path: root/45915-0.txt

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 45915 ***

Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this
      file which includes the original illustrations.
      See 45915-h.htm or 45915-h.zip:
      (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/45915/45915-h/45915-h.htm)
      or
      (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/45915/45915-h.zip)


      Images of the original pages are available through
      Internet Archive. See
      https://archive.org/details/pacificationofbu00crosrich





THE PACIFICATION OF BURMA


[Illustration: _Picket on the Chin Hills._
LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD.]


THE PACIFICATION OF BURMA

by

SIR CHARLES CROSTHWAITE, K.C.S.I.

Chief Commissioner of Burma, 1887-1890
Member of the Council of India, etc., etc.

With Illustrations and Maps







London
Edward Arnold
1912

(All rights reserved)




PREFACE


Upper Burma was invaded and annexed in the year 1885. The work hardly
occupied a month. In the following year the subjugation of the people
by the destruction of all formidable armed resistance was effected;
lastly, the pacification of the country, including the establishment of
an orderly government with peace and security, occupied four years.

As head of the civil administration, I was mainly concerned with this
last phase.

It would be a difficult task to give a continuous history of the
military operations by which the country was subjugated. The resistance
opposed to our troops was desultory, spasmodic, and without definite
plan or purpose. The measures taken to overcome it necessarily were
affected by these characteristics, although they were framed on
definite principles. A history of them would resolve itself into a
number of more or less unconnected narratives.

A similar difficulty, but less in degree, meets the attempt to record
the measures which I have included in the term "pacification." Certain
definite objects were always before us. The policy to be followed for
their attainment was fixed, and the measures and instruments by which
it was to be carried out were selected and prepared. But I have found
it best not to attempt to follow any order, either chronological or
other, in writing this narrative.

My purpose in writing has been to give an intelligible narrative of
the work done in Burma in the years following the annexation. It was
certainly arduous work done under great difficulties of all kinds,
and, from the nature of the case, with less chance of recognition or
distinction than of disease or death. The work was, I believe, well
done, and has proved itself to be good.

My narrative may not attract many who have no connection with Burma.
But for those who served in Burma during the period covered by it,
whether soldiers or civilians, it may have an interest, and especially
for those still in the Burma Commission and their successors.

I hope that Field-Marshal Sir George White, V.C., to whom, and to all
the officers and men of the Burma Field Force, I owe so much, may find
my pages not without interest.

I have endeavoured to show how the conduct of the soldiers of the
Queen, British and Indian, helped the civil administration to establish
peace.

I believe, as I have said, that our work has been successful. The
credit, let us remember, is due quite as much to India as to Britain.
How long would it have taken to subjugate and pacify Burma if we had
not been able to get the help of the fighting-men from India, and what
would have been the cost in men and money? For the Burmans themselves
I, in common with all who have been associated with them, have a
sincere affection. Many of them assisted us from the first, and from
the Upper Burmans many loyal and capable gentlemen are now helping to
govern their country justly and efficiently.

It has been brought home to me in making this rough record how many of
those who took part in this campaign against disorder have laid down
their lives. I hope I may have helped to do honour to their memories.

I have to thank all the kind friends who have sent me photographs to
illustrate this book, and especially Sir Harvey Adamson, the present
Lieutenant-Governor, for his kindness in making my wants known.

  C. H. C.
  _February, 1912._




CONTENTS


    CHAPTER                                                      PAGE

        I. THE ADMINISTRATION OF BURMA                              1
       II. THE CHIEF COMMISSIONERSHIP OF BURMA                     19
      III. UPPER BURMA                                             30
       IV. MANDALAY                                                37
        V. DEALING WITH DACOITS                                    60
       VI. CIVIL AND MILITARY WORKS                                66
      VII. A VISIT TO BHAMO                                        74
     VIII. DISARMAMENT                                             80
       IX. TROUBLE WITH THE WUNTHO SAWBWA                          90
        X. MILITARY REPLACED BY POLICE                             95
       XI. BURMA BECOMES A FRONTIER PROVINCE                      100
      XII. DACOITY IN THE MINBU AND MYINGYAN DISTRICTS            107
     XIII. TROUBLE IN THE MAGWÈ DISTRICT                          115
      XIV. GRADUAL CREATION OF AN EFFICIENT POLICE FORCE          128
       XV. THE SHAN STATES                                        133
      XVI. THE SHAN STATES (_continued_)                          160
     XVII. THE KARENNIS, OR RED KARENS, AND SAWLAPAW              188
    XVIII. THE TRANS-SALWEEN STATES                               209
      XIX. BHAMO AND MOGAUNG                                      234
       XX. BHAMO, THE SOUTHERN TOWNSHIPS, AND MÖNG MIT            268
      XXI. THE CHINS                                              287
     XXII. THE CHIN-LUSHAI CAMPAIGN                               308
    XXIII. INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF BURMA                       337
           INDEX                                                  343




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS


    PICKET ON THE CHIN HILLS                           _Frontispiece_
                                                          FACING PAGE
    THE PALACE, MANDALAY--"CENTRE OF THE UNIVERSE"                  6
    THAYETMYO--MAIL STEAMER LEAVING                                26
    A PONGHI'S FUNERAL PROCESSION                                  38
    MANDALAY                                                       48
    SHWÈTAKYAT PROMONTORY OPPOSITE SAGAING                         64
    "THE MOAT," MANDALAY, AND NORTH WALL OF FORT DUFFERIN          70
    OUTER BAMBOO STOCKADE OF BURMESE FRONTIER VILLAGE              86
    CONSULTATION OF VILLAGE HEADMEN WITH CHIEF COMMISSIONER        90
    BURMESE DACOITS BEFORE TRIAL-WORST CHARACTERS AND
    NATIVE POLICE GUARD                                           110
    SAW MÖNG, SAWBWA OF YAWNGHWÈ, AND HIS CONSORT                 142
    PADAUNG LADIES--SHAN STATES                                   154
    A JUNGLE CAMP IN THE SHAN STATES                              166
    PAGODAS AT MANG KAO-SHAN STATES                               180
    GROUP OF RED KARENS                                           190
    SAWLAWI--SAWBWA GANTARAWADI. (RED KARENS)                     202
        THE EASTERNMOST POINT OF THE BRITISH-INDIAN EMPIRE--REACH
        OF THE ME KHONG, WHERE OUR BOUNDARY
        MARCHES WITH FRENCH INDO-CHINA                            212
    KACHIN WOMEN AND CHILDREN                                     244
    YAWGIN WITH CROSS-BOW (MOUNTAINS NORTH OF MYIT KYINA)         250
    KACHIN WOMEN (NORTHERN IRRAWADDY)                             250
    BHAMO BATTALION DRAWN UP FOR INSPECTION                       252
    GETTING A DHOOLIE UP AN AWKWARD BIT                           268
    CLIMBING UP THE STEEP CHIN HILLS (CHIN CAMPAIGN)              268
    BARGAINING WITH HAKA CHINS                                    276
    MARCHING INTO THE KLANG KLANG COUNTRY (CHIN-LUSHAI
        CAMPAIGN)                                                 282
    HAKA SLAVE-WOMAN SMOKING A PIPE                               284
    HAKA BRAVES                                                   284
    ON THE CHIN HILLS--ARRANGING PLAN OF ATTACK (CHIN-LUSHAI
        CAMPAIGN)                                                 288
    HAKA CHINS                                                    292
    A CHIN "ZU" DRINK                                             292
    IN THE SECOND DEFILE OF THE IRRAWADDY BELOW BHAMO             304
    BURMESE LADIES MAKING A CALL                                  324




MAPS


  MAP OF SHAN STATES                                              133
  MAP OF TRANS-SALWEEN                                            209
  MAP OF BHAMO MONGMIT                                            234
  MAP OF CHIN HILLS, ETC.                                         253
  MAP OF KACHIN HILLS, BHAMO, KATHA                               303




THE PACIFICATION OF BURMA




CHAPTER I

THE ADMINISTRATION OF BURMA


On the 20th of December, 1852, Lord Dalhousie issued a proclamation
annexing the province of Pegu to the British Dominions. "The
Governor-General in Council," he said, "having exacted the reparation
he deems sufficient, desires no further conquest in Burma and is
willing that hostilities should cease.

"But if the King of Ava shall fail to renew his former relations with
the British Government, and if he shall recklessly seek to dispute its
quiet possession of the province it has now declared to be its own, the
Governor-General in Council will again put forth the power he holds
and will visit with full retribution aggressions, which, if they be
persisted in, must of necessity lead to the total subversion of the
Burman State and to the ruin and exile of the King and his race."

In 1885 the fulfilment of this menace--prophecy it might be called--was
brought about by the contumacy of the Government of Ava. The Burman
State was "totally subverted." Its territories were added to the
British Empire. The King and his race were "ruined and exiled."

At the end of November, 1885, the British commander was in full
possession of Mandalay, the capital. Our forces had made a procession
up the great river, which is the main artery of the country, almost
unopposed. Such opposition as there had been was childish in its
feebleness and want of skill and purpose. Fortunately for us the King
and his ministers prided themselves on their voluntary army system.
King Thebaw was not going to compel his subjects to defend their
country. They were told to go about their daily tasks without fear or
carefulness. They might sleep in their beds. He would see to it that
the foreign barbarians were driven into the sea whence they had come.
Unfortunately the soldiers to whom he trusted were insufficiently
trained, badly armed and equipped. He had intended, perhaps, to remedy
all this and to train his troops for six months before the fighting
began.

His enemy, however, was unreasonably hasty and had an abundance of
fast steamers for transporting the invading force. Before the training
could begin or the arms be provided or the officers instructed, the
invaders were before Ava, where the bulk of the defending army had been
collected, and a few miles from the capital. The King's government was
as helpless as it had been arrogant and pretentious. Ministers of State
were sent down in hot haste with messages of submission and surrender.

The army, however, took a different view of the case. They refused
to obey the order to surrender which had come from Mandalay. Before
General Prendergast could land his men they dispersed over the country
in every direction with their arms, and as the British force had no
cavalry to pursue them, they got away to a man. At first under various
leaders, few of whom showed any military talent, they waged a guerilla
warfare against the invaders; and afterwards, when their larger
divisions had been defeated and broken up, they succeeded in creating a
state of anarchy and brigandage ruinous to the peasantry and infinitely
harassing to the British.

On the 29th of November Mandalay was occupied and the King a prisoner
on his way down the river to Rangoon. The waterway from Mandalay to the
sea was under our control. A few of the principal places on the banks
of the river had been held by small garrisons as the expedition came
up, and the ultimate subjugation of the Burman people was assured. The
trouble, however, was to come.

To a loosely organized nation like the Burmese, the occupation of the
capital and the removal of the King meant nothing. They were still free
to resist and fight. It was to be five years before the last of the
large gangs was dispersed, the leaders captured, and peace and security
established.

Burma will be, in all likelihood, the last important province to be
added to the Indian Empire. Eastward that Empire has been extended as
far as our arms can well reach. Its boundaries march with Siam, with
the French dominion of Tongking, and on the East and North for a vast
distance with China. Our convention with France for the preservation of
the territory which remains to Siam and our long friendship with the
latter country bars any extension of our borders in that direction. It
is improbable that we shall be driven to encroach on Chinese territory;
and so far as the French possessions are concerned, a line has been
drawn by agreement which neither side will wish to cross.

In all likelihood, therefore, the experience gained in Burma will not
be repeated in Asia. Nevertheless it may be worth while to put on
record a connected account of the methods by which a country of wide
extent, destitute of roads and covered with dense jungle and forest,
in which the only rule had become the misrule of brigands and the only
order systematic disorder, was transformed in a few years into a quiet
and prosperous State.

I cannot hope that the story will be of interest to many, but it may be
of some interest and perhaps of use to those who worked with me and to
their successors.

From 1852 to 1878 King Mindôn ruled Upper Burma fairly well. He had
seized the throne from the hands of his brother Pagan Min, whose
life he spared with more humanity than was usual on such occasions.
He was, to quote from the Upper Burma Administration Report of 1886,
"an enlightened Prince who, while professing no love for the British,
recognized the power of the British Government, was always careful to
keep on friendly terms with them, and was anxious to introduce into
his kingdom, as far as was compatible with the maintenance of his own
autocratic power, Western ideas and Western civilization." He was
tolerant in religious matters even for a Burmese Buddhist. He protected
and even encouraged the Christian missions in Upper Burma, and for
Dr. Marks, the representative of the Society for the Propagation of
the Gospel in Mandalay he built a handsome teak church and a good
clergy-house, giving a tinge of contempt to his generosity by putting
them down by the Burmese burial-ground. The contempt was not for the
religion but for the foreign barbarians who professed it.

His measures for encouraging trade and increasing and ordering the
revenues were good, and the country prospered under him. In Burma
there are no hereditary leaders of the people. There is no hereditary
aristocracy outside the royal family, and their descendants rapidly
merge into the people. There was no law or binding custom determining
the descent of the crown within the family. Every one with royal blood,
however little, in his veins was a potential pretender. Whenever the
crown demised the succession was settled by intrigue or violence, and
possible aspirants were removed by the prince who had obtained the
prize. There was no other way of securing its peaceful enjoyment.

Under the King was the Hlutdaw, or great Council of State, composed of
the Chief Ministers, who were appointed by the King from the courtiers
who had the good fortune to be known to him or had helped him to the
throne. To each of these was assigned a province of the empire, which
he governed through a deputy.

The immediate power was vested in the deputy, who resided in the
province and remitted to the Minister as much as he could collect over
and above the amount due to the crown and, it need hardly be said,
necessary for his own needs. The provinces were divided into townships,
which were ruled by officials appointed by the governors, no doubt with
regard to local influence and claims, and with a general inclination to
keep the office in a family.

The really stable part of the administration on which everything rested
was the village, the headship of which was by custom hereditary, but
not necessarily in the direct line.

As there was little central control, it may be supposed that under a
system of this kind the people were pillaged, and doubtless they were
to some extent. But the deputy-governor on the spot had no organized
police or militia to support him. If he wanted to use force he had to
pay for it, and if he drove his province to the point of rebellion he
was unlikely to profit by it.

The amount of revenue was fixed at Mandalay with reference to a rough
estimate of what the province could pay, and that was divided amongst
the townships and again amongst the villages. The headman of each
village, assisted by a committee or Punchayet, as it would be called
in India, settled the sum due from each householder, and this was as a
rule honestly and fairly done. It was not a bad system on the whole,
and it was in its incidence probably as just as local taxation in Great
Britain, which I admit is somewhat faint praise.

As to the administration of justice between man and man and the
security of life and property, there was no doubt little refinement of
law and not always impartiality in the judges. The majority of civil
cases in a society like Burma, where there are few rich men and no
great landowners, must be trivial, and in Burma disputes were settled
by arbitration or by the village headmen, who could rarely set at
nought the opinion of their fellow-villagers.

In a country which is under-populated and contains vast areas of land
fit for cultivation unoccupied and free to all, migration is a great
check on oppression. Life is simple in Burma. The climate for the most
of the year makes a roof unnecessary; flitting is easy. Every man is
his own carpenter. He has put together his house of bamboo and planks
cut by his own hands. He knows how to take it down. He has not to send
for contractors or furniture vans. There are the carts and the plough
cattle in his sheds. He has talked things over with his wife, who is a
capable and sensible woman.

One morning they get up, and instead of going to his fields or his
fishing or whatever it may be, he takes his tools, and before sunset,
his wife helping, the house is down and, with the simple household
goods, is in the cart. The children find a place in it, or if they are
old enough they run along with the mother. If the local magistrate
is so blind to his own interests as to oppress his people, there is
another wiser man a few score leagues away who is ready to welcome
them. For what is the good of land without men to live on it? Is not
the King's revenue assessed at so much to the house? But suppose the
worst comes to the worst and the man in power is a fiend, and neither
property nor life nor honour is safe from him, even then there is the
great forest, in which life, though hard, is a real pleasure to a man;
and, given a good leader, the oppressed may soon change places with his
oppressor.

We are too ready to imagine that life under such a King as Mindôn
or even as Thebaw must be unbearable. We fancy them armed with all
the organization of the Inland Revenue Department and supported by
a force like our constabulary. Fortunately they were not. No system
of extortion yet devised by the most ruthless and greedy tyrant is
at all comparable in its efficacy to the scientific methods of a
modern revenue officer. The world will see to what a perfection of
completeness the arts of oppression and squeezing can be carried
when the power of modern European organization is in the hands of a
socialist government.

It need not be supposed, therefore, that under King Mindôn life in
Upper Burma was bad, and it must be remembered that since 1852 escape
to British Burma, although forbidden, was not impossible.

Under Thebaw things were different. Mindôn was on the whole
well-intentioned, and had kept the power in his own hands. Thebaw was
weak and incompetent, and the Ministers who had most influence with him
were the worst men. With his barbarities, old-fashioned rather than
unexampled, and perhaps not much worse than the measures of precaution
usually taken in Burma after the succession of a new king, or with the
causes of the war which led to his deposition, the present narrative
is not concerned. It is desired to give as clear an idea as possible
of the state of Upper Burma when we were called upon to administer the
country.

The rapacity and greed of the Court, where the Queen Supayalat was the
ruling spirit, set the example to the whole hierarchy of officials.
The result was a state of extreme disorder throughout the whole
kingdom. The demands made on the people for money became excessive and
intolerable. Men left their villages and took to the jungle. Bands of
armed brigands, some of considerable strength under active leaders,
sprang up everywhere. Formed in the first instance as a protest and
defence against extortion, they soon began to live on the country and
to terrorize the peasantry. After a time, brigands and Ministers,
finding themselves working for a common object, formed an unholy
alliance for loot. The leaders of the bands came to an understanding
with the more powerful officials, who in turn leant upon them for
support.

[Illustration: THE PALACE, MANDALAY--"CENTRE OF THE UNIVERSE."]

Under such conditions it was not wonderful that the sudden seizure
of the capital and the summary removal of the King should have
completed the dissolution of society, already far advanced. The British
Government, if it had decided to annex Upper Burma, might by a more
leisurely occupation, not only with a larger military force, but with
a complete staff of civil administrators, have saved the people from
some years of anarchy and great suffering. But that is not our way, and
under modern political conditions in England is impossible.

The country was taken and its government destroyed before we had
decided what we should do with it, or considered the effect on the
people.

The King's rule ended on the 29th of November, 1885. On the 1st of
January, 1886, the Viceroy's proclamation included Upper Burma in Her
Majesty's dominions. The administration of the country was temporarily
provided for by allowing the Hlutdaw, or great Council of State,
to continue in power, discharging all its functions as usual, but
under the guidance of Colonel (afterwards Sir E. B.) Sladen, who was
attached as Political officer to General Prendergast's staff. All Civil
officers, British and Burmese, were placed under the Hlutdaw's orders,
and the King's Burmese officials throughout the country were instructed
to go on with the regular performance of their duties as if nothing had
occurred. Some arrangement had to be made, and probably this was the
best possible. The best was bad.

On the 15th of December the Chief Commissioner, Sir Charles Bernard,
arrived at Mandalay from Rangoon. On his way up the river he had
visited Minhla, Pagan and Myingyan, where Civil officers, supported by
small garrisons, had been placed by General Prendergast. He decided
that these three districts should be removed from the jurisdiction
of the Hlutdaw and controlled directly by himself. Mandalay town and
district were similarly treated. A British officer was appointed to
govern them, under the immediate orders of Colonel Sladen, who was
responsible to the Chief Commissioner.

All this must have confused the minds of the people and prevented those
who were ready to submit to the British power from coming forward.
Fortunately this period of hesitation was short. From the 26th of
February, 1886, Upper Burma became a province of British India.

When the Chief Commissioner, who had gone down to Rangoon with the
Viceroy, returned to Mandalay, the Hlutdaw was finally dissolved and
Sir Charles Bernard took the government into his own hands. A few
of the Burmese Ministers were retained as advisers. At first they
were of some use as knowing the facts and the ways of the King's
administration. Very soon they became superfluous.

It must not be supposed that no steps had been taken towards the
construction of an administration during the first two months of the
year. Anticipating the decision of Her Majesty's Government, Sir
Charles Bernard had applied his signal energy to this work, and before
the end of February the Viceroy had laid his rough proposals before
the Secretary of State. As soon as Upper Burma was incorporated with
British India the scheme of government already drafted came into force.

The country was mapped out into fourteen districts, corresponding as
closely as possible to the existing provinces under the King, namely:--

    Mandalay    Minbu      Pagan
    Katha       Bhamo      Ningyan, afterwards
    Ava         Shwèbo        called Pyinmana
    Chindwin    Kyauksè    Ye-w
    Myingyan    Sagaing    Yamèthin

and after a time three more were added: Taungdwingyi, Meiktila, and the
Ruby Mines. The boundaries were necessarily left vague at first until
more accurate knowledge of the country enabled them to be defined. At
first there were no maps whatever. The greater part of the country had
not been occupied nor even visited by us.

To each district was appointed an officer of the Burma Commission
under the style of Deputy Commissioner, with a British police officer
to assist him and such armed force of police as could be assigned to
him. His first duty was to get in touch with the local officials and to
induce those capable and willing to serve us to retain or take office
under our Government.

Having firmly established his authority at headquarters, he was to work
outwards in a widening circle, placing police posts and introducing
settled administration as opportunity offered. He was, however, to
consider it his primary object to attack and destroy the robber bands
and to protect the loyal villages from their violence. There were
few districts in which the guerilla leaders were not active. Their
vengeance on every Burman who attempted to assist the British was
swift and unmerciful. As it was impossible at first and for some time
to afford adequate protection, villages which aided and sheltered
the enemy were treated with consideration. The despatch of flying
columns moving through a part of the country and returning quickly to
headquarters was discouraged. There was a tendency in the beginning of
the business to follow this practice, which was mischievous. If the
people were friendly and helped the troops, they were certain to suffer
when the column retired. If they were hostile, a hasty visit had little
effect on them. They looked on the retirement as a retreat and became
more bitter than before.

Upper Burma was incorporated with British India on the 26th of
February. Thereupon the elaborate Statute law of India, including the
Civil and Criminal Codes, came into force, a body of law which implies
the existence of a hierarchy of educated and trained officials, with
police and gaols and all the machinery of organized administration. But
there were none of these things in Upper Burma, which was, in fact, an
enemy's country, still frankly hostile to us. This difficulty had been
foreseen, and the proper remedy suggested in Lord Dufferin's minute
(dated at Mandalay on the 17th of February, 1886) in which he proposed
to annex the country.

The Acts for the Government of India give to the Secretary of State the
power of constituting any province or part of a province an excepted
or scheduled district, and thereupon the Governor of the province may
draw up regulations for the peace and good government of the district,
which, when approved by the Governor-General in Council, have the full
force of law.[1]

This machinery is put in force by a resolution of the Secretary of
State in Council, and at the Viceroy's instance a resolution for this
purpose was made, with effect from and after the 1st of March, 1886. It
applied to all Upper Burma except the Shan States.

Sir Charles Bernard was ready to take advantage of the powers given
to him. Early in March he published an admirable rough code of
instructions, sufficiently elastic to meet the varying conditions,
and at the same time sufficiently definite to prevent anything like
injustice or oppression. The summary given in Section 10 of the Upper
Burma Administration Report for 1886 shows their nature.

"By these instructions each district was placed in charge of a
Civil officer, who was invested with the full powers of a Deputy
Commissioner, and in criminal matters with power to try as a magistrate
any case and to pass any sentence. The Deputy Commissioner was also
invested with full power to revise the proceedings of any subordinate
magistrate or official and to pass any order except an order enhancing
a sentence. In criminal matters the courts were to be guided as far as
possible by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Penal
Code, and the Evidence Act (_i.e._, the Indian Codes). But dacoity
or robbery was made punishable with death, though magistrates were
instructed to pass capital sentences only in very heinous cases. In
order to provide a safeguard against undue severity in the infliction
of punishments, it was ordered that no capital sentence should be
carried out except after confirmation by the Chief Commissioner. No
regular appeals were allowed from any decision; but it was open for
any one who felt aggrieved by the decision of a subordinate officer
to move the Deputy Commissioner to revise the order, and for any one
who demurred to an order passed by a Deputy Commissioner to bring the
matter to the notice of the Chief Commissioner.

"In revenue matters the customs of the country were as far as possible
to be observed, save that no monopolies (except that of precious
stones) were allowed and no customs or transport duties were levied.
As regards excise administration, in accordance with the custom of
the country the sale of opium and of intoxicating liquors to Burmans
was prohibited. But a limited number of licences were issued for the
sale of liquors to persons not of Burmese race, and the Chinese were
specially exempted from the restrictions imposed on the traffic in
opium."

Thus in four months after annexation the country had been parcelled
into seventeen districts, each under the charge of a Deputy
Commissioner, who was guided by the provisional instructions and
worked at first directly under the Chief Commissioner. It was thought
(_vide_ Lord Dufferin's minute of February 17, 1886) that the province
could be worked, in the beginning, without any authority such as
Divisional Commissioners or Sessions Judges interposed between the
Chief Commissioner and the district officers. "I would adopt, as I
have already said," wrote Lord Dufferin, "the simplest and cheapest
system of administration open to us. There will be in each district
or circle one British Civil officer and one police officer. The Civil
officer will work through the indigenous agency of the country, Myo-ôks
(governors of towns), Thugyis (headmen of villages) and others,
confining his efforts in the first instance to the restoration of
order, the protection of life and property, and the assessment and
collection of the ordinary revenue.... But most of the unimportant
criminal work and nearly all the civil suits must be disposed of by
the native officials, subject to the check and control of the district
officer."

The area of the province, excluding the Shan States, which were left to
the care of their own chiefs, was nearly one hundred thousand square
miles. It was divided into seventeen districts. There were no roads in
the interior, much of which was difficult country. The Irrawaddy, it
is true, formed a splendid line of communication from north to south.
But the river was not connected with the districts east or west of it
by anything better than an ordinary village cart-track, with numerous
streams and rivers, most of them unbridged. The Eastern districts
between the Sittang and the Irrawaddy were especially inaccessible.
Under such circumstances it was impossible for any man to discharge the
duties imposed on the Chief Commissioner, even if all his subordinates
had been endowed with ripe wisdom and experience. Only a man of the
heroic energy and devotion of Sir Charles Bernard could have conceived
it possible. Moreover, the Chief Commissioner was to be responsible
for all death sentences, and was to be the final Court of Revision for
the province; while the lower province also remained in his charge,
and although he was relieved of the routine work of Lower Burma, the
responsibility still rested on him, and was by no means nominal. It was
not business.

The difficulty soon began to be felt. In June a Commissioner was
appointed for the Eastern Division, Mr. St. G. Tucker, from the Punjab.
In August and September three more commissionerships were constituted,
to one of which, the Northern, was appointed Mr. Burgess (the late Mr.
G. D. Burgess), of the Burma Commission; to the Central Division, Mr.
F. W. Fryer (now Sir Frederick Fryer), from the Punjab; and Mr. J. D.
La Touche (now Sir James La Touche) from the North-Western Provinces
to the Southern Division. The Chief Commissioner delegated to them,
in their respective divisions, the general control of the district
officers and the revision of their judicial proceedings, including the
duty of confirming sentences of death.

The administrative divisions of the province, excluding the Shan
States, then stood as follows:--

    1. The Northern Division      Bhamo
                                  Katha
                                  Shwèbo
                                  Ruby Mines
                                  Mandalay

    2. The Central Division       Sagaing
                                  Kyauksè
                                  Yeu
                                  Chindwin
                                  Ava

    3. The Eastern Division       Meiktila
                                  Yamèthin
                                  Ningyan (afterwards called Pyinmana)

    4. The Southern Division      Myingyan
                                  Pagan
                                  Minbu
                                  Taungdwingyi

This organization enabled the Chief Commissioner to attend to his
own work and brought the task of governing the whole of Burma within
the powers of an energetic man. It enabled him to give sufficient
time to the organization of the revenue and of the police and to the
exercise of that control without which there could be no united action.
The attempt to govern without an authority intervening between the
executive officers in the districts and the head of the province was
due to a desire for economy, and to the belief that in this way there
would be closer connection and easier communication between the Chief
Commissioner and the executive officers. In fact, the contrary was the
result, and in all such cases must be.

The framework of a civil administration had now been formed. It
remained to give the district officers such armed support as would
enable them to govern their charges.

In the autumn of 1886 the country generally was far from being under
our control. It had been supposed that our coming was welcome to the
people and that "the prospects of the substitution of a strong and
orderly government for the incompetent and cruel tyranny of their
former ruler" was by the people generally regarded with pleasure. (See
Lord Dufferin's minute of February 17, 1886.) But by July it had
become evident that a considerable minority of the population, to say
the least, did not want us, and that until we proved our strength it
was idle to expect active help even from our friends.

The total military force hitherto employed in Upper Burma had been
about fourteen thousand men. There was not anywhere in the whole
country a well-armed or organized body of the enemy. A few hundred
British troops could have marched from north to south or from east to
west without meeting with very serious opposition or suffering much
loss. Small flying columns could be moved through the country and might
find no enemy, and might even gather from the demeanour of the people
that they were welcome. When the soldiers passed on, the power of the
British Government went with them, and the villagers fell back under
the rule of the guerilla leaders and their gangs. At first there may
have been some faint tinge of patriotism in the motives which drove the
leaders and members of these bands to take the field. Very soon they
became mere brigands, living on the villagers and taking whatever they
wanted, including their women.

"These bands are freebooters," wrote Sir George White[2] (to the
Quartermaster-General in India, July 17, 1886), "pillaging wherever
they go, but usually reserving the refinement of their cruelty for
those who have taken office under us or part with us. Flying columns
arrive too late to save the village. The villagers, having cause to
recognize that we are too far off to protect them, lose confidence in
our power and throw in their lot with the insurgents. They make terms
with the leaders and baffle pursuit of those leaders by roundabout
guidance or systematic silence. In a country itself one vast military
obstacle, the seizure of the leaders of the rebellion, though of
paramount importance, thus becomes a source of greatest difficulty."

The experience of the first half of 1886 had brought home to the
Government of India as well as to the military officers in the field
that the resistance was more widespread and more obstinate than any one
had foreseen. Sir George White considered that "the most effective plan
of establishing our rule, and at the same time protecting and gaining
touch of the villages, is a close occupation of the disturbed districts
by military posts" (_ibid._). Under the circumstances, this was the
best course to adopt, provided that the posts were strong enough to
patrol the country and to crush every attempt at rising. The people
might be held down in this way, but not governed. Something more was
necessary. The difficulties were to be overcome rather by the vigorous
administration of civil government than by the employment of military
detachments scattered over the country. A sufficient force of armed
police at the disposal of the civil officers was therefore a necessity.

It had been foreseen from the first by Sir Charles Bernard and the
Government of India, although the strength of the force necessary
to achieve success was much under-estimated. In February, 1886, two
military police levies, each of five hundred and sixty-one men, were
raised from the Indian army. Of these one was sent to the Chindwin
district and one to Mandalay. At the same time the recruitment of two
thousand two hundred men in Northern India for a military police force
was ordered. These men were untrained and came over in batches as they
were raised. They were trained and disciplined at Mandalay and other
convenient places, and were distributed to the districts when they were
sufficiently formed. Thus besides the soldiers the Chief Commissioner
had about 3,300 men at his disposal.

As the year went on and the magnitude of the undertaking began to be
understood, the need of a much larger force was admitted. Two more
levies were sanctioned. One from Northern India was raised without
difficulty, and was posted to the railway line from Toungoo to
Mandalay, which had been tardily sanctioned by the Secretary of State
in November, 1886, and was at once put in hand. The other, a Gurkha
battalion for use in the Northern frontier subdivision of Mogaung, was
more difficult to recruit. At the end of the year two companies had
arrived, and after being trained at Mandalay had gone on to Bhamo. By
this time forty-six posts were held by the military police. The hunger
for men, however, so far from being satisfied, continued to grow. After
reviewing the position in November (1886) Sir Charles Bernard decided
to ask the Government of India for sixteen thousand men, including
those already sanctioned, nine thousand to be recruited in India and
seven thousand in Burma.

It was proposed that ultimately half of this force should be Indians
and half local men. They were all to be engaged for three years, and
were to be drilled and disciplined, and divided into battalions, one
for each district. Each battalion was to contain fixed proportions of
Indians and local men, "under the command of a military officer for
the purpose of training and discipline and under the orders of the
local police officers for ordinary police work." At this time it was
believed that Burmans, Shans, Karens and Kachins could by training and
discipline become a valuable element in a military police force, and
the experiment was made at Mandalay. This was the beginning of the
Burma military police force, which contributed so pre-eminently to the
subjugation and pacification of the province. The attempt to raise any
part of it locally was, however, very quickly abandoned, and it was
recruited, with the exception of a few companies of Karens, entirely
from Indians.

But to return to the middle of 1886. Sir George White, in writing to
Army Headquarters, urged the necessity of reinforcements. The fighting
had, it is true, been trivial and deaths in action or by wounds had
amounted to six officers and fifty-six men only. Disease, however, had
been busy. Exposure and fatigue in a semi-tropical climate, the want of
fresh food in a country which gave little but rice and salt fish, was
gradually reducing the strength and numbers of the force. One officer
and two hundred and sixty-nine men had died of disease and thirty-nine
officers and nine hundred and twenty men had been invalided between
November, 1885, and July, 1886.

There were few large bodies of the enemy in the field--few at any rate
who would wait to meet an attack. It was only by a close occupation
of the disturbed districts by military posts that progress could be
made. The Major-General Commanding did not shrink from this measure,
although it used up his army. Fourteen thousand men looks on paper a
formidable force, but more men, more mounted infantry, and especially
more cavalry were necessary.

It had been a tradition at Army Headquarters, handed down probably
from the first and second Burmese Wars, that cavalry was useless in
Burma. The experience of 1885-6 proved it to be the most effective
arm. It was essential to catch the "Bos," or captains of the guerilla
bands, who gave life and spirit to the whole movement. Short compact
men, nearly always well mounted, with a modern jockey seat, they were
the first as a rule to run away. The mounted infantry man, British or
Indian, a stone or two heavier, and weighted with rifle, ammunition,
and accoutrements, on an underbred twelve-hand pony, had no chance of
riding down a "Bo." But the trooper inspired the enemy with terror.

"In a land where only ponies are bred the cavalry horses seem monsters
to the people, and the long reach and short shrift of the lance
paralyse them with fear," wrote Sir George White, and asked that as
soon as the rains had ceased "three more regiments of cavalry, complete
in establishments," should be added to the Upper Burma Field Force.

The proposal was accepted by the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir
Frederick Roberts, and approved by the Government of India. It may
be said here once for all that the Government of India throughout
the whole of this business were ready to give the local authorities,
civil and military, everything that was found necessary for the
speedy completion of the work in hand, the difficulties of which they
appreciated, as far as any one not on the spot could.

"It is proposed," they wrote to Lord Cross (August 13, 1886), "to
reinforce the Upper Burma Field Force by three regiments of native
cavalry and to relieve all or nearly all the corps and batteries which
were despatched to Burma in October last. The troops to be relieved
will be kept four or five months longer, so that, including those sent
in relief, the force will be very considerable and should suffice to
complete rapidly and finally the pacification and settlement of the
whole country."

In consequence of the increased strength of the field force the
Government of India directed Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Macpherson,
Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, to transfer his headquarters
to Burma and remain there until the conclusion of the operations.
Unfortunately, Sir Herbert died shortly after reaching Burma. The
Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Frederick Roberts, then took charge of
the business and landed in Rangoon in November.

It was evident that Sir George White had not exaggerated the
difficulties of the work. After taking stock of the position, Roberts
asked for five more regiments to be sent from India. During the cold
or, as it should be called in Burma, the dry season following, much was
done to gain control of the country, under the personal supervision of
the Commander-in-Chief. Especially in the Eastern Division, where large
bands of men under various pretenders had been most troublesome, the
stern energy of General Lockhart produced a rapid and wholesome change.
When Sir Frederick returned to India in February, 1887, the subjugation
of Upper Burma had been accomplished and the way was cleared for the
civil administration. But four years of constant patient work were
needed before the country was pacified and the peasant who wished to
live a life of honest industry could accomplish his desire.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] "The Government of India," by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, chap. i. p.
105. Second edition.

[2] Major-General, commanding the Burma Field Force, now Field-Marshal
Sir George White, V.C., G.C.B., &c.




CHAPTER II

THE CHIEF COMMISSIONERSHIP OF BURMA


My first acquaintance with Burma was made in the early part of 1883.
I was then a member of the Legislative Council of India. Mr. Charles
Bernard, who was Chief Commissioner of British Burma, had asked for
a year's leave, and Lord Ripon selected me to take his place. During
that year, 1883-4, I went over Lower Burma--British Burma as it was
then called--and learnt the methods of the administration and became
acquainted with the officers in the commission and the nature of the
country and its people.

There was at that time very little communication between the Court of
Ava and the Chief Commissioner, who represented the Governor-General
in Council. The embassy which the King had sent to Simla with the
ostensible purpose of making a new treaty had been suddenly recalled,
notwithstanding, and perhaps in some degree because of, the very
honourable and hospitable manner in which Lord Ripon had received it.
The King was already negotiating a treaty with France, and in 1883,
before the mission despatched for this purpose to Europe had left
Mandalay, it was believed to have been drafted. But when I surrendered
the office to Sir Charles Bernard on his return from leave in February,
1884, there was no thought of war in the near future.

From Rangoon I was transferred to Nagpur, to the post of Chief
Commissioner of the Central Provinces. Towards the end of 1885, fever
drove me to England on sick leave just as the relations with the King
of Burma were broken off and war had become unavoidable. Returning from
leave in November, 1886, I found awaiting me at Suez orders posting
me to the Public Service Commission, of which the late Sir Charles
Aitchison was president. At Bombay I found instructions to proceed at
once to Hyderabad in the Deccan, as the Viceroy (Lord Dufferin) desired
to see me. At Hyderabad I waited on Lord Dufferin. He told me that
Bernard might have to leave, and he wished to know if I would accept
the appointment of Chief Commissioner of Burma if he decided to offer
it to me. He added that it was in his opinion the post in all India
most to be coveted, and that if he was not Viceroy he would choose
Burma: an unnecessary stimulus, as ever since leaving that province in
1884 my ambition had been to succeed Bernard. I told the Viceroy that I
would go to Burma if it were offered to me.

I was with the Public Service Commission at Lahore, Allahabad, and
Jubulpore, and back to Bombay, before I heard anything more about
Burma. At the end of January, 1887, we were leaving the Parel Station,
Bombay, for Madras, where the next sitting of the Commission was to
be, when the train was stopped just as it began to move, and the
station-master ran up with a clear-the-line message for me from the
Viceroy, desiring me to wait further orders at Bombay. I left the
train gladly, as I knew that it meant that I was to go to Burma, and
I was delighted to be relieved from the work of the Commission, which
was distasteful to me, especially as it appeared from the character
of the evidence brought forward, a matter left entirely to the local
Government in each province, not likely to lead to beneficial results.
On the 3rd of February a telegram dated the 2nd came from the Viceroy,
offering me the Chief Commissionership as Bernard's health had
broken down, and desiring me to come to Calcutta to consult with the
Government.

As soon as I could arrange my affairs I went to Calcutta. The Viceroy
received me on the 14th of February. He took me out to the lawn at the
side where the great house throws a pleasant shade in the afternoon.
There we sat, and Lord Dufferin explained to me how matters stood in
Burma, and gave me his instructions on many points and on the general
principles which he wished to guide the administration.

The organization of the military police and the material of which the
force was to be constituted was one of the chief matters he spoke
about. He attached much importance to the enlistment of Burmans, Shans,
and Karens, so that the unhealthy posts might be held by acclimatized
natives. British officers would have to be posted to command them,
and they must be relieved at short intervals. He showed me letters
which had passed between him and Bernard about the military police
force, to which, as an instrument in the pacification of the province,
he attached the first importance. He spoke of the strength of the
Commission, and told me to consider it carefully and ask for more men
if I thought them necessary. Generally he considered that true economy
dictated the expenditure of as much money as was necessary to fit out
the new province with offices, roads, buildings, and river steamers,
and it was folly, he said, not to give it. Barracks and shelter for
troops and police should be vigorously pushed on.

The questions of the Shan States and our relations with China were
discussed. As to the Shan States, I represented the manner in which
our relations with the feudatory chiefs in the Central Provinces were
managed and the saving in cost and responsibility to be gained by
leaving them quasi-independent. Lord Dufferin approved of this policy
and preferred it to annexation, even in the case of the Wuntho Sawbwa,
who had shown an inclination to refuse submission to our Government.

The Viceroy spoke at length and with emphasis regarding our relations
with China, which he looked upon as most important. We were face to
face, he said, with a very powerful neighbour, who might greatly
harass us if she or even her subordinate officials chose to worry us.
Two officers of the Chinese Consular Service had been sent to Upper
Burma to be at my disposal in dealing with the Chinese in Burma and in
conducting relations with the Chinese Government. In the matter of the
frontiers of Upper Burma, where they touched China, great care should
be exercised. "Feel your way," he said, putting out his hand, "and when
you come against anything hard, draw back," advice that was most sound
in dealing with the ill-defined boundaries of a conquered province. We
wished to hold what our predecessors had held or had been entitled to
hold, and we did not desire to leave unoccupied space for others to
come in. He told me to think carefully whether there was anything I
wanted done and to let him know before I left. I was to see him again.

In a country where one man is as good as another, where there are
no landlords, no hereditary aristocracy and no tribal chiefs,
the Government, especially a foreign Government, is at a great
disadvantage. It is impossible to deal with each individual. The first
question is, who is the great man of this village: who has influence,
who knows the villagers, their characters and so on? Having found the
man, it becomes possible to enter into relations with the village and
to treat with them as a whole. In Upper Burma there was a recognized
headman in each village who had duties, and powers corresponding to his
duties; and in many administrative matters, especially in taxation, the
village was dealt with as a whole.

The difficulty in Lower Burma was the absence of such a local authority
or unit. The villagers were not held together by any obligation to
each other or by subordination to any one on the spot. Each man had
his own bit of land which he held directly from the Government. He
lived where he pleased, and if he put his house in the same place with
other cultivators, it was for the sake of convenience and protection.
The villages were grouped for revenue purposes by the British
administration under officials who collected the taxes and received
a percentage on the amount. Each of these _taik Thugyis_ (headmen of
circles), as they were designated, had many villages under him and
could not be expected to have local knowledge or personal influence in
all of them. He had no powers outside his revenue work. It was open
to any one to put up his hut in any village, wherever he could find
room. There was no one to say him nay, even if he was a gambler, an
opium-eater, or a notorious evildoer living by theft and robbery. There
were, it is true, village policemen appointed by law, who were intended
to supply the wants of a local authority. But no power was given to
them: they were subordinated to the regular civil police and had no
status as revenue officials. Consequently they tended to become mere
village drudges, although by no means useless and frequently showing
both courage and sagacity in police matters.

When I was in Burma in 1883-84 gang-robbery was prevalent, even in the
neighbourhood of Rangoon; so much so as to demand close attention from
the head of the province. I had observed that in nearly every case
where a large gang of dacoits, to use the Indian term, was dominating a
district or part of a district they were assisted by sympathisers, who
sent them food, supplied them with information, and made it possible
for them to live undetected. The codes of Indian Criminal Procedure
do not enable a magistrate to touch cases of this sort. If the people
are against the Government--and in 1887 they were certainly not minded
to help it--the difficulty of detecting and convicting such secret
abettors is almost insuperable. At any rate, it was a slow process, and
meanwhile violence and disorder flourished and the peasantry became
more and more enthralled to the brigands.

It occurred to me that nothing would give the civil magistrate more
assistance than the power of summarily removing persons who, while they
themselves appeared to be living harmless lives without reproach, were
enabling the insurgent or brigand gangs to keep the field.

I explained my views on these matters to the Viceroy. He promised me
his support and desired me to embody my ideas in a draft Regulation
before I left Calcutta. With the assistance of the Legislative
Department the draft was quickly completed, and on my arrival in
Burma it was circulated to district officers for their opinions. It
was delayed by various formalities and inquiries, and was not finally
made law until October, 1887. Founded so far as might be on the system
indigenous to the country and in accord with the mind of the people,
this law was a great aid to the administration. Writing in October,
1890, I said: "I think that most officers will now admit that the
policy of dealing with the people by villages and not by individuals
has been a very powerful instrument for suppressing disorder and
establishing our authority. It would not have been possible to use this
instrument if the village system had no vitality. If we are to rule
the country cheaply and efficiently and to keep the people from being
robbed and oppressed by the criminal classes, the village system must
be maintained in vigour. It cannot thrive or live unless the post of
headman is sought after, or at least willingly accepted, by respectable
persons." I believe the provisions of the village regulation are still
a living force and are brought into action when occasion arises. But
the life of the system is the headman, his dignity and his position.
This is what the author of "The Soul of a People" wrote in 1898:--

"So each village managed its own affairs untroubled by squire or
priest, very little troubled by the State. That within their little
means they did it well no one can doubt. They taxed themselves without
friction, they built their own monastery schools by voluntary effort,
they maintained a very high, a very simple, code of morals entirely of
their own initiative.

"All this has passed or is passing. The King has gone to a banishment
far across the sea, the Ministers are either banished or powerless for
good or evil. It will never rise again, this government of the King
which was so bad in all it did and only good in what it left alone. It
will never rise again. The people are now part of the British Empire,
subjects of the Queen. What may be in store for them in the far future
no one can tell; only we may be sure that the past can return no more.
And the local government is passing away too. It cannot exist with a
strong Government such as ours. For good or for evil, in a few years,
it too, will be gone."[3]

This is a prophecy which I believe has not yet been fulfilled, and I
hope never will. But to return to the order of events.

I was detained in Calcutta until the 24th of February. Time by no means
wasted. I had frequent opportunities of seeing the Members of Council
and learning what was going on in each department. Lord Dufferin
allowed me to discuss matters with him more than once. On the 19th I
attended His Excellency in Council and explained my views, especially
regarding the village system. Leaving Calcutta in the British India
steamship _Rangoon_ on the 24th, I landed at Rangoon on Sunday the 27th
of March. Next day I relieved Sir Charles Bernard and took charge of
the Province of Burma.

In order to enable the Chief Commissioner to give more time to the
affairs of Upper Burma, a Special Commissioner, Mr. Hodgkinson, had
been appointed to take immediate charge of the older province. I found
that the Special Commissioner was in fact ruler of the Lower Province,
and was so regarded by the public. Nothing which was not of a very
extraordinary nature was referred to the Chief Commissioner, whose
responsibility, however, remained unimpaired. For example, two or
three days after my arrival the Viceroy telegraphed in cipher to the
Chief Commissioner about some matters in Lower Burma which had given
rise to questions in Parliament, and of which the responsible Chief
Commissioner had no cognizance. No more competent and trustworthy man
than Mr. Hodgkinson could have been found for the work. Nevertheless
the arrangement did not seem to me quite satisfactory.

There were urgent matters requiring to be settled with Mr. Hodgkinson,
more especially the Budget of the Province and the organization of the
police in Lower Burma, which needed thorough reform. They had earned
the reputation of being the worst and the most costly in the world,
and during the last eighteen months they had not belied it. It was
necessary to form a body of military police for Lower Burma of suitable
Indians, trained and disciplined. During the few days I was in Rangoon
this and other urgent matters--for example, the arrangements with the
Bombay Burma Company about the Upper Burma Forests, the Ruby Mines,
the condition of some of the Lower Burma districts, the postings of
officers, the distribution of reinforcements of military police just
disembarking from the transports, consultations with the General
Commanding in Lower Burma as to the measures necessary along and beyond
the line of the old frontier within the limits of his command, all
these things and much more would have given me plenty of work for many
days.

I could only dispose of those matters which required my personal orders
and leave the rest to Mr. Hodgkinson. I could not remain in Rangoon.
Sir Charles Bernard had a powerful memory. The Upper Burma Secretariat
was, as has been said, in Mandalay; when Sir Charles Bernard was in
Rangoon, he relied to a great extent on his memory. Letters and
telegrams received from Mandalay were dealt with and returned with his
orders, no copies for reference being kept. As the Rangoon Secretariat
was ignorant of Upper Burma affairs, I found myself completely in the
air. I decided therefore to start as soon as possible for Mandalay.

I left Rangoon by rail for Prome on the 9th of March. At Prome a
Government steamer, the _Sir William Peel_, was waiting for me, and
I reached Mandalay on the 14th. To a man sailing up the river there
were few signs of trouble. The people appeared to be going about
their business as usual, and no doubt along the river bank and in
the neighbourhood of our posts there was little disorder. But this
appearance was deceptive. Just beyond the old frontier the country from
the right bank of the Irrawaddy up to the Arakan Yoma was in the hands
of insurgents.

On the right bank of the river, forty miles above Thayetmyo, is the
Burman fort and town of Minhla, where the first opposition was offered
to the British expedition. I found here a small detachment of Indian
troops, and in the town, about half a mile off, a police post. I learnt
from the British officer commanding the detachment and from the Burman
magistrate that for some fifty miles inland, up to the Chin hills on
the west, the villages were deserted and the headmen had absconded.
This is an unhealthy tract, with much jungle, and broken up into small
valleys by the spurs from the Arakan mountains. The noted leader Bo
Swè made his lair here and had still to be reckoned with. His story
illustrates the difficulties which had to be overcome.

In November, 1885, after taking Minhla, a district was formed by Sir
Harry Prendergast consisting of a large tract of country above the
British Burma frontier on both sides of the river to Salin, north of
Minbu, on the right bank, and including Magwè and Yenangyoung on the
left. This district was known at first as Minhla, but afterwards as
Minbu, to which the headquarters were moved. Mr. Robert Phayre, of the
Indian Civil Service and of the British Burma Commission, was left in
charge, supported by a small force.

[Illustration: THAYETMYO--MAIL STEAMER LEAVING.]

Mr. Phayre, a relative of that distinguished man, Colonel Sir Arthur
Phayre, the first Chief Commissioner of British Burma, was the right
man for the work. He began by getting into touch with the native
officials, and by the 15th of December all those on the right bank of
the river had accepted service under the new Government. Outposts were
established, and flying columns dispersed any gatherings of malcontents
that were reported. A small body of troops from Thayetmyo, moving
about in the west under the Arakan hills, acted in support of Minhla.
Revenue began to come in, and at Yenangyoung, the seat of the earth-oil
industry, work was being resumed. Everything promised well.

There were two men, however, who had not been or would not be
propitiated, Maung Swè and Ôktama. Maung Swè was hereditary headman or
Thugyi of Mindat, a village near the old frontier. He had for years
been a trouble to the Thayetmyo district of British Burma, harbouring
criminals and assisting dacoit gangs to attack our villages, if he
did not lead them himself. He had been ordered up to Mandalay by the
Burmese Government owing to the strong remonstrances of the Chief
Commissioner.

On the outbreak of war Bo[4] Swè was at once sent back to do his utmost
against the invaders. So long as there was a force moving about in the
west of the district he was unable to do much. When the troops were
withdrawn (the deadly climate under the hills compelled their recall),
he began active operations.

The second man was named Ôktama, one of the most determined opponents
of the British. He had inspired his followers with some of his spirit,
whether fanatical or patriotic, and harassed the north of the district
about and beyond Minbu. His gang was more than once attacked and
dispersed, but came together again. He and Maung Swè worked together
and between them dominated the country.

In May, 1886, Maung Swè was attacked and driven back towards the hills.
He retired on Ngapè, a strong position thirty miles west of Minbu and
commanding the principal pass through the mountains into Arakan. Early
in June, 1886, Mr. Phayre, with fifty sepoys of a Bengal infantry
regiment and as many military police (Indians), started from Minbu to
attack Maung Swè, who was at a place called Padein. The enemy were
reinforced during the night by two or three hundred men from Ngapè. The
attack was delivered on the 9th of June, and Phayre, who was leading,
was shot dead. His men fell back, leaving his body, which was carried
off by the Burmans, but was afterwards recovered and buried at Minbu.
Three days after this two parties of Ôktama's gang who had taken up
positions near Salin were attacked by Captain Dunsford. His force
consisted of twenty rifles of the Liverpool Regiment and twenty rifles
of the 2nd Bengal Infantry. The Burmans were driven from their ground,
but Captain Dunsford was killed and a few of our men wounded.

Reinforcements were sent across the river from Pagan: and Major
Gordon, of the 2nd Bengal Infantry, with ninety-five rifles of his own
regiment, fifty rifles of the Liverpool Regiment, and two guns 7-1
R.A., attacked Maung Swè in a position near Ngapè. The Burmans fought
well, but were forced to retire. Unfortunately the want of mounted men
prevented a pursuit. The enemy carried off their killed and wounded.
Our loss was eight men killed and twenty-six wounded, including one
officer. We then occupied Ngapè in strength, but in July the deadly
climate obliged us to withdraw.

Maung Swè returned at once to his lair. By the end of August the whole
of the western part of the district was in the hands of the insurgents,
rebels, or patriots, according to the side from which they are seen.

Meanwhile Salin had been besieged by Ôktama. He was driven off after
three days by Captain Atkinson, who brought up reinforcements to aid
the garrison of the post. Captain Atkinson was killed in the action.
Thus in a few weeks these two leaders had cost us the lives of three
officers.

In the course of the operations undertaken under Sir Frederick
Roberts's command in the open season of 1886-87, this country was well
searched by parties of troops with mounted infantry. Bo Swè's power
was broken, and in March, 1887, he was near the end of his exploits.
In the north of the district, the exertions of the troops had made
little impression on Ôktama's influence. The peasantry, whether through
sympathy or fear, were on his side.

I have troubled the reader with this story because it will help to the
understanding of the problem we had before us in every part of Upper
Burma. It will explain how districts reported at an early date to be
"quite peaceful" or "comparatively settled" were often altogether in
the hands of hostile bands. They were reported quiet because we could
hear no noise. We were outsiders, as indeed we are, more or less, not
only in Burma but in every part of the Indian Empire--less perhaps in
Burma than elsewhere.

On the way up the river I had the advantage of meeting Mr. (now Sir
James) La Touche, the Commissioner of the Southern Division, Sir Robert
Low,[5] commanding at Myingyan, Brigadier-General Anderson, Captain
Eyre, the Deputy Commissioner of Pagan district (which then included
Pakokku and the Yaw country), and others. At Mandalay I was able to
consult with General Sir George White, commanding the field force,
with His Excellency Sir Charles Arbuthnot, the Commander-in-Chief of
the Madras Army, and with the civil officers, namely, the Commissioner
of the Northern Division, Mr. Burgess,[6] and Mr. (now Sir Frederick)
Fryer, the Commissioner of the Central or Sagaing Division, and their
subordinates. No more capable or helpful men could have been found. The
Commissioner of the Eastern Division was out of reach for the time. The
only way of getting to that country was by road from Mandalay, which
would have taken many days. I had to wait until I returned to Rangoon
and could go by rail to Toungoo before I made acquaintance with Mr.
Henry St. George Tucker, of the Indian Civil Service, a Punjab officer.

FOOTNOTES:

[3] "The Soul of a People," pp. 103-4.

[4] _Bo_ means "Captain"; _Maung_ is the ordinary way of addressing a
Burman, the equivalent of "Mister."

[5] The late General Sir Robert Cunliffe Low, G.C.B.

[6] The late Mr. G. D. Burgess, C.S.I., Judicial Commissioner, Upper
Burma.




CHAPTER III

UPPER BURMA


I will now give as brief a sketch as may be of the state of Upper Burma
when I arrived in Mandalay in March, 1887.

Upper Burma, inclusive of the Shan States, contains in round numbers
one hundred and sixty thousand square miles, of which the Shan States
cover sixty thousand miles and the Chin hills ten thousand. It may
be divided, for the present purpose, into four parts. The first is
the great valley of the Irrawaddy, from the mountain ranges north of
Mogaung to the northern boundary of the Thayetmyo district; the second
is the valley of the Chindwin; the third is the valley of the Sittang,
in which lies the Eastern Division, down to the boundary of the Toungoo
district; and the fourth is the Shan States. In 1887 the British
administration had not yet touched the Chin hills or the Kachins in the
mountains which divide Burma from China.

Beginning with the Irrawaddy Valley, Mogaung, the most northerly
post of importance, was held by a Burman Myoôk, or township officer,
nominally for us. He collected the revenue and spent it--much, no
doubt, on his establishment, for which no regular provision had been
made. South of Mogaung as far as Bhamo the country was quiet, and no
organized gangs were in the field. The Katha district, which comes next
below Bhamo, was disturbed on the Wuntho border, and was not much under
control.

The Wuntho Sawbwa, a Shan chief exercising independent jurisdiction
within his country, had refused our invitation to come in. A strong
force under Brigadier-General Cox, with Mr. Burgess, the Commissioner
of the Northern Division, had gone to try the methods of peaceful
persuasion. The districts south of Katha, namely Shwèbo and Ye-u, were
controlled by dacoit gangs under active leaders.

On the left bank of the river the Shan States of Mohlaing and Möngmit
were disturbed by the raids of Hkam Leng (_vide_ Chapter XX.). The Ruby
Mines district, with its capital, Mogok, was held in force and had
remained submissive since its occupation.

South of the ruby mines lies the district of Mandalay, shut in on the
north and east by the Shan hills. There was a British force of some
thousand men of all arms in Mandalay itself, with several outlying
detachments and a strong party in the hills at Pyinulwin,[7] forty
miles on the road to Hsipaw. In spite of this force the district was
dominated by three or four leaders, who had large followings and acted
in concert. They had divided the country between them into definite
jurisdictions, which they mutually respected. They collected revenue
from the villagers. Disobedience or any attempt to help the British
Government met with swift and severe punishment. They professed to be
acting under the authority of the Myingun Prince, who was at the time a
refugee in Pondicherry, and they were encouraged and helped to combine
by a relative of the Prince, known as the Bayingan or Viceroy, who went
from one to the other and supplied them with information. The district
of Ava, south of Mandalay, was in a similar state. The valleys of the
Samôn and Panlaung gave good shelter to the dacoits. Unfortunately
several district boundaries and divisions of military commands met in
this country, and on that account action was not so prompt as it ought
to have been.

Following the river below Ava, the Myingyan and Pagan districts
extended to both sides of the river, an inconvenient arrangement
inherited from the Burmese Government. The headquarters of these
districts, both on the left bank, were held by garrisons of some size,
and within striking range the country was controlled.

About forty miles from Pagan town, and as many from the river, is
the isolated hill or mountain of Popa. It rises to a height of four
thousand five hundred feet, a gigantic cone throwing out numerous
spurs. It is wooded thickly almost to the top, and extending for a long
distance round it is a tangle of scrub jungle and ravines, an ideal
hunting-ground for robbers and the home of cattle-thieves.

South of this was the Taungdwingyi district, extending down to the
old border. It was in the hands of a leader named Min Yaung, who was
well provided with ponies, and even elephants. The northern spurs of
the Pegu Yoma divide this district from the Sittang Valley, and are
densely wooded, offering a harbour of refuge to criminals. To this,
among other causes, it was due that this district gave more trouble
than any other in Upper Burma. It was at that time separated from the
river by the Magwè township, which belonged to the Minbu district, and
enjoyed comparative peace, owing mainly to the influence of the Burman
governor, who had taken service under us and for a time was loyal.

These parts of the Myingyan and Pagan districts, which were on the
right bank of the Irrawaddy, were not really under our control or
administered by us. The wild tract on the Yaw (_vide_ Chapter XXI.,
p. 295), which was much left to itself in Burmese times, had not been
visited, and was overrun by dacoits.

Southward, still on the right bank, came the Minbu district, where
Ôktama and Bo Swè were still powerful, the former in full force.

The difficulties of country and climate which our men had to face in
this district were very great. The west of the Minbu district lies up
against the range of mountains known as the Arakan Yoma, which run
parallel to the sea and shut off the Irrawaddy Valley from the Bay
of Bengal. The country below the Yoma is what is known in India as
Terai, a waterlogged region reeking with malaria, deadly to those not
acclimatized. Many a good soldier, British and Indian, found his grave
in the posts occupied in this district, Taingda, Myothit, Ngapè, and
Sidoktaya. The dacoit leaders knew the advantage of being able to live
where our men could not. Soldiers like Captain Golightly (Colonel R. E.
Golightly, D.S.O., late of the 60th Rifles) and his mounted infantry
would have made short work of them under less adverse conditions.

Passing to the Chindwin, which joins the Irrawaddy at Pakokku,
twenty-five miles above Myingyan, the Upper Chindwin[8] was fairly
quiet. The two local potentates, the Sawbwa of Hsawnghsup and the
Sawbwa of Kalè, were not of much importance. The former had made his
submission; the latter was holding aloof, but had shown his goodwill
by arresting and delivering to the Deputy Commissioner a pretender who
had attacked a British post and was gathering to his banner various
leaders. Lower down, the country round Mingin, where Mr. Gleeson,
Assistant Commissioner, was murdered in 1886, was much disturbed. In
the Lower Chindwin there was trouble in Pagyi and Pakangyi. The former
country, which is covered with forests and very unhealthy, had been
placed under the management of Burmans of local influence--a plan which
answered for a time. The Kani township, which adjoins Mingin, had been
governed from the first by the Burmese Wun well and loyally. He was
murdered on that account by a dacoit leader. His younger brother was
appointed in his room and followed in his steps. On the left bank the
country was not openly disturbed. The river trade was busy, but boats
were obliged to take a guard or to be convoyed by a steam-launch.

At this time the cause of order seemed nearer victory in the Eastern
Division than elsewhere. The Sittang Valley includes the Kyauksè
district, which at first was placed under the Commissioner of the
Central Division, but was allied in dacoit politics to Meiktila.
Myat Hmon, Maung Gyi, and Maung Lat, names well known to soldiers
in 1885-6, hunted this country, making the Hmawwaing jungles their
rallying-ground. When hard-pressed they took refuge in the hills of
Baw and Lawksawk, coming back when the troops retired. In the three
districts of Meiktila, Yamèthin, and Pyinmana, which then formed the
Eastern Division under Mr. H. St. George Tucker, General Sir William
Lockhart had given them no rest day or night. Nevertheless, in March,
1887, large bands were still active.

The Shan States were in a very troubled state, but a good beginning
had been made, and Mr. Hildebrand had nearly succeeded in breaking
up the Limbin Confederacy (_vide_ Chapter XV.). But throughout the
plateau dacoities were rife and petty wars were raging. Wide tracts
were laid waste, and the peasantry, deserting their fields, had joined
in the fights or gone across the Salween. Great scarcity, perhaps in
some cases actual famine, resulted, not from failure of rain, but from
strife and anarchy. And this reacted on Burma proper, for some of the
Shan States on the border gave the dacoits encouragement and shelter.

The whole of Upper Burma at this time was in military occupation. There
were one hundred and forty-one posts held by troops, and yet in wide
stretches of country, in the greater part of the Chindwin Valley, in
the Mogaung country and elsewhere, there was not a soldier. The tide,
however, was on the turn. The officers in command of parties and posts
were beginning to know the country and the game, while the dacoits and
their leaders were losing heart. The soldiers had in fact completed
their task, and they had done it well. What remained to be done was
work for the civil administrator.

The first and essential step was to enable the civil officers to get a
firm grip of their districts. For this purpose a civil police force,
recruited from the natives of the country, was necessary. Without it,
detection and intelligence were impossible. Commissioners and generals
were alike unanimous on this point.

The next thing was to provide an armed force at the disposal of
the district officer, so that he should be able to get an escort
immediately--for there was no district where an Englishman could yet
travel safely without an armed escort--and should be able also to
quell risings and disperse ordinary bands of insurgents or brigands
without having to ask assistance from the army. The military police had
been designed and raised for these purposes, and the men were being
distributed as fast as they arrived from India.

The relations of the district officers to the commandants of military
police and of the latter to the civil police officers, and the duties
and spheres of each, had to be defined. I had drafted regulations
for these purposes, and was waiting for the appointment of an
Inspector-General to carry them out. It had been decided before I left
Calcutta that a soldier should be selected for this post. The military
police force was in fact an army of occupation sixteen thousand strong.
Many of them were old soldiers who had volunteered from the Indian
regiments, the rest were recruited mainly from the fighting races of
Northern India. And they were commanded by young officers, some of whom
had come with somewhat exalted ideas of their independence. It was
imperative, therefore, to get an able soldier who could look at matters
from all points of view, and who could manage men as well as command
them. For it required a delicate touch to avoid friction between the
military and civil members of the district staff. Some of the civil
officers were young, some were quite without experience, and some were
inferior to the military commandants in force and ability.

In April, 1887, Colonel E. Stedman, commanding the 3rd Gurkhas, who
had accompanied Mr. Hildebrand to the Shan States, was appointed to be
Inspector-General of Police in Upper Burma, with the military rank of
Brigadier-General. Among the many able officers of the Indian Army it
would have been hard to find another man equally adapted to the work. I
had reason to be grateful to General Stedman (now Sir Edward Stedman,
G.C.B., K.C.I.E.) and to the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts (then Sir
Frederick), who selected him.

On the 21st of March, 1887, I wrote to Lord Dufferin regarding the
relations of the district and police officers as follows: "The
relations between Deputy Commissioners, District Superintendents (Civil
Police) and Commandants (Military Police) are ill-defined and work
badly, unless all are really good fellows. I have decided to keep the
Commandant to his military work, and the District Superintendent of
Police to the real civil police duty--intelligence, detection, and
investigation. The Deputy Commissioner has by law supreme control and
must exercise it.... The Deputy Commissioners have no hold on their
districts, and through the absence of a civil police they get no
intelligence and no touch with the people. Hence our military parties
sometimes go wandering about blindly, unable to get any information.
There must be a completely separate trained body of Burman Civil
Police, trained not to arms but to their police duties.... I have got
orders under issue about the location of posts and everything connected
with them and the constitution of the police in them. We must have some
Burmans and some Civil Police Burmans in every police post, and I think
in every military post also."

The details of these matters could not be settled until General Stedman
came to take up the work. Meanwhile I must return to affairs at
Mandalay.

FOOTNOTES:

[7] Now the hill station for Upper Burma, named Maymyo from Colonel
May, who commanded the Bengal Regiment, which garrisoned the place in
1887.

[8] The district was not formally divided into Upper and Lower until
1888.




CHAPTER IV

MANDALAY


Soon after my arrival in Mandalay I made the Thathanabaing's
acquaintance. He is the head of the Buddhist monks, the religious
order which in Bishop Bigandet's words is "The greatest in its extent
and diffusion, the most extraordinary and perfect in its fabric and
constituent parts, and the wisest in its rules and prescriptions that
has ever existed either in ancient or modern times outside the pale
of Christianity."[9] The Thathanabaing is the head of this order for
purposes of discipline and for settling doctrinal disputes. His title
means that he has power over all religious matters. It is misleading
to speak of him as an archbishop or to apply any of the titles of the
Christian Church to the Buddhist monks, who are not priests in any
sense, but "are the strict followers of Buddha, who, like him, have
renounced the world to devote themselves to the twofold object of
mastering their passions and acquiring the true wisdom which alone can
lead to the deliverance."[10] "The regulations they are subject to and
the object they have in view in entering the religious profession debar
them from concerning themselves in affairs that are foreign to their
calling."[11]

The great mass of the Pongyis, or monks, in Upper Burma, who may have
numbered in 1887 twenty or thirty thousand persons, obeyed the rules
of their order and took no part in the troubles that followed the
annexation. In the King's time the Thathanabaing neither personally nor
as representative of the order interfered in affairs of State. He might
have, as a work of mercy, pleaded for the remission of a sentence,
but it is doubtful whether he went beyond that, or whether he had any
political influence in our sense of the word. As a "religious" he would
have, and was bound to have, no concern with mundane affairs. Could he
bring any influence to bear on the people at large to induce them to
submit peacefully to our rule?

"When we speak," writes Bishop Bigandet,[12] "of the great influence
possessed by the religious order of Buddhist monks we do not intend to
speak of political influence. It does not appear that in Burma they
have ever aimed at any share in the management or direction of the
affairs of the country. Since the accession of the house of Alomphra
to the throne, that is to say, during a period of above a hundred
years, the history of Burma has been tolerably well known. We do not
recollect having ever met with one instance when the Pongyis, as a
body, have interfered in the affairs of State. But in a religious point
of view," continues Bishop Bigandet, "their influence is a mighty one."
And undoubtedly if they were an energetic, ambitious, and intellectual
body, instead of a thoroughly lazy and densely ignorant set of men,
they might easily direct this influence to worldly purposes, and they
might have excited the people to resist the British.

One of my first acts at Mandalay was to issue orders for the repair of
monasteries occupied by our men and for making compensation in some
form to the monks, and at least twice afterwards I reiterated and
enlarged these orders. No doubt this matter of the monasteries was a
grievance. But, as often happens, it was made more of by busybodies and
correspondents interested in defaming the administration than by the
sufferers. It was an unfortunate necessity of war. The only remedy was
to build barracks and reduce the garrison, both of which were done with
all the speed possible. It is worth noting that the Thathanabaing did
not make any complaint to me on this head. In his conversations with me
he dwelt mainly on the sufferings caused to the monks by the removal
of the inhabitants from the walled city, which was being converted
into a cantonment. The monks living in the cluster of great _Kyaungs_
(monasteries), of which the Incomparable was the centre, depended on
the faithful in the city for their food. I reminded him of the removal
of the people by their own monarchs, first from Ava to Amarapura and
then from Amarapura to Mandalay. He replied that the King removed the
_kyaungs_ with the people, and put them up on the new sites at the
public cost, and also compelled his Ministers to build new monasteries.
He was amused by my suggesting that the Commissioner and the secretary
who accompanied me should be ordered to erect some monasteries on the
sites to which the people were being moved. He saw the humour of it.

[Illustration: A PONGHI'S FUNERAL PROCESSION.] [Blank page]

I found the Thathanabaing in my intercourse with him always courteous
and good-humoured; and in his bearing there was neither arrogance nor
ill-will. Of the Pongyis generally in Upper Burma I saw something, as
in riding about the districts (there were no motors or tents for Chief
Commissioners in those days) we had generally to ask the Pongyis to
give us shelter; and their manner was courteous and hospitable. Not a
few, I thought, felt and deplored the misery which the disturbances
caused, and would have been glad to work for peace. It must be
remembered that from the experience of our rule in Lower Burma they
knew the attitude of the British Government towards their religion.
They had no reason to fear oppression or persecution. They knew at the
same time that in losing a Buddhist King their position and influence
must be lowered. They could hardly be asked to rejoice with us.

In common with others who know Burma better, I doubt if the religious
orders as a body had much influence on the course of events, or took an
active part in the resistance to us. When a monk became a noted leader,
it was a patriot who had been a monk and not a monk who had become a
patriot. At the same time some of the most serious and deepest-laid
plots were hatched in monasteries or initiated by Pongyis.

I may give some instances of the conduct and feelings of Pongyis.

In August, 1887, a pretender calling himself the Pakan Prince joined
a conspiracy to get up a rebellion in Mandalay. The police detected
the movement and the prince was arrested. The prince told all that he
knew. The originator of the scheme was a Sadaw or Abbot living in one
of the Thathanabaing's monasteries. He made his escape. I sent for the
Thathanabaing and he consented readily at my request to cite the Sadaw
to appear before him and to proclaim him as a man with whom Pongyis
should not associate. Whether he was sincere or not, I cannot say.
But he issued the injunction and I took care it was widely published.
Another case shows how the people as well as the Pongyis were coming
to regard us. The town of Tabayin in the Ye-u (now Shwèbo) district
was burnt by insurgents soon after our occupation of Mandalay. It was
rebuilt in 1887 owing to the exertions of certain Pongyis formerly
attached to the place. In order to ensure protection for the new town
the Pongyis induced the people to build a barrack at their own expense
for the police. Similarly, in July, 1887, when I was at Ngathaingyaung
in the Bassein district of Lower Burma the people were glad to have a
detachment of Bengal Infantry (7th Regiment) in one of the monasteries.
They welcomed them. One of the monks had learned Hindustani from the
men; and the Abbot, or head Pongyi, told me he would gladly give up his
own monastery if it was wanted for the soldiers.

Another matter which occupied my attention in Mandalay at this time was
our position towards the Chinese in Upper Burma. They are most numerous
in the Northern Division and congregate in Bhamo and Mandalay. They
numbered according to the census of 1901 about ten thousand, and may
have been less in 1887. Owing to their energy in trade and their wealth
they formed a not insignificant body, and like most bodies they had
their grievances.

It was arranged to hold a meeting in order to let them state their
complaints. All the prominent Chinese in Mandalay attended the
meeting, and Mr. Warry was present to interpret for me. They had minor
grievances about the collection of the jade duties and the farm of the
india-rubber tax in the Mogaung subdivisions. These things were easily
arranged. The chief subject of complaint, however, was the difficulty
in procuring and trading in opium, a matter not to be easily settled.
The regulations issued by the Chief Commissioner in March, 1886,
practically stopped the traffic. The words were these:--

"No shops whatever will be licensed for the sale of opium, inasmuch
as all respectable classes of Burmans are against legalizing the
consumption of opium in the new province. Any one found selling opium
to persons other than Chinese, or transporting opium in quantities
above three tolahs, or keeping a saloon for consuming opium, will
be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding Rs. 500 or to three
months' imprisonment, or to both. As traffic in opium was absolutely
prohibited under the Burmese Government, there will be no hardship in
thus proscribing opium dealings."

The Chinese, however, considered it the greatest hardship. The small
quantity, little more than one ounce troy weight, which might be
lawfully transported, practically stopped dealings in the drug. This
provision may not seem to go beyond the regulations of the Burmese
Government. But there was all the difference between a rule meant to
be enforced and one that could be easily evaded or was not intended
to be made effective. No doubt the prohibition by the King of the use
of opium by Burmans was real, and was backed by religious precept and
influence; but the restrictions on the Chinese were laxly administered
and were not too inconvenient to them.

If the Burmese alone had been concerned, opium might have been
prohibited altogether, and the prohibition might have been made
effectual, for it would have been backed by a very strong religious
sanction. But the Chinamen had to be considered. It was contrary to
our interests and wishes, especially at that time, in Upper Burma to
make things unpleasant for them. They are at all times a useful and
enterprising element in the population, although the ingenuity of the
least reputable amongst them in exploiting the Burmans and leading them
to gamble and to smoke opium requires to be firmly checked.

A second objection to prohibition, and even greater than the
hardship and annoyance it would cause to the Chinese, was the great
difficulty--almost impossibility, it may be said--of enforcing it.

Opium is perhaps as easy, and in Burma as profitable, to smuggle as
any article in the world. The Chinese are born smugglers. The poppy is
largely cultivated in Yunnan and in the hilly country on the Salween.
To prevent smuggling of opium overland into Burma would require a very
large expenditure and a numerous establishment. The thousand miles of
coast would be equally difficult to watch. If the growth of the poppy
is prevented in China and India it may perhaps become practicable to
stop opium from entering Burma. It was futile at that time and under
those circumstances to attempt absolute prohibition.

The Indian Excise and Opium Acts were extended to Upper Burma in
the latter half of 1888. The restrictions on the sale to Burmans of
opium and intoxicants were maintained--and neither excise licence nor
opium-shop was allowed in any place where the non-Burman population was
not considerable. Yunnan opium, which had hitherto come in free, was
subjected to a duty. The result was a great increase in the price of
opium in Upper Burma and at the same time energetic smuggling; while
it was believed, that so far as the restrictions against the sale of
liquor or opium to Burmans were effectual, their efficacy was due,
as in the King's time, more to the strength of the Buddhist religion
than to the power of the British Government and the honesty of its
magistrates. No further change was introduced while I was in Burma.

An excitement, however, arose in England, and the societies who,
belonging to one of the most intemperate races in the world, make it
their vocation to preach temperance to the most abstemious and sober of
nations, drove the Government of India to experiment on Burma. Since
1893 one device after another has been tried to prevent Burmans from
getting opium. The results appear to have been that contraband opium
has been driven to some extent from the market; that the consumption
of Government opium which has paid duty has doubled; that hundreds of
people are punished yearly, not a few on false charges, for offences
against the Opium Act, many of them by imprisonment; that the use of
cocaine and other drugs worse than opium has been substituted for it,
and in spite of the police is growing.

The following passage from a very excellent and accurate handbook of
Burma by Sir J. George Scott, K.C.I.E. (Alexander Moring, Ltd., 1906)
is worth quoting as the opinion of a man who knows the country well:--

"In Kokang and the Wa States the out-turn (of opium) runs to tons. West
of the Salween, Loimaw is the only place where opium is systematically
grown for profit. The cultivators are all Chinamen, and the amount
produced in the season reaches about four thousand pounds. The price
ranges from twelve to fifteen rupees for three and a half pounds. No
doubt a very great deal is smuggled into Burma by opium-roads--tracks
only passable by coolies, and not known to many. It is to be noted that
there are no victims to opium in the opium-producing districts, any
more than there are in Ssu-ch'uan, where the people are the wealthiest
in China and half the crops are poppy. It is only in places where opium
is prohibitive in price that there are victims to opium. If a man is
accustomed to take opium, he must have it to soothe his nerves under
excessive fatigue; if he lives in a malarious district, it is necessary
to kill the bacteria. When such a man is poor and comes to a place
where opium duty is high, he has to starve himself to get the anodyne
for his muscles, quivering under the weight of loads which no white
man could carry, or to soothe the racking fever in his bones. He dies
of want and opium is denounced. Where opium is cheap, the people are
healthy and stalwart and the women are fruitful. East of the Salween
the universal opinion of opium is that of the Turk, who stamps on his
opium lozenges _Mash Alla'h_, 'the gift of God.' Some of the Wa eat as
well as smoke opium; but, so far as is known, regular opium-eating is
rare, and none of the races drink it in the form of an emulsion, like
the _Kusumba_ of the Rajputs. West of the Salween, the European cant
about opium has penetrated. A Shan either tells deliberate lies or says
he only smokes when he has fever. The Rumai is pious and hypocritical,
and says his opium is intended for his ponies or for cases of malarial
fever. There are, of course, cases of excess, but the opium victim
is never the hideous spectacle of the man sodden with alcohol or the
repulsive bestiality that the man becomes who takes food to excess"
(pp. 268-69).

The only laws that will preserve the Burmans from the evils of opium
and alcohol and other drugs are the teachings of Buddha. So long as
they preserve their vigour and command the Burmans' belief, there
is not much fear. The danger is that Buddhism will be undermined by
Western education and contact with Europe, before it can be replaced
by a better and stronger faith. The number of young Burmans coming to
England is increasing. Will they return as abstemious and as temperate
as they came? They will not: the danger to the Burman is probably more
from alcohol than from opium, and more from contact with the West than
with China.[13]

This question, however, had no influence whatever on the work we
were engaged in. I was able to reassure the Chinese and to make them
feel that the Government desired to treat them with fairness and
consideration. The Chinese in Burma behaved throughout these stormy
years as loyal citizens. There were at first numerous reports of
hostile gatherings on or near the Chinese frontier, especially in the
north of Hsenwi and at Hpunkan, near Bhamo. They had little foundation
in fact. The only case in which it is certain that an armed body of
Chinese entered Burma was in January, 1889. A strong body of Chinamen,
chiefly deserters from the Chinese army and outlaws, gathered on the
Molè stream north-east of Bhamo. They were promptly attacked by the
police and so severely handled that they were not heard of again.

Still less influence on the restoration of order had the Ruby Mines
affair, which excited the British public and enabled parliamentary
busybodies to create an absurd fuss. The whole question of these mines
and their administration might well have waited until we had pacified
the country. Even as a source of revenue they were of no great moment,
and if we had left the native miners alone we should have saved the
heavy expense of maintaining a strong force up in the hills and making
a long and costly cart-road from the river. Mogok, the headquarters of
the mines, lies nearly six thousand feet above the sea-level, and is
distant sixty miles by road from the river port of Thabeikkyin, most
of it lying through thick jungle, poisoned with malaria and, in 1887,
infested with dacoits.

