe +answerable for all the theories which have been propounded for their +solution. In examining the claims of the Gospels to be accepted as +historical documents, it is most unreasonable to make them responsible for +theories which were not formulated in the Church until centuries after +their publication. + +Most of the positions affirmed in the above quotation were not formulated +until a late period of the Church's history. Certainly they are nowhere +directly laid down in the New Testament. The utmost which can be asserted +of them is, that they are alleged to be derived inferentially from its +teaching. They form no portion of the Apostles' or of the Nicene Creeds, +which are the only formularies outside of the New Testament which can be +represented as embodying the creed of the universal Church. Nor can they +be found even in the Athanasian creed. In discussing the claims of the +Gospels to be esteemed as historical, they can only be made fairly +responsible for what they actually contain. To bring into such a +controversy positions only affirmed in recent attempts to formulate a body +of Christian doctrine, as though they had any bearing on the claims of the +New Testament to be viewed as containing a divine revelation, can lead to +no satisfactory result. + +I now return to the consideration of the difficulties above referred to. +It is important to take a careful survey of the entire question, because +they are not only put with great force in the passage which I have quoted, +but I believe that in different forms they weigh heavily on the minds of +many thoughtful men. I will first offer a few observations on the general +principle. + +Nothing is easier than to affirm that the introduction of moral evil into +the universe is a marring of the Creator's plan in its formation. The +argument is founded on the supposition that an Almighty God exists, who is +wise, holy, and benevolent, and who intended to manifest these attributes +through the rational beings which he has created. It is affirmed that the +existence of moral evil in man is a failure of this purpose on the part of +God. But it is the most certain of facts that moral evil does exist in the +world, and that it exists quite independently of Christianity. The +objection therefore is not one directed solely against the Christianity of +the New Testament, but bears with equal weight against every form of +theism, which admits that the universe has been created, and is governed +by a God who is almighty, wise, holy, and benevolent. + +If there be a God who is the Creator of the Universe, it is clear that He +must have been the Creator of man, and that man could only have come into +being in conformity with His pleasure. Now, if we decline to admit that +man was created morally perfect, yet as he must have been created a moral +agent, it is clear that the first man must have sprung into being either +with the moral faculties of a savage, or in some intermediate condition +between these and a state of moral perfection. It follows, therefore, that +man must have been made capable of moral progress. This is affirmed by all +those who assert that he was first produced in a savage state. But the +possibility of moral progress involves also the possibility of +retrogression. The truth of this is borne witness to by the most palpable +facts of daily experience. Men of the highest mental powers are capable of +abusing them to the worst purposes, and thus of sinking fearfully low in +the moral scale. The case of a man like Fouché will illustrate my +argument, a man gifted with high intellectual powers, but who sunk into +the lowest condition of moral turpitude. Such a man is incomparably worse +than the first original savage. I submit, therefore, that whatever view we +may take of the condition in which man was originally created, even if he +were created a savage, yet he was made a moral being capable of elevation +or degradation; and that, to use a human metaphor, the purpose of a holy +God must have been his elevation. Yet this involves the possibility of his +moral degradation. This degradation has also become a fact. It is clear, +therefore, that the difficulty is one which is inseparable from every +possible form of theistic belief, and is no peculiarity of Christianity. + +I shall not attempt to enter on so profound a question as the origin of +evil, and how its existence is consistent with the perfection of a holy +God. It is a subject quite beyond the issue before us, and lies not at the +foundations of Christianity, but of theism, the truth of which is taken +for granted in the objections which the author adduces against the popular +view of the scriptural account; for if there is no God the objections are +valueless. Still he ought to have informed his readers that it is urged as +a partial explanation of those difficulties by the defenders of +Christianity, that it is highly probable that the creation of a moral +being possessed of free agency, but who at the same time is not capable of +sinking into a state of moral degradation, involves as great a +contradiction as the conception of a circle which should possess the +property of concavity and not of convexity. No rational man believes that +it is within the compass, even of omnipotence, to work contradictions. If +this be so, it follows that the possibility of the existence of moral evil +is a necessary condition of the existence of free agency. The production +of a free moral agent capable of yielding a willing obedience to the moral +law is a more glorious work than anything in the material universe, even +than that universe itself. It might, therefore, have been the good +pleasure of the wise, holy, and benevolent Creator to create free moral +agents, even if it involved the existence of moral evil. I am far from +propounding this as a complete solution of the difficulty, but when it is +thus used unsparingly against Christianity, it would have been only candid +to have told the reader that it bore with equal weight against every form +of theism, and to have given the partial explanation which has been +propounded by theologians. + +In reply to the definite statements before us, I affirm that nowhere in +the Gospels, or in any other portion of the New Testament is it asserted +or even implied that revelation was rendered necessary by the frustration +of the divine purpose in creation, or that redemption was a kind of +afterthought in the divine mind rendered necessary by such a failure. On +the contrary, the synoptic Gospels make no affirmation whatever on the +subject. The fourth Gospel contains several statements about the end and +purposes of the Incarnation, but of a description totally different from +those which are alleged in the above quotation to constitute the +groundwork of Christianity. As I have already shown, the Gospel of St. +John speaks of its great purpose as being a revelation of the moral +character of God in the person of Jesus Christ. According to its theology +God has already manifested himself in creation; in the Gospel He makes a +still higher and nobler manifestation of His moral character in the person +of our Lord. The author of the first Epistle ascribed to St. John, whom I +must assume to have been the author of the Gospel, makes the following +direct affirmation on the subject. "That which was from the beginning, +which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have +looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life; for the life +was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you +that eternal life which was with the Father and was manifested unto us; +that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may +have fellowship with us: and truly our fellowship is with the Father and +with his Son Jesus Christ." In these words it is evidently the intention +of the writer to set forth the divine purpose of the Incarnation. It is +true that in other passages he assumes the existence of evil in the +universe, and declares it to be the work of the devil, and that one of the +purposes of this divine manifestation was its destruction. Still he drops +no hint of any failure in the Creation, or that it was the purpose of the +Incarnation to mend a marred scheme. On the contrary, the great truth set +forth in the Epistle and in the Gospel is that Creation and Redemption +form portions of one great whole; and that the latter is a manifestation +of the divine glories beyond God's previous manifestations of himself, +whether in creation or in history. + +Similar are the views of the Apostle Paul. According to him, while many +other purposes were effected by the Incarnation, there is one great +purpose running through all divine revelation. In several passages he +affirms that its influence extends far beyond that which it exerts on the +race of man. He again and again asserts that it was the gradual unfolding +of an idea or purpose which existed from eternity in the divine mind. Thus +he writes: "And to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery +which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God who created all +things by Jesus Christ, to the intent that now unto the principalities and +powers in heavenly places might be known by the Church the manifold wisdom +of God, according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus +our Lord." (Eph. iii. and ix.) "Having made known to us the mystery of His +will, according to His good pleasure, which He purposed in Himself, that +in the dispensation of the fulness of times He might gather in one all +things in Christ, both which are in heaven and in earth, even in Him." +(Eph. i. 9, 10.) "And having made peace by the blood of His cross, by Him +to reconcile all things unto Himself: by Him, I say, whether they be +things in earth or things in heaven." (Col. i. 20.) I fully admit that the +Apostle affirms that the design of bringing man into union with God was a +portion of this purpose. Nothing however is more foreign to the ideas of +St. Paul than that revelation is an afterthought adopted as a remedy for a +marred plan. + +Nor are the views of the other writers of the New Testament different. St. +Peter tells us that the angels desire to look into the redemption wrought +by Christ. St. James assures us that, "known unto God are all His works +from the foundation of the world." The author of the Epistle to the +Hebrews speaks to the same effect: "God, who at sundry times and in divers +manners spake in times past unto the fathers in (by) the prophets, hath in +these last days spoken unto us in His Son." So far from its being the idea +of the sacred writers that redemption is an afterthought designed to +remedy the failure of the original purpose of creation, that both of them +are viewed as parts of the same whole; both are purposes which have +existed in the divine mind during the eternal ages, and have been +gradually evolved in time. Nothing is further from their mind than that +the divine mode of working is by fits or starts, or sudden interventions. +Man was the last form of life which God has introduced into the world, and +in that sense He is said to have rested from His creative work. But God is +no less distinctly affirmed to be always working in nature and in +providence, so that Sabbath days form no exception: "My Father worketh +hitherto and I work." + +Such being the views of the writers of the New Testament on this subject, +the whole of those objections, as far as they are founded on the assertion +that revelation is intended to remedy the failure of God's creative +purpose, fall to the ground. My present supposition is that I am reasoning +with believers in theism. If God has gradually evolved creation, each +successive stage of the evolution forms a part of one great and +comprehensive whole. At each stage the work is incomplete, but its +incompleteness is no proof of failure. A period has existed when the only +beings in the world were devoid of rationality. If an objector could have +contemplated it in this stage, he might have urged that the plan of +creation was a failure, while in reality it was only incomplete. Man came +in at the next stage of the great design. The next stage, according to the +New Testament, is the Incarnation of the Son of God, intended as a higher +manifestation of the moral glories of the Creator for the purpose of +raising man to a higher moral and spiritual elevation. To the attainment +of this purpose all the previous events in man's history have been made +subservient. Surely those persons with whom I am reasoning ought to be the +last to object that there is anything inconsistent with the divine +character in such a gradual unfolding of the divine purposes. We might as +well object that every advancing stage of the great design of Creation was +introduced to remedy a preceding defect as assert that Christianity +originated in this cause. The world was in a most unfinished state when it +was only tenanted by the lower forms of life, and great fault might have +been found with its construction. But a higher came, and a higher, then +man, then Christ our Lord, the second Adam, as St. Paul designates him, +"from heaven heavenly." Whatever may have been the assertions of certain +classes of theologians who have attempted to fathom the divine mind by +their own short sounding line, the sacred writers take no narrow view of +the purposes of the Incarnation. It is declared that they will be realized +in the yet distant future, towards which consummation they are gradually +being carried out in time. + +It follows, therefore, that the New Testament affirms that a purpose is +consistently carried out in the history of redemption far different from +that which has been here placed before us as the assumptions of +Ecclesiastical Christianity. The author has placed these in their most +objectionable form; and if Christian apologists have affirmed on such +premises as those above stated that a divine interposition was rendered +probable, I shall not attempt to defend them. To establish the probability +of a revelation additional to that afforded by creation we have no +occasion to appeal to theories, but to facts. + +The existing moral and spiritual condition of mankind is universally +admitted to be imperfect. Both believers and unbelievers in revelation +alike acknowledge that the attempt to improve it is desirable. No less +certain is it that man possesses faculties which can only receive their +perfect development in a higher condition of things than the present. +These as much point to a higher development of man as the organization of +the lower forms of animal life points to the higher and more perfect ones. +If, therefore, God be the Creator and moral Governor of the world, a +further manifestation of Him is rendered highly probable. + +This probability may be reasoned out by analogies in the history of the +past. Higher developments from lower forms have been the rule. Are they +then to cease with man in his present state of imperfection? How man came +to be thus imperfect, how his moral degradation has originated, is a +question which does not fall within the present argument. It is a fact, by +whatever theory it may be attempted to be accounted for. If a rational +being had existed in those ages during which there was manifested nothing +but the lower forms of life, and had come to the conclusion that the world +as it then existed was the work of an intelligent Creator, he would have +pronounced it highly probable that the resources of creative power would +yet receive a more glorious manifestation. When vertebrate life was first +introduced into the world, a careful examination of the state of things +would have led to a similar conclusion. But the lower forms of vertebrate +life are typical of the higher, and the higher point to man. Before man +entered the world a being capable of comprehending the condition of things +as then existing would have pronounced it highly probable that there would +be yet a further manifestation of creative energy, and that the work +required for its consummation the production of rationality. + +Such and far more numerous have been the actual stages of creative action. +Are we entitled to call them a failure because they were relatively +imperfect, or any fresh intervention of divine power an interference to +remedy a previous failure? On the contrary, these so-called interventions +are the persistent carrying out of a determined purpose. The acts of Deity +are inaccurately designated interventions. He is always working with the +most perfect knowledge of the means which He employs, and the most perfect +controul over them. Failure with Him is impossible. The word +"intervention" as applied to the operations of God conveys the idea of a +machine which He originally constructed, and then left to its own +operations. Such a machine will in course of time get out of order, or +perform its work imperfectly, and require to be supplemented by additional +contrivances. Thus when the clock ceases to go there arises a necessity +for the intervention of the clockmaker. He constructs his clock and leaves +it to itself. But creation is no mere machine; the Divine worker is always +present in His works. The last idea which would have occurred to the +authors of the Bible was that God was obliged to be making a number of +special interventions to cure defects in the results of His operations. As +the Bible cannot help using the language of man, expressions derived from +the defects of human language are at times used in it, but the one +prevalent idea is that God is always present working in the kingdoms of +nature and of grace, that all His actions are the constant carrying out of +a predetermined purpose, and that with Him is no variableness neither +shadow of turning. + +If the possibility of the introduction of moral evil into the universe is +a necessary condition of the creation of a free moral agent, or in other +words, if the contrary supposition involves a contradiction, the Creator +must have viewed the production of such a free agent as so desirable, that +it formed a part of His purpose to create him notwithstanding this +possibility. If then moral evil became a fact, it involved no failure in +the purposes of God. He must have viewed the existence of such beings as +desirable, even if this contingency became a fact. Why, I ask, may not a +further manifestation of Himself, by means of which moral evil might be +reduced to the smallest dimensions, or even ultimately removed, while +freedom is still preserved, form a portion of the same great purpose of +the divine mind? If this be possible, the assertion that Redemption is a +special intervention of God for the purpose of remedying the breaking down +of his creative plan, is disproved, and with it all the other inferences +of the numerous writers whose views I am considering. + +In affirming the probability of a revelation, the Christian apologist need +not go beyond the region of actual facts. He has no occasion to rest his +proof on any statement made by a supposed revelation the truth of which is +the point at issue. To do so would be to assume the thing which requires +to be proved. But facts as they exist, independently of any statements in +the Bible, are quite sufficient. Man exists. He is possessed of powers and +aspirations which this state of things does not gratify. He is capable of +moral action, and there is something within him which affirms that he +ought to obey the moral law. Yet its realization by him is of the most +imperfect character. Does the actual condition of man afford satisfaction +even to the unbeliever, account for it as he may? Is there not a great +amount of moral evil in the world? Do not considerable numbers of men, +instead of progressing to higher degrees of moral perfection degenerate +through various stages of moral corruption? Does not moral evil cause a +great amount of physical suffering? Are not vast numbers of men the prey +of ignorance and superstition--great evils doubtless, and of which +unbelievers heavily complain? In one word, when we contemplate the present +condition of mankind, does not the sternest reason affirm that it is +inconceivable that this can be the final condition of God's creative work? +Yet these things are no theories but obvious facts, and on the supposition +on which we are reasoning, facts in the universe of God. + +It follows therefore, that facts such as these, when contemplated by +reason, establish the probability, nay almost the certainty of a further +divine action. Of course this is based on the assumption that there is a +wise and holy God who is the author of the universe, but both the +opponents and believers in revelation can only argue this subject at all +on the supposition that God exists. Any fresh mode of divine action will +probably differ from the preceding ones, because man exists as a moral and +spiritual being. It is therefore probable that such divine action will be +moral rather than physical; or, in other words, the divine purpose of +creation includes within it a yet further manifestation of the divine +character and perfections. This is what the New Testament affirms to have +taken place in the Incarnation. This is my position. + +I shall only add one or two more brief remarks. Those who charge +theologians with making unfounded assumptions should be guiltless of +making them themselves. The warning against falling into this error may be +profitably taken to heart by both parties to this controversy. It is +affirmed that the constitution of nature bears everywhere the indications +of systematic upward progression. I ask, is this systematic upward +progression everywhere true of man? Are there no where indications of +retrogression? Europeans generally during the last two thousand years have +progressed, although even this is not universally true, for some of the +fine arts attained to greater perfection in the ancient than in the modern +world. But has the Hindoo race progressed during the last three thousand +years? Have the Chinese? Is it not true that the progress of these two +races has been one of considerable retrogression? Where is the progress +made by the Negro races from the first dawnings of their history? Yet +these three races form more than half of the human family. Again, have the +Arab races progressed since the days of Abraham? Are the Mahommedan races +in a state of gradual improvement? These are questions to which a definite +answer must be returned before the proposition above referred to can be +esteemed a solution of all the problems of human history. + +It will perhaps be replied that nature is gradually extinguishing these +unprogressive races, under the pressure of her inexorable laws. Yet they +constitute an overwhelming majority of the human race, and it is strange +to talk of this progressive improvement of the human race as a great law +of nature, if the mode of improvement be the extinction of the great +majority of mankind. But are the Hindoo, Chinese, Negro, and other +unprogressive races less numerous than they were three thousand years ago? +The evidence is all the other way. We want present facts and not theories +of the future. It has been affirmed, that "The survival of the fittest is +the stern law of nature. The invariable action of law of itself eliminates +the unfit. Progress is necessary to existence. Extinction is the doom of +Retrogression." These assertions may receive their fulfilment in some +period of the distant future, but they certainly do not agree with the +past history of man. Whatever progress the European races may be capable +of, certain conditions of climate form an inexorable barrier to their +supplanting the Negro, the Hindoo, or the Chinese, and we know that +European blood in certain climates has actually degenerated. + +Again, it is stated "that the highest effect contemplated by the supposed +revelation is to bring man into harmony with law; and this is insured by +law acting on intelligence, and even on instinct." Where, I ask, is the +proof of this derived from the history of man? Is the moral condition of +the races above referred to higher than it was three thousand years ago? +Did the moral condition of the Greek race progress or retrograde during +the four centuries which preceded the Advent? Which was the more elevated +condition of Roman morality, that of the century which preceded and +followed the conquest of Italy, or that of the empire and its crumbling +institutions? + +Again, we are told that "there is not in reality a gradation of breach of +law that is not followed by an equivalent gradation of punishment." This +may be the case in some Utopia in which the author lives, but it certainly +neither is nor ever has been the condition of this world. Does villany, I +ask, always receive adequate punishment in this world? It has been the all +but universal opinion of mankind that it does not. Did not Fouché die +quietly in his bed, possessed of wealth and honours, and a darkened +conscience? Did not Philip II. of Spain, after all his crimes, die under +the delusions of self-approbation? In a controversy like this the most +confident assertions will not supply the want of facts on which to ground +our reasonings. + +It follows, therefore, that the assertion that the Christian argument +involves reasoning in a circle, or else that it assumes the point at +issue, is disproved. + + + + + +CHAPTER IX. DEMONIACAL MIRACLES--GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. + + +It has been objected that the admission which the New Testament is alleged +to make as to the reality of demoniacal miracles weakens, if it does not +destroy, the value of miracles as an attestation of a revelation. In order +to do full justice to the force of this objection I will state it in the +words of the author of "Supernatural Religion:"-- + +"The necessity of asserting the dependence of miracles on doctrines is +thrust upon divines by the circumstance, that the Bible narrates so many +cases of false miracles, and contains so many warnings against them." + +"The first thought which must occur to any unprejudiced mind is amazement +that an Almighty God should select as a guarantee of his supposed +communications signs and wonders which can be so easily imitated by +others, that there must always be a doubt whether the message be from the +kingdom of heaven, or from the kingdom of lies. It seems _à priori_ +absolutely incredible that a divine revelation which is so important, and +which it is intended that man should believe, should be made in such +obscure language, and with such doubtful attestation. That heaven should +condescend to use the same arguments as hell, and with so little +difference in the degree of the power exhibited, that man can scarcely, if +at all, discriminate between them, is a theory of the most startling +description." + +"Does not the necessity of this theory of false miracles, of the power of +God thus placed on a level with the power of Satan, in a matter where the +distinct purpose is to authenticate by miraculous testimony a miraculous +revelation, rather betray the unreality of miracles altogether, and +indicate that the idea of such supernatural intervention originates solely +from the superstitious ignorance of men in ages when every phase of nature +was attributed to direct supernatural interference, and ascribed with +arbitrary promptness to God or to the devil? It is certain that as +miracles are represented as being common both to God and Satan, they +cannot be considered as a distinctive attestation of a divine revelation." + +After quoting Dr. Mozley to the effect that "Miraculous evidence cannot +oblige us to accept any doctrine contrary to our moral nature"--an +abstractly true statement, but quite inapplicable to the New Testament, +which no where affirms that miracles have been wrought in attestation of +doctrines--the author continues: "The assertion that evidence emanating +from God is in some cases to be rejected is a monstrous proposition; and +the evidential force of miracles is totally destroyed by the logical +inference from it, and from the double character of miracles as Divine and +Satanic; that God is not only capable of exerting supernatural power to +attest what is true, but that Satan equally possesses and exercises the +same power in opposition to God for purposes of deception. If miraculous +evidence is indifferently employed to certify truth and error, it is at +once degraded by such common service into contempt." + +These passages put us in possession of the author's views, and perhaps it +would be impossible to state the objections more strongly. I have quoted +them thus fully, not only as embodying the views of this particular +writer, but as placing before us in a clear and distinct light the chief +objections which can be urged against the attestation that miracles give +to the truth of the Christian revelation, on the assumption that +demoniacal miracles have been performed, or even on the admission that +they are possible. + +Before I enter on the general question, I must briefly draw attention to +the statements and assumptions contained in this remarkable passage. + +1. The assertion that miracles are alleged in proof of doctrines, and that +divines, when the necessities of their position compel them, affirm the +direct converse of this, viz. that miracles are dependent for their truth +on doctrines, is an entire misapprehension of the Christian argument. Its +true position will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. + +2. The assertion that the miracles of Almighty God can be imitated by +Satan is a gratuitous assumption. Nowhere is this affirmed in the New +Testament. On the contrary, our Lord uniformly declares that His works +were clearly distinguishable from the working of Satan, and could only +maliciously be confounded with them. + +3. While the Bible speaks of false miracles, its language is quite +consistent with the fact that they were impositions practised on the +senses, like the acts of jugglers. + +4. The word "miracle" is here used to denote a supernatural fact in +external nature devoid of all moral environment. I have already pointed +out the inaccuracy of this position; and shall have much to say on this +subject hereafter. To strip a superhuman occurrence of its moral aspect is +simply to assume the question at issue. + +5. It is not correct that the essence of a miracle consists in the degree +of power manifested in the performance of the outward act. The performance +of a miracle does not necessarily involve a greater exertion of power than +is manifested in the ordinary occurrences of nature. A miracle is not only +an act of power, but it involves the elements of prediction and of +purpose. + +6. The affirmation that the Christian argument involves the position that +heaven must condescend to use the same arguments as hell, if demoniacal +possession is supposed to be possible, is altogether inaccurate. + +7. The Christian argument nowhere involves the assumption that evidence +emanating from God is under certain circumstances to be rejected. It is +quite conceivable that a real miracle may have been wrought, which was +adequately attested when it was performed, but that the evidence has +become imperfect by lapse of time. + +8. Even if it be supposed that demoniacal miracles are possible, there is +nothing in that assumption which renders it necessary to take for granted +that Satan is allowed to ramble over the universe and work miracles at his +pleasure, and to imitate the miracles of God. The New Testament uniformly +asserts that whatever agency he can exert is a permitted one, which is +confined within definite limits. + +In considering the question of demoniacal miracles it must be kept in mind +that the language employed by the writers of the Bible is invariably +phenomenal. They describe events as they appeared to the eye of the +beholder. Hence it by no means follows, when they refer to the arts of +magic and other similar practices which were so prevalent in the ancient +world, and say that the magicians did such and such things, that they +meant to affirm the reality of their performance. Their language is always +taken from the observer's point of view. As far as he saw, they did so. We +frequently speak in the same way of modern feats of conjurors. Thus, when +it is said that the magicians brought forth frogs, the language is quite +consistent with the act being a delusion successfully practised on the +senses. + +It is affirmed by the author that the Bible asserts the reality of such +miracles. I reply that it makes no such assertion, but merely describes +them as they appeared to the eye of the beholder. Its strong denunciations +of such practices is no evidence that they were anything else than +deceptions which the performers endeavoured to palm off for wicked +purposes. The precept of Moses, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live," +has been urged as affording proof that the Bible in unqualified terms +asserts the reality of witchcraft. Whether the art was real or simulated, +the sentence of the lawgiver would have been equally just, for impostors +who practise such arts for the purpose of delusion, are far more injurious +to society than many kinds of criminals who have undergone the severest +punishment. In the New Testament "lying wonders" are occasionally referred +to. The expression may legitimately mean one of two things, either a +supernatural act performed for the attestation or propagation of a lie, or +an apparent miracle, which is in itself a lie. It cannot be denied that +the language of the New Testament will honestly bear this interpretation. +I will quote the strongest passage to be found in it. St. Paul, writing to +the Thessalonians, in speaking of the manifestation of a great anti- +christian power, says, "Whose coming is after the working of Satan, with +all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all the deceivableness +of unrighteousness, in them that perish, because they receive not the love +of the truth that they might be saved." This language is quite consistent +with the idea that the works here spoken of were not supernatural, but +deceptions wrought for the propagation of a system of falsehood. + +There can be no question that impositions of this kind have been +systematically practised in later times in support of a great system of +ecclesiastical power, and to attest doctrines in connection with it. But +it is worthy of observation that the demoniacal supernaturalism which we +read of in the New Testament, is not represented as having been employed +for the attestation of any system of doctrine whatever. Elymas, the +sorcerer, practised his art for the purpose of establishing an influence +over Sergius Paulus, but for aught that appears he was a simple impostor. +All the other cases of Satanic supernaturalism referred to in the Gospels +resolve themselves into cases of possession, or the occasional production +of a disease. + +It is further to be observed that nowhere throughout the New Testament is +a miracle, properly so called, ascribed to Satanic action. Possession is a +phenomenon entirely different from a miracle. I admit that there is one +apparent exception, namely in the history of our Lord's temptation. This +if it is intended to be a description of an objective fact, is undoubtedly +an instance of direct interference with the action of the forces of +nature; Satan is here represented as possessing and exercising the power +of counteracting the force of gravitation by transporting the body of our +Lord from place to place. As this is the one solitary instance in the New +Testament in which such power is ascribed to him, it demands especial +consideration. We are told that during one period of his temptation our +Lord was carried by Satan to an exceeding high mountain; and again, that +he was placed on a pinnacle of the temple. These acts involve such an +exercise of supernatural power as may justly be put in comparison with his +walking on the water. It becomes therefore a very important question +whether this account is intended to be taken as a literal narrative. The +fact of its being the only recorded instance of its kind affords a +contrary presumption, for if the writers had believed that there was +nothing in such interference with the physical forces inconsistent with +the ordinary course of Satanic action it is hardly possible that they +could have viewed this as a solitary instance of the exercise of such +power, especially when the case of the demoniacs afforded so many +opportunities for its manifestation. It is clear from the narrative itself +that the only source of information regarding the temptation must have +been an account given by our Lord himself to his disciples, as it was an +occurrence of which there could have been no witnesses. Otherwise it must +be assumed to be a mere fiction. It is also clear that the three +temptations into which the narrative is divided are intended to describe +three great crises through which our Lord's mind passed. According to +Mark's account he is represented as undergoing temptations during the +whole period of forty days. Matthew and Luke present us with the general +results of the entire temptation. If our Lord gave an account of it to his +disciples, there can be no reason why he should not have embodied its +results in a narrative form, as is the course which he adopted in his +parables. If the parables were not usually introduced with the formula "he +spake a parable," we might easily mistake them also for narratives of +actual occurrences. But although this is the usual form, it is not the +only one, as appears in the parable of Dives and Lazarus. It is therefore +quite conceivable that on giving his disciples an account of the crises +through which his mind passed during the period of the temptation he may +have put it into a parabolic form, of which himself was the centre, as one +which would be most adapted to the level of their apprehensions; otherwise +it would have assumed the character of a number of abstract disquisitions. + +But we are not left to infer from mere probabilities that the narrative +was not intended to be understood literally. One portion of it places it +beyond doubt that it was intended to contain a visionary or parabolic +element of some kind. In the account of the temptation to fall down and +worship Satan, it is expressly stated that the Devil transported our Lord +to an exceeding high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the +world and the glory of them. The narrative of Luke adds that all this was +done in a moment of time, which shows clearly that it was not intended to +be from one end to the other a literal statement of facts. It is therefore +absolutely necessary to assume the presence of a visionary element +somewhere; the only question is, where, and to what extent? If we attach +the meaning usually assigned by the writers in the New Testament to the +word "world," it is impossible to imagine that any amount of credulity can +have believed that there was any mountain from whose top such a view could +have been attained by the unaided power of the human eye. But further, it +is asserted not only that the kingdoms of the world were rendered visible, +but _their glory_; that is to say, the spectator was able to see their +great cities, their buildings, and all their signs of outward +magnificence, for the sight of their glory was obviously intended to add +force to the temptation. Yet even the most credulous people possess some +moderately correct idea as to the extent of view which the eye can reach +and would feel quite certain that without the interposition of a miracle +such a survey in a moment of time would be impossible. + +It may probably be urged by some that the first part of the account only +is intended to be a description of an objective fact, and that the last +temptation was visionary. To this I reply that the entire narrative is +couched in language of fact, and the latter portion quite as much so as +the former. Besides, if the sight of the kingdoms of the world and their +glory was a visionary representation, then the reason for conveying Jesus +to a lofty mountain ceases, for such a vision might equally well have been +presented to him in a plain; whereas if we take it as an account of a +literal fact, it is clear that the reason for conveying him to the +mountain was to afford him an extensive view. It is therefore impossible +to draw a distinction between the two portions of the narrative. + +Every consideration therefore proves that the entire narrative is either +parabolic or an account of a visionary transaction, precisely similar to +many of those described in the Old Testament, and not of an actual +occurrence. This being so, we arrive at the inference that nowhere in the +New Testament is Satanic influence described as interfering with the +ordinary action of the forces of nature, by a direct exertion of power. + +It may however be objected that there were probably reasons why he was +permitted to do so on this particular occasion; but on such a question I +shall not enter. I shall only repeat that it is impossible to view the +latter portion of the narrative as an account of an objective fact; and +this being the case it is far more probable that the whole partakes of the +same character. At any rate it is the single instance in the New Testament +in which the possession of such power is ascribed to Satan. + +This has a very important bearing on the argument. The author affirms that +the writers of the New Testament attributed to Satan a general power of +interfering with the forces of nature, and of working miracles which may +fairly be contrasted with the miracles of God. But whatever may have been +the opinions of others on this subject, it is clear that such opinions +were not held by them. If they had believed that Satanic agency was +constantly exerted in the affairs of the visible universe, there is every +reason why they should have invented numerous stories of this description, +and ascribed them to Satanic intervention. The writer to whom I am +referring, urges in the strongest manner, that the belief in magic, and in +frequent exertions of demoniacal power over the external universe, was +universal among the Jews at the time of the Advent. To prove this, he has +adduced a number of opinions entertained by the writers of the Talmud and +others, involving the most grovelling superstitions, and asserts that +indications of the same are to be found in the Gospels. As an instance, he +favours us with the following story told by Josephus, who declares that he +was an eye-witness of the fact. + +"Josephus had seen a countryman of his own, named Eliezer, release people +possessed of devils in the presence of the Emperor Vespasian and his sons, +and of his army. He put a ring containing one of the roots prescribed by +Solomon, into the nose of a demoniac, and drew the demon out of his +nostrils, and in the name of Solomon, and reciting one of his +incantations, he adjured him to return no more. In order to demonstrate to +the spectators that he had power to cast out demons, Eliezer was +accustomed to set a pitcher of water a little way off, and he commanded +the demon, as he left the body of the man, to overturn it, by which means +the skill and wisdom of Solomon was made very manifest." + +The object for which this and kindred stories are referred to, is to prove +that the Jewish mind was so intensely credulous and superstitious on the +subject of demoniacal action at the time of our Lord, that there was +nothing so monstrous, which it was not in the habit of accepting as fact. +We are also repeatedly informed that the followers of Jesus shared in this +unbounded credulity. It may be even inferred from the assertion before us, +that they were far more credulous. The argument which this writer adduces +is plausible, and it may be stated thus. If a writer like Josephus, who +was extensively acquainted with Greek literature, and the Talmudists who +belonged to the _élite_ of the nation, could narrate such follies as +facts, what must have been the beliefs of the vulgar herd? We must not +forget that the followers of Jesus were chiefly from the lower orders. +"The common people heard him gladly." The inference which the reader is +allowed to draw is that they must have been addicted to yet more gross +credulity. + +What were the reasons which induced Josephus, a man who had seen the wide +world, to relate this monstrous story I shall not inquire. One can hardly +believe that he was a dupe; his reporting it, however, no more proves that +such beliefs were universal when he wrote, than the existence of a wide- +spread spiritualistic literature proves that a belief in spirit-rapping +prevails generally among all classes of society at the present day, +although many of the believers in spiritualism belong to the educated +classes, and readily accept absurdities which the sound sense of +multitudes of artisans would immediately repudiate. + +The argument before me tells in a direction precisely opposite to that +which is intended by those who have invoked it, and it is marvellous that +they do not perceive that it is destructive of their own case. I put it as +follows: If the authors of the Gospels entertained the views of demoniacal +agency which this author represents them to have held, their narratives, +which directly lead them to refer to that subject, would have contained +numerous references to stories of the type of that quoted from Josephus. +Let me illustrate this argument by an example. The Arabs and other +Orientals believe in the power of demons and magicians over external +nature. They consider this action to be of frequent occurrence. Their +literature therefore abounds with accounts of such monstrous +interventions. But the Gospels, with the exception of the history of the +Temptation, do not contain an account of a single marvel wrought by the +agency of demons on external nature. Demoniacal agency is repeatedly +mentioned by them; but it belongs to an order of phenomena of an entirely +different character. What, I ask, is the only legitimate inference? That +the authors of the Gospels were free from the superstitions in question. + +Before going further it will be necessary to ascertain what is the precise +nature and character of that demoniacal supernaturalism which is +apparently asserted in the pages of the New Testament. Without doing so, +it will be impossible to form a correct opinion on the subject under +consideration. + +The New Testament apparently ascribes to Satanic agency not only a power +of suggesting temptations to the minds of men, but also in certain cases +of depriving them of the supremacy of their wills, of enslaving their +intellectual and moral powers, of interfering with the use of their bodily +organs, and, in one instance, of imparting an unusual strength. These +phenomena constitute what is designated as "possession," and bear no +inconsiderable resemblance to different forms of insanity. + +But the New Testament also makes mention of lunacy as well as possession. +How far they were distinguishable from each other we have no sufficient +data to enable us to determine. At one time they are spoken of as the same +disease; at others they are clearly distinguished from each other. + +The language of the Gospels seems to imply that some maladies were +believed to be produced by the influence of possession. In one or two +instances language is used which may imply that a bodily disease was +brought on by Satanic agency without actual possession. Whatever may have +been the belief of the Jews on this subject, it is certain that the cases +referred to in the Gospels are very few; and although the mention of +diseases is very common, nothing is said about their being due to +demoniacal influence. Not a single case occurs in which ordinary accidents +are referred to this influence, although such is affirmed to have been the +common belief of the Jews. In the Acts of the Apostles only two cases of +possession are mentioned, one that of the damsel at Philippi, and the +other the occasion when certain Jewish exorcists undertook to exorcise +demoniacs at Ephesus in the name of Jesus. + +The former case is of some importance. The girl is described as possessed +by a spirit of Pytho, _i.e._ she pretended to practise the art of +divination by the inspiration of the god Apollo, and in many respects she +practised the arts of the modern fortune-teller. Such persons were not +uncommon at the time. The Pythia at Delphi professed to prophesy under the +influence of a similar inspiration. Whatever may have been the real causes +by which this mental condition was brought about, the paroxysms were so +real that one is recorded to have died under their influence. Her state +when under prophetic influence, is described as one of phrensied +excitement. St. Paul is represented by the historian as addressing himself +to the spirit, and commanding him to come out in the name of Jesus Christ. +The powers of such persons were confined to diving into the secrets of the +future; but to other kinds of supernatural power they made no claims. + +If the language here employed be other than phenomenal, it seems to imply +that in St. Paul's opinion certain practices of the ancient world which +were far from uncommon, were connected with demoniacal agency. These were +usually combined with certain forms of religious phrensy, such as even in +the present day manifest themselves in connection with the more degraded +forms of religion. At no period was this class of phenomena more prevalent +than during the century which preceded, and that which followed the +Advent, when human nature was stirred to its profoundest depths. + +There are also a few passages in St. Paul's writings which seem to affirm +a connection between demoniacal agency and pagan worship. Whatever may +have been his own opinions on this subject, it is evident that the action +which he supposed to have been exerted was entirely mental. Not one word +is uttered by him which implies that he regarded this mode of demoniacal +action as involving a power of interfering with the forces of the material +universe. + +Such is a general statement of the facts as they appear in the New +Testament in connection with possession, and demoniacal action. It has +been necessary thus distinctly to state them, in order that we may keep +the subject clear of all adventitious issues with which it has been +attempted to obscure it. That form of demoniacal action involved in the +supposed power possessed by demons of tempting men to evil does not fall +within the limits of the present controversy. + +But the opponents of Christianity are not content to reason on the facts +respecting demoniacal action as they are presented to us in the pages of +the New Testament. They charge its writers with a number of the most +grotesque beliefs on this subject, for which the book itself furnishes us +with no evidence. This course has been taken for the purpose of fastening +on them a boundless credulity, and thereby destroying their claim to be +accepted as credible reporters of historical facts. I will cite one or two +examples of this mode of reasoning, in order that we may be able to form a +correct estimate of its value. + +After having given a detailed account of a number of monstrous beliefs +gleaned from the Talmud and other sources respecting angels, the author of +"Supernatural Religion" then proceeds: "The belief in demons at the time +of Jesus was equally emphatic and comprehensive, and we need not mention +also that the New Testament is full of it. They are in the air, on earth, +in the bodies of men and animals, and even at the bottom of the sea. They +are the offspring of the fallen angels who loved the daughters of men. +They have wings like angels, and can fly from one place in the earth to +another. They attain a knowledge of the future by listening behind the +veil of the temple of God. Their numbers are infinite. The earth is so +full of them, that if man had the power to see, he could not exist on +account of them; there are more demons than men, and they are about as +close as the earth thrown up out of a new made grave. It is stated that +each man had 10,000 demons on his right hand, and 1000 on his left.... The +crush on the Sabbath in the synagogue arises from them; also the dresses +of the Rabbins become so soon worn through their rubbing; in like manner +also they cause the tottering of the feet. He who wishes to discover these +spirits must take sifted ashes, and strew them about his bed, and he will +perceive their footprints upon them like a cock's tread." Here follow a +number of the most ineffable absurdities, unsurpassed by anything +contained in the Arabian Nights, which I need not cite. The author then +proceeds: "Demons, however, take more especial delight in foul and +offensive places, and an evil spirit inhabits every private closet in the +world. Demons haunt deserted places, ruins, graves, and certain kinds of +trees. We find indications of these superstitions throughout the Gospels. +The possessed are represented as dwelling among the tombs, and being +driven by unclean spirits into the wilderness, and the demons can find no +rest in clean places. Demons also frequented springs and fountains. The +episode of the angel who was said to descend at certain times and trouble +the water of the pool of Bethesda, so that he that first stepped in was +healed of whatsoever disease he had, may be mentioned here in passing, +although the passage is not found in the older manuscripts of the fourth +Gospel, and was certainly a late addition." Here follow further citations +of Rabbinical absurdities. The author then proceeds: "The Talmud and other +Rabbinical writings are full of references to demoniacal possession, but +we need not enter into details on this point, as the New Testament itself +presents sufficient evidence respecting it. Not only could one spirit +enter into a body, but many took possession of the same individual. There +are many instances mentioned in the Gospels, such as Mary Magdalene, out +of whom went seven demons ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}), and the man whose name was +legion, because many demons ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) had entered into him. Demons +likewise entered into the bodies of animals, and in the narrative to which +we have just referred, the demons, on being expelled from the man, +requested to be allowed to enter into the herd of swine, which being +permitted, 'the demons went out of the man into the swine, and the herd +ran violently down the cliff into the lake and were drowned,' the evil +spirits, as usual, taking pleasure only in the destruction and injury of +man and beast. Besides possession, all the diseases of men and animals are +ascribed to the action of the devil and demons. In the Gospel, for +instance, the woman with a spirit of infirmity is described as bound by +Satan, although the case was not one of demoniacal possession." The author +then proceeds to enumerate a large number of grotesque beliefs as held by +the Jews at the time of the Advent. + +I regret the necessity which has compelled me to cite so lengthy a +passage, but it is absolutely necessary that the reader should be enabled +to see, beyond the possibility of misapprehension, the nature of the +objections which are urged against the historical credibility of the +Gospels, and the reasonings by which they are attempted to be supported. +The general principle that underlies them may be stated in a few words, +that the followers of Jesus and the authors of the Gospels were a prey to +such a multitude of degrading superstitions on the subject of demonology +as wholly to destroy the value of their historical testimony. + +The effect of this passage with its context is to produce the impression +on the mind of the reader, not only that these absurd beliefs were +generally entertained by the Jews at the time of the Advent, but that they +constituted the form of thought of the followers of Jesus. It may be urged +that the object of the author is to prove the general superstition of the +times; and that he does not intend to affirm that it was shared in by +every one of the followers of Jesus. This may be correct; but if it is not +intended to be asserted that the followers of Jesus were the prey of equal +superstitions, the reference to this mass of credulity can have no bearing +on the present argument, and is simply misleading. To what purpose, I ask, +is it made, unless it is intended to implicate our Lord's followers in +these beliefs? Unless it were so, the fact that others entertained them +would not in the smallest degree affect the value of their historical +testimony. But on this point we are not left to inferences; not only are +passages in the Gospels referred to, but we are repeatedly informed that +the followers of Jesus did share in these popular delusions. + +The position, therefore, which is taken by the author is clear. His +readers are invited to believe that the followers of our Lord were a prey +to the belief in a number of ineffable absurdities respecting demons such +as he has enumerated. If this can be established, the conclusion is +inevitable, that their historical testimony is valueless. + +Let us now consider the mode in which the proof of this is attempted to be +established. The authorities quoted are chiefly the Talmudical writers; +that is to say, persons who wrote as late as from A.D. 200 to A.D. 500, +are cited as the proof that such opinions were universally entertained by +the Jews in the time of Jesus Christ. Equally valid would it be to quote +the writers of modern spiritualism to prove that such opinions were held +by our ancestors in the time of the Stuarts or the Plantagenets. On the +strength of this and kindred evidence, such opinions are ascribed to the +original propagators of Christianity, and to the authors of the Gospels. + +But this is not all. The only correct method of ascertaining the +superstition and credulity of any particular writer is carefully to +examine the contents of his book, and to note the various instances which +we find in it of what we consider to be superstitions; and then proceed to +estimate their value, and, if needful, to compare them with other +contemporary authorities. This course, however, is not that pursued by +this writer. On the contrary, he quotes the absurdities which we have seen +from the Talmudical writers, and refers in the midst of them to nearly +every passage in the Gospels which can be made to bear even a remote +reference to the views in question. I submit that such a mode of reasoning +is not conducive to the interests of truth. + +A few examples of this mode of conducting the argument require notice. + +After referring to a number of monstrous superstitions, he tells us that +the Jews believed that "demons took especial delight in foul and offensive +places, and that an evil spirit inhabits every private closet in the +world. Demons haunted deserted places, ruins, graves, and certain kinds of +trees. We find indications of these superstitions throughout the Gospels. +The possessed are represented as dwelling among the tombs, and as being +driven by unclean spirits into the wilderness, and demons can find no rest +in clean places." + +"We find indications of these superstitions throughout the Gospels." To +this observation I invite the reader's attention. Is it meant to be +affirmed that any indication can be found in the Gospels that the writers +believed that a demon inhabited every private closet in the world? Two +instances only are referred to in the text, in one of which the demoniac +of Gadara is represented as dwelling among the tombs, and as having been +driven into the wilderness; and the other the parable of the unclean +spirit going out of the man, and finding no rest when walking through dry +places. Do these two cases prove the truth of the sweeping assertions +above referred to? Does the parabolic representation that the expelled +demon found no rest in dry or clean places prove that the disciples of +Jesus believed that they took especial delight in foul or offensive ones? +Does the fact that the demoniac of Gadara had been driven by the evil +spirit into the wilderness prove that it was a universal belief that +deserts and graves were haunted by demons? + +In proof also of these assertions we are referred in a note to five +passages in the Gospels, viz. Matt. viii. 28; xii. 43; Mark v. 3-5; Luke +viii. 27-29; xi. 24. Five passages are very few to justify the assertion +that we find indications of these superstitions throughout the Gospels. On +examining them, however, the five references are reduced to two, three +belong to the account of the demoniac at Gadara, reported by each of the +Synoptics; and two to the twofold report of the same parable as given by +Matthew and Luke! This is a very slender foundation on which to ground the +assertion that the followers of Jesus believed that "demons took especial +delight in foul and offensive places, that they inhabited every private +closet in the world, and that they haunted deserted places, graves, ruins, +and certain kinds of trees, and that we find indications of these +superstitions _throughout the Gospels_." + +Still more extraordinary is the next reference. "Demons haunted springs +and fountains," says the author. To this he adds, "the episode of the +angel who was said to descend at certain seasons and trouble the water of +the pool of Bethesda, so that he who first stepped in was cured of +whatsoever disease he had, may be mentioned in passing." + +Why, I ask, mention it at all? Is the visit of an angel to this particular +pool for the purpose of working a miracle, a proof that the followers of +our Lord believed that demons inhabited springs and fountains? + +But our astonishment at the author's reference to it is increased when we +read the following words: "_Although the passage is not found in the +oldest manuscripts of the Fourth Gospel, and it is certainly a late +interpolation_." + +I must put the question again in real earnestness. This being so, why +mention it here? The author admits that it formed no portion of the +original Gospel of St. John, and that it is certainly a late +interpolation. Now the Gospel of St. John, according to the opinion of the +most eminent unbelievers, was not published before A.D. 170. If this was +the case (the author himself evidently assigns to its composition a very +late date) a late interpolation could not have found its way into its +pages until about the year 250, at the earliest 200. What then is the +nature of the reasoning before us? We are referred for proof that the +followers of Jesus held these opinions to an authority which the author +himself admits to have been a late interpolation, which could not have +been introduced into this Gospel earlier than 180 years after the ministry +of our Lord, as a proof that his original followers believed that demons +inhabited springs and fountains. Such reasonings furnish their own +refutation. + +The exposure of one more fallacy of this description will be sufficient. +We are told that, "Not only one evil spirit entered into a body, but many +took possession of the same individual. There are _many instances +mentioned in the Gospels_, such as Mary Magdalene, out of whom went seven +demons, and the man whose name was legion, because many demons had entered +into him." + +I ask, where are these "many instances"? The plain fact must be stated, +that the two here referred to, constitute the only ones which are +mentioned as facts by the Evangelists. Besides these there is the parable +of the unclean spirit going out of the man above alluded to, who, when he +could find no rest returned to his former habitation in company with seven +other spirits more wicked than himself. It should be observed that in two +of the cases the number given is the mystical number "Seven"; and that one +of them occurs in a parable, the moral of which is, to warn the Jews, that +although they had got rid of the evil spirit of idolatry, they were in +danger of falling into the greater evil of Phariseeism and hypocrisy. + +But to return to the argument. The great mass of the author's citations +for the purpose of proving that the Jews at the time of the Advent, and +among them the followers of Jesus, were a prey to these grotesque beliefs +respecting the action of demons, are made from authors who are separated +by an interval of centuries from the ministry of our Lord. I submit, +therefore, that such authorities are utterly valueless to prove that His +disciples and early followers were a prey to these gross delusions. Nor +has he adduced an atom of valid proof from the New Testament itself. The +references above referred to have either been made in a most careless +manner, or have been used to assist in proving a foregone conclusion. + +But let us suppose for the sake of argument that the Jews at the time of +our Lord did generally entertain these monstrous demoniacal beliefs: to +what conclusion, I ask, would such a fact, if true, indubitably point? +Credulous and superstitions people, invariably invent stories that are the +counterparts of their own credulity. This is proved by the whole mass of +existing mythology. Mythological inventions give us the precise measure of +the beliefs of those who have originated them. If then the demonology of +those who have elaborated these portions of the Gospels was of the +character that this writer and others assert it to have been, the Gospels +would have contained an embodiment of such demoniacal beliefs as those +which the author has so industriously collected, and has endeavoured to +fasten upon their writers. + +Now the idea of demonology having been present in the minds of the +writers, it is obvious that they did not omit all reference to these +absurd beliefs, merely because they were outside the subject on which they +were writing. But while demoniacal action is repeatedly alluded to, it is +an undeniable fact that no stories of the description given by this writer +are to be found in them. The author therefore has furnished the most +conclusive proof, without intending to do so, that these forms of thought, +to whomsoever else they may have appertained, were neither those of the +original followers of Jesus, nor of the authors of the Gospels. + +It follows therefore that this attempt to prove that the followers of our +Lord and the authors of the Gospels were a prey to such a mass of +grotesque beliefs respecting demons, as to invalidate their historical +testimony, falls to the ground, and that the data on which this has been +attempted to be established, afford proof on the contrary that they did +not entertain the beliefs in question. + + + + + +CHAPTER X. THE EXISTENCE AND MIRACLES OF SATAN. + + +I fully admit that a difficulty is involved in the idea that a being like +Satan is permitted to perform actions which bear even a remote analogy to +divine miracles. I have already shown that the New Testament only +apparently ascribes to him a supernatural action of a very limited and +special kind, differing widely from our usual conception of a miracle. I +now proceed to inquire how far this limited action, thus attributed to +him, if we suppose that possession was an objective fact, and not a form +of madness, interferes with the validity of the attestation of miracles to +the Christian revelation. + +The existence of a being like Satan is alleged as constituting an enormous +difficulty against the statements of the New Testament. A numerous class +of writers dismiss the idea of his existence as unworthy of serious +argument, and endeavour to dispose of it with a sneer. This world however +contains numerous analogous cases of very evil men endowed with the +highest mental powers, who have exerted the most injurious influences on +others. Their existence is a fact; and the difficulties attending it +cannot be got rid of by any kind of evasion. The objections that have been +urged in connection with this subject are not founded on the facts of the +moral universe as they exist; but on _à priori_ principles alone. It has +been affirmed to be incredible that Almighty God should have permitted the +existence of such a being as Satan; or if his existence is permitted, that +he can be allowed to interfere in the affairs of men. + +In dealing with this question it is evident that I must proceed on the +supposition that I am reasoning with theists only. The whole question is +irrelevant on the principles of Pantheism or Atheism, or, to put the case +more distinctly, on such principles there is no greater difficulty in +supposing that nature has evolved evil beings superior to men in their +faculties and powers in some other part of the universe, than that it has +evolved evil men, who are gifted with high forms of intelligence in this; +or even that such beings should be capable of interfering in human +affairs. If Pantheism or Atheism is a correct account of the facts of the +universe, it is impossible to say what kind of beings nature may have +evolved in the past, or may evolve in the future from her prolific womb. + +But if it is once conceded that a personal God exists, who is the moral +Governor of the Universe, the affirmation that the existence of such +beings is inconsistent with his attributes, is only another form of +asserting that the existence of moral evil is incompatible with them. The +ground of its existence has been a problem, into which the human mind has +striven to penetrate from the earliest dawn of thought, without ever +approaching to its solution; but into this question it is useless to +enter. In the present argument we are dealing with facts, and the +existence of aggravated forms of moral evil in the universe is a fact. If +there be a God, it must be consistent with his attributes. The real +difficulty lies in its existence at all in the universe of a God who is +all-powerful and good. + +But since it does exist, the existence of a being like Satan is a mere +question of degree. It is an unquestionable fact, whether we can explain +it or not, that many men of the worst moral principles have been gifted +with the highest intellectual powers, and have been placed in positions in +society which have enabled them to inflict the greatest evil on others. +History is full of such cases. The most extreme forms of human corruption +have been not inaptly designated as "Satanic." If therefore under the +moral government of God it is a fact that such forms of human wickedness +exist; and if it is supposable, that there are other rational beings in +the universe endowed with higher powers than man, how can it be +inconceivable that they may differ in moral character, precisely in the +same way as men do; and that some may be eminently virtuous, and others +fearfully corrupt? It is clear that the difficulty centres in the +existence of moral evil in the universe of a God who is possessed of +almighty power, and perfect holiness and goodness. Why has He permitted +it? Is its existence a necessary condition of the creation of a free moral +agent? If so, might not the amount of it have been greatly diminished? The +utmost light that reason can throw on these questions consists of a few +very imperfect glimmerings. The fact is undeniable, that a large mass of +moral evil exists, and in very fearful forms. If there be a Creator of the +universe, it is plain that the present state of things must be consistent +with his attributes. The only mode of escaping from this difficulty is by +taking refuge in the vastly greater ones of pantheism or atheism. + +Many theists, pressed by these difficulties, have attempted to evade them +by endeavouring to reduce the amount of moral evil in the universe, the +existence of which they cannot deny, to indefinitely small proportions, +and then affirming that it will be ultimately swallowed up in the ocean of +universal good. But the mere diminishing of its amount by no means solves +the difficulty. The real question is, how has it come even into temporary +existence? But there is also a still more grave objection to this course +of reasoning. It renders it necessary that we should close our eyes to the +most obvious facts. So far is it from being the case that the amount of +moral evil in the world is small, that it is very large. This fact is +indisputable. The whole course of history tells us that it has existed in +all past ages and in very aggravated forms. To try to get rid of the +difficulty in this manner is simply to close our eyes, and refuse to see +it. + +But not only does moral, but physical evil exist. This is another +unquestionable fact, and its existence bears directly on my argument. Many +and vain have been the attempts to explain it away. It has been affirmed +that pain after all is no such great matter. I strongly suspect that those +who have asserted this, have experienced but little of it. It is true that +it may ultimately result in good under God's government, but taken by +itself, it is undeniably an evil. Do not frightful sufferings abound? Do +not most painful diseases afflict our frames? Is it not possible to suffer +terribly from causes quite independent of our own conduct? Is not a great +earthquake a terrible calamity to those who suffer from its effects, +although it may be attended with beneficial results to those who do not? +Pains may be said to be useful warnings; but surely the warning might have +been given without the extremity of the suffering. They are also affirmed +to be the penalties of ignorance, and this may be partially true: but the +ignorance is in a vast majority of cases unavoidable. It is a simple fact, +that a great amount of physical suffering exists, the reason of which we +are wholly unable to explain. + +But further: moral evil propagates itself, and inflicts calamities on +those who are not implicated in its guilt. Is it not true that men have +existed both in the ancient and modern world, whose actions have inflicted +the greatest evils on mankind for generation after generation? Can any one +doubt that descendants suffer for the sins of remote ancestors, and +children for those of their parents? Facts are facts, and they will not +become less so by our refusing to look at them. The evil wrought by such a +man as Philip II. of Spain, is a fact, and it has extended its baneful +influence to our own times. Is not a large portion of the evils under +which France has groaned, traceable to the misdeeds of two of her +sovereigns? These were quietly sleeping in their graves, when the evils +they had occasioned burst on the head of their guiltless successor. But it +is needless to quote examples. History is one long succession of them. +Whether we like it or not, the old saying is an accurate account of the +moral order of the universe as it exists, "Visiting the sins of the +fathers on the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that +hate me, and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep +my commandments." These are facts which the theist equally with the +Christian must face, for they exist in the universe of that God, in whose +moral perfections both believe. I repeat, therefore, that the only way of +escaping from them is by rushing into the far greater difficulties of +pantheism or atheism. + +These reasonings might be indefinitely extended. The result which follows +from them is clear, that if we attempt to reason from abstract principles +to the constitution of a universe, we shall produce one utterly unlike +that which actually exists. It follows, that as they cannot account for +the facts of the universe, as they come under our observation, they are +unsafe guides on all similar questions. Consequently they are unable to +show that the existence of evil beings possessed of superhuman powers, is +inconsistent with the perfections of God. + +Nor is there any greater force in the objection, that if such beings exist +at all, it is inconsistent with our conceptions of the divine government, +that they should be allowed to interfere in the affairs of men. I reply, +that it is equally inconceivable, that God should have allowed a man, to +whom he has imparted the greatest mental endowments, and whom he has +placed in an elevated position in society, who lived centuries ago, to +exert an evil influence on the present generation. The difficulty that a +powerful influence for evil can be exerted by men on those who have never +seen them, and of whose existence they have never heard, is just as great +as the one under consideration. Yet it is one of the most undeniable of +facts, that men do exert the most powerful influence on one another, and +that such influence can be exerted by generations long since passed away +on those who live ages afterwards; and that it can be exerted +unconsciously. + +I am far from wishing to deny, that the difficulty is a real one. On the +contrary, I fully admit it; and that it is one which our present faculties +are unable to explain. But it is one which is not peculiar to +Christianity, nor has it originated in it. The interference of superhuman +beings in human affairs for the purposes of evil, would be only another +form of the same difficulty. + +Precisely similar reasonings to those which have been employed to prove +that the existence of a being like Satan is impossible, when they are +applied to other subjects, bring us into direct collision with realities. +There can be no doubt, that if the constitution of the universe had been +placed in our hands, its phenomena would have been very different. But our +function is a far humbler one. It is not to erect a universe according to +our conceptions of what is best, but to learn the order of that in which +we live, and to accept facts on sufficient evidence, however strongly they +may conflict with abstract theories. + +I now proceed to consider the real difficulty connected with this subject, +and which has been very strongly urged by the author of "Supernatural +Religion." It is this. "If it is conceivable that beings exist who possess +superhuman knowledge and power; and that they are capable of interfering +as the New Testament affirms, in the affairs of men, how can the +performance of a miracle be the guarantee of a divine commission? May not +inferior agents, who possess superhuman knowledge and power, be able to +produce results which would to all outward appearance be miraculous? Might +not an evil being, who was possessed of the highest intelligence like +Satan, perform such actions as would be equivalent to miracles, for the +purpose of authenticating falsehoods? All that such actions prove is the +presence of superhuman knowledge and power; but they would leave it quite +uncertain whether the power was divine or Satanic." Such is the objection, +and it demands an adequate solution. + +I reply, that if we view the question merely as an abstract one, it is +quite possible, if a superhuman being of high intelligence is permitted to +interfere in the affairs of men, that he should be able to perform actions +which might have all the appearance of being supernatural. Such results +might be even brought about by a superior acquaintance with the existing +forces of nature, and by a successful combination of them, without the +introduction of any new force whatever. For such results we need not +invoke the aid of a supernatural being. They have been frequently effected +by a superior human intelligence acting on an inferior one. We all know +how Columbus used his superior knowledge of astronomy, to predict an +eclipse, and the ignorant natives of America mistook this as denoting the +presence of a superhuman being. Such results may be always produced, when +superior knowledge acts on ignorance; and such is the origin of no +inconsiderable number of impositions which have been practised on mankind. +It is therefore quite conceivable, as an abstract question, that as men +who possess a very superior intelligence, are capable of producing results +which to an inferior intelligence would have the appearance of being +supernatural, without really being so, in the same manner, if Satan is +supposed to possess an intelligence greater than that of the wisest of +mankind, and if his interference in human affairs is permitted, he may be +able to perform actions which would have the appearance of being +supernatural, by a skilful use of the existing forces of nature. + +But to such power there must be a limit. There are certain results which +plainly lie beyond the power of any mere combination of the forces of +nature to produce. Of these, many of the miracles recorded in the Gospels +are instances, such as the cure of blind or leprous men by no other +visible instrumentality than a word or a touch. Actions of this kind +differ wholly in character from those which we are now considering. If a +miracle was a more objective fact taking place in external nature, and +nothing more, it might be open to question whether its performance was +owing to supernatural agency, or to some combination of known or unknown +forces. But the miracles with which we are concerned in this controversy, +involve a great deal more than more objective facts in material nature. + +But assuming, as I cannot help doing in an argument like the present, the +existence of a God, who is the Creator and Governor of the universe, the +question is not a mere abstract one, what a Being like Satan, if he is +supposed to exist, might be capable of doing; but it becomes entirely one +of permitted agency. It is plain, that if there is a God, every being in +the universe, however powerful or intelligent, can only act within a +certain definite sphere of operation, which the Governor of the universe +has assigned to him. Within what limits then is he allowed act? Are +subordinate agents permitted to interfere with the material forces of +external nature? and if so, within what bounds? Can they wander over the +universe at their mere will and pleasure, and interfere with its +operations? How far is their interference permitted in the moral and +spiritual worlds? The question before as is even reduced to one of far +narrower limits. Our only direct knowledge of the existence of such an +agency is derived from Revelation. The real point therefore which concerns +us is, to what extent is such permitted agency affirmed in the New +Testament. Do the Satanic interventions there described interfere with +divine miracles as attestations of a divine commission? We have nothing +whatever to do with abstract propositions or with what Rabbinical writers +may have affirmed on this subject, but with the assertions of the New +Testament alone. + +If there is a God, it is certain that the present order of nature must be +a manifestation of His will. So must be the energy of its forces in +conformity with invariable law. Whatever power He has delegated to +subordinate agents, must form a portion of this universal order, and be +exercised in conformity with the divine purposes. It is inconceivable that +subordinate agents can be allowed to break in upon it at their will and +pleasure, for the general permanence of its order forms an essential +condition for the exercise of moral agency. If they are allowed to do so, +it must be only within clear and definite limits, which ultimately +effectuate the purposes of the Creator. Such is the nature of the power +which man can exert over material nature. It can only modify results, by +giving a new direction to its forces. In the case of man this power is +limited to the world in which he lives. In a similar manner, if beings +superior to him in power and intelligence exist, their interference must +be subject to definite limitations. Such is the uniform affirmation of the +writers of the New Testament. Even if we take their language in the most +literal sense, the supernatural interventions which they attribute to +Satan, are confined to a very definite order of phenomena. In one word, +the sacred writers have described Satanic intervention as limited to the +world of mind; and as capable, through its action on the mind, of +producing certain results on the bodily organization. To this there is one +exception, the apparent ascription of a few diseases to Satanic agency. +This I shall consider hereafter. + +It is a remarkable fact, and one worthy of particular attention, that the +supernatural action attributed to Satan in the New Testament, with the +exception above referred to, is a mental one. It is through the action on +men's minds alone, that demoniacal agency produces any results on their +bodily frame. No direct action on the material forces of nature is ever +attributed to it. We find nothing in the smallest degree resembling the +act of a demon overturning a pitcher of water. The kind of influence +attributed to Satan is of a similar character, though much higher in +degree, to that which one man can exert over another. One man of superior +mental power is capable of exerting an influence over a weaker mind to +such a degree, as almost to enthral it. We call this a species of +fascination. In the New Testament the similar but mightier Satanic +influence is Possession. One mind, by getting a powerful hold on another, +can exert an influence on the body, as in mesmerism. The Satanic influence +exerted in possession is only a more powerful one. + +It is certain that the extent to which one human mind can act on another +is bounded by no narrow limits; what is more, it is one which is +frequently exerted for evil. It is evidently within the purposes of the +Creator to permit this. Why it is allowed to the extent to which it is, is +beyond our powers to discover. But the wide extent to which it not only +can be, but actually is exerted, is a fact that cannot be denied. It is +also an influence that can be exerted secretly. The difference between +this power and that which is supposed to be attributed to Satan in the New +Testament is far more one of degree than of kind; and the latter is one +which is bounded by clear and definite limits. Between a Satanic +possession and a miracle performed by Jesus the distinction is +unmistakable. + +It follows from the foregoing considerations, that the Satanic +supernaturalism, which we have to consider, as far as if stands in +opposition to the miracles of God, is reduced to very narrow limits. It +consists almost exclusively of possession and its phenomena. No other kind +of action bearing even a remote analogy to a miracle, with the single +exception of the history of the temptation, is anywhere attributed to +Satan in the New Testament. + +In estimating the evidential character of miracles, it has been a far too +common practice with those who deny the historical character of the +Gospels, to keep out of view their moral aspect as an important portion of +their evidential value. It has been affirmed that a miracle must be +estimated as an act of power quite apart from its moral impress. The +author before me even goes the length of supposing, that, if Satan is as +cunning as he is represented in the New Testament, he may even turn +himself into an angel of light and perform works bearing the impress of +holiness for the purpose of furthering the interests of the kingdom of +lies. + +Such an idea receives no countenance from anything which is affirmed by +St. Paul. The passage in which allusion is made to Satan transforming +himself into an angel of light is as follows: "For such are false +apostles, deceitful workers, transforming themselves into the apostles of +Christ. And no marvel, for Satan himself is transformed into an angel of +light. Therefore it is no great thing if his ministers should be +transformed as the ministers of righteousness." It is quite clear that +nothing was further from the Apostle's mind than the idea of Satanic +miracles bearing the impress of holiness as wrought in support of the +kingdom of falsehood. He is simply speaking of Judaizing teachers, who +claimed the support of apostolical authority, for the purpose of +disseminating their unchristian views. + +The idea is absurd and ridiculous, but we know that it occurred to the +opponents of our Lord, who charged him with working miracles by Satanic +agency. The special instance in which they made this charge was that of +his supposed expulsion of demons. Our Lord met it by the decisive +argument, "How can Satan cast out Satan? If Satan be divided against +himself, how shall his kingdom stand?" In a word, he appealed to the moral +aspect of his miracles as a convincing proof that their accusation could +only have been instigated by deliberate malice. + +The same objection was doubtless urged against his other miracles, +although it is nowhere stated in express terms in the Gospels. But +whatever absurd beliefs may have been entertained by the learned Rabbis, +they were easily met by the common sense of the people. "We know," said +the Rabbis, "that this man is a sinner." "How can a man that is a sinner +perform such miracles?" is the reply. "Whether he be a sinner, I know not, +but one thing I know, that whereas I was blind, now I see." "Can a devil +open the eyes of the blind?" It is evident that the difficulties suggested +by the author of "Supernatural Religion" as to the evidential value of +miracles being nullified by the views which prevailed respecting +demoniacal action were not appreciated when the fourth Gospel was +composed, although according to this theory they ought to have been at +that time in full force. But apart from the peculiar character ascribed to +Satanic supernaturalism in the New Testament, the entire idea that there +could have been any danger of confounding Satanic miracles with the +miracles of God, rests on the fallacy of confounding a mere objective fact +with an action of a moral agent. A miracle does not consist merely in the +outward event, which is caused by him, but in the occurrence united with +the character and purpose of the agent. The actions of holy beings must +bear the impress of their holiness; those of evil ones, of the contrary. +If, therefore, evil moral agents are capable of performing actions which +are analogous to miracles, they cannot fail to be stamped with the evil of +their characters. Such would always form a discriminating mark between +Divine and Satanic miracles, even on the supposition that the latter are +possible. + +This precisely represents the case as it stands in the New Testament. All +the miracles alleged to have been wrought by God, bear a definite impress +of character and purpose. The supernaturalism ascribed to Satan is no less +definitely marked. The one clearly comes from above. The indications that +the other, if real, must have come from below, are equally distinct. The +moral impress which the two series of events bear, is fully sufficient to +discriminate the one from the other. + +The attempt to distinguish between the miraculous act and its moral +environment, is absurd. It has been affirmed that one miraculous act is as +good as another, quite apart from the circumstances with which they are +attended. Such a principle would destroy the distinction between a highly +meritorious act and the foulest crime. A, for example, has killed B. The +outward act may be the same; but the accompanying circumstances make all +the distinction between a justifiable homicide, and a most atrocious +murder. It is ridiculous to affirm that principles which are legitimate in +common life become invalid only when they are applied to the evidences of +Christianity. Why, in the name of common sense, may not one miracle be as +clearly distinguishable from another by its moral environment, as an event +in ordinary life is similarly distinguished? The affirmation, therefore, +that the supposition of the possibility of Satanic miracles must +invalidate the miracles of God is absurd. + +Our Lord, therefore, was right in appealing to the character of his works +as affording a conclusive proof of the source whence they originated, and +in contrasting them with the species of supernaturalism which was +popularly attributed to Satan. "How can Satan cast out Satan? If I do not +the works of my Father, believe me not; but if I do, though ye believe not +me, believe the works, that ye may see and believe that the Father is in +me and I in Him." + +This is conclusive reasoning. It is only possible to darken the question +by treating it as one of bare possibilities, as to what kind of actions a +being like Satan might be capable of performing, if he is allowed to +interfere with the arrangements of the universe at his pleasure. Such a +supposition is foreign to the question at issue, which is whether the +supernaturalism which the New Testament is supposed to attribute to him +can interfere with the evidential value of the miracles wrought by Jesus. +My reply is, Examine and compare the two. When this has been done, no +doubt can remain on any reasonable mind that the latter, if real, are from +above; and the former from below. The affirmation therefore that if +Satanic miracles, such as possession, are possible, it invalidates the +evidence of those wrought by God in attestation of the truth of a divine +commission is disproved. + +Equally invalid is the objection against a miraculous attestation to a +divine commission, on the ground that such testimony can be easily +imitated. I reply, that the great mass of the miracles recorded in the New +Testament do not easily admit of a fraudulent imitation. I by no means +deny that the art of legerdemain is capable of producing results which to +an ignorant observer have the appearance of being supernatural. But this +class of actions bears not the smallest analogy to the miracles recorded +in the New Testament. No art of legerdemain can persuade a man who has +been for many years blind to believe that he has recovered his sight, and +enable him to act accordingly. + +But it has been argued; if God is the moral Governor of the universe, is +He not bound to prevent a being like Satan from acting for the purposes of +evil in the affairs of men? This question may be best answered by asking +another. Is He not equally bound to hinder evil men from exerting such +terrible influences on others, even long after they are dead? Is He not +bound to hinder the possibility of the bringing up of children by their +parents in various forms of vice, so as to render them in after life, more +wicked than themselves? Yet it is an indubitable fact that such an +influence is exerted under the moral government of God. Human life abounds +with such cases, which bear a close analogy to Satanic action exerted in +the affairs of men. When we can fully fathom the reason for the permission +of the one, we shall have made considerable progress in understanding +those of the other. The case may be simply stated. There are difficulties +in the moral government of the universe, into the grounds of which we +cannot penetrate. These press equally on every form of theism. The Satanic +supernaturalism described in the New Testament presents a precisely +analogous difficulty. This therefore can form no reason why one who +believes that God is the moral Governor of the universe, as it now exists, +should reject Christianity because the difficulties are of a similar +order, and press equally on both. The only escape from them, as I have +already said, is the inevitable position assumed by atheism, or pantheism, +and the dreary prospect which they afford to the aspirations of the human +mind. + + + + + +CHAPTER XI. POSSESSION: IS THE THEORY THAT IT WAS MADNESS SUBVERSIVE OF +THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE GOSPELS OR INCONSISTENT WITH THE VERACITY OF +CHRIST? + + +There can be no doubt that the subject of possession is attended with real +difficulties, whichever view we may take of its actual character. + +The symptoms which are alleged to have accompanied it present many of the +usual phenomena of madness. No possession is believed to take place now, +but such phenomena are attributed to causes purely natural. The supposed +possessions therefore which are mentioned in the New Testament or in other +ancient writings are said to be due only to ignorance of natural causes. +Many very eminent defenders of Christianity have been so deeply impressed +by these and other reasons that they have admitted that possession is only +a form of madness, and that the language respecting it in the New +Testament is based on the current ideas of the day. + +It is desirable that the difficulty should be put in the strongest light. +I will therefore state it in the words of the author of "Supernatural +Religion." "It would be an insult to the understanding of those who are +considering this question, to pause here to prove that the historical +books of the New Testament, speak in the clearest and most unmistakable +terms of actual demoniacal possession." Now what has become of this theory +of disease? The Archbishop of Dublin is probably the only one who asserts +the reality of demoniacal possession formerly, and in the present day; and +in this way we must say that he is consistent. Dean Milman, on the other +hand, who spoke with the enlightenment of the 19th century, "has no +scruple in averring his opinion on the subject of demoniacal possession to +be that of Joseph Mede, Lardner, Dr. Mead, Paley, and all the learned +modern writers. It was a kind of insanity, and nothing is more probable +than that lunacy would take the turn, and speak the language of the +prevailing superstition of the times." The Dean, as well as "all the +learned modern writers" to whom he refers, felt the difficulty, but in +seeking to evade it, they sacrifice the Gospels. They overlook the fact, +that the writers of these narratives, not only themselves adopt "the +prevailing superstition of the times," but represent Jesus as doing so +with equal completeness. There is no possibility, for instance, of evading +such statements as those in the miracle of the country of the Gadarenes, +where the objectivity of the demons is so fully recognised, that on being +cast out of the man, they are represented as requesting to be allowed to +go into the herd of swine, and being permitted by Jesus to do so, the +entry of the demons into the swine is at once signalised by the herd +running violently down the cliff into the lake and being drowned. (p. +131.) The author might have strengthened his case, as far as modern +authorities are concerned, by drawing attention to the fact, that even Dr. +Farrar, who seems to maintain the objective reality of demoniacal +possessions in his recently published "Life of Christ," admits that in the +statement that the demons locally passed from the man into the swine, some +inaccuracy has crept into the narrative of the Evangelists. + +It will be at once seen that the all-important point in this objection is +the apparent acceptance by our Lord of demoniacal possession, as being a +correct account of an objective fact. I fully agree with this writer, that +those who affirm that it was madness and nothing else are bound, when they +propose this solution of the difficulty, to point out distinctly how it +affects the question of our Lord's veracity, and the historical character +of the Gospels. + +In approaching this question, let me at once observe that while I +entertain a definite opinion as to the nature of the inspiration of the +New Testament derived not from _à priori_ assumptions, but from a careful +study of its facts and phenomena, yet the question at issue is not what is +the nature or the extent of the inspiration, but the reality of the +supernatural events recorded in the Gospels. This issue is one which is +purely historical, and therefore I have simply to examine it on historical +grounds, and not to defend any particular theory of inspiration. Our +business is first to ascertain what are the facts of the New Testament +which are supported by historical evidence; when we have ascertained +these, we shall be in a position to propound a theory of inspiration in +accordance with the facts and assertions; still, however, it will be +necessary to find out how a certain state of the facts will affect the +character which the Gospels attribute to our Lord. + +The following facts are plain on the surface of the Gospels. First, that +the followers of our Lord believed that the demoniacal possessions there +recorded were objective facts, and not mere forms of disease. + +Secondly, that our Lord himself, if the words attributed to Him are +correctly reported, used language which seems to imply that He shared in +this belief. + +Thirdly, that in a particular instance, not only do the Evangelists affirm +that our Lord addressed a demoniac, but also the demons who possessed him, +and that He permitted their departure into a herd of swine, thereby +apparently confirming the objective reality of the possession. + +The question is a far more serious one, as it affects our Lord, than those +on whose reports the statements of the Gospels are founded. He is +represented as being a divine person, and as possessed in His human +nature, not of infinite but of superhuman knowledge. His apparent sanction +of an erroneous view is therefore a very different thing from the apparent +sanction of it by an author of a Gospel, or from the mistaken views which +his followers might have entertained as to the causes of a bodily disease. + +I should find no difficulty in adopting the theory of the eminent writers +above named, that the demoniacal possessions mentioned in the New +Testament, were nothing but forms of insanity, if it were not that our +Lord has apparently recognised their reality. It has been urged that if +possession was nothing but insanity, there is an end of the miracle. But +this is not the case, for the cure of a madman is quite as much a +supernatural act as the expulsion of a demon. + +Let me now assume for argument's sake, that possession was simple madness. +How does such a supposition affect the veracity of the authors of the +Gospels, and their judgment as credible historians of the events of our +Lord's life? + +If we assume that possession was madness, it is evident from the language +which the Evangelists have employed that they must have shared in the +ignorance of the times in which they lived as to the true causes of the +complaint. When however we speak of the ignorance of any particular +period, it should be observed that the expression is an indefinite one. We +have no right to impute to any body of authors opinions on particular +subjects of which their writings contain no traces. It has been affirmed, +as we have seen, that the Jews of the apostolic age held a number of +opinions on the subject of possession of the most grotesque and monstrous +description. I have already shown that to impute these opinions to them, +when no trace of them can be found in their writings is a most unfair mode +of reasoning. + +When, therefore, I use the expression that they must have shared in the +ignorance of the age respecting the causes of this disease, I must guard +against the danger of ascribing to them a greater degree of ignorance than +that which they have actually shown. The expression, "ignorance of the +age," denotes no uniform quantity of ignorance shared in by every +individual alike. In an ignorant or superstitious age, one person may be +far more so than another. It is quite conceivable that two thousand years +hence human improvement may have become so great, that those who live in +the present century may be designated as ignorant. It may be hereafter +asserted that such writers as Huxley, Tyndall, Herbert Spencer, and Mill +shared in the ignorance of the age in which they lived on some important +physical facts. But from this it would be absurd to draw the conclusion +that they were believers in the alleged facts of spiritualism because +large numbers of their contemporaries were known to have believed in them, +and spiritualistic publications enjoy a large circulation both in Europe +and America in this nineteenth century. + +As far as the Evangelists are concerned, the supposition that I am now +considering involves nothing more than that they held a false theory as to +the cause of a particular form of disease, and that they have used +language respecting it that embodies this theory. In this point of view +they would not differ from writers of every age who have entertained false +theories as to the causes of physical phenomena. In such cases it is easy +to separate the fact from the incorrect view as to what were the causes of +that fact. Ancient philosophical writers held many false theories as to +the place of the local habitation in our bodies of certain affections of +our moral nature. These can be traced very distinctly in the language of +the present day. Thus we say that a man is devoid of heart, and talk of +making appeals to the heart. These, and multitudes of similar expressions +which occur both in ancient and modern writings, involve false +philosophical theories; but it is easy to separate the facts intended from +the theories. Thus, if the authors of the Gospels inform us that our Lord +cured a demoniac, and give an account of the demoniac's outcries, as +though they were the utterances of a demon, we have only to substitute +madman for demoniac, and the correct state of the case is easily +discovered. + +The real difficulty which is felt on this subject, arises not from the +narratives as ordinary histories, but on the supposition that the writers +possessed an inspiration which ought to have guarded them from such +errors. Popular theories of inspiration unquestionably render such an +assumption necessary, but I can see no ground for it, either in the +statements of the Gospels, or any other portion of the New Testament. +Nowhere is it affirmed that its writers were to be guided into all truth, +scientific, philosophical, or even historical. All that is affirmed is +that they possessed a degree of supernatural enlightenment adequate to +communicate the Christian revelation to mankind. Neither is there a hint +given, nor can a fact be adduced, to show that their supernatural +illumination extended beyond this. The spiritual gifts bestowed no +enlightenment beyond the special function of those gifts. This the +affirmation of St. Paul in the Epistles to the Corinthians makes clear. A +person having the gift of tongues, if he had not also that of +interpretation was unable to interpret his own utterances, and the +possession of the high gift of prophecy by no means exempted the possessor +from the danger of using it in a manner to create confusion in the Church. +Even the highest apostolic gifts conferred no infallibility, but were +strictly limited to their proper functions of communicating the great +truths of the Christian revelation. The idea that they conferred a general +infallibility is no statement of the New Testament, but a pure figment of +the imagination. + +It therefore by no means follows because the writers of the New Testament +had an illumination sufficient for their functions that they had any other +than their ordinary enlightenment beyond that limit. They might have been +good teachers of religious truth, and yet utterly ignorant of physical +science. The assertion may be correct that St. Luke possessed a +supernatural guidance sufficient to enable him to compose the third +Gospel, and yet it may be no less true, that as a physician he had no +medical knowledge beyond that of his time, and that he shared in all its +errors as to the causes and cure of physical disease. A man may be a good +physician of the soul, and at the same time a very ignorant physician of +the body. It is quite conceivable, therefore, even if the Evangelists or +those followers of Christ from whom they derived their accounts possessed +various degrees of supernatural enlightenment on matters directly +affecting Christianity, that they possessed none whatever as to the causes +of disease, and that they may have viewed madness as a result of +demoniacal action, and described it accordingly. The facts would remain +the same; the symptoms might have been exhibited, and the cure actually +effected. + +But the New Testament likewise affirms that our Lord imparted to His +followers the power of expelling demons, as well as that of healing +diseases. Now, on the supposition that these demoniacs were simple +maniacs, how does this affect the credibility of the narrative? + +I reply that during the mission of the Apostles and the Seventy (for these +are the cases alluded to) there is no promise made them of supernatural +enlightenment. They were simply sent out to announce a specific fact, the +near approach and setting up of the kingdom of heaven, and to work +miracles in confirmation of it. It is true that in His address to them, +our Lord told them that a time was coming when they would have to testify +to Him before princes and kings, and that He promises them, that they +should receive supernatural assistance, suitable to the emergency. But +this never arose during the mission in question. They were commanded to +cure the reputed demoniac in confirmation of their mission. This would be +an equally miraculous sign whether he was one possessed or a simple +maniac. In this case, therefore, there was no reason why they should be +supernaturally enlightened as to the causes of this disease, more than of +any other. No doubt the theories then prevalent as to the causes of +disease generally were very faulty. It could not be otherwise in the state +of medical science at that period. So they must always have been while +such a truth as the circulation of the blood was unknown. But the object +of Christianity was not to communicate scientific knowledge, or to teach +the true causes of disease, but to discover truths mightily operative in +the moral and spiritual worlds. It follows, therefore, that the ignorance +of the disciples as to the actual causes of mania no more affects the +credibility of the narrative than their ignorance of the causes of +paralysis or leprosy. + +It is also evident from the statements of the Gospels, that there were a +considerable number of persons who practised exorcisms of various kinds, +and who fully believed that the persons on whom they operated were +possessed by demons. It seems also probable from the allusions made to +them, that these exorcisms were occasionally successful in effecting a +cure; and it may be, more frequently, in mitigating the symptoms. This, +however, was not always the case; for the Evangelists describe the +disciples as entirely unsuccessful in the case of the child, out of whom +they invoked the demon to depart in the name of Jesus. It is worthy of +observation, that in this instance, the father of the demoniac describes +his son's case as a combination of lunacy and possession, "He is lunatic +and sore vexed." Their failure is directly attributed to want of faith, +_i.e._ that there was something wanting in their mental state which +prevented them from exerting the requisite influence over the lunatic +youth. The want of success with which exorcists were not unfrequently +attended is strikingly set before us in the account given in the Acts of +the Apostles, of the attempt made by certain Jewish exorcists to cure the +demoniac at Ephesus. In this case it not only ended in a complete failure, +but in an aggravation of the malady. + +Now when we consider the various forms which mania assumes, it is quite +credible that exorcisms may have exerted a favourable influence on it, +altogether apart from any supernatural power possessed by the operator. It +is clear that the supposed maniacs imagined themselves under the influence +of demoniacal possession. When we consider the powerful influence that one +mind is capable of exerting over another under these circumstances we can +see that the presence of superior mental power was an influence exactly +suited to produce a favourable result. In our modern treatment of mania +(whatever may be the opinions as to its physical origin) it is now +universally admitted that moral means are the most efficacious. Some +obvious physical causes can be dealt with and removed, while others +cannot. But the most successful operator on these forms of lunacy is he +who applies to them the most effective moral treatment, under which in +many cases its symptoms have gradually disappeared. One of these modes of +treatment is never to cross the patient on the subject of his delusions. +Nothing is more remarkable than the influence which the efficient +practitioner can exert over persons suffering from these forms of madness, +by the mere energy of his will; a display of mental power analogous to +that of strong faith. This will often produce a calm among maniacs which +persons of inferior endowments utterly fail to excite. It is an +unquestionable fact that high mental and moral power is capable of +producing striking results on different forms of maniacal disease. + +This being so, it follows that exorcists might be capable of exerting upon +maniacs a powerful influence favourable to cure. In the ancient world the +usual treatment was that of extreme harshness. The demoniac of Gadara had +been bound with chains and fetters. This is now known to have a direct +tendency to aggravate the disease, rather than to cure it. It is no +wonder, therefore, if the exorcist, by adopting an opposite mode of +treatment, and even by sympathizing with the sufferer's delusions, was +capable of alleviating the symptoms of the complaint, if not of effecting +a cure. The whole result may have been due to moral influence and +spiritual power, which may have been taken for the expulsion of a demon. +In whatever way it was effected, the cure or the alleviation was no less +real. + +It follows, therefore, that the exorcists of the ancient world were far +from necessarily being a set of impostors, even on the supposition that +possession was simple mania. They may have been able to effect real +alleviations or even cures of the complaint, although they were ignorant +as to its cause, or how their exertions produced a successful result. +There is nothing inconsistent with their general honesty, if they +themselves were under the belief that they were expelling demons, while +they were really curing ordinary mania. It should also be observed, that a +real power of exerting an influence on madmen was one which in those times +of ignorance, both of mental and physical science, admitted of fearful +abuse, and if exercised for evil purposes, was capable of producing many +of the worst results with which the practice of witchcraft and sorcery +have been attended. A large portion of these latter operations no doubt +resulted from the successful practice of ocular deception, but another +portion of them unquestionably resulted from the mighty influences that a +powerful mind can exert over a weak, imaginative, and superstitious one. +There are many depths of human nature into which science has as yet failed +to penetrate; and among these are the entire phenomena of mania and +religious frenzy. + +These facts and considerations are sufficient to vindicate the credibility +of the writers of the New Testament in their statement, that a power of +exorcism was known and exercised in their time, and that its exercise was +at times attended with favourable results. The statement on this subject +attributed to our Lord, "If I by Satan cast out devils, by whom do your +sons cast them out? therefore shall they be your judges," is plainly an +_ad hominem_ argument. It amounts to no more than this; You Pharisees +accuse me of casting out demons through Beelzebub. You assert that your +disciples exercise a power of exorcism; and that they do this in virtue of +a divine power communicated to them. On what principle of common sense can +you affirm that the power which I exercise is demoniacal, and that which +your disciples exercise is divine?--There is no assertion made one way or +the other as to the reality of the acts in question; nor is there any +difficulty in supposing that our Lord recognised that some of the +influences thus exerted were genuine. + +I have hitherto, in treating this part of the subject, been dealing with +the supposition that our Lord's disciples mistook maniacs for demoniacs, +and the consequences of such a mistake on the authenticity of the Gospel +narratives. I must now address myself to the far more important question +as to the consequences which follow from our Lord's apparent recognition +of the existence of demoniacal possession on the supposition that it was +simple mania. + +The facts as they appear in the Gospels are unmistakable. It was the +distinct opinion of their authors that our Lord recognised the phenomena +which they have reported as the results of demoniacal possession and not +of simple mania. In proof of this it will be needless to refer to every +instance they have recorded. The account of the demoniac at Gadara and +that of the lunatic youth are among the most remarkable, and on them the +case may be allowed to rest. In the former case the words of St. Mark, +whose description of the scene abounds in those details which are rarely +seen except in narratives derived from direct ocular testimony, are: "And +all the demons besought him, saying, Send us into the swine that we may +enter into them. And forthwith Jesus gave them leave. And the unclean +spirits went out and entered into the swine, &c." In the case of the +demoniac child the Evangelist describes the Apostles as asking Jesus, "Why +could not we cast him out?" The following words are ascribed to our Lord: +"This kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting." It is undeniable, +therefore, that the Evangelists have ascribed to Jesus a belief in the +reality of demoniacal possession. + +I am not concerned in the present argument with the words and actions +which they have attributed to the demoniacs; but with the words and +actions attributed to Jesus. We know that some madmen labour under the +delusion, not only that they are emperors and kings, but even in a few +instances that they are God himself. This being so, it is quite possible +that a maniac may confuse his personality with one or more demons; and +speak and act consistently with the delusion. The maniacs may have given +utterance to exclamations resulting from mere delusions; but the +Evangelists in recording these utterances gave simple statements of facts. +It is quite possible, that the demoniac of Gadara may have imagined +himself possessed by a legion of demons, and have spoken and acted +accordingly, whilst he was at the same time labouring under simple mania. + +Now, on the assumption that possession was simple mania and nothing more, +the following suppositions are the only possible ones. + +First, that our Lord really distinguished between mania and possession; +but that the Evangelists have inaccurately reported his words and actions, +through the media of their own subjective impressions, or, in short, have +attributed to Him language that He did not really utter. + +Second, that our Lord knew that possession was a form of mania, and +adopted the current notions of the time in speaking of it, and that the +words were really uttered by Him. + +Third, that with similar knowledge, He adopted the language in question as +part of the curative process. + +Fourth, that He accepted the validity of the distinction, and that it was +a real one during those times. + +These alternatives demand our careful consideration, not for the purpose +of determining which is the correct one, but of estimating the results +which flow from either of them on the central character of the Gospels. +The position which I take must be clearly stated. It is this: If +possession be mania, there is nothing in the language which the +Evangelists have attributed to our Lord which compromises the truthfulness +of his character. If, on the other hand, we assume that possession was an +objective fact, there is nothing in our existing scientific knowledge of +the human mind which proves that the possessions of the New Testament were +impossible. + +Let us consider the first alternative. + +A careful examination of the phenomena presented by the synoptic Gospels +leads to the irresistible conclusion that they largely consist of accounts +which had been handed down by oral tradition, for a considerable time +prior to their being committed to writing, and that these have been in +various degrees supplemented by information derived from other sources. +Assuming this to have been the case it gives an adequate account of the +differences of form which they present, their variations in minor +circumstances, and that most remarkable of all their phenomena, the +samenesses of expression interwoven with considerable diversities, which +is presented alike by the parallel narratives and discourses. The +threefold and more frequently twofold form in which several of the +discourses have been handed down to us, prevent us from believing that +these discourses were intended to be rigid reproductions of the verbal +utterances of our Lord. All they can be is an accurate account of the +sense and very frequently of his words. The important question for our +present consideration is, Have the Evangelists, in reporting the +discourses of Jesus, imparted to them a colouring derived from their own +subjective impressions or do they accurately convey to us his meaning and +his meaning only? Or with respect to the point before us, Have the +Evangelists in reporting the utterances of Jesus to the demoniacs and his +observations on possession to his disciples given us the substance of what +He actually said, or their own impressions of what He might have said? + +I reply, the internal grounds for assuming their accuracy are strong. This +is vouched for by the fact that while we have a three or twofold report of +the same discourse, varying very considerably in words and arrangement, +and while we have whole sentences in one Evangelist which materially aid +in determining the meaning, either omitted in one or inserted in another, +still with all these variations in expression, the variations in sense are +of the smallest possible importance. This being the case the whole aspect +of the discourses leads us to infer that they are altogether unaffected by +the subjective impressions of those who reported them. They are indelibly +stamped with the mind of Jesus himself and with his alone. There are many +points on which his teaching ran strongly counter to the subjective +impressions of those who reported it. Here then if such impressions had +intruded themselves we should be certain to find indications of such +intrusion, and that in no doubtful form. But there are none. The theory +therefore of the introduction of the subjective impressions of the +followers of our Lord into the discourses has no foundation in their +contents, and therefore it is wholly illegitimate to assume it for the +solution of a difficulty. + +The phenomena which distinguish St. Mark's Gospel strongly display the +marks of autoptic testimony. This greatly increases the difficulty of the +supposition in question, for these expressions are found in that Gospel, +and in it we also find the remarkable saying, "This kind goeth not out but +by prayer and fasting." It seems therefore impossible to doubt the +Evangelist's assertion that such words were uttered by our Lord. + +But I must now inquire whether Dr. Farrar's supposition is tenable, that +some misapprehension has crept into the narrative when it affirms that the +demons in objective reality left the body of the man and entered into the +swine. + +I answer that there is nothing in the Evangelists which requires us to +consider their words as an accurately scientific statement of the mode in +which the demon acted on the mind of the possessed. + +It is true that they repeatedly say that they entered in and out of the +man, but this may well be in conformity with popular ideas on the subject, +without intending to assert as a scientific fact, that the demons made +either the body or the spirit of the man their local habitation. The New +Testament attempts to determine nothing respecting the _modus operandi_ of +spirits. God is said to dwell in a holy man, but it is ridiculous to +affirm that the omnipresent Spirit makes the man his local habitation. +There is a case in point as to the use of such language in the narrative +of the woman who was healed of the issue of blood. The effect produced on +her is described by our Lord and the Evangelists by the words "Power +({~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}) has gone out of me." Yet no one who considers the mode in which +the Gospels are composed, will affirm that our Lord by using these words +intended to convey a scientific truth as to his _modus operandi_ in +performing the miracle, or that it was actually performed by some subtle +emanation called "Power," which issued from his person. With those who +assume that neither our Lord nor his Apostles could use popular +expressions of this kind, but were bound to use terms of strict scientific +accuracy all reasoning is thrown away. If the strictest verbal accuracy +must be observed on every occasion it would be incorrect to say that a +physician has cured a lunatic, for the idea on which the term lunacy is +founded is scientifically inaccurate. It follows therefore that the terms +which are so constantly applied to demons in the New Testament, that they +entered into, departed out of, or possessed a man may well be popular +expressions, denoting that they exerted a mighty, nay, an overwhelming +influence upon him, which in the shattered state of his physical or moral +condition he was unable to shake off, without determining anything as to +the mode in which that influence was exerted. Thus, in St. John's Gospel, +the devil is described as having put it ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}) _into the heart_ of +Judas Iscariot to betray our Lord. After the giving of the sop, Satan is +said to have entered into him. Surely the only fact which these words are +intended to convey is that Judas allowed his whole moral and spiritual +being to be overpowered by the influence of the evil one. It is quite +possible that the Evangelists might have thought that the influence was +exerted by actually going in or coming out of a man. But this is a mere +physical theory as to the mode of action, and certainly is not a point on +which the writings of the New Testament anywhere affirm that a +supernatural knowledge was imparted to their authors. + +It follows therefore that the expressions "going out from the man," and +"entering into the swine," may only denote the cessation of the influence +of the demons over the man, and its exertion on the swine, without +determining the mode in which that influence was exerted. Surely when our +Lord promised that He would come to the man who loved him and make his +abode with him, that did not imply a local indwelling of his person but an +indwelling of influence. + +With such expressions in abundance before us, in which it is obvious that +they were never intended to denote anything local, it is absurd to fix it +on the sacred writers in this particular case. They nowhere assert that +the demons were seen to pass from the man and enter the swine. It was +simply a matter of inference from the facts which they witnessed that they +had done so. The man ceased to rave and became a rational creature. The +swine rushed down into the lake and perished. They also affirm that the +result took place by the permission of Jesus. Yet it is somewhat +remarkable that it is only Matthew who attributes to him the word "Go." +Mark and Luke only mention the request of the demons, and the result which +followed. There is nothing therefore derogatory to the character of the +Evangelists as historians in supposing that the facts received a colouring +from their own subjective impressions, though it would be so if under such +circumstances they had allowed those impressions to assign a different +meaning to our Lord's words from that which he actually conveyed. + +This conclusion at which we have arrived, that our Lord's meaning is +accurately reported by the Evangelists, disposes of the first alternative. +We will now proceed to examine the second, viz., that our Lord knew that +possession was mania, and that He adopted the current notions of the times +in speaking of it. The all important question is, how far does this affect +his veracity? + +On this point Archbishop Trench has laid down the following position +broadly: "If Jesus knew that the Jewish belief in demoniacal possession +was baseless and that Satan did not exercise such power over the bodies or +spirits of men there would be in such language that absence of agreement +between thoughts and words in which the essence of a lie consists." + +If this position is correct it involves a principle far more extensive +than the case immediately before us. It is nothing less than that our Lord +neither in his formal teaching nor in his conversation should have used +language which was other than scientifically correct. It might be argued, +that if He had done so He would have lent his sanction to the error which +it involved. Even if the principle thus laid down could be confined to +religious truth (which it cannot), it would then have been necessary that +whenever the current ideas, or the mode of conception of the day contained +an assumption involving an incorrect theory or endangering a religious +error, our Lord ought to have corrected it in the course of his teaching. +If we admit that demoniacal possession was a real agency there can be no +doubt that the Jews would confound many cases of ordinary mania with it. +This being so, if the principle is correct, our Lord ought to have pointed +out the distinction. Again, even if it is assumed that demoniacal agency +was sometimes manifested in the phenomena of witchcraft, there can be no +doubt that much of it was due to human imposture. On the principle laid +down by the Archbishop our Lord ought to have corrected every error that +was prevalent on that subject. On the same principle it would have been +impossible for him to have used an _ad hominem_ argument or in fact any +form of expression founded on an erroneous conception. It is therefore +evident that the principle, if accepted at all, can only be accepted under +very considerable qualifications, or we shall convert our Lord from the +revealer of truth and teacher of Christianity into one whose duty it was +to combat every erroneous opinion of the day. On such a theory it is +difficult to see how our Lord was not bound to correct every erroneous +opinion then current respecting the first and second chapters of Genesis, +and to point out their true relation to the modern discoveries of geology, +for He expressly referred to the second chapter in his teaching. He also +referred to the flood, respecting which many erroneous opinions were +undoubtedly current. If the principle is good it might be urged that He +sanctioned those errors by his silence. + +The same principle must also have been applicable to many other erroneous +opinions which the Jews entertained respecting the interpretation of the +Old Testament. In fact it would be difficult to assign any limits to our +Lord's duty of correcting popular errors which had any kind of bearing on +religious truth. + +But to return to the demoniacs. Is there any thing inconsistent with our +Lord's truthfulness, if we suppose that they were lunatics and nothing +more, in his using the current language of the day respecting them? Let it +be observed that two considerations are really involved; first, our Lord +is represented as conversing directly with the demoniac. Secondly, He also +occasionally speaks of demoniacal possession in his ordinary teaching in +the current language of the day. Now if it be admitted to be consistent +with his truthfulness to address such language to the maniac, is it +equally so to employ such language in his discourses to others? + +I observe first, that if possession was mania, the real ground of the +popular error was an erroneous opinion as to the cause of a natural +disorder. The popular belief in fact ascribed it to supernatural instead +of natural causes. So far, but no farther, it touched religious questions. +To correct the error involved not merely the teaching of religious truth, +but in this particular case the enunciation of sounder principles of +mental philosophy. I think that I may fearlessly affirm that the teaching +of scientific truth, either mental or material, did not come within the +scope of our Lord's divine mission. Political truth is a part of moral +truth, and moral truth is closely allied to religious truth. Now although +Christianity is a power which will ultimately reform the political world, +our Lord expressly affirmed that it was no part of his mission to +enunciate political truth. + +In the same manner it may have formed no direct portion of his mission to +teach correct views respecting the origin of mania, or to counteract the +opinions which ascribed it to supernatural causes. + +If this principle is correct, there is nothing inconsistent with his +truthfulness if when our Lord conversed with a supposed demoniac, He +addressed him in language which took for granted the truth of his +delusions. Even if it is supposed that truthfulness required that He +should have exposed a popular delusion, surely it was no occasion for +doing so, when He was addressing a madman. Who would affirm that a +physician is wanting in truthfulness if he addresses his patient in terms +of his own delusions, or imagines that it is his duty to enter into a +discussion with a madman as to the causes of his malady? + +On these principles it is quite consistent with our Lord's truthfulness to +suppose that the dialogue with the demoniac of Gadara actually occurred, +while He himself knew that possession was nothing but mania. Let us +suppose that the man was a raving madman. He had been treated cruelly. He +rushed towards Jesus and was awed by the greatness of his character. The +dialogue takes place, as it is described by the Evangelist. I see no want +of truthfulness on our Lord's part, nor can I conceive any necessity for +explaining to the man that he was not possessed by a multitude of demons; +or if the madman requested that the demons by whom he imagined himself +possessed might be allowed to go into the swine, that our Lord should +explain to him that it was impossible that they should do so because the +idea of the demoniac was a delusion. The case would be one of confused or +double personality, and accordingly the narrator has described the demons +and the man as alternately speaking, and our Lord as addressing them. In +such a case the form of the narrative would be modified by the subjective +impressions of the narrator. + +But the words which our Lord is described as addressing to the demoniac +lad also require consideration. St. Mark describes them as follows. Jesus +rebuked the foul spirit, saying unto him, "Thou deaf and dumb spirit, I +charge thee come out of him, and enter no more into him; and the spirit +cried, and rent him sore and came out of him." Let us suppose that the +disease was mania, and that our Lord knew it to be so, but that the +father, as well as the maniac and the others who were present believed +that it was caused by the action of an evil spirit. What was there +inconsistent with veracity in addressing the maniac in terms of his own +delusions? If it is urged that the belief in possession was a +superstition, and that to use such language tended to confirm the belief, +I reply that if we assume that our Lord was bound not to use the language +which was common among his hearers in speaking of such diseases, or that +He ought to have given explanations of their true causes, then we assume +that his character as a revealer of Christianity rendered it necessary +that in the course of his public ministry He should correct all the errors +which He encountered, and never use language which had originated in them. + +The words which are ascribed to our Lord by the Evangelist when He stilled +the tempest will throw light on this subject. St. Mark gives them as +follows: "He rebuked the winds and said to the sea, Peace, be still." The +word here rendered "Be still" is in the Greek far more emphatic, _Be +gagged_ ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}). In the case of the demoniac our Lord is represented as +rebuking the evil spirit. Here He rebukes the waves. Now it is only +possible to rebuke rational agents. Such an expression would therefore be +only accurate if addressed to a being who was capable of hearing it, and +who was uttering load cries. It may be objected that the expression +favours the notion that the speaker supposed the roaring of the waves to +be the voice of an evil spirit, who was exciting the tempest, or, in other +words, that He gave countenance to the heathen belief, that it was the +voice of Æolus, the spirit of the storm. Whatever amount of superstition +may be attributed to the Jews at the time of the Advent, it will scarcely +be urged that the followers of Jesus attributed the roaring of the gale to +the voice of a demon. Still it may be urged on the principles above +referred to that the words uttered by our Lord tended to confirm +superstitions notions as to the nature and origin of storms. I argue, on +the other hand, that these expressions prove indisputably that the +language used by Him was not always intended to be a literal description +of fact, any more than the numerous similar addresses to the inanimate +creation which we find in the Psalms. + +But in the case of the demoniac, the real difficulty consists in the +results which are alleged to have happened to the swine. I have already +obviated some portion of this as far as the form of the narrative is +concerned. But there remains the fact that the swine are stated to have +rushed into the lake and perished. As to the reality of such an occurrence +there can have been no mistake. The mere mode of expression offers no +explanation, nor can a mistake respecting such an occurrence have +originated in any possible deception of the imagination. _If it was not a +fact it must have been a fictitious invention._ Can any explanation of it +be given? It has been suggested that the swine were driven down the cliff +by the madman. Against this supposition, it has been urged that no animals +are less easily driven than swine. How then could it have been possible to +drive two thousand of them into the water? But there is no necessity to +assume that they were driven at all. The scene as it is described by the +Evangelists was well calculated to inspire animals with fright. It would +however have been impossible to frighten two thousand of them. Granted: +but large herds of animals follow their leaders implicitly. When under +excitement one makes a leap, the others will follow. All that would have +been necessary, if we suppose that the herd was near the edge of the +cliff, was that the leaders should have received the requisite impulse +from the madman, and under its influence rushed wildly down the cliff, and +been followed by their companions. + +But the case is different when our Lord speaks to others, and not to the +demoniacs themselves. His observations to the Pharisees on this subject I +have already considered. There remains the striking one addressed to the +disciples: "This kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting." The +circumstances of the case are these. The disciples had failed to cure the +youth, whether a demoniac or a simple lunatic. They ask our Lord why it +was that they had failed. He tells them that it was because of their +unbelief. Now it is impossible for us to say what was the nature of the +influence of faith in affecting miraculous cures, and why the want of it +prevented success. It is sufficient to draw attention to the fact that it +is uniformly laid down in the New Testament, that in the case of +subordinate agents working miracles faith was necessary for their +accomplishment. Our Lord also usually required faith in the recipients of +his cures, but not always. But to his disciples when they attempted to +perform a miracle faith was indispensable to their success. The question +was not what was the nature of the disease, but why in this particular +case they had failed to cure it. Our Lord replied that in this instance +not only was faith necessary to effect the cure, but a very unusual degree +of it. If the question had been what was the cause of the child's disease, +and if our Lord know that it was not possession, but mania, it is quite +possible that He would have refused to answer it, as He did on other +occasions when curious questions were put to him, and would have deduced +some moral lesson from the fact. This it will be remembered was the course +which He pursued when He was asked whether only a few would be saved. But +the inquiry was not what caused the disease, but why the attempt to cure +it had proved a failure. Such being the question, there is nothing +inconsistent with truthfulness in our Lord's answer. He avoided entering +into an explanation as to what was a physical cause of the disease, which +was quite foreign to his divine mission. He therefore simply told them +that their failure was owing to their unbelief, and then added, in +language couched in their own forms of thought, and which would not +therefore open a discussion on subjects foreign to the purposes of his +mission, "This kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting." + +Those who lay stress on difficulties of this kind are in the habit of +overlooking the plain fact, that our Lord's teaching was specifically +addressed to the living characters of the day, and to their existing lines +of thought, and cannot without reference to them be directly translated +into our own. This remark is no less true of the moral teaching contained +in the Gospels, than of their historical statements. It is even more so, +for a great number of the moral precepts of Christ cannot be applied as +practical guides until they have been adapted to the altered conditions of +thought and of society.