The mines were then worked by the Shans, who live on the spot and have
hereditary rights. A proposal had been made by Sir Charles Bernard, and
supported by the Government of India, to give a lease of the mines for
three years to Messrs. Gillanders Arbuthnot, of Calcutta, at an annual
rent of two lakhs of rupees, the equivalent then of about £14,000. This
firm had been accustomed to trade in rubies with the Shans at Mogok.
The proposal was judicious, and would have enabled the Government to
learn the value of the mines before committing themselves for a longer
term, as the firm's books were to be open to inspection.

This proposal, however, did not meet the views of the gentlemen who had
marked down the ruby mines as a field of speculation. A parliamentary
intrigue was got up. Questions were asked--jobs were hinted at. The
enormous value of the mines--the richest ruby mines in the world--was
talked about, until the British public began to see rubies and to
suspect, I verily believe, Sir Charles Bernard and all of us, his
official heirs and successors, of desiring to make dishonest fortunes.
Some of the speculators went to Simla to persuade the Government of
India that Gillanders Arbuthnot's offer was inconceivably ridiculous.
Then they came on to Rangoon with letters of introduction, not
unaccompanied by hints and warnings to be careful, to sniff about the
mines and get the ear of the authorities in Burma. The Secretary of
State trembled lest he should be suspected of favouring somebody; and
if I had destroyed Mandalay or drained the Irrawaddy, I doubt if there
would have been more disturbance than was caused by the grant to one of
the prospectors of a few yards of worthless land at Mogok on which to
erect a hut, and of an ordinary licence to mine.

Eventually an expert was sent out to inspect and value the mines. The
gentleman deputed to this duty was no doubt a skilled mineralogist,
even if he was without previous experience in ruby mines. It is
possible that his report was worth the cost. It was, I take it, a means
of getting out of a parliamentary difficulty. It served the Secretary
of State for India as an excuse for delay, and gave the appearance at
least of a searching and impartial investigation.

Late in 1889 a concession for seven years was granted to five lucky
promoters; and then the course usual in such cases was followed. A
company was floated in London under the auspices of a big financier.
The success for the concessionaires was unexampled. The public,
especially the small investors, in an enthusiasm of greed, tumbled
over each other to secure shares. In November, 1889, the company began
to work. Its history since has not been one of remarkable prosperity
either for the Government or the shareholders. The terms have been
revised several times. The receipts of the Government from the company
in 1903-4 were Rs. 2,11,500, or £14,000.

The history of this matter is interesting only as an example of the
futility of interfering with the Government of India in local matters.
To the administration of Burma it meant more writing, more labour, more
anxiety, when attention was needed elsewhere. When a man's house is
on fire he does not want to spend time in polishing the handle of his
door. I was compelled to keep at Mogok better men and a stronger force
than the district needed. For some years there was much disturbance in
the neighbouring country. But it was unconnected with the mines.

It is a defect in parliamentary government that so many members,
avoiding the really important matters, fasten greedily on lesser
questions, especially those which promise a scandal. As Parliament
chose to look at this matter as one of imperial interest, the mines
acquired an importance out of all proportion to their value. I found
the ruby mines was a burning question, and I had to go there without
delay. I left Mandalay on the 29th of March in a steamer for Kyannyat,
which was then the river station for Bernard Myo and Mogok, with Mr.
Herbert White and my private secretary. We rode the forty miles from
the river to Sagadaung, the halting-place at the foot of the hills,
taking as we went an escort of five mounted men (Gurkhas) from the
military posts on the road, and stopped there for the night. From
Sagadoung a mule-path (twenty miles) took us to Bernard Myo, where I
halted, and next day rode into Mogok.

The regulations and conditions under which it was proposed to allow the
mines to be worked were explained to the native mineowners and to the
persons present on behalf of the applicants for the concession, and the
way was cleared for a settlement.

A matter of more importance, although not one in which Parliament was
interested, was the dispute about Möngmit and Mohlaing (explained in
Chapter XX.). The Sawbwa of Möngmit and his ministers, as well as the
claimant, Hkam Leng, had been summoned to attend me. The latter did not
appear. He was one of the few irreconcilables Upper Burma produced. The
investigation of the case satisfied me that he had no title to Möngmit,
and I ordered him to be informed that his claim to that State was
inadmissible, but that he would be recognised as chief of Mohlaing if
he appeared and submitted.

After a few days at Mogok I returned to the river, marching down by
the Thabeikkyin road. We were obliged to go slowly, as it was thought
necessary to take an escort of twenty-five Gurkhas. One Paw Kwe, the
headman of a village on the road, the influential brigand in these
parts and one of the most evil-looking rascals I ever met, accompanied
the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Carter,[14] and was in a measure
responsible that no mischief should befall us. In the hope of keeping
him quiet I gave him a subsidy for carrying the mails. But he preferred
unemployment and took again to the jungle after a time, and, I believe,
became an irreconcilable.

The leisurely march down gave time to take up some matters of
importance that were waiting for me.

In the forefront of pressing questions was the provision of a
sufficient fleet of steam-launches. The delta of the Irrawaddy,
where the population is most dense and most wealthy, is a country of
rivers and creeks, where most of the transport is by boats. In the
rice-harvest season the waterways are much used by the Burman craft
carrying rice to the mills at Rangoon or Bassein, or making their way
homeward with the money for which it has been sold.

The waterways needed to be patrolled. The disorders following the
annexation extended to the creeks and rivers, and river pirates had
become more daring and the necessity of a well-formed service of river
police more urgent. Lower Burma was not well provided in this matter;
and being unable to obtain funds, the administration was driven to
apply local funds intended for roads to the purchase of launches.

In the Upper Province the want of suitable boats was even greater.
There were some six hundred miles of waterway to be served. The rivers
were the main lines of communication, and on the banks were placed
in most cases the headquarters of districts, the military stations
and outposts, and most of the larger villages and busier markets. At
first, until I had time to revise administrative boundaries, several
districts included land on both banks. Insurgents and dacoits had no
difficulty in obtaining boats for the purposes of attacking river craft
or waterside villages, or of escaping from pursuit. Once or twice we
were compelled to put an embargo on the boats to hinder the enemy from
getting across, but it was impossible to interfere thus with the river
life of the province, except under great necessity and for a very short
time.

To meet the demands of the soldiers, the police, and the district
officers, and, before the telegraph service was complete, to keep up
communication between stations and outposts, many boats were required.
It was also necessary to have the means of moving small bodies of
troops up and down or across the river without delay as the need might
arise.

[Illustration: MANDALAY.]

I had little difficulty in showing the need for a better fleet. But
the Government of India were startled at my demands. The Director of
Indian Marine, Captain John Hext, R.N. (now Rear-Admiral Sir John Hext,
K.C.I.E.), was sent down to persuade me to reduce the size and cost of
my navy. He was successful, and might perhaps succeed in persuading
the Emperor of Germany to limit his naval armaments. He had designed
an excellent type of river boat, a very light-draught paddle-wheeler,
with simple machinery and fair speed, with accommodation for half a
company of rifles and a couple of officers. They were built under his
instructions in the Government dockyard at Kidderpore. Being his own
creation, he named them the X type. In Burma they were called after
every type of robber known to the country. It was agreed that I was
to have nine of these boats and four smaller craft. I had asked for
twenty-three boats, and looking back, I am surprised at my moderation.
At the present time, after twenty years of peace and freedom from
organized crime, I believe the Burma Government has a fleet four times
as large as that with which I had to be content. But then I was, as it
were, a pioneer.

I was back in Mandalay on the 10th of April. There were some gleams of
light between the clouds. Baw or Maw, a small Shan State on the Kyauksè
border, had been brought to reason by General East without fighting:
the Kalè Sawbwa on the Chindwin had completed the payment of his
tribute: Hla U, the most noted leader in the Sagaing district, had been
killed by his own men, who were sick of the life.

On the other side of the account, Sinbyugyun, a post north of Salin
in the Minbu district, held by a military garrison of fifty men, had
been attacked twice and partially burnt. The news from the Northern
Shan States was somewhat disquieting. A desultory warfare was going on
in Hsenwi between the hereditary chief of the State, who had allied
himself with the pretender, Saw Yan Naing, and San Ton Hon, the usurper
in possession of Northern Hsenwi, supported by the Sawbwa of Hsipaw. It
was reported that San Ton Hon was being driven back, and it was feared
that the Hsipaw chief, who was our only assured friend in the Shan
States, might suffer a repulse. It seemed at one time that it might
become necessary to send an officer to Hsipaw with a small force. I was
unwilling to take this step. I wished to leave the Northern Shan States
alone until the next open season, and then to deal with the settlement
of the States as a whole. The rains, moreover, were now near at hand,
and Sir George White disliked moving troops into the hills if it could
be avoided. I held a party of military police ready, and had obtained
the Viceroy's consent to act, if it should be necessary. Meanwhile arms
and ammunition were sent up to Hsipaw, and the Sawbwa, who was not more
incapable or half-hearted than his opponents, contrived to hold his own
until the next open season.

The military police were arriving now, and were being distributed and
sent to their various destinations.

I could do little more by remaining in Mandalay. The most urgent
matters in connection with the police were the definition of their
duties and of their relations with the civil officers, their housing,
rationing, and medical treatment. Until, as I stated before, these
matters had been discussed and settled with the new Inspector-General
of Police, little progress could be made in relieving the soldiers from
occupying the small posts.

General Stedman was expected to arrive in Rangoon about the middle of
May, and it was convenient that he should meet me there.

Another matter which called me to Rangoon was the condition of Lower
Burma. Shortly before I took charge the Government of India had called
the Chief Commissioner's attention to the state of the province, "the
constant occurrence of petty dacoities (gang robberies), the apparent
want of concerted and energetic action in dealing with them which,"
they wrote, "have attracted the serious notice of the Governor-General
in Council. His Excellency trusts that the subject may receive your
immediate and active intervention."

The condition of the province was bad from a police point of view. The
people had enjoyed excellent harvests and good prices. Yet there was a
constant recurrence of crime, and the police quite failed to cope with
it. The excitement of the last year or two had been too much for the
younger Burmans. They could not settle down again, and the spirit of
loot and adventure rather than any real patriotism led to numerous gang
robberies, and sometimes to foolish outbreaks, of which men from Upper
Burma were sometimes the instigators.

Even within a short distance of Rangoon an Upper Burman, related, it
was said, to the Minbu leader, Ôktama, raised the Golden Umbrella and
called for followers. Some hundreds obeyed the call, but at the first
sight of the police they began to disperse. A party of Karens, led by a
British police officer, came up with some of them, killed and wounded
several, captured others, and made an end of the rising.

The Karens in Lower Burma were loyal and generally staunch, especially
the Christian Karens. The American Baptist missionaries have done an
inestimable service to the Karen race. They understand thoroughly
how to educate--in the true sense of the word--a tribe that has been
despised and trodden down for some generations. The missionary has
made himself not only the pastor but also the chief of his people,
and in those troubled times he organized them under their catechists,
taught them discipline and obedience, and made them useful and orderly
members of society, industrious, self-respecting, and independent. The
Government of Burma owes a debt to the American Baptist Mission which
should not be forgotten.

On receipt of this letter from the Government of India, reports from
Commissioners and from the head of the police had been called for.
Their answers were now before me. The Inspector-General of Police in
Lower Burma was the late Mr. Jameson, an officer of ability and long
experience. He frankly admitted that the police administration had
failed in suppressing organized brigandage. "So far," he wrote, "from
the crime of dacoity having been eradicated by British administration,
each year more dacoities are committed than in the one preceding." He
attributed this failure to defects in the judicial courts, especially
the Court of Revision and Appeal, which resulted in making punishment
very uncertain and sentences capricious; to the absence of any law
establishing a village organization and responsibility; and to the
number of arms in the hands of the peasantry, who received them for
their self-defence against dacoits, but gave them or lost them to the
robbers. The result was, Mr. Jameson asserted, that after thirty-five
years of British rule the country "was in a more disturbed state than
after the second war."

There is no doubt that the judicial administration in Lower Burma
was defective. The Judicial Commissioner who presided over the Chief
Appellate and Revising Court for the interior of the province was
selected by the Government of India from the members of the Indian
Civil Service of one of the Indian provinces, and seldom stayed long
in Burma. It is no libel on the distinguished men who have held this
position to say that as a rule they had no knowledge of the language
or customs of the people or of the conditions of Burma. They came from
some quiet province of India, and were unable at first to appreciate
those conditions. One of them might think the sentences awarded by the
magistrates too severe; his successor might pronounce them to be too
lenient.

There was a tendency to forget that an act--for example, shooting a
thief or burglar at sight--which in a quiet and settled country may
be a crime, may be excusable in a state of society where plunder and
murder by armed robbers are everyday occurrences.

Much mischief may be and was done by well-intentioned but inept
judicial action; neither the police nor the people knew how far they
might go in defending themselves or in effecting the capture of
criminals, and circulars were issued explaining the law which would
have puzzled the Chief Justice. A Burman peasant before he fired his
gun had to consider whether all the conditions justified him; and a
frontier guard had to pause with his finger on the trigger while he
recalled the words of the last circular on the use of firearms. The
result was that the police and the people were nervous and demoralized.
It was better to let the dacoit pass or to run away than to run the
risk of a trial for murder.

This may seem exaggeration. On one occasion when the prisoners in a
central gaol mutinied, the armed guard stood idle, until at last, when
the convicts were breaking out, one of the guards took his courage in
both hands and fired. The riot was checked. I wished to reward the man,
but the superintendent of the gaol reported that he could not discover
who had fired the shot. The warders said they did not doubt the
Chief Commissioner's power to reward them, but they knew the Judicial
Commissioner would hang the man who fired the gun.

The freedom with which licences to possess firearms had been granted in
Lower Burma was no doubt responsible for the facility with which the
bad characters could arm themselves. Every day's experience proved that
to arm the villagers was to arm the dacoits. Burmans are incredibly
careless. Even the Burman constables, who were to some extent trained
and disciplined, constantly allowed their guns to be taken. A
half-hearted measure had been in force in Lower Burma, which required
that a village must have at least five guns, as it was thought that
with that number they could defend themselves. Like most half-measures,
it was of no use.

The absence of a village organization and of the means of enforcing
village responsibility was no doubt a very great obstacle in the way
of the police, even if the police had been good. But when everything
had been said it came to this, that the police were bad and police
administration in a hopeless muddle.

The Burmans have, from the first day that British officers have tried
to discipline them, shown a great want of responsibility and incurable
slackness and little sense of duty. They cannot be trusted to keep
watch and ward, to guard or escort prisoners or treasure, or even
to remain on duty if they are posted as sentries. The discipline of
Frederick the Great might have improved them. But he would have shot
most of his men before he had made trustworthy soldiers of the few that
remained.

Hence it came to pass that Indians were enlisted to perform the duties
which the Burmans seemed unable to fulfil. A few Indians were posted to
every station for these purposes, and the Burmans were employed mainly
on detection and investigation and reporting. This system led to still
further deterioration of the Burman constable, who ceased to rely on
his own courage or resources.

The Indians, again, were recruited locally. The police officers who
recruited them had no experience of the Indian races and did not know
one caste from another. The most unfit men were taken. They were
not much looked after, and their officers did not know the Indian
languages or understand their customs.

When the risings took place in Shwègyin and elsewhere after the
annexation, the Burma police showed themselves to be absolutely
untrustworthy. More Indians were enrolled and the mischief increased.
The Burman knew he had behaved badly and was not trusted, and became
more untrustworthy, while the Indians were not under proper discipline,
scattered about as they were in small parties, and were in any case
quite useless for detective or ordinary police purposes. The only
exception to this condemnation of the indigenous police that could be
made was, I think, the armed frontier guard in the Thayetmyo district,
who were stationed and housed with their families on the frontier of
British Burma.

It was clear that the working of the police force in Lower Burma
required thorough investigation, and that its constitution would have
to be recast. As necessary subsidiary measures, the country would have
to be thoroughly disarmed, and above all a village organization must be
created and the joint responsibility of the village for certain crimes
enforced.

A committee was appointed to consider the best method of reforming
the civil police force of Lower Burma. I took in hand the question of
thoroughly disarming the whole province, and a bill dealing with Lower
Burma villages on the lines of the Upper Burma village regulation was
framed.

These matters would take some time. The Indian police, however,
could be improved at once. It was decided to remove all Indians from
the civil police, and to enroll them in a regiment under a military
commandant, similar to one of the Upper Burma military police
battalions in formation and discipline. Their headquarters were to be
at Rangoon, and the men needed for other districts were to be sent
from Rangoon and treated as detachments of the regiment. They were to
be enrolled for three years under a Military Police Act, which was
passed in 1887. Pending the report of the Committee and the measures
that might be taken on their advice, it was necessary to act at once
in the most disordered parts of the province. Especially in portions
of the Shwègyin district in Tharawaddy, and in the northern townships
of Thayetmyo the dacoit gangs were strong and active. The ordinary
district staff seemed helpless and unable to make head against the
brigands, to whose exactions the peasants had become accustomed.
They found it easier to make terms with the criminals than to help a
government that was unable to protect them.

I adopted the plan of selecting a young officer known for his activity
and character, and placing him in charge of the disturbed tract, giving
him a sufficient police force and magisterial powers, and making him
independent of the Deputy Commissioner of the district, who continued
to conduct the ordinary administration. This special officer had no
other duty than to hunt down and punish the gangs of outlaws. He was
to be always out and always on their tracks, using every means in his
power to make friends with the villagers and induce them to give him
information and help against the common enemy.

This policy succeeded, and the disturbed districts were brought into
line. The late Mr. Henry Todd Naylor,[15] of the Indian Civil Service,
distinguished himself especially in this work, and won a well-merited
decoration from the Viceroy.

I had made up my mind to dispense with the services of the Special
Commissioner for Lower Burma as soon as possible. The appointment was
undoubtedly necessary at first, when communications were bad, but as
the province settled down the need was less and the saving of labour
to me very little. The responsibility remained with me. I was bound
to know everything that went on, and in such matters as the condition
of the province the Government of India expected me to intervene
personally.

The work and exposure since the annexation were beginning to tell on
the members of the Commission, especially on those who had sustained
the heaviest burdens of responsibility and had been most exposed to the
climate, and I was hard pressed for men to fill the places of those
who wanted leave.[16] An accident happening to the Commissioner of
Tennasserim, I decided to send Mr. Hodgkinson there and to take the
Lower Burma work into my own hands.

An increase to the Secretariat had been sanctioned in April, 1887.
This enabled me to save a man by appointing Mr. Smeaton (the late
Donald Mackenzie Smeaton,[17] C.S.I., M.P.), to the newly created
post of Chief Secretary. He had served for some years in Burma, with
distinction, under Sir Charles Aitchison and Sir Charles Bernard.

In a short time the Secretariats were united in Rangoon and the work
distributed into the ordinary departments of Indian administration
without reference to territorial division.

On the arrival of General Stedman in the middle of May (1887), the
Upper Burma military police questions were brought under discussion.
The men, as I have said before, were coming in fast. The sanctioned
strength at this time was fifteen thousand five hundred men. It was
necessary to determine the constitution of the force, its relation to
the Deputy Commissioners of districts, and the methods by which it was
to be rationed and kept supplied with necessaries.

These matters had been thought out before General Stedman's arrival.
They were now discussed with him in detail, and the general lines to
be followed were laid down. Briefly, the following constitution was
adopted:--

The keynote of Indian administration was, and I believe still is, that
the District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner, or by whatever name he
may be called, is the executive representative of the Government, and
is responsible for all matters in his district subject to the control
of the Commissioner of the division. He is especially responsible for
the peace of his district, and therefore the allocation of the police
force rests primarily with him. It was laid down for the guidance of
Deputy Commissioners that the most important and central posts should
be occupied by fairly strong bodies of military police, to which should
be attached a few Burman constables, some of whom were to be mounted,
who were to collect information, receive reports, and investigate
cases. Between the military police posts, and helping to link them up,
were to be civil police stations manned by Burmans exclusively, who
were to be locally recruited. A constant and systematic patrol was to
be maintained between the military police posts. The posts were to be
fortified and capable of defence by the garrison remaining after the
despatch of a patrol. It was laid down as a fixed law that the reserve
at headquarters must be sufficient to provide a reasonably strong
movable column ready to reinforce any part of the district that might
need it.

The police force was divided into battalions, one to each district,
of a strength varying with the size and wants of the district. To
each battalion was appointed a commandant, to all except a few very
small battalions a second-in-command, and to some more than one. These
officers were all selected from the Indian Army, and, with very rare
exceptions, were capable men. The interior economy, the training,
and the discipline of the men were left to the commandants under the
Inspector-General's orders. With these matters the civil officials
could not in any way interfere.

It was found necessary from the first to restrain firmly the tendency
of the local officials to fritter away the strength of the force in
small posts. The moment anything occurred they wanted to clap down
a post on the disturbed spot; and if this had been allowed to go on
unchecked there would not have been a man left to form a movable column
or even to send out a patrol of sufficient strength.

The number of men to be kept at headquarters, the minimum strength of a
post, and the minimum number of a patrol had to be absolutely laid down
by the Chief Commissioner's order. At first the strength prescribed was
too small. After some experience, the lowest post garrison was fixed at
forty rifles, the minimum strength of a patrol at ten rifles; and these
orders were stringently enforced.

It was resolved to mount a certain number of the force, and as soon
as the ponies could be obtained--which was not an easy matter, as the
mounted infantry and the army transport took up very many--about 10 per
cent. of the men were mounted.

Many of the military police who arrived in Burma in 1887 were newly
raised and insufficiently trained levies, and until the men had been
drilled and taught to use their weapons it was impossible to do much
towards relieving the soldiers from the outposts. The rainy season was
occupied in the work of instruction. The task was performed under very
difficult conditions, for the men were often called away to occupy
posts and take part in active operations, and the officers were few.
The duty was well done, and by the end of the autumn of 1887 we were
in possession of an army, which proved itself to be a most serviceable
instrument for reducing the country to order. The men, whether in the
field or in their lines, behaved exceedingly well.

Hardly less important than the constitution of the force was its
maintenance in a state of contentment and efficiency. At the beginning
of 1887 the number of military police landed in Burma was between
five and six thousand, and as the year advanced the force was fast
increasing. As the men arrived they were rapidly distributed to the
districts of Upper Burma, and when trained were destined to relieve the
troops in distant outposts.

It was necessary to make immediate arrangements for their rations and
for renewing their clothing, equipment, and ammunition; and also for
the medical treatment of the men. The principal medical officer of
the field force kindly undertook to organize the medical service, and
Captain Davis was engaged in working out the details.

Captain S. C. F. Peile, who, in 1885, had accompanied the Bengal
Brigade of the field force as executive commissariat officer, had been
selected to organize the supply business of the police force. He was
ready to commence work early in April. The rains in Burma begin in May.
Large numbers of the police were stationed in the Eastern Division,
where cart traffic would soon become impossible, and also in the Ruby
Mines and other districts, which would soon be cut off altogether.

I had found at several places that the military police at outposts were
not properly rationed and depended on the military commissariat, which
might at any time be moved away.

The question arose as to the best method of supplying our men. One of
the conditions under which they had taken service was that they should,
as in the army, get money compensation for dearness of provisions at
a rate varying with the price of flour. The men of the Indian army,
when not on active service, ration themselves, and are paid on this
principle. But this system presupposes that the necessary provisions
are procurable in the local markets.

The Burman markets afford everything that a Burman needs--Burman
caviare, a dainty that one has to be brought up to; tinned milk,
biscuits, sardines, and other delicacies; but wheat flour, _ghi_
(clarified butter), and various pulses are not to be had. It is on such
things that the fighting man from Northern India lives.

After discussing the question carefully with Captain Peile, it was
determined, with the consent of the men, to give no compensation and
to serve out rations to all at a fixed monthly charge. The Central
Direction undertook to deliver sufficient supplies at the headquarters
of each battalion. The distribution to the outposts was to be managed
by the battalion officers with the battalion transport.

I was able to say at the end of the year that the Supply Department had
worked well, and that without its aid the organization of the military
police could not have been effected. The system has stood the trial
of more than twenty years, and it is doubtful whether any cheaper or
better system could have been devised for the supply of a large force
in similar circumstances.

The same establishment under Captain Peile provided for the supply and
renewal of clothing, arms, and ammunition.

These matters and the work connected with the many parts of the
administrative machine of the province gave me ample occupation in
Rangoon for some weeks.

FOOTNOTES:

[9] "Legend of Gaudama," vol. ii., p. 319. (Trübner, 1880.)

[10] _Ibid._, p. 242.

[11] _Ibid._, p. 303.

[12] "Legend of Gaudama," vol. ii., p. 303.

[13] A summary of the measures taken in Burma is given in the report of
"The Committee appointed by the Philippine Commission to investigate
the use of opium and the traffic therein," which deals with the
evidence in a sane and judicial manner. (See "The Province of Burma,"
by Alleyne Ireland, F.R.G.S., vol. ii., p. 845 _et seq._)

[14] Mr. G. M. S. Carter had served in the Police Department in
British Burma for eleven years and had made a reputation for ability
and knowledge of the people. In June, 1886, he was appointed to be an
Assistant Commissioner and posted to Upper Burma. Mr. Carter was one of
the best executive officers in the Commission, and his death in 1890
was a severe loss to the Government and a sorrow to all of us, his
comrades and friends.

[15] Mr. Todd Taylor, C.S.I., C.I.E., died last year, after acting as
Financial Commissioner of Burma.

[16] Amongst others, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Fryer, Mr. Symes, and Mr. Carter
were asking for leave. Of these only Mr. Fryer (Sir Frederic Fryer,
K.C.S.I.) is alive. The others are dead many years.

[17] Mr. Smeaton was at this time serving in the North-Western (now
United) Provinces of India.




CHAPTER V

DEALING WITH DACOITS


It was about this time (May, 1887) that the news of the surrender
of the Limbin prince to Mr. Hildebrand, and the submission of the
influential Sawbwa of Möngnai came to remove some of our anxieties.
Lord Dufferin telegraphed his congratulations to me: "These
circumstances," he said, "greatly clear the air." They proved in effect
that we need not apprehend any very serious opposition in the Shan
States, and that there was no risk in holding that country with a small
force during the rains, on which point there were apprehensions in some
quarters.

Good news came also from Upper Burma. A noted gang, led by men of more
force than the ordinary leaders of dacoits possessed, had surrendered
to Major Ilderton, who commanded a post at Wundwin, in the Meiktila
district. The gang was known by the name of the place, Hmawwaing, where
it made its retreat, and it had sustained several severe attacks before
the leaders gave in, of whom two had been village headmen and the third
had been a Government servant under the King. The three had long worked
together; and before the annexation they had dominated the northern
part of Meiktila. They were pardoned, and provision made for their
support. Two of them absconded. They soon found, however, that their
influence was gone. The country was weary of them. One (Maung Kala)
died of fever; a second (Myat Hmon) gave himself up again. The third
(Maung Ohn), the most educated and best bred of them, had remained
quiet.

It was now necessary for me to return to Upper Burma, but I had not
yet met Mr. Tucker, the Commissioner of the Eastern Division. As the
rains were beginning, and the extension of the railway beyond Toungoo
had not been opened, I asked Mr. Tucker to meet me at Toungoo. I could
not spare time to march up to his headquarters. The chief engineer of
the Mandalay Railway, Mr. Buyers, was pushing on the line as fast as he
could. He had many difficulties to contend with. The Burmans, although
coming readily to the work, were new to it. The working parties had to
be protected; the heavy forest in some divisions of the line had to be
cleared. I had seen Mr. Buyers and satisfied myself that work was going
on well.

I met Mr. Tucker, and received from him a fairly satisfactory account
of his division. Meiktila and Yamèthin were almost quiet. Pyinmana was
a difficult tract to reduce to order. It is described in the _Burma
Gazetteer_ as "one large forest with the exception of the immediate
surroundings of Pyinmana town and small patches of cultivation near
the villages and streams." The station had been for some months almost
besieged by dacoits, who took cover close to our lines. So much so that
the postmaster, who came from a peaceful district, put up a notice
closing the post-office as "urgent private affairs" compelled him to
leave. It needed a good deal of peaceful persuasion to induce him to
remain at his work.

In April, May, and June the troops of Sir William Lockhart's command,
aided to some extent by the police, were very active. The forests
and all the hiding-places were thoroughly explored and for the time
at least cleared of dacoits. Meanwhile the civil officers, under the
energetic direction of Mr. H. St. G. Tucker, vigorously disarmed the
district, making full use of the men of local influence. By the middle
of June, when Mr. Tucker met me, only small bands were left, who were
forced to conceal themselves, and there was little trouble afterwards
in this district. But the difficult country of the Pegu Yoma between
Pyinmana and the Magwè district of the Southern Division continued to
harbour dacoits until 1890.

I returned to Rangoon from Toungoo and left for Upper Burma on the 10th
of June. Going by the river, I stopped at all the towns on the way up,
seeing the officers, inspecting every part of the administration, and
discussing affairs.

In Lower Burma the towns and villages showed their wonted comfort
and prosperity, the boats were as numerous as ever, and the rice and
other produce was waiting in abundance at the landing-places for the
steamers. The disturbances had had little effect on trade.

The country inland to the west of the river was still harassed by
predatory gangs in the wilder parts, and the police did not appear able
to suppress them.

There was no need, however, for the aid of the soldiers. I was able
to reduce the number of outposts occupied by troops, and I would have
reduced them still more, but that the General Commanding in Lower Burma
was unable to provide barrack-room for the men occupying them. It was
clearly time to take up the question of reducing the garrison of Lower
Burma.

It was not a good thing to accustom the civil officers, the police,
or the people to depend on detachments of troops scattered over
the country, and it certainly was not good for the discipline
and efficiency of the men. The conduct of the soldiers, however,
was excellent, and the people welcomed them. I found a general
unwillingness to lose the sense of security which their presence
gave; and possibly also the profits of dealings with them. The Indian
soldiers and the Burmans were on excellent terms. Even where the men
were quartered in the monasteries the Pongyis did not want them to
leave.[18]

At Thayetmyo the region of dacoit gangs and disturbances was reached.
The main trouble appeared to be in what may be termed Bo Swè's country,
which lay on the right bank of the river, reaching from the old British
Burma boundary to a line going westward with a slight southerly curve
from Minhla to the Arakan mountains. Part of the trouble I thought
arose from the fact that the jurisdiction of the Lower Burma command
had been extended so as to cover this country, while the civil
jurisdiction belonged to the Minbu district of Upper Burma. This
impeded free communication between the civil and military authorities.
I transferred the tract to Thayetmyo, made it a subdivision of that
district, and put a young and energetic officer in charge. The tract
across the river was similarly treated.

I was now in Upper Burma again. Minbu on both sides of the river (it
extended to both banks at this time) was very disturbed. Ôktama's power
was not broken. Villages were attacked and burnt, and friendly headmen
were murdered.

Pagan, the next district, was not much better; and divided as it was
by the river, and containing the troublesome Yaw tract, the civil
authorities were somewhat handicapped. From Pagan I crossed over to
Pakokku, even then a fine trading town and the centre, as it still is,
of the boat-building industry. The town in 1887 had a population of
about 5,000, which had increased in 1901 to 19,000. It was well laid
out with handsome avenues of tamarind-trees. Standing on good sandy
soil and well drained, it was a fine site for the headquarters of a
district.

The town and its neighbourhood had been skilfully governed by a lady,
the widow of the old Governor, who had died thirty years before. Her
son, a very fat and apparently stupid youth, was titular town-mayor
(_Myo-thugyi_); but because he was suspected of playing false, through
fear of the insurgents, he had been superseded, and a stranger from
Lower Burma appointed as magistrate.

The wisdom of importing men from Lower Burma was always, to my mind,
doubtful, and in this case was peculiarly open to objection, as it
was a slight to the widow, who was undoubtedly an able woman, and had
joined the British cause from the first.

It was said that in 1885 she was ordered by the King's Government to
block the channel by sinking boats, of which there were always plenty
at Pakokku; she let all the Upper Burma craft go--for a consideration,
of course--and sunk some boats which belonged to British Burma. She was
alleged to have made a thousand pounds by this transaction, which is
very characteristic of the East.

I called on this old lady and had some conversation with her, and I
would gladly have seen more of her, as she appeared to be a woman of
some power. It was arranged to remove the Lower Burman magistrate and
to send an English Assistant Commissioner, who would work through the
hereditary Governor and his mother.

At Myingyan, the next station, I found the best of my officers was
Captain Hastings,[19] the commandant of the military police, who was
fast making his men into a very fine battalion, with which before
long he did excellent service. I waited at Myingyan to see General
Sir Robert Low, who had been at Mandalay. He was satisfied about the
progress in his district, except in the country about Salin, Ôktama's
country, and in Taundwingyi, which he said was full of dacoits, and
would probably be their last abiding-place.

It was a true prophecy, as I learnt to my sorrow. Partly owing to the
very difficult country on its east border, and partly, perhaps even
more, to the incompetence and weakness of the local officers, this
district became my shame and despair. But at this time I had not been
over the Taundwingyi country.

My next halt was at Myinmu, the headquarters of a subdivision of the
Sagaing district, on the right bank, about thirty miles below Sagaing.
Mr. Macnabb, a young soldier who had lately joined the Commission, was
there as subdivisional officer. His report was not very satisfactory.
Myinmu, for some reason or other, was especially obnoxious to the
insurgents and was repeatedly attacked. Even quite recently there
has been some trouble at Myinmu, although it is now a station on the
railway which goes from Sagaing to the Chindwin.

Ava, which is a little further up on the opposite side of the river,
was at that time a separate district. But except that it was the old
capital of Burma, and was a favourite ground for dacoits, there was no
reason for keeping a Deputy Commissioner there, and little ordinary
work for him. It was soon to be added to the Sagaing district, to which
it still belongs. There were no troops at this time at Ava; the Indian
military police were good.

I found the experiment of training Burmans as military police still
going on in Ava. It will be remembered that the first idea was to
recruit half the force from the Burmans and other local races. The
commandant called my attention to the gross waste of money that was
involved in this experiment. The Burman officers were hopelessly unfit.
One had been imported from Lower Burma; the other was a half-caste, a
poor specimen of his kind in every way. They were disbanded as soon as
possible.

[Illustration: SHWÈTAKYAT PROMONTORY OPPOSITE SAGAING.]

The dacoits hung about the country under the Ava Deputy Commissioner
for a long time. His jurisdiction did not extend over more than three
hundred and fifty square miles, but it was harried by three noted
guerilla leaders--Shwè Yan, who occupied the country on the borders of
the Kyauksè and Ava districts; Bo Tok, who frequented the borders of
Ava and Myingyan; and the third, Shwè Yan the second, who ravaged the
south-west part of the district. The two last were killed by British
troops. The first and the most formidable of the three was reported to
have disappeared.

It may be mentioned here, as illustrating the persistence of the
insurgents and the apparently endless nature of the task, which
demanded all our patience and perseverance, that in the spring of 1888
Ava was as bad as ever. There were nineteen well-known leaders--"named
varieties," as a gardener might call them--who, in the words of the
official report, "held the countryside in terror." Early in May,
Shwè Yan, whose disappearance had been reported, was again on foot
with a strong body of followers. A force of troops and police which
encountered him lost two British officers.

From Ava I went over to Sagaing and inspected the station and the
police, and crossed to Mandalay the same day. Sir George White met me
on landing, and I rode up with him to my quarters on the wall.

This journey had occupied me eighteen days. I left Rangoon on the 10th
of June, and reached Mandalay on the 28th. But the time had been well
spent in gaining information and in making or renewing acquaintance
with the district officers. I had inspected all stations on the way,
and had been able to dispose of many questions on the spot. When I
was not on shore, the office work and correspondence kept me busy. My
secretary and I had to write on the skylight of the boat, as there was
no accommodation of any kind except a few dressing-rooms below, which
in that climate and at that season were suffocating.

FOOTNOTES:

[18] The same is true of the British soldier, of whom in war or peace
his countrymen cannot be proud enough. When, after the barracks were
built at Mandalay, a regiment (the Royal Munster Fusiliers) was ordered
to leave a great group of monasteries, the abbots and chief Pongyis
came to me with a petition to let the soldiers remain where they were.

[19] Now Major-General Edward Spence Hastings, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding
the Mandalay Brigade. The Myingyan Battalion was in 1892 formed into
the 4th Burma Battalion under its old commandant.




CHAPTER VI

CIVIL AND MILITARY WORKS


Nothing has been said as yet about roads and communications, the most
powerful of all aids in pacifying a disturbed country. The plains of
India in most provinces lend themselves to military operations, and
for the greater part of the year an army can move about at will. In
Burma the long and heavy rains, the numerous streams, and the extensive
and dense forests and jungles, make campaigning very difficult. The
country, in Sir George White's words, quoted before, "is one huge
military obstacle."

Sir Charles Bernard had not lost sight of this part of his work. With
the aid of Mr. Richard, of the Public Works Department, a most able
superintending engineer, as much as possible had been done. No time had
been lost.

In Mandalay itself, in 1886, fifteen miles of road had been re-formed,
the bridges renewed and metal consolidated, and in the country
generally more than two hundred miles of roads had been taken in hand
and partially finished. Tracks one hundred feet in width had been
cleared of forest and jungle between many of the military posts, a work
in which the military officers took a large part. As our occupation
of the country became closer, more roads and more tracks were called
for. These forest tracks can hardly be called engineering works, but
they were of first importance for the free movement of troops. The time
during which road-making can be carried on is short in Burma, owing to
the great rainfall. The dry zone in the centre of the province, where
the climate is no impediment, is precisely the country where roads are
least necessary.

Eastern Governments as a rule trouble themselves very little about
roads and public buildings of a useful kind. In Burma there were
pagodas and monasteries innumerable. But roads and prosaic buildings,
such as court-houses and jails, received little attention. Such a thing
as a trunk road did not exist.

Controlling the engineering establishment in Lower Burma there was a
chief engineer, who was also Public Works secretary. His hands were
full. To ask him to supervise the work in the new province as well was
to lay on him an impossible task and to ensure the waste of much money.
A chief engineer for Upper Burma was appointed at my request, and Major
Gracey, R.E., who was selected for the post, had arrived in Burma. I
have met with few men who had more power of work and of getting their
subordinates to work, or who took greater care of the public money,
than Major Gracey.

On his arrival, in consultation with Colonel Cumming, the expenditure
was examined and the whole situation discussed in Rangoon, and
afterwards both officers met me in Mandalay. There was much difficulty
in obtaining a sufficient number of engineers and a competent
engineering establishment. The Indian Public Works service in the
higher grades is recruited in England, and the subordinates are
appointed in India. Service in Burma was for many reasons unpopular
with men trained in India. The other provinces were not anxious to part
with their best men. Hence the men who came to Burma were frequently
unwilling and sometimes not very efficient.

The difficulty was to apportion the existing establishment as fairly as
possible between the two provinces, so as to give Major Gracey a fair
number of men with Burman experience.

With Major Gracey's help everything went on well, and as fast as
possible. A list of the work done in 1887 would fill a page. The grant
for military works in that year was £317,500. Permanent barracks at
Mandalay and Bhamo, and a great number of temporary buildings to
accommodate troops, were erected all over Burma in the first year of
Major Gracey's tenure. Many of the temporary buildings were put up by
military and civil officers; but after a time, all military buildings
were carried out by the Public Works Department.

The Civil Works grant was nearly £350,000.

The provinces had no court-houses, no jails, no places of detention at
the police stations, and no barracks or accommodation for the military
police. Two larger jails, one at Mandalay for eight hundred prisoners
and one at Myingyan for one thousand, although not yet completed, were
already occupied. Of three smaller prisons at Monywa, Pagan, and Minbu,
one was finished and two partially, but enough to be of use. At ten
stations small lock-ups were being built for persons arrested by the
police. The jails and lock-ups were pressed on, because the existing
arrangements for confining prisoners inherited from the Burmese
Government were insufferable, and in some cases inhuman.

Provision had to be made for housing some thousands of military police.
At the headquarters of eighteen districts accommodation had to be
provided for about half a battalion, with hospitals, guard-rooms,
magazines, and cook-houses. These buildings, especially the hospitals
with accommodation for 8 per cent. of the strength, were constructed
of good permanent material. The barracks, officers' quarters, stables,
and the like were built in the cheapest way consistent with comfort and
health. The condition of the country in a year or two would permit, it
was expected, of a reduction of the military police force, or at least
of a change in its disposition; the barrack accommodation would not
be permanently wanted, but the hospitals could be used for the civil
population.

Added to all this building work, roads to the extent of five hundred
miles, of which one hundred and fifty were hill roads, were laid out
and made passable, raised and bridged in most cases, and in some places
metalled. These works were scattered over the province from Bhamo
to the old frontier of British Burma. In designing the roads it was
remembered that the great trunk lines of communication were the great
rivers in the centre and west of the province, and the railway in the
east. All the main roads were designed to be feeders to the rivers or
the rails. In addition to the larger roads, many hundreds of miles
of tracks and rough district roads were cut through the forest and
jungles, and a survey was begun, to open up the difficult Yaw country,
through which we had afterwards to push troops. (_vide_ Chapter XXI.).
I think it may be claimed that our engineers did their duty.

The middle of Upper Burma, the dry zone, as it is called, differs in
climatic conditions from the country to the south and north of it. The
rainfall is deficient, and droughts, sometimes severe, are not unknown.

The Burmese rulers were capable of large conceptions, but they lacked
skill; and their great irrigation schemes, attempted without sufficient
science, were foredoomed to failure. The largest works of this class
existing, when we took the country, were the Mandalay and Shwèbo
Canals, which were of little use, as even where the construction was
not faulty they had been allowed to go to ruin. In Kyauksè Salin
(Minbu district) and elsewhere there were extensive canals of a
less ambitious nature, which although neglected were still of much
service. Even in the turmoil of 1886 and the pressure of what was in
fact a state of war, Sir Charles Bernard found time to attend to the
irrigation systems; and as soon as a skilled engineer could be obtained
from India, and funds allotted, the work of irrigation was tackled in
earnest. The first business was to examine the existing systems and see
whether they could be made use of. Before I left Burma in December,
1890, I had the pleasure of knowing that this work was in hand, and
that further deterioration from neglect had been stopped, and also that
new schemes were under consideration.

The expenditure in Upper Burma at this time was very great. An army
of fourteen thousand men cannot be kept in the field for nothing.
The military police force was a second army, and there was besides
all the cost of the civil administration. The incoming revenue was
in comparison insignificant. In 1886-7 it had been £250,000 in round
numbers, in 1887-8 it rose to £500,000--not enough to cover the public
works expenditure alone.

It was not wonderful, therefore, that the Government of India, whose
finances at the time were by no means happy, should be nervous about
the expenditure. They were most gentle and considerate in the matter;
and although it was evident that our success in Burma would be measured
in England mainly by the financial results, no pressure was put upon
me to get in revenue, and I felt the pinch chiefly in the difficulty
of getting an adequate and competent engineering establishment and
immediate funds for works, the urgency of which was less apparent to
the Government of India than to me on the spot. With Lord Dufferin's
backing I obtained what I wanted, and I hope I did not exhibit an
indecent importunity.

I had considered and reported to the Finance Department all possible
means of raising the revenue. On the whole, my conclusion was that we
had to look rather to existing sources than to new taxation, which in
a country not yet completely subdued and of which we had imperfect
knowledge would have been inexpedient. The excise revenue might have
been made profitable, but we were debarred from interfering for the
time with the regulations made and sanctioned (somewhat hastily,
perhaps) by the Government of India, immediately after the annexation.

Under the circumstance, the best and quickest method of improving the
financial conditions was clearly the reduction of the field force.
This was already under discussion. The initial step had been taken
and one regiment of Native Infantry had been sent back to India. The
military police had begun to relieve the troops in the outposts. The
Major-General, Sir George White (who in addition to his merits as
a gallant leader and good strategist, was an able administrator),
was careful always of public money, and in perfect accord with the
civil administration. He desired his men to be relieved as quickly as
possible.

It was a matter, however, in which it was unsafe to rush, and in which
a heavy responsibility rested on me. Events were happening from time
to time which warned us that we were not yet out of the wood. On the
3rd of June, for example, the troops at Pyinulwin, forty miles from
Mandalay, led by Colonel May, had attacked a stockade held on behalf
of the Setkya Mintha, a pretender. Darrah, Assistant Commissioner, was
killed, an officer named Cuppage badly wounded, and several men lost.
Hkam Leng (see Chapter XX.) was active in the Möngmit Country.

[Illustration: "THE MOAT," MANDALAY.
And North Wall of Fort Dufferin.]

The Commissioners of the Northern and Central Divisions were urging me
to have the large and numerous islands between Mandalay and Sagaing
cleared of the gangs who held them. They represented the necessity of a
river patrol. The cry from the Southern Division was for launches. The
Commissioner wrote that the only boat in his division fit for service
was that assigned to the military authorities; and this was the day
after Captain Hext's arrival on his mission from India, to persuade me
to reduce my demand for boats.

The Deputy Commissioner for Mandalay reported that there was a dacoit
leader stockaded within forty miles of Mandalay, and that he was unable
to get a force to turn him out of his position.

At the same time (July, 1887) bad news came from the Ye-u district. Two
pretenders had appeared with a considerable following. As a prelude
they had burnt villages, crucified one of the village headmen, and
committed other brutalities. The civil administration was obliged to
ask for help from the soldiers in this case. The weather was fine,
and the country which these men had occupied was a good field for
cavalry. The Hyderabad Cavalry were in the field at once, and the
Inspector-General of Police was able to get together a hundred mounted
military police and send them to help. A force from the Chindwin side
co-operated. The gathering was very soon scattered. One of the leaders
died of fever and the other escaped for a time, but was afterwards
captured in the Lower Chindwin district, where he was attempting to
organize another rising.

I was compelled in Sagaing also to ask Sir George White's assistance.
The Sagaing Police battalion was backward in training and not fit for
outpost work in a bad district. The death of Hla U had been expected
to bring peace. But it now appeared that the district on both sides of
the Mu was in the hands of three or four dacoit leaders who collected a
fixed revenue from each village, which was spared so long as the demand
was paid. Any headman who failed to pay was murdered remorselessly. In
some cases the man's wife and children were killed before his face, to
add to the sting of death.

The system in the Sagaing and other districts much resembled--in its
machinery, not altogether in its methods--the organization of the
Nationalists in Ireland.

At my request Sir George White consented to occupy the district
closely, and although the gangs were not caught or brought to justice,
some protection was given to the peaceful part of the population until
we were ready later on to take the district in hand and destroy the
gangs.

In Sagaing, as in some other cases, the local officers had been
ignorant of what was going on around them. It was believed to be quiet
because we had no touch with the people, and they told us nothing.

The intention in referring to these events is to show why caution was
needed in the matter of relieving the troops. It must be remembered
that a very large proportion of the military police had received
very little training before their arrival. With the exception of
some two thousand men, all were recruits entirely untaught in drill
or discipline. The employment of such raw men on outpost duty under
native officers whom they did not know was not without risk. In many
cases the risk had to be faced, and consequently some disasters were
inevitable. Progress was slow, but under the conditions it was good.
"To instil discipline into so large a body of young soldiers," wrote
the Inspector-General (General Stedman), "was a far more difficult
task than to teach them the rudiments of drill. By discipline must be
understood not only good conduct in quarters and prompt obedience to
the orders of superiors, but the necessity of sticking to one another
in the field and the habit of working together as a welded body."

Before I left Mandalay again for Lower Burma, Sir George White and I
had arrived at an agreement regarding the force which it was necessary
to keep up. We were able to propose the abolition of the field force
and the reduction of the garrison by one regiment of British Infantry,
two regiments of Indian Cavalry, eight regiments of Indian Infantry,
and one British Mountain Battery. The allocation of the troops
and police was reviewed in consultation with the Commissioners of
Divisions and so made that the one force supplemented the other. The
reduction was to take effect from the spring of 1888.

We were now about to enter on a new development of the British
occupation. The civil officers, supported by the military police, were
to take the responsibility of keeping order. The soldiers were there
ready to help if need be, but they were not to be called out except for
operations beyond the power of the police.




CHAPTER VII

A VISIT TO BHAMO


I had arranged to hold a Durbar at Mandalay on the 5th of August, in
order to meet the notables of Burma, and such of the Shan chiefs as
might be able to come, face to face, and to make them understand the
position, the intentions, and the power of the British Government. I
hoped, perhaps not in vain, that the spirit of my words might penetrate
to the towns and villages of Burma.

Meanwhile I had not visited Bhamo, and I decided to go there. I had
sent for Mr. Hildebrand, whom I wanted to consult about the operations
in the Shan States which were to be undertaken in the coming cold
season. He arrived before I left Mandalay for Bhamo, and as he
evidently needed rest, I asked him to remain at Government House until
my return.

I found Bhamo a disappointing place. A very dirty, miserable kind of
village, arranged in two streets parallel to the river. At the back lay
a marsh or lagoon, which evidently was at one time a channel for the
backwater of the river. Conservancy there was none, and the stench from
the streets, the lagoon, and even the bank of the river was sickening.
Considering that the place had been the headquarters of a district
since our occupation, and a cantonment for British and Indian troops,
it was not much to be proud of. But the soldiers and the civil officers
had been well occupied with more pressing business.

The Chinese were the most prominent of the population. They were all,
it was said, opium smokers, and seldom moved until near midday. They
managed notwithstanding to make money, and to retire with fortunes
after a few years. I anticipated a large increase of the trade with
China, but doubted if the town could grow much on its present site.[20]
As to the trade, it could not make much progress on account of the cost
of transport between Bhamo and Tengyueh, the risk of attack by Kachins,
and the exactions and oppressions of the Chinese Customs officials,
who at one time had maintained a _likin_ station within the British
boundary not far from Bhamo. There was another route used by traders,
which went by Mansi and Namkham, a Shan State on the Shwèli. Since the
Kachins in the country south of Bhamo have been subjugated, the Chinese
caravans have preferred the Namkham route; and at present although the
Kachins have ceased to raid, and much has been done of late to improve
the road to Tengyueh, the trade has not returned to that channel.

A survey for a light railway to Tengyueh has been made, but a strange
indifference exists to the benefits certain, as I think, to result
from making the line. The construction of a railway between Northern
Burma and Yunnan has always appeared to me essential to the full
development of the province. The opportunity has been lost and France
has anticipated us. It would be a difficult and expensive work no
doubt, but whether more difficult than the French line may be doubted.
Even now, after twenty years, it has not been surveyed beyond the
Kunlon ferry, and the opinion of persons without engineering knowledge
has been accepted as sufficient to condemn it. But we may still hope.
Napoleon crossing the Alps might have scoffed at the notion of a
railway to Italy.

There is a vast area of land in Upper Burma waiting for population to
cultivate it, and if communications were made easy, the Chinese Shans
and possibly Chinese and Panthays from Yunnan might be induced to
settle in the northern districts. The Chinese and Burmans are akin,
and the offspring of Chinese fathers and Burman mothers have the good
qualities of both races, which cannot be said of other crosses.

I returned to Mandalay from Bhamo before the end of July, having learnt
and arranged much, especially in consultation with Major Adamson, the
Deputy Commissioner, regarding the contemplated occupation of Mogaung.
The stations on the river were all inspected on the way down.

I found Mr. Hildebrand waiting for me, and discussed with him and with
Sir George White the plans for an expedition to the Shan States.

The Durbar was held on the 5th of August, and I think was a useful
function. It was held in the great Eastern Hall of the Palace, the
place where the King of Burma used to give audience to his feudatories
and his people. The ex-ministers and some of the Shan Sawbwas were
present, and the great hall was crowded with notables and officials
from Mandalay and other districts. It must have been to them a striking
occasion, and to many of them, perhaps, not altogether pleasant. To
such as had any patriotic feeling, and no doubt many of them had, the
representative of a foreign Government standing in front of the empty
throne must have been the abomination of desolation standing where it
ought not.[21]

My duty, however, was not to show sympathy with sentiment of this
kind, but to impress them with the permanence, the benevolence, and
the power of the new Government. In an appendix I have given the text
of my speech and some comments upon it taken from an article in the
_Times_ newspaper of the 13th of September, 1887. Two of the high
Burman officials who had formerly been in the King's service, the
Kinwun Mingyi, one of the Ministers of the State, and the Myowun, or
City Governor of Mandalay, both of whom had given great assistance to
the British Government, received decorations. The former was made a
Companion of the Star of India and the latter of the Indian Empire. I
was glad to get the following commendation from Lord Dufferin.

He wrote: "I congratulate you on your Durbar and upon the excellent
speech you made on the occasion. It was full of go and good sense, and
will convince everybody that you really mean business."

There were fresh rumours at this time (August, 1887) of hostile
intentions on the part of the Chinese, of gatherings of soldiers and
bandits on the frontier, of the presence of auxiliaries from Yunnan
with San Ton Hon in Theinni. There was no foundation in fact for any
of these rumours; Mr. Warry, the Chinese adviser, placed no faith in
them, and I did not believe in them. But they were repeated in the
newspapers, magnified in gossip, and disturbed the public mind.

The best way of silencing these rumours was to make our occupation
of the northernmost district, Mogaung, effectual, and to establish a
definite control in the Shan States. In concert with the Major-General,
proposals for effecting both these objects had been prepared and were
before the Government of India, and I knew that the Viceroy approved
them.

In neither case was serious opposition expected. Detailed accounts
of both movements will be found in separate chapters of this book.
In the case of the Shan States, the character of the expedition was
essentially peaceful and conciliatory. The escorts given to the two
civil officers were strong enough to deter, or if necessary overcome,
opposition and support the dignity of our representatives. But unless
hostilities broke out, in which case the military commanders would
necessarily become supreme, the control was vested in the senior civil
officer, Mr. Hildebrand. It is unnecessary to say more here, except
that with Sir George White's help everything was done to keep down
the cost. Not a man more than was absolutely necessary was sent. The
Shan plateau, at this time nowhere prosperous, was in some parts on
the verge of famine; not from drought or other climatic cause, but
simply from the cat-and-dog life the people had led for some years. No
supplies could be obtained in the country. It was necessary to ration
the troops for four or five months, and the cost of transport was heavy.

Every one felt, however, that cost what it might, the work we had
undertaken must be completed. Nothing could have justified us in
leaving the Shan country any longer in a state of anarchy; and I
doubt if even the most narrow-minded Under Secretary in the Financial
Department dared to raise objections to the needful expenditure. It
may be permitted to say here that no money was better spent. The Shan
plateau for lovely scenery, for good climate, and I believe for its
natural wealth, is proving itself a most valuable possession. Lord
Dufferin thoroughly approved of the action taken in these cases.

It was a relief to deal with these larger matters. They were less
harassing than the constant stream of administrative details of every
kind which leave a man at the head of a large province barely time to
think of his most important problems. The demands from the Secretary
of State for information, which came through the Government of India,
wasted a great deal of time. Members of Parliament who cannot force
themselves into notice in other ways, take up a subject like Burma, of
which no one knows anything, and ask questions which the Secretary of
State has to answer. Frequently there was little foundation for these
questions, and when the call came to answer them, it took both time
and labour to ascertain what they were all about. Correspondents of
newspapers, not so much perhaps out of malice--although that is not
quite unknown--as from the necessities of their profession are greedy
for sensational news. They know that the English public prefer to
think that their servants abroad are either fools or scoundrels. If
everything is reported to be going well and the officers to be doing
their duty, few will credit it, and none will be interested in it. But
hint vaguely at dark intrigues or horrible atrocities, ears are cocked
at once, and the newspaper boys sweep in the pence.

Few of the uninitiated would believe how much time has to be given by
the head of an Indian province to the placing of his men. In a climate
like Burma, and under the conditions obtaining in 1887, frequent and
sudden sickness compels officers to take leave. The civil staff of the
province was barely sufficient if no losses occurred. If a man fell
out it was often difficult to supply his place, and if a good man went
down, as they often did, it was sometimes impossible to find a good
man to succeed him. Writing to Lord Dufferin at this time (September,
1887) of one of the worst districts, I said: "I have not been able to
put a good man there yet, but I hope to have a man soon. It all depends
on getting hold of the right man." In a settled province the personal
factor is not so important; but in a newly annexed country it is
everything. Even in the oldest province in India, if a fool is put in
charge of a district and kept there long enough you will have trouble
of some sort.

Much has been heard of late years of the evils of transfers, and
even Viceroys have talked as if the carelessness or favouritism of
provincial governors were responsible for the mischief. The real cause
in my experience is the inadequacy of the staff of officers. If one
man falls sick and has to leave his district, two or three transfers
may become inevitable. The Government of India realize no doubt that
the staff, of the smaller provinces especially, is inadequate. If they
give a liberal allowance of Englishmen the expense is increased and
promotion becomes too slow. If they cut down the staff, the head of the
province has to tear his hair and worry through somehow.

FOOTNOTES:

[20] The population was 8,048 in 1891, and 10,734 in 1901, of which
number 3,000 were natives of India. These numbers include the garrison.

[21] This was written before the removal of the capital of India from
Delhi to Calcutta.




CHAPTER VIII

DISARMAMENT: TROUBLE IN PAGYI


It was in Rangoon at this time that I made up my mind to disarm the
whole province, Upper and Lower, rigorously, as soon as possible. I
wrote to Lord Dufferin on September 30, 1887, as follows: "I am of
opinion that the time has come for the complete disarming of the whole
province, except perhaps on some exposed frontiers. The firearms in
the hands of dacoits are evidently much fewer, but they continually
replenish their stock by taking arms from villagers and Burman police.
I would temper the measure in the Lower province by giving arms to
selected Karens and Burmans, who should enrol themselves as special
constables. As the Burmans hate nothing so much as signing any
engagement to serve for a term, few of them would enrol themselves.

"I should fix the number of such special police myself, for each
district."

The Baptist missionaries, I feared, would not look upon the scheme
with favour. The loyalty of the Karens and the benefits of their
organization under their missionaries, to whom the Government, as I
have said on a former page, owes much, were not questioned. But it was
not admissible that the Government of Burma should prefer one race
more than another, and I had been warned by one of the missionaries
themselves that Burman ill-will had been excited by the preference
given to Karens in raising bodies of police auxiliaries during the
disturbances.

By laying down conditions, fair and necessary in themselves, which men
of the one race were likely to accept, but would be less acceptable to
the other, as much discrimination was made between Karens and Burmans
as was needful or decent.

In Upper Burma, Sir Charles Bernard had ordered the withdrawal of
firearms from the villagers, soon after the annexation. It was not
possible to carry it out effectually at that time. It was not until
1888 that I had arranged all the details and could put the orders fully
into force. It is admitted generally to have been a beneficial measure,
and to have helped very much to pacify the country and to put down
dacoity. It is a pity that the disarmament of Lower Burma had not been
enforced many years before. But no accumulation of facts are enough to
destroy a prejudice, and for a long time my action was violently, I
might say virulently, denounced in the Press and in Parliament.

The wisdom and necessity of this measure has come, I think, to be
admitted by most people and was never doubted by my successors, who
wisely disarmed the Chins at the cost of a serious rising and a hill
campaign. The number of firearms taken from the villagers amounted
in the years 1888 and 1889 to many thousands. Most of them were very
antiquated and fit for a museum of ancient weapons. But they served
the purpose of the Burman brigand, and not a few good men, British and
Indian, died by them.

The Village Regulation was passed on October 28, 1887. It established
on a legal basis the ancient and still existing constitution of Upper
Burma. While emphasizing the responsibility of the village headman, it
gave him sufficient powers and the support of the law. It also enacted
the joint responsibility of the village in the case of certain crimes;
the duty of all to resist the attacks of gangs of robbers and to take
measures to protect their villages against such attacks. In the case
of stolen cattle which were traced to a village, it placed on it the
duty of carrying on the tracks or paying for the cattle. It gave the
district officer power to remove from a village, and cause to reside
elsewhere, persons who were aiding and abetting dacoits and criminals.
This enactment, the genesis of which I have given in a former chapter,
was framed in accordance with the old customary law and with the
feelings of the people. It strengthened our hands more and gave us
a tighter grip on the country than anything else could have done.
Without the military police no law could have done much. Without the
Village Regulation, the military police would have been like a ship
without a rudder.

When the open season of 1887-8 began, the administration was in a
strong position to deal with the disorder still prevailing. It was
prepared as it never had been before. There was the law enforcing
village responsibility, and enabling the magistrate to deal summarily
with the persons who were really the life of dacoity; those who, living
an apparently honest life, were the intelligence and commissariat
agents of the gangs. All the details of disarmament had not been
settled, but every opportunity was taken of withdrawing arms, and in
the case of dacoit leaders or their followers, or of rebel villages,
the surrender of a certain number of firearms was made a condition
of the grant of pardon. Lastly, the military police organization was
complete, and the physical force needed to enforce the law was thus
provided in a ready and convenient form.

The rains were over, and I anticipated that the dacoits would again
become active. I also thought it probable that the inexperienced police
would meet with some disasters.

The country now in the Thayetmyo district, frequented by Bo Swè, was
quieter. He was a fugitive with a diminished following. Early in
October we were cheered by the news of his destruction. The Viceroy
wired his congratulations.

It may seem unworthy of the Government of a great country to rejoice at
the death of a brigand whose influence did not extend over more than a
few hundred square miles. It was not the man's death, but all that it
meant. A sign of the coming end--slowly coming, it may be, but still
the coming end--of a very weary struggle with a system of resistance
which was costing us many good men and a lavish expenditure of money.
Bo Swè was ridden down by a party of Colonel Clements' Mounted Infantry
belonging to the Lower Burma command. He and his men were surprised in
a ravine, and many, including Bo Swè, killed.

There were still left the broken remnants of the leader's following.
Active officers, with special powers and sufficient police, were placed
in charge of the Northern subdivisions of the Thayetmyo district on
both sides of the river, and order was established before the end
of 1887. But in Upper Burma the districts of the Southern Division
remained in a very bad state. Ôktama was still master, especially in
the valley of the Môn. I had not found the right men for Minbu, and the
weakness of the civil administration was represented as an evil, not
without reason, by the military commanders.

The following extract from a letter dated 1st of October, 1887, from
the Commissioner of the Southern Division will give a better idea of
the state of things than mere general phrases:--

"On 16th August, Po Saung, an informer, was caught and killed by Bo
Cho's gang in Pagan.

"On 29th August, Yan Sin, a dacoit who had submitted, was caught and
killed by Nga Kway in Pagan.

"On 5th September, at Kôkkozu village in Pauk, the dacoits tried to
catch the thugyi, but failed, and caught and murdered his wife.

"Su Gaung, a mounted police constable, was shot while carrying letters
between Myingyan and Natogyi on 16th September.

"In Lindaung, Pagan district, the thugyi was murdered a month ago
and Thade's gang on 10th September attempted to capture his son, but
failed, and plundered the village.

"On 29th September, Nurtama in Minbu, which is the headquarters of the
Kyabin Myoôk, was attacked. The Myoôk's and seven other houses were
burned; no one was killed. The Myoôk lived here in fear of his life for
some time. He sleeps at night at Sinbyugyun, on the other side of the
Salin Creek, and if he sleeps at Nurtama he does not sleep in his own
house, but in a little post which he has built. He has taken a guard of
ten men from Sinbyugyun.

"On 24th September at Sagyun, in Myingyan district, Custance's
interpreter and the thugyi of Welôn were breakfasting in the village;
they were attacked, and the interpreter killed, his head being nearly
severed from his body. The thugyi escaped with a slight wound."

More than one attack was made on Yénangyaung, the village near the
oil-wells, with the object of killing the Burman headman. The raiders
did not secure him, but they carried off his wife and daughter and set
fire to a number of boats, loaded with oil. The military police (a few
raw Punjabis without a British officer) were flurried and did nothing.
These attacks made them nervous, and shortly afterwards, taking a
forest officer, who was going down the river with a white umbrella[22]
over his head, for a leader of rebels, they fired volleys at him until
he and his crew had to get out of the boat and cling to the side of it.
Fortunately the men shot badly and no one was hit. The forest officer
complained loudly of the indignity he had suffered, which he thought
was not within the letter of his bond. It was believed that the men who
had made the attack on Yénangyaung had come from the right bank of the
Irrawaddy River. There was a patrol launch on this part of the river,
and it had called several times at Yénangyaung before the attack. We
had not enough boats to patrol a long stretch of river effectually, and
it was easy for the dacoits to watch the steamer as it went up or down
and time their crossing. The Commissioner, therefore, collected the
boats on the right bank and put them under guards until confidence was
restored. The towns on the left bank below Pagan were reported to live
in dread of attack.

Meanwhile trouble broke out in the Chindwin district, on the west of
the river. Two leaders of revolt had appeared in this region. One was
the Bayingan, or Viceroy, of the Myingun Prince whose name has already
been mentioned. He was known to have left the Mandalay district with
the object of raising a disturbance in the Chindwin. The other was a
person called the Shwègyobyu Prince, who at the time of the annexation
had been a vaccinator in the Government service in the Thayetmyo
district. He must have been a man of considerable character and
ambition, for when the war began he went up to the Chindwin country and
established himself at Kanlè, in the difficult hills of the Pondaung
range. He assumed, with what right is not known, the style and title of
"Prince," and proceeded to enrol men to resist the foreigners.

While we were congratulating ourselves on the destruction of Bo Swè and
his gang, news came down that Pagyi was up. As yet we had not been able
to occupy this region. It was a country of hills and ravines, densely
wooded and also very unhealthy. It had been impossible to find civil
officers to administer it, or men, either soldiers or police, to occupy
it. The people had always more or less managed their own affairs under
their own headmen, and as a temporary makeshift we had endeavoured
to continue this arrangement. One, Maung Po. O, had been appointed
an honorary head constable, and had hitherto maintained order in the
south-west corner of Pagyi, and Maung Tha Gyi, an influential headman,
held a similar position in the north-west and had done well and had
acted with loyalty. The villages under Maung Tha Gyi, a group of small
hamlets of twenty to thirty houses each, lay in the thick scrub jungle
on the spurs of the Pondaung range.

A leader named Bo Sawbwa, who was acting in the interests of the
Shwègyobyu Prince and had fortified himself in the jungles south of
Pagyi, attacked and carried off Po. O. At the same time Maung Tha Gyi
suddenly threw off his allegiance to the British, collected men, and
fortified a position near one of his villages. He was reported to
be ready to join the Shwègyobyu Prince, who ever since his gang was
dispersed in 1886 had been harboured by a circle of villages in the
west of Pagyi.

On receipt of this intelligence every precaution was taken. Sir George
White sent Colonel Symons to take command of the military operations,
and I selected Mr. Carter as the best man to accompany him as a civil
officer with magisterial powers.

Captain Raikes was Deputy Commissioner of the Chindwin district at the
time. He was away on leave, and Mr. W. T. Morison,[23] of the Indian
Civil Service, Bombay Presidency, was acting for him and was at Alôn,
the district headquarters on the left bank of the Chindwin River. Mr.
W. T. Morison was a young officer of five or six years' service and had
been in Burma a very short time. He was one of the young men, of whom
there were not a few in Burma, who took instinctively to the work.

On the 2nd of October he crossed over to the disturbed tract and
joined Lieutenant Plumer, who, with a detachment of the 2nd Hyderabad
Contingent Infantry, was at Hlawga, a march west from the river.

Mr. Morison wrote at once to Maung Tha Gyi, ordering him to come in.
Tha Gyi, who was at one of his villages, Chaungwa, about sixteen miles
from Hlawga, sent an evasive reply and began to collect men and arms.

Mr. Morison decided to try to surprise him. On the morning of the
8th of October, Lieutenant Plumer and Mr. Morison, with twenty-one
Mounted Infantry, from the military police battalion, and the Hyderabad
Contingent, left Hlawga soon after midnight, and surprised Chaungwa at
four o'clock in the morning, when it was still dark.

The village, when day broke, was found to be on the west bank of a
deep ravine, at the bottom of which was the only cart-road. On the
steep bank on which the village stood strong fortifications and
entrenchments, commanding this cart-road, had been built; trees had
been felled and thrown across, and the road covered with bamboo spikes.
Our men were led by an excellent guide, who took them through the
jungle across the ravine and up to one of the enemy's outposts.

Twenty-one men could not surround the village, but they rushed it,
killing one only and capturing six. The leaders, who were found to have
been the Bayingan and Maung Tha Gyi, escaped. Nine ponies tied near the
house occupied by the former were taken, and in the house were found
twenty royal battle standards, many arms, and much correspondence.

After a halt for rest, the main body, fifteen rifles with the prisoners
and captured ponies, were sent off. Lieutenant Plumer and Mr. Morison,
with a jemadar and six mounted military policemen and a Burmese
interpreter, remained behind, hoping that some of the enemy would
return and fall into their hands. The Burmans, however, were not so
simple. After a short delay the two British officers and their men
set out to follow the main body. The moment they reached the ravine
a volley was fired from the perpendicular bank opposite the village.
Maung Po Min, the interpreter, was shot in the leg, his pony killed,
and Mr. Morison's hand was grazed by a bullet. Mr. Morison, who was
well mounted, took Po Min up behind him, and they all scrambled up the
western bank of the ravine, hoping to be able to see the dacoits and
return their fire. A few volleys were fired at random, as the enemy
could not be seen; and then, fearing further ambuscades, the small
party took a jungle track, hoping it would lead round into the main
road lower down. The village of Chaungwa is on the spurs of a low range
of hills. The jungle is of the densest, and cut up in every direction
by deep ravines, and they had no guide. The track was evidently taking
them in a wrong direction. They resolved to leave it and make as nearly
due east as they could.

[Illustration: OUTER BAMBOO STOCKADE OF BURMESE FRONTIER VILLAGE.]

The rest of the story can best be told in Mr. Morison's own words,
taken from a letter to the Commissioner of the Central Division, dated
Camp Kyadet, the 13th of October, 1887:--

"After about fifteen minutes the dacoits, who had followed us,
opened fire on us from about 50 yards in the front, they being quite
concealed. After one volley they would retire, allow us to go forward
200 yards, then go round in front and give us another volley. We had
at each volley to dismount and try and return their fire as best we
could. But from first to last the dacoits were invisible and under
complete cover, and, knowing the jungle, had time to go ahead, lie
in wait for us, and take aim. This continued for over an hour. Our
horses were completely done out with going down and up the precipitous
ravines, and the ravines became at last quite impassable for horses.
So after a consultation we determined to leave our ponies and make our
way east on foot. Shortly after leaving the ponies one of the men, Amir
Mahomed, was shot dead in the head from one of the usual ambuscades.
That the others of our party escaped appears a miracle to me. However,
after about two hours, _i.e._, about 10 a.m., the firing ceased, and we
managed, exhausted as we were, to get clear of the jungle by 2 p.m.,
going 200 yards at a time and then lying down to rest. We arrived at
Mintainbin at 4 p.m. and Hlawga at 6. Our loss was thus one man killed
and seven police ponies, with saddles and bridles, left.... The men
behaved well throughout the affair."

If the ponies had not been left there would have been little chance of
the men escaping from the jungle with their lives.

Unfortunately, the mass of the Bayingan's correspondence was in one of
the saddle-bags abandoned with the ponies. Some of the documents saved
were copies of notices to noted leaders in many districts of Upper
Burma and the Shan States. The following is a translation of one of
them:--

"I, the Bayingan Prince, brother of the Myingun Prince, write to the
Chief Bo Nyo U and other Chiefs in Sagaing as follows. I have been to
all Sawbwas, Bo Gyôks (Chief Bos), and other Bos of the north, south,
and east, and have given orders and administered oaths which they have
taken; they have promised to serve loyally, and we intend to drive the
British from Kani and Pagyi and take Alôn, Shwèbo, Dabayen, &c., and go
up to Mandalay in month of Tazaungmôn."

Careful inquiries showed that Maung Ba, the Bayingan Prince, arrived
in Pagyi in the end of September and came to Maung Tha Gyi. Since his
arrival he had been corresponding with the Shwègyobyu Prince and other
Bos in this part, and had actually sent over to Yaw for assistance.
He had friends in Alôn and elsewhere. A letter from Kin Le Gyi (a
maid-of-honour to Supayalat, who had since the war taken contracts
for public works in Monywa and elsewhere, and had been trusted by the
British officials) was found in the Prince's house, saying that she was
going up to Alôn to see how the troops were disposed and what all the
officers were doing, and that she would write to him on her return.
This is very characteristic of the Burman woman.

On the 12th of October Morison was back at Kyadet, in the south of
Pagyi, where there was a military post, and consulted with Major
Kennedy, commanding the 2nd Hyderabad Contingent Infantry, who arrived
with a reinforcement of seventy rifles. They decided to telegraph for
more troops. This request had been anticipated.

Unfortunately, Major Kennedy did not wait for the reinforcements.
Hearing that the Bayingan and Tha Gyi had taken up a position
at Chinbyit, about twenty miles from Kyadet, he left with a few
Mounted Infantry. He was accompanied by Captain Beville, Assistant
Commissioner, who had been posted to the district to enable Mr. Morison
to return to his headquarters at Alôn. The rebels, who were in strength
and in a good position, stood, and both Major Kennedy and Captain
Beville were killed. The rebels lost forty men, killed. The seventy
rifles, under Lieutenant Plumer (2nd Hyderabad Contingent Infantry),
came up in time to complete the defeat of the enemy.

It was reported at the time that the leaders had escaped. Afterwards
it was found that Maung Tha Gyi and the Bayingan Prince had both been
killed.[24] Nga Pyo, a notorious rebel and dacoit leader, was present,
but did not expose himself, and lived until 1889, to be assassinated by
a colleague. Whether the Shwègyobyu Prince was there is doubtful.

The action at Chinbyit cost us much. Lord Dufferin wrote: "It is too
distressing to think that so slight an affair should have cost us the
lives of two valuable officers." Their lives were not thrown away. The
loss inflicted on the enemy was severe, and the death of the Bayingan
prince put an end to a troublesome organization.

FOOTNOTES:

[22] The white umbrella is a token of royalty.

[23] Wm. Thomson Morison, C.S.I., member of Executive Council of the
Governor of Bombay.

[24] Mr. Carter records in the official diary of his work in Pagyi with
Colonel Symons, under date 27th of November, 1887: "At Chinbyit visited
scene of late fight. The villagers pointed out the skeleton of the
Bayengan. The body had been left where it had fallen, a few bushes and
stones being placed over it to keep off dogs and vultures."




CHAPTER IX

TROUBLE WITH THE WUNTHO SAWBWA


I left Rangoon on the 30th of November, after arranging the measures
necessary for commencing the disarmament of the province at the
beginning of the new year. There were two districts in Lower Burma
giving trouble at that time--Tharrawaddy in the Pegu Division and
Thayetmyo. Tharrawaddy has always been a sore spot.[25] In the early
part of 1889 it was brought into a more orderly state; but towards the
end of the year, owing in a great measure to the action of the local
officers in issuing licences for firearms to the villagers, the gangs
were able to obtain weapons, and crime increased to such a degree that
strenuous measures had to be adopted.

I went to Thayetmyo, and there met the local officers and heard what
account they had to give. They reported the remaining gangs to be
small. Parties of Mounted Infantry, with active police and civil
officers, were told off to work both sides of the river, and a great
improvement was effected in a few months.

I marched from Thayetmyo to Minhla, about seventy miles, having all
the neighbouring villagers collected to meet me at each halting-place.
They were encouraged to talk freely and tell their grievances. They
complained only of the impressment of carts and such-like matters
inseparable from the constant movement of troops and the disturbed
times. That they had suffered a good deal between the upper and the
nether millstone--the Government and the dacoits--may be easily
believed. But it was in great part their own fault, as they would not
give our officers information.

[Illustration: CONSULTATION OF VILLAGE HEADMEN WITH CHIEF
COMMISSIONER.]

The country through which we marched was mostly dense forest and
jungle, with very few villages. It was only necessary to see it to
understand the difficulty of beating out of such cover small gangs of
active men, unencumbered by anything except their arms, and able to get
food from any hamlet. The wonder is that with a mere handful of Mounted
Infantry at their disposal, our officers were able to run the dacoits
down and exterminate them in so short a time.

Sir Benjamin Simpson, K.C.I.E., Surgeon-General, with the Government
of India, who had been sent over by the Government to advise me about
the medical establishments of the military police and of the province
generally, accompanied me on this march.

From Minhla I went to Minbu and saw the officers there. I then went on
to Pagan. In order to see the country about Popa, I rode from Pagan to
Popa and back by another road. This country is very wild and densely
wooded. It would seem to one riding through it to be uncultivated, but
this is not the case. All the bottoms of the slopes are cultivated, and
there are numerous shallow streams which in the dry weather have no
water in them. The villages were few and poor-looking, mere huts with
palm-leaf thatch. The cattle, however, were numerous and good, carts
stood in all the villages.

Not a man was to be seen anywhere, only women and children. We had
lost our way and wanted a guide, and eventually were fain to ask for
two women to show us the way. It is no wonder that Popa was the home
of dacoits. Most of the people seemed at this time to live by stealing
cattle from the neighbouring and more populous districts. Once they
got the cattle into their villages, they kept them in enclosures,
hidden away in the jungle, until they could drive them off to a distant
market. This country was not brought under control for two years.

From Pagan I crossed to Pakokku and saw the Wunkadaw and her son, and
Mr. Browning the Assistant Commissioner, and then went on to Myingyan.
I had only time to inspect the station and see the officers and talk
to Brigadier-General Low, when a telegram came from Sir George White
asking me to come up to Mandalay at once, as trouble threatened with
the Wuntho Sawbwa.

This man's territory lay in a hilly country lying between the Katha
district and the Chindwin River. He had been from the first year of
our occupation a source of trouble; he refused to come in, and at one
time objected to pay his tribute. Early in '87 the Commissioner of the
Northern Division, Mr. Burgess, went to the town of Wuntho, which is
on the eastern extremity of his country, and is not his real capital
although he takes his title from it, to meet him. Mr. Burgess was
accompanied by a military force. The matter was then arranged by the
Sawbwa paying his tribute, but he refused to see our officers, and
continued to give trouble by harbouring dacoits and insurgents who
raided our territory.

It was the fixed policy of Lord Dufferin to preserve so far as might be
these autonomous States. I have explained elsewhere how it came about
that Shan States existed in this part of Burma, separated as they were
by position and in their politics from the body of States on the Shan
plateau. Every endeavour was made therefore to smooth matters and not
to quarrel with the Wuntho man, whom we believed, and perhaps justly,
to be actuated more by fear than by determined hostility.

The circumstances which led Sir George White to call me to Mandalay
were these. A regiment of Gurkhas was coming across from India to
relieve another which had been some time in Burma. It was convenient to
bring the relieving regiment down by the Kabaw Valley to the Chindwin,
where they would meet the other. A road had been selected through the
Wuntho territory by which both regiments should march. They were to
meet on the Chindwin and exchange transport trains, thus saving expense
and trouble.

This was a natural arrangement. The route did not pass through the
Sawbwa's capital. The military authorities had satisfied themselves
that it was practicable for troops. I agreed to the proposal, caused
the matter to be carefully explained to the Sawbwa, and directed him to
collect supplies and to clear the roads.

The Sawbwa replied, objecting to our troops passing through, and
proposing an alternative route to which he had no objection. He based
his opposition on the ground of personal fear, and referred to our
assurance that Wuntho should not be occupied. I considered that we
could not allow the Sawbwa to close his territory to us, and after
consulting the Major-General, I told the Sawbwa through the Deputy
Commissioner of Katha that the regiments must march by the road we
had chosen. Rumours had been heard for some time that the Sawbwa
was blocking his roads and preparing to oppose us in force. General
White wished me to come up at once as the regiment leaving Burma had
reached Kawlin, which is on the verge of Wuntho territory, and it was
necessary to decide on the action to be taken in case its march was
opposed. I decided to let it wait at Kawlin for ten days in order to
give the Sawbwa time to reply to my order, utilising the delay by
making arrangements to support and strengthen the Gurkhas in case we
should have to fight. Soon after this decision had been reached, Sir
George White sent me a telegram from the Colonel commanding the 43rd,
dated from Kawlin, to the effect that the route by which he had been
ordered to march was impracticable, and that the attempt to march
along it would be opposed. General White advised the acceptance of the
Sawbwa's alternative route, which was reported to have been prepared
and supplied with provisions.