(4) They are in fact principles given in the form +of precepts. If our Lord's words had been reported so as to make them +square with the lines of thought of every age, they would have given us, +not his actual teaching but a modification of it. It is our duty by a +careful study of the great principles on which it is based to apply it to +our present wants. It may appear to some far more desirable that it should +have been capable of a direct instead of an indirect application, yet the +fact is as I have stated it. Want of attention to this has occasioned no +inconsiderable number of the difficulties of the New Testament. + +One or two remarks will be all that is necessary for illustrating the +position which some have adopted that our Lord's mode of dealing with +demoniacs was intended by Him as part of the process of cure. I should not +have alluded to this subject at all unless the view in question had been +propounded by a very eminent writer. I have already considered its main +principles under the previous head. + +It ought to be observed that the care of demoniacs, whatever view we may +take of possession, belongs to a class of our Lord's miracles which are +distinct from all others. All the others are described as wrought on the +human body, or on external nature. The Evangelists do not record a single +miracle beside these that was wrought on the human mind. This is a +remarkable fact. In the course of his ministry He encountered every form +of moral and spiritual disease, from the weaknesses of his disciples and +attached friends to the opposition of his most avowed enemies. Now, +although He emphatically asserted that He was the physician of the soul, +and although for the spiritual diseases of men He felt the most profound +sympathy, never once is Jesus represented as exerting his supernatural +power for their care. On the contrary, He is uniformly represented as +having recourse to moral and spiritual means and not to miracles to effect +it. Physical diseases He cures instantaneously, moral ones slowly and with +effort. This fact is worthy of deep attention as showing that our Lord +uniformly acted in conformity with the laws of the moral universe. If the +Gospels are fictions, why is the Great Physician of Souls never +represented as performing a sudden or miraculous cure in the moral and +spiritual worlds, in the same manner as He does in the material? The need +of miraculous intervention to secure Simon Peter from the moral and +spiritual danger which surrounded him was as great as to prevent him from +sinking in the water. Yet no other than moral and spiritual influences +were called into action. + +The following is the bearing of this fact on the question before us. If +the cure of a demoniac was the expulsion of a demon, it involved the +liberation of a moral nature from its thraldom, and at the same time the +cure of the bodily organisation as far as its disordered condition enabled +the demon to exert his power. If, on the other hand, it was the cure of +simple mania, still the act had a direct bearing on the moral nature of +the sufferer. In either case the use of moral means as well as +supernatural agency would be especially appropriate. If demoniacs were +madmen, our Lord was fully justified in displaying towards them the +highest degree of sympathy, and in bringing to bear on them the mighty +moral and spiritual forces which abode in his lofty personality. The same +remark would be equally true if the sufferer was held in thrall by +demoniacal power. Each class of miracles in the mode of their performance +is exactly suited to the condition of those on whom our Lord was +operating. On either supposition He was dealing not merely with physical +forces, but with moral agency, and He dealt with it accordingly. + +I conclude, therefore, that if it may be taken as established that +possession involved nothing but simple mania, there is nothing in the +facts as they are recorded in the New Testament inconsistent with that +supposition, or which affects the credit of the Gospels as historical +narratives. Nor are they inconsistent with the idea that their writers +were favoured with such supernatural assistance in composing them as was +adequate for the purpose of giving us such an account of the actions and +teachings of Jesus as was necessary for communicating all the great truths +of the Christian revelation. Nor is the supposition inconsistent, as it +has been alleged to be, with His divine character and truthfulness. + +I will examine in the next chapter the supposition that possession was not +mania, but an actual objective fact. + + + + + +CHAPTER XII. POSSESSION, IF AN OBJECTIVE REALITY, NEITHER INCREDIBLE NOR +CONTRARY TO THE ASCERTAINED TRUTHS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. + + +I now proceed to the consideration of the remaining alternative, the truth +of which the form of the narrative seems most to favour, viz., that our +Lord accepted the distinction between possession and mania; and that +during those times possessions were actual occurrences. + +In considering this subject, it will be necessary to pay attention to the +distinction to which I have referred in the previous chapter, that even if +many of the phenomena that accompanied possession were due to superhuman +agency, the Gospels are by no means pledged to any particular theory of +the _modus operandi_ by which the phenomena were brought about. What I +mean is that these phenomena might have been due to a superhuman agency, +without involving the fact that the demon had a local habitation either in +the body or the spirit of the man. All that the Gospels can be taken to +affirm is, that the evil spirit in some way or other, of which we are +ignorant, held the man in a state of thraldom, made his mental powers the +subject of a divided consciousness, overpowered the functions of his +reason and his will, and through his action on the mind used for his own +purposes the organs of his body. The writers of the New Testament are +pledged to no theory as to how such results were effected. They have +simply reported the phenomena as they presented themselves to their +observation. In doing this, the language which they have employed denotes +local habitation; but the words used in stilling the storm make it quite +clear that the literal meaning cannot be pressed. Considering the general +character of these narratives, it is impossible to pledge them to the +particular mode in which these results were brought about. + +One circumstance seems to militate against the supposition that possession +involved nothing but simple mania, namely, the numbers of those who are +spoken of as possessed. If the Gospel narratives are historical, it would +appear that such cases were numerous. Not only are several miracles of +this description definitely recorded, but the Evangelists several times +affirm that our Lord cured demoniacs in considerable numbers, without +furnishing us with the details. Now it is difficult to believe that +maniacs existed in such large numbers in a country of the size and +population of Judæa. Yet all the phenomena of possession point to +maniacal, and not to harmless lunacy. The number of the cases of mania +that occur bears but a small proportion to those of the latter form of +derangement. It is true that at times of popular excitement various forms +and numerous cases of frenzy manifest themselves; but these differ from +mania, though they not unfrequently terminate in it. I have made these +observations, because, in discussing such a subject, it is only right to +state fully the difficulties with which particular theories are attended. +It is very probable, however, that as the symptoms so closely resembled +each other, many cases of actual mania would be confounded in popular +estimation with possession, and, therefore, that cases of actual +possession may not have been so numerous as at first sight would appear. + +On the supposition that possession was a reality, we have no means of +determining what moral or physical preconditions were necessary for its +manifestation. It is clear that the authors of the Gospels must have +considered that it was owing to some predisposing causes, physical or +moral, though they have not described them. Unless this was the case, the +evil, instead of being partial, would have been universal. Various moral +causes would naturally form a suitable precondition for its manifestation. +There can be no doubt that a number of vices, when indulged in beyond a +certain point, reduce man's moral being to a wreck and render him +obnoxious to the action of external agency. The power of self-control may +be indefinitely weakened. If vice is carried to its extreme forms, it +produces phenomena hardly, if at all, distinguishable from madness. Such a +state of man's moral nature would form a suitable precondition to enable a +superhuman being to overpower the reason and the will, the supremacy of +which was already impaired by an influence from within. In such cases +possession would have been rendered possible by a man's self-induced moral +corruption. + +The testimony of history proves that during the century which preceded and +that which followed the Advent, the state of moral corruption was extreme. +Men were sated with the old, and craving for new and unheard of forms of +sensual gratification. The old class of ideas, moral and religious, were +gradually dying out, and men were eagerly seeking for something to fill +the void. There consequently never was a time when a greater number of +abnormal forms of thought burst on the human mind, which was shaken to its +utmost depths. The outbreak of fanaticism combined with moral wickedness, +which displayed itself forty years after in the Jewish war of +independence, is probably without a parallel in the history of man. For +this there must have been years of preparation. A somewhat similar state +of things existed in the Pagan world, which led to the production of +numerous religious charlatans and impostors. The times were characterised +by an extravagance of thought on almost every subject, philosophy itself +forming no exception. Such an abnormal mental condition was peculiarly +suited to the reception of external mental influences, if we suppose them +possible. + +But I am bound to admit that the facts recorded in the Gospels prove that +possession was not always the result of moral degradation. This is proved +by the case of the youth, whose possession the father directly connects +with lunacy, and says that it had seized him from a child. In this case +the cause which rendered the possession possible must have been physical, +probably a derangement of the nervous system. + +If I understand rightly the position which is taken by those who affirm +that possession was mania, and nothing else, it is as follows. It is +alleged that at certain periods of history, the belief in possession has +been widely spread. Possessions are unknown in modern times; and all the +instances which have been alleged are either cases of mania or delusion. +The belief in it has gradually died away as knowledge has advanced. In +former times it generated a number of grotesque stories, which were pure +inventions of the imagination heated by enthusiasm. Such facts as were +real may be referred to madness as their cause. The others are simply +disbelieved. Under the influence of increasing knowledge, there has arisen +a widespread belief in modern times, that there is nothing superhuman in +the causes of such phenomena, but that they are due to influences existing +within the mind itself. This, as it is affirmed, being true of all the +alleged instances of possession in the modern world, it is inferred that +similar ones in the ancient world are equally unreal; and if we had the +requisite data before us, we should be able to refer them all to ordinary +human causes. + +With respect to the general fact, there can be no doubt that advancing +knowledge has caused a general disbelief in the reality of any modern form +of possession, or of witchcraft. The supreme grotesqueness of the +phenomena of the latter has caused the belief in it to perish under the +influence of common sense, aided by an increased acquaintance with sound +principles of causation, and the stability of the operations of nature. +Still it is incorrect to affirm that the prevalence of such beliefs has +been due to no other cause than universal ignorance. The belief in +witchcraft produced its most unhappy results during the reigns of +Elizabeth and the Stuarts, in the very age of Bacon, Shakespeare, and +Raleigh. Such beliefs originate in certain principles of our minds whose +gratification consists in the contemplation of the marvellous, the action +of which I shall consider hereafter. They have existed in every condition +of society, and only changed the form of their manifestation. Those who +boast of our freedom from such delusions, owing to the superior light of +the nineteenth century, seem to have forgotten the existence at the +present day of a belief in spiritualism, which is little, if at all, less +absurd than witchcraft, though the former has encountered a less severe +treatment than the latter. This has been more due to the improvement of +our humanity than to our knowledge of physical science. It is a fact that +spiritualism is believed in by multitudes; and its votaries belong far +more to the cultivated class of society than to the ignorant and the +vulgar. What the witch mania was to the sixteenth and seventeenth +centuries, spiritualism is to the nineteenth. It is the peculiar form +rather than the possibility of such delusions that has passed away. + +It should be observed also that the demoniacal supernaturalism of the +monastic writers, and of the middle ages, differs from that of the New +Testament to such a degree that they cannot fairly be compared. In the +former the apparition of demons and departed spirits was a thing of +constant occurrence; in the latter, never. To the monks the devil was +continually appearing in the most phantastic forms, and performing the +most grotesque miracles. To this form of demonology modern spiritualism +can put in very strong claims to be esteemed the genuine successor. The +heated imagination of even such a man as Luther suggested to him that he +saw Satan in visible reality. It is worthy of remark that St. Paul knew +nothing of visible Satanic manifestations. With him they were invariably +spiritual. + +It is important to keep steadily in view the fact, that the New Testament +invariably represents possession as consisting in the action of a stronger +mind on a weaker one. The influence which the demon exerted on the bodily +organs might have been effected through the agency of the man himself. It +is never described as involving a visible manifestation of the demon, but +his action is one which is purely mental and spiritual. His presence and +his departure were simply judged of by their effects. + +It follows, therefore, that the denial of the possibility of an influence +of this kind must rest on a very wide principle. It cannot be confined to +such action alone, but must go to the extent of denying the possibility of +the action of all spiritual beings on the mind of man. The only principle +on which the denial can rest is, that our mental science has so far +succeeded in analyzing all the past and present operations of the human +mind, that it is justified in affirming that they all originate entirely +within the mind itself; and are never brought about by an action on it +from without by any invisible agent. If this is the principle on which the +denial rests, it will be equally valid to exclude the action of God on our +minds, as well as that of all other invisible beings. It will doubtless be +urged that it is only intended to deny the action of invisible evil +beings. But if it is true that our mental philosophy has ascertained that +all our thoughts originate either in the mind itself, or in the mind acted +on by external nature, or by other men, the principle must be valid for +proving that all other spiritual agency exerted on the mind is impossible, +and that all supposed instances of it are delusions. It is impossible on +this principle to exclude the evil agency, and not to exclude the good +also. + +It is evident that this principle is far too broad to be used for the +purpose of affirming the impossibility of the action of external evil +agents only. It is based on the supposition that our mental philosophy is +so complete as to be able to assign even the most abnormal portions of our +mental action to definite and known forces, all of which originate within +the mind itself, and are never due to external influences. If mental +philosophy could establish this as a fact, it would doubtless prove that +possession was impossible; but it could prove a great deal more, even that +God never acted on or influenced the spirit of man. But if there is any +one phenomenon of the mind, of the origin of which we are ignorant, the +whole principle is vitiated, for that very phenomenon may be caused by the +action of an external power. The real point of the controversy therefore +is, Is our mental science thus complete? Has it been able to reduce all +our mental phenomena, including the most abnormal of them, to the action +of known forces? Has it analyzed our mental powers to their inmost depths? +Until it has done this, it is impossible to affirm that the abnormal +actions of the mind may not be occasioned by an external agency. + +It will probably be urged, that although our philosophy has not yet +succeeded in assigning all our mental phenomena to the action of known +forces, it hopes to accomplish this hereafter; and that its past conquests +ought to be accepted as a pledge of its future performances; and that the +time will certainly come, when it will be able to refer every mental +phenomenon to a cause originating in the mind itself, and acting in +conformity with invariable law. Promises, however, are not performances; +what is requisite to impart validity to wide affirmations is present +actual knowledge, not the hope that future scientific conquests will be +extended over the entire regions of the unknown. Science professes to walk +by sight and not by faith. In a subject of this kind it is most +unphilosophical to assume that the possibilities of the future are the +realities of the present; and to enunciate propositions whose validity +rests solely on the fact that they are so. + +I will now definitely state the principle which can alone give any +scientific value to the assertion, that such demoniacal action as that +which is described in the New Testament, is unbelievable. It is as +follows: that we have so completely ascertained the nature of the forces +which act on our minds, and the laws which regulate them, that we know as +a scientifically established truth, that they all originate either in our +own mental organization, or in the action of other men on our minds. The +statement of the principle in this distinct form at once shows that it is +invalid. + +It is impossible for one moment to affirm that our knowledge is so +complete, that we have a scientific acquaintance with the causes of all +our varied mental phenomena, and the laws which regulate them. We have +ascertained the nature of several of our mental processes; but how small a +portion of man's mental activity do they embrace. I need only +particularize a few of which we are in complete ignorance, as to the +forces which generate them, and the laws which regulate their action. + +First, with respect to Genius. Genius is a mental power which manifests +itself only on rare occasions. Who can affirm that we have ascertained the +law which regulates its birth? We may judge from analogy that this, as +other things, follows a law of some kind; but respecting the causes which +give it birth our philosophy is profoundly ignorant. Nor have we any +knowledge of its mode of action. It manifests itself in various forms. +There is the genius which makes the poet, the philosopher, the scientific +discoverer, the orator, the politician, and many others. How those who are +possessed of this power effectuate their mental operations, or how their +great ideas originate in their minds is a subject which exceeds the limits +of our scientific knowledge. Take for example the genius of the poet. +Whence came, and what was the nature of that intuitive power with which +Shakespeare was endowed, or how was it called into exercise? We call such +powers intuitions. We say that a great poet is endowed with a species of +inspiration. What is this but to confess our entire ignorance both of the +origin and the mode of his mental operations. Probably the poet himself +would be unable to give us any analysis of the origin of his own thoughts, +or of the laws that regulate them. How then can we venture to affirm that +they must all originate in the mind itself, and not be due to the action +of some external power? The habit of speaking of his inspirations, from +which scientific men are not exempt, proves our complete ignorance both of +its nature and origin. + +But to descend to a humbler sphere--our own minds. We are all conscious +that thoughts rush into them in a most unbidden manner, and that we pass +through mental states which our analysis is unable to explain. Can any man +affirm, however deep may be his philosophy, that the known laws of +association of ideas are adequate to account for all the mental phenomena +of which he has been conscious? Who has not had experience of severe +efforts to realize something in thought, which have ended in failure, and +that the right thing has suddenly come into his mind uncalled and +unbidden? Not unfrequently has a sudden thought entered the mind (we know +not whence it came) which has entirely changed the whole current of a +previous life. Still more frequently has a happy idea occurred to us, the +origin of which it is impossible to trace. Who again has not had +experience of the sudden rushing of a temptation into his mind with an all +but overwhelming force, even while his thoughts were occupied with +subjects in no way allied to the suggestion? Many of our mental phenomena +may be explained by the principle of association of ideas and other known +mental powers; but who can venture to affirm that they are adequate to +account for all the various states of which he has been conscious, or that +some of them have not originated in suggestions from without? Scientific +knowledge is certainly able to make no such affirmation. + +Next: there are numerous abnormal conditions to which the mind is +unquestionably subject. Who will venture to affirm that he has penetrated +to their depths, or ascertained the laws which regulate their action? +These have a most important bearing on the present subject. They are best +designated by the term phrenzy. Their aspect is very varied. They differ +in many respects from mania, though they are closely allied to it. They +are confined to no one race of men, but are co-extensive with human +nature. They were prevalent in the ancient world, and connected with +various forms of religious belief. They display themselves with peculiar +violence in the religious rites of savages. In Oriental countries at the +present day, they frequently manifest themselves and assume a great +variety of aspects. Examples might be easily adduced. The phrenzied +fanatic often presents indications of his mind being acted on by an +overwhelming external influence; and when under the influence of the rites +of a degraded religion, the symptoms present no little resemblance to +those which accompanied demoniacal possession. + +I have no wish to affirm that such phenomena must be due to an action of +this kind, but to draw attention to the fact that we are ignorant of the +power in which they originate, and that such being the case, it is quite +possible that their most violent and terrible forms may be aroused by the +influence of a power external to the mind itself. Equally ignorant are we +of the causes of even their milder manifestations. Whatever may be the +hopes which are entertained of the future triumphs of science, it is not +too much to assert, that it has not yet reduced these abnormal conditions +of the mind to any thing like a scientific law, and that it has not +succeeded in tracing the phenomena to the exclusive operation of a force +acting within the mind itself. In truth our mental science is ignorant of +their causes: and for aught that it can affirm to the contrary, many of +them may be due to causes human, superhuman, or a combination of the two. +In cases where we are profoundly ignorant, dogmatical assertions should be +carefully avoided. While such phenomena are incapable of explanation by +the action of known mental forces, the students of mental science are not +justified in affirming that possession contradicts its known truths. + +I fully admit, however, that there is a system of professed mental +science, which, if its truth could be proved, would establish the fact +that possession was impossible. I need hardly say that I allude to that +which affirms that thought is the result of a function of the brain, and +nothing else. According to the views of these philosophers, the brain +secretes thought as a gland secretes its own peculiar secretion. Until +this philosophy has succeeded in proving the truth of its first +principles, it is useless to consider its bearing on this particular +question. + +There is another abnormal mental condition, the existence of which is +unquestionable, and which has a close connection with the present +question, namely, the ecstatic state. The forms in which this has +manifested itself have been extremely various, and it is impossible for +any one to assert that our mental philosophy has fully fathomed them, and +has succeeded in assigning them to forces originating within the mind +itself. On the contrary it is not too much to affirm that it has as yet +wholly failed to analyze its nature, or to account for the abnormal powers +displayed by the mind when in this condition. In the ancient world this +state of mind was closely connected with the manifestations of the +prophetic power, the reality of which was recognized by many of its +philosophers. It will of course be observed that I am not speaking of this +power as it existed in the Jewish church, but of its supposed +manifestations in the heathen world. Similar ecstatic states have +frequently displayed themselves in modern times. When in this condition +the mind is especially liable to be acted on by external influences. Is it +possible, I ask, in the present state of our mental philosophy, to assert +that we know their nature, or the forces which produce them? The ecstatic +in union with a phrenzied state of the mind was apparently the condition +of the Delphian priestess when she delivered oracles to those who +consulted her. According to all the accounts that we possess, she +presented the appearance of being subject to an overpowering external +influence. Every other description which we possess of the manifestation +of this prophetic power, (and we have several) describes it as presenting +phenomena closely allied to raving madness, an influence of some kind +apparently overpowering the prophet's personality. Until the forces which +produced these phenomena in the ancient world, and the somewhat similar +ones which have been manifested in modern times, can be shown to owe their +origin to forces originating in the mind itself, and to nothing else, it +is absurd to affirm that such a phenomenon as possession is in +contradiction to our scientific knowledge of the human mind. + +There is another point which demands our attention, namely, the close +connection between the extreme forms of moral wickedness, and madness. It +is an unquestionable fact that nothing is more difficult than to draw the +precise line where moral wickedness ends, and madness begins. In their +great outlines they are easily distinguishable, but in the more advanced +stages of moral evil, the one passes into the other by insensible degrees. +So difficult is it to lay down the precise line which separates them, that +scientific men are not wanting, who affirm that every extreme case of +moral wickedness is a species of mania. Consistently with this theory +frequent efforts are made to save the most abandoned criminals from the +consequences of their crimes. If the principle is correct, it is +impossible not to assign lesser degrees of moral evil to the same cause. +Such a principle logically leads to the denial of any distinction between +moral and physical action. Happily however, although this conclusion is +one which has been arrived at by a considerable number of physicists, it +is one which the common sense of mankind steadily refuses to accept. It is +sufficient for the present purpose, that extreme forms of moral evil shade +off into mania by insensible degrees; and that ultimately they are capable +of producing insanity. If insanity can be produced by moral causes, it +follows that a superhuman influence powerful for evil, acting on a +degraded moral nature, may be attended with a similar result, and produce +such a phenomenon as possession. + +But further: while madness is produced by physical causes, it is a certain +fact that it is frequently occasioned by causes purely mental. Of this the +instances are innumerable. These mental causes react on the brain and the +nervous system; and thus they superinduce disease on those parts of our +bodily organization by means of which the mind exercises its powers. Still +the disease itself originates in causes that are not seated in the body, +but in the mind. The mind is therefore capable of acting powerfully on our +bodily frame. If therefore possession be viewed as the action of one mind +on another, there is no reason why it should not be able to superinduce +those forms of bodily derangement which exhibited themselves in the +demoniacs by the simple action of the mind upon the body. The mental +causes capable of producing mania are, as we know, of a varied +description; and among them is the action and influence which one mind is +capable of exerting on another. As, therefore, in certain states of our +minds, or of our nervous system, mania with all its results can be +produced by the simple action of mind on mind, and through the action of +the mind disorder may be produced in our bodily organization, there can be +no reason why possession with all its attendant phenomena should not +originate in similar causes. There is nothing to imply that the superhuman +agency manifested in possession was directly exerted on the body of the +possessed. An agency which was entirely mental was fully adequate to +produce all the phenomena with which it was accompanied. + +In cases of mania produced by mental action the removal of the exciting +cause is the precondition of its cure, and in many cases effects it. +Similarly, in cases of possession the removal of the exciting cause would +produce similar results. + +It follows, therefore, from the foregoing considerations, that the +allegation that the possessions described in the New Testament are +incredible, because they contradict the known truths of mental science, is +disproved. + +The question really resolves itself into the following one: Do evil +beings, other than men, exist in the universe? Or, if they exist, is it +credible that they are allowed to interfere in the affairs of men? This +question we have already considered in a former chapter, and we have +arrived at the conclusion that if we free ourselves from the trammels of +_à priori_ theories, and judge only by the facts of the universe as it +exists, neither their existence nor their intervention in human affairs is +contrary to our reason. + +Two things, however, must be steadily kept in mind. First: that if such +interventions in human affairs are facts, the agency which can be exerted +is only a permitted agency, and only capable of being exerted in +subordination to the divine purposes in the government of the universe. A +large number of the difficulties with which the subject is attended have +originated in the wholly inaccurate idea that a power is attributed in the +New Testament to Satan, of interfering both in the material and the moral +universe at his own will and pleasure. This, however, is altogether +contrary to the fact. Whatever power is attributed to him is an entirely +permitted one, and exercised in subordination to the general purposes of +God. Secondly, that although the disorder in the moral world might lead us +to suspect the presence of an evil agency, different from that of man; yet +as it is not a visible one, but confined to the regions of the mind, it is +one which cannot come under our distinct observation, and could therefore +only become known to us by revelation. + +One more difficulty has to be considered. It is alleged that possession +never takes place now. It is therefore inferred that it never took place +at all. + +I reply first, if we grant that demoniacal action, in the form of +possession has now ceased, it by no means follows that it was not once +real. The objection overlooks the fact that its action was a permitted +one; and could only be exercised within the limits assigned to it. There +may have been reasons at the time of the Advent why the exercise of a +Satanic agency should be permitted at that particular period to a greater +extent than it ever has been before or since. + +Secondly: certain moral and physical conditions were necessary for its +exercise. These may be no longer in existence, but they may have passed +away with many other abnormal conditions of human nature which existed in +the ancient world. + +Thirdly: it is not possible to affirm with certainty that, even at the +present day, no supernatural agencies bearing an analogy to possession, +are exerted on the mind. This will be only possible, when all those +abnormal phenomena which manifest themselves in connection with various +debased forms of religion and other cases of phrenzied excitement can be +traced to known forces, originating solely in the mind itself. + +There is one further objection which requires a brief consideration. It is +urged that the writers of the New Testament entertained the belief, that +diseases were generally occasioned by demoniacal action, quite +independently of possession; and that this belief has received the +sanction of our Lord. One case only is alleged in proof of this, that of +the woman with the spirit of infirmity. She was no demoniac, but an +ordinary diseased person, and the disease is asserted to have been +occasioned by demoniacal action. + +I reply, that considering the large number of diseases of various kinds +mentioned in the New Testament, in none of which is there any allusion to +demoniacal agency as their cause, a single example is a narrow foundation +on which to build the affirmation that the followers of our Lord held such +a theory as to the origin of disease in general. I admit that +disorganization of the bodily functions is mentioned among the phenomena +of possession. But this differs widely from a bodily evil superinduced +without the agency of possession. Let us inquire whether the special +instance affords any justification for this wide assertion. + +The Evangelist states that the woman was bowed down by a spirit of +infirmity, and could in no wise lift herself up. Here it is just as absurd +to fasten on him the intention to describe a scientific fact, as when on +another occasion it is said that "_power_" went out of our Lord "and +healed them all." The one stands on the same ground as the other. + +In effecting the cure, our Lord uses the words, "Woman, thou art loosed +from thine infirmity." Here there is no reference to Satanic agency +whatever. The only mention of it occurs in his argument with the ruler of +the synagogue on the lawfulness of effecting such cures on the Sabbath +day. The words are, "Thou hypocrite, ought not this woman, who is a +daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, to +be loosed from this bond on the Sabbath day?" + +These words are addressed to the ruler in answer to the objection that our +Lord was no prophet, because he effected his cures on the Sabbath. If so, +as the reality of the miracle was not denied, it was intended to be +implied that it had been wrought by the power of Satan, of which the +violation of the Sabbath was the proof. The real point of controversy +therefore was the lawfulness of effecting cures on this day, not the +Satanic origin of the complaint. Was there any conceivable reason why our +Lord should not discuss the point with the ruler on his own principles? +Why was it necessary to raise a wholly different issue, viz. the Satanic +or non-Satanic origin of the disease, instead of confining it strictly to +the point, which was the all-important one, that His curing this woman on +the Sabbath day was so far from being a proof that He did not come from +God, that it was a strong reason for believing that He did so? To have +entered on a discussion as to what was the cause of the complaint, would +not only have diverted attention from the real question, but would have +introduced one wholly foreign to the purposes of His divine mission. + +Two suppositions only are possible respecting possession. It must have +been either a form of madness produced by natural causes, or a +manifestation of superhuman power. As the facts on which a judgment can be +formed are meagre, I have not ventured to determine which of these two +theories is alone consistent with the facts and phenomena of the New +Testament. I have therefore taken either alternative, and shown, that +neither does the theory that it was mania interfere with the claims of the +Gospels to be accepted as historical documents, nor is the language +attributed to our Lord contrary to the truthfulness of His character; nor +does the supposition that it was due to superhuman causes contradict the +established truths of mental science. + + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. THE ALLEGED CREDULITY OF THE FOLLOWERS OF JESUS. + + +The allegation that the followers of Jesus, and the early Christians +generally, were a body of intensely credulous and superstitious people, +may be considered as not only the stronghold of those who impugn the +historical character of the Gospels, but also as the arsenal from which +they draw no small number of their weapons of attack. A credulity which +knew no limits is liberally ascribed to them as showing how every +miraculous narrative might have been invented. They have even been +credited with a facility of inventing fictions, and then deluding +themselves into the belief that they were facts which they had actually +witnessed. Thus it has been asserted that it was their firm belief that +the Messiah ought to have wrought miracles; that Jesus himself may not +even have professed to perform them; but that the fervid imaginations of +His followers invented a set of miracles, attributed them to Him, and +ended with the belief that they had seen Him perform them. On the other +hand, whenever these objectors are pressed by a difficulty in accounting +for the origin of particular phenomena in the Gospels, they retire on the +credulity of the followers of Jesus as into a kind of citadel, in which +they consider themselves so strongly entrenched that they may defy every +attack. There is also another important purpose which it is made to serve. +It is asserted that it renders worthless the testimony of the followers of +Jesus as to the actual occurrence of miracles. + +The allegation takes two forms: + +1st. That the followers of Jesus were the prey of a credulity and +superstition which greatly exceeded the limits of the ordinary credulity +of mankind; and that therefore the value of their historical testimony is +destroyed. + +2nd. That the ordinary credulity of mankind with respect to the occurrence +of supernatural events is so great and widespread, as to render the +invention of miraculous narratives easy, and to destroy the credit of all +narratives containing them. + +I propose to consider these subjects in this and the following chapter. + +Nothing is easier than to charge a body of men with intense credulity and +superstition. Before, however, such charges deserve to have any notice +taken of them, they should be substantiated by direct proof. It is +impossible to meet them if urged in a mere general form. Fortunately, the +author of "Supernatural Religion" makes a number of specific and definite +charges, in which he endeavours to fasten an unspeakable degree of +credulity and superstition on the immediate followers of Jesus and the +authors of the Gospels, and refers to authorities in support of his +assertions. I will state his general position in his own words. + +"We have given a most imperfect sketch of some of the opinions and +superstitions prevalent at the time of Jesus, and when the books of the +New Testament were written. These, as we have seen, are continued with +little or no modification throughout the first centuries of our era. It +must however be remembered that the few details that we have given, +omitting much of the grosser particulars, are the views absolutely +expressed by the most educated and intelligent part of the community; and +that it would have required infinitely darker colours adequately to have +portrayed the dense ignorance and superstition of the mass of the Jews. It +is impossible to receive the report of supposed marvellous occurrences +from an age and people like this, without the gravest suspicion. Miracles +which spring from such a hot-bed of superstition are too natural in such a +soil to be the object of surprise; and in losing their exceptional +character, their claims on attention are proportionally weakened, if not +altogether destroyed. Preternatural interference with the affairs of life +and with the phenomena of nature was the rule in those days, not the +exception, and miracles in fact had apparently lost all novelty, and +through familiarity had become degraded into mere commonplace." + +"There can be no doubt that the writers of the New Testament shared in the +popular superstitions of the Jews." + +Before proceeding further, I must draw the reader's attention to three +affirmations in this important passage. + +1st. That the educated Jews of the time of Jesus were a prey to the +superstitions in question. + +2nd. That the common class of Jews were a prey to yet grosser +superstitious. + +3rd. That the followers of Jesus, who were chiefly Jews of the lower +classes, and the authors of the Gospels, shared in these superstitions. + +The author devotes not less than fifty pages to a minute description of +the superstitions of the educated classes. These are alleged to have been +of so gross a nature, that the reader will get but a very imperfect +conception of the point at issue, unless I give a brief sketch of some of +them. + +I. The Jews are affirmed to have believed in an innumerable multitude of +angels, whose agency was continually displayed in the ordinary phenomena +of nature. They presided over and energized in its ordinary operations, as +for instance, in thunder, lightning, the winds, the seas, frost, hail, +rain, mists, heat, light, &c.; heaven and earth in fact are filled with +them, and they are also continually busying themselves in human affairs, +of which minute details are given. + +II. They are alleged to have believed in a demonology of the most +phantastic description. To this I have elsewhere sufficiently alluded. + +III. They are likewise affirmed to have believed that the sun, moon and +stars are rational beings, and traces of this belief are distinctly +affirmed to exist in the New Testament. + +IV. The belief in sorcery, witchcraft and magic is affirmed to have been +universal among them. To give the reader an idea of the grossness of these +beliefs, to which even the educated classes are affirmed to have been a +prey, I must quote the following passage: + +"Amulets consisting of seals, or pieces of paper, with charms written upon +them, were hung round the necks of the sick, and considered efficacious +for their cure. Charms, spells and mutterings were constantly said over +wounds, against unlucky meetings, to make people sleep, to heal diseases, +and to avert enchantments; against mad dogs for instance, against the +demon of blindness and the like, as well as formulæ for averting the evil +eye, and mutterings over diseases." Here follow several pages of +unutterable absurdities. It is not too much to say, that there was hardly +an occurrence in nature, and hardly an event of daily life, which was not +influenced by these supernatural powers, and very frequently in a manner +unspeakably grotesque. If such were the beliefs of educated people, urges +the author (and he tells us that he has omitted the grosser forms of +them), what must have been those of the lower orders, and the extent of +their degraded superstition? It must be kept constantly in mind that the +followers of Jesus chiefly consisted of persons taken from the lower +strata of society. But the author in express words charges them with +sharing in such beliefs. If they did not, the reference to them would have +no bearing on the argument. + +We have therefore in this portion of the work a definite issue raised for +our consideration. It is no vague charge of general boundless credulity +and superstition, such as is generally urged against the followers of +Jesus and the authors of the Gospels. It is presented to us in a clear and +definite form. I fully allow that if this charge could be substantiated, +it would deprive the Evangelists of all historical credit. + +The issue which is thus raised is consequently one of the highest +importance. It will be necessary therefore for us carefully to examine the +mode in which it is attempted to establish the truth of these charges. The +process is an extremely singular one. + +When we have a set of writings before us and endeavour to estimate the +amount of credulity and superstition to which their authors were a prey, +the only legitimate mode of proceeding is to subject these writings to a +thorough and minute examination as to the indications of credulity and +superstition contained in them. Having done this, it then becomes our duty +to ascertain the amount of general good sense or the want of it which is +displayed by them in these or in other subjects, and then to form a +general conclusion by fairly balancing the indications of credulity and +good sense against each other. The author, however, seems not to have had +the smallest idea that it is the duty of the critic to ascertain what are +the facts of the case as presented by the writings, and to form a general +conclusion by a careful review of the entire evidence. On the contrary, +his mode of reasoning is to quote a number of opinions held by various +writers, widely separated from each other in time, to charge them on the +contemporaries of our Lord, and refer to nearly every passage in the New +Testament which has even the remotest bearing on the subject, for the +purpose of fastening these superstitions on the followers of Jesus. Such a +mode of reasoning can only avail to establish a foregone conclusion. + +Again: In forming a judgment on such a subject, it also behoves us most +carefully to consider whether the subject-matter of the writings is or is +not of such a character, that if their authors had been addicted to such +gross superstitions, there would not of necessity have been frequent +examples of them in their pages? Also whether the absence of such +references, when the subject on which they were writing was certain to +have suggested them to their minds, does not constitute a strong proof +that these superstitions were not held by them? In one word, it is absurd +to attempt to charge writers with boundless credulity and superstition, on +the ground that a multitude of grotesque beliefs were prevalent in their +day. No author can be held responsible for beliefs other than those which +appear in his pages, especially when subject-matter of his writings would +have been certain to call them into activity if he had entertained them. + +The course pursued by the author is directly opposite to this. He has been +compelled to adopt it, because it is the only method by which extreme +credulity and superstition can be fastened on the writers of the Gospels. +The available contemporary literature, besides that contained in the New +Testament, which can throw light on the opinions of the followers of +Jesus, is very small. The point which requires proof is that the entire +Jewish nation, _without any exception_, was a prey to the basest +superstition and credulity. Unless this can be established, the charge +against the authors of the Gospels falls to the ground, except so far as +it can be proved by the Gospels themselves. The contemporary proof of it, +however, failing, he endeavours to substantiate his position by quoting +the opinions of writers separated from the times of Jesus by several +centuries, and affirming that they were held by the entire body of His +contemporaries. Such a mode of reasoning is useless to support anything +but a foregone conclusion. + +A brief reference to the authorities relied upon will at once expose the +fallacy of the argument. First, certain differences existing between the +Septuagint and the Hebrew Scriptures are pressed into the service, which +are no instances of either credulity or superstition. Then the frequent +idolatries which prevailed among the Jews prior to the captivity are +adduced as a proof of the superstitious tendencies of the Jewish mind, as +if superstitions prevalent at the time of Becket were any evidence of the +condition of English thought at the present day. Next the absurdities in +the Apocryphal Book of Tobit are put in as evidence, although the contrary +evidence afforded by the other books of the Apocrypha, which contain no +traces of such superstitions, is left without mention. The writings of an +Assyrian Jew who lived about three hundred and fifty years before the +Christian era are about as valid to prove the opinions held by Christ and +his followers as the opinions of Cicero would be in evidence of the +beliefs of Constantine. Then reference is made to the angelology and +demonology contained in the writings of Philo, who was unquestionably a +contemporary of our Lord; but not the smallest hint is given to the reader +that he was deeply tinged with the principles of the Neo-Platonic +philosophy, a mode of thought wholly alien from that of the Palestinian +Jews, or that Philo was himself an Alexandrian Jew. Next the book of Enoch +is quoted, which (whenever it was written, for its date is uncertain) is +unquestionably not the work of a Palestinian Jew. This book, which is an +Apocalypse, contains a monstrous angelology and demonology, and abounds +with extravagances. Although part of it was written prior to the Advent, +other portions are clearly subsequent to it. Its author is unknown; but it +is highly probable from certain resemblances of expression between it and +the New Testament, that he was acquainted with portions of the latter; or, +to state the theory of unbelievers, that the authors of the New Testament +borrowed from it. If this view is true, then it is evident that they must +have rejected its angelology and demonology, for that contained in the New +Testament is utterly dissimilar in character to that which we read in the +book of Enoch. As far, therefore, as the evidence of this book is +concerned, it affords a distinct proof that they were not a prey to its +monstrous superstitions. This remark is equally applicable to the book of +Tobit, and the writings of Philo. + +But there is a reference made to Philo which deserves particular notice as +an exemplification of the mode adopted by those who endeavour to fix the +charge of unbounded credulity on the authors of the Gospels. I cite the +author. + +"The belief that the sun, moon and stars were living entities possessed of +souls was generally held by the Jews at the beginning of our era, along +with Greek philosophers, and we shall presently see it expressed by the +fathers. Philo Judæus considers the stars spiritual beings full of virtue +and perfection, and that to them is granted lordship over other heavenly +bodies, not absolute, but as viceroys under the Supreme Being. We find a +similar view expressed regarding the nature of the stars in the +Apocalypse, and it constantly occurs in the Talmud and Targums." + +"We find," says the author, "a similar view expressed regarding the nature +of the stars in the Apocalypse," _i.e._ that the stars are spiritual +beings full of virtue and perfection, and that they hold lordship over +other heavenly bodies. No quotation is made from this book, but four +passages are referred to in a note as proving this. They are as follows: +"The mystery of the seven stars which thou sawest in my right hand, and +the seven golden candlesticks. The seven stars are the angels of the seven +churches, and the seven candlesticks which thou sawest are the seven +churches." (Rev. i. 20.) With as good reason may it be said that the book +of Revelation teaches the rationality of candlesticks. + +"These things saith He that hath the seven Spirits of God, and the seven +stars." (Rev. iii. 1.) It is difficult to see how this proves that the +author of the Revelation was of opinion that the stars were rational +entities. The next passage referred to (Rev. iv. 5) makes no mention of +stars at all, but of "seven lamps of fire burning before the throne, which +are the seven Spirits of God." The last reference is: "I saw a star fall +from heaven unto the earth; and to him was given the key of the bottomless +pit." (Rev. ix. 1.) Here a star is spoken of as a living agent; but to +refer in proof of this to a book which is full of symbols and is an avowed +vision is ridiculous and misleading. On the contrary, the New Testament +supplies the most unquestionable evidence that its writers were free from +this superstition, into which even philosophers had fallen. + +The next writer referred to, to prove that the followers of Jesus were a +prey to credulity and superstition, is Josephus, in his narrative of the +signs which preceded the destruction of Jerusalem. + +To what extent Josephus embellished these signs may be a question. Most of +them have a very heathen aspect, and it is unquestionable that he was much +disposed to conciliate his heathen readers. It is sufficient to observe +that the pages of the New Testament contain nothing resembling them. + +But the chief source whence these ineffable puerilities are derived, and +charged on the contemporaries of our Lord, and through them on the writers +of the New Testament, is the Talmud. Probably there are no writings in +existence from which a more monstrous set of absurdities can be collected +than from those of the Talmudists. But how does this prove that this mass +of nonsense was believed in by the Jewish nation in our Lord's day? One +portion of the Talmud, the Mishna, was composed between A.D. 180 and A.D. +200, or some years after the date assigned by unbelievers to the Fourth +Gospel. The lateness of this date is urged by them as conclusive proof +that that Gospel does not embody the real traditions of the early +followers of Jesus. How then can it be urged with any thing like +consistency that the Mishna adequately represents their views respecting +the order of nature? But the other portion of the Talmud, the Gemara, was +not put forth in a written form prior to A.D. 500. To quote works thus +remote in time as proofs of the superstitions of the followers of Jesus, +is to adopt a course which if applied generally to history, would reduce +it to a tissue of falsehoods. Bishop Jewell was a believer in witchcraft; +but it would be absurd if some future writer were to quote the writings of +modern spiritualists as a proof that he believed in their doctrines. + +Nor is it true that the opinions of the masses of a nation are at all +adequately represented by those of its learned men, especially when +learning, as in the case in question, assumed the most unbounded licence +of speculation. In most cases the common sense of the masses who are +brought into contact with the hard facts of daily life will preserve them +from puerilities, into which learning, which draws exclusively on the +imagination, is certain to fall. There is sufficient evidence of the +superstition of the masses during the middle ages; but nothing would be +more absurd than to quote some monstrous opinions held by the great +scholastic writers to prove that they were the current opinions of the +vulgar. Yet the principle here adopted is to adduce opinions propounded by +learned writers, who lived centuries afterwards, as a proof that they were +current among the entire Jewish race at the time of Jesus Christ. + +The remaining references in proof of this position are still more +noteworthy. To establish the superstition of the Jews at the time of the +Advent, a set of opinions are adduced which were held by Christian +Fathers, whose writings cover a period of not less than four centuries. A +list of them will be sufficient. The apocryphal Barnabas and Hermas, +Justin Martyr, Theophilus, Clement of Alexandria, Tatian, Tertullian, +Cyprian, Origen, Augustine, Jerome, Chrysostom, Lactantius, Eusebius, and +Cyril of Jerusalem. A number of grotesque opinions are collected from +these writers, as though they could have any possible bearing on the +question whether the followers of Jesus were able correctly to report what +they saw and heard. + +I submit therefore that the facts adduced utterly fail to establish the +charge of intense superstition and credulity against the followers of +Jesus. But I go further, and affirm that they furnish the means of giving +a most conclusive proof of the contrary. + +These quotations furnish us with a clear and conclusive proof, which is +also furnished by the entire range of literature, that when writers are +the prey of a definite class of superstitions, their pages will afford +abundant evidence not only of their existence, but of their nature and +character. This, of course, must be qualified by the supposition that the +subject-matter on which they wrote is one suitable to call their latent +superstitions into activity. This always happens when the works are of a +religious character. In such cases they will faithfully reflect the +superstitions entertained by their authors. This is pre-eminently the case +with all the writings in question. They are all on religious subjects, on +which they allowed their imaginations to run riot. They entertained a +number of grotesque opinions, and accordingly we find in their writings a +grotesque super-naturalism, exactly corresponding to the peculiar ideas of +each individual writer. On the principle that "out of the abundance of the +heart the mouth speaketh," we may be quite certain that when an author is +extremely credulous and superstitious, it will find expression in his +pages whenever he is writing on a subject on which his imagination gives +scope to exhibit them. + +I put the argument as follows: all writers exhibit in their pages the +superstitions to which they are a prey. The writers of the New Testament +do not exhibit the superstitions in question. It follows therefore that +from these particular superstitions they are free. Consequently the charge +against them of intense superstition and credulity falls to the ground, as +far as it rests on the evidence in question. + +The amount of subject-matter in the New Testament which, independently of +a general belief in miracles, the opponents of Christianity can designate +as superstitious, is of a very limited and definite nature. It may be said +to be almost exclusively confined to a belief in the reality of +possession;--a few cases of disease occasioned by Satanic agency;--an +occasional intervention of angels, and their power to act on nature;--and +perhaps that demonology and heathenism were in some way connected with +each other. This is the sum total of such beliefs which appear on the face +of the New Testament. They appear in unequal degrees in the works of +different writers; and viewing them as mere human compositions, we have no +right to charge on one writer the beliefs of another. The book of +Revelation, and its imagery as professedly merely seen in a vision, cannot +fairly be introduced into this controversy. + +If then we concede, for the sake of argument, that the Jews in the time of +Christ were a prey to the extravagant superstitions referred to; if they +believed that the whole course of nature and human life was incessantly +interfered with by an army of spirits in numbers passing all +comprehension, and that these interferences were of the most grotesque and +phantastic character; if they universally believed in magic, charms and +incantations, the non-appearance of such phenomena in the pages of the New +Testament is a proof that its authors were not a prey to the current +superstitions of the day. No inconsiderable number of supernatural events +are recorded in their pages, but unbelief itself is compelled to admit +that they are all of a dignified character, with perhaps the exception of +the entrance of the demons into the swine, and the discovery of the piece +of money in the mouth of the fish. From what is monstrous, grotesque and +phantastic, they are absolutely free. + +If it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that miracles are possible, +then it cannot be denied that those of the New Testament, taken as a +whole, stand out in marked contrast to the current supernaturalism of +superstition. Their whole conception is lofty; there is in them nothing +mean or contemptible; they subserve a great purpose; they are worthy of +that great character to whom they are ascribed, Jesus Christ. I put the +question boldly: how is it, if the followers of Jesus were a prey to the +degrading superstitions above referred to, that we find no indications of +them in their pages? Also: how is it possible that men of such a character +should have invented such a number of noble creations? Let unbelievers +account for this on any principle which a sound philosophy can recognise. + +But further: the Gospels mention a certain number of possessions, and +their cures effected by our Lord. Here then we are in the very presence of +a demonology such as was actually believed in by the followers of Jesus. +Here, therefore, is the very condition of mind and outward circumstances +where, if they had been a prey to the phantastic and disgusting beliefs +about demons above referred to, such beliefs would certainly have made +their appearance in their pages. But, as I have shown, the demonology of +the Gospels stands in marked contrast to that of the Talmud, of Josephus, +and of the Christian Fathers. We have no fumigations of demoniacs with the +liver of a fish, we hear nothing of a demon drawn out of a man's nose, and +overturning a basin of water, nothing of a demon inhabiting every private +closet. On the contrary, their action is described as mental, and, through +the mind, affecting the body, with the exception of a few doubtful cases. +I am not here arguing whether a belief in the reality of demoniacal +possession is a superstition or not. But I affirm that if the writers of +the New Testament had been a prey to the superstitions with which they are +charged, these are the narratives in which they could not have failed to +make their appearance. Again: It has been affirmed that they held a +monstrous angelology. I reply that although angels are unquestionably +stated to have appeared, and their existence is affirmed by the writers of +the New Testament, still their recorded appearances are rare. They are +confined to a few very remarkable occasions, viz.: the Annunciation and +birth of our Lord, the temptation, the agony in the garden, and the +resurrection. Surely this does not look as if the authors of the Gospels +thought that they were always interfering with the course of nature or the +events of life. In the Acts of the Apostles, they appear at the Ascension; +once to liberate St. Peter, and at another time the Apostles, from prison; +to direct Philip to preach to the eunuch; twice in a vision to St. Paul; +and Herod Agrippa is also said to have been smitten by the ministry of an +angel. There were certainly many occasions when, if the writers had +believed in the habitual intervention of angels, we should have found them +introduced. Thus an angel is not sent to deliver Paul from prison, or to +still the tempest, but simply to assure him of his safety. St. Paul +enumerates in a passage of some length the various dangers which beset him +in his missions, especially mentioning the perils he encountered in +travel. But neither he nor St. Luke once refers to an angelic intervention +in his favour. In numerous passages he refers to dangers and persecutions +which he encountered. But it is our Lord, and not angels, who delivered +him. Is this consistent with a belief in their habitual intervention in +nature? If he was the visionary which he has been asserted to have been, +would he not have been continually seeing visions of angels for his +protection? + +In St. Paul's writings we are in the presence of documents which are in +the highest degree historical. Even those who endeavour to prove that the +Gospels and the Acts were not written until the second century, are +obliged to allow that at least four of the most important of his letters +were written within 30 years after the Crucifixion, and that the evidence +that four of the remainder are his, vastly preponderates. Here then we are +in the presence of historical documents of the highest order, compared +with which such a writing as the book of Enoch is worthless, and the +Talmud and the Fathers are modern compositions. What light then do these +letters throw on the opinions of St. Paul and the Pauline Churches? Much +every way: they let us into the secret of their inner life. They tell us +that these Christians thought they possessed certain supernatural gifts; +that St. Paul asserted that he wrought miracles; that demons by an +invisible agency tempted men to sin, and opposed the progress of the +Gospel; but beyond this there is scarcely a trace of angelology or +demonology in them. With these epistles in our hands, is it credible that +their writer, or those to whom he wrote, held a multitude of monstrous and +phantastic beliefs on this subject? Are not these writings characterized +by supreme good sense? Do they not in this point of view marvellously +contrast even with those of the earliest Fathers? The writer undoubtedly +believed that unseen spiritual agencies were capable of acting on the mind +of man, and that they were active agents in the production of moral evil; +but where is the evidence that he considered that external nature was +under their control, or that they made themselves visible to the mortal +eye? Although he affirms that he possessed a supernatural illumination on +religious subjects, only on two occasions does he refer to visions as +actually seen by him; and he directly affirms that he had the power of +distinguishing the ecstatic from the ordinary condition of his mind. Even +with the aid of the Acts of the Apostles, we can only add a few more to +the number. Surely this is not the mental condition of a man who was a +prey to unbounded superstition. Contrast the amount of good sense in the +epistles of St. Paul with an equal number of consecutive pages from the +Fathers and the Talmud, and the difference is enormous. Where are the +ineffable puerilities found in these writings even hinted at in those of +St. Paul? + +Again: if we include in our examination the other writings of the New +Testament, they wholly fail to supply us with any evidence of the +superstition or credulity of their authors. On the contrary they are +characterized by the marks of uniform good sense. It will be doubtless +objected that they, as well as St. Paul, were bad logicians, and that +their applications of the Old Testament Scriptures are inapt: but this +does not affect their trustworthiness as historians. They were undoubtedly +men of great religious fervour, yet they are both sparing in the use of +miracles, and when they report them, the miraculous action is never +represented as extending beyond the necessities of the case. Their +miracles consist of simple acts, as for instance the cure of diseases, but +all marvellous superadditions are wanting. It has been urged that in +comparing the miracles of the Gospels with other miraculous narratives, we +have no right to do more than compare the external miracle of the one with +the external miracle of the other; as for instance a resurrection with a +resurrection, or a cure of blindness recorded in one with a similar case +recorded in another; and not to take into account either the external +circumstances or the moral aspect of the miracle. I have elsewhere proved +that this position is untenable. But for the purpose of the argument let +us here assume that all the circumstances may be the invention of the +narrator. If it be so, it proves at any rate the soundness of his judgment +and the elevation of his ideas, _i.e._ that it is impossible that he could +have been either intensely superstitious or credulous. How is it possible, +I ask, for minds which were a prey to such monstrous beliefs as those +which we have been considering, to have dramatized miraculous narratives +of the elevated type of those contained in the Gospels? Would not all the +circumstances with which they invested them be the counter-part of their +own degraded conceptions? + +But there is one most distinctive phenomenon presented by the Gospels +which affords a conclusive proof that neither their authors nor the +followers of Jesus could have been a prey to either degrading superstition +or credulous fanaticism. I allude to the fact that, whatever theory may be +propounded to account for their origin, the Gospels, as a matter of fact, +unquestionably contain a delineation of the greatest of all characters, +whether actual or ideal, that of Jesus Christ. I shall hereafter draw +attention to the portraiture of this character for the purpose of proving +that they are veritable historical documents. In this place I refer to it +simply for the purpose of proving that their authors and those who +invented the alleged fictions of which their contents consist, were +possessed of a soundness of judgment which is wholly inconsistent with the +truth of the assertion that they were a prey to boundless superstition or +credulity. + +For the purpose of the argument I must assume that this character is a +fictitious one, because to assume that it is a delineation of an actual +historical character, would be to take for granted the entire question at +issue. If the Jesus of the Evangelists is an historical personage, there +can be no doubt respecting the claims of the Gospel to be a divine +revelation. But even if we make the assumption above mentioned, it is +quite clear that those persons who invented the character, or who put it +together out of the number of legendary stories floating about in the +Church, must have been possessed of a sound judgment, and the highest +appreciation of what was great and noble. The character we have before us, +and it is confessedly the noblest which can be found either in history or +fiction. The inventors, whoever they were, have succeeded in portraying a +great harmonious whole. Such a character could only have been delineated +by men possessed of sound discriminating judgment. The more the Gospels +are depreciated as histories the more does this depreciation establish the +credit of their authors as the successful delineators of an ideal +character, to which they have succeeded in imparting a naturalness which +men of the most exalted genius have mistaken for an historical reality. +They must have been, therefore, consummate masters of the art of ideal +delineation. The mental powers adequate to effect such results are those +of high genius, to which in this case must have been added a very elevated +conception of morality. Such mental qualities are never exhibited by men +who are the prey of gross credulity and superstition. The great ideal +delineations of poets have been only capable of being produced by the +_élite_ of the human race. On the other hand, if we assume that the +character is a fictitious one, and its inventors men of the mental calibre +which they are affirmed to have been by those against whom I am reasoning, +it would have been inevitable that its proportions should be marred by the +introduction into it of traits marked by meanness, puerility, and +monstrosity. + +In support of this assertion we have no occasion to appeal to theories but +to facts. Happily antiquity has preserved to us several delineations of a +mythical Jesus on which the inventors have stamped the most unmistakable +impress of their own credulity and superstition. I need not say that I +allude to the Apocryphal Gospels, the delineations of Jesus which they +contain, and above all to their miraculous narratives. Those who reiterate +these charges against the authors of the Canonical Gospels, are very slow +to draw attention to their bearing on this portion of the argument. In the +Apocryphal Gospels we are brought face to face with the legendary spirit +exerting itself in the invention of miraculous stories. There can be no +doubt that their authors were both extremely credulous and superstitious; +and their miraculous narratives give us the precise measure of their +credulity. There is every reason to believe that two of these compositions +were written as early as the second century. What, I ask, is the general +character of the miracles which they have attributed to Jesus? There can +be only one answer. They are mean, ridiculous, degraded, burlesque, +destitute of all trait of moral grandeur. If the authors of the four +Gospels, or the inventors of their miraculous narratives, whoever they may +have been, had been a prey to similar credulity and superstition, the +marks of them would have been indelibly stamped on their pages. + +These documents also contain accounts of miracles wrought by Jesus, some +of which, as bare facts, are precisely the same as some recorded in the +Canonical Gospels, _i.e._ they contain accounts of resurrections from the +dead, and the cure of diseases. I ask, do their accompanying circumstances +and moral aspect stand as nothing in our estimate of the credibility of +their authors? Compare the account of the resurrection of Lazarus, or that +of our Lord himself, with the resurrections in the Apocryphal Gospels, and +mark the difference. Compare likewise the other miracles, which, as bare +facts, resemble one another. The one have the stamp of historical +probability, and precisely fit in with the lofty character of Jesus; the +other of an unbelievable legend, in which the character is degraded to a +level with the conceptions of the inventors. + +Let not unbelievers, therefore, decline to grapple with the question. Let +them cease to pass it over in silence. I propose to them the following +questions for solution. If both sets of Gospels originated with minds +intensely credulous and superstitious, whence has come the difference +between them? Why is the one set of miracles dignified, and the other +mean? Whence the entire difference of their moral aspect? Why is the Jesus +of the Canonical Gospels the most elevated personage in history, and the +Jesus of the Apocryphal ones, one of the most mean and silly? If two of +the Apocryphal and the four Canonical Gospels are the production of the +superstition and credulity of the same century, whence the marvellous +contrast between them? Which of the Fathers of the second or third century +was equal to the task of reducing a mass of floating legends, the +creations of numbers of superstitious men, into their present form, as +they stand in our Canonical Gospels? Would they not certainly have +coloured the events with their own absurdities? If, on the other hand, it +be allowed that the Canonical Gospels are the production of the first +century, and the Apocryphal Gospels of subsequent ones, how came the +credulous followers of Jesus to produce fictions dramatized with such +admirable taste in the first century, and the same spirit in subsequent +centuries to present so striking a contrast? The only possible answer +which can be returned to these questions is that the phenomena of the +Canonical Gospels are inconsistent with the supposition that their +miraculous narratives are the invention of men who were the prey either of +credulity or dense superstition; they must have been men well able to +distinguish between a genuine miracle and a mythic parody of one. + +But it has been urged that the dignified character of Jesus induced the +compilers of our present Gospels to select all the miraculous stories of a +high type which were current in the hotbed of Christian fanaticism, and to +attribute them to Jesus, and to suppress all of a contrary description. If +this be the true solution of the facts, then it certainly follows that the +compilers of the Gospels must have been free from the superstitions of the +times in which they lived. Otherwise, how came they to select all the +elevated stories and attribute them to Jesus, and to consign those of a +lower type to a well-merited oblivion? Is it not a fact that credulous and +superstitious people have often attributed what is contemptible and mean +to elevated characters? Let the Apocryphal Gospels bear witness. It +follows, therefore, that even on this supposition the question must be +decided in favour of the authors of our present Canonical Gospels, that +they must have been free from the degraded superstitious to which their +fellow-believers were a prey. + +But there is yet another problem, even if we assume the above supposition +to be true, which urgently demands solution. If, among the mass of legends +with which the history of Jesus was incrusted, a certain portion of the +miraculous stories were of an elevated type, who among His credulous and +superstitious followers were the inventors of them? Were they men of like +credulity with the remainder? There are only two alternatives. They were, +or they were not. If they were, I ask, how came they to invent elevated +stories? If they were not, then it follows that there were persons among +His followers who were neither intensely credulous nor superstitious. If +the latter be the alternative adopted, then the theory which I have been +considering, which attributes to the followers of Jesus such a degree of +those qualities as to render their historical testimony valueless, falls +to the ground. + +It follows, therefore, on a careful consideration of the position, that +the data on which the charge which we have been considering is made +against the followers of Jesus and the authors of the Gospels utterly fail +to establish it; and that the phenomena of the New Testament prove the +contrary to have been the fact. + + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. THE LOVE OF THE MARVELLOUS--ITS BEARING ON THE VALUE OF +TESTIMONY TO MIRACLES. + + +It has been objected that the love of the marvellous has in every age +constituted so remarkable a phase of human nature as greatly to weaken, if +not entirely to invalidate the testimony to the performance of miracles. +It is alleged that the great historians of ancient times have recorded a +number of supernatural occurrences which are now summarily rejected as +incredible: and it is therefore argued that all narratives of miraculous +occurrences must share the same fate. This objection differs from that +which I have considered in the former chapter, in that it avoids the +necessity of imputing to the followers of Jesus and the authors of the +Gospels a degree of superstition and credulity greatly in excess of that +which characterizes the majority of mankind. It will be therefore +necessary to give this subject a careful consideration. + +It is an unquestionable fact that the human mind has been in all ages +disposed to accept a number of narratives of supernatural occurrences upon +very insufficient testimony, and which the principles of sound reason lead +us to reject as untrue. Such beliefs have been peculiar to no one period +of the world's history, but have been co-extensive with the human race; +and they form one of the most remarkable facts in our nature. Many of the +ancient historians have reported such occurrences without apparent +suspicion; or if they entertained any doubts respecting their truth, they +did not venture even to whisper them into the popular ear. What is still +more; eminent men of the ancient world did not scruple to act in matters +of this kind a part which they knew to be deceptive, because they held the +opinion that such beliefs, though they might be laughed at by +philosophers, were necessary to act as restraints on the vulgar. Thus we +know, on the most indubitable authority, that a Roman Augur could gravely +act his part before the public at the very time that he was secretly +laughing in his sleeve at the ridiculousness of his art. It does not +therefore follow because the ancient historians have reported numbers of +occurrences of this nature with considerable gravity, that they accepted +them as facts. They were frequently influenced by the spirit of +accommodation, thinking it necessary for the welfare of society to keep up +the vulgar ideas on the subject. It would be inaccurate therefore to +attribute all the accounts of such things which we meet with in ancient +writers to simple credulity, or to infer from them that they did not +believe in an inviolable order of nature of some kind. With respect to the +arts of magic, however, one feels that even the greatest of the ancient +writers contemplated them with a kind of bated breath. This would appear +to have been the state of mind even of Tacitus, with one exception the +greatest historian of the ancient world, and one who was intimately +acquainted with the various systems of its philosophy. Conscious as he was +that vast numbers of the professors of magic were impostors, he seems +hardly able to realize the fact that the whole art was a delusion. + +It has been affirmed that the progress of physical science has destroyed +in this nineteenth century all belief in the actual occurrence of the +supernatural, and that it now prevails only in some of the dark corners of +Christendom. The widespread belief in the phenomena of spiritualism, which +is certainly very far from being confined to religious men, and from which +some students of physical science have not been exempt, is a striking +proof of the contrary. All that can be affirmed with truth is that, in +these modern times, these forms of belief have taken a new direction. +Modern science has done much to establish and spread the belief that the +operations of all natural, _i.e._ material forces are uniform. Many of its +students have even brought themselves to the belief that the occurrence of +any event whose existence is due to the action of any other than the known +forces of nature, is impossible: though this is far from being the +invariable, and is certainly not the necessary result of its study. Still, +probably, the most ardent votary of these opinions would find it difficult +to keep himself wholly free from terrors arising from unseen causes, if +they were aroused by a suitable apparatus. The study of physical science +is far from being a universal safeguard against the invasions of +superstition. Its causes lie far more deeply rooted in our nature than the +principles of physical science can reach. Nor is it able to guard against +an extravagant use of the imagination. + +Whether, in the present state of our philosophy, we have fully penetrated +to the depths of this principle thus working in the mind of man, may admit +of doubt; but its presence there, as an essential portion of our nature, +is an unquestionable fact. We are not without the means of getting a +general idea of its character. It is doubtless intimately connected with +those principles of our nature which constitute man a religious being, and +which form a fundamental part of his mental constitution. As such it must, +like all our other faculties, have a legitimate and an illegitimate +action. It points, as we shall see, to the existence of the supernatural. +A rational religion forms the object for its appropriate exercise. +Whenever man has been destitute of this, and his reason has been weak, +this principle, devoid of its proper object, has always manifested itself +in various forms of extravagance. So powerful is it in the human mind that +even avowed atheism has not been proof against its power. Julius Cæsar was +an atheist, and possessed one of the most powerful minds that ever +inhabited the human frame. Yet, on the great day of his triumph, he +ascended the steps of the Capitol for the purpose of averting an avenging +Nemesis. Napoleon the First was no atheist, though few persons who have +ever lived have been more free from the restraints of religion or +superstition. Although he possessed a mighty intellect and was no stranger +to the truths of modern science, yet even he believed in his star. Many +other instances of men of powerful intellect who disbelieved in religion, +yet who entertained singular superstitions, might be easily adduced. I +refer to them for the purpose of proving that the principle out of which +such things originate must be one which is deep-seated in the nature of +man, and therefore an essential portion of it. If it is founded on a +fundamental principle of our mental constitution, it follows that it must +have a legitimate subject-matter on which to exercise its powers, and that +the abnormal forms of it which are so frequently manifested are the +results of some disorder in its action. What then is its nature? + +There are certain principles deeply-seated within us, which form as +definite a portion of ourselves as even our rational faculties, and which +directly prompt to the belief in the supernatural, and therefore point to +its existence. Among these, the faculties of imagination, wonder, +reverence and awe, hold a conspicuous place. It is impossible to deny that +they form portions of the actual constitution of our minds, however we may +account for their origin. Is it then our duty to eradicate them because +they prompt us to the belief in something which transcends the visible +order of nature? This will hardly be affirmed by the most thorough-going +sceptic; for if it be our duty to do so, the human mind must be a mass of +disorder in the midst of a universe of order. If we were to make the +attempt (for indeed it has been attempted) the result would be to upset +the balance of our mental constitution, and it would terminate in failure. +Human nature, taken as it is, constitutes a whole. These faculties hold in +it a place subordinate to reason and to conscience. When our rational, our +imaginative, and our moral powers act harmoniously together, they +constitute man a religious being. + +But, for the purposes of the present argument, I have simply to draw +attention to the fact that imagination, wonder, reverence and awe form an +essential portion of our being. It would be in the highest degree +undesirable to get rid of them, even if we were able. How mighty is the +influence of the first of these principles! It lies at the foundation of +everything that is great and noble in man. To it are due the magnificent +creations of poetry; in fact everything which adorns life, and much of +that which raises us above the mechanical forces of nature. Destitute of +it, our reason could not act; nay, it could not even exist; and we should +be reduced to the mere mechanical action of the understanding, the wheels +of which would be in danger of rusting. Nor has the faculty of wonder a +less definite place in our being. It is closely connected with our +imagination, which supplies it with objects fitted to excite it, and ought +to be exercised under the guidance of reason. Its object is the great and +the vast, shall I not say, the infinite? Regulated by reason and united +with awe, it produces reverence. Reverence points to the existence of some +object which is really worthy of veneration. Veneration can only be +legitimately exercised on that which is truly venerable. As such it +directly points to a personal God, and refuses to rest in anything short +of Him as able fully to gratify its aspirations. Viewing them as a whole, +the legitimate object of these faculties, and the subject from which they +can receive their fullest gratification, is that Great Being who +everywhere manifests Himself in this glorious universe. But when man has +ceased to contemplate in nature a rational power guiding and controlling +it, the principle of wonder has frequently prompted him to gratify its +aspirations by peopling it with a multitude of phantastic creations. When +under the influence of awe, he has contemplated it in its terrible +aspects, unguided by a being who possesses a moral character, these +feelings have prompted the imagination to fill it with beings who excite +the feeling of superstitious dread. + +Although the vastness of the material universe and the energy of its +forces can excite the feeling of wonder, yet that of reverence refuses to +find in the mere extension of space, or the might of material forces, any +object adequate to its demands. The vastness of the material universe may +fill the mind with wonder and admiration; but even wonder refuses to rest +satisfied with a vastness of which the limits are known. It demands +something which is conceivable, which yet runs up into the regions of the +inconceivable. But even here the feeling of reverence can find nothing on +which to energize. It directly points to a moral being in whom it can find +a centre, and it will find its gratification in nothing short of one. To +talk, as many Pantheists do, of feeling reverence for an impersonal +Universe, is a misuse of language. What! to reverence a Being, if the +impersonal Universe can be called a Being, which is everlastingly casting +up the bubbles of existence in the form of moral agents, and is +everlastingly devouring them, devoid alike of consciousness, volition, and +a moral nature! + +It follows, therefore, if these principles form a constituent portion of +our nature, that like all our other faculties, they must admit of a right +and a perverted use. It is therefore absurd to lay down as a general +principle, because they admit of an illegitimate use, that the whole class +of phenomena connected with them are worthy of nothing but summary +rejection, without exercising our reason on the evidence on which they +stand. All that their existence can prove in reference to this subject is +something which is very like a truism; that mankind, being liable to all +kinds of mistakes and errors, and having frequently fallen into them, no +class of phenomena ought to be accepted as facts, until evidence of their +occurrence has been adduced which is capable of satisfying our reason. But +this is a very harmless proposition. + +There can be no doubt that to a perverted use of these faculties is due +the belief in a kind of current supernaturalism, which in various forms +runs through the entire history of man. This has owed its origin to the +efforts of the imagination to supply objects for its gratification when +the reason is feeble and the moral faculties have become perverted. Hence +the readiness of large masses of mankind to accept narratives of marvels +without regard to the evidence on which they rest. They are accepted +simply as gratifying the principle of wonder. This is the cause of what I +have designated by the term "Current Supernaturalism." + +But because all our faculties admit of abuse, and the higher they are, the +greater, this forms no reason for rejecting their legitimate use, or the +entire subject-matter on which they operate. As I have observed, the +principle is found energizing wherever man exists. Although in one age it +may be more active than in another, it is alike the inheritance of the +civilized man and the savage. It has displayed itself in the creations of +the poet and the writer of fiction; in the various forms of religious +thought; in the production of ghost-stories and pictures of the under- +world; in the creation of the various forms of demonology, witchcraft and +magic; in the milder form of fairy-tales; in charms and incantations, and +in efforts to pry into the future. Even in philosophy and science we may +trace its influence, not only in aiding and suggesting their great +discoveries, but in propounding multitudes of startling theories, erected +on the smallest basis of fact. These not only gratify this feeling, but +promise an apparently royal road to knowledge, which avoids the long and +tedious one of only propounding theories after a careful investigation of +facts. But in the regions of intellectual pursuit, its abnormal +manifestations are pre-eminently in the science of historical criticism, +in those numerous departments of historical inquiry where the facts are +few and vague. Here nothing is easier than to supply the absence of facts +by theory, and to erect a magnificent edifice on a foundation of sand. The +ancient soothsayer gratified vulgar curiosity by guessing at the events of +the future. There is a species of modern soothsaying which expends its +energies in guessing at the events of the past. Such guessing presents an +unspeakable fascination to a large number of minds, by its happy mixture +of fiction and fact, and is the true analogue to many of the forms of +ancient thought. It has been necessary to draw attention to these things +for the purpose of proving the widespread influence of this principle on +human nature. Its action has manifested itself in different forms in +different ages; but the cause is the same in all, the existence in man of +a principle which points to the existence of God, and which can only +receive its adequate gratification in Him. + +The action of similar principles produces in man the love of the +extraordinary, the unusual and the novel. This is so powerful that unless +it is kept in subordination to reason, it produces a number of fictitious +beliefs. So strong is it, that it may be truly said of large numbers of +mankind that they spend all the time which they are not compelled to +devote to the serious realities of life, in little else than hearing and +speaking of some new thing. It is undoubtedly the cause of a large number +of fictitious beliefs, and produces, in minds where the rational powers +are weak, a ready acceptance of the unusual, the strange, and the +wonderful. The same principle, acting in conjunction with others, when +uncontrolled by reason, has occasioned many of the exaggerations which are +to be found in history. + +Still, as one of the fundamental principles of our minds, it cannot but +have a legitimate sphere of action. United with curiosity, it is the chief +source of all mental activity. It is that which produces the earnest +desire to penetrate into the regions of the unknown. As such, it is +essential to the activity of our rational faculties, and has been the +exciting cause which has rendered all our great discoveries possible. + +It follows, therefore, that if these principles form part of our mental +constitution, the objection that they destroy the value of miracles as a +testimony to a revelation is absurd. We might as well argue that because +the love of the marvellous has generated a belief in a number of fictions +as facts in ordinary history, it invalidates its testimony to events which +have really happened, or renders all unusual occurrences incredible. I +will illustrate this by an example. Herodotus tells us in his history that +there were certain tribes who dwelt in wooden habitations erected over +lakes, and he gives us several particulars as to their manner of life. +This fact, until a comparatively recent period, might have been pronounced +incredible, and have been supposed to have originated in the simple love +of the marvellous, either in the author or in his informants. I own that +when I first read the historian, this was the opinion which I formed +respecting it. But we now know that he reported an actual fact. On the +other hand it is certain that a great portion of the details of the +Scythian expedition of Darius must have originated in the undue activity +of the mental faculties to which I have referred, _i.e._ that they are +inventions. But if the principle of summarily rejecting narratives of +events which lie beyond our experience is valid, because the abnormal +activity of certain faculties has urged men to invent, and believe in a +multitude of fictions, the account of the lake-dwellings given by the +historian ought to have been rejected as equally unworthy of credit, with +some of the occurrences of the Scythian expedition. It is impossible to +deal with the events of history on any general _à priori_ principles; they +must stand or fall on their own intrinsic evidence. + +It follows, therefore, that if these principles admit of an abnormal +action, we are still by no means justified in a summary rejection of all +unusual occurrences. It only forms an adequate reason for closely +scrutinizing the evidence on which the credibility of history rests. The +faculty of imagination, instigated by that of wonder, has produced +widespread beliefs in a mass of supernatural events which are utterly +incredible. But as that faculty must have a legitimate action somewhere, +it is clear that its abuse can be no valid reason for the rejection of all +supernatural occurrences, unless for other reasons they are proved to be +incredible. The whole must be a question of evidence and of reason. If it +formed a valid ground for the rejection of miracles, it is clear that the +principle on which it is founded cannot be confined to any such narrow +limits, but must have a wide and general application, and extend to all +that is wonderful and unusual. + +It is an unquestionable fact that a large proportion of mankind in every +age have eagerly sought the means of affording gratification to the +feeling of wonder, and that this has been the means of introducing into +history a considerable number of fictions of various kinds. But does this +invalidate its testimony? Does it justify us in rejecting whole classes of +phenomena as unworthy of consideration? We have already seen that whatever +principle is applied to miracles must be equally applied to all +extraordinary events, because as phenomena there is no difference between +them. We admit that many fictions have got into history. These it is the +duty of the critical historian to detect and displace. Will anyone affirm +that their introduction invalidates the events in the history of the past, +which rest on an adequate attestation? What that is, I shall consider +hereafter. Whatever effect this may have exerted on the minor details of +history, will anyone affirm that its great outlines do not rest on a +substantial basis of truth? It is impossible to lay down on these subjects +a wide and comprehensive canon which will save us the trouble of careful +and accurate investigation. All reports of extraordinary events, marvels, +and miracles, must stand or fall with the adequacy of the evidence which +can be adduced for their occurrence, and cannot be decided by any +artificial rule. If the evidence is good, they must be accepted, +notwithstanding the fact that extensive classes of marvels have been +accepted by mankind on testimony wholly insufficient to establish their +truth. If the evidence fails, they must be regarded as the result of the +abnormal exercise of faculties which yet have a legitimate place in our +mental constitution. + +Nothing is more common than the assertion that at certain periods of +history, mankind have been ignorant that there is an order in nature; and +that this ignorance has given these faculties such unbounded play as to +render all reports of supernatural occurrences unworthy of credit, +notwithstanding any amount of evidence which may be alleged in their +favour. It is urged that, if men are ignorant that there is an order in +nature, to such a state of mind nothing would be really supernatural; but +every event, whether supernatural or otherwise, would be viewed as a +matter of ordinary occurrence. To this state of mind a miracle would +convey no meaning, and therefore it would be valueless as evidence of a +divine revelation. In other words, it has been affirmed that there have +been certain conditions of mankind in which the love of the marvellous has +been so powerful, and the action of reason so weak, as to destroy all +sense of the distinction between a natural and a supernatural occurrence. + +I reply that the Christian revelation was not addressed to such a +condition of the human mind. On the contrary, it was made after a long +course of preparation for its introduction. After the whole course of +previous history, under the controlling providence of God, had prepared +the way for His Advent, Jesus Christ appeared. The Gospel was not preached +to men in the lowest state of barbarism, but to civilized man. What may +have been the ideas of degraded savages, at some early period of the +history of our race, it will be needless to inquire. With mankind in such +a condition we have nothing to do in the present controversy, but with the +state of thought in the Roman Empire during the first century of our era. +This was no period of mental darkness or of boundless credulity. In the +early ages, when every phenomenon of nature was viewed as due to the +action of some capricious god, the belief in an order of nature must have +been in a high degree vague and uncertain. But such a state of things, +whatever it might once have been, had long since passed away. The period +of history now under consideration was one of widespread intelligence, +varying greatly in different parts of the empire, but still one of +intelligence and civilization. + +It is impossible for men to attain a degree of progress necessary for the +existence of civilization, and still to remain ignorant that a large class +of natural occurrences follow an order which does not admit of deviation. +Civilization would be impossible unless this were generally recognized. It +is in fact founded on its recognition. At the same time, there is a class +of phenomena which are not recognized by the ordinary mind as following a +definite order. It is within this alone that the beliefs of current +supernaturalism exert their activity. But the supernatural occurrences +narrated in the New Testament do not belong to this ambiguous order of +events, and are therefore unaffected by them. + +There is a large class of events which civilized man cannot help +recognizing as belonging to a definite order and sequence, and where the +belief in the marvellous exerts little or no influence. The violation of +this order he views as impossible. Thus he cannot fail to recognize the +fact that men cannot walk on the water without support; that thousands of +persons cannot be fed by a few loaves and fishes; that diseases never +leave us instantaneously by no other agency than that of a touch or a +word; and that men who have been actually dead have never returned to +life. No amount of the love of the marvellous has ever induced men to +consider such occurrences possible. Whatever may have been the current +supernaturalism of the ancient world, it did not embody beliefs of this +description. This is proved by the entire course of ancient history. Its +supernaturalism is of a wholly different order. The love of the +marvellous, therefore, has never so confounded the distinction between the +natural and the supernatural among civilized men, as to have deprived a +miracle of its significance. + +Such an assertion respecting any part of the Roman Empire, during the +century which preceded and that which followed the Advent, would be +contrary to fact. On the contrary, certain classes of events which were +reported to have happened, were invariably believed to have been really +supernatural. They were so far from being considered as devoid of meaning, +that persons supposed to be skilled in the art of interpreting them were +habitually consulted as to what they were intended to denote. The only +exceptions to this were those occurrences which were supposed to have been +brought about by the art of magic. These seem to have been viewed as in +some measure due to the existence of occult powers in nature, the results +of which the professors of the art had succeeded in mastering. It may be +safely affirmed that at no portion of this period was the love of the +marvellous so prevalent in any portion of the Roman Empire as to have +deprived a real miracle of its signification. + +It follows therefore that it is impossible to lay down any abstract rule +which will save us the trouble of investigating the evidence of miracles, +because mankind has in all ages been greatly influenced by the love of the +marvellous, and under its influence has invented a number of occurrences +which reason pronounces incredible. The action of this principle is far +from being confined to subjects connected with religion, but extends over +the whole range of literature. While it is quite true that, under the +influence of various principles of this description, numbers of fictions +have been reported by ancient historians, this forms a valid reason only +for rejecting those which rest on no adequate attestation. The adoption of +the other principle would render all knowledge of the past impossible. All +the faculties of our minds admit of a legitimate and an illegitimate use. +To reject the results of the right use of our faculties, because they are +capable of a wrong one, is absurd. + +But an opposite view may be taken of the entire question, and one which is +dictated by the principles of reason. + +Several principles in man directly point to the existence of the +supernatural. Among these veneration and conscience occupy a conspicuous +place. These acting in conjunction with reason constitute man a religious +being. Man alone of all living beings is capable of religion. The +principle of reverence finds its only adequate gratification in the +contemplation of moral perfection. Moral perfection is inconceivable where +personality and volition are not. This principle therefore forms the +counterpart in man which is directly correlated to the being and the +perfections of a personal God. It follows that instead of these principles +invalidating the existence of the supernatural, they establish it. The +conception of immensity is the adequate subject-matter on which our +faculty of wonder works. The highest conception of greatness is realized +in God. In Him therefore this faculty receives its most perfect +realization. Reverence points to greatness united with supreme moral +goodness. The imperfection of man will not satisfy it. It therefore impels +man to bow down before the throne of One who transcends the imperfections +of the created universe. If there be a personal God, supremely good, who +is the Creator and moral Governor of the universe, nothing is more in +conformity with our highest reason than that He should make a further +manifestation of Himself to man, in addition to that which He has made in +the material universe. + + + + + +CHAPTER XV. OUR SUMMARY REJECTION OF CURRENT SUPERNATURALISM CONSIDERED IN +ITS BEARING ON THE EVIDENCE FOR MIRACLES. + + +There can be no doubt that there is an enormous mass of supernatural +beliefs which we feel at once justified in rejecting without troubling +ourselves to inquire into the evidence on which they rest. Others also we +reject because on investigation we find them altogether destitute of +evidence. Others again which rest on evidence which would be sufficient to +establish an ordinary fact, we reject notwithstanding this attestation, on +the ground of their inherent improbability. It has been objected that our +summary rejection of the great mass of current supernaturalism puts the +case of miracles out of court, and renders them so improbable, that it is +unnecessary minutely to examine the evidence which can be adduced in +support of them. I propose therefore in this chapter to consider the +reasons for our summary rejection of the great mass of current +supernaturalism, and its bearing on the credibility of the miracles in the +New Testament. + +First: I observe that the stories of current supernaturalism are not the +only ones which we reject in a summary manner. We treat in the same way a +great number of other stories which offend against the principles of +common sense. It is clear that in these latter cases, we do not reject +them merely because they are supernatural, but because they are generally +incredible. The fact therefore that we thus reject a number of absurd +narratives without inquiry into the evidence on which they rest, cannot be +urged as a reason for rejecting other occurrences which are not involved +in any such absurdity. If the principle is valid against miracles, it must +be equally so against other extensive classes of facts. To assert that +miracles are thus absurd or ridiculous is to assume the point which ought +to be proved. + +Secondly: We reject the great mass of current supernaturalism because it +is unable to assign any adequate reason for its existence. When it is +alleged that a miracle has been performed as an attestation of a +revelation, if it forms a necessary portion of such attestation, this is +an adequate reason for the miracle. But the great mass of current +supernaturalism is utterly unable to assign any reason for its existence; +or if reasons have been given, they are quite inadequate. Of this the case +of magic is an example. If it were a reality, it would not only interfere +with the order of nature, but no reason could be given for this +interference. If, on the other hand, its phenomena were alleged to be due +to secret forces in nature, then they would belong to an order of +grotesque and monstrous phenomena, which we are justified at once in +refusing to believe to be due to the action of intelligence or goodness; +and on the supposition that there is a moral Governor of the universe, it +is utterly incredible that they would occur either by his agency or with +his permission. + +Perhaps the best attested occurrences of current supernaturalism are the +phenomena of spiritualism. It will tend to the illustration of this +subject, if we consider the grounds on which we reject a large portion of +its reported phenomena quite irrespectively of the evidence produced in +favour of their reality, and ascribe the belief in them to the effect of +an excited imagination, and in some cases to imposture. In considering +this subject, it is not necessary to examine whether the phenomena alleged +by spiritualists, if true, would be really supernatural, or belong to an +order of nature hitherto unknown. + +Many of the manifestations of spiritualism possess a grotesqueness which +we see in no other class of natural phenomena. If they are alleged to be +the results of the action of natural forces previously unknown, then they +must belong to a class of forces which contrast in a most remarkable +degree with all known ones; that is to say, the known and the unknown +forces of nature must be utterly out of harmony with one another. I am now +speaking on the supposition that such forces are merely natural ones, not +under the guidance of intelligence. In that case they must have been +always in existence, only latent; yet they now for the first time manifest +themselves under very special circumstances and conditions, such as are +highly favourable to the existence of delusion. The abnormal character of +these phenomena, so entirely at variance with the known order of nature, +forms the strongest ground for the conviction that they cannot be the +results of the action of unknown natural forces. It would require an +overwhelming amount of evidence to convince us that these two sets of +natural forces, distinguishable by the strongest possible contrasts, (viz. +those which produce the visible phenomena of nature, and those which +produce another class, intermittent in their action, of which +grotesqueness and monstrosity are the most striking characteristics, and +which only manifest their existence under circumstances calculated to +throw a suspicion on their reality), can be the results of the action of +forces which have been present in nature during all past time. + +But further: these phenomena, if natural, must belong to an order of +nature which is not only unlike the visible order, but would throw its +action into confusion. I am here reasoning on the supposition that the +moral order of the universe is due to the action of nothing but physical +forces. If this be so, it must form a portion of the existing order of +nature. But the forces which, on the supposition of the truth of +spiritualism, must be capable of being brought into activity, would +interrupt that moral order of which we are actually conscious. Their +action, if real, would interrupt the entire course of the moral world. No +man would be safe from their intrusion. Even in our deepest retirement we +should never be free from the invasion of their prying curiosity. Such a +power would be incompatible with the moral order of society. It follows, +therefore, that an unknown order of nature, presenting the most violent +contrast to the visible one, whose phenomena do not follow an invariable +but an intermittent law, and are only alleged to manifest themselves under +conditions favourable to imposture, possesses such a degree of inherent +improbability as to justify its rejection, even by those who recognise the +action of none but material forces in the universe. + +But to those who recognise the present order of nature as due to the +action of a wise and intelligent Creator, it becomes absolutely incredible +that forces such as the phenomena of spiritualism require for their +production, can form a portion of that order which He has created, as they +contradict every conception which we can rationally form of his character. + +But if these phenomena are viewed as due to the action of supernatural +agency, the reality of their occurrence becomes still more inconceivable. +If such agency is capable of being exerted, we can only conceive that its +exertion is permitted for the realization of some known end. Yet the +phenomena of spiritualism serve no purpose whatever. Spiritualists have +been holding their _séances_ for many years; but no one practical result +has yet been realized by them. The spirits of the departed have been +invoked, but they have never yet given a single useful response. Surely if +there be a spirit world, its occupations cannot be the production of the +abnormal, the mean and the grotesque. Its employments must possess some +pretensions to be esteemed dignified. It has been alleged that such +manifestations help to convince the incredulous of the reality of the +immortality of man. On the contrary, the idea that spirits can be guilty +of such phantastic tricks can only help to throw discredit on the +doctrine. It follows, therefore, that if the phenomena of spiritualism are +viewed as due to supernatural causes, it is utterly incredible either that +the Governor of the Universe would permit such a course of action, or that +the spirits themselves, unless deprived of reason, would exhibit +themselves in such a variety of phantastic forms, and for no other +apparent purpose than to effect a number of capricious interferences with +the visible order of nature. This incredibility is so great as to entitle +us summarily to reject the idea that the reputed phenomena can be actual +occurrences. In addition to this, the alleged manifestations are made +under circumstances pre-eminently suited to excite suspicion. + +The phenomena of modern spiritualism are a fair illustration of the +general character of the current supernaturalism of the ancient world. It +was for the most part equally senseless and absurd. The attestation to its +actual occurrence was of a very inferior character to that which can be +urged in favour of the alleged facts of spiritualism. I have merely taken +notice of these latter as an illustration of the general aspect of the +phenomena of current supernaturalism, and as placing before us the reasons +which fully justify us in rejecting a large portion of it without minutely +inquiring into its evidence. + +I will now proceed to contrast the entire mass of current supernaturalism +with the miracles of the New Testament for the purpose of still further +illustrating the grounds on which we reject it, while we claim for the +latter that their reality must be tested by the evidence which can be +adduced in favour of their actual occurrence. + +Let me again draw attention to the fact that the only correct conception +of a miracle in connection with this controversy, is that of an event +wrought in external nature with a definite moral aim and purpose. +Extraordinary events, to which no such moral aim and purpose can be +assigned, may be unusual occurrences, but are in no proper sense of the +words evidential miracles. An isolated occurrence of an extraordinary +nature, and an event marked with a definite moral purpose, are two wholly +different things. The one may be credible, and the other wholly +incredible. We habitually recognise the distinction in ordinary life, and +it entirely affects our judgment of the probability of an event. We esteem +the action of a particular person quite credible under one set of +circumstances, which we should reject as incredible under another. Thus if +we were informed that a friend with whom we were intimately acquainted, +had precipitated himself from a height into the water, supposing him to be +sane, we should not believe it. But if we received the information that he +had done it to save a person from drowning, and we knew that he was a man +of courage, we should accept the fact without the smallest hesitation. On +this account, therefore, the moral aspect of the alleged miracle is of the +utmost importance; and it is necessary for its correct conception that it +should not only be an extraordinary occurrence in external nature, but +that it should take place at the bidding of another, and in order to +render it credible, that it should be calculated to effectuate some +definite moral purpose. + +Alleged supernatural events, which are destitute of these accompaniments, +are always liable to a very high degree of _à priori_ suspicion. In fact +it would be difficult to prove them to be supernatural. All that could be +affirmed respecting them would be that they were very unusual occurrences, +which it was impossible to account for by the action of any known force. +If the universe is under the government of God, all supernatural action +must either be the result of His agency or permission. If He interferes +with the order of occurrences, it is evident that such interference cannot +be capricious, but must have a definite purpose. We are justified, +therefore, in refusing to accept occurrences as supernatural, which are +destitute of all appearance of purpose in their performance. + +But further: the alleged miracle must be consistent with the character of +God, before it is possible to attribute it to Him as wrought by His direct +agency. This rests on the same principle on which we refuse to credit the +reports of actions performed by men which are contradictory to their well +known characters. But this is far more certain with respect to God than it +can be of man. Human characters can at best be but imperfectly known, and +there are unseen depths in the human heart which sometimes render actions +possible, which stand in striking contrast to the general character of the +agents. To state the truth generally, as it is impossible that man can act +in opposition to the inmost principles of his moral being, so in a far +higher degree is it impossible that God can contradict the perfections of +His moral nature. This being so, it follows that we are entitled to reject +all miracles alleged to have been wrought by God, which are contrary to +His moral attributes; all which are low, mean, or grotesque, and unfitted +to realize an elevated moral purpose. + +It will here be objected that if these positions are true, demoniacal +miracles are rendered impossible. I have already pointed out that if +demoniacal supernaturalism is affirmed in the New Testament to be an +actuality, its action is described as being limited to the human mind, and +that whatever permitted activity is conceded to it, always bears the most +distinctive marks of being from beneath. There is no possibility of +mistaking between such supernatural occurrences and the miracles of God. + +Such then are our general principles, the truth of which can hardly be +contested. If they are true, the great mass of current supernaturalism is +worthy of rejection for the following reasons. + +1. While it claims to be the result of supernatural agency, it is +destitute of all definite moral purpose, and such moral impress as it +bears is mean and degraded. What end, I ask, was it designed to serve? It +involved an almost continual interference with the order of nature; or if +at times it claimed to be due to occult forces, they were only suited to +confound the visible order of the universe. I am reasoning on the +supposition that there is a God who rules the world. This being so, it is +impossible to conceive that such a mode of acting can be His. Under this +head of supernaturalism fall all the monstrous and the grotesque, and the +entire range of magical phenomena. + +2. The whole range of ancient supernaturalism is in contradiction to +everything which we can conceive of the moral character of God. Let us +take as an illustration the phenomena of Soothsaying. Who can believe that +God employed the entrails of slaughtered beasts as the means of revealing +the future? or that it was consistent with his character to manifest his +will through a multitude of monstrous portents? There is perhaps not a +single occurrence of ancient supernaturalism which does not offend against +our primary conception of the Divine character; and, therefore, the whole +is worthy of summary rejection. + +3. Ancient supernaturalism assigned its occurrences to no cause adequate +to produce them. Those who asserted its reality, referred it to the action +of deities who possessed very limited power, or to occult powers in +nature. Such occult powers we now know to have no existence, and the power +attributed to the supposed deities was far too limited to be capable of +producing the results in question. All reputed events, the alleged cause +of which is unable to produce them, we are entitled to reject without +further investigation. + +4. A large amount of ancient supernaturalism rested on no evidence +whatever. Of those portions for which any reasons were alleged, the +evidence itself was of a character exactly suited to discredit it. Of this +kind was the whole of the supernaturalism connected with the state +religions. These were in the hands of men who used them for the purpose of +acting on the vulgar, and who therefore readily accepted the report of +anything, however incredible, which could subserve their end. Other +portions were palpable impostures worked for the basest and most selfish +purposes. A very brief acquaintance with the nature of the evidence on +which it rests is sufficient to justify us in rejecting it without +entering on any inquiry as to its details. + +Such being the general character of ancient supernaturalism, it is absurd +to argue that its existence is a reason for rejecting along with it +another order of supernaturalism, which stands contrasted with it in every +particular. We might as well urge the existence of a vast number of +counterfeits as a reason for rejecting everything which is genuine. We do +not reject it because it is supernatural, but because it is utterly +incredible. A statement of a few particulars will exhibit the contrast +between it and the supernaturalism of the New Testament in a striking +point of view. + +1. Christian supernaturalism alleges that its occurrences are the result +of the action of a force which, if present, is certainly adequate to +produce them. Ancient supernaturalism alleges no cause whatever, or one +wholly inadequate. + +2. Christian supernaturalism alleges a perfectly adequate purpose for its +production; that purpose being the attestation of the divine mission of +Jesus. Ancient supernaturalism alleges either no purpose at all, or a +degraded one. + +3. Christian supernaturalism is made to centre around the greatest and +most exalted character that has ever appeared in history. Ancient +supernaturalism, instead of being connected with the most eminent +characters of the times, directly connects itself with the most +questionable. + +4. Christian supernaturalism is stamped throughout with a high moral +character and aspect. This is wholly wanting in the supernaturalism of the +ancient world. + +5. Christian supernaturalism belongs to an elevated order and type; the +objects realized by it were for the most part benevolent. The mode of its +action was dignified and the effects produced by it were instantaneous, +following directly on the word of the agent. The mode in which its +miracles were performed is characterized by the utmost simplicity, +destitute alike of anything scenic or fantastic, entirely in harmony with +the great character who performed them. The supernaturalism of the ancient +world is marked by the opposite characteristics. + +6. Christian supernaturalism, or to speak more correctly, the greatest +supernatural occurrence which Christianity records, namely the +Resurrection of Christ, has not only left a mighty impression on history, +but has created a civilization of its own which embraces all the +progressive nations of the world, and exerts a powerful influence even on +those who deny its truth. The only result wrought by the supernaturalism +of the ancient world was the moral degradation of those among whom it +prevailed. + +7. The supernaturalism of Christianity rests on an attestation which even +unbelievers would allow to be quite sufficient to establish the truth of +any ordinary facts. The other rests either on no testimony at all, or on +one which is open to the gravest suspicion. + +Such are some of the striking contrasts which distinguish the +supernaturalism of the New Testament from that of the ancient world. When +two series of events present such opposite features, it is the duty of a +sound philosophy to trace these distinctions to their causes, and to show +what is the nature of the forces which have impressed on each series its +own peculiar characteristics. Instead of this, however, we are invited to +pronounce both alike incredible; that is to say, because one series of +events is deeply impressed with characteristics which render them +incredible, we are invited to pronounce a similar condemnation on another +series, which is distinguished by the most opposite features, and which +has only this point in common with the former, that both belong to an +order of events which we designate as supernatural. Nothing can be more +unphilosophical than such a mode of reasoning. We reject the one series in +a mass, not because the events which it contains are supernatural, but +because they are absolutely incredible. A similar rule we apply to +ordinary, no less than supernatural occurrences. + +But it will doubtless be objected that there is another series of +supernatural occurrences which rational men, with a few exceptions, greet +with an equally summary rejection, viz. the long series of ecclesiastical +miracles which extends in an almost unbroken succession from the second +century of our era nearly to the present day. These, it has been urged, +are alleged to have been wrought in attestation of Christianity, and bear +some remarkable analogy, as facts wrought in external nature, to the +miracles recorded in the Gospels. It is argued that if we reject the one, +we are for the same reason bound to reject the others. + +The following points may be considered as admitted. + +First; That every century from the second downwards has been characterized +by a considerable amount of pretension to the possession of supernatural +power; and during this period one section of the Christian Church claims +to have actually wrought miracles. + +Secondly; Several of these miracles, viewed merely as phenomena in outward +nature, are precisely similar to those recorded in the New Testament. + +Thirdly; When a miracle is alleged to have been performed at the present +day, as has recently been the case in a neighbouring country, not only all +unbelievers in the possibility of supernatural occurrences, but also all +rational Christians concur in its summary rejection, not merely on the +ground that the evidence is insufficient, but that the event is in itself +incredible. + +Fourthly; That rational men reject in a similar manner and for similar +reasons the great mass of ecclesiastical miracles as unworthy of serious +inquiry into their attestation. + +With respect to the second point, I have already observed that if we view +miracles merely as phenomena in external nature, and if a similar belief +in a current supernaturalism, which we have seen to be one of the +phenomena of human nature, prevailed in the Church, it was to be expected +that the current forms of ecclesiastical supernaturalism would adopt those +of the New Testament for their basis, and consequently that it would +abound in narratives of resurrections from the dead and the cures of +various diseases. This is actually the case. It may also not only excite +our wonder that the model was not far more exactly copied, but that +ecclesiastical, and especially monkish miracles, which constitute an +overwhelming majority of the miracles of Church history, abound so largely +in features which stand in such marked contrast to the miracles of the New +Testament, their peculiar characteristics being the same as those of +ancient supernaturalism, viz. the monstrous and the grotesque. This point +is one which demands the serious consideration of unbelievers; for if, as +they aver, they are both due to the action of the same causes, this +diversity requires to be accounted for. The truth is, that with the +exception that both series contain reports of miracles which are similar +or mere objective occurrences, in other respects their characteristics +differ widely. + +With respect to the fact that rational men concur in the rejection of +modern miracles, it should be observed that this is not because all +supernatural events are believed to be incredible; but because the reputed +events themselves possess characteristics which excite in us the gravest +suspicions of their truth; and especially because by far the greatest +number of them are well known not to have originated in mere credulity, +but in actual imposture. Men or communities who have once lent themselves +to the deliberate coining of miracles, are of blasted reputations, and +whenever marvellous occurrences are reported by such persons, we are +justified in rejecting them without further inquiry. It is evident that +these are the grounds on which such stories are rejected, and not simply +because they are supernatural, since those who believe in the +supernaturalism of the New Testament concur with those who disbelieve in +it, in thus rejecting them. + +I must now briefly consider the general grounds on which we reject the +great mass of ecclesiastical miracles, while we accept those in the +Gospels as actual occurrences. + +The general ground of our rejection of them is precisely the same as that +on which we reject the supernaturalism of the ancient world. The only +thing which distinguishes them from the latter, is that they contain a +number of events which viewed as bare facts are similar to those recorded +in the Gospels. In every other respect the contrast is complete. I shall +only draw attention to a few considerations which might otherwise escape +the notice of the reader. + +The ecclesiastical miracles were not wrought in attestation that the +person working them had a divine commission, but that a divine power +permanently abode in the Church. The qualification which was thought +necessary for the exhibition of this power was the possession of a great +degree of reputed sanctity. The exercise of miraculous power was supposed +to prove, not that its possessor had a divine commission, but that he was +a saint. The saint was supposed to have in himself some inherent power of +working miracles, bearing a considerable analogy to that which the woman +with the issue of blood believed to be possessed by our Lord. A miraculous +power in the shape of a virtue issued from the saint. Hence the +supernatural power which was ascribed to dead men's bones and to relics. +Such a supernatural power is devoid of everything which presupposes a +divine purpose, and of all evidential value. Its frequency would destroy +the nature of a miracle as an attestation of a divine commission, and +involve an interference with the order of nature, which would destroy the +sense of its regularity, the knowledge of which is so essential to our +well being, as well as to the conception of a miracle. Moreover, the +supernatural agency is not supposed to be due to the direct intervention +of God, but to some imaginary virtue residing in man. + +The ecclesiastical miracles of which we have anything like a detailed +account, when they are not simply regarded as due to the direct sanctity +of the person performing them, are never alleged to be performed in proof +of a divine commission; but when they are asserted to have been +evidential, they are affirmed to have been wrought in proof of some +doctrine, or in favour of some particular party in the Church; or, what +invests them with a still greater degree of suspicion, in favour of the +power of a particular order. The last class of alleged miracles may at +once be dismissed as due to simple imposture. The first are strongly +contrasted with those of the New Testament, where we cannot find the +account of a single miracle wrought in attestation of a doctrine, the one +or two apparent exceptions being really performed to attest a divine +commission. But when a miracle is wrought to prove an irrational doctrine, +the credibility of the miracle perishes with the truth of the doctrine. We +are, therefore, justified in rejecting the miracles whenever we have +sufficient evidence that the doctrines which they were alleged to attest +are untrue. Again: whenever a particular party alleges a divine +attestation in its favour, its character may be known by its works. The +parties in the Church who have claimed such miraculous attestation, have +proved by their actions that the idea of a divine interference in their +favour is incredible, as being inconsistent with the divine character. + +It is perfectly true that at the present day all rational men, with few +exceptions, concur in rejecting almost the entire mass of ecclesiastical +miracles. They do this, however, not because they believe miracles to be +impossible, but because they are persuaded that God will not work one on a +light or trivial occasion, and because the great mass of such pretended +miracles are characterised by marks which are inconsistent with the idea +that they have been wrought by God. With our larger acquaintance with the +order of nature, we no longer believe that it is possible for miracles to +be wrought by any inherent virtue in things themselves, but that if +performed at all, it can only be by the direct agency or permission of the +Author of Nature. In a word, the general incredibility of the +ecclesiastical miracles, and their repugnance to our conception of the +mode of the divine acting is the reason why we reject them altogether. + +It is also unquestionably true that at the present day a great majority +even of religious persons would receive with no little incredulity the +report of a miracle, while such incredulity would not have existed at a +former period. This is due to two causes: first, our increased knowledge +of the permanence of the forces of material Nature; and secondly, our +belief that supernatural occurrences can only take place by the direct +agency and permission of God, and not by means of my supernatural power +inherent in particular persons. From this we draw the inference that +almost all the alleged ecclesiastical miracles must be rejected as +inconsistent with the divine character. We are of opinion, therefore, that +a miracle wrought for any other purpose than the attestation of a +revelation is not credible; and as from the nature of the case revelations +must be rare, we summarily reject all reports of supernatural occurrences +as impostures, or the offspring of a heated and undisciplined imagination. + +Now although this is generally the case, yet it is unquestionable that if +a miracle was reported to us with a pre-eminently strong attestation, no +rational person would refuse to give a serious consideration to the +evidence merely because the event was supernatural. A reported miracle +would doubtless be attended with no inconsiderable degree of antecedent +improbability; but if a man with whom we were intimately acquainted, of +sound intellect, and high moral character were to allege that he had +performed an act which, if real, must have been indisputably miraculous, +it would be altogether irrational to reject his assertion summarily as +unworthy of consideration merely because in all ages miraculous stories +have been extensively believed. The application of such a principle would +lead us into the grossest error. + +This question has a very important bearing on the subject before us. It +has been alleged that while nothing has been more common than the +ascription of miracles to eminent men, it is impossible to find a man of +sound judgment and high moral character who has deliberately affirmed that +he has performed one himself. That such affirmations have been very rare +is certain, and for the simple reason, that miracles have been very rare +occurrences. But the assertion that no such cases are to be found is +inaccurate. One, at all events, exists, although probably the only one, +but it is that of a man of the most undoubted veracity, the Apostle Paul. +As I have already observed, four of the most important writings which have +been attributed to him are admitted by a vast majority of those +unbelievers who are competent to form an opinion on the subject, to be his +genuine productions. These are before us, and we can form from them a full +judgment as to the character of the man. In them he distinctly tells us +that he performed miracles. He writes: "I have therefore whereof I may +glory in those things which pertain to God. For I will not dare to speak +of any of those things which Christ hath not wrought by me to make the +Gentiles obedient by word and deed, through mighty signs and wonders, by +the power of the Spirit of God; so that from Jerusalem, and round about +unto Illyricum, I have fully preached the Gospel of Christ." (Rom. xv. 18, +19.) Here at least we have a direct affirmation on the subject. It is not +the only one made by him. But there is also one which is equivalent to +another affirmation made by One whom unbelievers must admit to have been +the greatest man who ever lived, Jesus Christ Himself. Those with whom I +am reasoning allow that the discourses in the Synoptic Gospels are +accounts of His real utterances. In them He directly affirms that He +performed miracles. + +Even those against whose opinions I am arguing, will concede that the +characters of Christ and St. Paul stand at the greatest height of moral +elevation. If there are any other persons whose utterances have been +handed down to us, who have deliberately made this affirmation, their +numbers are unquestionably few. Certainly no other thoroughly great and +elevated character has done so. This is a remarkable fact and well worthy +of consideration. While many of the Fathers have affirmed that miracles +were performed by others, not one of them has affirmed that he has wrought +any himself. The supernaturalism of the New Testament differs, as we have +seen, from all other alleged kinds of supernatural occurrences. It differs +moreover in this respect, that one of the persons through whose agency +these miracles are declared to have been performed, has made a deliberate +affirmation that he wrought them; and that the founder of Christianity, in +recorded utterances which are admitted to be genuine, has likewise +asserted that miracles were wrought by Him. + +It follows, therefore, that our summary rejection of all the current +supernaturalism which has been alleged to have taken place at various +periods of history, is quite consistent with our accepting as true the +series of supernatural events recorded in the New Testament, which are +distinguished by characteristics of an entirely different order. + + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO MIRACLES AS CREDENTIALS OF A +REVELATION. + + +While considering this subject, it will be necessary to keep steadily in +view that miracles are not alleged in the New Testament to have been +performed to prove the truth of doctrines, but that a particular person +possesses a divine commission; or in attestation of particular facts, such +as the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. + +The truth of a divine commission being established, it follows that the +divinely-appointed messenger must have some message to communicate. We +further infer that God will not intrust a message to any person whom He +has not previously fully enlightened as to the subject which he has to +communicate, and who would not truthfully communicate the message with +which he is intrusted. A miracle is therefore not only an attestation to +the divine commission of the person performing one, but also to the +adequate information and veracity of the messenger. Although a miracle is +not wrought to prove the truth of a particular doctrine, but that a +particular person is intrusted with a divine commission, we accept a +doctrinal statement as true, when made by a messenger thus attested, +within the limits of the message with which he affirms himself to be +intrusted, on the ground that such a messenger must both be truthful, and +possess adequate knowledge. In other words, our belief in the doctrinal +statement does not rest on the miracle, but on the veracity of God. + +This is the affirmation made in the New Testament respecting the most +important class of the miracles which it records. As I have elsewhere +observed, not a single instance occurs in it of a miracle wrought for the +purpose of proving that a doctrine is true. Our Lord's distinct +affirmation is, "The same works that I do, bear witness of me that the +Father hath sent me." (John v. 36.) "If I say the truth, why do ye not +believe me?" (John viii. 46.) The miracles which are alleged to have been +performed by the Apostles for directly evidential purposes, were wrought +in proof of the Resurrection of Christ, and of their own divine +commission, which directly depended on it. + +Let it also be observed that it by no means follows that every miracle +recorded in the New Testament was performed exclusively for evidential +purposes. This point I shall consider hereafter. + +If these principles are correct, they will at once dispose of two +objections which are alleged against miracles: first, that they cannot +prove a doctrine; and secondly, that they cannot prove a moral truth. I +fully accept the statement that moral truths cannot be proved by the +evidence of miracles, but must rest on their own inherent evidence; and +that all positive duties rest on the command of God, to whom we feel, on +other grounds, that all love, reverence, and adoration are due. The truth +of doctrines also cannot be established by the performance of a miracle; +but when we accept them on external authority, they rest on the testimony +of God, and our full persuasion that He must be in possession of all +truth. Although, therefore, I accept as correct these principles, on which +the objection is founded, they have no bearing on the point at issue; for +the New Testament nowhere affirms that its miracles were wrought to prove +either doctrinal statements or moral truths, but facts. + +1. It is objected that the prevalence of supernatural beliefs renders the +existence of miracles "so hackneyed as scarcely to attract the notice of +the nation to whom the Christian revelation was in the first instance +addressed." (_Supernatural Religion._) + +I reply that this objection contains two inaccuracies. First, it is not +true that the miracles of Jesus scarcely attracted the notice of those +among whom they were performed. The only authority on this point is the +New Testament itself, and this assertion contradicts its express +statements. Numerous passages in the Gospels directly affirm that the +miracles of our Lord attracted very general attention, and produced a +profound astonishment; and that those who had witnessed them considered +that there was a wide distinction between them and the miraculous +pretensions then current. His fame is represented as having been spread by +them in regions beyond Palestine; and great multitudes are stated to have +collected, both for the purpose of hearing Him and of being healed of +their diseases. The fourth Gospel represents our Lord as rebuking the +multitudes, for attending on Him for sordid purposes. It is quite true, +that notwithstanding the miracles, the body of the Jewish nation +ultimately rejected Christianity, though the epistles bear witness that +the Jewish element which was attracted into the Christian Church was +large. The assertion, therefore, is simply contrary to fact, that miracles +were in those days so common and hackneyed as to attract little or no +attention to him who professed to work them. + +Equally inaccurate is the assertion that the evidence of miracles as the +attestation to a revelation was a "hackneyed" one. The Old Testament +professed to rest on miraculous evidence. This being the case, the Jews +were fully entitled to expect that if God made a further revelation of His +will, it would be accompanied by a miraculous attestation. But Judaism was +the only religion of the ancient world which professed to be founded on +the evidence of miracles. A belief in a current supernaturalism was no +doubt mixed up with the ancient religions, but its wonders were not +alleged to have been wrought in attestation of the fact that they were +revelations, nor even as attestations to their truth. The religion of the +Greeks possessed both priests and prophets; but they performed no miracles +in attestation of a divine commission. The only attestation of this kind +which they claimed was the utterance of obscure or mendacious oracles. I +am not aware that anyone who pretended to be a revealer of the divine will +in ancient times ever professed to perform visible and palpable miracles +in proof of his assertions. Similar is the position of the old religions +which still exist in the modern world. Many of them abound in stories of +the most fantastic manifestations of their gods in ancient times. Their +votaries believe in the efficacy of magic, charms, and incantations. But +none of these things have been affirmed to have been wrought in +attestation of a divine commission. Mahometanism claims, in the strictest +sense, to be a divine revelation; yet the Koran even offers apologies for +the fact that its founder wrought no miracles in attestation of his claim +to be a divine messenger. So far therefore is it from being the fact that +miracles are so generally alleged by religions in vindication of their +claim to be revelations, that Judaism and Christianity are absolutely +unique in this respect. The idea of working a miracle in attestation of a +divine commission is so far from being a "hackneyed" one, that it has the +strongest claims to originality. + +2. It is urged by the same writer that "every marvel and every narrative +of supernatural interference seemed a matter of course to the +superstitious credulity of the age. However much miracles are the +exception to the order of nature, they have always been the rule in the +history of ignorance. In fact the excess of belief in them throughout many +centuries of darkness, is almost fatal to their claims to credence now. +They have been limited to periods of ignorance and superstition, and are +unknown to ages of enlightenment. The Christian miracles are rendered +almost as suspicious from their place in a long series of similar +occurrences, as they are by their being exceptions to the sequence of +natural phenomena. It would be extraordinary if cycles of miracles +occurring before and since those of the Gospels, and in connection with +every religion, could be repudiated as fables, and these alone maintained +as genuine." + +The principles which I have laid down in a former chapter fully meet the +chief points raised in these objections. A few additional observations on +them, therefore, are all that will be necessary. + +First: the assertion that every marvel or narrative of supernatural +interference seemed a matter of course to the superstitious credulity of +the age, is inaccurate. If they had been of habitual or constant +occurrence, they would have ceased to be marvels at all. In such a case +the trade of the impostor would have gone, for it would not have paid him. +The entire plausibility of such reasonings arises from confounding under a +common name phenomena wholly different in character. I ask emphatically, +did the current supernaturalism of any age or nation accept as matters of +course such events as the resurrection of Christ, or the cure of a blind +man, or a man full of leprosy, by a word or a touch? Have not heathen +writers pronounced actual resurrections from the dead to be +impossibilities? Were such occurrences ever believed to be within the +power of magic to effect? Belief in the possibility of such occurrences +became current only under the influence of Christianity. + +2. It is not correct to assert that the belief in miracles has been +confined to ages of ignorance. Will it be affirmed that the most +flourishing period of Grecian literature was an age of ignorance? Yet a +belief in a current supernaturalism prevailed in it. Was the Augustan age +an age of ignorance? Both ages were ignorant of physical science: but +during few periods has the human intellect been equally active. Each age +contained men endowed with common sense sufficient to make them adequate +judges whether the supernatural occurrences above referred to were +possible or not. + +3. It is inaccurate to affirm that the Christian miracles are interposed +between two similar series of supernatural occurrences. There is only one +point in common between them; the claim to be supernatural. As I have +proved, in every other respect they are strongly contrasted. It is, +therefore, by no means extraordinary that a series of supernatural +occurrences, which have the highest moral impress, and possess other +distinguishing characteristics, should be true; and that the others, one +of which took place before and the other after that in question, and which +are stamped with the very opposite characteristics, should be false. + +The same author adduces the following objections, as lying at the root of +miraculous testimony to a revelation: "Surely supernatural evidence of so +common and prodigal a nature betrays great want of force and divine +originality. How could that be considered as special evidence for a new +revelation, which was already so well known to all the world, and which +was scattered broadcast over so many centuries, as well as successfully +simulated by Satan." Again: "Instead of a few evidential miracles taking +place at one epoch of history, and filling the world with surprise at such +novel and exceptional phenomena, we find miracles represented as taking +place in all ages and in all countries. The Gospel miracles are set in the +midst of a series of similar wonders which commenced many centuries before +the dawn of Christianity, and continued without interruption fifteen +centuries after it. No divine originality characterized the evidence +selected to accredit the divine revelation." (P. 192.) + +I reply, First: It behoves those who except against the plan of attesting +a divine revelation by miracles, to inform us in what other way it is +possible that the truth of a divine commission can be attested. It is +doubtless possible for God to make a special revelation of His will to +each individual man; yet even this would involve supernatural agency of +some kind; and it is very questionable whether to do so would be +consistent with the plan of God's moral government which comes under our +actual observation. But the Christian revelation is founded on the idea of +making a divine manifestation additional to, and of a different order +from, that which is made by the created universe; and not simply of +imparting so much additional information to each individual. This +manifestation professes to be made by the Incarnation. How, I ask, was +such a manifestation to be made except by a supernatural action of some +kind? It is clear, therefore, that every manifestation of God differing +from that made by the ordinary forces of nature, or by the moral nature of +man, must be supernatural. There can be no doubt as to the means which +must be employed. The only question which can be raised is one which I +have considered elsewhere, namely: whether it is the purpose of God to +make such a manifestation of Himself. + +It will be objected that such a manifestation might have been made self- +evident to the moral nature of man, and consequently it would have +required no additional attestation. To this I reply that, on the +supposition that it is God's purpose to make such an additional +manifestation of Himself, He must be allowed to be the only adequate judge +of the right mode of accomplishing it. + +But even if a revelation involved no such manifestation of God, but only a +communication of truth to man, it is incumbent on those who object to its +attestation by miracles, to find some other method by which the reality of +a divine commission could be attested, and to show that this mode would be +preferable to an attestation by miracles. + +But further: if we regard a miracle as a supernatural occurrence wrought +in attestation of a divine commission, which is the unquestionable aspect +of a considerable number of those recorded in the New Testament, the fact +that there was a wide-spread belief in the existence of supernatural +events is far from interfering with its efficacy. What did the current +beliefs imply? That there existed beings, other than the blind forces of +nature, who interfered in human affairs; and that they were in some way or +other capable of communicating with man. What is the very conception +implied by a revelation? That a God exists, who is the moral Governor of +the universe, who cares for man, and is capable of holding communications +with him. Both conceptions rest on a common ground--the existence of +supernatural beings capable of manifesting themselves by outward +indications. Why then should not the moral Governor of the universe, if it +was His purpose to make a revelation, employ media, which were all but +universally recognized? No inconsiderable number of the objections of +unbelievers rest on the assumption, that if there be a God, it is +derogatory to His character to suppose that He is capable of condescending +to the weaknesses and imperfections of man. A God who neither will nor can +do so may be a very grand conception; but one who is very ill adapted to +the wants of human nature, and who is incapable of exciting human +sympathies. The only thing that would be necessary, on the supposition +that it was His purpose to make such a revelation, would be that His mode +of manifesting His presence should be one clearly distinguishable from the +events of current supernaturalism. What was requisite would have been to +afford evidence that the manifestation in question was due to no other +being than Himself; that is to say, that the miracles should bear the +unquestionable impress of His own perfections. The subject of alleged +demoniacal miracles I have considered elsewhere. The simple question +before us is--Are the supernatural events recorded in the Gospels clearly +distinguishable in their general character from the supernaturalism which +was current previous to the Advent? I have already shown that it contains +no doubtful indications as to who the agent must have been, if we suppose +the facts to have been actual occurrences. + +But further: if the objection has any validity, it presupposes that God +ought not to make a revelation in ages of superstition and ignorance; but +must wait until knowledge has cleared away the mists of ignorance and +error, and supplied us with the means of infallibly discriminating between +true miracles and false ones; or, in other words, we must wait for the +much-talked-of jury of scientific men, who can submit His alleged miracles +to the whole range of scientific tests. Happily, however, God has gifted a +considerable number of men with common sense, which is quite adequate to +determine whether a certain class of events wrought under certain +circumstances are miraculous operations, or mere natural occurrences, or +due to imposture. If this be so, what is there, I ask, unworthy of God, in +making a revelation at such times as man stands in special need of one? + +It is further objected that a miraculous attestation to a divine +commission shows a want of force and divine originality. I ask, how? The +fact is that with the exception of Judaism, no ancient religion professed +to be so attested; and the Jew would naturally expect that any fresh +revelation would be attested in a manner similar to that which he believed +in as divine. + +The objection that because the belief in supernaturalism was so general, +therefore miracles must be worthless as evidence, I have already shown to +be fallacious. + +But it is also objected: "Instead of a few evidential miracles taking +place at one particular period of history and filling the world with +surprise at such novel and exceptional phenomena, we find them represented +as taking place in all ages and in all countries." + +This is the old objection of the Jews who demanded of our Lord a sign from +Heaven. Both demand a particular class and order of miracle, viz.: +something stupendous, or terrific. The value of each objection lies in +conceiving of a miracle as a mere objective fact in external nature, +stript of all its moral accompaniments. In one word, it contemplates the +miracle in its most vulgar aspect, as a bare act of power, a portent, a +prodigy. A great light everywhere appearing in the heavens might have +appeared to vulgar minds a greater miracle, and have attracted more +attention than the cure of a man full of leprosy by the utterance of a +word. But it would not have presented stronger evidences of having been +wrought by the power of God. + +But with respect to the general question, I ask, Is not the resurrection +of Jesus Christ in every respect an exceptional event? Where are +resurrections to be found in the history of current supernaturalism? Who +ever pretended, before or since, to have a divine commission which was +attested by his own resurrection from the dead? This miracle is at any +rate absolutely unique; and it must never be forgotten that it is the only +one recorded in the New Testament on the truth of which its writers stake +the claim of Christianity to be regarded as a divine revelation. Although +they refer to other miracles, wonders and signs which God wrought by