As my order sent through the Deputy Commissioner had been couched in
very peremptory terms, I felt it inadvisable to withdraw. The Sawbwa
was reported to be making preparations for opposing us by force,
and if we drew back now our action would be certainly attributed to
fear. There was telegraphic communication with Katha, but letters to
Wuntho had to go on by messenger. It occurred to me that the Deputy
Commissioner's messenger might still be stopped, and I telegraphed to
Katha to recall him. Fortunately the letter was stopped at Kawlin.
Under these circumstances Sir George White and I agreed to send the
Gurkhas by the road which the Sawbwa had prepared. Any other course
would have laid us open to the charge of having picked a quarrel with
the Sawbwa.

There was every reason at the time for avoiding a step which would
have increased our direct responsibilities. The civil staff of the
province was weak, not only in numbers but in experience. I was forced
to trust men with districts who had no training and did not know
Burmese. The annexation of Upper Burma was more difficult in some ways
than the annexation of the Punjab. In the latter case there was in the
army and in the adjacent provinces a supply of officers acquainted
if not with the language of the Punjab, yet with a kindred speech.
The whole _cadre_ of Lower Burma was only threescore men, and it was
impossible to take many men fit for service in Upper Burma from its
ranks without leaving the Lower Province very much undermanned. For
these reasons I did my best as long as I was in Burma to avoid a breach
with the Wuntho Sawbwa, and latterly, when he sent in his wife to
Mandalay to see the Commissioner, I was in hopes that we had overcome
his suspicions, but I felt certain that sooner or later we should be
obliged to get rid of him. I do not regret having waited as long as
possible. When he broke out in 1891 the whole of the adjacent country
was under control, the military police were organized and trained,
and his revolt was put down with very little trouble or disturbance.
No one can say that he was treated otherwise than with the greatest
forbearance. I shall not have to refer to him again.

FOOTNOTE:

[25] "Long notorious for the ill-repute of its inhabitants." See Burma
_Gazetteer_, vol. i., p. 258.




CHAPTER X

MILITARY REPLACED BY POLICE


The beginning of 1888 saw the civil administration in a position to
wage a systematic campaign against all disturbers of the peace.

Lower Burma had been reduced almost to its normal condition. The late
Mr. Todd Naylor in the Tharrawaddy district had thoroughly extirpated
the gangs which had troubled it and brought it to a state of quiet
which it had not enjoyed for a very long time.

The disarmament of the whole province had been systematically taken in
hand; the Village Regulation had become law, the military police had
been organized and now numbered 17,880 men. The whole conditions had
been changed. At the beginning of the year (1887) the troops had held
one hundred and forty-two posts and the police fifty posts. At the
end of the year the police held one hundred and seventy-five, and the
troops eighty-four. The concentration of the troops in a few principal
stations, left the work of destroying the remaining gangs to the
military police, who were frequently engaged in action with dacoits.
There were a few petty disasters at first. Nothing else was or could
have been expected of partially trained men scattered about in small
posts. There were only three serious cases in 1888. In one case, in
distinct contravention of my orders, a small picket of ten men had been
put out on the edge of a forest in a small house or shed without even a
bamboo stockade. The picket was two miles from a military police post.
The Burmans set fire to a cooking shed and volleyed the police by the
aid of the firelight. Seven men fell to the first two volleys and only
two were unwounded. These men behaved gallantly and kept the dacoits at
bay until aid came from the post.

In another case and in another district a patrol of one jemadar and
eleven sepoys was ambushed. The jemadar and nine of the men were killed
and one man badly wounded and left for dead. The remaining man with the
aid of two Burmans reached the nearest post. A party was sent out and
the wounded man picked up.

The third disaster was in the Magwè district, where thirty men under
an English Inspector met a large body of dacoits and were forced to
retreat losing seven killed and two wounded. Six Snider rifles and two
ponies were captured by the dacoits. This was an unfortunate affair for
which the men were not responsible. It gave the Magwè dacoits fresh
spirit.

To the responsible head of the administration the year 1888 was one of
much anxiety. The troops were vacating numerous outposts held by them
and they were being replaced by police fresh from India, and most of
them imperfectly trained. The dacoits had learned to fear the soldiers,
and the presence of a large body of men with numerous outlying
detachments under military discipline and keeping touch with each
other, kept districts which had all the elements of disorder and were
perhaps in fact dominated by dacoit leaders in apparent tranquillity.
Sagaing was a notable instance of this. The district was covered
with posts, but the soldiers hardly saw a dacoit, and consequently
no progress was made in breaking up what was a strongly organized
combination against our rule.

The troops, moreover, had learned their work; they were led by trained
and zealous officers, who had acquired in many cases a minute knowledge
of localities which was lost with them. The military police, on the
other hand, were new to the country and the work, and seldom had the
advantage of being led by trained British officers. The effect of the
change began to be felt towards the end of 1887, and the beginning of
1888--that is to say, in the season of the year when life in the forest
is dry and pleasant, the favourite time for the pastime of dacoity.
Hence there was no doubt a revival of disorder in some places, and
the petty disasters which befell the military police were magnified
and made much of by some correspondents who found it profitable to
misrepresent everything connected with the administration of Burma.

The transition stage did not last long. The Indian police picked up
their work with rapidity. No men could have learnt it quicker. They
were constantly engaged with dacoits; they frequently followed up and
inflicted punishment on them and recovered property without loss to
themselves. The few mistakes were seized upon and magnified while the
successes vastly greater in number were not noticed.

In the first orders regarding the military police the minimum garrison
of a post was fixed at twenty-five men. This was found to be too weak
and was raised to forty, and the minimum strength of a patrol was fixed
at ten. I found it necessary to forbid any new post to be established
without my sanction and to lay down the strength of the movable column
to be maintained in each district. The local officers seemed unable
to refrain from putting out posts until there was not a man left at
headquarters.

In April, 1888, the Viceroy asked me if I saw any sensible signs of the
reduction of our troops and the substitution of the police encouraging
the dacoits or loosening our hold on the country. After explaining
that the districts where the dacoits were most active and organized
there had been no reduction of troops, but, on the contrary, constant
military activity under keen commanders, I wrote:--

"I have carefully watched events and thought over the matter, and my
conclusion is that the dacoits know that the troops have retired and
that the police move in small numbers and have taken advantage of the
occasion. If this is allowed to go on they will get bolder and will
give trouble.... I am inclined to sit tight and wait until the men have
learnt their work. The native officers will learn the language and the
country.... The commissioners and district officers like to cover their
districts with a perfect network of posts at short distances from each
other. If they were allowed their own way there would not be a man left
to move about. Last August (1887) this was foreseen, and the strength
of the movable column to be kept for active operations in each district
was laid down, and orders have been given and have been enforced
forbidding the formation of new posts without my sanction."

Lord Dufferin accepted my views, saying that he would not go into the
various considerations which I had placed before him, "except to say
that I fully appreciate the calmness and good sense with which you have
discussed the matter. A more excitable man might have gone off at a
tangent and have been frightened into measures which would certainly
have been very expensive and might not have been necessary. I have
taken the Commander-in-Chief into counsel, and after going fully and
very carefully into the whole matter we are content to accept your
views."

There was in point of fact no reason for anxiety. Week by week the
police improved. The first combined movement attempted with military
police was in the difficult Popa country where four small columns under
Captain Hastings, Commandant of the Myingyan battalion, succeeded in
running Ya Nyun's gang hard, but did not capture him. And in various
encounters in this district alone the dacoit gangs loss amounted to:
killed, 105; wounded and captured, 29; captured, 486. Eighteen ponies
were taken, 316 firearms, and many dahs and spears.

The casualties of the military police in Upper Burma, during 1888,
were 46 killed and 76 wounded, whilst the dacoits lost 312 killed
(actually counted after action), and 721 captured. The casualties in
the Army in Upper Burma between the 1st of May, 1887, and the 31st of
March, 1889, were: killed or died of wounds 60, and wounded 142. (Par.
26 of the Despatch of Major-General Sir George White, K.C.B., V.C.,
late Commanding the Upper Burma Force. Dated Simla, July 6, 1889.) The
police could not have been more active than the soldiers had been. They
probably suffered more in proportion to their numbers owing to their
inferior training. During the year 1888 the military police were in the
field constantly in almost every district in the province.

It became evident that we had not a sufficient number of British
officers; if a man fell sick or was wounded, there was no one to take
his place. Sixteen additional officers were sanctioned for the police,
but they did not arrive until after the close of the year. They added
much to the strength and efficiency of the force.

On the whole, it became evident before the middle of 1888 that the
police were getting a hold of the province and that no danger had been
incurred by reducing the military garrison and bringing the troops into
quarters. We had still to rely on the assistance of the soldiers in
work that belonged more properly to the police.

Hence in Sagaing, Magwè, the Chindwin district, and some other places
where the insurgents showed special activity, I was compelled in some
cases to ask for aid. If it was sought unwillingly, it was given
most readily by the Major-General commanding, and was invaluable.
The civil administration was not yet able to stand alone. It was not
so much the rank and file but the many British officers, keen and
experienced, whose withdrawal was felt; for it will be remembered each
police battalion had at the most two British officers, while very few
districts had an area of less than three thousand square miles.

As an example of the invaluable aid rendered by the soldiers, two of
the most noted leaders on the Ava side, Shwè Yan and Bo Tok, who had
been the scourge of the country since the annexation, fell to parties
of British Infantry. Bo Tok was killed by Mounted Infantry of the
Rifle Brigade led by Major Sir Bartle Frere, and a few months later,
Lieutenant Minogue, with some Mounted Infantry of the Royal Munster
Fusiliers, ran down Shwè Yan. The deaths of these two men, who kept the
borders of Ava, Myingyan, and Kyauksè in a ferment, enabled the civil
power to bring this country into order in a short time.

The military police, however, took their full share of work. A man
who had given endless trouble to the troops since the annexation and
made his lair on the east side of the Kyauksè district was the Setkya
leader. He was attacked by the Kyauksè military police under Captain
Gastrell, Commandant of the Mandalay battalion, and his band dispersed.
The Setkya escaped, but he was caught and delivered up by the Shan
Sawbwa of Lawksawk. After his defeats on former occasions he had found
a safe refuge in the Shan hills. The Shan leaders were now our loyal
subjects, and the Setkya's career came to an end.




CHAPTER XI

BURMA BECOMES A FRONTIER PROVINCE


In another direction there was a still greater change than
the substitution of police for troops. From being an isolated
administration hardly able to look up from our own affairs, and obliged
to work in detail, district by district, to establish a beginning of
order, Burma was rapidly becoming a frontier province, with daily
extending boundaries. I was occupied in this year with framing the
administration of the Shan States, which had been visited by Mr.
Hildebrand and Mr. Hugh Daly,[26] with our relations to Eastern
Karenni, with the Trans-Salween States and the Siamese claims on that
border. The distant region to the north of Bhamo had been occupied for
the first time, and it was becoming evident that we should have to
reckon with the Kachins in the north and north-east; while the eastern
frontier of Upper Burma resting up against the great mass of mountains
which stretch down from Manipur to the Bay of Bengal, was beginning to
demand attention.

There had been hitherto no leisure and no need to give much thought
to the tribes of Chins and others inhabiting these hills. It had been
suggested at an early period that Burma should send a party through the
Chin country to meet another from the Bengal side, with the design of
opening up communication from east to west and making a through road.

I was opposed to this project, and besought the Viceroy to disallow
it. I looked upon it as a certain way of rousing the Chins before we
were ready to deal with them. A few days before the end of 1887 Lord
Dufferin telegraphed his agreement with my view. In a letter which
followed, he wrote: "When the idea was originally proposed, I allowed
the matter to be taken in hand with some hesitation, as I felt that it
would probably prove a premature endeavour, and I saw no special reason
for embarking on luxurious enterprises of the kind while the main work
on which we are engaged is still incomplete. For God's sake let us
get Burma proper quiet before we stir up fresh chances of trouble and
collision in outlying districts."

Of the wisdom of this doctrine there was no doubt. And no one could
have been more anxious to avoid new difficulties than I was. The Chins,
however, forced our hands, and before the rains of 1888 it was clear
that it would be impossible to ignore them. It was foreseen from the
first that the occupation of Upper Burma must bring us into conflict
with half-savage or altogether savage tribes who occupied the mountains
on three sides of the province; and no doubt when it was decided to
annex the kingdom the responsible authorities had this matter in their
minds.

From the first occupation of Mogaung the isolation of that post and the
difficulty of reinforcing it, especially in the rains, was a source of
disquiet. I had lost no time in asking that some mountain guns should
be attached to the Mogaung battalion of military police, and that a
survey for an extension of the railway to the north of the province
should be undertaken. The guns were readily granted. To give life to
the railway project several departments in India had to be persuaded,
notably Finance and Public Works. When their consent had been obtained
the Government of India had to move the Secretary of State to sanction
the work and to grant the money for it. The survey was started in 1890,
and some progress, which may be characterized without injustice as
deliberate, had been made before I surrendered Burma to my successor
in December of that year. The line to Myitkyina, three hundred and
thirty-one miles, was opened in 1895.

These frontier matters have been dealt with in separate chapters of
this book. They are referred to here to show the change which had
come over the province. The area of administration was extending
rapidly--more rapidly than our resources in men.

Before the end of 1888 the interior of the province ceased to give
much cause for anxiety, although it cannot be described as altogether
restful. Daylight had appeared in the districts of the Northern and
Central Divisions, where the outlook had been darkest. And in some of
the southern districts, Minbu and Myingyan (in which was now included
Pagan), and in Pakokku, as well as in the whole of the Eastern
Division, the disturbances had ceased or were confined to difficult
forest tracks in which the remaining gangs had taken refuge.

The Magwè district, as it was now called (the township on the left bank
of the river, which had before belonged to Minbu, had been transferred
to the Taungdwingyi district, and the headquarters moved to the river
town of Magwè), was a source of trouble and sorrow. Nothing seemed to
succeed there. Sir Robert Low's warning that this would be the last
stronghold of dacoity or organized resistance was justified by events.

The British public were becoming very weary of Burma and even of the
abuse heaped upon the local government of the province. Tormented by
the questions in Parliament, the Secretary of State would order us
every now and then to report how we were getting on, like a child that
has planted a flower and pulls it up occasionally to make sure that it
is alive. Nevertheless those on the spot were not disheartened. The
work had to be done, and all were determined to do it. Personally I had
encouragement from every one in the province, civilian or soldier, for
whose opinion I cared. Lord Dufferin's kindness and support were never
wanting. He understood well the nature of the task. He was satisfied
with the work done, and his confidence in our success was firm.

Writing to me on April 2, 1888, he expressed his satisfaction with our
work and with what had been done, in terms which are too flattering to
be repeated by me.

The constant recurrence of small encounters, small successes, and
occasionally small disasters, was very wearisome at the time to all
of us, and would be as fatiguing to the reader as to me to relate. I
will give the history of some cases, which will be enough to explain
how the province settled down. It will be remembered that the Village
Regulation became law in October, 1887. It took some time to get the
district officers, magistrates as well as police, to make themselves
acquainted with it, and still longer to induce some of them to make use
of its provisions.

In the summer of 1888 the country generally had improved much. Few of
the big Bos, or leaders of gangs, were left. But in some districts
there was not merely a system of brigandage; it was a system, a
long-established system, of government by brigands. The attacks on
villages, the murder and torture of headmen and their families, were
not so much the symptoms of rebellion against our Government as of the
efforts made by the brigands to crush the growing revolt against their
tyranny.

Hence it came about that in districts where there was little activity
on the part of British officers, and where the chief civil officer
failed to get information, very little was heard of the dacoits, simply
because the people were paying their tribute to the leaders, who did
not need to use coercion.

Sagaing was one of the worst districts in this respect. It had been
under the domination of brigands for years before Thebaw was dethroned.
It was held by a score of dacoit leaders, who had a thousand men armed
with guns at their call. Each had his own division, in and on which he
and his men lived, leaving the villagers alone so long as they paid
their dues, and punishing default or defection with a ruthless and
savage cruelty that might have made a North American Indian in his
worst time weep for human nature. It was brought home to us by hard
facts that the question was whether the British Government, or what
may be called the Bo Government, were to be masters. The people were,
everything considered, wonderfully well off. They found our officers
ready to accept their excuses and to remit taxation, or, at the worst,
to enforce a mild process of distraint or detention against defaulters.
On the other side were the Bos, with fire and sword, and worse if their
demands were refused or if aid in any form was given to the foreigners.
If the people would have given us information, the dacoit system could
have been broken up in a very short time. As they would not, the only
course open was to make them fear us more than the dacoits.

In Sagaing no measures hitherto taken had made any visible improvement.
Persuasion had been tried. The display of a strong military force
occupying the country in numerous posts had no effect. The soldiers
seldom saw or heard of a dacoit. The experiment was made of allowing
influential local Burman officials to raise a force of armed Burman
police on whom they could depend. This succeeded in some cases. But on
the whole it failed. The Burmans gave up their guns to the first gang
that came for them, or allowed them to be stolen. We could not afford
to arm the enemy. I came to the conclusion that the Deputy Commissioner
would never get his district into order.

Colonel Symons, working with Mr. Carter, had done very good service in
reducing the troublesome country of Pagyi in the Lower Chindwin into
order (see p. 85). I asked Sir George White to let me have Colonel
Symons's help again. He readily agreed. I sent him, with Mr. Carter, to
put Sagaing in order, giving Mr. Carter full powers under the Village
Regulation and ample magisterial powers, but reserving the ordinary
administrative work to the Deputy Commissioner. At the same time,
Mr. Herbert Browning, Assistant Commissioner, was posted to the Ava
subdivision to work with Captain Knox, of the 4th Hyderabad Cavalry.

The Sagaing military police battalion was placed under Colonel Symons's
orders, and thus unity of command was assured.

Captain Raikes was at this time acting as Commissioner of the Central
Division, in the absence of Mr. Fryer, who had taken leave. Captain
Raikes was a man who knew Burma well, and was keen and energetic in his
work. He came to the conclusion, and Colonel Symons agreed with him,
that the severest pressure must be put on the villagers.

A great obstacle in our way was, as has been said, the refusal of
the villagers to assist us. But an equal obstacle was their zeal in
giving assistance and information to the brigands. The powers of the
Village Regulation had been used elsewhere, under my instructions, to
remove persons who gave assistance in any way to the dacoits, and with
excellent effect. The proposals now made to me by Colonel Symons and
Captain Raikes went beyond anything hitherto done. They represented
that so long as the relatives and sympathisers of the brigands remained
in their villages, no progress was possible. The gangs would be fed and
furnished with immediate news of the movements of police or troops,
while no assistance would be given to us. The people themselves told
our officers that they could not help us. If they did, the dacoits'
relatives informed against them and their lives were taken. Hardly a
day passed without some murder of this kind.

It was proposed, therefore, to issue a proclamation to all villages
believed to be in league with the dacoits, informing them that unless
the men belonging to the village who were out dacoiting surrendered
within a fixed time, all their relations and sympathisers would be
ordered to leave the village and would be removed to some distant place
out of reach of communication. At first the people thought this was a
mere threat, and little notice was taken of it. When they found that it
was to be enforced, and that the relations and friends were actually
being deported, the effect was magical. Concurrently with this action
the dacoit gangs were hunted incessantly from jungle to jungle and
village to village, and severe fines were imposed on villages which
harboured the outlaws or withheld information regarding their movements.

The results were better than I had dared to hope. Many dacoits
surrendered in order to save their people from being removed. The
villagers came forward with information, and put police and soldiers
on to the tracks of the gangs. Small parties of dacoits could no
longer move about without danger of being attacked and captured by the
people they had preyed upon so long. Whole bodies of men came in and
surrendered with their arms. At the end of 1888 few members of the
Sagaing gangs were at large, and the district was reduced to order. In
Ava the success was similar; and the districts of Yeu Shwèbo and the
Lower Chindwin had likewise benefited from Colonel Symons's labours.

The credit of devising this system is due to Colonel Raikes. I
hesitated at first to go as far as he advised. There were obvious
reasons against moving people in this manner; but, if it was easy
to see objections to it, it was very difficult to devise a milder
measure that would be successful. It proved the most effective weapon
in our battery for the restoration of peace and order. The people, of
course, felt the pressure of these coercive measures. It was intended
that they should feel it. One of the most notorious leaders in the
Sagaing Division, Min O, after his capture, declared the fining under
the Village Regulation had ruined him, because the villagers, finding
themselves unable to meet both the Government demands and his, and
finding that the Government could enforce payment while he no longer
could, turned upon him and refused to give him asylum. The moving and
grouping of villages made it difficult for the gangs to get food, and
compelled them to disband or surrender.

The _Gazetteer of Burma_, in the article on Sagaing (vol. ii., p. 188),
published in 1908, records that "the strict observance of the Village
Regulation ... gradually led to the pacification of the country. By the
end of 1888 no less than twenty-six dacoit leaders, including Shwè Yan,
had been killed and twenty-six captured, and most of their followers
had come in and were disarmed. Since that time the district has given
no trouble."

FOOTNOTE:

[26] Lieut.-Colonel Sir Hugh Daly, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Resident in Mysore.




CHAPTER XII

DACOITY IN THE MINBU AND MYINGYAN DISTRICTS


The disorder in the Minbu district was similar to that in Sagaing, but
I doubt if it had been of such long standing.

It differed in other respects from Sagaing. In that district the Bos
formed a confederation. Each had his own village or district, from
which he drew his supplies, and his exclusive rights which the others
recognized. They communicated with each other and were ready to
join forces when it was necessary. In Minbu the government was more
autocratic, and centralized in the hands of Ôktama, who had seven or
eight lieutenants under his orders. There was also another point of
difference. The leaders in Sagaing and generally elsewhere, were local
men, and for the most part professional robbers. Ôktama had been a
Pongyi some years before, in a monastery a few miles north-west of
Minbu. He professed to have a commission from some obscure prince, but
laid no claim to royal blood.

He made his first appearance in Minbu in February, 1886, and induced
the headmen of many villages to join him.

The people at this time were like sheep without a shepherd. They had
heard of the destruction of the wolf they knew, and to whose ways they
had become accustomed. Of the new-comers, the _Kalas_, or barbarians,
they had had no experience, and they had as yet no reason to believe in
their power to protect them. Naturally, therefore, they looked about
for some one to help them to work together in their own defence.

Ôktama no doubt had a capacity for organization and command, and the
people recognized him as a leader of men; otherwise it is difficult
to conceive how in so short a time he secured their allegiance. His
attack on Sagu, a town on the right bank of the Irrawaddy nearly
opposite Magwè, has been mentioned before. He burnt the town, which was
held by a handful of troops, and then laid siege to Salin with a force
said to have numbered five thousand men. The deaths of the two British
officers in action against him increased his prestige, and from that
time until a few weeks before his capture on the 20th of July, 1889, he
was at the head of a large confederacy which had more power in Minbu
than the British.

Ôktama assumed the title of Commissioner (Mingyi), and created a
regular system of government. He had five lieutenants under him, to
whom defined portions of the country were entrusted. His intelligence
department was perfect. If the British troops showed a sign of
movement, warning was sent from village to village and reached Ôktama
in time for him to shift his camp. The organization was very strong.
It could not have lived and grown as it did if my officers in Minbu
had not been weak, and their rule "placidius quam feroci provincia
dignum." They were not of the stuff that can bring a turbulent people
to submission.

When I was at Minbu, in the early part of the year, I wished to march
through the district and speak to the people. Both the Commissioner
and the Brigadier-General, Sir Robert Low, strongly opposed my wish,
as they thought it likely that my party would be fired on, the effect
of which would be bad. However, I gave my instructions regarding the
measures to be taken.

In the June following I rode through the valley of the Môn. The country
seemed to me prosperous and well cultivated; betel-vine gardens and
plantations of bananas were frequent near the villages, and I saw no
sign of distress or armed disorder.

Nevertheless the people were even then under the feet of the dacoits. I
changed the district officials as soon as possible.

The improvement of the district dated from the appointment as Deputy
Commissioner of Mr. H. S. Hartnoll, who brought to the work the
necessary energy, activity, and judgment. He was assisted by Mr. G. G.
Collins and Mr. W. A. Hertz, who were as zealous and active as their
chief. In May, 1888, being assured that the people were getting weary
of the brigands, I issued a proclamation offering a free pardon to all
the rank and file on condition that they surrendered and engaged to
live peaceably in their villages. The leaders, eight in number, were
excepted by name. They were to be pursued until they were captured or
killed.

As two years and a half had elapsed since the annexation, the fact that
Burma was part of the British Empire must have penetrated to the most
remote village. Warning, therefore, was given that the full rigour of
the law would be enforced against all who were taken fighting against
the Government, or who aided or abetted the leaders excepted from
pardon. The terms of this proclamation were explained to the headmen
and villagers assembled at suitable places, and the severe penalties
that would follow disobedience were explained to them. A period of one
month was allowed for surrenders, and the pursuit of the gangs was
pressed unceasingly all through the rains and open season of 1888-9.

The sequel I will give in Mr. Hartnoll's words:--

"His [Ôktama's] power had gradually grown less and less from time to
time, but the difficulty has always been to get information of him and
his leaders. The villagers would give no aid or information. They began
to turn at the beginning of this year (1889) when certain fines were
imposed on the worst of the villages, yet they did not give us all the
help they could. In April, though his power was much broken and many
of his lieutenants killed and captured, yet he had a fairly strong
gathering; and Maung Ya Baw, Maung Kan Thi, Ôktaya, Nga Kin, and Byaing
Gyi were still to the fore.

"From May 1st the relations of dacoits were removed from their villages
and a fortnightly fine imposed on all harbouring villages. On this the
villagers gave him up. He and all his principal men except Maung Kin
are dead or captured. He had at the end only one boy with him....

"Our success has been entirely achieved by bringing the villagers to
our side by imposing a periodical general fine on them until they
helped us, by removing the relations and sympathizers of the dacoits,
by holding certain points fairly close together throughout the district
till the leader troubling the point held was caught, and by having
constant parties of troops and police always on the move."

The capture of Ôktama was effected in this wise. Maung An Taw Ni, an
Upper Burman, the township officer of Legaing, a little town with
a population of about three thousand people, some fifteen miles
north-west of Minbu, received information that the dacoit chief was
near the Chaungdawya Pagoda, a short way from Legaing. Maung An Taw
Ni, who had borne a very active part in all the measures taken against
the dacoits, started at once with some military police. They came upon
Ôktama sitting despairingly by the pagoda with only one follower. It
was a tragic picture. When Burmans shall paint historical scenes for
the galleries at Rangoon or Mandalay, or write on the events following
the fall of their king, "Ôktama at the Golden Pagoda" will be a
favourite theme for ballad or drama (_pyazat_).

Another example of dacoity in Upper Burma may be taken from the
Myingyan district. I will give the case of Ya Nyun, which gained some
notoriety at the time. It is remarkable also for the fact that Ya Nyun
is probably the last great leader who is still alive. And that he
owes his life to the extraordinary conduct of some very subordinate
officials, who, in the loyal desire, it may be supposed, to secure his
apprehension, took upon themselves to induce him by vague words to hope
for his life if he surrendered. It is certain that no man in Burma ever
deserved to be hung more than Ya Nyun. If the voice of the blood of the
murdered cries from the ground, the cries for vengeance must still be
echoing through the villages and woods round Popa.

[Illustration: BURMESE DACOITS BEFORE TRIAL--WORST CHARACTERS AND
NATIVE POLICE GUARD.]

Ya Nyun was the Myingaung (literally Captain of the Horse) of the
Welaung sub-district of Myingyan, bound at call to furnish one hundred
mounted men to the king's army. He had thirty headmen of villages under
him. His father, who had been Myingaung before him, was a murderer and
a scoundrel. He had been dismissed by King Mindon's Government and
tattooed as a bad character with the Burmese words meaning: "Beware,
cease to do evil," on his forearm.[27] The son, however, was at Court
a hanger-on of the Yaw Mingyi, one of the big ministers. He obtained
his father's post. He returned to Welaung and kept a large following of
thieves and robbers, and lived on the people.

His oppression became intolerable, and two years before the war a
deputation of the Thugyis (village headmen) went up to Mandalay to beg
protection, but as the Taingda Mingyi, the most powerful and the worst
man about the Court, took Ya Nyun's part, they could get no redress.
Two years afterwards a second deputation was sent, and Ya Nyun was
summoned to Mandalay. The matter was under inquiry when the British
advance became known. Thereupon Ya Nyun was decorated with a gold
umbrella (equivalent to a K.C.B.) and sent back to Welaung to fight
against the British. So far his case resembles, to some extent, that
of Bo Swè, who was, however, a gallant gentleman and an honest citizen
beside Ya Nyun.

His first step was to gather around him his former followers, and he
started with about fifty ruffians as the leaders and stiffening of
his gang. They had to live, and his methods were the same as those of
other dacoit leaders. Money and food and women were demanded from the
villages, and those who refused supplies were unmercifully punished,
their property seized, their villages burnt, their women dishonoured,
and their cattle driven off by hundreds. Those who in any way assisted
the troops were the objects of special barbarities. If they could not
be caught, their fathers or brothers were taken. One of his followers
deposed that he was with Ya Nyun when three men who were related to a
man who had assisted the British were ordered to be crucified in front
of the camp. He says: "I saw the bodies after they were crucified.[28]
They were crucified alive and then shot, their hearts cut open," &c. In
another case "five men were caught. Nga Kè [one of Ya Nyun's men] rode
over them as they lay bound, and then shot them."

An Indian washerman, belonging, if I remember right, to the Rifle
Brigade, straggled from a column on the march. This same witness, who
acted as a clerk or secretary on Ya Nyun's staff, kept a diary and
wrote letters and orders, goes on: "Ya Nyun ordered Aung Bet to cut a
piece out of the Indian's thigh, morning and evening, and give it to
him to eat. The flesh was fried. This was done three days. Six pieces
were cut out, then Ya Nyun ordered him to be killed. He was killed. I
saw all this with my own eyes."

The ill-treatment of women by these gangs was not unknown. Sometimes
they were taken and ill-treated as a punishment to the village which
had set at naught the Bo's order. Sometimes they were taken as
concubines for Ya Nyun and his comrades. There is one case on record
where seven young girls were selected from a village "on account of
their youth," and after the dacoits had ill-used them, five were
deliberately slaughtered for fear of their giving information. Two
escaped. This occurred in January, 1890. The remains of the five girls
were found in the jungle afterwards by our men.

The Deputy Commissioner, who examined 136 witnesses as to the doings of
Ya Nyun's gang, concluded his inquiry in these words:--

"A perusal of the evidence shows that the organization, which had,
perhaps, its first origin in a desire to resist the British Government,
degenerated rapidly, as might have been expected from the disreputable
persons who played the part of leaders, into a band of marauders who
subsisted by terrorism, rapine, murder, dacoity, and other outrages.
While remaining in open defiance of Government, they soon ceased to be
political rebels, in any respectable sense, though they occasionally
gathered in sufficient numbers to resist the troops or police, even
so late as February, 1889. They showed no more mercy to their own
countrymen than to foreigners. They can have no claim to the title of
patriots, but merely to that of _damya_, dacoit, the title invariably
applied to them by their own countrymen."

So wrote the Deputy Commissioner who made the inquiry in 1890. Ya
Nyun has been in the Andamans ever since. I have been told that he
has shown there a capacity for command, and is in charge of a gang
of convicts. Then by all means let him stay where he is useful and
harmless.

I have given the history of Ya Nyun's rise to power and some
indications of the nature of his gang. In 1887 to 1888 it was
frequently encountered by troops and police, and was more than once
roughly treated, but the wilderness around Popa afforded a shelter from
which the small and scattered parties of dacoits could not be driven.

In March and April, 1888, a series of combined operations was
organized. Four columns of military police acted under Captain
Hastings, Commandant of the Myingyan battalion. Several of Ya Nyun's
men[29] were killed and many captured.

In the autumn murders, accompanied in some cases with atrocious
cruelties, began again. Early in 1889 Ya Nyun, collecting several other
leaders, mustered a strong force, and occupied a position near his
own village of Welaung. A body of military police failed to dislodge
him, and although the gang was met soon after by a party of the Rifle
Brigade, and dispersed with heavy loss, the power of the organization
was not destroyed.

After these events an experienced officer, with powers extending to
all the country in which Ya Nyun and his accomplices acted, was given
control of the operations against the brigands. At his suggestion a
pardon was offered to Ya Nyun if he would surrender. I consented with
much reluctance, but it seemed better to free the country from misery
at any price. The man would not avail himself of it. Throughout the
rains he and his men were more active than usual, and their raids were
marked by more wanton cruelty and bloodshed than before; a symptom, as
I have said before, that the people were becoming less submissive to
the dacoits, who on their part were striving to retain their hold on
them.

As little substantial progress was being made, I went to the Popa
subdivision in January, 1890. I called up an additional police force
and saw that the utmost pressure was put, under the Village Regulation,
upon the villages which harboured and assisted the dacoits. Some
success against the smaller leaders followed, but at the end of April
all the greater men, ten in number, for whose capture rewards had been
offered, were still at large.

In the middle of April the Commissioner, Mr Symes (the late Sir E.
Symes), advised that the time had come for adopting the procedure
followed so successfully in Sagaing, Minbu, and elsewhere. This was
done. Proclamations were issued much in the same terms as those used in
other districts, offering pardon to the rank and file, and warning all
concerned that villages assisting the gangs would be severely fined,
and that sympathizers and relatives would be deported to a distance.
The rewards offered for the capture of the leaders were doubled.

The success was extraordinary. The whole dacoit organization fell
to pieces. It collapsed as a tiger shot in the head falls in his
tracks. On the 30th of May, 1890, Ya Nyun surrendered. Eleven of his
lieutenants or comrades had fallen in action, and forty-two men of note
surrendered with him.

One very influential leader of the bands in the Myingyan district,
whose name was well known in the years preceding, was not caught.
Bo Cho had not shown himself since 1888, and was reported to have
disappeared. He lay low until 1896, when he managed to get together
some men and began his old game. But in 1896 the Government knew what
to do and did it. An officer with sufficient military police was at
once appointed and empowered to take action against him, the provisions
of the Village Regulation were put into effect, and in a few days he
was a prisoner. He was not given an opportunity for further mischief.

FOOTNOTES:

[27] This was the Burman substitute for finger-prints. I have often
seen men who have endeavoured to cut the brand out of the flesh.

[28] The usual practice was to kill the man and then tie the body to a
bamboo railing, with the arms and legs stretched out.

[29] Ya Nyun himself on this occasion had a narrow escape. His dah,
or sword, was taken and presented to me by the officers and men of
the Myingyan battalion. It is a handsome weapon, and was, I believe,
presented to Ya Nyun by village headmen of the Yamèthin district.




CHAPTER XIII

TROUBLE IN THE MAGWÈ DISTRICT


I have alluded several times to the Magwè district. It was in a very
bad state and was a blot on the administration, which gave me much
thought. This district was called Taungdwingyi at first, and took the
name of Magwè when the subdivision of that name lying along the left
of the river was added to it. It was not until the end of 1888 that it
began to be very troublesome. The leader of most influence at first was
Min Yaung, who was killed by a party of troops in May, 1887. Another
leader, Tokgyi, rose afterwards and gave much trouble, but he was
captured in April, 1888. It seemed that no formidable leaders remained.
Small raids and dacoities occurred here, as in most parts of the
province, at that time. The revenue collections had increased largely,
which was a good sign.

In August, 1888, however, a pretender with the title of the Shwèkinyo
Prince raised his standard, and was joined by a noted dacoit Bo Lè
and others. They hatched their plots in a place on the border of the
Magwè township, and began work in November, 1888. Unfortunately,
everything in this district was unfortunate, at the very commencement
the gang under Bo Lè encountered a party of thirty mounted men of
the Magwè battalion, under a British Inspector of Police. The police
were badly handled, and lost seven killed and two wounded, while six
rifles and three ponies were taken by the dacoits. This gave the gang
encouragement, while the police, who had not much cohesion, were for a
time somewhat shaken. [See p. 96.]

After this event the gangs separated, probably because the country
could not feed them, and took up points at a distance from each other.
In January, 1889, some of the leaders joining hands again, surprised a
party of the Myingyan police, and inflicted some loss on them, but were
soon afterwards punished by Mounted Infantry from Magwè.

Throughout March and April, the pursuit was kept up with varying
success. At last in May, the Mounted Infantry got on to their tracks,
killed Bo Lè, and dispersed the gang.

Hitherto the brigands had confined themselves to the west and
north-west of the district, open dry country with a good deal of waste
land offering a good field for the action of mounted troops.

After a time the Taungdwingyi subdivision also became disturbed, and
dacoities became frequent. The conditions on the eastern side of the
district were different. The hills known as the Pegu Yomas run along
the eastern boundary dividing Magwè from Pyinmana for about sixty
or seventy miles; from the Thayetmyo boundary on the south, to some
distance beyond Natmauk on the north. From Natmauk the hills gradually
diminish and slope away to the plains. The slopes of the Yomas are
densely wooded, and between the Magwè boundary and the low country to
the east there was much teak forest worked by the Bombay Burma Company.
At that time there was also a good growth of the Acacia Catechu, and
many of the Burmans employed in extracting cutch lived in the forests,
and cultivated small cleared plots here and there. The richest villages
and best rice-producing land in the district lay along the low lands at
the foot of the Yomas, within raiding distance. No dacoit could have
wished for better conditions, especially when an inefficient district
officer and a poorly commanded police battalion were added.

At this period of the campaign I had lost by sickness and death some
of the best and most experienced men. The strength of the Commission
all told was not enough for the necessities of the province in its then
state. I was compelled to place districts in charge of men who were
unfit owing to inexperience and want of training.

It is a fact of which we may all be proud that the average young
English gentleman when thrown into conditions which demand from him
courage, energy, and judgment, and the power of governing, answers to
the call. Whether he comes from a good school or university, or from
his regiment, from the sea or the ranch, whether he has come through
the competitive system or has obtained his appointment by other means,
he will in the majority of cases be found capable, and sometimes
conspicuously able. It is necessary, however, that he should be taught
and trained in his work. The Magwè district was in itself not specially
hard to manage, not nearly so difficult as many others in Upper Burma.
It was in charge of a junior man of the Indian Civil Service, clever
but not very wise.

As it was necessary to take special measures against the Yoma gangs, an
officer, who had been ten years in the police in Lower Burma and had
done excellently in the adjacent district of Thayetmyo, was appointed
to work on similar lines in Taungdwingyi.

He was in this matter independent of the Deputy Commissioner, who,
although senior to him in the Commission, was much his junior in years
and experience. One of the chief duties assigned to him was the removal
of villages from which dacoits received their supplies. He removed
those lying nearest the hills which harboured the brigands. No doubt
the gangs were inconvenienced and exasperated by this measure. In
April, 1889, the village of Myothit was attacked and the police post
burnt. In May a large body of dacoits under the standard of Buddha
Yaza, a pretended prince, who in preceding years had a large following
in the Eastern Division, gathered in the Pin township in the north of
the district east of Yénangyaung. A party of military police led by
two Indian officers attacked them successfully, but they collected
again in a stronger position and a second attack by one hundred rifles
(military police), led by the Assistant Commissioner and the Assistant
Superintendent of Police, neither of them trained soldiers, failed; but
soon afterwards the gangs were again met and dispersed.

On the 1st of June, 1889, a small body of dacoits was encountered by
Mr. Dyson, Assistant Commissioner, who had with him a party of police.
A fight ensued, in which Mr. Dyson was killed. The man who led this
gang was killed afterwards and his followers surrendered. But this was
no compensation for the loss of a promising young officer who could be
ill spared.[30]

There was a force of police in the district quite able to hold it, if
they had been properly handled, and they were supported by Mounted
Infantry. There was evidently a want of some controlling authority
which was not to be found in any of the local officers. Just at this
time Colonel W. Penn Symons, who had been working in Sagaing, succeeded
to the command of the Myingyan district, and at my earnest invitation
he went to Magwè and assumed control over the operations for reducing
the district to order. All civil and police officers were placed under
General Symons absolutely so far as the operations were concerned.

A proclamation was then issued offering a pardon to all who were
out, excepting only those who had committed murder and certain named
leaders, on condition that they submitted and returned to a peaceful
life. This proclamation had some effect, and more than 150 dacoits
surrendered with their arms. Most of the men who came in belonged to
the Pin and Yénangyaung townships.

In July (1889) I was able to devote a fortnight to this troublesome
district and to meet General Symons at Magwè. With him and some of
the local officials I marched round the district, going from Magwè to
Taungdwingyi, and then up the east to the north, ending at Yénangyaung
on the north-west.

I found the country in a better condition than the reports of crime had
led me to expect. Going north from Taungdwingyi a good deal of land
was lying untilled. But elsewhere every possible field was ploughed
and sown, and cattle were plentiful and in good case. This part of the
district was a fine open country divided into big fields with thorn
hedges. There were, however, here and there tracts of very difficult
scrub jungle broken by ravines from which it would be difficult to
drive dacoit gangs.

I had the principal men collected to meet me at all the halting-places
and had much consultation with them. The people came readily with their
petitions and spoke with perfect frankness of their grievances.

As a problem in administration the conditions differed much from those
hitherto dealt with. In Sagaing, Minbu, and elsewhere, the lawlessness
was universal and chronic. In Magwè the gangs were small and consisted
mainly of professional criminals, not of peasants who had joined
well-known leaders either to save their own lives and property or to
resist the establishment of a foreign Government. Some of the leaders
even were well-known outlaws from Lower Burma, and it was asserted that
there were natives of India with the gangs. But only in one case was
this substantiated. A native of India, a man of the sweeper caste, had
been captured and he was in the Magwè jail. A note written a few days
after I had left Magwè will give the impressions I brought away from my
tour.

"The two main difficulties are the bad state of the Police Battalion
and the nature of the country on the north and on the east of the
district. These were aggravated by the injudicious action on the part
of the subdivisional officer, for which I must take my share of the
blame as I selected him and trusted him fully in consequence of his
great success elsewhere. In his desire to force the dacoits to leave
the slopes of the mountains, he moved villages too far from their
fields and did not show a proper care and judgment in selecting the
temporary sites for them to occupy. It was said that men joined the
dacoit gangs in consequence. It may have been so in a few instances.
The people spoke to me frankly and freely, and they did not allege
this. Still, it may be true. I debated much with myself whether I
should say, 'Go back at once to your old sites.' This would have
pleased all.... All the headmen I saw admitted that the villages
moved were those which added and fed the dacoits, and they admitted
unreservedly that if they returned they must continue to aid and feed
them. General Symons was of opinion that the removal of these villages
would prove of the greatest assistance in capturing the gangs. The
mischief for that season had been caused and some of the more distant
lands must lie empty. To let the people return now (July) was useless,
while it would prolong our work.

"Their argument was, 'There are fewer dacoits now than there used to
be even in the King's time. We prefer dacoits to inconvenience and
hardship.'"

That was their attitude everywhere, and if peace was to be established
we could not accept it. I removed the incompetent officers and sent the
best officer I had at my disposal (the late Mr. Todd Naylor) to take
charge of the district. At the same time a competent Commandant was
posted to the military police battalion.

General Symons undertook to remain in the district for another month.
Minbu had been cleared of the gangs which had harassed it so long, and
I was able to transfer Mr. G. G. Collins to Magwè to help Mr. Todd
Naylor.

Having put matters in train, my duties took me to Mandalay and then up
the Chindwin to arrange matters connected with the coming expedition
against the Chins. General Symons was appointed to command the
Chin-Lushai expedition, and Magwè had to be left to the local officers.
Progress was slow. The dacoits lay up in the forests of the Yomas, and
until they were driven out and destroyed there would be no peace.

For the last three months of the year my health compelled me to take
leave to the Nilgiri Hills. There was no hill station in Burma at that
time. The climate varying between a stokehole and a fern-house was not
invigorating, and labour, physical and mental, such as we were all
sustaining was somewhat exhausting.

During my absence Mr. A. P. MacDonnell,[31] Home Secretary to the
Government of India, was appointed to act for me. He took up the
Magwè business vigorously, and under his direction several columns
were organized to operate simultaneously in the unsettled tract from
Yamèthin, Pyinmana, Magwè, and Thayetmyo. They commenced work in
December, 1889. The party from Magwè encountered one of the gangs in
the Yomas, but inflicted no punishment on them. One leader was driven
out and captured or killed in the Yamèthin district. But there was
no marked success. The dacoits were able to get food anywhere in the
forests from the cutch boilers, and it was suspected ammunition from
the Burman foresters in the Bombay Burma Company's service.

On my return, from leave in December 1889, I had the great honour
of receiving His Royal Highness Prince Albert Victor of Wales,
accompanying him to Mandalay by rail and returning by river. This duty
necessarily delayed the ordinary work of administration.

On examining the situation in Magwè, I came to the conclusion that the
operations in the Yomas must be placed under the control of one man.
I selected Mr. Porter, Deputy Commissioner of Pyinmana, and made the
whole business over to him with definite instructions as to the powers
he was to exercise and the course of action he was to follow. Tracks
had already been cleared through the Yomas. The different parties
engaged in the work were well combined and held together by Mr. Porter.
The gangs were dispersed and either captured or forced to surrender,
and by the end of May the work was complete.

Meanwhile in the north of the district Mr. Todd Naylor and Mr. Collins
had succeeded in breaking up the small gang that still held out under
two noted leaders, and the district was finally cleared. All the
leaders had been killed, captured, or driven out of the district. Some
sought refuge in Lower Burma. One Lugalégyi, a well-known Bo, was
arrested in Prome before the end of the year. To quote once more from
the _Gazetteer_ (1908): "Since then Magwè has been undisturbed" (vol
ii., p. 56, article "Magwè").

I will give one more instance of dacoit methods reported to me by the
late Mr. Donald Smeaton, then Commissioner of the Central Division,
dated August 13, 1889, from the Pagyi country. Reading it over after
the lapse of more than twenty years, I am glad that I was able to
help in ending the anarchy which begat such crimes. Mr. Smeaton
wrote: "Early in the forenoon of the 18th July I was riding back with
Lieutenant Macnabb from Kyaw to Zeittaung. We were passing the village
of Jut about four miles from Zeittaung, when we were hailed by a
villager and a military policeman, who informed us that the village
had just been dacoited by Saga and a gang of fourteen or fifteen men.
We at once went into the village and were conducted by the Thugyi to
the house which had been Saga's principal object of attack. We were
there informed that this house had been singled out by Saga because
its owner, Po Hkine, one of his late followers, had surrendered with
his arms to the special officer, that Saga's object had been to kill
Po Hkine. Fortunately Po Hkine and his wife were at Zeittaung when the
attack was made. Not finding Po Hkine or his wife, Saga had dragged
down from the house two old women, Po Hkine's mother and aunt, and
tortured them by burning parts of their bodies with lighted torches.
The elder of the two women was severely burnt and was lying on the
ground: the other was sitting. Both were in great pain. We questioned
the two women. They said the gang had come straight to their house
shouting out 'Saga! Saga!' and on finding that Po Hkine was not there
had gone up the bamboo steps and dragged them to the ground. They then
reproached them with allowing Po Hkine to surrender and demanded all
the money and jewelry in the house. The old women gave up all their
money and their ornaments, but nevertheless they were tied up, a bamboo
mat with a hole cut to allow the head to pass through was put over
them, and two or three of the gang held lighted torches to their backs
and between their legs. The villagers were too afraid to yield any
assistance. The women fainted, and the dacoits left them lying on the
ground. The villagers were doing their best to soothe the two women and
alleviate the pain when we came to the house.

"I have known of several cases in which women have been regularly
trussed and suspended over a fire by dacoits till they gave up their
money and ornaments.

"I can recall one case in which dacoits pushed wood shavings up between
a woman's legs and set them on fire.

"In several cases of this kind that have occurred within my own
knowledge the unfortunate women have died."

But I must have surfeited the reader with robberies and murders
and savage cruelties. My purpose has been to draw a true picture
of the conditions with which we had to deal. There may be some who
think that stern measures of repression are wrong and that under all
conditions kindness and forbearance should be the only weapons of a
civilized Government. It is to be wished that such persons could have
an opportunity of testing their theories without danger to any but
themselves.

It is well, however, to record as a matter of history that, so far as
was practicable, the rank and file of those who joined insurgent or
brigand gangs were treated leniently. They were freely pardoned, if
they had not committed murder, on condition that they surrendered with
their arms and engaged to live quietly in their villages. Where it was
necessary and possible, work was provided for them. When I left Burma
there were thousands who had so surrendered and were living honest
lives. Very few, I believe, went back to the wild life.

There were a very large number of men, especially in the early years,
who were run down and captured and sentenced by the magistrates to long
terms of imprisonment. It would have done infinite mischief if these
men had been released after a short time and allowed to join their old
companions.

I opposed the idea of a general jail delivery. When it became possible,
the cases were examined under my orders by an experienced officer
and the sentences were revised. It was not a task that could be done
without labour, care, and knowledge. It was necessary to consider the
condition of the district to which each man belonged. If that district
was still disturbed, and especially if the gang of which he had been a
member was still holding together, it would have been foolish weakness
to send him back again. As a dog returns to his vomit, so does a dacoit
to his gang, if he can find it. The magistrate is bound to think of the
people who may suffer, rather than of the criminal who had preyed upon
them. In Burma at least we had not outgrown this primitive morality. No
one who had had my experience of the difficulty of catching these very
interesting gentlemen would have cared to let them loose again.


THE FIRST DURBAR IN THE SHAN STATES.

About this time I was able to carry out an intention I had formed of
visiting Fort Stedman and meeting all the Shan chiefs and notables.

The distance from the nearest point in the plains to Fort Stedman was
seventy miles, of which fifty-six were through the hills. The road was
under construction, but in that state which made it worse travelling
than the bullock-path it was meant to supersede.

The journey would take altogether about fourteen days, and it was not
easy for me to get away from other business for so long a time. Nor was
it possible always to summon the chiefs away from their headquarters.

The ride up through the hills was very beautiful, and the view from the
range commanding the great lake of Inle was one of the finest I had
seen in Burma.

Fort Stedman lies on the further or eastern shore of the lake, and
after a long and hot ride we had to wait for a considerable time for
the State boat of the Yawnghwè Sawbwa who was bringing Mr. Hildebrand
across.

At the landing-place I found a guard of honour of the Shan levy under
Captain Tonnochy, the Commandant, and at the village bazaar higher up
all the chiefs had assembled to meet me. On the next day I held an
informal reception of all the Sawbwas and other potentates.

A large hall, mostly of bamboo, had been constructed on the
parade-ground, and in this, on the 19th of March, I received the
chiefs. All the chiefs, with the exception of a few, were present.
Many of them met me for the first time, and I learnt that to most
of them also it was the first occasion of their meeting with their
fellow-chiefs. They were presented to me in turn, and the Sawbwas of
Möngnai and Yawnghwè, who it was considered had rendered services of
some value to the British Government, received the medal and gold chain
of honour given by the Viceroy for local services in Burma.

It was a notable assemblage. It was the first occasion on which all
these potentates of various degrees, who had for years previously been
fighting amongst themselves or rebelling against Burmese tyranny, had
been brought together in peace and harmony under a strong rule. Each
of them had made his formal submission to the Queen-Empress. Each had
received a patent confirming him in his rights and position as head of
his State. Each of them knew that the reign of peace had begun and that
he was henceforth secure.

I reminded them that this was the work of the British power, and that
it had been carried out without their assistance by the soldiers of the
Queen-Empress and at the cost of her Government of India.

I pointed out to them that they, the Shan chiefs, had duties and
obligations on their side: primarily the good government of their
peoples, the impartial administration of justice, the development of
their territories by roads, and the improvement of agriculture and
trade. "I do not want you," I said, "to imitate or adopt the forms or
methods of British government; but I think you can do much by a careful
choice of your subordinates, by the judicious curtailment of the right
to carry arms, by suppressing the extravagant and public gambling
which, experience shows, invariably leads first to ruin and then to
crime."

Lastly, I explained to them that they could not be excused from paying
tribute, the amount of which would be adjusted to their ability. The
British Government was maintaining garrisons for their benefit, and had
undertaken costly expeditions for their defence. It was necessary to
ask them to remember their obligations.

The first assessment of the Shan States to tribute was made in 1887-8,
on the basis of the sums paid to the King of Burma, so far as they
could be ascertained. The country had, however, suffered very greatly
from the prevailing anarchy, and many of the States were depopulated
and the land was lying waste. Much of the nominal demand had to be
remitted. Even now (in 1911) the tribute received by the Government
(which may be taken to be at most not more than one-third of the
revenue collected from the people by their chiefs) hardly covers the
expense of administration, including the garrison of fifteen hundred
military police who maintain internal order and guard the frontiers.
The vast sums expended on the Mandalay-Lashio railway in the Northern
States and on the road connecting the Southern States with the
Toungoo-Mandalay railway have not been repaid, except by the increased
prosperity of the country.

The Shan population may be taken at about one million two hundred
thousand persons. It would be a high estimate of the incidence of the
tribute received by the Government if it were reckoned at sixpence per
head. As a source of revenue, therefore, the Shan States are not of
much account. The country, however, has improved--slowly, it is true,
but without interruption. The railway from Mandalay to Lashio has done
much for the Northern States. That now under construction from the
Toungoo-Mandalay line to the headquarters of the Southern States will
have greater and more rapid effect on that fertile country. I fully
anticipate rapid progress in the near future. It is something to be
able to say that since my visit to Fort Stedman in March, 1890, the
peace of the Shan States has not been broken, except by a few small
local risings of the wilder tribes (not Shans) in the mountains on the
north and on the east.

To the student of the science of politics the Shan States will prove,
perhaps, the most interesting field of observation in the province
under the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma. There is nothing quite of the
same character in India. When we occupied the country, the condition of
the Shan chiefs had more resemblance to that of the petty chiefs and
Rajas in the central provinces of India before Sir Richard Temple dealt
with them, than to any other Indian example. But Temple gave to the
larger States the character of feudatory rulers of foreign territory
outside of British India, whereas, as I have mentioned below, in the
chapter on the Shan Expedition of 1887-8, the Shan States one and all
were made part of British India by the proclamation annexing Burma.

There is nothing in India similar to this case; where a great territory
of sixty thousand square miles, being by law an integral part of
British India, is administered not through the regular officials and
courts, but directly by many quasi-independent chiefs, each supreme in
his own territory, but guided and controlled by British officers, whose
advice they are bound by their engagements to follow.

It results from these conflicting conditions that everything has to be
done by or under some legal enactment. If the ordinary laws of British
India (for example, the codes of criminal law and procedure) do not
apply, it is because under the Shan States Act or some other enactment
the local Government has suspended their operation and has substituted
other rules to which the force of law has been given.

In the Feudatory States of India, on the other hand, any interference
which becomes necessary is exercised not by virtue of an enactment of
the legislature, but by the use of the sovereign executive power.

That this difference is vital there can be little doubt. At present it
is the policy, and no doubt the wise policy, of the Government of India
to avoid interfering with the native States, as much as may be, even by
way of advice.

An Indian ruler can do as he likes, and it is only in gross cases of
misrule which are clearly injurious to the people, and the consequences
of which extend, or are likely to extend, beyond the boundaries of the
State, that the sovereign Government feels compelled to intervene.

In the Shan case the local Government has the power by law of
interfering and controlling the chief, and it will feel bound to use it.

It will be interesting to watch to which side the tendency will be.
As the people advance in condition and education, and as the chiefs
become more intelligent and trained to affairs, will the control of
the executive increase or diminish? Will the tendency be, as in India,
for the executive Government to withdraw into the background and leave
the chief to govern, or will the chief tend to become an official of
the State, exercising his powers under the restrictions and forms, and
subject to the appellate and revisional powers of the regular courts?
Up to the present time the control has tended to become more close.

FOOTNOTES:

[30] Mr. Dyson had come to us from the Public Works Department. He had
been employed in the Ava subdivision of Sagaing and had shown himself
keen and energetic, but he was still very inexperienced in this sort of
work.

[31] Now Lord MacDonnell, P.C., G.C.S.I.




CHAPTER XIV

GRADUAL CREATION OF AN EFFICIENT POLICE FORCE


Lord Dufferin left India in December, 1888. I went to Calcutta to see
him before he left, and had the honour of being introduced by him to
the new Viceroy, the Marquis of Lansdowne. I had reason to be very
grateful to Lord Dufferin for his confidence and encouragement and
unceasing support, and if he could have stayed to see the work finished
it would have given me infinite satisfaction. I had no less cause,
however, to be thankful to Lord Lansdowne.

During the four years I was in Burma, I was in constant communication
with the Viceroy; and every week, unless I was absent in distant
places, I wrote to him confidentially, keeping him fully informed of
events and of my wants and wishes. Lord Dufferin had asked me to write
to him in full confidence and regularly, and Lord Lansdowne allowed
me to continue the practice. It was an addition, and often not an
insignificant addition, to my work. It repaid me, for it established
and maintained confidential relations between the Viceroy and his
subordinate in Burma. It was a great help to the Chief Commissioner,
who had no one on the spot to whom he could open his mind.

I have noticed already the change in the province and the diversion
of attention from the interior to the frontier districts. This change
shows itself very clearly in my correspondence with the Viceroy, which
reflected the matters giving me most anxiety from week to week. During
the first half of 1889 the affairs of the frontiers occupied the chief
place. I have given their history in separate chapters.

It might be thought, from the space I have given to dacoits and their
leaders, that the time had hardly yet come for reducing the military
police. In truth the struggle with the dacoits was drawing to a close,
and the forces of order were winning all along the line. The outbursts
in Magwè and elsewhere were like the last dying efforts of a fire.

The extent to which the military police and the troops had changed
places can best be understood from this, that on the 1st of January,
1887, the troops held one hundred and forty-two posts and the military
police fifty-six. On the 1st of January, 1889, the police held one
hundred and ninety-two posts and the troops forty-one. And the state
of the province was such as to lead me to consider the possibility of
reducing the military police strength.

It has been seen how the withdrawal of the troops led for a time to
renewed activity on the part of the discontented and criminal classes.

With this experience before us it was resolved to move with the
greatest caution, and to feel our way step by step. The following
procedure was adopted. The state of each district and of its
subdivisions was carefully reviewed. The posts which might be
altogether withdrawn were first selected, then those of which the
garrisons might be reduced in numbers. The changes thus determined were
to be made gradually, so as to attract as little attention as might
be. The men brought in from the posts were not to leave the district
at once, but were to remain at headquarters, where their discipline,
drill, and musketry could be worked up.

If it should appear from an increase in disorder that reduction had
been premature, the mistake could be remedied at once by ordering the
men back to their posts. If, on the contrary, no mischief followed,
the surplus men were to be drafted, by companies if possible, into a
provincial reserve battalion, which would be brought to a high standard
of military efficiency, and would be available in case of need for
any part of the province. Finally, when the reserve battalion became
crowded, I proposed to offer the trained companies to the army, if the
Commander-in-Chief would accept them and if the men would take military
service, of which there was no doubt.

This scheme was carried out, and continued until the strength of the
military police force was not greater than the Government of Burma
needed.

Another change was made in order to reduce the forces, namely, the
amalgamation of two or more battalions under one Commandant. It was
necessary at first to give a separate battalion to each district, in
order that each Deputy Commissioner should have a sufficient force of
military police at his hand and under his control. But when the country
became peaceful and active service was rarely called for, there was
no reason for maintaining an organization that was costly in money
and men. Thus by doubling up the battalions, aggregating nineteen
companies, in the Eastern Division, into one battalion of fifteen
companies, four companies were saved and drafted into the Reserve.

This process went on until, in the year 1892, seven fine regiments
had been given to the army. These were treated at first and for some
time as local regiments attached to the province. Of late years,
however, the policy in the Indian Army has been to obliterate all local
distinctions and to make service general.

The strength of the military police in Upper Burma now is, I
understand, fifteen thousand men in round numbers. The strength in
1889 was eighteen thousand. The reduction, therefore, has not been
so very great. The fact is that no sooner had the interior of the
province been reduced to order, than fresh territory began to come
under administration. Vast tracts of hill country on the east, on the
north, and on the west, which were left to themselves in 1890, are now
held by the military police. From the frontier of French Indo-China
on the east to the Bengal boundary on the west, and northwards along
the Chinese boundary wherever it may be, the military police keep the
marches of Burma. In the mountains inhabited by Kachin tribes on the
north and east of the Myitkyina district, the whole of this troublesome
borderland is held by the police. Sixteen hundred and twelve rifles,
with forty-one native officers and nine British officers, more than a
tenth of the whole strength, are stationed in this district, which in
1887 was outside the pale. The Shan States and the Chin country are
similarly garrisoned.[32]

I have always felt that our failure to train the Burmans to be soldiers
is a blot on our escutcheon. I have mentioned an experiment to enlist
Karens. This succeeded for a time. The men learnt their drill quickly,
and as trackers and for forest work they were very useful. It was
decided in 1891 to raise a Karen battalion, with which, and an Indian
battalion, it was proposed to form a military police force for Lower
Burma. The Karens were placed on the same footing as the Indians, and
British officers were appointed to command them. In drill, endurance in
the field, and courage, the Karen showed himself a good man. But from
some cause he failed in discipline, and in 1899 it was found advisable,
owing to insubordinate conduct, to disband the battalion and distribute
the companies among the Indian battalions. There has been more success,
I am told, with the Kachins, who are showing themselves trustworthy.
They are certainly a strong race, probably the strongest we have in
Burma.

Another direction in which the change from the sword to the plough
and the pen was showing itself was in the prominence given to the
administration of the civil police. It is very easy to get up a cry
against the police in Burma or in India, but they will not be improved
by constant abuse, frequent prosecutions, censures, and condemnations
by High Court judges, or still less competent critics, or by other
methods of giving a service a bad name.

One of the hardest tasks connected with the administration of a country
by foreign rulers is the creation of a good police force. When the
people from whom the force has to be recruited have lived for years
under a despotic and altogether corrupt government, the task becomes
doubly hard. And when the foreigners appointed to officer and train
the force have for the most part no knowledge of police work and no
acquaintance with the vernacular of the people, the task would have
made Hercules drown himself in the nearest ditch.

It had to be done, however, and it was undertaken. The work had not
gone far in 1890, but it was started, and two good and experienced
police officers of high standing had been appointed to go round Upper
Burma, district by district, and instruct the English officers. It
was not possible at that time to find Burmans fit to take charge of
the police of a district. I do not know whether such men are yet
forthcoming.[33] We are well advanced in the second century of our rule
in India, yet I believe there are few Indian gentlemen who are willing
to take an appointment in the police and fewer still who are well
fitted for it.

The question of the civil police in Lower Burma was taken up
systematically in 1888. A committee was appointed by me to diagnose
the ailment from which the police were suffering, and to prescribe
remedies. On their report in 1889 a scheme was drawn up, the main
features of which were the division of the Lower Burma force into
military and civil, the former, as in Upper Burma, to be recruited from
India and partly, it was then hoped, from the Karen people, the latter
to be natives of the country. To the latter was to be entrusted all
police work of detection and prevention. They were to be subjected to
drill and discipline and accustomed to stand alone, and they were to
be schooled and trained to police duties. The military police force
was to be organized as one regiment under a military officer. Their
headquarters were to be in Rangoon, and they were to furnish such
detachments for outdistricts as might be wanted from time to time. This
scheme, with little alteration, was carried out in 1891, and I believe
is still in force.

[Illustration: SHAN STATES]

FOOTNOTES:

[32] This is well brought out by Lieut-Colonel S. C. F. Peile in his
"History of the Burma Military Police" (Rangoon, 1906), p. 12.

[33] I have learnt from Sir Herbert White that two Burman officers hold
the rank of District Superintendents of Police with credit.




CHAPTER XV

THE SHAN STATES


The country inhabited by the Burmans, properly so called, may be
described roughly as the valleys of the Irrawaddy and Chindwin Rivers,
south of 23 N. Latitude. The hills which bound the Irrawaddy Valley on
the east, close in the great river in its northern reaches, and as far
south as Mandalay. Below that point the river turns westward and leaves
a widening plain between its left bank, and the spurs of the Eastern
Range, which rise abruptly from the low ground. The passes through
this range lead to a hilly plateau, the altitude of which is from two
to four thousand feet above sea-level rising occasionally to five and
six thousand feet. This plateau is intersected from north to south by
the Salween River, which, rising somewhere in the mountains to the
north-west of Yunnan, enters the sea at Moulmein. The channel of the
Salween is in most places deep. To the east the high land continues,
but is rougher and more mountainous, and rises until the watershed
between the Salween and the Mekong is crossed. The descent to the
Mekong is then made through difficult and rugged country much cut up by
watercourses. The Shan States, which were at the time of the annexation
tributary to the Burman monarch, are situated, with some insignificant
exceptions, on this plateau.

The Shans are a distinct race from the Burmans. The existing Burmese
people may be traced, it is said, to tribes dwelling in the Eastern
Himalaya and the adjoining region of Thibet. The Tai or Siamese branch
of the Indo-Chinese people, called Shan by the Burmese, are supposed
to have migrated from their original seat in Central Asia towards the
south, and to have settled along the rivers Mekong, Menam, Irrawaddy,
and Brahmaputra. They are found as a distinct race from the borders of
Manipur to the heart of Yunnan, and from the Valley of Assam to Bangkok
and Cambodia. Major H. R. Davies found them occupying most of the
low-lying valleys in Southern Yunnan, and on the Tongking border, and
in small communities even in Northern Yunnan and on the Upper Yangtze.
Although so widely spread, in some cases even scattered, and, except
in Siam, subjected to alien races, they have preserved to a great
extent a common language and national character.[34] In religion they
are Buddhist of the Burmese type, but less strict in the observance
of religious duties and ceremonies and less regardful of animal life.
They are in many ways a civilized people, unwarlike, and given to
agriculture and commerce. They are not unfriendly to foreigners. "I
must have travelled," writes Major Davies, "some fifteen hundred miles
through Shan countries, and I never remember any difference of opinion,
or unpleasantness of any kind."[35]

"It may be accepted as historical," says Phayre, "that the Tai race
became supreme in the country of the Upper Irrawaddy early in the
Christian Era and continued to be so under a consolidated monarchy
for several centuries. About the ninth century A.D. it began to
break up into separate States which eventually were conquered by the
Burmans."[36] In the Irrawaddy Valley the Shans lost their autonomy,
and were amalgamated with the Burman population; but those on the high
plateau to the east continued to be governed by their own chiefs,
according to their own customs, subject to the suzerainty of Burma.
Some small States west of the Irrawaddy, survived the dissolution of
the Shan kingdom, and they also enjoyed a similar but less marked
independence.

Up to the time of the annexation at the end of 1885, the King of Burma
had exercised a real, although spasmodic and irregular control over the
Shan chiefs. In theory the office of chief, or Sawbwa, was hereditary
in the family. The Sawbwa was supreme in his own territory. He had the
power of life and death, and so far as his subjects were concerned,
wielded absolute authority unfettered by any rule stronger than custom.
The character of the Government varied in consequence with the personal
character of the chief. The main check on oppression was the facility
with which the people could emigrate into some neighbouring State. In
practice, however, the Burma Government did not scruple to interfere
with the Sawbwa; and this interference was the chief cause of the
strife and contention which divided and ruined the country. A Burmese
Bo-hmumintha, or Resident, to use the Indian term, had his seat of
administration at Möngnai, and was supported by a force of brigands
rather than soldiers. He was assisted by political agents subordinate
to him residing in some of the more important States.

The interference thus exercised was seldom if ever in the interests
of good administration. As a rule it was confined to efforts to raise
a revenue. Tolls and exactions at various points on the trade routes
were numerous and oppressive; enough at times to obstruct commerce, and
even to close a trade route altogether for a season. The ease, however,
with which another road could be found, and the duty evaded, was some
check, and the Shans, who are industrious cultivators and born traders,
contrived to remain fairly prosperous and not much below their Burman
neighbours in wealth and comfort. As in Burma, while there were some
rich men, there was no real poverty. No one but the idle and vicious
needed to be in want.

The office of Sawbwa was, as has been said, hereditary in theory, and
it does not seem that the Burmese Government diverted the succession
from mere caprice or favouritism. Some pains were taken to secure the
loyalty of the chiefs. The King not seldom invited the sons of Sawbwas
to the Court of Ava at an early age, for the twofold purpose of rearing
them under Court influence, and of keeping them as hostages for their
fathers' good conduct. Notwithstanding this marked subordination to
the King of Burma, each chief assumed the same insignia and marks of
royalty as his Suzerain, and in his own view, and to his subjects,
probably, was a great and independent monarch.

It has been said that the influence of the Burmese Government was
seldom in the interests of good administration. On the contrary, it
was frequently used to stir up strife between the Sawbwas, in order
to prevent them from combining against the King. Not unnaturally,
therefore, he was not always regarded with feelings of loyalty or
affection. Rebellions against his government were frequent, but
owing to the want of cohesion amongst the Shans, and the absence
of a leader of capacity to unite them and to organize resistance,
even the loose-jointed Mandalay administration was able to put down
revolt without difficulty. It was done with ruthless severity. There
was little inclination on the part of the Sawbwas, in spite of this
oppression, to seek aid or protection from the Siamese, whose rule
would not have been a change for the better. The Möngnai Sawbwa and
others, after failing in a rebellion against Burma, sought refuge in
Kengtung, the largest and most powerful of the Trans-Salween States,
which had some traditional connection with China, and owing to its
distance from Burma, and the rugged nature of the intervening country,
enjoyed more than a shadow of independence. Nor did those States which
lie on the Mekong and formerly owned or claimed to own territory on
the east bank, invite Chinese protection. Their feelings towards China
were friendly enough. But their position on the very extremity of that
Empire, where there was little life in the administration, rendered it
unsafe to lean on help from that quarter.

A letter written to the Chief Commissioner by the Sawbwa of Hsipaw
(Northern Shan States) in 1886 shows the attitude of the Shan Chiefs
towards Burma and China.

"During the last war between the English and the Burmese," he writes,
"the Chinese Emperor placed 300,000 men at Maingmawgyi to guard the
Chinese frontier. The Chinese officials wrote to the Sawbwas inviting
them to a conference at Maingmawgyi to draw up a friendly treaty, as
the Burmese King had been taken away by the English.

"But I am under great obligations to the Queen-Empress, so I made
answer thus: 'From time immemorial we Shans have not sought protection
either from China or Burma; of late, however, the Burmans, regardless
of law and justice, have exacted our submission to them by force of
arms.

"'Since the conquest of Burma by the British and the removal of the
Burmese King, the Sawbwas and Myozas have been trying their best to
restore peace and order. And now we are asked to come to Maingmawgyi
and draw up a treaty of friendship. We cannot respond to the invitation
as yet. We, chiefs of the Shan country, must first of all consider
which side could confer on us peace and happiness, and then enter into
friendly relations with the Government of such side.'"

The problem before the Administration of Burma in 1886 was, to use
the political slang of to-day, "The peaceful penetration" of the Shan
country. The mantle of the Burmese monarch had fallen on the shoulders
of the British Government. The Shan chiefs and their people had to be
persuaded to make submission to the Queen-Empress and to accept her as
their overlord. This persuasion had to be effected if possible without
the use of force. A show of force, however, was necessary. During 1886
the despatch of an expedition to the Shan States was impossible. The
work on hand in Upper Burma was more than enough. Thus it happened that
until 1887 the only attempt to make British influence felt in the Shan
States was the deputation of an officer with a small force to Hsumhsai,
a small State lying between Mandalay and Hsipaw.

To make the measures taken to solve this problem intelligible, a
brief account must be given of events in the Shan country immediately
preceding and following the deposition of the King of Burma. The
grouping of the States for administrative purposes into North and
South, which was not inherited from the Burman Government and was not
founded on any distinction recognized by the Shans, had its origin in
these events. The States, the history of which is of most importance
in this connection, are Hsenwi and Hsipaw, to the north of Mandalay;
Yawnghwè and Möngnai farther south; and, on the east of the Salween,
the large State of Kengtung.

Hsipaw lies in the hills on the Mandalay-Lashio road, about one hundred
and thirty miles from the capital of Upper Burma. The Sawbwa, by name
Hkun Saing, was the first of the Shan chiefs who came in contact
with the British Government and the first to submit himself to the
suzerainty of the Queen-Empress after the annexation. The circumstances
which led to his contact with the British are these. In 1882 Hkun
Saing incurred the displeasure of King Thebaw and fled to escape his
vengeance. After some wanderings, which extended, it is said, into
Siam, he came to Rangoon, and with a wife and servants settled in the
Kemmendine suburb. He lived, he said, in fear of assassination by
agents of the King, and doubted the fidelity of some of his followers.
In 1883 his fears, apparently, overcame him, and he shot down two of
his men whom he accused, I believe not without reason, of plotting
against his life. He was arrested, tried for murder before the Recorder
of Rangoon, and condemned to death.

The sentence was commuted by the Chief Commissioner to transportation,
and he was confined in the jail at Rangoon. The Chief Commissioner
visited Hkun Saing a few days after the beginning of his imprisonment,
and found him taking his punishment like a man, uttering no complaints
and working with a will at the task[37] imposed on him. The jail
authorities were then instructed to treat him as a political prisoner.
After a sufficient time had elapsed to make it plain to independent
chiefs that if they sought refuge in British territory they must submit
themselves to British law, he was released on condition that he left
our jurisdiction. He retired to Eastern Karenni, and lived under the
protection of Sawlapaw, the chief of that country. On the removal of
the King of Burma, he obtained some assistance in men and money from
Sawlapaw, and made his way to his own territory.

Meanwhile much had been happening there and in the neighbouring States
during his absence.

To the east and north-east of Hsipaw is the State of Hsenwi, which is
one of the largest divisions of the Shan country. The tract known by
this name contains nearly twelve thousand square miles. On the north
and north-east it is bordered by Chinese Shan States. The population of
the State is said to number about one hundred and fifty thousand and is
of mixed races, the pure Shans being outnumbered by Kachins, Palaungs,
and Chinese. For many years Hsenwi had been torn by dissension.
Frequent struggles between rival claimants to the chiefship, as
frequent appeals to Burma by the party who for the time was worsted,
had distracted and ruined the country. At the time of the annexation of
Upper Burma Naw Hpa was the titular Sawbwa, one of whose daughters had
been espoused by King Mindon. He was the representative of the ancient
ruling family of Hsenwi and had been expelled by a usurper named Sang
Hai. The story is worth telling as an illustration of Burmese ways.

About the middle of last century the Siamese made an attack on the
Trans-Salween State of Kengtung. The Cis-Salween States were called
upon for contingents to form a force to repel the invasion, and Sang
Hai, who was previously unknown, led the Hsenwi men to victory and won
much renown. On his return, finding himself at the head of victorious
troops, he rebelled against his lawful ruler Naw Hpa, and turned him
out.

Naw Hpa was summoned to Mandalay, and condemned to imprisonment for
having failed to maintain his authority, while a cadet of the Hsenwi
house was appointed in his stead. This cadet, U Po by name, was driven
away ignominiously by Sang Hai, and was recalled to Mandalay and sent
to join Naw Hpa in jail. Numerous Burmese officials of high rank with
imposing titles were sent up one after another, and one after another
was expelled by Sang Hai, and they came back, in the order of their
going, to join the company of failures in Mandalay prison.

At last, about 1877, all the Sawbwas from Yawnghwè to Möng Löng were
ordered to make a combined attack on Sang Hai. This was too much for
the usurper. He went east of the Salween, and Naw Hpa was sent back to
rule a ruined and distracted country. But Sang Hai before he retired
had thrown his mantle over the shoulders of his son-in-law, San Ton
Hon, who was for a Shan a good fighting-man. The unlucky Naw Hpa was
driven out once more, and again ordered to Mandalay to explain his
failure to hold his own. He knew by experience what this meant, and
deputed his son, who was known as the Naw Möng, to represent him at
Court, or rather in prison, while he himself took refuge with the
Kachins.

When Thebaw succeeded his father Mindon, he imprisoned his stepmother,
the Hsenwi Queen, Naw Hpa's daughter, and killed her son. And as Naw
Hpa himself was a refugee and Naw Möng was in jail San Ton Hon was left
free to establish himself in Hsenwi, or rather in the Northern and
Eastern Divisions of the State. The Southern, known as the Taunglet,
had already broken away and separated into four petty chiefships.
The middle portion, called the Alelet, was governed in a fashion by
Sang Aw, commonly know as the Pa-ôk-Chok, who had his headquarters at
Möngyai. A Burmese official with a small force had been left at Lashio,
but unable to support himself against San Ton Hon he withdrew as soon
as he heard of the fall of the Monarchy.

On the British occupation of Mandalay the son of Naw Hpa, Naw Möng,
who had been imprisoned by Thebaw, was set free. He made his way into
Hsenwi, collected followers, and seized the capital, which had been
evacuated by the Burmans. He was quickly expelled, however, by San
Ton Hon. Meanwhile his father, Naw Hpa, with a following of Kachins,
came upon the scene, and another element of strife appeared in the
Myinzaing Prince, who had been imprisoned by the King and along with
other political prisoners was released on the occupation of Mandalay.
He made his way to the Shan hills and endeavoured to collect followers
and oppose the British. His cause appears to have been taken up by
Naw Hpa and Naw Möng, in the hope of strengthening their own party. A
confederacy was formed to raise the standard of the Myinzaing Prince.
The plan of campaign was to seize possession of this part of the Shan
country. Hsipaw was to be assigned to Naw Möng, while Hsenwi was to be
restored to Naw Hpa. The town of Hsipaw was attacked and completely
wrecked, and a movement was directed against San Ton Hon.

Such was the condition of affairs when Hkun Saing made his way back
from the Karenni country. After some opposition he made himself master
of Hsipaw, to find the place in ruins, the only house standing being
his own _haw_, or palace, which had been spared in fear, it was said,
of the Spirit of the Palace. Under these circumstances it was natural
that Hkun Saing, the lawful Sawbwa of Hsipaw and San Ton Hon, the _de
facto_ chief of Northern Hsenwi, should make common cause against the
confederacy headed by Naw Hpa and his son. This was in July, 1886.

Between the Hsipaw State and Mandalay on the western border of the
Shan plateau lies the small State of Hsumhsai, known to the Burmans
as Thonze. It was formerly ruled by its own chief, and had been a
very prosperous little district. Its position within easy reach of
Mandalay exposed it to the constant and mischievous interference of the
Burman Government. For forty years before the annexation it had been
administered by Burmese officials, but with some regard to Shan customs
and sentiment. In 1886, after the British occupation of Mandalay, it
became a bone of contention between Kun Meik, acting for his brother
the Sawbwa of Hsipaw, and the Myinzaing Prince, who had occupied this
part of the plateau. There were two men of influence in Thonze, Maung
Sa and Maung Se. Maung Sa attached himself to Kun Meik, and Maung Se to
the Myinzaing Prince. They fought with varying fortune for some time.
Eventually Kun Meik was forced back to Hsipaw. The Myinzaing party
remained masters of Hsumhsai for some months, pillaging and destroying
everything. The trade route was entirely closed throughout the year
1886, and traffic between Mandalay and the Shan States either ceased or
followed a very circuitous route.

The Chief Commissioner and the military commanders had so much on
their hands in 1886 that the question of the Shan country was of
necessity postponed. In November, however, it was found imperative
to give attention to affairs in Hsumhsai. A column under Colonel E.
Stedman,[38] with Mr. H. Thirkell White[39] as civil officer, was sent
to reopen the road and restore order. Mr. White recorded that at the
time of his arrival (18th of November, 1886) "The country was to a
great extent deserted, villages had been abandoned, and many of the
inhabitants had fled to the neighbouring States of Mönglon, Hsipaw,
and Lawksawk, but chiefly to Mönglon. Much of the land had been left
uncultivated; the road was neglected and overgrown with long grass.
These evidences of disorder we saw as we passed through Hsumhsai, and I
learned from the people that the state of the rest of the country was
the same as that of the part which we saw." It may be noted here that
when Hkun Saing, the Sawbwa of Hsipaw, came to Mandalay in 1887 to meet
Sir Charles Bernard, he laid claim to three small States--Hsumhsai,
Mönglon, and Möntung--as formerly belonging to him. Inasmuch as Hkun
Saing was the first Shan chief to acknowledge the supremacy of the
British Government, there was a desire to make much of him and to meet
his wishes. These three States were made over to him without going into
the merits of the case. At the time the intricacies of Shan politics
were little understood. The people of Mönglon especially were averse
to being subjected to the Sawbwa, who failed to govern justly or
efficiently, and the settlement of this part of the country became very
difficult. The ultimate result in consolidating the States under one
chief has, I believe, been good.