Him, +yet whenever they adduce the full and conclusive evidence of His divine +mission, they always appeal to the fact that God had raised Him from the +dead. + +But a further objection is urged as invalidating this kind of testimony: +"At the very time when the knowledge of the laws of nature began to render +men capable of judging of the reality of miracles, these wonders entirely +ceased. This extraordinary cessation of miracles at a time when their +evidence ought to have acquired value from an appeal to persons capable of +appreciating them, is perfectly unintelligible, if they are viewed as the +supernatural credentials of a divine revelation." + +This passage contains several fallacies. One, to which I have repeatedly +drawn attention, runs through it, viz., the classing together every kind +of alleged supernatural occurrence, from the miracles of Jesus to the +fantastic performances of the magician, as though they all stood on the +same level. I need not further allude to the fallacy of such reasoning. + +2. It is affirmed that miracles entirely ceased when the knowledge of the +laws of nature began to render men capable of judging of their reality. I +conclude that by the word "miracles" in this passage, the author means +ecclesiastical miracles, viz., those which have been alleged to be wrought +in attestation of the established system of belief. If it is meant to be +asserted that all belief in a current supernaturalism has now ceased, the +affirmation is inaccurate, as the wide-spread belief in spiritualism +abundantly testifies. + +But if the assertion is intended to be confined to ecclesiastical +miracles, it involves an inaccuracy as to a matter of history. They had +become thoroughly discredited long before the birth of modern physical +science. The cure of blind and leprous persons by a touch, or the feeding +of five thousand persons on seven loaves and a few fishes, require nothing +else than sound common sense for the appreciation of their supernatural +character, or the testing of their reality. The assertion, therefore, that +miracles ceased precisely at the time when their evidence would have been +most valuable, by their being able to be tested by those persons best +capable of appreciating them, is entirely inaccurate. + +I fully admit that a belief in a current supernaturalism, as for instance +in the absurdities of witchcraft, survived the Reformation. What the +Reformation destroyed was a belief in a divine order of miracles wrought +in support of an ecclesiastical system. The belief in this current +supernaturalism has been gradually diminishing ever since, under the +combined influence of the increase of the knowledge of physical science, +and common sense. The objection raised is simply irrelevant to the point +at issue. + +But there is another subject which demands consideration. Hitherto we have +been dealing with the evidential character of miracles. But although all +miracles have an evidential value, if they can be adequately attested, it +by no means follows that every miracle recorded in the New Testament was +intended to subserve this purpose alone. It was necessary not only that a +revelation should be communicated, and receive an adequate attestation, +but that it should be propagated among mankind. To render this possible, +it was necessary that its messengers should be armed with some means of +insuring that their message should be heard with attention. There was also +another object to be effected; namely, the establishment in the world of +that great institution, the Christian Church, which was intended so +largely to influence its destinies. + +It will be quite clear to any person who carefully considers the various +supernatural occurrences recorded in the New Testament that they are not +all of equal evidential value. The highest class of them are directly +affirmed to have been performed for the purpose of attesting the divine +mission of Jesus Christ, and as a portion of His supernatural +manifestation. To this class belong the miracles wrought by Himself, and +several of those performed by the Apostles. But there is another class +referred to in the Acts of the Apostles, of which the primary object seems +to have been to awaken attention to the Apostolic message, though even +these were not destitute of evidential value. There is also another order +of manifestations frequently referred to in the Epistles, viz., the +supernatural gifts of the Spirit, one of the declared purposes of which +was to lay deep the foundations of the Christian Church. As divine +interpositions, they were all to a certain extent evidential; but it will +be important to observe that there is an order of supernatural +manifestations mentioned in the New Testament, whose apparent primary +intention was to subserve a different purpose. + +Let it be observed therefore, that at the introduction of Christianity, +two distinct purposes had to be effected: first, to attest the truth of +the revelation; secondly, to establish the Church. + +I will briefly draw attention to this latter portion of the subject, as +far as it affects certain portions of the supernatural action affirmed in +the New Testament. I allude to a certain class of miracles, such as the +cure of the cripple at Lystra, those wrought by the passing of Peter's +shadow, and by garments brought from Paul's person, and some others; also +to the entire class of the supernatural gifts mentioned in the Acts of the +Apostles, and so frequently referred to in the Epistles. + +One of the greatest difficulties which beset the missionary is to obtain a +hearing in the midst of the hostile elements by which he is surrounded. +Yet to obtain this is the necessary condition of carrying on his work. In +this respect, the modern missionary possesses great advantages compared +with the primitive missionary of Christianity. He belongs to a superior +civilization, and is therefore able to bring to bear the whole force of a +higher on a lower one. This was exactly reversed in the case of the +primitive missionaries. Instead of being able to bring to bear the +prestige of a high civilization on those among whom they laboured, they +belonged to a despised race; or if the missionary himself was a member of +the race whom he addressed, he belonged to the lower sections of society. +How was this enormous deficiency to be supplied? How was a man thus +despised to obtain a hearing for the message with which he was charged? +The New Testament affirms that the deficiency was supplied by imparting to +the early Church a certain number of supernatural endowments, which, when +once communicated, acted like our ordinary faculties; also that a +supernatural gift of curing certain diseases was imparted to particular +individuals, a gift which was exactly suited to obtain an attentive +hearing for their message. + +Among the supernatural gifts which St. Paul affirms to have been +communicated to the Church, there were two of which he asserts that the +operation was distinct, but which are merged in the modern idea of +miracles. These he designated by the expressions {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, or +the inworking of powers; and {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, endowments of healing +powers. The distinction in function between these powers is affirmed by +him no less than three times; what it consisted in, we are only able to +judge from the terms themselves, and the nature of the case. There is +every probability that the distinction points to a higher and a lower +exercise of supernatural power; the one being the evidential miracle +properly so called, and the other a supernatural knowledge of how to +effect cures--a gift which would be exactly suited to enable the missionary +to obtain that attentive hearing of his message which he so urgently +required. The Epistle of St. James furnishes us with a general idea of the +nature of the gift, when he directs, that in case a person was sick, the +elders of the Church were to be sent for, who were to pray over the sick +man, and anoint him with oil in the name of the Lord; "And the prayer of +faith," says he, "shall save the sick; and the Lord shall raise him up." +(James v. 15.) The whole description points to a cure which, although in a +measure supernatural, was not instantaneous; the latter point being one +which would be required to make a miracle in the proper sense of the word +evidential. A power of effecting cures, however, whether by a knowledge of +natural means supernaturally acquired, or by supernatural agency, would be +one which would obtain for the despised Jewish missionary a hearing in +Gentile cities, which otherwise he would be unable to obtain. + +To such a class of supernatural operations would belong such cures as +those effected by the conveyance of handkerchiefs and aprons from St. +Paul's body to the sick. These are only asserted to have taken place on +one occasion, at Ephesus, a city greatly addicted to the arts of magic. +They were adapted to the circumstances of the place, where the Apostle had +to encounter a particular form of supernaturalism; and they would have +been exactly suited to meet the difficulty in question. The historian +tells us that the success was great, for many of those who had used +magical arts came forward and confessed their deeds, collected together +their magical books, which were worth a considerable sum of money, and +publicly burned them. The same observations apply to Peter's shadow. +Although the historian does not tell us that cures were wrought by it, yet +the narrative presupposes that a large outburst of supernatural power took +place in connection with Peter's person. Although the cure of the cripple +at Lystra belongs to a class of miracles which is strictly evidential, yet +the immediate occasion of its performance seems to have been with the view +of arousing the attention of an ignorant heathen population. + +But not only had a revelation to be communicated and attested, not only +had converts to be made and instructed, but it was also necessary that the +foundations of the Church, the visible kingdom of Christ, should be firmly +laid, and that it should be established among the visible institutions of +the earth. Sufficient attention has not been paid to this portion of the +subject in considering the question of supernatural intervention. The +establishment of the Church as a visible institution, which was intended +gradually to leaven mankind with the great principles of His revelation, +is again and again affirmed by Jesus Christ to have been one of the great +purposes of His coming. A description of its character and functions forms +the subject of no inconsiderable number of His parables, and it is the +great end and purpose for which He gave the great final Apostolic +commission to go and gather it together out of all the nations of the +earth. + +The Church of Christ had therefore to be formed into a community out of +the most heterogeneous elements. It was destined not for a momentary +existence, but for a continuous growth, so as to leaven human nature with +its influences. The creation of such a society was a conception so bold +that it had never previously entered the head of either poet or +philosopher. Those with whom I am reasoning will not deny that the attempt +was a very arduous, and to all appearance a most chimerical one. + +Yet it is the most certain of facts that the Church of Christ is now in +the nineteenth century of its existence. The boldness of the undertaking +will be more fully estimated when we reflect that the Church was intended +to be a society which, while existing in the world, should differ in its +essential character from all the other societies on the earth. Its action +was to be entirely spiritual and moral. Its founder intended it to be +invested with no coercive powers. The appeal was to be, not to force, but +to conscience. + +Those who offered to enroll themselves as the subjects of Christ's +spiritual kingdom had to be formed into a social organization. Unless this +could be effected, one of the great objects for which the revelation was +given must have proved a failure. The elements of which it had to be +composed were of the most unpromising description. The first converts +consisted of no small number of Jews and proselytes, who were extensively +leavened with the narrowest prejudices of Judaism. When the Gentiles began +to join the new community, its members were chiefly derived from the lower +ranks of society, including a considerable number of slaves. The infant +Church embraced a great diversity of opinions and characters. When +converts were made, the time for their instruction was short. Yet such an +institution had to contend with mighty civilization, the habits and +prejudices of existing society, the self-interest of a corrupt religion, +and the opposition of a powerful government. + +Such were some of the difficulties which had to be surmounted before this +new institution could be firmly planted among the existing societies of +the world, and expand itself with the life which was peculiarly its own. +If the primitive followers of Jesus were animated by the credulous +superstition which unbelievers delight in attributing to them, none should +be better qualified than they to form a judgment of the difficulties which +must have beset their path. Yet these have been surmounted. To this fact +the vigorous life of the Church during eighteen centuries testifies. It +has not only held its ground, but it has succeeded in leavening all +existing civilizations with its influences. How has this been +accomplished? The Apostolic Epistles return an answer. They affirm that +the early converts were endowed with a number of supernatural gifts, +exactly fitted to qualify them for the various functions which they were +called upon to discharge. I subjoin a list of them, as they are directly +affirmed by St. Paul to be then existing in the Corinthian Church. They +were nine in number, each of which is asserted by him to have had a +distinct and separate function and subject-matter: the gifts of wisdom, +knowledge, faith, working of miracles, endowments of healing powers, +prophecy, discerning of spirits, tongues, and interpretation. It does not +appear whether this last is meant to be exhaustive of the supernatural +mental endowments which the members of the early churches supposed +themselves to possess, or whether they were varied for the purpose of +meeting particular exigences. Nor do I ask those with whom I am reasoning +to accept this statement as a true account of an objective fact; but only +that they were supposed to be so by the Apostle and those to whom he +wrote. It is plain, however, that these supernatural endowments, if real, +were precisely such as the Church was in urgent need of, as the +instrumentality for welding together the discordant elements of which it +was composed, and enabling it firmly to plant itself in the soil of human +nature. + +These supernatural gifts of the Spirit, with two exceptions, produced no +results on external nature. They constituted enlargements of the powers of +the human mind. As such, they cannot with strict propriety be said to +belong to the class of evidential miracles, although like all other +supernatural operations of which God is the Author, they cannot fail to be +indirectly evidential. It is important to observe that they belong to a +separate class of supernatural phenomena, which were as necessary in +reference to the Christian revelation, contemplating as it did the +institution of a divine society, as the order of supernatural +manifestations which directly attested the divine mission of Jesus Christ +and His Apostles. If this was their end and purpose we can understand why +they were withdrawn at a very early period, before they could be submitted +to the tests of our modern _savants_. They were given for a special +purpose, and they were withdrawn when they had accomplished it. The +Apostle who affirms their existence asserts that they were not intended +permanently to continue in the Church. + +There is one more allegation which is occasionally urged against the +miracles of the New Testament, and which I must briefly consider. It is +alleged that pious frauds have been very general in all ages of Christian +history; that many good men have not hesitated to participate in them; and +that literary forgeries were very abundant in the first ages of +Christianity, and were even common in the days of the Apostles. It is +insinuated that this state of mind throws great suspicion on the alleged +miracles of the apostolic age. + +As the charge of pious fraud is not made against Jesus himself or his +immediate followers, it is difficult to meet so indefinite an objection. +It seems to be put in to add force to others, rather than for its +intrinsic value. Modern unbelievers express a nearly unanimous concurrence +in endeavouring to account for the miracles of the New Testament, by +assuming that the followers of Jesus were the victims of the most intense +enthusiasm, superstition, and credulity. It is difficult to comprehend, on +the assumption that the existence of the supernatural portions of the New +Testament is due to these causes, how direct fraud could have anything to +do with the concoction of these miraculous stories. Intense enthusiasm and +fanaticism, and deliberate fraud, are usually opposite poles of character; +and if we call in one to account for these miracles, we must exclude the +other from exerting an influence on their origination. To make the charge +of any avail against the narratives of the Gospel, it is necessary not to +prove that pious frauds were common in the second, third, or fourth +century, or even in the first, but to establish directly either that Jesus +professed to work miracles while He knew that they were not such, or that +His followers deliberately invented a number of miraculous stories and +attributed them to Him, well knowing that He had performed none. The +charge that the miracles of the New Testament originated in enthusiasm and +credulity is a definite one, and can be definitely met. So is the one that +they originated in deliberate fraud. So would be the charge that the +innocent followers of Jesus were imposed upon by fraudulent impostors. But +to combine the charge of intense enthusiasm and credulity with that of +conscious fraud, is a mode of reasoning which contains the grounds of its +own refutation. + +It is no doubt a fact, that the practice of literary forgery was not +unknown to the early ages of Christianity. St. Paul seems to have thought +that there were in the world impostors daring enough to attempt to forge a +letter in his name, and to try to foist it on the churches which he had +planted, as a genuine production. But the existence of such impostors has +no bearing whatever on the question whether the miracles recorded in the +New Testament are facts or fiction. Did not St. Paul himself assert that +he had performed miracles? Was he an impostor? Did he not believe that +Jesus Christ in veritable reality rose from the dead? What have such +beliefs to do with the existence of a set of daring literary impostors? +Happily, however, the whole of this class of ancient writers were utter +bunglers in the art of fictitious composition. It is a universal +characteristic of them, that they were entirely unable to throw themselves +into the spirit of former times, or of the persons whose names they +assumed. In their references to history, geography, manners, customs, and +character, they lay themselves open at almost every point to certain +detection. There is good reason for believing that no forger or writer of +fiction in the ancient world has succeeded in his art. In investing +fiction with apparent probability, the modern world has completely +outstript the ancient. Still, however, even in the most perfect works, +when the fictions are extended over a wide sphere of action, no amount of +genius will protect a writer from leaving some weak point unguarded. It is +probably not too much to say that neither in ancient nor modern times, has +a fictitious work or a forgery been able to maintain its ground against +the apparatus which can be brought to bear on it by a sound and rational +criticism. + +Most of the other objections which are adduced against the miracles of the +New Testament have been answered in principle under the foregoing heads. I +must now adduce some of the most important considerations which prove them +to have been historical facts. + + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE GREAT FACTS OF +CHRISTIANITY REST--GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. + + +It has been urged by opponents, that the defenders of historical +Christianity rest content with endeavouring to prove that miracles are +possible or probable; but that they neglect an all-important part of their +duty, viz.: that of adducing historical proof that miracles have been +actually performed. If the fact is as here stated, there can be no doubt +that works which profess to discuss the subject of miracles, and omit to +give a clear statement of the chief points of the evidence which can be +adduced to prove that they have actually occurred, must be unsatisfactory. +To answer the objections which are urged to prove that miracles are +impossible, or which affirm on general principles that all evidence in +their favour is unworthy of credit, is an essential preliminary to the +consideration of the historical evidence which can be adduced to prove +their actual occurrence. But to afford proof, that as facts they rest upon +an adequate attestation, is the essential duty of every one who asserts +their reality. To this portion of the work I will now proceed to address +myself. + +What then is the position occupied by the Christian advocate? Is it +requisite in order to establish the truth of Christianity, that he should +give an historical proof of everyone of the miracles recorded in the New +Testament? I answer this question emphatically in the negative, and for +the following reason. The New Testament itself, while it affirm that many +miracles have been performed, rests the truth of Christianity on one +miracle alone, the Resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. This is the +great event which, according to the Acts of the Apostles, the early +missionaries urged as the distinctive proof of their Master's divine +mission. The views expressed in the Apostolic Epistles are precisely +similar. In them, the entire evidence of the truth of our Lord's divine +mission is made to centre in the fact of His resurrection. Not only is the +great fact referred to either directly or indirectly in almost every page, +but St. Paul has distinctly rested the truth of Christianity on the +reality of its occurrence. Such a statement is made respecting no other +miraculous event recorded in the New Testament. It is the miracle of +miracles, unique and alone, by which the seal of God was affixed to the +divine mission of Jesus Christ. It formed the _locus standi_ of the +Church, and the sole ground of its existence. If it was not an objective +fact, those who testified to its occurrence must have been false +witnesses, and the whole of Christianity either a delusion or an +imposture. + +It follows, therefore, that this great miracle forms the very key of the +Christian position. Everything else is an outwork, an important one it may +be, but yet an outwork. If this position can be successfully assailed, the +entire fortress of Christianity must surrender at discretion. If, on the +other hand, the most determined unbeliever could be convinced that there +is good historical evidence that Jesus Christ rose from the dead, he would +find no difficulty in accepting the Gospels as historical documents, and +the whole _à priori_ objection against them would disappear. + +Again: If the Resurrection of Christ is a fact, Christianity must be a +divine revelation. The perfect historical accuracy of the Gospels in +minute details may be still open to question; deep thought and careful +investigation may be necessary for ascertaining the precise amount of +truth communicated by that revelation; past ages may have erred in its +interpretation, or in their deductions from it; many questions as to the +relation in which revelation stands to science or history may be open +ones--all this is both conceivable and possible--but still, if Jesus Christ +rose from the dead, his entire manifestation, work, and teaching, must be +a communication from God to man. + +This then is my position. The real question stands within very narrow +limits. The miracle that requires strong historical proof is the +Resurrection. The other supernatural occurrences recorded in the Gospels +are important portions of the revelation made by Christ. They were +important evidences to those who witnessed them. But to us in these latter +times the one great question is: Is the Resurrection capable of being +established as an actual occurrence? If it is, it will carry with it all +the others. If it is not, the proof of the others will fall along with it. + +Let us examine the historical conditions of the case. Christianity differs +from all other religions in professing not to consist of a mass of +abstract dogmatic statements, but to be founded on, and largely to consist +of, a number of historical facts. There are unquestionably a considerable +number of dogmatic statements in the pages of the New Testament; but they +profess to grow out of the facts and to be explanations of them. The facts +form, so to say, the essence of the religion. The Christianity of the New +Testament is a growth which encircles itself around the person of its +founder in a manner in which no other system of thought or religion, which +has existed among men, has ever done. If we take the person of Jesus +Christ out of the New Testament, the whole system of its teaching crumbles +into nothingness. If we remove the person of its founder from every other +system of human thought--its great religions form no exception--the system +remains intact. This is a very striking peculiarity in Christianity. In +this respect it stands absolutely unique. + +But as Christianity is founded on an historical person, who lived in a +particular age, so He is the founder of a great historical institution, +the Christian Church. This institution differs from every other society +which has ever existed, in that both its origination and its continued +existence are inextricably bound up with the person of its founder. Other +societies could exist even if it could be proved that their reputed +founders were creations of the imagination; but this would be fatal to the +life of the Church of Christ. If it could be proved that Jesus Christ was +a myth, or nothing but a learned Rabbi, the Christian Church, mighty +society as it is, would certainly collapse. The Christian Church without +Christ would be far more out of place than the play of Hamlet with the +part of Hamlet omitted. In this respect it is a institution unique among +all those which the world has ever seen, whether political or religious. + +This great society, which now comprehends a vast majority of the +intelligence of mankind, and all the progressive nations of the world, had +a definite beginning in historical times. It differs wholly from a +philosophic sect, whose bond of union consists in the acceptance of a body +of dogmatic teaching. It is and ever has been an organized society with +specific purposes and aims, and one which has ever meditated schemes of +conquest. It differs widely from all political institutions, and yet ever +since its birth it has taken a place beside them. + +The origin of this society is not lost, like that of many others, in the +mists of the hoary past. History enables us to assign a definite time when +this society was certainly not in existence. It no less definitely marks +out a period when it not only was in existence, but had entered on a +condition of active growth. Its origin did not take place in the cloud- +land of the mythic or the semi-mythic period of history, but in the reign +of Tiberius Cæsar, and in a country occupied by Roman garrisons, and +presided over by Roman governors. + +It will be objected that our only accounts of the causes which led to the +organization of this society are writings composed by its own members. In +this there is nothing peculiar; for until societies have grown +sufficiently powerful to attract the attention of the world outside them, +there can be no other source of information. Still the fact can be +ascertained on the most unquestionable authority, that at a certain date +this society was not in existence, and that within a certain number of +years afterwards, it was not only in existence, but rapidly increasing; +and that it originated in Jesus Christ, who was put to death by the Roman +government. + +This society, therefore, came into existence at a definite period of time. +Its early writers give us an account of how it originated. They affirm +that its founder was Jesus Christ; and that, having been interrupted by +His death, it was called into a new existence by His resurrection. To this +great event they most positively affirm that the origin of the Church, as +an institution, was due. To the belief in it as a fact, it has certainly +owed its gradual enlargement, until it has attained its present dimensions +after more than eighteen centuries of existence. To this belief is due the +great moral power which it has exercised on mankind; and if its members +could be persuaded that the belief in the Resurrection of its founder was +a mere delusion, great as this society is, it would certainly perish. + +There are five facts connected with the origin of this society, which no +one who believes in the possibility of historic truth will dispute. + +First: That at the year A.D. 25, this society had no existence. + +Secondly: That in A.D. 40, it was in a state of vigorous growth. + +Thirdly: That it was founded by Jesus Christ. + +Fourthly: That His crucifixion by the Roman government caused its +temporary collapse. + +Fifthly: That an event of some kind, which took place shortly after His +death, imparted to it a new vitality, which it has never lost to the +present hour, and which has caused it to exert a mightier influence on +mankind than any other community, whether political or religious, that has +ever existed. + +The problem, therefore, which history has to solve, is to account for the +renewed life, the marvellous progress, the intense vitality of this +society, and the mighty influence which it has exerted on the destinies of +mankind; originating as it did in the smallest possible beginnings, and in +a manner differing from all other existing institutions. + +The Christian Church has propounded, from the first commencement of its +renewed life, its own solution of this problem. It is: that its founder, +after having been crucified, rose again from the dead. This account has +this clear and obvious advantage, that if it be true, it sufficiently +accounts for all the phenomena whose existence we have to solve. His +resurrection was a power adequate to revive the society after its +temporary collapse, to impart to it its mighty moral and spiritual energy, +and to impress on the original work and teaching of Jesus, a new and +peculiar aspect. In short, assuming the Resurrection to have been a fact, +it assigns a cause adequate to account for all the phenomena which have +been presented by the Church. Here then we have firm ground on which to +take our stand; viz., the belief of this society as to its origin, capable +of being traced historically to the first hour of its renewed life, and +which also, if true, affords a rational account of it. + +But further; besides this account which the Church has given of its own +origin, there is no rival account of it in existence. As far as historical +documents are concerned, there is no other. All others are founded on +conjecture. + +Our opponents, however, affirm that the alleged fact which the Church +asserts to have been the cause of its existence is incredible, because all +miracles are impossible. Then, leaving _à priori_ grounds, they also +affirm that the evidence to prove the Resurrection to have been an +historical fact is insufficient for the purpose. + +The Church, however, is clearly in possession of a vantage-ground, from +which it is not easy to dislodge her. The cause which she alleges is +adequate to account for all the phenomena. + +The _onus probandi_ therefore clearly rests on the opponents of +Christianity. If they deny the truth of the fact which the Church has ever +handed down as the true account of her origin, they are bound not only to +show that it is devoid of historical attestation, but to propound a theory +which will adequately account for all the facts to which history +testifies. It is clear that nothing short of this is required of them as +philosophical historians. Certain facts are plain and undeniable. A +society, of a very special character, sprang into existence at a definite +point of history, and has exerted a mightier influence than any other on +the destinies of man. If therefore they reject the account which the +Church herself gives, they are bound to supply a rational account of how +this great society came into being; how the phenomena which constitute its +history have been brought about; and what it was that imparted to it its +vitality and power. We are in the presence of the greatest institution +with which history is acquainted, founded as it is on the greatest ideal +conception (if it is not historical) which the human mind has ever +succeeded in inventing. Both these came into existence, not in pre- +historic times, but in the midst of a period of contemporaneous history. +Respecting the times, the modes of thought, and the general character of +the period, we have extensive historical data. The religious, moral, and +philosophical opinions, and the general line of thought, are well known. +The various forces which were then in activity we are able to appreciate. +With all these data before him, it is incumbent on the philosophical +historian to give us an account of the moral and religious forces in +activity at this period, which were capable of creating the Christian +Church, and generating its conception of the ideal Christ. If it is +alleged that after the utmost investigation it is impossible to account +for their origin by the action of any known moral or spiritual forces +acting on the human mind, this would be at once to confess that the origin +of Christianity and the Church is entirely abnormal, or in other words, +that it is a moral and spiritual miracle. + +To do unbelievers justice, they have not been slow to recognize the fact +that if they reject the account which the Church has given of its origin, +they are bound to give us a rational one of how Christianity came into +existence. Accordingly, theory after theory has been propounded on this +subject. No intellectual exertion has been spared to point out how +Christianity and the Church have succeeded in getting into existence, and +in effecting their religious and moral conquests, by forces purely human, +and without the aid of any supernatural intervention. + +One thing respecting these theories is worthy of particular attention. No +unbeliever has as yet been able to suggest one which has succeeded in +commanding, I will not say the universal, but even the general assent of +the unbelieving world. Theory after theory has been propounded and +abandoned. It is therefore clear that the difficulty of accounting for the +origin of Christianity and the Church through the action of the ordinary +forces that operate on the human mind, is extreme. There is no analogous +case in the whole history of man. Let me briefly enumerate the chief +principles which have been invoked to aid in the solution of this problem. + +First, it has been attempted to get rid of the supernatural elements +contained in the Gospels by representing them as distorted representations +of real facts. This has been justly abandoned as childish. Then came the +mythic and legendary theories. These, having been found inadequate, have +been supplemented by various theories of development of ideas; and the +supposition of a violent party spirit existing in the Church, which under +the influence of a spirit of accommodation produced various compromises; a +mass of varied and often contending opinions seething in the bosom of a +society continually threatened with disruption, until they somehow +succeeded in welding themselves together; enthusiasm, fanaticism, +boundless credulity, aided by a prodigious power of mythic and legendary +invention, and whenever occasion so required, the presence of a moral +atmosphere, which on great emergencies did not shrink from deliberate +imposture. All these, in ever varying degrees and proportions, have been +pressed into the service of creating the Church, the ideal Christ, and the +Christianity of the New Testament. It is impossible in a work like the +present to examine these various theories, and show their inadequacy as +philosophical explanations of the fact. This I have already done in a +former work,(5) to which I must refer the reader for their refutation. A +few observations only will be necessary in this place. + +First: The positions taken by unbelievers are theories, which rest on the +smallest basis of historical evidence. I readily admit that where there is +a known fact, but the recollection of the events which would give an +account of its origin has perished, if a theory can be propounded which +fully accounts for the fact, then it has a right to take its place as an +historical event which rests on evidence of the highest probability. An +example derived from the mode in which the study of comparative philology +discloses the history of the past will explain my meaning. We have before +us the facts of language. The history of those who formerly used it has +perished; the accounts of their migrations have nowhere been preserved. +But certain facts of comparative philology justify the assumption that +certain primitive races of men must have migrated in particular +directions. These assumed migrations are really a theory, but one which is +exactly adequate to account for the facts which language unquestionably +presents. Thus the facts of the Indo-Germanic languages justify the +assumption that in the pre-historic ages, migrations westward must have +taken place, of which history contains no record. Still the theory affords +so perfect an explanation of the facts, that the occurrence of the +migrations is as certain as if they had been recorded by contemporaneous +writers. On similar grounds it has been inferred with a degree of +probability so high as to be equal to certainty, that a language earlier +than the Sanskrit, and from which both it and the Indo-Germanic family of +languages have been derived, was spoken by a previous race. Investigations +of this kind are largely adding to our historical knowledge. + +Let us observe the basis on which such arguments rest. In all these cases +we have before us not mere conjectures, but a distinct and positive fact, +or set of facts. The connecting links are missing. By the aid of +conjecture we propound a theory; or in other words, we suppose a set of +events to have occurred, which, if they really happened, would be adequate +to account for the facts in question. When they thus account for them, and +for them alone, and no other conjectural occurrence will do so, the +assumed fact is fully entitled to take its place in history as an event +which has actually happened. The reason of this is, that it can stand the +test of historical verification. + +A problem similar to that above referred to is the one which those who +deny the historical truth of the Gospels are called upon to solve. We are +in the presence of certain unquestionable historical facts, viz., the five +above referred to, and many others. The denial of the truth of the +Christian account leaves them without the connecting link which once +united them. What was that link? It can only be supplied by conjecture. +But to enable such a conjectural fact or facts to take rank as historical +events, they must be adequate to account for the facts, and be true to +human nature, and to the circumstances of the case; in other words, they +must be capable of enduring a rigid historical verification. Theories +which cannot endure this are no better than ropes of sand. This is the +character of the theories which have been propounded to account for the +Christianity of the New Testament. + +Let me illustrate this by one of the favourite theories used by +unbelievers for this purpose. We are told that a number of extremely +hostile factions divided the primitive Church. Of these the followers of +James, Peter, and Paul may be taken as fairly representative. These were +in a state of great hostility to each other, and went on gradually +elaborating a Christianity that was in conformity with their own views and +tastes. After a while it occurred to these hostile parties that it would +be advantageous to compromise their differences. An influential person, +such as we may suppose the author of the Acts of the Apostles to have +been, composed a history, for the purpose of making matters smooth, and to +afford a common ground of union among the contending factions. This +process was repeated as often as was necessary; and in good time, by the +aid of myth and legend, and the whole of the needful apparatus, appeared +the Christianity of the New Testament, and the Church was consolidated out +of these varied elements. + +Such theories grievously offend against the logic of history, and are in +direct variance with the facts of human life. We are here in the midst of +a whole mass of conjectural facts, each of which is imagined to account +for the existence of the other; and the whole of them taken together fail +to give an adequate solution of the phenomena before us. They are both +untrue to human nature and unable to account for either the facts of +Christianity or the existence of the Church. I must content myself with +selecting one of them for illustration. We are asked to believe that the +Church was divided into a number of parties, the opposition between whom +was violent; and that these effected a number of compromises, out of which +was ultimately evolved a common Christianity. This result is in direct +contradiction to the testimony of the religious history of man. Religious +parties do not effect compromises, but go on contending and widening their +differences, until their enthusiasm wears out and they die of inanition. +To this the history of all sects bears ample testimony, and the greater +the enthusiasm and not unfrequently the lesser the grounds of difference, +the greater the animosity. Compromises between hostile sects, in the rare +cases in which they have taken place, have been brought about by means of +external coercion. The religious history of mankind presents no example of +furious religious parties, while animated by a living enthusiasm, +voluntarily coalescing on the general principle of compromise. Witness the +unsuccessful attempts at compromise between the Eastern and Western +Churches, even when it was urged by the strongest external pressure. +Witness the sects which grew out of the Reformation. Compromises have +frequently originated among politicians, but these have in vain tried +their healing influences among contending sects. Occasionally they have +been brought about by the aid of pressure exerted by the temporal power, +as in the Church of England. Nothing more strongly illustrates the +difficulty with which compromise between religious parties can be effected +than the failure of the attempts to reconcile the Church of England and +the Methodists. The compromiser who will effect this union exists only in +the hopes of the future. But we need not confine ourselves to the +manifestations of sectarian spirit in connection with Christianity. The +Mahometan Church is also divided by sectarian differences. Is there any +tendency to produce a common Mahometanism, erected on the basis of +compromise? Do Buddhism and Brahminism show any disposition to compromise +their differences by fusing them into a common Pantheism which shall suit +both parties? The idea of producing a Christianity by a succession of +happy compromises entered into by violently hostile parties in the early +Church, is a dream which, however plausible it may have seemed in the +closet, is rudely dissipated the moment we come in contact with the stern +realities of life. + +But further: the wide separation of the early Churches from each other; +and, according to the opinions of those against whom I am reasoning, their +want of a governing power acknowledged by all, must have rendered +agreement on the basis of mutual compromise impossible. Compromises are +the results of considerations of policy, and are unheard of among +fanatics, such as my opponents assert the early followers of Jesus to have +been. But what further renders this theory untenable is, that it is +compelled to imagine a number of developments accompanied by corresponding +compromises between hostile parties, before we can succeed in evolving the +Christianity of the New Testament. Not only does it contradict the history +of man; not only is it an assumption made to form the connecting link +between other established facts, but it is itself founded on other +assumptions. Among these are the assertions made as to the evidence of the +party spirit existing in the Church, and the opposition between its +leaders. Party spirit we know to have existed, but not with the violence +which this theory is compelled to postulate. The statement also that the +doctrinal opposition between these parties was of so declared a type is +not founded on the evidence that we possess, but on a highly exaggerated +view of it, distorted for the purpose of adding strength to the theory; +or, in other words, it is founded on a set of unwarranted assumptions. The +passages in the New Testament alleged to prove the declared opposition +between the leaders of the Church, which this theory is compelled to pre- +suppose, can only be made to do so by taking it for granted that they do. +For example, the assertion that the person denounced in the Epistles to +the Seven Churches in the book of Revelation, is St. Paul, is a simply +gratuitous one, the only evidence for which is the will and pleasure of +those who make it. The theory, therefore, not only contradicts the history +of man, but is based upon a number of alleged facts which are either +absolute assumptions or exaggerations, and fail to give any account of the +origin of Christianity which will stand the test of the scrutiny of a +sound philosophy. + +The mythic and legendary theories are equally unable to account for the +facts as they stand in the New Testament. I cannot here attempt to follow +them in their innumerable windings. Taken by themselves they are not now +accepted as adequate accounts of them, but other theories are called in to +aid them. Still, whatever assistance these are supposed to impart, myth +and legend must always hold a prominent place in the systems of those who +endeavour to account for the origin of the Gospels on purely human +principles. As they contain a large supernatural element, it is certain +that if this is not historical, it must have originated in some species of +fiction, _i.e._ either in the mythic and legendary spirit, or in pure +invention. Hence the use of myths and legends must always be freely +invoked by those who, while they deny the historical character of the +Gospels, do not go to the length of accusing the original followers of +Jesus of deliberate invention. + +I must here draw attention to one particular portion of the evidence, the +full significance of which I have described elsewhere. Whatever opinions +may be formed as to the unhistorical character of the Gospels, there is +one fact respecting them as to which believers and unbelievers must alike +agree, namely that they contain a delineation of the most perfect +conception ever formed by the mind of man, the character of Jesus Christ. +There it is, beyond the power of contradiction; the overwhelming majority +of men possessed of the most powerful minds have recognized it as the +greatest of ideals, as well as the millions of ordinary men to whom it has +been the object of supreme admiration and attraction. The following +questions respecting it therefore urgently demand an answer. + +If the Gospels are a mere collection of mythic and legendary stories, +generated and put together in the manner affirmed by those who deny their +historical character, how got this great character there? If the fables of +which they are composed are the inventions of many minds, whence its +unity? If their inventors were credulous enthusiasts and fanatics, whence +its perfection? If they were implicated in all the superstitions of the +age, whence its moral elevation? Of what order of thought then existing is +it the embodiment? How could the credulity which was necessary for the +acceptance of such fictions, or how could the spirit which invented them, +have conceived these moral elements? There the character is--let us be +distinctly informed how it was put together; how much of it is fact, and +how much fiction; how the fictions were welded together with the facts so +as to compose the whole; and what class or order of minds in the early +Church was equal to its elaboration. This delineation must have been made +at an early period, and could not have been a late invention; for it is +substantially the same as that contained in those Epistles of St. Paul, +which are acknowledged to have been written within thirty years of the +date of the Crucifixion. A distinct answer to these questions is demanded +of those who affirm that the Gospels have no value as histories. It is +impossible to deny that they have a most important bearing on the present +question. Why do not unbelievers set themselves to grapple with this +problem? + +But the value to be assigned to the Gospels as histories must be a matter +for subsequent consideration. At present I need simply draw attention to +the fact that while the opponents of Christianity fully recognize the +necessity of propounding a rational theory of its origin, the more we +examine their various theories in detail, the more apparent becomes their +inadequacy to account for the phenomena. The fact, already alluded to, +that unbelievers cannot come to any agreement among themselves on this +subject, shows that they find the problem extremely difficult of solution. +The plausibility of their theories is due to the abstract and general form +in which they are presented. Various causes are held up without any +discrimination as to what each of them is capable of effecting; and the +wished-for result is ascribed to their combined action. But when we +analyse the various forces at their command, ascertain the mode of their +action, the difficulties they would have to encounter before they could +effectuate their results, and examine whether they are true to the facts +of human nature as testified to by the long course of history, it is not +too much to affirm that all the investigations of unbelievers have +completely failed to give an account of the origin of Christianity which +can take the place of that handed down to us by the Church. Until this can +be given, notwithstanding all the expenditure of intellect on the +question, we are justified in affirming that the problem is insoluble, +although Christianity originated in a period unquestionably historical, in +the midst of the Roman Empire over which it rapidly spread, despite the +opposition of the government and the entire organization of society. + +Before proceeding to the direct considerations by which the great fact of +Christianity is attested, I must take a general glance at the nature of +the materials which we have at our command, and at their historical value. + +I shall take as my starting-point the five facts already mentioned, the +historical certainty of which it is needless to prove. My starting-point, +therefore, is the continuous existence of the Church, which came into +being at a definite period of time, to which it can be traced up in one +unbroken succession. This society has always affirmed that its corporate +existence, as well as the life of its individual members, is due to the +Resurrection of its founder. I shall also carefully examine and estimate +the contemporaneous evidence afforded by the Epistles of St. Paul, +especially those which are acknowledged to be genuine, as well as that of +the other writings of the New Testament, for the purpose of estimating the +value of their testimony on this subject. Even if some of these writings +are not allowed by unbelievers to be the productions of the persons whose +names they bear, still they are all of a very early date, and +unquestionably reflect the thoughts and ideas of those who wrote them, and +of the persons to whom they are addressed. But before I enter on my +immediate subject, it will be necessary to lay down the leading principles +of historical evidence, and to estimate the value of tradition as a +testimony to historical facts. + +I am fully prepared to abide by the chief principles laid down by Sir G. +C. Lewis on this subject in his great work on the _Credibility of Early +Roman History_. They are generally considered to be sufficiently severe +and exacting. By many they are viewed as of far too stringent a character. +The evidence on which the great fact of the Resurrection rests, will +endure their most rigid application. They have this great advantage, that +they are laid down for the investigation of a subject purely secular, with +which religion has nothing to do. They are therefore wholly free from +religious bias, and are simply the principles for testing the claims of +ordinary facts on our belief. If the chief facts of Christianity can stand +this scrutiny, it is impossible to affirm that they are not supported by +the strongest historical testimony. + +1. Every alleged fact, in order to be entitled to our belief, must be +shown to rest on direct contemporaneous testimony, or that which is its +historical equivalent. + +This rule is by no means intended to affirm that every fact for which +contemporaneous testimony can be adduced is true; but only that it is to +be accepted as such when there is no reason for disbelieving it. We must +have some means to enable us to form a judgment of the knowledge and +veracity of the informant. It remains for consideration, when the direct +testimony of a contemporary is not to be had, as must be frequently the +case with events long past, what may be considered as its historical +equivalent? + +It must be kept in mind that one of the most valuable forms of +contemporaneous testimony, if not the most valuable of all, is a set of +letters which contain various and definite allusions to the current +events, habits, and modes of thought of the time. For certain purposes +these are far more valuable than formal histories. The latter are +frequently written under the influence of party spirit, partiality, or +bias. The writer of a history is usually on his guard, has carefully +considered what he says, and affords us but little opportunity of +interrogating him. But the writer of a letter, unless he has special +reasons for being guarded, places before his correspondent his entire +mind. We are therefore capable of interrogating him. He often lets us into +the secret causes of events. He also makes a number of incidental +allusions to events which are passing. These form testimony of a most +valuable kind. We can in a manner almost converse with him. As a +confirmation of the facts which formal histories narrate, and as letting +us into the secret springs of events, a series of letters, written by +persons who were actively engaged in them, are historical documents of the +highest order. Their value is increased when they bear all the appearance +of coming from the writer's heart. Nothing is more striking than the happy +results which have accrued from the extensive use made by modern +historians of original correspondence. It is not too much to say that it +has largely modified our view of events, as they have been reported in +formal histories. Another very high form of contemporaneous testimony is +the existence of institutions and monuments which can be certainly traced +up to a particular period, and which owed their existence to events of +that period. These form a species of living witnesses to the truth of the +facts out of which they have originated, and as far as their testimony +goes, it is incapable of falsehood. The most valuable testimony of this +kind is a great institution of which we possess definite evidence that it +originated in a particular event, or in the belief of it. This kind of +evidence Christianity possesses in the highest form, in the continued +existence of that great institution, the Christian Church. + +2. Testimony has a general credibility, subject of course to the knowledge +and honesty of the informant, when the reports are derived from those who +lived during the generation in which a particular event occurred, +supposing it to have been one of sufficient notoriety to attract +attention, and that the reporter possessed adequate means of information, +and investigated it with sufficient care. We are always justified in +assuming that he tells the truth unless there are reasons for suspecting +the contrary. + +3. Narratives of events which a man has heard from his father or his +contemporaries, but which happened before his own recollection, are for +the purpose of history, (but subject to the requisite qualifications) fair +representations of contemporaneous testimony. + +History admits hearsay testimony under proper restrictions. The knowledge +of the past would be impossible, if it were to allow itself to be fettered +by the technical rules which have been introduced into the administration +of justice. The all-important considerations with the historian, are the +notoriety of the fact and the truthfulness of the informant. Facts that a +man may have heard detailed by his grandfather or his contemporaries as +having happened in their time stand as representations of contemporaneous +testimony in the same position as those derived from the earlier +generation. + +4. But when a third stage is interposed in the transmission of events, as +for instance when we learn from our fathers or grandfathers what they have +learnt from theirs, an element of uncertainty is introduced. Still an +historian, writing after such an interval of time, if he sifted evidence +with care, would be able to report with accuracy all the great events, +whatever difficulty he might have in ascertaining the minor details. +Within this period abundance of sources of accurate information exist on +all points of importance, although the details gradually fade out of +people's recollections. After this interval, the accounts of events are +likely to receive a certain amount of colouring, according to the +prejudices of the narrators; but the interval is too short, and the +remembrance of them too recent, to allow of their becoming incrusted with +important mythical additions. All the materials for investigation are in +existence, and within the reach of the honest historian. He might find +difficulty in arranging the details in historical sequence; but if he does +not give an accurate account of the great outlines, it is owing, not to +the want of historical materials, but to the absence of a desire to +investigate and report the truth. + +5. The limits of time during which tradition can be considered as a +sufficiently accurate medium for preserving the memory of events, may be +put generally at from one hundred to one hundred and twenty years. Within +this period careful investigation and inquiry will enable the historian to +report the main features of events with substantial truth, from the +testimony of those who were contemporaries, or who derived their +information from those who were. Beyond this period, when the knowledge of +occurrences has to pass through three or four media of transmission, +tradition becomes an uncertain and untrustworthy informant, and after the +lapse of a greater interval, it is utterly unreliable, affording no means +of checking the introduction of legendary narratives. There may be a few +exceptional cases which have impressed themselves deeply on the public +recollection. Occasionally the protracted lives of a few individuals may +lengthen the period of trustworthy transmission, but this is an event of +such rare occurrence as but slightly to modify the general rule. + +It must be observed that there are two cases in which the traditional +knowledge of events is transmitted with far more accuracy, and over far +longer intervals of time than in ordinary ones, viz., those of families +which have an historical importance derived from the actions of their +ancestors, and those of bodies of men who have a kind of corporate life, +succeeding one another in unbroken succession, especially when this +corporate life is founded on the events themselves. This latter case +presents the means best adapted for the traditionary transmission of +facts, and one in which it is hardly possible that they should fail of +being accurately transmitted within a reasonable interval of time. This +was precisely the position occupied by the Christian Church during the +first century of its existence respecting the chief events in the life of +its founder. + +An example will illustrate this: If there had been no written memorials of +the life of John Wesley, there can be no doubt that the society which he +founded would have handed down to the present day an account of the chief +events of his life, which would have been accurate in its main outlines. +Thousands of persons are now living who have conversed with those who have +heard him preach; I myself have done so. It would therefore be impossible +to impose upon them a wholly mythic account in place of that which would +have been handed down by the Wesleyan body. Yet this society is founded on +a set of dogmas, not on the historical facts of its founder's life. The +Christian Church therefore was in a far superior position for preserving a +substantially accurate account of the chief events in the life of Jesus +Christ, yet the interval which separates us from the death of Wesley is +greater than that which elapsed between the death of Christ, and the +publication of the latest of the Synoptic Gospels, even if we accept the +dates which are assigned to them by our opponents. + +6. When the knowledge of past events has perished, it is impossible to re- +construct them by the aid of conjecture, except within the limits to which +I have previously alluded. These limits must be strictly defined, +otherwise that which is propounded as history becomes nothing else than a +statement of our subjective impressions. Conjectures which cannot stand +the test of historical verification cannot be accepted as facts of +history. + +Nothing is easier than, when facts are wanting, to invent them, and thus +bridge over the intervals which lie between others, the connecting links +of which have perished. But how are we to know that such conjectural +events were real facts, and not mere creations of the imagination? Clearly +this can be determined in no other way than by subjecting them to a rigid +verification. If they will not endure this, they must be rejected. +Historical conjectures have no higher claims for acceptance than +scientific ones. Both must be subject to the same tests, and must share +the same fate. I do not deny that many such conjectures may have a +considerable degree of plausibility; but, unless we rigidly reject from +the rank of historic facts those that break down under the test of +verification, histories will be converted into novels or poems. If our +knowledge of the connecting links between events in the history of the +past has perished, we shall not improve it by imagining facts, and calling +the result by the name of history. + +We cannot be too guarded in this particular subject, because an almost +boundless license has been introduced into the present controversy. Pure +creations of the imagination, which it is impossible to verify, are +constantly propounded as facts in the history of the past. I by no means +wish to deny that both parties must plead guilty to the charge of this +species of historical forgery. The fact may be unpleasant, but we shall do +no good by refusing to recognize it. When the knowledge of past events has +perished, and our conjectures break down under the test of verification, +we have nothing to do but to remain content with our ignorance. + +If these principles are correct, a considerable number of recently +published lives of Jesus, and other similar compositions, have no claim to +the designation of historical writings. They are mere novels evolved out +of the self-consciousness of their authors. They are nothing but simple +imaginations of what, under certain conjectural circumstances, might have +happened, but are destitute of all evidence that they actually occurred. +If history is thus degraded, it must become devoid of all scientific +value. I have pressed this point because nowhere is this license of +conjectural guessing at events more largely indulged in, than in questions +connected with the Bible and its criticism. + + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII. THE TESTIMONY OF THE CHURCH, AND OF ST. PAUL'S EPISTLES, TO +THE FACTS OF PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY. THEIR HISTORICAL VALUE CONSIDERED. + + +I have in the preceding chapter drawn attention to the chief principles of +historical evidence, and to the importance of certain classes of +historical documents; also to the important bearing which the continued +existence of a great institution like the Christian Church has on this +subject, especially as its origin can be traced up to a definite period of +history. I have further shown that as the Church gives a definite account +of its origin, which, if true, is an adequate one; it is incumbent on +those who reject this account to propound another which shall be able to +stand the application of the principles of a sound philosophy of human +nature. I must now consider the evidence which the existence of the Church +as a visible institution, and the Epistles of St. Paul, afford to the +great facts on which Christianity is based. + +If it can be proved beyond question that the Church immediately after it +assumed a distinctive form not only believed in the Resurrection of Jesus +Christ, as one among many miraculous facts, but affirmed that the belief +in its truth was the one sole ground of its corporate existence, within a +very short interval after the date of His crucifixion, it must be +admitted, even by unbelievers, to involve a question of the most serious +importance. It proves for certain that the belief in one miracle, and that +the greatest of all recorded in the Gospels, was neither a mythic nor a +legendary creation. It further follows that if the original followers of +Jesus thought that He had risen from the dead, it may be taken as a moral +certainty that they must have believed that other supernatural actions +were performed by Him during His life. The solution which unbelievers +propound as the account of the origin of the miraculous narratives in the +Gospels is that they are a gradual creation of a mythic and legendary +spirit. Hence their efforts to assign them to the latest possible date. If +their publication can be deferred to the early years of the second +century, they consider that this would afford the requisite time for +surrounding the history of Jesus with a halo of mythic and legendary +environment. But if it can be shown that the new-born Christian Church, +within a short interval after the Crucifixion, affirmed that the sole +ground of its renewed life was the belief in the Resurrection of its +founder, the possibility that such belief could have been either mythic or +legendary is taken away. Whatever may be urged about the other parts of +the story, there remains one miracle (and that the greatest of all), which +it is impossible to affirm to have been either a mythical or a legendary +creation. If the Church accepted it as the sole ground of its existence, +and if that belief can be traced to the hour of its birth, it must have +been due either to some species of delusion, or to a fact. If Jesus was +thus believed to have risen from the dead, it is useless to assign the +belief in His other miracles to a later legendary spirit. + +But further: The Church, within a short number of years from the date of +its birth, must have had all the consciousness that it was a young +society. It was engaged in a constant struggle for existence, and had +before it the alternative of enlarging its numbers, or perishing. A new +society constantly struggling for existence could not fail within this +interval of time to have the most lively consciousness of what it was to +which it owed its origin, and which formed the bond of union among its +members. It must have been to them a constantly recurring thought. Every +one must have known that it was an alleged miraculous fact, a supposed +Resurrection of one who had been crucified. Was it possible for the +members of such a society to avoid looking back with anxiety on the +alleged ground of its existence? It was no dogma capable of endless +discussion, but a fact. The bond of union was allegiance to a living +person. Is it conceivable that this person was not the object of daily +interest to its members, or that they did not make His history the subject +of earnest inquiry? Can we suppose for one moment that any of them were +ignorant of or had forgotten the grounds on which they had joined the new +community, or which formed the basis of its life? The recollections of the +members of a society which is only between twenty and thirty years old +must be fresh. + +But it may be said, these people were very credulous. Be it so. Credulous +people placed in the circumstances of the Christian Church are never +deficient in curiosity. Even if the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus +had originated in credulity, the first principles of human nature would +have urged them to get all the information which they could respecting it. +They were in the exact position to enable them to do this. Within ten, +twenty, thirty, or forty years, there must have been plenty of information +at hand to enable them to ascertain whether the society to which they +belonged did or did not owe its existence to this belief, and to get full +information as to the general outline of the story on which it was +founded. It is impossible for members of a society whose origin was so +recent to have remained ignorant of the circumstances which gave it birth. +They must have been handed down by a lively tradition. I conclude +therefore, that it would have been simply impossible for the members of +the Church, within this short time, to be mistaken as to whether its +existence and continued life was due to the belief that its founder had +risen from the dead, or whether He was supposed to have worked miracles +during His life; and that its belief could not have been due to mythic or +legendary causes. + +The question before us then, becomes clear and definite, freed from the +vagueness with which it has been endeavoured to obscure it. If it can be +proved that the Christian Church owed its origin to its belief in the +Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and that its renewed life began within the +briefest interval after His crucifixion, the whole discussion becomes +narrowed into the following issue: Is it possible that such a belief, +within so short a time after His death, could have originated in a +fiction? Three alternatives are open for our acceptance, and three only; +either: + +Jesus did not really die, while his followers supposed that He had, and +they mistook some appearance of Him after His crucifixion for a +resurrection: + +Or they imagined that He appeared to some of them after His death, but the +appearance was a delusion of their imaginations: + +Or He rose from the dead as an objective fact. + +Other alternatives there are none; and with respect to this particular +miracle, the whole apparatus of myth, legend, development and compromise, +which is so liberally used to account for the supernatural portions of the +Gospels, is simply worthless as a rational account of the origin of the +story. + +A very bold affirmation has been made, that no contemporary testimony can +be adduced for the performance of any miracle recorded in the New +Testament. This assertion is founded on the supposition that none of the +Gospels can be proved to have been written earlier than the end of the +first, or the beginning of the second century. It is alleged that they are +of very uncertain authorship, that two of them do not profess to +communicate anything but second-hand information; and the proof of the +early composition of the other two utterly fails. The three first Gospels +being thus quietly assigned to the region of myths and legends, and the +fourth affirmed to be a forgery, it is asserted that contemporary evidence +for the truth of the supernatural narratives of the Gospels wholly +disappears. + +What then is contemporaneous testimony to a fact? Few persons who actually +witness events compose histories of them. There is scarcely an account of +a great battle which has been composed by the general who commanded in it; +and when such accounts have been published by persons who were actually +present, they could have witnessed but a small portion of the events which +they describe. Such is the case with the great mass of facts which +constitute the history of the past. The chief actors in them are seldom +the historians. + +But although such persons rarely compose narratives of events at which +they were actually present, yet it is quite possible to possess testimony +which for all practical purposes is of equal value. As I have already +pointed out, such testimony consists of historical documents composed by +persons who lived during the time in question, and who had ample means of +procuring information from those who must have known the truth of the +occurrences. + +We possess contemporaneous testimony of the highest order in the Epistles +of St. Paul. I have already observed that no documents are of higher +historical value than letters composed by persons actively engaged in the +events to which they refer. I must now point out specifically the +importance of these letters as historical documents. + +First: four of the longest of them are admitted, by every school of +unbelievers, who have given any consideration to the subject, to be the +genuine productions of the Apostle. The evidence, both external and +internal, of his authorship, is of the highest character. If it is not +valid to prove that they were written by him, all historical certitude is +rendered impossible. They are the two to the Corinthians, and those +addressed to the Romans and the Galatians. Their importance is greatly +enhanced by their presenting to us a more distinct picture of the +innermost life of the Apostle than any others which have been attributed +to him. To these may be added four more, viz. the two to the +Thessalonians, and those