Another State of which it is useful to give some special account is
Yawnghwè, called by the Burmese Nyaungywe. Yawnghwè is in the Central,
or Myélat, Division of the Shan States, and is easily accessible from
the plains. It is remarkable for its physical formation. A broad
valley running from the north to the south forms the western half of
the State, and the centre of this valley is the Inle Lake, a large
expanse of water covering an area of seventy square miles (_Upper Burma
Gazetteer_). The eastern side of the State is hilly, and some of the
ranges rise to six thousand feet and more. Yawnghwè, it is said, in
former days ruled the country from the Hsipaw border on the north to
Karenni on the south. It was undoubtedly the most prominent State in
the Myélat.

At the time of the occupation of Mandalay by the British, Saw Möng was
Sawbwa. He had gone down to Mandalay in 1885 to see King Thebaw. It is
said that he brought back with him to Yawnghwè the Legya Queen, one of
King Mindon's wives, and her son, whose standard he set up, calling on
all the chiefs to aid him to fight the British and retake Mandalay. A
combination of small States was formed against him, and he was wounded
in both legs and obliged to retire. Being thus incapacitated, he sent
for his half-brother, Saw Ôn, and handed the conduct of affairs to him
while he went to Mandalay to recover from his hurt. Saw Ôn defeated the
hostile party, and having established his authority, took possession of
the State and told Saw Möng he need not return. Meanwhile the Limbin
confederacy had been formed, and Saw Ôn was called upon to join it. He
refused, and shrewdly proclaimed himself an adherent of the British
Government and appealed to the Chief Commissioner for aid.

[Illustration: SAW MAUNG, SAWBWA OF YAWNGHWÈ, AND HIS CONSORT.]

In order to explain the appearance of the Limbin confederacy, we
must now go eastward of the Salween to the State of Kengtung. This
chieftainship is one of the largest of the States, and comprises
about twelve thousand square miles. It lies between the Salween and
the Mekong, touching both rivers. Owing to its distance from Mandalay
and the very rugged and mountainous nature of the country between the
two rivers, Kengtung of late years had been left to itself by the
Burman Government. Soon after Thebaw's accession to the Kingdom of
Ava, many of the Shan States revolted against him, and Kengtung took
a conspicuous part in the rebellion. The Sawbwa seized the Burmese
Resident and his escort and put them to death. He attacked the adjacent
and smaller State of Kengcheng and turned out the chief, installing in
his room a man of his own. It so happened that the Chinese had occasion
about this time to strengthen their forces in Southern Yunnan, probably
as a precaution against French aggression. Hearing of the action taken
by Kengtung against Kengcheng, a large part of which lay east of the
Mekong, the Chinese general sent a force to Kengtung. It was agreed to
submit the dispute between the claimants to the Sawbwaship of Kengcheng
to the Chinese commander. He installed one of the claimants, and
provided against a revival of the quarrel by decapitating the other.
After these events the authority of the Burman Government ceased to
exist in Kengtung.

In 1882 the Sawbwa of Möngnai and the chiefs of several neighbouring
States revolted against Thebaw and found a safe refuge in Kengtung.
Möngnai is one of the most important of the States. It contains nearly
three thousand square miles. The River Salween is the boundary on the
east, and divides it from Kengtung. It has been already mentioned that
a Burman Bo-hmu, or Resident, with an armed force, was stationed in
Möngnai, which derived dignity from being the centre of Burmese power
in the Shan States, and suffered proportionately. The exactions of the
King's Government at last became intolerable. The Sawbwa, Kun Kyi, was
summoned, with other defaulters, to Mandalay, and imprisoned there
until the sums demanded were paid.

About 1882 Kun Kyi was again summoned to appear. He preferred to
revolt. While the Burmese subordinate official (the Resident had just
died) was preparing to seize him, he raised his people, led them
against the King's garrison, and destroyed it. On the news reaching
Mandalay, a large force was dispatched to avenge this outrage, and
the Sawbwa, with several other chiefs in like straits, took refuge
in Kengtung. One, Twet Nga Lu, with the assistance of the Burmese
officials, took possession of Möngnai.

Twet Nga Lu was an unfrocked monk, a native of Kengtawng, a sub-State
of Möngnai, who signalized his return to a worldly life by making
himself unpleasant to his neighbours. He had made an attack on Möngnai,
but was driven off. A younger brother of the Möngnai Sawbwa had married
a lady named Nang U, by whom he had a son. Whether this nobleman died,
or was dismissed by Nang U, is uncertain. However that may be, she
espoused Twet Nga Lu, and thereupon her minor son was appointed by the
King to be magistrate of Kengtawng with the unfrocked monk as guardian.
This arrangement had taken place before the retirement of the Sawbwa,
Kun Kyi, to Kengtung, and was very distasteful to him.

It came about thus, that the Sawbwa of Möngnai, the premier chief in
the Shan country with Lawksawk and several others, all suffering from
the King's tyranny, found themselves in Kengtung.

Naturally they took counsel together regarding the measures to be
adopted for recovering their territories, and protecting the Shans
generally against the oppressive rule of Burma. It was resolved to form
a confederacy under one leader. Their decision and the reasons for it
are stated in a letter addressed by them to Hkun Saing, the Sawbwa
of Hsipaw, on the 26th of March, 1886. Referring to a communication
which they had received from Hkun Saing, in which he advised that "it
would be beneficial to the Shans to have their country welded into a
congeries of independent States like Germany," they state their own
views in the form of resolutions, declaring that there is no hope of
establishing peace or putting an end to the endless strife between the
States, unless they are united under one suzerain. They consider that
the interests of their religion and of the country generally demand the
selection of a supreme ruler, who will combine the Sawbwas and enable
them to withstand any attempt to injure them or their religion.

Acting on these principles they decided in 1885, before the British
Government had moved against King Thebaw, to invite the Limbin Prince,
one of the Royal Family who was living in British Burma as a refugee on
a small pension allotted to him by the British Government, to come up
to Kengtung and to accept the position of Suzerain of the Shan States,
with the object of "wresting the crown from King Thebaw." The Prince
accepted the call, and arrived at Kengtung on December 10, 1885. On his
arrival, forces were raised from Kengtung and the other confederating
States, and advance parties were sent forward under the command of the
Sawbwas of Möngnawng, Möngnai, and Lawksawk.

The States joining in this enterprise under the nominal leadership of
the Limbin Prince--a poor creature quite unable to lead any one--became
known as the Limbin Confederacy. A counter league was formed by all
those interested in keeping the exiled Sawbwas out of their territories
and maintaining the existing state of things. On the other hand, the
Sawbwas of Möngpawn and several other influential Sawbwas espoused the
cause of the Confederacy. Twet Nga Lu was the leading spirit of the
counter league, and he directed its forces against the States which
were allied to Möngnai. He was met and defeated by Möngpawn, and early
in the year 1886 Kun Kyi, the Sawbwa of Möngnai, and his companions
in exile had expelled the usurpers and recovered their territories.
The Confederacy then set themselves to induce or compel other States
to join them and to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Limbin Prince.
Saw Ôn, the _de facto_ ruler of Yawnghwè, rejected their invitation.
The Confederacy determined to move from Möngnai against him, as it was
important to force Yawnghwè, the State adjoining Möngnai on the west,
and the most powerful in the Central, or Myélat, Division, to give its
adherence to the Prince.

The foregoing outline will perhaps suffice to make the situation at and
immediately following the annexation intelligible.

The danger-points appeared to the Chief Commissioner to be the critical
situations of the two Sawbwas, who had signified their adherence to
the British Government, namely, Hsipaw in the north and Yawnghwè in
the central portion of the States. Hsipaw and his ally, San Ton Hon,
were pressed by the coalition under Naw Hpa, Naw Möng, and Prince Saw
Yan Naing--another scion of Royalty who with his brother had raised
their standard at Chaunggwa, in the Ava district, and after being
driven out of that had eventually joined Naw Möng in Hsenwi. Yawnghwè
was threatened by the powerful Limbin Confederacy, and had no prospect
of help from any neighbouring State. Both these Sawbwas had declared
themselves to be friends of the British Government, and at the time
they were our only adherents.

The deputation of Mr. Herbert White to Hsumhsai in 1886 has already
been mentioned. He succeeded in opening the trade route between
Hsipaw and Mandalay and in strengthening the position of the Sawbwa
Hkun Saing. Accordingly, when Sir Charles Bernard came to Mandalay at
the end of 1886, Hkun Saing was able to hasten down to meet him, and
to make in person his submission to the British Government. He was
received with much ceremony by the Chief Commissioner. His loyalty to
the Queen-Empress and belief in her power were not open to doubt. On
his return journey from Mandalay in February, 1887, Mr. J. E. Bridges,
the Deputy Commissioner, with a small military escort and some officers
of the Survey and Intelligence Departments, accompanied the Sawbwa
to Hsipaw. Mr. Bridges remained there twenty-five days, gathering
information regarding Shan politics and the country generally, and
opening communications with other States. He came to the conclusion
that the Shan chiefs were little disposed to welcome the advent of
British power. Hkun Saing, the Sawbwa of Hsipaw, stood out alone as
our friend. The party under the flag of the Chaunggwa Prince, which
was striving to eject San Ton Hon from Hsenwi, was equally hostile to
Hsipaw. Much of the country had been ravaged by the Myinzaing Prince
and his adherents. His view was needlessly despondent.

Before the end of 1886 it had been decided to begin by sending an
expedition to relieve Yawnghwè from the threatened attack by the Limbin
Confederacy. To provide men for another movement to help Hsipaw was
thought to be impossible. In accordance with a promise made to Hkun
Saing by the Chief Commissioner at their meeting in Mandalay, a supply
of arms and ammunition was sent to him, which, it was hoped, would
enable him and San Ton Hon to defeat their enemies. It may be stated
here that although some anxiety was felt from time to time regarding
events in Hsenwi and Hsipaw, it did not become necessary to move troops
to their assistance. Naw Hpa and his son Naw Möng made submission to
the Superintendent at Fort Stedman early in August, 1887, and further
action in the Northern States was deferred until the open season of
1887-8.

But to return to the end of 1886. Although it had been impossible
to take more active steps to bring the Shan States into line, the
administration had not been idle. The policy to be adopted towards
them generally was thought out and the main lines were laid down by
Sir Charles Bernard. Letters explaining the principles which would
guide the British Government in its relations to them were written
to the various chiefs. They were assured that there was no desire to
interfere in the internal affairs of the States. British supremacy
must be acknowledged, peace must be preserved, the people must not
be oppressed. Subject to these conditions and to the payment of a
moderate tribute, the British Government undertook to recognize the
Sawbwas who were in effective possession, to uphold their rights, and
to give freedom and open the way for commerce. Preparations were made
accordingly to send an expedition to the Shan plateau. Its immediate
duty was to relieve Yawnghwè. The ultimate purpose was to establish a
political officer with a sufficient military force in a strong position
on the Shan plateau from which he could, as the representative of
British power, control the States. There was no intention of fighting
the Shans. On the contrary, it was desired to win their friendship and
to induce them to trust us. Already the duties, imposts and monopolies
which strangled trade in the King's time had been swept away. It
remained to establish peace and to open the trade routes which the
prevailing anarchy had closed.

Hlaingdet was chosen as the starting-point of the expedition which was
to carry out this policy. A force assembled there in December, 1886,
under Colonel E. Stedman of the 3rd Gurkha Regiment, consisting of--

    2 guns 1-1 E.D.R.A.
    Four Companies 2nd Battalion Hampshire Regiment.
    Four Companies 3rd Gurkha Regiment.
    50 men of the Bombay Sappers and Miners.
    40 Mounted Infantry (who joined at Pwehla after the force had started).

The objects of the expedition, as has been stated, were peaceful and
political. The military commander was responsible for the disposition
of the troops, and in the event of active operations becoming necessary
was to have entire control. The negotiations with the Shans and the
conduct of affairs generally, apart from purely military matters, were
entrusted to the civil head of the expedition, Mr. A. H. Hildebrand (at
that time Deputy Commissioner of Tharrawaddy). Ten years previously
Mr. Hildebrand had served on a mission to the Karenni country and had
arranged for the protection of that people from the encroachments of
the King of Burma. Subsequently as District Officer of the Salween
Hill Tracts and later in the Arakan Hills he had shown his capacity
for ruling and influencing half-civilized peoples. Mr. J. G. Scott,
now well known as Sir George Scott, was appointed to assist him. Mr.
Scott at a former period had been attached to the S. P. G. College
in Rangoon, and under the _nom de plume_ of Shway Yoe had made a
reputation as a writer on Burma and its people. On the annexation of
Upper Burma he had been appointed to the Commission.

The leaders of the expedition, both civil and military, were well
chosen. Their instructions were to take every precaution against giving
avoidable offence or trouble to the people, to gain the goodwill of
chiefs, priests, and villagers, to interfere as little as might be with
their prejudices, their religious houses, and their private life.

The move from Hlaingdet was to have been made at once on the assembling
of the force. But the state of the roads and doubt as to the best
route caused delay both at the outset and afterwards. The hill passes
leading to the Shan country had become very difficult owing to disuse
during the troublous times of 1885-6. In some places also they had
been purposely blocked by the Burman villagers to protect themselves
against Shan cattle-raiders, and by Shans who wished to obstruct the
expedition. It was very hard to get labourers to clear and repair the
roads and make them passable by the main body of the force and the
transport animals.

On the 3rd of January it was decided to advance, and Colonel Stedman,
with two hundred Gurkhas, proceeded to occupy Pyinyaung, twenty-two
miles from Hlaingdet. There were doubts as to the best route. As the
reports received from Yawnghwè represented the Sawbwa to be hard
pressed by the Limbin Confederates, Colonel Stedman resolved to follow
the most direct road, disregarding its difficulty, and pushed on to
Kyatsakan and across the Pyindeik Pass. Singu was occupied on the 20th.
Some show of resistance was made at several places. But it was very
faint-hearted, the enemy being only some Shans in the service of the
Lawksawk Sawbwa, poorly armed and undisciplined. Mr. Hildebrand had
not yet arrived. His subordinate, Mr. Scott, who performed his duties
temporarily, distributed copies of a proclamation issued by the Chief
Commissioner explaining the motives and objects of the expedition to
the chiefs of the Myélat States, and wrote letters in his own name to
the most prominent men. He made good use of the time also to explore
roads and collect labour for improving them.

On the 21st of January Mr. Hildebrand with the remainder of the force
joined Colonel Stedman at Singu. On the 27th of January the main body
advanced to Kaukon, where another feeble attempt at resistance was made
by some of Lawksawk's forces. On the following day numerous elders
from the neighbouring villages came in and welcomed the British. The
constant fighting between the Limbin's men and their opponents led by
the Yawnghwè Sawbwa, had made life a burden to the people. The country
was being depopulated. No one dared to sow, not knowing who would reap.

On the 29th of January Pwehla was reached. The chief villagers and the
Pongyis met the column outside the town, and a favourable and peaceable
progress was anticipated. Hitherto there had been some apprehension
lest the Sawbwa of Yawnghwè, who had represented himself as being hard
pressed by the Limbin Confederacy, should be overpowered before help
could reach him. It was now ascertained that this fear was unfounded.
As there was no cause for haste, Mr. Hildebrand decided to take the
opportunity of summoning the chiefs of the Myélat States to appear
and to make their submission. There was an advantage, moreover, in
giving the Lawksawk Sawbwa time to consider his position and to submit
peacefully; and with this object every endeavour was made by letter and
messenger to explain the situation to him.

On the 7th of February the force reached Bawyethat Pagoda, about
half-way between Yawnghwè and Kugyo. Here it was met by the Sawbwa Saw
Ôn, who came with the full glory of Shan pomp to welcome the British
representative. It was found that a body of men from Lawksawk had
occupied Kugyo, which is in Yawnghwè territory. Mr. Hildebrand wished
to send a letter to the commander to persuade him to retire his men,
but no one could be found willing to carry it, for fear of the wild
Kachins and Panthays said to be amongst his followers. There was
nothing for it, therefore, but to attack Kugyo, which was taken on the
9th of February, without loss on our side. On the 10th the column made
a formal entry into Yawnghwè and was received with much state by the
Sawbwa. It had been intended to fix the headquarters of the British
Administration a little way off, but the country was found to be
low-lying and unhealthy. A site was chosen on the slope which leads
up from the great lake of Yawnghwè to the Hsahtung range. A fort was
built, and named after Colonel Stedman, the officer commanding the
force. Here the headquarters of the Superintendent of the Southern Shan
States were established.

The arrival of the expedition at Yawnghwè was followed by an immediate
change in the attitude of the neighbouring chiefs. By the middle
of February Yawnghwè had been relieved and the bands attacking him
dispersed. The whole of the Myélat had submitted, most of the chiefs
appearing in person. To the south, Möngpai and others of importance had
accepted the British suzerainty, some by letter and some in person.
To the north, Lawksawk and Möngping held aloof, but it was hoped to
induce them to come in. Laikha, Möngkung, and Kehsi Mansam had declared
themselves on the British side. Letters were despatched to Möngnai and
all the adjacent States, urging them to accept the supremacy of the
British and to cease fighting amongst themselves. Letters were also
sent to the chiefs of Karenni, offering friendship and suggesting a
meeting.

After the dispersal of the bands at Kugyo, the Limbin Confederacy
had withdrawn their troops and the Confederate chiefs had retired to
their own territories. The Limbin had betaken himself to a place near
Hopong. Nevertheless there was no sign of the Eastern States giving in
and dissolving the Confederacy. Letters were again written to them. A
special letter was addressed to the Limbin, promising him his liberty
if he surrendered, with a sufficient pension and a house at Moulmein or
Rangoon.

While the results of these overtures were being awaited, it became
urgent to attend to the quarrel between Möngpai, the most southerly of
the Shan States, and Pobye, the chief of Western Karenni, which adjoins
Möngpai on the south. A perennial feud existed between them, and at
this time had broken out with fresh energy. Both the combatants had
written to Mr. Hildebrand praying him to send a British officer with
a force to put a stop to the strife which was ruining the country. In
answer to this appeal Mr. Scott, with a hundred Gurkhas under command
of Captain Pulley, was sent southward to Payagon, where the Burmese
garrison used to be stationed, and near which the Möngpai Sawbwa had
now made his residence. They made the journey of seventy miles by boat
down the Nam Pilu River through a fertile and irrigated country, which
had evidently suffered much from both the contending factions.

The Sawbwa received Mr. Scott with hospitality and welcomed the
settlement of the Shan States under the British Crown. He said he had
prayed for this and urged it on his compatriots for thirty years. "Now
that the British have come," he exclaimed, "there will be peace." He
asked for a British garrison at Payagon, as a protection against the
Karennis, who raided the Shan country for slaves. The Shans were quite
unable to withstand them, and men and women were carried off into
hopeless slavery (_vide_ Chapter XVII.).

It had been intended that the force under Colonel Stedman should return
to Burma by the southern passes to Toungoo, and that Mr. Scott with
the troops accompanying him should remain at or about Möngpai until
the main body joined him. Owing to some military exigencies this plan
was changed, and the expedition was ordered to return by the route by
which it came. Captain Pulley with Mr. Scott's escort was recalled at
once to Fort Stedman. Mr. Scott had to withdraw, leaving unsettled many
matters, more especially the quarrel between Möngpai and the Karenni
chief Pobye, and without waiting for several headmen of neighbouring
districts who were on their way to meet him. This was unfortunate.

After the return of Mr. Scott and his escort to Fort Stedman on the
7th of March, 1887, a long halt followed, during which voluminous
correspondence was carried on with the various chiefs who held aloof
and with the Limbin Prince, who it was hoped might be induced to
surrender and thus dissolve the Confederacy. The Prince was reported
to be at Hopong. Letters were sent to him and to Möngnai, and to
Möngpawn, inviting them to meet Mr. Hildebrand at Hopong on the 17th
of March, and preparations were made for the march. The difficulties
of transport had been overcome, the pack-bullock baskets loaded
up; the coolies collected, and everything ready for a start, when
letters were received from Möngpawn saying that he could not meet the
Superintendent. Möngnai was at Gantarawadi, the capital of Eastern
Karenni, witnessing the marriage of his nephew to a daughter of
Sawlapaw, the Karenni chief. Möngnai's sister-in-law had died. She
could not be buried until Möngnai returned. Until the funeral was over
Möngnai could not attend to business, and without him the others could
do nothing. Royalties are governed by conventions.

It was obvious that Möngpawn's object was to gain time. To countermand
the march, now that all preparations had been made and the forward
movement widely made known was open to many objections. The Yawnghwè
Sawbwa argued strongly against a change of plans, which he said would
certainly be misinterpreted. Mr. Hildebrand, however, decided to
countermand the march. He wished to give the Confederacy full time
to consider the alternatives before them. He held that a voluntary
acknowledgment of British supremacy made from a conviction that it was
the best course for their own interests would be more valuable even if
it were delayed than an immediate submission enforced by arms.

This waiting policy was not free from some disadvantages. The delay
in taking action was sure to be attributed to weakness. The time
was used by Sawlapawgyi, who was hostile to the British, to urge
the other Karenni chiefs and those Shan Sawbwas with whom he could
communicate to hold aloof. In the neighbourhood of Yawnghwè and in the
Myélat States generally signs of unrest and trouble were manifest.
For the first time since the occupation of Fort Stedman mail-runners
were stopped and robbed. The Sawbwa of Lawksawk, who remained openly
and uncompromisingly hostile, was thought to have instigated these
outrages. It was resolved to strike the first blow at him. He was
warned by letter that the Superintendent was coming to Lawksawk and
ordered to remain at his capital to meet him.

The difficulty of collecting transport had to be overcome again.
The Yawnghwè Sawbwa for some cause was not zealous in assisting the
expedition. For one reason he desired to make the most money he could
out of the opportunity, and made a very persistent effort to extort
exorbitant rates for the carriage furnished.

It was not until the 4th of April that the force began to march for
Lawksawk. It moved by very easy stages. The various bands of marauders
posted along the route to harass the march fled as the expedition
advanced. These ruffians had been working in concert with dacoit gangs
in the districts below the hills, who had thus been able to resist
the British troops; but now, finding themselves liable to be taken in
the rear, very soon surrendered to the military post at Wundwin, an
unexpected but very useful result of Mr. Hildebrand's action. Before
the column reached Lawksawk the Sawbwa Saw Waing fled. The town was
occupied on the 11th of April. Temporary arrangements were made for
administering the State by putting in charge a Burman, Bo Saing, who
had held office under the King's Government and was acceptable to the
people, and the force turned its face towards Hopong.

Meanwhile fighting had been renewed in the south-east. Möngnai returned
from Karenni with some men lent to him by Sawlapaw and drove Twet
Nga Lu out of Kengtawng. Laikha, Möngkung, and Kehsi Mansam, who had
been invited by Mr. Hildebrand to come to Hoypong to meet Möngnai
and Möngpawn with a view to their reconciliations, put their own
interpretation on this invitation and attacked Möngpawn in force.
Peremptory orders were sent to them to withdraw. When the force entered
Hopong on the 17th of April, the day appointed for meeting Möngpawn and
the Limbin Prince, the town was found in ruins and all but deserted.
The Limbin had not come, and Möngpawn was occupied in defending himself
against his enemies. The intelligence received showed that Laikha and
his allies had not obeyed the order to withdraw their men. Finding
that an engagement was in progress a few miles off, Mr. Hildebrand
and Mr. Scott with forty Mounted Infantry and fifty Punjabis under
Major Swetenham rode for the scene of the fight, which went on for a
short time unchecked by the arrival of the British party. The opposing
forces had stockaded positions on the opposite slopes of a small
valley, and were firing briskly on each other. Möngpawn was induced to
cease firing. The Assistant Superintendent, Mr. Scott, went up to the
stockade of the attacking party, and the leaders were soon persuaded
to withdraw their men, who for their part were only too glad to go
to their homes. When the British retired to Möngpawn in the evening,
they left the opposing leaders mingled together in good-humoured talk,
bragging of the desperate deeds of valour performed in the combat.

[Illustration: PADAUNG LADIES--SHAN STATES.]

A few days were spent at Möngpawn. The Sawbwa Hkun Ti is described as a
man of strong character, "the moving spirit in the Limbin Confederacy."
He was quite ready, however, to give up this coalition and to transfer
his allegiance to the Queen-Empress. He advised the despatch of a party
to Möngnai to hoist the British flag and to bring in the Limbin Prince.
The rains were now well on, and marching had become very difficult. It
was decided, therefore, not to take the whole force but to send the
Assistant Superintendent with fifty rifles under Lieutenant Wallace to
Möngnai. The Superintendent with the main body marched back to Fort
Stedman.

Mr. Scott was detained for some days in Möngpawn waiting for rations.
The time was well employed. Two of the minor chiefs, Naungmawn
(a brother of Möngpawn) and Möngsit (Möngpawn's son-in-law, and
half-brother of Mawknai), came and tendered their allegiance. Others
offered their submission by messenger and promised to meet the
Assistant Superintendent at Möngnai, which they said was the place of
assemblage for the Shan States from ancient times. More than this, very
friendly relations were established during this halt between the people
and the troops. The _Myozas_ (headmen) from the neighbouring villages
came round every evening for rifle-practice with the officers; and it
is recorded that Möngpawn and his brother made very good shooting.
The troops were paraded and manoeuvred for their entertainment.
Notwithstanding these courtesies, however, no promise to surrender the
Limbin Prince could be obtained from these chiefs. "It must depend,"
they said, "on his own decision." They suggested that better terms
should be offered to him. "This was an instance," says Mr. Hildebrand,
"of the way in which the Shan chiefs cling together, and of the
sanctity they attach to an oath." Although the Limbin's cause and the
ideas on which it was based were hopelessly lost, they would not coerce
him to surrender.

On the 2nd of May Mr. Scott's party began their march, and entered
Möngnai on the 5th, having suffered from heavy and incessant rain all
the way. After crossing the Mewettaung Range, they entered a level
valley which extends to Kengtawng on the south-east and up northward as
far as Laikha. The altitude of this valley is about 4,000 feet. It is
the centre of the silk cultivation, the eggs and larvæ being imported
periodically from the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Szechuen. When
the party passed through the whole district had been ravaged by men
from Laikha, and only a few almost empty villages survived. Twet Nga
Lu from Kengtawng had also been at work, and on the last march of
seventeen miles into Möngnai most of the villages were found in ruins.
They had been burnt by his marauders two months before.

The description of Möngnai at this time is worth quoting (Mr.
Hildebrand's Report, June 22, 1887, par. 97).

"From the north there is a long avenue-like approach to Möngnai. The
walls of the ancient city still exist in a very dilapidated state.
They are about 20 feet high and machicolated. The city was about 1,000
yards square, and there remain signs of extensive suburbs. Everything,
however, has been destroyed. Of ten thousand houses only three
hundred (mostly recently built) remain; out of one hundred and twenty
monasteries only three are left standing. The Sawbwa himself lives in
a bamboo house, instead of the former teak-wood _haw_ (palace). The
interior of the city walls is all jungle-grown."

It is as well to put on record some description of the condition in
which the British found the Shan States. A few years hence we shall be
denounced as the ruthless destroyers of a country which we had found
wealthy and prosperous.

The Sawbwa of Möngnai came in unpretentious fashion to see Mr. Scott
the day after his arrival. His superiority in breeding and character to
most of the chiefs was marked, He made no difficulty about accepting
British supremacy, and proffered all his influence to induce the other
chiefs to follow his example. The typical character of the Shans as a
race of traders came out in his request that his submission to British
authority should be made known in Moulmein. In former times there was
a good trade in timber with the Moulmein merchants. When they were
informed of the establishment of peace this trade he anticipated would
revive.

It remained to induce the Limbin Prince to submit and to accompany Mr.
Scott to Fort Stedman. This was not a question of very high diplomacy,
but it required some skill, tact, and patience to induce the Prince
to make a voluntary surrender. It would have been very easy to have
arrested and removed him by force. Such action, however, would have
been distasteful to the Shan chiefs and might have rendered it more
difficult to dispose of other pretenders still remaining in the
Northern States. The Prince showed himself to be a poor creature, whose
chief characteristic was an immeasurable conceit. He was, after all,
only the illegitimate son of the Ein-she-min, or War Prince, who was
the brother of King Mindon. But Burmans and Shans, like some other
people, if a man is a prince, do not ask too curiously what sort of a
prince he may be. When he left Möngnai, mounted on an elephant, with
his gong beating, great numbers of people knelt down by the roadside
as he passed, and similar respect was shown to him at other places.
Notwithstanding his conceit, he did not put a very high price on his
submission. This descendant of kings, who had left his refuge in
British Burma to become the head of a great Shan Confederacy to be
formed on the model of the German Empire, was glad to barter his lofty
ambition for a stipend of £16 sterling a month and a house at Rangoon,
or Moulmein, or elsewhere.

While the Prince was making arrangements for the journey, the Assistant
Superintendent with Lieutenant Wallace, 27th Punjab Infantry, and
Lieutenant Jackson, R.E., rode to Mawkmai, some twenty-five miles over
rolling country covered with scrub-oak forest. They found Mawkmai
situated in a fine valley 120 miles in extent, irrigated from the Nam
Nyim River, and well cultivated; the main crop being paddy. The town
was in good order, well built and prosperous. "The one town," records
Mr. Scott, "in the Shan States that has not been destroyed in the
inter-State wars." The trade relations between Mawkmai and Moulmein are
close; the Salween in the rainy season being navigable and affording
good means of communication.

The British officers were received with courtesy and hospitality by
the Sawbwa and his officials. The suzerainty of the Queen-Empress was
accepted as a matter of course. The only anxiety of the chief was in
respect of the duty likely to be imposed on exported timber, which had
been severely taxed by King Thebaw.

On the 11th of May the party returned to Möngnai. The attitude of
the Sawbwa Kun Kyi was excellent. He assured Mr. Scott that he would
be able to promise the submission of the Trans-Salween States, who
all looked to him as their leader, and to Möngnai as their place
of assemblage. He asked as a special favour to himself, and as a
confirmation of his authority, that he might be allowed to fly the
British flag over his residence. This request was granted. In the
evening the British officers with a small guard of honour went to the
Sawbwa's _haw_, or palace, where a flagstaff had been prepared, and
the Union Jack was run up by Mr. Scott, the bugles sounding a general
salute and the troops presenting arms. A great number of people from
Möngnai and the neighbouring villages were present. They saluted the
flag in their customary attitude of respect, on their knees, and when
the troops marched off the Sawbwa's band struck up. What march it
played has not been recorded.

The Limbin Prince had now made his arrangements for the journey, and
on the 13th the party started for Fort Stedman, which was reached on
the 20th of May. The route lay over a road which had not been used
for a year and which the contending parties had endeavoured to make
impassable. Four sepoys and several camp-followers were spiked in the
feet. But for this mishap the three weeks' march from Möngpawn round
by Möngnai would have been accomplished without having a single man on
the sick-list; and this although there had been much rain, especially
on the return journey. After five days' rest the Limbin Prince was sent
under escort to the plains, and passed into obscurity.

On the 22nd of June the Superintendent was able to report from Fort
Stedman: "The Southern Shan States have now all given in their
submission; caravans of cattle and pedlars move about from State to
State with perfect freedom and confidence, a condition of things which
has hardly existed since the accession of King Thebaw in 1879." (Mr.
Hildebrand's Report, June 22, 1887, par. 147.)

FOOTNOTES:

[34] "Yunnan," by Major H. R. Davies.

[35] Ibid., p. 21.

[36] Sir A. P. Phayre, "History of Burma," p. 13.

[37] He was grinding wheat or paddy in a hand-mill.

[38] General Sir Edward Stedman, G.C.B.

[39] Sir Herbert White, K.C.I.E., late Lieut. Governor of Burma.




CHAPTER XVI

THE SHAN STATES (_continued_)


The narrative in the last chapter took the history down to the end of
June, 1887, when comparative peace had been established in the Southern
States.

The Northern States up to this time had not come under the influence of
the Superintendent at Fort Stedman. The Chief Commissioner had decided
that no expedition should be sent into those States until after the
rains of 1887, unless it became absolutely necessary for the support
of the friendly Sawbwa of Hsipaw. The chief had been able, as has been
explained (p. 147), with the alliance of San Ton Hon to hold his own
and to defeat their opponents headed by Naw Möng and the Chaunggwa
Prince. If he had stopped at that point much misery and destruction
would have been saved. But Hkun Saing's vanity had been inflated by the
reception he had received at Mandalay when ten years' revenue had been
remitted to him and the States of Möngtung, Manglön, and Hsumhsai made
over to him, and he cherished visions of further aggrandisement. San
Ton Hon was very much of the same mind.

After defeating the Prince they turned their forces southward and made
an attack on Hsenwi Alelet, where comparative peace had been maintained
by the Pa-ôk-Chok at Möngyai. San Ton Hon led his troops down by the
east while Hsipaw's men, under the Sawbwa's father-in-law, went by
the west. Mr. Hildebrand had heard of their designs and sent them
orders to desist. The allies persisted, however, alleging that they
were acting under instructions from Mandalay. Möngyai was occupied.
The Pa-ôk-Chok and Naw Möng, who was with him, escaped to Möngnawng
and sent messengers to Fort Stedman praying for redress. They were
ordered to remain quiet until the Superintendent should come to Hsenwi.
San Ton Hon remained in Möngyai making arrangements for administering
the district. He then left for the town of Hsenwi in obedience to a
further order from Mr. Hildebrand. By the end of August, 1887, peace
had been restored, that is to say, active fighting had ceased in the
Northern States, and the contending parties awaited the coming of the
Superintendent to settle their claims. Little harm would have resulted
from the turbulence of Hsipaw and San Ton Hon if they had restrained
their followers from ravaging the country. These bandits, San Ton
Hon's Kachins at the head of them, had burnt and destroyed everything.
Thus the autumn of 1887 saw the cessation of bloodshed in both the
Northern and Southern States. All were beginning to look to the British
representative at Fort Stedman as the final arbitrator of disputes, and
trade began to revive.

Meanwhile the objects to be aimed at and the measures to be taken
in the ensuing open season of 1887-8 were occupying the Chief
Commissioner. Mr. Hildebrand was invited to Mandalay, and the subject
was fully discussed and settled in consultation with him. The main
lines of the policy to be followed in relation to the States were
defined. The conditions upon which the chiefs were to hold their
States under the British Government were determined and embodied in a
patent, or _sanad_, to use the Indian term, for the greater chiefs,
and in a letter of appointment for the lesser. By the _sanad_ the
recipient was recognized as a feudatory chief and empowered to govern
his territories in all matters whether criminal, civil, or revenue, and
was authorized to nominate for the approval of the Government a fit
person according to Shan usage to be his successor. These privileges
were made subject to certain conditions, one of which was the payment
of a tribute, settled for five years at the amount previously paid to
the King, and liable to revision thereafter. The forests and royalties
on all minerals and precious stones were reserved to the Government.
Order was to be maintained by the chief, the rights and customs of
the people were to be respected, and trade protected. All disputes
arising between one State and another were to be referred to the
Superintendent, at whose headquarters the chief was to maintain an
agent or representative. The order of appointment given to the lesser
men bound them to pay the revenue assessed by the Superintendent, and
in all matters connected with the administration of their districts to
conform to the instructions and orders issued by the Chief Commissioner
or the Superintendent.

It was decided that each chief or ruler, whether known by the title
of Sawbwa or some lesser designation, should be required to appear in
person, to make a declaration of allegiance, and to subscribe to the
terms of his _sanad_. Where there were rival claimants, weight was to
be given to the _fait accompli_, and to considerations of expediency
rather than to those of abstract right or justice. It was not held
incumbent on the British Government to go behind existing facts or
to inquire how the man in possession came by his power, provided he
appeared to be a person capable of maintaining order.

Some matters of importance hitherto unsettled were decided by the Chief
Commissioner at this time. The important State of Lawksawk had been
left in temporary charge of a Burman Myoôk (_vide_ page 154). There
was a man named Hkun Nu who had been the (hereditary) Myoza of a small
State called Tabet by the Burmans, Tamhpak by the Shans. He had been
deposed about 1892 by the Burman Government because he could not raise
the revenue demanded from the State. He lived in great poverty in
Mandalay until the deposition of the King. His case coming to the Chief
Commissioner's notice, a small allowance, enough to keep him alive,
was made to him. Hkun Nu proved himself useful in giving information
about the Shan country and in taking letters, not without some personal
risk, to various potentates. He accompanied the expedition to the
Shan States early in 1887, and was found by Mr. Hildebrand to be both
intelligent and trustworthy and to be a person of some influence in
the Shan country. On Mr. Hildebrand's recommendation, and with the
goodwill of many of the notables of Lawksawk, and of some of the
principal Sawbwas such as Möngnai and Möngpawn, he was appointed by
the Chief Commissioner to be Sawbwa of Lawksawk, a territory of 4,048
square miles and paying a gross revenue of Rs. 27,297. Thus from being
the dismissed magistrate of a petty district, earning a small wage
as a guide and messenger, Hkun Nu became the ruler of a considerable
and wealthy State by a sudden turn of the wheel of fortune. It may be
recorded here that the State prospered under him. On his death in 1900
he was succeeded by his son, who was summoned to Rangoon in 1906, and
presented to their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales.
He received the decoration of K.S.M. on the 1st of January, 1907, and
has done much in the way of road-making and otherwise to improve his
country.

Another matter that came up was the Sawbwa of Möngnai's claim to the
adjacent State of Kengtawng, which had been made over by the Burmese
Government to Twet Nga Lu. Orders were now passed confirming the
Sawbwa's title to administer Kengtawng as a State subordinate to him.

Many important questions remained, which could not be settled until
the Superintendent was able to visit each State with a sufficient
military escort to mark his authority and to render opposition
improbable. Hsenwi was in a disturbed and distracted condition and
had to be pacified and arrangements made for its administration. The
method in which the group of smaller States on the western edge of
the plateau known as the Myélat was to be administered had also to be
considered and decided. The nearness of these States to Mandalay had
resulted in diminishing their independence. Their position was in fact
not much different from that of a purely Burman district. Then there
were the Trans-Salween States, with which communication had not as
yet been established. Five of the smallest of these had been claimed
by the Siamese. Another very difficult matter was the attitude of the
Karennis, whose relations with the British Government it was necessary
to define. In the case of every State, big or little, the amount paid
as revenue during the King's time had to be ascertained, the tribute
payable to the British Government to be determined, and engagements to
be taken for its regular payment.

In Mr. Hildebrand's expedition in the beginning of 1887 only one force
had been employed. Experience showed that the area to be dealt with was
too large for one column. While the force was in the south, fighting
and disturbances were going on in the north. The appearance of two
expeditions, one starting from Mandalay and visiting the north, the
other from Fort Stedman, taking the Southern States and then moving
up to combine with the first, would make a greater impression than a
single force of much larger strength. Rumour would magnify the numbers
of each, and if opposition were contemplated by any of the chiefs,
he would not know where to direct his attack. For these reasons it
was decided to employ two columns. The larger, under command of Major
Swetenham, 27th P.I., was composed of:--

    2 guns 1-1 Eastern Division, R.A.
    50 rifles--West Surrey Regiment.
    150 rifles--27th P.I.
    25 British }
    25 Native  } Mounted Infantry
    20 lances--1st Bombay Lancers.

It assembled at Fort Stedman, and was called the Southern Shan Column.

The smaller column was commanded by Major Yates, 1-1 Eastern Division,
R.A., and included the following troops:--

    2 guns 1-1 Eastern Division, R.A.
    50 rifles--Royal Munster Fusiliers.
    100 rifles--43 G.L.I. (Bombay Army).
    50 rifles--Native  } Mounted Infantry.
    25 rifles--British }

This column was designated the Northern Shan Column. Its starting-point
was Maymyo (Pyinulwin), forty miles from Mandalay.

To Mr. Hildebrand, as Superintendent of the Shan States, was given
the chief political charge, and, within certain limits laid down by
the Chief Commissioner, the movements of the columns and the measures
to be taken for the pacification of the country were left to his
discretion. He was to accompany the Southern Column, and Mr. J. G.
Scott was appointed to go with him as his Assistant. Lieutenant H. Daly
was posted as civil officer with the Northern Column. In all political
matters he was placed entirely under Mr. Hildebrand, and was told that
he was to act, and only to act, under his instructions.

The relations of Mr. Hildebrand to the military officers in command
of the columns were carefully defined. The primary object of the
expeditions was to establish peace, decide disputes, and lay the
foundations of orderly rule for the future. The need of warlike
operations was not anticipated. The military officers commanding were
instructed therefore to give to the civil officers every assistance
in carrying out the wishes of Government that could be given with due
regard to the safety and well-being of the troops. In the event of
hostilities becoming necessary, then the civil officer was to stand
aside while the soldiers became solely responsible for the planning
and carrying out of the necessary operations. The maintenance of the
strictest discipline was enjoined, and the most scrupulous exactitude
in paying for labour and supplies. Troops and followers were made to
understand that they were operating in a friendly country.

Instructions were given to Mr. Hildebrand as to the route to be taken
by each column, the matters demanding his attention, and the principles
by which he was to be guided. Mr. Daly with the Northern Column was to
move through Hsipaw to Northern Hsenwi, then to Tawngpeng, the chief of
which State was still recalcitrant; and thence returning to Hsipaw, he
was to march to Möngyai in Central Hsenwi.

Mr. Hildebrand with the Southern Column was to go to Möngpai, thence to
Mawkmai, thence to Möngpan, and then to Möngnai, which was a convenient
centre for the settlement of many matters. After a halt there, which it
was anticipated might extend to several weeks, the column was to turn
northward and march through the intervening States to Möngyai, which
it was to reach about the same time as the Northern Column. The idea
was to bring the two columns together in Hsenwi, where the contending
parties of San Ton Hon, Naw Hpa, Naw Möng and Nga Aw the Pa-ôk-Chok,
whom San Ton Hon and the Hsipaw Sawbwa had expelled from Möngyai, were
expected to give trouble. At Möngyai, the settlement of the large State
of Hsenwi--the most difficult, perhaps, of the duties entrusted to Mr.
Hildebrand--would have to be taken in hand.

The Southern Column started on the 22nd of November, 1887, on its five
months' march through the States. Before it moved, the chiefs of the
Myélat and the Sawbwas and Myozas of States in the neighbourhood of
Fort Stedman, were called in; the revenue to be paid by each was fixed,
and the drafts of their _sanads_ and letters of appointment given to
them. There was no difficulty with any of them except Saw Ôn, the
Sawbwa of Yawnghwè, who owed his position to the support afforded to
him by the British Government. He objected to the payment of revenue,
and feigned illness to avoid appearing before the Superintendent. He
made it almost impossible to get coolies or bullocks, except directly
through him and at most exorbitant rates. He exhibited, in fact, a fine
example of a swollen head. But it may be that he partly believed in the
truth of some absurd stories respecting the withdrawal of the British
from Burma, which he was found afterwards to have spread abroad.

The first halt was made at Kaung-i, the residence of the Möngpai
Sawbwa. The settlement of the chronic feud between him and Pobye, the
Karenni chief, was the main business here. Pobye appeared, and the
Superintendent heard both parties. After vainly endeavouring to bring
them to an agreement, Mr. Hildebrand induced them to pledge themselves
to abide by the Chief Commissioner's decision, and meanwhile to keep
the peace. At a later date, they submitted their case at Rangoon to the
Chief Commissioner, who settled the dispute....

At Möngpai every effort was made without success to induce Sawlapaw,
the powerful chief of Eastern Karenni, to come in and arrange a _modus
vivendi_ with the British authorities. He remained obstinately
hostile, and had to be chastised later on.

[Illustration: A JUNGLE CAMP IN THE SHAN STATES.]

At this halt, where several chiefs were assembled, the principle of
succession ruling in the Shan States was discussed. It appeared that as
a rule succession devolved on the eldest son of the chief wife: failing
her male issue, on the eldest male issue of the next wife. Failing
heirs in the direct line, the succession went to collaterals. This was
shown to be the ancient custom not to be departed from except in the
case of obvious unfitness of the heir for the duties of his position
either from incapacity or from vice. In Loilong and Hsahtung some
questions relating to minor chiefships were settled. It was found that
on this south-western frontier of the Shan States the inhabitants were
mostly Karens and kindred races split up into small tribes speaking
different dialects, timid and shy people submitting to the tyranny of
dacoits and outlaws who sought a refuge in their hills from the pursuit
of the police and troops in the low country.

The column marched through the Mawkmai territory to Möngpan. No special
matter had been marked for settlement in Mawkmai. But it was noted that
the villagers in the south stood in great fear of Sawlapaw, and paid
blackmail to him. Work in the forests of Southern and South-eastern
Mawkmai had been stopped on account of the hostility of the Karenni
chief. The adjacent country was practically deserted, and the
complaints against Sawlapaw were loud. Mawkmai, however, at this time
was the most wealthy and prosperous of the Shan States, and the Sawbwa
seemed powerful enough to hold his own against any of his neighbours.

From Mawkmai the column went on to Möngpan. Here they met the Siamese
Commissioners and Mr. Archer, His Majesty's Acting Vice-Consul at
Chiengmai (Zimme), who had come to discuss the claim made by the
Bangkok Government to some small States east of the Salween. Möngpan
had been taken and burnt by the filibuster Twet Nga Lu, who had so far
recognized British authority that after his expulsion from Kengtawng
by Kun Kyi, the Möngnai Sawbwa, he came to Fort Stedman and laid his
claim before the Superintendent. It was considered and rejected by the
Chief Commissioner. Thereupon he collected a regiment of _bravi_, as
numerous in the Shan States in 1887 as in Italy of the Middle Ages, and
descending on Kengtawng burnt whatever had escaped former devastations.
Compelled to retreat by the Sawbwa's men, he retired south on Möngpan,
and captured it in December, 1887. Again driven out by the Möngnai
troops, he fell back beyond the Salween, the Möngnai men following
him. But as the pursuit led them into the territory of Möngtung and
Möng Hang, which were claimed by the Siamese, they were ordered by the
Superintendent to retire to the right bank of the Salween. Twet Nga Lu
was left encamped close to Möngtung, where a small Siamese garrison was
stationed, and he thus escaped for the time. He was proclaimed a rebel
and dacoit and every chief in the Shan States was desired to treat
him as an outlaw. This was the situation at Möngpan when the Southern
Column met Mr. Archer and the Siamese Commissioners at that place.

The four States in dispute with Siam were Möngtung, Möng Hang, Möng
Hta, and Möng Kyawt. They were claimed by the British Government as
part of the undoubtedly Burman State Möngpan, but had been occupied
secretly by the Siamese. A fifth, Möng Hsat, was also claimed by them,
but no garrison had been placed in it. It was and always had been a
dependency of Kengtung, with which the Siamese could not pretend to
have any connection. The Siamese claim had its origin in the conduct
of the local rulers (_Phayas_) of these little territories in the
disturbed times following the overthrow of King Thebaw.

The Mawkmai Sawbwa made a successful attack on Möngpan in the cold
season of 1886-7. Earlier in the same year the Siamese had moved
up a large force from Chiengmai, ostensibly to assist the British
in maintaining order: more probably in the hope of picking up some
fragments for themselves when the Burman Government went to pieces.
Under these circumstances the local rulers, threatened with burning
and robbery by Mawkmai, with invasion and slavery by Siam, sought
the protection of the more powerful Siamese and drank the water of
allegiance to Chiengmai. This was the only foundation for the claim
made by the Bangkok Government. Their assertion that the States had
been under Siam for a century had nothing to support it. The population
was admittedly Shan. A report of the facts was drawn up and sent to the
Chief Commissioner. Meanwhile a _modus vivendi_ was arranged by Mr.
Hildebrand with the Siamese Commissioner on the basis of maintaining
the _status quo_, preserving peace, and abstaining from working the
forests in the States until the dispute was settled by the Governments
of the two countries. It may be stated here that a decision in favour
of the British claim was announced in 1888 and effect given to it. Four
States were restored to Möngpan, and possession of the fifth, Möng
Hsat, confirmed to Kengtung.

The State of Möngpan contains a broad area of good paddy land, and in
former times exported large quantities of paddy. When Mr. Hildebrand
visited it he found the lands devastated. With the one exception of
Laikha it had suffered more than any other Shan State. The town had
been repeatedly burnt by filibusters. The great bulk of the population
had fled over the Salween and scattered through the smaller States,
some even going as far as Chiengmai (Zimme) and Kengtung. Leaving
Möngpan, the column reached Möngnai on the 7th of January, 1888, and
halted there for some weeks. Möngnai had been the place of assemblage
of the Cis-Salween chiefs in the King's time. All of them had been
warned in advance to meet Mr. Hildebrand at Möngnai, and all except the
Sawbwa of Laikha, the Myozas of Möng Kung and Kehsi Mansam, who had
started too late, were present. The chiefs assembled at Möngnai were:--

    The Möngnai Sawbwa.
    The Möngpawn Sawbwa.
    The Möngpan Sawbwa.
    The Mawkmai Sawbwa.
    The Wanyin Myoza.
    The Nawng Wawn Myoza.
    The Hsahtung Myoza.
    The Möngsit Myoza.
    The Möngnawng Myoza.
    The Hopong Myoza.
    The Keng Hkam Myoza.
    The Nam Hkok Myoza.

Naw Möng, son of Naw Hpa, who was claimant of Hsenwi, and Kun Aw, who
was Pa-ôk-Chok of Möngyai in Hsenwi Alelet, and had been ejected by San
Ton Hon and Hkun Sa, the exiled chief of Möngtung, were also present.

The question of tribute was one in which all took a keen interest, and
it was fully discussed. The right of the British Government to demand
tribute was not contested. But the manner of it, whether it should be
in the form of annual presents or of money to be raised from the people
by a house tax, was the subject of dispute. The exemption for ten years
which had been given to the Sawbwa of Hsipaw caused much heartburning
and led to demands for a similar indulgence.

Eventually, however, all agreed to pay tribute, the amount for the next
five years being that which had been paid yearly in King Mindon's time.

The Trans-Salween States from various causes did not appear at Möngnai.
But a dispute between Mawkmai and Möngnai regarding the right to a
small Trans-Salween State of Möng Pu was settled satisfactorily in
favour of Möngnai. Mawkmai's claim had no strong foundation, and after
the facts had been set forth, the Sawbwa accepted them and yielded
in a peaceable and graceful fashion. It was evident that already the
authority of the British Government had been acknowledged by all, and
that its decisions would be obeyed.

On the 20th of January Mr. Hildebrand held a Durbar, which all the
chiefs, and a very great number of the smaller folk, attended. The
draft patents and letters of appointment were given to the chiefs,
along with suitable presents, and the advantages of the peace which
would follow the establishment of British authority were pointed out to
them by the Superintendent in a speech. A march past and a sham-fight
by the troops gave them an opportunity of comparing British disciplined
and trained troops with their own disorderly and ill-equipped
followers. Sports followed the Durbar, affording amusement to all and
giving a common ground on which all could unite. The wisdom and the
excellent results of holding these meetings cannot be denied.

On the 22nd of January, 1888, the column left Möngnai and started on
its way to Möngyai, where it will be recollected (p. 166) it was to
meet with the Northern Column and Mr. Daly. The route to be taken on
this march had been left by the Chief Commissioner to Mr. Hildebrand's
discretion. Is has been seen that the Laikha group of States were not
represented at the Durbar. The Superintendent, therefore, instead of
taking the route to the east through Möngnawng, which was reputed to
be the shorter, took a western road leading through Laikha, Möng Kung,
and Kehsi Mansam. It proved to be the easiest route that could have
been followed, and showed the troops to as large a number of States as
possible.

On the second march out the Sawbwa of Laikha and the Myoza of Möng Kung
were met coming to meet the Superintendent. They turned and marched
with the column. They said that difficulties in procuring supplies
had delayed them, and the truth of this statement was proved by the
appearance of the countryside when the next march brought the force
into Laikha territory--a wide billowy plain not long ago closely
cultivated and well peopled: now deserted and waste. "The face of
the land," wrote the Superintendent, "was deserted and desolate as
an American pampas or a Russian steppe. We marched along the main
north road which had clearly been not long since a wide thoroughfare
travelled over by many men and many cattle. Now it was narrowed to
a mere path which encroaching bushes and rank grass threatened at
no great distance of time altogether to obliterate. Marks of tigers
were seen here and there on the clay trodden hard by the feet of many
wayfarers now no more to be seen. The few householders who remained
were gaunt with hunger, and had not energy enough left to pull up the
bamboo spikes which had been placed in the ground during the fighting
which was the primary cause of all this misery, emphasized by the
famine which succeeded as a necessary result. The Hsen (local headman)
spiked his foot coming out to meet the column."

The description of the town of Laikha is not less melancholy. It has
been on the decline for years. "Civil wars and local disturbances have
ruined it slowly but surely." It was one of the finest and wealthiest
places in the State, and there were many splendid monasteries and
elaborate pagodas. These were found deserted and falling to pieces,
the shrines left to moulder away without a single pious offering, the
jungle coming up to their very thresholds and creepers tearing the
bricks asunder.

Leaving Laikha on the 30th of January, three marches brought the
column to Möngkung, a State blessed with very fertile soil and good
streams. But here also local dissension and Burman interference had
brought ruin. On the death of the chief (designated _Myoza_), one
Hkun Saing was able by bribery or intrigue to procure an order from
Mandalay giving him the succession. The people, however, clung to
the rightful heir, the son of the deceased Myoza, a boy of ten or
twelve. Hkun Sang persuaded the neighbouring State of Möngnawng to
take his part. Kehsi Mansam took the boy's side. Nearly every village
in both States was burnt, and the able-bodied men were too absorbed
in the fight to till the soil. Ruin and famine followed in the track
of the fighting, which did not cease until our troops arrived on the
Shan plateau. The only villages to which any prosperity remained were
those in the hills inhabited by tribes of a Karen origin who held
aloof from Shan politics. At Möngkung the minor chief of Möngsang and
Mönghsu came to see the Superintendent. Here also news came that Mr.
Daly with the Northern Column had reached Hsenwi and had received from
San Ton Hon a promise that he would come to Möngyai. This hopeful
information regarding San Ton Hon enabled the Superintendent to issue
a proclamation in Shan to the monks, headmen, and elders of Hsenwi,
assuring them that a settlement of their affairs would certainly be
made and ordering them to attend at Möngyai.

From Möngkung to Kehsi Mansam was four marches through a country
marked by the ravages of war. Nevertheless the Myoza, "an undersized,
insignificant-looking creature, addicted to the use of opium," was not
too depressed to come out fifteen miles to meet the column, which he
played into the town with a band of local musicians and dancers leading
the way.

Matters relating to some minor States were discussed at Kehsi Mansam,
and the peaceful settlement of Hsenwi seemed not distant. But it was
sanguine to expect that people who had been engaged in petty wars for
years would take suddenly to the ways of peace. The lion does not all
at once lie down with the lamb, nor it might be said more appropriately
does the jackal make peace with the wild dog. Two days after the
arrival of the column at Kehsi Mansam it was reported that an attack
had been made on Möngyai and San Ton Hon's deputy driven out. The men
who headed this adventure were nephews of the Pa-ôk-Chok and gave out
that they were acting for that personage with the Superintendent's
approval. As the Pa-ôk-Chok and Naw Möng had accompanied the force ever
since it marched from Möngnai, it was feared that this story might seem
probable to San Ton Hon and might prevent him from coming to Möngyai.
Letters, therefore, were sent to reassure him and to explain that the
expulsion of his man from Möngyai would not influence the decision of
the Superintendent.

From Kehsi Mansam, passing through the Alelet or Central Division of
Hsenwi, the column reached Möngyai on the 15th of February, 1888.
Mr. Daly, with the Northern Column, joined Mr. Hildebrand on the 1st
of March. Kun San Ton Hon came with him. Meanwhile all the headmen
of various denominations, uncouth to English ears, Myozas, Heins,
Seins, Ta Möngs, and Kin Möngs, had collected in obedience to the
Superintendent's summons, and were busy no doubt in discussing the
situation and the best methods of settlement and comparing the present
condition of the State broken up into petty divisions, none of them
powerful enough for self-defence, with the comparative order which had
prevailed when it was under its hereditary Sawbwas, who could show an
unbroken succession for two hundred years.

On the 1st of March, when San Ton Hon arrived with Mr. Daly, all the
Hsenwi claimants were assembled at Möngyai. Naw Möng--representing
his father, Naw Hpa, who was a refugee with the Kachins in the north;
Sang Aw, the Pa-ôk-Chok, who claimed the Central Division; and San
Ton Hon, who claimed the whole State. Naw Hpa was pronounced on all
sides to be too old and infirm to rule. Naw Möng claimed as his heir
and representative the whole of Hsenwi, excepting some of the southern
subdivisions, which had been given independence in the King's time.
His attitude was most reasonable. He confessed his obligations to the
British Government. Unless they had occupied Mandalay and removed
Thebaw, he and his sister would have been lying still in hopeless
imprisonment. He was ready to bow to the Superintendent's decision,
whatever it might be. The Pa-ôk-Chok was even more accommodating. He
was an old worn man whose only title to be considered in the matter was
that he had preserved the peace in the Central Division at a critical
time. He would be quite content if he were permitted to administer
Möngyai. San Ton Hon, who had no rightful title to any part of Hsenwi,
not unnaturally laid claim to all the country that was or had been
known by that name. On reflection, however, he adopted an attitude of
greater humility and declared his willingness to abide by the decision
of the Superintendent.

The points to which the Superintendent's inquiry should be directed
had been laid down by the Chief Commissioner in the instructions
given him. Amongst other points, such as the history of the several
claimants, their sources of influence and their ability and power to
govern, the Chief Commissioner had laid stress on the real wishes of
the people of Hsenwi as a whole or of such parts of it as should be
separately considered. "You should then," he wrote, "pending a full
reference to the Chief Commissioner, make such arrangements for the
administration of Theinni [Hsenwi] as you deem most fitting, bearing in
mind that the great object to be attained is peace in the country. You
must not be guided either in your provisional arrangements or in your
recommendations solely by considerations of abstract right or abstract
justice. You must give great weight to considerations of expediency
and keep prominently before your mind that Theinni [Hsenwi] must have
strong permanent Government in order to ensure peace and prosperity;
and that the chief or chiefs must be both friendly to the British
Government and ready and able to give proof of friendship by prompt
and powerful action should such be necessary." The question whether
the policy should be to unite the country into one large State, or to
recognize the divisions into which it had been broken up, was left to
Mr. Hildebrand's discretion, but an inclination in favour of the large
State was indicated.

It was decided to hold a conference of all the persons interested in
this matter and to ascertain, so far as might be possible, the views
and wishes of the people. A large (_Mandat_ or) temporary hall was
constructed by the Pa-ôk-Chok for the assemblage. On the date fixed,
the 3rd of March, 1888, "about fifty headmen of circles, many superiors
of monasteries, monks, sidesmen, almoners, and village elders were
assembled, while outside gathered great numbers of the common people
from all parts of the country. There were also present beside the
claimants, representatives of all the chief Southern States and of
Hsipaw." In fact, it was an assemblage of all the estates of the realm
in the Shan country--the Lords Temporal, the Lords Spiritual, and the
Commons. They had come together to assist in deciding by whom and how
the Hsenwi territory should be governed. And they had come at the call
of a Government which had taken a visible form in the Shan country only
a year before, which only two years previously had displaced the King
of Burma to whom the Shans had been subject for centuries, and which
was still fighting in Burma proper against the adherents of the King.
It was certainly an achievement not easily matched in the history of
conquests or annexations, and showed the confidence in our power and
our justice which a very short experience had been able to create.

It was not a mere show; the people had not assembled themselves to
register a foregone decision. The Superintendent was making an honest
attempt to ascertain the wishes of all classes. The machinery was
rude. But it was quite as likely to succeed in its object as the
elaborate devices of advanced democracies which give free play to the
arts of false-tongued demagogues and afford them every opportunity of
bamboozling electors, most of whom are more ignorant of the issues than
the Shans who assembled at Möngyai.

The method adopted for taking the votes was to call upon each head
of a circle to record his opinion, and then to take the opinion of
the assembly. The first question put was whether Hsenwi should be
reunited or whether it should remain divided, and if divided, into how
many parts. The opinion against reunion into one State was manifested
unmistakably. On the second point there was much discussion, but the
result showed a balance, and a large balance, of opinion in favour of
two States, North and South. The great majority, when the question
of the rulers to be appointed was put, gave the North to San Ton Hon,
and the South to Naw Möng. The Pa-ôk-Chok did not press his claim. "On
the whole," the report says, "considerable intelligence and a shrewd
appreciation of the novel idea of an open election were displayed, and
a member of the outside crowd created some amusement by his vigorous
championing of San Ton Hon. This unexpected interlude had a very good
effect in putting most of the headmen at their ease and in persuading
the entire assemblage that the election was a perfectly open matter,
and that any one present might give his opinion and his reasons for
holding it." The Shans were evidently a primitive people in election
matters at least, and had to learn the art of breaking up meetings and
silencing opponents.

After electing the Sawbwas of Northern and Southern Hsenwi, the
boundary to be fixed between the two divisions was discussed and
settled with the acquiescence of San Ton Hon and Naw Möng, but against
the views of some of the latter's people, who thought that Southern
Hsenwi was shorn of some territory which ought to belong to it.

Further disagreement between the Naw Möng and his people followed when
on the second day of the Durbar the amount of revenue to be paid by the
two divisions respectively came to be considered. The Naw Möng offered
spontaneously to pay the sum formerly paid to the King by the Alelet
Division, without making any deduction on account of the circles which
the boundary now adopted had given to the Northern territory. This easy
attitude of their newly appointed chief caused acute discontent, which
afterwards manifested itself. San Ton Hon was a man of different stamp.
The Naw Möng had offered a revenue of Rs. 15,000. San Ton Hon made a
stand against paying more than Rs. 500. He agreed, after much talking,
to pay Rs. 2,000. The Northern Division of Hsenwi was no doubt much
poorer at the time than the South. Still the amount was considerably
less than the State ought to have paid. The Superintendent, however,
thought it wiser to accept it than to risk a rupture with San Ton Hon.

The unequal treatment was impolitic as well as unfair and bred trouble
in Southern Hsenwi. A month after the column left Möngyai a rising
against Naw Möng was organized by the discontented party, and he had
to make his escape by flight. Mr. Daly, who was at Hsipaw, rode out
at once with a small party and summoned all the heads of circles to
Möngyai. An inquiry was held, the leaders of the revolt were arrested
and tried by the Sawbwa of South Hsenwi, and were sentenced to terms of
imprisonment. New headmen were appointed in place of those condemned.
Mr. Daly returned to Hsipaw, and the Naw Möng had no further trouble to
contend with. The settlement of Hsenwi made at the Möngyai Durbar has
stood the test of time and is a monument to the officers concerned in
bringing it about.

Leaving Möngyai on the 7th of March, the column marched to Lashio by
easy stages.

Nothing has been said hitherto as to the Northern Shan Column which
accompanied Mr. Daly. Mr. Daly had preceded the force to Hsipaw and
made arrangements for its progress. He had despatched letters to the
Northern chiefs announcing his coming, and reassuring them as to the
nature of the movement.

The route laid down for the Northern Shan Column by the Chief
Commissioner was from Hsipaw to the northern part of Hsenwi; thence
westward to Namhsan, the chief town in Tawngpeng; then back to
Hsipaw and from Hsipaw on to Möngyai to meet the Southern Column. No
independent powers were given to Mr. Daly, who was to place himself in
all political matters under Mr. Hildebrand's orders. He was to act as
the precursor of the Superintendent, summoning the chiefs and headmen
and explaining to them the objects of Mr. Hildebrand's coming. He was
also to collect information as to the state of affairs and the position
of the various factions in Hsenwi. He was given authority, however, to
insist on the cessation of fighting, and empowered, if the necessity
should arise, to use force in maintaining peace. He was empowered also
to take action in Tawngpeng for securing the submission of the Sawbwa,
and to require him to pay tribute for the past year of such sum as he
(Mr. Daly) might judge reasonable, explaining that this payment was
exacted because the Sawbwa had harboured disaffected persons.

The Northern Column left Hsipaw on the 29th of December, 1887, and
crossed into Tawngpeng territory. All the villages were deserted,
and on the 30th of December the advance- and rear-guards were
simultaneously fired into. Two mules were killed and a driver wounded.
A few volleys into the bush dispersed the attacking party. The town of
Namhsam was reached on the 31st. All the inhabitants had disappeared.
Mr. Daly remained eight days, in the hope of inducing the Sawbwa
to come in, but without success. He was able, however, to restore
confidence. The townspeople returned to their houses, and on the march
of the column to Hsenwi the villagers on the road watched the troops
without concern. The attack on the column was afterwards explained.
There was an old standing feud between Tawngpeng and Hsipaw, dating
from a treacherous massacre of Tawngpeng officials by the grandfather
of Hkun Saing, the Sawbwa of Hsipaw. Mr. Daly had been several weeks in
Hsipaw, and a number of Hsipaw bullock-drivers were with the column.
This aroused the suspicions of the Tawngpeng officials, and orders were
given to oppose any armed men from Hsipaw. However this may have been,
the misunderstanding was only for a time.

Mr. Daly then went on to the town of Hsenwi, or rather to the site of
the town, for the town had been destroyed, to meet San Ton Hon, who
after some hesitation came in to see him and arranged to attend the
Conference at Möngyai. The Northern Column then marched east to the
Kunlon Ferry on the Salween, to Mansi, where San Ton Hon joined Mr.
Daly and accompanied him to Möngyai. Except that the submission of
the Tawngpeng Sawbwa had not been obtained owing to his timidity or
hostility, the task appointed to the Northern Column had been executed
with complete success.

But to go back. After the Durbar was over at Möngyai, the Southern
Column, according to its wont, gave a display for the popular delight.
On the first day there was a sham-fight, which was viewed with much
interest by chiefs and followers; and on the second, garrison sports,
which it is related "proved a great attraction and tended in no small
degree to bring the troops and the people together and to produce good
feeling on both sides."

All hope of meeting any of the great Trans-Salween chiefs was now past.
Various causes had prevented them from coming in, amongst others a raid
made across their track to Möngnai by the irrepressible Twet Nga Lu,
and some mischievous lies spread by Saw Ôn of Yawnghwè regarding the
withdrawal of the British forces. Trans-Salween affairs had therefore
to be laid aside for a more convenient season. But much useful
information was gathered and recorded by the Superintendent and Mr.
Scott.

From Lashio the column moved to Panglon, a village on the eastern
borders of Tawngpeng territory, to which place the chief had been
summoned to meet the Superintendent and make his submission. He did
not obey the summons, but sent excuses for his absence alleging age
and infirmities, and saying that he wished his son to be accepted as
Sawbwa in his room. Two days afterwards this son, entitled the Naw
Möng, accompanied by most of the chief officials, came in, and with
humble apologies for the attack made on the Northern Column, tendered
his allegiance to the British Government. As it appeared that the old
Sawbwa was nearly eighty years of age, it was decided to accept the
Naw Möng, Hkun Kyan, as chief, and to draw out the _sanad_, or patent,
in his name. This was done, and the amount of revenue to be paid by
Tawngpeng was determined. It may be recorded here that Hkun Kyan
administered the State for seven years until 1895, when he resigned on
account of ill-health. A cousin succeeded him but proved incompetent,
and in 1904 a Government officer was put in charge of Tawngpeng. At
present, the Sawbwa is administering the State satisfactorily.

Having settled this matter, the column marched into Hsipaw. It is worth
noting that Hkun Saing, the chief of Hsipaw, had obtained greater
favour from the British Government than any other of the Shan chiefs.
The more prominent of them bitterly resented the concessions made
to Hkun Saing, namely: the remission of his revenue for ten years
and the conferment on him of the three States of Möngtung, Mönglong,
and Hsumhsai, to which he had no right. His services to the British
Government consisted in this, that he came down to meet the Chief
Commissioner at Mandalay and was the first to make his submission
to the Queen-Empress. It might have been expected, therefore, that
he would have made some show of providing shelter and supplies for
the troops. He did nothing. The extraordinary favours which he had
received led him to think that he must be necessary to the Government,
and he made no effort to prove his gratitude. The gift of Möngtung to
Hkun Saing was resented by the inhabitants of that State, who claimed
independence and wished to be ruled by their hereditary chief, who had
been dismissed by the Sawbwa of Hsipaw. Similar were the feelings of
the people of Mönglong, whose hereditary ruler, Nga Maung, gave great
trouble to our administration. Mr. Hildebrand worked hard to arrive at
some settlement by which peace might be assured. He was unsuccessful,
and Möngtung as well as Mönglong was torn by dissension for some years.
At length in 1893, owing to this and other administrative failures,
a British officer was appointed to advise and guide the Sawbwa Hkun
Saing, and by this means peace and order were restored.

On the 9th of April, after a tour of four months and nineteen days,
the Southern Shan Column, under Colonel Swetenham, accompanied by Mr.
Hildebrand and Mr. Scott, marched into Mandalay. The expedition had
done its work well. Every chief, big and little, in the Cis-Salween
States had been met and his formal recognition of British supremacy
obtained. Long-existing feuds had been set at rest, and claims the
subject of prolonged fighting peaceably adjudicated. The revenue
payable by each State had been ascertained, and with one or two
exceptions definitely fixed. The Southern Column had marched upwards
of seven hundred miles, and had passed through the territory of
every important chief. The few minor States untraversed by it had
been visited either by Captain Jackson, R.E., of the Government of
India Survey, or by Lieutenant Stanton, D.S.O., of the Intelligence
Department, accompanied in each case by small parties of troops; and by
their labours a map had been constructed on which the position of every
important place in the Cis-Salween States was scientifically fixed.
Moreover, a mass of information regarding the Shan country, its main
features and products, and the character and politics of the people,
was collected, invaluable to those engaged in administering this wide
country.

[Illustration: PAGODAS AT MANG KAO--SHAN STATES.]

If the Shans generally on the west of the Salween have accepted British
rule and learned to trust our good faith and moderation, the credit
must be given to the work done by the two columns. Although that work
was in the main of a civil character, and the military force was there
as an escort and a protection in case of need, yet the soldiers deserve
quite as great a share of the blessing promised to the peacemaker as
the civilians. In building the Indian Empire, soldiers and civilians
have always worked hand in hand. In Burma and the Shan States the old
tradition was not belied.

The civil officers with the columns recorded their gratitude to Colonel
Swetenham and his officers for their unwearying efforts to assist the
Superintendent in his communications with the chiefs and the people.
But more than that: "It remains to be noted," writes Mr. Scott, "that
this desire to aid the Superintendent in his duties was no less
conspicuous among the native officers, and the men, alike of the 2nd
Queen's, the Battery, and the 27th Punjab Infantry. The native officers
in particular took a most intelligent and evidently real interest in
the objects of the expedition. They not only succeeded in suppressing
all crime and ill-treatment of the people by the sepoys and followers,
but they were foremost in showing the example of friendly and social
intercourse with the people. Nearly every one in the regiment had
picked up during their two years' stay in Burma a certain amount of
Burmese; to this was added a few words of Shan; and these used freely
on all occasions, whether apposite or not, never failed to break down
the nervousness and awe with which the population was at first disposed
to regard us. Whenever we halted for any time, friendships were struck
up between the troops and the people, and that the goodwill and esteem
thus created was not merely superficial or assumed was more than once
proved in the most satisfactory manner. Followers were lost or strayed
away from the camp. In every case these animals or men were taken
care of, fed, and in some cases clothed and physicked and eventually
sent on to join the column." A further proof of the friendliness of
the people was the immunity of the mails from detention or pillage.
Although sent without guards by native runners, they were invariably
delivered after passing sometimes through many States and many hands.
"If, therefore," concludes Mr. Scott, "as there can be no doubt is the
case, the Cis-Salween States have definitely and thankfully accepted
our suzerainty, no small share of the credit of our success is due to
the exertions of the officers of the Shan Column."

In dealing with semi-savage and ignorant races, the power of rumour
and misrepresentation can hardly be overestimated. When the Shans saw
that the Southern Column left no detachment behind it at Möngnai,
and instead of returning from Hsenwi to Fort Stedman marched down to
Mandalay, rumour began to be busy and the ignorant imagination of the
people to seek reasons for this movement. Ready at hand to supply food
for fancy was Saw Ôn, the Yawnghwè Sawbwa. An intriguer and gossip
by nature, he sat down to write letters to all the greater chiefs,
informing them that the garrison at Fort Stedman had been reduced to
forty men. This advanced person had already begun to take in some
of the Rangoon papers and to read the telegrams, which he could not
understand but from which he contrived to extract the notion that there
was going to be a European war and that the British were withdrawing
their troops from Burma, to which the notices in the papers of troops
leaving in the course of the ordinary reliefs seemed to point. These
letters reached men even more ignorant than himself. The impression
gained ground that the British power was passing, and the disappointed
claimants, the adventurers, and the men with a grievance saw an
opportunity for action.

It will be remembered that the chief of Eastern Karenni had not met
Mr. Hildebrand at Möngnai. The country of the Karenni, or Red Karens,
has an area of nearly five thousand square miles, much of which is
hill and forest. On the east it is bounded by Siamese territory; on
the north by the Shan States; on the south by Lower Burma; and on the
west by a hill tract which separates it from the level country of Burma
proper. It is divided into Eastern Karenni and Western Karenni. We are
concerned at present with the former, which consists of one single
State, Gantarawadi. The ruler of this State was Sawlapaw. He resided at
the chief place, Saw Lon, and he is aptly described by Mr. Scott as a
stubborn man from his youth, who had grown old in the belief that his
country was impregnable and his people in their hills invincible. He
was confirmed in this unfounded belief by the extraordinary timidity
and cowardice of the Shans, who habitually submitted to be raided and
robbed, and to see their people carried away into slavery by this
overbearing savage and his men.

Now Sawlapaw had a long-standing grievance with the adjoining Shan
State of Mawkmai. The cause, or the alleged cause, was the seizure
by the Sawbwa of Mawkmai, twenty-two years before, of a number of
elephants and timber in Karenni forests. He had endeavoured to get
redress from the Burmese Government twice, but without success. The
Burmese Government had disappeared, and now he had seen a British force
come and go, he was told for good and all. He thought his opportunity
had come, and advanced on Mawkmai. The Sawbwa of that State, by name
Hkun Hmon, had a bad conscience. His father, Ne Nwe, the man whom
Sawlapaw accused of robbing him of his elephants, had died some time
back. According to Shan custom Hkun Hmon ought to have buried his
father and divided the personality amongst certain relations who were
entitled to it. Shan custom demanded that the burial should precede the
payment of the legacies. Hkun Hmon disliking the idea of parting with
the property, put off the burial indefinitely, making, it may be hoped,
some sort of decent, if temporary, shelter for his father's body, by
placing it, for example, in a coffin of teak with a generous covering
of honey.

Now the principal legatees were in Möngnai, and were connections
of the Möngnai Sawbwa. Hence the "Smock-faced" Hkun Hmon, as Mr.
Scott dubs him, when he heard of the Karenni force advancing upon
him, knowing that Möngnai and the Karenni chief were allies, became
conscience-stricken; and, imagining that a combined attack would
be made on him, fled without raising a finger to defend himself. The
Karenni entered Mawkmai on the 2nd of March without let or hindrance.
They proceeded to burn the town and ravage the country. They destroyed
everything. Even the monasteries and bridges were burnt. The Mawkmai
Valley, which up to that time had escaped devastation and was the only
part of the Shan States that had been spared, was completely ruined.
Sawlapaw then appointed a man of his own to be Sawbwa of Mawkmai, and
declared the State to be annexed to Karenni. Hitherto Eastern Karenni
had been treated with much forbearance by the Chief Commissioner--more,
perhaps, because it was inconvenient to move against it just then than
from a desire to spare Sawlapaw.

Mr. Scott, after returning to Mandalay with the Southern Shan Column
(see p. 180), had hurried back by the Natteik Pass to Fort Stedman.
Late in April the Chief Commissioner sent him orders to clear the
Karenni out of Mawkmai and restore the rightful Sawbwa, Hkun Hmon.
He left Fort Stedman on the 2nd of May, with a party under Colonel
Sartorius of the Beleuchi Regiment, to execute these orders.

The same influences which had led Sawlapaw to go on the warpath, at
this moment had operated on the energetic mind of Twet Nga Lu. Since
his expulsion from Kengtawng by the Möngnai troops (vide p. 168) he
had remained on the east of the Salween, and had collected a number of
his ruffianly followers who had been able to get arms and powder from
Chiengmai. Crossing the river he took the town of Möngpan on the 4th of
March, the day after the Karenni's seizure of Mawkmai.

The news of these disturbances had reached Mr. Hildebrand at Hsipaw.
He had sent orders to the Möngnai Sawbwa to collect men to expel Twet
Nga Lu and to reinstate Hkun Hmon in Mawkmai. Hkun Kyi raised what men
he could and attacked Twet Nga Lu's position, but he was defeated,
followed up by the bandit, and had to seek safety in flight. This
happened on the evening of the 3rd of May.

On the 6th of May fugitives from Möngnai brought the news of this
catastrophe to Mr. Scott, who was _en route_ to Mawkmai with Colonel
Sartorius. There was no hesitation. The direction of the march was at
once changed to Möngnai. Mr. Scott saw at once the lucky chance offered
to him of making an end of Twet Nga Lu. On the 9th of May a halt was
made at Kanglu, nine miles west of Möngnai. The morning of the 10th of
May was very wet, which rendered a surprise of the enemy more possible.
Mr. Scott had studied the ground when he was with the Southern Column,
and felt able to guide a mounted party in the hope of capturing the
noted filibuster. There was no Mounted Infantry with the column. All
the officers' ponies were requisitioned. Six men of the Rifle Brigade
and one man of the Beleuchi Regiment were thus mounted; and under the
command of Lieutenant Fowler of the Beleuchis, and led by Mr. Scott,
the little party started on the adventure.

Following bypaths over the hills, they escaped notice, and the heavy
rain falling kept most of the peasants under shelter. The town was
entered by the south. Mr. Scott, knowing the ground, led them straight
to the Sawbwa's haw--palace is too grand a name--a teak and bamboo
structure with a stockade round it. Evidently the brigand felt quite
secure. Hardly any one was about, and Twet Nga Lu himself was in bed in
the verandah. He was seized and secured before he quite knew what had
happened. This could not be done, however, without some noise, which
brought in an armed crowd of his chief retainers. Mr. Scott ordered
them peremptorily to sit down, which is the Burmese equivalent of
"Hands up!" They hesitated. A straight blow between the eyes dropped
the foremost. The rest sat down at once, and before they had time to
count their opponents or take stock of the situation, the riflemen had
collected their arms. An anxious and rather bad time followed until
firing was heard, and the gallant little advance party knew that their
supports had come into action. Colonel Sartorius entered the town from
the north, and after a slight engagement, in which four of the ruffians
were killed, the town was cleared of the armed rabble which had held it.

Along with Twet Nga Lu were taken six notable captains, the chief of
whom was Hkun Sang Möng Cheng, his most trusted bravo, for years
a terror to the hillside for his cruelty. He and Twet Nga Lu were
famous for their powers of tattooing and charming, and all of them
were universally believed to be proof against bullet or steel. Mr.
Scott decided to let the Möngnai Sawbwa try them, all except Twet Nga
Lu, according to Shan custom. The Sawbwa sentenced them to death, and
after the Superintendent had considered and confirmed the sentence,
they were shot on a crowded market-day in Möngnai, by a firing-party
of Beleuchi Rifles. The executions were carried out in the presence
of British officers and with every regard to humanity and decency.
No greater scoundrels have ever met with a more deserved punishment.
"All these malefactors," records the Superintendent, "were charmed
against bullet and sword wound, and news of their death spread like
wildfire throughout the States, and has done much to reform previously
incorrigible murderers."

Twet Nga Lu himself was sent into Fort Stedman, presumably as being
too noted a personage to be dealt with by a Sawbwa. The Shan States,
on the annexation of Upper Burma, had been swept into the net and were
constituted a part of British India before accurate information had
been gained of their political conditions and their relations to the
King's Government. On this account there were technical difficulties
in the way of a trial by the Superintendent. The Chief Commissioner's
orders to the Assistant Superintendent were in these words: "As
to the prisoners, including Twet Nga Lu, send such as are Siamese
subjects or natives of doubtful States in custody to Fort Stedman;
make over natives of British Shan States to Möngnai Sawbwa for trial
and punishment according to Shan custom--but do not allow any cruel or
barbarous punishments. Take care that Twet Nga Lu does not effect his
escape. If the Möngnai Sawbwa sentences any prisoner to death for an
offence other than murder, suspend execution until you get orders on
this point." Mr. Hildebrand was instructed therefore to send Twet Nga
Lu back to Möngnai to be tried by the Sawbwa. On the way he attempted
to escape, and was shot by the Beleuchi guard escorting him. The men
returned to Fort Stedman and reported what had happened, saying that
they had buried him on the spot.

It was desired to verify this statement, as there might have been
trouble if the brigand had escaped, or even if the Shans had not
believed him to have been killed. Unfortunately Mr. Scott, who was at
Möngnai, was too unwell to go to the place, and did not visit it for
some time. When he was able to go he found the marks of a very shallow
hole, but no human remains of any kind except a long lock of hair,
which might have been Twet Nga Lu's. The Shans, however, all believed
that Twet Nga Lu was dead, and there was no reason to discredit the
report of the Beleuchi sepoys.

All doubt on this point was removed afterwards. The scene of the
brigand's death was in the wooded hills which border Möngpawn. The
day after he was shot a party of Shans from Möngpawn disinterred, or
rather lifted, the corpse from its shallow grave, and shook off the
loose earth. The head was cut off, shaved, and sent to Möngnai, and
exhibited there at the north, south, east, and west gates of the town
during the absence of the Assistant Superintendent at Fort Stedman. The
various talismans were removed from the trunk and limbs. Such charms
are generally small coins or pieces of metal, which are inserted under
the skin. These would be doubly prized as having been enshrined in
the flesh of so noted a leader, and no doubt were eagerly bought up.
The body was then boiled down, and a concoction known to the Shans as
Mahè Si was obtained, which is an unfailing charm against all kinds of
wounds. So valuable a "medicine" did not long remain in the hands of
the poor, and soon found its way into some princely medicine-chest. The
value attached to the fat of the tiger, and the demand for it by men
of greater culture than the Shans could or can boast, are known to all
Indian sportsmen. Such was the end of Twet Nga Lu. It was certainly, so
far as the body is concerned, most complete.




CHAPTER XVII

THE KARENNIS, OR RED KARENS, AND SAWLAPAW


It has been told how Mr. Scott was on his way to Mawkmai, when Twet
Nga Lu's enterprise caused him to turn his course to Möngnai. He
now returned to the original object of his expedition, namely, the
expulsion of the Karennis from Mawkmai and the restoration of the
Sawbwa Hkun Hmon, whom they had expelled. He reached Mawkmai with the
force under Colonel Sartorius on the 16th of May, 1888, and found that
the Karennis had not awaited his coming. Mawkmai was occupied, and
Sawbwa Hkun Hmon reinstated. Colonel Sartorius returned to Fort Stedman
with the main portion of his command, leaving, in accordance with the
instructions given to him, a hundred and fifty rifles, under Lieutenant
Fowler, at Mawkmai, which was considered to be the most fitting post
for the civil officer and his escort.

Mawkmai being only a long march of twenty-five miles from Möngnai, a
detachment of twenty-five rifles was thought enough to support the
Sawbwa, and in June, Hkun Hmon reported that the Karennis had quitted
his country. All seemed to have settled down. The Superintendent did
not hesitate, therefore, to call Mr. Scott to Fort Stedman for various
business matters. Mr. Scott reached Fort Stedman on the 28th of June,
and reported that all was well. Lieutenant Fowler was at that time
in Mawkmai. On the 1st of July he moved his headquarters to Möngnai,
leaving the detachment of twenty-five rifles to garrison Mawkmai. The
Karennis, it may be presumed, were watching his movements, for on the
3rd of July, in the evening, a body of Karennis attempted to rush the
town. They were repulsed, but kept up a fire on the defenders until
long after dark. The twenty-five Beleuchis, seconded by the Sawbwa and
his armed rabble, returned the fire and inflicted some loss on the
enemy, who had withdrawn to a short distance. Considering it unsafe,
after this experience, to leave Mawkmai with so small a detachment,
Lieutenant Fowler moved his headquarters back to that place.

The monsoon was now in full force. With roads of the most primitive
kind and swollen rivers, rapid travelling was difficult. Mr. Scott
left Fort Stedman as soon as the news of what had happened reached
him. Leaving his baggage to make what speed it could, he rode on and
arrived at Mawkmai half-starved and dressed in some Shan garments which
he had borrowed on the way to replace his dripping clothes, only to
find that the fighting was over. Lieutenant Fowler, learning that the
enemy had taken up a position within a day's march of Mawkmai, went
straight for them, carried their entrenchments at the point of the
bayonet, and drove them out with a loss to them of sixty men. This
experience ought to have diminished the arrogance of Sawlapaw. He was
very little moved by it. He wrote on the 13th of July in the most
royal style, requesting the withdrawal of British troops from Mawkmai
lest they should be "accidentally harmed" by his men when he attacked
Hkun Hmon. This letter was returned to Sawlapaw's messengers by the
Chief Commissioner's orders. A letter written in August, in which he
explained his claims against Mawkmai, and asserted that he did not know
the relations of that State to the British Government, was dealt with
in the same way. Both these letters were written in a style that was
inconsistent with the position of the Karenni chief, and they meant
defiance.

In July, 1888, the matter was referred to the Government of India,
and their sanction was received in August to demand from Sawlapaw
compensation for the damage done to Mawkmai and securities for his
future good behaviour, and to enforce these demands if they were not
complied with.

In September, as the Karenni chief showed no signs of yielding, or
willingness to meet Mr. Hildebrand, the Chief Commissioner prepared
and placed in the Superintendent's hands an ultimatum in the following
terms: Sawlapaw was required firstly to come in to Fort Stedman, and
there make in person his submission as a chief subordinate to the
Queen-Empress. Secondly, to pay an indemnity of two lakhs of rupees to
cover the damage done to Mawkmai and the cost of the expedition sent
to relieve that State; thirdly, to surrender five hundred serviceable
muskets; lastly, to covenant to pay annually a tribute of five thousand
rupees to the British Government. This ultimatum was placed in the
Superintendent's (Mr. Hildebrand's) hands, but he was instructed to
withhold it until November, and meanwhile to endeavour by all possible
means to persuade Sawlapaw to come to terms.

In October it seemed as if the Karenni chief was beginning to have
some misgivings. He adopted a tone of humility and apology, which
led Mr. Hildebrand to hope for a peaceful ending. To make it easier
for him, a reduction of the indemnity and of the number of the guns
to be surrendered was allowed to Sawlapaw if he made his personal
submission without delay. Later on, at Mr. Hildebrand's request, the
Chief Commissioner allowed Mawkmai to be substituted for Fort Stedman
as the place to which the chief should come, so that he should have a
very short distance to travel beyond his own borders. On November 16th,
as the obstinate chief showed no signs of yielding, the ultimatum was
despatched. On the 17th a letter was received by the Superintendent
bearing the date of November 5th. This letter, which had been written
in a much more friendly tone, had been delayed _en route_. In it
Sawlapaw proposed that Mr. Hildebrand should meet him at Loikaw on
December 14th, accompanied "by a small escort," so that the people
"should not be alarmed." "The reason," he added, "why I propose Loikaw
is that at present I am like a mother with her child in her arms; she
has to be with it always in order to prevent it crying; my people
will feel my absence if I go to Fort Stedman." Mr. Hildebrand was
permitted to accede to this request, provided Sawlapaw brought with him
the two lakhs of rupees and the five hundred muskets required by the
ultimatum. As an alternative the chief was told that if before the 14th
of December he sent in the money and arms to Fort Stedman, to prove
his good faith, the date for his personal submission at Loikaw would
be postponed to the 1st of January, 1889. These concessions, which
were made in the hope of avoiding a conflict, led to nothing except,
perhaps, the hardening of Sawlapaw's heart. To leave the shelter of
his own territory, and present himself before a foreign potentate
whom he is conscious of having offended, was a hard thing to ask of
a half-civilized ruler. But there was no evidence that Sawlapaw had
any honest intention of submitting. He was said on all sides to be
preparing to resist us. It is just possible that if the Superintendent
had been allowed further latitude he might have persuaded the Karenni
to make some sort of apology. To the Chief Commissioner it appeared
absolutely necessary, as an example, to insist on open and unmistakable
personal submission.

[Illustration: GROUP OF RED KARENS.]

During all these negotiations, preparations for the expedition had
been going on. It was expected that the main strength of Sawlapaw's
resistance would be on his northern boundary. He would in all
likelihood raid the districts of Lower Burma on his south; or, if he
were hard pressed, he might try to escape in that direction, or he
might cross into his own territory on the east of the Salween. It was
settled, therefore, that there should be two columns. The main force,
which was to make the real attack and to occupy Sawlôn, the capital of
Eastern Karenni, was to concentrate at Saga, thirty-six miles south of
Fort Stedman, on the 27th of December. The other was to travel up by
the Salween _viâ_ Papun, and march on Bawlaké in Western Karenni. Its
duty was to cover the districts of Lower Burma, and at the same time
to distract the attention of the enemy and also prevent his retreat
southward. The command of this force was given to Colonel Harvey. To
meet any attempt on Sawlapaw's part to escape eastward, a suggestion
made by the British representative at Bangkok that the Siamese might be
asked to co-operate had been accepted in August, and no further measure
in this direction was thought necessary.

With Colonel Harvey were one hundred rifles of the Cheshire Regiment
and one hundred and fifty rifles of the 8th Madras Infantry. Fifty
rifles of the latter regiment had been advanced to Papun early in
November, and the frontier posts of that district, which were held
by Gurkha and Karen (Lower Burma) police, were reinforced. At the
same time, in order to bring pressure to bear upon Sawlapaw and the
Karennis, who depend to a large extent on imported food, a blockade was
established and all exports from British territories stopped.

On the 7th of December Mr. Hildebrand reported that the Mawkmai Sawbwa
had received letters from Sawlapaw announcing his intention to fight.
On the 10th of December he telegraphed from Mobye that there was no
hope of a peaceful solution. Lest an advance from the south should
endanger a settlement, Colonel Harvey had been held back by the Chief
Commissioner's orders. On the receipt of Mr. Hildebrand's telegram from
Mobye, he was ordered to cover the frontier of the Salween district,
arranging to reach Bawlaké on the date on which the Northern Column
hoped to occupy Sawlôn. Colonel Harvey arrived at Papun on the 19th
of December. Two days previously Kyaukhnyat, a village on the Salween
River north-east of Papun, was attacked by a considerable number of
Karennis. The village was burnt and the bazaar plundered under the eyes
of the police, who were content to defend their own post. The delay,
intended to avoid bloodshed, resulted, as often happens, in encouraging
the enemy to strike the first blow. Another post was also attacked
about the same time. As a precaution Colonel Harvey was strengthened by
the addition of fifty British and one hundred Madras Rifles, and moved
from Papun to Bawlaké on the 26th of December. Pazaung, a stockade held
by Karennis, was taken without difficulty, and as that place offered a
favourable position for covering the frontier of Lower Burma, Colonel
Harvey remained there until he heard of the occupation of Sawlôn. The
bulk of his column then returned to their quarters, leaving some Madras
Rifles to strengthen the police outposts for a time.

The Northern Column was commanded by Brigadier-General H. Collett, C.B.
It was composed of the following troops:--

    2 guns, No. 1 Mountain Battery, Bengal.
    100 rifles, 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade.
    250 rifles, 1st Beluchi Light Infantry.
    4 signallers and 40 Mounted Infantry, Rifle Brigade.
    70 Mounted Infantry, 1st Beluchi Light Infantry.
    25 Queen's Own, sappers and miners, with medical and
         commissariat staff.

On the 19th of December final orders were communicated to Mr.
Hildebrand by wire. They prescribed the course to be followed in
each of the possible cases that might arise, while at the same
time allowing him a wide discretion in arranging the details. The
main points on which the Chief Commissioner insisted were that the
East Karenni chief should make his submission in an unmistakable
fashion, and give substantial guarantees for his future good conduct.
Accordingly, whether Sawlapaw met Mr. Hildebrand at Loikaw or not,
the Superintendent, with the column, was to proceed to Sawlôn, and
there arrange the conditions on which he was to retain his position
as a feudatory chief, of which open personal submission was the most
essential.

The instructions then proceeded as follows: "If your march is opposed
by armed force, the nature of the measures to be taken will be a
military question, to be decided by the officer commanding; except on
purely military grounds of urgent necessity, the Chief Commissioner
does not wish villages to be burnt; in no case must villages be sacked.
Your object should be to show the people that our quarrel is not
with them, but with Sawlapaw. Loikaw should not be destroyed, unless
the officer commanding thinks it necessary on military grounds. You
should remain at Sawlôn till the future administration is settled. If
you are forced to turn out Sawlapaw, it will be necessary for you to
stay there till you receive the Chief Commissioner's orders on your
recommendations; this may involve delay, but it cannot be avoided. It
is desirable to humble Sawlapaw, and ensure his peaceful behaviour in
future; but very undesirable to cause him to fly and leave the country
in confusion. The object is to keep him in a friendly, subordinate
alliance. You have liberty, if he submits, to mitigate the terms to
such extent as you may think necessary to secure his future friendship,
and to let him see that we have no desire to harm him. If he does not
submit, it will be necessary to punish him."

The terms and tenor of these orders will suffice to show that although
the Chief Commissioner had little expectation of the peaceful
settlement still hoped for by Mr. Hildebrand, he was anxious to avoid
a conflict. It appeared to him that further delays and concessions
could only result in encouraging Karenni arrogance, and would be
misunderstood by others. There were military reasons, moreover, for
finishing the business quickly and letting the troops return from the
field.

General Collett, having assembled his force at Saga, left that place on
the 29th for Sawlôn, Sawlapaw's capital. His route lay by Loikaw. As
far as Nga Kaing, a village one march from that place, a good road had
been cleared and bridged by the Sawbwa of Yawnghwè, the Myoza of Saga,
and in that portion of it which passed through Sawlapaw's territory by
Karennis acting under the instructions of the Mobye Sawbwa. On the part
of the peasantry there was no enmity towards us.

The road for some way before reaching Nga Kaing passed through scrub
jungle, which gave an enemy every chance of annoying the troops.
Nothing, however, occurred, and on the 1st of January, 1889, the force
debouched into the wide open paddy plain of Karenni without being
molested. While the camp was being pitched, the Beleuchi Scouts, who
were exploring some wooded ground near the village, were fired upon.
They were immediately joined by the Beleuchi Mounted Infantry, under
Lieutenant Tighe. The enemy, driven through the wood and compelled
to break cover, attempted to make for the high ground; but, our men
getting between them and the hills, forced them into the plain.
They numbered two or three hundred, most of them Shans under two of
Sawlapaw's officials, and were not without courage. Several times they
turned and stood to face their pursuers; but, ill-armed and without
discipline, they had not a chance. The threescore of Mounted Infantry
broke them up, rode them down, and drove them almost up to Loikaw,
eight miles distant, inflicting heavy loss. Some of them, seeing escape
to be hopeless, turned fiercely on their enemies, and the Beleuchis
lost four killed and seven wounded in the pursuit.

There was little chance for a combatant soldier to gain distinction
against such a foe. Captain Crimmin, of the Indian Medical Service
(Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel John Crimmin, V.C., C.I.E.), was awarded a
Victoria Cross for gallantry in this action.

General Collett pressed on at once with a portion of his force, in
order to complete the rout. He reached Loikaw after dark, and found it
deserted.

Loikaw consisted of two parts, inhabited by two separate communities,
the one of Shans, the other of Karens. The latter was quite deserted.
But the Shans sent out a mission with green leaves, the equivalent
of a flag of truce, to welcome our people, and did what they could
to make the bivouac on the ground north of the village comfortable
for them. Thus the night of New Year's Day saw General Collett with
Mr. Hildebrand and a part of the force occupying Loikaw, while the
remainder of the troops and the baggage were in the rear at Nga Kaing.
On the next day, the 2nd of January, General Collett halted, to allow
the rest of the column and the baggage to come up. The difficulty of
moving even five hundred men in this country, destitute as it was of
supplies for British and Indian soldiers, and equally destitute of
roads, was great. The transport bullocks numbered thirteen hundred;
there were ponies and elephants and camp followers innumerable. The 3rd
of January was taken up in getting the column ferried across a stream
named the Balu, which runs below Loikaw, and is eighty yards wide and
unfordable.

While the soldiers were thus occupied the Superintendent used the
delay to distribute a proclamation issued by the Chief Commissioner,
explaining why the force had entered the Karenni country, and promising
that the peaceful inhabitants should suffer no harm. The result of this
was that some of the elders came in to ask for flags or other tokens
which they might use to show that their villages were not hostile. The
peasants generally had left their homes, they said, and fled to the
hills, and would not return unless they had some assurance of safety.
Mr. Hildebrand, therefore, having found in the baggage some red cloth,
made flags and gave them to the elders for distribution. Before the
evening of the 3rd people were returning in numbers to their homes,
and applications for red flags came in from all sides. When the force
continued its march flags were found placed on the paths leading up to
villages from the main track.

Sawlôn was found to be four marches from Loikaw. On the 4th General
Collett began to move, and encamped at Kawpiti, where trees had been
felled and thrown across the road, and the advance-guard of Mounted
Infantry was fired on. Our men replied, and the enemy, having suffered
some loss, retreated. Some villagers came up with a red flag to warn
our men that the jungle on either side of the road had been spiked, as
Sawlapaw had taken measures to oppose us. The warning was useful, and
only one pony was injured.

On the 5th the ferry on the Pon Chaung River, at a place called
Tilanga, was reached. There had been no opposition hitherto, but
directly the scouts appeared on the river bank fire was opened on
them from the other side, a distance of one hundred and fifty yards.
There was a village on the far bank from which the shots came. Our men
returned the fire, but, as it seemed, with no effect. The guns were
brought up, and two shells were dropped into the village, and set it
on fire. All resistance then ended; but the river had to be crossed.
Empty rum casks had been brought with the force, and the sappers began
to make rafts. The river, however, was deep and rapid, and the attempt
to cross the force on rafts had to be given up. The enemy had removed
and concealed their boats. A close search was made for them, and six
or seven were discovered. A ford at some little distance was found
practicable for elephants, and amongst the Shans who followed the force
sufficient skilled boatmen were found to man the boats. On the next
day, the 6th of January, General Collett began to cross his men, and by
the evening the whole force was on the other side of the Pon Chaung.
The elephants and boatmen were exhausted, and could do no more that
day, while all the commissariat bullocks and their loads still remained
to be brought across the stream.

On the 7th, leaving a guard for the bullocks and baggage which had not
crossed, the main force pushed on. The road now became very difficult.
It narrowed down to a steep path, on the east side of which rose
abruptly a range of rocky hills, on the west side ran the Pon Chaung,
with its tangled jungle, affording the best of cover to an enemy. The
ascent was sometimes severe. Small parties of the enemy were concealed
on the slopes of the hills at short distances, and occasional shots
were fired from the opposite bank of the river. An enemy with more
knowledge or better arms might have made the advance very difficult. As
it was, the hillsides on our left had to be searched and cleared before
the main body could pass. It was dusk before Sakangyi, about six miles
from the last bivouac, was reached. The casualties were one man in the
Rifle Brigade killed and one wounded; two Beleuchis severely wounded;
and Surgeon Manders shot through the thigh.

During the night the baggage came slowly in. The last bullock was not
in camp until several hours after sunrise. The enemy made no attempt
to annoy the baggage or the rear-guard. Leaving on the 8th, as soon
as the men had breakfasted and the rear-guard was in camp, the force
worked its way on in the same manner as on the day before. Firing went
on incessantly, but the flanking parties of Beleuchis did their work
perfectly. The woods within range were thoroughly beaten and cleared of
the enemy, and the force passed through the defile (capturing two guns,
both mounted on carriages, on the hilltop) and entered the more open
country without a casualty.

Sawlôn was now in view. The Beleuchis, under Colonel Sartorius (Colonel
George Conrad, C.B.), were sent forward at once to occupy the town,
which stands on a plateau some three hundred feet above the river. It
was found to be quite deserted. The rest of the column encamped on the
bank of the river below.

It may be well here to give some account of Sawlôn, the capital of the
Red Karen country, as it was in January, 1889. It stands on some high
ground about a mile to the east of the Pon Chaung. The hills at this
point rise by three steps, the first and second of which open out into
two small plateaux. The town is on the first step. To those looking at
it as the force left the defile, it appeared to consist of a few huts.
On ascending the hill, however, it was found to be well laid out, and
to contain some really fine houses. Three broad streets ran through
the town parallel to each other, and were crossed at right angles by
connecting roads of lesser width. There was an excellent water-supply.
A stream from the plateau above the town had been led down the face of
an almost perpendicular rock, and formed a very picturesque waterfall.
On reaching the level it flowed through the town from east to west.
The channel which carried the main supply was substantially bridged in
each of the main streets. On both sides of every street in the town
were smaller channels, fed from the parent stream. The watercourses
were all carefully lined with teak to prevent erosion. Posts with glass
lamps stood before the houses of the better class. Here and there in
the main street a perambulator was seen standing, where it had been
left when the people fled. A box in Sawlapaw's storehouse was found
full of babies' bottles, together with a very large stock of arrowroot.
Evidently the younger generation of the Karennis inclined towards the
luxuries of the West.

The chief, however, was said to stand on the ancient ways, rarely
quitting his house, except to climb to his paddy-fields above the town,
which he worked with his own hands like an ordinary peasant. His haw,
or palace, however, gave some signs of his rank--a large old rambling
house of teak, inside a teak palisade, with a smaller house for his
wife in the same enclosure; a stable close by, with loose-boxes for
four ponies, well built of teak, with iron-barred windows, and raised
about three feet above the ground. Teak timber, which formed the wealth
of the State, was lying about everywhere. The road leading up from the
river to the town was littered with fine logs. It seemed that there
would be little difficulty in recovering the indemnity demanded from
Sawlapaw. Near the palace was an immense timber-yard with four sheds;
in each shed were four saws. The yard was full of timber sawn and in
the rough. The converted timber was methodically stacked in wooden
frames round the yard, each frame containing the same cubic measurement
of timber, so that there was no need to count the pieces. The palace
was by no means the finest house in the town; that of Sawlawi, the
Kya Maing, or heir-apparent, was especially good. A monastery and a
rest-house, of great solidity and excellent workmanship, with very good
carving, stood a little way off.

With the occupation of Sawlôn the active military operations ended. The
work of Mr. Hildebrand was only now beginning, and it was difficult
and perplexing. Sawlapaw had disappeared, and if the people knew his
whereabouts, none would tell. Little was known of the inner politics
of the Karenni State. If the old chief chose to hide himself and
let the case go against him by default, who was to be appointed in
his room? It will be remembered that in the instructions given to
Mr. Hildebrand, the possibility of having to supersede Sawlapaw was
contemplated, and Mr. Hildebrand was definitely told that he was to
remain in Sawlôn until the future administration had been settled and
the Chief Commissioner's orders received. In a private letter the Chief
Commissioner wrote: "In the alternative of Sawlapaw running away and
leaving the country without a governor, you must find some one to take
his place. I do not want Karenni left on my own hands. You have had so
much practice in king-making that I need say no more."

Mr. Hildebrand's difficulties were much increased by the announcement
of the General in command, that the column must leave Sawlôn on the
23rd of January, to return to Fort Stedman, as the rations were
insufficient for a longer stay. The task before him was no easy one
in any case. That he should be able to effect a settlement of Karenni
affairs in a fortnight was too much to hope. There was a risk that
the object of the expedition might be frustrated, and that the work
would have to be done over again. General Collett consented to send
for a supply of rations to meet the column at Mobye, to enable him to
remain at Sawlôn until the 30th of January. It is not known on whom the
responsibility rested for arrangements which might easily have made the
expedition fruitless.

There was no possibility of laying the matter before the Chief
Commissioner and obtaining his orders. Mr. Hildebrand, therefore,
took the risk on himself and set to work at once to find Sawlapaw if
possible; failing that, to select some one in his room. As a first step
a proclamation was issued calling upon Sawlapaw to appear before the
18th of January, and stating that if he did not come in a successor
would be appointed to take charge of his State pending the Chief
Commissioner's orders. At the same time the people generally were
invited to come to Sawlôn to confer with Mr. Hildebrand and advise him
on the choice of the man to be appointed, in case Sawlapaw did not
appear.

Meanwhile it was as well to acquire some knowledge of the feelings
of the people. The Superintendent's camp was moved up to the (Pongyi
Kyaung) monastery, and by constant intercourse with monks and people
their confidence was won, and an idea of the causes that had led to
Sawlapaw's flight was formed. The disaster suffered by his men at Nga
Kaing village on the 1st of January had convinced Sawlapaw that further
opposition to our advance was hopeless. But there was a war party in
the State of which one Naw Maing of Loikaw was the head. The measures
taken to resist the force were the work of this party. On the 5th of
January the smoke of the Tilanga village on the Pon Chaung was seen
at Sawlôn. The chief then made up his mind. He told those who wished
to remain to do as they pleased. For himself he would leave Sawlôn
and would never come back. He took his wife and a few followers, and,
forbidding any one else to come after him, he went to the upper plateau
above the town, where he had another house, and was not seen again in
Sawlôn. No one would tell whither he went.

Thereupon the Shan villagers (there was a Shan community in Sawlôn)
went to the Pongyi and moved him to head a deputation to the officers
with the British force. On the morning of the 6th, with two red flags
and the customary green boughs, the party set out to meet the British
who were expected to arrive at Sawlôn that day. When they did not
arrive, thinking the delay was on account of Sunday, the deputation
returned to the town. On the evening of the 6th General Collett's force
was encamped beside the Pon Chaung. A few Beleuchi Mounted Infantry
Scouts were sent on to reconnoitre the road. At the entry of the defile
they were fired on by some Karennis, and one of the ponies was killed.
They retreated without stopping to recover the saddle. The Karennis,
taking the saddle from the dead pony, went back to Sawlôn in triumph,
displaying their spoil and declaring that the enemy were few in number
and had retreated. This put new spirit into the war party, and the
peace deputation dissolved. On the 7th, when it was reported that
the British were advancing in force, every one left the town, and it
was found deserted, as has been already told. In two or three days,
however, most of the people, Shans and Karens, had returned to their
homes.

There appeared to be little chance of inducing Sawlapaw to make his
appearance. The day fixed for Sawlapaw's surrender was the 18th of
January. On the 17th a deputation representing the chief men of three
of the largest communities came to Mr. Hildebrand and begged for
further days of grace and a written safe-conduct for Sawlapaw. Both
requests were granted. Furthermore, a promise was given that if he
would come in and fulfil the conditions of the ultimatum, he would
be confirmed in his position as head of the Karenni State. The date
for the appearance of Sawlapaw, or, failing this, the election of his
successor, was postponed until the 25th.

Mr. Hildebrand was assured that the Kya Maing, or heir-apparent, who
was a nephew of Sawlapaw, would appear as a candidate for election.
The 25th, the 26th, and the 27th passed, but no Kya Maing. The
long-suffering patience of the Superintendent was exhausted. Fate, in
the form of commissariat supplies, demanded a settlement before the
30th. Just as arrangements were being made for an election, a note was
brought in from the Kya Maing to the effect that he was on his way
to Sawlôn from his hiding-place in the jungle, but had broken down,
footsore and weary. He promised to appear on the next day. As the
people earnestly besought that his prayer might be granted, and as it
was evident to the Superintendent that this man, as heir to Sawlapaw
and acceptable to the people, was the right man to take charge of the
State, and as moreover one of the wealthiest men in the State gave
security to the amount of Rs. 20,000 that he would produce the Kya
Maing, the proceedings were postponed until the morrow.

The remaining time had now dwindled to twenty-four hours, and the
28th of January was a day of anxiety for Mr. Hildebrand. It was a
relief when the arrival of the Kya Maing was put beyond doubt. He made
his appearance at an early hour, a man (by name Sawlawi) of about
thirty-eight years of age, intelligent-looking, and evidently popular
in Karenni. The election was held at noon. There were twenty-nine
electors, of whom six were Heins, or chiefs of divisions, four were
the chiefs or representatives of the Western Karenni States subject to
Sawlapaw, the rest were headmen of villages or groups of villages, and
traders in timber and other goods, many of whom were men of wealth and
influence. Each man gave his vote, with the result that Sawlawi was
unanimously elected.

Fourteen of the wealthy electors entered into a joint bond to pay the
compensation of two lakhs and the five hundred muskets specified in the
ultimatum, and a further sum of one lakh as war indemnity; the money to
be paid before the end of December into the Moulmein Treasury, and the
muskets to be lodged in Fort Stedman before the end of the following
March. The order of appointment given by Mr. Hildebrand to Sawlawi was
as follows:--

   "I, the Superintendent of the Shan States, hereby appoint you,
   Sawlawi, Kya Maing, to be Chief of the State of Eastern Karenni, on
   the following conditions:--

   "1. That you shall govern your State in accordance with established
   custom, and as a tributary to the British Queen whom you acknowledge
   to be your Suzerain.

   "2. That you shall enter into no negotiations, treaties, or agreements
   with any other State than that of England.

   "3. That you shall pay as tribute the sum of Rs. 5,000 yearly.

   "4. That you will in all matters obey the orders of the Superintendent
   of the Shan States.

   "5. That in case of dispute with Siam about territory east of the
   Salween, you will refer the matter to the Superintendent of the Shan
   States for arbitration.

   "6. That no Shan, or Burman, or British subjects of any race shall be
   detained in any part of Eastern Karenni against their will, but that
   they shall have free liberty to go where they please.

   "Given under my hand and seal this 29th day of January, 1889.

    "A. H. HILDEBRAND,
    "_Superintendent of Shan States_."

[Illustration: SAWLAW:--GANTARAWADI SAWBWA.
(Red Karens.)]

The sixth clause was inserted to provide for the abolition of slavery.
It will be noted that the terms of the order did not make the State of
Eastern Karenni part of British India. Experience of the difficulties
arising from the position of the Shan States as part of British India,
and of the absence of such difficulties in the case of the feudatory
States of the Central Provinces, induced the Chief Commissioner
to leave the Eastern Karenni State in the position of a feudatory
chiefship.

The fifth clause needs explanation. It has been told above (p. 191)
that a suggestion made by the British Representative at Bangkok
for inviting Siamese co-operation had been acted upon. At the time
no hint had been given by the Siamese, so far as was known to the
Administration of Burma, that they had ulterior views, or claims to
advance. It was supposed, naïvely perhaps, that as a friendly nation,
anxious on many grounds to ensure the protection of Great Britain,
they had agreed to act partly to help the British Government, partly
to protect their own border. It was not until the 10th of November,
1888, that Mr. Gould, H.M.'s Representative at Bangkok, intimated
that in return for their co-operation the Siamese would probably wish
to establish their territorial rights over the Karenni possessions
lying east of the Salween. That was the first notice of the Siamese
intentions which reached the Chief Commissioner, and he had dispatched
his ultimatum to Sawlapaw before its receipt. Mr. Gould was informed
that the ultimatum could not be altered to include the Siamese claims.
At the same time Mr. Hildebrand was instructed to reserve those claims
in his settlement with Sawlapaw. Hence the insertion of the fifth
clause in the order of appointment given to Sawlawi.

As a matter of fact, the Siamese co-operation was purely nominal and
valueless, too late to be of any use. On the 11th of December Bangkok
was informed that the columns from the Shan States and Papun would
reach Sawlôn about the 7th of January. On the 28th of December the
Vice-Consul at Chiengmai was told of the attack by the Karennis on the
police post at Kyaukhnyat, and was asked to move the Siamese to act. On
the 10th of January the result of the fight near Loikaw was telegraphed
to Bangkok and Chiengmai. On the 17th they were informed of the
occupation of Sawlôn. While Mr. Hildebrand was arranging matters after
the occupation, a detachment of troops went to reconnoitre Ywathit, a
village on the right bank of the Salween, about thirty miles south of
Sawlôn. From Ywathit a party went out to see the Salween, some three
miles away. This was on the 20th of January. On the evening of that day
the advance-guard of the Siamese force appeared on the east bank of the
Salween, at the mouth of the Mèpai Chaung, and the officer commanding
this party was visited by the Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Barnard, on
the 21st of January. It was known from the Vice-Consul at Chiengmai
that the Siamese had taken no action until the middle of January. This,
however, is a digression.

On the day following the election, a Durbar was held in a large hall
in the rest-house in the grounds of the monastery, near which the
Superintendent had pitched his camp. The place was well fitted for
the occasion and was more ornate than one would have expected to find
in the wilds of Karenni. A spacious chamber "built of the best sawn
teak with venetians and folding doors of good workmanship, and a floor
which might have been made for a ball-room, the whole," writes the
Superintendent, "both inside and out being very highly finished with
panelling and carving and gilding." Here the notables, who had met for
the election of the new chief, and all the townspeople assembled, and
the Superintendent (as the Representative of the British Government),
supported by the General commanding and all the officers of the force,
opened the Durbar. A broad, sturdy figure of a man, with a face that
bore the marks of work and climate, a determined man, patient and
considerate, but nevertheless a man accustomed to be obeyed. There were
no bright uniforms, no show of gold or scarlet. Civil and military
were all in the working-dress of the field, soiled and stained with
dust and sweat; for the last few marches through the wooded defile of
the Pon Chaung had been very toilsome. Amongst the Shans and Karens
assembled, some spots of gay colour might be seen, and smart white
jackets here and there.

In a few words the causes which had led to the expedition were
explained and the consequences, namely, the subordination of the
Karenni chief to the British Government, and the payment by him of
an indemnity. This might be unpleasant to some of them. On the other
hand, to the Karenni people at large, it meant a better government,
the cessation of raids and petty wars, the extension and protection of
trade, and undisturbed peace. The order of appointment (provisional,
as subject to the Chief Commissioner's approval), was then read and
given to Sawlawi. Thus the Karenni territory, which had been hitherto
independent and had been protected by us from the designs of Burma,
became practically part of the Empire. It may be noted that Mr.
Hildebrand acted as the Representative of the British Government on
both occasions. On the first, when he secured the independence of
Karenni by negotiation with the Burmese King; on the second, when he
made Karenni subordinate to the Government of India.

What was the first use made of his new power by Sawlawi? His first
thought was to rid his territory east of the Salween of the Siamese
troops now occupying it. The Superintendent gave him letters to the
Siamese commander, announcing the fall of Sawlapaw and the appointment
of Kya Maing Sawlawi in his place; informing him that matters had been
arranged with the Karennis, that the British force was withdrawing
on the 30th of January, and that Siamese co-operation was no longer
necessary. At the same time the Vice-Consul at Chiengmai was asked to
use his influence to procure the immediate recall of the Siamese troops.

On the 30th of January the British troops left Karenni and marched
back to Fort Stedman. Sawlawi was left to his own resources. Prophets
of evil had foretold the immediate reappearance of Sawlapaw and the
vengeance to be executed on his successor and his supporters. Excited
journalists published tales in Rangoon of wholesale executions in
Sawlôn under the old chief's orders. As a matter of fact, the ex-Sawbwa
never attempted to disturb the Settlement, and the new Sawbwa, Sawlawi,
carried out his engagements punctually. The indemnity was paid and the
fire-arms surrendered. To the day of his death, in 1907, he governed
his people in an upright and capable manner.

It must be confessed there was some risk in leaving the country the day
after Sawlawi's instalment. The Chief Commissioner's instructions were
clear that the Superintendent should remain in Sawlôn until he received
orders on his proposals. Mr. Hildebrand, however, had no choice, and
the risk had to be taken, because of the defective arrangements for
feeding the troops, which made it impossible to stay. In taking the
responsibility he did his duty well. The only difficulty in Eastern
Karenni arose from the action of the Siamese Government in continuing
to occupy the territory east of the Salween, which had been long held
by the Karens, was vital to them, and had never been in the possession
of the Siamese.

This was a matter which threatened at any moment to disturb the peace
and gave anxiety to those responsible for maintaining it. The first
act of Sawlawi, as has been said, after his appointment was to ask
the assistance of the Superintendent to procure the withdrawal of the
Siamese from the territory east of the Salween. The British Vice-Consul
at Chiengmai and the Siamese officer in command of their troops
were notified that peace had been made and that the British troops
were leaving the field; the withdrawal of the Siamese was therefore
necessary. The Siamese claims had been reserved for settlement in the
terms of Sawlawi's appointment. The Chief Commissioner prohibited the
Karenni chief from attacking or making any forcible resistance to them.
When month after month passed and they made no show of retiring, but on
the contrary began to appropriate the timber and even the elephants of
the Karenni traders, the local Government of Burma was placed in a very
uncomfortable position. Sawlawi urged that he had accepted our terms,
made his submission and acknowledged himself to be the subordinate of
the Queen-Empress. He looked in return for the advantage of British
protection; apparently he was not to have it. He knew well enough that
it only needed a firm order and a small display of force to cause the
retirement of the Siamese with more alacrity than they had displayed
in their advance. Why was nothing done? If he began to doubt our good
faith, it was no wonder.

As a matter of fact--a fact to him unknown, and unintelligible if it
had been known--the Chief Commissioner could do nothing but put the
case to the Government of India. This was done in as strong words as
possible. The Government of India could do nothing except through
the Secretary of State; the Secretary of State could not act except
through the British Foreign Office; the Foreign Office was obliged to
work through the Siamese Embassy in London and the British Resident
in Bangkok; the King of Siam had to consult his local lieutenants at
Chiengmai. The situation demanded patience, and much of it.

It has been said above that the territory occupied by the Siamese
was vital to the Karennis. Their best and most extensive forests,
the main source of their wealth, lay there. The only way of getting
timber to the market from the forests was (and is) by floating it down
the Salween, the mouth of which is in British territory opposite to
Moulmein. The logs are stopped and collected at Kado, a short distance
from the mouth of the river, and a duty levied by the Government of
Burma. Every owner of timber has his stamp with which he marks his
logs, and a register of these stamps is kept by the forest officer. The
logs which had been seized by the Siamese were easily distinguished,
and orders were given to the forest officer to detain them. By this
means a check was put upon the rapacity of the Siamese, and the loss
of the Karenni timber dealers restricted. In the course of time, the
matter was arranged between the Siamese and the Foreign Office, and the
Karennis were restored to possession (_vide_ Chapter XVIII, p. 221).

The history of this matter shows the difficulties which the Government
of India and their subordinates on the spot meet with in dealing with
a boundary dispute, even of a simple kind, with a foreign country. The
facts have to be gathered locally and placed before the Government of
India, who then have to negotiate through the Foreign Office, with
the risk of misunderstanding and the certainty of long delays. It is
unavoidable. Fortunately, on the north-western frontier, where the
delays and hesitation which caused inconvenience in the disputes with
Siam might breed serious trouble, the action of the Government of India
is less trammelled.

[Illustration: TRANS SALWEEN]




CHAPTER XVIII

THE TRANS-SALWEEN STATES


With the capture of Twet Nga Lu and the subjugation of the Red Karens
all serious trouble in the Shan States west of Salween ended. Writing
in July, 1890, the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States was able
to say:--

"During the year under report, which extends from the beginning of
June, 1889, the Shan States have been perfectly quiet. Nowhere have
there been any revolts, nowhere any insubordination or sedition; hardly
anywhere, except along the frontier with Burma, any dacoities or gang
robberies." (Report on the Shan States for 1889-90 by Mr. (now Sir
George) Scott.)

Pretenders had become convinced that they could not succeed against the
chiefs who had been confirmed in possession by the Sovereign Power,
and they settled down to make the best of things. The floating army
of ruffians who had supplied the fighting material in past times had
disappeared, and contrived to pick up a living in more peaceful ways.

"They make very good show-figures in a Sawbwa's processions, with their
tattooing from ankle to throat and their chest and arms bossed all over
with armlets and charms let in below the skin. They are also admirable
letter-carriers to distant States. They know all roads, they are afraid
of nobody, and they seem to be able to trudge from dawn to sunset for
an indefinite number of days.... It is certain, however, that the
States are infinitely quieter than they have been at any time since the
death of King Mindon, and probably quieter than they have been at all."
(_Ibid._)

The year 1889 therefore offered a good opportunity for attending to
Trans-Salween affairs.

Early in this year the question of the frontier line which was to limit
our responsibilities eastward was anxiously considered. Some of the
States west of the Salween which had already come under our protection
held or claimed ground east of the river. There were others lying
wholly east of the Salween which had been subject to the dominion of
Burma although they had been loosely held. Of these the most important,
Kengtung and Kang Hung, held, or claimed to hold, territory east of the
Mekong.

It will be easily understood that the Government was not eager to lay
hold of more territory than it was bound in honour to accept as the
successor of the Burmese dynasty. We had already taken as much as we
could administer or garrison with efficiency. Our authority was now
definitely established up to the Salween. The country lying between
that river and the Mekong was known to be mountainous, unhealthy, and
unprofitable, destitute of roads, a succession of steep mountain ranges
which made travelling most laborious. To maintain even a handful of
troops in that region would be costly. Revenue, there would be none.
It was asked where were our responsibilities to end? It was not easily
answered. The problem had several sides--the military, the political,
and the administrative. From the soldiers' point of view the arguments
in favour of making the Salween our eastern boundary had considerable
force. The river gave a clear and definite frontier drawn from north
to south. The advance of a possible enemy through the country between
the Mekong and the Salween could not, from the nature of the ground,
be made without much difficulty; whereas the defence would have, in
the wide plateau with its rolling prairies on the west of the Salween,
an admirable position, with easy communications open to the Irrawaddy
Valley.

Looking at the matter, moreover, from a broader point of view, it was
doubtful whether the British dominion in India was not outgrowing
its strength. In 1886 the annexation of Upper Burma added, roughly,
120,000 square miles to the area for which the Government of India
was responsible. Of this, roughly speaking, 20,000 square miles lay
across the Salween. Before Upper Burma was added to the Empire it had
been argued by a great military authority that if we were seriously
threatened by an enemy beyond the frontier of India, it would be
necessary to recall the garrison of British Burma and to let that
province go for the time. If there were any foundation for this opinion
the difficulty in the event supposed would be very much increased by
the addition of the new province. For no addition had been made to
the army in India since the annexation. There were strong reasons,
therefore, for not going a yard farther than was necessary. The advance
beyond the Salween meant the inclusion of some 20,000 square miles of
very difficult country and the possible neighbourhood of a troublesome
power.

In support of the military arguments it was urged that the Salween was
designed by nature for a boundary. It cut its way, in a line running
almost due north and south, through steep mountains and rocks. It was
not navigable in its upper reaches; the mouth and the navigable portion
of the river were in our hands. But as a matter of fact, however
adapted by its natural formation for such a purpose, the Salween has
not been able to limit the spread of any race or power that has settled
on its banks. On the north the Chinese hold both banks. The Shans have
settled indiscriminately on either side. It proved no obstacle to
the extension of the Burmese power to the eastward. In short, so far
from having been "an uncompromising natural boundary," as it has been
called, it has not been a boundary at all except for a short length of
about sixty miles where it divides the Lower Burma Salween district
from Siamese territory. Moreover, it is a timber-floating river. The
teak cut on either bank must be rafted down to Moulmein; and hence
disputes would be sure to arise. Rivers, as a rule, are held to be bad
boundaries, and the Salween is no exception.

At first sight the strategical objections to crossing the Salween
appeared to derive support from a consideration of the relations to
foreign powers which might follow. It was not desired to take any step
which might in the near future bring us into contact with France, and
thus add a new factor to the frontier problems of our Indian Empire.
The Government was even more anxious to avoid action which might give
offence to Siam, or have the appearance of want of consideration in
our dealings with that somewhat unreasonable power.

Further examination, however, led to a doubt as to the soundness of
these views. Supposing that the British Government, influenced by these
motives, decided to decline responsibility for these Trans-Salween
States, what would become of them? Even Kengtung, the most powerful,
could not stand alone. China and Siam might be invited to absorb them,
and thus a belt of territory might be placed between our boundary and
that of French dominion in Tonquin China. But China, it was believed,
had no wish to increase her responsibilities in these regions, where
her authority was very weak. Siam might be willing enough, but her
rule would be feeble and unstable, and not welcome to the Shans. Both
countries on this frontier were more likely to lose than to gain. If,
with the view of avoiding the inconveniences that might arise from
becoming conterminous with a great Western Power in these distant
countries, we should invite Siam or China, or both, to relieve us of
the charge of the Trans-Salween country, what security was there that
either of these powers would retain the territory given to them? We
might be creating the very conditions we wished to avert. The result
of a cautious policy of this kind might be to make our dominion
conterminous with that of France, not on or beyond the Mekong but on
the Salween itself--an intolerable position.

Looking at the matter from an administrative and local point of view,
the Chief Commissioner was against stopping short of the frontier
claimed by the King of Burma. It was argued that our new subjects,
whether in Burma proper or in the Shan States, would not understand
such a policy, and that it would have a bad effect on their feelings
towards us. We might dignify it by the names of prudence and
forbearance; they would ascribe it to fear and weakness. To them we
should seem to have lifted a burden too heavy for our strength. We were
afraid of going into places which the King had held and prepared for us.

This, however, might be disputed, or treated as a question of
sentiment. But the practical objections were evident and insuperable.

[Illustration: THE EASTERNMOST POINT OF THE BRITISH-INDIAN EMPIRE.
Reach of the Mé Khong where our boundary marches with French
Indo-China.]

Looking to the character of the country lying between the Salween and
the Mekong, it was certain to be the refuge of all the discontent and
outlawry of Burma. Unless it was ruled by a Government not only loyal
and friendly to us, but thoroughly strong and efficient, this region
would become a base for the operations of every brigand leader like
Twet Nga Lu, or pretender such as Saw Yan Naing, where they might
muster their followers and hatch their plots to raid British territory
when opportunity offered. To those responsible for the peace and order
of Burma such a prospect was not pleasant.

These arguments prevailed, and it was decided to accept without
flinching the full burden of responsibility which fell on us as
standing in the King of Burma's place.

The States east of the Salween which were under the King of Burma came
under two categories: those which were governed directly by their own
chiefs or Sawbwas, and those which were subordinate parts of certain
Cis-Salween States. Kang Hung and Kengtung came in the first class, and
were the most important of the Burmese possessions east of the Salween.
Their position may be roughly judged by the tribute paid to the King
and the contingent they were bound to supply to the royal army. The
tribute consisted of gold blossoms and cups, candles, bales of silk,
ponies, and embroidered pillows; and it was due not only to the King
and the heir-apparent, but to the members of the Hlutdaw, or Cabinet.
Kang Hung sent tribute every third year, while Kengtung sent nearly
thrice the value every year. The former State furnished a contingent
of 2,500 men, half musketeers and half spearmen, and maintained seven
posts on the southern frontier of from 60 to 100 men. The latter's
contingent was of the same strength; but seven guards, with garrisons
of from 50 to 200 men, had to be maintained by Kengtung on the southern
frontier.

Kang Hung was the largest in area of the Trans-Salween States connected
with Burma. The greater and the richer part lay to the east of the
Mekong, and was overlapped on the north-east and east by Chinese
territory. It was divided into twelve "panna," or townships, six of
which lay on the east and six on the west of the river. The six _panna_
on the east were more under the influence of China than those on the
west. Nevertheless, it is said that when Upper Burma was annexed there
were no Chinese settlers in the eastern _panna_, and no interference of
any kind by China with the administration of the country. Although in
1885 the King of Burma, in his secret treaty with the French, purported
to cede Kang Hung to France, he had lost hold of Kang Hung altogether
at that time, and he had no power then or previously to dispose of it
without China's consent, although China did not meddle with the local
Government.

Kengtung, which adjoins Kang Hung on the south, has had something of
a history. About the middle of last century the Siamese invaded it.
They were routed, and did not care to try a second venture. Later on it
was the first State to revolt against Thebaw's exactions. The people,
led by their chief, attacked the Burman Resident, and put him and his
escort to the sword. The similar revolt at Möngnai about the same
time gave King Thebaw as much as he could do, and Kengtung was left
alone. It has been related in Chapter XV how the Shan chieftains met at
Kengtung and formed a Confederacy under the Limbin Prince. The chief
of Kengtung had intrigued previously with the Myingun Prince with the
object of inducing him to be their chief. As he was unable to come, the
Limbin Prince was invited to lead. It was not the Burmese dynasty, but
the person of King Thebaw they wished to be quit of.

When the Limbin Confederacy dissolved and Möngnai and the leading
Cis-Salween States came under the British flag, the Kengtung Sawbwa
should have come with them. There were, however, influences which
kept him aloof. The chief who had taken the lead against Thebaw had
just died. His son, who was Sawbwa in 1888-9, was a mere boy, only
thirteen years of age. The country between Kengtung and Möngnai,
through which he would have had to pass to meet Mr. Hildebrand, had
been much disturbed and was unsafe. It was well known that his father
had invited the Myingun Prince to head the revolt against Thebaw. As
the party of resistance to British rule in Burma regarded the Myingun
as their leader, it was possible that Kengtung might not be welcomed by
the British authorities. These apprehensions, however, would have had
little force had it not been for Saw Waing, the ex-Sawbwa of Lawksawk,
who, with an armed following, had taken refuge in Kengtung, and had
obtained much influence over the young chief. If a representative from
the Chief Commissioner could have gone immediately to Kengtung he would
have submitted at once; for he had no chance of standing alone, and
he knew it. But it took time to decide our policy, and determine the
course to be followed regarding the easternmost dependencies of Burma.
It was not wonderful that the boy-Sawbwa and his advisers should await
events.

South of Kengtung, lying partly between it and the Mekong and partly
across that river, was a small State called Chieng Kong. This State was
believed at the time to be subordinate to Kengtung and to follow the
fortunes of the larger State.

The small districts which were formerly governed directly by Burma
had been annexed by Kengtung about the time of his revolt against the
King. They were not of importance, except that one of them, Hsenyawt,
contained the chief ferry over the Salween and included land on both
banks of the river. The other, Hsenmawng, was a small circle entirely
surrounded by Kengtung land. These two little tracts had in the King's
time been administered by Burmese officials, probably in connection
with the customs levied on the ferry traffic.

Kengtung had also appropriated the district of Möngpu, which had
belonged to the Möngnai Sawbwa, and an adjoining tract known as
Mönghsat, which Möngnai also claimed. So far the questions concerned
only the interests of our own feudatories.

Farther to the south, down the east bank of the Salween, lay four
small States--Möng Tang, Möng Hang, Möng Kyawt, and Möng Hta. These
four districts belonged to the Cis-Salween Sawbwa of Möngpan. Owing to
the action of the Siamese officials, who attempted to take possession
of them, there was trouble in 1888, and the Superintendent had been
sent across to arrange the disputed points with representatives of the
Siamese authorities. The Siamese, however, did not choose to appear.
They thought, it may be presumed, that having a bad case, or no case
at all, they had a better chance of success by diplomatic action. On
the spot, and with local evidence at hand to rebut them, it would have
been difficult to prove their assertions. Nothing could be done under
the circumstances but to inquire and report the facts. This was done.
The Government of India were satisfied that these divisions belonged to
Burma, and were part of the territory of the Möngpan Sawbwa. The Chief
Commissioner was authorised to put Möngpan in possession. Accordingly
Mr. Scott visited the districts and formally installed the Sawbwa. He
found that the residents were without exception Möngpan Shans. There
were no Lao inhabitants.

Until the dissolution of the Burmese authority in 1885, there had been
no thought or talk of Siamese interference. At that time, seeing the
chance of advancing their frontier to the Salween, an ambition they had
doubtless cherished, the Chiengmai officials had ordered the headmen of
these States to appear to swear fealty to Siam. They obeyed the order
as the only means of escaping destruction. They returned gladly to
their hereditary chieftain.

For five weeks after Mr. Scott's visit there was perfect quiet. How it
came about that this settlement was again disturbed is not quite clear.
The Siamese were bent on advancing their frontier to the Salween up to
the southern boundary of Kengtung. Seeing that Mr. Scott had returned
and had left no evidence of British authority in the shape of official
or garrison, the former game was repeated. The headmen of the four
States were again summoned "to drink the water of allegiance." Three of
them obeyed. The fourth, Möng Tang, sent a representative and wrote at
the same time to the Möngpan Sawbwa excusing his conduct on the ground
of _force majeure_, and promising to return to his lawful lord when
order was finally restored.

It was not until some time afterwards that the Siamese made overt
demonstrations by sending armed parties to the States, but the people
were very much alarmed and ceased all communication with the west of
the Salween. This reopening of the matter was not comprehended by the
Shans, and it did not help to enhance our reputation in the Shan States.

South-west of these Trans-Salween possessions of Möngpan, and separated
from them by a Siamese district called Mueng Fai, lie two districts,
Mehsakun and Möngmau, forming part of the territory of Mawkmai. The
history of these tracts illustrates the fluid state in which the
country on the borders of the Shan States and Siam was in 1887-9,
and for some time previously. Perhaps neither Burma nor Siam had any
established and acknowledged authority in these regions. In 1823
the chief of Mawkmai, Né Noi by name, who was distinguished by the
appellation of the Kolan (nine fathom) Sawbwa, was cast into prison in
the Burmese capital. He escaped, and returned to his country through
Eastern Karenni, in much the same way as the Hsipaw Sawbwa at a later
date. But he could not withstand the Burmese power; and crossing the
Salween, with the aid of Shans from Mawkmai he "carved," to use the
words of Mr. Scott's report, "the two States of Mehsakun and Möngmau
out of the jungle," and settled down there with his own people.

Here he lived for twenty years, until in 1873 he obtained a pardon and
went back to Mawkmai, leaving a nephew to govern the Trans-Salween
acquisitions. While he was at Mawkmai he was no peaceful neighbour, but
made himself feared by the Karennis on his south border and by the Laos
on the south and east. So far from being in any way subordinate to the
Siamese officials at Chiengmai, he attacked the Siamese district of
Mehawnghsawn and drove out the Shan, named Taiktaga San, who had been
placed there by the Chiengmai authorities. He bestowed the district
on his niece, by name Nang Mya. She was a lady with much force of
character, who in England, in the reign of King George V. would have
been a militant suffragette, and would have made short work of the
ministry by marrying them all out of hand. Nang Mya, probably feeling
the need of local knowledge and connections, dismissed her first
husband, who bore the not very imposing name of Pu Chang Se, recalled
her predecessor, Taiktaga San, from exile, and made him her consort.
When the Kolan (nine fathom) Sawbwa returned across the Salween to
Mawkmai, she and her new consort transferred their allegiance to the
Siamese Governor at Chiengmai, without opposition on the part of the
Mawkmai Sawbwa. Mehawnghsawn, it may be explained, is farther from
Mawkmai than from Chiengmai, and the Salween flows between.

This transaction, however, did not affect the districts of Mehsakun and
Möngmau, which remained under Mawkmai territory without question until
1888.

When the Red Karen chief, after the old Kolan's death, attacked
Mawkmai, Kun Noi, who was governing Mehsakun on his uncle's behalf,
behaved disloyally to his cousin, the rightful heir to Kolan, and
induced the Karenni to make him master of Mawkmai. How Kun Hmon was
restored to his position in Mawkmai by a British force has been told
above (Chapter XV, p. 184). He was unable, however, to regain the two
Trans-Salween districts, and it was not convenient at the moment to
send a party across to reinstate him. Kun Noi, having been ejected
from Mawkmai by the British, turned his thoughts to Siam and opened
communications with the Chiengmai authorities through his cousin,
the lady Nang Mya, who governed at Mehawnghsawn, with the view of
placing himself under their protection. This was the origin of the
Siamese pretensions to the Trans-Salween districts of Mawkmai. They
had no foundation in right. It had been for some time their ambition
to advance their frontier to the Salween, but as long as Burma had a
remnant of strength, they could not. They thought the time opportune
when the Burmese power had gone and the British had not yet made good
their hold. On the 6th of March, 1889, a band of men, some of whom were
militia from Chiengmai, came and occupied Tahwepon, the chief ferry
on the Salween in Mawkmai territory, and hoisted the elephant flag of
Siam, claiming the whole of the borderland lying east of the river for
the King of Siam.

The position of Eastern Karenni has been explained in the chapter
concerning events in that country. The people are numerous and all
Karen. In the thirty-eight villages in which they live there are
neither Shans nor Laos. The territory had been for many years in the
hands of the Karenni chief, and was colonized by his people, just
as the two districts north of it had been colonized by Mawkmai. It
formed the most profitable portion of the Karenni State, by reason of
its extensive and valuable teak forests. The capital required to work
the timber was found by British subjects from Moulmein, the Karennis
furnishing the labour. The timber trade was completely stopped by the
Siamese; the elephants employed on it seized and carried off. The
floating of the timber which had to be sent down to Moulmein by the
Salween was prevented, and communication between the east and west
banks prohibited by them. Such a state of affairs was most galling to
the Karennis and injurious to the dignity and to the revenues of their
chief.

Such was the condition of affairs in 1889, and it became necessary
to take action to prevent further mischief. It was decided by the
Government of India, in communication with the Foreign Office, to
appoint a Commission to survey the frontier and settle disputed points
with representatives of the Siamese. Accordingly, as soon as the
season permitted, a Commission was formed under Mr. Ney Elias, C.I.E.,
as chief. The members of the Commission were Mr. W. J. Archer, Her
Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Chiengmai, Mr. J. G. (now Sir J.
George) Scott, Major E. G. Barrow (now Sir Edmund Barrow), Captain F.
J. Pink (now Colonel Francis J. Pink, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Queen's
Royal West Surrey Regiment). A survey party from the Government
of India, under Captain H. M. Jackson, R.E., was attached to the
Commission. Surgeon J. K. Close was appointed to the medical charge,
with Dr. Darwin as his assistant. The escort, commanded by Major
Clarke, O.L.I., was composed of two companies of the Oxford Light
Infantry, two guns of a Mountain Battery, and a few rifles of the Shan
(military police) Levy.

Early in December the Commission met at Fort Stedman, and marching
down through Loikaw and Sawlôn, the Karenni capital, encamped near
Ywathit, at the ferry on the Salween called Ta Sanglè. Here they had
expected to meet the Commissioners who, it was understood, had been
appointed by the Bangkok Government to represent it. No one appeared,
however, with credentials from Siam. Whether this was a deliberate act
of discourtesy, or only a failure caused by the general debility of
the Siamese administration, may be questioned. Most probably it was an
instance of the common policy of Orientals and others with a weak case,
who prefer to plead before a distant and necessarily more ignorant
tribunal, rather than to submit their statements and evidence to a
well-informed officer on the spot. Perhaps, also, the advisers of the
Siamese Government avoided taking part in the inquiry in order that
they might refuse to be bound by an unwelcome finding.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Elias was forced to proceed in the
absence of the other side. The working season in these latitudes
is short, and to have delayed action would have played the Siamese
game and given them more time to harass the Karennis and appropriate
their property. Although no final decision could be arrived at, the
Commission could ascertain the facts, survey the country, and place the
matter in a clear light before the Government of India. At least we
should acquire an exact knowledge of the case, and be able to say what
we were fighting about. The business, therefore, was allowed to proceed.

A standing camp was formed at Ta Sanglè, and three parties, led by Mr.
Ney Elias, Mr. Archer, and Mr. J. G. Scott, respectively, started to
examine and survey the Karenni country. Ten months had passed since the
Siamese had appeared in these parts. The time occupied unavoidably in
a triangular correspondence between the Chief Commissioner in Burma,
the Government of India in Simla, and the Foreign Office at Whitehall,
had not been altogether wasted by the Siamese, who had endeavoured
to get the proverbial nine points of the law on their side. They had
established a series of posts along the Salween, all of them stockaded
and flying the white elephant flag of Siam. In each of these posts
were fairly large garrisons of from fifty to one hundred men, some
of them well armed Siamese troops, others Laos and Shans--men, these
latter, from the west of the Salween, who had sought refuge in Siamese
territory from the troublous times of the past years.

It was found that the frontier of Trans-Salween Karenni was clearly
defined by a range running from north to south, from fifteen to
five-and-twenty miles from the Salween. The inhabitants, almost all
Karens, had built their villages on this frontier range. As they live
by the rude method of cultivation known as _Taungya_, they frequently
move from one site to another to get fresh ground. The forests are
rich in teak, but the timber was worked not by the Karens, but by
Shans, or by Burmese traders from Moulmein. Everything went to show
that the country had been settled and opened up by the Red Karens, and
that the Siamese neither had nor pretended to have any rights over
it until the time of our expedition against Sawlapaw. From inquiries
made and from the number of their villages the Karen population was
estimated at between three and four thousand. The Siamese had taken a
very practical method of marking them for their own. All adult males
without exception had been tattooed on the forearm with the emblem of
an elephant, with a running number added below. At first it was thought
that this might help us to compute the number of people in the country.
But the tattooing had not been done systematically at the villages
where the people lived, but at markets and ferries as they chanced to
come from the villages around, to sell their produce or make purchases.
Thus while one man in a village might be branded with the number one
hundred, his neighbour in the same village might be numbered four
hundred. Without visiting every village, therefore, it was not possible
to learn the highest number reached, and for this there was not time.

Going north to the districts of Möngmau and Mehsakun, claimed by
Mawkmai, Mr. Elias was met by a major in the Siamese army, who claimed
to be a member of the Commission representing Siam. This gentleman
begged the question in dispute by welcoming Mr. Elias to Siamese
territory, but made no further contribution to its settlement. The
inquiry having convinced the Commission that the Mawkmai Sawbwa's
right to these districts was beyond doubt, he was permitted to resume
possession. He brought in his officials with an escort of his own
Shans, and the Siamese officers thereupon retired. Mawkmai's possession
was not disturbed again.

In the four States claimed by Möngpan events took a similar course. An
official representing Siam was found encamped close to Möng Tung, with
about one hundred and fifty men. He was requested to leave, as these
States were undoubtedly British territory and had been formally so
declared. He left without delay or reluctance, and the Möngpan Sawbwa
was put in possession, his nephew being appointed governor of the four
States, and entrusted with the task of restoring them to order and
prosperity. So far the Commission had completed their task. As the
Siamese had failed to co-operate, the decisions could not be regarded
as final. They were left, as the Bangkok Government may have intended,
to be reopened and disputed in London. Much information, however, had
been gathered about a country hitherto unknown, and a solid foundation
laid for a lasting settlement of our frontier with Siam. Captain
Jackson's party had worked with the energy for which he had already won
a reputation in three preceding seasons in the Cis-Salween States.

"In this his fourth season," wrote the Superintendent of the Southern
Shan States to the Chief Commissioner, "he had an exceedingly difficult
region to survey, and he has fixed on our charts an area which would
probably have exceeded the powers of any one whose physique was not in
equal proportion to his zeal."

Before the Commission had finished the settlement of this strip of
country from the south border of Eastern Karenni to the northern
frontier of Möng Tung, it had become evident that if they were to
complete their task the whole body could not visit Kengtung. Mr.
Scott, therefore, was deputed for this purpose, and left early in
February. He decided to start from Möngnai, where he proceeded in order
to procure transport. The lateness of the season made it above all
things necessary to march quickly, impossible with pack bullocks, the
ordinary transport of the Shans, which make thirty-four stages from
Möngnai to Kengtung. The Panthays (Chinese Mohammedans) with their
mules, do the same journey in twelve days. They march from daylight
to midday, and after a couple of hours' halt go on till sunset. Mules
have the advantage of bullocks in the matter of gear as well as in
speed and endurance. The loads are fastened not to the saddle, but to
a light wooden frame which fits into grooves on the saddle, and can be
lifted off in a minute and as easily replaced. The process of loading
and unloading is therefore greatly simplified, and much labour and
time saved. Moreover, baggage of all sorts and shapes can be loaded
on mules, whereas bullocks cannot carry any that will not fit into
their baskets. Then a mule will walk almost as fast as a man in heavy
marching-order, and will cover twelve or fifteen miles while a bullock
is doing his five; so that instead of waiting for their food after a
twelve-mile march until the bullocks hobble in when the sun is low, the
men will get their food half an hour after they reach camp. But Mr.
Scott has led us away from the business in hand in his enthusiasm for
mules.

Panthay mules are not to be found waiting on a stand like taxi-cabs. It
is not easy to get them for casual work. Mr. Scott, therefore, was kept
some time at Möngnai waiting for mules, and then could not get enough
and had to fill the gap with elephants. From Möngnai he went up north
by the Nam Teng Valley, crossing the Nam Teng at Ko-up, where a bamboo
bridge had been built over the river. The villages on both sides of the
river had been raided by the brigand Twet Nga Lu, whose story has been
told elsewhere (_vide_ Chapters XV and XVI).

East of the Nam Teng River in the State of Keng Tawng, "the country for
nearly twenty miles at a stretch," Mr. Scott reported, "is practically
a desert. Yet all along the road old wells and ruinous monasteries
and the grass-grown skeletons of former paddy-fields, to say nothing
of hill-clearings, showed that formerly there must have been a large
population here.... The handful of people who have so far returned to
Keng Tawng have settled twenty miles farther south, round the site of
the old capital. There is a magnificent banyan-tree, known far and wide
as Mai Hung Kan, at Maklang.... The adjoining monastery was burnt by
Twet Nga Lu's brigands, and not even the sanctity of the tree which
twenty men could not span, under whose branches a fair-sized village
might be built, has yet been able to persuade the monks to return.
There are not, in fact, enough of the pious in the neighbourhood to
support them."

Of the next State entered, Keng Hkam, the same story has to be told.
The Nam Pang, a stormy river which rises in the north near Lashio,
flows into the Salween near Keng Hkam. The valuable portion of this
district consists of an extensive plateau extending along the right
bank of the Nam Pang, where tobacco and sugar grow well, and very fine
rice-fields and extensive groves of palms made the country rich.

The State suffered greatly in the Twet Nga Lu's disturbances. The old
capital was absolutely destroyed, and nothing now remains but the ruins
of fine teak monasteries and some ornate pagodas absolutely falling to
pieces.

The chief had moved to a new town three or four miles off, but
intended, now order had been restored, to build again on the old site.
Many families had emigrated to the east of the Salween.

This chief, styled _Myoza_, accompanied Mr. Scott to Kengtung. His
avowed object was to improve his mind by travel, and to learn English
modes of procedure. It afterwards, however, appeared that he was
attracted more by the fame of the charms of a lady of the Kengtung
Royal Family than by a craving for knowledge. "He was successful in his
wooing," wrote Mr. Scott, "and it may be hoped that his bride will put
an end to the habit which he is developing of making inconsequent set
speeches. Otherwise he is in great danger of becoming an intolerable
young prig."

It is not possible here to follow the journey to Kengtung march by
march. It must suffice to give some idea of the country through which
the party had to go. From Keng Hkam to the Kaw Ferry on the Salween,
the road was easy enough, the only difficulties being caused by the
passage of the Nam Pang, across which, owing to the nature of the bed
of the stream, the pack animals could not swim, and had to be ferried
over. The Nam Teng, which was one hundred paces wide and twelve feet
deep under the eastern bank, would have been a cause of delay had not
the Shans thrown a bamboo bridge across the stream. This bridge built
by the villagers, in six days it was said, was crossed easily and
safely by the loaded transport mules. The bamboo is worth more to the
peasants than gold and silver and precious stones. With it a Burman
or Shan can do almost anything. For offence or defence, for house or
furniture, for carrying water or making a raft, the bamboo is equally
good.

Mr. Scott's party crossed the Salween at the Kaw Ferry, which is in the
small State of Hsenyawt, which is described as a simple chaos of hills
with probably not above a couple of hundred acres of flat paddy-land
in its whole area. The village, which exists for the ferry rather
than for any other reason, can hardly find room for more than two or
three houses in a cluster, and is consequently scattered over a square
mile or so of broken ground. On the other side of the Salween it is
uninhabited, and the road for some distance is very difficult, climbing
along the side of a gorge through which the Nam Leng runs. Mr. Scott
tells us that the Panthay traders carry picks and spades to make the
road as they go, and it is only their labour which has kept the route
open. From the ferry the road runs north-east to Hsenmawng, which is
another small State and town under the same man who governs Hsenyawt.
There are two routes to Kengtung from this place. One, the northern,
through Möng Ping, bears the proud title of _Lammadaw_ (the royal
road), and was always used in Burmese times; but landslips had made it
dangerous for animals, and fighting between rival leaders, for men. The
other road, which kept more to the south, passing through a district
named Möng Pu Awn, was perhaps longer but better, and was followed by
Mr. Scott. It follows a zigzag course. First north-east, to Hsenmawng,
then south-east to Möng Hsen, then north-west again to Kengtung. "East
of Hsenmawng," writes Mr. Scott, "is a simple sea of hills, range
behind range all the way to Kengtung. The main ridges run nearly due
north and south, and they with their spurs and sub-features, can hardly
be said to be broken by the valleys of Möng Pu Awn or of Möng Hsen.
It is a constant succession of ascents and descents the whole way to
Kengtung."

The mountains crossed were often of some height, and between the
altitudes of 3,500 and 5,000 feet were covered with pine forest. The
main range of Loi[40] Pè Möng, the great divide between the Salween and
the Mekong Valleys, which averages 6,000 feet, and rises in many places
to more than 7,000, carries no pine forests.

"On the spurs and sub-features, which stretch far away to the west,
forming what may be almost called a plateau--a very uneven one
certainly, cut up by gigantic gullies, and sprinkled with numerous
eminences, but still a rough sort of tableland--pine forest is the
prevailing growth, and seems to give place to oak and chestnut above
5,000 feet, which, however, is about the average of this high-land
plain. Notwithstanding the ruggedness of the country which is very
much like a Brobdingnagian ploughed field, the road is not by any
means bad. It is very fatiguing, but for a mule-track it is very much
better than the roads at many places in the Western States, where
the path climbs straight up the hillside with a Roman directness of
purpose, or follows stream beds and rocky gorges with a pertinacity
born of an ignorance of shoe-leather. Beyond the Salween the track
follows the line of the spurs, with the result that one very seldom
has a back-breaking climb. The credit of this natural engineering eye
seems to belong rather to the Panthay and Chinese merchants than to the
natives of the country; for farther south, where the Panthay caravans
pass but seldom, the paths follow the usual Shan system of going
straight from point to point." It was through a country of this sort
that the little party which was to receive the submission of its chief,
and settle his relations with the Sovereign Power, made its way. With
Scott were two other white men, Captain Pink, of the Queen's Royal West
Surrey Regiment, who was a member of the Commission, and Dr. Darwin,
a civil surgeon, in the service of the Burman Government. The escort
consisted of eighteen old soldiers, Sikhs of the Shan levy which had
lately been taken over by the army, and as many untrained recruits of
the same corps. There were besides a few Burmese clerks on Mr. Scott's
staff, some servants and camp-followers, the transport mules with their
Panthay drivers, a few elephants--which were more imposing though less
agile than the mules--and lastly the princely wooer in the shape of the
Myoza of Keng Hkam, with a tail of rough spear-men to give a touch of
romance to the cortège. Not a very imposing embassage, certainly, to
represent the majesty of England, and to require the allegiance of a
chief who ruled over twenty thousand square miles of country. But the
leaders had the right spirit, and not a man with them, from the trained
soldiers to the rough mule-drivers, but marched with his head high.

The town of Kengtung is about ten miles as the crow flies from the pass
over the Loi Pè Möng.

"It lies in a plain about twenty miles long and perhaps fifteen
broad. To the west and north this is perfectly flat and under paddy
cultivation; to the east and south are low grassy hills with swamps
in the hollows. The town is built on the western edge of this rolling
country and overlooks the paddy-lands. It is surrounded by a wall about
fifteen feet high, and machicolated at the top." (The wall and a moat
were constructed by the Burman King Alompra in the eighteenth century.)
"The bricks are insufficiently burnt, the wall is old and therefore
crumbled away in many places, so that it is picturesque rather than
formidable; moreover, some hills to the south-west would enable
field-guns to drop shells wherever they pleased over the _enceinte_.
The wall follows the line of the rolling ground, and to the north and
south towers above the plain. To the west it has not this natural
advantage, and jungle affords admirable cover up to the dry ditch
which protects it on this side. To north-east and south swampy ground
covers the approach. The walls measure four and three-quarter miles
round, and have ten gates, which used to be covered by semicircular
arches. Only two of these arches, however, now remain, both on the
eastern face. There is very little level ground within the walls, and
only the northern half of the walled town is inhabited. Even this
portion is so overrun with trees as to be almost jungle, and there
are several large swamps among the houses. These supply the people
with water to drink and small mud-fish to eat. There are probably
seven or eight hundred houses within the walls, and many of these
are very substantial. Some are entirely built of brick; some have
brick basements and plank walling; and the number of bamboo houses is
very small. All the better-class houses are roofed with small tiles
made locally. To judge from the Sawbwa's audience-hall, these tiles
are not a very satisfactory protection against rain, but they at any
rate prevent the fires which do such frequent mischief in other Shan
towns. The monasteries are numerous, and some of them are adorned with
elaborate carving and wall paintings. They are much like the ordinary
Burmese or Shan Kyaung (monastery) in general architecture, but there
is an indefinable suggestion of Tartar influence about them. This is
particularly noticeable in the massive gateways which immediately
suggest the _paifang_ of China."

There was a very large colony of Shan Chinese to the east of the town.
They had large gardens and kept innumerable goats, pigs, ducks, and
fowls.

"Their houses are all built of bamboo, and their villages, like
those of China, are inconceivably dirty, though in their person the
inhabitants are clean enough."

To the industry of these people is due the manufacture of tiles and of
the pottery work, which is sold cheap and of great variety in Kengtung
bazaar. The inhabitants of the plain in which the city lies were,
Mr. Scott estimated, about twenty thousand. There were some military
surveyors in his party, but owing to the very critical state of affairs
for some time after the city was entered, it was thought better not to
send them out to survey.

Such, briefly, was the city of Kengtung when the small British
party entered its gates on the 14th of March, 1890. The elephants,
although they marched slowly, and may have been execrated at times on
that account, undoubtedly added pomp to the somewhat insignificant
procession which entered the city. What followed is best told in the
words of Mr. Scott's report. (Report on Southern Shan States for the
year 1889-90.)

"We were met at the edge of the plain by the Tawphaya, the Sawbwa's
cousin and Chief Minister, along with a number of the principal
officials, and marched in procession to the town. Great part of the
road was lined by villagers, who stood in many places three or four
deep to see us pass. We camped on the site of the old Burmese post,
and were visited almost immediately after our tents were pitched by
the Sawbwa and his half-brother, the Kyem Meung (heir-apparent). The
Sawbwa is sixteen, and looks older. The Kyem Meung's age is a matter of
dispute between the Ministers, his mother, and himself. Dates vary over
three years, but he looks a good deal younger than his brother.

"A formal return visit was paid to the Sawbwa next day. He is building
himself a new brick _haw_ (palace), and the old palace, which is a
dingy wooden erection, is said to be so rickety that it would have
infallibly collapsed with the number of people who were to be present
at the reception. We were therefore received in the court-house, which
looks rather like a railway goods shed outside, but has been rather
highly decorated within. The gilding is now, however, worn and tawdry.
There is a large gold throne at the farther end, enclosed within a
railing, and reached by folding doors from behind, like the Mandalay
_Yazapalin_, which it otherwise resembles in construction. The Sawbwa
and his brother sat on chairs in front of this, outside the railing,
and we were placed between them. There was an enormous gathering of
officials both of the town and the neighbourhood, and of the prominent
merchants of the town, and the conversation was kept up by these and
by the Kyem Meung, for the Sawbwa had never a word to say beyond Yes
or No. The merchants all talked of the opening up of communications
with the West, and particularly of the construction of a railway. Trade
at present is entirely with China. The old Chiengmai trade is greatly
interfered with, and almost put an end to by taxations, restrictions,
and imposts levied at the Siamese frontier posts. The general
impression received was that the merchant class and the bulk of the
ministers were delighted with the establishment of British authority
in Kengtung. There is a huge drum near the door of the audience-hall.
It is made of hide stretched on a wooden frame, and is about the size
of a puncheon. This is said to have been made by the 'hill-people,'
but by what hill-people and where, nobody knew. One stroke on this
_Sigyi_ announces that the Sawbwa has ascended the throne; two, that he
has left the palace to go through the town; and three strokes summon
all officials and armed men within hearing to the palace without an
instant's delay. We heard three strokes on this drum a good many times
during the next few days.

"On the night of the 16th of March, the second day after our arrival,
there was a _pwè_ (a posture dance) inside the Sawbwa's enclosure.
Eight of our Panthay mule-drivers, who had been out searching for stray
mules, went in after dark to buy cheroots at the usual bazaar. They
were set on by the Sawbwa's men. Most of them escaped, but one man
was seized, held with his face to the ground and shot in the back by
the Sawbwa himself. He was then set free and went back to his camp.
Two other shots were heard, and one of the Panthays has never since
been seen. The Panthay camp was some distance away in the plain, and
before I had got more than the excited account of one of the Panthays,
who fled from the palace to our camp, I had demanded, next morning,
an explanation from the Sawbwa, and the production of the man who
had fired the revolver. I got no explanation, except that the Sawbwa
had issued an order that none of our followers were to be allowed
to go about in the town wearing arms. In a country where every male
above six years wears a dagger, this was an absurdity. The order had
not, moreover, been communicated to our people. I therefore demanded
the surrender of the offender, and had issued this order before the
Panthays managed to summon up courage enough to denounce the Sawbwa
himself as the murderer. It was impossible to recede. It was necessary
for British prestige and for our own personal safety to settle the
case. Our followers expected to be massacred in their beds; the Sawbwa
feared that he would be seized in his palace, and filled it with armed
men. For two days the suspense was rather trying. I then announced that
if my orders were not complied with, I would march down to the _haw_
the next day. This brought up the Tawpaya and several other ministers,
with a petition that I would decide the case as it stood. They produced
no witnesses, and did not deny that the Sawbwa was the offender. I
therefore sentenced him to pay Rs. 500 compensation to the wounded man
and Rs. 1,500 if the missing man was not produced within five days
alive and well. This sentence, I informed them, was a concession to the
low state of their civilization and the ignorance of the Sawbwa. The
Rs. 500 were paid a couple of hours afterwards, and the Rs. 1,500 a few
days before we left.

"The incident was all the more embarrassing, because none of the
details of the Sawbwa's relations with the British Government had been
settled. He had been reduced to such a state of fear that it was only
by again threatening to march down to the _haw_ that I was able to
persuade him to come and discuss the terms under which he received a
_sanad_ of appointment from the British Government. When he did come,
however, his manner was much more satisfactory, and he accepted in
every detail the terms of the _sanad_ and promised to attend future
Durbars of the Shan chiefs. Other matters which had to be arranged with
him concerning his western frontier were also easily put in train for
settlement."

It is impossible to read this brief account without doing homage to
the well-considered audacity of Mr. Scott's action, which ended once
for all any inclination on the part of Kengtung to resist the British
Government.

During the next few days the terms of the Sawbwa's patent of
investiture were finally arranged. In his leisure time a wealth of
information regarding the province and its wonderful variety of races
was acquired by Mr. Scott, which it is regretted for the reader's sake
cannot be given here.

On the 29th of March, three days before the time fixed for leaving
Kengtung, a Durbar was held for the purpose of formally presenting
the chief with his patent of appointment. It was attended by all the
officials connected with the Kengtung State. The only foreigners
present were the princely wooer from Keng Hkam and the brother-in-law
of the Möngnai Sawbwa. But so large is the area of the State that
the assemblage was as numerous as if it had been a general Durbar of
the Shan States at Fort Stedman. Mr. Scott improved the occasion by
impressing on them that British supremacy meant peace and trade.