to the Philippians and to Philemon, which, +although doubted by some, are yet fully admitted by other unbelievers, +among whom is Renan, to be genuine. The internal evidence that the +Epistles to the Philippians and to Philemon were written by the same +person who composed those to the Corinthians and Galatians, is as strong +as such evidence can possibly be. The whole form of thought is instinct +with the presence of the same mind. Nor can the two to the Thessalonians +admit of any reasonable doubt. To these follow the two to the Colossians +and the Ephesians, for which the evidence is certainly less strong; but +Renan admits that it greatly preponderates on the side of their being +genuine productions of St. Paul. Altogether, then, we have eight letters +which are undoubtedly his, and two more which are probably so; instinct +with his mind, and placing before us a vivid picture of the innermost life +of the early Church. + +Secondly, as to their date. Six of them were unquestionably written within +twenty-eight years after the crucifixion, by the most active agent in the +propagation of Christianity, who had been employed in this work for a +period of at least eighteen years previously. Let us consider what such a +period of time really means. Twenty-eight years is about the period which +lies between the present year and the repeal of the corn-laws. While some +of those who effected it have passed away, many of those who took a most +active part in it are still living. All the events connected with it lie +within the period of the most lively historical recollection. Many persons +are still alive who can look back with the most perfect reminiscence to +the great events of the anti-corn-law agitation. While these persons live, +it will be impossible to encircle the chief actors in it with a halo of +myth or legend. In precisely the same position must multitudes have stood +to the ministry of Jesus Christ, and the foundation of the Christian +Church, when these Epistles were written. The fact is worthy of our +deepest attention, that when we read these letters and the various +statements they contain, we are in the immediate presence of some of the +most important events in history. + +Although St. Paul had never seen Jesus himself, yet his age was such when +he wrote these letters, that his recollection was good for many years +before the commencement of His ministry. Great numbers of persons also +were alive whose recollections of events that occurred at a much earlier +date must have been distinct and clear. With the early followers of Jesus +he had for not less than twenty years every facility for holding +communication. Is it to be believed that a man whose entire being was +swallowed up in one continuous sacrifice of himself to Jesus Christ, and +who was penetrated with the profoundest love towards Him, had not +accurately informed himself of the great facts of His earthly life, when +during the last twenty years he had enjoyed every means of obtaining +information from His followers, and previously had investigated it with +the keen scent of an angry persecutor? The idea is incredible. In these +letters of St. Paul therefore, as far as they throw light on this subject, +we are in the presence of contemporaneous historical evidence of the +highest order. + +Thirdly: Although these letters were written within so brief an interval +after the Crucifixion as from twenty-five to thirty years, yet they afford +evidence which carries us up to a much earlier period. St. Paul's +conversion dates at least eighteen years earlier than the earliest of +them. His testimony therefore is good as to the general nature of the +beliefs of the Christian Church during the whole period of his ministry. +It proves, among many other things, this all-important point, that the +Resurrection of Christ was believed by the whole Christian community, and +formed the groundwork of the existence of the Church, within less than ten +years after the crucifixion. But the Apostle's hostile connection with the +Christian sect dates still earlier. As a persecutor he must have +ascertained what were the leading subjects of the Christian belief, and +must have subjected the whole matter to a rigid investigation. Above all, +he could not have failed to know whether the belief in the Resurrection of +Christ was or was not from its commencement the ground of the renewed life +of the Christian Church. + +Every consideration must have induced him when a persecutor to make this +entire question the subject of a most careful investigation. Nothing was +more important than that he should ascertain whether any considerable +interval had elapsed between the Crucifixion of Christ and the propagation +of the report of His Resurrection; and his means of ascertaining the truth +about it must have been complete. To determine this for certain would have +been most important in his work of convicting the founders of the new sect +of imposture; for if any considerable time had elapsed between the death +and reported resurrection, it would have afforded that of which all the +theories of unbelief stand in need, a sufficient interval for the delusion +to grow and propagate itself; or, if the belief was the result of fraud, +for the imposition to be concocted and spread. St. Paul's testimony +therefore affords the most conclusive proof that the belief in the +Resurrection as a fact was contemporaneous with the foundation of the +Church; that it was the cause of its renewed vitality; that no interval +could have elapsed between the death of Jesus and His reported +resurrection, sufficient for the growth of myth or legend, the fabrication +of an imposture, or the gradual spreading of the hallucinations of a +single individual among a multitude of persons. In one word, if the belief +in the Resurrection originated in the conversion of some subjective +delusion into an objective fact, it must have been one which spread with +incomprehensible rapidity. + +These letters also form the most convincing proof, not only that the +Resurrection was universally believed as a fact by the communities to +which they were addressed, but that it was accepted by the individual +members of these Churches from the first commencement of their +Christianity. Although two of these Churches had been planted by St. Paul, +that of the Romans was not planted by him, and was of considerable +standing when he wrote the letter. Its fame had spread throughout the +whole Christian world. Everything in the Epistle denotes that its +Christianity was of no recent growth. Many of these Churches, especially +the Jewish portions of them, could carry their recollections up to a much +earlier time. It should be carefully observed that the interval of twenty- +eight years from the foundation of a sect is a period wholly insufficient +for the growth of an hereditary and otiose faith. The majority of the +members of these Churches were beyond all doubt actual converts, who had +once been either Jews or Pagans. However credulous we may suppose them to +have been, their conversion must have been due to an inquiry of some kind. +The short period which had elapsed since the foundation of the Church and +the supreme interest which the whole of the events and circumstances must +have excited in the converts, were precisely what was requisite for +preserving traditionary recollections with the utmost soundness. There +could have been no doubt in any of their minds whether or not the belief +in the Resurrection was the groundwork of their Christianity. They must +have known therefore whether it was a story which had gradually spread, or +had existed from the beginning; or whether the peculiar form of it was an +invention of St. Paul; or whether it was the foundation of the convictions +of those by whom they had been converted. The manner in which the fact of +the Resurrection is referred to in these Epistles proves that the belief +was of no recent growth, but had existed from the beginning. The Epistle +to the Romans opens with these words:--"Concerning His Son Jesus Christ ... +who was declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit +of holiness, _by the resurrection from the dead_." It is impossible that a +writer could have made such a reference as this at the opening of his +letter, unless he had been certain that the belief in the Resurrection had +been accepted as a fact by those whom he addressed, and by the whole +Christian community with whom they were acquainted. + +But further: it is utterly incredible that if the converts accepted the +fact of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ as the foundation of their +Christianity, they should have contentedly remained ignorant of the facts +of His previous history, at a period when there must have been abundant +means of obtaining an acquaintance with it. + +Fourthly: the value of these letters as historical documents is greatly +increased by the fact that a strong spirit of party existed in the +Churches. None are more ready to accept the fact that the Church was +divided into a number of parties than the opponents of Christianity. Not +only have they admitted it, but for their own purposes they have greatly +exaggerated it. But it is a weapon which can be used in defence of +Christianity more efficaciously than in opposition to it. It is clear on +the face of these letters not only that the Churches were divided into +parties, but that party-spirit existed in them with considerable violence. +It is needless for the purpose of the present argument to ascertain the +number of the parties into which some of the Churches were divided; but +these letters, confirmed as they are by incidental references in the Acts +of the Apostles, leave no doubt that the opposition between St. Paul and +those who followed his teaching, and a powerful Judaizing party in the +Church, was of a very decided character; that this party had a great +dislike to the person of the Apostle; and that he himself denounced them +as corrupters of the fundamental principles of the Gospel. They make it +quite clear that even in the Churches of which he was the founder, the +Apostle was far from having it all his own way. Judaizing teachers had +made very considerable progress in alienating the Galatian Churches from +him. His letter to these Churches discusses the entire question between +him and his opponents, who actually went the length of denying his +apostolical authority. In the Church of Corinth also there was a powerful +Judaizing party, who affirmed that he was no true Apostle. In this Church +there were also other parties who designated themselves by the names of +particular leaders in various degrees of opposition to St. Paul. It is +evident that these parties must have derived their views of Christianity +from a source quite independent of the Apostle. Portions of the first and +not less than half of the second Epistle are occupied by St. Paul in +setting forth his claims in opposition to these leaders. It is altogether +a mistake to suppose that these Churches were disposed to accept his +assertions without question, as equivalent to oracles from Heaven. On the +contrary, Judaizing teachers habitually followed his steps, and to some +extent succeeded in subverting the faith even of his own converts. + +Nothing can more enhance the value of these letters as historical +documents than the existence of this party-spirit in the Churches to which +they were addressed. If St. Paul had written them to none but devoted +admirers, as is frequently the case with the leaders of religious sects, +his assertions might have been open to grave suspicion. It might have been +urged that such persons were ready to accept anything and everything which +he affirmed. But nothing is more keen-eyed than religious party-spirit in +detecting and denouncing the false positions of an opponent, even when it +is sufficiently ready to accept everything which makes in its own favour. +So strong was the opposition to the Apostle, that in two of these +Churches, as we have seen, a powerful party existed who went the extreme +length of denying his right to the apostolic office. Yet these letters +were not only intended to be read to the whole Church, but portions of +them are directly addressed to the opponents in question. What guarantee +of the truthfulness of statements can compare with this? The Apostle's +letters are openly read in the presence of the opposing party, before the +assembled Church, challenging them to impugn his statements. It will +perhaps be objected that we have no record of the discussion which +followed the reading of his letters, and of the results attending it. The +second Epistle to the Corinthians has preserved some of those results, +though it is plain that an opposing party still continued. This Epistle is +a very strenuous attack on them. The man who had the moral courage to +write such letters as the second to the Corinthians and that to the +Galatians, to be openly read in the presence of his adversaries, must have +been well assured of the goodness of his cause. Common sense alone would +have suggested to him not to make in them statements which were sure to +receive direct and instant contradiction. + +It is clear, therefore, that certain points on which these letters make +very definite statements must have been held in common by St. Paul and his +opponents. If it had not been so, it is impossible that the letters could +have been written in their present form. The Christianity on which the two +parties agreed beyond all doubt, concentrated itself around the Messianic +character of Jesus. The letters themselves make the points on which they +disagreed sufficiently obvious, centering as they did on the necessity of +observing the rites of the Mosaic law in the Christian Church. But the +Epistles contain a vast number of allusions to other subjects, not a few +of which are of a very incidental character. What is the only legitimate +inference which can be deduced from this circumstance? Obviously that the +Apostle wrote them with the fullest conviction that his statements on +these subjects would be accepted by his opponents as part of their joint +belief; and not only by them, but by all the members of the Church. It is +inconceivable that a man of the mental calibre of St. Paul should have +written letters such as those to the Corinthians and Galatians, abounding +as they do with references to facts and doctrines, if he had not been +fully persuaded that they constituted the common faith of himself and +those to whom he wrote. + +It is impossible to over-estimate the historical importance of letters +like these, when in this incidental manner they contain numerous +references to facts and opinions, and to the actual controversies then +existing in the Church. The form in which they are made constitute us +almost as adequate judges of their value as if we were able to interrogate +their author. We have him, in fact, in the witness-box before us, and can +narrowly scrutinize his mental character. They can leave no doubt on our +minds as to whether the allusions were incidental, or made for a purpose. +The value of letters, written by persons who have impressed on them the +image of their own inner life and character, and referring at the same +time to current events and opinions, is now universally acknowledged as +the best means of correcting the mistakes and misrepresentations of formal +histories. But when we take into consideration that these letters of St. +Paul are outpourings of his inmost mind, intended not only for admiring +friends, but for scrutinizing opponents, we have before us historical +evidence of the highest order. + +Fifthly: The Apostle presents himself to us in these letters in the +fullest outbursts of his heart. We have the whole man before us, +intellectually, morally, and religiously. Probably no eight letters exist +in all literature, from which it is possible to construct in equal fulness +the mental portraiture of the writer. Nowhere can we find stronger bursts +of feeling. He was a man of deep sensibility, united with the firmest +resolve. His sacrifice of self, and complete freedom from all selfish +aims, is exceeded by only one character in history. Who can read these +letters through, and question the sincerity of the writer? Can any one +believe that he was not true to his convictions, or that he was capable of +deliberately stating what he knew to be false? If the facts were not as he +has stated them, the only possible alternative is that he was the prey of +an hallucination. Yet in every detail of business, and in disposing of all +practical questions, his judgment was of the soundest character. + +There is one remarkable fact which these letters bring out distinctly, +which is probably true of no other man that ever lived. The Apostle +claimed to decide certain questions authoritatively in virtue of a divine +guidance which he possessed. He gave that decision on two points, having +the closest bearing on the daily life of the Christians of that day, and +which excited deep conscientious scruples. These were: whether the +obligation of observing certain days was binding on the Christian +conscience, and whether it was unlawful to eat meat which had been offered +in sacrifice to a heathen god. On each of these points he gives his own +apostolical decision; yet in the very act of doing so, he directly enjoins +that the conscientious scruples of those who could not acquiesce in it +should be respected. Can this be said of any other man who thought that he +possessed a supernatural guidance? Enthusiastic he was; but his was an +enthusiasm which did not blind his judgment. He was a man, too, of a +highly delicate mind, yet capable of using a refined sarcasm in dealing +with his opponents. We have the whole man before us, and his entire +character renders him a witness of the highest order. + +As modern unbelievers refuse to allow us to appeal to the Gospels as +historical documents, it becomes a matter of the highest importance to +ascertain what facts in connection with the origin of Christianity and the +beliefs of the earliest followers of Jesus can be established with the aid +of these letters. Unbelievers cannot dispute that they are the authentic +writings of the most active agent in the propagation of Christianity, who +has contributed more to its permanent establishment than any other of the +disciples of Jesus. This being so, it is impossible to deny that they are +contemporary historical records of the highest value. Our opponents demand +contemporary testimony, and we present them with the Epistles of St. Paul. +In pursuing this argument, it will be my duty to forget that we Christians +consider that the man who wrote them had a supernatural guidance, and to +use them as I would the letters of Cicero. I will proceed to examine their +testimony. + +First: It has been asserted, with a view of weakening the evidence of the +supernatural portions of the New Testament, that although its writers have +reported miracles as wrought by others, not one of them has affirmed that +he himself ever performed one. + +I reply that St. Paul distinctly affirms that he believed he wrought +miracles. "Truly," says he, "the signs of an apostle were wrought among +you in all patience, in signs, and wonders, and mighty deeds." (2 Cor. +xii. 12.) He here affirms that such a power was possessed not only by +himself, but by other Apostles also. The power to perform "signs, wonders, +and mighty deeds" was directly connected with the apostolic office. + +Again, he says to the Galatians (iii. 5), "He that ministereth to you the +Spirit, and worketh miracles among you." In this reference he evidently +means himself, and affirms that he had performed miracles in Galatia. + +In the Epistle to the Romans he makes the following affirmation: "For I +will not dare to speak of any of those things which Christ hath not +wrought by me, to make the Gentiles obedient, by word and deed, through +mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God; so that from +Jerusalem, and round about unto Illyricum, I have fully preached the +Gospel of Christ." (Rom. xv. 18, 19.) Here then we have St. Paul's direct +affirmation that in his own opinion, throughout the mission in question, +he had been in the habit of performing "mighty signs and wonders." After +these passages it is needless to quote further. The Apostle deliberately +affirms to the Corinthians and Galatians that he performed miracles, and +the whole passage makes it clear that he supposed they would fully +recognize the fact of his having done so. Of course this affirmation does +not prove that they were real miracles; but it does prove that he and +those to whom he wrote thought that they were so. Not less distinct is his +affirmation to the Romans. These passages further distinctly prove that it +was an accepted belief in the Churches when the Apostle wrote, and even at +a much earlier period, that supernatural manifestations attended the early +preaching of Christianity. It follows therefore that the invention of +miraculous stories was not due to a later mythic and legendary spirit. +This the statement made by the Apostle in his Epistle to the Romans +distinctly proves; for he evidently considered that he had been in the +habit of performing miracles up to the very time when he wrote the letter, +and during the whole course of his preceding ministry. Also the +affirmation that miracles were the signs of an Apostle, and admitted to be +such, is a strong corroboration of the statement made by the Synoptics +that our Lord was supposed to have conferred such powers on the Apostles; +and as it is simply incredible that any should have believed that He +conferred on the Apostles powers which He did not exercise himself, it +carries up the belief of the Church that Jesus was a professed worker of +miracles to the very first years of Christianity. I am quite aware that +these beliefs of the Church do not prove these miracles to have been real +ones. But they do prove that the belief in their actual performance was +contemporary with the birth of Christianity itself. They therefore could +not have originated, as the opponents of Christianity are never weary of +assuming, in a mythic or legendary spirit; for myths and legends require a +considerable time to grow; and it is impossible that they can encircle an +eminent character with an unreal halo till after those who witnessed his +actions and personally know him are silent in the grave. But in the case +before us we have affirmations of St. Paul respecting himself, which put +the whole apparatus of myths and legends out of the question. If then this +belief in the manifestation of a supernatural power in connection with +Christianity dates thus early, there are only three modes in which it is +possible to account for it, viz. that it was due to deliberate and +conscious imposture; or that Jesus and His immediate followers laboured +under a delusion when they thought that they performed miracles; or that +they were really wrought. As no one now-a-days pretends to maintain the +truth of the first alternative, we may dismiss it from further +consideration. + +But it will be asserted that St. Paul does not mention any specific +miracles which he considered that he had performed, and that his +statements are merely general. I reply that such a mode of statement is +precisely what we should expect to find in a letter of this kind, and is +just the one which would be adopted by a person who was satisfied that +those to whom he was writing were as firmly convinced of the fact as he +was himself.... A formal and distinct description of the miracles which he +had performed would have been quite out of place in a reference of this +kind, and would have implied that doubts respecting them existed on one +side or the other. Besides, the words which he uses embrace all the +different expressions by which the various kinds and aspects of miracles +are designated in the New Testament. + +Secondly: These letters also afford unquestionable evidence that at the +time when they were written both the writer and those to whom he addressed +them, were firmly convinced that there was then actively operating in the +Church a number of supernatural manifestations of a very peculiar +character, and widely different from any species of supernatural belief +which has been current before or since. I allude to the gifts of the +Spirit, to which the Apostle has so frequently alluded in these Epistles, +and of the nature of which he has in those to the Corinthians given a +distinct account, together with definite rules to regulate their use. The +reason why he has given us a far more definite account of this class of +manifestations than of the other is obvious. In the Church in question +they had become the subjects of ambitious rivalry, and under its influence +some of them had been perverted to pernicious uses. The whole subject is +definitely treated of in the 12th, 13th, and 14th chapters of the first +Epistle to the Corinthians, besides a number of distinct references to it +in other portions of his writings. These assertions on the part of St. +Paul that both he and those to whom he wrote were fully of opinion that +supernatural powers were then manifested in the Church, are so clear that +they require a most careful consideration. The following points respecting +them are proved by this Epistle. + +1. That St. Paul, and the various parties in the Corinthian Church, +however much they might disagree on other points, fully believed that +these supernatural powers were _then and there_ manifesting themselves in +the Church. This belief might have been a delusion, but the letter proves +beyond doubt that it was entertained by the whole Church, including all +its various parties. + +2. That these gifts were earnestly coveted by the various members of this +Church; that many of them made a very ostentatious use of them; and that +stringent rules were required to prevent their use from degenerating into +an abuse. + +3. Nine of these supernatural endowments are enumerated by the Apostle. It +is not clear whether the list is intended to be exhaustive. Probably it is +not; but it is evident that the writer intended to enumerate the chief of +them. They are as follows: the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, faith; gifts of +healing ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}); working of miracles ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}); +the gift of prophecy, those of discerning spirits; tongues and +interpretation. This list of gifts in a slightly altered form is repeated +no less than three times in the same chapter. They are affirmed to be +supernatural endowments, qualifying the possessor for distinct functions +in the Church. It is worthy of particular remark, as showing how free the +Apostle was from contemplating the subject with the eye of a credulous +enthusiast, that he distinctly asserts that they were designed for a +definite purpose only, and that when that was effected they were to cease. +A fanatic would certainly have considered that they were destined to +continue for ever. This point is worthy of our deepest attention. + +4. The existence of a marked distinction between these gifts is definitely +affirmed by the Apostle. They were not confined to a particular order of +men, but were spread over the entire community. They also differed not +only in kind but in degree. Some of them subserved higher, others humbler +purposes. The reason for which they were given was the building up of the +Church into a distinctive community. When that was effected they were to +cease. + +5. The Apostle also most carefully points out that a distinction of +function existed between these various supernatural endowments. This is a +very important consideration. Whether we view them as realities, or as +delusions, it is plain that this distinction of function must have pointed +to some corresponding facts well known in the Church, at the time when the +Epistles were written. The possession of one of them by no means implied +that of another, although the subject-matter upon which they operated was +closely akin. Thus the possession of the gift of tongues (whatever it may +have been), did not imply the possession of the gift of interpretation. On +the contrary, the rules which the Apostle gives for the regulation of +those gifts, as well as his statements respecting them, prove that they +were a set of distinct manifestations, and were possessed very often by +different persons, and that the presence of the one power by no means +implied that of the other. This must unquestionably point to the existence +of a remarkable phenomenon of some kind. Even if it is supposed that St. +Paul and those to whom he wrote were labouring under a delusion, it proves +that the Apostle possessed a power of discrimination which is not +exhibited by an ordinary enthusiast or fanatic. + +A distinction which St. Paul affirms to have existed between two of these +gifts, viz. between the gifts of healing and of miracles, deserves special +attention. That a real distinction existed between them is affirmed three +times over in the same chapter. Both of these gifts, according to our +present mode of viewing the subject, would be confounded under the +designation of a power of working miracles. But it is clear from the +Apostle's statement, that he, and those to whom he wrote, saw an +appreciable distinction between them. "To another," says he, "are given +the gifts of healing by the same Spirit; to another the working of +miracles." "But all these worketh that one and the self-same Spirit, +_dividing to every man severally as he will_." (1 Cor. xii. 9-11.) Again, +in summing up their relative importance, he says: "thirdly teachers, after +that miracles, _then gifts of healing_," (ver. 28); and again, as +qualifying individuals for particular offices: "Are all apostles? are all +prophets? _are all workers of miracles? Have all the gifts of healing?_" +(ver. 29, 30.) Now although we may deny that these phenomena were +supernatural in their character, it is plain that there must have been +something in existence in this Church corresponding to them, and of which +they were the supposed manifestation. The Apostle and those to whom be +wrote evidently understood one another. + +What this distinction was it is now impossible accurately to determine. As +I have already observed, it probably had reference to a higher and lower +class of miracles; those which were in the proper sense evidential; and +those which might in various degrees have resembled the act mentioned by +St. James, the anointing a sick man with oil in the name of the Lord, the +offering fervent prayer for his recovery, and the gradual cure of his +complaint. Such would belong to a lower class of miracles to which I have +elsewhere alluded, as rather fitted to procure a favourable attention to +the missionary than for evidential purposes. Be the distinction what it +may, and even supposing that St. Paul and the Corinthians were under a +delusion as to their supernatural character, it is plain that some real +difference, which was clearly distinguishable, must have existed in the +outward manifestations. This is a fact of very considerable importance, as +it proves that both the Apostle and the Corinthians were in a state of +mind in which they were capable of exercising a clear discrimination +between these gifts, which is the last thing of which visionary and +credulous enthusiasts ever think. + +6. These gifts were likewise clearly separate in respect to the subject- +matter on which they operated. The Apostle and the Corinthians supposed +that they communicated a supernatural illumination of some kind; but the +illumination conferred by one might leave the possessor completely in the +dark with respect to the special subject-matter of the other. This is +definitely affirmed with respect to the gift of tongues, and +interpretation. A person might possess the former and yet be altogether +destitute of the latter. There can be no doubt that the same analogy ran +through them all. This is affirmed when St. Paul asserts that all these +gifts were the work of one and the same Spirit _dividing to every man +severally as he will_ (1 Cor. xii), and is implied by the comparison which +he institutes between them and the members of the human body and their +respective functions. Thus: the power of seeing furnishes no information +in matters of sound; nor the latter on the perceptions we derive through +the sense of smell. Equally functional were these gifts, each being +confined to its own proper subject-matter. If the idea was that the +possessor had an inspiration, as far as respects the subject-matter of his +gift, it conferred on him no supernatural knowledge on matters outside its +special function. Thus a man who had the gift of tongues might remain +perfectly ignorant of the interpretation of them, if he had not the latter +gift. One who possessed the power of discerning of spirits might have been +destitute of the power of working miracles. One who had the gift of +prophecy might have had no illumination with respect to that special +knowledge which was conferred by the gift of wisdom. The inspiration which +was supposed to be conferred by them, conferred no general +infallibility--it was strictly functional and did not extend beyond the +limits of the gift. + +All these points are of the highest importance in an historical point of +view. Whether we think that St. Paul and the Corinthians were, or were +not, under delusions about this matter, they clearly prove that there must +have been phenomena of some kind which were supposed to be the results of +the gifts in question; and that the persons who believed that they +possessed them exercised a discriminating judgment respecting them. It is +no less clear that they did believe that they actually possessed them. +Some of them were of such a nature that it is difficult to comprehend how +the possessor could be under delusion on the subject. Take for example the +power of discerning spirits. Once the possessor had it not. Afterwards he +must have believed that he possessed a supernatural insight into the +character of others. It is difficult to comprehend how a man's +consciousness could be deceived on a point like this. He must have surely +known whether within a definite period of time he had obtained an insight +into character, which he did not possess before. Everywhere in the account +given us of these gifts we seem to be dealing with facts. The distinctions +laid down as existing between them, and the separateness of their +functions are truly philosophical, supposing the gifts to have been real, +and were the last things which were likely to have occurred to credulous +enthusiasts. + +7. These gifts admitted of being abused. The possession of them was not +sufficient to confer any infallibility in the use of them. This fact is +worthy of deep attention, not only as pointing to the reality of the +manifestations but to the soundness of the Apostle's judgment. If these +gifts had been mere inventions of a credulous imagination they would have +been represented as guarded from the possibility of abuse by the +supernatural power in which they originated. Even at the present day it is +a very common idea that the gift of inspiration cannot possibly be a +functional one which is limited to a definite subject-matter, but that it +must confer a general infallibility. Very different were the views of St. +Paul and of the Churches to which he wrote. The Apostle was of opinion +that when they had been once conferred, they were subject to the control +of the will, and capable of a good or bad use in the same manner as our +ordinary faculties. His statement is clear that in this Church they were +used in a manner little conducive to edification. In order to suppress +this abuse he adopted some stringent rules. No person was to be allowed in +the congregation to use the gift of tongues (a gift which he was so far +from underrating that he thanked God that he possessed it more largely +than any other member of the Church), unless there was some one present +who had the gift of interpretation. The gift of prophecy held the second +rank in point of importance. Yet from the eagerness of its possessors to +use it, confusion arose in the congregation; and the Apostle was compelled +to prescribe rules for limiting its exercise and enforcing order among the +prophets. The more the account is studied the stronger must be the +conviction that it points to actual phenomena, which were exhibited in the +Apostolic Churches; and that St. Paul, in his description of them, +exhibits the strongest indications of a sound judgment. + +Such were the phenomena which the Apostle, and those to whom he wrote, +considered to be supernatural manifestations. I observe respecting them: + +First: That it is clear that when St. Paul wrote these Epistles, both he +and those whom he addressed were fully persuaded that certain supernatural +manifestations were then habitually present in the Church. It is +impossible to attribute this belief to the presence of the mythic or +legendary spirit. + +Secondly: It is clear from other statements in the Epistles, not only that +St. Paul firmly believed that he himself was endowed with several of these +supernatural gifts, but that he had been the means of imparting them to +others. + +Thirdly: If we consider the nature of some of these gifts, it is difficult +to conceive that a man like St. Paul could have been deceived respecting +their reality. Several of them involved accessions of mental power, as for +example the gift of wisdom, knowledge, and discerning of spirits. He must +have known that at one time he had nothing but his natural endowments. At +a later period he must have believed that his wisdom, knowledge, and power +of discerning character was increased. These must have been definite facts +of his mental consciousness. It is difficult to conceive how delusion was +possible, when in his treatment of the entire subject he displays such +clear indications of sound judgment and common sense. + +Fourthly: It is necessary to suppose not only that St. Paul was a prey to +delusion on this subject--if we deny that the gifts were real--but that a +similar delusion was spread over the entire Church. Its individual members +believed that they possessed them, no less than the Apostle. Those who +possessed only the lower gifts were emulously desirous of possessing the +higher ones. They also made an ostentatious use of them. Such are not the +phenomena presented by enthusiasm. Was it possible that considerable +numbers of persons should be deceived in supposing that they had acquired +particular mental endowments of which they well knew that they had been +previously destitute? + +Fifthly: While the phenomena under consideration were unquestionably +believed both by St. Paul and the Corinthian Church to be supernatural +manifestations, yet it is a supernaturalism which differs in its entire +aspect and character from any other which has been believed in by man. We +may wander over the entire regions of history and fable, and we shall fail +to find any belief in the supernatural, bearing the smallest resemblance +to it. It is most definitely contrasted with that which has been ascribed +to the contemporaries of our Lord; and which I have considered in the +earlier portions of this work. Whence has come this most striking +contrast? If St. Paul and the members of the Corinthian Church were a prey +to the superstitious beliefs above referred to, how was it possible for +them to have considered themselves to be living in the midst of an +atmosphere which presented so marvellous a contrast. The gifts, if real, +were precisely suited to the wants of the Church, for building it up into +the great institution which it became. It required accessions to its +numbers from the populations in the midst of which it lived. The two +miraculous gifts, even if they were not evidential, were fitted to draw +attention to its claims. Collected as its members were from Judaism and +Heathenism, without sufficient means for their definite instruction, those +who performed this office were qualified for it by two gifts conferring +various degrees of enlightenment. Then there was the prophet, who as an +inspired preacher expounded and enforced the truths of Christianity. Its +members were ill-qualified for public offices, owing to the low condition +of the society from which they sprang. Here again were two mental +endowments to supply the need, the power of discerning spirits and the +supernatural gift of faith. All these gifts here enumerated, were the very +endowments suited for the building up of a body of converts taken from +such unpromising sources, into the great society to which it speedily +grew. A new society had to be formed of a wholly different character from +any previously existing. It was designed to leaven by new influences the +state of religious, moral, and political thought out of which it +originated. The old social organization met it with determined opposition. +The problem was how was it to be erected on such a basis as would give it +permanence? The Church of Jesus Christ was to be a new moral creation in +the midst of effete society. An extensive communication of endowments, +such as are referred to in the Pauline Epistles, was the very thing which +was requisite to accomplish this purpose. It came into existence; it grew; +it struggled; it conquered; it subverted the old forms of civilization; it +created new ones. These are facts which require to be accounted for. The +forces referred to in these Epistles as in active energy before the eyes +of St. Paul and the members of these Churches, were adequate to have +effected this. Without some such moral creation attending the first +planting of Christianity, the formation of this unique society out of the +various elements of which it was composed, and their welding together into +an organization instinct with life, which has imbued with its principles +all existing institutions, must remain a problem which baffles all the +attempts of philosophy to solve. + +Lastly: These letters prove on the highest historical evidence that a +supernatural power was believed to be manifested in the Church at the date +of their composition, wholly different from any kind of ordinary current +supernatural belief. Through the Acts of the Apostles, its existence can +be traced up to a still earlier period. Two of these gifts, but two only, +involved a power which we should now designate as essentially miraculous. +This being so, the testimony of St. Paul, involving as it does that of the +entire Church, is express as to the belief of contemporaries that miracles +were actually performed. We can trace this belief up to the first origin +of Christianity. If Jesus was believed to have endowed His followers with +this power, it is impossible to believe that He was not supposed to have +possessed it himself. These Epistles therefore are evidence that the +earliest followers of Jesus believed that He was a worker of miracles. So +far the proof is complete that the ascription of miracles to Jesus and His +original followers was not due to the imagination of subsequent +generations. + +The careful perusal of these Epistles can leave only one impression on the +mind of the reader, that he is in the presence of facts of an +unquestionably historical character. + + + + + +CHAPTER XIX. THE EVIDENCE FURNISHED BY THE EPISTLES TO THE FACTS OF OUR +LORD'S LIFE, AND TO THE TRUTH OF THE RESURRECTION. + + +I have proved in the last chapter that St. Paul and those to whom he wrote +his Epistles firmly believed that a number of supernatural manifestations +were displaying themselves in the Church under their immediate +observation, and that their presence can be traced up to a much earlier +date. I have also shown that St. Paul asserts in the most positive +language that he was persuaded that he wrought miracles during the whole +course of his mission. It is therefore in the highest degree probable that +the servant was convinced that he did by the divine power of his Master +that which he believed that his Master had accomplished before him; in +other words, that he was a worker of miracles. But as it has been asserted +that St. Paul knew only of a divine, and scarcely anything of a human +Jesus, that is to say, that he was to a great extent ignorant of the +events of our Lord's life, I must inquire what light the Epistles throw on +this subject; for if it can be shown that St. Paul allowed himself to be +ignorant of the human life of Jesus, it lowers the value of his testimony +to the fact of the Resurrection. + +The ground of this affirmation is that the direct references to the events +of our Lord's life are few, and that he chiefly dwells on the glorified +aspect of it after His Resurrection. The only passage, as far as I am +aware, which has been adduced as proving this strange position is the +following:--"He died for all, that they which live should not henceforth +live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them and rose again. +Wherefore, henceforth know we no man after the flesh; yea, though we have +known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him no more. +Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are +passed away; behold all things are become new." 2 Cor. v. 15-17. The +utmost that this passage can be made to prove is, that the belief in the +Resurrection of Christ had thrown an entirely new aspect over His human +life. The persons who had witnessed it had not seen its true significance. +This is what the Synoptic Gospels plainly affirm to have been the case +even with the Apostles during His public ministry. They had witnessed the +events, but they had failed to penetrate into their inner life. This is +what the Apostle means by "knowing Christ after the flesh," _i.e._ +according to the uniform meaning of that expression in the New Testament, +the knowing the events of His life merely externally, as so many bare +objective facts devoid of spiritual significance. This he affirms would be +the mode in which neither he nor the Church would in future contemplate +this subject. The very words which he uses imply that he and others had +had this knowledge of Jesus. But such a knowledge would have been +impossible without an intimate acquaintance with the events of His human +life. What he affirms is, that he will contemplate them in future in their +moral and religions aspect. + +The affirmation that St. Paul was not thoroughly acquainted with the +details of our Lord's ministry, and that after his conversion he was +simply absorbed in the contemplation of a divine Christ is incredible. +When we are asked to accept a startling proposition, it is necessary that +it should not offend against the first principles of human nature. That a +man like St. Paul did not make accurate inquiries into the facts of his +Master's life is inconceivable. In his eyes His human was the +manifestation of His divine life. Did not the persecutor Saul thoroughly +inform himself respecting the life and actions of Him whose divine mission +he denied, and whom he believed to be an impostor? Was not this the +obvious course to take, in order to enable him to expose imposition, and +to destroy the Church? On the other hand, the converted Paul was animated +by a more intense love for Jesus than one man ever felt for another. Is it +conceivable that such love did not impel him to treasure up in his bosom +every reminiscence which fell within his reach, and to inquire with the +most profound interest into the life and actions of him who was become the +object of his adoration? Is it conceivable that the man who was +incessantly inquiring into the condition of his converts, made no inquiry +about the life and actions of his Master? + +The position of St. Paul, the ardour of his temperament, the fierceness of +his opposition, and the intense self-sacrifice with which he afterwards +consecrated himself to Jesus Christ, falling into communication as he must +with persons who had witnessed His earthly ministry, are sufficient proof +that the Apostle had used every available means of becoming acquainted +with the facts of His life. But in the Epistles themselves, although owing +to the circumstances which called them forth, they contain few direct +references to it, the indirect allusions are quite sufficient to prove +that St. Paul and those whom he addressed, were in possession of a number +of facts respecting their Master's life which formed the subject of a +common Christology. I am quite ready to admit that when the Apostle wrote, +none of our present Gospels were in existence. The converts had to receive +their instruction orally, or from short written memoranda. But instruction +of some kind they must have had. Without it, converts from Paganism could +have known nothing about Him to whom in the act of joining the Church they +professed allegiance; Jewish converts living in Gentile cities, but +little. As Christianity was not a mere body of dogmas, like a philosophy, +but consisted in direct adhesion to a person, it is clear that it could +not be propagated at all without at the same time communicating +information respecting His history. The early missionaries announced that +Jesus was the Christ. Such an announcement would have been meaningless +unless they had given an account of who Jesus was, what He had done to +claim the homage of those addressed, and what was the nature of His +office. These considerations establish the fact that an oral account of +His life must have been handed down in the Church prior to the publication +of written Gospels, sufficiently definite to constitute the Christianity +of the converts. The intimations contained in the Epistles prove that such +was the fact. + +First let us consider St. Paul's own positive assertions. The most +important is in 1 Cor. xv. "Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you +({~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}, I remind you of, or refresh your memories respecting) the Gospel +({~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}) which I preached unto you, which also ye have received, +and wherein ye stand; by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory +what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain. For I delivered +unto you first of all ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, as matter of prime importance) that +which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the +Scriptures; and that He was buried, and that He rose again the third day +according to the Scriptures." + +Let it be observed that the subject which the Apostle was here discussing +with certain members of this Church--the possibility of a resurrection of +the dead--led him to refer to the first principles of Christianity as he +had taught them. They denied the truth of a material resurrection. St. +Paul draws their attention to the fact that Christianity as taught by him +consisted of a body of facts. The following points are clearly deducible +from the passage before us. + +1. The {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, or message of good news, which the Apostle had +announced at his first preaching at Corinth, consisted of a body of facts +as distinct from mere doctrinal teachings; and that whatever doctrines he +taught were built on them as a foundation. + +2. Among the facts of prime importance which he announced, was the death, +burial, and resurrection of Christ. + +3. He states that in his preaching there were matters of prime importance, +of which Christ's death and resurrection was one. It follows therefore +that there were other matters of prime importance, which his present +argument did not require him to notice. This is obvious from the nature of +the case: the announcement of Christ's death and resurrection would have +been scarcely intelligible without the addition of a great many other +facts to give it meaning. But further, the assertion that there were facts +of prime importance, implies that there were also points of secondary +importance, which he must have announced likewise, or in other words, that +the Gospel which he proclaimed must have consisted of an account, more or +less full, of the human life of Jesus. + +4. This account the Apostle says that he delivered to the Corinthian +Church. The words imply that he committed it in a formal manner to their +keeping, as the ground of their Christian instruction. This he likewise +affirms that he had no less formally received. + +5. As his statement respecting the Resurrection is somewhat minute, the +inference is, that the other facts of prime importance were communicated +with equal detail. It is also fairly presumable that in his oral +communications the Apostle did not give a bare list of the appearances of +Jesus after his Resurrection, but a detailed account of them; and so with +respect to his other facts. This his converts would naturally have +required him to do, if we suppose that they were only animated by common +curiosity. The less important facts would be necessary to connect together +those of primary importance. In short, the Apostle's narrative must have +been what we may call a brief Gospel. + +6. As St. Paul states that one of the facts which he committed to the +Church was that Christ died for our sins, it follows that he must have +given an account of his death more or less resembling those in our present +Gospels. + +7. One of the great facts which he delivered to the Church, was that of +the Resurrection of Christ. This is the great miracle of Christianity; the +one to which it is expressly affirmed that the Church owes its being. The +Apostle's Gospel therefore contained a detailed account of one great +miracle. It is also fairly presumable that among his other facts of +primary or secondary importance were accounts of supernatural occurrences +in the life of Jesus. + +8. The Apostle does not leave us without the means of judging respecting +the amount of matter in these narratives of events in the life of Christ +which he committed to the Church. He has given us (in 1 Cor. xi. 23-25) a +formal account of the institution of our Lord's Supper, quite as full as +that contained in either of our Gospels. This account he prefaces by the +same words which we have already considered, as denoting the form or mode +in which he received it, and delivered it to the Church: "For I have +received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, that the Lord +Jesus the same night in which He was betrayed took bread; and when He had +given thanks He brake it, and said, Take, eat; this is My body which is +broken for you. This do in remembrance of Me. After the same manner also +He took the cup, when He had supped, saying, This cup is the New Testament +in My blood: this do ye as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me." This +account varies in words, but it is equal in minuteness, and substantially +agrees with those in our present Gospels; although it more nearly +approaches, while it is not precisely identical with that of Luke, who is +asserted in the Acts to have been the companion of the Apostle. Judging +therefore by this example, the historical details which St. Paul committed +to the Church respecting the life of Jesus must have been of considerable +minuteness. + +8. Another fact in the life of our Lord is directly referred to in these +letters, His descent from the family of David. "Who was made," says the +Apostle, "of the seed of David, according to the flesh, and declared to be +the Son of God with power according to the spirit of holiness, by the +resurrection from the dead." These words prove that St. Paul was in +possession of an account of the birth of Jesus, which in this particular +point was in agreement with that in St. Matthew's and St. Luke's Gospels, +and that it was known to the members of the Church at Rome, and received +by them as true. He does not positively affirm that the birth was +supernatural; but his language clearly implies it. It would be absurd in +speaking of an ordinary human birth to say that the person born was +descended from his ancestors, "according to the flesh." The natural +meaning of such an expression is that both the writer and those whom he +was addressing were well acquainted with an account of the supernatural +birth of Jesus, and accepted it as true. So far their accounts and that in +the Gospels agreed in the main issue. + +9. One more reference must be added: "Jesus Christ," says the Apostle, +"was made a minister of the circumcision for the truth of God, to confirm +the promises made unto the fathers; and that the Gentiles might glorify +God for His mercy." This passage not only proves that the Apostle and +those to whom he wrote were in possession of an account of the +circumcision of Christ, but also that they well knew that His ministry had +been confined to the Jewish people, but with the ultimate purpose of His +being manifested to the Gentiles. In these particulars it exactly +corresponded with the account given in our Gospels. + +10. There are also several passages in which the Apostle directly refers +to our Lord's teaching, and clearly distinguishes it from his own. These +references uniformly agree with that which is attributed to Jesus in the +Synoptic Gospels, and prove that the Apostle and the Church were in +possession of details of it. + +Such are the direct references to the life of Jesus in these Epistles. But +there are numerous indirect references which prove that the Apostle and +those to whom he wrote must have been acquainted with accounts of the life +of its Founder, which went into a considerable degree of detail. I shall +give a few instances: + +1. His preaching of the Gospel to the Thessalonians is described as a +proclamation that Jesus was the Christ or Messiah. In one of the Epistles +to this Church he speaks of them as having been so powerfully influenced +that in consequence of it "they had turned to God _from idols_ to serve +the living and true God," and "as having become _followers of him and of +the Lord_." Among persons thus utterly ignorant of Christianity, as they +were when he first preached to them, it would have been impossible to make +an announcement of this kind, or to set forth the Messianic claims of +Jesus, without laying before them a great many of the details of His human +life. The expression above quoted, implies clearly that he had put his +converts in possession of such an account of the life of Christ as to +enable them to become "followers of the Lord." + +2. These Epistles contain many definite assertions as to the duty of +imitating Christ. "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ;" "As many as have been +baptized into Christ have put on Christ;" "Let every one of us please his +brother for his good unto edification, for even so Christ pleased not +himself;" "The God of patience and consolation grant you to be like minded +one toward another, according to Christ Jesus;" "I beseech you by the +meekness and gentleness of Christ;" "Ye have not so learned Christ;" "Be +ye followers of me, as I am of Christ." Many other similar expressions +might be cited, but these are sufficient. + +First: I observe that the exhortation to put on the character of another +is meaningless, unless the persons so exhorted were known to have been +thoroughly acquainted with the life and actions of him whom they are urged +to imitate. The same observation is true when we are deliberately +recommended to make another person our example. Again, the exhortation to +lay ourselves out in efforts to please others for their good to +edification, on the ground that Christ pleased not himself, would be +without meaning, unless the writer felt assured that those whom he +addressed were in possession of facts in the life of Christ, which +exhibited Him in the character of a sacrificer of self. So again, the +exhortation to patience, after the example of Christ, is founded on the +assumption that those whom the Apostle was addressing were acquainted with +details which exhibited him as a model of patience. The same remark is +true with respect to the entreaty addressed to the Corinthians by the +meekness and gentleness of Christ. They must have been acquainted with +actions of His which exhibited Him as supremely meek and gentle. These and +other indirect references form an indisputable proof that the churches to +whom St. Paul wrote must have been in possession of a very considerable +number of details of the human life of Jesus, in which a large portion of +the instruction given to those Churches consisted. This imparts to them a +far higher value than if they had been direct. It is the mode universally +adopted in genuine letters, where the writer, and those to whom he writes, +are freely communicating to each other their inmost thoughts. When one +party is firmly persuaded that the other is well acquainted with a certain +set of events, they never detail them formally, but simply refer to them +in passing allusions. Such allusions are the strongest possible evidence +that the events in question are the common property of the writer and of +those whom he is addressing. + +The whole of these Epistles contain a continuous body of references to the +various aspects of our Lord's divine and human character as it is depicted +in the four Gospels. The references to the former are very numerous. They +contain a Christianity of so advanced a character as to resemble in all +its great features that which we read of in St. John's Gospel, and which +are only distinguishable from it, if distinguishable at all, by the aid of +minute criticism. I have treated this subject at length in another work in +reference to its evidential value, and therefore need not discuss it here. +I shall only observe that the incidental references in these Epistles to +these subjects form the strongest historical proofs that St. Paul and +those to whom he wrote were in possession of a sufficient number of facts +respecting the life of Jesus to enable them to found on them a definite +Christology; and that there must have been well known in the Churches a +general outline of His human life, which must have been to their members +as recent converts a subject of the profoundest interest. I fully admit +that if Paul and the early Christians, while centering their highest +affections on the glorified Christ, had been contented to remain in +ignorance of the facts of His human life, the value of their testimony to +the truth of the Resurrection would have been greatly weakened. But the +supposition is not only untrue to human nature, but is contradicted by the +facts of the Epistles, which it is impossible not to admit as documents of +the highest historical value. + +I will now proceed to examine the evidence which these Epistles afford to +the truth of the Resurrection. The references which they contain to this +great miracle of Christianity are extremely numerous, occurring in some +form or other in almost every page. Shall I not say that their entire +contents are written on the supposition of its reality? They are of the +most direct as well as of the most incidental character. They make it +clear that the belief in it lay at the foundation of the existence of the +Church; that it was that which was supposed to communicate its moral power +to Christianity, and that it was the source of the new spiritual life of +every individual believer. In the following passage St. Paul distinctly +pledges the truth of Christianity on the reality of the fact: "And if +Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also +vain; yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have +testified of God that he raised up Christ, whom he raised not up, if so be +that the dead rise not, ... and if Christ be not raised, your faith is +vain; ye are yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep in +Christ are perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are +of all men most miserable." (1 Cor. xv. 14, etc.) Whatever opinion may be +formed as to the genuineness of the other writings of the New Testament, +they give one consistent testimony that the belief in the Resurrection was +co-extensive with the Church, and constituted the only ground of its +existence. How could it be otherwise? The Church, as a community, was +founded on the belief of the personal Messiahship of Christ; a dead +Messiah would have been utterly worthless to it. Without a living Messiah +to form its centre the whole superstructure must collapse. + +The following are some of the most important points which these letters +prove as matters of fact respecting the Resurrection. + +First: That the belief in it was co-extensive with the entire Church. It +was not the belief of any single party in it, but of the whole community. + +This they establish on the most indisputable evidence. The existence of +various parties in the Church in direct opposition to St. Paul proves +beyond the possibility of contradiction that it was the one belief +respecting which there was not the smallest diversity of opinion. If these +parties had not existed, it might have been urged with some degree of +plausibility that the testimony of these letters was inconclusive, because +all the members of the Churches received servilely whatever St. Paul chose +to dictate. But as we have already seen, a powerful party existed in both +the Corinthian and Galatian Churches, who summarily rejected his claim to +apostolic authority, maintaining that the twelve were the only genuine +Apostles. Nevertheless, the Epistles make it clear that they must have +believed in the Resurrection quite as strongly as St. Paul did himself. + +Let us suppose for a moment that they doubted it. How is it conceivable +that St. Paul should have addressed to them such letters as those to the +Corinthians, abounding everywhere with both direct and incidental +allusions to it as an acknowledged truth and as the foundation of his +reasonings? Would anyone in his senses have thus exposed himself to +instant denunciation if he had supposed that there was the smallest doubt +respecting its reality in the minds of his opponents? Would they not at +once, if they had entertained it, have made short work with the Apostle +and his reasonings? But the point is almost too clear to need any +argument. + +In one of the passages where he is discussing with them the reality of his +apostleship he urges as the foundation of his claim to this office: "Have +not I seen Jesus Christ our Lord?" This reasoning is evidently founded on +the supposition that all the other Apostles professed to have seen Him; +and that none could have a valid claim to the office who had not seen Him. +But Paul could only have seen Christ after the Resurrection; and it was in +virtue of an appointment from the risen Jesus that he claimed to hold the +office. If there had been the smallest doubt in the minds of his opponents +as to the reality of the Resurrection, or if they had not been persuaded +that the Apostles, whose claims they set up against those of St. Paul, +affirmed that they had seen Him also, this would at once have settled the +controversy and covered the Apostle with confusion before the assembled +Church. + +But if this reasoning requires any additional confirmation, it is afforded +by the Epistle to the Galatians. The opposition leaders in this Church +were yet more hostile to St. Paul than those at Corinth. His denunciation +of them is very severe. They are described as "false apostles, deceitful +workers," and subverters of the Gospel. Yet in the very opening words of +his address to this Church in which he thus sharply denounces his +opponents, the Apostle writes: "Paul, an Apostle, not of man nor by man, +but by Jesus Christ, and God the Father _who raised him from the dead_." +Is it conceivable, I ask, that St. Paul should have used such language, +under such circumstances, in addressing this Church, unless he was +absolutely certain that his opponents accepted the Resurrection of Christ +as a fact? We shall see hereafter that these assertions and allusions of +the Apostle not only prove that the Resurrection was believed in by every +section of the Christian community at the time when he wrote these +letters, but that they enable us to carry up the date of this belief to +the very commencement of Christianity. + +Secondly: The Epistle to the Romans sets before us the state of this +belief in a Church which St. Paul had not visited. Of the exact date of +the foundation of this Church we have no record; but the entire contents +of the Epistle prove that it had been in existence for many years before +the Apostle addressed to them this letter. The general impression produced +by it is that this was one of the most important Christian communities +then in existence. We learn from it that among its members were persons +attached to the household of Nero. As the intercourse between Rome and +Judæa was very considerable, there can be no doubt that the Church +originated at an early period, either by Christian Jews visiting the +imperial city, or by Roman Jews visiting Judæa and having thus become +converted. At any rate its Christianity must have been derived from a +source entirely independent of St. Paul. The evidence afforded by this +Epistle as to the importance and universal prevalence of the belief in the +Resurrection, and to its early origin is conclusive. The allusions to it +are more numerous than in any other of St. Paul's Epistles. Most of them +are of an entirely incidental character, and their general nature proves +beyond the possibility of question that both the writer and those to whom +he wrote must have viewed the fact as the fundamental groundwork of +Christianity. The reference to a few passages will render this point +indubitable. + +An allusion of a most incidental character as forming the ground of the +writer's apostleship occurs in the very opening words of the Epistle: "And +declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of +holiness, _by the resurrection from the dead_; by whom we have _received +grace and apostleship_ for obedience to the faith among all nations for +his name." It is inconceivable that St. Paul should have thus addressed a +body of strangers, at the very commencement of his letter, unless he had +been certain that they accepted this belief as an unquestionable fact. + +Besides several references in the intermediate chapters, there are three +allusions to it in the sixth chapter of the most incidental character, in +which the belief in the Resurrection is directly connected with baptism, +and affirmed to lie at the very foundation of Christianity, and to be the +divine power exhibited in the renewed Christian life. "Know ye not that as +many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into his +death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death, that like +as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even we +also should walk in newness of life. For if we have been planted together +in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his +resurrection: knowing this, that our old man is crucified with him, that +the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve +sin. For he that is dead is freed from sin. Now if we be dead with Christ, +we believe we shall also live with him: knowing that Christ being raised +from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over him. For in +that He died, He died unto sin once; but in that He liveth, He liveth unto +God. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but +alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord." + +It is impossible to read this passage without feeling that it is +conclusive of the question before us: the whole community to whom it was +addressed must have accepted the Resurrection as a fact, and that +acceptance must have been contemporary with the very commencement of their +Christianity. A portion of the baptismal rite to which they had all +submitted was viewed by them as symbolical of their Master's death: the +other portion, of His Resurrection. His death and resurrection were +considered by them as setting forth their cessation from their old habits, +principles and character, in which they had lived as Jews or Pagans; and +their entrance into that new moral life into which they were brought by +Christianity. The Apostle directly appeals to the recollection of those +whom he is addressing, to say whether it was not a certain fact that their +entire Christianity, including all its moral influence, centered in this +truth. His words therefore carry this belief up to the first origin of +this Church. They go, moreover, a step further, and involve the belief and +testimony of those by whom its first members had been converted. + +But further: the Apostle, throughout this chapter, speaks of the +Resurrection of Christ as being the great moral and spiritual power of +Christianity. The members of the Church had entered on a new moral and +religious life. They had died to their former sinful habits and practices. +They were living to God, and were reaping the fruits of holiness instead +of receiving the wages of sin. That these facts were true, the Apostle +appeals to their consciousness to witness. Was this a fact or was it not? +It would have been impossible for St. Paul to write in this manner unless +he had been assured that those to whom he wrote thought so. This power had +for its centre the belief in the Resurrection of Christ. It was caused by +their connection with Him as a living person to whom all their regards +were due. + +It is impossible to have stronger historical evidence that this belief was +esteemed by the Church to be fundamental to Christianity when this letter +was written. I shall therefore only quote two more passages as showing the +purely incidental character of the allusions:-- + +"Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? It is God that +justifieth; who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, yea rather, +that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh +intercession for us. Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?" (Rom. +viii. 38, &c.) Again: "He that regardeth the day regardeth it unto the +Lord; and he that regardeth not the day, to the Lord he doth not regard +it. He that eateth, eateth to the Lord, for he giveth God thanks; and he +that eateth not, to the Lord he eateth not, and giveth God thanks. For +none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we +live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord.... +For to this end Christ both died and rose, and revived, that He might be +Lord both of the dead and living." It is impossible that any words could +make it clearer than these do that the belief in the Resurrection formed +the centre of the daily life of Christians at the time when the Apostle +was writing. The Christian was a man who was consecrated to the service of +Christ as to a living person, who had a right to his supreme regard. + +It is therefore established beyond the possibility of a doubt that the +belief in the Resurrection of Christ was universal in the Church when St. +Paul wrote these letters, _i.e._ within less than thirty years after the +event. At this period of time the traditional recollection of it, +according to the principles laid down by Sir G. C. Lewis, would have +formed the best material for history. All the other writings of the New +Testament, whatever be their supposed date, give a uniform testimony in +complete agreement with this. One of them demands a special notice--the +book of Revelation. + +Unbelievers do not dispute that this is a contemporaneous document, the +work of the Apostle John, and freely use it to support their own theories +as to the intensity of the opposition between the Jewish Apostles and St. +Paul. I am quite sensible that a book which is professedly an apocalypse +must be used with caution as an historical document, or we may fall into +numerous errors in drawing inferences from obscure allusions contained in +visions. But if there is one point more than another which this book makes +clear, it is the strength of the author's belief in the Resurrection of +Jesus. The frequent allusions to it, and to Jesus as being the Christ, put +this beyond all dispute. We have here the testimony of a book which +unbelievers concur in considering to have been composed not later than a +year after the death of Nero, and allow it to be the one solitary writing +in the New Testament composed by one of the twelve Apostles. + +According to the opinions of the opponents of the historical character of +the Gospels, St. John was the most Judaizing of the original apostles of +Christ. Of this they think that they discern very distinct traces in the +book of Revelation. His opposition to St. Paul was in their opinion +extreme; and they think that he is actually referred to in the second and +third chapters as teaching the Jewish Christians to apostatize. To discuss +the truth or falsehood of these opinions can form no portion of the +present work; but it is plain that in either case we cannot have a more +unexceptionable witness. If these views are correct, the Apostle may be +considered as the spokesman of the Jewish Christians. At any rate he was +one of the original followers of Jesus. Now there is no book in the New +Testament which testifies more strongly to the completeness of the belief +in the Resurrection of Christ, and of His continued Messianic life in the +heavenly world. The writer had conversed with Him before His crucifixion. +The vision is to a considerable extent a description of His resurrection +life. + +This testimony alone carries with it the belief of the primitive Church at +Jerusalem, and proves that on this point at least they and St. Paul were +at one. This his Epistles place beyond the possibility of question. The +parties in opposition were beyond all doubt Judaizing Christians. +According to those against whom I am reasoning, they represented the +opinions and claimed to act under the authority of St. James and the +Church at Jerusalem. But as these Judaizing teachers were at one with Paul +about the fact of the Resurrection, it follows that the leaders of that +Church concurred with him in opinion also. If their opposition was as +strenuous as has been attested, if there had been any difference between +St. Paul and the twelve on so fundamental a point, it is impossible that +they could have avoided adducing it to the Apostle's prejudice. + +The strength of St. Paul's assurance, that there was no diversity of +opinion in the Church respecting this fact is remarkably illustrated by a +passage in 1 Cor. xv. Had it not been so, his reasoning would have been +simply absurd. There were persons in that Church who denied the fact of a +future Resurrection. Yet they must have admitted the truth of the +Resurrection of Christ. This is clear from the following words:--"If there +be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen." The reply to +this argument is so obvious that it could not have escaped the dullest +apprehension; if those who denied the reality of a future resurrection of +the dead had entertained the smallest doubt as to the Resurrection of +Christ, they would have had nothing to do but to affirm that the fact was +doubtful, and the whole argument would fall to pieces. On the contrary, +however, St. Paul thought that they were so fully persuaded of the truth +of Christ's Resurrection, that he could safely use the fact to prove the +possibility of that future resurrection which they denied. It is clear, +that unless the belief was of the firmest character, no logical position +could be more dangerous than this line of argument. + +The Epistle to the Romans establishes the same conclusion. The belief of +this Church in the Resurrection as the fundamental fact of Christianity +can be traced up, as I have already observed, not only to the commencement +of their own Christianity, which was palpably of many years' standing, but +even to the birth of Christianity itself. Of this, one brief incidental +allusion offers decisive proof: "Salute," says St. Paul, "Andronicus and +Junia, my kinsmen, and my fellow-prisoners, who were of note among the +Apostles, who were also in Christ before me." + +This passage makes the following points clear. Andronicus and Junia were +converted to Christianity before St. Paul, _i.e._ within less than ten +years from the date of the Crucifixion. They must therefore have been +members of the Jerusalem Church. They were of note among the Apostles. +This expression cannot mean less than that they were highly esteemed by +the original twelve, and by the leaders of the Church at Jerusalem. Yet +the Apostle wrote this Epistle in the fullest confidence that they would +accept his Christology, including his account of the Resurrection. This +proves that both they and the Church at Jerusalem, including all its chief +leaders, accepted the Resurrection as a fact within a very short interval +after its supposed date. But it does more: it proves that its importance +as vital to Christianity was fully recognized; or, in other words, it +proves that the belief must have been contemporaneous with the origin of +the Church. + +Equally decisive is the proof afforded by the Epistle to the Galatians. It +mentions two visits which the writer made to Jerusalem. One in which he +paid Peter a visit of fifteen days, during which time he communicated with +James. On the second occasion he went up to Jerusalem as a member of an +embassy from the Church at Antioch, for the purpose of settling points +under dispute between the Jewish and Gentile converts. On this occasion he +tells us that he had a formal interview with the leaders of the Jewish +Church, of which Peter, James, and John were esteemed the pillars. He +expressly informs us that he communicated to them the leading points of +the Gospel which he preached among the Gentiles; and that he received from +them the right hand of fellowship, which can only mean that they +sanctioned his views and fundamental principles. It is true that the +Resurrection is not expressly mentioned as one of these; but it is +impossible that the statement that he communicated his Gospel to them can +be true, if this was not one of the facts which he imparted to them. + +It is a very important fact, and worthy of special notice, that in the +account given in the Epistle to the Corinthians of the appearances of +Jesus after His Resurrection, St. Paul expressly affirms that the risen +Jesus was seen by Peter and by James; the latter appearance being +mentioned nowhere else: and the former only referred to in the exclamation +which greeted Cleopas and his companion on their return from Emmaus. It +seems, therefore, morally certain that St. Paul had heard an account of +these two appearances from the Apostles in question. If so, it brings us +directly into contact with two of the most important of the apostolic +body, who must have believed that they had actually seen him. Respecting +the belief of St. John, the third pillar of the Church at Jerusalem, the +testimony of the book of Revelation leaves no room for doubt. These +writings enable us to affirm that three of the original Apostles believed +that they had seen Jesus, risen from the dead. It is evident, therefore, +that this brings us into the presence of historical evidence of the first +order, quite independently of the affirmations of the Gospels. + +If the first Epistle of St. Peter is genuine (and there is nothing but +surmises and _à priori_ assumptions about the opposition of his views to +those of St. Paul on which the doubts respecting its genuineness are +based) then we have the affirmation of the fulness of his belief in the +Resurrection under his own hand. Besides the strong external testimony +that it was written by St. Peter, there is one proof of its genuineness +which is almost conclusive, and to which sufficient weight has not been +attached by either the defenders or the opponents of Christianity. It is +hardly possible to read this Epistle carefully without feeling that the +writer of it is the same man as the Peter of the Gospels; the one being +separated from the other by a considerable interval of time; the Peter of +the Epistle being in fact a mellowed form of the Peter of the Gospels. But +this has not only a direct bearing on the evidence of the Resurrection, +but also a most important one, which I shall notice hereafter, on the +historical character of the Gospels themselves. + +One more writing of the New Testament must be alluded to, because whoever +was its author it belongs to a school of thought distinct from the other +writings of the New Testament. I need hardly say that I allude to the +Epistle to the Hebrews. The testimony of this writing to the fact that the +belief in the Resurrection of Jesus was fundamental to Christianity is no +less decisive; it not only proves what were the individual opinions of the +writer, but of the school of Christian thought for whom it was intended. +It affords abundant proof that the writer knew that their opinions on the +subject were entirely in accordance with his own. + +I have now shown on the strongest historical evidence that it is +impossible that the belief in the Resurrection can have grown up slowly +and only succeeded in gradually establishing itself. On the contrary, I +have proved that it was coeval with the birth of the Church, and that it +formed the one sole ground of its existence. I have also proved that the +belief in it was universal, and that it was accepted by the entire +Christian community without distinction of party; and that their belief +can be traced up as the sole cause of the renewed life of the Church after +the crucifixion. I shall consider in the following chapter the bearing of +these facts on the truth of the Resurrection, and show that the facts +before us are inconsistent with any other supposition but that of its +objective occurrence, and that it is impossible to account for it by any +theory which endeavours to explain it on the supposition that the belief +originated in the credulity and enthusiasm of the followers of Jesus. + + + + + +CHAPTER XX. THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST AN HISTORICAL FACT. + + +I have proved in the preceding chapter, on the testimony of the highest +order of historical evidence:-- + +1. That the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus was universal in the +Church when St. Paul wrote these Epistles. + +2. That this belief was held by every section in the Church, by the +strongest opponents no less than by the admiring friends of St. Paul. + +3. That the Churches holding this belief were separated from each other by +a wide geographical area, and consisted of a great diversity of character, +thereby affording the greatest obstacle to the spreading of an absurd +story. + +4. That these Churches did not merely accept the Resurrection as a bare +fact, but that they considered that their existence as communities was +based on its truth. + +5. That they viewed the fact of the Resurrection not only as the great +bond of union, but as the source of the moral power of the Christianity +which they professed, and fully believed that their acceptance of it had +exercised a mighty influence in turning them from the low and debasing +pursuits of their previous life. + +6. That their belief in the Resurrection was closely bound up with all the +pursuits of their daily life. + +7. That these Epistles not only afford indisputable proof that this state +of things existed in the Churches within less than twenty-eight years +after the crucifixion, but they no less clearly show that the earliest +Christian communities, such as the Churches of Antioch and Jerusalem, +entertained similar beliefs. + +8. That it is an unquestionable historical fact that the belief in the +Resurrection was co-eval with the restored life of the Church which had +been extinguished by the crucifixion. + +9. That the three pillar Apostles of the Church of Jerusalem believed that +they had seen Jesus after His Resurrection, and that the entire body +entertained a similar opinion. + +10. That as late as A.D. 57 or 58 more than 250 persons were still living +who believed that they had seen Jesus after His Resurrection; and that +originally more than five hundred persons entertained a similar +persuasion. + +Such are plain facts of history. The question now before us is, how are +they to be accounted for? Only three possible alternatives present +themselves. Either: + +Some of the followers of Jesus must have fancied that they saw Him risen +from the dead, and have communicated this delusion to the rest. Or: + +That He did not actually die, when He was supposed to have done so; and +that His subsequent appearance, when partially recovered, was mistaken for +a resurrection. Or: + +That He rose from the dead in veritable reality, and was seen by His +followers, and conversed with them. + +I omit another possible supposition, that the belief in the Resurrection +was due to a deliberate fraud, because no one capable of appreciating +moral or historical evidence ventures to affirm it. The idea that the +greatest and purest of human institutions can owe its origin to a +deliberate imposture is a libel on human nature. + +Around one or other of these alternatives the contest lies. It is useless +to attempt to becloud the question with a number of barren and indefinite +generalities, such as myths and legends, vague charges of enthusiasm, +fanaticism, and credulity, or general assertions of developments brought +about by a succession of compromises between hostile parties. We are here +in the presence of stern historical facts, which require a clear and +definite solution. The Christian Church exists as a fact. We can trace it +up to its first origin. It asserts that its existence is due to the +Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and to nothing else. If unbelievers affirm +that the fact is false, they are bound to offer some theory which is true +to human nature, and lies within the possibilities of things, to show us +how this belief originated, and how it was able to consolidate the life of +this new community. + +The idea that the greatest moral power which has ever appeared among +mankind has had no other origin than a baseless delusion is supremely +melancholy. That Christianity has been such a moral power will be disputed +by few; and a large number of unbelievers will allow that notwithstanding +the faults which they attribute to it, nothing has equally contributed to +the civilization and elevation of the race. Yet if it be a delusion, it +must be recognised as such, and we must submit to our hard fate. Still it +is a terrible proposition to realize, that the noblest of human +institutions has originated in a lie, even if it be one which was not +deliberately intended as such. + +It is evident that however great may be the general credulity of mankind, +it is a very difficult matter to get any number of men to accept as a fact +the assertion that a person who has actually died has returned again to +bodily life. Such a belief will only be effected by the production of +evidence which, if not true, is at all events in the highest degree +plausible. This, as I have already observed, is fully established by the +history of the past, for however numerous the narratives of marvellous +occurrences may be, whether in histories or fictions, it is next to +impossible to find reports of beliefs in the actual occurrence of a +resurrection, or even in the possibility of one prior to that of Jesus +Christ. Now St. Paul's conversion cannot be dated later than within ten +years of the crucifixion; most probably it was earlier. It is clear that, +prior to his conversion, communities of Jewish Christians must have +existed in considerable numbers--in such numbers, in fact, as to raise his +wrath and indignation to the highest point. The spirit of persecution is +aroused by a sense of danger. It is clear, therefore, from the fact of the +persecution, that the persons in power saw danger from the progress of the +new sect, and that its numbers most have been considerable. From St. +Paul's testimony, it is also certain that Christianity had spread at least +to one place beyond Judæa. The inference, therefore, seems irresistible +that in the period which elapsed between the crucifixion and St. Paul's +conversion, the number of the believers in the Resurrection of Jesus had +increased to several thousands. Those, therefore, against whom I am +reasoning, cannot help admitting that an interval of eight or ten years is +a very short one for the conversion of such a large number of persons to +the belief that a man who had been publicly executed, in the very city in +which many of them lived, had been restored to life. + +It is impossible that this belief could have been entertained by only a +few solitary individuals who treasured it up secretly in their bosoms. On +the contrary, the conditions of the case prove that it must have spread +rapidly. It was not sufficient for the creation of the Church that a few +solitary enthusiasts should believe that their Master was risen from the +dead, but it was necessary that the Society, which Jesus had formed in his +life-time, should be immediately reorganized on the basis of this belief. +The belief in the Messiahship of Jesus constituted the original bond of +union. A dead Messiah was, in the eyes of a Jew, an absurdity; still more +so one who had been publicly crucified. With the death of Jesus, +therefore, the bond of union among His followers must have been severed. +Unless the Church was to perish in His grave, it was absolutely necessary +that it should be re-constructed on the basis of His renewed life. The +slowness with which any large number of even credulous people will accept +the fact of a resurrection from the dead, must have formed an obstacle, +the force of which it is impossible to over-estimate. Yet the work was +done, and, within a period of seven or eight years, the belief had spread +so widely that its adherents could be numbered by thousands. The truth of +the Resurrection, founded on the direct testimony of a considerable number +of persons who had had sufficient opportunity of testing it by the +evidence of their senses, would fully account for the rapid growth of the +belief. If, however, it originated in the brain of one or two crazed +fanatics, if the belief of so prodigious an event could propagate itself +at all, a considerable interval of time was absolutely necessary for its +doing so. The memory of the Crucifixion was fresh and recent. What would +have been the natural effect of announcing the fact of His Resurrection? +Incredulity! What has become of His body? Why does He not appear to His +former friends? The strangeness of the event must have prompted even the +most credulous to make some inquiry about the matter, and the inquiry must +have dissipated the delusion. Such a belief could only readily propagate +itself after recent memories had grown dim, and a long interval of time +had elapsed, sufficient for the Founder of Christianity to become +surrounded with a halo of imaginary glory. + +Let us now consider the position in which the followers of Jesus must have +found themselves on the night of the Crucifixion, and during the following +days. Their hopes had been based on Him as the Messiah, who was to reign +in the kingdom promised by the prophets; and they expected important +places in that kingdom as the reward of their fidelity. These hopes must +have been annihilated. The Messiah whom they expected to reign had +perished at the hands of His enemies. What was to be hoped for more? Many +could not help thinking that he had been a self-deceiver, if not an +impostor. Was there any ground for hoping that He could be raised from the +dead? Many of the prophets of the ancient Church had perished by the +authority of former governments, or by the violence of the mob. But God +had never interfered to vindicate the cause of one of them by raising him +from the dead. The utmost that He had done was to raise up some new +prophet to take his place. But this man was more than a prophet--he was the +Messiah. Did not all the old prophets promise Him a kingdom and a glory +and a mighty triumph? Yet He had been cut off by His enemies, instead of +triumphing over them; and His dead body was silent in the grave. Any hint +that the Gospels allege Jesus to have given His followers of His own +Resurrection is, according to the theory of those with whom I am +reasoning, a late invention. On the days, therefore, which followed the +Crucifixion, the Church must have presented the stillness of death, broken +only by a few utterances of loving despair. + +But the Church did not perish; it set itself to the work of +reconstruction. It expanded and grew. Within the space of eight years +after the Crucifixion, the believers in the Resurrection could be numbered +by thousands. This is an indisputable fact. Again it expanded and grew, +and it never ceased to grow until in less than three hundred years after +the public execution of its Founder by the authority of the Roman +government, one of its professed adherents mounted the imperial throne, +and found its strength sufficient to enable him to make it one of the +institutions of the State. These facts are without a parallel in history. +How are they to be accounted for? The followers of Jesus affirmed that +their Master rose from the dead; and that He thus resumed His place as the +Messiah of His Church. Unbelievers, in the face of the evidence before us, +cannot deny that the great body of His followers must have believed that +He had done so within the short interval of a few months after His public +execution. Our documents on this point are distinct and definite. They +affirm that He was not only seen but handled by many of His disciples +after His Resurrection, that He ate with them, and that they had +interviews with Him individually and collectively. I must now examine the +alternative positions; and first, that His supposed appearances were +delusions of the imagination. + +The loose and general affirmation has been made that the followers of +Jesus were so enthusiastically attached to Him that the idea of His death +was simply unbearable, and that they attempted to get rid of the fact by +supposing that He had risen from the dead. + +I reply first: that all such general statements are worthless. We have +specific facts before us; and these can only be accounted for by facts +which are equally definite, and not mere fancies. The assertion before me +is not only a bare supposition without one atom of evidence to rest upon, +but it contradicts all the known facts of the case. So far is it from +having been the case that the disciples were in such a state of +enthusiastic exultation, that our own documents inform us that they had +fallen into the lowest state of despondency. + +But further: when a theory is propounded to account for an historical +fact, the possibility of the supposition must be supported by some +analogous cases in the history of man, more or less resembling it. All +theories which are devoid of this support are worthless as history. Let +those, therefore, who would urge this on our acceptance as an account of +the origin of the greatest event in history, show that something like it +has occurred in the records of the past. Let them show us one instance of +a body of men whose enthusiasm for their leader was so great that, when he +had been put to death by the authority of the government of the country, +they got over this by fancying that he had been raised from the dead, and +then took to persuading others of its truth. The enthusiasm of followers +for their leaders has urged them to form plots, and even to make attempts +to rescue them from the hands of their enemies. Such enthusiasm, however, +is not even hinted at in the case of the disciples of Christ. No whisper +of tradition has reached us that any of them formed a plot, or made a +solitary attempt to rescue their Master. Are we then to believe that they +imagined a resurrection to repair the damage of His Crucifixion? Such +imaginative conceits would never have made a single convert to their +story. They left their Master to perish in His agony, and when He had +expired under the hands of His executioners, restored Him to an ideal life +by imagining that He was risen from the dead. Such fictions may be safely +dismissed without further notice. + +Secondly: Let us suppose that some one of His disciples thought that he +actually saw Him, and in the height of his enthusiasm converted a fancy +into a fact; and persuaded the other disciples that He was risen from the +dead: that these too, in turn, were wrought up into so high a state of +enthusiasm that they likewise fancied that they saw Him: thus the delusion +spread. I reply:-- + +First: As I have already observed, we are entitled to demand that some +analogous case should be adduced before we can be rationally asked to +accept such theories as to the solution of an unquestionable historical +fact. Surely, if such are the workings of human nature under influences so +general as enthusiasm and credulity, some similar occurrence must be no +uncommon event in history. Let one therefore be adduced. + +Secondly: Nothing is easier to affirm than that some credulous and +enthusiastic follower of Jesus mistook a fancy of his imagination for a +fact, thought that he had seen Him alive, and communicated his enthusiasm +to the rest. Whatever may be said as to the possibility in fits of +enthusiasm of a few half-crazy fanatics mistaking fancies for facts, it is +clear that to communicate this enthusiasm to others is a very difficult +undertaking, especially when they are in a depressed state of mind. As I +have already shown, it is in the highest degree difficult, if not +impossible, to persuade even very credulous persons of the occurrence of +an actual resurrection, as all history and fiction prior to the Advent +testify. A case of a person who professed to have seen, touched, +conversed, and eaten with one who was raised from the dead is not on +record. The belief in ghost stories and apparitions of the departed is to +be met with at every turn. Sorcery professed to be able to bring departed +spirits from the under-world, but it never attempted to restore to life a +body which once was dead. + +Between these two classes of facts the distinction is most important. The +enthusiasm or credulity which easily creates the one belief, refuses to +accept the other. What we have to account for in this case is, not that +some imaginative follower thought that he had seen the spirit of the +crucified Jesus, come from the under-world to make a communication to his +followers, and that the other disciples credulously accepted the report: +but that the appearance was that of his body restored to the functions of +animal life--in one word, a _Resurrection_, able to repair the damage which +had been occasioned by his Crucifixion. + +But for the purpose of arguing the question we must suppose that some one +of the enthusiastic followers of Jesus fancied that he saw Him after His +death, and mistook that fancy for a fact. I own that it is very difficult +even to assume the existence of enthusiasm in the present instance, +because all the known facts as well as the conditions of the case prove +that whatever enthusiasm had once existed, it was at a very low ebb on the +morning of the supposed Resurrection. Still, however, the assumption must +be made, or argument will be impossible. As one enthusiast will be as good +as another, let us assume that our supposed enthusiast was Mary Magdalene, +who went early to the sepulchre, found the stone gone, saw the gardener in +the dim light, mistook him for Jesus, and went and told her friends that +she had seen Him risen from the dead: or to put the case more simply, that +her excited brain created some spectral illusion; and that under its +influence she thought she saw Him, and proceeded to convey the report to +her friends. + +It at once strikes us as most unaccountable that, enthusiastic as she must +have been, she did not do something to assure herself of the reality of +the bodily presence of her Master. It was hard even for an enthusiast to +believe that it was He. If she had spoken, and it was the gardener, she +would have been at once cured of her delusion. If she had attempted to +embrace Him and it had been a phantom, the same result would have +followed. Surely the intensity of her love, however credulous or fanatical +she might be, would not have allowed her to leave the spot without some +suitable demonstration. Equally incredible is it that she should have left +Him, without inquiring whither He intended to betake Himself, or obtaining +the promise of some future meeting at which His disconcerted friends might +see Him. However enthusiastic she may have been, it is simply untrue to +human nature, that she should have thought that her much loved Master had +appeared to her in bodily reality, and that she should neither have spoken +to Him, touched Him, nor endeavoured to ascertain the place of His +proposed retreat, nor what His intentions were about the future. If she +had done any of these things, it would have dissipated her delusions. + +Let us suppose, however, that all these difficulties do not exist, and +that she is gone to publish among the friends of Jesus that she had seen +Him risen from the dead. His death had proved to them a stunning blow; but +let us suppose that they were still eagerly desirous of the occurrence of +something which might renew their old faith in their Master's Messiahship. +It is clear that nothing short of a belief in His resurrection could have +accomplished this. Yet however desirous they may have been of His return +to life, they were confronted with the stern fact that He had been +publicly executed, and that the credulity of the past had not succeeded in +restoring dead men to life. Their despondency occasioned by the events of +the last three days was extreme. Let us suppose that Mary Magdalene rushes +in with the announcement: "I have seen the Lord,--the tomb is empty,--He is +risen from the dead." However desirous they might be that the news should +be true, it is evident that such an announcement must have filled the +minds of even the most credulous with astonishment. What! not the +apparition of His departed spirit, but a bodily reality, the very man +himself? Is it possible that none of them suspected that it was the dream +of an enthusiastic woman? Is it conceivable that men or women, +passionately attached to their Master, asked her no questions about the +interview; what He had said to her; where He was to be found? Some replies +to these and kindred questions were inevitable; and unless they were +distinct and satisfactory, the rising enthusiasm must have been checked. +Is it true to human nature that the most enthusiastic credulity could have +accepted these things as facts, or that the dead Jesus could have +straightway assumed His place of Messianic dignity in their minds, if He +had made no appointment where He could meet His friends; or if that +appointment was created by the imagination of the Magdalene, but when +tested by the attempt to see him, it proved a delusion? + +But even credulity, when united with profound love and attachment to a +departed friend, must have some farther satisfaction than a fancied sight. +If the disciples, in the height of their enthusiasm, imagined that they +saw Him, they surely would have spoken to Him. Could they have helped +embracing Him on his return to life after His cruel sufferings and +ignominious death? Above all, what about the future? Was He going to teach +again in public? Was He not going to bring confusion on His enemies? Was +He actually going to retire from public view out of their way? And if He +did so, what about His Messianic claims? Who was to head the party for the +future? Could they have no secret interviews with Him? If He henceforth +retired into obscurity, what announcement were His friends to make to His +opponents? The most fanatical enthusiasts must have asked some of these +questions. + +Either no answer was returned, and the delusions must have been +immediately dispelled; or the enthusiasm which generated a phantom, and +mistook it for a reality, invented an answer likewise. Any reply which +fell short of a promise to appear for the future at their head, and either +convince or confound His adversaries, must have extinguished their belief +in His Messiahship. They either fancied they saw Him again, or they did +not. If the former was the case, they must have had repeated interviews, +all created by the imagination, at which something definite must have been +supposed to have passed sufficient to establish the belief that He was a +Messiah returned to them from the grave. If His old Messianic character +had ceased, some definite plan must have been propounded of the mode in +which He was going to enter on a new one. If, however, we accept the +alternative that He saw them no more, we shall possibly be told that His +followers accounted for His absence by imagining that He had for a time +been taken up into heaven, whence He was shortly coming again to destroy +His enemies. But in that case it must have been a cruel blow to +enthusiastic love. What! their much loved Master, for whom they had +sacrificed their all, to afford them one mute interview after His +resurrection, immediately to go into heaven, and leave them without a +head, exposed to the assaults of the opponents who had murdered Him? + +But let us imagine all these difficulties got over, and that they fancied +that they caught one solitary glimpse of Him, and that He was taken up +into heaven, whence He would come again to revive His sinking cause. Was +He to return in a few days, or months, or years? If the days became +months, and the months years, what was to be done with the Church in the +meantime? Was it to organize itself? If so, on what new basis? Was it to +confront His foes? Was it to make converts; or quietly to await His +return? If the latter, as months and years passed away, the Church must +have simply died of inanition, and we should have heard no more of +Christianity. If the former hypothesis be preferred, then it is plain that +His followers must have determined to start His Messiahship on a new +basis. But what was this? How was it to be propounded to the world? How +were His other disciples to be persuaded to accept it? Instead of an +earthly, the Church for the future must be headed by a heavenly Messiah, +who was coming at some future day to take vengeance on His foes. Such a +change of tactics must have been resolved upon, and that speedily; the +whole plan must have been conceived and executed by a few credulous +enthusiasts, or the belief in the Messiahship of Jesus must have been +extinguished in His grave. + +But further; the necessity of converting the other disciples to this +belief was most urgent; for until this could be done, the society was +dissolving into its individual elements. How was it to be accomplished? It +is easy to say that these enthusiasts communicated their enthusiasm to the +rest. But this little sentence conceals behind it whole mountains of +difficulty. Every one to which I have already alluded, must have had to be +surmounted in each individual case. There must have been many other +disciples who dearly loved their Master. What must have been their +feelings on hearing that He had appeared to only four or five of them, and +had gone up into heaven? What! He, whom we loved, who dearly loved us, +risen from the dead, and gone to heaven without affording us the +consolation of a parting interview? Such a thought was enough to chill all +ordinary enthusiasm. Was His mother one of those who fancied they saw Him +come again from the grave? If she was, could she have been mistaken? If +she did not see Him, what must have been her feelings at the thought that +He had left the world, without allowing her to behold Him? What would have +been the feelings of the women, whose beneficence had contributed to His +support, or of His intimate friends among the Apostles? Surely all these +would have thought it more certain that their companions' report +originated in a heated imagination, than that Jesus should have acted +thus. + +But the idea that a few fanatics only fancied that they saw Jesus alive +after His Crucifixion is negatived by an historical fact distinctly +affirmed by St. Paul in the face of his opponents in the Corinthian +Church. Having mentioned His appearance to Peter and the twelve, St. Paul +asserts: "After that, He was seen of above five hundred brethren at once, +of whom the greater part remain unto this present, but some are fallen +asleep." + +Here then we are in possession of direct contemporaneous testimony. This +assertion is boldly made in the face of the powerful party who denied St. +Paul's apostleship. It is clear that if they had not believed in the truth +of his assertion, they would not have lost such an opportunity of throwing +discredit upon him by convicting him of falsehood. The Apostle affirms in +the presence of his adversaries that there were then living more than 250 +persons who believed that they had seen Jesus Christ after He had risen +from the dead; and not only so, but that upwards of 500 persons had seen +Him on one and the same occasion. If this assertion was false, nothing was +easier than for the opponents of the Apostle to refute it. + +On the supposition, therefore, that the belief in the Resurrection +originated in a delusion, it must have been one on a prodigiously large +scale. Unless St. Paul, and the opposing section of the Corinthian Church, +who must have represented the opinions of the Church at Jerusalem, were +misinformed on this subject, it is necessary to frame an hypothesis which +shall not only account for three or four fanatics, fancying that they saw +Jesus Christ alive, when it was nothing but the creation of a disordered +imagination, but for the fact that more than five hundred persons laboured +under a similar delusion. The assertion of the Apostle is express, not +that more than five hundred persons were persuaded to believe that some +others had seen Jesus Christ after He was risen from the dead, but that +they had actually seen Him themselves. + +The only way of evading the force of this testimony is either by directly +impugning St. Paul's veracity, or by supposing that he made an assertion +based on a vulgar rumour. The whole character of the Apostle renders the +supposition of a deliberate falsehood incredible, besides the danger +already alluded to of certain detection by his opponents. Nor is the other +alternative more tenable, that on such a subject he adopted a mere idle +rumour. No subject more occupied his mind than the Resurrection of Jesus +Christ. For Him he sacrificed everything. To Him he devoted his entire +life. Is it conceivable that such a man would not, under the influence of +common curiosity, have inquired into the alleged facts of his Master's +Resurrection? But these letters prove that he was a man of far more than +ordinary curiosity. It is clear from them that he kept himself acquainted +with the details of the events which took place in the Churches which he +had planted. Messengers were sent by him to supply him with all necessary +information. Even in so distant a Church as that of Rome, which he had not +even visited, he knew no small number of the chief Christians by name, and +took the deepest interest in their affairs. Are we to believe that such a +man received such a fact connected with the dearest interests of his life +without taking the trouble to ascertain its truth? Moreover, his former +character as a persecutor must have rendered it necessary that he should +institute a diligent inquiry into the alleged Resurrection of one whom he +considered an impostor, and whose adherents he was endeavouring to compel +to renounce their allegiance. We must, therefore, conclude that what St. +Paul here affirms must have been true, that on one definite occasion +several hundreds of persons thought that they had seen Jesus Christ after +He was risen from the dead. + +But if it is in the highest degree difficult to account for the +possibility of three or four of the disciples of Jesus fancying they saw +their risen Master, when they saw nothing but a creation of their own +imagination, what theory can be framed to account for the fact of several +hundreds of persons having become the prey of a similar delusion? Large +numbers of persons do not fall into delusions of this kind. Are we to +suppose that some of them affirmed that some distant object which they saw +was Jesus, and that the remainder accepted the assertion without inquiry? +If He had not come near to them, would they not have rushed up to a man, +who was believed to have come up again from the grave, and endeavoured to +converse with him? Let all history be searched for any fact at all like +this. Until something like it can be found, we are justified in +pronouncing such a delusion impossible. Nay: however common the belief in +ghost stories, it would be impossible to find a case of several hundred +persons who believed that, on some one definite occasion, when they were +all assembled, they had seen the ghost of a person who had recently been +executed, appear before them, and on the strength of this belief, +constituted themselves into a new society;--a society which has endured +through eighteen centuries? However cynical our views may be, it is +impossible to believe that human nature is a lie. + +Again: If for the purposes of the argument we accept the impossible +supposition that a few deluded fanatics persuaded themselves that they had +seen their Master risen from the dead, and that they set themselves to +persuade others that this was a fact, then it is clear that the wish of +making converts to their belief must have been a very gradual and slow +process. This, in the face of all the evidence supplied by history, does +not require further proof. It would be impossible to make converts at all, +without adducing some overwhelming evidence of the truth of their +assertion. But on the supposition that it was a delusion of the +imagination, such evidence could not be forthcoming. Such beliefs are only +possible after the lapse of very considerable intervals of time, if they +are possible even then. + +But in the present case recollections were all fresh. Will the attempt to +persuade persons who live in the city where a public execution has taken +place, that the man executed is alive again, succeed? Will it succeed +anywhere in the neighbourhood, while the events are still in everybody's +recollection? Living actors must have died out, memories of the past must +have become faint, before such things can be made to wear even the +semblance of possibility. But the plain historical facts refuse to concede +the requisite interval during which such a belief could slowly grow up. +While the belief was growing, the Church would have been perishing from +want of a Messiah to step into the place of the dead Jesus. On the +contrary, the growth of the belief was rapid. The Church speedily rose +from its ruins. Before St. Paul's conversion, it had increased to such +numbers as to be worth persecuting. There was a Church at Jerusalem; there +were Churches in Judæa; there were Christians in Damascus. Before this +event the small knot of deluded fanatics had persuaded thousands; they had +formed the Society which subverted the religion and institutions of the +Roman empire, and of which all the progressive races of men profess--now in +the 19th century of its existence--to be still members. The facts of +unquestionable history utterly refuse to the advocates of this theory the +time necessary for imparting to it even a passing plausibility. + +I infer, therefore, that the theory that one or more credulous enthusiasts +among the disciples of Jesus fancied that they saw their Master risen from +the dead, while in reality they were labouring under some mental +hallucination, and that they communicated their enthusiasm to the rest, +and that these created the Christian Church, is unsound in philosophy, +contradicts the facts of history, and the phenomena of human nature, as +testified to by past experience, and is destitute of the possibility of +verification, and also is contrary to analogy. It follows, therefore, that +this portion of the alternative before us must be pronounced utterly +inadequate as a solution of the facts. + +Let us now consider the other alternative, that Jesus did not actually +die, but, although He had been crucified, escaped with His life; that His +disciples saw Him after His crucifixion; and, being persuaded that He had +expired, mistook His appearance for a restoration to life. + +This alternative need not detain us long. It is involved in a considerable +number of the difficulties which are connected with the assumption that +some one or more of the disciples fancied that they saw Him when they did +not really see Him, and that they persuaded the others that He was risen +from the dead. These difficulties I have already disposed of. But it has +in addition some difficulties peculiarly its own, which I will now briefly +notice. + +I admit that it was possible to recover from the effects of crucifixion, +if taken down from the cross in time. This we learn from Josephus, who, on +his return one day from going to examine a place for the encampment of the +Roman forces, found that three of his friends had been crucified during +his absence. By his entreaties, he obtained the orders of Titus for their +being taken down. Two died under cure; one recovered. Josephus is silent +as to whether they had been scourged before they were crucified. This was +no doubt an important point in reference to the possibility of recovery. +Such was the usual practice; although when the Romans crucified the Jews +in large numbers, as they had now been in the habit of doing for some +time, it may be a question whether it was always inflicted. These persons +had probably been suspended on the cross for some hours before they were +taken down. They were treated with the utmost care, with a view to their +recovery; yet two out of the three died. Such are the facts, as related by +Josephus. + +It has been suggested that Jesus was only in a swoon when taken down from +the cross; that in the sepulchre He recovered His consciousness, to which +the large quantity of spices used at His burial might have contributed; +that He managed to creep out of the grave to some place of security, where +He was seen by a few of His disciples, but that He died not long after. +This, it is said, the disciples mistook for a Resurrection, and that it +formed the basis of the renewed life of the Church. Let it be observed +that there would be the same difficulties in re-constituting the Church on +such a basis, and in procuring converts to this belief, as there would +have been on the other alternative, which I have shown to be untenable. +These, therefore, I need not consider. + +This theory pre-supposes not only that the body of Jesus was interred, but +that it was committed to the custody of His friends. This fact we have +from the Gospels; as well as the additional fact that the time during +which He was suspended on the cross did not exceed six hours at the +utmost. But we also learn from them that, before Pilate ordered the body +to be delivered up, he took care to ascertain, from those in charge, the +certainty of the death; and the fourth Gospel affirms that one of the +soldiers, in order to remove all doubt on the subject, pierced his side +with a spear. Now without the aid of the Gospels it would not have been +known that the body was committed to the custody of His friends. If, +therefore, their historical testimony is good for this fact, it is absurd +to refuse them credence when they testify to the other facts. We say +distinctly: if the truth of the one set of facts is denied, because the +Gospels are unhistorical, the truth of the other set (for the Gospels are +the sole authorities) must not be assumed on their testimony. Apart from +this, we are only at liberty to assume that the crucifixion was conducted +in the usual manner; and that the bodies were disposed of accordingly, +_i.e._ that, if the crucified persons were buried at all, they were buried +ignominiously. It has also been affirmed that Pilate sacrificed Jesus by +compulsion, and that the centurion on guard was not ill-disposed towards +him. This again, I say, we only learn from our present Gospels, and I must +again protest against the practice of accepting their testimony on one +side and ignoring it on the other. The Romans, moreover, were not the sort +of men to allow a crucified victim to be taken down from the cross until +they were well assured that he had hung there long enough to extinguish +life; and from the frequency of such executions they would learn how long +it would require, and what on such occasions were the symptoms of death; +nor did they concede to persons so executed an honourable burial. + +But further: It never occurred to the Jews that it was possible that the +crucified Jesus had escaped with His life, and that this fact was really +at the bottom of the announcement of His resurrection. If it was known to +any person concerned that He had thus escaped, nothing could have been +more dangerous on the part of His followers than to announce that He was +risen from the dead. This was the very thing to promote inquiry, and to +arouse a suspicion among His enemies that He had not really died, and thus +to induce them to make every effort to ascertain the place of His retreat. +The quickest way to put an end to the story of the Resurrection was to +produce the living Jesus, weak and exhausted from His wounds; or, if He +had really died, to produce His body. But not a single whisper has come +down to us from the opponents of Christianity that He did not really die. +If such an idea had afforded even a probable account of the story of the +Resurrection, it would certainly have occurred to Paul when a persecutor, +and he would have had recourse to it as a means of dissipating the +delusion. Such are some of the first difficulties which surround this mode +of accounting for the story of the Resurrection. A sepulchre was a place +ill-fitted for a man, exhausted by scourging and crucifixion, to recover +in; nor was there a retreat at hand. But, as we scrutinize the matter more +closely, these difficulties become impossibilities. + +It is clear that from the hour of His supposed death on the cross, Jesus +disappears from history, except in the form of Jesus the Messiah raised +again from the dead, the great Founder of the Christian Church. If, +therefore, His supposed Resurrection was nothing but a recovery from a +swoon, one of two things is certain: either He died shortly after from +exhaustion, or He lived somewhere in deepest retirement, only receiving +visits from those of His followers who were in the secret, and in due +course He expired. Perhaps it may be urged that His friends succeeded in +carrying Him off into some distant country, and that some one or more of +His followers, who had seen Him slowly recovering, mistook this for a +resurrection, and propagated the story. + +We must keep steadily in view that what we have to account for is not a +mere story of a resurrection propagated by a crazed fanatic, but the +erection of the Christian Church on its basis. It is a plain fact that +Jesus appeared no more in public, and that His earthly history ends with +His crucifixion. What became of Him? It is impossible to over-estimate the +importance of this question. + +Let us take the first supposition that He recovered from a swoon, but died +shortly afterwards from exhaustion. This theory involves the necessity +that some one or more of His followers should have seen Him alive and +dying of exhaustion. Was it possible, I ask, for the most deluded +fanaticism to mistake such a condition for a resurrection from the dead? +Was this a basis on which to revive the hopes of the disciples, and to re- +construct the Church? Would any amount of enthusiastic credulity mistake +such a person for the Messiah of the future? If He died shortly +afterwards, what became of His Messiahship? Did His other followers pay +Him no visits during His illness? Did they see Him die, or attend His +burial? Surely such positions do not require serious argument. + +But let us suppose that He recovered, lived in retirement and only +received the secret visits of a few followers, and that out of this the +story of the Resurrection grew. How grew? I again ask. Such growths +require considerable periods of time, and these, history utterly refuses +to grant. Would it be possible, I ask, for any deluded follower to mistake +such facts for a resurrection from the dead? Could Jesus himself have so +mistaken it? or, however well the secret might be kept, would a Messiah, +living in privacy, out of the sight of friends and foes, be a possible +Messiah, who could impart a new life to the Church? In such a case it is +impossible to exonerate the persons concerned from fraud, even the Great +Teacher himself. Are we to suppose that He himself actually mistook His +recovery from a swoon for a resurrection, and justified His followers in +publishing a report of it? Why then did He not appear in public and assert +His Messianic claims? But could His followers have persuaded themselves +that a man who must have shown distinct indications of slow recovery, and +who never ventured to appear again in public, was raised again from the +dead to continue His Messianic work? If this is the true account of the +matter, it was not a delusion but an imposture. If we suppose that a few +friends only visited Him, what did His other disciples say about the +matter? Did the few, with the concurrence of their Master, propagate the +belief that He was gone into heaven, knowing that He was still on earth? +Be these things as they may (and those who have started the idea should +solve it), if the real basis of the story of the Resurrection be a +recovery from a swoon and a subsequent life of privacy, Jesus must have +shared the common fate of humanity and died. This must have been known to +those with whom He lived; it must have been known to those who visited +Him. His death must have dispelled their delusions. Henceforth the +propagation of their story must have been due to wilful fraud--a fraud for +which it is impossible to assign a motive, and which it is not the modern +practice to charge on the first propagators of Christianity. + +The remaining supposition, that Jesus, after having been seen by one or +two of His followers alive and slowly recovering, was conveyed away to +some distant place, where they saw Him no more, and that out of this grew +the story of His Resurrection and Ascension into Heaven, is not only in +itself intrinsically incredible, but it offends against every one of the +principles which I have established. I need not, therefore, discuss it +further. + +The existence of the Church is a fact. It is professedly based on another +fact, namely, the Resurrection of Christ. If this be true, it fully +accounts for the existence, origin, and growth of the Church. No other +theory can account for it. The Resurrection is a fact, or a delusion. If +it is not a fact, two suppositions respecting its origin are alone +possible. These have been proved, on the strongest historical evidence, to +be impossible. It follows, therefore, that the only remaining alternative +is the true one: that JESUS CHRIST ROSE FROM THE DEAD. Its attestation is +stronger than that of any other fact in history. + + + + + +CHAPTER XXI. THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE GOSPELS AS DEDUCED FROM PREVIOUS +CONSIDERATIONS. + + +I have proved in the preceding chapters that one of the miracles recorded +in the Gospels is substantiated by the highest form of historical +testimony, on evidence quite independent of their contents. I have adopted +this course because unbelievers affirm that the miraculous narratives +contained in them are alone sufficient to prove them to be unhistorical. +It has therefore become necessary to prove the truth of the greatest +miracle which they narrate, without any reference to their assertions. +Christianity unquestionably existed before the Gospels were written, and +the all-important fact on which it rests can be substantiated without +their aid, on data which are conceded by our opponents. Its truth or +falsehood therefore does not rest on any mere question as to what was +their actual date, or who were their authors. Still they are the only +records of the life of Jesus Christ that the Church possesses. The +question therefore as to whether they are true in all their chief +outlines, is one of such importance as to render a few observations on +this subject indispensable. + +There can be no doubt that no one would have ever thought of denying their +general authenticity, except on account of the miraculous narratives they +contain. This has made them the battle-field of Christianity, because it +has been supposed that if their historical character can be shaken, +Christianity would be disproved as resting on no other basis. For this +purpose every variation in them, even the smallest, has been noted, and +these variations have been magnified into contradictions. There is no +weapon which criticism has not employed for the purpose of impugning their +veracity. But the real ground of offence is the miraculous narrative. As, +however, I have proved that the most important miracle recorded in them +can be established on grounds quite independent of their testimony, we can +now approach their consideration with this great antecedent difficulty +removed. If the Resurrection of Jesus is an actual occurrence, the other +miraculous events recorded in them no longer stand in the way of their +acceptance as genuine histories. This one miracle is sufficient to carry +all the rest; not, of course, that it proves that they occurred, but it +gets rid of the entire _à priori_ difficulty with which their acceptance +is attended. Nay, further, if Christ rose from the dead, it is more +probable than not, that this was not the only miracle connected with Him: +or, in other words, if the authors of the Gospels attributed to Him no +other miraculous action, it would rather afford a presumption against them +as credible historians. It follows therefore, that although the proof of +the Resurrection does not by itself establish the reality of the other +miracles recorded as having been performed by Him, it renders them so far +probable, that the same amount of evidence, which is sufficient to +establish the ordinary facts of history, is sufficient to establish the +general truth of the events recorded in the Gospels. I do not mean to +affirm that some miracle may not have been incorrectly attributed to +Christ in the traditions of the Church, from which the narratives in the +Gospels have been derived, in the same manner as some inaccurate reports +of facts have obtained admission into ordinary histories. But as these +latter do not affect the general credibility of history, so errors of this +description would not affect the general credibility of the Gospel +narratives. All that I claim for them is that they should be both alike +tried by the historical canons of criticism applicable to the same species +of documents. Let me state once for all the position that I occupy. I am +not called upon to prove that no error can have crept into their accounts; +that events are all arranged in their true order of sequence; that +variations do not exist in them which with our present knowledge of the +details, it is difficult to reconcile, or even that the Evangelists +themselves may not have misconceived their true order, or grouped them in +one that was the result of religious considerations. The determination of +such questions may affect our views as to the nature of the inspiration +under which we suppose the Gospels to have been written, but it is one +wholly foreign to an historical discussion. The question which I have to +consider is, not the extent of the inspiration of their authors; but +whether they do or do not contain genuine history; and if they do, to what +class of historical writings they belong, and to estimate their testimony +accordingly. + +I will consider this last question first. The Gospels most distinctly +affirm that they do not belong to the class of professed histories, but to +that of memoirs. This is a very important consideration; for if they only +claim to be memoirs and not histories it is absurd to demand of them an +accuracy of arrangement and of detail, which would be essential to a +history, but which forms no portion of the plan of a memoir. But they not +only affirm that they are memoirs, but memoirs of a peculiar character; +that is to say, religious memoirs, composed with a double purpose, viz. +that of setting forth the events of a life, and at the same time of +teaching a religion. + +This point is so important, and is so generally overlooked in the +arguments both of those who affirm and of those who deny their historical +character, that it will be necessary to prove it. It is not only evident +from the general nature of their contents, but three of the Evangelists +directly affirm it, and two of them, Luke and John, in express terms. The +former distinctly asserts that he composed his Gospel in order that a +person called "Theophilus" might know the certainty of the things in which +he had been instructed. "Forasmuch as many have taken in hand to set forth +a declaration of these things that are most surely believed among us; even +as they delivered them unto us, which from the beginning were eye +witnesses and ministers of the word; it seemed good to me also, having +perfect understanding of all things from the first, to write unto thee in +order, most excellent Theophilus, that thou mightest know the certainty of +those things in which thou hast been instructed." (Luke i. 1-4.) + +Here we have the purpose of the writer definitely affirmed. It is to set +forth a statement of the leading facts of the life of Jesus, for the +purpose of communicating instruction in the Christian religion. In one +word, the author proposed to teach a religion by means of a narrative of +facts. It is hardly possible to give a more accurate description of a +memoir as distinguished from a history. He also tells us that he meant to +compose it in an orderly arrangement, but he does not tell us whether the +order was intended to be strictly chronological, or merely regulated by +the avowed religious purpose of the work. It is quite possible for a +writer to adopt an orderly arrangement, who arranges his matter as much by +religious considerations as by chronological ones. According to the +statement of this preface, the religious purpose is clearly the +predominant one; and it is therefore only reasonable to suppose that it +has exerted considerable influence on the grouping. + +We learn also from this preface that the things most surely believed among +Christians consisted of a number of facts, which had been delivered to +them by persons who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of +the word. Several persons had already set forth written accounts of them +before the author composed this Gospel. It is implied that he did so +because he possessed better and more accurate sources of information than +previous writers. The object, however, is clear; it was that Theophilus +might know the certainty of those things, _i.e._ the great facts on which +the Christianity, in which he had been instructed, was based. + +The assertion of this religious purpose in the composition of the fourth +Gospel, and that the materials are a selection from a large mass of others +is even more distinct and definite. "Many other signs truly did Jesus in +the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book, but +these are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of +God, and that believing ye may have life through his name." (John xx. 30, +31.) + +Words could hardly have been framed which more definitely assert that this +Gospel is a memoir, and not a history; and that the religious purpose, in +its composition, was the predominant idea of the writer. + +The assertions of the author of St. Mark's Gospel, although not equally +full, are sufficiently definite. He designates it as "The beginning of the +gladsome message of Jesus Christ, the Son of God." Here, again, the +religious idea is plainly the predominant one in the writer's mind, and +the obvious conclusion is that he intended his work to be a memoir, and +not a history. + +We have no such direct affirmation by the author of St. Matthew's Gospel, +unless the opening words, "The book of the generations of Jesus Christ, +the Son of David, the Son of Abraham," are intended to cover the entire +work. The nature of its contents, however, leave not the smallest doubt +that his design in writing was precisely the same as that of the other +Evangelists, viz. to teach Christianity by setting forth a memoir of the +life of Jesus Christ. + +Such, then, is the avowed purpose of the authors of the four Gospels. Each +of them is a religious memoir. This being so, it is absurd to demand of +such writings what can only be found in regularly composed histories. + +In what, then, does a history differ from a memoir? The object of the +historian is not only to give an account of the events which he narrates +precisely as they occurred; but the order of his narrative is regulated by +the definite sequences of time and place. The writer of a memoir, on the +contrary, is not bound to observe this order, but he is entitled to vary +it in reference to the special object he has in view, and the points which +he requires to illustrate. + +But the religious purpose is most definitely affirmed to have been the +predominant one in the minds of the authors of the Gospels. It would +therefore have an important influence on their arrangement of their +materials. We should expect to find them grouped far more in reference to +this end, than to the mere sequences of time and place. When certain of +the actions or portions of the teaching of our Lord illustrated the +particular subject which each Evangelist had before him, he would neglect +the exact historical order, and group them in reference to this special +purpose. + +In writings of this description, therefore, while all the chief points of +his life and his discourses ought to present a substantial agreement, we +should naturally expect to find a considerable number of minor +divergencies. While we have the fullest right to expect that the facts +will be accurately reported, we have no right to demand that the writer +should observe no other order in his narrative than the mere sequences of +time and place. It is on the assumption that the authors of the Gospels +intended to set forth an exact historical account of the ministry of +Christ, instead of taking them for what they have affirmed them to be, +religious memoirs of that ministry, that no inconsiderable number of their +alleged discrepancies have originated. + +The presence of variations, or if it is preferred to call them +contradictions, in writings of this description by no means invalidates +their historical character. It has been well observed by a writer in the +"Westminster Review," that they are to be found in every historical +writing from Herodotus to Mr. Froude. As these discrepancies in the +Gospels are so largely dwelt on by unbelievers, I subjoin a passage from +Dean Stanley's account of the murder of Thomas a Becket, in his "Memorials +of Canterbury Cathedral," as showing the existence of such inaccuracies +even in the accounts of persons who were actual eye-witnesses of events in +which they were deeply interested. Speaking of the number of existing +accounts of the murder, he says:-- + +"Of these thirty narrators, four, Edward Grimes, William Fitzstephen, John +of Salisbury, who unfortunately supplies but little, and the anonymous +author of the Lambeth manuscript, claim to have been eye-witnesses. Three +others were monks of the convent, and although not present at the +massacre, were probably somewhere in the precincts. Three others, though +not in England at the time, had been on terms more or less intimate with +Becket, and two of them seem to have taken the utmost pains to ascertain +the truth of the facts which they narrate. From these several accounts, we +can recover the particulars of the death of Archbishop Becket to the +minutest details. It is true that having been written by monastic and +clerical historians, after the national feeling had been raised to +enthusiasm in his behalf, allowance must be made for exaggeration, +suppression, and every kind of false colouring which could set off their +hero to advantage. It is true, also, that _in some points the various +authorities are hopelessly irreconcilable_. But still a minute comparison +of the narrators with each other, and with the localities, leads to a +conviction that on the whole the facts have been substantially preserved; +and as often happens, the truth can be ascertained in spite and even in +consequence of attempts to distort and suppress it." + +It is clear, therefore, that the presence of variations, nay even +_hopeless contradictions_ in such narratives, does not interfere with +their general historical character. It appears that from narratives which +contain "exaggeration, suppression, and every kind of false colouring," we +can ascertain the particulars of the death of Becket to the minutest +particular. Why do not unbelievers apply the same rule to the Gospels? Why +are their minor variations in details alleged to prove that the entire +narrative is unhistorical? One thing respecting them is clear: instead of +presenting indications of "exaggeration, suppression, and false +colouring," they are characterized by a uniform sobriety in their +statements. They offer no comments, and allow the facts to produce their +own impression on the reader. + +It follows therefore that if the Gospels were ordinary biographies, the +variations in them would not interfere with their historical character, +and that differences in mere details would leave the main facts +unaffected. Still more true is this with respect to memoirs, and +especially with those composed with the object of teaching a religion. +Attention to this obvious fact will get rid of a large number of the +objections which have been so pertinaciously urged against them. + +With respect to their general credibility, it is important to observe that +even if the date of the Synoptics be placed as late as that assigned to +them by those critics who deny their historical character, viz. somewhere +between A.D. 90 and 115, still the time when they must have been composed +lies, according to the rule of Sir G. C. Lewis, within the period of +trustworthy historical tradition. In this case the earliest of them would +bear date about sixty, and the latest of them about eighty-five years +after the events they narrate. Renan is of opinion that their internal +evidence proves them to have been composed before the destruction of +Jerusalem. Be this as it may; even at the date assigned to them by the +most sceptical critics, good traditionary information lay within the reach +of their respective authors. The interval is about the same in the one +case as that which separates us from the invasion of France by the allies +in 1814, and in the other case from the outbreak of the French Revolution. +Many persons are still alive who can remember the former event; and +although nearly everyone who could remember the latter has passed away, +yet large numbers of the existing generation, whose recollections will be +good for twenty years to come, have conversed with those who took the +deepest interest in the scenes in question. While this generation lives, +it would be impossible for the whole outline of the facts to become +falsified. Minor errors might creep into the details; their precise order +and sequence might not be accurately preserved; yet their general outline +would be handed down correctly, and it would be impossible to hide the +true history behind a set of legends. If the authors of the Synoptic +Gospels were only separated by this interval of time from the events that +they narrate, they must have had all the materials of true history within +their reach. Persons must have been living when the first Gospel was +written who could accurately remember the events in question; and even at +the latest date which can be assigned to the other Gospels, large numbers +of persons must have been living who had heard narratives of them from +their fathers, which, as unspeakably interesting, they would treasure up +with the liveliest recollection. + +It follows, therefore, that even if we assume the latest date which has +been assigned for the publication of the Synoptic Gospels it lies +considerably within the period of accurate historical recollection, even +if we suppose that their authors composed them from traditional sources +only, and were not assisted by written documents. But the existence of +documents is expressly asserted by the author of St. Luke's Gospel. And +even if we were devoid of this testimony, we might infer it from the +inherent probability of the case. This was inevitable, as the basis of the +religion was placed on a personal history. The system of instruction must +have involved a constant reference to the details of that history. When, +therefore, the members of the Churches heard them from the lips of +original witnesses, the interest of the subject must have induced those +who were able to write, to compose brief memoranda for the purpose of +assisting their recollections. In this way a considerable amount of +Christian literature in connection with the life of Jesus must have grown +up in the course of years, and the necessity for it would become the more +urgent in proportion as the original disciples who had heard His +discourses and seen His actions passed away from the scene. This is +exactly in conformity with the statement made by the author of St. Luke's +Gospel. + +It is clear, therefore, that even if the publication of our present +Gospels did not take place before the time assigned to them by +unbelievers, the historical materials at the command of their authors must +have been ample. It would have been impossible that facts and legendary +inventions should have become blended together within so short a period. +Consequently nothing but neglect to use the materials at hand, or a +deliberate purpose of falsification could have prevented them from giving +an account of the ministry of Jesus which would be substantially accurate +in all its main features. If on the other hand we suppose these Gospels to +have been written for the purpose of falsification, then their +contradiction to the accounts which had been hitherto