"As is usual with a speech in the Shan States, a running comment was
kept up in different parts of the audience on the various points
enumerated, and on the whole it seemed that their comprehension was
satisfactory and their resolution praiseworthy. The ministers promised
by the Sawbwa complete obedience to the Chief Commissioner in all
matters connected with the State; and the Sawbwa himself was divided
between admiration for the repeating carbine which he received as a
present and a laudable desire to be amiable."

The party left Kengtung on their return journey on the 1st of April,
and marched back by a southerly route through the four small States
belonging to Möngpan, where some disputes had arisen which required Mr.
Scott's orders. These questions were finally settled for the time at
least at Möngpan, and Mr. Scott then returned to Fort Stedman, which
he reached after an absence of six months, on the 6th of June, 1890.
He had been away on this distant work all the open season of 1889-90.
Although the Shan States in his immediate charge had not been visited
by the Superintendent, there had been no trouble. The Sawbwas as well
as the British administrators were putting aside warlike things, and
devoting their energies to the things of peace. The Lawksawk chief
had done us good service in 1899 by capturing the Setkya Mintha, a
pretender who had been a nuisance since the annexation. In 1890 he
broke up and captured most of the gang that followed a noted leader
Kyaw Zaw. The growth of wheat and other crops occupied the minds of
other Sawbwas, while the Chief Commissioner was devising a procedure
code to guide the Shan rulers in administering the law. It was
necessary to frame rules which should secure substantial justice and
at the same time should not be beyond the powers of the Shan judges to
comprehend. Communications between the States and Burma were vigorously
pushed on, although not quite as fast as the Superintendent wished and
in his enthusiasm thought possible.

The work done in 1889-90 was good and lasting. Although, owing to
the failure of the Siamese Government to take part in the inquiry, a
further Commission had to be appointed to settle and demarcate the
boundary, the decisions arrived at by Mr. Ney Elias were practically
confirmed, when the final demarcation was made in 1892-3 to some extent
by Mr. Hildebrand, but for the most part by Mr. H. G. A. Leveson,
of the Indian Civil Service and of the Burman Commission. The only
difference of importance was that the minor State of Chieng Kong, which
bestrode the Mekong and was supposed to be more or less tributary to
Kengtung, was, as regards the eastern or Trans-Mekong portion, of which
Möng Hsing was the chief town, assigned to Siam.

But before the Government at Bangkok had had time to receive the homage
of the Möng Hsing chief, the French crossed the Menam and obtained the
treaty of Chantabun from Siam, by which everything east of the Mekong
passed to France and Möng Hsing became French.

As to Kang Hung, in arranging matters with China we transferred all the
rights in this State on both sides the Mekong--the whole, in fact, of
the Sibsong Panna (or twelve provinces)--to China, on the condition
that she should never cede any part of it to another power. With an
almost indecent haste, China gave up a portion of the Kang Hung country
to France. As a protest, we refused to pay the decennial tribute of
gold flowers, which had been conceded to save the face of China after
the annexation, and demanded a revision of the eastern frontier of
Burma agreed with China in 1894. A new agreement was made in 1897 which
gave Burma a better boundary. It is not likely that new difficulties
will arise on this side, although the boundary has not been demarcated.
Trouble is more probable on the north, where no openings should be
left. China does not forget her claim to Burma.

Kengtung showed a proper sense of his duties after Mr. Scott's lesson
to him. The present Sawbwa, who was at the Delhi Durbar in 1903, is
reported to have said to one of the officers from Burma, "We thought
we were great men, but now we see that we are only monkeys from the
jungle." So Durbars, like other forms of adversity, may have their
uses, and quite as sweet.

FOOTNOTE:

[40] Loi in Shan means "mountain."




CHAPTER XIX

BHAMO AND MOGAUNG


When Upper Burma was annexed the first step towards the constitution of
a well-ordered province was to parcel out the country into districts of
such a size and with such boundaries that they could be conveniently
administered. The wise course was followed of preserving the old
native divisions, which had probably resulted from the teaching of
experience and the nature of the country and differences of race. For
few innovations vex a people more than changes in the boundaries of
the units of jurisdiction which touch their daily life. Hence it came
to pass that all the country between 23° 37' N. and the undefined line
dividing Upper Burma from China and Thibet, somewhere about 28° N.,
was constituted the charge of a single Deputy Commissioner, with the
China frontier as its eastern boundary, and as its western limit the
Hukawng Valley, the Upper Chindwin district, and further south the
Katha district. The headquarters of the Deputy Commissioner and of the
military garrison were placed at the town of Bhamo, from which the
district took its name.

The Irrawaddy cuts the district in two from north to south. The town
of Bhamo lies in a plain along the left bank of the river, midway
between two defiles, usually spoken of as the first and second defile,
through which the waters rushing down from the region of mountains in
the north have cut their way. The river is open all the year round, as
far as Bhamo to large river-steamers. But the first or northern defile
is always difficult, and when the river is in flood, impassable. Hence
Bhamo is the gate of Upper Burma, and the port for the trade which has
existed for centuries with Western Yunnan. In a very small way it is
the Peshawur of Burma, and for the purpose of raids and such like the
Kachin tribes play the part of the Pathans on the north-west frontier
of India. The greater part of the district is hilly and covered with
forest; and the Kachins, who form quite a third of the population, live
in the hills.

[Illustration: BHAMO MONGMIT ETC.]

It is said that trade follows the Flag. In this case the reverse is
true. The Irrawaddy Flotilla Company had prepared the way for us here.
Bhamo had been the northern terminus of their steamers since 1869,
and for some time the Government of India had kept a Resident there
to protect the trade. But no attempt had been made to navigate beyond
Bhamo.

In December, 1885, a force was sent up by river to occupy the town,
and an officer of the Burma Commission, Captain Cooke, accompanied it,
and began to establish a civil administration. No opposition was met
with. The population of the town was not in a position to resist us.
Mixed with the indigenous Burmans and Shans was a considerable colony
of Chinese traders--some of them Cantonese who had filtered up from the
coast, others hardy and adventurous men from Yunnan, engaged in the
jade and amber and rubber trades in the northern part of the district.
These foreigners, although they disliked exceedingly our interference
with the opium and liquor traffic, and even more our attempts in the
interests of the troops to improve their methods of sanitation, were
not actively hostile. The peasantry of a mixed Shan-Burman race, who
cultivated the level country round and below the town, were peacefully
inclined, though shy and timorous. But the Kachin tribes soon began
to show their teeth and to do their best to make things unpleasant.
The policy laid down from the first for the guidance of the local
officers in their dealings with the Kachins was one of patience and
conciliation. Perhaps too much stress was laid on this. In one case,
certainly, the Deputy Commissioner's anxiety to adhere to this policy
was carried to an extreme, and caused mischief.

It will be convenient to take the northern portion of the district
first--that part, namely, which begins from 24° 37' N. and goes right
up to the Chinese boundary. It now forms a separate charge, known
as the Myitkyina district, but at the time we are writing of, was
the Mogaung subdivision of the Bhamo district, and contained about
10,000 square miles of country, of which two-thirds were, and still
are, forest. The level and valley lands along the Irrawaddy and its
tributaries, mostly on the right bank, are fertile, yielding rice as
the main crop; but even now, after twenty years of peace, the area
cultivated is very small. It is given in the _Burma Gazetteer_ (vol.
ii., p. 123) as twenty-eight square miles. The area in the hills
tilled, after a primitive method, has not been estimated, but as there
are between twenty and thirty thousand Kachins who live on its produce,
it is probably larger.

Of the wide forest area, part is in the low hill ranges, part in the
plains. Twenty-five years ago, when there was not a road, the dense
undergrowth and bamboo jungle, and in the lower lands the wide seas
of elephant-grass, made the passage of men and transport animals most
difficult and laborious.

From a fiscal point of view Mogaung was supposed to be the most
important part of the Bhamo district. The collection of a royalty on
jade was farmed in the King's time for about Rs. 50,000, and there
was also an income from the rubber-trees, mostly wild, but to a small
extent cultivated.

In March, 1886, a force accompanied by Captain Cooke, the Deputy
Commissioner, made its way to Mogaung. The Deputy Commissioner reported
that the "country was then, for the most part, brought under control
and settled administration." This was a figurative and official way of
saying that a person of local influence, by name Maung Kala, had been
recognized and put in charge as a magistrate in the British service.

After a very brief visit the Deputy Commissioner with the troops went
back to Bhamo, and left Maung Kala to carry on the government as he
best could, without police and with no military support nearer than
Bhamo, which is at the least 150 miles from Mogaung, whether the
journey is made by water or land. Even a handful of troops, lightly
equipped, could not have been sent up in less than a fortnight. There
was no telegraph to Mogaung. Maung Kala belonged to a family of great
local influence, which had held office for several generations, and
was reputed to be of Chinese descent. But whatever his influence, he
was sure to make enemies in his endeavours to keep order and to collect
revenues, and there was no visible force behind him. His reign was
short, and he was soon assassinated.[41]

A Burman official was sent up from Bhamo by the Deputy Commissioner
to succeed the murdered man. He soon found that he was not wanted
at Mogaung and he retired to Sinbo, whence he could at least make a
show of controlling the river-side villages. Po Saw, the son of Maung
Kala, was then appointed by the people to his father's post, and
whatever order or show of government there was in the country was due
to him. Subsequently, in consequence of his having summarily executed
a pretender who had endeavoured to impose himself on the people, the
Deputy Commissioner recognised Po Saw's authority and withdrew the
Burman. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the British Government
had jurisdiction in Mogaung. No revenue was collected--at least, none
was paid into the Bhamo treasury. In this respect, however, Mogaung
was little worse than the southern portion of the district which was
administered by the Deputy Commissioner himself, supported by the
garrison at Bhamo. In September, 1886, Major Cooke reported: "This
district has, I believe, been one of the quietest districts in Upper
Burma. The tranquillity of the district is in a great measure due to
the fact that no real attempt was made to collect the revenue until
July or August." Even the tranquillity so purchased was, however, only
comparative, and the soldiers had quite enough to do. In the open
season of 1886-7 it was not found possible to give men for an effective
expedition to the north. Things had to be allowed to take their own
course for the time. The Administration had no choice.

Early in 1887, however, the military police began to arrive from
India, and in the spring of that year five companies, mainly Gurkhas,
under the command of Lieutenant O'Donnell, were posted to Bhamo. This
strengthened the hands of the civil administration. It was then too
late to start an expedition to Mogaung. But Lieutenant O'Donnell was
sent up to Sinbo, a village of some importance on the right bank of
the Irrawaddy, just above the first defile. Here a strong stockade was
built and a Gurkha garrison posted in it. An Assistant Commissioner
also, Mr. Twomey, was sent to watch the course of events in the north.

There were three routes by which Mogaung could be reached from Bhamo.
One was by going up the Irrawaddy and turning into the Mogaung River,
on which lies the town. This was quite possible for a very small force
which had not to carry all its supplies and transport. The object,
however, was not merely to reach Mogaung, but to go to the jade-mines
and explore the country. Since an explorer (Lieutenant Bayfield) made
his way to the mines in 1838, no European had visited them. Nothing
was accurately known of the nature of the country, of the supplies
it afforded, or of the numbers and temper of the Kachin tribes which
dominated it. All that could be gathered from the Chinese and others
showed that there would be much difficulty in all these matters. It was
suspected that the Chinese were disposed to magnify the difficulties.
Nevertheless it was necessary that the force should be prepared for all
emergencies, and should be in every respect self-sufficing. Hence the
river route was considered impracticable.

Another way was to land the force at Katha and march up through
Mohnyin. Our knowledge of the route between Mohnyin and Mogaung also
was imperfect. It was not under our control, and a force passing up
would have to take everything with it. The third route was by the
left bank of the Irrawaddy. It had this advantage, that although the
marching would be difficult, boats could follow the force up the river,
could meet it at fixed points, and could carry a large quantity of the
supplies, certainly as far as Sinbo and probably in the smaller craft
as far as Mogaung. After much consideration it was decided to send the
expedition by this route. A fortified post was to be established at
Mogaung, to be held by the military police, to serve as a base for the
advance of the force to the jade-mines and other parts.

Much care was given to the composition and equipment of the force[42]
by the General commanding in Upper Burma, Sir George White. It was
necessary that it should be prepared for all emergencies; that it
should carry with it supplies for the whole time of its absence from
Bhamo; that it should be able to move, as occasion required, either by
land or water, and be ready to make its own roads and bridges. It must
be strong enough to fight its own way and repel attacks; and at the
same time the numbers of the force were limited by the necessity of
carrying its own food and of keeping the transport train from becoming
too large.

The Chief Commissioner selected Major Adamson, the Deputy Commissioner
at Bhamo, to go with the force. To him was entrusted the task of
dealing with the Kachins and of establishing the authority of the
British Government. He had served for thirteen years in Lower Burma,
and was known as one of the best officers in the Commission. He fully
justified the confidence placed in him.

Some time before the expedition started, Major Adamson summoned Po Saw
from Mogaung to meet him at Sinbo. He came accompanied by many of the
chief Shan residents and Chinese merchants. He promised to obey the
Deputy Commissioner's orders. The Deputy Commissioner then formally
appointed him to be magistrate of Mogaung in his father's room and from
the date of his father's death, and paid him a large sum as arrears
of salary. He was then dismissed, with orders to clear the roads of
jungle and collect supplies for the troops. He was instructed also to
summon all the Kachin chiefs connected with the jade-mines to meet the
representatives of the British Government at Mogaung. All this Po Saw
readily promised to perform. Major Adamson went back to Bhamo well
pleased with his willingness to help and believing in the loyalty of
his intentions.

All preparations having been completed, the expedition marched from
Bhamo on the 27th, by the north gate of the town. It was for these
parts an unusually large and well-found force, and impressed the
townspeople who crowded to witness its departure. It consisted of
the following troops: Cheshire Regiment, 50 rifles, under Captain
Armstrong; Kelati-Ghilzai Regiment, 101 rifles, under Lieutenant
Morton; Mounted Infantry, 25 rifles; Bhamo Military Police (Gurkhas),
500 rifles, under Lieutenant O'Donnell;[43] Mountain Battery (Bengal),
2 guns, under Captain Triscott,[44] R.A. Captain Clements was in charge
of the commissariat.

The land transport consisted of 350 pack-mules with drivers and two
elephants, who were sent back after a few marches, as they proved to be
useless. A fleet of three steam launches and thirty-three large country
boats, with supplies, was sent up by river, with a force of sixty-six
Native Infantry, under a native officer, on the launches.

Captain Triscott, R.A., with Lieutenant Williams, R.A., as his staff
officer, was in command of the whole force.

A Roman Catholic missionary who spoke Shan and Kachin accompanied the
expedition as interpreter. A survey party to map the country, a forest
officer to report on the forests, and Mr. Warry, the Chinese adviser to
the Chief Commissioner, made the staff complete.

The march up the left bank of the Irrawaddy was difficult. There were
two considerable streams, the Taeping and the Molé, affluents of the
Irrawaddy, to be crossed in the first few marches. These rivers,
however, caused comparatively little delay. The track kept as near as
possible to the course of the Irrawaddy. Sometimes it crept along close
to the river-bank, across numerous spurs separated by small streams
flowing into the main river. The ascents and descents were very steep,
and to make them passable for laden animals much jungle-cutting and
road-making had to be done. Sometimes the gradients were so steep as to
necessitate the cutting of zigzag paths. At times the animals had to be
taken up the steep banks and into the forests in order to find a road.

On the 2nd of January the camping-ground was on a sandy spit by the
river-bank, at a village called Nanti. Here the steam-launches and
the thirty-three boats met the land columns. On the 4th the march lay
along the side of the first defile, where the river flows between
rocky banks. The laden animals found easier going here, as there was
no rank vegetation; but it was slow work, as paths had to be cut for
them on the steep sides of the beds of dry streams which had frequently
to be crossed. On the 4th, after leaving the defile behind, the force
debouched on sandy level ground close to the stream, and halted at the
village of Manhé, where the column had to cross the Irrawaddy. The
headman of Sinbo, with some fourscore men and half as many boats which
he had brought down by the Deputy Commissioner's orders, to help in
the work, was waiting. Next day was devoted to the crossing. At 7 a.m.
it began, and by half-past 3 p.m. the last man was landed on the right
bank.

The Irrawaddy at this place and at this time of the year is three
hundred yards wide, with a current of about two miles an hour. The
formation of the river-bed, the broad sloping banks of sand and gravel,
and at places the depth of water close to the side, made the work
simple enough, however laborious. The two launches could come alongside
the bank, and the artillery and infantry, with arms and ammunition,
were taken over in them. Then came the baggage animals, who were made
to swim the river in batches of four or five at a time. A canoe, with
one Burman boatman in the bow, was drawn up alongside the bank, with
the bow against the stream. Then four or five men, each leading an
animal, passed round to the stern of the boat and seated themselves in
the canoe holding the animals by their leading-ropes. As soon as they
were seated a second boatman took his stand in the stern. The bow was
shoved off and the canoe punted across the river by the two boatmen.
Thus the animals were swimming up-stream astern of the canoe, and were
not in danger of being forced by the current against it. Three hundred
and fifty animals swam the river in this manner, and not one was
drowned or hurt.

The column was now on the right bank of the Irrawaddy. The next march
brought them to Sinbo, where a garrison of military police was already
established in a stockade, near to which a large camping-ground had
been cleared for the troops. Supplies from Bhamo had been landed and
stored, and the commissariat staff was busied in arranging for their
transport to Mogaung. The fleet had also arrived before the column. The
launches being unable, owing to the shallowness of the river, to get up
beyond Sinbo, were sent back to Bhamo.

The next two marches, partly through forests partly across plains
cropped here and there with rice, brought the force to the bank of the
Mogaung stream. The water was deep and the current ran very strong.
The crossing of this little river gave more trouble than the passage
of the Irrawaddy. For Po Saw's promises proved false. He had made no
preparations and sent down neither men nor boats. However, three or
four boats were found at a village higher up the stream. Teak logs were
lying about. Rafts were made; and the guns and commissariat stores
taken over. There were not enough boats to tow the large number of
pack-animals across. Mules and ponies were driven into the water in
herds and forced to make their way to the other bank, which unluckily
was very steep with a muddy bottom. Nevertheless they all got over
except one, but many were very spent and were brought up the bank with
difficulty.

The road now lay on the left, or east, bank of the river, and entered
a country of which nothing was known. It was dominated by the Kachin
chief of the neighbouring hills, from whom the inhabitants had to
purchase protection--in plain English, immunity, to some small extent,
from murder and robbery. As they had been forced at the same time to
pay taxes to the Burmese officials, they had suffered much, and many
of the villages were deserted.

The failure of Po Saw to carry out Major Adamson's instructions gave
rise to some anxiety. Treachery was feared, and precautions were taken
against surprise. The road was now in parts very difficult, over steep
forest-covered hills running down close to the Mogaung River, and
intersected by many steep ravines. Progress was slow, as the way had
to be cleared of bamboo and other undergrowth before the pack-animals
could pass. In places on reaching the proposed halting-place it was
found to be a small, confined spot, and the ground had to be cleared
before the camp could be pitched. A party of Chinese Shans on their way
to Mogaung joined the camp at night, and were engaged to accompany the
force and help to clear the road, for which they were well paid.

After some sixteen miles of difficult ground, which was covered in two
marches, the column struck the river again near Tapaw. Here the headman
advised Major Adamson to cross to the right bank again, as the land
road to Mogaung was only five or six miles, whereas the river made
a detour of double that distance, first going north and then coming
back to the south-east. There were no boats to be had here. After some
consideration Captain Triscott and Major Adamson decided that it was
advisable to send to Mogaung and summon Po Saw. They had heard from a
Kachin Sawbwa whom they met on the road that the Chinaman who farmed
the jade-mine revenue had been murdered, and they were now told at
Tapaw that an Englishman had passed down-stream in urgent haste.

Here we must go back to Mr. Warry's movements. It has been said above
that Mr. Warry, the adviser on Chinese affairs, had been appointed to
go with the expedition. He belonged to the Chinese Consular Service,
spoke Chinese well, and understood that difficult people as well as
an Englishman can. He was on most friendly terms with the Chinese in
Burma, and could trust himself to them without fear. It appears that
instead of marching with Major Adamson, as it was intended, he had
gone by himself with some Chinamen by the river. When the expedition
arrived at Sinbo it was found that Warry had gone on in his boat,
meaning to travel up the Mogaung stream. His attempt to go ahead of the
expedition, if that had been his purpose, was foiled by the refusal of
his Chinamen to attempt the ascent of the Mogaung until they had learnt
that the column had preceded them.

Hence on the 12th of January he was in his boat on the Mogaung, some
seven or eight miles in rear of the marching column, when he met Mr.
Rimmer, a commander in the Irrawaddy flotilla's service, coming down
the stream as fast as his men could paddle. Rimmer had in his boat
a Chinaman very badly wounded in the head. It was Lon Pein, who had
been at one time the farmer of the jade-mine taxes under the King's
Government. Rimmer's story was that he had pushed on to the town of
Mogaung alone, for the purpose of examining the waterway. He reached
the town on the 19th of January, and having accomplished his object was
about to return at once when Lon Pein came to him and told him that
he feared an attack by Po Saw's men, who sought his life. He implored
Rimmer to stay and help to defend him until the troops should arrive.
The people of the town appeared to be friendly enough. But believing
that Lon Pein's life was in danger, he chivalrously agreed to stay. He
took up his quarters in the Chinaman's house, and they made ready in
such manner as they could to resist an attack. Rimmer was armed with a
rifle, and Lon Pein, it may be presumed, had fire-arms of some sort.
They had not long to wait.

At midnight of the 10th a body of ruffians besieged the house with
more vigour even than the police led by the Home Secretary against the
house in Sidney Street. The house was of the kind usual in the country,
raised on piles with a floor none too closely fitted. The assailants
got underneath and fired through the floor, and thrust spears wherever
they could find an opening. Early in the fight Lon Pein fell wounded in
the head, and never recovered consciousness. Rimmer's rifle was shot in
two, and his knee was grazed by a ball. However, he continued to hold
out until dawn, when the assailants made off. Next day he managed to
find his boat and, with the assistance of some town's-people, to carry
Lon Pein to it. The inhabitants expressed their sympathy and regret,
but did not explain their failure to help him. Po Saw, it appeared, had
left Mogaung the day before, but Rimmer believed that Lon Pein had good
cause for holding him responsible for the attack.

[Illustration: KACHIN WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF THE UPPER IRRAWADDY.]

Warry persuaded Rimmer to return with him to the protection of the
troops, and they joined the column on the 13th, before it left Tapaw,
and entered Mogaung with it on the 14th of January. Evidently there was
mischief on foot. The leaders of the expedition, on hearing the story,
decided that before advancing further it would be wise to make Po Saw
show his hand. The difficulty was to get a trustworthy man to carry a
message to Mogaung. There was a Mussulman, a native of India, who had
come up as an interpreter, with the force, Safdar Ali by name. He might
have been a descendant of Sinbad the Sailor, for he had led a life of
travel and adventure. He had traded in jade, and was familiar with many
parts of the country. He spoke Burmese, Shan, and Kachin, in addition
to his native Hindustani, and he had taken wives of the daughters of
Heth in most of the bigger places. In consequence, or in spite, of
these alliances he was on good terms with the people about, and could
obtain intelligence of local affairs. Safdar Ali volunteered to take a
letter to Po Saw, and with a native to show him the shortest road, he
departed.

Meanwhile Captain Triscott and Major Adamson, with some Mounted
Infantry, had gone out to examine the track, and found that for four
or five miles it crossed a rice plain cut up by numerous muddy ditches
which the baggage animals could not get over. Beyond this rice-ground
rose some hills, at the foot of which was a morass, which the column
would find very difficult to pass. They turned back to the camp,
therefore, to collect labour to make the road passable. Safdar Ali, on
his way back from Mogaung, overtook them, and reported that Po Saw had
disappeared after the Chinaman's murder, and had gone, it was said, to
raise the Kachins nearest to Mogaung. This was not cheering news, as Po
Saw's influence with the Kachins had been relied upon as the means of
establishing peaceable relations with them.

However, the other officials of the town had been helpful; boats had
been sent down to Tapaw, and before the day ended, the _nakan_, or
deputy magistrate, attended by the Kyaung Tagas and Payatagas (builders
of monasteries and pagodas), arrived to pay their respects. They were
reprimanded by Major Adamson for their neglect, and were directed
to take steps at once to make the road passable. The poor men were
evidently in fear and trembling, dreading the vengeance of Po Saw on
the one hand and the wrath of the British Government on the other.
However, the march next day was made without great difficulty: the
ditches were filled up or bridged. The swamp proved a greater obstacle.
Luckily there was an abundance of elephant-grass hard by. This was cut,
and being spread thickly on the surface of the swamp, made a passable
road.

After climbing the hill, the pagodas and monasteries of Mogaung became
visible; and when the level ground round the town was reached, a number
of the chief people were seen, who had come out to meet the British
force and make their submission. On reaching the gates a conference was
held with these, while the town was reconnoitred by the soldiers for a
suitable camping-place.

The burgesses were evidently suffering from great fears. They dreaded
the Kachins, to raise whom was the design of Po Saw. Under these
circumstances it comforted them to learn that the British had come to
stay, and that their town would not be left again without an English
officer and a sufficient garrison. Major Adamson then proclaimed the
offer of a reward of 1,000 rupees for the discovery and arrest of the
murderer of Lon Pein, the Chinaman. He told them to have no fear of
the British soldiers, and assured them that if the Myo-ôk Po Saw would
return to his duty even now, he would be forgiven and restored to
office. By this time, a good site having been found on a sand-bank at
the upper end of the town, the whole column marched through the main
street, that all might see its strength, and established the camp there.

Mogaung[45] was once the capital of a considerable Shan principality.
In 1888 it could count only about three hundred houses. Standing on the
bank at the confluence of two streams, it is washed by water on two
sides. On the other two sides it was defended by a teak palisade in bad
repair. The town is well planned, being, like Rangoon and Mandalay,
laid out in squares, with brick-paved roads at right angles to each
other, one main road, likewise paved, running through the middle.
Many pagodas, substantial structures of brick, and large and handsome
monasteries of teak, ornament the inside of the town and also the
spaces outside the walls. A Buddhist bishop, with jurisdiction over the
whole of the north part of the Bhamo district, had his seat at Mogaung
in 1887-8.

In the centre of the town were some very good houses belonging to the
wealthier residents, and at the upper end the Chinese--who formed, as
they do now, a large and important class of the inhabitants--had their
quarters and their temple. Most of the trade in jade and rubber was
in their hands, and their houses were as uncleanly here as in other
towns of Burma. One of their chief employments was the manufacture
of arrack, which they sold to the town's-people. The shops in their
quarter reeked of it. Whatever the Indian Temperance Society may think,
we cannot be accused of introducing alcohol or the vice of drunkenness
into these regions. Orders were at once issued against selling liquor
to the British soldiers. These orders were treated with indifference
until a Chinaman was caught in the act. He was promptly flogged, and
there were no more cases of the kind. Another race found at Mogaung was
the cross-breeds between Chinese and Shans. "We noticed," says Major
Adamson (short account, p. 27), "very many Chinese Shans.... They are
strange, wild-looking people, as a rule rather short in size, but often
strong and wiry. They are invariably dressed in a blue cotton jacket
and loose blue Chinese trousers, and they wear their hair in a sort
of long tail behind, more or less after the fashion of Chinese. They
are each armed with a long sword, and as a rule each carries a bag, in
which he keeps his eating utensils, food, and blanket."

In the river in front of Mogaung is an island, where the boats which
bring jade and rubber from the north, and all sorts of miscellaneous
merchandise from Bhamo, were moored. A small bamboo bridge gave
connection with the mainland. "The island is looked upon as a place
of safety in the event of the Kachins attacking the town. Many of the
villagers keep their valuables in boats for protection, and some women
and children go nightly to sleep in the boats, where they consider they
are safer than in their houses (_ibid._, p. 28)."

It was Major Adamson's duty to get into touch with the people, and
procure the necessary intelligence concerning local politics and
conditions. There was a man of influence in the town called Shwè Gya,
who had been appointed by Major Cooke to be the _nakan_, or deputy,
when Maung Kala was recognized as Myo-ôk. He could not get on with Po
Saw when that person succeeded to power, and retired into private life.
Shwè Gya was a man of some note and of strong individuality. He was a
cross-breed between a Kachin father and an Assamese mother. But he had
adopted the dress, habits, and religion of the Burmese Shans. He had
been a soldier at one time, and understood Kachin tactics well. Being
able to appreciate the power of the English, he threw in his lot with
them. This man Major Adamson took into his confidence, and found him
most useful and most loyal.

It was necessary for Adamson to be open to all comers and at all
times. As this was not possible within the camp, he moved his quarters
to a rest-house in the town, taking a small British guard for his
protection. On Sunday, the 15th, his mind was relieved by learning that
Po Saw had returned. A Durbar was arranged, to which all the notables
were summoned. The officers of the force being present, Major Adamson
received Po Saw formally, and after explaining the objects of the
expedition and the general policy of the British Government, namely
the establishment of peace and the encouragement of trade, he censured
the Myo-ôk for his conduct, and called on him to explain it. Po Saw
alleged that fear of being called to account for Lon Pein's murder had
been the reason of his flight. Major Adamson accepted the excuse, and
restored him to office. At the same time he assured the people that no
one should be prosecuted for offences against the British Government
committed before the arrival of the expedition, except those who had
been parties to the murder of the Chinaman.

O'Donnell and his police, who had fallen behind the column owing to
the boats with their supplies having been delayed, had now arrived,
and the work of building a fort for their occupation was begun. A site
was chosen on a piece of ground in the middle of the town, bounded on
one side by the river, of which the banks were very steep and formed a
natural defence, leaving the other sides to be protected by palisades.

The mornings now were very cold and foggy, the thermometer falling to
45° or 50°. About nine o'clock the fog cleared off, and the climate
was delightful. The soldiers were naturally eager to move. They
were eating up their stores, and if the Kachins meant mischief the
less time they had to prepare it, the better. A council of war was
held. Major Adamson wished to wait until the Kachins had had time to
arrive. His instructions were to avoid hostilities with the Kachin
chiefs if possible. Po Saw had not summoned them to meet him as he
had been ordered; the letters from the British Representative were
only now reaching them. The Chinese, through Mr. Warry, also strongly
urged delay. Moreover, nothing was yet known about the road to the
jade-mines; and as it was found that, contrary to expectation, paddy
for the transport animals could be procured from the villages in the
neighbourhood, the arguments against delay lost some of their force.
The council decided, after discussion, to halt for ten days.

During the next few days the chief work was the collection of materials
for the fort and its construction, which was rapidly pushed on by
Captain O'Donnell. Houses were also put in hand for the officers who
were to remain in Mogaung, namely the Commandant of military police,
the Assistant Commissioner, and a surgeon. Surveys were made of
the neighbouring country, information about the roads and villages
collected, and in short every preparation made for the advance.

On the 22nd of January, Shwè Gya reported to Major Adamson that
the Myo-ôk Po Saw had disappeared once more. His conduct since his
reinstatement had not been good. It was decided to capture him if
possible, and keep him a prisoner. He was reported to be in a village
about five miles away. Taking fifty men and some mounted police, under
the command of Captain Armstrong, of the Cheshire Regiment, Adamson
descended on the village, surrounded it, and searched every house.
There was no trace of Po Saw; but a man known to be in his service, and
another who was recognized to be Bo Ti, his right-hand man, were made
prisoners.

The final disappearance of Po Saw upset Major Adamson's plans. It was
idle to expect that the influential Kachin chiefs would now come in. It
was necessary to appoint a man to carry on the duties of the Myo-ôk.
Shwè Gya was the best man, but he was not a Shan and the people would
not have accepted him. With the consent of the townsfolk another member
of Maung Kala's family was chosen and placed in authority, with Shwè
Gya as the deputy and real working man. All this was done in public,
and explained to the people. At this time some letters of a friendly
tone came in, with presents from some Kachin chiefs whose hills were on
the road to the jade-mines.

The time had come now for an advance. The fort was ready for
occupation, and was defended by a substantial bamboo palisade, Captain
O'Donnell, with all his police except a detachment of seventy-five, who
formed part of the expeditionary force, were left to garrison it. Mr.
Twomey, Assistant Commissioner, was placed in administrative charge,
and orders were left for the despatch of Bo Ti and the other prisoner
to Bhamo. On the 26th of January the march began. The troops forming
the column under Captain Triscott's command were:--

    Khelati Ghilzai Regiment                100 rifles
    Gurkha Military Police                   75   "
    Cheshire Regiment                        50   "
    Bengal Mountain Battery                   2 guns.

[Illustration: YAWGIN WITH CROSSBOW.
(Mountains north of Myit Kyina.)]

[Illustration: KACHIN WOMEN.
(Northern Irrawaddy.)]

A field-hospital, under Surgeon-Major Barron, and a train of transport
animals with provisions and commissariat stores for seven days,
completed his equipment. Mr. Warry, a survey party, a forest officer,
the Roman Catholic priest who acted as interpreter, Safdar Ali, and
the new Myo-ôk, Poh Myah, with Shwè Gya, the deputy, and some armed
followers, accompanied Major Adamson. Supplies were forwarded up by
river to Kamaing, the first principal halting-place, thirty-three miles
from Mogaung.

Before the force left a reconnoitring party had been sent up to
Kamaing, and had reported the road to be very difficult. The report
was not found to be exaggerated. Marching through elephant-grass
and thick forest, which hid everything except the immediate
neighbourhood, a hardly visible path, obstructed often by huge
fallen trees; camping-grounds which had to be laboriously cleared of
elephant-grass[46] and undergrowth, before standing-room could be found
for the animals or resting-place for the men, with sometimes heavy rain
which drenched every one, made the march anything but pleasant. All
hardships, however, were born with cheerfulness; and as the country was
new and unexplored, and there was a chance of a fight at any time, the
men were full of spirit. They and their officers were true soldiers.

On the 30th the stream on the opposite bank of which lay Kamaing was
reached. It ran deep, and the banks were precipitous. Fortunately, it
was only about the width of a cricket pitch. Trees were felled and
elephant-grass cut, and with the aid of a big trunk found sticking
up in the bed of the river, a bridge was made, over which the whole
force, laden animals and all, safely crossed. "Kamaing," writes Major
Adamson, "is splendidly situated on a small hill, close to the river,
at the point where its two main branches unite, the larger branch, the
Nampoung, coming from the Indawgyi Lake in the south-west" (ibid., p.
40). It had been a flourishing town, as the still remaining monasteries
and pagodas proved. These religious buildings were, however, deserted,
the last monk having died a year before. Of the whole town only a few
houses remained. The place had shared the fate of all this country in
the Kachin rebellion of 1883. There were still a few shops, however,
where Manchester goods could be bought, and articles of food for daily
use were to be had. Country spirits and opium were also on sale.

Here letters came in from the two brothers who ruled the hills in
which the jade-mines are situated. They were called Kansi Naung and
Kansi Hla. Their tone was friendly, though they wrote with the hope of
preventing the advance of our people from Mogaung. Answers were sent
by mounted messengers, saying that the force was already at Kamaing
and would continue its march next day, and assuring the Sawbwas of our
peaceable intentions.

Starting from Kamaing on the 31st of January, the bank of the Indaw
River was reached after some of the most difficult marches made during
the expedition. The path was passable for men but not for a long line
of laden animals. It was very swampy, with tall elephant-grass on each
side, which had been set on fire to make the track passable. The men
had to force their way through the charred stalks, and as there was
a heavy fog at the time "the faces and clothes of the whole column
were speedily as black as if they had been down a coal-mine." (Short
account, p. 36.) For some distance every yard of the road had to be
made by cutting down the tall, coarse grass and spreading it on the
surface of the swamp until it would bear the weight of the animals. So
they made their way, always through the tall grass, until the Indaw
River was struck. Here it was decided to form a defensible camp, in
which all superfluous animals, stores, and tents should be left,
with a sufficient garrison to guard them, while the main body pushed
on to the jade-mines. After their experience of the country, it was
held to be dangerous to move with the whole train if there was any
likelihood of fighting. Two days were occupied in preparing this camp,
in getting some portion of the road cleared in advance, and in holding
communication with a neighbouring Kachin Sawbwa.

On the 3rd of February the reduced column, in light fighting order,
left Kamaing with seven days' provisions, loaded on some hundred
and twenty-five mules. Each man carried two days' rations besides.
Everything that could be done without, including tents, was left in the
camp. It was as well, for the road continued difficult, and every bit
of ground at the halting-places for the night had to be cleared. The
march was sometimes in the bed of a stream sometimes through dense cane
jungle growing in swamp. Hard work in deep mud, from which all sorts of
noxious vapours rose, caused the men to sweat profusely, and exhausted
the animals. Fortunately, through the medium of Shwè Gya, Major Adamson
persuaded some of the Kachin villagers to approach him, and their
services were hired for road clearing.

[Illustration: BHAMO BATTALION DRAWN UP FOR INSPECTION.] [Blank Page]

[Illustration: CHIN HILLS ETC.]

On the 6th messengers from the jade-mine Sawbwas, Kansi Naung and
Kansi Hla, were met, carrying letters for the Deputy Commissioner. The
letters were quite friendly in tone, and invited the British force to
halt on the bank of the Uyu River, where there were grass and water in
plenty. Major Adamson was much relieved to get this communication, as
it seemed to give promise of a peaceable visit to the mines.

The road ascended now through forest and thick bamboo undergrowth, and
was very fatiguing. For the first time men were met carrying down loads
of jade stone. The watershed between the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy
was crossed, and the road then descended into an open plateau, out of
the dense and dismal forest through which our march of seven miles had
been. From 7 a.m. till 2 p.m. we had been steadily marching, but we had
only been able to accomplish seven miles. Heavy rain fell that night
and turned the camping-ground into a bog, and made the road for next
day (February 6th) very heavy. The mud and water reached to the bellies
of the mules, and in places the column was forced to leave the path and
cut a new way through the forest. The Namthein, an affluent of the Uyu,
had to be crossed several times, the water being up to a man's knee and
the bed of the stream 50 yards broad.

At midday the weary force encamped on a tongue of land at the junction
of the Namthein and Uyu Rivers. The camp was on a lovely spot. It faced
southwards, and commanded a view of the junction of the two streams. On
the right was the Uyu, a beautiful stream of from 75 to 100 yards from
bank to bank, "as clear as crystal, and alive with fish, which kept
rising to the surface in the evening, like trout in an English stream.
The bed was generally rocky, full of large water-worn boulders; but
for a short distance above our camp there was a very deep pool under
the opposite bank, while the shore on our side was sandy and gravelly,
and sloped very gradually towards the deep part.... The spot which we
selected for a camp was a beautiful triangular piece of ground, covered
with short grass and a few bushes on the northern portion, and with
a long tongue of shingle and sand stretching southwards to the place
where the streams met."

In this pleasant place came a further letter to the leaders of the
expedition from Kansi Naung, saying that he had given orders that the
English should be treated well, and promising to come himself with
presents.

Next day, however, brought only disappointment. A letter came from
Kansi Naung saying that illness prevented him from keeping his promise.
Other signs indicated that all was not right, and Shwè Gya, who had
been hopeful hitherto, lost heart. The military leaders were for good
reasons in favour of immediate action. Major Adamson, however, took
the responsibility of giving Kansi Naung more time, and wrote to him
peremptorily, saying that they could not wait, and that he must come
in. On the 8th of February news came that Kansi Naung was at a village
on the opposite side of the river, not a mile off. Shwè Gya was asked
to go across to see him. But he declined, saying that he knew Kachins
were on his track to murder him.[47] From two men who came across from
the Sawbwa's camp, one of whom Major Adamson had met in Mogaung, it was
learnt that emissaries from Po Saw had arrived, and were urging the
Kachin chief not to visit the British.

The right course was now clear. Adamson told the men publicly to go
back to Kansi Naung and tell him that if he did not appear before ten
o'clock next day the column would advance to the jade-mines by force if
necessary. Later in the day the polyglot and polygamous interpreter,
Safdar Ali, volunteered to go to the Kachin camp to see if he could
influence the Kachins, or at any rate find out what was in their minds.
His offer was accepted. At the same time all was made ready for a
fight. Next day (February 9th) Safdar Ali returned with a message from
Kansi Naung that the Sawbwa would come, but that ten o'clock was too
early for him.

Captain Triscott fixed the advancing or attacking force at one hundred
rifles and one gun; the rest were not more than sufficient to defend
the camp. The numbers of possible enemies might be large, and if the
advance was opposed the camp also would probably be assailed. By nine
o'clock the men had fallen in and were waiting for the order to march,
when a large party appeared on the opposite side of the river. The
leading man carried a fine pair of elephant tusks. It was evidently a
friendly visit, and proved to be Kansi Naung with twelve other chiefs.
The troops drawn up for a hostile advance were at once turned into
a guard of honour. The military and civil leaders sat in chairs in
front of the hut in which they had sheltered, and the Kachin Sawbwas
on their arrival were seated on the ground in front of them. The tusks
were presented and all the chiefs made their submission. Major Adamson
assured them, Shwè Gya interpreting, that the British Government would
respect their rights in the mines. They were warned against listening
to Po Saw, who had been dismissed from the British service. Presents
were given to each of them, and they were dismissed.

On their departure the troops immediately fell in and started for the
jade-mines, which were reached after an uneventful march on a rough
forest path, which rose to an altitude of fifteen hundred feet. There
was not much to see. "A collection of about fifty houses and what
appeared to be a large quarry, while all over the place were blocks of
white stone of all sizes, some of which were tinged or streaked with
green." The main object of the expedition, to obtain the submission of
the Kachin chiefs and assert the authority of the Government and its
right to the revenue from the mines, had been attained. As no water was
to be had, and there were no rations for the men, the force, after a
short rest, marched back to camp. Everything had gone well during their
absence from the camp. But disquieting letters had come from Mogaung,
telling of a Kachin assault on the stockade.

It remained now to explore the Indaw country. Taking only a small party
from the camp, Adamson went in boats up the Indaw River to the lake, a
very fine piece of water, about sixteen miles long from north to south
by six broad. He found the country round it to be naturally fertile
and bearing marks of much former prosperity. But it had been the scene
of the Kachin rebellion of 1883, which had its rising here, and here
also the rebels had made their last stand. It had been devastated with
all the ruthlessness of an Asiatic conqueror. It bore the marks of
recent prosperity and a thick population. Good roads still united the
ruined villages; nearly every little stream was crossed by solid teak
bridges; sites of old villages still showed gardens of mango, jack,
tamarind, and other fruit trees growing amongst monasteries and pagodas
all absolutely deserted, amidst great stretches of splendid rice plains
showing signs of recent cultivation. Yet only one small patch of land,
about ten acres under tillage, and only in a few places some poor huts
which, surrounded by double and treble stockades, showed the conditions
under which the few surviving peasants lived.

It was hoped that with unlimited rice plains, a magnificent lake
swarming with fish, a Government that would enforce peace, with open
water communications and in the near future a railroad, this beautiful
country would recover prosperity. All that can be said after a
generation has passed is that "it is only beginning to recover from the
devastation caused by the Kachin rising of 1883" (_Burma Gazetteer_,
vol ii., p. 120, edit. 1908). So much easier is it to destroy than to
restore.

The Indawgyi country being now explored, the party rejoined the main
body at the Sakaw camp, and the force set out on its return march to
Mogaung. They had left Mogaung on the 27th of January, and had marched
for four weeks through jungles and marshes most favourable to a savage
enemy skilled in ambuscade. Yet not a shot had been fired. Po Saw,
however, had been busy with the Kachins. Mogaung had been attacked on
the 3rd of February, and the report of this had reached Major Adamson.
They were prepared, therefore, for hostilities, and before they reached
Mogaung, on the 24th of February, they were attacked and lost several
men.

The state of affairs at Mogaung was not very reassuring. The people
were in much alarm. Women and children were sleeping in the boats. The
road was unsafe, and communication with the Irrawaddy was interrupted.
The last boats, four in number, which left the town with the mails
and some prisoners under a guard, had been fired on by Kachins; and
a boatman and one of the Gurkha police were hit. No Chinese boat had
ventured up the river for three weeks. The resident Chinese were
putting their temple in order of defence, and every one expected that
there would be fighting.

The expeditionary force had, however, to return to Bhamo. They had
accomplished the work for which they had been detached. Major Adamson
also was obliged to resume the charge of his district, which had been
left more or less during his absence to a subordinate officer.[48]
Mogaung, the town and the subdivision, were placed in the hands of Mr.
Twomey, the Assistant Commissioner, supported by Captain O'Donnell and
the military police, who were quite able to defend the stockade and the
town, but were not strong enough to keep the country around in order,
if the Kachins came down.

The arrangement was that Captain Triscott should march back by the land
route through Mohnyin to Katha and open up the country which had not
been explored. It had been intended originally to send a small force
up from Katha to meet him. This proved impracticable, but a party of
military police had occupied Mohnyin. Accordingly the expeditionary
force marched back by this route. They were opposed several times by
bodies of Kachins, who had fortified themselves in positions across the
road. These enemies, however, were easily dislodged by the guns, and a
junction with the military police was effected at Mohnyin. The rest of
the return march was made without incident.

It was hardly to be expected in any case that Major Adamson's
expedition should result in the immediate establishment of peace in
the Mogaung country and in placing our relations with the Kachins on
a friendly footing. To secure the submission of a wild people divided
into as many tribes as there are hills in their country, and to bring
them under a civilized system of government, is not the work of a few
weeks. But it was hoped that more than a beginning had been made, and
that time and the residence of British officers at Mogaung would do the
rest.

Some untoward events had occurred to render this hope vain. The conduct
of Po Saw in leaving Mogaung and taking refuge with the Kachins was the
main cause of the difficulties which began to be felt early in 1888.
If Major Adamson had been successful in capturing Po Saw when he made
Bo Ti a prisoner, and if Bo Ti had been securely detained, much of
the trouble which followed during the subsequent years 1888 and 1889,
and even later, would have been avoided. Unfortunately the advantage
accruing from Bo Ti's capture was soon to be lost. He was sent down to
Bhamo and confined in the jail there. The jail, like other buildings
in Upper Burma, was made of wood. It had a stout teak palisade round
it, secure enough if the guard had been trustworthy. It happened that
just at that time an attempt had been made to assassinate the Colonel
commanding in Bhamo. While he was dressing for mess his body-servant
crept up behind him as he stood at the glass and stabbed him in the
back. The servant, a native of India, was arrested at once and locked
up, pending trial, in the same jail with Bo Ti. These two conspired to
escape. They scooped away the ground from the base of some of the big
teak posts which formed the palisade and contrived to loosen them. The
guard being either asleep or in collusion with them, they got away.

Bo Ti soon made his escape felt by our people at Mogaung. He joined
Po Saw somewhere in the Kachin Hills, probably at Thama, and helped
to raise the tribes. The influence of both these men over the Kachins
was very great. In Po Saw's case it was probably more hereditary than
personal. He was descended from the former ruling family, and with the
Kachins as well as with the Burmans a drop of royal blood counts for
much. Personally Po Saw seems to have been a treacherous and cowardly
character. Bo Ti, on the contrary, was a bold leader and had some
military capacity. The two together were powerful for mischief; and it
would have saved much hard work to our men and many lives if they had
been shot in the beginning. However, there they were, and they had to
be reckoned with. The assault on Mogaung and the attack on the column
returning from the jade-mines (_vide_ p. 256) were, in fact, the work
of Po Saw.

For a short time after Major Adamson left with the expeditionary force
there were no disturbances. But signs and rumours of Po Saw's activity
were frequent. The attempts to stop the column on its way from Mogaung
to Mohnyin were organized or instigated by him. In the latter half of
April the rumours began to take shape, and the Kachins were said to be
on the warpath. In the third week of April the headman of a group of
villages in the rice plain south of Mogaung reported to the Assistant
Commissioner that Bo Ti and three chiefs of the Ithi Kachin tribe had
ordered him to join a party which they were organizing for an assault
on Mogaung. If he refused, they threatened to destroy the village
of Taungbaw in which he lived. They required him to meet them at a
given place to settle details. At this time Mr. Twomey, owing to an
accidental wound, had taken leave, and Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, a young
soldier who had been appointed to the Commission, held his place. The
headman proposed that a strong party should be sent from Mogaung to
ambush Bo Ti and his friends when they came to the trysting-place. This
proposal seemed to Lieutenant Eliott to be treacherous dealing which
a British officer ought not to countenance, and he refused to join
in it; a piece of high-minded chivalry somewhat misplaced under the
circumstances. The headman having been advised by Lieutenant Eliott not
to keep the appointment with Bo Ti lest treachery should be intended,
left the fort.

Early next morning he ran in to report that before dawn Bo Ti, with
some hundreds of men, had come to Taungbaw and were stockading
themselves in the village. Taungbaw is four or five miles from Mogaung.
Captain O'Donnell and Lieutenant Eliott, taking the mounted men
and a company of Gurkhas, started at once for the scene of action,
ordering reinforcements to follow. They met fugitives who confirmed
the headman's report, and said that Bo Ti was in strong force and was
fortifying his position. Taungbaw is on a small hill rising abruptly
from the plain, detached and about 400 yards distant from the main
ridge, and about the same distance from a village called Zédi, which
was occupied by friendlies, Burmese and Shan peasants, from the plain.
Bo Ti had been too busy in strengthening his position to pay attention
to the movements of these people.

When O'Donnell and his men were about six thousand paces from the hill,
a signal shot was fired by the enemy's outpost. Advancing to within 400
yards, our men delivered several volleys. Each volley was answered by
a Kachin cheer. Evidently they meant to make a stand. At this moment
the reinforcements from Mogaung came up and it was decided to attack
the Kachin position. The hill was steep and covered with thick bamboo
jungle, very difficult to get through. The enemy could not be seen.
Dividing his men into three parties, O'Donnell sent the mounted men
round the left flank to form up in rear of the hills. Part of his
infantry were sent round the right flank and told to get well under the
hill. The remainder, led by the two British officers, then worked round
the right flank, which seemed to offer the best openings for an ascent.
As they crossed a narrow causeway in a paddy-field and a small bridge
they drew the Kachin fire.

On coming into touch with the first party it was told to go farther
on round the hill. The order was then given to advance with fixed
bayonets. The bamboo jungle prevented the men from getting on fast. A
heavy fire was kept up by the Kachins, but owing to the steepness of
the ascent the bullets flew high and there were no casualties. Beyond
the bamboo jungle was the village stockade, which was within 30 yards
of Bo Ti's position. But when the Kachins saw the Gurkhas forcing their
way through this stockade, they did not wait for the bayonet, but after
firing a few shots bolted down the hill, our men chasing them.

At the bottom the mounted men took up the running, and it was a case
of every man for himself, Unfortunately when the firing began some of
the Mounted Infantry ponies were scared and broke away. Owing to this
mischance the pursuit was less effective than it should have been.
Even so the affair was well managed and gave a lesson to the Kachins,
who left eighteen dead near the village and on the line of flight,
and several prisoners were also taken. The friendly villagers lay low
during the fight. When it was all over they came to the front and began
mutilating the dead in a barbarous fashion, and were driven off with
difficulty and not without force.

Some anxiety was felt by Captain O'Donnell and Mr. Eliott lest Po Saw,
learning that the greater part of the garrison had gone out, should
attack the Mogaung stockade. Only sixty-six men, some of them sick, had
been left in the fort--enough, perhaps, to hold it, but not to defend
the town. Fortunately no attempt was made by Po Saw. At the time of
the fight he was on his way to the jade-mines. He had attempted, as it
was learnt afterwards, to come to Bo Ti's assistance, but he could not
reach the scene of the fight in time.

The next month showed constant activity on the part of Po Saw and Bo Ti
and their Kachin allies. Frequent attacks were made on boats going down
or up the Mogaung River. It became necessary to send them in convoys
with police guards. Villages near Mogaung were raided, and early in May
Nanpapa, near Sinbo, was attacked, many villagers killed or carried
away, and the village destroyed. Po Saw himself took up a position
at Kamaing, where he could harass the traders on the route to the
jade-mines and Indawgyi, and from which he could also threaten Mogaung.
It was not possible for Captain O'Donnell to drive him away or to act
on the offensive at any distance from the fort. Hence the enemy became
more daring.

On the 21st of May, under cover of night, a large body of Shans,
under Bo Ti, got into the town and took up positions within the low
brick-wall enclosures of the pagodas, which, as has been described,
were scattered about in and outside the town. The garrison, under
Captain O'Donnell and Lieutenant Eliott, turned out against them. A
really good fight followed, in which the enemy lost forty-nine men
killed and many wounded, and were driven in confusion out of the town.
They were nearly all Shans, some of whom had come from the Uyu country
beyond the jade-mines. The garrison lost twenty-three men killed and
wounded. The Gurkhas were gallantly led, and behaved grandly, and on
that day the Mogaung Levy won a name for itself.

The situation at Mogaung caused some anxiety. The garrison was too
weak. Its strength was now only two hundred and ninety-two men, many
of whom were sick, not enough to allow a force to leave the post for
a day. Two hundred men were ordered up from Bhamo, and with that
addition the garrison would be able to hold their own, but it would not
suffice to enable them to punish the Kachins. Bo Ti was occupying a
place called Nyaungbintha, in the midst of the Ithi tribe of Kachins,
by whom he was strongly backed. At Kamaing on the north was Po Saw,
supported by the Thama Sawbwa of the Lepei tribe, who appeared to be
most hostile. There could be no permanent peace until the strength of
these tribes should be broken.

At the earnest request of the Chief Commissioner two mountain-guns,
with the necessary equipment, were given to the Mogaung Levy. There was
some not unnatural reluctance on the part of the military authorities
in India to trust an irregular force with artillery. But the excellent
conduct of the men in the late fights, and the proved capacity of the
gallant young soldier commanding them, overcame their unwillingness.
It was impossible to allow Captain O'Donnell to attack stockades and
to turn large bodies of the enemy out of strong positions without
artillery. With only one British officer, or at the most two, a chance
shot or a bamboo spike might deprive the force of its commander and
cause a disaster. The Chief Commissioner pressed this argument, and
asked to be allowed to raise the garrison of Mogaung to ten companies.
Sanction was given in October.

It took time, however, to raise and train the additional companies
of Gurkhas; and in any case the expeditions which the conduct of the
Kachins had rendered necessary could not have been undertaken until the
rains had passed. In the meanwhile, until the guns and reinforcements
reached them, the Mogaung officers were instructed to concentrate
their men in Mogaung, not to attempt to occupy outposts; to move about
patrols of fifty men when the weather permitted it; to strike at the
enemy when they saw a good opening and could inflict real punishment;
while leaving always enough men in the fort to defend it and the
town. They were forbidden to make small and hasty expeditions into
the Kachin Hills in order to retaliate on raiders. These restrictions
were galling, no doubt, to Captain O'Donnell and to the Assistant
Commissioner, Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, who was a keen soldier as well
as a promising administrator. The Chief Commissioner, however, could
not risk a catastrophe. Moreover, he held that spasmodic action of
this sort, while exposing small parties of our men to much risk, only
embittered the wild hill-men without impressing them with our strength,
and was transient in its effects. The plan of subsidizing those chiefs
who were not in arms against us, and could help to guard the trade
routes or carry the mails, was recommended.

Present needs having been provided for, a plan of operations to be
undertaken during the coming open season was framed by the Chief
Commissioner, in consultation with Sir George White, and early in
November it was sanctioned by the Government of India. Four separate
operations were to be undertaken.

1. Against the Lepei tribe north of Mogaung, the leading chief being
the Sawbwa of Thama, Po Saw's main supporter.

2. Against the Ithi tribe south of Mogaung, who were under the Sawbwa
of Panga.

3. Against the Sana Kachins of the Lataung tribe, who had raided near
Mogaung in May.

4. Against the Makau and other tribes in the neighbourhood of Sinbo,
who were responsible for the destructive attack on Nanpapa in May, and
for another in August on trading boats at Hlegyomaw on the Mogaung
River.

The control of these operations was taken by Sir George White at the
Chief Commissioner's request, the military police in the subdivision
being placed at his disposal. While the necessary preparations were
being made, letters of the nature of an ultimatum were sent to the
Sawbwas of Thama and Panga and other tribal chiefs, requiring them to
make formal submission to the subdivisional officer at Mogaung, to pay
for the damage done by them to traders, and to surrender Po Saw and Bo
Ti, who had lately added to their crimes the murders of Shwè Gya, the
best friend the British Administration had in Mogaung, and of the loyal
headman of Kamaing who had always helped us.

On the 7th of January, 1889, the force[49] detailed for these
expeditions left Mogaung under command of Captain O'Donnell.[50] The
first step was to occupy Kamaing, after a very slight opposition by
the Thama Sawbwa's men, and to establish a permanent military police
post there. Unfortunately smallpox broke out amongst the Gurkhas of the
Levy, and Captain O'Donnell found it necessary to halt at Kamaing until
the 15th of February, and thus a whole month of the most favourable
season for military operations was lost.

On the 15th of February, the men's health having been restored, the
force fell to work with energy, and engagement rapidly followed
engagement. On the 16th of February three villages were taken after
some resistance. On the 17th the Kachins were encountered on a strongly
stockaded position, which was taken and destroyed. On the 19th Thama
itself was taken. The enemy here showed more fight. Three men of the
Hampshires received gunshot wounds, and two officers and eleven men
were injured by bamboo spikes.

Captain O'Donnell's report gives the following account of this
engagement, which shows the nature of the fighting in these
expeditions:--

"My guide, who had done splendidly up to this, lost me four valuable
hours in finding the road. He struck it at last, and after a severe
climb of 4½ miles, we came out near the village of Thama. On arriving
at the crest of the hill Lieutenant Eliott, Assistant Commissioner,
received a letter, stuck in a stick on the road, from Thama Sawbwa, in
which he said we might come and burn his village, he would do nothing
but hide in the jungle, &c. This put us on our guard, and we went on
cautiously over the crest, and then saw what appeared to me through
my glasses, a garden paling. I examined it well, but found nothing
suspicious about it. However, I ordered the advance with all caution.
The Hants were in front, the Gurkhas forming flanking parties in rear.
When about sixty yards from the place we could not make out that it was
more than a paling, when suddenly we were saluted by a volley from many
guns. Three Hants men fell under this badly wounded, but the remainder
walked off the road into the jungle and poured in some very steady
volleys. The Gurkhas were quickly up on the right flank, and the guns
were brought up and two rounds fired at the stockade, and then with a
wild cheer it was rushed and taken, the rebels not waiting....

"Blood was found here. I went on, leaving the rear-guard to bring on
the wounded. We came before a second stockade; we were again saluted,
but no casualties occurred, and one round from a gun and another charge
made us masters of this also. In this charge much damage was done us,
two officers and eleven rank-and-file being spiked by bamboo spikes.
Captain Macdonald and I were both spiked through the foot. After this
no more opposition was met with and Thama was entered and destroyed. A
search in the jungle was made, but nothing found. After the sick had
been attended to I returned to camp, meeting no opposition _en route_."

On the 21st of February a place called Muklon was assaulted and
taken. Here Lieutenant Hawker, of the Hampshire Regiment, fell badly
wounded--spiked in the thigh. He was sent down to Bhamo, where he died
of the wound. By the 9th of March the operations against the Lepei
tribe had been completed, all their villages or stockades taken, and
large quantities of grain captured. Our losses amounted to twenty-one
officers and men killed and wounded. The Kachin loss is not known; it
was probably very small, as they made no firm stand.

After little more than a day's rest Captain O'Donnell moved out
again, this time against the Ithi tribe to the south of Mogaung. He
established a post at Nyaungbintha, in the centre of their territory.
By the 28th of March ten villages of this tribe had been taken with
very little fighting. The village of Waranaung, of which the chief
had been loyal in every respect since the occupation of Mogaung, was
carefully preserved from injury.

On the 4th of April a move was made against Sana, which fell without an
effort.

The column now turned south to Sinbo, and from that base moved out
to punish the villages concerned in the barbarous raids on Nanpapa
and Hlegyomaw. The villages concerned having been taken after some
resistance, the task assigned to Captain O'Donnell was completed on the
4th of May.

In these four expeditions our casualties amounted to one officer
and three men killed, and five officers and thirty men (including
followers) wounded. The column was engaged with Kachins thirty-two
times, and took forty-six stockades. Owing to the loss of a month by
the sickness at Kamaing, the work was more hurried than the Chief
Commissioner had designed. The results, however, were very good,
and had been obtained with more ease and less bloodshed than had
been expected. By the occupation of Kamaing, the trade route to the
jade-mines was opened and made safe. The Marip tribe who dominate the
jade-mines, and the Sassum tribe who adjoin the amber-mines, were
freed from Po Saw's pressure and their loyalty assured. Villages from
the Kachin tribes came in by scores to make formal submission to the
Assistant Commissioner at Mogaung. Of the Thama Sawbwa's villages
only Thama and two others held out; the Ithi tribe, the Kachins round
Sinbo, and the Lakun tribe south of the Ithi country all submitted. In
short, the peace of the district was secured and the authority of the
Government established.

From the number of casualties it might be inferred that the service
was one of little danger. The inference would be wholly wrong. The
column was engaged in bush or jungle fighting with the enemy almost
every day, and if our casualties were not greater it was due as well
to the precautions taken by the leader and to his skilful tactics as
to the failure of the Kachins to defend their stockades. The heaviest
part of the work fell on the Gurkhas of the Mogaung Levy (military
police), who furnished the flanking parties. Without them the force
must have lost heavily. "The flanking done by the Gurkhas was splendid
indeed, and it is entirely owing to their jungle work that I had not
more casualties."[51] The column marched over six hundred and fifty
miles, fighting continually, and the men's clothes and boots were
torn to pieces. It was a fine display of patient endurance, courage,
and persistence, in face of great difficulties, by officers and men.
The Commander, Captain O'Donnell, was one of the soldiers to whom the
Administration of Burma in those days owed so much. And he was greatly
assisted by Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, to whom fell the difficult duty of
providing good guides and correct information.

Captain O'Donnell concluded his report on the results of the operations
with a notice of Lieutenant W. Hawker, of the Hants Regiment. "He was
spiked through the thigh while gallantly leading his men in a charge at
Mukton on the 15th of March, 1889. He was attached to the Mogaung Levy
for these operations. He was senior to Lieutenant Benson, and might
have taken command of the levy from that officer." But he showed "a
sincere spirit in the welfare of the service" in refusing to supersede
Lieutenant Benson, who belonged to the Indian Army and knew the men and
their language. "He volunteered to take charge of the transport on the
line of march, and this he did until Captain Macdonald was wounded. He
was commanding the Hants men when he received his death-wound."

FOOTNOTES:

[41] A lesson enforced by many examples in Upper Burma was that until
a country in the process of annexation can be held permanently, it is
useless and sometimes cruel to occupy it and leave it after a time.
The following is taken from a report on the Ava district: "Myotha
is a large village which had previously welcomed and aided British
detachments, and had as a consequence been plundered by the rebels on
their departure. Most of the inhabitants were in hiding in the jungles;
they came in on hearing of the arrival of the troops, but were much
distressed at their leaving."

[42] _Vide_ a short account of the expedition to the jade mines by
Major C. H. E. Adamson, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo (J. Bell &
Co., Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1889).

[43] Colonel Hugh O'Donnell, D.S.O. He raised the Mogaung Levy, and
served all through the Burma business, 1886-91, and did excellent work.

[44] Colonel Charles Prideaux Triscott, R.A., C.B., D.S.O.

[45] Present population something under 3,000. The Myit Kyina Railway
has a station at Mogaung.

[46] At some places the grass had to be trodden down by marching the
men backwards and forwards.

[47] This was not a mere suspicion. He was marked down and assassinated
soon after this (_vide_ p. 264).

[48] It must be remembered that we had not a spare man in these years;
while the overworked civil staff, especially the best of them, were
often disabled by sickness and compelled to leave.

[49]
                              { Capt. Macdonald.
    Hants Regiment--51 rifles {
                              { Lieut. Richards.

    Mountain Battery }
                     } 2 guns, Capt. Fuller, R.A.
      No. 2 Bengal   }
    320 Mogaung Levy { Lieut. Benson, Munster Fusiliers, Commanding.
      (Gurkhas and   { Lieut. Hawker, Hants Regiment.
      Sikhs)         { Lieut. Manning, South Wales Borderers.
         Mr. Crowther, Inspector of Police.
         Lieut. Clements, Staff Officer.
         Lieut. Eliott, Assistant Commissioner, Political Officer.
         Col. Cronin, Senior Medical Officer.
         Mr. Ogle, India Survey Department.

[50] Under military regulations Captain O'Donnell, being in command
of troops called Military Police, would have been unable to command
regular troops, and thus his experience and ability would have been
lost. This difficulty was easily avoided by Sir George White.

[51] Captain O'Donnell's report.




CHAPTER XX

BHAMO, THE SOUTHERN TOWNSHIPS, AND MÖNG MIT


South of Bhamo when we took the country was a Shan State known as Möng
Leng, and adjacent to it and separating it from the district of the
Ruby Mines was another Shan State named Möng Mit. The two together
covered a large area, including the lower valley of the Shwèli and
stretching from the southern boundary of Bhamo to the northern and
north-western limits of the Northern Shan States of Tawngpeng and North
Hsenwi. Neither of them was included in the list of Shan States proper.
They were much mixed up with the adjacent British districts Bhamo Katha
and the Ruby Mines. They were little interested in the politics of
the Shan States; and being more easily accessible to the Burmese and
very open to Kachin raids, they had not much cohesion or independence.
For these reasons they were not placed under the jurisdiction of the
Superintendent of the Northern Shan States, but were dealt with by the
Commissioner of the Northern Division.

At the time of the annexation the Sawbwa of Möng Mit had died. His
heir, a minor, was under the tutelage of the _Amats_, or ministers, who
formed a council to rule the State; which, as well as its neighbour,
Möng Leng, was in great disorder. The diverse races which people this
country, Kachins and Palaungs[52] in the hills, Burmans and Shans in
the more open parts, make it hard to govern. In Möng Leng there was
in 1886-7 no central authority. In Möng Mit the administration was
very feeble. The Kachins were in the ascendancy. They were ousting
the Palaungs, and trampled on the more peaceful villagers of the
plains. But even the Kachins had no cohesion and obeyed no central
authority. Each chief did what seemed best in his own eyes; he raided
and blackmailed every village that lay within reach of his hills.
The formation of the country, a jumble of hills covered with dense
jungle, through which the drainage of the higher ranges forces its way
naturally, produced an unruly race. The only open tract of any extent
is the valley of the Lower Shwèli from Myitson to the Irrawaddy at
Pyinlebin.

[Illustration: GETTING A DHOOLIE UP AN AWKWARD BIT.]

[Illustration: CLIMBING UP THE STEEP CHIN HILLS.
Chin Campaign.]

Early in 1886 one Hkam Leng came to the Deputy Commissioner of the
Bhamo district which touches Möng Leng on the south, and claimed to be
recognized as the chief of both Möng Leng and Möng Mit. He was told
that his claim would be inquired into, and that meanwhile he should
remain quietly in Katha. Towards the end of the year, however, growing
impatient, he went to Möng Mit and presented himself to the people as
their Sawbwa. But they rejected him without ceremony. He applied to the
Deputy Commissioner for assistance without success, and then became
irreconcilable and a centre of disturbance.

The ministers of Möng Mit, on the other hand, were loyal and helpful.
To the extent of their power--not much, it is true--they gave active
assistance to the British force which occupied the Ruby Mines in
1886-7. In April, 1887, the Chief Commissioner being at Mogok, the
headquarters of the Ruby Mines district, received the ministers of
Möng Mit there and inquired into the facts. Finding that the title of
the young Sawbwa was good, he confirmed him in his position. It was
decided to appoint a regent, assisted by the ministers, to govern the
State until the young chief should come of age. The boundaries of Möng
Mit territory were defined, and Hkam Leng was formally warned against
overstepping them, while at the same time he was assured that if he
came in and made submission to the Government he should be recognized
as chief of Möng Leng. In despite of this he attacked villages in Möng
Mit and endeavoured to establish himself by force of arms.

During 1887 he continued in open hostility. Several small expeditions
had to be made against him; and the southern border of the Bhamo
district, as well as the Möng Leng country and the Kachins in all the
hills about, were kept in a restless state. As it was found impossible
to reconcile him, Hkam Leng was outlawed and the Möng Leng country
partitioned. The northern part was added to the Bhamo district as the
Upper Sinkan township; the remainder was made over to Möng Mit, to
which it had at one time been subject.

Hkam Leng, however, was by no means disposed of. He lurked for the most
part in the Kachin Hills to the east of the Möng Leng country, and was
frequently in the villages along the upper reaches of the Sinkan. To
him another restless spirit was soon allied. In 1886 the two sons of
the Hmethaya Prince, one of King Mindon's numerous progeny, had made
themselves prominent in resisting the British Government. Their cause
was taken up by a notable guerilla leader, Shwè Yan, who raised their
standard in the Ava district. Driven out of Ava at the end of 1886,
they took hiding in Mandalay, where a plot was hatched for supporting
their claims. The conspiracy was discovered and the leaders arrested.
The younger Prince was captured and sent to school in Rangoon. The
elder, Saw Yan Naing, escaped to Hsenwi, and failing to get help there
retired to the mountainous and very difficult country on the borders of
Tawnpeng and Möng Mit. There he made his quarters in a strong position
not easy to approach, and gathered round him a band of discontented and
desperate characters. No attempt was made during 1887-8 to dislodge
him, and he contented himself with threatening Möng Mit. He was invited
to surrender, and favourable terms were offered to him. The only wish
was to relieve the country from his presence. But he would have no
truck with us.

Early in 1889 reports came in from Bhamo and other sources that Saw Yan
Naing and Hkam Leng had agreed to unite forces and make simultaneous
attacks on various points in the north. They were reported to be
enlisting the aid of Kachin tribesmen, Chinese bandits from across
the border, and Burmese outlaws. Risings were to be organized in the
Upper Sinkan township and a descent made on Möng Mit. Even the date
for the rising was fixed. Whether there was any systematic concert or
not was never ascertained, but a good many outbreaks occurred without
any visible connection and of no great magnitude, but enough, taken
all together, to harass both soldiers and police, as well as those
responsible for the administration. From the Ruby Mines district as
early as the last week in December had come reports of a gathering,
headed by Saw Yan Naing, at Manpun, in the hills, three marches from
the town of Möng Mit. A detachment from the Hampshire Regiment was sent
from Bernard Myo, the Cantonment of the Ruby Mines, to Möng Mit, to
garrison the town, while the State levies went out to act against the
body of rebels at Manpun.

Meanwhile Lieutenant Nugent, who was in command at Möng Mit, hearing
that there were some dacoits a few miles off, went with sixteen men
of the Hampshires to attack them. The dacoits were strongly posted.
Lieutenant Nugent and one private were killed and six men wounded. The
remaining nine men, encumbered with the wounded, had to retire. This
disaster happened on the 14th of January. Lieutenant Nugent was a young
officer without experience of the country, and he ought not to have
been left without some one capable of advising him.

It was promptly retrieved. The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Archibald
Colquhoun, getting together troops and police, renewed the attack on
the enemy's position and drove them out with much loss. On the 20th of
January the village or town of Twingé, on the Irrawaddy, was taken and
burnt by one of Hkam Leng's adherents. No attempt was made on Möng Mit
after that date, and no formidable bands were encountered, although the
Ruby Mines districts and the adjacent parts of Möng Mit were harassed
by small gangs of robbers. A feeling of anxiety, however, prevailed
and begat alarming rumours. The imagination of Shans, Burmans, and
perhaps of other nervous persons, is fertile in the matter of numbers,
and loves to deal in large figures. At the end of January hostile
gatherings at different points, amounting to nearly two thousand men--a
quite impossible number--were reported from Mogok, the headquarters of
the Ruby Mines district. With a view to allaying these apprehensions
the garrisons there and at Möng Mit were strengthened.

The Chief Commissioner thought it best, under the circumstances, to
place the control in the hands of one man, and at his request Sir
George White appointed Colonel Cockran, of the Hampshires, to command
all the troops and military police in the disturbed area, with orders
to take the measures necessary for the peace of the country and for the
destruction of such gangs as might be found. Up to the end of March,
however, no important action was taken, as no large body of the enemy
had been located.

On the 30th of March a column under Major Garfit, of the Hampshire
Regiment, was dispatched against Saw Yan Naing, who was still at
Binbong, near Manpun. Four stockades were taken without loss on our
side, and Saw Yan Naing and his following fell back for the time. The
Chief Commissioner intended, and had arranged with the Major-General
commanding, that this column should remain in Binbong and the
neighbourhood at least till the middle of April, in order to make our
influence felt in these wild parts and to co-operate with a police
force which had been sent through Mönglong, a sub-State of Hsipaw,
lying south-west of Möng Mit, and also to join hands with Lieutenant
Daly, the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States, who was ordered
to come with military police through Tawnpeng. Unfortunately the
officer commanding misunderstood his instructions, and leaving Binbong
on the 6th of April returned to Möng Mit. The expedition consequently
was not very fruitful of results, and Saw Yan Naing returned to the
neighbourhood and took up his quarters at Manton a little farther north.

Unluckily, Lieutenant Daly was unable to leave his headquarters at
Lashio until the 7th of April. He then proceeded to Tawnpeng in
accordance with the orders he had received from the Chief Commissioner,
directing him to co-operate if possible with the force acting against
Saw Yan Naing. Lieutenant Daly had been instructed also to get into
communication with the Prince, and to renew the offer of terms if he
would surrender.

In January, when at Hsipaw, Lieutenant Daly had met a Shan who had been
with Saw Yan Naing in July and August of the year preceding (1888);
this man undertook to take letters to the pretender. He arrived at Möng
Mit soon after the defeat of the band which had gathered near that
place, and heard that the Prince had left Manpun after that encounter,
in which one of his chief followers, besides many others, had fallen.
The messenger, therefore, was unable to deliver the letters. However,
in March Lieutenant Daly, being at Hsipaw, again met this man, and sent
him off with fresh letters to the Prince. Again fortune was adverse.
Major Garfit delivered his attack just before Lieutenant Daly's man
reached Manpun, and the Prince had gone. However, he had not gone far,
and was found by the messenger in Möng Mit territory, in a Palaung
village. He had a following of one hundred men, more or less, of whom
twenty were Burmans, the rest Shans and Kachins; none of them men of
note. As Saw Yan Naing had been attacked only two or three days before
by the column from Möng Mit, he was not disposed to trust the promises
made to induce his surrender. Nevertheless, he behaved as a Prince
should. The messengers were allowed to stay four days in his camp, and
were hospitably treated.

They were then dismissed with a polite letter, to the effect that "he
had not plotted against the Government, but that on account of his
past offences he feared to come in, that he had no wish for Government
alms" (an allowance had been offered to him); "and that he would take
to flight if Lieutenant Daly came near his camp." He had married the
daughter of a Kachin chief. It may be that beyond allowing himself
to be made the centre of disturbance he had taken no active part in
the movements made in his name. None the less his presence in British
territory was the cause of trouble.

While these events were passing in Möng Mit a watchful eye had to be
kept on other parts of the district. Towards the end of December,
1888, the Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo received news of the appearance
of a Mintha, or prince of some kind, on the Molè River, north-east
of Bhamo. This Prince gave out that he was in concert with Saw Yan
Naing, and his plans may have been conceived with the design of acting
with Saw Yan Naing and Hkam Leng. The rising appeared to be somewhat
formidable. It was promptly met. Mr. Segrave, the Superintendent of
Police, was sent out at once with a strong detachment of military
police. He encountered the band, which was made up mainly of Chinese
brigands and deserters from the Chinese army, on the 9th of January,
1889, and punished it severely, killing more than fifty men. The rest
dispersed and escaped, probably over the Chinese border. The peace of
the district north of Bhamo was not disturbed again during the year.
The connection of this band with Saw Yan Naing was not established. In
their camp were found papers showing that they were in communication
with the leaders of the Mogaung malcontents, namely, the Sawbwa of
Thama and Po Saw.

Hitherto it had been found impossible to post military police in the
Upper Sinkan township. The difficulty of communication, especially in
the rains, was great, and the climate very hurtful. The best possible
arrangement was made by appointing a Kachin of much influence to act as
magistrate and executive officer, and this man had been able to keep
order, at least on the surface. His headquarters were at Sikaw. In
December, 1888, Mr. Shaw, the Deputy Commissioner, visited Sikaw and
also Si-u, an important village near the head of the Sinkan stream.
He learnt that Hkam Leng, who was allied by marriage to the Kachin
chiefs of the Lweseng and Tonhon range in the east of the township, was
harboured by them, and from time to time came down to Si-u and levied
contributions from the peasants. The Kachin magistrate had followed
the Burman plan of shutting his eyes to that which it was inconvenient
to see, and, lest he should incur his superior's displeasure, he said
nothing about it. He was warned against permitting Hkam Leng to enter
his township, and ordered to send speedy information to Bhamo if he
should reappear. This warning had a good effect. Early in January,
1889, he reported that Hkam Leng had returned to Si-u, and was
corresponding with a pretended Prince at Hpon Kan, a hill range thirty
miles from Bhamo, a very nest of hornets. At the same time information
was received from other sources that a large gathering of Chinese and
Burmese, said to number five hundred men, were at Hpon Kan.

The Chief Commissioner was at Bhamo at the end of January. He arranged
that a patrol of troops should visit Sikaw and Si-u at least once a
month. Unfortunately something prevented the despatch of the military
patrol, and on the 3rd of February the duty was entrusted to a party
of fifty military police. On the 4th of February, at Malin, a village
on the Sinkan River, about twenty miles from Si-u, the police came on
a large body of rebels strongly stockaded. They attacked the stockade,
but were repulsed, losing two men killed and ten wounded and all their
baggage.

A strong column, consisting of 60 rifles of the Hampshire Regiment,
150 of the 17th Bengal Infantry, and two guns, left Bhamo as soon as
news of this disaster came in. On the 7th of February, after driving
in their outposts, this force engaged the enemy at Malin, where they
were holding a strong position. They stood their ground with more than
usual courage, and were not dislodged without some severe fighting,
which cost us the loss of one officer and four men killed and eighteen
wounded. The pursuit was carried for some distance, but they did not
rally, and dispersed over the country. It was ascertained that this
rising had been organized by Hkam Leng and Saw Yan Naing. In fact,
the nucleus of the gang was a body of eighty or ninety men from the
Prince's headquarters at Manpun joined by large numbers of villagers,
some of their own free will, some under compulsion. The villages that
furnished contingents were fined, the police force increased at the
cost of the township, and the population as far as possible disarmed.
No attempt was made to punish the individuals who had taken part in the
business. Hkam Leng retired to his Kachin wife and allies in the hills.

Late in May an attempt was made to capture him, but it was frustrated
by his Kachin supporters, who afterwards came down in force and
occupied Si-u. On the 2nd of June they were attacked by troops and
police and driven out, losing twenty-one killed. The police force in
the Upper Sinkan was reinforced again. The rains being now at hand,
further action had to be postponed.

Everything united to obstruct the work of bringing this part of the
country into order. The hills and forests, the neighbourhood of the
Chinese frontier, the character of the people, Kachins and Palaungs,
who had to be dealt with piecemeal hill by hill, and had never
submitted to any central control, all combined to make it a very hard
task. The Burmese officials may have had some control over the tribes.
But probably so long as they did not make too much disturbance the
hill-men were left to do as they liked. When there is no government
things arrange themselves, and a limit is automatically fixed which the
raiding tribes cannot exceed without exhausting their preserves. The
advent of the British cut the weak bonds by which the hill people had
been held, and the appearance of Saw Yan Naing and Hkam Leng as active
opponents of the foreign invaders gave them a rallying-point.

The first step towards peace was the capture or expulsion of these
two leaders, both of whom, it may be noted, following the example of
more enlightened princes, had cemented their alliances by marriage
with Kachin ladies of rank. It was decided, therefore, so far as the
northern part of the province was concerned, to devote the open season
of 1889-90 to the complete subjugation of this tract of country. If
possible, the two leaders were to be got rid of. In any case the
recalcitrant Kachins and others were to be reduced to obedience and
the authority of the Möng Mit State over its outlying parts affirmed.
In the district north of Bhamo nothing called for immediate action. A
strong body of seasoned Gurkhas from the Mogaung Levy under Captain
O'Donnell could be detached to strengthen the column of troops provided
from the Bhamo garrison.

It was arranged accordingly that one column should go to Si-u and move
early in December against the Lwèseng and Ton Hon Kachins and then move
on to Manpun; and that a second, starting from Möng Mit, should join
the first at Manpun, while at the same time the Superintendent of the
Northern Shan States (Lieutenant Hugh Daly) should move with some of
the Shan Levy (Indian military police) through Hsenwi and act with the
first two columns; and a fourth column, also of military police under
Mr. H. F. Hertz, Assistant Superintendent of Police, should work up
from the south-east through Möng Löng and along the Tawnpeng Möng Mit
boundary.

[Illustration: BARGAINING WITH HAKA CHINS.]

Instructions were given to the Sawbwas of Tawnpeng and North Hsenwi to
take measures to stop the passage of fugitives through their States.
There was a reasonable hope that these measures, although they might
not effect the capture of the leaders, would establish the authority of
the British Government and bring home to the people of this difficult
tract the inconvenience of resistance.

The Bhamo column, commanded by Major Blundell, accompanied by Mr. G.
W. Shaw, the Deputy Commissioner, left Bhamo on the 15th of December,
1889, for Sikaw. The tribes began to take in the situation. Twelve
hills or groups of the Lakun tribe came to Sikaw to make formal
submission, and one of their leading men volunteered to guide the force
against Lwèseng. This was a good beginning. Major Blundell, sending
forward a detachment to Si-u to keep the road open, left Sikaw on the
20th of December and marched on Lwèseng. A party of Gurkhas under
Captain O'Donnell was ordered to take up a position at the ferries in
the rear of the Lwèseng Range, which were said to be the only places
where the Shwèli River could be crossed. Several other such points,
however, were found, and at one of them were signs that the fugitives
had already crossed over. While making this reconnaissance Captain
O'Donnell's men were exposed to Kachin fire from the hills, and a very
distinguished Gurkha officer (Kala Thapa Sing) fell.

The main body reached Lwèseng on the 22nd of December. A stockade
across the road a mile from the village was defended by Kachins, and in
taking it a native officer was killed and five men wounded. The village
was found deserted, and was occupied by our men. There was some sniping
from the hill-slope afterwards, and two were wounded. Next day the
force advanced to Ton Hon. Two stockades erected across the road were
defended, but were turned, with the loss of two men wounded, and Ton
Hon was occupied without further fighting. But again the Kachins fired
from the hills into the village, and one Gurkha was killed and another
wounded. A halt was made at Ton Hon for some days in order to open
communications with the Kachins, in the hope of bringing them to terms.
The elders of Lwèseng and Ton Hon and other neighbouring villages came
in. The Deputy Commissioner selected seven villages which had opposed
the troops and harboured rebels, and imposed on them a fine of money
(Rs. 2,500) and guns (50). By the 30th of December all the villages
belonging to these tribes had submitted and part of the fine had been
paid. The chiefs, however, still held aloof.

On the 3rd of January, 1890, the column left for Manton, leaving a
Burmese civil officer, supported by a detachment of the 17th Bengal
Infantry, to collect the balance of the fine. Manton was reached
without any fighting on the 11th of January; and the column from Möng
Mit marched in on the same day. The village was found deserted, and Saw
Yan Naing had fled. He made his escape, it was said, into the Chinese
territory of Chefan. On his road through Northern Hsenwi he just missed
falling into the hands of Mr. Daly, who arrived at Manton on the 16th
of January. Thus the three parties met and were able to exchange
information. After a few days' halt Mr. Daly continued his tour through
Hsenwi territory, while the Möng Mit and Bhamo columns waited at Manton
for supplies. Some villages which had been hostile were visited; and
as a large body of Kachins and Palaungs was reported to have gathered
at Lanchein, a few miles south of Manton, where Saw Yan Naing had
stayed on his flight, two detachments were sent out to disperse them.
Stockades had been built across the road and were stubbornly defended
by the enemy. Here Major Forrest, in leading one of the detachments,
was severely wounded. The village was taken and destroyed, while the
troops returned to Manton.

It was now decided that the Möng Mit party under Major Greenaway, with
Mr. Daniell as civil officer, should move south to Manpun, while the
Bhamo column remained at Manton. On the way Mr. Daniell was met by
the headmen of the villages between Manton and Manpun who had come to
tender their submission to the British Government. They were told that
if Saw Yan Naing was with them he must be given up, and fines were
imposed on those groups or circles of villages which were known to have
given the rebel leaders active help.

By the 25th of January all the headmen of the five hills or circles
comprised in the south-western quarter of the Möng Mit State had made
formal submission. On the 26th of January Mr. Hertz, who had marched
from the south-east through Möng Löng with his military police,
arrived in Manton. The rough country along the Taungbaing border had
been entrusted to him to search--a duty he performed well, while as
a by-work he constructed a very useful map of the ground. The Möng
Mit column moved to Yabon, a village nearer to Möng Mit, and from its
position a better base for operations. News was now received that
Hkam Leng was in hiding in Sumput, a village north of the Shwèli.
Major Greenaway, accompanied by Mr. Shaw, marched with a part of his
force for Sumput by way of Molo, which ferry was reached on the 1st
of February. Hkam Leng, however, had left Sumput, and Major Greenaway
moved across the Shwèli to Kyungyaung.

Convinced by the experience of these operations that the mere movement
of troops through the country was ineffectual, the Chief Commissioner
decided to take rougher measures to bring home to the people of this
tract the power of the Government, and to convince them that they could
not support these disturbers of the peace with impunity. Orders were
issued, therefore, to arrest and deport the headmen of the villages
which aided and sheltered the two leaders. These orders reached Mr.
Shaw at Kyungyaung and were executed at once. The headmen of twelve
villages who had been most active were arrested and sent into Bhamo,
and at the same time monthly fines were imposed on their villages.
Similar measures were adopted under Mr. Daniell and Mr. Hertz's
supervision in the circles which had befriended Saw Yan Naing. But in
spite of the efforts of the civil and military officers, who spared
neither themselves nor their men, the capture of Saw Yan Naing and Hkam
Leng was not effected.

The open season was now drawing to a close. It seemed unlikely that
further action on the lines followed hitherto would have much more
success. The Chief Commissioner asked Brigadier-General Gatacre to
visit the country with Mr. Shaw and see if they could advise any other
measures more adapted to the nature of the case. Early in March, with a
strong force, General Gatacre visited Si-u Ton Hon and Lwèseng, north
of the Shwèli, and then went southward through Molo to Manton. He
reported the country through which he passed to be quiet and the people
to be submissive. Leaving a party of one hundred rifles, including
forty Mounted Infantry, at Sipein with Mr. Shaw, to work the circles
north of the Shwèli, and Mr. Daniell with one hundred rifles at Manton
to work south of that river, he withdrew the remainder of the troops.
Proclamations were issued, with the Chief Commissioner's approval,
warning the people of the consequences of opposing the troops and
promising reduction or remission of the fines that had been imposed
if the leaders of the revolt were surrendered. On the 28th of March
the headmen gave Mr. Shaw a formal engagement to observe the terms of
the proclamation, and he was able to withdraw the troops and return to
Bhamo.

Before the close of the operations the headman of Manton, who was one
of the most obstinate adherents of Hkam Leng and had hitherto evaded
arrest, was captured by the Kachins of the neighbouring circles and
delivered to Mr. Daniell. He was deported to Mogok, the headquarters
of the Ruby Mines district. All this country, it should be remembered,
known as the Myauk-Kodaung (the northern nine hills), estimated to
contain 2,500 square miles, belongs to the Möng Mit State. On the
withdrawal of the troops an official of that State was left in charge
with a force of the Sawbwa's militia to keep order. Before the British
troops left the Kachin Sawbwas entered into solemn engagements to keep
the peace, to shut their hills against Saw Yan Naing, and to obey the
Möng Mit Sawbwa to whom they are subject.

Some progress had been made by the middle of 1889 towards the
establishment of order. The root of the trouble, however, lay in the
weakness of the Möng Mit administration. The most effectual measure
undoubtedly would have been to place the State directly under the
administration of a British officer. This method of meeting the
difficulty was considered and set aside by the Chief Commissioner.
In the earlier years of our rule there were strong reasons against
absorbing any of these quasi-independent territories. It was our
settled policy to maintain the Shan States in the position they enjoyed
under the Burmese Government. The absorption of one of them would have
alarmed the others just when we were striving to win their confidence
and to bring them peacefully into the fold. For this reason mainly the
Chief Commissioner refused to wipe out the Kalè State, although in that
case there were much stronger reasons for adopting this course (_vide_
Chapter XXI., pp. 291, 292), and a desire not to depart from this line
of policy led him to treat Wuntho with forbearance. In the present
instance, moreover, the Möng Mit chief was a minor; his ministers might
be accused of incapacity but not of dishonesty or hostility.

It was sought by other means to improve the administration of Möng
Mit. Saw Möng, who had been ejected by his enemies from his hereditary
State of Yawnghè (_vide_ pp. 142-143), at the time of the annexation
was selected as a man of some power and of known loyalty and placed as
regent in Möng Mit. The experiment did not succeed. Whether from want
of sufficient governing power or because, not being their hereditary
chief, he met with little support from the people, Saw Möng[53] failed,
and in 1892 it was found necessary to place the State temporarily under
the Deputy Commissioner of the Ruby Mines, who governed it as part of
his district until the year 1906, when the young Sawbwa came of age,
and was entrusted with the administration of his State. He is doing
well. Saw Yan Naing and Hkam Leng did not appear on the scene again.
What has become of them is not known, and it is hardly necessary to
inquire. It is hard to see what use they served except to try the
endurance of our people and to harass the souls of their compatriots.

The narrative as regards Möng Mit and the territory once called Möng
Leng, now known as the Upper Sinkan township of Bhamo, has been brought
down to the year 1889-90.

It is now necessary to go back a year or two and deal with the range
of hills known as Hpon Kan, lying about thirty miles to the south-east
of Bhamo. The Kachins in these hills began to harass us from the
first. Early in 1886 they attacked Sawadi on the Irrawaddy and exacted
tribute from the Sinkan villages. They raided the open country near
Bhamo several times, and on one occasion even made their way within our
lines, killed some Indian soldiers and burnt some of the barracks.

They were in reality not of great account. But the first attempts to
deal with them were unfortunate, and after a time they began to be
regarded with a seriousness quite unmerited. Two military expeditions
went from Bhamo in 1886, the objective being Karwan, the village of
the most important chief of the tribe. The first expedition failed to
reach the village and returned without doing anything. The second in
the same year was well managed from a military point of view, and had
forced its way against some opposition to a point close to Karwan,
when the civil officer with the column, under some misunderstanding of
the orders he had received from the Chief Commissioner, Sir Charles
Bernard, stopped the advance, and the column retired without effecting
the object for which it had been sent. The result was that the Karwan
chieftain and his tribe were persuaded that the British were afraid to
meet them. The chief would neither submit nor deign to visit the Deputy
Commissioner, and his hill became a rendezvous for the restless and
evil spirits around. Gatherings of Burmese and Chinese were reported,
and it was apprehended at one time that they would join the rising in
Upper Sinkan. They confined their action, however, to some small raids
on insignificant villages below the hills. In the beginning of March,
1889, they again descended to the plains and stockaded themselves at a
place named Kyawgaung, killed the headman and carried off his family.
Some troops, sent out to cover a fatigue party building a post for the
police at Mansi, about fifteen miles from Bhamo, were fired at from the
jungle, and the village of Mansi, consisting of a few houses, was burnt
by the Kachins, and two of the military police killed.

[Illustration: MARCHING INTO THE KLANG KLANG COUNTRY.
Chin-Lushai Campaign.]

The necessity of punishing the Hpon Kan Kachins for all their misdeeds
had long been admitted. The country round Bhamo was kept by them in
constant alarm, and the failure to deal with them led to excitement and
want of confidence in the Bhamo bazaar, peculiarly ready to believe
absurd rumours and subject to panic. More urgent matters had hitherto
delayed action, and the garrison of Bhamo had been so weakened by the
despatch of troops to Mogaung, that it could not afford men for other
work. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, was compelled to wait. Towards
the end of March the return of troops from the north made it easier to
find a force for the Hpon Kan business; and the opportunity was at once
taken of destroying this nest of hornets, or, to describe them more
accurately, mosquitoes. Sir George White arranged a plan of operations
at the Chief Commissioner's request, and the Commander-in-Chief of the
Madras Army, being at the time in Upper Burma, gave his approval at
once.

The force was of such a strength as to ensure the complete reduction
of the refractory tribes, it was hoped, without fighting. It consisted
of two guns of a mountain battery, fifty sappers, two hundred and
fifty British, two hundred and fifty Native Infantry, of whom one
hundred were Gurkhas, and was commanded by Brigadier-General George
Wolseley,[54] C.B. The civil officers with the force were Mr. Shaw,
Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo, and Mr. Warry, of the Chinese Consular
service, with whose name the reader is acquainted already (_vide_
Chapter VII.). Regarding the work of the expedition and the manner
in which it should be carried out, the Chief Commissioner gave full
instructions. The punishment of the Sawbwa of Hpon Kan and of his
people, unless they made timely submission, was the duty imposed on
the force. Notice was to be given to the Kachins that villages which
helped the advance of the force would be protected; villages from
or near which any opposition was offered would be destroyed; and on
those Kachins who would not submit as much damage as possible would be
inflicted by destruction of their houses and property. In any case, the
village where the Sawbwa had his residence was to be occupied; and a
fine in money and guns was to be exacted from him. The amount of the
fine was to be fixed by Mr. Shaw with reference to the Sawbwa's means
and to the amount of damage done in his raids. All captives held by
the Kachins were to be surrendered. If this was impossible the fines
payable by the custom of the country in such cases were to be exacted.
In the event of the Sawbwa rejecting the terms his village was to be
destroyed.

In view of the former failures, strict orders were given that
negotiations with the Sawbwa were not to be opened until Karwan,
his capital village, was occupied by the British force. There, and
nowhere else, were the terms of surrender to be settled. And it was
added that "under no circumstances should Mr. Shaw advise the return
of the force or the suspension of operations until the objects of the
expedition should have been accomplished and the Sawbwa's village
occupied." The Chief Commissioner added that "if it were possible the
force should remain in the Sawbwa's village for some days so as to
make his humiliation apparent to his people and to the neighbouring
tribes." Orders were issued by the Commander-in-Chief of Madras, Sir
Charles Arbuthnot, at the Chief Commissioner's request, for the troops
to remain at Hpon Kan until the Chief Commissioner should be satisfied
that they could be withdrawn without bad results.

The troops were divided into two columns, and, avoiding the direct road
where the Kachins might be prepared to oppose us, they took different
routes, and after very slight opposition Karwan was occupied. Our
loss was two killed and three wounded. The Sawbwa did not make his
appearance. Karwan and several other villages were therefore destroyed.
On the 23rd of April the Sawbwa of Washa, a neighbouring village of
another tribe, and the elders of Neinsin, one of the Hpon Kan villages,
the headman of which was detained as a hostage in Bhamo, came forward
and volunteered to bring in the headmen of Hpon Kan. They were given
two days to make good their offer.

[Illustration: HAKA SLAVE WOMAN.
Smoking a pipe.]

[Illustration: HAKA BRAVES.]

On the 25th of April they came back with two of the Karwan elders, who
accepted the terms imposed by the Deputy Commissioner, and promised
to bring in the Sawbwa and other elders. The terms imposed were that
fines for various murders and for the burning of Mansi should be paid
and fifty guns surrendered and captives restored. The money fine was
paid in full and the guns delivered. The Chief Commissioner thereupon
sanctioned the withdrawal of the troops, and the main body left Karwan
on the 15th of May. Before the evacuation of the place the headmen of
the Hpon Kan villages entered into a solemn agreement to cease from
raiding. This promise has been kept.

The objects of the expedition were thus accomplished, and these tribes
did not give trouble again.

While General Wolseley was at Karwan, Mr. Daly, the Superintendent of
the Northern Shan States, accompanied by Mr. Sherriff, a representative
of the Rangoon Chamber of Commerce, came to Nam Kham, on the left bank
of the Shwèli, the chief town of a small State subordinate to North
Hsenwi. It was a good opportunity of joining hands and examining the
road between Hpon Kan and Nam Kham.[55] Taking a sufficient escort,
General Wolseley went by a circuitous route, to avoid a neck of Chinese
territory which runs down between the Bhamo district and North Hsenwi.
Leaving Karwan on the 2nd of May, Wolseley made Nam Kham on the 8th.
After two days he returned to Bhamo with the troops.

It may be added, before closing this chapter, that the Kachin tribes,
whom it was necessary to subdue with such severity, have been for many
years furnishing excellent recruits to the military police; and Kachin
detachments, officered by men of their own race, can now be entrusted
with the charge of frontier outposts.

FOOTNOTES:

[52] Palaungs are a Mon-Anam tribe, found mostly in the uplands of the
Northern Shan States (_Upper Burma Gazetteer_, vol. iv., p. 179).

[53] In justice to Saw Möng it should be noted that he has
been restored to his own State of Yawnghwè, and has shown much
administrative power.

[54] General Sir George Wolseley, G.C.B.

[55] Nam Kham is the place where Mrs. Leslie Milne resided for fifteen
months to gather materials for her charming book, "Shans at Home."
Writing of the Northern Shans States she says (page 186): "Before the
country was annexed to Great Britain, in 1886, each chief governed
his own State, and the King of Burma was his overlord, to whom he was
obliged to pay a heavy tribute. Burman officials terrorized over the
Shans, and, owing to heavy and unjust taxation, the people were in a
perpetual state of rebellion against their chiefs. The chiefs were
constantly fighting amongst themselves, and were also trying to free
themselves from the Burman rule." The condition of the country under
Burma has been described in the historical chapter of her book, written
by the Rev. Wilbur Willis Cochrane, of the American Baptist Mission.
She goes on: "I should like to draw attention to the unhappy state
of the people under the invasion of the Kachins, who were slowly but
surely taking possession of the hill country." Then Mrs. Milne quotes
from "Parliamentary papers for 1859-76." It is sufficient to give here
only a part of the quotation: "They (the Kachins) have ousted many
Shan tribes, and wherever they appear they assume the same character
of 'lords of all they can reach,' only to be appeased by some form
of 'blackmail.'... They inspire such terror that in the neighbouring
plains no Burman or Shan will venture alone, or even in company,
unarmed along the roads within their reach." "This state of affairs,"
Mrs. Milne concludes, "lasted until the British annexation, and our
Government have worked what one might almost call a miracle; for, the
first time since the beginning of Shan history, peace prevails all over
the country."




CHAPTER XXI

THE CHINS

GENERAL FAUNCE'S EXPEDITION


The seventeenth chapter told the story of the Sawlapaw expedition,
which covered the time from the spring 1888 to the second month of
1889. The western frontier of the province was the scene of equally
interesting and much more difficult operations during the same period.
When Upper Burma was annexed it is doubtful whether the difficulties,
that might arise from the wild tribes which would become our
neighbours, received much consideration. The Burmese Government thought
very little of raids and disturbances on their frontiers. A British
Administration could not show the same indifference.

Along the west of the Upper Burma districts of the Upper and the Lower
Chindwin, of Pakokku, and of Minbu, lies a wild region of hills,
inhabited by semi-savage tribes known to us as Chins. This mountainous
region forms a wedge very long in comparison to its width. The broad
end marches with the south of Manipur, the Naga Cachar, and east Sylet
hills, and the point rests on Cape Negrais. It is formed of high,
narrow ridges and deep valleys, all running from north to south,
and the people are split up into numerous tribes and clans speaking
many different dialects. The only system of government was that of
headmen of villages, or at the most of a small group of villages, and
consequently negotiations with the Chins as a people were impossible.
The principal tribes, with which the present narrative is concerned
are, on the north, the Siyins, including the Sagyilains, and the Sokte
tribe, including the Kanhows; in the centre of the country the Tashons
and Hakas (nicknamed by the Burmese Baungshès); and, southward of them,
a number of tribes, Chin-boks among others, who are less formidable as
border neighbours.

Between the hills and the Chindwin, and forming an enclosure in the
Upper Chindwin district, was the little Shan State of Kalè. Like the
States on the Shan plateau, it was governed by a Sawbwa who had a
measure of independence. Owing to its position, practically, on the
Chindwin, Kalè was much more in subjection to the Government of Burma
than the more distant Shan chiefships. It was, moreover, exposed to
raids from the hill-men, and for a long time past had suffered much
from the Siyin group, who were the most frequent and barbarous raiders,
burning villages, slaughtering the peasants, and carrying off many as
slaves into the mountains.

At the time of the annexation the Sawbwa of Kalè was an old man, by
name Maung Ket, incapable of administering his country. On the 1st of
January, 1887, the Chief Commissioner, finding that he could neither
keep order within his territory nor protect it against enemies from
without, caused him to be removed with some of his officials to
Mandalay, and appointed his nephew to rule in his stead. In November,
1887, Maung Ket escaped from Mandalay with his followers and took
refuge with the Tashon Chins, who in former years were on friendly
terms with the Kalè State.

In March, 1887, the Deputy Commissioner of the Upper Chindwin (Captain
Raikes) met representatives of the Tashon tribes at Indin and explained
to them that raiding must be stopped. His warnings seem to have
influenced them; for a whole year few villages were attacked. Several
circumstances, however, had tended to unsettle the minds of these wild
tribes.

The ex-Sawbwa of Kalè had a disturbing influence and endeavoured no
doubt to persuade them to help him to regain his position. In the open
season of 1887-8 a project for opening up the Chin country from the
Bengal boundary in the west to the frontier of Burma proper on the east
was started in India, prematurely so far as we were concerned. It was
proposed that roads should be made through the hills, communications
established, and the hill people subjugated. The phrase "from the
Salween to the sea" was invented and had some effect.

[Illustration: ON THE CHIN HILLS--ARRANGING A PLAN OF ATTACK.
Chin-Liushai Campaign.]

In the winter of 1887 Captain Raikes with another officer went up the
Myittha River and arranged a meeting with the Tashon chiefs. Sonpek,
the principal man of the tribe, came down from the mountains and met
Captain Raikes on the 3rd of January, 1888. He was courteous, even
friendly in his manner, but guarded in his speech. His fears were
excited by the close questioning (concerning the routes through his
country eastward) to which he was subjected, so much so that he would
hardly accept the presents offered to him by Captain Raikes. The
meeting, however, ended in outward friendliness on both sides. No
action was taken by the Government towards entering or approaching the
Tashon country, and nothing indicated that the Chins had been seriously
alarmed.

Other events followed which added to their uneasiness. Captain Raikes
had visited Indin in March, 1887, and had found two persons in the
ruling Sawbwa's service whose intrigues were causing trouble in the
Kalè State. One was Maung Tok San, the other Maung Tha Dun, styled
"Chingeh," or "Minister for the Chins." These two men were removed by
Captain Raikes from Kalè and confined at Alôn. After some months they
were released on security. They made use of their freedom to escape to
the Chin Hills, where they joined the old Sawbwa who had preceded them,
and helped him to excite the tribes.

It happened at the same time that part of the Pakokku district on the
Lower Chindwin was very much disturbed. The guerilla leader, known
as the Shwègyobyu Prince, had been able to collect a considerable
following and to raise a small revolt (see Chapter VIII., pp. 84, 85).
Expelled from the low country, he also sought safety with the Tashons.
The arrival of a Burman Prince, whether genuine or pretender, did not
matter, a man with a certain amount of prestige, a good deal of energy,
and a bitter hatred of the foreigners, gave the Tashons heart, and they
determined to take action. On the 4th and 5th of May a body of Sonpek's
Tashons, numbering some hundreds, descended on Indin, made the Sawbwa
prisoner, and took him to Chingaing (a village near the foot of the
hills), where he had interviews with Sonpek and the Shwègyobyu Prince.
He promised to join them in their resistance to the British, and on
that condition was allowed to return to Indin. The Sawbwa, however,
kept faith with us. Getting some men together, he sent them to attack
the Shwègyobyu Prince in Chingaing, and despatched urgent messengers to
the Deputy Commissioner (Mr. Ross) asking for assistance.

This sudden raid by the Chins on the Kalè State, and their readiness to
assist a pretender like the Shwègyobyu Prince, had not been foreseen,
and took the authorities by surprise. The messages received at
headquarters were alarming. Eleven hundred Tashon Chins were reported
to have surrounded Indin and carried off the Sawbwa. Several thousands
were said to be on the warpath; five hundred had occupied Indin, three
hundred were marching on Taungdwin, three hundred on Kalewa--all
these of the Tashon tribe. Of the Siyins, five hundred were making
for Kalemyo, six hundred threatening the Kabaw Valley, and so on. The
numbers were obviously much exaggerated. Nevertheless, as the men on
the spot thought the situation serious, measures of precaution had to
be taken. A force under Major Gleig, consisting of 100 rifles, Cheshire
Regiment, 250 Madras Infantry (15th) and two guns, were sent up the
Chindwin River in steamers to Kalemyo. At the same time 150 Mounted
Infantry (100 British, 50 Native), accompanied by Captain Eyre, the
Deputy Commissioner of the district, were despatched from Pakokku, viâ
Pauk and Gangaw, to take the raiders in the rear. A party of military
police from the Kabaw Valley Battalion, with two guns, were moved down
to Kalewa.

These dispositions sufficed to restore order for the time. Major
Gleig's force disembarked at Indin on the 24th of May; Captain Eyre
with the Mounted Infantry was at Chingaing, a few miles from Indin, on
the 26th, the rifles and guns from the Kabaw Valley arrived at Kalemyo
about the same date. The party, accompanied by Captain Eyre, marched
up through the Yaw country without meeting with any opposition. They
covered 152 miles in eight days and hoped to surprise the Shwègyobyu,
who, with a mixed following of Burmans and Chins, had continued to
hold Chingaing; but as soon as the alarm was given by his scouts
he fired the village and escaped into the hills. The enemy were
encountered only on one occasion. On the 17th of May a police officer
making a night march with 60 rifles of the military police (Indians)
was attacked by a body of men under Bo Saga, a noted dacoit leader. The
men lately enrolled were unsteady and fell back, and the party retired,
losing two men wounded. The officer reported that he had found the
villages on his march deserted and that the insurgents were collecting
men and arms. Several Burman villages had been burnt; men, women, and
children had been killed, and many carried off into the hills. The
measures taken may seem in the recital out of proportion to the danger.
But it was by no means a false alarm.

The rains had now set in, and the Kalè and Yaw country in that season
does not tempt the hill-men to raid. They returned to their mountains.
The disturbances ceased almost as suddenly as they had begun. The
troops returned to their quarters, a guard of military police being
left at Indin to protect the Sawbwa.

Although order had been restored for the present, it was evident to the
Chief Commissioner that the Chins had yielded to the climate rather
than to fear. They had escaped punishment; and as they had burnt
villages and returned home with many captives the campaign in their
eyes must have seemed successful.

It was necessary to protect the Yaw Valley which was our territory,
and the Kalè country, the Sawbwa of which was our dependent and too
weak to help himself. A proposal was made by the local officer to
simplify matters by taking the Kalè State under direct administration.
It was argued that as we were obliged to defend Kalè, we might as
well administer the country and receive the revenues. Looking,
however, to its effect on the minds of the people, this appeared to
be a mistaken policy. Every Sawbwa in the Shan States might have been
degraded on similar grounds. The Kalè man, so far as was known, had
not been disloyal. In the early part of 1887 he had acted well, and in
the present affair he had not acted badly. If he had not been well
informed regarding the movements of the Chins, he was no worse than
the British officers in the district. He was suddenly surrounded and
seized. In procuring his liberty by consenting to join the insurgents
he took the best course, or what he thought the best course, for
himself. He lost no time in sending information to the nearest officer,
and he attacked the rebel gathering with his own men. To remove him
under such circumstances would have been unfair, and might have alarmed
others whose fears it was not good policy to arouse.

It was decided, therefore, by the Chief Commissioner not to absorb
Kalè, but to leave a military or police guard at or near Indin, with
supports at Kalewa. An ultimatum was sent to the Tashons, ordering them
to deliver up the Shwègyobyu Prince and other leading rebels, as well
as the leaders of the Chins who captured the Sawbwa of Kalè and raided
his villages. On the 21st of July, 1888, the Chief Commissioner (in a
minute submitted to the Government of India) recounted the events which
have been narrated, and gave his opinion that there could be no peace
until the Chin tribes had been subdued. He asked permission to take the
matter in hand as soon as the dry weather set in, and to subjugate the
Chins once for all.

The first step in the plan of campaign was to occupy in force and
permanently the difficult country lying below the Chin Hills, and to
bring it under efficient administrative control.

For this purpose the Chief Commissioner in June, 1887, asked the
Government of India to raise a frontier battalion in India for the Yaw
Valley. It was assumed, in framing the plan of campaign, that this
battalion would have been ready before the rains ended, and that it
would have been possible to hold this district firmly. To have attacked
the Chins and to have withdrawn the troops would have been to leave the
villages in the plains exposed to the vengeance of the hill-men.

The next step was to march an expedition into the Chin Hills. The force
was to be divided into three parts. The Siyin and Sagyilain tribe was
to be invaded from the Kalè Valley by a force of the Kabaw Valley
military police, brought down for the duty. The Tashon country was to
be entered simultaneously by a column of regular troops with two guns,
having its base at Sihaung on the Myittha River, to which place the
men, their baggage, and supplies, could be brought by water. At the
same time a force collected at Gangaw was to threaten the Yokwa Haka
and Thatta Chins, to prevent them from helping the Tashons.

[Illustration: HAKA CHINS.]

[Illustration: A CHIN "ZU" DRINK.]

The subjugation of the Tashons was judged to be the most formidable
task. The object was to reach and, if necessary, to destroy their
chief village in Burmese Ywama. There were no roads, only difficult
hill-paths. Hill-coolies and mules were necessary for transport. There
were no supplies in the country. The work, therefore, would have to
be taken in hand leisurely, the road cleared and made practicable for
mules, supply-stations established, and nothing left to chance. A slow,
determined advance, it was held, would have a greater moral effect than
an attempt by forced marches to surprise the enemy. If it were possible
a simultaneous attack should be made from the Arakan or Chittagong
Hills on the west to take the Tashons in the rear.

In reply to the ultimatum sent to them (see above), the Tashons
released the captives taken in the raids on the 18th and 19th of May,
but declined to give up the Shwègyobu Prince and other Burman rebels.
They put forward counter-claims on their own part, and threatened
further raids if their demands were not complied with.

In August an order was sent to the chief of the Siyin and Sagyilain
tribes to surrender the captives taken by them from several villages in
the preceding April and July, and they were warned that if they did not
comply with this demand punishment would follow.

Early in September raiding began again. While the Government of India
were considering the Chief Commissioner's proposals the Chins acted.
They put their threats into execution. A village near Sihaung was
raided by the Tashons on the 17th of September, and an alliance was
formed by a large number of subdivisions of the Haka tribe. On the 18th
of September a village in the Gangaw circle of the Pakokku district
was attacked, it was reported, by Tashons. It was clear to the local
officers that the anticipation of serious trouble would be realized.
The Government of India were pressed, therefore, to allow the immediate
enlistment of the military police levy for the protection of the Chin
frontier, which had been asked for early in June. In October the reply
of the Governor-General in Council to the Chief Commissioner's minute
of July 21st was received. It was a refusal to sanction the proposed
expeditions.

About this time the local officers reported that Sonpek, the Tashon
leader, was inclined to give up the Burman refugees, but that he
would not surrender the old Sawbwa of Kalè. It was just possible that
through the latter's influence Sonpek's inclination might be translated
into action. The old Sawbwa, therefore, was informed that he would
be pardoned for his part in the disturbances if he brought about the
surrender of the Burman rebels by the Tashons. At the same time, as
a precaution against the attacks which were anticipated, Kalewa and
Sihaung were garrisoned, and endeavours made to prevent the Chins from
getting their usual supplies of salt and other necessaries from the
plains.

The country lying between the Chin mountains and the Chindwin and
Irrawaddy Rivers is, speaking generally, what would be called in India
"terai"; covered with large stretches of forest and intersected by
numerous watercourses and streams, with a heavy rainfall and intense
heat. It is very unhealthy and a difficult country for troops to work
in. The main river in this track is the Myittha, which rises from
the southern part of the Chin mountains; it runs almost due north
for a hundred miles or more, and then turning suddenly to the east
for fifteen or twenty miles joins the Chindwin at Kalewa. During its
course northward it receives by many affluents the drainage of the
eastern slopes of the Chindwin. Three ranges of thickly wooded hills,
called the Pondaung Ranges, run parallel to the Myittha on the east,
with intervening valleys which are fertile and cultivated. East of the
third range of hills lies the Pagyi township of the Lower Chindwin
district. In the west of this township, bordering on the hills above
mentioned, is the country known as Shitywagyaung--"the valley of the
eight villages"--of which the most important is Thitkyidaing. West of
this village lie Saga and Kyaw. The country lying between the Myittha
River and the range of hills on the east is known as the Yaw country,
in the southern part of which is the Yaw River, which rises in the same
hills as the Myittha, but, turning in a south-easterly direction, makes
its way to the Irrawaddy below Pakokku, the river-port of the district
in which the Yaw country lies. Gangaw is the chief village in the Yaw
country, and is more than 100 miles from Pakokku. The road to it passes
through Pauk at about the twentieth mile, and the Yaw River, which has
to be crossed, is unfordable when in flood.

In 1888 the country about Thitkyidaing had not been thoroughly reduced,
chiefly on account of its unhealthiness and the scarcity of civil
officers. Mr. Carter and Colonel Symons worked this tract in 1887-8,
and brought it to order after the disturbances raised by the Shwègyobyu
Prince, in which Major Kennedy and Captain Beville, Assistant
Commissioner, met their deaths. Many of the dacoit leaders were
captured or killed at that time, but the country was not thoroughly
controlled.

There was so much to do in the early years of the annexation and so
few to do it, that outlying tracts like the Yaw country were neglected
for a time. This tract had, it is believed, even in the King's time,
been left very much to itself. In 1887 the Deputy Commissioner of
Pakokku (Captain Eyre) visited it. The people received him well. An
arrangement--the best possible at the time--was made with the local
officials, who undertook to pay the revenue and to be responsible for
the order and protection of the territory. Hitherto the people had
defended themselves against the Chins; and, to encourage them, five or
six hundred muskets were distributed to villagers who in the opinion
of the Burman officials would make good use of them. In some cases
a subsidy was given to pay for the maintenance of a rude militia or
irregular police. This arrangement had worked well until the time of
the events now to be told, and it had the recommendation of economy in
money and men when economy was more than usually imperative.

The refusal of the Government of India to allow an expedition into
the Chin country in no way absolved the Chief Commissioner from the
duty of protecting the people against these savages, for which purpose
he had sufficient means at his disposal. He therefore took counsel
with the Major-General commanding in Upper Burma (Sir George White) as
to the measures necessary. It was resolved to move a body of troops
up from Pakokku through Gangaw along the whole line of the frontier
subject to raids, and to establish a chain of posts, Tilin, Gangaw,
Kan, Sihaung, Kambalè, and Indin. General Faunce, who commanded the
military district in which the disturbed tracts were situated, was
given the control of the operations. Major Raikes, who was at the time
in charge of the Lower Chindwin, and had had more intercourse with the
Chins than any other of the civil officers, was associated with General
Faunce and entrusted with the political duties. A force about 500
strong was ordered to move up along the frontier with General Faunce,
while three companies of Gurkhas were to be sent by river to Kalewa. No
preparations were made for attacking the Chin strongholds in the hills,
as the Government in India had forbidden it. Raiding parties were to be
followed up and punished whenever and so far as it might be possible.

The Chins began to act before these arrangements had been completed.
Reports of raiding came tumbling in fast. On the 14th of October
Homalin was attacked by followers of the Shwègyobyu, assisted by Chins
from the Tashon country. On the 17th Chitpauk, in the Kabaw Valley,
was raided by Siyins, who killed seven and carried off forty-five
villagers. On the 20th of October Kambalè was surrounded, two villagers
were murdered and six kidnapped. On the 22nd of October the Siyins
attacked Kantha, north of Kan, and made off with thirty-two villagers.
On the 29th of October a large body of the hill-men came down on
Kalémyo, the principal village in Kalè. They burnt part of it, killed
three of the villagers, wounded four, and carried forty into slavery.
On the same day Khampat, in the Kabaw Valley, was raided by a party of
Kanhows, seven men were killed and twenty-seven taken away.

These occurrences gave the Chief Commissioner a text for again
preaching the need of punishing these unruly mountaineers; and,
meanwhile, such measures as were possible and within his powers were
taken. On the 9th of November the Government of India intimated
that they were inclined to reconsider the proposal of the Burman
Administration. On the 16th their orders came, giving the Chief
Commissioner a free hand to do what he could with the troops at his
disposal, and with the transport to be had within the province.

General Faunce had left Pakokku on the 14th of November. Captain Eyre,
the Deputy Commissioner of Pakokku, went with him. His orders were to
give all the help possible to the General, especially in procuring
transport. He was to retain charge of the Pakokku district, and was
not to go beyond its limits. The force accompanying General Faunce
consisted of 356 men of the 10th Madras Infantry, 49 Mounted Infantry
of the 10th Bengal Infantry, and 50 lances of the 1st Madras Lancers.
As they went forward posts were established at Chaungu, 7-1/2 miles
north of Pauk, at Tilin, at Gangaw, and at Kan on the Myittha, 20 miles
north of Gangaw, and at Sihaung, between Kan and Indin.

The garrisons at Gangaw and at Kan were strong, 170 rifles at each
place, all of the 10th Regiment Madras Infantry. At Sihaung the
strength was 250 rifles. Hitherto, as has been explained before, the
task confided to General Faunce was to protect the frontier, to stop
raids, and, if possible, to pursue and account for the raiding parties.

The sanction given by the Government of India on the 16th of November
completely altered the character of the movement. It became primarily a
punitive expedition against the Chins. The 1st Bengal Mountain Battery,
77 strong, with 6 guns, 58 Madras sappers, and three companies of the
44th Gurkhas, were sent up by steamer to Kalewa; and by the time the
General arrived at Kambalè, which he made his headquarters and the base
of his expedition, he had a force of twelve hundred men (650 being
Gurkhas) under his orders, besides between 200 and 300 military police
(Indians), who held Indin and Kalewa, and were placed at his disposal.

As a consequence of the change of policy, transport became an urgent
question--in fact the main question. The military authorities asked
for two thousand coolies, men that could carry loads in the hills. The
Deputy Commissioner, Captain Eyre, believed that he could get the men,
and at the instance of the General commanding, the Chief Commissioner
consented to allow Captain Eyre to go with this large body of coolies
if he could enlist them, and an officer was ordered up to Pakokku to
take charge of the district and to set Captain Eyre free for this
purpose. This fact is mentioned, as it explains in a measure how the
Deputy Commissioner's attention was somewhat distracted from his
immediate duty--the administration of the district for which he was
responsible.

Captain Eyre accompanied General Faunce as far as Kan, near the
northern boundary of the Pakokku district. He then left him, meaning
to return to Gangaw for the purpose of collecting coolies. He had
information of several gatherings of dacoits, under known leaders, in
the hills north-east of Gangaw, and at Mozo, north of Kan, and some
time was spent in looking after them. He heard of a body of dacoits
in position in the bed of a stream, between two thickly wooded banks
in a strongly stockaded camp. The dacoits were taken by surprise, and
their camp was rushed and destroyed. Pursuit was impossible, owing to
the nature of the country, and there was nothing to be done except to
return to Kan. The enemy harassed the retiring party all the way, and
our men had continually to turn and drive them off.

Next day reports came in that the villagers were joining the dacoits,
and that a body of some hundreds were collected at Chaungzon. After
arranging with the officer commanding at Kan that a party should be
sent to attack this gathering, Captain Eyre returned to Gangaw to
collect the coolies wanted by General Faunce. He reached Gangaw on
the 11th, and busied himself with this duty. On the 16th of December,
hearing that three of the dacoit leaders were in considerable strength
at Kunze, north-east of Gangaw, a force of 105 rifles, 10th Madras
Infantry, attacked and dispersed them, but without inflicting serious
loss. From that date the garrison of Gangaw may be said to have done
nothing. They sat still and allowed the rising to gather strength.

Seeing the dacoit bands active and gathering strength, while the
British officers and the garrison were apparently helpless, the
villagers, to whom guns had been given, the quasi-militia men amongst
the foremost, joined the insurgents. It was another object-lesson in
the folly of arming the Burmese peasantry, and the still greater folly
of allowing an Asiatic foe to think you are afraid to attack him.
The town of Gangaw was defended by a stockade of teak. The military
post had been so placed as to rest on this stockade, and would have
become untenable if the enemy had succeeded in occupying the town. The
garrison of 170 men had therefore to defend the town stockade, nearly
a mile in extent. It was not considered strong enough to hold the town
and at the same time to move against the hostile bands, who had now
gathered in considerable numbers, and were occupying a village called
Shonshé on the south, and three villages on the north-west. On the 24th
of December a convoy with supplies left Gangaw for Kan, which was the
next post to the north. It was fired upon soon after leaving Gangaw,
and lost two men killed and two wounded. From Kan this party went on
to Sihaung, from which place it returned. It was again attacked on the
march back, between Sihaung and Kan, and lost heavily. Meanwhile the
enemy, who had been strengthened from the peasantry around, attacked
Gangaw on the 30th of December, and again on the 31st. They were
reckoned to number 500 men, but their attacks inflicted no loss on the
garrison.

Some sort of council of war, in which both civil and military officers
joined, now took place, and it was held that if a determined attack
were made on Gangaw or Kan it must succeed. The garrison of Kan,
therefore, was ordered into Gangaw, and they obeyed the order, to say
the least, without reluctance. They met with no opposition on the
way, but they brought with them reports of the loss suffered by the
detachment which went to Sihaung, which helped further to depress the
dispirited garrison.

In Gangaw itself, although it was assaulted daily until the 6th of
January, when a relieving force arrived, there were no casualties. The
enemy was contemptible, and even his numbers were, it is believed,
exaggerated. The danger was created by the inaction of the defence
rather than by the number or the enterprise of the assailants.

The Chief Commissioner was in Rangoon during the early days of
December. The first news of the trouble came to him in a telegram
from Major Raikes, who was on special duty on the Chin frontier; it
was dated the 14th of December, from Gaungu on the Myittha, and was
received in Rangoon on the 17th. It reported the attack made on the
dacoit camp by Captain Eyre on the 9th of December, and recommended
that troops should be sent against this gang. In reply, Major Raikes
was reminded that all the troops and military police on the frontier
were under the General's orders and were close to the scene of action,
while it would take a fortnight or more to send troops up from
Pakokku. On the 20th of December a second telegram came from Major
Raikes, reporting the affair at Chaungzon on the 13th of December. He
explained that General Faunce had ordered the officer commanding at
Gangaw to deal effectively with these gatherings; that two attempts,
both unsuccessful, had been made to disperse the band near Chaungzon;
that a third attack was about to be made, but the force ordered to
make it could only be spared for a few days, as the General wanted all
his men for frontier patrols and for the expedition into the hills. He
therefore pressed for reinforcements as necessary for the destruction
of these gangs.

Orders were then given for a small column of military police and troops
to march up at once from Pakokku. The Deputy Commissioner of the Lower
Chindwin was told to send all the police he could spare across from
Alôn to the disturbed area. The state of things was communicated by
telegram to Sir George White, who was on the Chindwin on his way to
Kalewa, and the despatch of reinforcements from Pakokku was suggested.

On Christmas Day the first reports from Captain Eyre himself came in.
He described the insurgents as increasing in numbers rapidly, and
begged for more troops. This was the first intimation received by the
Chief Commissioner that the local officers were unable to cope with the
rising and that it was of a serious character. The Commissioner was
thereupon ordered to Pakokku to hasten the dispatch of the small column
previously mentioned; and lest there should be difficulty in finding
Sir George White, the officer commanding at Myingan was asked to get a
force ready for immediate despatch. On the 26th a message came from Sir
George White, dated from Mingin on the Chindwin, that he had ordered
the despatch of a force 200 strong from Pakokku _via_ Pauk, and Major
Kingston with 250 rifles, troops and military police, from Alôn, to
hasten to Gangaw. At the same time Colonel Macgregor, with 150 rifles
of the 44th Gurkhas, who were with General Faunce, was ordered down
from Sihaung to Gangaw. Meanwhile the Chief Commissioner had sent up
125 rifles of the Pakokku military police, under Lieutenant Phillips,
by forced marches by the Kyaw Valley route. Major Kingston and
Lieutenant Phillips joined hands at Kyaw on the 2nd of January. On the
6th they attacked the insurgents in Shonshé, south of Gangaw, and drove
them out with considerable loss. At the same moment Colonel Macgregor
with his Gurkhas fell upon the bands who were occupying a village north
of Gangaw, and handled them roughly. No stand was made by these people,
who had kept nearly 350 Madras Infantry shut up in Gangaw.

The duty of restoring order in the Yaw country was entrusted to Colonel
W. P. Symons, who had displayed great ability in dealing with dacoit
gangs in Sagaing. He was assisted by Mr. D. Ross, as civil officer in
charge of the district. The country was cleared of dacoits, partially
disarmed, and reduced to order. The rank and file of the insurgents
were allowed to return to their homes, the guilty villages being
punished collectively by fines. The Yaw country has been peaceful ever
since.

The Gangaw episode was, in the language of the Boer War, "a regrettable
incident." The garrison at the outset may have been unable to face
the insurgents in the field, but, after the Kan detachment had been
called in, it numbered 340 rifles--a sufficient number of disciplined
troops to deal with a much larger number of dacoits, a mere rabble,
armed, when they were armed at all, with old muzzle-loading rifles, or
still more ancient muskets. The incident was not, however, barren of
good results. It sufficed to convince even the most devoted admirer
of "the old coast army" that a portion of the Madras troops was unfit
for active service--a fact which had more than once been brought to
notice by the Chief Commissioner. The disbanding of the regiment
responsible for the failure was the beginning of a large measure of
army reform that had been too long delayed. Hence these events, trivial
in themselves, may be worth recording.

The narrative may now return to the central business, namely, the
expedition against the Chins.

General Faunce arrived at Kambalè and assumed command of the operations
on the 3rd of December. On the 7th the fighting began. A working-party
sent to establish a post between Kambalè and the foot of the hills
was fired on, and Lieutenant Palmer, R.E., who commanded the Madras
Sappers, was killed. On the 10th of December a strong body of Chins of
the Tashon tribe suddenly issued from the hills, and attacked the camp
of the 42nd Gurkhas at Sihaung, and a simultaneous attack was made on
the village. They paid dearly for their audacity. The Gurkhas drove
them off, followed them up, and inflicted heavy loss on them. On the
same date Indin, the capital of the Kalè Sawbwa, was fired into, and
the military police post of Kangyi, twenty miles north of Kalemyo, was
attacked.

It had been intended to limit the operations of the season 1888-9 to
the Siyin and Sagyilaing tribes. In dealing with savage people it is
not possible to lay down a line beyond which you will not step. In
view, therefore, of the probable necessity of taking action against
the Tashons, 200 rifles of the Norfolk Regiment, 50 Madras sappers,
and the remaining companies of the 42nd Gurkhas from their quarters
at Bernardmyo, were ordered to the front. Sir George White himself
arrived at Kalewa on the 29th of December, but left to General Faunce
the immediate command of the force in the field. Matters were further
complicated by the appearance of another section of the Chins. In
October, a village in the Kubo Valley had suffered from a raid by
Kanhows. A large body of this tribe came down in December and attacked
Kangyi, north of Kalemyo. It was held by military police, who repulsed
them. Further investigations made it clear that these Kanhows were
so closely related by position and ties of kindred to the Siyins and
Sagyilains as to make them indistinguishable. A proposal, therefore, to
include them in the operations against the latter was sanctioned. It
was proposed also to send at the same time a column to Minlèdaung, on
the borders of the Tashon country, but this was not found convenient
and was dropped.


[Illustration: KACHIN HILLS, BHAMO, KATHA.]

An ultimatum was now sent to the Siyins and Sagyilains, demanding the
restoration of all their captives, the surrender of a certain number
of fire-arms, and the payment of a fine. In default of the acceptance
of these terms, General Faunce was told to destroy the villages of
the tribes and by a rigorous blockade to prevent food supplies from
reaching the hills. During December and January preparations for the
advance occupied the attention of the General and his staff. Transport
coolies were obtained from Manipur. A road was begun, and step by step
the base of operations advanced towards the goal of the expedition, the
main village of the Siyins, called Koset by them.

On the 23rd of January, 1889, Sir George White and General Faunce made
a reconnaissance to the summit of the Letha Range, to an altitude of
8,200 feet above sea-level. The force then advanced steadily up the
hills in the face of a continued but unsuccessful opposition; the
sappers, assisted by coolies, making a road as the men climbed up, and
constructing rough stockades in which the men slept and rations were
stored. The advance was obstructed by formidable stockades, generally
held by the enemy, but not firmly defended. Day and night the Chins
ambushed our men, taking advantage of every suitable position. The
following telegram from Sir George White to the Chief Commissioner,
dated the 28th of January, 1889, describes one of the skirmishes:
"Enemy yesterday attacked our working-party on road above this, and
held our covering-party, 40 British and 100 Gurkhas, from 9 till 2,
when I arrived and ordered their positions to be charged. We carried
all, driving them entirely away, getting off ourselves wonderfully
cheaply--only one Norfolk dangerously wounded. Enemy in considerable
numbers, using many rifles and plenty of ammunition. They fired at
least 1,000 rounds, standing resolutely until actually charged, even
trying to outflank us. Their loss probably about eight or ten, but they
were carried down the Khuds at once. Most difficult enemy to see or hit
I ever fought."

On the 4th of February the village of Koset was reached, and after a
slight resistance, occupied. It was fired by the Siyins before they
retreated, and was reduced to ashes before our men reached it. The
enemy harassed the camp every night, firing into it from the higher
ground, and at several villages they ineffectually opposed us. They
opened communications at one time with the political officer, but
as they continued ambushing and firing on the troops and refused to
surrender the Burman captives, it was evident that they were fooling
us. Step by step, therefore, the advance was made good, until the Siyin
territory had been overrun, and by the 5th of March all their villages
were in our hands. The site of the village of Tôklaing was chosen as
the headquarters of the Chin expeditionary force, and its name was
changed to "Fort White," and a post was built there with materials
taken from the village.

The chastisement inflicted on the Siyins had some little effect on
the Kanhows, who had made similarly insincere overtures. On the
24th of February a deputation of them came to Fort White, bringing
presents and asking that their villages might be spared. With the
Chief Commissioner's approval, terms were offered to them, namely:
to surrender all the captives in their hands, and a portion of their
fire-arms; to pay a fine of 1,000 rupees, and to engage to pay a light
annual tribute as a token of submission. Ten days were given them to
consider and accept these terms. On the 6th of March they returned,
bringing six of the captives and presents, but failed to comply with
the other conditions. Their presents, therefore, were refused, and
on the 8th of March General Faunce moved against them. The force was
actively engaged against them until the 20th of March, when it returned
to Fort White. The operations were well planned and executed, and
imposed great labour on the troops, as the mountain tracks were most
precipitous and difficult. Most of the villages were destroyed, in many
cases by the Chins themselves, and large stores of grain and other
food-supplies were taken. April was occupied in negotiations with the
Tashons, and the troops rested.

[Illustration: IN THE SECOND DEFILE OF THE IRRAWADDY BELOW BHAMO.]

As it was ascertained that the Siyins had built a new Gurkha village
at Tartan, which had been taken in the earlier operations, a force
consisting of 65 rifles of the 2nd Battalion Norfolk Regiment and 60
rifles of the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry was sent to drive the Chins
out. The village was strongly stockaded and obstinately defended. One
of the two stockades was taken. The loss on our side was one officer
(Second-Lieutenant Michel) and two men of the Norfolk Regiment killed,
one Gurkha killed, and two officers and six men wounded. In this action
Captain Le Quesne, of the Army Medical Corps, showed conspicuous
courage in attending to Lieutenant Michel, and was awarded the Victoria
Cross. The troops retired to Fort White without completing their work.
A few days later they returned and destroyed the village and stockades
unopposed.

The rains, which begin early in this region, had now set in, and active
operations ceased. In this business, from first to last, including
the engagements of Gangaw and Kan, our loss amounted to 26 killed and
54 wounded; the enemy's loss can only be conjectured--it was probably
light. The main object now was to secure the peaceful submission of
the Tashons. Towards the end of March they showed an inclination to
parley, and sent letters purporting to come from six of their chiefs.
It was decided to give them as much time as possible to consider the
terms offered to them, and in the meanwhile no movement was to be made
against their villages or certain settlements of the Kanhows which were
within, or close to, the borders of the Tashon tribe. One of the Kalè
officials, Maung Nwa, was selected to take a letter to the chiefs,
giving them twenty-one days to decide on their course of action.

Maung Nwa succeeded in reaching Falam, the Ywama, or mother-village, of
the Tashons. On the 18th of April he returned to Fort White, bringing
letters from the chiefs and from the ex-Sawbwa of Kalè. A minor chief
accompanied him, and on a subsequent day another Tashon chief came in
with messages to Major Raikes. This beginning of personal intercourse
was encouraging, and on our part concessions were made in respect
of the surrender of the Burmese refugees, while the release of the
captives was insisted on. Later on some overtures were made on the part
of the Siyins and a few captives delivered to our officers. On the 2nd
of May men from the Kanhow tribe came in; they brought the fine of Rs.
1,000, which had been imposed on them, and the tribute, and tendered
the submission of their tribe, but no captives. They clung to their
captives as to life. Later on, however, they released some and brought
them to Fort White. It was believed at the time that they had given up
all; it was discovered later that they had held back a considerable
number. The Siyins surrendered seven captives; but they made no further
steps towards submission. At the end of the open season of 1888-9
the situation was this: Severe punishment had been inflicted on the
offending tribes, and 114 of the Burmans carried off by raiding parties
had been recovered. The Siyins and Sagyilains, notwithstanding the
destruction of their villages, had not given in; the Kanhows had made a
show of submission, and had partly complied with our terms; the Tashons
had exchanged messages, but had given no proof of penitence.

It was necessary to show the Chins that the arm of the British
Government was long enough to reach them even in their mountain
fortresses, and that our soldiers could remain in their country. It was
decided, therefore, to keep the troops at Fort White during the rains
and to prevent the Chins, who had not submitted, from rebuilding their
villages or cultivating their fields. A rigorous blockade of the routes
from their hills to the plains was ordered, in the hope that it would
help to overcome their obstinacy. Nothing more could be done until the
season for taking the field again came round.

General Faunce's column had done all that men could do in a very
difficult and unknown country against a very difficult enemy,
pronounced by a man who had seen some fighting to be "the most
difficult enemy to see or hit I ever fought." The expedition was late
in starting. The reason has been explained. That the next season's
operations were more successful with less severity is no reproach
to the General commanding the first expedition or to the political
officer. Their work had made our power felt, and had given us some
knowledge of the people. If a garrison had not been established at Fort
White in 1888-9, it would have been scarcely possible to have acted
against the Tashons on the plan which ensured success in 1889-90.




CHAPTER XXII

THE CHIN-LUSHAI CAMPAIGN


General Faunce and his men had worked hard and well. By May, 1888,
the advance had been made good as far as Tôklaing, called Fort White.
But although that place was only a short distance (thirty miles) from
Falam, the main settlement of the Tashons, we had not been able to
reach it. This tribe was known to be the most numerous and the most
influential of the Chins in these parts, and their subjugation was
essential.

The character of the country which was the scene of operations has been
described in the preceding chapter. For a successful effort to conquer
it much and timely preparation was necessary. Several circumstances had
made this impossible. It will be remembered, in the first place, the
Government of India had viewed the enterprise askance. The head of an
Indian province looks mainly to his own affairs; and not having a free
hand, and being without direct responsibility for the financing of a
military expedition, he presses hard for what he wants. To the Supreme
Government, far from the scene of raids and disorder, and less directly
concerned with the causes and consequences of them, the financial
aspect looms largest. The Government of India were beginning to take
alarm at the heavy burden with which the annexation of the new province
was loading them. They were aware of the very wide extent of territory
under the nominal sway of the dethroned King, and of the distant
boundaries, ill-defined and seemingly endless, marching not only with
China and Siam, but with savage peoples of whom hardly the names were
known. They feared, naturally enough, that the local authorities might
allow their zeal to push them on too hastily if not too far. Little
was known about the relations of the King's Government to the wide
region lying between the Irrawaddy Valley and the Mekong. The northern
and north-eastern boundaries were very indistinctly defined, and no
thought had been given to the great wedge of mountainous country
between Burma proper and Bengal.

The end of 1888 found us engaged in all these outlying regions. Active
operations were going on in the Shan States, in the difficult hills
east of Bhamo, and in the rugged country about the Ruby Mines. In
the far north there were disturbances all around Mogaung, which was
inadequately garrisoned and difficult to get at. Added to this, there
were still districts of Upper Burma which were harassed by gangs of
guerillas. There was more than enough work for every soldier and every
civilian in the country and for every penny that the Treasury could
afford. Facts, however, had proved strong, and the Chins themselves
forced us to act. But General Faunce's force started too late, and
therefore without adequate preparation for a big campaign. Added to
this came the unfortunate Gangaw affair, which interrupted his supplies
and called off some of his best troops.

In the summer of 1889 the position at Fort White was hardly
encouraging. The place had proved very unhealthy, and the garrison had
few men fit for service. Not only had we failed to touch the Tashons,
who had been chiefly responsible for the troubles of the past year, but
we were far from having come to terms with the Siyins and Kanhows, on
which tribes our hand had been heavy. The political officer, indeed,
still believed that hunger would bring them in. The Kanhows had made
a partial and half-hearted submission, retaining, however, most of
their Burman captives. The others would have no truck with us, and
treated our demands, as well as our advances, with obstinate silence.
Their courage was higher, and the pressure on them less than had
been thought. The Baungshès, moreover, to the south of the Tashons,
including the Yokwa Haka and Thetta clans, had been continuously on
the warpath, and had had no communication with our officers since the
winter of 1887.

There were only two courses open--either to make a well-prepared
systematic advance into the Chin Hills and bring these people under
British rule, not necessarily administration in the full meaning; or to
retire altogether and leave an _enclave_ of savagery between Burma and
Bengal, trusting for the protection of the Burman villages to frontier
posts and spasmodic expeditions. The long history of the dealings of
the Bengal Government with the Lushais and Nagas, very similar people,
had proved the futility of the latter course. The inclination in Burma
was all for the former, and this met with the thorough approval of the
Supreme Government. The work was to be undertaken in a whole-hearted
manner that would ensure success.

During the inactive season of 1889, the scheme of operations was
carefully worked out. The plan of campaign approved by the Supreme
Government was very much on the lines sketched in the Chief
Commissioner's minute of the 21st of July, 1888. The central object
was the Tashon tribe. On their north we already had in Fort White a
footing in the hills with communications secured to Kalewa, on the
Chindwin. It was decided to make the attack from the Burma side in two
strong columns. The Northern Column was to gather at Fort White, and
was to deal in the first instance with the still refractory tribes
in its immediate neighbourhood. The Southern Column was to muster at
Pakokku and, making its base at Kan in the Myittha Valley, to move up
deliberately into the hills to Yokwa and Haka, subjugating the villages
as the force advanced and securing the release of the captives.
Then, leaving a garrison in Haka, it was to move northward and, in
combination with the Fort White Column, to make a simultaneous attack
on Falam, the Tashon capital, from both sides. Meanwhile, a third force
was to enter the hills from Bengal territory and open communications
or, if necessary, join hands with the Burma columns. For the operations
of this last force the Burma Administration had no responsibility.

To protect the villages in the plains from raids and to keep open
communications while the expeditions were in progress, it was decided
to establish ten posts along the more northern portion of the
Chin-Burman frontier. The force to be employed from Burma was to be
nearly four thousand fighting men, besides some military police. The
number of transport animals and of coolies necessary for such a body
would be very great. Carts were useless after the first few marches
from the Irrawaddy. Some fodder for ponies and bullocks might be
procurable, but it was certain that once in the hills almost every
ounce of food for man and beast would have to be sent up from the
Irrawaddy Valley.

The success of the campaign, therefore, was a question of transport
and supply. Kan, which was to be the base of the Southern Column, was
to be fed from Pakokku on the Irrawaddy, distant 165 miles through
difficult and sparsely inhabited country. Work had been begun in 1888
on the road; but labour was scarce and the cart-track was not open
for more than half the distance. Provisions for Fort White and its
communications, as well as for the frontier posts, could be sent up
by steamer to Kalewa on the Chindwin. The difficulty was to move them
thence to Kalemyo within reach of the troops. If the Myittha were
navigable, it would be invaluable; all the frontier posts from Kalemyo
to Kan were on that river, but its waters were unknown. Mules and
coolies in large numbers, men from Assam and from the Northern Punjab
able to carry loads on hill paths, were promised by India. Arrangements
for collecting some eight or nine hundred carts at Pakokku were put in
train; and contracts for the hire of country boats, of which Pakokku is
the great building centre, were given.

In August I went up the Chindwin to Kalewa to meet Major Raikes,
who had been stationed at Fort White since the close of the active
operations, and had been busy acquiring information of the people
and country and endeavouring to induce the Chins to come to terms. I
brought with me two naval officers--Captain Wilson, R.N., then Port
Officer at Rangoon, and Commander Holland, of the Royal Indian Marine
Service. These officers were deputed to ascertain how far the Myittha
could be navigated; and, as their inquiries gave reason for hoping that
the river might be navigable, the task of exploring it was entrusted to
Commander Holland. The results of his work were encouraging, and he
was directed to organize a transport service of boats.

But to return to Kalewa. The Chief Commissioner, after discussing
matters closely with Major Raikes, resolved to inform the Tashons
that the British Representative, with an armed force, would proceed
to Falam, their head village, and there receive the submission of the
tribe, and if necessary enforce it. A proclamation to that effect was
sent to the chiefs in the following terms:--

"A British army will march to the Tashon Ywama. The British Government
wishes to preserve your tribe, and does not desire to punish you as
it has punished the Kanhows and Siyins who have resisted the British
forces.

"The British Government desires from you only two things: First, that
the captives taken from Burman villages shall be released. Secondly,
that you shall in the future behave peacefully, and cease to attack the
subjects of the Government.

"Therefore the Chief Commissioner hereby declares and promises that you
will be excused from punishment for the past if you comply with the
following terms:--

   "(i) That you shall assist the British troops in their march through
   your country to your Ywama, and that you will neither attack nor
   oppose them;

   "(ii) That you shall to the utmost of your power compel the Siyin and
   Kanhow tribes to surrender their captives.

   "(iii) That the chiefs shall meet the officer in command of the
   British forces at the Ywama, and deliver up to him all the captives in
   the possession of your tribe and pay a fine of 10,000 rupees.

   "(iv) That you shall render annually a tribute of two elephant tusks
   and ten silk pieces to the British Government.

"If you comply with these terms your lives and property will be spared,
and the former orders requiring you to deliver up the Shwègyobyu and
other rebels will not be enforced.

"On the other hand, if you will not comply with these conditions the
Chief Commissioner will direct the troops to punish you severely."

Up to this time the surrender of the Burman outlaws had been made a
condition of peace with the Tashons. It was now said by those who knew
them best that the surrender of the refugees was repugnant to Chin
honour; and in the hope of making it easier for them to yield, the
Chief Commissioner consented to waive this demand. Permission was also
given to Major Raikes to reduce the fine, if it would make negotiations
more hopeful. But on the other points, especially the condition that
the troops should march to Falam, their capital, and there receive the
formal and public submission of the chiefs to the British Government,
no concession whatever was to be made. Negotiations on this basis
continued between the political officer and the Tashons without result.

In the beginning of December the chiefs agreed to meet Major Raikes at
Sihaung. The terms of the proclamation were explained to them, and they
were made to understand that they were final and would be enforced. The
chiefs were impracticable. They affirmed that if our men advanced they
could not control their tribesmen. The ex-Sawbwa of Kalè was present
at this meeting, having come down with the Chins. He wisely took the
opportunity of surrendering to Major Raikes, and was sent to Pakokku,
where he lived afterwards in receipt of a pension from the Government.
His surrender exploded a theory which had been started, that the
Tashons were holding out in order to procure his reinstatement in Kalè.

A proclamation in similar terms was sent to the Haka and Yokwa Chins.

Meanwhile the work of collecting transport and forwarding stores was
pushed on; the boat service on the Myittha was organized, and was
worked by Commander Holland with great energy and success.

Brigadier-General Faunce had left Burma. He was succeeded in command of
the brigade by Colonel W. P. Symons (well known as General Sir W. Penn
Symons), who met his death in the first action of the Boer War. Colonel
Symons had made his reputation already as an active and able soldier.
He was much more. He was peculiarly fitted by temper, tact, and
administrative ability to conduct a difficult business like that now in
hand. The command of the Chin-Lushai expedition was given to him by the
Chief Commissioner's request. The question arose whether he should have
also the control of the negotiations and arrangements with the Chins.

For some time the feeling in India had been, as it still is, against
the division of authority in expeditions of this kind. No doubt, as
a rule, the man who holds the military command should have control
of the negotiations also. At the same time the circumstances of each
case and the qualifications of the man must be taken into account. In
Burma hitherto it had been found more convenient, if not necessary, to
divide the duties and to give what is called the political business to
a civil officer acquainted with the language and customs of the people
to be dealt with. In the present instance it happened that Major Raikes
had from the beginning dealt, under the Chief Commissioner's orders,
with the Chin tribes. He had had more opportunities than any one of
acquiring a knowledge of their character and politics. It was somewhat
difficult to ask him now to work in subordination to the military
commander who had had no part in the business.

The Chief Commissioner was ready to brush aside this personal
difficulty and to allow Major Raikes to resign his post if he preferred
to go. He would willingly have placed the chief authority unreservedly
in General Symons's hands. The question was carefully considered and
discussed. Finally, by General Symons's desire it was arranged to
leave to the civil officer the negotiations with the Chins and the
arrangements to be made with them when they submitted. It happened,
however, that before the advance into the hills had well begun,
Major Raikes was compelled by illness to go away. General Symons was
then put in undivided control of the whole business, under the Chief
Commissioner's orders. Two civil officers were selected to serve as
his assistants, absolutely in subordination to him. Mr. D. Ross was
posted to the Southern Column and Mr. B. S. Carey to the Northern. This
arrangement worked admirably.

The rains of 1889 were unfortunately late. The Southern Column,
1,869[56] strong, was concentrated at Pakokku. From Pakokku to Kan,
which was to be the base for the operations, was one hundred and
sixty-five miles. Shelters had been erected at the halting-places,
and such provisions as could be procured were gathered and stored by
the civil district officers. The troops began to move on the 23rd of
November, and the march was successfully carried out in fifteen days,
by detachments of one hundred fighting men with followers marching in
succession daily. The first detachment left Pakokku on the 23rd of
November, and the leading columns were only just able to get through
the falling rivers and the drying country. The ground was heavy and the
heat great. Nevertheless, troops and followers arrived at Kan in good
condition, with only a nominal sick list.

By the middle of November the Northern Column, 1,622[57] strong, was
ready at Fort White and was waiting for the hill-coolies who were to
form the transport, before it should move out.

The garrisons for the ten posts which were to protect the frontier
were sent up the Chindwin to Kalewa, and had to march down the Myittha
Valley. Late rains had flooded the Kalè Valley, and as late as the end
of November the country was impassable to anything but an elephant.
On the 24th of October it took fifteen hours to get one hundred and
seventy fresh mules, with elephants to carry their saddles and gear,
through the bogs and swamps on the last five and a half miles of the
road into Kalemyo, which was the distributing base for supplies for
Fort White and for the posts in the Kalè Valley. By the end of December
these ten posts were built, occupied, and rationed--a testimony to the
qualities of the officers and men who overcame such difficulties.

By the end of January, 1890, five hundred and fifty-one tons of stores
had been sent by road to Kan, and six hundred and thirty-eight tons
landed at Kalemyo by water. The river transport service not only did
this, but also provided, as a by-work, carriage for many men joining
their corps and for sick sent down to the rear. From the beginning
of February, when the country had become dry, all supplies for the
Southern Column were brought in carts from Pakokku to Kan and on to
Haka on hired pack-bullocks and Government transport animals. To add to
the difficulties, virulent cattle disease broke out in the Myittha and
Kalè Valleys, and caused enormous loss.

One-third of the pack-bullocks had died. The sickness was not confined
to the transport animals. It was said that the villagers in the Kalè
State lost 90 per cent. of their buffaloes.

The first troops of the Southern Column reached Kan on the 7th of
December. On the 9th the sappers, with a covering escort, commenced
work on the road to Haka, which was sixty-four miles distant. Every one
thought that our men would be in Haka in ten or twelve days, and all
calculations were based on this estimate. It was sixty-six days before
the leading files entered Haka, and the mule-road did not reach that
place until the seventy-seventh day. This, although the whole strength
of the force was devoted to road work: every man who could dig was set
to it. The country opposed to the engineers a tumbled network of steep
hills and deep ravines. The climate proved deadly. Soldiers and coolies
were ill with fever. Out of seven Royal Engineer officers, at the end
of December six were lying ill. In comparison with the difficulties
caused by the nature of the country and the climate, the fiercest
opposition of the Chins was insignificant.

"This disappointing delay," wrote General Symons, "was not without
its compensating advantages in dealing with the Chins. They expected
us to make a quick advance, do some damage, and retire. The steady,
persistent advance, together with the pains that were taken to get into
touch with them and to explain our objects and intentions, paralysed
their spirits and efforts for resistance, and thus tribe after tribe
submitted and yielded to our terms."

This is, no doubt, the true way of dealing with savages. They are
like children. They are terrified if they see a person approaching
them steadily, with measured steps and outstretched arms. But it is
much more difficult and requires more resources in money and men
and transport to advance into a difficult country, making each step
good and permanent, than to rush in, burn, slay, and retire. The
latter method of warfare the savage understands. His enemies appear
suddenly, set fire to his village, kill those they come across, and
are away again. He flees into the jungle at the first alarm, and comes
back little the worse as soon as the other side retires. That the
better method was not followed in 1887-8, and that the more barbarous
system was adopted, was not voluntary. Circumstances forced it upon
the authorities in Burma, as the only means at their disposal for
protecting the peaceful population in the plains. Besides, it is only
fair to say that the tribes dealt with the former year, the Siyins and
Kanhows, were by far the most warlike and bloodthirsty of the Chins.
The severe chastisement inflicted on them, and the maintenance of the
garrison in Fort White during the year, had brought home to all the
folly of trying conclusions with disciplined and well-armed troops.

On the 17th of December the advance-guard of the Southern Column
occupied Taungtek on the road to Haka. From that date to the 28th of
December the Chins from time to time made feeble attempts to resist,
harassing the troops by firing into camp. On the 28th, near Taungtek,
they had a considerable number of men in action; according to their
own account five hundred men, of whom three hundred had fire-arms. But
they could do nothing. From that day they gave up the fight and made no
further opposition.

On the 8th of January two Yokwa Chins came into camp. The objects
of our coming and the conditions of peace were explained to these
two men, and they were sent back to repeat them to their chiefs. But
therein lay the difficulty. Who were the real chiefs? There were
numbers of chiefs, each with his own following, each bitterly jealous
of his fellows. To negotiate under such conditions required the tact
and patience which General Symons fortunately possessed. The most
intelligent and influential of the rivals had to be discovered, and his
position strengthened by dealing through him.

Henceforth affairs progressed well, and there was no combined
opposition to the advance. One unfortunate incident, however, occurred.
Some Chins lying in ambush shot Lieutenant Foster, of the King's
Own Scottish Borderers. The tribes had been fully warned that acts
of treachery would meet with punishment. The nearest village was
destroyed. This, happily, was the sole occasion on which the Southern
Column was compelled to use violence.

A few days afterwards Yokwa was occupied, and this section of the
Baungshès yielded. The terms imposed on them were the surrender of
the captives, the payment of a fine and of an annual tribute, and an
engagement to keep the peace in future. The mule-path, meanwhile, was
being pushed forward on to Haka, the headquarters of an important
section. The same tactics soon led to their submission. The subjugation
of the whole Baungshè clan was now complete, for the minor sections
followed the lead of the premier communities. The headquarters of the
expedition were fixed henceforward at Haka, and negotiations for the
surrender of the captives were begun.

This was not an easy or speedy business. Nominal rolls of the persons
held in durance by the Chins had been prepared, and it was known by
which tribe and by which village the captives had been taken. But some
of the raids had been committed months before. Slaves were current coin
in the hills, and passed from hand to hand as easily as a bank-note in
more civilized regions. Their value was fixed with reference to the
customary ransom paid by their Burmese relatives, and seems to have
averaged ten or twelve pounds sterling. In barter, according to Mr.
Carey, a slave would exchange for three or four head of cattle, a good
gun, a dozen pigs, or a wife. However willing the tribe or the village,
or even the original captor, might be to keep faith, it was often
difficult to trace the slave and obtain his release from the present
holder, who had bought him with a price and did not see why he should
be at a loss. A view not unreasonable from a Chin point of view, but
quite inadmissible from our side.

While these negotiations were proceeding at Haka, and the mule-road was
being completed to that place, reconnaissance parties were sent out to
the west, the country was explored, the submission of a western tribe,
the Klanklangs, was secured, and communication with the Chittagong
Column, under Brigadier-General Tregear,[58] was opened. The advance
parties of General Symons and General Tregear's forces met on the 26th
of February, at Tao village, fifty-two miles west of Haka. This meeting
was notable for the recovery of the heads of Lieutenant John Stewart,
of the Leinster Regiment, and the soldiers (two British and one Indian)
who had been killed by Hoswata Shendoos on the 3rd of February,
1888, when surveying in the Chittagong Hill tracts. Their skulls had
decorated the village of some Chin chief at Haka ever since. As to
how they came to Haka nothing is known. The chief may have taken them
himself, or he may have purchased the trophies from the real heroes. No
inquiry was made, and no retaliation was inflicted on the accomplices
in the murder of our fellow-countrymen.

The Southern Column being thus engaged, the Northern Column, under
Colonel Skene, with Mr. Bertram Carey as civil officer, had not been
idle. Mr. Carey had to do with a very difficult position. The tribes
with whom he was immediately concerned were as defiant in December,
1889, as they had been a year before; and he had no medium of
communication with them. Gradually, by patience and skilful handling,
the Sagyilain Chins living in the nearest villages were induced to
bring supplies of eggs and fowls to market. Trading led to closer
intercourse. Mr. Carey established himself at Yawlu on the road from
Fort White to Falam, the chief Tashon village, and very soon Tashons
as well as Sagyilains came to Yawlu daily to sell their produce, and
the situation became less strained, while the troops procured better
food. After a little Manglön, the chief of the Sagyilains, came to see
Mr. Carey, and made his submission to the British Government. This was
a most welcome event. Manglön became a medium in all negotiations with
the Siyins, and remained loyal and trustworthy in subsequent troubles.

No progress, however, was made with the Siyins, who promised to
surrender if the Tashons made peace. The best months for active
operations were passing. But it was thought inexpedient to adopt
rough methods against them until a settlement had been made with the
Tashons.[59] After some negotiations with the chief of Mwebingyi (an
important village), who promised to surrender and invited a visit, Mr.
Carey, with Colonel Skene and a small force, guided by Sagyilain men,
marched to Mwebingyi. Three miles from the village they were fired on
by Chins from all sides. A sharp skirmish followed. The Chins, driven
back to their village, set it on fire and took to the hillsides. We
lost two men severely wounded owing to this treacherous attack.

The time had now come when the much-delayed advance of the Southern
Column made the combined movements of the Northern and Southern Columns
upon the Tashon Ywama possible. The reduction of this tribe was the
main object of the campaign, to which all the other operations were
leading. It was important to avoid a hostile collision with it. It
would have been easy enough to harass and punish the tribe village
by village, but at the cost of life, destruction of property, and
misery. General Symons's instructions were to accept no surrender and
to conclude no negotiations except at Falam, the Tashon head village;
and his purpose was to make resistance hopeless by placing the forces
from Haka and Fort White simultaneously on the north and south of
the Ywama. Accordingly, on the 8th of March a force 350 strong, with
one gun, under Colonel Skene, left Fort White. On the 9th General
Symons, with 290 rifles and two mountain-guns, marched from Haka. The
Southern Column had suffered so much from sickness that its strength in
fighting-men and transport coolies had been seriously reduced. Without
the aid of the Northern Column, it could not have given enough men to
garrison Haka and at the same time to deal with the Tashons. It was a
matter of moment, therefore, that the two columns should operate in
concert. A successful and rapid reconnaissance to within eight miles
of the Ywama was affected, and the two forces arrived on the opposite
banks of the Manipur, or Nankathe River, within an hour of each other
on the 11th of March.

The Tashons had not intended to yield without a fight.

"Innumerable stockades, breastworks, and obstructions, extending over
some nine miles of country, but chiefly intended against an enemy
advancing from the north, had been freshly erected at every commanding
point. Large numbers of armed men watched both columns as they
advanced, but there was no collision. It is difficult to estimate their
numbers; but on the south of Manipur River near the Ywama there were
not less than 5,000 men, of whom two-thirds were armed with guns, the
rest with spears."[60]

Disregarding the protests of some of the chiefs who came out to meet
him, General Symons marched his men to a spot within one thousand yards
of the Ywama, and fixed his camp there. The chiefs were assembled and
asked if they agreed to our terms. With the inconsequence of savages,
after allowing us to advance unopposed, they rejected our conditions,
refusing firmly to pay tribute and demurring even to the fine. General
Symons warned them of the risk they were incurring and dismissed them.

The scene on this occasion was dramatic, and is thus described by Mr.
Bertram Carey, who was present:--

"The whole valley, in which formerly lay the original village of
Falam, was full of armed Chins, numbering not less than 3,000 men,
gathered from all sides; the host seemed to settle itself in groups
of from 10 to 100 men. They were quiet in demeanour, but held their
heads high and seemed quite prepared for whatever might be the result
of the negotiations. The crowd was a motley one, the Tashon chiefs
dressed in the gaudy tartan of the tribe, well armed with bright guns,
vermilion and black parti-coloured dah scabbards, and beautifully
inlaid powder-horns. The Whenohs were conspicuous by their chignons,
which contrasted with the lofty head-dress of their neighbours, the
Yahows, who were present carrying the strange _shendu_, chopper-shaped
dahs in basketwork scabbards. Scattered around in bunches were the
scowling Siyins, the half-breeds from Tawyan and Mintèdaung, the
semi-independent clique of Kwungli, and the trans-Nankathè tribesmen
of Sokte and 'Poi' origin. The congregation was armed with a variety
of weapons; spears and flint-lock guns predominated, but bows and
quivers of barbed arrows were carried by not a few. Each man bore his
food-supply for a few days on his back."[61]

The next two days were spent in wearisome negotiations which might have
driven a less patient man to the use of force. His forbearance was
rewarded, and the chiefs gave way. The tribute for 1889 was delivered,
and five thousand rupees, the amount to which he had thought right to
reduce the fine, was paid.

The Tashons admitted that until a few days before the forces reached
Falam they had intended to fight. Their position as head of the Chin
tribes and the fear of losing prestige impelled them to resist. When
they found their enemies coming from two sides, they began to lose
heart. All their outlying villages, who knew they must suffer first and
most, prayed them to make peace.

It is evident that the rough handling of the Siyins by General Faunce
had given a salutary lesson to these people. The event proved also
the wisdom of marching to the headquarters of the tribe, and there
compelling the public submission of their leaders.

The object of the combined march having been attained, the columns
separated, the Southern returning to Haka and the Northern to Fort
White. During the remaining months of open weather General Symons was
occupied in gathering in the captives, improving his relations with
the Chins, and in exploring the country. In April, accompanied by the
Haka chief, he visited many villages to the South and was everywhere
well received. On the 15th of April General Tregear met him at Haka,
now linked up with Fort Tregear by a mule-track, which was brought
into Haka, a distance of eighty-one miles, on the 13th of April. The
Chittagong Column had met with no opposition. Their work was mainly
road-making, reconnoitring, and surveying--work of the first importance
in securing permanent peace. The Lushai country was as difficult as any
on the Burma side.