accepted by the +Church must have destroyed their credit. It would have been impossible for +the authors to have succeeded in concealing the facts behind a mass of +myths and legends while they formed the very groundwork of the daily life +of the community. Under the peculiar circumstances of the Christians of +the first century some portion of the events of the life and teaching of +Christ must have been brought to their minds every day. The hostility of +the Pagan world around them was alone sufficient to ensure this. Moreover, +the religion was not one which was committed to the custody of a caste or +priesthood; but it appealed directly to the individual. As distinguished +from the other religions of the world Christianity may be not incorrectly +defined as the religion of the individual. It awoke emotions of the +profoundest nature in the hearts of even its humblest followers, +addressing itself both to their consciences and their affections. These +emotions were all centered in a personal life. If one fact is more certain +than another, it is that Jesus was viewed by the early Christians as their +religious King, to whom they owed a personal allegiance. This must have +rendered it necessary for them to treasure up all the facts of His history +with the deepest care. + +Further: the early Christians not only lived in the midst of a society +extremely hostile to them, but were also zealous proselyters. This alone +would have been sufficient to compel them to keep in lively remembrance +the chief events in the history of Jesus. How else was it possible for +them to persuade others that He was the Christ? The Church was not a +school of philosophy, but consisted of a body of men whose bond of union +was adherence to a leader. To make converts to such a religion would have +been impossible without an accurate acquaintance with the facts on which +His claims were grounded. + +Corporate bodies possess a power of handing down a traditionary knowledge +of events in a far greater degree than individuals. The Christian Church +consisted of a set of communities which had not only an individual, but +also the strongest corporate life. Although it contained no priesthood, +properly so called, the cohesion of these communities, placed as they were +in the midst of a hostile population, in Jewish or Gentile cities, was of +the strongest character, and in proportion to their smallness, the action +of each individual member would be important. Each separate Church +therefore formed a corporation as opposed to the Jewish and heathen world +by which it was surrounded; and each separate unit felt himself animated +by a similar life, which dictated to him the necessity of conquering or +perishing. From this arose an intense desire of making new converts and of +increasing the number of the faithful. How was this to be accomplished? An +organization was necessary. Each of the communities had one which was +suitable to its need. One of its most important functions must have been +to instruct new converts in its principles, and to keep actively burning +the zeal of its original members. But as the existence of the community +was founded on an adhesion to a person, the course of instruction must +have consisted to a considerable extent of details of the actions and +teaching of Jesus. "How shall they believe on him of whom they have not +heard?" was a pertinent question of St. Paul, "or how shall they hear +without a preacher?" No society has ever existed in the world which has +had an equal inducement to hand down accurately the events of its +founder's life, or had equal facilities for detecting any attempt to +substitute a fictitious account of him for the true one. + +It follows therefore that at the period in question it would have been +simply impossible that a fictitious or legendary account of the life of +Jesus should have taken the place of the one which these Churches had +accepted at the time when they first came into existence. I have already +proved that the Epistles of St. Paul put it beyond the possibility of +question that an account of the chief facts in the ministry of Jesus +formed the foundation of the religious life of the Churches at the time +when he wrote them, and that it had done so from the first. The difficulty +therefore of introducing an entirely new version of it must have been +insurmountable. A doubtful fact or two might have become incorporated, but +while the religious life of the community was thus strong, it would have +been utterly impossible to give a new colouring to the whole. + +But further: this difficulty must have been greatly increased by the wide +separation of such Churches as those of Rome, Corinth, Galatia, Jerusalem, +and others, from one another. Each Church must have had an account of its +own of the chief facts of our Lord's ministry. If one of them could have +been induced to accept a new set of facts, there would have been the +greatest difficulty in persuading the others to follow its example. Daily +experience teaches us how very slow religious bodies are in changing the +fundamental articles of their belief. However much the sentiments of +individuals may have changed, the original confessions of faith are +retained with the utmost tenacity, even after they have ceased to embody +the religious life of the community. What confessions of faith are to +modern Churches, the chief facts of the ministry of our Lord must have +been to the primitive one; the only difference being that these latter +lived with a far greater tenacity in the minds of the early Christians +than the former have in modern Churches. If therefore a single Church +could have been induced to accept a new version of its Founder's life, the +separation of these different communities from one another, would have +placed an insuperable barrier in the way of imposing such an account on +the other Churches. The inquiry must have at once arisen, Whence has this +Church derived its new Gospel, thus fundamentally different from that +which has from the first formed the basis of our religious life? + +It is clear therefore that even if we accept the latest date which had +been assigned to the publication of the Synoptic Gospels, their authors +must have been in possession of abundance of materials for setting forth +an account of the ministry of Jesus, which would have been correct in all +its great outlines; and that even if they had been so minded it would have +been impossible for them to have succeeded in palming off a previously +unknown set of facts in place of those which had hitherto formed the +groundwork of the life of the different Churches. We have seen also that +when St. Paul wrote his Epistles, the different Churches were in +possession of an outline of the ministry of Jesus Christ which contained +within it, as a matter of the highest importance, the most remarkable +miraculous fact which is recorded in the Gospels. Is it to be believed +that this was the only one; or, is it possible that a set of miraculous +narratives could have succeeded in taking the place of the account of His +life and teaching which was in possession of the Churches, within the +interval of time which separates St. Paul's Epistles from the publication +of the first of the Synoptic Gospels? + +I conclude, therefore, that the original narratives must have attributed a +number of miracles to Jesus Christ; that the accounts of them must have +been handed down to the time when our opponents allow that the Gospels +were published, and that by this means they have been incorporated into +them. Not only has the alleged late date of the publication of the Gospels +been urged as a reason for discrediting them as reports of historical +facts, but also the uncertainty of their authorship. It will not fall +within the scope of this work to examine the value of the testimony by +which each Gospel has been assigned to its respective author. It will be +sufficient here to observe that it is as strong as that by which the +authorship of any other ancient writing is ascertained. The internal +character of two of these Gospels fully agrees with the traditionary +account. Although the assertions of the early Fathers vary as to the +precise relation in which Mark stood to Peter, the ancient traditions are +unanimous in connecting him in some way or other with the Apostle. The +phenomena of this Gospel are precisely such as we should expect if this +was the case. In nearly every case where we can ascertain, either from +this or from one of the other Gospels, that Peter was an eye-witness of an +event recorded in it, St. Mark gives precisely such a description of it as +we might expect would be given by a man of the peculiar temperament of +Simon Peter. We know, both from the Acts of the Apostles and from the +Epistles of St. Paul, that St. Luke was a companion of that Apostle. The +peculiarities of the Gospel that bears his name are precisely such as we +should have expected if its author was a companion of the great Apostle of +the Gentiles. There is also every reason for believing that Luke was not +an eye-witness of the ministry of Jesus. The author of the Gospel affirms +that he was not an eye-witness. In conformity with this the Gospel bears +the most distinctive marks of compilation. So far the internal structure +of these two Gospels entirely agrees with the external testimony as to +their authorship. We know also on the authority of the early Fathers that +Matthew composed a Gospel in the Hebrew language which was designed for +the use of Jewish Christians. Now whoever is the author of the present +Greek Gospel which bears his name, it is distinguished by precisely the +same characteristics as those which are described as appertaining to the +Hebrew Gospel of St. Matthew, that is to say, that the proportion which +the discourses bear to the narrative portions of it is very large; and its +contents make it evident that it was chiefly designed for the use of +Christians of the Jewish race. If therefore our present Gospel was not set +forth by the Apostle himself in Greek, both the external testimony and the +internal evidence prove that it is a representation of its contents +sufficiently accurate for all the practical purposes of history. + +But the question as to the names of the persons who actually set forth our +Gospels has been made of far more importance than it deserves, both by the +defenders and the opponents of Christianity. The all important point is, +are they faithful accounts of the primitive traditions of the Church +respecting the chief events of its Founder's ministry; and were they +composed within that period of time, when the recollections of it must +have been so fresh as to render it impossible to substitute a body of +fictitious and legendary narratives in place of those which had been +handed down in the Church from the beginning? Unless we know enough about +an author from external sources of information, to enable us to form a +definite opinion as to his judgment and means of information, our mere +knowledge of his name will help us little. The information which +ecclesiastical tradition affords us respecting the authors of the Synoptic +Gospels is little beyond that which is contained in the New Testament +itself, and is insufficient to enable us to form a judgment respecting +their character. That judgment must be formed exclusively from the +writings themselves, and can only be arrived at after a careful +examination of their contents. + +It will be urged that if our present Greek Matthew could be shown to have +been the work of the Apostle, we should then have the testimony of an eye- +witness of the ministry of Jesus; and if we have no certain evidence that +it was composed by him, then none of the events recorded in the Synoptics +rest on autoptic testimony. The truth of this position I entirely deny. +The real question is, do the events recorded in them faithfully represent +the traditions of the Church? Have we evidence that the traditions which +were current when these Gospels were composed, are accurate +representations of the accounts of the ministry of Jesus, which were +handed down by our Lord's original disciples? If so, they must rest on +autoptic testimony, as they could only have been derived from our Lord's +companions. The mere knowing the name of one of them, unless we knew a +great deal about his judgment and discretion, is of far less importance +than the assurance that we are in possession of the general testimony of +the entire body. Nor does it necessarily follow that any one follower of +Jesus, even an Apostle, was in constant attendance on His person. We know +from the Gospels themselves that this was not always the case. If such a +person had narrated events which occurred during his absence, he must have +been indebted for his knowledge of them to the testimony of others. If +therefore the present Greek Matthew could be proved to be the work of the +Apostle, still it by no means follows that he was an eye-witness of every +one of the events recorded in it. If, however, it was set forth in its +present form by some other hand, I fully admit that neither of the +Synoptics was composed by an Apostle. But this is a wholly different point +from the consideration whether they do or do not embody the testimony of +the eye-witnesses of the ministry of Jesus Christ. This does not depend on +our knowledge of the names of their respective authors, but whether we +have good evidence that they faithfully embody the primitive apostolical +traditions. + +A careful perusal of the Synoptics will convince the reader that neither +of them professes to embody a set of personal reminiscences. On the +contrary, they bear the strongest indications of being a collection of +apostolic traditions. Of this I shall offer distinctive proof in the next +chapter. The only Gospel which embodies such personal reminiscences as +indicate the authorship of an eye-witness is that of St. John. But the +indications of the presence of an individual personality in St. Matthew's +Gospel are almost entirely wanting. In its general structure it forms a +striking contrast to that of John. Supposing it to have been composed by +the Apostle, he has entirely hidden his individuality in his narrative. + +The question, therefore, really turns on the conclusion at which we are +able to arrive as to whether the Synoptic Gospels are faithful +representations of the primitive apostolic traditions. I have proved that +even at the latest date to which opponents assign their publication, they +must have been written within the period when all the requisite materials +existed for composing a substantially correct account of all the leading +facts; that such a traditionary account was certainly handed down in the +Church; that it formed the ground-work of its existence; that it must have +been derived from apostolic men, who had ample means of knowing the facts; +that the Church possessed the means of transmitting them accurately, such +as were never possessed by any other Society; and that it was under the +necessity of doing so as the condition of its life; and that while this +account remained fresh in the recollections both of the community and of +its individual members, it would have been impossible to foist on them a +fictitious story. I shall now proceed to inquire how far the phenomena of +the Gospels tend to establish these positions. + + + + + +CHAPTER XXII. THE HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF THE GOSPELS AS DEDUCED FROM +THEIR INTERNAL STRUCTURE. + + +This subject is an extremely extensive one. The utmost, therefore, that I +can do is to notice a few of the most important points which bear on the +argument. I have already shown that the general principles of historical +evidence point to the conclusion that the Synoptic Gospels are three +different versions of the primitive apostolical traditions respecting the +actions and the teaching of Jesus Christ, and that even on the assumption +that the dates assigned to them by the opponents are the correct ones +(which however I would by no means be understood as conceding, for all the +internal evidence points to a much earlier period), they were still +composed within the period when such traditions possess the highest +historical value. I must now inquire whether the general structure of +these Gospels confirms this conclusion. + +The question therefore at once arises, what is their general character? Do +they present the marks of traditionary history; or of being three works +composed by three different authors, who not only wrote independently of +each other, but who used no common source of information? Do their +narratives present us with the characteristics of historical truth or of +fictitious invention? The facts before us are ample, and they ought to +enable us to return a definite answer to these questions. + +The most remarkable trait which first strikes the reader is the presence +of a common narrative interwoven with a considerable amount of matter +peculiar to each Gospel. Many of the events, and several of the discourses +are narrated by all three Evangelists; others by only two. Besides these +common narratives and discourses, which form the larger portion of the +Gospels, each of them contains narratives and discourses peculiar to +itself. While they possess much that is common, it is clear that each +writer had a distinct object in view in the compilation of his Gospel; +that of St. Matthew being chiefly designed for Jewish Christians; that of +St. Luke for Gentile converts, and that of St. Mark occupying an +intermediate place between the two. It was also obviously the object of +the author of St. Matthew's Gospel to set forth the discourses; of that of +St. Mark's to give a graphic description of the actions of our Lord. Each +of these Gospels is also distinguished by a number of minor peculiarities. + +When the common narrative comes to be closely scrutinized, it presents us +with phenomena more remarkable than any that can be found elsewhere in +literature. These narratives are couched to a considerable extent in the +same words and phrases, closely interwoven with a number of most singular +variations, which have an important bearing on their historical character. +As far as the words are identical, they force on us the conclusion that +they must have been derived from some common origin. These identities are +more striking in the narrative than in the discourses. Three independent +writers, if they intended to hand down the general sense of a body of +discourses, on the supposition that they were in possession of accurate +information, would repeat them to a great extent in the same words. But +that three independent writers, who used no common source of information +in narrating the same occurrences, should have employed the same words to +the extent to which it has been done by the authors of these Gospels is +simply impossible. + +But if they had all copied from the same document, these identities of +expression must inevitably have been more complete. It would have been +impossible that they could have been of the capricious character which +they present to us in the pages of the Evangelists. Even in the +narratives, frequent as is the use of the same words, the variations are +numerous; nor are they much less so in the discourses. They are of the +most singular character, and without the smallest apparent purpose. +Sometimes they are simple changes in grammatical construction, or a word +of nearly the same meaning is substituted for another. Then we find one or +more lines, sometimes a whole sentence, transposed. Sometimes words or +lines which are inserted by one Evangelist are omitted by another, the +omission obscuring, and the insertion throwing light on the sense. At +other times, a whole incident is omitted which, if it had been inserted, +would have made an obscure context plain. In the discourses it +occasionally happens that a part of one which we read in the same context +in another Evangelist, and which seems to be required by the connection, +is omitted, when words of nearly the same import have been attributed to +our Lord elsewhere. Again: sayings are reported in which, while many words +are the same, others are varied without any conceivable reason for the +variation. In one or two instances, when words are put into the mouths of +persons different from those to whom they are attributed by another +Evangelist, the grammatical structure is altered to suit the variation. Of +this we have two remarkable examples in the account of the healing of the +Centurion's servant, and in the narrative of the request which the two +sons of Zebedee and Salome presented to our Lord. The words are precisely +the same, while the grammatical forms differ, according as the one or the +other is regarded as the speaker. + +Such are the chief phenomena. But the full extent and character of these +variations, in the closest union as they are with identities of +expression, can only be appreciated by a careful comparison of the +parallel narrative of the Gospels. Numerous, however, as are the +variations, it must be observed that they exert scarcely any appreciable +influence on the general sense. They utterly negate the idea that they can +have originated in any set or deliberate purpose. Let us take for example +the account of the feeding of the five thousand. The Synoptics employ the +very remarkable expression, that after the performance of the miracle, our +Lord _constrained_ the disciples to embark, without giving us a hint of +the reason of so unusual an occurrence. We turn to St. John's Gospel; he +says not one word about our Lord's constraining the disciples to embark, +but tells us that the multitude were designing to come and take Jesus by +force and make Him a king. This notice, which is of the most incidental +character, gives as the fullest explanation of an event which would +otherwise have been extremely obscure. + +But further: in the account of the miracle itself, one of the Evangelists +tells us, that the numbers who were fed were about five thousand, besides +women and children. How then were the numbers ascertained? and how came it +to pass that the men only were numbered, and neither the women, nor +children? Another Evangelist tells us that the multitude were directed to +sit down in companies by hundreds and by fifties. This at once explains +how the numbers were arrived at. But if this was the case, how came it to +be known that the men were about five thousand; and how came it to pass, +that the women and children were excluded from the total enumeration? Here +again another Evangelist comes to our help; and informs us that although +the order was given to the whole multitude to sit down in companies, those +who actually did so were the {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} not the {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, _i.e._ that the men +only sat down, but the women and children did not. This is told us in the +most incidental form, appearing only in the Greek. + +This last case is perhaps the most remarkable example in the Gospels, of +the manner in which an incidental variation in one Evangelist throws light +on the obscurities of another. Can such a narrative be otherwise than +historical? This note of veracity is so entirely incidental that it has in +all probability escaped the notice of nine hundred and ninety-nine out of +every thousand of its readers. There are many others, though less +striking, all of which are of the same incidental character, and it is +impossible to attribute them to design. Surely this can only have resulted +from our being in the presence of facts and not of fiction. + +But the variations in the discourses require a further notice. When +variations occur in highly important discourses, it is open to the +suspicion that they have originated in the deliberate purpose of giving a +different doctrinal meaning to the words. But when we closely examine +those in the Gospels, although they are very numerous, we find them of a +purely incidental character, exerting a very inconsiderable influence on +the sense. I am aware that attempts have been made to show that some few +of these variations have originated in design; but these attempts only +prove the straits to which those who make them are driven. Thus in the +account of the Sermon on the Mount as we read it in St. Matthew, the +passage runs: "Blessed are the poor in spirit for theirs is the kingdom of +heaven." In the corresponding passage in St. Luke it runs: "Blessed are +_ye_ poor," _i.e._ the poor people who were our Lord's disciples, for the +Evangelist expressly tells us that these words were addressed, not to the +multitude generally, but to them. The supposition that this variation +indicates the presence of something resembling communistic views in the +author of St. Luke's Gospel is too absurd to be worthy of serious +discussion. Taking them as a whole, these discrepancies create no +appreciable difference in the teaching of Jesus as reported by the +different Evangelists. + +One thing respecting them is clear--they bear the strongest testimony to +the historical character of the writings which contain them. It is simply +inconceivable that the authors of the Gospels made them deliberately. They +must have found them in the sources from which they drew their +information. They form one of the strongest proofs that neither a forger, +nor an accommodater of facts for the purpose of making them fit in with +particular doctrinal theories, has had any hand in originating them. In +simple changes in grammatical structure, purpose or design is +inconceivable. + +But the variations in narratives, such as those above referred to, are +even more important as constituting an attestation of their historical +reality than variations in discourses. Four separate versions of a +fictitious incident fail to clear up one another's obscurities. But the +ability to do so is the distinctive mark of imperfect narratives of facts, +told by different witnesses. When two things of a complicated mechanical +construction exactly dovetail into each other, it is a proof that they +have originated in the same mind. In a similar manner, when a number of +distinct narratives, each of which is more or less incomplete, exactly fit +into each other, this constitutes a proof, that they did not originate in +a fiction but in a fact. + +An illustration will aid in showing the force of this reasoning. The early +history of Rome is unquestionably of a highly legendary character. We have +two versions of it, one by Livy, and another by Dionysius. These writers +do not give us direct accounts of the primitive legends, but their +narratives are compiled from authors of a much earlier date, who first +reduced them to writing. Still these historians may be viewed as +substantially accurate reporters of the legendary history, as it was +compiled by the earlier writers. An important question therefore arises, +does the twofold account which we possess of these legends, after all the +efforts made by Livy and Dionysius to weave them into a consistent whole, +bear the smallest analogy to the narratives contained in four Evangelists? +It is clear that great disagreements existed among the original +authorities. Let us take any account of the supposed events of three +years--do the variations in the two accounts bear the smallest resemblance +to the singular phenomena which we find in the Evangelists? Will they +dovetail into one another? Will the small additions in one throw light on +the obscurities of the other? Do the speeches present any indications of +being copies of a common original? All these questions must be answered in +the negative. Whence then comes this difference between the narratives of +the Evangelists and the legendary accounts of the origin of the Roman +power? I answer, because the one is founded on fact and the other on +fiction. + +It is not my intention to discuss the innumerable theories that have been +propounded as to the origin of the Gospels, for the purpose of accounting +for the common narrative, its variations, and the additions peculiar to +each. Many of these theories violate the principle of common sense; and if +the contrary were not known to be the fact they would suggest the idea +that their authors had never practised the art of literary composition. +Among them I shall only notice the theories which suppose that the +Evangelists had before them one common document when writing their +Gospels; or that one of them had before him the Gospel of another; that +they deliberately copied the common words and phrases, and no less +deliberately made the alterations, additions, and transpositions which the +common narrative presents. Let us take for an illustration the supposition +that the author of Mark's Gospel had that of Matthew before him, or the +converse. In the one case he must have deliberately retained all the +common words and phrases, after making the most capricious variations and +suppressions. Next, he must have inserted all the little additions which +distinguish the Gospel of St. Mark from that of St. Matthew, and made the +requisite transpositions. But what is still more remarkable, he must also +have taxed his invention to insert in the midst of its impersonal +narrative all those graphic descriptions which impart to Mark's Gospel the +appearance of ocular testimony. Besides all this he must of set purpose +have omitted nearly all the discourses in which Matthew's Gospel is so +full, or have placed them in a different context. If, on the other hand, +we suppose that Mark's Gospel is the original and Matthew's the copy, the +whole process must be reversed, and above all the author must have +deliberately struck out the graphic portions of Mark, except in one or two +instances, when he has added some of his own. All theories which are +founded on the supposition that the authors of either Gospel used a common +document and deliberately altered it, or that one of them formed his +Gospel out of that of another by a number of additions and subtractions +axe simply incredible. + +But the common narrative exists with the identities of expression +interwoven with its variations. How are we to account for this remarkable +fact? The identities of expression must have had a common origin. But what +do the variations prove? Evidently that the narrative had passed through a +period of oral transmission. No other theory can adequately account for +them. + +Such variations would naturally spring up in the course of oral +transmission. We have already seen that the circumstances of the Church +rendered such a mode of transmission necessary, as details of our Lord's +life must have formed regular portions of Christian instruction. In doing +this, variations would inevitably arise. After a while they would assume a +distinctive type in different Churches. If then the Synoptic narratives +are three versions of an oral Gospel handed down in as many Churches, and +put together with additions by their respective authors, this affords a +reasonable explanation of the phenomena which the common narrative +presents. In this case the only thing which involves a difficulty is the +large number of identities preserved by the Evangelists. This proves the +strong hold which the words must have had on the minds of the members of +the different Churches. + +The existence of a traditionary narrative is still further proved by the +fourth Gospel. No one can deny that this is an independent record, and +that its origin must have been wholly different from that of the other +three. Yet in those portions which cover common ground with the Synoptics +we meet with phenomena of a similar order, all proving that there must +have been a narrative in existence which had impressed itself indelibly on +the mind of the Church; so much so that an entirely independent writer +fell into the same mode of expression when his subject led him to narrate +incidents common to the other three. + +Every consideration which can be brought to bear on this subject tends to +prove the existence of a traditionary narrative of the actions and +teaching of Jesus which was handed down in the Churches prior to the +publication of either of the Synoptic Gospels, and that their common +matter must have passed through a period of oral transmission. It follows +therefore that our three Synoptics are three different versions of the +same oral Gospel modified in the course of transmission and supplemented +by additional information introduced by their respective authors. We know +as a fact that a traditionary narrative maintained its place in the Church +far into the second century. Papias deliberately expressed his preference +for it as compared with written records; and the writings of other Fathers +show their acquaintance with it. + +It is clear therefore that a number of traditionary narratives existed in +the Church; and that if a number of persons had set themselves to reduce +these accounts to writing, they would have presented phenomena analogous +to those of the Synoptic Gospels. I have also shown that these Gospels +present all the phenomena which distinguish this species of narrative. The +substantial agreement of the three, both as to facts and as to the +discourses, is a guarantee that the actual traditions of the Church have +been accurately reported. Their diversities also afford the strongest +proof that these reports were composed in perfect independence of each +other. + +It is remarkable that the great majority of those against whom I am +reasoning admit that the discourses in the Synoptic Gospels are fairly +accurate representations of the actual utterances of Jesus, although they +must have passed through a period of oral transmission. Yet it is certain +that the accurate transmission of discourses by oral tradition is far more +difficult than that of a report of facts through the same medium. The +difficulty of preventing the intrusion of foreign elements is much +greater. Slight alterations may materially affect their meaning. Yet the +discourses recorded in the Synoptics bear the indelible impress of a +single mind, that of Jesus Christ.(6) It follows therefore that if the +traditions of the Church were able to hand down accurately the discourses +of our Lord until the time when they were reduced to writing, still more +easily would they transmit a correct account of His acts as narrated by +His original followers. Except on account of the antecedent difficulty +with which the miraculous element in the narrative is supposed to be +attended, it would be absurd to accept the one and to reject the other as +mere legendary invention. But having once established the fact of the +Resurrection, the antecedent difficulty of the miracles is effectually +disposed of, and the facts resume their place in history. + +It forms no objection to the general argument that some of the Synoptics +contain narratives of considerable length, which are omitted by others. It +was precisely what was to be expected that the traditionary accounts would +vary in this respect, and have incidents reported by different witnesses +of our Lord's ministry incorporated into them. They abound in the Gospel +of St. Luke, who distinctly states that it is a compilation. + +A careful study of the Gospel of St. Matthew must lead to the conclusion +that its narrative portions are derived from the same general sources as +those of the other two. We find in it precisely the same verbal identities +which have been already noticed as affording proof of the existence of a +common source of information, and the same variations which prove that it +must have passed through a period of oral transmission. Nor are the +indications of autoptic testimony stronger in Matthew than in the other +two Evangelists; in fact, they are less so than in Mark. The discourses in +Matthew, viewed as a whole, are a far more complete collection of the +sayings of our Lord, than those in Mark or Luke. It seems to have been one +of the chief purposes of the author of this Gospel to make a collection of +them, and to unite them by a brief narrative of events. But even in the +discourses, some of the variations found in Mark and Luke possess stronger +claims to be regarded as the original form of the utterances of our Lord, +than the corresponding ones in Matthew. In the parts which are common to +the Synoptics, they are evidently founded on one common source of +information; and in this respect neither of them can put in a higher claim +to originality than the other. + +Such are some of the chief characteristics of these Gospels, which have +the most intimate bearing on their claims to be regarded as genuine +historical productions. They are accounts of the traditions of the Church +respecting the life and teaching of its Founder at the time when they were +composed. I have already shown, that if they were composed at any time +between the ministry of Jesus Christ and the first twenty years of the +second century, it would have been impossible to have substituted a +legendary narrative for the account which was handed down in the Church. I +am not concerned to prove that no inaccuracies could have crept into these +traditionary accounts. The only question of the smallest importance is, +are they substantially historical? On this question mere minor details, +the order and arrangement of events, or even the introduction of two or +three erroneous accounts, has no more bearing than it has on the general +credit of other histories. Our question is, what is their value as sources +of history? This must be kept perfectly distinct from the question as to +the nature and extent of the inspiration of the writers. + +With respect to a large number of alleged discrepancies, their whole force +as objections to the historical character of the Gospels is disposed of by +the simple consideration that their authors assert them to be memoirs, and +not histories. No small number of others can be shown to exist only in the +imagination of those who allege them. A few real difficulties will +probably remain; but these no more invalidate their historical character, +than similar ones which are to be found in every writer "from Herodotus to +Mr. Froude." + +It must not be forgotten that a careful examination of the Gospels +discloses a mass of additional evidence on this subject which is +inconsistent with the idea that their narratives are a mere congeries of +legendary inventions. It would be impossible to investigate it in a work +like the present, or even to give an idea of its value, as shown in the +intimate acquaintance of the authors with the events, ideas, customs, and +general circumstances of the times. To compose such stories out of any +materials which could have been at his hand at the beginning of the second +century, supposing him to have been devoid of all personal knowledge on +the subject, would defy any modern writer of fiction, even one possessed +of the highest genius; not to speak of the incompetence of the ancient +world in this class of literature, rendering the attempts of such writers +as existed among the early Christians simply hopeless. + +There are two additional points to which I must draw attention here, in +the internal structure of the Gospels, as establishing their historical +character. + +The strongest evidence which the Gospels afford of their being historical +narratives is the unquestionable fact that they contain a delineation of +the greatest of all characters, Jesus Christ our Lord. This character is +there depicted, even in the opinion of unbelievers of the greatest +eminence, with a matchless perfection. Why will they not grapple with the +question of its origin, and show how it is possible that such a character +should ever have found a place in the Gospels, on any theory which they +have propounded to account for their origin? It does not originate in any +formal sketch or delineation. This the Evangelists have nowhere given. It +is the combined result of all the facts and the discourses which they +contain. The whole subject matter of the Gospels is in fact the material +out of which this great character is delineated. How came it there if the +Gospels consist only of a mass of mythic and legendary stories which +gradually accumulated in the Church? How is it possible that a bundle of +legends thus thrown together can have created the perfect character of +Jesus Christ, forming, as it does, an harmonious whole? How has it come to +pass that the authors of our Gospels, if they each composed their +narratives from a mass of fictions which grew up during a period of +seventy years, have each given us a delineation of the same Jesus? These +are problems which have an intimate bearing on the question whether they +belong to the order of historical or fictitious compositions, but with +which unbelief has hitherto most prudently declined to grapple. I shall +not pursue them further here, as I have discussed them fully in the work +already referred to, and shown that the portraiture of Jesus Christ as +delineated in our Gospels is inconsistent with any theory of their origin +which has been propounded by our opponents. To this work I must refer the +reader. + +But there is a second character which is harmoniously delineated in the +Gospels, to which I have not alluded in the work above referred to, that +of Simon Peter. This character, though a subordinate one, is also a +perfect delineation of its kind, instinct with historic life. It differs +from that of Jesus Christ in being that of a purely human character, +possessed of many of the virtues and not a few of the frailties of +ordinary human nature. No student of the Gospels can rise from their +perusal without a lively conception of it. If they are historical, the +account of the origin of this second character of which they present us so +perfect a delineation is a very simple one. It is that of a genuine man, +whose actions they have correctly recorded. But if the Gospels are such as +my opponents affirm them to be, I must earnestly put to them the question, +How came this character there also? Each Gospel presents us with a +delineation of Peter. In each the same living man is before us, in all his +virtues and in all his failings. How, I ask, is it possible that the +author of each Gospel has succeeded in creating a character of Simon +Peter--each true to nature and each manifestly a delineation of the same +person--out of a number of fictions, myths, and legends? Can any one affirm +that the Peter of the Gospels presents us with one single trait of a +character formed by legend? + +But the existence of this delineation in each of the Gospels involves +those with whom I am reasoning in a yet further difficulty. The New +Testament contains a fifth delineation of the character of Simon Peter, +professedly drawn by himself. I allude to his first Epistle. This +unbelievers say is not his genuine production, though the external +evidence for it is strong. In either case it will be equally available for +my argument. If it was written by him, it is separated by an interval of +from thirty to forty years from the Peter of the Gospels. After such a +period of time we ought to find the same substantial lineaments of +character, but chastened, improved, and softened by the influence of +Christianity. This is precisely what we do find. The Peter of the Epistle +is the Peter of the Gospels, in all the substantial elements of his +character, but raised to a greater moral elevation. The Peter of the +Gospels is the Peter of youthful aspirations, who has had little +experience of the trials and struggles of human life. The Peter of the +Epistle while continually reminding us of the Peter of the Gospels, is a +deeply softened man, with many of his infirmities changed into the graces +to which they are allied. + +Now if the four Peters of the Gospels are fictions, how have their +inventors succeeded in delineating him true to his youthful character, and +true to human nature? If, on the other hand, the Peters of the Gospels and +of the Epistle are all five creations of the imagination, the difficulty +is increased to impossibility. How was it possible for the forger of the +Epistle to have delineated a Peter who should be true to the legendary +character of the Peter of the Gospels, and at the same time such an +improved version of it as would naturally result from the trials of +between thirty and forty years spent in the service and in attempts to put +in practice the teaching of his Master? It follows, therefore, that the +five portraitures of Simon Peter presented us in the New Testament, are so +many distinctive proofs that the Gospels are historical realities, and not +the mere offspring of the imaginations of their respective authors. + +I am now in a position to restore the Gospels to their place in history, +and to estimate the value of their testimony. The Synoptics are so many +versions of the traditions, preserved in the different Churches during the +first century, of that portion of the life and teaching of Jesus which +formed the groundwork of Christianity. Such an account, more or less full, +must have been handed down from the first origin of the Church. This +account received enlargements from different narrators who had been +witnesses of different events of our Lord's life and ministry; but so +completely was it interwoven with the daily course of Christian life, that +it is impossible that matters inconsistent with its fundamental conception +can have become incorporated with it. Moreover, the whole period lay +within the limits of time during which traditions are strictly historical. +No community ever existed which had equal facilities for handing down +accurately the events of its Founder's life, or had stronger inducements +to do so. The Church was struggling for existence, and seeking to +assimilate to itself the elements by which it was surrounded. This alone +must have kept steadily in its memory the leading events of the life of +Jesus. These, as we have seen, must also have formed the subjects in which +its converts were habitually instructed. Jesus Christ, to use the +expressive language of St. Paul, must have been to the primitive Christian +community from the hour of its birth "all and in all." + +From the various direct and indirect references in St. Paul's Epistles we +can form a general idea of the life and teaching of Jesus, as it must have +been accepted by the Churches to which he wrote. All the outlines +furnished by these Epistles may be traced in our present Gospels. If we +descend to a still later period, we shall find that accounts, +substantially the same, were spread over the entire Church. Even if it is +true that the early Ecclesiastical writers do not cite the Gospels, it is +evident that they were in possession of accounts, either written or +unwritten, which were for all practical purposes the same. It follows, +therefore, that as the Synoptics contain three versions of the ministry of +Jesus which were handed down by the Churches of the first century, their +claim to the character of historical documents substantially accurate in +all their main features is unquestionable. + +Nothing is more lamentable than the manner in which a number of minute +verbal questions have been introduced into this great controversy. Both +parties have freely indulged in it. The life of Christianity has been made +to depend on whether some passage in a particular Father bears a precise +verbal agreement with another passage to be found in our present Gospels. +Such matters may be interesting as mere literary questions, but surely +they are not worthy to be dignified by the title of historical ones. To +represent the life of Christianity as depending on them, is to leave the +broad basis of historical investigation, and descend to the mere +technicalities of legal evidence, by which the parties who are most +capable of throwing light on the case are excluded from giving evidence at +all, while many minor points are debated with the utmost ardour. I desire +to express no opinion as to whether this is right or wrong in judicial +processes; but the principles of history are widely different. All +evidence must be accepted for what it is worth, and for no more. The +issues are great ones, and are not dependent on any mere set of barren +technicalities. + +Christianity is not only one of the greatest facts in history, but the +greatest; and its truth or falsehood can never be dependent on whether a +passage more or less in Justin Martyr is an accurate citation of another +in St. Matthew's Gospel. The only questions of real importance are: Do the +numerous references of the early Christian writers to the life and +teaching of Jesus Christ substantially agree with the accounts of that +life and teaching given in our Gospels? Do they contain any account which +gives a really different version of it? If such agreement exists, although +there may be minor differences, the matter is settled as an historical +question. The Gospels, in all their great outlines, are virtually accurate +accounts of the traditions of the primitive Church respecting the actions +and the teaching of its Founder, and as such they satisfy all the +conditions of history. + +It is impossible that I should in this place enter on the question of the +authorship or the date of the Fourth Gospel. The literature on this +subject would fill a library of no mean size. I shall only refer to Mr. +Sanday's able vindication of its historical character. One thing +respecting it is clear. It is either the veritable work of an eye-witness +of the facts which it records, or it is a consummate fiction, such as can +be found nowhere else, either in the ancient or the modern world. Its +author must have united a fixed determination to perpetrate a forgery on a +most sacred subject, with one of the loftiest ideals of morality, and an +inimitable power of simple description, and of inventing fictitious scenes +in a manner which is in the highest degree true to human nature. If this +work was really written by a person who was not a Jew, one hundred and +fifty years after the events which are described in it, and a century +after the destruction of Jerusalem, the accuracy of its descriptions is +one of the most singular phenomena in literary history. Wherever it runs +parallel with the Synoptic Gospels, it throws light on their obscurities +without the smallest apparent intention of doing so. In some places it +helps to correct erroneous impressions into which the reader of the +Synoptic narratives might otherwise have fallen. Even in that most +striking disagreement between them, respecting the Paschal character of +the Last Supper, we find in the Synoptics hints which corroborate St. +John's account of it. One simple alternative, and one only, lies before +us; either to accept this Gospel as a history of the highest authority, or +to reject it as an audacious forgery. + +It now remains for me very briefly to consider the value of the testimony +of the Gospels to the truth of the Resurrection. + +If one thing more than another is evident respecting them, it is that they +were not written for the purposes of controversy with unbelievers, but for +the instruction of Christians. It is certain that the last thing which +occurred to their authors was to guard their narratives against possible +objections. This is made clear by every page. At the time when they were +composed, the Resurrection had long been accepted by the entire body of +believers, as the foundation of their faith. It was therefore not +necessary for the Gospels to prove it, as it would have been if they had +been composed with a direct view to unbelievers. This is a point which it +is important to bear in mind in considering the nature of their testimony. +Two of the narratives of it are entirely incidental; and it is quite clear +that their authors never intended to give an exhaustive account of the +facts. The other two, though giving us more details, participate largely +in the same character. It is impossible to read either narrative with care +and not feel that it was never intended to be a systematic account of all +the facts with which the author was acquainted respecting the +Resurrection. + +It is objected against these narratives that they abound with variations, +amounting to contradictions. The variations are unquestionable, and it +will readily be conceded that it is extremely difficult to piece together +all the details of the existing accounts so as to weave them into an +harmonious whole. In fact they are inevitable whenever the incidents +described are of exciting interest. Such must have been the character of +those connected with the Resurrection. + +The chief difficulty is found in the details of the morning of that +important day. They are in an extremely fragmentary form, and it is quite +clear that we have not all the events before us. If we had, we should then +be in a position to judge what is the precise nature of the variations in +the minor details. But even if contradictions could be proved to exist, +how does their presence invalidate the main facts, whose truth is +established by wholly independent testimony? The only way in which it can +be made to do so is by mixing up questions involving particular theories +of inspiration with considerations purely historical. Such discrepancies +exist in connection with some of the most important facts of history in +their minor details, without in the smallest degree invalidating their +historical credibility. + +This may be easily tested by examining a number of newspaper accounts of +any exciting event, which are derived from reporters entirely independent +of each other. One witnesses one thing, and one another; and it is often +difficult to weave the whole into a perfectly consistent narrative. No one +can doubt that the morning of the Resurrection must have been one in the +last degree exciting to the disciples of our Lord. They were not mere +reporters, but persons profoundly interested in the various occurrences. +It would therefore have been inconsistent with the historical truth of +their position, if their narratives had presented us with no variations. + +It is certain that several women accompanied our Lord on His last journey +to Jerusalem. What was more likely than that they would visit the +sepulchre at different times, and with different purposes? Can any one +doubt that their excitement must have been great? What conceivable +difference can it make to the great fact of the Resurrection, that one +account mentions two Marys as going to the sepulchre; that the second adds +to these Salome; that the third mentions several women; and that the +fourth mentions Mary Magdalene alone? There might have been, as far as +anything which appears in the narratives is concerned, several different +visits; or the same person may have returned more than once. Or what is +the use of urging that there is an apparent variation of about an hour +between the different accounts, as to the precise time when these visits +were made? Do variations of this description, which are found in accounts +derived from eye-witnesses of Louis XVI's flight from Paris, in the +smallest degree invalidate the fact? Or what conceivable difference does +it make that one narrative represents the women as seeing one angel, and +another two; and that one describes the appearance as taking place inside, +and another outside the sepulchre? It is quite possible that all these +accounts may be true, and that these occurrences took place on different +occasions. If they were true, nothing was more unlikely than that the +women could have given an orderly narrative of them. Variations must occur +in all reports of events when the witnesses see only a portion of them. +The great facts before us are plain and evident; and unless they are +falsehoods, there could be no possibility of mistake respecting them. +Different bodies of women found the sepulchre empty. Some of them affirmed +that they had seen Jesus risen from the dead, and that He sent a message +by them to His disciples. Peter and John visited the sepulchre, and found +it empty. Later in the same day, Peter affirmed that Jesus Christ appeared +to him; on which day also two other disciples affirmed that they had seen +Him on a journey, at first without recognizing Him, but that they did so +afterwards. On the evening of the same day, these two disciples, ten of +the Apostles, with other persons in company, saw Him in a body, and were +permitted to test the reality of His Resurrection by handling His Person, +and by seeing Him eat. About such facts there could be no mistake. Most of +them were well known and accepted when St. Paul wrote his Epistles, when +the means of testing their truth was ample. We know on the same authority +that the whole apostolic body asserted that they had seen the Lord, and +that as many as five hundred other persons made a similar assertion. These +are the chief facts, and a number of minor variations such as those above +referred to cannot affect their credibility. + +It has been objected that the author of St. Matthew's Gospel was ignorant +of some of these appearances. On what ground is the objection made? On the +fact that he has not mentioned them? Does a writer always report all he +knows, especially when his writing is intended for the use of those who +firmly believe the fact already? Nothing can exceed the fragmentary +character of this portion of his narrative. If this Gospel was composed at +the late period assigned to it by those against whom I am reasoning, +namely, A.D. 90, it is incredible that these were the only facts known to +the writer, at least thirty years after St. Paul wrote his Epistles. The +charge of ignorance might be sustained with far greater plausibility if it +were admitted that St. Matthew was the author of this Gospel, because it +might have been expected that he would mention the first occasion on which +his Master had appeared to him rather than the third. But his authorship +is denied, and the publication of the Gospel assigned to the last ten +years of the century, when it was impossible that the author, whoever he +may have been, could be ignorant that it was alleged that our Lord had +appeared on other occasions besides those mentioned by him. + +I will now consider the threefold account of the great appearance on the +morning of Easter-day. One of them is contained in the supplement to St. +Mark's Gospel; the other two are those in Luke and John. Let us first +carefully observe the mode in which they are narrated in the supplement. + +Its author seems to have entertained a stronger view of the indisposition +of the disciples to believe the truth of the Resurrection than the other +two narratives appear to warrant. He first notices the appearance to Mary +Magdalene on the morning of that day, and says that the disciples refused +to credit her report. Next, he tells us of the appearance to the two +disciples as they went into the country; and states that on their return +they told it to the remainder, "_Neither believed __ they them._" +"Afterward," he adds, "he appeared _to the eleven as they sat at meat, and +upbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they +believed not those who had seen him after he was risen_." It is evident +that the author of the supplement entertained a strong view of the +incredulity of the disciples when their companions reported to them the +fact of the Resurrection. + +Let us now examine how the facts stand in Luke's narrative. It opens with +a detailed account of the journey into the country of Cleopas and his +companion, and of our Lord's appearance to them. Our Lord addresses them +in the following words: "_O fools and slow of heart,_" ({~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} +{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}) "_to believe all that the prophets have spoken._" After +their recognition of Jesus, they are described as immediately returning to +Jerusalem, "_and find the eleven gathered together and those that were +with them, saying, the Lord is risen indeed, and hath appeared unto +Simon._" "_And they_" (_i.e._ Cleopas and his companion) "_told what +things were done on the way, and how he was known unto them in the +breaking of bread._" The narrative then proceeds: "_And as they thus +spake,_" (_i.e._ Cleopas and his companion) "_Jesus himself stood in the +midst of them, and said unto them, Peace be unto you._" It then informs us +that they were terrified and supposed that the appearance was that of a +spirit. On this our Lord reasons with them: "_Why are ye troubled, and why +do thoughts arise in your hearts? Behold my hands and my feet that it is I +myself, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have. And when +he had thus spoken, he showed them his hands and his feet._" The writer +then adds: "And when they yet believed not for joy and wondered, he said +unto them, Have ye here any meat? And they gave him a piece of a broiled +fish, and of an honey-comb, and he took it and did eat before them." The +author then proceeds with his narrative: "These are the words that I spake +unto you, while I was yet with you, that all things might be fulfilled +that are written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets and in the +Psalms concerning me." And he adds: "_Then opened he their understanding, +that they might understand the Scriptures._" + +The following is the account given of the same meeting in St. John's +Gospel. After having given a full description of the appearance to Mary +Magdalene, he thus describes our Lord's appearance on the evening of +Easter-day: "Then the first day at evening, being the first day of the +week, when the doors were shut where the disciples were assembled for fear +of the Jews, _came Jesus and stood in the midst, and said unto them, Peace +be unto you. And when he had so said, he showed them his hands and his +side._ Then were the disciples glad when they saw the Lord. _Then said +Jesus unto them again, Peace be unto you: as my Father hath sent me, even +so send I you. And when he had said this he breathed on them, and said, +Receive ye the Holy Ghost._" + +The difference between the supplement of Mark's Gospel and the narratives +of Luke and John is very remarkable. Are the variations such as would be +found in different reports of a set of fictions, or are they such as +distinguish brief but inexact reports of actual occurrences? This is a +very important question. + +First: the three accounts bear the clearest indications of being +independent. It is incredible that any one of the three writers having +before him one or both of the other two accounts should have composed his +own as it now stands. + +Secondly: the author of the supplement uses very strong language in +describing the unbelief of the disciples. He says that when they told it +to the others, they did not believe their report. St. Luke, on the other +hand, informs us that as soon as Cleopas and his companion entered the +room where on their return they found the Apostles and others assembled +together, they were received with the exclamation: "_The Lord is risen +indeed, and hath appeared unto Simon._" + +Again: the author of the supplement says that when Jesus appeared to the +eleven as they sat at meat "_he upbraided them with their unbelief and +hardness of heart_ ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}) +_because they did not believe them that had seen him after he was risen._" +St. Luke tells us that not only were Cleopas and his companion received +with the joyful exclamation, "_The Lord is risen indeed_," but instead of +upbraiding them Jesus addressed them with the words "_Peace be unto you_;" +which is confirmed by the author of the fourth Gospel, who, if St. John +was really the author, must have been present. In neither of these Gospels +is there one word of "upbraiding the disciples with unbelief;" while both +affirm that Jesus proceeded to give them rational grounds for believing +that He was actually risen from the dead, by showing them, according to +one, "his hands and his feet," according to the other, "his hands and his +side." It is quite probable that He may have done both. St. John adds, +"_Then were the disciples glad when they saw the Lord._" + +But St. Luke's account is more specific. He tells us that immediately on +His entry fear took possession of their minds. "_They were terrified and +affrighted_," and supposed that it might be a spirit, and not Jesus +actually raised from the dead. Our Lord therefore before showing them His +hands and His feet proceeded to reason with them as to the reality of His +appearance. "_Handle me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones __ +as ye see me have._" Here there is nothing of reproach, such as is +suggested by the supplement to St. Mark's Gospel. Yet there was +incredulity of a certain kind in the room, but not one which was worthy of +reproach. We learn from St. Luke that it was not the incredulity of +_unbelief, but of joy_; in other words, that the news seemed too good to +be true, and they dared scarcely trust the evidence of their senses. On +this however nothing in the form of a _reproach_ passes the lips of Jesus; +but for their further satisfaction, _he asks for food and eats it before +them_. + +On all these points the narratives of St. Luke and St. John throw light on +each other, as such accounts, if founded on fact, ought to do, while their +independence is indisputable. According to those with whom I am reasoning, +the Gospel of St. John is much the latest written. If therefore the author +had borrowed from Luke, it is incredible that a writer who had such powers +of setting forth fictions in the garb of facts, should have omitted the +other remarkable incidents mentioned by St. Luke, and not have dressed +them up with the art of which he was so consummate a master, for these +would have communicated a striking reality to the scenes. It is therefore +unquestionable that these two accounts present all the phenomena of +history, and none of those of fiction. + +But how stands the continuation of St. Mark's Gospel, which affirms that +our Lord upbraided the eleven with their unbelief and hardness of heart on +the occasion of His appearance on Easter evening? + +The author of the supplement was probably not aware that Cleopas and his +companion were present in the room when our Lord appeared to the eleven, +or even that others besides the eleven were present, as is expressly +affirmed by St. Luke to have been the case. The impression which it leaves +on the mind is that they reported the Resurrection to the disciples +generally on their return, and that it was disbelieved by them, and that +the appearance to the eleven was a subsequent event. + +We are now in a position to see how this misapprehension may have +originated; and that instead of invalidating the account, it forms a +strong confirmation of its truth. There were persons in the room whom our +Lord had actually reproached for their unbelief, viz. Cleopas and his +companion; though He reproached none who were present on the occasion of +His appearance. The words stated by St. Luke to have been used by Him +were, {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}, "O fools and slow of heart." Those +used in St. Mark in describing the address to the eleven are {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} +{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, "He upbraided their unbelief and +hardness of heart." The one expression is the very counterpart of the +other. There were persons present who had been thus reproached but a few +hours before: the author of the continuation was aware of the fact that +some had been thus reproached, and he supposed that the reproach was +addressed to all the assembled disciples, instead of the salutation of +peace with its attendant circumstances. + +Then as to their having been received with expressions of incredulity on +their return, St. Luke tells us that they returned to Jerusalem, "_and +found the eleven gathered together, and them that were with them._" Now as +they had set out early in the day, it was necessary on their return that +they should make some inquiry as to where the Apostles were to be found. +In doing this it is probable enough that they went to inquire of some +disciples who received their account with incredulity, and that then this +incredulity may through misapprehension have been transferred to the whole +assembly. I submit therefore that notwithstanding this disagreement +between the three accounts, that of the continuation of St. Mark's Gospel +gives a strong corroboration of the statements of the other two. These are +precisely the kind of variations which we find in reports of events after +they have passed through a few stages of oral transmission. + +The narratives of St. Luke and St. John furnish us with one more very +incidental confirmation of each other. St. Luke informs us that on the +occasion of this interview our Lord "_opened their understanding, that +they might understand the Scriptures._" St. John says that "_He breathed +on them, and said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost._" The words and the mode of +expression differ greatly; but both statements point to one and the same +fact, that on this occasion the persons present supposed that they +received a supernatural enlightenment. St. Luke describes the effect +produced on the minds of the disciples; St. John gives the actual medium +of its production. Coincidences of this kind prove that the narratives +must be founded on facts, and are beyond the skill of a forger to imitate. + +I have now considered a few of the leading features of the Gospels, which +establish the general historical character of their contents. A close +examination of them would put us in possession of a large amount of +additional evidence, but to enter on such an inquiry here would be +inconsistent with the limits of the present work. As I have already +observed, the minute scrutiny of a number of minor details, as far as the +great historical question is concerned, would be a needless expenditure of +labour. The real question at issue is: Is the account of our Lord's life +and teaching, as it is handed down in our present Gospels, substantially +true in its great outlines, or has one of a wholly different character +been substituted for the true one, and usurped its place in the teaching +of the Church? On a broad question of this kind, minor discrepancies in +the accounts have no real bearing. If the narrative is true in its great +outlines, it follows that our Lord's character must have been beyond all +question superhuman, and justifies us in affirming that He must have been +a "teacher come from God." Such a conclusion will still leave open a +number of questions of the deepest importance, but they belong to the +province of theology to investigate, and form no necessary portion of an +historical inquiry. If the Gospels _in their broad outlines_ are +historical; above all, _if Jesus Christ rose from the dead_, it follows +that the New Testament must contain a divine revelation. + +As this last fact forms the central position of Christianity, I have made +its historical truth the chief subject of my investigation. In doing this +I have relied only on documents which are contained in the New Testament +itself, and chiefly on those whose genuineness is conceded by opponents. I +have shown that no species of documents can possess a higher historical +value than these, and that the circumstances under which they were +written, the nature of their contents, and the persons to whom they were +addressed, form an attestation to the truth of the facts asserted in them, +which is unrivalled in the whole course of literature. By means of these I +have firmly established the fact that the belief in the Resurrection of +Jesus Christ was the foundation on which the Church rested as a community +from the first dawning of its existence, and the basis of the life of its +individual members; and that considerable numbers of the followers of +Jesus Christ affirmed that they had seen and conversed with Him after He +had risen from the dead. I have shown that these facts rest on the highest +form of historical attestation. This being so, there can be only two +alternatives respecting them. Either the belief in the Resurrection was +founded on the fact that He actually rose from the dead; or it must have +originated in the delusions of His followers. I have shown that the +various theories which have been propounded to account for it on the +latter supposition, when tested by the actual facts, are untrue both to +human nature and to the possibilities of the case. From this it results, +as a necessary consequence, that JESUS CHRIST ROSE FROM THE DEAD. If He +rose from the dead, the truth of His divine mission is established, and +His claim to be the King and supreme Legislator of the Church is +vindicated. This claim may be fully set forth in two sayings of His own, +recorded in St. John's Gospel: "I am the light of the world; he that +followeth Me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of +life." (xiii. 12.) "Thou sayest that I am a king. For this end was I born, +and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto +the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice." (xviii. 37.) + +The practical conclusion which this investigation suggests cannot be +better expressed than in the words of the same divine Teacher: "He that +believeth, believeth not on me, but on Him that sent me; and he that seeth +me seeth Him that sent me. I am come, a light into the world, that +whosoever believeth on me should not abide in darkness. And if any man +hear my words, and believe not, I judge him not; for I came not to judge +the world, but to save the world. He that rejecteth me, and receiveth not +my words, hath one that judgeth him; the word that I have spoken, the same +shall judge him in the last day." + +THE END. + + + + + + +FOOTNOTES + + + 1 My quotations throughout this work are taken from the first edition. + The passage here quoted is somewhat altered in the third edition, + but not so as to affect the general meaning. + + 2 The word which is here translated in the A. V. "miracles" is in the + original {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}. + + 3 J. S. Mill, in his recently published essays, considers this the + most formidable objection against theism. + + 4 See for example, Matt. v. 39-42, Luke vi. 20, 21, 24-26, and various + others of a similar description. + + 5 "The Jesus of the Evangelists." + + 6 Mr. Mill, in his recently published Essay on Theism, has strongly + expressed his belief that these discourses are the veritable + utterances of Jesus. + + + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SUPERNATURAL IN THE NEW TESTAMENT*** + + + +CREDITS + + +August 19, 2014 + + Project Gutenberg TEI edition 1 + Produced by David King, and the Online Distributed + Proofreading Team at <http://www.pgdp.net/>. + + + +A WORD FROM PROJECT GUTENBERG + + +This file should be named 46630-8.txt or 46630-8.zip. + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + + + http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/4/6/6/3/46630/ + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one -- the old editions will be +renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law +means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the +Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States +without permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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