"There is the dense jungle, which prevents one seeing a dozen yards
ahead; rocks extending over large portions of the hillside are
constantly met with, and when it was found impossible to avoid them
much time was taken up in blasting operations. Range upon range of
precipitous hills, running at right angles to the line of advance, had
to be crossed, and the question of a sufficient supply of water at the
different camps had to be considered in determining the trace of the
road."[62]

Two large rivers had to be bridged.

It is not within the scope of the present narrative to describe the
work done by the Chittagong Column. Its approach from the west had
beyond doubt made General Symons's task easier, and success more
certain.

On returning to Fort White, Mr. Carey resumed his immediate duty of
bringing the Siyins within the fold. They had promised to submit if
the Tashons made peace. He called upon them now to keep their word.
Only one chief came in, and, as he brought no captives, Mr. Carey
sent him away. So far from submitting, they cut the telegraph wires
daily and annoyed our people. A policy of waiting and conciliation had
failed. Several of the worst villages were therefore singled out and
destroyed, not without some fighting, in which several sepoys were
killed. Unfortunately, in two cases, in which some troops from Kalemyo
were engaged, the bodies were allowed to fall into the enemies' hands.
The Chin braves were able to return with two heads, more expressive of
victory than guns or standards, and no doubt published in their fashion
jubilant bulletins. The triumph was short-lived. A month afterwards a
detachment of the 42nd Gurkhas, marching down on their way to India,
destroyed the villages concerned. Before the end of April all the
Siyins had made outward submission and had accepted our terms, which
were that a yearly tribute should be paid and that the captives should
be surrendered. Each clan was to be allowed to rebuild its villages
when the captives held by it had been released, and not before. The cut
telegraph wire and the two heads were brought in, and the captives were
being gradually surrendered.

The results of the campaign were good and permanent. The foundation
was laid for an effective control over these troublesome hill-men, and
peace with security was given to the Burmans in the plains and to the
Chins themselves. Raiding and slavery as institutions were condemned,
and were soon to disappear altogether. Before the troops left the field
one hundred and thirty-eight captives were liberated. There were a
few raids made after General Symons finished his task, but they were
promptly punished. There were some disturbances among the Chin tribes.
They were easily checked, and systematic disarmament here, as in Burma
proper, changed the temper and habits of the people.

This success had been achieved almost without bloodshed, but at a
great cost to our men of suffering and loss of life from disease. The
sickness among troops and followers was appalling, and the transport
animals perished by hundreds. Nine men, of whom two were officers,
were killed in action; two hundred and seven, of whom seventy-two
were fighting-men, perished of disease. And two thousand one hundred
and twenty-two were invalided, of whose seven hundred and nine were
fighting-men--one-fifth of the whole force.

A permanent post was built at Haka, which was found to be a healthy
place; and the headquarters of a civil officer, with control over the
Baungshès and Tashons, was established there.

Fort White continued for some time to be the headquarters of the civil
and military staff in the north. But the garrison was reduced, and as
the site was always sickly, the fort was moved back to the Letha Range,
retaining the name which it had received from Sir George White. Falam,
the chief village of the Tashons, is now the headquarters of the civil
administration of the Chin Hills.

[Illustration: BURMESE LADIES MAKING A CALL.]

It is worth while, perhaps, to give some account of the Chins in these
the first years of British rule.

At the time of General Symons's expedition the Chins were a savage
race. They had arms in abundance, flint-lock guns of English make, and
spears. They were armed not so much against strangers as against each
other. In former times, when they were ill-provided with fire-arms,
the Burmans used to oppress them; but for a long time the position had
been reversed. Intertribal feuds, however, and feuds between villages
and families of the same tribe, were very common and made it unsafe to
move without arms. No man who owned a gun ever left his house without
it. While the fields were worked by women and slaves, armed men stood
guard. So it was even less than a century ago in parts of India. What
caused the feuds was a matter for speculation. Apparently disputes
about debts were the most frequent; commerce, in fact, as among Western
peoples, led to quarrels. As for government, even the most primitive
form of tribal or village organization appears to have been imperfect.
There were many chiefs, and if any one of them, as Jahoota,[63] for
instance, was pre-eminent, he could not count on the obedience or
support of the others. Their jealousies interfered with everything. Of
their manners and customs not much was put on record in the earlier
reports, which were necessarily more concerned with military matters.
They made forays on the Burmans for heads and slaves. They were much
given to sacrifices, and sometimes to human sacrifices. For example, it
was usual to sacrifice slaves at the funerals of persons accidentally
killed. Of their marriage-customs nothing is said in the early reports.

The country was not rich. There were no forests that it would pay to
work, and no minerals had been discovered. The cultivation was of the
primitive kind--"Taungya," or "Jhoom"--that is to say, felling the
trees, burning them when dry, and sowing hill-rice and other crops in
the ash. In the forests they had plenty of game, and much fish--Mahseer
and other kinds--in the rivers; and the jungles were rich in fruits and
roots that would support life if the grain failed. Metal of all kinds
was very scarce. The hills produced none, and the Burmese Government
had forbidden the export of metals from the plains. The trouble the
Chins gave by cutting the telegraph wire was caused by their desire to
procure metal, rather than to cause annoyance. Mr. Carey compared the
attraction felt by the Chin for the unprotected wire to that felt by an
English boy for an unfenced apple-orchard. The insulator spikes were
beaten into hoes and the wire melted to make bullets, or bangles for
the damsels. Their wants were blankets, cottons and other cloths, iron
and steel for tools, lead for bullets, needles and thread and salt. In
exchange they were able to offer honey, beeswax, chillies, mats, and a
little lac.

The reports of 1889 were more concerned with the measures carried
out for their subjugation than with descriptions of the people and
their manners. In the main, what is written in the _Burma Gazetteer_
published in 1908 is true of the Chins of twenty years ago:--

"They are a sturdy, warlike, hospitable people, slow of speech, grave
of habit, paying great regard to rank and to the ties of clan, but
spoilt by their intemperance, their vindictiveness, their treachery,
their greed, their lack of persistence,[64] and their personal
uncleanliness."

There is a quaint humour about this description which is refreshing in
a Gazetteer. A race would have to be good indeed if, with such an array
of vices, there was anything left to spoil.

Their villages are described as built on the hill-slopes, some of them
fortified; and their houses are often solid, elaborate structures.
Their dress is the reverse--a loin-cloth, none too ample, and a blanket
for the men; a short skirt and jacket for the women. Home-woven
check plaids are seen in a good many costumes, and some tribes have
distinctive plaids, as in Scotland. The people are mainly vegetarians,
but they will eat anything, from a dog to an elephant. They smoke
tobacco in pipes, and they make a liquor from fermented grain,
presumably rice, which is called _zu_. They suck up this, in the most
approved fashion, through a hollow reed, out of the original still-pot.
Enormous quantities of _zu_ are consumed at Chin entertainments, which
usually end in disgusting orgies.

THE CHINBÔKS AND CHINBONS.

Tribes called the Chinbôks, claiming to be of the same stock as the
Hakas but speaking a different language, are found at the head-waters
of the Maw and Yaw Rivers. Farther south, at the sources of the Saw and
Salin and on the eastern slopes of the Môn Valley, live the Yendus.
Below them, and southernmost of all the Chins, are the Chinbons, who
from the Môn on the east extend along the border of the Mimbu district
into the Akyab and Kyaukpyu districts of Lower Burma.

These three tribes were less fierce than their kindred to the north,
and possessed only the arms of savage warfare--the bow and arrow and
spear. Some of them, those on the borders of the Tilin township at the
headquarters of the Maw River, were noted for cattle-lifting. But the
Chinbôks on the Yaw and the Yendus on the Saw and Salin Rivers rivalled
the Siyins as slave-raiders. At the commencement of the winter of 1889
there were twenty-one captives in the possession of these tribes. They
had made twelve raids since December, 1888, in which five villagers had
been killed and sixteen carried off. Many had been wounded in resisting
or escaping, and large sums had been extracted as ransom.

It was decided, in making up the account against these savages, not to
go back behind December, 1888. In that month a notable raid had been
committed on Taunggyo in the Pauk township, in which thirty-two persons
were carried off and held to ransom at nine pounds sterling each, which
appears to have settled down as the sum beyond which the ability or
affection of the Burman would not go (see p. 318). After this crime
trade with the plains had been prohibited to the Chinbôks, so far as
lay in our power.

The difficulty in dealing with them lay in their want of cohesion
and the absence of any sort of tribal bond. With the Shans there
were the Sawbwas; with the Chins to the north there were the tribal
divisions, more or less marked, with chiefs who could speak, or at
any rate profess to speak, for their people. But with the people with
whom we were now to come in contact there was an absence of political
organization beyond the village, which was usually very small. It was
necessary to visit as many as possible of the villages concerned in
the raids, to receive the submission of each, and to impose fines for
misconduct; and as an obligatory condition to insist on the surrender
of captives, and the repayment of ransoms, not going back farther than
December, 1888. Substantial guarantees for the future were also to be
exacted.

It had been intended to make the dealings with these three tribes part
of the operations under General Symons's control, and to give to Mr.
Ross, under his orders, the immediate conduct of the negotiations.
When the full proportions of the task assigned to General Symons were
seen, it became plain that he could not undertake the Chinbôks; and
in consequence of Major Raikes's illness, Mr. Ross had to remain with
the Southern Column. Fortunately the Chin Frontier Levy had now been
raised, and had had a little time to fit itself for service. Their
posts at Kalemyo, Kan, and Gangaw were wanted by the regular troops
of the Southern Column. This freed the Levy opportunely, and gave the
Chief Commissioner a sufficient force for the expedition into the
Chinbok country. An admirable officer was at hand to conduct it, in
Lieutenant R. M. Rainey (now Colonel Rainey-Robinson), the Commandant
of the Levy. To him was entrusted the conduct of the business.

Lieutenant Rainey began, on the 16th of December, 1889, by dealing with
twenty-one Chinbok villages, consisting of two hundred and eighty-three
houses, situated on the Maw Chaung, the southernmost affluent of the
Myittha, on which Tilin, the headquarters of the Tilin township, is
situated. The claim against them was for cattle stolen. But cattle
thefts and slaves were mere questions of accounts. They set up and
proved a counterclaim for the price of slaves sold to the plaintiffs
before the British occupation. Lieutenant Rainey thought it best to
admit the counterclaim and let bygones be bygones, but to provide for
the future. He induced the twenty-one villages to appoint a chief as
their spokesman and agent in dealing with us, and to agree to pay a
small tribute in kind leviable from each village as an acknowledgment
of fealty to the British Government.

So far there had been no opposition. Lieutenant Rainey then moved
his headquarters from Tilin to Chaungu or Yawdwin, some twenty miles
south. This village is situated on an affluent of the Yaw River, and
made a good base for the next part of the business. The Chins in the
valley of the Yaw and its tributaries were raiders. They attempted to
harass the force, and Captain Willcocks (now Lieutenant-General Sir
James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.), the Intelligence Officer, who
was surveying and reconnoitring for a further move to the south, was
attacked. This compelled a resort to punitive measures, and several
offending villages were destroyed. A defensible advanced post was
established at Chaungzon, in the heart of their hills. These methods
brought the hostile Chins to reason. From this until the close of the
operations the work progressed, bloodless and unopposed. The villages
submitted, captives were delivered up, headmen were appointed, and
fines exacted from all villages which had raided since December, 1888.

Lieutenant Rainey then returned to Chaungu; and moving his base
still farther south to Laungshe, came into contact with the Yindus
and Chinbons. By the exercise of tact and patience he succeeded in
bringing these sections to submit to the British Government and to
release their captives. As before, headmen were appointed, the payment
of tribute was promised, and guarantees for good conduct given. The
work was thoroughly well done. General Symons, in his despatch on the
Chin-Lushai Campaign, wrote:--

"The Chinbok operations, though in no way under my direction or
command, but ably, even brilliantly, conducted by Lieutenant Rainey,
Commandant of the Chin Levy Military Police Battalion, have squared
well with our work and settled an adjoining belt of country beyond our
capability to touch."

Lieutenant Rainey was another of the young soldiers who aided the civil
administration in difficult times and showed their fitness for affairs.
The country which submitted to him was made a separate civil charge,
known as "The Pakokku Hill Tracts," the headquarters of which were for
some years at Yawdwin and are now at Kanpetlet on Mount Victoria.

It is noticeable that the Chinbôks and their confrères had been
excluded from trading and from all intercourse with the plains since
the beginning of 1889. On making their submission they begged that the
blockade might be raised. It was evidently a useful weapon. If it had
failed in the case of the Tashons and the more northern tribes, it was
because it had not been effective.

We had now made ourselves felt by most of the tribes. There remained
unvisited a stretch of hills separating the Minbu district of Upper
Burma from Arakan. The Chins dwelling in this tract preyed on the
peasantry in the neighbouring districts. During the preceding two
years sixteen villages had been raided in Minbu, twenty-one persons
killed and thirty-nine carried into slavery. Of these captives sixteen
had been ransomed by their friends at a very heavy price. In the
adjoining township of the Pakokku district there had been several
forays, and seventeen persons had been captured and carried off. It was
not possible at this time to find men for a comprehensive expedition
against these Chins. Civil officers from the three districts of Akyab,
Kyaukpyu, and Minbu were deputed, with small bodies of police, to meet
at a central point. They assembled the chiefs and village headmen. The
Chins were peaceful and submissive, but very few of the captives were
restored. These clans belonged to the Akyab district geographically,
and had not yet realized that their eastern borders had come under the
British Government and were no longer to afford a happy hunting-ground
for the pursuit of human game. They were found to be by no means
formidable, badly armed, and little inclined to fight.

The following year (1890-1) saw the beginning of the systematic control
of the Chin tribes. For administrative purposes they were roughly
divided into three parts. The northern tribes were governed from Fort
White, the central tribes from Haka, and the southern from Yawdwin.
Captain F. M. Rundall commanded the garrison at Fort White, and also
held charge of our relations with the Chins when Mr. Carey had to take
leave. Our knowledge of these people was at first far from accurate,
and the then recognized divisions of the tribes controlled from Port
White were roughly as follows:--[65]

1. The Siyins and Sagyilains who lived in five villages, of which
Koset, Sagyilain, and Tôklaing were the chief. The first Port White was
built on the site of Tôklaing, which was afterwards given back to them
when the fort was moved.

2. The Kanhows, inhabiting between thirty and forty villages north of
Fort White, of which Tunzan, on the left bank of the Manipur River, is
the capital.

3. The Mobingyis, as they were called from the Burmese name for their
chief village, Molbem, which lies on a spur overlooking the Manipur
River on the left bank, and was a very large village.

4. The Nwi-tes and other minor tribes akin to the Kukis of Manipur.

It is now known that the right name of the Mobingyis is Sok-te, a very
large tribe, of whom the Kanhows are only a powerful clan.

5. The Ngwite and Late, who occupy the hills between Mwelpi and Manipur.

6. The Haitsi Lope, who live on the eastern slope of the Letha Range
bordering the Kabaw Valley.

At the end of the last season's operations Mr. Carey had reported the
submission of the Siyins and the acceptance of our terms. At the same
time he had little trust in their good faith, and when Captain Rundall
succeeded him at Fort White their attitude was more or less hostile.
They continued to cut the telegraph wire and to give petty annoyance
to the troops. The capture of some of the wire cutters gave some help
to diplomacy. The Siyins submitted in order to get their brethren
released. They surrendered their captives and agreed to pay tribute and
keep the peace. The Kanhows proved more difficult. Captain Rundall took
advantage of a dispute about the succession to the leadership of the
tribe to open communication with one of the claimants.

But before anything came of it the Kanhows raided a Burman village,
killing eight persons and carrying off twelve. They were ordered to
restore all captives, to give up the heads taken in the raid, to pay a
fine of Rs. 4,000, to submit to the Government, and to bind themselves
to pay an annual tribute of Rs. 300. These terms were not complied
with. Captain Rundall, therefore, marched with three hundred rifles
and two guns against the village of Tungzang. The Chins fought, and
lost twelve men killed and twenty-one prisoners, including some of
their chief men. They had now tried conclusions and were satisfied.
Thirty-nine captives were surrendered and the fine and tribute paid
in full. Some of the chiefs were sent to Rangoon, and shown over some
large steamers, mills, and the like, and, it is said, were impressed
by the sight. However that may be, they have not given much trouble
since. Some useful road work was done during this year by the Madras
Pioneers. A road from Fort White to Falam, the Tashon mother-village,
was constructed. As the old site of Fort White still continued to be
very unhealthy, the garrison and headquarters of the civil officer were
moved back to a post hitherto known as No. 5 Stockade on the Letha
Range.

The Chins to be controlled from Haka were found to be divisible into
five tribes:--

1. The Tashons, a large tribe having their headquarters at Falam,
half-way between Haka and Fort White.

2. The Hakas, lying south of the Tashon country and round about Haka.

3. The Klanklangs, to the west of the Haka tribe and between them and
Fort Tregear, on the Chittagong side.

4. The Yokwas, who lie to the south and east of the Hakas; and lastly,

5. The independent tribes, known generally by the nickname of Baungshè,
in the hills south of the Yokwas.

Mr. D. Ross,[66] the Assistant Commissioner who had accompanied General
Symons's expedition, held Haka until March, 1891, when he had to leave
on account of his health. He was succeeded by Mr. D. J. C. Macnabb,[67]
Assistant Commissioner, a young soldier of a well-known stock. Friendly
relations with the Chins were maintained. The road from Kan, in the
Myittha Valley, to Haka, was kept open by Chin labour, and the regular
postal service was performed by Chins. The Myittha Valley was not
raided, and generally the Haka Yokwa tribes were well behaved. Trouble,
however, came from the independent Baungshès, with whom, owing to their
want of cohesion, it was difficult to deal.

General Symons had left one weak spot in his work. There was a
powerful village called Thetta, eight miles south of Yokwa. Of it he
wrote:--

"It has resisted all our efforts to bring it to complete submission,
although some captives have been given up and a fine paid.... It is a
blot on our work to have left this village unsettled, but it commands
the Kan to Yokwa road, and I considered it better to leave it to stew
in its obstinacy and isolation rather than resort to drastic measures
which would have had the effect of driving the inhabitants into the
jungles and making the road unsafe. The boon of convoys and traders
and others being able to use safely and freely the road between Kan
and Haka without escorts was too great to risk the loss of it for the
satisfaction of an exercise of our power which, at the best in my
opinion, would have had but little effect in bringing about the desired
result."

At the same time he recorded his opinion that unless the Thetta people
gave in, the political officer would have to visit and compel them.

It was the old story. The Thettas thought forbearance was the sign
of weakness and fear. In November, 1890, they became openly hostile.
They committed a series of outrages, and at last brought matters to a
head by killing Mr. Wetherell, a young police officer, and attempting
the life of the political officer, Mr. Macnabb. In January, 1891, a
force of one hundred and forty rifles started from Haka to punish
the village. They had no guns. The village was strongly stockaded.
Lieutenant James, R.E., and two Gurkha sepoys were killed, and the
officer commanding decided that he could not storm the defences
without heavy loss. The Chins were invited to a parley, and they agreed
to pay a small fine for their misconduct and to yield an annual tribute
in future.

Such an arrangement was for us equivalent to a defeat. It was decided
to take up the coercion of the Baungshès in a businesslike manner. Two
strong columns, with guns, were despatched, one from Haka with Mr. Ross
as political officer, the other from Gungaw with Mr. Macnabb. They met
at Thetta without opposition, and recovered the fine which the Thetta
villagers had promised to pay, and traversed the Baungshè country,
receiving the submission of the villagers.

Thetta, however, was not yet subdued. They had defied us, killed our
men, and escaped with a small fine. In 1894 they began to rob and
murder, and when they were called to account they behaved themselves
proudly. On the 1st of January, 1895, a force under Major Keary,
D.S.O., of the 6th Burma Rifles, with Mr. H. N. Tuck as political
officer, occupied the village, arrested the chiefs, and disarmed the
villagers. The chiefs were afterwards degraded in open Durbar.

But the year 1891 was not to close without further difficulty. General
Symons, reporting to the Chief Commissioner from Haka, dated the 1st of
May, 1890, wrote (para. 9):--

"The Klanklangs are almost a separate tribe, but they are Baungshès
and live on fairly good terms with the Hakas. The Yokwas do not march
with the Klanklangs, neither are they friendly with them. (10) The
Klanklangs, finding themselves at the beginning of the year between
the Burma and Chittagong Columns, made haste to submit to the troops
entering their country, and readily agreed to easy terms imposed. (11)
The settlement with the Klanklangs and their chief, Ya Hnit--whom, to
suit the convenience of the Chittagong officials, we are now agreed to
call 'Jahoota'--was very rightly left to me as the representative of
the local Government of Burma. The Klanklang Ywama (chief village) is
only sixteen miles from Haka, and Jahoota and other head chiefs live
there.... I do not think this tribe will give us any more trouble. The
meeting of the Eastern and Western Columns in their territory, and the
continual passing of troops backwards and forwards without committal of
harm or excess, has had the best effect."

In March, 1891, Mr. Macnabb, with Lieutenant Mocatta and one hundred
rifles, set out to visit the Klanklangs and to meet an official from
Port Tregear at Tao. The tribe, which had surrendered to General
Symons, was held to be friendly. The road passed through their hills,
and there was no thought of interfering with them. They had, however,
been raiding on the Lushai side, and it was intended to warn them to
abstain from this. On the outward march to Tao the Klanklang chiefs
did not appear. They were said to be occupied in propitiating their
_Nats_, or guardian spirits, and to be very drunk. Mr. Macnabb,
therefore, postponed his interview until he came back from Tao. On
the return march a large body of Chins, said to have been seven or
eight hundred, suddenly fell upon the small column, which fought its
way on to Klanklang with some difficulty, losing five men killed and
ten wounded, and one British officer (Lieutenant Forbes) wounded.
Reinforcements from Haka, under Colonel Mainwaring, met the returning
column at Klanklang and saved them from further loss. Officers and men
had behaved admirably. A fine of guns and money was imposed on the
tribe, and preparations were made for enforcing it.

Before the preparations were complete Jahoota came suing for peace. He
proved that he had been away and had had no concern in the treacherous
attack, which had been organized by two subordinate chiefs in his
absence. He brought in guns and other valuables in part payment of
the fine, and was ordered to produce the two offenders and to raze
their houses to the ground. As the culprits were not surrendered, the
political officer, with three hundred rifles, visited Klanklang in May.
He found that the houses had been destroyed, but the two men had fled.
Some of the villages paid their shares of the fines; but others held
out, and owing to the lateness of the season and want of transport, it
was impossible to coerce them. Jahoota, in proof of his good faith,
gave up his eldest son as a hostage, and he was left to re-establish
his authority. There has been no difficulty since in managing these
Baungshè tribes, and in the years 1894-5 they, as well as all the
southern tribes, were disarmed.

The control of the rude southernmost Chins, known as Chinbôks,
Chinbons, and Yendus, was exercised at first by a subdivisional
officer stationed at Yawdwin. From Lieutenant Rainey's expedition up
to January, 1891, no disturbance occurred. In that month a very daring
raid was made on Yawdwin itself, and the place looted under the eyes
of the police garrison. Further raids followed, and a strong force of
regular troops had to be sent to restore order. A military post was
established within the hills. In 1896 this post also was attacked. The
country was then placed under efficient administrative control. Posts
were established in suitable places. A civil officer with sufficient
powers was appointed to live in the hills and govern the people. His
headquarters are now at Kanpetlet, on the slopes of Mount Victoria,
some 6,000 feet above the sea-level. And a small force of Gurkha
military police under a British officer is maintained there. Raiding
has ceased, and the people have been disarmed. In other respects twenty
years have not changed them much. In the _Burma Gazetteer_ (of 1908,
vol. ii. p. 393) it is recorded:--

"The inhabitants of the tract are practically all animists. The Chinbok
men wear a very scanty loin-cloth, and are seldom seen without their
bows and arrows. The women's dress consists of a smock and a short
skirt. The females have their faces tattooed."

It may be doubted whether Western civilization will make them happier.
Tattooing is more lasting and more conducive to domestic peace than
paint and powder. It is cheaper in the long run.

FOOTNOTES:

[56]
    1st Battalion King's Own, Scottish Borderers       500 rifles
    No. 7 Mountain Battery                              84   "
    No. 6 Company Queen's Own, Sappers and Miners      151   "
    2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas                          410   "
    2nd Madras Infantry                                630   "
    Burma Company Queen's Own, Sappers and Miners       94   "
                                                      ----------
                               Total                 1,869 rifles


[57]
    1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment                   300 rifles
    42nd Gurkha Light Infantry                        477   "
    No. 5 Company Queen's Own, Sappers and Miners      95   "
    10th Bengal Infantry                              460   "
    28th Bengal Infantry                              290   "
                                                     -----------
                               Total                1,622 rifles


[58] Now Major-General Sir Vincent William Tregear, K.C.B., Indian
Army, retired.

[59] It was understood at this time that the Siyins were quite
subordinate to the Tashons, whose control, however, proved to be
limited.

[60] Brigadier-General Symons's Despatch, dated the 1st of May, 1890,
from Haka.

[61] "The Chin Hills," vol. i., p. 89. Government Press, Rangoon, 1896.

[62] Brigadier-General Tregear's Despatch, May 31, 1890.

[63] Regarding Jahoota, or Ya Hnit, see pp. 334-335 _infra_.

[64] It may be questioned whether, in view of the obstinate resistance
shown by some tribes, they can be fairly charged with lack of
persistence.

[65] For accurate and most interesting information regarding the Chins,
their manners, customs, and history, I must refer the reader to the
"Chin Hills," by Bertram S. Carey, C.I.E., and H. N. Tuck (2 vols.,
Rangoon Government Press, 1896.), which can be seen at the India Office
Library.

[66] Mr. Ross, after excellent service, died at Rangoon in 1910.

[67] Mr. Macnabb is now Major Macnabb, Commissioner of the Sagaing
(formerly called Central) Division of Upper Burma.




CHAPTER XXIII

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF BURMA


Of the many other parts which go to make up the working machinery of a
great province nothing has been said, as the object of this account is
to show how peace and order were restored, or rather given, to Burma.
Along and step by step with this rough work, however, every part of an
advanced administration began to take shape. There was none which was
not, at the very least, called into existence.

The revenue of Upper Burma increased from £222,000 in 1886-7 to
£1,120,000 in the year 1889-90. No new taxes were imposed. The revenue
grew by careful administration. From the year 1888 I had the assistance
of Mr. Fryer as Financial Commissioner in dealing with this branch of
the work, and the subject of the land revenue of the Upper Province
was examined more minutely than had been possible before. In 1889 a
regulation declaring the law relating to rights of land and formulating
a complete system of revenue law for Upper Burma was framed in Burma,
and passed by the Governor-General in Council. In it provision was
made for the gradual survey and assessment of the land; and before the
end of 1890 the cadastral survey had broken ground in two districts in
which the cultivated area was largest.

The Forest Department had been busy from the first, and progress had
been made in ascertaining the condition and resources of the great teak
forests of Upper Burma.

The Government of India had treated Burma with generosity in the
matter of money for public works. The extent of our undertakings was
limited by the difficulty of obtaining a competent staff, rather than
by a deficiency of funds. The expenditure on barracks and other
accommodation for troops at stations where garrisons were to be
permanently kept was necessarily large. At district headquarters in
civil stations, court-houses, and (where necessary) jails had been
built, and court-houses had also been provided in many subdivisions.
The irrigation works in Kyauksè were not neglected, and the Mu Canal
scheme in the Shwèbo district had been taken in hand. The railway to
Mandalay was opened in March, 1889, and the surveys for the Mu Valley
line, which was to take the rails up the right bank of the river
and through all the difficult country traversed by Major Adamson's
expedition in 1887-8, had been completed and construction had begun.

Great attention had been paid to the improvement of communications,
including several difficult hill-roads. A good cart-road had been made
from the river to the ruby mines. Another from Mandalay to Maymyo was
being taken on to Lashio; and, from Meiktila to Kalaw on the Shan
plateau, seventy-six miles, a road was well advanced. The land-locked
Yaw country had been opened up, and a mule-track from Kalewa on the
Chindwin to Fort White in the Chin Hills had been finished. Roads over
the Yomas, which had sheltered the Magwè dacoits, had been completed.

The money, poured into the country for roads and buildings, apart
from the railway expenditure, was nearly all spent on native labour
and on material produced in the country. In the aggregate it was more
than the sums received as revenue. That it, along with the railway
expenditure on labour, helped largely in settling the country directly
and indirectly, is certain. If Indian and Chinese Shan coolies were
employed, it was because Burman labour was not forthcoming.

Nor had some of the refinements of administration been neglected.
In the larger towns a simple system of municipal government was
introduced, care being taken not to hurry a somewhat primitive people
accustomed to corrupt methods and with little sense of responsibility
along the slippery paths of local self-government.

In the middle of 1890 a Judicial Commissioner was appointed for Upper
Burma. I accepted this refinement more reluctantly than I would have
welcomed a reduction of the garrison. But the character of the man
appointed to the post (the late Mr. Hodgkinson) was an assurance that
there would be no display of judicial pyrotechnics, such as lawyers
sometimes indulge in, and that some regard would be paid to the
conditions under which our officers were working.

The provision of medical aid for the people was taken in hand
energetically, under the guidance of Dr. Sinclair, who administered
the medical department of the whole of Burma. It was not possible to
provide substantial public hospitals, and at first only temporary
buildings were erected. Excellent permanent hospitals had been built
for the military police, and on their withdrawal it was intended that
these buildings should be converted into civil hospitals.

Vaccination was introduced also, and every district was furnished with
the means of protection against smallpox. The people came readily to be
vaccinated, and no Burman, so far as I know, expressed an objection,
conscientious or other, to being protected from the ravages of a
loathsome disease. But they are comparatively a backward race and still
have much to learn.

In the matter of education, it was not the time to do much, and I
was inclined to walk very warily in Upper Burma. The Director of
Public Instruction was sent round the province in 1889 to examine the
condition of the existing schools; and on his report a beginning was
made by appointing an inspector and some assistant inspectors, more to
ascertain and collate facts than with a view to active interference.
Later on the grant-in-aid rules in force in the lower province were
introduced. The author of the _Burma Gazetteer_ (vol. i., p. 132)
writes: "Missionary schools are now plentiful, and lay schools, both
public and private, abound; but the bed-rock of vernacular education in
Burma is still monastery teaching, and with it is intimately bound up
the educational welfare of the people."

I am inclined to agree with this statement. The system of monastic
schools has, I think, been an immense boon to the people of Burma, and
if only the monks could be roused to educate themselves more and to
cast off some of their old ideas I should like to see it maintained.

The danger is that the contact with Western knowledge and ascertained
fact may destroy the belief of the young Burmans in the monastic
teaching, and this danger is increased, if it is not caused, by the
superstitious ignorance of the monks and their inability to disentangle
the moral teaching of their great founder from the cobwebs of fairy
tales, about the form and nature of the earth and the like. With this
in mind, a beginning was made towards inducing the Pongyis to employ
certificated assistant teachers in the monastic schools.

Western teaching may, however, have less effect on Eastern faiths
than we think. I was visiting a lay school in Burma one day, I forget
where, but I was talking to one of the pupils, a very intelligent boy.
I asked him about the shape of the earth, and so on. He had it all
pat, the conventional proofs included. I said: "Now, you know what the
Pongyis teach, which do you believe--what you have learnt here, or in
the monastery?" He replied unhesitatingly, "What the Pongyis tell me,
of course." "Why then," I asked, "did you say the earth was round and
went round the sun?" "Oh," he said, "I must say that or I should not
pass the examinations; but I believe the other." There may be more
intelligent students, even at a riper age, of the same mind as this
boy. Sometimes, perhaps, in the West, it is the other way about.

On the 10th of December, 1890, I surrendered my charge to Sir Alexander
Mackenzie,[68] one of the ablest men of his time in India.

In his summary of the Administration Report of Burma, for the year
1890-1, dated December 21, 1891, is written: "Upper Burma being now
perfectly tranquil, it is not necessary to describe separately the
progress made in the pacification of each district. The fact that
there were fewer crimes in Upper than in Lower Burma during the year
is sufficient proof that except in certain frontier tracts the work is
complete."

It is pleasant to most of us to know that our work is appreciated by
others. It pleased me the other day, and it may please those for whom
I have put together this rough account of the pacification of Burma to
read this passage from the "Shans at Home," by Mrs. Leslie Milne and
the Rev. Wilbur Willis Cochrane (p. 29):--

"At the time of the annexation, every part of the Shan highlands west
of the Salween was ravaged with war, Shans against Shans and Burmans
against them all. To bring peace and an era of prosperity, put an end
to feuds, settle the disputes of princes, re-establish the people in
their homes, and organize out of chaos a helpful and strong government
was no easy task. That it was accomplished with so small a force, so
quickly and with so little opposition, was due to the energy, ability,
and tact of the British officials upon whom the Government had placed
responsibility.

"Immediately after the annexation, began the era of improvement.
Twenty-four years have passed since then. The British peace officers
have retired, or are retiring, but they leave behind them a prosperous
and peaceful people. The towns are growing towards their former
dimensions; wealth and trade are increasing beyond all expectations.
Population is rapidly increasing. A mother with her little child can
travel alone from Mogaung to the border of Siam, and from Kengtung to
Rangoon, with comfort and perfect safety."

FOOTNOTE:

[68] The late Sir Alexander Mackenzie, K.C.S.I., afterwards
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.




INDEX


  A

  Adamson, C.I.E., Major C. H. E., Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo, 76,
    239-267, 338

  Aitchison, Sir Charles, 20, 56

  Akyab, 330

  Alelet (central division of Hsenwi), 140, 160, 169, 173

  Allahabad, 20

  Alomphra, House of, 38, 227

  Alôn, 88, 289

  Amarapura, 39

  Amats (ministers), 268

  American Baptist Missionaries, work among the Karens, 51, 80

  Amir Mahomed, death of, 87

  Andamans, 112

  Anderson, Brigadier-General, 29

  Arakan Mountains, 62, 148, 293

  Arbuthnot, Sir Charles, Commander-in-chief of the Madras Army, 29, 284

  Arbuthnot, Gillanders, 45

  Archer, Mr. W. J. (H.M. acting vice-consul at Chiengmai), 167, 168,
    219, 220

  Armstrong, Captain, 240

  Assam, Valley of, 134, 311

  Atkinson, Captain, killed, 28

  Aung Bet, 112

  Ava, Court of, 19;
    training of police at, 64, 65, 99;
    King of, 1;
    kingdom of (subdivision of Sagaing), 8, 31, 118, 143, 270;
    invaded, 65


  B

  Barron, Surgeon-Major, 250

  Barrow, Major (now Sir Edmund Barrow), 219

  Bassein, 40, 48

  Balu stream, 195

  Bangkok, 134, 167, 168, 191

  Baungshè tribe (Tashons), 288, 332, 334, 336

  Baw (or Maw) submitted to General East, 33, 49

  Bawlaké, 191

  Bawyethat Pagoda, 150

  Bayfield, Lieutenant (explorer of Jade Mines, 1838), 238

  Bayengan or Viceroy of Myingun Prince, 31, 84, 87-89

  Bengal boundary, 130

  Benson, Lieutenant, 264, 267

  Bernard, Sir Charles, arrival, 7, 8;
    code, 10;
    roads, &c., 56, 66;
    irrigation, 69;
    village disarmament, 81;
    meeting with Hkun Saing, 142, 146;
    policy towards Shan States, 147

  Bernard Myo, 46, 47, 271

  Beville, Captain, 88, 295

  Bhamo, 8, 30, 40, 44, 67, 74-79;
    description of Bhamo, 234-241, 309

  Bigandet, Bishop, 37

  Binbong, 272

  Blundell, Major, 277

  Bo Cho, 83, 114

  Bo-hmu, 144

  Bo-hmumintha, 135

  Bo Le, death of, 115, 116

  Bombay, 20;
    Burma Company working the teak forests, 116, 121;
    sappers and miners, 148

  Bo Nyo U, 88

  Bo Saga, 291

  Bo Saing, 154

  Bo Sawbwa, 85

  Bo Swè, story of, 26-28, 62, 82

  Bo Ti, 250-264

  Bo Tok, 65, 99

  Brahmaputra, 134

  Bridges, Mr. J. E., Deputy Commissioner, 146

  Browning, Mr. Colin, 92, 104

  Buddha, teaching of, 44;
    Yaza, 117

  Buddhists (Shan), 134

  Burgess, C.S.I., Mr. G. D. (Judicial Commissioner, Upper Burma), 12,
    29, 30, 92

  Burma, boundaries of, 3

  Burma, Upper, incorporated with India, 8;
    scheme of government, 8;
    scheduled district, 10;
    divisions of provinces, 12;
    description of districts, 30-36;
    marches of, 130

  Burma, Lower, village organization, 22, 53;
    dacoity, 23;
    defective police arrangements, 52;
    evil of arming villages, 53;
    evil of mixed police, Indian and Burman, 53, 54;
    King of, 76, 125, 134-138, 144, 148, 169, 175

  Burmans, country of the, 133;
    military police, 64, 65;
    special constables, 80

  Buyers, Mr. G. D., chief engineer, Mandalay Railway, 61

  Byaing Gyi, 109


  C

  Calcutta, 20, 24, 128

  Cambodia, 134

  Carey, Mr. Bertram, 314, 319-321, 326, 331

  Carter, Mr. G. M. S., 47, 85, 89;
    sent with Colonel Symons to Sagaing, 104, 295

  Chaungwa, 86, 87;
    Ava district, 146, 147;
    Prince, 160

  Chaungu, 297, 329

  Chaungzon, 300, 329

  Chefan, 278

  Chieng Kong given to Siam, 232

  Chiengmaai (or Zimme), 167-169

  China, care in dealing with, 21;
    and Upper Burma, 40;
    opium traffic, 40-44;
    rights over Kang Hung, 232

  Chinbôks, 327-336

  Chinbons, 327-336

  Chinbyit, 88, 89

  Chindwin, Lower, 8, 33, 64, 84, 99, 105;
    river, 92, 120, 133, 288, 294, 311

  Chinese in Bhamo, 74, 75;
    Shans, 75;
    threaten the frontier, 76, 77;
    in Hsenwi, 138;
    attitude to Trans-Salween States, 136

  Chingaing, 290, 291

  Chins, disarmament of, 81, 100, 101;
    country, 131, 294;
    Chin-Lushai, 308-336;
    expedition against the, 287-307;
    five tribes, 332

  Chitpauk, 296

  Chittagong Hills, 293;
    column, 319-336

  Clarke, Major O. L. I., 219

  Clement, Colonel, assists in capture of Bo Swè, 82

  Clements, Lieutenant, 264

  Close, Surgeon J. K., 219

  Cochrane, Rev. Wilbur Willis, 285

  Cockran, Colonel, 272

  Collett, C.B., Brigadier-General H., 192, 195

  Collins, Mr. G. G., 108, 120, 121

  Colquhoun, Mr. Archibald, 271

  Cooke, Captain (of Burman Commission), 235, 236

  Cox Brigadier-General, 30

  Crimmin, Captain, Indian Medical Service (Surgeon-Lieut.-Col. John
    Crimmin, V.C., C.I.E.), 195

  Cronin, Colonel, senior medical officer, 264

  Cross, Lord, 17

  Crosthwaite, K.C.S.I., Sir Charles H. T., 3;
    former service in British Burma, 19;
    offered Chief Commissionership and summoned to Calcutta, 20, 21;
    relieves Sir C. Bernard at Rangoon, 24;
    arrival at Mandalay, 26;
    return to Rangoon, 50;
    leaves for Upper Burma, 62;
    leaves Ava for Sagaing and meets Sir George White, 65;
    examination of irrigation system, 69;
    reduction of field force considered, 72;
    arrangements for Durbar at Mandalay, 74;
    visits Bhamo, 74;
    speech at Mandalay Durbar, commendation by Lord Dufferin, 76;
    on transferring men, 78, 79;
    disarmament--letter to Lord Dufferin, 80-82;
    visits Thayetmyo and district, 90;
    letter to Viceroy on police posts, 97;
    administration of Shan States, 100;
    conferred with Lord Dufferin, 100, 102;
    visit to Minbu, 108;
    visit to Popa, 114;
    meeting with General Symons at Magwè, 118;
    consultations with men of the Magwè district, 119;
    transfer of Mr. G. G. Collins to Magwè, 120;
    return to Mandalay, 120;
    on sick-leave to Nilgiri Hills, 120;
    accompanies H.R.H. Prince Albert Victor of Wales, to Mandalay, 121;
    action against dacoits, 123;
    Durbar in the Shan States, 124, 125;
    scheme for reduction of the military police, 129-130;
    correspondence with the Viceroy, 128;
    appointment of Colonel Cockran, 272;
    appoints Maung Ket's nephew ruler over Kalè, 288;
    decision not to absorb Kalè, 292;
    establishes posts along the Chin frontier, 296;
    proclamation to the Tashons, 312;
    account of internal administration, 337-341;
    visit to lay school, 340

  Crowther, Mr., inspector of police, 264

  Cumming, Colonel, 67

  Cuppage, Mr., wounded while fighting against Set Kya, 70, 71

  Custance, Mr., 83


  D

  Dabayen, 88

  Dacoits, Mandalay, Ye-u, Mu, 71;
    Sagaing, 72, 103;
    Government, 112;
    measures taken against, 123

  Dalhousie, Lord, 1

  Daly, C.S.I., C.I.E., Lieut.-Colonel Hugh, agent to the
    Governor-General in Central India, 100; assisted Mr. Hildebrand
    against the Shans (1887), 165, 170-178, 272-276, 278, 285

  Daniell, Mr., 278-280

  Darrah, Mr., Assistant Commissioner, killed by Set Kya's men, 70

  Darwin, Dr., 219, 226

  Davies, Major H. R., 134

  Davis, Captain, principal medical officer of the Field Force, 58

  Deccan, 20

  Disarmament (village regulation), 80-89

  Dufferin, Lord, minute by, 9, 11;
    meeting with Sir Charles Crosthwaite, 24;
    on surrender of Limbin Prince, 60;
    aids Sir Charles Crosthwaite in obtaining funds for engineering
      work, 70;
    commendation on Sir Charles Crosthwaite's speech at the Durbar, 76;
    with regard to the Shan Expedition, 77, 78;
    writes on the action at Chinbyit, 89;
    policy as to autonomous States, 92;
    agreement with Sir Charles Crosthwaite's views as to police
      posts, 98;
    roads through the Chin country, 101;
    on the work done in Burma, 102;
    left India, 128

  Dunsford, Captain, killed, 28

  Durbar, Mandalay, 76;
    Shan States, 124, 125;
    Kengtung, 231

  Dyson, Mr., Assistant Commissioner at Magwè, 117, 118


  E

  Ein-she-min, or War Prince, the Limbin Prince, 157

  Elias, C.I.E., Mr. Ney, Chief of the Commission to survey the Frontier
    and settle disputed points, 219, 220; decisions confirmed, 232

  Eliott, Lieutenant L. E., 259-263, 264, 265

  Expenditure and Revenue, Upper Burma, army, military police force,
    incoming revenue, 69, 70

  Eyre, Captain, 29, 290, 297


  F

  Falam, Tashon capital, 310, 312, 320;
    headquarters of the Civil Administration, Chin Hills, 324

  Faunce, General, 287;
    Chin Expedition, 306;
    Chin Lushai, 308, 313;
    left Burma, 313

  Feudatory States of India, 126, 127

  Forbes, Lieutenant, 335

  Forrest, Major, wounded, 278

  Fort Stedman, 124, 126, 147, 151-156, 158, 160, 161, 164, 167, 186

  Fort Tregear, 332, 335

  Fort White, formerly Tôklaing, 304, 310, 324

  Foster, Lieutenant, killed, 318

  Fowler, Lieutenant (of the Beleuchis), 185, 188, 189

  France, contact on the Siamese frontier to be avoided, 211

  French, Indo-China, 130;
    dominions in Tonquin China, 212;
    secret treaty with the King of Burma, 214;
    obtained the Treaty of Chantabun, 232

  Frere, Sir Bartle, 99

  Fryer, Mr. F. W. (now Sir Frederick Fryer), Commissioner of the
    Central Division, 12, 29, 55, 104

  Fuller, R.A., Captain, 264


  G

  Gangaw, 290, 293, 296, 297-328

  Gantarawadi, 153, 183

  Garfit, Major, 272, 273

  Gastrell, Captain, Commandant of the Mandalay battalion, 99

  Gatacre, Brigadier-General, 280

  Gaudama, Legend of, 38

  Gaungu, 300

  Gleeson, Mr., 33

  Gleig, Major, 290

  Golightly, Captain (Colonel R. E. Golightly, D.S.O.), 32

  Gordon, Major, arrives at Salin with reinforcements, 28

  Gould, Mr., H.M. Representative at Bangkok, 203

  Gracey, R.E., Major, chief engineer, Upper Burma, 67-68

  Greenaway, Major, 278, 279

  Gungaw, 334


  H

  Haitsi Lope tribe, 331

  Haka, 316, 332-334

  Hakas, 288, 309, 332

  Hartnoll, Mr. H. S., Deputy Commissioner Minbu, 108, 109

  Harvey, Colonel, 191;
    arrival at Papun, 192

  Hastings, Captain, Commandant of the military police at Myingyan
    (Major-General Edward Spence Hastings, D.S.O.), 63, 64, 98, 113

  Hawker, Lieutenant, 264-266

  Hertz, Mr. H. F., 277, 279

  Hertz, Mr. W. A., 108

  Hext, R.N., Captain John, Director of the Indian Marine (now
    Rear-Admiral Sir John Hext, K.C.I.E.), 48, 71

  Heins (Karenni chiefs of divisions), 173

  Hildebrand, Mr., 35;
    accepts the surrender of the Limbin Prince, 60;
    at Mandalay, to meet Sir Charles Crosthwaite, 74, 76, 77;
    visit to Shan States, 100, 124;
    made Civil head in the expedition against the Shans, 148-187;
    connection with the Karennis, 188-208

  Himalaya, Eastern, 133

  Hkam Leng, 31, 47, 71;
    dacoit leader, 269-281

  Hkun Hmon, reinstated at Mawkmai, 184, 188

  Hkun Kyi, 184

  Hkun Nu, 162;
    appointed Sawbwa of Lawksawk, 163

  Hkun Sa, 169

  Hkun Saing, first Shan chief to submit to the British Government,
      137, 138, 140, 141, 160, 170, 172;
    concessions made to, 179

  Hkun Sang Möng Chen, 185, 186

  Hkun Ti, 155

  Hlaingdet, 148, 149

  Hla U, Sagaing District dacoit leader, 49

  Hlawga, 85-87

  Hlegyomaw, 263, 266

  Hlutlaw (or cabinet), 213

  Hmawwaing jungles, 33;
    gang surrenders, 60

  Hmethaya Prince, 270

  Hodgkinson, Mr., of the Special Commission, Lower Burma, 25;
    transferred to Tennasserim, 56;
    appointed Judicial Commissioner for Upper Burma, 338, 339

  Holland, Commander, of the Royal Indian Marine Service, 311

  Homalin, 296

  Hopong, 151, 152, 154, 169

  Hoswata Shendoos, 319

  Hpon Kan, 274, 282;
    Kachins, 283

  Hpunkan, 44

  Hsahtung, 167;
    Myoza of, 169;
    range, 151

  Hsawnghsup, Sawbwa of, 33

  Hsen, the local headman in Laikha territory, 171

  Hsenmawng, 215

  Hsenwi, 44, 49, 137-139;
    Queen of, 140, 141, 146;
    Alelet, 160;
    Central, 165, 166;
    boundaries fixed, revenue, &c., 176, 177;
    Northern, 165, 268

  Hsenyawt annexed to Kengtung, 215

  Hsipaw, 31, 137-147, 273;
    Sawbwa of, 49, 136, 160, 161, 166

  Hsumhsai, 137, 141, 142, 160

  Hukawng Valley, 234

  Hyderabad, 20;
    Cavalry, 71;
    Infantry, 85, 89


  I

  Indaw River, 252

  Indawgyi Lake, 251

  Indiarubber tax, 40

  Indin, 288, 289, 296, 302

  Inle Lake, 124, 142

  Ilderton, Major, 60

  Ithi tribe, 266

  Ireland, F.R.G.S., Alleyne, 44

  Irrawaddy, 12, 108, 134, 241;
    Valley, 30, 133, 311;
    patrol steam launches, 47;
    Flotilla Company, 235, 236

  Irrigation schemes, existing canals taken over by the British, 69


  J

  Jackson, R.E., Lieutenant H. M., 157, 180, 219

  Jade duties, 40;
    mines, farming of, expedition to, 234-267

  Jahoota or Ya Hnit, Chief of the Klanklangs, 325, 334, 335

  James, R.E., Lieutenant, 334

  Jameson, Mr., Inspector-General of Police in Lower Burma, 51, 52

  "Jhoom" or "Taungya," primitive cultivation, 325

  Jubulpore, 20

  Jut, village of, 121


  K

  Kabaw Valley, 92, 290, 296, 331

  Kachin Hills, 263

  Kachins, 75, 130, 131, 138-140, 150, 161, 234-278;
    Sana, 263;
    Hpon Kan Kachins, 283;
    Lweseng, 276;
    Ton Hon, 276

  Kado on the Salween, timber collected, 207

  Kalas, or barbarians, 107

  Kala Thapa Sing, Gurkha chief, 277

  Kalè, Sawbwa of, 33, 49, 288, 294;
    State, 290, 313, 316

  Kalemyo, 290, 311, 316, 328

  Kalewa, 290, 294, 297, 311, 312

  Kamaing, 251, 261

  Kambalè, 296, 297, 302

  Kan, 296-299, 311, 315, 328

  Kang Hung, largest Trans-Salween State, 210, 213

  Kanglu, 185

  Kangyi, 302

  Kanhows, 287, 296, 306, 312, 331

  Kani, 33, 88

  Kanlè, 84

  Kanpetlet, 330, 336

  Kansi Hla, Kansi Naung, rulers in the jade-mine hills, 252, 255

  Kantha, 296

  Karenni, Eastern, 100, 138;
    Western, 151;
    States, 140, 142, 148, 154;
    chiefs, 151, 152;
    country, description of, 182

  Karennis, 163;
    expedition against the, Colonel Sartorius and Mr. Scott, 188-208

  Karens, Christian, Baptist Mission to, 51;
    as special constables, 80;
    scheme to enlist, 131, 132, 167

  Karwan, 282

  Katha, 8, 31, 93, 238, 257, 269

  Kaukon, 150

  Kaungi, residence of the Möngpai Sawbwa, 166

  Kaw Ferry, 224

  Kawlin, 93

  Kawpiti, 196

  Keary, Major D.S., 334

  Kehsi Mansi, 151, 154, 169-173

  Kemmedine, 138

  Kengcheng, 143

  Keng Hkam, 169, 223

  Kengtawng, 154, 156, 163, 167, 168;
    description of, by Mr. Scott, 223

  Kengtung, 136, 137, 139, 143-145, 168, 210, 213;
    description of the city of, 226, 227;
    Sawbwa, submits, 230-231

  Kennedy, Major, 88, 295

  Khampat, 296

  Khuds, 304

  Kidderpore, 49

  Kingston, Major, 301

  Kin Le Gyi, maid-of-honour to Supayalat, 88

  Kin Möngs, headman, 173

  Kinwan Mingyi, Minister of State, 76

  Klanklangs submission of, 319

  Knox, Captain, 104

  Kokang, 43

  Kôkkozu, 83

  Koset, 303

  Ko-up, 223

  Kubo Valley, 302

  Kugyo, 150, 151

  Kukis tribe, 331

  Kun Aw (Pa-ôk-Chok of Möngyai), 169

  Kun Hmon, 218

  Kun Kyi, Sawbwa of Möngnai, 144, 145, 158, 167

  Kunlon Ferry, 75, 178

  Kun Meik, 141

  Kun Noi, 218

  Kunze, 298

  Kyabin Myoôk, 83

  Kyadet, 87, 88

  Kyannyat, 46

  Kyatsakan, 149

  Kyaukhnyat, 192, 204

  Kyaukpyu, 330

  Kyauksè, 8, 13, 49, 65, 69, 99, 338

  Kyaw, 121, 295, 301

  Kyawgaung, 282

  Kwungli, 322

  Kyaw Zaw (Lawksawk chief) gang broken up, 232

  Kyem Meung, heir-apparent of Kengtung, 228

  Kyungyaung, 279


  L

  Lahore, 20

  Laikha, 151, 154, 156, 169;
    Sawbwa of, 171

  Lakun, tribe, 266

  Lanchein, 278

  Lansdowne, Marquis of, made Viceroy, 128

  Laos, 217

  Lashio, 140, 177, 223

  Late tribe, 331

  Lataung tribe, 263

  Laungshe, 329

  Lawksawk, 33, 99, 141-154, 162

  Legaing, 110

  Legya Queen, one of King Mindon's wives, 142

  Lepei tribe, 262, 263, 266

  Letha range, 303

  Leveson, Mr. H. G. A., of the India Civil Service and Burman
    Commission, 232

  Limbin Confederacy, 34, 143-151, 155

  Limbin Prince, 60, 145, 146, 151-158

  Lindaung, 83

  Lockhart, General Sir William, 18;
    work in Eastern Division, 33;
    work among dacoits, 61

  Loikaw, 190-196

  Loilong, 167

  Lon Pein (Chinaman farmer of jade-mine taxes), 244-246

  Low, G.C.B. Brigadier-General Sir Robert Cunlilfe, 29, 64, 91, 102, 108

  Lugalegzi arrested, 121

  Lushai country, Chin-, 308-336

  Lweseng, 274, 276, 278, 280


  M

  Macdonald, Captain, 264, 265

  MacDonnell, Mr. A. P. (now Lord MacDonnell, P.C., G.C.S.I.), Home
    Secretary to the Government of India--acted for Sir Charles
    Crosthwaite when on sick-leave, 120

  Macgregor, Colonel, 301

  Mackenzie, K.C.S.I., Sir Alex., Lieut-Governor, Bengal, 340

  Macnabb, Lieutenant D. J. C. (now Major Macnabb, Commissioner of the
    Sagaing Division), 64, 121, 333, 334

  Macpherson, Lieut.-General Sir Herbert, transferred to Burma,
    death of, 18

  Magwè, 32, 61, 96, 99, 102;
    trouble in district of, 115-127

  Maingmawgyi, 136

  Mainwaring, Colonel, 335

  Makau tribe, 263

  Maklang, famous banyan-tree Mai Hung Kan at, 223

  Malin, 275

  Mandalay, 2, 8, 19, 26, 31, 46, 67, 71, 74, 88, 133, 137-142,
      146, 160-164;
    and Lashio Railway, 61, 125, 126;
    and Shwèbo Canal, 69

  _Mandat_, or temporary hall, 175

  Manders, Surgeon, 197

  Manglön, 160;
    chief's submission to British Government, 320

  Manhé, 241

  Manipur, 134

  Manpun, 271, 273

  Mansi, route for traders, 75, 178, 282, 285

  Manton, 278

  Marip tribe, 266

  Maung An Taw Ni, township officer of Legaing, 110

  Maung Ba, 88

  Maung Gyi, 33

  Maung Kala, dacoit leader, death of, 60

  Maung Kala, magistrate in British service, 236, 250;
    assassinated, 237

  Maung Kan, Thi, 109

  Maung Ket, Sawbwa of Kalè, 288

  Maung Kin, 109

  Maung Lat, 33

  Maung Nwa, a Kalè official, 305

  Maung Ohn, 60

  Maung Po Min, the interpreter, 86

  Maung Po O, 85

  Maung Sa, 141

  Maung Se, 141

  Maung Swè, story of, 27

  Maung Tha Dun, 289

  Maung Tha Gyi, 85-89

  Maung Tok San, 289

  Maung Ya Baw, 109

  Mawkmai, trade relations between Moulmein and, 157, 158, 165;
    Sawbwa of, claims Möng Pu, 167-169, 217;
    restored to Möng Mau and Mehsakun, 221

  May, Colonel, 31, led the troops against Set Kya, a pretender, 70

  Maymyo (Pinulwin) 31, 164

  Mehawnghsawn, 217

  Mehsakun, 216, 217, 221

  Meiktila, 8, 60, 61

  Mekong, River, 133, 136, 143, 210, 232

  Menam, River, 133

  Mèpai Chaung, 204

  Mewettaung Range, 156

  Milne, Mrs. Leslie, extract from "Shans at Home," 285

  Minbu, 8, 28, 32, 62, 69, 83, 91, 102, 107, 119, 120, 330

  Mindôn, King of Upper Burma, reign, character, taxation, &c., 3,
      110, 139, 140, 170, 270;
    wife of (Legya), 142

  Minhla, 7, 8, 26, 62, 90, 91

  Minlèdaung tribe, 322

  Min O, 106

  Minogue, Lieutenant, 99

  Mintainbin, 87

  Min Yaung, 32, 115

  Mobingyis tribe, 331

  Mobye, 192

  Mocatta, Lieutenant, 335

  Mogaung, 30, 77, 101;
    Expedition to, 234-286

  Mogok, capital of Ruby Mines, 31, 45-47, 271

  Mohlaing, 31, 47

  Mohnyin, 238, 257

  Molè River (tributary of Irrawaddy), 44, 240, 273

  Molo, 280

  Môn, Valley of, 83, 108

  Möng Hang, 168, 215

  Möng Hsat, 168, 169

  Möng Hsu, 172

  Möng Hta, 168, 215

  Möngkung, 151, 154;
    Myozas of, 169-172

  Möng Kyawt, 168, 215

  Möng Leng, 268

  Mönglon, 141, 142

  Möng Löng, 139

  Möngmau, 216, 217

  Möngmit, Shan States, 31, 47, 268-286

  Möngnai, town of, 137, 144, 146, 151, 152;
    Sawbwa, 60, 136, 143, 145, 152-169, 215;
    decorated, 124

  Möngnawng Sawbwa, 145;
    Myoza, 169;
    town, 161;
    State, 172

  Möngpai Sawbwa accepts British suzerainty, 151, 152, 165, 166

  Möngpan, 165-169, 215

  Möngpawn, 153-158;
    Sawbwa, 145, 169

  Möngping, 151

  Möngpu, appropriated by Kengtung, 215

  Möngsang, 172

  Möngsit (son-in-law of Möngpawn), 155;
    Myoza, 169

  Möng Tang, 215

  Möngtung, 142, 160, 168, 169

  Möngyai, 140, 160-167, 172

  Monywa, 68, 88

  Moring, Ltd., Alexander, 43

  Morison, C.E.I., Mr. Wm. Thomson, of the Indian Civil Service,
      Bombay Presidency, 85;
    joined Lieutenant Plumer, 86-87

  Moulmein, 133, 151, 157, 158, 211

  Mozo, 298

  Mu River, 71;
    Valley line, 338

  Mueng Fai, Siamese district of, 216

  Mwebingyi, Chief of, 320

  Mwelpi, 331

  Myat Hmon, 33, 60

  Myauk-Kodaung, 280

  Myélat (central division, Shan States), 142, 149-150;
    submission of, 151, 153, 166

  Myinmu, 64

  Myingun Prince, 31, 84, 214

  Myingyan, 8, 31, 63, 83, 92, 99, 102, 110, 113, 116, 301

  Myinzaing Prince, 140, 141, 147

  Myitkyina Railway, 246

  Myitson, 269

  Myittha River, 293, 311

  Myoôk, township officers and members of subordinate Civil Service, 162

  Myotha, 237

  Myothit, 32, 117

  Myo-thugyi Town Mayor of Pakokku, 63;
    mother of, visited by Sir Charles Crosthwaite, 63

  Myowun, City Governor of Mandalay, 76


  N

  Naga Cachar, 287

  Nagpur, 19

  Nam Pilu River, 152

  Nam Hkok Myoza, 169

  Namhsan, 177, 178

  Namkham, route for traders, 75, 285

  Nam Nyim River, 157

  Nam Pang River, 223

  Nam Teng Valley, 223

  Namthein River (affluent of Uyu), 253

  Nang Mya, niece of Mawkmai chief, Né Noi, 217

  Nang U, marriages, 144

  Nankathe River, 321;
    tribe, Trans-, 322

  Nanpapa, 261, 266

  Nanti, 241

  Napawng River, 251

  Natmauk, 116

  Natogyi, 83

  Naungmawn (brother of Möngpawn), 155

  Naw Hpa, Sawbwa of Hsenwi, 139, 140, 146;
    submits to British Government, 147, 160, 166, 169, 173

  Naw Möng, son of Naw Hpa, 139, 140, 146;
    submits to British Government, 147, 160, 166, 169, 173, 176-179

  Nawng Wawn Myoza, 169

  Naylor, C.S.I., C.I.E., Mr. Henry Todd, of the Indian Civil
      Service, 55;
    as Financial Commissioner of Burma, 55;
    sent to take charge of Magwè District, 120, 121

  Negrais, Cape, 287

  Neinsin, 284

  Né Noi, the Kolan or nine-fathom Sawbwa, 217

  Né Nwe, 183

  Nga Aw, 166

  Nga Kaing, 195

  Nga Kè, one of Ya Nyun's men, 111, 112

  Nga Kin, 109

  Nga Kway, 83

  Ngapè, 27, 28

  Nga Pyo, 89

  Ngathaingyaung, 40

  Ngwite tribe, 331

  Nilgiri Hills, 120

  Ningyan, afterwards called Pyinmana, 8

  Nugent, Lieutenant commanding at Möngmit, killed, 271

  Nurtama, 83

  Nyaungbintha, 266

  Nyaungywe or Yawnghwè, 142

  Nwi-tes tribe, 331


  O

  O'Donnell, Lieutenant (Colonel Hugh O'Donnell, D.S.O.), Bhamo and
      Mogaung affairs, 238, 240, 249, 260, 261;
    report by, 265-267, 277

  Ogle, Mr. (India Survey Department), 264

  Ôktama, story of, 27-29, 32;
    methods of government, defence, &c., 107-109;
    capture of, 110

  Opium regulations, 40, 41;
    Acts, 42, 43;
    Buddha's teaching against, 44


  P

  Padein, 28

  Pagan, 7, 8, 31, 63, 68, 83, 84, 91, 102;
    Min, 3;
    Prince, 39

  Pagyi, 33, 84, 85, 88

  Pakangyi, 33

  Pakan Prince, 39

  Pakokku, 63, 92, 102, 290, 293-301, 311, 315, 330

  Palaungs (Northern Shan tribe), 138, 268, 276

  Palmer, R.E., Lieutenant, 302

  Panga Sawbwa, 263

  Panglon, 179

  Panlaung, valley of the, 31

  Panthays, 75, 150;
    methods of travelling, 222, 225

  Pa-ôk-chok, 140, 160, 169, 173, 174

  Papun, 191, 192

  Pathans, 235

  Pauk, 83, 290, 295

  Paw Kwe, 47

  Payagon, 152

  Pazaung, 192

  Pegu, annexation of, 1;
    Yomas, 61, 116;
    division, 90

  Peile, Captain S. C. F. (later Lieut.-Colonel), Executive
      Commissariat officer, 58;
    made director of supply to outposts of military police, 59;
    "History of Burma Military Police," 131

  Pè Möng Mountains, 225

  Phayas, local rulers, 168

  Phayre, Colonel Sir Arthur P., 27, 134;
    Mr. Robert, 26, 27;
    death of, 28

  Philippine Commission, 44

  Phillips, Lieutenant, 301

  Pin township, 117

  Pink, Captain Francis J. (Colonel F. J. Pink, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.),
    219

  Plumer, Lieutenant, accompanied Mr. W. T. Morison against Maung
    Tha Gyi, 85, 86

  Pobye, Karenni chief, 151, 152, 166

  Po Hkine, 122

  Poh Myah, 251

  Poi tribes, 322

  Police force, gradual creation of efficient, 128-132;
    military, 54, 68;
    posts and patrols, military replaced by police, 95-99;
    work of Indian, 97

  Pon Chaung, 196

  Pondaung Range, 84, 85, 294

  Pondicherry, 31

  Pongyis, 37-40, 62, 150;
    monks and teachers, 339, 340

  Po O, 85

  Popa Mountain district, 31, 91; country, 98, 110

  Porter, Mr., Deputy Commissioner, Pyinmana, 121

  Po Saung, 83

  Po Saw, 243-274

  Prendergast, General Sir Harry, 2, 8, 26

  Prome, 26, 121

  Public Works Service grants, 67, 68

  Pu Chang Se banished (first husband of Nang Mya), 217

  Pulley, Captain, 152

  Punjab, 94;
    Northern, 311

  Punjabis, 84, 154

  Pwehla, 148, 150

  Pyindeik Pass, 149

  Pyinmana, 13, 61, 116, 120

  Pyinulwin, 31, 70

  Pyinyaung, 149


  Q

  Quesne, Captain Le (Army Medical Corps), awarded Victoria Cross, 305


  R

  Raikes, Captain (afterwards Major), Deputy Commissioner, Chindwin, 85;
    system to overthrow dacoits, 105, 106;
    meeting with Tashon chiefs, 289;
    Chin-Lushai campaign, 311, 312;
    illness of, 328

  Railways, Tengyneh, 75;
    Toungoo-Mandalay, Mandalay-Lashio, 124;
    Mu Valley line, &c., 338

  Rainey, Lieutenant R. M. (now Colonel Rainey-Robinson), commandant
    of the Levy (Chin Frontier Camp), 328, 336

  Rajputs, 43

  Rangoon, 2, 7, 50, 51, 54, 59, 61, 65, 138, 151, 157, 166, 270

  Reduction of Field Force, 70-73

  Revenue, 337

  Richards, Lieutenant, 264

  Richards, Mr., assisted Sir Charles Bernard, Superintending Engineer
    of Public Works Department, 66

  Rimmer, Mr., Commander in the Irrawaddy Flotilla Service, 244, 245

  Ripon, Lord, 19

  Roads and communications in Burma, 66-68, 100, 338

  Roberts, Sir Frederick, sanctions reinforcements, 17, 18;
    search for dacoits, 28

  Ross, Mr. D., 290, 301, 314, 328, 332, 334

  Ruby Mines, 8, 31, 44;
    concession to, 46;
    military police at, 58;
    British occupation of, 268;
    operations in, 309

  Rumai, 43

  Rundall, Captain F. M., 330-332


  S

  Sadaw, 40

  Safdar Ali, a Mussulman (native of India), interpreter in Bhamo and
    Mogaung, 245

  Saga, a dacoit leader, 121, 122, 191, 295

  Sagadaung, 46

  Sagaing, 8, 64, 88, 96, 99, 103, 118, 119

  Sagu, 108

  Sagyilains, 287, 292-331

  Sagyun, 83

  Sakangyi, 197

  Salin, 28, 64, 83, 108

  Salween, hill tracts, 148;
    river, 133, 139, 143, 158, 169, 209-233;
    Trans-, 136, 139, 158, 163, 170, 209-233;
    Cis-, 139, 169, 180, 209-233

  Samôn, Valley of, 31

  Sana, 266

  Sang Aw, 140, 173

  Sang Hai (usurper Hsenwi), 139

  San Ton Hon, 49, 77, 139-147, 160, 161, 166, 169, 172-176, 178

  Sartorius, C.B., Colonel George Conrad, of the Beleuchi Regiment,
    184, 185, 188

  Sassum tribe, 266

  Sawadi, 282

  Sawbwas, superior chiefs, Shan States, office of, sons of,
    134-136, 161

  Sawlapaw, chief of Eastern Karenni, 138, 153, 154, 166, 167, 183-207

  Sawlapawgyi, 153

  Sawlawi, the Kya Maung, or heir-apparent of Sawlapaw, 198;
    appointed chief of Karenni, order of his appointment, 202

  Sawlôn (capital of Eastern Karenni), 191;
    occupation of, 192;
    description of, 197

  Saw Möng, Sawbwa of Yawnghwè, 142, 143, 281

  Saw Ôn, Sawbwa of Yawnghwè, 143, 146, 150, 166, 179, 182

  Saw Waing, ex-Sawbwa of Lawksawk, 154, 214

  Saw Yan Naing, 49, 146, 270-281

  Scott, Mr. J. G. (Sir J. George Scott, K.C.I.E.), 43;
    expedition against the Shans, 148-187;
    appointed to assist Mr. A. H. Hildebrand, 209, 216, 219, 220;
    expedition to Trans-Salween States, 224-233

  Segrave, Mr., Superintendent of Police, 274

  Set kya, a pretender, attacked by Colonel May, 70, 99;
    captured by the Lawksawk chief, 232

  Shan Hills, 31, 99;
    plateau or thonze, 92, 141, 148;
    race, or Tai branch, 133, 144

  Shan States, difficulties in dealing with, 21, 34;
    durbar, 76, 77, 124-127;
    expedition against, 133-187;
    at peace and policy, 159-164

  Shans, Chinese, 138;
    effort to win confidence of, 148, 152;
    Sawbwas, 153;
    at home, quoted, 285

  Shaw, Mr., accompanied Major Greenaway, 279

  Shawy, Yoe (_nom de plume_ of Mr. J. G. Scott), 148

  Sherriff, Mr., Representative of Rangoon Chamber of Commerce, 285

  Shitywagyaung, 294

  Shonshé, 301

  Shwèbo, 8, 31, 88

  Shwè Gya, 248-254, 264

  Shwègyin, 54

  Shwègyobyu, Prince of Lower Chindwin, 84, 85, 290, 292, 312

  Shwèkinyo Prince, 115

  Shwèli, Lower, 269

  Shwè Yan (guerilla leader), invades Ava and Kyauksè districts, 65,
      270;
    death of, 99

  Siam, 138

  Siamese, 136-138;
    claim to Shan country, 167-169;
    claim to Karenni, 202-208;
    invasion of Kengtung, 214-216;
    methods of marking villagers, 221

  Sibsong Panna (twelve provinces), 233

  Sidoktaya, 32

  Sihaung, 293, 297

  Sikaw, 274

  Simla, embassy to, 19;
    Sir George White's despatch from, 98

  Simpson, Sir Benjamin, K.C.I.E., surgeon-general, 91

  Sinbo, 238, 241, 266

  Sinbyugyun, 49, 83

  Singu, 149, 150

  Sinkan, 270, 274, 275, 282

  Sipein, 280

  Sittang River, 12;
    Valley, 30, 32

  Si-u, 274, 280

  Siyins, 287, 292, 293, 312, 320, 322;
    submission of the, 324, 331

  Skene, Colonel, 319, 320

  Sladen, Colonel (Sir E. B. Sladen), 7, 8

  Smeaton, Mr. (the late Donald Mackenzie Smeaton, C.S.I., M.P.), made
      Chief Secretary, 56;
    Commissioner of Central Division, account of cruelty of dacoits in
      Pagyi country, 121, 122

  Sokte tribe, 287, 322, 331

  Sonpek, Tashon chief, 289, 294

  "Soul of a People" quoted, 24

  Stanton, D.S.O., Lieutenant, of the Intelligence Department, 180

  Stedman, Colonel E. (now Sir Edward Stedman, G.C.B., K.C.I.E.),
      35, 36, 50;
    appointed Inspector-General of Police in Upper Burma, constitution
      and training of military police, supplies, &c., 56-59, 72;
    leader of expedition to open trade routes through Shan States, 149-152;
    Fort (named after Colonel Stedman), 124, 126, 147, 151-187

  Stewart, Lieutenant John, 319

  Su Gaung, 83

  Sumput, 279

  Supayalat, Queen, 6, 88

  Sylet Hills, 287

  Symes, Mr. E. (the late Sir E. Symes), 55, 114

  Symons, Colonel W. Penn, expedition against Maung Tha Gyi, 85-89;
    sent to settle disturbances in Sagaing, 104;
    plan to deport those aiding dacoits, 105;
    succeeds the command in Nyingyan and Magwè, 118-120;
    Chin-Lushai Campaign report, 329;
    Thetta report, 333;
    Klanglangs report, 334, 335

  Swetenham, Major, 154, 164, 181

  Szechuen, 43, 156


  T

  Tabayin, 40

  Tabet, 162

  Taeping River, tributary of the Irrawaddy, 240

  Tai, Siamese branch of Indo-Chinese, 133, 134

  Taiktaga San driven out of Mehawnghsawn, 217

  Taingda, 32;
    Mingyi, 111

  Tamhpak, 162

  Ta Möngs (Shan headmen), 173

  Tao, 319, 335

  Tapaw, 245

  Ta Sanglè, ferry on the Salween, 219

  Tashons (nicknamed Baungshès by the Burmans), submission of, 288,
    289, 293, 310, 312, 322

  Taungbaw, 259, 260

  Taungdwingyi, 8, 32, 64, 102, 115-119

  Taunggyo, 327

  Taunglet, southern portion of Hsenwi, 140

  Taungtek, 317

  Tahwepon, ferry on the Salween, 218

  Tawngpeng, 165, 177-179, 268

  Tawphaya, Chief Minister of Kengtung, 228

  Tawyan tribe, 322

  Temple, Sir Richard, 126

  Tengyueh, 75

  Thabeikkyin, 47

  Thade's gang, 83

  Thama Sawbwa, 262, 263

  Tharrawaddy, 55, 90, 95, 148

  Thathanabaing, Pongyi, 37, 39

  Thayetmyo, 54, 55, 62, 82, 83, 90, 116, 117

  Thebaw, King, rule, character, and submission, 2, 6, 7, 103,
    140-145, 214

  Theinni (Hsenwi), 77, 174

  Thetta, 309, 333, 334

  Thibet, 133

  Thonze, or Hsumhsai, 141

  Thugyis (village headmen), 111, 122

  Tohon Range, 274

  Tokgyi, 115

  Tôklaing, 304

  Tongking, 134

  Tonnochy, Captain, 124

  Touche, Mr. J. D. La (Sir James La Touche), 12;
    Commissioner of Southern Division, 29

  Toungoo, 29, 30, 61;
    and Mandalay Railway, 126, 152

  Tregear, Brigadier-General (Major-General Sir Vincent William
    Tregear, K.C.B.), 319, 323

  Triscott, R.A., C.B., D.S.O., Colonel Charles Prideaux, Commander
    of the force in the Expedition to the Jade Mines, 240-255

  Tuck, Mr. H. N., 334

  Tucker, Mr. Henry St. George, Commissioner of Eastern Division, 12, 29;
    meets Sir Charles Crosthwaite, 60, 61

  Tungzang, 332

  Twet, Ga Lu (formerly a monk, a native of Kentawng), 144;
    leader against the Limbin Confederacy, 145, 154, 156, 163, 168;
    driven out of Kentawng, surrender and death, 184-187

  Twingé, 271

  Twomey, Mr., 238, 257, 259


  U

  U Po (Cadet of Hsenwi House), 139

  Uyu River, 253


  V

  Victoria, Queen-Empress, 125, 136-138, 146, 155, 158, 180, 190

  Victoria, Mount, 330, 336

  Village regulations, 81


  W

  Wa States, 43

  Wales, their R.H. the Prince and Princess of, 163;
    H.R.H. Prince Albert Victor of, 121

  Wallace, Lieutenant, 155, 157

  Wanyin Myoza, 169

  Waranaung, 266

  Warry, Mr., 40, 240-244, 283

  Washa, 284

  Welaung, 110, 111, 113

  Welôn, 83

  Wetherell, Mr., killed, 333

  Whenohs tribe, 322

  White, Major-General Sir George, describes military difficulties, 14;
    asks for reinforcements, 16;
    takes command, 18;
    Upper Burma subjugated, 18;
    consultation with Sir C. Crosthwaite, 29;
    question of helping Hsipaw, 50;
    meets Sir C. Crosthwaite, 65;
    on communications, 66;
    as administrator, 70;
    expedition against dacoits in Sagaing district, 71, 72;
    expedition into Shan States, 76, 77;
    preparations against Maung Tha Gyi, 85;
    trouble expected with the Wuntho Sawbwa, 92-94;
    despatch on casualties in the army, 98;
    equips the force for Mogaung expedition, 239;
    consultation with Sir C. Crosthwaite as to protection against
      Chins, 296;
    operations against Chins, 300-307

  White, Mr. Herbert Thirkell (now Sir H. T. White, K.C.S.I., late
      Lieut.-Governor of Burma), 46;
    sent with Colonel Stedman to open roads through Hsumhsai, 141, 142;
    deputation to Hsumhsai, 146

  Willcocks, Captain (now Lieut.-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G.,
    C.B., D.S.O.) intelligence officer, 329

  Williams, R.A., Lieutenant, Staff Officer to Captain Triscott, R.A., 240

  Wilson, R.N., Captain, Port Officer at Rangoon, 311

  Wolseley, C.B., Brigadier-General George (afterwards General Sir
    George Wolseley, C.B.), 283-286

  Wun, Governor of Kani, murdered, 33

  Wundwin, 60, 154

  Wunkadaw, ruler of Pakokku, and her son, the _Myo-thugyi_, 63, 92

  Wuntho Sawbwo (Shan chief), 30, 90-94, 281


  Y

  Yabon, 279

  Ya Hnit (chief of the Klanklangs), 334, 335

  Yahows, 322

  Yamèthin, 8, 61, 120

  Yangtze, Upper, 134

  Ya Nyun, dacoit leader, 98, 110;
    account of his doings, 111-113;
    surrenders, 114

  Yan Sin, dacoit leader, 83

  Yaw country, 32, 63, 290, 291, 295;
    river and valley, 292, 295

  Yawdwin, 329, 330, 336

  Yawlu, 319

  Yaw Mingyi, 111

  Yawnghwè or Burmese Nyaungywe, 137, 139, 142, 146-153;
    Sawbwa decorated, 124;
    assisted Colonel Symons, 194

  Yénangyaung, 27, 83, 84, 117, 118

  Yendus, 327, 329, 336

  Yen Shwèbo, 105

  Ye-u, 8, 31

  Yokwa tribe, 309, 317, 318, 332-334

  Yoma, Arakan-, 32;
    gangs, 117
    Pegu-, 32, 61, 116

  Yomas, 116, 120, 121

  Yunnan, 42, 75, 77, 133, 134, 143, 156

  Ywama, 320, 321;
    Klanklang Ywama, 334;
    Tashon, 320, 321

  Ywathit, 219


  Z

  Zédi, 260

  Zeittaung, 121

  Zimme (Chiengmai), 167


The Gresham Press,
UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED
WOKING AND LONDON.




      *      *      *      *      *      *




Transcriber's note:

Obvious errors of punctuation and diacritics were corrected.

Hyphen removed: Hnaw[-]waing (index entry), water[-]way (p. 244).

p. 83: "Yéuangyaung" changed to "Yénangyaung".

p. 100: "beginnng" changed to "beginning" (beginning to demand
attention).

pp. 117 (twice), 264: "Assistant Comissioner" changed to "Assistant
Commissioner".

p. 122: "measurer" changed to "measures" (stern measures of repression).

p. 123: "pacticable" changed to "practicable" (so far as was
practicable).

p. 133: "insigificant" changed to "insignificant" (with some
insignificant exceptions).

p. 136: "Nothern" changed to "Northern" (Northern Shan States).

p. 172: "Sang Ton Hon" changed to "San Ton Hon".

p. 177: "arrangments" changed to "arrangements" (made arrangements for
its progress).

p. 200: "occount" changed to "account" (on account of Sunday).

p. 220: "faily" changed to "fairly" (each of these posts were fairly
large).

p. 239: "equiqment" changed to "equipment" (Much care was given to the
composition and equipment).

p. 252: "peacable" changed to "peaceable" (our peaceable intentions).

p. 276: "enlightend" changed to "enlightened" (the example of more
enlightened princes).

pp. 303 (twice), 306: "Sagyilaings" changed to "Sagyilains".

p. 315 (fn): "rifle" changed to "rifles".

p. 322, index entry: "Mintèdaung" changed to "Minlèdaung".

p. 350, index entry for Nang Mya: "cheif" changed to "chief".

*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 45915 ***